

EDMUNDO BALSEMÃO PIRES
Universidade de Coimbra
uc2683@fl.uc.pt

On the Historicity of the History of Philosophy

Sobre la historicidad de la historia de la filosofía

RESUMEN: Siguiendo los enfoques contemporáneos del significado de la Historia de la Filosofía para la Filosofía, en este trabajo abordaré la situación de la Historia de la Filosofía de Hegel en el sistema, confrontándola con las Historias especiales (Política, Arte, Religión), el desarrollo lógico de la Idea en figuras y las «totalidades concretas» dotadas de significado epocal. El texto es también un ensayo de articulación del desarrollo lógico de la Idea con las condiciones semánticas de las réplicas históricas de su significado.

PALABRAS CLAVE: HISTORIA DE LA FILOSOFÍA – HISTORIA DE LOS CONCEPTOS – SEMÁNTICA – FILOSOFÍA DE LA HISTORIA.

ABSTRACT: Following contemporary approaches to the meaning of the History of Philosophy to Philosophy, in this paper I'll address the situation of Hegel's History of Philosophy in the system, confronting it with the special Histories (Politics, Art, Religion), the logical development of the Idea in figures and the epochal meaningful "concrete totalities". The paper is also a first essay to articulate the logical development of the Idea with the semantical conditions of the historical rendering of its meaning.

KEY WORDS: HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY – HISTORY OF CONCEPTS – SEMANTICS – PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

I. HISTORY'S INTELLIGIBILITY – LEARNING FROM SOME PARADOXES

THE FUNDAMENTAL PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS are historical concepts. This does not mean only that each Philosophy receives its problems and conceptual underpinnings from previous thinkers, but a double conceptual and

semantic indebtedness towards a thinking tradition and towards more general semantic associations.

History of Philosophy is in a twofold manner attached to History and in a twofold mode attached to Philosophy.

Regarding History, History of Philosophy situates Philosophy or the philosophers as heirs of their own social and political time and as legatees of a philosophical tradition. Considering Philosophy itself, History of Philosophy is an object for philosophical explanation and what is rebuilt whenever a philosopher conceives the past of Philosophy for its own purposes.

From this last point of view, the past of Philosophy is an idealized metaphor for the thinking activity of the philosopher and not a true historical object.

Under the concept of Historicity, the generation of philosophers that includes Mariano Álvarez-Gómez has conveyed a philosophical method to address some frequent topics of philosophical analysis of History of Philosophy.

These go from the temporality of the human being situated in the world (following Martin Heidegger's *Daseinsanalyse*, Hans-Georg Gadamer's views on the Historicity of meaning understanding or Paul Ricoeur's use of the dialogue-world-text structure of historical understanding); the hermeneutical transformation of the methods of the *Geisteswissenschaften* and History (along the path opened by Wilhelm Dilthey's and Paul Yorck's essays); the engagement in so-called historical demythologization and in clarification of the existential Christian biblical message for the contemporary world (mainly after Rudolf Bultmann); and the topics related to memory and narrative-agential structures in textual analysis (P. Ricoeur).

Essential traits of this universal method, going from History to Practical Philosophy and to the Methods of textual Hermeneutics, were exposed and reshaped in the field of the «History of Concepts», particularly through Reinhart Koselleck's detailed historical research guided by the faith in a reflective pathway going from Social History, History of Concepts to History of Philosophy.

The today's undisputable outcome of this large movement of ideas is the thesis of the synthesis of the subjective and objective aspects of the traditional meaning of History as narrative understanding and *res gestae* – conceptual semantics is neither subjective nor objective.

M. Álvarez-Gómez investigations on Nicholas of Cusa and Hegel are illustrations of the application to the particular field of essential texts of the modern History of Philosophy of a shared methodological approach to History of Philosophy of an entire generation of academics.

