Durham E-Theses

Policy and Populism: Explaining Support for the Radical Left in Contemporary Western Democracies

GOODGER, EDWARD,HARVEY,WILLIAM

How to cite:

GOODGER, EDWARD,HARVEY,WILLIAM (2021) *Policy and Populism: Explaining Support for the Radical Left in Contemporary Western Democracies*, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/14235/

Use policy

Durham University

Policy and Populism: Explaining Support for the Radical Left in Contemporary Western Democracies

Edward Goodger

Trevelyan College

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy: Government and International Affairs. Submitted January 2021.

<u>Declaration</u>

This thesis is the result of my own work. Material from the published or unpublished work of others which is used in the thesis is credited to the author in question in the text. The copyright of the thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without the author's written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.

Signed: E Goodger

Date: 10/08/2020

Abstract

Defined by stridently redistributionist economic policies that challenge mainstream economic norms in many Western democracies, radically left-wing political actors have risen to prominence in many such countries. Despite their newfound prominence, the radical left remains understudied relative to their radical right counterparts. In my voter-level analysis, I test two common explanations of radical left support. First, the '*policy-proximity*' account, which suggests radical left support is the result of proximity between voters and these actors on policy dimensions. I examine this with three plausibly relevant policy dimensions: economics, cultural policy, and migration policy. Second, the '*populism-based*' account, which suggests the radical left draws support from populist voters attracted by their challenge to established political parties.

I test both these accounts in three case studies: Germany, the US, and the UK. I draw upon survey data which includes voters' support for the radical left, their policy preferences on the policy dimensions, and their populist attitudes. Additionally, I use research designs which enable me to more confidently rule out 'persuasion effects' arising from pre-existing electoral support of voters. Furthermore, simultaneous examination of both the policy-proximity and populism-based accounts controls for possible confounding between them.

I find little evidence supporting the populism-based account in all three case studies. Policy-proximity results are more nuanced. German case findings generally conform with the policy-proximity account; however, I am least able to deal with persuasion effects here. I deal with persuasion effects more in the US case; however, US case findings commonly challenge the policy-proximity account. Finally, in the UK case I use panel data to rigorously deal with persuasion effects when examining changes in Labour Party support as this party shifts to the radical left under Jeremy Corbyn. I find that policy-proximity explains relative magnitude of shifts in Labour support but cannot explain pronounced positive shifts in this support across ideological groups. Overall, across the three cases, I find some support for the policy-proximity account; however, there are aspects of radical left support which policy-proximity does not explain. Consequently, future research is needed to continue to investigate support for these political actors.

<u>Acknowledgements</u>

First, I must offer sincere thanks to my supervisory team – Dr Nick Vivyan, Dr Gidon Cohen, and Dr Neil Visalvanich. It cannot have been easy to supervise me. There have been many occasions throughout reading, data processing, and writing which have varied from the bemusing to the frustrating. Yet throughout these eventualities, and commonly my resulting confusion, my supervisors have offered encouragement and positivity. Although my meetings with them would often set me out of heavy academic action for the rest of the day, I remain eternally grateful for their seemingly infinite patience.

Further thanks must also go more widely through the Durham politics department. In particular, to Professor Emma Murphy, who offered me much encouragement in the midst of academic setbacks and personal struggles. I am also grateful to staff in the wider department, including the CIPB academics for their advice and support. To my fellow politics researchers, I also offer thanks and the best of luck. Although I did not know many of you well, we have all been in the same introductory boat setting out into the vast ocean of academia together. Having shared this experience with you, I wish you all the best of luck with your remaining studies and for your futures.

Away from the department, I am also grateful to Philip Riley for proofreading my thesis. Reading through this thesis may have been challenging enough, even before his correction of my sometimes-wayward spelling. Nevertheless, I appreciate his reading this thesis, and the suggestions he made to improve readability.

I would also like to acknowledge Trevelyan College. I have been a proud and active member and resident of my college since September 2015, through six iterations of JCRs and MCRs. The people to thank here are numerous, and would make it impossible to keep to my self-imposed one-page limit for this section. But they include members of all common rooms and staff who have formed a vast patchwork of wonderful memories for me. Notably my fellow PhD students, including Yasmin Ilkhani and Fliss McDowall, deserve thanks for their relatable challenges and relentless encouragement. Also, a special mention to Wan Aiman Azmi – a fellow politics nerd whose constant interest in my research helped convince me it was truly worth pursuing.

I am also immensely grateful to my family for supporting me throughout. They could have easily opposed my pursuit of a PhD, or pushed for me to finally enter the world of regular employment. But they allowed me to persist and willed me on to pursue this research. I love you all, although I don't tell you that nearly enough.

Lastly, I would like to thank my girlfriend, Alice Naylor. Obvious thanks are due here, for putting up with me both inside and outside of work. Voting and elections remain uninteresting to you, despite my efforts to enthuse about this subject. Even through the darkest moments of this PhD, I had you to turn to. You always responded with reassurance and support, so without you this project may never have even made it to paper.

My gratitude to all the above, both the named and unnamed, is truly immense. Without you all the screaming, shouting, and the manic laughter that seem to make up the average PhD would surely have all been for naught.

Table of Contents

List of Figures:

Chapter 2 - Theory:

Chapter 4 – Germany Case Study:

List of Abbreviations:

AfD – Alternative für Deutschland

ANES – American National Election Studies

BES – British Election Study

CCES – Cooperative Congressional Election Study

CDU/CSU – Christlich Demokratische Union/ Christlich-Soziale Union

FDP - Freie Demokratische Partei

GLES – German Longitudinal Election Study

IU - Izquierda Unida

KKE – Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas

ND - Néa Dimokratía

PASOK – Panellenio Sosialistiko Kinema

PC – Plaid Cymru

PDS - Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus

PVV – Partij voor de Vrijheid

SNP – Scottish National Party

SP – Socialistische Partij

SPD – Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands

SYRIZA – Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás - Proodeftikí Symmachía

UKIP – United Kingdom Independence Party

<u>Introduction</u>

Although opinion is divided on whether left-wing challenges to established politics are a positive development (Forrester, 2019), or a threat to liberal democracy (Holmes, 2017; Kagan, 2019), there can be little doubt that in recent years these challenges have occurred. In Germany, *Die Linke* continues to be a prominent electoral force despite ties to the discredited government of East Germany (Doerschler & Banaszak, 2007; Campbell, 2018). In the United States, the 2016 presidential candidacy of Senator Bernie Sanders triggered an ongoing debate about the future of the Democratic Party (Edsall, 2019). In the United Kingdom, the established Labour Party veered away from convergence, and outwardly challenged economic norms while under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn (Maigaushca & Dean, 2019; Watts & Bale, 2018). Further examples also exist, including the rise of *SYRIZA* in Greece at the expense of the more moderate *PASOK* (Mudde, 2017; Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014), the rise of *Podemos* in Spain to come third in national elections (Ramiro & Gomez, 2016; Kioupkiolis, 2016), and the fall of the more moderate *Parti Socialiste* in France with support moving to the more radical *La France Insoumise* (Hanley, 2017).

What unites these challenges from the left is strident economic policies including opposition towards fiscal austerity, deregulation, and lower taxes. Those policies are ones accepted, to varying extents, by both centre right and centre left political actors. In contrast, these left-wing challengers promote higher taxes – particularly on wealthy individuals and on businesses – public ownership, stronger economic regulation, and higher government spending (March, 2008; 2012; Roca, et al., 2017). In contrast to the established centre-left's acceptance of economic norms including low taxes and austerity, this 'radical left' challenges economic policy convergence. My thesis focuses on this radical left, and asks *what explains support for radical left political actors in contemporary Western democracies?*

This research question is important, because a large number of countries have seen their long-established parties challenged by the radical left. It is therefore important to investigate *why* these radical left challengers have received such high – sometimes surprisingly high – levels of electoral support. Perhaps this radical left support is explained by voters being more radical than previously assumed, or maybe this support arises from a backlash against established

politics. Thus, not only does investigating radical left support tell us about these increasingly prominent political actors, it potentially also offers wider insights into the state of electoral politics in Western democracies. In response to the greater prominence of these radical left actors, I investigate where their support has come from.

However, despite the radical left's recent breakthroughs and new prominence, there has not been a great deal of research into the support they have received. In comparison with the radical right, where there is a large field of research stretching back well into the twentieth century, research on the radical left is relatively new, and most existing research here has focused on their ideology and policies. This existing research is important, especially as it has identified the radical left's economic policy challenge to their converged counterparts, and defined these political actors based on this (March, 2008; 2012, Roca, et al., 2017). Most of this existing radical left literature is 'party-level' research, where radical left parties themselves are the unit of analysis. Further examples of this include research which has categorised these political actors (Gomez, et al., 2016), shown how they have evolved historically (March & Mudde, 2005), identified other ideological features of the radical left (Charalambous, 2011; McGowan & Keith, 2016), and separated them from their more extreme counterparts (March, 2008). Although important and useful, these party-level contributions do not explore reasons why the radical left receives voters' support. To examine the motivations behind radical left support, my thesis differs from these party-level accounts by taking a 'voter-level' direction.

Voter-level research on the radical left is so far relatively uncommon, but there have been recent efforts by political scientists to study which voters support radical left political actors and why. For example, through consideration of populism (Akkerman, et al., 2014), of the impacts of both policy preferences and populism (Akkerman, et al., 2017), and the roles of nativist and redistributionist policy preferences (Rooduijn, et al., 2017), on support for both the radical right and the radical left. My thesis builds on and complements this recent research, examining a new range of empirical cases and using diverse research designs to investigate mechanisms which potentially underpin radical left support.

Early commentary on the emerging radical left suggested they were too ideologically extreme to be electorally competitive (Cowley, 2017; Jones, 2016; Jones, 2017; Freedland, 2017; Cohen, 2017); however, contrary to these initial assessments they have received substantial electoral

support. This unexpected success raises an interesting question: are voters more left-wing, or become more left-wing, than originally thought? If this is the case, voters may be more receptive, or have become more receptive, to the radical left's policies. This would then suggest voters support the radical left based on their own policy preferences. This leads me to one of the theories which I test in this thesis – the policy-proximity account.

This account is built on the highly established spatial theory of voting, which suggests that levels of proximity between voters and political actors in policy spaces explains electoral support (Downs, 1957). Under this account, voter policy-proximity with the radical left determines their support for these political actors. However, existing literature drawing upon that theory has not generally considered how voter policy preferences are potentially the result of 'persuasion'. For example, in relation to the radical left, voters' pre-existing support for a radical left actor may cause them to alter their policy preferences. In this scenario, radical left support from these voters would be the cause of, rather than the consequence of policy-proximity, and thus not conform with the spatial theory of voting (Brody & Page, 1972). An important contribution I make in this thesis is consideration for and isolation of these 'persuasion effects' when testing how far policy-proximity explains support for the radical left.

I analyse the impacts of policy-proximity on three policy dimensions. Economic policy defines the radical left and separates them from their competitors. Consequently, it is plausible that spatial proximity with voters on an economic policy dimension may explain support for the radical left. Under the policy-proximity theory, this would mean observing support for the radical left from voters in close proximity with these political actors on an economic policy dimension. This would also mean voters who are not in proximity with the radical left here would be less supportive of them. Aside from economics alone, it may also be on other policy dimensions that levels of proximity with voters explains radical left support. Voters may be more concerned with non-economic policy instead, which leads me to consider the potential impacts of proximity on cultural and migration policy, and whether this explains support for the radical left. Previous research connecting migration policy with radical left actors (McGowan & Keith, 2016), and the post-materialism thesis of Inglehart (1971) drawing out 'cultural policy' relating to individual rights, motivate my consideration of these two non-

economic dimensions. Additionally, research into radical right support has found these two non-economic dimensions to be important to voters, and to explain support for radical right actors (Kitschelt & McGann, 1995; Kitschelt & Rehm, 2014). A further contribution my thesis makes is through testing whether levels of proximity with voters on these two non-economic policy dimensions also explains radical left support. In brief, what I mean by 'migration policy' is voter preferences regarding the place of migrants within a country. By 'cultural policy', I am referring to preferences around broad social and personal rights – such as drugs policies, law and order beliefs, and attitudes towards LGBT rights and abortion.

The second theoretical explanation I examine in this thesis is whether voter populism explains support for radical left actors. Populism itself is defined by its appeal to the 'ordinary/'pure people' versus a 'corrupt elite' group (Mudde, 2007). For example, the Dutch radical left's call to voters with 'Vote Against!' as their election slogan, while attacking political elites as 'neo-liberal Ayatollahs' (March & Mudde, 2005, p. 35). Similar populism has been observed from numerous other instances of the radical left (March & Mudde, 2005, pp. 35-36), leaving this a common (although not necessarily ubiquitous) feature of these political actors.

Populism has featured as a theory of electoral support in numerous accounts of the radical right in the past, and has been found in previous research to explain support for both the radical right and the radical left in the Netherlands (Akkerman, et al., 2014; 2017). There is the possibility that voters who adhere to this 'people' versus 'elite' dichotomy – and who therefore hold more populist attitudes – would be supportive of the radical left as a result of the anti-elite rhetoric of those political actors. This possibility leads me to also test the populism-based account, and how far this explains radical left support.

This briefly explains the two potential explanations of radical left support that I examine in this thesis. My simultaneous consideration of both these theories is itself important as a contribution to existing literature which has generally not tested the two alongside each other. Both of these accounts potentially confound one another, meaning my consideration of both accounts allows me to examine the distinct roles of each on radical left support.

I test these theoretical accounts via three quantitative case studies, looking at support for *Die Linke* in Germany, the 2016 Sanders presidential campaign in the US, and the UK Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn. In contrast to existing research in this field (Mudde, 2017; Doerschler

& Banaszak, 2007; Akkerman, et al., 2017; Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014), I do not focus purely on radical left political *parties*. The German case involves examining support for a 'classic' radical left party, but the US and UK case studies focus on actors rather than long-established radical left political parties. The US case study focuses on a radical left candidate in an intra-party primary election. The UK case study looks at an established political party which shifted to the radical left specifically upon the election of Jeremy Corbyn as party leader.

These three case studies represent an original and valuable contribution to existing research. Fundamentally, these cases greatly expand the scope and consequently the relevance of my thesis by testing the theories across three case studies. The breadth and depth provided by my thesis thus contrasts with previous voter-level radical left research that has often focused on a more limited range of cases (for example, Akkerman et al. 2014; 2017). Furthermore, this is a new combination of case studies, meaning my thesis brings voter-level analysis of radical left support to new contexts.

There are also specific features within these cases which allow me to better deal with alternative explanations of radical left support, including the persuasion effects issue I highlighted earlier. In particular, it is important that the US and UK case studies are not long-established radical left parties, which are more likely to occur in a multiparty context (for example, *Die Linke* in Germany). The US and UK radical left not being long-established actors, like *Die Linke*, allows me to better isolate policy-proximity and populism effects in both of those cases. This is because, without that established radical left party, it is less likely that US/UK voters have prior support for or attachments to the radical left in these cases. This then mitigates persuasion of voters' policy preferences and populist attitudes based on pre-existing radical left support/attachments. Fundamentally, the diversity between these three case studies, including examining support for a longstanding radical left actor in the multiparty German context versus looking at support for the emerging radical left in the US and UK cases, is a strength of my analysis. It is a strength because in my research I take analysis of radical left support to new and under-studied contexts, thus broadening previous examination of support for these actors.

In each of my three case studies, I examine the extent to which individual voters' support for a radical left actor can be explained by variation in respondent-actor ideological proximity on economic left-right, cultural liberal-conservative, and migration inclusive-exclusive dimensions, and by variation in respondent populist attitudes. I do this in all three cases thanks to survey data which includes measures of radical left support, of policy preferences on three dimensions, and of populist attitudes.

Across all three case studies, I do not consistently find highly populist voters to be more supportive of the radical left. Thus, results in my thesis do not support the populism-based account. Turning attention to policy-proximity results, in the Germany case study results generally conform with the policy-proximity account. In particular, on the economic policy dimension, where I find both increased radical left support from proximal voters and decreased support from spatially-distant voters. However, the nature of *Die Linke* as a long-established and prominent political party meant I could not thoroughly separate its possible persuasion effects from voters' policy preferences and populism. This brought me to the US case study, where the intra-party nature of the radical left actor controlled for one likely persuasion effect: partisan attachments. Although I find greater radical left support based on economic policy-proximity, US case results generally did not conform with the policy-proximity account. I find a curvilinear pattern of radical left support, with spatially-distant voters on all three policy dimensions more supportive of the radical left – contrary to expectations. Finally, in the UK case I exploited panel data to rigorously deal with persuasion effects. Relative to the policy-proximity account's expectations, I find mixed results. Challenging this account, I find a general increase in radical left support including from spatially-distant voters. However, looking at magnitudes of these increases in radical left support, I find these to be higher from the more proximal voters, which suggests there is some policy-proximity effect on radical left support here. That leads me to conclude limited observation of this account in the UK case study.

In sum, I take two established theories of support, which previously featured in radical right research, operationalise these in the context of three cases, and test their ability to explain electoral support for the radical left in each case. Results in these three cases do not entirely conform with either account. However, I find limited evidence of policy-proximity explaining

radical left support. Furthermore, I find this after greater consideration for persuasion effects, and in a new combination of case studies. Lack of evidence in favour of the populism-based account suggests the rise of the radical left's support is not the product of a populist backlash against established political parties. Meanwhile, radical left support does seem to reflect policy appeals of these political actors, with this seen not based on just economic policy alone but also on cultural and migration policy. However, policy-proximity on the three dimensions does not comprehensively explain support for the radical left – as demonstrated with some unexpected observations of radical left support from spatially-distant voters. I have found policy-proximity only partially explains radical left support. Further research is needed to continue to explain this phenomenon, and that research needs to look beyond traditional spatial accounts. I discuss a few potential alternative explanations for future exploration in the conclusion of this thesis.

Thesis Structure

To address the question of explaining support for the radical left, my thesis proceeds as follows.

Chapter 1 includes discussion of existing literature. I argue in this chapter that support for radical political actors has been associated with proximity on economic, cultural, and migration policy and based on populist attitudes in previous research. The radical right and radical left do not share all characteristics. For example, differing in their policy emphasis: the radical right focusing on opposition towards immigration, and the radical left on economics. Furthermore, they differ in terms of their cultural policies: the radical left being more liberal, and the radical right more authoritarian and conservative. But the radical right and radical left are similar in the way they challenge their more moderate counterparts: centre right and centre left political actors, respectively. Their similar position as political challengers suggests that insights from radical right studies, including the roles of policy-proximity and populism, may also explain support for the radical left. I also review existing research on radical left actors, showing how this has primarily focused on the policy positions taken by these actors. I also discuss the limited previous voter-level research into radical left support here. I draw attention to gaps in this existing literature, including the lack of consideration for both policy-proximity and populism.

In Chapter 2, I present the two main theoretical accounts I examine in this thesis. I discuss the theory behind the policy-proximity account first, including the idea of a voters' 'ideal point' in a policy space, and levels of utility voters associate with different policy positions taken by political actors. From this, I draw out the three policy dimensions considered under the policy-proximity account in my thesis, and state the broad expectation that voters in proximity with the radical left on these dimensions will be more supportive of these political actors. I then set out the populism-based theory, linking back to the definition of populism in the literature review, and highlighting the anti-elite policies of the radical left. I then examine whether support for the radical left is greater among individuals who exhibit higher levels of populist sentiment.

In Chapter 3 I explain the research methods practised in the final three chapters of the thesis. The overall purpose of the first half of Chapter 3 is to explain and justify the overall methodological approach in my thesis. I explain the regression models which feature in this thesis, with indication of how I include spatial and populism variables in these regressions. In the second half of this chapter, I focus on the case studies, including their respective roles. I discuss the 'classic' German case study in the context of its established nature, which makes it difficult to disentangle the potential persuasion effects of *Die Linke* on voters' policy preferences and populism. The US and UK cases arise in response to this, making important strides to deal with potential persuasion effects. In the final part of Chapter 3, I justify why other radical left case studies do not feature in my thesis, drawing particular attention to inadequate data in these cases.

I then proceed to the empirical case studies. This includes the German case study in Chapter 4, the US case study in Chapter 5, and finally the UK case study in Chapter 6. Focus in these cases is on *Die Linke*, the 2016 Sanders presidential campaign, and the Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn, respectively. These three chapters all follow broadly the same format, with focus first on contextualising the radical left political actor, before a shift to case-specific methodology, theoretical expectations, then results.

Following the empirical chapters, I conclude this thesis. In that conclusion, I summarise my findings and discuss their implications. Those implications reflect on each of the three case studies, and on both the policy-proximity and populism-based accounts. Results lead me to

conclude partial explanation of radical left support based on voter-actor policy-proximity on the economic, cultural, and migration policy dimensions. Finally, I offer some potential avenues for future research, which may build off my thesis to find further factors which explain support for the radical left in contemporary Western democracies.

Chapter 1: Literature Review

1.0: Introduction

In this chapter, I discuss literature relating to the spatial theory of voting, and populism as an explanatory factor of electoral support. Part of this discussion includes literature on support for and the appeal of radical right political actors, and crucially how this radical right research could inform study of radical left support. The first three sections of this chapter are focused on the underlying spatial and populism-based theories: the first looking at previous research linking economic policy-proximity with electoral support, the second focusing on literature showing roles of cultural and migration policy-proximity, and the third directed at existing literature on populism and its role in electoral support. In the fourth and final part of this chapter I discuss some further contributions to existing radical left research, including my simultaneous consideration of both policy-proximity and populism, and examining radical left support via evaluation questions.

1.1: Economics and Radical Left Support

To draw out economic policy-proximity as a potential explanatory factor of radical left support, I focus first on existing literature which has indicated economic policy as the defining characteristic of the radical left. In this first sub-section, I show what the economic policies emanating from the radical left are, which also leads into delineation of the radical left from their 'Centre Left' and 'Extreme Left' rivals. I then turn attention to the second part of this section, where previous research has demonstrated economic policy preferences to be important to understanding support for radical left political actors.

It is vital to understand what is meant by the radical left in my thesis. For this purpose, I adopt a minimal definition, capturing the key general point of differentiation between radical left actors and other political actors. This definition defines the radical left as *challengers towards contemporary capitalist economic norms within their respective context*. Note the consideration of the contexts of radical left political actors. Thus, two radical left actors in two different countries may offer different policies, but both offer policies that challenge contemporary capitalist economic norms in their respective countries. I draw this minimal definition from existing literature – in particular 'party-level' research. The term 'party-level' refers to the focus on the policies proposed by political actors, but also their leadership and levels of organisation. Opposing the party-level is the 'voter-level', which instead focuses on the factors which cause individual voters to support the actor.

The language of 'contemporary capitalist economic norms' alludes to economic policies which are often branded as 'neo-liberal' (March, 2008; March & Rommerskirchen, 2015). In party-level research, Luke March identifies the radical left's opposition towards 'neo-liberal marketization and trade liberalisation promoted by the Euro-Atlantic financial institutions' – the so called 'Washington Consensus' being its other moniker (March, 2012, p. 6). Economics-based accounts define neo-liberalism as espousing the deregulation of business and finance in favour of the 'free market', privatisation of public services, reductions in state social spending, opposition towards trade unions, and reduced taxes on the rich and corporations, among other policies (Kotz, 2009, p. 307).[1]

The radical left are opposed to these contemporary capitalist economic norms, and are instead found to promote 'collective economic and social rights' in response to economic inequality (March, 2012, p. 9). Furthermore, the radical left's opposition towards austerity and support for redistributive tax-and-spend policies are other economic policies from radical left political actors, according to March (March, 2012, p. 8; March & Mudde, 2005), and further demonstrate their opposition towards contemporary economic norms. Specific examples of the radical left's economic policies include anti-corporate attitudes from the Dutch radical left (March,

---

[1] Some features of radical left's economic policies also shared by radical right. In particular, protectionism (Mudde, 2007, pp. 125-128).

2012, p. 130), and the promotion of redistributive taxation, a higher mandatory minimum wage, and a shorter working week from the German radical left (March, 2012, p. 124).

It is also important to consider the context of these radical left economic policies. An example to illustrate this is the US radical left. Part of the appeal of Bernie Sanders in his 2016 presidential campaign was his proposal for single-payer healthcare (Gordon, 2016). This policy is mainstream in Europe, accepted by the right and the left, but in the US it represents a radical proposal which even the Democratic Party has been reluctant to accept (Brownstein, 2019).

In Europe too, context plays a role when identifying the radical left. The context of Eastern Europe is one of Soviet Communism, which still has a legacy that permeates into the modern radical left in this region. For example, the radical left in Eastern Europe has been slow to embrace pro-European and environmentalist policies. Furthermore, East European radical left political actors remain more conservative in terms of cultural policy, and Leninist in terms of their internal culture and organisation (March, 2012, pp. 92-93).

Context is important to identifying the radical left political actor in the US. It is also important when explaining variance in the radical left across Europe. The minimal definition of the radical left is therefore explicit that what exactly constitutes a radical left stance depends on a country's political context. Something which is relevant to this point about context is the time period under investigation in my research. I examine radical left support in the 2015-2017 period. During this period there were many prominent radical left actors offering stridently anti-austerity and pro-redistribution economic policies. I discuss this time period more in the research design chapter of my thesis.

To further illustrate what is meant by the radical left, I contrast these political actors with their centre left counterparts. The radical right's policies have been indicated to be radicalisations of mainstream right-wing beliefs, such as authoritarianism and nativism (Mudde, 2010). Similarly, the radical left have been said to radicalise mainstream left-wing beliefs like egalitarianism and internationalism, with more strident policies in these areas from radical left political actors compared to those offered by their centre left counterparts (March, 2012, p. 9).

By looking at their relationships with egalitarianism, I also separate the radical left from their centre left counterparts. This is a principle shared across left-wing politics, but egalitarianism is promoted to varying extents between the manifestos of centre left and radical left political actors. To demonstrate this variance, I look to the manifestos of the German radical left *Die Linke* versus that of their centre left opponents – the *SPD*. *Die Linke*'s manifesto is committed towards 'equality of all persons' – a statement combined with tax increases intended at 'reducing the extreme inequality and concentration of private wealth' (*Die Linke*, 2011, p. 34; p. 41). This commitment is further galvanised by section 5 of the party's 2017 election manifesto, declaring 'Inequality is Unsocial' before offering vociferously redistributionist policies: including financial transaction tax, higher taxes on the wealthy and corporations, and higher taxes on large inheritances (Die Linke, 2017, pp. 37-39). In contrast, the *SPD*'s manifesto makes commitments not to economic equality of outcomes, but rather offers 'equal opportunities for women and men' (*SPD*, 2009, p. 5), combined with fewer material commitments around taxation and equivocation on opposition towards austerity (*SPD*, 2009, p. 26). Furthermore, the *SPD*'s 2017 manifesto's overtures towards equality primarily focus on social inequality, including gender and racial equality, rather than economic inequality and the wealth redistribution offered by *Die Linke* (SPD, 2017).

The radical left is also separated from the centre left by their different attitudes towards the contemporary capitalist economic norms of their particular contexts. Remember I discussed these norms earlier, with these including policies like lower taxation, reduced government spending, privatisations, and promotion of the free market. In brief, the centre left accepts these contemporary capitalist economic norms, but the radical left reject them and instead propose 'root and branch systemic change of capitalism' (March, 2008, p. 3).

More specifically, on the issue of these contemporary capitalist economic norms the position of the centre left is one of convergence in the 2015-2017 period of my investigation. Centre left political actors converged with right-wing political actors, becoming more ideologically alike, and aligning themselves with these same economic norms. For example, in Germany the *SPD* shifted to the right in the 1980s and 1990s, and in the UK the Labour Party also became more right-wing over roughly the same period. They both converged to accept these 'neo-liberal' economic policies (Turner & Green, 2007). The radical left, on the other hand, rejected

convergence, and tried to fill the vacuum left by the increasingly moderate centre left (Abedi, 2002). Therefore, I distinguish the radical left from the centre left by their different attitudes towards these contemporary capitalist economic norms.

Overall, the radical left differs from the centre left by the former's rejection of 'neo-liberal' economic policies, with the latter embracing them. The radical left's economic policies lean pro-state, advocating a limited role of private enterprise (March, 2012, p. 16). They are vehemently anti-austerity, instead supporting increased taxation on the wealthy and businesses, and favouring increases in public spending and workers' rights (March, 2012, p. 124). All of this presents a challenge to this 'neo-liberal' economics of lower taxes, deregulation, and reduced government spending.

I have shown what distinguishes the radical left from the centre left, but what distinguishes the radical left from the extreme left? The terms 'extreme right' and 'radical right' have sometimes been synonymous with each other, wrongly according to Mudde (2010, p. 1168). In my thesis, like the research of Luke March, the radical left is also considered separate from the extreme left (March, 2008). I separate the extreme left from the radical left in two ways: by their attitudes towards capitalism, and their attitudes towards democracy.

The role of democracy separating the extreme left from the radical left is an area where I draw upon literature on the right. Attitudes towards democracy also separate the radical right from the extreme right, according to Mudde (2010). Extremism is considered the antithesis of democracy (Backes, 1989); however, the definition of democracy in this context is a matter of some debate. A minimal definition of representative democracy as 'an institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realises the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will' (Schumpeter, 1949, p. 250) would suggest that extremism is a rejection of popular sovereignty.

When separating the extreme right from the radical right, Mudde takes a more specific definition of democracy. There is the more basic, procedural idea of democracy, where people vote for representatives in elections. The radical right are not opposed to this, but the extreme right are critical of democracy even at its base, procedural level (Mudde, 2010). Above this is *liberal* democracy, which includes protection of minorities and individual rights. The radical

right are opposed to *liberal* democracy, via their plebiscitarian and authoritarian appeals (Mudde, 2007, p. 157).

The radical and extreme left's relationship with democracy is similar to that of the radical and extreme right. At the procedural level, the extreme left reject the idea of compromise with "bourgeois" political actors, including social democracy, and support extra-parliamentary action (March, 2008, p. 3). In contrast to the extreme left, the radical left accept democracy at the procedural level, but combine this with belief in political reform and inclusion of marginalised groups into the political system. Through belief in these reforms, the radical left are supportive of liberal democracy, in contrast to the extreme left (March, 2012, p. 18).

The extreme left's attitudes towards capitalism are again more hard-line than those of the radical left. The radical left are defined by their challenge towards the contemporary capitalist economic norms of their particular context, but this does not extend to a belief in abolishing capitalism entirely. A systemic change of capitalism is what the radical left advocate, not supporting a planned economy but rather a mixed one, with private ownership confined to small and medium-sized enterprises (March, 2008, p. 3). In contrast, the extreme left's position is one of outright rejection of capitalism, including their complete opposition towards most market enterprise (March, 2008, p. 3).

In sum, existing literature separates the radical left from the extreme left. The radical left are challengers towards contemporary capitalist economic norms, separating them from the centre left which converged and accepted these economic norms. But the radical left and the extreme left differ over attitudes towards democracy and capitalism from the extreme left, with the extreme left more hostile towards both.

To help clarify what is meant by the radical left, I offer three example political actors – one centre left, one radical left, and one extreme left. All three compete in a single context – Greece. I will cite literature discussing these three Greek left-wing political actors – the centre left (*PASOK*), the extreme left (*KKE*), and the radical left (*SYRIZA*) – to show the differences between them all. The ultimate purpose here is to illustrate the separation of the radical left from the centre left and extreme left.

In terms of attitudes towards democracy, the *KKE* are adherents of 'democratic centralism' instead (Doukas, 1991). Under this Leninist practice, political decisions are taken by the party's members, rather than by the public. Furthermore, the *KKE* state their opposition towards 'hypocritical bourgeois parliamentary democracy', stating instead 'Direct and indirect democracy is based on the workers' assembly' (KKE Central Committee, 2017). In contrast to the *KKE*, *SYRIZA* in their 2015 Thessaloniki Programme do not state opposition to the current electoral and parliamentary democracy in Greece, merely proposing reforms to introduce and empower democratic institutions, for example via greater economic autonomy (SYRIZA, 2015). Similarly, *PASOK* do not state opposition towards electoral or parliamentary democracy in Greece, with overtures instead to uphold extant political institutions in Greece (PASOK, 2019).

On the subject of economic policies, there are stark differences between the *KKE* and *PASOK*. Greek efforts to join the Eurozone led to a shift by established political parties, like *PASOK*, to embrace contemporary capitalist economic norms, including privatisation and spending restraint (Moschonas, 2001). The result was this political actor converging with the centre right *ND*, gradually becoming a centre left social democratic party (Tsakalotos, 1998). In particular, through acceptance of austerity measures in the early 2010s. The extreme left economic policies of the *KKE* include rejection of globalisation and neo-liberal economics, but most of all a wholesale rejection of capitalism. The *KKE* reject free market economics, saying this is undesirable for working class Greeks. Instead, the *KKE* pushed needs-based wages, provision for the unemployed, and the creation of agricultural cooperatives (Keith & Charalambous, 2016).

SYRIZA fits between both the converged *PASOK* and the anti-capitalist *KKE* in terms of economic policies. *SYRIZA*'s economic policies present opposition towards austerity, akin to the *KKE* and in contrast to *PASOK* (Mudde, 2017). *SYRIZA*'s policies also included significant spending commitments in the Thessaloniki Programme, proposing meal subsidies, taxes on large properties, a housing guarantee, and free electricity, amongst other spending promises (SYRIZA, 2015). However, *SYRIZA*'s policies do not extend to the rejection of capitalism in its entirety, with further separation from the *KKE* through the latter's Euroscepticism (Verney, 2011).

Literature discussing these three left-wing political actors has separated them from each other. The radical left reject 'neo-liberal' capitalist economic policies supported by the converged centre left, such as deregulation and lower taxes. But their rejection of these policies is not pursued to the extent of the extreme left's support for dismantling this economic system entirely. Nor does it profess an uprooting of democratic institutions, instead proposing reforms to existing institutions. Furthermore, the radical left offers a radicalisation of mainstream left-wing values, like internationalism and egalitarianism, pressing these values more forcefully compared to the tacit support offered for them by the centre left (March, 2008; 2012; March & Mudde, 2005; Boldrini, 2018).

1.1.2: Economic Policy and Support for the Radical Left

Party-level research was important to my separation of the extreme and centre left from the radical left. This party-level research has also looked at the radical left's shift away from Communism (March, 2012; March & Mudde, 2005), and examined environmentalist ideology emanating from 'left-libertarian' parties (Kitschelt, 1988). Research has also tried to categorise the non-mainstream left, based on their differing ideologies and where they draw support from (March, 2008; Gomez et al., 2016). Ideology has also been the focus of other research, drawing attention to the radical left's anti-austerity policies (Roca, et al., 2017), and how Euroscepticism is a common feature among these political actors (Charalambous, 2011).

These party-level accounts define the radical left based on their economic ideology. But is it that economic ideology that drives voters to support radical left political actors? To look further into this question, I now turn to discuss voter-level research that connects voters' economic policy preferences with radical left support.

One example of radical left literature which considered economic policy preferences comes from Visser et al. (2014), who conducted voter-level research considering both demand-side factors (e.g. occupation, education, policy preferences) alongside country-level factors (e.g. unemployment rate, GDP, authoritarian legacy). Across results from 32 European countries, and 175,000 respondents, this research concluded support for income redistribution as the main determinant of support for radical left ideologies.

Note that Visser et al.'s research did not consider support for radical left political actors, but instead looked at voters' self-identified adherence with radical left ideology. What Visser et. al. effectively found was an association between voters supporting income redistribution and voters identifying themselves as radically left-wing. That identification with radical left ideology may be associated with support for radical left political actors, but Visser et al. did not explore this. My focus on voters' support for radical left political actors means I do examine whether this is associated with economic policy preferences. This may be the case, particularly under the spatial theory of voting where these left-wing voters are in proximity and thus assumed to be supportive of the radical left political actor. However, it may also not be the case. Instead, it may be non-economic ideological considerations which determine support for the radical left. My thesis investigates this further.

Economic policy preferences have featured in further research on radical left support. Previous voter-level research, utilising survey data, considered factors behind the varying success of 39 radical left political parties, across 34 European countries (March & Rommerskirchen, 2015). This research found economic attitudes, in particular feelings of insecurity arising from unemployment and opposition towards a more globalised economy, to be important to explaining support for the radical left. Other factors were also linked with radical left support here, including high Euroscepticism, and previous radical left success. Competition from Green and radical right parties, and presence of electoral thresholds, were found to impede radical left support (March & Rommerskirchen, 2015, p. 48).

In addition to this, further research demonstrates links between radical left support and economic policy preferences. In a case study of the German radical left *Die Linke*, again utilising survey data, economic attitudes were associated with support for this political party (Bowyer & Vail, 2011). Support for *Die Linke* was associated with concerns over economic inequality, and support for government intervention to reduce such disparities. This research also shows that economic policy preferences of voters have a greater role in support for the radical left than both demographic factors and general ideological left-right positioning (p. 699). However, Bowyer and Vail do not consider other non-economic ideological determinants of support for this radical left political actor, such as cultural and migration

policy preferences. Nor do they weigh the possible impact on radical left support of non-ideological factors.

Bowyer and Vail built on previous research from Doerschler and Banaszak (2007), who used survey data to investigate support for *Die Linke's* predecessor – the *PDS* – finding this was associated with ideological beliefs of voters again relating specifically to economics (Doerschler & Banaszak, 2007). This research examined four factors and how they related to vote choices in a hypothetical election. Those four factors were economic and political evaluations, East German identity, identification as the 'losers of unification', and ideological beliefs. Of these four factors, only the ideological beliefs of voters, with economic policy preferences being the focus here, were significantly associated with support for the radical left *PDS* (Doerschler & Banaszak, 2007, p. 366).

The research of Bowyer and Vail, Doerschler and Banaszak, and March and Rommerskirchen all examine support for long-established radical left political parties, based on economic policy. However, an issue arises from this, which I refer to as 'persuasion effects'. To expand on this, there is uncertainty over whether voters first form their policy preferences and are then drawn to support the political actor in closest proximity with these views, or whether voters decide to vote for a political actor for whatever reason and then mould their policy preferences after the actor they become attached to. This is an issue raised in other research looking at support based on policy-proximity, which raised the idea that voters may be 'persuaded' to alter their policy preferences to conform with those of a political actor they have already decided to support for whatever reason (Brody & Page, 1972, p. 457).

In relation to the radical left specifically, voters may have previously decided to support the radical left actor, and subsequently altered their policy preferences specifically to match this actor. Populist attitudes of voters may also be subject to persuasion effects. Brody and Page state that persuasion is the effect of, rather than the cause of, candidate evaluations (Brody & Page, 1972, p. 457). Radical left support from persuaded voters is not the product of policy-proximity or populism. Therefore, to truly understand the causal effects of policy-proximity and populism on radical left support, I need to isolate possible persuasion effects of these actors. From that I can more accurately draw out the roles of both accounts on radical left support.

Crucially, that research which identified support for the radical left based on voters' economic policy preferences did not consider potential impacts of persuasion effects. Consequently, the associations they identified may not be the result of economic policy-proximity, but of pre-existing support for a radical left and resulting persuasion effects instead. An important contribution my research makes to existing literature is by dealing with persuasion when testing how policy-proximity explains radical left support.

Some existing voter-level research on radicals does consider and control for some persuasion effects, in a limited capacity. For example, party ID control variables account for how partisan attachments impact on electoral support, with these appearing in some existing research on the radical right (Arzheimer, 2008, and on populist political actors (van Hauwert & van Kessel, 2018). However, if voters' policy preferences, for example, are measured after they have potentially come to identify with a political actor, then their policy preferences would have the effects of party identification incorporated into them. This means controls on party ID would not remove the potential persuasion effect of this variable on voter policy preferences.

One of the suggested ways to control persuasion effects is with panel data (Brody & Page, 1972, p. 458). Much of the existing voter-level research into support for radicals bases its analysis off cross-sectional instead of panel data. However, panel data involves asking questions to a sample of voters over time, with their responses observable across multiple waves of data. This means with panel data there is the potential to draw measurement of voter policy preferences and populism from before a political actor's radical leftism becomes evident. Consequently, voters' policy preferences and populist attitudes would be separated from potential persuasion effects arising from a radical left political actor.

More thorough consideration of persuasion effects, compared to existing literature, is one of the contributions of my thesis. I explain the ways I address this issue further in Chapter 3 of my thesis.

I have supplied evidence which suggests that voters' economic policy preferences may determine radical left support. However, there are a number of gaps in existing research in this area. The persuasion effects issue is one, but another is the common lack of additional consideration for non-economic policy preferences and how these impact on radical left support.

An exception to this is the research of Rooduijn et al. (2017), which considered economic and non-economic policy preferences alongside each other when explaining support for the radical left. This voter-level research focused on the differences between radical right and radical left voters. Rooduijn et al. found that radical right supporters and radical left supporters differed in their economic and non-economic attitudes. Specifically, supporters of the radical right and radical left were distinguished by different attitudes towards egalitarianism, altruism, and support for government promotion of equality, with the radical left embracing these and the radical right eschewing them (Rooduijn, et al., 2017). Note the economic nature of these attitudes, particularly over equality and a redistributive role of government. But accompanying these attitudes was also consideration for non-economic preferences, Euroscepticism, and nativism, finding that attitudes in these areas also differentiated support for the radical left from the radical right.

Rooduijn et al.'s research provides further indication of an association between economic policy preferences and support for the radical left. Crucially, Rooduijn et al.'s research varies from earlier discussed literature by its added consideration of non-economic factors. Continuing in this theme, my thesis also considers how non-economic policy preferences are associated with radical left support. This leads me to the next section of this chapter, focused on existing literature which has considered how non-economic policy preferences are associated with support for radical political actors.

1.2: Cultural Policy and Migration Policy

In this section, I discuss research which has identified electoral support based on policy-proximity on two non-economic policy dimensions. I divide this discussion into three subsections, with the overall objective of showing how these non-economic dimensions may be important to explaining support for the radical left.

In the first subsection, I show how voters simply may not be solely concerned with economic policy when formulating support for the radical left. Instead, these non-economic policy areas are potentially more salient to these voters, and thus have a role in radical left support. The research of Ronald Inglehart, stemming from the post-materialism thesis (Inglehart, 1971), primarily underpins this idea of a shift in issue salience potentially driving cultural policy

salience. From that salience, cultural policy is potentially important to understanding support for the radical left.

Following that, I discuss migration policy as another non-economic dimension with potential to explain support for the radical left. Existing literature provides support for migration policy, as a potential explanatory factor of radical left support.

Secondly, previous research has found non-economic policy to be relevant in explaining support for the radical right. Given the radical left and radical right's common challenge towards the political mainstream, the relevance of non-economic policy for understanding radical right support may also indicate a role explaining support for the radical left.

1.2.1: (Post-)Materialism and Cultural Policy

According to Stokes (1963), the most evident criticism of the Downsian model of proximity and spatial voting was the reliance on a single policy dimension in his original account. At the heart of this criticism was the idea that political competition is not realistically built around a single policy dimension, and that in fact there are 'several dimensions of political conflict' (Stokes, 1963, p. 370). The interests and motivations of voters are diverse, and as such it is unreasonable to expect their political preferences to depend on a single issue. Applied to my discussion so far, it becomes reasonable to expect some voters to not be primarily concerned with economic policy. For these voters, cultural and migration policy may be more salient. Subsequently, it is based on these dimensions that these voters would formulate support for the radical left.

That itself raises the question of why it is specifically cultural policy which I include here, as one of the alternatives to economics. My rationale behind cultural policy stems from Inglehart's post-materialism thesis. Inglehart originally hypothesised that voters who grew up in a time of economic downturn would be primarily concerned with material issues, including financial stability and physical security. Whereas voters who grew up in a period of economic prosperity would have greater concern for post-material issues, including the idea of belonging and self-expression (Inglehart, 1971). Thus, intergenerational shifts between material and post-material attitudes explain the rise of new issues, such as the promotion of the welfare state (Inglehart, 1977), and also motivate political movements (Inglehart, 2007).

The post-materialism thesis draws out potentially salient non-economic issues. Put into more specific terms, these 'cultural' issues include LGBT rights, views around gender roles, beliefs concerning personal rights including free expression and abortion, and attitudes around criminal justice. The rise of these post-material issues, being salient to many voters, drives my inclusion of them when considering proximity-based support for the radical left. The dimension itself spans from 'culturally-liberal' voters, who are supportive of individual rights, promote rehabilitative justice, and oppose traditional gender norms, to the 'culturally-conservative' where support is for more traditional and hierarchical society with more draconian law-and-order policies.

Ultimately, Inglehart's post-materialism account motivates my consideration of cultural policy when examining support for the radical left. Especially as Inglehart suggests the proportion of post-materialists at the millennium was comparable to the proportion of materialists in American and Western Europe (Inglehart, 2018). Consequently, these voters who are less concerned with economic policy, and more concerned with cultural policy, make up a substantial portion of the potential support for the radical left. Finally, the support for the post-materialism account from time series data adds greater weight to the idea of non-economic policy salience, and specifically cultural policy salience, being present and widespread amongst voters in Western democracies (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005).

A final brief point I would make is that I admit the possibility of non-economic policy salience being present here amongst voters. That is something I acknowledge, and motivates my inclusion of non-economic policy dimensions as part of my consideration of policy-proximity. But, to clarify, issue salience itself does not play a role in the empirics of my thesis. This concept is important for drawing out non-economic policy dimensions, but when examining policy-proximity support for the radical left I instead look at the average effects of proximity on each dimension.

1.2.2: Migration Policy and the Radical Left

Inglehart's theory builds towards my inclusion of the cultural policy dimension in my research into radical left support. Cultural policy primarily concerns individual rights and autonomy, but Inglehart does not extend this explicitly to cover policy relating to migration.

Therefore, it is here that I will draw out what previous research says about migration policy and the radical left. In particular, how this dimension potentially explains radical left support.

Party-level examination of the radical left's positions on migration policy have found that these political actors generally push a migrant-inclusive agenda. That said, there is some variation between radical left political actors on this issue. In research looking at five radical left political actors, spread across Greece, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden, all five supported more open policies towards asylum seekers, including protections from deportations and more humane treatment (McGowan & Keith, 2016). But there was variation over the issues of migrant integration, with some linking migrant communities with social problems, but others proposing housing and education policies to avoid segregation. There was also some variation over immigration policy, with the Dutch radical left *SP* and Danish radical left *SF* proposing slightly more restrictive policies compared to the other three political actors examined (McGowan & Keith, 2016). Finally, the radical left's migration policy was often oriented around its economic proposals. For example, the calls for immigration controls were not ethnically based, but rather based on protection of the domestic labour market (McGowan & Keith, 2016).

Furthermore, in research looking specifically at the UK, more migrant-inclusive government policies following the European Union's 2004 enlargement is said to have caused a rise of migration policy salience, especially as immigration was perceived as a 'threat' (Sobolewska & Ford, 2020, p. 41). This sequence also connected the issue immigration with the European Union, ultimately driving Eurosceptic attitudes suggested to culminate in the UK's decision to exit the EU (Sobolewska & Ford, 2020, p. 123). This rise in migration policy salience meant parties had to adopt positions on this dimension, including the Labour Party (Sobolewska & Ford, 2020, pp. 309-311). Crucially, migration policy has become a dimension with an important role in political competition. With this dimension becoming salient to voters, it becomes plausible for proximity here to explain voters attitudes towards radical left actors.

At the voter-level, previous research has also identified migration-based support for the radical left. When I was discussing the research into holding radical left ideology earlier, from Visser et al. (2014), I mentioned this voter-level research included a variable relating to anti-

immigration attitudes.[2] That research, which does not investigate support for radical left political actors, but rather adherence with radical left ideology, found that the higher aversion was towards immigration the lower were the chances of radical leftism (p. 552). This constitutes a voter-level link between the radical left and migration policy preferences. However, there is again the downside with this research that it has not tied adherence with radical leftism to electoral support for radical left political actors. Furthermore, the research of Rooduijn et al. (2017) identified supporters of radical left political actors as being generally more pro-immigration, and suggested this to be due to higher levels of education amongst radical left voters (Rooduijn, et al., 2017).

Finally, there has also been voter-level research connecting the migrant-inclusive policies of the radical left with greater support for these political actors from migrant communities. The Dutch radical left *SP* was found to receive a significant amount of support from immigrants (Wirries, 2012), with this also found in the support for the radical left in both Sweden and Denmark (Bird, et al., 2010). Existing literature has also shown the migrant-inclusive policies of *SYRIZA* in Greece to have been reciprocated by higher levels of support for this political party from enfranchised migrants (Mason, 2012).

Coupled with the post-materialism thesis from Inglehart, offering cultural policy as a salient non-economic issue, I also have both the party-level and voter-level research in this sub-section connecting migration policy with support for these political actors. Previous research has often overlooked these non-economic issues in policy-based explanations of radical left support in the past. Consequently, my consideration of these two non-economic dimensions is an important contribution I make through my research. Including these two non-economic dimensions is also a relevant feature, as I have shown how both cultural and migration policy are feasibly important to understanding support for the radical left.

That does not necessarily mean it is *only* these two non-economic dimensions upon which policy-proximity potentially explains radical left support. For example, environmental policy may also be salient to voters (Achterberg, 2006). That brings me to further justify cultural and

---

[2] Named 'Perceived Ethnic Threat'.

migration policy as potentially important, this time looking to their place explaining support for other radicals.

1.2.3: Evidence from the Radical Right

The final part of my case for considering these two non-economic dimensions, relating to cultural and migration policy, draws upon previous research into the radical right's support. As I noted at the end of the previous sub-section, it is uncommon to find inclusion of non-economic policy in existing examinations of radical left support. However, these dimensions have featured in previous research on the radical right.

The research of Herbert Kitschelt took both cultural and migration policy into account when exploring support for the radical right. Cumulating cultural and migration policy into the single 'authoritarian/libertarian' dimension, Kitschelt & McGann (1995) suggested increased support for the radical right to be a consequence of a shift in the shape of a 'competitive space'. In this space, voters no longer determined their electoral support based on economic policy alone, but also began to consider beliefs on the 'authoritarian/libertarian' policy dimension too.

In later work with Philipp Rehm, Kitschelt postulated that policy preferences on three dimensions, characterised as 'Greed', 'Grid', and 'Group', explained electoral support (Kitschelt & Rehm, 2014, p. 1671). These three dimensions respectively follow the economic, cultural, and migration policy dimensions in my research.

Kitschelt's contributions are important, by including all three dimensions that also feature in my research. But Kitschelt is also far from the only spatial account to have considered the impacts of cultural and migration policy. In one spatial account, support for the radical right in nine Western European countries was explained through non-economic (immigration and law-and-order) policy preferences of voters (Rovny, 2013). Furthermore, in an adaptation of the traditional proximity-based spatial account to also include issue salience, success for the radical right (and Green parties) across 17 Western European countries was explained based on mainstream party strategies in policy spaces (Meguid, 2005).[3]

---

[3] Dimensions including law-and-order, national(istic) way of life, traditional morality, and opposition towards multiculturalism found 'indicative of mainstream party accommodation of radical right

Further research has also demonstrated policy-proximity on the cultural and migration policy dimensions to be relevant to understanding support for radical right political actors. Migration policy-proximity finds support as an explanatory factor of electoral support for the Belgian radical right *Vlaams Blok* (Coffé, 2004), the German radical right *Die Republikaner* (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2000), and the French radical right *Front National* (Mayer, 1998). In relation to the radical left, the more cosmopolitan attitudes identified from radical left supporters in Rooduijn et al.'s research (2017) suggest that support for the radical left can also be explained on this policy dimension – with migrant-inclusive voters supporting the radical left.

The case for including the cultural and migration dimensions in my research is primarily rooted away from radical right research. Specifically, I motivate the cultural policy dimension from Inglehart's post-materialism thesis, and the migration policy dimension from previous research which explored this dimension with the radical left. Aside from these justifications, there remains the case that the radical left and radical right bear the commonality of their challenge to mainstream political actors. Previous research, including that of Rooduijn et al. (2017), contributes towards this case of similarities between the radical right and radical left. Arising from that case is the possibility that voters defect from mainstream political actors to these radicals due to common sources of dissatisfaction concerning the same policy areas. Based on this notion, the cultural and migration policy dimensions found to be relevant to explaining radical right support may also have some place in explaining support for the radical left.

1.3: Populism and Radical Left Support

Populism is the core component of the second account in my examination of support for the radical left. This is quite an established area of research, in particular relating populism with the radical right. Populism is something which has been noted from both the radical left and radical right previously (Akkerman, et al., 2017). Therefore, my discussion here of populism in existing literature will cover this both in research on the radical right and the radical left.

---

parties'. Environmental protection and anti-growth economy similarly related to accommodation of Green parties (Meguid, 2005, p. 352).

I draw a definition of populism from Cas Mudde's contributions in this field (2004; 2007; 2010; 2017). Mudde defines populism as a 'thin-centred ideology', dividing society into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups – the 'pure people' versus the 'corrupt elite' (Mudde, 2007). Prominent research has been undertaken in this area by Mudde, and others. Predating the work of Mudde, Margaret Canovan described populism as 'notoriously vague', ultimately defining this concept as 'an appeal to "the people" against both the established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values of the society' (Canovan, 1999). Mudde's definition follows this theme, by identifying this division as the defining feature of populism. Furthermore, Mudde's definition has been accepted by a range of other scholars (Rooduijn, et al., 2012; Aslanidis, 2015; Moffitt & Tormey, 2013; Schulz, et al., 2018).

The description of populism as a 'thin-centred ideology' draws upon research about nationalism, itself identified as a thin-centred ideology because it severs itself from wider engagement and interpretation of policy and political concepts (Freeden, 1998, p. 750). Thin-centred ideologies exhibit a 'restricted core attached to a narrower range of political concepts' (Freeden, 1998). Mudde relates this description back to populism, where the core concept is 'the people', and by extension also the 'elites' as their opponents. Furthermore, populism combines with other ideologies, such as nationalism but potentially socialism, ecologism, or one of many other ideologies (Mudde, 2004, p. 544).

Nativism, for example, is an ideology which commonly accompanies the populism of the radical right. In this situation, the 'ordinary people' represent the native population, and are drawn into opposition with migrant groups (Mudde, 2007, p. 22). Populism calls upon these 'ordinary people' to defend the homogeneity of their country from the threat of mass migration (Mudde, 2007; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2018). This represents just one example of a populist divide from the literature. More broadly, right-wing populist political actors may draw its 'enemy' group from multiple facets of society, including LGBT individuals, trade unions, mainstream left-wing political parties, Roma people, Jewish people, Muslim people, and even those identified as 'democrats' or 'Westerners' in some former USSR states (Mudde, 2007).

Populism from the radical left rests on economic grounds. This economics-based radical left populism is the product of substantial evolution by many of these political actors, who moved

away from association with the USSR in the atmosphere of the fall of the Iron Curtain, and then mutated to embrace 'social populism'. The radical left profess acceptance of democracy and rejection of capitalism (March & Mudde, 2005, p. 35), but also make anti-establishment appeals, pointing out what they see as a 'betrayal' from social democrats and the more established left-wing political actors; making populist appeals which have economic themes, rather than the nativist or nationalist appeals seen from populists on the right (March, 2007). Previous research has found further evidence for this as well, in the context of the Greek radical left (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014). This further research points out the *inclusive* nature of left-wing populism regarding immigration, as opposed to the exclusionary nature of its right-wing counterpart. Emphasis is then shown to be on economics from left-wing populist political actors, fundamentally presenting a challenge towards inequality and big businesses (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014).

A great deal of literature on the radical right has discussed how these political actors profess populist messages. This is something Cas Mudde draws particular attention to, in multiple contributions (Mudde, 2004; 2007; 2010), along with other authors in this field (Betz, 1994; Rooduijn, et al., 2012; Rydgren, 2005). Mudde's pan-European research implicitly connects support for the radical right with populism, while also considering a wide range of demand-side and supply-side explanations of radical right success (Mudde, 2007).

There have been contributions made which look at populism as an explanatory factor of support for radicals. For example, research has examined populism-based support for both the radical right and the radical left in the Netherlands (Akkerman, et al., 2014). After first identifying levels of populism amongst Dutch voters, Akkerman et al. found that highly populist voters were more likely to vote for the radical right *PVV* and radical left *SP* than for the mainstream political parties. Further voter-level research has also investigated populism and support for the radical right and radical left in the Netherlands. From measuring vote choice to determine *PVV* and *SP* supporters, this research examined how populist, economic, cultural, and migration attitudes varied across supporters for the populist radical right and radical left. Finding populism to be consistent across supporters for both, with *SP*'s supporters more economically left-wing, *PVV*'s supporters more intolerant towards immigration, and

neither party's supporters distinguished by cultural policy preferences (Akkerman, et al., 2017).

Both Akkerman papers demonstrate measurement of populist attitudes at the voter level, with later motivation to also profile supporters of left-wing and right-wing populist political actors. Crucially, populism was an explanatory factor of support for both the radical left and radical right in the Netherlands. However, there are also downsides to their research. Specifically, in the 2017 research there was also consideration of policy preferences alongside populism. However, single questions were used to gauge cultural and migration policy preferences, with the potential for survey respondents to misunderstand these questions and give an inaccurate sense of their beliefs. Multi-item batteries of questions would mitigate this possibility – a point made in more detail in the research design of this thesis.

There are other points to raise in response to Akkerman et al.'s research, such as the consideration of only one country – the Netherlands – narrowing the extent to which their conclusions can be applied to other radical political actors. Furthermore, recall earlier I cited previous research raising possible confounding factors referred to as 'persuasion effects', where voters are not drawn to support a political actor based, in this case, on their populist sentiments, but rather because of pre-existing support for radical left political actors (Brody & Page, 1972). Neither piece of research cited from Akkerman et al. includes consideration for these persuasion effects, and how they potentially cause voters to shift their policy preferences and populist attitudes to match the radical left political actor after pre-existing support.

Similar research has investigated the links between populist attitudes and electoral support in general, with other countries the focus, such as consideration of the impacts of populist attitudes on electoral support in Slovakia (Stanley, 2011), and Poland (Stanley, 2018). However, in the former, populist attitudes of voters had only a limited impact on voting behaviour in Slovakia. In the latter research focusing on voting behaviour in Poland, levels of populism impacted on electoral support; however, this played a more secondary role, with populist attitudes instead intensifying the roles of 'cultural attitudes'[4] on voting.

---

[4] Relating to social traditionalism and nativist attitudes on immigration.

Furthermore, in work across nine European countries, it was found that populist attitudes were associated with support for populist parties (van Hauwert & van Kessel, 2018). This would be expected, and follows the results of similar research on populist attitudes and electoral support (Stanley, 2018). Also found was an association between economic policy preferences and support for radical left populists, with culturally-conservative and migrant-exclusive policy preferences associated with support for radical right populists (van Hauwert & van Kessel, 2018).

Looking at previous research into populism as an explanatory factor specifically of radical left support, the anti-establishment and anti-mainstream views emanating from the radical left *Podemos* in Spain was deemed important to explaining their support, in contrast to the relative obscurity of their more established but less populist radical left rivals, the *IU* (Ramiro & Gomez, 2016). However, the downside with this research is the lack of accompanying consideration of policy preferences, and how these differentiated support for *Podemos* from *IU*. Different policy preferences of their respective voters may also define support for both *Podemos* and *IU*. Instead, the only way voters' ideology is considered in this research is via a self-placement 1–10 scale, which does not relate to a specific policy dimension, and has also been found to be deficient for predicting electoral support particularly amongst less informed voters (Evans, et al., 1996). Further exploration of specific policy preferences and their roles in electoral support is therefore a potential avenue for further investigation.

I have discussed a wealth of existing literature here, including both party-level and voter-level accounts. There are two key messages taken from this previous research on populism. Firstly, previous research has connected populism with the radical right, with some voter-level research here demonstrating levels of populism to be associated with radical right support. Potentially arising from this is populism also explaining support for other radical political actors, but this time on the left. Secondly, there are ways to build on existing voter-level research on populism and support for the radical left; specifically, through also simultaneously examining the impacts of policy-proximity on three dimensions, and through separating radical left persuasion effects from voters' populist attitudes and policy preferences. Thus, there is both justification for examining populism as a potential

explanatory factor of radical left support, and there are areas my thesis can build on and contribute to existing literature.

1.4: Alternative Explanations

In this section, I will bring together previous research into radical left support, and identify three common alternate explanations for support of these political actors. Not only does this mean I acknowledge these alternative explanations, it also allows me to justify my focus on policy-proximity and populism in my thesis. The three alternative explanations I will explore, drawing upon previous research on the radical left, are the socio-structural model, protest-based support, and the role of issue salience.

1.4.1: Socio-Structural Voting

As I showed earlier in this chapter, economics is the key defining factor of the radical left. But this does not necessarily only manifest itself as support for these actors based on policy-proximity. Aside from this, it is also possible that radical left support is a consequence of economic hardship found in certain socio-demographic groups. In this case, economically deprived voters may be attracted to the radical left based on their redistributive economic policies, which can potentially relieve the material hardships of these voters.

Previous research has explored this possibility, looking at associations between measures of economic deprivation and support for the radical left. One common metric of economic hardship is class identification; specifically, identification as working class and how predictive this is of radical left support. In cross-sectional work across Western Europe, Luis Ramiro found that identification as working class was associated with increased likelihood of supporting a radical left actor (Ramiro, 2016). Ramiro continued to explore the economic insecurity case, through the lens of working-class identification, but found this not to be significantly associated with support for the Spanish radical left (Ramiro & Gomez, 2016). On the one hand, this is potentially down to varying scope of this research – the former being cross-sectional, and the latter looking specifically at Spain – but on the other it may be how economic insecurity is gauged which affects the extent radical left support is explained by this variable.

Looking beyond working-class identification, previous research has examined the effects of economic insecurity via the national unemployment rate. This feasibly gathers the economic deprivation effect, as higher unemployment may indicate negative macroeconomic conditions in a country. Examination of the national unemployment level showed this was a significant demand-side determinant of higher radical left support (March & Rommerskirchen, 2015). Furthermore, previous research has found that higher personal income is associated with reduced support for radical left parties – finding this in Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden – showing how economic security reduces susceptibility of voting for the radical left (Charalambous & Lamprianou, 2017). However, the same research also tested whether it was these structural variables, including economic (class) and non-economic (age, gender) groups, or voter attitudes (relating to economics, cultural, and migration policy) that set radical left supporters apart from voters for other variants of left-wing political actors. They found that it was voter attitudes, rather than these structural factors, which set the radical left's supporters apart from supporters of social democrat and green actors (Charalambous & Lamprianou, 2017). Other research matches this conclusion, finding in Germany that it is ideology which is associated with radical left support, above the impacts of socio-structural demographics, and in particular highlighting the role of economic ideology on radical left support (Bowyer & Vail, 2011).

There is evidence to suggest that socio-structural factors are important to understanding voting behaviour, although perhaps these factors have less direct effects. For example, that socio-economic class does still drive voters to adopt certain policy preferences, with these preferences subsequently important to determining vote choices (Evans & Northmore-Ball, 2018, p. 131). However, in my research I examine the latter part of this course, looking at how far voters policy preferences, and their proximity with the radical left, explain their support for these actors.

1.4.2: Protest Voting

Another alternate explanation identified in existing literature relates to the idea of protest voting. Protest voting may arise out of opposition towards policy consensus on issues like immigration, economics, or the European Union. Alternately, it may occur out of protest against established political parties. In either case, it is conceivable that the radical left will be

benefactors of such votes, given these actors are challengers towards mainstream political parties and propose economic policies which challenge prevailing capitalist norms. Furthermore, the 'Election Day is Protest Day' electioneering of the German radical left shows how these actors can make explicit appeals to disillusioned voters (March & Mudde, 2005).

There is evidence that support for the radical left does increase when there is a right-wing government, suggesting that incumbency may partly drive this greater support (March & Rommerskirchen, 2015). However, the radical left does not make similar gains when the mainstream left are in government, whereas the radical right gains support regardless of the mainstream right or left being in charge. Thus, evidence suggests protest-based support for the radical left is more conditional than for their radical right counterparts (March & Rommerskirchen, 2015, p. 48).

Further research on this idea has looked cross-sectionally to analyse the extent of protest voting with non-mainstream left-wing and right-wing political actors. Looking specifically at multi-faceted protests against democracy, it finds that support for the radical left is increased amongst voters who express dissatisfaction with the treatment of minorities, and amongst those perceiving a democratic deficit linked with economic inequality (Hernandez, 2018).

There is a strong theoretical case supporting the notion of protest explaining support for radicals in general. Summed up briefly, left-wing voters are attracted to radical left actors as part of a backlash, in protest against the 'perceived identical nature of the establishment political parties' (March & Mudde, 2005, p. 36). In addition to the research I have already cited in this sub-section, protest has been tied to the radical right in previous research, looking at this in Austria (Ignazi, 2003), and France (Mayer, 2005).

Protest voting literature has identified many factors which cause voters to protest, including socio-economic deprivation (Klönne, 1989), opposition towards political institutions or elites (Bergh, 2004), and against aspects of the modern geopolitical world – such as protests against globalisation (Ramiro & Gomez, 2016). But these causes all result in a common protest: a backlash against mainstream political parties, who protest voters deem to not adequately represent them and their interests (Mair, 2013). No matter the specific causes, protest voting comes back to the desire to reject established politics, and enhance the representation of popular interests. That relationship is akin to the conflict inherent with populism, between

the 'ordinary people' and a 'corrupt elite'. In this case, the conflict is 'ordinary people' opposing established political actors and elites. Thus, when I explore how levels of populist sentiment are associated with radical left support, I can also indirectly make an inference about the extent of protest driving this support, as protest is a feature of populism.

1.4.3: Issue Salience

The policy-proximity account suggests levels of proximity between voters economic/cultural/migration preferences and the radical left explains their levels of support for these actors. Issue salience goes beyond this, and adds an extra consideration to the baseline concept of support based on policy preferences. What it adds is the notion that voters prioritise or value a certain issue more than others.[5] For example, a voter who is spatially-distant from the radical left on economic policy, but still supports them because they are in proximity with this actor on another dimension which they are more concerned about. This salience may come about for a variety of prevailing reasons: for example, in a time of high unemployment the issue of the economy will likely be a salient issue for most voters. To illustrate further, during the 2014-15 European refugee crisis the issue of migration became a highly salient issue to many voters (Talò, 2017). Therefore, the potential for issues to be more salient, to certain voters and in certain periods, is undeniable.

Previous research has investigated this concept, imbuing issue salience into their policy-based explanations of political support. For example, research looking at voting behaviour in Canada found that issue salience was the key underpinning factor to the effect of 'owned issues' on vote choices (Bélanger & Meguid, 2008). Further research, looking at the US, identified the presence of issue salience amongst voters in their electoral decisions (RePass, 1971), and research looking at the 2017 German federal election found economically-left and culturally-authoritarian voters opted for whichever party was in proximity on their more salient dimension (Steiner & Hinnen, 2021). Finally, and specifically to radical political actors, previous research has suggested salience is particularly important for these actors. Radical actors 'have an incentive to play up new issues and thereby enable themselves to reap electoral

---

[5] I have summarised the fundamental idea here, although a degree of debate exists around this between 'salience' referring to issue *prominence*, or to issue *importance*, or to the degree that an issue is a particularly pressing *problem* (Wlezien, 2005).

gains' (de Vries & van de Wardt, 2011, p. 178), with empirical evidence of this phenomena relating to salience of EU-related issues in response to the Euroscepticism common from radical left and right actors (Hooghe, et al., 2002; de Vries & Edwards, 2009).

It is plausible that voters may find a particular issue, or issues, more important than others, and that this specific salience varies between voters and time periods. Furthermore, by including multiple policy dimensions in my analysis, I can potentially draw salience-based implications from my results. By which I mean I may be able to conclude that greater effect of proximity on one dimension compared to others is a result of greater salience voters place on that particular policy dimension.

I have discussed issue salience previously in this chapter, as an important justification behind my consideration of two non-economic dimensions in my policy-proximity account: specifically, cultural policy and migration policy. In doing so, I acknowledged that voters can be more concerned with one dimension than another. My multidimensional approach in the policy-proximity account is an acknowledgement that I may observe voters' support for the radical left on different dimensions, with voters valuing some issues more than others.

1.5: Further Contributions

The fundamental contribution of my thesis makes to existing literature is the voter-level examination of how far policy-proximity and populist attitudes explain radical left support. I examine this in a new combination of three diverse case studies, as opposed to existing research in this field which has predominantly focused on single cases (for example, Akkerman et al. 2013; 2017). In my examination of both policy-proximity and populism-based radical left support, I also more strongly deal with persuasion effects compared to previous research. Consideration of persuasion effects is important to accurately determining the roles of policy-proximity and populism on radical left support.

Aside from these more fundamental contributions, there are a few other specific areas where my thesis adds to previous research.

It has not been common for existing literature to consider the impacts of all three of the policy dimensions which form my policy-proximity account. Nor is it common to see these three policy variables included alongside consideration of voters' populist attitudes. The downside of this is that existing literature has not produced an account of the impacts of policy preferences and populism, with control placed on the effects of each on support for the radical left.

To illustrate this further, there is existing research which takes account of voters' economic policy preferences, such as the analysis of radical left support in Germany (Bowyer & Vail, 2011), and the implicit inclusion of economics via globalisation considered in further analysis of support for radical left parties (March & Rommerskirchen, 2015). There is also common consideration of immigration policy preferences in existing research, including research into radical left ideology (Visser, et al., 2014), and research on support for both radical left and radical right political actors (Rooduijn, et al., 2017). Cultural policy preferences are a less common feature of previous studies, but limited indication of policy preferences here are included in research into support for populist radical right and radical left in the Netherlands (Akkerman, et al., 2017).

That research from Akkerman et al. represents the only piece of existing literature from those cited which includes populism alongside variables relating to policy preferences on all three dimensions. At first sight this might make my thesis look similar to Akkerman et al.'s research. However, there are some critical differences. The policy-proximity and populism-based accounts in my thesis are carefully operationalised to three distinct case studies with consideration for persuasion effects, whereas Akkerman et al.'s research looked at only one case – the Netherlands.

In terms of the independent variables, the research of Akkerman et al. is an exception. Generally existing research has not considered voters' policy preferences on three separate dimensions alongside each other. Nor have they included these policy preferences alongside consideration of voters' populist attitudes, despite these three policy preferences and populism potentially being associated with electoral support according to literature on the radical right and radical left. This then constitutes a gap in existing literature. My

simultaneous consideration of these three policy dimensions, and of populism, addresses this existing gap.

1.5.2: Dependent Variables

Existing research has also taken different directions with the dependent variables. Most research in this field has looked at electoral support via vote choice questions (Jessee, 2012; Bowyer & Vail, 2011; Doerschler & Banaszak, 2007; Rooduijn, et al., 2017; Akkerman, et al., 2017; Ramiro, 2016).

Complexities and added considerations arise from the use of vote choice questions. I discuss these further in the research design, but in brief there is a wider choice context which feeds into vote choice question responses. This wider choice context, including contextual factors like competitiveness within an electoral system, and proximity with other political actors, feeds into responses to vote choice questions, alongside appraisals of political actors. However, in my thesis I want to focus on appraisals of these political actors alone, with this choice context left aside as much as possible.

This leads me to examine support for the radical left through questions which ask respondents to evaluate these political actors, rather than whether they voted for them. The use of evaluation questions rather than vote choices is in contrast to most previous research in this field. Although vote choice questions are more commonly used, my thesis is not alone in looking at voter evaluations instead – this appears in other contributions (Cho & Endersby, 2003). But given the prevalent use of vote choice questions, my use of evaluations instead is a deviation from much of this existing literature.

Less consideration of evaluations for radical left political actors, as the dependent variable, is a gap in the literature. I address this gap, not just as part of my original contribution, but also because it avoids the complexities which arise with vote choice questions.

1.6: Literature Conclusions

From existing research, I first defined the radical left as challengers towards the contemporary economic norms of their respective contexts. This sets them apart from the centre left, who accept 'neo-liberal' economic norms, and the extreme left, who vary from the radical left in

their attitudes towards democracy and by the extreme left's wholesale rejection of capitalism. I also illustrated the division of the radical left from its centre left and extreme left counterparts in this chapter, through looking at examples of each of these political actors in Greece. To clarify, this definition of the radical left is not static. In a different time it is possible that the radical left may look different to what I have identified here.

After defining the radical left, I turned attention to existing voter-level research into support for the radical left and radical right. I identified three policy dimensions from this literature, where proximity with voters may explain their support for the radical left. These policy dimensions relate to voters' economic, cultural, and migration policy preferences.

Existing literature has found economic policy preferences of voters to be important to explaining support for the radical left (Bowyer & Vail, 2011; Doerschler & Banaszak, 2007; Akkerman, et al., 2017; March & Rommerskirchen, 2012). Cultural and migration policy preferences have been connected with support for radical political actors before – in particular, the radical right (Mayer, 1998; Bjørklund & Andersen, 2002; Falter & Schumann, 1988; Mungui-Pippidi & Krastev, 2004; Coffé, 2004; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2000). Based on existing voter-level research, which demonstrates the relevance of economic, cultural, and migration policy to voters, support for the radical left may be explained by policy-proximity on these three dimensions. However, previous research which identified support for radicals based on policy preferences did not strongly separate potential persuasion effects from voters' policy preferences. This is an area where I contribute to existing literature, as it is important to deal with these persuasion effects when accurately identifying the role of policy-proximity. Doing so isolates the specific role of policy-proximity on radical left support, clarifying how far this variable is a cause of that support rather than a product of it.

