Dissertation

Title

Trade Unionism and the Institutional Equilibrium in MENA States

A Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) Supported Study of the Arab Upheavals 2011 - 2013 in Twelve Countries

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Abbreviations

AC Action de Changement *Mauritania*

ALBA Aluminium Bahrain

APP Alliance Populaire Progressiste *Mauritania*

ASU Arab Socialist Union *Libya*

ASU* Arab Socialist Union *Egypt*

ATUC Aden Trade Union Congress *Yemen*

BAPCO Bahrain Petroleum Company

BFLUF Bahrain Free Labour Union Federation

BICI Bahraini Independent Commission of Inquiry

BLF Bahrain Labour Federation

BNS Bahrain Nursing Society

BTA Bahrain Teachers' Association

CCRC Commission Consultative pour la Revision Constitutionelle *Morocco*

CDT Confédération Démocratique du Travail *France*

CDT* Confédération Démocratique du Travail *Morocco*

CEN degree of centralisation of trade union institutions

CGTT Confédération Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens *Tunisia*

CHA Comparative Historical Analysis

CLA Conceil de Lyceés d'Algérie

CLTM Confédération Libre des Travalleurs de Mauritanie

CNAPEST Conseil National Algérien des Professeurs de l'Enseignement Secondaire et Technique

CNCD Coordination Nationale pour le Changement et la Démocratie *Algeria*

CNES Conseil National des Enseignants du Supérieur *Algeria*

COD Coordination de l'Opposition Démocratique *Mauritania*

csQCA Crisp Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis

ECI Economic Complexity Index of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

EDLC Egyptian Democratic Labour Congress

EFITU Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions

ETUF Egyptian Trade Union Federation

FDT Fédération Démocratique du Travail *Morocco*

FDTL Forum Démocratique pour le Travail et les Libertés *Tunisia*

FFS Front des Forces Socialistes *Algeria*

FIS Front Islamique du Salut *Algeria*

FITU-J Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Jordan

FLAM Forces de Libération Africaines de Mauritanie

FLN Front de Libération Nationale *Algeria*

FLTU Federation of Libyan Trade Unions

FNDD Front National pour la Défense de la Démocratie

fsQCA Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis

GCBW General Committee of Bahraini Workers

GFBTU General Federation of Bahraini Trade Unions

GFJTU General Federation of Jordanian Trade Unions

GFOTU General Federation of Omani Trade Unions

GFTU General Federation of Trade Unions *Syria*

GPC General People's Congress *Libya*

GTUFW General Trade Union Federation of Workers Libya

IFLB Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain

INOPP intertwinedness with oppositional forces

ITS Independent Teachers' Syndicate *Egypt*

ITUC International Trade Union Confederation

JLC Joint Labour-Management Committees *Bahrain*

JMP Joint Meeting Parties *Yemen*

KAA Kuwait Accountants and Auditors Association

KAEPA Kuwaiti Aircraft Engineer and Pilot Association

KEYS bargaining strength of trade unions in key sectors of the economy

KJA Kuwait Journalist Association

KMA Kuwait Medical Association

KSE Kuwait Society of Engineers

KTS Kuwaiti Teachers' Society

LADDH Ligue Algérienne pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme

LIFG Libyan Islamic Fighting Group

LTDH Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de l'Homme

MENA Middle East and North Africa

MNA Mouvement National Algérien

MOMP Ministry of Military Production *Egypt*

MP Mouvement Populaire *Morocco*

MSP Mouvement de la Société pour la Paix *Algeria*

MSSD (Most Similar System Design

MTI Movement de la Tendance Islamique *Morocco*

mvQCA Multivariate Qualitative Comparative Analysis

NCC National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change *Syria*

NCLO National Conference for the Libyan Opposition

NCRS National Committee of Retired Servicemen *Jordan*

NDP National Democratic Party *Egypt*

NFPF National Front for Progressive Force *Bahrain*

NFSL National Front for the Salvation *Libya*

NFTU National Federation of Trade Unions *Libya*

NUB National Unity Bloc *Bahrain*

NUC National Union Committee *Bahrain*

NUPO Nasserist Unionist People's Organisation *Yemen*

OCC Oman Consultative Council

ONM Organisation Nationale des Moudjahidine *Algeria*

PAGN Parti d'Avant-Garde Nationale *Mauritania*

PAGS Parti de l'Avant-Garde Socialiste *Algeria*

PAM Parti Authenticité et Modernité *Morocco*

PDP Parti Démocrate Progressiste *Tunisa*

PDRY People's Democratic Republic of Yemen

PDT Progressive Democratic Tribune *Yemen*

PFLO Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman

PPC Political Parties Committee *Egypt*

PPM Parti du Peuple Mauritanie

PRDR Parti Républicain Démocratique pour le Renouvellement *Mauritania*

PRDS Parti Républicain Démocratique et Social *Mauritania*

PSD Parti Socialiste Destourien *Tunisa*

PWF Professional Worker's Federation *Libya*

PWP People's Will Party *Syria*

RCC Revolutionary Command Council *Libya*

RCD Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique *Tunisia*

RCT Rational Choice Theory

RFD Regroupement des Forces Démocratiques *Mauritania*

RND Rassemblement National Démocratique *Algeria*

RNI Rassemblement National des Indépendants *Morocco*

RS Revolutionary Socialists *Egypt*

SATEF Syndicat Autonome des Travailleurs de l'Education et de la Formation *Algeria*

SCC State Consultative Council *Oman*

SIPES Syndicat Indépendant des Professeurs de l'Enseignement Secondaire *Mauritania*

SIT Syndicat Islamique du Travail *Algeria*

SMT Social Movement Theory

SNAPAP Syndicat National Autonome des Personnels de l'Administration Publique *Algeria*

SNEM Syndicat National des Étudiants de Mauritanie

SNES Syndicat National d'Ensignment Secondaire *Mauritania*

SNIM Société Nationale d'Industrielle Minière *Mauritania*

SNJT Syndicat National des Journalistes Tunisiens

SNPSP Syndicat National des Praticiens de Santé Publique *Algeria*

SNS Syndicate National de Sonatrach *Algeria*

SOE State Owned Enterprise(s)

SOEC deterioration of the authoritarian bargain

TNC Transitional National Council *Libya*

TPMN Touche Pas à Ma Nationalité *Mauritania*

TRI role of tribalism concerning upward mobility

UC Union Constitutionnelle *Morocco*

UDC Union des Diplomés Chômeurs *Tunisia*

UFD Union des Forces Démocratiques-Ère Nouvelle *Mauritania*

UFP Union des Forces de Progrés *Mauritania*

UGET Union Générale des Étudiants de Tunisie

UGSA Union General de Syndicats Algériens

UGTA Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens

UGTL Union Générale des Travailleurs Libyens

UGTM Union Générale des Travailleurs du Maroc

UGTM* Union Générale des Travailleurs de Mauritanie

UGTT Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail

UMT Union General du Travail *Morocco*

UNFA Union Nationale des Femmes Algériennes

UNFP Union Nationale des Forces Populaires *Morocco*

UNJA Union Nationale de la Jeunesse Algérienne

UNPA Union Nationale des Paysans Algériens

UPD Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès *Mauritania*

UPR Union Pour la République *Mauritania*

URETAE Union of Real Estate Tax Authority Employees *Egypt*

USFP Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires *Morocco*

USTA Union de Syndicat de Travailleurs Algériens

UTICA Union Tunisienne de l'Industrie, du Commerce et de l'Artisanat

UTM Union des Travailleurs de Mauritanie

WFTU World Federation of Trade Unions

YAR Yemen Arab Republic

YSP Yemeni Socialist Party

YWTUF Yemeni Workers Trade Union Federation

Contents

Chapter 1

Introduction: Between Authoritarianism, Comparative Politics, and Social Movement Theory

On February 10 2011, Lee and Weinthal (2011) stated in an online article of *The Guardian* that perhaps "the most overlooked factor in the demise of the authoritarian Ben Ali regime in Tunisia, and the weakening of Hosni Mubarak's grip on state power in Egypt, has been the trade unions in both countries." The assessment is little surprising, bearing in mind that Lee is the founding editor of *LabourStart*, a news and campaigning website of the international trade union movement. That does not mean that this appraisal should be discarded in advance, as trade unions did indeed play their roles during the Arab uprisings of 2011 - 2013. However, it is part of a dilemma in which the news coverage of Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries as well as the discipline of Middle Eastern Studies has been stuck for some decades.

On the one hand, trade unions are mentioned - if at all - *en passant*, together with other mass organisations in corporatist authoritarian arrangements, or they are often lumped together with other civil society organisations. That attitude engenders a clear and critical lack of scrutiny of the history, nature, and position of trade unions and trade union movements within the structures of power in the respective countries. Against that background, many of the writings about trade unions in MENA suffer from a misery of indeterminacy. Literature is packed with sentences that include wordings like *trade unions did*, *trade unions have*, *trade unions were*, or *trade unions are*, with no clarification about which trade unions are talked about, in which sectors they were active, who was in charge, or what were their motives. Much of the internal struggles, fragmentations, and dynamics within these entities is neglected, and, indeed, there is something inaccurate when Lee uses the word "overlooked", as you can only overlook something you are actually searching for.

Especially before 2011, the bulk of journalists and scientists focused on security, terrorism, authoritarianism, sectarianisation, economic issues, and betimes human rights abuse. This attitude is somewhat understandable, as the Arab World is of particular interest for the "Western" mainstream for reasons interconnected with the aforementioned fields. In this light, MENA is a strategically relevant neighbouring region of Europe under constant tension. In times of globalisation and glocalisation, such tensions challenge policy-makers in Europe directly on at least three levels - by voters' opinions influenced by human right activists, by direct migration into the European Union, and by terrorism as a transnational phenomena.

On the other hand, information about trade unionism in MENA is more than often supplied by networks and scientists who are genuinely sympathetic towards trade unionism as such. Sometimes, it seems that they pounce on any glimpse of workers' struggle, keeping hopes up that the workers movement might become independent from the regimes some day. These contributions are rather focused on events than on the very structures of trade unions within the regimes, implicitly expecting the workers of MENA to finally develop class consciousness and to rise against the capitalist class. This category also includes many scientific macro-analysis, especially those with a Marxist or Neo-Marxist inclination, which already made Somers (1989, p.325) ask why the prevailing task seems not to be "how to explain [...] what is or has been empirically present, but rather the failure of people to behave correctly according to a [Marxian] theoretical prediction". This *epistemology of absence* (Lockman, 1993; Somers, 1989) led to much frustration and a feeling of disappointment - as many Arab trade unions do indeed have a close relationship to the regimes. They are interstratified with regime loyalists, co-opted into the state apparatus, and seem to have somewhat lost connection with the needs and demands of their base. While elsewhere in the world labour unions are ascribed the potential of being a "watchdog to make elites accountable, model democratic behaviours, act as a mediator between the elites and the citizenry in finding solutions to social, economic and political problems" (Fick, 2009, p.250), Middle Eastern and North African unions are often merely regarded as the "watchdog of the regimes" (Schmidinger, 2013).

The thesis at hand aims at filling the gaps that both aforementioned currents have left. It is based on the belief that, first, trade unions are an important factor in MENA countries and that they do deserve more attention. This includes a comprehensive breakdown of how they emerged, their strategies and limits in the past, and what their relationship to the regimes was like. Second, it aims at giving an overview of the behaviour and stance of trade unions during the critical juncture of 2011 - 2013, when MENA regimes came under heavy pressure. The analysis does not only focus on *what* happened during that time but also aims at shedding light on the circumstances, preconditions, and (inter)dependencies that led to a particular behaviour of trade unions. Hence, the objective is to understand *how* and *why* trade unionism did - or did not - try

to change power structures in a sample of twelve MENA countries - without resorting to class analysis only.

This study uses recent techniques from the fields of comparative politics and combines authoritarianism research with social movement theory to assess the role of trade unionism during the critical juncture of 2011-2013. It resorts to *Qualitative Comparative Analysis* (QCA), a method initially developed by Charles Ragin (1987) based on Boolean logic that allows for the identification of multiple conjunctural causations.[1]. The core concept and main level for comparison in this study is the *institutional equilibrium*, a concept borrowed from Rational Choice Theory, of each country. By that way, particularistic approaches to explain the power structures of single MENA countries can be included into a meta-framework, without the study becoming dependent on their individual parameters. The superordinate research question is: *"Under which circumstances did trade unions adopt a transformative stance during the protests of 2011-2012 in the MENA Region?"*. Here, transformative refers to the attempt to alter the in 2010/2011 existing institutional equilibrium of the state.

1.1   Why Study the "Arab Spring"?

The upheavals and unrest that shook the MENA region since the beginning of 2011 is a remarkable juncture in many aspects. The years before, Middle Eastern Studies were so preoccupied with analysing the stability of the regimes that the mass protests and the eventual ouster of four heads of state caught the community off-guard (Gause III, 2011). The exceptionally rapid, intense, and relatively simultaneous popular protests generated a common identity and points of references for movements across the region (Lynch, 2013), also setting up ties cross-cutting borders, as, for instants, cooperation between Tunisian and Libyan youth movements shows. The surprising and quick ouster of the long term ruler of Tunisia started a domino effect that struck other Arab states like an external shock. The uprising in Tunisia created a kind of blueprint or *master frame* for other countries. Indeed, early risers often create master frames that can "pry open institutional barriers through which the demands of other groups can pour" (Tarrow, 2018, p.167). In 2011, this did not only happen inside a single country - it affected an entire region.

Among the things that had been underestimated by scholars dealing with the MENA region before 2011 was the importance of laws and other institutions. Besides "bread and butter" demands, protesters in 2011 and beyond made demands for a change in the legal frameworks of MENA countries, like constitutions, electoral laws, or labour legislation. These legal documents, which have often been considered not worth the paper they were written on, nonetheless, shaped systems sui generis and have increas-

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[1]For those not familiar with the approach, section 2 offers a detailed introduction about the basics and possibilities of QCA.

ingly been a base for political opposition. Brown (2002) had already concluded in his comparative study about constitutionalism in the Arab world that, sooner or later, these kind of institutions indeed do matter.

By that way, protests pushed the regimes into action. Demands reached from the fall of the regime (*isqat al-nizam*) to the mere reform of the regime (*islah al-nizam*), but, in any case, for a period of at least a few months, nearly every MENA regime seemed to be skating on thin ice. Indeed, the region witnessed palpable changes caused by the protests. Table 1.1 (taken from Razzaz and Razzaz (2013)[2]) gives an overview:

Table 1.1: Course and Reactions to the protests 2010 - 2012 in Arab countries

	FISCAL EXPANSION	DISRUPTION IN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY	CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT	CONDUCT ELECTIONS	CHANGE IN THE CONSTITUTION	REMOVAL OF HEAD OF STATE
Tunisia	X	X	X	X	X	X
Egypt	X	X	X	X	X	X
Libya	X	X	X	X	X	X
Yemen	X	X	X	X	X	X
Syria	X	X	X	X	X	
Morocco	X	X	X	X	X	
Jordan	X	X	X	X	X	
Bahrain	X	X	X	X		
Algeria	X	X	X	X		
Sudan	X	X	X	X		
Kuwait	X	X	X	X		
Oman	X	X	X			
Lebanon	X	X				
Iraq	X	X				
Saudi Arabia	X	X				
UAE	X					

Although the overall results of the reform endeavours often did not meet the expectations of the opposition nor the international community (Brownlee et al., 2015), the upheavals that started in 2011 can be classified as a *critical juncture*. Basically, a critical juncture is a time of uncertainty in which the rules of the game in a political system can be re-negotiated and new path dependencies may emerge. This period of political crisis is a lacmus test for loyalties, reveals strength and strategies of political players, and provides a - sometimes abrupt - change of opportunity structures. An elaborate introduction of the trinity of institutional equilibrium, critical juncture, and interference factors is given in section 4.2.

A second feature that makes the Arab upheavals a valuable period for academic research is the initially intrinsic nature of the events that took place during that time as well as their course. The events came abruptly and the international community was widely unprepared. These circumstances made it difficult to launch theories and hypotheses that focussed on the role of big players in international relations, as it was

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[2]Having delivered a comprehensive overview, the authors, nonetheless, overlooked the reshuffling of the cabinet in Oman 2011/2012. The exchange of ministers was a major demand of the protesters in the Gulf country. Furthermore, developments after 2013, like the constitutional change in Algeria in 2014, are not included. As the scope of the thesis at hand ends in 2013, the overview is sufficient.

done with many domestic decisions and events in MENA before. It is this *domestic moment* that renders the upheavals of 2011 particularly valuable for science, in that it reveals the importance of local power structures, opposition forces, networks, and also the legal framework of the countries. It is also a opportunity to correct some assumptions and premises of authoritarianism research. As Gause III (2011), one of the first scholars to publicly admit the shortcomings of pre-2011 MENA research puts it: "Explaining the stability of Arab authoritarians was an important analytic task, but it led some of us to underestimate the forces for change that were bubbling below, and at times above, the surface of Arab politics". Among the forces bubbling below the surface, as the course of the upheavals showed, were also trade unions and trade union activists.

1.2   A Study Entering many Uncharted Waters

In order to answer the research question above, a long road had to be taken, as this study delves into uncharted waters in many aspects. First, no study involving and scrutinising the institutional equilibria of twelve Arab countries has ever been published. The institutional equilibria, roughly explained, answers the question why these states do not collapse or disintegrate from within.

A similar research agenda does exist. However, instead of engaging at length in detailed country comparisons,[3] the most prominent social science publications about MENA focussed on the relation between authoritarianism and the third wave of democracy, and the authoritarian resilience in particular (Carothers, 2002; Schlumberger and Albrecht, 2004; Posusney, 2004; Anderson, 2006; Schlumberger, 2007; Murphy, 2008)[4]. Much of this literature including larger monographs and collections (Lust-Okar and Zerhouni, 2008; King, 2009; Lust, 2013), just like the study at hand, builds up on insights from political economy (Beblawi and Luciani, 1987; Richards and Waterbury, 2014). Often, also other macro-level perspectives on MENA countries that also incorporate cultural aspects (Harik, 1990; Bill and Springborg, 2000) are included. While these studies provide valuable insights, they also still lack depth and systematisation in many aspects. Second, no systematic and comprehensive *confirmation*[5] about the nature and embedding of trade unions into the institutional equilibrium and their positioning towards

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[3] Numerous comparisons covering a wide range of topics and including two to three countries do exist. However, given the twelve country sample of this thesis, it would go beyond the scope of this introduction to introduce all existing combinations. A valuable overview can be found in the outstanding introduction *Comparative Politics of the Middle East and North Africa* in Yom and Gasiorowski (2019).

[4] As the patchwork of concepts that can be found in the discipline is one of the main reasons the study at hand resorts to the concept of the institutional equilibrium, a more elaborate literature review can be found in the section introducing the design, in particular part 4.3.1.

[5] A basic premise of the study at hand is that science must consist of *confirmation* and *explanation*. For an elaborate view on this distinction see the chapter *Scientific Explanation* in *Introduction to the Philosophy of Science* by Salmon (1999). As the part of the confirmation lags behind many conclusions in Middle Eastern Studies, the study at hand resorts to thick descriptions in the case studies.

the state authorities has been published yet. From a historical perspective, a collection edited by Zachary Lockman (1993) scrutinised state-workers relations in the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, and Iran, and three years later a collection edited by Ellis Goldberg (1996) focussed on the history of the labour movement in Turkey, Syria, Israel, Egypt and the Maghreb. These contributions do not claim to be comparative nor introduce any kind of abstract level of comparison.[6]. Covering more recent developments, there has been a focus on workers and workers' movements foremost in Egypt (Beinin and Lockman, 1988; Posusney, 1997; Shehata, 2009), especially under the premises of economic opening and the role of the highly co-opted and monopolistic Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF). Comparative endeavours processing these results in order to gain a more comprehensive picture of state-labour relations in MENA are still missing in Western literature. Symptomatically, although not encompassing all possible aspects, the most comprehensive attempt to explain the weakness of trade unions in MENA has been delivered by Yemeni Journalist Al-Sama'i (2019a,b,c) in Arab online articles. Also written in Arabic, Salibi (2017) scrutinises trade unions in MENA *after* 2011, albeit devoting little space and time to the very histories of the movements and countries. In an exceptional study of a Western scholar, Thomas Schmidinger (2004) analysed the workers' movement in Sudan from a historical perspective and concludes that the trade union movement was heavily intertwined with the independence movement and the history of the communist parties. The author also found similar patterns in Egypt, Algeria, Syria, South Yemen, and Iraq. It is also Schmidinger (2013) who gave the most comprehensive overview of trade union action during the Arab uprisings in 2011, albeit focussing on the epicentres of trade unionism like Egypt and Tunisia and omitting other cases worthwhile to analyse like Yemen or Kuwait.

Third, the role of trade unions and trade unionism during the Arab uprisings 2011 - 2013 has been analysed foremost with a focus on the Tunisian Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT) (Yousfi, 2013, 2015, 2017; Wilder, 2015; Bellin, 2015; Aduani and Ben Sedrine, 2018), the newly emerged trade union movement in Egypt (El-Mahdi, 2011; Alexander and Auragh, 2014; Beinin, 2015; Abdalla, 2017), or both (Hartshorn, 2018). And while single area experts also analyse trade unions during the protest in Morocco and Mauritania (Buehler, 2015b) or Jordan (Adely, 2011), trade unions appeared mostly in small paragraphs or subclauses of publications that dealt with the Arab Spring in a more broad perspective[7] (Lynch, 2013; Kamrava, 2014b; Joffé, 2014; Sadiki, 2015).

Fourth, as a method, QCA has barely been applied to study MENA. The approach is almost completely new to a discipline that is used to implement qualitative methods and which is driven by the need of policy consulting to produce quick inferences

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[6]For an elaborate overview of publications and trends concerning the history of the working class in the Middle East and North Africa see Jones (2015).

[7]For a more elaborate summary of the evolution of comparative politics in MENA before and after the uprisings of 2011 see Schwedler (2015).

- which often do not necessarily need to be backed by strong sources. QCA, which needs either a stable base of data or much in-depth research, has entered research about the MENA region in the last years only. Publications using the approach in MENA dealt with long-term monarchical survival (Bank et al., 2015), different paths to democratisation (Alijla and Aghdam, 2017), and the analysis of Security Council sanctions (Boogaerts and Drieskens, 2020). In 2014, methodologist and QCA expert Priscilla Álamos-Álamos-Concha (2014) presented her QCA study *Pathways to Revolution* at World Congress of Middle Eastern Studies (WOCMES) in Ankara; beyond these contributions, QCA remains a dark horse in Middle Eastern Studies.

1.3   Why and How this Study Uses Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)

This study can be characterised as standing in the tradition of Comparative Historical Analysis (CHA, Skocpol and Somers (1980);Pierson and Skocpol (2002); Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003)). Against this background, the method of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is used as an amendment to, and enhancement of CHA. Using QCA with a clear qualitative focus, as explained in section 3.2, bears the advantage of providing a higher degree of systematisation of data and transparency of the research process.

Qualitative Comparative Analysis is a comparative method that initially resorted to Boolean Algebra and used the Quine-McCluskey Algorithm in order to find patterns of similarity and difference between cases. Those cases are classified into the presence (1) or absence (0) of a particular outcome, and turned into combinations of variables which are also coded according to the absence (0) or presence (1) of variables. The configurations can be minimised in order to eliminate variables that were *not* affecting the particular outcome. Section 2 elaborates on the roots, methods and possibilities of the approach.

QCA bears several advantages vis-á-vis quantitative methods such as regression analysis and pure qualitative methods. It is also particularly fruitful when the number of available cases as well as access to large datasets is limited (Taylor et al., 2011; Jordan et al., 2011). Given the problem of sparseness of reliable data of the MENA region which is often exacerbated by incompleteness and fraudulence, QCA seems a promising approach for the region and other area studies. Furthermore, QCA is able to identify multiple pathways with different combinations of variables leading to the same outcome. These different paths may reveal similarities and exceptions among the cases, and the different intersections can enhance knowledge about their relationships. Much has been written since Ragin (1987) introduced QCA for the first time. The version that uses a clear dichotomisation is by now labelled Crisp Set Qualitative Com-

parative Analysis (csQCA). It has been complemented with a version that allows for a subdivision of the outcome in more than two outcomes called Multivariate Qualitative Comparative Analysis (mvQCA), Cronqvist (2007), and a version that uses fuzzy sets called Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), Ragin (2000, 2008); Rihoux and Ragin (2009, chap.5)) where outcome and variables can be categorised according to an interval scale of choice.

The study at hand uses csQCA in its very basic form as it was first introduced in 1987. The utilisation of mvQCA is not advisable due to the small sample (twelve cases) of this study. In mvQCA, just as in csQCA, the minimisation of two configurations require that only *one* variable differs. Given the very small n sample size, the probability that reasonable and parsimonious outcomes are produced is comparatively low.

The decision not to resort to fsQCA was less easy to make. A more fine disaggregation of the cases of Libya, Oman, and Yemen which all share the same configuration in the truth table (see Appendix A.2) could probably have yielded more insights about the strength and interplay of different variables. As the nature of almost all variables that are tested is qualitative, and a reasonable scaling is difficult due to the devastating data availability, a simple dichotomisation and interpretation of the data seemed more fruitful.[8].

In addition, key to this study are more pragmatic considerations. In the course of QCA's thirty years of history, the approach and the theoretical discussions became increasingly formalised and mathematised. While the initial process of QCA, as introduced at the end of the 1980s, could be conducted with pencil and paper, newer versions of the approach require a proper software, and theoretical discussions are packed with formulas. This is a bewildering and somewhat amusing paradox, keeping in mind the history of QCA's initially used algorithm. The Quine-McCluskey algorithm is mainly based upon the works of Willard van Omen Quine, who proved the technique on philosophical-logical grounds (Quine, 1952, 1955). It was refined by electrical engineer McCluskey (1956) who acknowledged its usefulness, but regarded the original handling as "unwieldy". His main contribution was the change of the notation. As a philosopher, Quine had used Greek letters only for literal formulas and normal formulas (Quine, 1952). In other words, all that McCluskey did was to declinker the method from the encrypted language of a niche expert. This made it possible for Ragin and Drass to adopt the algorithm, and allowed it to enter into political science. Today, the pressure from quantitative methodologists drags QCA again into a more encrypted direction. As useful and - from a scientific point of view - perfectly right this development is, it bears the disadvantage of leaving much of the scientific community behind. Whilst QCA was introduced as a middle-path between qualitative and quantitative research, some contributions nowadays seem to only target researchers who are trained exclusively in quantitative methods. For the field of Middle Eastern Studies, consisting

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[8]For a more detailed view on the possible pitfalls and paradoxes of fuzzy set QCA see (Cooper and Glaesser, 2011).

of anthropology, cultural studies, language, political theory, or just like for any other interdisciplinary area studies, synergistic effects may remain untapped. Years of study have often made experts, no matter the subject, lose track of what a layperson or a colleague from another discipline really understands about a topic or method. QCA theorists have to be careful that they do not make the approach a patchwork of scientific subfamilies that develop progressively into hermetics.

The target audience of a study is - and should be - a pivotal element of any study. If the study is meant to be read by individuals outside the scientific community, namely NGO activists, policy consultants, politicians, or peers from neighbouring disciplines using different approaches, the needs of these groups should be met. From a different angle, modern techniques and enhanced methods indeed *do* produce more accurate and precise results. The balance of scientific complexity and comprehensibility for a greater audience is a field of psychology that has barely been addressed in social sciences. If the target audience is larger than the scientific community, it can be particularly fruitful to depict matters with less complexity or invest in more time and space to explain difficult concepts thoroughly. Funkhouser and Maccoby (1971) have already found that articles written for a rather unqualified audience did not repel specialists and interested readers, whereas more demanding articles repelled all but the specialists. Moreover and more recently, Scharrer et al. (2017) have found that popularised articles addressed to a lay audience made laypeople agree more with the knowledge contained in the claims than scientific articles addressed to expert audiences did. Furthermore, the study could not prove that reading popularised depictions did lead laypeople to perceive the topic as being less complex and less controversial than reading scientific depictions.

The tensions between public understanding and scientific complexity is another reason why this study uses csQCA. After having run a test-wise model with fsQCA I decided that the additional insights that were yielded did not outweigh the surplus of complexity. As chapter 3 argues, QCA is, by that way, regarded as an evolutionary extension of Comparative Historical Analysis.

Concerning further methodological aspects, this study resolves contradictions of the truth table completely. The possibility to include contradictions into the minimisation process in order to determine the *consistency* (Ragin, 2006) of the final terms at the very end is a valuable possibility to deal with large n or randomised sample size. However, the smaller the sample size is, the more time a researcher has to get deeper into the cases and to adjust the model.[9] The usage of *coverage* (Ragin, 2006) is also renounced in this study; a detailed explanation is thus given in section 3.2.

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[9]For further problems with the measurement of consistency in QCA see Haesebrouck (2015).

1.4   Outline and Course of the Study

When Przeworski and Teune (1970) demanded from the scientific community in social science to exchange "names for variables", their implicit assumption was that scientists dealt with almost complete datasets. After I had decided to analyse the roles of trade unions during the 2011 uprisings, I was astonished to which extent reliable data, empirical backed inferences, and detailed descriptions of domestic interdependencies in MENA countries are missing. This is a reason why almost 800 sources have been included into this study in order to confirm the institutional equilibria of the twelve cases, the history and role of trade unions within these equilibria, the course of the uprisings of 2011 - 2013, and, also in order to set up meaningful variables. The lion's share, still, consists of relevant scientific literature from anthropology, sociology, history, political science, economics, and other disciplines integrated into the field of Middle Eastern Studies. Additionally, legislative documents in three languages[10], official statements of trade unions and state officials, surveys of the International Trade Union Confederation, as well as reports from online and analogous Newspapers (foremost *Al-Jazeera* and *Al-Quds al-'Arabi*), have been used. Data has been taken from the databases of the World Bank, the International Labor Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the Economic Complexity Index of the MIT Media Laboratory of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

The second chapter of this study gives a detailed introduction of the process and possibilities of QCA. There, the truth table, Boolean operations like the de Morgan calculations, and the difference between conservative, theory-guided, and absolute minimisations will be explained. Those who are already familiar with the approach are welcomed to skip that section; for those who break new ground dealing with QCA this section is highly recommended.

Chapter three dives deep into the foundations of QCA. The chapter identifies QCA as a successor of Comparative Historical Analysis and classifies it as a late impact of the behavioural revolution on social science, and depicts systematisation as QCA's main innovation. Furthermore, the chapter argues that QCA can be regarded as a chameleon approach that is qualitative or quantitative only depending on the sample size n. Finally some major criticisms are addressed. The quintessence of the chapter is the credo for the entire study being *to hold the case studies as thick as possible and as parsimonious as necessary, and the minimisation and interpretations as thick as necessary and as parsimonious as possible.*

Chapter four introduces the research design. The trinity of institutional equilibrium, critical juncture, and interference factors is elaborated on. To begin with, some guidelines for the study in inter-cultural contexts are set up. A key conclusion is that concepts may not be able to travel from one region of the world to another. While this is covered by the concept of institutional equilibrium regarding the state, trade

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[10]All translations from Arabic to English have been made by the author.

unions in MENA have different histories, features, and meanings for the local populace than they may have in OECD countries. First, trade unions have traditionally been close to the state, as the history of many trade unions is heavily intertwined with anti-colonialism and nationalism. Furthermore, their predecessor in many regions, Islamic Guilds, were even embedded into the state administrations. Second, the Marxist turn of organised labour as witnessed in many European countries at the end of the 19th century did not happen in a comparable manner in MENA countries. Socialist and communist ideologies did play a role, however, they were only one stream alongside with other forces including the very state and state class, Arab nationalists, Islamists, and even tribal associations. Eventually the study at hand establishes a definition of trade union that is geared towards the concept of an Arab *Naqaba*.

Chapter five introduces the five variables for the QCA minimisation. These are the deterioration of the authoritarian bargain (SOEC), intertwinedness with oppositional forces (INOPP), centralisation vs. fragmentation of trade unions degree of centralisation of trade union institutions (CEN), role of tribalism concerning upward mobility (TRI), bargaining strength of trade unions in key sectors of the economy (KEYS). The chapter derives the variables from literature about trade unionism in OECD countries and, as an anticipation, from observations taken from the case studies. Moreover, variables that were not included into the minimisation process are discussed.

Chapter six contains the twelve case studies. The sequence of the cases is determined with the help of a distance matrix and chain of comparison in order to maximise the differences in the configurations in the consecutive cases. By that way, the nature and thresholds of the variables and the classifications of the cases become clearer. The case studies follow a fixed meta-pattern: First the institutional equilibrium of the country is introduced, followed by an analysis of the nature, history, and strategies of trade unions inside this institutional equilibrium. A third section deals with the events during the critical juncture that started in 2011 within the respective country and the position of trade unions vis-á-vis inference factors.

In Chapter seven and eight the minimisations are discussed, and major findings are summarised and interpreted. The study ends with prospects for future research projects.

Chapter 2

QCA as Method

The Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is not only located at the border between variable and case oriented research, as Ragin stresses constantly. It is moreover located at the spot where in the philosophy of science where not only the tectonic plates of variable oriented research and case oriented research meet, but also the plates of induction and deduction as well as positivism and constructivism slide past each other. The position on this particular hot spot renders the QCA approach innovative on the one hand, and relatively difficult to map according to its foundations on the other. By mixing different traditions, the approach overcomes many flaws, however, many flaws are inherited as well. Therefore, the first part of this thesis deals with QCA as a Method, followed by an outline of its theoretical foundations.

The basic features of QCA have been introduced and discussed in several publications especially around the year 2010 (Cronqvist, 2007; Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009; Schneider and Wagemann, 2009; Rihoux and Ragin, 2009; Grofman and Schneider, 2009; Badie et al., 2011; Berg Schlosser and Cronqvist, 2012). The reason for dealing in detail with the approach here is to show the roots of the approach and to lower transaction costs for the reader who is not familiar with the approach. This is of utmost importance, as the audience of the thesis at hand will be the scientific community on the one hand but also, and in the long run maybe foremost, policy makers and individuals working in fields outside academia.

A focus will also be put on the transformations and (re)interpretations of the data in the *dialogue between the data and theory.* Apart from noteworthy exceptions like Fritzsche (2014), only few authors go deep into the mechanisms and possibilities of QCA and Boolean Algebra that can be used during that dialogue.

2.1 Boolean Algebra and Set Theory

Ragin (1987, p.85) himself states rightly that it would not be necessary to understand Boolean Algebra in its entirety to comprehend its use in comparative social science.

For those unfamiliar with different algebraic assumptions, set theory, or QCA, and for those who are simply interested by nature, this section will go a little beyond the common introduction of the system in mainstream QCA literature. Those familiar with Boolean logic or QCA are welcomed to skip this section, although a glance on section 2.1 might be useful, as an understanding of the binary notation used throughout this thesis helps to trace the minimisation process.

Assumptions from Aristotele to Bool to Circuits

Repeatedly the QCA literature stresses that the approach rests on Boolean algebra. Georege Boole made important contributions to the philosophy of logic, especially by his books *"The Mathematical Analysis of Logic"* (1847) and *"An Investigation of the Laws of Thought"* (1854), and like Leibnitz before him, Boole attempted to describe comprehensively mathematically operating systems that try to substitute verbal reasoning by a genuine symbolic calculation (Diagne, 1990, p.8). Ever since then, Boolean logic entered different realms of science and practice, and coined the fields of propositional calculus (also called propositional logic, sentential calculus, or sentential logic) in philosophy, probability calculus, set theory, electrical engineering, and eventually computer sciences and informatics. Although the foundations are the same, the notations of the different subfields differ. Table 2.1 gives a brief overview.

First-order logic		Digital Logic			Set Theory		QCA	
$\vee$	OR	$+$	OR	$\cup$	union		$+$	OR
$\wedge$	AND	$\cdot$	AND	$\cap$	intersection		n/a	AND
F	FALSE	0	false	S(Z)	null set		0	false
T	TRUE	1	true	S(U)	full set		1	true
$\neg A$	NOT A	$\bar{A}$	not A	C(S)	complementary set		a	not A

Table 2.1: Operators in Different Contexts of Boolean Algebra

The main pillars and starting points of the different realms can already be traced back to three Axioms of Aristotle:

The law of identity $(A = A)$ A thing is a thing and not another thing. So, whenever a thing is labelled it is essential that this label stays the same during the entire process of reasoning. Moreover, every law proved while resorting to the label or symbol tied to a certain meaning remains true when the meaning - symbol connection stays the same.

The law of non-contradiction:$(\neg(A \wedge \neg A))$ A thing cannot be and not be at the same time, or, be and be its opposite at the same time. Moreover, a statement cannot be true and false at the same time. There is no possibility that A exists and (formally: $\wedge$) A is not (formally: $\neg$) A at the same moment.

The law of excluded middle ($A \lor \neg A$)   There is nothing inbetween false and true. A statement can only be false or true and a thing can be or (formally: $\lor$) and there is no third option.

Boole (1854, p. 241) thought that Aristotle's logic was not a science but a collection of scientific truths, too incomplete to form a system of itself, so he introduced some amendments[1] of which three help to understand QCA: First, Boole introduced the (1) as universal term indicating the truthful existence of something. A square is a square and a polygon, hence (1 = s·p). He also introduced the (0) to show nonentity: A square that is also a circle does not exist (0 s·c). The structure of these equations is still used as basic substructure of QCA formulas. Second, Boole introduced a way to express tautologies: A circle and a circle is a circle (c = cc). Last but not least, where Aristotle saw predications between common substantives to common substantives Boole saw equations between class-terms. That is a reason why today[2], Boolean Algebra is often referred to as modus operandi in the *algebra of classes*, a subfield of logic that is sometimes regarded as an independent discipline itself (Flegg, 1964). According to the concept of class - which is also used in QCA - classes can be formed out of heterogenous basic populations. Humanity can be divided into the classes "feminine" and "masculine" (ignoring for the sake of parsimony some individuals claiming not to be represented by this dichotomy), and if we set a particular threshold at a particular height, say, 1,60m, we can divide humanity in "small" (< 1,60m) and "tall" (>1,60m). In a nutshell, classes are collections of instanaces, objects, or sets consisting of entities that can be unambiguously defined by a property that all its members share. Classes can be regarded as arbitrary collections of sets, qualifying as sets if they are also elements of some class.[3]

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[1]The following is taken mainly from Corcoran (2003)

[2] The word "today" is here of importance, as Boole lived and was active before huge parts of mathematics, like arithmetics by Gottlob Frege or set theory by Georg Cantor, were categorized, standardised and canonized in the second half of the 19th century. Many scholars were unpleasantly surprised to discover while reading Boole's logical writings "how ill-constructed his theory actually was and how confused his explanations of it is" (Dummett, 1959; Corcoran, 2003)). Maybe this is the reason why Boole is often misinterpreted and adorned by others with borrowed plumes. Corcoran (2003, p.282) puts it in unadorned words, stating that "Boole is one of the most misunderstood of the major philosophers of logic. He gets criticised for things he did not do, or did not do wrong. [...] He gets off without blame for errors and omissions he should have corrected himself. He gets credit for things he did not do, or did not do right. He did not write the first book on pure mathematics, he did not present a decision procedure, and he did not devise boolean algebra."

[3]After some cataclysms in mathematics, among other things because of the Russel-Paradox, the definition of class and set which is underlying these statements and which will be used in this study was introduced at the end of the 19th century. Any set is a class but not any class is a set (for a more elaborate view see (Muller, 2001)). These definitions were also unknown to Boole.

Standard Operations and Notation

The Boolean propositional logic allowed for calculations that are able to reveal whether combined statements of classifications are true or false. Taking a look back on table 2.1, one may ask why in digital logic and also QCA the plus (+) sign is used to describe OR while the dot (·), actually known from multiplication is taken to describe AND although this use is rather counter-intuitive. The reason can be found in the hierarchisation of mathematical operations: In decimal algebra multiplication and division has to be conducted first, then addition and subtraction. The signs in digital logic do not refer any more to the operations conducted in arithmetics but to the order of operations. By that way, hierachised operations similar to arithmetic math can be conducted, most notably the

Cumulative Laws
$$A + B = B + A \quad \text{and} \quad A \cdot B = B \cdot A \tag{2.1}$$

Associative Laws
$$A + (B + C) = (A + B) + C \quad \text{and} \quad A \cdot (B \cdot C) = (A \cdot B) \cdot C \quad and \tag{2.2}$$

Distributive Law
$$A \cdot (B + C) = A \cdot B + A \cdot C \tag{2.3}$$

Additionally, as a variable and its complement represent 1 and 0, some calculus operation have a deviant outcome compared to standard arithmetic. Variables and their complements cancel each other out and potentialisation is ignored, as the potentialisation of 1 leads to the outcome 1 and the potentialisation of 0 leads to the outcome 0. Additionally, according to set theory, the set A OR the intersection of the set A with another set B (A AND B) is the same as the set A only, as the equation describes no elements outside of A. Therefore, the following three statements are true:

$$(A \cdot B) + (A \cdot \bar{B}) = A \tag{2.4}$$

$$(A + B) \cdot (A + \bar{B}) = A \tag{2.5}$$

$$\text{because} \quad B\bar{B} = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad B + \bar{B} = 1$$

$$AB + A = A \tag{2.6}$$

With the help of these operations, *de Morgan's Law* can be applied, showing what is explicitly *not* part of the set. Assuming a found configuration in a QCA analysis is the intersection of A and B, then everything what is not A and not B would be the parts that are not covered by the first configuration. De Morgan's Law is applied by

turning all variables into their negatives and by changing all ANDs with ORs and vice versa. Hence:

$$1 = AB \longmapsto (a + b) = 0 \tag{2.7}$$

Using Binary Notation in QCA

QCA uses the aforementioned methods in order to find pattern and congruence between the constructed classes and the constructed sets. As in the course of the study a binary notation for QCA will be used for the sake of higher transparency, a short excursus to binary notations is worthwhile.

Our decimal number system, with radix = 10 that prescribes that the tenth number counting from zero becomes two-digit, and after ten two-digit blocs it becomes three-digit and so forth, is accepted for most common mathematical operations. However, endless other number systems are possible. Dealing with a system of two values being true or false expressed the values (1) and (0) respectively can be represented by a number system with the radix 2. Any positive integral radix r can be converted into the decimal system by:

$$\sum_{k=-q}^{p} a_k \ r^k; 0 \leq \ a_k \ \leq r - 1 \tag{2.8}$$

whereas q is the amount of places after the decimal point, meaning lower than zero, and p is the amount of numerals before the decimal point, meaning higher or equal zero[4] The common ground between the binary system (r=2) and Boolean Algebra and set theory is the common domain of the numbers 0,1, also called *Boolean Domain*. Basically, the binary notation goes back to the roots of the QCA approach: It uses a combination of two-elementary Boolean Algebra and set theory that emerged in the context of switches and *switching algebra* and that was presumably first mentioned by Ehrenfest in 1910 (Greniewski et al., 1955) but had its ultimate breakthrough due to a contribution by Shannon in 1938 (Shannon, 1938; Flegg, 1964). A QCA notation, for instants ABC that indicates that all three statements are true and form a conjuncture can also be written as 111. The number 111 in the binary system equals the number 7 in the decimal system. By that way decimal numbers can be allotted to the configurations. This is used in the minimisation process as described in the next section.

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[4]For instants, using $r = 10$ the decimal number 512 can be expressed as: $2 \cdot 10^0 + 1 \cdot 10^1 + 5 \cdot 10^2 = 512$ while q=0; and p=3, as there are no numerals lower than zero and three numerals above zero.In Boolean algebra, using $r=2$,the same number is expressed differently: $1000000000 = 0 \cdot 2^0 + 0 \cdot 2^1 + 0 \cdot 2^2 + 0 \cdot 2^3 + 0 \cdot 2^4 + 0 \cdot 2^5 + 0 \cdot 2^6 + 0 \cdot 2^7 + 0 \cdot 2^8 + 1 \cdot 2^9 = 0+0+0+0+0+0+0+0+512 = 512$ while q=0 and p=10, as there is again no numerals after the dot and 10 before. Every known number of the decimal system can be expressed in binary code respectively.

2.2   The basic Procedure of QCA

Qualitative Comparative Analysis contains a form data analysis technique, the boolean minimisation process, to figure out similar configurational pattern between cases bearing the same outcome. This "analytic moment" uses Boolean algebra and is the connecting part between case selection and description on the one side, and interpretation to gain the final result at the end on the other. It is the pivotal pillar and bottleneck of the approach; Rihoux and Lobe (2009, p.229) have shown this in graphic 2.1

Figure 2.1: Stages of QCA Studies

As the minimisation process is the heart of the approach, it will be described first in the following section. Afterwards, concrete implications for the study in terms of case selection and interpretation will follow. The entire minimisation process consists of three steps which will be described in the following sections:

– First, after the determination of all cases and outcomes of interest these cases and their features are summarised in a truth table

– Second, in a first process of minimisation so called main implicants are computed, being simplifications of the configurations under scrutiny.

– Third, in a further minimisation some main implicants are sorted out for the sake of a more parsimonious result.

– Fourth, the resulting equation will be transformed with the help of Boolean algebra operations and interpreted. This part will give a short insight of what is possible to extract from the data and the produced final Boolean expressions in QCA.

2.2.1 The Truth Table

At the beginning of a study, a set of cases and an outcome is determined. An observed, or present outcome equals (1), a non-observed, or absent outcome equals (0). Then, a range of variables, that is causal conditions considered to have an impact whatsoever on the outcome under scrutiny has to be determined. Specific letters are allotted to those causal conditions to simplify the further process. At this stage, Ragin (2008) suggests to streamline the causal conditions as much as possible by combining conditions that seem substitutable. Like the outcomes, the variables are dichotomized according to observation and non-observation of that particular feature in the cases by presence (1) and absence (0).

All the observed and collected data is summarised in a truth table. The catchy example taken in this section to illustrate the process of QCA has already been introduced, albeit with a lower degree of elaboration, by (Berg Schlosser and Cronqvist, 2012). Imagine a children's birthday party in the neighbourhood where the parents of the birthday child only invite a couple of guests. That should be reason enough to speculate - especially by those who were not invited - what actually caused the parents to chose only a limited circle and what makes that limited circle so special. Investigators face the following truth table:

Name	Age (A)	Boy (B)	Classmate (C)	Living next Door (D)	Invitation (Outcome)
Sabrine(0)	0	0	0	0	0
Sandra(1)	0	0	0	1	1
Mandy(2)	0	0	1	0	1
Manuela(3)	0	0	1	1	1
Martin(4)	0	1	0	0	0
Dominik(5)	0	1	0	1	1
Patrick(6)	0	1	1	0	1
Fred(7)	0	1	1	1	1
Alexandra(9)	1	0	0	1	0
Christine(10)	1	0	1	0	1
Elena(11)	1	0	1	1	1
Rainer(13)	1	1	0	1	0
Paul(15)	1	1	1	1	0

Table 2.2: Conditions and Observations for the Outcome "Invitation"

In table 2.2 several children, their attributes, as well as their invitation or non-invitation to the birthday party are shown. No immediate rationale for the selection is apparent. The children are regarded as cases, and the attributes refer to the kid being elder or not (A), being a boy or not (B), being in the class of the birthday child or

not (C), and living next door or not (D). Note that A (age) is a quantitative variable. As mentioned above, in dealing with quantitative variables, the researcher has to set up a particular threshold to define absence or presence of the attribute. If the variable would be labelled "elder kids", and if the birthday child is, say, eight years old, the threshold would be 8, so every kid being > 8 years old would be coded (1), all other (0).

The Boolean sum of the variables of each case or child forms a configuration. In the next step, all observed configurations are grouped according to to the outcome invitation (1) or non-invitation (0) rendering a boolean function connected by OR and AND nexus. As already shown in table 2.1, in QCA functions an observed variable is represented by a upper-case latter while a non-observed variable is represented by a lower-case letter. The Boolean functions for the birthday-example are thus:

$$1 = abcD + abCd + abCD + aBcD + aBCd + aBCD + AbCD + AbCd \quad (2.9)$$

and

$$0 = abcd + aBcd + AbcD + aBcd + ABcD + ABCD \quad (2.10)$$

The particular combination of each child can be found in these equations. They are separated by a logical OR (+) as every child had the same outcome, so different paths for that outcome are possible. For instance, first configuration of the function that renders a positive outcome belongs to Sandra. She is neither elder than the birthday child (a), nor a boy (b), nor a classmate (c), but she lives next door (D). The first configuration with negative outcome represents Paul, who has not been invited (outcome $= 0$), who is elder than the birthday child (A), who is a boy (B), who is a classmate of the birthday child (C) and who lives next door (D). The All other configurations can be assigned to the children in the truth table analogously.

2.2.2   Minimisation according to Quine-McCluskey

The underlying assumption of the QCA minimisation process is that there are causal conditions that can be eliminated as they do not have an impact on the outcome. If for instance only one condition differs in two configurations while all other variables are equal and both configurations render the same output, the differing variable can be regarded as irrelevant. In the words of (Ragin, 1987, p.93):

> "...if two Boolean expressions differ in only one causal condition yet produce the same outcome, then the causal condition that distinguishes the two expressions can be considered irrelevant and can be removed to create a simpler, combined expression."

Such a minimisation can be achieved by different algorithms. Ragin and Drass resorted in their first QCA programme to the Quine-McCluskey algorithm that had been

actually used to minimise electric circuits in electrical engineering.[5] The key focus here is placed on the mechanisms and steps of the minimisation process to achieve a better understanding.

To illustrate the basic procedure, the upper-case and lower-case letters are changed to (1) for presence and (0) for absence of a variable and the terms are arranged according to the number of ones. For equation 2.9 we thus face, using binary notation:

$$
\left.\begin{array}{lll} 1 & 0001 & abcD \\ 2 & 0010 & abCd \end{array}\right\} \text{no or one 1}
\quad
\left.\begin{array}{lll} 3 & 0011 & abCD \\ 5 & 0101 & aBcD \\ 6 & 0110 & aBCd \end{array}\right\} \text{two 1}
\quad
\left.\begin{array}{lll} 7 & 0111 & aBCD \\ 10 & 1010 & AbCd \\ 11 & 1011 & ABcD \end{array}\right\} \text{three 1}
$$

The Quine-McCluskey algorithm is mainly based upon the works of Willard van Omen Quine who proved the technique on logical grounds (Quine, 1952, 1955). The procedure is transparent and involves a minimal loss of data. The approach as been refined by McCluskey (1956) who acknowledged the usefulness for many variables, however calling the original Quine handling "unwieldy". His main contribution is the change of the notation. Quine, being a philosopher, had used Greek letters only for literal formulas, and normal formulas (Quine, 1952). McCluskey discarded the expressions involving literals and using the binary characters. Furthermore, he proposed dashes to show that a variable has been eliminated. The minimisation process is conducted until no further minimisation is possible. It is of the essence that only one number differs between two terms, while dashes are not regarded as numbers, in McCluskey (1956, p.1422) words:

> If two binary characters are identical in all positions except one, and if neither character has a dash in the position in which they differ, then the two characters can be replaced by a single character which has a dash in the position in which the original characters differ and which is identical with the original characters in all other positions.

The difference between Ragin's statement above and the quotation of McCluskey lies in the method of the latter making a minimisation of multiple stages is possible. Applying this technique to the example of the birthday party, the following expressions are generated:

---

[5]There has been a discussion about the nature, advantages, and disadvantages of different kinds of algorithms for QCA starting about 2008. Indeed, there are several ways to minimise electrical circuits (for further evaluation see for instants (Dusa, 2010) or more recent (Baumgartner and Thiem, 2017)). In sum, other algorithms than the Quine-McCluskey algorithm have resembling outputs, however do use less computer resources and memory, and are thus faster. This feature has become until now (2019) and will become in the future, due to technical progress, less important - and so will the entire discussion as well.

1; 3	00-1	abD
1; 5	0-01	acD
2; 3	001-	abC
2; 6	0-10	aCd
3; 7	0-11	aCD
5; 7	01-1	aBC
11; 3	-011	aBC
11; 10	101-	AbC
(still minimisable)		
2; 10	-010	bCd
(not further minimisable)		

$\Rightarrow$

1; 3; 5; 7	0--1	aD
1; 5; 3; 7	0--1	aD
1; 3; 6; 7	0-1-	aC
2; 6; 3; 7	0-1-	aC
2; 3; 11; 10	-01-	bC
2; 10	-010	bCd

prime implicants

According to the very right column, the new, minimised expression is:

$$1 = aD + aC + bC + bCd \tag{2.11}$$

The terms found in equation 2.11 are called prime implicants. Any logical expression X implicates another logical expression Y if Y is a part of X. Any logical expression X is implied by any case Z if X is part of the combination Z (Cronqvist, 2007, p.359). In the example, attribute (B) is implicated by any male child. On the next level, main implicants are parts of longer expressions, implicating these expressions. For instance, the main implicant aD found in the minimisation process implicates the cases of Sandra (abcD), Manuela (abCD), Dominik (aBcD), and Fred (aBCD). The essential feature of main implicants is that an implicant X becomes a main implicant if no other implicant implies X. It is the expression involving as few statements or attributes as possible. Thus, it cannot be minimised any further by the procedure applied in the birthday example so far.

Prime Implicant Chart

However, this has not been the end, as equation 2.11 can be simplified to a higher extent. To that end, a prime implicant chart is set up to find the essential main implicants.

Some configurations are only implied by one of the eight main implicants, some by more. In a nutshell, the essential prime implicants are those main implicants, that are essential to cover all cases. Table 2.3 presents the data of the birthday example in such a prime implicant chart. The top row contains all cases according to their original decimal label and the very right column contains the prime implicants found in the minimisation process so far. When a prime implicant implies a particular case, the case is marked with a cross in the prime implicant's row. Sticking to the example given above, the prime implicant aD implies Sandra (abcD; binary: 0001; decimal: 1), Manuela (abCD; binary: 0011; decimal:3), Dominik (aBcD; binary: 0101; decimal: 5), and Fred (aBCD; binary: 0111; decimal: 7), so the respective columns are marked with an x.

If a particular case is implied by a single prime implicant only, the respective field is marked with a bold upper-case X.

Case (dec.)	1	2	3	5	6	7	10	11	Expression
	X		x	**X**		x			aD
		x	x		**X**	x			aC
		x	x				**X**	**X**	bC
			x						bCD
Case (conf.)	abcD	abCd	abCD	aBcD	aBCd	aBCD	AbCd	AbCD	

Table 2.3: Prime Implicant Table for the Outcome "Invitation"

The sum of the marked prime implicants form the essential prime implicants. In the birthday example we thus face:

$$1 = aC + aD + bC \tag{2.12}$$

The term bCD has been eliminated. According to the laws of Boolean Algebra, specifically the one described above in equation 2.6, this could have been forecast after the first minimisation, as

$$bC + bCD = bC \tag{2.13}$$

2.3   Transformations and Interpretations

At this point the researcher can start to interpret the results, draw conclusions, and also change the parameters of the model. Equation 2.12 shows that the children that were invited are either younger classmates OR younger neighbours OR girls attending the same class. Thus,it can be deduced that no elder boys were invited. To be able to make more statements, it is possible to transform the equation according to the laws described in equation 2.4 and 2.5:

$$1 = aC + aD + bC = a(C + D) + bC \tag{2.14}$$

and

$$1 = aC + aD + bC = C(a + b) + aD \tag{2.15}$$

The equations give a useful structure to make statements about the pattern of conditions for the outcome "invitation" (1). Equation 2.14 shows that those children that have been invited were younger and classmates or living next door OR girls from school. From another point of view, shown in equation 2.15, the invitees were attending the same class while being younger or girls OR younger children from the neighbourhood. Quite some interpretive statements can be drawn from these insights. Besides the fact that no elder boys were invited it can be read that all elder girls asked to come attend

the same class as the birthday child. A researcher's task would now be to build theories explaining this outcome. It could be that the birthday child does not like elder boys as she is in an age where boys are of less interest and elder boys, in turn, are not interested in young girls. Going deeper into the case a researcher could search for past occurrences of bullying by elder children. If that were the case, it seems to only be a problem of the neighbourhood, as equation 2.15 shows that elder girls from class have indeed been invited.

A complementary step to verify the established theories is to check whether the assumptions are backed by the complete data set. Maybe elder girls or elder boys do simply not belong to the data as such cases could not be observed. Alexandra and is an elder girl living next door (configuration AbCD) and has indeed not been invited. Paul and Rainer are elder boys (having the configuration ABxy), both live next door and Paul is even a classmate too. Both have not been invited either. This means, first, cases of elder boys living in the neighbourhood or being classmates have been observed. Second, and this is another step of interpretation, maybe Paul has a huge impact on the result, as he might be a bully in school and in the neighbourhood. Or the birthday child simply does not like him. All these questions have been risen by the conducted minimisation process and have to be answered qualitatively by the researcher.

2.3.1   Limited Diversity and Assumptions about Remainders

This section aims at sensitising the reader for the importance of logical remainders in the research design. Best practice would be to find a really existing case for every possible configuration. As in social science such a demand is rather utopian, fix outcomes can be ascribed to exploit the approach, and, consequently, to render the final expression more parsimoniously. At best, pre-knowledge and theoretically grounded assumptions are used to eliminate unknown outcomes and to complete the data set by that way.

What might have struck the reader already regarding the birthday party example is the fact that not all possible combinations of the four variables can be found in the data set. In general, the quantity of possible configuration is determined by the kind of splitting of the variables. In this case it is a dichotomization (0 and 1) so the base has a radix r=2 [6]. As the truth table involves four variables, 16 combinations are possible in this example.[7] Indeed, table 2.2 consists of 13 combinations only, so three cases are missing. The higher the number of variables is, the higher also is the number of possible configurations. As the number of possible configurations grows exponentially, the likelihood of unobserved data inside the data set increases the more variables are

---

[6]The radix 2 is the base for csQCA; the calculation differs in other techniques of the QCA family, for instants in mvQCA

[7]Setting the value of k to 4, the formal calculation is

$$\prod_{i=1}^{k} r_i \quad = \quad \prod_{i=1}^{4} 2 \quad = \quad 2^4 \quad = \quad 2 \cdot 2 \cdot 2 \cdot 2 \quad = \quad 16$$

tested.

This is an unfavourable aggravation for any study as it bears the aura of being some-what incomplete. Additionally, the lack of these configurations may lead to difficulties within the minimisation process, as it might be difficult to find configurations that differ in one variable only (Ragin, 1987, p.10). Therefore, like in statistical analysis, simplifying assumptions are made in QCA whereby these assumptions still allow a maximum of causal complexity. These assumptions, in combination with particular Boolean techniques, range from conservative statements to simple causal statements. The underlying ratio is simple: the greater the variety of combinations taken into ac-count, the smaller the number of prime implicants in the final expression.

To render a more parsimonious result, Ragin proposes different procedures to handle the the unobserved configurations. First, the limitations of the expression gained by the minimisation process have to be determined. Then, different possible values of the logical remainders can be run through whereat three variations can be distinguished, labelled here "theory guided remainder assumptions", "complete negative remainder assumption", and "complete positive remainder assumption".

To determine the limits of the study, the table can be augmented by all possible com-binations of the variables and a further column is introduced coding all expressions according to their absence (0) or presence (1) in the real world.

Observed (R)	Name	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	Outcome (I)	Config.	Dec.
1	Sabrine	0	0	0	0	0	abcd	0
1	Sandra	0	0	0	1	1	abcD	1
1	Mandy	0	0	1	0	1	abCd	2
1	Manuela	0	0	1	1	1	abCD	3
1	Martin	0	1	0	0	0	aBcd	4
1	Dominik	0	1	0	1	1	aBcD	5
1	Patrick	0	1	1	0	1	aBCd	6
1	Fred	0	1	1	1	1	aBCD	7
1	Alexandra	1	0	0	1	0	AbcD	9
1	Christine	1	0	1	0	1	AbCd	10
1	Elena	1	0	1	1	1	AbCD	11
1	Rainer	1	1	0	1	0	ABcD	13
1	Paul	1	1	1	1	0	ABCD	15
0	Log. Remainder	1	0	0	0	-	Abcd	8
0	Log. Remainder	1	1	0	0	-	ABcd	12
0	Log. Remainder	1	1	1	0	-	ABCd	14
		(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	Invitation (Outcome)	Configuration	Dec.

Table 2.4: Conditions and observations for the outcome "Invitation"

Adding Theoretical Assumptions

It would absolutely be justifiable for any researcher to stop at this stage and begin with individual, case focussed, and theoretically guided interpretations. Nevertheless, theoretical knowledge can be used to make further steps in the direction of a more

parsimonious expression. If the researcher had strong evidence that the birthday child does not like elder boys indeed - maybe because she once said so in the presence of the researcher etc. - it is valid to change the outcome of the logical remainders that imply elder boys from (-) to (0). Such a proceeding shall be labelled here "theory guided remainder assumption" as the logical remainders are manipulated and included into the minimisation process on theoretical grounds. Conducting the minimisation process of the configurations with *negative* outcome incorporating the logical remainders that include (AB) for "elder boys" would yield the following expression:

$$AB + AcD + acd \qquad\qquad (2.16)$$

Not surprising, as this has been the theoretical assumption, being an elder boy (AB) is a reason to be excluded from the party. Additionally, being elder in general, living next door, but not being a classmate (AcD), or being younger in combination with not being a close neighbour (acd) are reasons for exclusion. The equation differs from the minimisation of the observed negative configurations only in the term (AB) - as a minimisation of the uninvited cases in table 2.2 and 2.4, would simply render *AcD + acd*. It would be a comprehensible way to extend the expression, yet it does not make the final expression more parsimonious. If the theory guided outcome assumption would have had produced more terms, they would have had to be checked back theoretically.

Applying de Morgan's Law

An inconsistency appears when De Morgan's law is applied to the original expression gained in the minimisation process without any outcome assumptions for the logical remainders *(aC + aD + bC)*:

$$
\begin{aligned}
1 = aC + aD + bC \quad &\longmapsto \quad (A + c) \cdot (A + d) \cdot (B + c) = 0 \\
&\qquad (A + Ad + Ac + cd) \cdot (B + c) = 0 \qquad (2.17) \\
&\qquad\qquad AB + Ac + cd = 0
\end{aligned}
$$

It rightly shows that among the observed positive outcomes, there are no elder boys, no elder classmates and no one who is neither classmate nor living next door. Taking into account the insight that in a conservative reading it would not be permissible to make statements about elder boys in general as elder boys outside the neighbourhood have not been observed, the researcher finds herself in a dilemma only to be solved on theoretical grounds. Working with and interpreting equation B.1.2 is always somewhat adulterated as long as the data set is incomplete. This becomes even more clear when applying the law to equation 2.3.1, which derives from the theory guided outcome assumption that the birthday child does not like elder boys. The result is slightly

padded:

$$0 = AB + AcD + acd \qquad \longmapsto \qquad (a + b) \cdot (a + C + d) \cdot (A + C + D) = 1$$

$$(a + aC + ad + ab + bC + bd) \cdot (A + C + D) = 1$$

$$aA + aC + aD + aAC + aC + aCD + aAd+$$
$$aCd + adD + aAb + abC + abD + AbC + bC+$$
$$bCD + Abd + bCd + bdD = 1 \qquad (2.18)$$

$$0 + aC + aD + 0 + aC + aCD + 0 + aCd + 0 + 0+$$
$$abC + abD + AbC + bC + bCD + Abd + bCd + 0 = 1$$

$$aC + aD + bC + Abd = 1$$

Compared to the original equation without additional assumptions *(aC+aD+bC)* a new term has appeared: *Abd*. True, Christine, decimal number 10 and the logical remainder with the decimal number 8 are covered by that expression, however Christine is covered by bC already, so the only reason for the existence of *Abd* seems to be the case with the decimal number 8. As it is, as mentioned, a logical remainder, the usefulness of the term *Abd* is questionable.

Differences in the Calculations and the Constant Need for Interpretation

Ragin suggests to code all logical remainders across the board negative (0). He argues that unobserved cases might be unobserved as they simply might not exist and mentions a protestant Latin American state as example simply not found in the real world (Ragin, 1987, p.109). True, in the birthday example, it could indeed be the case that elder children of remote neighbourhoods or elder children not being classmates simply do not belong to the circle of acquaintances of the birthday child - or put more simple: She does not know anyone having these attributes so they are out of question to be invited. This suggestion should be taken with a pinch of salt, as it is in fact a pre-assumption in theory that should be tested with foresight.
The same is true for the suggestion to assume that all logical remainders would yield a positive outcome if they existed. Coding all unobserved cases (1) and conducting the minimisation process with the observed positive outcomes would yield the equation

$$Ad + aD + bC = 1 \qquad (2.19)$$

which is different from equation *(aC + aD + bC)* obtained by minimising only the observed positive outcomes. Instead of being a younger classmate *(aC)*, the expression alleges that being elder and from remote neighbourhoods (Ad) would be a sufficient condition to be invited. Again, the configuration with the decimal number 10 (Chris-

tine) is implied by that new term, still being covered by bC too. Except for Christine, only logical remainders are implied. Like in the absolute negative outcome assumption, the result is questionable, and such an expression should be checked by the researcher with regard to theoretical meaningfulness. On the one hand, the term Ad includes elder boys from remote neighbourhoods and as shown by the aforementioned restrictions of the study due to non-observance of such cases the term should be limited or even discarded. The same is true if there is strong evidence that the birthday child does not like elder boys at all, also introduced as theory guided outcome assumption. Hence, referring to term aD, new insights seem slender. On the other hand, focussing on the elimination of the term aC the question rises whether being a younger classmate really is a sufficient condition to be invited.

The techniques described here as "theory guided remainder assumption", "absolute negative remainder assumption", and "absolute positive remainder assumption" often differ according to their length or quality or both. Together with the application of De Morgan's law, the researcher has various expressions to check. Table 2.5 gives an overview:

	(I)=1	De Morgan (I)=1	(I)=0	De Morgan (I)=0
Assumption ⇓				
None	aC+aD+bC	AB+Ac+cd	AcD+acd	aD+Ad+C
Theory Guided	aC+aD+bC	AB+Ac+cd	AB+AcD+acd	aC+aD+bC+Abd
Negative Outcome	aC+aD+bC	AB+Ac+cd	ABC+AcD+cd	aC+aD+bC
Positive Outcome	Ad+aD+bC	aBd+acd+ABD+AcD	AcD+acd	aD+Ad+C

Table 2.5: Types of final expressions according to assumptions about logical remainders

While recommending the absolute negative outcome assumption, Ragin (1987, p.115) acknowledges subsequently that both, the negative and the positive outcome assumption, are possible avenues for resolving the contradiction problem seems a little indecisive and bewildering. The researcher is left alone at this point and has to evaluate, assess, decide and assert the route taken in her particular research. Acknowledging the vast differences between the different assumptions, in this study, the different equations produced by the assumptions will be openly compared.[8]

2.3.2   Designing and Redesigning

From the very moment when the variables and the truth table are set up, the iterative process of QCA gathers momentum. The approach systematises the steps that can be taken in order to gain insights and results. The picture of Rihoux and Lobe (2009) shows these steps.   Adjustments of the design can be achieved by redesigning the

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[8]By that way I don't follow completely the recommendations and views of e.g. Olsen (2007) - who dehorts from using absolute assumptions about logical remainders at all - nor his counterpart Baumgartner and Thiem (2017). My decision to resort to a qualitative evaluation derives from issues connected with case sensitivity in QCA as shown here and also discussed later in section 3.3.

Figure 2.2: Stages of QCA Studies - detailed

set of countries, the set of variables, or the classification of the latter[9]. An obstacle towards a straightforward QCA process is the phenomenon of contradictory rows. A possible result of a range of observations and hence of the produced truth table may be that two or more exactly identical combination of circumstances lead to different outcomes being positive (1) in one or some cases and negative (0) in others at the same time.[10] Turning to the birthday example, this would mean that two children share the same attributes according to the variables but one is invited and the other is not.

At that point of the study, there are several possibilities to proceed. The first is to assume that there has to be an additional circumstance that had not been taken into account which explains the different outcome. For instance, the truth table may entail the following rows:

$$ABCD = 1 \quad \text{and} \quad ABCD = 0 \tag{2.20}$$

A researcher has to return to the cases and search until she finds a differing, omitted variable. She might find out that the birthday child is interested in horses or even a member in an equestrian club, just like some other children she knows. Including the

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[9]For the distinction between sets and classes see part 2.1 especially the reference in footnote 3.