More recent epistemological trends of the 1980s and 1990s, some of them connected to Deconstruction (J. Derrida), to the manifold constructivist movement, the continuous reception of philosophical views different from the

hermeneutical tradition (v. g. Michel Foucault) or the varieties of «discourse analysis» with distinct semiotic proposals went into directions and analytical demands difficult to predict some decades before from the inside of Hermeneutics, challenging some of its methodological premises and not only its humanistic ideology.

Recently, Hans U. Gumbrecht's account of the movement of the Conceptual History (Gumbrecht: 2006, 7-36) gives a picture of the today's challenges defying the supremacy of the hermeneutical methods in the History of Concepts, from the point of view of an insider.

On the other hand, a growing feeling of an erosion of the belief in the proximity of Man to the historical situations in first order descriptions is no longer disputable and in itself a matter of cultural blames or incentive for «Second-Order Science».

Concerning the meaning of the History of Philosophy to Philosophy, many methodological problems devised in Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* seem today unsolved, only elliptically tackled or simply erased. Contemporary philosophers feel that Hegel's History of Philosophy is indebted to his Philosophy of History and that this one is obsolete.

Take for example the paradox of the freedom of the intelligible Spirit immanent in History. In short, what Hegel intended with this idea was to show that if History of Philosophy has to have a philosophical importance, then History itself should have a rational substructure coextensive with the development of freedom. The circle of History and the self-consciousness of History begins in the modern times with freedom's self-reflection.

This claim is the responsible for the systematic connection between Philosophy of History and History of Philosophy. The acceptance of the Hegelian definition of the subject matter of the History of Philosophy entails the refusal of the investigation of the philosophical past circumscribed by the historian or the philologist, whose objects are the grammatical meaning of texts or the historical facts scrutinized according to causal-temporal objective criteria.

Hegel would also refuse the use of ancient philosophies for the purpose of illustration or justification of contemporary ideas or the meta-theoretical use of the notion of a dialogue between thinkers in a spiritual medium without a concrete historical ground.

The assumption of the thesis of the development of freedom in History is the complete idea of the History of Philosophy. This conjecture demands the proofs of the Philosophy of History.

The systematic position of the History of Philosophy in Hegel's Philosophy, especially its relation to the *Science of Logic*, imposes the examination of the

logical rhythm of the manifestation of the Idea in the History of Philosophy as the progression of the free thought towards self-consciousness.

The development of a parallelism between the logical, the historical and Philosophy in its History is a conceptual challenge, especially because the logical and the historical should not be used as two abstract dimensions that an external observer can examine in comparisons but a self-referential circle.

Hegel's systematic articulation of Logic with History of Philosophy and this one with Philosophy of History is a proposal to tackle the old troubles or paradoxes concerning what is permanent and what changes in the History of Thought which has motivated the varieties of the so-called *philosophia perennis* in a recent past.

The philosopher's concept of «begriffene Geschichte» (*Phenomenology of Spirit*) defines the intelligibility of the historical time (also reflected in the History of Philosophy) at the level of the understanding of History, but not directly at the level of the causal-temporal nexuses between the events.

I'll address the paradoxes across three basic aspects (A., B., and C.): the *pragmatic*, the *paradox of the beginning* and the *logical-semantic dimension*.

A. Friedrich Nietzsche's comments on the German representatives of the historicism and the German disease of History in his *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen II* (1874) are illustrations of the ambivalent sentiment regarding History and the philological methods applied to Philosophy at the turn of the century. F. Nietzsche's key interrogation about the justification of the use of History of Philosophy to Philosophy is a result of the self-image of XIX century historiography as a positive science that deals with details about facts and events, as shown in the type of the antiquarian History. Here, what makes the intelligibility of the historical are the causal-temporal connections. Causality is the only rule for the accumulation of knowledge on historical facts and for their intelligibility.

