

1997

John S. Service and United States-China relations, 1933–1945.

Yufeng Wang

Follow this and additional works at: <https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd>

Recommended Citation

Wang, Yufeng, "John S. Service and United States-China relations, 1933--1945." (1997). *Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports*. 9980.

<https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd/9980>

This Thesis is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by the The Research Repository @ WVU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Thesis in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you must obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/ or on the work itself. This Thesis has been accepted for inclusion in WVU Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports collection by an authorized administrator of The Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact researchrepository@mail.wvu.edu.

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

UMI

A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/521-0600

JOHN S. SERVICE AND U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS, 1933-1945

DISSERTATION

Submitted to the College of Arts and Sciences

of

West Virginia University

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

The Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by

Yufeng Wang

Morgantown

West Virginia

1997

UMI Number: 9727695

**Copyright 1997 by
Wang, Yufeng**

All rights reserved.

**UMI Microform 9727695
Copyright 1997, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.**

**This microform edition is protected against unauthorized
copying under Title 17, United States Code.**

UMI
300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48103

© COPYRIGHT 1997

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my deep appreciation to members of the Committee who carefully read my drafts and made constructive suggestions. I am especially grateful to Dr. Jack Hammersmith, who tirelessly corrected my drafts and offered encouragement and criticism. My greatest thanks are to my adviser, Dr. Wesley Bagby, to whom I have accumulated many debts of gratitude during the past several years when this dissertation took shape, without whose guidance, advice, inspiration, and patience this work would not be completed. Dr. Bagby also furnished me with his collection of primary documents, including the Hurley Papers and Chiang's diaries from archives in Taiwan. To Mr. John Service and his wife Caroline, with whom I had two interviews and many contacts, I express my special thanks for their hearty support for this dissertation. My field research was made possible in part by a grant from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library and by travel grants from the Office of Academic Affairs and Research of West Virginia University.

NOTE ON ROMANIZATION OF CHINESE TERMS

The romanization of Chinese names and places in this dissertation is based on the official *pinyin* method defined by the Chinese Pinyin Plan, adopted by the People's Congress of China on 11 February 1958. The *pinyin* system for transcription of Chinese characters into alphabetic writing is simpler, more efficient, and closer to the original Chinese pronunciation than the more traditional Wade-Giles system. Thus "Yanan" is used instead of "Yenan." However Wade-Giles forms are retained for a few well-known names that have permeated English literature such as "Chiang Kai-shek." On rare occasions, the nineteenth-century Imperial Post Office romanization or other customary forms are used for historical consistency, like in the case of "Sun Yat-sen." A list of Chinese terms with all available *pinyin*, Wade-Giles, English, and original Chinese forms is provided in Appendix B for the reader's reference.

ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines John S. Service's China career as a Foreign Service officer from 1933-45, and the impact of his diplomatic activities and political reports on Sino-American relations during World War II. It explores his dual heritage as an American missionary son who was born and bred in China, revealing how this American-Chinese experience affected his personality and diplomatic approach that proved to be critical in his distinctive life and career.

World War II presented China and the United States with an unparalleled opportunity for close cooperation and the two countries worked to build an effective alliance, but the promising wartime cooperation soon deteriorated into disillusionment. The dramatic change in U.S.-China relations from friendly involvement to hostile non-recognition following the 1949 Communist victory triggered bitter debates in the United States over America's China policy. Political analysts and historians have, for decades, posed questions as to how America "lost China" or suffered a "lost chance" in China. The focus of this political and scholarly scrutiny has been America's wartime China policy and the role of such "China hands" as John Service.

Despite the rich literature on Sino-American relations during World War II from both sides of the Pacific, the long posed question of whether America had

adopted a realistic policy concerning wartime China needs to be clarified, and Service's role in the dramatic Sino-American discourse fully investigated. The available literature on those subjects was largely written in the 1950s and 1960s during the Cold War, and in the 1970s amidst the "China-mania." Moreover, they were mostly either based on fragmentary sources, chiefly in English, or influenced by political environment. The recent release of declassified archival material and primary documents in the United States and China makes it both possible and necessary to produce a more comprehensive and balanced study on Service and U.S.-China relations in the turbulent 1930s and 1940s.

Based on extensive research on primary and secondary sources in English and Chinese, and on personal interviews with Service, this dissertation concludes that Service, with his extensive Chinese experience, was one of the few Americans who had a comprehensive understanding of China and its problems. His insights into Chinese political situations were firmly based; his prediction of a Chinese civil war and the Communist victory has withstood the test of time. His enthusiastic call for America's assertive intervention in Chinese domestic affairs and his passionate effort to remake China along democratic lines, especially his recommendations of cooperating with the Chinese Communists were, despite his good intentions, impractical considering China's strong nationalist sentiment and America's long-standing anti-Communist politics. In the end America's well-intentioned interventionist undertakings in China failed and Service, with his extraordinary career there, became a victim of history.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FORWARD	1
INTRODUCTION	7
CHAPTER ONE: U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS IN RETROSPECT	21
“Lost China” or “Lost Chance in China”	21
Modern China and the History of Sino-American relations	30
GMD-CCP Rivalry and the War Against Japan	35
America’s Wartime Entanglement in China	42
CHAPTER TWO: DUALITY: FORMATIVE YEARS	70
Student Volunteers in China	71
China Service in the YMCA	73
Youth in Chengdu	80
American Education	85
CHAPTER THREE: THE MAKING OF A DIPLOMAT	99
Choosing the Foreign Service	101
Kunming: Starting Off As a Good Bureaucrat	104
Beijing: New Horizons	111
Shanghai: Apprenticeship	126
CHAPTER FOUR: CHONGQING: THE NATIONALISTS	151
Chongqing: A City of Dismay and Courage	158
General Handyman and Sideline Observer	168
Close Alley, Uneasy Partnership	179
Field Observer and Political Reporter	197
CHAPTER FIVE: YANAN: THE COMMUNISTS	252
The CCP’s Approach to America	255

America's Response to the CCP	264
Service and the Dixie Mission	283
Coalition Government and America's Dilemma	313
CONCLUSION	358
AFTERWARD	374
APPENDIXES	
A. CHRONOLOGY OF ACTIVITIES AND EVENTS	379
B. LIST OF CHINESE TERMS	384
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	389

FORWARD

His central role in the strange case of the purloined government papers rests on the integral fact that Service was the author of so many of the documents which turned up in the New York office of an ardent Communist sympathizer in 1945. The content of these documents may prove, however, to be of even greater importance to the historical record than the fact that they were stolen, because herein the fall of China to Communism was anticipated and espoused.¹

----- Anthony Kubek

It is a shame and a disgrace that he and his family should have to face . . . such humiliation, embarrassment and inconvenience.²

----- John E. Peurifoy

The day of 6 June 1945 started out as any other one for John S. Service, Foreign Service officer of the U.S. State Department. He had just returned from China two months before; there he had had extensive talks with the Chinese Communist leaders in their Yanan (Yenan) caves. However, an unforeseen squall was on its way. In the old State Department building at mid-afternoon, while Service was busy preparing proposals for modernizing the Foreign Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation agents were intently scrutinizing names and numbers in the hallway outside his office door.

About eight, a knock on his apartment door brought Service the shocking announcement: "You are under arrest for conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act."³

In addition to the handcuffs and other disgraces, the arrest forever altered his public name from John S. Service to John Steward Service. Overnight, this quiet and unpretentious diplomat became headline news.

Service was arrested in connection with the Amerasia espionage case which also involved five others. The Amerasia magazine was owned, edited, and published by Phillip J. Jaffe, a Russian-born greeting-card manufacturer in New York, who was enthusiastically supportive of Communists in China and the United States. The bi-monthly magazine had a small circulation, less than 2,000, mostly among intellectuals and diplomats interested in Asian affairs. Since its inception in 1937, it had been devoted exclusively to political and economic issues in Asia, and was widely read by officials in the State Department. Conservatives called it "the Bible' of the influential bloc in the State Department which saw in the Chinese Reds, rather than Nationalist government, the true destiny of China."⁴ Service was charged with handing over classified government documents to Jaffe and other reporters, which he claimed as personal copies.⁵

The arrest of Service in connection with the Amerasia case created a sensation at home and abroad. While right-wingers welcomed it as laudable news, liberals condemned it as an "attack on democracy."⁶ When the shockwave reached China, his associates reacted with immediate concern. China theater commander General Albert C. Wedemeyer expressed his "complete confidence" in Service and his loyalty. David Barrett, who had worked closely with Service in Yanan, the Chinese Communist headquarters, remarked that "no one out [in China] will swallow this dose," reflecting

an almost unanimous reaction among American diplomats and military personnel then in China.⁷

Chinese responded quickly to the electrifying news of Service's arrest, calling it a "turning point" in Sino-American relations. Guomindang (Kuomintang) (GMD) newspapers were "overjoyfully crowing."⁸ The Chinese Nationalist Daily, for instance, carried an editorial on 9 June titled "We Must Clean Up the Traitors Who Undermine Sino-American Relations." It stated that "the guilt of the arrested is beyond doubt. . . . It goes to prove that, in view of the arrest of Service, there must still be numerous Communist traitors hidden in the American government who are doing their utmost to undermine the diplomatic relations between the United States and China."⁹ Chiang Kai-shek expressed high hopes in his diary: "The American government arrested six people for espionage. They were Communists. Service was the key man to connect Stilwell with the Chinese Communists. After the arrests American policy toward China will be clarified, and obstacles will be cleared. . . . This is a turning point in our diplomatic affairs."¹⁰ The pro-Communist newspaper in Chongqing (Chungking), Xinhua Ribao [New China daily], immediately responded with a brief editorial criticizing the arrest, but it was killed by government censors.¹¹ Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders, with whom Service had worked closely during his mission with the American Military Observers Group in 1944 and 1945, reacted vigorously, regarding it also as "a turning point in American policy towards China" from cooperation to rupture with the CCP.¹² On 25 June, the Jiefang Ribao [Liberation daily] carried an editorial, "Understand America's Dual Policy toward

China through the Arrest of [Amerasia] Six."¹³ A month after Service's arrest, CCP Chairman Mao Zedong wrote an editorial for the Xinhua News Agency, in which he warned the United States of the grave consequences of changing direction in its China policy. He stated that the decision to cooperate only with the GMD "is the resolution of a group of politicians in government. . . . This solution was not only mistaken but also dangerous. . . . If it is allowed to carry out, the U.S. government will no doubt sink into a deep and stinky hole that will be hard to get out of; and put itself in the position of adversary toward hundreds of millions of awakening Chinese."¹⁴

The Amerasia arrest not only started a long saga of interrogation and legal ordeal for Service, it also set off a major debate over U.S. China policy and his role in Sino-American relations, a process that has not ceased to this day.

ENDNOTES

1. U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Internal Security Subcommittee, The Amerasia Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China, edited by Anthony Kubek (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970), 70.
2. Statement by John E. Peurifoy, Deputy Under Secretary of State. See "Text of Peurifoy Statement on Service," The New York Times, 17 March 1950.
3. John S. Service, "Twenty-Five Years After the Amerasia Case: Myths, Scholarship, and A Few Facts," 5, John Service Papers, Box 1, Folder 6, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley (hereafter John Service Papers, Berkeley).
4. Frederick Woltman, "Chance Glance Set Off Famous 'Amerasia' Case," The Washington Daily News, 1 May 1950.
5. Owen Lattimore had an interesting recollection about how at a dinner party in his house in Maryland, Service, as a guest, showed him a document with Mao's angry words about America's dealing with the CCP. Owen Lattimore, China Memoirs: Chiang Kai-shek and the War Against Japan (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1990), 234.
6. Woltman, "Chance Glance Set Off Famous 'Amerasia' Case;" see also "Truman Ordered Amerasia Arrest," Washington Daily News, 15 May 1950. The American Legion printed an article by Eugene Lyons celebrating the arrest of the "New Privileged Class." American Legion Magazine (September 1951), in John Service Papers, Independence.
7. Rich to John S. Service, 19 June 1945, John Service Papers, Box 2, Folder 35, Berkeley.
8. John S. Service to Professors, 25 November 1985, 3, John Service Papers, Box 1, Folder 24, Berkeley.
9. Translations of editorials in the N.Y. Chinese Press on the arrest of the "six," 1, John Service Papers, Box 1, Folder 20, Berkeley.
10. Chen Jingzhi and Wu Boqing, eds., Zongtong Jianggong Dashi Changbian Chugao [A chronological draft of important events concerning President Chiang] (Taipei: Yangming Shuwu, 1978), 2558.
11. "Reflections on the So-called 'Espionage Case,'" Xin Hua Ribao [Chongqing, China], 9 June 1945, John Service Papers, Box 1, Folder 20, Berkeley.

12. Stuart Schram, Mao Tse-tung (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966), 231; M. Lindsay to Sir Horace, 24 August 1945, Hurley Papers, Box 92, Folder 7, University of Oklahoma.

13. "Cong Liu Ren Beipu Kan Meiguo Duihua Zhongce de Liantiao Luxian," [Examining America's dual policy toward China through the arrest of the Amerasia six] Jiefang Ribao [Liberation Daily], 25 June 1945.

14. Mao Zedong, "Ping Hurley Zhengce de Weixian," [On the dangers of Hurley's policy], Xinhua Daily, 12 July 1945. Quoted in Zhonggong yu Meiguo Guanxi Shiliao Ji [Collection of historical documents on CCP-U.S. relations], vol. 1 (Hong Kong: Dangdai Zhongguo Yanjiu Shuo, 1972), 7.

INTRODUCTION

Jack Service would be the first to agree that no records are made without pain. Perhaps he and his wife and supporter Caroline would also agree that it is even more painful to be the chief supporter of a record breaker than to be the protagonist himself. Nevertheless, they survived intact and their story is a triumph.¹

-----John K. Fairbank

If, by some miracle, the clock could be turned back and I had my life to relive, I would still wish to be a Foreign Service officer.²

-----John S. Service

World War II was a crucial period in Sino-American relations. Japanese aggression brought America and China into closer contact and presented promises and opportunities to both countries. After years of anguished fighting, China delightedly found in America long-sought goodwill and the promise of deliverance. Among other world powers casting covetous eyes on China, the United States stood alone in supporting a strong and united China. To both countries' dismay, however, China emerged from this victorious war as fragile as ever; and, by the end of the 1940s, it was split into mainland and Taiwan, a bitter fruit for the next generation of Chinese to swallow. Four years after its triumph in Asia, the U.S. not only lost what was gained in China, it confronted in that once friendly country great hostility, a pattern of enmity and alienation that persisted until the early 1970s.³

The dramatic turn in U.S.-China relations from friendly involvement to hostile non-recognition after 1949 led to bitter debates within the United States over America's China policy. This controversy aroused great emotions that made the effort at rational observation and objective analysis difficult. For decades, political analysts and historians posed questions as to how America "lost China," and who was responsible for the "catastrophe" of Communist victory. "Our relation with China since the end of the Second World War has been a tragic one," remarked John F. Kennedy in 1948, "and it is of the utmost importance that we search out and spotlight those who must bear the responsibility for our present predicament."⁴ The focus of this scholarly scrutiny has been the nature of the U.S.-China relationship and the role of such American experts as John S. Service.

Service was born in 1909 to an American missionary family in Chengdu (Chengtu), southwest China. Like most Americans in China, his childhood was sheltered by foreign compounds and invisible walls of prejudice against native people. He received a purely American education from the Shanghai American School (1920-24) through Oberlin College in Ohio, where he graduated in 1931. His youth coincided with turbulence in China. He witnessed the earthshaking Nationalist Revolution and the vicious Japanese aggression.

Despite cultural differences and poles-apart material conditions, Service was not totally estranged. He was always interested in the Chinese and vastly concerned about China. In an almost inexpressible way, China captivated Service, and he sought to pursue his career there. In April 1933, he returned to Shanghai after passing the

Foreign Service exam and looked forward to a fulfilling diplomatic career. He served in the Foreign Service in various posts--from the remote Kunming, through the "paradise" of Beijing, to the grand treaty port of Shanghai--and in different capacities. Under difficult circumstances, he attentively learned to be a "good bureaucrat" and effectively mastered the Chinese language. He did exceedingly well: passing the non-required third year Chinese language exam, and receiving Class VIII promotion three years ahead of the normal schedule. Despite all the achievements and various commendations, he was somehow not content. The dramatic political and international situation motivated him to be more involved, to be in the center of action. After over three years in Shanghai, he volunteered to transfer to Chongqing, China's wartime capital.

While working in Chongqing from May 1941 to April 1945, Service's diplomatic career blossomed. The war-torn capital was a familiar place to him with echoes of his youth. This political center in the land of his birth offered an ideal theater for him to achieve his ambition and put his talent into use. Prolonged Japanese aggression in the Pacific brought the United States into a closer relationship with China. Service was concerned about the developments in China, particularly their relation to the interest of the United States:

China has always had a deep interest for me. To a technician in the field of foreign relations . . . it presents uniquely complex and difficult problems . . . [It] was my inevitable involvement, as a reporting officer on the spot, [to try] to find solutions to these problems--solutions which would best serve the long-range interest of the United States.⁵

He preferred field observation to "monotonous desk work in the embassy,"⁶ and gradually shifted from "general handyman" to political reporter, spending almost half of his time traveling in the field.

In 1943 when Sino-American relations faced the acute test of China's stagnant war against Japan and escalating rivalry between the Guomindang (GMD) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Service's diplomatic career took another turn. In August, at the request of the War Department, he was detailed to the staff of General Joseph W. Stilwell, commander of American forces in the China-Burma-India theater (CBI). Under General Stilwell, he became a full-time political reporter. In addition to routine office work, he concentrated on political observations and reporting, which to him was a vital step-stone both for career advancement and better understanding of China.

Service's wide-ranging contacts in Chongqing, and frequent travel throughout southwestern-northwestern parts of China in Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangxi, and Gansu provinces, helped to enhance his understanding of that country; it also facilitated his search for solutions for a better China and more potent U.S. presence there. The Chinese government's inactive resistance to Japanese aggression and its blockade of the Communist areas disheartened Service. His strong distaste for the GMD stimulated his interest in the CCP and its wartime cooperation with the United States; he became a frequent visitor to the CCP representative Zhou Enlai at his official residence near the government buildings.⁷ He became, in Ambassador Gauss' words, "our governmental authority on Chinese communism."⁸ He advocated the sending of

an American observation group to the Communist headquarters. In July 1944, after two promotions within one month, Service was assigned to the CCP headquarters in Yanan as the only civilian officer with the Military Observer Group (Dixie Mission).⁹ Seated next to the highest-ranking CCP leader, Mao Zedong, at the reception dinner table, Service was regarded as an important representative of the friendly Franklin Roosevelt administration, and Mao soon had several long conversations with him in the caves of Yanan.¹⁰

In his numerous reports to Washington, Service vigorously suggested that in the struggle between Communists and the Nationalists, the CCP was bound to win, because it was based on the support of great masses, and that Chiang Kai-shek's government was doomed to be tossed behind by the revolutionary current. He advocated a more pragmatic American approach to China. America's future in China, he argued, lay in its ability to force the Nationalist government to implement democratic reforms and to work with the Communists, the certain winner in a struggle for power.

The illustrative "Stilwell Crisis" in 1944, in which the American general and the Chinese Commander-in-Chief clashed over personality and China's proper wartime strategy, not only poisoned Sino-American relations, but also aggravated this young "Old China hand." Service pleaded for America's involvement "to promote the cause and the spread of ideas of democracy in China."¹¹ He further explained that since Chiang was dependent on America's aid, the U.S. should be forceful in dealing with him, and be open-minded in seeking political alternatives.¹²

Service's on-site examination and comprehensive reports about China, particularly about the Chinese Communists, influenced policy makers of different ranks; they were read and largely appreciated by politicians up to the president and by military leaders in the War and Navy Departments. His views stimulated debates and controversies among American policy makers over Sino-American relations and U.S. China policies.¹³ His perspectives and direct contact with CCP leaders delighted Mao Zedong and the CCP leadership who regarded him as a sympathetic American diplomat and eagerly sought American support and long term cooperation through him. The GMD government abhorred him as a detrimental figure who had, through his pro-Communist reporting, undermined U.S. support for the central government.¹⁴ Americans were more divided over the issue.

As an American Foreign Service officer and political reporter in China throughout World War II, Service played an important role in wartime U.S.-China relations. A junior officer in the embassy and at the army headquarters, he was by no means an architect of America's China policy. But the quantity and depth of his political reports immediately separated him from the nameless crowd. During his four years of diplomatic service in Chongqing and Yanan, he supplied a large part of the material that the embassy dispatched to Washington.¹⁵ His keen analysis on CCP-GMD relations and vigorous appeal for America's active involvement in Chinese affairs not only sparked political controversies, they also shed light on the question of America's appropriate diplomatic intercourse abroad.

Despite the rich literature on Sino-American relations during World War II and

scattered studies on Service's work, the long-posed question of whether the United States under President Roosevelt had fostered realistic policies toward China remains to be persuasively answered; and the comprehensive story of Service's role in United States-China relations needs to be more fully investigated. The available literature on those subjects was largely written in the 1950s and 1960s in the height of the Cold War, and in the 1970s when favorable emotions over China were high. Moreover, they were based on fragmentary sources, and primarily reflected American perspectives. It is unfortunate that historians have not been able to produce more comprehensive and balanced studies on the issue largely because of the lack of direct access to archival information that the CCP and GMD still jealously guard from impartial investigation, and because of insufficient efforts by American scholars to explore the available Chinese sources.¹⁶

These examples will illustrate the problem. In James Reardon-Anderson's Yenan and the Great Powers: The Origins of Communist Policy (New York, 1980), the author admittedly relied on "speculations" to answer such questions as what the Chinese Communists learned from their encounter with the Americans and the legacy of the Yanan experience, although plenty of Chinese sources were available.¹⁷ In his elaborate and much appreciated study on Americans and Chinese Communists, 1927-1945 (Ithaca, 1971), Kenneth E. Shewmaker not only omitted important Chinese sources, he almost completely ignored the important role John Service had played during the crucial years of engagement in World War II. In his more than three hundred pages in which he discusses official and unofficial Americans who had

contacts with CCP, Shewmaker mentions John Service only once!¹⁸ One of the widely cited books by Professor Lloyd E. Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927-1937 (Cambridge, Mass., 1974) has no reference to Chinese sources and two-thirds of its notes rely solely on the documents from the U.S. State Department.

While it is important to draw upon the contemporary reports of U.S. diplomats and intelligent agencies, it is essential to note that these sources were primarily for internal study and were subject to certain limitations. As John P. Davies pointed out in 1954, his wartime reporting about China along with various estimates were based on insufficient evidence because "in a battle, that to wait for all the intelligence to come in is to be paralyzed while decisive events pass one by."¹⁹ It is thus necessary for historians to provide more judicious and dispassionate assessments of controversial issues in a broader historical context. In China, after long negligence, research on the United States and Sino-American relations revived with the "reform and opening" in the late 1970s, and more objective studies on the two countries' wartime relations have been conducted after the restoration of their diplomatic relations in 1979.²⁰

Indeed no historical study is valid unless it deals with issues in proper perspective and with balanced sources. This dissertation attempts to offer an analysis of U.S.-China relations in World War II through examining John Service's crucial role in this relationship. It will trace Service's life and career, focusing on the years of his foreign service work in China from 1933 to 1945. It will explore his experience as an

American who was born and bred in China, revealing how this heritage influenced his personality and affected his diplomatic approach to China. It will assess Service's political reports and their impact on U.S.-China relations. By using Service as the lens for surveying the development of Sino-American relations, it seeks to contribute to the clarification of the controversies that have developed about American policies toward China, Chiang Kai-shek, and Chinese Communist leaders. A close examination of Service's life, work, and political views on China will help answer critical questions as to whether the United States adopted a reasonable approach to China during the 1940s, whether Service contributed to the "loss of China" or whether his recommendations might have prevented the dramatic change in relations between America and mainland China, and finally whether the United States "lost China" or merely "lost a chance in China." Understanding the complexity of the subject, I will approach it by examining all major factors involved in wartime U.S.-China relations and by bringing both the Chinese and American sources and perspectives into focus.

This dissertation is based on extensive research using primary and secondary sources in both English and Chinese. Dr. Wesley Bagby's book, The Eagle-Dragon Alliance²¹ and his timely supervision have provided scholarly stimulation and guidance to this dissertation. I interviewed Service twice at his home in Oakland, California, and have since corresponded with him. Service and his wife, Caroline, have encouraged and supported my research whole-heartedly. I did substantial research at the Bancroft Library in Berkeley and the Harry S Truman Library in Independence, Missouri, where Service's personal papers are located. I also

conducted lengthy research at numerous research centers and libraries including the Harvard-Yenching Library, the Hoover Institution, Library of Congress, and the National Archives. The continued flow of new archival materials such as the 1994 declassification of the "Commanding General File, Records of Allied and U.S. Army Commands, China-Burma-India Theater of Operation" (Record Group 493) by the National Archives in Suitland, Maryland, greatly facilitated my research. I was able to obtain substantial primary and up-to-date Chinese sources from mainland China and Taiwan, partly due to the boom of scholarship on U.S.-China relations in commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of World War II in 1995.

The dissertation is divided into five chapters. Service was brought under the spotlight by his arrest in connection with the Amerasia case. That also became the prelude to the controversies over America's role in China and Service's role in this relationship. The first chapter will review, as background information, U.S.-China relations in World War II and the controversies over the issue of "who lost China" to set the stage for Service's diplomatic work. Chapter two will discuss the dual characters of Service during his formative years, in which his personality was heavily influenced by his missionary parents and his experience in China. Chapter three will discuss his early diplomatic experience and his initial observations of Chinese affairs. The fourth chapter is devoted to his Chongqing years as a field observer and political reporter dealing with the ruling Kuomintang. The last chapter will focus on Service's experience in Yanan and his reports on the CCP and its relations with the GMD, and his recommendations for America's interest and future in China, all of which are most

controversial. It will draw conclusions concerning Service's role in Sino-American relations during the critical years of World War II and on the lasting debate over America's China policy. The dissertation will end with a postscript describing how Service has been recognized and honored since the early 1970s in the United States, for his outstanding diplomatic service, and in China for his genuine effort to improve Sino-American relations.

ENDNOTES

1. John K. Fairbank, Introduction to "State Department Duty in China: The McCarthy Era, and After, 1933-1977," an interview with John Service conducted by Rosemary Levenson, Regional Oral History Office, the Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1981, iv.
2. John Service, "Foreign Service Reporting," Foreign Service Journal (March 1973), 22.
3. For a brief analysis, see Nancy B. Tucker, "China and America: 1941-1991," Foreign Affairs (1 January 1992): 75.
4. Congressional Record, 19 June 1948, A 4560.
5. U.S. Senate, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 81st Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950).
6. J.W. Esherick, Interview with Service, September and December 1972, in John S. Service, Lost Chance in China: The World War II Despatches of John S. Service, edited by J.W. Esherick (New York: Random House, 1974), 8.
7. Ji Chongji, Zhou Enlai Zhuan, 1898-1949 [Biography of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: Renmin Ribao Press, 1989), 540.
8. Service, Lost Chance in China, xvii.
9. For further information about the mission, see Dixie Mission Papers, Modern Military Records, National Archives, Washington D.C.
10. He Di, Chao Jianlin and Qi Weihua, "Kang Ri Zhanzheng Houqi Meiguo Duihua Zhengce de Yanbian," [The evolution of America's China policy during the latter part of the anti-Japanese war of resistance] in Jing Mingnan, ed., Zhong Mei Guanxi Shi Lunwen Ji [Collection of essays on Sino-American relations] (Chongqing: Chongqing Press, 1985), 317.
11. John S. Service, "State Department Duty in China: The McCarthy Era, and After, 1933-1977," an interview conducted by Rosemary Levenson, Regional Oral History Office, the Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1981, 246.
12. Service, Lost Chance in China, 162-65.

13. Anthony Kubek commented that Service's reporting from China was of the "greatest importance at the time." See U.S. Senate, The Amerasia Papers, 30.

J. W. Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, however, praised Service in 1972 as a man with "an invaluable and unique collection of experience and learning . . . [who] reported accurately and thoroughly on the events not only in Nationalist-held areas in China, but also in the Communist-held areas." He commented that "these Foreign Service Officers in China served their country well, but their country did not always serve them well." See United States Senate, China and the United States: Today and Yesterday (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), 1-2.

14. Official Guomindang documents blamed Service as one of the chief persons who intended to damage the Chinese central government and establish a formal relationship between the United States and the Chinese Communists. See Zhunghua Minguo Zhongyao Shiliao Chubian: Dui Ri Kangzhan Shiqi. Di San Bian, Zhanshi Waijiao [The initial collection of important historical documents of the Republic of China: the period of anti-Japanese war, book 3, wartime diplomacy], 3 vols., Qin Shaoyi, chief editor (Taipei: The Editing Committee of the Initial Collection of Important Historical Documents of the Republic of China, 1980), 11-12.

15. "Personal Statement of John S. Service," in U.S. Senate, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation, 1968.

16. James C. Hsiung gives detailed account on the difficulties of getting access to archival materials in both the Chinese mainland and Taiwan and the antagonism presented when research officials demanded the removal of "uncontrollable" scholars from the list of participants. See James C. Hsiung and Steven I. Levine, China's Bitter Victory: The War With Japan, 1937-1945 (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1992), x.

17. James Reardon-Anderson, Yenan and the Great Powers: The Origins of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 1944-1946 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 169.

18. Kenneth Shewmaker, Americans and Chinese Communists, 1927-1945: A Persuading Encounter (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971), 168.

19. E.J. Kahn, The China Hands: America's Foreign Service Officers and What Befall Them (New York: Viking, 1975), 69.

20. There have been scattered but in-depth studies on Sino-American relations and Service's role in this connection. For a comprehensive review of research on Sino-American relations after 1979, see, Yuanhong Lin, "1979 Nian Zhi 1984 Nian 6 yue Guonei Zhong Mei Guanxi Shi yanjiu Shuping," [Review of researches on the history of sino-American relations conducted from 1979 to June 1984] in Ding Mingnan, Zhong Mei Guanxi Shi Lunwen Ji, 368-88. One of the most influential books is Tao Wenzhao's Zhong Mei Guanxi Shi, 1911-1950 [Sino-American Relations, 1911-1950] (Chongqing: Chongqing Press, 1993); See also He Di, "Kang Ri Zhangzheng Houqi Meiguo Duihua Zhengce de Yanbian," 311-35. Tao

Wenzhao, "Cairo Huiyi Shi Meiguo Dui Hua Zhengce de Zhuanzhe Dian Ma?" [Did the Cairo conference mark a turning point in America's China policy?] Lishi Yanjiu [Historical Research] (6, 1995); Wu Jingping, "Kangzhan Shiqi Zhong Mei Zujie Pingshu" [The Sino-American lend-lease relations during the war of resistance] Lishi Yanjiu (4, 1995).

21. Wesley Bagby, The Eagle-Dragon Alliance: American Relations with China in World War II (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1992).

CHAPTER ONE

U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS IN RETROSPECT

Our policy toward China should be guided by two facts. First, we cannot hope to deal successfully with Chiang without being hard-boiled. Second, we cannot hope to solve China's problems (which are now our problems) without consideration of the opposition forces--Communist, provincial and liberal.¹

----- John S. Service

Because of the betrayal of China at Yalta, because of its withholding of effective aid to China at crucial times, and, above all, because of its great power and undisputed world leadership, the United States was not 'innocent of blood' [see Matthew 27:24] of falling China.²

----- Hu Shih

Starting as a foreign service clerk in the remote American consulate at Kunming in 1933, and recalled to Washington, D.C. from China in early 1945, John S. Service had worked during a critical era in the history of modern China and Sino-American relations. To comprehend his historical role, one must start from modern China's troubled encounter with the West and the development of Sino-American relations, and revisit the ever-evolving debate over America's World War II China policy.

"Lost China" or "Lost Chance in China?"

The Chinese Communist victory over the U.S.-supported Guomindang in 1949

triggered a fervent debate in the United States over how America had “lost China” and who was responsible for such a loss, one that continues today, more now by historians than politicians. One central issue of this enduring debate has been the impact of Service and his political reports on the development of U.S.-China relations in World War II.

In an attempt to explain America’s failure in China, the State Department issued the China White Paper in August 1949, in which it concluded that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the U.S. government, and that America had done its utmost to help avert such a disaster.³ To many this simple government explanation was to evade responsibility. Journalist Joseph Alsop, for example, argued with deep regret that American government had contributed to the failure of the Nationalists and opened the door for Communism. “If you have kicked a drowning friend briskly in the face as he sank for the second and third times,” he claimed, “you cannot later explain that he was doomed anyway because he was such a bad swimmer.”⁴ Historian Tang Tsou criticized America's unwillingness to use force to achieve its ends in China: "Any policy based upon a refusal to intervene militarily in Chinese civil war would have been doomed to failure."⁵

Interpretations of America’s China policy have been influenced by political developments within and between the two countries. Immediately after the Communist victory and in the 1950s when the Cold War was in its full swing, “betrayal” by the American government, especially by its Foreign Service officers, was blamed for the “loss of China” to communism. Frustrated Americans “could not

believe that China had made this choice freely."⁶ They angrily charged that the victory of the Chinese Communist Party was caused by the betrayal of Foreign Service officers who had committed "the China `crime'" of selling Chiang Kai-shek and his government "down the river."⁷ John Service and his China reports became the primary targets of leading Republicans and like-minded writers in the decade-long search for the cause of the "loss of China." They scorned him as a ardent supporter of the Chinese Communists and a "gravedigger" of America's China policy.

General Patrick Hurley dismissed Service's policy recommendations as "a plan for the removal of support from the Chiang Kai-shek government with the end result that the Communists would take over."⁸ Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin cited Service's official duty in Yanan as proof of Communist penetration and influence in the State Department.⁹ He called Service "a known associate and collaborator with Communists and pro-Communists."¹⁰ Robert R. McCormick, editor and publisher of the Times-Herald, wrote in 1951 that Service and other Foreign Service officers were traitors who, through their pro-Communist reporting, "helped in the betrayal of China." Responsibility for the "loss of China," the writer continued, lay with those "traitorous" diplomats, "dumb" and "dumber" loyalists like Secretary Dean Acheson and General George Marshall, and President Harry Truman.¹¹

Pro-GMD Chinese media in the United States eagerly joined the debate. The Chicago Chinese newspaper, Chicago Daily Commentary, called the "loss of China" a "tragedy of Asia" and blamed Service and other Foreign Service officers for their "faulty information and predictions" and the "nearsighted judgment of the policy

makers in Washington" who failed to see the menace of communism.¹² In Taiwan, where the defeated Nationalists had fled, the rhetoric went so far as to generate a conspiracy theory. Hou Lichao, for example, concluded that Service and other American China experts were traitors to both China and the United States and had carried out an international plot to sabotage American policy in China and undermine the Nationalist government by favorably reporting the Communist situation.¹³

Former Secretary of State James Baker has described Sino-American relations as a compass with only two headings, "in the McCarthy era . . . the Chinese were godless Communists who killed our sons in Korea and repressed their own people. In the 1970s they were a hardworking and long-suffering people whose exotic and mysterious culture was romanticized by American popular opinion and deemed worthy of intensive engagement by Republican and Democratic presidents alike."¹⁴ Indeed by the early 1970s, despite continued attack on Service by Anthony Kubek in his lengthy The Amerasia Paper: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China (Washington, 1973),¹⁵ as Americans and Chinese looked for ways to bring about rapprochement, the tide turned from the "lost China" interpretation to the "lost chance in China" explanation.

Based on his wartime political reporting and policy recommendations, Service originated the "lost chance" thesis in 1971. In his important monograph The Amerasia Papers: Some Problems in the History of US-China Relations (Berkeley, 1971), he suggested that if anyone in a position of authority a quarter of a century earlier had reflected on what he and other knowledgeable "China hands" were then

reporting, there might not have been any Taiwan problem, and "Mao's China, come to power in a different way and not thrust into isolation by a hostile West, might be quite a different place."¹⁶ In the same year when asked about U.S.-Communist relations in the 1940s by a Japanese television commentator, he simply replied that America had "missed a great opportunity."¹⁷ His "lost chance" theory became well known with the publication of his wartime reports titled Lost Chance in China: The World War II Dispatches of John S. Service (New York, 1974).

Influenced by Service's judgment, many scholars agreed that although America could not have "lost China;" it did, by ignoring the Communist appeal, "lose a chance" in China. The enormous flow of newly declassified documentary evidence helped this interpretation gain momentum. Service was praised as a credible China expert who saw the truth two decades earlier than most of his fellow countrymen; a "record-breaker" and national hero who deserves the thanks of his country.¹⁸ John K. Fairbank remarked that "Mr. Service's reports of 1943 and 1944 . . . were both farsighted and courageous. He foresaw the disaster we would face if we relied entirely on the Kuomintang to maintain our position in China."¹⁹

With Nixon's visit to China in 1972, E.J. Kahn expressed the prevalent view of the time by claiming that history would have been different if Washington had heeded Service's warning that Chiang was sure to lose:

Indeed, history might have taken a different turn if anybody in power in Washington had heeded Service's accounts of his 1944 and 1945 conversations with the Communist chiefs, and some of his other reports around that time. He was saying that, no matter what hopes anybody entertained about China's future, and no matter how much anybody might wish to see Chiang Kai-shek

retain control of a unified China, in the struggle between Chiang and the Communists Chiang was certain to lose.²⁰

He further pointed out that Service, as one of the few American diplomats whom future leaders of China Mao and Chou knew well and seemed to trust, "represented the very best in America, [and] could have been most helpful to his country."²¹ Joseph Esherick eagerly supported this proposition and blamed U.S. policy makers for losing a chance to continue good relations between the United States and China after World War II. He claimed that "had the policy makers in Washington only been able to recognize the fatal weakness of the KMT, the burgeoning strength of the CCP and the clear desire of the latter to avoid any postwar conflict with the United States, then decades of Sino-American hostility might have been avoided."²²

In her sensational and controversial article, "If Mao Had Come to Washington," Barbara Tuchman asked why "the information and opinions provided by experienced observers" whose job was to keep government informed "were so consistently and regularly ignored."²³ She concluded that, by ignoring Communist leaders Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai's request to visit the U.S., America had missed the opportunity of cooperation the CCP had so zealously sought.

Warren Cohen has argued that the Soviet and Chinese Communist mutual mistrust in 1945 created an "open historical situation" and a possible opportunity for the United States to bid for friendship with the Communists. But "the bid was never made, and Mao was left no choice but to take whatever terms Stalin was willing to offer."²⁴

Based on his analysis of recently available CCP historical records, Chinese historian Zhang Baijia maintains that, despite the deterioration of relationship between the CCP and the United States by the end of the war, from the CCP's perspective, there was certainly an opportunity for good relations that the United States might have grasped, and in reality the chance had existed for more than four years throughout the war. The problem was that the U.S. government never realized its need to utilize this "chance."²⁵

To Wesley Bagby, if the Roosevelt government had followed the recommendations of Service and others to cooperate and arm the CCP during the war, "if America had not made itself the enemy of the ultimately victorious revolutionaries, postwar Chinese-American relations might have resembled those that followed the Nixon rapprochement."²⁶ However Bagby further points out that the strength of anti-communist ideology in America made the approach difficult.

The debate over the "loss of China" or "lost chance in China" has had less relevance in mainland China, where scholars have naturally refused to equate Chiang Kai-shek and the GMD's failures to the "loss of China." Many argue that the result of the civil war was inevitable and that out of the ashes of the old regime rose a new China and new people who finally "stood up" in the world. Even Chinese scholars across the Taiwan Strait are finally beginning to reach similar conclusions about Chiang's "loss" of China. Based on a careful study of primary sources and extensive interviews with GMD insiders, writer Zhuo Qiwei admits that, despite his admirable attributes, Chiang's failure in China was inevitable in light of the overwhelming tasks

and the crushing CCP challenge he faced.²⁷

The "lost chance" interpretation has been under constant attack from the very beginning. Its fundamental assumption is that the CCP was eager to approach America, and it was "American behavior" which "presented a serious obstacle to diplomatic intercourse."²⁸ Such an assertion has been seriously challenged from both sides of the Pacific Ocean.

Edwin Martin is probably the first historian in the U.S. who systematically challenged the notion of "lost chance in China."²⁹ Recent scholarly tensions have been centered on whether the United States really had a chance for better relations with the Chinese Communists in the 1940s; and if so, how and when did the two sides lose this chance? Ironically, the strongest contests to the "lost chance" consensus developed in the 1970s have come from a number of researchers from mainland China, especially those who, after China's crackdown on student demonstration in 1989, have taken harshly critical views of the CCP's past. Armed with some newly available Chinese records, Chen Jian has dismissed America's lost chance in China as a "myth" and insists that anti-Americanism was integral to Mao's revolutionary design for China.³⁰ Michael Sheng has similarly asserted that "there was never a chance for the United States to win over the CCP . . . it was only a myth."³¹ He not only rejects the "repetition of an old model in Sinology" of "Western impact and Chinese reponse," which undermines Chinese initiative, he also firmly believes that the nature of the CCP and its concealed close ties with Moscow had determined its anti-American agenda, no matter what the United States could have done.³² Their

newfound assertiveness did not convince Warren Cohen and others who maintain the lost chance thesis.³³ It is worth noting that the new debate has focused more on possible U.S.-CCP accommodations in 1949-50 rather than in 1944-45, as Service's "lost chance" theory originally intended.

In truth, the persistent controversy and time-honored rhetoric around Service and U.S.-China relations can be viewed in three perspectives: the complicated nature of Chinese politics, Service's provocative views of events in China, and the limitation of political and scholarly analyses. The legendary Chinese poet Su Dongpuo (1036-1101) once wrote that when looking at the same mountains from different positions, one side appears to be rolling hills and the other side looks like rugged peaks. Historical interpretations often ran the risk of being partial and subjective.

It is not surprising that Service's controversial views on China would arouse much attention in light of the fateful and puzzling age he lived in. Like many other China experts of the time, he was caught in the dilemma of his realpolitik approach as a professional diplomat dutifully serving his country, his progressive and idealistic outlook, and his deep compassion for China, his birth place. This mix of emotions and motivations can easily explain why a moderate foreign diplomat could be so closely involved in Chinese domestic politics and, at the same time, express such positive views of the communist path in China. Service's perspectives on China and controversies over his views can only be understood in a broad historical context of tempestuous Chinese situation and intricate Sino-American relations. A concise explanation of U.S.-China relations is thus in order.

Modern China and the History of Sino-American Relations

Arnold J. Toynbee once stated that a nation's history cannot be attributed to internal causes alone; it naturally depends on the action of external forces.³⁴ This analysis is particularly true in the study of modern China and Sino-American relations during World War II, which were complicated by international competition and rising Chinese nationalistic sentiment, and the unfolding social revolution deeply rooted in China's longtime socio-economic decay.

For more than a century, from the 1840s to the end of World War II, China was torn by the push and pull of Western impact and Chinese response. Anti-imperialist nationalism, a persistent theme of the early twentieth century, had its roots in China's historical struggle with nomadic invaders which stretched far back to the ancient past. But modern nationalism's rise to dominance was a reaction to Western challenge and encroachment after early European gunboat diplomacy forcefully opened China's door to Western goods and influences.³⁵ The British and other Western powers demanded special privileges and punished anti-foreignism in the aftermath of the Opium War of the 1840s. The best example of China's reaction was the 1900 Yihe Tuan (Righteousness and Harmony) Movement, known in the West as the "Boxer Rebellion," in which anti-foreign resentment reached a climax that resulted in destruction of property and 242 foreign lives. To punish this anti-foreign outburst, an eight-nation expedition occupied Beijing and forced the Chinese court to punish officials and pay an indemnity amounting to \$333 million.³⁶

Constant humiliation by Westerners and especially the shocking defeat by the Japanese in the war of 1894-95 astounded China and stimulated intense interest among patriotic youth and intellectuals in searching for ways to salvage China. The 1911 Republican Revolution destroyed the ancient imperial institution but did not provide immediate solutions to the prevailing problem of foreign dominance. World War I further disappointed Chinese hopes for international equality and respect when the Allied powers gave Japan the former German sphere in Shandong. This triggered the momentous May Fourth protest in 1919, which inspired Chinese nationalism along with an intense fervor for Western science and democracy as tools for national salvation. As Immanuel Hsü has observed, "Nowhere in Chinese history . . . had social and intellectual changes been so drastic and fundamental" as in the May Fourth movement.³⁷ By the mid-1920s, two revolutionary forces created by the movement, the reformed Guomindang and newly-established Chinese Communist Party, with military and political assistance from the Soviet Union, formed a United Front in an effort to achieve social revolution and international equality. Under this first United Front they worked together in 1924-27 in the conciliatory spirit of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the Communist International. The CCP recognized the GMD authority; many joined the Nationalists on an individual basis.³⁸ Dissimilar as they apparently were, both the Nationalists and the Communists shared the common goals of abolishing unequal treaties and modernizing China. Stemming from painful experience with the West and Japan, nationalism would not only unite the two parties but also become a persistent theme in modern Chinese history, influencing the Chinese world outlook of

the early twentieth century. Powerful and sometimes fervent patriotic sentiment was characteristic of Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong, and other Chinese leaders, GMD or CCP alike, despite their later deep and bitter split.

Against this background, America's China policy, guided by the double aims of economic profit and idealistic aspiration, was not only destined to be self-contradictory, it would also be hindered by international competition and internal discord in China. By the end of the nineteenth century, many American were attracted to China by the lure of the huge China market; others were driven there by the missionary spirit and the progressive impulse to reform China. Following Japan's invasion of northeast China (Manchuria) in 1931, an increasing number of Americans, including serious students of China, experts in various fields, and journalists ventured to China. More U.S. Foreign Service officers and military experts were also assigned to posts in the Middle Kingdom. They went to China to observe, help, and seek opportunities. Some had either emotional ties to or genuine sympathy for China; others were sent on business and official duties. Many would become experts on China affairs and would become known as "China hands."³⁹ John Service was one of them.

Though something of a late comer, the United States benefitted fully from the unequal treaties, and, moreover, sought to add the concepts of "most-favored nation" and extraterritoriality. The Treaty of Wangxia (Cushing Treaty) of 1844 clearly stated that "if additional advantages or privileges, of whatever description be conceded thereafter by China to any other nation, the United States, and the citizens

thereof, shall be entitled thereupon, to a complete, equal, and impartial participation in the same." The 1858 Treaty of Tianjin (Tientsin) (Reed Treaty) further maintained that if the Chinese government at any time granted to any nation or people "any rights, privilege or favor . . . such right, privilege and favor shall at once freely inure to the benefit of the United States, its public officers, merchants and citizens."⁴⁰ As further defined by Secretary of State John Hay's 1899 and 1900 "Open Door" notes,⁴¹ America's China policy was to keep China open to American trade and maintain a balance among Western powers and Japan. Though self-serving, the Open Door policy was coincidentally employed by the United States to argue for China's political and territorial integrity.⁴² And, despite the inequitable demands, the remission of Boxer indemnity funds to support Chinese education further demonstrated American goodwill toward China. In the 1921-22 Washington Disarmament Conference, America sought to reaffirm the Open Door in China, and compelled Japan to retreat from Manchuria and the Shandong peninsula. The Japanese agreed to pull their troops out of Siberia and evacuate Shandong.⁴³ Although, to the dismay of the Chinese, nothing was done to diminish the existing unequal treaty system, the conference marked a significant shift in U.S. Far East policy toward restricting Japanese expansion and increased friction with Japan. Moreover, the crusading American missionaries and their philanthropic and educational work left a generally favorable impression in China. The number of American missionaries in China rose from a thousand or so in 1900 to more than three thousand by 1930.⁴⁴ They bridged the gulf between the United States and China and built special bonds between these

two peoples, which, despite great differences, are still deeply felt in both countries. All these undertakings created a well-publicized legend of a historical "love affair" between the two countries, as summarized by John Foster Dulles: "Our relationship with China is primarily based upon a long background of religious, cultural and humanitarian association. . . . There is . . . a stable and lasting foundation of friendship between the people of China and the people of the United States."⁴⁵

American missionaries' ventures in Chinese science, education, and medicine were, nonetheless, operated under the system of unequal treaties which granted foreigners special protection and privilege that made even the most westernized Chinese uneasy. To many Chinese, Christianity was just another manifestation of Western imperialism, and missionaries had long been the direct target of Chinese anti-foreign outbursts. During the storm of Chinese nationalism in the 1920s, the rise of the Nationalists under Chiang's leadership was accompanied by frequent attacks on mission chapels, and especially on missionary schools and hospitals which were seen as more dangerous and deceiving.⁴⁶ Many of the "China hands" who witnessed the situation held unfavorable views on missionary work in China. Service commented that American missionaries, with a patronizing attitude toward China, "had convinced themselves that [they] were doing great help to China." It was a prejudice, he continued, based on partial and inadequate information.⁴⁷ Indeed, for most missionaries, educators, and merchants, the historical bonds were strong but conditioned by self-interest.⁴⁸

GMD-CCP Rivalry and the War Against Japan

America's evolving China policy and the development of Sino-American relations were seriously tested by two major events during the first half of the twentieth century: the Japanese invasion of China and the fierce GMD-CCP struggle for power. With the escalating Japanese aggression toward China and the emergence of Chiang Kai-shek, a converted Methodist married to an American-educated woman, as China's new leader, came profound changes in American attitude. Increasingly, the U.S. considered China a vital security interest.

In the competition for dominance in China, Japan claimed that it was different from Western powers because it had a "special relationship" with China based on race, culture, and co-responsibility to drive Westerners away and construct a new East Asia.⁴⁹ As early as the late 1890s Japanese military and civilian leaders had perceived the rising tide of Chinese nationalism as a menace to Japanese interests in China, a potential obstacle that only military force could suppress. Furthermore, Japanese leaders had pictured China as a declining civilization incapable of responding to the Darwinian challenges of the modern world. They claimed that invading China was a "forward advance" to help China fend off Western dominance and to realize the Japanese version of Manifest Destiny.⁵⁰

Two trends in particular hastened the Japanese decision of further encroachment: China's promising national unity and state building, and the surging tide of nationalism aroused by the Nationalist Revolution.⁵¹ After the 1911 Republican revolution, as Dr. Hu Shih observed in 1934, China made undeniable

political and social progress:

Since the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912--although there were many signs of stagnation which gives us no satisfaction--there has been much undeniable and valuable progress: (1) the overthrow of the monarchy, (2) innovations in education, (3) family reforms, (4) modernization of social customs, (5) new experiments in political organization, (6) promulgation of new statutes, (7) liberation of women.⁵²

In 1926 the Nationalist Revolutionary Army launched a triumphant Northern Expedition from Guangzhou and quickly overran the warlords in central and southeastern China. Chiang established the new government of the Republic of China in Nanjing in 1927 and continued his campaign for national reunification and economic development. By the end of 1928 GMD troops had occupied Beijing, and the "Young Marshall," Zhang Xueliang (Chang Hsueh-liang), brought Manchuria into political union with the rest of the nation. China's unity was nominally complete. Meanwhile the Nanjing government's ambitious program of modernization was yielding limited success.

Distrust, however, started to prevail within the United Front during the Northern Expedition and it would engulf the GMD and CCP, the two major forces of the Nationalist Revolution. Chiang Kai-shek had developed a deep hatred of communism during his disappointing four-month fact-finding trip to the Soviet Union in late 1923, which had confirmed his suspicion of Russia's ambition in China.⁵³ To him, China's paramount and most pressing problem was to achieve national unification and to obtain a full measure of national independence. The Communists, as instruments of the Soviets and obstacles of unification, therefore must be destroyed.

Not long after Dr. Sun Yat-sen's death and only three years after the inception of the United Front, Chiang launched his bloody purge on the CCP in Shanghai on 12 April 1927 in the middle of the Northern Expedition, in fear of the rapidly growing CCP-controlled mass mobilization and out of suspicion of Soviet-directed international conspiracy.⁵⁴ The leftist faction of the GMD led by Wang Jingwei in Wuhan soon followed Chiang's suit to "clean Communists." With the resolution of "rather killing a thousand by mistake than letting one Communist escape," the GMD purge destroyed the CCP organization almost completely. Communist leader Ren Bishi later estimated the destruction as "100 percent in the white areas and 90 percent in the Soviet areas."⁵⁵ Surviving CCP leaders responded by organizing armed rebellions. Mao Zedong told his fellow revolutionaries to abandon any dreams and be ready to fight. He would write, "a revolution is not the same as inviting people to a dinner party, or writing an essay. . . . A revolution is an uprising, an act of violence whereby one class overthrows another."⁵⁶ In the following years Mao and Zhu De's (Chu Teh) peasant-based Red Army managed to survive in rural bases in remote border areas located in-between Hubei (Hupei), Jiangxi (Kiangsi), Anhui (Anhui), and Fujian (Fukian) provinces.

China's steady political and economic development and the prospect of national unity under the Nanjing government increasingly alarmed Japan, who had a growing stake in China. The Japanese outnumbered all foreigners there by the early 1930s. Hard hit by the global economic depression, Japan was wary of China's relative economic prosperity, and impatient with Western powers who appeared weak

when confronting the piecemeal erosion of the privileged imperialist order in China. To forestall formation of a united and strong China, in 1931 Japan stepped up its aggression by occupying Manchuria and setting up a puppet regime--Manzhuguo (Manchukuo).

Facing the two major challenges of Japanese encroachment and Communist revolution, the newly consolidated central government under Chiang made a clear choice as to which of these dangers to eradicate first. It is evident that GMD leaders fully understood Japan's ambition in China, but they viewed internal unification and construction as more urgent than engaging the Japanese prematurely. In early 1933 after assessing battlefields, Wang Jiangwei (Wang Ching-wei) concluded that resistance to Japan could not be sustained. Because of the insurmountable discrepancy in weaponry "the Chinese were slaughtered before they even saw the enemy."⁵⁷ To Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, appeasing the Japanese became critical to power consolidation and national unification. The Communists, engaged in an open civil war with the government since 1927, were growing dangerously strong in remote mountainous regions under Mao Zedong's leadership. Facing the difficult alternatives of engaging the Japanese or exterminating the CCP, Chiang chose, as a priority, to eliminate the Communists, whom he regarded as the disease of the heart in comparison to Japan, which he saw as a mere disease of the skin. In accordance with this strategy of "unification before resistance," the Chinese government's initial policy of "resistance and negotiation" toward Japan was replaced by reconciliation and appeasement. Chiang maneuvered to avoid a fatal showdown with Japan by strenuous

negotiations and humiliating compromises. The Tangu Truce, signed on 28 May 1933, for example, resulted in a cease fire between the Japanese Army and the Chinese resistance forces by designating the area from the Great Wall to Beijing as a demilitarized zone to be patrolled by Chinese police and security forces.⁵⁸

Meanwhile, Chiang, in a lengthy speech to GMD military commanders in December, proclaimed that China's future lay in the outcome of the Communist-extermination campaign. "The anti-Communist crusade," he said, "is the final moment for each individual, our revolutionary army, and the destiny of our nation. It is also the last chance for us to save our nation from demise and renew her vitality."⁵⁹ Wang and other Nationalist leaders seconded this policy. From 1931-1934 Chiang mounted five "extermination campaigns." The first four ended in failure and frustration.⁶⁰ Finally, in October 1934, the government forces regenerated and were able to destroy over 80 percent of the central Red Army in their resounding fifth campaign. CCP leaders Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and others escaped with more than 100,000 followers and embarked on their epic Long March on foot in search for breathing space. It would take them nearly 8,000 miles northwest to the backwater of Shaanxi (Shansi) province a year later, with less than 10,000 survivors.⁶¹ Chiang's demonstrated anti-Communist determination and the bitter civil war experience would make it impossible for Service and other Americans to bridge the gap between the Nationalists and Communists during World War II.

In contrast to his relative success in "exterminating" the CCP, Chiang's soft stand toward Japan only hardened the enemy's position. The Japanese Army made it

plain that "for the interests of Japan, we have decided to advance our military forces to reach our ultimate goal. There is not a slight possibility of compromise or cease fire between Japan and China."⁶² By the end of 1935, it was apparent that the Chinese government's appeasement policy had not worked and Chiang had to declare that China's endurance had its limits. His statement at the Fifth Guomintang Party Congress revealed his bottom line: "We will never give up peace until peace is hopeless; we will never speak lightly of sacrifice if we are not driven to the last extremity that makes sacrifice inevitable."⁶³

Chiang's policy of non-military resistance toward Japan met soaring domestic resistance and wide-spread protest, not only from the Communists but also from non-Communist patriots. That opposition led to the Xian (Sian) Incident in December 1936, when Young Marshal Chang's Manchuria troops kidnaped Chiang and forced him into a second United Front with his bitter enemy, the Communists, against Japan.

Chinese unification prompted the Japanese to launch an all-out war against China by attacking the Lugou Qiao (Marco Polo Bridge) in Beijing on 7 July 1937. The "last extremity" had arrived. Japan's assault added fuel to the flames of anti-imperialist sentiment; it also united major political forces in resistance against Japanese aggression. The second GMD-CCP United Front was formalized by the CCP's 22 September manifesto; in it they pledged to uphold national political unity and reorganize the Red Army as part of the National Revolutionary Army.⁶⁴ The new United Front created a promising situation where even Mao warmly praised the GMD war efforts:

After the Lugou Qiao incident . . . the policy of the Nanking government announced by Mr. Chiang Kai-shek, and the government's military engagement are applaudable. The military resistance in Pingjin, Shanghai, and Nankou are worth great appreciation. The Lugou Qiao incident has no doubt triggered a nationwide war of resistance. . . . The key to the anti-Japanese war is to turn the war of resistance launched by Guomindang into a wholesale national war of resistance. Only then can the war of resistance achieve final success.⁶⁵

Unfortunately, the budding unity was unstable from the very beginning. Deep-seated differences and fundamental mistrust between the GMD and the CCP made genuine cooperation impossible. Having fought a devastating ten-year civil war from 1927-37, the two regarded World War II as merely an interlude between civil wars in China. As the war against Japan dragged on and no victory was in sight, each sought to conserve power for the ultimate showdown to control China.

It would be unjust solely to blame Chiang for the political and military disunity, or simply to label him as a traitor who willingly gave up his country for personal power, as CCP representatives have sometimes done. His intense patriotism was constantly revealed in his dairies and speeches.⁶⁶ Chiang was not a coward or a wishful-thinker who naively believed that Japanese aggression could be averted by constant retreat. His peace gestures toward Japan and his belligerent policy toward the CCP were in accordance with his nationalistic and pragmatic considerations. These schemes resulted from meticulous calculations of the internal and especially the international situation.

It was clear to Chiang and other Chinese leaders that, despite Japanese encroachment, other powers had no less rapacious ambitions in China and that China

could only survive through maneuvering. In 1934 Chiang analyzed the situation with fair accuracy that Japan could not conquer China without confronting the United States and other powers:

China is now a weak nation. . . . Japan has the military might to swallow China. But Japan cannot realize its ambition unless it can resolve the Pacific complication. Therefore it has long determined to defeat all powers associated with the Pacific region before triumph over China. . . . We understand that Japan's enemy is not just China. Its bigger foes are at its sides. China is in its forefront. . . . The United States is in its rear, the Russians are at its right side, and the British at its left (colonies in South Pacific). China is its front target, but the war cannot be won only by frontal attacks. How can Japan conquer China when it had all the biggest and strongest enemies at its sides and in the rear?⁶⁷

As early as 1932, U.S. Ambassador Nelson Johnson had reported to Washington that in a conversation with Chiang and H.H. Kung he found that the idea of a war in which the U.S. would figure as the champion and savior of China was current among many Chinese leaders.⁶⁸

America's Wartime Entanglement in China

World War II in East Asia started with Japan's full-scale invasion of China in 1937. The United States, from reluctant sympathizer in 1937 to active ally in 1941, was dragged into a difficult wartime relationship with China without sufficient knowledge of its war situation and internal politics.

The first period of China's War of Resistance was marked by Chinese troops' stiff resistance against the rapidly-advancing Japanese army. When the Japanese

navy launched its second major attack of the decade on Shanghai on 13 August 1937, Chiang deployed his carefully built-up troops to defend Nationalist China's base region. Chinese forces battled vigorously and fought the Japanese to a surprising standstill in Shanghai, spoiling Japan's early dream of a quick victory over China. But the Nationalist government suffered heavy losses in the Shanghai-Nanjing area and was forced to withdraw westward toward China's interior by the end of 1937, with probably as much as two-thirds of Chiang's central army destroyed.⁶⁹ In 1938 both Hankou (Hankow) in central China and Guanzhou (Canton) to the south were lost. Chiang established his wartime capital in Chongqing in the southwest province of Sichuan to continue his struggle.

By early 1939 the superior Japanese army was being increasingly bogged down by China's immense guerilla resistance and had lost much of its momentum. From 1939 to 1945 the war was in a state of stalemate, with Nationalist troops never initiating a major offensive against the Japanese. Instead, Chiang shifted his attention exceedingly toward the expanding CCP forces.

Following the outbreak of the War of Resistance in July 1937, CCP forces were reorganized into the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army to fight alongside GMD troops. From the remote caves of Yanan in the northwest, Mao directed his units to penetrate into the rear of Japanese lines, to mobilize the masses, and to arm the peasants. This strategy of "independent guerilla warfare" was so successful that by the end of the war the CCP military had expanded from fewer than 100,000 men in 1937 to approximately a million. At the same time CCP membership

rose from 40,000 to 1.2 million, and the population of Communist-controlled areas was enlarged from two million to one hundred million.⁷⁰

Both the Japanese and Chiang were alarmed by the growing Communist strength. Mainland Chinese historians claim that after 1939 the CCP was fighting the majority of Japanese troops in China. And they charge that Chiang and his Nationalist government followed a policy of "actively suppressing the Communists and passively resisting the Japanese." According to CCP history, from 1939 to 1943, Chiang launched three major anti-Communist campaigns. Nationalist troops started to blockade the CCP base around Yanan in 1939 at the height of the "first anti-Communist upsurge," and the number of GMD troops stationed there eventually reached 200,000 or more by 1943 in the last upsurge. In the second and most serious anti-Communist upsurge, Communist troops were attacked by government forces in South Anhui (Anhui) in the New Fourth Army Incident in 1941, resulting in the arrest of the commander of the New Fourth Army and the death of its Communist political commissioner along with 8,000 soldiers.⁷¹

Chiang Kai-shek and GMD historians, nevertheless, often portrayed Mao and the CCP as the evil destructive force in the War of Resistance. Mao's alleged policy directive to CCP cadres, urging them to fully utilize the opportunity of Japanese war for self-expansion, was quoted repeatedly. "Our fixed policy," Mao said, "should be 70 percent expansion, 20 percent dealing with the Kuomintang, and 10 percent resisting Japan."⁷² While it is hard to confirm the accuracy of the above quotation from mainland Chinese sources, Mao was known to stress the "independence and self-

determination” of the CCP and its armed forces' from the central government. He restricted his commanders from large-scale engagement with the Japanese, and asked them to focus instead on territorial expansion and military buildup, often at the expense of the GMD. Thus, the GMD-CCP United Front in the Anti-Japanese War achieved only a limited degree of Chinese national unity in 1937-39; in fact, its existence was merely a matter of formality after the New Fourth Army Incident. The United States was drawn into this Chinese tangle in the Pacific War without fully understanding the CCP problem.

The Nationalist government's policy after the Sino-Japanese war broke out was to persuade the United States along with England to mediate the crisis and come to China's aid. In late 1937, Chiang and other national leaders accurately estimated that (1) the war against Japan would be a protracted struggle--a stalemate in which Japan could not conquer China and China would not be able to defeat Japan; (2) international competition would intensify and sooner or later European powers and the United States would intervene in Asia; (3) the United States was the only power that would take major action in the Pacific.⁷³ The national government policy, therefore, in Chiang's words was to "utilize the power of England and the United States to solve the Sino-Japanese crisis." It was essential to him that while resisting Japan, China had to exercise patience and await changes on the international scene.⁷⁴

Chiang watched the international scene intently. Initially he made it widely known that in the war against Japan, he sought only to return peace to China consistent with the principles of the Nine Power Treaty rather than the total defeat of

Japan. Concerned about foreign influence in China, he based China's international policy on *realpolitik*: taking advantage of American and British support to force Japan to seek peace with China and settle the Sino-Japanese crisis; and using the impetus of Sino-Japanese cooperation to make the U.S. and England give up unequal treaty rights.⁷⁵

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 brought a sense of relief and great hope to Chiang. It was clear that on the eve of Pearl Harbor he no longer regarded Japan as the most dangerous enemy. He felt that the U.S. and England had attempted to use China to exhaust Japan; it was now their turn to contribute and sacrifice.⁷⁶

Immediately after Pearl Harbor, he asked American and British diplomatic and military representatives in China to meet with him to discuss what was to be done. In two conferences on 8 December, he outlined his ideas for a great coalition to share with China the task of defending the Pacific.⁷⁷ But his search for endorsement of the basic principles of combined or joined strategy of the U.S., British Commonwealth, and China over the whole Pacific area, and his suggestion that a strategy council be established in Chongqing, were disregarded.

Instead, the task of global strategic planning was taken over by the newly-formed Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff.⁷⁸ China's exclusion from this and other wartime decision-making bodies such as the Combined Command of the Southwest Pacific Theater, and the flat U.S. rejection of Chiang's repeated request to join the Munitions Assignment Board which allocated military equipment among the

allies was a humiliation that constantly reminded Chiang and other Chinese leaders.⁷⁹ And the Allies' lack of commitment to China would later further disillusion the Chinese government. But Chiang was pleased by American and British recognition of his position as supreme command of all Allied forces in China.⁸⁰

It is clear that after the United States joined the war against Japan in December 1941, America's first priority remained in Europe while seeking to keep China in the fighting.⁸¹ Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War, thus described such a policy: "In Anglo-American grand strategy the war against Germany came first, second came the great 'amphibious' movement across the Pacific toward the Japanese island empire. The China-Burma-India theater was a poor third."⁸²

Even though China was not primary in its wartime strategy, the United States had a clear policy of supporting a strong and united China.⁸³ Furthermore, China fortunately had ample sympathizers in Washington. Stanley Hornbeck, who was then the adviser on Far Eastern political relations at the State Department, appealed for more aid to China. In a memo dated 20 May 1942, he wrote:

The Chinese have . . . heard and have rejoiced in American promises that we would get goods into China and they have seen that the goods do not arrive. . . . From now on there is only one way by which we can make sure of maintaining China's confidence; we must deliver goods. . . . The number of planes needed for doing this job is ridiculously small in comparison with the relatively huge numbers that we are sending to other fronts. Is there not something wrong about a strategy . . . which in theory or in practice would call for investing everything in several scattered theaters and investing nothing in a theater which, if occupied by the enemy, would mean the loss of a useful ally and the acquisition by the enemy of that prize which has been the major objective of political and military operations on his part for a period of 50 years?⁸⁴

Considerable American attention to China caused resentment from British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who had an eye on U.S. Lend-Lease materials. "I told the President how much I felt American opinion overestimated the contribution which China could make to the general war," he observed. "The extraordinary significance of China in American minds, even at the top, was strangely out of proportion. I was conscious of a standard of values which accorded China almost equal fighting power with the British Empire, and rated the Chinese armies as a factor to be mentioned in the same breath as the armies of Russia."⁸⁵

America's entry into the Pacific War brought unprecedented Sino-American cooperation. It also offered opportunities for America to be deeply involved in domestic Chinese affairs. The contentious Stilwell case serves as a good example of a frustrated American attempt to change China to conform to its values and conduct. Differing from other efforts, this scheme came from the highest government level, and in the end America became the victim of its own mis-perception of China.⁸⁶

Major Sino-American conflict first centered on military strategy and Stilwell's command problems in China. Chiang's decision to ask for a U.S. general to assist him was driven by three considerations: cultivating America's friendship, obtaining more U.S. aid, and countering Japan's vicious invasion of Burma that threatened China's last land link to the outside world. But the appointment of Lieutenant General Joseph Warren Stilwell as Chiang's Chief of Staff soon created discord between the two governments. Stilwell worked hard to carry out his mission to supervise and control Lend-Lease aid to China, to improve and maintain the Burma Road, and to command

U.S. and Chinese forces assigned to him and improve the combat efficiency of the Chinese army. The White House acknowledged that Stilwell was "under the Generalissimo in theory rather than fact."⁸⁷ To Chiang, the appointment of Stilwell was a fiasco: not only did the General's early experience in China remind him of old Western dominance, but Stilwell was deeply antagonistic towards the GMD government which he thought to be past all hope. Moreover, instead of helping get aid from Washington, Stilwell later tried to block such aid.⁸⁸ Stilwell and Chiang's mutual dislike was well known and troublesome to Washington. By the summer of 1943, Harry Hopkins recorded that

The President indicated his very strong dissatisfaction with the way our whole show is running in China. He stated that Stilwell obviously hated the Chinese and that his cablegrams are sarcastic about the Chinese and this feeling is undoubtedly known to the Chinese and the Generalissimo. Furthermore, the President said that it is quite clear the Generalissimo does not like Stilwell.⁸⁹

The cause of constant dispute between Stilwell and Chiang was deep and complex, and it went beyond mere personal discord or the simple "bitter disagreement over military policy."⁹⁰ It was a conflict between two different cultures, a struggle between Chinese nationalism and American attempts to influence and change China according to its values. Adding to the antagonism was a confusing three-dimensional command relationship in which Stilwell was to be Chiang's chief of staff and field commander, receive orders from the U.S. in regard to the employment of U.S. forces and distribution of Lend-Lease supplies, and yet serve under the commanding British officer vis-a-vis operations in Burma.⁹¹ This resulted in a political and personal

conflict so bitter that Stilwell constantly used "peanut," "idiot," and "slacker" to refer to Chiang.⁹²

What Chiang desired was more material and less political intervention. But he was constantly disappointed. Stilwell agreed in the summer of 1942 that the U.S. had "failed in all [its] commitments." He wrote: "In any case, I was to radio and ask for Yes or No on the question 'Is the U.S. interested in maintaining the China Theater?'" Chiang told Stilwell in a conversation that President Roosevelt in a telegram promised to supply China with planes and war materials but less than 10 percent of the goods had arrived. "I do not entertain any doubt that the President is sincere," he continued, "what has been done is perhaps without his consent or knowledge. As Chief of Staff to me, you are responsible for seeing to it that the promised material is forthcoming."⁹³ Chiang made his strongest complaints in early May 1943, telling Stilwell that neither he nor the Chinese people could "understand why the U.S. [had] sent such a pitiful handful of planes and supplies to China."⁹⁴ To Stilwell, however, after the failure in Burma in May 1942, wartime difficulties were primarily the responsibility of bad GMD leadership. In a memorandum to the Chief of Staff General George Marshall, Stilwell wrote that the low morale of the troops and bad conditions were "entirely the fault of the Chinese 'leaders,' and could be corrected by taking obvious remedial measures."⁹⁵ Stilwell was given the command of the elite Chinese 5th and 6th armies during the first Burma campaign, most of which were lost in Burma. Stilwell blamed Chiang and the Chinese officers for their ineffective support and action, and thought Chinese officers under him worthless and the GMD

government corrupt. He presented a three-point program: execute three Chinese generals, organize a new Chinese army under his unrestricted command, and draw a new plan to re-invade Burma.⁹⁶

Stilwell's judgment was in tune with the prevailing American perception in China and in Washington that China was passive in its war effort and resisting desperately-needed reforms,⁹⁷ as Secretary of State Dean Acheson explained in 1949:

In the opinion of many observers [the GMD] had sunk into corruption, into a scramble for place and power, and into reliance on the United States to win the war for them and to preserve their own domestic supremacy. . . . It was evident to us that only a rejuvenated and progressive Chinese government which could recapture the enthusiastic loyalty of the people could and would wage an effective war against Japan. American officials repeatedly brought their concern with this situation to the attention of the Generalissimo and he repeatedly assured them that it would be corrected. He made, however, little or no effective effort to correct it and tended to shut himself off from Chinese officials who gave unpalatable advice.⁹⁸

Sino-American differences were exacerbated by intensified antagonism between Stilwell and Chiang. As Joseph Alsop observed, "by the summer of 1942, only six months after Stilwell's appointment this strange vendetta of an American theater commander against an allied chief of state had transferred Stilwell's Chungking headquarters into a hostile enclave in the Generalissimo's territory."⁹⁹ Stilwell's disrespect for Chiang went so far as to cause President Roosevelt to protest that the Generalissimo must not be treated as a tribal chieftain.¹⁰⁰

In spite of other concessions, Chiang was not ready to give Stilwell "unrestricted" commanding power over Chinese forces, as demanded by President

Roosevelt on 19 September 1944.¹⁰¹ On 24 September, Chiang sent a telegram to Madame Chiang and Executive Minister H.H. Kung, who were visiting the U.S., asking them to be firm on the issue. Kung immediately called on Harry Hopkins, claiming that China's seven-year successful resistance to Japan was the result of the Generalissimo's durable policy and the Chinese soldiers' unshakable national consciousness. If Stilwell took command, both would be greatly damaged.¹⁰² In a telegram to Hopkins, T.V. Soong explained that the Generalissimo wanted the president to recall Stilwell and replace him with another American officer. "His own experience has convinced him that retaining General Stilwell under any circumstances would make him a prisoner in his own house. His decision is final and he told me that he is ready to take the consequences, whatever they may be."¹⁰³ Soong went on to suggest that "provided that General Stilwell is recalled and replaced by a really qualified American officer, I consider that the present is the greatest opportunity for the United States to influence China in the right direction."¹⁰⁴ Stilwell's recall in October 1944 probably averted a further deterioration of Sino-American relations. But it did not change the fact that the Chinese government was struggling to survive in a simultaneous fight against two deadly enemies, the Japanese and the CCP, while dealing with American interference.

Yet, despite the acrimony over the Stilwell issue, wartime U.S. China policy encountered the strongest opposition from Chiang's government on the issue of Chinese Communism. Even though as early as 1941 numerous reports were flown back to Washington discussing the CCP-GMD dispute, it was disillusionment toward

the GMD by many American China experts that brought Washington's attention to the rival CCP forces.¹⁰⁵ To the United States, which was mainly concerned with a speedy conclusion of the war, a coalition Chinese government was not only morally right but the neatest and simplest answer to preserving both China's integrity and American interests. Secretary Acheson defended America's effort in trying to bring the Nationalists and Communists together:

In contrast to the unity of the people of China in the war against Japan were the divided interests of the leaders of the Kuomintang and of the Chinese Communists. . . . It seemed highly probable in 1943 and 1944 that, unless the Chinese could subordinate their internal interests to the larger interest of the unified war effort against Japan, Chinese resistance would become completely ineffective. . . . In the light of the paramount necessity of the most vigorous prosecution of the war, in which Chinese interests were equally at stake with our own, traditional concepts of policy [of non-intervention] had to be adapted to a new and unprecedented situation.¹⁰⁶

It was the rising strength of Chinese Communism and America's active but drifting approach toward it that complicated Sino-American relations the most and, in the long run, hindered its China policy and changed the postwar power structure in Asia.

