

Edmund Husserl in Talcott Parsons: Analytical Realism and Phenomenology*

Mitsuhiro Tada

Abstract: This article aims at clarifying the philosophical (=phenomenological) implication of Talcott Parsons's analytical realism. Generally, his theory is understood as being confrontational to phenomenology; however, in his first book, *The Structure of Social Action*, Parsons positively referred to Husserl's *Logical Investigations*. They shared a sense of crisis: Husserl thought that there was no certain basis in modern science, and Parsons had the feeling that there was no common theory to establish sociology as a science. Thus, both of them criticized the factual sciences of positivism (positivistic empiricism) and showed a strong orientation to the general theory. For this, they depended on conceptual realism (Platonic realism). According to Husserl, scientific knowledge will be arbitrary if the Ideal is not there as the norm of fact. He believed that in truth all people always see Ideas. Similarly, Parsons thought that in truth all people always act toward the Ideal, because the Ideal element is necessarily found through the logical framework of sociology, i.e., the action frame of reference. Hence, he maintained that the Ideal element that gives a normative orientation to actions is real, though analytical, insofar as the social order is established.

Key words: Talcott Parsons, Edmund Husserl, analytical realism, phenomenology, voluntaristic theory of action, action frame of reference

Introduction

The aim of this article is to discuss the *analytical realism* that Talcott Parsons employed in his first book, *The Structure of Social Action*, and to discern its "philosophical implication" (Parsons [1937] 1968: 753). For this purpose, I will concentrate especially on his fragmentary references to Edmund Husserl's phenomenology in that book. They shared a sense of crisis: Husserl thought that there was no certain basis in modern science, and Parsons had the feeling that there was no common theory to establish sociology as a science. Thus, both of them criticized the factual sciences of positivism (positivistic empiricism) and showed a strong orientation to the general theory.

* This article is based on a part of the unpublished doctoral dissertation (Tada 2012) that was written in Japanese, and the basic conception was presented in the International Sociological Association, RC16 Mid-term Conference: Cultures and Civilization in the Contemporary World (June 27-29, 2012 at Trento University, Italy).

Parsons is typically understood as being confrontational toward the phenomenological school. For instance, it is well known that his correspondence with Alfred Schutz, a pioneer of phenomenological sociology, ended inconclusively. Parsons admitted directly, “I am afraid I must confess to being skeptical of phenomenological analysis” (Parsons [1941] 1978: 88). According to some reviewers, such a gap in their conversation is ascribed to Parsons’s lack of understanding of phenomenology (see Rehorick 1980: 353). Maurice Natanson, who wrote the foreword to the published collection of their correspondence, noted, “[a]lthough Parsons had listed [Schutz’s] *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* [*The phenomenology of the social world*] in the bibliography of *The Structure of Social Action* and has some references to Husserl’s *Logische Untersuchungen* [*Logical Investigations*] in the final chapter, phenomenology remains largely out of reach” (Natanson 1978: xiii). In fact, especially since the late 1960s and the 1970s, Parsons’s theory has been criticized mainly by the phenomenological school as an objectivist grand theory that ignores human subjectivity.

However, just because Parsons is confrontational toward Schutz and his followers does not mean that he is also confrontational toward their originator, Husserl. It should be verified whether Husserl really remained “out of reach” for Parsons. Practically, the ideas that Husserl and Parsons developed about science or social science were clearly headed in the same direction.

Zygmunt Bauman (1976) has already pointed out that Husserl and Parsons shared a basic methodology. Bauman stated as follows:

The phenomenological sociology of Parsons has achieved, in purely methodological sense, what Husserl’s [*sic*] tried to achieve in vain. Proceeding by purely phenomenological analysis of the intentional content of selected concepts [...], it arrived at the concept of society and culture as ‘objective necessities’ without sacrificing the essentially subjective character of experience of which they are constructed. This remarkable feat has been accomplished by substituting ‘social action’ for transcendental subjectivity as the starting-point (Bauman 1976: 146).

Similarly, Bennetta Jules-Rosette (1980) has very clearly showed that Parsons’s theory relied on Husserl when it dealt with the translation of human experience into analytic categories. Unfortunately, however, neither Bauman nor Jules-Rosette detailed what the relationship of Parsons’s analytical realism to Husserl’s phenomenology was like. This issue must be clarified, because the philosophical (=phenomenological) implication of analytical realism is the very basis of Parsons’s action theory.

The conventional criticism of Parsons’s theory has largely taken on a political character. As Ken’ichi Tominaga (2004: 377-81) points out, behind the extensive acceptance of the phenomenological school in the late 1960s and 1970s were ideological attacks on Parsons by

Neo-Marxists. However, if trying to refute Parsons scientifically rather than politically, it would be unfair to judge his theory by only examining it superficially. It would be necessary to view his philosophical basis using the method of *epoché* (the suspension of judgment or prejudice). Then, we will find that the word “logical,” which Parsons repeatedly used in *The Structure of Social Action*, is presumably derived from Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*. As a matter of fact, “the early Parsons was a budding phenomenologist” (Rehorick 1980: 353). To bring this out, I will analyze the statements of Husserl and Parsons below.

Parsons’s Criticism of Empiricism and Fictionalism

In this section, I will explain Parsons’s criticism of positivistic empiricism and clarify the principles of analytical realism. One of the objectives of Parsons’s analytical realism was to avoid confusing scientific statements and actual objects. His critical attitude towards positivism (including utilitarianism) covered not only the issue of social order, but also the theory of social science. According to him, for example, the classical mechanics and classical economics called “positivistic empiricism”¹ reify the general theoretical concepts and assume the validity of such concepts for the concrete phenomena in question (Parsons [1937] 1968: 728). This empiricism commits what Alfred North Whitehead calls the “Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness.”² The concrete phenomena to which the theoretical system is applicable were held to be exclusively understandable in terms of its categories. Or, all changes in such phenomena were thought to be predictable from knowledge of the values of the variables of the system (Parsons [1937] 1968: 728). In sum, “only *one* system of analytical categories could be applicable to the understanding of any given concrete class of phenomena” (Parsons [1937] 1968: 757). Parsons’s analytical realism was antithetical to this assumption. He thought that the adequate understanding of concrete phenomena requires the employment of analytical categories drawn from more than one such system, perhaps from several (Parsons [1937] 1968: 757).