[10]Even if two configurations with the same combination of variables render the same outcome, a researcher should consider to intervene, as these combinations are useless for the minimisation process.

new variable E (sharing the same hobby) or e (not sharing the same hobby) might solve the problem of contradiction, so the equations would turn

$$ABCDE = 1 \qquad \text{and} \qquad ABCDe = 0 \tag{2.21}$$

The new variable E/e has to be added to all cases of the truth table and has to be included into the minimisation process. This would be a redesign of the **set of variables**. These steps might lead to an effusive use of new variables that may hamper a parsimonious outcome of the minimisation. Another possibility would be to take one case out of the overall sample. This redesign of **the set of cases** should be avoided as it might give the impression of arbitrariness and should - if this step becomes evidently necessary - be justified on logical grounds. A valuable approach would be to alter the definition of the outcome.

Another way of dealing with contradictions would be to redesign the **classifications of variables**. If there are many contradictory rows, the contradiction may be caused by a single variable or by a combination of variables. If the variable is quantitative, the threshold can be changed to repeat the entire minimisation process afterwards. For instance, if the threshold for age had been established as "elder than 8" ($A > 8$) it could be set at "elder or equal 8" ($A \geq 8$) meaning that ($a \leq 8$) in the first case and ($a < 8$) in the latter. By switching the threshold, some configurations might change when the respective variable is affected by the alteration . *Abcd* might turn to *abcd* and so forth.

Transferring this way of dealing with thresholds to the field of social research opens up even more possibilities depending on the dispersion of the data. A popular threshold is the mean of a data set, however, other positions could make sense too, like the median, if there are many runaway values and the number of cases is not odd-numbered. Often, it is more useful to identify two clusters, one located at the the top and the other at the bottom of the scaled data and set the threshold in between. Generally, the positioning of the threshold and by that way altering the classification of variables is one of the many freedoms that the QCA approach grants the researcher. To avoid abuse of this freedom and for the sake of transparent scientific work, the positioning should be comprehensible and, at best, theoretically grounded.

Second, when facing qualitative variables causing contradictions, the efforts that have to be undertaken are more substantial. The easiest way would be to leave and ignore the problem causing variables for the rest of the study. However, by that way important information will get lost. A better possibility poses the rearrangement of variables. A means to do so can be found in the "ladder of abstraction" by Satori (1970) that derives from the assumption that terms and concepts can be hierachised according to their level of abstraction. Any variable causing contradictions can be replaced by a subordinate or superordinate term or concept, best expressed by relations of subsets

and supersets. In general, X is a subset of a set Y, or equivalently Y is a superset of X, if X is "contained" inside Y. That is, all elements of X are also elements of Y. Assuming the variable "classmate" (C) causes contradictions, it could be tested whether it is maybe not enough that a kid is a classmate; maybe it has to be a bench mate to be invited. In this case we climbed down the ladder of abstraction, as the new variable (M) for bench mate is clearly a smaller subset of (C), formally $M \subset C$.

Against this background, a method to render the final equation more parsimoniously is to climb up the ladder of abstraction. Maybe it has not been important for the birthday child whether a kid is a classmate, maybe it would be sufficient that the kid was in the same grade or even the same school. In this case, the new variables (G) for grade and (S) for school are supersets of (C), formally: $S \supset G \supset C$. Again, every movement on the ladder of abstraction should be backed by reasonable theoretical assumptions to avoid abuse.

Another possibility to deal with contradiction causing qualitative variables consists of questioning the meaning of certain names of variables hermeneutically, referring to hermeneutics as critical methodology for analysing texts and statements in general. Beginning such a hermeneutical process and taking the term "living next door" (D) in the birthday-party example, it becomes obvious that "next door" is an elastic term. We can assume that all children living in the same house or street to be living "next door", but what about the block? Or if the birthday child dwells in a small village in the countryside, does that mean that all kids living in the same village are living "next door" too? And if it is a village remote from the next urban center, should the neighbouring villages be included into the concept "next door" as well? A key feature of hermeneutic reasoning and questioning consists of finding out what the research subject, third parties, or the researcher might mean by the term under scrutiny, in this case "next door". A breakdown of possible interpretations would be:

same house $\rightleftarrows$ same street $\rightleftarrows$ same village/block $\rightleftarrows$ same residential cluster [11]

The researcher has to elaborately determine which interpretation is the most likely to fit. For this, further research has to be conducted to, at best, reveal the particular interpretation being meaningful for and influencing the decision of the birthday child. In the course of that process, it is not important to stick to the term "next door" if encountering another term that fits better. What is important, however, is that the researcher gives a *clear definition* of what she means.

2.3.3 Evaluating Theoretical Arguments

As shown, the QCA approach does not only use Boolean techniques to answer a research question but also draws right from the beginning on theoretical arguments. It also bears the possibility of a comparison of theoretical arguments with the expressions gained

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[11]cluster having approximately the same distance to a particular center

through Boolean minimisation. Such a proceeding gives insights to evaluate theoretical pre-assumptions. In social science, these assumptions are already scribed by existing theories of the field, found prominently in area studies, or existing theories of social sciences and its close parallel sciences in general. Returning to our oversimplified birthday example, a researcher could assume that the birthday child invites girls from class and from the neighbourhood. Hence, the theoretically assumed final expression would be

$$I_t = bD + bC \tag{2.22}$$

Now it is possible to make statements about the accuracy of the assumed final expression by multiplying it with the final expression obtained after having minimised the positive, really observed cases shown in equation 2.9:

$$
\begin{aligned}
(I) \cdot (I_t) &= (bD + bC) \cdot (aC + aD + bC) \\
&= abCD + abD + bCD + abC + abCD + bC \\
&= abD + bC
\end{aligned}
\tag{2.23}
$$

As speculated, the assumption that being a girl from class *(bC)* would be a sufficient condition could be confirmed; it is part of the final expression of the minimisation of all positive and observed outcomes anyway. The assumption that being a girl from the neighbourhood would be a sufficient condition could only by confirmed with limitations. It is a reasonable statement, yet only true for younger girls. Taking a look at the truth table 2.2 reveals that the cases of Sandra(1) and Manuela(3) are implied by that expression and that both have indeed been invited while there is no observation of non-invitation with that expression. The expression abD simply does not appear in the final equation as it has been minimised with the help of the configurations of Dominic (decimal:5), Patrick (decimal:6), and Fred (decimal:7). Hence, it is a sufficient condition, however, it is not the most parsimonious one.

In the example of equation 2.3.3, the final expression without any assumptions about the logical remainders has been taken and multiplied out. Theory testing using a final expression gained by theoretical pre-assumptions would render the result of theory testing different. Taking, for instance, the final expression obtained applying an absolute positive outcome assumption, the operation would produce the following calculation steps:

$$
\begin{aligned}
(I_p) \cdot (I_t) &= (bD + bC) \cdot (Ad + aD + bC) \\
&= 0 + AbD + bCD + AbCd + abCD + bC \\
&= AbD + bC
\end{aligned}
\tag{2.24}
$$

The expression $AbD + bC$ differs in the very first letter from the expression obtained after using the conservative statement for theory testing ($abD + bC$), however that very letter changes the entire meaning: The conservative expression implies all younger girls from next door, the expression using the absolute positive outcome assumption implies

all *elder* girls from neighbourhood. Comparing the two expressions, and against the background of all what has been described and explained so far, three conclusions can be made.

First, manipulating logical remainders is a deeper intervention than it seems at first glance, especially when using and benefiting from QCA in a comprehensive and exhaustive manner. The researcher will encounter contradictions, some of them riddling and puzzling, and thus time and resource consuming. The entire line of argument and reasoning becomes more feeble and attackable if the steps undertaken are not documented and well grounded.

Second, exactly that flexibility gives the researcher a vast amount of freedom. If the decisions undertaken by the researcher in the course of the study are well-grounded, nearly every variable - and even combinations of variables, as shown - can be tested. The assumptions made, of course, shape the results. However this, as will be discussed in the next section, is to a certain extent impossible to avoid in social sciences.

Third, the outlined flexibility is a temptation at the same time. Manipulation of thresholds, variables, logical remainders etc. can be used to achieve the result the researcher expects or even wishes for. Therefore, *transparency* is of the essence. This involves clear definitions of variables and the documentation of steps taken.

Chapter 3

What csQCA is - and what it is not

3.1 Comparative Historical Analysis and Configurational Methods

When Ragin (1987) introduced the distinction between variable oriented research and case oriented research, he referred to the latter as something that goes without statistical tests. Concretely, he put case oriented research in line with comparative studies: comparativists would seek to identify historical explanation for particular historical outcomes and the goals of these studies are historically interpretive and causally analytic (p.35). Thus, case-oriented studies include **history**, **interpretation**, and **causal inference**. By their help, patterns of invariance can be inducted from small N studies using a palmful of variables.

Taking a look at the history of methods in science, especially focussing on history, interpretation, causal inference, pattern of invariance, configurations of variables, and small N studies, it can be argued that what Ragin actually refers to when describing "case oriented research" is basically what (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003) would label Comparative Historical Analysis (CHA).[1] The following features distinguish comparative historical research from other scientific endeavours in social science (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003; Mahoney and Villegas, 2009):

Identification of causal configurations: Comparative historical inquiry focuses on the explanation and identification of causal configurations that produce major outcomes of interest. In comparative historical research, the question of why a certain outcome occurred is of the essence. Propositions being supposed to be a possible cause are carefully selected and tested according to their correlation and non-correlation across the cases.

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[1]This subfield of connecting history with past and contemporary political issues has also been labelled differently like "comparative historical research", "comparative historical analysis", or "historical institutionalism" (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002; Tilly, 1989).

Scope on processes over time: Comparative historical researchers analyse historical sequences over time and pay tribute to the dynamics of processes over time. They are concerned with the dimensions of time, including issues of timing and sequencing. History matters in the long run because temporal context matters (Abbott, 2001; Pierson, 2004).

Systematic analysis of similar and contrasting cases: Practitioners of comparative historical inquiry use similar and contrasting cases for comparison referring to the outcomes of interest.

Deep knowledge of the cases under scrutiny: Comparative historical researchers attempt to gain a deep understanding of their cases. Within-case analysis becomes a central mode of causal inference and the scholar becomes an expert of each case for a better understanding of similarities and contrasts (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003; Collier et al., 2004).

Restricted knowledge: The result of a study is not universally applicable knowledge. However, it represents a bargain in which significant advantages are gained. A dialogue between theory and evidence of an intensity that is rare in quantitative social research is made possible which highlights similarities and particularities at the same time.

All these features are essential parts of QCA as it has been introduced in the previous section. The approach uses configurations, contrasts cases with different outcomes ((1) and (0)), takes process tracing over time into account when setting up variables, demands for deep knowledge of the cases, and includes a sophisticated system for a dialogue between theory and evidence. So, what is new about QCA and where do these new features derive from?

3.1.1 The Evolution of Comparative Research

A crucial issue that QCA aims to tackle is the problem of unsystematised and loose data. Especially in very small n and small n research designs, data seems often rather unformalised, hence the scientific quality of case studies is often questioned (Gerring, 2017, p.221-223; Rihoux and Lobe, 2009). The allegation of unsystematised and intransparent research designs accompanies scientific research since its very beginnings. What Ragin labels case oriented research and what refers rather to historical comparative analysis has always been in the center of that critique. It has been uttered and been formalised most prominently in an era between the 1950s and 1960s that has been labelled loosely "the behavioural revolution". To understand this development, its benefits, and flaws, it is fruitful to trace some scientific developments of social science

during that time.

Historical Comparative Analysis and Political Science are two different streams that overlap, interact and cross-fertilize each other, however, they have to be differentiated. Especially in Germany a branch of study emerged after the Napoleonic Wars focussing on the art of ruling and administrating a people. The *Policeywissenschaft* or later *Staatswissenschaft* included public law, the early political economy, public health concerns, urbanism and urban planning. It was rather an administrative science and was often meant to prepare the student to become a public officer in the Prussian administration. As the name Staatswissenschaft (science of the state) already implies, the focus was much in line with German thinking at that time, regarding the state as most prominent feature shaping and coining human behaviour, and being the pivotal point of power relations (Munck, 2007). Furthermore, when speaking of *Wissenschaft* (science) at that time, people mostly meant the accumulation of knowledge for a greater good in form of ideographic institutionalism and description of institutions. Much of that thought was exported in the following years by German migrants or foreign scholars trained in Germany, who migrated into scientific landscape of the United States.

Opinions differ whether Francis Lieber was the first officially named Professor of political science in 1857 (Farr, 1988) or if the term *political science* was first coined in 1880 by Herbert Baxter Adams at John Hopkins University, in any case, by the introduction of this very term a loose space was opened. And the German Staatswissenschaft diffused into that space opened up by the first use of this term and filled it. So, clearly, scholars using comparative historical research, as outlined above, at the turn of the century would not label themselves "political scientists". The new stream "political science", on the other side, lacked the aim to *explain* outcomes and was far too much micro level focussed to welcome comparative historical research as an scientific fellow or even integrate it into its own realm.

At another frontier, scholars tried to demarcate the new discipline "political science" in relation to history as all compassing discipline which in many cases also addressed the state. The founders and early adopters sought to differentiate their new field by restricting research to the relative present. Stating that "history is past politics and politics is present history", political scientists would focus on contemporary history and leave the field of the past to historians. Consequently, political scientists avoided or ignored all issues that might have led to the status quo from the past and focussed on more delimited questions of the formal political institutions associated with state bureaucracies and governments (Munck, 2007). The logical result is a neglect of comparative historical analysis in political science until the second half of the 20th century. What would play a major role in future struggles and discussions in science was the circumstance that neither comparative historical research nor the new subject of legal-institutional political science featured coherent theory or methods. Comparative historical research consisted mainly of unsystematically collected data, information and case

studies. By means of logic, hermeneutics, more or less untested Marxian assumptions, and ad hoc deductions and inductions, hypothesis and correlations were postulated and poured into essays and monographs. The formal-legal approach, on the other hand, was largely devoid of theory as well and mostly did not yield general testable hypothesis at all. Moreover, it seemed to be a rather non-critical style of science and rather corroborating current structures of legitimation. Munck (2007, p.37) writes:

> "Political scientists [...] presented arguments, that largely reflected the prevailing consensus about the merits of limed democracy, on the institutional questions of the day, such as the reforms adopted in the US after the Civil War and the constitutional changes in Europe in the late 19th and 20th centuries"

Both research paradigms got heavily under pressure from the 1920s on and especially in the 1960s by a more broad development in the field. Today often labelled as "the behavioural revolution"or "the behavioural approach" it definitely constituted a kind of new "mood" (Dahl, 1961), a movement stressing "the behavioural persuasion in politics" (Eulau, 1963), or a "conceptual revolution" remaking the meaning of theory in the field (Easton, 1965)[2].

Being one of the most prominent advocate of the conceptual changes, it is worthwhile to take a closer look at the writings of George E. Catlin, especially his *The Science and Method of Politics* (1927) and his chief work *The Function of Political Science* (1956). Catlins oeuvre endorses the very beginnings and the peak of the movement. Four aspects help to clarify the Zeitgeist of that time:

First, he defines politics, from the side of the subject matter, as a field where all behaviour results in the control of collaboration of one will over or with another (p.122). As critics remark, this would cover the entire range of human behaviour, growing out of the desire for power over one's fellows (Hanford, 1927) and thus being too close to sociology. Indeed, Catlin claims that political Science and Sociology are inseparable and in fact these are two sides of the same coin (Catlin, 1956).

Second, Catlin suggests to dilate the scope of research agendas with regard to institutions. He states that politics is not limited to the study of national and sovereign states. Political science is rather the study of structure of social controls - of which there are many other forms than states and administrations - such as churches and their ecclesiastical polity, unions, cities, international organizations, even family authority. These are all no less "political" or worthy of examination than municipal or state government (Catlin, 1956, p.819).

Third, and this part describes what the "behavioural revolution" has been widely become known for at its best, Catlin encourages his fellows to take economics as example,

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[2]The critique of methodological inconsistency had twinkeled already at the beginning of the century in the scientific community. It can be traced back to the year 1908 in which Graham Wallas published *Human Nature in Politics* and Arthur Bentleys published *The Process of Government*. Both scholars were inclined to lay greater emphasis on the informal processes of politics and less on political institutions in isolation. Later on, in 1925, Charles Merriam as well criticised contemporary political science for its lack of scientific rigor in his "New Aspects of Politics".

in which scientists began to develop methods capable of conditional predictions. He thus calls for a separation of political science from cognate subjects and the building of a system of thought. Beneath the structure, he states, there may be detected functions, common to the whole field, resting on the natural laws of human nature, and determinant of the shape which even the broadest structures take (Catlin, 1956, p.819). Fourth, while the former techniques of inference were often rather macro-descriptive in nature, revealing the mechanisms of groups, institutions and laws over time, the new approach took the personal decision of the single individual into account. Catlin, as well as David Easton later on, tired of unsystematic macro level postulations, demanded more research about micro units and to recommend to young students to stop talking about 'Capitalism' and 'Socialism,' 'Sovereignity' and 'Authority' and to "go and look at what actually happens" (Catlin, 1956, p.819).

Subsequently, until the 1960, new approaches in the field became, indeed, more empirically grounded, focussing on, and using probability survey samples, panels of informants, metric techniques such as scalograms and factor analysis, and the analysis of political group behaviour by other statistical means (Eulau, 1963, p.33). Former research consisting of predominantly historical, legalistic, and institutional case studies with a traditionally intuitive-descriptive approach were thus replaced by the introduction of more empirical methods, borrowed mostly from the field of economics, psychology, and natural sciences. All in all, David Easton (1965,p.7) pinpointed the new "behavioral credo" in eight assumptions:

- the search for regularities or patterns in political behaviour

- the use of a verification principle such as hypothesis testing

- an emphasis on methodological technique

- quantification by precision in the recording of data

- the separation of values from facts in an analytic fashion

- the systematization of both theory and practice

- pure science in the sense that theory precedes application, and

- integration in the sense that political behaviour research is interdisciplinary

Turning back to QCA, we can claim that the approach fulfils all the requirements for scientific research demanded by Easton. However, different from many streams that adopted statistical methods as suggested by the early Behaviourists, QCA resorts to another technique that has been labelled amongst others by Lijphart (1971) as "the comparative method". Under the influence of the new rigour concerning methodological accuracy of the 1950s and 1960s, the question arose how to deal with studies with a low number of observations or instances. This included the will to systematise, precise, and enhance the quality of comparative historical analysis that got heavily under pressure, for the sake of higher transparency and replicability.

3.1.2 Configurational Methods as Answer to the Small N Problem

Ragin refers to case-oriented methods as classic comparative methods (p.53) tying the term case-oriented close to John Stuard Mill's canons of experimental logic in *A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive* (1843). He does so for good reason when dealing with case oriented studies, however, it might be puzzling for beginners that the epistemological and historical foundation of QCA itself are sometimes allegedly related to David Hume and John Stuard Mill. Ragin mentions Mill a couple of times in his basic QCA introduction from 1987 and devotes entire subsections to the Method of Agreement and the Method of Difference. But this is only to refer to "rough guidelines for the conduct of comparative inquiry" (p.44).

The fact that the recurrence on Mill is only a door opener becomes clear when taking a closer look at Mill's canons. The Method of Agreement is a method for eliminating unimportant causes in a configuration and identifying a common, single cause:

> If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon (Mill, 1872)

This method does not account for intersections or conjunctural causation. True, Mill mentions the possibility of "chemical causation", however in his methods he refers to one cause only. Consequently, Ragin himself only guesses that Mill would "probably allow for the possibility that this single cause might be a recurrent combination of conditions" (p. 36). A few pages hereafter he even acknowledges that Mills methods are incapable at all of handling multiple or conjunctural causation (p.42). The relation between QCA and Mill's methods is thus restricted to three basic features:

First, the method of agreement is a method to **identify pattern of invariance**, meaning it is a tool to search variables that are constant across a wide range of cases and thus do not vary whenever the particular outcome is observed. Second, it analyses **configurations** that consist of several variables or causes. And third, these configurations may consist of few variables and the research design includes only few cases, hence being appropriate for **small N studies**.

Against that background, QCA can be regarded as a Comparative Configurational Method (CCM) (Rihoux and Lobe, 2009). The concept of configurational methods, including Mills methods, also includes a number of methodological approaches, all of which seek to gain new insights by analysing configurations of cases. A configuration is a particular combination of factors that are called conditions and may include stimuli, causal variables, ingredients, determinants and so forth. The combination builds a case or, vice versa, a case renders a particular combination of variables that produces an outcome of interest.

The use of configurational methods beyond Mill's canons is not new to social science. Just like many other research traditions, during the behavioural revolution, the incon-

Approach	Mills Method of Agreement	Most Diffrent System Design	Qualitative Comparative Analysis
1. Case	ABCD = 1	ABcd = 1	ABCD = 1
2. Case	abcD = 1	abcd = 1	ABCd = 1
Inference	D = 1	cd = 1	ABC = 1

Table 3.1: Comparison of different traditions of comparison

sistent use of methods and approaches in the comparative literature of political science was criticised (one of the first being Macridis (1955)) which resulted in a range of publications trying to sharpen the methodological awareness of the scientific community (amongst others (Eckstein and Apter, 1963; Kalleberg, 1966; Przeworski and Teune, 1970; Satori, 1970)). Arendt Lijpharts essay on "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method" (1971), describing the comparative method as scientific approach alongside with the experimental and the statistical method, was very influential. He seizes on a suggestion already made by sociologist Smelser(1965) to apply the comparative method in the scientific niche of small N studies.

Notably, "The Logic of Comparative Inquiry" (1970) by Przworski and Teune draws on a similar logic like Mill in their (Most Similar System Design (MSSD))/MSSD designs, although there is not a single reference to his canons. The method is rather inductive and starts with two cases with the same outcome and tries to find common variables in a stepwise manner. As the names indicate, MSSD is a design where cases are chosen that are most similar with respect to the nature of their configurations while the cases render a different outcome. By that way, the part of the configuration that differs is very likely to cause the differences in the outcomes. The Most Different System Design eliminates variables that probably do not explain the outcome and resembles roughly Mill's Method of Agreement: Variables should be as different as possible and the outcome should be the same. Table 3.1 compares three approaches of comparison:[3]

Against this background, it can be stated that csQCA follows the basic logic of its predecessors and develops the approach further. Also the *dialogue between data and theory* which is central to QCA is already intrinsic to the frameworks of Przworski & Teune. Basically, they start from the very microlevel with only few cases and a single independent variable to check whether the latter holds sway across systems. If it does not, the systemic level or the variable is altered. If it does, more independent variables can be added. Although not using the term, by that way they also allow for multiple

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[3]The notation of MDSD is a simplification to make the process more comparable. Przeworski and Tuene (1970, p.84) actually state $D = I_1, I_2, ...S_{(k+1)} \cdot I_3 \cdot N_j$ while the dependent phenomenon D depends upon I_1 and I_2 regardless of systems and upon I_3 depending on the characteristic S_1. The term N refers to residual factors, similar to the term ϵ in regression analysis.

causational conjuctions (Przeworski and Teune, 1970, esp. p.76-87). Simlar to QCA, a "ladder of abstraction" can be used to find the best results for the comparison. If the established canon of theories is not capable of explaining an outcome in a satisfying manner, the researcher is allowed to modify existing theories (p.84).

However, as table 3.1 shows, it seems that QCA is the less parsimonious approach and the other look somewhat inferior. But here comes a basic strength of QCA into play: By using the minimisation process, the configurational analysis can be repeated, while it is meant to be conducted only once in the concepts of Mill. This stepwise and iterative procedure allows for greater complexity by considering carefully possible conjunctions, as has been shown in chapter 2. QCA is, without doubt, a result of an evolution of comparative methods that started in the 19th century and that got its probably biggest push during the behavioural revolution.

3.1.3   What is Variable Oriented about QCA?

Against that background, the aim of Ragin's QCA goes beyond the formalisation of comparative social research according to the behavioural credo. His basic interest in variable-oriented[4] research derives from the attempt to import quantitative techniques from mainstream social science to test theory (Ragin, 1987, p.54). The publishing year of any publication often mirrors intentions, backgrounds, or connections to the underlying scientific episteme of that time. So does 1987, the publishing year of the initial book of QCA. The positivism dispute and its aftermaths had abated and opened space for a generation of scientists that increasingly showed interest for "mixed methods". The positivism dispute of the late 1960s and early 1970s had arisen around issues of explanation and understanding in social sciences and disembogued into a polarization between so called "qualitative" and "quantitative" methods[5]. Ragin choses the terms "variable oriented" and "case oriented" to describe two streams in science.

3.1.4   Systematisation as Main Innovation of QCA

The very basic idea behind social research is that every social unit, such as a nation-state, has interacting structural features. Interacting means that the change in one feature cause changes in other features which, again, might produce changes in others and so forth. Data on social units provide snapshots of instances of these structrual

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[4]I define a variable as any entity that can take on different values and that can, at least theoretically, be observed and/or measured. It is located in an ontological field that is characterised by a level of abstraction which is capable of including several observations, rendering them comparable.

[5]The great figures of the behavioural revolution do not mention "quantitative" or "qualitative" in their benchmarking works at all. The wording is different, such as the "behavioural approach" and the "traditional approach" (Easton, 1957), "contemplative sience" and "empirical political science" (Easton, 1969, p.1052), or as "behavioural methods" or "modern behavioural technology" against "classical writers" (Eulau, 1963, p.31). The terms quantitative and qualitative enter the scientific stage in the 1980s.

processes and can thus be represented in terms of variables and intercorrelations (Ragin, 1987, p.55). To reveal, assess, and categorise these intercorrelations further, as a first step, a range of theories about the connections has to be identified. These theories can be well-known from literature while competing with each other, or can be a blunt but somewhat educated guess of the researcher. This is what Ragin means when he writes that variable-oriented research is theory centred (Ragin, 1987, p.53) and draws heavily on already existing theories.

Taking a closer look at the aims and design features shown in table 3.2 reveals that case oriented research can mimic variable oriented research in most of the categories. Especially as all three streams are able to adopt variables, the distinction blurs, however, in "variable oriented" research variables are necessary. Concerning the process, Ragin identifies four steps that are necessary to conduct a variable-oriented study (Ragin, 1987, pp. 57-58):

1. The theory to be tested must be specified in terms of variables and expected interrelations

2. Competing explanations must be identified and formulated in terms of variables and interrelations as well

3. The variables have to be expressed in appropriate measures that have to be checked according to their validity and reliability

4. Statistical tests like regression and correlation tests provide comparable values to rank the theories of structural causation

Aware of and striving for a reliable and scientific research design, Ragin devotes an entire point to scientific accuracy and rigour. However, no matter if case or variable oriented, every researcher who deals with interrelations of historical, social, or economic phenomena is responsible for a proper research design, including[6]:

Identification of reliable sources.   Part of what Ragin calls "appropriate measures that have to be checked according to their validity and reliability" refers to reliable data sources and propper collection of data. On the one hand, there are several sources that might be biased by the way data collection of the data or by interest guided manipulation. For instance, the data published by official Arab state institutions should be used with care, as well as the membership stats of national trade union associations. On the other hand, own data aquisition in hughe populations by the researcher herself

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[6]Much of what Ragin labelles "prework" should actually not be something related to variable oriented research but to good science in general. Nonetheless, Ragin anticipates thoughts that have been maybe best expressed and elaborated later in Brady and Collier (2004)'s *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards* who recur heavily on King et al. (1994)'s seminal work *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. From this perspective, Ragin was ahead of the times with his ideas of shared standards in social science.

	VARIABLE ORIENTED	CASE ORIENTED	csQCA
Variables are used to identify mutual features or processes	yes	yes, but not necessary	yes
Cases are held anonymous, abstract names of systems substitute real names	yes	no, case studies deal with real cases of the world	both possible
Cases are randomly chosen	yes	no	not necessarily
Cases are regarded as independent without addressing much systematic process analysis and interdependencies	yes	no, process analysis and several unsystematic factors can be included	no, the configuration of one case has an impact on another by the minimisation process
Concepts and Theories are often monolitic, ready to be tested, and not intended to be changed	yes	not main intention, however possible	no, theory building is intended in the dialogue between data and theory
Generalisation is more important than complexity and ideosyncracies. The main question is "is there a relationship", not, "why is there a relationship"	yes	no	no, deviant cases are put under scrutiny

Table 3.2: Ontologies and premisses of csQCA retated to case oriented and variable oriented research according to Ragin (1987) and Della Porta (2008)

is only possible in samples, as full surveys are simply unfeasable. To avoid a selection bias, the collection is usually randomized. Randomization means a method based on chance alone by which data units are assigned to a treatment group. While the research on a macrosocial and macrosystemical level like a group or area of nation states does not require sampling, the macrodata used for the dependent variables should be checked, especially in extra-european contexts.

Avoidance of nonsense correlations.   A nonsense correlation is a correlation supported by data but having no basis in reality. A famous example is the correlation between the amount of storks in a region and the human birthrate. Indeed, there is often a correlation, however, this correlation does not derive from the amount of storks but from the fact that young families tend to move to the countryside. A researcher should check the reasonability of the estimated connections and search for possible reasons for correlations that seem not to have a scientific meaning. When working theory guided, the danger of nonsense correlations is minimized, however, other pitfalls remain distorting the results.

Avoidance of confoundings.   Knowing the aforementioned connection between storks, birthrates and countrysides, it becomes clear that the birthrate is a confounding variable that stands actually for the countryside and the actual reasonable statement would be that there are many storks in the countryside. The circumstance that a third variable z influences x and y can be assessed with statistical methods like conditional logistic regression analysis; in the prework phase of the study a researcher should search for such already conducted studies in her field or resort to qualitative literature hinting at such a correlation and include it into the research design.

Avoidance of nuisance variables.   With the same caution a researcher should watch out for unaccounted variables that influence the outcome of y while having no effect on or any connection to x. This is often tied to the issue of sampling, as in non-randomized sampling there is a acute danger of choosing special cases only unconsciously or due to lacking alternatives (the polls and experiments conducted by students at institutes of psychology are, for instance, mostly biased by education level as the participants are mostly students). So, especially in studies without the possibility of randomisation a researcher has to be careful.

Introduction of reasonable proxy-variables.   A confounding variable like described above should no be confused with a proxy variable. A proxy variable is sometimes used intentionally to include unobservable or immeasurable variables into the study. GDP can be used as proxy for high standard of living, satellite images of ocean surface color might be use as proxy for depth that light penetrates into the ocean over large areas and so forth. The assumed correlation between the a variable and

the proxy variable might be somewhat imperfect. Nonetheless, the underlying credo is that including an imperfect proxy of a hard-to-measure variable is often better than not including an important variable at all.

The main difference consists in the explicitness. During the process of research, a case oriented scholar might come across nonsense correlations, confoundings, or nuisance variables. Furthermore, the use of proxy variables case oriented research designs is also possible. These steps and techniques, including the testing of theories, are actually not new to configurational comparative analysis, nor to comparative historical research, nor to single case studies (concerning the latter see especially Ulriksen and Dadalauri (2016)). Moreover, these features do not have much to do with variable or case oriented research as such; rather they touch the question of positivism and inductivism, as prominent positivist were known to have argued strongly that enquiries could only proceed if the researcher's effort to observe relevant facts was guided either by clear theoretical expectations or, at a minimum, by some kind of "explanatory hunch" (Hempel, 1966, p.11-12). In case oriented research designs, however, many of these steps usually happen in a stage before writing and many of these ditched thoughts will never enter the publication. The main difference and also the major strength of QCA is that it forces the researcher to systematise the data to a higher extent, leading to a higher degree of transparency (see also: de Meur and Rihoux, 2002; Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009), however, at the expense of a certain freedom in design.

3.1.5 The Central Role of Statistics in Ragin's Thoughts

To understand the perception held by Ragin about what he labels "variable-oriented research" it is important to bear in mind that he views the latter through the lenses of someone who "...was trained, as most American social scientists today, to use multivariate [7] statistical techniques whenever possible" (Ragin, 1987, p.vii). Indeed, throughout his 1987 book, whenever he refers to variable-oriented research techniques or quantitative research, he mostly refers to multiple statistical methods, and, in nearly all examples, to multiple regression and correlation analysis respectively.
Statistical methods depend on large n samples. Consequently, the credo of variable oriented research is to widen the population to be tested as much as possible (Ragin, 1987, p.55):

> Typically, a variable-oriented study begins by specifying the hypothesis to be tested and then delineating the widest possible population of relevant observations. The wider this population, the better. Not only does a wide population

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[7] The use of "multivariate" and "multiple" statistical techniques seems a little tangled throughout the book. Technically speaking, multivariate statistical techniques are techniques that consider several independent, but may as well take several dependent variables into account. The examples examined by Ragin are, without exception, studies and models that account for one dependent variable only. In the following text, only the term multiple will be used to make that difference more clear.

provide a basis for a more exacting test, but it also gives the investigator the opportunity to demonstrate the breadth of an argument.

This is made to render the results more representable and to achieve conclusions with a high degree of generalization. The introduction of some basic measures of a simple multiple regression analysis already highlights some points important in comparison with QCA. Multivariate statistical methods use means of data and probability to predict unmeasured outcomes. To assert the quality of the prediction, **distances** in the scatterplot are taken into account. Also nearly all statistical tests require the same basic assumptions. In a nutshell, as shown above, these are

- The use of means as most important building block

- The use of distances in a scatterplot

- Expression of quality of estimations in measures of probability

- Prediction of unobserved data

- Prediction without necessarily accounting for causality

- Need for large n to gain representability and a high degree of generalisation

Summarizing the findings about the pre-work and core features of variable oriented research, it becomes evident that QCA does not use the same techniques and does not presuppose the same assumptions. Means may be used to set the threshold to dichotomise variables, however, they do not play a role in the minimisation process. Distances, probability, and prediction are no core features either. Furthermore, csQCA should not be taken to make predictions; Generalisations should not go far beyond the sample of examined cases. Nonetheless, QCA has also its roots in the credo of the behavioural revolution, even when it takes a different path than mainstream social science in which statistics became the main method.

3.2   QCA as Chameleon Approach

As has been argued so far, csQCA is an iterative process that enhances comparative historical research by introducing a higher degree of parsimony on the one hand and a higher degree of explicitness, transparency, and replicability on the other. At the same time, it does not resort to statistical methods with its means, probabilities, and matrice driven modes of analysis.

Twenty-five years after the publishing of Ragin's "The Comparative Method", Rihoux and Marx (2013) took the opportunity to trace how Ragin's seminal statements have been adopted and reframed in the literature of the field so far. Among other things, they reach the conclusion that Ragin's statement that QCA would represent a sort of middle way between case-oriented and variable oriented strategies, or broader, qualitative and quantitative research, has not been adopted or debated any further. However,

the question whether the dichotomisation of scientific endeavours brings benefits at all was still going on. Many authors denied, stating that both approaches should be considered to be based on critical realism (Lund, 2005), and some even argued that the dichotomy might hamper the education of young students as these trench wars hamper the development of science as such (Prakash et al., 2007). And although a wide range of literature inside and outside the QCA canon encourages "bridging the quantitative-qualitative gap" can be found in various disciplines of social science (Tarrow, 1995, 2004; Lieberman, 2010; Sil and Katzenstein, 2010; Lüdeke, 2013), there seems to be a disaccord about what quantitative or qualitative actually *is*. Brady and Collier (2004, p.244-247) determine four theoretical fields in which quantitative research and qualitative research differ. They admit that there is no clear distinction within each field, however, drawing together all four criteria would render it possible to label a study qualitative or quantitative. In their dichotomy, the comparative method is subsumed under qualitative methods, together with case studies, small-N analysis, concept analysis, the comparative-historical method, the ethnographic tradition of field research, interpretive and constructivism (p.4 fn1)[8]. The following table gives an overview and puts the statements into relation to csQCA:

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[8]For a more elaborate discussion about the nature of qualitative and quantitative research with more references see Gerring (2017, p.153–192).

	QUALITATIVE	QUANTITATIVE	Comment	csQCA
Level of Measurement	Data organized on an ordinal, interval, or ratio level of measurement	Data organized on a nominal level of measurement	*The level of quantitative measurement is "higher" e.g. more precise. Order, units of measurement, and zero points are a weakness in this context.*	Both possible
Size of N	Large-N research	Small-N research	*Observed practice in science: The cut-point between small and large-N is somewhere between 10 and 20. The availability of data plays a major role.*	Theoretically both possible
Statistical Tests	Employs statistical tests in reaching its conclusions	Does almost never employ statistical tests	*Many relevant assumptions have to be met to conduct meaningful statistical tests*	Only when designing variables on the microlevel
Thick versus Thin Analysis	The knowledge of each case is typically incomplete	Analysts place great reliance on detailed knowledge of cases	*Although quantitative researchers may use thick descriptions as well, it is more widespread among qualitative research*	Theoretically both possible

Table 3.3: Quantitative and qualitative research according to Brady and Collier (2004) related to csQCA

Some features are intuitive: The level of measurement in the data used by QCA initially might be interval, ordinal, or ratio scaled, however, the constitutive and seminal step of QCA is to dichotomize data in order to turn any interval scaled measures into Boolean algebra variables. What remains is the weakness of levels of measurement and zero points in form of thresholds of the dichotomization. This problem is related to many research built upon variables. Furthermore, as shown above, QCA does not necessarily use statistical tests. The Boolean operations do not include probability. True, the initial data might have been statistical features like the mean or average of macro-data or opinion polls taken from different countries and turned into the (1 - 0) dichotomy. But the main operations that use boolean algebra, do use implicitly the comparative method.

When it comes to the matter of thick descriptions, the classification of QCA turns to be a little complicated. There are three stages where detailed case knowledge enters the stage in a QCA study.

First, when determining the variables, there has to be a basic knowledge about interconnectivity of phenomenon and variables on the one hand, and a basic knowledge about the nature of the systems under scrutiny on the other, in order to be able to establish a reasonable hypothesis.

Second, after the establishment of the variables and some first minimizations, the dialogue between the data and the theories begins which needs and deepens the case knowledge of the researcher. Third, the final interpretation of the result, e.g. the final Boolean equation has to be justified and consolidated by case knowledge again.

The basic orientation of QCA is rather qualitative and that is why Ragin chose the name *Qualitative* Comparative Analysis. However, it is worthwhile to steer attention to the points of table 3.3 which include the notion of being *theoretically possible.* In a scientific comparison, there is always a trade off between the number of cases and the time a researcher is able to spend on every single instance, and also QCA does not fully escape that logic (Rihoux and Lobe, 2009, p.231). Every researcher faces a limitation of time and resources. Variable oriented research, just as quantitative research rather tends to account for generality at the expense of complexity while the case oriented studies, say, qualitative research focusses on quite the opposite. Variable oriented research does not require an in-depth familiarity with the cases like case-oriented research does. However, it renders the check of many cases and variables possible on a perhaps more superficial level. The advantage of variable oriented research according to Ragin is that theories can be evaluated and rank on the ground of statistical operating figures without getting deeply into the cases. The sources for the assumptions made and tested by the researcher are thus mostly secondary literature; there is no need to be an area specialist, as aggregated data from the particular cases under scrutiny - in comparative social science mostly nation-states - is available at cross-national data banks accessible for all investigators (Ragin, 1987, p.58).

The difference between depth and breadth becomes especially visible when it comes to theory testing. Multivariate statistical methods allow for the test of many competing theories, while a common reproach considering case oriented studies is the lack, neglect, or even ignorance of such an endeavour. This is especially true if the case-oriented investigation is foremost interpretive in nature (Skocpol and Somers, 1980, Ragin, 1987, p.57). Figure 3.1 shows roughly the interpretation between the number of cases and time that can be spent for in-depth analysis.

Figure 3.1: The relation between depth and breadth of a scientific study

The node $(1|1)$ represents a single case study where the resource time is completely spent on one case, while all points of the domain $(n < 1)$ represent policy analysis that focus on parts of a political or societal system. The simplicity of this graph is its strength and shows at least three things:

- especially in very small n the loss of time that comes up with each added case is palpable, the larger the size of n, the lower the loss of time to engage in in-depth research.

- the larger the sample size n becomes, the more difficult are in in-depth studies. Statistical, deductive, and research drawing on already existing theories is necessary.

- in turn, the smaller the sample size is, the more time a researcher has to focus on idiosyncrasies and theory building, and the less cases are included, the more time and freedom a researcher has to examine the cases (see also: Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003, p.10)).

- The loss of freedom that comes with the more narrow corset of variable oriented research that affects the process of QCA still allows for creativity when it comes to theory building and the establishment of new variables. This is only and only maximised in small and very small n.

As the approach is iterative and resorts to a dialogue between the data and theories, the greater amount of time can be used to do both, theory building out of the observations of case studies, theory building with the help of already existing theories, and eventually the testing of these theories using the comparative method. Hence, the trade-off between breadth and depth can be read as chance. The more cases involved, the more shallow the theory building part of QCA becomes. The more cases are examined, the less time is left for each to engage in deep case studies. The less cases are involved, the more time can be spent for the development of new ideas and theories. Turning back to table 3.3, it becomes clear that the nature of csQCA, say, whether it is more qualitative or quantitative, or more or less theory driven, or case oriented

depends on the sample size n. Besides theory building on the ground of deep case knowledge, the surplus on time can also be spent to experiment with the variables, like changing thresholds, joining variables, or climbing up and down on the ladder of abstraction. The techniques introduced in section 2.3 come to the fore.

Additionally, some features of QCA can be neglected, especially the coverage of the cases. The coverage of a final configuration applied to very small n has almost no explanatory power. If a researcher finds that two or three positive cases out of eight are covered by a final expression, the coverage would be 37.5 per cent and 50 per cent respectively. While these numbers may have an impressive effect on some individuals, there is little additional value, given the small size of that subsample. In very small n, it is rather valuable to use the surplus of time to work out elaborate qualitative explanations for the respective countries. This requires a broad case knowledge which is - at best - introduced and explicated in the case studies.

Against this background, it is of importance to document and render the underlying lines of thoughts more easy to follow. This supports the idea of rich descriptions in order to disclose the knowledge base of the researcher on the one hand and the included theories on the other. It simply makes the research more **transparent** and replicable. Moreover, even information mentioned in the case studies and that are not processed further to generate variables, but which help to get a better impression of the case in the sense of *verstehen*, may be beneficial for students and scholars who read the study. Acknowledging the fact that the task of science is also to *maintain* knowledge future research is rendered more easyly. This consideration also derives from the devastating state of the source material in Middle Eastern Studies which will be addressed in section 4.3.1.

Having said all this, some statements can be made about QCA and the way it is used in this study. First, QCA is neither qualitative nor quantitative, and it is neither truly variable oriented nor case oriented. The depth of the study is determined by the sample size n. More resources can be used to scrutinise the cases in small n, which renders complex descriptions possible. These deep descriptions enhance the transparency of the study and make the eventual minimisation process more traceable. In this light, QCA is predestined to be used as a enhancement of CHA, and both parts of science - confirmation and explanation - can easily be included.

3.3 Addressing Some Major Criticisms of QCA

Ever since the number of QCA studies constantly rose beginning from the 1990s, also criticism about the approach did not abate. Debates emerged mainly around topics like case sensitivity (Goldthorpe, 1997), distortions through omitted variables (Seawright, 2005; Achen, 2005), the temptation of manipulating the data set (Lieberson, 1994, 2004) , measurement errors (Markoff, 1990; Hug, 2013; Seawright, 2014) determinism

and probability (Clark et al., 2006; Tanner, 2014), and eventually how, if, why, and why not QCA would resort to Mill's methods (Hug, 2013). Much of these criticisms have been addressed elsewhere (Goldstone, 1997; de Meur et al., 2009; Maggetti and Levi-Faur, 2013; Thiem, 2014). This section aims at retracing the discussions under the special aspects of very small n studies as outlined in the previous sections.

3.3.1   Methodological and Design Related Issues

Before starting with the main criticism, a very basic statement has to be made: csQCA in very small n shouldn't and maybe even mustn't be taken for generalisations that go beyond the very cases under scrutiny. The aim is not to make general laws but to draw conclusions for the cases, as outlined in the tables 3.2 and 3.3. Especially macro-units like entire countries should be considered as unique (Skocpol and Somers, 1980) and generalisations may only be transferred to other cases or sets of cases with much care (Della Porta, 2008, p.206). Against that background, the determinism reproach, often uttered by critics, should be regarded in a different light. Results of csQCA equations are not universal and as each results needs a (re)interpretation of the data, the aim to scrutinise on single cases becomes clear. The result is never a statement in the form of "in all systems/cases of the set n and beyond does the combination of the variables ABC render the outcome x". It is foremost a statement in the form of "under the (asymmetric) information we could gather in this study, the best explanation for the outcome x is the combination of ABC for the case z". No comparativist will say that her result is a strict and inviolable if...then...else condition (Goldstone, 1997).
Probabilistic approaches, in turn, do have some setbacks as well, and depending on the research, there is often little difference in value of highly probable outcomes and outcomes with a statistical lower probability. This has already been acknowledged by Jeffrey (1969), arguing that an explanation of a low probability event is not necessarily weaker than an explanation of a high probability event (Salmon, 1999, p.93-100).
What has to be acknowledged, though, is that theories that are set up only by the help of observations taken from the "black box" of a single case often elude from more stringent empirical critique (Goldthorpe, 1997). Customised explanations can be read as an advantage, as events that happen without underlying a general law can be traced and explained[9], however true, if a researcher does attempt to identify an abstract hypothesis that might explain multiple cases, the final QCA result might become just an accumulation of idiosyncrasies. By using the ladder of abstraction and configurating the sets and classes of the research design with care and reasonable justification, this should be avoided. Moreover, in the dialogue between the data and theory there should

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[9]This is also an important feature of science as such. Salmon (1999, p.17) give the example of an ink stain on the carpet: Some clumsy movement of an employee in the office might have caused an ink pot to fall from the table. This is a sufficient explanation, however, it does not underlay a general law.

and must be some deductive theories included.[10]

In a similar vein, also the critique that csQCA would be prone to be manipulated in order to produce results that fit into the ideological world-view of the researcher has been uttered repeatedly (Lieberson, 1991; Goldthorpe, 1997; Lieberson, 2004). The problem may arise that, if facts appear to refute the theory, the theory is not reconstructed but simply limited in its scope and that much uncontrolled subjectivism is included into the study (Burawoy, 1989). It is an important objection and already the behaviouralists demanded ideology-free science for a good reason. Even if subjectivity and consciously or unconsciously manipulated data is by no means a problem of QCA only and also affects large n statistical methods (Flyvbjerg, 2006), especially dichotomous data sets can be very tempting to be manipulated.

In this context, Seawright (2005) also concludes that knowledge of cases is neither unique to nor inherent in QCA especially as the identification of all missing variables required a perfect knowledge of the underlying causal processes. If a particular cause was mistakenly believed to have no impact on the outcome, or if it was yet unmeasured or even undiscovered, researchers would omit the relevant variable. He even states that, against that background, QCA would be a step backwards from the problems regression analysis tried to solve:

> [...] ordinary regression fails whenever omitted variables are correlated with the included variables, but it can succeed if omitted variables are uncorrelated with included variables. By contrast, Boolean-algebraic QCA always fails when there are omitted variables of any sort. (Seawright, 2005, p.19)

Also measurement errors would have a high impact on QCA results and distort the entire result (Lieberson, 1994; Hug, 2013). These are all serious objections. However, as shown in figure 3.1, the researcher has much more time to get knowledge of the cases in order to avoid the pitfalls that emerge when working with variables as outlined in section 3.1.4 on page 52. The dialogue between theory and the data and the systematisation of the process that has been identified in section 3.1.4 as core innovation of QCA helps to get systematically deeper into the cases. Still, the share of responsibility of each researcher applying QCA is probably much higher than in regression analysis and caution and circumspection have to be the most important guidelines. Therefore, a research design in very small n csQCA should, for the sake of transparency and replicability, hold the *case studies as thick as possible and as parsimonious as necessary* while the *results should be held as thick as necessary and as parsimonious as possible.*

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[10]For a apt and well-designed example of the use of the theory between the theory and data see (Fritzsche, 2014).

3.3.2   Small n Research and Avoiding to Fiddle while Rome Burns

The fact that it is more difficult to design a clean and flawless research design with QCA, however, does not mean that the approach should be discarded as a whole, as suggested by some authors (Seawright, 2014; Tanner, 2014; Clark et al., 2006). Following the assessment of Satori (1970) and Lijphart (1971), the comparative method is of importance in small n settings, and, by fact, much of worldwide cutting edge topics and important fields for policy making are located in that realm. Studies of small samples are clearly also a part of to go looking "what actually happens" (Catlin (1956, p.819), as introduced in 3.1.1 above on page 46). Authors discarding small and very small n studies because of their potentially erroneous results, sticking exclusively to large n "quantitative" designs with clear and unambiguously measurable data fall into the same trap as the generation of the behavioural revolution - which started to bring statistics into social science. Already in 1967 the American Political Science Association (APSA) denominated the pure behavioural approach in political science as of "no relevance" due to its tendency to focus on readily observable phenomena -such as electoral behaviour- rather than more subtle and deeper analysis (Sanders, 2010). Indeed, especially in the post war period, being a time of immanent change in societal and moral structures, results of political research based on behaviouristic paradigms seemed rather disappointing, especially at a time of intense social conflict and rapid social change, including the Vietnam war, the civil rights movement, the woman's movement, the sexual revolution, and the 1968s counter-culture. These developments cried out for empirical, but also for detailed qualitative analysis. The behaviouralist research agenda failed to address any of these topics in a satisfying manner (Smith, 2004, p.72) which encouraged Leo Strauss to rail against political science of that time, stating (Strauss, 1962, p.327):

> Only a great fool would call the new political science diabolic: it has no attributes peculiar to fallen angels. It is not even Machiavellian, for Machiavelli's teaching was graceful, subtle, and colorful. Nor is it Neronian. Nevertheless, one may say of it that it fiddles while Rome burns. It is excused by two facts: it does not know that it fiddles, and it does not know that Rome burns.

Against this background, it is of importance to remind and warn critics of QCA not to fall into the trap of naivety as many of their behavioural predecessors did. There is a need for research under asymmetric information and using small sample sizes, especially given the interconnectedness of the globalised world today. New emerging questions arise at high speed and urge for answers and it is also the duty of science to do its best to serve society by bringing systematised, transparent, and replicable results, as far as possible. As has been argued before, csQCA gives a good framework to tackle these questions, being a tool of systematisation of comparative research that is a step forward in the line of the evolution of comparative methods. Statistical methods - even if we agreed with Lijphart (1971) who clearly acknowledges their superiority

vis-á-vis the comparative method - did not find yet a way to deal with small and very small n in a satisfying manner. On the contrary, as Kittel (1999) concludes, a sensitive interpretation of the findings obtained by advanced statistical methodology in comparative political economy is still dependent on small-N comparative analysis. In an intercultural research context, a careful interpretation of inputs and outputs is of the essence. As political science studies seek to understand interpretively constituted environments, there is no reason why its methods should not be interpretive as well. Nevertheless, behaviouralist barely ask the question what a writer really meant when using a certain term or how maybe a test person understands a certain term or question in an inquiry. The course is rather to be clear and (possibly) wrong than to be so impenetrable that other writers have to debate the "meaning" of what has been written (Sanders, 2010, p.62). Constructivism, with its attention to the role of interpretation in human action, offers valuable insights when it comes to the interpretation of phenomena across cultural borders. Just as it is not possible to understand changing domestic policies and institutions without attention to the introduction of ideas (Hall, 1989; Sikkink, 1991; Berman, 1998; Blyth, 2002), it is impossible to understand phenomena in a different cultural context without questioning own assumptions, terms, and concepts. QCA seems an appropriate approach, as by fact, it does not only allow a dialogue between theory and cases: it even enforces it (Fritzsche, 2014). Keeping that in mind the design of the study at hand is introduced in the next chapter.

Chapter 4

Applying QCA in Critical Juncture Research: The Research Design

For the application of any approach, the main unit, sample size, observations, and the direction of influence have to be determined in advance. This section aims at delimiting and justify these features with respect to research questions that take aim at the role of trade unions throughout the course of the Arab Spring protests of 2010 - 2012. Three basic concepts will be used to specify the research approach. This section deals with the basic question of how the outcome, according to QCA, should be determined. As the superordinate research question is *"Under which circumstances did trade unions adopt a transformative stance during the protests of 2011-2012 in the MENA Region?"*, the following four questions have to be answered in this chapter:

- How is the determination of the QCA outcome (0 /1) conceptualised?

- Which concepts can be applied in an inter-cultural research framework?

- How is the main unit "labour union" defined and where are the boundaries of the concept?

- What is the scope of the study and which countries are included?

This chapter introduces the concept of an institutional equilibrium, which has the advantage of being able to make use of varying concepts of authoritarianism. In this way, a patchwork of concepts can be applied to analyse the cases in which these concepts as such do not necessarily need to be entirely comparable. What the concepts have to be comparable in is that they 1) describe the stability of the regime in a appropriate manner, 2) show vulnerabilities that have been, or might have been attacked during the uprisings of 2011-2012, and 3) are able to identify players that have or might have conducted such an attack. The basic assumption for the institutional equilibria is the rise and fall of authoritarian bargain, described as the exchange of political participation for welfare and social security.

Following the institutional turn in authoritarianism research, this section also introduces the concept of institutional shielding. It is defined as institutions, set up by

the regimes notably after the beginning erosion of the authoritarian bargain to shield themselves against blows targeting their legitimacy. A range of pillars of institutional shieldings within cases in the MENA region will also be introduced and categorised into violence, legitimacy, and legal framework. This serves as the basis for the case studies in the next chapter. The term "trade union" will subsequently be scrutinised to determine the transferability of the concept into in the MENA region and eventually to conceptualise it as a research object in the environment of the the institutional equilibria of the cases.

4.1 Concept Application in Inter-Cultural Studies

Middle Eastern Studies as a discipline and its predecessor, Oriental Studies, have come under attack with respect to their aim, scope, and methods. Similar to CHA, the field that initially focused on the study of the history, culture, politics, economies, and geography of the region has suffered from a reputation of being descriptive, theory-free, often focussed on single cases, as well as being reluctant to adopt interdisciplinary approaches (Bill, 1996, p.502). Additionally, regarding the production of knowledge in the time of colonialism and beyond, a 1970s generation of scholars imputed an "Orientalist" view (Said, 1978), calling the subject a system of representations serving to preserve the West's authority and supremacy over the region, having helped to "define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience" (p.1-2). Edward Said's critique transcends the political and also attacks the way Western scholars approach other cultures and societies. In the essay *The World, The Text and the Critic* (1984), he gave the example of a scholar who had been told that some Indians believed that the world rested atop an elephant. The scholar interviewed an Indian and asked him what he - the scientist – considered of the critical question, "What does the elephant stand on?". He replied, "a tortoise". Said tells the story to outline the naivety and practical limitations of asking the wrong sort of questions (Brown, 1999, p.565). As soon as two years earlier, Binder (1976) complained that Middle East studies have been "beset by subjective projections, displacements of affect, ideological distortion, romantic mystification, and religious bias, as well as by a great deal of incompetent scholarship".

The application of theories, models, and approaches that have been developed and tested in western countries, however, can be difficult to apply to a culturally, societally, and historically different region of the world. As the premises of the scientific concepts may differ, the researcher runs the risk of producing nonsense correlations. Different interpretations of signifier and signified (de Saussure, 1916; Lacan, 1956) say that a sound image and its meaning as a concept, may produce different forms of discourses (Foucault, 1982, 1994). Discourses can be summarized as what is done or not done in a particular realm of time and space, forming the "rules of the game" to which

the subject is subjected to due to its throwness (Heidegger, 1962) into existence in a particular culture, status, or body. As a researcher may be restricted due to her own discourse, it is useful to apply Foucault's *Archology of Knowledge* to determine the meanings of significations, symbols, and signs inherent in the discourse of the research objects. Acknowledging that it is impossible to determine the signified of a significant completely and comprehensively (Derrida, 1982), the task of understanding the world and to produce meaningful and correct inferences - which is a main task of science as such - becomes particularly difficult in fields that bear features differing from the pool of experiences of the researcher. Hence, there is something in what Gibb (1963, p.129-130) - who has been branded as "Orientalist" by Said (1978) - states, when writing that a crucial task of a researcher (in this context the "Orientalist")

> is to furnish that core out of his knowledge and understanding of the invisibles - the values, attitudes and mental processes characteristic of the "great culture" that underlie the application even today of the social and economic data - to explain the why, rather than the what and the how, and this precisely because he is or should be able to see the data not simply as isolated facts, explicable in and by themselves, but in the broad context and long perspective of cultural habit and tradition.

The tradition of the "old Orientalists" (most prominent Massignion, Lane, and Lewis), however, turned a blind eye to the impact of industrialisation, modernisation, and the sheer interaction with other cultures and discourses on the Arab and Islamic world. Lockman (2016, p.130-134) provides numerous examples in which Orientalist thought and analysis remained entrapped in the interpretation of Islamic medieval texts and dogmas to explain the behaviour of modern states and societies during the Cold War. What is striking though, is a surprising accuracy of the analysis of Orientalists in hindsight. Albeit using some questionable assumptions, stereotypes, and a picture of a "great culture" based on few and selective sources, Lewis (1954, p.12) writes in an essay about "Communism and Islam"

> [t]he present revolt of the Muslims against the immorality and opportunist of their own and of some Western leaders may temporarily favour the Communists, with their appearance of selfless devotion to an ideal, but will work against Communism when Muslims come to see the realities behind the propaganda.

He does not only forecast part of the the developments in Iran that happened 25 years later, or Oman during the Dhofar crisis, but also the developments in many Arab countries in which Islamism has superseded Communism as largest opposition movement already before 1990. This analysis, however, is not valid for all Arab countries, as indicated in the example of South Yemen. Nor is it valid in other Muslim states like Indonesia, which developed an idiosyncratic version of Islam (Geertz, 1971). No matter whether the analysis of Lewis was a mere coincidence or not[1], it seems fruitful to bear the particularities of the Arab and Muslim world in mind and *also* to include

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[1]For a critical answer of Said see Said (1979, 1980) A more analytical approach is offered by Ma (2012).

them into theory building and testing in research about Middle East and North Africa. Indeed, it can be assumed that the relationship between structure and agency is dialectical when acknowledging that societies form the individual, who, again, create and alter societies in a continuous loop (Berger and Luckman, 1978). Every study should therefore consider the role of dispositives, defined as the remainder of past discourses that still influence the present, when engaging in inter-cultural research.

The difficulty of such a task is exacerbated because every deliberate action has an *external* effect as well as an *internal* intention. Internal relates here to thoughts and and intentions, whereas external is understood as the form of observable bodies and environments in social science that also bear the danger of misinterpretation of the observed actions. Collingwood (1946) gave a famous example to illustrate this dilemma: A man cutting another man with a knife. The description of this event as a single utterance does not provide the information we need to classify the action precisely. On the one hand, we could have witnessed a cruel act of murder. On the other hand, it could have been a surgery in an operating theatre and a physician acting in mutual consent with a patient. Science, aiming at making the world understood, thus becomes hampered in two ways: To study the environment by observing and writing down structures, anatomies, phenotypes, movements, or events becomes a source of possible errors and misinterpretations. Second, science aims to establish a system of interrelations between these observations, finding causal connections and effects. Science tries to *explain*, and the challenge of identifying, assessing, and eliminating rival explanations[2] is the fundamental concern in social research (Brady and Collier, 2004). Nonetheless, every researcher faces the impossibility of an unambiguous and definite confirmation of a postulated relationship. David Hume (1748) already argued that whenever we make inferences from observed facts to the unobserved we are clearly reasoning ampliatively – that is, the content of the conclusion goes beyond the content of the premises (Salmon, 1999).

Having said this, every researcher of the MENA region faces the dilemma that she has to ponder if the proposed concept and conception that underlies her approach to the region could be a romanticised and possibly prejudiced notion of Orientalism to purposely construct otherness. The researcher also has to acknowledge that language, concepts, internal intentions, as well as external, visible effects may significantly differ from what she harbours in her particular pool of experience, and is thus prone to misinterpretation. Both approaches produced extra-scientific outgrows (Halliday, 2003, p.14-15): The historical particularism that produced Orientalism was welcomed by colonial powers to justify their rule. The analytic universalism that followed the behavioural revolution became a main pillar of modernization theory, which has been discarded by mainstream social science due to observations in developing countries

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[2]An explanations shall be defined here as "an attempt to render understandable or intelligible some particular event [. . .] or some general fact by appealing to other particular and/or general facts drawn from one ore more branches of empirical science" (Salmon et al., 1992).

that rebutted a straightforward linearity of economic and democratic development. The question of which concepts are able to "travel" (Zemni, 2004, p.300), and in which incidents the inner-system logic of language, socialisation, and perceptions coin the outcomes of the region is a pivotal part of any research. In the words of Said (1983, p.226):

> Like people and schools of criticism, ideas and theories travel from person to person, from situation to situation, from one period to another. Cultural and intellectual life are usually nourished and often sustained by this circulation of ideas, and whether it takes the form of acknowledged or unconscious influence, creative borrowing, or wholesale appropriation, the movement of ideas and theories from one place to another is both a fact of life and a usefully enabling condition of intellectual activity. Having said that, however, one should go on to specify the kinds of movement that are possible, in order to ask whether by virtue of having moved from one place and time to another an idea or a theory gains or loses in strength, and whether a theory in one historical period and national culture becomes altogether different for another period or situation.

In the following sections the concepts applied in this research will be introduced and discussed whether and to which extent they are able to travel.

4.2   Critical Junctures and Institutional Equilibria

As the aim of this study is to determine whether trade unions in the MENA region tried to alter the power structures of their countries in 2011-2012, the first question to resolve is how to describe and conceptualise these power structures. The concept of institutional equilibrium offers a solution that bridges the gaps that comparativists have left unfilled when dealing with the MENA region. Indeed, cross-country analysis is scarce and the applied theories differ from country to country and from scholar to scholar.

4.2.1   Institutional Equilibria

Among the things that can be observed unambiguously is change. There is, for the most part, widespread agreement among observers about the fact that change *has* happened, even if they may disagree about *what* they have observed and the extent and impact on a research object. In experiments in (natural) sciences, the ex-ante situation is compared with the ex-post situation, whereas in social sciences and history this procedure is done by comparing different periods of time. From around 2000 onwards, when the enthusiasm and hopes for *The End of History* (Fukuyama, 1992) that was expected to lead to a sustainable and comprehensive *Third Wave of Democracy* (Huntington, 1993) had paled away, scholars looked with some astonishment at Arab countries. By then, a widespread perception among them was that these regimes had not witnessed any transition whatsoever from authoritarian rule to democracy. This questioned the hopes that had been refuelled by the developments in Latin America

and South Europe (O'Donnell et al., 1986) as well as the fall of the Soviet Bloc. The seemingly exceptional developments in the Arab world eventually led to the proclamation of the end of the "Transition Paradigm" (Carothers, 2002). Attention turned away from questions of when democratisation might ultimately occur or what Arab countries actually lack, and rather focused on how political rule in Arab countries remained stable. Apparently, the "democratisation paradigm" as a concept was not able to "travel", whereas research about stability seemed to be a more promising approach. The stability in the institutional set of MENA countries that prevent large-scale change can be conceptualised as an *institutional equilibrium.* Theory about institutions can be traced back to Durkheim ([1895] 1950), who viewed institutions as beliefs and modes of conduct shared in a collectivity, and the bulk of what has been introduced in Chapter 3.1 as Comparative Historical Analysis deals with institutions. They can be seen as "human-made, nonphysical elements, norms, beliefs, organizations, and rules, exogenous to each individual whose behaviour it influences that generates behavioural regularities (Grief and Laitin, 2004, p.635). In this study, the very broad definition of North (1991, p.97) will be used, who defines institutions as "humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction", consisting of "both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)". It uses the underlying assumption that the development of a particular organizational form is the result of an effort to reduce the transaction costs of undertaking the same activity without such an institution (North and Thomas, 1976; Williamson, 1987). Their level of analysis in social sciences can be more fine, or more coarsely granular, and it may include behaviour as well as institutional bodies. Units may range from "a single organization (for example, a political party, a union, or a corporation), to the structured interaction between organizations (for example, a party system or relationships between branches of government), to public policies, to a political regime as a whole" (Capoccia and Keleman, 2007; Ball, 2004, p.249).

Already applied to a state by Weber (1972, p.657), the study of institutional equilibria has a long-lasting history in post-WWII economics (Gluckmann, 1968; Ullmann-Margalit, 1977; Schotter, 1981)). In a conceptualisation that derives from game theory, there are many kinds of possible equilibria. An equilibrium shall be defined here, according to John F. Nash, as a solution within a non-cooperative game where players, knowing the playing strategies of their opponents, do not have incentives to change their strategy. A change of strategy in a Nash equilibrium will ultimately leave the player worse off. The nature of the game forces the players either into action or passivity because a self-enforcing institution is one in which each player's behaviour is the best response, according to his or her own assessment of the possible costs and benefits of actions.[3]

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[3]This last trailer refers to a broader version of Rational Choice Theory in which subjectivity is the main pillar of human behaviour, see for instants Boudon (1996), Esser (1999), and Hedstrom (2005).

Such approaches have already been used by Przeworski (1991) and Geddes (1994) for analysis of the transformation and non-transformation of authoritarian regimes in Latin America and Eastern Europe.

4.2.2 Critical Junctures

The second concept used for the conceptualisation of the QCA analysis refers to *critical junctures*, which, too, are closely tied to the observation of change, and which will subsequently be applied to conceptualise the Arab uprisings between 2011 and 2013. Under this concept, existing institutions or a set of institutions may come under attack due to external shocks, changing results, internal emancipation, or the possibility of individuals starting to formulate desires for change. This negative feedback can lead to - or can already be part of - critical junctures in which new institutions are created (Collier1991; Katznelson1997; Thelen1999). Critical junctures shall be defined as periods of time in which change is possible at lower costs, in the words of Capoccia and Keleman (2007, 348-351):

> Critical junctures are characterized by a situation in which the structural (that is, economic, cultural, ideological, organizational) influences on political action are significantly relaxed for a relatively short period, with two main consequences: the range of plausible choices open to powerful political actors expands substantially and the consequences of their decisions for the outcome of interest are potentially much more momentous. Contingency, in other words, becomes paramount.

However, the period under scrutiny does not necessarily produce revolution-like, profound changes. The concept of a critical juncture refers rather to a window of opportunity, allowing for the change of the predominant rules of the political game. It is not related to factual change nor a certain degree of change that actually took place, but a time of uncertainty that allows for different paths. They are "moments of relative structural indeterminism when actors shape outcomes in a more voluntaristic fashion than normal circumstances permit" (Mahoney, 2001, 347). Moreover, critical junctures are "relatively short periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents' choices will affect the outcome of interest" (Capoccia and Keleman, 2007, p.348). "Relatively short periods of time," means that the juncture itself must be brief relative to the period the institutions or set of institutions to be changed already exist. "Substantially heightened probability," means that the probability of the factual change of the outcome of interest due to an agents' choices is higher during the period of the juncture relative to its probability before and after.

Critical Junctures are no anonymous procedures. There have to be players inside the equilibrium that believe that a change in the rules of the game, say, the set of institutions, would be beneficial at least for their own group. These players will be labelled

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For a discussion of the typologies of RCT see Opp (1999)

here as *Critical Interference Factors.* They attempt to change the institutional equilibrium by either aiming to produce a critical juncture and/or conducting attacks on the institutional equilibrium within a critical juncture. Many of these critical interference factors are organised in parties, interest groups, or social movements.

4.2.3 Critical Interference Factors and Social Movement Theory

Research putting groundbreaking events or short times of turmoil under scrutiny has often dealt with revolutions and rebellions, as many historical works indicate (Gurr (1970); Tilly (1978); Skocpol (1979) to name a few, much of the CHA literature can be included). Out of the research agenda of revolution studies emerged another scope of research that dealt with social movements and contentious politics. Contentious politics can be defined as "what happens when collective actors join forces in confrontation with elites, authorities, and opponents around their claims or the claims of those they claim to represent" (Tarrow, 2018, p.4). In his seminal work *From Mobilization to Revolution* Charles Tilly (1978) laid the cornerstone for what became known as "Social Movement Theory" (SMT), a scientific current in social science that seeks to explain why social mobilization occurs, the forms under which it manifests, as well as potential social, cultural, and political consequences.

Among the factors that facilitate social movement action are opportunity and threat (Eisinger, 1973). Opportunities refer to the extent to which other groups, including governments, are vulnerable to new claims of domestic groups. Opportunities include the policy of security forces between repression and tolerance, the centralisation of political institutions, the cultural acceptance of the movement's goals in society, and the possible alliances with other civil society groups or parties within the political arena (Della Porta, 1999, pp.197-221). A threat is competition in the sense of "the extent to which other groups are threatening to make claims which would, if successful, reduce the contender's realization of its interests" (Tilly, 1978, p.133).