U.S.-Chinese Communist relations in the late 1930s and early 1940s were limited to unofficial journalistic contacts which produced an inadequate and superficial understanding of Chinese politics. Despite the general understanding that Communism was not the cause of chaos in China but rather the effect of certain fundamental conditions,¹⁰⁷ the United States did not have an overall strategy to cope with the Communists. America's determination to implement its wartime policy of a

"strong and united China . . . friendly to the United States and not subservient to any other power,"¹⁰⁸ and to bring the Chinese together further complicated the already-delicate and fragile situation in that country. After Pearl Harbor, America increased its informal contacts with CCP representatives in Chongqing. Many of these were initiated by John Service who was assigned to the task and eager to explore and report on the growing strength of the Chinese Communists.

One cannot understand the CCP and its international policy without appraising its deep-rooted nationalistic sentiment. Consistent with a patriotic, modern Chinese world outlook, the CCP was characterized by strong anti-imperialist tendencies. As early as 1922, the Communists had concluded that America was no different from other imperialist powers in aiming at the economic exploitation of China. Because it lacked spheres of influence in China, however, Washington needed to support China's central government to maintain the Open Door. After 1928 that meant standing behind Chiang. A unified China under a pro-American regime would be advantageous to U.S. economic expansion.¹⁰⁹

World War II and the changing international balance brought theoretical and practical changes in the CCP's diplomacy. The basis for CCP's policy during the war was, in addition to its steady expansion, to unite with all necessary forces against the Japanese invasion. On the diplomatic front, the CCP gave up its old slogan of "down with all imperialists" in favor of a strategy of a united front with all countries against Japanese aggression.¹¹⁰

After 1937 the Communists had realized the value and promise of American

support, and its policy aimed to get U.S. support for China's war against Japan as well as for domestic unification and democratic reform. By the winter of 1940 when the GMD was actively attacking the CCP instead of engaging the Japanese, Mao instructed Zhou Enlai to approach the United States through the American Embassy in Chongqing, the first CCP diplomatic initiative toward the United States.¹¹¹

The Chinese Communists' united front initiatives to the U.S. were further crystallized into a policy of seeking American support and military cooperation following the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. Despite Chiang's persistent opposition and a GMD blockade, the CCP succeeded in inviting foreign journalists and American military observers to Yanan in 1944, and launched an effective propaganda campaign to win favorable opinions from both groups.

For its part, the CCP's initiatives and gestures did not get much reaction from the United States before 1944. America's wartime policy continued to focus on supporting the central government and maintaining distance from the Communists. Washington opposed civil war but was not ready to become involved in the intricate relationship between the two rival forces.

Despite America's apathy and indifference regarding their initiatives, the Chinese Communists sought opportunities to influence Americans who had powerful pens and influential positions. Zhou Enlai, the CCP representative in Chongqing, worked hard to cultivate American diplomats.¹¹² Service was among the few honored American guests who frequently visited Zhou. On 6 August 1942, in a conversation with John Davies, Zhou extended an invitation for an official visit by U.S.

representatives to Yanan.¹¹³ Zhou's message received positive responses from numerous Foreign Service officers in China, especially Service who proved the most vigorous advocate for official contacts with the CCP. He proposed to Washington that the CCP problem was sufficiently important for the future to warrant America's sending representatives to Yanan.¹¹⁴

Under Army instructions Service assisted in the difficult negotiations to obtain Chiang's permission for U.S. army intelligence teams to enter the Communist area. These efforts succeeded at last in June 1944 with Vice President Henry Wallace's mission to China. Service was one of the first eighteen members of the American mission to Yanan, known as the "Dixie Mission," under the command of Colonel David D. Barrett.¹¹⁵

The arrival of the United States Army Observer Group on 22 July 1944 was a historic moment in American-CCP relations. It marked the beginning of official contacts between the U.S. and the CCP and the breakthrough of a long government blockade on the Communists. The mission brought new promises to the Communists. It signified the recognition of growing CCP influence at home and abroad.¹¹⁶ Mao was so excited that he personally modified an editorial for the Jiefang Ribao [Liberation Daily], and added "comrades" to its original title of "Welcome American military observation group." Mao exclaimed that the Americans' arrival was "the most exciting event since the war against Japan."¹¹⁷

While actively approaching the United States, CCP leaders were simultaneously launching psychological warfare against the GMD government,

attacking its inaction against Japan and demanding socio-political reforms. In 1943 the CCP issued a manifesto in commemoration of the sixth anniversary of the Anti-Japanese War. It called for greater unification, political reform, and increased productivity. The CCP argued that to meet the need of resisting Japan's invasion, the "only policy is to reform politics along the lines of Mr. Sun Yat-sen's three people's principles." It went on to say that "it makes one wonder why 400 million Chinese could not defeat a little more than three dozens of Japanese divisions. Lack of industries is not the only or a major reason. The only explanation is that China does not have a democratic political system."¹¹⁸

Communist demands were well-received by liberal-minded Americans in China and coincided with the views of many American diplomats. These sentiments were thoroughly expressed in Service's political reports to Washington. In his October 1944 memorandum, for example, Service contended that "it is time for the sake of the war and also for our future interests in China, that we take a more realistic line. . . . The Kuomintang government is in crisis."¹¹⁹ The report generated great political controversy in the United States. General Patrick Hurley called it "a plan for the removal of support from the Chiang Kai-shek government with the end result that the Communists would take over."¹²⁰ Although Service and other "China hands's" recommendations of forcing Chiang to reform or else seek political alternatives were not directly adopted by Washington, they nevertheless had great influence on U.S. policies toward China.¹²¹

Service himself believed that ideology should not be made the basis of

international relations. He later commented that CCP leader Mao Zedong was also "treating foreign relations as basically non-ideological. He was thinking in nationalistic terms and assuming that most countries base their foreign policy on national interests."¹²²

It was evident that by 1944 America had become deeply involved in Chinese domestic affairs, and democracy and liberal reform had become issues which caused tensions in Sino-American relations. Even during wartime, when American aid was needed, the Chinese remained suspicious of it. Many historians have also expressed reservations about U.S. expectations and actions during World War II. Paul K.T. Sih maintains that "in international contacts, it is very difficult to draw a line of demarcation between 'friendly advice' of an ally and 'political intervention' of a domineering foreign power . . . American good-will mission were not altogether as altruistic, pure, and innocent as they appeared or were intended to be!"¹²³ Lloyd Eastman argues that "in a profound sense, Anglo-American democracy was not suited to China."¹²⁴

By the end Service's moralistic and interventionist appeal was rejected by then Ambassador Hurley, who had delighted and then disillusioned the CCP by his changing diplomacy. Service was relieved from embassy duty and recalled to Washington in early 1945. And America and CCP relations went back to where they had started.

To fully understand America's wartime entanglement in domestic Chinese politics and the ultimate failure of its China policy and Service's role in them one has

to turn to the formative years of the diplomat. As one follows Service's life and career in China, it becomes evident that his personality and social attitude were deep-rooted in his American experience in China; they were overlays of his original experience during the formative years in Sichuang and other parts of China.

ENDNOTES

1. Service, Lost Chance in China, 162-65.
2. Hu Shi, "Introduction" to John L. Stuart, Fifty Years in China: The Memoirs of John Leighton Stuart (New York, 1954), xx.
3. U.S. Department of State, The China White Paper (originally issued as United States Relations with China, with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949) (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1949), vi.
4. Joseph Alsop, "The Feud Between Stilwell and Chiang," Saturday Evening Post, 7 January 1950, 16.
5. Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China, 1941-50 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), 218.
6. Robert P. Newman, Owen Lattimore and the 'Loss of China' (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), ix.
7. Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), 535.
8. "Personal Statement of John S. Service," in U.S. Senate, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation.
9. New York Times, 28 June 1950, 22.
10. New York Times, 8 October 1950, 38.
11. Times-Herald, 15 May 1951.
12. Chicago Daily Commentary, 22 March 1951. For similar views, see Kansas Times, 24 March 1951.
13. Hou Lichao, Shui Shi Zhongguo yu Meiguo de Pantu? [Who were the tractors of China and the United States] (Taipei: Yuandong Shubao Press, 1960), 2.
14. James A. Baker, III, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989-1992 (New York: G.P. Putman's Sons, 1995), 101.
15. U.S. Senate, The Amerasia Papers, 30.

16. John S. Service, The Amerasia Papers: Some Problems in the History of US-China Relations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 191-2.
17. Kahn, The China Hands, 6.
18. John K. Fairbank who had worked closely with Service in China during World War II maintained in 1950 that "Mr. Service deserves the thanks of all patriotic American citizens for his courage in stating the truth of the situation in China as he saw it, even though it was not at the time and has not since been palatable to some Americans. For this and similar comments, See Kahn, The China Hands, 9; and E.J. Kahn, "Profiles: Foresight, Nightmare, and Hindsight," The New Yorker (8 April 1972), 64. See also Service, "State Department Duty," iv.
19. New York Times, 2 November 1949, 26.
20. Kahn, "Profiles: Foresight, Nightmare, and Hindsight," 43.
21. Kahn, The China Hands, 6.
22. Service, Lost Chance in China, xxi.
23. Barbara Tuchman, "If Mao Had Come to Washington: An Essay in Alternative," Foreign Affairs (October 1972): 60.
24. Warren Cohen, "United States and China Since 1945," in New Frontiers in American-East Asian Relations, ed. by Warren Cohen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 141.
25. Zhang Baijia, "Kang Ri Zhanzheng Shiqi Guogong Liangdang de Duimei Zhengce, 1937-1945" [Guomindang and Communist policies toward the United States during the Anti-Japanese War], in Yuan Ming and Harry Harding, eds., Zhong Mei Guanxi Shi shang Chenzhong de Yiye [Sino-American relations, 1944-1955: collaborative reassessment of a troubled time] (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 1989), 32.
26. Bagby, The Eagle-Dragon Alliance, 151.
27. Zhuo Qiwei, "Wei Chiang Kai-shek Gaiguan Dinglun" [Assessing Chiang Kai-shek after his death], Shijie Zhoukan [World Journal Weekly Magazine], 21 May 1995.
28. N. Tucker, Patterns in the Dust (New York, 1983), 42-43.
29. See Edwin Martin, "The Chou Demarche: Did the US and Britain Miss a Chance to Change Postwar History in Asia?" Foreign Service Journal (November 1981).
30. Chen Jian, "The Myth of America's 'Lost Chance' in China," Diplomatic History 21, no. 1 (Winter 1997): 77-86.

31. Michael Sheng, "The Triumph of Internationalism," Diplomatic History 21, no. 1 (Winter 1997): 95.

32. Michael Sheng, "Chinese Communist Policy toward the United States and the Myth of the 'Lost Chance,' 1948-1950," Modern Asian Studies 28, pt. 3 (July 1994): 501-2.

33. Warren Cohen, "Was There a 'Lost Chance' in China?" Diplomatic History 21, no. 1 (Winter 1997): 71-75.

34. Arnold Toynbee, A Study of History (abridgement of Volumes I-VI by D.C. Smervell), 14th edition (New York: Oxford Press, 1958), 1-4.

35. Gunboat diplomacy was well summarized by Israel Epstein, one of the old American "China hands:"

In the bad old days of not so long ago foreign countries which wanted to get China into a proper frame of mind to talk concessions had a habit of first sailing one of their smaller navy boats up to her shores, unbuttoning their guns and perhaps lobbing over a few shells. This was known as Gunboat Diplomacy and in its time it seldom failed. As a necessary preliminary to the whole business, those at whom the guns were pointed were accused of being "antiforeign," which was apparently the greatest crime a Chinese could commit.

See Israel Epstein, The Unfinished Revolution in China (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1947), 21.

36. John K. Fairbank, The United States and China, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 187.

37. Immanuel Hsü, The Rise of Modern China, 5th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 493.

38. By agreement, high ranking GMD officials were not allowed to join the Communist Party to keep dual status. In the summer of 1925, when the GMD high-ranking official, Zhang Zhizhong, expressed to his colleague Zhou Enlai at the Huangpu Military Academy his inclination to join the CCP, Zhou politely declined. See, Zhang Zhizhong, "Wuo Yu Zhonggong," [My relations with the Chinese Communist Party] Chongqing Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji [Selections of Chongqing historical literature], Vol. 7 (Chongqing: Wenshi ZiliaoWeiyuanhui, 1980), 2.

39. For more information, see Kahn, The China Hands.

40. Hunter Miller, ed., Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America, vol. 4, 559, 560; vol. 7, 793, 804; also see Department of State, The China White Paper, 413.

41. Edwin Reischauer and John K. Fairbank, East Asia: Tradition and Transformation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), 642-43.
42. Even though trade and business in China were only a small part of America's overseas undertaking, the myth of the immense China market endured. As stated by the State Department, American policy towards China was primarily based on the principle of equality of commercial opportunity that was embraced in the Open Door policy. In viewing U.S. China policy at the turn of the century, Service commented that Americans feel it "was a wonderful thing to China. They don't realize that the Open Door policy was really a selfish commercial policy to make sure that no one else had any rights or privileges that we don't have." See John S. Service, interview by the author, 1 August 1989, Oakland, California (tape recordings remain with the author).
43. Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, 9th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974), 646.
44. Reischauer and Fairbank, East Asia, 795.
45. State Department Bulletin, 18 December 1950.
46. Paul A. Varg, Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats: The American Protestant Missionary Movement in China, 1890-1952 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958): 185-93.
47. Service, interview by the author, 1 August 1989.
48. Ross Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics (New York: Octagon Books, 1974), 2.
49. See, for example, "The Joint Statement of the Japanese Premier (Konoe) and the President of the Nanking Government (Wang Ching-wei), June 23, 1941," in Leland M. Goodrich, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations: Vol. IV, July 1941-June 1942 (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1942), 490-91.
50. This view was revived during the textbook revision controversy in the 1980s. For a more detailed discussion on the textbook issue, see Allen S. Whiting, China Eyes Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 46-51, 56-60.
51. For more information about economic development before Sino-Japanese war, see Thomas G. Rawski, Economic Growth in Prewar China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).
52. Quoted in Hsiang-hsiang Wu, "Total Strategy Used by China and Some Major Engagements in the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945," in Paul K.T. Sih, ed., Nationalist China During the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945 (New York: Exposition Press, 1977), 39.

53. In a report to Dr. Sun Yat-sen upon returning from the Soviet Union, Chiang wrote on 14 March 1924: "According to my observation, the Russian Communist Party is not to be trusted. . . . The Russian Communist Party, in its dealing with China, has only one aim, namely, to make the Chinese Communist Party its chosen instrument. . . . To turn the lands inhabited by the Manchus, Mongols, Moslems and Tibetans into parts of the Soviet Union; it may harbor sinister designs even on China proper." See Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China: A Summing-up at Seventy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1957), 23; President Chiang Kai-shek: His Life Story in Picture (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1972), 8.

54. Dr. Sun Yat-sen died in Beijing on 12 March 1925.

55. Ren Bishei, "Guanyu Jige Wenti de Yijian," [Opinions on several problems] Fuxiao (April 1943), 41.

56. Mao Zedong, Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. II (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1961-65), 262; quoted in Jerome Chen, Mao and the Chinese Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), 212.

57. Ha-sheng Lin, "New Look at Chinese Nationalist Appeasers," in Alvin Coox and Hilary Conroy, eds., China and Japan: Search for Balance Since World War I (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio Books, 1978), 228. Wang expressed similar views in Huabei Shibian Ziliao Xuanbian [Collection of selected materials on the north China incident] (Henan, 1983), 88.

58. For more information, see Han-sheng Lin, "A New Look at Chinese Nationalist 'Appeasers,'" 229; Xiang Xintang, "Qianding 'Tanggu Xieding' de Qianqian Houhou" [Before and after the signing of the 'Tanggu Truce'], in Tianjin Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji [Selections of literary and historical materials of Tianjin] (Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Press, 1985), 45-85; and James T.C. Liu, "Sino-Japanese Diplomacy during the Appeasement Period, 1933-1937," Ph.D. diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1950.

59. Jiang Zongtong Ji [Collected speeches and writings of president Chiang] (Taipei, 1960), 229.

60. For military deployment by the government during the five anti-Communist campaigns, see Hsi-Sheng Ch'i, Nationalist China At War: Military Defeats and Political Collapse, 1937-45 (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1982), 246.

61. Jerome Chen, Mao and the Chinese Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), 200; Yung-fa Chen, Making Revolution: The Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China, 1937-1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 26; Hsi-Sheng Ch'i, Nationalist China At War, 21; and John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, East Asia: Tradition and Transformation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), 889.

62. Xiang, "Qianding 'Tanggu Xieding' de Qianqian Houhou," 49.

63. Jiang Zongtong Milu: Zhong Ri Guanxi Bashi Nian zhi Zhengyan [Secret records of President Chiang Kai-shek: testimony on eighty years of Sino-Japanese relations] (Taipei, 1977), 75; also China Weekly Review, 18 July 1936, 231.

64. The Communists made their concessions first in a 10 February 1937 telegram from the CCP Central Committee to the GMD Central Executive Committee. See Hsü, The Rise of Modern China, 588.

65. Mao Zedong, "Qinlue Zhongguo Shi Bu Shi Riban de Chulu?" [Is invasion of China Japan's resolution?], in Zhai Guangyu and Lu Jia, eds., Quanguo Jiangling Kangzhan Minglun Ji [Famous speeches of national generals in the war of resistance] (Shanghai: Kangzhan Bianji She, 1938), 108-09.

66. Chiang constantly claimed that "personal sacrifice was nothing but sacrificing the country was intolerable." In reviewing the events after June 1935, Chiang expressed in his diary: "Alas! [My] country had reached such a point, how can I be? How can any Chinese get rid of this humiliation!" See Jiang Zongtong Milu, 48.

67. Chiang Kai-shek, "Diyu Wairu yu Fuxing Minzu," [Resist outside invasion and revitalize China], in Zhai and Lu, Quanguo Jiangling Kangzhan Minglun Ji, [Famous speeches of national generals in the war of resistance] (Shanghai: Kangzhan Bianji She, 1938), 6-7.

68. Memorandum of Conversation, 24 May 1932, Nelson T. Johnson Papers, Library of Congress.

69. Lloyd E. Eastman, Seeds of Destruction: Nationalist China in War and Revolution 1937-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), 143.

70. Denis Twitchett and John Fairbank, eds., The Cambridge History of China, vol. 13, pt. 2 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 618-19.

71. News of the New Fourth Army Incident and the official CCP response to it were delivered to the American Embassy by American leftist writer Anna Louise-Strong. See Memorandum of Conversation, 29 January 1941, Records of the U.S. Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of China, 1940-1944, Department of State Decimal File 893, National Archives.

72. See Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China: A Summing-Up at Seventy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1957), 85; Hsü, The Rise of Modern China, 589; Arthur Young, China and the Helping Hand, 1937-1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), 58.

73. Zhang Baijia, "Kang Ri Zhangzheng Shiqi Guogong Liangdang de Dui Mei Zhengce," 18. See also Zhang Qijun, Dangshi Gaiyao [Brief party history], vol. 3 (Taipei: Zhonghua Wenwu Gongyingshe, 1979), 972-73, 1143-44; and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Modern History Research Institute, ed., Hu Shi Ren Zhu Mei Dashi Qijian Wanglai

Diangao [Telegrams of Hu Shih as ambassador to the United States] (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1978), 1.

74. Zhang Xienwen, Zhonghua Minguo Shigang [Brief history of the Republic of China] (Zhengzhou: Henan Renmin Press, 1985), 543. Zhang Baijia, "Kang Ri Zhanzheng Shiqi Guogong Liangdang de Dui Mei Zhengce," 18.

75. Zhang Qijun, Dangshi Gaiyao, 1153; Zhang Baijia, "Kang Ri Zhanzheng Shiqi Guogong Liangdang de Dui Mei Zhengce," 34.

76. Zhang Qijun, Dangshi Gaiyao, 1153. Zhang, Baijia, "Kang Ri Zhanzheng Shiqi Guogong Liangdang de Dui Mei Zhengce," 19-20.

77. Herbert Feis, The China Tangle: The American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), 4-5.

78. *Ibid.*, 11

79. They agreed to the appointment of a Supreme Commander of American, Dutch, Australian, and British forces in the southwest Pacific Theater to coordinate the common effort. *Ibid.*, 42

80. Churchill and Roosevelt agreed, at a 24 December meeting, upon the organization of two combined commands--one for the southwest Pacific and one for China, the joint staff in China was to function under the Generalissimo's direction. *Ibid.*, 12.

81. Tsou, America's Failure in China, 23-25.

82. Feis, The China Tangle, 14.

83. Joseph Grew to American Embassy in China, American Policy in China, 7 May 1945, Hurley Papers, Box 91, Folder 8, University of Oklahoma.

84. Feis, The China Tangle, 41.

85. Winston S. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), 133.

86. Michael Hunt, The Making of A Special Relationship: The United States and China to 1914 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 300, 303.

87. Harry Hopkins, Memorandum, 15 July 1943, Harry Hopkins Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.

88. J.E. Stilwell, Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, 1 May 1943, Stilwell Collection, Container 8, Outcard 186, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, California.

89. Hopkins, Memorandum, 15 July 1943.

90. Alsop, "The Feud Between Stilwell and Chiang," 17.

91. Feis, The China Tangle, 18.

92. Ibid.

93. Joseph Stilwell, The Stilwell Papers, edited by Theodore White (New York: William Sloan & Associates, Inc., 1948), Entry, June 25, 1942; quoted in Feis, The China Tangle, 43.

94. Feis, The China Tangle, 63.

95. Ibid.

96. Alsop, "The Feud between Stilwell and Chiang," 26-27

97. For example, in a report, Colonel Frank Dorn concluded that the Chinese government was "completely rotten" and that the United States should not have a blind faith in China because "China's millions [would] not rise to receive munitions and planes and to fight the enemy, for the simplest reason that both China's millions and China's leaders [were] medieval in their outlook and thought." Frank Dorn, Memorandum to the Commanding General, 29 March 1943, Stilwell Collection, Hoover Institution.

98. The China White Paper, VII, VIII.

99. Ibid.

100. Alsop, "The Feud between Stilwell and Chiang," 17.

101. Message from President Roosevelt to the Generalissimo, 19 September 1944, Records of the China Theater of Operation, RG 493, National Archives, Suitland, MD.

102. Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby, Thunder Out of China (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1946), 224.

103. Telegram for Mr. Harry Hopkins from Dr. T.V. Soong, [n.d.], Harry Hopkins Papers, Franklin Roosevelt Library.

104. Ibid.

105. David Barrett to War Department, 4 March 1941; Memorandum of Conversation: Dispute between the Communists and the Chinese Government, 11 March 1941; Nelson Johnson to the Secretary of State, 15 April 1941, Records of the U.S. Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of China, 1940-1944, Department of State Decimal File 893, National Archives.

106. The China White Paper, VI.

107. Tuchman, "If Mao Had Come to Washington," 59.

108. Personal Statement of John S. Service before a Sub-Committee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 22 June 1950, 7, John Service Papers, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, Missouri (hereafter John Service Papers, Independence).

109. See "D Re Ci Quanguo Daibiao Dahui Xunyan," [Manifesto of the second national congress], in Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji [Selected documents of the CCP Central Committee], vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongyang Danxiao Chubanshe, 1989), 99-118.

110. Zhang Beija, "Kang Ri Zhangzheng Shiqi Guogong Liangdang de Dui Mei Zhengce," 22-23. Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong Xuanji [Selected works of Mao Exiting], combined edition (Beijing: Renming Chubanshe, 1964), 233, 723. Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong yu Sinuo de Tanhua [Mao Zedong's conversation with Snow] (Beijing: Renming Chubanshe, 1979), 108-17.

111. Nanfangju Dangshe Ziliao, Dashi Ji [Party material of the Southern Bureau: chronicle of events] (Chongqing: Chongqing Chubanshe, 1986), 120.

112. Feis, The American Tangle, 160.

113. Andrew P. Lee, "Conversation between General Yeh Chien-yin and Colonel Ivan D. Yeaton at Yen-an, China," Yen-an Observer Group APO 879, 3 August 1945, John Service Papers, Box 1, Folder 30, Berkeley.

114. Ibid. For the original draft of Service's proposal, see Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1943, China (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957), 198-99.

115. Personal Statement of John S. Service, 22 June 1950, 6, John Service Papers, Independence.

116. Zhang, "Kang Ri Zhangzheng Shiqi Guogong Liangdang de Dui Mei Zhengce," 25.

117. Jiefang Ribao [Liberation Daily], 15 August 1944.

118. "Zhongguo Gongchan Dang Zhongyang Weiyuanhui Wei Kangzhan Liu Zhounian Jinian Xuanyan," [Manifesto of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee in commemoration of the sixth anniversary of war of resistance] Jiefang Ribao, 2 July 1943, 1.

119. Service, Lost Chance in China, 165

120. Personal Statement of John S. Service, 22 June 1950, John Service Papers, Independence.

121. Xie Ranzhi, "1943 Nian Zhong Mei Waijiao Wenjian de Beijing Fenxi," [Examining the background of the Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1943], Yuoguan 1943 Nian Zhong Mei Waijiao Guanxi Wenjian Cankao Ziliao [References relating to Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1943, China (Taipei: Zhongyang Weiyuanhui, 1962), 25.
122. Service, The Amerasia Papers, 183.
123. Sih, Nationalist China During the Sino-Japanese War, xvi.
124. Lloyd E. Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927-1937 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 179-80.

CHAPTER TWO

DUALITY: FORMATIVE YEARS

That old China was a troubled place--for most Chinese, Warlords, national disunity, civil war, imperialism, unequal treaties, Japanese aggression, ruinous inflation, grinding poverty, natural disasters, callously rapacious rulers.¹

All of us in China--although we never really were trained or educated in Chinese; we didn't go to Chinese school, we didn't even have Chinese playmates--almost all of us grew up with this strong attachment to China. It is rather a hard thing to account for.²

----- John S. Service

John S. Service was born in Chengdu (Chengtú), southwest China, on 3 August 1909. His parents worked in this remote city in China's interior as missionaries. Service spent his entire childhood there but within American circles. He learned, from house servants, to speak some Chinese but was almost completely separated from other Chinese. His purely American schooling did not, however, prevent him from learning about China. Gradually, he grew attached to both his mother country and his birth place. This American experience in early twentieth-century China, a place twisted by turbulent social revolution, powerful Western influence, and constant tensions between them, left deep impression on him.

Service's personal character, along with traits that proved to be critical in his life and career, stemmed from his family heritage and early experience in China. The

values and outlook of his parents, their idealism and drive, their manners and restraint, affected Service deeply. He recalled in 1989 that "within the family there were some habits and taboos. The boys were always treated, so far as possible, as responsible individuals. . . . There was never any argument in front us. . . . Great importance was put on self-control and restraint . . . it was also consistent that praise was not lightly or lavishly bestowed."³ He evidently inherited from his father the pioneer spirit, determination, and likable easy-going manner.⁴ Service received more from his mother, whose "pleasant, well-bred, and unpretentious way," intellectual taste, sharp observation, and cool judgment are all cherished by Service to this day.⁵ His curiosity about China, deep concern for humanity, and patience and tolerance were rooted in his early years in China.⁶ As E.J. Kahn noted, by his teens Service "had ingrained in him the Chinese esteem of sensitivity to the feelings of others."⁷ The Chinese culture he absorbed would greatly affect his personal outlook and diplomatic career.

Student Volunteers in China

Service's parents, Grace Boggs and Robert Roy Service (Bob), both born in 1879, had been brought up by Protestant pioneer families in California. Robert's father, John Service, second of the "three Johns" in the family, was a frontiersman who settled in California in 1859.⁸ Unlike John's family which had its roots in Michigan, Grace's ancestors were early New England Puritans. One of them had fought in the War for Independence and had been given a sword by George Washington. Her grandfather, a forty-niner, journeyed to California through Mexico.⁹

Robert and Grace were serious, idealistic, and star students at the University of California, Berkeley.¹⁰ It was their association with the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) that brought them together and, eventually, to China. In their junior year, with Grace the treasurer of the Young Women's Christian Association and John president of the Young Men's Association, they fell in love. They married in 1904, despite Grace's father's strong opposition to a banker's daughter marrying a farmer's son.¹¹ Through involvement in the YMCA, Robert Service, in particular, came into contact with the Student Volunteer Movement, which was burgeoning at the turn of the century with its motto of "the world for Christ in our generation,"¹² a clear message of righteous manifest destiny. Robert and Grace, as nonsectarians, were both inspired by the head of the YMCA, the dynamic and charismatic John R. Mott, and other outstanding leaders of the movement who stressed the importance of saving the world through service to others. Unlike the Peace Corps of the 1960s and 1970s, in the YMCA and the Student Volunteer Movement at the beginning of the century participants made lifetime commitments.

Upon graduation in 1902, Service accepted a job as general secretary for the YMCA at Purdue University in Western Lafayette, Indiana. After their marriage in the summer of 1904, the Services volunteered to serve abroad. They were overjoyed when assigned foreign service by John Mott. "It was all tremendously thrilling," Grace wrote in her diary, "that evening Mr. Mott talked to us both. I well remembered his solemnity and some of his advice. He emphasized that this was a lifework. . . . As we listened to his impressive words, we felt that we were making a

solemn decision, full of privilege and responsibility.”¹³ They were even more "thrilled" when they got the assignment to establish a local Y association in Chengdu, China. Grace Service revealed their feelings repeatedly in her memoir, Golden Inches: "We wanted most to go to China and were excited to be going to a remote pioneer station in the far interior."¹⁴

China Service in the YMCA

After a year's journey passing through Shanghai, Hankou, and Chongqing, the Services reached their destination, Chengdu, in October 1906, but after the tragic loss of their six-month old baby daughter, Virginia, to dysentery on board a ship on the Yangtze. Initial difficulties did not weaken their will but the death of their daughter much saddened them. This painful experience would have a great impact on Grace who, convinced that unsanitary conditions caused Virginia's death, would later keep her sons away from Chinese children whom she considered unsanitary.¹⁵

The Services went to China in the midst of a growing "Christian occupation of China"--the substantial expansion of Protestant missionary movement in China during 1900-20. The number of Protestant missionaries in China rose dramatically from 1,296 in 1889 to 3,833 in 1906, and 6,636 in 1919. Nearly half of them were Americans.¹⁶

China in 1906 was at a historical turning point. After humiliating concessions to foreign powers by the much-weakened Chinese court in the aftermath of the anti-foreign Boxer uprising, patriotic Chinese who hoped to save their country from the

corrupt Manchu government and insatiable imperialists were bringing the Qing Dynasty to an end through the Republican Revolution. In their decades long stay the Services witnessed dramatic and turbulent changes. The Republican Revolution brought the last dynasty down in 1911. Western dominance and disillusion with World War I awakened a generation of Chinese youth in the 1919 May Fourth Movement. Profound social problems, warlordism, insatiable Japanese aggression, and the promising Bolshevik revolution in Russia encouraged the growth of the Chinese Communist movement.

Ever since William Cassels of the China Inland Mission had set up his mission station in 1886, Sichuan province where the Services spent most of their life had been a major center for crusading Protestant missionaries in China's interior.¹⁷ The Services represented the second generation of Protestant missionaries. This generation was more likely to be American, came from smaller societies, and penetrated more deeply into China's hinterland. The YMCA was one of the new missionary organizations that arrived in China at the turn of the century. It would become the seventh largest Protestant missionary society in China by 1919, with 192 missionaries concentrating their work on Chinese youth in major cities, including Chengdu.¹⁸ But broadened missionary activities in Sichuan intensified popular anti-foreign and anti-missionary sentiments. In Chengdu, the Services lived through the hair-raising days of anti-foreign unrest following the Boxer Movement which targeted missionaries and their converts, particularly substantial landowners, with the local jingle: "first kill the converts, then kill the foreigners." They also experienced the

unpredictable period of the 1911 Republican Revolution when clashes of different forces and executions were incidents of daily life.¹⁹ In Sichuan the intensified struggle among Western powers, the imperial court, and local elites produced the patriotic "self strengthening movement" that resulted in steady progress toward modernization and patriotic awakening. The "railroad protection" campaign, which predated the Republican Revolution in the nation, broke out in May 1911 with fierce local opposition to the Qing (Ching) court's move to nationalize railroads and grant railroad construction rights to the four-power consortium. The Services were overwhelmed by mass demonstrations, anguished petitions to the imperial court, clashes between government troops and local forces, and armed uprisings.

Despite the drama and danger, however, China remained to foreigners much the same old place of adventure, prestige, and alienation. As John Service later recalled:

In the old days, humble classes seemed to regard you as something strange and fearsome. Traders and suppliers of service saw you as possessed of wealth but often not much sense. The political and military knew you were a protected individual. The governing and intellectual groups showed their resentment by reverse condescension and an air of cultural superiority.²⁰

Foreigners in the changing China were indeed among the privileged groups. They enjoyed extraterritoriality and belonged to the upper class. Cultural and economic difficulties and their unwillingness to give up special rights and protection engulfed benevolent crusaders like the Services from ordinary Chinese.

Unlike the more Westernized treaty-ports, Chengdu, the provincial capital of

Sichuan with a population of half a million, was to foreigners a rather traditional Chinese city, underdeveloped but with a progressive outlook. In 1911, after touring many places, the noted American sociologist Edward A. Ross of the University of Wisconsin described Chengdu in his Changing Chinese as the most progressive purely Chinese city, an example of "Western influence at its best."²¹

Missionary life in Chengdu centered around the foreign circle. The Services were active in this small foreign community of over a hundred and were expanding their contact and influence into the Chinese society. They joined many of the foreign community clubs and societies like the literary Fortnightly Club and University Book Club. Grace was a constant contributor to the West China Missionary News.²² They also belonged to the American Association, of which Grace was secretary, to maintain an identity apart from the more influential British community, and to keep in touch with the distant American consul in Chongqing, over two hundred miles away. They lived, for thirteen years, in a two-storied compound, a walled wooden enclosure, remodeled by Bob from a long, single-structured Chinese house, with a handsome spirit screen. They chose the house because of its good neighborhood, on a street with a temple, a middle school, and few Chinese families;²³ and because of its closeness to the government-run West China Union University, a place that had originally attracted the American YMCA to Chengdu and would become a center of its activities. They lived in that two-story house longer than any other place in China. In the summer, made uncomfortable by the disagreeable heat and humidity in the city, Westerners, including the Services, took to the surrounding hills, traveling, as was the

rule for the rich and important, by sedan-chair. The Services' summer house, in the White Deer Summit (Bai Lu Ding), was held so dear that Grace Service not only devoted many pages in her memoir Golden Inches to describing it, but also used the bookplate dedicated to it until her death. She called the White Deer Mountain "our mountain" because Robert Service first "discovered" it and obtained in 1915 a 99 years lease for the mountaintop which was enclosed by a rough stone wall.²⁴

Even though the Services had lived in other cities, they regarded their experience in Chengdu as the defining point of their life in China. During their long stay from 1906 to 1921, Robert and Grace Service made a remarkable contribution to the progress of the Chengdu YMCA and the surrounding community; and, more importantly, they opened up a Chinese window to the West and built a bridge of understanding between America and China in that remote city. As the American YMCA secretary, Robert Service was charged with setting up a local YMCA in Chengdu and cultivating the friendship of Chinese students, gentry, and officials. He successfully carried out these missions. Starting from scratch and with the help of his wife, he was able to expand by 1919 the Chengdu YMCA to include over one thousand paid members, a science museum, and a student center. He helped train Chinese secretaries for the association, carried on programs like the YMCA boys' club in local schools with activities in Bible studies, athletics, and English conversation classes, and became popular among people with whom he associated.²⁵ His wife commented that "Bob felt that duty always should come first. His devotion to the interests of the Y was ever the determining factor with him."²⁶ His hard YMCA work

and agreeable personality were so well-liked that the city donated a vacant public building as a gift to be the central YMCA for the city.²⁷

As they made changes in the life of others, the Services also changed themselves. As one follows their careers, it becomes obvious that the Services led lives with a dual character: they remained western but strove to build bonds with the Chinese; they lived within the circles of the privileged few but strongly felt for the unfortunate many.²⁸ They loved their work from the very beginning and grew more attached to the community they served. Grace devoted time to learning Chinese, and habitually incorporated many Chinese words or literal translations of local expressions into her diaries such as "spent a lot of heart" (fei xin) and "jian" instead of room.²⁹ During a furlough back home when a lady from the YMCA told her that she was wrong in going to China and that she should think of her mother and stay in America, Grace laughed and told the lady that her mother was full of zeal for missions and was glad to have her in the Orient.³⁰ John Service remembered his father as a man who had special liking for Chinese, "It seemed to be against his nature to be with a Chinese--any Chinese--without engaging him in friendly, interested conversation."³¹ Grace recalled that her husband always took pleasure in his social contacts with Chinese. "In the good fellowship around the table at feasts," she continued, "he seemed to expand, became a raconteur, and surprised those who knew him as a quiet man at gatherings of his nationals."³² Facilitating this interest and involvement was his excellent Chinese. He had been exposed to Chinese in California, through, in part, the family Chinese cook, but he learned most of his Chinese in China. Though never

good at reading and writing, his oral Chinese was, according to many, perfect.

According to his son: "I have heard Chinese insist that hearing him behind a screen they would not guess that it was a foreigner speaking. But it was pure colloquial Sichuanese, which could astonish and amuse Chinese from other regions."³³ Robert Service also represented an organization with an influential Chinese board of directors, and his YMCA work brought him into contact with national leaders. In 1912 he had a picture taken with Sun Yat-sen.³⁴ Grace was even invited to Chiang Kai-shek's wedding reception in 1927.³⁵

The Services grew to love China, and developed a tremendously strong affection for the Chinese people. As John Service recalled, his parents, especially his father, "felt strongly interested in China, much concerned and involved in China. He was always optimistic about China, that things were going to come out all right."³⁶ However, a large part of the China they knew and the Chinese people with whom they came into direct and constant contact were their servants, most of whom came from poor families in the countryside. Their simplicity, honesty, and loyalty affected the Services. John Service explained: "Maybe this has something to do with why so many of us liked China, because really the only China we know was through our servants."³⁷ In 1937, two years after her husband passed away, Grace Service proudly told of the story of their laundry man, Lao Liu, who "expected life to be full of labor, and was grateful to work in a place where he was sure of pay and a roof over his head."³⁸ After Liu died of disease, the Services assumed financial responsibility for his mother as long as she lived.³⁹

In 1920 their achievements in Chengdu led the American YMCA to transfer the Services to Chongqing to start a new YMCA there. Their story there was of continued success. But by 1935 Robert Service was greatly depressed by being unable to continue his work for the YMCA because of the Great Depression. He died of liver cancer in Shanghai in September with his sons by his side, at age 42. Missionary work in China had damaged his health. He had contracted malaria in 1906 and could never get it completely out of his system. His friends remembered him as a man "so full of vigor, laughter, goodwill, and great aims, he had all Chengtu from lowly coolies to highest officials for his friends."⁴⁰ The Chinese he associated with spoke of him as a man of Chinese character: tolerant and with a willingness to see another's position. Service, who had felt he "had no place in America," had finally settled in China.⁴¹ He was buried in that remote land to which he had devoted his career, in the Chongqing foreign cemetery alongside his daughter, Virginia. The Services' mission was carried on, in a different capacity, by his oldest son, John, who would devote his career to building bridges of understanding between American and China through diplomacy.

Youth in Chengdu

On 3 September 1909 occurred the "greatest affaire" to the Services, the birth of their first son, John Steward Service (Jack). He was one of five foreign babies in Chengdu at the time. Babies born to American missionary families working in China in the first decade of the century were a rather common phenomenon. Other B-I-Cs

(Born-In-China) included publisher Henry Luce (1898), diplomat John P. Davies (1908), and historian Martin Wilbur (1908).⁴² The arrival of their much-expected son brought the Services great joy and fulfillment. They were pleased that, as a baby, he had both American and Chinese characteristics. Grace Service could not conceal her satisfaction when Professor Edward Ross commented during his 1910 visit that baby Jack "appeared to be a real American child,"⁴³ but she also insisted that baby cried in Chinese "Ai-ya, Ai-ya."

Like most China-born Americans, John Service had a sheltered childhood, growing up in a walled compound apart from Chinese society. Fearful of disease, the Services, like other missionary families, tried to keep their children away from both the local people and any unwashed food.⁴⁴ To Grace, her children's meals were an immediate concern, and she always prepared them herself with the cook's aid. Also, Service described an occasion when the family walked in the countryside on the narrow paths of rice fields:

I remember walking along the path and seeing a rather large, stout Chinese coming towards me and then suddenly finding myself in the flooded rice field. I remember my mother was absolutely frantic about this because, of course, the rice fields were fertilized with what we called night soil. . . . My mother was simply beside herself till we could get someplace where all my clothes could be taken off.⁴⁵

Service was not allowed to play with Chinese children in the street. And Chinese children, as they did to all foreigners, customarily called him "foreign devil" (Yang Guizi), though without much animosity.

Considering the unequal relations between foreigners and ordinary Chinese,

turbulent times, and faulty sanitary conditions in old China, the Services' concerns were not so much unwarranted phobia but rather an understandable choice. But, the Service family, like most foreigners, could not do what the Chinese were doing, and this isolated them from Chinese society.

This strong sense of enclosure haunted Service's childhood. When he later described their summer house in the mountains he spoke of happy times and, at the same time, the closeness of the "super compound:"

Our family spent five summers (1917-21) in this house on White Deer Summit. For us boys they were happy times. . . . One obvious plus was that, compared with life in the city, we were free. No compound walls; no traveling by sedan chair to other distant compounds; no need to arrange and schedule play. . . . For the children it was something like an idyllic and extended version of a city block in small town America. But this freedom was possible, in a sense, only because our stockaded mountain top was itself a super-compound. Except our servants, no Chinese lived on the mountain: we were our own little world. Proof of the distance from the unhygienic China was the fact that on the mountain, and only on the mountain, we were permitted to go barefoot.⁴⁶

As an American child who grew up in isolation, Service lacked Chinese playmates and never felt that he was accepted by the society he lived in. When he recalled his childhood years later, he sighed with great feelings: "It was an odd life in the sense that it seems odd to have lived in a country and spent all your childhood there, and look back and realize that you never had a Chinese friend!"⁴⁷ This feeling was common among American China-born children. One of his best friends, C. Martin Wilbur, who was one year older than Service, remarked: "I had a few good friends among the American kids who lived nearby, but no Chinese friends at that

stage of my life that I can remember. What a pity! We were an encapsulated foreign community living in a sea of Chinese. I was a spectator of all those around me, and my hope was to be as American as possible."⁴⁸

Service's only Chinese contact was with the family's Chinese servants. He learned about China, the Chinese language, and most importantly the qualities of Chinese people from them.⁴⁹ This was also true of his brother, Robert, whose spoken Chinese was much more fluent than the rest because he spent more hours playing with the house servants. Unlike his younger brother, however, Service had limited contacts with the servants but he came to love them. In his young heart they were independent, respectful, trustworthy "good people . . . [who] devoted themselves completely to the family" but without "any humility or servility or anything like that."⁵⁰

Service's parents were well aware of the isolation and made sure that their children had companionship. His mother always arranged weekend visits to have her children meet other foreign kids "for good playtimes, so they did not suffer from being alone."⁵¹ Though the number of places was limited, he had good times at the American and Canadian Methodist compounds inside the city and at the American and Canadian parts of the West China Union University campus outside the city. Like all the American children who grew up in Chengdu, Service clearly remembered and immensely enjoyed the swings and various ropes that hung from one of those "wonderful old trees." He had fun watching adults playing tennis in the compounds, or observing them dressed up in Chinese dress-up parties. He could not forget the

surprise fortieth birthday celebration for his father with many Chinese well-wishers, and fantastic firecrackers. He also vividly recalled the garden parties at the British Consul General's on each Empire Day (May 24) when the children were able to fish for unlimited goodies.⁵²

Through compound-to-compound visits, Service's contacts expanded. Among his childhood playmates were children of missionary families from America and Canada. The closest family friends and comrades at play came from the neighboring Yard family, Dr. James Yard, his wife Manelle, and their four little girls. Dr. Yard was a missionary teacher who joined a small group of liberal missionaries to support the Chinese movement for greater respect and more church autonomy, views shared by the senior Service and much esteemed by John Service.⁵³ The Yard family certainly left a deep impression on Service who took pride in the family and especially his childhood playmates like the notable head of the National Organization for Women (NOW), Molly.⁵⁴ Another well-known childhood friend was John Davies, and the two boys' lives were to be linked together through the strenuous years of World War II when both would be attached to the staff of General Joseph W. Stilwell and later when both ran into trouble during the McCarthy era.

With his family, "little John" Davies had visited the Services in 1908 before John Service was born. In 1916, when the Davies family moved to Chengdu, the two boys became good friends, although Service later said that they had "never been intimate friends. He is older than I am. There is sort of junior to senior relationship between us."⁵⁵ Still, they did grow up together in Chengdu, Chongqing, and

Shanghai, and liked to play war games which were later cited by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy as proof of “radical tendencies” in playing “Communist war games in their childhood in Chengtu.”⁵⁶

To John Service, eating lunch with his father in a Chinese restaurant was not only a big weekly father-and-son affair but also an eye opening event. Eating with some of the YMCA staff and hearing people talking with his father broadened his knowledge about street people in Chengdu. He recognized that “the people in whatever restaurant knew Bob well and knew that he liked to eat--most of all, Baozi”⁵⁷

Looking back from a long time and distance, Service reflected on his identity as an American child growing up in China: “looking back I’m surprised at the Americanness that my parents were so anxiously--apparently anxious--to instill. We played mostly with American children. . . . Obviously we felt very different from Chinese . . . a sort of separateness, if not superiority, to Chinese.”⁵⁸ Compared to children who grew up in a simple local atmosphere, Service’s childhood was surrounded by a sense of strangeness, superiority, and often loneliness. But it was this complexity that brought him into early maturity and made him ponder issues that did not concern other youth.

American Education

Service had a purely American education from pre-school through college. His parents, especially his mother, were sure that they would eventually return to

America.⁵⁹ Even though he could speak Chinese, his parents saw no need for him to learn to read and write the language. He would later systematically learn written Chinese in Beijing in 1935 after he joined the Foreign Service. Lacking an American school in Chengdu and dissatisfied with the quality of the newly established Canadian school there, Grace Service decided, with her teaching experience, to instruct her son through the then-popular Calvert School mailing system which operated out of Baltimore, Maryland. Service started his preschool education with his mother when he was five. He kept a regular busy school schedule at home: class would run from 8:30 to 12:30, with a couple of lessons and a half-hour recess between them, every school day morning. He later recalled that he was eager to get up and get to his studies and finish his lessons early.⁶⁰

Quality teaching and disciplined study enabled Service to make substantial progress. He could read and write before he started his first grade in Cleveland, Ohio, during his father's furlough in the States in 1915. Impressed with his talent and knowledge, the teacher suggested that he skip the second grade. So, when returned to China, Service jumped into the third grade in the Calvert system. His mother was pleased with the textbook and the "excellently planned sheets" for daily lessons. In addition to the standard textbook and routine schedule, Service was undoubtedly influenced by his mother who was intellectually keen on reading and writing. In one year, 1915, for example, she read sixty-four books, and wrote four hundred and five letters.⁶¹

Among the magazines and newspapers she subscribed to were The New

Republic, Atlantic, Century, The North China Herald, and Millard's Review (later China Weekly Review). Service, too, became fond of reading. He recalled that he was interested in reading and keen on looking up things in the family Encyclopedia Britannica, things like historical categories and various animals, "one thing or another leading you on."⁶² With a positive learning environment and a demanding teacher, he advanced rapidly. At age eleven, he was ready for high school.⁶³ Grace Service reflected with satisfaction in 1937 that "I felt then, and still feel, that I was wise in giving our sons American teaching in our own home."⁶⁴

By 1920 Service had gone through the sixth grade of the Calvert system and his parents decided to send him to the Shanghai American Boarding School, a small high school without any Chinese students.⁶⁵ Service was not much impressed with the boarding school: the classes were "boring" and the efforts to pursue American sports were "foolish." He was deeply critical of the school for "single-minded[ly] trying to be an American school."⁶⁶ He was, however, attracted to Shanghai, the dazzling "strange place." His curiosity led him to many forbidden places; he would sit by the railways, watching trains come and go, or listen to the telephone poles for the whistling of the wires. He also liked to walk to the dock and watch the ships, which horrified a school obsessed with student safety. It was also in Shanghai that he was able to roam the Chinese streets, though against the school regulations, to shop in tiny Papa-Mama shops or eat Chinese snacks like peanuts or duck eggs.⁶⁷ He also learned his first written Chinese in Shanghai streets by reading numbers, in both Chinese and English, on the streetcars.

Returning from Chongqing to Shanghai after his first summer vacation was full of adventure and jeopardy. It was the first trip Service had taken alone. At twelve, he not only traveled hundreds miles by himself in six weeks, he had, "in his care," a Chinese college student who trusted his money to Service. He witnessed warlord shootings while aboard a steamer in Ichang. In a letter to his parents, Service vividly described the startling event. When the shooting started during the night, foreigners were called to the captain's cabin because it was shielded by steel plates. Service, however, chose to stay in his cabin. The ship was struck many times by bullets flying thick and fast. The next morning, when he appeared for breakfast, the ship's officers were all astounded by the apparent oversight of having left a twelve-year-old foreign boy in danger.⁶⁸

Throughout his early school years in China and the United States, Service was constantly puzzled about his identity. A strong sense of not belonging to either society often bewildered him. While attending first grade in Cleveland at the age of six, he was often teased by others for growing up in China. He was embarrassed to be shown off as coming from China. "Oh, speak some Chinese for us!" or "Let's see you eat some rice."⁶⁹ At high school, his surname was a target of his schoolmates. Because it sounded like the Latin servus (slave), some called him "slave."⁷⁰ Having lived in isolation for so long, he experienced cultural shock at the complexity of school environment. He remarked later that "just having so many other Americans, I think, was hard to take. . . . I just wasn't used to having so many of my kind."⁷¹ From 1924 to 1925, during his father's second leave back to America, Service attended

Berkeley High School as a senior. His school year at Berkeley High was lonesome and twisted. He did not feel at home at all. In China he was completely American; in America, he was regarded as somewhat Chinese. At fifteen, he was laughed at for wearing short pants as he had in China while others were wearing long trousers and dirty cords. He had to try to get his cords dirty enough to be respected. He worked hard to keep it a secret that he was "a strange freak from China."⁷² Without friends or much to do, he studied hard and completed his high school in 1925.

Having graduated from high school at fifteen and being tired of always being the youngest in his classes, Service decided to wait two years before going to college. In 1925 he returned to China with his parents. He got a job as an apprentice draftsman for the YMCA architectural office in Shanghai. He loved the job because he had always been interested in mechanical drawing and also because he worked with a group of Chinese. For fifteen months, from September 1925 to December 1926, he was the only foreigner working with a crew of Chinese draftsmen drawing detailed floor plans.⁷³ It was, perhaps, the first time that he had had independent contact with the Chinese.

Also during this interlude between schools Service got more chances to see and understand China. The mid-twenties was an exciting period in Chinese history. When the Northern Expedition started in 1926, there were strong nationalist feelings and some anti-foreign agitation in China. Service observantly read about the exciting events. In the summer, he took a trip north to Beijing with a family friend. He saw the retreat of the warlords' army as well as sights and conditions of the city including

the peculiar brothels. The family friend was very interested in the conditions of prostitutes in China. Service went to see the brothels with him, but later declared he was not a customer.⁷⁴

In 1927 at age seventeen Service decided to return to the United States for college. En route he traveled through Asia and Europe. He visited India and took a bicycle tour in England. The milestone of his independence, perhaps, was his college years at Oberlin and his departure from the family's strong religious background.

As the son of two ardent Berkeley alumni, Service had always been expected to attend that university. When in 1920 a house guest from Oberlin College urged his mother "to think seriously of sending at least one son to Oberlin," she told him that there was no chance. Service did go to Berkeley for summer pre-freshman classes, but the tedious summer experience convinced him he would be better off in a smaller college. To him, "moving from a small school in China to big place like the Berkeley campus was not easy."⁷⁵ He decided independently that he would go to Oberlin College in Ohio, a college that was well known in China. Many of the American missionaries there were alumni, including two teachers at the Shanghai American School.⁷⁶ Even though his parents told him to make his own decision, his choice of Oberlin over Berkeley was a blow to them.⁷⁷

Service went to Oberlin in 1927, majored in economics, and graduated four years later in 1931. He loved the school and made the best of it. Oberlin was, to him, "a good YMCA atmosphere, friendly and optimistic."⁷⁸ Yet, the missionary zeal of this private religious college did not capture Service very much. Instead, he was

attracted to its values of liberal education. At Oberlin, the religious side of his life "took a drastically downward turn."⁷⁹ He said later that he "ended college with no feelings at all in religion, and a complete inability to understand parents'--particularly father's still strong feeling about it."⁸⁰ In a 1989 interview Service told the author about his attitude toward missionary work: "I was never sympathetic with my parents when I grew up as an adult. . . . I was not sympathetic with missionary work at all. I think missionaries should stay home."⁸¹

At Oberlin, Service distinguished himself in many academic, social, and athletic fields and loved the rewarding college experience there. He later recalled: "I had a very good liberal education, a very broad one, . . . I took a lot of history, a lot of English literature, some political science."⁸² He was president of the Honor Court; treasurer of the Oberlin Peace Society; and reporter for the Oberlin Review. He also worked on the college annual and was in charge of stage handling for the Dramatic Association. However, his greatest success was in athletics: he was the captain of Oberlin cross-country and track teams for three years.⁸³ As a member of the Oberlin cross-country team, he won the Ohio college conference championship in 1929.⁸⁴

Service was well-liked and respected at Oberlin. His popularity and quality of work were reflected in the recommendation of his coach, Daniel Kinsey, who was later elected president of the Cross-Country Coaches in 1949.⁸⁵ Kinsey wrote in 1932:

In regard to . . . qualities of manhood, force of character, and leadership I must say that these are his strongest qualities. Although Jack is outstanding in Oberlin because of his ability in athletics, he is even more outstanding as a

team captain and as an inspiration to his team mates. I have never seen an athlete idolized by his team as more than the c country team idolized Jack Service. . . . he not only has a high idealism but the necessary courage to put into act his idealism. . . . I assure you that I have never met an American athlete whom I would recommend as strongly as I would Jack Service.⁸⁶

In addition to academic, social, and athletic activities, Service started dating, like his parents, in his junior year. The object of his attention was his classmate, Caroline Schultz; both graduated in 1931. After completion of his undergraduate study in economics, he stayed in Oberlin for another year for post graduate work in art history. Meanwhile, he was seriously considering his career.

Service's early years did not follow the normal pattern of other youngsters. He lived in two societies, not belonging to either but emotionally attached to both. During his youth, he began to build a sense of obligation for both societies he loved. Such a commitment was to be shown during his work in China for the American Foreign Service.

ENDNOTES

1. John S. Service, "That Old China Was a Troubled Place," The New York Times, 24 January 1972, 33.
2. John S. Service, "State Department Duty," 28.
3. John S. Service, ed., Golden Inches: The China Memoir of Grace Service (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), xxiii.
4. Service also inherited his father's Chinese family name "Xie," which, combined with the English surname, reflected the family's virtue of gracefulness and serving. For other references about the Service names, see Kahn, The China Hands, 5.
5. *Ibid.*, xxii.
6. John S. Service, interview by the author, Oakland, CA, 14 May 1992 (tape recordings remain with the author).
7. Kahn, "Profiles: Foresight, Nightmare, and Hindsight," 44.
8. The three "John Services" include Robert Service's grandfather who took up land in 1840 in Michigan, Robert's father who settled in California in 1859, and Robert's oldest son who, born in China, became a Foreign Service officer. For details of the family history, see John Service, Pioneer, edited by Fred Field Goodsell with the assistance of John and Julia Service (Waban, Mass.: Privately printed, 1945).
9. Service, "State Department Duty," 1. Also see Asa B. Clarke, Travels in Mexico and California. Comprising a journal of a tour from Brazos Santiago, through central Mexico, by way of Monterey, Chihuahua, the country of the Apache on river Gila, to the mining districts of California (Boston: Wright and Hasty, Printers, 1852).
10. The local newspaper described Roy Service as the campus hero at the University of California. He held Pacific coast records in the half mile and "was one of the greatest athletes the university ever produced," Oakland Tribune, 11 September 1932. See also Service, ed., Golden Inches, xvi.
11. Service, Golden Inches, 1.
12. Service, "State Department Duty," 4. See also, John R. Mott, The Evanglization of the World in This Generation (New York: Student Volunteer Movement, 1904), 36; Fletcher S. Brockman, I Discover the Orient (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1935), 18. A good reference for the history of the YMCA is Shirley S. Garnett's Social

Reformers in Urban China: The Chinese Y.M.C.A., 1895-1926 (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1970).

13. Service, Golden Inches, 3-4.
14. Ibid., 10.
15. Ibid., 25-29. A similar situation occurred to one of the Services' friends. C. Martin Wilbur recorded the fact that after the tragic death of his three-month baby sister in November 1914, his mother became extremely cautious about the quality of the food. See C. Martin Wilbur, China in My Life: A Historian's History (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 5.
16. John K. Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker, eds., The Cambridge History of China, vol. 12, pt. 1 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986): 168.
17. Pat Barr, To China with Love: the Lives and Times of Protestant Missionaries in China, 1860-1900 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1973).
18. Fairbank and Feuerwerker, Cambridge History of China, vol. 12, pt. 1, 171.
19. Service, Golden Inches, 114, 147.
20. John S. Service, "A Conscious Pride in China's Development," New York Times, 25 Jan. 1972, 35.
21. Edward A. Ross, The Changing Chinese (New York: Century, 1911), 303.
22. Service, Golden Inches, 208.
23. Ibid., 55.
24. Ibid., 175, 183.
25. Ibid., 110, 206, 209.
26. Ibid., 237.
27. Ibid., 164.
28. Service, "State Department Duty," 32.
29. Service, Golden Inches, 55, 222.
30. Ibid., 178.
31. Ibid., 65.
32. Ibid., 194.

33. Ibid, 65; and Service, "State Department Duty," 28.
34. Kahn, "Profiles: Foresight, Nightmare, and Hindsight," 43; Service, Golden Inches, 144.
35. Service, "State Department Duty," 166.
36. Ibid., 28.
37. Ibid., 29.
38. Service, Golden Inches, 262.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., 334.
41. Tracy Strong, "Advance Guard for the Y.M.C.A.," New York Times, 5 November 1989.
42. See Fairbank and Feuerwerker, The Cambridge History of China, vol. 12, pt. I, 168; Kahn, The China Hands, 309; and Wilbur, China in My Life.
43. Service, Golden Inches, 107.
44. In old Sichuan as most other parts of China, flies accompanied everyday life of the ordinary people, and most Chinese thought little of them. John Service was greatly impressed with the improvement of public health and sanitation when he returned to China decades afterwards. He commented that "Grace could hardly have imagined the wonders that have been achieved in education about public health and sanitation." Service, Golden Inches, 156; and John Service, "Life in China Is 'Obviously Better,'" The New York Times, 26 January 1972. See also Kahn, "Profiles: Foresight, Nightmare, Hindsight" 61.
45. Service, "State Department Duty," 30.
46. Like his mother, Service cherished the memories of their summer home at the White Deer Summit. When travel to China became possible, White Deer Summit was one of the places he eagerly wanted to return to. It took him the third visit in 1980 to find that nothing remained on the Round Top where their summer house had been so winsomely erected. Today their mountaintop has become a plantation for medical herbs. Service, Golden Inches, 191.
47. Service, "State Department Duty," 32.
48. Wilbur, China in My Life, 7.
49. Service, interview by the author, 1 August 1989.

50. Service, "State Department Duty," 31.
51. Service, Golden Inches, 184.
52. Ibid., 195.
53. Arrogance, suspicion, and lack of confidence in Chinese ability and good faith led American missionaries to keep complete control of Christian institutions in China, which caused great contention between the American missionary establishment and Chinese Christians. For more information on Chinese Christians' demands for respect and self-government, see Varg, Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats, 99, 100-103, 204-211.
54. Service, Golden Inches, 106-07, 293.
55. Service, interview by the author, 14 May 1992.
56. Service, "State Department Duty," 46. John P. Davies, Dragon by the Tail: American, British, Japanese, and Russian Encounters with China and One Another (New York: Norton, 1972), 286.
57. Service, Golden Inches, 167.
58. Service, "State Department Duty," 33.
59. To get an American education was a common practice for Americans born in China. John Davies also had his education in the United States except for one year of college in Beijing. See Davies, Dragon by the Tail, 9; also, Service, "State Department Duty," 28.
60. Service, Golden Inches, 184; "State Department duty," 34, 35.
61. Service, Golden Inches, 174.
62. Service, "State Department Duty," 35.
63. Kahn, The China Hands, 62.
64. Service, Golden Inches, 184.
65. The Shanghai American School had both day students and boarding students. It was located at first in the Hongkou section; later it was moved to the French Concession with fine buildings on the campus. See Wilbur, China in My Life, 6.
66. Service, "State Department Duty," 47.
67. Ibid., 47-49.
68. Service, Golden Inches, 245-47.

69. Service, "State Department Duty," 52-53.

70. Kahn, The China Hands, 5.

71. Service, "State Department Duty," 48.

72. Ibid., 52.

73. Ibid., 56-57, 59; Kahn, "Profiles: Foresight, Nightmare, Hindsight," 46. See also John Service File, Oberlin College Alumni Association, Oberlin, Ohio.

74. Service, "State Department Duty," 60-61.

75. Service, Golden Inches, 234.

76. Service, "State Department Duty," 68. Kahn, The China Hands, 46. Another notable Oberlin College graduate was the Chinese Finance Minister Dr. H. H. Kung who was the president of his class of 1906. He was a frequent visitor to Oberlin College. He lived in the United States after the Civil War. See Cleveland News, 23 June 1950; Service Files, Oberlin Alumni Association, Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio.

77. Service, Golden Inches, 234.

78. Service, "State Department Duty," 69.

79. Ibid., 76. It is also interesting to note that despite Service's apathy toward religion, he was more tolerant than many of his friends. John Davies, a man free of bitterness, had little regard for religion. His comments on missionary work in China reveal his disapproval: these people as members of "righteous and consecrated crusade that strove with love to win China to Christ and, in so doing, did much to shatter a civilization that had endured for millennia." See Kahn, The China hands, 5.

80. Service, "State Department Duty," 76.

81. Service, interview with the author, 1 August 1989.

82. Service, "State Department Duty," 92.

83. Chronicle-Telegram, 20 May 1931, in Service Files, Oberlin Alumni Association, Oberlin College.

84. Service, "State Department Duty," 70; Oakland Tribune, 11 September 1932; and Service Files, Alumni Association, Oberlin College.

85. D.R. Sprankle to Dan Kinsey, Dan Kinsey File, Oberlin Archives, Oberlin College.

86. Daniel Kinsey to Mr. C.R. Alburn, Dan Kinsey File, Oberlin Archives, Oberlin College.

CHAPTER THREE

CHINA SERVICE: THE MAKING OF A DIPLOMAT

We lived in compounds separated, isolated, insulated from China in many ways. And yet . . . all of us, who were B-I-C, Born in China, ended up with a tremendous nostalgia for China, a desire to go back to China, strong feelings of ties to China and particularly the Chinese people.

I always assumed if I was going to do it, I would go to China. This I just sort of took for granted.¹

-----John S. Service

Diplomats are made, not born. However, John S. Service had a combination of natural instinct and refined quality that made him a vigilant Foreign Service officer, surpassing most of his peers in language ability and perseverance and dedication to the service. He entered the Foreign Service at a diplomatic crossroads when a more vigorous and democratized diplomacy was replacing the traditionally frail and autonomous profession.² He was a product of both the old and new lineage: stringently trained but indulgent in outlook. He was a regular Foreign Service officer striving to do what he thought was the best for his home and host countries. Vicious Japanese aggression allied China and the United States against their common enemy. His connection with China facilitated both insightful views and interventionist efforts that would put him in the spotlight of controversy.

Service's road to a Foreign Service profession was natural and smooth. He had always taken it for granted that he would return to China after college. He passed the Foreign Service entrance exam with relative ease in 1932. His first post in the remote consulate of Kunming in 1933-1935 trained him to be a "good bureaucrat," which would become an asset for his later administrative career in the Foreign Service. His two-year language study in Beijing from 1936 to 1937 not only improved his Chinese skill, it was also an eye opener for him to a broader world. There, through windows of ancient buildings and temples, he could look into China's history and culture; through friends he expanded his contacts into circles of eminent scholars and active journalists. There he read, for the first time, extensively about China and heard, with great fascination, about the Chinese Communists. It was in Beijing that he became further attached to China: sympathetically following student anti-government demonstrations and anxiously watched the "little" Japanese marching into the city with pitiless looks and gigantic horses. His work in the Shanghai consulate in 1938-1941 was remarkable: he passed the optional third year Chinese exam that many "China hands" fearfully skipped and expanded his experience in the various operations of the consulate. Despite compliments from his supervisor, he was still not content. He sought to do political reporting, for nothing else could give him "much feel on what [was] going on in a country, or the likely trend."³ His diplomatic career blossomed while working in China's wartime capital Chongqing in 1941-1945, near his birthplace. He was like a fish letting into the water, handling his work with ease and great efficiency. It was only natural that his intimate knowledge of and great

interest in China would put him on the center stage of wartime Sino-American relations.

Choosing the Foreign Service

Throughout his college years at Oberlin, Service had searched without much success for a major and a career. He had hoped to become an engineer, but disappointing experience with math courses and the math teacher soon discouraged him. He chose economics as a major but did not limit himself to it. He had hoped to look into diplomatic affairs but his impulse pointed more toward teaching. His interest in art history kept him at Oberlin for another year in graduate school. But the gloomy economy and the termination of financial support from the YMCA eradicated any hope of pursuing graduate education and a teaching career. He decided to get a job and start a family. It was imbedded in him that he would somehow work in China. He tried but failed in his junior year to get a position with the Standard Oil Company. He did not know then that instead of selling oil for Chinese lamps, he would end up with a career in the Foreign Service that would link his life with the Chinese scene.

The idea of working for the Foreign Service seemed both logical and practical for Service. He had long been interested in diplomatic work. While in Chongqing as a young lad, he had been exposed to the Foreign Service through friendly contacts with some of the consuls there. This interest was once again arrived by his childhood friends. In the summer of 1932 during a family visit to Chicago with old friends from

Chongqing, he enviously learned that his boyhood friend, John Davies, had just passed the Foreign Service exam. With the encouragement of friends, Service resolved to face the same challenge, "why not? If John Davies could pass the examination, why couldn't I?"⁴ But soon his enthusiasm was dampened by a dash of cold water. In California, his friend from China, Harrison Arnolds, told him that he had failed the same test but was enthusiastically preparing for a second try. Arnolds told Service that he could not possibly pass it the first time but that it could be regarded as a good warm-up experience. After a few days of pondering, Service finally made his decision. On the way to Berkeley with his parents, he found himself racing the clock when he learned that one had to apply for the Foreign Service exam six weeks ahead of time and that he had only one night before the deadline. He anxiously rushed to the Western Union office and sent his application.⁵

Service's decision to apply to the Foreign Service caught his father by surprise, and he was not very happy about it. Bob Service had taken it for granted that his oldest son would work, like himself, for the YMCA, to which he had made a lifetime commitment. The older Service had never held a high opinion of the Foreign Service corps. Like most missionaries of his time, he looked scornfully at the diplomats with their "devil-may-care" worldly reputations. This deep-seated distrust of the Foreign Service was indeed widespread, despite the passage of the 1924 Rogers Act formalizing the Foreign Service as a career based on entry by examination and promotion by merit.⁶ However young Service's enthusiasm overcame his father's reluctance, and Robert finally told his son that it was a career and he should make a

commitment to it.⁷

Service led a busy life in the following months, preparing for the Foreign Service entrance exam. In July he became a drop-in graduate student at Berkeley where his father had been a campus star thirty years before. He registered for a few courses related to the exam and buried himself in the library most of the time. Also in September, without much preparation, he took part in the regional marathon contest with 25,000 other participants and won with a new record. Meanwhile he worked part-time waiting on tables and operating the switch board. As the local Oakland Tribune reported, Service had to hurry back to Berkeley immediately after the marathon in Oakland, for he was “waiting table in a fraternity house there, and had to be at work for the noon meal. After that he had to rush to the Berkeley Women's City Club, where he was part-time operator on the switch board.”⁸ He worked hard but was prepared for the worst. He told reporters who surrounded him after the marathon that he would try again, should he fail the Foreign Service exams.

In late September Service took the extensive exam in San Francisco and successfully passed it.⁹ The three-day written exams on six subjects were exhausting with two subjects each day and three hours for each subject. He got little sleep. In December he received the result, 79 percent. This fairly good score qualified him to take part in the second round oral exam in Washington D.C., where he was examined by high ranking officials from the State Department with "all sorts of weird questions" concerning diplomatic and political affairs.¹⁰ He took the oral and the physical exam on the same day. He was excited when the Board of Examiners informed him that he

had "passed the recent Foreign Service entrance examination with a rating of 83.00 per cent" and that his name had been "placed on the list of those eligible for appointment as Foreign Service officers."¹¹ He credited the broad liberal education he had received, particularly at Oberlin, for both his choice of the Foreign Service and the exemplary exam results that ensured him a diplomatic career.

Having passed the Foreign Service exam, the next question was what to do. Service could not anticipate an immediate assignment because of the dreary prospects of the economy. Rumors of retrenchment in the State Department and advice from old "China hands" convinced him that his best chance was to sail to China at his own expense and await appointment there.¹²

Kunming: Starting off as a Good Bureaucrat

At age twenty-four, in April 1933, Service was back in China with a clear goal and elevated anticipation. In Shanghai, while working as a clerk for the American Oriental Bank for less than \$100 a month, he applied for a position of clerkship at the American consul-general there and constantly checked for a vacancy. The State Department looked favorably on the applicant whose transportation abroad it would not have to pay, and whose intimate knowledge about China could be readily employed. Not long afterwards Service was offered a job as a clerk in Kunming, Yunnan province, a position declined by another officer. It carried an annual salary of \$1,800.

Kunming, known to Chinese as the "Spring City," was a landmark in Service's

life. It was his first post for the Foreign Service; it was also the place of his marriage with Caroline Schulz. At the time it was regarded by Americans in China as no-men's land and "the end of everything."¹³ It was a microcosm of the 1930s China at large: controlled by regional warlords and strongly influenced by foreign powers. Because of its distance from Shanghai or Guangzhou (Canton), America had established a consulate there to provide protection for the nearly a hundred Americans, mostly missionaries, and to keep an eye on the French who then had much control of the province. Service gladly took the job, despite opposition from his fiancée, to whom he had become engaged in January 1933. Other family members also considered moving to "backwoods" Yunnan as a foolish step. Only later would his wife, Caroline, concede that his was a smart decision, for the bank where he had worked was soon sunk in the Great Depression.¹⁴

America's Yunnan Consulate in 1933 was a two-man post. Soon after Service's arrival, John Davies, the vice consul, was transferred to India, leaving Service with senior vice consul Charles Reed as his chief. Service was not much impressed by his boss, especially the way Reed handled his Chinese interpreters. Reed was not atypical among Foreign Service officers of the time who had little knowledge of Chinese and were not keen on learning about China. He would easily lose his patience with interpreters who translated headline news for him. Service was particularly reserved about the political reporting, based on pure gossip and hearsay, mostly from the British Consulate.

As a junior officer, Service's duty was to do the interminable routine work from

which he learned to be a "good bureaucrat."¹⁵ He did almost everything from maintaining files to typing letters. He learned the "nitty-gritty" of the Foreign Service through the avenue of a clerkship in one of the most isolated and warlord-ridden provinces.¹⁶ He recalled in 1977 that although he "wasn't getting any very useful training in political reporting, [he] was learning to be a bureaucrat . . . the business of being a clerk and learning from the ground up how things are actually done--filing, coding a telegram, all the routine operations--was something that always stood me in good stead."¹⁷ Service was useful for the consulate and, particularly, for Reed because of his language skills and his effective work. His steady and solid work made favorable impressions on both his immediate superior and policy makers in Washington. When his report on the general conditions of Yunnan reached Washington, it received praise. He was soon promoted to the position of non-career vice counsel on 7 July 1934.¹⁸

In addition to work, Service was anticipating his marriage to Caroline Schulz. He wrote to his future mother-in-law that "getting married seems to occupy most of my thoughts these days."¹⁹ Marrying someone half way around the world was not easy. A non-career officer was not eligible to leave his post. Service wrote to Mrs. Schulz: "As you mention, our situation is a most amusing, if it weren't so difficult and unusual one. She is coming to meet me half way around the world, and I have the wedding to arrange for."²⁰ His boss provided much needed help. Service happily informed his family that "Mr. Reed, my officer, has changed a good deal as we have gotten to know each other better and is giving me leave to meet her, which he earlier

would not do, and has suggested that we live here at the consulate for a while till Caroline knows what she wants to do."²¹ On September 29 after a long journey starting off in San Francisco, Caroline and her mother-in-law landed in Shanghai. After a short delay caused by illness, Caroline journeyed to Haiphong, French Indochina, where Service was awaiting her boat.²² As planned, Jack and Caroline immediately had a French civil wedding performed by the French authorities in Indochina. Four days later the Services had their second wedding, American style, in Kunming. It was a modest religious ceremony presided over by a visiting American minister and witnessed by the American consul. There was no family, no best friends. Service wrote to his family before the wedding that "while John Davies, an old boyhood friend, was here, I might have had a best man. But now there is no one whom I would be anxious to have."²³ Despite the simplicity, their wedding and activities in China were carried by the Oberlin Alumni Magazine like a fairy tale.²⁴

For the young Services, life in Kunming was rather inconvenient and sometimes difficult. To foreigners Kunming was a remote, small, and detached society. Its six thousand feet elevation, and lack of modern facilities were not conducive to business and cultural activities. It was not inviting even to the most dutiful American Protestant missionaries. A year after their marriage, the young couple moved out of the consulate and rented a semi-foreign and semi-Chinese house that belonged to a British missionary. They had a limited life within closed circles. Their main contacts were with British, French, and American missionaries. The consulate did not have much business with the local Chinese government or with the

representative of the central government that had been extending its influence into the remote province since 1927. It functioned basically as a guard or counseling office for the handful of missionaries who were struggling in their effort to convert the native people. In one case, as Service later recalled, after more than a decade's effort, a dedicated missionary died in isolation without a friend or a single convert. Service later commented that "about the only thing to do in Kunming was to go to dinner parties with the same people. . . . It was a foreign life floating on the surface of China."²⁵ For Caroline, despite the delightful moments of marriage and intimate friendship with people in the foreign community, life in Kunming was not all enjoyable, and tough for someone who was always well-sheltered by her family. She suffered from poor health and had to have several operations. In Shanghai she had had an appendectomy; in Kunming, she suffered from breast abscesses and underwent numerous operations.²⁶

To Service, one novel experience in Kunming was hearing the tale of the Communists dashing for the Jinsha River in their Long March toward the northwest. Although the State Department had established an early file on Chinese communism during the May Fourth Movement, American observers were generally confused about the nature of the so-called Communist rebels in China's countryside around 1930. In Kunming Service did not anticipate that those Communists would play such a significant role in his later diplomatic career.