One may feel that F. Nietzsche's efforts to separate the useful and the inconvenient for Life across the three types of History (the antiquarian, the critical and the monumental) are somehow vague if we apply them to the contemporary situation of the historical research. But his pragmatic claim concerning the value of actuality for the fixation of the meaning of Thought against the goal of the accumulation of data in antiquarian History, remains central in the understanding of the philosophical interest of the History of Philosophy. Let us call it the *commitment towards actuality*.

The *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen II* pointed to a paradoxical limit of the historical investigation of the past which consists in the persistence of the past in actual meaning effects and the resistance of the present to be part of the historical facts. Both aspects can be seen as attestations of the difference

between life and truth or, according to another formulation, the distinction in value between life and intelligibility. However, F. Nietzsche's commitment towards actuality does not mean the same as Descartes' absolute beginning with the *Cogito*.

The difference of life and facts and the resulting paradoxes were also relevant for Hegel and even if his solution was not in favour of a radical pragmatism, the presence of a tension between actuality and the past proves that his conception of the History of Philosophy cannot be confused with historicism or accumulation of factual data. A dialectic commitment towards actuality means the consideration of life as entailing an inner drive towards self-consciousness and self-understanding which is freedom, not a blind force.

B. The Cartesian *Cogito* is a symbol of the absolute beginning in modern Philosophy, the freedom needed for the fixation of a point of departure of a quasi-deduction of a set of consistent and justified propositions. The Cartesian system interrupts the tradition.

Obedying to the ambition of consistent justification, each system, like Descartes', is a model that transcends its epoch. Apparently, systematic consistency, a method of internal proof and the set of justified propositions are matters that can be reassessed detachedly from any historical consideration, as a construction of quasi-eternal truths.

From a Hegelian viewpoint this is a highly disputable claim because with Descartes the criteria of the absolute beginning with the *ego cogito* and the ideal of the mathematical consistency of the system are both seen as unexplained effects of a will to begin with certainty that have no support in a historical self-understanding of modern Philosophy. The modern as an epoch, however, emerges in History precisely as the discovery journey of the self-causation of the self as self-consciousness of a human subject. Thus, the quasi-eternal truths attached to the beginning with the *ego cogito* result from historical demands of the modern foundation of the philosophical certainty.

C. The attempts to formulate a consistent answer to the paradoxes comprising time and intelligibility evolved from the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the *Science of Logic* to the Berlin *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*. The method of a direct assembling of the logical Idea and the historical time was excluded. The synchronicity between the logical and the real-historical is itself a philosophical puzzle, similar to the relation between the logical and the real («Real Philosophies») in the system of the *Encyclopaedia*. Synchronicity, the meaning of the *now*, the present, is at least twofold, if one reads its meaning from the logical perspective or from the historical concrete evolution. If the historical identified as causal connection between events in chronological time

is essentially open, not concluded, the logical understanding of the historical is conceived in a logical *now*.

History of Philosophy introduces in this twofold explanation a third assessment, a mediation. A self-conscious manifestation of the historical development takes its own place, in philosophies, systems, in a variety of textual philosophical production, and in concepts specified with semantical-historical and logical-semantic properties.

In History of Philosophy, conceptual semantics is embedded in logical categories and in the socio-historical development of the linguistic meanings. Nonetheless, conceptual semantics cannot synchronize, in an exact manner, its logical and historical faces. Semantics reveals the structure of a stage in the self-reflection of the logical Idea, but not the coincidence of the Idea with the historical reality. This explains why a concept entails semantics and does not denote directly the reality.

Hegel's solutions for the paradoxes (A., B, and C.) are not simple and unquestionably they are not reliant on a choice between the poles of the traditional alternative subject-object, such as realism or idealism, historical facts or logical explanations.

The use of the pre-Kantian and Kantian relation of the subject-object poles of the cognitive relation in the explanation of Hegel's appraisal of History of Philosophy is misleading.

The basic arguments Martial Gueroult mobilized to criticize Hegel's views in the theoretical part of his *Dianoématique* entail the assumption of the non-reflective structure of History and the opposition between facts (phenomena) and logic (dialectical reason) that the German philosopher contested in the pre-Kantian and in Kantian Epistemology.

