

Formation of Malaysia and its Impact on the International Relations of Southeast Asia in 1963

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- I Surrounding Settings
- II Movement toward the Formation: the United Kingdom, Singapore and Malaya
- III Malayan Triangle: Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines
- Conclusion

I Surrounding Settings

Before 1961, the international relations of Southeast Asia had mainly been those among the so-called big powers which had possessed or possessed colonial territories in the region. Though the Republic of Indonesia, the Republic of the Philippines and the Federation of Malaya had already been independent, yet their diplomatic relations with one another and with other powers had been greatly influenced by the former colonial powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and France. In this sense, there had not existed true diplomatic relations among those Asiatic nations in the area. It can be said that through the Malaysia question, the diplomatic relations of Southeast Asia entered upon a new phase which was characterized by the struggle for leadership among the leaders and by their efforts to solve their own problems.

When colonial powers depart from their colonial territories, there seem to be two main patterns of withdrawal. One may be called a French pattern in which the colonial powers are forced to grant independence to their territories through revolutionary wars, just as France and the Netherlands have bitterly experienced them in Indochina and the Dutch East Indies respectively. The other may be called an English pattern in which they voluntarily give independence to their territories before they are forced to. The formation of Malaysia can be said to have followed the latter pattern.

Before the establishment of Malaysia, the United Kingdom had experienced difficulties in forming two federations by grouping quasi-states together. A Federation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was formed in 1949

and was dissolved in 1963. The Federation of the West Indies was established in 1958 and was dissolved in 1962. The failure of them seems to have been due to the premature planning on the British side and the lack of political consciousness on the side of the peoples in the territories. Why did the United Kingdom approve the establishment of Malaysia after the failures of the two preceding federations? What were the British and Malayan motives for the creation of Malaysia at the first place? The writer would like to explain those points and answer these questions in this paper.

II Movement toward the formation of Malaysia:

U. K., Singapore and Malaya

In this chapter, the writer would like to analyse the formation of Malaysia from the following angles: who took the initiative?; was it evolution or revolution?; it was the conglomerate of multi-racial states with different political status and parity.

The idea of merging British Malayan territories into a kind of viable unit was not entirely new. In fact, as far back as 1887, such a plan was proposed by Lord Brassey, a head of the British North Borneo Company to the British Government and since then it had been discussed on and off without any realization. After the Second World War, the concept of Malaysia was renewed. In 1949, foreign correspondents were privately asked about it by Malcolm Macdonald, British High Commissioner for Southeast Asia and in 1952, the same subject was discussed between High Commissioner Macdonald on one hand and President Achmet Sukarno and Vice-President Mohammad Hatta of Indonesia on the other.⁽¹⁾

Meanwhile, Malayan nationalism brought independence to the Federation of Malaya in 1957. Two years later, Singapore became a self-governing state and was supposed to be independent in several years. Thus in the latter years of 1950s, the United Kingdom was in process of retreating from its last colonial strongholds in Southeast Asia, leaving only three crown colonies of Hong-Kong, Sarawak, Sabah (North Borneo) and one protectorate, Brunei intact. At the same time, the future status of Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei was much concern of the British Government in the age of revolution.⁽²⁾

Ever since Singapore achieved self-governing status in 1959, its prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and his People's Action Party were eager to have "some form of

association with the Federation of Malaya⁽³⁾ in order to fulfill "part of the PAP manifesto of 1959"⁽⁴⁾. Moreover, without any connection with the Federation, Singapore's viability as a state would be doubted economically and politically. Singapore was hard pressed in providing more jobs to unemployees whose numbers had amounted to a tenth of the total working forces and were growing by twenty-thirty thousand workers per year. In order to cope with this problem, Singapore needed foreign capital and technology to make itself industrialized. Industrialization, however, required a larger market for its products than Singapore itself could provide. Therefore, Prime Minister Lee and his party tried to solve the problem by creating the so-called Malayan Common Market through an active economic association with the Federation of Malaya. Thus, negotiations began in 1960 but ended in failure⁽⁵⁾.

Politically, the Government of Singapore put the house in order by making an end of the raging labor strife and made the situation more attractive and conducive to the introduction of foreign capital. Moreover, it adopted Malay as the national language of Singapore.⁽⁶⁾ In this way it paved the way for the future merger with the Federation.