¹ Although positivism and empiricism do not necessarily logically imply one another, the scientific materialism of classical mechanism and the utilitarianism of classical economics are considered examples of a combination of positivism and empiricism. See Parsons ([1937] 1968: 70).

² According to Whitehead, this fallacy was produced by the mechanistic theory of nature, which has resigned supreme since the seventeenth century, and which is the orthodox creed of physical science. It corresponds to a distortion of nature that Henri Bergson called the intellectual “spatialisation” of things. However, unlike Bergson, Whitehead himself thought that such distortion is not a vice necessary to the intellectual apprehension of nature, but is merely the accidental error that results from expressing concrete facts under the guise of very abstract logical constructions (Whitehead [1925] 1967: 50-51). In sum, he considered that criticism should be directed towards mistaking such abstraction for concrete realities, because the abstraction itself is inevitable in order to apprehend concrete objects.

It [positivistic empiricism] is correct in insisting on the scientific legitimacy of general theoretical concepts, but wrong in its interpretation of their status in relation to concrete reality [...] [T]he assumptions necessary for a theory of economic *laissez faire* cannot, for the general purposes of social science, be assumed to be constant features of all social systems, but such systems are found to vary in ways subject to analysis in terms of other, noneconomic elements of the theory of action. In so far as this is the case, the single system of economic theory is inadequate to the broader theoretical task (Parsons [1937] 1968: 729-730).

Such criticism by Parsons of positivistic empiricism was based on his way of understanding empiricism. According to him, the common characteristic of a group of methodological views that have been brought together under the term “empiricism” is

the *identification* of the meaning of the concrete specific propositions of a given science, theoretical or empirical, with the scientifically knowable totality of the external reality to which they refer. They maintain, that is, that there are an immediate correspondence between *concrete* experienceable reality and scientific propositions, and only in so far as this exists can there be valid knowledge. In other words, they deny the legitimacy of theoretical abstraction (Parsons [1937] 1968: 23).

This empiricist thought claims that the categories of the given theoretical system are by themselves adequate to explain all the scientifically important facts about the body of concrete phenomena to which it is applied (Parsons [1937] 1968: 69-70). Empiricism is the idea that scientific knowledge is a total reflection of the “reality out there,” and even selection is alleged to be illegitimate (Parsons [1970, 1974] 1977: 27).

Parsons attacked this presupposition. Empiricism wrongly transfers the logical determinism of scientific theory into an empirical determinism (see Parsons [1937] 1968: 70). In reality, as Max Weber insisted with the concept of *ideal type*, selection among available factual information is inevitable (Parsons [1970, 1974] 1977: 27). Parsons thought that any human experience needs an abstraction through a conceptual framework. The empiricist belief, “let the facts speak for themselves,” cannot be taken at its word (see Parsons [1937] 1968: 10). Facts do not speak for themselves. They are always selectively observed and laden with theory. Even the common sense that empiricist observation builds upon is a theory, and often a bad theory (see also Yui 2002: 34). “[A]ll empirically verifiable knowledge—even the common-sense knowledge of everyday life—involves implicitly, if not explicitly, systematic theory in this sense” (Parsons [1937] 1968: 10).³

³ Incidentally, the reason why Parsons expressed skepticism about Schutz’s phenomenological

Parsons's criticism of empiricism focuses primarily on this positivistic type of empiricism. In addition, he criticizes the other two versions of empiricism, "particularistic empiricism" and "intuitionist empiricism" (Parsons [1937] 1968: 729). Unlike positivistic empiricism, particularistic empiricism suggests that objective knowledge is only knowledge of the details of concrete things and events. Intuitionist empiricism permits a conceptual element in social science, but maintains that this must only formulate the unique individuality of a concrete phenomenon. Parsons thought that these types of empiricism were incompatible with the generality of scientific theory, because they reject the validity of the concepts of general theory.

Among these three versions of empiricism, positivistic empiricism seems a kind of naïve realism that considers knowledge to directly reflect the external reality. And the other two, particularistic empiricism and intuitionist empiricism, can be said to be one type of extreme realism in the ontological context, i.e., nominalism that regards only individuality as real. Anyway, Parsons rejected all of these three empiricisms together as "empiricist realism."

Nevertheless, Parsons did not deny realism itself. Rather, he threw out Weber's conception of ideal type, which appeared as a conscious reaction to empiricist realism, as a fictional view. Based on the formulation of ideal type, scientific concepts are supposed to be not reflections of reality, but just "useful fictions" (Parsons [1937] 1968: 730). Weber had strongly inhibited himself from any sort of realism that ran the risk of being confused with the empiricist positions against which he was fighting. Consequently, he was driven in the direction of a fiction theory of the logical nature and function of social science concepts (Parsons [1937] 1968: 603).

In his [Weber's] polemics, especially against the "objectivist" position [of empiricism], Weber again rightly, laid powerful stress on the fact that scientific concepts, particularly in the social sciences, did not reflect the totality of "raw experience," which was of infinite diversity and complexity. In this situation he was led to minimize the other side of the picture, that all concrete observation of empirical fact, above all rigorous scientific observation, takes place in terms of a conceptual scheme. "Raw experience" in Weber's sense is not concrete actuality at all but a methodological abstraction. Hence again the emphasis on the *unreality of concepts* (Parsons [1937] 1968: 603, emphasis added).

In contrast to Weber's "fictionalism," Parsons characterized his own position as realistic in epistemological meaning (Parsons [1937] 1968: 730). He believed that the general concepts of science, which he called analytical elements, adequately grasp aspects of the objective external

analysis appears to be because Schutz looked like an empiricist. Parsons thought, "what you [Schutz] mean essentially is an ontological reality, what a concrete real actor "really" experiences" (Parsons [1941] 1978: 88; see also 90).

world:

These concepts [called analytical elements] correspond, not to concrete phenomena, but to elements in them which are analytically separable from other elements. There is no implication that the value of any one such element, or even of all those included in one logically coherent system, is completely descriptive of any particular concrete thing or event. *Hence it is necessary to qualify the term realism with “analytical.”* It is the possibility of making this qualification which renders the resort to fictionalism unnecessary (Parsons [1937] 1968: 730, emphasis added).