Along the French reception, aspects of Hegel's critical appraisal of the old paradoxes were re-examined by Victor Delbos (1917), Émile Bréhier (1928), Paul Ricoeur (1955) or M. Gueroult (1979) with objections to Hegel's solutions.

Along many decades the philosophers commonly included in «Analytic Philosophy» overlooked Hegel's critical assessment to the paradoxes, probably because they were not focused on the historical and philological investigation of the past.

Recent transformations of the historical self-consciousness of the analytic philosophers changed their attitude (see: Westphal 2010/11), even if some affiliated authors (Wilfrid Sellars, Richard Rorty, Robert Brandom or John McDowell) alternate between descriptions of the systems' coherence and a pragmatic perspective that favours the study of the historical arguments of philosophers in order to better establish contemporary thesis, according to a non-historical method.

This last alternative does not embrace Hegel's singular, post-Kantian and non-dualistic, approach to the historical and logical (dialectical) dimensions of the History of Philosophy.

On the other hand, Historiography was never sympathetic to the subordination of the variability and contingency of the historical events to the prose of the Absolute. Respectful to the historians' warnings, some academics devoted to the History of Philosophy have circumscribed their work to philological tasks of textual deciphering, periodization and monographic interpretation, which in the German context influenced by W. Dilthey shaped a method applied by Hermann Nohl and his successors to Hegel's work, under the heading *Entstehungsgeschichte*.

Contemporary History of Philosophy continues to regard its tasks in a similar vein. Presentations of academic results in History of Philosophy, congresses, academic thesis, particularly in European countries, are predominately configured according to philological demands.

Applying the hermeneutical notion of dialogue to History of Philosophy, P. Ricoeur (Ricoeur 1955) envisaged in the *singular essence* of each Philosophy in historical discussion with other *singular essences*, a motive for the refusal of Hegel's Philosophy of History in connection to History of Philosophy and the totalization of the historical world of the Philosophy of History.

P. Ricoeur's historical dialogue between philosophies occurs as a communicative praxis that cannot eliminate as untrue one of the participants. It is the meaning of the communicative efforts of the philosophies that realizes a structure of the true knowledge, surpassing the limits of the sceptic views on the incommensurable aspirations to truth.

Nonetheless, the hermeneutical, communicative model of the dialogue is not able to erase the central figure of the *real* in Hegel.

It is the general problem of the concretization of the free Spirit in History (Reason in History) that explains two queries considered in Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*.

The first, already referred as Hegel's repetition of the old paradox of the History of Philosophy, asks how it is possible that the Thought which, apparently, is not submitted to time, can have a History.

The second is a less radical query. It takes for scrutiny the connections of the History of Philosophy to the other histories (histories of Religion, Politics, Law, the Arts or Science) in the formation of the «concrete totalities».

In my view, it is the understanding of the ties of the History of Philosophy to the other histories that can give a contemporary look to the ideal of a reconstruction of the actuality of the Real (*Zustand der Welt*) as a «concrete

totality» (*konkrete Totalität*) of figures of meaning with historical and logical connotations.

II. FIGURES

The historical character of Philosophy is a mediation of the active movement of the Universal and the particular form of its temporal expression. The historical is not opposed to the logical. The concrete expression of the universal represents its particularity. However, the particular is not an unrelated form. A particularity relates to other particularities. This relational structure of the particular is emphasized along the text of the *Kolleg 1825/26* of the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*. Here, the notion of *Gestalt* (figure) gives the concrete expression of the mediation. Hegel uses *Gestalt* according to a conceptual pattern acquired in Jena and modified in the *Science of Logic* to accommodate the manifestation process of the logical Idea.

Figure is a dynamic constellation of relations between components provided with a logical meaning in the Idea's exteriorisation.

After the *Science of Logic*, the Introduction to the *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* (§ 32) gives a reason for the characterisation of such components as concepts and real existences of the Idea.