When Service was performing his bureaucratic duties in Kunming, Chiang's troops were chasing Mao's Long March columns nearby. In mid-1935 when the Long

March skirted Kunming, the foreign community was startled by assorted rumors from outside. The subject of Communists became the center of discussion among customs, post office, and missionary families. The government decided that women and children had to be removed temporarily to French Indochina. Service's job was to ensure a smooth evacuation. Foreigners were as paranoid as some of the local lords. Despite the anxiety, the Red Army passed by the walls of Kunming like ghosts, without leaving a trace. When foreigners gathered in their local clubs, the talk became pure speculation and hearsay, for nobody had seen a single Communist. Service had no idea what the Communists were like, but the impression he received was favorable. To Service, the Communists were "sort of Robin Hood" legends. "It was very impressive," he remarked, "their treatment of the people. It made a very real impression;" he continued:

Villages very close to Kunming were told the day before hand [to] "prepare so much rice. So many people are going to be here tomorrow. You will be paid." The remarkable thing was that everything worked out just as the scouts had said. So many people did come the next day, rice was prepared, and they were paid.

It made a tremendous impression because people were not used to being paid for anything that was provided to soldiers. This was not in the papers. It was what you heard from talking to the people.²⁷

Leaving behind a good memory among the people was like sowing the seeds for a future harvest. And that was all the Communists could expect at this moment of flight. Time was on their side, however, for at a later moment a single spark could start a prairie fire. But in 1935, the young diplomat, like most others, chose not to

take the Communists seriously for they were, after all, a small bunch of losers, beaten and chased by government forces.

Yunnan years were eventful for the Services, filled with both joy and sorrow. The biggest excitement came on 3 July 1935 with the arrival of their first baby, Virginia, named after Service's oldest sister who had died in infancy during the family's journey to Chengdu decades earlier.²⁸ Their delight was soon overshadowed by the sorrowful news that his father was dying in Shanghai. In spite of his wife's bad health, Service flew to Shanghai by way of Chongqing on a military plane. He arrived in time and worked around the clock with his mother and two brothers to save his father. But Bob Service's health was irreversible; he suffered cirrhosis of the liver, which proved fatal. His spirits were also shattered by the cruel blow that the YMCA had ended his employment after an adult lifetime. On 29 September 1935 Bob Service passed away. His death came only days before the good news arrived that he was to be returned to active service in the YMCA and that his oldest son would soon receive his long-awaited commission from the Foreign Service.²⁹

On 3 October 1935 Service received his commission as non-classified Foreign Service officer and his vice consul position changed to career status. He would be paid \$2,500 plus a \$265 cost of living allowance.³⁰ At the same time, Service was assigned to Beijing for language study. Without delay he rushed back to Kunming to get his newborn baby and sick wife, who was struggling for recovery from numerous operations, and together they set off for his new post.

Beijing: New Horizons

The Services arrived in Beijing in early December 1935, and found life there much more pleasant than in Kunming. For foreigners, Beijing was inviting and glamorous, infused with conveniences and privileges.³¹ The Services enjoyed it all. "It was a wonderful place," John Service observed, "the life and the homes, the old Chinese homes that people were able to rent or buy, attracted people who simply wanted a lovely place to live."³² To Caroline Service, "life there was remarkably pleasant. . . . there were the old shops to go to, full of beautiful things. We had rickshaws. The camels came into Peking. It was like an Arabian Night's dream and we all loved it. There were places to go and eat. . . . It was a kind of a lotus-eater's land."³³ The assured paradise for foreigners was the resort in the Western Hills, about fifteen miles outside the city, where scattered foreign bungalows loomed in the woods, waiting for their owners to escape from the noise of the busy streets and heat of the burning summer sun. Elizabeth (Betty) Spencer offered the most incisive portrait of this paradise:

Going to a dinner party in Peking is an experience itself. . . . You feel so elegant and secure seated in your rickshaw, wrapped up in fur coats . . . [with] your legs and feet in blankets -- just like sleigh riding. I always . . . feel like a Russian princess, especially when the little silver bells of the rickshaw sound clear in these cold, moonlit nights. . . . The beggars and women with babies at their breasts, old men dragging on crutches and little girls in pigtailed braided with bright red string. . . . silence interrupted only by the soft pat pat of the coolies' feet, so well coordinated and swift . . . that one is not conscious of a human being between the shafts.³⁴

It was, perhaps, this appealing environment that made the old city, hundreds of

miles away from China's new capital of Nanjing, the preferred location for America's embassy. Ambassador Nelson Johnson was an old "China hand" with a warm personality, cool judgment, and tremendous experience. He had been stationed in Beijing, Hankou (Hankow), and other places and had witnessed worldshaking changes in China since his first arrival in Beijing in 1907.³⁵ A self-claimed Daoist (Taoist), he spoke Chinese and knew how to deal with Chinese with skill and respect. His relaxed work style and easygoing personality made the embassy an informal and comfortable place to work and socialize.

Americans in Beijing lived in various communities. They were divided into artist, diplomatic, missionary, academic, and military groups. American officials had two legation quarters--the diplomatic compound where the ambassador's residence and the chancery were located, and the marine guard compound for military officers. Most other officers with lesser rank would live in a third place called San Guan Miao (San Kuan Miao) with numerous residential quarters. As a language student not qualified to live in any of those places, Service was glad to rent a traditional Chinese house, a big and elegant courtyard compound near the Forbidden City. His social activities were largely limited in the embassy which was "very informal." Caroline explained, "Everybody knew everybody else well. We all lived close together," and there were plenty of dinners to attend, including the ambassador's.³⁶ When the Service's first son, Bob, was born, Mrs. Johnson loaned her baby carriage to them. Caroline was apparently pleased that they were treated like family. Despite the busy social life, Service's focus was on language studies. When other youthful diplomats

trotted around the legation quarters on horseback, he jogged around.³⁷

As a language attaché, Service's main task was to study Chinese, concentrating on official correspondence, newspaper, and interpreting skills for official interviews. He spent his first months at the China Union Language School that attracted mostly missionaries and some scholars and business people. Starting off was not easy, and he had serious problems with both the oral and written language. He could speak some Chinese, but his Sichuan accent and local dialect "horrified" the teachers who insisted that he forget everything and start completely anew. His written language skill was even worse. He had never learned to read or write Chinese except some self-taught Chinese numbers during his boarding school days in Shanghai. Still, he enjoyed his assignment in Beijing, "an idyllic place to be with ostensibly no responsibility except to study." But he did not appreciate the "time-wasting" teaching system of spending "practically all day with a teacher across the table working on the text."³⁸ However he was much appreciative when, during his six months stay in the Western Hills, his teacher offered to take buses every day to give him lessons there.³⁹ With steady work, his language study proceeded successfully.

Beijing was an ideal place for cultural and academic inquiries, and Service tried to explore both. He was a frequent visitor to the prestigious Peking University, and was acquainted with Dr. Hu Shih. Service was a regular member of a study group that included Dr. Hu Shih and Dr. Chiang Mon-lin, later president of the University.⁴⁰ During his second year in Beijing, Service became interested in Chinese thought and was introduced to Chinese philosophy by Hu Shih. He attended Hu's lectures on

Chinese philosophy for a year and was captivated. "It was very interesting," he proclaimed, "Philosophy is not my subject. . . . But, the lectures were interesting."⁴¹ His interest in China increased as his knowledge expanded. He also acquired a Chinese name, "Weisi," meaning "great thought." With the inherited last name Xie (Hsieh) (means thanks), his Chinese name could not have been more authentic. His appreciation later became obvious when he retired to the hills of Berkeley and put up a sign with the Chinese name he had retained from his Beijing days.⁴²

Service also learned about China from books, newspapers, and other sources. In addition to the required readings in Chinese geography and foreign rights, he sought to further understand China, its land and people. One of the books that imparted fundamental knowledge was Richard H. Tawney's account on Land and Labor in China (Octagon Books, 1932, 1964). "It was the first, analytical, economic-sociological approach to China that I had seen."⁴³ He recalled, "I read very extensively and as my interests were scholarly rather than social I found most my friends among the large groups of newspaper correspondents, professors, students, and researchers who were either residing or continually passing through Peiping."⁴⁴ As the old Chinese saying goes: "near vermilion one gets stained pink; close to ink, one gets stained black." Keen association with scholarly books and broad contacts with perceptive people affected Service's conception of China.

It was in Beijing that Service first came to know a number of people who would have immediate impact on him or would later play a significant role in his life and career. He met with Colonel Joseph Stilwell, the military attaché at the embassy,

and frequently visited Stilwell's assistant, Major David D. Barrett, whose "Pekinese indeed could diminish a foreigner's foreignness."⁴⁵ He became acquainted with numerous China watchers and reporters such as Owen Lattimore, who would later become Chiang Kai-shek's advisor; Haldore Hansen of the Associated Press, Frank Oliver of Reuters, Arch Steele of the New York Herald Tribune, and Frank Smothers of the Chicago Daily News. The person who had the most lasting influence on Service was Edgar Snow, a reporter for the Saturday Evening Post.

Service and Snow met in Beijing at a critical moment in Chinese history during the December Ninth student movement. "It is easy to remember when I first met Ed," Service recalled, "It was in Peking on 9 December, 1935."⁴⁶ Upon his arrival in Beijing, Service was drawn into the sensational student demonstrations led by the underground Communists in the Beijing Student Union and provoked by increasing Japanese aggression and the government's non-resistance. After seizing Manchuria on 18 September 1931, Japan continued to encroach on China proper to fulfill its ambition in Asia. Neither the Chinese strategy of nonmilitary resistance, nor the shattered collective security system of the League of Nations, nor the U.S.'s adherence to the Open Door and the Stimson Doctrine of "non-recognition" could stop the momentum of Japanese militancy. In late 1935, the Japanese set up a puppet "North China Five-Province Anti-Communist Autonomy Movement" and Beijing was in imminent danger of Japanese occupation. To patriotic Chinese and liberal Americans in Beijing, the end of 1935 was "the absolute nadir and living death in China."⁴⁷

While Chiang and the government was "trading space for time," patriotic students ran out of forbearance.⁴⁸ Enraged by Japanese aggression and government impotence, in the morning of 9 December around 6,000 students and faculty members from major Beijing universities marched to the streets.⁴⁹ They shouted "Down with Japanese imperialism," "End the Civil War," "Unity for resistance," and clashed with the police. Service dashed into the streets to watch "the students' spunky effort" against the government. When most of the foreign press was chiefly interested in foreign interests in China and showed little concern with what was going on inside China, Snow was a rare exception, one who was also genuinely concerned about the destiny of the ordinary Chinese. Among the handful of foreign journalists it was not hard for Service to pick out Snow who mingled with the student crowds and took pictures from the sidelines.⁵⁰ One of the student organizers from Yanjing University, Chen Han-po, recalled the event and the Snow's involvement:

Finally the day we had been anxiously anticipating arrived. On December 8 . . . Huang Hua brought us the word for action: a demonstration to be held the next morning. We then informed the Snows of our plans, including the slogans we intended to use, the route of the procession and the site for gathering. On December 9, students from Yanjing and other universities took to the streets to protest the government's capitulation to the Japanese invader's strategy of taking Chinese territory. Snow and his wife joined the marching students.⁵¹

The December Ninth demonstration sparked an anti-Japanese and anti-government firestorm throughout China. On 16 December several thousand students took on the streets of Beijing again with an even bigger demonstration. It was not only supported by leading scholars and school officials, it also attracted the attention

of most foreign correspondents in Beijing. The president of Yanjing University, Dr. J. L. Stuart, gave moral support to the student movement. Peking University president Chiang Mon-lin pointed out that the anti-Japanese sentiment would not recede if Japan continued its aggression.⁵² Japanese authorities and news media were alarmed. Japanese Major-General Kenji Doihara believed that both the Chinese Nationalist government and the Chinese Communists were behind the students' movement. The Japanese Shanghai Nippo blamed American influence for the fanatical student demonstrations.⁵³

Though never an intimate friend, Edgar Snow had a profound impact on Service with his strong sense of humanity and his ground-breaking report on the Chinese Communists. After being in Beijing for a while, Service began actively to involve himself in broader issues and contacts. As a member of the intimate small discussion group--the China watchers--with such foreign journalists as Snow and Chinese scholars as Dr. Hu Shih, Service greatly deepened his understanding of China's problems. The scholarly presentation of research papers and heated debates over world affairs always captivated Service. He remembered most explicitly, however, that one evening when the group met at his house everybody was astounded at the unexpected appearance of Edgar Snow, who had been mysteriously out of town for months and was reportedly "executed by the Reds." Service listened with fascination to Snow's report on how, breaking through the Guomindang blockade, he had gone to the Communist base in Yanan and interviewed Mao Zedong and other CCP leaders. What he brought back was news of the Communist push for a United

Front against Japan. Like many others, Service was excited by the possibility of an end to the military conflicts between the Nationalists and Communists.⁵⁴

From Snow, Service first learned about the Communists and their stand for a United Front against Japanese aggression. He also learned that Yanan was a whole new world where the Communists appeared to be honest, sincere, and forthright.⁵⁵ "It was quite an evening," Service sighed, "the first impact on this group of 'China watchers' was stunning. Suddenly there was a new factor, of uncertain but potentially vital significance in the China equation."⁵⁶

In addition to the fresh and arousing information about the Communists, Snow's strong sense of humanity and his refusal to be satisfied with detached neutrality filtered through to Service and remained in him for a long time to come. "It was not ideas nor ideology that absorbed him, nor the great affairs of international encounters and diplomacy," Service observed; "the force that filled him was a warm, intense, and almost passionate sense of humanity." Service thoroughly embraced Snow's philosophy that "each of us is a piece of history that affects our lives."⁵⁷ He greatly esteemed the style and substance of Snow's field reporting that combined heart with head:

The best field reporting of this type is dependent, however, on more than merely an intellectual aptitude. It needs, for true success, some human qualities of empathy and the ability to see into the problems and aspirations of a foreign people. It was these qualities, as well as his reputation for honesty, factual reporting, that commended Ed Snow to the Chinese leaders, that led to their confidence and friendship. . . . It was these qualities, too, that gave Ed's reporting on China its pre-eminent greatness. This is not to suggest that Ed reported more with his heart than his head. . . . He called the shots when he saw them, with courage and without compromise of integrity. His reports have

stood the test of time to an astonishing degree. His foresights based on them have become history. They were valid, in large degree, because they did combine heart and head. It was his misfortune (and of a generation of Americans involved in China) that China became an emotional and political issue in America to the extent that such reporting was not acceptable.⁵⁸

Service's later political reporting would echo the same sense of obligation and farsightedness.

One could not be in Beijing in 1936-37 without developing an awareness of the political problems between the CCP and GMD in the midst of Sino-Japanese crises. And Service followed the development of both trends. The startling Xian Incident of 12-25 December 1936 became a fuse that touched off an outburst of patriotism in China and an overall Sino-Japanese War.⁵⁹

By late 1936, after subduing the local militarists and crushing the Communists in the fifth extermination campaign, Chiang stood head and shoulders above all others in China. The government's preparation for military defense received an additional boost when on his fiftieth birthday (31 October 1936), the whole nation donated money to buy warplanes. The capital city Nanjing alone, for example, donated 100 airplanes.⁶⁰ Chiang craved to root out the "Communist bandits" who had survived their Long March and set a base in Shaanxi. Young Marshal Zhang Xueliang's Northeastern Army along with General Yang Hucheng's Seventeenth Route Army were sent to suppress them. Instead of fighting the Communists, however, Zhang and Yang were won over by their patriotic appeals. At the time CCP leaders, influenced by Soviet Union's worries about Japan's ambitions on the Russian Far East, had already altered their strategy from "anti-Chiang and resist Japan" to "forcing Chiang

to resist Japan.” Meanwhile, with triumphant confidence Chiang threw all caution to the winds when he accepted Zhang’s invitation to inspect the Northeastern Army in Xian. Caught by surprise, on the morning of 12 December, Chiang was detained by the two generals.

The days that followed were a period of restrained panic in the government, blind anxiety among the populace, and jubilant mediation by the Communists. Upon retaining Chiang, Zhang and Yang informed the government in Nanjing that Chiang was retained safely for introspection and that his fate would be decided upon acceptance of their “eight demands:” (1) reform the Nanjing government to accept all parties to salvage China; (2) end all civil wars; (3) immediately release patriotic leaders in Shanghai; (4) release all political prisoners in the country; (5) allow people's patriotic movements; (6) guarantee people's political freedom for organizations and gatherings; (7) follow Dr. Sun's behest; and (8) immediately hold a national conference for patriotic resistance to Japan. The Communists watched the event attentively and favored a peaceful solution. Zhou Enlai offered mediation and was invited by Zhang and Yang to Xian to help resolve the crisis. Chiang was at first unyielding to the “eight demands” and to Zhou’s suggestion of a second GMD-CCP United Front.⁶¹ After anguished negotiations the ice began to crack, especially when Zhou hinted that Chiang’s eldest son could be brought back from Russia--according to unconfirmed accounts. Chiang finally promised verbally to end the anti-Communist civil war and form a United Front to resist Japanese aggression.⁶² Tragedy was averted, and the nation celebrated with high spirit and great cheers when Chiang was

released on 25 December.⁶³

Service tried to follow the Xian episode carefully. But Beijing was distant from Xian, and the embassy was always insulated from Chinese political events. Fiddling with his shortwave radio during the trying event, he suddenly heard an English voice calling from Xian. The announcer was American author Agnes Smedley. News of the peaceful resolution was an exciting breakthrough. Service rushed to the embassy and staggered everybody with his findings.⁶⁴ Service could feel the erupting sensation among the Chinese when he saw people like Dr. Chiang Mon-lin of Peking University weep upon hearing the news.⁶⁵

The Xian Incident boosted Chiang's popularity and energized China's efforts to resist Japan. Service and other Americans in Beijing shared the excitement and gained new confidence on China's ability to fend-off Japanese aggression. In the months following the settlement of the incident, China achieved greater unity under the central government and stiffened its opposition to Japan's aggression, despite differences and difficulties between the GMD and CCP. Entering 1937, the liberal Dao Gong Bao's [Ta-Kung Pao] New Year's Day editorial revealed the tone of optimism for a United Front. "From today," it proclaimed, "China will have only the United Front, and never again will there be internal hostility."⁶⁶ On 5 January, General Yang Huchen and seven other high ranking officials further petitioned the central government to end any attempts for a civil war while facing the national crisis of foreign invasion.⁶⁷

The prospect of unity and resistance heartened many local commanders and

aroused their patriotic fever. General Song Zheyuan, for example, instructed his 29th Route Army not to participate in civil wars, and fight to the death to defend China's sovereignty, territory, and people.⁶⁸ On 10 February the CCP sent a telegram to the Third Plenary Session of the Guomindang Central Executive Committee to formalize its policy of "uniting with Chiang to resist Japan." It made five requests for the GMD to stop the civil war, extend freedom, release political prisoners, make genuine preparation for armed resistance, and improve people's standard of living. To show its good faith for unity, the CCP offered the GMD four pledges: to (1) end armed insurrection directed at overthrowing the government; (2) replace the "Soviet government" with "the government of special regions of the Republic of China;" (3) adopt a system of democratic election in the special region; (4) discontinue the CCP's policy of land confiscation and carry out the guiding principle of the United Front.⁶⁹ Despite deep suspicion, Chiang could not flatly reject the CCP's proposals since "they contain no divergent views from those of the central government."⁷⁰ Agreement in principle was one thing, working out an acceptable accord was another. Difficult negotiations continued for several months over the legality and proper status of the CCP army, the Communist border areas, and all minority parties in the United Front.⁷¹

If the Xian Incident induced a United Front, the Japanese attack at the Lugou Qiao outside Beijing gave it a final push. The prospect of an increasing national unity and stability in China led the Japanese to embark upon more aggressive actions even after the more moderate Hayashi cabinet replaced the Hirota government in early 1937. The Japanese ambition over China and their anxiety about the United Front

was displayed in the military exercises conducted near Beijing after June 1937. On 7 July the Japanese finally seized an opportunity when a soldier was allegedly missing. They demanded a search and the withdrawal of Chinese troops in the town of Wanping. General Song Zheyuan's defending forces refused and returned fire when the Japanese army attacked the Lugou Qiao outside Wanping. The Japanese military had expected Chiang's government to back down once again, but the gunshots over the Lugou Bridge started a long and bloody War of Resistance, one that would last eight years and cost nearly thirty million Chinese lives. When Chiang declared all-out war on Japan, China was unified than ever before. Two months later on 22 September, putting aside their differences and antagonisms, the GMD and CCP formally declared the formation of a second United Front.⁷²

The United Front and China's all-out War of Resistance did little to alter Japan's designs on China. It did, however, arouse enthusiasm and change the views of those who had not been able to see any light of "resistance from [China's] immense vegetable mass."⁷³ The Commander of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, was apparently impressed with China's progress. He reported that "China is gradually going ahead. There has been a great wave of nationalist feeling aroused due to Japan's doings. The Nanking government is gradually extending its control over such areas as Canton, Szechuen, and Shantung. . . . The Chinese Army is being drilled incessantly. The budget is balanced!"⁷⁴ Like Ambassador Johnson and many others who "became increasingly optimistic about China's position," Service was hopeful that the liberalized Guomintang, with the cooperation of the Communists, would lead

China out of despair⁷⁵ He explained: "during this period the situation in China was hopeful. China was much more unified than ever before and was amazing herself and her friends with her success in fighting off or at least delaying the Japanese."⁷⁶

The United States watched developments in China and kept a respectful distance from the Sino-Japanese crisis. Isolationist sentiment was strong at home. It opposed any risks of embroilment in China or anywhere abroad.⁷⁷ America's policy in this crisis was clear: to stay completely neutral.⁷⁸ Prior to the final crisis, the State Department had kept a watchful eye on the escalating Sino-Japanese conflict but politely rejected China's appeal for U.S. mediation based on the Nine Power Treaty of 1921.⁷⁹ However, after the outbreak of hostilities in the Beijing-Tianjin area, upon constant Chinese request and persuasive British insistence, the U.S. did make diplomatic efforts to help both sides reach a settlement. But when the U.S. ambassador to Japan, Joseph Clark Grew was informed by the Japanese Foreign Minister that Japan would not withdraw until China agreed to end anti-Japanese activity in China, this mediation effort was aborted.⁸⁰ America's aloofness toward the Sino-Japanese crisis was a practical reaction. Washington policy makers were attempting to steer a middle course between appeasing domestic noninvolvement sentiment and professing friendship to both China and Japan. Despite apparent sympathy toward China, the Roosevelt government made clear that U.S. interest in China was not worth risking a conflict with Japan. This aloof American position and its continued trade with Japan drew considerable criticism. The reputable Australian journalist W.H. Donald, who had been in China since the early Republican

Revolution, warned the United States against profiting from Japan's aggression in China:

The Japanese are doing their best to lure financiers to support them in the exploitation of China. They promise all kinds of profits. . . . If American financiers are wise they will consider the whole proposition very carefully before they allow themselves to be intrigued into an effort to "get rich quick" with the aid of Japanese and at the expense of the Chinese. . . . if the democratic powers refuse to give China any aid, they will commit the greatest crime in history if they, in any way, succor or give tangible support to the Japanese.⁸¹

In sharp contrast to official U.S. neutrality, Service was concerned about developments in China. When the fight started, he was in the hospital at the Peking Union Medical College with scarlet fever. Several miles away, in his hospital bed, he could clearly hear the shots in the night and continued heavy fighting during the day. When the Japanese occupied Beijing, Americans were instructed by the embassy to move into the legation quarters, but Service was unable to go because of illness. Once back in his house and home alone, Service could not rest easy. He tried to get out of the house to find information in the city, but was repeatedly forced back by Japanese rifle shots.⁸² Like many Chinese language students and scholars, Service's sympathy was with China. He later revealed his position: "I was critical of the Neutrality Act. . . . My own views, privately expressed to my colleagues and friends, were in support of stronger aid to China and in opposition to the sale of ore and scrap iron to the Japanese."⁸³ In late December, after over two years study, he successfully passed the last week-long exam which featured such questions as "Trace the relations between China and Japan over the last hundred years. Do not be brief." Service's next

assignment would be in Shanghai.⁸⁴

Shanghai: Apprenticeship

The Shanghai appointment was initially disappointing to Service. Captivated by Chinese affairs and fond of the Chinese language, he desired a position in a smaller post where he would get a chance to use his knowledge and language skills for political reporting. Assignment to the Shanghai Consulate, the largest American government overseas undertaking, seemed to diminish any such opportunity. Moreover, misfortune always seemed to come in pairs. He knew well that he would not have much opportunity to speak the Mandarin he had practiced so hard for two years, for Shanghai was not a Mandarin-speaking area. In addition, the “slack” style of the consulate’s executive officer in charge of routine office work deepened Service’s negative impression of a big post. As a newcomer, he was not met at the boat upon his arrival in Shanghai in January 1938; and, a married man, he was assigned a place in the bachelors’ quarters. The executive officer was an old treaty port type who “was very anti-Chinese language service,” apparently believing that “most China people became effete snobs or went native.”⁸⁵ And it was a popular perception among Americans and other Westerners in Shanghai that it was weird to have close contact with the Chinese people or their language. Caroline Service explained: “In fact, people would have thought you were very odd if you’d gone what they called ‘going native,’ in other words, living like Chinese or seeing more Chinese!”⁸⁶ Therefore, this executive officer gave orders to Service that he was not

allowed to have any access to the Chinese correspondence coming to the office.

Despite this initial discouragement, Service worked to make the best of the difficult situation, and grew increasingly fond of the consulate job. He later remarked that his posting to Shanghai "turned out to be a very interesting, and in many ways, a very valuable assignment."⁸⁷ Unable to be involved in Chinese affairs, Service became a handy man of all trades with the "science of bureaucracy."⁸⁸ In over three years, he was rotated through the consulate general. "I served in every section of the consulate general at least twice and occupied every position except that of consul general for at least a brief period."⁸⁹ This comprehensive training and experience further prepared him to be a administrator and observant reporter.

Service's first job in Shanghai was to write a survey of the English language press in China through examining and sorting various issues and materials. Disappointed at the officer before Service, the consul general and later ambassador, Clarence E. Gauss, was much appreciative of Service's work. He would later carry this initial favorable impression to Chongqing where they again worked together under difficult circumstances. "Gauss liked my job and I got a very nice note commending me," Service remembered years later.⁹⁰

Service worked in the political section for a substantial time and received his first lessons in political reporting and the value of good writing. "Form is sometimes more important than content. You're not going to be a successful reporter unless your reports are read," Service explained. Good writing takes painstaking efforts. Decades later he could still remember the embarrassment when one of the supervisors in the

office commented on his writing: "terrible, tear it up."⁹¹ Through tough supervision and good guidance, Service's writing skill vastly improved.

Service's work in the visa section was perhaps most significant to the consulate and fulfilling to himself. As the general relief man, Service was assigned to the visa section soon after his arrival and worked there for a relatively long time. His supervisor, John B. Sawyer, was a rigid administrator and a family friend who had gone to Berkeley with Service's father and had looked out for Service when he was at the American boarding school in Shanghai.⁹² The visa section was a place where Service was able to be closer to the Chinese and their affairs. Though handling paper work and issuing visas, he learned firsthand the strict U.S. immigration policy regarding the Chinese. Because of the intimate trust from a Chinese staff member with whom he had lunch and practiced Chinese everyday, Service was able to detect corrupt conduct by another Chinese staff member in the visa section and have him fired.

In 1940 with the international situation swiftly changing in Europe, some 17,000 Jews managed to get out of Europe through Italy and rushed into Shanghai, one of the few places where they could land without a passport.⁹³ Thousands sought pathways to the United States. This presented a big problem for the small visa section, which had usually handled only a couple of cases a day. Service was able to organize a successful task force and set up a special unit to handle these cases. In the early 1940s, anti-Semitism was not uncommon among American diplomats. According to his colleagues in Shanghai, Service always stayed aloof from all the

jokes at the expense of the incoming immigrants.⁹⁴ It is not surprising to find gratitude from Jewish immigrants for his respect and kindly help. Max Knight, who later worked at Berkeley for the University of California Press, for instance, felt a life-time debt of gratitude for the visa he received from Service.⁹⁵

While working at the consulate, Service pushed hard in his spare time to prepare for the optional third-year Chinese exam which few Foreign Service officers dared to take. He was able to study one hour before work with a Chinese he had known in Beijing. He also tried to cultivate friendships with Chinese clerks at the consulate. He ate lunch with them and used the rest of the lunch hour to practice Chinese every day. Hard work paid off, and he successfully passed the third-year language exam. Remarked one of his colleagues, "One thing that puzzles me: how in hell can you get any studying done with wife and children about? I speak with feeling."⁹⁶

Service was promoted to class VIII, after jumping through three unclassified positions in just four years after his commission. Ordinarily, it took seven years. "Never in my government experience have I know anyone to turn in a better performance," the vice consul in the visa section observed in a letter in 1941.⁹⁷

In addition to strenuous work, Service enjoyed busy family and social life in Shanghai. After several months of separation, his wife and kids returned from the United States to join him in May 1938, when Shanghai was thought to be safe again. It was a precious time for the Services, because in wartime China families frequently had to leave. Until the family was evacuated again in November 1940, they "enjoyed

the two years very much," as Caroline Service recalled. With the salary increase resulting from his promotion, Service was given a larger allowance and could rent an elegant house, the "Haig Court," which was "certainly one of the nicest apartment houses in Shanghai."⁹⁸

As the world's sixth largest city and the biggest treaty port in China, Shanghai in the 1930s was anything but pure Chinese. Foreigners lived in the foreign areas, divided into two parts, the French Concession and the International Settlement.⁹⁹ British, American, Italian, and Japanese troops and police each had a sector of the International Settlement to protect. While foreigners were exempt from Chinese laws, the Chinese could not escape foreign police brutality. Caroline Service later recalled that the Chinese were "really very badly treated often, you know, beaten by the police."¹⁰⁰ Shanghai was a paradise for the wealthy. With a tiny land tax, foreigners did not have to pay taxes of any sort. John Gunther, correspondent for the Chicago Daily News, observed the discrimination against the Chinese in 1938 Shanghai:

In Shanghai one finds most flamboyantly and conspicuously the Westerner who hates the Chinese. He has done the Chinese an injury, that is sucked wealth out of him; for this he cannot forgive China. In a Shanghai Park was the famous sign, NO DOGS OR CHINESE ALLOWED. Some years ago an American newspaper man entertained no less a Chinese than H.H. Kung (now the prime minister!) in his office. The landlord would not allow Dr. Kung to enter the elevator reserved for whites. . . . With my own eyes I have heard a high consular officer say to his secretary, in the presence of a well-dressed young Chinese, "throw that damned Chink out."¹⁰¹

Like almost all Americans, the Services lived a life insulated from the Chinese masses. "It was a very weird thing, when you think back," Caroline Service later

suggested; "We lived above--and . . . we lived on a different plane from the Chinese. We lived always as foreigners. Maybe there was no other way to live in China. . . . It was as though we were living in a glass bubble inside something else. And we were always inside our own glass bubble, all floating around, seeing each other, perhaps talking with each other, perhaps knowing one or two Chinese, but insulated."¹⁰²

Reversing their old proverb, the Westerners' motto in Shanghai became in China, do not do what the Chinese do, for "going native" was considered oddly unnatural. For decades, foreigners had fought successfully for special rights and superior status in China. To many Americans, including the Services, what was habitually done became natural. One American went to an extreme, however, according to Caroline Service, to complain about her servants: "They're too stupid. They can't even speak English!"¹⁰³ However, unlike most Americans, Service worked hard to get closer to the Chinese. Beside willingly socializing with Chinese staff at the consulate, he joined clubs that had Chinese members.

Service's family background also helped him expand his social contacts in Shanghai. He was able to make "a great many friends" in various circles. He became active in American community church affairs and became the president of a luncheon club at the foreign YMCA, despite his apathy toward missionary work in China.¹⁰⁴ He joined the Junior Chamber of Commerce and various other clubs with Chinese members. Among those contacts, Service felt more comfortable with intellectuals and journalists, "a large number of my friends and associates continued to be newspapermen, writers, and research students."¹⁰⁵ He had a fondness for journalism

as a profession, but he also held low opinions of the traditional foreign press, noting "most of the regular foreign press in China was chiefly interested in developments that affected foreigners. . . . There wasn't very much concern with what was going on in China."¹⁰⁶

Service's interest in Chinese affairs grew as China's political problems and international crisis mounted. His reading list expanded to include articles from journals most popular among the "China hands" like the Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs, published by the Institute of Pacific Relations founded in 1925, and the liberal magazine Amerasia, issued in 1937 in the wake of the Sino-Japanese crisis.¹⁰⁷ Service also followed closely the astonishing development of the Sino-Japanese war after the Lugou Qiao Incident. When he first arrived in Shanghai in early 1938, arguably the biggest battle of China's War of Resistance--the Shanghai campaign--had just concluded. In the following three years during his stay in Shanghai, the war would develop from its first phase of fierce fighting and rapid Japanese advance to its second stage of stalemate and political maneuvering. Internal conflict within China's United Front would cumulate in major GMD-CCP crises. And international developments would turn America from China's passive sympathizer to its active ally.

Following the Logou Qiao Incident, Japan quickly extended its military talons over a large part of north China where the central government had weaker control. With the newly consolidated United Front, and under the pressure of patriotic outcry, Chiang decided to make a firm stand at Shanghai to prevent further Japanese attempts

to cut China in half along the Beijing-Hankou railroad.¹⁰⁸ The battle of Shanghai broke out on 13 August 1937 with Chinese troops taking the offensive. Chiang deployed his elite central units and other regional forces, seventy-one divisions and more than a million men strong, with nearly all he had in artillery (five artillery regiments). Chinese soldiers fought relentlessly for nearly three months, but the bravery and patriotic spirit of the poorly equipped Chinese troops could not stop the advance of Japan's mechanized army. On 9 November Chinese troops had to retreat to defend the capital city of Nanjing. Under heavy artillery fire and tank assault, Nanjing quickly fell. The victorious Japanese occupied the Chinese capital in December and started a six-week massacre that, according to post-war investigation by the Far East War Tribunal, killed more than 300,000 Chinese soldiers and civilians. By the end of 1938, China had lost all major metropolitan centers on the east coast, and nearly half of its fighting strength.¹⁰⁹

Despite military disasters, the stiffened Chinese resistance demonstrated in the Shanghai campaign further boosted Chinese patriotism and national unity and won more international attention and sympathy. Local military leaders in Sichuan, Guangxi, Hunan, and Yunan all joined this "holy war" against Japan.¹¹⁰ American military men who had little respect for the Chinese soldiers were impressed with the Chinese resistance. They "could hardly believe the news" of Chinese stubborn resistance around Shanghai.¹¹¹ Admiral H. E. Yarnell observed the Shanghai battle closely and with great interest. He reported from the American flagship U.S.S. Augusta: "The Chinese troops which put up the fight around Shanghai were their best

trained divisions, and if they had had adequate artillery and aircraft, they would have driven the Japanese to their transports.”¹¹² In a personal letter, he expressed moral outrage over Japan’s killing of non-combatants:

One shocking feature about the campaign around here has been the indiscriminate killing of non-combatants . . . at one time during the operations around Shanghai they deliberately machine gunned a fleeing mass of women and children who were trying to escape from the fighting area. They have been ‘mopping up’ Nanking ever since its capture, that means they are shooting most of the men found in the city.¹¹³

Japanese occupation of southeast China and control of Shanghai not only forced the Chinese government to evacuate to the interior, it also threatened America’s interests. During the Shanghai campaign, the Japanese extended their heavy bombing up the Yangtze River. On 19 September, the Japanese naval commander informed the American embassy of their plan to bomb Nanjing in two days and advised Americans to get out of the city to avoid trouble. Without much contemplation, Ambassador Johnson quickly evacuated the embassy to the U.S. gunboat Luzon anchored on the Yangtze River, and watched safely from afar the Japanese “rape of Nanjing.” The weak American reaction to the Japanese aggression shattered illusions among the Chinese and drew stormy criticism from concerned Americans.¹¹⁴ America kept its official policy of neutrality well into 1939 and maintained peace with Japan until the attack on Pearl Harbor at the end of 1941.

Parallel to the deepening Sino-Japanese crisis was the growing split between the Guomindang and the Communists within China’s United Front. Since the Xian Incident, the two parties had been working to resolve their differences on the common

ground of resisting Japanese aggression. Close military cooperation was carried out in early battles of the War of Resistance. While central government forces were heroically fighting the Japanese in the Yangtze region, the newly organized Communist Eighth Route Army achieved the first major victory of the war by destroying more than 3,000 Japanese troops at the Pingxi Pass of the Great Wall in September 1937. Moreover, Nationalist troops achieved one of the great victories of the war during the Taierzhun campaign in March 1938, when they crushed more than 20,000 Japanese troops and temporarily stopped the Japanese attempt to connect the north and southeast China theaters.

For a while many saw in the spirit of United Front the light of early dawn for China. But the initial optimism was soon diminished when both parties realized that the war would be a protracted struggle, and they quickly adjusted their wartime objectives to prepare for a long fight. The Communist strategy of “independent guerilla warfare” behind enemy lines achieved astonishing success while government forces were exhausted and reduced. The Eighth Route Army, for example, expanded from 40,000 in August 1937 to 250,000 a year later, and 400,000 by 1940.¹¹⁵ Chiang failed to force the CCP troops to fight the Japanese in major battles. He also lost control of vast Japanese-occupied areas to the CCP. Competition often led to armed clashes between CCP and GMD forces. The conflict became open when Chiang moved troops to blockade Yanan in 1939 during what the CCP called “the first anti-Communist upsurge.”

The growing GMD-CCP rivalry soon attracted Service to domestic Chinese

politics. The pivotal event of this persistent rivalry was the New Fourth Army incident. On 7 January 1941, government troops launched massive attacks on the retreating New Fourth Army headquarters unit, resulting in the death of nearly eight thousand Communist troops. The incident alienated many American observers and greatly influenced their opinions on Chiang's government vis-à-vis the CCP. Service was deeply affected by the event.

The New Fourth Army incident was the result of accumulated escalation of GMD-CCP conflict within the United Front that had been several months in the making. Rapid Communist expansion into north and central China ran increasingly into "friction" with existing GMD military-administrative presence. From 20 August to 5 December 1940, the Eighth Route Army launched its greatest offensive of the war against the Japanese--the Battle of the Hundred Regiments. The CCP claimed that the Battle had destroyed more than 4,6000 Japanese and puppet troops and hundreds of enemy transportation lines.¹¹⁶ Chiang was as alarmed as the Japanese by the apparent Communist military strength. Already driven to the rocky cliffs of inland Chongqing by the Japanese, Chiang could not afford to lose the rear areas to the Communists. Communist troops and border areas must be restricted.¹¹⁷ The resulting GMD effort to drive the Communist forces back to the north and compete with them in control of territories behind the enemy lines further convinced the CCP leadership that the future of its existence hung in the balance. Both sides believed that no means could resolve the conflict but force. As Mao stated, "power grows out of the barrel of the gun;" and General Zhu De remarked, "Chiang is afraid of only one thing,

strength."¹¹⁸

After losing much of north China to the Eighth Route Army during the first “anti-Communist upsurge,” Chiang was determined to limit Communist expansion in central China and the Yangtze valley where the Communist New Fourth Army was attempting to establish guerilla base areas. The New Fourth Army was formed in 1938 by several thousand CCP guerrillas left behind by the Long March and named after the old Fourth Regiment, a bipartisan elite force during the Northern Expedition of 1926-1928. General Ye Ting, hero of the Northern Expedition and a former Communist, was named Commander-in-Chief, but actual control fell to veteran CCP political commissioner Xiang Ying.¹¹⁹

The New Fourth Army expanded quickly from its authorized strength of 12,000 men in 1938 to 100,000 in 1940, extending its zone of operation from three provinces to over seven in the Yangtze valley and southeastern China. To clear the New Fourth from the Yangtze valley and drive it to the north bank of the Yellow River, the government deployed over twenty divisions eastward to menace the CCP forces north of the Yangtze River, where the Communists argued that it was rightfully north, “north of the river” Yangtze.¹²⁰ Disregarding government orders that they reposition further north as early as September 1940, in early October the New Fourth’s 1st and 6th detachments under General Chen Yi’s North Yangtze Command crushed Jiangsu governor Han Te-ch’in’s attacking 89th Army in the battle of Huangqiao, in which GMD troop losses totaled more than 15,000.¹²¹ While CCP leaders celebrated their victory, “Chiang was again rendered speechless and again

could only bite his lip," as Zhou Enlai remarked.¹²² But Chiang quickly fought back. On 9 December he personally ordered all New Fourth Army units to be north of the Yangtze and all Eighth Route forces to be north of the Yellow by 31 December. The CCP leadership decided to comply in part with this order.¹²³ Ignoring Mao's instructions to move at once and change route, Xiang Ying and Ye Ting's New Fourth Army Headquarters Group started to retreat from their base in southern Anhui on 4 January 1941 and was immediately blocked by fifty thousand GMD forces. Bitter battles broke out on 7 January and lasted for seven days until the Communists were overwhelmed. Weary and hungry, Ye Ting and five hundred troops were taken prisoner with the rest lay dead or wounded. With the bulk of its forces already operating in areas north of the Yangtze River, the New Fourth Army lost 10% of its total strength.¹²⁴

The incident marked "the second anti-Communist upsurge" that brought the CCP-GMD United Front to the brink of demise. Accusing the New Fourth Army of "defying orders for a long time," Chiang declared it dissolved for insubordination on 17 January. He explained:

In November it was ordered by the high command to move northward to engage the enemy in a certain appointed area. It elected not to respond, but waited until the expiration of the period of time allotted, then made an arbitrary move southward, executing a premeditated maneuver leading to an attack in broad daylight upon the headquarters of General Shang-Kuan Yun-hsiang in command of the 40th Division. This plainly mutinous proceeding caused its disbandment as a disciplinary necessity.¹²⁵

The CCP counter-acted quickly by issuing an official order through its Revolutionary

Military Committee on 20 January, appointing General Chen Yi as acting commander and Liu Shaoqi (Liu Shao-chi) as Political Commissioner to reorganize the New Fourth Army.¹²⁶ While privately holding Xiang Ying's "rightist surrender" to the GMD responsible for the catastrophe, publicly the CCP loudly condemned "the unprecedented sin of the pro-Japanese clique for attacking their allied armies," and vigorously attacked Chiang for this "second anti-Communist onslaught."¹²⁷ Mao cabled Chiang after receiving the details of the incident, warning: "Those who play with fire ought to be careful . . . If things continue to develop this way, the entire people of the whole country will throw you into the gutter."¹²⁸ The spokesman of the CCP military committee stated in an interview that "the Chinese Communist Party of today is no more the Chinese Communist Party of 1927 and cannot so easily be cheated and oppressed. . . . May those who play with fire have a clear brain to think. We warn them that if they value their bones, they'd better be more careful in the fire game. . . . The New Fourth Army in Central China and Southern Jiangsu still consists of some 90,000 men who will fight on for the liberation of the people."¹²⁹ The incident was to remain a subject of bitter and prolonged controversy throughout the war of resistance.

While the New Fourth Army incident did little to alter the power balance between the GMD and CCP, it had a major impact on international opinion. The CCP won a propaganda victory by presenting themselves as martyred patriots, and by portraying the GMD as reactionaries who "want to put an end to the War of Resistance by what they call Sino-Japanese cooperation in 'suppressing the

Communists.” It charged the GMD for wanting to “substitute civil war for the war of resistance, capitulation for independence, a split for unity, and darkness for light. . . . People are telling each other the news and are horrified.”¹³⁰ The American embassy kept a watchful eye and promptly informed Washington on major developments; the State Department maintained an open channel with China watchers like Anna L. Strong and followed the event with much interest.¹³¹ Chalmers Johnson wrote in 1962 that “no single event in the entire Sino-Japanese War did more to enhance the Communists’ prestige vis-a-vis the Nationalists than the destruction of the New Fourth Army headquarters while The defeat made them martyrs to the cause of Chinese nationalism.”¹³² Chen Yung-fa of the Academia Sinica in Taiwan has stated that “the publicity given the CCP defeat obscures the actual situation. . . . It would have been unreasonable to expect the KMT not to respond to CCP expansion of its territorial control.”¹³³ And the American correspondent Theodore White called the New Fourth Army incident “the King Charles’ head of the Chinese Civil War.”¹³⁴

The New Fourth Army incident further stimulated Service’s interest in political reporting. Despite its cloudy nature, the Communist explanation sounded, to Service, more persuasive in the context of anti-Japanese War of Resistance. Inspired to learn more of the situation and relations between the two political parties, he decided to explore the possibility of political reporting. It was not only the pathway for “fame and fortune,” it was also the best channel to understanding Chinese affairs. He later explained: “It was not a decision based on my own political sympathies particularly. [I] was looking for something to be the main--the ball game.”¹³⁵

In the international section of Shanghai and far from front lines of the Sino-Japanese war and GMD-CCP conflict, Service felt isolated and wanted to join the action. Realizing the weakness of America's political reporting in China, he became more interested in becoming a penetrating political reporter. He asked to be transferred to Chongqing, China's wartime capital. The remote mountainous city was not a desirable post to many, but it was attractive to Service. Not only it was wartime China's political center, it also was the land of his youth. In the spring of 1941 Service wrote to Ambassador Johnson in Chongqing, requesting the transfer. In a letter to his mother and Caroline he explained, "it is probable that nothing will come of this. . . . But it is possible. . . . As you know I would be very pleased."¹³⁶ Not long afterwards the anticipated reply came: transfer to Chongqing as soon as possible.

ENDNOTES

1. Service, "State Department Duty," 29, 85.
2. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "The Measure of Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs 73 (1 July 1994), 146.
3. John S. Service to Bob Service, 10 December 1972, John Service Papers, Box 1, Folder 36, Berkeley.
4. Service, Golden Inches.
5. Service, "State Department Duty," 84.
6. Barbara Tuchman, Sand Against the Wind: Stilwell and the American Experience in China (London: MacMillan, 1971), 60.
7. Service, "State Department Duty," 85.
8. Oakland Tribune, 11 September 1932.
9. Service's average grade on the written test was 79 percent, and oral test 87 percent. See Service, "State Department Duty," 93a-93b, and News-Tribune, 2 February 1933.
10. Service, "State Department Duty," 93.
11. Foreign Service Examination Rating Report, 24 January 1933, John Service Papers, Box 2, Folder 47, Berkeley.
12. U.S. Congress, Senate, United States-China Relations: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971), 3-5.
13. Service, "State Department Duty," 98.
14. Caroline Service, An Oral History Conducted in 1977-1978 by Rosemary Levenson, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1981, 36 (Hereafter Caroline Interview).
15. Service, "State Department Duty," 101.
16. Service, Lost Chance in China, xv.
17. Service, "State Department Duty," 103.

18. Edgar Sherve to Colonel Schulz, 6 August 1934, John Service Papers, Box 2, Folder 47, Berkeley.
19. John Service to Everyone, 8 May 1941, John Service Papers, Box 2, Folder 35, Berkeley, 6
20. John Service to Mrs. Schulz, 15 September 1933, John Service Papers, Box 2, Folder 35, Berkeley.
21. Ibid.
22. Service, Golden Inches, 326.
23. John Service to Mrs. Schulz, 15 September 1933, John Service Papers, Box 2, Folder 35, Berkeley.
24. Alumni Magazine, Oberlin College, March 1934.
25. Service, "State Department Duty," 107.
26. Caroline interview, 50.
27. Service, "State Department Duty," 117-18.
28. Virginia Service later attended Oberlin College following the path of her father, and graduated in 1957. See John Service Files #2, Alumni Association, Oberlin College, Ohio.
29. Service, Golden Inches, 334.
30. L. Pinkirten to Colonel Edward Schulz, 30 September 1935, Box 2, Folder 47, John Service Papers, Berkeley; Service, "State Department Duty," 114a.
31. Beijing was the location of numerous Chinese imperial dynasties. The name Beijing (Northern Capital) was given by the second emperor of the Ming Dynasty in 1403. It remained the capital of China until late in the mid 1920s. In 1928 the Nationalist government renamed it Beiping (Northern peace). But in 1949 with the establishment of the People's Republic of China, the name was changed back to Beijing.
32. Service, "State Department Duty," 126.
33. Caroline Interview, 55.
34. Gary May, China Scapegoat: the Diplomatic Ordeal of John Carter Vincent (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, Inc., 1979), 45.

35. For more information about Nelson Johnson, see Russell D. Buhite, Nelson T. Johnson and American Policy toward China, 1925-1941 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1968).
36. Caroline Interview, 54.
37. Kahn, "Profiles: Foresight, Nightmare, and Hindsight," 127.
38. Service, "State Department Duty," 122-23.
39. Caroline Interview, 56.
40. Service, interview by the author, 1 August 1989.
41. Service, "State Department Duty," 127.
42. Kahn, The China Hands, 5.
43. Service, "State Department Duty," 124.
44. "Personal Statement of John S. Service," in U.S. Senate, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation, 1963.
45. Ibid.; Kahn, The China Hands, 75.
46. John Service, "Edgar Snow, Some Personal Reminiscences," The China Quarterly 50 (1972): 209-10.
47. Helen Foster Snow, My China Years (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1984), 154.
48. President Chiang Kai-shek: His Life Story in Pictures, 28.
49. See Ci Hai [Lexicographical encyclopedia], s.v. "The December Ninth Movement," 1979 edition with a reduced format (Shanghai: Shanghai Cishu Press, 1979).
50. Service, "Edgar Snow," 210; Helen Snow, My China Years, 164.
51. Chen Han-po, "Amidst the Student Movement," Beijing Review (15 February 1982).
52. Helen Snow, My China Years, 179; Chiang Menglin, Tides from the West: A Chinese Autobiography (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), 204.
53. Helen Snow, My China Years, 172.
54. Service, "State Department Duty," 129.

55. Snow's talk became a preview of his Red Star Over China that fascinated a largely unformed world. Red Star Over China was written and published in the midst of events that led to the Sino-Japanese War and the second CCP-GMD cooperation during World War II. It was less than two months after Snow left the northwest that Chiang was "detained" at Sian on 12 December 1936 by young Marshall Zhang Xueliang. And before Snow's book was finished, the Japanese had fired the shots at the Lugou Bridge on 7 July 1937, which hastened the development of the United Front. Red Star Over China was first published in London by Victor Gollancz in 1937. It was soon translated into Chinese and published in the Shanghai International Settlement. Other English editions were published in 1938, 1944, 1961, and 1968 by Random House and Grove Press. For more information, see Service, "Edgar Snow," Zhou Hongjun, "Snow he ta de Xixing Manji" [Snow and his red star over China], in Wang Xi, ed., Zhong Mei Guanxi Shi Luncong [History of Sino-American relations: Selected essays] (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 1985): 377-95.

56. Service, "Edgar Snow," 211.

57. Ibid., 213, 215.

58. Ibid., 218.

59. For detailed first hand accounts of the Xian Incident, see H.H. Kung, "Xian Shibian Huiyi Lu" [Memoire of the Xian incident], in Li Jinzhou, Xian Shibian Qinli Ji [Eyewitness account of the Xian incident] (Taipei: Zhuanji Wenxue Press, 1972); Li Yunhan, Song Zeyuan yu Qi Qi Kangzhan [Song Zeyuan and the 7-7 War of Resistance] (Taipei: Zhuanji Wenxue Press, 1973), 168-77.

60. Chen, Mao and the Chinese Revolution, 229.

61. Kong, "Xian Shibian Huiyi Lu," 71.

62. There has been disagreement on who initiated the second CCP-GMD united front. Scholars on the Chinese mainland generally agree that Mao suggested a united anti-Japanese front in his December 1935 speech, "On Anti-Japanese Imperialism Tactics." There was little doubt that the CCP initially pushed for a United Front to carry out their set anti-Japanese scheme and to be able to take part in the government. The question of whether and to what degree did Moscow's directives influence Mao's decision remains open for debate.

63. Royal Leonard, a young American aviator, witnessed the departure and informed the American ambassador. For more information, see Nelson Johnson, "Memorandum of Conversation," 13 January 1937, Nelson Johnson Papers, Box 69, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

64. Service, "State Department duty," 132. Agnes Smedley was a leftist freelance writer who wrote frequently about the CCP and its leaders. Her major works include: Battle Hymn of China (New York: Knopf, 1943); China Fights Back, An American Woman With the Eighth Route Army (London: V. Gollancz, 1938); and The Great Road: The Life and

Times of Chu Teh (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1956).

65. Service, "State department Duty," 132; Kong, "Xian Shibian Huiyi Lu," 120.

66. Chen, Mao and the Chinese Revolution, 230.

67. The life story of General Yang Hucheng ended in tragedy. After the Xian Incident he was forced to "observe" abroad by Chiang Kai-shek. And his enraged 17th Route Army was suppressed. When Yang returned to China after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, he was detained and secretly imprisoned until 1949, when he and his family were brutally knifed down before the Communists took over Chongqing. See Selected Works of Zhou Enlai (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1981), 216. For a full text of General Yang's telegram, see Kong, "Xian Shibian Huiyi Lu," 120-23.

68. Li, Song Zheyuan yu Qi Qi Shibian, 180-81.

69. See Chen, Mao and the Chinese Revolution, 231; and Zhou, Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, 217. For a full text of the CCP proposal, see Guo Hualun, Zhonggong Shiji [On the history of the Chinese communist party] (Taipei: Zhonghua Mingguo Guoji Guanxi Suo, 1969), 202.

70. Chen, Mao and the Chinese Revolution, 231.

71. Zhou, Select Works of Zhou Enlai, 218-19.

72. On 22 September the CCP Central Committee announced its "Manifesto On Unity." A day later Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek made a statement on GMD-CCP unity. For a complete version of the agreement and details of the CCP and GMD statements on the United Front, see, Department of State, The China White Paper, 523-25.

73. Margaret Stanley, Foreigners in Areas of China Under Communist Jurisdiction before 1949: Biographical Notes and A Comprehensive Bibliography of the Yen-an Hui (The University of Kansas, 1987), 7.

74. H. E. Yarnell to Alfred, 7 July 1937, Harry Yarnell Papers, Box 4, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

75. Buhite, Nelson T. Johnson, 125; Service, "State Department Duty," 144.

76. "Personal Statement of John S. Service," in U.S. Senate, State Department Loyalty Investigation, 1963.

77. Paraphrase for Admiral Yarnell of the Department's Telegram dated June 13, 16 June 1938, Harry Yarnell Papers, Box 4, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

78. On 1 September 1937 Chinese Ambassador C.T. Wang expressed to the State Department China's disappointment over actions the American government had taken (on

Sept 14) in reference to carrying of arms, etc. by American ships. He said that nineteen planes which the Chinese government had purchased had been removed. The Chinese government owned these planes and now they were being withheld. See Conversation: the Secretary of State and the Chinese Ambassador Dr. C.T. Wang, 17 September 1937, Cordell Hull Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

79. On 2 Oct. 1936 the Chinese Ambassador Dr. Sao-Ke Alfred Sze called on Secretary Hull and urged that the U.S. government take action similar to that taken by the British government at Tokyo in asking the Japanese government to be moderate and conciliatory toward China. Hull replied that "we will give every attention and consideration to each phase as it develops," but will "avoid any step which might do more harm than good." See Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary Hull and The Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Sao-Ke Alfred Sze, 2 October 1936, Cordell Hull Papers, Real 28, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. On 16 July 1937, the new Chinese Ambassador Dr. Chengting T. Wang called on the Secretary and Mr. Hornbeck and asked the US to take action based on the Nine Power Treaty which "would restrain the Japanese." Hornbeck believed it would not work toward peace but contribute toward the opposite. See Conversation: the Secretary of State and the Chinese Ambassador Dr. C.T. Wang, 17 September 1937, Cordell Hull Papers, Real 28, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington.

80. Buhite, Nelson Johnson, 129; Joseph Clark Grew to American Consul in Shanghai, 8 November 1938, Box 14, Harry Yarnell Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

81. Donald to James A. Thomas, 31 July 1937, quoted in Sterling Seagrave, The Soong Dynasty (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), 362.

82. Service, "State Department Duty," 136.

83. "Personal Statement of John S. Service," in U.S. Senate, State Department Loyalty Investigation, 1963.

84. Kahn, "Profiles: Foresight, Nightmare, and Hindsight" 48.

85. Service, "State Department Duty," 142.

86. Caroline Interview, 66-67.

87. Service, "State Department Duty," 146.

88. *Ibid.*, 142.

89. "Personal Statement of John S. Service," in U.S. Senate, State Department Loyalty Investigation, 1963

90. Service, "State Department Duty," 146.

91. *Ibid.*, 148.

92. Ibid., 147.

93. Karen Shopsowitz, [www.filmmakers.com], "A Place to Save Your Life: The Shanghai Jews," motion picture.

94. Kahn, The China Hands, 66.

95. Service, "State Department Duty," 155.

96. Arthur Ringwalt to John Service, 17 March and 14 July 1939, John Service Papers, Box 2, Folder 17, Berkeley.

97. Service, "State Department Duty," 153, 153a.

98. Caroline Interview, 65; Caroline Service, "China Revisited," Oberlin Alumni Magazine (January-February 1972): 24.

99. The International Settlement was administered by a Municipal Council run by the British which was responsible to the Consuls General of the Great Powers. Before 1928, no Chinese was allowed to participate in the Council. By 1938 the Council contained five Chinese out of fourteen. But the Council had little real power.

100. Caroline Interview, 68.

101. John Gunther, Inside Asia (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1939), 169-70.

102. Caroline Interview, 66.

103. Ibid., 67.

104. Service, interview by the author, 1 August 1989.

105. "Personal Statement of John S. Service," in U.S. Senate, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation, 1963.

106. Service, "State Department Duty," 138.

107. The Institute of Pacific Relations was established in 1925 in Honolulu by a group of YMCA officials. It was thereafter supported by private donations, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation. Records show that most American career Foreign Service officials concerned with Far Eastern affairs such as Stanley Hornbeck and Nelson Johnson had been either occasional or regular readers of Amerasia since its inception in 1937. See, Kahn, China Hands, 161.

108. Li Zongren, "Li Zongren Huiyi Lu," [Memoirs of Li Zongren] Ming Bao 12, no.7 (July, 1977), 29; Ch'i, Nationalist China At War, 249.

109. See Hsiang-Hsiang Wu, "Total Strategy Used by China and Some Major Engagements in the Sino-Japanese War," in Sih, Nationalist China During the Sino-Japanese War, 53-56; Ch'i, Nationalist China at War, 42-43; China Year Book, 1937-1945 (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1947), 302-03.
110. Wu, "Total Strategy Used by China," 53.
111. Dennis L. Noble, "China Hands: The United States in China, 1901-1937" (Ph.D. diss., Purdue University, 1988), 234.
112. H.E. Yarnell to J.W. Thomason, 4 January 1938, Harry Yarnell Papers, Box 4, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
113. Ibid. For similar account, see Ch'i, Nationalist China at War, 42.
114. Buhite, Nelson Johnson, 131.
115. The Eighth Route Army was the major Communist force with General Zhu De as its Commander-in-Chief. It was named in August 1937 as part of the agreement of the United Front. See, T'ien-wei Wu, "The Chinese Communist Movement," in Hsiung and Levine, China's Bitter Victory, 85-87.
116. For further information about the Battle of the Hundred Regiments, see Fairbank, ed., The Cambridge History of China, vol. 13, pt. 2, 676; and Ci Hai, s.v., "The Battle of the Hundred Regiments," 1768.
117. According to Zhou Enlai, the GMD demanded further unification of military command and government orders and sealing off of the border areas. See, Zhou, Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, 222-23.
118. Ibid., 224.
119. For more information, see, Leng Xin, Cong Canjia Kangzhan dao Mudu Rijun Touxian [From joining the war of resistance to witnessing the Japanese surrender] (Taipei: Zhuanji Wenxue Press, 1967), 85-86.
120. Zhou, Selected Works, 224.
121. See Ci Hai, s.v., "The Huangqiao Battle;" and Fairbank, The Cambridge History of China, vol. 13, pt. II, 666.
122. Zhou, Selected Works, 225.
123. For more information, see Zhongyang Dangan Guan, ed., Wannan Shibian Ziliao Xuanbian [South Anhui incident: selected materials] (Beijing: Zhongyang Dangxiao Press, 1982), 124; Guo, Zhonggong Shilun, vol. 4, 186-90; Zhou, Selected Works, 224-225; Wu, "The Chinese Communist Movement," 89-101.

124. Wu, "The Chinese Communist Movement," 101. For similar account, see, Yung-fa Chen, Making Revolution: The Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 69.
125. Chiang Kai-shek, "The Function of Revolutionary Discipline," address to a weekly memorial service, Chongqing, 27 January 1941. Quoted in Chi-Wei David Wu, "A Rhetorical Analysis of Selected Speeches by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, 1937-1945" (Ph. D. diss., Ohio University, June 1986), 169.
126. "Documents of the Kuomintang-Communist Crisis," 26 January 1941, Records of the U.S. Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of China, 1940-1944, State Department Decimal File 893.00/14689, LM 65, Roll 2, National Archives.
127. Zhou, Selected Works, 224; and "Documents of Kuomintang-Communist Crisis," 26 January 1941.
128. Theodore White, In Search of History: A Personal Adventure (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), 115.
129. "Documents of the Kuomintang-Communist Crisis," 26 January 1941. For more information on the New Fourth Army incident, see Wannan Siban: Ziliao Xuajiji [Selected documents concerning the southern Anhui incident] (Beijing: Zhongyang Dangxiao Press, 1982).
130. Mao Zedong, "Order and Statement on the Southern Anhwei Incident," in Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 2, 454.
131. Stanley Honbeck to Anna Louise Strong, 10 March 1941, State Department Decimal File 89300/14689, National Archives.
132. Chalmers Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), 140.
133. Chen, Making Revolution, 77.
134. Seagrave, The Soong Dynasty, 374.
135. Service, "State Department Duty," 182; Lost Chance in China, 169.
136. Service, "State Department Duty," 158a

CHAPTER FOUR

CHONGQING: THE NATIONALISTS

Toward China we had two objectives. The first was an effective joint prosecution of the war. The second was the recognition and building up China as a major power entitled to equal ranks with the three big Western allies, Russia, Britain, and the United States.¹

-----Cordell Hull

The crux of all important Chinese problems--military, economic, and political--is democratic reform. . . The implication of our policy therefore depends on close coordination of our activities in China, the tactful exertion of suggestive pressure on the KMT, and careful encouragement of these democratic forces.²

-----John S. Service

With Chiang you can be friendly only on your own terms. He must give in to constant, strong and unified pressure. Never relax on your objectives. Keep hammering at him.³

-----Mao Zedong

The political complexity and wartime difficulties of Chongqing presented exhilarating challenges to the young Foreign Service officer who had arrived there in May 1941 with great anticipation. John Service started off at the embassy as a general handyman, handling a great variety of tasks from routine office work to picking up a car from Indochina. His intimate knowledge of China, his command of the Chinese language, and his keen interest in political issues soon put him in the

center of Sino-American contact. He became increasingly involved in political reporting and spent large amount of time in the field observing the developments and talking to people in various capacities. His transfer to the staff of General Joseph Stilwell in August 1943 was a turning point in his diplomatic career. It made him a "free agent" and a full time political reporter. His numerous reports on the Nationalist government and its relations with the Chinese Communists aroused great attention in Washington. Though not a top Foreign Service officer, he played a significant role. He provided a long briefing for Henry Wallace during the vice president's visit to China; he interpreted the "stiff message" from President Roosevelt to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek demanding General Stilwell's full command over the Chinese army. In Chongqing, Service wrote perceptive and controversial reports that attracted policy makers in Washington but gravely irritated Chinese government officials. Like some of the most outstanding news reporters in Chongqing, Service had a strong sense of purpose.⁴ As he later remarked, "the reporter owes something . . . to history. He watches history being made, wherever he is. It may be a relatively quiet backwater. Or he may be very close to momentous events--as I was to the world-changing revolution of a half billion people--that make insignificant his role as an individual."⁵

As a political reporter Service was confronted with, in John K. Fairbank's words, an "ambivalent situation where the outcome [was] uncertain, the values [were] mixed, and the sides [were] in conflict."⁶ Out of this complicated combination, however, emerged his antipathy to Chiang Kai-shek and the Guomindang (GMD) government. He witnessed the decline of the cherished United Front in the aftermath

of the New Fourth Army incident and blamed the GMD for its deterioration; he attentively observed the problems confronting the Chinese government but believed those were chiefly its own making; he searched for solutions for a better China that could best serve the interests of the United States. Not a man of combative nature, his antagonism toward the Chinese government was nonetheless conspicuous.

His political views on China not only grew out of his understanding of that country but also were much influenced by people with whom he associated. He found friends among progressive Americans and reform-minded Chinese. Wide-ranging contacts with liberals and firsthand field observations deepened his disappointment in the Chinese government and convinced him that a better China depended on the progress of democracy which could only be achieved by outside pressure, especially America influence. His superiors in the State Department were in tune with his conclusions: “The United States government is confronted with the question not whether it should do something, but what it should do . . . we should use our influence judiciously and consistently, bearing in mind Chinese nationalist susceptibility, to guide China along democratic, cooperative paths.”⁷

Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 drove the United States and China into close alliance and cooperation. With mutual sincerity but without much experience, both countries toiled hard for working cooperation. After Pearl Harbor, China offered enthusiastic support and willing subordination to America’s leadership in the Allied cause against the Axis aggression. It provided high positions for American personnel, listened attentively to their advice, and willingly supported U.S.

policies. The United States took the lead in recognizing China as a major power and gave up its unequal treaty privileges and the Chinese exclusion clause in the United States. In the face of extreme difficulties, its courageous pilots slowly but steadily airlifted wartime materials desperately needed in China over the "Hump." It made genuine efforts to train and equip thirty-nine divisions of the Nationalist army with a thousand American instructors and advisers in India and China, and hundreds of Chinese flying cadets in the U.S., which evidently facilitated the modernization of the Chinese army and creation of an Air Force.⁸

But Sino-American wartime cooperation was ill-fated for it failed to adjust a relationship that historically had never been on an equal footing and adapt mutual perceptions that had been far from fair-minded. America's historical associations with China as a feeble nation and its wartime strategy of prioritizing Europe and other theaters largely determined its patronizing attitude of treating China as a honored but second-class ally. It promised, in Warren Cohen's words, "to give whatever supplies not needed elsewhere" but denied China participation in the process of making strategic and logistical decisions.⁹ A. T. Steele has claimed that Chiang became more acceptable to the United States after "his marriage to a beautiful Wellesley graduate, Mei-ling Soong, . . . The fact that the Chiangs were devout Methodists was an additional point in their favor, in American eyes." As time passed, however, the popular perception of Chiang as a devout Christian and a steadfast American friend and ally quickly faded in the reality and reports of government corruption and wartime difficulties.¹⁰ But the perception that America was to patronize China and

uplift it to democratic standards persisted. "For half a century the Chinese had been our wards," claimed Louis J. Halle, "upon whom we had lavished a parental beneficence."¹¹ General Stilwell complained that "I never heard Chiang Kai-shek say a single thing that indicated gratitude to the President or to our country for the help we were extending to him."¹² Joseph W. Esherick simply concludes that "it was an embarrassing fact that our Chinese ally in the war against the Axis was a one-party pro-fascist dictatorship."¹³

Despite its deep appreciation of America's material assistance and uplifting of China's world status, the Chinese government found itself in a constant tug-of-war with its superior ally. Already being caught in the two deadly forces of Japanese invasion and Communist upheaval, and frustrated with other powers, offending America became the last thing the Chinese government would chose. But its high expectations for U.S. aid and thirst for equal treatment were bound to conflict with America's policy of aloofness toward China. America's inability to translate its moral support into active policy, and its tendency to accept China as a power only in form not in substance frustrated the Chinese government. In the spring of 1942, in the midst of the failing Burma campaign and disappointment over America's handling of Lend-Lease materials, Chiang loudly complained to Washington through his minister of foreign affairs that China had been treated as a ward, not a partner.¹⁴

It was eventually the issue of Communism and political reform that touched Chiang to the quick and damaged the relationship between America and the Chinese government. America's slowness in supplying aid to China was caused not only by

the difficulties of transportation, but also by its long-standing conviction that Chiang was less interested in fighting the Japanese than engaging the Communists. This was reinforced by constant reports from Service and other Foreign Service officers that Chiang and his government, corrupt and untrustworthy, could serve only short term U.S. interests and were not-worthy of a long-time investment. The United States not only distrusted the Chinese to handle Lend-Lease materials, it began to attach conditions and strings to American aid, which to the Chinese government was truly a humiliation. In contrast, despite difficulties in supply and delivery, “no conditions of any kind were set” for Lend-Lease to the USSR.¹⁵ As the war proceeded, there was a growing perception among America’s “China hands” and, through their reports, policy makers in Washington that America’s hope in China lay in China’s political unity through democratic reforms, and that, as a reactionary, Chiang was resisting such a transformation. Thus, by 1944 the focus of contention turned from Lend-Lease to political reform.

General Stilwell soon became the focus for both issues. His position as the commanding American general and as Chiang's chief of staff highlighted both Sino-American wartime intimacy and conflict. Although a subordinate of Chiang, he held little respect for his chief. Expected by the Chinese to obtain aid for his theater, he at times worked hard to block such supplies. As a foreigner associating with the Nationalist Chinese government, he saw himself as the savior of Chinese unity and the War of Resistance, which he believed could only be achieved by giving him unlimited command of all Chinese troops. In July 1944 in the middle of Japan’s Ichigo

offensive, Stilwell recorded his feelings that if the crisis "was just sufficient to get rid of Peanut without entirely wrecking the ship, it would be worth it."¹⁶ Emotions over China ran increasingly high. According to Barbara W. Tuchman, some Americans in Chongqing, especially those who had shared the hopes of the early days, developed, in the words of one, "an intense distaste, even hatred" of Chiang and his government. Others like Ambassador Gauss were merely "fed up."¹⁷ Tensions went so high that ordinary words could no longer convey the opinion of many involved. The American Consul-General in Kunming, William London, claimed that "present trends can be changed only through the death of Chiang or by successful revolution."¹⁸

By 1944 most American leaders in Washington became deeply pessimistic about the Chinese government as a result of unceasing reports about Chiang's corruption and venality, reports which proved to be partially factual. Some analysts concluded that "it was essentially this corruption that made the wartime alliance between the Kuomintang and Washington a profoundly uneasy one."¹⁹ But others believed that America should share the responsibility. Highly critical of America's insensitive dealing with the Chinese government, General Chennault's assistant, Captain Joseph Alsop, claimed that he was certain that the Chinese would cooperate a hundred percent "as long as they [were] treated decently."²⁰ John Service recalled that at one time, Alsop cheerfully proposed that American generals like Stilwell who did not share his views on supporting the Nationalist government be drawn and quartered.²¹ To Warren Cohen, the Roosevelt years demonstrated that American policy was naturally designed to serve American interests, but without particular

regard for China, "the fact that China too benefitted was as incidental as it was undeniable. Roosevelt's East Asia policies gave Americans no cause for grievance-- and the Chinese no cause for gratitude."²²

Chongqing: a City of Dismay and Courage

Chongqing means, literally, "happy again." The opportune name symbolized the optimistic spirit of the region in history and hope of the nation during the War of Resistance. This war-torn capital was an ancient place, dating at least back to 1189 during the Song Dynasty when the name was changed from Gong Zhou to the Prefecture of Chongqing. According to legend, this historic city had existed for more than four thousand years. The old interior city was opened to foreigners as a treaty port in 1895 under the Treaty of Shimonoseki in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War.²³ It resembled a small peninsula with three sides abating the Yangtze and Jialing rivers. Built on a big cliff, it carried the nickname of "mountain city."

Chongqing was described by many as "an amazingly unfortunate site for human habitation" with its foggy skies and winter rain, its burning heat of the summer sun, and all seemingly "under a quarter of an inch of mud."²⁴ The "mountain city" was, however, an ideal place for a wartime capital for all its natural defects. It had natural advantages too. With its extended roads and rivers, all the communications of western China came to a focus in Chongqing. The bad weather could reduce the enemy's bombing. From its rocky hills were carved "the world's most impregnable air raid shelters."²⁵ The rich soil of Sichuan, a huge triangle of land bigger than France

or Britain, produced a sufficient food supply for the city. There was a popular saying that whatever sows elsewhere in China grows better in Sichuan, "the land of plenty."²⁶

No wonder the city surprised visitors with virtually no sight of beggars during even the most trying years of war. Having stayed in Chongqing for nearly a year, journalist Floyd Taylor described the city:

In such an atrocious climate there are not many weeks in a year in which Japanese bombers can visit the city. . . . Chungking's caves, painfully dug by workmen with primitive tools, aided only by small amount of blasting powder, are not only big enough to provide air-raid shelter for all the inhabitants but to shelter the city's valuables. There is one cave that runs the width of the city. . . . Food is expensive because of the economic conditions brought by the war, but there is enough rice and wheat for everyone though the population of the city has increased from four hundred thousand in 1937 to about a million in 1945.²⁷

Service's transfer from Shanghai to Chongqing was on short notice, and the trip to the wartime capital was difficult. The Japanese invasion and their reckless bombing of Chongqing made it impossible to fly directly there during daytime. He had to go to Hong Kong to catch a flight, and to avoid Japanese attack, it had to take off after midnight. On 8 May 1941, at dawn, an American airplane took Service to the misty city of Chongqing.²⁸ The more than five-hour journey was exhilarating and Service was in high spirits when he arrived. His cheerful mood was set off by the beautiful scene of the night sky: "The night was clear with almost a full moon and great white clouds that we were in and out of then high above. Then the clouds below became solid and we seemed out of touch with the earth altogether with only stars above us. Then the sun came out we were above a great white cotton quilt without a

ripple in it."²⁹ On board the big Douglas airplane, Service took particular notice of his fellow passengers. Among them was the illustrious Time, Life, and Fortune publisher Henry Luce and his wife, the famous Clare Boothe, on their way to visit the Chiangs. Service did not anticipate that he and Luce, both China-born missionary sons passionately interested in China, would later take totally different approaches toward China, the Chinese government, and Sino-American relations.³⁰

Across the Yangtze River on the south bank from the city stood the American embassy in the midst of the foreign business communities. The embassy had moved to Chongqing in early August 1938 following the fleeing Chinese national government, but Americans preferred to locate away from government headquarters and other foreign embassies in the city. The embassy was a temporary post on the second floor of the former Standard Oil Company building, an old four-storied structure connected to a factory on one side and a coal mine on the other. It was a "dilapidated building" that later reminded John Carter Vincent of "a Japanese brothel."³¹ The first and third floors were used by navy personnel and military attachés. The attic became the communication center connecting the embassy with the outside world through a portable radio.³² Complying with Washington's attitude that America should stay out of the line of fire in the Sino-Japanese crises, Ambassador Nelson Johnson made no effort to improve the embassy.