On the other hand, despite Singapore's fervent courting, the Malayan Government "remained, at the best, cautious and non-committal and, at the worst negative or positively hostile"⁽⁷⁾ to the proposed merger. The reason why the Federation of Malaya had been unreceptive was rather simple: Tunku Abdul Rahman, Premier of the Federation and his Alliance Party had fought communist rebels throughout the period of the Emergency, 1948-1960 and suspected Singapore was under the influence of Peking due to its overwhelming Chinese population; in addition they were afraid that the union between Singapore and the Federation would tip the racial balance in favor of the Chinese in it.⁽⁸⁾

A succession of events, however, forced Premier Rahman to change his mind on the matter. In Singapore, the majority in the legislative body which had been brought by PAP in the election of 1959 began to whittle away. In April 1961, the PAP was defeated in a by-election contest and had two more PAP men in the legislative body switched to the opposing party.⁽⁹⁾ In this way the fortune of the PAP was downward. This defeat was not only a shock to the PAP, but also engendered much anxiety to the Alliance Party in the Federation.

By May 1961 the situation of the PAP was further deteriorated facing the danger

of splitting, which would force a governmental change. The following government would demand the independence of Singapore and independent Singapore would be, without doubt, dominated by the communists. Under these circumstances, Premier Rahman thought that it would be less dangerous for the Federation of Malaya to have Singapore within it than outside it.⁽¹⁰⁾ So he reconsidered the idea of merger with Singapore inclusive of three other states; Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei. Finally he came to believe that the creation of Malaysia could lead to the solution of the future of Singapore and three British states of Borneo by giving them independence through merger.⁽¹¹⁾

On May 27, 1961 Premier Rahman made the famous speech of his decision on volte-face concerning the merger at one of press club meetings in Singapore.⁽¹²⁾ It was, therefore, Premier Rahman who took the initiative with regard to the formation of Malaysia.

As far as Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei were concerned, the initial reaction to the speech was a mixture of pros and cons.⁽¹³⁾ The majority of population of these territories who were Malayan were in favor of the plan. On the other hand, the minority comprising the Chinese; the Indian and the indigenous were generally opposed to it fearing the possible predominance over them of Malays as in the past.

In July 1961 the regional Commonwealth Parliamentary Association meeting was held in Singapore in which leaders of all the states of future Malaysia participated. They established a Malaysian Solidarity Consultative Committee with the purpose of promoting and hastening "the realization of Malaysia" through collecting "views and opinions" and encouraging debates and propagating information on Malaysia. Subsequently the Committee met several times at different places. Thus it contributed greatly to the creation of Malaysia.⁽¹⁴⁾

Meanwhile, on August 23, 1961 Premiers Rahman and Lee agreed in principle about a merger between the Federation of Malaya and Singapore. The agreement contained the establishment of a central government which would take charge of diplomacy, internal security and defense and the retainment by Singapore of "autonomy in matters of education and labor policy". A joint working team was set up to deliberate on more minute plans.⁽¹⁵⁾

Both premiers began to campaign for the merger seriously in their own governments and among their own peoples. In the Federation Premier Rahman

got the merger plan supported with comparative ease after three days' deliberation in the Assembly. In Singapore, however, Premier Lee had difficulty in convincing the Assembly of the advantage of the merger. Even thirteen members of the PAP came out to oppose him leaving his position insecure with a very narrow majority of one in the Assembly. Nevertheless the two Premiers concluded the so-called Heads of Agreement which had been worked on since August.⁽¹⁶⁾ This agreement included: that Singapore was to be embraced as one of the states within the Federation with a greater measure of autonomy in education and labor than the other states; that Singapore was to be allowed the special status in economic matters of dispensing revenue, raising loans and safeguarding the "entrepot trade"; that Singapore was to have fifteen members in the Federal Assembly much more limited than those accorded to the other states in proportion to population.⁽¹⁷⁾

It was a great political compromise introducing an idea of parity in which special political privileges of Malays were to be protected in return for special economic status was assured to Chinese. This parity was also applied to the British Borneo territories. This parity, however, came to lead to the separation of Singapore from Malaysia in August 1965.

In the same month Premier Rahman went to London with this agreement and came to an understanding with the British government on the concept of Malaysia and on the planned merger between the Federation and Singapore as the first step "within the wider framework". Premiers Rahman and Macmillan considered Malaysia, inclusive of Malaya, Singapore and the British Borneo territories desirable. Moreover they agreed that the defence arrangements of 1957 were to cover all the territories of Malaysia and the British Government was to continue to use its military and naval bases "for the purpose of assisting in the defence of Malaysia for Commonwealth defence and for the preservation of peace in South-East Asia".⁽¹⁸⁾