In parallel, the *Kolleg 1825/26 on History of Philosophy* revises again the figure and conceives its essential features according to the historical approach – *wir haben uns also geschichtlich zu verhalten* (Hegel: 1993(b), 221). Historically, the figures are temporal, particular, expressions of the Universal.

Their predicates of multiplicity, contingency and episodic manifestations are described in the notion of a sequential series (*Reihenfolge*) of figures in both collections of *Lectures*. Thus, the figures are put in an order that can be followed in a temporal orientation.

In the History of Philosophy, the logical figure gives to itself a contingent expression which Hegel calls *Erscheinung*, also agreeing to his former conceptual practise.

In the context, the manifestation (*Erscheinung*) has a double meaning.

Regarding the logical Idea, the development of its determinations as knowledge of itself gives to the Idea a manifestation similar to the objectivity of knowledge. Furthermore (*die zweite Erscheinung*), the productions of the knowing Idea concern circumstances, temporal and geographical, and can materialize in individualities.

According to both directions of the logical manifestation, the complete circle of the development of the knowing Idea is continuously historical. Historicity is not an accident added to this spiritual movement, but a structural dimension of the self-determination as manifestation in a series. The main

consequence is the already mentioned thesis of a logical rhythm that can be recalled from the historical data.

The guiding thesis of the Philosophy of History that is conserved in the perspectives about the History of Philosophy is the idea of History as realization of freedom.

The singularity of the historical epochs, of the individualities and philosophical systems is acknowledged.

The comments on the antique character of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and other Greek philosophers led to the conclusion that each Philosophy is the reflective product of its time. Its singularity relies on the individuality of the philosophers that realize different possibilities given in the semantic matrix of a defined epoch validating, at a certain extent, a prosopography (Hegel: 1993(b), 226).

Reason in History reverberates as «Philosophy of its own time». It represents the orientation of the logical figures to their historical belongings and the intelligibility of this process in the philosophical prose.

Hegel calls this manifestation in figures «meaning» (*Bedeutung*): *Aber der Gedanke hat auch eine Erscheinung, und diese von ihm unterscheidend, kann man wohl von «Bedeutung» sprechen* (Hegel: 1993(b), 222).

Therefore, the relation of the logical Idea to its historical figures is conceivable as a process of meaning rendering and incarnation of a dynamic that has its source in freedom.

In a contemporary assessment, one may say that if a figure is the logical structure of meaning rendering in History to History, the figure's meaning emerges in terms, concepts and in semantical associations as the concrete components responsible for the historical meanings of the figurative manifestation.

A contemporary rewriting of Hegel's intentions may rediscover the notion of figure by inscribing it in the semantic evolution of terminological constellations, relying on the society's structure and on the historical evolution.

In Hegel's scheme interweaving logical Idea and figure, the epochal semantical matrixes would operate at a mediating level, in-between the logical universality and the historical particularities.

A semantical investigation at the level of the rendering of historical meanings in terminology is valid even if one withdraws Hegel's logical and metaphysical explanations from his scheme.

The interpretative conversion of the Hegelian theory of the logical figurative manifestation into an historical description of meaning rendering to History is a viable approach, leading to large semantical researches, complementing the limited vocabulary of the conventional History of Philosophy.

Figure and figurative understanding of History can now tolerate a correction - the figure's meaning may represent the tissue of particular semantic articulations in historical terminological evolving grids.

III. LANGSAMKEIT DES WELTGEISTES

In Hegel's manuscripts composed for the 1820 and 1823 editions of the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, the philosopher discusses what seems to be a not very frequent notion in his vocabulary – «Langsamkeit», «Langsamkeit des Weltgeistes» (Hegel: 1993(b), 35-37).

The slowness of the Spirit concerns the gradual process of the History of Thought entering in its own free space as the spiritual substance in the time of the world. It also represents the slowness of the Spirit gathering together the dimensions of its «concrete nature», the diversity of its real relations.