Thus, Parsons’s analytical realism took a clear shape. He introduced it to avoid both empiricism and fictionalism. This can be explained by dividing the term “analytical realism” into the two parts: “analytical” and “realism.” On the one hand, Parsons considers theoretical concepts to be selective abstractions or, to be more exact, as “analytical” abstractions of the properties of phenomena. Theoretical concepts do not reflect concrete reality as a whole, but scientific knowledge is impossible without abstract theoretical concepts. That is why Parsons rejected empiricist realism. On the other hand, Parsons maintained that analytically abstracted elements are not fictional but real. Scientific concepts adequately grasp aspects of reality, although partially. In this sense, Parsons stands ontologically not on nominalism but on conceptual “realism,” which maintains the correspondence of scientific concepts to reality (Akasaka 2009: 122, 126). His theory can seem like a fictional construction that loses touch with reality, but he persisted in realism. The foundation of analytical realism was not the part of “analytical” but of “realism” (see Akasaka 2009: 126-7).

This unintelligibility of analytical realism is rooted in its inclusion of three different categories of scientific concepts: conceptualizing methodology, ontology, and epistemology. Parsons selected a standpoint in each of the categories (see Akasaka 2009: 123, 150-151). In the methodological dimension, he selected abstractive constructionism, which regards scientific concepts as selective abstractions from an aspect of reality. In the ontological dimension, he selected not nominalism but conceptual realism, which considers concepts to have a corresponding reality. In the epistemological dimension, he selected not idealism but realism, which suggests the reality of an objective world. Parsons developed these three arguments on the same level (Akasaka 2009: 123).

The reason why he did so presumably comes not from his confusion, but from the ambiguity of the concept of reality. As shown above, Parsons characterized himself as realistic in epistemological meaning, but he also held to realism in the ontological dimension: conceptual realism. This realism is the different type of extreme realism from nominalism. While nominalism can lead to materialism in modern sciences, conceptual realism should look rather like extreme idealism from the contemporary viewpoint, because it maintains that the universal or the Ideal is genuinely real.

Ontology in Parsons and Husserl

For Parsons himself, analytical realism was primarily an epistemological standpoint. However, it is ontologically rather similar to *Platonic realism* regarding mathematical-logical objects. In the history of thought, the Platonic world of Ideas was originally the refined form of the Pythagorean doctrine that number lies at the base of the real world (Whitehead [1925] 1967: 28). Thus, according to Platonic realism, mathematical-logical objects are not products of the human mind. Contrary to the assumption of psychologism, Ideas such as number are considered to be real beyond mundaneness.

Certainly, Parsons supposed that his study belonged to the empirical sciences, but Parsons's analytical realism seems to be fundamentally linked with Platonic realism. This is especially shown in his reference to Husserl's *Logical Investigations*. In the book, Husserl called the character of being of a mathematical-logical object "Ideality," and stated as follows:

Ideal objects [...] exist genuinely. Evidently, there is not merely a good sense in speaking of such objects (e.g. of *the* number 2, *the* quality of redness, of *the* principle of contradiction etc.) and in representing them as sustaining predicates: we also have *insight into* certain categorical truths that relate to such Ideal objects. If these truths are valid, everything that their validity objectively presupposes must have being. If I get an insight into that 4 is an even number, that the stated predicate actually pertains to the Ideal object 4, then this object cannot be a mere fiction, a mere *façon de parler*, a mere nothing in truth (Husserl [1901] 1913: 124-5).

This statement, beyond an epistemological meaning, clearly suggests Husserl's realism in the ontological dimension. He believed that Ideal objects such as numbers exist independently from subjectivity. As Alfred Schutz says, "Husserl has shown that there are ideal objects of knowledge which are as independent of the knowing subject as real objects are" (Schutz [1957-8] 1966: 163). In fact, at that time there was criticism that Husserl was a "Platonizing realist," although he himself argued against this characterization (see Husserl [1913] 1950: 48-50). Historically speaking, too, logic and ontology have been inseparable since Aristotle. Hence, it is more natural to think that Husserl's attempt in logic has ontological implications.

Such realism of Husserl was related to his understanding of the concept of rationality. He asserted that rationality had to be the one in the "noble and genuine sense [...] as the original Greek sense that became the Ideal in the classical period of Greek philosophy" (Husserl [1954] 1976: 337). From his viewpoint, however, the rationality of modern times had been far from genuine. He criticized the consequence of the development of exact sciences as "a true revolution in the technical

mastery of nature” (Husserl [1954] 1976: 315).

For Platonism, the real had a more or less perfect methexis [participation] in the Ideal. This gave for ancient geometry possibilities of a primitive application to reality. Now, in the Galilean *mathematization of nature*, this [nature] itself is idealized under the guidance of the new mathematics; it itself becomes – to express in a modern way – a mathematical manifold (Husserl [1936] 1976: 20).

In Husserl’s opinion, this kind of rationalization was a deviation from rationality, mathematizing and naturalizing the human spirit and posing a crisis for European humanity. It reduces the Idea of science to the factual sciences (*Tatsachenswissenschaften*), thereby abandoning questions about the meaning of life. Everything spiritual is treated only as physical materiality.

Husserl can be thought to belong to *the generation of the 1890s*, which Stuart Hughes (1958) characterized as the “revolt against positivism,” although Hughes made only a passing reference to Husserl. There, positivism means a materialistic, mechanistic, and naturalistic tendency. In sum, it is a general tendency to element-reductionism and applies the thinking way of natural science to human action as well (Kida 1977: 88-90). However, this method cannot grasp the organic unity of the meaning that makes human phenomena exactly “human.” Thus, for example, Henri Bergson’s philosophy of life and Max Weber’s interpretive sociology appeared.

As a member of the generation of the 1890s, Husserl committed himself to realizing the “true and genuine rationalism” against the rationalism of the Enlightenment that had been laden with hidden absurdity (Husserl [1936] 1976: 200-201), and he called himself the “genuine positivist” (Husserl [1913] 1950: 46). This conviction of Husserl had been supported by the Platonic belief that the real has participation in the Ideal. For his purpose to refute false rationalism, Ideal objects had to exist genuinely. Husserl attempted to ground modern science with the Ideal in the sense of Greek philosophy, and always asked the question of *how the Ideal is given to the empirical*.