The British Government, however, maintained that the leaders and peoples of the British Borneo territories should be consulted before the incorporation of them into Malaysia. For this purpose a Commission was set up concurrently by the British and Malayan Governments on 16 January 1962 consisting of a Chairman and four committeemen, two appointed by the British Government and two by the Malayan Government. The Commission was authorized to assess

the opinions of Sarawak and Sabah on the planned merger and, in due course, to tender its report with recommendations. At the same time the Sultan of Brunei was consulted separately by some other means.⁽¹⁹⁾

The Commission was led by Chairman Lord Cobbold and made its inquiry throughout the territories between February and April. The Commission's report was published in June 1962. The report stated:

About one-third of the population in each territory strongly favors early realisation of Malaysia without too much concern about terms and conditions. Another third, many of them favorable to the Malaysia project, ask, with varying degrees of emphasis, for conditions and safeguards varying in nature and extent: the warmth of support among this category would be markedly influenced by a firm expression of opinion by Governments that the detailed arrangements eventually agreed upon are in the best interests of the territories. The remain-third is divided between those who insist on independence before Malaysia is considered and those who would strongly prefer to see British rule continue for some years to come. If the conditons and reservations which they have put forward could be substantially met,⁽²⁰⁾ the second category referred to above would generally support the proposals.

In the conclusion, the Commission reported that the formation of Malaysia was "an attractive and workable project" and was "in the best interests of the Borneo territories" and moreover, the incorporation of them into Malaysia would be "to the advantage of other participants in the federation".⁽²¹⁾

The Commission recommended: that those governments, concerned with the planned Malaysia, should decide on the future of the British Borneo territories as soon as possible; that the Constitution of Malaysia should be made on the basis of that of the Federation of Malaya; that concerning religion the Chairman and British Committeemen insisted on freedom of religion, while the Malayan members maintained that Islam should be the national religion in Malaysia; that concerning language both the Chairman and British Committeemen considered both English and Malay as the official languages, whereas the Malayan members wanted Malay but allowed English to be used together with Malay for the transitional period of ten years at least; that the Federal Government should have control over immigration.⁽²²⁾ Brunei was out of the Commission's inquiry, so Premier Rahman went to Brunei and secured the consent from all the members

of the Sultan in Council of the Malaysian plan.⁽²³⁾

On 1 August 1962 the British and Malayan Premiers met in London and favorably received "almost all the recommendations on which the Commission were unanimous". They announced that Malaysia would be established on 31 August 1963 and an Inter-Governmental Committee were to be set up consisting of the representatives of the British, Malayan, Sarawak and Sabah Governments for the purpose of working out "the future constitutional arrangements and the form of the necessary safeguards". They also let the Sultan of Brunei know their decisions and told him that they would welcome Brunei in Malaysia if they wanted to join it in the future.⁽²⁴⁾

While the new Committee set out to work, Premier Lee of Singapore was strenuously campaigning for the merger using all the possible means of communication. The situation was, however, so untenable that he decided on submitting the case to the voters. Thus in September 1962 was a referendum held, in which three alternatives were presented for the voters to choose one. The first alternative was the governmental proposal of joining Malaysia with autonomy on education and labor in return for fewer representatives in the new Federal Assembly. The second was to join Malaysia on the same conditions as those states in the Federation of Malaya and the third was for merger on no less advantageous conditions than those given to the Borneo territories. Through the rather rigged referendum Premier Lee succeeded in obtaining an overwhelming approval for the governmental proposal.⁽²⁵⁾

On 9 July 1963 the Malaysia Agreement was finally signed in London by those representatives of all the Governments concerned, but Brunei stayed away from the Agreement. Though the difficult question of financial matters had been worked out, yet there remained the problem of "the precedence of the Sultan of Brunei in the Conference of Rulers" unsolved.⁽²⁶⁾ Thus all was set for the Malaysia Day.

In this way the United Kingdom withdrew from Southeast Asia leaving only its Crown colony, Hong-Kong behind. Its way of withdrawal was unique and distinguished from those of France and the Netherlands: without revolutionary wars the British colonies were granted independence leaving its interests intact, while French and Dutch withdrawals accompanied revolutionary wars such as Indochinese war and Indonesian war. In this sense the British withdrawal could

be said evolutionary rather than revolutionary. Moreover Malaysia is a conglomerate of the multi-racial states with different status which is a marked accomplishment in the formation of nation.