Ms. 1820 calls this relational diversity *Umfang* (Hegel: 1993(b), 37).

The philosopher characterizes further the formation of the relational diversity of the Spirit as a particular activity. It is this activity of the Spirit that consumes time and is slow.

The final deed is a *Gestalt*, a figure.

After the introduction of the act of the configuration of the relations (*gestalten*), the same passage concludes with the notion of a concrete totality: *das Gestalten seines Begriffs, sein Denken seiner, ist zugleich Gestaltung seines ganzen Umfangs, seiner konkreten Totalität in der Geschichte* (Hegel: 1993(b), idem).

The logic articulation of the text is clear about the thesis of the configuration of the relations as the activity responsible for the real extent (*Umfang*) of the knowing Spirit. Consequently, the concrete totality can only be disclosed through the figure (*Gestalt*). It is not an abstract construction and it takes its own time to be articulated.

The totality is not a given reality, but a production of relations of meaning. The process of the Spirit's self-appropriation, as free movement, configures its relational diversity as a meaningful progression.

If the notion of Tradition, from *tradere*, to confide, surrender, deliver, transmit, gives a partial sense to a line of transmission, the concept of Epoch, from *époché*, suspension, interruption, modules the tradition in figures that do not follow linearly ones from the others. Thus, History is not repetition of the same.

Meaning applies to figures as the organisation of relations between concrete elements in defined epochs. The concrete depth of a figure is specified in the aspects of the Ethical Life of a People. The dimensions of the self-organization of the Ethical Life also defines the different branches of the historical knowl-

edge (politics, science, arts, religion, and philosophy) as fields of meaning formation identified as particular structures of the logical Idea in its epochal manifestations.

Allowing here a practical interpretation, with totality or concrete totality one may refer to the coherence of semantic structures shaped in the distinct historical disciplines of the meaning formation. The fact that these structures are evoked whenever the understanding of a real process takes place, proves that one envisages real figures (*Gestalten*) and not arbitrary fictions. The conception of such network of figures is the thought of a totality or concrete totality if the goal with the conception is not a reduction of some parts to other parts or the consideration of fragments.

Regarding the History of Philosophy totality or totalization do not mean *Summa* in the medieval sense, but the thinking presence of real relations produced in the process of the self-understanding of the logical Idea.

The absence of synchrony, the reference to a slowness of the historical emergence of the meaning of History itself explains the «patience of the Concept» in front of the openness of the historical particularities and the need for a consideration of the richness of the particular besides the universal.

Slowness is also the index of a structural non-coincidence between the discovery of freedom in the History of Philosophy and in the special histories.

IV. CONCRETE TOTALITIES AND THE TASKS OF EVOLUTIONARY SEMANTICS

In *Ms. 1820* along the division about the «concept of Philosophy», Hegel claims that the History of Philosophy is not concerned with the particular events or the particularities of the peoples' existence, but with the «general character of the People and Epoch» (Hegel: 1993(b), 57). The element of the universality represents the domain of development of the History of Philosophy. However, this is already a universality shaped by its historical materials.

The understanding of the meaning dimensions of the Ethical Life of a People in the historical disciplines deals with semantical premises connected to cultural memory and to the use of a shared semantic memory. According to this view, theoretical uses of the items of the semantic memory converts general shared symbols embedded in linguistic forms in concepts, in scientific or philosophical concepts.

If the History of Philosophy has to have a genuine historical orientation, then the conversion of semantic memory in conceptual traditions and the combined evolution of both are central topics. The attention to these evolutionary processes prevents History of Philosophy to identify itself with a study of authorities and influences, monographies about philosophers, doxography, or naïve pragmatic appropriations of the past.

If the articulation of the History of Philosophy with the other histories and the semantic-conceptual evolution are seen as features of an integrated model, they are also the best defence against the objection of an «external» perspective on the History of Philosophy or against the infamous theory of the reflex (Ricoeur: 1955, 49). In semantic and conceptual evolution nothing can be considered external in opposition to an internal.