The political opportunity structure shapes activists' perception of the likelihood of success of different strategies to effectuate social change. A triggering event may lead to a critical juncture and alter the opportunity structure, giving rise to hopes that the agenda of a movement can be implemented. In this case, collective action is possible as a means to change the status quo. Repression can enhance or diminish opportunities for social mobilisation (Honari, 2018; Moss, 2014). On the one hand, the likelihood of success can be perceived as too low and direct confrontation as too dangerous. On the other hand it can give rise to moral incentives (Kenney, 2001), de-legitimise the state (Chang P.Y., 2007), or increase ideological commitments (Postigo, 2010).

Having said all of this the following definitions shall be applied for this research:

- An *Institutional Equilibrium* is a stable set of institutions that counterbalance

each other. Opportunity structures prevent a change of institutional equilibria and are actively influenced by regimes to secure power.

- During a *Critical Juncture*, the *Opportunity Structures* inside a country changes, opening a window of opportunity for a change of the institutional equilibrium.

- Those agents within a country that actively attempt to change institutional equilibria are labelled *Critical Interference Factors*.

4.2.4   Social Movement Theory and Rational Choice Models: Pitfalls and Opportunities

The conceptualisation of MENA regimes as institutional equilibria is promising for a study about institutional change using QCA for three reasons. First, the game theoretical perspective scrutinises the relationship between institution and behaviour and allows to explain "why existing institutions continue to exist" (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 950). This aspect helps to understand vulnerabilities of regimes and the positioning of players in the set of institutions. Second, taking an existing equilibrium that slides into a critical juncture provides comparability among states that were confronted with the Arab uprisings of 2011-2013. It also constitutes a technique to either include or exclude cases in the study. Third, conceptualising trade unions as possible critical inference factors that aim or do not aim at altering the institutional equilibrium help to dichotomise their actions into equilibrium-threatening (1) and non-equilibrium-threatening (0). This is also a pre-condition for a successful csQCA analysis. As the stability providing equilibrium is defined qualitatively for every case, a framework balancing analytic universalism and historical particularism is set up, seeking to avoid the pitfalls of inter-cultural research.

Social Movement Theory (SMT) and and Rational Choice assumptions have been regarded as "strange bedfellows" (Foweraker, 1997, p.50) for a long time, especially when authors focus on their most radical peculiarities. However, Rational Choice has influenced Social Movement Theory from the 1970s onwards, when the resource mobilisation approach complemented the mass psychology driven traditional approach (McCarthy and Zald, 1977, p.1216-1217). Indeed, there are a number of similarities between the game theoretic perspective of critical juncture research and SMT. Independent from the Nash equilibrium, SMT also departs from the notion of an equilibrium ever since it became an inherent part of the study of contentious politics after WWII. During this time, the emergence of social movements was explained by a modernity-driven disruption of old orders that caused panic, anxiety, shame, guilt, and depression, and ultimately led to collective action (Smelser, 1962; Tilly, 1978; Della Porta, 1999). Relative deprivation and structural restraints were at the center of these concepts. The basic idea of an equilibrium was upheld implicitly, and eventually became part of the framework of social movement studies in general sociology (Della Porta, 1999, p.8).

A major criticism launched by Social Movement Theorists against Rational Choice Models refers to the narrow conceptualisation of the motives for action. Starting from the canon of Weber's rational-purposeful action (*Zweckrationalität*), value rational action (*Wertrationalität*), affective and traditional action (Weber, 2013)[4], Rational Choice models were alleged to focus on the instrumental-rational purpose oriented *Zweckrationalität* only. However, Esser (1993) and Kroneberg (2005) have shown possibilities to expand on Rational Choice models by modelling "choice" in a given situation as being framed by actions beyond the instrumental-rational paradigm. This is possible due to a broader view of value-expectancy theory (VET) in which the expected value of an action transcends direct measurable economic or material benefits (Opp, 2013, 1-2). By including systems of beliefs and different kinds of generated knowledge into the analysis of Rational Choice, theorists moved towards SMT, albeit keeping an individualistic micro-approach, which now allowed for greater theoretical flexibility. Furthermore, the conceptualisation of social movements as players that offer different and competing frames for interpretation of the perceived reality (Denzau and Nort, 2008, p.24), enriched Social Movement Theory. Simultaneously, Social Movement scholars increasingly advocated the inclusion of Rational Choice conceptions into their research (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991; Ostrom, 1998). Today, scholars openly write about a reconciliation between SMT and Rational Choice Theory (RCT), in which identity is accepted as a question both of original cultural materials and of individual organisation and strategy. Consequently, collective action by social movements is seen as having a kind of "dual logic" (Cohen and Arato, 1992, p.580) as they are both expressive (of identity) and instrumental (Foweraker, 1997, p.51)[5]

A second battlefield of the two approaches to collective action was the ontological presumptions regarding the emergence of social movements. A narrow version of Rational Choice scholarship views institutions as self enforcing equilibria in which behaviour is generated endogenously (Weingast, 2002). Changes of an institutional equilibrium or the emergence of a critical juncture were explained in hindsight as some kind of external shock, neglecting the manifold possibilities of emancipation and learning processes over time (Streeck and Thelen, 2005, p.3-4). Grief and Laitin (2004) showed that these gaps can be bridged by bringing in quasi-parameters and repeated game theory. In games that require a long-term strategy because they are played several (up to infinite) times, particular parameters (in this case: fixed rules of the game) can become negotiable if players come to the conclusion that the institutional framework renders suboptimal results. A possible emerging competition between players willing to change the rules on the one side, and status-quo agents on the other may eventually result

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[4]For a detailed discussion of these forms of actions, their underlying rationalities, and a more finely graduated interpretation of Weber's writing see Kalberg (1980); Swidler (1973); Wallace (1990) and perhaps with a more critical view Levine (1981).

[5]For an elaborated mixed framework see, for instance, the study of Zhou and Wang (2018) about the role of rationality in motivating participation in social movements applied on the case of anti-Japanese demonstrations in China.

either in gradual convergence to a new equilibrium, the persistent dominance of the existing equilibrium, or utmost chaos (Aoki, 2008, p.125). In a similar vein, DellaPosta et al. (2016) additionally integrate the power of new ideas and innovations observed in other institutional configurations such as foreign states.

These modifications allow the inclusion of time into the research design as well as historical particularities. These particularities are institutional arrangements that derive from a past juncture or gradual change and can be robust and inertial, even if the environment of the game has already changed.

4.3   Institutional Equilibria in the MENA Region

The trinity of institutional equilibrium, critical juncture, and critical interference factors set up a broad framework for analysis that allows for the inclusion to different sub-theories. This includes more nomothetic and general theories, as well as theories that have been developed with special regard to the MENA region or single countries. The following section gives an overview of approaches that have been used to approach political systems of the region. It will trace the developments and turns of authoritarianism studies, and outline the basic concepts that will also be applied in the case studies, and which ultimately help to determine the institutional equilibrium.

4.3.1   Regimes in MENA: A Patchwork of Concepts

Especially after the change of paradigms from the democratisation paradigm to the stability paradigm, scholars paid attention to the robustness of authoritarianism. Just like the years before, many scholars dealing with the MENA approached the region applying, testing, and generating new concepts and theories. The concept of authoritarianism, first developed by Linz (1971) for Spain under the rule of Francisco Franco and later elaborated inductively as metaframework in Linz (2000) became a catchword, however, it lacked elaboration and systematic inquiry of the different sub-types of authoritarian regimes (Geddes, 1999, p.121). Studies after WWII focussed on the new emergence of a mixture of corporatist structures, socialist rhetoric, and capitalism that could be observed in an extreme form in Egypt of Gamal 'Abd Al-Nasser and to different extents in Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan and to a lesser degree in Syria and Iraq (Richards and Waterbury, 2014, p.17-22). This form of *State Capitalism* gave rise to a state bourgeoisie that controlled, however, did not own the major means of production it gave rise to and to a process of accumulation. Different from the classical Marxian view of the relations between owners of the means of production and the proletariat, state bourgeoisie members in Arab countries do not have any legal, hereditary title to their offices, as Richards and Waterbury (2014) notes:

> ...[t]he survival of the members of this class is dependent upon three factors: (1) their ability to move from position to position within the state hierarchy, (2)

their technical competency, making them marketable in any milieu, and (3) their
ability to build nest eggs (farms, businesses, investments, foreign bank accounts)
outside the state sector. Seen in this light, the state bourgeoisie is a strange class
indeed. Property is not the source of its power; it has no juridical claim to the
positions that are the source of its power; and it cannot and may not even want
to reproduce itself as a state class.

Access and position inside this particular kind of *State Class* (Elsenhans, 1997) are
determined by cultural capital (education, religion, language, ideology), social capital
(family, clientelist relationships), or symbolic capital (e.g. participation in anti-colonial
wars) (Ouaissa, 2005, p.203-204).
The observed lack of upward mobility, the establishment and consolidation of a re-
stricted circle of individuals that possessed the power inside the country, and the co-
option of the population into a large public sector bears resemblance to what (Schmit-
ter, 1974) labels *State Corporatism*. Under this concept, the ruling elite organises so-
cial members pre-emptively into exclusive associations, which were advocated as their
sole legitimate representative, while parallel or overlapping organisations are severely
discriminated against. These mechanisms were eased by inherited highly centralised
colonial administrative systems that were initially designed to enable an elite to sub-
jugate a majority (Murphy, 1999, p.18). The successors of the colonial rulers often
adopted the abandoned institutions and included them into an own, particular in-
stitutional equilibrium to consolidate power. The emergence of mass mobilising and
centralised organisations especially in Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Syria, or Iraq
strongly indicate similarities to the corporatist systems that initially derive from fas-
cist backgrounds. Elites of the Gulf countries that mostly experienced a form of "state
building by accident" (Anderson, 1991), in contrast, found other ways to secure power
that relied on a mixture of kinship and modern political state institutions and admin-
istration (Herb, 1999).
Against that background, much research focussed on the behaviour of elites and their
survival strategies inside the higher echelons of power. The question arose, how elites
could survive and consolidate their power in authoritarian systems, in which formal
rules and the legal institutional frameworks are weak and flexible yet the outcomes of
the political processes are predictable with high certainty and reliability (Przeworski,
1991, p.10-14). A key feature was found in the patrimonial and *neopatrimonial* struc-
tures of MENA states that focussed on personalism and informality (Eisenstadt, 1973;
Pawelka, 2002; Lust, 2009). Neopatrimonialism is (Banks and Richter, 2010, p.2):

> ...a system of rule in which a top figure within the state hierarchy governs mainly
> through a network of personal and informal relations [...] These dyads function
> through the exchange of loyalty to the patron and the granting of political and/or
> material influence to the client. In this understanding, all members of the politi-
> cal elite are directly dependent on the leader, and they are recruited to politically
> relevant circles primarily due to their loyalty to the central figure and only sec-
> ondarily on the basis of other criteria such as performance or competence.

Concepts like the *Political Relevant Elites* (PRE) (Perthes, 2004) combined the in-

sights from State Capitalism and Neopatrimonialism while offering a broad scientific access to the political structures of the region, by including "all those who yield political influence and power" and who "contributed to the definitions of political norms and values" (p.5). Despite this broad approach that allowed for a qualitative analysis of different cases, the underlying social and cultural pattern of the clientelist relations, especially when it comes to kinship, remained unexplored for a long time. This is astonishing as there are clear evidences for the dominance of family bonds even in many formally republican systems such as the Takriti clan in Iraq until 2003, the Oudja clan in Algeria, or the Alawite sect in Syria and so forth (Murphy, 1999, p.19). Research remained scarce for a long time, as tribalism, and especially the term *Tribal Society* was a long time used to describe any sort of pre-industrial and hence somewhat backward society (c.f. Gluckman (1965, p.81) for a critique: Kraus (2004, p.37-39)). Especially after the critique of Orientalist thought in Western science, the research field remained fallow in comparative politics about the MENA region, only until it was rediscovered during the revival of ethnicity as a concept from the 1990s onwards. Back then, analysis approached the state and state formation in the region under the aspect of tribalism (Khoury and Kostine, 1991; Uzi, 2016) and also comprised extreme voices that attested a "simultaneity of the unsimultaneous" (Tibi, 1991) of tribe and nation state claiming that the "imposed nation states" never managed to control or suppress the tribal mechanisms of decision making in the region.

Much of the literature that dealt with tribalism and the state also resorted to the *Muqadamma* of Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) and in particular to his concept of *'Asabiyya)* which might be best translated as group loyalty, social cohesion, or solidarity. Although some scholars equalise the term with tribal bonds, Ibn Khaldun himself simply stated that kinship is something that facilitates 'Asabiyya the best, leaving space for other kinds of feelings that might generate entities making claims to power on another base of solidarity as well. Although still criticised for being misused and mobilized for particular colonial and post-colonial projects and for being sign of "implacable monolithic Eurocentric hegemony over Islam" (Salama, 2011), the concept of the competition of different 'Asabiyyas that generates a circle of rise and fall of dynasties has witnessed a limited revival among social scientists in the West and elsewhere (Hinnebusch and Schmidt 2008; Goldsmith 2011; Zaidi 2011; Alatas 2014 for anthropology: Ahmad 2005)

Having said that, all the introduced concepts and frameworks face a mutual problem: They were mostly tested in a limited sample of countries and, hence, there can be made only a limited assessment about their "travelability" across the region. The concept of authoritarianism as such has only been elaborated little since its emergence (Albrecht, 2012), and scholars have repeatedly argued that Schmitter's regime-level definition of State Corporatism is too holistic to be operational in empirical studies (Wilson, 1983). The PRE concept of Perthes (2004) has been applied in his 2004 volume in a fruitful

manner in nine Arab states and Palestine however, it has been criticised for omitting the dynamics between the populace and the elites that constitute an important pillar of the logic of power in the region (Schwanitz 2005 Asseburg and Wimmen 2015, p.7-8). The concept of Neopatrimonialism has also been used to a limited extent only (Banks and Richter, 2010) and also, most traditional attempts to define the concept of the tribe in ways that were applicable beyond a single empirical situation never succeeded in comparative perspective (Kraus, 2004, p.38).

Besides the sheer observation of a limited application in comparative perspective of many concepts, another circumstance hints at a limited travability of most concepts that have been developed to analyse the MENA region. Although Schlumberger (2008), just as his colleague Albrecht, complains about the lack of differentiation and sub-conceptualisation of authoritarianism, his own model of *Patrimonial Capitalism* seems pretty tailored to fit Egypt, and the concept has barely been applied to other MENA countries, although it might have yielded fruitful insights in comparative perspective[6]. Indeed, many concepts that might have been fruitful for application in comparative perspective underwent their process of theory building in Egypt and got stuck on their way to other countries (Moore (1974); Pawelka (1985); Kassem (2004) to name a few). Indeed, comparativists until the 1980s were preoccupied especially with Egypt, Syria and Iraq (Pripstein Posusney, 2004), building up material scholars that followed could easily build upon. Other underlying reasons are straightforward and understandable: Research endeavours in these countries benefited from their advanced infrastructure compared to other MENA countries, high education rates and language knowledge that made communication with the indigenous more easy, and a political interest fostered by the growing economic power of these countries. Furthermore, as much of the literature indicates, Western strategic interests in states with crucial natural resources (such as Saudi Arabia), or vital security ties (such as Afghanistan), trump studies of transition especially in a broader comparative perspective (Levitsky and Way 2002, p.41 Carothers 2003 Diamond 2009 Girod and Walters 2012, p.182). Consequently, countries such as Mauritania's civil movement after the coup of 2008 or Kuwait's semi-democratic experiment get less attention and are rarely compared to the "big players" of the region.

The travelability of concepts can be questioned as the structure of the big players in the MENA region differs significantly from other countries: Egypt due to the role of the Army, and Iraq and Syria due to their violence driven form or totalitarian rule. There are also clear differences in power structures and legitimacy between republics and monarchies (Anderson, 1991; Demmelhuber, 2015). Indeed, MENA countries do have different institutional equilibria inside the political exchange domain that consists of governmental, private, and cultural actors. The concept of the institutional equilibrium, however, is capable of conceptualising this variety. As Aoki (2008, p.120) puts

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[6]For an application in historical perspective in Algeria and Tunisia see Charrad and Jaster (2015), although the authors do not only draw on Schlumberger's work.

it:

> The government protects/transgresses the rights of private actors (property rights, the right to live and so on) in exchange for certain returns (taxes, prestige, etc.). The private actors respond by support- ing/resisting/submitting to the government's choice with/without mutual coordination among themselves. Even in this simple game structure a variety of different equilibria can arise, depending on the ways in which coalitions between the government and particular private actors, as well as those among the private actors, are formed. These equilibria can be identified as institutions of the state.

For each country, the different state and private institutions form an unique set of institutions that remains in a particular equilibrium.

4.3.2   The Lowest Common Denominator: A Bargain Rule

Although acknowledging that there is a variety of institutional equilibria in the MENA region, some basic assumptions can be made that do apply in all countries of the sample of the present study. The central starting point for understanding the societal dynamics is the assumption of the existence of a social contract as a tacit, unwritten agreement among the members of a group, community, state or nation that limits individual behaviour on the one hand, and sets individual responsibilities and rights on the other. Such an implicit contract coins the nature of living together in every society and the concept can be traced back to Socrates, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. Against this background, the type of social contract found in Middle East and North Africa differs from the one alleged to development, democratic countries in terms of the role performed by the state. It is often less dependent on tax revenues and rather a distributor of wealth, in the words of Krauthammer (1991):

> Normally a state needs some kind of tacit social contract with the civil society because ultimately the state must rely on society to support it with taxes. The oil states are in an anomalous position: they do not need a social contract because national wealth comes from oil and oil is wholly controlled by the state. Oil states are peculiarly distributive states. Government distributes goods to society rather than the other way around. It is therefore the source not only of power but of wealth. This makes possible an extraordinary degree of social control exercised by a powerful, often repressive state apparatus.

However, the structure of the social contract has more sweeping features in the MENA region than redistribution and repression only, and, moreover, features cannot be found only in oil states of the region. The clear expectation towards the state to provide welfare in terms of social security and labour, and the de-politicisation of the population in exchange for these benefits play a crucial role. The relinquishing of political participation by the populace can be explained by a heady excitement of Arab nationalism which was accompanied by the wish for international recognition (Ibrahim, 1993), demands towards the new elites that promised an enhancement of socio-economic circumstances after independence, and the wish for physical security.

This *Authoritarian Bargain* comprised agrarian reforms combined with the nationalization of industry, banking, insurance, and trade, the adoption of import substitution and the protection of local industry, a central role for the state in the provision of welfare and social services, and, concerning participation, a vision of the political arena, as fundamentally noncompetitive and organic (Amin et al., 2012, p.32-33). In sum, this implicit contract in the MENA region that emerged between the 1940s and 1970s, is characterized by the following features (Yousef, 2004)

- A preference for redistribution and equity in economic and social policy

- A preference for states over markets in managing national economies

- The adoption of import substitution industrialization and the protection of local markets from global competition

- Reliance on state planning in determining economic priorities

- An encompassing vision of the role of the state in the provision of welfare and social services

- A vision of the political arena as an expression of the "organic unity of the nation," rather than as a site of political contestation or the aggregation of conflicting preferences

In this bargain, citizens were required to "surrender their political and social rights to participatory government" and "expected to accept the legitimacy of the ruling regime, however grudgingly, and are rewarded with a variety of goods and services in return, most of them tangible but some also intangible, as well as socio-economic benefits" (Kamrava, 2014*a*, p.2). These benefits consist most prominently of subsidies for food and fuels, job opportunities, and social welfare services like free access to medical healthcare. Therefore, Bellin (2004) attests Middle Eastern and North African countries an unwillingness to democratic reforms, stating that the "masses do not prioritize it, and the elite has reason to be frightened by it. The champions of democracy are few and far between" (p.141).

4.3.3 The Institutional Turn and Institutional Shielding

The authoritarian bargain, however, got under stress from the 1970s onwards. The strategy of import substitution reached a peak by the early 1970s, and until 1990 food imports rose steadily from $2 billion to $20 billion annually. Arab external debt rose about 40 times from less than $5 billion in 1970 to about $200 billion. The ability of most Arab states to subsidize food, provide services, or generate enough jobs was steadily diminished due to debts and disproportional population growth. Gains

achieved after independence and the symbolic capital of revolutionary individuals, groups and regimes had bottomed out by the 1980 (Ibrahim, 1993, p.33).

These developments that were accelerated by the decline of the oil price are particularly interesting from an analytic view. As the state could not meet the expectations tied to the social contract of the authoritarian bargain, discontent spread all over the region and the elites had to adapt. In this situation, institutions can stay robust and inertial for a while even if the environment of the game is continually changing to a certain extent (Aoki, 2008, p.124), however, in the long run the state had to make concessions. First, as the pressure to implement economic reforms and economic opening exerted by donors like the World Bank and the IMF increased especially after the Washington consensus, the massive welfare state was targeted, leading to cut backs in subsidies, fringe benefits, and public employment. This caused, in a first wave starting in the late 1970s, mass protests among the population of which the most palpable ones gained fame as food riots, or *Bread Riots* as described by Thompson (1971). The protests in Morocco (1981, 1984), Algeria (1988), Tunisia (1978, 1984), Egypt (1977, 1984), Tunisia (1978, 1984), Jordan (1989) were an outgrow of the diminished capability of the state to provide welfare, however, in the early stage protesters did not aim at exchanging the regime or the authoritarian bargain as a mode of rule, but simply demanded socio-economic enhancement or the revocation of cut backs.

This attitude changed from the mid 1980s onwards. While regimes and also some scholars had argued before that economic liberalisation should precede political liberalisation for the sake of stability (Posusney, 1997, p.7), the atmosphere of democratisation that coined the years before the fall of the Soviet Union in 1990 also influenced the MENA region. Limited democratic openings occurred in nearly all countries of the MENA region, often accompanied by the establishment of civil society organisations and political parties. A self-concious middle class, often geared to Islamic ideology[7], and especially consisting of those segments that did not directly form a part of the political relevant elites, pushed for liberalisation of the political system and a higher degree of participation. In this atmosphere, however, the state elites managed to remain in control of the neuralgic points of power while claiming to conduct political and economic opening. Observers of this strategy soon labelled many of MENA countries *Electoral Autoritarianism* (Schedler, 2006), *Hybrid Regimes* (Diamond, 2002), or *Semi-Authoritarianism* (Smith, 2005). Following the logic that single-party regimes expand political rights during times of crisis in order to secure their hold on power (Geddes, 2003, p.69), this regime type sets up facades of democracy, including multiparty elections for the chief

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[7]It would go beyond this study to discuss and assess the ontology of Islam as a political force, especially if the impulse to induce change is rooted in the ideology of Islam itself (c.f. Voll (2013)) or in the socio-economic background while Islam is, especially in its violent interpretation, simply used as an interchangeable justification for action (c.f. Ansari (1984)). A discussion can be found in Hafez and Wiktorowicz (2004). What can be assumed safely is that Islam can arguably be presented to be about justice and, hence, it is more easily possible to be invoked as common ground to encounter perceived injustice, like the authoritarian regimes (ibd.)

executive and the national legislative assembly, in order co conceal and reproduce the reality of authoritarianism (Schedler, 2006, p.1). Especially single party entered a fine line between political opening and holding on to power, trying to give the party rule a legitimate colouring by elections. A complicated situation emerged, well described by Murphy (1999, p.25):

> The state cannot afford simply to ditch the party, not only because the party represents the ideological source of regime legitimacy, but because the party has provided the route for co-opting society through its position as intermediary between state and corporate groups. Equally, the party cannot simply disassociate itself from the state. To do so would be to lose its access to power and, since the state is the product of the party in ideological and personnel terms, the party would be undermining its own credibility.

Consequently, liberal-democratic principles of fairness and freedom are violated so profoundly that they become instruments of authoritarian rule rather than instruments of democracy. The techniques of this form of authoritarianism comprised election fraud, intimidation, but also the design of the legal framework that discriminated against particular parties or individuals by using gerrymandering or setting the thresholds for electoral competition unattainably high. Also co-optation of political parties into government coalitions as junior partners became a strategy to enhance legitimacy while the old unity parties and their networks managed to still hold the reins of power. In a broader sense, co-optation can be defined as a bargain between community leaders on the one side and the state administration that is responsible for the distribution of resources on the other. Community leaders receive legitimacy among their community as moderators between the state and their subgroup, being able to distribute a share of the public wealth among their peers. The regime, in turn, gains control over, and acceptance from that particular subgroup. Consequently, co-optation has been identified as a main contribution to the resilience of Arab authoritarian regimes (Gandhi, 2010; Buehler, 2015a, p.367).

Also the new democratic institutions that emerged during the hybridisation of the systems like parliaments, political parties, or civil society organisations, hence, soon became a part of the regime. Researchers that became aware of the role of basically "democratic" institutions which, in contrast to widespread beliefs, did not undermine authoritarian rule but rather formed a part of it, soon heralded the "institutional turn in comparative authoritarianism" (Pepinsky, 2013).

What has been happening inside the MENA region, after the authoritarian bargain got under pressure, can be described as a constant fight for the maintenance of an institutional set meanwhile the environment that initially produced that set had already altered. It is a fight to protect anachronistic or simply dysfunctional modes of rule that suffered from a loss of legitimacy and credibility among its subjects. To analyse the stability, in the sense of the capacity of the regimes to deal effectively with the problems confronting them and to adjust flexibly to changing circumstances (Lijphart, 1968, p.8), one has to determine the shielding that causes the resilience in a changing

environment. To clarify this point it is useful to take a look into equilibrium theory in a broader sense. Meteorologist Timmerman (1981, p.32) writes about the difference and relation of resilience and reliability:

> If we are vulnerable [...] then there are, at least, two strategies of defence which do not involve active offense. We can rely on being able to shield ourselves from the blow; or we can rely on being able to absorb the blow. The first shielding, concentrates on a continuous, reliable defence - reliability. The second much less popular (for obvious reasons), relies on being able to bounce back from being battered or wounded - resilience. What is interesting to note is that failure of the first type of defence is catastrophic in a way unmatched by the second; since failure of the shield reveals a lack of absorptive capacity underneath.

According to this reading, authoritarian regimes are not resilient, they are rather reliable. This does not contradict Przworski's (1991) classical definition of authoritarianism in which the outcomes of the political processes are predictable with high certainty and reliability. However, because of the possible misleading character of the term, it shall be replaced in this context with *institutional shielding*. A regime thus has a core or basic legitimacy that can be ascribed a resilience to new ideas or regime change. Additionally, and especially when this core legitimacy crumbles, authoritarian regimes set up a range of institutions and mechanisms to hamper and impede possible attacks on its nature - for the sake self protection. The higher the vulnerability of the system's narrative, and the more the legitimacy of the core elites erodes, the stronger is the necessity for a strong institutional shielding. If a unity party can be sure about winning an election, the uncertainty of the electoral results can be absorbed in the sense of resilience. However, when the party cannot be sure about victory, or a weak result would undermine its absolute claim to power, the elites set up institutions and frameworks that facilitate the wished outcome.

The following section describes possible pillars of institutional equilibria including their institutional shielding and divides them into the categories violence, legal frameworks, and core legitimacy.

4.4   Pillars of Institutional Shieldings

Acknowledging that the Bargain Rule can be found as a core element in any Arab country, the particular peculiarities of the systems differ. Institutional equilibria and their particular institutional shielding are unique and there is no blueprint that could be applied to a multitude of countries. Each country requires a case study to determine the very nature of the political institutional equilibrium, its pivotal pillars, and how and by whom these pillars were jeopardized during the critical juncture 2011-2013. These institutions derive from a very broad pool and their importance for the respective systems has to be explicated. Nonetheless, this section will exemplify the most common mechanisms of institutional shielding.

4.4.1 Institutionalised Violence and the State in MENA

There is no possibility to understand the equilibria of Middle East and North Africa without addressing violence. Violence is not only a feature of the collective memory of the population that was inscripted due to a long-lasting history of colonisation, repression, and competition between violent political currents (Silverstein and Makdisi, 2006). Violence is not only a feature of non-state actors, violence is a conscious technique of governance in the states of Middle East and North Africa (Ismail, 2019; Hinnebusch, 2006). Repression by physical force became possible due to a security sector, which generated jobs at the same time, including secret service structures that penetrate opposition and the population to monitor any kind of dissent. In countries that adopted a mass-mobilising one party republican system such as Syria or Libya, the surveillance and the draconian punishments for dissent produce a form of omnipresent terror (Arendt, 1951) that characterise totalitarian systems. Dissent becomes a matter of cost-benefit calculations as institutions that openly use violence embody something like a Nash equilibrium. Individuals obey by adhering to particular patterns of behaviour as deviation will make the individual worse off than will adherence (Calvert, 1995, p.216-266). The deterrent effect of imprisonment, torture, executions, discrimination from access to public service and job opportunities create common knowledge about the costs of dissent. This common knowledge is part of an educational process which is impressed powerfully and unforgettably upon the consciousness of the individual, generating institutionalisation in the sense of Berger and Luckman (1978, p.87). Repression is used to show the state's power and determination to protect the current institutional equilibrium (Davenport, 1995) and follows the logic of the authoritarian bargain, in which citizens are denied the right to challenge the state.

As the hybridisation of regimes develops at different paces depending on nature, economic well-being, or credibility of the legitimacy narrative, also the degree of state violence differs across regimes. In their fQCA cross-country analysis, Schneider and Maer (2017) identify two stable types of electoral authoritarianism, of which one is more flexible in applying specific, performance orientated legitimation strategies while relying less on repression, and a second one that relies on hard repression and diffuse sources of legitimation. A trade-off between institutionalised violence and other forms of institutional shielding can be assumed, whereby violence seems to be the last resort when other forms of institutionalisations fail to protect the institutional equilibrium. The institutionalisation of violence in MENA has contributed to what the Lebanese Journalist Samir Samir Kassir (2013) called *'Ajz*, an Arabic term denoting impotence or helplessness. (Kassab, 2009, p.357) summarises the dilemma as follows:

> Time and again the scope of devastation caused by state repression on all levels
> is deplored. The ever-recurring term used to describe the situation is incapaci-
> tation or impotence ('ajz) resulting from this devastation — a sort of endemic
> bankruptcy, collective despair, and pervasive depression, hence the attractiveness
> of fascist promises, salvational doctrines, and charismatic leaders. The disman-

tlement and fragmentation of society are particularly alarming. The subjugation
of society by state terror and the never-ending states of emergency have made
it impossible for society's constituting communities to forge an empowered body
politic that is eager to engage in public matters and capable of doing so.

If institutionalised violence is a part of the institutional shielding of Arab author-
itarian regimes, the question that arises for researchers who try to determine critical
interference factors is how institutionalised violence can be attacked. A key aspect is
the open demand for transparency and accountability. By identifying those who com-
mit violence and demanding to bring them to justice, players can enhance the cost of
the use of violence by the state. Indeed, the MENA region has witnessed the emergence
of different human rights groups at least since the 1980s that address issues of repres-
sion in public - and consequently often became the target of repression themselves.
Furthermore, as the example of the case of Libya will show, it was a group of relatives
and other interested individuals demanding an investigation of the 1996 Abu Salim
Prision massacre who initially sparked the large wave of protests in 2011. In Tunisia,
the humiliation of street vendor Bouaziz by a policewoman caused violent protests on
a large scale spreading from his home region, and eventually the police lost control of
small regions in the country. These are examples of cases in which institutionalised
violence was targeted first peacefully and later violently by different groups of the coun-
tries. These events confirm the notion of Scott (1992, p.196) stating that a "hidden
transcript is continually pressing against the limit of what is permitted on stage, much
as a body of water might press against a dam". If an act of insubordination - which
may comprise the demand of accountability of the ruling elites or individuals acting
on their behalves - is not rebuked or punished, then a small success might encourage
others to follow the example until the dam breaks[8]. This logic explains the quick es-
calation of violence that could be witnessed in Syria and Libya in 2011, especially as
the hybridisation of the regime was comparatively underdeveloped, with the regime
heavily relying on totalitarian techniques of institutionalised violence.

4.4.2   Legal Frameworks and Bureaucracies

Among the most important part of institutional shielding are bureaucracies and their
patronage networks that hamper participation in a broader sense. The bureaucracy,
say, the administrative machinery, is an organisational structure that can be found in
every MENA country and that often builds a part of the political relevant elites. Due
to networks of patronage in which the patron keeps his client - often being a local leader
- sequacious and loyal by stick and carrots, the entire procedures are characterised by
rampant corruption and a neglect of the rule of law. The favouritism for those who
have connections into the state bureaucracy, and also the connections between the po-
litical relevant elites which build an important pillar of their factual power, may be best

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[8]Tilly (2012, p.188) label this phenomenon also "de Toqueville effect"

described by the Arabic term *Wasta.* Wasta, literally meaning "middle" or "medium" refers to connections and networks that help to get jobs and obtain government services, licenses, or degrees that would otherwise be out of reach or would take a long time or effort to be obtained (Ramady, 2015, p.vii). This "hidden force of Middle East" (Cunningham and Sarayrah, 1993) is fostered and reinforced by a canon of administrative procedures that help to keep those out who do not have the right connections, and at the same time setting the value for the services that are provided by Wasta like in a market. It corresponds to the more colloquial use of the word bureaucracy, involving "unnecessary rules and procedures", and "the stifling of all initiatives by using these rules and procedures actually to block them" (Page, 1992, p.6-7) for the sake of culling those demands that do not harm the institutional equilibrium of the country. This strategy makes use of restrictions to set up private businesses (Djakov et al., 2002), selective licensing of civil society organisations (Jakob, 2019), or the legal constraints for the establishment of political parties (Karvonen, 2007). Concerning the latter, the geographical design of the electoral law also protects the status quo of power distribution by allowing or excluding particular parties or individuals from participating in elections, or the design of electoral constituencies in a manner that benefits a (ruling) party, known as gerrymandering.

The governmental bodies and institutions as well as the mass mobilising groups in a corporatist system may also be protected by a legislative framework defining their powers. This holds especially true for the interplay between the executive, legislative, and judicative branches of government as well as for the laws regulating the relationship between the civil administrative body and the army. The most straightforward institutional shielding for a country leader would be the codified election for lifetime, preventing external shocks caused by elections. Further competencies of the leader may include the right to dissolve the parliament, the right to rule by decree, influence in staffing policies concerning the cabinet of ministers, or unrestricted power over the security forces.

Another aspect of the legal framework refers to the laws that justify violence exerted by security forces. This comprises restrictions of demonstrations and strikes and also limitations of the freedom of speech. Especially the press, but also civil society activists can be easier brought to trial when the penalty code defines criminal acts like publishing and disseminating false news with intent to disturb public order, insulting the ruler and / or his family, insulting the judiciary, inciting the population to overrule laws, or spreading panic among the population.

All the features of the legal framework, in their administrative, political-procedual, or criminalising nature, can be justified by a state of emergency. Although widespreadly used by authoritarian regimes before 2001, it can be safely assumed that the entrance of the term "fight against terrorism" after September 11, 2001 into international politics has been embraced and welcomed as a carte blanche for repression and restriction of

human rights, as the case of Yemen will strikingly illustrate. Anti-Terror laws have functioned as justification for violence against opposition groups that threatened the stability of the regimes.

An attack on the legal framework for the sake of altering the institutional equilibrium could be witnessed in Jordan and Kuwait where particular parties demanded a reform of the electoral code. Also the demands for constitutional reforms like seen in Tunisia and Egypt fall into the same category. The allegation of corruption as witnessed throughout the MENA region especially since the beginning of the 2000s is more difficult to categorise. If it is a general reproach that does not necessarily target particular institutions, or when only particular, interchangeable individuals are pilloried, the institutional equilibrium of the country is not necessarily targeted. The demand, however, to exclude Ben Ali and his entire family from obtaining state positions in the future as demanded in Tunisia, or to exchange a vast part of the government in Oman targeted the institutional equilibrium.

4.4.3   Identity and Legitimacy

Legitimacy refers to the populace's acceptance of a ruler that is often culturally and historically in-scripted, or at least justified by tradition, and hence difficult to contest. Legitimacy can derive from deliberative processes as well as from mutually accepted hierarchies and authorities. In the Muslim world, power is often claimed by religious figures, having enjoyed a religious education, or even tracing their own descent from the holy prophet Muhammad (Sayyids) (Lee and Shitrit, 2013). These claims often compete with the primordial family bonds on which tribal Sheikhs resort to justify their claims of power on the one hand, while Arab history has also witnessed a unique and powerful symbiosis of Islam and tribes on the other (Khoury and Kostine, 1991). The monarchy of Morocco, for instance, resorts to their leading role in religion and to tribal alliances at the same time. Most North African states also often resort to a founding myth which is connected to a historical event like the anti-colonial struggle or the revolution of a great leader. These events are re-invoked in propaganda and framing of history inside and outside the country.

Continuity is an important justification for control, and as claims about beginnings are claims to power (Foucault, 1966). These myths are used to justify the prevailing order of institutions. This is true for monarchies that can point to a long-lasting history of dynastic rule, unity parties that were part of the anti-imperialistic fight for independence, or charismatic leadership. Measures of expropriation have also been justified with regard to a socialistic ideology, even if the term "socialistic" is rightly contested in analysis about the Pan-Arab, Ba'athist, or Nasserist Ideologies (Moore, 1974) that prevailed during the first years after the independence of many MENA states. Founders Aflaq and Al-Bitar declared already in 1942 freedom (hurriyah) from foreign control, the unity (wahdah) of all Arabs in a single state and later socialism (ishtirakiyah) as

the leading motives of Ba'athism. The slogans "Unity, Freedom, Socialism" and "One Arab Nation with an Immortal Mission" appeared on party publications. This rhetoric has been used also during the time of liberalisation after the authoritarian bargain got under pressure since the 1980s. As Murphy (1999, p.22) notes:

> The ability to disguise its own class interests, and to prevent the articulation of competing class interests, enabled regimes to continue to use the language and rhetoric of socialism even though their strategy was less a retreat from capitalism than a combination of etatism and welfarism. Middle East 'socialist' regimes came to power not by revolution but by military and palace coups. New ruling elites were not vanguards of mobilized masses but applied top-down interpretations of socialist structures and ideological concepts tailored to eliminate opposing power-bases rather than genuinely to transform society.

Matters of identity also play their role when it comes to ethnicity and nationality. As seen in the case of Jordan, a particular part of the institutional equilibrium is the positioning in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as well as the treatment of minorities inside their own country. Jordan's marginalisation of Palestinians from joining public service can be read as a strategy to limit the access to power. The cases from the Gulf show how guest workers are kept out of the political decision-making process, and how the inclusion and exclusion from political rights of segments of society by granting or denying citizenship is used as a tool to shield the institutional equilibrium.
Legitimacy can, at best, be attacked by a counter-narrative that questions the hegemonial discourse of the ruling elites. Back in the 1960s and 1970s, Communist Parties tried to offer an alternative to Pan-Arab Socialism and to monarchies. After the decline of Communist Parties in the region, Islamist groups and parties often emerged as new counterparts of the ruling elites. The Muslim Brotherhood, different Salfi groups, or the Shirazi movement took that role, as will be seen in the cases of Jordan, Bahrain, or Yemen.

4.5 Towards a Constructivist Understanding of Trade Unions

In this section, the research subject - trade unions - will be conceptualised. The underlying assumption is that the concept "trade union", as it is used in research in liberal democracies, is applicable for MENA countries to a limited extend only. To underpin this reasoning, a short comparison between trade unionism in Europe and MENA will be made. A special focus is set on the Marxian Turn that workplace organisation underwent in Western society and science, as well as the relationship between organised labour in MENA and historical Islamic Guilds. By applying a constructivist approach and focussing on the term Naqaba, some difficulties related to the intransferability of the concept "trade union" can be solved.

4.5.1   Trade Unionism in the European Context

Workplace or craft organisation has a history that dates back at least to the 14th century in Europe (Reid, 2004), and to the 9th century in Middle East (Massignon, 1920). Trade union like associations emerged already in the 18th century in Britain, focussing more on the low skilled worker than on specialised craftsmen. These organisations, that were often influenced by journeymen, copied the structures and rituals of guilds and developed strategies to pressure masters or the state to receive higher wages or fringe benefits (Reid (2004, pp.9-14), for a historical comparative perspective in Europe see Crouch (1993, esp. pp.70-72)). In the 19th century, and with an increasing degree of industrialisation, organised labour experienced a *Marxist Turn*. In *The Capital*, Karl Marx describes trade unions as an association where "workers combine in order to achieve equality with the capitalist in their contract concerning the sale of their labour" being an "insurance formed by the workers themselves" (Marx, 1969, p.1070). Some paragraphs before, he defines the aim of trade unions as to prevent the price of labour-power falling below its value inside the production process. Elsewhere Marx (1969) and also Engels (1881) uttered more concrete, political ideas, stating that there would be

> two points which the organised Trades would do well to consider, firstly, that the time is rapidly approaching when the working class of this country will claim, with a voice not to be mistaken, its full share of representation in Parliament. Secondly, that the time also is rapidly approaching when the working class will have understood that the struggle for high wages and short hours, and the whole action of Trades Unions as now carried on, is not an end in itself, but a means, a very necessary and effective means' but only one of several means towards a higher end: the abolition of the wages system altogether.

Tracing the history of Europe reveals that trade unions did not enter parliaments directly, however, labour parties were founded, having ties with the unions and perusing sometimes more, sometimes less the same agenda and supporting each other in different campaigns. Labour unions and labour parties are labelled "organized labour" and coined the history of the continent. Nonetheless, with the view of bargaining as a possibility to prevent enrichment of the burgeois class, Marx - just like John Stuart Mill in 1869 - also denied the Wage-Fund Theory in which gains by one section of the workers could only be obtained at the expense of other sections. Both follow a basic reasoning based on Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* and elaborated by the early economist McCulloch (1854), who attested workers a disadvantage when it comes to negotiations with capitalists. According to this view, it was only when workers acted in "a simultaneous manner which is equivalent to a combination [...] that it becomes the immediate interest of the masters to comply with their demand." Without that combination, workmen would "not be able to obtain a rise of wages by their own exertion, but would be left to depend on the competition of their masters"[9].

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[9]For a more elaborate summary and criticism see Hutt (1980, 22-24)

In the post-WWII era, two trajectories emerged, and fierce fights between these two were fought among workers, among politicians, and also among scientists. The "social polarisation thesis" followed the Marxian reading and advocated confrontative strategies against the ratcheting down of working conditions and wages in order to set limits to a rampant bourgeois class that tried to exploit state institutions for personal gain. The second trajectory, the "regional thesis" advocated a social compromise and partnerships for production on the micro level, thus rather accepting than challenging the logic of capitalist competition (Western, 1997; Hyman, 2001b).

Against the background of the experience of devastating mass unemployment, crisis and war, mainstream unionism after WWII became more co-operative, as employees and also employers appreciated the benefits of industrial peace and long-term predictability of labour costs (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000, p.34). After a phase of labour militancy in many European countries in the late 1960s and 1970s, collective bargaining and systems of institutionalised labour representation that included the state emerged (Regini, 1992, p.2-7), fostering cooperation between state, employers, and employee representatives. The regional thesis was also supported by an atmosphere of anti-communist resentments during the McCarthy era and was spurred by the cold war as such.

From an economic perspective, in the 1950s, for instance Hutt (1980) criticised the disadvantage-of-labour thesis and claimed that trade unions tend to push the wage over a market equilibrium, thereby causing unemployment, as the higher wages would lock up resources that could otherwise be used to employ more workers. This view remained predominant among Western economists and was only challenged in the 1980s by Freeman and Medoff asking in a rather unconventional manner *What Do Unions Do?* (1984). By pointing at external effects of unionisation like higher motivation and output of workers, or more effective communication between rank and file and management, the authors argued that organised labour would in sum produce more benefits than costs.

Eventually, the further decline of the social polarisation thesis during the heydays of neo-liberal politics in 1980s, Europe gave way for a the dominant Western understanding of the role of trade unions until the early 2000s. The recent trade union development programs of the ITUC in 2018, for instance, clearly aim at empowering trade unions worldwide to become rather a social partner, and also to play a role beyond economic activities (ITUC 2018). Development effectiveness means in their context that sustainable trade unions

- improve the working and living conditions of male and female workers

- advance respect for human and trade union rights,

- thereby contributing to decent work, social justice and democratic processes.

- Trade unions are both: A social partner in the tripartite relations with employers, governments and workers and also part of the civil society

The role of trade unions inside civil society varies from country to country and from time to time. Basically, they have an inherent political function apart from their socio-economic endeavours (Streeck and Hassel, 2003), and that political function grew in importance in times of neo-liberalism and globalisation when trade unions tried to form broader international and domestic alliances (Hyman, 1997*b*; Munck, 2008). With the decline of Marxism as an ideology and societal adoption to capitalism, states produced divisions among the workers and created mechanisms - such as protectionism or nationalism - that integrated workers into capitalist democracies (Tarrow, 2018, p.18). In developed countries, the type of revolutionary trade union, trying to enforce the dictatorship of the proletariat and the abolishment of the wage system, suffered almost complete extinction.

Stronger ties to other civil society groups could be witnessed as the result of the forging of new alliances, and human rights activists soon discovered the mobilisation power of trade unions. Unionism already played a role in struggles of people of color in the United States during the Civil Rights Movement's time (Korstad, 2003). Trade unions also became agents of democratisation in developing countries, most visible in COSA-TUS remarkable fight against apartheid in South Africa, as well as in developments of trade unionism in India, Brazil, or the Philippines of the late 1980s and early 1990s (Seidman, 2011). This *Social Movement Unionism* clearly blurred the boundaries between political and economic players and is the result of a more broad agenda of worker's organisations beyond collective bargaining and shop floors. This broad concepts of trade unionism complicated a definition of the boundaries of trade unions worldwide.

4.5.2   The Relation between Trade Union and *Naqaba*

Many (Western) authors suggest that trade unions are an imported concept that spread over middle east with the help of European workers that migrated to Middle East and North Africa. According to this reading, workers dominated by "foreign" capital organised, leading to a close cooperation and intertwining between these workers and the nationalist movements (Kassalov, 1963). In times of anti-colonial struggle, many political leaders of the independence movement stressed the importance of building a mutual front against the colonial oppressor in order to achieve the dream of an independent national project. The situation of quasi-opposition brought the union movement and the first parties together and became a fruitful environment for party-union bonds also observed by Valenzuela (1989, p.11) in Latin American countries.

But there is also a vibrant history of Ottoman Guilds that coined the relations of professional groups and structures of the state, foremost inside the Islamic city (Lewis, 1937). Guilds lost their power at the end of the 19th century, however, some remainders could be found at least in Damascus and Beirut of the late 1920s, existing together with communist unions, business unions and a wide range of hybrids (Jakob, 2019).

Although there are some evidences for linear developments between guild and unions in the Levant (Allouni, 1959), the grade of influence of old guild structures on modern trade union formation is contested (Baer, 1970), which might be due to an astonishing lack of interest about the topic by Western scholars; as Quataert (2001, p.95) clearly states still in 2001, it is "difficult to analyse the role of guild organizations in the later formation of labor unions, labour dispute, and strikes in the early twentieth century because we do not understand the nature of the guilds themselves".

The history in Lebanon and also in Egypt (Ried, 1974, p.37) indicates, that continuing tensions remained between the view of the syndicate as a tool of the government or clan networks and the view of it as representative of the membership. This struggle was already fought under the Ottoman empire, between state authorities and union members, as well as between members themselves. In the Gulf, when the ruling elite started to harass and prohibit organised labour especially to protect the tribal dynastic institutional equilibrium against Panarab and Socialist ideas, these ideas spread with the help of tribal and kinship networks. The result was a mix of clan patronage and socialism, showing how ideas form the "West" were somewhat adopted, however, the emerging concepts often kept their "traditional flavour" (Ried, 1974, p.37). As the break between guild culture and traditional industrial relations came quite abruptly, many workers were still used to employer-employee pattern of the Ottoman Empire. As Allouni (1959, p.67), mirroring the stance and allegations of many progressive leftist of his generation against the workers, puts it for the case of Syria:

> [...] in most countries where craft and industrial undertakings were largely family affairs, the head of the business, or perhaps the chief of the guild embracing a number of small family businesses, was a person of considerable power and authority in his restricted community. This had been the pattern for generations and it could hardly be expected that things would change overnight. The workman, the laborer, the apprentice, did not see his hard lot as the result of oppression, nor was it, for many of the old master-craftsmen were the kindliest of men; employees did not resent the long hours of work, for their forefathers had labored thus for many generations and, like their forebears they were above all things stubbornly traditionalist.

A more striking continuity between Islamic Guilds can be found in linguistics. Even if we cannot determine the true connection, we can observe that a term for "Guild" (naqaba) is nowadays used as a term for "trade union" in modern standard Arabic and almost all dialects. Guilds in the MENA region were among the first organisations that had a written code of conduct labelled "Dustur" (Farsi: Permission), a word that is today used as "constitution" in Arab Systems (Lewis, 1937, p.30). The master of ceremony was called Naqib, whereas the root of the word is not completely clear: na-qa-ba is located in a broad linguistic field comprising the words "penetrate", "drill", "excavate", "ransack", "seek", or "quest".

Khira (2014) relativises in his study of the legal framework of trade unions in Algeria the notion of a leading role of trade unions for the working class, as the term bears something religious. He does so by deducing "naqaba" from the person "Naqib", who

he describes as "elected, honourable person to take care about the interests of a category or group of persons". True, in many Arab armies a *Naqib* is also a captain or platoon leader, however, a more suitable word would be "representation" or "agency" (Arab original: *niaba*) (Khira, 2014, p.16). Sura (5:12) of the Quran already refers to Naqib as leaders of the twelve tribes of Israel while the term might be best translated as chieftains, supervisor, or censor. Naqib continued to be a moral leader during the Abassiyd empire and Al-Mawardi (2000) speaks in Chapter eight of his seminal *The Ordinances of Government* of Niqba tribunals to "protect people of noble lineage from being subjected to the authority of those whose nobility and lineage are not equal to theirs" (p.144). It is heavily tied to purity and leadership, and the Naqib in a classical Guild, or "most esteemed" Naqib (Naqib al-Ashraf) often claimed decent from the Prophet Muhammad, however, he was subordinate to the leaders or elders of the Guild (the Shaykh, pl.: Shuyukh).

Among the first organisations that labelled themselves Naqaba was the Egyptian Lawyers Syndicate of 1912. Reid (1974, p.38) retells the genesis of the name as follows:

> An official suggested to Minister of Justice Sa'd Zaghlul calling the ruling council of the lawyers' body Majlis Naqabat [*sic*] al-Muhamin (Council of the Syndicate of Lawyers) rather than simply Majlis al-Muhamin (Council of Lawyers), and calling its head naqib rather than ra'is (president). Zaghlul protested, wondering if the official wanted to remind people of the lowly porters and coal dealers, who also had a naqib. When the official suggested the parallel with the highly respected naqib al-ashraf, Zaghlul agreed to the change.

This quote indicates that porters and coal dealers also had a kind of Naqib, however, research about that topic is scarce. In general, the study of guilds in political history, and especially the transition form Guilds to trade unions, including the question whether an underlying dispositive may have influenced the way workers in the MENA region perceive, assess, and run trade unions, stopped by the end of the 1970s. It coincides with the emergence of the Orientalism-Debate, which led to a crisis in Area Studies, as comparisons between the West and the non-West came systematically under suspicion of bearing deep-seated academic conceptions of "us" and "them", shaping in a patronising way how non-Western regions and their inhabitants were supposed to be perceived and understood (Basedau and Köllner, 2007, p.107).

4.5.3   Approaching the Concept of *Naqaba*

We simply cannot pin down all the differences between the concept "trade union" in the "West" and the concept trade union in MENA countries especially regarding possible path dependencies. We can capture three facts that there has been continuous struggle about the nature of the Guild, and in particular if it should be an independent pressure group or form part of the government. This discussion in MENA is way older than Marxism and the resulting disputes about the roles of trade unions in Sovjet style socialism. However, to understand the effect and agency of an institution

embedded into a particular systemic, cultural, and linguistic context, it is also possible and worthwhile taking a look at the use of the term under scrutiny inside that particular region. Qandil (1995, p.28) for instants, describes trade unions or *Naqabat* in his seminal work about professional associations as

> organizations consisting of persons working in a single profession or professions being close to each other, or an industry or a craft being connected to each other, aiming to enhance the working and material conditions of its members, performing as united and elucidating professional organization striving for the protection of the honour and interests of its members.

Although being an Arab scholar, Quandils' definition comes quite close to a classical French one, describing a trade union or *syndicat* as association

> constituée par les membres d'une même profession, de professions similaires ou connexes, ou de professions différentes relevant de la même branche d'activité, en vue d'étudier et de défendre les droits, les intérêts matériels et moraux communs à cette profession, à cette branche d'activité (relations au sein du travail, représentation auprès des pouvoirs publics, etc.) (Birou, 1966)

Webbs' (1894) classic definition of a trade union as "a continuous association of wage earners for the purpose of maintaining or improving the conditions of their employment" remains even more vague. However, these basic definitions give some important insights. First, none of the definitions expresses a particular relation to the state. Independence in general, whether from the state, business, or clan structures is not mentioned. The Arab definition of Naqaba above bears special mandates. When referring to elucidating or enlightening (Arabic original: "tua'wi"), information and knowledge transfer on the members seems to implicate a clear duty or task. Moreover, the protection of the honour (Arabic original: "shirf") constitutes a particular task of the unions towards the environment it is embedded into. In the Western world, this is something that actually is rather ascribed to white-collar professional associations and qualifying associations and less for trade unions (Millerson, 1960, p.47). Even if these thoughts are only indicators, we can see again a lack of a clear and necessary class based policies and aims in a Marxian sense.

The excursion into the etymological field is a piece in the puzzle to explain why Western scholars seem to be disappointed with the performance of trade unions in Middle East. The research field of trade unions in extra-European contexts has become a realm in which predominantly scholars who avow themselves to some kind of Marxist tradition prevail, and indeed, many of the working place organisations in MENA did not follow the trajectory of class struggle or put the working class on the forefront of the fight for a utopian future. In this sense, most Arab workers organisations of the 19th and 20th century have - according to this Marxist reading - mostly been "yellow" instead of truly "red" [10].

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[10]Yellow Unions are in the communist terminology of the 1920s those non-radical workers movements that do not aim at social revolution, do not recognize the dictatorship of the proletariat as an immediate contingency, and do not follow the Communist International (Pasvolsky, 1922)

The influence of foreign, European workers, the well organised Communists Parties, and eventually the regimes of MENA states altered that basic structure and tradition in the course of time. In Western countries, the government favoured rather business, say "yellow" unions: Already Perlman (1979), had condemned the interventions of both revolutionary and reformist socialists in his famous *Theory of the Labor Movement* of 1928, and he openly questioned the "maturity of a trade union mentality". In many MENA countries, in contrast, the nationalist elite, successful businessmen, and later the state tried to incorporate and use the emerging trade unions to achieve goals at the national macro-level. Hence, the seeds for a close state-trade union relationship was present even before the independence of many MENA states, and it sprouted and bloomed under the new elites after independence. A welcomed justification for the domestication of trade unionism was also borrowed from a non-MENA region: At the 10th Congress of the Russian Communist Party in 1921, Lenin managed to put through his vision of trade unions as educational organizations and schools of administration, economic management, and communism, arguing that the revolution had been success-ful and the political role of trade unions had thus come to an end. As shown in the case studies, this decision influenced also the view of leaders on trade unions especially in the republics of Egypt, Syria, and Libya. Leaders there also argued that their model of Arab Socialism posed the end of a historical path, which trade unions do not need to change any more.

As the term "trade union" and its organisation still differ to an in-explorable extent, between the western and the Arabic concept, a basic assumption of this thesis is that the concept of trade unionism and the body of theories about them as known in West-ern societies cannot travel to the MENA region without causing heavy distortions and inaccuracies. Therefore this study focusses on those organisations that are la-belled by the national legal framework *Naqaba*, or those who label themselves *Naqaba*. This approach includes professional associations (*Naqabat Mihniya*) as well as workers unions (*Naqabat 'Umaliya*) and comprises also any other names of workplace related organisation in literature such as labour unions, trade unions, syndicates, professional syndicates and so forth.

4.6   Trade Unions as Guardians of the Authoritar-ian Bargain

Middle East and North Africa has traditionally been consigned at the margins of social movement studies (Pourmokhtari, 2017). Due to the weakness and rarity of successful and visible social movements in the region, and a canon of theories that derive from research about liberal democracies, several scholars posed the question whether these theories are able to account for the complexities of social movements in contemporary

MENA societies at all (Bayat, 2009; Buechler, 1995, p.4). The question to which extend the concept of trade unions as such can travel has barely been asked, maybe because the concept is contested among scholars and also among members and leaders of the unions themselves. As Hyman (2001*a*, p.211) puts it:

> [...] within any union can be found conflicting views of its underlying purpose, its priority, objectives, the appropriate forms of action, and the desirable patterns of internal relations. Such ambiguities are compounded when we attempt cross-national analysis: the questions what is a trade union? or what does it mean to be a trade union member? will receive very different answers according to national context. There can be no innocent definition of trade union identity.

Additionally, political process models describing the very interactions between social movements, societies, and states were lodged in the democratic West for a long time and this started to change at the beginning of the 1990s (Tarrow, 2018, p.28) only. Scholars have shown some interest in opposition movements, and particularly in the mobilisation potential of Islamist groups (c.f. Wiktorowicz (2004); Hafez and Wiktorowicz (2004)). The relationship of Western academia with the topic labour movements is, however, particularly special. The starting conditions for organised labour differed significantly between western and non-western countries, as organised and public sector labour in MENA has always been somewhat an elite class whose privileges came at the expense of unorganised workers, the rural poor, and the informal sector (Posusney 1997, p.6Richards and Waterbury 2014, p.235. As shown in the section, social movements and especially trade unions in MENA elude from much of the logic home to western-liberal democracies. The environment of authoritarianism, state corporatism and also hybrid regimes sets constraints on collective action that are essential to analyse to understand contentious politics in the region.

4.6.1 Social Movements and Contentious Politics under Authoritarianism

The development of social movements in the MENA region altered in nature after the liberalisation and hybridisation of the regimes. In the decades before, after independence, most countries adopted a corporatist model, in which interests were negotiated and incorporated into the state's decision-making structures through internal mechanisms rather than through external challenge. The state created organisations to represent functional groups within society such as agricultural producers, industrial producers, blue and white collar workers, women, and initially also the military to harmonise their demands. In the atmosphere of nationalism soaked with the rhetoric of socialism, any attempt to struggle for interests outside the state-corporatist system was suppressed by the regime, which labelled these activities "an attack on the national consensus" (Ehteshami and Murphy, 1996, p.755). Especially in single party systems, the legislative framework allows the ruling elite to control bargaining on the one hand, and help reveal the preferences of various factions on whose support the regime relies

(Gandhi, 2010, p.78-81) on the other. Especially in the earlier phase, as mass mobilising organisations provided job opportunities, they were welcomed by the lower middle classes as a chance for upward mobility (Murphy, 1999, p.15). At the same time, mass organisations fulfilled the tasks of providing feedback to the state, whereas this feedback was soon less given on a deliberative basis by its members but rather collected by the authorities via observation and control.

Consequently, Schmitter (1979) distinguishes between societal, i.e. liberal corporatism, and state, i.e. authoritarian corporatism. In the latter system, the regime seeks to co-opt labour in order to organise and mobilise it, especially to prevent a class-based challenge (Murphy, 1999, p.15). This is the kind of corporatism found in MENA countries. The system of state corporatism tried to solve a dilemma faced by authoritarian regimes: The violent suppression of popular resistance might be the most promising and straightforward way to achieve regime-survival, however, reliance on repression damages the regime's legitimacy and makes it less sensitive to popular demands (Tilly, 2012, p.179-194). Repression in the name of national coherence, socialist solidarity, or other kinds of legitimacy claims make it more difficult for social movements to openly attack the institutional equilibrium of the country. Grass root mobilisation becomes barely possible, given the penetration of everyday life by the security forces and regime ideology. In this situation, the logic of collective action changes. Different from the theory of collective action (Olson, 1982), in which individuals have strong incentives to become active in rather smaller groups, small interest groups face severe difficulties in organising under authoritarian rule. In smaller groups, the likelihood of being a target of repression is higher than in a larger group, as the hazard and probability of being identified personally is higher. If large organisations grow to a critical mass, however, the likelihood of a successful attack on the regime is higher (Schnabel, 2006). Hence, authoritarian corporatist regimes always tried to balance repression and concession to avoid the emergence of a critical mass. From a game theoretic perspective, as Marks (1992) has shown, there are two possible equilibria: Either everyone in the political opposition will protest or no one will.

When hybridisation of the authoritarian regimes in the MENA region started, the thresholds for the establishment of civil society organisations apparently fell. However, the legal framework as part of the institutional shielding contained the civil society and culled the movements according to the regime's discretion. Consequently, social movements and civil society organisations became more an instrument of state social control than a mechanism of collective empowerment, leading rather to further depoliticization than encouraging resistance (Asseburg and Wimmen, 2015). The use of institutionalised violence helped to keep the process of culling under control. At the same time, the government sets incentives to set up civil society organisations that correspond with the ideology of the regime. Already Tilly (1978, p.106) states:

> The repressiveness of a government is never a simple matter of more or less.
> It is always selective, and always consists of some combination of repression,
> toleration, and facilitation. Governments respond selectively to different sorts of
> groups, and to different sorts of actions. [...] Governments which repress also
> facilitate. While raising the costs of some kinds of collective action to some kinds
> of groups, they lower the costs of other kinds of collective action to other kinds of
> groups. They do so in two different ways: (a) by simply diminishing the difficulty
> of specific varieties of mobilization and/or collective action, and (b) by providing
> positive incentives for specific varieties of mobilization and/or collective action.

Tilly (1978, p.106) also distinguishes between repression, toleration, facilitation,
and coercion. The more the group and the action are accepted by the state, the more
open it will be to tolerate or even facilitate social movements. If the movements are
part of the ideology and propaganda of the state, membership can become compulsory.
Figure 4.1 taken from Tilly systematises state attitudes towards social movements.

Figure 4.1: State Responses to Social Movements under Authoritarianism

As open contentious politics is severely hampered, groups began to form in a more
clandestine or subtle way. This includes "passive networks" or "non-movements" es-
pecially comprising young citizens who met rather casually in schools, colleges, urban
public spaces, parks, cafés, and sports centres and who shared commonalities by similar
hairstyles, blue jeans, hang- out places, food, fashions, or the pursuit of public fun.
They lack a clear leadership and a space like an office or fixed gathering point and
are thus less vulnerable to surveillance and repression (Bayat, 2009, p.18-22). Under
repression, personal connections become of utmost importance (McAdam and Paulsen,
1993), and hence, social networks that extend beyond kinship, ethnicity, or neighbour-

hood also become largely casual, unstructured, and paternalistic.

4.6.2   The Role of Tade Unions in Authoritarian Corporatist Regimes

Among the civil society organisations organised labour plays a crucial role in the inner system logic of most authoritarian MENA regimes. Bajo (2013) states that calling trade unions civil society movements poses a simplification that limits the understanding of different forms of collective actions: Trade unions are set up by workers only, they are often mass organisations, have a history that is often heavily intertwined with the history of their home country, and they are mostly subject to own legislation (p.111). However, I would argue that trade unions are a special case of civil society and of social movements, as social movements "consist of groups and organizations, with various levels of formalization, linked in patterns of interaction which run from the fairly centralised to the totally decentralized, from the cooperative to the explicitly hostile" (Diani, 2003, p.1). True, unions are workers' organisations, however, they do not necessarily act as mass organisations. In highly fragmented union landscapes as found in Lebanon, Morocco, or Mauritania, unions may also be interest groups for particular segments of society. Even in countries where the trade union system is centralised under the umbrella of a single federation, single unions may act successfully as interest groups. This success is based, following Olson's theory of collective action, on their small size, their control of small but important sectors of economy, and their ability to influence the government - like the trade unions in the oil sectors of Kuwait or Iraq. And even if the history of the union movement is indeed intertwined with the history of the country and the regime, they are still prone to splits, new foundations, and inter- and intra-leadership struggles caused by external shocks and developments of the Zeitgeist. They pose examples of social movements which mostly are also forged by a common aim. Similar to other civil society organisations, they can be defined as an interest group that first emerged outside the state framework, however ,as soon as a higher level of organisation and professionalism was reached they became subject to special laws: The laws of associations for civil society organisations, and the labour law concerning trade unions. Indeed, many organisations in the MENA region that label themselves trade unions, and also fulfil the same tasks as a trade union, are subject to NGO laws.

The existence of organised labour outside its corporatist framework is particularly threatening, as workers discontent jeopardises the legitimacy of the regime, especially when this legitimacy is based on a socialist narrative. Furthermore, as Communist ideas competed with the more market oriented Panarab ideologies in the years after independence, and workers were quite susceptible for these ideas, single party mass mobilising corporatist regimes were quick to co-opt trade union organisations and to

establish state controlled frameworks to control the workers movement. Against that background it is the term "state capitalism" that describes the basic dynamic at best, as state enterprises and ostensible public ownership did not involve any major revision of the relations of workers and managers to the means of production. The profit motive remained and the workers did not gain control of the surplus value of their own labour (Richards and Waterbury, 2014, p.206) - which led to disappointment and discontent among many leftists. In Gulf countries, in contrast, the leftist threat to primordial, patrimonial and dynastic rule was encountered with harsh repression of workers movement and a prohibition of trade unions in all countries until at least 2002.

In this atmosphere, the emergence of independent trade unionism became nearly impossible due to a rigid organisational structure of unionism in general, which bears features of bureaucratisation, and, second, due to an explicit vulnerability of its members. Union activists can be located easily, as they are tied to a particular workplace. Although clandestine union networks did appear, as the case or the Iraqi WFTDU in Kurdistan indicates, the special nature and traceability make trade unions a special case under civil society organisations. Moreover, this from of collective action is too important for governments to remain passive especially as they may breed militancy; control of trade unions is too crucial, too big too fail, as (Tilly, 1978, p.74) already observes in 19th century Europe:

> When it escaped the union-busting of employers and governments, the trade union greatly increased the capacity of workers to act together: to strike, to boycott, to make collective demands. This preparatory mobilization often began defensively, in the course of a losing battle with employers or in the face of a threat of firings, wage reductions, or cutbacks in privileges. It normally required risky organising efforts by local leaders who were willing to get hurt.

Given that importance, and given the fact that institutionalised violence is a crucial pillar of the institutional equilibrium in every MENA country, the violent repression of organised labour reaches a level in which repression does not bear the possibility of being an opportunity, as some SMT theorist rightly argue in other cases. The observation of Marks (2014, p.14) in his comparison of trade unions in Britain, Germany, and the United States in the 19th and early 20th centuries, stating that "repression politicized unions because it compelled them to try to change the rules of the game" does not hold true for the MENA region. The apparatus of coercion hampers politicisation to an extraordinary extent, and if mass protest occur, it occurs mostly inside the boundaries of the social contract of the authoritarian bargain, demanding for the promised share for political quietness. By fact, even the Tunisian UGTT, which has played an utmost progressive role during the critical juncture of 2011-2012, has not touched the nature and pillars of the institutional equilibrium in the decades before. The bread riots that shook the region since the erosion of the authoritarian bargain and liberalisation politics did neither target the nature of the regimes and the social contract; they were rather reinforcements of the latter, aiming at protecting the socio-economic status or even squeezing more benefits out the state.

The fact that coercion and repression has been used by the regimes does not mean that the regimes do not respond to workers demands. Even the trade union associations that were co-opted to a high extent, such as the Algerian UGTA, the Egyptian ETUF, or the Jordanian GFJTU fulfilled the role of advocating worker's protection and workers rights inside a limited manoevering space. They were part of tripatite consultations, recorded workers demands and complaints consulted the government in issues like the minimum wage, fringe benefits, and job creation and also provided a possibility of upward mobility. For generations trade unions have played that role in the MENA region, and such a role can, especially regarding a feeling of 'Adjz, become accepted and institutionalised over time. As (Berger and Luckman, 1978) put it:

> Roles appear as soon as a common stock of knowledge containing reciprocal typifications of conduct is in process of formation, a process that, as we have seen, is endemic to social interaction and prior to institutionalization proper. The question as to which roles become institutionalized is identical with the question as to which areas of conduct are affected by institutionalization, and may be answered the same way. All institutionalized conduct involves roles. Thus roles share in the controlling character of institutionalization. As soon as actors are typified as role performers, their conduct is ipso facto susceptible to enforcement. Compliance and non-compliance with socially defined role standards ceases to be optional, though, of course, the severity of sanctions may vary from case to case. The roles represent the institutional order.