- (1) Arnold C. Brackman, *Southeast Asia's Second Front: The Power Struggle in the Malay Archipelago*, (New York and others: Frederick A. Praeger Inc., 1966), p. 42.
- (2) Richard Allen, *Malaysia: Prospect and Retrospect; The Impact and Aftermath of Colonial Rule*, (London and others: Oxford University press, 1968), pp.134-5.
- (3) J. Kennedy, *A History of Malaya*, second ed., (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1970), p. 292.
- (4) Ibid.
- (5) J. M. Gullick, *Malaysia*, (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1969), p. 148.
- (6) Ibid.
- (7) Kennedy, op. cit. p., 292.
- (8) R. S. Milne, 'Malaysia: A New Federation in the Making', *Asian Survey*, III, No. 2, February 1963, p. 76.
- (9) Brackman, op. cit., p. 33.
- (10) Milne, op. cit., p. 76.
- (11) Zainal Abidin bin Abdul wahid, 'Malaysia, South-east Asia and World Politics', in Wang Gungwu (ed.), *Malaysia: A Survey*, (London and Others: Pall Mall Press, 1964), p. 365.
- (12) Victor Purcell, *Malaysia*, (London: Thames and Hudson Ltd., 1965), pp.186-7.
- (13) John Bastin et al., (comp.), *Malaysia: Selected Historical Readings*, (Kuala Lumpur and Others: Oxford University Press, 1966), p.402, and Brackman, op. cit., pp. 68-69 and 76-77.
- (14) Kennedy, op. cit., p. 296.
- (15) Ibid.
- (16) Ibid., p. 297.
- (17) Ibid., pp. 297-8.
- (18) Ibid., p. 298.
- (19) Purcell, op. cit., pp. 193-4.
- (20) Peter Boyce, *Malaysia and Singapore in International Diplomacy: Documents and Commentaries*, (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1968), p. 13.
- (21) Bastin et al., op. cit., p. 412 and Allen, op. cit., p. 151.
- (22) Purcell, op. cit., p.198 and Allen, op. cit., pp. 152-4.
- (23) Ibid.

- (24) Boyce, op. cit., pp. 14-5.
- (25) Kennedy op. cit., p. 306 and Boyce, op. cit., pp. 15-6.
- (26) Gordon P. Means, 'Malaysia: A New Federation in Southeast Asia', Pacific Affairs, XXXVI, No. 2, Summer 1963, p. 159.

III Malayan Triangle: Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines

In the first half of this chapter the writer would like to analyse reactions of Indonesia and the Philippines to the formation of Malaysia as struggles for the leadership of Southeast Asia and in the second half he would try to examine its impact on the international relations in Southeast Asia as Asian efforts to solve Asian problems.

When Tengku Abdul Rahman, Premier of the Federation of Malaya broached on the Malaysia plan at a press luncheon in May 1961, the initial reactions of two other countries-the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of the Philippines-were rather favorable to it; partly because Indonesia had been very much preoccupied over the West Irian dispute with the Netherlands⁽¹⁾ and partly because the Philippines had been on friendly terms with Malaya on the basis of the Association of Southeast Asia.⁽²⁾

As a matter of fact, Raden Subandrio, Foreign Minister of Indonesia sent a letter to the New York Times to the effect that his country was not against the Malaysian project.⁽³⁾ Moreover in a debate in the General Assembly of the United Nations in November 1961 repeated he this statement that when Indonesia had been informed of the Malaysia plan, it had told the Malayan leaders that Indonesia had "no objection and wished them success"⁽⁴⁾. The Philippines too did not at first object the Malaysia plan as detrimental to its security. President Diosdado Macapagal even recognized that the Malaysia plan was a strong rampart against threat of communism.⁽⁵⁾

So from the latter half of 1961 to the earlier part of 1962 seemed there to be more or less a rapport on the formation of Malaysia between Malaya on one side and Indonesia and the Philippines on the other side. This seeming rapport, however, did not come to develop itself into a bona fide peace. Though the United Kingdom had collaborated on the project of Malaysia, thinking that Malaysia would be stronger and more viable a nation and would bring political stability to the region, yet the actual British withdrawal from Southeast Asia

brought forth a kind of power vacuum which led inevitably to power struggle for leadership among the leaders of these nations.

Fearing that Malaysia, once established, might predominate over Southeast Asia and would provide the Philippines with a fait accompli concerning the status of Sabah (North Borneo), President Macapagal initiated this struggle by presenting the Philippines' formal claim to ownership of Sabah to the United Kingdom in June 1962.⁽⁶⁾

Was the timing of this presentation "accidental" as professor J. W. Gould had pointed it out in his book?⁽⁷⁾ It seems to the writer that the timing as well as the claim was subtle and purposeful on the side of President Macapagal.