Carried by the U.S. navy motorboat, Service arrived at the ambassador's little house above the river when everybody was having breakfast. Hungry as a bear, he immediately joined the group. With the relaxed atmosphere of the embassy generated

largely by the easygoing ambassador whom Service had known in Beijing, Service fit into the new environment quickly. Johnson's Daoist philosophy of "doing nothing and there is nothing that will not be done" impressed Service. Even though his arrival coincided with the departure of the ambassador, Johnson influenced him in no small ways. He wrote to his family about keeping a journal like Johnson: "Johnson says he writes daily as a journal and just closes the letter up about once a week or when it is time to catch a clipper and sends it off. I guess I will try that, at least as long as things are new here and perhaps interesting."³³ And he did keep his journal for the first three weeks.

Service's arrival coincided with the Japanese bombing season that had started in May, and he had a grim taste of it. The first day after Service's arrival, 9 May, was clear. Soon after he arrived at the office in the morning, the Japanese launched their second air raid of the year with two big waves, each consisting of about 30 planes.³⁴ Service observed that the Japanese planes

came in very high. The military men said over 16,000 feet. . . . They came straight down the river. As they came over the city the anti-aircraft suddenly started up, seemingly from all around us. . . . Then an indescribable whistling sound and seconds later a whole series of great explosions with great black clouds of smoke. . . . We could see the flash of those explosions and several incendiaries landed on the beach and burned themselves out.³⁵

Theodore White accurately described the ineffectiveness of the Chinese air defense system: "Its antiaircraft guns were almost useless. . . . It had no radar nor air force worthy of the name."³⁶ Two pieces of anti-aircraft shrapnel whistled down and landed nearby; one was handed hot to Mrs. Luce for a souvenir. Among the severely

damaged buildings was the British ambassador's house; because of the damage his wife had to take the children to the country for a few days.³⁷

For over three years since 1939, the Japanese had raided Chinese cities with Chongqing as the prime target. During the first bombing raids that lasted for two days on 3-4 May 1939, Japanese bombers inflicted over 7,500 civilian casualties and destroyed more than 1,200 houses. Time correspondent Theodore White vividly described the scene of horror:

Terror hit Chungking with all the impact of the bombs. Panic came from the known--the dead, the bleeding, the hundreds of thousands who could not crowd into a shelter. Even more it came from the unknown--the droning planes from a new age, for which superstition had no explanation and no remedy. Japanese incendiaries started a dozen small fires, which within an hour or two had met in several distinct patches of creeping destruction that were eating out the ancient slums forever. Within the back alleys, the lanes, the twisting byways of the city thousands of men and women were outlined against the night. All the compound noises of a great fire were intensified by the setting of an old walled city--there were the whistling and cracking of timbers, the screaming of people.³⁸

Chiang recorded his infuriation with Japanese in his diary: "The enemy's shameless truculence has reached its extreme. The reckless bombing over civilians is the most brutal conduct I have ever seen. . . . Shouldn't God the holy spirit give these vicious enemies their overdue punishment?"³⁹

But soon the disruption and high death toll became less severe with the development of air warning systems and dugouts. In the aftermath of the great destruction and dismay of the 1939 bombing, the Chinese government quickly developed an effective warning system. Based on thousands of people watching the

skies in unoccupied China, a simple and reliable siren system was developed to give people ample warning when the enemy planes were approaching. When they were within 50 miles, the central switch at the power house was pulled. With all the lights and power out, the city went dark. This saved an enormous number of lives but did little to prevent property damage. When lights were out and supplies of water were cut off by the Japanese bombing, fires caused by bombs usually went unchecked. White claimed the system resulted from "a monumental elaboration of Chinese ingenuity, decked out with a few tricks contributed by America's technician of the air, Claire Chennault, senior aeronautical adviser to the Chinese government all through the war."⁴⁰

With its credible warning system and prevalent dugouts, the people's confidence was restored and Chongqing became a city of courage and endurance. Despite the lack of modern weaponry, the city opposed the Japanese aggression with three assets: the effective air-raid precaution system, the extensive caves throughout the city, and the indomitable will of the people.

During the following years, the Japanese intensified their air raids over Chongqing. The Chinese Vice Minister of Information, Hollington K. Tong, described his personal experience during the severe 1940 bombing: "On June 6, our office building escaped destruction, as if by a miracle. Several bombs exploded in our own compound. . . . [on 28 June] we had the fifth of the six consecutive days of air raids and the nineteenth of the twenty days of raids, within a month. One bomb made a twenty-foot hole in front of our office building."⁴¹ Despite enormous property

damage, human casualties were relatively light because people had ample warning and sufficient time to go into the dugouts in the rocky hills. These manmade caves functioned as both shelter for lives and property. One observer accounted: "Some of the more valuable equipment of the government is kept in the caves with which the Chungking hills are honeycombed. Printing presses, both public and private, usually are in caves for protection from bombers. . . . Several factories have their most modern and useful machinery in caves."⁴² Tong expressed the confidence people in Chongqing had gained through time:

what kept us up through all the hardships was the realization that the enemy was expending far more than he was achieving. Thanks to the dugouts in the rocky hills and the partial evacuation of the city, casualties were becoming steadily fewer. The question heard everywhere was not how long we could endure, but how long the Japanese could continue the costly raids.⁴³

Service was greatly impressed with the Chinese warning system, the dugouts in the city, and particularly the calmness of the people:

We have a good dug-out under our hill, but some distance from the office. Nobody did anything till the second alarm. There always seemed to be plenty of warning. . . . There are many tunnel openings in the face of the cliff above river on the city side and we could watch the long lines of people streaming into them. Then after the last urgent alarm, when all the city is below ground, the whole water front and city become deserted. You can almost feel the waiting, expectant silence.

But his daily work was nevertheless often interrupted by the bombing:

There was an air-raid alarm that lasted almost the whole day. The urgent was sounded three times and each time we went back to the stand-by. But all life

has to stop. People in the city spent more than five hours in the dugout and the coolie could not get down the hill with our lunches and so we didn't get anything to eat until 3:30. . . . in the office we tried to work. But it's impossible to concentrate or get anything done. One fine morning, even before the alarms start, you find yourself looking out the window to look for the signals and wondering when they'll come.⁴⁴

Service grew impatient with the reckless Japanese bombing and helpless Chinese defense. When more than 50 Japanese planes appeared in the Chinese sky on 10 May 1941, Service expressed anger: "This time no anti-aircraft--yesterday it was obvious that the Chinese shells could not reach nearly high enough. And no Chinese planes. It makes one angry that there can be no active opposition."⁴⁵

Despite the tensions of war, Service's Chongqing days started off with enjoyable dinner parties and happy reunions with new acquaintances and old friends. On the first day of arrival, he had dinner with Colonel David Barrett, Assistant Military Attaché, whom he had known in Beijing. Lunch at the Chinese Prime Minister H. H. Kung's home was pleasant. Dr. Kung prepared the home meal with his delicious native Shanxi (Shansi) cooking. He remembered Service's parents and their service. When he learned that the young diplomat had graduated from Oberlin College in Ohio, his own alma mater, he was delighted and the conversation launched forth into a long discussion of his association with Oberlin. Kung's "granddaddy" type of talk rather fascinated Service, as he told his family later. Oberlin was a favorite topic of Kung. As president of his class he had been active and outstanding on campus. After graduation in 1906 he had maintained close contact, serving on the board of trustees of the college and paying frequent visits there.⁴⁶

Social activities at first kept Service busy. He paid visits to old family friends and acquaintances among reporters like Mac Fisher of United Press. He called on the British Counselor, and had lunch and dinner with the French Counselor. The seemingly endless parties and gatherings, mostly for the occasion of Ambassador Johnson's departure, were highlighted by the dinner gathering at Generalissimo Chiang's on 10 May. Americans were the only foreign guests at the grand party among about fifty high-ranking Chinese officials, including all the cabinet ministers and top military men like Generals Bai Chongxi (Pei Chung-hse), He Yingqin (Ho Ying-chin), and Feng Yuxiang (Feng Yu-hsiang). When Service was introduced, Madame Chiang mentioned his parents. His immediate impression of the hosts was that the Generalissimo's speech was lengthy and Madame Chiang was gracious. He later recalled that he was a little annoyed with Madame Chiang's comment on his name: "Service--what a lovely name! I hope you will be of service to China."⁴⁷ Despite delicious food and a cordial atmosphere, Service was distrustful of the Chiangs' motivation for such an extravagant occasion. He wrote in his journal: "Even Johnson's departure might not be the cause of such elaborate entertaining if our country did not seem to be on the verge of something or other. Whether justified or not, the Chinese expect a good deal."⁴⁸

Despite a busy schedule and constant complaints from others that Chongqing "was gloomy and insufferable," Service was eager to cultivate the city he had known in his youth.⁴⁹ He wrote to his mother about his search for the old Chongqing:

Occasionally, and in a few places here, I got vivid reminiscences. I think none

are so strong as when I take a sampan (instead of a motorboat or steam launch ferry) and get down close to the old swirling river and then land on the city side where the bank seems one of the few things that hasn't changed. Today something about the beach, and the junks and kids and pigs made me think of the time that we came down by Wu-pan in 1920 and tied up at Chungking.⁵⁰

The heavy damage caused by the bombardments left a deep impression on Service. He vividly pictured his experience while having tea with the British Counselor at his house: "A couple of blasts went off that sounded almost in the room. . . . There was one just under our feet that shook all the dishes and nearly spilled my tea."⁵¹ Nine days after his arrival, he got a chance to walk extensively through the alleys of mud, bamboo, and temporary structures.⁵² In a place where lumber was scarce and bamboo was plentiful, most of the houses and shacks were made of mud and bamboo, and most of them had been destroyed and rebuilt. The war created a major twist to Chongqing: an ancient city with temporary structures. Service was greatly moved by the war-torn old city. "It is really a depressing sight," he observed in his journal:

although the quick reconstruction is wonderful, much of it is makeshift and flimsy. Every building shows signs of bombing and every now and then you come to an area where the destruction has been complete and no attempt to rebuild has been made. But big new streets are continually being opened up and fires should be easier to control this year.⁵³

Optimism and endurance characterized the people of Chongqing and carried them on during the trying years of the war. These high spirits were illustrated in the story of a little shop and its owners. On a street near the government headquarters,

there was a cake and candy shop named "Heaven Knows." The owners, Mr. and Mrs. Wang, had fled from Shanghai. The little shop was destroyed six times by Japanese bombs. But each time they rebuilt it. By the war's end their seventh shop was still standing. Visitors and customers were impressed with their courage and sense of humor. An American observer remarked: "The good humor of Mr. and Mrs. Wang is typical of Chungking. Almost every foreigner who flies over the Hump to visit Chungking comments on the spirit of its residents."⁵⁴ The busy streets with countless little shops and various noises--animal barks, motor-bus horns, marching bands, singing waiters, and yelling newsboys--mingled to form a lively symphony.

Sturdy endurance under reckless Japanese bombing was what made Chongqing great and immortal in the War of Resistance. President Roosevelt expressed his respect to the people of Chongqing in a letter to Generalissimo Chiang on 25 May 1944:

Among the greatest inspirations of this war to the American fighting spirit has been the vivid memory of the great courage which the men, women, and the children of the city of Chungking have displayed during the long period of siege and repeated attacks. By their fortitude and endurance the citizens of Chungking have won a place in the heart of every American.⁵⁵

General Handyman and Sideline Observer

Ambassador Johnson was transferred on 14 May 1941, shortly after Service's arrival. Johnson's departure, after decades of service in China, reflected his anguish and dismay toward the turbulent and wearing country and its war-torn capital. In 1940 he expressed his desperation in a personal letter to the State Department director

of Far Eastern Affairs, Stanley Hornbeck: "Please relieve me and let me go in peace."⁵⁶

The newly arrived ambassador was the able and cynical fifty-five-year old Clarence Gauss. Since 1907 when he had first arrived in Shanghai as deputy consul general, Gauss had spent most of his adult life in China but had never bothered to learn Chinese for "he had the peculiar notion that the study of Chinese could have a corrosive effect on a non-Chinese brain."⁵⁷ His precise and orderly mind was highly prized by the Foreign Service; but his sour, brusque, and pessimistic attitude toward China and the China service made him less than wholly credible both in Chongqing or Washington. One of his subordinates noted, for example, that "when one first met him the smile that grimaced his pallid face . . . was as disconcerting as his customary chill gaze."⁵⁸ In 1944 John Davies asked not be assigned under Gauss' authority because of the ambassador's strong dislike of him.⁵⁹ Barbara Tuchman describes this old "China hand" as too "businesslike:"

Gauss after 30 years of consular service in the country was not a Sinophile with strong feelings one way or another. . . . He had none of the diplomats' professional suavity and cheer. . . . He was businesslike, unremarkable in appearance, a chain smoker of cigars, impatient of the indirect ingratiating methods of the Orient.⁶⁰

Gauss' scornful and moody attitude toward the Chinese came in part from his treaty port experience. He came to China's wartime capital with the persistent belief that China was "only a minor asset to us but could become a major liability." The Chinese who found this Westerner inscrutable were not happy with him, as a

colleague said, "because he is cold and says no."⁶¹ "We have a misfire here as ambassador," one observer informed President Roosevelt in October 1941, five months after Gauss assumed the ambassadorship, "despite his thirty odd years in China, he has never lived among [the Chinese], does not understand them, and conceals very poorly his dislike of them. . . . He resents [it] if they invite him out (and he refused several dinners) but also resents [it] if they don't invite him. . . . Mainly he dislikes crossing the river at night and being with them."⁶² In reference to Gauss's behavior, Davies noted that "Mr. Gauss does not enjoy social gatherings . . . and that he has very few contacts with Chinese and British officials of any description."⁶³

The American embassy in Chongqing was understaffed with only nine people including the ambassador, and it lacked transportation. Without a car, its location away from the city center and the hilly conditions made it hard to commute. Crossing the fast-flowing Yangtze River was difficult; climbing up and down the hill with a sedan chair was even harder, especially at night.⁶⁴ While everybody else depended on the sedan chair, Service walked back and forth between home and office. He wrote to his family: "People could not imagine me walking home last night so more insisted that I take a chair. But I didn't like it. Makes me nervous and I couldn't relax."⁶⁵ It took him about twenty minutes to go down and about fifty minutes to climb up. At one time his colleagues were shocked to see him walking back in heavy rain. He was rather proud of the independence he had gained from the "wretched chairmen" who were shrewd and demanding.⁶⁶ His ability and willingness to walk under difficult conditions produced for him numerous assignments to the city for the embassy. It

proved useful in the absence of a car.

The harsh conditions were made worse by constant Japanese bombings. The embassy's regular work was constantly disrupted and its staff, like the Chinese, lived at the edge of life and death. Against all odds, Gauss was determined to make the embassy work and was fortunately helped by a competent staff, most of whom variably commanded the Chinese language and traveled widely in the country. Despite the lack of close Washington connections enjoyed by his immediate predecessor and other ambassadors like Joseph Grew, he managed to turn his embassy into the best informed one in China.⁶⁷

By early 1941 the grave situation in Europe and Southeast Asia had pushed the United States and China into closer contact, though America continued to pursue the path of neutrality and conciliation with Japan. In February Roosevelt sent one of his administrative assistants, Lauchlin Currie, to Chongqing as his personal emissary. Currie would be put in charge of Lend Lease for China after March 1941.⁶⁸ Following extensive talks with the perceptive and friendly White House agent, Chiang wrote to President Roosevelt on 26 February with cheer and confidence, expressing that China would work with the United States to bring about "a just and lasting peace" and "a better world order."⁶⁹

Roosevelt apparently appreciated the symbolic gifts from the Chiangs brought back by Currie--an album containing a set of stamps issued since the foundation of the Republic of China and the precious scheelite seals. On 9 April he sent Chiang a letter drafted by Currie and the State Department. It assured China of America's moral

support in the War of Resistance: "As you are aware, we are exerting ourselves to be helpful in positive, concrete ways to nations which are resisting armed attack, including your country. We believe wholeheartedly that the causes to which we are committed will win."⁷⁰

The United States made China eligible for Lend-Lease aid ahead of the Soviet Union. After the 15 March informal indication from President Roosevelt and the 5 July formal announcement that China would be eligible for Lend-Lease, military materials began to arrive in China.⁷¹ Compared to other theaters and areas, however, China's Lend-Lease allocation was small due largely to the low priority of Asia in America's strategy and difficulties in transportation. In late July America promised to provide China \$2,400 million worth of war materials by the end of the year.

According to the U.S. Treasury Department records, however, China actually received only \$26 million, which consisted of 1.7 % of the total U.S. Lend-Lease aid that year. And that was a larger percentage of U.S. aid than in any subsequent year except 1945 (1942: 1.5%; 1943: 0.4%; 1944: 0.4%; 1945: 8.0%).⁷²

America's early military aid was nevertheless significant. It also served multiple purposes. It was to promote America's self-interest and security in China; to safeguard the well-being of Sino-American relations; and to make China a strong and democratic stronghold in Asia. These objectives were echoed by numerous military reports and documents.⁷³

After President Roosevelt's 27 May Fireside Chat, Chiang Kai-shek immediately expressed his appreciation for the president's moral support and pressed

for further material aid, asking specifically for 500 airplanes:

The Chinese people are most grateful to you for the reference to our national struggle against Japanese aggression in your fireside chat of May 27th, and also your assurance of continued and increased material assistance. I take this opportunity to thank you most warmly for your approval of \$49,000,000 worth of ordnance for China under the Lease-Lend Bill. May I refer again to our urgent need of airplanes. Through Dr. T.V. Soong I have presented a request for the modest organization of an air unit of 500 airplanes.⁷⁴

The heads of the two countries increased their communication in the summer of 1941. On 8 July, based on the "most reliable source originating from Japan," Chiang informed Roosevelt of a secret treaty concluded on 6 July by Japan, Germany, and Italy. He sought U.S. support for a military alliance between China, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. He wrote to the Chinese ambassador to the United States: "Will you ask the President if he would be in favor of such an arrangement, and if the situation is ripening for a military pact between China, Russia, and Great Britain with the friendly support of the United States."⁷⁵ On 31 July Chiang wrote to Roosevelt to thank the U.S. government for granting China's request to freeze all assets: "I am most grateful to you . . . This is additional evidence of your desire to assist China in every possible way. . . . I am sure that the action of your government in freezing all Japanese assets will prove an important body blow to the aggressor."⁷⁶

Despite the increased communication between Chongqing and Washington, America's continued dealings with Japan made China nervous and the Chinese government felt frequent moments of frustration. In the summer of 1941 the United States and Japan conducted a series of negotiations concerning East Asia. China and

the American embassy were both kept in the dark. The Chinese Foreign Minister, Quo T'ai-chi, called on Gauss several times, asking "are you ready to sell us down the river? Our Ambassador [Dr. Hu Shih] has been told by your Secretary of State that it's necessary to have these discussions with the Japanese. What are you discussing?" "What is going on? What are you people doing? What are you going to do to us?"⁷⁷ Service was brought along each time by the ambassador to prepare the memoranda of the conversations. He noticed the uneasiness of the ambassador every time he was bombarded with questions by the alarmed and agitated Foreign Minister.

The Chinese government felt neglected by the Allied powers. Immediately after the declaration of the Atlantic Charter on 14 August, the Chinese Foreign Minister delivered a warm statement of public endorsement. But in a memorandum to the president, Secretary of State Cornell Hull remarked: "The Ambassador [of China] . . . gently complained that his government has been largely neglected in recent acts and utterances of this government and Great Britain."⁷⁸ Among other things, China was mostly concerned with the possibility of the U.S.'s relaxing its embargo on Japan. On 25 November the nervous Generalissimo wrote to T.V. Soong in Washington:

Please explain to them the gravity of the situation. . . . If, therefore, there is any relaxation of the embargo or freezing regulations, or if a belief of that gains ground, then the Chinese people would consider that China has been completely sacrificed by the United States. . . . The Chinese army will collapse, and the Japanese will be enabled to carry through their plans, so that even if in the future America would come to our rescue the situation would be already hopeless. Such a loss would not be to China alone. . . . We would therefore only request the United States Government to be uncompromising, and announce that if the withdraw of Japanese armies from China is not settled, the question of relaxing of the embargo or freezing could not be considered.⁷⁹

The high-level talks between the United States and Japan also worried various groups in China, including the Communists. Mao Zedong warned the party faithful of a Far East Munich.⁸⁰

As time passed, Gauss became increasingly disturbed with the way Americans functioned in Chongqing--the U.S. economic and military planners who bypassed his office and dealt directly with the Chinese government--and was highly critical of the way Washington conducted diplomacy concerning China. He had regarded the ambassadorship as making him the U.S. authority in Chongqing, but he was constantly ignored and he had little success coordinating American efforts there, which were increasingly expanding and constantly intermingled, especially when the situation in the Pacific became tense.⁸¹

Service understood Gauss, and his impression of his boss had not changed since the Shanghai days. For Service the ambassador was tough, impersonal, and a workaholic who was demanding of himself and his staff. Service noted, for example, that the ambassador "sat down and wrote official despatches or expected his staff to."⁸² Moreover, Gauss lacked sympathy and friends in Washington. "Gauss had no friends in the State Department," Service commented later, "nobody in the State Department really felt any great warmth or sympathy toward him. He was a cold man in many ways. There wasn't this sort of tie with Hornbeck, for instance, that Johnson had had."⁸³

As third secretary at the embassy, Service was assigned various duties. His first job was in the consular and general affairs section. One memorable consular job

Service had performed under Johnson had been issuing a unique “permanent visa” for Madame Chiang’s passport without an expiration date.⁸⁴ Working in the chancery as a chief administrative officer, Service became a handyman, a drafting officer, and a general assistant to the ambassador. He frequently accompanied the ambassador when calling on the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs or other high officials and he prepared frequent memoranda of conversations. Drafting dispatches and telegraphs for the ambassador's signature offered Service a good opportunity for administrative training and brought him closer to the ambassador.⁸⁵ Service later elaborated on his relationship with the ambassador: “Gauss and I were very close. I was sort of like a son to him . . . his own son I think was a disappointment to him. I lived with him in Chongqing for a long time.”⁸⁶

Service and Gauss became indeed very close. Toward the end of 1941 Service moved out of the little house he had shared with second secretary Everett Drumright and another embassy staff member, located on top of the first range owned by the Standard Oil Company. Relocation was to the residence shared by the ambassador and counselor, John Carter Vincent, who came to Chongqing at about the same time as the ambassador.⁸⁷

Service began to build broad contacts with Chinese as well as Americans soon after he arrived in Chongqing. His boyhood in Sichuan and family ties to the province helped him. The American economist, Arthur N. Young, who served in the Chinese government as a financial adviser from 1927 to 1949 was among intimate family friends. Despite different views on the Chinese government and Sino-

American relations, Young later spoke highly of Service.⁸⁸ While Service's first official contacts were with liberal intellectuals who worked for the government, he was on friendly terms with numerous government officials. He became close bridge-partners with some of the well-known intellectuals and high ranking Chinese officials like Jiang Tingfu (T. F. Tsiang), an academic pioneer in the history of China's foreign relations and former ambassador to the Soviet Union,⁸⁹ the Minister of Foreign Affairs and long-term Guomindang member Quo T'ai-ch'i, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and ambassador to Washington Chengting Wang (C.T. Wang), and a number of others in positions of influence and knowledge.⁹⁰ Speaking the local dialect gave Service better access to Chinese circles like the Rotary Club and the Masonic lodge. His easy relations with the local community and his ability to get around impressed his colleagues at the embassy. One of those colleagues, Edward Rice, recalled that one day when he was taking a stroll with Service and another Foreign Service officer Philip Sprouse, Service sniffed the existence of a tiny restaurant in a side alley, ran ahead of them, bought a bowl of meatballs and broth, slurped it down, sprinted back, and caught up with them before they'd covered a block.⁹¹ Service's contacts, as he later contended, "were unusually broad and close, whether with missionaries, businessmen, newspapermen, or Chinese officials."⁹²

Among associates who influenced Service's views on China were American missionaries and China correspondents, including Brooks Atkinson of the New York Times, Eric Sevareid of CBS, and Theodore White. As a Washington journalist who worked in China in 1943 remarked, "Americans, both civilian and military

correspondents all lived rather closely together, and all felt themselves involved in a common cause."⁹³ The embassy was a focal point for all Americans and kept close ties with them. With various passing visitors--officials, missionaries, and correspondents--Service was able to exchange information about China. He recalled years later: "most of these people I met in the normal course of events and from many of them, particularly the missionaries going to and coming from various places in China, I was able to pick up information on conditions. Also many men whom I had previously known were among the correspondents in Chungking and I soon became thoroughly acquainted with the others."⁹⁴ Foreign correspondents contributed to Service's views and were influenced by him in return. While being a Foreign Service officer was his first choice, he said later that becoming a foreign correspondent was his second. "The link, of course," he explained, "is the absorbing quest to observe, understand, and report in depth what is really happening in a foreign society: to get beneath the superficial, pick up the important, underlying trends--and from that basis to try to look into the future."⁹⁵

Service's great interest in the political arena, and the lack of China-trained officers in the Foreign Service, soon brought him to political reporting, largely on volunteer basis. He wrote his first political report on 30 October 1941. It was based on a long talk with the American International Service correspondent, Jack Belden, who had just returned to Chongqing after traveling six months through southwestern China.⁹⁶ Belden had come to China in 1933. At age twenty-eight, he was idealistic and hard-driven. A friend described him as a man with "a sad, ragged, torn,

incredible character."⁹⁷ He was one of the small group of "China hands" who attentively studied China and learned Chinese. He reported the major events after the Japanese seized Beijing and continued their encroachment on southeastern China. He was there to report the agonizing decision the Chinese government made to explode the Yellow River, flooding eleven cities and 4,000 villages, to bog down Japanese military advance and to win time for resistance.⁹⁸ The interview reflected Service's general concern about the plight of the peasantry, the conditions and morale of the army, and the relations between the Communists and the Guomindang government under Chiang Kai-shek.

In his report Service summarized Belden's observations: food shortages were the most serious problem facing the peasantry; good military morale existed, especially among Chinese soldiers; and deteriorating relations between the CCP and GMD showed "no sign of improvement."⁹⁹

Close Ally, Uneasy Partnership

Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 brought China a powerful ally after four difficult years of fighting Japan alone. Immediately after the United States' declaration of war on Japan, the Chinese government cabled Washington to express its sympathy and support. Chiang wrote on 9 December: "in this tragic hour when you too are assailed by the treacherous aggressor the people of China renew their gratitude to the people of the United States for the understanding and help that have given us. To our now common battle we offer all we are and all we have to

stand with you until the Pacific and the world are freed from the course of brute force and endless perfidy."¹⁰⁰

To the Chinese leadership, the U.S. entry into the war would not only ensure ultimate victory over Japan, it would also uplift China from neglect in the background to prominence in the forefront.¹⁰¹ Chinese officials were cheered over the news and did nothing to conceal their feelings. In an internal speech after Pearl Harbor Chiang stated that England and the United States

Had regarded us of little importance, and attempted to use us to exhaust the Japanese. Now the Japanese suddenly attacked England and the United States, China does not need to feel repentant. Half of the danger in our war against Japan is over. In the past, America's containment did not allow Japanese movement into the North or the South, but it did nothing against its westward march. Now the danger of Japan's all out attack on China no longer exist.¹⁰²

Author Han Su-yin vividly described the jubilant feeling on the part of the Chinese after hearing the news of Pearl Harbor:

Almost immediately there were noises in the street, newsboys shouted extras, people surging out of their houses to buy the newspaper, crowding together, the sounds of their voices above the hum of the traffic. . . . Chiang was so happy he sang an old opera aria and played Ave Maria all day. The Kuomintang government officials went around congratulating each other, as if a great victory had been won.¹⁰³

Considering itself the veteran in the war against Japan, China spoke up for common decisions and joint actions against Japan.¹⁰⁴ Chiang invited American and British diplomatic and military representatives in Chongqing to discuss what was to be done after Pearl Harbor. In two conferences on 8 December he outlined his ideas

for a great coalition to share with China the task of defending the Pacific. He suggested that all enemies of the Axis participate in a military alliance and unify their operations under the leadership of the United States and that a joint military war council be established to plan and coordinate the strategy of war in the Pacific.¹⁰⁵

On 23 December Chiang called a joint military conference into formal session, unfortunately its only one. The meeting was large with several delegates from each of the participating countries--China, England, and the United States, plus the Australian minister. Chiang chaired the conference. Immediately there was conflict between China and England. The British general Sir Archibald Wavell, newly appointed Supreme Commander of the ABDA (American-British-Dutch-Australian) nations' front in the Far East, presented three requests at the outset: (1) strengthen air power over British-controlled Burma; (2) provide part of the Lend-Lease weapons allocated to China to defend Burma; and (3) deploy Chinese army to help defend Burma.¹⁰⁶

The joint military conference revealed the deep-seated distrust and hostility between two of the three major Allies. The Chinese leadership understood the importance of Burma as the only gateway to the mainland after the Japanese had closed the China coast. But Chinese generals were offended by the British effort to grab Lend-Lease materials intended for China and to demand China's defense of Burma without offering anything in return. British assertiveness reminded them of Britain as the dominant imperialist power, the original aggressor against China's sovereignty, and originator of the unequal treaties. The British had just snatched 150 trucks of Lend-Lease supplies already allocated to China. General Ho Yingchin was

so disillusioned that he declared that "China is willing to return all the Lend-Lease materials in Burma and end cooperation with England and Burma."¹⁰⁷ However, Chiang, trying to pull the coalition together, agreed with the principles underlying Wavell's requests. He stated that "the three points General Wavell put forward are technical issues, I therefore agree with the principle of them . . . British and American's battle is China's battle, and vice versa."¹⁰⁸ At breakfast on 24 December, Chiang told Wavell that "neither China nor England can afford to lose, therefore, if Britain needs, we can send 80,000 forces to Burma to fight the Japanese." Wavell replied: "It would be a humiliation to England if China liberates Burma. We only hope that China can let us use the American Lend-Lease allocated to China." Chiang replied: "Chinese have a motto 'man cannot establish himself without trust.' Britain and China are now friends in adversity. We should provide mutual help and understanding. If Britain needs to borrow Lend-Lease material like the late 150 trucks, please consult us." Wavell was reportedly embarrassed and promised to investigate the truck issue of which he pleaded ignorance.¹⁰⁹

China's appeal for collective action against Japan failed, and the first joint military conference was the last and the only one. Chiang's attempt to set up a joint military command center in Chongqing was doomed to fail in the reality of China's lack of military strength, America's Europe-first strategy, and Britain's unwillingness to recognize China as an equal partner. Herbert Feis further explains that "the expectation that other Allies would center effective powers of decision over the vast Pacific area in Chungking was unrealistic in view both of their states of mind and the

condition of their military forces. It was out of proportion because it implied that Chiang should be given an active, and possibly superior, part in determining the use of armed forces and resources far stronger than those of China."¹¹⁰

Churchill and Roosevelt agreed at their 24 December meeting to organize two combined commands--one for the Southwest Pacific and one for China. They agreed to the appointment of a supreme commander of American, Dutch, Australian, and British forces in the Southwest Pacific Theater to coordinate the common effort. At Roosevelt's suggestion, they also agreed to have Chiang assume supreme command of all forces of the united powers operating within the China theater. The American-British proposal did not make any military commitments to send troops to the Chinese or schedule large operations in the China Theater, nor did it ensure China any large share of the total military production of the Allies. However, it did give China a sense of shared authority. Chiang was delighted to receive Roosevelt's letter of 31 December, inviting him to assume the supreme command, and was quick to accept the position. On 6 January 1942, four days after his acceptance of the supreme commanding position in the China Theater, he asked Roosevelt to appoint an American officer to be chief of the joint general staff to serve under him. In reality the joint general staff of allied forces in the China theater was never organized.¹¹¹

China's attempts to gain international recognition and great power status coincided with America's design of making China as one of the major powers for the postwar world. Roosevelt desired "a united, democratically progressive, and cooperative China" capable of functioning as a counterweight to the Soviet Union,

and open to U.S. commercial penetration.¹¹² He envisaged a grand future for Asia, one in which the U.S. and China would cooperate to construct a new order. "China was to be treated as a great friend so that it would become a great power, a great friend eventually helping the United States to keep order and peace in the Far East."¹¹³

Roosevelt further revealed his great hope for China in a White House meeting with T.V. Soong on 16 July 1943:

I have been telling Churchill that the Chinese are much clever than the Japanese, who are just imitators. . . . China is very much bigger than Japan and has given remarkable proof of her vitality and has made astounding progress. But this progress should be accelerated so that China should become a great power. Indeed, I believe she will become the greatest power in the world. . . . you must talk with the greatest confidence in the Chinese people and future of China. . . . I want to put China in the sun even before she has the economic power.¹¹⁴

When the United Nations declaration was drafted, Roosevelt personally made sure that China was among the four founding members.¹¹⁵ On New Year's Day 1942, he invited Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, T.V. Soong, to the White House to sign the declaration along with Churchill and the Russian ambassador.¹¹⁶ Twenty-six countries joined the United Nations declaration.

Chiang was overwhelmed by the dramatic change in China's status as well as international affairs during the last month of 1941. He wrote in his diary: "President Roosevelt particularly congratulated T.V. for China's four power status, which makes me ashamed and apprehensive." In his January 1942 monthly introspection he again highlighted his feelings:

Since the twenty-six-country declaration of the United Nations . . . China has become one of the four powers. And after I became the Supreme-commander of the China Theater, Vietnam and Thailand were also included in the theater. China's prestige and status have reached its historical height. Fearful of being harmed by the luring title, how can I not to be cautious and uneasy?¹¹⁷

The Sino-American alliance in the war also opened the door for unprecedented American influence over China. And the American embassy was eager to use the leverage in an attempt to make China meet the standards and expectations of the United States. The result was repeated disillusionment and frustration, highlighted in the loan controversy of December 1941 and early 1942. On 30 December, the Chinese government approached the United States for a \$500 million political loan. The Chinese Minister of Finance, H. H. Kung, later explained in a letter to the U.S. Secretary of Treasury that "my reason for approaching you is political above all. . . . so as to demonstrate that China's confidence in the allied powers is matched by equal confidence in China of the allied powers, in the crucial months of emergency immediately before us."¹¹⁸

Upon receiving the Chinese request, Gauss sparred with Chiang over terms of the loan. Gauss asked for a list of specific Chinese needs. When the request was declined, he was so disturbed and angry that he rejected an invitation to the New Year's Eve party given by the Chinese government. Following Gauss decision, Counselor Vincent also declined the invitation, despite his apparent "disappointment."¹¹⁹

The American embassy at this time combined two distinctive viewpoints. First, there were those like the ambassador who embodied the old imperious treaty

port spirit; they looked at China as America's ward. Second, there were those who appreciated Sino-American relations with fresh zeal, who longed to create "a new society of dynamic possibilities." Among these liberal "China hands" were Counselor and First Secretary John Carter Vincent and John Service.¹²⁰ Yet, the conservative ambassador and his liberal counselor jointly opposed the loan for different reasons, and they cabled Washington to urge that strings be attached to the loan. Gauss cautioned against an unrestricted loan that could be used by "the retrogressive, self-seeking, and . . . fickle elements" in Chinese ruling circles.¹²¹ To him, the loan must be used on currency reform, industrial production, and other economic reforms. Vincent, however, wanted to use the loan as a political lever to bring about political reform in the government. Service was more in line with Vincent. He remarked that the Chinese government seized every opportunity "for heavy demands in the way of financial and military aid;"¹²² he expressed support for the effort to keep enough strings on the loan to at least be able to advise on its use.

Roosevelt and his advisers had no intentions of following the advise of the embassy. Washington's priority was to send most American military and economic assistance to England and Russia, but to seize every opportunity to reassure Chiang and thus keep China in the war.¹²³ The departments of state, war, and treasury jointly urged Congress to authorize the loan. Congress passed it unanimously on 6 February 1942. The next day Roosevelt cabled Chiang, notifying him of the action which Washington saw as a sign of faith in the common cause.¹²⁴

Washington's decision angered both Gauss and Vincent. The Counselor lost

his temper upon hearing Washington's decision. He wrote to Hull, arguing that China's cessation of resistance was "so remote . . . that it is hardly worth consideration. Internal factors . . . were the key to China's resistance. . . . America's policy should be based on a realistic assessment of Chinese capabilities and allied necessities . . . [the] needs in other theaters of war." In a letter to his wife, Vincent stated that the U.S. should have informed the Chinese that "under the present circumstances we cannot give effective aid."¹²⁵ Washington's decision also had a depressing impact on Gauss. He viewed Roosevelt's rejection of his position on the loan as one more indication to him that his views on China counted little with the State Department or the White House. He became more withdrawn, avoiding almost all of the important social functions attached to his office.

In the spring of 1942, Sino-American relations were put to a further test with the arrival of Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell. General Stilwell arrived in China in early March with a multi-functional mission. He was to serve as Chief of Staff and field commander for the Generalissimo, to represent the U.S. government on any international war council in China, to control U.S. Lend-Lease aid to China, and to improve, maintain, and control the Burma Road to China.¹²⁶ The unsettling question of command imposed a "hell of mental load" on him, as he himself described it.¹²⁷ He had to deal with the complicated command relations--getting orders from Chiang as his chief of staff, from the U.S. in regard to the use of U.S. troops and materials; from the British officer in regard to operations in Burma. His mission would later prove to be terribly frustrating to him. His first meeting with the Generalissimo was, however,

pleasant and encouraging. "Now I don't have to wake up in a blue funk every morning and wonder what the hell I can do to justify my existence,"¹²⁸ noted Stilwell. The American was apparently happy to hear one of the Chinese generals referring him as the number two man in China. His positive first impression of both the Generalissimo and other Chinese leaders soon faded in the futility of the Burma campaign, which lasted from March to early May 1942.

Stilwell's first job was to work with the British to defend Burma with the command of the Chinese Fifth and Sixth Armies, an arduous and overwhelming assignment from the start. The first problem was military strategy. Both Chiang and Stilwell recognized the importance of the Burma campaign and were offended by the British, but they differed on the proper strategy for the Burma campaign. Stilwell wanted a swift offensive, "Let's go before they build up." Chiang preferred a defensive war. He cautioned that it would take five Chinese soldiers against one Japanese for offensive purposes, and he was not ready to risk his best divisions in Burma where the British were likely to run away. He was able to persuade Stilwell that his strategy made "a lot of good sense."¹²⁹

Many frustrations soon developed in Burma. Stilwell complained about the confusing chain of command, the Generalissimo's letters to his field commanders, and their reluctance to take Stilwell's orders. "If my suggestions run counter what they think he wants they offer endless objections," Stilwell wrote. "I can't shoot them; I can't relieve them. . . . So the upshot of it is that I am the stooge who does the dirty work and takes rap."¹³⁰ This problem was resolved after Chiang went down to Burma

to clarify Stilwell's authority. But within a month, the situation became so desperate that Chiang appealed to England for immediate help. On 17 April he wrote to Churchill, complaining that the Chinese had been fighting in Burma for almost a month, and had not yet received a single machine or the expected Allied air help and protection. Churchill's immediate reply was simple; nothing could be done.¹³¹

Without sufficient supplies and air protection, Chiang's worst nightmare had come true, and Burma was soon lost. In face of the massive Japanese forces on wheels and in the air, Stilwell urged that all available forces be rushed into a Chinese offensive while the British held on to their positions. When the British were trapped, he had to send his Chinese reserve forces to rescue the British while the Chinese line was being crushed. When the Burma road was cut, Stilwell and part of his remaining Chinese forces retreated to India. He painfully admitted that "we got a hell of a beating."¹³²

The loss of Burma had devastating effects on China. All land and sea routes to China were now closed. The only way by which the Chinese could procure anything from outside was by air--from India over the high Himalayas. The Japanese marched into China along the Burma Road. After strenuous fighting, Chinese forces with the help of the Fourteenth Air Force (formerly American Volunteer Group) under General Chennault stopped the Japanese at the doorstep of Yunnan. In Chongqing, gloom deepened, and disappointment mounted. The Chinese government had hoped that the U.S. participation in the war would help China strengthen its position against Japan; but five months later, the situation was worse than ever.

The fiasco of Burma produced fault-finding, charges and counter-charges between Chiang and his Chief of Staff. The Chinese government believed that three factors were responsible for the disaster--little equipment had been provided to the forces in Burma, which lacked planes and artillery; the British commanders mismanaged the fight and their forces failed to do their part; and, without understanding the conditions of the war, Stilwell rashly risked the best units of the Chinese army. To Stilwell, however, the defeat was caused by local hostility, lack of air protection, inferior equipment, poor transportation and communication, a defeatist attitude by the British, and, particularly, interference by Chiang.¹³³

The Burma Campaign further divided American experts over the issue of U.S. China policy. Hornbeck called for a reexamination of America's Europe-first strategy. He asked: "Is there not something wrong about a strategy . . . which in theory or in practice would call for investing everything in several scattered theaters and investing absolutely nothing in a theater which, if occupied by the enemy, would mean the loss of a useful ally." He argued constantly that the only way to maintain China's confidence was to "deliver goods." But the embassy in Chongqing held a different view, as revealed in Vincent's diary: "Let Burma remain fallen, and get on with the war. Let the Chinese continue to resist as they have . . . for the past five years--and get on with the war."¹³⁴

Chiang was baffled by the Anglo-American treatment of his government. He was even more resentful that the respected American government would not trust him with the control of the Lend-Lease allocation within his own country, as it did the

British and the Russians. This discriminatory treatment constantly reminded him of the recent Chinese history of humiliation imposed by Western powers. In April he cabled his Foreign Minister T.V. Soong in Washington to have a heart-to-heart talk with Roosevelt and clarify the confusion in Sino-American relations. Chiang explained:

As you know, I have to fight continually against demoralizing doubts on the part of my officers, who concluded that American attitude towards China is in essence no different from what held by other nations, that both in the all-important matters of joint-staff conferences and war supplies, China is treated not as an equal like Britain and Russia, but as a ward. The president has consistently shown himself to be the one great friend of China, and I may say on our part we have been loyally responsive. We have placed Chinese armies under American command, and we have shown every readiness to support American policies, sometimes even against our own judgment.¹³⁵

Chiang's frustration and dismay were shared by Hornbeck who complained in May that, despite the president's liberal and positive promises to provide China with adequate planes, "somewhere, somehow, orders became modified, allocations are pared down, diversions were made . . . the transport service upon which the Chinese have relied as a sort of last hope does not materialize."¹³⁶ He continued to argue that the number of planes needed to aid China was "ridiculously small in comparison with the relatively huge numbers that we are sending to other fronts."¹³⁷

Chiang's resentment mounted as time passed. The repeated transfer of Lend-Lease materials resulted in less than ten percent of the promised materials actually being delivered to China, a clear sign to him that China was being slighted. This translated to antagonism toward Stilwell who controlled the Lend-Lease in China.

Chiang was direct in his charges to the American, saying that "as Chief of Staff to me, you are responsible for seeing to it that the promised material is forthcoming."¹³⁸

Despite his equal hostility to Chiang, Stilwell had to admit that "we failed in all our commitments, and blithely tell him to just carry on, old top."¹³⁹ Chiang's anger was justifiable by the fact that China was being called upon to aid in the defense of other countries but got no guarantee that others would contribute to China's war effort in return. He was being asked and had offered to send Chinese troops into Burma. He was being asked to allow a squadron of the American Volunteer Group, which had been recruited to protect China, to fight in Burma and agreed to do so. He was being asked to give up Lend-Lease supplies designated for China which were on the docks of Rangoon.¹⁴⁰

During the months that followed, Stilwell tried to force his plan of recovering Burma to reopen the supply route to China and to save his "face" after the terrible loss of the first Burma campaign. Chiang had concluded that China could not afford to take more risks in Burma, despite its vital importance, without an Anglo-American commitment and guaranteed air protection. With increased frustrations, Stilwell grew impatient. Despite his discontent with the Allied lack of commitment and the constant reallocation of equipment, he blamed Chiang for the stalemate. After an unpleasant conversation with Chiang, he wrote on 16 June that the Chinese government was a structure "based on fear and favor" and that it was in the hands of "an ignorant, arbitrary, stubborn man." He concluded that "only outside influence can do anything for China--either enemy action will smash her or some regenerative idea must be

formed and put into effect at once."¹⁴¹

Stilwell's view of Chiang and China would later translate into recommendations that Washington reduce its military aid to China and reallocate materials urgently needed elsewhere. On 24 June the U.S. Tenth Air Force designated to assist China was assigned to Egypt with Stilwell's consent but without consulting Chiang. At the same time another squadron of light bombers en route to China was detained in Egypt. And a number of transport aircraft already in service on the China air line were transferred to the Near East. When Chiang complained, Stilwell cabled Washington stating, with some exaggeration, that Chiang was angry and demanded an explanation of America's interest in the China theater. Meanwhile in Washington, Soong was informed by the War Department that America would stop sending supplies to India for the China theater after July since there were ample stocks there. Soong replied with bitterness: "if it is so, there is no need for us to be in Washington, and the relating Chinese agencies in Washington should therefore be closed and sent back to China."¹⁴²

In late June the presidential envoy and Lend-Lend representative Currie returned to Chongqing for a 16-day tour. Currie's presence annoyed Ambassador Gauss who had always resented the president's out of channel dealings with China. While the Chinese government gave Currie unprecedented attention, Gauss remained ignored and isolated in his residence on the south bank. The ambassador felt, according to his first secretary, "boxed, bottled, and pitched."¹⁴³

Service was assigned by Gauss to assist Currie and accompany him on tours of

Chinese arsenals and industrial plants.¹⁴⁴ But the presidential envoy was influenced by views of his Chinese hosts more than any embassy personnel. The Generalissimo seized every opportunity to explain the gloomy situation and his discontent with Stilwell. "Stilwell, as my Chief of Staff, is my subordinate," Chiang complained,

But he constantly exercises the power as the President's representative, which has made me puzzle at how to properly treat him. . . . About the issue of requesting five hundred airplanes, he did not follow my order to request, nor did he explain why he would not apply. I do not usually weigh materials very much. . . . It was not in my mind to get U.S. supplies when I asked the United States to recommend a Chief of Staff. I hope you would explain this to President Roosevelt.¹⁴⁵

It was during this conversation that the issue of recalling Stilwell first surfaced.

Chiang claimed that "whether Stilwell should be recalled is up to the United States government. I will not express my opinion."¹⁴⁶

The slow reaction from the White House over the Stilwell issue prompted Chiang to lay his cards on the table after the Currie visit. On 29 July he stated China's minimum requirements and sent them to Washington through Stilwell: (1) three U.S. divisions to India, to cooperate with the Chinese to establish communications in Burma; (2) 500 combat airplanes to operate from China beginning in August and to be maintained thereafter at that strength; (3) after August, monthly transport deliveries over the Hump at a minimum of 5,000 tons. This would increase the volume of aid then coming by air to China fifty times. Stilwell supported such a request in order to facilitate his Burma campaign, but he refused to forward it with his recommendation.¹⁴⁷ Fearing China's collapse and a separate peace with Japan,

Washington agreed to meet a modified version of the three requests, without sending American forces.

Currie's mission to China had a substantial influence on Roosevelt's view of the problems in China. Believing that difficulties in China were caused by differences in personalities between Chiang and Stilwell, Roosevelt told Currie: "I cannot help feeling that the whole situation depends on the problem of personalities rather than on strategic plans." He decided to "get the right people" to China.¹⁴⁸ He considered recalling Stilwell and approached his Chief of Staff, General George Marshall, through Currie. The meeting between Currie and Marshall was unpleasant. Marshall's apparent arrogance made Currie uncomfortable. When Currie told Marshall that the president wanted Stilwell relieved, the general asked "is he sending you around to tell me?" When he learned that Currie had gone to China for three weeks, Marshall departed after an awkward period of silence.¹⁴⁹ The president was not ready to give up at this initial rejection. "What is the situation in regard to Stilwell in China?" asked Roosevelt who wrote to the General directly that "apparently the matter is so involved between him and the Generalissimo that I suppose Stilwell would be more effective in some other field." But Marshall and Secretary of War Henry Stimson persuaded the president that it would be impossible to find anyone better than Stilwell as replacement. They argued that Stilwell was most suited for the job, for the person to carry out the reopening of Burma must be an American and a troop leader rather than a negotiator or supply man to promote harmony in Chongqing, although harmony in Chongqing would have made all

problems less obtrusive.

The difficulties between Stilwell and Chiang remained a thorn in Sino-American relations and were well known to Chinese officials and America's "China hands." In a long letter to Ambassador Gauss, Davies, then attached to Stilwell's staff and working as Stilwell's press man, explained the problems his boss encountered in terms of China's policy of relying on the United States to defeat Japan; and Stilwell's involvement in domestic Chinese politics:

A fundamental difficulty which faces General Stilwell is that China's policy in the prosecution of this war is not always parallel to ours. . . . All informed Chinese are keenly aware that of the four principal members of the United Nations, China has suffered the longest and the greatest in this conflict. . . . China's policy, now we are fighting the Japanese, is to remain technically in the war so as to be able to sit at the peace table as a "fighting" ally, to expend as little as possible its strength and to rely upon other members of the United Nations--primarily the United States--to defeat Japan.

A second fundamental difficulty confronting General Stilwell is that, in addition to his professional military task, he is involved, whether he likes it or not, in Chinese domestic politics. He is a major force in Chinese politics . . . he commands a military force in China, is empowered to issue orders in the Generalissimo's name and has under his control Lend-Lease material for distribution to China makes him, despite all of his wishes to the contrary, a Chinese political factor. While he endeavors to avoid playing domestic politics, he cannot prevent politics from being played on him.

Chinese and Americans have criticized [him] for getting on badly with the Chinese. General Stilwell is not a man who will willingly compromise. He has not concealed from the Chinese what he thinks of their incompetence and corruption. Naturally, many of them have thereby been offended. . . . China is badly in need of the Puritan spirit. The Chinese have not produced it themselves excepting, in a modified form, in the Generalissimo.¹⁵⁰

Field Observer and Political Reporter

During the bitter infighting between Chiang and Stilwell, Service's view of the GMD and Sino-American relations underwent a significant transformation from optimism in 1941 to despondency by 1942. Like most "China hands" who had shared high hopes for China to play an active role in the war against Japan, Service became disappointed in the Chinese government, its conduct of the war, and its handling of domestic issues. He explained in 1950 that the central government was already in decline in the summer of 1941 when it was disastrously defeated in the Zhongtiaoshan battle in North China. "We could see from month to month, even from our limited observation point of Chungking a deterioration within China. . . . The closing of the Burma Road and the isolation of China were important factors but not the whole explanation of [the] Chinese inability to take effective measures against inflation, speculation, and official corruption."¹⁵¹

If Service's first political report in 1941 was based on hearsay and second hand information, his work thereafter would rely largely on firsthand experiences, eyewitness observations, and direct contact with ordinary people. In the spring of 1942 after the United States had gone to war with Japan, the State Department sent a long, elaborate questionnaire requesting information on morale, psychological warfare, and propaganda agencies in China. Service was assigned to write the report. He talked to "everyone that [he] could think of that knew something about the field," including many Chinese as well as foreigners. He collected information from all sorts of sources such as wall posters and prisoners.¹⁵²

In the report Service provided insight into the political, social, and economic situation in China. He concluded that the Guomintang was a dictatorship which gave the party a monopoly of propaganda. He reported the conflict between the Communists and Guomintang in the areas close to or under Japanese occupation, and the Communists' efforts to "arouse and unite" the people and their guerrilla activities. He emphasized the effects of general war-weariness and economic hardship.¹⁵³ To Service, such work was "perplexing" and "un-State Department," but he did it well. It provided chances for him to contact more people and stimulated his interests in domestic Chinese politics. He made similar reports in later years.

Preferring field observation to "monotonous desk work in the embassy,"¹⁵⁴ Service began his field travel as early as April of 1942. Through a missionary contact he was invited to visit the irrigation works in Sichuan operated by the provincial government. With the ambassador's permission Service took a ten-day trip. He gained firsthand knowledge of the irrigation conditions in central Sichuan and broadened his connections.¹⁵⁵ Also, during the discord surrounding the failed Burma campaign, Service was sent out to collect information and report on Chinese morale and conditions.

Service's most important field trip in China was his journey to the western provinces in the summer of 1942. In July, after finishing up the report on psychological warfare, he attended a China Society of Engineers Conference in Lanzhou, Gansu province, and visited the newly-developed oil fields in the region. Service was the only foreigner in the group made up of government engineers,

engineering professors, and a few newspaper men. He was delighted to be the first foreigner to visit the oil fields and to be able to travel through an extensive area which had not been visited by American officers for a number of years.¹⁵⁶

The trip was pleasant and emotional to Service. Others in the group were his age, and he could easily get along with them, living and eating completely like a Chinese. He was liked and treated as an insider by his Chinese fellows. They called him "Chinese American." It was the first time he felt that he was "completely accepted as a friend by the Chinese on a very intimate basis."¹⁵⁷ Such feelings filled, in a unconscious way, the long felt need that had "missed a great deal" in his youth. He had had many contacts with the Chinese, in Kunming, in Beijing, in Shanghai, and in Chongqing, but those were mostly official duties and business dealings. In Kunming, Service had lived within the compact foreign community, and he did not know any "real" Chinese; in Beijing and Shanghai, his range broadened, but the Chinese he got to know were either older generations with fixed ideas or young students with western education and western pretensions.¹⁵⁸ Service liked the group of young Chinese intellectuals who were educated and open-minded, "modern in every sense, but not aping the West;" patriotic but not attempting to cover up any unpleasant facts about China.¹⁵⁹

The trip was also educational. Traveling the road from Chengdu to Lanzhou was visiting more than two thousand years of Chinese history. Service and his companions saw places mentioned in the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, crossed the headwaters of the Han river, and passed through the place where General Zuo

Zongtang (Tso Tsung T'ang) had led his army to re-pacify Xinjiang. He observed famous inscriptions on ancient temples, and walked on the old Silk Road. At the Dunhuang (Tunhuang) Temple he was overwhelmed by thousands of magnificent frescoes dating back to the Tang dynasty. This trip to China's ancient west made a deep impression on Service. During the long journey he saw the footsteps of Chinese civilization and pitiful sights of the current conditions: starvation, forced recruits and death on the road. "More clearly than in Chungking," he recalled, "I was able to see the effects of inflation, official corruption, speculation, thought control of students and professors, the working of the secret police, the operation of a vicious conscription system, and the disastrously heavy military impositions which in some areas were forcing farmers to abandon land."¹⁶⁰

Service was also able to pass through the government blockade around the Communist area for the first time. He saw the lines of blockhouses and the idle concentration of government troops. He talked to missionaries living in the region and to Chinese who had crossed the lines into the Communist districts, even though none of the Chinese he traveled with were Communists. But the impression he obtained from talking to local people was that the Guomindang was in decline and inevitably there would be a GMD-CCP civil war. When asked their preference for a victory in such a struggle, many pointed to the Communists.¹⁶¹

When the group arrived in Lanzhou in late September, Service learned that the defeated Republican presidential candidate, Wendell Willkie, was being sent to China by President Roosevelt via Lanzhou from the Soviet Union during his 49-day world

by President Roosevelt via Lanzhou from the Soviet Union during his 49-day world tour to promote his "one-world" philosophy of international relations. Service decided that, since he was there, he should go and welcome the president's envoy. He rushed to meet Willkie only to realize that Willkie took no notice of him. He was not invited to a reception dinner. He concluded that it was "Chinese tactics that . . . try to isolate these visitors from as much local American contact as possible."¹⁶²

While Service continued his field travel in western China, Willkie went on to Chongqing. His arrival in the Chinese war-time capital generated great delight among the Chinese and deep dismay in the embassy. On 1 October, the first day of the infamous Chongqing "October mist," the gloomy sky was seemingly brightened by Willkie's arrival, the most high profile American to visit China since ex-President Ulysses S. Grant had come in 1879. The Nationalist government had long sensed the importance of Willkie's China mission as an excellent opportunity to get American aid. When Willkie's airplane landed at Xiping Ba airfield, all important government officials were there except Generalissimo Chiang and Lin Sen, president of the national government.¹⁶³ Those present included H.H. Kung, Zhang Qun, He Yingqing, Sun Ke (Sun Fo), Wang Shijie, and Chen Lifu.¹⁶⁴

Willkie's mission was to examine China's military strength and to inform the Chinese government of the U.S. decision to abandon all unequal treaties, action which compelled Britain to respond in kind. The British informed the Chinese government on 9 October that they would also discard their unequal treaties. This was indeed exhilarating news to Chiang. In his 10 October diary the Generalissimo claimed:

“Received proclamations from the United States and Great Britain to voluntarily give up extraterritoriality. This was the utmost life-long ambition of the late Premier. Today it is achieved in my hands. My heart is filled with happiness. It is truly the most fortunate thing ever in my life.”¹⁶⁵ He praised the American effort as having “lighted a light to guide man's progress on the road to equality and freedom for all the people.”¹⁶⁶ Three weeks later on 31 October he addressed the People's Political Council concerning the abolition of unequal treaties and stressed the importance of nationalism. He claimed that “the principle on Nationalism has first to be applied. Then obstacles to the solution of problems involved in the application of the principles of people's sovereignty and livelihood would be removed.”¹⁶⁷

Many of the “China hands” were not impressed with Willkie's dynamic performance during his visit. John K. Fairbank recorded his impression of the Willkie trip in his diary: “Nothing could have demonstrated for us more dramatically the cultural gap between China and America. The visitor, full of bounce and gusto, projected his personality American-style to gain favor and win votes from people who were not voting. It was like an African chief performing his tribal dances before Eskimos.”¹⁶⁸

Service got a chance to hear Willkie's speech in Xian. He was appalled when he realized that Willkie's meaning was apparently deliberately changed when it came out of the tongue of the Chinese interpreter, who was the Minister of Information. When Willkie said that “he'd looked into the eyes of the common man of China and he realized what Chinese aspirations were, what the common men of the China

wanted," the "common men" became "China" when it was translated into Chinese. Service believed that the U.S. practice of not training interpreters and relying on interpreters in the host country should be changed. He explained that the reason U.S. government officials preferred foreign translation was that "they did not want the State Department to know what they were doing."¹⁶⁹

During his trip in western China, Service became increasingly concerned about China's wartime conditions and the livelihood of its people. When he learned about the severe famine in Henan province, he decided to go there for a firsthand observation. He started his three-day journey on 14 October, proceeding from Xian to Luoyang, the capital of Henan. The information he obtained was extensive. He talked with many informed Chinese officials and relief agents, and studied their reports. He saw for himself the miseries of the peasantry and the haggard starving refugees on the road, hoping somehow that moving could help them evade the grave. He felt pain through their sufferings: "the woman may be one more mouth to feed; the man will be needed to plant and harvest the new crop, he may earn something by selling his strength as a coolie on the labor market, or he may lead the family out of the famine area, pushing the few essential possessions on a wheelbarrow."¹⁷⁰

The causes of the disaster, Service judged, were both natural conditions and social oppression. The drought in Henan had reduced the spring and summer crops to approximately 20% of the normal harvest. But the drought itself would not cause a famine. The war and the brutal oppression in the area made the situation worse. Some even called the disaster "a man-made famine."¹⁷¹ In his 5 November report

“The Famine in Honan Province,” Service talked at length about the burden of the peasantry, the heavy taxation and the great amount of grain requisitioned by the military. He discussed the relief problems and government role in the disaster. He concluded that corruption among local officials and oppression of the peasantry were the big problems. He saw no sign of immediate upheaval but said depression and discontent were universal.¹⁷²

His extensive field observation, from Chengdu to Lanzhou then to Henan, proved a turning point in Service’s China career. As soon as he returned to Chongqing in late November, he wrote the “most important reports on the oil fields and the Honan famine.”¹⁷³ He later recalled that after the trip he became an outside man and field observer, an independent operator and reporter.¹⁷⁴ It was a great opportunity for Service to learn more about China and substantiate his perspectives on the Chinese government. And he was eager to share them with his associates, particularly those of influence in Washington when he was ordered back to the United States for consultation in early December.

Back in Washington, Service found himself in demand. He was the first political reporter on China in town since Pearl Harbor and the first officer from Chongqing since December 1941. He was asked to talk to the State Department Far East staff meeting, to brief the White House China expert Lauchlin Currie, and to meet with journalists specializing in East Asian affairs.¹⁷⁵

Fresh from China and equipped with broad field observations, Service was distressed by outdated information and limited visions of Washington’s China

specialists. Extensive talks with them convinced him that these experts needed fresh knowledge of China. He realized that the presiding patriarchs of the Far East, Maxwell Hamilton, and particularly the long-established authoritarian Stanley Hornbeck, had not actually been in China for "a great many years," and did not understand the current Chinese situation.¹⁷⁶ Currie, the White House "man on China," was keen on getting current information and approached Service for his personal letters from the field as a source of information. The old Foreign Service officer on China, Clarence Spiker, also called Service for a meeting. Spiker had spent his entire career in China but his knowledge about that country, Service felt, was rather superficial. He was impressed by Service's explanation of the different groups and factions in the ruling Guomindang. After broad contact and extensive talks with the Washington circle, Service concluded that "State Department knowledge of China was fairly superficial;" and that U.S. China policy could not be made merely in Washington, but should be based on realistic assessments from the field.¹⁷⁷ Other "China hands" concurred with Service's view. Fairbank, for example, wrote to Washington months later arguing that "the failure of persons in responsible position to keep in touch with the field through personal experience in the field is, I believe, most unhealthy intellectually and represents a considerable danger to the success of American policy."¹⁷⁸

By the end of 1942 Service's views of the Chinese government and the ruling Guomindang had greatly changed. Firsthand observation and constant contact with liberal groups, including Communist representatives, convinced him that the United

Front was nothing but an empty shell and that a civil war was inevitable. Davies at the time jumped to the same conclusions as Service that the civil war in China was inevitable, it was only a matter of time.¹⁷⁹ Service's views first shocked his wife, Caroline, who had stayed in California with their children and her parents throughout the war years. Caroline recalled years later:

I remember what a shock it was when he came home in December 1942 and said there was going to be civil war. . . . the thing that shocked me was that Jack was already saying that there was going to be civil war in China probably. You see, what he was talking about, was not so much what the Japanese were doing in China, but what was going to happen in China after the war. . . . This was all something which I had never heard of or read of in the paper.¹⁸⁰

After impressions gained from his eight-month work in Chongqing and extensive travels through southwest and northwest China, Service had become extremely pessimistic about the future of China. His attitude was noticed by several officers in Washington and they suggested that he convey his observations in a formal memorandum to the State Department.

On 23 January 1943, while still in Washington for consultation, Service wrote a summery report on China, particularly on GMD-CCP relations. He pointed out the dangerous trends in China as he saw it. He claimed that the United Front was "definitely a thing of the past," and that it was impossible to find any optimism for its resurrection as long as the current leadership of GMD was in power. In short, he believed that a civil war was inevitable. He warned about the implications of this disunity on the immediate war effort as well as on China's political and social conditions:

Non-Communist Chinese of my acquaintance . . . consider the likelihood of the civil war the greatest problem facing China. . . . Belief in the certainty of eventual civil war leads the same Chinese to question whether the United States has given sufficient realist consideration to the future in China of democracy. The question is raised whether it is to China's advantage, or to America's own interests, for the United States to give the Guomindang Government large quantities of military supplies which, judging from past experience, are not likely to be used effectively against Japan but will be available for civil war to enforce "unity" in the country by military force.¹⁸¹

It was evident to Service that it was in the interests of the United State to make effort to prevent a deterioration of China's internal political situation. He mentioned the suggestions of Zhou Enlai that America would be "the only force" that could influence the Guomindang to reform.¹⁸² Service also proposed ways in which the United States could influence the Guomindang and help to improve conditions in China. He reported Zhou's proposal that the American government emphasize the nature of the war as "democracy against Fascism;" that the United States give some recognition of the Communist army as a participant in the war against Japanese fascism; and that the best way to do so be to send representatives to the Communist area.

Service's report was apparently influenced by Zhou Enlai. As the Communist representative in Chongqing, Zhou contacted the embassy frequently. He and the visiting Communist commander, Lin Biao, had had a long talk with Service and Vincent on 20 November 1942. In the interview Zhou and Lin suggested that the U.S. influence the GMD to improve conditions in China, to address America's hope for Chinese democracy, to recognize the CCP as an anti-Japanese force, and to give part

of Lend-Lease aid to the Communists.¹⁸³

Service's extensive 23 January 1943 report on GMD-CCP relations was the first such memorandum in the State Department. John Davies, another expert on GMD-CCP relations among the "China hands" did not compile his first memorandum on the issue until June 1943.¹⁸⁴ Service's call for America's active intervention in Chinese domestic affairs was a departure from the old school diplomats who opposed interference in the domestic affairs of other nations. He insisted that it was in America's interest to respond and promote political change in China.

Service's memorandum attracted the Department's attention and sparked "waves of consternation and disapproval."¹⁸⁵ It was obvious to Service that his views presented a challenge, in a way, that touched the nerves of the old-style China observers; a challenge to the established power that had been out of touch from the real situation but was not ready to concede it; and a challenge to the American China policies perceived by the old China experts. Hornbeck's initial reaction was outrage and vitriol. His comments ranged from "ridiculous" to "preposterous" and "scandalous." Maxwell Hamilton, then chief of the Far Eastern Division, recommended that people "pay no attention to Service. Don't take him too seriously. He's young and immature."¹⁸⁶

To Service, the Washington consultation was a good experience. He had met with the policy makers and presented them with firsthand information and personal perspectives; and he had fulfilled his responsibility, as a field observer, to portray a more accurate picture of China to help Washington formulate a realistic China

policy.¹⁸⁷ His report furthered his Foreign Service career as a political reporter. "This memo, I have subsequently felt," Service remarked, "was a sort of milestone. . . . Having pressed the need for direct and comprehensive knowledge concerning the Chinese Communists, it was perhaps inevitable that I should be given an increasing amount of this work until it finally became a full-time assignment."¹⁸⁸

Service returned to Chongqing in early May 1943 and was immediately sent to Lanzhou, a strategic point close to the Communist area, where the embassy by now was regularly stationing an officer as observer. In Lanzhou, Service was mainly involved in economic intelligence and political reporting. Citing several examples of the government's effort to ban leftist plays and books, he wrote about the Chinese intellectuals' resentment of censorship and cultural control by the GMD. He agreed with the liberal Chinese view that the recent government stress on Confucianism was "an indication of the fundamental reactionism of the Kuomintang."¹⁸⁹ He reported on the general situation in the northwest, for which he was commended by both the embassy and the department.¹⁹⁰ His 5 July report on the "Chinese Propaganda as Shown by Wall Slogans in the Northwest" received a rating of EXCELLENT for its timely, valuable information, and careful analysis of the subject matter.¹⁹¹

Ambassador Gauss was greatly satisfied with Service's performance at the embassy. "He was outstanding," Gauss commented, "I don't know of any officer in my whole thirty-nine years of service who impressed me more favorably than John Service."¹⁹²

By the summer of 1943, China's political situation had become a major

concern at the headquarters of General Stilwell. Stilwell therefore urged the War Department to have trained political observers assigned to his command to supplement the work done by his military intelligence. Service, along with two other Foreign Service officers--Raymond P. Ludden and John K. Emmerson, were chosen. On 29 June the Secretary Stimson sent a formal request to the Secretary of State for the transfer of the three diplomats to Stilwell's staff. Davies had already been assigned to the army and was then working closely with Stilwell as a political adviser. He recommended Service because he thought Service would be the right man to establish possible contacts with the CCP.

Service was "very happy" and "pleased" about the transfer.¹⁹³ He had long been interested in serving in the Army. He had talked to Stilwell in Chongqing about the possibility of joining the military and mentioned it again to State Department officials while in Washington.¹⁹⁴ On 10 August Service was recalled from Lanzhou and assigned by the State Department to Stilwell. He was later given the Army rank of Colonel on 19 July 1944. According to the Department instructions, he was to be completely under Stilwell's authority. The three newly assigned officers functioned in a loose way under Davies. Service was assigned to the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater Forward Echelon Headquarters in Chongqing where he worked as a consultant to G-2, the intelligence section of the General Staff. His duties were never clearly defined, but his service proved to be very helpful to the Army. Initially, he provided valuable military intelligence service to G-2: as the only man who had gone over the Burma road before it was closed by the Japanese, he wrote down everything

in memory and drew maps on the Burma Road as the primary source for Army operations; he also provided road descriptions and maps on northwestern China where he had traveled for four months while working for the embassy; and at the end of 1943 he escorted an Army engineer officer on a road reconnaissance mission by jeep across the southwestern Chinese provinces of Yunnan, Guizhou (Kweichow), and Guangxi (Kwangsi).¹⁹⁵

In February 1944 Service was back in Chongqing to begin arguably the most active and productive year of his diplomatic career as a “full time political reporter” at CBI Chongqing headquarters. Each morning, except for an hour or so in the office, he would spend most of his time outside and usually had both lunch and supper in Chinese restaurants with Chinese friends. He concentrated his time on making contacts, conducting field observations, gathering intelligence, and writing political reports. “My own primary interest was political reporting,” he explained, and believed that wide contacts with Chinese from diverse political backgrounds gave him an advantage. In his own words, “my position and my background in Chongqing gave me unusually broad and numerous contacts, foreign and Chinese and in every walk of life. . . . I continued to expand an extensive circle of Chinese contacts, largely among newspapermen but also with members of such groups as the liberal wing of the KMT, the minor parties making up the Democratic League, and various military figures or their representatives.”¹⁹⁶ His political reporting and policy recommendations focused on three major areas: the CCP and its relations with the GMD; the deterioration of Chiang’s government; and the “third force”--democrats, liberal dissidents, and

regional leaders. Ambassador Gauss described Service's duties as a political officer:

His job was to cover the water front. His job was to get every bit of information that he possibly could. He went over to the Chungking side of the river every day and he saw everybody that he could. Now it was difficult to get information in those days. We had censorship. They had all these wonderful stories about Chinese victories which never proved to be true.¹⁹⁷

His colleague, John Davies, described his work in a more vibrant way: "Hurtling about Chungking like a supercharged atom, his vitality, his manifold contacts and his lucid and prolific articulation [were] a constant source of astonished gratification to the headquarters."¹⁹⁸

Service lived an active and exciting social and personal life in Chongqing. He shared a floor with Solomon Alder, U.S. Treasury Attaché and the American member of China's Stabilization Board; they lived on the second floor of a three-story house owned by H.H. Kung. Alder, a brilliant economist who held different political views but understood China's bleak wartime economic conditions, became a close friend and influenced Service's political reporting. Service worked closely with other "China hands" as well. He met John Fairbank who was working for the Office of Strategic Services in 1942-43 and who found Service "always to be the political officer most in touch with the Chinese people."¹⁹⁹ Service maintained good relations with the American press in Chongqing, including Brooks Atkinson, Harold Isaacs of Newsweek, Theodore White, and others.

Service attributed his working energy and enthusiasm partly to his falling in love with a Chinese woman, an attractive, "fairly prominent" actress named Chao

Yun-ju. Service lived with Chao for several months at Alder's house. He was in love "in a wholehearted way" and was not apologetic, even years later. But Caroline refused his request for divorce, and Ambassador Gauss warned him not to be "a damn fool."²⁰⁰ This brief romantic affair did not damage his family life, but it would cause troubles for him years later during his State Department loyalty hearings in 1950, when the Guomindang embassy accused him for having an illegitimate child with a Communist agent.²⁰¹

The year 1944 was a critical time for the Chinese government and for America's China policy, and Service was increasingly concerned. He felt that he had the responsibility to inform policy makers in Washington of the "real" Chinese situation as he knew it. In numerous reports he warned his government that, after seven years of war, China was undergoing rapid deterioration and its ability to continue fighting was in doubt, caused largely by misgovernment. He urged Washington to give immediate consideration to these problems.

In his 1 July report, Service wrote that the situation in China was becoming critical and that the position of the Guomindang and the government was weaker than it had been a decade earlier. He listed the crises facing the GMD government: low morale and discouragement among the people, depression and discontent among the intellectuals, oppression and abuses of the peasantry, and the growing opposition of the Communist forces. He believed that Chinese government policies were "precipitating the crisis." He suggested that Washington formulate a realistic view of China and take active responsibility to help create a China America desired:

We cannot simply hope for improvement in China; we must work for it. We do not wish directly and actively to interfere in the internal affairs of China but we should overlook no opportunity to indicate to the Chinese government . . . of action we think it should take to strengthen itself and discharge its obligations now and in the post-war period. We should make clear our conception of the type of Chinese government which we believe will make possible our close collaboration with China in military, political, and economic matters.²⁰²

Service's report attracted wide attention in the State Department and the White House. A State Department memorandum of 28 August placed special emphasis on Service's account of the deteriorating situation in China and was in tune with his policy recommendations. It noted, in part: "Mr. Service outlines, with competence and insight, the causes and character of the current weakness of the Chinese government and makes recommendations with regard to the United States policy to meet the situation. It is anticipated that there will be gradual deterioration in the political and economic situations."²⁰³

Service's 1 July memo also prompted the White House to take action. The State Department informed Gauss that the president had given careful consideration and agreed that "a positive, frank and friendly approach to Chiang on the subject of governmental and related military conditions in China should be made at this time. . . . We have taken note of Chiang's suggestion that the Chinese Communists should be told to settle their differences with the government. . . . [it] is strictly similar to that used with the Vice President, indicating a discouraging lack of progress in Chiang's thinking."²⁰⁴

One focus of Service's political reporting was China's "third force," the liberal and regional alternatives to the GMD and CCP. He made frequent contacts with liberal GMD dissidents, intellectuals from the Democratic League, and regional generals, and reported his observations and their views back to Washington. He talked with Sun Fu, the son of Sun Yat-sen and a liberal Guomindang member who was unhappy with Chiang's regime; he met with Marshall Feng Yuxiang (Feng Yuhsing), the "Christian general" who had become a bitter critic of Chiang after being stripped of military authority.²⁰⁵ Service paid frequent visits to Madame Sun Yat-sen, sister of Madame Chiang and an outspoken critic of Chiang's government, and presented her views. On 14 February he described what was probably his sixth meeting with Madame Sun: "I called on Madame Sun by appointment on the afternoon of February 10th. She was more outspoken and apparently nearer to bitter than on any of the previous four or five times that I had met her. . . . talked about refusal for her to go abroad. . . . referred Chiang as nothing but a dictator."²⁰⁶

Madame Sun's strongly pro-CCP views were at the same time carried by Time magazine, where she wrote:

Reactionary and fascism in China are strong. . . . This is proven . . . by the diversion of part of our national army to the task of blockading and "guarding" the guerrilla areas, by the fact that some still hold private profit above the national interest, by the oppression of the peasantry and by the absence of a true labor movement . . . Some Chinese reactionaries are preparing [civil war] to destroy a democratic sector in our struggle. That sector is the guerrilla bases in North Shensi and behind the enemy lines.²⁰⁷

Service's memorandum of his conversation with Madame Sun reached the

White House. Currie forwarded it to Roosevelt, characterizing Service's memo as summarizing "an interesting conversation."²⁰⁸

Service became increasingly critical of conservative elements within the Guomindang and was eager to warn against any possible misinformation about the reactionary nature of the national government. When Chiang, in an effort to energize the government and its war effort, made numerous cabinet changes,²⁰⁹ war correspondent Theodore White wrote two articles in Time about the liberal trends in China's national government manifested by the appointment of new "liberal-minded" cabinet members. Service immediately repudiated White's arguments in a 13 February memorandum. He argued, for example, that the Propaganda Minister Ju Jiahua (Chu Chia-hua), was not only one of the most anti-Communist leaders, but also anything but liberal:

At least one organization with which he is connected, the San Min Chu I Youth Corps, appears to have been influenced by Nazi models and ideology. . . . The propaganda Minister's letters are interesting primarily as revealing the sorry result of China's efforts to perpetuate abroad a falsely optimistic picture of the conditions within the country. Most of the Minister's criticism are so far divorced from reality that they need no comment.²¹⁰

Service's views of the youth corps were clearly more critical than that of the Chinese Communists. In a conversation with Service, Vincent, and Sprouse earlier on 4 May 1943, CCP representative Zhou Enlai had remarked that the Three People's Principles Youth Corps was a copy of the Communist Party's youth organization and expressed the opinion that the movement itself and its published aims were good but that the Corps was in the hands of the wrong leadership.