I then turned attention to existing literature on populism. This was defined from previous research, in particular from Cas Mudde (2007), who highlighted the presence of a division made by populists, defining one group as the 'ordinary people', and opposing them with the 'corrupt elite' group. The radical left's populism calls upon people to oppose big businesses, the wealthy, and a 'neo-liberal' economic consensus. I also discussed research which explained support for radical right and radical left political actors through voters' populist attitudes (Akkerman, et al., 2013; 2017). With this existing literature showing how populism

can explain support for radical political actors, there is the possibility that this will also explain support for the radical left in my thesis.

This brings me to the final section of this literature review, which focused on gaps in existing literature. The fundamental contribution of my thesis is its investigation of support for the less studied radical left, via the policy-proximity and populism-based accounts, and with stronger consideration for persuasion effects relative to existing research. I detailed further contributions, including the significance of examining both accounts simultaneously to control for possible confounding between the two. Whereas previous research generally had not included both together. Furthermore, measuring radical left support with evaluation questions means in my thesis I mitigate the effects of a wider choice context on these responses.

Chapter 2: Theory

2.0: Introduction

What explains electoral support for radical left political actors in contemporary Western democracies? To answer this research question, I consider two accounts, to see how far they explain support for the radical left. The first is the *policy-proximity account*, based on the spatial theory of voting which suggests electoral support is based on levels of proximity voters have with political actors on policy dimensions. The second account considered in this thesis is the *populism-based account*, which suggests that populist voters would be supportive of the radical left because of the anti-elite and anti-establishment rhetoric which commonly accompanies their economic policies.

Both policy-proximity and populism are established explanations of electoral support – a point which justifies their consideration in this thesis. In particular, the spatial and populism-based theories have received notable application to the radical right, where they have explained support for these political actors. For example, Kitschelt & McGann's (1995) explanation of radical right support based on policy-proximity, and Cas Mudde's (2007) discussion of populism-based support for the radical right. Applying these established theories now to the radical left, and seeing how far their related accounts explain support for radical left political actors, is the core contribution of my thesis.

The primary objective of this chapter is to explain the general frameworks from which I derive both accounts. Consequently, I divide this theory chapter into two main sections: the first discussing the spatial theory of voting, and the second section explaining the populism-based theory. In both of these sections, I outline how each of these two accounts explains electoral support. Accompanying this is also a discussion of critical assumptions in the spatial theory, and considerations for the populism theory. Finally, I also discuss features of each account's application in my thesis, for example setting out three policy dimensions which are plausibly relevant to the policy-proximity account, with both theories being summarised in a chapter conclusion afterwards.

2.1: Spatial Theory

2.1.1: Background and Fundamentals

The spatial theory of voting has substantial history amongst accounts of electoral support. Kitschelt and McGann's (1995) previously discussed application of the spatial theory to the radical right is only a small part of it, although notable here because of its application to other radical political actors. But beyond Kitschelt and McGann there are many other instances where this theory has explained electoral support, and a great deal of research which developed this theory in the first place.

Although well-established in the field of voting behaviour, initially the spatial theory featured in an economics setting by Harold Hotelling (1929). Hotelling used this theory to explain the effect of spatial positioning of high street retail outlets, relative to each other and customers, on sales (Hotelling, 1929); the basic idea being that distance of competing shops from a customer's home would influence where they spend their money. Hotelling theorised that customers would be more likely to patronise the shop which is closer to them on the High Street than the shop which is further from them.

Later research expanded the spatial theory's applications to also explain voting behaviour. Black et al. undertook this development for the scenario of committee voting (Black, et al., 1958), with Downs applying it to a mass electorate (Downs, 1957). The application of this theory to voting behaviour turns customers into voters, the High Street into a policy space, and each shop into a competing political actor. This yields a logic where voters become more likely to support a political actor which is in closer proximity with their own position in a policy space.

This logic has since featured in many accounts of political support, such as in multiple accounts of voting behaviour in US presidential elections by Stephen A. Jessee (Jessee, 2009, 2010, 2012). Evidence is found demonstrating the value of the spatial theory of voting in explaining voting behaviour in the context of the US (Jessee, 2012, p. 175). In addition to Jessee's work in the US, Dow sets the explanation this theory provides against one of its main rivals – Directional theory – finding greater support for the spatial theory in his research (Dow, 1998). Furthermore, applications of the spatial theory have been made to the UK (Cho

& Endersby, 2003; Endersby & Galatas, 1998), to Spain (Queralt, 2012), and France (Rosenthal & Sen, 1977). Heyne (2019) adopted a spatial account when measuring satisfaction with democracy. Further applications of spatial theory by Kitschelt were also undertaken, separate from his accounts of radical right support, including on the development of party systems in Eastern Europe (Kitschelt, 1992).

Then there is the application of the spatial theory to explain support for the radical right, including the research of Kitschelt and McGann (1995). I discussed Kitschelt and McGann's research in the previous chapter, with focus on the policy dimensions they included. Overall, they suggested that changes in the positions of voters, combined with the convergence of established parties on two policy dimensions, explained how the radical right made electoral breakthroughs in the 1980s and 1990s. Those two policy dimensions expanded to three in later research (Kitschelt & Rehm, 2014). Piero Ignazi also contributes to the debate about spatial positions and radical right support, with further work on the role of mainstream party convergence in policy spaces (Ignazi, 1992; 2003). Overall, the spatial theory has substantial background in the field of electoral support, including applications to explain support for the radical right.

In short, the spatial theory is a highly established framework for understanding electoral support. Therefore, this theory may plausibly explain electoral support for radical left political actors. The question remains, however, of what the spatial theory of electoral support is. Discussion of the fundamentals of this theory, its key assumptions, and the underlying logic of this theory, now follows.

I first need to explain two important concepts of this theory: proximity and utility. Proximity refers to the degrees of closeness between the views of voters and the policies offered by competing political actors. Under the spatial theory, this proximity is what predicts voters' electoral support. Proximity may be viewed on a single policy dimension relating to one issue, or this space may consist of multiple policy dimensions each relating to different issues. Voters associate utility with different policy positions, and vote for the candidate whose policy position maximises this utility.

I can illustrate this proximity and utility with a hypothetical policy space. This space includes one policy dimension, for example relating to defence policy.[6] Assume the left side of this dimension symbolises non-interventionism, the right side represents strongly militaristic and pro-intervention policy, and between these extremes are more moderate policies – for example, supporting limited interventions. Voters are located on policy dimensions at the point of their most preferred policy position, known as their 'ideal point'. Political actors are also located on policy dimensions, with their positioning determined by the policies they promote. For example, a political actor with an anti-interventionist policy agenda could be located well to the left of this example dimension, a pro-interventionist political actor well to the right, and a more pragmatic or moderate actor here would be located closer to the middle of this dimension.

Under this theory, voters strive to maximise their utility, and do this by supporting political actors whose policies are most in line with their own policy preferences (their 'ideal point'). By extension of this, a political actor that proposes policies which are not in line with voters most preferred policy position would receive less support from these voters. In summary, this theory suggests voters support the political actor with policies in closest proximity with their 'ideal point' and are less supportive of political actors which offer policies that are spatially-distant from their 'ideal point'.

This operates on the assumption that voters are motivated by self-interest and maximising utility by supporting the political actor whose policies are in closest proximity to their own 'ideal point'. For example, a voter who supports higher taxes and redistributive economic policies would, by their self-interest, be more supportive of a political actor that proposes these policies. That voter associates these policies with greater utility, and votes for the political actor promoting these policies in order to maximise their utility. In relation to the example I offered just now, a voter positioned in closest proximity with a political actor on the non-interventionist side of that defence policy dimension would be more supportive of that non-interventionist actor. That voter associates this political actor's policies with higher utility than the policies of a moderate actor or a pro-intervention actor on this dimension.

---

[6] To clarify, this dimension is purely an example, and does not itself reflect on the economic, cultural, or migration dimensions in my research.

Enelow and Hinich (1984) provide support for this first assumption. In their contribution to this theory, they state that 'voters recognize his own self-interest, evaluates alternative policies or candidates on the basis of […] self-interest, and casts his vote for the policy of candidate most favourably evaluated' (Enelow & Hinich, 1984). This is a theoretical defence for this assumption, but there is also empirical evidence supporting it. From Enelow and Hinich's analysis of voting behaviour in the 1976 and 1980 US presidential elections, they found that voters do view candidates as being positioned within a policy space and that voters are more supportive of candidates in closest proximity (Enelow & Hinich, 1984). Support for the assumption of rational voting, and for the spatial theory as a whole, also comes from Jessee's investigation of voting behaviour in the 2004 and 2008 US presidential elections (Jessee, 2009; 2012).

The second assumption is that voters know where competing political actors are located in policy spaces, and can therefore identify which political actor is in closest proximity with their 'ideal point'. This is important, as unless voters can determine which political actor is closest to their own position, their electoral support will not necessarily be based on spatial proximity with a political actor, as suggested in this account.

There is a great deal of debate around this assumption. It is undeniable that some voters will have greater knowledge about policy areas and stances of political actors within these policy spaces than others. Research from Campbell et al. (1960) suggested around 15 to 30 per cent of people who hold opinions were unable to say where political parties stood in these policy spaces, and speculate that the prevalence of this lack of knowledge may be higher as voters may be embarrassed to admit this (Campbell, et al., 1960, p. 181). Amongst informed voters too, there is the suggestion that only 40 to 60 per cent of these voters end up perceiving party differences, and can hence identify one political actor as being closer to their own position than its competitors (Campbell, et al., 1960, p. 180).

Thinking ahead to my application of the policy-proximity account, results that do not follow the underlying expectation here – that spatial proximity predicates political support – may be explained by the observations of Campbell et al. (1960). If, as that research suggests, a significant portion of both informed and uninformed voters are unable to identify where

radical left political actors are located in a policy space, then results may show little evidence of a relationship between proximity and support for these political actors.

Although Campbell et al. expressed doubts over the extent to which voters can identify the spatial positions of political actors, there has also been support for this assumption. Other research has shown that voters do often know about quite specialist policy areas (Sniderman, 1993). Voters can also acquire knowledge about political issues, becoming able to understand the different policy proposals of political actors on different issues (Lupia & McCubbins, 1998, p. 86). This ability of voters to inform themselves can also permeate to quite niche issues, such as nuclear power, where voters can become informed of different policy proposals of political actors (Kuklinski, et al., 1982).

Regardless of whether voters are able to acquire knowledge about political issues, and are able to then vote rationally based on their proximity relative to competing political actors, there are still realistically going to be voters who are not as informed. Previous research has examined the extent less-informed voters vote in line with the spatial theory. Although these less-informed voters have been found to be less prone to support the political actor they are spatially closest to (Palfrey & Poole, 1987), there has still been support observed based on policy proximity (Jessee, 2012, p. 145).

In the case of Jessee's research finding spatial voting behaviour from less-informed respondents, this may be due to what Campbell et al. say is the main determinant of political support – partisanship (Campbell, et al., 1960). Jessee further researches this link, finding that amongst highly partisan voters there was indeed a strong relationship between their partisan attachments and electoral support. However, the electoral support of those who did not have partisan attachments was formulated in line with the spatial theory (Jessee, 2012, p. 149). The solution to this, according to Jessee, is a hybrid model, which includes the effects of both partisanship and ideology. The impacts of voters' partisan attachments on electoral support are firmly established by existing literature. Consequently, I will have to consider and account for the impacts of partisan attachments in my analysis if I am to accurately observe the roles of policy-proximity and populism on radical left support.

Overall, the spatial theory assumes that voters are capable of understanding policy issues, and thus plausibly have a reasonable understanding of the location of political actors in policy

spaces. Voters are then assumed to support the political actor closest to their own position. Amongst this discussion, there were some doubts expressed over the core assumptions of rational voting and the ability of voters to identify the spatial locations of political actors. I cited research supporting these assumptions, but finding results suggesting no relationship between spatial proximity and radical left support would suggest the doubts expressed over these assumptions may be valid.

I illustrate the logic of the spatial theory further in Figure 2.1. This demonstrates a unidimensional space, unrelated to any specific policy area and drawn from the research of Enelow & Hinich (1984, p.13).

Figure 2.1: Unidimensional Spatial Voting Theory

In Figure 2.1, y and z represent political actors present on a single policy dimension, and $\frac{y+z}{2}$ represents the mid-point between these two political actors.

Assuming utility declines symmetrically around the voter's ideal point, voters positioned on this policy dimension to the right of the midpoint are always in closer proximity with y than with z. Thus, they would be more supportive of y than z. Equally, those to the left of the midpoint will always be in closer proximity with z than y, thus will be more supportive of z than y. Voters located at the mid-point itself would, according to this theory, have equal appraisals of y and z.

This expresses the general logic of support in a unidimensional policy space. However, what is meant by 'support'? This is very important when empirically testing the spatial theory. There are two possible directions here: measuring utility or choice. Previous spatial research has utilised both choice and utility measures. For example, Jessee's research on the 2004 and 2008 US elections used measures of choice (2009; 2010; 2012), and Cho & Endersby's study of

spatial voting in the UK opted for measuring utility by examining voter evaluations for political actors (2003).

I discussed these measures of radical left support briefly in Chapter 1, in the context of previous voter-level radical left research which has mostly utilised vote choice measures. I have preference for measures of evaluation instead, which I then concluded as a further contribution to existing literature. In Chapter 3 of my thesis, I explain the reasons behind this preference in more detail.

2.1.2 Dimensions

Looking back at Figure 2.1, this expresses the spatial theory with a unidimensional policy space. Attention now turns to the dimensions which build policy spaces. Existing literature provides some indication of which policy dimensions may be important to understanding support for the radical left. These dimensions relate to economic, cultural, and migration policy. I discussed these in Chapter 1, with focus on their relevance in previous research. What I will do here is discuss them again, but in relation to the spatial theory, and drawing out broad expectations relating to these dimensions.

The *economic policy dimension* is perhaps the most plausibly linked to radical left support, given the economics-based definition of the radical left, identifying these political actors as challengers towards contemporary capitalist economic norms. Consequently, it is conceivable that I will see support for the radical left based on economic policy preferences.

On the left of this policy dimension, there is support for higher taxes – particularly on the richest and businesses – and opposition towards austerity and privatisation. The right of this dimension relates to support for lower taxation, free-market economics, and spending restraint. The radical left are generally found well to the left of mainstream political actors on this dimension, proposing an anti-corporate and pro-redistribution agenda of higher taxes, higher public spending, and public ownership. Social democrats and green parties also share some of these policies, broadly supporting egalitarian policies and higher taxes. However, as I showed in my literature review chapter, the radical left pursues anti-corporate and redistributive policies more stridently and vociferously than social democrat and green parties.

In general, an economic policy dimension has been a common feature of spatial accounts. Downs, in his canonical study, presented his application of the spatial theory with a single policy dimension relating to government intervention in the economy (Downs, 1957). A further example is Endersby and Galatas (1998), who find links between vote choice and policy areas including nationalisations, redistribution of wealth, and taxation vs. services (Endersby & Galatas, 1998, p. 375). Previous research has suggested that the decline of class-based political support has precipitated the rise of economic policy preferences as a determinant of political support (Endersby & Galatas, 1998; Franklin, 1985). The earlier discussed research of Kitschelt also included an economic policy dimension (Kitschelt & McGann, 1995; Kitschelt & Rehm, 2014). Other accounts mentioned later in this section which also included an economic policy space include Tavits (2007), and Hellwig (2014).

Radical left political actors will predictably fall on the left side of the economic policy dimension. Based on that, I can state two expectations about support for the radical left on this dimension.

Firstly, the policy-proximity account in this thesis predicts that *voters to the left on this dimension would be more supportive of radical left political actors, and voters to the right of this dimension would be less supportive of radical left actors.*

Secondly, and more specifically, *the expectation is that voters well to the left of the economic dimension* (i.e., beyond the centre-left political actors) *will be the most supportive of the radical left*, owing to close proximity with these political actors, and *support for these political actors will fall monotonically as voters move to the right pole on this dimension, where support will be lowest.*

Expectations stated in this chapter are relatively vague, as these depend on context-specific factors such as whether radical left support is measured via vote choices or evaluations, the positions of the radical left, and where other political actors are located too if looking at vote choices. Therefore, the empirical case study chapters are where I state more precise expectations for both accounts.

The *cultural policy dimension* runs from the 'liberal' to the 'conservative' sides. This dimension broadly reflects views over criminal justice, traditional gender roles, and issues relating to personal rights such as abortion, LGBT rights, and drug legalisation. Those considered

'liberal' on this dimension will be pro-LGBT rights, abortion, and rehabilitative justice, and opposed to things like the death penalty and traditional gender roles. The 'conservative' side of this dimension takes the opposing positions on these issues, representing a more 'traditionalist' view of society.

The *migration policy dimension* runs from the 'migrant-inclusive' to the 'migrant-exclusive'. Broadly this dimension considers how voters view the place of immigrants in society. The 'migrant-inclusive' side of this dimension represents the belief that immigration is beneficial economically and culturally. At the other end of this dimension, the 'migrant-exclusive' voters see immigration as a threat to the national economy and cultural identity.

As I discussed in the previous chapter of this thesis, previous research has shown how cultural and migration policy are both potentially salient issues for voters. Consequently, it is possible policy-proximity on these dimensions may explain radical left support. Furthermore, the cultural and migration dimensions have, like economics, appeared in spatial accounts of political support. I also showed this in the previous chapter of this thesis, drawing particular attention to the research of Kitschelt. In his original spatial account of the radical right with McGann, the competitive space where voters and political actors were located had shifted from being unidimensional around economics alone, and had come to also include what they refer to as the 'Authoritarian vs. Libertarian' policy dimension (Kitschelt & McGann, 1995, p. 16). The implication of this dimension is that it combined both cultural policy and attitudes towards migration, thus involving preferences on both cultural and migration dimensions, showing both to be important in addition to economics in understanding electoral support.

Cultural and migration policy were included separately in later research from Kitschelt, where these were referred to as 'Grid' and 'Group' respectively (Kitschelt & Rehm, 2014). Again, Kitschelt's research identifies cultural and migration policy preferences as important in the minds of voters, and contributing to their electoral support. Away from the various contributions of Kitschelt, the cultural policy dimension also features in the account of Laver and Garry (2000), in their research aimed at refining how policy positions of political parties are conceptualised and measured. Finally, cultural policy also appears as an integral part of the spatial account of Tavits (2007), in research looking at how shifts on economic and cultural policy impact on support for political actors.

In addition to the migration dimension's role in Kitschelt's research, there is other research where this policy dimension has played a major role. Firstly, research from Merrill (1994) on party support in Norway and Sweden included two dimensions, one of which concerned the issue of immigration (the other was healthcare). This research explains increased support for anti-immigrant parties as a consequence of a concurrent increase in immigration (Merrill, 1994), showing that voters' positions on this position have been relevant to their electoral support. Furthermore, Hellwig (2014) includes attitudes towards immigration when trying to identify how this issue, along with other issues linked to cultural and economic preferences, informs positioning of political actors. Migration policy preferences were found to be an important determinant of political views in this research, as incidentally were economic and cultural policy preferences (Hellwig, 2014).

Unlike with economic policy, cultural and migration policy are not defining features of the radical left. This means the radical left's positions on both of these policy dimensions is likely to be less uniform than their economic policies. Consequently, the expectations I can state here are even less specific.

To offer a broader expectation for policy-proximity support on these two dimensions, *radical left support is expected to be higher from voters in close proximity with the radical left political actor on these dimensions, and lower from voters not in close proximity with the radical left on these dimensions.*

I will state more detailed context-specific expectations for radical left support on the cultural and migration policy dimensions in the empirical chapters. I will then be able to consider the contexts of the case studies, including possible case-specific variance in the radical left's positions on both of these dimensions. As these two issues are not defining ones in relation to the radical left, it is possible these actors do not propose radical policies on these dimensions. However, radical left actors do not need to propose hard-line policies on these dimensions for their support to be explained based on cultural or migration policy-proximity. All that is needed is for the radical left to be positioned closer to some voters on these dimensions than other political actors, and for voters to care enough about these dimensions for proximity here to influence their political behaviour.

In broad terms, results would conform with this account if greater support for the radical left came from spatially-proximal, and lower support for the radical left from spatially-distant voters. If this is the case, I would conclude policy-proximity to explain levels of support for the radical left.

In terms of the causal pathway of this account, radical left support would arise from *pre-existing* policy-proximity. Specifically, radical left supporting voters *first* form their own policy preferences, and then *subsequently* evaluate political actors based on their proximity with these preferences. This account assumes it would be actors in closest proximity with the voter's policy preferences that receive this voter's support. Critically, voters form policy preferences *first*, and then *subsequently* evaluate actors based on proximity with these. It is important to clarify this causal pathway, which is why I make greater efforts to control for potential reverse-causality by more thoroughly addressing the persuasion effects issue – a major contribution of my thesis. Were it the case that pro-radical left voters first had support for these actors, and subsequently came to be in close proximity with them on policy dimensions, this is potentially mistaken as radical left support based on policy-proximity. However, according to Brody and Page (1972) this reverse-causal relationship would not truly provide support for the policy-proximity account.

There has also been criticism of the spatial theory of voting. Stokes suggested that policy issues are not always dominant in election campaigns, with 'valence issues' being important instead (Stokes, 1963, p. 373). Inclusion of valence issues is just one of the suggestions Stokes offers for the Downsian spatial theory, in response to his criticisms including questioning whether voters determine their electoral support based on a single policy dimension, as originally suggested by this theory (Stokes, 1963, p. 370). To mitigate this criticism, later applications of this theory have included consideration of multiple policy dimensions, including me in this thesis.

Despite doubts and criticism levelled at this theory, and particularly at its original Downsian application, the spatial theory remains highly established amongst accounts of political support; established through frequent application in the field of political support, with some of these accounts cited earlier in this chapter. Separate from these other applications of this established theory, the spatial theory provides an intuitive account of political support,

suggesting that spatial proximity between voters and political actors on policy dimensions determines electoral support. Not only is this theory intuitive, but it is also testable using responses to election survey questions – something discussed further in each case study and the research design chapter.

2.2 Populism

To broaden my analysis of support for the radical left, I consider a second account in my thesis. Accompanying the policy-proximity account is the populism-based account. To remind, when I talk about populism, I am drawing attention to a 'thin-centred ideology' which presents a 'Manichaean' division between two homogeneous, antagonistic groups. These groups, the 'ordinary (or pure) people' and the 'corrupt elites', are presented as conflicting with each other (Mudde, 2010; Akkerman, et al., 2014). I discussed populism as a concept in greater detail in Chapter 1 of my thesis. My focus here is instead on populism as an explanation for electoral support.

The primary motivation for including populism in my thesis is because of the relationship some voters may draw between the radical left's anti-elite economic policies and the anti-elite nature of populism. In addition to this, the populism-based account is also an established account of political support, with particularly frequent application to explain support for the radical right (Mudde, 2017, p. 3). To cite some examples, there are studies of radical right populism in different contexts such as Scandinavia (Rydgren, 2010), of how the prominence of radical right populists has impacted policymaking (Zaslove, 2004), and studies of different types of right-wing populist political actors (Betz, 1993). Much of the discussion of populism with the radical right has been at the party-level, identifying their populist appeals and suggesting these as the reason for their prominence (Mudde, 2007; 2017; Arzheimer, 2015; Kioupkiolis, 2016; Otjes & Louwerse, 2015; Rooduijn, et al., 2012). There are also voter-level accounts which include populism as an explanation for electoral support. For example, Akkerman et al.'s (2014) examination of levels of populism amongst the electorates of different political parties in the Netherlands. Whether party-level or voter-level, the persistent place of populism in accounts of radical right support give credence to this theory of political support. With populism playing a role in support for the radical right, there is a place for this theory in my thesis, where it may also be relevant to understanding support for the radical left.

From the supply-side, political actors make populist appeals to the electorate, either exploiting or constructing an 'us' vs. 'them' division in society. They turn the 'ordinary people' against an 'elite' or 'enemy' group, in a bid to uproot a political or economic establishment and assert popular sovereignty. The more commonly studied radical right populism targets groups including minority religions, LGBT people, and migrant groups, amongst others, including also political 'elites' seen as facilitating the interests of these groups (Mudde, 2007). For example, encouraging the majority ethnic group (the 'pure people') to oppose immigration ('outsiders') and a 'corrupt' pro-immigration political 'elite' (Mudde, 2007). However, separate from the radical right, the economic policies of the radical left are potentially linked to populism.

The economic policies of the radical left, including support for higher taxation on corporations and wealthy people, increased spending on public services, and public ownership of services and industries, are often accompanied by rhetoric which is quite populist. For example, the Dutch Socialist Party's opposition towards so-called 'neo-liberal Ayatollahs' – making an anti-neoliberal ideological challenge an intrinsic part of their populist discourse (March & Mudde, 2005, p. 35). Additionally, the Baltic radical left made calls for ending the elite's 'pillage of the state […] deception, and flogging off its people to a cabal of foreign capitalists' (March & Mudde, 2005, p. 36). This populist discourse not only highlights the 'neoliberal' policies which the radical left opposes whilst also making redistributionist overtures, it also presses a populist 'people' versus 'elite' conflict.

Populist appeals are also made by the Greek radical left *SYRIZA*, whose appeals to the electorate through their newspaper *Avgi* use headlines such as 'Do not corrupt the mandate of the people' (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014), thus calling upon 'the people' as part of their appeal to the electorate, while also identifying an enemy in the Troika[7] (Mudde, 2017, p. 16). The radical left *Podemos* in Spain makes similar appeals, calling upon 'the people' to oppose a class called '*la casta*', representing the traditional political parties and established institutions in this context, and blamed for the country's economic difficulties (Ramiro & Gomez, 2016). In Germany, *Die Linke* use language of 'a few enrich[ing] themselves at the cost of the many' and of 'global ruling elites' not serving the interests of the majority (Die Linke,

---

[7] European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund.

2011, pp. 15, 23). In the US, Bernie Sanders castigated a 'political and economic establishment', and linked them with a 'rigged economy' (Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2018). Finally, in the UK the Labour Party shifted to the left upon Jeremy Corbyn's election to the party's leadership, with Corbyn's faction of the party also emphasising a division between them and their party's members versus the 'elite' of the parliamentary Labour Party who were frequently more critical of Corbyn (Watts & Bale, 2019).

These examples demonstrate the tendency for radical left political actors to adopt populist rhetoric when promoting their economic agenda. As a consequence of this tendency, there is a conceivable role of populism in radical left support: specifically, where support for radical left political actors is a consequence of the populist rhetoric which accompanies their left-wing economic policies, rather than for the policies themselves. From this link, between the radical left and populism, it is possible that levels of populist sentiment are associated with support for the radical left. If this is the case, this would provide an explanation of support for these political actors.

The role of radical left political actors on the supply side, making populist appeals to voters, is an important element of this theory's mechanism of support. However, also important is how populist voters react to radical left political actors. On the demand side, these populist voters view the world and their own place in society as one where there is this 'us' vs. 'them' division. The existence of these populist voters is also important to this theory. Populist attitudes among voters may come about for a variety of reasons, and I will explain some of these. The purpose of that discussion is not to argue in favour of a particular reason behind voter populism, but rather to show how populist voters come to be present.

Feelings of insecurity may draw voters to adhere to populism. Under this explanation, large parts of the population feel uncertain about their identity, about their job, or about life in general (Mudde, 2007, p. 223; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2018; Spruyt, et al., 2016). This feeling of insecurity may occur because of cultural factors, where mass immigration causes large parts of the population to feel threatened about their cultural identity as they see 'aliens' or 'foreigners' entering their communities (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2018, p. 1677). These voters are on the one hand drawn to populists whose underlying ideology is nativism and migrant-

exclusive, and on the other hand encouraged to oppose established 'insider' political parties which have been shown to converge around acceptance of immigration (Mudde, 2007, p. 281).

Voters may also feel insecure as a result of economic challenges, where more people in Western democracies no longer have the right knowledge or skills to be in rewarding employment. The increasing lack of low-skilled but rewarding jobs leaves less-educated citizens feeling economically vulnerable. The consequence is a group of citizens who are simply not suited to functioning in the contemporary, globalised world. These voters, who are potentially unemployed or part of a society which has become less equal, are a class of economic 'left-behinds' who express their anger over inequality and economic insecurity by supporting populist political actors (Inglehart & Norris, 2016).

Political changes may also predicate feelings of insecurity. Developments with political institutions have often moved power from the national level to the supranational level. Leaving aside the UK's exit from the European Union, governance across Europe has increasingly become supranational and integrated across the continent. According to Kriesi (2014), supranational governance structures lead to longer and less transparent chains of representation. Combined with this, the 'mediatisation' of politicians has linked representatives more directly to voters, which has fostered a feeling that established political parties and politicians are fundamentally all alike (Kriesi, 2014). This has led to political insecurity, cultivating an environment where populist voters are predisposed to vote for political outsiders, instead of for established and mainstream political actors.

The developments in economics, in the movement of people, and the creation of supra-national political organisations, are all said to increase feelings of insecurity amongst voters. These developments are also representations of increasing globalisation. Those members of society who feel culturally threatened by immigration, feel insecure as a result of changing economic fortunes, or are opposed to European integration or the general internationalisation of politics, are dubbed the 'losers of globalisation'. Under the 'losers of globalisation' thesis, it is these voters in particular who are most likely to adhere to populism (Kriesi, 2014). This constructs a potential electorate for populist political actors to appeal to.

The reasons behind the development of populism amongst voters are not the focus of my thesis. This discussion merely shows how voters may begin to adhere to populism via

insecurity. Additionally, voters may begin to adhere to populism simply as a form of political resentment, in the protest vote thesis, or through the 'support thesis'.

The protest vote thesis suggests that political resentment leads to people adhering to populism, including the need to protest against mainstream politics. An example of this is observed from the Italian radical right 'Lega Nord', and the desire of their voters to protest against the national government in Rome (Betz, 1994). Bergh (2004) identified two types of protest: 'system protest' and 'elite protest'. The former is rarer, but under 'system protest' voters are drawn to oppose political institutions. The latter is found to be more common, and is where voters protest against political elites, such as mainstream political parties and a mistrusted 'political class' (Bergh, 2004). This offers another account of how voters come to adhere with populism, further outlining a potential electorate for populist political actors to attract.

Voters may also begin to adhere to populism via the 'support thesis'. Policy preferences are important here. In brief, voters conform with populism by agreeing with the underlying policies proposed by a populist political actor (Mudde, 2007, p. 219). If a populist political actor, for example, was also rigorously anti-austerity, a voter who is also anti-austerity would conform with the populism of that political actor. A potential issue for my thesis arises here, as there is need to control for the effects of both voters' policy preferences and populism on radical left support. Otherwise, I may incorrectly deduce radical left support to be associated with policy-proximity and obscure the potential role of populism.

Initially, it would seem like this 'support thesis' undermines the extent I can view populism-based support for the radical left. If coexisting policy-preferences draw these voters to adhere with populism, how is this populism-based support rather than support based on policy-proximity? In response to this question, I draw attention to the responses to this 'support thesis'.

The fundamental flaw with this thesis is that it assumes a direct and causative link between radical policy preferences and populism, where voters adhere to populism if their own policy preferences match the radical ideology of a populist political actor (Mudde, 2007, p. 220). However, previous research into support for the populist radical right has identified evidence which counters this entirely. That research finds most supporters of the populist radical right

are not in fact 'extreme right' when placing themselves on an ideological scale, and that the majority of the 'extreme right' voters did not vote for populist radical right parties (Billiet & De Witte, 1995; Eith, 2003). Furthermore, other research has suggested that support for a radical right political actor was in fact due to its anti-elite message, rather than its right-wing ideology, further breaking this link between populism-based and policy-based support (Rooduijn, 2018, pp. 356-357).

What this means is that adherence to populism *may* arise from common policy preferences, but previous research has not definitively identified a causal relationship. Crucially, it is plausible to imagine that there are populist voters who do not share the stridently left-wing policy preferences of radical left political actors. Therefore, it is entirely possible that populism attracts people to support the radical left, but these voters do not also share policy preferences with these political actors.

I have explained three ways that voters may adhere to populism. Voters may be drawn to become populists and identify with their inherent 'us' vs. 'them' worldview through economic/cultural/political insecurity, through political resentment, or through concurrent support for the policies offered by populist political actors. Which of these most explains voter adherence to populism is not the focus of my thesis. The purpose of discussing these was purely to show how some voters may be more receptive than others to populist rhetoric, because they have developed populist-consistent attitudes themselves already.

To bring this back to the radical left, on the supply side radical left political actors spread their economic policies which draw attention to inequality and include anti-elite rhetoric focused on big businesses and the rich, while also making redistributive appeals to the 'ordinary people'. On the demand side, voters adhere to the 'us' vs. 'them' nature of populism, and are assumed to support political actors which call for opposition towards 'elites'. In this situation, populist voters may be drawn to the anti-elite economic policies of the radical left. There is then potential for levels of populism to be associated with support for the radical left.

Under the populism-based theory, the expectation is that *voters who adhere to populism will be more supportive of radical left political actors, relative to voters who do not adhere to populism.* To separate populist voters from voters who are not populists, I use survey questions which ask about adherence to anti-elitism, a Manichaean worldview, and support for popular

sovereignty. Populist voters would adhere to a Manichaean 'good' versus 'bad' division of the world, would oppose 'elite' groups, and would profess support for popular sovereignty.

Looking at the causal pathway of this account, support for the radical left arises from pre-existing populist attitudes. More specifically, pro-radical left voters *first* have populist attitudes, and *subsequently* support the radical left actor. As with policy-proximity, there is potential for reverse-causality here, arising from persuasion effects. In this case, support occurring first and then subsequently persuading these pro-radical left voters to adhere with populism. This situation would appear to support the populism-based account, but in reality populist adherence would be a consequence of, rather than a cause of, radical left support. This potential for reverse-causality means there is also an imperative here to address persuasion effects. Doing so is important to accurately determining whether voter populism explains support for the radical left.

A final point of note is how this account relates to the case studies in my thesis. There is a degree of diversity between the cases in my research; between the non-mainstream radical left in Germany, versus the radical left in the US and UK cases which have occurred within mainstream governmental parties. Although it is possible for mainstream ex-governing parties to express populist messages – for example, *PASOK* in Greece (Pappas, 2015) – this does raise the issue of how the wider governing legacies of these parties potentially disrupt the populism-based account in my research. Specifically, challenging mainstream political actors is a common populist appeal. However, if this appeal instead emanated from a mainstream political actor, populist voters would conceivably meet this with scepticism. Consequently, this potentially creates a situation where I see more support for the non-mainstream radical left in Germany, compared to the radical left appearing within mainstream parties in the US and UK cases. This is a point I will take into account when drawing my final conclusions. The diverse cases in my analysis then potentially become an advantage, as I can see how populism-based support compares between the non-governing and non-mainstream German radical left, versus the previously incumbent US and UK cases.

2.3: Theory Chapter: Conclusion

To conclude this chapter, I will summarise both the policy-proximity and populism-based accounts of radical left support considered in my thesis.

The spatial theory of voting is well-established in the field of political support and voting behaviour. That established nature is an important justification for considering the policy-proximity account, which derives from that theory. The policy-proximity account suggests support for the radical left will be a function of levels of proximity voters have with these political actors. The voters in closer proximity with the radical left political actor would be more supportive of them, and the voters located further from the radical left would be less supportive of them. This broad expectation comes from the assumption of self-interested voters wishing to maximise utility, and that voters can identify where competing political actors are spatially located relative to their 'ideal point' of preferred policy outcomes. The application of the spatial theory in my thesis, referred to as the 'policy-proximity account', focuses on three plausibly relevant policy dimensions, relating to economic, cultural, and migration policy preferences.

The second potential explanation of radical left support which I consider in this thesis is the populism-based account. Populism is defined by an 'us' vs. 'them' dynamic, appealing to the 'ordinary people' to oppose an 'elite' group. Populism as a theory of electoral support has been frequently applied to the radical right, making it another established account. The primary justification for applying the populism-based account in my thesis is found in the connection between the radical left's economic policies and populism. Specifically, the radical left's economic policies are quite populist through their anti-elite nature. Therefore, there is a possibility that support for radical left political actors is associated with levels of populism amongst voters.

Chapter 3: Research Design

3.0: Introduction

In the previous chapter I outlined a series of theories that could explain support for the radical left. Prior to that, I provided an overview of the current state of research in the field of radical political actors. In that literature review I highlighted gaps in existing research. How I test both the policy-proximity and populism-based accounts, and how I address these gaps in existing literature, is explained in greater detail in this chapter.

The first half of this chapter provides a general overview and explanation of the approach arising from the research question. I discuss the survey data, which is necessary to test both accounts here. I also explain the modelling approaches which are used in the analysis of this survey data. Overall, the early parts of this chapter explain the general methodology of my thesis and the rationale behind this.

The second half of this chapter focuses on case selection. I will discuss the three case studies in my thesis: *Die Linke* in Germany, the 2016 Sanders presidential campaign in the US, and the Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn in the UK.

3.1: Overall Methodology

In Chapter 1 I identified party-level accounts and voter-level accounts of radical left support. Party-level research places the party as the unit of analysis, with research then seeking to explain variation in support of these parties. There may then be focus on the party's policies, their leadership, and their levels of organisation, to explain electoral support. However, my thesis instead focuses upon voter-level data, which allows me to examine whether voters with particular opinions support the radical left, rather than just whether radical left political actors do well or badly in certain countries. To be clear, voters become the unit of analysis in the voter-level approach of my thesis, with me analysing how their policy preferences and populist attitudes are associated with support for radical left political actors.

The voter-level approach which is present in my thesis relies on survey data. Such data allows me to examine how support for the radical left is associated with voters' policy-proximity

with the radical left, and how far levels of populism amongst voters explains support for the radical left.

3.1.1: Survey Data

Survey data allows for my thesis to take place by providing individual-level data to test both accounts of radical left support. Thinking about those two theories brings me to an important area of consideration, relating to the requirements of this survey data. There are three core requirements of these surveys: the first being inclusion of a measure of support for the radical left, and the second and third relating directly to the policy-proximity and populism-based accounts.

The first requirement is the most fundamental. The surveys need to ask respondents about their attitudes towards a radical left political actor. This is the dependent variable across my voter-level analysis. As I said in the previous chapter, attitudes towards the radical left may be expressed in different ways – utility (evaluation) of a radical left political actor, or vote choice for the radical left political actor.

I briefly stated my preference for evaluation questions in Chapter 1, in contrast to much of the existing literature into radical left support. To explain this preference in greater detail, vote choice responses are a function not only of appraisals of a political actor, but also factors like voter position relative to other political actors and the competitiveness of those actors in that electoral system.This wider choice context adds complexities; for example, with vote choice questions there would be the added task of identifying where all competing political actors are located on the policy dimensions, including political actors other than the radical left. The task of identifying the locations of all political actors can be complex, and incorrect positioning of one among several actors could yield misleading results. Evaluation questions are more separate from this wider choice context, however, meaning there is no need with these questions to identify (and potentially misidentify) the positions of all competing political actors.

An additional area I consider when deciding between evaluations versus choice is how they both relate to each other. Both plausibly tap into support for the radical left, but do evaluations predict vote choice? Likewise, does vote choice predict evaluations for political actors?

Evidence suggests that evaluations are predictive of vote choice, although they do not completely map onto these choices, whereas the opposite – vote choice mapping onto evaluations – is not the case (Macdonald, et al., 2001, p. 492). Further support for evaluation measures, in the form of numerical ratings, is also present in existing literature where these were found to be imperfect but suitable measures of utility (Eggers & Vivyan, 2020, p. 473). Responses to vote choice questions are impacted upon by multiple contextual factors, such as the positions of other political actors and the competitiveness of the radical left given the electoral system. However, I do not want these contextual factors feeding into dependent variable responses. Consequently, I favour use of evaluation questions in my thesis, instead of vote choice questions.[8]

The second requirement of the surveys relates to the policy-proximity account. This account assumes voter-actor proximity in policy spaces explains candidate evaluations and electoral support. In relation to the radical left in my thesis, this account broadly expects voters well to the left on economics would be more supportive of radical left political actors, and voters in close proximity with these actors on the cultural and migration policy dimensions would also have higher support for them. Therefore, examination of this account requires measurement of the policy preferences of voters on these three dimensions. Without indication of these policy preferences, I would be unable to test the policy-proximity account of radical left support.

I have a preference here for questions asking about policy preferences in the form of multiple-item batteries of questions. This as opposed to single-item self-placement scales, where respondents are asked to indicate their policy preferences in a single question, asking them to place themselves on a left/right or libertarian/authoritarian scale. Instead, multiple-item batteries ask respondents a series of related questions, often but not always with a five-level Likert-type scale of responses.

---

[8] Concurrently analysing radical left support via vote choice questions would require a whole separate explanation of the theory in the context of an electoral choice (rather than utility), and separate expectations for each case context given different positions of non-radical left actors in each country. As this would add complications to my analysis, both in practice and interpretation, I have opted not to carry out this concurrent vote choice-based analysis.

The preference for multiple-item batteries over single-item questions or scales is founded upon research which has tested the explanatory power of both in the context of electoral support. This research found that compared to a single nationalisation question, a self-placement left-right scale, a multi-item left-right scale, and the postmaterialism scale from Inglehart (1977), that the multi-item left-right scale was the best predictor of electoral support (Evans, et al., 1996). The same research also found that the self-placement left-right scale was highly unreliable at predicting voters' ideological positions on libertarian-authoritarian (cultural) and left-right (economic) dimensions, especially amongst respondents who were not politically informed (Evans, et al., 1996, p. 107). Respondents potentially misunderstand questions in surveys; however, with multiple questions feeding into the policy dimensions and populism the consequences of misunderstanding a single question are mitigated. Therefore, I have a preference here for multi-item batteries of questions when drawing out the populism and policy preferences of survey respondents, instead of single-item self-placement ideological scales.

To draw out economic policy preferences, I look for questions relating to views around taxation vs. spending, and about redistribution including whether government should encourage greater equality. For cultural policy, I look for questions relating to individual rights, including LGBT rights, law and order policies, and abortion. For migration policy, I look for questions regarding border policy and treatment of immigrants. These are broadly the questions I use, to draw out policy preferences on each of the three policy dimensions. However, the questions I end up using is highly dependent on what is available in survey data. As a result, there is some variance in questions used – especially when guaging cultural policy preferences. For example, the issue of guns is a cultural policy in the US context, and in the UK case the concept of traditional 'British values' and obedience to authority features in survey data. I include these issues when measuring voters cultural policy preferences in both cases, but the consequent variability may raise questions over the comparability of results across cases. In response, I also run a robustness test in the US and UK cases. In this test I look at the role of cultural policy-proximity based on a stripped back set of policy measures, not including guns in the US case, and not including 'British values' in the UK case.

Refraining from single-item self-placement scales sets my thesis apart from many existing contributions in this field (Ramiro, 2016; Ramiro & Gomez, 2016). Furthermore, my use of multi-item batteries of questions differentiates my thesis from that of Akkerman et al. (2017). That research included a similar range of variables to those considered in my thesis, but application of a cultural policy variable was derived from a single question relating to law and order, whereas my cultural policy variable is drawn from multiple questions.

The third requirement of the surveys relates to the populism-based account. This account suggests high levels of voter populist sentiment will be associated with support for the radical left. Therefore, I need some indication of the populist attitudes of voters. As with the questions relating to policy preferences, there is a preference here also for multi-item batteries of questions pertaining to populism. These questions ask about support for popular sovereignty, attitudes to politics and politicians, adherence with anti-elitism, and how far respondents have a 'good' versus 'evil' Manichaean worldview. These questions are commonly used in other voter-level accounts of populism and electoral support, for example Akkerman et al. (2014; 2017), and van Hauwaert et al. (2020). The fact that they have appeared in many other voter-level accounts of populism and electoral support indicates they provide robust and reliable measurement of populist attitudes amongst survey respondents.

This leads me to the three core requirements of survey data: measures of radical left support, of policy preferences, and of populist attitudes. All three of these requirements need to be met to test the theoretical accounts of interest in my thesis. Consequently, radical left political actors which occur in countries where survey data does not satisfy these three requirements cannot be included in my thesis.

Another consideration with these surveys is control variables. In order to gain a more accurate understanding of the roles of preferences on each policy dimension, and the role of populist attitudes on radical left support, I also need to control for a range of other factors which potentially also impact on support for the radical left. These other factors relate to other determinants of electoral support, for example ethnicity, socioeconomic class, and education levels. Something else looked for in these surveys is questions relating to other explanatory factors, from which the impacts of these can be controlled. Although not a strict requirement of the surveys used in my thesis, the inclusion of control variables is still important in order

to gain a more precise picture of how policy-proximity and populism impact on support for the radical left. The specific control variables which are considered, including case-specific controls, are discussed in the chapters on each case study.

In my thesis, I use multivariate regression to examine the relationship between support for the radical left, with populist attitudes and policy-proximity with voters. Also included in these regressions are control variables.

Looking first at the variables of interest, policy preferences and populism, how are these variables included in these regressions? Remember I draw indication of the policy preferences and populism of each respondent from multiple-item batteries of questions. By averaging responses across these multiple questions, I obtain an overall impression of policy preferences on each dimension, and of populist attitudes. I then group respondents based on these averaged responses to policy and populism questions. I add these groups to the regressions, and then observe how radical left support varies based on the differing policy preferences and populist attitudes of the respondents reflected in these groups.

My primary reason for including policy preferences and populism as groups is so I can observe non-linear relationships between these and radical left support. I do not necessarily expect non-linear relationships to be present, but if they do exist then I can observe them by including these as groups. For example, with these groups I would be able to observe greater radical left support from voters located at the centre-right of the economic policy dimension, if this turns out to be the case contrary to expectations. This is one example of a possible non-linear relationship, which I would be able to observe by using this grouping methodology. The alternative to including these variables as groups would be to simply add voter positions as scalar variables into the regressions. From this I would examine how a change in, for example, the measured voter position on economic policy impacts on support for the radical left. However, that approach would assume a linear association between position on this dimension and radical left support.

Across existing literature, it is more common to forgo grouping, in favour of this alternative with scalar variables in the regression models. That being said, I am not alone in pursuing this

grouping methodology. Justification for this approach appears in previous research, relating to regression analysis specifically – '[…] *it is appropriate to discretize a continuous variable if a simple monotonic or quadratic relation does not seem appropriate*.' (Gelman & Hill, 2007, pp. 66-67). Furthermore, grouping respondents has also featured in previous research on UK voting behaviour, where it allowed for easier observation of non-linear relationships between demographic groups and strategic voting (Eggers & Vivyan, 2020).

I group respondents in a way which accounts for the distribution of the data.[9] This is important for making the groups more comparably sized to each other, as responses across policy and populism questions are not uniformly distributed. Without considering the distribution of the data when formulating these groups, there would be disproportionately small groups, from which there would be less reliable inferences. More comparably sized groups would lead to more reliable inferences from these. I form five groups on each policy dimension, with five groups also drawn from responses to populism questions. These five groups allow me to distinguish between radicals, moderates, and those who have intermediate responses to survey questions.

The grouping methodology allows me to readily observe non-linear relationships, should they exist, rather than imposing linear functional form on these variables. Additionally, supporting my analysis with groups, I also provide supplementary results following the more common scalar methodology. I briefly discuss these supplementary results with scalar variables in my analysis of radical left support, and appendicise these regression models.

The groups here are stated in relative terms, so for example the 'Radical-Liberal' group on the cultural policy dimension comprises respondents who are, relative to all who answered cultural policy questions, the most culturally-liberal. Likewise, respondents in the 'Centrist' groups on each dimension are those whose positions are in the centre relative to the overall distribution of responses. Identifying respondents' positions and labelling these groups in this relative rather than absolute way is also consistent with my defining of the radical left relative to the context of these political actors.

---

[9] Using 'Quantile' function in R, which provides cut points to divide data into five groups of more comparable sizes than if the scale were divided into equal parts (ie. 0–2, 2–4, 4–6, 6–8, 8–10).

The regressions include groups relating to policy preferences and populist attitudes. Alongside these, I also include control variables. I mentioned these earlier, in the context of drawing these from survey data. In the context of analysis, I include these control variables in the regressions, in order to separate the impacts of these variables from the roles of policy-proximity and levels of populist sentiment. Consequently, these control variables clarify the respective roles of policy-proximity and populism on support for the radical left.

Regressions are a staple of voter-level research into electoral support. However, they do not represent the sole method of analysis in my thesis. I also include descriptive analysis. In the UK case study, I include tables which present average radical left evaluations from policy and populism groups. These are similar to the regressions, but do not include control variables, and focus on presenting the absolute levels of evaluation for the radical left in that case study.

3.1.3: Summary of Approach

The two accounts I consider in my thesis suggest support for the radical left is related to proximity in policy spaces and populist attitudes of voters. Therefore, survey data needed to include measures of support for the radical left, but also voters' policy preferences and levels of populism. From responses to questions on each policy dimension, and relating to populism, I place survey respondents into groups. I explained this grouping methodology previously, and justify this approach based on its ability to show possible non-linear relationships between these variables of interest and radical left support. Analysis primarily comes via regression analysis. These regressions demonstrate relationships between policy preferences and populism with radical left support, relative to a baseline group, and with control on the roles of other explanatory factors.

A final point to note is that the period of analysis in my research is between 2015 and 2017. All of the survey data that I examine, across the three case studies, comes from that two-year period. Following the 2008 financial crisis, and resulting recession, all three case studies suffered economic downturns leading to government responses which included austerity policies involving substantial and controversial reductions government spending. In this unifying context of economic difficulties, there was not only the potential for widespread voter discontent but also for a rise in salience around economic policy. Although broadly unified by economic downturns, these three cases also differ in some respects. For example,

the UK's decision to exit from the European Union dominates that case study's politics in this period. However, I do not need the cases to be entirely comparable. What I can see is some common conditions across them though, especially relating to economics.

3.2: Case Studies

Attention in this half of the chapter is on providing an overview of the case studies; specifically, how the three case studies in my thesis complement each other and allow me to test my theories of interest. Consequently, I divide this section into four parts. In the first three of these I discuss each of the three case studies. In the final part I consider other instances of the radical left and explain why I do not include them as case studies in my thesis.

Before that, the inclusion of three cases in my thesis contrasts with the single-country case studies (for example, Akkerman et al., 2017). Inclusion of multiple case studies provides a stronger test of both theoretical accounts I examine. If I were to find, across all three cases, consistent support for either policy-proximity or populism-based account, this would provide stronger evidence in favour of that account of radical left support than similar findings from one case study alone.

Another advantage of my case selection here is that it brings together the more established radical left, in the multiparty German context, with the more emerging radical left in the US and UK contexts which have fewer major parties. The initial advantage of this is examination of radical left support between a multiparty versus more limited party contexts, from which perhaps there will be notable reflections on findings. Beyond that also, these contexts are important when addressing persuasion effects, as with the more emerging radical left it is easier to isolate policy-proximity and populism-based effects on support, with these variables less likely to have been affected by pre-existing support for less established radical left actors.

Thus, my consideration of these three case studies is an important contribution made by my thesis and builds on previous research into radical left support.

3.2.1: Germany case study

My German case study focuses on the *Die Linke* party. I have previously described this case study as the 'classic' example of a radical left actor. I use this description for two reasons.

Firstly, because *Die Linke* is well-recognised as being on the radical left of German politics in contrast to its competitors and arising from its position as successor to the GDR's ruling party. Secondly, because existing literature has generally focused on political parties like *Die Linke* before. For example, the *SP* in the Netherlands (Akkerman, et al., 2017), both radical left political parties – *Podemos* and *IU* – in Spain (Ramiro & Gomez, 2016), and *SYRIZA* in Greece (Kioupkiolis & Katsambekis, 2018). Therefore, *Die Linke* is similar to the actors focused upon in a great deal of existing radical left research.

Other than its status as a classical case study, a further feature of the German case is its cross-sectional nature. This means I observe support for *Die Linke* at a single period, with survey data for this case study coming from the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES). This has the advantage that there is one set of prevailing circumstances feeding into stated support for this political actor. By 'prevailing circumstances' I mean the multiple background factors which may affect responses, such as economic performance, unemployment level, and many other factors.

However, the German case study faces the problem of persuasion effects. I discussed this in the literature review and explained why it is important to deal with this issue, so I can isolate and observe the effects of policy-proximity and populism on radical left support. To counter this, I need to separate the policy preferences and populism of voters from pre-existing support they may have for radical left political actors. The suggestion of Brody and Page to address this is through the use of panel data (Brody & Page, 1972, p. 458), through which I can draw voters' policy preferences and populism from before the radical left came to prominence, and thus before the radical left could potentially cause persuasion effects.

The established nature of *Die Linke* means voters are plausibly more likely to have supported or associated themselves with this party. In turn, this may have caused voters to shift their policy preferences or populist attitudes to match those emanating from *Die Linke*. Panel data cannot realistically separate pre-existing *Die Linke* support from voters' policy preferences or populist attitudes, as it would need to stretch back for decades to allow this. Therefore, I am unable to separate *Die Linke*'s persuasion effects from the policy preferences and populism of voters. I can mitigate the impacts of possible persuading factors, such as how identification with German political parties may cause voters to have higher or lower evaluations for *Die*

Linke. However, control variables cannot separate the impacts of these effects persuading voters to alter their policy preferences and populist attitudes. Therefore, these control variables only partially address the issue of persuasion here.

The German case study has advantages and disadvantages. In its favour is its cross-sectional nature. With this, I observe support for the radical left party *Die Linke* in a single wave with a single set of prevailing circumstances. However, a downside of this case study relates to persuasion effects. The established nature of *Die Linke* is important here because this means voters are more likely to have had their policy preferences and populist attitudes persuaded by this political actor. I also cannot mitigate this with panel data, given *Die Linke*'s long presence in German politics. Overall, the role this case study plays is the classic radical left political actor, taking a similar form to radical left political actors which have featured in existing research in this field. However, like those other contributions the issue of persuasion effects needs to be dealt with more thoroughly. This brings me to the other two case studies in my thesis.

3.2.2: US Case Study

Unlike the German case study, the US case study does not consider a classic radical left political party. Instead, a radical left political candidate is the focus in this case study. Specifically, the Bernie Sanders presidential campaign in the 2016 Democratic Party primaries. I argue in Chapter 5 that the 2016 Sanders campaign is a radical left political actor, showing how it conforms with the minimal definition used in this thesis. In brief, though, the 2016 Sanders campaign competed against the moderately left-wing presidential campaign of Hillary Clinton, which represents the centre left counterpart to Sanders' radical left candidacy.

I draw survey data for this case study from two surveys: the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) and the American National Election Study (ANES).

The primaries system present in US elections is an advantage of this case study. It separates support for the centre left Clinton campaign from support for the radical left Sanders campaign, in the intra-party primaries contest where I can examine support for each respective candidacy. This intra-party context addresses one specific persuasion effect – partisan attachments. Attachments to the wider Democratic Party are not likely to lead to

persuasion where policy preferences or populist attitudes are altered to conform specifically with the Sanders campaign. Therefore, the nature of this case study mitigates the impacts of partisan attachments as a potential persuasion effect.

On the other hand, this does not mean attachments to *Sanders* do not exist, with these attachments specifically to Sanders then potentially causing their own persuasion effects. This is a possibility because the survey data in the US case study comes from after the 2016 Democratic presidential primaries. Thus, voters may have recently formed attachments specifically to the Sanders campaign, which in turn may impact upon policy preferences and populism of voters. Consequently, the US case study is not totally immune to the charge of persuasion effects.

However, in contrast to the German case study the Sanders campaign does not represent an established radical left political party. Instead it is a radical left political actor in an intra-party context – the 2016 Democratic primaries. The consequence of this political actor not being an established feature of US politics is that voters are plausibly less likely to have formed attachments to this political actor. Without these long-standing attachments, it is conceivable that any persuasion effect which has occurred would be weaker in the US case study than *Die Linke*'s persuasion effect on German voters.

Like the German case study, the US case study is cross-sectional in nature, drawing observations of support for the radical left from a single time period. Again, this has the advantage of responses at a single time period. Furthermore, the US primaries system presents this case study as an actual electoral choice, where support for the radical left Sanders campaign is analysed against support for the centre left Clinton campaign. Focus is then on the policy-proximity and populism-based reasons behind voting for one of these candidates over the other. This is also reflected by the dependent variable in the US case study. There are no measures of evaluation for Sanders as well as Clinton in either the CCES or ANES. Therefore, the dependent variable in this case study is a vote choice question, asking respondents which candidate they voted for in the 2016 presidential primaries. Although vote choice questions raise complexities, like having to identify the positions of competing candidates on policy dimensions, with the Democratic primaries in 2016 there are only two

candidates to locate – Sanders' campaign, and Clinton's campaign.[10] Placing two political actors is manageable; added to that, the lack of evaluation questions for both Sanders and Clinton necessitates the use of vote choice questions instead.

The US case study forms part of the response to the German case. In particular, through greater ability to mitigate persuasion effects. Possible persuasion arising from partisan attachments is addressed in this case study, by the intra-party context of the Sanders campaign. However, attachments with Sanders himself may have caused persuasion of voters' policy preferences and populism into line with his campaign, but this is plausibly limited by the less established nature of this radical left actor. Nevertheless, the US case study forms part of my response to persuasion effects, while also providing an examination of policy-proximity and populism-based support for a radical left political actor in an intra-party context.

3.2.3: UK Case Study

Moving to the final case study, the radical left in the UK is the Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn. The surprising rise of Corbyn to Labour's leadership began the notable shift of that political party from the centre left to the radical left. I explain the context of this shift, and Labour's radical leftism under Corbyn's leadership more in Chapter 6 of this thesis.

In the German and US case studies, cross-sectional data was utilised, with this justified based on the single range of prevailing circumstances with the sole wave of data. However, with cross-sectional data I cannot separate pre-existing radical left support from voters' policy preferences and populism. In response to this downside, I use panel data in the UK case study instead, with this drawn from the British Election Study (BES). Panel surveys track responses of a sample over time, allowing me to observe radical left support at multiple points in time from the same respondents. These over-time responses are crucial to the way the UK case study accounts for the previously discussed issue of persuasion effects.[11]

---

[10] In 56/57 contests during the 2016 Democratic presidential primaries, Sanders and Clinton were the only two candidates.

[11] Panel data not used in US case study because it does not include questions related to support for Bernie Sanders 2016 campaign. I did not use panel data in the Germany case study for two reasons: first, because panel data in the Germany case would not reach back far enough to mitigate persuasion

Thoroughly controlling for persuasion effects requires separation of voters' policy preferences and populism from the influence of a radical left political actor. In the UK case study, the panel data design better separates pre-existing radical left support from policy preferences. I separate them by measuring voters' policy preferences from before Corbyn became Labour leader, thus before Labour shifted to the radical left. Therefore, although support for the Labour Party would have existed in this pre-Corbyn wave, with this impacting on policy preferences, that support was not for a radical left Labour Party at that point, because Corbyn was not yet Labour leader. Consequently, in the pre-Corbyn data there was no radical left political actor present for policy preferences to have been persuaded by. I then examine how Labour evaluations changed between the 2015 (pre-Corbyn) wave of panel data, and the 2017 (post-Corbyn) wave of data, from groups of voters with varying policy preferences.

This separation is possible because the BES includes policy questions on all three dimensions, as well as the dependent variable question, in both the pre-Corbyn and post-Corbyn waves of data. However, I cannot carry out the same separation with voters' populist attitudes, as the BES only includes populism questions in post-Corbyn waves. Therefore, while the UK case study does get around radical left persuasion effects in relation to voters' policy preferences, I am unable to take the same approach to separate these from the populist attitudes of voters. Using post-Corbyn measures of populism potentially biases results in favour of this account, as the persuasion effect of Corbyn's radical leftism would cause voters to become more populist. This is something to be mindful of with the UK case study's populism-based results.

The dependent variable in the UK case study is a measure of evaluation, this time for the Labour Party, rather than a vote choice dependent variable. In this case study I examine how Labour Party evaluations change over time between pre-Corbyn and post-Corbyn waves of BES data.

Crucially, with the UK case study I break the link between possible radical left persuasion effects and policy preferences. This is not possible with the German case study, nor wholly achievable with the US case study, and is a key advantage of the UK case study. The consequence of breaking that link is that I can examine the effects of policy-proximity on

---

effects from the long-extant *Die Linke*; and second, because cross-sectional data has the advantage of coming from a single period (and a single set of prevailing circumstances).

support for the radical left, and mitigate the possible criticism that these policy preferences are the product of persuasion effects arising from pre-existing support for a radical left political actor.

3.2.4: Alternative Case Studies

The German, American, and British case studies in my thesis represent three examples of radical left political actors, with each of these case studies serving a different function: Germany as the 'classic' case study, akin to those in existing literature in this field; the US case study examining voting for a radical left political actor in an intra-party context, and thus addressing the persuasion effect of Democratic Party attachments; the UK using panel data to separate over time potential persuasion effects of the Corbyn-led Labour Party from voters' policy preferences. Yet these three case studies do not represent the full range of radical left political actors. In this sub-section, I will address some other well-known radical left political actors, and answer the question of why they do not feature in my analysis.

The radical left *Podemos* in Spain and *SYRIZA* in Greece have previously been mentioned in this thesis; in particular in the literature review, where they have featured in other analyses of radical left political actors. Yet they do not feature as case studies.

The reason *Podemos* is not included is because the Spanish election study – *Centro de Investigacione Sociólogicas* – does not include measures of populism or policy preferences relating to economic, cultural, and migration policy.[12] This means I am unable to include this case study in my policy-proximity and populism-based analysis of radical left support. Furthermore, as a reasonably established radical left political actor – certainly to a greater extent than the radical left in the UK and US case studies – there is potential for voters to have pre-existing support for or attachments to *Podemos*, from which there would be a risk of persuasion effects causing voters to alter policy preferences and populist attitudes into line with this political actor.

---

[12] Closest reference to policy preferences in Spanish election surveys is a single question asking respondents to place themselves on a left/right scale which does not specifically refer to economic policy preferences. Respondents then judge their position based on econ *and* non-econ preferences, whereas I want to separate the impacts of econ and non-econ policy-proximity.

Similar reasons prevent *SYRIZA* from featuring in my analysis. The *ELNES* is the Greek election survey; however, this also does not meet the requirements for my thesis. Specifically, it includes no measures of cultural policy preferences and very limited data on economic and migration policy preferences. However, requirements are met by this election survey's battery of populism questions, which broadly mirror those used in each of my three case studies. The lack of survey data in Greece forms a practical reason why support for *SYRIZA* is not examined in my thesis. In addition to this, again there are potential persuasion effects arising from pre-existing support for this political actor. Difficulties working around that possible persuasion form another reason not to include this case study in my thesis.

Other radical left political actors also fall foul of their national election surveys when considered for inclusion in my thesis, including the French radical left *La France Insoumise*, for example, with France's election study being comparatively tiny in terms of responses – numbering at only 1,830 (Gougou & Sauger, 2017), and likely dropping significantly once non-responses are excluded. Furthermore, this election study contains a rather limited range of questions on economic attitudes of respondents. Survey data which does not meet the requirements for my analysis is what prevents a French case study. In terms of persuasion effects, it might be possible with this relatively new political actor to employ similar controls to those used with the UK case study, and draw measures of policy preferences and populism from before this political actor existed or became prominent. However, this cannot happen with unsuitable survey data.

The lack of survey data was the issue preventing a French case study. However, this is not the case with the Dutch radical left *Socialistische Partij* (SP). The Netherlands features survey data – the Dutch Parliamentary Election Study (DPES) – which includes measures of economic, cultural, and migration policy preferences, levels of populism, and measures of radical left support. However, the *SP* has also received a great deal of attention from previous research, for example the research of Akkerman et al. (2014; 2017). The previous attention the Dutch radical left has received causes me to consider other radical left political actors which have received less coverage.

Survey data is a major determining factor when including case studies in my thesis. A great deal of research similar to mine has utilised data from the European Social Survey (Rooduijn,

et al., 2017; Ramiro, 2016; Visser, et al., 2014). However, I do not use ESS data in my thesis. I previously discussed this research which used ESS data in the literature review, under voter-level accounts of the radical left. The ESS includes some measures relating to policy preferences; however, a major downside of this survey data relative to my requirements is its lack of questions relating to populist attitudes. Consequently, the ESS does not meet all data requirements, and thus cannot make up for the deficiencies identified in the country-specific surveys present in Greece and Spain, as well as others.

The chief concern highlighted here in the case selection process is the availability of suitable survey data. The three case studies in my thesis all come with appropriate survey data, including indication of voter policy preferences on all three dimensions, their populist attitudes, and support for the radical left. In addition to this, I have shown how in two of my case studies – the US and UK cases – I separate potential radical left persuasion effects from voters' policy preferences or populism. Other case studies discussed here might have been able to fill the role of *Die Linke* in my thesis, as they are also established radical left political parties. However, the fact they exist in countries without suitable survey data excludes them from appearing as case studies in my thesis.

3.2.5: Case Study Comparison

In this final sub-section, I return to the case studies which do feature in my thesis. Specifically, drawing out the differences between these cases, but also the crucial set of similarities that form the core of my investigation into support for the radical left.

The three case studies differ by dependent variable, with the German and UK cases looking at radical left evaluations, but the US case looking at vote choices. Then there is the cross-sectional nature of the German and US analysis, versus the panel-based over-time UK case study. Also, the cases differ by their wider party contexts: Germany being a multiparty system, the US a two-party system, and the UK a limited multiparty system with two dominant parties. Finally, there are some differences in survey questions that I draw upon, especially when testing cultural policy-proximity. I fully acknowledge these differences, but these raise the question of how comparable my findings are across these cases.

Some of these differences do alter my analysis slightly. For example, the different dependent variables between the German/UK cases and the US case is something I have to account for when discussing results. Additionally, robustness testing of cultural policy-proximity from the stripped back set of survey measures addresses differences in questions building this dimension. Whereas the cross-sectional versus panel-based difference is also something I make clear when interpreting results, and brings the advantage in the UK case of more rigorously addressing persuasion effects.

Overriding these points, however, are the common expectations across the three case studies which fundamentally unite them. Regardless of the foibles of case context, small alterations in design, and noteworthy points when interpreting results, my research remains the same in terms of the practical tests of both policy-proximity and populism-based accounts. I still test how far radical left support is explained by policy-proximity and populist attitudes, and as such I remain able to draw broad conclusions in relation to both these accounts.

My reliance on secondary survey data, which is non-uniform in the questions asked, inevitably introduces differences between these three cases. But adopting the approach I have here, which respects and accounts for some of the differences in this secondary survey data, arguably produces stronger tests of both theories in each case study. The alternative would be I, for example, measure radical left support via vote choices in the German and UK cases, to match the US case. However, pursuing this course would lead to a disadvantageous trade-off, sacrificing theoretical and empirical clarity for the sake of greater case similarity. Furthermore, the common expectations across my cases when testing policy-proximity and populism allow for comparable results. From that point I can still draw wider conclusions that reflect on both those accounts, and provide an answer to my research question.

3.3: Research Design Conclusion

This chapter has discussed two major areas of my thesis: the overall methodology, and the case studies. To summarise what I said about methodology first, surveys provide voter-level data from which I observe whether voters with particular policy preferences or levels of populism are more supportive of radical left political actors. I also explained grouping of survey respondents here, based on their policy preferences and populist attitudes. Grouping

respondents enables me to readily observe non-linear relationships between these variables and radical left support, should they exist. I do not necessarily expect non-linear relationships, although this is something I discuss further in each of my three case study chapters. I also explained the use of regressions, which are the primary means of analysis in my thesis, with control variables also included in these regressions in order to provide a more accurate picture of the roles of policy preferences and populism.

Following that, I discussed the case studies. This section was important in many ways, including justifying why it is the radical left in Germany, the US, and UK which feature in my thesis and not others. I also showed how these three case studies each make contributions, including addressing the issue of persuasion effects.

The German case study acts as the classic case study with its focus on a radical left political party – *Die Linke*. However, the established nature of this political party means I cannot separate its persuasion effects from voters' policy preferences or populist attitudes. The US and UK case studies were set out in response to this charge. The US case study addresses this by looking at a radical left political actor in an intra-party context – the Sanders campaign in the 2016 Democratic Party presidential primaries. In the UK case study, looking at the UK Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn, I use panel data to thoroughly separate possible persuasion effects from voters' policy preferences. I do this by taking measures of policy preferences from before Labour's radical left shift under Corbyn's leadership, and thus before a radical left actor was around to potentially cause persuasion. As I explained earlier in my thesis, mitigating persuasion effects is not only an important contribution to existing research, but it also means the roles of policy-proximity and populism on radical left support are more accurately identified here.

Chapter 4: The Radical Left in Germany

4.0: Introduction

The first case study investigates policy-proximity and populism-based motivations behind radical left support in Germany. The radical left political actor examined here is *Die Linke*. Developing and evolving out of the far-left politics of the GDR, *Die Linke* remains a significant political force in Germany today, currently holding 69 seats in the Bundestag. Furthermore, relative to other political actors within Germany, I show how *Die Linke* is a radical left political actor.

Die Linke's ideology is the main justification for deeming this political party to be radical left. I show how *Die Linke* propose more radical policies, particularly on economics, compared to other left-wing political actors in Germany. In contrast to the other case studies in this thesis, *Die Linke* is an established radical left political party, rather than a primaries candidacy or a shifting political party.

I divide this chapter into four parts. The first section will contextualise *Die Linke*. In this section I will discuss the place of *Die Linke* within German politics. The objective of this section is to argue that *Die Linke* is the radical left political actor in Germany, meeting the minimal definition of the radical left. That minimal definition defines the radical left by their opposition towards contemporary capitalist economic norms within their context. This section contrasts their more radically left-wing policies with those of the centre-left *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (*SPD*), and the culturally-liberal Green Party of Germany. In addition to qualitative analysis of party manifestos, I draw quantitative support for *Die Linke*'s radical leftism from the Chapel Hill expert surveys.

In the second part of this chapter, I outline the research design of the German case study. This shows how I measure support for *Die Linke* based on the policy preferences and levels of populism of survey respondents in Germany. I draw these responses from the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES). I outline which questions are used to measure economic, cultural, and migration policy preferences of respondents. I also show which questions I use to derive levels of populism amongst voters, and how I measure support for the radical left

Die Linke. I also state control variables here, with these guided by other accounts of electoral support in Germany.

Following this, I discuss empirical expectations for the German case study in the third part of this chapter. I draw case-specific expectations relating to the policy-proximity and populism-based accounts. Consequently, expectations in this chapter are specific to the German case study.

The fourth and final part of this chapter is an analysis section. I use linear regressions to present support for *Die Linke*, from GLES respondents grouped according to their policy preferences and levels of populism. I present results of the German case study here. Overall, I find little evidence to support the populism-based account of radical left support. However, I find support for the policy-proximity account across all three policy dimensions – particularly on the economic policy dimension. Relative to voters identified in the centre of the policy dimensions, I find higher *Die Linke* evaluations from voters in proximity with this political actor, and lower appraisals for *Die Linke* from the spatially-distant respondents.

4.1: Contextualising *Die Linke*

To begin, I will discuss the German political context in which *Die Linke* competes. I will also consider here the policy stances of *Die Linke*, relative to their main counterparts on the left – the *SPD* and the Green Party. This section will first provide context for the German political system, including the background of *Die Linke*, and more generally of the left in Germany. This section will first include more qualitative evidence, considering party manifestos and policy documents to identify what left-wing parties stand for in Germany. More quantitative evidence follows that, which includes placements of *Die Linke* and other political actors by the Chapel Hill expert surveys, along the economic, cultural, and migration policy dimensions.

The overall purpose here is to show that *Die Linke* conforms with the minimal definition of the radical left,[13] as challengers towards contemporary capitalist economic norms with these norms including policies such as fiscal austerity, privatisation, and low taxes. In respect to the

---

[13] This involves party-level comparison of left-wing German parties. The party-level is where I can identify *Die Linke*'s challenge to the contemporary economic norms of the German context. The radical left and radical right may draw on similar pools of voters; however, this comparison lies at the voter-level, rather than the party-level, and consequently does not help draw out this actor's radical leftism.

German context, I identify *Die Linke* as more left-wing than the *SPD*. I also show *Die Linke* to propose distinctly radical economic policies, including strong anti-corporate, pro-worker, and anti-austerity themes, in contrast to the more moderate economic policies and rhetoric emanating from the *SPD* and the Greens.

<u>*4.1.1: Development of Die Linke*</u>

Rebranded as *Die Linke* in 2007, the radical left in Germany has evolved significantly since the country's reunification in 1990. Previously known as the *Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus* (PDS), and before that a branch of the East German ruling *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* (SED), *Die Linke*'s roots go back to the former GDR. Democratisation and moderation within the *SED* forced longstanding East German leader Erich Honecker from office (Sarotte, 2014). It was from this moderation that the *SED* shifted from a rigidly Marxist-Leninist political organisation, to become the PDS.