In a similar vein, Hyman (1994) writes about "union identities" which may be viewed as inherited traditions which shape current choices and reinforce and confirm identities. As a consequence, unions in different countries have different identities shaping their nature and behaviour. Against this backdrop we can define labour unions in most countries of the MENA region as *guardians of the authoritarian bargain.* Their role is to address the erosion of this particular social contract, demand the workers share for their quiescence, and hamper privatisation, economic opening, and everything that might impede the function of the very job creation machine they expect he state to be. These statements lead back to the basic question that has been put in the beginning: Is what a western socialised researcher regards as a trade union a concept that can be applied offhand in MENA states? The history of the genesis of established unions is different, the environment they emerged in is different, and the driving forces that fostered their foundation differ as well.

4.7 The Final Concept: Trade Unions as Critical Interference Factors

4.7.1 The Definition of Trade Union

The conceptualisation of trade unions as Naqabat helps to identify the research object, however, some points should be clarified. The inclusion of professional associations, for

instance, is a result of the use of the term Naqabat as basic concept. This might be bewildering for observers who are used to the socio-economic environments of OECD countries or other regions. An engineers union would barely be mentioned together with a miners union, or a medical association together with a carpenters' union. Three aspects may dispel doubts: First, teachers, engineers, or medical staff is mostly state employed or dependent on state activity. They become wage-earners just like blue collar workers, especially in corporatist, state driven regimes with a low degree of hybridisation and privatisation. Second, also in western societies the boundaries between white-collar/middle-class versus blue-collars/working class and proletariat versus lumpenproletariat have diminished, as both share a similar subjectivity and relational positions within the economic system, especially in opposition to the new ruling elite of technocrats and business-owners. These systems have, hence, also undergone a "proletarianisation of the white-collars" (El-Mahdi, 2011; Hall, 1997; Marshall, 1997). Third, and somehow interwoven with the second point, especially the emergence of Social Movement Unionism has eroded the general rejection of direct political action, such as strikes (which form part of (blue collar) "trade union principles" according to Millerson (1960, p.219)) among professional and qualifying associations.

The crucial question is how these entities are able to push through their demands. Strikes and work stoppages are part of the repertoire workers can resort to, and these form cornerstones in the "incessant struggle between capital and labour" in which the capitalist constantly strives to reduce wages to their physical minimum and to extend the working day to their physical maximum, while the worker constantly pushes in the opposite direction (Marx, 1969). Indeed, as Silver (2003) demonstrates in his work *Forces of Labor: Workers' Movements and Globalization Since 1870*, the power of the workers' movement is tied to its ability to launch and organise labour actions, including general strikes, local strikes, riots, disputes, demonstrations, and lockouts. The most straightforward power, thus, derives from a collective decision not to work, or to withhold labour through various means (Holmes, 2015, p.106). This power is used or threatened in collective bargaining and poses an asset when it comes to negotiations about the enhancement of working conditions. Hence, the definition of trade union used in this QCA analysis is not tied to wage dependency but to the theoretical ability to collectively push for demands by threatening to refrain or indeed refraining to work. The political background of the organisations does not play a role. Consequently, the following definition will be used in the further course of this thesis:

> *Trade unionism is collective and frequent action that is institutionalised in a - at least officially - democratic-participatory framework in which the leadership is elected. The mutual basis of trade union members is the necessity to sell their labour power or to use their human capital in order to make a living at a common workplace or in a common profession. Their aim is to protect and improve their living standards[11] by influencing enterprise and state decisions via*

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[11]By that way, also Journalists Unions and Bar Associations that fight against human rights abuses

> *collective bargaining or consulting whereas work stoppage is at least theoretically a permanent implicit or explicit option*[12].

As a last point to clarify, the terms labour unions and trade unions will be used interchangeably in this study. A trade is, according to the dictionary of middle English, a "trodden path", and in modern English it refers to a profession or manpower-demanding section or the economic system.

The term syndicate, however, has a different historical meaning and could be misleading. According to the *American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*, Syndicalism is

> A radical political movement that advocates bringing industry and government under the control of federations of labor unions by the use of direct action, such as general strikes and sabotage. [French syndicalisme, from (chambre) syndicale, trade union, feminine of syndical, of a labor union, from syndic, delegate [...]]

In this reading, a syndicate's agenda is specifically tied to a political program of anarcho-syndicalism, while trade unionism is a broader concept. Unfortunately, the translators of the term Niqaba, especially in French and Spanish, is Syndicate or Sindicato and these terms are also used in English literature in an unquestioned manner. Although the term syndicate may have emancipated from its initial meaning, I will use the term in citations only, in order to avoid misunderstandings.

The Three Stages of Trade Union Activity

In order to determine whether a trade union acted as critical interference factor attacking the institutional equilibrium of a state, the intrinsic intention of the labour action, negotiation, or statement has to be put under scrutiny. It is not enough, if a trade union committed some kind of action. Roughly there can be three stages of labour action distinguished: socio-economic on the enterprise level, socio-economic on the national macro-level, and political on the national macro-level.

The first stage is local and demands are addressed to the direct superior, supervisors and the shop or enterprise management. Claims focus on plant level issues like particular wages or benefits, working conditions including health and security issues, or other plant-specific regulations.

Second, trade unions can also engage in the struggle involving interpretations of socio-economic macro-conditions. This struggle transcends the simple worker-company conflict and enters the local or national political arena. Trade unions may aim at influencing economic policies of the state regarding wages and working conditions by proposing alterations of the legal framework *inside* an existing regime. These alterations do not touch the nature of the institutional equilibrium as such, however, may cause conflicts

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of their members are included. Put in blunt words, not being harassed while working and not being imprisoned and / or dying because of the work done is a kind of protection of living standards

[12]Due to a lack of data, however, agricultural associations will be excluded from this study even if they are made up of employees working for great land owners or betimes for the state in the many Arab countries.

of interests with the ruling elite. Possible demands include the call for higher pensions, higher wages including the minimum wage, better access to health services, or job creation in the public sector.

A third stage of engagement refers to actions that aim at changes beyond economic polices and that target directly the distribution of power inside a country. It is a characteristic of Social Movement Unionism but can also appear as a trade union goal as such. In the latter case, the leadership and / or the workers do not see any other way to achieve their goals than by deep changes within the power structure of the country. But also claims and demands that target the distribution of power by influencing the pivotal institutions of an institutional equilibrium as mentioned above count as political interference, such as demands for a more powerful role of the parliament (Bahrain), demands for changes in the electoral law to alter the distribution of seats in the legislature (Jordan, Kuwait), campaigning in or calls for boycotting elections (Kuwait), or the removal of pivotal persons like long-term leaders of a county and their networks (Tunisia, Egypt).

For this study, only the third stage, say, the attempted alteration of the political equilibrium will be coded (1) according to the QCA dichotomisation, while protests for socio-economic enhancement of the workers, whether on the plant-level or on the national macro-level, will be coded (0). This results of the characterisation of trade unions in MENA as guardians of the authoritarian bargain as outlined in section 4.6. According to that logic, socio-economic protests that do not touch the balance of power in the country are not attacks on the institutional equilibrium but rather a part of the latter.

4.7.2   Narrowing Down the Sample

Scope and Limitations of the Study

By dealing with a particular region of a world, a scientist - willingly or unwillingly - enters the realm of *Area Studies.* The definition of an area is necessarily theory guided and the boundaries of an area may fluctuate from research to research, and there is a wide range of definitions of Area Studies and Areas as such. They may include common political administrative units, culturally determined ethnic enclaves, linguistic communities, or economic zones of production and exchange (Rafael, 1999, p.1208). Approaches and methodologies are heterogeneous. Sticking to a definition by (Szanton, 2002) "Area Studies" is best understood as a family of interconnected academic fields and measures unified by a common commitment to intensive language study, in-depth field research in the local language(s), close attention to local histories, viewpoints, materials, and interpretations, testing, elaborating, criticizing, or developing grounded theory against detailed observation, and multi-disciplinary conversations often cross-

ing the boundaries of the social sciences and humanities (Basedau and Köllner, 2007, p.109).

Area studies deal deliberatively with contiguous regions of the world like Western or Eastern Europe, the Americas, East Asia or Middle East and North Africa. Defining countries of these regions as main unit N[13] bears some advantages. First, some variables can be hold constant. If a study is conducted about democratization in Latin America - theoretically - language, religion and colonial history are predominantly the same. They might have the same impact on the dependent variable across all countries and form for instance in regression analysis a part of the error term ϵ. Second, as the countries often have an intertwined history, area experts emerge, that are able to focus first on a certain country and expand their studies to a neighbouring one due to similar cultural or economical features. The marginal costs decrease for each study of another country in that particular region. A third advantage is related to the latter: With the emergence of area experts, deep and elaborated knowledge about that region can be produced about few cases when statistical tests would fail due to the small amount of cases - this is referred to as the small-n problem in social science.

A disadvantage, however, concerns the fact that non-random selection bears the danger of producing endogeinity, which means that the independent variable is somewhat correlated with the error term ϵ. Simply put, there could be a relation between the outcome and one of all conditions that were not taken into account. Thus, this study about trade unionism in MENA countries, as it is designed here, cannot account explicitly for possible conjunctions between conditions that have been held constant and conditions included explicitly into the minimisation process. As outlined in section 3.3, omitted variables pose a problem for QCA as approach compared with statistical methods that build upon probability and interval scales. These hidden variables can only be revealed in inter-regional comparisons. This study is, against that backdrop, a step forward to understanding the region better and generating knowledge for future research, but by no means a comprehensive and omni-explanatory result.

Narrowing Down the Sample

A second problem arises concerning the boundaries of the areas to be studied. In a globalised world, facing regional integration, cross-regional exchange of cultures, concepts, and ideas, any region, once defined, witnesses a deterioration in the course of time. Identities become more fluid and more difficult to access, to evaluate, or to categorise in a meaningful way in order to conduct scientific inference. The delimitation of

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[13]Capital N is the main unit or basic population. It includes all possible instances, cases, individuals or any other research object inside a population. All countries of the world would be N if the unit of analysis was countries. A minor n refers to *samples* of the basic population N. All countries of the Middle East could be n of the main unit N if N is defined as all countries of the world.

an area should be well deliberated and substantiated, and even if, there is always the danger that the defined main unit N is actually a sample part n of a more reasonable, superordinate main unit N.

For this study, five complex features are decisive for the inclusion of cases into the sample. First, the country has to have a comparatively low democratic performance while a particular institutional equilibrium of which the authoritarian bargain is an essential part has to be stable for a comparatively long period of time. This excludes countries that have witnessed constant instability or major changes of their power structures in recent time such as Iraq since 2003 (US-led invasion, continuous instability), Lebanon at least since 2005 (Cedar Revolution)[14], Sudan 1983-2005 (civil war and secession), and Somalia.[15].

A second common feature of the sample countries refers to the Arab language. This is less due to lingo-cultural parallels than due to the acceleration of communication and information exchange between the countries. Indeed, concerning the waves of protests, the fall of the regime in Tunisia caused a "domino effect" (Schraeder, 2012), and youth groups of the entire region imitated organisational structures from Tunisia and Egypt in order to conduct own protests, even if they led in most MENA countries to "modest transformations" (Bellin, 2012) only.

Third, the protests that emerged have to be comparatively large concerning the history of protests of the particular country. This means that Tunisia is included, where palpable protests have taken place from 2006-2008 in the south, however, the protests of 2011 mobilised several hundred thousand across the country, and also Oman is included, where the maximum of protesters at one spot in 2011 was 2,000, however, given that there was no culture of protest at all in the country in the decades before, the jump in numbers is significant. Consequently, in Arab countries that did not experience a wave of protests, like Qatar,or the United Arab Emirates, the question why trade unions did not participate in the protest would be a subset of the question why there were no or only negligible protests at all; this would be a different research question.

Fourth, trade unions as defined in section 4.7.1 have to be existent in the country. By focussing on the organisational structure of a *Naqaba*, the workers committees of the Gulf in Qatar and Saudi Arabia are excluded from the study, as well as the United Arab Emirates, where Penal Code (Law No. 3 of 1987, as amended) makes it a criminal offence for anyone to found, join or participate in a trade union or to participate in a labour strike. The question why unions did not participate in the protests in those counties where trade unions are illegal is a subset of the question why trade unions are actually illegal in these countries at all; this would, aain, be a different research

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[14]For a historical overview of the Lebanese and Iraqi trade union movement see Jakob (2019, 2016) respectively.

[15]Mauritania seems to be an exception of this rule at first glance, as the country experienced a coup in 2008. As the case study outlines, however, the logic of the institutional equilibrium has barely changed, as the coup was a "correction" of domestic politics by the old elites and the military after a brief period of democratic opening

question.

Fifth, the concrete outcome of the protests is not of the essence. In critical juncture research, even those countries that did not witness major changes should be included into a study, as a critical juncture does not mean that indeed there have been changes. Capoccia and Keleman (2007, p.353) note that

> [...]ignoring the near misses of history would actually deprive scholars of important and interesting negative cases with regard to the outcomes they seek to explain: in other words, it would introduce selection bias into their comparative analyses and consequently arrive at weaker (and possibly flawed) findings.

The research design is summarised by table 4.1:

Concept	Design
Main unit N	*Arab countries facing a critical juncture 2010 - 2013*
Institutional equilibrium	*Different occurrence of "Bargain Rule"*
Critical interference factor	*Labour unions as Naqabat*
Scope of time	*Pre- and mid-Juncture*
Positive Sample n_1	*Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait*
Negative Sample n_0	*Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Oman*

Table 4.1: Summary of the research design

Chapter 5

The Variables and their Implications

Trade unionism is diverse and indicators for its strength are numerous, including institutional differences, identity differences, and differences in employer, political party, or state strategies (Frege and Kelly, 2003, p.12). Cross-national variation and historical contingency change according to the cleavage structure of countries, and the timing of industrialisation and democratisation often shaped trade unions' opportunity structures (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Centralization, political unity, organizational concentration, access to government, legal protection, and patterns of worker militancy are further factors to be considered depending on the cases (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000, p.52). All these factors are not necessarily found in every country and attempts of parsimonious explanations for union strength should be handled with care. Indeed, even literature about industrial relations in developed countries is "littered with generalizations which are assumed to be universal, but which are in fact conditioned by the circumstances of time and space" (Hyman, 2001a, p.204).

Concerning developing countries, democratisation research additionally expanded possible readings and interpretations of the role and strength of trade unions, and also regional particularities play their decisive role. In MENA they include the role of trade unions as guardians of the authoritarian bargain, tribalism, or neopatrimonialism - which are all barely addressed in Western literature dealing with the regions' trade unions.

The following section introduces five variables used for the minimisation. They are rooted in research about OECD countries, democratisation research, and studies of authoritarianism as well as observations from the case studies.

In addition, different concepts are discussed and assessed according to their value for the MENA region. Based on this discussion, the variables are defined and eventually the states of the sample will be classified and coded either as (0) or (1). Table 5 gives an overview of the handling of variables in the remainder of this study.

VARIABLE	*Description*	Sources (among others)	Handling
Deterioration of the Authoritarian Bargain (SOEC)	*Decreased standard of living in combination with a loss of trust in the competence or willingness of authorities to solve socio-economic problems leads to a challenge of the institutional equilibrium as a whole*	(Yousef, 2004) Shantayanan and Ianchovichina (2018)	Included
Intertwinedness with Opposition Parties (INOPP)	*Cooperation and/or personal union between trade unions and leading political parties or NGOs of the opposition that were change agents during the critical juncture made trade unions become a change agent too*	Deppe et al. (1978), Valenzuela (1989),	Included
Centralisation vs. Fragmentation (CEN)	*More centralised unions have less transaction costs when communicating and can reach more easily a critical mass. On the other side, they are often prone to or a result of state control and repression*	Valenzuela (1992), Schnabel (2013)	included
Degree of Tribalism (TRI)	*If strong family ties or the belonging to a tribe form the most prominent form of upward mobility, the emergence of class consciousness is hampered leading to weak trade unions*	Schmidinger (2013), Al-Sama'i (2019c)	Included
Union Militancy in Key Sectors (KEYS)	*Presence and bargaining power in economic key sectors, proved by recent successful strikes, push trade union confidence to challenge the state*	Valenzuela (1992), The World Bank (2004)	Included
Degree of Industrialisation	*Industrialisation is a key indicator for union density. Higher mobilisation rates lead also to more political activity*	Lee (2005), Schnabel (2013)	Excluded as standalone variable. Union density does not necessarily lead to higher militancy. Implied by KEYS as an impact can only be assumed if industrial sectors are also key sectors of the economy.
Rentier State Pattern	*Rentier states tend to suppress unions in order to protect key sectors. The systematic repression and legal hurdles lead to weak trade unions*	Beblawi and Luciani (1987), Cammett and Pripstein-Posusney (2010)	Excluded as standalone variable. Implied by KEYS.
High Share of Guest Workers in the Labour Force	*A high share of guest workers leads states to cut trade union rights in order to prevent unrest and to protect the institutional equilibrium. The exclusion of guest workers diminishes the mobilisation base for trade unions.*	Crystal (2007), Schmidinger (2013)	Excluded as standalone variable. No evidence given in the case studies.
Presence of Strong Leftist Parties	*Trade unions benefit in a symbiotic way from strong ties to leftist parties in government and opposition*	Allern (2017) Ebbinghaus (1995)	Excluded as standalone variable. The term leftist is not transferable to the MENA region and other currents such as welfare oriented Islamism have to be considered as well. Implied by INOPP.

Table 5.1: Handling of Variables to explain trade union agitation against the institutional equilibrium in MENA countries

5.1 Deterioration of the Authoritarian Bargain (SOEC)

Following the conclusion of Gurr (1970), the deterioration of living standards is a main reason why men rebel. These findings also coincide with results from democratisation studies, as democratizations in the 1980s have all occurred, with the possible exception of Korea, in crisis economies (Valenzuela, 1992, p.453). In this reading, a break of the authoritarian bargain could result in people attacking the institutional equilibrium of the state. If the state is no longer able or willing to fulfil its part of the authoritarian bargain, discontent may emerge questioning the competence and legitimacy of the ruling elite or the entire system as such.

Scenario I: Official and Institutionalised Trade Unions Turn Against the State

In such a situation, also existing or new trade union structures may be used to turn against the institutional equilibrium of the state. As has been shown, especially in section 4.6.2, the role of trade unions in MENA countries is heavily tied to the compliance of the authoritarian bargain. Theoretically, a centralised and even co-opted trade union federation can get into rows with a ruling regime that pursues liberalisation politics that include cut-backs in welfare and job creation. There have, for instance, been historical periods of tensions between the Algerian UGTA (especially in the 1970s and 1980s), the Egyptian ETUF (1990s), or the Tunisian UGGT (especially 1978-1984) and their respective governments because of liberalisation and privatisation politics. The role of trade unions can be considered as the watchdog of the authoritarian bargain (not necessarily only of the regime as such, as argued by Schmidinger (2013)), and union representatives need legitimacy with regard to their clientèle. As a result, such struggles were frequently the result of implemented or announced liberalisation politics that threatened the social contract. Real or feared deterioration of living standards undermined trust in the regime, and if a threshold of acceptance is reached, unions may turn against the state.
Collective action targeting the institutional equilibrium can also be regarded with a focus on the willingness of survival of a trade union body as institution. Golden (1997) has shown that strikes in situations of mass workforce reductions are not triggered by the threat of job loss per se but instead by a possible threat to the union organization.

Scenario II: Workers Form New, Independent Trade Unions and Turn against the State

Apart from institutionalised union structures, the workers themselves may also turn their back to the corporatist unions and start to organise outside of the union frame-

work provided by the regime. Within the inner logic of authoritarian MENA regimes, and from the viewpoint of the regimes, the trade unions' right of existence is tied to their capability of surveilling the workforce and giving feedback to the regime on how to adjust their policies of sticks and carrots. From the workers' perspective, unions stand for job creation, welfare, and fringe benefits that compensate for the lack of political freedom. If unions can no longer fulfil this role, they lose their right of existence and if the opportunity structures allow, new independent unions may emerge. These unions, as can be traced in the case studies, do not necessarily have a progressive, democratic or even a downright political agenda. They often simply try to accomplish what the official trade union bodies did not manage to achieve: the defence of the authoritarian bargain.

Policies of economic opening in times of globalisation also trigger some other changes in strategies between workers and the state. On the one side, workers start to organise more frequently when feel the state is failing to comply with the social contract. On the other side, the state becomes more reluctant to use coercion against protesting workers due to the imperative of attracting private capital as the modus operandi of neoliberal privatisation (El-Mahdi, 2011, p.394). Under these conditions, both sides veer away from the nationalist project and founding myths of the state. In this scenario of *Corporatist Collapse* (Hartshorn, 2018, esp. p.4) a space of new opportunity structures opens up in which more frequent protest as well as the institutionalisation of new labour unions becomes possible.

Scenario III: Trade Unions Struggle for Benefits while Leaving the Institutional Equilibrium Untouched

While this scenario seems reasonable for MENA countries, the business cycle theory, which is well established in research about OECD countries, suggests - in contrast - that union growth is pro-cyclical. According to this reading, employment growth as well as increased living standards enhance membership growth in the short term, and vice versa, unemployment and economic crisis decrease union density (Schnabel, 2013, p.258). Unions with low membership are - at least without significant allies in the political arena - less likely to reach a critical mass. Hence, the deterioration of living standards caused by a possible breach of the social contract would decrease the likelihood of union activity due to the fear of repression and a perceived low probability of success. This atmosphere can, however, create a despair that might lead to regime change, as mentioned by (Valenzuela, 1992, p.453).

On the other side, economic stability may trigger workers' protest in order to enhance their own socio-economic situation. When the country is economically stable and / or regaining strength after a crisis, workers and trade unions may try to increase their material benefits without questioning the very structure of the state. These patterns

could be witnessed in the cases like Algeria or Morocco in 2011. Socio-economic driven protests can be - against the background of the authoritarian bargain - something that does not necessarily *challenge* the institutional equilibrium but in fact *enforces* and *uses* it. Especially in times of critical junctures caused by external shocks, like caused by the pictures of the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, these tactics make sense: the uncertainty of the situation, and the insecurity of rulers on how to react provides a higher bargaining power to those who utter demands in that very moment. Put in other words: Not every socio-economic upheaval is a part of a larger revolutionary endeavour that aims at toppling the institutional equilibrium.

Just like Latin America, MENA countries experienced in the second half of the 20th century what Karl Polanyi (1947) had labelled "double movement". On one side, forces promoting economic liberalism, disembedding of the economy, and commodification of all strata of life face, on the other side, forces that struggle for social protection. Labour movements play a key role inside the latter camp, forming part of a reactionary counter-movement that aims to resist the "uprooting" of the economy from society. Transferred to MENA countries, the restricted economic opening and privatisation policies that started in many MENA countries after the abatement of the oil boom in the late 1970s resemble such a push of economic liberalisation. Much of the "bread riots" like in Morocco (1981, 1984), Algeria (1988), Egypt (1977, 1984), Tunisia (1978, 1984), or Jordan (1989) can be regarded as representation of a countermovement.

Especially on the eve of privatisation politics and economic opening, the internal alliances inside many regimes had changed. Had the regimes and official trade unions acted in many countries in concert before, cracks started to appear in the plaster that held both together. The struggle between cadres of the trade union institutions fighting privatisation and cuts of subsidies on the one side, and a network of state officials and a new emerging business elite on the other side has impressively been shown for countries like Egypt (Posusney, 1997), Morocco (Catusse, 2001), or Tunisia (Ennaceur, 2000). During these struggles, however, the nature of the regime, and in particular the authoritarian bargain, remained untackled by unionists. Different from the notions of Zemni (2004), Abdelrahman (2012), Wilson (2013), or other authors who recur on Rosa Luxemburg (1906)'s *Mass Strike*, it is definitely possible in MENA to pursue economic aims while *not* having a political transformative stance. Not for nothing, Polanyi[1] labels those forces that fight for social security as *reactionary*, and not *progressive*.

Indicators and their Implications for the Variable SOEC

The following indicators were taken as approach for a dichotomisation of the Variable SOEC (for a summarizing overview see table A.1 in the Appendix):

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[1]The relationship between Polanyi and Marxism has been the issue of many debates. For an elaborate overview see Selwyn and Miyamura (2014)

Total Unemployment Rate   If unemployment rises in general, unionists might fear losing their job in the future and decide to take collective action. A decline of the unemployment rate, in turn, could also hamper motivation to protest, strike, or attempt to change the institutional equilibrium. Following the theories that suggest that union activity increases in a pro-cyclical manner, declining unemployment rates might encourage unionists to take action in order to increase their share of economic revenue. Using a regression of the unemployment statistics from 2000 to 2010, the gradient β_{Unem} shows the trend that might have affected workers' perceptions about the breach of or adherence to the authoritarian bargain on the part of the state.

Inflation Rate   Following the same logic as suggested for the unemployment rate, we may assume that increasing inflation and devaluation of the currency enhances the cost of living and pushes workers to take action against a country's institutional equilibrium. Again, stable currencies and low inflation rates may be taken by workers as a sign for increased prosperity and/or security and encourage them to demand a greater share of revenues. These renegotiations are part of the very logic of the authoritarian bargain. In extreme cases and after failed negotiations, workers might nevertheless attack the institutional equilibrium of a state. Using a regression of the inflation statistics from 2000 to 2010, the gradient β_{Infl} shows the trend that might have affected workers' perceptions about the breach of or adherence to the authoritarian bargain on the part of the state.

Corruption Perception   Transparency International defines corruption as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. In the perception of workers this may mean that resources that should actually be used to uphold the authoritarian bargain are channelled into the pockets of an elite that enriches itself at the expense of the simple citizen. The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) measures the trust of citizens in their administrative elite. Low or falling CPI indices may lead to a perceived necessity to change the institutional equilibrium in order to re-channel resources and enhance their own economic well-being. Using a regression of the CPI indices from 2000 to 2010, the gradient β_{Transp} shows the trend that might have affected workers' perceptions about the breach of or adherence to the authoritarian bargain on the part of the state.

Health Expenditure out of Pocket   Increasing health expenditure may set workers under pressure, may rise discontent, and may eventually lead to demands of systemic change. HEP data can be used as a proxy for the condition, betterment, or deterioration of social systems in general. Unlike data that focusses on medical infrastructure, HEP is more suitable to mirror the real expenses and financial stress workers face as customers in the healthcare sector. Using a regression of the HEP indices from 2000 to 2010, the gradient β_{Healt} shows the trend that might have affected workers' perceptions about the breach of or adherence to the authoritarian bargain on the part

of the state.

Increase in Purchasing Power of the Minimum Wage 2001 - 2010 The purchasing power of the minimum wage increased in almost all countries of the sample, albeit to a different extent. Two features make this indicator difficult to interpret: First, the numbers (taken from ILOSTAT) are not available for all countries for that period of time. Second, there is little information about how large the informal sector - in which workers do not benefit from the minimum wage - actually is. Extreme cases like Yemen or Libya, where the ppp of the minimum *decreased* over time show, nonetheless, that existing numbers are a meaningful support for the assessment of the variable SOEC.

The Importance of Qualitative Research and the very Perception inside the Countries

Sheer numbers can be regarded as a basis for discontent, but they do not necessarily trigger revolutionary socio-economic uprisings, as has been shown in the seminal work of Gurr (1970). Other circumstances influence the willingness for systemic change against the backdrop of socio-economic deterioration. The important factor is the very *perception* of the populace which eventually leads to uprisings aiming to change the institutional equilibrium. Shantayanan and Ianchovichina (2018) argue convincingly that while income inequality measures in the MENA region displayed comparatively low numbers of inequality and poverty compared to other developing regions, subjective well-being measures decreased sharply, especially for the middle class, and most particularly in the countries with the most intense uprisings.

According to the Arab Barometer poll of 2012-2014, some 63.55 per cent of the respondents stated that they consider the wish for the betterment of their own economic situation as main reason for the Arab uprisings. A driving force of the protest was the unemployed youth who could no longer benefit from the authoritarian bargain as, due to austerity measures, the state had cut back public employment and could no longer absorb the cohorts that entered the labour market after education. In the private sector, state owned firms with high market power were able to set prices and bar start ups and small enterprises from gaining a foothold in the branch. While this is a more than acceptable explanation for the mass protests, it is insufficient to explain trade union mobilisation. Defining trade unions as groups consisting of employed workers, the possibility of losing one's job due to protests and strikes leads to a different cost-benefit calculation among unionists.

In comparative perspective, economic indicators can support the assumption that an uprising had socio-economic root; however, they cannot be taken as the sole and sufficient conditions. What is regarded in one country and / or cultural context as unbearable and unacceptable may be tolerated in another. Therefore, the determination

of the dichotomisation has to be done in a qualitative manner for each country. The definition of SOEC shall be:

> *If socio-economic indicators hint at a deterioration of standards of living to an extent that trade unions come to the conclusion that in the existing institutional equilibrium the authoritarian bargain can not be accomplished by the state, the variable SOEC is set to (1). In case trade unions protest for higher benefits without questioning the institutional equilibrium, the variable SOEC is set to (0), as the authoritarian bargain is still regarded as intact, and these protests are part of the negotiation procedures within the logic of the institutional equilibrium.*

Against that background, the interconnectedness between political stability and the wish for enhancement of socio-economic conditions is essential. If socio-economic well being does not meet expectations of the populace, political activists have to choose whether they want to struggle for better conditions of living *within* the system, say, within the rules of the game, or if they attempt to change the rules of the game as such. The latter option involves an increased degree of uncertainty. The question is, hence, whether activists are ready to jeopardise political stability by attacking the existing institutional equilibrium in order to enhance their living conditions. Such strategical considerations play their role, as will be shown, in cases like Algeria or Mauritania, in which the collective memory had been shaped by a history of recent instability.

5.2 Intertwinedness with Opposition Forces (IN-OPP)

Since the emergence of Social Movement Unionism it became a widespread strategy of unions to establish ties to other civil society organisations, and to participate in campaigns that go beyond classical issues of workplace conditions. Unions bonded with the movement of altermondialists, environmental groups, human rights activists, or anti-fascist currents to form broad fronts addressing the current matters and disputes in society. By that way, unions could acquire access to key individuals and networks within specific communities, enhance their reputation, and eventually increase their appeal to poorly represented strata of society (Hyman, 1997a; Frege and Kelly, 2003, p.9). Unions may also be historically tied to particular groups of society including political parties that have initially fostered their emergence, or also those that managed to gain positions inside the union movement and bureaucracy. Holding these positions, these individuals and their respective groups may increasingly exert influence on the stances and strategies of the unions.
Outside of the European context, strategical alliances between unions and political parties could also be observed in Latin America and South Asia: The unions' wish for changes in legislation or for the implementation of particular policies affecting their members are complemented by the parties' wish to capture the political allegiance of

unionists who might become voters in national elections or might form a valuable network of militants and demonstrators (Valenzuela, 1989, p.9-13).

Having said all of this, the variable INOPP aims at testing whether the closeness, partial amalgamation, of mutual coordination, or close cooperation between trade unions and leading opposition parties affected the eagerness of trade unions to change the institutional equilibrium. The respective opposition party has to be a critical interference factor itself and has to push for the same or similar aims as the trade unions. The variable does not assess any direction of dependence and may thus include unionists affecting party politics and vice versa.

> *If the majority of the institutionalised trade unions in a country cooperated closely either with a political opposition party, a social movement, or any other kind of political group that attempted to challenge the institutional equilibrium in 2011, the variable INOPP is set to (1) for that country. If trade unions were not embedded at all in the aforementioned networks, if there is credible proof for a relatively unbiased independence of the unions, or if they cooperated, however, the partner was not a critical interference factor in 2011, the variable INOPP is set to (0).*

Workers and Ideologies in MENA

Especially in times of crisis, unions change their strategies to include the redefinition of interests, new systems of internal relations, to broaden or narrow their agenda, and altered power tactics (Hyman, 1994, p.132). This also holds true for the working force which may accept representation on a different ideological base than the official union bodies' orientation. Trade unionists and unions in MENA did not remain untroubled by these kind of reorientations. Historically, three major changes in the discourses of the region can be identified that also affected workers and activists:

First, in the "pluralist era" before and shortly after the independence of MENA states, as Halpern (1963, 335-336) argues, local and small organised unities rarely succeeded to alter working conditions significantly in Middle East. Therefore a political strategy was necessary to achieve success on the macro level. Alliances between national parties and other anti-colonial and unions became an important part of the anti-colonial struggle. After the achievement of the nationalist project, unions had to re-orient and were often co-opted into the new state systems - to the detriment of many old and new opposition parties.

Second, between the late 1960s and 1970s, parts of the political strata swung to the left. Such groups included foremost political forces that were dissatisfied with the way "Arab Socialism" developed, blaming the defeat of 1967 on a half-hearted modernisation and the inconsequent implementation of socialist ideas inside the traditionalistic environment of MENA countries (Ajami, 1981, p.34-48).[2]. Remainders of this strata

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[2]For a reckoning with the Arab regimes after 1967 from an Arab-leftist perspective see *Self Criticism after the Defeat* by Al-Azm (2011). Against that background, and for the impact of the European youth movements of 1968 on the Arab leftism after 1967 see Di-Capua (2018)

inside the trade union movement can still be found in Egypt or Bahrain, as will be shown in the case studies.

Third, at the beginning of the second half of the 20th century another force also entered the political landscape: Political Islam became the most powerful opposition movement in MENA countries and managed to out-crowd almost everywhere Arab Nationalist or Panarab rhetoric as main ideological basis for critic of the regimes. At the latest since the ouster of their Communist allies after the Iranian revolution 1979 it became obvious that Islamist groups have particular organisational advantages. They often have access to rich social networks in religious, educational, and charitable circles and due to their position as religious and political actors they can elude from state repression as many Arab regimes try to maintain a semblance of Islamic legitimacy (Mecham, 2014, p.202). Yet, these movements were also increasingly vulnerable as the possible threat of violent Islamism had been used frequently for crackdowns on political parties. Nonetheless, due to a wide range of resources, political groups with Islamic inclination are often better equipped for social mobilization than their non-religious rivals (Mecham, 2014, p.202). Furthermore, as self-proclaimed last great ideology encountering colonialism, capitalism, and often Western decadence, political Islam has managed to become an umbrella and collection pit for discontent individuals and regime critics.

Excurse: Political Islam and Trade Unions

Being the most recent development and clearly affecting MENA's political landscape, it is worthwhile focussing on Political Islam and its relationship to trade unions, especially as this combination may seem bewildering and counter-intuitive for many readers. Trade unionism and religion have an ambivalent history and relation.[3]

The Al-Faruqi - Al-Banna Controversy

From an early Marxian view, religion is viewed as opium for the people that disguises class conflict, and consequently, *red* unions repudiated any religious interference on a practical as well as on a theoretical level. Nonetheless, in Europe at the turn of the 19th century also anti-socialist confessional unions, mostly Catholic in nature,

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[3]Scholars who focussed on union-party ties in OECD countries (Allern, 2017; Ludlam et al., 2002; Coates, 1999; Ebbinghaus, 1995) mostly focussed on the relationship between unions and social-democratic, socialist, communist parties, or other political groups "left of the center". Besides some notable exception like Biesca (2018) who scrutinises on "trade unionism against socialist modernisation" in post-Franco Spain of the 1980s, still, the concept "trade union" remains among Europe citizens and scholars a "leftist" phenomenon. This focus appears quite narrow when it comes to the roles and stances outside the European and anglophone world. Besides the still underexplored relation between Islamists and labour movements, also cases like the Malaysian labour movement which displayed union formation along ethnic lines (Rowley and Bhopal, 2006), or rightist, often nationalist and ethnic-oriented trade unions in India (Mahmood, 2016) show that workplace organisations can be politically more diverse.

emerged. Eventually this trajectory merged with the social democrat currents due to a mutual basis of capitalism-scepticism and an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary approach to systemic change (Hyman, 2001*b*, p.2-3). For the MENA region, the book *Towards Islamic Labour & Unionism* published in 1985 displays two divergent views on the role that Islam should -or could - play in industrial relations. On the one side, the American-Palestinian intellectual Ismail Al-Faruqi stresses that Islam repudiates social stratification of people based on employment or occupation. He condemns a materialistic classifications into working and ruling classes.[4]

On the other side, Gamal Al-Banna, brother of the notorious founder and leader of the Muslim Brotherhood Hassan Al-Banna, and an active trade unionist himself, expresses a different view. Indeed, he agrees, just like Al-Faruqi, on the the necessity for fair labour conditions and wages, however, as he puts "justice" instead of "egalitarianism" in the center of his thoughts, he concludes that organised labour is consistent with Islamic law (Al-Faruqi and Al-Banna, 1984; Syed, 2008). A central pillar of this reasoning is the claim that asymmetric power relations between employers and employees may seduce the former to dictate terms in violation of the Islamic principles of justice and equality. By resorting to this reasoning, Al-Banna takes the same road as Adam Smith (1776), McCulloch (1854), and John Stuard Mill (1869) who perceived a "disadvantage of labour" when it comes to employer-employee negotiations and whose views became the basic justification for European trade unionism in the 19th and early 20th century. Although G. Al-Banna's lifetime project of an international Islamic trade union federation failed, and he remained an outsider in the circles of the Muslim Brotherhood, his views and writings show that trade unionism and Islam are not mutually exclusive.

State Provided Welfare as a Core Demand of Political Islam

Indeed, from a more practical and grass-root driven point of view, there are clear intersections between trade unionism in the MENA region and political Islam. Although the degree of involvement of state structures into welfare and charity is a contested matter among Muslim scholars (for a discussion see Dean and Khan (1997)), there is a broad consensus that the Islamic community should create instruments to avoid deprivation and relief the poor. Some interpretations of the Quran even induce a right to work for all members of society, as work is desirable. Moreover, different passages of the Quran

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[4]He mainly relies on a Hadith of Al-Bukhari and also Al-Muslim where Prophet Muhammad is supposed to have said "Your slaves are brothers of yours. Allah has placed them in your hand, and he who has his brother under him, he should feed him with what he eats, and dress him with what he dresses himself, and do not burden them beyond their capacities, and if you burden them, (beyond their capacities), then help them." Also the Kuranic verse "God loveth those who are kind" (5:13) and a Hadith by Tirmidhi stating that the Prophet said "One who mistreats those under him will not enter paradise" are read as an imperative for the employer who, if he is a faithful Muslim, does not exploit his subordinates (Syed, 2008). Additonally, the Hadith "No harm, no foul" passed by Ibn Samura in which Prophet Muhammad judges in favour of property rights is widespredly read as a prohibition to strike against employers.

stress the importance of a "good life" (hayat tayyibah), "welfare" (falah), provision of ease and alleviation of hardship, and prosperity. All organisations, including the state, should reflect that character and to ensure freedom from moral corruption, hunger, fear and mental tensions (for an elaborated version of this interpretation see c.f. Chapra (1979)). Responsibility is delegated by God - who is the most merciful - to the faithful community forming what Abul A'la Maududi labels "popular vicegerency" (Maududi, 1955, p.183)[5] In a similar vein, Al-Banna argues that trade unions contribute to two of the above mentioned basic needs: food against hunger and security against fear (Al-Faruqi and Al-Banna, 1984, p.69).

As peoples of the MENA region have gnashingly accepted the paternal and patronising role of the state in exchange for their rights to participate, and as they have perceived trade unions in the course of time and history as watchdogs of the authoritarian bargain, it stands to reason that trade unionism became also a promising way to enhance the base of mobilisation for the political opposition that aligned itself to this kind of welfare-oriented political Islam. The Islamic trade unions that emerged after 1989 in Algeria and that had close ties to the FIS, as well as the workers organisation in the early 1980s in Syria that were often steered and mobilised by the Muslim Brotherhood were also anti-reform movements to protect the authoritarian bargain. The traditional, "leftist" trade unions were co-opted or crashed by the regimes and with them also an entire repertoire of socialist rhetoric usually used by workers against oppressive regimes became useless for opposition purposes. Islam, as argued some of its leaders, was suitable to fill that gap.

Political Islam Competing about the Middle Classes

The mobilisation of workers was a difficult task for political Islam, though. Belal (2005, p.9) cites Tunisian Al-Nahda leader Al-Ghannoushi complaining:

> This group (the workers) came to represent a huge problem for many capitalist regimes and even socialist ones [...] and yet the Islamists have failed to mobilize it [...] The reason behind the weakness of Islamist influence in this sector goes back to their (Islamists) ignorance and insensitivity regarding political and social problems of the working class.

In the 1980s, Ghannoushi seemed to be an exception among his peers. As Al-Banna (1982) argued, besides the widespread belief that it was actually the employer's and not necessarily the workers duty to guarantee good working conditions, also the perception of trade unions as imperialist and Marxist (and hence atheist) organisations

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[5]Although stressing the importance of welfare and a limited degree of participation, in the same book Maududi also shows clear tendencies towards totalitarianism when writing that the Islamic state " seeks to mould every aspect of life and activity in consonance with its moral norm and programmes of social reform. In such a state no one can regard any field of his affairs as personal and private. Considered from this point of view the Islamic State bears a kind of resemblance to the Fascist and Communist states." For a discussion see Bale (2009).

hampered the willingness of Islamic organisations and individuals to engage in trade unions. Since the 1990s, this ideological gap seems to narrow, and at least since the 2000s Islamic activists do play a role inside MENA's trade union movement, as the cases of the Al-Nahda in Tunisia (from the point when Ghannoushi encouraged Islamists to join trade unions), the ties between al-Wefaq and the GFBTU in Bahrain, the dominance of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan's professional associations, or the participation of candidates from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt's trade union elections since 2001 indicate.

An important factor to understand the dynamics of trade unionism as alternative to the state-steered frameworks is the role of the middle classes. The classical two-class structure that emerged after WWII with landlords, military officers, bureaucrats, most of the rich traders and some of the intelligentsia on top and highly segmented agglomerations of peasants, workers, and most of the intelligentsia on the bottom (Halpern, 1969, p.98-99) changed over time. The inability of populist regimes to include or suppress emerging lower-middle and middle classes led to a diversity of civil-society institutions at least since the 1980s. Turning their backs to the old Panarab and Arab nationalist ideologies, the middle classes bore intellectual, organisational, and mobilising capital many of the ideologically coined political groups were competing about.

The establishment of civil-society institutions was often also encouraged by the state in order to disencumber the regimes - which were often not able to meet the demands of these classes anymore (Bayat, 2002, p.2). Although this brought a notable shift from class based organisation to organisation in communities and loose NGO's, especial professional white-collar associations became a platform for the middle classes. Middle classes may, but do not *necessarily* bond with political Islam or become a part of the Islamist spectre (Beinin, 2005, p.113), however, this alliance proved to be powerful in the past. The successful organisations and parties affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Nahda in Tunisia, Islamic Action Front in Jordan, Islah Party in Yemen and so forth) are evidences for their success, while all of them started to mingle into professional organisations since the early 1990s, especially into the engineers, teachers, and medical staff unions.

The emergence of NGO's was also fostered by humanistic-liberal groups that stressed secularity and the importance of Human rights. The Tunisian Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de l'Homme (LTDH) or the Yemen Center for Human Rights (YCHR) are examples of middle class driven and politically active human rights organisations, that also often held close ties to Journalists Unions and Bar Associations.

5.3   Centralisation vs. Fragmentation (CEN)

The case studies in this thesis display a wide range of institutional frameworks and factual manoeuvring space for trade unionism reaching from relative openness and freedom to organise strict co-optation into a rigid framework of state-corporatism. Following Griffin et al. (1980), the degree of centralisation is tied to the influence of the central labour organisation on rank and file unionists as well as the bargaining strength of these central organisations confronting the state on the one hand, and private employers on the other. The handling of the variable CEN is as follows:

> *If a trade union framework inside a country is characterised by an institutionalised hierarchy that gives the central trade union federations a clear and practically undisputed predominance in negotiations with the state and enterprises as well as a monopoly or quasi-monopoly on union membership, the variable CEN is set to (1). If the country is characterised by trade union pluralism with several trade union federations that display roughly equal membership numbers and bargaining power, the variable CEN is set to (0).*

5.3.1   Authoritarian Corporatism and State Sponsored Unionism

To understand the nature of centralisation of trade unions in MENA, it is worthwhile taking a look at the literature about corporatism that eventually leads to state sponsored trade unionism. Indeed, central features of corporatism are macro-management, coordination, systematisation, and harmonisation of bargaining over working conditions.

In Western countries, a trade union mobilising corporatist system became likely to emerge when trade unions formed in times of class formation. This explains the high degree of centralisation of Swiss, Austrian, German, and Nordic trade unions in contrast to their more decentralised French or US counterparts (Therborn, 1992, p.28).

Now, similar to Europe (Linz, 2000), MENA corporatist authoritarianism emerged as compromise between welfare-oriented, authoritarian socialist currents, counter-revolutionary conservatism, and anti-etatist, liberal, and rather state-sceptical elements during the struggle of independence against European powers. Having a mutual project, these forces closed ranks to an even higher extent than many of their European counterparts: As many MENA labour movements formed part of the nationalist movement, their ties to the new ruling elites were often strong and included overlapping party and trade union leadership. Those countries that resorted to a Pan-Arab nationalist and/or socialist anti-colonial ideology were even more prone to include the worker's movement into the nationalist front. How uncompromising the national leadership could be about the role of trade unions could be witnessed in many countries struggling for independence, inside and outside the Arab World. A quote of Tanzanian anti-colonial activist, politician, and political theorist Julius Nyerere (1922-1999) shows that impressively:

> [...] either the trade unions and the political organisations are prongs, or 'legs' of the same nationalist movement, or they are not. If they are, then the question of whether they should or should not cooperate in getting the country from point A to point B does not arise. They must cooperate. Otherwise a nationalist movement, or the socialist movement, or whatever you may like to call it, cannot move forward at all. It is bound to break up."

After independence, the integration of monopolistic mass organisations and the reliance on these organisations for mobilisation and monitoring the population became a main pillar of the country's power structure. This coincides with the observation of Crouch (1993, p.8) who stated that the discipline of corporatist arrangements, that somewhat bore the veiled implication of fascism or at least conveyed some kind of antiliberalism, was a key factor to understand strong centralisation of union movements in the history of Europe. Additionally, centralised union structures bear advantages for the business elite of a country: Studies from OECD countries indicate that local managements are more relaxed about centralised unions as they interfere less in workplace management and local wage-setting and may nonetheless solve the latent conflict between capital and labour (Schnabel, 2013, p.266).

Especially the countries of the sample that became officially Republics after independence tended to attempt to include trade unionism into the new state apparatus in order to control it (Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria, Yemen)[6]. Thus, in these countries a state-union relation emerged that is labelled "state sponsored unionism" by Valenzuela (1992). The worker's organisations in these countries are characterised by official financing, compulsory membership, and strict boundaries to the sectors they cover. The leadership is designated by state officials or elected by workers whereas in the latter case state authorities screen and possibly exclude candidates in advance (Valenzuela, 1992, p.448). State sponsored trade unionism may also include systems like Algeria or Tunisia, in which trade union pluralism is theoretically allowed by law, but the centralised hegemonic unions or union federations were favoured by the regime. The emergence of new labour organisations was hampered due to discrimination by state authorities and also by the high transaction costs every new union has when it attempts to rise in a sector where already a big player exists (Millerson, 1960, p.49).

5.3.2 Trade Unionism in the Context of Hybridisation Strategies

Other examples of centralisation follow a similar logic, however, the initial motivation of state authorities for the introduction of a centralised trade union framework differs. Bahrain and Oman undertook some reforms affecting overall participation of the populace at the beginning of the 2000s. This reform driven trade unionism is a balancing act of the regimes between pleasing the international community in order to improve in-

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[6]Although not being a Republic, also Jordan belongs to this category. Authorities copied much of their union legislation in the 1970s from Syria and Iraq.

ternational relations and to spur cooperation and investment, pleasing reform oriented forces inside the country who painfully point out that the ruling class lacks legitimacy, and the wish to still control the workers movements in order to preserve the hegemonic position of that ruling elite.

In this environment, which can be found foremost in the Gulf countries, the creation of official representation for workers is made stepwise: First a system of workers committees, which resembles a state controlled and a-political system of councils, is introduced. Besides Oman and Bahrain such systems could also be found in Qatar and Saudi Arabia. In a further step, this system is turned into a proper trade union framework, as seen in Bahrain (2002) and Oman (2006). These legal reforms can be regarded as test balloons released by the regime in order to fathom how much self-determination can be given to workers without the regime losing its influence. During this process, the regime takes care that the trade union bodies first, remain ideology-free, second, are staffed with a leadership that is loyal to the regime and that supports its (industrial) politics, and third, that these new organisations remain somewhat financially dependent on the state.

A more relaxed strategy to neutralise the threat that can derive from trade unions can be found in Morocco and Mauritania. Trade union pluralism was allowed at an early stage, which led to a highly fragmented trade union landscape. This type resembles what Valenzuela (1992) labels "contestatory unionism", however, different from his classification, it occurs under an authoritarian pretext. A wide range of different political ideologies and parties produced several different trade unions and trade union federations that compete with each other. These parties and ideologies, however, are not system challenging. They are part of the institutional equilibrium in the sense of providing the state elite legitimacy by mimicking a democratic opposition. These groups compete about the access to state resources and use trade union mobilisation as a trump to enhance their bargaining position. Consequently, in these cases of controlled pluralism and deepened liberalisation, unions tend to split according party lines (Hinnebusch, 2005, p.351-352) and keep each other in check.

5.3.3   Implications and Definition of the Variable CEN

In the case of a critical juncture, it is thinkable that a centralised or decentralised structure has an impact on trade union behaviour. A possibility would be that the centralisation and integration into the state apparatus and the closeness to the regime bar trade unions to join those voices who demand a change of the institutional equilibrium of the country. A possible explanation could be an extraordinary degree of violence used by the regime to keep its corporatist arrangement up. This can be seen in Syria and Libya. An incorporated, say, co-opted trade union system is a strategy of self defence of the regime, especially if violence is an inherent part of the institutional equilibrium. The more authoritarian and intolerant a system, the more important civil

societies and mass organisations become for mobilisation and the utterance of demands, and, consequently, the more dangerous it is for ruling elites (Valenzuela, 1989, p.16). If the grip of the regime on the trade union movement is so strong that no unionist will challenge the state, a final QCA equation including CEN and a trade union movement that is passive or even pro-regime (Outcome = 0) is probable.

A centralised union system, on the other side, also decreases transaction costs and provides an efficient framework for communication. Whenever a workers' movement that is organised in a strict corporatist structure turns against the ruling elite, the centralisation is an organisational asset, as could be witnessed in the case of Sudan in the 1980s or Tunisia in 1978. The penetration of the workforce, that often reaches the shop floors and offices of small economical or political workplaces, leads to a broad pool for mobilisation. If the national trade union leadership gets into rows with the state leadership, this potential pool may give self confidence to the union federation to start a mass strike. High workplace penetration and mobilisation capacity could thus be an explanation for the presence of (CEN) in a final equation rendering the outcome (1).

A counterargument states that encompassing unions or confederations will always hurt one of their constituencies and will hence more likely refrain from action (Hege and Visser, 1993; Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000, p.46). This possible lethargy may also be reinforced by strategic behaviour connected with Olsen's (1982, 1985) Theory of Collective Action in which individuals in large organisations have less incentives to pursue their goals as too many free riders would diminish the eventual reward of the activists. Indeed most authors of the corporatist tradition explain the union decline since 1980s using these pattern as explanation for weakened centralised wage bargaining institutions (Lee, 2005, p.72). This, again, could be explanations for a final QCA equation including CEN and rendering the outcome (0), as it is not completely clear if political changes might not decrease the power of the union.

Adding another dimension, in a highly decentralised system in which collective bargaining is decentralised completely, free competition between unions may fragment and weaken unions as bargaining agents to a maximum extent (Valenzuela, 1992, p.448). This may lead to a complete de-politicisation, as the local labour leaders and rank-and-file workers do not assume that their mobilisation will affect the macro-economic or political situation beyond their workplace of craft (Valenzuela, 1992, p.455). Hibbs (1978) argue that the decentralisation of trade unions goes along with a predominance of (yellow) business unions that pursue non-political goals like in the industrial relation system of the United States and to a lesser extent in Great Britain. Such a weakening fragmentation could be an explanation for a final QCA equation including (cen) and rendering the outcome (0). On the other side, Frege and Kelly (2003, p.19) argue that political action in divided union movements is still possible as long as there is a certain degree of inter-confederal unity, as in Spain in the mid-1990s, in Italy the early

1990s, and in Morocco in the 1980s and early 1990s. In this case, a fragmented union landscape can still be a decisive change agent.

5.4   Degree of Tribalism (TRI)

In his pointed essay about the weaknesses of the trade union movement in Yemen, Al-Sama'i (2019b) points at the hampering role of tribalism and the centrality of family bonds. Especially in countries with a strong rural character, but also in strong patrimonial systems, tribal and clan connections are of the essence to making a living and/or for upward mobility in general. Consequently, the variable TRI is handled as follows:

> *If in a country upward mobility and economic well being is heavily coined to tribal or family connections, and tribalism poses an indispensable part of the institutional equilibrium, the variable TRI is set to (1). If the state bureaucracy, mass organisations, or economic activity provide chances for upward mobility that are relatively independent from primordial decent, the variable TRI is set to (0). The latter case, however, does not mean that family bonds do not play a role; they just play a minor role in comparison to the cases coded (1).*

5.4.1   Tribalism as Part of States in MENA

The scientific dealing with tribalism often triggered some criticism stating that an "ideology of tribalism" (Mafeje, 1971) has helped to construct the "other" while concealing inner-African realities. For the MENA region, however, we can assume a strong role of tribal identities, especially as individuals and groups referred historically to themselves as tribes (*banu / qabai'l / 'asha'ir*) pointing at a common ancestry and generating a feeling of solidarity among their members. This origin can be transmitted by folklore and a collective memory - which might, without doubt, also be constructed - and is betimes even reinforced by the prevailing historical narrative of the state. Indeed, the classification of tribalism and tribes does not necessarily follow a biological-ethnological tradition, but should rather be regarded as mutual concepts and personal attitudes. This view can also be found in Ibn Khaldun's concept of Asabiyya which resembles a kind of a social force or mutual feeling of solidarity which can be built on blood and kinship but also on faith, trust, and a resulting strong cohesion in a group. Ibn Khaldun himself saw such a pronounced Asabiyya especially among Bedouin tribes and families, as these were due to the geographical conditions and their lifestyle extremely dependent on mutual support.

Today, as the example of Kuwait shows vividly, this kind of solidarity can be found among urban tribal associations that form quasi-parties in the political system of some MENA countries. Historically, colonial powers and leaders of new emerging nation

states depended on tribal systems for the sake of stability. Tribal structures, power, and authority was used, maintained and often preserved in a dialogic way (Evans-Pritchard, 1987; Ledger, 2010). The strength of tribal pattern is hereby not restricted to the countryside and may also diffuse into urban and industrialised areas where trade unions traditionally have their strongholds. This may happen due to a top-down trajectory in which the regime culturally encourages the favouritism of family bonds, and also due to migration from rural areas into cities whereby individuals preserve their bonds to the village or family (Kassalov, 1963, p.28). Also the economic structure may play a role, as despite some tensions between bosses and employees, especially in the private and informal sector workers are more likely to remain loyal to their employer than to class-based organisations consisting of their colleagues (Bayat, 2002, p.7). Rent income and the self-dependence of many individuals, often inside the informal sector, also blurred class lines and decreased the likelihood of class consciousness (Farsoun, 1998, p.15).

Although in many Arab states lineage pattern can indeed be regarded as the "invisible skeleton of the community" (Bill and Springborg, 2000, p.73), the impact of the geographical situation, colonisation history, industrialisation, and other historical idiosyncrasies have altered and influenced the power, degree and nature of tribalism in the states of the sample. The classification of Arab states by Harik (1990) is a useful categorisation to start, distinguish the cases, and determine the dichotomisation of the variable TRI.

5.4.2   Tribalism and Worker's Solidarity

The basic reasoning behind the inclusion of the variable TRI is the assumption that a high degree of Tribalism - which might be part of, or be explicitly protected by the institutional equilibrium - cross cuts and eventually ousts a mutual feeling of solidarity among workers of a workplace or branch. The presumption is thus that a positive variable TRI led to weak or passive trade unions during the critical juncture (Outcome = 0).

According to a possible reading, the feeling of solidarity, in a Marxian reading labelled *class consciousness* would lead to the perception among the workers that it was more preferable to organise their fellow workmates to achieve socio-economic or political aims rather than relying on other ontologic-ideological or primordial forms of organisation.In Middle East and North Africa, many family, tribal, ethnic, and religious groups have been composed of individuals who represent two or more classes, often producing conflicts of interest between workplace organisation and kinship, or facilitating what Marx calls a "false consciousness". A comparably increased permeability of class lines due to prevailing family bonds in the MENA region is a widely observed outcome of

this group-class tension (Bill, 1972, 431)[7], making the concept of class less useful for analysis of MENA countries.

5.5　Bargaining Power in Key Sectors (KEYS)

The variable KEYS measures the relative strength of trade bargaining power of trade unions in economic sectors that are of importance for state income. As will be argued, this variable bears advantages vis-á-vis classical figures used in OECD countries such as urbanisation, industrialisation, or union density. The definition of the variable KEYS is:

> *If trade union organisations have since the 1990s successfully struggled for enhancements of their salaries or working condition in key sectors of the economy, the variable KEYS is set to (1). If there have not been such attempts, or if struggles of workers were successfully repressed by the state, the variable KEYS is set to (0).*

5.5.1　Industrialisation and Union Density in OECD Countries

A widespread argument about the strength of trade unions is connected to the degree of urbanisation and industrialisation. It starts from the claim that the necessary condition for trade unionism would be the buying and selling of labour power on a significant scale, and particularly industrialisation would be characterised by this economic pattern (Allen, 1969). Tracing the evolution of European trade unions, indeed, and somewhat obvious, the more labourers left the agricultural sector and found employment in the industrial sector, the more grew the strength of organised labour - as for instance Crouch (1993) has convincingly shown. With the development of service-based societies at the expense of the industrial sector, union density and power declined, as service industries are alleged to be difficult to organize (Griffin et al., 1980, p.179-180). Indeed, in Europe, a change from large-scale blue collar workplaces to more atomised and dispersed high-skilled working places diminished the power base of unions, as white-collar workers and highly skilled individuals are supposed to have lower attachment to the labour force (Schnabel, 2013; Ebbinghaus et al., 2011, p.260). Consequently, studies have found that a shift in employment from manufacturing (the traditional union stronghold) to the service sector lowered union density (Schnabel, 2013; Blaschke, 2000, p.258).

This form of *de-industrialisation* was enforced by the combination of higher outputs of

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[7]The weakening of the solidarity between workers, however, is something that cannot only be applied to MENA countries, also in western societies a "disaggregation of the working class" (Hyman, 1992) could be witnessed, and some wondered if democracy and solidarity may have become "incompatible" (Streeck, 1988).

the service sector and lower productivity at the same time, leading to a higher capability of absorbing the labour force (Rowthorn and Ramaswamy, 1997). Additionally to that technology driven de-industrialisation, the industries in Europe got under pressure by trade liberalisation, and labour was the first factor to be replaced in order to maintain competitiveness, leading to trade driven de-industrialisation (Alderson, 1999; Lee, 2005). In a unique research about industrialisation, union density, and collective action, for the 16 OECD countries of his sample Lee (2005, p.81) clearly states:

> employment in the industrial sector is the most consistent and the strongest determinant for unionisation trends, regardless of any introduction of economic, political, international variables and any change of the estimation strategies between OLS and GLS variants.

This observation goes hand in hand with the views of other scholars stating that membership is the most important indicator of the capacity for collective action of workers (Shorter and Tilly, 1974; Korpi, 1983; Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000, p.59).

5.5.2 The Problematic of Union Density and Industrialisation in MENA Countries

The connection between industrialisation, union density, and capacity to act in the political arena can also be found in the assessment of the weakness of Yemeni trade unions of Al-Sama'i (2019*c*). Nonetheless, trade union density is helpful to a limited extent only when asking the question of willingness or even success of attempted change of the institutional equilibrium:

First, the membership numbers of MENA trade unions are prone to manipulations, especially concerning unions that are close to the system. As state resources are often distributed according to membership numbers, and the state is mostly in charge of checking the accuracy of the reported statistics, the regime has incentives to confirm membership numbers of allied unions that go beyond their real amount of members.

Second, membership numbers are no indicator for willingness to change the structures of power, as in many countries and branches of the MENA region trade union membership is - if not compulsory - highly recommended for workers who do not want to attract attention of the security forces. Also social insurance is often administered by trade unions like in the cases of Syria or Egypt, and this kind of "Ghent System" boosts the union membership - as can be also observed in European countries like Belgium, Sweden, or Denmark (Western, 1997; Frege and Kelly, 2003; Schnabel, 2013, p.265). Third, political transformation as such is not necessarily tied to union density: The cases of "redemocratisation" in Latin America and East Asia show, by world standards, medium to low levels of union density, oscillating about 15-20 per cent (Valenzuela,

1992, p.453).

Also low union organisation rates do not necessarily indicate a lack of collective action. This also holds true for MENA, where many unions traditionally followed a protectionist, almost reactionary course. Especially countries with state-sponsored industrialization where regimes offered organised labour benefits that tied it closely to the state, workers were sensitive to the withdrawal of state support (Langohr, 2014, p.188). Unions in Algeria or Egypt entered confrontations with the regime about privatisation and trade liberalisation, and the judgement of The World Bank (2004, p.150) shows that this resistance played a role despite low membership rates:

> Unionised workers in MENA have often hijacked the public debate and impeded labour market reforms despite their declining share in the labor force and the political control governments subject them to. Resistance to reform not only has slowed progress in privatizing public enterprises, where labor retrenchment is a concern, but also has delayed bringing the legal code into alignment with current practices in labor markets, such as the use of temporary contracts. [...] As a result of all these factors, labor market reforms have been absent from the policy agenda in MENA for much of the past decade.

The question remains why unions, even when their membership numbers decline or are low from the beginning, have the power to influence state decisions. A promising approach seems to be the search for the existence of strong trade union activity in key sectors of the economy. Measuring union strength by that way takes the possible leverage into account that trade unions do have in fact vis-á-vis the state. This variable resorts to the term *trade union militancy*, defined by to Bacon and Blyton (2002) as strong union workplace activity and great engagement with management in solving operational problems and long-term business strategies. Also incidents of union-led strikes and successful negotiations about working conditions and wages between 2000 and 2010 need to be taken into account.

The degree of overall industrialisation is also not necessarily the key indicator, as small industries like oil and gas production often contribute significantly to the state revenues. Combined with a low diversification of the economy, rentier states (Beblawi and Luciani, 1987) are often highly dependent from the export of a few goods only. Militant trade unions in these key sectors, thus, have a disproportionately high potential of influencing state decisions[8].

Another sector in which unions may have a great bargaining power are connected to infrastructure and especially to the public goods that are necessary to uphold the authoritarian bargain. And as the state sector is an important employer in MENA countries, also trade unions in the public sector may be influential opponents of the

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[8]Much of the literature argues that in countries of rentier state pattern and especially in the gulf monarchies the regimes impede and suppress union activity by bans on strike and on unions (Cammett and Pripstein-Posusney, 2010; Crystal, 2007). While this is true for several oil exporting rentier states of the gulf, there is no evidence for such a pattern in the 12-country sample I use, as the strong unions in the oil and petrochemical sectors of Kuwait, the unions in the Aluminium sector in Bahrain, and the oil unions in Oman indicate. Only Libya may display such pattern of union suppression.

regime. Strikes in public transport, garbage disposal, public administration, schools, electricity and water, or among maintenance workers may - if well organised - also have a significant impact on the state. The authoritarian bargain requires the state to provide public goods and welfare, and a lack or retardation may chip away the state's legitimation.

5.5.3 Handling and Measurement of the Variable KEYS

To classify the cases according to the definition of the variable KEYS as given above, first key sectors have to be determined, and second, incidents have to be found that justify the coding of the variable as (1) or (0). Information about the key sectors is taken from the CIA Factobook of 2010, the Economic Complexity Rankings (ECI)[9], OECD and World Bank statistics, and additional sources which are explicitly mentioned in the running text.

To assess the bargaining power of trade unions in these sectors, first it has to be determined if unions were existent in this sectors at all. For the sample of the 12 countries, indeed, key sectors were - at least formally - present in these neuralgic points of the economy. Second, reports of successful - or unsuccessful - strikes and labour disputes will be taken into account. The important qualitative indicator is the degree to which unions where able to push their demands vis-á-vis the state and / or employers.

The weakness in key sectors can also be a symptom of an overall weakness of the trade unions or trade union federations on the macro level. A reasonable proxy is therefore the success of trade unions and federations in tripatite negotiations about economic policies and features like the minimum wage. If the position on the macro level is weak, and the unions are sidelined in these negotiations, a weak bargaining position can be assumed which may also derive from the weakness in key sectors. This claim, of course, has to be justified qualitatively case by case.

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[9]The Economic Complexity Index (ECI), published by the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) of the Media Lab of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), measures the relative knowledge intensity of an economy by considering the knowledge intensity of the products it exports. For more information see (Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2019)

Chapter 6

Stock-Taking: Labour Unions during the Uprisings 2010 - 2012

The roles, reactions, and embedding of labour unions during the Arab uprisings differ greatly from country to country. To make a reasonable determination of the outcome (1) and (0) for each case every country will be put under scrutiny. The form, parts, and content of the case studies is not entirely fixed, however, they follow a particular structure.

First, the kind of the institutional equilibrium is introduced and described, including the most important institutions, mechanisms, and discourses that form important pillars of the equilibrium. They are outlined with the help of a historical analysis of the country that describes the genesis, former junctures, and state strategies the country has experienced since independence. Furthermore, a brief review of constitutions, electoral laws, or other legal documents of concern is included in order to give an understanding of the institutional shielding that was set up in the course of the hybridisation of the systems. This first part also determines the dichotomisation of the variable TRI for the case under scrutiny.

A second part introduces the genesis and history of the trade union movement of the country. The part describes the role of the movement during the struggle of the countries against colonial powers, state-trade union relationships after independence, and the background of how, why, and when unions were legalised. By introducing the legal framework for trade union activity as well as the emergence of the most important union federation(s), the dichotomisation of the variable CEN is determined. This part also shows the history of labour unrest in the country and how trade unions reacted to the hybridisation of the system and hence determines the dichotomisation for the variable KEYS and INOPP.

A third part gives an overview about the critical juncture, the main interference factors, and the role trade unions played during the events. By giving an overview of the socio-economic situation in 2010, and the perception and demands of the protesters, the dichotomisation of the variable SOEC is determined. This last part eventually also

	SOEC	INTEROPP	CEN	TRI	KEYS	Outcome	Dec-Nr.
Mauritania	0	0	0	1	0	**0**	(2)
Morocco	0	0	0	1	1	**0**	(3)
Algeria	0	0	1	0	1	**0**	(5)
Syria	0	0	1	1	0	**0**	(6)
Oman	1	0	1	1	0	**0**	(22)
Yemen	1	0	1	1	0	**0**	(22)
Libya	1	0	1	1	0	**0**	(22)
Tunisia	1	0	1	0	0	**1**	(20)
Bahrain	0	1	1	1	0	**1**	(14)
Kuwait	0	1	1	1	1	**1**	(15)
Egypt	1	0	1	0	1	**1**	(21)
Jordan	1	1	1	1	0	**1**	(30)

Table 6.1: Truth Table Showing the Eventual Determinations of the Outcomes and Variables of the Study

gives evidences and reasoning for the dichotomisation of the very outcome that is used during the minimisation process for the case.