Based on his broad contacts and extensive on-site observations, Service wrote numerous other reports covering a wide range of China's problems, many of which proved to be more useful to the embassy and the State Department than to the Army. His April 1944 report on the situation in Sinjiang had an important bearing on Sino-Soviet relations. He suggested that the confrontational GMD policy was suicidal and that America's close involvement with the GMD would probably throw the Communists toward the Soviet Union and contribute to the Russian domination of Asia. He recommended that the United States not become involved in the situation there:

Neither now or in the immediately foreseeable future does the U.S. want to find itself in direct opposition to Russia in Asia; nor does it want to see Russia have undisputed dominance over a part or all of China. The best way to cause both of these possibilities to become realities is to give, in either fact or appearance, support to the present reactionary government of China beyond carefully regulated and controlled aid directed solely toward the military prosecution of war against Japan.²¹¹

A copy of his report was sent to the embassy; the embassy in turn forwarded it to the State Department. His report again received a rating of excellence.

Despite some controversies, Service's reports were widely valued by both his immediate superiors and numerous experts on China. General Stilwell praised him for serving the army effectively. John K. Fairbank commended him for being "both farsighted and courageous, and for predicting the disaster the U.S. would face with its entire reliance on the GMD for its position in China."²¹² His firsthand observations and in-depth political reports on GMD-CCP relations strongly influenced U.S. policies

toward China and its Communists.

Near the end of 1943 the turbulent Sino-American relations reached a “honeymoon” peak at the Cairo Conference but experienced another quick deterioration afterwards. From 22 November to 26 November, Generalissimo and Madame Chiang met with Roosevelt and Churchill at Cairo. The Cairo Conference highlighted China’s closeness with the U.S. and its difficulties with Britain. Chiang and Roosevelt agreed on the principles of Japan’s unconditional surrender, the independence of Korea, and the return of Taiwan and Manchuria to China. But they failed to reach a consensus on the CCP question. For Chiang, Roosevelt’s suggestion of a coalition government between the GMD and CCP was evidence that the president was being misled by Stilwell and the American embassy’s Chongqing intelligence.²¹³ On the other hand, Chiang’s proposal for a joint Burma campaign did not get a positive response from Churchill. The British were annoyed by Roosevelt’s great attention to China. One of the officials claimed that he “did not like the idea of the Chinese running up and down the Pacific.”²¹⁴ Churchill complained that “the talks of the British and American Staffs were sadly distracted by the Chinese story, which was lengthy, complicated, and minor. . . . All hopes of persuading Chiang and his wife to go and see the Pyramids . . . fell to the ground, with the result that Chinese business occupied first instead of last place at Cairo.”²¹⁵

The Cairo Conference was a great diplomatic achievement for China and a personal triumph for Chiang. Abroad, it demonstrated China’s status as one of the Big Four and Chiang’s prestige as one of the great Allied leaders. At home, Chiang’s

political prestige reached an all-time high. But the Cairo euphoria was soon overshadowed by deep-seated differences over priorities and policies regarding a second Burma campaign. Chiang wanted greatly to have a land supply route through Burma. Afraid of a repeated disaster, he requested a large joint operation with protection from air and sea. The British made it clear that they were not committed; they preferred instead to use the resources to protect their colonial interest in India and other territories. Although American military leaders believed it was essential to regain Burma in order to break the Japanese encirclement of China, Roosevelt yielded to Churchill's demands in the end. In the following months the Chinese leadership was shocked to learn that not only was the large Burma campaign aborted but much of the promised military aid was also canceled. Frustrated, Chiang dealt with this disappointment in his 27 February 1944 diary entry: "Recently I have been ponderously beset with agony and was under grave crossfire from within and without. But this is insignificant compared to what I had gone through in the past. Intimacy or aloofness, gain or pain in diplomacy cannot be unchanged. Today's loss may pave the way for tomorrow's victory."²¹⁶

In December 1943 the campaign to retake Burma started on a limited scale when Stilwell led a joint Chinese-American task force consisting mainly of three Chinese divisions into Burma from India. In May 1944 the 115,000 strong Chinese Expeditionary Force, known as the Y-Force, attacked from Yunnan province. The Burma Road was finally reopened and the first 500 truck loads of Lend Lease aid reached Kunming on 28 January 1945. Chiang decided to rename the Burma Road

the “Stilwell Road” to show fairness toward Stilwell. But Chiang and the Chinese government blamed Stilwell’s self-serving Burma campaign for using up vital military and Lend-Lease resources and contributing to the Japanese Ichigo offensive.²¹⁷

Japan’s devastating Ichigo (Operation Number One) offensive in April 1944 greatly intensified the international and domestic difficulties facing Chiang’s government. While the delayed Burma campaign was proceeding slowly amidst confusion and discontentment, the Japanese launched the well-planned Ichigo to retaliate against the successful bombings along the China coast that had produced heavy losses to them. Fearing American bombing launched from China against its home islands, Japan embarked on the largest and most destructive offensive since 1938. The Japanese slid through the Nationalist defense lines, posing a direct threat to Kunming, a strategic key point in China and a gateway to Chongqing.

Japan’s goals in the Ichigo campaign were to destroy U.S. air bases in south-central China where General Chennault’s 14th Air force had been launching effective air attacks, and to open railway communication from Indo-China to Manchuria. To pursue their goal, the Japanese moved ten divisions from north China and Manchuria, and redeployed ground troops and new airplanes originally intended to defend Tokyo to central China. With air support and heavy artillery, Japanese forces first struck Henan province on 8 April. Chinese resistance was crushed by overwhelming Japanese forces consisting of a tank division, an infantry division, and a cavalry brigade, along with several artillery battalions. With full control of the critical Beijing-Hankou railway, Japanese troops quickly moved southward to Hunan. The

capital city of Changsha, which had successfully resisted Japanese attacks three times previously, fell on 18 June without heavy fighting. The Japanese wasted no time marching to Hengyang to attack the Chinese airfield. Supported by Chennault's airplanes, Chinese forces under General Fang Xianjue fought fiercely for over six weeks and inflicted 19,381 casualties on the Japanese.²¹⁸ By November, Chennault's other bases in Keiling (Kwilin) and Liuzhou (Liuchow) in Guangxi province had been destroyed. The Japanese seemed un-stoppable and they continued to march westward toward Chongqing. In the face of this threat, General A.C. Wedemeyer suggested that Chiang and the Chinese government move to Kunming. But Chiang made it clear that he would remain in Chongqing to fight to the end, even if he had to die. By December, however, the Japanese halted their westward advance, for militarily they had been stretched to the limits and had accomplished the goals of destroying U.S. airbases in China and opening rail lines between Vietnam and north China.

General Chennault's 14th Air Force succeeded in hampering but not stopping the Japanese offensive. When Chennault pleaded for an additional 10,000 tons of supplies from Stilwell to strengthen his "hopelessly inadequate" power, Stilwell declined to pass along the request. Only under intense pressure from Chiang did he agree to divert 1,500 tons to Chennault, if the war department consented. But General Marshall flatly rejected the request; he had come to the conclusion that airplanes and war materials would be better used in Europe.²¹⁹ During the Ichigo seventeen American air bases were lost. Went with them Chennault's dream of attacking Japan with China-based air power.²²⁰ Chennault and Chiang's government often charged

that Stilwell's refusal to provide military aid was responsible for the Ichigo catastrophe.

The Ichigo offensive brought ruinous military, political, and economic consequences to Chiang and the Chinese government. It caused nearly 500,000 Nationalist casualties. The Chinese government not only lost vast territory but one fourth of its industrial factories. Human and material tolls were also incalculable. According to Chinese news reports, in Kuangxi province alone, during the Ichigo campaign 110,000 people were killed and 160,000 were wounded with 300,000 houses destroyed.²²¹

Ichigo manifested the deterioration of Chiang's GMD government and its military forces, despite the heroism and combativeness of individual Chinese forces. Stilwell blamed the Nationalist military leadership for its "colossal ignorance and indifference." He concluded that the Chinese leadership was totally incapable of making positive contributions in the war against Japan.²²² However, representing the more traditional and established American opinion of China, Henry Luce's pro-GMD Life urged in its 1 May editorial an appreciation of the difficulties under which the Chinese Government was operating, after so many years of war. Theodore White explained the issue in a different light in 1946 by comparing the Nationalist decay with the Communist success:

Thus . . . the invasion of China by Japan reached its high-water mark and receded. For the government and its armies 1944 had been a year of unmitigated disaster. Almost half a million Chinese soldiers had been lost, the entire coast was cut off from the Central Government, eight provinces and a population of more than 100,000,00 had been ripped from the direct control of

Chungking. The Kuomintang could explain its defeats in convincing terms of poverty and weakness. It could rightly charge America with having neglected it during a period of great want and suffering. But could not explain why another army, that of the Communists, was moving from success to success in North China.²²³

To Service, the GMD's weakness and problems were of its own making, and the solution required "political reform within China."²²⁴ On 20 June, he wrote a long briefing for the visiting vice president, Henry Wallace, on "the Situation in China and Suggestions Regarding American Policy." He pointed out that the situation in China was critical and that since China depended on America's assistance, the U.S. government should use its military aid as leverage to force GMD to make democratic reform, which he saw as the key solution to China's problems. "It will be useless to continue giving this aid in the past haphazard manner," he argued,

The crux of all important Chinese problem--military, economic, and political--is democratic reform. . . . We must seek to contribute toward the reversal of the present movement toward collapse and to the rousing of China from its military inactivity. This can be brought about only by an accelerated movement toward democratic political reform within China. Our part must be that of a catalytic agent in this process of China's democratization. It can be carried out by the careful exertion of our influence, which has so far not been consciously and systematically used.²²⁵

The outpouring of criticism and negative publicity from major American newspapers and magazines as a result of Ichigo added to the unhappy situation of Chiang and the GMD government. The New York Times published more news about China than any other publications. Other journals and newspapers highly critical of Chiang and his government included the Christian Science Monitor, the New York

Herald Tribune, the Chicago Daily News, the Washington Post; the liberal weeklies of the Nation and the New Republic, and academic publications like the Foreign Policy Bulletin and the Institute of Pacific Relations' bi-monthly Far Eastern Survey.²²⁶

Chiang was sensitive to American public opinion on China, but he was increasingly alienated by the ceaseless criticism. In a 15 June confidential report to Roosevelt, Currie stated that

regarding American criticism of China, the Generalissimo was reported to have said: "as for foreign criticism, I at first paid some attention to it but it has passed the point of being reasonable. Formally if the foreigners found 1% good about China, they said that China was 100% good. Now if they found 1% bad, they say that the other 99% is also bad. We should stop worrying about such criticism just as I now disregard it. Censorship must be maintained to protect us against these unfair criticisms."²²⁷

Despite Chiang's censorship, negative reports and rumors of scandals reached Washington. In early May Service learned of rumors in Chongqing about domestic trouble at the Chiangs' household, stories concerning Chiang's mistress. Sensing the strong implications for China's political stability and Sino-American relations, Service eagerly assembled a report on 10 May for the embassy and sent a copy off channel to Currie who subsequently forwarded it to Roosevelt. He thought the president would be interested in this bit of scandal.²²⁸

In the midst of the Japanese Ichigo offensive, Chiang was also besieged by the Stilwell crisis. Stilwell and the Joint Chiefs in Washington concluded from the unfolding Ichigo debacle that the best way to make China an effective fighting partner

was to place Stilwell in command of all Chinese forces. Stilwell originated the idea, one based on his interpretation of his duty as "Field Chief of Staff." Marshall supported his close friend and promised that, with the enlarged command, he would propose that Stilwell be promoted to full general. Stilwell wanted to force Chiang on the issue. "If the President were to send him a very stiff message," suggested Stilwell to Marshall, "emphasizing our investment and interest in China, . . . and insisting that desperate cases require desperate remedies, the G-mo might be forced to give me a command job. Without complete authority over the Army, I would not attempt the job."²²⁹ With the American military's increasing interest in the war potential of the Communists, Stilwell asked specifically that CCP forces be included.

The tense and deteriorating relationship between Chiang and Stilwell was hardly a secret to the White House. In truth, Roosevelt had entertained the idea of withdrawing Stilwell in several occasions. In June, when Vice President Wallace visited Chongqing to discuss the Communist problem with Chiang, Wallace realized that the Generalissimo and Stilwell had completely lost trust in each other and urged Roosevelt to replace Stilwell. Although Wallace was not in sympathy with Chiang, his recommendation was influenced by Chennault and Chennault's subordinate Lieutenant Alsop.²³⁰ Marshall and the military, however, blocked the recommendation as before.

Roosevelt also became increasingly skeptical about Chiang's leadership following the Cairo Conference. At the conference Stilwell and Davies had conveyed highly critical views of Chiang to the president. Chiang should not be the sole object

of Allied support, Davies contended strongly, for “his philosophy is the unintegrated product of his limited intelligence, his Japanese military education, his former close contact with German military advisers, his alliance with the usurious banker-landlord class, and his reversion to the sterile moralisms of the Chinese classics.”²³¹ Stilwell’s apparent success in Burma and the Ichigo disaster helped Marshall persuade Roosevelt to try Stilwell’s approach to the bewildering Chinese situation. Roosevelt wanted a united China to wage an effective war against Japan and appointing Stilwell as commander of all Chinese forces, including the CCP, would be a first step to the establishment of a coalition government.

The “very stiff message” Stilwell asked for was drafted by the War Department and signed by President Roosevelt without change. It arrived in Chongqing on 7 July. Service, acting as interpreter, accompanied General Benjamin Ferris, then senior officer in Chongqing, to deliver the message. The message demanded that Chiang place Stilwell in full command of all Chinese forces and was written in frank terms:

The critical situation which now exists in my opinion calls for the delegation to one individual of the power to coordinate all Allied military resources in China, including the Communist forces. . . . I recommend for your most urgent consideration that you . . . place him (Stilwell) directly under you in command of all Chinese and American forces and that you charge him with full responsibility and authority.²³²

Fulfilling his “unfortunate” translating duties, Service was astonished at the tone of the message. As he later observed, “despite what seems to be continuing Chinese (and American) assumption that I had something to do with the content of the message, I was in fact as completely surprised as the recipient.”²³³ Davies also viewed

this American demand as “unwise” and “obviously unacceptable” to Chiang.²³⁴ To Theodore White, it was “a breach of China’s sovereignty.”²³⁵

Chiang was enraged upon receiving Roosevelt’s stiff message on the day of the seventh anniversary of China’s War of Resistance, and especially angered by Roosevelt’s direct reference to Communist troops. The frankness of the message and the face-to-face delivery method made him appear to be losing face, which was something extremely hard for him to accept.²³⁶ “It is obvious that America is determined to intervene in China,” he recorded, “I only have three options to this: refusal, acceptance, and delay. Later I decided to delay.”²³⁷ The next day Chiang sent a soft but firm reply to Roosevelt, agreeing only in principle to let Stilwell command all Chinese troops, stating that the complicated Chinese political situation required a “preparatory period in order to enable General Stilwell to have absolute command without any hindrance.” He repeated his earlier request for a personal emissary from President Roosevelt with “full power” and “complete trust” to adjust the relations between him and Stilwell.²³⁸ On 23 July Chiang attached three additional conditions: no CCP forces should be under Stilwell’s command; Stilwell’s position in relation to Chiang should be clearly defined; and the Chinese government should have full authority over Lend-Lease. Soong was more straightforward about the Chinese position in his telegraph to Hopkins, saying “the War Department wants to force General Stilwell down his [Chiang’s] throat. . . . I personally assure you without qualification that on this point the Generalissimo will not and cannot yield.”²³⁹

Sensing Chiang’s strong resistance, Roosevelt decided to alter his course to

avoid a direct confrontation by accepting his call for a personal envoy. On 9 August former Secretary of War Patrick Hurley, a tall, handsome Oklahoman with a flashy appearance, was selected by Marshall and appointed as intermediary to “promote efficient and harmonious relations between the Generalissimo and General Stilwell to facilitate General Stilwell’s exercise of command over the Chinese armies placed under his direction.”²⁴⁰ After talking to H.H. Kung, a man with the amiable manner of a Chinese aristocrat, Roosevelt felt Chiang’s three pre-conditions were “matters of detail” that could be worked out by friendly negotiations.

Donald Nelson, chairman of the War Production Board and formerly head of Sears Roebuck and Company, was sent along with Hurley as another “personal representative” of the president on a mission to study China’s economy with “a report and recommendations.”²⁴¹ Privately, Roosevelt just wanted to pull his friend out of trouble with the War Production Board and advised Marshall that Nelson was not to meddle with policy and strategy but confine himself to selling razor blades. Nelson, nevertheless, after close examination of China’s wartime conditions and numerous talks with Chinese officials, presented an extensive, secret report to Roosevelt. He concluded that although China was handicapped by poor transportation, severe shortage of supplies, and runaway inflation, its inability to wage an effective war was accelerated by the tragic defects in the leadership, particularly in the Ministry of War.²⁴²

After conferring with Stilwell in New Delhi, Hurley reached Chongqing with Stilwell and Nelson on 6 September and immediately entered negotiations with

Chiang. Despite frustration and resentment, especially of favorable reports pouring out of Yanan from Western journalists and the Dixie Mission, Chiang decided on a conciliatory approach to prevent further complications with America while attaining maximum political leverage over the CCP. On 8 September Hurley reported to Roosevelt Chiang's plan to place Chinese forces under Stilwell's command:

The Generalissimo stated to General Stilwell this morning and to me this afternoon that he is prepared to give General Stilwell actual command of all forces in the field in China and that with this command he is also giving to him his complete confidence. He stated that General Stilwell will now have to give considerable attention to political factors.²⁴³

Stilwell, however, found out in a "plain talk" with T.V. Soong that Chiang's concept of "field commander" fell far short of his demand to be overall commander with full power, including the authority to replace the War Minister He Yingqin.²⁴⁴

Differences over military strategy pushed the Stilwell command controversy to a final showdown. When in the Ichigo offensive the Japanese advanced westward to Guilin and threatened Kunming, Chiang demanded on 15 September that Stilwell launch attacks in Burma to take the pressure off the Chinese or else he would pull the Y-Force back to protect Kunming. Marshall was infuriated upon receiving Stilwell's report. He drafted an ultimatum to Chiang, demanding that he give Stilwell "unrestricted command" of all Chinese forces:

I have urged time and again in recent months that you take drastic action to resist the disaster which has been moving closer to China and to you. Now, when you have not yet placed General Stilwell in command of all forces in China, we are faced with the loss of a critical area in East China with possible

catastrophic consequences. . . . Only drastic and immediate action on your part alone can be in time to preserve the fruits of your long years of struggle and efforts we have been able to make to support you. . . . I am certain that the only thing you can now do to prevent the Jap from achieving his objectives in China is to reinforce your Salween armies immediately and press their offensive, while at once placing General Stilwell in unrestricted command of all your forces. The action I am asking you to take will fortify us in our decision and in the continued efforts the United States proposes to take to maintain and increase our aid to you.²⁴⁵

True to his leadership style of trying different and sometime contradictory approaches, Roosevelt signed the ultimatum on 16 September while attending the second Quebec Conference with Churchill, with little consideration of Chiang's dignity.

Stilwell was jubilant when the message arrived in Chongqing on 19 September, and insisted, over Hurley's objections, that he deliver it to Chiang in person. Chiang was having a meeting with Hurley, Soong and He discussing the final details of naming Stilwell as "field commander" when Stilwell arrived. Chiang accepted the message handed over by Stilwell and read the attached Chinese translation in silence. "I see," he said slowly and turned the cover on his teacup upside down--a signal to terminate the meeting. He wrote in his diary: "This is truly the biggest humiliation in my life!"²⁴⁶ But for Stilwell, "this is the happiest day of my life,"²⁴⁷ and he wrote a verse to his wife to celebrate that read in part: "I've waited long for vengeance--At last I've had my chance. . . . Oh! The blessed pleasure! I've wrecked the Peanut's face."²⁴⁸

Chiang decided at once to ask the American government to recall Stilwell. He

told Hurley that "the Chinese people and army cannot endure any longer the humiliation imposed by those like Stilwell. This was indeed the obstacle for Sino-American cooperation."²⁴⁹ On 25 September he asked Hurley to inform the president that China would not give in on three principles: "(1) the three people's principles as China's foundation cannot be shaken, therefore Communism will not be allowed to transform China; (2) Sovereignty and dignity, as basis of any nation, cannot be harmed; (3) national and personal integrity cannot be humiliated, that is, no imposed cooperation will be accepted. Otherwise, any sacrifice will be prepared."²⁵⁰ While seeking not to alienate Roosevelt, Chiang stood firm in insisting on Stilwell's recall. Speaking with anger and banging the table, Chiang told the GMD Standing Committee that Stilwell "must go," and that China would not tolerate America's "new form of imperialism."²⁵¹ He refused Roosevelt's 6 October proposal that Stilwell be relieved as Chiang's chief-of-staff but continue to command Chinese forces in India and Burma.

After some hesitation and overnight pondering, Hurley decided to endorse Chiang's position. He telegraphed the president on 13 October and advised him that Chiang and Stilwell were "fundamentally incompatible, . . . If you sustain Stilwell in the controversy you will lose Ching Kai-shek, and possibly you will lose China with him."²⁵²

Roosevelt, having taking the initiative in relinquishing the unequal treaties and promoting China to big power status, was not prepared to force an American commander on China against Chiang's expressed wishes. Although dismayed by

Chiang's government, he regarded the alternative of supporting the Communists as too risky and awkward. Hurley's opinion helped him to overcome Marshall's opposition. Roosevelt's decision to recall Stilwell and appoint General Wedemeyer as the new Chief of Staff and commander of U.S. forces in China reached Chongqing on 19 October.

Service was not directly involved in the Stilwell crisis except for translating Roosevelt's initial message on 7 July, but the result of the crisis made him an internationally-known controversial figure in U.S.-China relations. In late July he was appointed to the "Dixie Mission"--the American Military Observation Group--as a political adviser and went to the Communist capital, Yanan. He was not fully aware of the unfolding developments in the Stilwell episode until 9 October, when he learned from Hurley's aide, E.J. McNally, the surprising news that Stilwell's job was in jeopardy. The next day, in an effort to fight off Stilwell's imminent recall, Service summarized his thoughts on Chiang's government and Sino-American relations in a long memo titled, "The Need for Greater Realism in Our Relations with Chiang Kai-shek." In it he called for a reassessment of America's policy toward China. It was time for the United States to adopt a new and more realist China policy, dealing with Chiang more forcefully and seeking political alternatives if necessary. He wrote, in part:

Our dealings with Chiang Kai-shek apparently continue on the basis of the unrealistic assumption that he is China and that he is necessary to our cause. It is time for the sake of the war and also for our future interests in China, that we take a more realistic line. . . . The Kuomintang government is in crisis. . . . the Kuomintang is dependent on American support for survival. But

we are in no way dependent on the Kuomintang. We do not need it for military reasons. . . . We do not fear Kuomintang surrender or opposition. . . . We need not fear the collapse of the Kuomintang government. . . . We need not support the Kuomintang for international reasons. . . . We need not support Chiang in the belief that he represents pro-American or democratic groups. All the people and all other political groups of importance in China are friendly to the United States and look to it for the salvation of the country, now and after the war. . . . Our policy toward China should be guided by two facts. First, we cannot hope to deal successfully with Chiang without being hard-boiled. Second, we cannot hope to solve China's problems (which are now our problems) without consideration of the opposition forces--Communist, provincial and liberal.²⁵³

In his report Service explained why Chiang should be dealt with by force. "We seem to forget that Chiang is an Oriental; that his background and vision are limited; that his position is built on skill as an extremely adroit political manipulator and a stubborn, shrewd bargainer; that he mistakes kindness and flattery for weakness; and that he listens to his own instrument of force rather than reason."²⁵⁴

When Stilwell's dismissal became a reality, Service was asked by Stilwell to accompany him back to the U.S. while Davies replacing Service in Yanan. Stilwell thought Service would be helpful in telling his side of the story to the administration and news media, especially in arguing for open relations with the CCP, but he found himself muzzled effectively by Marshall and the military. Service worked hard for his commander's cause and for what he believed would be a more realistic China policy, and succeeded in influencing public opinion. He helped to bring Brooks Atkinson's exposé on the Stilwell case to the chief foreign news editor of the New York Times, and the publication of the exposé on 31 October caused a terrific sensation.

Atkinson's major theme, that, by recalling Stilwell, America was appeasing an

“unenlightened cold-hearted autocratic political regime,”²⁵⁵ was repeated in similar stories elsewhere in the U.S. press. Service also had lunch with Henry Luce in New York and presented Stilwell’s side of the event, but his efforts did not stop pro-Chiang accounts from appearing in Time and Life.²⁵⁶

The extent of the bad publicity and negative reaction to the Stilwell recall in the U.S. caught the Chinese government off guard. Its counter-attack strategy was to blame Stilwell’s pro-Communist advisers for his misjudgments. It told the same story all over the world; Stilwell was a fine general and Chiang had the highest regard for him, but the American was mis-informed and misled by young pro-Communist or even Communist agents. Specifically the blame was directed at Davies and Service. Thus, in November 1944, Service was denounced around the world by the Chinese government,²⁵⁷ and frequently called “a Communist spy” afterwards.²⁵⁸

Stilwell’s recall gave Chiang much needed relief. For Chiang, the Stilwell controversy “was the ultimate reason of this year’s every international and domestic difficulty. I never experienced this hurting feeling in my life. . . . Hereafter every important military, diplomatic, and domestic task can be carried out according to plans.”²⁵⁹ But his optimism was misplaced. The long term devastating impact of the Stilwell crisis would go far beyond negative publicity. Disillusioned by Chiang’s government, American military planners gave up any hope of using the Chinese mainland as a base in the final offensive against Japan. At the February 1945 Yalta Conference, President Roosevelt turned to the Soviet Union for help. In exchange for its entry into the Pacific War, Roosevelt agreed to grant Russia special rights in

Manchuria, which would help the CCP firmly establish itself in Manchuria during the postwar civil war. Chiang later realized that Roosevelt's "betrayal" of China at Yalta and Marshall's frequent "pro-Communist" stands during his mediation of the GMD-CCP conflict in 1945 were all part of the fallout from the Stilwell crisis.²⁶⁰

In an attempt to explain the Stilwell crisis, General Wedemeyer claimed that his predecessor's failure in China lay in his lack of understanding of and sensitivity to the complexity and differences of Eastern culture. "General Stilwell was regarded as the leading expert on China in the War Department," he claimed. "Yet I found much evidence indicating that he, too, had failed to understand the complex political and psychological problems which were the result of China's past experiences at the hands of Westerners."²⁶¹

Cultural difference and personal dislike between Chiang and Stilwell, however, only intensified their confrontation; the core issue was the Chinese Communist problem. Stilwell enraged Chiang by insisting on American military cooperation with CCP forces. Chiang remarked in 1975 that "for resisting Japan, Stilwell was China's friend, but on the Communist question . . . Stilwell was a huge negative factor."²⁶² It was on the Chinese Communist issue that Service made the most important contribution in his China service career.

ENDNOTES

1. Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. II (New York: Macmillan Co., 1948), 1583.
2. Service, The Amerasia Papers, 170.
3. Ibid.
4. For similar assertions and perspective, see Theodore H. White, In Search of History: A Personal Adventure (New York: Harper & Row, 1978).
5. Service, "Foreign Service Reporting," 24.
6. Stephen R. Mackinnon and Oris Friesen, eds., China Reporting: An Oral History of American Journalism in the 1930s and 1940s (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 184.
7. Draft of Telegram to Ambassador Gauss, 7 September 1944; with Summary of Memorandum by John S. Service, 1 July 1944; and State Department analysis of the Chinese situation, 9 August 1944, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's Files: China, Box 27, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
8. John K. Fairbank, The United States and China, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 307. For detailed information about the Infantry Training Center, see Samuel M. Chao, "American 'Know How' For Chinese Soldiers," in Hollington K. Tong, ed., China: After Seven Years of War (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1945), 204-12. For information about Chinese pilots trained in Arizona and Texas and the contribution of the CACW (Chinese American Composite Wing), see Chao, "Flying Under Two Flags," in Tong, China: After Seven Years of War, 184-203.
9. Warren I. Cohen, America's Response to China: An Interpretative History of Sino-American Relations (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1971), 153.
10. A. T. Steele, The American People and China (New York: McGraw Hill, 1966), 17.
11. Louis J. Halle, Cold War As History (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 194.
12. Franz Schurman and Orville Schell, eds., The China Reader: Republican China (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), 271.

13. Service, Lost Chance in China, 62.
14. Chiang Kai-shek to President Roosevelt, 10 March 1942, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File: China, Box 27, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library; for the Chinese version see Guo Rongzhao, Jiang Weiyuanzhang yu Luosifu Zongtong Zhanshi Tongxun [Generalissimo Chiang and President Roosevelt wartime correspondence] (Taipei: Zhongguo Yanjiu Zhongxin, 1978), 97.
15. Leon Martel, Lend-Lease, Loans, and the Coming of the Cold War: A Study of the Implementation of Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), 34.
16. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 475.
17. Ibid., 262.
18. Ibid., 466.
19. Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 247.
20. Service, Lost Chance in China, 335.
21. Kahn, The China Hands, 81.
22. Cohen, America's Response to China, 162-63.
23. For more information about the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and the furious Chinese reaction to the treaty, see Hsü, The Rise of Modern China, 5th ed., 339-43.
24. John K. Fairbank, Chinabound: A Fifty-Years Memoir (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1982), 202.
25. White and Jacoby, Thunder Out of China, 7.
26. Rice and wheat are staples in Sichuan province. As one of the eight major food types and flavors in China, Sichuan meals are famous and they were enriched by the variations brought by the "down-river people" from coastal cities in eastern China.
27. Floyd Taylor, "Chungking: City of Mud and Courage," in Tong, China: After Seven Years of War, 32-33, 38; see also White and Jacoby, Thunder Out of China, 8.
28. There have been some mistakes about the date of Service's arrival at Chongqing. In numerous places in both published and unpublished materials, the date appears as 3 May. But according to family letters he wrote during his first three weeks in Chongqing, he arrived in the early morning of 8 May 1941. See John Service to Family, 8-25 May 1941, John Service Papers, Box 2, Folder 35, Berkeley; "Personal Statement of John S. Service," in U.S. Senate, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation; and Chronology of Events, 1941-

1945, John Service Papers, Box 1, Folder 16, Berkeley.

29. Service to Family, 8-25 May 1941.

30. Henry Luce was regarded by some as the "single most influential journalist who wrote or published about China in the 1940s." For an explicit account of Luce's role in Sino-American relations and his distinction with John Service in views regarding China, see Mackinnon and Friesen, China Reporting: An Oral History of American Journalism, 7-14. Luce's wife Clare Boothe was president of the American China Policy Association in 1945 and Ambassador to Italy under Eisenhower. See Kahn, The China Hands, 17-18.

31. May, China Scapegoat, 64.

32. For more information about the American embassy in Chongqing, see Buhite, Nelson T. Johnson, 144-45; and Service, "State Department Duty," 162.

33. Service to Family, 8-25 May 1941, 4.

34. The Japanese usually sent several dozen planes during one air raid. In a 1939 bombing over Chongqing, as General Feng Yuxiang counted, nearly eighty planes bombed civilian targets. Feng Yuxiang, Wo Suo Renshi de Jiang Jieshi [The Chiang Kai-shek I know] (Hong Kong: Qishi Niandai Press, 1975), 104.

35. Service to Family, 8-25 May 1941, 3

36. White and Jacoby, Thunder Out of China, 11.

37. Ibid.

38. White and Jacoby, Thunder Out of China, 12.

39. Jiang Zongtong Milu [Secret records of President Chiang], vol. 12 (Taipei: Central Daily News, 1977), 31.

40. Ibid., 13. Also see Service's description of the Chongqing air defense warning system in John Service to Family, 8-25 May 1941.

41. Hollington K. Tong, China and the World Press (Nanjing, 1948), 127-28.

42. Taylor, "Chungking," 38.

43. Tong, China and the World Press, 129.

44. Service to Family, 8-25 May 1941, 3

45. Ibid.

46. H. H. Kung Files, Oberlin Alumni Association, Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio; see also Cleveland News, 23 June 1950.

47. Service to Family, 8-25 May 1941, 5; Service, "State Department Duty," 167; and Kahn, The China Hands, 67.

48. Service to Family, 8-25 May 1941, 4.

49. John C. Vincent, for example, complained that Chungking was "indescribable," its weather was terrible. See May, China Scapegoat, 63-64.

50. Service to Family, 8-25 May 194, 8.

51. Ibid.

52. Taylor described the conditions of houses and buildings in Chongqing: "The better houses have glass windows, but most people have only rice-paper windows or, at best, wooden shutters . . . screens are beyond the means of the majority. . . . The finest building in the city is the National government building . . . but many a government office is made of mud and bamboo, has uneven floors or rough boards--under which rats live and die and became putrid and smell--old and battered desks, aged typewriters of many makes. . . . Few buildings, either public or private, have running water, and even fewer have modern toilets." see "Chungking," 37-38.

53. Service to Family, 8-25 May 1941, 8.

54. Taylor, "Chungking," 31.

55. Message to President Roosevelt from Chiang Kai-shek, 10 July 1944, Roosevelt Papers, Map Room Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

56. Buhite, Nelson T. Johnson, 145.

57. Kahn, The China Hands, 64.

58. May, China Scapegoat, 65.

59. John Davies to John Carter Vincent, 14 October 1944, John Service Papers, Box 1, Folder 27, Berkeley.

60. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 262.

61. Ibid.

62. Anonymous to Roosevelt, 15 October 1941, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary File: China. Roosevelt passed these observations to Secretary of State Hull, see Roosevelt to Hull, 21 November, 1941, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File:

China, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

63. *Ibid.*, 73.

64. Service, "State Department Duty," 172.

65. Service to Family, 8-25 May 1941.

66. *Ibid.*, 9.

67. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 262.

68. Prior to his position in the White House, Currie had worked at Harvard University where he earned a Ph.D. in economics and later served on the Federal Reserve Board. As a liaison officer in China for Currie during World War II, John K. Fairbank had close contacts with Currie. For more information about Fairbank's view of Currie, see Fairbank, Chinabound, 175, 183, 195-96.

69. Chiang Kai-shek to President Franklin Roosevelt, 26 February 1941, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File: China, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

70. Lauchlin Currie, Memorandum for the President, 27 March 1941; and President Roosevelt to Generalissimo Chiang, 9 April 1941; Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File: China, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

71. Guo, Jiang Wiyuanzhang, 5; Wu Jingping, "Kangzhan Shiqi Zhong Mei Zujie Guanxi Shuping" [Sino-American lend-lease relations during the war of resistance], Lishi Yanjiu 4 (1995): 51.

72. Arthur N. Young, China and the Helping Hands, 1937-1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), 350; Wu, "Kang Zhan Shiqi," 53; Chi-Wei David Wu, "A Rhetorical Analysis of Selected Speeches by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek During the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, 1937-1945," Ph.D. diss. (Ohio University, 1986), 143. For a fuller account of loans China obtained during World War II, see Wang Tieya, Zhong Wai Jiu Yue Zhang Huibian [Collection of treaties between China and foreign countries] (Beijing: Sanlian Shudian, 1128-30 and 1156-59.

73. In Xiaoyi Zhonghua Minguo Shiliao Chubian: Dui Ri kangzhan Shiqi. Di San Bian. Zhanshi Wanjiao [Preliminary collection of important historical documents of the Republic of China: the period of Anti-Japanese War of Resistance, book three, war time diplomacy], 3 vols., (Taipei: the Editorial Committee, 1980), 617; Kahn, The China Hands, 89.

74. Telegram from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, 31 May 1941, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File: China, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

75. Telegram from Chiang Kai-shek, 8 July 1941, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File: China, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library; published also in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941: The Far East, vol. IV, 1004.

76. Telegram to the President from Chiang Kai-shek, 31 July 1941, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File: China, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

77. Service, "State Department Duty," 183, 185.

78. Cordell Hull, Memorandum to the President, 19 August 1941, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File: China, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

79. Telegram from Chiang Kai-shek to T.V. Soong, 25 November 1941, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File: China, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library; also published in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941: The Far East, vol. IV, 660-61.

80. Cohen, America's Response to China, 152.

81. After Pearl Harbor, the American government began to pay more attention to the war effort in China. Several new agencies began to emerge in Chongqing to reenforce the embassy's strength. The new agencies were mostly intelligence and information collecting setups such as the Office of Strategic Services.

82. Service, "State Department Duty," 163.

83. *Ibid.*, 184-85.

84. *Ibid.*, 171.

85. "Personal Statement of John S. Service," in U.S. Senate, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation.

86. Service, interview by the author, 14 May 1992.

87. Service to Family, 8-25 May 1941.

88. When asked in an interview if he knew John Service, Young said: "Oh, very well. His mother was Mrs. Young's high school teacher in San Bernardino High School many years ago, and we've known the Services since the boys were growing up." He described Service as being "a very sincere and honest fellow" who "had a different view of what was in the interest of the United States, and I think that to some extent he has been vindicated as being more perceptive--having a more perceptive view of the situation than many others." "Service is more the steady, plodding type." He commented that John P. Davies doesn't have as much stability, he's more the brilliant type. See James R. Fuchs, Oral History Interview with Dr. Arthur N. Young in Pasadena, California, 21 February 1974, Harry S Truman Library, 81-82, 90.

89. For information about T.F. Tsiang and his work, see E-tu Zen Sun, "The Growth of the Academic Community 1912-1949" and Lloyd E. Eastman "Nationalist China During the Sino-Japanese War 1937-1945," in Fairbank and Feuerwerker, The Cambridge History of China: Republican China 1912-1949, 410 and 576; Charles R. Lilly, "Tsiang T'ing-fu: Between Two Worlds, 1895-1935," Ph.D. diss. (University of Maryland, 1979).

90. "Personal Statement of John S. Service," in U.S. Senate, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation, 1965; Service had favorable impressions of these men, especially Quo T'ai-chi whom Service later characterized as "a wonderful old man." Service, "State Department Duty," 183.

91. Kahn, The China Hands, 68

92. "Personal Statement of John S. Service," in U.S. Senate, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation.

93. Eric Sevareid to Conrad Snow, 21 April 1950, Box 1, Folder 2, John Service Papers, Berkeley.

94. "Personal Statement of John S. Service," in U.S. Senate, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation.

95. Service, "Foreign Service Reporting," 22.

96. For a detailed account of Service's China memoranda, see Service, Lost Chance in China, passim.

97. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 182.

98. Ibid., 187; for information about Jack Belden's views on China, see his perceptive account of the Chinese Civil War from 1946-1949, China Shakes the World (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949).

99. Service, Lost Chance in China, 1-6.

100. Telegram to the President from Generalissimo Chiang, 9 December 1941, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File: China, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library; published also in Department of State Bulletin (19 December 1941), 508.

101. For similar views, see Feis, The China Tangle, 3.

102. Zhang Qijun, Dangshi Gaiyao [A brief party history], 1153; Zhang Baijia, "Kang Ri Zhanzheng Shiqi Guogong Liangdang de Dui Mei Zhengce."

103. Han Su-yin, Birdless Summer (New York: Putnam, 1969), 40; Jin, Zhou Enlai Zhuan, 537.

104. Robert W. Barnett, "Isolated China," Far Eastern Survey (27 July 1942): 169; Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 234.
105. Tong, China and the World Press, 169; Feis, The China Tangle, 4-5
106. Jiang Zongtong Milu, vol. 13, 8; Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 234; and Tong, China and the World Press, 171.
107. Jiang Zongtong Milu, vol. 13, 9.
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid., 13.
110. Feis, The China Tangle, 9
111. Guo, Jiang Weiyuanzhang, 57-58.
112. Charles Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Time Runs Out in CBI (Washington, D.C: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1959), 337; Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, "The China Hands in Historical and Comparative Perspective," in Paul G. Lauren, ed., The China Hands' Legacy: Ethics and Diplomacy (London: Westview Press, 1987), 59.
113. John P. Davies, Dragon by the Tail: American, British, Japanese, and Russian Encounters with China and One Another (New York: Norton, 1972), 224.
114. Record of Conversation with the President and Mr. Hopkins, 16 July 1943, T.V. Soong Papers, Box 32, Hoover Institution.
115. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 234.
116. Cheng Tianfang, "Kang Zhan Shiqi Zhong Mei Guanxi Huiyi," [Sino-American relations during the War of Resistance in retrospect], in Youguan "1943 Zhong Mei Waijiao Guanxi Wenjian" Cankao Ziliao [References relating to Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1943, China], 5.
117. Jiang Zongtong Milu, vol. 13, 15.
118. Guo, Jiang Weiyuanzhang, 48; Feis, The China Tangle, 19-29.
119. May, China Scapegoat, 69.
120. Ibid., 70.
121. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 251.

122. "Personal Statement of John S. Service," in U.S. Senate, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation.

123. May, China Scapegoat, 72

124. Feis, The China Tangle, 23; Guo, Jiang Weiyuanzhang, 48-52.

125. May, China Scapegoat, 80.

126. Department of State, The China White Paper, 469; also Feis, The China Tangle, 16.

127. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 263.

128. Ibid.

129. Ibid., 266-67.

130. Feis, The China Tangle, 31.

131. Ibid., 32.

132. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 299.

133. Jiang Zongtong Milu, Vol. 13, 25-30; Feis, The China Tangle, 33.

134. May, China Scapegoat, 78. See also Memo by advisor of political relations, 7 May 1942, Foreign Relations 1942: China: 40-42; and Memo of 20 May 1942, Foreign Relations 1942: China, 49-51.

135. Chiang Kai-shek to President Roosevelt, 10 March 1942; with attached T.V. Soong Memorandum for the President, and Chiang's Telegram to Soong, 19 April 1942, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File: China, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library; for the Chinese original see Guo, Jiang Weiyuanzhang, 97.

136. Stanley Hornbeck, Memorandum, 20 May 1942, State Department File, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

137. Ibid.

138. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 312.

139. Stilwell, The Stilwell Papers.

140. For similar arguments, see Feis, The China Tangle, 10.

141. Stilwell, The Stilwell Papers, Entry 19 June 1942.

142. Jiang Zongtong Milu, vol. 13, 82.
143. May, China Scapegoat, 66.
144. "Personal Statement of John S. Service," in U.S. Senate, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation.
145. Jiang Zongtong Milu, vol. 13, 84.
146. Ibid.
147. Feis, The China Tangle, 44; Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 312.
148. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 323.
149. Ibid., 324.
150. John Davies, Strictly Confidential Memorandum for the Ambassador: the Stilwell Mission, 9 March 1943, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File: China, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
151. "Personal Statement of John S. Service," in U.S. Senate, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation.
152. After Service finished the long report in July, he found out that the State Department project had been suggested by a Chinese scholar who was interested in psychological warfare, and the report served partly for the scholar's own research. Service, "State Department Duty," 197.
153. Service, Lost Chance in China, 63-65.
154. Joseph Esherick, Interview with John Service, September and December 1972, Quoted in Ibid., 8.
155. For example he made an "extremely good friend" with a correspondent from the Chinese Central New Agency. Service, "State Department Duty," 194.
156. "Personal Statement of John S. Service."
157. Service, "State Department Duty," 200. Service was thirty-two when they started, he had his birthday during the trip.
158. Ibid., 200-201.
159. Ibid., 202.

160. "Personal Statement of John S. Service," in U.S. Senate, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation, 349.

161. Ibid.

162. Service, "State Department Duty," 214.

163. Lin Sen was an old revolutionary from Sichuan province. He was named president of the National government in order to attract support of his home province; his presidency was ineffectual. He died in August 1943. See, Lloyd E. Eastman, "Nationalist China during the Sino-Japanese War 1937-1945," in Fairbank and Feuerwerker, The Cambridge History of China, vol. 13, pt. 2, 560.

164. Chen Hailiang, "Kangzhan Qijian Willkie Teshi FangYu Jianwen" [Special envoy Willkie's visit to Chongqing during the War of Resistance], Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Vol. 27 (Beijing: Zhongguo Wenshi Press, 1994), 80.

165. Chen, "Kangzhan Qijian," 78.

166. Chiang Kai-shek, The Collected Wartime Messages of General Chiang Kai-Shek, 1937-1945, ed. and trans. by George Kao (New York: John Day Company, 1946), 734.

167. Chiang Kai-shek, "The End of Unequal Treaties in China," closing address to the 1st Plenary Session of the 3rd People's Political Council, Chongqing, 31 October 1942. Quoted in Wu, "A Rhetorical Analysis of Selected Speeches by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek," 187.

168. Fairbank, Chinabound, 206. For information about the impact of Willkie's trip in the United States, see Sterling Seagrave, The Soong Dynasty (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), 378.

169. Service, "State Department Duty," 217.

170. Service, Lost Chance in China, 12.

171. Ibid.

172. See John Service, "the Famine in Honan Province," in Service, Lost Chance in China, 9-19.

173. "Personal Statement of John S. Service," in U.S. Senate, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation.

174. Service, "State Department Duty," 199.

175. "Personal Statement of John S. Service," in U.S. Senate, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation.

176. Service, The Amerasia Paper, 98.
177. Ibid., 145.
178. Fairbank, Chinabound, 284.
179. Paul Varg, The Closing of the Door: Sino-American Relations, 1936-46 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1973), 91.
180. Caroline Interview, 76.
181. Service, The Amerasia Papers, 97-98.
182. Zhou Enlai made this point on 20 November 1942 when he had an interview with Service and John Carter Vincent. See Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, China, 197.
183. Jiang Zongtong Milu, vol. 13, 78.
184. John P. Davies, "The China Hands in Practice: The Personal Experience," in Lauren, The China Hands Legacy, 41.
185. Service, The Amerasia Paper, 98.
186. Service, "State Department Duty," 230.
187. Philip Sprouse to the Secretary of State, 13 May 1943, Records of the Office of Strategic Services, RG 226, National Archives.
188. "Personal Statement of John S. Service," in U.S. Senate, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation.
189. John Service, "Resentment of Censorship and Cultural Control by the Kuomintang," 2 June 1943, State Department Decimal File, 893.00/15038, LM 65, Roll 3, National Archives.
190. "Personal Statement of John S. Service," in U.S. Senate, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation.
191. Howland Shaw to Clarence Gauss, 21 October 1943; and Clarence Gauss to John Service, 18 November 1943, both from John Service Papers, Box 2, Folder 30, Berkeley.
192. Kahn, The China Hands, 65.
193. Service, "State Department Duty," 244.
194. Ibid., 243.

195. Henry L. Stimson to the Secretary of State, 29 June 1943, John Service Papers, Box 1, Folder 11, Berkeley; John P. Davies Jr. to John Carter Vincent, 14 October 1944, John Service Papers, Box 1, Folder 27, Berkeley; and Service, "State Department Duty," 244-53.
196. "Personal Statement of John S. Service," in U.S. Senate, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation.
197. This was Ambassador Gauss' statement before the State Department Loyalty Board during its investigation of Service's loyalty in May 1950. See U.S. Senate, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation, 2067.
198. Davies to Vincent, 14 October 1944.
199. Fairbank, Chinabound, 280.
200. Service, "State Department Duty," 264.
201. *Ibid.*, 384.
202. Summary of Memorandum by John Service, 1 July 1944, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File: China, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
203. Department of State, Division of Chinese Affairs Memo, 9 August 1944, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File: China, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
204. Draft of Telegram to Ambassador Gauss, 7 September 1944, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File: China, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
205. For more information, see Service, Lost Chance in China, 34-41, 108-12, 116-20.
206. John Service, Conversation with Madame Sun Yat-sen, 14 February 1944, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File: China, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
207. *Ibid.*, see also "Voice from Chongqing," Time, 14 February 1945.
208. Lauchlin Currie to the President, 17 March 1944, Roosevelt Papers, President Secretary's File: China, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
209. Donald Nelson to President Roosevelt, 20 December 1944, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File: China, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library; Martin Wilbur, Report on an interview with Dr. Chiang Mon-lin, 17 January 1945, Records of the Office of Strategic Services, RG 226, National Archives.
210. John Service to Assistant Chief of Staff, 13 February 1944, Records of the Office of Strategic Services, RG 226, National Archives.

211. Howland Shaw to Clarence Gauss, 21 June and 13 September 1944; and Clarence Gauss to John Service, 5 August and 7 October 1944, all from John Service Papers, Box 2, Folder 30, Berkeley. See also "Personal Statement of John S. Service," in U.S. Senate, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation; and Service, Lost Chance in China, 122.
212. New York Times, 2 November 1949, 26.
213. Jiang Zongtong Milu, vol. 13, 118; Roosevelt's suggestion of a coalition government was recorded by his son Elliott Roosevelt, see Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943 (Washington: GPO, 1961), 323.
214. Feis, The China Tangle, 96.
215. Winston Churchill, Closing the Ring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951), 328.
216. Jiang Jingguo (Chiang Chingkuo), Fengyu zhong de Jingjing [Silence in the storm], 42. Translated and cited in Guo, Jiang Weiyuanzhang, 1.
217. These simple facts about the second Burma Campaign are from Jiang Zongtong Milu, vol. 13, 140-44; and Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 415-54.
218. Jiang Zongtong Milu, vol. 13, 189.
219. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 459.
220. Chennault, Way of a Fighter, 324.
221. See Xinmin Bao [New People's Daily], 20 March 1946; quoted in Eastman, "Nationalist China During the Sino-Japanese War," 582.
222. Stilwell, The Stilwell Papers, 316-19.
223. White and Jacoby, Thunder Out of China, 197.
224. John Service, "Summary: the Situation in China and Suggestions Regarding American Policy," 20 June 1944, John Service Papers, Box 2, Folder 42, Berkeley.
225. Ibid.
226. American Criticism of China, 13 June 1944, Records of the Office of Strategic Services, RG 226, National Achieves.
227. Lauchlin Currie, Memorandum for the President, 15 June 1944, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File: China, Box 27, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

228. Domestic Troubles in the Chiang Household, 10 May 1944, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File: China, Box 27, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
229. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience, 468-69.
230. Telegram for President from Wallace, 28 June 1944, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File: China, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
231. John Davies to Harry Hopkins, 31 December 1943, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File: China, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
232. President Roosevelt to the Generalissimo, 7 July 1944, Commanding General Oklahoma File, Box 5, Records of the China Theater of Operation, RG 493, National Archives. The date of the 7 July 1944 message is often mistaken as 6 July possibly for the time zone difference between China and America. See, for example, Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience, 469.
233. Service, The Amerasia Paper, 62.
234. Davies, "The China Hands in Practice," 46.
235. White and Jacoby, Thunder out of China, 224.
236. For more information and comments, see Hong Zhang, "Tragic Cooperation: Chiang Kai-shek and America's China Policies from Pearl Harbor to Hurley's Mission" (M.A. Thesis, University of Toledo, August 1989), 31.
237. Jiang Zongtong Milu, vol. 13, 150.
238. *Ibid.*, 150-51; Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience, 471.
239. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 471
240. Franklin Roosevelt to P.J. Hurley, 18 August 1944, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File: China, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
241. Franklin Roosevelt to D.M. Nelson, 18 August 1944, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File: China, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
242. Donald Nelson to President Roosevelt, 20 December 1944, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File: China, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
243. For the Eyes of the President Alone, 8 September 1944, Joseph Stilwell Collection, Container 17, Outcard 205, Hoover Institution Archives.
244. Stilwell, The Stilwell Papers, notes of 16 September 1944, 331.

245. President Roosevelt to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, 18 September 1944, Joseph Stilwell Collection, Container 28A, Outcard 309, Hoover Institution Archives.
246. Jiang Zongtong Milu, vol. 13, 157.
247. Ibid.
248. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 494; Bagby, The Eagle-Dragon Alliance, 145; and Barbara G. Mulch, "A Chinese Puzzle: Patrick J. Hurley and the Foreign Service Officer Controversy" (Ph.D. diss., University of Kansas, 1972), 27-28.
249. Jiang Zongtong Milu, vol. 13, 157.
250. Ibid., 158.
251. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 498.
252. Patrick Hurley to President Roosevelt, 13 October 1944, Hurley Papers, University of Oklahoma; Chinese version in Jiang Zongtong Milu, vol. 13, 161.
253. Service, Lost Chance in China, 162-65.
254. Ibid., 164.
255. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 505.
256. Service, "State Department Duty in China," 293-94.
257. Ibid., 294-95.
258. Jiang Zongtong Milu, vol. 13, 95.
259. Ibid., 162.
260. Ibid., 163-64.
261. Albert Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1958), 305.
262. Jiang Zongtong Milu, vol. 13, 164.

CHAPTER FIVE

YANAN: THE COMMUNISTS

The communist problem in China has most important bearing[s] on U.S. policy in the Far East.¹

-----Chiang Kai-chek

Chinese and American interests are correlated and similar. They fit together economically and politically. We can and must work together. The United States would find us more cooperative than the Kuomintang. We will not be afraid of democratic American influence--we will welcome it.²

-----Mao Zedong

Unless the Kuomintang goes as far as the Communists in political and economic reform, and otherwise proves itself able to contest this leadership of the people . . . the communists will be the dominant force in China within a comparatively few years.³

-----John S. Service

America's communication, or mis-communication, with the Chinese Communists during World War II was crucial to both wartime and post-war Sino-American relations. In the War of Resistance the Chinese Communists were compelled to adjust their traditional antagonistic policy toward the U.S. and to seek U.S. cooperation in the struggle against both Japanese aggression and Guomindang political dominance. The war also presented great opportunities for the United States

to assure the balance of power in Asia by achieving a strong, united, and pro-American China.⁴ By 1944, as the war entered its last stage, the growing strength of the Communists in north China not only challenged the power of the Nationalist government but also complicated America's China policy. Caught in the obsession that the Communists were not only destructive but little more than international agents in China, Chiang Kai-shek would not yield an inch to the Communist demand for social and political reforms. America's commitment to Chiang's national government kept it from pragmatic dealings with the CCP and other major political forces.

None of the three American missions during 1944-45--Wallace, Dixie, and Hurley--that dealt with the Chinese Communist issue and CCP-GMD relations accomplished much. Assiduous American efforts to improve CCP-GMD relations and establish a coalition Chinese government foundered on China's profound social problems, the deep-rooted distrust between the CCP and GMD, and insufficient U.S. understanding of the complexity of Chinese politics.⁵

As a Foreign Service officer attached to the American Army headquarters in China during the crucial period of 1944-45, a time when the CCP was rapidly expanding and the GMD was weakened by its inherent deficiencies and Japanese attacks, John Service played a central role in wartime U.S.-CCP relations through his political reporting and his direct contacts with the CCP leadership. Closely associated with all three American missions, working behind the scene or on center stage, he was assigned to gather intelligence about the Communists, and he eagerly conducted long interviews with CCP leaders in Chongqing, China's wartime capital, and in the caves

of Yanan at Communist headquarters.

During his first three-month stay in Yanan as a member of the Dixie Mission from July to October, Service compiled fifty-one memoranda and reports. Upon his return to China from home consultation, he wrote twenty-six more from 14 February to 1 April 1945, when he was recalled from China.⁶ CCP Chairman Mao Zedong and other leaders regarded him as an important representative of the friendly Roosevelt government and eagerly sought American support through him. His comprehensive reports about the Communists and their relations with the ruling GMD were read by policy makers in Washington including the president, and influenced the making of U.S. China policy, although his recommendation of closer relations with the CCP was not implemented. He became not only what Gauss had termed the "governmental authority on Chinese Communism,"⁷ but also a key figure in the later controversies over America's China policy and the enduring debate over whether America had "lost China" or rather had suffered a "lost chance in China." His inquiries were ingenious and passionate, reflecting his intimate knowledge about that country and his heart-felt understanding of its agony and elation. His reports on the Chinese Communists contributed to a higher level of understanding about the complexity of Chinese politics. His recommendation of forceful "America's leadership in China," nonetheless, posed serious questions about America's proper role in China and the appropriateness of its friendly intervention in Chinese domestic affairs.

The CCP's Approach to America

Established in 1921, the Chinese Communist Party was a product of both the nationalist movement and international influence. Its agenda and outlook were largely formulated as a search for China's salvation from its decaying domestic system, and in reaction to its grievous experience with Western imperialists since the mid-nineteenth century. Mao Zedong maintained that imperialist powers "imposed their ruthless rule on China and reduced an independent China into a semi-colonial and colonial China."⁸ The CCP was characterized by strong anti-feudal and anti-imperialist tendencies. CCP leaders had concluded, early in 1922, that the United States, despite its revolutionary tradition, was, not unlike other imperialists, attempting to use its economic superiority to depose Anglo-Japanese hegemony in China, and that Washington's Open Door policy was merely one more instance of using economic leverage to dominate China.⁹

World War II and the changing international balance brought a sharp theoretical and practical reorientation in the CCP's international policy. Complying with the Comintern's united front strategy, the CCP enunciated a policy of rallying all necessary forces to resist Japan's invasion. On its diplomatic front, the CCP gave up its old slogan of "down with all imperialists" in favor of strategic unity with all countries opposing Japanese aggression.¹⁰

As soon as Japan launched its all-out war against China in 1937 and seized the Beijing-Tianjin area, the Chinese Communists began to seek American and British support. "Living in a period of bitterest sufferings in our history," Mao exclaimed,

“we Chinese people most urgently need help from others.”¹¹ Two weeks after Japan occupied Beijing, Mao defined the basic line of the CCP's foreign policy as to continue to work with the Soviet Union “as the most reliable ally,” but also to “enlist the sympathy of Britain, the United States, and France for our resistance to Japan.”¹²

Understanding the importance of America's position in the war against Japan and in the struggle for future China, the CCP defined its policy toward the United States as seeking to “utilize America's influence over the Nationalist government to maintain internal unity and China's ability to resist Japanese aggression.”¹³ These CCP initiatives were explicitly revealed in newspapers and other propaganda outlets, mainly Jiefang Ribao in Yanan and Xinhua Ribao in Chongqing. While keeping a watchful eye on America's moves in Asia and trying to avert a “Far Eastern Munich,”¹⁴ the CCP cheerfully endorsed the 1939 Anglo-American loan to China, expressing gratitude for assistance from the two democratic countries:

The establishment of the \$25 million loan from the United States, and £10 million loan from the United Kingdom have great political and economic significance. . . . These loans are the actual aid to China from these two countries after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war. Even though the amount might be petty, the assistance to China's war of resistance is by no means insignificant. . . . We are sincerely grateful for this assistance from two major democratic countries.¹⁵

Still deeply suspicious of Western powers, the CCP, while appealing for foreign aid, repeatedly stressed the principle of self-reliance. When appraising the Anglo-American loan, for instance, it quickly pointed out that Western assistance was “earned by our persistent struggle for self-reliance and the war of resistance.”¹⁶ It also

made it widely known that securing Western help must entail “no loss of our territory or our sovereign rights.”¹⁷

Mao elaborated his “new democracy” theory to provide an ideological justification for the party’s new conciliatory approach toward both the GMD and Western powers. According to Mao, the Chinese revolution resulted from China’s deep-seated “feudalistic” problems and, inspired by the Soviet revolution, would pursue an unique independent path most suitable for China’s own situation. Before conditions were ripe for a socialist revolution, the CCP must lead a “new democracy,” which was different from either the Soviet proletarian type or the American bourgeoisie model, and was in line with Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary ideal envisaged in the Three People’s Principles--nationalism, people’s rights, and people’s livelihood. Mao wrote:

The new democratic revolution is vastly different from the democratic revolution of Europe and America in that it results not in a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie . . . but all the revolutionary classes under the leadership of the proletariat. All who stand for resistance to Japan and for democracy are entitled to share in this political power. . . . [it] also differs from a socialist revolution in that it . . . does not destroy any section of capitalism which is capable of contributing to the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal struggle.¹⁸

The pragmatic policy of the Chinese Communist Party toward the United States was mainly initiated and carried out by Zhou Enlai, leading member of the CCP Central Committee and chief CCP representative in Chongqing.¹⁹ In the summer of 1941 when America’s policy toward Japanese aggression clarified and hardened, and in the midst of the Guomindang blockade of Communist border regions that had

started in 1939, the CCP took a major step toward approaching the West. On 12 July 1941 the party issued a directive stating that “under the present situation, no matter if they are imperialist states or the capitalist class, all who oppose fascist Germany, Italy, and Japan and aid the Soviet Union and China are good, helpful, and just . . . a possible American war against Germany and Japan is not imperialist in nature, but just.”²⁰ Mao instructed Zhou, who was in charge of the entire Communist operation in GMD-controlled areas through the CCP Southern Bureau (Nanfang Ju),²¹ to approach the United States and Great Britain through diplomatic channels. By the fall of 1941 it was clear to the CCP that American support was critical both for China’s War of Resistance and for its political struggle against the GMD. It stressed the two principles of self-reliance and democratization.²² A Jiefang Ribao editorial suggested that “the more progress we can make in our internal unity so as to become a democratic state in name and in reality, then the greater sympathy and aid we will receive from the antifascist peoples of the world.”²³

The CCP’s establishment and activities in Chongqing were centered around three points in and near the city--Hongyan, the Xinhua Ribao, and Zengjiayan. Located in the rural area outside Chongqing, Hongyan was the Eighth Route Army’s Chongqing office and lodging place for many CCP leaders including Zhou Enlai. Published legally in Chongqing, the Xinhua Ribao was the CCP’s propaganda instrument and official voice in GMD-controlled areas. Near downtown, overlooking the fast flowing Jialing River, was the famous Zengjiayan #50, popularly known as Zhou Gongguan, Zhou’s official residence and public office. Zengjiyan #50, on the

first floor of a three-story building Zhou shared with a GMD official and a wartime service group, was near the Nationalist government headquarters, and close to the white house of Chiang Kai-shek's secret police chief, General Dai Li. Zhou was Vice Minister of the Political Affairs Department of the National Military Affairs Council and functioned unofficially as chief CCP representative in Chongqing. It was at Zhou Gongguan that General Zhou, as he was customarily called, frequently entertained his foreign guests, particularly American journalists, scholars, and Foreign Service officers--to whom he zealously promoted CCP policies.

The active CCP campaign to win American sympathy and favor in early 1941 through its representatives in Chongqing marked the first major Communist diplomatic initiative toward the United States.²⁴ Zhou played a crucial role, for instance, in presenting the CCP's interpretations of the New Fourth Army incident, winning widespread domestic and international support, particularly Americans' sympathy and donation of more than ten million Chinese yuan.²⁵ Hugh Deane, a freelance writer for the Christian Science Monitor, was in China when the incident occurred. Before he left for America, Zhou and his aids gave Deane a farewell dinner at which Zhou handed the American reporter a map showing the areas where GMD-CCP troops had clashed. The information furnished by Zhou influenced Deane's writings on the incident and CCP-GMD relations, about which he conducted ten articles. Deane argued that by inflicting the anti-Communist incident, the GMD had clearly blown its opportunity to take advantage of people's patriotism and wish for unity, that without mass support the GMD was on its way out, and that having won

the heart of the peasants, the CCP represented China's future.²⁶

Following the New Fourth Army incident the CCP's focus in Chongqing was to expand influence and win friends at home and abroad. Zhou often met with eminent Chinese at the Xinhua Ribao office, and his sincerity and casual style won him many friends. He made even greater efforts to influence the Chongqing foreign community. He paid frequent visits to foreign ambassadors in China, and held numerous talks with various Americans, including writers and reporters like Earnest Hemingway, Anna L. Strong, Agnes Smedley, Israel Epstein, and scholars such as John K. Fairbank. Most of his American contacts were, however, with Foreign Service officers and military personnel.²⁷

Zhou's effective communication with and influence over the Chongqing foreign community were widely recognized. Fairbank, the American cultural representative from the Office of Strategic Services, recalled that when he first met Zhou, he was immediately captivated by the diplomat's charm.²⁸ Fairbank's high regard was reflected by most Americans who knew Zhou. Chiang's American political adviser, Owen Lattimore, described him as "very much a favorite among foreign embassies in Chongqing. This was because he was frank and open. . . . He was certainly a great favorite among the Americans, especially the military."²⁹

America's entry into the Pacific war not only brought China and America closer but also presented the CCP a possible ally in its struggle against the GMD, whom the CCP claimed was anything but democratic--an idea Americans also held strongly. Immediately after America entered the war, the CCP issued a series of

statements including the “Chinese Communist Party's Declaration for the Pacific War” and “Instructions on the Pacific Anti-Japanese United Front” to show its friendliness and pragmatism toward the United States and other Western powers.³⁰ According to the CCP Central Committee, while committing to Chiang and the Nationalist government, the United States was more concerned with winning the war and creating a united, strong, and democratic China in postwar Asia. Therefore “the Chinese Communist Party should cooperate sincerely, frankly, and whole-heartedly with England and the United States to enhance the Allied strength and to improve the wartime situation in China.”³¹ Under this guidance, the party actively sought popular support from the U.S. by influencing the media and public opinion,³² and, on the other hand, it frequently expressed its willingness to establish wartime military cooperation with the United States.

The arrival of Lauchlin Currie as President Roosevelt's special envoy in Chongqing in the summer of 1942 prompted the CCP's first official invitation for Americans to send a mission to Yanan and other Communist-controlled regions. Zhou Enlai invited Currie for a meeting. When he declined, the CCP representative managed to deliver several messages to him in which Zhou emphasized two issues: Lend-Lease aid to CCP forces and an American visit to Yanan. On 6 August, in a conversation with Davies, Zhou again extended an invitation for an official American visit to Yanan.³³

Through increased contacts with American officers like Service, Davies, Drumright, and John Vincent in Chongqing, Zhou could understand the many

dimensions of America's China policy--keeping China in the war to tie up Japan, trying to prevent a civil war between the CCP and GMD, and supporting the central government while pressing it to reform. He seized every opportunity to cultivate his diplomatic connections, and kept pressing for America's recognition and support of the CCP.³⁴

Early in 1943, the CCP intensified its push for direct CCP-U.S. contact by inviting an American observer's mission to Yanan. While Service was home for consultation, Zhou held numerous talks with Davies and Vincent. On 16 March, concerned with America's indifference toward the CCP's earlier invitation and the government's continued anti-CCP campaign, Zhou again extended an invitation, emphasizing the importance of America's firsthand observation in the Communist areas. He told Davies that in order for Americans to gather intelligence regarding enemy activities, and for more effective liaison, the United States should have a small group of officers stationed in Yanan and other Communist border regions.³⁵ In late March and again in early May, Zhou had two conversations with Vincent and repeated Yanan's invitation for an official American mission.³⁶

In June, after the halt of CCP-GMD negotiations and in the midst of the "third anti-Communist upsurge," Zhou returned to Yanan to consult with other CCP leaders. They decided to approach the United States on two diplomatic fronts--in Chongqing and Yanan. They made a number of overtures to Americans. In mid-July, Zhou's secretary in Chongqing informed the American embassy of government troop movement toward Communist border regions in Shaanxi.³⁷ A month later, Mao and

Zhou cabled Dong Biwu (Tung Pi-wu), senior CCP official representing the CCP in Chongqing in Zhou's absence, to propose to the American embassy that the Communists provide Americans with intelligence on the Japanese, in return for American information concerning Lend-Lease aid to China.³⁸ On 1 September, Zhou spelled out CCP's foreign policy priorities at a Political Bureau meeting that "in diplomatic dealings, we first focus on the United States with England as our second priority."³⁹ In October, when General Stilwell returned to Chongqing, Dong immediately furnished him with secret intelligence on GMD troop movement northwest toward the Communist regions.⁴⁰

Meanwhile, the CCP successfully carried out a public relations campaign against the GMD by advocating not only Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles, the most potent symbol of the Chinese Revolution, but also Western democratic ideas. While Communist publications in Yanan discussed the inseparable nature of the War of Resistance and democratic reform, the Chongqing-based Xinhua Ribao carried an editorial on 14 August endorsing the Atlantic Charter and calling for China to join the worldwide movement toward democratic change.⁴¹ Fairbank observed that the rational and open style of Zhou and his aids in Chongqing helped create a pro-Western image for the CCP among Americans:

The Communists who lived up the street in Zhou Enlai's headquarters do an excellent job of contact with the Americans, with whom they can discuss things critically and realistically. . . . Their line now appears to be to act just as much like modern American liberal democrats as possible, which to some extent they are; . . . Our impression of them is very favorable, because the group here consist of Yenching and Tising Hua students who speak good English and know their Western ideas.⁴²

The Chinese Communists insistently and actively sought American cooperation after Pearl Harbor, despite America's apparent apathy to their first gestures. Even though its search for Western support and the change in its diplomatic orientation were more tactical than ideological, the CCP's approach to the United States was an integral part of its wartime united front strategy; it was also in accordance with its definition of the current stage of the Chinese revolution as being "not proletarian but bourgeois-democracy."⁴³ It was by no means a fundamental change in its basic revolutionary principles or ultimate aims, which were "to strive for the final building of socialist and Communist societies."⁴⁴ Despite differences with Moscow over Communist principles and CCP-GMD relations, the CCP leadership firmly held to the idea that the Soviet Union was a true democracy and a dependable supporter of the Chinese revolution. When Colonel Barrett asked about which country was more democratic in November 1944, Zhou answered that the Communists considered the Soviet Union as the greatest democracy in the world; but the Communists would be "extremely glad if we could enjoy the same sort of democracy as you do in the United States today."⁴⁵

America's Response to the CCP

America's interactions with the Chinese Communists before 1944 were very limited. Without official and direct connections, its understanding of the Communists was largely superficial and secondhand. Some Americans viewed the Communists as radical international agents; others called them anti-government "bandits;" more

regarded them as merely agrarian reformers. On 16 November 1936, for example, in a conversation with Major Takeo Imai, Military Attaché to the Japanese embassy, Ambassador Johnson had explained the conventional American attitudes toward the Chinese communist movement. He claimed that communism in China was "purely" an agrarian movement that came from internal discontent rather than outside influence and from movements of students, who as the "natural radicals of all countries," tended to embrace the Communist idea:

Communism after all was an idea, and that ideas were like water; for just as water seeks its level, filling all holes and valleys in its rush to find its level, so ideas like communism fill all valleys of discontent and holes of defeat in their rush downward to find their level. This was in obedience to a natural law, and if the farmers and students of China could be given a happier outlook on life I felt that communism as such would lose its interest for them.⁴⁶

Official information about the Communists remained largely secondhand well into the early years of the War of Resistance. The publication in 1938 of Edgar Snow's extensive account of the Communists in Yanan, Red Star Over China, brought a new level of curiosity and understanding about the Chinese Communists. The book was first published in England and immediately became popular in the U.S. The first U.S. edition sold 15,000 copies, the largest sale of any non-fiction book about Asia.⁴⁷ Following Snow's venture, such American journalists as T.A. Bisson and Owen Lattimore journeyed to Yanan and other Communist bases to conduct interviews and firsthand observations.⁴⁸ Despite their different perceptions of the Communists as social revolutionaries or agrarian reformers, these first encounters brought back from Yanan a message, often favorable and highly enthusiastic.⁴⁹ Earl Leaf of the United

Press discovered that the Communists were pleasantly informal and egalitarian, and that Yanan reminded him of a fun “Boy Scout summer camp.”⁵⁰ Joy Homer, though pro-Nationalist and anti-Communist, was similarly impressed by the young, energetic, patriotic, efficient, and “lovable” Communists in Yanan.⁵¹ Their well-disposed appraisals were to have a profound impact on U.S. understanding of the Chinese Communists.⁵²

Even President Roosevelt became fascinated with the inside stories of the Chinese Communists when he read Snow’s book. He would invite the journalist to the White House several times during the subsequent years to discuss the China situation with him.⁵³ The fast changing situation in China during the war convinced Roosevelt that relying on State Department reports was not enough for a clear picture of that country. Thus, he sent special missions to serve as his ears and eyes.⁵⁴ One purpose of these missions was to learn about the Communists.