Rebranding as the *PDS* was part of the party's evolution following the fall of the Berlin Wall. This evolution also included the expulsion of many former political figures of the GDR. The *PDS* officially repudiated the 'Stalinist' system following a party conference at the end of 1989 (Priestland, 2010; Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, 2011).

The *PDS* was a divided force, still offering a stridently anti-capitalist message, but including factional divisions between pragmatists, modern (Marxist) socialists, and the 'old left'. These divisions resulted in a long-running struggle over the political programme of the *PDS* (Segert, 2002). The result of this struggle was the PDS evolving, away from the *SED*'s extreme left Communism, to become what March and Mudde describe as a 'democratic socialist' party (March & Mudde, 2005); this 'democratic socialism' being to the left of social democracy, adhering to democratic principles, but still advocating for systematic overhaul both through grassroots democracy, and through rejection of capitalism (March & Mudde, 2005).

Die Linke was born out of the *PDS*, in combination with *SPD* defector group *Arbeit und soziale Gerechtigkeit – Die Wahlalternative* (WASG), in 2005. This unified the anti-capitalism of the *PDS* with radical disaffection from the centre-left *SPD* in *WASG*, forming a new political alliance in an effort to broaden appeal outside of the former GDR. *Die Linke* has since become a fixture of the Bundestag, meeting Germany's 5% electoral threshold in successive elections since the

party began. However, despite efforts to broaden appeal for the party, most support for *Die Linke* comes from regions which were formerly part of the GDR.

Despite *Die Linke*'s connections with the East German ruling party, they do not advocate the Communism seen from 'extreme left' political actors. *Die Linke* is not an extreme left political actor anymore, but rather a radical left one as a result of this party's moderation which took place decades ago. This radical leftism is a consequence of *Die Linke*'s left-wing policy agenda, which is radical relative to the positions of other German political actors. I explain *Die Linke*'s radical policies in greater detail in the next part.

4.1.2: The Radicalism of Die Linke

In *Die Linke*'s policy document, approved by their membership in 2011, there are numerous statements of economic policy preferences and proposals. These policies conform with the minimal definition, demonstrating a challenge to the contemporary capitalist economic norms within Germany, further showing *Die Linke* to be a radical left political actor.

Among *Die Linke*'s economic proposals is reintroducing a wealth tax, increasing inheritance tax, and redistributing income from the richest to the poorest (Die Linke, 2011, p. 7). *Die Linke* state the purpose of these policies is to mitigate inequality, which the party says is the inevitable outcome of the current capitalist economic system (Die Linke, 2011, p. 5). Criticisms of capitalism are included throughout this policy document, which is characterised as an economic system which has only served to increase the profits of corporations, and the wealth of the richest (Die Linke, 2011, p. 4). Critique of these contemporary capitalist economic norms I observe here is part of the minimal definition of the radical left. More specifically, this criticism focuses on negatives of capitalism, including ecological damage, inequality, and undermining of democracy. However, language of 'overcoming' and 'transcending' capitalism is present in *Die Linke*'s policy document, rather than of replacing or abolishing capitalism in its entirety. In fact, the only discussion of 'abolition' is in relation to exploitation under capitalism, with this followed first by criticism of the Soviet-promoted alternative and second by proposal of their 'democratic socialist' alternative (Die Linke, 2011, p. 27). Crucially, *Die Linke*'s criticism of capitalism is in line with the minimal definition of the radical left. Furthermore, their denunciation of communism separates *Die Linke* from being a far left political actor. Instead, *Die Linke* present their 'democratic socialist' alternative.

Die Linke's alternative includes removal of basic provision (e.g., energy, water, housing, health) from 'capitalist profiteering', with these instead being 'publicly organised and guaranteed' (Die Linke, 2011, p. 31). What *Die Linke* seem to be proposing here is a wider range of nationalised services and institutions. However, and further separating *Die Linke* from the far left, they do not indicate wholesale opposition towards private property. They are supportive of privately-owned small and medium-sized businesses, and propose merely greater regulation of larger banking sector businesses (Die Linke, 2011, pp. 38-39).

Die Linke's 'democratic socialist' alternative also includes policies targeting the rich and private corporations, such as an increase in capital gains tax (Die Linke, 2011, p. 41), a 'large increase' in the top rate of income tax (Die Linke, 2011, p. 41), and a requirement for company bosses to report financial assets held overseas (Die Linke, 2011, p. 41). Combined with these policies, which are clearly targeted at the wealthy, are policies of tax relief for middle- and low-income workers (Die Linke, 2011, p. 7). The overall vision *Die Linke* present for tax and redistributive policy is one which limits the wealth and wealth accumulation of the rich, while seeking to benefit the poorest in society (Die Linke, 2011, p. 7).

From these taxation policies and redistributive agenda, a clear pillar of *Die Linke*'s economic policy is egalitarianism. Egalitarianism itself is not unusual on the left. The centre-left are identified by March as also adhering to the overall commitment to equality, but the radical left is distinguished by a radicalisation of this belief (March, 2012). To see whether *Die Linke* have radicalised egalitarianism further than their centre-left counterparts, I look to the mainstream *SPD*, to examine the extent of this party's egalitarianism.

I also discussed this in the literature review, to demonstrate how the radical left differs from its more moderate centre left counterpart. The concept of equality is itself divided between commitments to 'Equality of Opportunity', and 'Equality of Outcome'. I see the latter from *Die Linke*, with their redistributionist policies and strident targeting of the richest in favour of society's poorest (Die Linke, 2011, p. 38). From the *SPD*, their current 'Hamburg Programme' (ratified in 2007) indicates this centre-left political actor pursuing equality of opportunity instead (SPD, 2007, p. 7). This is a rather more moderate position, not targeting the wealthy explicitly and merely offering support for equal *opportunities* for education, employment, and social security. There is no explicit commitment to redistribute wealth in the *SPD*'s platform,

which differentiates this party's more moderate egalitarian policy from the more radical proposals of *Die Linke*. Furthermore, from the previous German election in 2017, the respective manifestos of *Die Linke* and the *SPD* demonstrated the former's radicalism over the latter, with *Die Linke*'s redistributionist policies in response to the notion that 'Inequality is Unsocial' (Die Linke, 2017, pp. 37-39), in contrast to the *SPD*'s emphasis of social equality over economic redistribution (SPD, 2017).

Another pillar of the radical left's economic policy concerns the issue of ownership. The radical left favours public ownership, opposing privatisation and supporting worker collectives and the role of the state instead (Fagerholm, 2015). *Die Linke*'s policy document conforms with radical left beliefs on this issue (Die Linke, 2011, p. 5), including my earlier comments on the party's commitment to publicly organise and guarantee basic provisions (Die Linke, 2011, p. 31). All this supports my argument in favour of *Die Linke* as the radical left in Germany. By contrast, the *SPD* makes no similar commitments to worker collectives and public ownership in the 'Hamburg Programme', again showing the *SPD* to be more moderately left-wing relative to *Die Linke*.

A further key feature of radical left economic policy is their complete opposition to policies of fiscal austerity. I would observe this with statements opposing spending cuts, and commitments to increase spending on public services. To analyse how far *Die Linke* conforms with this, I look for anti-austerity statements in their policy programme. I also look for commitment to increase spending on public services, such as on healthcare, infrastructure, and education.

The *SPD*'s policy programme makes some scattered and somewhat vague claims supporting further funding for public services, with some language even suggesting support for fiscal restraint (SPD, 2007, p. 26). In contrast, *Die Linke* make statements highly critical of spending cuts (Die Linke, 2011, p. 22), promising to reverse these with significantly increased government funding (Die Linke, 2011, p. 7). The anti-austerity nature of *Die Linke* is well documented, with observation of this emanating from *Die Linke* in previous literature (Hartleb, 2015; Scholl & Freyberg-Inan, 2018; Hudson, 2015; Patton, 2017). These previous observations provide further evidence for *Die Linke*'s opposition to austerity, which, combined

with equivocation from the *SPD*, shows additional disparity between these two parties in terms of how left-wing they both are.

In three ways I have shown *Die Linke*'s economic policy stances to challenge contemporary economic norms: specifically, on the issues of egalitarianism, ownership, and government spending. On these issues, I have shown *Die Linke* to consistently take more radically left-wing positions than the mainstream-left *SPD* on economic issues. The economic policies of the *SPD* do not represent as systematic a challenge to contemporary capitalist economic norms as the policies presented by *Die Linke*. According to *Die Linke* themselves, the *SPD* has converged with the German centre-right on economics. In particular, *Die Linke* notes the *SPD*'s abandonment of anti-capitalist economic and social realignment since the late 1950s, leaving *Die Linke* as the sole major German political party to challenge these capitalist economic norms (Die Linke, 2011, p. 11).

So far, I have drawn parallels between *Die Linke* and the *SPD*, to show the former to be on the radical left of German politics. *Die Linke*'s economic policies conform with the minimal definition, showing a challenge to contemporary capitalist economic norms, while the mainstream *SPD* have not made the same commitments. However, the German left does not solely consist of these two political parties. Also present here is the Green Party. Broader consideration of the German left follows.

4.1.3: The German Left: Beyond Die Linke

The modern German left consists of three major political parties – the *SPD*, Greens, and *Die Linke*. The *SPD* represents the largest of these political parties, having also historically been a governing party of Germany both before and since reunification. However, the *SPD*'s leftism became more moderate in the face of anti-Communism, and major electoral defeats against Chancellor Adenauer in 1953 and 1957, which both resulted in the *SPD*'s convergence. The *SPD* then adopted the 'Godesberg Programme', which accepted Adenauer's market economics, rejected nationalisation, repudiated the goal of replacing capitalism, and renounced Marxist theories of materialism and class struggle (SPD, 1959; Dyson, 1975). This began the course for the *SPD* to be a moderated left-wing force in Germany – something demonstrated with previous analysis of their economic policies.

This leaves the *SPD* as a moderate-left party, with support from the liberal, left-wing middle classes, and historical but fading support from working class Germans (Gingrich & Häusermann, 2015; Bremer, 2017). Having separated *Die Linke* from the *SPD* in terms of their roles on the left of German politics, I will now consider the leftism of the Green Party.

The Green Party (aka *Grünen*) also deviates from *Die Linke*. Originally founded in 1980, the current Green Party's economic policies do not include the anti-corporate, pro-worker attitudes seen from *Die Linke*. Instead, this party has undergone a re-orientation, adopting radically liberal cultural policies, accompanying their longstanding ecologist politics. However, I argue that the Green Party are not a radical left political actor.

The Green Party in Germany falls closer to what Kitschelt called the 'left-libertarians' (Kitschelt, 1988). These political actors are left-wing through their support for solidarity and equality, with libertarianism through their rejection of centralised bureaucracy, and support for individual autonomy and self-governance (Kitschelt, 1988, p. 197). Between what Luke March writes about the radical left, and what Kitschelt writes about these 'left-libertarians', there are key differences separating *Die Linke* from the German Green Party.

The minimal definition of the radical left reflects the first of these differences. This states the radical left are challengers to contemporary economic norms within their respective contexts. Crucially, the defining feature of the radical left is their economic policies. Whereas, for the 'left-libertarian' Green Party radical left economic policies are not their defining feature. Historically, their defining issue is the politicisation of environmental politics; however, environmental politics could not remain the Green Party's only major policy area. When other parties began to formulate their own ecologist platforms the Greens had to adapt and expand their platform in order to remain electorally competitive. To do this, the party evolved, remaining outspoken advocates on environmentalist politics, but more recently also adopting radical stances on cultural issues (Blühdorn, 2009).

The Green Party's cultural policies centre around policies of equality of opportunity, social emancipation, and the encouragement and enablement of the social state (Blühdorn, 2009). The Green Party adopted this new policy direction in their 'Nuremberg Resolution', which stated the three pillars of their cultural policies to be 'access to employment, access to education and social goods, and the financial safeguarding of existence' (Bündnis 90/Die

Grünen, 2007). Furthermore, the Green Party's cultural policies are fundamentally libertarian, with vocal support for drug legalisation (Green Party of Germany, 2019a); feminism (Green Party of Germany, 2019b), support for LGBT rights (Green Party of Germany, 2019c), and statements supporting diversity and free expression (Green Party of Germany, 2019d; Green Party of Germany, 2019e). Economics, by contrast, has not been as distinctive an issue for the Green Party in recent elections (Williams, et al., 2017). Based on this, it becomes difficult to reconcile the Green Party with the minimal definition of the radical left.

What the Green Party then represents is a party which is relatively moderate in some respects, including economic policy, but radical in terms of their cultural policies. This is a product of the party emphasising particular issues: in this case, environmental and cultural issues. Parties like this will tend to be more radical on the issues they emphasise, and more moderate on their less emphasised issues. The same is the case for the radical right *AfD*, who as a radical right actor emphasise migration policy (Mudde, 2007, p. 22), where they pursue radically nativist policies (Alternativ für Deutschland, 2017, pp. 57-64), but are more moderate in terms of their economic policies (Alternativ für Deutschland, 2017).[14] Furthermore, these stances can change over time: the Green Party in Germany demonstrate this, by adopting more radical cultural policies in response to the widespread politicisation of the environment (Blühdorn, 2009).

The Green Party in Germany does not neglect economics entirely. The Green Party justifies its economic policies on environmental sustainability, in contrast to *Die Linke*'s push towards equality of outcome, anti-austerity policies, and public ownership. The Green Party also makes commitments towards redistribution regarding taxation policy, expressing the broad left-wing commitment towards greater equality, but without the radical, anti-corporate and pro-worker case for their economic stances identified from *Die Linke* earlier (Green Party of Germany, 2019g; Green Party of Germany, 2019h). These economic policy differences between *Die Linke* and the Green Party lead me to conclude that the former conforms with the minimal definition, with the latter falling short of challenging contemporary capitalist economic norms.

---

[14] *AfD*'s economic policies moderate by being both pro-free market and anti-privatisation (without public consent), (Alternativ für Deutschland, 2017, p. 66; p. 68).

So far this account of political actors has been purely qualitative, considering the policy documents of *Die Linke*, the *SPD*, and the Green Party. Quantitative evidence, considering the respective policy positions of all German political actors, can further build the case of *Die Linke*'s radical leftism. I make a more quantitative case now. These quantitative assessments can also provide some idea of the positions of *Die Linke*, and other German political parties, on all three policy dimensions considered under the policy-proximity account.

The Chapel Hill expert surveys show where sixteen political analysts place parties on separate policy scales for each dimension. These political analysts were asked questions about party economic, cultural, and migration policy positions, as well as positions on other policy dimensions, with further questions on how populist parties are, and the balance of power between members and leadership (Polk, et al., 2017).

I include the list of questions used from the Chapel Hill expert surveys in Appendix 1.0. To briefly allude to the questions which I use, Chapel Hill asks where parties fall on policy dimensions, how clear parties are on their policies in a given area, and how important these policy areas are to a given party. The former set of questions are what I use here, as they provide an impression of party positions on these three dimensions.

The Chapel Hill surveys provide an idea of *Die Linke*'s position on each policy dimension. With this, I can state expectations for the policy-proximity account by considering which voters are closer and further from *Die Linke*'s position. The German political parties analysed in the Chapel Hill expert surveys come from both right and left of the political spectrum. To understand the full policy space, and the positions they occupy, I present them all on an economic policy scale, a cultural policy scale, and a scale of migration policy positions.

First, the economic positions of *Die Linke*. In Figure 4.1 I include the average position of *Die Linke* from across the Chapel Hill expert survey respondents. I include *Die Linke*'s position alongside the averaged locations of other German political parties, for the sake of comparison. I include the averaged positions of all these parties in a table under Appendix 1.0.

Figure 4.1: Economic Policy Positions of Die Linke according to the 2017 Chapel Hill Expert Surveys

In Figure 4.1, the Chapel Hill surveys show *Die Linke* to be markedly more economically left-wing than all other political actors in Germany. I distinguish the radical left by their leftism on economic policy, with Figure 4.1 providing further evidence for *Die Linke*'s radical leftism relative to the German context. Earlier in this chapter, I showed how *Die Linke*'s economic policies are more radically left-wing than those offered by both the Green Party and *SPD*. The Chapel Hill expert surveys reflect this earlier observation, with the respective positions of all three of these political parties in Figure 4.1.

I will look back at Figure 4.1, and others conveying *Die Linke*'s spatial positions according to the Chapel Hill expert surveys, later in this chapter when I state expectations under the policy-proximity account for radical left support in Germany.

In Figure 4.2, I provide the cultural policy positions of German political parties. Again, these are according to the Chapel Hill expert surveys, with the placement of each party representing the average position of each of these parties according to those respondents.

Figure 4.2: Cultural policy Positions of Die Linke according to the 2017 Chapel Hill Expert Surveys

Figure 4.2 shows *Die Linke* to be slightly to the liberal side of the centre of this policy space. Although economics is the continuing theme throughout *Die Linke*'s policy document, there

are also statements showing the party's support for LGBT rights (Die Linke, 2011, p. 51), drug legalisation (Die Linke, 2011, p. 44), and pro-choice stances on abortion (Die Linke, 2011, p. 50). Consequently, *Die Linke*'s place to the liberal side of the centre makes sense here. The Green Party are notably liberal in Figure 4.2, which also conforms with the cultural policies identified from this political actor mentioned earlier in this chapter. Although the radical left are not defined by cultural policies, it is possible support for these political actors is associated with proximity to voters' preferences on this policy dimension.

Figure 4.2 also estimates *Die Linke*'s position to be similar to both the *SDP* and *FDP* on this dimension. This may create issues were I looking at radical left support expressed via vote choice questions, where proximity-based support would conceivably go to any of these three parties from moderately-liberal voters on this dimension. However, as I examine the effects of proximity on support via evaluation questions, I can still observe support for *Die Linke* without proximity with these other parties being problematic.

Figure 4.3 shows positions of German political parties on the migration policy dimension, according to the Chapel Hill expert surveys.

Figure 4.3: Migration Policy Positions of Die Linke according to the 2017 Chapel Hill Expert Surveys

The Chapel Hill expert surveys placed *Die Linke* to the inclusive side of the migration policy space, falling between the slightly more migrant-inclusive Greens, and the slightly less migrant-inclusive *SPD*. Like cultural policy, migration policy is not a defining issue of the radical left. However, as with the cultural policy dimension, the purpose of including the migration dimension is to examine whether support for the radical left is explained by voter-actor policy-proximity on this dimension.

Like their cultural policies, the migration policies of *Die Linke* are not discussed as thoroughly as their economic policy stances. But there is a section of *Die Linke*'s policy document which calls for 'open borders for persons in need' (Die Linke, 2011, p. 51). *Die Linke* also oppose migration policy which grants social and political rights to immigrants purely based on economic need, tying migration policy to economics while also demonstrating migrant-inclusiveness (Die Linke, 2011, p. 51).

The migrant-inclusive positions of the Green Party and *SPD* in this policy space also conforms with the statements each party has made on migration policy (SPD, 2007, p. 20; Green Party of Germany, 2019f). Additionally, as with Figure 4.2, the relative closeness of *Die Linke* with other parties – here the Greens and *SPD* – is not as problematic here because I examine support via evaluation questions, rather than vote choices.

Chapel Hill's quantitative evidence also brings this contextualising section to a conclusion. I have argued in this section that *Die Linke* is a radical left political actor in the German context. I have also drawn this political actor close to the minimal definition, demonstrating this political actor's challenge to the contemporary capitalist economic norms within Germany. Comparison was also made with the converged *SPD* and the less economically-radical Green Party, showing how, relative to the wider left-wing political parties in Germany, *Die Linke* is a radical left political actor.

4.2: Research Design: Data and Measurement

The German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) provides data to examine this case study. In this section, I will explain which survey from the GLES is used, which questions provide measurement of voter economic, cultural, and migration policy preferences, which questions show me how populist these voters are, and how radical left support is measured.

The 'GLES 2017 Pre- and Post-election Cross Section' is the source of my data. This survey contains a total of 4,291 observations,[15] from people who were asked questions through a face-to-face interview (Roßteutscher, et al., 2019). This is a two-wave rolling cross section, with different respondents in each wave. Data is pooled between the pre-election and post-election

---

[15] Pre-election n = 2,179, post-election n = 2,112

waves. Policy-proximity and populism-based support for the radical left in Germany is primarily determined from this pooled data.

At the heart of my thesis is the need to measure radical left support. In the German case study, I measure support for *Die Linke* from a question asking respondents to evaluate them on a scale from +5 to -5. +5 signifies a respondent who has a high opinion of the political actor, with -5 signifying a respondent with a negative opinion of the political actor. I include the wording of the dependent variable question in Appendix 1.0, alongside all other questions used from the GLES surveys.

The GLES survey asks respondents to evaluate all German political parties, but I only consider responses evaluating *Die Linke* on this +5 to -5 scale. The objective with these responses is to examine whether higher evaluations for *Die Linke* come from voters in close spatial proximity with this political actor on three policy dimensions, or from voters who are identified as populists.

I primarily draw results in this chapter from pooled pre-election and post-election responses. However, in addition to results from pooled data, I also provide separated pre-election and post-election results in the Appendix. Under Appendix 1.4 are pre- and post-election results from economic policy groups. Pre- and post-election cultural policy results are under Appendix 1.5. Migration pre- and post-election results are under Appendix 1.6.

4.2.1: GLES: Economic Policy Measures

Understanding the policy preferences of voters is crucial to measuring policy-proximity support for the radical left. What I will detail here is how I measure the economic policy preferences of each GLES respondent. Three questions in the GLES survey provide measurement of the economic policy preferences of respondents.

The first two of these questions ask respondents how far they agree with statements in the GLES' 'Issues Battery'. The five-point Likert scale of responses goes from 'Strongly Agree' to 'Strongly Disagree'. I draw two economics-related statements from the 'Issues Battery', asking how far they believe the government should not intervene in the economy, and how far they believe the government should take measures to reduce income inequality. Support for government economic intervention and measures to reduce income inequality would indicate

a left-wing respondent on this dimension, with right-wing respondents taking the opposite views. The third and final question used to measure voters' economic policy preferences relates to a 1–11 economic scale. Voters are asked to locate themselves on this 1–11 scale. 1 indicates favouring lower taxes and less social services, and a response of 11 indicates support for more social services and higher taxes.

Responses to the two 'Issues Battery' questions are recoded to match the 1-11 economic self-placement scale question. I calculate the average of each respondents' answers to these three questions, and with this average I place each respondent into an economic policy group.

Alongside the test of the policy-proximity account with these policy groups, I also test this account with a second set of groups, which I refer to as 'proximity groups'. To create this second set of groups, I draw upon a question similar to the self-placement 1-11 scale. This alternate question asks respondents to place political parties on this same scale, rather than to place themselves. I combine responses to the party-placement variant of this question with self-placement economic policy scale responses. By subtracting respondent self-placement from their *Die Linke* placement I gain a measure of their proximity with *Die Linke* on this dimension. A smaller number from this calculation indicates less difference between self-placement and *Die Linke* placement, signifying closer spatial proximity. With these calculated differences, I form a series of 'proximity groups' each reflecting different levels of proximity on the economic policy dimension.

I include all three questions on voters' economic policy preferences, and the fourth question detailed here relating to party-placement on economics, in Appendix 1.0. I then test the policy-proximity account with two alternate models – one with the proximity groups, and the other with the economic policy groups.

4.2.2: GLES: Cultural policy Measures

I use two questions to ascertain preferences from GLES respondents on cultural policy. I draw both questions from the 'Issues Battery' referenced previously. Again, the GLES asked respondents to place themselves onto a five-point scale from 'Strongly Agree' to 'Strongly Disagree'. For the sake of consistency across policy scales, these responses are also recoded onto a 1–11 scale, like economic policy preferences.

The first of these questions asks respondents how far they agree or disagree with a statutory quota on women on supervisory boards of large companies. The second of these questions concerns same-sex marriage. In response to these questions, I would expect culturally-liberal respondents to agree with both questions, with culturally-conservative respondents disagreeing with same-sex marriage and quotas on women on company boards. Again, I include these questions in Appendix 1.0.

Both of these questions measure cultural policy preferences of respondents, with no other alternative questions in the GLES. The GLES also includes an 'Authoritarian/Libertarian' measure, which would seem to suit my purposes here but actually asks respondents about their views on immigration, and therefore I do not use this to determine cultural policy preferences. The limited range of questions measuring cultural policy preferences of respondents is not ideal. However, the two other case studies in my thesis include more measures of cultural policy preferences.

Unlike on economics, the GLES does not include questions measuring self-placement and party-placement on a 1–11 cultural policy scale. As a consequence, I cannot form proximity groups on this policy dimension.

As with responses to economic policy questions, I also average the responses across the two cultural policy questions. With this average, I place each respondent into a cultural policy group reflecting their position on this dimension.

4.2.3: GLES: Migration Policy Measures

For indication of the migration policy preferences of GLES respondents, I use three GLES questions. Two of these questions come from the 'Issues Battery', the first of which asks respondents how strongly they agree or disagree with the statement that immigrants should assimilate into German culture. The second question used from the 'Issues Battery' asks respondents how far they agree or disagree with an annual limit on the number of refugees entering Germany (aka *Obergrenze*). Opposition towards assimilation and towards the *Obergrenze* would indicate a migrant-inclusive respondent. The third question used to measure migration policy preferences of voters is another 1-11 scale – the 'Authoritarian/Libertarian' question mentioned previously. Akin to the economic 1–11 scale,

this migration policy scale also includes a self-placement question where the GLES asks respondents to place themselves on a scale from 1 (migrant-inclusive) to 11 (migrant-exclusive). Responses to the 'Issues Battery' questions are rescaled to match the 1-11 migration policy scale self-placement question. All three answers to these questions are then averaged, with these averages used to group each respondent into one of the migration policy groups.

The economic policy self-placement and party-placement 1-11 scales are replicated on the migration policy dimension. This allows me to again create a series of proximity groups, this time based on migration policy. Once again, I subtract each respondent's self-placement on this policy dimension from their placement of *Die Linke*, yielding a measure of proximity which I use to create migration proximity groups.

The three questions relating to migration policy preferences and the party-placement question are all included under Appendix 1.0. This leads to another two-step test of the policy-proximity account here, with both policy groups and proximity groups constituting alternate tests of this account.

4.2.4: Policy-Proximity: Groups

I have shown how I draw voter-level economic, cultural, and migration policy preferences from the GLES. I have also indicated a further test of the policy-proximity theory, based on proximity groups on economic and migration dimensions. There are two approaches when testing the policy-proximity account, differentiated as 'proximity groups' and 'policy groups'.

I group respondents to analyse the role of economic, cultural, and migration policy-proximity on radical left support. Recall from the research design that I defended this approach, as it allows me to observe possible non-linear relationships.

There are 5 proximity groups each on economics and migration policy dimensions, going from the 'closest' proximity group, to the 'furthest'. Respondents in the 'closest' group have the smallest difference between their own economic/migration position and where they placed *Die Linke*. Spatial distance from *Die Linke* then increases up to the 'furthest' proximity group. Respondents in the 'furthest' group have the least proximity between their own positions and where they place *Die Linke* on the economic and migration dimensions.

In Table 4.1 are the proximity groups for the German case study. Below the name of the proximity groups is the number of respondents in that group.

Table 4.1: Summary of Proximity Groups on each dimension ('folded')

	Groups				
Economic Proximity Group	Closest *(n = 1,264)*	2 *(n = 772)*	Moderately Distant *(n = 586)*	4 *(n = 868)*	Furthest *(n = 616)*
Migration Proximity Group	Closest *(n = 1,148)*	2 *(n = 716)*	Moderately Distant *(n = 562)*	4 *(n = 1,070)*	Furthest *(n = 610)*

Few respondents are to the left of *Die Linke* on economics, or more inclusive on migration policy. Therefore, to make groups more comparably-sized, I group respondents who are on one side of *Die Linke*'s position with those located to their other side by a similar magnitude on each policy dimension. For example, I group respondents who are three places more inclusive than *Die Linke* on migration policy with respondents who are three places more exclusive than this actor. However, this assumes the three-place more inclusive respondents will have the same appraisals for this political actor as those who are similarly more exclusive. To account for this, under Appendix 1.1 is an expanded table, with five proximity groups to each side of *Die Linke*'s position. With these *unfolded* proximity groups, I do not group together respondents who are, to continue the example, three places more inclusive than *Die Linke* with those who are three places more exclusive than this actor. Instead, they are in separate, *unfolded* proximity groups in Appendix 1.1.

I also examine *Die Linke* evaluations from these unfolded proximity groups. However, with fewer respondents to *Die Linke*'s economically-left or migration-inclusive sides compared to the right and exclusive sides, the sizes of these unfolded proximity groups are much less comparable than those of the *folded* groups in Table 4.1. The less comparable sizes of the unfolded proximity groups cause me to include results from these in the appendix instead of the main text. I briefly appraise results from the unfolded proximity groups in the analysis section, but primary results from this test of the policy-proximity account come from the folded proximity groups stated in Table 4.1.

I draw policy groups from the averaged responses to economic, cultural, and migration policy questions. As explained in Chapter 3, I group voters in a way which accounts for the non-uniform distribution of data, and thus avoid creating groups which have a disproportionately small number of respondents in them. There are five policy groups on each of the three dimensions. I include the policy groups on each of the three dimensions in Table 4.2. Recorded below the names of each group is the number of respondents in each group from the pooled pre-election and post-election responses. There is disparity between these group sizes, despite my earlier claims the grouping methodology[16] would make these comparably sized. This disparity most likely arises from the distribution of responses to the questions of policy preferences. Although not entirely equal in size, without that grouping methodology the sizes of these groups would be even more disproportionate.

Table 4.2: Summary of Policy Groups on each dimension

	Groups				
Economic Policy Group	Radical-Left *(n = 532)*	Centre-Left *(n = 584)*	Centrist *(n = 632)*	Centre-Right *(n = 473)*	Radical-Right *(n = 746)*
Cultural Policy Group	Radical-Liberal *(n = 929)*	Moderate-Liberal *(n = 506)*	Centrist *(n = 502)*	Moderate-Conservative *(n = 490)*	Radical-Conservative *(n = 578)*
Migration Policy Group	Radical-Inclusive *(n = 275)*	Moderate-Inclusive *(n = 298)*	Centrist *(n = 313)*	Moderate-Exclusive *(n = 376)*	Radical-Exclusive *(n = 268)*

Finally, the grouping methodology here also means these groups labels are relative to their context. For example, respondents in the 'Centre-Right' economic policy group hold views on this dimension which are moderately right-wing *relative to the German context.* This nature of the groups is consistent across all three case studies, meaning I consistently examine radical left support from respondents labelled in a way which is *relative to their context*.

---

[16] R – Quantile function.

In addition to the policy-proximity account, I also investigate how far levels of populism amongst voters explain radical left support. I will now explain my application of this theory to the German case study.

As a reminder: populism divides a society into two groups: with the 'ordinary' or 'pure' people opposing the 'corrupt elite'. Questions which gauge levels of populist sentiments amongst voters would ask about attitudes towards 'elite' groups, whether they hold a Manichaean 'good' versus 'bad' worldview where the 'ordinary people' oppose the 'elites', and ask whether they support popular sovereignty. Populist voters would oppose 'elite' groups, would perceive this Manichaean worldview, and would profess support for popular sovereignty.

To measure voter-level populism in the German case study, I utilise six questions from the GLES. These questions, included in the 'Populism & Efficacy' battery, measure how far voters adhere with populism. Again, I include the questions used from this battery in Appendix 1.0, alongside other German case study survey questions. But to briefly describe some of these questions, they ask respondents how far they believe in political compromises, whether they believe the Bundestag should follow popular will, and about differences between 'ordinary people' and 'elites'.

There is a five-point scale of responses to these questions, running from 'Strongly Agree' to 'Strongly Disagree'. Once again, I calculate the average response across all these questions, giving me an overall impression of each respondent's level of adherence to populism.

Having calculated the average response across these six questions from each respondent, I group these respondents according to their levels of adherence with populism. I state these populism groups in Table 4.3:

Table 4.3: Summary of Respondent Groups: Populism-based Theory

	Groups				
Populism	Radical-Populist *(n = 1,132)*	Moderate-Populist *(n = 1,066)*	Centrist *(n = 1,264)*	Moderate-Non-Populist *(n = 766)*	Radical-Non-Populist *(n = 1,000)*

4.3: Empirical Expectations

Both the policy-proximity and the populism-based accounts considered in my thesis imply certain relationships between *Die Linke* evaluations and the predictor variables just described. For the policy-proximity account, I need to consider where *Die Linke* are located on the policy dimensions relative to GLES respondents. For the populism-based theory, the underlying notion is that support for the radical left will come from respondents who adhere more to populism. More detailed consideration of expectations follows in this section.

Expectations under the policy-proximity account consider *Die Linke* evaluations from both the proximity groups and from the policy groups. As I created the proximity groups from calculating the difference between self-placement and *Die Linke* placement on economics and migration, these respondents are already positioned relative to this political actor on these policy dimensions.

For the policy groups, I return to the Chapel Hill expert surveys. These surveys provide an indication of *Die Linke*'s location in policy spaces. However, the Chapel Hill surveys do not identify the positions of *Die Linke* on the same scale as GLES respondents are located. Therefore, I develop expectations from policy groups through a series of scenarios. In each of these scenarios, I suggest *Die Linke* to be in closest proximity with a plausible range of policy groups. I then state expectations in each of these scenarios where *Die Linke* is in closest proximity with a different policy group.

4.3.1: Expectations: Economic Policy Groups

To begin, I will state expectations of *Die Linke* evaluations from groups on the economic dimension. I will discuss these from the proximity groups first, before turning attention to the policy groups.

From the five economic proximity groups, I expect the 'Closest' group to have the highest evaluations for *Die Linke*. The 'Furthest' group would have the lowest evaluations for this political actor. This would leave a monotonic relationship between proximity groups and *Die Linke* evaluations: specifically, where evaluations increase with greater proximity between respondents and *Die Linke*. Observing this monotonicity would conform with the policy-proximity account of radical left support.

Expectations from economic proximity groups are summarised in Figure 4.4. This shows how I predict evaluations to be highest from the 'Closest' group, and fall away to be lowest from the 'Furthest' group.

Figure 4.4: Expected Evaluations from Economic Proximity Groups

From the economic policy groups, expectations are partly based on evidence from the Chapel Hill expert surveys. Recall that, in Figure 4.1, Chapel Hill identified *Die Linke* as being notably left-wing on the economic policy dimension.

However, uncertainty about how far Chapel Hill appraisals of *Die Linke* map onto positions of GLES respondents lead me to consider several scenarios of expectations. Across these scenarios the common expectation is that there will be a single peak, where one group of respondents has highest evaluations of *Die Linke* due to closest policy-proximity with this political actor. There would then be a monotonic decline in evaluations on each side of this peak, as policy-proximity reduces. These scenarios consider which group is in closest proximity with *Die Linke*, and how this would impact on evaluations for this political actor across the policy dimension.

The first of these scenarios assumes *Die Linke*'s radically left-wing position in Chapel Hill closely maps onto GLES respondents. I then assume *Die Linke* to be in closest proximity with the 'Radical-Left' economic policy group. Consequently, I would expect highest *Die Linke* evaluations from this group. The 'Radical-Right' economic policy group is the most spatially-distant from *Die Linke*, and therefore I expect this group to have the lowest *Die Linke*

evaluations. I would observe a monotonic relationship in this scenario, where evaluations of *Die Linke* increase from the economically right-wing groups to the left-wing groups. I reflect this pattern in Figure 4.5.

Figure 4.5: 'Radical Left' Economic Policy Group Expectations

However, it is possible that Chapel Hill overestimated the economic placement of *Die Linke*, relative to GLES respondents. The second scenario takes this possibility into account, suggesting *Die Linke* is in closest proximity with the 'Centre-Left' economic policy group. In this scenario, I would observe highest *Die Linke* evaluations from the 'Centre-Left' group instead, with lowest evaluations from the 'Radical-Right' group. The 'Radical-Left' group is not closest to *Die Linke*, so would have lower evaluations than from the 'Centre-Left' group. This would leave a non-monotonic relationship between economic policy preferences and *Die Linke* evaluations. I reflect this second scenario in Figure 4.6.

Figure 4.6: 'Centre Left' Economic Policy Group Expectations

Scenarios where *Die Linke* is further to the right do not seem plausible, considering the economic policies of this political actor I discussed earlier. Therefore, I do not consider any scenarios with the premise that *Die Linke* is in closest proximity with economically centrist or right-wing respondents.

This yields two sets of economic expectations: one set based on the proximity groups, and the other for the policy groups. In the latter, I considered two plausible scenarios where *Die Linke* is in proximity with either the 'Radical-Left' or 'Centre-Left' economic policy groups. Observing results which conform with these expectations would provide support for the policy-proximity account of radical left support.

4.3.2: Expectations: Cultural Policy Groups

Without GLES questions asking respondents to place either themselves or *Die Linke* on a cultural policy dimension, there are no proximity groups on this dimension. Instead, expectations relate to policy groups on this dimension only. For these, I again turn to the Chapel Hill surveys.

I previously showed *Die Linke*'s cultural policy position, according to Chapel Hill, in Figure 4.2. This suggested *Die Linke* is slightly less liberal compared to the mainstream-left *SPD* and centrist *FDP*. Nevertheless, the party represents a moderately-liberal/centrist political actor in Figure 4.2. From this, I consider which cultural policy groups this positioning of *Die Linke* maps onto from the GLES respondents.

114

Should Chapel Hill's placement of *Die Linke* closely map onto cultural policy groups from the GLES, it would be the 'Centrist' cultural policy group that is in closest proximity with *Die Linke*. Therefore, the 'Centrist' cultural policy group would have the highest evaluations of *Die Linke*. Lowest evaluations of *Die Linke* would come from the 'Radical-' groups at the fringes of this policy space. The relationship between cultural policy positions and *Die Linke* evaluations would then be curvilinear in this first scenario, as summarised below in Figure 4.7.

Figure 4.7: 'Centrist' Cultural Policy Group Expectations

However, it may be that all parties in Figure 4.2, including *Die Linke* but with the possible exception of the radical right *Alternativ für Deutschland* (AfD), are in fact more liberal than the Chapel Hill expert surveys suggest. This would make sense, considering the culturally-liberal policies of *Die Linke* identified earlier in this chapter.

Under two more scenarios, *Die Linke* may actually be in proximity with the 'Moderate-Liberal' or 'Radical-Liberal' cultural policy groups. In the first of these scenarios, highest evaluations from the 'Moderate-Liberal' group would mean appraisals for *Die Linke* would be slightly lower from the 'Radical-Liberal' group, and lowest overall from the 'Radical-Conservative' group. Observing highest evaluations from the 'Radical-Liberal' group would mean there is monotonicity in my results, with appraisals decreasing as policy-proximity reduces, and

lowest evaluations for *Die Linke* from the 'Radical-Conservative' group. I present both of these further scenarios below, in Figures 4.8 and 4.9, respectively.

Figure 4.8: 'Moderate Liberal' Cultural Policy Group Expectations

Figure 4.9: 'Radical Liberal' Cultural Policy Group Expectations

I have now explained three scenarios for *Die Linke* evaluations from cultural policy groups. Results may conform with either of these scenarios to provide support for the policy-proximity account, as *Die Linke* is conceivably in closest proximity with respondents from the 'Centrist' group, 'Moderate-Liberal' group, or the 'Radical-Liberal' group.

4.3.3: Expectations: Migration Policy Groups

First, I state expectations for *Die Linke* evaluations from the migration proximity groups. Then I come to expected evaluations from the migration policy groups, which draw upon Chapel Hill's placement of *Die Linke* in this policy space.

The first expectation is that highest *Die Linke* evaluations would come from the 'Closest' proximity group. Also expected is that evaluations would get progressively lower across the other groups, falling to their lowest from the 'Furthest' proximity group. Figure 4.10 reflects this monotonic pattern, where support for *Die Linke* is associated with levels of policy-proximity.

Figure 4.10: Expected Evaluations from Migration Proximity Groups

The second set of expectations on this dimension relate to the policy groups. I provided Chapel Hill's placement of *Die Linke* earlier, in Figure 4.3. This showed *Die Linke* to be a moderately migrant-inclusive party, to a greater extent than the *SPD*, and to a lesser extent than the Green Party. I again consider a number of plausible scenarios, where *Die Linke* is in proximity with a plausible range of different policy groups.

The first of these scenarios again assumes the Chapel Hill survey's placement of *Die Linke* closely maps onto the migration policy responses in the GLES. This would mean Chapel Hill's identification of *Die Linke* as moderately-inclusive would put this political actor in closest proximity with the 'Moderate-Inclusive' migration policy group. Under this scenario, I would expect highest *Die Linke* evaluations from the 'Moderate-Inclusive' group, with lowest evaluations expected from the most spatially-distant 'Radical-Exclusive' group. Evaluations would fall on both sides of the 'Moderate-Inclusive' group, as policy-proximity reduces. I summarise the evaluations under this first scenario in Figure 4.11.

Figure 4.11: 'Moderate Inclusive' Migration Policy Group Expectations

The second plausible scenario assumes that, relative to GLES respondents, *Die Linke* is more migrant-inclusive than the expert surveys suggested. In this scenario, *Die Linke* is in closest proximity with the 'Radical-Inclusive' group. The expectation would then be a monotonic relationship between migration policy preferences and *Die Linke* evaluations, where *Die Linke* evaluations progressively increase from the 'Radical-Exclusive' group to the 'Radical-Inclusive' group on the migration policy dimension. Figure 4.12 reflects this scenario.

Figure 4.12: 'Radical Inclusive' Migration Policy Group Expectations

The underlying notion in both scenarios, where migrant-inclusive respondents have higher evaluations of *Die Linke*, is plausible given *Die Linke*'s inclusive and internationalist appeals noted earlier in this chapter. However, *Die Linke*'s position in this policy space relative to GLES

respondents may be in closer proximity with more moderately-inclusive voters, or more radically-inclusive voters. Both of these scenarios allow me to observe higher *Die Linke* evaluations from either of these groups, which would plausibly be the result of closer policy-proximity with this radical left party.

This covers expectations relating to the policy-proximity account, for both the economic and migration proximity groups, and for the policy groups on all three dimensions. Throughout all these scenarios, I have demonstrated expectation of a single peak in *Die Linke* evaluations, with highest evaluations from the voters in closest proximity with *Die Linke* on each of the three policy dimensions. Evaluations for this political actor would then be lower as proximity with this political actor reduces. Several scenarios have offered different but plausible suggestions of which groups *Die Linke* is in closest proximity with, and the consequences of these different scenarios on evaluations for this radical left political actor from all policy groups.

4.3.4: Expectations: Populism-based Account

Under the populism-based account, I expect a monotonic relationship between levels of populism and support for the radical left. It is expected that populist voters, who adhere to the 'us' versus 'them' nature of populism, would be more supportive of the radical left owing to the anti-elite economic policies emanating from these political actors.

In relation to the populism groups in this case study, I would expect the 'Radical-Populist' group to have significantly higher evaluations of *Die Linke* compared to the 'Centrist' populism group's evaluations. That 'Centrist' populism group includes respondents who are neither overtly populist nor non-populist. Observing higher *Die Linke* evaluations from the 'Radical-Populist' group would support the populism-based account, as it would show support for the radical left to come from populist voters who are conceivably attracted by the anti-elite rhetoric of these political actors.

4.4: Analysis

I now have a set of case-specific expectations, drawn from application of both policy-proximity and populism-based accounts to *Die Linke* in the German context. Observing results which follow these expectations will provide support for their respective accounts as an

explanation of radical left support. I will first cover results from testing the policy-proximity account. Results from the populism-based account will follow.

I present all results in the form of linear regressions. Recall that the dependent variable used across these regressions is an evaluation scale, from +5 to -5. I include the populism groups, policy groups, and proximity groups as dummy variables in these regressions. For the policy groups, the 'Centrist' group on each dimension acts as the baseline category across economic, cultural, and migration policy measures. I also use the 'Centrist' group as the baseline category with the populism groups. For the proximity groups, the 'Moderately-Distant' group acts as the baseline category.

I pool pre-election and post-election data here, with this data then used for the regressions with policy groups in this section. Included under Appendices 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6 are regressions including policy groups from separate pre-election and post-election data, with economic, cultural, and migration policy groups, respectively. The purpose of these separate pre-election and post-election results is to show how consistent attitudes in each separate wave are to the pooled results. I provide brief summaries of results from the separate waves in this analysis section, with these results broadly consistent with findings from the pooled data. Furthermore, under Appendices 1.3, 1.5, 1.7, 1.9, 1.11, 1.12, 1.14, and 1.17, I include analysis with scalar variables instead of respondent groups. Results with scalar variables also broadly follow my findings from respondent groups in this analysis section.

4.4.1: Control Variables

The East/West control variable is one that has featured in previous research on political behaviour in Germany (Gschwend, 2007), so this is something I also include. I consider responses to GLES questions about province of birth and year of birth. With this I create an East/West dummy variable. Those born in a West German state before 1990 are recorded as 0, and respondents born in an East German region before 1990 are recorded as 1s. I count respondents from Berlin – a split entity prior to German reunification – as being from the GDR.

Further controls take account of demographic factors, which also may influence support for *Die Linke*. These include gender, religion, education, and socioeconomic class. The GLES

presents education responses, and socioeconomic class responses ordinally. I then see how an increase in these scales (i.e., higher educational attainment, higher socioeconomic class) impacts on *Die Linke* support. I include gender and religion as dummy variables, coded as either 0 or 1. I code female respondents as 1, and male respondents as 0 on the gender variable. I code non-religious respondents as 1, and religious respondents coded as 0 under the religion control variable. These factors have also been present in previous research on political support in Germany (Schoen & Schumann, 2007).

Party identification control variables are also included, in order to account for 'Michigan Model' based support based on partisanship (Campbell, et al., 1960). There are nine dummy variables created to control for this, each representing respondents who expressed identification with each of the following: *Die Linke, CDU, CSU, SPD, FDP, Grünen, AfD*, and one of several other smaller political parties. The ninth of these variables accounts for people who did not identify with any political party. Respondents recorded as a 1 identified with the given political party,[17] and those represented by a 0 did not identify with that particular option. This provides control on party identification's effects on *Die Linke* evaluations, but does not address how this variable potentially persuades voters to alter their policy preferences or populism.

4.4.2: Economic Policy Preferences and Radical Left Support

To begin, I first look at how economic policy preferences and proximity with *Die Linke* impacted upon evaluations for this radical left political party. I will cover results from the five proximity groups first, and follow this with results from the policy groups.

From the proximity groups, the expectation is a monotonic relationship between proximity and *Die Linke* evaluations: specifically, with highest *Die Linke* evaluations from the group in closest proximity, and lowest evaluations from the most spatially-distant proximity group. I summarised this in Figure 4.4. Table 4.4 is a linear regression of *Die Linke* evaluations with these proximity groups.

---

[17] Or expressed no party identification on the ninth of these control variables.

Table 4.4: Regression of Economic Proximity Groups and Die Linke Evaluations

Effect of Economic Policy Proximity on Evaluations of Die Linke

	Die Linke Evaluations	
	(1)	(2)
Closest	1.206***	0.682***
	(0.105)	(0.107)
2	0.640***	0.320***
	(0.115)	(0.117)
Moderately-Distant	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
4	-0.339***	-0.183
	(0.114)	(0.114)
Furthest	-1.179***	-0.729***
	(0.125)	(0.125)
DieLinke_PartyID		4.579***
		(0.164)
CDU_PartyID		0.269**
		(0.135)
CSU_PartyID		-0.525**
		(0.234)
SPD_PartyID		1.726***
		(0.136)
FDP_PartyID		0.208
		(0.188)
Greens_PartyID		1.991***
		(0.160)
Afd_PartyID		0.065
		(0.196)
Other_PartyID		0.009
		(0.328)
No_PartyID		1.370***
		(0.135)
Gender		0.271***
(1 = Female)		(0.068)
Religion		0.480***
(1 = Non-Religious)		(0.071)
Education		0.101***
		(0.033)
Social_Class		-0.150***
		(0.040)
EastWest		0.092
(1 = Born GDR)		(0.070)
Constant	5.516***	4.081***
	(0.087)	(0.206)
Observations	6,562	4,990
R^2	0.085	0.309
Adjusted R^2	0.085	0.306
Residual Std. Error	2.693 (df = 6557)	2.378 (df = 4971)
F Statistic	153.259*** (df = 4; 6557)	123.264*** (df = 18; 4971)
Note:	*$p<0.1$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$	

The first question to answer is whether a monotonic relationship is present between proximity and *Die Linke* evaluations in Table 4.4. As expected, I do observe a monotonic pattern of *Die Linke* evaluations in this regression. Respondents closest to *Die Linke* give the party significantly higher ratings compared to the respondents in the baseline 'Moderately-Distant' group. I also find reduced evaluations for *Die Linke*, relative to that baseline group, from the 'Furthest' group of respondents. These respondents are the most spatially-distant from *Die Linke*; therefore, their lower evaluations for this radical left political actor are in line with the policy-proximity account's expectations. I find this pattern of radical left support in both columns of Table 4.4, so both with controls included and not included. Given the importance of control variables clarifying the roles of policy-proximity and populism on radical left support, I consider the stronger test of these accounts to come after including these variables. Therefore, I primarily interpret results after including controls. Looking across the models with and without controls in Table 4.4, the control variables do seem to diminish the effect of proximity, but not to a point of statistical insignificance. Therefore, having controlled those additional explanatory factors, results still support the policy-proximity account.

Results in Table 4.4 also follow the expected pattern of *Die Linke* evaluations in Figure 4.4. The pattern of evaluations in Table 4.4 is plotted below, in Figure 4.13, [18] showing the same expected decline in *Die Linke* evaluations as policy-proximity reduces.[19]

---

[18] In Figure 4.13, and with all plotted results, controls are treated as follows: dummy variables (e.g., Gender) set to 0, scalar controls (e.g., Education) set to mode.

[19] Note 'Moderately-Distant' baseline group recorded as '3' in Figure 4.13.

Figure 4.13: Plotted Results of Economic Proximity Groups

However, as stated earlier, Table 4.4 assumes that voters on both sides of *Die Linke*'s position by similar magnitudes would have comparable evaluations for this political actor. To examine this further, in Appendix 1.1 I tabled proximity groups on both sides of *Die Linke*. In Appendix 1.2 I included this unfolded range of proximity groups instead. The baseline group is different in Appendix 1.2, instead being the group in closest proximity with *Die Linke* rather than the 'Moderately-Distant', but despite this the pattern of evaluations follows that in Table 4.4: specifically, evaluations for *Die Linke* reduce as spatial distance increases. Consequently, I continue to observe results which follow the policy-proximity account's expectations with the unfolded proximity groups. Results without proximity groups, and with the proximity scale instead, also show the same monotonic pattern of *Die Linke* evaluations under Appendix 1.3. Specifically, an increase in the economic proximity scale (representing greater spatial distance) is still associated with significantly reduced evaluations for *Die Linke*. Consequently, the scalar model does not change my conclusions from Table 4.4.

Next, I consider whether results from economic policy groups also follow expectations. I offered two different scenarios for expected *Die Linke* evaluations from the economic policy

groups. In the first of these scenarios, *Die Linke* is in closest proximity with, and thus is expected to have the highest evaluations from, the 'Radical-Left' economic policy group – as reflected in Figure 4.5. The second scenario suggests *Die Linke* is in closest proximity with the 'Centre-Left' economic policy group, with highest evaluations expected from this group instead – as shown in Figure 4.6. Both these scenarios expect lowest *Die Linke* evaluations to come from the 'Radical-Right' economic policy group, owing to this group being located furthest from *Die Linke* on this policy dimension. Table 4.5 shows *Die Linke* evaluations from the economic policy groups.

Table 4.5: Regression of Economic Policy Groups and Die Linke Evaluations

Evaluations of Die Linke by Economic Policy Group

	Die Linke Evaluations	
	(1)	(2)
Rad Left	0.924***	0.409***
	(0.164)	(0.145)
Centre Left	0.175	-0.035
	(0.160)	(0.141)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Centre Right	-0.598***	-0.366**
	(0.169)	(0.149)
Rad Right	-1.178***	-0.801***
	(0.151)	(0.134)
DieLinke_PartyID		4.624***
		(0.221)
CDU_PartyID		0.112
		(0.180)
CSU_PartyID		-0.442
		(0.289)
SPD_PartyID		1.580***
		(0.181)
FDP_PartyID		0.211
		(0.253)
Greens_PartyID		1.913***
		(0.216)
Afd_PartyID		0.004
		(0.267)
Other_PartyID		0.435
		(0.443)
No_PartyID		1.281***
		(0.177)
Gender		0.203**
(1 = Female)		(0.091)
Religion		0.427***
(1 = Non-Religious)		(0.095)
Education		0.130***
		(0.044)
Social_Class		-0.132**
		(0.053)
EastWest		0.117
(1 = Born GDR)		(0.093)
Constant	5.718***	4.245***
	(0.111)	(0.263)
Observations	2,941	2,941
R^2	0.065	0.284
Adjusted R^2	0.063	0.279
Residual Std. Error	2.772 (df = 2936)	2.431 (df = 2922)
F Statistic	50.609*** (df = 4; 2936)	64.360*** (df = 18; 2922)

Note:	*$p<0.1$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$

The coefficients from the economic policy groups do degrade in column two, after including controls, but statistical significance remains. Those significant coefficients show the spatially-proximal 'Radical-Left' economic policy group to have significantly higher average support for *Die Linke*, and the spatially-distant 'Centre-Right' and 'Radical-Right' groups to have significantly lower average *Die Linke* support - all relative to the 'Centrists'. These results are in line with expectations, especially those expressed in Figure 4.5. Figure 4.14 graphically demonstrates the pattern of radical left support I find in Table 4.5.

Figure 4.14: Plotted Results of Economic Policy Groups

Looking at the relative magnitude of these coefficients, column two of Table 4.5 shows average *Die Linke* evaluations to be .41 higher from 'Radical-Left' respondents, relative to the 'Centrists'. At the other end of this dimension, average *Die Linke* support falls significantly relative to the 'Centrists' – by .37 and .80 from the 'Centre-Right' and 'Radical-Right' groups, respectively. These results suggest a monotonic relationship between economic policy preferences and radical left support in Germany, with both the expected increases and decreases in average radical left support.

Recall that I also include results from separated pre-election and post-election waves, under Appendix 1.4. Coefficients in Appendix 1.4 are broadly consistent with the pattern I observe

above, in Table 4.5. Specifically, relative to the 'Centrists' there are positive coefficients from the groups in proximity with *Die Linke*, and negative coefficients from the spatially-distant economic policy groups. Also consistent is the pattern of *Die Linke* evaluations when regressed with the scalar variable of economic policy preferences. I include this model under Appendix 1.5, which shows how an increase in average economic policy responses – representing greater leftism on this dimension – is associated with significantly increased *Die Linke* evaluations. As before, the scalar model does not challenge earlier conclusions from economic policy groups.

Before moving to results from respondents on the next policy dimension, a brief summation of the control variables. I find *Die Linke* evaluations to be higher from more educated voters, non-religious voters, female voters, and voters from a lower socioeconomic class. Although introducing controls diminished the size of the coefficients from proximity groups and policy groups, they generally did not diminish their statistical significance. This means I can more reliably conclude observation of support for *Die Linke* based on economic policy-proximity.

4.4.3: Cultural Policy Dimension and Radical Left Support

I drew expectations for *Die Linke* evaluations from cultural policy groups purely from the expert surveys. There are no proximity groups here, as the GLES lacked questions where respondents could place themselves and *Die Linke* on a cultural policy scale.

I stated three scenarios here, with slightly different expectations in each depending on the group assumed to be closest to *Die Linke*. The first scenario assumed *Die Linke* to be in closest proximity with the 'Centrist' cultural policy group. The second scenario suggested closest proximity with the 'Moderate-Liberal' policy group. Finally, the third scenario suggested closest proximity with the 'Radical-Liberal' cultural policy group.

Under the first scenario, I expected highest *Die Linke* evaluations from the 'Centrist' cultural policy group. I then expected lowest *Die Linke* evaluations from the groups at the fringes of this policy dimension – the 'Radical-Liberal' and 'Radical-Conservative' groups. I reflected this in Figure 4.7, with a curvilinear relationship anticipated here between cultural policy preferences and radical left support.

In the second scenario, I expected highest evaluations for *Die Linke* from the 'Moderate-Liberal' group, with lowest evaluations from the 'Radical-Conservative' group. There would

not be a monotonic relationship in this scenario, as evaluations would be slightly lower from the 'Radical-Liberal' group compared to the 'Moderate-Liberal' group – reflecting the latter's closer proximity with *Die Linke* on cultural policy in this scenario. I summarised the expected pattern of evaluations in this scenario with Figure 4.8.

I predicated the final scenario on *Die Linke* being in closest proximity with the 'Radical-Liberal' cultural policy group. Under this scenario, I would expect highest *Die Linke* evaluations from that policy group. I also expected lowest *Die Linke* evaluations from the spatially-distant 'Radical-Conservative' group in this scenario, forming a monotonic pattern between *Die Linke* evaluations and cultural policy preferences. I reflected these expectations with Figure 4.9.

Across all these scenarios, in Figures 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9, there is a single peak in evaluations. I expected highest *Die Linke* evaluations from one group – the group in closest proximity with this political actor in the cultural policy space. I then stated the expectation that evaluations would fall away, as policy-proximity with *Die Linke* reduces.

In Table 4.6 is a linear regression of *Die Linke* evaluations from cultural policy groups.

Table 4.6: Regression of Cultural Policy Groups and Die Linke Evaluations

Evaluations of Die Linke by Cultural Policy Group

	Dependent variable:	
	Die Linke Evaluations	
	(1)	(2)
Rad Lib	0.494***	0.160
	(0.156)	(0.138)
Mod Lib	0.190	0.060
	(0.177)	(0.155)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Mod Con	-0.459**	-0.269*
	(0.178)	(0.157)
Rad Con	-1.204***	-0.752***
	(0.171)	(0.153)
DieLinke_PartyID		4.758***
		(0.220)
CDU_PartyID		0.167
		(0.181)
CSU_PartyID		-0.198
		(0.294)
SPD_PartyID		1.623***
		(0.181)
FDP_PartyID		0.056
		(0.251)
Greens_PartyID		1.927***
		(0.216)
Afd_PartyID		0.172
		(0.271)
Other_PartyID		0.692
		(0.446)
No_PartyID		1.329***
		(0.178)
Gender		0.124
(1 = Female)		(0.092)
Religion		0.358***
(1 = Non-Religious)		(0.096)
Education		0.130***
		(0.044)
Social_Class		-0.161***
		(0.053)
EastWest		0.162*
(1 = Born GDR)		(0.093)
Constant	5.651***	4.279***
	(0.125)	(0.274)
Observations	2,980	2,980
R^2	0.046	0.272
Adjusted R^2	0.045	0.268
Residual Std. Error	2.799 (df = 2975)	2.451 (df = 2961)
F Statistic	36.227*** (df = 4; 2975)	61.558*** (df = 18; 2961)

Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

In Table 4.6, average evaluations of *Die Linke* from the 'Radical-Conservative' group are significantly lower compared to the 'Centrists' group. I see this both with and without control variables, however once again these do have a dampening effect on coefficients. That dampening also reduced the 'Radical-Liberal' group's coefficient to statistical insignificance in column two. With the roles of policy-proximity and populism more accurately expressed after including controls in column two, I conclude that culturally-liberal policy preferences are not associated with higher average support for the radical left in Germany.

However, expectations are followed from the 'Radical-Conservative' policy group, who have significantly reduced *Die Linke* evaluations relative to the baseline group. I expected this given the spatial distance between *Die Linke* and these respondents on the cultural policy dimension. Column two also shows no significantly increased average evaluations, relative to the 'Centrists', from either culturally-liberal policy group. Consequently, *Die Linke* evaluations from culturally-liberal respondents are statistically indistinguishable from those of the 'Centrists' baseline group in terms of average radical left support. This plausibly fits with policy-proximity expectations here, as there was uncertainty about whether *Die Linke* was in proximity with either the 'Centrist', 'Moderate-Liberal', or 'Radically-Liberal' cultural policy group. Broadly comparable average evaluations across these groups potentially reflects this uncertainty.

Table 4.6 provided results which conform with the policy-proximity account: specifically, the observation of significantly lower average support for *Die Linke*, relative to the 'Centrists', from the spatially-distant 'Radical-Conservatives' policy group. In all three scenarios this observation was expected. The pattern of average *Die Linke* evaluations in Table 4.6 is plotted below, in Figure 4.15.

Figure 4.15: Plotted Results from Cultural Policy Groups

Note also in Figure 4.15 how average evaluation levels from the 'Moderate-Liberal', and 'Radical-Liberal' cultural policy groups are all relatively similar to each other, reflecting the lack of statistically significant differences in *Die Linke* evaluations relative to the 'Centrists'.

In Appendix 1.6 is the regression of pre-election and post-election cultural policy groups. There is variance in attitudes between these two waves. Unlike above, with pre-election data there are lower average evaluations for *Die Linke* from all cultural policy groups, relative to the 'Centrists'. Furthermore, I did not observe the lower *Die Linke* evaluations from the culturally-conservative group with post-election data. However, the combination of relative lower evaluations from culturally-conservative pre-election respondents, and relative increased evaluations from the culturally-liberal post-election respondents, plausibly yields the cumulative results in Table 4.6 and the pattern of radical left support in Figure 4.14. Finally, under Appendix 1.7 is the regression of *Die Linke* evaluations but with the scalar cultural policy variable instead. This shows an increase in that scale (representing a shift to the culturally-conservative side of that dimension) is associated with lower average *Die Linke* evaluations. This conforms with my findings in Table 4.6, leading me to the same conclusions I drew from the group-based model.

<u>*4.4.4: Migration Policy Dimension and Radical Left Support*</u>

Turning attention to support for *Die Linke* based on migration policy-proximity, examination of radical left support on this dimension returns to proximity groups and policy groups. I discuss results from migration proximity groups first. I expected a monotonic relationship between proximity and *Die Linke* evaluations, where the 'Closest' proximity group would have highest evaluations of *Die Linke*, and the 'Furthest' proximity group would have lowest evaluations. I include the regression of migration proximity groups in Table 4.7.

Table 4.7: Regression of Migration Proximity Groups and Die Linke Evaluations

Effect of Migration Policy Proximity on Evaluations of Die Linke

	Die Linke Evaluations	
	(1)	(2)
Closest	0.428***	0.473***
	(0.109)	(0.111)
2	0.294**	0.259**
	(0.121)	(0.121)
Moderately-Distant	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
4	-0.485***	-0.195*
	(0.111)	(0.112)
Furthest	-1.437***	-1.119***
	(0.126)	(0.128)
DieLinke_PartyID		4.768***
		(0.159)
CDU_PartyID		0.275**
		(0.134)
CSU_PartyID		-0.396*
		(0.225)
SPD_PartyID		1.640***
		(0.134)
FDP_PartyID		0.274
		(0.187)
Greens_PartyID		1.942***
		(0.159)
Afd_PartyID		0.337*
		(0.196)
Other_PartyID		0.409
		(0.335)
No_PartyID		1.462***
		(0.133)
Gender		0.237***
(1 = Female)		(0.068)
Religion		0.537***
(1 = Non-Religious)		(0.071)
Education		0.063*
		(0.033)
Social_Class		-0.232***
		(0.040)
EastWest		0.219***
(1 = Born GDR)		(0.069)
Constant	5.924***	4.557***
	(0.090)	(0.209)
Observations	6,864	5,154
R^2	0.049	0.303
Adjusted R^2	0.049	0.301
Residual Std. Error	2.764 (df = 6859)	2.405 (df = 5135)
F Statistic	88.869*** (df = 4; 6859)	124.086*** (df = 18; 5135)
Note:		*$p<0.1$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$

Looking across the migration proximity groups, from the 'Closest' to the 'Furthest' group there is a monotonic relationship with average *Die Linke* evaluations. This follows expectations when that monotonic relationship shows evaluations are, relative to the 'Moderately-Distant' baseline group, .47 higher from the group in closest proximity with *Die Linke* on this policy dimension. This is seen from column two, which takes into account the control variables, however even without those controls the pattern is the same and the coefficients not hugely different from most groups.

Relative to that 'Moderately-Distant' baseline group, average evaluations of *Die Linke* in column two are also on average 1.12 lower from the group with the least policy-proximity with this political actor. Results from proximity groups closest and furthest from *Die Linke* conform with the policy-proximity account, supporting this account's explanation of radical left support on the migration policy dimension. Furthermore, they conform with expectations as depicted in Figure 4.10. Figure 4.16 presents the pattern of results in Table 4.7 in graphical form, demonstrating the same pattern of *Die Linke* evaluations which conforms with expectations.

Figure 4.16: Plotted Results from Migration Proximity Groups

Table 4.7 includes results from the folded range of migration proximity groups. In Appendix 1.8 are *Die Linke* evaluations from the unfolded migration proximity groups that I detailed in Appendix 1.1. I observe the same pattern from those unfolded migration proximity groups as in Table 4.7. Specifically, relative to the baseline group (the 'Absolute Closest' group) evaluations for *Die Linke* declined as policy-proximity reduced. This conforms with the policy-proximity account of radical left support. Additionally, with the scalar variable of migration proximity, under Appendix 1.9, I find the same pattern again. Specifically, increases in that migration proximity scale, representing greater spatial distance, is associated with lower *Die Linke* evaluations. Therefore, once again, the scalar model does not alter my substantive findings from the group-based model.

Moving now to the migration policy groups, two scenarios are present here. Each one includes the expectation of a single peaked pattern with highest average *Die Linke* evaluations from the migration policy group in closest proximity with this political actor. As before, all expectations here are relative to the 'Centrist' migration policy group. In the first scenario, that group is the 'Moderately-Inclusive' policy group. In the second, highest average *Die Linke* evaluations are expected from the 'Radical-Inclusive' policy group. In both scenarios, lowest average evaluations for *Die Linke* are expected from the spatially-distant 'Radical-Exclusive' migration policy group. The first scenario's expected pattern of *Die Linke* evaluations was summarised in Figure 4.11, with the second scenario's expected monotonicity presented in Figure 4.12.

I test these expectations for *Die Linke* evaluations and migration policy preferences in Table 4.8. In previous regressions of policy groups, the number of responses was roughly the sum of pre-election and post-election responses. In Table 4.8, this is not the case. This is a consequence of a different distribution of responses across the three migration questions, which limits the amount of pooled data compared to what is available on the other two policy dimensions.

Table 4.8: Regression of Migration Policy Groups and Die Linke Evaluations

Evaluations of Die Linke by Migration Policy Group

	Dependent variable:	
	Die Linke Evaluations	
	(1)	(2)
Rad Inc	1.104***	0.651***
	(0.230)	(0.217)
Mod Inc	0.705***	0.531***
	(0.226)	(0.201)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Mod Exc	-0.229	-0.222
	(0.214)	(0.189)
Rad Exc	0.208	-0.073
	(0.233)	(0.213)
DieLinke_PartyID		4.800***
		(0.303)
CDU_PartyID		0.355
		(0.240)
CSU_PartyID		-0.247
		(0.364)
SPD_PartyID		1.624***
		(0.241)
FDP_PartyID		0.401
		(0.353)
Greens_PartyID		1.808***
		(0.306)
Afd_PartyID		0.534
		(0.380)
Other_PartyID		-0.136
		(0.594)
No_PartyID		1.432***
		(0.236)
Gender		0.277**
(1 = Female)		(0.127)
Religion		0.432***
(1 = Non-Religious)		(0.136)
Education		-0.023
		(0.065)
Social_Class		-0.143**
		(0.071)
EastWest		0.254*
(1 = Born GDR)		(0.131)
Constant	5.048***	4.140***
	(0.158)	(0.364)
Observations	1,513	1,513
R^2	0.030	0.259
Adjusted R^2	0.027	0.250
Residual Std. Error	2.778 (df = 1508)	2.439 (df = 1494)
F Statistic	11.658*** (df = 4; 1508)	29.039*** (df = 18; 1494)

Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Looking after controls in column two, average evaluations for *Die Linke* rise by .65 and .53 from 'Radical-Inclusive' and 'Moderate-Inclusive' groups, respectively. Both represent statistically significant increases in average *Die Linke* evaluations, by comparison with the baseline 'Centrists' group. However, at the other end of the migration policy space there is no statistically significant decrease in *Die Linke* evaluations from the spatially-distant 'Radical-Exclusive' group, rendering a partial observation of policy-proximity support for the radical left in Table 4.8.

The pattern I observe here, with expected increases in average *Die Linke* evaluations relative to the 'Centrists' but not the expected decrease, is seen both with and without control variables. These controls have once again dampened the coefficients but have not changed significance levels. Therefore, while these controls predictably reduce the effect of policy-proximity on this dimension, they do not change the conclusion of migrant-inclusive support for *Die Linke*.

Results from the inclusive migration groups conform most strongly with expectations in Figure 4.12, demonstrated by the larger increase in evaluations from the 'Radical-Inclusive' group, rather than the 'Moderate-Inclusive' group. However, the difference between each inclusive group's evaluations is quite small. Fundamentally, *Die Linke* evaluations increased from inclusive migration policy respondents, with this radical left support associated with greater policy-proximity with the migrant-inclusive *Die Linke*.

The pattern of average *Die Linke* evaluations in Table 4.8 is presented graphically in Figure 4.17. This reflects the increased average evaluations for *Die Linke*, relative to the 'Centrists', from the inclusive groups. It also reflects the lack of statistically significant decreases in average *Die Linke* evaluations from the exclusive groups, again relative to the 'Centrists'.

Figure 4.17: Plotted Results from Migration Policy Groups

Consequently, I conclude a partial link between migration policy-proximity and evaluations for the radical left in Germany. This is partial because I did not observe the expected decrease in *Die Linke* evaluations, relative to the 'Centrists', from the spatially-distant 'Radical-Exclusive' group, but did see the proximal migrant-inclusive voters evaluating *Die Linke* more positively relative to the same baseline.

In Appendix 1.10 are results from migration policy groups in pre-election and post-election data. When separated by these two waves, the coefficients in each regression conform with expectations. However, both demonstrate markedly greater reduction in *Die Linke* evaluations from the migrant-exclusive policy groups, compared with observations in Table 4.8. As results in all three of these regressions of migration policy groups conform with expectations, there is still support for the policy-proximity account here. Results with the scalar migration policy variable, under Appendix 1.11, also conform with Table 4.8. Specifically, increases on the migration policy scale, representing greater migrant-exclusive preferences, are associated with significantly reduced *Die Linke* evaluations. Thus, my earlier conclusions from migration policy groups in Table 4.8 are not altered by the scalar model.

At this point, conclusions have pertained to the policy-proximity account alone. However, I now turn attention to the second account tested in my thesis – the populism-based account – and appraise how far levels of populism explain radical left support.

To test this theory, I grouped GLES respondents based on their responses to populism questions. The expectation under this account was that the more populist voters would have higher evaluations of *Die Linke* compared to the baseline group. That baseline group is the 'Centrists' group, where respondents did not express either strong populist or non-populist sentiments.

Observing the 'Radical-Populist' group having the highest evaluations of *Die Linke* would conform with expectations under the populism-based account, and support this theory's explanation of radical left support. In Table 4.9 is a linear regression of *Die Linke* evaluations from populism groups. The GLES pools pre-election and post-election responses to populism questions, leaving no separate pre-election and post-election responses. As a result, there are no regressions from the separated waves of GLES respondents in the Appendix.

Table 4.9: Regression of Populism Groups and Die Linke Evaluations

Evaluations of Die Linke by Populism Group

	Dependent variable:	
	Die Linke Evaluations	
	(1)	(2)
Rad Populist	0.363***	0.115
	(0.118)	(0.107)
Mod Populist	0.178	0.129
	(0.120)	(0.105)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Mod Non-Populist	0.068	0.152
	(0.132)	(0.114)
Rad Non-Populist	0.169	0.186*
	(0.122)	(0.107)
DieLinke_PartyID		4.977***
		(0.164)
CDU_PartyID		0.204
		(0.136)
CSU_PartyID		-0.589***
		(0.224)
SPD_PartyID		1.785***
		(0.135)
FDP_PartyID		0.118
		(0.188)
Greens_PartyID		2.130***
		(0.162)
Afd_PartyID		0.120
		(0.201)
Other_PartyID		0.368
		(0.338)
No_PartyID		1.419***
		(0.134)
Gender		0.287***
(1 = Female)		(0.069)
Religion		0.290***
(1 = Non-Religious)		(0.072)
Education		0.152***
		(0.035)
Social_Class		-0.191***
		(0.041)
EastWest		0.139**
(1 = Born GDR)		(0.070)
Constant	5.353***	3.932***
	(0.081)	(0.207)
Observations	5,228	5,228
R^2	0.002	0.269
Adjusted R^2	0.001	0.266
Residual Std. Error	2.879 (df = 5223)	2.468 (df = 5209)
F Statistic	2.588** (df = 4; 5223)	106.347*** (df = 18; 5209)

Note:	$^*p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

Immediately apparent in Table 4.9 is the lack of statistically significant coefficients, relative to the 'Centrists' baseline, once control variables are included under column two. This suggests levels of populism do not cause notably higher or lower average evaluations of *Die Linke* relative to the baseline group. That being said, in column one – without controls – the 'Radical-Populist' group has significantly higher evaluations for *Die Linke* compared to the baseline group. This perhaps vindicates the control variables, as without them I would be led to conclude in favour of the populism-based account, when in fact that association with radical left support seems to be bound up with control variable effects.