Each case study begins with the introduction of the truth table row and a brief summary of the findings. The complete truth table

In order to determine a reasonable sequence of the case studies, a *chain of comparison* is used which is based on a distance matrix. A distance matrix shows the number of variables that are different between two countries. The use of the chain of comparison and, in particular, the use of the distance matrix is different from the use of a distance matrix as introduced, for instance, by Berg-Schlosser (2012, chapter 7). It is not the aim of this section to give explanations for the outcomes (1) and (0) by putting them directly into relation with the variables. This is done at length in chapter 7 of this study. The current chapter focusses on a reasonable and comprehensive delimitation of the variables and justifies their coding as (1) or (0). The step is of importance as all five variables are qualitative, and the chosen threshold for the variables of each case is vulnerable and can easily be attacked by critics if it is not well justified. By using the chain of comparison, the dichotomisations can explicitly and implicitly be made transparent and a clarifying light is shed on grey zones. The chain of comparison does not follow a "most similar system - different outcome" or "most different system - similar outcome" design, but rather attempts to maximise the amount of different variables among two consecutive cases. Based on the distance matrix (see A.4), the following sequence for the chain of comparison has been chosen:

Table 6.2: Chain of comparison with number and kind of differing variables

Case	Direction	Case	Different Variables	Differing Variables
Libya	→	Algeria	3	SOEC, TRI, KEYS
↳	←	↵		
Algeria	→	Jordan	4	SOEC, INOPP, TRI, KEYS
↳	←	↵		
Jordan	→	Morocco	4	SOEC, INOPP, CEN, KEYS
↳	←	↵		
Morocco	→	Tunisia	4	SOEC, CEN, TRI, KEYS
↳	←	↵		
Tunisia	→	Kuwait	4	SOEC, INOPP, TRI, KEYS
↳	←	↵		
Kuwait	→	Oman	3	SOEC, INOPP, KEYS
↳	←	↵		
Oman	→	Mauritania	2	SOEC, CEN
↳	←	↵		
Mauritania	→	Yemen	2	SOEC, CEN
↳	←	↵		
Yemen	→	Bahrain	2	SOEC, INOPP
↳	←	↵		
Bahrain	→	Egypt	4	SOEC, INOPP, TRI, KEYS
↳	←	↵		
Egypt	→	Syria	3	INOPP, CEN
↳	←	↵		
Syria	→	Libya	1	SOEC

The chain of comparison is a guideline that encourages to compare the current case study with the preceding case. If there are particular features that would become clear more strikingly when compared to another case of the sample, also these cases are used. The results form the basis for the minimisations in chapter 7.

6.1 Libya (0)

Libya is a sparsely populated country that is often divided into the three provinces of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fessan. These provinces roughly mirror but also often cross-cut tribal influence zones. Tribes were of utmost importance under the rule of Gaddafi although the political System of the Jamihiriya derives from genuinely republican ideas. The protests of 2011 escalated quickly and turned into a long-lasting civil war. Trade unionism was dominated by the state and almost no civil society organisations were allowed to exist outside the framework of the Jamihiriya. Consequently, reform oriented union activity during the critical juncture was absent. The truth table row reads as follows:

SOEC	INOPP	CEN	TRI	KEYS	**Outcome**	Decimal Code
1	0	1	1	0	**0**	LYB(22)

Table 6.3: Truth table row for the case of Libya

Given the pivotal role of tribes inside the country, on which Gaddafi was resorting as a main pillar of power for decades - as outlined in section 6.1.1 - the variable TRI is coded (1). The strict corporatist centralisation of trade unions inside the Jamhariya system before 2011, as described in part 6.1.2 leads the coding of CEN as (1). The same section also shows that the hard grip of the authorities - who did not allow any worker's dissent - diminished the official trade union bodies' bargaining power in key sectors.

Section 6.1.3 shows that, although the initial spark for the protests was the detention of a human rights activist, the socio-economic circumstances in Libya were deteriorating in the years before, nourishing the grievances that actually led to the upheavals. During the upheavals, trade unions lacked a progressive base inside the official union framework and outside; there was no connection to any of the three major opposition currents that are introduced in 6.1.3. The variable INOPP is thus coded (0).

6.1.1   The Equilibrium of the "Stateless State"

The generation of Libya's coup of 1969 redrafted the country's system from the scratch. A system of councils replaced the old monarchical bureaucracy and by embedding tribal structures into the decision making processes and into networks of distribution, Colonel Ghadaffi and his closest allies managed to maintain a more than 40 years lasting rule.

The Jamihiriya as Basic Structure of the System

Inspired by Arab Nationalism and in admiration of Gamal 'Abd-Al-Nasr, who had managed to implement his vision of an Arab republic in an internationally widely observed and often acclaimed manner in neighbouring Egypt, a group of young officers ousted Libya's King Idriss in 1969 in a bloodless coup. The legitimacy of the Kingdom, based genuinely on the history of the Sanussi Sufi Brotherhood and the Sanussi royal house, turned into ramshackle already throughout the 1960s due to the rapid and asymmetric oil-driven modernisation in a conservative and tribal society. Questions of distribution and corruption as well as little support outside its popular base in the eastern province of Cyrenaica became the pitfalls of the Kingdom (Vandewalle, 2012, p.76). The new rulers struggled to find a new sustainable system that would meet the

concerns of the educated urban strata, the diverse tribal federations, and the Islamic 'Ulama who had mostly been associated with the Sanussi Monarchy.

The unity of the three former Ottoman provinces Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fessan was maintained. Facing a surprising political apathy for politics on the national macro-level among most of Libya's population, especially in rural, tribally controlled areas, the idea of countrywide elections was dropped and a system of councils was implemented. Mass mobilisation from the grass-root level became a pivotal element of the logic of the new system. In 1971, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) was implemented as a vanguard unity party to mobilize the masses for political participation and to help to consolidate the revolution (Vandewalle, 2012, p.82). After some years, the degree of mobilisation appeared unsatisfactory to the revolutionaries. In 1973, the charismatic primus inter pares within the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), the 30 year old then Colonel Mu'ammar Al-Ghadaffi, came up with an entirely new system and ideology. Following Ghadaffi's "Green Book" of 1975 and its socio-political implications, Libya became a sui-generis system of governance by the masses. Its author chose the unique name of *Jamahiriya* in contrast to the Arab name for Republic *Jumhuriya* to stress the difference. The basic idea was to abolish all intermediate institutions between state and society and which targeted hierarchical bureaucratic structures inherent in modern states and especially political associations and parties.

In 1977, the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya was proclaimed. The system was promoted as a republic based on local popular councils and communes on the very basic local level named Basic People's Congresses. These congresses each elected a working committee which, again, form popular congresses for each district. The upper, say, national level committee was called General People's Congress *Libya* (GPC), and resembled an oversized national parliament of 2,700 representatives from the Basic People's Congresses. Subsequently, the latter chose the General People's Committee, being the equivalent of a Cabinet. Hence, a separation of power was theoretically implied, whereas the General People's Committee represents the executive branch and the General People's Congress represents its legislative counterpart (Paoletti, 2011, p.317). Additionally, basic popular congresses also elected administrative people's committees to replace government administration on every level of the system. However, the factual competences of these bodies were severely limited. Secretaries, say, ministers were proposed and appointed by the regime, and key functions and fields of parliamentary autonomy such as foreign policy, discretionary power regarding the army and the police, as well as the country's budget, and the petroleum sector could not be influenced by the GPC. Additionally, this Jamahiriya body was complemented by the so-called revolutionary body since 1979 which had a similar structure and consisted, analogously, of revolutionary committees that were already introduced in 1977. The members of the revolutionary committees who were recruited from offices, schools, businesses, and the armed forces, were more loyal to Ghadaffi and his rhetoric, and served as watchdogs

and corrective of the Jamahiriya bodies.

In the course of the system adoption, the RCC was formally abolished, the ASU dissolved and its structures and members were absorbed into the two Jamahiriya bodies. Ghadaffi himself and loyalists from the coup retained crucial positions – Ghadaffi and Abu-Bakr Yunis Jabr remained heads of the Libyan army, Khuwaylidi al-Hamidi remained commander of the police, and Mustafa al-Kharubi its chief of staff (Vandewalle, 2012, p.104). By 1980, the system transformation was completed, producing a system that would last until the uprising of 2011.

Tribalism as Backbone of the System

The structure of the state of masses was only one of the overlapping power structures that secured Ghadaffi's rule. Close family members of Ghadaffi, his inner circle of loyalists, and the tribal system also played pivotal roles (Paoletti, 2011, p.315-318).[1] As he stated himself on a few occasions, Ghadaffi regarded himself as the nominal "supreme guide" of the entire population which he considered to be a large clan itself (Barany, 2011, p.29). Tribal traditions have also received particular attention in the Green Book, stating that to an individual, the family is more important than the state (p.101), with many of the book's ideas reflecting a tribal ethos by their insistence on egalitarianism and lack of hierarchy (Vandewalle, 2012, p.102). Consequently, tribal leaders played a key role on the local level by resolving local conflicts, influencing the People's Congresses and Committees, and even implementing socio-economic development plans. From 1993 onwards, they were regarded officially as the natural leaders of the local system, serving on a three-year rotational basis in many organs of the system (Tarkowski-Tempelhof and Omar, 2012; Paoletti, 2011, p.9).

Libya's largest tribe, the Warfalla, were represented prominently in the higher echelons of power, together with Ghadaffi's own tribe, the Ghadaffa, and the tribe he married into, the second largest tribe of Maghrara. The Warfalla, a federation of about 50 sub-tribes, especially dominated the revolutionary councils. These tribes also formed militias which the regime's physical power relied upon (Brahimi, 2011, p.614). The Army, in contrast, lost influence as a decisive institution inside the country and underwent cutbacks and personal reshuffling in order to prevent a possible move against the regime. During Ghadaffi's rule, he experienced four attempts of his fellow Army officers to remove him from power, which can be regarded as a main reason for his mistrust (Barany, 2011, p.30). The coup attempt in 1993, which was led by branches of the Warfalla inside the army, showed the cracks in loyalty and caused a change of attitude and strategy of Ghadaffi. Aware of the pivotal roles of the tribes, he resorted to sheer violence when he demanded a statement of oath of allegiance of all tribes to

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[1]Ghadiaffi's children Mu'tasim and, to a much lesser extent, Khamis were influential figures inside the security apparatus, whilst Aisha and Saif enjoyed the privilege to run civil society organisations outside the Jamhariya bodies (Sadiki, 2012, p.301).

assure their acceptance of his rule, threatening consequences which embraced torture, incarceration, and execution (Sadiki, 2012, p.302).

The distribution of influence opportunities of the tribes on the national level was rather asymmetric. The Warfalla dwell mainly in the region of Tripolitania and along the coast region from the capital Tripoli to Benghazi, while the Maghrara derive mainly from the province Fessan in the south-west. Consequently, the numerous and heterogeneous tribes and tribe associations of the country's east often felt discriminated. Also vast parts of the Tuareg, located at the Algerian border, and the Tebu from the south-east resented the regime. This was particularly due to the top-down appointment of local rulers who were often Arabs, a resulting lack of upward mobility, and suppression of their language and culture (Tarkowski-Tempelhof and Omar, 2012, p.9). This socio-cultural landscape packed with inherent break points and characterised by suppressed frustration turned out to be a tinderbox when the first protests broke out in 2011.

A Marginalised Political Opposition

Organised opposition in Libya was scarce. In 1981, the National Front for the Salvation *Libya* (NFSL) was founded with the aim of overthrowing the regime and invoking nostalgia of the Sanussi rule. Unlike other emerging opposition groups in the MENA region at the same time, the inclination of the NFSL can be assessed as rather moderate, as it criticised Ghadaffi for being un-islamic, yet often demanded liberal rights. The group had already set up an entire plan for a post-Ghadaffi era in the 1980s, comprising a road to democracy that included constitution drafting bodies, free elections, and a parliamentary system (Deeb, 1994, p.192-196). On May 8 1984, National Front commandos failed in a daring assault on Gaddafi's headquarters at the Bab al-Aziziya barracks near Tripoli, attempting to assassinate the Libyan leader. The incident fuelled Ghadaffi's wrath on Islamists. Libya has not witnessed a successful and visible militant Islamic opposition movement like Al-Nahda in Tunisia, the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya in Egypt, or the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria or Jordan. Deeb (1994) identifies four reasons. First, the Islamic legacy of the Sanusiyya in pre-Ghadaffi Libya which had always been a rather peaceful and reformist current, even discarding the predominant Maliki School of law and the advice of its scholars. Second, the highly fragmented tribal society in Libya that is balanced in a vertical and horizontal manner. Third, the equal character of the country combined with the absence of abject poverty, bridging the gap between social classes by eliminating economic differences but paradoxically at the same time reaffirming the differences in social status. Fourth, the careful domestication and co-option of religious rhetoric and symbols into the state. This was a major difference to the more straightforwardly secular systems of Egypt or Syria. The attempt to merge Libya and Egypt in 1972-73 failed, inter alia, because the Libyan negotiators insisted on adhering to the Shari'a as the source of all

legislation in the projected new state. Consequently, there was barely any breeding ground for welfare oriented Islamism. The oil revenues did not cause much inequality, due to the rentier state pattern and the rural-tribal character of the system there was only a very small middle class, and rhetoric and symbols of Islam were used already by the state.

At the same time, Islamic radicalism was rejected. Ghadaffi advised the population to drop any attempt to join Islamic groups. He even declared in 1990 that "any person who belongs to the Muslim Brotherhood or to the militant Takfir wal-Hijra or Tabligh "is doomed and must be executed because his existence harms other[s]" (Deeb, 1994, p.196). Especially in the 1990s the regime had to deal with returnees from the Afghanistan War who formed the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Its aim was to replace the regime with what they considered to be an Islamic State. The group launched a series of guerilla attacks in Cyrenaica that made the regime conduct military operations for the first time since 1969 (Martinez, 2006, p.157-158). Resorting to an international network of radical Islamists but not having a stable base inside the country, the LIFG was defeated by 1998. In the late 2000s, Ghadaffi's son worked on reconciliation with the Islamists groups. Muslim Brothers and former LIFG were freed from prison and some even included into his project 'Libya in 2025' (Sadiki, 2012, p.305).

6.1.2 Trade Unionism: From Fragmentation to Discrimination

Starting from the 1920s and benefiting from geographical proximity to Europe, a civil society emerged and bloomed until the 1950s in Libya (Al-Sharif, 2010, p.53–95). Also workplace organisation and trade unions formed part of civil society - and broke up soon along political lines due to a lack of effective political parties (Schnabel, 2005, p.201). By 1969, three major union federations dominated the trade union's landscape. The Professional Worker's Federation *Libya* (PWF) and the National Federation of Trade Unions *Libya* (NFTU) were located in Tripoli and close to the Monarchy (Giavanis, 1984, p.140). The Nasserist Federation of Libyan Trade Unions (FLTU) had its headquarters in Benghazi, basically played the role of an opposition party in the country's system, and consisted of many workers from the oil sector, ports and seafaring, and the tobacco industry. After the six day war, students joined forces in 1967 with protesting trade unionists' actions, and oil and dock workers went on strike. The regime answered with repression and mass trials, announced having discovered a conspiracy inside the FLTU, and eventually managed to purge the unions' leadership from its militant elements (Schnabel, 2005; First, 1975, p.201).

Gadaffi's coup of 1969 promised to change the role of unions at first glance. The leader of the FLTU, Suleiman Maghrabi, who had resisted the Italian occupation and

the Monarchy for a long time, and who had organised the oil workers strike in 1967, became Libya's first Prime minister after the in the same year (First, 1975, p.85). However, active and politicised trade unions did not match with the ideas of the "leader of the revolution" that he would develop and present in the next years. Ghadaffi had uttered, despite his populist rhetoric, severe concern about wildcat self-determination of the people. According to him, mass organisations represented the direct will of the people, and as civil society organisations would express particular interests, they were against the new doctrine. Hence, all civil society organisations operated under the early established law No.111 of 1970 as heavily restricted "civil groups" (*Djam'aat Ahliya)* until 2001, when the law was replaced by a similar draft. Law 111 (1970) allowed civil society organisations only under the umbrella of the Jamahariya body and banned all hitherto existing civil society organisations, including independent trade unions. Law No. 17 of 1972 even stipulated death penalty for everyone who would seek to form a banned party, grouping, or organisation or support such endeavours without confirmation of the councils.

In the same year, Ghadaffi also addressed the labour movement in a straightforward manner. He announced that labourers and the revolution would be an indivisible entity, so there should be no labour unions which could exploit their positions and outplay the revolution and the working forces against each other. Consequently, old union organisations, no matter if they had earned some reputation by fighting for independence, against the Monarchy, or struggled with American oil companies, were replaced by a new union structure built in 1972 from the scratch. Similarly to Jordan, however, more rigorously, the framework was set up under the auspices of the Ministry of Labour and union officials were proposed by the Ministry and elections were closely supervised (First, 1975, p.124;129). The membership in this General Trade Union Federation of Workers Libya (GTUFW) was automatic (except for foreign workers), although workers had the right to opt out. Law No. 9 of 1985 and law No. 23 of 1998 were the basis for more detailed regulations on how municipal governments regulate and inspect the activities of trade unions, still only allowing for a single union in each branch and region.

The newly established institutions were kept free from regime critics and widespreadly depoliticised. When Ghadaffi was asked about the relationship of the ASU and the unions, he clearly stated (First, 1975, p.131):

> The trade unions have nothing to do with politics - at no time and at no place. [...] It must be clear that trade unions and federations are professional organizations which tackle the problems of their members. Politics must be confined to the ASU. It is impermissible to conduct politics outside the ASU in any union or profession. Otherwise, trade unions and federations would turn into political parties.

Consequently, independent trade union activities on the grass-root level did not appear. Even when the Port Worker's Union began to organise in a clandestine way

between 2005 and 2006[2], such organisations were nearly impossible to be set up - on the one hand because of the institutional legal framework but also, on the other hand, because of the tribally dominated local Jamahirya councils that would not allow for competition. In 2007 a new law on trade unions was issued, and the GTUFW claimed to have become more independent of the regime. The International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), however, doubted that real progress had been made, pointing at the lack of freedom of association, the restricted collective bargaining framework, and the de-facto ban on strikes. Dissimilar to the cases of Jordan or Egypt, where the middle class or welfare oriented leaders were able or willing to establish significant white collar associations, the representation of worker's demands vis-á-vis the state could be handled in Libya by addressing the official trade union bodies or the bodies of the Jamihiriya only.

Despite the appearance of very small clandestine groups, there was, consequently, no independent trade union action before 2011, nor and militancy or bargaining power in any key sectors. Libya is the country of the sample that is most dependent on natural resources with more than 90 per cent of its exports consisting of crude petroleum, petroleum gas, refined petroleum, scrap Copper, and scrap iron. The 104th rank (2013 - 2017) in the Economic Complexity Index of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (ECI) ranking hints at a low diversification of the economy and, indeed, Libya met all conditions of a classical rentier state. It was estimated that less than 30 per cent of the population participate in the labour market at all (Schnabel, 2005, p.201). In the atmosphere of harsh repression of trade union organisations as described above, no collective action has been reported for many decades, neither in the key sectors nor in any other sector. The case of Libya is clearly coded KEYS = (0).

6.1.3 2011: The Quick Escalation from Protest to Revolution

Directly neighbouring Algeria and Tunisia, where the earliest protests of 2011 took place, the pictures of the events also fuelled demonstrations in the Ghadafi-led country. The initial spark was ignited on February 15 2011, when human rights activist and lawyer Fathil Terbil, one of the most prominent activists in favour of the families of victims of the Abu Salim prison incident in 1996,[3] was arrested in Benghazi. A crowd gathered peacefully outside the police station to demand his release and security forces opened fire. Watching the events in the neighbouring countries of Tunisia

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[2]Taken from an interview with Union Générale des Travailleurs Libyens (UGTL) chairwomen Nermin Al-Sharif on Libya al-Hadath TV in the news show Akhbar Al-Bilad on September 27 2016, see (Al-Bilad, 2016)

[3]Many of the LIFG fighters that were captured in the early 1990s were brought to the Abu Salim prison. Due to the poor conditions of detention, prisoners started a revolt on June 28 1996, in which one guard was killed. As a result, the security forces, on the orders of the then intelligence chief Abdullah as-Sanusi, perpetrated a massacre of the inmates, mainly from Benghazi. Human rights organisations estimate that about 1200 prisoners died.

and Egypt carefully, the armed forces had received an order to show "zero tolerance" towards demonstrations during that sensitive period of time. In response, the NCLO[4], several Facebook and websites, and according to some sources also the NFSL (Dahn, 2011) called for a "Day of Rage" on February 17. Mass protests broke out in Tripoli, Benghazi, Ajdabiya, Derna, Zintan, and Bayda and were met with extreme violence by the security forces. The day caused 24 deaths countrywide and dozens of wounded. Let alone in Al-Baida, where Snipers shot from the rooftops, 13 deaths were counted. The regime had warned the population to join the protests in online announcements. Gadaffi himself joined several hundred supporters who gathered in Tripoli to counter calls for anti-government protests.

After these events, the militarization of the conflict took place at a surprisingly quick pace. Only ten days later, demonstrators were equipped with stun grenades for fishing and bulldozers abandoned by international oil companies, as well as light and heavy weaponry they received by defectors of the army (Brahimi, 2011, p.606). Radical chants like "People want the end of the regime" or "No God but Allah, Muammar is the enemy of Allah" emerged as early as in the first days (Al-Jazeera Online, 2011), and after the harsh reaction of the security forces, people did not resort to peaceful protests over several months. Against that background, the domestication and weakness of the armed forces during the rule of Ghadaffi turned to be a boomerang in the sense that the apparatus lacked the capacity for collective action and reaction to the threat of the regime (Haddad et al., 2012, p.137). Consequently, in the city of Benghazi, protesters were able to overwhelm both police and army forces only 24 hours after the Day of Rage. Additionally, experienced military leaders like Chalifa Haftar, leading figure of the NFSL, returned quickly from their exile to take over the military campaigns.

The outbreak of the upheavals was fuelled by grievances under the surface about the deterioration of living standards in the years before 2011. As Brahimi (2011, p.606) summarises comprehensively, its initial roots were

> ...soaring food prices, housing shortages, high unemployment, a rapidly growing population coupled with low rates of job creation, corrupt and ossified administrations, brutal security services, the systematic denial of political and civic rights, and autocratic rulers who had clung to power for decades and were looking to pass it down to their progeny.

The socio-economic aspect of this statement can be supported with economic key data in comparison with other countries of the sample. The unemployment rate of 17.6 per cent in 2010 is the highest in the entire sample, outstripping Yemen by about 5 per cent. The instability of the economy is mirrored well in the inflation rate. While the country had a deflation until 2004, the inflation rate increased again, peaking in a hyperinflation of 10 per cent in 2008. The purchasing power of the minimum wage and the currency as such fell constantly in the late 2000s, and the index of transparency

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[4]The National Conference for the Libyan Opposition (NCLO) was formed in 2005 in exile, by a group of intellectual expatriates and activists. It was supported amongst others by the Libyan League for Human Rights and also the NFSL.

perception remained in the lower third displaying a downward drift. The rampant youth unemployment (about 40 per cent) clearly indicated the incapability of the state to fulfil its part of the authoritarian bargain. Even if the events around Fathil Terbil sparked the unrest, the underlying grievances rooted in the incapability of the state to provide welfare as expected. Libya is hence coded SOEC = (1).

Competition between different Currents of the Revolution

Three major trajectories of opposition organisations emerged in the second half of February that would cooperate betimes, set up double structures, and often compete with each other. First, the *17th February Movement* encompassed a large number of online and grass-root activists, mainly consisted of young, urban, middle-class citizens of higher education, and was based in an old courtyard in Benghazi. It claimed to have several civil society organisations under its umbrella and held ties to the Date-Movements in Tunis and Algiers. Second, local councils emerged soon after February 17, especially in the east of the country, adapting the structure of - and often building upon - the Basic People's Congress council system of the Jamhiriya (Tarkowski-Tempelhof and Omar, 2012, p.4.). As family and kinship often live together or close in a particular neighbourhood, tribal networks played a significant role inside these committees. Third, the Transitional National Council *Libya* (TNC) was founded on February 27 by a number of prominent figures from inside the country and nationals living and working abroad.

Different from Jordan, the different currents faced severe difficulties to cooperate. The cooperation between the 17th February Movement and the TNC was, at best, bumpy. The movement, radical in its will to overcome the old regime, was suspicious of the manning of the exile council. They feared the re-emergence of the old Ghadaffi-networks due to the high number of regime defectors inside the TNC. The role of the most prominent defector, General Younis, was criticised as in-transparent, as well as the role of his tribe, the Al-Obeid, which became more prominent inside the TNC (Tarkowski-Tempelhof and Omar, 2012, p.3-4). The youth movement also mistrusted in the same vein the representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood, which - being heavily marginalised inside Libya's political landscape - had in the past already signalled eagerness to cooperate with the old regime. But the TNC also earned mistrust from many local councils and local militia leaders on the ground. On the one hand, it was accused of encompassing too many Benghazi representatives, and having a bias towards two key families, the Bogaigis and the Garianis, while western provinces seemed under-represented. On the other hand, it was accused of harbouring too many (western) liberals - often exiles who would not understand the domestic dynamics on the local levels of the country. Consequently, the council would neither represent the traditionalistic-Islamic character of the country, nor its tribal balance of power (Dawisha, 2013, 156-157).

The local councils that were built in the course of the struggle against the old regime

were a base for tribal coordination and action. The mistrust and dissatisfaction with the regime that had already led to the coup of 1993, together with desires for revenge made many tribes withdrew their support for the Ghadaffi regime. Foremost, the Zawiya in the West withdraw allegiance to the regime, weakening severely Ghadaffi's power-house, and also in the East, the Misurata were amongst the first to revolt against state authorities and would be followed by many others when the rebellion gained momentum. As, especially, many of the western tribes formed part of the security forces, these steps accelerated the disintegration of the Army.

The military operations were rather uncoordinated. Every militia, although meant to coordinate with the TNC, pursued their own interests. As a common ground served a blurred opposition narrative that advocated for a return to the pre-Ghaddafi state, invoking anti colonial figures like Omar Mukhtar, as well as resorting to the previous Libyan flag of 1949-1969. (Tarkowski-Tempelhof and Omar, 2012, p.2-3). Beyond these symbols, the internal divisions remained and already caused clashes that would eventually lead to civil war. The bonding with the TNC became an option for the different tribes after it became clear that they would channel the international supply of weapons and medical equipment.

During the protests against the government in 2011 and the following militarisation, union structures did not play a role in mobilising or even uttering constructive workers' demands to influence the new institutional equilibrium. Unsurprisingly, the GTUFW's leadership not only did not participate in the uprisings of 2011 - on the contrary: The GTUFW together with the Syrian General Federation of Trade Unions (GFTU) called on other trade unions to help stop NATO's military intervention against Libya (Schmidinger, 2013, p.46). The QCA code for Libya is therefore (0).

6.2 Algeria (0)

Although a loose alliance of civil society organisations attempted to reform the political system during the protests 2011, the demands of trade unions were restricted to socio-economic enhancements. Those unions, that joined the alliance, withdrew after they received fiscal concessions or managed to better their position inside the system of (re)distribution of resources. None of the main pillars of the institutional equilibrium as will be described in section 6.2.1 were openly attacked, and also the role of the national federation Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens (UGTA) was not questioned to the extent witnessed in Jordan or Egypt. Professional associations, although comprising regime critics who were especially critical about the role of the military, did not take the decisive steps to push for reforms. The Outcome for the case of Algeria is therefore coded (0). The truth table row reads as follows:

SOEC	INOPP	CEN	TRI	KEYS	**Outcome**	Decimal
0	0	1	0	1	**1**	ALG(5)

Table 6.4: Truth table row for the case of Algeria

The variable INOPP is coded (0), as no broader alliance between trade unions and political opposition parties emerged. Furthermore, tribal and family bonds, as will be described in section 6.2.1 did not play a pivotal role in the system, especially compared to the cases of Jordan and Libya. TRI is therefore coded (0). The dominant role of the UGTA justifies the classification of the variable CEN as (1), and, as argued in part 6.2.2, and especially with regard to the other countries of the sample, the federation and its unions did still have a palpable bargaining power in neuralgic sectors of the economy and in negotiations with the state; hence KEYS is coded (1).

6.2.1 The Institutional Equilibrium as Result of the Independence War

The political system in Algeria corresponds to what Linz (2000) labels a bureaucratic and ideology-free authoritarianism. In such systems, a limited number of persons or groups of persons who mostly have made career inside the system form the linchpin of the institutional equilibrium. The individuals or groups on the top of the state were labelled "Political Elites" (Putnam, 1976), "Political Relevant Elite" (Perthes, 2004, p.5), "State Clan" (Yefsah, 1982) or "State Class" (Elsenhans, 1997; Ouaissa, 2005). In Algeria these entities benefited from a historical legitimacy that derived either from the independence war, clientelism, the capability to reward followers by the distribution of rents, or combinations of the aforementioned.

Similar to Libya, Algeria also fits into the pattern of "Rentier-States" (Beblawi and Luciani, 1987; Schwartz, 2008). The small number of military leaders and party functionaries that monopolised the key positions in state institutions for decades are dependent of the influx of rents on the one hand and the ability to maintain and invoke symbolic, legitimizing capital on the other. The elite is riddled with permanent internal struggles and pattern of constant co-optation. Exclusion of political ambitious groups create a constant flux at the margins of the circles of power (Ouaissa, 2005), made the Algerian case rather an "equilibrium of instability" that is characterized by a fragile balance between the various (potentially) destabilizing dynamics and competitors over rents (Werenfels, 2007, p.5).

In contrast to Libya, different institutions provide several possibilities of upward mobility beyond tribal affiliations. Werenfels (2007) identifies five main pillars that form

the core elite in Algeria and that act as decision-maker and veto-powers inside the corridors of power: The former single-party Front de Libération Nationale *Algeria* (FLN), the national Army, the bureaucracy, business networks inside the private and state led economy, and the national trade union federation.

Brothers in Arms: The Party and the Army

The most powerful party in Algeria, the FLN, has its roots in the struggle for independence and remained the sole legal and ruling political party before the legalisation of further parties in 1989. Established in 1954, it aimed at forming an elite party which was supposed to guide the way along a socialist development path - at least since its second congress in Tripoli in 1962, and fixed in the Charter of Algiers in 1964. It had started as clandestine and later mass mobilising movement that was neither a political party in a narrow sense nor a militia or an ordinary army (Roberts, 1983, p.117), forming thus rather a civil melting pot for the fight for independence of the country. The networks and connections it set up during that time remained the most important sources of power and influence until today, most notably the Organisation Nationale des Moudjahidine *Algeria* (ONM), the Union Nationale de la Jeunesse Algérienne (UNJA), the Union Nationale des Femmes Algériennes (UNFA), Union Nationale des Paysans Algériens (UNPA) and - already established in 1956 and one of the most powerful organisations - the trade union federation Union Nationale des Travailleurs Algériens (UGTA). These mass organisations served as channels to communicate and implement top-down policies and additionally exercised occasionally bottom-op auxiliary function to the police and the Army enlarging the latter's web of espionage (Werenfels, 2007, p.36).

The Army networks in Algeria derive from the the central role of its predecessor, the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN), the military wing of the FLN, that was organized as the country's armed forces after Algeria's' independence in 1962. The role of the Army as been powerful since, and while the regime can be classified as a mobilising party regime, it had from its very beginning a military component due to the long-lasting independence war against France. This component gained upper hand when the military commander Houari Boumedienne ousted Ahmed Ben Bella in a military coup in 1965 (Linz, 2000; Quandt, 1969, p.288). Relying on and coquetting with the role of the "spearhead *of* the revolution", as written in the constitution of 1962, and moreover the protector and "watchdog *on* the revolution" (Zartman, 1973, p.211, emphasis added) the Army became an indispensable veto-power that interfered most visibly into politics after the elections of 1992. Two years before, the single party system had collapsed paving the way for the 1989 constitution and elections in 1991. The Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut, FIS) eventually won the elections and outstripped the FLN as leading party, however, the military quickly nullified the

results. After the ban of the FIS and the persecution and incarceration of many of its members, Islamist insurgents emerged challenging the new power holders. The instability that followed spiralled into a civil war that caused 200.000 casualties and lasted until 1997. Until 2011, the prevailing power of the Army remained, making its backing to a necessary condition for a successful candidacy for president[5].

Bureaucratisation and economic Hybridisation of the System

The civil bureaucracy of Algeria had been established already during the French rule. As Algeria had the formal status of a *Département* and not a mere protectorate, a complex and potent bureaucratic apparatus was built and eventually left behind when the country gained its independence. The apparatus was particularly strong, as other forms of administration had been erased in the name of an ideology of integration, leaving the indigenous population atomized and to a great extent state-dependent (Linz, 2000, p.157). This was paticularily true for tribal self-autonomy on the intermediate and higher level of the state. Instead of fighting and condemning this French heritage as imperialistic imposition, the construct was converted relatively seamlessly into the new national bureaucracy as a part of the greatly promoted socialist project. That way, since the 1960s it became a prime space for the forming and emergence of a new technocratic elite (Zartman, 1973, p.213).

Individuals with an urban, educated, relatively wealthy and Francophone background emerged as dominant groups on the top level, while the bureaucracy also served as a melting pot for the old, mercantile and urban bourgeoisie of pre-colonial Algeria, the old tribal nobility including high military ranks and religious figures, and on the lower level the detribalized peasantry which gained upward mobility through the access to French education (Roberts, 1983, p.109). In the course of time, horizontal and vertical clientelist connections emerged and became the bargaining power of the bureaucracy inside the inner circles of power. While core elites used the bureaucracy as a tool to exert and widen influence in the provinces on the one hand, the bureaucrats set up networks with religious brotherhoods, local notables, and tribal networks on the other (Talahite, 2000). In contrast to Libya or Jordan, however, tribalism did not enter the higher echelons of power, neither as a ruling practice nor as ideology in any form. The French heritage and the socialist project produced identities and rhetoric that were rather urban, often secular, and mostly eager to stress their modernist inclination.

The hydrocarbon sector, being still the most important sector of the economy until today, was fully state-controlled by 1972. Consistent with socialist economic theory of that time, the industrial sector was favoured vis-a-vis the agricultural and service sector as it produced higher rates of growth and revenues. Like in many socialist sys-

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[5]Werenfels (2005, p.60) reports from a political analyst claiming that "without the argument that they have the army on their side, not even their wives would vote for them". Surely rhetorically exaggerated, the quote hits, however, the core of a political reality in Algeria.

tems with planned economy, the production mismatched the real demand, however, the losses could be cushioned by the high oil and gas revenues. By that way, the State Owned Enterprise(s) (SOE) became, in the long run, rather a social space than an economic one. Their function embraced foremost the exchange of favours and social accommodation inside the patron–client networks of the public administration (Liabès, 1989, p.219).

The emerging dependence on food imports and the decline of the oil prices in the late 1970s and 1980s forced the economic administration to reorient. At the beginning of the 1980s, 66 large state enterprises were split into 474 specialised units. Managerial autonomy was granted to newly-designated enterprises and the transfer of ownership to "fonds de participation" (Shareholding Funds). Privatization efforts that followed especially in the 1990s posed rather a form of transfer from state monopoly to private monopoly (Werenfels, 2007, p.49). The emerging system resembled the patrimonial capitalism which Egypt would set up about a decade later: The organisational and managerial ties between the new enterprises, the funds and the government were still intact and exploited (Dillman, 1998; Kumar, 1993, p.98), and economic reform was instrumentalised for new rent-seeking opportunities for the bureaucratic, political, military and ex-military elites (Rouadjia 1994).

6.2.2   An Inherent Part of the System: Trade Unionism

The first conference of Arab workers in 1930 already recommended the independence of Algeria ('Amr, 2013, p.24). The decision was initially contested from inside and outside the movement especially concerning the nature and pace of the independence struggle. After French repressions of trade union activities during the years of war and the incarceration of many union activists, the movement experienced an increased nationalisation concerning its rhetoric and its leading staff. As internal struggles remained, in 1956 three union federations existed: The Union de Syndicat de Travailleurs Algériens (USTA), following Messali Hadj and having an evolutionary and socialist stance, the Union General de Syndicats Algériens (UGSA) that absorbed parts of the Algerian branch of the French CDT, in which the Communist party prevailed, and the Union General des Travailleurs Algériens (UGTA) that was created on the initiative and auspices of the FLN, having a revolutionary and militant stance towards independence. The UGTA had great influx by Algerian trade unionists of the Algerian Branch of the Confédération Démocratique du Travail *France* (CDT) as well and from the French Confederation of Christian Workers, wishing to contribute to the struggle for independence of Algeria (Gobe, 2008). Due to an internal struggle of the nationalist movement between the FLN and the Messalist Mouvement National Algérien (MNA) in which the FLN emerged as winner especially during the independence war, until 1962, the USTA desintegrated and was absorbed by the UGTA.

The Interdependence between the Regime and the UGTA

The UGTA has been closely allied with the FLN until the opening of the party system in 1989, recurring on the FLNs power to help the union center to ouster competition in exchange for loyalty and support for unpopular measures. This balancing act was questioned for the first time severely during strikes in 1964/65. Eventually the FLN managed to tighten its grip on the UGTA, purging its leadership, and bringing thus the union center back on the party's course. The party was somewhat dependent on the union federation as workers rights were a pivotal part of its socialist agenda and rhetoric. At the same time, and similar to the relationship between the ETUF and the Egyptian regime, the FLN tried to keep opposition forces and regime sceptics out of the rank and files of the union federation.

The close relationship of the UGTA and the FLN, however, led to a growing alienation between the trade union center and the working class. The UGTA proved to be incapable of of handling or solving many of the strikes that took place between 1975 and 1980 in large industrial complexes in the public sector. At that time, a new generation of workers inside the expanding state enterprises, largely adhering to the consumer model, and less reluctant to strike than the generation of the independence war (Chikhi, 1982, 61-62), diffused into the lower ranks. A struggle of power between these new workers and the old cadres of the UGTA and the FLN emerged. Additionally, the Communist Party, that had dissolved the UGSA already in 1957 for the sake of union unity after the Leipzig World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) Congres 1957 (Lichtblau, 1962, p.385), and that had been banned after 1965 and reorganized in 1966 as Parti de l'Avant-Garde Socialiste *Algeria* (PAGS), still held influential posts inside the UGTA.

Different from Libya, where the grip of the regime on the trade unions was uncontested and the oil revenues prevented the country to slide into an economic crisis, Algeria was more unstable in the 1980s. Given the threat of losing influence inside the union federation, the regime increased efforts to purge the organisation from critics. The introduction of Article 120 of the FLN statutes stipulated party membership for all officials of the mass organisations, including the UGTA, making PAGS members and other regime critical voices to have reassess their affiliations or go underground (Lawless and Findlay, 2015, p.38).

These measures, however, could not prevent several popular protest movements, including major protests in Oran (1982), Algiers (1985), or Sétif (1986). The social contract that was established in the years of Boumédiène's regime consisting of the exclusion of vast parts of the population from political power in return for the regime taking care of its well-being (Werenfels, 2007, p.33) got under pressure. Reforms, that had been applied to the educational and health sector resulted in the emergence of

a system of privileges (e.g., selective schooling system, private vs. public hospitals, etc.) alienated segments of the Algerian society even further. In Summer 1988 many workers faced acute housing shortage, water problems, food shortages, high inflation, an increase in prices of most commodities, and high unemployment, cementing the view that the old social contract had been broken (Zoubir, 1993). The following riots of October 1988 resulting in about 500 deaths and 1000 wounded that would turn to be the beginning of a democratic opening of the country were accompanied by labour strikes on the grass-root level. Although the General Secretary of the UGTA still issued an appeal for workers to end demonstrations and provide "firm support and total trust in the leadership of president Chadli Benjedid" during the peak of the demonstrations in 1988 (King, 2009, p.150), the number of strikes organised by the UGTA rose significantly between 1988 and 1992, as the union center feared to lose its access to the core elite due to liberalisation politics and possible system change (Ouaissa, 2005, p.117).

The Worker's Movement during the Civil War

The new constitution of 1989 and the labour code of 1990 marked a new beginning for the possibilities of organised labour and allowed for a multi-party system and trade union pluralism. The latter led to several new foundations, and at the beginning of the 1990s the union landscape in Algeria could be divided into three main categories of unions. First, the "old" unions under the umbrella of the UGTA, that proved to be more independent, still formed part the inner circles of political power in the country on the one hand, and benefited from connections into that circle on the other. Second, the FIS started to form trade unions having an Islamic focus and an own union center, the Syndicat Islamique du Travail *Algeria* (SIT). These projects were foremost successful in the fields of education, healthcare and some factories, but did not receive permissions from the ministry of labour (Abdelkader, 2014). Nonetheless, they played an important part in the protests of June 1991 initiated by the FIS and disappeared for the time being from the political landscape after the dissolution of the FIS in March 1992. Third, a range of secular unions stressing their independence from the UGTA and FLN emerged already after 1989. Due to the pressure of the still FLN controlled government, the Army, and the UGTA, only few of about 53 new foundations in 1989 and 1990 survived the turbulences of the civil war and its aftermath. The most prominent ones, which were still active in 2011, were the public workers union Syndicat National Autonome des Personnels de l'Administration Publique *Algeria* (SNAPAP), the Conseil National Algérien des Professeurs de l'Enseignement Secondaire et Technique (CNAPEST) inside the education sector as well as unions in the healthcare sector such a the Syndicat National des Praticiens de Santé Publique *Algeria* (SNPSP)[6]. When the FIS began to discover trade unionism as a tool to reach political goals, the

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[6]For a comprehensive overview of the independent trade unions after 1990 see Abdelkader (2014, p.25-28)

nationalist movement and the old elites never cut ties with the UGTA. This holds particularly true for the secular nationalist movement represented by the Rassemblement National Démocratique *Algeria* (RND) and FLN. They helped to recover and reinforce its hegemony in the trade union landscape, as the UGTA acted as the main opponent to the newly implemented Islamic unions. At this particular time, the nationalist movement had already lost its important influence on the student and youth movements inside the universities to the FIS, which was a bitter experience and a significant loss of power (Fauzia, 2012, p.174). Thus, a similar symbiotic relationship as already described for the period of the war of independence emerged again between the nationalist secular decision-makers and the Army on the one side, and the UGTA on the other. Especially in exchange for financial and technical support, the UGTA's loyalty was bought, and consequently, the stance of the UGTA became more rigours during the war. Dividing the general mindset of attitudes of the Algerian people towards non-violent endeavours to end the war into the group of "dialogueists" on the one hand, vouching for peace negotiations, and "eradicators" advocating a military, uncompromising path on the other, the UGTA clearly belonged to the latter (Abdelkader, 2014, p.28).

A new Symbiosis in the Postwar Era

In the years after the war, the UGTA regained much of its power and influence. It remained de facto a part of the state apparatus and the only recognized social partner in state-employers-employees tripartite collective bargain. At the same time, the number of independent trade unions had been restricted again. Many unions were not granted the necessary approval by the state if its objectives are classified as to be contrary to the established institutional labour system and/or may disturb the public order and the norms and values of the country (Branine et al., 2008, p.414-415).

The price for the protection of the monopoly to pay by the UGTA was the support of unpopular measures including privatisation and shut down of public enterprises. Despite some symbolic collective actions aiming at socio-economic enhancement or protection of the status quo that are undertaken frequently, the buttress of government policies of the union center seems a core pillar of the strategy of the UGTA. A high UGTA cadre interviewed by Branine et al. (2008) claimed in 2007: "We are living a period of market economy and we must respect the rules of the game. Our main responsibility is to obtain compensations for workers or re-integrate them in the private sector job market".

However, while liberal opposition parties portrayed the General Union as a network of "yellow unions", the federation was still aware of its mission to protect worker's rights as far as they concern the authoritarian bargain (Tamlali, 2009). This was especially true for the lower levels, where healthcare workers, port workers, and other public sector

employees frequently went on strike. The Federal Education Federation in the states of Bejaia and Tizi Ouzou cooperated with the independent trade union movement, and especially energy sector unions fought against the new liberal hydrocarbon law. Algeria was highly dependent on hydrocarbons which still accounted for roughly 60 per cent of budget revenues, 30 per cent of GDP, and over 95 per cent of export earnings in 2009. The ECI rank is 114, being one of the least diversified country of the sample. Industry contributes to 61.5 per cent of the GDP, and the state owned company Sontrach, a producer of fuels, lubricants, natural gas, and petrochemicals, is the largest company in Africa. Its trade union, the Syndicate National de Sonatrach *Algeria* (SNS) is comparatively well organised and managed to gain a 15 per cent wage increase in 2006 (M.T., 2006). But also on the top level and in negotiations with the state, the UGTA managed to gain some victories. In the 1990s, at the same time when the Libyan trade unions were domesticated inside the Jamihiriya system, the UGTA managed to push forward and put through the most comprehensive unemployment insurance of the entire region. Since the 1990, the federation is also part of tripartite negotiations about the minimum wage (Hammouda, 2011, p.31) which had the highest increase in purchasing power of the entire sample between 2000 and 2010. Compared to the other countries of the sample, this bargaining power is impressively high; hence, the variable KEYS is coded (1).

6.2.3   2011: Trade Unions between Socioeconomic Protest and the Fight for Recognition

The protests in Algeria broke out two days after a significant rise in consumer goods including sugar and oil, which came into force at January 1 2011. These protests were fuelled and inspired by the ongoing protests in the neighbouring country of Tunisia. In fact, Algeria was one of the first countries in the region affected by the wave of uprisings and protests that had begun in Tunisia a couple of weeks earlier (Volpi, 2013). With the growing unrest in the entire MENA region in mind, authorities feared that large numbers of people would join the announced mass protests on January 7 2011 after the Friday prayers. But contradictory to expectations, the demonstrations were peaceful, relatively small, and lacked political drive. A reason might have been the increased police presence and other security measures which were taken in advance by the regime, but also a high degree of fragmentation among the society, especially regarding the protests, played a significant role. Fragmentation could be found inside the Islamic spectre between the Islamic ruling party and the Islamic opposition[7] on the one hand, but also between the secular and the Islamist spectrum on the other (Jabi, 2011). Inside the secular camp, the Front des Forces Socialistes *Algeria* (FFS) also

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[7] Mouvement de la Société pour la Paix *Algeria* (MSP), avowing themselves to the Muslim Brotherhood, forms part of the government, together with the FLN and the RND, the latter being a party consisting mainly of military staff and administrative clerks and Kabylist politicians prone to privatisation politics (Fauzia, 2012, p.173).

competed in the Kabyle area in the north of Algeria with the RND. (Ottaway and Hamzawy, 2011).

A Broad Alliance Lacking the Drive to Change the System

The demands carried to the streets in the rallies and demonstrations were mainly restricted to socio-economic enhancement similar to protests which emerged in the country nearly every couple of years. As Jabi (2011) states about the beginnings of the protests in January 2011 in comparison to the protests of the past decades:

> Despite some characteristics that are unique to the most recent protests, when compared with those of the past, the events of January 2011 were not new. For example, as in previous protests, these recent ones began in the larger cities, and were characterized by large mass mobilization. They are even similar to earlier protests in the degree of violence used, as well as the weakness of the authorities, and in the political and social contexts that have distinguished the popular protest movement for over two decades.

During the following weeks of January and February, hopes arose among segments of the civil society that the new wave of mobilisation could be used to push for systemic change. The first civil society alliance that attempted to address demands to the government emerged as a melting pot of more than 80 subgroups, labelled the Coordination Nationale pour le Changement et la Démocratie *Algeria* (CNCD) and was founded on January 21 2011.

It included many student organisations, the human right organisation Ligue Algérienne pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme (LADDH) and also the collective SOS Disparues, devoted to disclosing war crimes and trace the history of victims of the civil war, signed the intial announcement. Also the RCD was included which, technically, was forming part of the government. The major independent trade unions that joined the CNCD were the aforementioned public employee union SNAPAP and organisations mainly stemming from the educational sector, namely the university based national union Conseil National des Enseignants du Supérieur *Algeria* (CNES) founded in 1991, the Syndicat Autonome des Travailleurs de l'Education et de la Formation *Algeria* (SATEF) founded 1990 in the Kabyle City Tizi Ouzou and being close to the FFS, and the Conceil de Lyceés d'Algérie (CLA) that emerged under that name for the first time in 2010, representing high school teachers of the capital Algiers (Beddoubia, 2015; Abdelkader, 2014; 'Amr, 2013). The CNCD's initial demands included:

- The announcement of the creation of a National Concentration Coordination for Democratic Change,

- The decision on the organisation of a national march to demand the lifting of the state of emergency which has been raging for nineteen years and which is immobilizing the country and violating all the freedoms and

- The expression of the total solidarity with the Tunisian people in their struggle against totalitarianism and the establishment of a democratic state.

The UGTA remained largely invisible during the critical phase of the protests (Lynch, 2013, p.188). Although the union center had contributed to the emergence of the RND in 1997 and still holds ties to the party, it did not act as mediator or progressive force, and avoided contact with the CNCD.

Meanwhile, the cooperation between the 80 different groups turned to be difficult and the alliance got riddled with internal disparities (Mekouar, 2016). When the movement planned the next demonstration, leading members of the CNCD learned that the RCD had already scheduled a demonstration at the same time. The CNCD joined in, giving the impression that the entire rally was organised by the RCD and that the CNCD posed a mere tool of the party. For many observers, this de-legitimised the movement as intermediate and moderate change agent. Additionally, the human rights associations refused to cooperate with the RCD's leader Said Sadi, who was known for being an *eradicateur* defending Army operations with civil casualties during the civil war. The FFS, that had joined after the initiation of the CNCD also withdrew from the protest after the impression among many activists grew that the RCD tried to co-opt the movement.

Trade Unions as Opportunist Agents in Time of Crisis

Although the protests remained largely without top-down organisation and were lacking a coherent vision, the government lead by president Bouteflika felt urged to offer concessions. On February 3, the government announced that the nineteen-year-lasting state of emergency would be lifted, a measure that was indeed implemented three weeks later, moreover, more opposition parties would be allowed, private radio and television stations permitted, and a a new job creation programme was implemented (Volpi, 2013, p.108). Also amendments to the constitution that should "strengthen democracy" were promised. After the announcement and partial implementation of the concessions, the most active trade unions CNES, SATEF, and CLA considered that their political goals had been achieved and mobilisation should be "paused" (Mekouar, 2016). By March 2011, it became obvious that the wave of Arab uprisings including their political impacts in other countries would not affect Algeria in a comparable way. Although in March at least seventy strikes throughout the country took place, held by professional associations and unions including teachers, rail workers, health sector workers, and court clerks, the political drive to change the equilibrium of power had significantly vanished. As Volpi (2013, p.110) states, Algerians felt that the weakness of the state and the momentum of the protests would allow to improve working conditions and social circumstances:

> The dynamics of these strikes, which would remain commonplace throughout the year, illustrate the continuing relevance of the traditional social contract proposed by the Algerian regime: The administration provides better socio-economic conditions in exchange for continuing (albeit grudging) political quiescence.

This assessment can be backed by economic indicators, especially against the background of Algeria's particular history of a devastating civil war in the 1990s and the development during the 2000s. Although total unemployment was at about 10 per cent in 2010, it had been constantly falling since 2000 (19 per cent decrease) and even more since the end of the civil war (21 per cent decrease). The same is true for youth unemployment which decreased from 50 per cent in 2000 to 21 per cent in 2010. Although inflation rates increased slightly between 2000 and 2010, they mostly remained under 5 per cent and never even rudimentarily approached the 1992 peak of 32 per cent. At the same time, the purchasing power of the minimum wage more than doubled between 2000 and 2010 which is the highest increase in the entire sample. These numbers and the fact that most parties and groups of civil society, including trade unions, did not attack the institutional equilibrium can be read as evidence that the bulk of protest in Algerian were rather procyclical and part of distribution struggles within the system. The protests did not emerge because the authoritarian bargain had failed in the eyes of the populace, but rather because it was still intact and different groups of the population attempted to increase their share of the cake. The case of Algeria will therefore be coded SOEC = (0).

Professional Associations Struggling for Access to Power Circles

The role of professional organisations in Algeria is particularly different, as will be shown later, from their counterparts in Egypt or Jordan and thus, their role during the protests was also different. First, they also belong to the framework of the UGTA where they enjoyed an albeit limited, however palpable degree of freedom. Second, the independent associations that emerged were barely politicised. Algeria had witnessed a significant switch from blue collar workers to white collar workers due to increased efforts of the government to strengthen the service sector in the past decades and, thus, trade union activities also shifted from the industrial sector - say, blue collar workers, to white collar workers. Most of them were working in the service or welfare sectors. These workers were more intertwined with the ruling elite, less adaptive to ideological agendas and utopia, and eager to keep open channels of communication. Criticizing the political system and its power holders was no part of their overall strategy (Hussein, 2017, p.8; p.19).

However, some actors were less intertwined with the ruling elites. They could be often found in the professions that were former FIS strongholds like education and healthcare. These players tried to get a foot into the door in 2011, playing mass mobilization as trump in order to get access to the state elite. For instance, Achour Idir, the leader of

the CLA - that was licensed as union in 2013 - uttered that he would be ready to enter a political office in 2015 (Hamadouche, 2017), while his criticism of the regime gradually paled out. Actually, progressive forces did exist, especially in the independent trade unions. Werenfels (2007, p.106) cites an interviewee from SNAPAP four years before the protests:

> Our first priority should be an autonomous justice. It is impossible to change the situation if you have a justice that takes orders; we need a state under the rule of law. What we also need is the retreat of the army from politics and the election of a president by the people.

These voices could not hold sway during the critical juncture, hence, the institutional equilibrium was not challenged by trade union organisations during the protests of 2011.

6.3   Jordan (1)

The late 2000s and the turmoil in the protest years 2010-2012 caused a politicisation of trade unionism inside Jordan that would be visible even the years to follow. In May 2013, nine unions representing more than 7,000 workers founded the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Jordan (FITU-J), challenging the official General Federation of Jordanian Trade Unions (GFJTU). In general, the focus of the workers unions in 2011-2012 was on the fight for more freedom to unionise, however, some political demands also swapped into their portfolio of claims (Al-Muqdad, 2012). The professional associations did not hide their willingness to reform the system either. Especially the demanded reform of the electoral law is crucial in this context. A change of the one-man-one-vote system and a redesign of voting districts would significantly weaken the basis of power of the King. The structure of the parliament, where tribesmen loyal to the King from the countryside and hinterlands of the country pose about 60 per cent of the MPs, would have been challenged and would have cause a decisive change of the institutional equilibrium of the country. Acknowledging the progressive role of the professional associations, and the rather structural, however slightly political role of the worker's unions, the outcome for the case of Jordan is (1) according to the QCA code of this study. The variables are encoded as follows:

SOEC	INOPP	CEN	TRI	KEYS	**Outcome**	Decimal Code
1	1	1	1	0	**1**	JOR(30)

Table 6.5: Truth table row for the case of Jordan

The pivotal role of tribalism will be outlined, especially, in part 6.3.1 leading to TRI = (1), and the corporatist centralisation and comparatively little intra-union competition before 2011 will be outlined in part 6.3.2 leading to CEN = (1). The last part of that section also shows the weakness of trade unions inside key sectors of the economy before 2011, which was a major reason for the emergence of independent trade unions in that year. Consequently, KEYS is set to (0).

Although many issues are addressed in the parts before, section 6.3.4 will scrutinise the embedding of the new emerging trade unions and professional white collar associations into civil society and opposition groups (INOPP), and deals with the socio-economic situation of the country before 2011 (SOEC). Although different currents started protesting at the beginning of the critical juncture, these currents, including trade union bodies, cooperated in the further course of the events. The cooperation, in which also the welfare oriented *Islamic Action Front* (IAF) was heavily involved, was based on the perception that the institutional equilibrium at that time was not able to guarantee the compliance with the authoritarian bargain on the part of the state, and thus needed reform. Consequently, INOPP and SOEC are both coded (1).

6.3.1 The Institutional Equilibrium: The King, the Army, and the Tribes

The institutional equilibrium in Jordan is based on the King as part of a "linchpin Monarchy" encouraging controlled social pluralism and maintaining the ability to mobilize parts of the population in a top-down manner (Herb, 1999). Furthermore, the role of the military and the introduction of law disciplining the state objects (Massad, 2001), and the co-optation of tribes and tribal alliances that dates back already to the Ottoman Empire (Robins, 2004, p.6-40) is of relevance.

According to the constitution, the legislative power is vested in the National Assembly and the King (Art.25), the executive power is also vested in the King, who exercises his powers through his Ministers (Art. 26), and the King is the head of the state and is immune from any liability and responsibility (Art. 30). Furthermore, the King has the right to interfere into staffing politics of the parliament and the government (Art. 34) and has the right to rule by decrees (Art.40). Political parties were banned between 1956 and 1992 and did also not play afterwards a substantial role in political participation due to a restrictive party law, an electoral law that favours loyalists, and a weak position of the parliament vis-á-vis the King.

The Palestinian Question as Decisive Conflict

The Jordanian identity is comparatively young in the region. Before Transjordan was established in 1921, there was no territory, people, or nationalist movement referring

to itself as Transjordanian. The country was set up by the British in order to reward the Hashemite dynasty that had supported British troops in World War I, giving the Hijazi Hashemite Amir Abdullah a realm to reign under the auspices and subtle control of Great Britain. Although some anti-colonial upheavals occurred in the 1930s, Jordan's independence in 1946 was less a result of fierce local struggle than to shifts in perceptions and values about colonialism after World War II. This independence had rather a mere nominal gloss in several instances, as the country continued to depend on massive British subsidies and, most notably, the country's Army continued to be led by a British officer (Massad, 2001, p.12).

The British head of the Army General John Bagot Glubb, was expelled in 1956. The Army as institution as such was kept intact, Arabized, and nationalised. This followed the pattern observed already by Fanon (1963) in which nationalist movements in Middle East maintain and rely on the same institutions that were used to control them before independence. The same is true for vast parts of the public administration, the courts, the bureaucracy, and the police. The role of the Army became palpably indispensable especially during the civil war of 1971 when the PLO challenged the King's legitimacy to represent Palestinians inside the country (Yorke, 1989; Sirriyeh, 2000, p.24-25). In support of the King and many of his followers who have always invoked the fear of the loss of Transjordan identity and its replacement by a Palestinian homeland, the military branches of the Palestinians were eventually driven out of Jordan by the Jordanian Army and reorganized in Lebanon. The Army remained one of the most important pillars of power for the Monarchy during the 1980s and 1990s. The King provided and granted reserved seats at Jordan's universities being highly in demand by ordinary students as well as full scholarships for the spouses of Army officers and servicemen. Moreover, custom exemptions, Army exclusive shops, tax relief, and other discounts provided comfortable social-economic conditions and an enhancement of the role of high ranking military staff in the country's economy.

The conflict with the Palestinians had also an impact on the relation between tribal leaders and the King. Especially in the sparsely populated southern part of the country, dominated by the Bani Sakhr, the backing of the Monarchy has traditionally been strong. The tribe has always been counted as stalwart allies of the Hashemite ruling family since the days of Abdallah I (Sirriyeh, 2000, p.79) and has been rewarded since with government posts and tax exemptions in order to gain stability and prevent secession (Robins, 2004, p.24-27). During the crisis of 1970/1971 also the supporting role of the tribes became apparent, both inside and outside the Army. A Bedouin recruitment program had already been started before 1970 and had been intensified particularly in 1968 when the strength of the PLO had already grown more and more palpable as military threat to the regime (Lawrence, 1978, p.33-34). As the defeat of the Palestinian armed forces could be assessed as a merit of tribal zeal, as a reward for loyalty, the Council of Tribal Leaders (Majlis Shuyukh al-Ashai'r) was set up by royal

decree on July 31, 1971 few days after the final expulsion of the Palestinian guerrillas (Massad, 2001, p.50-51;61). The council was dissolved two years later and replaced by an extra-juridical understanding between the country's tribes and the Monarchy. This new understanding (known as Mahdar al-Qasr, or the Palace Convention) aimed at conceding more weight to tribal law and traditions as well as normalising tribal rules for the sake of a common Jordanian identity. As most laws concerning Bedouin were abolished in 1976, two observations can be made. First, the Palace Convention was one of the fist decisive and explicit steps that strengthened the factual coexistence of three realms of law in Jordan until today, being civil, personal status, and tribal law. Second, the see-saw of granting and subducting special rights to tribes mirrors the identity struggle between tribalism and nationalism inside the country that has not been solved completely until today.

The Restrictions of the Electoral Processes

Different from Algeria and Libya, Jordan falls into the category of semi-rentier states (Beblawi and Luciani, 1987; Brynen, 1992; Greenwood, 2003). To sustain the co-optation of Transjordan supporters and business allies, the regime could rely on oil revenues until the early 1980s, as well as external income that was acquired by support of other Arab countries, as the Arab League resolved in 1974 that the oil-rich Arab states should provide multi-annual financial aid to the states in confrontation with Israel. However, in the course of the 1980s it became apparent that the influx of rents would not suffice to maintain the existing distribution networks. Similar to Algeria, facing an economic crisis causing demonstrations and riots in 1988-1989, after liberalisation politics imposed by the IMF, democratic reforms were implemented. However, different from Algeria, the Jordanian elites managed to cushion the impact of democratisation by setting up a institutional shielding that hampered the opposition. A crucial part of that shielding was the electoral law and processes. Hence, opposition was formally allowed but it actually remained toothless. Furthermore, this pattern of hybridisation allowed for competition for the resources to be distributed and gave the regime a higher legitimacy due to an increased democratic appearance, however, without imperilling the monarchical system as such; in the words of Greenwood (2003, p.257):

> [...] under the revised terms of the new liberal bargain, the regime could rely on the mechanism of elections and political pluralism to decide who got what and how much in an environment of economic austerity. The competitive nature of elections and a more pluralistic polity helped shift responsibility for citizens' standard of living to the legislature and the government and away from the Palace, thereby insulating the Palace from popular discontent with neo-liberal economic reform.

This strategy already had worked out during the bread riots of 1996, when demonstrators attacked PM Kabarati for pushing forward the IMF economic reform programme despite strong opposition in the elected Lower House of Parliament and inside

the population. Protesting against the lift of bread subsidies, they chanted "long live the King, down with Kabarati!" (Andoni and Schwedler, 1996, p.41). The eventual violent dispersion of the demonstrations by the security forces showed, nonetheless, the King's willingness to proceed with the liberalization process. This attitude was backed by a steadily growing number of businessmen - inside and outside the tribes - being included into the apparatus via a top-down selection process that lead eventually to the palpable power shift from a designated "old guard" to the business oriented and wealthy "new guard" since the elections of 2007 (Larzillière, 2016, p.19).

Especially the cleavage between urban areas in the north-west (including the East-Bank of the river Jordan) and the south-eastern periphery remained crucial and was intensified by the fact that Palestinians dominated partly the private sector and parts of the East-Bank. The King, thus, always trying to consolidate his power, needed to balance the interests and relied more on the tribal, rural areas. Serving as an example, the electoral law of 1986 allocated only 45 percent of the parliamentary seats to the cities of Amman, Irbid, and Zarqa, although 74 percent of the population lived in these cities in the 1990s (Sahliye, 2005, p.121). Additionally, the voting principle was changed to consolidate tribal dominance in the parliament. While the 1989 Jordanian parliamentary elections were predicated upon the principle of one-man multiple-votes, since 1993 the one-man-one vote system was in force. The multiple vote system allowed the voters to cast as many votes as there are parliamentary seats in the districts and enabled the Islamic candidates to form electoral lists with representatives of Jordan's ethnic, social, and religious minorities such as particular Bedouin networks and tribes, Christians, or Circassians (Sahliye, 2005, p.114). The one-man-one-vote principle, in contrast, was criticised by Islamic groups, professional associations, and other parts of civil society as strengthening tribal candidates, acknowledging that family bounds remain the most important personal connection in Jordan. Given the pivotal role of tribal bonds inside the political system of Jordan, the country is coded TRI = (1).

The party that got hit the hardest by the changes of the electoral system was the Islamic Action Front (IAF), an Islamist party affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood. The parliamentary elections of 1993 diminished the influence of the IAF due to the alteration of the electoral system and strong push-backs from the regime. In that particular election, the number of IAF seats fell despite the fact that the number of received votes increased compared to the results of Muslim Brotherhood candidates in 1989 (Greenwood, 2003, p.256). The parliamentary elections of 2007 even reduced the number of seats from 17 in 2003 to 6 due to repression and a skilful exploit of the electoral law of 2001 by the regime (Brand, 2017). The Muslim Brotherhood, standing mainly outside the echelons of power, represent religiously conservative circles as well as parts of the middle class. They especially posed a threat to the institutional equilibrium of the country as the King - as a Hashemite claiming to be a descendent from Prophet Mohammad - enjoyed guideline competence in religious issues and ben-

efited from the legitimacy given by that descent. The religious component has been important as means to weld together the young nation, and it had already been invoked by Jordan's first King Abdullah I when stating in front of the Army: "Your link with the army of the Prophet lies in your relationship with me" (Lawrence, 1978, p.27).

6.3.2 Labour Unions: Political Activism in a Narrow Corset

The first workers unions in Jordan were founded in the 1930s and worked in the underground until their formal legal legitimation by the law No.35 in 1953 (Al-Muqdad, 2012). The date marks the beginning of a vibrant civil society era in which several trade unions spawned, protected by the 1952 Constitution that granted the free establishment of trade unions within the limits of the law (Art.23). Until 1954, when already eleven unions were founded, six of them submitted a request to register a federation in order to unify all trade unions and to represent their interests before the relevant authorities, establishing thus the General Federation of Jordanian Trade Unions (GFJTU). Standing under leftist, nationalists, and Nasserists influence, the federation involved forthrightly into political questions. This included calls for the termination of the Jordanian-British Agreement of 1948, support of the 1956 as Prime Minister elected Suleiman an-Nabulsi from the National Socialist Party before and after his dismissal by the King, and other policies mainly directed at enhancing Jordan's disentanglement from British influence (Hurani, 2001*a*, p.13-15). This attitude and zeal - that often diametrically opposed the strategies and policies of the palace - led to crackdowns on unions and the persecution of many of the movement's leaders, causing a shut-down of about 60 per cent of the trade union organisations until 1961. With the establishment of Trade Union Law 21 of 1961, the movement started to flourish again. The new bloom was accelerated by the Palestinian Question and the struggle against Israel that had entered the trade union movement as decisive issue in the course of the 1960s, leading to a doubling of trade union organisations from 20 in 1967 to 40 in 1969. During the civil war of 1970-1971, the GFJTU split into a pro-Palestinian and a nationalist, pro-Transjordanian fraction, and the movement nearly busted because of the internal and external struggles it was riddled with. Different to Algeria, where the regime never managed to control the union movement completely, this weakness could be exploited by the state authorities. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour then took the initiative to assign a temporary executive committee replacing the GFJTU, forcing unions to hold new elections in 1971, and issuing Temporary Labour Law number 67 granting the minister amongst other right to interfere into and dissolve unions because of the spread of "destructive" ideologies (Hurani, 2001*a*, p.15). Based on amendment 84 to the Labour Law of 1961, which gave the Minister of Social Affairs the right to classify the professions, handicrafts and industries in which workers may create unions, the number of workers' unions was restricted to seventeen. This

number remained valid until the wake of the protests of 2010. Although not being a Republic, Jordan had taken the same steps as neighbouring Syria and Iraq by bringing the trade union organisations under its control, centralising it, and purging it from regime critical elements.

Professional Associations as Party Substitutes

The development of professional white-collar associations differed from the fate of workers' unions. Unlike the latter, the constitutions of the professional associations were not subject to oversight by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (Moore and Salloukh, 2007) and the possibilities for the state to interfere were more restricted, both inside and outside the law. State intervention and undemocratic procedures were also more common in worker's unions: According to a study by Al-Muqdad (2012), members had the impression that disputes inside the leadership are not solved by consensus (workers unions': 50.7 per cent; professional white-collar unions: 22.8 per cent), and 45.4 per cent of the members of professional white-collar associations and even 63.1 per cent of the members of workers' unions reported a lack of interactivity between the unions leadership and its basis, indicating a more authoritarian atmosphere in workers' unions. Although the regime undertook diverse measures between intimidation and monetary incentives to penetrate and steer the professional associations like it did with the worker's unions, the associations resisted successfully any attempted co-optation by state authorities (Moore and Salloukh, 2007, p.13). Additionally, while the foundation of licensed workers unions ceded in 1976, two other professional associations, namely the Legal Accountants Association and the Artists Union were still allowed in 1987 and 1997 respectively (Al-Muqdad, 2012, p.451)[8]. Given that relative freedom, and in the absence of political parties that had been banned in 1956, professional associations became party-substitutes. They provided space for the voices of opposition and held competitive elections that reflected the strength of the political currents that corresponded to the particular Zeitgeist of the different phases of Jordanian history (Brand, 2017). During the 1980s, the influence of Islamic groups rose inside the professional associations, leading to the first chairman affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood in 1992. Unable to exert palpable influence inside parliament due to the laws and policies of the regime, the Brotherhood increased further activities inside professional associations. With its welfare oriented rhetoric it filled the gap left by leftist groups which suffered internal struggles especially after the dissolution of the USSR. Since the early 1990s, a competition began in the elections of the white-collar associations between the "white list" (Islamic inclination) and the "green list" (leftist-national inclination). These lists also mirror the two largest opposition blocks in parliament. In the decades before,

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[8]For a comprehensive overview of the existing workers' unions and professional associations including their year of foundation and membership numbers in 2010 see Al-Muqdad (2012, p.451-453).

nationalists, who were betimes challenged by leftist candidates, dominated the union boards. However, until 2011 candidates with inclinations to political Islam succeeded in controlling the unions of engineers, agricultural engineers and nurses, while the two sides exchanged over time control over lawyers, doctors and pharmacists (Al-Muhaisn, 2011).