What was vague in P. Ricoeur's 1955 dialogical model of the History of Philosophy was balanced by the «concept of concept» in R. Koselleck's History of Concepts. The collective attempt to examine the «fundamental socio-historical concepts» of the modern world under «History of Concepts» entails also a serious methodological proposal to address Hegel's relation of the logical figures to the concrete totalities.

After the publication in the 1970s-1990s of the *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, in the macro-theoretical Part I of *Begriffsgeschichten* (2006) the last version of R. Koselleck's views on the origins, meaning, main goals and confrontations lines of the History of Concepts is disclosed.

Concerning the confrontations, the author clarified the implications of the self-limitation of the History of Concepts to the literary, philosophical or scientific articulated language of concepts *vis-à-vis* the uses of language in daily life or in the discursive conceptualizing of non-canonical literary production. If R. Koselleck didn't subscribe the elimination from the research of these forms of discursive conceptualizing, he defended himself against an abusive proliferation of fields of study dealing with non-reflective uses of the concepts.

The printed form of the modern literary and philosophical communication, under defined social conditions, makes possible the quick diffusion of concepts. Follows from this situation a multiplicity of semantic associations that are not constrained under any conceptual discipline. The admission of the semantic openness of the conceptual meanings to ordinary language and discursive conceptualizing due to the modern form of the textual communication seems to defy the traditional importance, reinforced by Hegel, of the History of Philosophy as a central reflective domain for the self-reflection of the historical concepts.

Indeed, communication is a reflective process but does not obey to the philosophical use of reflection.

The problematic confrontations of the History of Concepts don't finish here.

Another problem to be handled is the need for categorization of the semantic resonances of the differentiation of Society in linguistic conceptual indices. This full programme was not envisaged in the many faces of the History of Concepts.

As already stated, both confrontation lines in R. Koselleck's History of Concepts were inherent to Hegel's problems with the relation of the figures to the concrete historical totalities. They were also reshaped in N. Luhmann's own definition of the role of Semantics in his theory of social differentiation.

The solutions are different, the confrontation lines may have different categorizations, but the tensioned fields remain.

Explained by sociological tools, the semantic legacy of concepts is not exclusively ruled by the transmission lines of the History of Philosophy. It is related to the evolutionary structure of the society and to the forms of communication, especially to scientific, literary and scholar communication with their social and symbolic forms, semantic networks and material constituents.

Semantic matrixes of defined terminological groups vary with the degree of conceptual elasticity or openness to semantic variation. Nonetheless, the figurative (logical) character of the historical terminology doesn't cause that with a term or concept one faces the concrete reality. Semantic evolution gives indices of the self-descriptions of the Ethical Life of a People, but not the Truth.

This explains the internal duality of the notion of conceptual semantics – conceptual and semiotic.

Philosophy reframes the historical semantics according to its own conceptual repertoire, eventually structured in systems. A linear linkage from the philosophical repertoire to the general semantic possibilities of an epoch is impossible, not only due to the semantic variation that characterizes the evolution of modern communication.

Each new Philosophy combines in its own way the semantic and conceptual possibilities of a defined epoch and the heritage of conceptual genealogies of longer duration. One can grasp this rule in the evolution of social and political categories.

Short and long durations are assembled. Philosophies that are self-conscious about their past need to be committed to a continuous critical scrutiny regarding the entanglements of their semantical streams with social evolution and larger semantical connections.

Conceived as contemporary transformations of the Hegelian concepts of figure and concrete totality, several analytical tasks can be sketched along the semantic-conceptual field.

A *first group* of tasks, already mentioned, refers to the identification and explanation of transfers from the general semantic social memories to conceptual formations along short and long durations within generative bidirectional channels.

A *second group* needs to address the formation of clusters of very specific conceptual lineages associated to semantic networks.