After controls, there is limited evidence that the 'Radical-Non-Populists' group respondents had higher evaluations for *Die Linke*, compared to the baseline. However, this association is directly the opposite of expectations here, as I had expected higher evaluations for *Die Linke* from populist voters rather than non-populists.

The pattern of *Die Linke* evaluations I find in Table 4.9 is presented graphically in Figure 4.18.

Figure 4.18: Plotted Results from Populism Groups

142

The lack of statistically significant increases in average support for *Die Linke* from the 'Radical-Populists' group, relative to the 'Centrists', suggests that the effects of populism and non-populism had little reliable impact on evaluations for *Die Linke*. As a result, findings here did not follow expectations under the populism-based account, leaving little evidence supporting this explanation of radical left support.

Finally, under Appendix 1.12 I include the regression of *Die Linke* evaluations with populist attitudes as a scalar variable, rather than populism groups. In that regression, results conform with Table 4.9. Specifically, I find no significant association between levels of populism and support for *Die Linke*. This again leaves by substantive findings from Table 4.9 unaltered by the scalar model.

4.4.6: Multiple Linear Regressions and Radical Left Support

I have so far examined the simple impacts of populism and policy-proximity on radical left support in Germany. However, it may be that variables across policy dimensions, and from populism groups, have had a confounding role on radical left support. For example, uncontrolled preferences on the economic or cultural dimensions may bolster the effects of 'Radical-Inclusive' migration policy-proximity on *Die Linke* evaluations. To understand the roles of each predictor variable more fully – across policy preferences and populism – on radical left support, I should control for their respective impacts on *Die Linke* evaluations. I accomplish this with multiple linear regressions.

I include two multiple linear regressions in this section. The first of these will include the economic and migration proximity groups and the populism groups. The second multiple linear regression will include the policy groups from all three dimensions with the populism groups. Under Table 4.10 is a multiple linear regression of proximity groups, with the 'Moderately-Distant' proximity groups, and 'Centrist' populism group as the baseline.

Effect of Economic/Migration Policy Proximity on Evaluations of Die Linke

	Die Linke Evaluations				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Econ_Closest	0.908***		0.526***		0.469***
	(0.139)		(0.121)		(0.119)
Econ_2	0.380**		0.231*		0.164
	(0.152)		(0.132)		(0.130)
Moderately-Distant	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Econ_4	-0.593***		-0.307**		-0.312**
	(0.148)		(0.129)		(0.127)
Econ_Furthest	-1.347***		-0.823***		-0.651***
	(0.160)		(0.140)		(0.139)
Immig_Closest		0.569***		0.486***	0.446***
		(0.145)		(0.124)	(0.123)
Immig_2		0.467***		0.247*	0.241*
		(0.158)		(0.135)	(0.134)
Moderately-Distant	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Immig_4		-0.301**		-0.241*	-0.184
		(0.146)		(0.125)	(0.124)
Immig_Furthest		-1.358***		-1.187***	-1.094***
		(0.164)		(0.143)	(0.144)
Rad Populist					0.292**
					(0.118)
Mod Populist					0.033
					(0.114)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Mod Non-Populist					0.068
					(0.122)
Rad Non-Populist					0.107
					(0.115)
Constant	5.648***	5.712***	4.268***	4.537***	4.333***
	(0.115)	(0.119)	(0.230)	(0.230)	(0.260)
Observations	4,106	4,106	4,106	4,106	4,106
R^2	0.075	0.051	0.313	0.321	0.338
Adjusted R^2	0.074	0.050	0.310	0.318	0.334
Residual Std. Error	2.776 (df = 4101)	2.812 (df = 4101)	2.397 (df = 4087)	2.383 (df = 4087)	2.354 (df = 4079)
F Statistic	83.552*** (df = 4; 4101)	55.080*** (df = 4; 4101)	103.351*** (df = 18; 4087)	107.328*** (df = 18; 4087)	80.258*** (df = 26; 4079)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.10: Multiple Linear Regression of Radical Left Support from Proximity and Populism Groups

(Part 2/2)

Effect of Economic/Migration Policy Proximity on Evaluations of Die Linke

	Dependent variable:				
	Die Linke Evaluations				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DieLinke_PartyID			4.743***	4.947***	4.626***
			(0.178)	(0.175)	(0.176)
CDU_PartyID			0.314**	0.328**	0.299**
			(0.149)	(0.148)	(0.146)
CSU_PartyID			-0.753***	-0.637**	-0.685***
			(0.259)	(0.257)	(0.255)
SPD_PartyID			1.721***	1.834***	1.600***
			(0.150)	(0.148)	(0.148)
FDP_PartyID			0.427**	0.430**	0.450**
			(0.208)	(0.206)	(0.204)
Greens_PartyID			2.044***	2.125***	1.876***
			(0.178)	(0.176)	(0.176)
Afd_PartyID			0.153	0.651***	0.484**
			(0.210)	(0.212)	(0.213)
Other_PartyID			0.101	0.418	0.156
			(0.349)	(0.347)	(0.344)
No_PartyID			1.447***	1.663***	1.461***
			(0.149)	(0.147)	(0.147)
Gender			0.269***	0.288***	0.240***
(1 = Female)			(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.075)
Religion			0.382***	0.450***	0.472***
(1 = Non-Religious)			(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.078)
Education			0.087**	0.032	0.059
			(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.038)
Social_Class			-0.162***	-0.213***	-0.174***
			(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
EastWest			0.097	0.147*	0.166**
(1 = Born GDR)			(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.076)
Constant	5.648***	5.712***	4.268***	4.537***	4.333***
	(0.115)	(0.119)	(0.230)	(0.230)	(0.260)
Observations	4,106	4,106	4,106	4,106	4,106
R^2	0.075	0.051	0.313	0.321	0.338
Adjusted R^2	0.074	0.050	0.310	0.318	0.334
Residual Std. Error	2.776 (df = 4101)	2.812 (df = 4101)	2.397 (df = 4087)	2.383 (df = 4087)	2.354 (df = 4079)
F Statistic	83.552*** (df = 4; 4101)	55.080*** (df = 4; 4101)	103.351*** (df = 18; 4087)	107.328*** (df = 18; 4087)	80.258*** (df = 26; 4079)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

My focus is on column 5 in Table 4.10, which shows results after simultaneously including as predictors the economic and migration proximity groups, populism groups, and the other control variables. The previous conclusions identified from proximity groups continue from Table 4.10. Specifically, I find that the most spatially-proximal 'Closest' groups had significantly higher average evaluations for *Die Linke* compared to the baseline, and lower average evaluations for *Die Linke* from the 'Furthest' proximity groups. Both of these findings conform with expectations. Looking at the relative magnitudes of these coefficients, proximity on both policy dimensions is associated with similarly increased average evaluations for *Die Linke*. At the other end of these dimensions, spatial-distance on migration policy is associated with a larger decrease in average *Die Linke* evaluations than distance on economic policy.

There is, however, a notable change to the results from the 'Radical-Populist' group. Table 4.10 shows that after controlling for economic and migration proximity groups, as well as the control variables, holding radically populist beliefs is associated with a .29 increase in average evaluations for *Die Linke* compared to the baseline. Crucially, this represents a statistically significant increase in average *Die Linke* evaluations. Looking at magnitudes again, radical populism's association with higher average *Die Linke* evaluations seems to have roughly half the effect of close proximity on both economic and migration policy dimensions.

In summary, I find higher average *Die Linke* evaluations from respondents who are spatially close to this political actor, and lower average *Die Linke* evaluations from the spatially-distant groups – both compared to the baseline voters. Finally, I find evidence supports the populism-based account's explanation of radical left support in Germany. The overall outcome from Table 4.10 is support for both policy-proximity and populism-based accounts. Furthermore, when including the unfolded economic and migration proximity groups in the regression, as I do in Appendix 1.13, I generally observe the same pattern of evaluations. Figure 4.19 graphically portrays the patterns of average *Die Linke* evaluations I identify in Table 4.10.

Figure 4.19: Plotted Results from Econ and Migration Prox. Groups, and Populism Groups

Figure 4.19 displays the crucial conclusions from Table 4.10. Namely, the monotonic patterns of average *Die Linke* evaluations from the economic and migration proximity groups, and the significantly higher average *Die Linke* evaluations from the 'Radical-Populist' group relative to the baseline. These patterns all conform with their respective accounts.

Finally, I also find this monotonicity when including scalar proximity variables, rather than proximity groups. I include this model under Appendix 1.14. It shows that increases in each proximity scale, representing increased spatial distance from *Die Linke*; and increases in the populism scale, representing increasing levels of non-populist attitudes, are associated with reduced *Die Linke* evaluations. This conforms with my findings in Table 4.10, showing both policy-proximity and populism-based support for the radical left in Germany. Thus, after looking at the scalar models of policy and populism variables, my substantive findings are unchanged.

Moving now to the multiple linear regression of policy groups across all three dimensions and populism groups. I include this regression in Table 4.11, working from pooled pre-election and post-election data. The baseline in this regression is the 'Centrists' groups on all three policy dimensions and populism. The sample is significantly smaller here, as respondents needed to answer all questions pertaining to the three policy dimensions, populist attitudes, control variables, and evaluations of *Die Linke*. This brings the number of respondents to 1,242.

Table 4.11: Multiple Linear Regression of Radical Left Support from Policy Groups on all Dimensions and Populism Groups

(Part 1/2)

Evaluations of Die Linke by Policy Group

	Die Linke Evaluations							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rad Left	1.077***			0.801***	0.569***			0.482**
	(0.243)			(0.239)	(0.218)			(0.217)
Centre Left	0.068			-0.006	-0.082			-0.096
	(0.237)			(0.232)	(0.210)			(0.209)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Centre Right	-0.544**			-0.423*	-0.398*			-0.334
	(0.254)			(0.250)	(0.225)			(0.226)
Rad Right	-1.248***			-1.149***	-0.992***			-0.920***
	(0.221)			(0.218)	(0.198)			(0.199)
Rad Lib		0.561**		0.275		0.294		0.144
		(0.241)		(0.235)		(0.215)		(0.213)
Mod Lib		0.247		0.160		0.094		0.016
		(0.276)		(0.266)		(0.243)		(0.240)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Mod Con		-0.580**		-0.580**		-0.386		-0.395
		(0.279)		(0.269)		(0.247)		(0.243)
Rad Con		-1.050***		-0.767***		-0.711***		-0.541**
		(0.266)		(0.260)		(0.241)		(0.240)
Rad Inc			1.062***	1.117***			0.594**	0.588**
			(0.251)	(0.246)			(0.233)	(0.232)
Mod Inc			0.608**	0.745***			0.406*	0.461**
			(0.247)	(0.238)			(0.219)	(0.217)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Mod Exc			-0.247	-0.130			-0.280	-0.168
			(0.233)	(0.224)			(0.206)	(0.203)
Rad Exc			0.255	0.101			-0.024	0.055
			(0.259)	(0.258)			(0.235)	(0.237)
Rad Populist				0.664***				0.094
				(0.234)				(0.219)
Mod Populist				0.270				0.125
				(0.230)				(0.209)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
ModNon-Pop				-0.262				-0.098
				(0.241)				(0.219)
Rad Non-Pop				-0.355				-0.118
				(0.234)				(0.214)
Constant	5.555***	5.422***	5.059***	5.275***	4.315***	4.155***	4.238***	4.512***
	(0.162)	(0.200)	(0.173)	(0.313)	(0.378)	(0.402)	(0.398)	(0.462)
Observations	1,242	1,242	1,242	1,242	1,242	1,242	1,242	1,242
R^2	0.078	0.048	0.028	0.134	0.291	0.273	0.267	0.308
Adjusted R^2	0.075	0.045	0.025	0.123	0.280	0.262	0.257	0.291
Residual Std. Error	2.686 (df = 1237)	2.730 (df = 1237)	2.758 (df = 1237)	2.616 (df = 1225)	2.370 (df = 1223)	2.399 (df = 1223)	2.408 (df = 1223)	2.352 (df = 1211)
F Statistic	26.316*** (df = 4; 1237)	15.659*** (df = 4; 1237)	8.970*** (df = 4; 1237)	11.838*** (df = 16; 1225)	27.831*** (df = 18; 1223)	25.520*** (df = 18; 1223)	24.789*** (df = 18; 1223)	17.973*** (df = 30; 1211)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.11: Multiple Linear Regression of Radical Left Support from Policy Groups on all Dimensions and Populism Groups

(Part 2/2)

Evaluations of Die Linke by Policy Group

				Dependent variable:				
				Die Linke Evaluations				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
DieLinke_PartyID					4.616***	4.750***	4.770***	4.382***
					(0.323)	(0.326)	(0.328)	(0.326)
CDU_PartyID					0.318	0.254	0.337	0.218
					(0.255)	(0.260)	(0.260)	(0.256)
CSU_PartyID					-0.426	-0.336	-0.308	-0.325
					(0.394)	(0.398)	(0.401)	(0.393)
SPD_PartyID					1.667***	1.646***	1.744***	1.393***
					(0.257)	(0.263)	(0.262)	(0.261)
FDP_PartyID					0.712*	0.464	0.402	0.590
					(0.364)	(0.367)	(0.369)	(0.363)
Greens_PartyID					1.967***	1.990***	1.939***	1.566***
					(0.323)	(0.328)	(0.337)	(0.334)
Afd_PartyID					0.504	0.697*	0.585	0.614
					(0.385)	(0.392)	(0.394)	(0.391)
Other_PartyID					-0.537	-0.423	-0.466	-0.677
					(0.667)	(0.675)	(0.679)	(0.665)
No_PartyID					1.469***	1.435***	1.481***	1.348***
					(0.253)	(0.257)	(0.257)	(0.254)
Gender					0.215	0.111	0.278**	0.127
(1 = Female)					(0.136)	(0.141)	(0.139)	(0.139)
Religion					0.305**	0.249*	0.354**	0.294**
(1 = Non-Religious)					(0.146)	(0.148)	(0.149)	(0.146)
Education					0.023	0.054	-0.025	-0.021
					(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.071)	(0.071)
Social_Class					-0.101	-0.112	-0.161**	-0.083
					(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)
EastWest					0.205	0.280**	0.308**	0.247*
(1 = Born GDR)					(0.140)	(0.142)	(0.143)	(0.140)
Constant	5.555***	5.422***	5.059***	5.275***	4.315***	4.155***	4.238***	4.512***
	(0.162)	(0.200)	(0.173)	(0.313)	(0.378)	(0.402)	(0.398)	(0.462)
Observations	1,242	1,242	1,242	1,242	1,242	1,242	1,242	1,242
R^2	0.078	0.048	0.028	0.134	0.291	0.273	0.267	0.308
Adjusted R^2	0.075	0.045	0.025	0.123	0.280	0.262	0.257	0.291
Residual Std. Error	2.686 (df = 1237)	2.730 (df = 1237)	2.758 (df = 1237)	2.616 (df = 1225)	2.370 (df = 1223)	2.399 (df = 1223)	2.408 (df = 1223)	2.352 (df = 1211)
F Statistic	26.316*** (df = 4; 1237)	15.659*** (df = 4; 1237)	8.970*** (df = 4; 1237)	11.838*** (df = 16; 1225)	27.831*** (df = 18; 1223)	25.520*** (df = 18; 1223)	24.789*** (df = 18; 1223)	17.973*** (df = 30; 1211)

Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Primary interpretation of Table 4.11 comes from column eight, which includes coefficients representing average *Die Linke* evaluations from all policy and populism groups relative to the baseline, and after also accounting for the control variables. I will discuss these dimension-by-dimension, with attention on the populism groups too.

From the economic policy groups, I find the expected increase in average *Die Linke* support from the 'Radical-Left' and decrease in this support from the 'Radical-Right' relative to the baseline. Therefore, and consistent with earlier conclusions, I find results here which follow expectations at each end of this policy dimension. However, I now find this and other conclusions, after also accounting for policy preferences on the other two dimensions, having taken populism into account, and including the control variables.

Table 4.11 shows consistency with the earlier results from the cultural policy groups. Specifically, I still do not find increased average *Die Linke* evaluations, relative to the baseline, and I again find the significant decrease in *Die Linke* support from the spatially-distant culturally-conservative voters. Consequently, my earlier conclusion of support for the policy-proximity account, based on lower average *Die Linke* evaluations from spatially-distant cultural-conservatives, is maintained.

Consistency also continues to be apparent when looking at migration policy groups. In column eight I find increased average evaluations for *Die Linke*, relative to the baseline, from the spatially-proximal migrant-inclusive voters, but do not find the equally expected decreased *Die Linke* support from the spatially-distant migrant-exclusive voters. Therefore, once again, I conclude partial support for the policy-proximity account on this dimension. This is partial because average *Die Linke* support followed expectations at only one of the two ends of this dimension.

From the populism groups, I find no statistically significant differences between their average *Die Linke* evaluations and those from the baseline voters. Thus, results here do not follow expectations even after accounting for policy preferences on all three dimensions and the control variables. Consequently, there is little evidence supporting this account of radical left support here.

In terms of magnitudes, the largest difference in average *Die Linke* evaluations is from the economic 'Radical-Right' policy group, with a .92 reduction in average *Die Linke* evaluations, relative to the baseline. Thus, distance from *Die Linke* on economics is associated with lowest levels of support for this political actor, compared to the impacts of spatial distance on both other policy dimensions. Looking at magnitudes of average *Die Linke* evaluation increases, these were broadly similar from the 'Radical-Left' and 'Radical-Inclusive' groups on the economic and migration policy dimensions, respectively. Therefore, proximity on both these dimensions is roughly equally associated with greater average support for *Die Linke*, relative to the baseline group. 'Moderate-Inclusive' positions on the migration dimension are also associated with a comparable increase in evaluations of *Die Linke*, relative to the baseline, which further suggests migration policy-proximity is associated with support for the radical left.

Looking at column four, this shows coefficients from all policy and populism groups without the control variables. Interestingly, before inclusion of the control variables there was a significant increase in average *Die Linke* support from the 'Radical-Populist' voters. However, the control variables nullified this significance, as it also did in Table 4.9. Once again, this perhaps vindicates the control variables, without which I may have wrongly concluded populism-based radical left support.

Although Table 4.11 has mostly just confirmed my earlier conclusions, it has made an important contribution. Results in column eight of Table 4.11 came after controlling for the potential confounding roles of policy preferences on the three dimensions, of populist attitudes, as well as the control variables. Consequently, Table 4.11 has acted as a robustness test of my earlier conclusions, and yielded a set of more reliable findings. Figure 4.20 shows the pattern of average *Die Linke* evaluations across each dimension's policy groups and across the populism groups.

Figure 4.20: Plotted Results from Policy Groups (all dimensions) and Populism Groups.

To quickly address the separated pre-election and post-election results under Appendices 1.15 and 1.16, respectively. Coefficients from both pre-election and post-election data broadly followed the patterns I observe in Table 4.11. Specifically, increased evaluations from the economically-left and migrant-inclusive respondents, and decreased evaluations from the economically-right and culturally-conservative respondents. Consequently, pre-election and post-election results broadly conform with previous observations.

Finally, results also conform under Appendix 1.17, which includes policy preferences and populist attitudes as scalar variables. Increases on the economic policy scale, representing greater economic leftism, are associated with significantly higher *Die Linke* evaluations. Furthermore, increases on the cultural, migration, and populism scales – representing greater conservatism on cultural policy, migrant-exclusiveness, and non-populism, respectively – are associated with decreased *Die Linke* evaluations.

This conformity with scalar variable results, and pre-/post-election results, leads me to draw overall conclusions for this chapter.

4.5: Germany Conclusions

First, I will summarise results for both accounts I examined here. I find little consistent evidence to support the populism-based account. More specifically, with regression of the populism groups alone, and in multiple regressions with the policy groups on all three dimensions, I find no statistically significant coefficients next to the 'Radical-Populist' or even the 'Moderate-Populist' group. On one occasion in my analysis, I did find radical populism to be associated with higher evaluations for *Die Linke*; however, generally my analysis did not find evidence supporting this account of radical left support. Examination of this account in both other case studies will help me make more definitive conclusions about the possible role of populism in support for the radical left.

I tested the policy-proximity account in two ways: the first way with proximity groups, and the second through policy groups. From the former, I observe a monotonic relationship between proximity groups and evaluations for *Die Linke*. This relationship followed expectations, as the groups in closest proximity with *Die Linke* had the highest evaluations for this political actor, with these falling as policy-proximity reduced. These proximity groups are an advantage of the German case study, as they provide an additional test of the policy-proximity account. From the policy groups, results broadly conformed with expectations. I find the spatially-proximal groups have higher *Die Linke* evaluations relative to the baseline 'Centrists' group, and lower evaluations for this political actor from the spatially-distant groups. I find this most consistently from economic policy groups; however, on all three dimensions I observe results which conform with the policy-proximity account. These results persisted in multiple linear regressions, which further leads me to conclude support for the radical left based on policy-proximity.

What do these conclusions mean in relation to existing research specifically on electoral support in Germany? Previous research has also examined the links between support for the radical left *Die Linke* and voters' policy preferences, and their populist attitudes. Political disaffection, and East/West nostalgia was linked with support for *Die Linke*, along with left-

right ideology on the GLES self-placement scale (Campbell, 2018). I also find voter ideology to be associated with radical left support, however I expanded on this by looking at more specific ideological beliefs relating to three policy dimensions. These three dimensions also appeared in previous research, along with populism (Loew & Faas, 2019). Populist attitudes are associated with likelihood of voting for *Die Linke* in that research, unlike my own, however this may be the product of different dependent variables meaning voters expressed their support for the radical left differently. The conclusions reached by Loew and Faas relating to policy preferences and radical left support are in line with my findings, with cultural and migration policy linked with *Die Linke* support, but to a lesser extent than economic policy preferences.

Results of this case study lead me to conclude support for the policy-proximity account of radical left support in Germany. However, the nature of this case study leaves me wondering whether this substantial support for this account truly arises from policy-proximity. The established nature of *Die Linke* makes it difficult to disentangle possible persuasion effects from this political actor's support. Potentially voters had already decided to support *Die Linke* prior to the GLES data, and that pre-existing support meant voters had shifted their policy preferences to conform with *Die Linke*. According to Brody and Page, such support would not equate to backing of the policy-proximity account (Brody & Page, 1972).

Control variables partly contribute to separating wider persuasion effects here, and I included many of these in this case study. These controlled for factors including party identification and education, and how these impacted on *Die Linke* evaluations. However, these variables do not control for how they potentially shifted the policy preferences and populism of voters. So, while these control variables are useful and important here, for clarifying the roles of policy-proximity and populism, they are insufficient for controlling their potential persuasion effect on the variables of interest.

Chapter 5: Support for Sanders – the Radical Left in the US

5.0: Introduction

During the 2016 Democratic presidential primaries, the campaign of Hillary Clinton began with many advantages, including huge polling leads (Richinik, 2014), large amounts of money and endorsements (The Hill, 2015), and the backing of established Democratic politicians (Jensen, 2013). Yet despite winning the Democratic Party's nomination in 2016, the story of the campaign was not entirely of Clinton's success. Nor did her campaign ultimately receive the levels of support expected earlier in the electoral cycle. Instead, the presidential campaign of Senator Bernie Sanders became the story (Roy, 2016).

A little-known Senator from Vermont, Sanders challenged the mainstream Democratic Party from the radical left, overcame scarce early media coverage (Patterson, 2016), raised large amounts of money while declining corporate donations (Wagner, 2015), and ultimately achieved 45% of pledged Democratic delegates following primary victories in 22 states. In this chapter I investigate the surprising levels of support for the Sanders campaign in the 2016 Democratic primaries.

The primaries system separates support for each contender in the intra-party Democratic Party primaries. I examine support for the radical left Sanders campaign versus support for the more moderate Clinton campaign. I talked earlier about persuasion effects, and how I seek to control for these impacting on voters' policy preferences and populism. The context of the US case study is important here, because it addresses one possible persuasion effect – party attachments – by looking at an intra-party electoral choice. Thus, attachments voters have with the wider Democratic Party should not persuade voters to alter their policy preferences and populism into line specifically with the Sanders campaign. Consequently, the intra-party context of the US case study mitigates potential persuasion arising from party attachments.

In the first part of this chapter, I demonstrate the radical leftism of Bernie Sanders, where his campaign fundamentally challenged the mainstream Democratic Party in the 2016 primaries. This first considers quantitative placements of Sanders, before moving into greater detail by discussing the policy positions of his campaign compared to those of the mainstream

Democratic candidacy of Hillary Clinton. I also look at the differing rhetoric of each campaign, and how this further indicates Sanders' challenge to the Democratic Party's establishment.

Following that, I explain particular details of the research design for the US case study. This includes discussion of voter-level data from the CCES and ANES, as well as the grouping of respondents by their policy preferences and populism. I also discuss US control variables here. Expectations follow from this, relating to the policy-proximity and populism-based accounts.

Finally, in the analysis section, I find support for the policy-proximity account from the radically left-wing economic respondents, who I find to have higher probability of voting for Sanders than Clinton compared to centrist voters on this dimension. However, results more frequently challenged the policy-proximity account, including increased Sanders voting probability from spatially-distant voters, and unexpected associations between support for Sanders/Clinton and cultural and migration policy preferences. My conclusion from testing the populism-based account follows that made in the German case, with little evidence suggesting levels of populism explain radical left support in the US.

5.1: Contextualising Sanders

The purpose of this section is to argue that Bernie Sanders represents a radical left political actor in the US context. At the root of this is the challenge Sanders posed to the traditional Democratic Party in 2016. The Democratic Party itself constitutes a rather loose coalition of factions, with these competing interests often leading the party to compromises and marginal-gains (Grossmann & Hopkins, 2016). Sanders appears here in 2016 as part of the left-wing faction, presenting more strident and radical policies in contrast to the more traditional incremental and pragmatic approach of the Democratic Party.

I ultimately show how the Sanders campaign is different from the established Democratic Party, in this section. I show this through his more radically left-wing policies compared to those of Clinton in 2016, and through his rhetorical challenge to Democratic Party tradition by shirking the moniker of 'Liberal', instead identifying himself as a 'Socialist'.

5.1.1: Quantitative Appraisals of Sanders

The first way I examine Sanders in relation to Clinton within the Democratic Party is through quantitative measurements of the positions of each of these candidates. I include two quantitative measures here, from Crowdpac and from DW-NOMINATE.

First, a look at how Crowdpac assesses both Sanders and Clinton. The methodology for this measurement is based on donors to each candidate. By comparison with Sanders, and broadly representing the mainstream Democratic Party, is Clinton. Clinton historically had a generally liberal voting record, according to Crowdpac's ideological scores for the 2016 candidates (Willis, 2015). They place each candidate on a scale from -10 (very liberal) to +10 (very conservative). Crowdpac places Clinton on this scale at -6.4, with Sanders placed on the same scale further to the left of Clinton, with a score of -8.3.

The second quantitative measure included here is from DW-NOMINATE. This measurement analyses roll call patterns to infer a position on an ideological dimension which underpins legislative voting. When compared to Clinton in the last Congress where she was a member (2007-2009), Sanders was placed as the most liberal Senator on this dimension, while Clinton was placed as thirteenth most liberal member of the Senate (Poole & Rosenthal, 2015).

These quantitative placements provide an overall impression of where Sanders falls in US politics. Both quantitative measures here show Sanders to be on the radical left of US politics, and to be more left-wing than Clinton. However, these measures are limited by the fact that they measure the positions of politicians on a single left/right scale. This conflates different policy areas into just one dimension. To look beyond single-dimensional measures of ideology, I now look more specifically at the policies proposed by both Sanders and Clinton in the 2016 primaries.

5.1.2: Sanders vs. Clinton: Policy Divisions within the Democratic Party

I will try to link qualitative analysis here with the three policy dimensions considered under the policy-proximity account in my thesis. I will then not only make the case of Sanders' leftism compared to Clinton, but also gain some idea of where both candidates are located on the economic, cultural, and migration policy dimensions. This will be useful for when I come to state case-specific expectations for radical left support under the policy-proximity account.

First, I will look at the respective positions of both candidates on economic policy. Remember the minimal definition of the radical left adopted in this thesis, where I defined the radical left as political actors which oppose contemporary capitalist economic norms. For example, with the radical left proposing significantly higher taxes on the rich and big businesses, supporting greater regulation of businesses, and greater government provision and spending in areas like education and healthcare. To see how Sanders and Clinton diverge on economic policy, with Sanders radically to Clinton's left, I will look at their respective policies in these areas.

Sanders placed economic policy at the heart of his campaign, regularly denouncing Wall Street (Bernie Sanders Presidential Campaign, 2016),[20] large corporations (Bernie Sanders Presidential Campaign, 2016),[21] the 'super rich' (Bernie Sanders Presidential Campaign, 2016),[22] and income inequality in the US (Bernie Sanders Presidential Campaign, 2016).[23] These attitudes all conform with the minimal definition, by demonstrating strident redistributionist and regulatory policies. However, to compare Sanders' stances to those taken by Clinton, two areas with evident divisions between both candidates are healthcare and college education. On these two issues, Sanders routinely proposed policies which were notably more left-wing compared to the mainstream-Democratic policies of Clinton.

On healthcare, Clinton committed to upholding the Affordable Care Act (also known as 'Obamacare') were she elected as President (Office of Hillary Rodham Clinton, 2019).[24] Obamacare was the flagship healthcare policy of President Obama, and in brief it offered discounts on government-sponsored healthcare plans to the point where all Americans would have access to affordable health insurance (Neporent, 2013).

Obamacare was a compromise when originally formulated, and represents an example of a marginal-gains approach of the Democratic Party (Oberlander, 2010). Originally more left-wing Democrats identified Obamacare as being too moderate (Cusack, et al., 2016). The left of the Democratic Party wanted a single-payer healthcare system, but reluctantly supported Obamacare as the best alternative at that time (Grossmann & Hopkins, 2016). When the time

---

[20] 'Reforming Wall Street'
[21] 'Making the Wealthy, Wall Street, and Large Corporations Pay their Fair Share'
[22] 'Income and Wealth Inequality'
[23] *ibid*
[24] 'Health Care'

came in the 2016 election for a radical left Democrat to propose their own healthcare policy, Sanders unsurprisingly moved to Clinton's left. He proposed expanding existing healthcare provisions to offer universal single-payer healthcare (Bernie Sanders Presidential Campaign, 2016).[25]

The comparison between the two on this issue was characterised as Clinton's commitment to 'Medicare for more', while Sanders offered 'Medicare for all' (Harrop, 2016). Manoeuvring to Clinton's left flank on this issue further highlights the radical leftism of Sanders. Further support for this radical leftism comes from the break from the previous marginal-gains approach of the Democratic Party. The avowed commitment to radical reform by Sanders on healthcare policy diverges from the Democratic Party's more traditional incremental approach, and further highlights Sanders' challenge to the established Democratic Party.

Another issue where Sanders took more radically left-wing policy positions compared to Clinton's mainstream Democratic presidential campaign is college education. Again, Clinton offered a liberal policy, typical of a mainstream Democratic presidential candidate. She proposed lowering the interest rates on student loans, and additional investment in higher education (Zurchner, 2016). Sanders again manoeuvred to Clinton's left on this issue, by proposing free college tuition, funded by taxes on Wall Street financial transactions (CBS Democratic Primary Debate, Nov. 14 2015).

Sanders' general commitment to subsidise healthcare and college education is funded through a more progressive tax system targeting the wealthy and corporations (Bernie Sanders Presidential Campaign, 2016). Additionally, Sanders has supported greater regulation of Wall Street businesses, including a new Glass-Steagall Act to separate corporate and savings banks (Stein, 2018). Sanders has also proposed legislation to curb the size of corporations, and expressed desire to regulate their practices (Lane, 2018; FeelTheBern.Org, 2019). It is conventional for a radical left political actor to adopt stances opposed to large corporations and propose higher taxation to increase public expenditure (March, 2008). Consequently, this provides further proof of Sanders' radical leftism.

---

[25] 'Medicare for All: Leaving No One Behind'

A final monetary-related issue where Sanders and Clinton differed was on the issue of campaign finance. Donations to political campaigns in the US is a controversial issue, because contributions from large businesses and wealthy individuals to campaigns are commonly seen as buying influence (Smith, 2014). It is typical for corporations to donate to political campaigns, and during the 2016 election the Clinton campaign alone raised over $1 billion with much of that money coming from wealthy individuals and corporations (Gold & Narayanswamy, 2016).

Sanders did not accept any money from these wealthy donors, however; a position which further shows how Sanders challenged the established Democratic Party. Instead, he funded his campaign through smaller contributions from individual Americans. The campaign received and was funded by more than 2 million of these donations (Wagner, 2015), resulting in a cumulative total of over $230 million raised (OpenSecrets.Org, 2017). This followed Sanders' commitment from the outset of his campaign to reject corporate donations (Bradner, 2015). This demonstrates another substantial difference from Clinton, who accepted these donations, and shows again Sanders' anti-corporatist attitude which is typical of a radical left political actor.

Despite profound disagreements between Sanders and Clinton on economics, both candidates did not disagree on all policy areas. Moving to consider cultural policy positions of both candidates, Sanders and Clinton expressed similar policy preferences here. Both supported liberal cultural policies, including protecting rights to abortions (OnTheIssues.Org, 2019), both now supporting LGBT causes (Jacobs, 2015; Bernie Sanders Presidential Campaign, 2016),[26] and both now generally favouring increased background checks on firearms (Ye Hee Lee, 2016; Flores, 2016).

In relation to migration policy, both Sanders and Clinton support paths to citizenship and believe in immigration reform (Gambino, 2015; Min Kim, 2015). Therefore, as with cultural policy, Sanders and Clinton agree here also.

The divergence between Clinton and Sanders over economics, and the similar positions of Sanders and Clinton on cultural and migration policy, will impact upon empirical

---

[26] 'Fighting for LGBT Equality'

expectations later, as I will need to indicate expectations of which voters would be more likely or less likely to have supported Sanders versus Clinton depending on their policy-proximity with both candidates. For now, the more salient conclusion is that Sanders is in policy terms on the radical left of US politics, and of the Democratic Party. This is based on Sanders' economic policies, which include outward opposition to deregulation, support for increased taxation on businesses and the rich, and radical policies for government provision of healthcare and education placing him to Clinton's left on these issues.

5.1.3: Sanders, Socialism, and the Democratic Party

Moving from quantitative assessments of Sanders, and more qualitative arguments around the policy proposals of Sanders relative to those of Clinton, an analysis of candidate rhetoric also demonstrates Sanders' challenge to the Democratic Party. This comes about through his embracing of the description 'Socialist'.

Despite the Democratic Party's position on the left within US politics, in contrast with European leftist parties who adopt and embrace the term 'socialism', the Democratic Party has long rejected this terminology. Instead, Democrats more often use the term 'liberal'.

In the US, socialism has long held negative political connotations. Prior to 2016, to negatively paint a candidate for political office as a socialist was a common tactic (Barreto, et al., 2011; Engler, 2017). Furthermore, in 2015 50% of Americans surveyed by Gallup said they would not support a socialist candidate for President, compared to 47% who said they would. In relative terms, this made socialists less popular as candidates for President than an atheist, a Muslim, or a gay/lesbian candidate (McCarthy, 2015). This demonstrates how the American public has previously looked at socialists and socialism with a degree of distrust.

America's fear of socialism developed historically, partly from the ideological conflict between the US and USSR in the Cold War, but also the connection Americans make between socialism and authoritarian communist regimes (Leibovich, 2007). Additionally, the class-based foundations of socialism have also been at odds with the base American beliefs of self-reliance and self-governance (Romance, 2018). Consequently, the Democratic Party has not only always avoided identification with socialism, but also has a history of *anti*-socialism as a patriotic and popular endeavour in US politics (Heing, 2018).

Ever since the New Deal of the 1930s, the Democratic Party has made explicit efforts to oppose socialism by maintaining and promoting broadly pro-capitalist policies and rhetoric. The New Deal coalition of the Democratic Party was itself avowedly pro-capitalist (Le Blanc, 2003). This pro-capitalism persisted in the Democratic Party, until Sanders' campaign in 2016.

Amongst the mainstream Democratic Party, it was rare for political figures to identify themselves as socialists, in response to the common aversion to socialism amongst the American public. However, in 2016 Sanders did not follow this pattern. Instead of simply branding himself a 'liberal', Sanders described himself as a 'Democratic Socialist' on numerous occasions (Kruse, 2015; Dreier, 2017). In doing so, he broke from tradition, and challenged the Democratic Party mainstream.

The purpose of this section was to show how Sanders challenged the mainstream Democratic Party in 2016. I observe this through policy proposals from Sanders, which deviated from the common marginal-gains and compromise-based approach of the Democratic Party, offering more radical proposals compared to those of Hillary Clinton. Additionally, the use of the term 'socialist' by Sanders to describe himself and his policies is another way he challenged Democratic Party tradition in 2016.

The additional purpose here was to argue that Sanders represents a radical left political actor within the US political context. To conclude this case, I recall the minimal definition of the radical left in my thesis, with these political actors identified as challengers towards the contemporary capitalist economic norms of their particular context. By Sanders' policy preferences proposing higher taxation on corporations and the wealthy to pay for government-provided healthcare and college education, he breaks from mainstream policy of both the Democratic and Republican parties. Additionally, support for a new regulatory Glass-Steagall Act, overtures to curb the size of corporations, and rejection of donations from large businesses represent further ways in which Sanders has rejected established economic norms of deregulation, low taxation, and support for corporations in the US. Having provided evidence to support the argument of Sanders' status as a radical left political actor, my attention turns to the research design for this case study.

5.2: US Research Design

For the US case study, I obtain voter-level data from two sources: the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), and the American National Election Survey (ANES). The CCES provides measures of policy preferences and support for the radical left, but not populism. The ANES includes populism questions, so I use data from this survey to test the populism-based account. Compared to the CCES, the ANES is a much smaller survey in terms of number of respondents. Other than its populism questions, the ANES includes a set of 'Feeling Thermometers' asking respondents to indicate attitudes towards socioeconomic groups. Although those thermometers could provide indication of attitudes towards groups which relate to the three policy dimensions (e.g., wealthy people, LGBT people, immigrants), questions relating to specific policies seem like stronger gauges of respondent policy preferences. The CCES includes such questions relating to specific policies and attitudes towards them, and is also a much larger survey in terms of its sample size – enhancing its explanatory power. Therefore, for testing the policy-proximity account, I draw upon CCES responses in this chapter.

CCES data comes from their 'Common Content 2016'. This comes from as an internet survey of over 64,000 people (Ansolabehere & Schaffner, 2017). ANES data comes from their '2016 Time Series Study', which had a total of 4,270 responses, gained through a combination of face-to-face and internet interviews (American National Election Studies, 2017).

When measuring support for the radical left in the German case study, the dependent variable was a question of evaluations for *Die Linke*. However, in the US case study neither survey includes a similar measure of evaluations for both Sanders and Clinton. Therefore, the dependent variable is instead a question of vote choice in the presidential primaries. Possible responses to this question include Sanders and Clinton, with other candidates from the Republican Party also included as possible responses. My analysis includes only those who supported Sanders or Clinton, with respondents who supported neither Clinton nor Sanders recoded as NA. With the dependent variable in my analysis considering both Democratic candidates, the US case effectively considers the probability of supporting the moderate-left Clinton campaign or the radical left Sanders campaign, instead of measuring changes in evaluation as with the German case study. I include the dependent variable questions, from

both CCES and ANES, in Appendix 2.0, alongside all questions used from surveys in the US case study.

The German case study was open to the criticism of persuasion effects, which are difficult to mitigate due to *Die Linke's* status as a long-established radical left political party. Given *Die Linke*'s long existence, it is more probable voters came to identify with or support that party, for whatever reason. Whereas the Sanders campaign began with the 2016 Democratic Party primaries, meaning voters are less likely to have formed attachments with this newer radical left political actor in the US. The primaries system is important, because it allows me to examine support specifically for the intra-party radical left Sanders campaign versus for his more moderate opponent. Looking at an intra-party radical left actor means Democratic Party attachments – a potential persuasion effect – would not plausibly cause voters to alter their policy preferences or populism into line with the Sanders campaign specifically.

Under this design, attachments to the Democratic Party should not cause a persuasion effect in relation to the Sanders campaign specifically. However, this design does not rule out voters forming attachments directly with Sanders, rather than the Democratic Party. These Sanders attachments may also be a persuasion effect, as both CCES and ANES data comes from after the 2016 primaries have concluded. Therefore, voters may have recently formed attachments to Sanders, from which there may have been impacts on their policy preferences and populist attitudes. Although I cannot control this possible persuasion effect arising from attachments specifically to Sanders, the fact that his candidacy is a less established political actor than *Die Linke* still leads me to suggest the US case study is more immune to persuasion effects than the German case study.

5.2.1: US Voter Attitudes: Economics

I draw three questions from the CCES to measure economic policy preferences. These questions are all included in Appendix 2.0. The first of these asks respondents to state their preference for higher taxation, or reduced government spending. The CCES places responses to this on a scale from 0 – indicating support for higher taxation – to 100, which indicates support for cutting government spending instead. Considering the policy preferences indicated at each end of this scale, those with responses close to 0 are considered to be more

left-wing economically, and those with responses close to 100 hold right-wing economic policy preferences.

Two additional questions used to determine voter economic beliefs ask whether respondents support or oppose certain policies. These policies include repealing the Affordable Care Act (aka Obamacare), and increasing the federal minimum wage to $12 per hour. Economically left-wing respondents would indicate opposition to repealing Obamacare, and support for an increased federal minimum wage, with the economically right-wing respondents taking the opposite perspectives on both of these questions. The scale for both questions differs from the tax vs. spending question, being binary instead. I recode the left-wing responses to 0, and the right-wing responses to 100 to take this into account, matching the scale of the tax vs. spending question above. Like in the Germany case study, I calculate the average economic position of each respondent from their answers over these economic policy questions, and locate each respondent's economic policy preferences on this common 0 to 100 scale.

5.2.2: US Voter Attitudes: Cultural

Cultural policy preferences are determined from fourteen questions, over a range of cultural issues including abortion, gun control, crime, and gay marriage. I have included these questions under Appendix 2.0. Respondents indicate their support or opposition to policy proposals in these areas on a binary scale. I recode the data to place all culturally-liberal responses at one end of this scale, and all culturally-conservative responses at the other. I calculate the average response from across these fourteen questions, giving me an indication of each respondent's overall cultural policy preferences. I also modify the scale here to become 0 to 100, thus matching that of economic policy responses. Averages close to 0 indicate culturally-liberal respondents, with those close to 100 demonstrating culturally-conservative policy preferences.

Of these fourteen questions, three concern gun control, six concern abortion, four relate to crime, and one on gay marriage. I do not use all CCES questions on each of these issues.[27] Some of the questions here do not have a clear liberal or conservative response – I do not include responses to these questions. The number of questions on each issue varies in this case

---

[27] Unused question: CC16_330b (Support or oppose: Prohibit state and local governments from publishing the names and addresses of all gun owners).

study – something which is present within the CCES itself. I reflect the weighting by the CCES on these four issues in my own research, where there are not equal numbers of questions across gun control, abortion, crime, and gay marriage.

Given the context-specific nature of the gun issue, and the need for a degree of comparability across tests of cultural policy-proximity on radical left support in each case, I also perform a robustness check without using questions related to this issue. I still include responses to the questions related to abortion, crime, and gay marriage. I appendicise results from this stripped back test of cultural policy-proximity, and discuss these in the analysis section of this chapter.

5.2.3: US Voter Attitudes: Migration

I derive migration policy preferences from four questions, again asking respondents whether they support or oppose a set of policies. I include them all under Appendix 2.0. There are nine migration-related questions in the CCES overall; however, two of these do not have clear inclusive and exclusive responses, and the three others were put to much smaller subsamples of respondents. Including these three other questions would have limited the amount of data considered here, so I do not use their responses.

There are two possible responses to each of the four questions I use: one which is supportive of immigration and migrants, and the other which indicates opposition towards immigration. I calculate the average response to these four migration policy questions from each respondent, ensuring the same value for pro-migration responses across these questions, and a different value for anti-migration responses. Again, I modify the scale here to match the 0 to 100 scale of both other policy dimensions. Average responses close to 0 indicate migrant-inclusive respondents, and an average response close to 100 indicates migrant-exclusive respondents.

So far, I have shown how I draw out policy preferences from the CCES. Later, I will summarise theoretical expectations for respondents across all three of these policy dimensions. First, though, I will explain how I determine levels of populism amongst respondents.

5.2.4: US Voter Attitudes: Populism

For measures of populism, I turn to the American National Election Survey (ANES), and their '2016 Time Series Study'. This survey had a total of 4,270 responses, gained through a

combination of face-to-face and internet interviews (American National Election Studies, 2017). The dependent variable question drawn from the ANES matches that of the CCES. I include it alongside other survey questions, in Appendix 2.0.

Seven ANES questions pertain directly to populism. They ask how far voters agree with certain statements, including 'What people call compromise in politics is really just selling out on one's principles', 'Most politicians do not care about the people', 'The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions', and others which are detailed in Appendix 2.0. The same and similar questions to these have featured in other studies of populism (Akkerman, et al., 2014; Van Hauwart & Van Kessel, 2018), including in the other empirical chapters of this thesis.

Responses to these questions range on a five-point Likert-type scale from 'Agree Strongly' to 'Disagree Strongly'. The ANES codes these responses numerically, allowing me to average responses across these questions. Unlike non-populist respondents, populists would express cynicism towards politics, believe politicians are unprincipled, and believe in popular majoritarian sovereignty.

Once levels of populism amongst the respondents are known, I test how holding populist and non-populist attitudes is associated with probability of supporting Sanders versus Clinton in the 2016 Democratic Party primaries.

5.2.5: Grouping Respondents

With the average responses I have alluded to, on economic, cultural, and migration policy, and populism questions, I again group respondents. CCES respondents are grouped by their economic policy, cultural policy, and migration policy preferences. I also group ANES respondents, by their levels of populism.

I continue this grouping methodology from the German case study. I justified this in the research design, with this methodology allowing me to observe non-linear relationships should they be present. With average responses to economic, cultural, and migration policy, and populism questions, I bring respondents together into groups. I detail these groups below, in Table 5.1, with the number of respondents in each group in parentheses below.

(Ns subset to Sanders/Clinton supporters and Democrat-identifiers and leaners)

Policy dimension	Groups				
Economics *(n)*	Radical-Left *(6,034)*	Centre-Left *(4,569)*	Centrist *(1,959)*	Centre-Right *(1,011)*	Radical-Right *(177)*
Social *(n)*	Radical-Liberal *(8,365)*	Moderate-Liberal *(4,741)*	Centrist *(2,923)*	Moderate-Conservative *(2,429)*	Radical-Conservative *(213)*
Migration *(n)*	Radical-Inclusive *(7,574)*	Moderate-Inclusive *(6,076)*	Centrist *(2,931)*	Moderate-Exclusive *(1,612)*	Radical-Exclusive *(826)*
--	--	--	--	--	--
Populism *(n)*	Radical-Populist *(105)*	Moderate-Populist *(73)*	Centrist *(178)*	Moderate-Non-Populist *(115)*	Radical-Non-Populist *(270)*

Recall that possible dependent variable responses include Sanders, Clinton, and other candidates including those who competed for the Republican Party's nomination in 2016. The groups detailed in Table 5.1 come from *before* the data is subset to include Clinton and Sanders supporters. This means, for example, the Radical-Right group's economic views are radically right-wing relative to the whole survey sample, rather than relative to just those who voted for Sanders or Clinton. The latter would be the case if I created these groups *after* filtering dependent responses to only Clinton or Sanders voters, but would not truly represent Radical-Right economic policy preferences in the US. This also explains why the number of observations is much lower in some of these groups – where Radical-Right, Radical-Conservative and Radical-Exclusive policy preferences are not likely to be as common amongst Clinton and Sanders supporters as amongst the whole survey sample.

As with my previous analysis of radical left support, I label these groups relative to their context. Thus, respondents in the 'Centre-Right' economic policy group here, for example, hold moderately right-wing economic policy preferences *relative to the US case context.* And as

I said previously, this is also relative to the wider context of CCES respondents, rather than relative to just Sanders/Clinton voters.

I also labelled these groups relative to the wider survey respondents in my German case study. Obviously, Germany is not entirely the same as the US, or my later UK case study, and as a result these groups are not going to be exact equivalents across all three case studies. But these groups do not have to be entirely equivalent for me to test both policy-proximity and populism-based accounts. With both these theories I am testing how far people with *relative* policy positions/populism adherences – *relative to their contexts* – support radical left actors.

5.2.6: Control Variables

Policy-proximity and populism are not the only factors with potential impacts on radical left electoral support. I acknowledged this in the German case study, which led me to control variables for that chapter's analysis. I also include a range of control variables in this US case study.

First, two control variables which are more specific to the US context, relating to racial groups and church attendance. Previous research has associated both the former (Abramowitz, 1994; Finn & Glaser, 2010), and the latter (Manza & Brooks, 1997), variables with electoral support in the US. Therefore, I have grounds to also control for these factors in this chapter. Both are drawn from measures in the ANES and CCES, with these detailed further in Appendix 2.0. My analysis in this chapter also includes control on the gender of respondents, and their level of education. Both of these variables also appeared in the German case study.

I include Race and Gender in my analysis as dummy variables. For the former, 0 signifies a white respondent, while 1 represents a non-white respondent. With the gender control variable, 1 indicates a female respondent, and 0 a male one. Responses to the education and church attendance questions are ordinal, with these variables then demonstrating the impacts of higher education levels and more frequent church attendance on probability of voting for Sanders versus for Clinton.

An important factor that I controlled for in the previous case study was party identification. However, I have already indicated that this chapter addresses the roles of partisan attachments by examining support for political actors in the intra-party context of the

Democratic Party primaries. The impacts of identifying with the Democratic Party should not then be a persuasion effect altering voter policy preferences or populism to match those intra-party candidacies specifically. With the potential persuasion of party identification controlled by the nature of the US case study, including a PartyID control variable should not be necessary. To further ensure respondents have more equal identification with the Democratic Party, I subset US case study data to *include Democrat-identifiers and Democrat-leaners only*.

5.2.7: Empirical Expectations

I will outline expectations under the policy-proximity account first, with expectations of the populism-based account following these.

In the US case study, I state expectations along the lines of probability of voting for Sanders versus for Clinton in the 2016 primaries. This reflects the different dependent variable in this case study, which concerns vote choices rather than evaluations, and sub-setting to only include voters for these two candidates.

That different dependent variable also changes how I think about voters' utility. As this variable looks at support for both candidates, the respective positions of both Sanders and Clinton impacts on how voters view proximity with each of them. I illustrate what I mean here in Figure 5.1, which includes approximate positions of both candidates on the economic dimension:[28]

Figure 5.1: Scenario 1 – 'Radical-Left' Proximity – Probability Voting Sanders vs. Clinton

Note that Figure 5.1 applies only to the economic policy groups. I will come to expectations from cultural and migration policy groups afterwards. Assuming Sanders is in proximity with

---

[28] Assumes linear gain/loss of utility.

the 'Radical-Left' policy group – a reasonable assumption given the economic policies of Sanders outlined earlier – then voters in the 'Radical-Left' group would have higher probability of supporting Sanders instead of Clinton, relative to the baseline group ('Centrists'). I assume Clinton to be in proximity with the group one place to the right of the Sanders campaign – the 'Centre-Left' group in Figure 5.1. Probability of supporting Sanders falls as proximity with his campaign reduces, and voters are then in closer proximity with the Clinton campaign instead. They would then be more likely to support Clinton than Sanders. This would continue from the 'Centrist', 'Centre-Right', and 'Radical-Right' voters. Compared to Sanders, Clinton is one place in closer proximity with voters in those three economic policy groups. Given Clinton is equally closer to these voters compared to Sanders, I expect them to all be equally more likely to have supported Clinton than Sanders.

This assumes Clinton is in closest proximity with the 'Centre-Left' economic policy group, and Sanders is closest to the 'Radical-Left' policy group. Although this is a reasonable assumption considering the earlier discussion of the economic policies of the Sanders and Clinton campaigns, it is also possible the leftism of each candidate on this policy dimension has been overestimated. Both candidates may actually be located one place to the right of their positions in Figure 5.1. I illustrate this second scenario in Figure 5.2.

Figure 5.2: Scenario 2 – 'Centre-Left' Proximity – Probability Voting Sanders vs. Clinton

Figure 5.2 demonstrates the same drop in probability of supporting Sanders as there was in Figure 5.1, but positions this decline between both candidates in different positions. In this scenario, the 'Radical-Left' and 'Centre-Left' voters would have higher probability of supporting Sanders than Clinton, relative to the baseline group. The 'Centrist', 'Centre-Right', and 'Radical-Right' groups would have higher probability of supporting Clinton instead of

Sanders, with this being equal across these three groups – again because they are equally closer to Clinton relative to the location of Sanders on this economic policy dimension.

Both these scenarios demonstrate specific expectations for probability of supporting Sanders and Clinton, based on economic policy-proximity. Despite not being completely certain exactly where Sanders is positioned in this policy space, relative to Clinton and to respondents, I still assume probability of voting for Sanders over Clinton is higher from the 'Radical-Left' economic policy group. That probability falls as policy-proximity reduces, but remains constant to Clinton's right.

Expectations for cultural and migration policy groups, and their probability of voting for Sanders versus for Clinton, are similar across these two dimensions. Therefore, I discuss expectations of policy-proximity support on both these dimensions together.

Recall that in the first section of this chapter I showed that both Clinton and Sanders support similarly culturally-liberal and migrant-inclusive policies on the cultural and migration dimensions. From this, I consider both of these candidates to be in proximity with each other on both policy dimensions. This does not mean I cannot test the policy-proximity theory here, but it does change expectations. Instead, under this theory I would expect that *cultural and migration policy preferences will not be associated with changes in the probability of supporting Sanders or Clinton in the 2016 Democratic Party primaries.* If both candidates deliver the same policy outcomes, then voters should treat both Sanders and Clinton the same on these two policy dimensions. Thus, no cultural policy or migration policy group would have significantly higher probability of supporting Sanders or Clinton, relative to the baseline 'Centrists' group. Despite the proximity between both of these candidates, I can still potentially observe support which conforms with the policy-proximity account. Specifically, if I find support for Sanders based on preferences on these two dimensions, this would be inconsistent with the policy-proximity account. Furthermore, to exclude analysis of these two dimensions here, because of this proximity, would also create inconsistency with my other two case studies, where I do include analysis of these two dimensions.

On populism, there is the underlying notion that populist voters would be more supportive of a radical left political actor than voters who are not populists. I draw this expectation from the anti-elite nature of the radical left's economic policy, which conceivably attracts voters

who adhere to populism. Based on that underlying notion of the populism-based theory, *the expectation here is that, on average, the respondents in the 'Radical-Populist' group would have been significantly more likely to have supported Sanders in 2016.*

5.3: Analysis

In this section, I first examine support for the radical left in the US based on voter-actor policy-proximity on the economic, cultural, and migration policy dimensions. Following that, I examine the impacts of voter populism on radical left support in the US.

Again, I present results with linear regressions. These regressions allow me to test how probability of supporting Sanders and Clinton varies by policy group and levels of populism.[29] Despite the dependent variable being categorical in this case study, I do not present results in logistic regressions, opting instead for linear regressions. When processing data in the US case study, I analysed both logistic and linear models, with the trend of radical left support the same across the two. For the sake of consistency with results in both other case studies, I include results in linear models here too. To demonstrate this shared trend of results, I include logistic models of the same data under Appendices 2.6 and 2.7. These appendicised regressions include all policy groups with the sample of Democrat-identifiers and leaners, and results from populism groups, respectively. I also include models with scalar policy and populism variables, rather than respondent groups, under Appendices 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, 2.5, and 2.8.

To give an impression of the responses to the dependent variable in the CCES, the number of respondents who stated they supported Sanders in this survey is 9,012, with 12,661 stating they supported Clinton. These numbers drop in the regressions, as respondents needed to have also answered questions relating to policy preferences, and also because of the sub-setting to Democrat-identifiers and leaners. As in the previous chapter, the 'Centrist' group acts as the baseline group in all regressions.

---

[29] The scale of regressions runs from 0 (supported Clinton) to 1 (supported Sanders).

Under Table 5.2 is a linear regression of economic policy groups and their radical left support in the US. The scale of the dependent variable in this regression runs from 0 (supported Clinton) to 1 (supported Sanders). In total, there are 64,000 responses to the CCES. Of these respondents, 25,988 did not vote in the 2016 presidential primaries, thus leaving no dependent variable response. Once I subset respondents to include Sanders/Clinton voters, and Democrat-identifiers and Democrat-leaners, the number of responses comes to just over 13,500.

Table 5.2: Probability of Voting Sanders vs. Clinton – Economic Policy Groups

Probability of Voting Sanders v. Clinton by Economic Policy Groups

	Dependent variable:	
	Probability Voted for Sanders (vs Clinton)	
	(1)	(2)
Rad Left	0.137***	0.094***
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Centre Left	-0.015	-0.029**
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Centre Right	-0.035*	-0.020
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Rad Right	0.084**	0.099***
	(0.038)	(0.038)
Gender		0.021***
(1 = Female)		(0.008)
Race		-0.074***
(1 = Non-White)		(0.009)
Education		-0.003
		(0.003)
Church Attendance		0.046***
		(0.003)
Constant	0.351***	0.195***
	(0.011)	(0.021)
Observations	13,750	13,695
R^2	0.023	0.055
Adjusted R^2	0.023	0.054
Residual Std. Error	0.485 (df = 13745)	0.477 (df = 13686)
F Statistic	81.615*** (df = 4; 13745)	99.025*** (df = 8; 13686)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Recall that the expectation here was that probability respondents voted for Sanders over Clinton would be higher from the 'Radical-Left' economic policy group, and potentially also from the 'Centre-Left' group, relative to the baseline. I also expected this probability to fall and remain constant across the 'Centrist', 'Centre-Right', and 'Radical-Right' economic policy groups, with voters in these three groups having higher probability of supporting Clinton instead of Sanders. Both before and after including controls, I find that probability of voting for Sanders instead of Clinton was significantly higher from the 'Radical-Left' group, relative to the baseline. This conforms with the policy-proximity account, given the greater closeness of these voters with the Sanders campaign. The negative coefficient from the 'Centre-Left' group in column 2 signifies respondents there were significantly more likely to have voted for Clinton over Sanders, relative to the baseline. I assume this is due to greater proximity between these 'Centre-Left' economic policy voters and the Clinton campaign.

However, from the groups at the other end of this dimension, results do not conform with this account. On average, voters in the 'Radical-Right' group have significantly higher probability of supporting Sanders over Clinton, despite being spatially-distant from his radical left candidacy. This curvilinear pattern of support for the radical left does not fit with expectations of the policy-proximity account. The reasons behind the 'Radical-Right' respondents' higher probability of voting for Sanders over Clinton, relative to the baseline, is not explained by economic policy-proximity.

Appendix 2.1 replicates my analysis in Table 5.2, except with a scalar variable of economic policy preferences rather than groups. I find increase on the economic policy scale, representing greater right-wing policy preferences on this dimension, is associated with significantly lower probability of supporting Sanders instead of Clinton. However, with my group-based analysis I identified a curvilinear pattern with greater radical left support at opposing ends of this dimension. From the scalar variable model, my conclusion would be closer to expectations, as this curvilinear pattern – a pattern which fundamentally challenges expectations – is harder to spot. Given the non-linear pattern I find in Table 5.2, it seems inappropriate to impose linear functional form with the scalar variable, leaving my primary conclusions from the group-based model.

To briefly review the control variables, these diminished the coefficients from the 'Radical-Left' group, but not to the point that group's higher probability of voting for Sanders over Clinton, relative to the baseline, becomes statistically insignificant. Therefore, I can reliably infer that holding radically left-wing or radically right-wing economic policy preferences is associated with increased probability of voting for Sanders over Clinton, relative to the baseline group. Results in Table 5.2 are generally consistent between the models with and without controls, although I do again consider the stronger test of both theories to come after including these control variables. Looking at what these say about radical left support, being female, white, and a frequent churchgoer was associated with higher probability of voting for Sanders over Clinton.

5.3.2: Cultural policy Preferences and Radical Left Support

In Table 5.3 is the linear regression of cultural policy groups and radical left support in the US. The number of responses here is slightly higher than in Table 5.2 – a product of higher response rates across the questions used to create the cultural policy groups.

Recall that I judged Sanders and Clinton to be in similar positions on the cultural policy dimension. As a result, the expectation is that cultural policy preferences will not be associated with significantly increased or decreased probability of voting for Sanders or Clinton relative to the baseline group. The logic here being that if both candidates offer the same policy outcomes, there would not be a reason under the policy-proximity account to favour one over the other.

Probability of Voting Sanders v. Clinton by Cultural Policy Groups

	Dependent variable:	
	Probability Voted for Sanders (vs Clinton)	
	(1)	(2)
Rad Lib	0.202***	0.131***
	(0.010)	(0.011)
Mod Lib	0.062***	0.028**
	(0.011)	(0.011)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Mod Cons	-0.073***	-0.054***
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Rad Cons	-0.035	-0.015
	(0.034)	(0.033)
Gender		0.012*
(1 = Female)		(0.007)
Race		-0.068***
(1 = Non-White)		(0.007)
Education		-0.009***
		(0.002)
Church Attendance		0.042***
		(0.002)
Constant	0.284***	0.197***
	(0.009)	(0.017)
Observations	18,671	18,564
R^2	0.045	0.072
Adjusted R^2	0.045	0.071
Residual Std. Error	0.475 (df = 18666)	0.468 (df = 18555)
F Statistic	221.947*** (df = 4; 18666)	178.700*** (df = 8; 18555)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

First, the statistically significant positive coefficients next to the 'Radical-Liberal' and 'Moderate-Liberal' cultural policy groups suggest on average these voters have higher probability of voting for Sanders over Clinton, relative to the baseline group. Meanwhile, the significant negative coefficient from the 'Moderate-Conservative' group suggests on average these respondents had greater probability of supporting Clinton than Sanders, again relative to the baseline group. I find these results both with and without including the control variables. Thinking about initial interpretations of this, it is possible that voters did perceive

differences between Sanders and Clinton on this dimension, despite both candidates offering similarly culturally-liberal policies.

Crucially, none of these outcomes conform with the expectations of the policy-proximity account. In contrast to the expectation that cultural policy preferences would not be associated with greater probability of voting for either candidate, I instead find that cultural policy preferences *are* linked with support for Sanders and Clinton. Therefore, results from cultural policy groups in Table 5.3 do not follow the policy-proximity account in the US case study. I speculate on possible explanations for these unexpected results in the conclusion of this chapter.

With a scalar variable of cultural policy preferences, under Appendix 2.2, the pattern of support for Sanders and Clinton follows that in Table 5.3. Specifically, an increase in the scale – representing increasingly conservative cultural views – is associated with significantly lower probability of voting for Sanders over Clinton. That follows the reduced radical left support moving from the liberal to the conservative end of this dimension in Table 5.3, meaning the scalar model does not substantively alter my findings from the group-based model.

Finally, with the stripped back measures of cultural policy preferences (in this case, removing questions relating to guns), I produce the model under Appendix 2.3. Arguably, these cultural policy groups are more comparable to the ones in the German case study. Without the context-specific issue of guns, observed probability of voting for Sanders/Clinton is comparable to what I find in Table 5.3. Specifically, I still find the curvilinear pattern of radical left support on this dimension, with probability of voting for Sanders over Clinton increased from the opposing ends of this dimension, and the increase from the 'Radical-Liberal' group being statistically significant. Consequently, my conclusions are unchanged after testing this measure of cultural policy excluding the issue of guns.

5.3.3: Migration Policy Preferences and Radical Left Support

Continuing my analysis, to consider the impacts of migration policy preferences on radical left support, see Table 5.4.

Like with cultural policy, the expectation here was that migration policy preferences would not be associated with greater probability of voting for either Sanders or Clinton. This is again

due to Sanders and Clinton offering the same policies on this dimension, thus voters should not – under the policy-proximity account – have higher probability of voting for one of these candidates over the other. However, what I find in Table 5.4 does not follow that expectation.

Table 5.4: Probability of Voting Sanders vs. Clinton – Migration Policy Groups

Probability of Voting Sanders v. Clinton by Migration Policy Groups

	Dependent variable:	
	Probability Voted for Sanders (vs Clinton)	
	(1)	(2)
Rad Inc	0.177***	0.129***
	(0.010)	(0.010)
Mod Inc	0.056***	0.040***
	(0.011)	(0.011)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Mod Exc	-0.003	0.007
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Rad Exc	0.068***	0.056***
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Gender		0.012*
(1 = Female)		(0.007)
Race		-0.075***
(1 = Non-White)		(0.007)
Education		-0.005**
		(0.002)
Church Attendance		0.053***
		(0.002)
Constant	0.288***	0.125***
	(0.009)	(0.017)
Observations	19,019	18,907
R^2	0.023	0.067
Adjusted R^2	0.023	0.067
Residual Std. Error	0.480 (df = 19014)	0.469 (df = 18898)
F Statistic	110.786*** (df = 4; 19014)	170.736*** (df = 8; 18898)
	*	** ***

Again, I find statistically significant coefficients, this time from the 'Radical-Inclusive', 'Moderate-Inclusive' and 'Radical-Exclusive' groups both before and after including control variables. These show respondents in these groups had significantly higher probability of voting for Sanders than Clinton, relative to the baseline group. Consequently, I find these policy preferences to be associated with voting for the radical left in the US – a conclusion which does not conform with expectations.

When testing this with a scalar variable of migration policy preferences, instead of groups, as I do in Appendix 2.4, I find an increase in the migration policy scale – representing more migrant-exclusive attitudes – is associated with significantly lower probability of having supported Sanders over Clinton. This broadly matches with Table 5.4 – in particular, the smaller positive coefficient from the 'Radical-Exclusive' group. However, the scalar results do not indicate the curvilinearity I find in Table 5.4. Given that curvilinearity, the non-linear pattern I find in Table 5.4 suggests that the scalar variable's imposition of linear form is inappropriate here. Regardless, as findings from the scalar model broadly match with Table 5.4, my fundamental conclusions here are unchanged.

5.3.4: Multiple Linear Regression of Policy Preferences and Radical Left Support

So far, I only find support for the policy-proximity account from the 'Radical-Left' economic policy group, with those voters having significantly greater probability of voting for Sanders over Clinton, relative to the baseline group. However, I also find a curvilinear pattern of radical left support across the economic policy groups – where probability of voting for Sanders over Clinton was also higher from the spatially-distant 'Radical-Right' group. Also unexpected was my observation of a link between voters' cultural and migration policy preferences and higher probability of voting for either Sanders or Clinton. I find this despite both candidates offering the same policies here, so voters should have treated both candidates the same.

A possible explanation for this is that voters with radically left-wing economic policy preferences are also in the cultural and migration policy groups associated with greater probability of supporting Sanders than Clinton. The 'Radical-Inclusive' and 'Radical-Liberal' respondents, in particular, may also be in the 'Radical-Left' economic policy group, and drawn to support Sanders by that economic policy-proximity rather than their cultural and migration preferences. To control for any potential confounding of policy preferences across dimensions, and thus clarify the respective roles of these variables on Sanders/Clinton vote probability, I include them all in a multiple linear regression.

Under Table 5.5 is this multiple linear regression of policy groups on all three dimensions, alongside the previous four control variables. The full model, with all controls and policy groups included, falls under column 8 of Table 5.5.

Table 5.5: Probability Voting Sanders vs. Clinton - Policy Groups on all Dimensions

Probability of Voting Sanders v. Clinton by Policy Groups

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
				Probability Voted for Sanders (vs Clinton)				
Rad Left	0.137***			0.040***	0.092***			0.038***
	(0.013)			(0.014)	(0.013)			(0.014)
Centre Left	-0.015			-0.059***	-0.029**			-0.054***
	(0.013)			(0.013)	(0.013)			(0.013)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Centre Right	-0.029			-0.003	-0.016			-0.001
	(0.019)			(0.019)	(0.019)			(0.019)
Rad Right	0.071*			0.097**	0.083**			0.098**
	(0.039)			(0.039)	(0.038)			(0.038)
Rad Lib		0.181***		0.141***		0.115***		0.084***
		(0.013)		(0.014)		(0.014)		(0.015)
Mod Lib		0.044***		0.037**		0.011		0.006
		(0.014)		(0.014)		(0.014)		(0.014)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Mod Cons		-0.066***		-0.067***		-0.048***		-0.049***
		(0.017)		(0.017)		(0.017)		(0.017)
Rad Cons		0.027		0.008		0.045		0.031
		(0.046)		(0.046)		(0.045)		(0.045)
Rad Inc			0.145***	0.064***			0.105***	0.061***
			(0.013)	(0.014)			(0.013)	(0.014)
Mod Inc			0.033**	0.001			0.020	0.003
			(0.014)	(0.014)			(0.014)	(0.014)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Mod Exc			-0.024	-0.003			-0.013	-0.004
			(0.019)	(0.019)			(0.019)	(0.019)
Rad Exc			0.058**	0.082***			0.050**	0.063***
			(0.023)	(0.023)			(0.023)	(0.023)
Gender					0.021**	0.010	0.006	0.014*
(1= Female)					(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Race					-0.076***	-0.073***	-0.083***	-0.064***
(1=NonWhite)					(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Education					-0.003	-0.006*	-0.002	-0.010***
					(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
ChurchAttend					0.046***	0.037***	0.046***	0.035***
					(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Constant	0.352***	0.309***	0.332***	0.301***	0.196***	0.224***	0.177***	0.232***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.025)
Observations	13,465	13,465	13,465	13,465	13,465	13,465	13,465	13,465
R^2	0.023	0.034	0.017	0.047	0.054	0.055	0.051	0.066
Adjusted R^2	0.022	0.034	0.017	0.047	0.054	0.054	0.050	0.064
Residual Std. Error	0.486 (df = 13460)	0.483 (df = 13460)	0.487 (df = 13460)	0.480 (df = 13452)	0.478 (df = 13456)	0.478 (df = 13456)	0.479 (df = 13456)	0.475 (df = 13448)
F Statistic	78.361*** (df = 4; 13460)	119.682*** (df = 4; 13460)	58.871*** (df = 4; 13460)	55.755*** (df = 12; 13452)	96.630*** (df = 8; 13456)	97.121*** (df = 8; 13456)	90.204*** (df = 8; 13456)	58.915*** (df = 16; 13448)

| Note: | | | | | | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |

Looking primarily to the full model in column 8, the 'Radical-Left', 'Radical-Liberal', and 'Radical-Inclusive' policy groups all continue to demonstrate significantly higher probability of voting for Sanders over Clinton, relative to the baseline. I find this even after including the policy groups on all these dimensions, and thus controlling for possible confounding between them. The result is US case study data clearly demonstrates the policy preferences of these groups to be associated with support for the radical left Sanders campaign. I expected this from the 'Radical-Left' economic policy group, but not from cultural policy or migration policy groups. Thus, my earlier conclusion continues, where results only partially follow expectations.

Although the conclusion remains the same, this does not mean introducing all policy groups together with the controls has had absolutely no impact. Looking across from coefficients in the simpler models, to those in column 8, introducing all these variables together has reduced their impacts on probability of voting for Sanders versus Clinton. However, most of these coefficients continue to be statistically significant, relative to the baseline.

Amongst these significant conclusions, there also persists the curvilinear pattern of Sanders/Clinton vote probability from policy groups. Specifically, from the 'Radical-Right' economic policy group, and the 'Radical-Exclusive' group on the migration policy dimension. Again, I observe this despite including all policy groups together in Table 5.5. The increased probability of these voters supporting Sanders over Clinton, significantly relative to the baseline, continues to challenge expectations of the policy-proximity account.

Furthermore, under Appendix 2.5 I include the model with scalar variables, rather than policy groups. This model largely replicates previous scalar models in its results. Specifically, culturally-conservative and migrant-exclusive shifts on those dimensions are associated with lower support for Sanders vs. Clinton. However, the curvilinear patterns I find in Table 5.5 again suggest it is inappropriate to enforce linear functional form with the scalar variables. Regardless, the scalar model does not challenge my earlier conclusions. Most importantly, my observation of curvilinear radical left support, with this greater from opposing ends of the policy dimensions, challenges the policy-proximity account in my research.

Overall, this leaves expectations followed in only one area – from the 'Radical-Left' economic policy group. This group's proximity with the Sanders campaign on the economic policy

dimension explains their greater support for this political actor over the more moderate Clinton campaign. To sum up the patterns of Sanders/Clinton vote probability from policy groups, I present plotted results in Table 5.5 below, in Figure 5.3.