In a sense, Parsons’s analytical realism was a sociological version of the answer to Husserl’s question. It is well known that Parsons chose action as most suitable to the logical framework of sociology. Through the action frame of reference, he found *analytically* the universal elements included in all particular actions. Needless to say, the most important of those elements was the Ideal one, because his ultimate purpose was to solve the problem of social order. Parsons thought that this element is *real* in actions and gives a normative orientation to them.

Frame of reference is the logical framework including no concrete data. In Parsons’s opinion, the distinction between the frame of reference and concrete data is vital (Parsons [1937] 1968: 733). For instance, classical physics cannot discuss any concrete phenomenon without the space-time framework. All physical phenomena are described in terms of this frame of reference, and thus they

are supposed to have a common “structure”: every physical phenomenon must involve processes in time that happen to particles located in space (Parsons [1937] 1968: 733). Parsons applied this insight to action. As the title of his book, *The Structure of Social Action*, suggests, the structure common to all actions also should be revealed through the logical framework. Parsons refers to Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* here⁴:

[T]he action frame of reference may be said to have what many, following Husserl, have called a “phenomenological” status. *It involves no concrete data that can be “thought away,” that are subject to change.* It is not a phenomenon in the empirical sense. It is the indispensable *logical* framework in which we describe and think about the phenomena of action (Parsons [1937] 1968: 733, emphasis added).

From a theoretical point of view, Parsons’s reference to Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* is no coincidence. This work of Husserl had an influence on the Prague Linguistic Circle at that time, and thereby also helped to establish the French structuralism represented by Claude Lévi-Strauss. Phenomenology and structuralism originally had an affinity with each other. Both of them regard any group of phenomena as a closely associated, structural whole, and they look for the invariable character of phenomena. In reality, both interpreters and critics of phenomenology around the 1930s had thought that the convergence of phenomenology and structuralism was possible. Their competing schema appeared rather later, probably around the 1960s (see Holenstein 1975). As suggested above, however, such competing schema was motivated by the political atmosphere. There is no absolute reason to think that phenomenology and structuralism are scientifically confrontational toward each other.

Parsons referred to *Logical Investigations* in order to determine the role of the logical framework. A general property that is necessarily found through a specific frame of reference is the universal, and Parsons called it the analytical element. The frame of reference deduces the a priori conditions of an empirical object, and this is the meaning of the word “phenomenological” for Parsons:

Every actually or hypothetically concrete entity, described in terms of a frame of reference, must have properties. This is *one of the ultimate necessities of thinking about empirical reality, a*

⁴ The version of *Logical Investigations* referred to in the bibliography of *The Structure of Social Action* is not the revised second edition, but the first edition published in 1900 and 1901 (see Parsons [1937] 1968: xxxvii). This article uses the former. Incidentally, judging from Parsons’s description, his concern about this book seems to have been limited to the objectivistic part from volume one to the fourth investigation of volume two. In contrast, Husserl himself later developed the other part (the fifth and sixth investigations of volume two) into the phenomenology of transcendental subjects, although it was criticized as an anachoresis to psychologism at that time.

phenomenological fact. Within a given frame of reference there will be found to be a limited number of these properties which, taken together, are adequate to the description of the phenomenon in question (Parsons [1937] 1968: 749-50, emphasis added).

For instance, classical physics can describe a physical body in terms of a particular combination of particular “values” of general properties such as mass, velocity, and location. Analytical elements (and certain combinations of them) are such general attributes of concrete phenomena relevant within a given descriptive frame of reference. Therefore, an analytical element has no concrete existence apart from other analytical elements. It is only observable as its particular “value” in its particular case (see Parsons [1937] 1968: 34-5):

We may say that such and such a body *has* a mass of x , but not that it *is* a mass. We may also say that such and such an act is rational (to a certain degree) but never that it *is* rationality, in the sense of a concrete thing. There are, concretely, rational acts only in the same logical sense that there are heavy bodies (Parsons [1937] 1968: 34).

Both mass and rationality can be never observed as such. They manifest themselves only as a particular value in a particular body or action. Hence, “an ‘element’ is the general concept corresponding to any particular fact or facts which may by operational observation be predicated of a phenomenon” (Parsons [1937] 1968: 37 fn. 2; see also 615-6). In this sense, the analytical element is the universal and is immanent in the particular.

In *Logical Investigations*, Husserl had already described this character of the universal by using the term “non-independence” (*Unselbständigkeit*). According to him, there are two kinds of objects: the one is the “independent object” and the other is the “non-independent object.” The former means a concrete “piece” relatively independent from the whole. For instance, a car can be dismantled into an engine, a wheel, tires, and so on. These pieces are independent objects. In contrast, the latter is no spatial existence, even though it is called a “part.” It is the abstractive existence belonging to other things without any relation to subjective thoughts. For example, the color of this paper does not exist as the color itself. However, as a non-independent moment of the paper, the color is predestined to be the partial being (Husserl [1901] 1913: 240-241). In this sense, the non-independent moment has the Ideal necessity that cannot “be” otherwise. It conforms to the essential or Ideal law referred to by Husserl—that is, the necessary law that had been denied by British empiricism in the history of philosophy:

Non-independent objects are such pure kind of objects, in relation to which the law of essence consists, that they, if at all, only exist as parts of more inclusive wholes of a certain belonging kind.

(Husserl [1901] 1913: 240).

Acting against empiricism, Parsons also adopted this “ontological turn” (Husserl [1901] 1913: 239 Fn. 1⁵), which turns the notion of self-evidence (*Evidenzgedanken*) into the notion of pure, essential lawfulness (*reine Wesensgesetzlichkeit*). As a matter of fact, Alfred Schutz had already pointed out that Parsons’s unit analysis and element analysis correspond to the two kinds of phenomenological analyses that Husserl showed in *Logical Investigations*.⁶ According to Schutz, unit analysis breaks down wholes into *independent* parts, and element analysis breaks down wholes into *non-independent* parts (see Schutz [1940] 1978: 24, 135 n. 46). Non-independent parts included in a unit act are, as long as logically deduced through the action frame of reference, objective necessities that cannot “be” otherwise. Therefore, Parsons believed that they are real, even though analytical.