Restricted Bargaining Power due to the Political and Economic Structures

Concerning the topics dealt with, before the protests of 2010-2012, the attitudes of the professional white-collar association were mainly coined by a stance opposing the peace treaty with Israel on the one hand and a membership structure that represented vast parts of the middle class on the other (Al-Nuaisha, 2011, p.46). In both organisations, worker's unions and professional associations, socio-economic issues were addressed quite frequently, however, the narrow corset the workers' unions were forced into prevented a straightforward stance against regime politics. Under these circumstances, the bargaining power of trade unions vis-á-vis the state was comparatively low. This is also due to the economic structure: The country's economy is among the smallest in the Middle East and is heavily dependent on foreign assistance. Mining of potash and phosphate is a main source of GDP, and packaged medicaments, knit sweaters, and potassic fertilizers are important export goods. Due to its geographical situation, the transport of re-exported goods is also an important sector of the economy. Apart from the remittances from abroad, the country relies little on pure rents as it has a comparatively knowledge intensive production structure, which is mirrored in the 48th rank according to the ECI ranking - being even one rank before New Zealand. The privatisation programme adopted in 1996 affected many government owned key services like in the telecommunications, electricity, air transport, and mining sector. Meanwhile, the GFJTU had not found a strategy to address privatisation and lost, due to lacking responsiveness towards workers' demands, the support of much of the workforce (Al-Muqdad, 2012). While in Algeria the unions in the hydrocarbon sector had enough bargaining power and will to reach some concessions, the General Trade Union of Mines and Mining Employees in Jordan often condemned strikes in the mining sector, and the largest official union by 2011, the General Trade Union of Land Transport Employees and Mechanics, became rarely active despite of its centralisation and the importance of the sector[9]. Furthermore, trade union density had been constantly falling since 2001, and also the sheer membership numbers of unions were very low. The Union of the Textile Industry, which had achieved to conclude the second most agreements with employers in the 1990s (Hurani, 2001b, p.93), had less than 900 members in 2011 (Al-Muqdad, 2012). Consequently, KEYS is coded (0) for the case of

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[9]The high membership numbers resulted from the compulsory membership of taxi drivers. Between the 1980s and 1990s membership was also mandatory for all transport workers who needed any kind of licence.

Jordan.

6.3.3 Trade Unions in the Protests 2011 - 2012: Active on many Frontiers

The protests started to gain momentum in January 2011 and abated at about November 2012. Different currents merged in the protests and Jordan witnessed a time of intense activism and networking between opposition groups and civil society.

The Foremath of the Protests in 2011

The number of labour protests had already risen slightly but constantly since 2006, and at least two incidents which lay ground for the larger protests in 2011 are worthwhile mentioning. The collective actions in the port of Aqaba of 2010 and public sector day workers strikes in Dhiban. While the first can be categorised as mainly political, the second had a rather socio-economic dimension. Additionally the discontent with the political system rose steadily among members of the Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF. Protests in the port of Aqaba already emerged in 2009 when public workers protested plans to end subsidised housing, demanded higher wages, and the right to establish an independent trade union. A mediation role of the GJTFU was rejected by the protest leaders. Although the strikes and sit-ins were dispersed violently by the police, the government also offered a pay package that met the workers' demands (International Trade Union Conference (ITUC), 2010). Nonetheless, the planned sale of the port to a private investor and unmet promises brought labourers back on the streets in 2010, encountering police repression again. This time, the Army commander in Aqaba intervened directly protecting demonstrators who had taken refuge in the nearby military hospital from the security forces of the police. The protection by the Army - that was also reported in the media - had a significant impact on the strike culture of the country. Tell (2015, p.6-7) clearly states:

> As a result, a corner was turned: Jordanian labourers had proved themselves able to challenge neo-liberal policies, and workers of East Bank origin realized that the support of kinsmen and sympathizers in the military mainstream could be used effectively to confront the regime.

The events in the port of Aqaba in 2010 triggered further protest across the country and across various professions. Most visible the clandestine Teachers' Union, having been banned in the 1950s, protested in several cities against budget cuts, dismissals, and foremost for legal recognition by the government. In the course of the growingly intense protests that witnessed the dismissal of the two leaders Mustafah Raushdeh and Adma Izrekat, the National Committee of Retired Servicemen *Jordan* (NCRS) became aware of the protests and managed to merge interests and coordinate mutual

action with the teachers' union. The NCRS had emerged in 2007, when Army retirees started to criticise that the reforms of Abdallah II cut some privileges of the military and hit the retired staff particularly hard. Meanwhile, as stated by NCRS participants, the members of the professionalised Army and the new generation of retirees would face better conditions. The committee embraced many veterans of whom many fought in the 1970-1971 war, and started with socio-economic demands but soon turned to political issues (Tell, 2015, p.5-6). Their standpoint was characterised by anti-Palestinian attitudes and by a denial of Palestinian participation within the political framework (Al-Shalabi, 2011, p.97). A document already issued by the NCRS May 1 2010 underlined the supposed threat of a Palestinian influx and warned about solving "the Palestinian Question at the expense of the Jordanian People". Being careful to express loyalty to the King, the committee attacked the government though, criticising "monopolized cabinet formation and decision making". This politicisation resembling unprecedented critic and touching "red lines" of the political equilibrium entered the teachers protest, and soon slogans combined socio-economic grievances, critic of the government, and nationalistic rhetoric about the alternative Palestinian homeland. For the teachers association, being - just like most professional associations - participant in the "anti-normalisation" campaign that started 1994, the NCRS was a suitable partner for protests. Soon the union would adopt the demand of the dismissal of the government and take it to the streets.

According to another reading, the protests led by public sector day workers and some activists in Dhiban, a small town about 70km south of Amman, would have been the "cradle of the Arab Spring" in Jordan. Unrest in the region dates back at least to 2006, when a clandestine day labourers union led by Mohammad Sunayd organised sit ins and strikes to demand better working conditions, higher wages, and secure jobs in the public sector, hence, basically the abolition of the practice to hire day labourers (Adely, 2011, p.36). Concessions by the government followed but were not fully implemented, leading to further day labourers protests on May 1 2010 in the headquarters of professional white-collar unions in Amman. The conflict had gained some attention throughout the country and led to the sacking and multiple incarceration of Sunayd in the following months. Spurred and elated by the protests of Aqaba and the mobilization in Tunisia, on January 7 2011 day labourers and youth members of the Social Left organised a rally in Dhiban that exceeded the organisers expectations in size and would turn unexpectedly political in its postulations. Amis (2016, p.173) reports of an organiser who he interviewed, who stated:

> We hadn't planned on mentioning the Prime Minister, let alone the King. Back then this was a red line. We were scared [...] and no one knew what might happen. But to our surprise, others started to join us and take part...before we knew it, we were calling for the fall of the Samir Rifa'i government

The interviewee belongs to the squad of organisers that planned the next rally on January 14 2011.

Simultaneously to the emergence of the nationalist movement and the day labourers protest, a third current emerged after the parliamentary elections of November 2010 Islamic organisations and parties, foremost the IAF Muslim Brothers criticised that the newly elected House of Deputies would "not genuinely represent the Jordanian people" (Al-Shalabi, 2011, p.94). In many Friday marches in December, organised by the movement in down-town Amman, the dissolving of Parliament emerged as one of the leading demands. A year before the protests of 2010, Irhil Gharaibeh, Deputy Secretary General of the Islamic Action Front, openly called for reform and demanded to establish an expanded national front to convert Jordan into a constitutional Monarchy. Although the statement had been relativised and dismissed by the party's leadership, stressing a more moderate reform strategy, the discontent with the political system and foremost the electoral conditions remained palpable among the ranks and files of the IAF and was still present when the pictures of the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt arrived on the media screens in early 2011.

The Course of the Protests: A Networking Civil Society

The tensions and protests in Jordan that already emerged before the upheavals in Tunisia and Egypt gained a new dimension against the background of anti-government mass demonstrations that started elsewhere in December 2010. As activist Mohammad 'Ubaid stated in Amis (2016, p.176):"The roots of the Jordanian movement were there before the Arab Spring, but the Arab Spring gave it strength". The first huge mass demonstration, labelled "Day of Rage" by the press took place on January 14 2011 when about 12.000 demonstrated in about 20 cities against the rise in prices. These calls were complemented by the call for resignation of the prime minister Al-Rafa'i who was accused by demonstrators to be the "main enemy of the people" (Al-Quds al-'Arabi, 2011). On February 26, the demands of ten thousands of protesters included the dissolution of the parliament, calls for democracy, and the introduction of a constitutional Monarchy. Many voices demanded the return to a liberal constitution draft from 1952 from the short time of incumbency of King Talal (1951-1952) (Amis, 2016, p.174), amongst others promoted by leftists and most openly advocated by the Communist Party (Tariq al-Sha'ab, 2011a). It was the date when three currents in which trade union organisations were active in combined forces for the first time. These currents would merge, intertwine, and blur in the course of the protests in 2011-2012.

The Muslim Brotherhood, that had close ties to and some influence the professional associations, did not participate in the rallies of January 14 2011, however. Sticking to a less radical approach and aware of benefits of open channels to the government, the brotherhood perused the strategy of pushing outside the streets for reforms first, and after telephonic consultations between its leaders and high level governmental representatives the days before, the Islamic Action Front which is associated with the Muslim

Brotherhood, and the professional unions boycotted the march (Al-Quds al-'Arabi, 2011)[10]. Hence, the protests were mainly lead by leftists and nationalists parties and movements, including parts of the NCRS pensioners committees, and single dissidents of the professional union of engineers (Al-Quds al-'Arabi, 2011).

On January 25, the Islamic movement, especially the Islamic Action front, was part of the rallies, however, demanding for reforms the government had promised to implement as a result of a dialogue the weeks before. The main concerns were about the announced changes in the electoral law, and the Muslim Brotherhood accused the government of diversion and buying time. By their participation, also many professional associations joined the rallies.

On February 1, King Aballah II reacted by sacking the Prime Minster and the cabinet, and promised reforms, pursuing a similar strategy like the King in Morocco in the sense of trying to present himself as willing spearhead of the reform process. However, the constant pressure from the street did not cede and several new movements and alliances emerged during 2011. By that time, diverse groups had organised or joined protests, including parties like the Islamic Action Front, the Popular Unity Party, and the Jordanian Reform Front. Also interest groups formed related to geography, such as Ahrar al-Tafileh, Harak al-Ayasra in Jerash, the Theban movement and the movement of Ramtha. Furthermore, temporary interests were uttered supported by disturbances, sit-ins and riots by day labourers in agriculture, port workers, or miners (Diradka, 2016). Especially May 2011 witnessed the emergence of new players on the macro-level, joining forces and aiming at coordinating collective action. The most visible was founded on May 19, labelled the National Front for Reform, and headed by lawyer and former prime minister Ahmad Obeidat.[11] Cooperation and reform suggestions continued until late 2012.

The Trade Union Organisations Becoming Active

Different from Algeria, Jordanian trade unions started to mingle into politics and questioned the nature of the institutional equilibrium. During May 2011, about 250 members of professional associations, most of them, engineers, lawyers, writers, and workers form the health sector formed their own organisation called "Trade Unionists for Reform" (Naqabiun min Adjal al-Islah). In their initial statement, after an explicitly nationalistic and anti-Zionist preamble, they directly attacked the balance of power in the country and the superior position of the King by demanding:[12]

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[10]The city of Irbid is an exception as the influential cleric Al-Saquri was heavily involved into the protests.

[11]It included a broad spectre from Islamic movements like the Islamic Action Front, nationalist parties like The Arab Ba'ath Progressive Party, the National Action Party, and the National Democratic Public Movement Party, as well as left-wing parties like the Jordanian Communist party, the Democratic Unionist Party, the Jordanian Democratic People's Party (Hashd), the Jordanian Democratic Popular Unity Party, and the Progressive Party (Mahafzah, 2012).

[12]The initial statement and a number of signees can be found on the web page of Al-Madina Online (2011).

1. The rejection of all forms of absolutism, and the need for profound and funda-
   mental constitutional amendments that would lead to "the people as a source of
   authority".

2. The convergence of power and responsibility, not authority without responsibility
   or accountability, and no one to be above the law and the Constitution.

3. Election of the Houses of Deputies in accordance with a fair law and the super-
   vision of an independent body.

4. Formation of a parliamentary government, led by the parliamentary majority,
   and the rotation of power in a democratic manner.

5. Separation of powers, full independence of the judiciary and the establishment of
   a constitutional court.

6. Limiting the role of the security services in protecting the homeland, stopping its
   interference in political and civil life, and revoking its exceptional powers

7. Fighting corruption and mismanagement, no immunity from accountability and
   fair trial for anyone, and the indemnification of what has been stolen from the
   people's wealth.

In contrast, workers unions maintained first a low profile in the political sphere.
Given the restrictions and the history of domination and penetration by state author-
ities, they had a slightly different agenda. The country witnessed many new union
foundations in 2011 by which the role of the general federation was challenged. Over
the years, the organisation had lost credibility, as the trade union federation sometimes
had supported procedures like the rise in taxes or implementation of new taxes affect-
ing the working class if the economical situation seems to demand it. These attitudes
are connected to the quasi-dependence of the national union association on the public
grants its household is mainly relying on (Al-Muqdad, 2012, p.455). Hence, while the
professional associations already founded their own organisational committee (Madjlis
Al-Naqib) at the beginning of the 2000s, the workers unions focussed in 2011-2013 on
the struggle for recognition and changes in the legal framework for unions, using and
accepting Muhammad Al-Sunayd - who led the day labourers strike in Dhiban - as
figurehead. On August 13 2011, the parliament decided to pave the way for new, inde-
pendent trade unions. Already by June 2011, six independent trade unions had been
formed, among others the influential Trade Union of Jordanian Electricity Workers and
the Union of the Phosphate Workers (Adely, 2011). On October 6 2012, the General
Federation announced in an extraordinary conference changes in its charter, however,
not satisfying the independent trade union movement that aimed at more freedom and
an increase of the participation rate of Jordanian workers in unions.
November 30 2012 can be regarded as the end of the critical juncture, when finally the
"bubble burst" (Amis, 2016, p.187). The regime imposed a cut of subsidies causing an

up to 50 per cent price increase for transport and cooking gas. The protests that followed were met violently and dispersed. All professional associations except the nurses went on strike the next Sunday. However, the movements of the country lost gradually their regime sceptical stance. This was due to harsh reaction of the security apparatus, as criticism was more often punished according to the civil code. Additionally, civil war in Syria and Libya, and growing dissatisfaction with the performance of the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt, hampered much of the motivation.

6.3.4 The Alliance between Political Reformers and Rent Seeking Protesters

Concerning the variables SOEC and INOPP, some interpretation is necessary. A look at the economic data of Jordan gives some insights on the situation before 2011. Despite a peak at the beginning of the 2000s, unemployment had constantly fallen from about 20 per cent to 12,5 per cent between 1991 and 2010. However, 12,5 per cent is still a high percentage: It is the fourth highest unemployment rate of the sample and at the same level as Yemen. Youth unemployment was about 20 per cent in 2010. Similar to Tunisia, inflation rates fell between 1990 and 2000 but then started to increase again, leading to decrease of the purchasing power of the minimum wage of about 4 per cent between 2009 and 2010. The question remains whether this was perceived as the major reason for protest by Jordanians.

A quantitative study by Salah (2013) (cited in Al-Qadi (2015)) clearly showed that socio-economic grievances were the main reason for mobilisation of young activists, followed by a reform of the constitutional amendments (56.4 per cent) and a reform of the electoral procedures (20.5 per cent). Yet, mobilisation rates were higher among public sector workers than among the unemployed and those earning less than 500 Dinar per month (Diradka, 2016). Demands of the heterogeneous protest movement included an increase of the minimum wage, job creation, and enhanced working conditions in general on the one hand, and a call for political reforms in order to enhance freedom and liberty on the other. Also the nationalistic dimension and questions about the Palestinian homeland, that had mobilised civil society and professional associations already before 2011, played their role in the juncture of 2011-2013. The initial protests, however, that started in January 2011 and that laid the foundations for the protest movements that followed had their origins in the peripheries and were driven by socio-economic demands, especially the rise of prices. Even if most groups soon agreed on a more broad political agenda following the reasoning that the socio-economic conditions were a result from a deficient political system (Al-Qadi, 2015, p.91;95-96), we can safely assume that the breach of the authoritarian bargain was the main driving force behind the protests among the early risers. The case of Jordan is therefore coded SOEC = (1).

Concerning INOPP, the Muslim Brotherhood - the largest opposition group in 2011

- managed to benefit from the mobilisation potential via the professional white-collar associations. The fact that both organisations boycotted the January 14, 2011 rally, whereas both participated in the January 21 demonstrations is a first indicator. Furthermore, for instance, former Bar Association President Saleh Armouti, member of the Brotherhood dominated Islamic Current was on the forefront of the January 21 protests in 2011. Ties of the Brotherhood also reach into the workers unions: MB's deputy leader Bani Irshaid, secretary general of the IAF 2006-2009 and still member of the Executive Office in 2010, was an active trade unionist and became chairman of the General Union of White Cement Workers in 1992, and of the General Union of Construction Workers in 1995 which are both part of the GFJTU framework. Maysara Malas, chairman of the Liberties Committee of the Engineers' Union, and also at the forefront of the January 21 demonstrations in 2011, pins the role of the Brotherhood down in an Interview seven years later when stating (Abdalrahman, 2018):

> [...] the Muslim Brotherhood can call and mobilize for the largest participation in the movement, without leading the face or leadership so that it cannot even be accused of riding the wave.

Apart from the Brotherhood, especially trade union organisations became a valuable tool for many political activists - and vice versa - many newly emerging organisations actively sought the proximity to the political spectrum, coinciding with observations of Valenzuela (1989, p.9-13) from Latin America and East Asia. Because of these intertwinings, and also because of the close coordination in several committees, and mutual coordinated action, it can be assumed that the trade union movement was embedded - or grew into embedding - into a network with opposition movements. The case of Jordan is therefore coded INTEROPP = (1).

6.4   Morocco (0)

The institutional equilibrium of the Monarchy of Morocco relies upon the institution of the King, his tribal allies, and a hybridisation of the system that managed to steer away discontent from the royal house. Having a long lasting union history and also a history of labour unrest, since the 1990s there is a kind of truce between the ruling elite and the unions. Co-optation and fragmentation that was caused by labour law that allows for union plurality, in combination with a vibrant, yet also fragmented party landscape, split and weakened trade union institutions over time. Hence, while the 20th February Youth Movement challenged the equilibrium which ultimately led to a new constitution, unions were barely active in that political reform process and, similar to Algeria, stuck to socio-economic demands. While the Arab uprisings did not alter Morocco's macro-politics, and the continuity of monarchical rule was preserved, unions focussed on and achieved change in socio-economical micro-politics only (Buehler, 2015b, p.92). Thus, they cannot be labelled as critical inference factor aiming at disturbing the institutional equilibrium inside the country; the QCA outcome for

Morocco is set to (0).

SOEC	INOPP	CEN	TRI	KEYS	**Outcome**	Decimal
0	0	0	1	1	**0**	MOR(3)

Table 6.6: Truth table row for the case of Morocco

The importance of tribal connections, especially inside the *makhzen* as will be shown in section 6.4.2, and which resembles the case of Jordan, justifies the coding of the variable TRI as (1). Furthermore, as will be outlined in section 6.4.4, and compared to the other sample countries, Morocco did comparatively well according to many economic indicators. The variable SOEC is coded (0), as a possible breach of the authoritarian bargain was not a central incentive for the protests, as they had been in Jordan. Section 6.4.2 will analyse the logic of hybridisation of the Moroccan system in which union plurality and decentralisation had been and remained, as shown in part 6.4.3, a historical feature of the union landscape in Morocco. The variable CEN is thus coded (0). The anomic threat unions posed historically to the regime and a rediscovery of of bargaining power at least after 2007, as will be outlined especially in part 6.4.4 showed the potentials unions had in key sectors. KEYS is therefore coded (1).

While trade unions worked closely together with parties in the opposition, these parties, however, did not try to alter the institutional equilibrium in a significant manner. By fact, trade unions did not have any kind of sustainable alliance with those forces that actively tried to change the institutional equilibrium. As will be outlined more elaborately in section 6.4.3, the variable INOPP in set to (0).

6.4.1 Monarchy, Islam, and controlled Pluralism as Istitutional Equilibrium

According to its constitution, Morocco is a constitutional, democratic, parliamentary and social Monarchy. However, despite long-lasting ostensible and vividly promoted reform endeavours, the country remains authoritarian in the sense that it is characterised by strong central power and limited political freedoms. Morocco forms an example of a "hybrid political regime", in which a particular institutional arrangement imitates democratic legitimization which is, however, distorted by a series of legal restrictions and subordinated to an authoritarian rule exerting supreme power (Desrue, 2013; Olivier et al., 2008). The linchpin of the institutional equilibrium in this form of rule is the King and his inner circle. Article 19 of the constitution of 1996 granted the Monarch a special position in the system of power, stating:

> The King, "Amir Al-Muminin"(Commander of the Faithful), shall be the Supreme Representative of the Nation and the Symbol of the unity thereof. He shall be the guarantor of the perpetuation and the continuity of the State. As Defender of the Faith, He shall ensure the respect for the Constitution. He shall be the Protector of the rights and liberties of the citizens, social groups and organisations. The King shall be the guarantor of the independence of the Nation and the territorial integrity of the Kingdom within all its rightful boundaries.

6.4.2   The Role of Religion and Tribalism in the Political System

The rule of the King. similar to Jordan, has a religious and a tribal legitimatory dimension. Already the first King after independence in 1956, Muhammad V, relied on the support of nationalist and explicitly religious groups at the same time. The religious groups did not attempt to form a Caliphate like system where Islam is Religion and State (*din wa dawla*), but rather aimed at adding an explicitly Islamic dimension to the modern political system (Voll, 2013, p.58). Moreover, the Kings' claim to power is based on a claim of *shorfa* lineage making him a descendent of Prophet Mohamed. When from 1980 onwards, religious movements appeared being sceptical towards the legitimacy of the monarchical system, the royal family managed to keep the upper hand in religious questions, especially by relying on Sufi orders (Layachi, 2013, p.359-360; 364-366), and plying off the leftist and Islamist movement against each other (Dalmasso and Cavatorta, 2011). The King maintains a close relationship to the institutionalised clerical elite in the country, as he is the political and religious leader in one person. The ritual of the *Bay'a* confirms his religious acceptance and leadership and many influential clerics belong to his close advisers. Additionally, the Monarch relies on a network of close allies consisting of local tribe leaders, businessmen, high clerks of the administration, and Army officers. This network, being a main pillar of the Monarchy for centuries, is often labelled *makhzen*

Hybridisation and Fostered Co-Optation of Political Players

Thinking of the Moroccan political system as a network around the King that is able to distribute resources and opportunities, it was able to bind, co-opt and most notably attract political players and make them pliable. Showing a clear difference to Algeria's bureaucracies, Waterbury (1970, p.399) observes:

> "[T]he real politics of the country became concentrated in the competition for patronage among various ministers and their protégées. This kind of competition was and is far easier for the King to manage than that of political organizations and political ideology."

This is also true for the party system and the parliamentary procedures. First, by articles 23, 24, 27 and 30(7) the King received powerful possibilities to intervene into the legislative process, the composition of the executive branch, and jurisdiction,

violating formally the principle of the division of power. Second, the stimulated competition inside the pluralist society, and the wide inherent range of political ideologies, often caused feuding, mistrust, or even gridlock in the political process. In these cases the King managed to present himself as the main arbitrator of the political scene and the guarantor for stability in the country, allegedly making use of the political pluralism as a tool to divide and fragment the political parties. The "imaginary parliament" (Claisse, 1985), which was elected in a frequent cycle of four years, held debates and carried out bills, but had not the freedoms, competences, or sometimes the will to challenge the Kings' hegemony. At the same time, organisations outside the institutional sphere (state institutions, political parties, trade unions, media, associations) contributed to the consensual management of the permanent but restricted reform endeavour. Similar to Jordan, these institutions helped to dilute responsibilities in times of crisis, absorb criticisms or take the blows (Molina, 2011, p.436). At the same time, the regime expanded its networks of co-optation which had been including tribal leadership and local notables for decades (Buehler, 2015*a*), by fostering the emergence and upkeep of loyalist parties.[13]

In this environment, civil society organisations, parties and - different from Jordan - also trade unions benefited from a relatively liberal handling of approval procedures and could operate relatively free inside the country. This allows for a more elastic view on the premises of the concept of authoritarianism in the MENA region, however, civil society organisations cannot be seen as progressive or pushing for rapid democratisation of the country. They rather emerged in a space that was opened by the regime, allowing to advocate reforms within the existing political framework of power. They are not allowed to put the monarch's legitimacy into question or cross other, the balance of power changing "red lines". Hence, inside this space, they encounter a form of regime-controlled liberalisation that does not allow for the challenge of the monarchical control over the decision-making process, and that is rather part of the legitimation of the state order than a risk to it (Maghraoui, 2011).

6.4.3 The Co-optation of the Trade Union Movement and the Anomic Threat

The major trade union organisations did not elude from this logic of controlled pluralism. By 2010 being split into 21 different trade union federations, and riddled with internal divisions, unions had gradually lost their ability to mobilise workers and face or address the challenges and consequences of the implemented neo-liberal programs in the 1990s (Jibril, 2004). Unions were mostly affiliated to particular political parties

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[13]Loyalist parties allied with Mohamed VI included the Parti Authenticité et Modernité *Morocco* (PAM), the Rassemblement National des Indépendants *Morocco* (RNI), the Mouvement Populaire *Morocco* (MP), the Union Constitutionnelle *Morocco* (UC), and the Mouvement Démocratique et Social (Buehler, 2015*a*, p.365).

and did not challenge the very nature of the power balance in the country, say, the Monarchy, for decades.

The Fight for Independence and Early Fragmentations

It has not been like this ever since. The history of the Moroccan trade union movement as such is linked to the colonial history of the country. Starting in the 1930s, workers unions formed first as clandestine organisations consisting of French and Moroccan workers. Strikes in 1936 in the Sugar Company in Casablanca, spreading to other factories in the city, as well as to the phosphate mining centres of Louis Gentil (now Yousouffia) and Khouribga built a watershed in Moroccan worker's history. They resulted among other things in the concession to form unions, albeit for French workers only. This can be considered as a major reason for the growing nationalist consciousness among Moroccan workers and unions in the years to follow (Clement and Paul, 1984). The trade union movement that would emerge had often shown and proven a significant potential to mobilise the masses in Morocco's history and was characterised by palpable militancy. After the assassination of Tunisia's most prominent labour leader, Ferhat Hached, in 1952, Moroccan unionists rallied the streets of Casablanca and, following the call of nationalists, equipped themselves with improvised weapons. At the end of the rally, unionists attacked the colonial police with axes and batons (Buehler, 2015*b*, p.92).

In 1955, one year before the formal independence of Morocco, the well known activists Bouazza and Ben Seddiq managed to found the Union General du Travail *Morocco* (UMT), that would become a powerful player in the political arena and the start for institutionalization on the macro-level. Meanwhile, the connection to the Istiqlal Party and hence to the state apparatus grew stronger. The union officers got special benefits and were de facto paid by the state. The struggle for independence had unified the working class, however, it had also concealed the question of basic orientation of the UMT between class struggle and nationalism, that became more evident in the late 1950s. Discords between the UMT and the Istiqlal Party lead to the establishment of a second union center in 1959 labelled Union Générale des Travailleurs du Maroc (UGTM), and taking with it several important UMT locals among the teachers, dockers and miners. It was promoted as a step against the attempt of the UMT leadership and leftists inside the Istiqlal to take over the nationalist movement and the party (Clement and Paul, 1984). In the same year a new leftist party was founded, the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires *Morocco* (UNFP). After 1972, following a deterioration of the relationship between the UNFP and the UMT, the UNFP split. There was bloc close to the UMT, still labelled UNFP, and having a nationalist stance on the one side, and the new Socialist Union of Popular Forces Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires *Morocco* (USFP), defining itself as rather leftist-progressive on the other.

The latter founded the Confédération Démocratique du Travail *Morocco* (CDT*) in November 1978, despite a nationalist atmosphere and overemphasis of national unity due to the annexation of Western Sahara. Two years before the Islamic "Union Nationale du Travail au Maroc" (UNTM), having its stronghold in the educational sector was founded. Due to the emergence of many trade union organisations with strong ties to political actors since the 1960s and 1970s, already Moore (1970, p.184) attests that especially for parties, no matter how meagre their membership, it became "fashionable to create 'union appendages'". The four aforementioned union federations, together with the CDT split "Fédération Démocratique du Travail" which was formed in 2004, were the most influential union centres among the 21 existing ones in 2011.

Unions Becoming Appendices of Political Parties

In contrast to Jordan with its high degree of union centralisation, the power to mobilise made unions beneficial partners and tools for political parties in Morocco. While the trade union organisations mostly stuck to the guidelines of their political affiliates or maintained a low profile in political issues touching the distribution of political power (the UMT even declared itself explicitly a-political (Catusse, 2001, p.47-48, fn. 31), they uttered and perused socio-economic demands in a more straightforward manner. The massive protests against market-oriented politics implemented by the regime, most palpable in 1979, 1981, and 1990 were organised by unions and led to violent clashes with the security forces and fatal casualties. The protests developed a pushing and militant dynamic, leading to a harsh governmental reaction. In 1979, when unions mobilised especially among public employees of education, mining, and railway workers to pressure the elected government to raise wages and to compensate for price increases, 688 unionists were jailed, 708 teachers fired, and 178 healthcare workers dismissed (Buehler, 2015*b*, p.94). The riots of 1981 even peaked in a massacre of 645 participants and thousands of injured, and systematic repression of union leaders. The massive impact of and power unfolded by the street protests can be explained by the ability to activate disenchanted masses from the poorer areas that were bandwagoning along with the union organised rallies, due to the deterioration of the social-economic status of many urban dwellers that was a side effect of market-oriented politics. Eventually, most of the demands of the protesters were met and most price controls were reinstated. This ensured a kind of truce between the leading trade union organisations and the government for the years to follow. Even after the riots of 1990, causing 40 fatal casualties, when 20.000 mostly unemployed young men swarmed the streets and caused significant material damaged, the regimes' answer was rather moderate, although a campaign was launched against CDT leader Noubir Amaoui with a delay of two years (Waltz, 1995, p.128). This history of protests and riots caused a learning process of the monarchical power holders and among unionists. The latter, still being aware of

their mobilisation potential, nevertheless sought more the shelter of political parties and moved towards becoming a player and beneficiary inside the retaliation game of the Monarchy and the domesticated plurality, however, without searching for direct confrontation. The regime, on the other side, bearing the possible power of unions in mind, became more responsive to union demands for the sake of curtailing what Zartman (2016, p.71) labels the "anomic threat" that trade unions showed to be able to inflict. This bargain, however, led to an open space, as unions - just as political parties - tended increasingly to neglect the demands of the deprived population inside the country that stood outside the distribution networks linked to the regime. It was this space where the February 20 Movement finally emerged.

6.4.4   The Twofold Demands: Economic and Political Demands Separated

The protests of early 2011 triggered a reform process inside the country as well as some socio-economic concessions which were wrenched off from the regime amongst others by the leading trade union centres in a number of negotiations. Taking a look at the economic data, and similar to Algeria, the protests of workers and unions can be assessed as rather pro-cyclical: They did not mainly aim at changing the very nature of the institutional equilibrium and focussed on increasing the share of state revenues they receive. A look at the economic figures of the country supports this thesis: Unemployment was about 9 per cent in 2010, however, the rate decreased constantly since 2000 after it had been increasing at the end of the 1990s. It is the second most continuous decrease in the sample (again, after Algeria). Youth unemployment remained between 17 and 18 per cent, this is quite high, however, compared to the rest of the sample it is in the bottom half. Inflation rates were among the lowest in the sample and remained under 4 per cent per year between 2000 and 2010 and had, by trend, been falling since 1990. The purchasing power of the minimum wage had increased by more than 120 per cent between 2000 and 2010, whereas the minimum wage system, which was introduced already in 1936, was comparatively elaborated and well implemented (Agénor and Aynaoui, 2003, p.12). The case of Morocco is thus coded SOEC = (0).

Early Protests: Demanding for a King that Reigns but does not Rule

In January and the beginning of February 2011 the upheavals and political changes in Tunisia and Egypt had only triggered small manifestations of solidarity in Morocco with an international focus. But slowly voices and platforms covered by the anonymity of the internet began to ask questions about the situation inside Morocco. Several influencer and groups called for nationwide mobilisation on February 20 2011, forging thus a movement carrying the name of that particular date, and being a movement that

would play a crucial role in the moths to follow. Some demands were socio-economic in nature and addressed the dissatisfaction with the growing cost of living, or the high youth unemployment uttered in earlier protest waves, however, a more radical, political tone weaved itself into the slogans. Requests included (Molina, 2011):

- the realization of profound and radical constitutional and political changes to consolidate a democratic state built on strong institutions

- the construction of a state based on the rule of law, say, a more effective fight against corruption

- a free and independent legal system and division of powers

- a political system of parliamentary, say, constitutional Monarchy

Especially the last point the demands of the February 20 Movement earned the reputation of being rather moderate in comparison to its inspirational sources such as Tunisia and Egypt. The Monarchy as form of government, and Mohammad VI as its highest representative, was not put particularly into question. Nonetheless, even if we consider the slogan "a King that reigns but does not rule[14]" as a rather evolutionary than a revolutionary attitude, still the political quality of the demanded changes is remarkable and a phenomenon not witnessed in this extent before in the younger history of the country. The movement managed to incorporate different political players and currents, such as numerous non-governmental organisations like human rights associations, four small left-wing political parties, their and other parties' youth sections (including some in the government coalition), the Islamists of Al-Adl wal Ihsan and Al-Badil Al-Hadari, and a part of the Amazigh (Berber) movement (Molina, 2011, p.437).

The Rediscovery of Old Union Bargaining Strength

The protests of the February 20 Movement were accompanied by trade unionists and strikes. These activities differed with respect to their goals from the political aspects the February 20 movement stressed, and mostly covered socio-economic demands only. In fact, labour protests began to increase significantly before the rise of the February 20 Movement: On November 3 2010, public employees called a nationwide 48-hour strike with 85 per cent participation followed by a 72-hour strike on January 10 across all government office nationally, achieving a participation rate of 80 per cent. On January 28, the phosphate miners' union, an institution historically known for its militancy, went on strike for a health insurance actually granted by the labour law - but in

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[14]The original slogan *malakiya barlamaniya - yasud fiha al malik wa la yahkum* is more flexible as its common English translation, as the word "sada - yasidu" covers a lingual field from "dominate" over "predominate" to "reign". That way, the future role of the Monarchy was more open and somewhat blurred, and more political players could be included into the movement.

reality not available. The increase of collective action, which was mostly backed by the most influential trade union federations, was a result of a disappointment with the new government of which socialist inclined parties were members of. Before, labour leaders did not endorse in earlier protests of the 2000s in order to avoid compelling their allies in the government (Buehler, 2015b, pp.98-99). However, the unions became disillusioned from about 2007 onwards, perceiving that they could not count on the socialists to implement their demands.

With the strike in the mining sector, the union had hit a neuralgic point as Morocco was in 2011 the world's largest exporter of phosphate. The state owned *Office Chérifien des Phosphates* OCP remained the primary company for phosphate mining in Morocco, with more than 300,000 employees, producing 3 percent of its GDP and exporting almost 30 percent of its total exports (Catusse, 2009, p.2). Other key areas of the economy were agriculture, tourism, and the textile industry.

Even the UTM, often being accused of being regime friendly, struggled successfully for the right of its members in the textile sector. After a collective dismissal of 186 workers because of collective action at Somitex SA in 2004, the union submitted a complaint to the ILO (Case No. 2404, Morocco) and eventually reached a settlement by reconciliation: The workers concerned obtained material compensation, fixed jointly with the employer. The long lasting process is symptomatic for state-labour relations in the late 2000s. Strikes and sit ins often lacked participation and were often dispersed by the security forces (In Defence of Marxism, 2011), and authorities tried to exclude trade unions from from negotiations between the industry association, employers, and the state (, ILO). Still, unions had mostly enough strength and willingness to face state authorities when it counted.

Against that background, the high degree of privatisation of the Moroccan economy since the 1990s is a key feature to understand the role of trade unions vis-á-vis the state. New modes of tripartite negotiation that also involved the new class of owners openly broke with the tradition of direct face-to-face confrontation between workers' unions and the state (Catusse, 2009, p.23-24), which had been traditionally the main employer. The privatisation policies that also included basic infrastructure already at an early stage (Khosrowshahi, 1997, p.245), together with a straightforward policy of diversification that aimed at reducing the state's dependence of single, state owned industries like phosphate, making the state less vulnerable to collective action and strikes. Still, benefiting from its history of militancy, unions enjoyed bargaining power and influence on macro politics, as Agénor and Aynaoui (2003, p.12) still claim about the minimum wages in 2003:

> [...] they are usually the outcome of political and discretionary decisions, following overwhelming pressure from the trade unions. The few available studies reveal that the urban minimum wage regulation (which concerns mostly unskilled workers) is pretty well enforced in the private formal sector, through an active role of the administration and the trade unions.

When the wave of upheavals spread across MENA, trade unions saw a possibility to

push trough demands and regain credibility. By fact, the politically split union movement had lost more and more the support of the working class, as could be seen in the professional elections before 2011 in which the amount of trade union members in the working councils dropped from 47 per cent in 2003 to 35 per cent in 2009 (Meknassi and Rioux, 2010, p.10). It can safely be assumed that the new self-perception of unions after 2007 had strengthened its position in the country and especially in key sectors. Dissimilar to Jordan, this history of recent struggle, and the still echoing anomic threat, gave unions a comparatively high bargaining power. The variable KEYS is therefore coded (1) for Morocco.

This strength proved to be an asset in socio-economic negotiations that started soon after February 20. Issues were the enhancement of wages, the creation of new job opportunities, and issues related to the pension system and income taxes. State-labour consultations were announced already on February 21 by prime minister Fassi that would comprise four unions — the relative recent Fédération Démocratique du Travail *Morocco* (FDT), being close to government, the UMT, UGTM, and UNTM. These unions exerted tangible pressure to push their socio-economic demands. Additionally, the CDT - that boycotted the social dialogue accusing the regime of diversion and hampering of the reform process by setting up inadequate committees instead of showing direct action - increased the pressure form outside the negotiations. After the settlement of inter and intra-union disparities about the nature and extent of their claims, and some rounds of negotiation spiced with partially harsh denials of governmental proposals, on April 26 the body agreed upon a package of several measures. It included retirement bonuses, professional promotions, wage and pension raises and an increase of the minimum wage. The success of these negotiations can be traced back to the potential to mobilise, which the unions had shown in the decades before, being a part of the collective memory of the country and the ruling elite - which was trying to circumvent the anomic threat the movement could pose (Buehler, 2015*b*).

Trade Unions as Onlooker Nodding through Weak Reforms

However, different from Jordan, trade unions in Morocco did not engage much into discussions about system reform. They rather took the chance to reconnect with their base by pushing through socio-economic demands. Meanwhile, other players fought for reform.

King Muhammad VI announced in a speech on March 9 far-reaching reforms. The breadth and specific nature of the promises endorsing a substantial power shift away from the royal palace to elected institutions took many people by surprise. A core element was the announcement of a new constitution replacing the 1996 version, granting the parliament more rights vis-a-vis the King. In his speech, the King picked up many demands made by the February 20 movement, without mentioning the movement itself,

and presented himself as the trailblazer of the "reformist momentum". The strategy coincided with the self-image the King is promoting since his inauguration in 1999, depicting a picture of a reform-willing monarch being worried about the stability of his country. Moreover, the implementation of a new constitution or constitutional amendments has a long-lasting tradition in the country, as there have been undertaken seven such endeavours since independence already, the last in 1996. Shortly after the Kings' March 9 speech, the Commission Consultative pour la Revision Constitutionelle *Morocco* (CCRC) was implemented consisting of nominees of the King only, which was criticised by many activists. Furthermore, the meetings of the commission were not public and other civil society groups, trade unions, and even the February 20 movement got merely the opportunity to submit proposals in audiences in the framework of a so-called "political mechanism accompanying the constitutional reform" (Molina, 2011, p.439). The constitution, that was worked out in opacity and in a tight time frame, and that was supported by a positive media campaign, was accepted by the population in a referendum on July 1 2011 with more than 98 per cent. The leading trade union centres UTM, UGTM,and CDT, just as the majority of trade unions took the same stance as their parties and canvassed actively for the new constitution. Nonetheless, the outcome was rather sobering compared to the hopes the March 9 speech had risen. The new constitution did indeed introduce a formal enhancement in human rights, enhanced the independence of the government, and tackled judicial reforms. However, the basic role and power of the King was barely altered. He kept amongst other privileges the rights to rule by decree (Art. 42), the power to appoint and dismiss ministers (Art 47), and his status of the "Commander of the Faithful" (Art. 41) (Maghraoui, 2011, p.696).

Without going into further detail of the assessment of the constitution of 2011, two statements can be made. First, the constitution did not meet the hopes and demands of the progressive voices the February 20 Movement, and, second, it was the movement indeed that opened the road for reform as the progressive force inside the country. Even Belkeziz (2012) who explicitly defends the outcome of the constitutional reform process, acknowledges the Movement as the driving force. Hence, it can be identified as interference factor trying to alter the institutional equilibrium of the country. The role of parties and trade unions was, in contrast, rather hesitant (Maghraoui, 2011; Biagi, 2014). There was little intersection or exchange between unions and the movement, as the movement stressed that it emerged outside the established framework, say, explicitly outside the party and trade union framework. Moreover, it was the lack of political progressiveness that hampered a more close collaboration, as activist Mohammad Hanafi stresses when writing about "union goals" and "movement goals" (Hanafi, 2011):

> February 20 movement is not a party movement, it is, moreover, not directed by a particular union, or a group of trade unions, even though some of its founding constituents are of trade union nature. Any attempt to make it a trade union

movement limits the possibility of opening to the masses, because they [the unions] are only seeking to achieve union goals, rather than achieving the goals of the February 20 Movement.

Morrocan Journalist and activist Miriam Moukrim attests the Movements' failure to achieve its main goal of a far-reaching reform of the political system in Morocco, and ties that to the inability to activate established political players, amongst others the trade unions (Moukrim, 2015). This means, that trade unions did have allies in the parliaments among the opposition parties with which they were working closely together, however, unions did, just like their allies in opposition, not interfere into the reform process like the February 20 youth movement. The variable INOPP is hence set to (0).

6.5 Tunisia (1)

By 2010, a strong bureaucracy and security apparatus as well as a ascending business elite were the main pillars of Ben Ali's power. Also the Tunisian trade union federation UGTT had been an inherent part of the system. It was horizontally fragmented into a leading elite mostly located in Tunis, and a more radical base in the south. Even without focusing on the role the UGTT played in the transitional process - for which it gained the Nobel Prize for Peace in 2015 together with the Bar Association, the Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de l'Homme (LTDH), and the Chamber of Commerce Union Tunisienne de l'Industrie, du Commerce et de l'Artisanat (UTICA) - the role of the trade union movement in Tunisia can be seen as decisive for the change of the institutional equilibrium. For 2011 it turned true what Yousfi (2015, p.56) states: When it came to collective action, especially in times of crisis, the progressive part of the UGTT often could win through and was the one to take the decisions. The QCA codification for the country is (1).

SOEC	INOPP	CEN	TRI	KEYS	**Outcome**	Decimal
1	0	1	0	1	**1**	TUN(20)

Table 6.7: Truth table row for the case of Tunisia

Especially in comparison with Libya, Jordan, or Morocco, and as will be outlined in part 6.5.1, tribalism was existent in many parts of the country, however, it did never play a pivotal role in the country's macropolitics. The variable TRI is therefore coded (0). Due to economic mismanagement the state was not perceived capable to maintain the authoritarian bargain in a satisfactory manner for the populace. This becomes

evident when taking a look at the economic pattern and indicators of the country as will be done in part 6.5.1. Hence, the variable SOEC is coded (1). In this environment, and as will be outlined in part 6.5.5, the UGTT had lost its control over the union movement and also a huge amount of bargaining power in key sectors, especially since 2000. The variable KEYS is coded (0). As the UGTT still remained the dominant trade union federation with a high degree of centralisation, the variable CEN is coded (1), and due to its independence from political parties, which had always been a core attribute of the heterogeneous federation as shown in part 6.5.5, the variable INOPP is coded (0).

6.5.1   The Equilibrium: Police State, Corporatism, and Patrimonialism

By 2010, Tunisia was a Republic dominated by a single party that was characterised by a large bureaucratic body intertwined with state institutions. The President of the Republic posed the most powerful position in the equilibrium. He had the rights to propose bills which have to be prioritised in parliament (Art.28), was able to rule by decrees, and could declare emergency status (Art.46). His term could be extended by law in case of war or immanent peril and he could be re-elected infinitely (Art.39). Additionally, he had the right to dismiss members of Government (Art.51) and was the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (Art.44).

A Tradition of Keeping the Military in Check

Habib Bourguiba, who emerged as first President from the anti-colonial struggle against France, was a civilian with little sympathy for the military. During his incumbency he continuously argued that the scarce resources of the country should rather be spent on development than on defence (Bou Nassif, 2015, p.67, fn.10). Bourguiba's main pillar of power, just like the one of his successor Ben Ali, was the single party (the Neo-Dustour Party between 1957 until 1964, then the Parti Socialiste Destourien *Tunisa* (PSD) until 1988) that penetrated the Tunisian society. Party membership soon became necessary for any Tunisian who aimed at making a career in the public sector. Simultaneously, the emergence of a controlled sphere of civil society organisations was encouraged. This *controlled civisme* (Bellin, 2015, p.126), changing in extent over the post-colonial history, led to a comparatively vibrant civil society, which distinguishes Tunisia from other authoritarian party systems according to Linz (1971).

The ascendency to power of General Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, Bourguiba's Prime Minister and former director-general of national security, changed the power structures slightly. Ben Ali's power base was less located in the PSD but rather in the armed forces and the Ministry of Interior. A subtle power struggle between the party's bureau-

cracy and ambitious Army officers was unleashed, with the latter now more frequently becoming governors, ambassadors, and ministers. However, the favouritism was superficial only, as Bou Nassif (2015, p.69) states:

> And yet a careful examination of Bin 'Ali's allocation of positions to military elites during the initial years of his rule reveals no rupture with Bourguiba's practices. Although he appointed more officers to ministerial and diplomatic positions than did Bourguiba, the difference was marginal. Further, most of the officers whom Bin 'Ali appointed to civilian posts belonged to his own cohort; the new president was rewarding life-long friends, not the military institution.

The powerful party soon feared loss of influence and found an ally in the domestic security forces, in particular in the Direction Générale de la Secureté Nationale, and the police, which both competed with the Army about resources and viewed the installation of Army staff in their leading ranks as threatening. In 1991, the police eventually managed to drive a wedge between the Army and the president. In the Barakat al-Sahil affair, Minister of Interior Abdallah Qallal presented a Captain in the national TV who claimed to be part of a coup attempt steered by elements of the Islamist Al-Nahda party, and aiming at the establishment of a Iranian-like Shari'a State in Tunisia. The allegations, which turned much later out to be extracted under torture, had a deep impact of Ben Ali, who now even more started to rely on the Party and the domestic security services.

Patrimonial Clan Structures but no Systematic Tribalism

In contrast particularly to Morocco and Libya, Tunisia is the country of the sample with the least tribal and/or sectarian tensions. The relative homogeneity of the small country, that was actually meant to become a part of Libya under Italian rule, has allowed almost no emergence of particularistic groups based on ethnicity that would have delimited themselves against others in order to increase their share of the country's rents. This might have been a reason why a secularist-modernist project, which the first leaders around Habib Bourguiba had in mind, faced relatively little resistance from the populace. Moreover, it was one of the pivotal credos of Bourguiba to fight centrifugal forces of regionalism and tribalism and all leftovers of the "traditional structures of yesterday" (Micaud, 1969, p.471). Although tribal traditions and thinking did still exist by 2010, especially in the south of the country, the population had an ambivalent relationship towards it. Tribal solidarity was often regarded as something inevitable, yet often misused for propaganda against the region by the regime, which had made people even reluctant to discuss it (Khalil, 2014, p.51-53). Consequently, no serious political players emerged drawing somewhat on tribal bonds.

This does not mean that blood did not play a role in the political system of Tunisia. Like in each MENA country - and to different extents beyond - influential families did find a way to profit from kin connections in order to advance the political career or enrichment

of their members. This was particularly true after the regime started to promote privatisation politics. The family of Ben Ali himself is said to have befitted on a grand scale. The security apparatus he had set up under his control gave him and his family of about 140 persons vast powers that included arbitrary expropriation and power over lives wrapped ostensibly in the decisions of an obedient police and jurisdiction. Especially Leila Trabelsi, Ben Ali's second wife gained fame for her ruthlessness and became known as the "Régent de Carthage," a reference to her growing influence in politics. Her children conducted business all over Tunisia, and her brother Belhassen, called le parrain (the godfather), illegally assumed control over several enterprises and real estate. According to the Central Bank of Tunisia, relatives of the former president and his wife owned at least 180 major companies (Schraeder and Redissi, 2011, p.9). Nonetheless, compared to the countries of the sample, and given the lack of political power on the political macro level, tribalism was no decisive element of the institutional equilibrium. The variable TRI is therefore coded (0) for the case of Tunisia.

The Rise of Political Islam in the Shadows

While tribalism played a minor role, religion entered politics in the second decade after independence. Similar to the mass mobilising party system in Algeria, the fight against Islamism became a decisive element to understand the dynamics of the country.
Political Islam had a difficult stance from the beginning of the post-independence era. Bourguiba himself initiated the expropriation of properties of religious foundations, abolished the existing Shari'a courts, and stressed his secular reformism. Different from the regime of Morocco, which managed to unify tribal and religious currents under the leadership of the King, Bourguiba's rhetoric was straightforwardly republican, he repelled religious influence and even accused the 'Ulama of the country, including those from the influential Sufi currents, of collaboration with the French (Wolf, 2017, p.28). In the shadows, fuelled by disdain of Bourguiba's modernisation project, an allegedly corrupt and submissive clergy, and disappointment about the perceived failure of the Panarab Project due to the defeat of 1967, the Djama'a al-Islamiyya formed as first palpable Islamist group in 1972. It gained influence especially in the Tunisian heartland in the west and south, where people experienced a relative amelioration of living standards due Bourguiba's countrywide education programme. However upward mobility was often blocked (Wolf, 2017, p.28). This center-periphery divide between heartland and coastal areas was the result of a middle class that had developed around olive oil production in coastal areas, and that had led to the concentration of wealth and power in the north and the east of the country over time (Ayeb, 2011). These circumstances produced an economic dependence of the south on the north that still played a role in the early 2000s - although the south is rich in natural resources such as water, agricultural lands,oases, ores, gas and oil.
The Djama'a and its successor - the 1981 founded Movement de la Tendance Islamique

Morocco (MTI) - as well as its successor the Al-Nahda party (founded 1988) were constantly riddled with splits about issues of militancy versus non violence, democracy versus theocracy, the role of the president in the institutional setting of the country, or women's rights. Its moderate parts had contacts to an "Islamo-Destourian" wing, and even Bourguiba himself, occupied with the fight against the far left in the 1970s and early 1980s, turned at times a blind eye on the new Islamic current (Wolf, 2017, p.38-39). This changed on August 2 1987, when at the height of the tourist season bombs exploded at four hotels in Monastir - Habib Bourguiba's birthplace and one day before his birthday (Borowiec, 1998, p.39-40). Bourguiba was furious and although a group called Islamic Jihad, a splinter of the MTI that split around 1984, claimed responsibility, the government sought to link the violence to the Islamic movement as such. Consequently, besides the two bombers, also MTI chiefs Hamadi Jebali, Salah Karker, and Ali Larayedh were sentenced to death in absentia. The decision triggered criticism from inside and outside Tunisia, and even Ben Ali, who was responsible for the crackdown on the 1978 general strike and who had the reputation of being a hardliner regarding the Islamists was more than sceptical. When Ben Ali found out about a planned coup of the MTI scheduled on November 7 1987, he scheduled his own coup before that date. In this "medical coup", he managed bloodlessly to overtake the country by letting then 85 year old Bourguiba be declared mentally incapable of ruling the country any further. The Islamic movement decided to await the first decisions of the new President.

Ben Ali's initial politics promised change in Tunisia. He was ostensibly more eager to give Tunisia a religious image, however, in 1988 he criminalised activities and meetings in mosques by people other than those appointed by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, by this way hitting MTI's traditional recruitment base and site of activism (Wolf, 2017, p.69). After several crackdowns in the 1990s, the anti-terror law, rapidly drawn up after 9/11, gave security forces vast freedoms and systematic torture became a standard procedure welcoming young men in interrogations (Ayeb, 2011, p.469).

Second, Ben Ali promised democratic opening, changed the name of the PSD to Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique *Tunisia* (RCD), and called for elections in 1989. The MTI, which changed its name to Haraka Al-Nahda - as the electoral law prohibited the formation of parties on religious, racial, ethnic, and geographical grounds - won 17 per cent, although many observers claim that electoral fraud had halved their initial share of votes. Amendments to the electoral code prevented further large-scale victories of the Islamist or any of the six legal opposition parties. By 1990, 80 per cent of the seats in the lower chamber, the House of Deputies, were allocated according to the first-past-the-post system and hence RCD controlled, while opposition parties competed about the other 20 per cent. The constitutional law on the pluralism of candidatures for the presidential election of 1999 restricts even more blatantly the participation in the electoral process. The law provided that only the "first responsi-

ble" for a legal political party (Secretary General or Chairman) may become candidate, provided that he or she has been in office for at least five years at the time of the official application, and that his or her political party is represented in parliament for at least one term (Gobe and Chouikha, 2000, p.34-35).

Economic Reforms with a Patrimonial Capitalist Touch

Although the "socialist experiment" between 1961 and 1969, when Bourguiba supported the collectivisation of land and a planned economy suggested by Ahmed Ben Saleh, had been declared a failure, the predominance of the state in economics remained unbroken. Most economic indicators showed an increased share of the public sector in the national economy from 1969 to 1980, although the new investment codes of 1972 and 1974 provided incentives for private sector investment. About 110 new public enterprises emerged from 1973 to 1984, and in 1981 public sector enterprises still contributed about 60 percent of the value of all manufacturing production (Beinin, 2015, p.76). Although by the mid-1980s Tunisia experienced an economic crisis, the dominant social forces were unwilling to initiate changes that might have jeopardised their power to control the country (Murphy, 1999, p.5).

This did not change when Zine el Abidine Ben Ali seized power. Promising to usher in a new era of political liberalization, the new president was committed only wholeheartedly to the process of economic reform (Murphy, 1999, p.5). Similar to Egypt's patrimonial capitalism, especially circles close to Ben Ali benefited form most measures of economic opening and liberalisation. Additionally, the regime started to resort more to violence and repression in order to calm critics. This mode of government caused an alienation of the population from the ruling elite. Political opening did not directly threaten the power of the Ben Ali network and the ruling party as long as an atmosphere of fear could be upheld. The party lacked power and connections into the state to be really able to achieve sustainable change, and it also lacked connections into all strata of the population to be able to monitor its needs. Deviance and dis-accord were met with coercion. Consequently, Murphy (1999, p.233) writes already at the end of the 1990s:

> Ben Ali's version of corporatism is ultimately unsustainable in its present form. The failure to provide adequate institutional means for interest articulation and mediation acts to undermine any national consensus by alienating and marginalizing elements of society. Equally, the dependence upon coercion indicates that the organic nature of state-party-society relations has been whittled away. The problem for Ben Ali is that authoritarian measures are both the result of, and the cause of, political tensions that threaten to undermine the very political construction from which they originate.

This was exacerbated by a continuous deterioration of economic key indicators and the standard of living of the population. Although the total unemployment rate in Tunisia decreased from 15 per cent in 2000s, the rate of 13 per cent in 2010 was still comparatively high: It was about one third higher than in Morocco or Syria and at

the same level as Jordan and Egypt. Youth unemployment was with about 29 per cent in 2010 the second highest in the sample. Taking a look at the internal disparities reveals that in the peripheral areas, in which protests and also union activity began, total unemployment rates were between 22 and 25 per cent (Verdier-Chouchane and Obayashi, 2011). This means that a vast part of the population could not benefit from the increase of the purchasing power of the minimum wage of about 95 per cent since 2000 - which still was one of the lowest increase of the entire sample. Given the increased use of violence and political repression while the state was less capable of displaying an economic performance that could hold up the authoritarian bargain, the variable SOEC is coded (1) for Tunisia.

6.5.2 A Horizontally Stratified Union Federation with a Vibrant History of Workers Struggle

Three features of Tunisia are important to explain the history of trade unionism inside Tunisia: First, the concept of Controlled Civisme in combination with a need to show some "democratic progress" towards international donors, always created a small space for civil society engagement. Second, the center-periphery split allowed for network building outside the grip of surveillance of the regime, which was focussed on controlling the Sahel, the industrial centres of the north, and the capital. The division of Tunisia into a coastal area and the heartland is, however, misleading, as cultural, economical, and societal differences also persist between the south and south-east of the country on the one side, and a Gafsa-Sfax-Kerkennah Islands axis and the coastal strip from Sfax to El-Jem and Mahdia on the other. This semi-industrial area, which became a stronghold of the Al-Nahda party (different from the more remote south and south-east) after 2011, can be regarded as intermediate zone between the centres of power and the neglected peripheries of the country.

The impoverishment and marginalisation of the interior already impelled social mobilisations during the French rule and were a pivotal component of the nationalist movement. Indeed, many of the initial founders of the *Union Génerale des Travailleurs Tunisiennes* (UGTT) in 1946 originated from this intermediate region (Beinin, 2015, p.171). Under Ben Ali, the UGTT witnessed an alienation from its base - which still proved to be very active in many aspects especially in the intermediate zone and the peripheries.

Third, similar to Algeria, the UGTT was somewhat always a part of the system, benefited from its historical role during the struggle for Tunisia's independence, and also from a certain proximity to the regime. The relationship between the ruling party and the UGTT was, however, by no means free of tensions.

Early Confrontations between the Ruling Party and the Trade Unions

An increasing number of strikes in the 1950s and early 1960s called the attention of the single party and led to repression and the attempt to turn the UGTT into an educational arm of the ruling party. The constitution of 1959 stipulated in Art.19 that one-third of the Chambre des Conseillers, the second chamber whose members were appointed by local authorities and the president, should be elected at the national level from among employers, farmers and workers. Candidates should be proposed by the concerned professional organisations and seats were distributed equally among the professional sectors. By that way, the UGTT was meant to become a corporatist mass mobilising organisation to monitor the workers' grievances and to provide upward mobility for loyalists. These plans seemed to work out like a charm in the first two decades of the country's history, as the government enjoyed great influence on the federation: Bourguiba managed to remove UGTT president Ben Saleh in 1956 and his successor Ahmed Tlili in 1963 by influencing the UGTT's electoral procedures; their successor Habib Achour was simply arrested in 1965 (Wilder, 2015, p.351).

It cannot be determined whether the Labour Code of 1966 became relatively progressive because the regime felt secure due to its dominance over the unions, or if it feared massive wildcat strikes and clandestine unions if the law had been too strict on trade union issues. The law stipulates comparatively low hurdles to register a trade union (Art.250), gave them a voice in many employer-employee issues, and did not explicitly grant the UGTT the role of the countries sole trade union center - like in other corporatist mobilising party systems like Algeria, Libya, Egypt, or Syria.[15] Also the avoidance to strengthen the UGTT may have been a reason which had never been put completely under control, especially after it had proven to be a strong opponent in the late 1970s.

6.5.3   A Struggle with an Ambivalent Outcome: The 1977/1978 Upheavals

Despite increased repression, 1977 and 1978 became the most contentious and strike-loaded years in Tunisa's young history. European states closing their borders for Tunisian goods due to a recession caused, among other things, strikes in the large industrial complex of the textile industry in Ksar-Hellal, the birthplace of the Neo-Dustur party. The conflict led to a regional upheaval in 1978. Workers all over the

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[15]The split of the UTT in 1956, led by Habib Achour who had a rather pro-government stance and who could influence also the UGTT, may also have remained positively in the minds of the lawmakers. Another secession occurred in 1984, when the Union Nationale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UNTT) formed as a result of internal disagreement in the UGTT board, absorbing about one quarter of the UGTT members (Tartter, 1986, p.245). The UGTT, although having a powerful position and the backing of the regime which harassed new unions like the Confédération Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens *Tunisia* (CGTT) in the 2000s, has never been the sole trade union center *by law*.

country were rallying against a deterioration of living standards caused by the fall of
the price of olive oil and phosphate due to increased regional competition. The value of
Tunisian exports decreased by nine per cent between 1974 and 1977, and in the same
time external borrowing tripled the countries debt (Alexander, 2010b, p.78). The party
leadership demanded more control of the UGTT leadership over the protests, and when
this turned out to be impossible, the government demanded new union elections and
control of UGTT finances in 1978. The union leadership, which to a certain extent
managed to emancipate from the grip of the party in the years before, called a general
strike for 24 hours, which eventually caused mass protests, riots, and strikes in the
major cities of Tunisia, producing civil-war like sceneries.

The phase of regained strength and independence of organised labour was preceded
by a widening of the base of the UGTT. A number of new white-collar unions includ-
ing secondary school teachers, university professors and bank workers had joined the
federation (Wilder, 2015, p.352), and moreover, Habib Achour had quietly dropped
the UGTT's long-standing policy of excluding communists from union offices (Wilder,
2015, p.351). After an alleged plot against Bourguiba in 1962, the Communist Party
was prohibited in 1963, however, many members remained active in groups like the
Union Générale des Étudiants de Tunisie (UGET), the most important and only le-
gal—student body. The infrastructure of the UGTT, which was well organised and
financed, attracted many new members, especially in the peripheral and intermediate
zone where the grip of the PSD or RCD was not as strong as in its northern strongholds.
Moreover, political considerations were taken into account by many players in the coun-
try. As the succession of Bourguiba, who suffered from an apparently serious illness in
the 1970s, was not clear, many wanted to avoid spoiling their chances with the labour
movement. The leadership of the UGTT had proven to be a valuable ally for the PSD
in the Monastir crisis, when a group of liberals tried to seize regional party influence.
The UGTT had regained its influence and consequently, when UGTT leader Habib
Achour was confronted with his closeness to the PSD, he resigned from the central
committee of the Party keeping his UGTT post. Although he and other leaders were
imprisoned in the wake of the 1978 turmoils, strikes continued in the early 1980s, lead-
ing eventually to the release of Achour himself (Bellin, 2002, p.111).

The last years of the rule of Bourguiba were characterised by much broken porcel-
lain concerning state-UGTT relations. As at the economical level the country faced
difficulties to provide jobs and keep its part of the bargain rule, the state invested in
capital intensive technology to enhance the revenues and overstaffed most public owned
enterprises to absorb unemployed workers at the same time. Enterprises ran at 40-60
per cent productivity and were highly subsidised, and also subsidies for food and other
basic goods sky-rocketed (Alexander, 2010b, 78-79). The IMF pressured in 1984 for a
subsidies cut that would have doubled the cost of bread and other goods leading again
to several days of major riots across the country. The state ultimately reacted with re-

pression against the UGTT that backed many strikes (Bellin, 2002, p.111-112). When
the UGTT threatened a general strike if the decline in real wages was not halted, the
government withdrew finance — a serious threat to the union's budget — and prohib-
ited union meetings in the workplace. The labour newspaper was also banned for six
months, and in December 1985 Habib Achour and other union officials were sentenced
to prison (Tartter, 1986, p.245-246).

The UGTT: A Federation Incapable of Controlling its Base

The seizure of power by Ben Ali in 1987 changed the standing of trade unionism.
Trade unionists were released from prison and public sector workers, fired for union
involvement, were reinstated (Bellin, 2002, p.116-117). Reforms of the labour law aimed
at securing social peace rather than containing the union movement (Bida-Jbali, 1989).
Two major reasons can be identified to explain that turn. First, Ben Ali's ambivalent
relationship with the military, which he did trust to a limited extent only, but on which
he would have had to resort to put down mass protests. Second, the UGTT leadership
was a straightforward and loyal ally in the fight against Islamist forces and in particular
the Al-Nahda party. The second point changed over time, however.

The fact that Al-Nahda leader Ghannouchi encouraged to join trade unions and the
UGTT since the 1980s, claiming among other things that Fadhel Ben Achour, one of
the "fathers of the Islamic renaissance and defender of Islam in Tunisia", had been one
of the UGTT's founders (Wolf, 2017, p.59), broadened again the base of the UGTT.
By the end of the 1980s, about 20 per cent of the members could be counted to the
Islamic spectrum, making the unionists on the lower level even more unpredictable and
uncontrolled by the leadership. Until the early 2000s, the regime and the party thus
faced a dilemma, as Wilder (2015, p.358) notes:

> Threatening union leaders would do little to realise the government and private
> capital's objectives. Either the government would have to make concessions or
> they would have to steel themselves for a new level of violence. Once the regime
> was resigned to granting concessions, fighting for a less autonomous UGTT lead-
> ership would have served little point. It would only have undermined the effort
> to sell the bargain to workers.

Against this background, Yousfi (2015) classifies two currents also inside the UGTT
leadership: One current submissive to power and quasi-integrated into the state appa-
ratus, pursuing a passive or evolutionary strategy, and another one resistant to power
that controlled certain intermediate structures inside the association willing to use
pressure if necessary vis-á-vis- the regime.

The independence of the basis was further increased when the generation of the left-
ist students of the 1970s and 1980s entered the professional associations in the 1990s
and were also elected into official union posts from the 2000s on. This generation
of Arab nationalists, Maoists, Trotskyists, Social Democrats, and independent leftists
who viewed the UGTT leadership with reciprocal distrust became well represented in

the unions of primary and secondary school teachers, health, postal, and telecommunications workers (Beinin, 2015, p.142). In contrast to Morocco, however, the anomic thread that derived from the union movement could still be better controlled due to the centralisation of the union movement. While in the Kingdom the fragmentation of the union landscape weakened the union movement as a whole, however, due to the lack of control there was still a high residual risk. This residual risk also remained in Tunisia, however, the superstructure of the UGTT allowed for a high degree of control. The regime faced besides the Bar Association also the the Syndicat National des Journalistes Tunisiens (SNJT) - the only union recognised outside the framework of the UGTT - which criticised the government for restricting press freedom and its harsh treatment of journalists. The government was influential enough to exchange the leadership in 2009, though (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Also the leadership of the Association of Engineers held close ties to the regime and got a representation problem at the beginning of the 2000s (Gobe, 2009).

Also the Bar Association repeatedly protested against the harassment of lawyers who defended opposition figures and critical journalists. The cohesion and straightforward collective actions, which included several general strikes of lawyers in the 2000s made it a center stage of struggles both for the opposition and the government (Gobe, 2010b). They were also an essential part of the 18 October Coalition for Rights and Freedoms organised by opposition and human rights groups in November 2005 to steer international attention on the human rights situation in Tunisia while the country hosted the World Summit on the Information Society. If violence is considered an important pillar of Ben Ali's regime, these forces tried slightly to change the equilibrium of power, albeit their success was eventually limited.