Figure 5.3: Plotted Results – Table 5.5.

The first thing to draw attention to is the wide 95% confidence interval for the 'Radical-Right'/'-Conservative'/'-Exclusive' groups, reflecting the much smaller size of these groups relative to the others. Given their small size, it is arguably difficult to make truly reliable conclusions from these groups. However, their small size is a consequence of truly representing these economically-right, culturally-conservative, and migrant-exclusive policy preferences, which are simply less common amongst this subset sample of Democrat-identifiers, Democrat-leaners, and Sanders/Clinton voters.

Figure 5.3 reflects the curvilinear relationships I found earlier, where spatially-distant groups on the economic and migration policy dimensions had significantly higher probability of voting for Sanders over Clinton, relative to the baseline. Although not statistically significant, the point estimate from the 'Radical-Conservative' group also suggests these voters have greater probability of voting for Sanders than Clinton as well. Figure 5.3 also reflects this.

I continue to observe a curvilinear pattern where voters at opposing ends of the policy dimensions have higher probability of voting for Sanders over Clinton, relative to the baseline. Although the 'Radical-Left' group's higher probability of voting for Sanders over Clinton follows expectations, that curvilinear pattern, and the cultural and migration dimension results, persistently challenge the policy-proximity account.

5.3.5: Populism and Radical Left Support

I use ANES data to analyse the populism-based account – examining how far levels of voter populism are associated with voting for the Sanders campaign versus the Clinton campaign. The expectation here is that the 'Radical-Populist' group would have higher probability of voting for the Sanders campaign than the Clinton campaign, compared to the baseline group. Once again, that baseline group is the 'Centrists' group, made up of respondents who expressed neither strong populist nor non-populist attitudes.

I provide a linear regression of populism groups under Table 5.6, showing the probability that each group voted for either Sanders or Clinton on the same 0 to 1 scale also present in the ANES. The number of respondents overall is substantially lower in the ANES. This reduction in the number of respondents is not ideal; however, it is a product of the ANES being a much

smaller election study than the CCES. This does reduce the explanatory power of the ANES, which will impact on my interpretation of results.

Table 5.6: Probability of Voting Sanders vs. Clinton – Populism Groups

Probability of Voting Sanders v. Clinton by Populism Groups

	Dependent variable:	
	Probability Voted for Sanders (vs Clinton)	
	(1)	(2)
Radical Populist	0.056	0.094
	(0.060)	(0.075)
Moderate Populist	0.029	0.046
	(0.067)	(0.083)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Moderate Non-Populist	0.018	0.101
	(0.058)	(0.077)
Radical Non-Populist	-0.056	-0.004
	(0.047)	(0.061)
Gender		-0.091[*]
(1 = Female)		(0.048)
Race		-0.185[***]
(1 = Non-White)		(0.048)
Education		0.002
		(0.011)
Church Attendance		0.037[*]
		(0.019)
Constant	0.382[***]	0.299[**]
	(0.036)	(0.144)
Observations	741	381
R^2	0.007	0.074
Adjusted R^2	0.002	0.054
Residual Std. Error	0.484 (df = 736)	0.444 (df = 372)
F Statistic	1.326 (df = 4; 736)	3.695[***] (df = 8; 372)
Note:		[*]$p<0.1$; [**]$p<0.05$; [***]$p<0.01$

Immediately apparent when examining results in Table 5.6 is the lack of statistically significant coefficients. This suggests little difference, relative to the baseline group, in probability of voting for Sanders or Clinton across the populist and non-populist groups. This runs contrary to populism-based account expectations, where higher probability of voting for Sanders over Clinton was expected from the populist groups. However, this is in line with

results of the previous case study, where I find levels of voter populism did not predict support for the radical left in Germany.

However, the small amount of data in Table 5.6 diminishes certainty around the conclusions I can make here. It is harder to draw reliable inferences about the effects of populism on radical left support when there is such a small amount of data here. Therefore, while Table 5.6 points to levels of voter populism not being associated with greater or lesser probability of voting for Sanders/Clinton, I cannot say this definitively. Review of this theory may be an avenue for future research, should more data become available. But what I find from available data in Table 5.6 suggests levels of populism amongst voters does not explain support for the radical left in the US.

Under Appendix 2.8 is the test of the effect of populism on Sanders/Clinton voting probability, but with a scalar populism variable rather than groups. What it shows, albeit short of significance at the .05 level, is that an increase on that scale (representing greater populism) is associated with a decrease in probability of supporting Sanders over Clinton. This conflicts somewhat with point estimates in Table 5.6. More fundamental, however, is that neither model provides results which conform with expectations under the populism-based account. This means the scalar model does not fundamentally challenge my conclusions from group-based analysis in Table 5.6.

5.3.6: Results with PartyID Control Variable

My intent with Democrat-identifier/leaner sub-setting in this case study was to minimise variance in Democratic Party identification. It is possible that party identification may have had an effect on probability of supporting either Sanders or Clinton. For example, Democrat-identifiers/leaners may associate Clinton more closely with that party, and subsequently be more supportive of her candidacy. The role of party identification has a long-established history in the field of political behaviour – including in research on electoral support in the US (Jessee, 2012).

The possibility of an effect of party identification on probability of voting for Sanders/Clinton leads me to also include a second set of results. This second set of results includes a party identification control variable, alongside the other four controls that appeared earlier, and the

policy and populism groups. In this second set of results, the sample is not subset to Democrat-identifiers or Democrat-leaners, but still only includes those who either voted for Sanders or Clinton. I include the party identification control variable as a dummy variable in this regression.[30]

These alternate results effectively act as a robustness test of my sub-setting to Democrat-identifiers and leaners, versus using a PartyID control variable to separate effects of partisan attachments on Sanders/Clinton support. If results with a party identification control variable do not markedly differ against my earlier results from Democrat-identifiers and leaners, this would enhance my confidence in those earlier findings.

I include the first regression with the party ID control variable under Appendix 2.9, which includes all policy groups in a multiple linear regression. Results in Appendix 2.9 conform with those I found earlier in this analysis section. Specifically, the curvilinear pattern in probability of supporting Sanders is still present in Appendix 2.9. The PartyID control coefficient does obtain statistical significance, but that does not change the pattern of support for Sanders versus Clinton from policy groups.

Results from data subset to Democrat-identifiers and leaners, and results in the non-subset Appendix 2.9 regression with the PartyID control, are broadly consistent. Thus, the alternate way of accounting for partisan attachment effects, via the PartyID control variable, yields similar Sanders/Clinton support compared to results with sub-setting to Democrat-identifiers and leaners. That similarity gives me further confidence in the results I found earlier in this analysis section.

In Appendix 2.10 is a regression of populism groups with a PartyID control variable. The data in that regression was also not sub-set to Democrat-identifiers and leaners. Results also match between this regression and the earlier results from populism-groups in Table 5.6. I still do not find a statistically significant increase in Sanders voting probability, relative to the baseline, from the 'Radical-Populist' group. Once again, this similarity of results gives me further confidence in my conclusions from Table 5.6.

---

[30] Variable cumulates 'Strong Democrats', 'Not Strong Democrats', and 'Lean Democrats' together with responses of 0. 'Strong Republicans', 'Not Strong Republicans', 'Lean Republicans', and 'Independents' all coded as 1.

5.4: US Conclusions

Firstly, to sum up how far results conformed with the populism-based account. I did not find levels of populism to be associated with greater probability of voting for either Sanders or Clinton; however, this was based off the limited data available in the ANES. My conclusion here conforms with German case study results, where I also did not find consistent support for the populism-based account. Although the small sample size introduces an element of uncertainty into this conclusion, it does present an opportunity for future research to examine this account for US radical left support again, should more data become available.

I find some support for the policy-proximity account, with radically left-wing respondents on the economic policy dimension having significantly higher probability of voting for Sanders over Clinton, relative to the baseline group. Although results from the 'Radical-Left' economic policy group conform with the policy-proximity account, generally my results in this case study do not follow expectations. Despite being spatially-distant from the Sanders campaign, and thus expected to have greater probability of supporting Clinton's campaign instead, I find that the 'Radical-Right' economic policy group's voters actually on average have higher probability of supporting Sanders, relative to the baseline. I also find, contrary to expectations, that cultural and migration policy preferences are associated with higher probability of supporting either Clinton or Sanders, despite both these candidates offering the same policies on these dimensions.

Existing research has also found cultural policy preferences to be associated with support for Sanders versus Clinton, and explained it with the more traditional nature of the Clinton candidacy attracting more 'authoritarian' voters than the non-traditional Sanders campaign (Wronski, et al., 2018). Previous research has also reached similar conclusions to me over economic policy and Sanders/Clinton voting, specifically in relation to labour policies and regulation of businesses (Lyon, 2019). Finally, existing research also did not find populist attitudes to be reliably associated with greater probability of voting for Sanders, suggesting it was Donald Trump who benefitted from these voters' support in the 2016 US presidential election (Rudolph, 2019). Alongside potential future examination of populism-based radical left support in the US, future research may also examine how support for Sanders in his 2020 primaries campaign varied from his 2016 support. This may shed further light on radical left

support in the US, as in 2020 this would be examined amongst a far more crowded and diverse field of candidates.

What I find from policy groups presents quite a nuanced picture, where there is some support for policy-proximity but also many areas where results do not conform with this account. Compared to the German case study, results in the US case do not as consistently follow policy-proximity expectations. What could potentially explain this variation in results between the German and US cases?

In relation to unexpected results from the cultural and migration policy groups, it is possible voters on those dimensions perceived Sanders to be more culturally-liberal/migrant-inclusive than Clinton. If this is the case, it would explain why these liberal and inclusive voters had greater probability of supporting Sanders than Clinton, despite both candidates proposing the same policies on these dimensions. Furthermore, the different dependent variable in this chapter, which asks about vote choices rather than evaluations, may also explain variation in results. These vote choice responses include a wide range of background factors, such as immutable traits of each candidate. For example, maybe the fact Hillary Clinton is a woman led radically right-wing voters to have higher probability of supporting Sanders. Evaluation questions could have mitigated these background effects, but they are not available in US survey data.

Finally, the US case study has made an important contribution to my thesis. The German case study focused on a well-established radical left political party, which left it open to persuasion effects. However, the US case study's focus on an intra-party election with a radical left candidate mitigates the impacts of one persuasion effect – party identification – on voters' policy preferences and populist attitudes. Reflecting on the effects of this, it is possible the US case's mitigation of partisan persuasion effects also explains why the policy-proximity account receives less support compared to in the German case.

Chapter 6: From Convergence to Corbyn: the UK Radical Left

6.0: Introduction

In the final empirical chapter of this thesis, I turn attention to the radical left in the UK. The UK's radical left political actor is the Labour Party under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn. The UK Labour Party itself is an established party, and firmly a part of the UK's political mainstream. However, my focus is on the UK Labour Party specifically under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn, because under Corbyn this mainstream centre left political party shifted ideologically and began to promote more radically left-wing policies, relative to the UK context. This shift ended a period of convergence towards the centre ground by Labour before Corbyn's leadership. Between Corbyn's rise to become the party's leader in September 2015, and until his departure in 2020, Labour professed a more radically left-wing message relative both to Labour prior to Corbyn's leadership, and to the prevailing economic norms of the UK.

Like the US case study, in the UK case I again look at a less conventional instance of the radical left, as this arose here from an intra-party faction. Perhaps the most notable contribution of this case study is the way persuasion effects are rigorously addressed by the research design. I touched on this in Chapter 3 of this thesis, including how via use of panel data in the UK case study I separate voters' policy preferences and populism from the potential persuasion effect of the radical left Corbyn-led Labour Party.

In the first part of this chapter, I discuss the context of the UK case further. This includes justifying the treatment of Corbyn-led Labour as a radical left actor. I first do this in a qualitative way, before using the BES expert surveys to quantitatively show Labour's shift under Corbyn towards the radical left.

In the second part, I outline the UK case study's research design. This includes measures of voter policy preferences, populism, and radical left evaluations from British Election Study (BES) survey data. I also discuss the panel data design further here, including how this is utilised to control potential persuasion effects by drawing measures of policy preferences from prior to Corbyn's leadership of Labour. The second section concludes with expectations for Labour Party evaluations from both policy groups and populism groups.

In the third section I discuss results of the UK case study. Working through each policy dimension, before including all policy preferences in a multiple linear regression, I show results of tests of the policy-proximity account. I follow this with analysis of the populism-based account, which I also consider in a multiple linear regression alongside policy groups. Following this analysis section, I conclude the UK empirical chapter.

In this chapter, I find many results which did not follow expectations of the policy-proximity account. In particular, observation of increased radical left support even from spatially-distant voters. However, closer examination of the magnitudes of evaluation increases mean I conclude limited support for the policy-proximity account on all three dimensions. I also offer a few possible explanations for the unexpected evaluation increases. Finally, I also find no statistically significant relationship between high levels of populism and radical left support in the UK – a conclusion broadly matching that of the German and US case studies.

6.1: Contextualising Corbyn

There are two ways I contextualise the UK case study. First, qualitative discussion sets the context of the Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn, including how this political actor shifted from convergence to the radical left under his leadership. Following that, I undertake more quantitative contextualisation, drawing upon expert surveys to demonstrate the Labour Party's shift under Corbyn's leadership.

6.1.1: Qualitative Context of the Corbyn Case

Firstly, I will discuss the Labour Party in context. Labour's policy platform has evolved significantly over recent decades, moving from more radical policy in the early 1980s, to converge with the centre-ground in the 1990s and 2000s. From there, Labour shifted again, returning to radical leftism under Jeremy Corbyn's leadership. Discussion of these shifts forms the qualitative explanation of the UK Labour Party as a radical left political actor when Corbyn was its leader.

Economic difficulties and industrial strife in the late 1970s led to the ascent of Margaret Thatcher to the office of Prime Minister in 1979. Thatcher introduced a new agenda of monetarist economic policies, which at the time challenged most conventional economic thought (Gamble, 1989). Prior to this, many UK industries were nationalised, and taxation was

typically much higher. The economic agenda of the Conservatives under Thatcher reformed both of these key features of the pre-neoliberal economy of the UK (Edwards, 2017), which meant the political context of the UK shifted to the right.

Meanwhile, the leftist wing of Labour, led mainly by Tony Benn and Michael Foot, swept to the party's leadership in 1980. The agenda offered by Labour at this point was firmly on the left of British politics. Its proposals included unilateral nuclear disarmament, re-nationalisation of recently privatised industries, abolition of the House of Lords, and raised taxation (The Labour Party, 1983). In total, the Labour Party's agenda of that period strongly contrasted with the UK's political context, which was shifting to the right (Deeming & Johnston, 2018). This was a period of divergence in UK politics.

Following defeat in the 1983 election, Labour began an ideological shift, moving away from their more radical policies and towards the political centre (Thorpe, 2008). Labour's convergence with the political centre culminated with the election of Tony Blair as leader in 1994. When Labour won the 1997 general election, continued policies of low taxation and low public spending were emblematic of the party's convergence. By this point, Labour had decisively shifted, away from previous leftism, and converged with the political centre-ground (Kachel, 2012; Perryman, 2017).

This convergence was a key moment in the development of Corbyn's Labour. At this point a context has developed where the two main parties – Labour and Conservative – had both accepted – or at least did not challenge – underlying capitalist economic norms of lower taxation, reduced public spending, privatisation, and deregulation.

Labour's defeat in the 2010 general election, amidst a struggling economy, led to the election of Ed Miliband as leader. Meanwhile, the Conservative-led coalition government enacted policies which continued these accepted economic norms, including fiscal austerity, privatisation of Royal Mail, and reductions in taxes on corporations and high earners (Burton-Cartledge, 2017). Therefore, these prevailing economic norms continued to be present in the UK context. In this context, the Corbyn-led Labour Party later appears as a radical left challenger to these policies.

Ed Miliband did not explicitly challenge this economic consensus. His Shadow Chancellor, Ed Balls, announced he would not reverse Conservative spending cuts (Prince, 2015). Deputy Leader Harriet Harman encouraged Labour to abstain on a vote cutting government spending on welfare (Wintour, 2015). Ed Miliband continued to describe austerity as going 'too far and too fast' – critically not rejecting austerity itself (Doran, 2017). Furthermore, the Labour manifesto of 2015 did not pledge to take key utilities or services back into public ownership (The Labour Party, 2015).

Continued tacit support for Conservative economic policies meant Labour's convergence continued right up to Corbyn's ascent to the leadership (Seymour, 2016). With Labour's defeat in the 2015 general election, Ed Miliband resigned as Labour leader. In the resulting leadership contest, Jeremy Corbyn stood as an initial outsider. His campaign barely managed to get onto the election's ballot, having just minutes to spare whilst receiving the necessary nominations from MPs intending to 'broaden the conversation' rather than out of genuine support for Corbyn (Wintour & Mason, 2015; Page, 2019). The longshot status of the Corbyn campaign was also recognised in betting odds, as his chances of winning the leadership election initially stood at 980-1 (Odell, 2015). Nevertheless, Corbyn's leadership campaign was ultimately successful, and the previously little-known backbench MP took up the Labour leadership in September 2015.

Following the rise of Corbyn to party leadership, Labour again shifted ideologically, this time breaking from convergence to become challengers to the now long accepted economic norms. With this leftward shift, breaking from convergence, the Labour Party became a radical left political actor.

I can see Labour's shift by looking at the party's manifesto for the UK's 2017 general election. The policies in that manifesto diverge markedly from their proposals in the 2015 general election. Labour's 2017 manifesto proposed an agenda which explicitly opposed the long-running economic consensus which had persisted since the early 1980s. This included promises to increase taxes on the rich and on corporations (The Labour Party, 2017, p. 9), to increase funding for multiple public services (The Labour Party, 2017, pp. 37, 69, 73, 80, 86, 93, 104), and to end public sector pay freezes (The Labour Party, 2017, p. 38). Labour also

proposed a broad agenda of public ownership, promising nationalisation of rail, Royal Mail, water, and energy (The Labour Party, 2017, p. 19).

With the party's 2017 manifesto, Labour broke away from the long-running trend of convergence. Through breaking from this trend, the Corbyn-led Labour Party meets the minimal definition of the radical left, by challenging the prevailing capitalist economic norms of austerity, privatisation, and low taxes in the UK context. The Labour Party's 2017 manifesto demonstrates how this party began challenging these prevailing economic norms after Corbyn's rise to its leadership. First, the 1980s saw development of these economic norms. Then the Labour Party accepted these until 2015. Finally, under Corbyn's leadership the Labour Party began challenging these economic norms.

The full path of the Labour Party over this period: from divergence, to convergence, and back to divergence under Corbyn, is important. Previous research into the effects of convergence on support for radical actors suggested that, when convergence followed divergence, as with Labour in the UK, this creates conditions where a radical challenger can flourish (Ignazi, 2003). Although Ignazi's research focused on the rise of new challenger parties, it may also apply in this case where there is instead a radical challenger within a governmental party. The wider context of the Labour Party's ideological shifts potentially create conditions where this party's policies under Corbyn draw substantial support. As a result, there is even greater potential here for policy-proximity to explain support for this radical left actor.

The case of Corbyn's Labour is particularly interesting, because it is a mainstream political party which has moved to the radical left, unlike the non-mainstream radical left political party in Germany and the intra-party context of the US radical left actor. The nature of the UK case study, as a shifting political party, raises the prospect of investigating how their ideological shift has impacted upon voters' appraisals of them. Additionally, research on the Corbyn case follows a context of predictions that Corbyn had moved Labour too far to the left to be electorally successful in the UK (Cowley, 2017; Jones, 2016; Jones, 2017; Freedland, 2017; Cohen, 2017). In the context of defied expectations around Corbyn's Labour, I can provide indication of where support for this actor came from, and how far policy preferences and populism of voters explain support for this case.

I continue to build the case of the Labour Party's radical leftism under Jeremy Corbyn here, this time from quantitative analysis of this case study. Focus here is on how the Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn shifted on the three policy dimensions which have featured in earlier parts of this thesis. From looking at Labour's shifts on these three dimensions, I can later draw expectations for the policy-proximity account in this case study. Looking at Labour's positions on these dimensions will give me an impression of which voters are in proximity with this political actor, and I would therefore expect to be more supportive of Labour.

In previous case studies, I thought of the policy-proximity account in terms of proximity alone. The same is true in the UK case study, but added to this is also consideration of how voters reacted to the leftward shift of the Labour Party. As Labour shifts closer to some voters, I would expect these voters to evaluate this party more positively, and (all else equal) this voter would become more likely to vote for this political actor. This is a consequence of rising levels of utility for these voters, as Labour ideologically shifts towards them. Additionally, Labour's shift *away* from other voters would diminish utility from supporting this political actor. As a result, they would become less likely to support Labour as this shift takes place.

In the UK case, I derive the policy positions of Labour, and this party's policy shifts, from the British Election Study's Expert Surveys. The BES administers these Expert Surveys as online surveys, and they show where political analysts place Labour on policy dimensions. The cultural policy position of Labour is taken from an 11-point scale,[31] while the economic position of Labour is from another 11-point scale asking how pro-redistribution the party is.[32] Finally, the migration position of Labour comes from two sets of questions, both with a 7-point scale. These questions ask how far Labour considers immigration to be an economic benefit/threat[33] and how far immigration is a cultural benefit/threat.[34]

---

[31] Referred to as the 'Libertarian-Authoritarian scale' – 0 = libertarian, 10 = authoritarian.

[32] 'Pro-Con Redistribution' – 0 = pro-redistribution, 10 = not pro-redistribution.

[33] 'Immigration Good-Bad for Economy' – 1 = immigration is bad for economy, 7 = immigration is good for economy.

[34] 'Immigration Good-Bad for Cultural Life' – 1 = immigration undermines cultural life, 7 = immigration enriches cultural life.

I examine expert survey data from two periods: a Pre-Corbyn period, and a Post-Corbyn period. The pre-Corbyn data comes from April/May 2015. I draw post-Corbyn data from the May 2017 survey. As these expert surveys draw upon the views of multiple analysts, I average the appraisals of Labour's positions on each dimension, with both the pre-Corbyn and post-Corbyn data.

In Table 6.1 I include Labour's average positions on these dimensions, both pre- and post-Corbyn. The 2015–2017 changes are determined by subtracting one year's average placement of Labour from that in the other year.

Table 6.1: BES Expert Survey 2015-2017 ideological mean placements and changes

Ideological Group	Labour Party 2015	Labour Party 2017	**Labour Change 2015–2017**
Redistribution	3.86	2.67	**-1.19**
Social	5.01	4.39	**-0.62**
Immigration (Economic)	4.73	5.00	**+0.27**
Immigration (Cultural)	5.29	5.31	**+0.02**

Looking at Table 6.1, under Corbyn's leadership Labour shifts to become substantially more pro-redistribution, moderately more culturally-liberal, and marginally more migrant-inclusive compared to their pre-Corbyn positions.

I have demonstrated policy shifts by the Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn, with this shown both quantitatively and qualitatively. Of particular importance is how this political actor has challenged the UK's contemporary economic norms, with this supporting the observation of the Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn being a radical left political actor. Labour's policy shift was also demonstrated from the BES Expert Surveys, on all three policy dimensions of interest.

6.2: UK Research Design

As with the previous two case study chapters, I will again detail a case-specific research design. I will first cover questions drawn upon from the BES, before coming to policy and populism groups, expectations, and control variables in the UK case study.

6.2.1: Voter Data in the UK

I draw the policy preferences of voters and their Labour evaluations from the British Election Study's panel surveys. These surveys occur as an internet panel, measuring attitudes of voters over time through multiple waves. Each wave has around thirty thousand respondents. The panel surveys provide both pre-Corbyn and post-Corbyn data from a group of respondents. This gives me the opportunity to measure changing attitudes towards Labour from the same group of voters across the pre- and post-Corbyn waves. The downside of panel data, however, is that there are different prevailing circumstances in each wave, with these potentially impacting on responses in each wave, above the impacts of Labour's leftward shift between 2015 and 2017.

On the other hand, the existence of pre-Corbyn and post-Corbyn data with the panel surveys is also a critical advantage of this case study. It allows me to measure policy preferences of voters from a pre-Corbyn wave of data. Consequently, the radical left nature of the Labour Party under Corbyn would not have impacted on voter policy preferences in this case study, as I draw these preferences from the pre-Corbyn wave of BES data and Labour was not radical left in that wave. This leaves separation between voter policy preferences and any possible effects upon these arising from Labour's radical leftism. However, there are no pre-Corbyn measures of populism in the BES, so while I can separate policy preferences over time from radical left attachments, it is not possible to also separate populist attitudes of voters from radical left attachments.

Added to pre-Corbyn data's role in separating policy preferences from radical left attachments, this data also provides a baseline level of support for Labour, from which I can observe how evaluations of this political actor change as it shifted to the left under Corbyn's leadership. This will provide an answer to a specific question in the UK case study: how do

voters react to Labour's radical left shift? The BES panel surveys provide the data to investigate this.

6.2.2: Measuring Voters' Attitudes

Below, in Table 6.2, is a summary of the BES panel survey waves used in this case study. Justification of the use of each wave and battery of questions follows in this section.

Table 6.2: Summary of BES Panel Survey Waves used in UK Case Study

BES panel survey wave	Date fielded	Context	Policy Dimensions:			Populism Data	Evaluations
			Economics	Cultural	Migration		
Wave 4	March/April 2015	Early 2015 election campaign. Pre-Corbyn.			✓		
Wave 6	May 2015	Final pre-Corbyn wave. During 2015 election campaign.	✓	✓			✓ **(Pre-Corbyn Labour evaluations)**
Wave 10	November/ December 2016	One year after Corbyn became Labour leader.				✓	
Wave 13 (post-Corbyn)	June 2017	During 2017 election campaign. Corbyn leading Labour.					✓ **(Post-Corbyn Labour evaluations)**

The waves which are most important to this case study are Wave 6 and Wave 13, because they both provide measures of Labour evaluation. Wave 6 provides Labour evaluations before Corbyn's leadership, and Wave 13 provides Labour evaluations after almost two years of

Corbyn's Labour leadership. The retention rate of respondents between these two waves is 52.6%. This signifies how many pre-Corbyn respondents also answered the post-Corbyn wave (Fieldhouse, et al., 2017).

For the policy-proximity account, I observe how evaluations of Labour from respondents change between the pre-Corbyn and post-Corbyn waves. The BES measures Labour evaluations with a 0–10 scale, where a higher score indicates higher Labour evaluation. The Labour evaluations of voters are the dependent variable in this case study, as with the German case study in Chapter 4. Recall my preferences for evaluation questions to which, unlike vote choice questions, their responses are more separate from a wider choice context where factors like the electoral system and candidate competitiveness also have a role.

To test the policy-proximity account, I need to determine where voters are located on the three policy dimensions. I still have a preference here for multi-item batteries of questions when gauging the policy preferences of voters. Remember I drew upon previous research in this field which found these multi-item batteries to be more reliable for identifying the beliefs of respondents and predicting their electoral support, when compared to single-item measures (Evans, et al., 1996, p. 94).

I draw economic policy preferences from the five-item 'Values1' battery. This comes as a 1–5 Likert-type scale, asking how far respondents agree or disagree with five statements. These five statements relate to redistribution of wealth and attitudes towards big businesses, among other economics-related subjects. I include these five questions under Appendix 3.0 of this thesis, along with all other measures used from the BES. Previous research has identified this economic attitude scale as providing a reliable and stable measure of preferences over time (Evans, et al., 1996; Carmines & Zeller, 1979). The BES records the Likert scale of responses numerically. As with the previous case studies, I calculate the average response across these five questions from each respondent, yielding me a measure of where each respondent is located on the economic policy dimension.

I identify cultural policy preferences from another five-item battery of questions, called 'Values2' in the BES. The 'Values2' battery again asks voters how far they agree or disagree with five statements. These statements relate to criminal justice and attitudes towards traditional values. Again, the BES numerically records responses on another 1-5 Likert-type

scale. As with the economic dimension, I again take the average response to these cultural policy statements, to deduce where each respondent falls on this policy dimension. Alongside this, and as a robustness test, I again provide a stripped back test of this dimension, building this dimension from a set of questions which are arguably more comparable to the other case studies. Specifically, leaving out the questions relating to obedience towards authority, moral standards, and 'British values', and including the death penalty question ('al2') and the criminal sentencing question ('al5'). I also look at results from cultural policy based on these two questions, as a test which is arguably more comparable to both other case studies.

Migration policy preferences are determined with two questions, pertaining to views of the impacts of migrants on the British economy and culture. Specifically, whether respondents believe immigration undermines or enhances the UK's economy and culture. Respondents indicate their views here on a 1–7 scale. These questions have history in other research to ascertain attitudes towards migrants (Kappe, 2015; Kawalerowicz, 2017).

Economic and cultural policy preferences are drawn from wave 6 of the BES panel surveys, but migration policy preferences are drawn from wave 4 instead. This is because wave 6 does not include these migration policy questions. Wave 4 was fielded just two months before wave 6, and offers the most recent pre-Corbyn data on this policy dimension.

The way respondents answer the migration policy questions differs from the economic and cultural policy batteries, too. Economic and cultural policy questions were answered with a Likert scale, with responses between 1 and 5. With these migration policy questions, respondents are asked instead to indicate their policy preferences on a 1 to 7 scale, where 1 indicates a migrant-exclusive and 7 a migrant-inclusive position. I again average responses to these two questions, providing me an indication of the overall migration policy preferences of each respondent, from across these two questions.

Looking now to the populism-based account, remember that this suggests that the anti-elite economic messages of the radical left will draw populist voters to support these political actors. As in the previous case studies, testing this theory requires measurement of the populist attitudes of voters, in order to see how levels of populism are associated with radical left support. The BES panel surveys include measures of populist attitudes of each respondent, with questions relating to popular sovereignty, attitudes towards politicians, and feelings

about compromises in politics. However, unlike the policy questions, pre-Corbyn BES waves do not include populism questions.

Responses to questions in the BES populist battery return to a 1–5 Likert scale, where respondents indicate their levels of agreement/disagreement with five statements included in Appendix 3.0. This battery includes a familiar set of questions, which are slight variants on the questions used to measure levels of populism in both the German and US case studies. These are an established range of questions, featuring in other research which measures levels of populism amongst voters (Akkerman, et al., 2014; Van Hauwart & Van Kessel, 2018).

I measure voter populism from the 'Populism' battery in Appendix 3.0, with responses to these drawn from Wave 10 of the BES. This wave took place in November/December 2016 – just over a year after Corbyn became Labour leader. With no pre-Corbyn wave including the Populism battery, I tried to use measures of populism from earlier post-Corbyn waves of data, where possible persuasion by the radical left Labour Party would be less likely or less pronounced. The earliest wave where responses to populism questions are available is wave 7, which took place in April/May of 2016. However, the number of responses to populism questions in wave 10 was almost four times greater than in wave 7. In order to balance radical left attachments with number of responses, I instead opted to draw measures of voter populism from wave 10. At the cost of occurring a few months after wave 7, I examine the relationship between levels of populism and radical left support from a much larger number of respondents.

As with the policy questions referenced earlier, I also calculate the average responses to the questions in the Populism battery. Thus, I gain an overall impression of the populist attitudes of each respondent.

6.2.3: Grouping of Voters

With the averaged responses to economic, cultural, and migration policy questions, I have measures of the policy preferences of respondents on these three dimensions. I also know the populist attitudes of BES respondents. This brings me to the grouping of respondents, which I also did in the two previous case studies. Consequently, I can also observe possible non-

linear relationships between policy preferences and populism on support for the radical left in the UK case study.

As I explained in the research design chapter, I created these groups in a way which accounts for the non-uniform distribution of responses.[35] The result of this is the created groups are more comparably sized than they would have otherwise been. I will discuss the policy groups first, with these included in Table 6.3. Beneath the names of each group are the number of respondents in that group.

Table 6.3: Respondent Groups on Policy Dimensions

Policy dimension	Groups				
Economics	Radical-Left *(n = 1,384)*	Centre-Left *(n = 929)*	Centrist *(n = 1,840)*	Centre-Right *(n = 1,183)*	Radical-Right *(n = 1,594)*
Cultural	Radical-Liberal *(n = 1,556)*	Moderate-Liberal *(n = 1,310)*	Centrist *(n = 1,813)*	Moderate-Conservative *(n = 1,054)*	Radical-Conservative *(n = 1,029)*
Migration	Radical-Inclusive *(n = 1,159)*	Moderate-Inclusive *(n = 1,112)*	Centrist *(n = 1,650)*	Moderate-Exclusive *(n = 1,000)*	Radical-Exclusive *(n = 1,821)*

As in my previous analysis, I label these groups relative to the case context. The 'Centre-Right' economic policy group, for example, includes respondents with moderately right-wing economic policy preferences *relative to the UK* context. This has been my practice with groups throughout my analysis, meaning these groups have the same meaning across all three case studies in my thesis.

I examine Labour evaluations, and how these evaluations change between 2015 and 2017, from each of these policy groups. With the respondent groups known, I can state more specific expectations for Labour evaluations and how these evaluations change as Labour shifts to the left.

---

[35] Quantile function in R.

The first set of expectations are for which groups would have the highest Labour evaluations, and which groups would have the lowest evaluations for this political actor. In 2015, these expected evaluation levels are different from those in 2017, because of Labour's leftward shift. These 2015 and 2017 expected average evaluation levels are summarised below, in two diagrams:

Figure 6.1: Pre-Corbyn Labour Evaluation Levels

Figure 6.2: Post-Corbyn Labour Evaluation Levels

Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show expected average Labour evaluation levels from five groups across a generic left/right policy dimension in 2015 and 2017, respectively. To be clear, the x-axis policy dimension in Figures 6.1 and 6.2 does not pertain to either economic, cultural, or migration policy. It is purely generic and designed to demonstrate expectations for Labour evaluation levels under the policy-proximity account.

Figure 6.1 includes the expectation that the group in the mid-left of that generic dimension would have the highest average Labour evaluation levels. This is because, prior to Corbyn's Labour leadership, Labour was in its converged position, and therefore in proximity with these voters in the centre-left of this generic policy space. Consequently, I expect these voters to have had the highest evaluations of Labour in 2015. I would expect the lowest evaluations from the rightmost group, as these respondents are the most spatially-distant group from Labour's pre-Corbyn position.

Figure 6.2 shows the expected Labour evaluation levels with this political actor now further to the left of this generic policy dimension. This is meant to reflect the shift of the Labour Party

after Corbyn rose to the party's leadership. Under Corbyn, I would expect highest Labour evaluations from the leftmost group, as Labour moved into proximity with this group by 2017. Meanwhile the rightmost group is still located the furthest from Labour, therefore I would expect them to still have the lowest evaluation levels for this political actor in 2017.

That covers the broad expectations of evaluation *levels*, which I illustrated with a generic policy space in Figures 6.1 and 6.2. The second set of expectations concern evaluation *changes*. I assume these changes to have occurred in response to Labour's radical left shift under Corbyn's leadership. Depending on the location of voters in a policy space, there is expectation that Labour evaluations will rise from some respondents, and fall from others. I refer to these as *absolute evaluation changes*. Additionally, there are also expectations for the magnitudes of Labour evaluation increases and decreases. I refer to these as *relative evaluation changes*.

I explain both sets of expectations – for absolute and relative evaluation changes – from the diagram below:

Figure 6.3: Expected Changes in Labour Evaluations

Figure 6.3 depicts another generic left/right policy dimension on the x-axis, and on the y-axis the change in Labour evaluations. Once again, this diagram is not for the purpose of showing how specific respondent groups will appraise the Labour Party, nor does it pertain to any of the three policy dimensions. Instead, it allows me to demonstrate broad expectations of the policy-proximity account.

Included in Figure 6.3 are the rough positions of the Labour Party both prior to and after Corbyn's rise to the party leadership, displayed in this generic left/right space. In their pre-Corbyn position, Labour is indicated in a centre-left position. The post-Corbyn position of the Labour Party is further to the left of this policy dimension, representing the leftward shift of this political actor. I used the earlier discussed expert surveys to approximately place Labour both before and after Corbyn's leadership in Figure 6.3.

The line plotted along the diagram shows how I expect Labour evaluations to change from voters at different points along the x-axis. Voters in the leftmost segment of the x-axis witness Labour move towards their position (their 'ideal point') on this dimension. Consequently, the utility these voters associate with Labour rises as this party's policies shift towards their own 'ideal point'. Thus, post-Corbyn Labour's policies are associated with greater utility by these leftmost voters, compared to the policies of pre-Corbyn Labour. This leads to the expectation that these voters will have increased Labour evaluations in the 2017 post-Corbyn wave, compared to the 2015 pre-Corbyn wave. Voters to the right of pre-Corbyn Labour's position witness the Labour Party shifting away from their positions. As a result, utility associated with Labour's policies by these voters declines as the party shifts ideologically, leading to the expectation that Labour evaluations fall between 2015 and 2017 from voters located on the right of this dimension.

For the voters whose 'ideal points' are located between pre-Corbyn and post-Corbyn Labour's respective positions, expectations are less certain. Some of those voters' 'ideal points' are closer to Labour's post-Corbyn position, while others are in less proximity with Labour following the party's leftward ideological shift. Additionally, Labour shifts through the positions of these voters. This theoretically causes Labour evaluations to first rise, before then falling if Labour continues shifting to subsequently move further from this voter's 'ideal point' compared to the actor's initial position. As a result, expectations for the voters located between Labour's pre-Corbyn and post-Corbyn positions are less certain.[36]

---

[36] If I was measuring support with vote choices, a pertinent factor here would be positions of competing parties. However, using evaluation questions mitigates the effects of these positions. With vote choices, respondents indicate a single preference, and that preference is made in a specific context which factors in the positions of competing parties. With evaluation questions instead, respondents are not restricted to a single choice, nor are they constrained by the wider electoral contextual factors, including the positions of competing parties.

This has covered expectations for absolute Labour evaluation changes. I can also draw expectations of relative Labour evaluation changes from Figure 6.3. Remember that I assume Labour shifts towards and away from certain voters by a similar magnitude. Specifically, Labour shifts by equal magnitude towards all voters who are located to the left of the post-Corbyn Labour position. Subsequently, I expect voters in the leftmost segment of the x-axis to have the largest relative evaluation increase between 2015 and 2017 – a consequence of Labour's consistent shift towards these voters. Labour also, by equal magnitude, shifts away from all voters who are located to the right of Labour's pre-Corbyn position. Therefore, I expect voters located to the right of pre-Corbyn Labour's location in Figure 6.3 to have the largest relative evaluation decrease between 2015 and 2017 – again, a reflection of Labour's consistent shift away from these voters.

Recall the voter groups on each policy dimension, which I summarised in Table 6.3. So far, I have presented expectations in a general context. There are also expectations which are more specific to the respondent groups on the policy dimensions which I set out earlier.

First, group-specific expectations for Labour evaluation levels. I assume Labour was in closest proximity with the 'Centre-Left' economic policy, 'Moderate-Liberal' cultural policy, and 'Moderate-Inclusive' migration policy groups in 2015. Therefore, in the pre-Corbyn wave I would expect these groups to have the highest evaluation levels for Labour. Labour then shifts after Corbyn assumes the party's leadership, leading to the party's new proximity with the 'Radical-Left' economic, 'Radical-Liberal' cultural, and 'Radical-Inclusive' migration policy groups in 2017. The expectation would then be that the highest Labour evaluation levels in the post-Corbyn data would come from these policy groups, owing to their new proximity with this political actor. The smaller shifts by Labour on the cultural and migration dimensions, according to the expert surveys, may also leave this party in closer proximity with the 'Moderate-Liberal' and 'Moderate-Inclusive' groups. Thus, highest Labour evaluation levels from these two groups would also be conceivable under the policy-proximity account.

In terms of absolute Labour evaluation changes, I expect evaluations to increase from the 'Radical-Left', 'Radical-Liberal', and 'Radical-Inclusive' policy groups. This expectation arises from Labour's ideological shift towards these groups between 2015 and 2017, resulting in

greater policy-proximity with these voters. I also expect Labour evaluations to fall from the 'Centrist' groups on all dimensions, and from the 'Centre-Right', 'Radical-Right', 'Moderate-Conservative', 'Radical-Conservative', 'Moderate-Exclusive', and 'Radical-Exclusive' respondent groups. I expect these negative evaluation changes because Labour shifted away from these groups on their respective policy dimensions between 2015 and 2017.

Looking now to expectations for relative Labour evaluation changes, which focus on the magnitudes of these shifts. I expect the largest Labour evaluation increases from the 'Radical-Left', 'Radical-Liberal', and 'Radical-Inclusive' respondent groups, owing to Labour's shift towards these groups between 2015 and 2017. From the 'Centrist', 'Centre-Right', 'Radical-Right', 'Moderate-Conservative', 'Radical-Conservative', 'Moderate-Exclusive', and 'Radical-Exclusive' respondent groups, I expect Labour evaluations to decline by the largest magnitudes between 2015 and 2017, with this reflecting Labour's shift away from these respondents over that period. To clarify, I expect this decline in evaluations to be of similar magnitude across these spatially-distant groups on each dimension, because Labour becomes equally more distant from them between the pre-Corbyn and post-Corbyn waves.

To summarise all of these expectations, I have tabled them below, in Table 6.4.

Table 6.4: Summary of Expectations – Policy-Proximity Account, UK Case Study				
Expectations	**Economic Policy Groups**			
	'Radical-Left'	*'Centre-Left'*	*'Centrist'*	*'Centre-Right'*	*'Rad-Right'*
Evaluation Levels	2017: *Highest Labour eval levels*	2015: *Highest Labour eval levels*	2015: *Similar to 'Rad-Left'* 2017: *Reduced*	2015 & 2017: *Second-lowest Labour eval levels*	2015 & 2017: *Lowest Labour eval levels*
	Cultural/Migration Policy Groups			
	'Rad-Lib'/ 'Rad-Inc'	*'Mod-Lib'/ 'Mod-Inc'*	*'Centrist'*	*'Mod-Cons'/ 'Mod-Exc'*	*'Rad-Cons'/ 'Rad-Exc'*
Evaluation Levels		2015: *Highest Labour eval levels*	2015: *Similar to 'Rad-Left'*	2015 & 2017: *Second-lowest Labour eval levels*	2015 & 2017: *Lowest Labour eval levels*
	2015 & 2017: *Either group conceivably has highest Labour evaluation levels.*		2017: *Reduced*		
	All Policy Groups			
	'Rad-Left/Lib/Inc'	*'Cen-Left/Lib/Inc'*	*'Centrist'*	*'Cen-Right/Cons/Exc'*	*'Rad-Right/Cons/Exc'*
Absolute Eval Changes	*Labour evals increase*	*Labour evals increase or decrease*	*Labour evals decrease*	*Labour evals decrease*	*Labour evals decrease*
Relative Eval. Changes	*Largest increase in Labour evals*		*3rd-largest Lab. eval decrease*	*2nd-largest Lab. eval decrease*	*Largest Lab. eval decrease*

6.2.5: Populism-Based Account and Expectations

To reiterate briefly, the populism-based account suggests that voters who are populists will be more supportive for radical left political actors. I previously tested this account with both other case studies in this thesis, finding that in neither of those previous cases was radical left support associated with higher levels of populism. However, I now explore this with the UK case study.

Doing so requires measures of the populist attitudes of voters. I previously showed these measures from the BES, with indication of populist attitudes from a battery of five questions in the BES panel surveys. I again group respondents based on their averaged responses to the five populism questions, creating the populism groups detailed below in Table 6.5:

Table 6.5: Respondents Grouped by Populism

Populism Groups				
Radical-Populist *(n = 686)*	Moderate-Populist *(n = 730)*	Centrist *(n = 841)*	Moderate-Non-Populist *(n = 1,226)*	Radical-Non-Populist *(n = 889)*

Under the populism-based account the expectation is for increased Labour Party evaluations from respondents in the 'Radical-Populist' group. Observing this will demonstrate support for the radically left-wing post-Corbyn Labour Party as a function of populist attitudes amongst voters.

6.2.6: Control Variables

As with both the German case study and the US case study, I control for a series of explanatory factors in my investigation. The purpose of these is the same as in those previous cases – to separate the effects of these factors, and thus clarify the roles of policy-proximity and populism on radical left support. Some of the control variables applied in the UK case are more general, and follow those applied in both previous case studies, with some which are more specific to the UK and informed by previous investigations of electoral support in this context.

Continuing from both the German and US case studies, I control for the impacts of gender and education levels with the UK case study. Also included here are controls on respondent age, obtained through an age grouping variable in the BES. I control for respondent age here, with this previously identified as a defining feature of political preferences in the UK (Curtice, September 2017; Bell, 2019), as opposed to class, which has faded as an explanatory factor of electoral support in the UK (Evans & Tilley, 2012). In addition to these, variables relating to respondents' ethnicity and their beliefs about the European Union have also featured in these accounts (Holbolt, 2016; 2018; Kaufmann, 2017; Swales, 2016). Beliefs in relation to EU

membership plausibly have particular importance, as over the 2015–2017 period considered in this chapter the UK's EU membership referendum took place, and the matter of remaining or leaving the European Union became a highly salient issue. This control variable, drawing upon support or opposition towards EU membership, represents a context-specific control variable.

Another control variable which features in this case study relates to party identification. Control on party ID in the UK considers respondents who identify with the Labour Party, Conservative Party, Liberal Democrats, SNP/PC, and UKIP. I cumulate SNP and PC identifiers together, as they stand in separate regions of the UK – presenting candidates solely in Scotland and Wales, respectively. In controlling for party ID, my research follows previous examination of UK electoral support which also controlled for party identification (Kaufmann, 2017).

This provides a cumulative total of twelve control variables. To control for each of these variables, I consider responses to BES questions relating to each of them. I include these questions under Appendix 3.0. Some of these responses are ordinal, for example age and education. Other responses are nominal, including beliefs over EU membership (Remain vs. Leave), ethnicity (white vs. non-white), gender (male vs. female), and party identification, which is split into identifiers vs. non-identifiers for one of the seven specific parties considered. I include the EU beliefs, ethnicity, gender, and party identification controls as dummy variables.

6.3: Analysis

As in previous analysis sections, my attention is first on results from testing the policy-proximity account, and followed by analysis of the populism-based account.

I first report the average Labour evaluation levels from each policy group, drawn from both the 2015 and the 2017 waves of data. I also detail changes between these average evaluations. Examination of the policy-proximity account then continues, with linear regressions demonstrating how Labour evaluations changed between 2015 and 2017, and taking into

account a series of control variables. From these, I examine results relating first to expectations of absolute evaluation changes (i.e., whether Labour evaluations went up or down), followed by a focus on expectations of relative evaluation changes (i.e., the magnitude of evaluation changes). The regressions demonstrate Labour evaluation changes between 2015 and 2017 relative to a baseline group. As in previous analysis, the baseline group in all regressions is the 'Centrist' group.

In addition to this main analysis, I also provide a series of appendicised models. These include models with scalar variables replacing respondent policy groups and populism groups. Recall I have included these scalar variable models as supplementary results in both my German and US case studies previously, with these supporting my analysis by showing patterns of radical left support with the more conventional scalar variable approach, as opposed to including discretised respondent groups. I continue these supporting scalar results here as well, under appendices 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7.

6.3.1: Policy-Proximity: Economics

Table 6.6 shows Labour evaluations from each economic group in 2015 and 2017, and how each group's Labour evaluations changed over that period. All tables in this section show responses by BES respondents who answered the evaluation questions in 2015 *or* 2017. Some will have answered the evaluation questions in both years, given the retention rate,[37] but not all. The evaluation changes in the rightmost column of these tables are simply the mean 2015 evaluations subtracted from the 2017 evaluations.

---

[37] 52.6% retention rate between Wave 6 and Wave 13.

Table 6.6: Table of Economic Dimension mean Labour evaluations and changes by policy group (n = 6,930)

Ideological Group	2015 mean evaluation	2017 mean evaluation	**2015–2017 change in mean evaluation**
Radical-Left	5.676	6.577	**+0.901**
Centre-Left	5.167	5.924	**+0.757**
Centrist	4.879	5.332	**+0.453**
Centre-Right	3.290	3.768	**+0.478**
Radical-Right	2.161	2.224	**+0.063**

The third column of Table 6.6 shows average Labour evaluation levels in 2017 are highest from the 'Radical-Left' group. This follows expectations for evaluation levels because Labour under Corbyn moves into proximity with these voters. Furthermore, support for Labour progressively becomes lower working across this dimension, and moving away from Labour's position, towards the 'Radical-Right' economic policy group with lowest evaluations. This monotonic pattern in Table 6.6 is one where Labour evaluations reduce as policy-proximity on economics reduces, which is entirely in line with the policy-proximity account.

However, the second column also shows highest average Labour evaluation levels from the 'Radical-Left' group in 2015, despite it being the 'Centre-Left' economic policy group considered to be in closest proximity with Labour pre-Corbyn. The observation here, of highest average evaluation levels from voters not in proximity with pre-Corbyn Labour, does not conform with the policy-proximity account.

Looking quickly at the evaluation changes in column four of Table 6.6, average Labour evaluations increased by the largest magnitude from the 'Radical-Left' group. This is in line with expectations, given the increasing proximity of this group with Labour between 2015 and 2017. However, average Labour evaluations did not decrease from the 'Centrist', 'Centre-Right', or 'Radical-Right' economic policy groups, despite Labour's shift away from them over this period. The general increase in average Labour evaluations, from policy groups across this dimension, including groups Labour shifts away from, does not conform with expectations.

Moving now to the regression of economic policy groups, these show differences in the dependent variable (Labour evaluation change) from each policy group relative to a baseline

group ('Centrists'). I include policy groups as mutually exclusive dummy variables here, as in the previous case studies.

Unlike the tables of evaluations from each group, the regressions only include respondents who answered evaluation questions in both the pre-Corbyn wave *and* the post-Corbyn wave. Of the thirty thousand responses in the pre-Corbyn wave, this drops to around fifteen thousand due to the retention rate (52.6%) between the pre-Corbyn and post-Corbyn waves. Remaining observations halve again, because the BES only presented the party evaluation question to around half of BES respondents. The BES gave the other half of the sample questions relating to propensity to vote instead. Accordingly, the number of observations left in regressions of policy groups is around seven thousand. This number drops further after including control variables, leaving around four and a half thousand observations. I include the simple linear regression of economic groups under Table 6.7. The dependent variable is Labour evaluation changes, on a scale of +10 to -10.

Table 6.7: Regression of Economic Policy Groups and Labour Evaluation Changes

Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015–2017 by Economic Policy Groups

	Dependent variable:	
	Evaluation Change by Group	
	(1)	(2)
Rad Left	0.449***	0.395***
	(0.083)	(0.097)
Cen Left	0.274***	0.260**
	(0.093)	(0.107)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Cen Right	0.025	0.009
	(0.086)	(0.104)
Rad Right	-0.389***	-0.309***
	(0.079)	(0.104)
Education		0.012*
		(0.007)
EU_Vote		-0.334***
(1 = Leave)		(0.075)
gender		0.228***
(1 = Female)		(0.065)
ageGroup		-0.053**
		(0.025)
Ethnicity		0.188
(1 = Non-White)		(0.126)
Cons_ID		-0.425***
		(0.113)
Lab_ID		-0.850***
		(0.107)
LD_ID		-0.239
		(0.150)
SNP.PC_ID		0.960***
		(0.154)
UKIP_ID		-0.161
		(0.151)
Greens_ID		1.068***
		(0.210)
Other_ID		0.790***
		(0.265)
Constant	0.452***	0.924***
	(0.054)	(0.201)
Observations	6,930	4,574
R^2	0.015	0.088
Adjusted R^2	0.015	0.084
Residual Std. Error	2.319 (df = 6925)	2.172 (df = 4557)
F Statistic	26.896*** (df = 4; 6925)	27.377*** (df = 16; 4557)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

To quickly address the controls, average Labour evaluations increased by a smaller amount relative to the 'Centrists' from voters who supported leaving the EU, from older respondents, and from those who identified with either the Conservative or Labour parties. Attachments with the SNP/PC, the Green Party, or one of the 'Others' political parties are associated with increased average Labour evaluations, relative to the 'Centrists', along with being female. There are no statistically significant links (at the .05 level) between Labour evaluation changes and education levels, ethnicity, and identification with either UKIP or the Liberal Democrats. Inclusion of controls in column two predictably dampens the coefficients from the economic policy groups. As the purpose of these controls is to clarify the impacts of policy-proximity, I draw my main conclusions from after including these variables.

Evaluations rose from the 'Radical-Left' group, with this increase also representing the largest positive evaluation change across all economic policy groups in this regression. In absolute terms, Labour evaluations from the 'Radical-Left' economic policy group increased by 1.329.[38] This increase in Labour evaluations, and its magnitude, conform with expectations under the policy-proximity account. Thus, I find support for the policy-proximity account in Table 6.7, suggesting policy-proximity on the economic dimension is associated with support for the radical left in the UK.

However, contrary to expectations, evaluations rise from all five groups, irrespective of proximity and Labour's shifts. Note that the 'Radical-Right' group's negative coefficient does not exceed the Constant in absolute value. This means Labour evaluations from the 'Radical-Right' group increased by an average of .615 pre-Corbyn to post-Corbyn.[39] Labour evaluations also increased from the 'Centrist' and 'Centre-Right' groups. Therefore, continuing from Table 6.7, I find a general increase in average Labour evaluations from economic policy groups.

In Figure 6.4, I summarise the pattern of Labour evaluation changes from Table 6.7. Note that this pattern does not dip below 0 on the y-axis, thus reflecting the lack of negative changes in Labour evaluations between 2015 and 2017.

---

[38] I reach this number by combining the 'Constant' coefficient with the 'Radical-Left' coefficient (0.924 + 0.395 = 1.319).

[39] Constant (0.924) – Radical-Right (0.309) = 0.615

Figure 6.4: Plotted Results of Economic Policy Groups (UK)

The pattern of Labour evaluation changes in Figure 6.4 is markedly different from the expected pattern in Figure 6.3. The policy-proximity account's expectations included falling average Labour evaluations from the groups Labour shifted away from – the 'Centrist', 'Centre-Right', and 'Radical-Right' economic policy groups. However, there is instead this average Labour evaluations increase across the board.

However, I find this general increase in evaluations becomes smaller as policy-proximity reduces. The 'Radical-Right' economic policy group, who are most spatially-distant from Labour, has the smallest increase in Labour evaluations. These Labour evaluation increases are slightly larger from the 'Centre-Right' group, larger still from the 'Centrists', and 'Centre-Left' groups, and reach their zenith from the 'Radical-Left' economic policy group. This largest increase in average Labour evaluations from the 'Radical-Left' group conforms with the policy-proximity account, given Labour's shift towards these voters between 2015 and 2017. If any group's evaluations were going in increase the most under this account it would be the 'Radical-Left' group, and if any group were to have the smallest evaluation increase it would be the spatially-distant 'Radical-Right' group. I observe this pattern, and as such I conclude limited observation of support for the UK radical left based on economic policy-proximity.

Finally, under Appendix 3.1 I test the effect of economic policy proximity on Labour evaluation changes again, but here with a scalar variable of economic preferences instead of policy groups. The basic effect here is the same as in Table 6.7 – greater leftism on this dimension is associated with significantly increased evaluations of the Labour Party over the 2015-2017 period. Consequently, the scalar model does not change any of my substantive findings from my group-based analysis in Table 6.7.

6.3.2: Policy-Proximity: Cultural

Below is a table of average Labour evaluations, and changes between these in 2015 and 2017 by cultural policy position.

Table 6.8: Table of Cultural Policy Dimension mean Labour evaluations and changes by policy group (n = 6,762)

Ideological Group	2015 mean evaluation	2017 mean evaluation	2015–2017 change in mean evaluation
Radical-Liberal	5.356	6.374	**+1.018**
Moderate-Liberal	4.510	5.084	**+0.574**
Centrist	3.758	4.062	**+0.304**
Moderate-Conservative	3.427	3.689	**+0.262**
Radical-Conservative	3.208	3.345	**+0.137**

Average Labour evaluation levels from cultural policy groups in Table 6.8 broadly follow those I observe from economic policy groups in Table 6.6. Specifically, in both pre-Corbyn and post-Corbyn waves, there is a trend where evaluation levels are higher from the group Labour shifts towards: the 'Radical-Liberal' group here. These evaluation levels are lower as spatial-distance increases between Labour and the policy groups, culminating with the lowest Labour evaluation levels from the 'Radical-Conservative' group. The fact that I observe this trend in both pre-Corbyn and post-Corbyn waves presents the same challenge to the theory as I saw earlier. Specifically, the 'Radical-Liberals' had the highest evaluations for Labour in 2015, despite the assumption of the 'Moderate-Liberal' group being in closest proximity with the pre-Corbyn Labour Party.

Looking at evaluation changes in column four of Table 6.8, Labour evaluations rise from the 'Radical-Liberal' group. This follows expectations, as Labour shifted towards this group

between 2015 and 2017. In terms of magnitude, this positive shift of evaluations from the 'Radical-Liberal' cultural policy group is the largest increase in Labour evaluations on this dimension. This also conforms with expectations and corresponds with Labour's culturally-liberal shift on this dimension. However, contrary to expectations, Table 6.8 also demonstrates the previously characterised general increase in evaluations. As I see Labour evaluations increasing from cultural policy groups which Labour shifted away from – the 'Centrist', 'Moderate-Conservative', and 'Radical-Conservative' groups, results in Table 6.8 do not entirely follow expectations.

I include a linear regression of cultural policy groups and Labour evaluation changes in Table 6.9, alongside the control variables, to see how average evaluations for Labour changed from these groups compared to a baseline group. Once again, that baseline group is the 'Centrists'.

Table 6.9: Regression of Cultural Policy groups and Labour evaluation changes

Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015-2017 by Cultural Policy Groups

	Dependent variable:	
	Evaluation Change by Group	
	(1)	(2)
Rad Lib	0.714***	0.416***
	(0.080)	(0.103)
Mod Lib	0.270***	0.156
	(0.084)	(0.101)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Mod Con	-0.043	-0.086
	(0.090)	(0.106)
Rad Con	-0.167*	-0.155
	(0.091)	(0.110)
Education		-0.001
		(0.007)
EU_Vote		-0.190**
(1 = Leave)		(0.080)
gender		0.206***
(1 = Female)		(0.067)
ageGroup		-0.046*
		(0.026)
Ethnicity		0.244*
(1 = Non-White)		(0.129)
Cons_ID		-0.523***
		(0.109)
Lab_ID		-0.716***
		(0.108)
LD_ID		-0.212
		(0.152)
SNP.PC_ID		1.115***
		(0.156)
UKIP_ID		-0.024
		(0.153)
Greens_ID		1.123***
		(0.217)
Other_ID		0.832***
		(0.271)
Constant	0.304***	0.893***
	(0.055)	(0.208)
Observations	6,762	4,453
R^2	0.019	0.083
Adjusted R^2	0.018	0.080
Residual Std. Error	2.323 (df = 6757)	2.178 (df = 4436)
F Statistic	31.933*** (df = 4; 6757)	25.236*** (df = 16; 4436)

Note:	*$p<0.1$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$

As before I draw conclusions primarily from column two, after control variables are taken into account. Conforming with expectations, I find the largest pro-Labour evaluation change from the 'Radical-Liberal' cultural policy group – rising by an average of 1.309 – in column two.[40] This represents a statistically significant association between 'Radical-Liberal' policy preferences and increased evaluations for Labour post-Corbyn, relative to the 'Centrists', which is conceivably the result of greater policy-proximity between these 'Radical-Liberal' respondents and the Labour Party between 2015 and 2017. However, the expectation that 'Centrists', 'Moderate-Conservative' and 'Radical-Conservative' policy groups would experience a decline in Labour evaluations from pre- to post-Corbyn is still not followed. After including the controls, evaluations from the 'Centrists' increased by .893, with no statistically significant difference between this and the coefficients of the latter two groups. Consequently, results conform with the policy-proximity account from the 'Radical-Liberal' group, but not from groups at the culturally-conservative end of this dimension.

This leaves similar conclusions between the regressions of economic policy and cultural policy groups. The evaluation changes, particularly their magnitudes, do suggest there is some policy-proximity effect on radical left here, although this account is limited by the unexpected evaluation increases from the three spatially-distant cultural policy groups. To summarise these results from cultural policy groups in graphical form, I have included these in Figure 6.5.

---

[40] Constant (0.893) + Radical-Liberal (0.416) = 1.309

Figure 6.5: Plotted Results of Cultural Policy Groups (UK)

Figure 6.4 reflects the statistically significant increase in average Labour evaluations from the 'Radical-Liberal' cultural policy group, relative to the 'Centrists', with these increases getting smaller towards the culturally-conservative end of this policy dimension. Increased average Labour evaluations from the 'Radical-Liberal' policy group conforms with the policy-proximity account; however, continued observation of a persistent general increase in average Labour evaluations means results still do not consistently follow expectations.

Cultural policy results in this case study come with two sets of supplementary results, included in the appendix.

First, under Appendix 3.2 I include results with a scalar variable of cultural policy preferences rather than policy groups. An increase in that scale, signifying greater cultural conservatism, is associated with a significant decrease in Labour evaluations. That follows with expectations, and conforms with the overall pattern I identified in Table 6.9 and Figure 6.5. As a result, this scalar model does not change my conclusions from the group-based model.

Second, under Appendix 3.3 I test the effects of cultural policy-proximity from the stripped back set of questions – excluding responses to the 'British values', authority obedience, and moral standards questions – finding results which are consistent with those in Table 6.9. Specifically, I continue to find the general increase in Labour evaluations from groups across

this dimension. As a result, my conclusions are unchanged after testing cultural policy without the issue of 'British values'.

6.3.3: Policy-Proximity: Migration

In Table 6.10, I include Labour evaluation levels from migration voter groups, again alongside the changes in these evaluations calculated by taking the 2015 evaluations from those in 2017:

Table 6.10: Table of Migration Policy Dimension mean Labour evaluations and changes by policy groups (n = 6,742)

Ideological Group	2015 mean evaluation	2017 mean evaluation	2015–2017 change in mean evaluation
Radical-Inclusive	5.579	6.664	**+1.085**
Moderate-Inclusive	5.019	5.653	**+0.634**
Centrist	4.142	4.637	**+0.495**
Moderate-Exclusive	3.559	3.801	**+0.242**
Radical-Exclusive	3.089	3.181	**+0.092**

Observations from Table 6.10 remain similar to those in Table 6.8 and 6.6, with cultural and economic policy groups, respectively. In the third column, the group Labour moves into proximity with – the 'Radical-Inclusive' group – demonstrated highest average evaluations for the Labour Party in the 2017 wave, as expected. However, in the second column these average evaluations are also highest from this group in the 2015 wave, despite Labour's assumed proximity with the 'Moderate-Inclusive' group in 2015.

Another conclusion which continues from the earlier tabled evaluation levels is the lack of lower average Labour evaluations from the groups this political actor shifts away from. In the fourth column of Table 6.10, I instead find the spatially-distant 'Centrist', 'Moderate-Exclusive', and 'Radical-Exclusive' groups had smaller average evaluation increases. The magnitude of these changes suggests there is still some policy-proximity effect here, as the size of these evaluation increases got smaller as policy-proximity reduced. However, the fact that their evaluation shifts are positive does not follow expectations.

Once again, this brings me to regression analysis, where I introduce control variables and observe average Labour evaluation changes from a consistent sample of BES respondents. Again, I present these average evaluation shifts relative to a baseline group, representing the 'Centrist' migration policy group. I include this linear regression of migration policy groups below, under Table 6.11.

Table 6.11: Regression of Migration Policy groups and Labour evaluation changes

Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015–2017 by Migration Policy Groups

	Dependent variable:	
	Evaluation Change by Group	
	(1)	(2)
Rad Inclusive	0.591***	0.359***
	(0.089)	(0.108)
Mod Inclusive	0.139	0.063
	(0.090)	(0.106)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Mod Exclusive	-0.253***	-0.239**
	(0.093)	(0.113)
Rad Exclusive	-0.400***	-0.318***
	(0.079)	(0.101)
Education		0.005
		(0.007)
EU_Vote		-0.123
(1 = Leave)		(0.085)
gender		0.195***
(1 = Female)		(0.066)
ageGroup		-0.035
		(0.026)
Ethnicity		0.020
(1 = Non-White)		(0.128)
Cons_ID		-0.579***
		(0.107)
Lab_ID		-0.752***
		(0.107)
LD_ID		-0.202
		(0.152)
SNP.PC_ID		1.127***
		(0.157)
UKIP_ID		-0.039
		(0.154)
Greens_ID		1.233***
		(0.219)
Other_ID		0.896***
		(0.271)
Constant	0.495***	0.909***
	(0.057)	(0.206)
Observations	6,742	4,410
R^2	0.021	0.087
Adjusted R^2	0.020	0.084
Residual Std. Error	2.329 (df = 6737)	2.169 (df = 4393)
F Statistic	35.883*** (df = 4; 6737)	26.276*** (df = 16; 4393)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Labour evaluations rose from the 'Radical-Inclusive' group, as expected. In column two, evaluations from these respondents increase on average by 1.268.[41] Results also meet expectations for relative evaluation changes, because I see the largest positive evaluation change from this voter group. The highest evaluations for Labour from the 'Radical-Inclusive' group is plausibly the result of greater proximity between these respondents and Labour, as Labour shifts towards them between 2015 and 2017. Again, the controls dampened the effect of policy-proximity variables, but after these I still find significantly increased average Labour evaluations, in line with expectations from the 'Radical-Inclusive' group.

However, as has been the pattern throughout this section so far, results do not consistently follow expectations. Once again, I observe this general increase in Labour evaluations, including from groups Labour shifts away from between 2015 and 2017 – the 'Centrist', 'Moderate-Exclusive', and 'Radical-Exclusive' groups. The magnitude of these evaluation increases provides some support for the policy-proximity account. I again find the largest increase in Labour evaluations from the proximal 'Radical-Inclusive' group, and the smallest increase from the distant 'Radical-Exclusive' group, this provides some support for the policy-proximity account.

The pattern of average Labour evaluations from migration policy groups is summarised below, in Figure 6.6. Of particular note is this downward curve in average Labour evaluations as policy-proximity reduces. However, that curve does not drop below 0 on the y-axis, demonstrating the unexpected general increase in average Labour evaluations from all five migration policy groups.

---

[41] Constant (0.909) + Radical-Inclusive (0.359) = 1.268

Figure 6.6: Plotted Results from Migration Policy Groups (UK)

Results have not consistently followed expectations of the policy-proximity account. In particular, the direction of evaluation changes does follow expectations, with evaluations for this political actor increasing even from spatially-distant voters. However, the magnitude of these evaluation changes does bring results slightly closer to conforming with the theory, as I find the largest positive evaluation changes from the groups Labour moved towards between 2015 and 2017. These increases in average Labour evaluations also became smaller as spatial-proximity reduced. This pattern conforms with the policy-proximity account.

Finally, with a scalar variable of migration policy in Appendix 3.4, I find the same basic pattern as in Table 6.11. Specifically, Labour evaluations increasing with more inclusive policy preferences. Hence, the scalar model does not change my findings from group-based analysis.

6.3.4: Policy-Proximity Observations: Multiple Linear Regression

As in the previous two case studies, I look now to multiple linear regression, which clarifies the roles of preferences on all three dimensions on support for the radical left. I include this under Table 6.12. My focus is primarily on column eight. That column includes Labour evaluations changes with control on all policy groups and control variables. Note that the number of observations is significantly lower in column eight. This is a consequence of respondents needing to have answered questions on Labour evaluation in both waves of data, plus answering policy questions on all three policy dimensions and the control variables.

Table 6.12: Multiple linear regression of Labour evaluation changes from policy groups on all three dimensions.

(Part 1/2)

Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015-2017 by Policy Groups

| | Evaluation Change by Group | | | | | | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rad Left	0.706***	0.583***					0.629***	0.558***
	(0.132)	(0.131)					(0.133)	(0.131)
Cen Left	0.359**	0.314**					0.300**	0.284**
	(0.148)	(0.145)					(0.148)	(0.144)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Cen Right	0.121	0.096					0.159	0.074
	(0.142)	(0.141)					(0.141)	(0.141)
Rad Right	-0.235*	-0.188					-0.170	-0.246*
	(0.126)	(0.137)					(0.126)	(0.137)
Rad Lib			0.853***	0.634***			0.530***	0.476***
			(0.127)	(0.136)			(0.140)	(0.141)
Mod Lib			0.295**	0.244*			0.189	0.207
			(0.133)	(0.132)			(0.134)	(0.132)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Mod Con			-0.059	-0.031			-0.025	-0.017
			(0.140)	(0.137)			(0.141)	(0.138)
Rad Con			-0.096	-0.089			-0.066	-0.100
			(0.146)	(0.146)			(0.152)	(0.150)
Rad Incl					0.492***	0.290**	0.150	0.124
					(0.137)	(0.140)	(0.146)	(0.144)
Mod Incl					0.032	-0.006	-0.085	-0.045
					(0.140)	(0.138)	(0.140)	(0.138)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Mod Excl					-0.403***	-0.359**	-0.297**	-0.314**
					(0.149)	(0.148)	(0.149)	(0.148)
Rad Excl					-0.431***	-0.411***	-0.350***	-0.385***
					(0.125)	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.136)
Constant	0.256***	0.680**	0.171*	0.652**	0.487***	0.891***	0.227	0.631**
	(0.090)	(0.268)	(0.089)	(0.272)	(0.090)	(0.270)	(0.140)	(0.285)
Observations	2,558	2,558	2,558	2,558	2,558	2,558	2,558	2,558
R^2	0.022	0.089	0.027	0.088	0.022	0.086	0.047	0.103
Adjusted R^2	0.020	0.083	0.025	0.082	0.020	0.081	0.042	0.095
Residual Std. Error	2.241 (df = 2553)	2.168 (df = 2541)	2.236 (df = 2553)	2.169 (df = 2541)	2.241 (df = 2553)	2.171 (df = 2541)	2.216 (df = 2545)	2.154 (df = 2533)
F Statistic	14.303*** (df = 4; 2553)	15.505*** (df = 16; 2541)	17.440*** (df = 4; 2553)	15.369*** (df = 16; 2541)	14.123*** (df = 4; 2553)	15.013*** (df = 16; 2541)	10.441*** (df = 12; 2545)	12.149*** (df = 24; 2533)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6.12: Multiple linear regression of Labour evaluation changes from policy groups on all three dimensions.

(Part 2/2)

Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015-2017 by Policy Groups

				Dependent variable:				
				Evaluation Change by Group				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Education		0.012		-0.002		0.003		-0.001
		(0.009)		(0.009)		(0.009)		(0.009)
EU_Vote		-0.320***		-0.141		-0.079		-0.004
(1 = Leave)		(0.099)		(0.105)		(0.111)		(0.112)
Gender		0.189**		0.171*		0.155*		0.198**
(1 = Female)		(0.088)		(0.088)		(0.088)		(0.088)
ageGroup		-0.046		-0.027		-0.030		-0.028
		(0.035)		(0.035)		(0.035)		(0.035)
Ethnicity		0.112		0.107		0.081		0.039
(1 = Non-White)		(0.170)		(0.170)		(0.171)		(0.170)
Cons_ID		-0.337**		-0.474***		-0.541***		-0.252*
		(0.149)		(0.141)		(0.141)		(0.149)
Lab_ID		-0.774***		-0.725***		-0.722***		-0.846***
		(0.142)		(0.140)		(0.140)		(0.141)
LD_ID		-0.133		-0.165		-0.189		-0.202
		(0.197)		(0.197)		(0.197)		(0.196)
SNP.PC_ID		0.971***		1.077***		1.066***		0.896***
		(0.208)		(0.206)		(0.206)		(0.207)
UKIP_ID		-0.146		-0.092		-0.061		-0.030
		(0.207)		(0.208)		(0.208)		(0.208)
Greens_ID		1.318***		1.318***		1.384***		1.096***
		(0.298)		(0.299)		(0.298)		(0.300)
Other_ID		1.175***		1.264***		1.305***		1.144***
		(0.359)		(0.358)		(0.359)		(0.357)
Constant	0.256***	0.680**	0.171*	0.652**	0.487***	0.891***	0.227	0.631**
	(0.090)	(0.268)	(0.089)	(0.272)	(0.090)	(0.270)	(0.140)	(0.285)
Observations	2,558	2,558	2,558	2,558	2,558	2,558	2,558	2,558
R^2	0.022	0.089	0.027	0.088	0.022	0.086	0.047	0.103
Adjusted R^2	0.020	0.083	0.025	0.082	0.020	0.081	0.042	0.095
Residual Std. Error	2.241 (df = 2553)	2.168 (df = 2541)	2.236 (df = 2553)	2.169 (df = 2541)	2.241 (df = 2553)	2.171 (df = 2541)	2.216 (df = 2545)	2.154 (df = 2533)
F Statistic	14.303*** (df = 4; 2553)	15.505*** (df = 16; 2541)	17.440*** (df = 4; 2553)	15.369*** (df = 16; 2541)	14.123*** (df = 4; 2553)	15.013*** (df = 16; 2541)	10.441*** (df = 12; 2545)	12.149*** (df = 24; 2533)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

I observe statistically significant coefficients from the 'Radical-Left', 'Centre-Left', 'Radical-Liberal', 'Moderate-Exclusive' and 'Radical-Exclusive' policy groups, relative to the baseline. Looking further at these, higher Labour evaluations from the 'Radical-Left' and 'Radical-Liberal' groups are consistent with expectations of the policy-proximity account. Also expected was a similar increase in evaluations from the 'Radical-Inclusive' group, but I did not observe this. I do not see an over-time decrease in average evaluations of Labour from any policy group, thus there is again this general increase in Labour evaluations despite this political actor shifting away from many policy groups. Consequently, results remain mixed relative to expected evaluation changes.