U.S. Marine Captain Evans F. Carlson was sent in late 1938 as a field observer to gather intelligence. He went to investigate the Eighth Route Army, making friends with its commanders while preparing reports for the White House. He was the first American military observer to scrutinize the CCP army, under the auspices of the U.S. Navy and with the formal approval of Chiang.⁵⁵ Like many Western reporters, Carlson was attracted by the CCP leaders' simple and frank personalities and lifestyle, and by their strong sense of mission and brotherhood. He claimed that the Chinese Communists were more like Americans than any other group in China, for they “looked you squarely in the eye,” and, like Americans, they were straightforward and

truthful.⁵⁶ After much firsthand experience, he came to the belief that while the Communists were undoubtedly social revolutionaries, they were also nationalists who were eager to cooperate with the United States to fight Japan and reconstruct China.⁵⁷ Upon returning to Washington, he made public speeches, and published numerous articles and two books about the Communists and their military forces.⁵⁸ Roosevelt was fascinated by Carlson's reports and he recommended to Secretary Hull that he read part of them.⁵⁹

The growing favorable sentiment toward the Chinese Communists and support for extending aid to them concerned many traditional-minded China watchers. In a letter to the State Department, Major James McHugh, Naval Attaché to the U.S. embassy in China, wrote: "I doubt if there is a real basis for any compromise since the ultimate aim of the Communists is a complete new government controlled entirely by them and since they run every misfortune of the government into propaganda for their cause." He argued against suggestions by people like Edgar Snow that America should aid China and that such an aid should go to soldiers at the front and people behind the lines rather than the bureaucrats in Chongqing. He warned that such an interventionist approach would create "a puppet show" comparable to Japan in China, though a self-pro-claimed righteous one.⁶⁰

By early 1941, in the aftermath of the New Fourth Army incident, there was a growing interest in the Chinese Communists, particularly in GMD-CCP relations, at the embassy in Chongqing and among policy makers in Washington. According to State Department records, during the first five months of 1941, the American embassy

under Ambassador Nelson Johnson sent Washington more than two dozen memoranda and reports on Chinese Communists and CCP-GMD relations.⁶¹ Much of the information, however, was based on secondhand intelligence, or conversations with Zhou Enlai, mostly conducted by senior Foreign Service officer Everett F. Drumright.⁶² The Embassy also paid close attention to the attitudes of minor parties toward the CCP-GMD problem. Much later, on 24 May 1944, for instance, Gauss detailed for Washington events at the Constitutional Forum sponsored by several minor parties, with a lengthy report on Sun Fo's speech on China's future. Sun urged that "we must solve our political questions by peaceful means and must not on any account resort to civil war."⁶³

The State Department also relied on individual sources like author and correspondent Anna Louis Strong, who had close contacts with both Communist representatives and GMD officials and kept in touch with key players in the State Department like Stanley Hornbeck.⁶⁴ The concern over possible clashes between China's two major parties also motivated closer communication between the U.S. and British governments, who in mid-1941 reached a consensus view that Chiang should be pressured to collaborate with the Communists. The State Department therefore expressed such concerns in numerous conversations with China's foreign minister and its ambassador in Washington and instructed the American ambassador in Chongqing to convey America's concerns to Chiang.⁶⁵

Despite growing American interest in the troubled relations between the CCP and the national government, the Communists were regarded largely as a problem, not

a major force. Firsthand information became scarce after the central government's ban on journalists or observers to travel in Communist regions. But the channels of communication with the Communists were kept open largely by the efforts of CCP representatives in Chongqing, especially the artful Zhou Enlai, and by the keen Foreign Service officers at the embassy, particularly John Service.

Soon after arriving in Chongqing, Service came into direct contact with the CCP officials there. His first meeting with Chinese Communists was on 30 May 1941, when Everett Drumright took him to dinner at Zhou's residence. Zhou informed them of the stalemated CCP-GMD relations and discussed with them China's War of Resistance against Japan and possible U.S. responses. Zhou earnestly inquired whether America was actually endeavoring to mediate between China and Japan.⁶⁶

Service was favorably impressed by Zhou at this first meeting.⁶⁷ He recalled thirty-five years later, "Few people who met Chou En-lai face to face were likely to forget him. He carried an aura of magnetic vitality."⁶⁸ A month later Service, along with Counselor John C. Vincent and Drumright, lunched with Zhou at the embassy. During the long conversation, Service learned about the Communist stance on the Russo-German conflict and U.S.-China relations. Zhou claimed that the conflict presented the U.S. and England with a splendid opportunity to exercise a strong influence against Japan's aggression and that the appointment of Owen Lattimore as political adviser to the head of the Chinese government was a good selection.⁶⁹

As the Foreign Service officer with more contacts with Zhou than any other,

Service grew to understand Zhou well and build a substantial trust in him. He described Zhou as a person with "endurance, dignity, honesty, and principle."⁷⁰ He praised Zhou after his death in 1976: "I watched him over those years as he met many American visitors, high or low, civilian or military, sophisticated in Chinese affairs or completely uninformed. Yet no ignorance seemed to dismay him, or was any question dismissed as too trivial or irrelevant." Service remembered that those Chongqing talks with Zhou "were always a cerebral exercise, but a very pleasant one."⁷¹

Concerned with the apparent deterioration of the Nationalist government and GMD-CCP relations, and influenced by Zhou Enlai, Service gradually came to the conclusion that the CCP was more dynamic and likely to win power in future China, and that America was "the only force" that could influence the Guomintang to reform. In his 23 January 1943 summary report, he called for firsthand observations in the Communist areas.⁷² He suggested later that the best-suited American representatives to the Communist areas were Foreign Service officers with Chinese language skills, and that they be sent into Communist areas for day-to-day observations.⁷³

Though not the first to report the Communist initiative for an American mission to Yanan--Davies had conveyed Zhou's invitation in his 6 August 1942 report to Washington--Service was the first Foreign Service officer to propose, directly and vigorously, an official American visit to the Communist areas. He explained: "Due to the Kuomintang blockade, information regarding conditions in the Communist area at

present are not available. Such information as we do have is several years out of date, and has limitations as to scope and probable reliability." This strong appeal for direct knowledge concerning the CCP attracted more Washington attention to this issue than any previous reports.⁷⁴ The two most prominent and experienced policy makers on China in the State Department, Hornbeck and M. M. Hamilton, responded quickly. In a confidential memorandum, Hamilton contended that the GMD-CCP situation was important but should be followed with care. The State Department sent out a long memo to the Chongqing embassy, requesting further information.⁷⁵

For his part the more prominent and powerful Hornbeck was skeptical. Writing in a 30 January memo, he cautioned others to maintain "an attitude of intelligent skepticism" to reports emphasizing the CCP's strength and the prospects of a civil war. He also spoke strongly against Lend-Lease aid to the CCP, warning that the suggestion that "a part of such arms as we ship to China go to the 'Communists' is one which, were we to listen to it, would launch us on a course of playing both sides in a foreign country, which we never have followed, which I trust, we never will follow, and which, if followed would be both vicious and stupid."⁷⁶ Hornbeck was apparently in strong disagreement with the view that the "so-called Communists" were anything of importance and thought the present Chinese leaders would have the ability to deal with the problem.⁷⁷

Despite the skepticism of some leading experts on China, Davies, Service and other "China hands" pressed forward. On 23 March 1943 Davies reported his conversation with Zhou who reiterated the CCP's invitation for an American mission

to Yanan.⁷⁸ Immediately after his return from home consultation, Service was assigned to a new post in Lanzhou as a liaison officer to obtain information on the local economy, China's relations with Russia, and CCP forces in nearby regions. Before leaving for the new post, Service asked Consular George Atcheson about going into Communist areas. "By all means, if you have a chance, do it," Atcheson agreed.⁷⁹ Service knew that "any such venture would probably have to be disavowed by the Embassy and made on my own responsibility."⁸⁰ In Lanzhou he considered sailing down the Yellow River to reach the Communist areas, but heavy secret police surveillance on foreigners kept him from doing so.

Although the CCP's cooperative gestures and repeated invitations did not prompt immediate Washington reaction, they nonetheless attracted American attention. While Service was in Lanzhou trying to get information about the Communists and reporting to Washington his findings about the general discontent among intellectuals, Davies was pushing policy makers in Washington to give immediate attention to the Communists and their differences with the GMD.⁸¹ On 24 June, Davies urged in a long memorandum that it was crucial for Washington to obtain political and military information about the Communists and to adopt a more assertive American policy toward China. "We must have our own official sources of information in the Communist area," he wrote, "the final decision on policy waits on this information."⁸²

After joining General Stilwell's staff in late 1943, Service acted as liaison between the American Army headquarters and Chinese Communist representatives in

Chongqing. He visited CCP offices frequently, submitting questions and picking up replies on intelligence regarding Japanese forces in north China.⁸³ In the process he got acquainted and made friends with a number of CCP officials in Chongqing, including Zhou's secretary Chen Jiakang (Ch'en Chia-k'ang), a "really close friend,"⁸⁴ and Zhou's press secretary Kung Peng. When Kung's husband Qiao Guanhua underwent an operation, Service volunteered to give blood, but the doctors had difficulties to find his thin veins. Occasionally he had social gatherings with CCP leaders. On 25 October he and Fairbank had a dinner meeting with CCP representative Wang Bingnan that lasted after ten o'clock.⁸⁵ He later explained that establishing various contacts was an effective way to gather intelligence.⁸⁶

In the early months of 1944, when Service was busy traveling in southwestern China and General Stilwell was pondering the possibility of inviting the Communists to take joint action,⁸⁷ Davies urged again that a military and political mission be immediately dispatched to Yanan. Understanding that normal diplomatic or military channels could not put enough pressure on Chiang, he suggested that the request "should come directly from the president to overcome any initial refusal from the Generalissimo and to exercise America's 'ample bargaining power.'"⁸⁸

Pressed by the army and General Marshall, Roosevelt sent Chiang an official message on 9 February 1944, requesting permission for an American observers' mission to the Communist areas. He wrote, "It appears to be of very great advisability that an American observers mission be immediately dispatched to North Shensi and Shansi provinces and such other parts of North China as may be

necessary."⁸⁹

Chiang was not pleased with the proposal. He expressed his worries in his diary: "Americans want to send observers to Yanan. If so, Chinese Communists will poison their minds. Even some high American officials are affected by Communist propaganda. . . . I hope I can give them the facts to contradict this."⁹⁰ Determined to "suppress the move to send observers to Communist areas," he tried to hold out against such a dispatch as long as he could. Chiang indirectly rejected America's request in his 22 February message to President Roosevelt: "I have already issued instructions to the Minister of War to get into touch with General Stilwell's headquarters in order to map out a prospective itinerary for the Mission in all areas where the political authority of the national government extends, and wherever our army is stationed."⁹¹ This was certainly not what the Americans had requested.

Roosevelt was not only giving the issue of an American Observer Group increased attention, but also looking for ways to twist "Chiang Kai-shek's arm."⁹² On 1 March the White House informed Chiang that "we shall plan to dispatch the Observers' Mission shortly."⁹³ At the same time the War Department was already "working on personnel to constitute Observer Mission" and Davies and Gauss insisted that John Service be included.⁹⁴ Back in Chongqing, Service was running back and forth between Chiang's office and the army headquarters trying to get Chiang's permission but did not make much progress. On 25 March, Colonel Barrett was ordered from Guilin (Kweilin) to Chongqing to report to the CBI Headquarters "for temporary duty." He soon learned from Service that he was chosen to head the Dixie

Mission to be dispatched. But American plans were stopped by Chiang's emotional refusal.⁹⁵ On 1 May, Barrett was told to return to Guilin and resume duty there and forget about the Dixie Mission.⁹⁶

The Communists were aware of America's difficulties with Chiang over the issue of allowing an American observers mission to the Communist controlled areas. Mao instructed the party to take advantage of the U.S.-GMD differences over war strategies and the Communist issue and to cultivate America's friendship.⁹⁷ In line with Zhou's design of "spreading out" the CCP's achievements and "winning over" friends, in June 1944 the CCP successfully invited, with a strong U.S. assistance, a group of foreign correspondents to visit Communist-held areas.⁹⁸

The CCP had long invited journalists to visit Yanan to break the government media blockade, and foreign correspondents had tried to obtain government permission to enter Communist-controlled areas. In May, after ten journalists' direct appeal to Chiang, twenty-one foreign and Chinese journalists were granted permission to "observe the northwest," including the "so-called Communist areas." CCP representatives in Chongqing arranged for the long journey, and the journalists arrived in Yanan on 9 June.⁹⁹

The joint foreign and Chinese press delegation was impressed by the CCP's political, military, and economic successes in Yanan and other Communist bases in north China. They were equally attracted to the CCP's call for democracy and unity.¹⁰⁰ On 4 July Yanan organized a big ceremony to celebrate America's one hundred and sixty-eight years of independence. While Zhou was warmly praising

America's national unity, Mao eagerly granted an interview to correspondents. Mao told them that the Communist Party had always supported Chiang Kai-shek, and that China's most serious drawback was the lack of democracy, which should emerge from its proposed post-war unity.¹⁰¹ He tirelessly stressed the CCP's support for unity and democracy, and for a united front under Chiang:

Our hopes are based on unity and democracy. . . . Naturally the Generalissimo will be president of China. We have and will continue to stick to our promises, which are namely (1) not to overthrow the Kuomintang, (2) not to confiscate land, (3) to consider our democratically elected government as a local government under the national government, and (4) to place our army under the Military Affairs Commission as part of the national army.¹⁰²

The Communist efforts to make the correspondents feel at home with a simple but tailored agenda to promote their political and social ideas apparently worked. Many were pleased and impressed by their Communist hosts' enthusiasm, simplicity, and strong sense of purpose,¹⁰³ and all of the five American correspondents praised the CCP achievements.¹⁰⁴ Harrison Forman of the New York Herald Tribune, and Maurice Votaw, who worked for the Chinese Ministry of Information, emphasized the Communists' popular support. Guenther Stein of the Christain Science Monitor applauded the Communists' democratic practices.¹⁰⁵ Israel Epstein of the New York Times wrote about the CCP's broad political base and strong army.¹⁰⁶ To Father Cormac Shanahan, who wrote for religious publications, the Communist base was more like a "puritan religious community."¹⁰⁷ Service later observed that they "appear to have a bias favorable to the Communists."¹⁰⁸ Meanwhile, the party set up a radio station in Yanan to broadcast news of CCP activities and policies.¹⁰⁹

While the Communists were showcasing Yanan to the journalists, the hope of Service and other "China hands" for an official American mission there was renewed by Vice President Henry Wallace's China mission in June. Service eagerly wrote a long briefing for Wallace on the Chinese situation, with suggestions and input from Solomon Adler, and with the concurrence of Gauss and Stilwell.¹¹⁰ On 20 June, the day before Wallace's arrival, Service completed his lengthy and comprehensive report, "The Situation in China and Suggestions Regarding American Policy." In it he wrote that conditions in China were rapidly becoming critical and that, as the crisis deepened, the GMD must appeal to the United States for more aid. At such a moment America should seize the opportunity to influence China toward democracy. He concluded that democratic reform was the key to China's problems:

The crux of all important Chinese problems--military, economic, and political--is democratic reform. . . . We must seek to contribute toward the reversal of the present movement toward collapse and to the rousing of China from its military inactivity. This can be brought about only by an accelerated movement toward democratic political reform within China. Our part must be that of a catalytic agent in this process of China's democratization. It can be carried out by the careful exertion of our influence, which has so far not been consciously and systematically used.¹¹¹

Vice President Wallace's arrival in Chongqing on 21 June was a major event to Chinese leaders who had high expectations of improving the strained relations with the United States. All important government officials, including the Chiangs, and all the chiefs of foreign missions went to the airport to welcome him. Without much knowledge of China, Wallace was under the influence of Vincent, now chief of the

Division of Chinese Affairs, sent by the State Department as an old "China hand" to advise the vice president. Having been disappointed by Roosevelt's lack of assertiveness over the Yanan mission, Vincent was determined to urge Wallace to press the matter.¹¹² At Vincent's suggestion, Wallace declined the Chiangs' invitation to stay at the presidential villa and instead went to spend the first night with Gauss. The ambassador filled Wallace with rumors of Chiang's alleged affair and domestic troubles about which Service had written a report a month earlier.¹¹³ Wallace recalled in 1951 that the ambassador's views on the GMD government had "the strongest influence" on him¹¹⁴ and that his perspectives on China were also formulated by reading various reports and memoranda he had accumulated during the journey. Those briefing materials were largely supplied by Service.¹¹⁵

To Wallace, what really mattered to the United States was that, ideology aside, the Chinese Communists were nationalists who were willing to fight the Japanese. He concluded that they were "real patriots and they want to fight Japan."¹¹⁶ Pressing Chiang for a working agreement on the Communists was, among other issues, a top agenda of the Wallace mission. Before he left Washington, Roosevelt had expressed his concern about "getting the two groups together to fight the war."¹¹⁷ He advised his vice-president to consider his favorite formula for mediating warring factions: "Let me get them all into the same room with good chairs to sit on where they can put their feet on the table, where they can have cold beer to drink and cigars to smoke. Then I will knock their heads together and will settle everything." He asked Wallace to tell Chiang another working rule: "Nothing should be final between friends."¹¹⁸

Service and his like-minded supervisors and colleagues developed strategies for Wallace to get Chiang's final approval for the observer mission. During the first meeting on 21 June, Wallace tried to make Chiang accept his views through pressure and persuasion. He told the courteous but tense Chiang that Roosevelt was troubled by military disunity in China and that he would like to mediate between the government and the Communists. When the mention of the CCP and an American observers' mission to its headquarters did not prompt positive reaction, Wallace argued that if Communists in America could fight the war why should not the Chinese Communists be enlisted in the same cause. Wallace's attempt was met by Chiang's ardent proclamation that the Communists were destructive to the war effort. He asked Wallace "please do not press" the matter.¹¹⁹

Little progress was made in the first two days of inconclusive discussions over the Communist issue. Wallace was advised by Vincent and other "China hands" to press the matter harder but in a different light. In the 23 June morning session at Chiang's residence outside Chongqing, Wallace told his host that Americans were interested only in the prosecution of the war rather than in the Chinese Communists. Vincent added that a visit to the north would give the U.S. Army vital information on Japanese troop movements, and he asked Chiang to separate politics from military matters. After a brief silence, Chiang quickly decided to resolve the matter and to try to enlist the Americans in bringing the Communists to his terms. He told his American guests: "That can be done" and the military observers "would be permitted to go" as soon as they were organized.¹²⁰ Despite his changed position on the issue of

American observers mission to Yanan, Chiang's attitude toward the CCP and America had not altered. The Communists were, to him, not Chinese but "internationalists who would not obey his orders but subject to the discipline of the Communist International."¹²¹ He later wrote that Americans could always see China's problems but they could not see "the elements of the national tradition and what China's leaders do to fight and build the nation, and to arouse the country to fight. Wallace did not notice these things."¹²²

Elated, the vice president and his party decided to strike while the iron was still hot. They rushed to the embassy to hold an emergency meeting with the ambassador and other military and diplomatic officials. Service was called upon to discuss the details of the proposed mission and the message he had drafted earlier for General Marshall summing up various dealings and messages on the issue, including a suggested message from Roosevelt to Chiang.¹²³ Instructions then arrived from Washington: the president had agreed to send the message drafted by Service to Chiang as though it had originated in the White House. Although Chiang had agreed to the mission that morning and the message was no longer needed, it still had to be delivered. Service rode off with General Ferris to deliver the message as interpreter.¹²⁴

Service's arrival was a unpleasant surprise and an irritation to the Chiangs. General Ferris gave the presidential message Service had previously prepared and said that "the President thought this very important."¹²⁵ Having been the messenger and interpreter on several occasions, Service was familiar to the Chiangs who clearly

understood his role behind the observers mission. Service recalled later that "by this time they had decided that I was not a friend. . . . [They] had a pretty good idea that I was one of the pushers on this business."¹²⁶

As one of the planners of the trip, Service was invited by Wallace to join part of the afternoon session with Chiang. "The chief point in having me along, "Service explained, "was that I had been doing most of the planning on the observer group, knew best what facilities and staff we wanted, and might be able to sniff out hidden technicalities and roadblocks that the Kuomintang might try to throw in our way."¹²⁷ Though openly admitting that he would not support Wallace's bid for the presidency because of some "fuzzy and wild ideas," Service was highly impressed with Wallace's administrative skills, intelligence and decisiveness on the matter of the observers mission.¹²⁸

Forcing Chiang to accept an American mission was a major victory and a great joy to Service and other Foreign Service officers who had worked hard for this undertaking. Davies expressed his delight to another "China hand," John K. Fairbank, who was then working at the Washington headquarters of the Office of War Information. "Jack and I, of course, immeasurably cheered about the permission for the Observer's Group to Yen-an. I think it is about the most damned important thing we have gotten across since Little Sister was given her Wesley education," wrote Davies.¹²⁹

During the following weeks, Service worked enthusiastically on the detailed preparations for the mission, recommending personnel and preparing background

information. Formal CCP invitation for American observers mission to Yanan, a telegram sent by top CCP officials Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Zhou Enlai, came on 1 July.¹³⁰ Returning from Guilin for the second time to head the mission, Colonel David Barrett rushed to Chongqing on 4 July to join Service in laying the groundwork. He learned that General Stilwell had chosen him because he “desired the mission to be headed by an officer whom the Communists would respect and who could speak Chinese.”¹³¹ He reflected years later that it was “amusing to look back on the busy days just before our departure,” and recalled that with all the hard work for the mission, there were no specifications or orders on what the mission was to be.¹³² The Americans prepared sufficient supplies of candle and tea and \$1,000.¹³³ In addition to preparing reports and other background information about the Chinese Communists for members of the mission, Service also conferred with CCP representatives in Chongqing. On 18 July, the same day when Mao again extended the CCP’s standing invitation and welcome, Service had dinner with top CCP officials, Lin Zuhan and Wang Binnan, at their Chongqing headquarters, along with Colonel W. J. Peterkin, financial officer of the observer group, discussing the upcoming mission.¹³⁴

Service was to be one of the original eighteen members of the American Military Observer Group to Yanan, known as the “Dixie Mission” because Yanan as the rebel capital was referred to as “Dixie” among Stilwell’s political advisers in their private communication codes.¹³⁵ The first contingent, including Service and eight military officers under the command of Colonel Barrett, took off in good weather in the early morning of 22 July, heading for the Communist headquarters via Xian,

provincial capital of Shaanxi.¹³⁶ Service's role in bringing this mission together was appreciated by his superiors. In a letter of commendation to the Secretary of State on 10 May 1945, General Wedemeyer acknowledged that "Mr. Service was influential in the establishment of a Military Observer Group in Yanan," and that his thorough knowledge of Chinese customs and language enabled him to develop and maintain cordial relations with the Communist leaders.¹³⁷

Service and the Dixie Mission

Though totally comprised of lower ranking officers, the arrival of United States Army Observer Group around noon of 22 July was a historic high point in American-CCP relations and in the history of the Chinese Communist Party. It marked the beginning of open official contacts between the U.S. and the CCP and the start of a comprehensive CCP diplomacy. It also signified recognition of growing CCP influence at home and abroad.¹³⁸ Calling the American visit "the most exciting event since the war against Japan," Mao wrote editorials to welcome American "comrades," put on a new uniform, and dashed to the dusty airfield to greet the American representatives with a military band.¹³⁹ Peter Vladimirov, a Soviet reporter stationed in Yanan since 1942, described the occasion: "A day of supreme triumph for Mao Tse-tung! Mao looked impressive. Military music. Brave-looking soldiers demonstrated the high moral of the CCP armed forces. The impatient crowd. . . . Mao was very much excited . . . the main thing is to get weapons."¹⁴⁰

Yanan, 530 miles northeast of Chongqing, with the Yan River flowing through

the city and joining the Yellow River nearby, was a place with ancient history and revolutionary tradition. It had been the seat of the Yanan prefecture since the Sui Dynasty in 607. It was the birth place of the legendary peasant rebel Li Zicheng who had overthrown the Ming Dynasty in 1644.¹⁴¹ Shortly after the Long March, in December 1936, Communist forces acquired it during the Xian incident and designated it as the headquarters of the CCP border region. Most of its thirty to forty thousand residents lived in caves. Surrounded by barren hills on the loess plateau, local people had long found it convenient to live in cave dwellings--tunneled rooms into the hillside with windows and doors attaching to the front. The caves were warmer in the winter and cooler in the summer than regular houses. The 1937 Japanese bombing destroyed much of the city, with only the city-wall and the spectacular Tang dynasty pagoda standing as the significant remaining structures. Upon arrival, Service was surprised to find that Yanan, the place he had heard so much about, was "practically nonexistent."¹⁴²

Like their Communist hosts, members of the observer group were assigned eight cave quarters connected in a row. Each cave was about ten feet wide and sixteen feet long, with an arched ceiling of more than eight feet high. They were all simply furnished with a rough table, two wooden chairs, a stand for an enameled wash basin, and a rack for towels. The beds were planks on saw horses or rope strung on a frame. The cave's front was simple but decorative: stone building blocks with a wooden door and paper-pasted window frames to receive a medium light. A port-like roof about twelve feet wide covered the front of the cove. The grey-brick floor was

easily kept clean. The caves were luminous with sunlight; candles provided light for the evening. There was no running water and the restroom was distant from the living quarters, but the sanitary conditions were “entirely satisfactory.”¹⁴³

As guests of the CCP, American observers received free meals, simple but plenty: noodles, steamed bread (mantou), potatoes, meat, scrambled eggs, and, sometimes, watermelon and cookies. Occasionally, the Communist hosts would provide more elaborate lunch or dinner. Service liked the food and it tasted “extremely good” to Barrett.¹⁴⁴ The government blockade made it difficult for the border region to import goods. As Service observed, while salt was sufficient, certain items like sugar and rice were scarce in Yanan and luxury goods, unlike Chongqing, were not seen on market. Americans, therefore, brought their own coffee, sugar, and powdered milk.¹⁴⁵

The Americans were impressed by the Communists’ apparent respect and equal treatment for service providers and women. CCP liaison officers told the Americans not to bawl “boy,” as foreigners would usually do in China when they called for services, but to call “Zhao Daiyuan” [hospitality officer]. Barrett recalled that “I had never thought of it before I went to Yanan, but I think the Communists were correct in regarding ‘boy’ as a term with anything but a democratic connotation.”¹⁴⁶ He also noticed that when Mao introduced his wife, “much better looking and more chic” than the other wives, simply as Jiang Qing. He commented that while the more modern Chinese would address his wife as “Tai Tai” [Madame or Mrs.], and the traditional man would call his wife as “jian nei” [humble inner], Mao disregarded both as bourgeois

and disrespectful.¹⁴⁷ Upon Dixie's arrival, Zhou told Barrett that Dixie members should not make passes at local girls, but, he explained, truly falling in love would be a different matter.¹⁴⁸ Barrett was much impressed with the CCP stance, and Americans all agreed that "there should be no American-Chinese Communist 'relations,'" as Service later humorously related.¹⁴⁹

The primary mission of the Observer Group was to gather intelligence-- information on Japanese movement in northern China, on political, economic, and weather conditions of the region, on the CCP leadership, and especially on the "strength, composition, disposition, equipment, training, and combat efficiency of the Communist forces" to prepare for possible military actions against the Japanese.¹⁵⁰ The American observers, a happy and cohesive group, as journalist Guenther Stein observed, immediately set to work with enthusiasm, getting up early around 6:30 and working late into the evening.¹⁵¹

As second secretary of the American embassy, Service was initially the only political intelligence officer on the mission. The Communists regarded him as the civilian leader of Dixie and Barrett the military commander. Immediately after their arrival, Zhou and General Ye Jianying, the Communist Chief of Staff, held a meeting with Service and Barrett.¹⁵² On 26 July, the CCP gave the Americans a big welcome party with food and entertainment. Mao approached Service, who was seated next to the chairman at the dinner table, and animatedly complimented him on his interest in Chinese politics and thanked him for being a friend of the Communist delegation in Chongqing.¹⁵³ Mao's flexible style and keen interest made a lasting impression on

Service. In 1979 he described his impression of the CCP chairman: "Mao Zedong looked amiable and good-natured . . . He was active. His talks was full of vivid metaphors, traditional satire, and sharp astonishing assertions."¹⁵⁴ On 27 July, Zhou invited Service for a long talk on CCP-GMD negotiations and American and Chinese strategic plans in the war.¹⁵⁵

After being in Yanan for six days, Service reported his first impressions of the Communist capital. From long talks with American correspondents who had been in Yanan for several weeks and made available of their notes to him,¹⁵⁶ Service cautioned himself that he should "not to be swept off [his] feet" by their favorable reports of the Communists.¹⁵⁷ But after firsthand observations and extensive exchanges with most of the important Communist leaders, his findings ran surprisingly parallel with those of the journalists. In his report, "First Informal Impressions of the Northern Shensi Communist Base," Service described Yanan as having a friendly atmosphere and egalitarian spirit, filled with a strong sense of mission and high optimism:

My first impression--and those of the rest of the Observer Group--have been extremely favorable. . . . All of our party have had the same feeling--that we have come into a different country and are meeting a different people. There is undeniably a change in the spirit and atmosphere. . . . This difference in atmosphere is evident in many ways. There is an absence of show and formality, both in speech and action. Relations of the officials and people towards us, and of the Chinese among themselves, are open, direct and friendly. Mao Tse-tung and other leaders are universally spoken of with respect (amounting in the cases of Mao to a sort of veneration) but these men are approachable and subservience toward them is completely lacking.¹⁵⁸

Having seen so much of the poverty-stricken and corruption-ridden China, Service was greatly impressed with the improved living standard, the high spirits, and the equal treatment of women in Yanan. There were “no beggars, no signs of desperate poverty,” he reported; “women not only wear practically the same clothes, they act and are treated as friendly equals.”¹⁵⁹ He was particularly interested in the Communists’ high morale, a “YMCA sort of spirit of optimism.”¹⁶⁰

Service was excited to find in the remote mountains of northern Shaanxi “the most modern” and promising land in China. Yanan, with its uplifting vigor, stood in sharp contrast with the dispiriting and problem-ridden Chongqing. While the nationalists were pessimistic and waiting for the war to end, the Communists were confident and talking about winning a victory. With little material means, Yanan’s positive “can do” attitude formed a sharp contrast with Chongqing’s rampant inflation and mounting dissatisfaction. While the GMD was losing its revolutionary vitality and touch with the people, the CCP had kept a well integrated popular movement under competent leaders. He predicted that “this movement is strong and successful, and that it has such drive behind it and has tied itself so closely to the people that it will not easily be killed.”¹⁶¹ His lengthy report was circulated among policy makers in Washington and recommended by Harry Hopkins to the president as “interesting observations.”¹⁶²

As time passed Service’s first impression of Yanan was confirmed. Decades later he still retained enthusiasm for his initial experience. “Their whole attitude was a very different one,” he recalled. “It was very much like my own feelings that I had

found, new feelings, with my Chinese friends, of acceptance, of hospitality, of not being guarded, of not holding people off.” Reaching back into his own growth for a simile, he concluded that the informal environment was “like a sort of a Christian summer conference atmosphere.”¹⁶³

Service’s favorable impression of Yanan was echoed by other American observers. Having come out of the foggy and gloomy wartime capital, Chongqing, most observers were attracted to the sunny Yanan spirit and the CCP’s eager cooperative gestures. Major Wilbur Peterkin, finance officer of the mission who had come to Yanan with the second contingent on 7 August, recorded that even “the weather in Yanan was clear and stimulating.”¹⁶⁴ John K. Emmerson, fellow Foreign Service officer attached to the army, recorded later that in contrast to the “chaos of Chungking,” Yanan was “truly utopian.”¹⁶⁵ The more conservative anti-Communist Colonel Ivan Yeaton, successor to Barrett, Morris Depass, and W.J. Peterkin as head of the Dixie Mission, was also easily affected by the Yanan spirit. He proclaimed that Yanan to him was “like a breath of pure, clean mountain air after a month of London’s worst smog.”¹⁶⁶

Service was struck by Yanan’s lightheartedness. During the early days of the Dixie Mission the summer weather was pleasant; dance parties were held every Saturday evening, mostly outdoors, on packed earth, in a grove of fruit trees called “the Pear Orchard.” Even though the conditions were “miserable” compared to a normal dance hall, the occasion was of great fun. Service enjoyed fox trot, waltz, and the local folk dance (yang ge) with music played by a pickup orchestra. He met a

cheerful peasant girl who was working as a nurse at the International Hospital and had joined the Long March; and he was impressed by the pleasant dances of Mao's wife, Jiang Qing.¹⁶⁷ There were other recreational activities in Yanan. CCP leaders provided their American guests with various theatricals and music shows that "were highly entertaining," including chorus singing by boys and girls with, according to Barrett, "the sharpest voice I have ever heard."¹⁶⁸ The Americans were often invited to sing or perform. On one occasion soon after their arrival, Service recalled, after their performances, the Communists said "now our American friends should sing." Caught in surprise, the Americans did some quick consultation and found that the only thing they knew was "You Are My Sunshine." Then the audience requested "Translate! Translate!"¹⁶⁹ Singing and dancing were part of the "Yanan spirit;" they had also been an effective means to spread CCP's message among the masses. The observers had brought with them some games provided by GMD government special services in Chongqing. Service remembered the Chinese version of monopoly based on Shanghai real estate.

Service experienced the novelty of playing American baseball in Yanan, as exercise and recreation organized by Barrett. Being an outstanding runner, Service was brilliant in playing the outfield.¹⁷⁰ The Americans had a game with the Japanese prisoners, who were members of the Japanese People's Emancipation League run by Okano (later known as Nosako Sanzō), the Japanese Communist Party leader. Service later commented that their game was probably "the only baseball game during the war between Americans and Japanese prisoners."¹⁷¹ The Japanese league operated the

Japanese Workers and Farmers' School in Yanan, and entertained the American guests with folk songs and dances. Barrett recalled the "moving" but "distasteful" performance of "Superior Private Simada," a playlet portraying a Japanese soldier realized the error of the war and stamped upon the Japanese national flag with other soldiers. "If I had not talked with some of the actors and been sure they were Japanese," Barrett remarked, "I would not have thought it possible for sons of Nippon to behave in such a fashion."¹⁷²

Despite its remoteness from coastal centers and isolation from the outside world resulting from the GMD blockade, Yanan, Service found, had an active international community. When the Dixie Mission arrived, there was already a contingent of press people there. Service was delighted to meet old friends and new acquaintances. In addition to the German born Jewish American reporter Stein, he got to know George Hatem, called by the Chinese as "Dr. Ma Haide" (Ma Hai-teh), another Jewish American who had gone to Yanan with Edgar Snow in 1936 and remained thereafter. He met people he had known in Beijing and Chongqing like Michael Lindsay from England who had taught at Yenching University, and Martel Hall who had got out of Japanese occupied areas before reaching Yanan. He also met an Australian doctor, Hans Muller. He remembered vividly, on one occasion, when Zhou came to ask him if he knew a man named Ferry Shafer. "Well yes, I know Ferry Shafer very well," he replied. Shafer had been a close family friend of his parents and his tutor when he worked in the Shanghai YMCA before entering the Foreign Service. As a Hungarian, Shafer was detained as a friendly alien when he entered the border

region. With Service's confirmation, the CCP immediately released him from house arrest and sent him to Chongqing.¹⁷³ "So there was a group of people," Service later remarked, "certainly sympathetic to the Communists, but nonetheless people we could talk to very frankly and fully,"¹⁷⁴

The CCP's pro-American gestures were frequent, and obviously annoyed the Soviets in Yanan. In a long talk with Peter Vladimirov, Mao pointed out that America's position was of "tremendous importance" for the future of the Chinese Communists. Apparently aggravated by Mao's remarks, Vladimirov wrote in his diary, complaining about Mao's change of attitude:

Mao did not say a word about the Soviet Union, or its interest in the solution of the Far Eastern problem. . . . In his book On New Democracy [January 1940] . . . Mao had written (at least he can be interpreted in this way) that without the Soviet Union China would not be able to triumph over fascist Japan. He has now come to the opposite conclusion and intends to associate himself mostly with the United States and Britain."

He continued: "At such moments I feel how difficult it is for him to tolerate me, how unpleasant I am to him, and how far he actually is from me."¹⁷⁵

The CCP leadership understood that in order to win U.S. support, many issues, especially its connections with international communism, had to be handled with care. Mao had contended, for example, during an interview with a GMD official visiting Yanan with the foreign journalists, that "there has been in the past and there is now no connection between the Communist Party of China and the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R."¹⁷⁶ Zhou later reiterated the CCP's disengagement from the Soviets, saying that "although Yen-an is inspired by Moscow, there is no direct contact whatever

between the two points.” He stated that “there were only three Russians at Yanan and that these were not present in an official capacity.”¹⁷⁷ CCP leaders’ proclamations were confirmed by Service and other Americans’ close observations. In Yanan Service saw little Soviet presence--one Russian army doctor and two TASS correspondents, Vladimirov was one of them.¹⁷⁸ Soviet leader Joseph Stalin’s long-standing indifference toward the CCP reinforced this apparent independence of the Chinese Communists. He once told the American ambassador to Moscow that “the Chinese Communists are not real Communists, . . . they are margarine Communists.”¹⁷⁹

In Yanan, the Dixie Mission was proceeding well. Soon after their arrival the Americans told the Communists that they were in Yanan not to negotiate or promise but to observe, “to find all we can about you, what you’ve been doing, what the war has been like, what you think of it.”¹⁸⁰ CCP leaders were eager to provide ample information about their military organizations and operations behind enemy lines. They arranged a series of long meetings with the American observers, many of which were held in front of the cave dwellings under the sunny skies. Each meeting there was a presentation from a top military commander; and Service would listen attentively and take elaborate notes.¹⁸¹ “Chinese don’t seem to mind any length of talk or briefings. Each day we’d have another Communist leader come and spend the whole day more or less briefing us,” Service commented.¹⁸² Barrett was impressed by the CCP’s effective intelligence gathering and willingness to share information. The major Tokyo daily, *Asahi*, for example, was made available to Dixie members with

merely a two-day delay.¹⁸³

The American observers found in Yanan that people appeared to be free and relaxed. The over-all look of the Communist headquarters was casual and un-suppressive. Having seen too much police presence in Chongqing, they were surprised to find no signs of sentry. While Chiang was surrounded by a cordon of guards and secret operatives when he traversed the street, Mao's simple cave residence was not guarded. Americans walked whenever they wished, and no one ever bothered to lock his room.¹⁸⁴

Service was captivated with the Communists' cooperative style and thoughtful manners. When he asked if he could talk to Japanese prisoners of war, the Communists quickly replied, "Oh, yes, we've got a lot of them down the road, you're welcome." And when he inquired about back copies of CCP newspapers, Zhou immediately sent bales of them.¹⁸⁵

Service came to know CCP leaders firsthand and was able to develop good working and personal relations with them. He was able to meet Mao often, at least twice a week. Mao would appear in public often and casually, traveling on foot or in Yanan's only battered truck. In early August, Mao approached Service with a smile: "I suppose you want to see me." "Why, yes, I certainly do," Service replied. But Mao said "I want to see you also, but I think maybe it's better if we wait till we get acquainted a bit, you see more about us, know more about us, and then our talk will be more useful."¹⁸⁶ Mao would drop by for a short chat in the evening; Service and

other observers could also arrange to see him and other high ranking officials like Zhu and Zhou at any time or on very short notice.¹⁸⁷ Barrett also recalled that he saw the CCP chairman “frequently and talked to him informally on social occasions.”¹⁸⁸ The liaison officers, Huang Hua and Chen Jiakang, would come, sit and join the Americans; and when Americans visited them there would be “stay for lunch” kind of invitations.¹⁸⁹

Service was particularly happy to find several fellow Sichuanese among top CCP military commanders--Zhu De, Nie Rongzhen, Yang Shangkun, and Chen Yi. Having briefly attended the YMCA school in Chengdu, Chen Yi referred Service, with humor and respect, as “the son of my teacher.” Though Barrett did not like this “pig-eyed” general who spoke “the harsh and unpleasant dialect of Szechuan Province,” Service would later call him as “my old friend.”¹⁹⁰ From numerous long conversations with Chen Yi, Service learned in detail the Communist strategy and techniques in building up guerrilla bases.¹⁹¹ Service’s closest friend in Yanan was perhaps Zhou’s secretary Chen Jiakang, “a bright little man” with “a quick ferretlike mind” who had charmed many Americans in Chongqing.¹⁹² “We were really close friends, just as I would be close friends with an American. There were very few subjects that couldn’t talk,” Service recalled. After elaborate talks with Chen, Service came to realize the fundamental importance of the “rectification movement” of 1942-43 to CCP’s political unity, especially its implication to the Sinicization of Marxism and rejection of Soviet orthodox. To him, the movement was “not entirely different in effect from the revivalism and public confession of sins characteristic of some

Christian sects.”¹⁹³

It was this apparent Communist sincerity and openness that made the American mission in Yanan pleasant and productive. Being able to make “very close friends” was “one of the reasons why we enjoyed Yanan,” Service exclaimed.¹⁹⁴ He strove to be a “reasonably fair political reporter.”¹⁹⁵ George I. Nakamura, a technician who joined the Dixie Mission in early August as one of the nine members of the second contingent, commented that Service was “greatly liked by the Communists.”¹⁹⁶ Having kept an observant eye on the U.S.-CCP discourse, the Soviet reporter Vladimirov drew similar conclusions: “The most active member of the Observer Group is Service.” Service impressed him as young, energetic, progressive, businesslike, and “a man of sense.”¹⁹⁷ Zhou, said Vladimirov, regarded Service as an unprejudiced person of progressive views. He later commented that “When Service is in Yanan--everybody is on the alert.”¹⁹⁸

Service reported on 3 August that “among the Communist leaders, the relationship was pleasant and permissive, which surprised those of us who have had contacts with Chiang and saw the tension he had created among his subordinates.”¹⁹⁹ After talking with Mao and Zhou he became convinced that the CCP policy was “adherence to the United Front; full mobilization to fight Japan; abandonment of any purely Communist program; and recognition of the central government and the leadership of the Generalissimo.” He believed that “the indications are that they are sincere.”²⁰⁰

Vladimirov confirmed the CCP’s sincerity in seeking close cooperation with

the United States. He recorded that, three weeks after the American arrival, Mao was so encouraged by the prospect of CCP-U.S. collaboration that he told Vladimirov: “We’ve been thinking of renaming our party, of calling it not ‘Communist,’ but something else. Then the situation for the Special Area will be more favorable, especially with the Americans.”²⁰¹

One major mission of the Observers Group was to evaluate the CCP’s military strength and find the “most effective means of assisting their war effort.”²⁰² Soon after their arrival, the Americans and CCP leaders worked closely on the matter. In addition to hearing CCP generals’ detailed briefings on their military operations, the Americans delivered a series of lectures to CCP army officers on demolition equipment and techniques, and on weapons suitable for guerrilla warfare. The lectures were usually attended by approximately five hundred officers, many came from the various border regions and front areas. The Communists were delighted at the equipments and weapons displayed at each lecture; but they were frustrated by the reality that their American guests could only display but not instruct on how to operate them, in compliance with restrictions imposed by the central government.²⁰³ On conditions of the CCP forces, Service agreed with a War Department comprehensive report that “the Chinese Communist Regular Army is a young, well-fed, well-clothed, battle-hardened, volunteer force in excellent physical condition, with a high level of general intelligence, and very high morale.”²⁰⁴

Based on close on-sight observation and numerous meetings with the CCP military officials, Service understood the CCP’s urgent need for military supplies and

its quest for American aid. He was ready to press the matter on their behalf. On 12 August, he wrote to Davies about the need to supply weapons to CCP forces:

We have had long and exhaustive talks with all the top people; we have kept our eyes open; we've seen that things get done. . . . We are convinced these people mean business. Morale is high: they have fought and will fight. They hope to get help. Their wants are very modest and simple. But they are not beggars. On every ground they deserve assistance.²⁰⁵

He suggested that the U.S. government immediately send supplies to Yanan through the Burma Road or the Russian Road.²⁰⁶ Later that month Service would send Washington a formal report on the “Desirability of American Military Aid to the Communist Armies.”²⁰⁷ He stated that in the initial cooperation between the CCP and the United States, America had been the passive partner and that the U.S. should take more active measures to ensure the success of this “halfway cooperation.” “Such active cooperation,” he claimed,

would begin with our furnishing basic military supplies now desperately lacked by the Communist forces. It should be supported by training in the effective use of these supplies. It should be planned to lead, as the war in China develops into its late stages, to actual tactical cooperation of Communists with air and other ground forces.²⁰⁸

Service wrote that extending military aid impartially to both Guomindang and Communists would activate at least one force that really wanted to fight, enable the Communists to disrupt the Japanese, and prevent the GMD from starting a civil and stimulate it to reform.²⁰⁹ Service’s arguments ran parallel to those of other “China hands.” Barrett, for instance, held that the CCP should be given a small number of

weapons--rifles, machine guns, and some light artillery--to improve the efficiency of their fighting strength.²¹⁰

On 14 August, learning that Lieutenant Colonel Evans Carlson, who had visited and reported on Communist troops as the president's field observer and whom CCP leaders held in really high esteem,²¹¹ was wounded, four top generals, Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, Ye Jianying, and Nie Rongzhen wrote him a letter expressing their regards. They informed Carlson of the arrival of the Observer Group, the decaying situation of the GMD, and the promises of the Communist controlled areas and CCP-American cooperation:

The coming of our American friends is an important and long desired event. . . . Although the blockade continues and the disastrous policy of trying to fight the enemy by passively waiting for someone else to destroy him while actively struggling against the Communists and the Chinese people has not been abandoned, the process of the war has brought about the first contact between us and America.²¹²

Delighted over the news of America's mission to Yanan and over the prospect of improved CCP-American relations, Carlson immediately wrote President Roosevelt a personal letter, proclaiming his confidence in CCP leaders. He told the president that he was certain that "members of our military mission will become convinced, as I am convinced, that the leaders of the so-called Communist armies of China are more trustworthy than those of most of the Kuomintang units."²¹³ After reading both Carlson's letter and the attached CCP generals' message, Roosevelt wrote to his old friend on 15 November: "I am delighted to see those letters. Things in Chungking

look a little better, and I am hoping and praying for a real working out of the situation with the so-called Communists."²¹⁴

Having established an initial mutual feeling of trust with official American observers and anticipating imminent military cooperation with the United States, the CCP Central Committee issued an internal document on 18 August, "CCP Central Committee Instruction on Diplomatic Work," which called for a more assertive, high-profile foreign policy. The "Instruction" made it clear that CCP foreign policy should now change its focus from propaganda appealing for international sympathy to a search for international recognition and cooperation. The United States was critical in this regard, "Among all nations, America, England, and the Soviet Union are most critical to China. In our common struggle against Japan, America is our closest ally."²¹⁵ The Soviet Union had only limited political influence in China because of its preoccupation with Germany. It pointed out that the arrival of the American Observer Group and the previous visit of foreign journalists in Yanan marked the beginning of America's genuine communication with the new democratic China and was a diplomatic breakthrough for the CCP. Party leadership aimed at expanding cooperation with the United States: "Based on military cooperation, cultural, political, and economic cooperation will thereafter be realized. We cannot, however, currently expect too much."²¹⁶ Sensitive to China's modern history of Western aggression, the CCP leadership directed CCP personnel in foreign affairs to adopt an appropriate attitude, and to neither worship nor abhor the American observers.²¹⁷ Fully aware that close cooperation with America would trigger Japan's retaliation in

the Communist areas, CCP leaders were nevertheless determined that the benefit of cooperation would outweigh all risks. This “August Eighteenth Instruction,” according to Joseph W. Esherick, was a “significant indication of the seriousness and sincerity of the CCP overtures to the United States.”²¹⁸ It was regarded as a historical milestone in CCP diplomacy.

The “August Eighteenth Instruction” marked the CCP’s official adoption of an “allying with America” policy that would not change until April 1945. The major motive of this policy adjustment was its high expectation of military cooperation with U.S. forces. Mao concluded that “the United States may land in the lower reaches of Yangtze and we can cooperate with them.”²¹⁹ Activities of the Yanan Dixie Mission and Chennault’s Fourteenth Air Force personnel in the New Fourth Army controlled areas gave the CCP leadership a clear indication that Americans were seeking joint military actions. Cooperation with the U.S. military had already had a promising start. The CCP had set up a rescue committee to aid American and Allied flyers forced down in Japanese occupied areas. The CCP efforts proved invaluable to Lieutenant Henry C. Whittlesey, a member of the Dixie Mission charged with rescuing American pilots downed by the Japanese. While bravely helping others, Whittlesey and his interpreter Li Shaotang were killed by Japanese on a rescue mission in early 1945, along with twenty CCP soldiers battling the Japanese to recover their bodies.²²⁰ At least 70 American airmen would be rescued by Communist forces to escape capture by the Japanese and escorted to safety by the end of the war.²²¹ First Lieutenant John Baglio, for example, was helped by a peasant when he

was shot down in eastern Hebei province. After eighty-five days of travel through Japanese lines, Communist guerrillas led him safely to Yanan.²²² The CCP Central Committee cabled regional leaders, directing them to “freely cooperate with American military forces, expressing sincere welcome whenever it is possible.”²²³ In preparation for coastal military action to coordinate with American landing, it redeployed guerrilla units and cadres to the Shanghai-Nanjing region and coastal areas in north China. Mao mentioned American landing in China frequently in interviews with Service. Subsequent developments would prove that the CCP’s expectation and preparation for joint military action with the United States were premature.

On 23 August, the same day when Roosevelt was urging Chiang to give command to Stilwell, Mao held a six-hour talk with Service in his cave dwelling, with Zhou Enlai present.²²⁴ The CCP chairman told his American guest that U.S. policy was a vital concern to the Chinese people, and that since America’s influence in China could be decisive, it should be promptly applied. He then anxiously asked Service about America’s attitude toward China’s democracy, the Communist Party, and a possible civil war.²²⁵ He told Service that currently the CCP “only ask that American policy try to induce the Kuomintang to reform itself. That would be the first stage.” Mao suggested that America use democracy as a mean to influence the Chinese government: “Every American official meeting with Chinese officials, in China or the United States, can talk democracy. . . . Every American soldier in China should be a walking and talking advertisement for democracy. . . . We Chinese consider you Americans the ideal of democracy.” Should reform and democracy not be achieved,

Mao proposed that the United States establish direct ties with the Chinese Communists. The CCP chairman also pointed out that in order for the United States to support the true interests of China, it was only proper for Washington to provide military aid to all forces fighting Japan, including the Communists.²²⁶ Zhou suggested during the same conversation that the only way to win a decisive victory over Japan and avoid civil war in China was for the United States to support the CCP as well as GMD.²²⁷

Four days later, Zhou notified Service that the CCP Central Committee was considering a proposal to the GMD for a joint national conference.²²⁸ In a subsequent interview, Mao told Service that "Chinese and American interests are correlated and similar. They fit together, economically and politically."²²⁹ He appealed for mutual trust and cooperation: "We can and must work together. The United States would find us more cooperative than the Kuomintang. We will not be afraid of democratic American influence--we will welcome it. . . . We must cooperate and we must have American help."²³⁰ That was why it was so important for the Chinese Communists to know what Americans were thinking and planning, Mao explained. When Service suggested that the name "Communist" might not be reassuring to some Americans, Mao replied that even though he had thought of changing the name, people would not be frightened once they knew his followers.²³¹

Despite his strong interest in Mao's statements, Service declined Mao's request for him to fly to Chongqing to deliver the message to the ambassador and General Stilwell. Service later regretted his slow reaction to Mao's eager appeal when he

learned that his report had been sitting around the embassy for a month before being sent to Washington: "I didn't realize he was really putting himself down and asking, begging, pleading for a sort of American cooperation. . . . He was right, I should have really gone down. I should have made it more clear what the Communists were asking, what they were proposing. . . . So I think that was a mistake."²³²

By September, CCP policy toward the United States turned from general friendly gestures to particular requests for higher level contacts and a fair share of Lend-Lease material. On 8 September, the Central Committee sent a telegram to its Chongqing representative, Dong Buwu, instructing him to ask for American military aid through Stilwell, Hurley, and Nelson on the basis of the American observers' conversations and the pressing needs of an offensive in the Pacific. It directed Dong to invite Hurley and others to visit Yanan, with formal invitations soon to follow.²³³ Ten days later, on 18 September, Zhou told a group of selected soldiers that the CCP's internal and international status had been unprecedentedly improved, that "a new China is being recognized by the people of the whole world," and that the military should be prepared for major offensives.²³⁴ Party leaders discussed GMD-CCP relations and how to acquire American military aid at a national conference, and decided to invite General Stilwell to visit Yanan. In a lengthy invitation drafted by Zhou, the CCP claimed, that based on their contribution to the war and the government's refusal to provide them with any supplies, the CCP forces should receive "at least half of America's Lend-Lease arms and material to China."²³⁵

After more than one month on-site observations and long interviews with

leading Communists, Service was ready to compose extensive analyses and policy recommendations. On 3 September he wrote a report on "The Need of an American Policy toward the Problems Created by the Rise of the Chinese Communist Party," in which he suggested that the growth of the CCP had shifted the political balance in China, a fact that would inevitably result in a civil war. Since a civil war would harm the interests of the United States, its "interest in China will never be greater than it is now."²³⁶ Service believed that U.S. diplomatic influence should be firmly exerted to compel the Guomindang to share its power with the Communists, and that giving the CCP aid would prompt the GMD to reform. "This boosting of the Communists might swing the balance of political forces in China far enough so that the Kuomintang would be forced to reform its politics and--even more important," Service proclaimed, "to change its present reactionary leadership, and thus to move toward the cooperation with the Communists which would lead toward unity, democracy and national strength."²³⁷ He told Washington policy makers that "at present, it appears certain that the strongest of these would be the Communist Party, and that after a fairly short period it would succeed in unifying the country."²³⁸ He advised the American government to count the CCP, under any circumstances, as a continuing and important influence in China.

Service attributed the CCP's political strength to its democratic methods and moderate policies. In his 10 September report "The Development of Communist Political Control in the Guerrilla Bases," he discussed the CCP's effective "people's guerrilla warfare based on democracy," and concluded that Communist influence in

the guerilla bases was predominant and democratic. Supported by peasants and liberals, he commented, the Communists "have used their influence in a democratic way and to further democratic ends."²³⁹ He introduced the CCP's institution of democracy--the "three-third system," in which any elected government body was formed by one-third each of Communists, Nationalists, and liberal and non-party members. Rejecting earlier land confiscation policy, Service observed, the Communists carried out modest rent reduction programs that were announced but never implemented by the central government--reducing rent to a minimum of 37.5% of total harvest. Barrett agreed with Service's judgement on the CCP's democracy and modesty. He once told Zhou that "you may not have democracy in your area, but I am willing to admit it at least looks as if you had."²⁴⁰ Service's report received high marks from the State Department which remarked that "in view of the importance of the subject matter of this report, of the thoughtful and comprehensive character of the study the report is of outstanding merit and usefulness to the Department. It has been given the grade of 'Excellent.'"²⁴¹

Many American observers were interested in and impressed by the CCP's effective conversion of Japanese prisoners of war. Based on his firsthand observation and extensive talks with Japanese POWs, John Emmerson reported on how the old Japanese attitude of preferring death to capture changed when they encountered the Eighth Route Army. "Prisoners were amazed by the good treatment they received at the hands of the Chinese," he observed, "the Eighth Route Army's attitude toward its own men, toward Chinese peasants, and toward Jap captives, was an object lesson

repeated constantly before their eyes."²⁴² Another observer, Captain Charles G. Stelle of U.S. Army Air Corps and a member of the first contingent of the Yanan Observer Group, reported similar findings. He suggested that Americans "can learn a great deal from the experiences of the 8th Route Army not only in treatment and employment of prisoners but in propaganda methods and contents."²⁴³

Service and other American observers' positive reports on Yanan were reaffirmed by a second group of foreign journalists who came to the Communist capital in September. They not only observed the CCP leaders as being "physically and mentally sounder" than officials in Chongqing and wrote about their popular support and democratic experience,²⁴⁴ but also described Yanan as a place with plentiful harvest. Brooks Atkinson called Yanan "a Chinese wonderland city."²⁴⁵ Theodore White "humanized" the Communists by portraying them as approachable earthy men who lived not on taxes but on the sweat of their own brow. After the government blockade, the CCP had launched a production drive that made Yanan and other border regions self-sufficient. Peasants were encouraged to expand their sowing and harvesting; CCP leaders were expected to participate in this "Great Production Movement" by raising part of their own food. Zhu De grew cabbages. Mao, a chain smoker, had his own tobacco patch, raising enough quality of tobacco for all members in the party headquarters. Later when Americans offered him the Chesterfields, Mao was not impressed by the "heavy" and "strong" Turkish blend in American cigarettes. Service, also a chain smoker, "was glad to smoke local cigarettes."²⁴⁶

While these "simple, earthy men," to White, "did not look like any terrible

threat to Chungking and world stability,”²⁴⁷ they were a competent group of “vigorous mature and practical men” who were unselfishly devoted to high principles, and whose record had placed them “above any other contemporary group in China,” Service contended in early September. For him it was not surprising that “they have favorably impressed most or all of the Americans who have met them during the last seven years: their manners, habits of thought, and direct handling of problems seem more American than oriental.”²⁴⁸

Meanwhile, the American ambassador in Chongqing continued to discuss the Communist issue with Chiang. Deeply resentful of U.S. pressure, Chiang complained to Gauss that since the Observer Group had gone to Yanan, the Communists had grown “arrogant and refuse to continue negotiations.”²⁴⁹ On Washington’s inclination to put all Chinese troops, including the Communists, under Stilwell’s command, Chiang warned that “the problem of Communist cooperation would not be solved by the introduction of a foreign commander of Chinese armies.”²⁵⁰

Based on Service's reports on the conditions of Chinese Communists from Yanan, and having become increasingly impatient with Chiang’s inability to deal with the Communists, Hull told Gauss of Washington’s dissatisfaction with the lack of progress in Chiang’s thinking over the issue of communism. He instructed the ambassador to tell Chiang that “the President and I . . . are concerned not alone with reference to non-settlement with the Communists but also with regard to reports of dissidence and dissatisfaction among non-Communist Chinese in other areas of the country.”²⁵¹

On 16 September, Gauss reported to Washington that, although Chiang was agreeable over other issues, "I do not feel that there has been any fundamental change in his attitude toward the Communist problem."²⁵² Despite Chiang's laborious explanation that America's direct approach to the Communists was not only a sign of support for the CCP but also a form of intervention in China's domestic affairs, Gauss concluded that the problem lay in Chiang's lack of understanding of democracy. He wrote: "There is reason to believe that in the light of his limited background, experience and training, he does not have any realistic conception of either the character or the uses of democracy."²⁵³

Gauss suggested, and Washington approved, the idea of pushing Chiang to form a multi-party war cabinet to ease the increasing antagonism among China's major parties. Chiang's flat rejection of this proposal disheartened the weary ambassador who would soon resign his office.²⁵⁴ The State Department was equally disappointed at Chiang's reaction. Secretary Hull told the president that at least the U.S. had "put on record with Chiang our feeling with regard to the political situation in China."²⁵⁵

On 9 October, after nearly eighty days of intensive observation, interview, and exchange of findings with fellow officers and journalists in Yanan, Service reported his conclusions about the Chinese Communists and his forecast on their future in "Present Strength and Future Importance of Chinese Communists." He pointed out that a Communist victory in China would be inevitable because they had created a guerrilla base supported by the total population:

The Japanese are being actively opposed. . . . This opposition is possible and successful because it is total guerrilla warfare aggressively waged by a totally mobilized population. . . . This total mobilization is based upon and has been made possible by what amounts to an economic, political and social revolution. . . . Just as the Japanese Army cannot crush these militant people now, so also will Kuomintang force fail in the future. . . . With this great popular base, the Communists likewise cannot be eliminated. . . . a Communist victory will be inevitable. . . . We must draw the conclusion that the Communists will have a certain and important share in China's future.²⁵⁶

Service's views were later echoed by John Davies. Based on his own firsthand observation of Yanan, Davies claimed: "The Chinese Communists are so strong between the Great Wall and the Yangtze that they can now look forward to the postwar control of at least North China. . . . The Communists are in China to stay. And China's destiny is not Chiang's but theirs."²⁵⁷

October 1944 was eventful to Service as well as for Sino-American relations. Early that month, the bitter conflict between Chiang and Stilwell over strategy, power, and personality reached its climax. On 9 October news from Colonel McNally about Stilwell's eminent dismissal gave Service "a big venting of feelings."²⁵⁸ He wrote his famous double tenth day memorandum, suggesting that the president's representative, General Hurley, visit Yanan as a gesture of recognition to the Communists. He also advised Washington to "plan on eventual use of the Communist armies and this cannot be purely on Kuomintang terms."²⁵⁹ He pointed out that in pressing for the recall of Stilwell, Chiang "was up to his old tricks of beclouding the issue and introducing irrelevant matters."²⁶⁰

Service's passionate plea for Stilwell was not read before his boss was ordered

home on 19 October. "After Stilwell's recall, I really felt we were heading down the wrong track," Service explained; and "as time went on, I certainly became much more of an advocate of a policy position. After the Stilwell affair, most of us felt that it was worth sticking our necks out."²⁶¹ At the suggestion of John Davies, who came to Communist headquarters for the first time, Service was ordered to return to the United States simultaneously with Stilwell but on a separate plane for policy consultation. He left Yanan on 23 October after a three-month stay.

Based on the honeymoon type relations developed with members of the Dixie Mission in Yanan, CCP leaders sought a still higher level of contact with the U.S., particularly with the newly-arrived presidential envoy, General Patrick Hurley. Hurley's statement that his mission was to "unify the Chinese war effort" naturally attracted the keen interest of Mao and Zhou. They immediately asked the Observer Group to forward a formal invitation to Hurley for a Yanan visit. Hurley did not respond to the invitation, for he was not willing to institute any "form of recognition," as Service learned later. Service thought a visit to Yanan by Hurley would be of great value "even if it involved no negotiations and was done only for demonstration purposes."²⁶²

On his way to Washington via Chongqing, Service met Ambassador Gauss and General Hurley. Disappointed at the non-productive nature of America's dealing with Chiang, Gauss told Service during their long private talk on the evening of 23 October that he was ready to resign and asked Service to carry a personal message to the responsible officers in the State Department before his formal request. On 30

October, Service delivered Gauss' message to Joseph C. Grew, Acting Secretary of State, who announced the ambassador's resignation on 1 November before receiving Gauss's formal request.²⁶³ Service also called on Hurley, who requested that he report on the Communists. "The main burden of my comment," Service reflected later, "was that the Chinese Communists were going to be very difficult to deal with, that they were extremely confident of their strength which they felt was increasing steadily, and that their immediate goal was to insist on receiving a share of American arms chiefly because of the recognition which that implied." Hurley told him that "that was one of the things that he was there for and that he was going to see to it that they did receive some arms and that they were made a part of the unified Chinese war effort."²⁶⁴ He implored Service not to worry, "I will bring these two sides together."²⁶⁵ At Service's insistence, Hurley finally decided to visit Yanan. "But when he did, he went far beyond my proposal," Service later remarked.²⁶⁶

As the first Foreign Service officer who had been to Yanan, Service's return to Washington, after three months at the Chinese Communist headquarters, attracted great attention and interest. "I was in much more demand for these debriefing sessions," he commented. "It was a frantic business," running around and talking to officials like Currie and newspaper men. He was called to the White House and had an inconclusive forty-minute talk with Harry Hopkins. Service concluded that Hopkins was too close to H.H. Kung. When Hopkins asked Service's opinion of Hurley as a replacement for Ambassador Gauss, Service immediately replied that it would be a disaster. He explained that Hurley was "in the Kuomintang pocket,

working against Stilwell.”²⁶⁷ Service’s wife, Caroline, traveled from the west coast to meet him in Washington. She vividly remembered how shocked Service was on 30 November when he heard that General Hurley had been appointed ambassador to China. “Jack couldn’t believe that,” she recalled, “because he had such a low impression of Hurley . . . a clash of ideas and personalities.”²⁶⁸

Coalition Government and America's Dilemma

Having been in China for two short visits in 1931 and 1943, the presidential envoy General Hurley had arrived in Chongqing in early September at a critical moment in U.S.-China relations. The Stilwell issue was foremost and CCP-GMD conflicts were worsening. After failing to “promote efficient and harmonious relations between the Generalissimo and General Stilwell,” as he had been directed to do by Roosevelt,²⁶⁹ Hurley was still confident that he could accomplish what Stilwell and Gauss had failed--to “unify all military forces of China for the purpose of defeating Japan.”²⁷⁰ During the last months of 1944 and early 1945, Hurley found himself strenuously mediating between the CCP and the GMD in an attempt to establish a coalition government.

After numerous informal probes, the formal proposal for a coalition government was first put forward by the CCP in September 1944. The renewed CCP effort resulted partly from America’s hardening positions on Chiang.²⁷¹ In the aftermath of the Japanese Ichigo offensive, with the July impasse in CCP-GMD negotiations and with the promising prospect of America’s official mission to Yanan,

Mao had concluded in a 19 July telegraph to CCP regional headquarters that "changes in CCP-GMD relations depend on inflicting more difficulties on Chiang and more American pressures on him."²⁷² In his interviews with Service, Mao talked about a provisional National Congress where the GMD would constitute half of its seats and the CCP and other minor parties would control the other half.²⁷³ On 4 September, the CCP Central Committee adopted a proposal initiated by Mao and drafted by Zhou, claiming that "time has arrived for our party to present our request to the GMD, our nation, and the world for an immediate reorganization of the national government."²⁷⁴ The Communist agenda was to push the GMD government for a national conference, with participation from all political parties, all local governments and organizations, to set up a new national constitutional government. A coalition government "should become a political objective for the future political struggles of the Chinese people."²⁷⁵

The CCP's advocacy of a coalition government marked a departure from its previous tactic of recognizing Chiang's authority over the United Front. It also added more complications to America's self-imposed task of mediating CCP-GMD disputes. The CCP launched a propaganda campaign with newspaper articles and social activities reinforcing its proposal for a coalition government and openly criticizing Chiang.²⁷⁶ At the 24 September public meeting of the Constitutional Promotion Association, the CCP representative, Dong Biwu, stated that: "Without democracy, China cannot hope to survive this crisis, and China as a nation may disappear in the world. In order to solve our problems, we must solve them thoroughly. What we

Communists proposed at the P.P.C.[People's Political Council] was a coalition government as a national convention (wild applause)."²⁷⁷ The CCP's call for a coalition government was echoed by the White House press office, which claimed that a coalition government was urgently needed.²⁷⁸ Zhou approached Service on 10 October, saying that with GMD's stiffening attitude toward the CCP there was no hope for CCP-GMD negotiations or for the promised reorganization of government, and that the only hope for China was a complete change of government.²⁷⁹

Zhou later told an American officer that the CCP-GMD's failure to proceed with negotiations had been caused by the GMD's arrogant demand for a CCP total surrender of power. He insisted that the only way to resolve the impasse and salvage China was to "set up a coalition government, including other minority parties in addition to the Communists, but with a Kuomintang majority."²⁸⁰

The CCP's call for a coalition government was enthusiastically welcomed by the minority parties, liberal GMD members, nonpartisan groups, and student and intellectual organizations. At a national issues seminar organized by seven academic organizations from Chengdu on 4 October, for instance, the aging Zhang Lan, Chairman of the Chinese Democratic League, waved his hands and shouted "End one party rule, establish coalition government!"²⁸¹

The day of 7 November was special for Yanan. In the afternoon, when the regularly scheduled weekly plane arrived on the dusty Yanan airfield from Chongqing, the American observers and CCP officials who customarily came to greet planes from Chongqing were astounded by the appearance of a tall, arrogant,

soldierly, and handsome official with "the most beautifully tailored uniform" full of ribbons. Immediately after he learned from Colonel Barrett that this newcomer was General Hurley, special emissary of President Roosevelt, Zhou rushed to get Mao to welcome the highest ranking U.S. official ever to visit the Communist base. After an appropriate if hasty ceremony, the spirited Hurley entered two days of difficult negotiations with the Communists.

Davies, who had been in Yanan since 22 October when he replaced Service as army political observer, had a private meeting with Hurley. Davies frankly warned the general that CCP leaders were tough bargainers, and that he should not expect them to yield to Chiang's terms. Davies' attempt to dampen Hurley's enthusiasm apparently offended the general who insisted that Davies return to Chongqing the next day.²⁸²

During their first meeting Hurley told his CCP host that he sincerely hoped for CCP-GMD unity to fight the war against Japan, and that America had no intention of interfering with China's domestic affairs. With Service in Washington for consultation, Barrett acted as interpreter. Hurley then presented the Communists with five terms, in a "Basis for Agreement" (Xieyi de Jichu) drafted by him and GMD officials, for reaching a settlement between the CCP and the GMD. It called for the CCP armed forces to carry out orders from the central government and its National Military Council; for the reorganization of the CCP army under the national government with equal allowance and allocation of supplies; and for legalization of the Chinese Communist Party and all other political parties.²⁸³ Persuaded by Chiang,

Hurley argued that the CCP must give up control of their armed forces. When asked, Hurley replied that Chiang had agreed with the terms. Mao burst into rage at the GMD demands. During his subsequent meeting with Hurley in the afternoon, he denounced Chiang and the central government for harming the unity of the country and the War of Resistance. He pointed out that the GMD proposal was nothing but a demand for a total submission of the CCP forces in exchange for its participation in the government and its acquisition of legal status, and that China must have a coalition government shared by all political parties. When Hurley insisted that at least the proposal allowed the Communists a foot in the door, Mao pointed out that "a foot in the door meant nothing if one's hands were tied behind one's back," and that the army that needed to be reorganized was the corrupt and weak GMD force.²⁸⁴

Hurley suggested that the CCP draft a proposal which satisfied its terms and conditions. When the meeting resumed that afternoon, the Communist leaders presented their draft, which Hurley called "entirely fair" but insufficient. Upon Hurley's suggestion, the American revised the CCP document and the group reconvened the next morning. Demanding a coalition government and the CCP's legal status, the newly revised Five-Point Agreement was eagerly accepted by General Hurley, to whom the two proposals did not seem fundamentally different. He truly believed that "there is very little difference if any between the avowed principles of . . . the Kuomintang and the avowed principles of the Chinese Communist Party."²⁸⁵ Mao, certain of Chiang's refusal, however, insisted that Hurley sign the document. Reluctantly, the general did so but cautioned the CCP chairman: "Chairman Mao,

you of course understand that although I consider these fair terms, I cannot guarantee the Generalissimo will accept them.”²⁸⁶ As Zhou Enlai noted when he reported at the Seventh Plenum of the Sixth Party Congress: “Chiang knew the difference between allowing the CCP to participate in the government and forming a coalition with the Communists. But Hurley had mixed the two together, and therefore was confident that Chiang would be easily persuaded.”²⁸⁷

Delighted with the signing the advantageous five-point agreement and anticipating greater cooperation with the United States, Mao sent a letter to President Roosevelt through Hurley on the same day, expressing the CCP’s determination to defeat Japan and its desire to reach an agreement with the government. He then praised Hurley’s efforts:

I am greatly honored in receiving your personal representative, General Patrick Hurley. During his three day visit here in Yen-an we have congenially discussed all the problems concerning the unity of all Chinese people and all Chinese military forces for the defeat of Japan and reconstruction of China. For this I have offered an agreement. The spirit of this agreement is what we of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people have striving for in the anti-Japanese united front during the past eight years. It has always been our desire to reach an agreement with President Chiang Kai-shek which will promote the welfare of the Chinese people. Through the good offices of General Hurley we have suddenly seen hope of realization. It is with great pleasure that I express my high appreciation for the excellent talent of your personal Representative and his deep sympathy towards the Chinese people.²⁸⁸

Furthermore, he told Roosevelt that the CCP greatly appreciated the president’s laborious efforts in the pursuit of a unified China and for the defeat of Japanese aggression.²⁸⁹ Roosevelt would answer Mao’s letter later on 10 March 1945 upon his

return from the Yalta Conference. He wrote Mao that he “noted with special interest” Mao’s emphasis on China’s unity.²⁹⁰

As CCP leaders had expected, the conclusion of an agreement with Hurley in Yanan was only a beginning of a difficult GMD-CCP negotiation. With Hurley as the mediator, the negotiation produced nothing more than further frustration and distrust. On the same day when the agreement was signed, Zhou flew to Chongqing with Hurley to start negotiations with the government. Confident with the backing of a matured party and an expanding military force, the Communist representative appeared in Chongqing not as a humble bargainer but as a proud ambassador. Despite Hurley’s argument that the only way for the Communists to submit their military forces was to allow their participation in a coalition government, Chiang was not ready to change his position, to capitulate, as he interpreted it.²⁹¹ Rejecting the Yanan agreement, Chiang put forward three conditions for a bi-partisan compromise known as the three point proposal: the government would recognize the legality of the CCP and allow its army to join the national military forces; CCP forces should be under the command of the national military council of which the CCP could become a member; the objective of the national government was to make China a democracy. Hurley presented Chiang’s counter offer to Zhou on 21 November 1944. After reading Chiang’s offer, Zhou asked “what was his attitude toward the coalition government?” Hurley replied that the question of a coalition government was no longer on the agenda, but, he added, despite Chiang’s unwillingness to put everything into writing, he would permit the Communists to participate in the government. Zhou told Hurley

that Chiang's offer meant nothing. After all, the promise of having seats in the military council could be easily canceled by his orders as commander-in-chief. Zhou then pressed Hurley on a coalition government: "General Hurley, do you still agree with our stance on a coalition government as the precondition of China's unity?"²⁹² Hurley replied that he thought the CCP request was appropriate, but he was not in the position to agree for he was only a witness, not a negotiator.

Chiang invited the CCP representatives, Zhou and Dong, to a meeting at which he told the Communists that their request for democracy was not necessary for, as the revolutionary party, the GMD was already fighting for democracy. He then added that "the dignity of the government and the trust of the country can never be damaged." Determined to hold to the CCP's position that "nothing short of a coalition government and combined military command would be accepted," Zhou immediately pointed out that the GMD government was not China itself, "if the government becomes impotent, it must be reorganized." He told Chiang that "if we cannot directly present our request to the government, then we will have to turn to the people for an open dialogue."²⁹³ Disappointed with Hurley's changing attitude after his appointment as ambassador to China on 30 November, and frustrated with Chiang's adamant position on a coalition government, Zhou decided to end any further talks and immediately return to Yanan. Hurley reported to Hull that the Chinese government "had an opportunity to make a settlement with the Communists. They neglected or did not choose to do so."²⁹⁴

The CCP-Hurley tug-of-war continued after the failure of the November talks

in Chongqing. Before Zhou left for Yanan on 7 December, Hurley told him not to give up because the CCP would actually be cooperating with America, once it joined the government.²⁹⁵ Hurley asked Colonel Barrett to sway Mao toward accepting the government's three-point counterproposal. In a long interview with Barrett, Mao sharply criticized Hurley for going back on his words, observing,

We find the attitude of the United States somewhat puzzling. General Hurley came to Yanan and asked on what terms we would cooperate with the Kuomintang. We offered a five-point proposal, of which the basis was establishing a coalition government. General Hurley agreed that the terms were eminently fair, and in fact a large part of the proposal was suggested by him. The Generalissimo had refused these terms. The United States comes and earnestly asks us to accept counter-proposals which require us to sacrifice our liberty. This is difficult for us to understand.²⁹⁶

The next day after he returned to Yanan, Zhou sent Hurley a letter, explaining the CCP decision to end the nonproductive talks with Chiang. Attempting to persuade the United States to further press Chiang to accept a coalition government, Zhou told the general that he would publicize the CCP five-point proposal Hurley had signed.