6.5.4 The Revolution: A Hesitant but Still Powerful Intervention of the UGTT

Among scholars and other observers of the Arab Uprisings, the UGTT is the most striking example of an active trade union federation during the protests. As an institution that had historically displayed a relative continuous proximity to the regime, and yet represented various strata of the society, the federation struggled for some weeks to find a unified position. Eventually, it became an important player during the regime change and afterwards. The impulse for the upheavals of 2011 - and also for a change of position of the UGTT towards a more regime-critical stance - initially came from the intermediate zone. The protests of Gafsa in 2008 laid a cornerstone for the uprising of 2011.

From Gafsa to Sidi Bouzid to Bourguiba Avenue in Tunis

In 2008, more than 10.000 protesters were mobilised during struggles that started in
the phosphate mining region of Gafsa and that caused the most important protest
movement of Tunisia since 1984 (Gobe, 2010*a*). It resulted in three people being killed
and around 100 arrested and is often referred to as the "first phase" of the revolu-
tion that would ouster Ben Ali three years later (Mabrouk, 2011, p.473). The region
around Gafsa suffered from economic decline since the implementation of structural
adjustment programmes in the 1980s. Due to restructuring, from 1980 to 2006 the
number of employees of the *Gafsa Phosphate Company* (GPC) fell from 14–15,000 to
5,000–5,800. Unemployment ranged from 20.9 to 38.5 percent and poverty rates were
30–40 percent. When the phosphate price tripled in three years until May 2008, the
company announced new jobs, however, it did apparently not adhere to a 1986 agree-
ment stipulating to give 20 percent of all new positions to qualified locals and children
of former employees. The local population alleged - being a recurring motive also in
the 2010s - that workers from the political centres in the north of the country whose
families held ties to the regime would be privileged compared to the regional workers
and specialists. The mining union, however, refrained from taking the initiative to
bargain, and also the UGTT mostly showed reluctance. Consequently, the federation
became a target itself, for instance, by local branch leader 'Amara 'Abbasi, who was
also member of parliament and the RCD, and who had relatives owning manpower
firms (Beinin, 2015, p.167). In Redeyef a small group of local trade unionists position-
ing themselves against the UGTT's regional leadership started to set up a bargaining
committee led by Adnene Hajji, secretary general of the local elementary school teach-
ers union (Chouikha and Gobe, 2009). The protests that caused many incidents due
to the harsh reaction of the security forces were supported by local trade unionists, the
Union des Diplomés Chômeurs *Tunisia* (UDC)[16] and delegations from branches of the
LTDH in Kairouan, Jendouba, and Monastir led by Messaoud Romdhani. The regime,
unwilling - or unable - to enter into bargaining, raided homes of movement leaders,
resorted to violence and tear gas grenades, and arrested the main activists, including
the committee of Redeyef. This triggered the reaction of all local trade union commit-
tees in Redeyef, except the miners union. After minor concessions by the GPC and the
government, the wave of strikes abated by the end of the year without achieving its
main goals (Beinin, 2015, p.327). The networks that were set up during this period,
however, were reactivated and played a major role in the downfall of the regime in
2011.

The "second phase" (Mabrouk, 2011, p.473) started on December 17, 2010. The self-

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[16]The UDC groups unemployed persons - foremost university graduates - in Tunisia under one
umbrella since 2006. Although unofficial before the revolution, and not part of the UGTT, both
organisations have cooperated, although the UGTT's demands for wage increases for state officials
are often regarded by the UDC as being pushed through at the expense of new jobs (Vatthauer and
Weipert-Fenner, 2017, p.22-26).

immolation of the street vendor Muhammad Bouaziz on that date can be regarded as the initial event for the revolution in Tunisia and for the uprisings that shook the entire Arab world and beyond. Although the incident has to be read and interpreted against the background of the social environment in which it occurred, and the "collective improvisation, exploitation of opportunity and acceptance of risk" (Mabrouk, 2011, p.626) that the Tunisian people showed in its aftermath, the incident triggered a sequence of events and became the starting point for a domino effect inside the entire region. Although the first two weeks of protests in Tunisia lacked a homogeneous vision of what was actually sought (Mabrouk, 2011, p.627), the militancy of the protests that spread from the home town of Bouaziz through the entire transitional region increased with every harsh reaction by security forces. Protesters attacked policemen and police stations, leading to an up-winding circle of violence that peaked in massacres by the police on January 8 2011 in Tala and Kasserine. On January 12 2011 Professor Hatem Baltahir was shot dead by police in the town of Douz, triggering attacks on governmental buildings and security headquarters. Whole districts were turned to "liberated areas" out of the control of the police (Mabrouk, 2011, p.627). Protesters now chanted more openly slogans against the government including "bread, freedom, national dignity" like used already in Gafsa 2008, and also "work is a right, you band of thieves" targeting Ben Ali and his family. After Ben Ali insisted in a speech on January 9 that he is willing to reinforce order with all measures whatsoever, the protests reached greater Tunis, where citizens of the middle class joined the until then workers and lower strata driven protests in the suburb of Kram (Mabrouk, 2011, p.475). While in the following days also Sfax, the second largest city and economic center of Tunisia also witnessed mass demonstrations, on January 14 the Bourguiba Avenue in Tunis was the venue of the largest demonstration in the history of the country. The day before Ben Ali announced in a third and final television appearance that he had "heard" and "understood" them, promising not to run for a sixth term in 2014. Nonetheless, protests did not abate, and swelling numbers Tunisians carried signs reading "Game Over!" and chanting "Ben Ali, dégage!" ("Get out!") (Schraeder and Redissi, 2011). On January 14 he left the country.

6.5.5 The Role of the Army and Islamic Associations

The events that lead to the flight of Ben Ali escalated comparatively quickly. Several players had a stake in the course of the developments, either by clearly aiming at the change of the institutional equilibrium or by refraining from upholding it. Perhaps most striking in comparison with other MENA states that witnessed large scale protests and attempts to change the power structure, the Army in Tunisia did not intervene into the protests. This can be traced back to the preference of Ban Ali for the domestic security forces, especially since the Barakat al-Sahil affair in 1991. In 2010, the Army employed 35,000 men and women, while the number of the security forces was

commonly assumed to number as high as 130,000 (Schraeder and Redissi, 2011, p.6), and government spending on the military constituted only 1.4 per cent of the GDP [17]. The Army refused repeatedly to interfere violently in the protests, especially as many officers had no incentive to protect the regime and the probability for a coup would have increased significantly if the Army leadership had given such orders. Hence, even if the commander of the Army, 'Ammar, would have wanted to keep Ben Ali in power, the officers corps had denied orders, especially those orders which included shedding blood of civilians (Bou Nassif, 2015). Consequently, while the military led the repression of the upheavals in the late 1970s and mid-1980s, in 2010-2011 the heavy-handed response to the December-January protests was led by the police, who did not refrain from opening fire on unarmed protesters (Arieff and Humud, 2014, p.14). The Army decided to protect the demonstrations, especially after the deployment of the military to the streets on January 12 2011. Besides, when Ali Seriati, commander of the presidential guard of 8,000 soldiers allegedly planned a coup himself and persuaded Ben Ali to flee, Army leader 'Ammar initiated the arrest of Seriati and his associates, while at the same time giving safe passage to Ben Ali by securing the airport (Schraeder and Redissi, 2011, p.13).

A second player that surprised observers was the powerful Islamic movement. Although religious individuals participated in the protests, the Islamic spectrum, foremost the Al-Nahda party, did not make visible appearance by spreading signs at demonstrations or organising events. It became an important political player only after Ghannoushi's return from his exile in London at the end of January, and, perhaps more palpably, after the interim authorities granted Al-Nahda legal status as a political party in March 2011 to include it into the following transitional process. The decision to remain in the background during the peak of the protests can be attributed to the caution of the leadership, who was very eager to avoid the revolution to appear internationally as an Islamist coup. This coincides with the stance of Ghannouchi who portrayed himself as a moderate and a democrat (Arieff and Humud, 2014, p.17). Other Islamist currents had a difficult start to organise, as their infrastructure had often been destroyed by the systematic persecution under Ben Ali. But also the secular registered opposition parties[18] did not play an outstandingly progressive role. They even cheered the announcement of Ben Ali not to run for office in 2014 as a victory, while young protesters did not see a reason to celebrate.

The driving force behind the upheavals, especially in the first weeks, was the unorganised youth, unemployed individuals, and their local networks. The latter included families, kin-groups and tribes, organising spontaneous gatherings to share mutual experiences of deprivation and abuse. The family of the street vendor Bouaziz formed

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[17]The spending of other countries in the region was much higher, such as Algeria (3.3 per cent), Egypt (3.4 per cent), Libya (3.9 per cent), or Morocco (5 per cent) (Arieff and Humud, 2014).

[18]in 2010 the most influential parties were the Parti Démocrate Progressiste *Tunisa* (PDP), founded by Ahmed Nejib El Chebbi, the former Communist Party Ettajdid led by Ahmed Brahim, and the Forum Démocratique pour le Travail et les Libertés *Tunisia* (FDTL) led by Mustafa Ben Jaafar.

the nucleus and his fate triggered much solidarity. Also human rights activists, who followed the events, engaged first on the micro level. Especially lawyers were able to formalise the demands of the protesters and they had also been directly engaged with the Bouazizi family in the wake of their son's suicide from an early stage on (Mabrouk, 2011, 631-632).

Weakened Bargaining Power as a Result of the Horizontal Fragmentation

The horizontal fragmentation of the UGTT resulted in a decreased bargaining power for both sides. Demands of the lower level were often taken less seriously as employers knew that the support of the leadership in Tunis was questionable, and the leadership in Tunis had difficulties in pushing for demands - if they did so at all - as it was not clear if they could count on the support of the lower ranks, which often where dissatisfied with the UGTT strategy. This affected also the bargaining power in key sectors.

By 2010, Tunisia had a comparatively diversified economy in which machineries and textile products account for the largest share of exports. Phosphate mining accounted for about 2 per cent of the GDP and was an important source of state revenues. Already under Bourghiba, the diversification of the economy was spurred, especially the establishment of the light manufacturing industry (primarily textiles, garments, footwear, leather work and, increasingly, mechanical and electrical appliances), as well as the services sector (mainly the tourism industry and adjacent sectors (Erdle, 2011, p.20-21)).

The role of the UGTT as guardian of the authoritarian bargain, as demonstrated in the economic upheavals of 1978 and 1984, had softened in the course of the 1990s. Different from Morocca, an anomic threat did not play a major role any more. The passive role of the federation during the Gafsa protests of 2008 shows a lack of militancy and confidence to confront the state. These upheavals, like the ones of 1978 and 1984, led to concessions of the government for which, however, the few active unionists had to pay a high price. The main protagonists of the upheavals of 2011 were the unemployed. Although a militant stream controlled federations such as those of education or of postal services and telecommunications as well as some regional and local unions (Yousfi, 2013, p.23), of which the most could be found in the transitional area, by fact, its sole power would not have been enough to force the state into negotiations about the equilibrium of power. Apart from that, the early privatisation and diversification of the economy weakened unionism, especially since end of the 1990s when elites agreed that market forces and private businesses rather than state planning and the public sector should become the main pillar of state revenues and economic development (Erdle, 2011, p.18). It affected especially the bargaining power on the plant and enterprise levels, as Aduani and Ben Sedrine (2018, p.7) pin it down stating about the private sector:

> The workforce mobilised in this industry is unskilled and therefore easily replaced

in times of low unemployment, particularly among women. The trade union's negotiating power in relation to the labour market is therefore relatively weak. Added to this is the low rate of union membership in this sector.

The crucial role the UGTT played during the transformation process after the fall of Ben Ali, and the increase of membership numbers and bargaining power it gained in the years that followed should not hide the fact that the position of the federation on the shop floor and grassroot level was weak before 2011. As the 2007 ITUC Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights shows, strikes have been held in the education and health sectors, banks, the postal service, agriculture, and many public companies and offices, nonetheless, the results were repression rather than state concessions. True, since the 1990s, Tunisia had a unique system of unified contract negotiations. Every three years the UGTT negotiated with the UTICA about 51 sector-specific collective bargaining contracts covering most of the public as well as about 80 per cent of the private sector. And although the UGTT was involved only to a limited extent, the 2008 upheavals in Gafsa strengthened its bargaining position on the macro level. Nonetheless, the 2008 negotiations themselves, just as the ones of 2005, produced results that were dissatisfying for the bulk of the workforce. At least since the 2000s, the UGTT was forced into the defensive, facing more rigorous demands of the UTICA, and losing even more support on the local levels. The determination of the variable KEYS, hence, follows the assessment of Hartshorn (2018, p.116), who clearly states:

> Whoever did have influence over the political system, it was neither the UGTT nor its leadership. While the organisation was able to directly influence and even set policies during the socialist era of Bourghiba's rule, and maintained the capacity to at least disrupt the system in the 1970s and 1980s, it showed no such capacity in the 2000s. When and where militancy remained, it did so only at rank-and-file level and only at certain regions of the country.

Consequently, the case of Tunisia is coded KEYS = (0). Nonetheless, the union federation eventually interfered in the protests - and against the regime.

The Late Response of the UGTT

The role of the UGTT during the 2011 protests was ambivalent from the very beginning, clearly showing the two trajectories identified by Yousfi (2015). On the one hand, the local trade union branches, including representatives from local educational branches, provided infrastructure and a setting for spontaneous organisation of opposition to the regime (Mabrouk, 2011, 631-632). In the course of time, UGTT officials started also to protect and to accompany the protests, like pleading for the release of protesters arrested during a rally in Sidi Bouzid on December 25 2010 (Yousfi, 2015, p.62-70). Unionists in the peripheries and the transitional areas supported - with or without the approval of their next level representatives - the demands of the demonstrations. In contrast, the national executive bureau of the association in Tunis acted rather cautious and did not, for instance, approve the huge demonstration on the Habib Bourguiba

Street on January 14 2011 (Ben Achour, 2018). On January 4 2011, however, the Commission Administrative Nationale de l'UGTT, declared solidarity with the protesters. At that point of time, the leadership still refrained from clearly taking a leading role in the countrywide protests, although the national UGTT board demanded - for the first time in its history - far-reaching democratic reforms. Nonetheless, the majority of the executive bureau belatedly acceded to pressure from below by authorizing regional general strikes in Sfax - the union's historic heartland, where success was most likely - Kairouan, and Tozeur on January 12, and a two-hour strike in Tunis on January 14 (Beinin, 2015, p.200) The trade union movement as a whole, including white and blue collar organisations, organised actions like sit-ins, strikes, and demonstrations.

Although four parties in Tunisia carry the name Labour (the Communist's Worker's Party, the National Democratic Labour Party, the Democratic Forum for Work and Freedoms, and the Tunisian Labour Party), the union federation kept political parties at arms length and represented various strata of society (Yousfi, 2017). It also supported a broader alliance of individuals of the middle class that demanded more civil and human rights, and marginalised individuals and collectives that focussed on bread and butter demands (Ayeb, 2011, p.476). The historical proximity to the ruling party made it an inherent part of the system, similar to the UGTA in Algeria, and more independent than the Egyptian EFTU (not to mention the fully controlled the Syrian and Libyan Trade Union Federations). The UGTT was seldomly allied with opposition parties, and if, it was an issue based relationship over time. Given that freedom, the variable INOPP is coded (0) for the case of Tunisia.

6.6 Kuwait (1)

Trade unions in Kuwait hold an exceptional position in the Arab World and the Gulf area, as they formed mostly around ministries in the governmental sector. Despite being relatively close to the regime, unions showed their boundaries of loyalty towards the Sheikh during the protests of 2011. This behaviour can be read, in contrast to Tunisia, against the background of the struggle between an educated upper- and middle class that tried to defend recent democratic reforms on the one side and the ruling family on the other.

The active role of official trade unions during the struggle for the protection of the fruits of a long lasting endeavour of the opposition to strengthen the parliament justifies the coding of the Outcome for Kuwait as (1). This is especially true, as for the first time the movement did not only support the opposition and the electoral reform it was fighting for; it also confronted officially and unified the policies of the ruler.

SOEC	INOPP	CEN	TRI	KEYS	**Outcome**	Decimal
0	1	1	1	1	**0**	KUW(2)

Table 6.8: Truth table row for the case of Kuwait

The importance of tribal connections that runs like a red thread through the description of its institutional equilibrium (especially shown in section 6.6.1) justifies the coding of the variable TRI as (1). Although economic indicators displayed a worsening of the socio-economic conditions in the country (see part 6.6.3), the welfare state was still healthy, and demands of the protesters in 2011/2012 targeted mainly issues of the political participatory procedures. Hence, the variable SOEC is coded (0). As the legal framework produced a highly centralised national federation and only allowed for one union per profession and/or enterprise, as will be shown in part 6.6.2, CEN is coded (1). Furthermore, as especially the unions in the crucial petrol and petrochemical sectors showed some self-confidence and militancy in the past, as will be outlined in part 6.6.2, the variable KEYS is coded (1). Eventually, and as will be shown in part 6.6.2, the trade union movement was personally intertwined with parts of the opposition, in particular with the semi-loyalist tribal confederations. The variable INOPP is hence coded (1).

6.6.1 Institutional Equilibrium: The Semi-Democratic Experiment

In sharp contrast to Tunisia, Kuwait is officially a Sheikhdom and characterised by tribalism, yet, it cannot be classified as traditional Gulf Monarchy. Due to a long-lasting democratic struggle that has its roots in the 18th and 19th century (Tétreault, 2000), an outstanding hybrid system emerged that is often labelled the "Kuwaiti democratic experiment" (Yetiv, 2002; Salameh and Al-Sharah, 2011) or an "experiment in semi-democracy" (Kinninmont and Sirri, 2014). The main economic and political resources are oil and a huge welfare state, allegedly the most generous one worldwide. The most important groups struggling for the corridors of power are the family Al-Sabah, that rules the small town and the country that emerged around it since 1756 continuously, a powerful urban merchant class, rural and suburbial organised tribal associations, and eventually Islamist groups both Sunni and Shi'i.

The Ruling Family and the Merchant Class

Until the late 19th century the relationship between the Al-Sabah Family and the population of Kuwait and its surroundings was characterised by a mutual dependence.

Exerting rather administrative functions, the as-Sabah did not possess huge assets themselves and were dependent on the benevolence of the merchant class to run the administration. The members if the family were sometimes perceived as "perhaps the worst dressed and most ill-lodged residents in the place." (Al-Nakib, 2016, p.29). The authority of the Al-Sabah sheiks was limited by the omnipresent threat that Kuwait's merchants would leave for another port along the Arabian Gulf, taking their wealth, skilled labour, and assets with them. Hence, unpopular As-Sabah policies were often moderated and sometimes even reversed completely if they bore the danger of triggering the exodus of wealthy families (Casey, 2007, p.35). The same was true for the lower strata of society. Because of the sparse population of the area, the As-Sabah family could not afford to repel the poor population, mainly Bedouins, that was suffering from a relatively high inequality of incomes and wealth. Welfare and charity became a main pillar to hold the simple workers in town and this welfare and charity, again, was financed by the merchants.

The systematic and industrialised exploitation of oil that started about 1934 changed the economic pattern and power relations inside the country. As the young oil industry emerged under the control of the As-Sabah, the wealth of the family grew unprecedented and decreased its independence towards Bedouins and merchants. Already Mubarak the Great (1896-1915) challenged the old balance significantly when he entered into a competition on welfare with the merchants. This had become possible due to some accumulated assets in the form of family owned plantations in the Shatt al-Arab Region and, perhaps more important, the introduction of a tax system (Al-Nakib, 2016, p.23). This move already weakened the influence of the urban merchants. Against the background of the new oil revenues in the 1930s, soon criticism emerged claiming that Sheikh Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, would keep most of the money in his own pocket. A type of proto-democratic movement emerged until 1938, called Majlis movement, in which merchants built an opposition majlis to push for redistribution politics. Even if it was soon dissolved and replaced by a consultative council consisting of As-Sabah and merchant families, the overall pressure was high enough to force the As-Sabah to split the oil revenues by 1951 so that half of all future profits would be spent on public projects, infrastructural improvements, and government services (Casey, 2007, p.57-60).

After the country's independence from Britain, the family could consolidate its power through the constitution of 1962. The Amir is the pivotal element of the system, as he is the head of the state and his person is immune and inviolable (Art. 54), and he is formally part of the legislative (Art.51) and executive (Art.52) power. The judicial power is vested in the courts, which exercise in the name of the Amir within the limits of the Constitution (Art.53). Technically, the power of the Amir is restricted by the national assembly which is elected every four years. The assembly has the right to approve or disapprove a newly determined Amir, however, it has to accept one candidate of a list

of three candidates proposed by the As-Sabah family (Art. 4). The Amir names the prime minister who is often the heir prince, hence the Al-Sabah male next in line to be Amir. The national assembly cannot cast a question of confidence against the prime minister (Art.102). Additionally, the Amir may dissolve the National Assembly by a decree (Art.107)[19].

The Sheikh dissolved the parliament for the first time in 1976, following a government crisis caused by the urban merchant and middle class that soon discovered the parliament as a platform for opposition. They demanded more transparency concerning the oil contracts and the factual revenues of the state (Sabrie and Hakala, 2013, p.7).

Tribal Bedouins as Backbone of the Regime

In 1980 a reform of the electoral constituencies was implemented, favouring tribal associations which tended to have been more loyalist towards the As-Sabah family. Tribal associations grew in strength and importance in the political system of Kuwait since 1975 when the first "tribal primary elections" were conducted in order to nominate a common tribal candidates for the elections. The absence of political parties gave space to tribal affiliations that soon filled the political vacuum (Salih, 2011, p.142)[20]. Tribes have played a crucial role in the political system of Kuwait ever since and continue to be a pivotal player in the modern system. Their steady influence persisted due to several features. First, established tribes fulfilled the function of "gatekeepers" that had a say about who earns Kuwaiti citizenship, second, a tribal concentration in many residential areas increased their influence on the local level, and third, they formed a connection network providing job opportunities rendered possible by the dominance of tribal affiliates in the public service (Salih, 2011, p.143).

Benefiting from cheap foreign labour and from the rich oil resources of the country, the wealth of the state increased and soon a massive welfare state was introduced. For Kuwaiti citizens, and especially the Bedouins among them, the "Arab Social Contract" can be regarded as valid explanation of pattern of behaviour, as Salih (2011) observes:

> Although friction between the two forces has frequently occurred [...], the political alliance between them is maintained. In effect, the Bedouins look to the State to cater to their economic well-being in the form of jobs, housing, medical and educational services, and infrastructure, and the Monarchy looks for the Bedouin for political support.

The favouritism towards the Bedouins and particular loyalist tribes made calls for a reform of the political system grew stronger in the 1980s among groups that saw themselves discriminated against. These calls were formulated not only by the urban middle class but also by a new emerging player especially since 1979: Islamist groups.

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[19]The parliament has been dissolved six times between its establishment and 2010 (2009, 2008, 2006, 1999, 1986 and 1976).

[20]Different from Libya, political parties in Kuwait were not explicitly prohibited. The lack of mentioning in the constitution, the lack of a party law, and the lack of tradition simply seem to have hampered their formation and additionally led to the absence of serious attempts to form such entities.

A heterogeneous movement emerged challenging the system and demanding a reform of the electoral constituencies and a strengthening of the role of the parliament vis-á-vis the Sheikh. Political turmoil that was produced after the dissolution of the government in 1986 served as one of the claimed justifications of the intervention of Iraq in 1990.

The Iraqi Intervention and a Strengthened Parliament

The Iraqi intervention weakened the position of the As-Sabah family. First, the absence of the ruling family during the occupation and the belated return after liberation caused displeasure among parts of the population. Even the opposition that fled the country, and that supported the Sheikh after consultations in exile, was discredited in the eyes of those who stayed in the country. This was also true for the parts of the constitutional movement that fled abroad. The opposition movement thus split in the 1990s along the remainders-exiles cleavage and religious lines.

In 2010, the following groups were still of importance: The rather leftist *Democratic Forum* (1991) and the *National Democratic Alliance* (1992) are representatives of cross-sectarian groups that set up together with other independents the *National Action Bloc* (since 1992) in parliament. Additionally two Sunni opposition groups prevailed, being the *Islamic Constitutional Movement* (1991) that followed the tenets of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the older, Salafist coined *Islamic Parliamentarian Alliance* (1981), together with two mainly Shi'ite groups being the *National Islamic Coalition* (1988) and the Shirazi coined *Justice and Peace Alliance* (2004) (Casey, 2007; Sabrie and Hakala, 2013, p.123). None of these organisations ever succeeded in gaining more than 4 seats in the parliament while facing a block of about 20 Bedouin deputies who could often build majorities by mobilising some of the 8-10 independent deputies.[21] These groups were strengthened in the 1990s vis-á-vis the ruling family and also played a major role in the turbulent years from 2006 until 2012, when the parliament was dissolved three times in total (2006, 2008, and 2009). The time from 2006 until the protests of 2011 was characterised by a struggle between the parliament on the one side and the As-Sabah family on the other. When Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir as-Sabah died in January 2006, the 76 years old Sa'ad al-Abdallah as-Salim as-Sabah was elected by the As-Sabah family. However, his health was weak and he even could not come to parliament to take the oath. The parliament convened on January 24 2006 and decided by consensus to remove Sheikh Sa'ad from office. On January 29, Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Djabir as-Sabah was confirmed by the Parliament as Amir and took his oath of office. This process was a severe break with the previous custom to rotate the office between the two branches of family.

Also the layout of the voting districts was spotlighted by the parliament. The dominance of tribal groups - whose self-coordination could not been contained by the crim-

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[21]For a comprehensive overview of the election results in Kuwait 1992-2008 see Salih (2011, p.152).

inalisation of preliminary elections by a law in force since 1998 - made the parliament push for an electoral reform, which was meant to decrease the electoral districts from 25 to 5. When the As-Sabah family realised that they would not get a majority for their counter-proposal to reduce the amount of districts to 10, the Sheikh dissolved the National Assembly and announced new elections. Contrary to his expectations, the newly elected parliament embraced a majority for the five-district-proposal which was finally approved on July 27, 2006.

6.6.2 A Palmful - yet Powerful - Unions in the Governmental Sector

The history of Kuwaiti trade unionism reaches back to the 1960s and 1970s. It has been, since, an inherent part of the semi-democratic experiment, however, with severe restrictions. By fact, it is only a very small share of employees that was allowed to organise. Nonetheless, these unions became serious and self-conscious players in the political arena and often mouthpieces of the opposition.

Kuwait's Horizontally Fragmented Labour Market

Because of the sky-rocketing economy, since the 1950s labour became sparse and the rising salaries attracted many guest workers from more than 30 different countries. Especially guest workers from Arab neighbours, who where quite frequently prone to nationalist, Ba'athist, and Nasserist ideas, and who were quizzically regarding the idea of a Monarchy, were sceptically and attentively watched by the old national elites. This political threat and the fact that according to different censi the amount of guest workers threatened to outnumber the local population in the 1950s, and de facto did in the late 1960s, led to the emergence of nationality as form of dominance strategy. The new nationality law of 1959 can already be interpreted as one of several "tactics designed to divide Kuwaitis and expatriates and then co-opt the Kuwaitis" (Al-Nakib, 2016, p.178)[22]. Besides, the law caused the emergence of a new strata of society, the so called "bidun". Deriving from *bidun djinsiyya* [without citizenship], the term was attributed to workers of Palestinian origin, as well as some Iraqi, Egypt, and other Arab expatriates.[23]

According to Kuwaiti legislation by 2010, labour could be divided into four branches whereas each of their employees are governed by different labour laws:

- the private sector (al-qata'a al-ahli bi-suratihi al-'am) ruled by Law No.38 of 1964

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[22]Article 1 defines Kuwaitis as those people who settled in Kuwait prior to 1920, Article 4 excludes non-Muslims from citizenship, and the lion's share of the document assures that it is difficult to get Kuwaiti citizenship by another way, and that it is easy to lose it, once acquired by "virtue".

[23]Yet, the first biduns were mostly Arab Bedouin who were unable to register as citizens before 1920, due to illiteracy, homelessness, poverty and lack of access to public authorities.

concerning labour in the private sector,

the oil sector (al-qata'a al 'umal al-nifitia) ruled by the Law in the oil business sector No.28 of 1969,

- the governmental sector (al-qata'a al-hukumi) ruled by Law No.18 of 1960 concerning labour in the governmental sector,

- a hybrid sector of lower employees of the government and its subcontractors who carry out basic public services (al-qata'a al-khidmat al-'ama) ruled by Decree 7 of 1960.

The interplay between these laws exacerbated the gap between guest workers and indigenous citizens. For the filling of vacancies, Kuwaitis are given priority in any case, right before Arab nationals, being the second priority. If there are no qualified and willing applicants of these groups available, employers may resort to guest workers of other nationalities. As the governmental sector provides workers with financial and leisure benefits unmet by the other sectors, and the law grants every Kuwaiti citizen the right to fill a governmental position, this sector was soon filled up Kuwaiti nationals and even inflated to an extent that bears the clear characteristics of disguised unemployment (Al-Enezi, 2002, p.889).[24] At the same time, in the private and the public service sector, expatriates prevailed, due to less favourable working conditions, frequent controls and lower wages. This is mirrored particularly in Law 38/1964, which is also the only one that regulates or even mentions the formation of trade unions, stipulating by Art.69 that these regulations also apply to the governmental and the oil sector.

The Legal Framework Producing Trade Unions around State Institutions

Basically, the formation of trade unions in Kuwait is legal, however, three barriers were included to limit their political power. First, mere exclusion on the ground of nationality. Law 38/1964 exempts most Indian and Pakistani Government workers, temporary and casual workers hired for a period of less than six months, domestic workers, enterprises with less than five workers and without machinery, and sea workers (Art.2, 38/1964). Thus, a vast part of the working class, and most of the foreign workers, did not benefit from the rights specified by the law, and are not allowed to form trade unions. Those foreign workers who already stayed for more than five years in the country, and who can prove good conduct by an official record of the responsible institutions, may join a trade union under restricted conditions (Art.72, 38/1964). They cannot found unions and they cannot be elected into the administrative council of any union in order to try to make a career inside the union. Additionally, the

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[24]Since the industrialised exploitation of oil in the 1930s the government replaced the merchants not only as the providers of public welfare, but also as the main employer of national labour.

entire public service sector is exempted from forming trade unions. Being less attractive to Kuwaiti nationals due to lower wages, low reputation, and a strict yearly work assessment conducted by committees chaired by the responsible ministry (Chap. III, Art.34-43 Decree 7/1960), foreign guest workers prevail in the public service sector.

Second, the economic and political activities of unions were restricted heavily. It was prohibited for unions to engage in political, religious or sectarian issues, to invest funds in financial, real estate or other speculation, and to accept donations of any kind except with the explicit approval of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour.

Third, setting up a trade union was tied to extraordinary bureaucratic difficulties. It was not permissible to form a trade union if the number of represented workers is less than one hundred. Furthermore, there was no union plurality allowed, as it was not permissible to form more than one trade union for workers of one establishment or one occupation.

The foundation of new unions is particularly difficult as the union landscape has already been drawn-out and shaped with little space left for new unions. That is particularly because - setting the case of Kuwait apart from other countries in the MENA region and even worldwide - of the fact that most of the operating trade unions are not organised alongside professional lines or crafts. They emerged around administrative bodies like ministries or state-owned enterprises.[25]. The first unions, that were founded in the direct aftermath of the issuance of the Law 38/1964, comprise the trade union of the workers of the municipalities (1964), the trade union of the Ministry for Public Works (1964), of the Ministry of Health (1964), the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (1964), and the union of the workers of finance and customs (1965). On April 1 1965 these unions formed the Association of Unions in the Governmental Sector which was joined later by the trade union of the workers of the Ministry of Electricity and Water (1965), the Ministry of Communications (1968), and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour (1972).

The Self-Confidence of Trade Unions in the Petrol Industries

Unions had already emerged around the oil companies and branches of the country before the implementation of Law 28/1969 and the parallel amendment of Law 38/1964 allowing for the application of Chapter IX (formation of workers groups) in the oil sector. Whenever anything changed in the structure of the oil sector referring to the emergence or split of companies, these developments were echoed in the structure of trade unions. Consequently, the first union in the oil sector that emerged was the Workers of the Kuwaiti Oil Company KOC (1964), followed by the Japan Oil Company Workers Union in the Khafji Neutral Zone (suspended in 1970 after the implementation of Law

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[25]For all information and figures about the following trade unions mentioned here see the official website of the Kuwaiti Trade Union Federation KTUF *http://ktuf.org/*

28/1969 and the amendments to Law 18/1964 Chapter IX), and the American Oil Company Workers' Union (dissolved in 1977 after the complete nationalisation of the oil sector). These three unions formed the Workers Union of the Oil and Petrochemical Industry (1965), being an association that persists until 2011. It was later joined by the Workers Union of the Petrochemical Industry (1972) after petrochemicals grew more important for the country's economy. Later formed the Equate Petrochemicals Workers Union (1998) after the foundation of Equate, a global player in petrochemicals nowadays, the Kuwait Oil Tankers Workers Syndicate (2000), and the Gulf Oil Company Workers union (2003) that was founded as the legal subcontractors of the Japanese Arabian Oil Company (AOC).[26]

In 1968, the *Kuwaiti Trade Union Federation* (KTUF) was established in order to coordinate the trade unions that had emerged until then and that remained until today the umbrella organisation of the unions that would follow.

Especially the unions in the petrol industry were characterised by frequent activism and in special occasions also militancy. Their role power should not be underestimated, especially regarding the importance of the sector. The Gulf Monarchy is highly dependent on hydrocarbons, although it managed to diversify the economy by building downstream industries and to specialise on human capital intense products like Ethylene, Polyethylene, Ethylene Glycol or, Polypropylene. Still, top exports of Kuwait in 2010 were Crude Petroleum, Refined Petroleum, and Petroleum Gas. Petroleum and chemicals accounted for about 90 per cent of the total exports.

Union activity in this key sector tackled political questions (Tétreault, 1993), as well as economic questions, although strikes were no explicit means to settle disputes according to Art. 88 of the labour code of 1964; and also in the new labour law of 2010, strikes could, in effect, be prohibited in all cases of collective labour disputes (Al-Adjmi, 2016, p.130-131). Major disputes in key sectors of Kuwait took place in 2006, 2008, and also in 2011, when eventually wages in the petroleum sector were increased by 66 per cent. This stands in sharp contrast to the weak outcomes of workers struggles in Tunisia as outlined in the precedent case study. In Kuwait, already in a confrontation in 2007 - in which the government announced a harsh response to possible strikes - observers warned about consequences and repercussions if the trade unions chose the option of confrontation, and even more if parliamentary blocs supported the unions against the government (Al-Sa'adi, 2007). Given that bargaining power despite a union density of about five per cent in 2010, the case of Kuwait is coded KEYS = (1).

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[26]The AOC has historically exploited the oil fields in the area around Khafji that had been disputed between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. After the settlement of the border conflict already in the 1970s and a tightening of Kuwaiti legislation concerning foreign companies in the oil sector at the begin of the 2000s, the foundation of the Kuwaiti Gulf Oil Company provided a legal loop-hole for Japan to secure its oil supply and continue the traditional exploitation of the fields.

Trade Unions Between Leftism, Political Islam, and Tribal Bonds

Besides the formal trade unions, there are other labour related groups, especially professional associations that are organised under Law No. 24 of 1962 regarding clubs and public benefit associations. The Kuwaiti Teachers' Society (KTS) is the oldest of the professional associations and is characterised by a history of struggle. It was active before the independence, banned, and allowed to reorganise in 1963 under its today's name (Ghabra, 1991, p.202). Other important professional associations are the Kuwait Society of Engineers (KSE) founded in 1962, the Kuwait Medical Association (KMA) founded in 1963, the Kuwait Journalist Association (KJA) founded in 1964, the Kuwait Accountants and Auditors Association (KAA) from 1973, being an association center of today five associations, and the Kuwaiti Aircraft Engineer and Pilot Association (KAEPA) founded in 1973.

The relation between the state and the professional associations was ambivalent. On the one hand, the ruling elite searched to influence, use, or tame the associations. The fact that many of the civil society organisations depend on state finance gives the state a powerful tool to pursue these goals. On the other hand, opposition forces tried to position themselves inside the associations to be able to mobilise and pressure the government and the ruling family (Tétreault, 1993, 276-277). This generated a vibrant dynamic, as during the 1960s and 1970s, labour unions, many associations, and foremost the associations of teachers and students built a platform for those who called for Arab unity, total independence from foreign rule, the liberation of Palestine, and a socialist system (Ghabra, 1991, 203). When the Amir dissolved the parliament for the first time in 1976, seven civil society groups raised their voices by issuing a statement calling for "the return of legitimacy and constitutional rule, and the restoration of democratic gains as soon as possible." These bodies were the Kuwait General Union of Workers, the Association of Writers, the Bar Association, the Journalists Association, the Independence Club, the Teachers Association, and the National Union of Kuwaiti Students. Eight members of the executive bureau of the KTUF were arrested, as the federation turned out to be the main distributor of the statement among the population (Al-Dayin, 2009).

With the decline of Arab nationalism, the cards of political influence inside the unions and associations were redistributed. Political Islam seeped into civil society organisations and slowly replaced the outworn ideologies of the leftists, and gained control over the administrative bodies of many associations, foremost the powerful teachers association with their more than 14.000 members. Its influence, however, vanished over time. The trade unions in the governmental sector could - besides some singular successes in the 1980s - not been influenced by Islamic groups.

Different from the lists of names of the initial founders in the 1960s, today names of tribes like al'Anniza, al'Ajmi, Ar-Rashid, and Al-Mutayr dominate the executive bureaus. These tribes were loyal to the Amir, however, they were not of the dominating

loyalist tribes Al-Hauadjr, Bani Qahtan, Al'Atban or al-Mitran, and provided many independent MPs. For the KTUF and most governmental unions seems true what Tétreault (1993, p.277) observes when writing about official trade unions as a "kind of opposition, fulfilling what they believe are constitutional or functional responsibilities even if these contradict what are understood to be the government's desires", opposing its authoritarianism by using "their formal positions in the state to resist government control in the name of civic values". On the economical side, and somewhat consequently, following the logic of the Arab social contract, trade unions have played a big role as political instruments pressuring on the government and members of parliament to give in to populist demands that may often "not be fiscally sound" (Alsharekh, 2017). However whenever the democratic process of the country was at stage, unions mingled into politics, despite the definite prohibition by the labour law, and advocated a peaceful solution and the protection of democratic institutions. The same would turn true for he juncture 2011-2013.

6.6.3 The Upwinding Conflict between the Parliament and the Ruling Family

The trial of strength between the Parliament and opposition parties on the one side and the ruling family and its networks entered a new level of escalation when the pictures of the Arab upheavals from Tunisia and Egypt arrived in Kuwait. Mass protests followed in 2011, whereby these protests rose out of the willingness to protect the results of the slow democratic evolution inside the country rather than because of socio-economic concerns. This remains true although the economic situation in Kuwait worsened slightly: Unemployment rose between 2000 and 2010 but did not scratch at the 2 per cent mark, however, youth unemployment nearly doubled from about 5 per cent to 10 per cent at the same time. The inflation rate increased by trend during that period and peaked in 2008 with 10.5 per cent. However, compared to the case of Tunisia or Jordan, these figures are rather advantageous. Furthermore, taking a look at the protests movements reveals that the case should be read against the background of the semi-democratic experience that rendered the country an exception in the region. Starting with the Orange Movement in 2005/2006, and including the Fifth Fence movement as well as different groups like Islamists and the semi-loyalists in parliament, it becomes clear that socio-economic deterioration of standards of living had not been the driving force behind the protests. This thesis is also supported by the fact that the country still runs one of the most comprehensive welfare states of the world. The case of Kuwait will thus be coded SOEC = (0)

The Background: A Struggle about the Electoral Reform

The foremath of the events that were widespreadly called "Arab Spring" was coined by controversies and tensions between many political players, sides, and even within the political camps of Kuwait. The opposition suffered from high fragmentation between Islamists, Secularists, and tribal associations sceptical of the government, as well as from quarrels within these groups. On the other side, the offset of the old Sheikh and the appointment of a new one, disrupting the circle of oscillation between the family branches, caused some discords in the ruling family itself (Ulrichsen, 2014, p.215). The latter was exacerbated by the nomination of a Prime Minister of the Jaber branch of the Al-Sabah family, so for the first time the top three positions Emir, Crown Prince, and Prime Minister were held by the same branch of the family.

The Orange Movement that eventually emerged after 2006 was one of the prototypes of the youth movements that would shake the scaffolds of power of the authoritarian regimes of Middle East in 2011. It aimed at fighting corruption and found in the ongoing struggle about the electoral system a gateway and starting point to engage politically. Many of the movements founding members had recently finished their studies in the United States and were shocked by the culture of corruption they perceived in their own nation after their return (Albloshi and Alfahad, 2010, p.220). The movement used social media to organise and set politicians under pressure, and also resorted to print media in order to enhance their basis, gained support of 39 students associations and, more important, of the block of the 29 in the parliament. The bloc comprised opposition forces from different political backgrounds such as the leftist-secular Popular Action Front and the Islamic Constitutional Movement, and was also advocating for the five district solution. (Albloshi and Alfahad, 2010; Al-Mdaires, 2010, p.223).

Their cooperation was restricted to particular issues but lacked meta-coordination and a mutual vision for the future. However, the Orange Movement campaigned together with and for the bloc of 29 after the dissolution of parliament by the Sheikh. In the following elections, candidates supporting the five district solution gained victory and eventually implemented the electoral reform.

In the following years, the relationship of the parliament towards the prime minister and his government was coined by struggle, blockade, dismissals and tensions. Against the backdrop of the increasingly strong opposition, civic freedoms and rights were restricted, and the Sheikh eventually dissolved the parliament and announced new elections in 2009. The members of the new parliament appeared to be more government friendly, however, tensions remained and the Prime Minister was forced to resign in December 2010 due to a vote of no confidence. It was this fragile atmosphere, when the pictures and messages of the protesting masses of other Arab countries arrived in Kuwait.

A First Victory of Opposition Forces

Only few days after the downfall of President Ben 'Ali in Tunisia, ruling elites in Kuwait announced generous gifts to the citizens, ostensibly due to the 50th anniversary of the country's independence, the 20th anniversary of the liberation from Iraqi occupation, and the 5th anniversary of the inauguration of the new Emir. Each Kuwaiti received 1,000 Kuwaiti Dinars (roughly 3,600 Euro), as free coupons for basic food items for fourteen months between February 1 2011 and March 31 2012 (Ulrichsen, 2014, p.222). Inspired by the movements of the young "Arab Spring", a new youth movement (the Fifth Fence) emerged, trying to defend the achieved reforms in the country and attracting opposition members of parliament. They brought opposition strategies to a new, more radical level, in the words of Ulrichsen (2014, p.222):

> [...it] created a destabilising new dimension to oppositional politics [...] as the new groups were less willing to play by the established "rules of the game" and more inclined to test hitherto-sacrosanct red lines. Carefully constructed parameters of "traditional" opposition came under sustained pressure as political figures and groups became outflanked by more volatile competitors with differing sets of political demands and time frames for achieving them.

Different corruption sandals that were revealed in late summer infuriated the public and deepened the support for opposition forces. In September 2011, payments of about 350 Million in total were discovered that had trickled from the government to 16 MPs who mostly voted in favour of the government. These events propelled and strengthened the first wave of mass anti-government protests calling for the resignation of the Prime Minister.

Led by Musallam Al-Barrak, a progressive politician of the left-liberal Popular Action Front, demonstrators of a wide range of persuasions and backgrounds took the streets on November 16 2011. A day before, the constitutional court had averted an interpellation of the Prime Minister in parliament about the corruption scandals. Public anger grew and made demonstrators to storm into the National Assembly chanting anti-government slogans, and on November 27 2011, tens of thousands of Kuwaitis pushed for the resignation of the Prime Minister in the streets of downtown Kuwait. Against the backdrop of the falling regimes and the violence the year had witnessed all over the Arab world, the ruling family gave in, and Prime Minister Nasser Mohammad al-Hamad as-Salah resigned a day later (Ulrichsen, 2014, p.223).

The Escalation before the November 2012 Elections

The results of the 2012 February elections were another sign that the ruling family and their allies had lost more control in the country than they might have expected. Hoping for a more loyal parliament, the Amir dissolved the parliament and announced new elections, however, the opposition bloc - and especially tribal and Islamic candidates - experienced a landslide victory. Facing many sceptical and progressive MPs,

the as-Sabah family had more difficulties to ward off legislative proposals curtailing their power. Yet, the parliament could not find a mutual way to tackle policy issues, and Islamic currents tried unsuccessfully to push for a more prominent role of religion in society and state, alienating the secular and popular opposition forces.[27] Dissatisfied with the outcome, the Amir dissolved the parliament again and announced new elections for December 2012. Additionally, he introduced the one-man-one vote system instead of list system for the elections and tried to touch the five district layout of electorates. This triggered an outcry in vast parts of the political arena and for the first time the Amir himself was openly attacked when Mussallam al-Barrak addressed him directly on October 15 postulating: "We will not let you, your highness, rule this country on your own [...] We are not scared of your new batons or the jails you have built". That way, the slogan "we will not allow you, we will not allow you" became the slogan of the March of Dignity that took place a week later, and in which many protesters resorted to the color orange to summon continuity with the already abated 2006 youth movement (Ulrichsen, 2014, p.225). The demonstrations were dispersed with tear gas, marking the peak of violence in the country.

The December 2012 elections were boycotted by all major opposition groups from conservative tribal and Islamist candidates to merchant and liberal ones, and including Kuwait's largest three tribes — the Mutair, 'Awazem, and 'Ajmi. Also youth groups[28] whose relationship to the "established" political opposition was characterised by tension and a lack of consensus over objectives and methods, formed the main incentive of the initial protests that swept Kuwait in 2011.

Weak White-Collar Associations, Firm Trade Unions

The role of trade unions and professional white-collar unions was heterogeneous reaching from total passivity to collective action. The professional associations lost influence since the days of Arab nationalism and struggled with issues of competence for the sake of defending the quality of the profession and national issues. A good example provides the Teacher's Society that struggled about the actual standard of teaching in the sense of the quality of the people entering the profession and of their training. The majority of Kuwait's' teachers were Arab foreigners who faced a growing minority of Kuwaiti colleagues lacking qualification and receiving positions due to their nationality (Alobaid, 2006, p.236;243). The Teachers' Society, intimidated by the little rights the laws provided for uprisings of foreigners, especially concerning Kuwaiti domestic politics, was thus unable to tackle the problems. Consequently, Alobaid (2006, p.249) observes and concludes in his large-n quantitative research about the situation of teachers in Kuwait:

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[27]Among the proposals were the declaration of the Sharia' as "the" source of law instead of "a" source of law in the constitution, a morality police to observe woman behaviour in public, and high penalties against blasphemy.

[28]In March 2012 the Civic Democratic Movement formed out of three youth organisations that expressed definite dissatisfaction with the work of the MPs in parliament.

> As the situation stands, the union does not represent children, school, or society, nor does it attempt to act in these groups' interests. The union is located in one small building, where members do trivial work: they produce a monthly magazine, and often some afternoon activities for students. The Teachers' Union in Kuwait has little authority, and since membership is voluntary, teachers seem not concerned to join; none of the teachers interviewed during the research were members; teachers viewed the union as useless and powerless. Some did not even know that this union existed.

Other professional associations present a similar picture. The Bar Association struggled with complaints about lawyers who do not show up in court and a deterioration of the profession's reputation in general (Sabah, 2008). The Engineers Association was headed by Hissam Kharafi of the family that owns the M. A. Kharafi & Sons conglomerate in the private sector and was consequently mainly struggling against the contracting of foreign companies in Kuwait. And the Journalists Association surpassed itself in its announcements praising the Amir on its official website.

Trade Unions as Reform Oriented Political Players

The situation in the oil sector and the governmental sector was different. The oil unions have been facing the Project Kuwait since 1997 which was a 7 billion, 25-year plan to increase the country's oil production with the help of international oil companies. The oil unions were active, more militant, supportive to strikes against privatisation and threaten sometimes with "escalation" in the struggle about Kuwaiti jobs, if the government would not give in in negotiations. In the oil and the governmental sector, demands for higher wages also emerged in the course of 2011, the year of the "Arab Spring"[29]. The rise of 25 per cent wage increase announced by the government seemed not enough for many unions and led to strikes of customs workers and employees at Kuwait Airways (REUTERS, 2012).

In the political arena, trade unions in the governmental sector supported the reform of the constituencies and held connections to the moderate opposition in parliament. The year 2009 and the dissolution of the 2006 parliament yielded a political active trade union movement and leadership. Abdulrahman al-Ghanim, vice-president of the KTUF was elected to the first chairman of the newly established "Civil Society Forces" in June 2009. The CSF aimed at unifying moderate reform oriented groups and operated under the slogan "Building our country realistically is the will of change that our Emir wanted" (Al-Ra'i-Media, 2009). Simultaneously, Khalid Al-Tahous, the president of the KTUF and a member of the Al-'Ajmi tribe announced his candidacy for parliament[30] and got elected.

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[29]For an impression of the diverse strikes and struggles of Kuwait's trade unions in 2011 see the issue of the KTUF, monthly magazine Al-'Aamal from October 2011 (No. 509).

[30]Material of US Diplomacy published by the online-platform Wikileaks in 2009 classify At-Tahous as "Independent Conservative" (LeBaron, 2006). Against the aforementioned tribe dominance in the unions, this classification can be applied for most ranks in the leading organisations of the movement.

During the time between 2009 and the February 2012 election, the KTUF leadership presented itself as a civil society force trying to protect the democratic achievements of the country. In an interview with the newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsat, that was also published in the KTUF Magazin Al-'Aamal, Al-Ghanim criticised the MPs for playing the card of the "Arab Spring" by rallying on the streets instead of resorting to the tools provided by parliament to solve the problems of the country. Additionally he criticised Popular Action Front leader Al-Sa'adoon for his pro-privatisation course (Al-'Aamal No. 509, September 2011, pp. 12-14). A month before he had criticised the dominance of tribal and sectarian elements in the 2009 parliament (Al-'Aamal No. 508, August 2011, pp. 13-14). The KTUF repeatedly condemned violence by all sides and focussed on socio-economical issues while it gave every now and then glimpses of a preference for the five-district, and sometimes and also to the one-district solution.

With the announcement of the December 2012 elections and the one-man-one-vote system combined with rumours about increase of electorates by decree, the KTUF and its affiliated unions finally nailed its political colours on the mast. In a extraordinary session on October 21 2012, the executive bureau of the KTUF announced:

> After deliberating on the events resulting from the repression and clashes that led to many injuries among the citizens, which came after the announcement of the decree of amendment in the electoral system, the Executive Council of the General Union of Workers of Kuwait boycotts the elections scheduled for early December, in the wish to restore security and stability throughout the country to follow up its normal democratic path, which constitutes the protective shelter for economic and social development, and to preserve the dignity of this dear country and its people, and ask Allah Almighty to protect Kuwait and its Amir and its people from all evil.

This statement was carried jointly by most of the KTUF's trade unions. Some unions decided to issue statements that deviated in their radicalism: The Federation of Governmental Unions used the more cautious formulation of "the need to review the decision of the Palace of the choice of the voter to one candidate" and only threatened an election boycott, while the oil unions let no doubt about the decision to boycott and mentioned in a sinister formulation that "the constitution guarantees the right to organise gatherings in a peaceful manner". Even if the union of the ministry of electricity and water did not mention a boycott and only condemned violence, just as the Union of the Workers of the Ministry of Public Works,[31] the stance of the entire movement was political to an extent never witnessed in the history of Kuwait.

These statements were confrontational and by no means self-evident. While the oppositional current united non-governmental organisations, trade unions, and student groups with opposition political leaders, it was not able to attract liberal groups, such as the National Democratic Alliance or conservative Salafist (Alsayed, 2013). The outcome for the case of Kuwait is coded (1).

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[31]All statements in full length can be found in the KTUF magazine Al-'Aamal No.521 November 2012 pp.8-12.

6.7 Oman (0)

The Sultanate[32] of Oman is characterised by widespread powers of the head of state and a unique influence of Ibadi Islam in combination with a tribal tradition. The ruling authority of the Al Bu Said family is fixed in the *Basic Structure* of the State (the Constitution), and a number of Sultani Decrees that serve as legal framework for the country. Democratic institutions and processes were relatively new to the country, and among the Gulf countries of the sample, it is the sharpest contrast to the semi-democratic experiment of Kuwait. The Omani regime also resorts to a constructed and carefully nursed collective memory coined by the utopian vision of tribal cohesion, the preservation of the country's independence, and the person of the Sultan himself (Alhaj, 2000, p.101).

The small changes in the institutional equilibrium that were achieved during the protests of 2011 went their way without any interference of the young trade union bodies in the country. Perceived as a broker between the state and the business elite on the one side, and the Omani workforce on the other, the institutions were introduced in a top down manner and refrained from mingling into politics or from participating in the reform process whatsoever. The outcome for the case of Oman is therefore coded (0). The entire row has the following coding:

SOEC	INOPP	CEN	TRI	KEYS	**Outcome**	Decimal
1	0	1	1	0	**0**	OMN(22)

Table 6.9: Truth table row for the case of Oman

Although the business elite probably became the most important pillar of the power base of the Sultan, the country remains highly characterised by tribalism and family bonds. Based on the descriptions in part 6.7.1, the variable TRI is set to (1). Given the centralised character of the General Federation of Omani Trade Unions (GFOTU), and the lack of open trade union competition as will be outlined in part 6.7.2, the variable CEN is set to (1). These centralised union structures, which were created in a top down manner, remained close to the state and lacked militancy or initiative since their implementation. Following the assessment made in part 6.7.3, the variable KEYS is set to (0).

The variable most difficult to determine is SOEC. On the one hand, Oman, for sure,

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[32]The term Sultanate (*Sultaniya*, deriving from "sulta" meaning authority, power, or control, gained fame by the term Sultanism as used by Max Weber and later conceptualised by Juan Linz. Sultanism is an extreme form of patrimonialism among authoritarian regimes in which the power of discretion of the leader is maximised. For a brief introduction see Chehabi and Linz (1998).

had a higher standard of living than most of the countries of the sample. However, first, it was the country that struggled the most with its state budget among oil dependent countries of the Gulf region. Second, the demands of the protesters addressed socio-economic issues like youth unemployment or low wages which were the motivation of the bulk of the early risers. This is a major difference to countries where the variable SOEC is set to (0) such as Kuwait, or Morocco and Algeria which witnessed procyclical protests. These pattern of protests, in which the protesters assumed that with the existing equilibrium the social contract could not be held, renders the case rather similar to Jordan. Supported by a more elaborate assessment of the socio-economic situation of the country in part 6.7.1, the variable SOEC is coded (1).

6.7.1   The Sultan, the Mufti, and the Sheikhs

The pivotal figure of the Omani political system is the Sultan, whose "person is inviolable, respect of him is a duty, and his command is obeyed" according to Art.41 of the constitution. The system of governance is hereditary in the male descendants of Sayyid Turki bin Said bin Sultan (1832 - 1888). In the 2000s, Sultan Qaboos exerted different high ranking positions in the state, such as prime minister, defense minister, finance minister, minister for foreign affairs, and chairman of the central bank (Katz, 2004, p.3).

Taking the legal framework into account, the system bore resemblance to Sultanism as defined by Linz. Besides the Sultan, important political institutions of the system were the Royal Family Council, the Defence Council, the Council of Ministers, the Majlis Al-Dawla (resembling a second chamber), the Majlis Al-Shura (resembling a first chamber), and the Supreme Court. The Sultan had the right to interfere in all of these institutions. He formally presided the Council of Ministers (Art. 42) and he appointed the Prime Minister, whereas the competencies of the latter are not fixed in the constitution: The competences and powers of the Prime Minister are determined each time anew in the Sultani Decree of appointment (Art.48). Furthermore, the Sultan appoints and dismisses undersecretaries of ministries, secretaries-general and their equivalents, and senior judges.

The Madjlis Al-Dawla consisted of appointees that rendered outstanding services to the country or "whomever His Majesty the Sultan chooses" (Art.58), and had a consultative function. The same is true for the Council of Ministers which was, moreover, politically collectively responsible before the Sultan for the implementation of the general policy of the State (Art.52). The Madjlis Al-Shura consisted of elected members representing all the Provinces of the Sultanate (Art.58(8)). It can be dissolved "in circumstances His Majesty determines" (Art.58(19)), and had virtually no authority in the areas of foreign affairs, defense, security, and finances.

Even the most vital opposition groups did not challenge the system but were rather competing for access to the country's rents (Alhaj, 2000, p.100). A first wave of hy-

bridisation of the traditional system began by the establishment of appointed-elected consultatory committees in order to increase the opportunities of participation.

The Imamat, Dhofar, and the Beginning of Systematic Co-Optation

By 1970, Oman faced several challenges under the rule of Sultan Said bin Taimur. The country was economically weak, displayed high rates of illiteracy and a virtually non existent health system. The country was protected, and hence, dependent on Great Britain, making the Sultan a target of permanent criticism, and was undermining his legitimation inside the country. This was particularly true for the Imamat in the interior of the country, which enjoyed autonomy since the treaty of Seeb that ended a rebellion against the coastal Sultans in 1920.

The Imam Ghalib Alhinai had just been defeated with the help of Great Britain in the conflicts of 1954 and 1957 mainly caused by questions of oil concessions, and the Imamat was absorbed into a unified but still unstable state structure. Additionally, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO), consisting of Marxist-Leninist groups and Arab Nationalists had launched an ongoing military campaign in the western Province of Dhufar in 1962, aiming at the establishment of an Arab socialist republic resembling the model of South Yemen.

On June 23 1970 Sultan Said was overthrown by his own son Qaboos bin Said in a bloodless palace coup. In his first years, Qaboos was heavily relying on British consultancy, their "hearts and minds" campaign, and especially military support. The Royal Omani Forces had been modernised with the help of the British before and consisted of many mercenaries from outside the country (Takriti, 2013, p.196). This was a reason why the Army could be deployed more rigorously on the one hand, and this is also a reason why it never became a decisive element of the institutional equilibrium like in Algeria, Egypt, or Jordan. Against the background of the negative reputation the family earned during the reign of his father, the new Sultan started a state building process that would grant him stability until his death in 2020.

Sultan Qaboos used the increasing influx of oil revenues to set up state institutions that would be able to give highly paid jobs to the elite of the country. This way of co-opting local leadership, as seen in other countries of the sample from Algeria to Kuwait, targeted foremost wealthy merchants and tribal sheikhs (Valeri, 2012, p.268). But these tactics also bore fruits in the Dhufar conflict. The rebel forces did not only comprise impoverished lower strata individuals but also notables and former public servants (Takriti, 2013, p.171). After a amnesty and the promise to reward leaders who left the rebel fractions with financial benefits and job opportunities, the tide slowly turned in favour of the regime. The Marxist-Leninist front, that was weakened after an internal struggle with the Ma'shani tribe that had attempted to negotiate with the regime on its own, lost more and more allies, and faded away in the course of the

1970s.[33].

From the very beginning Sultan Qaboos and his allies stressed that the new leader of the country also had religious legitimation. While not being able to exhibit religious descent like the King of Morocco or the King of Jordan, the Sultan presented himself as the "Hand of God" on earth, "destroying the Almighty's enemies" (Takriti, 2013), especially during the Dhufar crisis. The Sultan also created and incorporated religious institutions. The lower strata of municipal Shari'a courts dealing with civic and personal cases remained virtually untouched while at the top level, for the first time in the history of Oman, the post of the Mufti was introduced. The new 29 year old Mufti Ibrahim bin Sa'id ai-'Ibri was a government friendly former judge of the highest Appeal Court and remained in office until - and beyond - the protests of 2011.

At the same time, the regime was cautious of not letting religious fanaticism of any kind spread through the country. In 1994 several hundred protesters were arrested whom the Sultan, accused of being Islamic extremists, however, providing little evidence; another wave of arrests followed in 1997, 2002, (Peterson, 2004, p.134-135), and 2005.

Shura, Sheikhs, and yet another Oil-Based Authoritarian Bargain

Starting from the 1980s, restricted possibilities for political participation were created. Similar to Bahrain and Kuwait, the inequality that arose from the new oil production triggered grievances which were perceived by the regime - especially in combination with Arab nationalist or welfare oriented Islamist rhetoric - as a threat (Alhaj, 2000, p.100). Since the systematic exploitation of oil, and as a part of the Sultan's state building agenda, the regime began to multiply the channels of participation. Different from Kuwait, however, the introduction and strengthening of participatory institutions was not a result of a bottom up struggle of marginalised strata of society. In Oman, the process of hybridisation of the system was top-down driven and rather pre-emptive than reactive. The nature of the new consultation institutions latched onto the tradition of Shura (consultations mostly in councils), which was actually a traditional means of the Imamat. Imams in Oman's Ibadi current of Islam are, at least theoretically-theological, elected freely. By this way a path-dependency could be suggested, as Shura has been - albeit in different forms and to different extents - a core element of all systems that emerged in Oman (Al-Farsi, 2013, p.63).

In 1981 the first nationwide council, the State Consultative Council *Oman* (SCC), was formed which was succeeded by the Oman Consultative Council (OCC) in 1991 (Alhaj, 2000, p.101). Universal suffrage was achieved for the first time when the parliamentary

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[33]The Ma'shani was the tribe Sultan Qaboos' mother descended from. The Marxist-Leninist *Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman* reacted to their possible defection with a brutal punitive expedition which, in hindsight, destroyed much of the trust and bonds the Front had set up also with other parts of the Dhufar population. The next tribe to defect, the Kathiri, dwelling around Sultan Qaboos' birthplace Salalah, eventually broke free without major consequences (Takriti, 2013, p.267-269)

system, as described above, was introduced (the Oman Council comprises the Madjlis al-Dawla and Madjlis al-Shura).

Although the elections are basically free and fair, similar to Jordan, tribalism is a decisive factor (Al-Farsi, 2013, p.53-54). Indeed, tribalism was a major concern of the young sultan, who assured in his inauguration speech that he would "fully appreciate the responsibilities of the sheikhs of the tribes" and support these responsibilities with salaries (Takriti, 2013, p.201). This was part of the deal, and many Sheikhs agreed, becoming another silent gear wheel in the authoritarian machinery of the Sultan, as Takriti (2013, p.202) puts it:

> Every sheikhly visit was the occasion of a Faustian exchange: the alienation of the political in return for the economic. All the announcements sounded the same. It mattered not who the sheikh was or which territory they represented. What counted was the repetition, the constant and persistent re-enactment of the Omani submission to the Sultan.

This loyalty was bought with the increasing oil wealth, which has also been used to finance the military campaigns in Dhofar, the establishment of a modern infrastructure, and improving the living standards of the population in general by public sector employment (Al-Farsi, 2013, p.60).

In contrast to many other countries of the sample that are also characterised by a high degree of tribalism, in Oman the social affiliation was institutionalised. The Directorate of Tribal Affairs of the Ministry of Interior lists tribes and their respective members and sheikhs, determining which individual is officially allowed to hold the title of sheikh (Valeri, 2012, p.273). Tribalism was also even used as a means to weaken religious animosities among the population: In 1980, shortly after the Iranian revolution, authorities decided to establish shuyukh qabila (sheikhs of tribe) for the Baharina and Lawatiyya communities of the capital (Valeri, 2012, p.272). These clans avowed to Shi'i inclinations of Islam and never had such a post, that was meant to act as intermediaries between the members of the community and the administration, before.

The Decline of the Oil Economy and Privatisation

Similar to most Gulf states, the Omani regime became aware of the finite availability and exploitability of oil fields. Indeed, the share of natural resources of the GDP fell from an all-time high of 82 per cent in 1979 to a low of 24 per cent in 1998. Expecting the share to fall to 9 per cent in 2020 (Katz, 2004, p.4), and facing an increasing budget deficit (Al-Farsi, 2013, p.57) the regime announced different measures in its "vision 2020", foremost the strengthening of the private sector and diversification of the economy.

The major shift in privatisation politics came in 1996. By that year, the state was a major player in almost all branches of the economy including the finance sector, the insurance sector, the petrol sector, or fishery and its downstream industries. A business

law was absent as each public company was established under and/or ran by its own Sultani Decree (McKinney, 1997, p.131). Sultani Decree 42/1996 promoted privatisation as state policy, including the privatisation of up to 40 per cent per facility in core areas of the state like water supply, electricity, sewage systems, highways, communication and mail systems. Art.11 of the new Basic Structure of the State provided that "The national economy is based on justice and the principles of free economy". Diversification was planned by promoting small and medium scale industries, improving agriculture and fisheries, and investment in tourism (Mubeen et al., 2017, p.11).

As the regime did not expect these measures to be enough to absorb the new cohorts of young Omani employees entering the labour market, and as a reaction to demands from vast parts of the population, policies of Omanisation were introduced. Against the background of a foreign labour force that exceeded 70 per cent, the aim was to decrease foreign labour to 50 per cent in the overall workforce, to 25 in the private sector, and to 5 per cent in the government sector respectively. The aims of diversification and privatisation on the one side and Omanisation on the other, however, more than often contradicted each other, as the Omani workforce was simply not skilled enough for the newly created jobs, or lacked the willingness to work anywhere else than in the governmental sector (Al-Hamadi et al., 2007; Ali et al., 2017; Swailes and Al-Fahdi, 2011). Thus, the public sector became more and more dysfunctional and hampered, as Common (2008, p.189) reports, recurring to (Valeri, 2007):

> [...] problems have been delayed by 'using the public sector as a safety valve. In particular, they (senior officials) tolerated a high degree of nepotism in the bureaucracy positions' which results in recruitment into a particular ministry or agency from the senior official's own tribe. [...] Officials confided that nearly 50 percent of their working day was occupied by either personal visits or telephone calls from people from particular villages or tribes pleading for employment, or on behalf of relatives.

The preference for public sector employment was also an outgrow of the wage structure of the Omani labour market. By 2010, about 70 per cent of Omani private sector workers earned less than the official monthly minimum wage of 200 Omani Rials (Valeri, 2012). Oman stands out among the the Gulf countries, as the official unemployment rate that remained according to World Bank data between 4.5 and 5 per cent during the 2000s, and youth unemployment was about 10 per cent - which are the most disadvantageous numbers of that region. Inflation rate peaked in 2008 at about 12 per cent and decreased again to about 3.5 in 2009 and 2010.

The grievances before - and also later during the protest 2011 - were clearly related economic issues. This is also a major difference compared to Kuwait, where SOEC is coded (0). The grievances arose out of a feeling that the social contract was - if not broken - at least at stake. Still, according to the CIP index, the population of Oman had the highest trust in their administrative authorities of the entire sample. This means that while the people were socio-economically dissatisfied, they thought that the state would still be able to fix their situation - and also the social contract. It was the

perception of skewed distribution of wealth that brought people to the street. Especially the newly emerged business elite became a core target of the protests. While the process of diversification faced some difficulties on the supply side of labour, the demand side, say, the emerging business elite, managed to bring itself into a rather beneficial position. The co-optation policies of the Sultan, that traditionally included modern educated groups, leading merchant family members of Muscat, the tribal Shaikhs of interior Oman, and some prominent religious figures (Alhaj, 2000), began to heel towards the uprising and heavily supported business elite. The turn to the merchant class was by no means a surprising strategy. Oman had established a chamber of commerce already in 1978 and, similar to Morocco or Tunisia, a symbiosis between the government and rising business circles emerged. Against that background, it is permissible to say that a breach of the social contract - in the eyes of the protesters who frequently compared their situation with other Gulf countries - was a driving motive for the protest in 2011. These demands where not pro-cyclical like in Algeria, nor mainly political in nature like in Kuwait but were rooted in the feeling that the state would not be willing to adhere to the social contract and meant as a gentle reminder. The variable SOEC is therefore coded (1).

6.7.2 Civil Society and Organised Labour

In contrast to Kuwait, civil society in Oman remained after the seizure of power of the new leader virtually non-existent for decades. For the first twenty years or so, this might be little surprising, as, in Peterson (2004, p.126)'s words, the country "lacked nearly all infrastructure, including a modern port, roads, schools, electricity outside the capital area, and even office space for the government". Hence, at the same time when other countries' trade union movements in MENA got into rows with the ruling regime after the magic and nostalgia of the anti-colonial struggle had slowly abated, in Oman there was barely a modern industry, no active workers' movement, no systematised unionism, and actually no civic movement in the Toquevillian sense at all - while Great Britain still had a well-established foothold on the country.