From Table 6.12, I can conclude associations between radical left support in the UK with left-wing economic policy preferences and radically-liberal cultural policy preferences. At the other end of these dimensions, the level of statistical significance from the 'Radical-Right' economic policy group diminishes from the .01 level observed in Table 6.7 to the .1 level in Table 6.12. This drop in significance suggests uncontrolled positions on cultural and migration policy had bolstered this group's coefficient earlier. At the spatially-distant end of the migration policy dimension, the statistically significant negative coefficient remains after including the economic and cultural policy preferences. Although, the migrant-exclusive groups average Labour evaluations still increased, relative to the 'Centrists' – maintaining this unexpected general increase in Labour evaluations, despite spatial-distance from Labour.

Results conform with expectations of absolute evaluation changes in two areas. First, with increased Labour evaluations from the 'Radical-Left' group, and second from the 'Radical-Liberal' group. Looking to relative evaluation changes, I see broadly the same pattern as before, with generally increased Labour evaluations across the board, but these evaluation increases becoming smaller as spatial-distance from Labour increases. Largest evaluation increases from the spatially-proximal groups suggest there is some validity to the policy-proximity account here.

Once again, I graphically summarise this pattern of average Labour evaluation changes. I do this in Figure 6.7. Note again the y-axis, which tracks positive evaluation changes alone. This reflects the general increase in Labour evaluations that I find in Table 6.12.

Figure 6.7: Plotted Results (Table 6.12) from Economic, Social, and Migration Policy Groups

It would be disingenuous to suggest that results in Table 6.12 consistently followed expectations of the policy-proximity account. I still find this general increase in Labour evaluations, which remains contrary to policy-proximity expectations. Although, as I have stated throughout my UK case analysis, there is still limited support for the policy-proximity account after looking at the magnitudes of these evaluation increases.

Appendix 3.5, which includes preferences on the three dimensions as scalar variables, provides results which mirror the basic pattern of Labour evaluations in Table 6.12. Consequently, my conclusions from group-based analysis are unchanged by the scalar models.

6.3.5: Populism-Based Observations

The expectation for this account is that average evaluations of Labour would be significantly higher from the 'Radical-Populist' group. This expectation was predicated upon the radical left's anti-elite economic appeals, which potentially draw support from voters who adhere to the 'us' versus 'them' division inherent to populism. Observing results which follow this expectation would lead me to conclude radical left support to be a function of higher levels of populism. However, I acknowledge that even if I find results which conform with the populism-based account, the extent this theory can answer the research question would be limited by a lack of consistent evidence supporting this account in both other case studies.

I again grouped BES respondents, this time according to their responses to questions related to populism. I include a linear regression of Labour evaluation changes from each populism group in Table 6.13.[42] The baseline in column one is 'Centrist' respondents who indicated neither strong populism nor non-populist attitudes. In column two, the baseline continues to be the 'Centrist' respondent group, plus respondents who scored zero on the control variables.

---

[42] High number of 'Don't Know' responses diminish amount of data here.

Table 6.13: Regression of Populism Groups and Labour evaluation changes

Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015–2017 by Populism Groups

	Evaluation Change by Group	
	(1)	(2)
Radical Populists	-0.057	-0.019
	(0.120)	(0.141)
Moderate Populists	-0.195[*]	-0.202
	(0.118)	(0.138)
Centrists	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Moderate Non-Populists	-0.048	-0.029
	(0.104)	(0.123)
Radical Non-Populists	-0.230[**]	-0.436[***]
	(0.112)	(0.133)
Education		0.015[*]
		(0.008)
EU_Vote		-0.405[***]
(1 = Leave)		(0.100)
gender		0.185[**]
(1 = Female)		(0.083)
ageGroup		-0.056[*]
		(0.033)
Ethnicity		0.225
(1 = Non-White)		(0.159)
Cons_ID		-0.565[***]
		(0.132)
Lab_ID		-0.674[***]
		(0.131)
LD_ID		-0.130
		(0.184)
SNP.PC_ID		1.077[***]
		(0.193)
UKIP_ID		-0.147
		(0.195)
Greens_ID		1.253[***]
		(0.280)
Other_ID		0.972[***]
		(0.339)
Constant	0.543[***]	1.044[***]
	(0.080)	(0.258)
Observations	4,372	2,931
R^2	0.001	0.077
Adjusted R^2	0.001	0.072
Residual Std. Error	2.324 (df = 4367)	2.195 (df = 2914)
F Statistic	1.598 (df = 4; 4367)	15.249[***] (df = 16; 2914)

Note:	[*]$p<0.1$; [**]$p<0.05$; [***]$p<0.01$

What Table 6.13 shows is contrary to expectations of the populism-based account but conforms with findings in both other case studies. Specifically, I do not find an increase in average Labour evaluation levels from the 'Radical-Populist' group, relative to the baseline, nor even from the 'Moderate-Populist' group. Therefore, populist attitudes are not associated with significantly increased average Labour evaluation changes between 2015 and 2017. I do find a statistically significant coefficient from the 'Radical Non-Populist' group, showing average Labour evaluations to have fallen from this group relative to the baseline. However, this was not one of the expectations under this account.

I could not separate Corbyn's potential radical left persuasion effect from voters reported populist sentiments here, due to those sentiments being expressed in post-Corbyn BES waves. I suggested earlier that this potentially biases results in favour of the populism-based account. However, upon observation of average Labour evaluation changes from populism groups, it seems their populism is not strongly associated with Labour Party support despite this potential bias.

Looking between columns one and two of Table 6.13, the coefficients are not markedly different once I include control variables in the regression model. To summarise results of this regression graphically, I have provided this pattern of average evaluation changes in Figure 6.8. This demonstrates the significant decrease in average Labour evaluations from the 'Radical-Non-Populists' group in particular, relative to the baseline. This also demonstrates the lack of significantly increased Labour evaluations from the 'Radical-Populist' group, again relative to that baseline.

Figure 6.8: Plotted Results from Populism Groups (UK).

Under Appendix 3.6, I test the role of populism with a scalar variable rather than groups. I find that an increase in the populism scale, representing greater populism, is associated with a significant increase in Labour evaluations. At first glance, this conflicts somewhat with my findings from Table 6.13, as it provides a result following expectations, with higher Labour evaluations from respondents with more populist attitudes. However, looking at Figure 6.8, it seems less appropriate to impose linear functional form with the scalar variable, considering the non-linear pattern in this figure. Furthermore, there is not a major difference in the magnitude of the populism effects implied by each of the two models,[43] meaning Appendix 3.6 does not present as fundamental a challenge to Table 6.13 as would initially appear.

---

[43] It is not straightforward to compare the magnitude of the estimated populism effect across a model that includes populism as a categorical predictor and a model that includes populism as a scalar predictor. But I can compare the magnitude of the predicted difference in Labour evaluation changes from opposing ends of the populism scale for the group-based model versus the predicted difference from the scalar model. For the group-based model (Table 6.13), I can calculate the predicted difference in Labour evaluation change for the 'Radical-Populist' and 'Radical-Non-Populist' groups as 0.417, which is the difference in the estimated coefficients for these two groups (-0.19 and -0.436). To get a comparable quantity from the scalar model (Appendix 3.6), I calculate the predicted difference in Labour evaluation change for a person with an "average" populism scale score for the 'Radical-Populist' group (4.68), and a person with an "average" populism scale score for the 'Radical-Non-Populist' group (2.42). A shift from 2.42 to 4.68 on the populism scale is a shift of 2.26. Multiplying this by the estimated populism coefficient in Appendix 3.6, yields a predicted difference in Labour

The lack of a major difference in magnitudes between both the scalar and group-based model, combined with Figure 6.8 showing enforcing linear form with the scalar variable to be inappropriate when there is a non-linear pattern, leads me back to my original conclusions. Namely, that populist sentiments are not strongly associated with higher support for the UK Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn.

6.3.6: Policy and Populism – Multiple Linear Regression

Finally, I control the respective impacts of voter policy preferences on all three dimensions, and the populism groups. The intention here is to yield a final, more accurate picture of the impacts of both policy-proximity and populism on radical left support in the UK. I provide the multiple linear regression of policy and populism groups under Table 6.14.

---

evaluation changes of **0.337**. This is similar in magnitude to the predicted difference in the grouping model (0.417).

Table 6.14: Multiple linear regression of Labour evaluation changes from all policy groups and populism groups

(Part 1/2)

Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015-2017 by Policy and Populism Groups

	Evaluation Change by Group									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Rad Left	0.706***	0.583***							0.586***	0.537***
	(0.132)	(0.131)							(0.134)	(0.133)
Cen Left	0.359**	0.314**							0.305**	0.298**
	(0.148)	(0.145)							(0.148)	(0.145)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Cen Right	0.121	0.096							0.172	0.084
	(0.142)	(0.141)							(0.140)	(0.140)
Rad Right	-0.235*	-0.188							-0.100	-0.189
	(0.126)	(0.137)							(0.127)	(0.138)
Rad Lib			0.853***	0.634***					0.766***	0.646***
			(0.127)	(0.136)					(0.145)	(0.146)
Mod Lib			0.295**	0.244*					0.283**	0.264**
			(0.133)	(0.132)					(0.134)	(0.132)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Mod Con			-0.059	-0.031					-0.027	-0.006
			(0.140)	(0.137)					(0.141)	(0.138)
Rad Con			-0.096	-0.089					-0.073	-0.083
			(0.146)	(0.146)					(0.153)	(0.151)
Rad Incl					0.492***	0.290**			0.238	0.179
					(0.137)	(0.140)			(0.146)	(0.144)
Mod Incl					0.032	-0.006			-0.032	-0.022
					(0.140)	(0.138)			(0.140)	(0.138)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Mod Excl					-0.403***	-0.359**			-0.368**	-0.346**
					(0.149)	(0.148)			(0.149)	(0.148)
Rad Excl					-0.431***	-0.411***			-0.421***	-0.397***
					(0.125)	(0.133)			(0.134)	(0.136)
Rad Pop							-0.196	-0.139	-0.144	-0.183
							(0.150)	(0.148)	(0.155)	(0.152)
Mod Pop							-0.220	-0.210	-0.138	-0.166
							(0.152)	(0.147)	(0.149)	(0.146)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Mod Non-Pop							-0.032	-0.074	-0.192	-0.154
							(0.135)	(0.131)	(0.133)	(0.130)
Rad Non-Pop							-0.294**	-0.468***	-0.823***	-0.704***
							(0.138)	(0.141)	(0.146)	(0.145)
Constant	0.256***	0.680**	0.171*	0.652**	0.487***	0.891***	0.555***	1.014***	0.427***	0.787***
	(0.090)	(0.268)	(0.089)	(0.272)	(0.090)	(0.270)	(0.102)	(0.276)	(0.161)	(0.294)
Observations	2,558	2,558	2,558	2,558	2,558	2,558	2,558	2,558	2,558	2,558
R^2	0.022	0.089	0.027	0.088	0.022	0.086	0.003	0.083	0.061	0.113
Adjusted R^2	0.020	0.083	0.025	0.082	0.020	0.081	0.001	0.077	0.055	0.103
Residual Std. Error	2.241 (df = 2553)	2.168 (df = 2541)	2.236 (df = 2553)	2.169 (df = 2541)	2.241 (df = 2553)	2.171 (df = 2541)	2.263 (df = 2553)	2.175 (df = 2541)	2.201 (df = 2541)	2.144 (df = 2529)
F Statistic	14.303*** (df = 4; 2553)	15.505*** (df = 16; 2541)	17.440*** (df = 4; 2553)	15.369*** (df = 16; 2541)	14.123*** (df = 4; 2553)	15.013*** (df = 16; 2541)	1.716 (df = 4; 2553)	14.363*** (df = 16; 2541)	10.271*** (df = 16; 2541)	11.481*** (df = 28; 2529)

Note:				
				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6.14: Multiple linear regression of Labour evaluation changes from all policy groups and populism groups

(Part 2/2)

Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015-2017 by Policy and Populism Groups

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
				Dependent variable:						
				Evaluation Change by Group						
Education		0.012		-0.002		0.003		0.012		0.002
		(0.009)		(0.009)		(0.009)		(0.009)		(0.009)
EU_Vote		-0.320***		-0.141		-0.079		-0.401***		-0.100
(1 = Leave)		(0.099)		(0.105)		(0.111)		(0.106)		(0.115)
Gender		0.189**		0.171*		0.155*		0.141		0.175**
(1 =Female)		(0.088)		(0.088)		(0.088)		(0.089)		(0.088)
ageGroup		-0.046		-0.027		-0.030		-0.038		-0.022
		(0.035)		(0.035)		(0.035)		(0.035)		(0.035)
Ethnicity		0.112		0.107		0.081		0.134		0.007
(1=NonWhite)		(0.170)		(0.170)		(0.171)		(0.171)		(0.169)
Cons_ID		-0.337**		-0.474***		-0.541***		-0.553***		-0.236
		(0.149)		(0.141)		(0.141)		(0.141)		(0.149)
Lab_ID		-0.774***		-0.725***		-0.722***		-0.652***		-0.821***
		(0.142)		(0.140)		(0.140)		(0.140)		(0.141)
LD_ID		-0.133		-0.165		-0.189		-0.097		-0.153
		(0.197)		(0.197)		(0.197)		(0.198)		(0.196)
SNP.PC_ID		0.971***		1.077***		1.066***		1.113***		0.863***
		(0.208)		(0.206)		(0.206)		(0.206)		(0.206)
UKIP_ID		-0.146		-0.092		-0.061		-0.126		-0.013
		(0.207)		(0.208)		(0.208)		(0.208)		(0.207)
Greens_ID		1.318***		1.318***		1.384***		1.533***		1.072***
		(0.298)		(0.299)		(0.298)		(0.297)		(0.299)
Other_ID		1.175***		1.264***		1.305***		1.294***		1.074***
		(0.359)		(0.358)		(0.359)		(0.360)		(0.357)
Constant	0.256***	0.680**	0.171*	0.652**	0.487***	0.891***	0.555***	1.014***	0.427***	0.787***
	(0.090)	(0.268)	(0.089)	(0.272)	(0.090)	(0.270)	(0.102)	(0.276)	(0.161)	(0.294)
Observations	2,558	2,558	2,558	2,558	2,558	2,558	2,558	2,558	2,558	2,558
R^2	0.022	0.089	0.027	0.088	0.022	0.086	0.003	0.083	0.061	0.113
Adjusted R^2	0.020	0.083	0.025	0.082	0.020	0.081	0.001	0.077	0.055	0.103
Residual Std. Error	2.241 (df = 2553)	2.168 (df = 2541)	2.236 (df = 2553)	2.169 (df = 2541)	2.241 (df = 2553)	2.171 (df = 2541)	2.263 (df = 2553)	2.175 (df = 2541)	2.201 (df = 2541)	2.144 (df = 2529)
F Statistic	14.303*** (df = 4; 2553)	15.505*** (df = 16; 2541)	17.440*** (df = 4; 2553)	15.369*** (df = 16; 2541)	14.123*** (df = 4; 2553)	15.013*** (df = 16; 2541)	1.716 (df = 4; 2553)	14.363*** (df = 16; 2541)	10.271*** (df = 16; 2541)	11.481*** (df = 28; 2529)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

My focus here is on column ten, which includes coefficients for all policy groups and populism groups alongside the control variables. What I find in column ten of Table 6.14 is generally consistent with my earlier conclusions. There are increased Labour evaluations across policy groups on all three dimensions, which does not follow the policy-proximity account. There are also the larger Labour evaluation increases from the groups this party shifted towards between 2015 and 2017, compared to the groups Labour shifted away from on each dimension. As I have said throughout this analysis section, where I have consistently observed this pattern of Labour evaluations, this offers partial support for the policy-proximity account.

Returning to the two accounts examined in my thesis, I can also make a final assessment of populism-based results in the UK case study. I observe the same pattern of results from populism groups as I did from Table 6.14. Specifically, relative to the baseline, respondents in the 'Radical-Populist' group do not on average have significantly increased support for the Labour Party. Therefore, once again, populist attitudes are not associated with significantly increased radical left support.

After taking policy preferences on all three dimensions into account, levels of voter populism, and the control variables, I still find mixed support for the policy-proximity account in the UK. I also find little to suggest support for the radical left in the UK is a function of populist attitudes amongst voters.

Finally, I find the same basic pattern of Labour evaluation changes when tested with scalar policy variables, rather than policy groups, in Appendix 3.7. The result is that the scalar results broadly underscore my primary policy-proximity findings. Appendix 3.7 shows the same direction of radical left support that I find in Table 6.14, with Labour evaluation increases higher from the more proximal policy groups. With regard to populism, the scalar results appear to conflict with my primary findings; however, my impression remains the same as with Appendix 3.6.

6.3.7: Alternative Analysis – Labour Leader Evaluations

To complement my previous examination of changes in Labour party evaluations, I also look at how policy-proximity and populist attitudes are associated with changes in evaluation of Labour's leaders. To produce this dependent variable, I subtract evaluations for Ed Miliband

in 2015 from evaluations of Jeremy Corbyn in 2017.[44] This provides a measure of changes in Labour leader evaluations. Looking at changes in Labour leader evaluations this time, instead of changes in evaluation for this party, acts as a robustness test of my previous conclusions. The previous conclusion of a general increase in Labour evaluations, regardless of policy-proximity, are potentially driven at least partly by impressions of Labour's new leadership. Thus, I want to also see what pattern of Labour leader evaluation changes is seen from the policy and populism groups. It is possible voters favoured Corbyn as a political outsider, conforming with previous research that has identified a 'maverick' effect (Ditto & Mastronarde, 2009). It may also be that voters saw Corbyn as more honest or more trustworthy, which would also have driven up support for Labour from voters across the policy dimensions. If this was the case, then I would see the same general increase in the dependent variable that I saw from policy groups earlier.

I have included results with this 'LikeLeader' dependent variable in the thesis appendix. Under Appendices 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10 are regressions of changes in Labour leader evaluations from economic, cultural, and migration policy groups, respectively. The trend of results from these appendicised regressions matches those in the corresponding analysis included earlier in this section – Tables 3.2, 3.4, and 3.6, respectively. Crucially, the same general increase in evaluations was present, meaning it may have been impressions of Labour's leadership change in 2015, from Miliband to Corbyn – an effect that I cannot completely disentangle from Labour Party evaluations – which explains this unexpected general increase in Labour evaluations.

There was some variance in conclusions between the multiple linear regressions of Labour evaluations (Tables 3.7 and 3.9) and these with the 'LikeLeader' dependent variable (Appendices 3.11 and 3.13). Specifically, whereas the levels of significance from the 'Radical-Right' and 'Radical-Inclusive' groups dropped with party evaluations, it remained with the 'LikeLeader' variable. Therefore, leader evaluations seem to emphasise the effect of some variables. However, and most importantly, the generally positive trend of Labour *leader* evaluation changes between 2015 and 2017 broadly follows that of Labour *Party* evaluation changes. Therefore, respondents may have incorporated their increased impressions of

---

[44] Question included under Appendix 3.0.

Labour's leadership into their evaluations of the Labour Party. This potentially accounts for the unexpected general increases in Labour Party evaluations that I have observed in this analysis section.

That being said, identification of Labour support based on leadership appraisals, including a potential 'maverick' effect and perceptions of honesty/trustworthiness, are outside of the policy-proximity account. Consequently, what this potentially shows is a need to account for these valence-type effects impacting upon radical left support, alongside the limited role of policy-proximity which I identify in this chapter.

6.4: UK Conclusions

First, I will summarise results in relation to both the policy-proximity and populism-based accounts. I did not find support for the populism-based account, having not seen significantly increased average evaluations for the Labour Party between 2015 and 2017 from the 'Radical-Populist' respondents. Therefore, support for the UK's radical left does not seem to be associated with levels of voter populism. Looking to the policy-proximity account, I find a general increase in Labour evaluations from all policy groups. This itself does not conform with this account, as I expected Labour's leftward shift to mean decreased evaluations for this party from spatially-distant policy groups. However, looking at the relative magnitude of these evaluation changes provided some support for the policy-proximity account, as the larger positive evaluation shifts came from the groups Labour shifted towards, with these increases being smaller from the groups Labour shifted away from. Overall, this left partially followed expectations, and limited observation of radical left support based on policy-proximity.

To further explore the unexpected general increase in Labour evaluations, I looked to alternate analysis with the 'LikeLeader' dependent variable. The notion here was that impressions of Corbyn as more honest or trustworthy potentially drove higher Labour evaluations across these policy groups. I find that evaluations also rose from across policy groups, regardless of proximity, once the dependent variable pertained to Labour's leaders. Thus, a potential valence-effect of Corbyn seems to be present here, where voters view him more positively maybe due to perceptions of greater honesty or as a maverick outsider. This potentially

explains the unexpected general increase in Labour evaluations that I find in the analysis section of this chapter.

Similar to my findings here, previous research also identified a general increase in support for the Labour Party between 2015 and 2017, with this explained by evaluations of Corbyn relative to incumbent Prime Minister Theresa May (Mellon, et al., 2018). Evaluations for the former rose throughout the 2017 campaign, whereas for the latter they declined. Thus, Corbyn's popularity relative to May's is another possible explanation for this unexpected general increase in evaluations. Further existing research here has suggested a shift in issue salience, from the economy to cultural and migration policy, when explaining how the Labour Party's support increased. Labour's manifesto is suggested to have won them a great deal of support based on their more culturally-liberal and migrant-inclusive policies (Curtice, September 2017). I also find stronger support for Labour from culturally-liberal and migrant-inclusive voters in this chapter. This previous research identified two non-policy-proximity factors – leader evaluations and issue salience – as important explanations of electoral support in the UK. Perhaps this demonstrates limitations of the policy-proximity account in this case context.

The UK case study makes the important contribution of separating persuasion effects from voters' policy preferences. What this means is results of the UK case study are more reliably the result of genuine policy-proximity, rather than this proximity arising from radical left persuasion. This is an important conclusion, but it should not distract from the unexpected patterns of Labour Party evaluations that I find here. I will look further at potential explanations for these unexpected findings in the next chapter, which concludes this thesis.

7.0: Conclusions and Implications

My intention in this thesis was to provide an account of support for the radical left, with focus on how far policy-proximity and populist attitudes explain support for radical left political actors. I highlighted the relevance of this right at the beginning of this thesis, where I set the radical left in the context of substantial (and often surprising) levels of electoral support and the need to explain this phenomenon. Having now carried out this voter-level research, I come to the concluding part of this thesis. It is here that I will reflect on my results across all three case studies and draw implications from these findings. These implications reflect not just on the question of radical left support, but also on the policy-proximity and populism-based accounts of electoral support. Prior to that, I will draw out the key messages of the component chapters in this thesis.

In the first chapter I demonstrated gaps in existing voter-level literature on support for the radical left. One of the more fundamental gaps I showed here is how existing literature has generally focused on the radical right instead of the radical left, meaning my research contributes by looking at support for less-studied political actors. A further area of contribution in my thesis includes my simultaneous examination of the roles of policy-proximity on three dimensions and populism. Finally, I explained how my thesis has gone to greater lengths to deal with persuasion effects, compared to existing literature, with this leaving a more accurate picture of the specific roles of policy-proximity and populism on voters' support for the radical left.

My focus in Chapter 2 was theory. In this chapter, I explained the fundamentals and assumptions of both the policy-proximity and populism-based accounts. In brief, the policy-proximity account assumes electoral support is the result of voter-actor proximity in policy spaces, with the theory here previously found to explain support including for the radical right (Kitschelt & McGann, 1995; Kitschelt & Rehm, 2014). That research also identified three policy spaces linking proximity with radical right support. Those three dimensions relate to economics, cultural policy, and migration policy. Given their relevance in the research of Kitschelt, as well as many others cited in chapters 1 and 2, these three dimensions also feature in my thesis. The populism-based account suggests that support for the radical left comes

from populist voters. The populism these voters adhere to is defined by an 'us' versus 'them' division in society, where one group of 'ordinary people' are set against a 'corrupt elite' (Canovan, 1999; Mudde, 2004). The overall expectation under this account is that populist voters would be more supportive of the radical left, as a result of the radical left's anti-elite rhetoric being akin to the 'us' vs. 'them' appeal inherent to populism (Mudde, 2007).

Chapter 3 formed the research design of this thesis. I focused on methodology here, highlighting the use of survey data and regression analysis. I explained how my study would require survey data including measures of radical left support, policy preferences on the three dimensions, and populist attitudes. I then outlined how I measured the impacts of policy preferences and populism on radical left support, with these included in multivariate regressions alongside control variables. Also included in Chapter 3 was explanation of all three case studies and their respective contributions, including how I deal with persuasion effects in the US and UK cases. In addition to discussing the three case studies, I also touched on alternative examples of the radical left and why they do not feature in my thesis, with the lack of suitable survey data being the most common reason for ruling out those cases.

This brings me to summarise Chapter 4 – the first of three empirical chapters in my thesis. In this chapter, I analysed support for *Die Linke* – the radical left in Germany. I argued this case was a classic example of the radical left, via its status as an established political party like those appearing in existing research on radical left support. Under the policy-proximity account, the expectation was for a monotonic relationship between proximity and radical left support. I find results which broadly conform with this account, through a monotonic pattern of *Die Linke* evaluations which I most consistently observed from voters on the economic policy dimension. From this, I concluded policy-proximity to explain support for the German radical left. I also concluded this based primarily on economic policy-proximity, with cultural and migration policy also having more limited links with radical left support. From populism groups, I did not find results which conform with the expectation that radical left support would come from more populist voters. Overall, therefore, I find support for the policy-proximity account in Germany, with little evidence supporting the populism-based account.

The established nature of *Die Linke* led me to consider two other case studies, where I could more thoroughly separate the radical left actor's potential persuasion effects from the policy

preferences and populism of voters. The first of these two case studies focused on support for the radical left in the US, in Chapter 5.

In Chapter 5 I analysed support for the 2016 Sanders presidential campaign, versus for his opponent – the more moderate centre left candidacy of Hillary Clinton – in the Democratic Party's presidential primaries. I did not find higher probability of voting for Sanders from the populist respondents, meaning again the populism-based account receives little support. Meanwhile, what I find from policy groups generally does not conform with the policy-proximity account. Policy-proximity does not explain the curvilinear pattern of radical left support, with higher probability of voting for Sanders over Clinton from spatially-distant voters on the economic and migration dimensions. Nor does this account explain the greater support for Sanders over Clinton, and vice versa, from voters on the cultural and migration dimensions, given both candidates offer similarly liberal and inclusive policies on these two dimensions. I do find support for the policy-proximity account from the economically 'Radical-Left' policy group, who have significantly higher probability of voting for Sanders over Clinton, relative to the baseline. However, findings in this case study generally challenge the policy-proximity account.

In the US case, I dealt with one specific potential persuasion effect – partisan attachments – via the intra-party context of the Sanders campaign. However, it is still conceivable that some voters formed attachments to Sanders himself in 2016 with these potentially causing persuasion of voters' policy preferences and populism. This brought me to Chapter 6, where I could make further progress in mitigating persuasion effects through the UK case study.

In the UK case study of Chapter 6 I examined changes in support for the Labour Party between 2015 and 2017, as this party shifted to the radical left under Jeremy Corbyn's leadership. In this chapter I continued to consider and rigorously deal with potential persuasion effects, this time through use of panel data instead of the cross-sectional analysis undertaken in the German and US cases. That panel data design in the UK case study allowed me to draw measures of voter policy preferences from data waves before Corbyn became Labour leader. Thus, I separated over time the policy preferences of respondents from persuasion by the radical left Labour Party. Unfortunately, however, I could not do the same with measures of populism, owing to those questions only appearing in post-Corbyn data. Nevertheless, the

panel data design, and its role addressing persuasion effects, is an important feature of the UK case study.

In the UK case, I observed some results which conform with expectations of the policy-proximity account and some results which do not. Challenging the policy-proximity account, I find a general increase in Labour evaluations between 2015 and 2017 from voters across each of the three policy dimensions, despite Labour's policy position shifting away from many of these voters over that period. The relative magnitude of voters' evaluation changes shows the largest increases in these came from the spatially-proximal voters on all three policy dimensions. This provides some support to the policy-proximity account, however that account still does not explain why spatially-distant voters had increased evaluations for Labour over the 2015-2017 period. Overall, some UK case results adhered with the policy-proximity account, but unexpected findings limit that account's explanation of radical left support. Looking at the populism groups, once again I did not observe support for the radical left from populist voters. Therefore, from the UK case study too results did not conform with expectations of the populism-based account.

Putting together these case studies and their empirical findings, what can I say about the factors that determine electoral support for radical left actors?

First, I can say that high levels of populism do not seem to be associated with greater support for the radical left. This was a common conclusion across all three case studies, despite the diversity between them. I raised this case diversity issue in relation specifically to populism in my theory chapter, saying how the governing legacies of the US and UK radical left potentially disrupts how far I can observe populism-based support. It was there that I acknowledged the need to consider the impact of the US and UK cases' institutional legacies. As I consistently found little evidence supporting the populism-based account, across cases where the radical left actor was part of a mainstream political party (US and UK cases) and where the actor was a non-mainstream party (Germany), it does not seem that institutional legacies have had an effect on my observations.

Although existing literature and the potentially populist nature of radical left rhetoric provided motivation for my testing this theory, I did not find evidence associating high levels of voter populism with support for the radical left. That being said, future research may revisit

populism-based radical left support in the US, if more data becomes available as my conclusion here was limited by a small sample.

Second, mixed conclusions over policy-proximity indicate this account offers a limited explanation of radical left support. In all three case studies I find voters in proximity with the radical left on the economic dimension to be more supportive of these political actors, compared to economically centrist voters. Furthermore, in the German and UK cases I find radical left support falling as policy-proximity reduced towards the right-wing economic voters. I also find policy-proximity on the cultural policy and migration policy dimensions to explain radical left support, albeit less consistently. Countering this are unexpected findings, such as the increased radical left support from spatially-distant voters in the US and UK cases. Another unexpected finding occurred when voter positions on cultural and migration policy dimensions were associated with higher probability of supporting Sanders versus Clinton, or vice versa, despite both candidates' proximity with each other. These are two of the areas where results did not follow expectations, which in turn limits the extent this account explains radical left support.

Overall, I do not find consistent evidence in support of the populism-based account, and I find only limited explanation of radical left support based on policy-proximity. In relation to the contribution of my thesis, I have reached these findings having tested both the impacts of populism and proximity on three policy dimensions simultaneously. Thus, I have identified how both accounts are related with radical left support while also controlling for any potential confounding between them. My thesis has also included more rigourous efforts to deal with persuasion effects. The purpose of this was to observe the roles of policy-proximity and populism more accurately, with each of these variables separated from potential persuasion by the radical left actor. Finally, my thesis has also tested both these accounts in three case studies – a range of cases which varied by multiparty versus limited party context, and by the more established German radical left versus the emerging US and UK radical left – building on much existing research that has considered more limited ranges of contexts.

7.1: Implications

I have concluded that levels of voter populism do not explain radical left support. Alongside this I have concluded radical left support is explained, albeit to a limited extent, by proximity with voters' positions on three policy dimensions: in particular, the economic policy dimension. But why are my findings important? I said in the introduction how the radical left has risen to sometimes surprising prominence and gained significant electoral support. With the radical left on the rise, it is important to explain and understand where this support has come from. I provided an account of this here, finding this support to be partly associated with proximity with voters in policy spaces. A simplistic explanation of the radical left's success might be to suggest voters are further to the left than previously imagined, and this is how these political actors received such substantial support. However, what I find instead is that policy-proximity does not completely explain support for the radical left. The increases in radical left support I find from spatially-distant voters in the US and UK cases potentially explains strong electoral performances from these actors, but crucially does not reflect policy-proximity effects on the three dimensions I considered.

Looking now more case-specifically, I find the most consistent results relative to policy-proximity expectations in the German case study. Why was it the German case study where results most closely conformed with policy-proximity expectations? I suspect this is down to persuasion effects, which I could not as thoroughly account for in the German case compared to the other two case studies. The result of not being able to control for these persuasion effects as thoroughly may be those results not being purely the result of proximity in policy spaces, but rather pre-existing support or attachment with *Die Linke*. Persuasion effects aside, I still find evidence supporting the policy-proximity account of radical left support in Germany.

If German results most closely conformed with expectations of the policy-proximity account, the US case study was the opposite. Although results followed expectations from the economically left-wing voters, what I also find is a curvilinear pattern of radical left support, with groups at opposing end of the dimensions more supportive of the radical left relative to the 'Centrists'. I also find voters on the cultural policy and migration policy dimensions supporting Sanders over Clinton or vice versa, despite proximity between these two

candidates suggesting voters would not treat one of these candidates differently from the other. This raises the question of what explains the unexpected results of the US case study?

Perceptions of voters may explain some of these unexpected results. For example, voters may have perceived Sanders to be more culturally-liberal and migrant-inclusive than Clinton, despite their campaign platforms not supporting this. If this was the case, then culturally-liberal and migrant-inclusive voters would have been more likely to support Sanders than Clinton, relative to 'Centrists' on these dimensions. Voters' perceptions may explain some of these unexpected results, however this was not something I was able to explore further without survey data asking respondents to place these two candidates on policy dimensions.

Another possible factor is the use of vote choice questions to measure radical left support, as opposed to evaluation questions used in both the UK and German cases. Therefore, background factors, such as candidate competitiveness, were potentially embroiled with responses to the dependent variable, whereas I mitigated these with evaluation questions in both other cases. The difference in dependent variables, between the US and German/UK cases, does substantially alter the interpretation of US case study results. With this case, my interpretation had to shift from looking at appraisals, to looking at actual votes within a context of an election and voting rules. As a result, the dependent variable difference would credibly explain some variation with this case's results. More specifically, it is plausible that economically right-wing, culturally-conservative, and migrant-exclusive respondents, when having to cast a single vote in an actual election, behaved differently from respondents in other case studies. As a result, it is important to remember the US case study is one of vote choices, rather than one of radical left evaluations.

A further possibility, which may explain this pattern of US case study radical left support, may be a protest effect where, for example, economically right-wing respondents were supportive of Sanders out of protest at the converged 'neoliberal' policies of more mainstream candidates, such as Hillary Clinton. This possibility would explain why I found higher probability of supporting Sanders, over Clinton, from economically right-wing voters. Finally, it may be that these dimensions were not salient enough to voters, with Sanders and Clinton not providing adequate cues as to their positions here, potentially leading voters to support the spatially-distant Sanders.

In the final empirical chapter in this thesis – the UK case study – what could have caused the consistent observation of a general increase in Labour evaluations? One possibility is a regression to the mean effect, where in this case evaluations of Labour may have been particularly low in the pre-Corbyn wave and rose to return closer to the mean level of evaluations by the 2017 post-Corbyn wave. Regression to the mean is one possibility, and would mean Labour evaluations increase from voters across the policy dimensions. Another possibility is valence-type effects, where voters potentially saw Corbyn as more honest or trustworthy compared to the pre-Corbyn leadership, leading to higher evaluations for Labour as a result. I examined this further with the Labour leader evaluations dependent variable, and find the same pattern of support in this alternate analysis. This suggests positive perceptions of Corbyn may have driven the general increases in Labour evaluations, despite spatial-distance between many of these voters and the Corbyn-led Labour Party. I examined those leader perceptions merely as a potential explanation for results which did not follow the policy-proximity account. These 'maverick' or honesty perceptions of Labour's leadership are not part of the policy-proximity account, and instead constitute valence-type effects. Consequently, possible valence effects do not provide support for the policy-proximity account, and potentially need further examination as a potential explanatory factor of radical left support.

Looking more broadly now, what do these results say about the explanatory power of the policy-proximity account? I find limited evidence, across three case studies, that policy-proximity explains support for the radical left. In particular, economic policy-proximity is associated with support for the radical left – a conclusion which is also in line with previous research Bowyer & Vail (2011), Doerschler & Banaszak (2007), and Akkerman, et al. (2017). I also find cultural and migration policy-proximity to explain radical left support, albeit less consistently. The pattern of results across these three cases also suggests that once persuasion effects are dealt with more thoroughly, in the US and UK cases, support for the policy-proximity account becomes less apparent. In both those cases, I better isolated the effects of policy-proximity on radical left support. From this, future research needs to reappraise the traditional Downsian conception of proximity, and better control persuasion effects to more accurately understand the effects of policy-proximity on electoral support.

Moving now to discuss implications of the populism-based account's results, my overall conclusion here was more simple: high levels of populism are not associated with radical left support. This conclusion was consistent across all three case studies, which leads me to conclude that populism does not explain support for the radical left. Thus, I do not find strong evidence to suggest the radical left has benefitted from a populist backlash against mainstream political parties; however, that does not mean this account is totally rejected.

Given the relevance of populism as an explanatory factor of electoral support in previous research (Akkerman, et al. 2014; 2017; Van Hauwart & Van Kessel, 2018; Stanley, 2018; Mazzoleni & Ivaldi, 2020), I do not reject this account entirely. However, the fact I find little evidence in support of its explanation of radical left, across all three case studies, leaves me to consider some possible factors which may explain why I did not find populism to explain radical left support strongly or consistently.

Firstly, although there is evidence supporting populism-based electoral support in previous research, that is not necessarily a ubiquitous finding. For example, previous research of electoral support in Slovakia found the role of populism on electoral support to be much smaller than expected (Stanley, 2011). Therefore, although my findings here conflict with a great deal of existing literature, I am not the first to have identified limits to the extent populism explains electoral support. Secondly, it may be that levels of populism are associated with support for the radical left, but only when there is more overt populist rhetoric emanating from these political actors. Future research may investigate this possibility, applying the populism-based account to other contexts where perhaps voters more widely see the radical left as making populist appeals. Thirdly, it may be that populism is associated more with radical right actors, and not the radical left. Thus, populist voters are drawn to support the radical right instead, and not to support the actors in my research.

I would also want to respond to two potential methodological points raised to explain my populism-based findings. Firstly, the survey questions I used to measure levels of populism may have had some role here, by inaccurately measuring respondent adherence with populism. However, I would dispute these measures being responsible here, as these questions have also featured in previous voter-level applications of populism to explain political behaviour. Secondly, it may be the fact I have looked at the effect of populism via

respondent groups which explains me finding less support for this account than previous research. That previous research examined the effect of populism as a scalar variable, instead of with respondent groups, and this difference may potentially explain variance in findings here. However, when testing this account with scalar variables I still did not consistently find support for populism across all of my case studies. Furthermore, I compared the magnitude of effects in the scalar versus the group-based models, and did not find a major difference in magnitude between both models.

Finally, I want to address the common context across the three case studies in my thesis. I mentioned in my research design chapter how I analyse radical left support in the 2015-2017 period – a period defined by backlash against 'neoliberal' economic policies, including deregulation, austerity, and lower taxes. I suggested there how the radical left's economic policies, especially in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 'Great Recession', potentially draw support to radical left actors, or perhaps simply increase the salience of this issue amongst voters. Ultimately, I more consistently found economic policy-proximity to explain radical left support, compared to less consistent findings from the two non-economic dimensions.

My consistent observation of economic policy-proximity support for the radical left, across all three cases, reinforces the idea that the radical left has benefitted from its stridently redistributive and anti-austerity policies in this 2015-2017 environment. Looking to the future, and responses to the Covid-19 economic downturn, the radical left's strength may continue in response to imposed or maintained fiscal austerity. Alternately, state intervention in the economy may alleviate desires for this shift in policy, which may indicate a shrinking of the pool of potential radical left support.

7.2: Limitations

There have been points throughout my analysis where I have noted challenges and limitations. I want to emphasise these in relation to the case studies and their research designs, as well as touching briefly on the limitations of the theories.

The policy-proximity account assumes voters know their own position in policy spaces, and where competing political actors are located. This issue potentially has ramifications where these perceptions cause voters to incorrectly imagine themselves closer to or further from

where the radical left is located. These voters then give greater support to the radical left without close proximity, or lower support despite being close to the radical left's location. I would have consistently taken these perceptions into account, along the lines of the 'proximity groups' in the German case study; however, available data in the US and UK did not allow for this. The perceptions issue is potentially very important here, as I suggested it as a factor which may account for some of the unexpected US case study results. I also acknowledge the wider criticisms of the Downsian spatial model from Stokes (1963); however, I was not trying to argue that spatial explanations like my policy-proximity account are perfect or explain all support for the radical left.

The populism-based account, meanwhile, perhaps labours under the view that populism is a right-wing phenomenon. I mentioned this possibility briefly earlier, when listing potential reasons for not finding strong support for the populism-based account. Voters may simply identify only right-wing political actors as populist, and not associate populism with left-wing political actors at all. This potentially results in populist voters being attracted to right-wing political actors as populists rather than political actors on the left. The fact that all three case studies in my thesis also feature right-wing populist political actors – *AfD*, Donald Trump's presidential campaign, and UKIP – would support this, with these right-wing political actors drawing support from populist voters, instead of these voters following expectations. This is a possibility; however, it did not stop populism being associated with radical left support in the Netherlands (Akkerman, et al., 2014; 2017), where there is also a right-wing populist political party. Nevertheless, the impacts of the radical left's coexistence with radical right political actors is something which may have impacted on results here. Future research could potentially mitigate this, by examining support for a radical left political actor in a country where there is no major radical right competitor.

Looking to limitations in the three case studies, in the German case I find strongest support for the policy-proximity account. However, I speculated earlier how persuasion effects, which I had less control over here, are potentially behind the relative strength of the policy-proximity account here, compared to in the other two case studies. The limitation here is that I was not able to thoroughly account for these persuasion effects, because of the established nature of *Die Linke*. This can also be viewed as an advantage, however, as the resulting comparison

between cases where I could mitigate persuasion effects, and the German case where I could not, provides an impression of how these effects impact on radical left support.

A further limitation of the German case, in relation to available data, is the limited range of cultural policy questions. The GLES included only two measures of cultural policy – one relating to women in the workplace, and the other to same-sex marriage. I would have liked more questions relating to this policy dimension, in particular relating to law-and-order issues where opinion is more divided than the issue of same-sex marriage, where opinion is now overwhelmingly liberal in the GLES. Scales of cultural policy self-placement and *Die Linke* placement, like those of economics and migration, would also have been a welcome feature here, from which I could have formed 'proximity groups' on all three dimensions. These issues aside, I was still able to provide an account of radical left support in Germany from the available data.

The first limitation of the US case study was the lack of evaluation questions for Sanders in the CCES and ANES, which meant I relied instead on vote choice questions to gauge voters' support for the radical left. I mentioned these vote choice questions earlier and their disadvantage where background factors, such as candidate competitiveness, may also be present in responses to these questions. In the German and UK cases, I used evaluation questions instead, which are less susceptible to these background factors; however, this was not possible given the US survey data. The first limitation of this case, therefore, is that I could not use evaluation questions to measure radical left support in the US case study. I would have preferred to use these questions here too, both to mitigate these background factors and to be consistent across all three cases. A second limitation was the need to use two different surveys, with a lack of populism questions in the CCES but less data available in the ANES. The use of two surveys meant I was not able to include variables relating to both the policy-proximity and populism-based accounts in multiple regression at the end of my analysis. In both other case studies this was possible and left me an impression of the impacts of both theories with control on possible confounding between the two. Thirdly, the available data in the US also limited how far I could draw conclusions from the populism-based variables, given how few responses the ANES has relative to other surveys used in this thesis. Overall, my inclusion of the US case study was ambitious, given the differences of this case study from

its European counterparts. Although there have been issues with this, I was able to produce an account of radical left support here. Furthermore, results here conformed with my conclusions on populism, and partially conformed with the policy-proximity account on the economic policy dimension.

The UK case study faced fewer limitations from the voter-level data. The panel data design here relied on retention of questions relating to policy preferences, populist attitudes, and the dependent variable across different waves of data. This was possible in the desired 'pre-Corbyn' and 'post-Corbyn' way with the policy-proximity variables, which was important to my accounting for persuasion effects. Unfortunately, the available data in the UK did not allow for this to take place with the populism variables. This was a downside of the UK case study, but without populism questions in pre-Corbyn BES waves I could not address this.

These three case studies enable me to draw conclusions about policy-proximity and populism-based radical left support in three distinct contexts. This included a classic example of the radical left in Germany, a radical left candidacy in an intra-party election in the US, and a shifting radical left political party in the UK. Crucially, I have drawn a set of common conclusions from all three of these cases, which have pointed to proximity in policy spaces (particularly economics) offering a limited explanation of radical left support, and suggested that populism does not explain support for these actors. However, this does not mean my conclusions here apply across all radical left political actors, although these three case studies are an improvement in that regard compared to previous research which included more limited ranges of case studies.

7.3: Future Research

One of the important contributions of my thesis was dealing with persuasion effects. This may have had a significant impact here, as it was in the cases where I could more thoroughly separate persuasion effects that conclusions relating to the policy-proximity account were more mixed. Future research into policy-proximity and radical left support should similarly account for these persuasion effects, if they want to isolate the effects of policy-proximity and more accurately understand how this relates to radical left support. Panel data is particularly helpful here, given its ability to separate voters' policy preferences from the possible

persuasion of an extant radical left actor. However, I admit this is difficult when examining support for established radical left parties like *Die Linke*.

On that subject, another point I made in this thesis was that research should not merely consider support for established radical left political parties, like *Die Linke*. Future research should acknowledge that the radical left, and radicals in general, have not merely occurred in such established forms. I showed this in my thesis through focus on a radical left candidacy in the US, and on an established but leftward shifting party in the UK. Future research may follow here, with further examination of radicals in their wider forms.

In relation to both accounts of radical left support explored here, future research may re-examine the roles of policy-proximity and populism on support for the radical left. Future policy-proximity accounts may also look beyond the three dimensions in my thesis. Those three dimensions have long been prominent areas of political discussion, but in the future other areas may also be relevant. For example, environmental policy and membership of supranational unions may be policy areas where proximity with voters explains their electoral support.

Future applications of the populism-based account may also occur. This may take place along the lines I alluded to earlier, with focus on support for the radical left in a country without a radical right competitor potentially drawing off this support. This account may also be pursued in explanation of support for the radical left where these political actors have used more overtly populist rhetoric, as I suggested it may be in this instance that populism-based electoral support is found.

Finally, in relation to radical left support, I only considered two accounts here. Future research may revisit these, in particular applying them to explain support for the radical left in different and new case studies as I have done. Future research may also examine other possible explanations radical left support in these case studies, with the policy-proximity and populism-based accounts being far from the only potential explanations. For example, future research may follow up on the suggestions of Stokes (1963), including integration of valence issues to examine how far voter perceptions of competence or trust for the radical left impacted on their electoral support. I investigated this briefly in the UK case, as a potential explanation for unexpected results, but future research may carry out more dedicated testing

of these valence-type effects on radical left support. There may also be future research into support for Bernie Sanders in the US, perhaps with a comparison between support for Sanders in 2016 and for his later presidential campaign amongst a wider field of candidates in 2020.

Although I have demonstrated how far voter-actor policy-proximity and populist attitudes are related to radical left support, there are further avenues when seeking to answer the question of support for these political actors. As the radical left remains prominent in many countries, including the cases I have examined in this thesis, it also remains important to continue to explain how the radical left gains their substantial electoral support. I would go as far as to argue that continued research in this area is as important as the already plentiful attention given to the radical right.

<u>Bibliography</u>

Abedi, A., 2002. Challenges to established parties: The effects of party system features on the electoral fortunes of anti-political-establishment parties. *European Journal of Political Research,* Volume 41, p. 551–583.

Abel, A., 2018. *The rise of the radical left in America's Democratic Party.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.macleans.ca
[Accessed 6 February 2019].

Acemoglu, D., Egorov, G. & Sonin, K., 2013. A Political Theory of Populism. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics,* 128(2), pp. 771-805.

Achen, C. H. & Bartels, L. M., 2016. *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections do not Produce Responsive Government.* 1st ed. Princeton: Princeton University.

Achterberg, P., 2006. Class Voting in the New Political Culture: Economic, Cultural and Environmental Voting in 20 Western Countries. *International Sociology,* 21(2), pp. 237-261.

ACLU, 2018. *Congressional Scorecard,* s.l.: ACLU.

AFL-CIO, 2019. *Sen. Bernie Sanders.* [Online]
Available at: https://aflcio.org
[Accessed 6 February 2019].

Akkerman, A., Mudde, C. & Zaslove, A., 2013. How Populist Are the People? Measuring Populist Attitudes in Voters. *Comparative Political Studies,* 47(9), pp. 1324-1353.

Akkerman, A., Zaslove, A. & Spruyt, B., 2017. 'We the People' or 'We the Peoples'? A Comparison of Support for the Populist Radical Right and Populist Radical Left in the Netherlands. *Swiss Political Science Review,* 23(4), pp. 377-403.

Aldrich, J. H., 1983. A Downsian Spatial Model with Party Activism. *American Political Science Review*, 77(4), pp. 974-990.

Alonso, S. & Kaltwasser, C. R., 2015. Spain: No Country for the Populist Radical Right?. *South European Society and Politics*, 20(1), pp. 21-45.

Alternativ für Deutschland, 2017. *Manifesto for Germany: The Political Programme of Alternative for Germany*, s.l.: Alternative for Germany.

American National Election Studies, 2017. *2016 Time Series Study*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, and Stanford University.

Ansolabehere, S. & Schaffner, B. F., 2017. *Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 2016: Common Content*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.

Antunes, R., 2010. Theoretical Models of Voting Behaviour. *Exedra*, Volume 4, pp. 145-170.

Arzheimer, K., 2008. Protest, Neo-Liberalism or Anti-Immigrant Sentiment: What Motivates the Voters of the Extreme Right in Western Europe?. *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft*, 2(173).

Arzheimer, K., 2015. The AfD: Finally a Successful Right-Wing Populist Eurosceptic Party for Germany?. *West European Politics*, 38(3), pp. 535-556.

Arzheimer, K. & Carter, E., 2006. Political opportunity structures and right-wing extremist party success. *European Journal of Political Research*, 45(3), pp. 419-443.

Aslanidis, P., 2015. Is Populism an Ideology? A Refutation and a New Perspective. *Political Studies*, 64(1), pp. 88-104.

Backes, U., 1989. *Politischer Extremismus in demokratischen Verfassungsstaaten: Elemente einer normativen Rahmentheorie.* s.l.:Springer-Verlag.

Backes, U. & Moreau, P., 2008. *Communist and Post-Communist Parties in Europe.* 1st ed. s.l.:Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Baggini, J., 2016. *Jeremy Corbyn is a great populist. But that's no good for our democracy.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com
[Accessed 4 October 2018].

Barreto, M. et al., 2011. The Tea Party in the Age of Obama: Mainstream Conservatism or Out-Group Anxiety?. In: J. Go, ed. *Rethinking Obama (Political Power and Social Theory, Volume 22)* . s.l.:Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp. 105-137.

Barr, R. R., 2016. Populists, Outsiders, and Anti-Establishment Politics. *Party Politics,* 15(1), pp. 29-48.

Bartle, J. & Griffiths, D., 2002. Social-Psychological, Economic and Marketing Models of Voting Behaviour Compared. In: N. J. O'Shaughnessy & S. C. M. Henneberg, eds. *The Idea of Political Marketing.* s.l.:Greenwood Publishing Group, pp. 11-30.

Bastow, S., 1997. Front national economic policy: From neo-liberalism to protectionism. *Modern & Contemporary France,* 5(1), pp. 61-72.

Bélanger, É. & Meguid, B., 2008. Issue salience, issue ownership, and issue-based vote choice. *Electoral Studies,* Volume 27, pp. 477-491.

Bell, D. S. & Criddle, B., 1994. *The French Communist Party in the Fifth Republic.* 1st ed. s.l.:Clarendon Press.

Bell, T., 2019. *Age, rather than class, has come to determine how Britain votes.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com
[Accessed 7 July 2020].

Berenson, T., 2015. *Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders Spar on Capitalism in First Debate.* [Online]
Available at: http://time.com
[Accessed 9 January 2019].

Berger, M. M., Munger, M. C. & Potthoff, R. F., 2000. The Downsian Model Predicts Divergence. *Journal of Theoretical Politics,* 12(2), pp. 228-240.

Bergh, J., 2004. Protest Voting in Austria, Denmark, and Norway. *Scandinavian Political Studies,* 27(4), pp. 367-389.

Bernie Sanders Presidential Campaign, 2016. *Fighting for LGBT Equality.* [Online]
Available at: https://berniesanders.com
[Accessed 5 February 2019].

Bernie Sanders Presidential Campaign, 2016. *Income and Wealth Inequality.* [Online]
Available at: https://berniesanders.com
[Accessed 18 January 2019].

Bernie Sanders Presidential Campaign, 2016. *Making the Wealthy, Wall Street, and Large Corporations Pay their Fair Share.* [Online]
Available at: https://berniesanders.com
[Accessed 5 February 2019].

Bernie Sanders Presidential Campaign, 2016. *Medicare for All: Leaving No One Behind.* [Online]
Available at: https://berniesanders.com
[Accessed 18 January 2019].

Bernie Sanders Presidential Campaign, 2016. *Real Family Values.* [Online]
Available at: https://berniesanders.com
[Accessed 18 January 2019].

Bernie Sanders Presidential Campaign, 2016. *Reforming Wall Street.* [Online]
Available at: https://berniesanders.com
[Accessed 15 January 2019].

Betz, H.-G., 1993. The Two Faces of Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe. *The Review of Politics,* 55(4), pp. 663-686.

Betz, H.-G., 1994. *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe.* 1st ed. s.l.:Springer.

Betz, H.-G., 2002. Conditions Favouring the Success and Failure of Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Contemporary Democracies. In: S. Y. Mény Y., ed. *Democracies and the Populist Challenge.* London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 197-213.

Betz, H.-G., 2003. Xenophobia, Identity Politics and Exclusionary Populism in Western Europe. *Socialist Register,* Volume 39.

Billiet, J. & De Witte, H., 1995. Attitudinal Disposition to Vote for a Radical Right-Wing Party: the Case of 'Vlaams Blok'. *European Journal of Political Research,* 27(2), pp. 181-202.

Bird, K., Saalfeld, T. & Wüst, A. M., 2010. *The Political Representation of Immigrants and Minorities: Voters, Parties and Parliaments in Liberal Democracies.* 1st ed. Abingdon: Routledge.

Bjørklund, T. & Andersen, J. G., 2002. Anti-Immigration Parties in Denmark and Norway The Progress Parties and the Danish People's Party. In: Z. A. H. P. Schain M., ed. *Shadows over Europe. Europe In Transition: The Nyu European Studies Series.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 107-136.

Black, D. et al., 1958. *The Theory of Committees and Elections.* 1st ed. s.l.:s.n.

Blais, A. & Carty, R. K., 1991. The Psychological Impact of Electoral Laws: Measuring Duverger's Elusive Factor. *British Journal of Political Science,* 21(1), pp. 79-93.

Blake, A., 2017. *Elizabeth Warren and Donna Brazile both now agree the 2016 Democratic primary was rigged.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com
[Accessed 9 January 2019].

Blühdorn, I., 2009. Reinventing Green Politics: On the Strategic Repositioning of the German Green Party. *German Politics,* 18(1), pp. 36-54.

Boldrini, M., 2018. What's Left? Far-left Parties Changing in Contemporary Europe. *Studia Politica: Romanian Political Science Review,* 18(4), pp. 593-611.

Bos, L. & Brants, K., 2014. Populist rhetoric in politics and media: A longitudinal study of the Netherlands. *European Journal of Communication,* 29(6), pp. 703-719.

Bowyer, B. & Vail, M., 2011. Economic Insecurity, the Social Market Economy, and Support for the German Left. *West European Politics,* 32(4), pp. 683-705.

Bradner, E., 2015. *Sanders doesn't want billionaires' backing.* [Online]
Available at: https://edition.cnn.com
[Accessed 2 February 2019].

Brams, S., 2008. *The Presidential Election Game.* 2nd ed. Boca Raton, Florida: Taylor & Francis.

Bremer, B., 2017. *The crisis of the SPD: Where now for Germany's Social Democrats?,* London: LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog.

Brody, R. A. & Page, B. I., 1972. Comment: The Assessment of Policy Voting. *American Political Science Review,* 66(2), pp. 450-458.

Brownstein, R., 2019. *The Most Critical Argument Democrats Will Have in 2020.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.theatlantic.com
[Accessed 25 February 2020].

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2007. *Aufbruch zu neuer Gerechtigkeit!,* Nuremberg: s.n.

Burton-Cartledge, P., 2017. Class Politics and the Revenge of the Future. In: 1st, ed. *The Corbyn Effect.* London: Lawrence & Wishart, pp. 162-176.

Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E. & Stokes, D. E., 1960. *The American Voter.* 1st ed. s.l.:University of Chicago Press.

Campbell, R., 2018. Persistence and renewal: the German Left Party's journey from outcast to opposition. *Contemporary Politics,* 24(2), pp. 153-172.

Campbell, T. D., 2017. *Populism and Its Discontents: Populism on the American Left and Right During the 2016 Election Cycle ,* Waco, TX: Baylor University.

Canovan, M., 1999. Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy. *Political Studies,* 47(1), pp. 2-16.

Canto-Sperber, M., 2004. *Proudhon, the First Liberal Socialist.* Stanford University, The Gimeon Conference on French Political Economy 1650–1848.

Carmines, E. & Zeller, R., 1979. *Reliability and Validity Assessment.* Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

Carter, E., 2005. *Extreme Right in Western Europe: Success or Failure?.* 1st ed. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

CBS Democratic Primary Debate, Nov. 14 2015. *CBS Democratic Primary Debate.* s.l.: CBS.

Charalambous, G., 2011. All the shades of red: examining the radical left's Euroscepticism. *Comparative Politics,* 17(3), pp. 299-320.

Charalambous, G. & Lamprianou, I., 2017. The (non) particularities of West European radical left party supporters: comparing left party families. *European Political Science Review,* 9(3), p. 375–400.

Cho, S. & Endersby, J. W., 2003. Issues, the Spatial Theory of Voting, and British General Elections: A Comparison of Proximity and Directional Models. *Public Choice,* Volume 114, pp. 275-293.

Chozick, A., Confessore, N. & Barbaro, M., 2016. *Leaked Speech Excerpts Show a Hillary Clinton at Ease With Wall Street.* [Online]

Available at: https://www.nytimes.com
[Accessed 15 January 2019].

Clark, H. et al., 2011. Yes we can! Valence politics and electoral choice in America, 2008. *Electoral Studies*, 30(3), p. 450.

Clark, H., Sanders, D., Stewart, M. & Whiteley, P., 2004. Valence Politics. In: H. Clark, D. Sanders, M. Stewart & P. Whiteley, eds. *Political Choice in Britain.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 315-328.

Clark, H., Sanders, D., Stewart, M. & Whiteley, P., 2011. Valence Politics and Electoral Choice in Britain, 2010. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion, and Parties,* 21(2), pp. 237-253.

CNN, October 13th 2015. *CNN Democratic primary debate.* Las Vegas: CNN.

Coffé, H., 2004. *Can Extreme Right Voting be Explained Ideologically?.* s.l., ECPR Joint Sessions.

Cohen, N., 2017. *Don't tell me you weren't warned about Corbyn.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com
[Accessed 4 October 2018].

Condon, S., 2016. *Hillary Clinton: Single-payer health care will "never, ever" happen.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.cbsnews.com
[Accessed 18 January 2019].

Converse, P. E., 1964. The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics. In: D. Apter, ed. *Ideology and Discontent.* New York: Free Press, pp. 206-261.

Cook, C. D., 2016. *The Pragmatic Case for Bernie Sanders.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.theatlantic.com
[Accessed 7 December 2018].

Cowley, J., 2017. *The Labour reckoning.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.newstatesman.com
[Accessed 2 October 2018].

Cox Richardson, H., Cohen, M. & Edelstein, J. H., 2017. *Civil war has broken out inside the Democratic party. Does the future belong to the populist left or the centrists?.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com
[Accessed 21 February 2019].

Cuperus, R., 2003. *The populist deficiency of European social democracy,* London: Rethinking Social Democracy.

Curtice, J., September 2017. General Election 2017: A New Two-Party Politics?. *Political Insight.*

Cusack, B., Ferris, S. & Sullivan, P., 2016. *The Chaotic Fight for Obamacare.* [Online]
Available at: https://thehill.com
[Accessed 5 February 2019].

Dalton, R. J., 2000. Citizen Attitudes and Political Behavior. *Comparative Political Studies,* 33(6-7), pp. 912-940.

Dalton, R. J., Flanagan, S. C. & Beck, P. A., 1984. Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies. In: R. J. Dalton & S. C. Flanagan, eds. *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignmment.* s.l.:Princeton University Press, pp. 3-22.

de Lange, S. L. & Art, D., 2011. Fortuyn versus Wilders: An Agency-Based Approach to Radical Right Party Building. *West European Politics*, 34(6), pp. 1229-1249.

de Vries, C. & Edwards, E. E., 2009. Taking Europe to its Extremes: Extremist Parties and Public Euroscepticism. *Party Politics,* 15(1), p. 5–28.

de Vries, C. & van de Wardt, M., 2011. EU issue salience and domestic party competition. In: K. Oppermann & H. Vierhig, eds. *Issue Salience in International Politics.* Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 173-187.

Dean, J. & Maiguashca, B., 2017. Corbyn's Labour and the Populism Question. *Renewal,* 25(3/4 (double issue)).

Deeming, C. & Johnston, R., 2018. Coming together in a rightward direction: post-1980s changing attitudes to the British welfare state. *Quality & Quantity*, 52(1), p. 395–413.

Delaney, A. & Jamieson, D., 2018. *Amazon Called For Raising The Minimum Wage. Republicans Say It's Fine As It Is, Thanks..* [Online]
Available at: https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk
[Accessed 23 January 2019].

Denver, D., 1994. *Elections and Voting Behaviour in Britain.* 1st ed. s.l.:Prentice Hall.

Die Linke, 2011. *Programme of the Die Linke party*, s.l.: Die Linke.

Die Linke, 2017. *SOZIAL. GERECHT. FRIEDEN. FÜR ALLE,* Berlin: Die Linke.

Ditto, P. H. & Mastronarde, A. J., 2009. The paradox of the political maverick. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,* Volume 45, pp. 295-298.

Doerschler, P. & Banaszak, L. A., 2007. Voter support for the German PDS over time: Dissatisfaction, ideology, losers and east identity. *Electoral Studies,* 26(2), pp. 359-370.

Doran, J., 2017. An Antidote to Pasokification. In: M. Perryman, ed. *The Corbyn Effect.* London: Lawrence & Wishart, pp. 214-226.

Dostal, J. M., 2017. The German Federal Election of 2017: How the Wedge Issue of Refugees and Migration Took the Shine off Chancellor Merkel and Transformed the Party System. *The Political Quarterly,* 88(4), pp. 589-602.

Doukas, G., 1991. The thirteenth congress of the KKE: Defeat of the Renovators. *Journal of Communist Studies,* 7(3), pp. 393-398.

Dow, J., 1998. Directional and Proximity Models of Voter Choice in Recent US Presidential Elections. *Public Choice,* Volume 96, pp. 259-270.

Downs, A., 1957. An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy. *Journal of Political Economy,* 65(2), pp. 135-150.

Drake, B., 2014. *Polls show strong support for minimum wage hike.* [Online]
Available at: http://www.pewresearch.org
[Accessed 23 January 2019].

Dreier, P., 2017. *Bernie Sanders' Socialism Is as American as Apple Pie.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.huffingtonpost.com
[Accessed 4 February 2019].

Dunphy, R., 2004. *Contesting Capitalism? Left Parties and European Integration.* 1st ed. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Dunphy, R. & Bale, T., 2007. Red Flag Still Flying?: Explaining AKEL — Cyprus's Communist Anomaly. *Party Politics,* 13(3), pp. 287-304.

Dunphy, R. & Bale, T., 2011. The radical left in coalition government: Towards a comparative measurement of success and failure. *Party Politics 2011,* 17(4), pp. 488-504.

Duverger, M., 1954. *Political Parties.* London: Methuen.

Dyson, K. H. F., 1975. Left-wing Political Extremism and the Problem of Tolerance in Western Germany. *Government and Opposition,* 10(3), pp. 306-331.

Eatwell, R., 2003. Ten Theories of the Extreme Right. In: P. H. Merkl & L. Weinberg, eds. *Right-Wing Extremism in the Twenty-First Century.* London: Frank Cass Publishers, pp. 47-73.

Eatwell, R., 2016. The Extreme Right and British Exceptionalism: The Primacy of Politics. In: P. Hainsworth, ed. *The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the Mainstream.* s.l.:Bloomsbury Publishing, pp. 172-192.

Edsall, T. B., 2019. *The Democratic Party Is Actually Three Parties.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.nytimes.com
[Accessed 3 July 2020].

Edwards, C., 2017. *Margaret Thatcher's Privatization Legacy,* s.l.: Cato Institute.

Eggers, A. C. & Vivyan, N., 2020. Who Votes More Strategically?. *American Political Science Review,* 114(2), p. 470–485.

Ehrenfreund, M. & DePillis, L., 2015. *How the $15 minimum wage could become a new dividing line in the 2016 primary.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com
[Accessed 23 January 2019].

Eith, U., 2003. Die Republikaner in Baden-Wurttemberg: Mehr als nur populistischer Protest. In: N. Werz, ed. *Populismus: Populisten in Ubersee und Europa.* s.l.:s.n., pp. 243-261.

Endersby, J. & Galatas, S., 1998. British parties and spatial competition: Dimensions of party evaluation in the 1992 election. *Public Choice,* 97(3), p. 363–382.

Enelow, J. & Hinich, M., 1982. Ideology, Issues, and the Spatial Theory of Elections. *American Political Science Review,* 76(3), pp. 493-501.

Enelow, J. & Hinich, M., 1984. *The Spatial Theory of Voting: An Introduction.* 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Engler, M., 2017. Naming Our Desire: How do we talk about socialism in America?. *Dissent,* 64(4), pp. 64-74.

Eskow, R., 2015. *5 Reasons Glass-Steagall Matters.* [Online]
Available at: https://berniesanders.com
[Accessed 15 January 2019].

Evans, G. & Chzhen, K., 2016. Beyond Valence: Estimating Models of Party Choice Without Resort to Ecological Fallacy or Unfounded Causal Assumptions. A Reply to Whiteley et al.. *Political Science Research and Methods,* 4(1), pp. 241-247.

Evans, G. & Chzhen, K., 2016. Re-evaluating the Valence Model of Political Choice. *Political Science Research and Methods*, 4(1), pp. 199-220.

Evans, G., Heath, A. & Lalljee, M., 1996. Measuring Left-Right and Libertarian-Authoritarian Values in the British Electorate. *The British Journal of Sociology,* 47(1), pp. 93-112.

Evans, G. & Northmore-Ball, K., 2018. Long-Term Factors: Class and Religious Cleavages. In: J. Fisher, et al. eds. *The Routledge Handbook of Elections, Voting Behaviour, and Public Opinion.* London: Routledge, pp. 123-135.

Evans, G. & Tilley, J., 2012. The Depoliticization of Inequality and Redistribution: Explaining the Decline of Class Voting. *The Journal of Politics,* 74(4), pp. 963-976.

Evans, J. A. J., 2004. *Voters & Voting.* 1st ed. London: Sage Publications Ltd.

Fagerholm, A., 2015. What is left for the radical left? A comparative examination of the policies of radical left parties in western Europe before and after 1989. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies,* 25(1), pp. 16-40.

Falter, J. W. & Schumann, S., 1988. Affinity towards right-wing extremism in Western Europe. *West European Politics,* 11(2), pp. 96-110.

FeelTheBern.Org, 2019. *Bernie Sanders on Corporate Regulation.* [Online]
Available at: http://feelthebern.org
[Accessed 5 February 2019].

Fieldhouse, E. et al., 2017. *British Election Study Internet Panel Waves 1-13,* s.l.: British Election Study.

Fielding, S., 2017. *The Labour Party: Continuity and Change in the Making of 'New' Labour.* s.l.:Macmillan International Higher Education.

Fiorina, M., 1981. *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections.* 1st ed. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Flores, R., 2016. *Where Hillary Clinton stands on gun control.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.cbsnews.com
[Accessed 5 February 2019].

Foran, C., 2016. *Bernie Sanders's Big Money.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.theatlantic.com
[Accessed 6 February 2019].

Ford, R. & Goodwin, M., 2014. *Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain.* 1st ed. s.l.:Routledge.

Forrester, K., 2019. *The crisis of liberalism: why centrist politics can no longer explain the world.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com
[Accessed 27 July 2020].

Franklin, M., 1985. Assessing the Rise of Issue Voting in British Elections since 1964. *Electoral Studies,* 4(1), pp. 37-56.

Franzosi, P., Marone, F. & Salvati, E., 2015. Populism and Euroscepticism in the Italian Five Star Movement. *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs,* 50(2), pp. 109-124.

Freeden, M., 1998. Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?. *Political Studies,* 46(4), pp. 748-765.

Freedland, J., 2017. *Copeland shows Corbyn must go. But only Labour's left can remove him.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com
[Accessed 4 October 2018].

Gabbatt, A., 2018. *Lean left: is America ready for a wave of Bernie Sanders-inspired socialists?.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com
[Accessed 7 December 2018].

Gambino, L., 2015. *Hillary Clinton promises 'path to full and equal citizenship' in Latino address.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com
[Accessed 6 March 2019].

Gamble, A., 1989. The Politics of Thatcherism. *Parliamentary Affairs,* 42(3), pp. 350-361.

Gelman, A. & Hill, J., 2007. *Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Models.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gemenisa, K. & Dinas, E., 2010. Confrontation still? Examining parties' policy positions in Greece. *Comparative European Politics,* 8(2), pp. 179-201.

Ghilarducci, T., 2018. *Republicans' Public Opposition To Social Security And Medicare.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.forbes.com
[Accessed 18 January 2019].

Giddens, A., 2010. *Anthony Giddens: The rise and fall of New Labour.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.newstatesman.com
[Accessed 28 January 2020].

Gigerenzer, G., 2010. *Rationality for mortals: How people cope with uncertainty..* 1st ed. New York: Oxford University Press.

Gilbert, J., 2017. The Absolute Corbyn. In: 1st, ed. *The Corbyn Effect.* London: Lawrence & Wishart, pp. 35-53.

Gingrich, J. & Häusermann, S., 2015. The decline of the working-class vote, the reconfiguration of the welfare support coalition and consequences for the welfare state. *Journal of European Social Policy,* 25(1), pp. 50-75.

Givens, T., 2005. *Voting Radical Right in Western Europe.* 1st ed. s.l.:Cambridge University Press.

Golder, M., 2003. Explaining Variation In The Success Of Extreme Right Parties In Western Europe. *Comparative Political Studies,* 36(4), pp. 432-466.

Gold, M. & Narayanswamy, A., 2016. *How mega-donors helped raise $1 billion for Hillary Clinton.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com
[Accessed 6 February 2019].

Gomez, R., Morales, L. & Ramiro, L., 2016. Varieties of Radicalism: Examining the Diversity of Radical Left Parties and Voters in Western Europe. *West European Politics,* 39(2), pp. 351-379.

Goodwyn, L., 1976. *Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America.* 1st ed. New York: Oxford University Press.

Goodwyn, L., 1978. *The Populist Moment: A Short History of the Agrarian Revolt in America.* 1st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gordon, J., 2016. *Bernie Sanders vs. Hillary Clinton: On the Issues.* 1st ed. s.l.:OnTheIssues.org.

Gougou, F. & Sauger, N., 2017. The 2017 French Election Study (FES 2017): a post-electoral cross-sectional survey. *French Politics,* Volume 15, pp. 360-370.

Graham, L., 2015. *Bernie Sanders files bill to legalize marijuana.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.cnbc.com
[Accessed 5 February 2019].

Gramlich, J., 2016. *Views of health care law break sharply along partisan lines.* [Online]
Available at: http://www.pewresearch.org
[Accessed 23 January 2019].

Green Party of Germany, 2019. *We argue for acceptance, diversity and self-determination.*
[Online]
Available at: https://www.gruene.de
[Accessed 12 August 2019].

Green Party of Germany, 2019. *We create clear rules in drug policy instead of criminalizing it.*
[Online]
Available at: https://www.gruene.de
[Accessed 12 August 2019].

Green Party of Germany, 2019. *We design our immigration country.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.gruene.de
[Accessed 12 August 2019].

Green Party of Germany, 2019. *We fight for free media and diverse culture.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.gruene.de
[Accessed 12 August 2019].

Green Party of Germany, 2019. *We finally create equal rights and equal pay.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.gruene.de
[Accessed 12 August 2019].