As stated above, Parsons’s analytical realism had not only epistemological but also ontological implications. Thus, his theory may be characterized as “epistemological ontology” (Luhmann 1984: 379). The reality of universal elements grounds sociology as a science. In contrast to the general presupposition of modern science, Parsons refused nominalism in the ontological dimension.

Obviously, the expression “epistemological ontology” is applicable to Husserl’s phenomenology as well. As his eidetic approach suggests, ontology runs through his entire body of work. He himself said that transcendental phenomenology “realizes the *Leibnizian* Idea of a *universal ontology* as a systematic unity of all conceivable a priori sciences” (Husserl [1962] 1968: 296).⁷ In fact, Husserl considered that a source of knowledge is not experience (*Erfahrung*), but intuition (Husserl [1913] 1950: 52). *In truth, all people always see “Ideas” and “Essences,” and people operate with them in their thoughts, and also formulate judgments concerning Essences* (Husserl [1913] 1950: 49). This was called the principle of all principles. The Ideal has no existence in the real environment, but,

⁵ This note was documented in the second edition of *Logical Investigations*. The part to which Husserl refers in his own article about logic shows the distinction between independent content and non-independent content: “[b]ecause it is naturally not considered that the accidental living experience of self-evidence, which enters only in the belated reflection and by the favorable disposition, makes the content a dependent one, so the determination ought to be objectively turned in an easily understandable way. There is objectively the law that a content of the concerning kind can exist only as a part of a whole, that is, associated with other contents” (Husserl [1894] 1979: 133 Fn. 1).

⁶ Especially in the third investigation, “On the Theory of Wholes and Parts,” and in the fourth investigation, “The Distinction between Independent and Non-Independent Meanings and the Idea of Pure Grammar.”

⁷ According to Arthur O. Lovejoy, Gottfried W. Leibniz was one of representative philosophers who exemplified the Platonic idea of the “Chain of Being.” Lovejoy says, “Leibniz was less concerned (I do not say he was not at all concerned) to maintain that the reason for a thing is a ‘good,’ in the common sense of conduciveness to the subjective satisfaction of God or man or animal, than to maintain that the thing at all events has *some* reason, that it is *logically* grounded in something else which is logically ultimate” (Lovejoy 1936: 146).

insofar as it is available through intuition, it is there as well (see Husserl [1913] 1950: 60-1). If the Ideal is not there as the norm of fact, knowledge will be arbitrary, and the universality and objectivity of scientific truth will be impossible. The reason that Husserl was confrontational against empiricism was because empiricism denied “Ideas,” “Essences,” and “knowledge of Essential Being” (Husserl [1913] 1950: 41).

If applying the “principle of all principles” to Parsons, it would be possible to say that *in truth all people always act toward the Ideal*. The Ideal does not exist in the real world and is therefore not empirical. Yet, actors should subjectively hold to it. The Ideal is, so to speak, always given in the intuition of actors as the norm of their actions. Seeing that social order is established, the Ideal should be real and should provide a normative orientation to actions. This was Parsons’s supposition.

For Parsons, there was no difference between natural science and social science in fundamental *logical* respects (Parsons [1937] 1968: 623). Thus, he thought that sociology, to be a science, has to adopt realism as natural science does. Parsons was a scientific realist, or a scientific monist. The being of the referent of a concept must be confirmed in some way. Otherwise, theory and concept remain just a hypothesis or metaphysical speculation (Akasaka 2009: 127). By advocating analytical realism, Parsons tried to guarantee the being of the object referred to by a sociological concept. He posited that the theory of social action is “not simply a group of concepts with their logical interrelations. *It is a theory of empirical science the concepts of which refer to something beyond themselves*” (Parsons [1937] 1968: xxi, emphasis added). His analytical realism was intended to restore the unjustly debauched status of analytical theory by American sociologists who had emphasized experiences, and to give theory an appropriate place in positivism (Akasaka 2009: 143).

Phenomenological Results of Reality

As pointed out above, Parsons modeled his scientific view after natural science. However, he did not think that reality is reductionistic. For instance, in Parsons’s opinion, it is false to infer that the ultimate relevant unit (e.g., unit act), with its elementary properties, alone is real, and the emergent properties are derived or fictitious. Such an inference is rather metaphysical atomism, and would be a departure from the empirical basis of science. What distinguishes the emergent from the elementary properties is only the fact that, upon unit analysis of the system in question, emergent properties evaporate beyond a certain point and are no longer observable (Parsons [1937] 1968: 749). Economic rationality is an example. It is an emergent property of action that can be observed only when a plurality of unit acts is treated together as constituting an integrated system of action. If the unit act is conceptually isolated, both the action system and the economic rationality are destroyed (Parsons [1937] 1968: 739-740).

According to Parsons, emergent properties designate “general” properties of complex systems of phenomena, and they can be empirically identified in the particular values (Parsons [1937] 1968: 749). Because of this, the term “emergent” also has “a strictly empirical meaning” (Parsons [1937] 1968: 749). In contrast, atomistic theory had dealt only with properties identifiable in the “unit,” and thereby had failed to treat such elements of emergent properties regarding complex combinations of units (Parsons [1937] 1968: 748-749). The analytical element is not “the particular” in the level of unit analysis, but “the universal” (Parsons [1937] 1968: 748). Analytical elements as universals do not exist as themselves, but manifest themselves as the “particular” values. In this sense, they were thought to be empirically observable.

Viewed from such a perspective of the element analysis, all concrete units are a “combination” of particular values of analytical elements (Weber’s *ideal type* is a conceptually isolated case and is an “invariable” arrangement of relations of particular values). Accordingly, every concrete entity described in terms of a frame of reference must have properties, i.e., analytical elements. For Parsons, this was a phenomenological fact, an ultimate necessity of thinking about empirical reality, and thus the Ideal element was supposed to be real as a general property of unit act.

In distinguishing analytical elements the facts must be taken as they are found. The criterion is always empirically verifiable independent variation in values. Where this is demonstrable there is a “real” element whether it be elementary or emergent. Indeed in science there is no other criterion of reality [...] There is no mysticism whatever about this concept of emergence. It is simply a designation for certain features of the observable facts (Parsons [1937] 1968: 749).