In fact the claim had been closely studied and debated off and on in the Philippines' Congress since 1946.⁽⁸⁾ In 1950 a resolution urging the Government to claim Sabah was unanimously adopted by the House with the concurrence of the Senate.⁽⁹⁾ From the outset Macapagal had been the prime mover in this matter in the House as well as in the Department of Foreign Affairs. Nonetheless nothing came out of this resolution. In the mean time the Philippines Free Press, "a respected and influential Manila Weekly" took up this issue and published it as the first article "in its series on North Borneo" requiring the Government to take action on December 30, 1961, on the day when Macapagal was installed as President.⁽¹⁰⁾ Certainly heartened by this press campaign, the House unanimously adopted the so-called Ramos resolution in April 1962 calling upon President Macapagal to take the proper measures with respect to the return of North Borneo and others to the Philippines.⁽¹¹⁾

In this way the press campaign and the following resolution by the House engendered strong sentiments in the country. Since his inauguration President Macapagal had earnestly waited for this occasion in order to take new initiatives in the Republic's foreign policy even if these marred the hitherto existed friendly relations with Malaya on the basis of the Association of Southeast Asia⁽¹²⁾ and in order to enhance his personal reputation as one of the greatest leaders in emerging nations. So he never overlooked it and chose the claim to North Borneo to fulfill his ambitions. Moreover it was very significant that the claim was made not to both the United Kingdom and Malaya but only to the former without mentioning the Philippines' objection to the Malaysia plan which was well under way. The writer maintains that the action of the President was rather for the

sake of political expediency.

In July 1962, only two months after the presentation of the claim to North Borneo, President Macapagal made a counterproposal of "a greater Malayan Confederation" consisting of Malaya, the Philippines, Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo against the Malaysia plan. In it he for the first time criticized directly the Malaysia plan as "a European project" that the Asians should not accept and advocated that they should make their own project referring to his Confederation. It is very much doubtful that he sincerely believed that his proposal would be accepted and be brought to realization instead of the plan. Then why did he dare to make such a proposal apparently impossible to be carried out at this time? It seems to be nothing but a gesture to make himself known as one of the greatest leaders in Southeast Asia.

Moreover in December 1962 when a major rebellion broke out in Brunei and its adjacent areas against the Malaysia plan under the leadership of Sheikh A. M. Azahari, leader of the Party Ra'yat in Brunei and he demanded the establishment of "a united and independent state of Kalimantan Utara or North Borneo", Azahari and his deputy Zaini bin Haji Ahmad were not in Brunei but in Manila. From there he directed the revolt and declared himself as "Prime Minister of the Revolutionary State of North Kalimantan". The fact that the Philippine Government tolerated, if not allowed, the rebellious activities of Azahari in Manila clearly indicates that President Macapagal would use every means short of war to prevent the realization of the Malaysia plan.

Furthermore in his "State of the Nation Address" in January 1963 President Macapagal stated that the Malaysia plan inclusive of North Borneo would pose problems to the security of the Philippines. First of all, because of the validity of the claim of the Philippines, Malaya could not likely provide North Borneo with security for long if the latter had come under the jurisdiction of the former through "arbitrary arrangement". This section of his address sounds like threatening and very much one sided.

He continued that the plan was likely to be "a continuation of colonialism based only on an expedient of false security". If so, Indonesia would not accept it. It seems that the collusion between Indonesia and the Philippines to block the plan began at this point. Because of the propinquity of North Borneo to the territory of the Philippines, it would be essential to the security of the latter

that the former should not be put under the Malayan Government. If not so, North Borneo under Malaya would directly "pose a grave and intolerable threat to" the Philippines in case Malaya on the Asian continent yielded to strong menace from the Asian continental communist.⁽¹⁷⁾

In this way the attitude toward the Malaysia plan of President Macapagal changed kaleidoscopically from an approver with the legalistic and historical claim to North Borneo and the proposer of the Confederation to the direct and serious opposer to the plan from the viewpoint of security according as political situations changed. Later it changed further.

In December 1961, one month after Subandrio, Indonesian Foreign Minister had assured the United Nations of the Indonesian approval of the Malaysia plan, the Indonesian Communist Party strongly criticized the Federation of Malaysia as "a form of neo-colonialism" in its resolutions.⁽¹⁸⁾ However, the Republic of Indonesia itself had been engrossed in the West Irian dispute with the Netherlands in the mean time. So it was not until after August 1962 when the dispute was settled in favor of the former that President Sukarno could pay serious attention to the Malaysia plan. In September Foreign Minister Subandrio stated in a press interview in Singapore that Indonesia could not but take counterwork if foreign military bases had been established in the North Borneo territories of the forthcoming state, Malaysia. In the following month Defence Minister Naustion warned that Indonesia was still surrounded with "imperialism and neocolonialism".⁽¹⁹⁾

In December when the Brunei revolt broke out President Sukarno announced that the people of Indonesia were in great sympathy with the North Borneans in their independent struggle.⁽²⁰⁾ His inflammatory statement excited the Indonesians to such a degree that against the United Kingdom and Malaya mass demonstrations were "staged" and strong protests were made by various political leaders and organizations apparently "with the approval and acknowledge of the military authorities".⁽²¹⁾ Despite these demonstrations and protests the Indonesian Government seems to remain content with this tense situation and remain moderate in its foreign policy toward Malaya.