The Communists' tough position undoubtedly alarmed Hurley who immediately cabled CCP leaders with a warning: making the CCP proposal public would mean negotiations were completely over. At the same time, Barrett expressed his concerns to the CCP representative in Chongqing, Wang Ruofei, over a possible deadlock. He told Wang that the CCP should not embarrass Hurley and that an end of the negotiations would not help the CCP. Hurley's threat and Barrett's persuasion worked. Mao immediately sent a message to Hurley via Wang Ruofei, stating that the

CCP had no intention of breaking up with the United States; the CCP proposal would not be publicized; but American friends should not ask the CCP to abandon its principles. Mao and Zhou especially asked Wang to inform Barrett and Davies of the CCP stance.²⁹⁷ When Hurley again invited Zhou to Chongqing to resume negotiations, Zhou replied that the CCP could not continue mere abstract discussions. To test the government's sincerity for unity and democracy, he then presented specific conditions: to release political prisoners, to end GMD encroachment on CCP anti-Japanese forces, to repeal all orders restricting freedom of speech, and to end secret policy activities.²⁹⁸

To create a working agreement between the CCP and the GMD, Hurley had done his best to persuade both parties to make concessions toward a settlement. Despite his sincere and genuine efforts, Hurley failed to understand the fundamental differences between the two political forces--with the CCP's demand for a coalition government and full participation, and Chiang's insistence on the Communists' complete surrender of their army and full support for the current government in exchange for some government offices.²⁹⁹ While persuading the CCP back to the negotiation table, Hurley reported to Roosevelt by telegram on 4 January 1945 that the CCP and the GMD had similar objectives of popular government and military unity, but they differed on whether the CCP should obey Chiang's orders. He still hoped to bridge the wide gap between Chiang and the Communists and avert a civil war. He was confident, he told the president, that Chiang could rise above party selfishness and anti-Communist prejudice to head a coalition government. If all

others failed, America could still influence China by providing limited weapons to CCP forces.³⁰⁰

Disappointed with Hurley's handling of the CCP-GMD issue, the Communist leaders decided to approach Washington directly. On 10 January, they requested through the American Observer Group in Yanan that an unofficial group from Yanan be dispatched to "interpret and explain to American civilians and officials . . . the present situation and problems of China," and that "Mao and Chou will be immediately available either singly or together for exploratory conference at Washington should President Roosevelt express [the] desire to receive them at White House as leaders of a primary Chinese political party."³⁰¹ The top secret message, supposedly kept from Hurley whom the CCP leaders no longer trusted, was blocked by him and never reached Washington,³⁰² and it became an embarrassment that the CCP leaders later wished to forget, even in the 1970s when new channels of communication were opened.³⁰³ Service later commented on the missed opportunity:

In January, 1945, before the die of American policy was really cast, Chou was astute enough to realize the problem. He asked to come to Washington so that he could talk to President Roosevelt and learn, 'from the horse's mouth,' where America stood on the vital issue that concerned the Communists. The hope was thwarted by Ambassador Hurley. [It] is probably right to doubt whether, at that stage, it could have changed history. It is certainly would have called for a virtuoso performance by one of the world's most brilliant and persuasive diplomats.³⁰⁴

On 24 January, pressed by Hurley, Zhou again flew to Chongqing to resume negotiations with the GMD.³⁰⁵ Tensions continued to center on the issue of CCP

armed forces. Hurley presented Zhou with another proposal, which called for setting up a new agency in which the CCP could participate under the existing government, establishing a three-men committee (with one GMD, one CCP, and one American) to reorganize the CCP army, and placing the CCP forces under an American commanding general. The GMD would also recognize the CCP's legal status. Zhou immediately rejected this offer. Mao later characterized the new GMD plan as turning the Chinese army, especially CCP forces, into a colonial army.³⁰⁶ Despite hard negotiations, neither GMD or CCP positions changed. Chiang made it clear that the Communist request could not be granted, that to produce a "coalition government was to overthrow government."³⁰⁷ On 15 February Zhou held a news conference, denouncing the government's interpretation, and returned to Yanan the next day. Deep-seated mistrust and fundamental differences over political and military power distribution made the January-February talks the last wartime negotiations between the two parties.

After Hurley's failed attempt to bring the two parties together in a coalition government, the CCP toughened its positions. The CCP claimed that it absolutely opposed civil war but was not afraid of such a war; and that, if, after much CCP restraint, "the Guomintang still wants to launch a civil war, they will lose any justification before the nation and the world. Our party can then declare that we are fighting a defensive war."³⁰⁸ Mao made it clear that the Chinese Communists would fight tooth and nail with the Nationalists for even one inch of land. CCP representatives in Chongqing informed the U.S. of its stance.

In Washington, Edgar Snow recorded the president's reaction in an interview immediately following the failed negotiations: "When I last saw him he had just heard about a breakdown in negotiations Pat Hurley was then conducting between Yanan and Chungking. It was 'very disappointing news.'" Roosevelt told Snow that the Communist requests were "along lines of a bill of rights" and "perfectly reasonable."³⁰⁹

The failure of GMD-CCP negotiations frustrated the new ambassador. He would soon blame career diplomats who, he believed, had formed too close a tie with the Communists in Yanan. With Service still in the United States, Hurley directed his frustration first at Davies who had gone back to Yanan for a second visit on 15-17 December, and whose reports on the Communists irritated him.³¹⁰ In his report "the Chinese Communists and Great Powers," Davies suggested that the CCP sought American friendship "not only because of the help we can give them, . . . but also because they recognize that our strategic aims of a strong, independent and democratic China can fit with their nationalist objectives."³¹¹ On 4 January Davies reported on Sino-Soviet relations, appealing for American military assistance to the Chinese Communists in order to boost the pro-American nationalist group and to counter the Soviet influenced doctrine within the CCP:

the Russians have witnessed the instructive frustration of American efforts to bring about by exhortation a Chiang-Communist agreement. If by our refusal now of military cooperation to the Communists the potentially pro-American and nationalist group at Yanan has lost prestige and those doctrine favoring reliance upon the Soviet Union have been further strengthened, the Kremlin doubtless knows it.³¹²

Davies predicted that because of America's unwillingness and inability to engage in realpolitik in China, it stood "to lose that which we seek--the quickest possible defeat of Japan and a united, strong and independent China."³¹³

Despite Hurley's antagonism toward him, Davies managed to escape trouble by asking to be transferred out of China. Originally reassigned to Moscow after his home leave, Service suddenly received a phone call after Christmas from Vincent, recently appointed director of Far Eastern Affairs, who told him that "Davies has gotten in a row with Hurley. We've got to get him out. Will you go back?"³¹⁴ Without hesitation, Service agreed to return to China as a member of General Albert C. Wedemeyer's staff.

Service returned to Chongqing from home consultation on 18 January, in the midst of the difficult Hurley-GMD-CCP negotiations, and was immediately drawn into the controversy. He was first confronted by the anguished ambassador who sought to bring him into line. Hurley told Service that his 10 October 1944 report calling for greater realism toward Chiang was "off base," that in the future the ambassador would do all policy recommendations, and that if he attempted to interfere with the ambassador, Hurley would "break" him.³¹⁵ Meanwhile, sensing that Hurley would not accurately report matters back to Washington, Zhou earnestly sought out Service on 14 February. The frustrated CCP leader told Service that negotiations had not gone anywhere and were "as good as dead" and that Chiang was fully responsible for the break-down.³¹⁶ Service reported his meeting with Zhou in a letter to Vincent: "This empty and disappointing proposal is unacceptable to all of the

opposition groups,” he observed, “all it permits is further talk, without commitments or limitation of the power of the Kuomintang.”³¹⁷ He also wrote a personal letter to Davies, calling Hurley the “small whisker.” He told his old friend and supervisor that things were getting worse under the overbearing influence of the general.³¹⁸

On the same day Service drafted a joint memorandum, “Military Weakness of Our Far Eastern Policy,” with another Foreign Service officer Raymond P. Ludden who had joined the Dixie Mission on 7 August. Ludden had taken a four-month field trip, with four other army officers, in the Communist guerrilla areas behind the Japanese line, covering more than 1,200 miles mostly on foot. The trip had turned him from a skeptic to a convert of the popular view that the Communists were supported by the masses. Returning to Chongqing in early February, he advocated military aid to the Communist forces who he believed were seriously engaging the Japanese. Service accompanied Ludden to report his findings to General Wedemeyer, who required a written report and ordered Ludden back to Washington as a source of information during his own consultation.³¹⁹ In their joint report to Wedemeyer, Service and Ludden argued that the weakness of America's China policy lay in its outspoken support for Chiang and the national government, and that in order for the United States not to be cut off from millions of Chinese allies, it had to recognize the Communists as the only group that could foster China's revolutionary ideas. They earnestly urged Washington to reexamine its China policy:

There is ample evidence to show that to the present Kuomintang government the war against Japan is secondary in importance to its own preservation in power. . . . We should be convinced by this time that the effort to solve the

Kuomintang-Communist differences by diplomatic means has failed. . . . In spite of hero-worshiping publicity in the United States, Chiang Kai-shek is not China and by our present narrow policy of outspokenly supporting his dog-in-the-manger attitude we are needlessly cutting ourselves off from millions of useful allies; many of whom are already organized and in position to engage the enemy. . . . The Communists are the only group at present having the organization and strength to foster such "revolutionary" ideas.³²⁰

Three days later, Service sent another memorandum to Washington reporting the possible GMD attempt to make a deal with the Soviet Union in order to settle the Communist problems. Service pointed out that the GMD had gone to the opposite of "the good but unpalatable advice given by Wallace: that desirable good relations with Russia depended on first settling China's internal Communist problem."³²¹ Service recommended that "the United States will be wise to avoid encouraging or assisting Chiang in these plans."³²² He could hardly know, however, that Chinese negotiations with the Soviets had been suggested and pushed by Hurley himself.

When Hurley was in Washington for consultation, career "China hands" at the embassy made their last bid to influence Washington's China policy. On 28 February, the embassy sent a telegram drafted by Service on "The Situation in China." Though the report was sent under the name of George Atcheson, Chargé d'Affaires in Hurley's absence, and unusually co-signed by all the political officers in the embassy, the ambassador could easily figure out the actual author. Starting with a gloomy portrait of China's political and military prospects, it argued that America's support of Chiang had given him a sense of strength and made him less willing to make any compromises, and as a result, the Communists had actively expanded their forces in the name of self-protection. It concluded that America's current diplomatic approach,

even with its long-standing good intention, would only worsen China's problems:

Although our intentions have been good and our actions in refusing to deal with or assist any group but the central government have been diplomatically correct, if this situation continues and our analysis of it is correct, chaos in China will be inevitable and the probable outbreak of disastrous civil conflict will be accelerated.³²³

The report went on to suggest that "the President inform the Generalissimo in definite terms that military necessity requires that we supply and cooperate with the Communists and other suitable groups who can assist the war against Japan," and that America use military aid as leverage to break the present deadlock.³²⁴ The State Department commended the report for its emphasis on "the need of flexibility" in U.S. China policy. The president received this report on 2 March but apparently did not approve its policy recommendations.³²⁵

Service had stayed in Chongqing for more than a month before he got a chance to request another visit to Yanan. The delay was apparently engineered by the ambassador with Wedemeyer's concurrence. In early March, while both Wedemeyer and Hurley were still in Washington for consultation, and after news that the CCP Seventh National Congress was to be held soon, Service again requested a Yanan visit.

Returning to Yanan on 9 March, four months after he had left for Washington, Service sensed a dramatic change in the mood of the CCP and the operation of the Dixie Mission there. Even Major Ray Cromley, who had joined the mission on 22 July and was temporarily in charge, was suspicious of him and apparently annoyed by

his presence. Parallel with their hardening attitude toward Chiang and the GMD was the Communists' less enthusiastic attitude toward America. Officials told Service that in order for them to survive, they would have to "seek new friends" where they could find them. On 11 March, two days after his arrival, Service reported on the Communists' attitude toward the central government, their demands for one-third representation of China in the United Nations conference at San Francisco, and their aggressive expansion of military forces.³²⁶ The unsettling political situation between the CCP and the GMD and America's puzzling attitude toward China delayed the convening of the CCP Seventh Congress, and prolonged Service's stay in Yanan, originally intended to last only two weeks.

Puzzled by America's attitude toward the CCP and still eager to express the CCP's continued desire for friendly relations, Mao invited Service to an extensive interview on 13 March. After criticizing Chiang's attempt to monopolize political power, Mao told Service that the only way to save China and its unity was to create a coalition government. The Chairman anxiously pleaded that "we hope America will use her influence to help achieve it. Without it, all that America has been working for will be lost."³²⁷

During his second visit to Yanan Service detected the Chinese Communists' political and military reorientation toward cooperation with the Soviet Union and attempted to assess its implication for America's China policy. Chen Yi talked to him frankly about the CCP's anticipation of Soviet entry into the Pacific war and about Communist forces' preparation to infiltrate into Manchuria to take over control in

coordination with the Soviets. In his 14 March report “Chinese Communist Expectation In Regard to Soviet Participation in Far Eastern War,” Service stated that the CCP was expecting Soviet attack on the Japanese army in northern Manchuria and believed that this development would “leave the Chinese Communists in control of Manchuria.”³²⁸

On 23 March Service gave his analysis on possible contacts between the Chinese Communists and Moscow. “The Chinese Communists received no Soviet arms,” but, he observed, “radio communication between Yanan and Moscow is certainly possible.”³²⁹ CCP leaders had told him that they had no radio equipment to communicate with Moscow except a receiver, but he suspected two-way radio traffic when he read Stalin’s reply to Mao’s Red Army Day message, published quickly on Jifang Ribao. Recently published Chinese documents indicate that the CCP had restored radio communication with Moscow in the summer of 1936 and Mao had kept weekly radio consultation with Stalin throughout the 1940s.³³⁰ Service reported that none of the three Russians in Yanan, including Vladimirov, “seem to be treated as persons of importance. . . . They do not appear to be on terms of close acquaintance with the chief Communist leaders.”³³¹ Vladimirov, however, recorded in his diaries that Mao often held long talks with him and routinely submitted radio messages to him for transfer to Moscow.³³²

Service never doubted the CCP’s authentic Communist outlook and he dismissed the popular notions of “the so-called Communists” or “agrarian reformers.” He believed, nevertheless, in the Chinese Communists’ genuine nationalism and their

independence from the Soviet Union. Mao once told Service, as he had told the Soviets earlier, that “we are, first of all, Chinese.”³³³ Service suggested in 1971 that when appealing for American help, “Mao was sincere in hoping to avoid a close and isolated dependence on the USSR. . . . Mao was treating foreign relations as basically non-ideological. He was thinking in nationalistic terms.”³³⁴ The eagerness with which Mao sought American cooperation, said Service, was “quite surprising:”

I was really almost taken off my feet by the warmth and fervor and earnestness with which he was arguing for American sympathy and support, for the compatibility of their views with American intentions in China, for the desire for American military participation in China. . . . It was a very convincing and surprising fervid presentation.”³³⁵

Service’s reports on the Chinese Communists’ nationalistic sentiment and their possible separation from Moscow were supported by other Dixie members. Davies suggested that the CCP’s nationalistic feelings, if cultivated, might prevail; but if the United States refused to cooperate, it might become a Soviet satellite. For Emmerson, the Communists did not seem to be Soviet puppets. He wrote later that Communist control of China was inevitable, but Soviet domination was not.³³⁶ Even the “self-styled solid Republican reactionary” Barrett “thought of the Party as Chinese first and communist afterwards.”³³⁷

As Soviet representative, Vladimirov feared that Mao had “set his hopes on the United States as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union.” He charged that Mao was “clearly offering himself as a partner” to Americans and had made it “abundantly clear that he is not a communist.”³³⁸ Vladimirov regarded Service as “the most

dangerous American” in Yanan who was the “most farsighted” to see the political reality:

The most farsighted approach to the Yanan problem in American policy is that of Davies and Service. As the last visit of Service showed, he correctly caught the nationalistic community between the leaders of the two largest groups in China. A realistic political calculation in behalf of the future interests of the United States. . . . Service is far from being a political idealist . . . is more perspicacious than many of his eminent compatriots. . . . Service is the most dangerous American here . . . he is interested not in words, but in political reality. But the irony of fate! . . . Such people like Service usually fail in their careers. He is too independent.³³⁹

Service, Vladimirov continued, was seeking to win over the CCP to block Soviet interest in China:

He does not betray the interest of his country. . . . He turned to the CCP leadership as a potential ally of his country. . . . Davies and he seemed to have grasped the nationalist implication of the policy of the CCP leadership. They see it as a future force which the United States can and must be friendly with if it wants to retain its position in this part of Asia. . . . help neutralize the might of the Soviet Union in the Far East. . . . Therein lies the substance of Service’s revelations. . . . That is why Service seems to lose self-control and flies into a passion.³⁴⁰

When reviewing Vladimirov’s Yanan diaries in 1971, Service cautioned that many entries were apparently heavily edited with “polishing” and “additions.” It was clear to Service that “much of the material purporting to deal with the Americans in Yanan does not come from a contemporaneous diary by Vladimirov, but has been put together much later from published materials.”³⁴¹ It was suspicious, for example, for Vladimirov to predict Service’s “fate” and “career” failure in March when even

Service himself had no indication of his encountering trouble with the Amerasia case in June. Yet still, it can be said that Vladimirov's concerns about Service's activities in Yanan reflected genuine Soviet worries over a potential CCP-American linkage.

Hurley was enraged when he learned that Service had gone to Yanan. He stormed over to the State Department, demanding Service's recall. When told that Service was not working for the State Department but for the Army, he rushed to the Secretary of War. On 30 March, Service received army orders to return to Washington at once. Not knowing that the message ordered Service's recall but sensing its importance, three highest ranking CCP officials, Mao, Zhou, and Zhu, approached him for a long talk that lasted from afternoon through supper on 1 April. Giving up any expectations for American military aid, CCP leaders expressed their hope for U.S. neutrality in the future GMD-CCP conflict. "The Communist policy toward the United States is and will remain one of extending cooperation regardless of American action,"³⁴² they said.

Arrived in Washington on 12 April, Service not only found a different atmosphere in the State Department over China policy but a much divided group of China experts; he also learned Roosevelt's death on the same day. He was taken off China-related work and immediately assigned to a task force to prepare new Foreign Service legislation. Receiving a double promotion from grade six to four in May, Service's diplomatic career seemed to be continuing on a smooth course. It would, however, quickly take a dramatic turn with the Amerasia arrest on 6 June. Without the opportunity to express his opinions at the State Department, he would actively

seek to influence U.S. China policy through passing background information to journalists, a normal practice taken by both diplomats and journalists in China during the war. Soon he was caught in the anti-Communist “witch-hunt,” which would overshadow the past and present deliberations of the State Department.

After Hurley’s open declaration of support for Chiang and the GMD government in early April, U.S.-Chinese Communist relations assumed the pattern of enmity and exclusion. The ambassador’s statement that the GMD-CCP problem was not one of democracy but rather a basic problem of national unity and disunity, received wide applause from government-controlled media but utter condemnation from the CCP. The Xinhua Ribao made the CCP stance clear: “We deeply regret the statements made by General Hurley, as he does not understand the popular demand for democracy which is the true basis for China's domestic unity. . . . The Communist armies are not protecting the selfish interests of a single party but are a popularly supported anti-Japanese force. Military unification without democratic union will lead nowhere.”³⁴³ The Chinese Communist policy of “uniting with America,” formulated in the summer of 1944, came to an end in April 1945. The CCP gave up any hope of military cooperation with U.S. forces. Its diplomatic strategy was now focused on joint military operations with the Soviets in Manchuria. On 18 April Mao instructed the party to actively prepare to assist the Red Army. During the CCP’s Seventh National Congress held in late April, the central committee decided to end active cooperation with the American military and restrict its activities in Communist-controlled areas, including disarming five OSS men who sneaked into the border

region and parachuted American pilots, and suspending constructions of communication and other facilities.³⁴⁴

America's professed support for Chiang embittered Mao toward the United States, a feeling that would remain years later. He reflected in 1947: "We made mistakes in our work during the previous period. . . . It was the first time for us to deal with the U.S. imperialists. We did not have much experience. As a result we were taken in. With this experience we won't be cheated again."³⁴⁵

Despite continued American efforts to bring the CCP and GMD together during General George Marshall's mediation in 1945-1946, China would fall into three years of destructive civil war that would end with a total Communist victory in 1949, just as Service had predicted in early 1943. Americans would be driven out of that once friendly country. Anguished by the hostile Sino-American relations after 1949, Service argued in 1971 that "if the United States had been able in 1945 to shed some of its illusions about China, to understand what was happening in that country, and to adopt a realistic policy in America's own interests, Korea and Vietnam would probably never have happened. . . . We would not still be confronted with an unsolvable Taiwan problem . . . because we would not have 'lost' China."³⁴⁶

ENDNOTES

1. Memorandum of Conversation, 16 February 1945, Hurley Papers, Box 98, Folder 2, University of Oklahoma.
2. John S. Service, "Changes in China, New and Not New," Oberlin Alumni Magazine (Spring 1986), 11.
3. Service, The Amerasia Papers, 162.
4. Statement of John Service before a Sub-Committee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 22 June 1905, 7, John Service Papers, Independence.
5. Hong Zhang, "Tragic Cooperation: Chiang Kai-shek and America's China Policies from Pearl Harbor to Hurley's Mission" (M.A. thesis, University of Toledo, August 1989), 58.
6. William P. Head, America's China Sojourn: America's Foreign Policy and Its Effects on Sino-American Relations, 1942-1948 (New York: University Press of America, 1983), 101.
7. U.S. Senate, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation, 2067.
8. Mao Zedong, "Dialectical Progression in Chinese History," quoted in Pichon P.Y. Loh, ed., The Kuomintang Debacle of 1949: Conquest or Collapse? (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1965), 94. See also Mao Zedong, "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 3 (New York: International Publishers Company, Inc., 1954), 73-84.
9. "Di Er Ci Quanguo Daibiao Dahui Xunyan," [Manifesto of the second national congress], in Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji [Selected Documents of the CCP Central Committee], vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongyang Danxiao Chubanshe, 1989), 99-118.
10. Zhang Baijia, "Kang Ri Zhanzheng Shiqi Guogong Liangdang de Dui Mei Zhengce," 22-23. Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong Xuanji [Selected works of Mao Zedong], combined ed. (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1964), 233, 723. Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong yu Sinuo de Tanhua [Mao Zedong's conversation with Snow] (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1979), 108-17.
11. Mao Zedong, "Stalin, Friend of the Chinese People," in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. II, 335.

12. Mao Zedong, "Policies, Measures, and Perspectives for Resisting the Japanese Invasion," in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. II (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1967), 17; also see Steven M. Goldstein, "The CCP's Foreign policy of Opposition, 1937-1945," in Hsiung and Levine, China's Bitter Victory, 109. .
13. Zhang, "Kang Ri Zhanzheng Shiqi Guogong Liangdang de Dui Mei Zhengce," 23.
14. "Gaijin Wqaijiao Zhengce yu Jiaqiang Waijiao Huodong" [Improve foreign policy and increase diplomatic activities], Xinhua Ribao [Xinhua daily], 29 October 1938; Yang Song, "Lun Zuijin Ouzhou de Jushi yu Wuoguo Menzhu Kangzhan" [The Current situation in Europe and our national war of resistance], Qunzhong [The Masses] 72 (30 May 1939), 12.
15. "Ying Mei Zhengfu Gei Wuoguo de Yuanzhu," [Assistance to China from the governments of Great Britain and the United States] Xinhua Ribao Shelun [Editorials of the Xinhua Daily] (Chongqing: Xinhua Ribao Press, 1939), 156-57.
16. Ibid., 157; Goldstein, "The CCP's Foreign Policy of Opposition," 113-15.
17. Mao, "Policies, Measures, and Perspectives for Resisting Japanese Invasion," 17.
18. Mao Zedong, "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. II, 327.
19. For more information about Zhou's role in forming the CCP's pragmatic foreign policy, see Shao, Zhou Enlai and the Foundations of Chinese Foreign Policy, 3-73.
20. "Guanyu Zhanzheng Xingshi Wenti de Zhishi" [Directive concerning the situation of the war], Jiefang Ribao [Liberation daily], 27 July 1940.
21. For a fuller account on the CCP Southern Bureau, see Nangfeng Ju Dangshi Ziliao Dashi Ji.
22. Goldstein, "The CCP's Foreign Policy of Opposition," 120.
23. "Mei Ri Tanpan," Jiefang Ribao [Liberation daily], 26 September 1941.
24. Nanfangju Dangshe Ziliao, Dashi Ji [Party material of the Southern Bureau: chronicle of events] (Chongqing: Chongqing Press, 1986), 120.
25. Zhou Enlai Nianpu [Chronology of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1989), 563.
26. MacKinnon and Friesen, China Reporting, 104-05.
27. Jin, Zhou Enlai Zhuan, 539-40.

28. Jin Chongji, Zhou Enlai Zhuan, 1898-1949 [Biography of Zhou Enlai, 1898-1949] (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1989), 540.

29. Lattimore, China Memoirs, 155.

30. Zhou Enlai Nianpu, 496.

31. History Department of Fudan University, Zhongguo Jindai Duiwai Guanxi Shi Ziliao Xuanji [Selected material of modern Chinese foreign relations], vol. 2 (Shanghai: Renmin Press, 1977), 153-55. Zhang Baijia, "Kang Ri Zhanzheng Shiqi Guogong Liangdang de Dui Mei Zhengce," 25.

32. In his statement before the Senate Tydings' Committee in April, 1950, the American Communist Party leader Earl Browder revealed that he had received information from Mao Zedong and that the information on one occasion "was placed in the hands of the president." See Anthony Kubek, How the Far East was Lost: American Policy and the Creation of Communist China, 1941-1949 (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1963), 269.

33. John Davies, Memorandum for Mr. Currie, 6 August 1942, State Department Decimal File, 893.00/14882, LM 65, Roll 3, National Archives.

34. Zhang, "Kang Ri Zhanzheng Shiqi Guogong Liangdang de Dui Mei Zhengce," 25.

35. John Davies, "Conversation with Chou En-lai," 16 March 1943; John Vincent to the Secretary of State, 22 March 1943, State Department Decimal File, 893.00/14701, LM 65, Roll 4, National Archives.

36. John C. Vincent, Conversation with General Chou En-lai, 23 March 1943, State Department Decimal File, 893.00/14989; Vincent, Conversation with Chou En-lai, 6 May 1943, State Department Decimal File, 893.00/15007, LM 65, Roll 3, National Archives; May, China Scapegoat, 99.

37. George Atcheson to Secretary of State, 17 July 1943, State Department Decimal File, 893.00/15063, LM 65, Rool 3, National Archieves.

38. Zhou Enlai Nianpu, 562.

39. *Ibid.*, 563.

40. *Ibid.*, 567.

41. Goldstein, "The CCP's Foreign Policy of Opposition," 122; "Kangzhan yu Minzhu Buke Fenkai" [The War of Resistance and democracy cannot be seperated], Jiefang Ribao [Liberation daily], 14 June 1943; "Chedi Shixian Daxiyang Xianzhang" [Thoroughly carry out the Atlantic Charter], Xinhua Ribao [Xinhua daily], 14 August 1943.

42. Fairbank, Chinabound, 271-72.

43. Mao, "Dialectical progression in Chinese History," 96. For the complete text, see Mao Zedong, "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 2 (New York: International Publishers Company, Inc., 1954), 96-101.

44. Niu Jun, Cong Yanan Zouxiang Shijie: Zhongguo Gongchandang Duiwai Guanxi de Qiyuan [Marching from Yanan to the world: the origins of the Chinese Communist Party's foreign relations] (Fujian: Fujian People's Press, 1992), 161; Mao, "The Chinese Revolution," 101.

45. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 64-65.

46. Conversation: Major Takeo Imai and Mr. Johnson, 16 November 1936, Nelson T. Johnson Papers, Box 69, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

47. Shewmaker, Americans and Chinese Communists, 57.

48. See, for example, T.A. Bisson, "Mao Tse-tung Analyzes Nanking in Interview," Amerasia I (October 1937): 360-65; and Yenan in 1937: Talks with the Communist Leaders (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).

49. For more information see, Kenneth E. Schewmaker, Americans and Chinese Communists. Nathaniel Peffer gives a good account on the uniformity of favorable impression of Yanan by Western correspondents in his article "Contrasting Yanan and Chungking," New York Times Book Review, 28 October 1945, 4.

50. Shewmaker, Americans and Chinese Communists, 76.

51. *Ibid.*, 119.

52. The favorite reports on the Communists by Western correspondents were widely cited by writers and scholars. See, for example, Lawrence K. Rosinger, China's Crisis (New York, 1945), 81-89; Maxwell S. Stewart, "The Chinese Communists," Nation (24 March 1945): 338-39; Richard Watts, Jr., "The Chinese Giant Stirs," New Republic (28 March 1945): 733-36.

53. Michael Schaller, The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938-1945 (New York: Columbia University, 1979), 21; also see Tuchman, "If Mao Had Come to Washington," 62.

54. Hou Tsung Chien, "U.S. Policy Toward China, 1912 to Present" (Ph.D. diss., Northern Arizona University, 1985), 103.

55. *Ibid.*, 104; also see Shewmaker, Americans and Chinese Communists, 100.

56. Shewmaker, Americans and Chinese Communists, 304.

57. Chien, "U.S. Policy toward China," 105.

58. See, Evans F. Carlson, The Chinese Army: Its Origins and Military Efficiency (Westport: Hyerion Press, 1975, c1940), and Twin Stars of China: A Behind-the-Scenes Story of China's Valiant Struggle for Existence by A U.S. Marine Who Lived and Moved with the People (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1940).

59. Schaller, America's Crusade in China, 20.

60. Acheson Memo, 24 April 1941, State Department Decimal File 893.00/14731, LM 65, Roll 2, National Archives.

61. State Department Decimal File 893.00, LM 65, Rolls 1-5, National Archives.

62. For example, Drumright had two conversations with Zhou Enlai within a month on 29 March and 14 April 1941. Everett F. Drumright, "Kuomintang-Communist Relations: Conversation with Chou Enlai," State Department Decimal File 893.00/14719, LM 65, Roll 2, National Archives.

63. C. Gauss to the Secretary of State, 24 May 1944, Records of the Office of Strategic Services, RG 226, National Archives. For Sun's speech, see Xinhua Ribao [Xinhua daily] and Ta Kung Pao, 15 May 1944.

64. Anna Louis Strong kept close contacts with Chinese officials both in the government and the Communist Party. She was a classmate of H.H. Kung at Oberlin College and had kept cordial relations with him despite her belief that Kung was not a good influence in the Chinese government. See John Davies, "Political Situation in China," Memorandum of Conversation, State Department Decimal File 893.00/14656, LM 65, Roll 2, National Archives.

65. M.M. Hamilton, "Dispute between the Communists and the Chinese Government," Memorandum of Conversation, 11 March 1941, State Department Decimal File 893.00/14727, LM 65, Roll 2, National Archives.

66. Drumright, "Kuomintang-Communist Relations," 31 May 1941; C. Gauss to the Secretary of State, 2 June 1941, State Department File, LM 65, Roll 2, National Archives.

67. U.S. Senate, China and the United States: Today and Yesterday, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), 6.

68. John S. Service, "Chou En-lai, as Seen by an Old China Hand," Los Angeles Times, 14 January 1976.

69. Everett F. Drumright, "Chou Enlai's Views on the World Situation," 30 June 1941, State Department Decimal File, 893.00/14757, LM 65, Roll 2, National Archives. Zhou later called on Lattimore for over an hour strictly curtsy talk with his old acquaintance who had visited Yanan in 1937. See Lattimore, China Memoirs, 153.

70. Jin Chongji, "Interview with John Service," 15 July 1985, in Jin, Zhou Enlai Zhuan, 540.

71. Service, "Chou En-lai."

72. John Service, "Kuomintang-Communist Situation," 23 January 1943, State Department Decimal File, 893.00/14969, LM65, Roll 3, National Archives; also Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, 198-99.

73. Service, Lost Chance in China, 176.

74. Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Memorandum, 23 January 1943, State Department Decimal File, 893.00/14969, LM 65, Roll 3, National Archives; For Davies' report on his conversation with Zhou during which Zhou extended his invitation for an official American visit to the Communist areas, see Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942 (Washington: GPO, 1956), 227.

75. State Department Memo, Stanley K. Hornbeck Papers, Box 381, John Service File, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley; Service, "State Department Duty," 229-30.

76. Stanley K. Horbeck, Memorandum, 30 January 1943, State Department Decimal File, 893.00/14969, LM 65, Roll 3, National Archives.

77. Service, "State Department Duty," 230.

78. John Davies, "Conversation with Chou En-lai," 16 March 1943, State Department Decimal File, 893.00/14989, LM 65, Roll 3, National Archives.

79. Service, "State Department Duty," 238.

80. "Personal Statement of John S. Service," in U.S. Senate, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation.

81. John Service, "Resentment by Chinese Intellectuals of the Cultural Control of the Kuomintang," 8 June 1943, State Department Decimal File, 893.00/15038, LM 65, Roll 3, National Archives.

82. Memorandum by John Davies, 24 June 1943, John Service Papers, Box 1, Folder 27, Berkeley.

83. "Personal Statement of John S. Service," in U.S. Senate, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation.

84. Service, "State Department Duty," 282.

85. Fairbank, China Bound, 279.

86. *Ibid.*, 258-59.
87. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 388.
88. John Davies, "Observer's Mission to North China," 15 January 1944, State Department Decimal File, 893.00/15297, LM 65, Role 4, National Archives.
89. Message for the Generalissimo from President Roosevelt, 9 February 1944, Commanding General Personal Message File, Box 3, RG 493, National Archives.
90. Chen Jingzhi and Wu Boqing, eds., Zongtong Jianggong Dashi Changbian Chugao [A Chronological draft of important events concerning president Chiang] (Taipei: Yangming Shuwu, 1978), 2322.
91. Chiang Kai-shek to President Roosevelt, 22 February 1944, Commanding General Personal Message File, Box 3, RG 493, National Archives.
92. Secretary of State to Secretary of War, 4 April 1944, United States Foreign Relations, 1944, 6: 307-08; May, China Scapegoat, 99; Henry Stimson to Secretary of State, 8 April 1944, State Department Decimal File, 893.00/15344, LM 65, Roll 5, National Archives; Barrett, Dixie Mission, 26.
93. Henry Stimson to the Secretary of State, 3 March 1944, State Department File, LM 65, Roll 5. National Archives; David D. Barrett to John Service, 26 November 1968, John Service Papers, Berkeley; Barrett, Dixie Mission, 26.
94. Henry Stimson to the Secretary of State, 7 March 1944, State Department File, LM 65, Roll 5, National Archives; and Eyes Alone Stilwell from Hearn, 22 March 1944, Commanding General Personal Message File, RG 493, Box 3, National Archives.
95. Barrett to Service, 26 November 1968.
96. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 26.
97. "Qingzhu Meiguo Guoqing," [Celebrating America's national day] Jiefang Ribao [The Liberation daily], 4 July 1944; Mao Zedong, "Xuexi he Shiju," [Study and the current situation] in Mao Zedong Xuanji [Selected works of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: Renming Press, 1969), 894-95.
98. Zhou Enlai Nianpu, 576.
99. *Ibid.*, 571.
100. Clarence Gauss to the Secretary of State, 6 March 1944, State Department File, LM65, Roll 5, National Archives; Zhou Enlai Nianpu, 577.
101. Mao Zedong, Interview, 12 June 1944, in Political Affairs (January 1945).

102. Interview with Mao Tze-tung by an Official of the Chinese Ministry of Information, 18 July 1944, Records of the Office of the Strategic Services, RG 226, National Archives.
103. Feis, The China Tangle, 160.
104. Hull to Gauss, 19 July 1944, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, 479-80.
105. Bagby, The Eagle-Dragon Alliance, 105. For more information on American journalist impression of Yanan, see, Harrison Forman, Reports from Red China (New York: Book Find Club, 1945) and Gunther Stein, The Challenge of Red China (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, Inc., 1945).
106. Israel Epstein, "Communist Army is Strong," and "Chinese Communists from All Classes," New York Times, 1 July and 20 August 1944.
107. Cormac Shanahan, "China's Communist Puzzle," China Monthly 6 (June 1945), 9-12.
108. Service, Lost Chance in China, 176.
109. Goldstein, "The CCP's Foreign Policy of Opposition, 1937-1945," 123. See also Sidney Rittenberg and Amanda Bennett, The Man Who Stayed Behind (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 77.
110. Service, "State Department Duty," 253-54, 268; Kahn, The China Hands, 108; Head, America's China Sojourn, 84.
111. John Service, "Summary: The Situation in China and Suggestion Regarding American Policy," 20 June 1944, John Service Papers, Box 2, Folder 42, Berkeley; see also Service, Amerasia Papers, 200-15.
112. May, China Scapegoat, 99.
113. Service, Lost Chance in China, 93-94.
114. Henry Wallace to President Truman, 19 September 1951, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File: China, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
115. Service stated that even though "the Embassy simultaneously was doing some reporting on the same subject but I think it fair to say that I supplied a large part of the Embassy's material." See "Personal Statement of John S. Service," in U.S. Senate, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation, 1968.
116. Herbert Feis, Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 408.

117. Henry A. Wallace to President Roosevelt, 19 September 1944, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File, Box 27, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

118. Henry A. Wallace, The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), 333.

119. May, China Scapegoat, 102; Department of State, The China White Paper, 554; Kahn, The China Hands, 109.

120. May, China Scapegoat, 102-03.

121. Chung-gi Kwei, The Kuomintang-Communist Struggle in China, 1922-1949 (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), 86-87.

122. Chen, Zongtong Jianggong, 2389.

123. For more information about Service's role in forming the observers' mission, see Service, "State Department duty," 269-70; Kahn, The China Hands, 110; Memo for the Vice-President, File 31363P, Henry Wallace Papers, quoted in May China's Scapegoat, 103, 321.

124. According to Kahn, Service rode off with the Vice President for the afternoon meeting, see Kahn, The China Hands, 110; but Service's own account indicates that Wallace was due to come out for that afternoon session and after he and Ferri delivered the message they withdrew. Service, "State Department Duty," 270.

125. Service, "State Department Duty," 270.

126. Ibid.

127. Kahn, The China Hands, 110; May, China Scapegoat, 103.

128. Service, "State Department Duty," 270; John Davies to John K. Fairbank, 4 July 1944, John Service Papers, Box 1, Folder 26, Berkeley.

129. John K. Fairbank to Lauchlin Currie, 17 July 1944, John Service Papers, Box 1, Folder 26, Berkeley.

130. John Service, "Message from Communist Leaders Welcoming American Observers," 3 July 1944, John Service Papers, Box 2, Folder 40, Berkeley.

131. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 25.

132. Ibid.

133. Ibid., 17.

134. Interview with Mao Tze-tung by an Official of the Chinese Ministry of Information, 18 July 1944; quoted in W. J. Peterkin, Inside China, 1943-1945: An Eyewitness Account of America's Mission in Yen-an (Baltimore: Gateway Press, Inc., 1992), 17.
135. Service, "State Department Duty," 314.
136. Statement of John Service, 22 June 1950, 6, John Service Papers, Independence; Barrett, Dixie Mission, 13.
137. State Department: For the Press, 3 October 1951, John Service Papers, Box 2, Folder 61, Berkeley.
138. Zhang, "Kang Ri Zhanzheng," 25.
139. Jiefang Ribao [Liberation daily], 15 August 1944.
140. Vladimirov, Vladimirov Diary, 233
141. Ce Hai, s.v., "Yanan."
142. John Service Testimony, 21 July 1971, in U.S. Congress, Evolution of U.S. Policy toward Mainland China, Executive Hearings, 7; quoted in Bagby, The Eagle-Dragon Alliance, 112.
143. Peterkin, Inside China, 18-19; Barrett, Dixie Mission, 29.
144. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 55.
145. Service, "State Department Duty," 288; Peterkin, Inside China, 19.
146. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 30.
147. *Ibid.*, 83.
148. *Ibid.*, 89; Peterkin, Inside China, 90.
149. Service, "State Department Duty," 281.
150. Memorandum to Colonel David D. Barrett, 21 July 1944, in Barrett, Dixie Mission, 28.
151. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 29, 45; Bagby, Eagle-Dragon Alliance, 112; Stein, The Challenge of Red China, 349.
152. Zhou Enlai Nianpu, 578.
153. John S. Service, "Desire of Chairman of Communist Central Committee for Continued American Representation of Diplomatic Character at Yen-an," with a Memorandum

of Conversation with Mao Tse-tung Enclosed, 27 July 1944, John S. Service Papers, Box 2, Folder 40, Berkeley.

154. John Service, "Ta Gao Zan Yuan Zu," [He is far-sighted] in Han Suyin and Service, eds., Huainian Mao Zedong [Cherishing the memories of Mao Zedong] (Hong Kong: Wanyuan Tushu Gongsi, 1977), 40.

155. Zhou Enlai Nianpu, 579.

156. MacKinnon and Friesen, China Reporting, 69.

157 Service, Lost Chance in China, 178-79.

158. John Service, "First Informal Impressions of the North Shensi Communist Base," 28 July 1944, John S. Service Papers, Box 2, Folder 40, Berkeley; Service, Lost Chance in China, 178-82; Foreign Relations, 1944, 517-20.

159. Ibid.

160. Service, "State Department Duty," 272.

161. Ibid., 274. Service, "First Informal Impressions of the North Shensi Communist Base," 28 July 1944.

162. Ibid.; Kahn, The China Hands, 118.

163. Service, "State Department Duty," 272; Service, Interview with William P. Head, 19 February 1978, Berkeley, California, in Head, America's China Sojourn, 97.

164. W. J. Peterkin, Inside China, 1943-1945: An Eyewitness Account of America's Mission in Yen-an (Baltimore: Gateway Press, Inc., 1992), 19.

165. John K. Emmerson, Japanese Thread: A Life in the U.S. Foreign Service (New York: Hott, Rinehart and Winston, 1978), 182.

166. Ivan D. Yeaton, Memoirs Manuscript, Hoover Institution, quoted in Bagby, The Eagle-Dragon Alliance, 121.

167. Service, "State Department Duty," 281, 279; Barrett, Dixie Mission, 50.

168. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 50.

169. Service, "State Department Duty," 280.

170. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 52.

171. Service, "State Department Duty," 280.

172. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 52.
173. Service, "State Department Duty," 286-87.
174. *Ibid.*, 286.
175. Peter Vladimirov, The Vladimirov Dairies, Yenan, China: 1942-1945 (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1975), 229-30.
176. Interview with Mao Tze-tung by an Official of the Chinese Ministry of Information, 18 July 1944. For more information concerning CCP's relations with Russia and the Comintern, see Li Tongcheng, "Mao Zedong he Stalin de Weimiao Guanxi" [Mao Zedong's delicate relations with Stalin], Renmin Ribao [People's daily], 17 March 1996; and Zhou Enlai Nianpu, 555.
177. Private Conversations with Zhou Enlai, 17 November 1944, Records of the Office of Strategic Services, RG 226, National Archives.
178. John Service, Reading Notes on China's Special Area by Peter Vladimirov, John Service Papers, Box 2, Folder 60, Berkeley; also Bagby, The Eagle-Dragon Alliance, 114.
179. Feis, Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin, 407-08.
180. Service, "State Department Duty," 273.
181. Peterkin, Inside China, 20.
182. Service, "State Department Duty," 273.
183. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 35.
184. *Ibid.*, 82; Bagby, The Eagle-Dragon Alliance, 115.
185. Service, "State Department Duty," 273.
186. *Ibid.*
187. Telegram from Ambassador Gauss to the Secretary of State, 16 August 1944, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File, Box 27, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library; Service, "State Department Duty," 272.
188. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 47.
189. Service, "State Department Duty," 272.
190. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 31, 34; Service, "State Department Duty," 309.
191. Service, The Amerasia Papers, 179.

192. Fairbank, Chinabound, 270, 278.
193. Service, Amerasia Papers, 179.
194. Service, "State Department Duty," 282.
195. Service, Lost Chance in China, 288.
196. Nakamura Interview, [n.d.], RG 332, National Archives.
197. Vladimirov, The Vladimirov Diaries, 252-54; and China's Special Area, 30.
198. Vladimirov, The Vladimirov Diaries, 368; quoted in Bagby, The Eagle-Dragon Alliance, 115.
199. Service, "He is Far-sighted," 41.
200. John Service, "The Communist Policy toward the Kuomintang," 3 August 1944, John Service Papers, Box 2, Folder 40, Berkeley.
201. Vladimirov, Vladimirov Dairies, 239.
202. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 28.
203. Charles C. Stelle, "Affairs to Dixie," 22 November 1944, Dixie Mission Papers, Modern Military Records, National Archives.
204. Lyman P. Van Slyke, ed., The Chinese Communist Movement: A Report of the United States War Department, July 1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), 205, quoted in Service, The Amerasia Papers, 148.
205. John Service to John Davies Jr., 12 August 1944, John Service Papers, Box 1, Folder 27, Berkeley.
206. Ibid.
207. Service, "State Department Duty," 520.
208. Ibid., 322.
209. Service, Lost Chance in China, 322-26; Bagby, The Eagle-Dragon Alliance, 121.
210. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 90-91.
211. Ibid., 42.
212. Evans Carlson to President Roosevelt, 28 October 1944, with Chu Teh, Chow En-lai, Yeh Chien-yin, and Nieh Yung-chen to Colonel Carlson, 14 August 1944, Roosevelt

Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

213. Ibid.

214. Ibid.

215. “Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Waijiao Gongzuo de Zhishi,” [CCP Central Committee’s instructions on diplomatic work], 18 August 1944, quoted in Niu Jun, Cong Yanan Zouxiang Shijie, 151; Zhou Enlai Nianpu, 580.

216. Ibid.

217. He Di, “The Most Respected Enemy: Mao Zedong’s Perception of the United States” The China Quarterly no. 137 (March 1994): 145.

218. Service, Lost Chance in China, 291.

219. Niu, Cong Yanan Zouxiang Shijie, 146.

220. Perterkin, Inside China, 65.

221. Service, The Amerasia Papers, 146; Bagby, The Eagle-Dragon Alliance, 114. There has been various account on the number of Americans rescued by the CCP forces, some reported that more than one hundred pilots were saved. See “Historical Summary of Yanan Liaison Team, Shensi Provence, China,” Dixie Papers, Modern Military Records, National Archives.

222. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 36-37; Whittlesey to Air Group Aid Section China, 9 September 1944, microfilm, Yenan Observer Group, Dixie Mission, Office of Chief Military History, Department of the Army, in Head, America’s China Sojourn, 99.

223. Niu, Cong Yanan Zouxiang Shijie, 151.

224. Service, Lost Chance in China, 292. It should be noted that in numerous works on the subject, Service’s conversation has been recorded as eight hours while his original report revealed a six-hour talk. See, Kahn, The China Hands, 119; Head, America’s China Sojourn, 102.

225. John Service, “Interview with Mao Tse-tung,” United States Foreign Relations, 1944, 602-14; Service, Lost Chance in China, 293.

226. Ibid., 302-03.

227. Zhou Enlai Nianpu, 581.

228. Ibid.

229. Service, Lost Chance in China, 307; Service, "Changes in China, New and Not New," 14.
230. Service, "Changes in China, New and Not New," 14.
231. Service, Lost Chance in China, 306-07.
232. Service, Interview with William P. Head, 22-23, in Head, America's China Sojourn, 103.
233. Zhou Enlai Nianpu, 582.
234. Ibid., 583.
235. Ibid.
236. Service, Lost Chance in China, 318; Foreign Relations, 1944, 615-16.
237. Service, Lost Chance in China, 319-20.
238. Ibid.
239. Service, Lost Chance in China, 225; Kubeck, Amerasia Papers, 867.
240. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 85.
241. Department of State to Patrick Hurley, [n.d.], John Service Papers, Box 2, Folder 30, Berkeley.
242. John Emerson, A View from Yenan (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 1979), 13.
243. Charles G. Stelle to Commanding General, 11 December 1944, Dixie Mission Papers, Modern Military Records, National Archives.
244. White and Jacoby, Thunder Out of China, 228-29.
245. Brooks Atkinson, "Yenan, A Chinese Wonderland City," New York Times, 6 October 1944, 12.
246. Service, Reading Notes on China's Special Area by Peter Vladimirov, Service Papers, Box 2, Folder 60, Berkeley.
247. White and Jacoby, Thunder Out of China, 228; White, "Inside Red China," Life XVII (18 December 1944): 39-46.
248. Service, Lost Chance in China, 198.

249. Chen, Zongtong Jianggong, 2421; Department of State, The China White Paper, 561.
250. Department of State, The China White Paper, 561.
251. *Ibid.*, 563.
252. C. Gauss to the Secretary of State, 16 September 1944, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File: China, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
253. *Ibid.*
254. Service, The Amerasia Papers, 69-70; "State Department Duty," 292.
255. Memorandum, Secretary Hull to President Roosevelt, 25 September 1944, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, 594.
256. Service, The Amerasia Papers, 161-62; Lost Chance in China, 247-49.
257. John Davies, "Will the Communists Take Over China?" 7 November 1944, Patrick Hurley Papers, Box 89, University of Oklahoma.
258. Service, "State Department Duty," 291.
259. Service, Lost Chance in China, 165; Kahn, The China Hands, 128-31. For a complete text, see also Amerasia Papers, 1014-17.
260. Service, "My Memorandum of October 10, 1944," 19 October 1949, John Service Papers, Box 1, Folder 48, Berkeley.
261. Service, Lost Chance in China, 329.
262. Service, "My Memorandum of October 10, 1944," 2. See also Service, The Amerasia Papers, 77-78.
263. Service, "State Department Duty," 292-93; Service, The Amerasia Papers, 74; Foreign Relations 1944, 185-86, 188-89.
264. Service, "My Memorandum of October 10, 1944," 3.
265. Service, Lost Chance in China, 331.
266. Service, "My Memorandum of October 10, 1944," 3.
267. Service, "State Department Duty," 299-300.
268. Caroline Interview, 78.

269. Franklin Roosevelt to Patrick Hurley; 18 August 1944, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File: China, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library; also see Barbara Gooden Mulch, "A Chinese Puzzle."
270. Patrick Hurley, For Secretary of State Only, 24 December 1944, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File, Box 27, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
271. See Lin Boqu, Dong Biwu, and Wang Ruofei to Mao Zedong, 5 June 1944; Li Xianian, Ren Zhishan, Chen Shaomin to Mao Zedong, in Niu Jun, Cong Yanan Zouxiang Shijie, 148.
272. Mao Zedong to Li Xiannian, etc., 19 Junly 1944, in Niu Jun, Cong Yanan Zouxiang Shijie.
273. Kubek, The Amerasia Papers, 791.
274. Niu, Cong Yanan Zouxiang Shijie, 147; Jin, Zhou Enlai Zhuan, 567; Zhou Enlai Nianpu, 581.
275. Jin, Zhou Enlai Zhuan, 567.
276. See, for example, CCP leader Lin Boqu's statement on the issue of coalition government carried by Jiefang Ribao [Jiefang daily] on 22 September 1944.
277. Political Information: Meeting of the Constitutional Promotion Association, 2 October 1944, RG 226, Records of the Office of Strategic Services 117970, National Archives.
278. Zhou Enlai Nianpu, 585.
279. Ibid., 585.
280. Private Conversation with Chou En-lai, 17 November 1944, RG 226, Records of the Office of Strategic Services 109244, National Archives.
281. Jin Chongji, Zhou Enlai Zhuan, 568.
282. Davies, "The China Hands in Practice," 46.
283. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 56-59; Zhou Enlai Nianpu, 586-87.
284. For the American record of the Hurley-CCP negotiations, see Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, 679-85.
285. Hurley, For Secretary of State Only, 24 December 1944, 8.
286. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 64.

287. Zhou Enlai Nianpu, 587.
288. Mao Tze-tung to President Roosevelt, 10 November 1944; and President Roosevelt to Mao Tze-tung, 10 March 1945, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File, Box 27, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
289. Ibid.
290. President Roosevelt to Mao Tze-tung, 10 March 1945, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File: China, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
291. Zhong Mei Guanxi Ziliao Huibian [Collection of documents on Sino-American relations] (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Press, 1957), 142; and Wang Bangxian, "Lun Taipingyang Zhanzheng Siqi Meiguo Zhengfu yu Zhongguo Gongcandang de guanxi" [Relations between the United States government and the Chinese Communist Party during the pacific war], in Wang Xi, Zhong Mei Guanxi Shi Luncong, 366; Zi, Meiguo Duihua Zhengce, 52.
292. Jin, Zhou Enlai Zhuan, 574-77.
293. Ibid., 576-77; Zhou Enlai Nianpu, 588-89.
294. Hurley, For Secretary of State Only, 26 December 1944, 7.
295. Jin, Zhou Enlai Zhuan, 77.
296. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 71; Niu, Cong Yanan Zouxiang Shijie, 155.
297. Niu, Cong Yanan Zouxiang Shijie, 157.
298. Zhou Enlai Nianpu, 593.
299. Don Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1956), 318.
300. Patrick Hurley, Memorandum for the President, 4 January 1945, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File: China, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
301. Top Secret to Wedmeyer for Dickey from Evens SGD Cromley, date undetermined, Hurley Papers, Box 98, Folder 1, University of Oklahoma.
302. MacKinnon and Friesen, China Reporting, 146.
303. Service, "State Department Duty," 309.
304. Service, "Chou En-lai."

305. Mao Tse-tung to Patrick J. Hurley, 11 January 1945; Patrick Hurley to Chairman Mao, 20 January 1945, Patrick Hurley Papers, Box 98, Folder 1, University of Oklahoma.
306. Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, 28 January 1944, quoted in Niu Jun, Cong Yanan Zouxiang Shijie, 157; Zhou Enlai Nianpu, 598.
307. Jin, Zhou Enlai Zhuan, 583.
308. Mao, Selected Works of Mao Zedong, 1151-159.
309. Edgar Snow, Journey to the Beginning (New York: Random House, 1958), 347.
310. Davies, Dragon by the Tail, 361-62; Mulch, "A Chinese Puzzle," 77.
311. John Davies, "The Chinese Communists and the Great Powers," 7 November 1944, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, VI, 668.
312. John Davies, "China and the Kremlin," 4 January 1945, State Department Decimal File, 893.00/1-445, National Archives.
313. Ibid.
314. Service, "State Department Duty," 300.
315. Mulch, "A Chinese Puzzle," 111.
316. Service, "State Department Duty," 304; Zhou Enlai Nianpu, 602.
317. Service, Lost Chance in China, 332.
318. John Service to John Davies, 19 February 1944, in Service, "State Department Duty," 306a
319. Service, The Amerasia Papers, 186-87.
320. R. P. Ludden and John Service, "Military Weakness of Our Far Eastern Policy," 14 February 1945, Hurley Papers, Box 91, Folder 3, University of Oklahoma; Service, Lost Chance in China, 355-58.
321. Service, Lost Chance in China, 343.
322. Ibid., 344.
323. Telegram from George Atcheson to the Secretary of State, 28 February 1945, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File, Box 27, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, 242-46; Service, The Amerasia papers, 110.
324. Telegram from George Atcheson to the Secretary of State, 28 February 1945.

325. Memorandum for the President from the Acting Secretary of State, 2 March 1945, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File: China, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library; also Service, Amerasia Papers, 109, 188.
326. Service, Lost Chance in China, 366.
327. Ibid., 378.
328. Ibid., 350.
329. Ibid., 351 and 353.
330. Huang Qijun, "The Process of Restoring Electronic Communication between the Party and the Comintern in 1935-36," Dangshi Yanjiu 2 (1987): 23, quoted in Sheng, "The Triumph of Internationalism," 98.
331. Service, Lost Chance in China, 352.
332. For example, Mao talked with Vladimirov on 24 March 1945 about CCP-GMD negotiations. See Vladimirov, The Vladimirov Diaries, 373.
333. Service, The Amerasia Papers, 169.
334. Ibid., 183.
335. John Service testimony, 21 July 1971, in Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Evolution of U.S. Policy toward Mainland China, Executive Hearings, July 1971; quoted in Bagby, The Eagle-Dragon Alliance, 118-19.
336. Bagby, Eagle-Dragon Alliance, 119.
337. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 46.
338. Vladimirov, The Vladimirov Diaries, 25 September 1944, quoted in Bagby, The Eagle-Dragon Alliance, 122.
339. Ibid., 377.
340. Ibid., 379.
341. Service, Reading Notes, 10.
342. Service, Lost Chance in China, 379; Zhou Enlai Nianpu, 606.
343. Telegram: Chinese Press Comment on Ambassador Hurley's Press Conference of 2, 9 April 1945, Hurley Papers, Box 98, Folder 5, University of Oklahoma.
344. Niu, Cong Yanan Zouxiang Shijie, 163-66; Peterkin, Inside China, 89.

345. “Mao Zedong Wei Huansong Xu Xiangqian de Yanhui Shang de Jianghua” [Mao Zedong’s speech at the farewell banquet for general Xu Xiangqian], quoted in He Di, “The Most Respected Enemy,” 147.

346. Service, Amerasia Papers, 191-92.

CONCLUSION

*The ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the government of the United States. Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capacity could have changed that result; nothing that was left undone by this country has contributed to it.*¹

-----Dean Acheson

*It just happens, I think, that history has proved that my recommendations were generally right. But by the time I left, I had become very much involved in China in what was going on there, and in the policy options for America, so that it had probably compromised my impartiality.*²

-----John Service

Starting off as a non-career Foreign Service officer in 1933 and ending up as a second secretary and experienced political reporter in 1945, John Service's story mirrored a unique American experience in turbulent and transitional China. Born and raised in China, he spent nearly three decades in that country, chasing his youthful dreams and pursuing his diplomatic career. His personal qualities and professional approach, so critical to his life and career, were deeply rooted in his missionary family heritage and his dual American-Chinese experience. An American boy brought up in insulated foreign compounds in the Chinese neighborhood, he was often haunted by a strong sense of not belonging to either America or China. Yet, sheltered life did not shield him from an earnest quest for human understanding; he grew passionately attached to both his native country and his birth place and drew strength from them.

Like his missionary father, he was deeply involved in China and devoted much of his energy to its remaking. His zealous search for better solutions for the troubled China and potent American interests there brought him to the center stage of Sino-American discourse during World War II.

A Foreign Service officer working as a field observer and political reporter, Service played an important role in wartime Sino-American relations. Among China watchers, he was better equipped than most to observe revolutionary changes in that country during the 1930s and 1940s. Fluent in the Sichuan dialect and Mandarin Chinese, he was able to mingle easily and to understand local people; like a “supercharged atom,” his inexhaustible energy brought him to Chongqing streets, southwestern mountains, northwestern frontiers, and Yanan caves. He was distinct in many ways--at a time when most Westerners were exhilarated with privileges, he was proud to “go native;” when many career diplomats were seeking to transfer to more comfortable and less tangled places, he volunteered for remote locations and difficult assignments. His profound knowledge of China, his broad contacts with various people, his keen observations of domestic Chinese politics, his genuine concern of China's deteriorating wartime conditions, and, particularly, his vigorous policy recommendations for American influence in China did not charm the Chinese government but endeared him to like-minded Americans and progressive Chinese. His political reports and policy recommendations, which concentrated on the problems of the Chinese Communists and Nationalists and the most appropriate U.S. response to China's civil strife, not only contributed to a higher level of American

understanding of China but also resulted in one of the bitterest debates over America's China policy.

Wartime Sino-American relations followed a pattern of promise and disillusionment. With American advisers attached to the Chinese government and Chinese officials canvassing the White House, the two countries cooperated in political, economic, and military fields. Sino-American strategic and military cooperation brought China much needed military aid and made it one of the "big four;" it also promised America a loyal ally and firm foothold in postwar Asia. But despite their sincere efforts, wide historical and cultural gaps prevented Sino-American relations from developing into an effective wartime alliance. The two countries' uneasy wartime partnership turned into postwar hostility following the Chinese Communist victory. And the historic chance of close U.S.-China relations Service and others had worked hard to grasp slipped away before the helpless eyes of contemporary participants and observers.

What went wrong? Had America "lost China" by failing to support Chiang in his struggle against the Communists, as McCarthy, Kubek, and others claimed? Did America simply lose a chance in China by refusing to cooperate with the Communists in 1944-45, as Service argued? Or, was America's "lost chance" for better relations with the CCP merely a "myth," as Sheng and others have insisted? Was it true, rather, that America bore no responsibility for what happened in China, for it had done everything possible to improve the situation, as Secretary of State Dean Acheson explained?³

Close examination, in previous chapters, of wartime relations between the United States and China and particularly Service's active involvement, has clearly shown that the "American failure" in China was real and inevitable; it was caused by China's deep-seated problems and America's impractical approach to the Chinese reality, and by both nations' inability to adapt quickly to the new conditions of wartime partnership from an old marginal and unequal relationship. Given the mounting wartime difficulties and sharp cultural-political differences between the two countries, America's failure in China seemed beyond its control. But the U.S.'s wartime undertakings in that country, from Stilwell's caustic relations with Chiang to Hurley's insensitive dealings with the CCP, not only added more difficulties to Chiang's government, but also planted seeds of distrust among the CCP leaders, contributing to the destruction of America's professed policy of a strong, united, and pro-American China. It is evident that the lasting debate over whether America "lost China" or suffered a "lost chance" in China has had less meaning than the inquiry on America's failure in that country.

Wartime China was caught at a historical crossroads between the crumbling old imperialist system of unequal treaties and the emerging new world order of national self-determination. Suffering from prolonged political instability and profound economic deficiencies, China presented itself and Sino-American relations with a set of acute tests. As the war dragged on, the Chinese government was laden with problems, both old and new. Chiang's determination to drive Japan out of China and prevent communism from spreading in the country put himself and the GMD

government in a suicidal war with two powerful enemies on both military and political fronts.⁴ His inability to deal effectively with the menacing Japanese invasion or the expanding Communist influence doomed him; but Chiang was not to give up. Regarding himself as the embodiment and driving spirit of a new nationalist China and having come to power through an insurrectionary path, he ardently refused to compromise his power for China's uncertain democratic future, as demanded both by his Communist enemies and his American friends. His lack of understanding of and incapability to deal with the pivotal problems facing millions of peasants and his heavy reliance on the fragile coastal commercial base and business elite further alienated him from the masses. Suffering from military inadequacy, Chiang's government cast high hopes for U.S. military aid and, at the same time, reduced itself to being dependent on American support.

The Chinese government was gradually caught on the horns of dilemma with the non-stoppable Japanese invasion, the expanding Chinese communist movement, the mounting discontent of the people, and the irresistible American pressure for more active war efforts and a greater responsive domestic policy. After exhausting struggles in the War of Resistance, the GMD government helplessly found itself besieged on all sides. Chiang's tragedy lay in his failure to understand the Chinese Communist movement as a desperate response to China's deep-seated social problems and to turn it to his advantage, in his unwillingness to compromise his power for popular demands to reform his government into a representative mechanism, and in his ineptitude to defy international forces, either an invading enemy or pushy friend.

Chiang's failure was, to a large extent, China's tragedy. When fundamental political differences and bitter military struggle prevented the two parties from achieving their common goals of national unity and prosperity, the nation was dragged into a bitter civil war and immeasurable miseries.

Even though Chiang's catastrophic defeat in the subsequent civil war was largely his own making, America's China policy undoubtedly contributed to his demise. In contrast to its professed policy of noninterference in China's internal affairs,⁵ the United States was more deeply involved in internal Chinese politics than it was in the domestic politics of any other country.⁶ Despite its low strategic priority, America had a clear agenda for China--to support a strong, united, democratic, and pro-American government. Concerned with China's problems and U.S. interests in that country, progressive Americans made genuine efforts to reach solutions compatible with their own experiences. They could not believe that China was capable of finding its own rightful path; unless uplifted, many were convinced that China would continue to fall. Despite the sharply contrasted political cultures of the two nations--with one triumphantly pursuing its continued march toward twentieth-century Manifest Destiny and the other struggling to stand up after more than a century of humiliation and defeat--Americans were determined, as a basis for American support, to remake China according to America's expectations and standards. Therefore, its non-interventionist tendencies gave way to a policy of deep involvement and friendly intervention.

During latter part of the war, as the situation in China was deteriorating,

America's chief concern in China turned more to politics than warfare. In addition to effective execution of the war, two related political issues--unity and democratic reform--became persistent themes of America's China policy, as reflected in the advocacies of Foreign Service officers and in Washington's diplomacy.

To achieve Chinese unity, Roosevelt approved the request for a complete American command of the Chinese army which resulted in the damaging Stilwell crisis. He was also ready to work with two "governments" in China, the GMD and the CCP, which opened the door for the Dixie Mission. Indeed, the president insisted, "I've been working with two governments there. I intend to go on doing so."⁷ At Cairo, when Chiang asked for American support against a potential British move to reestablish an imperial order in Shanghai, Hong Kong, and other Chinese territories, Roosevelt made it clear that America's support could not be "for nothing," the condition was government reform and cooperation with the Communists. He frankly complained about the character of Chiang's government, which, he told Chiang, "was hardly the modern democracy that ideally it should be."⁸ To "straighten out the mess of internal Chinese politics," he dispatched Hurley to China in August 1944.⁹ Based on recommendations by Service and others, the State Department meanwhile decided to follow a policy of guiding China along "democratic, cooperative paths,"¹⁰ and seeking a possible "alternative solution" to cure "China's ill."¹¹

Service disliked the old paternalistic and patronizing attitude held by missionaries in their effort to reshape China according to America's wishes. He, nevertheless, advocated a new policy following an even more vigorous interventionist

line than the missionaries had tried. While straying away from his religious roots, he inherited from his father the passionate zeal for improving China and uplifting its masses. Ignoring Chiang's claim that China's democracy must be its own and liberty and freedom for the nation must come first,¹² he warned Washington policy makers that hands-off would not work because China's problems had become America's own. His numerous reports and policy recommendations reflected a consistent theme: China's unsatisfactory war effect and deteriorating socioeconomic conditions were caused by the corrupt and reactionary GMD government led by Chiang Kai-shek, whose anti-Communist agenda had prevented it from reaching an agreement with the progressive and popularly-supported CCP. Service strongly advocated an active American involvement in China: pressuring Chiang to reform while establishing contacts with opposition groups, particularly the Chinese Communists.¹³

Unlike the old school diplomats who had opposed interference in the domestic affairs of other nations, Service insisted that it was in America's interest to promote political changes in China, a policy not merely made in Washington but based on realistic assessments from the field. In late 1944, when the hope for inducing the Chinese government to reform was diminishing under Chiang's strong resistance, Service recommended that America chose the winning side, the CCP, in China's political power struggle. In early 1945, when the highly hoped for U.S.-CCP cooperation turned to faultfinding and dismay, he sent his last wartime appeal for direct American influence in China: "Whether we like it or not, by our very presence here we have become a force in the internal politics of China and that force should be

used to accomplish our primary mission."¹⁴

Apparently uneasy with the ethical dilemma created by his personal distaste for the old paternalism in conflict with his new progressive notion of what was good for China, Service explained in 1971 that his "proposal for active political intervention may have seemed more of a departure in 1944 from customary, old fashioned, hands-off diplomacy than it seems today. But it was certainly a less direct form of intervention than seeking American command of the Chinese armies."¹⁵ He contended that his interventionist recommendations were "not very different in substance from the rather hopeful statements of the long-range policy the State Department itself was drafting in 1944 and 1945."¹⁶ Despite the professed similarities, Service's dealings with the Chinese government was more in tune with Stilwell, who, for the sake of China's future, would not mind of "racking" the "rotten" ship while Roosevelt was attempting to fix it.

It was the Communist issue that mostly dominated Service's concerns and which would bring him both fame and misfortune. Though a noncommunist in affiliation and outlook, reporting on the Chinese Communists and their relations with the GMD not only became his passion but also a "careerist decision," which helped him to be "noticed" and get "advancement" in the Foreign Service.¹⁷ He was chief among laborious bridge builders who connected Washington and the CCP on a higher level. His numerous reports on the CCP and its relations with the ruling GMD were widely circulated in the State Department and frequently read by the president. He worked to build close ties and mutual trust with members of the CCP by maintaining

close contacts with Zhou Enlai and other CCP representatives in Chongqing and winning confidence from CCP leaders in Yanan. His constructive undertaking in dealing with the CCP would become part of the foundation of Sino-American rapprochement in the early 1970's.

To understand the growing strength of the CCP and its implications for America's interests in China, he fought vigorously for an official American observer's mission to the "rebel" Communist areas. Under the sunny skies of Yanan and in the dingy caves of Mao Zedong, Service tirelessly sought to comprehend those Communists who displayed a simple style and a strong sense of purpose. He understood their long-range political goals but chose to emphasize their short-term democratic objectives. While intolerant of GMD conduct, he was patient with the Communists' undertaking. He reported favorably on CCP's popularity, its democratic reforms, and its revolutionary outlook, all of which were challenging to the GMD government, increasingly corrupt and unpopular. While advocating greater American flexibility and realism toward Chiang and the GMD government, Service was not ready to compromise his own stance on the issue of Chinese Communists. When Barrett pointed out Service's strong tendency to favor the CCP and be utterly critical of the GMD, Service replied: "What I have written in these reports and the recommendations I have made are my own observations and carefully considered opinions. If they don't like them in Washington, they can throw them out."¹⁸

With wartime unity disintegrating by 1945, Service's advocacy of cooperating with the Chinese Communists further lost favor. After Service was recalled on 30

March 1945, the Communists lost an enthusiastic sympathizer. With Service's arrest in June in the Amerasia case, their hope for American cooperation was further diminished. During the following years, Americans made a last attempt to help bring the rival parties, the GMD and CCP together, but they watched helplessly as the civil war unfolded from 1946-49.

The 1949 Communist victory in China destroyed the American hope of continuing a positive Sino-American relationship. Calling the Chinese Communist win an American "loss," frustrated Americans immediately searched for defects in their China policy. In addition to concentrated attention from the news media, the State Department held lengthy seminars to examine America's failure in China.¹⁹ Service and his political reports soon became the prime target of the "loss of China" ordeal. McCarthyists accused Service and other "China hands" of being guilty of committing the "China crime" by promoting the Communists and betraying the Nationalists; they charged Service with subversion, or at least naivete and error, of being taken in easily by the CCP's propaganda tactics and United Front maneuvers.²⁰

All of these tangled considerations still leave the historian with the necessity of seeking to judge Service's role in the development of U.S.-China relations during World War II and beyond. His earnest supporters called him "visionary," "record-breaker," and "detached observer;"²¹ arguing that if America had adopted a cooperative approach toward the CCP as he suggested, it would have had a favorable base in China and the world would become less complicated.²² Critics, of course, disagreed on every count.

Despite his progressive outlook, Service's pro-Communist views, like his anti-GMD sentiments, were essentially non-ideological;²³ they stemmed largely from his on-sight observations of China's wartime problems, his open-minded search for solutions, and his humanistic concern for China's impoverished millions. His reports on the CCP as well as the GMD reflected the corroding Nationalist government and the expanding Communist party. His suggestions that America cooperate with the Communists in 1944-45 were not as unnatural and risky as they would appear later in Cold War politics; in reality, many of his conservative colleagues drew similar conclusions. He explained in 1992 that he was not afraid of Communism and "was willing to look at all views without any terrible strong sense of [his] own;" and that there was "a widely distorted, unrealistic prejudice, fear of communism" in the United States.²⁴

It is evident that, as one of the few Americans who had a comprehensive understanding of China and its problems, Service's assessment of Chinese politics and his analysis of the declining GMD power proved sound judgments. His prediction of a Chinese civil war and the CCP's rise to power withstood the test of time. In contrast to the "lost China" theory, or the emerging "no chance" argument, his belief that America might have a last chance to avoid total hostility in China if it supported the Communists in 1944-45 has been more persuasive. In 1944 and early 1945 the CCP was thirsty for political legitimacy and international recognition and eagerly reached out for American aid. Its military, though rapidly expanding, consisted of about half a million men in the summer of 1944, as compared to nearly one million at the end of

the war. The Soviet Union had not had much influence in China. If the United States ever had a chance to develop a better relationship with the Chinese Communists, the best opportunity would have been in 1944-45.

Despite his objective attempts, Service's passionate involvement in China prevented him from becoming a detached observer. And his vigorous policy recommendations that America guide China toward Western democracy and that the United States establish friendly relations with the CCP, though they might have changed post-war Sino-Americans and reversed the power distribution in Asia, were nonetheless impractical, for neither Chiang's stern nationalist sentiments nor America's long anti-Communist standing would allow their realization.

America had tried, for both its own and China's interests, to change China by pressuring Chiang and his government to reform; however, the effort ended in frustration on both sides. China was simply too complex and Chiang was still too strong for America's forced intervention, as amply demonstrated in the Stilwell crisis. If nationalist feelings propelled Chiang's ardent resistance to American pressure, the same nationalistic sentiment prompted Mao Zedong to take a dramatic turn from a sincere hope for U.S. cooperation to infuriation and anger at Hurley and America's "imperialist" dealings with China. In the end, the promising Sino-American discourse produced a history of disillusionment, one in which every party involved--the GMD, the CCP, and the U.S.--despite their genuine efforts, suffered a disastrous loss. It is evident that profound socio-economic problems in China were bound to generate a revolution, and the CCP-GMD struggle to control this revolutionary course had to be

decided from within. To China's deep-seated and complex domestic problems, there was simply no American solution.

China proved a political grave to many deeply immersed in its affairs. Service's China story, like his father's, was both tragic and triumphant. Like his father, he committed his life and energy to his chosen pursuit and was good at what he did, but his career was ruined when his vigorous attempts to reform China and influence America's China policy ran counter to Cold War politics. Unlike his father who never got a chance to recover from the deadly blow of career loss in the YMCA, however, Service was content to "let history judge"²⁵ his work in China and lived long enough to see his role in China's "loss" be judged in far calmer and more reasoned terms.

ENDNOTES

1. Department of State, The China White Paper, vi.
2. Service, "State Department Duty," 1981, 297.
3. The China White Paper, vi.
4. Qin, Zhonghua Minguo Zhongyao Shiliao Chubian: Dui Ri Kangzhan Shiqi, 558.
5. The China White Paper, vi.
6. Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics, vii.
7. Edgar Snow, Journey to the Beginning (New York: Random House, 1958), 349.
8. Elliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946), 164.
9. May, China Scapegoat, 1.
10. Draft of Telegram to Ambassador Gauss, 7 September 1944; State Department analysis of the Chinese situation, 9 August 1944, Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's Files: China, Box 27, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
11. Memo by Chief of Chinese Affairs Division, 1 March 1945, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, 248.
12. Chiang Kai-shek, "China's March toward Democracy," Closing Address to the 3rd Plenary Session of the 1st PPC, Chongqing, 21 February 1939. Quoted in Wu, "A Rhetorical Analysis of Selected Speeches by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek," 170. Despite constantly referred by American observers as a reactionary, Chiang had always regarded himself as a revolutionary. His revolution, however, in his own words, "lies in [the] search for freedom and equality for China." See Chiang, "Wei Zhonggong Xuanyan Tanhua," [Statement on the Chinese Communist manifesto], in Zhai and Lu, Kangzhan Minglun Ji.
13. Service, Lost Chance in China, 162-65.
14. R.P. Ludden and John Service, "Military Weakness of Our far Eastern Policy," 14 February 1945, Hurley Papers, Box 91, Folder 3, University of Oklahoma.
15. Service, The Amerasia Papers, 144.
16. Ibid.