This analytical realism of Parsons, as already shown, was associated with Platonist relation between Idea and actuality. Besides that, it even seems to have tried to reconcile the confrontation between realism (conceptual realism) and nominalism in the debates about the problem of universals in the Middle Ages. As mentioned before, the concept of reality contains ambiguity, and there are correspondingly two types of realism: the one is a positivistic, mechanistic, and atomistic realism (=nominalism) in modern science, and the other is an extreme idealism, i.e., conceptual realism in metaphysics.

This ambiguity shows the fundamental character and limits of modern thought. Originally, the concept of reality in the pre-modern era was based on the prescription of the essentiality of things (see Yamamoto 1980: 198-200). It had nothing to do with whether the things actually exist in this world or not. In sum, establishing the essential order was realism in the sense that “universals” are real, and this derived from Plato’s theory of Ideas. Remarkably, modern science was born from the genealogy of nominalism that opposed such realism. Modern scientific thought proposed a new way of knowing things, and consequently, the reality concept fluidized and dispersed into three poles: (1)

the positivistic viewpoint that considers the reality of things as “being sensed,” putting the conceptual prescription of the essentiality of things in parentheses; (2) the materialistic viewpoint, which keeps away from sense-datum, that dissolves the reality of the world into the generality of material things for the objective description of physical bodies that are independent of consciousness; and (3) paradoxically, the viewpoint of new realism that assumes the modern rationality and supersedes the old realism. This new realism, for scientific knowledge of the material world, ascribes the reality of the objective world to the universal order of laws. Determinism was a byproduct of this (see Yamamoto 1980: 198-200). Modern science resurrected ontological metaphysics from materialistic realism (a kind of nominalism), although this realism was opposite to Plato’s Ideal-realism and was related only with particulars.⁸

Parsons’s stance on the reality concept also seems to be in line with such an intricate history of thought. This is shown in the question of how to build the Ideal into scientific theory. The reason for his introducing the subjective point of view was related exactly to this issue. Referring to Vilfredo Pareto’s opinion about realism in the Middle Ages, Parsons had admitted that the universal entities involved in realist philosophy are, from a general critical point of view, certainly outside the range of experience. Experience involves only the particular. Nevertheless, Parsons considered that such entities are also real in another sense: it is a “fact” that people believe in such entities, and this fact is in a state of mutual interdependence with other social facts, so that a loss of these beliefs results in an alteration of the social equilibrium (Parsons [1937] 1968: 287). Hence, metaphysical entities cannot be ignored as purely imaginary entities. They are essential elements in the sociologist’s issue, and this is the kernel of truth in realism and similar philosophies (Parsons [1937] 1968: 287). In this sense, there is no doubt about the importance of the value elements in action, and the peculiar status of them is ontologically affirmed. For Parsons, the subjective point of view was necessary to embed this kind of value element that should be in itself beyond experience. The value elements are, to the actor, subjectively real. Parsons remarks as follows:

[T]he abstractness of some of the concepts which are employed in the theory of action consists precisely in the fact that they are descriptive not of the actual observable state of affairs of overt action, but of the norms toward which it may be regarded as being oriented. Hence these concepts contain an element of “*unreality*” which is not involved in the physical sciences. Of course *the only reason for admitting such concepts to a scientific theory is that they are in fact descriptive of an empirical phenomenon, namely the state of mind of the actor*. They exist in this state of mind,

⁸ Such anti-intellectual determinism, i.e., scientific fatalism of positivism, was severely criticized by the “generation of the 1890s” mentioned above. This generation was never interested in irrationalism. Rather, it regarded the late nineteenth-century vogue of positivism as a travestied form of reincarnation of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, and sought the reinstatement of reason and freedom to their original status.

but not in the actor's "external world." It is, indeed, this circumstance which necessitates resort, on the part of the theory of action, to the subjective point of view (Parsons [1937] 1968: 295, emphasis added).

Parsons presumed that any action, insofar as it contributes to the social order, should include the orientation to normative value, and that a scientific observer would be able to empirically observe such value as a subjective meaning of the actor toward it. Therefore, different from other scientific frames of reference, the action schema has a subjective reference. The action frame of reference concentrates on the means-end relationship, and thus, it takes on not merely descriptive, but also causal significance that involves references to real processes of "motivation" in the mind of the actor. In this regard, the action frame of reference becomes more a "psychological" schema than a "phenomenological" one in *Logical Investigations* (Parsons [1937] 1968: 750). That is, it is a framework not to describe things but to causally explain human action. According to Parsons, however, the "phenomenological" aspect does not entirely disappear from the action schema. For a causal explanation, the analytical theory of action is applicable only to systems the facts about which can be stated in terms of the descriptive schema. Hence, Parsons thought that this "phenomenological" aspect binds the descriptive action schema and the analytical action schema together (see Parsons [1937] 1968: 751).

The term "psychological" seems to be used here in Husserl's meaning. Originally, Parsons regarded psychology as a science of action. But, in the context shown above, the word psychology implies that the subjective phenomena of motivation empirically exists in this real world, and that they are accessible to analysis in terms of "subjective categories" (see Parsons [1937] 1968: 750 fn. 2). Indeed, the psychology that Husserl distinguished from phenomenology means an empirical science concerned with psychic operations that have processes in time. For Husserl, a radical opponent of psychologism, an objective Idea such as number is irreducible to the real process of mental facts, even if such psychic operations (e.g., counting numbers) are related to mathematical propositions. "[P]henomenology lays bare the 'sources' from which the basic concepts and ideal laws of *pure logic* 'spring'" (Husserl [1901] 1913: 3).

Ideality of the universal, even if entering into the mental stream of particular experiences, cannot be explained by psychology. It always holds the identical meaning, and has a different character of existence than the stream of living experience itself does. Nevertheless, Parsons emphasized the subjective category, because such Ideality can be empirically observed in terms of its meaning for acting subjects. As Jules-Rosette (1980: 316 fn.5) also suggests, Parsons might think that a "phenomenological psychology" of an actor's real process of motivations should be integrated into action theory. In fact, Parsons made the following remark: "[t]o make psychology the science of psychological phenomena, in Husserl's sense, would be to make it the synthesis of all the sciences of

action” (Parsons [1937] 1968: 750 fn. 2).