Green Party of Germany, 2019. *We Share Prosperity more Equitably.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.gruene.de
[Accessed 29 September 2019].

Green Party of Germany, 2019. *We strengthen inclusion.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.gruene.de
[Accessed 12 August 2019].

Green Party of Germany, 2019. *We Strengthen our Economy.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.gruene.de
[Accessed 29 September 2019].

Greenwald, A. et al., 2009. Implicit Race Attitudes Predicted Vote in the 2008 U.S.
Presidential Election. *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy,* 9(1), pp. 241-253.

Grossmann, M. & Hopkins, D. A., 2016. *Asymmetric Politics: Ideological Republicans and Group Interest Democrats.* 1st ed. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Gschwend, T., 2007. Ticket-splitting and strategic voting under mixed electoral rules:
Evidence from Germany. *European Journal of Political Research,* Volume 46, pp. 1-23.

Guadiano, N., 2016. *Bernie Sanders defied expectations with long-shot presidential campaign.*
[Online]

Available at: https://eu.usatoday.com
[Accessed 7 December 2018].

Guiat, C., 2005. *The French and Italian Communist Parties.* 1st ed. London: Frank Cass Publishers.

Hainsworth, P., 2004. The extreme right in France: the rise and rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen's front nationa. *Representation,* 40(2), pp. 101-114.

Hainsworth, P., 2008. *The Extreme Right in Western Europe.* 1st ed. Abingdon: Routledge.

Hainsworth, P., 2016. The Front National: From Ascendency to Fragmentation on the French Extreme Right. In: P. Hainsworth, ed. *The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the Mainstream.* 1st ed. s.l.:Bloomsbury, pp. 18-32.

Halperin, S. & Heath, O., 2012. *Political Research: Methods and Practical Skills.* 1st ed. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hanley, D., 2017. Left and Centre-Left in France—Endgame or Renewal?. *Parliamentary Affairs,* 71(3), p. 521–537.

Harrison, L. & Startin, N., 2001. *Political Research: An Introduction.* 1st ed. s.l.:Routledge.

Harrop, F., 2016. *Obamacare Under President Hillary Clinton.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.realclearpolitics.com
[Accessed 5 February 2019].

Hartleb, F., 2015. Here to stay: anti-establishment parties in Europe. *European View,* 14(1), pp. 39-49.

Hawkins, K. A. & Kaltwasser, C. R., 2018. Measuring Populist Discourse in the United States and Beyond. *Nature Human Behaviour,* 2(241-242).

Heing, B., 2018. *Democrats have run from 'socialism' — while embracing socialist policies.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com
[Accessed 1 February 2019].

Heiss, R. & Matthes, J., 2017. Who 'likes' populists? Characteristics of adolescents following right-wing populist actors on Facebook. *Information, Communication, and Society,* 20(9), pp. 1408-1424.

Hellwig, T., 2014. The Structure of Issue Voting in Postindustrial Democracies. *The Sociological Quarterly,* 55(4), pp. 596-624.

Hernandez, E., 2018. Democratic discontent and support for mainstream and challenger parties: Democratic protest voting. *European Union Politics,* 19(3), p. 458–480.

Hernandez, E. & Kriesi, H., 2015. The electoral consequences of the financial and economic crisis in Europe. *European Journal of Political Research,* 55(2), pp. 203-224.

Heyne, L., 2019. Democratic Demand and Supply: a Spatial Model Approach to Satisfaction with Democracy. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion, and Parties*, 29(3), pp. 381-401.

Hiltzik, M., 2019. *They tried to call FDR and the New Deal 'socialist' too. Here's how he responded.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.latimes.com
[Accessed 14 March 2019].

Hinich, M., 1976. *Equilibrium in Spatial Voting: The Median Voter Result is an Artifact*, Pasadena, California: California Institute of Technology: Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences .

Hinich, M. & Pollard, W., 1981. A New Approach to the Spatial Theory of Electoral Competition. *American Journal of Political Science,* 25(2), pp. 323-341.

Hobolt, S., 2018. Brexit and the 2017 UK General Election. *Journal of Common Market Studies.*

Holbolt, S., 2016. The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent. *Journal of European Public Policy,* 23(9), pp. 1259-1277.

Hooghe, L., Marks, G. & Wilson, C. J., 2002. Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?. *Comparative Political Studies,* 35(8), pp. 965-989.

Hopkins, D., 2016. *Why Sanders Does Better With Independents.* [Online]
Available at: https://fivethirtyeight.com
[Accessed 25 March 2019].

Hotelling, H., 1929. Stability in Competition. *The Economic Journal,* 39(153), pp. 41-57.

Hough, D. & Koß, M., 2009. Populism Personified or Reinvigorated Reformers? The German Left Party in 2009 and Beyond. *German Politics and Society,* 27(2), pp. 76-91.

HRC, 2018. *Congressional Scorecard*, s.l.: HRC.

Hudson, K., 2015. The Radical Left in Britain. *Socialism and Democracy,* 29(3), pp. 147-157.

Ignazi, P., 1992. The silent counter-revolution: Hypotheses on the emergence of extreme right-wing parties in Europe. *European Journal of Political Research,* 22(1), pp. 3-34.

Ignazi, P., 2003. *Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe.* 1st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Inglehart, R., 1971. The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies. *American Political Science Review,* 65(4).

Inglehart, R., 1977. *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics.* 1st ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, R., 2007. Postmaterialist Values and the Shift from Survival to Self-Expression Values. In: R. J. Dalton & H. Klingemann, eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Inglehart, R., 2018. Chapter 2. The Rise Of Postmaterialist Values. In: R. Inglehart, ed. *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 66-103.

Inglehart, R. F. & Norris, P., 2016. *Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash,* s.l.: Harvard Kennedy School (Working Paper No. RWP16-026).

Inglehart, R. & Norris, P., 2000. The Developmental Theory of the Gender Gap: Women's and Men's Voting Behavior in Global Perspective. *International Political Science Review,* 21(4), pp. 441-463.

Inglehart, R. & Welzel, C., 2005. *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ivarsflaten, E., 2002. *The Populist Centre-Authoritarian Challenge: A Revised Account of the Radical Right's Success in Western Europe.,* Oxford: Nuffield College Working Papers.

Jacobs, B., 2015. *Hillary Clinton's views evolve on gay marriage, just in time for presidential campaign.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com
[Accessed 5 February 2019].

Jacobs, K., Akkerman, A. & Zaslove, A., 2018. The voice of populist people? Referendum preferences, practices and populist attitudes. *Acta Politica,* Volume 53, p. 517–541.

Jacoby, W. G., 2009. Ideology and vote choice in the 2004 election. *Electoral Studies,* Volume 28, pp. 584-594.

Jamieson, D., 2018. *Democrats To Prioritize $15 Federal Minimum Wage With House Takeover.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk
[Accessed 23 January 2019].

Jansen, R. S., 2011. Populist Mobilization: A New Theoretical Approach to Populism. *Sociological Theory,* 29(2), pp. 75-96.

Jensen, T., 2013. *Clinton could be unstoppable if she runs in 2016.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.publicpolicypolling.com
[Accessed 21 February 2019].

Jessee, S. A., 2009. Spatial Voting in the 2004 Presidential Election. *American Political Science Review,* 103(1), pp. 59-81.

Jessee, S. A., 2010. Partisan Bias, Political Information and Spatial Voting in the 2008 Presidential Election. *The Journal of Politics,* 72(2), pp. 327-340.

Jessee, S. A., 2012. *Ideology and Spatial Voting in American Elections.* 1st ed. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Jones, O., 2016. *Polling and Labour's Prospects.* [Online]
Available at: https://medium.com
[Accessed 4 October 2018].

Jones, O., 2017. *Last Words on the Labour Leadership.* [Online]
Available at: https://medium.com
[Accessed 4 October 2018].

Kachel, T., 2012. The British Left at the End of the New Labour Era - An Electoral Analysis. In: B. Daiber, C. Hildebrandt & A. Striethorst, eds. *From Revolution to Coalition - Radical Left Parties in Europe.* Berlin: Rosa-Luxemburg-Foundation, pp. 79-92.

Kalyvas, S. & Marantzidis, N., 2002. Greek Communism, 1968-2001. *East European Politics and Societies: and Cultures,* 16(3), pp. 665-690.

Kamarck, E. & Podkul, A. R., 2018. *What's happening to the Democratic Party?.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.brookings.edu
[Accessed 7 December 2018].

Kaplan, J. & Weinberg, L., 1999. *The Emergence of a Euro-American Radical Right.* 1st ed. s.l.:Rutgers University Press.

Kappe, R., 2015. *The political psychology of UKIP: Personality factors, authoritarianism and support for right-wing populist parties in Britain.,* London: University College London.

Kaufmann, E., 2017. Levels or changes?: Ethnic context, immigration and the UK Independence Party vote. *Electoral Studies,* Volume 48, pp. 57-69.

Kaufmann, E., 2017. Why Values, not Economics, Hold the Key to the Populist Right - and to Crafting New Migration Narratives. In: M. a. M. K. S. McAuliffe, ed. *Ideas to Inform International Cooperation on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.* Geneva: IOM.

Kawalerowicz, J., 2017. *Too many immigrants: What shapes perceptions and attitudes towards immigrants in England and Wales?,* Linköping: Linköping University.

Kehrberg, J. E., 2015. The demand side of support for radical right parties. *Comparative Political Studies,* 13(5), pp. 553-576.

Keith, D. & Charalambous, G., 2016. On the (non) distinctiveness of Marxism-Leninism: The Portuguese and Greek communist parties compared. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies,* Volume 49, pp. 147-161.

Kioupkiolis, A., 2016. Podemos: the ambiguous promises of left-wing populism in contemporary Spain. *Journal of Political Ideologies,* 21(2), pp. 99-210.

Kioupkiolis, A. & Katsambekis, G., 2018. Radical Left Populism from the Margins to the Mainstream: A Comparison of Syriza and Podemos. In: B. M. García Agustín Ó., ed. *Podemos and the New Political Cycle.* s.l.:Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 201-226.

Kitschelt, H., 1988. Left Libertarian Parties: Explaining Innovation in Competitive Party Systems. *World Politics*, 40(2), pp. 194-234.

Kitschelt, H., 1992. The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe. *Politics & Society*, 20(1), pp. 7-50.

Kitschelt, H. & McGann, A., 1995. *The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis.* 1st ed. s.l.:University of Michigan Press.

Kitschelt, H. & Rehm, P., 2014. Occupations as a Site of Political Preference Formation. *Comparative Political Studies*, 47(12), pp. 1670-1706.

KKE Central Committee, 2017. *Declaration of the Central Committee of the KKE on the 100th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.* [Online]
Available at: https://inter.kke.gr
[Accessed 10 March 2020].

Klein, E., 2015. *Bernie Sanders and Hillary Clinton's debate over capitalism, explained.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.vox.com
[Accessed 9 January 2019].

Klönne, A., 1989. Aufstand der Modernisierungsopfer. *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik,* 34(5), p. 545–8.

Klug, A., Rees, E. & Schneider, J., 2016. Momentum: a New Kind of Politics. *Renewal: a Journal of Labour Politics*, 24(2), pp. 36-44.

Knigge, P., 1998. The ecological correlates of right-wing extremism in Western Europe. *European Journal of Political Research*, 34(2), p. 249–279.

Knight, S., 2016. *Enter Left: The New Yorker.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.newyorker.com
[Accessed 10 October 2018].

Kodjak, A., 2016. *Platform Check: Trump And Clinton On Health Care.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.npr.org
[Accessed 18 January 2019].

Kotler-Berkowitz, L. A., 2001. Religion and Voting Behaviour in Great Britain: A Reassessment. *British Journal of Political Science,* 31(3), pp. 523-554.

Kotz, D. M., 2009. The Financial and Economic Crisis of 2008: A Systemic Crisis of Neoliberal Capitalism. *Review of Radical Political Economics*, 41(3), pp. 305-317.

Kriesi, H., 2014. The Populist Challenge. *West European Politics*, 32(2), pp. 361-378.

Kruse, M., 2015. *14 things Bernie Sanders has said about socialism.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.politico.com
[Accessed 4 February 2019].

Kuklinski, J. H., Metlay, D. S. & Kay, W. D., 1982. Citizen Knowledge and Choices on the Complex Issue of Nuclear Energy. *American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Nov., 1982), pp. 615-642*, 26(4), pp. 615-642.

Lane, S., 2018. *Bernie Sanders introduces bill to break up big banks.* [Online]
Available at: https://thehill.com
[Accessed 5 February 2019].

Lanoue, D. J., 1994. Retrospective and Prospective Voting in Presidential-Year Elections. *Political Research Quarterly,* 47(1), pp. 193-205.

Laver, M. & Garry, J., 2000. Estimating Policy Positions from Political Texts. *American Journal of Political Science,* 44(3), pp. 619-634.

Le Blanc, P., 2003. The Absence of Socialism in the United States: Contextualising Kautsky's 'American Worker'. *Historical Materialism,* 11(4), pp. 125-170.

League of Conservation Voters, 2019. *National Environmental Scorecard: Senator Bernie Sanders.* [Online]
Available at: http://scorecard.lcv.org
[Accessed 6 February 2019].

Leibovich, M., 2007. *The Socialist Senator.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.nytimes.com
[Accessed 1 February 2019].

Levin, H. M. & Kelley, C., 1994. Can Education Do It Alone?. *Economics of Education Review,* 13(2), pp. 97-108.

Lewis, J. B., 2019. *DW-NOMINATE plot - 116th Congress: Voteview.* [Online]
Available at: https://voteview.com
[Accessed 6 February 2019].

Loew, N. & Faas, T., 2019. Between Thin- and Host-ideologies: How Populist Attitudes Interact with Policy Preferences in Shaping Voting Behaviour. *Representation,* 55(4), pp. 493-511.

Lubbers, M., Gijsberts, M. & Scheepers, P., 2002. Extreme Right-Wing Voting in Western Europe. *European Journal of Political Research,* Volume 41, p. 345–378.

Lubbers, M. & Scheepers, P., 2000. Individual and Contextual Characteristics of the German Extreme Right Vote in the 1990s: A Test of Complementary Theories. *European Journal of Political Research,* Volume 38, pp. 63-94.

Lubbers, M. & Scheepers, P., 2002. The Front National vote from a macro and micro perspective. *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* 25(1), pp. 120-149.

Lubbers, M., Scheepers, P. & Billiet, J., 2000. Multilevel modelling of the Vlaams Blok voting: Individual and contextual characteristics of the Vlaams Blok vote. *Acta Politica,* 35(4), p. 363–98.

Lupia, A. & McCubbins, M. D., 1998. *The Democratic Dilemma.* 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Luther, K. R., 2011. Of goals and own goals: A case study of right-wing populist party strategy for and during incumbency. *Party Politics,* 17(4), p. 453–470.

Lyon, G., 2019. Working Conditions, Workers' Rights, and Candidate Preference in the 2016 Democratic Primary. *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 83(4), pp. 805-816.

MacDonald, S. E., Rabinowitz, G. & Listhaug, O., 1988. On Attempting to Rehabilitate the Proximity Model: Sometimes the Patient Just Can't be Helped. *Journal of Politics,* 60(3), pp. 653-690.

Macdonald, S. E., Rabinowitz, G. & Listhaug, O., 2001. Sophistry versus Science: On Further Efforts to Rehabilitate the Proximity Model. *The Journal of Politics,* 63(2), pp. 482-500.

Mair, P., 1998. *Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations.* 1st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mair, P., 2013. *Ruling the Void.* s.l.:Verso.

Mann, N., 2003. *Foot's Message of Hope to Left: BBC News.* [Online]
Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk
[Accessed 13 November 2018].

Manza, J. & Brooks, C., 1997. The Religious Factor in U.S. Presidential Elections, 1960–1992. *American Journal of Sociology,* 103(1), pp. 38-81.

March, L., 2007. From Vanguard of the Proletariat to Vox Populi: Left-populism as a 'Shadow' of Contemporary Socialism. *SAIS Review of International Affairs,* 27(1).

March, L., 2008. *Contemporary Far Left Parties in Europe: From Marxism to the Mainstream?,* Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Internat. Policy Analysis, Div. for Internat. Dialogue.

March, L., 2012. Problems and perspectives of contemporary European radical left parties: Chasing a lost world or still a world to win?. *International Critical Thought,* 2(3), pp. 314-339.

March, L., 2012. *Radical Left Parties in Europe.* 1st ed. Abingdon: Routledge.

March, L., 2017. Left and Right Populism Compared: The British Case. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations,* 19(2), pp. 282-303.

March, L. & Keith, D., 2018. *Corbynite Populism or a New 'Socialism of the Heart'?.* Cardiff, Political Studies Association.

March, L. & Mudde, C., 2005. What's Left of the Radical Left? The European Radical Left After 1989: Decline and Mutation. *Comparative European Politics,* 3(1), p. 23–49.

March, L. & Rommerskirchen, C., 2015. Out of left field? Explaining the variable electoral success of European radical left parties. *Party Politics,* 21(1), pp. 40-53.

Mason, P., 2012. *Greece: Trying to understand Syriza.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk
[Accessed 2 April 2020].

Mason, R., 2015. *Cameron says Tories' £25bn spending cuts are necessary and reasonable.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com
[Accessed 17 October 2018].

Mather, R. D. & Jefferson, K. W., May 2016. The Authoritarian Voter? The Psychology and Values of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders Support. *Journal of Scientific Psychology,* pp. 1-7.

Mayer, N., 1998. The front national vote in the plural. *Patterns of Prejudice,* 32(1), pp. 3-24.

Mayer, N., 1999. *Ces Français qui votent FN.* Paris: Flammarian.

Mayer, N., 2005. *Radical Right Populism in France: How much of the 2002 Le Pen votes does populism explain?.* Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Centre for the Study of European Politics and Society.

Mazzoleni, O. & Ivaldi, G., 2020. Economic Populist Sovereignism and Electoral Support for Radical Right-Wing Populism. *Political Studies.*

McAllister, I. & Kelly, J., 1982. Class, ethnicity, and voting behaviour in Australia. *Politics,* 17(2), pp. 96-107.

McCarthy, J., 2015. *In U.S., Socialist Presidential Candidates Least Appealing.* [Online]
Available at: https://news.gallup.com
[Accessed 1 February 2019].

McGann, A. & Kitschelt, H., 2005. The Radical Right in the Alps: Evolution of Support for the Swiss SVP and Austrian FPÖ. *Party Politics,* 11(2), pp. 147-171.

McGowan, F. & Keith, D., 2016. The Radical Left and immigration: Resilient or Acquiescent in the Face of the Radical Right?. In: L. March & D. Keith, eds. *Europe's Radical Left: From Marginality to the Mainstream.* London: Rowman & Littlefield International, pp. 89-111.

Meguid, B. M., 2005. Competition Between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success. *American Political Science Review,* 99(3), pp. 347-359.

Mellon, J. et al., 2018. Brexit or Corbyn? Campaign and Inter-Election Vote Switching in the 2017 UK General Election. *Parliamentary Affairs,* Volume 71, pp. 719-737.

Mény, Y. & Surel, Y., 2002`. The Constitutive Ambiguity of Populism. In: Y. Mény & Y. Surel, eds. *Democracies and the Populist Challenge.* London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1-21.

Merrill, S., 1994. A Probabilistic Model for the Spatial Distribution of Party Support in Multiparty Electorates. *Journal of the American Statistical Association,* Volume 428, pp. 1190-1197.

Miliband, D., 2016. *New Times: David Miliband on why the left needs to move forward, not back.* [Online]

Available at: https://www.newstatesman.com
[Accessed 2 October 2018].

Miller, W. E., 1991. Party Identification, Realignment, and Party Voting: Back to the Basics. *American Political Science Review*, 85(2), pp. 557-568.

Min Kim, S., 2015. *Sanders and immigration? It's complicated.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.politico.com
[Accessed 6 March 2019].

Minkenberg, M., 2000. The Renewal of the Radical Right: Between Modernity and Anti-modernity. *Government and Opposition,* 35(2), pp. 170-188.

Moffitt, B. & Tormey, S., 2013. Rethinking Populism: Politics, Mediatisation and Political Style. *Political Studies,* 62(2), pp. 381-397.

Momentum, 2018. *About: Where we Stand on Society.* [Online]
Available at: https://peoplesmomentum.com
[Accessed 22 October 2018].

Moschonas, G., 2001. The path of modernization: PASOK and European Integration. *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans,* 3(1), pp. 11-24.

Motel, S., 2015. *Opinions on Obamacare remain divided along party lines as Supreme Court hears new challenge.* [Online]
Available at: http://www.pewresearch.org
[Accessed 23 January 2019].

Mudde, C., 1999. The single-issue party thesis: Extreme right parties and the immigration issue. *West European Politics,* 22(3), pp. 182-197.

Mudde, C., 2000. *The Ideology of the Extreme Right.* 1st ed. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Mudde, C., 2004. The Populist Zeitgeist. *Government and Opposition,* 39(4), pp. 541-563.

Mudde, C., 2007. *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.* 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mudde, C., 2010. The Populist Radical Right: A Pathological Normalcy. *West European Politics,* 33(6), pp. 1167-1186.

Mudde, C., 2017. *SYRIZA: The Failure of the Populist Promise.* 1st ed. s.l.:Palgrave Macmillan.

Mudde, C. & Kaltwasser, C. R., 2018. Studying Populism in Comparative Perspective: Reflections on the Contemporary and Future Research Agenda. *Comparative Political Studies,* 51(13), pp. 1667-1693.

Mungui-Pippidi, A. & Krastev, I., 2004. *Nationalism after communism : lessons learned.* 1st ed. s.l.:Central European University Press.

NARAL, 2017. *2017 Congressional Record on Choice,* s.l.: NARAL.

Neporent, L., 2013. *Obamacare Explained (Like You're An Idiot).* [Online]
Available at: https://abcnews.go.com
[Accessed 14 March 2019].

Newport, F., 2018. *Democrats More Positive About Socialism Than Capitalism.* [Online]
Available at: https://news.gallup.com
[Accessed 4 February 2019].

NHLA, 2014. *National Hispanic Leadership Agenda Congressional Scorecard 113th Congress,* s.l.:
NHLA.

Nilsson, M., 2018. *Presumptions about Populism in the Press,* Uppsala: Uppsala University.

Norris, P., 2005. *Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market.* 1st ed. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.

Novack, J., 2016. *Sanders Plan Raises Taxes $15 Trillion, Slams Capital Gains And Charitable
Giving Of Rich.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.forbes.com
[Accessed 15 January 2019].

Oberlander, J., 2010. Long Time Coming: Why Health Reform Finally Passed. *Health Affairs,*
29(6).

Odell, M., 2015. *Bookmakers fear losses as long-shot Corbyn breaks betting records: Financial Times.*
[Online]
Available at: https://www.ft.com
[Accessed 11 November 2020].

Office of Hillary Rodham Clinton, 2019. *Health Care.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.hillaryclinton.com
[Accessed 5 February 2019].

Oliver, J. E. & Rahn, W. M., 2016. Rise of the Trumpenvolk: Populism in the 2016 Election.
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 667(1), pp. 189-206.

OnTheIssues.Org, 2019. *Hillary Clinton/Bernie Sanders on Abortion.* [Online]
Available at: http://www.ontheissues.org
[Accessed 5 February 2019].

OpenSecrets.Org, 2017. *2016 Presidential Race/Bernie Sanders (D).* [Online]
Available at: https://www.opensecrets.org
[Accessed 6 February 2019].

Otjes, S. & Louwerse, T., 2015. Populists in Parliament: Comparing Left-Wing and Right-
Wing Populism in the Netherlands. *Political Studies,* 63(1), pp. 60-79.

Page, S., 2019. Jeremy Corbyn and the war machine: Assemblage and affect in the 2015 UK Labour Party Leadership Contest. *EPC: Politics and Space*, pp. 1-19.

Palfrey, T. R. & Poole, K. T., 1987. The Relationship between Information, Ideology, and Voting Behavior. *American Journal of Political Science*, 31(3), pp. 511-530.

Pankowski, R., 2010. *The Populist Radical Right in Poland.* 1st ed. s.l.:Routledge.

Pantazopoulos, A., 2016. *Populism or National-Populism? A Critical Approach to Cas Mudde's Perspective on SYRIZA's Populism: TELOS.* [Online]
Available at: http://www.telospress.com
[Accessed 7 September 2018].

Pappas, T., 2015. Greek Populism: A Political Drama in Five Acts: European Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession. In: H. Kriesi & T. S. Pappas, eds. *Populism in the shadow of the great recession.* Colchester: ECPR Press, p. 181–196.

PASOK, 2019. *PASOK: Open Society - Rights.* [Online]
Available at: http://pasok.gr
[Accessed 6 November 2020].

Patterson, T. E., 2016. *Pre-Primary News Coverage of the 2016 Presidential Race: Trump's Rise, Sanders' Emergence, Clinton's Struggle,* s.l.: Shorenstein Centre on Media, Politics and Public Policy.

Patton, D. F., 2017. The Alternative for Germany's radicalization in historical-comparative perspective. *Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe,* 25(2), pp. 163-180.

Pauwels, T., 2011. Explaining the strange decline of the populist radical right Vlaams Belang in Belgium: The impact of permanent opposition. *Acta Politica,* 46(1), p. 60–82.

Pelinka, A., 2017. *The Haider Phenomenon.* s.l.:Routledge.

Perryman, M., 2017. The Great Moving Left Show. In: M. Perryman, ed. *The Corbyn Effect.* London: Lawrence & Wishart, pp. 5-34.

Polk, J. et al., 2017. Explaining the salience of anti-elitism and reducing political corruption for political parties in Europe with the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey data. *Research & Politics,* Volume January-March, pp. 1-9.

Polsby, N. W. & Mayer, W. G., 1999. Ideological Cohesion in the American Two-Party System. In: N. W. Polsby & R. E. Wolfinger, eds. *On Parties: Essays Honoring Austin Ranney.* Berkeley, CA: Institute of Government Studies, pp. 219-254.

Poole, K. T. & Rosenthal, H., 2015. *ENATE_SORT110 Rank Ordering.* [Online]
Available at: https://legacy.voteview.com
[Accessed 6 February 2019].

Popper, K. R., 1980. *The Logic of Scientific Discovery.* 1st ed. London: Routledge.

Prichard, A. & Worth, O., 2016. Left-wing convergence: An introduction. *Capital & Class,* 40(1), pp. 3-17.

Priestland, D., 2010. *The Red Flag: A History of Communism.* 1st ed. s.l.:Grove Press / Atlantic Monthly Press.

Prince, R., 2010. *Labour leadership contest: Ed Miliband wins key trade union backing: The Telegraph.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk
[Accessed 17 October 2018].

Prince, R., 2015. *Budget 2015: Ed Balls admits Labour would not reverse George Osborne's flagship measures.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk
[Accessed 1 October 2018].

Proudhon, P.-J., 1851. *General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century.* s.l.:s.n.

Queralt, D., 2012. Spatial Voting in Spain. *South European Society and Politics,* 17(3), pp. 375-392.

Quinn, T., 2017. *Jeremy Corbyn has left Labour unelectable.* [Online]
Available at: https://capx.co
[Accessed 2 October 2018].

Rabinowitz, G. & Macdonald, S., 1989. A Directional Theory of Issue Voting. *American Political Science Review,* 83(1), pp. 93-121.

Ramiro, L., 2016. Support for radical left parties in Western Europe: social background, ideology and political orientations. *European Political Science Review,* 8(1), p. 1–23.

Ramiro, L. & Gomez, R., 2016. Radical-Left Populism during the Great Recession: Podemos and Its Competition with the Established Radical Left. *Political Studies,* 65(1), pp. 108-126.

Rasinski, K. A., 1987. What's Fair is Fair - Or Is It? Value Differences Underlying Public Views About Social Justice. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* Volume 53, pp. 201-211.

RePass, D. E., 1971. Issue Salience and Party Choice. *American Political Science Review,* 65(2), pp. 389-400.

Richards, D., Diamond, P. & Wager, A., 2019. Westminster's Brexit Paradox: The contingency of the 'old' versus 'new' politics. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations,* 21(2), pp. 330-348.

Richinik, M., 2014. *Hillary leads Dems in polls for 2016.* [Online]
Available at: http://www.msnbc.com
[Accessed 21 February 2019].

Roca, B., Martín-Díaz, E. & Díaz-Parra, I., 2017. *Challenging Austerity: Radical Left and Social Movements in the South of Europe.* 1st ed. London: Routledge.

Romance, J., 2018. Ideology and the 2016 Election. In: C. Rackaway & L. L. Rice, eds. *American Political Parties Under Pressure.* s.l.:Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 121-142.

Rooduijn, M., 2018. What unites the voter bases of populist parties? Comparing the electorates of 15 populist parties. *European Political Science Review,* 10(3), pp. 351-368.

Rooduijn, M., Burgoon, B., van Elsas, E. J. & van de Werfhorst, H. G., 2017. Radical distinction: Support for radical left and radical right parties in Europe. *European Union Politics,* 18(4), pp. 536-559.

Rooduijn, M., de Lange, S. & van der Brug, W., 2012. A populist Zeitgeist? Programmatic contagion by populist parties in Western Europe. *Party Politics,* 20(4), pp. 563-575.

Rooduijn, M., van der Brug, W. & de Lange, S., 2016. Expressing or fuelling discontent? The relationship between populist voting and political discontent. *Electoral Studies,* Volume 43, pp. 32-40.

Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, 2011. *"We irrevocably break with Stalinism as a system!",* s.l.: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung.

Rosenfeld, S., 2018. *The Democratic Party is moving steadily leftward. So why does the left still distrust it?.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.vox.com
[Accessed 7 December 2018].

Rosenthal, H. & Sen, S., 1977. Spatial Voting Models for the French Fifth Republic. *American Political Science Review,* 71(4), pp. 1447-1466.

Roßteutscher, S. et al., 2019. *Pre- and Post-election Cross Section (GLES 2017),* Cologne: GESIS Data Archive.

Rovny, J., 2013. Where do radical right parties stand? Position blurring in multidimensional competition. *European Political Science Review,* 5(1), pp. 1-26.

Roy, A. S. A., 2016. *Bernie Sanders Lost The Democratic Primary -- But Won The Democratic Party.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.forbes.com
[Accessed 21 February 2019].

Rudolph, T., 2019. Populist anger, Donald Trump, and the 2016 election. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion, and Parties.*

Rydgren, J., 2005. Is extreme right-wing populism contagious? Explaining the emergence of a new party family. *European Journal of Political Research,* 44(3), pp. 413-437.

Rydgren, J., 2010. Radical Right-wing Populism in Denmark and Sweden: Explaining Party System Change and Stability. *SAIS Review of International Affairs,* 30(1), pp. 57-71.

Rydgren, J. & Ruth, P., 2011. Voting for the Radical Right in Swedish Municipalities: Social Marginality and Ethnic Competition?. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 34(3), pp. 202-225.

Saad, L., Jones, J. M. & Brenan, M., 2019. *Understanding Shifts in Democratic Party Ideology.* [Online]
Available at: https://news.gallup.com
[Accessed 21 February 2019].

Sakuma, A., 2016. *Cuban, Venezuelan immigrants wrestle with Bernie Sanders' brand of socialism.* [Online]
Available at: http://www.msnbc.com
[Accessed 4 February 2019].

Sanders, B., 2015. *Agenda for America: 12 Steps Forward.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.sanders.senate.gov
[Accessed 15 January 2019].

Santucci, J., 2017. *Party and Cleavage in the 2016 Election.* [Online]
Available at: doi:10.31235/osf.io/zpwje
[Accessed 7 December 2018].

Sarotte, M. E., 2014. *The Collapse: The Accidental Opening of the Berlin Wall.* 1st ed. s.l.:Basic Books.

Scheepers, P., Billiet, J. & De Witte, H., 1995. Het electoraat van het Vlaams Blok. De kiezers en hun opvattingen. *Sociologische Gids*, 42(3), p. 232–52.

Schoen, H. & Schumann, S., 2007. Personality Traits, Partisan Attitudes, and Voting Behavior. Evidence from Germany. *Political Psychology*, 28(4).

Scholl, C. & Freyberg-Inan, A., 2018. Imagining another Europe: Building a pan-European counter-hegemonic bloc around an anti-austerity master frame. *Comparative European Politics*, 16(1), p. 103–125.

Schulz, A. et al., 2018. Measuring Populist Attitudes on Three Dimensions. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 30(2), p. 316–326.

Schumpeter, J., 1949. *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy.* New York: Harper.

Scully, R. & Johns, R., 2010. *Devolution, Valence Voting and the 2010 Election.* University of Essex, Political Studies Association.

Segert, D., 2002. The PDS: regional party or second social-democratic party in Germany?. In: A. Bozóki & J. T. Ishiyama, eds. *The Communist Successor Parties of Central and Eastern Europe.* Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, pp. 166-187.

Seymour, R., 2016. *Corbyn: The Strange Rebirth of Radical Politics.* 2nd ed. London: Verso.

Shanks, J. M. & Miller, W. E., 1991. Partisanship, Policy, and Performance: The Reagan Legacy in the 1998 Election. *British Journal of Political Science*, 21(2), pp. 129-197.

Singh, S., 2014. Linear and quadratic utility loss functions in voting behavior research. *Journal of Theoretical Politics,* 26(1), pp. 35-58.

Skenderovic, D., 2007. Immigration and the radical right in Switzerland: ideology, discourse and opportunities. *Patterns of Prejudice,* 41(2), pp. 155-176.

Smith, W., 2014. *Political donations corrupt democracy in ways you might not realise.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com
[Accessed 6 February 2019].

Sniderman, P. M., 1993. The New Look in Public Opinion Research. In: A. Finifter, ed. *Political Science: The State of the Discipline II.* Washington: American Political Science Association, pp. 219-243.

Sobolewska, M. & Ford, R., 2020. *Brexitland: Identity, Diversity and the Reshaping of British Politics.* 1st ed. s.l.:Cambridge University Press.

SPD, 1959. Godesberg Program of the SPD. *German History in Documents and Images: Occupation and the Emergence of Two States, 1945-1961,* Volume 8.

SPD, 2007. *Hamburg Programme: Principal guidelines of the Social Democratic Party of Germany,* s.l.: SPD.

SPD, 2017. *Es ist Zeit für mehr Gerechtigkeit,* Berlin: SPD.

Spierings, N. & Zaslove, A., 2017. Gender, populist attitudes, and voting: explaining the gender gap in voting for populist radical right and populist radical left parties. *West European Politics,* 40(4), pp. 821-847.

Spross, J., 2018. *Bernie Sanders has conquered the Democratic Party.* [Online]
Available at: https://theweek.com
[Accessed 7 December 2018].

Spruyt, B., Keppens, G. & van Droogenbroeck, F., 2016. Who Supports Populism and What Attracts People to it?. *Political Research Quarterly,* 69(2), pp. 335-346.

Stanley, B., 2011. Populism, Nationalism, or National Populism? An Analysis of Slovak Voting Behaviour at the 2010 Parliamentary Election. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies,* 44(4), pp. 257-270.

Stanley, B., 2018. A New Populist Divide? Correspondences of Supply and Demand in the 2015 Polish Parliamentary Elections. *East European Politics and Societies: and Cultures,* 33(1), pp. 17-43.

Stavrakakis, Y. & Katsambekis, G., 2014. Left-wing populism in the European periphery: the case of SYRIZA. *Journa of Political Ideologies,* 19(2), pp. 119-142.

Steiner, N. & Hinnen, S., 2021. Vote choices of left-authoritarians: Misperceived congruence and issue salience. *Electoral Studies,* Volume 70.

Stein, J., 2018. *Sanders to launch new plan to break up Wall Street giants, including Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com
[Accessed 9 January 2019].

Stokes, D. E., 1963. Spatial Models of Party Competition. *American Political Science Review,* 57(2), pp. 368-377.

Stubager, R., 2008. Education effects on authoritarian–libertarian values: a question of socialization. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 59(2), pp. 327-350.

Swales, K., 2016. *Understanding the Leave Vote,* London: NatCen Social Research.

Swank, D. & Betz, H.-G., 2003. Globalization, the welfare state and right-wing populism in Western Europe. *Socio-Economic Review,* 1(2), p. 215–245.

SYRIZA, 2015. *The Thessaloniki Programme.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.syriza.gr
[Accessed 7 February 2020].

Taggart, P., 1995. New Populist Parties in Western Europe. *West European Politics*, 18(1), pp. 34-51.

Talò, T., 2017. *Public attitudes to immigration in Germany in the aftermath of the migration crisis,* s.l.: European University Institute.

Tavits, M., 2007. Principle vs. Pragmatism: Policy Shifts and Political Competition. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(1), pp. 151-165.

The Hill, 2015. *Hillary racks up endorsements for 2016.* [Online]
Available at: https://thehill.com
[Accessed 21 February 2019].

The Labour Party, 1983. *The New Hope for Britain,* s.l.: The Labour Party.

The Labour Party, 2015. *The Labour Party Manifesto 2015,* s.l.: The Labour Party.

The Labour Party, 2017. *For the Many, Not the Few: Labour Party Manifesto 2017,* s.l.: The Labour Party.

Thorpe, A., 2008. *A History of the British Labour Party.* 3rd ed. s.l.:Palgrave Macmillan.

Tomz, M. & van Houweling, R. P., 2008. Candidate Positioning and Voter Choice. *American Political Science Review,* 102(3), pp. 303-318.

Troy, G., 2016. *Why Black Voters Don't Feel the Bern.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.politico.com
[Accessed 25 March 2019].

Tsakalotos, E., 1998. The political economy of social democratic economic policies: the Pasok experiment in Greece. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy,* 14(1), pp. 114-138.

Tsakatika, M. & Lisi, M., 2013. 'Zippin' up My Boots, Goin' Back to My Roots': Radical Left Parties in Southern Europe. *South European Society and Politics,* 18(1), pp. 1-19.

Turner, E. & Green, S., 2007. Understanding Policy Convergence in Britain and Germany. *German Politics,* 16(1), pp. 1-21.

Van der Brug, W., Fennema, M. & Tillie, J., 2000. Anti-immigrant parties in Europe: Ideological or protest vote?. *European Journal of Political Research,* 37(1), p. 77–102.

Van der Brug, W., Fennema, M. & Tillie, J., 2005. Why Some Anti-Immigrant Parties Fail and Others Succeed: A Two-Step Model of Aggregate Electoral Support. *Comparative Political Studies,* 38(5), pp. 537-573.

van der Brug, W. & Mughan, A., 2007. Charisma, Leader Effects and Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties. *Party Politics,* 13(1), pp. 29-51.

van der Eijk, C. & Franklin, M. N., 2009. *Elections and Voters.* 1st ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

van Hauwaert, S., Schimpf, C. & Azevedo, F., 2020. The Measurement of Populist Attitudes: Testing Cross-National Scales Using Item Response Theory. *Politics,* 40(1), pp. 3-21.

Van Hauwaert, S., Schimph, C. H. & Azevedo, F., 2020. The Measurement of Populist Attitudes: Testing Cross-National Scales Using Item Response Theory. *Politics,* 40(1), pp. 3-21.

van Hauwert, S. & van Kessel, S., 2018. Beyond protest and discontent: A cross-national analysis of the effect of populist attitudes and issue positions on populist party support. *European Journal of Political Research,* 57(1), pp. 68-92.

Vermont Employee Ownership Center, 2018. *Senator Sanders Introduces Bills to Support Employee Ownership.* Burlington, VT, Vermont Employee Ownership Center.

Verney, S., 2011. An Exceptional Case? Party and Popular Euroscepticism in Greece, 1959–2009. *South European Society and Politics,* 16(1), pp. 51-79.

Veugelers, J., 2001. *Structural Conditions of Far-right Emergence in Contemporary Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Kitschelt's Theory.* Grenoble, ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops.

Visser, M., Lubbers, M., Kraaykamp, G. & Jaspers, E., 2014. Support for Radical Left Ideologies in Europe. *European Journal of Political Research,* Volume 53, pp. 541-558.

Wagner, J., 2015. *Bernie Sanders has now received 2 million campaign contributions, aides say.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com
[Accessed 6 February 2019].

Watts, J. & Bale, T., 2019. Populism as an intra-party phenomenon: The British Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations,* 21(1), pp. 99-115.

Weisskircher, M., 2019. The Electoral Success of the Radical Left: Explaining the Least Likely Case of the Communist Party in Graz. *Government and Opposition,* 54(1), pp. 145-166.

Welch, S. & Hibbing, J., 1992. Financial Conditions, Gender, and Voting in American National Elections. *The Journal of Politics,* 51(1), pp. 197-213.

Werkmann, C. & Gherghina, S., 2018. Organized for Parliament? Explaining the Electoral Success of Radical Right Parties in Post-Communist Europe. *Government and Opposition,* 53(3), p. 461–485.

Westholm, A., 1997. Distance versus Direction: The Illusory Defeat of the Proximity Theory of Electoral Choice. *American Political Science Review,* 91(4), pp. 865-883.

Weyland, K., 1999. Neoliberal Populism in Latin America and Eastern Europe. *Comparative Politics,* 31(4), pp. 379-401.

Whiteley, P., Clark, H., Sanders, D. & Steward, M., 2016. Hunting the Snark: A Reply to "Re-Evaluating Valence Models of Political Choice". *Political Science Research and Methods,* 4(1), pp. 221-240.

Williams, L. K., Stegmaier, M. & Debus, M., 2017. Relaxing the Constant Economic Vote Restriction: Economic evaluations and party support in Germany. *Party Politics,* 23(3), pp. 286-296.

Willis, D., 2015. *Hillary Clinton and the 2016 Democrats: Mostly Liberal, Together.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.nytimes.com
[Accessed 10 December 2018].

Wintour, P., 2015. *Welfare bill: Labour in disarray as 48 MPs defy whips to vote no.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com
[Accessed 1 October 2018].

Wintour, P. & Mason, R., 2015. *Labour leftwinger Jeremy Corbyn wins place on ballot for leadership: The Guardian.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com
[Accessed 11 November 2020].

Wirries, C., 2012. A Party for the "Simple People": The Socialist Party of the Netherlands. In: B. Daiber, ed. *From Revolution to Coalition: RLPs in Europe.* Berlin: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, pp. 144-162.

Wlezien, C., 1995. The Public as Thermostat: Dynamics and Preferences for Spending. *American Journal of Political Science,* Volume 39, pp. 981-1000.

Wlezien, C., 1996. Dynamics of Representation: The Case of US Spending on Defence. *British Journal of Political Science,* Volume 26, pp. 1-24.

Wlezien, C., 2005. On the salience of political issues: The problem with 'most important problem'. *Electoral Studies,* Volume 24, pp. 555-579.

Wolfgang, B., 2016. *Hillary Clinton blows chance to win over millennials with slow evolution on pot.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.washingtontimes.com
[Accessed 5 February 2019].

Wolfinger, R. E. & Rosenstone, S. J., 1980. *Who Votes?.* 1st ed. s.l.:Yale University Press.

Wronski, J. et al., 2018. A Tale of Two Democrats: How Authoritarianism Divides the Democratic Party. *The Journal of Politics,* 80(4).

Ye Hee Lee, M., 2016. *Everything you wanted to know about Bernie Sanders's record on guns.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com
[Accessed 5 February 2019].

Zaslove, A., 2004. Closing the door? The ideology and impact of radical right populism on immigration policy in Austria and Italy. *Journal of Political Ideologies,* 9(1), pp. 99-118.

Zaslove, A., 2004. The Dark Side of European Politics: Unmasking the Radical Right. *Journal of European Integration,* 26(1), pp. 61-81.

Zurchner, A., 2016. *US election 2016: Bernie Sanders' and Hillary Clinton's policies compared.* [Online]
Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk
[Accessed 5 February 2019].

Appendix 1.0: Germany

Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) Questions:

LRECON = position of the party in terms of its ideological stance on economic issues. Parties can be classified in terms of their stance on economic issues. Parties on the economic left want government to play an active role in the economy. Parties on the economic right emphasize a reduced economic role for government: privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, less government spending, and a leaner welfare state:

> *0= Extreme left*

> *5= Center*

> *10= Extreme right*

GALTAN = position of the party in terms of their views on democratic freedoms and rights. "Libertarian" or "postmaterialist" parties favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic participation.

"Traditional" or "authoritarian" parties often reject these ideas; they value order, tradition, and stability, and believe that the government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues:

0 = Libertarian/Postmaterialist

5 = Center

10 = Traditional/Authoritarian

IMMIGRATE_POLICY = position on immigration policy:

0= Fully opposed to a restrictive policy on immigration.

10= Fully in favour of a restrictive policy on immigration.

CHES Positions of Each Party on Economic, Social, and Migration Policy Dimensions:

	Die Linke	*CDU*	*CSU*	*SPD*	*Grünen*	*FDP*	*AfD*
Econ	*1.06*	*6.06*	*6.13*	*3.44*	*3.25*	*8.25*	*7.53*
Social	*4.13*	*5.80*	*7.47*	*3.67*	*1.40*	*3.80*	*9.47*
Immig	*3.19*	*5.63*	*7.80*	*3.81*	*2.25*	*6.44*	*9.31*

GLES Questions:

Dependent Variable:

'vn20' - Scalometer, political parties:

> *'What do you think of the different parties in general? Please tell me using this scale. -5 means that you do not think much of the party at all, +5 means that you think a great deal of the party. Use the values in between to express your opinion more precisely. What do you think of the …?'*

d) *Die Linke*

> *(11) +5 I think a great deal of the party*
>
> *(10) +4*
>
> *(9) +3*
>
> *(8) +2*
>
> *(7) +1*
>
> *(6) 0*
>
> *(5) -1*
>
> *(4) -2*

(3) -3

(2) -4

(1) -5 I do not think much of the party at all

Economic Questions: (pre-election)

'vn59' – Own position, socio-economic dimension:

'And what position do you take on taxes and social services? Please use this scale.

(1) 1 Lower taxes, although this results in less social services
(2) 2
(3) 3
(4) 4
(5) 5
(6) 6
(7) 7
(8) 8
(9) 9
(10) 10
(11) 11 More social services, although this results in raising taxes.'

'v32c' – Issue Battery:
'The state should stay out of the economy.'

(all 'Issue Battery' questions use the following scale):
'(1) Strongly agree
(2) Agree
(3) Neither agree nor disagree
(4) Disagree
(5) Strongly disagree'

'v32d' – Issue Battery:
'The government should take measures to reduce the differences in income levels.'

Economic Questions: (post-election)

'vn59' – Own position, socio-economic dimension:

'And what position do you take on taxes and social services? Please use this scale.

(1) 1 Lower taxes, although this results in less social services
(2) 2
(3) 3
(4) 4
(5) 5
(6) 6
(7) 7
(8) 8
(9) 9
(10) 10
(11) 11 More social services, although this results in raising taxes.'

288

'n32c' – Issue Battery:

> *'The state should stay out of the economy.'*

'n32d' – Issue Battery:

> *'The government should take measures to reduce the differences in income levels.'*

Cultural policy questions: (pre-election)

'v32b' – Issue Battery:

> *'There should be a statutory quota of women for the supervisory boards of large companies.'*

'v32j' – Issue Battery:

> *'Same-sex couples should be allowed to marry.'*

Cultural policy questions: (post-election)

'v32b' – Issue Battery:

> *'There should be a statutory quota of women for the supervisory boards of large companies.'*

'v32l' – Issue Battery:

> *'Same-sex couples should be allowed to marry.'*

Migration policy questions: (pre-election)

'vn60' – Own position, libertarian/authoritarian dimension:

> *'And what position do you take on immigration for foreigners? Please use the scale.*
>
> *(1) 1 Immigration for foreigners should be easier*
> *(2) 2*
> *(3) 3*
> *(4) 4*
> *(5) 5*
> *(6) 6*
> *(7) 7*
> *(8) 8*
> *(9) 9*
> *(10) 10*
> *(11) 11 Immigration for foreigners should be more difficult.'*

'v32a' – Issue Battery:

> *'Immigrants should be obliged to assimilate into the German culture.'*

'v32i' – Issue Battery:

> *'Germany needs an annual upper limit ("Obergrenze") for refugees.'*

Migration policy questions: (post-election)

'vn60' – Own position, libertarian/authoritarian dimension:

'And what position do you take on immigration for foreigners? Please use the scale.'

(1) 1 Immigration for foreigners should be easier
(2) 2
(3) 3
(4) 4
(5) 5
(6) 6
(7) 7
(8) 8
(9) 9
(10) 10
(11) 11 Immigration for foreigners should be more difficult.'

'n32a' – Issue Battery:
'Immigrants should be obliged to assimilate into the German culture.'

'n32k' – Issue Battery:
'Germany needs an annual upper limit ("Obergrenze") for refugees.'

Populism questions:

'vn66a' – Populism battery:
'What people call compromise in politics is really just selling out on one's principles.'

'vn66b' – Populism battery:
'The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.'

'vn66c' – Populism battery:
'The politicians in the German Bundestag need to follow the will of the people.'

'vn66d' – Populism battery:
'Differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people.'

'vn66e' – Populism battery:
'I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician.'

'vn66f' – Populism battery:
'Politicians talk too much and take too little action.'

Party-Placement Questions:

'vn56a-g' – Party positions, socio-economic dimension:

Now, several political issues. Some people prefer lower taxes, although this results in less social services. Others prefer more social services, although this results in raising taxes. What do you think are the positions of the political parties on this issue? Please use the scale from 1 to 11. What do you think is the political point of view of the ...

(D) DIE LINKE

> *(1) 1 Lower taxes, although this results in less social services*
> *(2) 2*
> *(3) 3*
> *(4) 4*
> *(5) 5*
> *(6) 6*
> *(7) 7*
> *(8) 8*
> *(9) 9*
> *(10) 10*
> *(11) 11 More social services, although this results in raising taxes*

'vn57a-g' – Party positions, libertarian-authoritarian dimension

And what about immigration? Should it be easier or more difficult for foreigners to immigrate? What do you think are the positions of the political parties on this issue? Please use the scale from 1 to 11. What do you think is the political point of view of the ...

(D) DIE LINKE

> *(1) 1 Immigration for foreigners should be easier*
> *(2) 2*
> *(3) 3*
> *(4) 4*
> *(5) 5*
> *(6) 6*
> *(7) 7*
> *(8) 8*
> *(9) 9*
> *(10) 10*
> *(11) 11 Immigration for foreigners should be more difficult*

Supplementary Results

Appendix 1.1: Left/Right & Inclusive/Exclusive Proximity Groups ('unfolded')

Economic Proximity Group	Furthest (Left) N = 89	4 (Left) N = 189	Moderately-Distant (Left) N = 186	2 (Left) N = 262	Closest (Left) N = 268	**Absolute Closest N = 406**	Closest (Right) N = 365	2 (Right) N = 391	Moderately-Distant (Right) N = 299	4 (Right) N = 484	Furthest (Right) N = 344
Migration Proximity Group	Furthest (Inclusive) N = 47	4 (Inclusive) N = 90	Moderately-Distant (Inclusive) N = 107	2 (Inclusive) N = 193	Closest (Inclusive) N = 247	**Absolute Closest N = 395**	Closest (Exclusive) N = 384	2 (Exclusive) N = 388	Moderately-Distant (Exclusive) N = 370	4 (Exclusive) N = 577	Furthest (Exclusive) N = 662

Appendix 1.2: Left/Right (unfolded) Economic Proximity Groups:

	Die Linke Evaluations	
	(1)	(2)
Furthest (Left)	-1.575***	-0.725**
	(0.314)	(0.319)
4 (Left)	-1.103***	-0.570**
	(0.237)	(0.247)
Moderately-Distant (Left)	-0.996***	-0.411*
	(0.238)	(0.241)
2 (Left)	-0.518**	-0.183
	(0.213)	(0.225)
Closest (Left)	-0.106	0.041
	(0.212)	(0.222)
Absolute-Closest	(baseline)	(baseline)
Closest (Right)	0.048	0.221
	(0.194)	(0.200)
2 (Right)	-0.617***	-0.324
	(0.191)	(0.201)
Moderately-Distant (Right)	-1.356***	-0.707***
	(0.206)	(0.213)
4 (Right)	-1.735***	-0.858***
	(0.182)	(0.190)
Furthest (Right)	-2.493***	-1.395***
	(0.198)	(0.205)
DieLinke_PartyID		4.546***
		(0.232)
CDU_PartyID		0.254
		(0.192)
CSU_PartyID		-0.577*
		(0.331)
SPD_PartyID		1.682***
		(0.193)
FDP_PartyID		0.224
		(0.267)
Greens_PartyID		1.963***
		(0.227)
Afd_PartyID		0.074
		(0.279)
Other_PartyID		-0.025
		(0.463)
No_PartyID		1.386***
		(0.192)
Gender		0.235**
(1 = Female)		(0.097)
Religion		0.054***
(1 = Non-Religious)		(0.011)
Education		0.120**
		(0.047)
Social_Class		-0.151***
		(0.057)
EastWest		0.069
(1 = Born GDR)		(0.099)
Constant	6.733***	4.650***
	(0.134)	(0.298)
Observations	3,260	2,478
R^2	0.086	0.310
Adjusted R^2	0.083	0.303
Residual Std. Error	2.682 (df = 3249)	2.372 (df = 2453)
F Statistic	30.560*** (df = 10; 3249)	45.954*** (df = 24; 2453)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Effect of Economic Policy Proximity on Evaluations of Die Linke

	Dependent variable:	
	Die Linke Evaluations	
	(1)	(2)
Econ_Proximity	-0.664***	-1.086***
	(0.049)	(0.053)
DieLinke_PartyID	4.609***	
	(0.169)	
CDU_PartyID	0.348**	
	(0.141)	
CSU_PartyID	-0.538**	
	(0.247)	
SPD_PartyID	1.717***	
	(0.142)	
FDP_PartyID	0.401**	
	(0.197)	
Greens_PartyID	1.992***	
	(0.167)	
Afd_PartyID	0.060	
	(0.202)	
Other_PartyID	0.087	
	(0.341)	
No_PartyID	1.431***	
	(0.142)	
Gender	0.233***	
(1 = Female)	(0.072)	
Religion	0.478***	
(1 = Non-Religious)	(0.074)	
Education	0.096***	
	(0.034)	
Social_Class	-0.139***	
	(0.042)	
EastWest	0.095	
(1 = Born GDR)	(0.073)	
Constant	4.852***	6.786***
	(0.204)	(0.067)
Observations	4,586	4,586
R^2	0.310	0.083
Adjusted R^2	0.308	0.083
Residual Std. Error	2.387 (df = 4570)	2.747 (df = 4584)
F Statistic	136.803*** (df = 15; 4570)	415.131*** (df = 1; 4584)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Appendix 1.4: Pre-election and Post-Election Results – Economic Policy Groups:

	Die Linke Evaluations			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rad Left (Pre)	1.183		0.596	
	(0.865)		(0.870)	
Centre Left (Pre)	0.066		-0.134	
	(0.842)		(0.839)	
Centrist	*(baseline)*		*(baseline)*	
Centre Right (Pre)	-1.335		-1.177	
	(0.915)		(0.909)	
Rad Right (Pre)	-1.333*		-1.122	
	(0.794)		(0.798)	
Rad Left (Post)		1.454**		0.795
		(0.728)		(0.723)
Centre Left (Post)		-0.197		-0.579
		(0.712)		(0.704)
Centrist		*(baseline)*		*(baseline)*
Centre Right (Post)		-0.763		-0.397
		(0.736)		(0.730)
Rad Right (Post)		-1.318**		-0.999
		(0.670)		(0.675)
DieLinke_PartyID			5.157***	3.622***
			(1.303)	(1.146)
CDU_PartyID			-0.311	-1.814*
			(1.022)	(0.969)
CSU_PartyID			0.258	-0.295
			(1.580)	(1.639)
SPD_PartyID			1.463	1.133
			(1.029)	(0.972)
FDP_PartyID			0.959	-0.489
			(1.483)	(1.311)
Greens_PartyID			2.226*	1.516
			(1.293)	(1.110)
Afd_PartyID			-0.160	-0.502
			(1.617)	(1.347)
Other_PartyID			0.761	0.609
			(2.422)	(2.516)
No_PartyID			-0.652	0.299
			(1.006)	(0.954)
Gender			-0.361	-0.983**
(1 = Female)			(0.543)	(0.452)
Religion			0.053	0.071
(1 = Non-Religious)			(0.064)	(0.052)
Education			0.169	0.466**
			(0.262)	(0.222)
Social_Class			0.365	0.015
			(0.309)	(0.275)
EastWest			0.296	0.788*
(1 = Born GDR)			(0.560)	(0.458)
Constant	4.652***	5.229***	1.984	3.063**
	(0.586)	(0.491)	(1.498)	(1.405)
Observations	1,506	1,460	1,506	1,460
R^2	0.008	0.011	0.035	0.053
Adjusted R^2	0.005	0.009	0.023	0.041
Residual Std. Error	10.512 (df = 1501)	8.653 (df = 1455)	10.418 (df = 1487)	8.510 (df = 1441)
F Statistic	2.987** (df = 4; 1501)	4.168*** (df = 4; 1455)	2.968*** (df = 18; 1487)	4.472*** (df = 18; 1441)

Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

<u>Appendix 1.5: Economic Proximity and Die Linke Evaluations – Scalar Variable:</u>

Evaluations of Die Linke by Economic Policy

	Dependent variable:	
	Die Linke Evaluations	
	(1)	(2)
Cumulative_Econ_Scale	0.250***	0.434***
	(0.028)	(0.026)
DieLinke_PartyID	4.594***	
	(0.221)	
CDU_PartyID	0.116	
	(0.180)	
CSU_PartyID	-0.441	
	(0.289)	
SPD_PartyID	1.575***	
	(0.180)	
FDP_PartyID	0.252	
	(0.253)	
Greens_PartyID	1.900***	
	(0.216)	
Afd_PartyID	0.023	
	(0.267)	
Other_PartyID	0.413	
	(0.443)	
No_PartyID	1.284***	
	(0.177)	
Gender	0.197**	
(1 = Female)	(0.090)	
Religion	0.432***	
(1 = Non-Religious)	(0.095)	
Education	0.132***	
	(0.044)	
Social_Class	-0.125**	
	(0.053)	
EastWest	0.119	
(1 = Born GDR)	(0.093)	
Constant	2.210***	2.495***
	(0.322)	(0.192)
Observations	2,941	3,916
R^2	0.284	0.068
Adjusted R^2	0.281	0.067
Residual Std. Error	2.430 (df = 2925)	2.720 (df = 3914)
F Statistic	77.423*** (df = 15; 2925)	283.393*** (df = 1; 3914)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix 1.6: Pre-election and Post-election Results – Cultural Policy Groups:

	Die Linke Evaluations			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rad Lib (Pre)	-0.563		-0.895	
	(0.759)		(0.757)	
Mod Lib (Pre)	-0.554		-0.581	
	(0.870)		(0.861)	
Centrist	*(baseline)*		*(baseline)*	
Mod Con (Pre)	-0.563		-0.401	
	(0.885)		(0.879)	
Rad Con (Pre)	-1.124		-0.644	
	(0.839)		(0.848)	
Rad Lib (Post)		0.821		0.618
		(0.722)		(0.715)
Mod Lib (Post)		1.004		1.087
		(0.813)		(0.798)
Centrist		*(baseline)*		*(baseline)*
Mod Con (Post)		-0.193		-0.010
		(0.811)		(0.795)
Rad Con (Post)		-0.271		0.261
		(0.791)		(0.788)
DieLinke_PartyID			5.551***	5.992***
			(1.175)	(1.193)
CDU_PartyID			-0.179	-1.060
			(0.932)	(1.005)
CSU_PartyID			0.483	0.958
			(1.442)	(1.765)
SPD_PartyID			2.464***	2.366**
			(0.940)	(1.013)
FDP_PartyID			0.810	0.338
			(1.342)	(1.355)
Greens_PartyID			2.725**	2.809**
			(1.166)	(1.159)
Afd_PartyID			-0.264	1.060
			(1.480)	(1.425)
Other_PartyID			1.223	2.017
			(2.254)	(2.568)
No_PartyID			-0.228	1.416
			(0.917)	(0.991)
Gender			-0.384	-1.190**
(1 = Female)			(0.502)	(0.482)
Religion			0.039	-0.011
(1 = Non-Religious)			(0.059)	(0.055)
Education			0.151	0.471**
			(0.236)	(0.234)
Social_Class			0.083	0.331
			(0.278)	(0.289)
EastWest			0.560	1.125**
(1 = Born GDR)			(0.508)	(0.484)
Constant	5.131***	4.547***	3.035**	0.251
	(0.625)	(0.568)	(1.422)	(1.507)
Observations	1,522	1,482	1,522	1,482
R^2	0.001	0.003	0.037	0.060
Adjusted R^2	-0.001	0.001	0.026	0.048
Residual Std. Error	9.625 (df = 1517)	9.240 (df = 1477)	9.493 (df = 1503)	9.018 (df = 1463)
F Statistic	0.453 (df = 4; 1517)	1.224 (df = 4; 1477)	3.239*** (df = 18; 1503)	5.149*** (df = 18; 1463)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Evaluations of Die Linke by Cultural Policy

	Dependent variable:	
	Die Linke Evaluations	
	(1)	(2)
Cumulative_Social_Scale	-0.126***	-0.244***
	(0.019)	(0.017)
DieLinke_PartyID	4.763***	
	(0.220)	
CDU_PartyID	0.187	
	(0.180)	
CSU_PartyID	-0.193	
	(0.294)	
SPD_PartyID	1.628***	
	(0.181)	
FDP_PartyID	0.047	
	(0.251)	
Greens_PartyID	1.935***	
	(0.216)	
Afd_PartyID	0.140	
	(0.270)	
Other_PartyID	0.685	
	(0.446)	
No_PartyID	1.337***	
	(0.178)	
Gender	0.114	
(1 = Female)	(0.092)	
Religion	0.357***	
(1 = Non-Religious_	(0.096)	
Education	0.137***	
	(0.044)	
Social_Class	-0.161***	
	(0.053)	
EastWest	0.166*	
(1 = Born GDR)	(0.093)	
Constant	4.691***	6.759***
	(0.270)	(0.089)
Observations	2,980	3,994
R^2	0.271	0.048
Adjusted R^2	0.268	0.048
Residual Std. Error	2.451 (df = 2964)	2.750 (df = 3992)
F Statistic	73.571*** (df = 15; 2964)	202.853*** (df = 1; 3992)

Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix 1.8: Inclusive/Exclusive (unfolded) Migration Proximity Groups:

	Die Linke Evaluations	
	(1)	(2)
Furthest (Inclusive)	-2.296***	-1.564***
	(0.426)	(0.443)
4 (Inclusive)	-1.613***	-1.352***
	(0.324)	(0.334)
Moderately-Distant (Inclusive)	-0.674**	-1.087***
	(0.303)	(0.319)
2 (Inclusive)	-0.607**	-0.778***
	(0.244)	(0.244)
Closest (Inclusive)	-0.101	-0.201
	(0.225)	(0.237)
Absolute-Closest	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Closest (Exclusive)	-0.241	-0.306
	(0.199)	(0.205)
2 (Exclusive)	-0.070	-0.169
	(0.198)	(0.200)
Moderately-Distant (Exclusive)	-0.505**	-0.514**
	(0.201)	(0.202)
4 (Exclusive)	-0.804***	-0.672***
	(0.182)	(0.184)
Furthest (Exclusive)	-1.750***	-1.509***
	(0.177)	(0.183)
DieLinke_PartyID		4.798***
		(0.225)
CDU_PartyID		0.326*
		(0.190)
CSU_PartyID		-0.338
		(0.319)
SPD_PartyID		1.700***
		(0.189)
FDP_PartyID		0.281
		(0.265)
Greens_PartyID		1.992***
		(0.226)
Afd_PartyID		0.312
		(0.278)
Other_PartyID		0.333
		(0.474)
No_PartyID		1.470***
		(0.188)
Gender		0.257***
(1 = Female)		(0.096)
Religion		0.058***
(1 = Non-Religious)		(0.011)
Education		0.061
		(0.047)
Social_Class		-0.231***
		(0.057)
EastWest		0.200**
(1 = Born GDR)		(0.099)
Constant	6.467***	5.164***
	(0.140)	(0.300)
Observations	3,429	2,574
R^2	0.053	0.306
Adjusted R^2	0.050	0.299
Residual Std. Error	2.762 (df = 3418)	2.407 (df = 2549)
F Statistic	19.037*** (df = 10; 3418)	46.816*** (df = 24; 2549)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix 1.9: Migration Proximity and Die Linke evaluations: Scalar Variable:

Effect of Migration Policy Proximity on Evaluations of Die Linke

	Dependent variable:	
	Die Linke Evaluations	
	(1)	(2)
Immig_Proximity	-0.645***	-0.766***
	(0.042)	(0.047)
DieLinke_PartyID	4.819***	
	(0.166)	
CDU_PartyID	0.356**	
	(0.140)	
CSU_PartyID	-0.379	
	(0.246)	
SPD_PartyID	1.833***	
	(0.140)	
FDP_PartyID	0.346*	
	(0.196)	
Greens_PartyID	2.067***	
	(0.165)	
Afd_PartyID	0.554***	
	(0.203)	
Other_PartyID	0.405	
	(0.338)	
No_PartyID	1.620***	
	(0.140)	
Gender	0.271***	
(1 = Female)	(0.071)	
Religion	0.534***	
(1 = Non-Religious)	(0.074)	
Education	0.033	
	(0.034)	
Social_Class	-0.210***	
	(0.042)	
EastWest	0.183**	
(1 = Born GDR)	(0.073)	
Constant	5.197***	6.568***
	(0.207)	(0.067)
Observations	4,586	4,586
R^2	0.316	0.055
Adjusted R^2	0.314	0.055
Residual Std. Error	2.376 (df = 4570)	2.788 (df = 4584)
F Statistic	140.865*** (df = 15; 4570)	267.702*** (df = 1; 4584)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix 1.10: Pre-election and Post-election Results – Migration Policy Groups:

	Die Linke Evaluations			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rad Inc (Pre)	1.411		0.684	
	(0.985)		(1.026)	
Mod Inc (Pre)	0.779		0.497	
	(0.969)		(0.974)	
Centrist	(baseline)		(baseline)	
Mod Exc (Pre)	-1.312		-0.910	
	(0.892)		(0.891)	
Rad Exc (Pre)	-1.899**		-1.597*	
	(0.861)		(0.885)	
Rad Inc (Post)		1.998**		1.998**
		(1.000)		(1.000)
Mod Inc (Post)		0.497		0.497
		(1.003)		(1.003)
Centrist		(baseline)		(baseline)
Mod Exc (Post)		-2.351**		-2.351**
		(0.985)		(0.985)
Rad Exc (Post)		-2.861***		-2.861***
		(0.982)		(0.982)
DieLinke_PartyID			5.567***	
			(1.334)	
CDU_PartyID			-0.166	
			(1.053)	
CSU_PartyID			0.241	
			(1.603)	
SPD_PartyID			2.007*	
			(1.060)	
FDP_PartyID			0.682	
			(1.554)	
Greens_PartyID			1.862	
			(1.351)	
Afd_PartyID			0.464	
			(1.667)	
Other_PartyID			0.532	
			(2.620)	
No_PartyID			-1.300	
			(1.032)	
Gender			-0.618	
(1 = Female)			(0.557)	
Religion			-0.010	
(1 = Non-Religious)			(0.066)	
Education			0.005	
			(0.284)	
Social_Class			-0.032	
			(0.314)	
EastWest			-0.171	
(1 = Born GDR)			(0.575)	
Constant	4.751***	4.845***	4.525***	4.845***
	(0.683)	(0.709)	(1.640)	(0.709)
Observations	1,530	1,501	1,530	1,501
R²	0.013	0.022	0.041	0.022
Adjusted R²	0.011	0.020	0.030	0.020
Residual Std. Error	10.871 (df = 1525)	12.072 (df = 1496)	10.764 (df = 1511)	12.072 (df = 1496)
F Statistic	5.105*** (df = 4; 1525)	8.582*** (df = 4; 1496)	3.629*** (df = 18; 1511)	8.582*** (df = 4; 1496)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix 1.11: Migration Policy and Die Linke Evaluations: Scalar Variable:

Evaluations of Die Linke by Migration Policy

	Dependent variable:	
	Die Linke Evaluations	
	(1)	(2)
Cumulative_Immig_Scale	-0.145***	-0.216***
	(0.030)	(0.024)
DieLinke_PartyID	4.797***	
	(0.302)	
CDU_PartyID	0.344	
	(0.239)	
CSU_PartyID	-0.267	
	(0.363)	
SPD_PartyID	1.610***	
	(0.241)	
FDP_PartyID	0.376	
	(0.352)	
Greens_PartyID	1.761***	
	(0.305)	
Afd_PartyID	0.593	
	(0.378)	
Other_PartyID	-0.108	
	(0.592)	
No_PartyID	1.442***	
	(0.235)	
Gender	0.294**	
(1 = Female)	(0.127)	
Religion	0.435***	
(1 = Non-Religious)	(0.136)	
Education	-0.032	
	(0.065)	
Social_Class	-0.149**	
	(0.071)	
EastWest	0.261**	
(1 = Born GDR)	(0.131)	
Constant	5.476***	7.196***
	(0.474)	(0.196)
Observations	1,513	2,036
R^2	0.259	0.038
Adjusted R^2	0.251	0.037
Residual Std. Error	2.437 (df = 1497)	2.741 (df = 2034)
F Statistic	34.836*** (df = 15; 1497)	79.847*** (df = 1; 2034)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix 1.12: Populism and Die Linke Evaluations: Scalar Variable:

Evaluations of Die Linke by Populism

	Dependent variable:	
	Die Linke Evaluations	
	(1)	(2)
Populism_Scale	0.022	-0.012
	(0.020)	(0.018)
DieLinke_PartyID	4.986***	
	(0.164)	
CDU_PartyID	0.205	
	(0.136)	
CSU_PartyID	-0.585***	
	(0.224)	
SPD_PartyID	1.784***	
	(0.135)	
FDP_PartyID	0.112	
	(0.188)	
Greens_PartyID	2.134***	
	(0.162)	
Afd_PartyID	0.157	
	(0.201)	
Other_PartyID	0.395	
	(0.338)	
No_PartyID	1.431***	
	(0.135)	
Gender	0.288***	
(1 = Female)	(0.069)	
Religion	0.296***	
(1 = Non-Religious)	(0.072)	
Education	0.146***	
	(0.035)	
Social_Class	-0.197***	
	(0.041)	
EastWest	0.142**	
(1 = Born GDR)	(0.070)	
Constant	3.961***	5.715***
	(0.197)	(0.095)
Observations	5,228	6,944
R^2	0.268	0.0001
Adjusted R^2	0.266	-0.0001
Residual Std. Error	2.468 (df = 5212)	2.829 (df = 6942)
F Statistic	127.465*** (df = 15; 5212)	0.439 (df = 1; 6942)

Note: $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

Evaluations of Die Linke by Unfolded Proximity Groups and Populism Groups

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			Die Linke Evaluations			
EconFurthest (Left)	-1.727***			-0.754**		
	(0.410)			(0.358)		
Econ_4 (Left)	-1.268***			-0.638**		
	(0.308)			(0.268)		
EconModDistant (Left)	-0.650**			-0.348		
	(0.304)			(0.264)		
Econ_2 (Left)	-0.532*			-0.105		
	(0.282)			(0.245)		
EconClosest (Left)	-0.251			-0.032		
	(0.283)			(0.244)		
Absolute Closest	*(baseline)*			*(baseline)*		
EconClosest (Right)	0.069			0.203		
	(0.254)			(0.221)		
Econ2 (Right)	-0.602**			-0.322		
	(0.254)			(0.221)		
EconMod-Distant (Right)	-1.194***			-0.561**		
	(0.277)			(0.242)		
Econ4 (Right)	-1.666***			-0.848***		
	(0.236)			(0.208)		
EconFurthest (Right)	-2.323***			-1.309***		
	(0.252)			(0.225)		
ImmigFurthest (Incl)		-2.036***			-1.719***	
		(0.603)			(0.512)	
Immig4 (Inclusive)		-1.618***			-1.210***	
		(0.428)			(0.365)	
ImmigModDistant (Incl)		-0.829**			-0.885**	
		(0.422)			(0.359)	
Immig2 (Inclusive)		-0.559*			-0.801***	
		(0.322)			(0.273)	
ImmigClosest (Incl)		-0.219			-0.126	
		(0.313)			(0.267)	
Absolute Closest		*(baseline)*			*(baseline)*	
ImmigClosest (Excl)		-0.232			-0.279	
		(0.265)			(0.225)	
Immig2 (Excl)		-0.055			-0.146	
		(0.260)			(0.221)	
ImmigModDistant(Excl)		-0.667**			-0.544**	
		(0.264)			(0.227)	
Immig4 (Excl)		-0.770***			-0.701***	
		(0.241)			(0.206)	
ImmigFurthest (Excl)		-1.752***			-1.494***	
		(0.234)			(0.206)	
Constant	6.602***	6.411***	5.600***	4.718***	5.200***	4.341***
	(0.176)	(0.187)	(0.131)	(0.329)	(0.332)	(0.325)
Observations	2,035	2,035	2,035	2,035	2,035	2,035
R^2	0.075	0.049	0.003	0.315	0.322	0.293
Adjusted R^2	0.071	0.045	0.001	0.307	0.314	0.286
Residual Std. Error	2.766 (df = 2024)	2.805 (df = 2024)	2.869 (df = 2030)	2.389 (df = 2010)	2.376 (df = 2010)	2.425 (df = 2016)
F Statistic	16.483*** (df = 10; 2024)	10.483*** (df = 10; 2024)	1.427 (df = 4; 2030)	38.574*** (df = 24; 2010)	39.863*** (df = 24; 2010)	46.315*** (df = 18; 2016)

Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Evaluations of Die Linke by Unfolded Proximity Groups and Populism Groups

			Dependent variable:			
			Die Linke Evaluations			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Rad Populist			0.388**			0.077
			(0.191)			(0.170)
Mod Populist			0.054			-0.015
			(0.193)			(0.166)
Absolute Closest			*(baseline)*			*(baseline)*
Mod Non-Populist			-0.007			0.148
			(0.209)			(0.178)
Rad Non-Populist			0.020			0.125
			(0.193)			(0.168)
DieLinke_PartyID				4.716***	4.924***	5.035***
				(0.252)	(0.247)	(0.253)
CDU_PartyID				0.294	0.340	0.314
				(0.211)	(0.211)	(0.215)
CSU_PartyID				-0.807**	-0.663*	-0.786**
				(0.367)	(0.364)	(0.371)
SPD_PartyID				1.701***	1.836***	1.956***
				(0.213)	(0.210)	(0.213)
FDP_PartyID				0.385	0.385	0.275
				(0.295)	(0.293)	(0.299)
Greens_PartyID				2.014***	2.139***	2.270***
				(0.253)	(0.250)	(0.253)
Afd_PartyID				0.173	0.580*	0.194
				(0.299)	(0.301)	(0.309)
Other_PartyID				0.061	0.288	0.313
				(0.493)	(0.490)	(0.500)
No_PartyID				1.475***	1.655***	1.675***
				(0.212)	(0.210)	(0.214)
Gender				0.241**	0.293***	0.321***
				(0.108)	(0.107)	(0.109)
Religion				0.043***	0.049***	0.038***
				(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Education				0.103*	0.039	0.075
				(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.055)
Social_Class				-0.163**	-0.228***	-0.210***
				(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.065)
EastWest				0.071	0.115	0.041
				(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.111)
Constant	6.602***	6.411***	5.600***	4.718***	5.200***	4.341***
	(0.176)	(0.187)	(0.131)	(0.329)	(0.332)	(0.325)
Observations	2,035	2,035	2,035	2,035	2,035	2,035
R^2	0.075	0.049	0.003	0.315	0.322	0.293
Adjusted R^2	0.071	0.045	0.001	0.307	0.314	0.286
Residual Std. Error	2.766 (df = 2024)	2.805 (df = 2024)	2.869 (df = 2030)	2.389 (df = 2010)	2.376 (df = 2010)	2.425 (df = 2016)
F Statistic	16.483*** (df = 10; 2024)	10.483*** (df = 10; 2024)	1.427 (df = 4; 2030)	38.574*** (df = 24; 2010)	39.863*** (df = 24; 2010)	46.315*** (df = 18; 2016)

Note:	
	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix 1.14: Econ./Immig. Proximity and Die Linke Evaluations: Scalar Variables:

Effect of Economic/Migration Policy Proximity on Evaluations of Die Linke

	Dependent variable:					
	Die Linke Evaluations					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Econ_Proximity	-0.664***	-1.086***			-0.515***	-0.891***
	(0.049)	(0.053)			(0.051)	(0.057)
Immig_Proximity			-0.645***	-0.766***	-0.570***	-0.668***
			(0.042)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.051)
Populism_Scale					-0.021	-0.108***
					(0.022)	(0.023)
DieLinke_PartyID	4.609***		4.819***		4.656***	
	(0.169)		(0.166)		(0.175)	
CDU_PartyID	0.348**		0.356**		0.327**	
	(0.141)		(0.140)		(0.146)	
CSU_PartyID	-0.538**		-0.379		-0.651**	
	(0.247)		(0.246)		(0.254)	
SPD_PartyID	1.717***		1.833***		1.621***	
	(0.142)		(0.140)		(0.147)	
FDP_PartyID	0.401**		0.346*		0.473**	
	(0.197)		(0.196)		(0.203)	
Greens_PartyID	1.992***		2.067***		1.894***	
	(0.167)		(0.165)		(0.174)	
Afd_PartyID	0.060		0.554***		0.533**	
	(0.202)		(0.203)		(0.211)	
Other_PartyID	0.087		0.405		0.191	
	(0.341)		(0.338)		(0.342)	
No_PartyID	1.431***		1.620***		1.487***	
	(0.142)		(0.140)		(0.147)	
Gender	0.233***		0.271***		0.236***	
(1 = Female)	(0.072)		(0.071)		(0.075)	
Religion	0.478***		0.534***		0.471***	
(1 = Non-Religious)	(0.074)		(0.074)		(0.078)	
Education	0.096***		0.033		0.054	
	(0.034)		(0.034)		(0.038)	
Social_Class	-0.139***		-0.210***		-0.178***	
	(0.042)		(0.042)		(0.044)	
EastWest	0.095		0.183**		0.174**	
(1 = Born GDR)	(0.073)		(0.073)		(0.076)	
Constant	4.852***	6.786***	5.197***	6.568***	5.673***	7.864***
	(0.204)	(0.067)	(0.207)	(0.067)	(0.229)	(0.149)
Observations	4,586	4,586	4,586	4,586	4,106	4,106
R^2	0.310	0.083	0.316	0.055	0.340	0.116
Adjusted R^2	0.308	0.083	0.314	0.055	0.338	0.116
Residual Std. Error	2.387 (df = 4570)	2.747 (df = 4584)	2.376 (df = 4570)	2.788 (df = 4584)	2.348 (df = 4088)	2.713 (df = 4102)
F Statistic	136.803*** (df = 15; 4570)	415.131*** (df = 1; 4584)	140.865*** (df = 15; 4570)	267.702*** (df = 1; 4584)	124.132*** (df = 17; 4088)	180.288*** (df = 3; 4102)

| *Note:* | | | | | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |

Evaluations of *Die Linke* by Policy Group

	Dependent variable:							
	Die Linke Evaluations							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rad Left	1.077***			0.824***	0.569***			0.498**
	(0.243)			(0.239)	(0.218)			(0.217)
Centre Left	0.068			0.014	-0.082			-0.089
	(0.237)			(0.232)	(0.210)			(0.210)
Centrist	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
Centre Right	-0.544**			-0.442*	-0.398*			-0.339
	(0.254)			(0.250)	(0.225)			(0.226)
Rad Right	-1.248***			-1.146***	-0.992***			-0.918***
	(0.221)			(0.218)	(0.198)			(0.199)
Rad Lib		0.561**		0.297		0.294		0.148
		(0.241)		(0.235)		(0.215)		(0.214)
Mod Lib		0.247		0.161		0.094		0.012
		(0.276)		(0.266)		(0.243)		(0.240)
Centrist	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
Mod Con		-0.580**		-0.555**		-0.386		-0.394
		(0.279)		(0.268)		(0.247)		(0.243)
Rad Con		-1.050***		-0.750***		-0.711***		-0.544**
		(0.266)		(0.260)		(0.241)		(0.240)
Rad Inc			1.024***	0.982***			0.631**	0.575**
			(0.275)	(0.268)			(0.251)	(0.249)
Mod Inc			0.634**	0.812***			0.354	0.437*
			(0.273)	(0.261)			(0.241)	(0.238)
Centrist	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
Mod Exc			-0.362	-0.291			-0.208	-0.160
			(0.251)	(0.240)			(0.223)	(0.219)
Rad Exc			0.099	0.0003			-0.119	-0.033
			(0.245)	(0.245)			(0.224)	(0.226)
Rad Populist				0.619***				0.074
				(0.233)				(0.218)
Mod Populist				0.236				0.099
				(0.229)				(0.208)
Centrist	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
Mod Non-Pop				-0.263				-0.105
				(0.242)				(0.219)
Rad Non-Pop				-0.372				-0.132
				(0.235)				(0.215)
Constant	5.555***	5.422***	5.148***	5.390***	4.315***	4.155***	4.277***	4.575***
	(0.162)	(0.200)	(0.194)	(0.322)	(0.378)	(0.402)	(0.414)	(0.473)

| | | | | | *Die Linke* Evaluations | | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
DieLinke_Party ID					4.616***	4.750***	4.759***	4.366***
					(0.323)	(0.326)	(0.329)	(0.327)
CDU_PartyID					0.318	0.254	0.333	0.212
					(0.255)	(0.260)	(0.260)	(0.256)
CSU_PartyID					-0.426	-0.336	-0.309	-0.324
					(0.394)	(0.398)	(0.401)	(0.393)
SPD_PartyID					1.667***	1.646***	1.755***	1.397***
					(0.257)	(0.263)	(0.262)	(0.262)
FDP_PartyID					0.712*	0.464	0.394	0.576
					(0.364)	(0.367)	(0.369)	(0.363)
Greens_PartyID					1.967***	1.990***	1.940***	1.566***
					(0.323)	(0.328)	(0.337)	(0.334)
Afd_PartyID					0.504	0.697*	0.583	0.611
					(0.385)	(0.392)	(0.394)	(0.391)
Other_PartyID					-0.537	-0.423	-0.478	-0.694
					(0.667)	(0.675)	(0.680)	(0.665)
No_PartyID					1.469***	1.435***	1.487***	1.352***
					(0.253)	(0.257)	(0.257)	(0.254)
Gender (1 = Female)					0.215	0.111	0.277**	0.123
					(0.136)	(0.141)	(0.139)	(0.139)
Religion (1 = Non-Religious)					0.034**	0.028*	0.039**	0.032*
					(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Education					0.023	0.054	-0.025	-0.021
					(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.071)	(0.071)
Social_Class					-0.101	-0.112	-0.160**	-0.082
					(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)
EastWest (1 = Born GDR)					0.205	0.280**	0.304**	0.243*
					(0.140)	(0.142)	(0.143)	(0.140)
Constant	5.555***	5.422***	5.148***	5.390***	4.315***	4.155***	4.277***	4.575***
	(0.162)	(0.200)	(0.194)	(0.322)	(0.378)	(0.402)	(0.414)	(0.473)
Observations	1,242	1,242	1,242	1,242	1,242	1,242	1,242	1,242
R^2	0.078	0.048	0.029	0.135	0.291	0.273	0.266	0.307
Adjusted R^2	0.075	0.045	0.026	0.124	0.280	0.262	0.255	0.290
Residual Std. Error	2.686 (df = 1237)	2.730 (df = 1237)	2.757 (df = 1237)	2.615 (df = 1225)	2.370 (df = 1223)	2.399 (df = 1223)	2.411 (df = 1223)	2.354 (df = 1211)
F Statistic	26.316*** (df = 4; 1237)	15.659*** (df = 4; 1237)	9.175*** (df = 4; 1237)	11.938*** (df = 16; 1225)	27.831*** (df = 18; 1223)	25.520*** (df = 18; 1223)	24.614*** (df = 18; 1223)	17.903*** (df = 30; 1211)

| Note: | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |

Evaluations of *Die Linke* by Policy Group

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
				Die Linke Evaluations				
Rad Left	0.626**			0.427*	0.202			0.138
	(0.264)			(0.258)	(0.231)			(0.232)
Centre Left	0.067			-0.053	-0.150			-0.227
	(0.257)			(0.249)	(0.224)			(0.223)
Centrist	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
Centre Right	-0.941***			-0.740***	-0.509**			-0.486**
	(0.263)			(0.255)	(0.231)			(0.229)
Rad Right	-1.349***			-1.078***	-0.816***			-0.750***
	(0.241)			(0.235)	(0.214)			(0.213)
Rad Lib		0.663***		0.369		0.283		0.151
		(0.252)		(0.244)		(0.221)		(0.220)
Mod Lib		0.407		0.389		0.297		0.267
		(0.277)		(0.265)		(0.241)		(0.238)
Centrist	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
Mod Con		-0.403		-0.306		-0.069		-0.049
		(0.278)		(0.266)		(0.242)		(0.238)
Rad Con		-1.181***		-0.766***		-0.579**		-0.426*
		(0.274)		(0.266)		(0.243)		(0.241)
Rad Inc			1.356***	1.107***			0.743***	0.593**
			(0.259)	(0.261)			(0.244)	(0.248)
Mod Inc			0.496*	0.512**			0.314	0.289
			(0.260)	(0.253)			(0.230)	(0.230)
Centrist	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
Mod Exc			-0.413	-0.450*			-0.234	-0.248
			(0.257)	(0.249)			(0.225)	(0.223)
Rad Exc			-0.765***	-1.063***			-0.719***	-0.815***
			(0.262)	(0.262)			(0.234)	(0.238)
Rad Populist				0.785***				0.430*
				(0.247)				(0.227)
Mod Populist				0.543**				0.391*
				(0.236)				(0.214)
Centrist	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)	(baseline)
Mod Non-Populist				0.199				0.365
				(0.265)				(0.238)
Rad Non-Populist				-0.050				0.288
				(0.244)				(0.221)
Constant	6.070***	5.727***	5.549***	5.732***	4.414***	4.278***	4.809***	4.803***
	(0.176)	(0.199)	(0.185)	(0.317)	(0.448)	(0.460)	(0.452)	(0.514)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
				Die Linke Evaluations				
DieLinkePartyID					4.686***	4.706***	4.634***	4.361***
					(0.356)	(0.359)	(0.356)	(0.360)
CDUPartyID					-0.077	-0.152	-0.117	-0.149
					(0.306)	(0.307)	(0.305)	(0.303)
CSUPartyID					-0.656	-0.621	-0.705	-0.573
					(0.545)	(0.547)	(0.544)	(0.540)
SPDPartyID					1.508***	1.462***	1.415***	1.287***
					(0.304)	(0.306)	(0.305)	(0.303)
FDPPartyID					-0.102	-0.261	-0.280	-0.135
					(0.415)	(0.416)	(0.414)	(0.411)
GreenPartyID					1.787***	1.786***	1.543***	1.286***
					(0.346)	(0.350)	(0.356)	(0.357)
AfdPartyID					-0.464	-0.343	-0.164	-0.140
					(0.424)	(0.428)	(0.429)	(0.431)
OtherPartyID					0.807	0.626	0.379	0.503
					(0.733)	(0.734)	(0.731)	(0.729)
NoPartyID					1.140***	1.091***	1.144***	1.053***
					(0.301)	(0.303)	(0.301)	(0.300)
Gender					0.282*	0.215	0.379***	0.237
(1 = Female)					(0.144)	(0.147)	(0.143)	(0.146)
Religion					0.030*	0.023	0.035**	0.032*
(1 = Non-Religious)					(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Education					0.224***	0.242***	0.113	0.100
					(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.074)	(0.075)
Social_Class					-0.174*	-0.214**	-0.270***	-0.191**
					(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.088)	(0.089)
EastWest					0.072	0.109	0.141	0.137
(1=Born GDR)					(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.145)	(0.144)
Constant	6.070***	5.727***	5.549***	5.732***	4.414***	4.278***	4.809***	4.803***
	(0.176)	(0.199)	(0.185)	(0.317)	(0.448)	(0.460)	(0.452)	(0.514)
Observations	1,198	1,198	1,198	1,198	1,198	1,198	1,198	1,198
R^2	0.063	0.052	0.065	0.146	0.302	0.297	0.307	0.330
Adjusted R^2	0.059	0.049	0.062	0.135	0.291	0.287	0.296	0.312
Residual Std. Error	2.827 (df = 1193)	2.842 (df = 1193)	2.823 (df = 1193)	2.712 (df = 1181)	2.454 (df = 1179)	2.462 (df = 1179)	2.445 (df = 1179)	2.417 (df = 1167)
F Statistic	19.930*** (df = 4; 1193)	16.498*** (df = 4; 1193)	20.771*** (df = 4; 1193)	12.630*** (df = 16; 1181)	28.309*** (df = 18; 1179)	27.731*** (df = 18; 1179)	28.992*** (df = 18; 1179)	19.132*** (df = 30; 1167)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix 1.17: Econ./Social/Immig. Policy and Die Linke Evaluations: Scalar Variables:

Evaluations of Die Linke by Policy Group

	Dependent variable:							
	Die Linke Evaluations							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Cumulative_Econ_Scale	0.250***	0.434***					0.265***	0.343***
	(0.028)	(0.026)					(0.040)	(0.038)
Cumulative_Social_Scale			-0.126***	-0.244***			-0.105***	-0.156***
			(0.019)	(0.017)			(0.028)	(0.026)
Cumulative_Immig_Scale					-0.145***	-0.216***	-0.113***	-0.224***
					(0.030)	(0.024)	(0.034)	(0.029)
Populism_Scale							-0.064	-0.200***
							(0.043)	(0.039)
DieLinke_PartyID	4.594***		4.763***		4.797***		4.362***	
	(0.221)		(0.220)		(0.302)		(0.325)	
CDU_PartyID	0.116		0.187		0.344		0.237	
	(0.180)		(0.180)		(0.239)		(0.254)	
CSU_PartyID	-0.441		-0.193		-0.267		-0.356	
	(0.289)		(0.294)		(0.363)		(0.389)	
SPD_PartyID	1.575***		1.628***		1.610***		1.386***	
	(0.180)		(0.181)		(0.241)		(0.260)	
FDP_PartyID	0.252		0.047		0.376		0.594	
	(0.253)		(0.251)		(0.352)		(0.361)	
Greens_PartyID	1.900***		1.935***		1.761***		1.506***	
	(0.216)		(0.216)		(0.305)		(0.332)	
Afd_PartyID	0.023		0.140		0.593		0.620	
	(0.267)		(0.270)		(0.378)		(0.386)	
Other_PartyID	0.413		0.685		-0.108		-0.587	
	(0.443)		(0.446)		(0.592)		(0.660)	
No_PartyID	1.284***		1.337***		1.442***		1.340***	
	(0.177)		(0.178)		(0.235)		(0.252)	
Gender	0.197**		0.114		0.294**		0.120	
(1 = Female)	(0.090)		(0.092)		(0.127)		(0.138)	
Religion	0.432***		0.357***		0.435***		0.312**	
(1 = Non-Religious)	(0.095)		(0.096)		(0.136)		(0.146)	
Education	0.132***		0.137***		-0.032		-0.012	
	(0.044)		(0.044)		(0.065)		(0.071)	
Social_Class	-0.125**		-0.161***		-0.149**		-0.071	
	(0.053)		(0.053)		(0.071)		(0.078)	
EastWest	0.119		0.166*		0.261**		0.269*	
(1 = Born GDR)	(0.093)		(0.093)		(0.131)		(0.139)	
Constant	2.210***	2.495***	4.691***	6.759***	5.476***	7.196***	4.022***	6.462***
	(0.322)	(0.192)	(0.270)	(0.089)	(0.474)	(0.196)	(0.659)	(0.490)
Observations	2,941	3,916	2,980	3,994	1,513	2,036	1,242	1,643
R^2	0.284	0.068	0.271	0.048	0.259	0.038	0.306	0.132
Adjusted R^2	0.281	0.067	0.268	0.048	0.251	0.037	0.295	0.130
Residual Std. Error	2.430 (df = 2925)	2.720 (df = 3914)	2.451 (df = 2964)	2.750 (df = 3992)	2.437 (df = 1497)	2.741 (df = 2034)	2.345 (df = 1223)	2.586 (df = 1638)
F Statistic	77.423*** (df = 15; 2925)	283.393*** (df = 1; 3914)	73.571*** (df = 15; 2964)	202.853*** (df = 1; 3992)	34.836*** (df = 15; 1497)	79.847*** (df = 1; 2034)	29.899*** (df = 18; 1223)	62.119*** (df = 4; 1638)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix 2.0: US

<u>**List of questions –**</u>

<u>*CCES:*</u>

Dependent Variable – CC16_328

'In the Presidential primary or caucus, who did you vote for?'

Economic Questions –

CC16_415r – *'If your state were to have a budget deficit this year it would have to raise taxes on income and sales or cut spending, such as on education, health care, welfare, and road construction. What would you prefer more, raising taxes or cutting spending? Choose a point along the scale from 100'*

'Congress considers many issues. If you were in Congress would you vote FOR or AGAINST each of the following?':

CC16_351I – *'Repeal Affordable Care Act. Would repeal the Affordable Care Act of 2009 (also known as Obamacare).'*

CC16_351K – *'Minimum wage. Raises the federal minimum wage to $12 an hour by 2020.'*

Cultural Policy Questions – CC16_330 – Gun Control:

'On the issue of gun regulation, do you support or oppose each of the following proposals?'

CC16_330a – *'Background checks for all sales, including at gun shows and*

over the Internet'

CC16_330d – *'Ban assault rifles'*

CC16_330e – *'Make it easier for people to obtain concealed-carry permit'*

Cultural Policy Questions – CC16_332 – Abortion:

'Do you support or oppose each of the following proposals?'

CC16_332a – *'Always allow a woman to obtain an abortion as a matter of*

choice'

CC16_332b – *'Permit abortion only in case of rape, incest or when the*

woman's life is in danger'

CC16_332c – *'Prohibit all abortions after the 20th week of pregnancy'*

CC16_332d – *'Allow employers to decline coverage of abortions in insurance plans'*

CC16_332e – *'Prohibit the expenditure of funds authorized or appropriated*

by federal law for any abortion'

CC16_332f – *'Make abortions illegal in all circumstances'*

Cultural Policy Questions – CC16_334 – Crime:

'Do you support or oppose each of the following proposals?'

CC16_334a – *'Eliminate mandatory minimum sentences for non-violent drug offenders'*

CC16_334b – *'Require police officers to wear body cameras that record all of*

their activities while on duty'

CC16_334c – *'Increase the number of police on the street by 10 percent, even*

if it means fewer funds for other public services'

CC16_334d – *'Increase prison sentences for felons who have already*

committed two or more serious or violent crimes'

Cultural Policy Question – CC16_335 – Gay Marriage

'Do you favor or oppose allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally?'

Migration Questions – CC16_331

'What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration? Select all that apply.'

CC16_331_1 – *'Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes'*

CC16_331_2 – *'Increase the number of border patrols on the U.S.-Mexican border'*

CC16_331_3 – *'Grant legal status to people who were brought to the US illegally as children, but who have graduated from a U.S. high school'*

CC16_331_7 – *'Identify and deport illegal immigrants'*

Control Variable – Race:

'What racial or ethnic group best describes you?'

Control Variable – Party Identification:

'Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a ...?'

Control Variable – Church Attendance:

'Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services?'

Control Variable – Education:

'What is the highest level of education you have completed?'

Control Variable – Gender:

'Are you male or female?'

ANES:

Populism Question – V162259

'What people call compromise in politics is really just selling out on one's principles.'

Populism Question – V162260

'Most politicians do not care about the people.'

Populism Question – V162261

'Most politicians are trustworthy.'

Populism Question – V162262

'Politicians are the main problem in the United States'

Populism Question – V162264

'The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.'

Populism Question – V162265

'Most politicians care only about the interests of the rich and powerful.'

Populism Question – V162267

'The will of the majority should always prevail, even over the rights of minorities.'

Control Variable: Race – V161310x

'Please choose one or more races that you consider yourself to be: - white, - black or African-American, - American Indian or Alaska Native, - Asian, or - Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander?'

Control Variable: Party ID – V161158x

[Derived Variable] - V161155, V161156, V161157

Control Variable: Church Attendance –

'Do you go to religious services [every week, almost every week, once or twice a month, a few times a year, or never/ never, a few times a year, once or twice a month, almost every week, or every week]?'

Control Variable: Education –

'What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have received?'

Control Variable: Gender –

'Is R male or female (Observation)?'

Appendix 2.1: Economic Policy and Sanders/Clinton Voting: Scalar Variable:

Likelihood of Supporting Sanders Campaign by Economic Policy Group

	Dependent variable:	
	Likelihood of Supporting Sanders by Group	
	(1)	(2)
econ_scale	-0.002***	-0.001***
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
gender		0.013
(1 = Female)		(0.008)
race		-0.085***
(1 = Non-White)		(0.009)
educ		0.001
		(0.003)
pew_churatd		0.048***
		(0.003)
Constant	0.460***	0.240***
	(0.006)	(0.021)
Observations	13,465	13,465
R^2	0.010	0.045
Adjusted R^2	0.010	0.045
Residual Std. Error	0.489 (df = 13463)	0.480 (df = 13459)
F Statistic	132.202*** (df = 1; 13463)	127.087*** (df = 5; 13459)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix 2.2: Cultural Policy and Sanders/Clinton Voting: Scalar Variable:

Likelihood of Supporting Sanders Campaign by Cultural Policy Group

	Dependent variable:	
	Likelihood of Supporting Sanders by Group	
	(1)	(2)
cultural_scale	-0.005***	-0.004***
	(0.0002)	(0.0003)
Gender		0.008
(1 = Female)		(0.008)
Race		-0.075***
(1 = Non-White)		(0.009)
Educ		-0.006**
		(0.003)
pew_churatd		0.036***
		(0.003)
Constant	0.522***	0.372***
	(0.007)	(0.024)
Observations	13,465	13,465
R^2	0.035	0.055
Adjusted R^2	0.035	0.054
Residual Std. Error	0.482 (df = 13463)	0.478 (df = 13459)
F Statistic	494.508*** (df = 1; 13463)	156.110*** (df = 5; 13459)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix 2.3: Cultural Policy and Sanders/Clinton Voting (Excluding Guns):

Likelihood of Supporting Sanders Campaign by Cultural Policy Group

	Dependent variable:	
	Likelihood of Supporting Sanders by Group	
	(1)	(2)
Rad Lib	0.169***	0.136***
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Mod Lib	0.053***	0.033**
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Mod Cons	-0.033**	-0.007
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Rad Cons	-0.026*	0.022
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Gender		-0.0005
(1 = Female)		(0.008)
Race		-0.083***
(1 = Non-White)		(0.009)
Education		-0.011***
		(0.003)
Church Attendance		0.037***
		(0.003)
Constant	0.388***	0.296***
	(0.010)	(0.022)
Observations	15,221	15,221
R^2	0.029	0.051
Adjusted R^2	0.029	0.051
Residual Std. Error	0.490 (df = 15216)	0.484 (df = 15212)
F Statistic	113.000*** (df = 4; 15216)	102.744*** (df = 8; 15212)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix 2.4: Migration Policy and Sanders/Clinton Voting: Scalar Variable:

Likelihood of Supporting Sanders Campaign by Migration Policy Group

	Dependent variable:	
	Likelihood of Supporting Sanders by Group	
	(1)	(2)
immig_scale	-0.002***	-0.001***
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Gender		0.008
(1 = Female)		(0.008)
Race		-0.086***
(1 = Non-White)		(0.009)
Educ		-0.001
		(0.003)
pew_churatd		0.048***
		(0.003)
Constant	0.451***	0.250***
	(0.006)	(0.021)
Observations	13,465	13,465
R^2	0.011	0.047
Adjusted R^2	0.011	0.047
Residual Std. Error	0.489 (df = 13463)	0.480 (df = 13459)
F Statistic	147.385*** (df = 1; 13463)	132.895*** (df = 5; 13459)
Note:		*$p<0.1$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$

Likelihood of Supporting Sanders Campaign by Policy Groups on all Dimensions

	Dependent variable:							
	Likelihood of Supporting Sanders by Group							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
econ_scale	-0.002***	-0.001***		0.00003				0.0001
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)		(0.0002)				(0.0002)
cultural_scale			-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.004***			-0.003***
			(0.0002)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)			(0.0003)
immig_scale				-0.001***		-0.002***	-0.001***	-0.001***
				(0.0002)		(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Gender (1 = Female)		0.013			0.008		0.008	0.007
		(0.008)			(0.008)		(0.008)	(0.008)
Race (1 = Non-White)		-0.085***			-0.075***		-0.086***	-0.075***
		(0.009)			(0.009)		(0.009)	(0.009)
Education		0.001			-0.006**		-0.001	-0.007**
		(0.003)			(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.003)
Church Attendance		0.048***			0.036***		0.048***	0.036***
		(0.003)			(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.003)
Constant	0.460***	0.240***	0.522***	0.527***	0.372***	0.451***	0.250***	0.381***
	(0.006)	(0.021)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.024)	(0.006)	(0.021)	(0.024)
Observations	13,465	13,465	13,465	13,465	13,465	13,465	13,465	13,465
R^2	0.010	0.045	0.035	0.036	0.055	0.011	0.047	0.056
Adjusted R^2	0.010	0.045	0.035	0.036	0.054	0.011	0.047	0.055
Residual Std. Error	0.489 (df = 13463)	0.480 (df = 13459)	0.482 (df = 13463)	0.482 (df = 13461)	0.478 (df = 13459)	0.489 (df = 13463)	0.480 (df = 13459)	0.477 (df = 13457)
F Statistic	132.202*** (df = 1; 13463)	127.087*** (df = 5; 13459)	494.508*** (df = 1; 13463)	168.743*** (df = 3; 13461)	156.110*** (df = 5; 13459)	147.385*** (df = 1; 13463)	132.895*** (df = 5; 13459)	113.559*** (df = 7; 13457)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix 2.6: Multiple Logistic Regression of all policy groups and probability of voting for Sanders/Clinton (Sample = Dem-identifiers + Dem-leaners)

Probability of Voting Sanders v. Clinton by Policy Groups on all Dimensions

	Probability Voted for Sanders/Clinton by Group							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rad Left	0.564***			0.155**	0.388***			0.149**
	(0.055)			(0.060)	(0.057)			(0.062)
Centre Left	-0.065			-0.265***	-0.130**			-0.249***
	(0.057)			(0.060)	(0.059)			(0.061)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Centre Right	-0.130			-0.013	-0.075			-0.007
	(0.083)			(0.085)	(0.085)			(0.086)
Rad Right	0.301*			0.432***	0.369**			0.444***
	(0.162)			(0.166)	(0.165)			(0.167)
Rad Lib		0.765***		0.608***		0.488***		0.364***
		(0.056)		(0.062)		(0.061)		(0.065)
Mod Lib		0.199***		0.172***		0.056		0.039
		(0.063)		(0.064)		(0.064)		(0.066)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Mod Cons		-0.330***		-0.342***		-0.252***		-0.266***
		(0.081)		(0.082)		(0.082)		(0.083)
Rad Cons		0.122		0.036		0.210		0.142
		(0.201)		(0.203)		(0.204)		(0.206)
Rad Inc			0.605***	0.273***			0.454***	0.265***
			(0.056)	(0.060)			(0.058)	(0.061)
Mod Inc			0.145**	0.009			0.094	0.016
			(0.059)	(0.061)			(0.061)	(0.062)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Mod Exc			-0.109	-0.017			-0.061	-0.022
			(0.085)	(0.087)			(0.087)	(0.088)
Rad Exc			0.254**	0.365***			0.227**	0.284***
			(0.099)	(0.101)			(0.101)	(0.103)
Gender (1=Female)					0.091**	0.043	0.024	0.062*
					(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.037)
Race (1=NonWhite)					-0.340***	-0.330***	-0.371***	-0.291***
					(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.042)
Education					-0.013	-0.025*	-0.007	-0.043***
					(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Church Attendance					0.205***	0.167***	0.206***	0.160***
					(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Constant	-0.609***	-0.803***	-0.700***	-0.841***	-1.333***	-1.207***	-1.421***	-1.173***
	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.078)	(0.095)	(0.096)	(0.097)	(0.114)
Observations	13,465	13,465	13,465	13,465	13,465	13,465	13,465	13,465
Log Likelihood	-8,942.069	-8,859.330	-8,979.215	-8,768.926	-8,717.292	-8,714.085	-8,740.586	-8,637.142
Akaike Inf. Crit.	17,894.140	17,728.660	17,968.430	17,563.850	17,452.580	17,446.170	17,499.170	17,308.280

Note: $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

Appendix 2.7: Logistic Model of Populism Groups and Sanders/Clinton Voting Probability
(Sample = Dem-identifiers + Dem-leaners)

Probability of Voting Sanders v. Clinton by Populism Groups

	Dependent variable:	
	Probability Voted for Sanders/Clinton by Group	
	(1)	(2)
Radical Populist	0.353	0.505
	(0.368)	(0.384)
Moderate Populist	0.164	0.269
	(0.412)	(0.429)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Moderate Non-Populist	0.440	0.528
	(0.371)	(0.390)
Radical Non-Populist	0.109	-0.004
	(0.298)	(0.321)
Gender		-0.457[*]
(1 = Female)		(0.241)
Race		-0.954[***]
(1 = Non-White)		(0.251)
Education		0.009
		(0.055)
Church Attendance		0.195[**]
		(0.098)
Constant	-1.046[***]	-0.942
	(0.228)	(0.737)
Observations	381	381
Log Likelihood	-229.812	-216.276
Akaike Inf. Crit.	469.624	450.551
Note:		[*]$p<0.1$; [**]$p<0.05$; [***]$p<0.01$

322

Appendix 2.8: Populism and Sanders/Clinton Voting: Scalar Variable

Likelihood of Supporting Sanders Campaign by Populism

	Dependent variable:	
	Likelihood of Supporting Sanders	
	(1)	(2)
Populism_scale	-0.072***	-0.063*
	(0.026)	(0.035)
Gender		-0.097**
(1 = Female)		(0.048)
Education		0.005
		(0.011)
Race		-0.187***
(1 = Non-White)		(0.048)
Church		0.035*
		(0.019)
Constant	0.590***	0.489***
	(0.079)	(0.161)
Observations	741	381
R^2	0.010	0.073
Adjusted R^2	0.009	0.060
Residual Std. Error	0.482 (df = 739)	0.442 (df = 375)
F Statistic	7.827*** (df = 1; 739)	5.864*** (df = 5; 375)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix 2.9: Multiple Linear Regression of Policy Groups and Probability of Voting Sanders/Clinton. With PartyID control.

Probability of Voting Sanders v. Clinton by Policy Groups on all Dimensions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Probability Voted for Sanders/Clinton by Group							
Rad Left	0.081***			0.004	0.084***			0.036***
	(0.012)			(0.013)	(0.012)			(0.013)
Centre Left	-0.063***			-0.094***	-0.037***			-0.057***
	(0.012)			(0.013)	(0.012)			(0.012)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Centre Right	0.007			0.021	-0.012			-0.003
	(0.017)			(0.017)	(0.016)			(0.016)
Rad Right	0.254***			0.251***	0.139***			0.138***
	(0.028)			(0.028)	(0.027)			(0.027)
Rad Lib		0.138***		0.132***		0.110***		0.085***
		(0.012)		(0.013)		(0.012)		(0.013)
Mod Lib		0.021		0.033**		0.008		0.007
		(0.013)		(0.013)		(0.013)		(0.013)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Mod Cons		-0.022		-0.044***		-0.024		-0.031**
		(0.016)		(0.016)		(0.015)		(0.015)
Rad Cons		0.232***		0.132***		0.148***		0.103***
		(0.035)		(0.035)		(0.034)		(0.034)
Rad Inc			0.107***	0.052***			0.099***	0.058***
			(0.012)	(0.013)			(0.012)	(0.013)
Mod Inc			0.004	-0.013			0.013	-0.001
			(0.013)	(0.013)			(0.012)	(0.012)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Mod Exc			0.004	0.007			-0.012	-0.009
			(0.018)	(0.017)			(0.017)	(0.017)
Rad Exc			0.141***	0.125***			0.082***	0.079***
			(0.020)	(0.020)			(0.020)	(0.020)
Gender					0.015*	0.005	0.0002	0.010
(1 = Female)					(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Race					-0.079***	-0.078***	-0.087***	-0.068***
(1=NonWhite)					(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Education					-0.006**	-0.008***	-0.004	-0.012***
					(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
ChurchAttend					0.045***	0.038***	0.045***	0.036***
					(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
PartyID					**0.337***	**0.354***	**0.344***	**0.343***
(1=Non-Dem)					**(0.013)**	**(0.012)**	**(0.012)**	**(0.013)**
Constant	0.425***	0.372***	0.391***	0.371***	0.220***	0.232***	0.201***	0.243***
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.023)
Observations	15,221	15,221	15,221	15,221	15,221	15,221	15,221	15,221
R^2	0.021	0.020	0.012	0.042	0.097	0.096	0.093	0.108
Adjusted R^2	0.021	0.019	0.012	0.042	0.097	0.095	0.093	0.107
Residual Std. Error	0.492 (df = 15216)	0.492 (df = 15216)	0.494 (df = 15216)	0.487 (df = 15208)	0.472 (df = 15211)	0.473 (df = 15211)	0.473 (df = 15211)	0.470 (df = 15203)
F Statistic	80.779*** (df = 4; 15216)	76.622*** (df = 4; 15216)	46.128*** (df = 4; 15216)	55.928*** (df = 12; 15208)	181.742*** (df = 9; 15211)	179.337*** (df = 9; 15211)	173.546*** (df = 9; 15211)	108.570*** (df = 17; 15203)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix 2.10: Probability of Supporting Sanders vs. Clinton – Populism Groups

With PartyID control.

Likelihood of Supporting Sanders Campaign by Populism Group

	Dependent variable:	
	Probability Voted for Sanders/Clinton by Group	
	(1)	(2)
Radical Populist	0.055	0.081
	(0.056)	(0.070)
Moderate Populist	0.070	0.108
	(0.063)	(0.076)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Moderate Non-Populist	0.011	0.113
	(0.056)	(0.073)
Radical Non-Populist	-0.070	0.015
	(0.045)	(0.057)
Gender		-0.035
(1 = Female)		(0.045)
Race		-0.199***
(1 = Non-White)		(0.045)
Education		-0.001
		(0.010)
PartyID		**-0.324***
(1 = Non-Democrat)		**(0.065)**
Church Attendance		0.033*
		(0.018)
Constant	0.413***	0.622***
	(0.034)	(0.142)
Observations	831	437
R^2	0.011	0.128
Adjusted R^2	0.006	0.109
Residual Std. Error	0.490 (df = 826)	0.448 (df = 427)
F Statistic	2.291* (df = 4; 826)	6.955*** (df = 9; 427)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix 3.0: UK

<u>*British Election Study – Panel Surveys:*</u>

<u>Dependent Variable:</u>

> *'How much do you like or dislike each of the following parties?'* – Labour

<u>Economic Policy Variables:</u>

Values1 – *'How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?'*

> lr1: *'Government should redistribute income from the better off to those who are less well off'*
>
> lr2: *'Big business takes advantage of ordinary people'*
>
> lr3: *'Ordinary working people do not get their fair share of the nation's wealth'*
>
> lr4: *'There is one law for the rich and one for the poor'*
>
> lr5: *'Management will always try to get the better of employees if it gets the chance'*
>
> Scale:[45]   'Strongly disagree'
> 'Disagree'
> 'Neither agree nor disagree'
> 'Agree'
> 'Strongly agree'

<u>Cultural policy Variables:</u>

Values2 – *'How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?'*

> al1: *'Young people today don't have enough respect for traditional British values'*
>
> al2: *'For some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence'*
>
> al3: *'Schools should teach children to obey authority'*

---

[45] Scale of responses matched with cultural policy and populism questions.

al4:   *'Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards'*

al5:   *'People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences'*

<u>Migration Policy Variables:</u>

ImmigEcon – *'Do you think immigration is good or bad for Britain's economy?'*

7 (Good for economy) – 1 (Bad for economy)

ImmigCultural – *'And do you think that immigration undermines or enriches Britain's cultural life?'*

7 (Enriches cultural life) – 1 (Undermines cultural life)

<u>Populism Variables:</u>

populism1:   *'The politicians in the UK Parliament need to follow the will of the people'*

populism2:   *'The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions'*

populism4:   *'I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician'*

populism5:   *'Elected officials talk too much and take too little action'*

populism6:   *'What people call "compromise" in politics is really just selling out on one's principles'*

<u>Control Variables:</u>

ageGroup – *'What is your age?'*

Under 18, 18–25, 26–35, 36–45, 46–55, 56–65, 66+

Education – *'What is the highest educational or work-related qualification you have?'*

No formal qualifications, Youth training certificate/skillseekers, Recognised trade apprenticeship completed, Clerical and commercial, City and Guild certificate,

City and Guild certificate – advanced, ONC, CSE grades 2-5, CSE grade 1, GCE O level, GCSE, School Certificate, Scottish Ordinary/ Lower Certificate, GCE A level or Higher Certificate, Scottish Higher Certificate, Nursing qualification, Teaching qualification (not degree), University diploma, University or CNAA first degree (eg BA, B.Sc, B.Ed), University or CNAA higher degree (eg M.Sc, Ph.D), Other technical, professional or higher qualification.

euRefVote – *'If you do vote in the referendum on Britain's membership of the European Union, how do you think you will vote?'*

Remain in the EU, Leave the EU

euRefVotePost – *'Which way did you vote?'*

Remain in the EU, Leave the EU

Gender – *'Are you male or female?'*

Male, Female

Profile_Ethnicity – *'To which of these groups do you consider you belong?'*

White British, Any other white background, White and Black Caribbean, White and Black African, White and Asian, Any other mixed background, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Any other Asian background, Black Caribbean, Black African, Any other black background, Chinese, Other ethnic group

Recoded as dummy variable: 0 = White-British, 1 = Non-White British

PartyID – *'Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat or what?'*

Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat, SNP, Plaid Cymru, UKIP, Green Party, BNP, Other

Recoded as series of dummy variables, 1 representing identifiers with each of the above. SNP and Plaid Cymru cumulated together. 'BNP' and 'Other' cumulated together also.

LikeLeader – *'How much do you like or dislike each of the following party leaders?'*

Miliband, Corbyn

0–10 scale. 0 = *'Strongly Dislike'*, 10 = *'Strongly Like'*

Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015-2017 by Economic Policy

	Dependent variable:	
	Evaluation Change	
	(1)	(2)
Econ_scale	0.309***	0.258***
	(0.031)	(0.044)
Education		0.013*
		(0.007)
EU_Vote		-0.328***
(1 = Leave)		(0.075)
Gender		0.220***
(1 = Female)		(0.065)
ageGroup		-0.053**
		(0.025)
Ethnicity		0.188
(1 = Non-White)		(0.126)
Cons_ID		-0.416***
		(0.113)
Lab_ID		-0.850***
		(0.107)
LD_ID		-0.239
		(0.150)
SNP.PC_ID		0.966***
		(0.154)
UKIP_ID		-0.161
		(0.151)
Greens_ID		1.079***
		(0.210)
Other_ID		0.817***
		(0.265)
Constant	-0.681***	-0.031
	(0.120)	(0.263)
Observations	6,930	4,574
R^2	0.014	0.086
Adjusted R^2	0.014	0.084
Residual Std. Error	2.320 (df = 6928)	2.173 (df = 4560)
F Statistic	100.568*** (df = 1; 6928)	33.169*** (df = 13; 4560)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix 3.2: Cultural Policy Proximity and Labour Party Evaluation Changes 2015-2017: Scalar Variable

Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015-2017 by Cultural Policy

	Dependent variable:	
	Evaluation Change	
	(1)	(2)
Social_scale	-0.364***	-0.236***
	(0.032)	(0.045)
Education		-0.001
		(0.007)
EU_Vote		-0.184**
(1 = Leave)		(0.080)
Gender		0.211***
(1 = Female)		(0.066)
ageGroup		-0.043*
		(0.026)
Ethnicity		0.249*
(1 = Non-White)		(0.129)
Cons_ID		-0.518***
		(0.109)
Lab_ID		-0.709***
		(0.107)
LD_ID		-0.205
		(0.152)
SNP.PC_ID		1.115***
		(0.156)
UKIP_ID		-0.011
		(0.153)
Greens_ID		1.114***
		(0.216)
Other_ID		0.821***
		(0.270)
Constant	1.784***	1.805***
	(0.116)	(0.248)
Observations	6,762	4,453
R^2	0.019	0.084
Adjusted R^2	0.019	0.081
Residual Std. Error	2.322 (df = 6760)	2.177 (df = 4439)
F Statistic	133.258*** (df = 1; 6760)	31.201*** (df = 13; 4439)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015-2017 by Cultural Policy Groups

	Evaluation Change by Group	
	(1)	(2)
Rad Lib	0.509***	0.315***
	(0.075)	(0.095)
Mod Lib	0.105	0.076
	(0.097)	(0.117)
Mod Con	-0.171*	-0.048
	(0.097)	(0.114)
Rad Con	-0.197**	-0.194*
	(0.085)	(0.102)
Education		0.0003
		(0.007)
EU_Vote		-0.193**
(1 = Leave)		(0.081)
Gender		0.177***
(1 = Female)		(0.067)
ageGroup		-0.054**
		(0.026)
Ethnicity		0.256**
		(0.129)
Cons_ID		-0.548***
		(0.108)
Lab_ID		-0.718***
		(0.108)
LD_ID		-0.224
		(0.152)
SNP.PC_ID		1.140***
		(0.156)
UKIP_ID		-0.029
		(0.153)
Greens_ID		1.153***
		(0.216)
Other_ID		0.857***
		(0.271)
Constant	0.385***	0.971***
	(0.053)	(0.207)
Observations	6,762	4,453
R^2	0.014	0.082
Adjusted R^2	0.013	0.079
Residual Std. Error	2.329 (df = 6757)	2.179 (df = 4436)
F Statistic	23.842*** (df = 4; 6757)	24.920*** (df = 16; 4436)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix 3.4: Migration Policy Proximity and Labour Party Evaluation Changes 2015-2017: Scalar Variable

Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015-2017 by Migration Policy

	Dependent variable:	
	Evaluation Change	
	(1)	(2)
Immig_scale	0.181***	0.129***
	(0.015)	(0.022)
Education		0.004
		(0.007)
EU_Vote		-0.114
(1 = Leave)		(0.085)
Gender		0.193***
(1 = Female)		(0.066)
ageGroup		-0.035
		(0.026)
Ethnicity		0.019
(1 = Non-White)		(0.128)
Cons_ID		-0.583***
		(0.107)
Lab_ID		-0.750***
		(0.107)
LD_ID		-0.203
		(0.152)
SNP.PC_ID		1.127***
		(0.157)
UKIP_ID		-0.018
		(0.153)
Greens_ID		1.243***
		(0.219)
Other_ID		0.904***
		(0.270)
Constant	-0.200***	0.384*
	(0.064)	(0.219)
Observations	6,742	4,410
R^2	0.020	0.087
Adjusted R^2	0.020	0.084
Residual Std. Error	2.329 (df = 6740)	2.169 (df = 4396)
F Statistic	139.637*** (df = 1; 6740)	32.292*** (df = 13; 4396)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix 3.5: Policy Proximity and Labour Party Evaluation Changes 2015-2017: Scalar Variable

Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015-2017 by Policy

				Dependent variable:				
				Evaluation Change				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Econ_scale	0.309***	0.258***					0.235***	0.274***
	(0.031)	(0.044)					(0.040)	(0.057)
Social_scale			-0.364***	-0.236***			-0.240***	-0.220***
			(0.032)	(0.045)			(0.051)	(0.063)
Immig_scale					0.181***	0.129***	0.092***	0.100***
					(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.031)
Education		0.013*		-0.001		0.004		0.001
		(0.007)		(0.007)		(0.007)		(0.009)
EU_Vote		-0.328***		-0.184**		-0.114		-0.005
(1 = Leave)		(0.075)		(0.080)		(0.085)		(0.111)
Gender		0.220***		0.211***		0.193***		0.187**
		(0.065)		(0.066)		(0.066)		(0.088)
ageGroup		-0.053**		-0.043*		-0.035		-0.027
		(0.025)		(0.026)		(0.026)		(0.035)
Ethnicity		0.188		0.249*		0.019		0.050
		(0.126)		(0.129)		(0.128)		(0.170)
Cons_ID		-0.416***		-0.518***		-0.583***		-0.243
		(0.113)		(0.109)		(0.107)		(0.149)
Lab_ID		-0.850***		-0.709***		-0.750***		-0.852***
		(0.107)		(0.107)		(0.107)		(0.141)
LD_ID		-0.239		-0.205		-0.203		-0.210
		(0.150)		(0.152)		(0.152)		(0.196)
SNP.PC_ID		0.966***		1.115***		1.127***		0.917***
		(0.154)		(0.156)		(0.157)		(0.207)
UKIP_ID		-0.161		-0.011		-0.018		-0.028
		(0.151)		(0.153)		(0.153)		(0.207)
Greens_ID		1.079***		1.114***		1.243***		1.111***
		(0.210)		(0.216)		(0.219)		(0.299)
Other_ID		0.817***		0.821***		0.904***		1.150***
		(0.265)		(0.270)		(0.270)		(0.357)
Constant	-0.681***	-0.031	1.784***	1.805***	-0.200***	0.384*	0.060	0.089
	(0.120)	(0.263)	(0.116)	(0.248)	(0.064)	(0.219)	(0.299)	(0.452)
Observations	6,930	4,574	6,762	4,453	6,742	4,410	3,817	2,558
R^2	0.014	0.086	0.019	0.084	0.020	0.087	0.033	0.098
Adjusted R^2	0.014	0.084	0.019	0.081	0.020	0.084	0.033	0.093
Residual Std. Error	2.320 (df = 6928)	2.173 (df = 4560)	2.322 (df = 6760)	2.177 (df = 4439)	2.329 (df = 6740)	2.169 (df = 4396)	2.278 (df = 3813)	2.156 (df = 2542)
F Statistic	100.568*** (df = 1; 6928)	33.169*** (df = 13; 4560)	133.258*** (df = 1; 6760)	31.201*** (df = 13; 4439)	139.637*** (df = 1; 6740)	32.292*** (df = 13; 4396)	43.758*** (df = 3; 3813)	18.443*** (df = 15; 2542)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix 3.6: Populism and Labour Party Evaluation Changes 2015-2017: Scalar Variable

Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015-2017 by Populism

	Dependent variable:	
	Evaluation Change by Group	
	(1)	(2)
Populism_scale	0.062	0.149**
	(0.046)	(0.059)
Education		0.016*
		(0.008)
EU_Vote		-0.400***
(1 = Leave)		(0.100)
Gender		0.199**
(1 = Female)		(0.083)
ageGroup		-0.059*
		(0.033)
Ethnicity		0.221
(1 = Non-White)		(0.159)
Cons_ID		-0.543***
		(0.132)
Lab_ID		-0.682***
		(0.131)
LD_ID		-0.139
		(0.185)
SNP.PC_ID		1.062***
		(0.193)
UKIP_ID		-0.178
		(0.194)
Greens_ID		1.237***
		(0.280)
Other_ID		0.953***
		(0.339)
Constant	0.224	0.385
	(0.164)	(0.322)
Observations	4,372	2,931
R^2	0.0004	0.074
Adjusted R^2	0.0002	0.070
Residual Std. Error	2.325 (df = 4370)	2.198 (df = 2917)
F Statistic	1.840 (df = 1; 4370)	17.985*** (df = 13; 2917)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix 3.7: Policy Proximity & Populism, and Labour Party Evaluation Changes 2015-2017: Scalar Variable

Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015-2017 by Policy and Populism

	Dependent variable:									
	Evaluation Change									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Econ_scale	0.309***	0.258***							0.162***	0.225***
	(0.031)	(0.044)							(0.042)	(0.058)
Social_scale			-0.364***	-0.236***					-0.349***	-0.295***
			(0.032)	(0.045)					(0.054)	(0.067)
Immig_scale					0.181***	0.129***			0.125***	0.114***
					(0.015)	(0.022)			(0.025)	(0.031)
Populism_scale							0.062	0.149**	0.333***	0.249***
							(0.046)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.069)
Education		0.013*		-0.001		0.004		0.016*		0.004
		(0.007)		(0.007)		(0.007)		(0.008)		(0.009)
EU_Vote		-0.328***		-0.184**		-0.114		-0.400***		-0.087
(1 = Leave)		(0.075)		(0.080)		(0.085)		(0.100)		(0.113)
Gender		0.220***		0.211***		0.193***		0.199**		0.188**
(1 = Female)		(0.065)		(0.066)		(0.066)		(0.083)		(0.088)
ageGroup		-0.053**		-0.043*		-0.035		-0.059*		-0.028
		(0.025)		(0.026)		(0.026)		(0.033)		(0.035)
Ethnicity		0.188		0.249*		0.019		0.221		0.036
(1 = Non-White)		(0.126)		(0.129)		(0.128)		(0.159)		(0.169)
Cons_ID		-0.416***		-0.518***		-0.583***		-0.543***		-0.211
		(0.113)		(0.109)		(0.107)		(0.132)		(0.149)
Lab_ID		-0.850***		-0.709***		-0.750***		-0.682***		-0.812***
		(0.107)		(0.107)		(0.107)		(0.131)		(0.141)
LD_ID		-0.239		-0.205		-0.203		-0.139		-0.162
		(0.150)		(0.152)		(0.152)		(0.185)		(0.196)
SNP.PC_ID		0.966***		1.115***		1.127***		1.062***		0.892***
		(0.154)		(0.156)		(0.157)		(0.193)		(0.206)
UKIP_ID		-0.161		-0.011		-0.018		-0.178		-0.038
		(0.151)		(0.153)		(0.153)		(0.194)		(0.206)
Greens_ID		1.079***		1.114***		1.243***		1.237***		1.115***
		(0.210)		(0.216)		(0.219)		(0.280)		(0.299)
Other_ID		0.817***		0.821***		0.904***		0.953***		1.045***
		(0.265)		(0.270)		(0.270)		(0.339)		(0.357)
Constant	-0.681***	-0.031	1.784***	1.805***	-0.200***	0.384*	0.224	0.385	-0.569*	-0.400
	(0.120)	(0.263)	(0.116)	(0.248)	(0.064)	(0.219)	(0.164)	(0.322)	(0.317)	(0.471)
Observations	6,930	4,574	6,762	4,453	6,742	4,410	4,372	2,931	3,817	2,558
R^2	0.014	0.086	0.019	0.084	0.020	0.087	0.0004	0.074	0.042	0.103
Adjusted R^2	0.014	0.084	0.019	0.081	0.020	0.084	0.0002	0.070	0.041	0.097
Residual Std. Error	2.320 (df = 6928)	2.173 (df = 4560)	2.322 (df = 6760)	2.177 (df = 4439)	2.329 (df = 6740)	2.169 (df = 4396)	2.325 (df = 4370)	2.198 (df = 2917)	2.269 (df = 3812)	2.151 (df = 2541)
F Statistic	100.568*** (df = 1; 6928)	33.169*** (df = 13; 4560)	133.258*** (df = 1; 6760)	31.201*** (df = 13; 4439)	139.637*** (df = 1; 6740)	32.292*** (df = 13; 4396)	1.840 (df = 1; 4370)	17.985*** (df = 13; 2917)	41.334*** (df = 4; 3812)	18.195*** (df = 16; 2541)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

2015-2017 Changes to Labour Leader Evaluations by Economic Policy Groups

	Dependent variable:	
	Evaluation Change by Group	
	(1)	(2)
Rad Left	0.659***	0.577***
	(0.075)	(0.088)
Cen Left	0.401***	0.392***
	(0.084)	(0.098)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Cen Right	-0.259***	-0.128
	(0.078)	(0.094)
Rad Right	-0.775***	-0.540***
	(0.072)	(0.095)
Education		0.013**
		(0.006)
EU_Vote		-0.437***
(1 = Leave)		(0.069)
gender		0.068
(1 = Female)		(0.060)
ageGroup		-0.096***
		(0.023)
Ethnicity		0.200*
(1 = Non-White)		(0.116)
Cons_ID		-0.569***
		(0.103)
Lab_ID		-0.890***
		(0.097)
LD_ID		-0.043
		(0.136)
SNP.PC_ID		1.764***
		(0.141)
UKIP_ID		-0.372***
		(0.138)
Greens_ID		1.675***
		(0.187)
Other_ID		0.921***
		(0.255)
Constant	0.988***	1.704***
	(0.049)	(0.182)
Observations	13,951	9,246
R^2	0.028	0.109
Adjusted R^2	0.027	0.108
Residual Std. Error	2.985 (df = 13946)	2.827 (df = 9229)
F Statistic	98.826*** (df = 4; 13946)	70.657*** (df = 16; 9229)

Note: $^*p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

Appendix 3.9: Changes in Evaluations of Labour Leaders 2015–2017, by Cultural policy groups

2015–2017 Changes to Labour Leader Evaluations by Cultural Policy Groups

	Dependent variable:	
	Evaluation Change by Group	
	(1)	(2)
Rad Lib	0.944***	0.287***
	(0.073)	(0.094)
Mod Lib	0.368***	0.153*
	(0.077)	(0.093)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Mod Con	-0.137*	-0.091
	(0.082)	(0.097)
Rad Con	-0.315***	-0.168*
	(0.083)	(0.100)
Education		0.002
		(0.006)
EU_Vote		-0.326***
(1 = Leave)		(0.074)
gender		0.046
(1 = Female)		(0.061)
ageGroup		-0.098***
		(0.024)
Ethnicity		0.255**
(1 = Non-White)		(0.119)
Cons_ID		-0.826***
		(0.099)
Lab_ID		-0.694***
		(0.097)
LD_ID		-0.015
		(0.139)
SNP.PC_ID		2.021***
		(0.143)
UKIP_ID		-0.276**
		(0.140)
Greens_ID		1.838***
		(0.192)
Other_ID		1.065***
		(0.262)
Constant	0.725***	1.758***
	(0.050)	(0.187)
Observations	13,629	9,017
R^2	0.022	0.101
Adjusted R^2	0.021	0.099
Residual Std. Error	3.006 (df = 13624)	2.845 (df = 9000)
F Statistic	75.767*** (df = 4; 13624)	63.197*** (df = 16; 9000)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

2015–2017 Changes to Labour Leader Evaluations by Migration Policy Groups

	Dependent variable:	
	Evaluation Change by Group	
	(1)	(2)
Rad Inclusive	0.924***	0.502***
	(0.082)	(0.100)
Mod Inclusive	0.374***	0.211**
	(0.082)	(0.099)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Mod Exclusive	-0.365***	-0.229**
	(0.085)	(0.104)
Rad Exclusive	-0.519***	-0.284***
	(0.072)	(0.094)
Education		0.003
		(0.006)
EU_Vote		-0.201**
(1 = Leave)		(0.079)
gender		0.036
(1 = Female)		(0.061)
ageGroup		-0.069***
		(0.024)
Ethnicity		0.139
(1 = Non-White)		(0.119)
Cons_ID		-0.878***
		(0.098)
Lab_ID		-0.790***
		(0.097)
LD_ID		-0.130
		(0.140)
SNP.PC_ID		1.935***
		(0.145)
UKIP_ID		-0.247*
		(0.142)
Greens_ID		1.777***
		(0.194)
Other_ID		1.047***
		(0.261)
Constant	0.904***	1.640***
	(0.052)	(0.189)
Observations	13,536	8,867
R^2	0.028	0.103
Adjusted R^2	0.028	0.101
Residual Std. Error	2.997 (df = 13531)	2.844 (df = 8850)
F Statistic	98.331*** (df = 4; 13531)	63.574*** (df = 16; 8850)

Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix 3.11: Changes in Evals of Labour Leaders 2015–2017, by policy groups on all dimensions

(Part 1 of 2)

Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015-2017 by Policy Groups

	Dependent variable:							
	Evaluation Change by Group							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rad Left	0.758***			0.699***	0.653***			0.649***
	(0.121)			(0.121)	(0.119)			(0.120)
Cen Left	0.593***			0.546***	0.572***			0.564***
	(0.138)			(0.137)	(0.133)			(0.133)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Cen Right	-0.247*			-0.171	-0.165			-0.177
	(0.131)			(0.130)	(0.129)			(0.129)
Rad Right	-0.690***			-0.575***	-0.496***			-0.526***
	(0.118)			(0.118)	(0.127)			(0.127)
Rad Lib		1.073***		0.485***		0.567***		0.316**
		(0.118)		(0.131)		(0.125)		(0.131)
Mod Lib		0.397***		0.218*		0.245**		0.192
		(0.126)		(0.126)		(0.123)		(0.123)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Mod Con		-0.100		-0.084		-0.018		-0.054
		(0.132)		(0.131)		(0.128)		(0.127)
Rad Con		-0.155		-0.228*		-0.017		-0.145
		(0.136)		(0.138)		(0.133)		(0.135)
Rad Incl			0.881***	0.419***			0.480***	0.307**
			(0.129)	(0.138)			(0.130)	(0.135)
Mod Incl			0.263**	0.069			0.117	0.059
			(0.133)	(0.133)			(0.130)	(0.130)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Mod Excl			-0.404***	-0.283**			-0.273**	-0.246*
			(0.139)	(0.138)			(0.136)	(0.136)
Rad Excl			-0.466***	-0.372***			-0.308**	-0.317**
			(0.117)	(0.122)			(0.123)	(0.126)
Constant	0.856***	0.600***	0.876***	0.776***	1.613***	1.601***	1.740***	1.508***
	(0.082)	(0.083)	(0.086)	(0.130)	(0.246)	(0.250)	(0.249)	(0.263)
Observations	5,164	5,164	5,164	5,164	5,164	5,164	5,164	5,164
R^2	0.032	0.025	0.026	0.056	0.113	0.103	0.105	0.121
Adjusted R^2	0.031	0.024	0.025	0.054	0.111	0.101	0.102	0.117
Residual Std. Error	2.968 (df = 5159)	2.978 (df = 5159)	2.977 (df = 5159)	2.933 (df = 5151)	2.844 (df = 5147)	2.859 (df = 5147)	2.857 (df = 5147)	2.834 (df = 5139)
F Statistic	42.321*** (df = 4; 5159)	33.121*** (df = 4; 5159)	34.618*** (df = 4; 5159)	25.326*** (df = 12; 5151)	41.089*** (df = 16; 5147)	37.115*** (df = 16; 5147)	37.665*** (df = 16; 5147)	29.427*** (df = 24; 5139)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix 3.11: Changes in Evals of Labour Leaders 2015–2017, by policy groups on all dimensions

(Part 2 of 2)

Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015-2017 by Policy Groups

	Dependent variable:							
	Evaluation Change by Group							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Education					0.016^{**}	0.0003	0.003	0.004
					(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
EU_Vote					-0.495^{***}	-0.333^{***}	-0.236^{**}	-0.185^{*}
(1 = Leave)					(0.092)	(0.098)	(0.103)	(0.104)
Gender					0.002	-0.027	-0.032	0.006
(1 = Female)					(0.081)	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.081)
ageGroup					-0.096^{***}	-0.085^{***}	-0.084^{***}	-0.079^{**}
					(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Ethnicity					0.128	0.173	0.105	0.075
(1=NonWhite)					(0.157)	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.157)
Cons_ID					-0.467^{***}	-0.757^{***}	-0.795^{***}	-0.359^{***}
					(0.136)	(0.130)	(0.129)	(0.137)
Lab_ID					-0.960^{***}	-0.793^{***}	-0.806^{***}	-1.007^{***}
					(0.130)	(0.129)	(0.129)	(0.130)
LD_ID					0.001	-0.053	-0.062	-0.054
					(0.184)	(0.185)	(0.184)	(0.183)
SNP.PC_ID					1.753^{***}	1.962^{***}	1.941^{***}	1.704^{***}
					(0.190)	(0.189)	(0.189)	(0.189)
UKIP_ID					-0.164	-0.114	-0.067	-0.031
					(0.194)	(0.196)	(0.197)	(0.195)
Greens_ID					1.813^{***}	1.904^{***}	1.908^{***}	1.626^{***}
					(0.257)	(0.259)	(0.258)	(0.258)
Other_ID					1.078^{***}	1.226^{***}	1.234^{***}	1.000^{***}
					(0.350)	(0.352)	(0.351)	(0.350)
Constant	0.856^{***}	0.600^{***}	0.876^{***}	0.776^{***}	1.613^{***}	1.601^{***}	1.740^{***}	1.508^{***}
	(0.082)	(0.083)	(0.086)	(0.130)	(0.246)	(0.250)	(0.249)	(0.263)
Observations	5,164	5,164	5,164	5,164	5,164	5,164	5,164	5,164
R^2	0.032	0.025	0.026	0.056	0.113	0.103	0.105	0.121
Adjusted R^2	0.031	0.024	0.025	0.054	0.111	0.101	0.102	0.117
Residual Std. Error	2.968 (df = 5159)	2.978 (df = 5159)	2.977 (df = 5159)	2.933 (df = 5151)	2.844 (df = 5147)	2.859 (df = 5147)	2.857 (df = 5147)	2.834 (df = 5139)
F Statistic	42.321^{***} (df = 4; 5159)	33.121^{***} (df = 4; 5159)	34.618^{***} (df = 4; 5159)	25.326^{***} (df = 12; 5151)	41.089^{***} (df = 16; 5147)	37.115^{***} (df = 16; 5147)	37.665^{***} (df = 16; 5147)	29.427^{***} (df = 24; 5139)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix 3.12: Changes in Evals of Labour Leaders 2015–2017, by Populism groups

2015–2017 Changes to Labour Leader Evaluations by Populism Groups

	Dependent variable:	
	Evaluation Change by Group	
	(1)	(2)
Radical Populists	0.030	0.076
	(0.111)	(0.131)
Moderate Populists	-0.006	0.028
	(0.109)	(0.126)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Moderate Non-Populists	-0.132	-0.317***
	(0.096)	(0.112)
Radical Non-Populists	-0.296***	-0.728***
	(0.104)	(0.122)
Education		0.021***
		(0.008)
EU_Vote		-0.670***
(1 = Leave)		(0.092)
gender		-0.029
(1 = Female)		(0.076)
ageGroup		-0.118***
		(0.030)
Ethnicity		0.154
(1 = Non-White)		(0.146)
Cons_ID		-0.874***
		(0.120)
Lab_ID		-0.786***
		(0.119)
LD_ID		0.075
		(0.170)
SNP.PC_ID		1.905***
		(0.175)
UKIP_ID		-0.296
		(0.182)
Greens_ID		1.910***
		(0.242)
Other_ID		1.165***
		(0.329)
Constant	1.027***	2.154***
	(0.074)	(0.236)
Observations	8,759	5,906
R^2	0.002	0.106
Adjusted R^2	0.001	0.104
Residual Std. Error	3.054 (df = 8754)	2.858 (df = 5889)
F Statistic	3.295** (df = 4; 8754)	43.822*** (df = 16; 5889)

Note: $^*p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015-2017 by Policy and Populism Groups

	Evaluation Change by Group									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Rad Left	0.758***				0.613***	0.653***				0.579***
	(0.121)				(0.122)	(0.119)				(0.121)
Cen Left	0.593***				0.500***	0.572***				0.526***
	(0.138)				(0.136)	(0.133)				(0.133)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Cen Right	-0.247*				-0.119	-0.165				-0.129
	(0.131)				(0.130)	(0.129)				(0.129)
Rad Right	-0.690***				-0.429***	-0.496***				-0.399***
	(0.118)				(0.119)	(0.127)				(0.127)
Rad Lib		1.073***			0.834***		0.567***			0.605***
		(0.118)			(0.136)		(0.125)			(0.135)
Mod Lib		0.397***			0.362***		0.245**			0.305**
		(0.126)			(0.126)		(0.123)			(0.123)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Mod Con		-0.100			-0.124		-0.018			-0.071
		(0.132)			(0.130)		(0.128)			(0.127)
Rad Con		-0.155			-0.297**		-0.017			-0.181
		(0.136)			(0.139)		(0.133)			(0.136)
Rad Incl			0.881***		0.526***			0.480***		0.377***
			(0.129)		(0.137)			(0.130)		(0.134)
Mod Incl			0.263**		0.149			0.117		0.106
			(0.133)		(0.133)			(0.130)		(0.129)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
Mod Excl			-0.404***		-0.387***			-0.273**		-0.306**
			(0.139)		(0.138)			(0.136)		(0.135)
Rad Excl			-0.466***		-0.517***			-0.308**		-0.370***
			(0.117)		(0.123)			(0.123)		(0.125)
Rad Pop				-0.085	0.028				0.049	0.002
				(0.142)	(0.145)				(0.139)	(0.141)
Mod Pop				-0.002	0.079				0.062	0.062
				(0.141)	(0.137)				(0.134)	(0.133)
Centrist	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*	*(baseline)*
ModNonPop				-0.197	-0.437***				-0.372***	-0.444***
				(0.126)	(0.124)				(0.120)	(0.120)
RadNon-Pop				-0.324**	-1.040***				-0.739***	-0.991***
				(0.130)	(0.136)				(0.130)	(0.134)
Constant	0.856***	0.600***	0.876***	1.037***	1.014***	1.613***	1.601***	1.740***	2.016***	1.701***
	(0.082)	(0.083)	(0.086)	(0.095)	(0.150)	(0.246)	(0.250)	(0.249)	(0.254)	(0.273)
Observations	5,164	5,164	5,164	5,164	5,164	5,164	5,164	5,164	5,164	5,164
R^2	0.032	0.025	0.026	0.002	0.070	0.113	0.103	0.105	0.107	0.133
Adjusted R^2	0.031	0.024	0.025	0.001	0.067	0.111	0.101	0.102	0.105	0.128
Residual Std. Error	2.968 (df = 5159)	2.978 (df = 5159)	2.977 (df = 5159)	3.014 (df = 5159)	2.912 (df = 5147)	2.844 (df = 5147)	2.859 (df = 5147)	2.857 (df = 5147)	2.853 (df = 5147)	2.816 (df = 5135)
F Statistic	42.321*** (df = 4; 5159)	33.121*** (df = 4; 5159)	34.618*** (df = 4; 5159)	2.243* (df = 4; 5159)	24.232*** (df = 16; 5147)	41.089*** (df = 16; 5147)	37.115*** (df = 16; 5147)	37.665*** (df = 16; 5147)	38.713*** (df = 16; 5147)	28.094*** (df = 28; 5135)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix 3.13: Changes in Evals of Labour Leaders 2015–2017, by Policy and Populism groups. (Part 2 of 2)

Changes to Labour Evaluation 2015-2017 by Policy and Populism Groups

					Dependent variable:					
					Evaluation Change by Group					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Education						0.016**	0.0003	0.003	0.021**	0.011
						(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
EU_Vote						-0.495***	-0.333***	-0.236**	-0.710***	-0.350***
(1 = Leave)						(0.092)	(0.098)	(0.103)	(0.098)	(0.105)
Gender						0.002	-0.027	-0.032	-0.044	-0.019
(1 = Female)						(0.081)	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.082)	(0.081)
ageGroup						-0.096***	-0.085***	-0.084***	-0.099***	-0.077**
						(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Ethnicity						0.128	0.173	0.105	0.150	0.040
(1=NonWhite)						(0.157)	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.157)	(0.156)
Cons_ID						-0.467***	-0.757***	-0.795***	-0.802***	-0.314**
						(0.136)	(0.130)	(0.129)	(0.129)	(0.137)
Lab_ID						-0.960***	-0.793***	-0.806***	-0.744***	-0.967***
						(0.130)	(0.129)	(0.129)	(0.128)	(0.129)
LD_ID						0.001	-0.053	-0.062	0.041	0.010
						(0.184)	(0.185)	(0.184)	(0.184)	(0.182)
SNP.PC_ID						1.753***	1.962***	1.941***	1.935***	1.660***
						(0.190)	(0.189)	(0.189)	(0.188)	(0.188)
UKIP_ID						-0.164	-0.114	-0.067	-0.235	-0.069
						(0.194)	(0.196)	(0.197)	(0.196)	(0.195)
Greens_ID						1.813***	1.904***	1.908***	2.063***	1.581***
						(0.257)	(0.259)	(0.258)	(0.256)	(0.257)
Other_ID						1.078***	1.226***	1.234***	1.242***	0.920***
						(0.350)	(0.352)	(0.351)	(0.351)	(0.348)
Constant	0.856***	0.600***	0.876***	1.037***	1.014***	1.613***	1.601***	1.740***	2.016***	1.701***
	(0.082)	(0.083)	(0.086)	(0.095)	(0.150)	(0.246)	(0.250)	(0.249)	(0.254)	(0.273)
Observations	5,164	5,164	5,164	5,164	5,164	5,164	5,164	5,164	5,164	5,164
R^2	0.032	0.025	0.026	0.002	0.070	0.113	0.103	0.105	0.107	0.133
Adjusted R^2	0.031	0.024	0.025	0.001	0.067	0.111	0.101	0.102	0.105	0.128
Resid. Std. Error	2.968 (df = 5159)	2.978 (df = 5159)	2.977 (df = 5159)	3.014 (df = 5159)	2.912 (df = 5147)	2.844 (df = 5147)	2.859 (df = 5147)	2.857 (df = 5147)	2.853 (df = 5147)	2.816(df=515)
F Statistic	42.321*** (df = 4; 5159)	33.121*** (df = 4; 5159)	34.618*** (df = 4; 5159)	2.243* (df = 4; 5159)	24.232*** (df = 16; 5147)	41.089*** (df = 16; 5147)	37.115*** (df = 16; 5147)	37.665*** (df = 16; 5147)	38.713*** (df = 16; 5147)	28.094***(df 28;5135)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01