In January 1963, however, Foreign Minister Subandrio mentioned that President Sukarno had decided to take the so-called confrontation policy⁽²²⁾ against Malaya because it had come to be "tools of colonialism and imperialism".⁽²³⁾ Thus at the turn of the year the Indonesian Government changed its attitude from the rather

friendly and cautious approval to the violent disapproval of the formation of Malaysia.

There are not a few academic papers which had been written about Indonesian motives from various angles during this period. Professor L. Castles argued that Indonesian Policies were probably based on three main anxieties: (1) that no consultation about the Malaysia plan was made by either Malaya or the United Kingdom, (2) that Indonesia might be surrounded by non-Asiatic powers, (3) that her separatist movement would be heartened by the formation of Malaysia.⁽²⁴⁾ Professor Donald Hindley and Journalist Arnold Brackman attributed the confrontation policy to Indonesian domestic politics: all elements wanted it for their own respective advantages.⁽²⁵⁾ Professor G. M. Kahin maintained that the policy of confrontation was made out of latent fears of China and the Chinese in Malaysia⁽²⁶⁾ and the former Vice-President of Indonesia, Mohammad Hatta based his opposition to Malaysia mainly on this thesis.⁽²⁷⁾ Professor B. K. Gordon considered the Indonesian foreign policy as basically expansionist.⁽²⁸⁾ Professor J. M. van der Kroef observed that certain frictions which had existed between Indonesia and Malaya in the past few years were contributed to the Indonesian Konfrontasi.⁽²⁹⁾ Historian Zainal Abidin bin Abdul Wahid claimed that Indonesian leaders regarded politically stable and economically prosperous Malaysia as destructive to Indonesia and thus adopted the cofrontation policy.⁽³⁰⁾

Besides these motives it seems to the writer that President Sukarno played the most important role in making the policy of confrontation. Since 1955 when the first Afro-Asian Conference was held in Bandung, Indonesia, he had been recognized as one of the most influential leaders in emerging nations both abroad and at home. He thought himself the leader, if not in the world, in Asia. Therefore he was unpleasantly surprised and his pride was severely wounded when neither the United Kingdom nor Malaya had consulted him about the Malaysian plan which would change political boundaries in the region.⁽³¹⁾

Moreover in 1959 he secured the power his own hands by making his Cabinet responsible only to him.⁽³²⁾ However the basis of his power had depended upon delicate balancing among various vested interests: especially "the army and the communists"⁽³³⁾. Toward 1963 political and economic situations were seemingly restored to a certain extent that some optimistic views of recovery from chaos were reported in the New York Times.⁽³⁴⁾ Nonetheless they were restless and came

to demand their respective démarche from the Government. In order to tide over these difficulties, to unite various factions once again and to keep his leadership intact, President Sukarno adopted the confrontation policy. In this sense he adopted it for the sake of political expediency.

Moreover he was very much proud that the independence of Indonesia had been obtained through fiery trials, that was to say, revolutionary wars in many ways quite different from those of Malaya and the Philippines.⁽³⁵⁾ Therefore he could not accept Malaya as truly independent a nation, not to speak of Malaysia. Thus he regarded the formation of Malaysia as a creation of neo-colonialism and imperialism which Indonesia should wipe out.⁽³⁶⁾ The more stable and prosperous Malaya or Malaysia was, the more ominous and threatening it must have looked to the so-called guided democracy of Indonesia.

Thus the writer maintains that the Malaysia question can be summed up as the leadership struggle among Premier Rahman of Malaya (later Malaysia), President Macapagal of the Philippines and President Sukarno of Indonesia. It is noteworthy that from January 1963 on both Sukarno and Macapagal came to collude with each other against the Malaysia plan and later Malaysia. With their collusion the Malaysia question seemed to enter upon a new phase.