A *third group* concerns the identification of levels of philosophical communication that entails essentially concepts and conceptual premises with the correspondent technicalities of a specialized field, eventually organized in systems of concepts.

A *last set of tasks* should address the importance of the scholar communication of Philosophy through the History of Philosophy and the contribution of the Academia to the crystallization of specified conceptual groups.

Along the short and long semantic durations, the History of Philosophy is a testimony of the diversity of the epochs echoing in terminological arrangements, negotiations and adaptations, especially if it is the actuality and the intelligence of the present that shape the line of the semantic horizon.

V. SPECIAL HISTORIES AND HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

Eduard Gans was a pioneer in the application to the special Histories of the Hegelian concept of History, beginning also a comparative and interdisciplinary approach to History which had in the concept of World a pivotal notion.

His contributions to a «Universal History of Law» (Gans: 1971, 13-36; Gans: 1981) are commonly mentioned as polemic documents portraying the debates between the «Historical School», historicism and Hegelianism.

E. Gans inferred from Hegel's views on World's History a justification for the development in the field of the Comparative History of Law of the self-consciousness of freedom as a criterion for the discrimination between epochal normative systems which was not envisaged in the cumulative research of the Historical School.

If one admits historical criteria of the formation of normative systems and if the norms should obey to these criteria, the evolution of Law is not a linear path, but obeys to a reflective modulation of tradition and epochs.

E. Gans's ideas were Hegel's theses along his Lectures on Philosophy of Law and Philosophy of History.

From Hegels' *Kolleg* 1825/26 on History of Philosophy it is possible to infer a coherent theory on the unity of Spirit and the diversity of its historical manifestations not only in different epochs but in the same epoch in different expressions, such as the «Constitution of the States, Religion, or Art».

Here, Hegel shows that the conventional idea of an «influence» between these fields and Philosophy is mistaken. «Influence» points to a causal association of previously existing separated phenomena. The notion of an internal relation of the Spirit and its manifestations is a way to avoid such abstraction.

In the *Lectures on the Aesthetics* Hegel applied his historical approach to the Arts, as a parallel to a similar procedure regarding Religion. Again, the

division C. of the chapter III (*Der Staat*) of the part III (*Die Sittlichkeit*) of the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Law* is devoted to «World History».

The articulation of the Universal History and the special Histories defines the concrete substance of the structure of an epoch. Philosophy is one side of the Spirit sharing its epochal self-determination with the other spiritual forms – Law, Religion, and Art.

Through the History of Philosophy, the explanation of an epoch's meaning in particular philosophical systems identifies the being of an epoch to another epoch, creates meaning that is effective in time.

The translation in thought of the epochal meanings causes adjournment and many resonances across the special histories. This is especially important for a scrutiny of the historical resonances of the philosophical meaning of the modern but is not exclusive of this epoch.

In the *Kolleg* 1825/26, the relation of Christianity to Greek Philosophy is characterized by the capture of the objective form of a former thinking process about former epochs and its adjournment alongside the slower duration of the Spirit of Time, echoing in the religious consciousness, among other fields.

Regarding the Greeks and Christianity Hegel says: *das, was die griechische Philosophie gewesen ist, in die christlichen Welt in die Wirklichkeit getreten ist* (Hegel: 1993(b), 238).

The philosopher's well-known thesis about the dawn of Minerva supplements the thesis on the adjournment.

Philosophy arrives later to a world that entered already in a crepuscular stage.

The active productivity of the thinking process, as judgement, contains a negative power. By producing its object, it also introduces a vacillation in the Spirit of Time (Hegel: 1993(b), 239).

The vacillation of the Spirit (*wanken machen*) that follows the reflection represents the contrasting effects of Philosophy as *Weltweisheit* – a division factor and reconciliation maker in the Spirit of Time.

The achievement of the meaning of History in the modern discovery of the consciousness of freedom represents to the concrete historical epochs and figures a continual *wanken machen* of what is taken for granted, as the continual adjournment of freedom in History.

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