Perspectives: Sociology as Rigorous Science

A few years after *The Structure of Social Action* was published, Alfred Schutz had this to say in his correspondence with Parsons:

His [Parsons'] analyses only answer the question of how a theoretical scheme can be established which is capable of explaining what may happen or what may be considered as happening in the mind of the actor. And so Parsons is not concerned with finding out the truly subjective categories, but seeks *only objective categories for the interpretation of subjective points of view* (Schutz [1940] 1978: 36, emphasis added).

Actually, the reason that subjectivity had significance for Parsons was because he thought that it could, as a category, help to construct a theory of social order. In this sense, Parsons merely dealt with individual subjectivity “as a thing.” He was never concerned about a living individual’s subjectivity. In contrast, Schutz insisted that the first consideration for sociologists was “what really does happen in the mind of the actor from his or her subjective point of view” (Schutz [1940] 1978: 36). That is, individual actors should be observed not as things, but as autonomous subjects who themselves observe the world. In the words of second-order cybernetics, Schutz was a second-order observer who observes the subjectivities of other observers, while Parsons remained a first-order observer who does not try to observe observers as such.⁹ Thus, as stated above, Parsons was criticized as ignoring human subjectivity, but largely for political reasons.

Parsons, however, should not be measured only in such a negative light of ideology. His attempt was originally an earnest effort to try to establish sociology as an independent science. According to Parsons, at the time he wrote *The Structure of Social Action*, there had been a strong current of pessimism among students of the social sciences, especially those who called themselves sociologists. The pessimism concerned that there are as many systems of sociological theory as there are sociologists, that there is no common basis, and that all is arbitrary and subjective (Parsons [1937] 1968: 774).

To the present writer [=Parsons] this current of sentiment has two equally unfortunate implications. On the one hand, it encourages the view that the only sound work in the social field is detailed factual study, without benefit of theory. On the other hand, for those who refuse to be satisfied

⁹ About these two types of observations, see also Tada (2010).

with this, it encourages a dangerous irrationalism which lets go of scientific standards altogether. We are told sociology is an art, that what is valuable in it is to be measured by the standards of intuition and inspiration, that it is not subject to the canons of rigorous logic and empirical verification (Parsons [1937] 1968: 774).

The reason why, in *The Structure of Social Action*, Parsons tried to find a common basis in the achievements of the great founders (Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim, and Weber) advocating analytical realism was that he was fighting these two implications. As Husserl resisted psychologism in order to ground modern science, Parsons aimed to establish “sociology as rigorous science,” which can hold out against the relativism of truth. Certainly, every scientific framework has different analytical realities, even though the observation object is the same. In this sense, reality is dependent on the scientific field. However, once the frame of reference in each field is decided, the analytical elements deduced by it cannot be contingent. They are omnipresent in every particular object. In the case of sociology, the analytically extracted elements of unit act through the action frame of reference should be logically-necessarily determined.

Just as the units of a mechanical system in the classical sense, particles, can be defined only in terms of their properties, mass, velocity, location in space, direction of motion, etc., so the units of action system also have certain basic properties without which it is not possible to conceive of the unit as “existing” (Parsons [1937] 1968: 43).

Such basic properties, that is, analytical elements, are not the psychological construction of each observer. Normative orientation is also one of them. “What is essential to the concept of action is that there should be a normative orientation” (Parsons [1937] 1968: 45). In the sense of being independent from observers, those elements are supposed to be real in themselves, and thereby sociology would, as a science, gain the common theoretical basis. Parsons concluded *The Structure of Social Action* as follows:

[W]e certainly need not be ashamed of our science [sociology]. Notable progress on both empirical and theoretical levels has been made within the short space of a generation. We have sound theoretical foundations on which to build (Parsons [1937] 1968: 775).

A theoretical system of science is, in Parsons’s opinion, quintessentially Ideal and has no place in the real world. Certainly, a system of scientific theory as Ideal reality is observable through meaningful symbols, so it is possible to say that there is verifiable knowledge. However, Parsons regarded such knowledge itself neither as a thing nor as an event in time, but as consisting of

“eternal objects,” as Alfred North Whitehead described them (see Parsons [1937] 1968: 763). Parsons thought that the reality of such eternal objects would be proved through the convergence of those four social scientists. His central interest in *The Structure of Social Action* was directed toward “the development of a particular coherent theoretical system, as an example of the *general process of ‘immanent’ development of science itself*” (Parsons [1937] 1968: 12, emphasis added). The a fortiori argument for why Parsons selected the four social scientists exists in that these people, within the broad, cultural unit of Europe, had developed the common body of Ideas, although there were almost no traces of direct influence of any one on any other (see Parsons [1937] 1968: 13-14). Because of their theoretical convergence, Parsons believed this was neither coincidence nor miracle, but evidence of the reality of the Idea, which he called the voluntaristic theory of action that underlay their scientific research:

[A] scientist as well as other men may be presumed to have philosophical Ideas and that these will stand in determinate reciprocal relations to his scientific theories. Indeed, since eminence in scientific theory implies a high level of intellectual ability, this is more likely to be true of scientists than of most men. It is clear that the *Weltanschauung* and the scientific theories of an eminent scientist cannot be radically dissociated. But this is no reason to believe there is not an immanent process of the development of science itself, and it is this that is the focus of interest here. Above all the motivation of the scientist in entering on his studies will not be treated except in so far as it is determined by the structure of the theoretical system itself with which he works. (Parsons [1937] 1968: 27).

According to Parsons, the system of scientific theory is not a physical object, but one of nonspatial, atemporal, and meaningful symbol systems. It is a conditioning element of scientific action (see Parsons [1937] 1968: 763-764). The reason why he discussed Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim, and Weber was not only because he borrowed their conceptions for the abstractive theory. Rather, for Parsons, the fact that those four scientists were *motivated* by the same Idea was the empirical evidence that proved the validity of the voluntaristic theory of action. Hence, Parsons stressed that his investigation in *The Structure of Social Action* is empirical:

[T]his study should be considered as an attempted empirical verification, in a particular case, of a theory of the process by which scientific thought develops, the theory that was there outlined [...] This study has attempted throughout to be an *empirical* monograph. It has been concerned with facts and the understanding of facts. The propositions set forth have been upon facts, and direct references to the sources for these facts have been given throughout in footnotes (Parsons [1937] 1968: 697).