In this way "confrontation diplomacy" began with the purpose of gaining compromises from Malaya. Through 1963-4 Indonesia made every effort shrewdly to associate the Philippines policy toward Malaya and later Malaysia with its foreign policy. On the other hand the Philippines tried to mediate between Malaya and Indonesia by suggesting "summit conference" one after another.⁽³⁷⁾

On 10 March 1963 President Macapagal submitted "a heads-of-Government summit" resulting in a three-day Tokyo meeting between Sukarno and Rahman in May. This meeting in turn paved the way for the Foreign Ministers' conference of the three countries in Manila.⁽³⁸⁾ The conference was held from 7 to 11 June. They adopted the so-called Manila Accord stating: that "the three ministers" sustained "the Macapagal plan" and agreed that they would co-operate for its realization, that Indonesia and the Philippines "would welcome the formation of Malaysia provided the support of the people of the Borneo territories is ascertained by ... the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representative"; that the 'Ministers recommended that a summit conference should be convened 'in Manila not later than the end of July 1963"⁽³⁹⁾. This Accord

engendered amicable feeling among these nations and the leaders. This feeling, however, did not last long.

Meanwhile the Malaysia plan had been advanced by the governments concerned despite the opposition of Indonesia and the Philippines. On 9 July the final Malaysia agreement was reached and signed in London. Because of this President Sukarno accused Premier Rahman of having broken "a claimed understanding" between them in Tokyo. Disregarding the work of the Cobbold Commission he further maintained that it had been agreed in Manila that Malaysia should be formed only after the wishes of the people of the British Borneo territories had been ascertained. Moreover on 27 July he told an audience that the Malaysia plan was a British scheme and that the Republic would destroy it by all means. He hinted that he would stay away from the forthcoming summit conference. An urgent entreaty by President Macapagal had him come to the Manila conference.⁽⁴⁰⁾

From July 30 to August 5 the leaders of the three countries met in Manila and published their own declaration. In it they agreed: (1) that they would adhere to "the principle of equal rights and 'self-determination of peoples"; (2) that they would keep "fraternal relations" and co-operate in the "economic, social and cultural fields"; (3) that they would "struggle against colonialism and imperialism"; (4) that they would build "a new and better world"; (5) that they would "take initial steps toward the establishment of Maphilindo"⁽⁴¹⁾. The plan of Maphilindo proposed by President Macapagal was to expand his previous proposal in order to include Indonesia. At the same time they stated "the terms of reference" for the inquiry of the United Nations in their communiqué and sent a letter of request, to U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations.⁽⁴²⁾ The leadership of the Philippines' President had been strongly felt throughout the conference.

Soon after U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations accepted their request, he organized a nine-man mission and sent it to Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo). The mission arrived at Sarawak on August 16 within less than two weeks after the Manila conference had ended. However, its inquiry did not begin immediately because Indonesia had insisted on sending more observers than those the United Nations had allowed to go along with its mission. Ten more days were spent for the settlement of this dispute. Indonesia and the Philippines did not send their observers "until some time after the inquiry had begun"⁽⁴³⁾. It seems to the writer that they intentionally interfered in the

United Nations work in order to delay the formation of Malaysia.

In any way the mission completed its work and reported to the Secretary-General. From the report he drew his own conclusions which were favorable to the establishment of Malaysia and published them on September 14. The conclusions stated: that the Malaysia plan had been extensively and intensively debated and was one of the principal issues in the elections in the British Borneo territories; that the elections were held voluntarily and justly and that a large majority of the people in the territories desired to participate in Malaysia. So U Thant considered that the wishes of the people in the territories to join Malaysia had been properly ascertained.⁽⁴⁴⁾ However Indonesia and the Philippines took objections to the report of the United Nations mission. According to their views, the mission's inquiry had not been comprehensive and impartial and their estimation was faulty and erroneous.⁽⁴⁵⁾

On September 15, the day before Malaysia was to come into being, Indonesia announced that it would not acknowledge Malaysia which was illegally being formed. The Philippines too declared that it would not recognize Malaysia.⁽⁴⁶⁾ Both nations recalled their respective ambassadors from Kuala Lumpur.

Amid the opposition and objection of Indonesia and the Philippines Malaysia was duly established on 16 September 1963. From that day on Indonesia intensified its activities against Malaysia along its borders as well as within borders, asking the Philippines to do the same. On the other hand the Philippines reluctantly followed the lead of Indonesia, but at the same time it continued in its peace offensive by proposing summit meetings. It is very much noteworthy that through the Malaysia question, the Asian nations came to take up their own problems and to solve them without the help of big powers and moreover, they established true diplomatic relations among themselves for the first time.

- (1) The West Irian dispute was settled in August 1962 between Indonesia and the Netherlands in favor of the former.
- (2) The Association of Southeast Asia (A.S.A.) was established in July 1961 under the leadership of Tunku Abdul Rahman, Premier of Malaya and Carlos Garcia, President of the Philippines with the purpose of promoting closer co-operation in every possible field of Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand.
- (3) Gungwu, op. cit., p. 367.