17. Service, Lost Chance in China, 169.
18. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 46.
19. Nelson Johnson, Memorandum for Conference, 28 September 1949, Box 69, 22, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
20. New York Times, 28 June 1950, 22; Vandenberg, The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, 535.
21. Nathaniel Petter to Conrad Snow, 11 May 1950, John Service Papers, Box 1, Folder 2, Berkeley.
22. Service, Amerasia Papers, 191.
23. Service, "State Department Duty," i.
24. Service, interview with author, 14 May 1992.
25. John Service to the editor of Berkeley Daily Gazette, 11 December 1954, John Service Papers, Box 1, Berkeley.

AFTERWARD

As one follows Jack Service's career through thick and thin, it becomes evident that the same qualities that made him the preeminent bearer of bad tidings also equipped him to survive the attack on him that the bad tidings evoke.¹

-----John K. Fairbank

I wouldn't necessarily want to go through it all again though. I would say it's been an exciting life. Maybe not all a good life. But ended up very well.²

-----John S. Service

John Service's arrest in June 1945 in association with the Amerasia case triggered an electrifying reaction among his associates at home and abroad; his trial became an even more sensational and high profile story. It aroused great political interest in both China and the United States, from the White House to the State Department and from the GMD government to the CCP headquarters. After his arrest, Service went to White House secretary Laughlin Currie, to whom he had furnished field reports since 1942, for help and advise. Currie referred Service to Tommy Corcoran, the all influential and trusted adviser of the late president, "one of the greatest powers behind the Washington scene."³

The Service case created great anxieties for all concerned. Though most of the like-minded "China hands" were "Hurleyed out," his trial was still likely to affect such people on his side as Gauss, Vincent, and Stilwell. The U.S. government also

had a high stake in his case--Washington was involved in mediating the GMD-CCP conflict for a coalition government, and did not want a highly publicized trial to spotlight its China dilemma. The Chinese government, already felt harmed by the unfriendly media, had a strong interest in avoiding more public controversies over Chinese affairs in the United States.

Well connected with the White House and closely related to the Chinese government through T.V. Soong, Corcoran apparently managed the issue on both Washington's and Chongqing's behalf. He convinced Service that avoiding being indicted was the best solution for his own career and for the sake of others. He advised Service to waive immunity and go before the grand jury and the Department of Justice to present his case and plead his innocence. It worked. Helped by the White House's behind-the-scene maneuvering, Service was able to talk to the newly-appointed attorney general, Tom Clark. His personable approach and eloquent manner convinced the twenty individuals on the grand jury panel. They voted unanimously in his favor.

Service's clearance in the Amerasia case, however, did not end government scrutiny and his ordeal continued. From 1945 to 1951, loyalty and security investigations and hearings became frequent events for Service. Despite repeated clearances in 1946, 1947, 1949, and 1950, the specter that haunted him would not go away. In 1951, with accusations from Senator Joseph McCarthy and opposition from the China Lobby, Service was investigated by the Civil Service Loyalty Review

Board. On 13 December, based on the Board's ruling of "reasonable doubt as to his loyalty," Secretary of State Dean Acheson dismissed him. Suffering from job loss and disgrace, Service managed to survive and succeed. While working for an engineering firm, he tirelessly fought for his honor and career. After six long years, he won his case before the Supreme Court, which ruled unanimously in 1957 that his discharge from the State Department was illegal. He resumed his career in the Foreign Service and restored full security clearance in 1959.⁴ After twenty-nine years of service in the State Department, he retired to his home in Berkeley in 1962 and started a new life and career there. In two years he earned his Master's degree while working at the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of California, Berkeley.

In 1971, when the Cold War ice began to melt and both the United States and China sought ways to bring about rapprochement, Service was invited by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai to return to the land of his birth as an honored guest of the People's Republic of China. The forty-six-day tour was an extraordinary experience. Much had changed. Old things were gone, even his father's grave was nowhere in sight. The familiar Yanan caves had been turned into history museums; and his close CCP friends had become distant national leaders. He was nonetheless content and optimistic:

Things are getting better in China all the time. Chinese Communism is an old type of Communism. . . . The people have a lot better life than they've had before, and government is really concerned about the great mass of people. Sure, the intellectuals and other groups have suffered, but insofar as the great

majority of people are concerned, all they know is they're a lot better off than they ever were."⁵

He was perhaps still trying to find an explanation or perhaps an excuse for things. After those trying years his sympathies still "tended to be with China."⁶ Honored by the American Foreign Service Association on 30 January 1973, his troubled diplomatic career ended in great recognition and high honor.⁷ In 1977 he received an honorary degree Doctor of Laws from Oberlin College, his Alma Mater.⁸

The scrutiny of and attack on Service not only made this unpretentious diplomat an infamous headline figure, but a strong and more tolerant individual. Despite years of political and legal struggle and endurance, Service, in John K. Fairbank's words, "survived intact and [his] story is a triumph."⁹ Looking back at his diplomatic career in war-torn China, the strenuous ordeal during the McCarthy era, and his gratifying years after retirement, Service emerged not bitter but optimistic. Like his father, he was proud and pleased to see his own son pursuing his chosen career--the Foreign Service. "If by some miracle, the clock could be turned back and I had my life to relive," he exclaimed in 1973, "I would still wish to be a Foreign Service officer."¹⁰

ENDNOTES

1. Service, "State Department Duty," iii.
2. Ibid., 515.
3. Fulton Lewis' Broadcast, 3 November 1950, John Service Papers, Box 1, Folder 24, Berkeley.
4. "John S. Service vs. John Foster Dulles," Supreme Court of the United States, in John Service Papers, Independence.
5. Lloyd Shearer, "Nixon's Trip to China: What Can We Expect?" Akron Beacon Journal, 20 February 1972, 9.
6. Service, "State Department Duty," 511.
7. "Some Questions for John Steward Service," in Service, "State Department Duty," 491a.
8. John Service Files, Alumni Association, Oberlin College.
9. Service, "State Department Duty," iv.
10. Service, "Foreign Service Reporting," Foreign Service Journal (March 1973), 22.

Appendix A

JOHN S. SERVICE: CHRONOLOGY OF ACTIVITIES AND EVENTS

Based mainly on: (1) John S. Service, "State Department Duty in China, The McCarthy Era, and After, 1933-1977," an oral history conducted 1977-1978 by Rosemary Levenson, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1981. (2) E.J. Kahn. "Profiles: Foresight, Nightmare, and Hindsight," The New Yorker, 8 April 1972, 43-95. (3) John Service File, Alumni Association, Oberlin College, Ohio. (4) Chronology of Events, John Service Papers, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

I. CHILDHOOD AND EDUCATION: 1909-1932

ACTIVITIES OF JOHN S. SERVICE	MAJOR HISTORICAL EVENTS
3 Aug. 1909: Born in Chengdu, China to Robert Roy and Grace Boggs Service	1908-11: The last emperor of China, Pu Yi, on the throne
1915: Completed 1 st grade in Cleveland, OH while parents were on a one-year leave in the States	1911: The Republican Revolution overthrew the Manchu Dynasty and established the Republic of China
1920-24: Attending the Shanghai American School after finished elementary education through home schooling	4 May 1919: May Fourth Movement 1 Jul. 1921: The founding of the Chinese Communist Party
1924-26: Working for a Shanghai architectural firm designing buildings for the YMCA	20 Jan. 1924: National Congress of Guomindang and formation of the 1 st GMD-CCP United Front
1927-31: Attending Oberlin College majoring in economics	9 July 1926: Official launch of the Northern Expedition 12 Apr. 1927: GMD-CCP split and start of the "1 st Revolutionary Civil War"
1931-32: One-year post-graduate study in art history at Oberlin College	18 Sept. 1931: Manchuria Incident and Japanese occupation of Northeast China

II. FOREIGN SERVICE CAREER: 1932-1941

ACTIVITIES OF JOHN S. SERVICE		MAJOR HISTORICAL EVENTS	
Sept. 1932:	Passed Foreign Service exams after taking preparation courses at University of California, Berkeley		
Apr. 1933:	Back in Shanghai, China; worked for the American Bank of Shanghai while awaiting assignment		
Jul. 1933:	Started working as a clerk at the American Consulate in Kunming	Oct. 1933:	Chiang launched 5 th Extermination Campaign against the CCP
7 Jul. 1934:	Promoted to non-career vice counsel	5 Oct. 1934:	Communist Red Army started the historic Long March
1935:	Commissioned a Foreign Service officer and began two-year language training in Beijing	15-18 Jan. 1935:	Zunyi Conference established Mao's leadership within CCP
		12 Dec. 1936:	Xian Incident & formation of the 2 nd GMD-CCP United Front
1937:	Started to work at the American Consulate in Shanghai	7 Jul. 1937:	Logou Qiao Incident and War of Resistance broke out
		13 Aug. 1937:	Shanghai Campaign
18 Apr. 1941:	Transferred from Shanghai to Chongqing	Dec. 1939 to Mar. 1940:	"1 st anti-Communist upsurge"
		Jan. 1941:	the New Fourth Army Incident

III. FOREIGN SERVICE CAREER: 1941-1945

ACTIVITIES OF JOHN S. SERVICE		MAJOR HISTORICAL EVENTS	
May 1941:	Joined the American Embassy staff in Chongqing, and was assigned to gather intelligence on CCP after Pearl Harbor	Feb. 1941:	Currie's mission to China
		May 1941:	Lend-Lease to China
Dec. 1941 to Jan. 1942:	Trip to Rangoon and returned to Chongqing via Burma Road	7 Dec. 1941:	Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
Apr.-Nov. 1942:	Trip through unoccupied China as an observer for the American Embassy	1 Jan. 1942:	United Nations Declaration
		Mar. 1942:	Stilwell arrived in Chongqing to be Chiang's chief of staff
		Mar-May 1942:	1 st Burma Campaign
22 Nov. 1942:	Interviewed CCP representatives Zhou Enlai, Lin Biao	Jul. 1942:	Currie's 2 nd visit to China
		Oct. 1942:	Willkie's tour to China

ACTIVITIES OF JOHN S. SERVICE		MAJOR HISTORICAL EVENTS	
Nov. 1942 to Apr. 1943: 23 Jan. 1943:	Home leave in US and consultation in the State Department Memo suggesting to send American observers to Yanan	11 Jan. 1943:	U.S. & British renunciation of unequal rights in China
10 Aug. 1943:	Assigned to General Stilwell's staff as a political officer	1 Nov. 1943: 1 Dec. 1943:	Moscow Declaration and China was made one of the Big Four Cairo Declaration after Chiang met with Roosevelt and Churchill
22 Jul. 1944:	Arrived in Yanan as the only civilian member of the Dixie Mission; stayed in Yanan until October	Apr. 1944: Jun. 1944:	Japan launched the Ichigo offensive Henry Wallace visited China and reached agreement with Chiang on US Observer Group to Yanan
27 Aug. 1944:	Reported his eight-hour meeting with Mao Zedong to Stilwell	10 Aug. 1944:	Hurley appointed Roosevelt's personal representative to China
21 Oct. 1944:	Ordered back to US by Stilwell	19 Oct. 1944:	Stilwell recalled from China
Nov. 1944 to Jan. 1945:	Home leave in California	1 Nov. 1944: 7 Nov. 1944: 30 Nov. 1944:	Gauss resigned as Ambassador to China Hurley flew to Yanan to negotiate with CCP Hurley appointed Ambassador to China
2 Jan. 1945:	Ordered to Chongqing for detail to Wedemeyer	9 Jan. 1945:	Mao Zedong secretly proposed that he visit US for talk with Roosevelt
26 Feb. 1945:	Drafted Acheson telegram	11 Feb. 1945: 26 Feb. 1945:	Yalta Agreement on Far East Acheson telegram to State Department recommending arms to Communists
4 Mar. 1945:	Returned to Yanan as an observer		
12 Apr. 1945:	Back in Washington after being recalled from his 2 nd trip to Yanan by Ambassador Hurley	12 Apr. 1945:	Death of Roosevelt; Truman took office

IV. FOREIGN SERVICE CAREER: 1945-1962

ACTIVITIES OF JOHN S. SERVICE	MAJOR HISTORICAL EVENTS
6 Jun. 1945: Arrested by FBI agents in connection to the Amerasia case, while working in the China-affairs branch of the State Department	
12 Aug. 1945: Restored to active duty by the State Department after a federal grand jury refused to indict	14 Aug. 1945: Japanese surrender and end of World War II 28 Aug. 1945: Mao Zedong flew to Chongqing for negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek
22 Sept. 1945: Arrived in Tokyo, Japan to work in the diplomatic section of General MacArthur's headquarters	27 Nov. 1945: Hurley resigned as Ambassador; Marshall accepted mission of mediation in China
Sept. 1946: Posted to New Zealand	18 Apr. 1946 to 23 Oct. 1946: House Judiciary Subcommittee investigation of <u>Amerasia</u> case
Jan. 1949: Back to Washington to work in the Division of Foreign Service Planning of the State Department	1 Oct. 1949: Establishment of the People's Republic of China
Mar. 1950: Recalled to Washington while on his way to India to be Consul of the New Delhi Embassy	5 Jan 1950: Sen. McCarthy's attack on Service
9 Oct. 1950: Hearings before the Loyalty Security Board of the State Department found in Service's favor; the Senate Tydings Subcommittee's report was also favorable to Service	25 Oct. 1950: Chinese "Volunteers" entered the Korean War
13 Dec. 1951: President Truman's Loyalty Review Board announced "reasonable doubt" of Service's loyalty; Secretary of State Dean Acheson fired Service the following day	
1952-1956: Worked for the Sarco company for more than five years	1955: The 1 st Taiwan Strait Crisis
17 Jan. 1957: The Supreme Court found in Service's favor after hearing his case presented by Edward Rhetts 3 Jul. 1957: Restored to Foreign Service status as of 14 December 1951 Sept. 1957: Returned to the State Department to work at the Division of Transportation Management	1958: The 2 nd Taiwan Strait Crisis

1959:	Named as US Consul to Liverpool, England, with little chance of promotion and transfer	
-------	--	--

V. RETIREMENT: 1962-PRESENT

ACTIVITIES OF JOHN S. SERVICE		MAJOR HISTORICAL EVENTS
May 1962:	Chose early retirement and settled in Berkeley, California	
1964:	Finished M.A. in political science at UC-Berkeley; and started to work as library curator and Assistant Specialist for the Center for Chinese Studies	
1969:	Promoted to Specialist at UC-Berkeley	
May 1971:	Published monograph <u>The Amerasia Papers: Some Problems in the History of U.S.-China Relations</u>	Apr. 1971: "Ping-Pong diplomacy"
Jul. 1971:	Invited to testify before Senate Foreign Relations Committee	15 July 1971: Nixon announced upcoming visit to China
26 Sept. 1971:	Started a 45-day tour of China under Zhou Enlai's invitation	Oct. 1971: People's Republic of China admitted to the United Nations and replaced Republic of China (Taiwan) as permanent Security Council member
Jan. 1973:	Attended Foreign Service Association luncheon honoring McCarthy era victims	Feb. 1972: The Shanghai Communique normalized US-China relations during Nixon's visit
1975:	Testimony at Fulbright Hearings on normalizing relations with China Three-month tour of China	
29 May 1977:	Received honorary degree Doctor of Laws from Oberlin College	1 Jan. 1979: The United States restored full diplomatic relations with China
Present:	Peaceful retirement with wife Caroline in Oakland, CA	

Appendix B

LIST OF CHINESE TERMS

<i>PINYIN</i>	<i>WADE-GILES</i> <i>(or other traditional forms)</i>	<i>ENGLISH</i>	<i>CHINESE</i>
		Acheson, Dean	艾奇逊
		Amerasia Magazine	亚美杂志
Anhui	Anhwei		安徽
		Atcheson, George, Jr.	艾其森
		Bagby, Wesley M.	白卫理
Bai Chongxi	Pei Chung-hse		白崇禧
Bai Lu Ding		White Deer Mountain	白鹿顶
Balu Jun		Eighth Route Army	八路军
baozi			包子
		Barrett, David D.	包瑞德
Beijing	Peking, Peiping		北京 (北平)
		Borodin, Michail	鲍罗廷
		Braun, Otto	李德
		Byrnes, James F.	贝纳斯
Chen Bulei	Ch'en Pu-lei		陈布雷
Chen Cheng	Ch'en Ch'eng		陈诚
	Ch'en Chia-k'ang		
Chen Guofu	Ch'en Kuo-fu		陈果夫
Chen Jiakang	Ch'en Chia-k'ang		
Chen Lifu	Ch'en Li-fu		陈立夫
Chen Yi	Ch'en Yi		陈毅
Chengdu	Chengtu		成都
		Chennault, C.L.	陈纳德
	Chi Ch'ao-ting		
Chongqing	Chungking		重庆
	Chu Chia-hua		
Da Gong Bao	Ta Kung Pao		大公报
Dai Jitao	Tai Chi-tao		戴季陶
Dai Li	Tai Li		戴笠
Daoist	Taoist		道教徒
		Davies, John P	戴维斯
Dong Biwu	Tung Pi-wu		董必武

Dunhuang	Tunhuang		敦煌
		Emerson, John K.	艾默生
		Epstein, Israel	爱泼斯坦
		Fairbank, John King	费正清
Fang Xianjue			方先觉
feixin			费心
Feng Yuxiang	Feng Yu-hsiang		冯玉祥
Fujian	Fukian		福建
Gansu			甘肃
		Gauss, Clarence E.	高斯
Gong Ping	Kung Peng		
Guangxi	Kuangsi		广西
Guangzhou	Canton		广州
Guilin	Kwilin		桂林
Guizhou			贵州
Guomintang	Kuomintang		国民党
Han Deqin	Han Te-ch'in		韩德勤
Han Suyin	Han Su-yin		韩素音
Hankou	Hankow		汉口
He Yingqin	Ho Ying-chin		何应钦
		Hornbeck, Stanley	康勃克
Hebei	Hepei		河北
Henan	Honan		河南
		Hiss, Alger	希斯
Hu Shi	Hu Shih		胡适
Huang Fu			黄郛
Huang Hua	Huang Hua		黄华
Huangpu	Huang-p'u		黄埔
Huangqiao	Huangchiao		黄桥
Hubei	Hupei		湖北
		Hull, Cordell	赫尔
Hunan			湖南
		Hurley, Patrick J.	赫尔利
		Jessup, Philip	吉赛普
Jiading	Kiating		嘉定
Jialing			嘉陵
jian			间
Jiang Jieshi	Chiang Kai-shek		蒋介石
Jiang Jingguo	Chiang Chingkuo		蒋经国
Jiang Menglin	Chiang Mon-lin		蒋梦麟
Jiang Qing	Chiang Ch'ing		江青
Jiang Tingfu	T.F. Tsiang		蒋廷黻
Jiangxi	Kiangsi		江西
jiannei			溅内

Jiefang Ribao	Chieh-fang Jih-pao Libration Daily	解放日报
	Joffe	越飞
	Johnson, Nelson T.	詹森
	Judd, Walter H.	周以德
Jinsha		金沙
Kong Xiangxi	Kung, H.H.	孔祥熙
Kunming		昆明
Lanzhou		兰州
Lao Liu		老刘
Leng Xin		冷欣
Li Jishen	Li Chi Shen	李济琛
Li Zicheng		李自成
Lin Biao	Lin Piao	林彪
Lin Sen		林森
Lin Zuhan	Lin Tso-han	林祖涵
Liu Xiang	Liu Hsiang	刘湘
Liu Shaoqi	Liu Shao-chi	刘少奇
Liuzhou	Liuchow	柳州
Luoyang	Loyang	洛阳
Lugou Qiao		卢沟桥
Lung Yun		龙云
Ma Haide	Ma Hai-Teh	马海德
mantou		馒头
Manzhouguo	Manchukuo	满洲里
Mao Zedong	Mao Tse-tung	满洲国
		毛泽东
Ming		梅乐斯
Nanfang Ju		明
Nanjing	Nanking	南方局
		南京
Nie Rongzhen	Nieh Yung-chen	新四军
		聂荣臻
Pingjin		七七事变
Pingxing Guan		平津
		平型关
Pu Yi		政学系
Qing	Ching	溥仪
Qiao Guanhua	Ch'iao Kuan-hua	清
Quo Taiqi	Quo Tai-chi	乔冠华
Ren Bishi		郭泰祺
		任弼时
San Guan Miao	San Kuan Miao	卢亭
Sanmin Zhuyi		三观庙
		三民主义
	Service, John S.	谢伟思

Shaanxi	Shensi		陕西
Shang Zhen	Shang Chen		商震
Shandong	Shantung		山东
Shangguan Yunxiang	Shang-kuan Yun-hsing		上官云相
Shanghai	Shanghai		上海
Shanxi	Shansi		山西
Shenyang	Shen-yang	Mukden	沈阳
Sichuang	Szechuan		四川
		Snow, Edgar	斯诺
Song	Soong		宋
Song Zheyuan			宋哲元
Song Qingling	Soong Ching-ling		宋庆龄
Song Meiling	Soong Mayling		宋美龄
Song Ziwen	Soong, T. V.		宋子文
		Southwest Associated Univ.	西南联大
		Sprouse, Philip D.	石博思
		Stilwell, Joseph W.	史迪威
		Stuart, John Leighton	司徒雷登
Su Dongpo			苏东坡
Sui			隋
Sun Ke	Sun Fo		孙科
Sun Zhongshan	Sun Yat-Sen		孙中山
Suzhou	Su-chou		苏州
	Sze Sao-Ke Alfred		
Taibei	Taipei		台北
Taierzhuang	Tai-er-chuang		台儿庄
taitai			太太
Taiwan			台湾
Tang Enbo	Tany En-pai		汤恩伯
Tangu			塘沽
Tao Xisheng	Tao Hsi-sheng		陶希圣
Tianjin	Tientsin		天津
	Tsiang T'ing-fu		
Tushan			土山
		Vincent, John Carter	范宣德
		Wallace, Henry A	华莱士
Wang Bingnan			王炳南
Wang Chengting	Wang Cheng-t'ing		王正廷
Wang Chonghui	Wang Chung-hui		王宠惠
Wang Jingwei	Wang Ching-wei		汪精卫
		Wedemeyer, Albert C.	魏德迈
Wei Daoming	Wei Tao-ming		魏道明
Xia			夏
Xian	Sian		西安
Xiang Ying	Hsiang Ying		项英

Xinhua Ribao	Hsin Hua Jih Pao	新华日报
Xinjiang	Sinkiang	新疆
Xiong Shihui	Hsiung Shih-fei	熊式辉
Xiping Ba		西坪坝
Xue Yue	Hsueh Yueh	薛岳
Yan Huiqing	Yen, W.W.	颜惠庆
Yanan	Yenan	延安
yang guizi		洋鬼子
Yang Hucheng	Yang Hu-ch'eng	杨虎城
Yang Shangkun	Yang Shang-k'un	杨尚昆
yangge		秧歌
Yangzi	Yangtze	扬子 (长江)
Ye Ting	Yeh Ting	叶挺
Ye Jianying	Yeh Chien-ying	叶剑英
	Young, Arthur N.	杨格
Yunnan	Yunnan	云南
Zhang Guotao	Chang Kuo-t'ao	张国焘
Zhang Junmai	Chang Chun-mai	张君迈
Zhang Lan		张澜
Zhang Xueliang	Chang Hsueh-liang	张学良
Zhang Zhizhong	Chang Chih-chung	张治中
zhaodaiyuan		招待员
Zhongtiao Shan		中条山
Zhou Enlai	Chou En-lai	周恩来
Zhu De	Chu Teh	朱德
Zunyi	Tsunyi	遵义会议
Zuo Zongtang	Tso Tsung T'ang	左宗棠
	Chang, Carson	

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

I. English:

A. Personal Papers and Interviews:

Caroline Service. An oral history conducted in 1977-1978 by Rosemary Levenson. Regional Oral History Office, the Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1981.

China-India-Burma Theater (Wedemeyer) Papers. Federal Records Center, Suitland, MD.

David Barrett Reports. Federal Records Center, Suitland, MD.

Dixie Mission Papers. Modern Military Records, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (from Wesley M. Bagby Collection).

Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers: Official File; President Personal File; President's Secretary's File; Map Room File. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY.

Harry S. Truman Papers. The Harry S Truman Library, Independence, MO.

J.P. Hurley Papers. University of Oklahoma (from Wesley M. Bagby Collection).

John S. Service. Interviews by the author, tape recording, 1 August 1989 and 14 May 1992, Oakland, CA.

John S. Service Papers. The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, CA.

John S. Service Papers. The Harry S Truman Library, Independence, MO

Joseph Stilwell Papers. Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, CA (from Wesley M. Bagby Collection).

Oral History Interview with Ambassador Philip D. Sprouse, conducted by James R. Fuchs, 11 February 1974. The Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.

Oral History Interview with Dr. Arthur Young, conducted by James R. Fuchs, 21 February

1974. The Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.

T.V. Soong Papers. Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, CA.

B. Government Documents:

Chen, Yin-Ching, ed. *Treaties and Agreements Between the Republic of China and Other Powers, 1929-1954*. Washington: 1957.

Chiang, Kai-shek. *The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, 1937-45*. Compiled by Chinese Ministry of Information. New York: The John Day Company, 1946.

----- *Resistance and Reconstruction: Messages during China's Six Years of War*. New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1943.

Clyde, Paul Hibbert. *United States Policy toward China: Diplomatic and Public Documents, 1839-1939*. New York: Russell & Russell, 1964.

Iriye, Akira C. *U.S. Policy toward China: Testimony Taken from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings, 1966*. Boston: Little, brown, 1968.

Republic of China, Government Information Office. *President Chiang Kai-shek: His Life Story in Pictures*. Taipei: China Art Printing Works, 1972.

Chinese Ministry of Information. *China Handbook 1937-1945: A Comprehensive Survey of Major Developments in China in Eight Years of War*. New York: Macmillan, 1947.

Mao Zedong. *On the Protracted War*. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1960.

----- *Selected Works*, 4 volumes. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1961-65.

----- *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, 4 volumes. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1967.

United States Congress, *Congressional Record*. 1944-50.

United States Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations. *Hearings on the Military Situation in Far East*. 82nd Congress, 1st Session. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1951.

United States Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. *China and the United States: Today and Yesterday, Hearings*. 92nd Congress, 2nd Session. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972.

- United States Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. *Evaluation of U.S. Policy toward Mainland China, Executive Hearing, July 1971*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971.
- United States Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. *Hearings on Loyalty of Employees of the State Department*. 81st Congress, 2nd Session. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950.
- United States Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. *The United States and Communist China in 1949 and 1950: The Question of Rapprochement and Recognition; a Staff Study*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973.
- United States Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary. *The Amerasia Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China*. Edited by Anthony Kubek. Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970.
- United States State Department. *The China White Paper* (originally issued as *United States Relations with China with Special Reference to the period 1944-1949*). Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1949.
- United States State Department. *China: Foreign Relations of the United States*. Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986.
- United States State Department. *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942 (China)*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956.
- United States State Department. *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1943, China*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1957.
- United States State Department. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, China*. Vol., 6. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967.
- United States State Department. *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945*. Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967.
- United States State Department. *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961.
- United States State Department. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Vol. VII, The Far East: China*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972.
- United States State Department. *State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation*. Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950.

C. Autobiographies, Diaries, and Memoirs:

- Band, Claire. *Two Years with the Chinese Communists*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948.
- Barnett, David D. *Dixie Mission: The United States Army Observer Group in Yen-an, 1944*. Berkeley: University of California China Research Monographs, 1970.
- Booker, Edna Lee. *News Is My Job, A Correspondent in War-torn China*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941.
- Chiang Kai-shek. *Soviet Russia In China: A Summering-Up At Seventy*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1957.
- Chiang Kai-shek's Secret Past: The Memoir of His Second Wife, Ch'en Chieh-ju*. Edited by Lloyd Eastman. San Francisco: Westview Press, 1993.
- Crow, Carl. *I Speak for the Chinese*. New York: Hasper, 1937.
- Emmerson, John K. *A View from Yen-an*. Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 1979.
- . *The Japanese Thread: A Life in the U.S. Foreign Service*. New York: Holt, Rinebart and Winston, 1978.
- Fairbank, John K. *Chinabound: A Fifty-Year Memoir*. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1982.
- Hull, Cordell. *The Memories of Cordell Hull*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948.
- Lattimore, Owen. *China Memoirs: Chiang Kai-shek and the Was Against Japan*. Compiled by Fujiko Isono. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1990.
- MacKinnon, Stephen and Oris Friesen. *China Reporting: An Oral History of American Journalism in the 1930s and 1940s*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.
- Morgenthau, Henry. *Morgenthau Diary (China)*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965.
- Peterkin, W.J. *Inside China, 1943-1945: An Eyewitness Account of America's Mission in Yen-an*. Baltimore: Gateway Press, Inc., 1992.
- Snow, Helen Foster. *My China Years: A Memoir by Helen Foster Snow*. New York:

William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1984.

Stilwell, Joseph W. *The Stilwell Papers*. New York: Schocken Books, 1972.

Stuart, John Leighton. *Fifty Years in China*. New York: Random House, 1954.

----- *The Forgotten Ambassador: the Reports of John Leighton Stuart, 1946-1949*.
Boulder: Westview Press, 1981.

Vladimirov, Peter P. *China's Special Area, 1942-1945*. Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1974.

----- *The Vladimirov Diaries: Yenan, China, 1942-1945*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday &
Company, Inc, 1975.

Wallace, Henry A. *The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace*. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973.

Wedemeyer, Albert. *Wedemeyer Reports*. New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1958.

Wilbur, C. Martin. *China in My Life: A Historian's Own History*. Edited by Anita M.
O'Brien. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996.

Zhang Guotao (Chang Kuo-t'ao). *The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party*, three volumes,
translated by R.A. Berton. Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1972.

D. Works By John S. Service:

Service, John S. *The Amerasia Paper: Some Problems in the History of U.S.--China
Relations*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971.

----- "Changes in China, New and Not New." *Oberlin Alumni Magazine* (Spring 1986).

----- "Chou En-lai, as Seen by An Old China Hand." *Los Angeles Times*, 14 January 1976.

----- "Edgar Snow: Some Personal Reminiscences." *China Quarterly*, 1972 (50):
209-19.

----- "Introduction to *Encyclopedia of China Today*." 3rd ed. Edited by Fredric M. Kaplan
and Julian M. Sobin. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1981.

----- *Lost Chance in China: The World War II Despatches of John S. Service*. Edited by
Joseph W. Esherick. New York: Random House, 1974.

----- "Only in Rejection Could There Be Vindication . . . Excerpts from 'Lost Chance in

China." *Foreign Service Journal*, 1974 51 (3): 14-16.

----- "Pertinent Excerpts." *Foreign Service Journal*, October 1951, 22.

----- "State Department Duty in China, The McCarthy Era, and After, 1933-1977." An oral history conducted in 1977-1978 by Rosemart Levenson. Regional Oral History Office, University of California, Berkeley, 1981.

-----, ed. *Golden Inches: The China Memoir of Grace Service*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.

II. Chinese:

"Aidao Luosifu Zongtong 哀悼罗斯福总统" [Lament President Roosevelt's death]. *Qunzhong* 《群众》 [The Masses] 30 April 1945: 216.

Beijing Municipality Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Party History Research Office. *Beijing Dangshi Yanjiu Wenji* 《北京党史研究文集》. Beijing: Beijing Press, [n.d.]

Chen Hailiang 陈海亮. "Kangzhan Qijian Willkie Teshi Fang Yu Jianwen 抗战期间威尔基特使访渝见闻" [Special envoy Willkie's visit to Chongqing during the war of resistance]. *Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji* 《文史资料选辑》, Vol. 27. Beijing: Zhongguo Wenshi Press, 1994.

Chiang Kai-Shek 蒋介石. *Chiang Zongtong Ji* 《蒋总统集》 [Collections of president Chiang Kai-Shek, vols]. Taibei, 1960.

----- *Chiang Zongtong Yanlun Huibian* 《蒋总统言论汇编》 [The Collected speeches and messages of president Chiang, 24 vols]. Taibei, 1956.

Chongqing Tanpan Ziliao 《重庆谈判资料》 [Documents on the Chongqing negotiations]. Chengdu: Sichuan Renmin Press, 1980.

"Guanyu Gongchan Guoji Jiesan Wentii Mao Zedong Zuo Xiangxi Baoguo 关于共产国际解散问题毛泽东同志详细报告" [Comrade Mao Zedong on the disolvement of the Comintern]. *Jiefan Ribao* 《解放日报》 [Liberation Daily], 28 May 1943: 1.

Guo Rongzhao 郭荣赵. *Jiang Weiyuanzhang yu Luosifu Zongtong Zhanshi Tongxun* 《蒋委员长与罗斯福总统战时通讯》 [Generalissimo and president Roosevelt wartime correspondence]. Taibei: Zhongguo Yanjiu Zhongxin Chuban, 1978.

Guogong Tanpan Wenxian Ziliao Xuanji 《国共谈判文献资料选集》 [Selections of documents on Nationalist-Communist negotiations]. Yangzhou: Jiangsu Renmin

Press, 1984.

History Department of Fudan University. *Zhongguo Jindai Duiwai Guanxi Shi Ziliao Xuanji* 《中国近代对外关系史资料选集》 [Selected material of modern Chinese foreign relations], volume 2. Shanghai: Renmin Press, 1977.

"Jiang Weiyuan Zhang Kangzhan Yanlun Teji 蒋委员长抗战言论特辑" [Special edition of Generalissimo's statements on the war of resistance]. *Wenxian* 《文献》 [Documents], Vol. 4. Shanghai: Zhonghua University, 1939.(WD1322)

Jiang Zhongzheng 蒋中正 (Chiang Kai-shek). *Su E Zhai Zhongguo: Zhongguo yu Egong Sanshi Nian Jingli Jiyao* 《苏俄在中国：中国与俄共三十年经历纪要》 [Soviet Russia in China: China's thirty years experience with the Russian Communists]. Taipei: Zhongyang Wenwu Gongying She, 1977.

Jiang Zongtong Milu: Zhong Ri Guanxi Bashi Nian zhi Zhengyan 《蒋总统秘录：中日关系八十年之证言》 [Secret records of President Jiang: testimony on eighty years' of Sino-Japanese relations], 14 vols. Taipei: *Central Daily News* 《中央日报》, 1974-78.

Kong Xiangxi (H.H. Kung) 孔祥熙. "Xian Shibian Huiyi Lu 西安事变回忆录" [Memoire of the Xian incident]. In Li Jinzhou 李金洲, *Xian Shibian Qinli Ji* 《西安事变亲历记》 [Eye-witness account of the Xian incident], 69-122. Taipei: Zhuanji Wenxue Press, 1972.

Leng Xin 冷欣. *Cong Canjia Kangzhan dao Mudu Rijun Touxiang* 《从参加抗战到目睹日军投降》 [From joining the war of resistance to witnessing the Japanese surrender]. Taipei: Zhuanji Wenxue Press, 1967.

Li Jinzhou 李金洲, *Xian Shibian Qinli Ji* 《西安事变亲历记》 [Eye-witness account of the Xian incident]. Taipei: Zhuanji Wenxue Press, 1972.

Lun Quanmian Kangzhan 《论全面抗战》 [On a whole-scaled anti-Japanese war]. Chongqing: Xinhua Daily, 1939.

Mao Zedong 毛泽东. *Guanyu Chongqing Tanpan* 《关于重庆谈判》 [On the Chongqing negotiation]. Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1960.

----- "Muqian Xinshi he Women de Renwu 目前形势和我们的任务" [On the current situation and our task]. In *A Reference to the New Democracy Theory*. Beijing: Beijing Normal University Press, 1951.

----- *Xin Mingzhu Zhuyi Lun* 《新民主主义论》 [On new democracy]. Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1952.

- Maxieer Shibai de Beiju* 《马歇尔失败的悲剧》 [The Tragedy of Marshall's failure]. [n.p]: Xianshi She, 1946.
- Nanfang Ju Dangshi Ziliao Dashi Ji* 《南方局党史资料大事记》 [Chronicle of events: historical documents of the CCP Southern Bureau]. Chongqing: Chongqing Press, 1986.
- Shishi Ribao Ziliaoshi 时事日报资料室. *Zhongguo Tongyi Wenti* 《中国统一问题》 [On the issue of China's unification]. [n.p]: Shishi Ribao, 1946.
- Tongyi Zhanxian Zhu Wenti* 《统一战线诸问题》 [Issues of the United Front]. Hong Kong: Free World Press, 1948.
- Wang Lixi 王礼锡. *Zai Guoji Yuanhua Zhenxian Shang* 《在国际援华阵线上》 [On the international front assisting China]. Chongqing: Shenghuo Shudian, 1939.
- Wang Pengsheng 王凡生. *Shiju Luncong* 《时局论丛》 [On the Current situation]. [n.p.], 1945.
- Wannan Shibian: Ziliao Xuanji* 《皖南事变：资料选集》 [Selected documents on the Southern Anhui incident]. Beijing: Zhongyang Dangxia Press, 1982.
- Weidemai Hewei Er Lai?* 《魏德迈何为而来》 [Why did Medemeyer come to China?]. Hong Kong: New Democracy Press, 1947.
- Wuke Naihe de Gongzhuang* 《无可奈何的供状》 [Helpless confession: comments on the U.S. China White Paper] (Editorials of the Xinhua News Agency). Hong Kong: Xinminzhu Press, 1949.
- "Xinhua Ribao Shelun 新华日报社论" [Editorials of Xinhua Daily]. Chongqing: *Xinhua Daily*, 1939.
- Xiong Xianghui 熊向辉. "Dixia Shier Nian yu Zhou Enlai 地下十二年与周恩来" [Twelve years of underground with Zhou Enlai]. *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily, overseas edition] 11 Jan. 1991: 1.
- Zai Kunnan Zhong Qianjin: Xinhua Ribao Yanlun Ji* 《在困难中前进：新华日报言论集》 [March in difficulties: collection of statements of Xinhua Daily]. Guangzhou: Lishao Press, 1938.
- Zhai Guangyu 翟光宇, Lu Jia 陆佳, eds. *Kangzhan Minglun Ji* 《抗战名论集》 [Famous speeches of national generals in the war of resistance against Japan]. Shanghai: Kangzhan Bianji She, 1938.
- Zhang Zhizhong 张治中. "Wo Yu Zhonggong 我与中共" [The Chinese Communists and I].

In *Chongqing Wenshi Ziliao xuanji* 《重庆文史资料选集》 [Selection of Chongqing historical literature]. Chongqing: Chongqing Wenshi Ziliao Yanjiu Weiyuanhui, 1980.

Zhong Me Guanxi Ziliao Huibian 《中美关系资料汇编》 [Collection of documents on Sino-American Relations]. Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Press, 1957.

Zhonggong yu Meiguo Guanxi Shiliao Ji 《中共与美国关系史料集》 [Collection of historical documents on CCP-U.S. relations]. Hong Kong: Dangdai Zhongguo Yanjiusuo, 1972.

"Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhongyang Weiyuanhui Wei Kangzhan Liu Zhounian Jinian Xuanyan 中国共产党中央委员会为抗战六周年纪念宣言" [Manifesto of the Chinese Communist Party on the sixth anniversary of the anti-Japanese war]. *Jiefan Ribao* 《解放日报》, 2 July 1943: 1.

Zhonghua Minguo Zhongyiao Shiliao Chubian: Dui Ri Kangzhan Shiqi. Di San Bian, Zhanshi Waijiao 《中华民国中央史料初编：对日抗战时期。第三编，战时外交》 [The Initial collection of important historical documents of the Republic of China: the period of Anti-Japanese War, book 3, wartime diplomacy, 3 vols.]. Qin Shaoyi, chief editor. Taipei: the Edition Committee of the Initial Collection of Important Historical Documents of the Republic of China, 1980.

Zhou Enlai Waijiao Wenxuan 《周恩来外交文选》 [Selection of Zhou Enlai diplomatic writings]. Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Press, 1990.

Zhu De 朱德. "Women You Banfa Jianchi Dao Shengli 我们有办法坚持到胜利" [We can endure to final victory]. *Jiefan Ribao* 《解放日报》, 7 July 1943, 1.

SECONDARY SOURCES

I. English:

A. Books:

Anderson, David L. *Imperialism and Idealism: American Diplomats in China, 1861-1898*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985.

Bagby, M. Wesley. *The Eagle-Dragon Alliance: America's Relations with China in World War II*. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1992.

Bailey, Thomas A. *A Diplomatic History of the American People*, 9th edition. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974.

- Barr, Pat. *To China with Love: The Lives and Times of Protestant Missionaries in China 1860-1900*. New York: Doubleday & Company, 1973.
- Barnett, A. *China on the Eve of Communist Takeover*. New York: Praeger, 1963.
- *Our China Policy: The Need for Change*. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1971.
- *A New U.S. Policy toward China*. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1971.
- Beal, John R. *Marshall in China*. New York: Doubleday, 1970.
- Beckman, Aldo, ed. *The China Trip; Now What?: A Discussion*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972.
- Belden, Jack. *China Shakes the World*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949.
- Bobsoue, Davis B. *Understanding Foreign Policy Decisions: the Chinese Case*. New York: Free Press, 1979.
- Braudt, Conrad, and Benjamin Schwantz. *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952.
- Budley, William & Karin Swisher, ed. *China: Opposing Viewpoints*. San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1989.
- Buhite, Russell D. *Nelson T. Johnson and American Policy toward China, 1925-1941*. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1968.
- *Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973.
- Burns, Richard Dean, ed. *Diplomats in Crisis: U.S.—Chinese—Japanese relations, 1919-1941*. Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio Press, 1974.
- Carlson, Evans F. *The Chinese Army: Its Origins and Military Efficiency*. Westport: Hyerion Press, 1940, 1975.
- *Twin Stars of China: A Behind-the-Scenes Story of China's Valiant Struggle by A U.S. Marine Who Lived and Moved with the People*. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1940.
- Cary-Elwes, Columba. *China and the Cross: A Survey of Missionary History*. New York: P.J. Kenedy & Sons, 1956.

- Chen Jerome. *Mao and the Chinese Revolution*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965.
- Chen Yung-fa. *Making Revolution: The Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China, 1937-1945*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.
- Chern, Kenneth. *Dilemma in China: America's Policy Debate, 1945*. Hamden: Arohon Books, 1980.
- Chi Hsi-sheng. *Nationalist China at War: Military Defeats and Political Collapse, 1937-45*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1982.
- Christopher, James W. *Conflict in the Far East: American Diplomacy in China from 1928-1933*. New York: Arno Press, 1970.
- Churchill, Winston S. *Closing the Ring*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951.
- . *The Hinge of Fate*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950.
- Cohen, Warren I. *America's Response to China: An Interpretative History of Sino--American Relations*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1971.
- . *New Frontiers in American-East Asian Relations: Essays Presented to Dorothy Borg*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.
- Coox, Alvind and Hilary Conroy, eds. *China and Japan: Search for Balance Since World War II*. Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-Clio Books, 1978.
- Crozier, Brian. *The Man Who Lost China: The First Full Biography of Chiang Kai-shek*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976.
- Davies, John Paton. *Dragon by the Tail: American, British, Japanese, and Russian Encounters with China and One Another*. New York: Norton, 1972.
- Denning, Margaret B. *The Sino--American Alliance in World War II: Cooperation and Dispute Among Nationalists, Communists, and Americans*. New York: P. Lang, 1986.
- Dickenson, Book, ed. *China and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1973.
- Donovan, Peter. *Chinese Communist Materials at the Bureau of Investigation Archives, Taiwan*. Ann Harbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1976.
- Eastman, Lloyd E. *The Aortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927-1937*.

- Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974.
- . *Seeds of Destruction: Nationalist China in War and Revolution, 1937-1949*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984.(WD2704)
- Epstein, Isreal. *The Unfinished Revolution in China*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1947.
- Fairbank, John King. *China: A New History*. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992.
- . *China Perceived: Images and Policies in Chinese-American Relations*. New York: Knopf, 1974.
- . *The United States and China*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979.
- Fairbank, John King and Albert Feuerwerker, eds. *The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 12, Part 1*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- . *The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 13, Part 2*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- Fairbank, Wilma. *America's Cultural Experiment in China, 1942-1949*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976.
- Feis, Herbert. *The China Tangle: The American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953.
- . *Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957.
- Feulner, Edwin J. *China--the Turning Point: Papers from the Time Seminars on U.S.--China Relations Held in Washington on July 1976*. Washington: Council on American Affairs, 1976.
- Finney, Charles G. *The Old China Hands*. New York: Doubleday & Company, 1961.
- Forman, Harrison. *Report from Red China*. New York: Book Find Club, 1945.
- Fry, Varian. *War in China: America's Role in the Far East*. New York: Arno Press, 1970.
- Goebler, Robert. *United States--China Relations: A Selected Bibliography*. Monticello: Vance Bibliographies, 1988.
- Goetz, Delia. *The Dragon and the Eagle*. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1944.

- Gregg, Alice H. *China and Educational Autonomy*. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1946.
- Gregor, A. James. *The China Connection*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986.
- Grasso, June. *Truman's Two-China Policy: 1948-50*. New York: M. Sharpe, 1987.
- Gupta, D.C. *United States Attitude toward China*. Delhi: S. Chand, 1969.
- Harding, Harry and Yuan Ming, eds. *Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955: A Joint Reassessment of a Critical Decade*. Wilmington, Delaware: SR Books, 1989.
- Head, William. *America's China Sojourn: America's Foreign Policy and Its Efforts on Sino-American Relations, 1942-1948*. Lanham: University Press of America, 1983.
- *Yenan! Colonel Wilbur Peterkin and the American Military Mission to the Chinese Communists, 1944-1945*. Chapel Hill: Documentary Publications, 1987.
- Henson, Curtis T. *Commissioners and Commodores: The East India Squadron and American Diplomacy in China*. University of Alabama Press, 1982.
- Hsu Immanuel C.Y. *The Rise of Modern China*. Fifth Edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
- Hubbard, George D. *The Geographic Setting of Chengtu*. Oberlin: Oberlin College, 1923.
- Hunt, Michael H., *The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and China to 1914*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.
- Hsiung, James C. and Steven I. Levine. *China's Bitter Vistory: The War with Japan, 1937-1945*. New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1992.
- Johnson, Chalmers. *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962.
- Kahn, Ely Jaques. *The China Hands: America's Foreign Service Officers and What Befall Them*. New York: Viking, 1975.
- Koen, Ross Y. *The China Lobby in American Politics*. New York: Octagon Books, 1974.
- Kolko, Gabriel. *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945*. New York: Random House, 1968.

- Kolko, Joyce and Gabriel Kolko. *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1949-1954*. New York: Harper & Row, 1972.
- Kubek, Autheny. *How the Far East Was Lost: American Policy and the Creation of Communist China, 1941-1949*. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1963.
- . *The Red China Papers: What Americans Deserve to Know about U.S.-China Relations*. New Rochelle: Artington House Publishers, 1975.
- Kusnitz, Leouard A. *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: America's China Policy, 1949-1979*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984.
- Kwei, Chung-gi. *The Kuomintang-Communist Struggle in China, 1922-1949*. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970.
- Latham, Earl. *The Communist Controversy in Washington: from the New Deal to McCarthy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966.
- Lauren, Paul Gorden, ed. *The China Hands' Legacy: Ethics and Diplomacy*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987.
- Lee, Kung-Sam. *The Secret of China's Victory*. Shanghai: China Daily Tribune Publishing Co., 1946.
- Liang, Chin-tung. *General Stilwell in China, 1942-1944: the Full Story*. New York: St. John's University Press, 1972.
- Lin, Yutang. *The Vigil of A Nation*. New York: The John Day Company, 1945.
- Liu, Kwang-Ching. *Americans and Chinese: A Historical Essay and a Bibliography*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963.
- Liu, Kwang-Ching, ed. *American Missionaries in China: Papers from Harvard Seminars*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966.
- Loh, Pichon P.Y. ed. *The Kuomintang Debacle of 1949: Conquest or Collapse?* Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1965.
- Martel, Leon. *Lend-Lease, Loans, and the Coming of the Cold War: A Study of the Implementation of Foreign Policy*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979.
- Martin, Edwin W. *Divided Counsel: the Anglo-American Response to Communist Victory in China*. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1986.
- Matloff, Maurice. *The War Department: Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare*,

- 1943-1944. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959.
- May, Ernest R. *The Truman Administration and China, 1945-1949*. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1975.
- May, Gary. *China Scapegoat, the Diplomatic Ordeal of John Carter Vincent*. Washington: New Republic Books, 1979.
- Medvedev, Roy A. *China and the Superpowers*. Translated by Harold Shukman. New York: Blackwell, 1986.
- Melby, John Fremont. *The Mandate of Heaven: Record of a Civil War; China 1945-49*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968.
- Moorsteen, Richard Harris. *Remaking China Policy: U.S.—China Relations and Governmental Decision-making*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971.
- Mulch, Barbara G. "A Chinese Puzzle: Patrick J. Hurley and the Foreign Service Officer Controversy." Ph.D. dissertation. University of Kansas, 1972.
- Myers, Romon H. ed. *Two Chinese States: U.S. Foreign Policy and Interest*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978.
- Neils, Patricia. *United States Attitudes and Policies toward China: the Impact of American Missionaries*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1990.
- Noble, Dennis L. "China Hands: The United States and China, 1901-1937." Ph.D. dissertation, Purdue University, 1988.
- North, Robert C. *Moscow and Chinese Communists*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1953.
- Oksenberg, Michael. *China and America: Past and Future*. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1977.
- Paddock, Paul. *China Diary: Crisis Diplomacy in Dairen*. Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1977.
- Payne, Robert. *China Awake*. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1947.
- Purifoy, Lewis McCarroll. *Harry Truman's China Policy: McCarthyism and Diplomacy of Hysteria*. New York: New Viewpoints, 1976.
- Pye, Lucian. *Warlord Politics: Conflict and Coalition in the Modernization of Republican China*. New York: Praeger, 1971.

- Raukin, Karl L. *China Assignment*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964.
- Reardon-Anderson, James. *Yenan and the Great Powers: the Origins of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 1944-1946*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980.
- Rhee, Tong-chin. "Sino-American Relations from 1942 through 1949: A Study of Efforts to Settle the China Problem." Ph.D. dissertation, Clark University, 1959.
- Romanus, Charles and Riley Sunderland. *Stilwell's Mission to China*. Washington, Department of the Army, 1953.
- . *Time Runs Out in CBI*. Washington, D.C: Office of Chief of Military History.
- Roosevelt, Elliott. *As He Saw It*. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946.
- Rosinger, Lawrence K. *China's Wartime Politics, 1937-1944*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944.
- Sainsberg, Keith. *The Turning Point: Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill and Chiang Kai-Shek*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985.
- Schaller, Michael. *The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938-45*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1979.
- . *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979.
- Schram, Stuart R. *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-Tung*. New York: Frederic A. Praeger, 1963.
- Schurmann, Franz and Orville Schell, eds. *Republican China: Nationalism, War, and the Rise of Communism, 1911-1949*. New York: Random House, 1967.
- Schwartz, Benjamin I. *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951.
- Schwemaker, Kenneth E. *Americans and Chinese Communists, 1927-1945*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971.
- Seagrave, Sterling. *The Soong Dynasty*. New York: Harper & Row, 1985.
- Selden, Mark. *The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971.

- Shao, Kuo-kang. *Zhou Enlai and the Foundations of Chinese Foreign Policy*. New York: St. Martin Press, 1996.
- Shaw, Chonghal Petey. *The Role of the United States in Chinese Civil Conflict, 1944-1949*. Salt Lake City: Charles Schlacks, Jr., Publisher, 1991.
- Sigur, Gaston J. *U.S. Policy Priorities for Relations with China*. Washington: U.S. State Department, 1987.
- Sih, Paul K.T. *Nationalist China During the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945*. New York: Exposition Press, 1977.
- Snow, Edgar. *Random Notes on Red China, 1936-1945*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957.
- *Red Star Over China*. New York: Random House, 1938; 1st rev. and enlgd. edn., Grove Press, 1968.
- *The Battle for Asia*. New York: The World Publishing Company, 1942.
- *The Long Revolution*. New York: Random House, 1971.
- *The Other Side of the River*. New York: Random House, 1961.
- Snow, Helen Foster. *The Chinese Communists: Sketches and Autobiographies of the Old Guard*. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Company, 1972.
- *Red Dust: Autobiographies of Chinese Communists*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952.
- So, Kwan-wai. *Essays in the History of China and Chinese--American Relations*. East Lansing: Asian Studies Center, 1982.
- Spence, Jonathan. *To Change China: Western Advisers in China, 1620-1960*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1969.
- Stanley, Margaret. *Americans in Areas of China Under Communist Jurisdiction Before 1949: Bibliographical Notes and a Comprehensive Bibliography of the Yen-an Hui*. The Center for East Asia Studies, The University of Kansas, 1987.
- Steele, Archibald Trojan. *The American People and China*. New York: McGraw--Hill, 1966.
- Stein, Guenther. *The Challenge of Red China*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,

inc., 1945.

Stueck, William Whitney. *The Wedemeyer Mission: A Study of American Politics and Foreign Policy During the Early Cold War*. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1984.

Sulter, Robert G. *China Watch: Toward Sino-American Recognition*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.

Tierney, John, Jr. *About Face: The China Decision and Its Consequences*. New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1979.

Thomson, James C. *While China Faced West: American Reformers in Nationalist China, 1927-37*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969.

Tong Hollington K. *China: After Seven Years of War*. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1945.

----- *China and the World Press*. Nanjing, China, 1948.

Tozer, Warren Wilson. *Response to Nationalism and Disunity: United States Relations with the Chinese Nationalists, 1925-1938*. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1974.

Tsou, Tang. *America's Failure in China, 1941-50*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963.

Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf. *Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 1949-50*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.

Tuchman, Barbara W. *Sand against the Wind: Stilwell and the American Experience in China*. London: MacMillan, 1971.

Utley, Freda. *Last Chance in China*. Bobbs-Merrill, 1947.

Van Slyke, Lyman P., ed. *The Chinese Communist Movement: A Report of the United States War Department, July 1945*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968.

Vandenberg, Arthur H. Jr., ed. *The Private Papers of Senate Vandenburg*, 2 volumes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952.

Varg, Paul A. *The Closing of the Door: Sino-American Relations, 1936-46*. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1973.

----- *Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats: The American Protestant Missionary Movement in China, 1890-1952*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958.

White, Theodore Harold. *In Search of History: A Personal Adventure*. New York: Harper & Row, 1976.

White, Theodore Harold and Annalee Jacoby. *Thunder Out of China*. New York: William Sloane Associates, 1946.

Whiting, Allen S., *China and the United States, What Next?* New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1976.

Willkie, Wendell L. *One World*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1943.

Wu Chao-kwang. *The International Aspect of the Missionary Movement in China*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1930.

Wu, Chi-Wei David. "A Rhetorical Analysis of Selected Speeches by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, 1937-1945." Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio University, June 1986.

Young, Arther N. *China and the Helping Hands, 1937-1945*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963.

----- *China's Wartime Finance and Inflation, 1937-1945*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965.

Zhang, Hong. "Tragic Cooperations: Chiang Kai-shek and America's China Policies from Pearl Harbor to Hurley's Mission." M.A. Thesis, University of Toledo, August 1989.

B. Articles:

Alsop, Joseph. "The Feud between Stilwell and Chiang." *Saturday Evening Post*, 7 January 1950, 17.

Arkinson, Brooks. "Chinese Still Try to Unify Factions." *New York Times*, 26 November 1944, 43.

----- "Critics at Large: Publication of State Department Papers on China of 1943 Evokes Reflections." *New York Times*.

----- "Yenan, a Chinese Wonderland City on a 3 Kinds of Time, Has One Clock." *New York Times*, 6 October 1944, 12.

----- "Yenan Is Well Fed with Big Harvest." *New York Times*, 25 September 1944, 9.

- Baldwin, Hanson W. "Review of the Chinese Situation." *New York Times*, 20 July 1943, 7.
- "Too Much Wishful Thinking About China." *Reader's Digest*, XLIII (August 1943): 63-67.
- Barnett, Robert W. "An Interview with Chou En-lai." *Amerasia*, V (May 1941): 123-27.
- "Isolated China." *Far Eastern Survey*, 27 July 1942, 169.
- Bisson, T.A. "China's Part in a Coalition War." *Far Eastern Survey*, XII (14 July 1943): 135-41.
- "Mao Tse-tung Analyzes Nanking in Interview." *Amerasia*, I (October 1937): 360-65.
- Buck, Pearl S. "'The Darkest Hour' in China's History." *New York Times Magazine*, 17 December 1944, 45-46.
- "A Warning About China: A Great Friend of the Chinese People Points to Danger That May Lose Us a Valuable Ally." *Life*, XIV (10 May 1943): 53-54, 56.
- Chen Jian. "The Myth of America's 'Lost Chance' in China: A Chinese Perspective in Light of New Evidence." *Diplomatic History* 21, no. 1 (Winter 1997): 77-86.
- "China Policy Fixed by Military." *The Washington Post*, 28 April 1950.
- "The Chinese Communists." *New York Times*, 17 August 1945, 16.
- "The Chinese Crisis." *New York Times*, 10 June 1944, 14.
- Clubb, Oliver Edmund. "How the Mandate of Heaven Was Wrested from Chiang." *Saturday Review*, 20 February 1971, 25-27, 37-38.
- Cohen, Warren I. "Introduction: Was There a 'Lost Chance' in China?" *Diplomatic History* 21, no. 1 (Winter 1997): 71-76.
- Eastman, Max and J.B. Powell. "The Fate of the World Is at Stake in China." *Reader's Digest*, XLVI (June 1945): 13-22.
- Epstein, Israel. "China Communists Confer with Rich." *New York Times*, 6 August 1944, 19.
- "Chinese Communists from All Classes." *New York Times*, 20 August 1944, 23.

- "Communist Army in China Is Strong." *New York Times*, 1 July, 1944, 6.
- "No Opium Poppies on Way to Yen-an." *New York Times* 14 August, 1944, 5.
- Fairbank, John King. "Our Chances in China." *Atlantic Monthly* 178 (September 1946): 37-42.
- Fitch, Geraldine T. "Letters to the Times: China Ends Eighth War Year." *New York Times*, 7 July 1945, 12.
- Garver, John W. "Little Chance." *Diplomatic History* 21, no. 1 (Winter 1997): 87-94.
- He Di, "The Most Respected Enemy: Mao Zedong's Perception of the United States" *The China Quarterly* no. 137 (March 1994): 145-58.
- Huskey, James L. "The Cosmopolitan Connection: American and Chinese in Shanghai during the Interwar Years." *Diplomatic History* 3 (1987. 11): 227-250.
- Isaacs, Harold R. "China: Today's Bitter Fiasco, Tomorrow's Sure Battleground and a Problem That Must Be Solved before World Peace is Won." *News Week*, XXV (23 April 1945): 60-61.
- Kahn, E. J. "Profiles: Foresight, Nightmare, and Hindsight." *The New Yorker*, 8 April 1972, 43-95.
- Lattimore, Owen. "American Response in the Far East." *Virginia Quarterly Review*, XVI (Spring 1940): 161-74.
- "Reports from Red China." *Atlantic Monthly*, CLXXV (April 1945): 133.
- "Let's Not Confuse Naive Diplomats with Enemy Spies." *Saturday Evening Post*, 1 September 1951, 10.
- McCormick, Robert R. "How We Lost China." *Times-Herald*, 15 May 1951, 12.
- McLean, David, "American Nationalism, the China Myth, and the Truman Doctrine: the Question of Accommodation with Peking, 1949-50." *Diplomatic History* 10 (1986): 25-42.
- "New Light on the China Story: First Year after Pearl Harbor--The Official record." *U.S. News & World Report*. 7 December 1956, 79-81.
- Peffer, Nathaniel. "Contrasting Yen-an and Chunking" (book review). *New York Times*, 28 October 1945, 4.

- "Our Distorted View of China." *New York Times Magazine*, 7 November 1943, 7, 40-41.
- "Senators Denounce Our Far Eastern Policy and the Loss of China." *The New York Times*, 20 August 1951, 11.
- Shanahan, Cormac. "China's Communist Puzzle." *China Monthly*, VI (June 1945): 9-12.
- "False Solution in Asia." *China Monthly*, VI (December 1945): 22-24, 26.
- Sheng, M. Michael. "Chinese Communist Policy toward the United States and the Myth of the 'Lost Chance,' 1948-1950. *Modern Asian Studies* 28, Part 3 (July 1994): 501.
- "The Triumph of Internationalism: CCP-Moscow Relations before 1949." *Diplomatic History* 21, no. 1 (Winter 1997): 95-104.
- Sniegoski, Stephen J. "Joseph R. McCarthy and the Historians." *Modern Age* 1985 29 (3): 132-42.
- Snow, Edgar. "China to Lin Yutang," and "China to Lin Yutang: II." *Nation* (17 February 1945): 180-83; and (31 March 1945): 359.
- "The Chinese Communists and War on Two Continents: Interviews with Mao Tse-tung." *China Weekly Review*, XCI (13 and 20 January 1940): 244-46, 277-80.
- "I Went to Red China: The Inside Story of China's United Front against Japan." *Saturday Evening Post*, CCX (6 November 1937): 100-03.
- "Interview with Mao." *New Republic*, CLII (27 February 1965): 17-23.
- "Interview with Mao Tse-tung: Communist Leader." *China Weekly Review*, LXXVIII (14 and 21 November 1936): 377-79, 420-21.
- "Must China Go Red?" *Saturday Evening Post*, CCXVII (12 May 1945): 9-10, 67-68, 70.
- "Six Million Lost Allies." *Saturday Evening Post*, CCXVI (10 June 1944): 12-13, 44, 46.
- Stranahan, Patricia. "Internationalists' fight for the Liberation Daily." *The China Quarterly* 123 (September 1990): 521-37.
- Strong, Anna Louise. "The Kuomintang-Communist Crisis in China." *Amerasia*, V (March 1941): 11-23.

- Tuchman, Barbara. "If Mao Had Come to Washington: An Essay in Alternative." *Foreign Affairs*, Oct. 1972.
- "Why Policy Makers Do Not Listen, China and the Foreign Service." *Foreign Service Journal*, 1973 50 (3): 17-24.
- Uhlmann, Lieutenant George. "Land of Five Withouts." *Far Eastern Survey*, XII (3 May 1943): 86-89.
- Wales, Nym [Helen Foster Snow]. "Old China Hands." *New Republic*, CLVI (1 April 1967): 13-15.
- "Why Communists Support the United Front: An Interview with Lo Fu." *Pacific Affairs*, XI (September 1938), 311-22.
- Watts, Richard, Jr. "The Chinese Giant Stirs." *New republic*, CXII (28 May 1945): 733-36.
- Wedemeyer, Lt. General Albert C., as told to George Creel. "Don't Count China Out." *Collier's*, CXVI (7 July 1945): 24-25, 46.
- Westad, Odd Arne. "Losses, Chances, and Myths: The United States and the Creation of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1950." *Diplomatic History* 21, no. 1 (Winter 1997): 105-15.
- White, Theodore H. "Inside Red China." *Life*, XVII (18 December 1944): 39-40, 42, 44, 46.
- "'Life' Looks at China: Through the Blockade One of Its Correspondents Brings This Firsthand Report." *Life*, XVI (1 May 1944): 98-101, 103-04, 106, 109-110.
- "Who Lost China! Point of Fact." *The Washington Post*, 4 May 1950.
- Woltman, Frederick. "Chance Glance Set Off Famous 'Amerasia' Case." *The Washington Daily News*, 1 May 1950,
- Yutang, Lin. "China and Its Crisis." *Nation*, CLX (24 March 1945): 324-27.

II. Chinese:

- Chen Jingzhi and Wu Boqing 陈敬之、吴伯卿, et. al. eds. *Zongtong Jianggong Dashi Changbian, Chugao* 《总统蒋公大事长编, 初稿》 [A Chronological draft of important events concerning president Chiang]. Taipei: Yangming Shuwu, 1978.

- Ding Mingnan 丁名楠, ed. *Zhong Mei Guanxi Shi Lunwen Ji* 《中美关系史论文集》 [Collection of essays on the history of Sino-American relations], vol. 1. Chongqing, China: Chongqing Press, 1985.
- Feng Yuxiang 冯玉祥. *Wuo Suo Renshi de Jiang Jieshi* 《我所认识的蒋介石》 [The Chiang Kai-shek I know]. Hong Kong: Qishi Niandai Press, 1975.
- Gongfei de Fanmei Yundong* 《共匪的反美运动》 [Communist bandits' anti-American movement]. Edited and published by Guofang Bu Qingbao Jiu [The Intelligence Bureau of the Defense Department]. Taipei: Guoli Tushu, 1961.
- Guan Shaoji 关绍纪. "Kang Ri Zhanzheng Qianqi Meiguo Dui Guogong Guanxi de Zhengce 抗日战争前期美国对国共关系的政策" [U.S. policy toward the relation between the Nationalists and the Communists in China in the early part of the anti-Japanese war]. *Wen Shi Zhe* 《文史哲》 [Journal of literature, history, and philosophy] 5 (1995): 16-21.
- Guo Hualun 郭华伦. *Zhonggong Shilun* 《中共史论》 [On Chinese communist history]. Taipei: Zhonghua Minguo Guoji Guanxi Suo, 1969.
- Han Suyin 韩素音 and John Service, eds. *Huainian Mao Zedong* 《怀念毛泽东》 [Cherishing the memory of Mao Zedong]. Hong Kong: Wanyuan Tushu Gongsi, 1977.
- He Di 何迪. "1945-49 Nian Zhongguo Gongchan Dang Dui Mei Zhengce de Yanbian 1945-49年中国共产党对美政策的演变" [The development of the Chinese communist party's policy toward the United States, 1945-49]. *Lishi Yanjiu* 《历史研究》 [China] 3 (1987): 15-23.
- Hou Lichao 侯立朝. *Shui Shi Zhongguo yu Meiguo de Pantu?* 《谁是中国与美国的叛徒》 [Who were the traitors of China and the United States?]. Taipei: Yuandong Shubao She, 1970.
- Ji Hongsheng 季鸿生, ed. *Zhong Mei Guanxi Wushi Nian* 《中美关系五十年》 [Fifty years of Sino-American relations]. Shanghai: Baijia Press, 1993.
- Jin Chongji 金冲及, ed. *Zhou Enlai Zhuan, 1898-1949* 《周恩来传, 1898-1949》 [Biography of Zhou Enlai, 1898-1949]. Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1989.
- Jin Qianli 金千里. "Stilwell, Zui Chajin de Canmonzhang 史迪威, 最差劲的参谋长" [Stilwell, the worst chief-of-staff]. *Central Daily News* (International Edition, Taiwan), 29 and 30 July 1993.
- Li Ao 李敖. *Jiang Jieshi Yanjiu* 《蒋介石研究》 [Chiang Kai-shek studies]. Beijing: Huawen Press, 1988.

- Li Yongtai 黎永泰. *Mao Zedong Yu Meiguo* 《毛泽东与美国》 [Mao Zedong and the United States of America]. Kunming, China: Yunnan People's Press, 1993.
- Li Yunhan 李云汉. *Song Zeyuan yu Qi Qi Kangzhan* 《宋哲元与七七抗战》 [Song Zheyuan and the 7-7 war of resistance]. Taipei: Zhuanji Wenxue Press, 1973.
- Liu Chongxiao 刘冲霄, ed. *Di Er Ci Shijie Da Zhan Zhong Meijun Yuan Hua Neimu* 《第二次世界大战中美军援华内幕》 [The inside story of American military's assistance to China in World War II]. Chengde, China: Sichuan People's Press, 1994.
- Niu Jun 牛军. *Cong Heerli dao Maxier: Meiguo Tiaochu Guogong Maodun Shimuo* 《从赫尔利到马歇尔：美国调处国共矛盾始末》 [From Hurley to Marshall: the complete story of U.S. mediation of the Nationalist-Communist conflicts]. Fuzhou: Fujian Renmin Press, 1988.
- *Cong Yanan Zouxiang Shijie: Zhongguo Gongchandang Duiwai Guanxi de Qiyuan* 《从延安走向世界：中国共产党对外关系的起源》 [From Yanan to the world: origins of the Chinese Communist Party foreign relations] Fuzhou: Fujian People's Press, 1992.
- Shi Yinhong 时殷红. "Lun Meiguo Chengren Xin Zhongguo Wenti 论美国承认新中国问题" [On the issue of America's recognition of new China, 1949-1950]. *Shijie LiShi* 《世界历史》 [World History] 1 (1991): 101-11.
- "Meiguo yu Xiandai Zhongguo 美国与现代中国" [The U.S. and Modern China - Review of History of Sino-American Relations, 1911-1950]. *LiShi Yanjiu* 《历史研究》 [Historical Research] 2 (1995): 53-68.
- Tao Juyin 陶菊隐. *Meiguo Qinhua Shiliao* 《美国侵华史料》 [Historical records on U.S. encroachment on China]. Shanghai: Zhonghua Shujiu, 1951.
- Tao Wenzhao 陶文钊. "Cairo Huiyi Shi Meiguo Dui Hua Zhengce de Zhuanzhe Dian ma 开罗会议是美国对华政策的转折点吗?" *LiShi Yanjiu* 《历史研究》 [Historical Research] 6 (1995): 111-19.
- Wang Cheng 王城. *Zhong Mei Guanxi Shikuang* 《中美关系实况》 [The true story of Sino-American relations]. Beijing: Xinchao Press, 1951.
- Wang Xi 汪熙, ed. *Zhong Mei Guanxi Shi Luncong* 《中美关系史论丛》 [The History of Sino-American Relations: selected essays]. Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 1985.
- Wu Jianxiong 吴剑雄. "Maxier Shihua de Yanjiu 马歇尔使华的研究" [Studies on Marshall's mission to China]. Ph.D. dissertation, Taiwan University, 1970.

- Wu Jingping 吴景平. "Kangzhan Shiqi Zhong Mei Zujie Guanxi Shuping 抗战时期中美租借关系述评" [Sino-American lend-lease relations during the war of resistance]. *Lishi Yanjiu* 《历史研究》 [Historical research]4 (1995): 48.
- Xie Mu 谢牧, ed. *Meidi Qinhua Zhengce de Bainian Zongjie* 《美帝侵华政策的百年总结》 [Summary of one hundred years American imperialist policy of encroachment on China]. Shanghai: Chaofeng Press, 1951.
- Yu Jian 余坚. *Zhong Mei Waijiao Guanxi zhi Yanjiu* 《中美外交关系之研究》 [Studies of Sino-American diplomatic relations]. Taipei: Zhongzheng Shuju, 1973.
- Yuan Ming 袁明. *Zhongmei Guanxi Shi shang Chenzhong de Yiye* 《中美关系史上沉重的一页》 [Sino-American relations 1945-1955 collaborative assessment of troubled time]. Beijing: Beijing University Press, 1989.
- "Xin Zhongguo Chenli Qianhou de Meiguo Dui Hua Zhengce Guan 新中国成立前后的美国对华政策" [U.S. policy toward China around the time of the founding of the People's Republic of China]. *Lishi Yanjiu* 《历史研究》 [China] 1987 (3): 24-33.
- "Sishi Niandai Houqi Zhong Mei Guanxi Shi Yanjiu de Dongxiang 四十年代后期中美关系研究的动向" [Trends in the study of Sino-American relations in the late 1940s]. *Lishi Yanjiu* 《历史研究》 [China] 1987 (6): 115-18.
- Zhang Baijia 张百家. "1945-55 Nian Zhong Mei Guanxi Shi Xueshu Taolun Hui Shuping 1944-45年中美关系史学术讨论会述评" [Comments on the symposium on the history of Sino-American relations, 1945-55]. *Lishi Yanjiu* 《历史研究》 [China] 1987 (3): 34-53.
- "Kang Ri Zhanzheng Shiqi Guo Gong Liang Dang de Dui Mei Zhengce 抗日战争时期国共两党的对美政策" [The Policies of the Guomindang and the Chinese communist party toward the United States, 1937-45]. *Lishi Yanjiu* 《历史研究》 [China] 1987 (3): 3-14.
- Zhang Lixing 张力行. *Maxier Shihua Jishi* 《马歇尔使华纪实》 [Records on Marshall's China mission]. Taipei: Zhandou Qingnian Press, 1955.
- Zhang Zige 张紫葛. "Kangri Shiqi de Song Meiling 抗日时期的宋美龄" [Song Meiling in the War of Resistance]. *World Journal*, 3-4 August 1995.
- Zhongguo Tongyi Wenti* 《中国统一问题》 [The Question of China's unification]. [n.p.]: Shishi Ribao Press, 1946.
- Zhongyang Weiyuanhui 中央委员会. *Youguan 1943 Nian Zhongmei Waijiao Guanxi Wenjian Cankao Ziliao* 《有关1943年中美外交关系文件参考资料》 [References relating to Foreign relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1943. China].

Taibei: Zhongyang Weiyuanhui, 1962.

Zhou Enlai Nianpu, 1898-1949 《周恩来年谱》 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai]. Beijing: Renmin Press, 1989.

Zhou Enlai Zhuanji 《周恩来专辑》 [Special collection of Zhou Enlai]. Edited by Zhongguo Wenti Yanjiu Zhongxin. Hong Kong: Zilian Press, 1971.

Zhuo Qiwei 卓起为. “Wei Jiang Jieshi Gaiguan Lunding 为蒋介石盖棺论定” [Final judgement of Chiang Kai-shek]. *World Journal Weekly Magazine*, 21 May 1995.

Zi Zhongyun 资中筠. *Meiguo Duihua Zhengce de Qiyuan he Fazhan* 《美国对华政策的起源和发展》 [Origins and development of U.S. China policy]. Chongqing: Chongqing Press, 1987.

APPROVAL OF EXAMINING COMMITTEE

Elizabeth A. Fones-Wolf

Elizabeth A. Fones-Wolf, Ph.D.

Joe D. Hagan

Joe D. Hagan, Ph. D.

Jack L. Hammersmith

Jack L. Hammersmith, Ph.D.

Mary Lou Lustig

Mary Lou Lustig, Ph.D.

Wesley M. Bagby

Wesley M. Bagby, Ph.D., Chair

4/29/97
Date