Parsons never tried to develop a hollow theory. Rather, he always looked for the foundation of sociology, as Husserl had for modern science in general. Thus, Parsons's analytical realism should not be criticized without sufficient reason. It follows that the same criticism should be directed at Husserl's phenomenology. Their commonality shown above will not only cause a stir in the politically stereotyped criticism of Parsons, but also request reconsideration of the issue of how sociology as a science is possible.

References

- Akasaka, Makoto (2009) *Syakai sisutemu riron seiseishi: Vui parêto, eru jei hendâson, tî pâsonzu* [The History of the Social System Theory: V. Pareto, L. J. Henderson, T. Parsons], Nishinomiya: Kanseigakuindaigaku syuppankai [Kwansei Gakuin University Press]. (In Japanese.)
- Bauman, Zygmunt (1976) *Hermeneutics and Social Science*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Grathoff, Richard ed. (1978) *The Theory of Social Action: The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons*, Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press.
- Holenstein, Elmar (1975) *Jakobson ou le structuralisme phénoménologique* [Roman Jakobson's Approach to Language: Phenomenological Structuralism], Paris: Seghers.
- Husserl, Edmund ([1894] 1979) "Bericht über deutsche Schriften zur Logik aus dem Jahre 1894 (1897) [Report on German Writings in Logic from the Year 1894 (1897)]," Bernhard Rang hrsg., *Husserliana Bd.XXII: Aufsätze und Rezensionen (1890-1910)* [Husserliana Vol. 22: Articles and Reviews], Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff 1979, 124-151.
- Husserl, Edmund ([1901] 1913) *Logische Untersuchungen. Bd.2: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, I. Teil* [Logical Investigations. Vol. 2: Investigations Concerning the Phenomenology and Theory of Knowledge, First Part], 2. umgearbeiteten Aufl., Halle a. d. S.: Max Niemeyer 1913.
- Husserl, Edmund ([1913] 1950) *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie* [Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology], Walter Biemel hrsg., *Husserliana Bd.III* [Husserliana Vol.3], Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff 1950.
- Husserl, Edmund ([1936] 1976) *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie: Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie* [The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological

- Philosophy], Walter Biemel hrsg., *Husserliana Bd.VI: Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie* [The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology], 2. Aufl., Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff [1954] 1976, 1-276.
- Husserl, Edmund ([1954] 1976) "Die Krisis des europäischen Menschentums und die Philosophie [Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity]," Walter Biemel hrsg., *Husserliana Bd.VI: Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie* [The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology], 2. Aufl., Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 314-348.
- Husserl, Edmund ([1962] 1968) "Der Encyclopaedia Britannica Artikel [Phenomenology. Edmund Husserl's Article for the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1927)]," Walter Biemel hrsg., *Husserliana Bd.IX: Phänomenologische Psychologie* [Phenomenological Psychology], Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 237-301.
- Jules-Rosette, Bennetta (1980) "Talcott Parsons and the Phenomenological Tradition in Sociology: An Unresolved Debate," *Human Studies*, 3: 311-330.
- Kida, Gen (1977) "Genshōgaku towa nani ka?: Nijusseiki shisō ni okeru imi [What is Phenomenology?: Its Meaning in the 20th Century Thought]," *Gendai-shisō* [Modern Thought], 5(2): 86-93. (In Japanese.)
- Lovejoy, Arthur O. (1936) *The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Luhmann, Niklas (1984) *Soziale Systeme: Grundriß einer allgemeinen Theorie* [Social Systems], Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.
- Natanson, Maurice (1978) "Foreword," Grathoff (1978: ix-xvi).
- Parsons, Talcott ([1937] 1968) *The Structure of Social Action: A Study in Social Theory with Special Reference to a Group of Recent European Writers*, vol. I-II, New York: Free Press.
- Parsons, Talcott ([1941] 1978) "Parsons: 'I must confess to being skeptical of phenomenological analysis.' (February 2, 1941)," Grathoff (1978: 79-93).
- Parsons, Talcott ([1970, 1974] 1977) "On Building Social System Theory: A Personal History," *Social Systems and the Evolution of Action Theory*, New York: The Free Press 1977, 22-76.
- Rehorick, David Allan (1980) "Schutz and Parsons: Debate or Dialogue," *Human Studies*, 3: 347-355.
- Schutz, Alfred ([1940] 1978) "*Parsons' Theory of Social Action: A Critical Review by Alfred Schutz*," Grathoff (1978: 8-60).
- Schutz, Alfred ([1957-8] 1966) "Max Scheler's Epistemology and Ethics," Ilse Schutz ed. with an introduction by Aron Gurwitsch, *Collected Papers III: Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 145-178.
- Tada, Mitsuhiro (2010) "Intentionality of Communication: Theory of Self-Referential Social

Systems as Sociological Phenomenology,” *Schutzian Research: A Yearbook of Lifeworldly Phenomenology and Qualitative Social Science*, 2: 181-200.

Tada, Mitsuhiro (2012) *Syakaiteki sekai no jikan kôsei: Syakaigakuteki gensyôgaku toshite no syakai sisutemu riron* [Der zeitliche Aufbau der sozialen Welt: Theorie sozialer Systeme als soziologische Phänomenologie; The Temporal Construction of the Social World: Theory of Social Systems as Sociological Phenomenology], Doctoral Dissertation, Waseda University. (In Japanese.)

Tominaga, Ken'ichi (2004) *Sengo nihon no syakaigaku: Hitotsu no dôjidai gakushi* [Sociology in Postwar Japan: A Contemporary History], Tokyo: Tôkyôdaigaku syuppankai [University of Tokyo Press]. (In Japanese.)

Whitehead, Alfred North ([1925] 1967) *Science and the Modern World: Lowell Lectures*, New York: Free Press.

Yamamoto, Makoto (1980) “Jitsuzaisei ni tsuite [On Reality],” Nobushige Sawada, Akira Ôide, Kojirô Nakayama, and Kinkichi Udô eds., *Kagaku to sonzairon* [Science and Ontology], Tokyo: Shisakusha, 197-207. (In Japanese.)

Yui, Kiyomitsu (2002) *Pâsonzu to syakaigaku riron no genzai: Tî Pî to yobareta chi no ryôiki ni tsuite* [Parsons and Sociological Theory Today: On The Intellectual Field called T. P.], Kyoto: Sekaishisôsha. (In Japanese.)