- (4) Allen, op. cit., p. 158 and Boyce, op. cit., p. 67.
- (5) Gungwu, op. cit., p. 367.
- (6) Sympathetic to the Philippines claim:
 H. B. Jacobini, "Fundamentals of Philippine Policy toward Malaysia", Asian Survey, IV, No. 11, November 1964.
 Martin Meadows, "The Philippine Claim to North Borneo", Political Science Quarterly, LXXVII, No. 3, September 1962.
 Defence of Malaysia or against the Philippine Claim:
 K. G. Tregonning, "The Claim for North Borneo by the Philippines", Australian Outlook, XVI, No. 3, December 1962.
 Michael Leifer, The Philippine Claim to Sabah, (Yorkshire: Center for South-East Asian Studies, University of Hull, 1968) .
- (7) James W. Gould, The United States and Malaysia, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969) , p. 208.
- (8) Boyce, op. cit., pp. 119-20
- (9) Bastin, op. cit., p. 418.
- (10) Ibid.
- (11) Boyce, op. cit., p. 113.
- (12) See Footnote 2 .
- (13) Boyce, op. cit., pp. 113-5.
- (14) Bastin, op. cit., p. 423.
- (15) Allen, op. cit., pp. 164-5.
- (16) Boyce, op. cit., pp. 119-20.
- (17) Ibid., pp. 120-1.
- (18) Ibid., pp. 68-9.
- (19) Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesia, Malaya, and the North Borneo Crisis", Asian Survey, III, No. 4, April 1963, pp. 175-8.
- (20) Allen, op. cit., p. 167.
- (21) Kroef, pp. 177-8.
- (22) Confrontation refers to a pattern of intensive diplomatic pressure, press campaign mobilization of public opinion and threat of military force; Indonesia used it against the Netherlands over the West Irian dispute.
- (23) Boyce, op. cit., pp. 69-70.
- (24) L. Castle, "Indonesian Attitude to Malaysia", Australia's Neighbours, 4th Series, No. 10, December 1963, pp. 3-4.
- (25) Donald Hindley, "Indonesia's Confrontation with Malaysia: a Search for Motives", Asian Survey, IV, No. 6, June 1964, pp. 904-13 and Brackman,

- op. cit., pp. 257-66.
- (26) G. M. Kahin, "Malaysia and Indonesia", *Pacific Affairs*, XXXVII, No. 3, Fall 1964, pp. 235-66.
- (27) Mohammad Hatta, "One Indonesian View of the Malaysia Issue", *Asian Survey*, V, No. 3, March 1965, pp. 139-43.
- (28) B. K. Gordon, "The Potential for Indonesian expansionism", *Pacific Affairs*, XXXVI, No. 4, Winter 1963-4, pp. 379-93.
- (29) Kroef, pp. 173-81.
- (30) Gungwu, op. cit., pp. 365-74.
- (31) Gould, op. cit., p. 202.
- (32) Hindley, p. 904.
- (33) Gould, op. cit., p. 202.
- (34) Hindley, p. 904.
- (35) Gould, op. cit., p. 201.
- (36) Allen, op. cit., p. 167.
- (37) Boyce, op. cit., p. 56.
- (38) Ibid.
- (39) Ibid.
- (40) Allen, op. cit., p. 170.
- (41) Boyce, op. cit., pp. 73-4.
- (42) Ibid.
- (43) Allen, op. cit., p. 172.
- (44) "Mission to Sarawak and Sabah: Secretary-General's Conclusions", *United Nations Reviews*, October 1963, pp. 14-5.
- (45) Boyce, op. cit., pp. 78-82 and pp. 121-4.
- (46) Allen, op. cit., p. 173.

Conclusion

In this paper the writer tried to explain how Malaysia was established, who initiated its formation, whether it was evolutionary or revolutionary and finally how multi-racial quasi-states were grouped together into a nation. Moreover he maintains that Malaysia brought forth the struggle for leadership over the power vacuum created by the British withdrawal from Southeast Asia among the leaders and at the same time, Malaysia introduced the new and true relations which had not existed hitherto for those independent nations in the area. It is of the opinion of the writer that Malaysia holds a key to understand the present

Association of South-East Asian Nations which has developed from the Association of Southeast Asia. Throughout the two associations, Malaya and later Malaysia has been and is one of the most active and prosperous members. Lately by having taken the initiatives in opening diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, Malaysia seems to have obtained the leadership of the association and will remain as the leader. It can be said that the formation of Malaysia was epochmaking in its concept and in its development.