Nonetheless, the PFLO managed to mobilise workers all around the country at the beginning of the 1970s. The largest strike in the younger history of Oman took place on September 1 1971 in the worker's camps in Ruwi, the commercial hub of Muscat (Takriti, 2013, p.220). Protests emerged foremost around low wages and the influx of foreign labour (Peterson, 2004, p.131). The PFLO also established later the National Committee of Omani Workers in October of the same year which did, however, not play a role in the further history of the country.

The answer of the regime was twofold: on the one hand, security forces aided by the British military crushed strikes relentlessly wherever they appeared at a broader scale. On the other hand, parading the welfare oriented aspects of Islam, the Sultan attempted to sooth worker's grievances by addressing the duty of employers to treat

workers well (Takriti, 2013, p.225). Bottom-up labour organisation would, against that background, remain unfeasible and unthinkable at lest until the 1990s.[34]

The high degree of tribalism in the country has, according to some scholars, heavily hampered the emergence of blood ties crossing civil society (Alhaj, 2000). While this is substantially true, also the very non-tradition of engaging in civil society activities cross-cutting primordial or traditional local ties played a role. Erfan and Sofy (2014) found in their comprehensive study of civil society obstacles in Oman that these organisations were often prone to be instrumentalised by particular individuals or groups, often lacked the formulation of a popper goal and vision, and also often lacked the awareness of the importance of sticking to the rules of the Omani legal framework as well as to the self-established internal regulations, including clear democratic procedures. Their unclear legal status and the lack of experience in finance and public relations prevented civil society organisations to put their names on the map of the political arena, which was exacerbated by the unawareness or negative approach of government representatives on all levels about the possible partnership between civil society organisations and the public administration.

Initiatives had also problems in attracting volunteers, which was mirrored in low membership and participation rates in general assemblies and board meetings, and often members stayed in their positions for many years. By the end of the 1990s, many young people simply lacked interest in volunteering. Al-Farsi (2013, p.206) cites the chairman of the Omani Writers Association stating especially regarding graduates, that "the cultured people [...] are not aware of their role in society".

Underdeveloped news networks and government censorship did not better that situation. In 2008 a Council of Minister directive of the Information Minister was leaked, instructing him to restrict the public's freedom to criticise government officials. To a higher degree than many other countries of the sample in which the freedom of press in heavily curtailed, the Omani media landscape resembles the Syrian media system, as there is very little possibilities in obtaining information, and the press is heavily controlled by the regime. Broadband coverage was low and in most rural areas absent, and the 51 per cent state-owned Omantel was the only internet service provider in Oman. Even in the Sultan Qaboos University library, three government agencies censored books and magazines (Eickelman, 2001, p.195). Accurate statistics and information, especially for civil society activists, was more than difficult to obtain (Erfan and Sofy, 2014). All these problems did not cease, even after Art.33 of the Basic Structure of the State and Royal Decree 14/2000 explicitly allowed for civil society associations.

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[34]Like in almost every Gulf country, sometimes conflicts and strikes among guest workers did happen. These collective actions mostly ended with dismissals, except if the governments of the respective countries intervened, such as India in the case of the arrest of about 2000 Indian guest workers in Oman in 1978 (Valeri, 2012, p.114).

The New Labour Unions as Top-Down Initiative

Although Oman had not ratified ILO Convention 87 (the Freedom of association and protection of the right to organise convention, 1948) or ILO Convention 98 (the Right to organise and collective bargaining convention, 1949), the beginning of the 2000 heralded a new era for trade unionism. First, Royal Decree No. 35/2003 allowed for representative committees of workers inside enterprises and a nationwide coordination similar to the JLC-GCBW system in Bahrain. In 2006, Sultani Decree 112 introduced the term trade unions (*naqabat*) for the first time and guaranteed that they had the "right to exercise their activity freely without interference in their affairs" on the part of the state. Finally, Ministerial Decree 294/2006 regulated the terms and conditions for legal strikes. The impulse to allow trade union structures, however, did not come from the populace in a bottom-up manner. Two major top-down reasons can be identified instead:

First, trade unions were seen by the state and parts of the business elite as a potential enhancement for the communication between and within industrial institutions. Consequently, domestic servants, members of the security apparatus, as well as of the state administration and other governmental units were exempted from Royal Decree 35/2003. The overall aim was to increase overall productivity (Al-Barashdi and Al-Suqri, 2014, p.112). Experiences with workers' committees inside formally foreign companies served as inspiration, such as in Petroleum Development Oman (PDO) which had been majority-owned by Royal Dutch Shell for a long time and inside which employee committees traditionally worked since the 1970s (Louër, 2015).

Second, Oman was getting increasingly embedded into the international community, especially concerning financial issues. Fathoming out possibilities for international trade cooperation and loans, the country opened up for international regulations which were also a driving motive behind the evolution of the labour code (Louër, 2015).

Concerning the formation of the new trade union bodies, the government was quick of the mark to steer the process from the very beginning. In 2005 a committee was set up in order to supervise and spur elections in company-level workers representatives committees. A year later, 43 of these committees represented almost 15 per cent of the private sector employees (Valeri, 2007). The still slow and often hampered process of union formation, that mostly resulted from a shortage of volunteers, led repeatedly to the postponement of the foundation of the first trade union federation. It was eventually established on February 15 2010 when some 50 individual unions joined the new General Federation of Omani Trade Unions (GFOTU). A further step in professionalisation was achieved by Ministerial Decree 59/2010, thus creating the possibility for unionists to become full-time officers in their respective trade union or the federation. The first union bodies displayed little militancy and were, as stated by an interviewee cited by Al-Farsi (2013), "trying to build a mutual partnership with the government" while reassuring that "people's presumption that this cooperation will lead to gov-

ernment control over the Union is not correct". Also the relationship to the business owners was notedly friendly: At a conference in 2012, GFTOU vice-chairman Nabhan Al-Batashi stated that "the end of the ideological struggle between labour and business owners" had arrived, and described the underlying attitude of trade unionism as being protective towards the enterprises they agitate in, depicting the latter as "breast-feeding mothers" (Khadr, 2012). The closeness of the union bodies to the ruling elite resembles the state-union relation the Bahraini GFBTU had in its first years after its foundation. Also similarly, the Omani union movement was benefiting from financial government support during the first years of their emergence. This was also true for union workshops in all governorates and an utterly positive stance of government officials, leading to an increase of GFOTU member unions to over 170 by the end of 2010.

6.7.3   An Embryonic Trade Union Movement with Little Bargaining Power

Given the friendliness of the new union bodies towards the regime, it is little bewildering that their militancy was rather underdeveloped. An official FAQ of the Ministry of Manpower Oman (2020) answers the question about achievements of the labour movement with a positive assessment mentioning the improvement of wages and leave, an increase in production, the reduction of frequent resignations, and reduction of shifting of workers from one facility to another. Pragmatically, the page continues stressing that the trade union work of the recent years has led to a "reduction of resorting to counter-productive means such as strike" and the resort to peaceful methods including collective bargaining, social dialogue, conciliation and mediation.

Indeed, the young trade union movement did not have the time, resources, or willingness to engage in labour dispute and show militancy. Generally, strikes in key sectors were barely registered since the implementation of the new labour code of 2006 that allowed for unionisation. Apart from high obstacles to schedule collective action, and the fact that government personnel was not allowed to organise, the union structures were still in their infancy. Those union bodies which emerged showed strict loyalty to the Sultan and its regime, and moreover, supported Omanisation alongside with the official authorities. Wage adoptions were introduced historically in a top down manner, like the public sector wage increase by 15 per cent in 2007 and no trade union organisation had ever addressed demands directly and on a large scale to the government. While Kuwaiti trade unions had a long history reaching back into the 1970s and often launched strikes despite a ban on strikes, Omani trade unions remained toothless in their first years after foundation. The Case of Oman is, consequently, coded KEYS = (0).

6.7.4 Protests 2011: One Small Step in the Arab Spring - But one Giant Leap for Oman

January until April 2011 was a caesura for Oman although the protests were barely covered by Western media. Reliable numbers are difficult to obtain, however, most likely about 5,000 to 10,000 people were protesting at once at certain points of time in the country. Protests led to foremost socio-economic concessions of the state leadership, and to the deployment of the Army at least in the streets of Soha, Salalah, and Seeb. The demands were heterogeneous and also included issues of Omanisation and labour, allegations of corruption, and civic rights demands that were already cautiously uttered about a year before by a group of intellectuals. After some socio-economic concessions and amendmends to the Basic Law, which strengthened the Madjlis al-Shura, protests abated by August 2011. The trade union movement was not involved into the struggle about reform.

A Whiff of a Civil Rights Movement

By 2007, the public space in Oman seemed almost fully under the control of the state authorities. Journalist criticising the participartory procedures inside the system as superficial or insufficient were intimidated or declared *persona non grata* (Valeri, 2007, 2012; Al-Rawi, 2016). In the wake of mass arrests following an Islamist conspiracy against the regime among university staff and students in 2005, the government had shown to outsiders and insiders of the country that it was ready to take repressive action in case of dissent, especially when coming from the strata of political Islam (Valeri, 2007).

Consequently, political activity outside the established channels of the government shifted into the virtual space. *Sabla al-Arab* and after its shutdown in 2006, *Sabla Oman* became prominent online forums in which betimes government criticism could be uttered. While the discontent with the state controlled media landscape grew among the younger population (Al-Rawi, 2016, p.109), it took a group of Omani intellectuals until 2010, during the 40th anniversary of Qaboos's accession to the throne, to present a document to the sultan urging for further-reaching reforms. The demands included the formation of a national council in order to draft a new constitution leading to a parliamentary Monarchy and measures against corruption among top political incumbents (Valeri, 2012).

In the meantime, several small-scale civil society groups emerged consisting of well-educated young Omanis who regarded their human capital as legitimation to participate to a higher extent in the political process, such as the Omani Society for Writers and Literati in Oman (chaired by former Omani Ambassador to the United States, Sadiq Jawad Sulaiman) (Moritz, 2018). Although these developments lacked the extent of civil society activism witnessed in other countries of the sample, especially

between 2008 and 2010, these developments were remarkable given the tight grip of the state on media and civil society.

Just like in most other countries of the sample, the first protests started on January 17 2011, the Friday after Tunisian President Zine ben Ali had fled to Saudi Arabia. About 200 people protested against rising prices of basic goods and on corruption, eventually gathering outside the housing ministry. A wave of small, however continuous sit ins followed that mostly addressed the deteriorating socio-economic situation the protesters perceived themselves to be affected by, as well as reforms of the political system.

Small Scale Protests, Still Having a Political Impact

Benefiting from online networking in which the platform Sablat al-Arab played a decisive role again, different demands were merged and larger crowds could be mobilised. *Green marches* took place on February 8 and February 18, whereas the latter culminated with a petition delivered to the government on February 23. Besides a number of socio-economic demands, the petition also contained demands that - at least - scratched at the political equilibrium of the country, such as (Worrall, 2012, p.104):

- freedom of press and expression

- an independent judiciary, a transfer of legislative powers to the Madjlis Al-Shura, and the founding of an independent constitutional court

- a strengthened position of the Madjlis Al-Shura vis-á vis the Ministries, particularly the right to vote down or up policies related to education and the economy

- abolishing the exceptional powers enjoyed by many state institutions and limiting the powers of security institutions

- an increase of government efforts in the fight against discrimination against women

- compulsory school attendance for all citizens until the age of 16 in order to better chances on the labour market

- relaxing of the legal stipulations to create trade unions and professional associations

Also calls for the dismissal of ministers alleged of being corrupt were repeatedly uttered. This can be read against the background of the aforementioned increased share of business elite inside the ranks of the Ministers in combination with a gridlock that was perceived by many Omanis concerning upward mobility of young politicians. Ministers were alleged of only pursuing their own agenda instead of caring about the nation's interest (Valeri, 2012, p.2). Indeed, the same Ministers were in office for 10 or 20 years, often having made their ministries fiefdoms, in a professionally but also in

commercial manner (Worrall, 2012; Kerr, 2011)[35]. Besides Maqbul Al-Sultan, Minister for Commerce and Industry, especially Ahmad bin Abdulnabi Makki, then Omani Minister of the National Economy, became a mutual target of rent-seeking and also of civil rights focussed activists (Louër, 2015; Moritz, 2018, p.51).

Spurred by the message of protests in the capital, and also of the ouster of Mubarak in Egypt, demonstrations and sit-ins increased until the first week of March 2011. New hot spots were Salalah, Seeb, and the industrial zone in Sohar. Especially events in Sohar escalated during the following two weeks when protesters set fire to government buildings and to a supermarket close to the industrial zone. A driving motive behind the protests here, and to a lesser extent also in other hot spots, was the allegation of favouritism towards foreign workers at the expense of the Omani workforce in staffing policies. The Army cleared twice the Globe Roundabout (Kurra Ardiyah) which had been relabelled "Reform Square" and which became the centre of protests including daily sit-ins and a protest camp. In the course of the military interventions, depending on the sources, one to six people died. As a result, the size of the demonstrating crowds rose up to 10,000 in the hot spots, and central places were also occupied by protesters in other cities and renamed, such as the *Call-To-Good Square* in Salalah, *Freedom Square* in Sur, or *People's Square* in Muscat (Worrall, 2012, p.101).

As most collective action was planned online and repression and censorship would not have halted the flow of the protests, the government decided to allow a cautious coverage of the events in Omani media (Al-Rawi, 2016, p.175). At the same time, and similar to other Gulf countries, the ruler first responded by announcing wide ranging economic benefits, including 50,000 new jobs, a rise of the private-sector minimum wage and in unemployment benefits, and increases in the monthly stipend for students. After cabinet reshuffles which turned to be unsatisfactory for the bulk of the protesters, he replaced 16 of the 29 members of the Council of Ministers. Royal Decree No 38/2011 even abolished the Ministry of National Economy.

This was, however, only seen as an initial step, especially for the protesters focussed on civil rights and reform. Consequently, Zakaria al-Mharmi, a doctor at Sultan Qaboos Hospital in Muscat and a leader of the protests stated: "We see the two royal decrees as part of the new reforms ... Next we want him to consider an elected government and a constitution change" (Benham, 2011). Indeed, the reform process that was going on slowly in the past decades got pushed to a new level by the protests of 2011. Besides changes in staffing policies, a royal decree issued in mid-March granted legislative and regulatory powers to the parliament, which had previously only been a consultative body. Funsch (2015) summarises:

> For the first time in the modern history of the state, the *Majlis al-Shura* has the prerogative to propose laws on its own initiative. In addition, before being submitted to the sultan for consideration, the annual budget of the state, as well

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[35]Financial Times journalist Simeon Kerr ascribes this statement to J.E. Peterson, who is a historian specialised on Oman. Regrettably, Kerr does not give a proper source.

as development projects, must be submitted by the Council of Ministers first to the *Madjlis al-Shura* and then to the *Madjlis al-Dawla* for review, discussion, and recommendations. Finally [...], the revision of the Basic Law grants members of the *Madjlis al-Shura* the right to challenge any minister suspected of wrongdoing under the law.

Although representing rather minor shifts in the architecture of power of Oman, especially compared to the huge cataclysms in Tunisia or Egypt, for many Omanis, this was a remarkably progressive step. Consequently, after having flared up in May again, with the begin of Ramadhan in August also the critical juncture in Oman came to an end.

Trade Unions: No Comment, no Participation

The stance of the young trade union movement towards the protests during the critical juncture of 2011 in Oman is difficult to assess, as there were no statements, announcements, or participation whatsoever. In a country in which trade unions are regarded as broker rather than progressive political forces (Louër, 2015), this is little surprising. Nonetheless, collective labour action could be witnessed also in Oman.

The key group of protesters was the unemployed youth but also industrial workers (especially in Sohar), public sector clerks in Muscat, and foremost students and teachers demanding educational reform[36]. At the beginning of February, teachers staged a protest against higher social increased costs of living and for performance related pay. In the wake, large number of schools remained closed across the country (Worrall, 2012, p.99). At the end of April, more than 80 teachers attempted to form an independent teacher's association at a conference at the Bosher Club Hall in Muscat (Al-Musha'ir, 2011), however facing difficulties to register their *Omani Association of Teachers and Educators*. The relaxing of legal stipulations for forming professional associations as demanded in the petition of February 23 can be read against that background.

During a phase in March several minor strikes occured, including aviation (Oman Air) and banking (Oman International Bank) and in the industrial zone of Sohar, where all 150 units in the Rusayl industrial estate north of Muscat were forcedly closed down by strikers, followed by strikes at the refineries in Muscat and Sohar (Worrall, 2012, p.102).

During all these events, however, official trade unions were not the trailblazers nor much engaged in the political arena. This is due to their closeness to the government as well as the lack of an embedding into a broader coalition of opposition groups. Louër (2015) pins it down when stating:

> Omani unions clearly do not position themselves as a political opposition and avoid showdowns with the government. This attitude allowed them to benefit

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[36]Education had also become a major aim of the reformist top-down endeavours since the 1970s. It has also been an admission ticket for the entrance to the higher echelons of power. The Constitution, for instance, stipulates that only candidates that can prove a level of education that is not less than the General Education Diploma may run for office in the Madjlis Al-Shura (Art.58(10)

from a substantial upgrade in the aftermath of the protests. Omani trade unions are not linked to underground political organizations, nor to informal political trends, their leaders were not previously known for being civil society activists and do not put forward an analysis of labor issues very different from that of the government, which they are careful not to antagonize.

The variable INOPP is, consequently, coded (0) for the case of Oman.

6.8   Mauritania (0)

Although being officially an *Islamic Republic*, tribal associations were of utmost importance in the history and present of Mauritania. Eventually helped by a strong Army, an elite consisting mainly of Moorish Arabs managed to seize control. The conflict with marginalised and often discriminated black Africans who mostly live in the south of the country has also been a steady companion of the country's history - different to the relatively homogeneous Oman. It also became a driving issue in the course of the uprisings 2011. While different protest movements struggled for a new constitution and a cutback of the role of the military, trade unions remained politically silent except for the Confédération Générale des Travailleurs de Mauritanie (CGTM) which, still, focussed on socio-economic demands only. The outcome for the country is therefore coded (0). The truth table reads as follows:

SOEC	INOPP	CEN	TRI	KEYS	**Outcome**	Decimal
0	0	0	1	0	**0**	MAU(2)

Table 6.10: Truth table row for the case of Mauritania

As will be outlined especially in 6.8.4, this weakness goes hand in hand with the incapability of mobilising allies in the political system. This holds true, although - similar to Morocco - political opposition parties and unions were often intertwined. Forces that attempted to change the institutional equilibrium, however, stood outside the traditional parliamentary opposition and no alliance between these forces and trade unions could be proved. The variable INOPP is coded (0). Additionally, the fragmentation of the union movement which derives from a union legislation that allows for union plurality, as will be shown in part 6.8.3, remained a decisive feature until 2011 and beyond. The variable CEN is thus coded (0). Given this fragmentation, and a low share of industrial labour in the country, the bargaining power of the unions, as will be outlined in section 6.8.3 was comparatively low. The variable KEYS is coded (0). Nonetheless, and especially compared to Tunisia and Oman, the country's economic indicators hinted at an economy that was poor, however recovering slightly. Similar to Morocco, the breach of the authoritarian bargain from an socio-economic perspective

was not a major issue of the protests, and rather the fight against racial discrimination and violence were on the focus of the demands. The variable SOEC is hence set to (0).

6.8.1 Tribalism, the Military, and a History of Coups

Mauritania is according to Art.1 of its constitution a social Islamic Republic[37] and the only country in Africa that carries the name Islamic in its official name. The country achieved independence from France in 1960 who had ruled the country from Senegal and faced some trouble to administer the region that was and is coined until today by tribalism and ethnic tensions.

6.8.2 The Dominance of Tribal Affiliations in the Country and Political System

About one third of the population consists of "black Mauritanians" and is mainly comprised of the Halpulaar, the Sonink, the Wolof, and the Bambara. Poular, Soninke, and Wolof are also "national languages" while the official language is Arabic. The population of Arab decent that often merged with Berbers are considered Moorish or Beydane and their tribes dwell mainly in the north, centre, and east of the country (N'Diayne, 2006, p.423). They make up the majority (about 60-70 per cent, depending on the source) of the population and by fact more than half of them are Black Moors (Salem, 2009, p.157). Historically, this group had a predominant position, could enforce religion and their Hassabian language on other parts of the population, and due to prejudice and colonial ways of organising the population according to racial category this position was consolidated under French rule (Cervello, 2006, p.146-148).

The Moorish society is heterogeneous. First it is organised in at least 150 different tribes with a complex net of interdependencies, alliances and rivalries, and second they display a horizontal stratification resembling a caste system. The Hassan tribes form the top of the hierarchy, being descendent from ranks of the Maqil Arabs who gained fame by their violent conquest of the Maghreb in the thirteenth century. The Zawaya or Marabouts rank slightly below them, forming a caste influenced by religious life after they had been defeated by the Banu Hassan in the seventeenth century. The Zanga form the lowest rank, consisting of defeated Berber and Arab groupings who were vassals of the Hassan tribes until the mid-twentieth century (Pazzanita, 1999, p.45). This rough classification, however, should not be seen as inflexible and inescapable, as groups of different strata, classes and casts have, especially after 1960, often pursued

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[37]The early regime coined the term "Islamic Socialism" that referred foremost to the nationalisation of key sectors of the economy, the elimination of exploitation of man by man, the systematisation of punishment and reward, state control of basic public services, and a mixed economic sector in which the state is associated with international or national private enterprises (Pantara, 2010, p.118, fn.57). Despite the religious touch of the name, it basically follows the Arab Socialist agenda that also could be found elsewhere at that time in North Africa.

common agendas or forged alliances.

After independence in 1960, first president Ould Daddah managed to balance the interests of the diverse ethnic groups, established a single party system with his Parti du Peuple Mauritanie (PPM), and, arguing that Mauritania was not ready for Western-style multi-party democracy, consolidated his power in an authoritarian-style system. However, he lost support during the Western Sahara conflict: After the withdrawal of the Spaniards, former Rio de Oro was divided between Morocco and Mauritania in 1970, and the Mauritanian Army could not hold sway against the indigenous militia Polisario in the years to follow, which even attacked the main income source, the iron mines of Zouerate, on Mauritanian ground. Daddah was eventually forced to resign by war-weary officers, giving way to the an unstable military rule that lasted until the coup of 1984 in which Ould Taya ascended to power and remained at the top of the country until 2005.

With the beginning of the military rule a change in the pattern of influence on the state politics occurred. The efforts to balance the interests of the different groups of the country was exchanged by a favouritism towards the Arab tribes. Protests by Mauritania's Black Africans against upcoming efforts to "Arabise" educational life and the civil service already took place in 1966, and their feeling of deprivation was exacerbated in the 1980s. A network of Smassides (Ould Taya's tribe), Oulad Bousba, and Idewaali, as well as wealthy families and businessmen who came to monopolise Mauritania's economy, including Ould Taya's close family, formed the backbone of the presidential party Parti Républicain Démocratique et Social *Mauritania* (PRDS) and held key positions within the sate (N'Diayne, 2006, p.42).

An Inauthentic First Hybridisation of the Political System

Under Ould Taya's rule, the country faced at least three major problems, which eventually made the state elite initiate a political hybridisation of the system. First, the country's economic performance worsened. The iron production that was nationalised in 1974 became an important pillar of the national revenues and natural resources accounted for about 20 per cent of GDP in 1976, however, this share decreased constantly and reached a bottom of 6 per cent 20 years later. More devastating for the economy were the successive droughts in the 1980s that had reduced the livestock population by more than a third, and total cereal output had slumped from around 120,000 tonnes a year to nearer 20,000 tonnes (Seddon, 1996, p.206).

Second, the bias towards Arab-Moorish tribal figures concerning the distribution of jobs, money, and opportunities triggered discontent in other parts of the population that betimes turned violent. Grievances led to the establishment of the Forces de Libération Africaines de Mauritanie (FLAM), a militant group that claimed to represent black Mauritanians in an Apartheid-like regime. Third, and connected with the

two former points, violence became a central part of the institutional equilibrium, leading increasingly to harassment, torture, and other human rights abuses in which also the Army was heavily involved. A border conflict with Senegal in which the Mauritanian black population in the country's south suffered ethnic cleansing triggered vast protests across the country. By 1990, the domestic and also international pressure led to a change of strategy of Ould Taya, who, in the eyes of many observers, had "overplayed the tribal card" (Pazzanita, 1999, p.50)

The hybridisation of the Mauritanian political system that followed began with a draft of a new constitution that was accepted in a referendum in 1991 and was also in force before and during the uprisings of 2011. Although vast liberal rights were granted, the system had a clear bias towards the office of the president. The president was elected for six years and infinitely re-electable (Art. 26/28), appointed the Prime Minister and discharged him from his functions (Art.30), was allowed to dissolve the parliament (Art.31), had statutory power, and was allowed to appoint candidates to civil and military positions (Art.32); moreover, he was the supreme chief of the Armed Forces. The bicameral parliament was dominated since the parliamentary elections of 1992 by the Parti Républicain Démocratique pour le Renouvellement *Mauritania* (PRDR), the successor of the PPM and PRDS.

Opportunities for oppositional elements to influence the regime remained scarce, especially as after the implementation of the constitution Art.104 was added, stating that "the legislation and regulations in force in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania shall remain applicable until they have been modified in the manner provided for in this Constitution". Against the background of the dominance of the old cadres around Ould Taya in the legislative process, this provision opened the door for a delay of a reform or the repressive legislation that prevailed under the military rule (N'Diayne, 2006, p.424). Also the role of the Army, which, similar to Algeria, was judged as too powerful among opposition forces, remained virtually untouched. Many high ranking officers benefited from the 1993 amnesty law regarding atrocities of the 1980s, as well as from positions that gave opportunities for self-enrichment in semi-legal dealings with the private sector (N'Diayne, 2006, p.429).

Consequently, little changed concerning the institutional equilibrium, and the predominance of the PRDS in elections continued nearly uncontested until 2004 (Rebstock, 2007, p.56-57). Apart from fraudulent elections[38], this was foremost possible by a harsh suppression of opposition parties and civil society as such.

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[38]Manipulation of elections was particularly easy for the regime as it could influence the administration - which was penetrated by loyal clerks and located in the urban centres of the state. As Rebstock (2007, p.57) points out, local hand-written birth registers were often non-existent or simply too remote and inaccessible for most of the poor urban population. Additionally, as Rebstock argues, about 30 per cent of the Mauritanian high-school students have a variant of Muhammad in their name, and the registration of Mohammad-son-of-Mohammad (Mohammad wuld Mohammad) was denied under the pretext that these names are not clearly attributable to real existing persons.

Political Violence as Glue of the Institutional Equilibrium

Although the hybridisation of the system was rather superficial, the regime now had to deal with an official opposition. This opposition, however, was often more interested in gaining access to rents than the representation of the entire country. The largest opposition parties Union des Forces Démocratiques-Ère Nouvelle *Mauritania* (UFD), led by Moktar Ould Daddah's half brother Ahmed Ould Daddah, the Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès *Mauritania* (UPD), led by Naha Mint Mouknass who was member of a family from the economic center of the Dakhlet Nouadhibou, and the pro-Iraqi Ba'athi Parti d'Avant-Garde Nationale *Mauritania* (PAGN) fought struggles inside the political relevant elites, however, they were mostly representing little more than the Moorish population and views of the heterogeneous country.

This only changed in 1995 when the Haratins of El Hor left the UFD and founded the Action de Changement *Mauritania* (AC) in August 1995. The departure of the Haratins was a turning point, as Haratins, who are normally considered as Moors, started to broaden their electoral base by also addressing issues the black population were preoccupied with (Marianne, 2002, p.9).

Members of all these opposition parties were frequently arrested, their meetings dispersed by authorities, and they were blamed for upheavals and civil disturbances like those in January 1995 after price increases (Pazzanita, 1999, p.55). This atmosphere had three major effects.

First, the civil society remained embryonic, even if after 1991 the country witnessed the foundation of civil society organisations unmatched in the country's history before.[39] State action also affected the media and in particular newspapers that suffered from censorship and open interference by the government concerning their news coverage.

Second, voter turnout in the elections remained low, being a symptom of disenchantment with politics especially among the alienated population not reachable by - or isolated deliberatively from - the networks around the PRDS, or tribal networks with access to the decision making process (Pazzanita, 1999, p.54). Third, the imbalance of power in the country and the weak and split opposition led to an undermining of national identity, a stronger reliance on local and tribal structures and growing grievances towards the center.

The justification of the iron hand of the regime became easier after the regime reinvented itself as a champion of the fight against Islamist terrorism after September 11 2001 (N'Diayne, 2006, p.426). It forged an alliance with the United States and made the country benefit from foreign assistance policies (Jourde, 2007). Indeed, groups that avowed themselves to political Islam had gained influence in Mauritania, especially in

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[39]Like in most other countries of the sample, civil society in Mauritania grew in importance already 1980s and a variety of civil society and political groups started to organise more visibly. Among these groups were players that could be found in other countries of the region as well, such as the Egypt backed Nasserists, Iraqi backed Ba'athists, Muslim Brothers, and also groups that addressed local idiosyncrasies such as "the Free" (El Hor) organisation, representing ethnic black Mauritanians and Moorish ex-slaves (Hlarratin) respectively (Seddon, 1996, p.203)

the poorer strata of urban regions, in which since the 1980s many former rural dwellers settled after they fled deteriorating socio-economic circumstances in the countryside. Players of political Islam, like Salafi groups and the Muslim Brotherhood oriented Jamaeea Al-Islamiya, also became more prominent in the political arena. Connections to militant Islamists, however, were rarely proven, and political leaders of political Islam openly condemned terrorism and supported the fight against Al-Qaida in Maghreb, rendering Jihadism a radical fringe that mainstream Islamists by fact opposed (Thurston, 2012).

Nonetheless, security forces acted more rigorously against opposition parties with Islamic inclination under the pretext of anti-terror operations. But also former allies of the President experienced increasing discrimination which led to an attempted coup led by the Oulad Nacer tribe and parts of their allies like the Ideyboussatt and Laghlal (N'Diayne, 2006, p.429). After another attempted coup in 2004, eventually the coup of 2005 ended the rule of Ould Taya. It was carried out by officers around Ely Ould Mohamed Vall, the director of national security, and the commander of the presidential guard Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz. Both declared the democratisatie of the country their main goal.

In the parliamentary elections that followed 2006, al-Mithaq, a list of independent candidates with Islamic inclination, became the dominant party in parliament, while the Regroupement des Forces Démocratiques *Mauritania* (RFD), a party founded by putschist Mohamed Vall became the second strongest party, and the PRDS ended up far behind on the fourth place.

Similar to Algeria, where the Army and the old elite was dissatisfied with the election results of 1991, Mauritania's newly elected president, Ould Cheikh Abdallahi, was eventually replaced in another coup by Abdel Aziz in 2008. Aziz himself became president in 2009 and set up the Union Pour la République *Mauritania* (UPR) in the same year in order to consolidate his basis of power (Buehler, 2015a, p.365). The military had become dissatisfied with Abdellahi and his politics of democratic opening, that also included the legalisation of the Tawasool party, which became a pool of activist of political Islam (Cavatorta and Garcia, 2017, p.315).

Similar to Ould Taya, Abdel Aziz searched to co-opt notables from rural areas, especially those from tribes allied with his Oulad Bou Sbaa clan, to consolidate his power. He won the elections of 2009 handily with 52.2 per cent in the first round (Antil, 2010). Frequent protests emerged until the Dakar Accord that was signed in June 2009 between the three poles of the parliamentary majority.[40].

After a rather calm first half of 2010, and heavy rainfalls in the second half, in the beginning of 2011 the pictures of the uprisings in other countries arrived in Mauritania.

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[40]These three poles were at the time of the signing of the Agreement the UPR supporting General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, the Front National pour la Défense de la Démocratie (FNDD), an anti-UPR coalition formed in 2009 including PNDD/ADIL, APP, UFP, and Tawasool, and finally the RFD supporting Ahmed Ould Daddah (Ould Bouboutt, 2014).

6.8.3 From the National Project to restricted Social Movement Unionism

Different from Oman, the Mauritanian trade union movement has a long history. Nonetheless, while trade union activities especially in the mining sector contributed to the struggle of independence, the importance of the union movement decreased over time. The major trade unions relinquished political issues to the government, and a labour legislation allowing for union plurality gave way for a fragmentation of the movement into many competing trade union centres.

From Trade Union Fragmentation to Unity and Back

An embryonic workers' movement emerged during the 1960s especially in the mining sector. Different from many other countries of the sample, mining and industrial workers were not necessarily privileged compared to their fellow citizens in the agricultural sector (Bennoune, 1988, p.46). Poor living conditions, including over-crowded and unhygienic slums without running water or electricity, triggered the first strike in Zouerate in 1968. Although it was crushed violently by the Army, involved trades unions gained influence in the political arena. They were also pushing for nationalist demands and were forming a major factor in the government's stance on relations with France, the creation of a national currency, and nationalisation of the iron ore mines (Seddon, 1996, p.201). Already in 1961 five trade union centres that stemmed from the time of the French rule merged to the Union des Travailleurs de Mauritanie (UTM), and at its Congress in February 1969 radical rank and file formed a "progressive UTM" which was mainly supported by the teachers' union. Until 1973 a struggle between the movement and state authorities began and eventually the state managed to gain control over the movement's organisations.

During the time of instability in 1981 several unions, which were dissatisfied with the grip of the regime on the movement, tried to break away from the state (WFTU North Africa, 2015; Seddon, 1996, p.203). However, significant independent unions emerged only after the announced democratic opening at the beginning of the 1990s when the rules of the game for trade unions changed. While the labour code of 1963 severely restricted union pluralism, the constitution of 1991 explicitly acknowledged the right of political freedom and freedom of labour unions in its very preamble. By this way, the regime imitated the strategy of neighbouring Morocco. Still, Art.14 banned strike for all "vital public services of vital interest to the nation" and in areas of national defence and security. In 1993 the Confédération générale des travailleurs de Mauritanie (CGTM) formed of which about a year later the Confédération Libre des Travailleurs de Mauritanie (CLTM) split. The Union Générale des Travailleurs de Mauritanie (UGTM*) formed in 2002 and held, just like the UTM, close ties to the ruling party (United States Department of State, 2004).

Trade Unions Accepting the Leading Role of the Regime in Political Questions

Compared to the overall population, trade unionism played a limited role in the country. By 2002, the informal and agricultural sector employed about 75 per cent of the country's citizens. However, in the remaining wage sector, nearly 90 percent of industrial and commercial workers were organised (United States Department of State, 2004). Protests occurred frequently since independence, but these protests did not aim at changing the equilibrium of power, and unions traditionally accepted and protected the authoritarian bargain, by that way supporting a social compromise in favour of Mauritanian nationalisation, and a form of radical, albeit authoritarian, populism (Seddon, 1996, p.200). Already in 1966, after lengthy negotiations, PPM and UTM agreed on a protocol in which the UTM accepted the supremacy of the PPM in the political sphere, while the PPM accepted the UTM as the only representative organisation of the workers.

This attitude started to change slightly in the mid-1990s. Ba'athist and Nasserists political forces gained some influence within the union movement which was seen as a threat by state elites and led to repression of collective action (Marianne, 2002, p.11). The CGTM was not officially affiliated with any party, while the CLTM was associated with the *Action pour le Changement* (AC) opposition party that campaigned for greater rights for Mauritania's Haratin and black populations (United States Department of State, 2004). This mirrored the two hazards the trade union movement could pose for the regime: First, as the IMF austerity politics, that began to be implemented since 1992, were a main target of opposition criticism, trade unions, as watchdogs of the authoritarian bargain, could easily fit into the opposition movements. During the bread riots of 1995, new and independent unions rallied alongside with opposition figures like Ahmed ould Daddah (UFD), or Hamdi ould Mouknass (UDP), whose speeches denounced the "nepotist management of state resources" (Marianne, 2002, p.11). Second, human rights groups that were preoccupied with the marginalised parts of society, marginalised regions of the country, and their deprivation from the centres of power, also addressing the human rights abuses, found in trade unions valuable allies - as long as the common denominator were the rights of workers. In the decades that followed, the networks of the trade union movement increased, and trade unions collaborated with human rights associations, youth movements, pro-democratic groups, campaigns against discrimination against black people or against slavery (Bajo, 2013, p.124).

Although new trade unions required a licence from the state authorities, this politics of selective licensing have not been used to an excessive extent like in Lebanon, and a heterogeneous union landscape emerged in the country. By 2011 Mauritania counted 19 national trade union centres in addition to a few autonomous professional white

collar unions with limited influence. Most of these trade union organisations did not stand out with government criticism in terms of socio-economic demands, nor did they challenge the institutional equilibrium of the country. Those unions that were active inside the political arena alleged the regime of taking advantage of this situation of amalgamation and confusion by instrumentalising workers' organisations (Le Comitée Exécutif de la CGTM, 2011).

This strategy could indeed be witnessed after the 2008 coup, which received little appreciation from the union movement. In August of that year, the police in Nouakchott brutally repressed a demonstration organised by trade unions to protest against the military coup. Even though the march had been authorised, several trade unionists, including Samory Ould Beye, General Secretary of the national trade union centre CLTM, were taken by force to the police station, before being later released (International Trade Union Conference (ITUC), 2009). In a unique move, the UTM, CGTM, and CLTM together with the smaller union centrers USCM, CNTM, and UNTM send a letter to the United Nations on August 25 2008 asking for assistance in the restoration of democracy in the country. During the critical juncture 2012 mutual statements between that *Intersyndicale* would follow.

A Split Union Movement Lacking Bargaining Power

The foundation of the Intersyndicale , that was undertaken in order to combine the forces of the different trade union centres, can be read as a move to compensate a low bargaining power of unions, especially in key sectors of the economy. The aforementioned droughts of the 1980s and economic mismanagement resulted in an increase of foreign debt in Mauritania. After nearly all of its foreign debt had been forgiven due to the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative at the beginning of the 2000s, the country focussed on the attraction of foreign investments, however, with little measurable results. Natural resources, especially iron and copper ore, gold, and crude petroleum accounted for about half of the GDP as well of exports in 2010. Due to large fishing grounds, also non-fillet fish, molluscs and processed crustaceans constituted about one third of the total export. Employment in agriculture was about 58 per cent and employment in industry about 10.5 per cent, being the highest and lowest value respectively of the entire sample, and the urbanisation rate is the second lowest after Yemen.

Strikes at the Société Nationale d'Industrielle Minière *Mauritania* (SNIM), accounting for about 15 per cent of the GDP, were almost non-existent in the 2000s, and unionisation in the fishing industry was virtually absent. The case of Mauritania bears a certain resemblance to the case of Morocco, as the workers in the key sectors - being almost exclusively natural resources in Mauritania - were split between the at least three large union federations according to their networks, identities, or political preferences. The very difference is that the Mauritanian labour movement never managed

to constitute an anomic threat to the government. The history of workers' struggle, as outlined in part 6.8.3, did not enter the collective memory of the country and regime as the Moroccan protests of the past decades did in Morocco.

While in Morocco the CDT was the most active union, the CLTM was in Mauritania the most militant organisation. Different from Tunisia, however, in Mauritania, no harsh harassment of trade union activities in key sectors became public during the 2000s. The importance and strength of the trade union movement was simply not high enough for the regime to consider concessions. When the Intersyndicale cooperated in 2008 in a dialogue, this cooperation did not last for long. It was not able to threaten militancy in form of strikes or other collective action, did not affect the key sectors, and produced, if at all, little results. Apart from that, social dialogue including all important trade union organisations remained virtually non-existent at all levels. The only multi-sector collective agreement dates back to 1974 and there were only four sectoral agreements, the most recent of which (for the mining industry) dates back to 1969. The case of Mauritania is therefore coded KEYS = 0.

6.8.4   Protests 2011-2013: An Alliance without Trade Unions

During the critical juncture that started 2011, trade unionism did play a restricted role during the process. And if at all, only socio-economic enhancements were demanded, while the protest movements on the streets struggled for a new constitution and a cutback of powers of the military in the political arena.

A Protest Movement Focussed on Political Issues and State Violence

Although Mauritania has the lowest rate of internet-coverage per households (0,17 fixed broadband subscriptions in 2011 compared to 2,2 in Egypt), news about the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia triggered protests especially in urban areas. Yacoub Ould Dahoud, a Mauritanian businessman burned himself on January 17 2011, and on January 20 the first demonstrators gathered at the May 1 Square in Nouakchott in order to protest against injustice. The government reacted promptly to the events and lowered prices for sugar, rice, cooking oil, and flour about 30 per cent. Nonetheless, after a couple of weeks of organisation, network building, and the agreement on common goals, different groups launched a mass demonstration on February 25 and presented a catalogue of 7 core demands, that all posed a direct attack on the institutional equilibrium, being (Lum, 2011):

  - the withdrawal of the military from politics
  - a firmer separation of powers
  - the establishment of a national agency to combat slavery
  - constitutional reforms affecting the electoral system

- the reform of the process by which officials publicly declare their assets
- the reform of local administration and the empowerment of elected mayors
- media law reforms

These major demands, which all tangle the political sphere, can be read against the background of a poor, however, economically recovering country. Although Mauritania remains one of the poorest countries of the sample, macroeconomic trends were positive. The general unemployment rate dropped from 12.5 per cent in 2002 to 10.5 per cent in 2010, showing a similar downward trend like Morocco and remaining at the level of Syria. With about 17 per cent, youth unemployment was high in 2010, however, this is the lowest number among the non-Gulf countries of the sample. At the same time, the absolute poverty rate decreased about 10 per cent since 2000, and also the healthcare-out-of-pocket expenditures decreased constantly since 2000 by about 1.5 per cent per year. The case is coded SOEC = (0).

The Youth Movement, Black Africans, and Opposition Parties Struggling for Concessions

The then-named *February 25 Youth Movement* stressed its independence from political parties. Nonetheless, and similar to Morocco, particularly youth sections of political parties, like the Regroupement des Forces Démocratiques, Union des Forces du Progrès (UPR), and Rassemblement pour l'Unité et la Démocratie, had joined early protests and had helped to set up dozens of Facebook groups. All participants hoped to achieve mass mobilisation on the symbolic Place d'Bloques, where several buildings had been sold in intransparent ways to businessmen close to the president, in the years before. Protest also spread to cities like Aleg, Aoujeft, Atar, and Zouerate, however, the overall number of protesters did not exceed a few thousands. The potential and real intervention of parties led to splits within the movement. On April 25 2011 foremost black African organised demonstrations addressing inequality and demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Moulaye Ould Mohamed Laghdaf and a national coalition government made up of technocrats. These demands were maintained despite some promised economic concessions, including job creation and a dialogue offer by authorities (Lum, 2011). Different from other countries of the sample with the exception of Bahrain, parts of the youth movement also addressed tribalism, and ethnic partisanship as a reason for the lack of upward mobility. By that point of time, however, leaders underlined that they did not seek to disrupt the "unity" or call for the resignation of President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz (Ghasemilee, 2011).

The grievances of the black Africans mostly stemming from the deprived south were exacerbated by allegedly fraudulent elections at Nouakchott University that discriminated against the black non-moorish dominated Syndicat National des Étudiants de

Mauritanie (SNEM). Street riots broke out, paralysing the overall protest movement for several months. The census that was planned in the same year worsened the situation, as many activists claimed that the procedures were discriminatory against mostly black people from the south. Census committees demanded documents regarding the parents and even the death certificate of the great grandparents,o which were simply not available for the bulk of the rural population, and registration was a necessary condition to the access of many state services and jobs. Just as seen in the Mauritanian electoral process, and similar to the cases of Jordan, Bahrain, and Kuwait, nationality became a highly politicised issue, leading to the foundation of the movement Touche Pas à Ma Nationalité *Mauritania* (TPMN) that became active especially in the second half of 2011.

A main demand of the opposition, especially of the Coordination de l'Opposition Démocratique *Mauritania* (COD), that was formed by 14 opposition parties after the 2008 coup, was the institutionalisation of a national dialogue that was stipulated in the Dakar Accords. However, the government claimed that it was a one-time matter between the coup and the presidential elections of 2009. Nonetheless, a national political dialogue between the presidential majority and the part of the Opposition, then called a "Dialogue" was held in Nouakchott from September 17 to October 19 2011 (Ould Bouboutt, 2014).

Two issues became the main focal point of discontent: The government extended the parliamentary term until the opening of the May 2012 session, although the constitution stating that the term has to end exactly after five years - which would have been in November 2011. Later on, the government postponed the elections of one third of the second chamber (the second chamber in Mauritania has electoral terms like the US-Senate) (Nup, 2012a). Furthermore, the opposition and the government struggled over proposed constitutional amendments during the National Dialogue[41]. The eventual amendments of March 2012 condemned coups as crimes, fixed a clear equal ranking of men and women on the labour market and for public offices, strengthened slightly the position of the Prime Minister vis-á-vis the President, and prohibited any kind of slavery. At the same time the first chamber was allowed to determine the date of elections (Ould Bouboutt, 2014), and the pivotal role of the office of the president remained virtually untouched.

Dissatisfied with much of the amendments, and with regard to the real situation in Mauritania concerning the role of the Army, discrimination, slavery, and the low living conditions, the intensity of opposition protests peaked in 2012. The protesters

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[41]By fact, only four parties of the COD - the Alliance Populaire Progressiste *Mauritania* (APP) of Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, and the smaller El Wiam, Hamam and Sawab - have joined the dialogue, along with about sixty formations close to the majority. The ten other members of the COD have strongly boycotted the dialogue, believing that their conditions were not respected, including the RFD, still led by Ahmed Ould Daddah (which is with 16 deputies and 7 senators the main opposition party), the Union des Forces de Progrés *Mauritania* (UFP) of Mohamed Ould Maouloud, and Tawassoul led by Jemil Ould Mansour (Spiegel, 2011).

radicalised and attacked the president more openly. The banners of the February 25 movement involved slogans like "active until the fall of the regime" and people shouted "fall, fall military regime!". A rally on March 12 organised by the February 25 movement was themed as "the beginning of the end of despotic power", and demonstrators vociferously requested the retreat of President Aziz.

Meanwhile, the range of issues addressed by the protest network had broadened. Also the exclusion of black Africans was criticised on many banners, and after incidents at the Higher Institute for Islamic Studies and Research, where the police attacked protesting women, the February 25 Movement organised a "march of victory" at the end end of March 2012 under the slogan "don't hit your mother, sister, wife, or daughter". Also the cooperation with the COD, intensified, which organised a demonstration under the slogan "ready to impose departure" on April 22 2012. The crowds of the demonstrations now reached several thousands, peaking on May 9 on Ibn Abbas Sqare, where according to the opposition about 60.000 protesters gathered - nearly 2 per cent of the country's population. Independently from the cooperation between the February 25 Movement, the TPNM, and the COD, also the Islamic party Tawasool became active during 2011-2012, however, it showed a penchant for selecting protest dates one or two days ahead of events announced by other groups, and their actions were often criticised as too radical and violent by other opposition groups (Nup, 2012*b*).

Although especially the February 25 movement and also the COD remained active in the years that followed, however, the critical juncture in Mauritania came to an end by the beginning of 2013.

A Passive Trade Union Movement with only one Exception

During the entire critical juncture, the trade union movement seemed to fight its own struggle focussed on socio-economic issues and avoided to enter the political struggles about the constitution. According to the ITUC, by 2011 the CGTM was the most representative workers' organisation, however, as the Government provided funds to the confederations in proportion to their memberships (United States Department of State, 2004), the UTM was still officially declared the largest trade union centre. The CGTM, known for its opposition against the 2008 coup, organised several rallies, however, without demanding changes within the institutional equilibrium. Already before the protests gained momentum in Mauritania, the CGTM, CLTM, and CNTM pointed in a mutual statement at an unemployment rate of 33 per cent and demanded of the state authorities "to take urgent and appropriate measures to stop the state of degradation and impoverishment of thousands of Mauritanian employees" (L'Intersyndicale de Mauritanie, 2011). Three weeks after the demonstrations of February 25 2011, the Intersyndicale organised a countrywide action day to protest and discuss matters of prices, unemployment, and the protection of Mauritanian workers. On April 15 2011

the CGTM, CLTM and CNMT organised a rally in the capital to pressure the government into negotiations. Although CGTM secretary general Abdelahi Ould Mohammad "Nahah", pointed out that it was "the politics of burying the head in the sand, repression and restriction of liberties that led to the ouster of Ben Ali and Mubarak" (Adrar Info, 2011), no concrete threat against the system was uttered.

However, the Intersyndicale started to disintegrate already in mid-2011. A few months after the beginning of larger protests, the government had managed to jam a wedge between the UTM, which had been relatively passive anyway, and the other members of the Intersyndicale. While UTM, CGTM, CLTM, and CNTM had complained mutually about the intransparent allocation of seats for the 99th International Labour Conference in Géneve in 2010 (L'Intersyndicale de Mauritanie, 2010), on June 3 2011, the CGTL submitted a complaint to the ILO claiming that UTM representatives were overrepresented among the delegates to the 100th International Labour Conference - at the expense of the CGTM (Commission de Vérification des Pouvoirs Mauritanie, 2011). The UTM left the Intersyndicale as - according to the CGTM official statement - leaders argued that their organisation could only exist within the state framework and that the front-line industrial union struggles did not suit them (Le Comitée Exécutif de la CGTM, 2011). The second organisation that broke the trade union front was the CLTM. It was invited to an inaugural ceremony of the opening of negotiations scheduled by state authorities for April 27 2011, and approved without consulting the CGTM and the CNTM. At the same time, a dispute about the representation of the mining workers trade union *Société Nationale Industrielle et Minière de Mauritanie* (SNIM), which was conducting an open sit-in and whose groupings were brutally repressed by the police, broke out between the CGTL and the CLMT, setting the seal on the CLMT's withdrawal from the Intersyndicale. Single-handedly, the CGTL organised a general strike for July 26 2011, as the government and the employers did not open social negotiations with the unions on the basis of the representation criteria provided by the Labor Code. According to its organisers, the strike was a success and joined by mining workers most notably of MCM Akjoujt (100 per cent) and the SNIM in Nouadhibou (40 per cent), telecommunication workers (Mattel 100 per cent), and workers from the Free Port of Nouakchott, Security Services and Guarding, Roads and Buildings, Food Industries, Chemical Industries, Central Administration, Road Transport (Le Comitée Exécutif de la CGTM, 2011).

During the two years of the peak of the uprisings, the focus on socio-economic demands did not change. In a CGTM statement published in August 2011 the union centre criticised the deterioration in the purchasing power of workers, precarious employment, and the lack of tripartite dialogue. In an interview CGTM leader Nahah already February 2011 set the aims by stating (Boolumbal, 2011):

> Nous organisations syndicales réclamons un Etat au service de toutes les populations. Ainsi nous pensons que l'Etat est tenu de procurer à tous ses citoyens la couverture sanitaire, l'éducation pour tous et l'emploi pour la composante des

> travailleurs de l'économie informelle. Nous pensons que l'Etat doit avoir une politique conséquente qui permettra de garantir un minimum nécessaire à tous ses citoyens.

This attitude ,that aimed at making the state responsible and accountable for the population's welfare without trying to change the very nature of the system, was continuously communicated in speeches and actions during the critical juncture. In an ordinary session of the CGTM on November 22-24, 2012, the CGTM met with the representatives of opposition parties like Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, President of the Alliance Populaire et Progressiste (APP) party, and members of the COD. The CGTM informed those representatives who presented possible crisis solutions, that although the union centre was not indifferent to the country's political future, the CGTM was and will remain a trade union actor equidistant from all political actors (Le Comitée Executif de la CGTM, 2012). Also professional white-collar associations stuck to rather apolitical topics such as the protection of their members and issues directly connected to their trade. The Journalist Union even downplayed the violations of freedom of press many journalists suffered according to Reporters Without Borders. During the beginning of the protests the union was rather preoccupied with the release of Ould Eddin who was captured in Libya and freed by April 2011. The union's President Ould Amadou explicitly thanked President Aziz for his efforts (Mohammad, 2011*b*), and, in general, the union's leadership seemed to have good connections to the regime and submit to its stipulations.

Also physicians and health care workers remained silent beyond demands that touched the core of their profession. Mauritanian health workers sought financial compensation for the risks they ran in their daily job, and a travel allowance for over two years. They announced a national open strike on April 7 2011 if the government continued to ignore their demands. Medical workers represented 70 per cent of Mauritania's public health sector (Ould Seyid, 2011), however, they did not aim at changing the nature of the political system. The same is true for the Bar Association, although it struggled with the regime about single incidents. When in November 2011 a government close activist, who was accused of drug delicts was absolved in a court trial and the minister of justice dismissed the leading judge Mohamed El Amine Ould Mokhtar and degraded four others, the Bar Association complained and stated that this would pose dangerous messages to all judges that they had to adopt what the executive authorities consider as right and just - otherwise they were subject to arbitrary dismissal from their jobs (Mohammad, 2011*a*). Collective action against the regime failed to appear.

The two teachers' unions Syndicat Indépendant des Professeurs de l'Enseignement Secondaire *Mauritania* (SIPES) and the Syndicat National d'Ensignment Secondaire *Mauritania* (SNES) conducted several strikes in April and May 2011 demanding higher salaries, housing, and a revision of employment contracts (Confédération Générale des Travailleurs de Mauritanie (CGTM), 2012). The government reacted with stick and carrot: Several teachers were dismissed and several improvements of working conditions

announced. There was, however, no confrontation between the regime and teachers concerning the institutional equilibrium in the country.

Given the hesitance of most of Mauritania's trade union institutions, and the focus on socio-economic demands of the Intersyndicale and also among the professional white-collar associations, the case of Mauritania will be coded (0) concerning the willingness of trade union organisations to change the institutional equilibrium.

6.9   Yemen (0)

Despite the unification of 1990, Yemen can still be considered societally and culturally split. The uprisings of 2011 were caused by a steady deterioration of living conditions and the discrimination of vast parts of the country concerning the distribution of resources, rents, and chances. While professional white collar associations played their role during the uprisings in certain areas and in a rather discontinuous manner, the infrastructure of independent workers' unions had dispersed beyond recognition in the early 1990s, and their capital was assimilated into newly emerging NGO structures. As they never recovered, workers' trade unionism as such did not play a significant role during the protests. Still, Yemen is in a grey zone between (1) and (0) for the QCA outcome. However, compared to the other cases of the sample where the outcome is coded (1), the Yemeni workers' movement lacked internal structure and coordination, and even when collective ad hoc actions were launched by workers during the critical juncture, institutional trade unionism was not the main vehicle for these actions. The outcome of the case is coded (0). For the sake of higher transparency, section 6.9.4 scrutinises this decision. The truth table row reads as follows:

SOEC	INOPP	CEN	TRI	KEYS	**Outcome**	Decimal
1	0	1	1	0	**0**	YEM(22)

Table 6.11: Truth table row for the case of Yemen

As will be shown in the analysis of the institutional equilibrium in part 6.9.1, tribalism played a pivotal role in the system of Yemen, hence the variable TRI is coded (1). Also the economic indicators justify setting the variable SOEC to (1), as will be shown in part 6.9.3. Part 6.9.2 shows that trade unionism alone was not able to interrupt the economic performance of the country before 2011.

The same section will describe how the regime managed to get control over the trade union federation merger after unification in 1990, and how it kept a high degree of centralisation causing progressive activists to drift into the NGO sector. The variable CEN is, consequently, coded (1). Although the welfare oriented Islamic party

Islah managed to gain palpable influence in some trade union associations, the overall majority of institutionalised trade unionism was not directly connected to opposition parties but rather to the ruling party GPC. The last part of section 6.9.4 focusses in particular on the underlying reasoning for the determination of the variable INOPP as (0).

6.9.1   Two Countries, Tribalism, and a History of Decentralisation

Before the upheavals of 2011, Yemen was a presidential Republic based on a strong decentralisation in favour of local tribes and tribal alliances, having clear features of authoritarianism according to Linz (2000, esp. p.159). The country emerged from a unification in 1990 of two country parts that differed in their socio-cultural and economic basis and, foremost, in their history. In the northern, tribal dominated highlands, the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) was installed by some help of Nasserist Egypt. The country succeeded the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen that had ascended from the crushed Ottoman Empire in 1927. In the rather plain south with a large coastal area, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) emerged in 1967 after the collapse of the British Aden Protectorate, and became the only full Soviet style socialist republic of Middle East. Both states were eventually ruled by a single party, the north by the GPC and the south by the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP). In the north, clearly being a sphere of influence of tribal politics, the GPC was established in 1982 as broadly parallel organisation of local 'committees' to provide a coordinated and unified system of political involvement meant to affect politics on the national level (Dresch, 1990, p.22). The YSP, following the model of socialist Eastern-European parties, had a tighter grip on the population in the more centralised South Yemen. Its most prominent figure throughout the 1980s was General Secretary Ali Salem al-Beidh.

A Unification with some Odds

In the heat of the events following 1989, the breakdown of the Soviet Bloc, and a worldwide hope for a new wave of democracy, the two countries decided to merge in 1990, in 1991 a new constitution was drafted, and elections followed in 1993. The unity of the two countries, which both had taken different roads to modernity in the previous decades, took many observers by surprise. Initially, leached out by dirigiste mismanagement, the south hoped to benefit from the relative wealth and sturdiness of the north, even if the price to pay would be an increased influence of the highland tribes. The discovery of huge oil fields straddling the border of the two countries promised future wealth and caused excitement among both populations and their leaders. This

was also a driving force behind the endeavours of Ali Abdullah Saleh, President of the YAR, who needed to increase his popularity outside the civil service sector and the Army. The doubts about uniting with a modernist and atheist state uttered by influential tribal leaders and the clergy, eventually paled away in the light of a promised bright oil-financed future (Clark, 2010, p.131).

The unification proceeded with some odds. The Ministry of Finance, headed by a northerner, blocked many reforms suggested by the YSP. Senior civil servants encountered newcomers from across the old border with mistrust, unwilling to give up competencies. No unity was achieved in the field of defence, as no part wanted to give up control over its military units. Additionally to the disproportional allocation of the population, the northern territories displayed a higher degree of fighting power, as - in contrast to the south - the tribes had never been disarmed. When the southern minister of defence tried to curtail the flow of state money for the highland tribes, he got into rows with the clan of Saleh, who's family members occupied high ranking military posts.

The elections of 1993 showed the new balance of power in Yemen. While the GPC won 123 (41 per cent) of the 301 seats, the Islamic party of al-Islah (*al-Tadjammu' al-Yamani lil-Islah*) won 62 seats (21 per cent), and the YSP only got 56 seats (19 per cent). The result is rather unsurprising keeping in mind that the population of the north was about four times as large as the population of the south (11 versus 2,5 Million). Giving a heavy blow to the YSP, the Islah party, led by the powerful tribal leader Abdullah al-Ahmar, won also the southern highland area YSP leader al-Beidh had hoped to win. This was one of many links in a chain of disappointing events the modernist south, especially in the city of Aden, had to digest. After some military incidents in the beginning of May 1994, Southern leaders attempted to secede and announced the foundation of the Democratic Republic of Yemen (DRY). In the following civil war, the YSP forces were defeated, despite some support from Saudi Arabia. The position of the separatists was weakened by the fact that many southerners sided against al-Beidh and his YSP. These groups followed Saleh's depiction of atheist Saudi-backed unity-crashers, and consequently, the final siege of Aden was led by former PDRY General Abdalrab Mansur al-Hadi, who would become Saleh's vice president in the same year (Clark, 2010, p.144).

A Hybrid System with Tribal Dominance

The tribal alliances and patronage networks of the country produced a long-lasting leader, despite a constitution (2000-2012) that actually fulfilled many requirements of a "Western-style" democracy. Candidates for the position of the President were screened jointly by the Praesidium of the House of Representatives and the second chamber (Madjlis Al-Shura) and had to achieve at least a 5 per cent support in the former, before they were allowed to compete in direct popular elections (Art.108). The

President was the supreme leader of the armed forces (Art.111), however, he could not, directly or indirectly, engage in any private business of any kind whether commercial, financial, or industrial (Art. 118); he was not allowed dissolve the House of Representatives (Art. 101) or to rule for more than two seven-year terms (Art.112). Moreover, the possibility of declaring state of emergency (Art.121) had never been invoked in the constitution's history. The system allowed for party plurality, and indeed, after 1990, many small political parties of different inclinations emerged, many of them not having more than a telephone, an office, and a newspaper (Canton, 2013, p.97).

Similar to Jordan's one-man-one-vote system, where the fact that ballot follows bloodline, and the layout of the voting districts was a pivotal part of the equilibrium, in Yemen the electoral laws facilitated discrimination. Yemenis were allowed to register for voting in their place of residence, in their family home town - even if they were not residents - or in the constituency of their workplace (Art. 3 and 4(a) of the General Elections and Referendum Law). Critics claim that registration at the main work address allowed government employees to be located for partisan reasons, especially in contested areas of the south, as Art. 105(b) of the election law stipulates a First-Past-the-Post system. Additionally, independent candidates require endorsement signatures by an *Amin* or *'Akel*, being local officials appointed by the government (Democracy at Large, 2005, p.3). The selection of candidates for presidency by the parliament also caused quarrels when in 1999 the Parliament denied a presidential candidate of the YSP. Further shortcomings include intimidation at the polling station, violation of voter secrecy, and under-age voting.

The higher echelons of power, especially in the north, mostly consisted of high ranking tribal leaders mostly of two federations, al-Hashid and al-Bakil, whereas the implied opposition between these two dominates much of tribal rhetoric (Dresch, 1990, p.23). Additionally, Saudi Arabia, although having supported the secession in the south 1994, also supports tribe branches in the north in a selective way.[42] The most decisive feature of Saleh and his close allies consisted of the ability to arbitrate and mediate between the tribes and at the same time buying their loyalty with government positions and remittances. He is quoted to have said once, "ruling Yemen is like dancing on the heads of snakes" (Clark, 2010).

Observers wrote repeatedly of a triumvirate (Carapico, 2011) that shared power according to an *'ahad*, implicit contract (Knights, 2013, p.265)[43]. Three persons and their

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[42]These branches include among the Hashid the Bayt al-Ahmar of the Humran section of the al-Usaymat tribe, and among the al-Bakil the Bayat Abu Ras of Dhu Muhammad, and Bayt al-Shayef of Dhu Husayn. Although only representing 2 per cent of the entire population, their influence in the country is palpable (Fattah, 2011, p.83). The role of Saudi Arabia in Yemen has always been ground for speculation. Pragmatics seem to prevail over ideology, letting the Kingdom change support according to the current political circumstances in order to bind as many resources of Yemen in its internal struggles as possible. The founder of Saudi Arabia, Abdul Aziz Al-Saud, is said to have croaked on his deathbed "never let Yemen be united" (Clark, 2010, p.133).

[43]Knight refers to a classified document of US-Security circles that states the contract existed in written form since 1978, in the foremath of Salih's ascendency to power.

networks are included according to that reading. First, Sheikh Abdallah al-Ahmar, Skeikh of Sheiks of the Hashid confederation, General Ali Mohsen al-Qadhi al-Ahmar, commander of Yemen's armed forces, and finally, Ali Abd'allah Saleh, who was, just as Mohsen, member of the Sanhan tribe.

The Opposition inside and outside the Legal Framework

In the 2000s, the regime had to deal with major political conflicts that turned violent, namely the Huthi insurrection, the reawakened secession movement of the south since 2007, and the emergence of radical Jihadi groups that linked themselves to Al-Qa'ida, especially since 2009.

The Huthi conflict received a military dimension when the regime charged and ultimately killed former MP of the Truth Party Badr Din al-Houthi, in 2004. The Huthi Family, foremost Imam Hussein Badreddin Al-Houthi, were advocating a Zaidi style of government with a more important role of the Zaidi 'Ulama. Zaidi Imams played an important role before the establishment of the YAR in 1962 and lost their influence to tribal associations that fought on the side of the republicans (Yadav, 2013, p.270). Consequently, the feeling of deprivation from power was, also due to the fact that the lion's share of the tribes in the north-western province of Sa'ada and the city al-Huth stood outside the patronage networks of the state, in particular as they are neither Hashidi nor Bakili (Dresch, 1990, p.23). The beginnings of "Ansar Allah", a religious-political group that built the nucleus of the Huthi movement can be dated back to the mid-1980s when a group of Zaidi youths formed an intellectual group to address and encounter the perceived injustices against their sect. Many Zaidi teachings were not allowed to be taught in public and a ban was imposed on printing its books (Eissa, 2013, p.45). After the death of Badr Din al-Houthi, his brothers fought an eight year lasting campaign against the government. By 2009, the conflict occupied ten Yemeni Army brigades, hence involving around half of the de facto active brigades in the Yemeni military (Knights, 2013, p.270).

In a similar vein of deprivation from remittances transferring networks, the southern movement (*Hirak al-Djanubi* shortly: Hirak) mobilised in 2005 against the slow pace of reconstruction of many areas hit by the 1994 war (Yadav, 2013, p.272), as well as against discrimination when searching jobs in public service, the Army, or the oil sector. The secession movement never completely ceased to exist after the war, and the movement faced a harassing government on the one hand, and the violence of southern Yemeni Al-Qa'ida returnees, who dreamt of purging the corridors of power from the detested YSP Marxists, who were still in control of many local administrations on the other (Clark, 2010, pp.149-162). The fact that the regime had turned a blind eye on the Jihadis in the south turned to be problematic for Saleh when Jihadis of the "second generation" - who were more radical and also targeted westerners and US-Americans -

gained attention of the United States. In the wake of the US-American "war on terror", Saleh had to mime a convincing fight against the radical Afghanistan veterans for the sake of not repelling an important international partner, without repelling some of his domestic allies that showed sympathy for the Jihadi cause in the south.

A further decisive element to understand the situation in the wake and before the protests of 2011 is the country's parlamentary opposition dynamics. The Saleh-regime was challenged by a cross-ideological alliance of officially registered opposition parties named Joint Meeting Parties *Yemen* (JMP). The alliance consisted of the Islah Party, the YSP, Zaidist currents such as the Truth Party (*Hizb al-Haqq*), as well as left-nationalist parties as the Nasserist Unionist People's Organisation *Yemen* (NUPO) (*al-Tanzim al-Wahdawi al-Shaa'bi al-Nasiri*). The Islah Party emerged as a new platform for more religious GPC members and managed to marginalise the YSP after 1990 (Durac, 2011, p.352). Despite the deep-rooted ideological differences between Marxist and Zaidi inclinations, the cooperation grew more professional and effective since 2002.(Heibach and Transfeld, 2017)[44] In the years before the uprisings of 2011, the Salafi as well as the tribal wing of Islah became more Saleh critical and engaged in the alliance. The JMP transformed from a issue-based coalition, foremost struggling for reform of the electoral law, to a better coordinated organisation with a more comprehensive programme (Heibach and Transfeld, 2017, p.602).

6.9.2   Trade Unions: Flashing up but Never Catching Fire

The 1956 established Aden Trade Union Congress *Yemen* (ATUC) was the first trade union centre of the country and played an important role in the struggle for independence from the British rule. After the revolution of 1962 in northern Yemen, the movement initially aimed at unification. Abdullah al-Asnaj, chairman of the Socialist People's Party and president of the ATUC, declared in front of workers in Aden: "I am a Yemeni deep down and we did not have the desire to fall under the rule of the Imam. Now that the Yemen Arab Republic has been declared, we feel that we are one people, and Sanaa is our capital, and Aden is our main port" (Dabuan, 2012). Early unification failed and the trade union organisations of the south became an integral part of the YSP's mass organisations. Simultaneously, in the north, twelve unions formed the General Confederation of Workers' Trade Unions. on July 17, 1965, having its nuclei in Taiz, Hodeidah, Mukha, Sana'a, and Al-Rahda (Al-Sama'i, 2019b). After the coup of 1967, the new authorities raided the headquarters of the union, seized all its contents, and arrested most of its leadership. In the decades to follow, the union struggled with the regime for the right to organise and self-determination. The 1980s witnessed a significant decline in the activity of public trade union organisations, many of which

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[44]The roots of the JMP go back to the late 1990s, however cooperation with the influential Islah was expanded in 2002 when Jarallah 'Umar, the deputy secretary-general of the YSP and the most important bridge builder between Islah and other opposition parties, had been shot after having delivered a speech to Islah's annual congress (Heibach and Transfeld, 2017, p.603).

turned to clandestine action due to the intensification of authoritarian repression. At the same time, the regime supported its own trade union networks that would oust the independent unionists and suppress any attempt to form independent, leftist-style unions.[45] In April 1984, the independent workers' union in the north was put completely under the influence of the regime.

With the unification of north and south, trade union structures were planned to be merged to form the Yemeni Workers Trade Union Federation (YWTUF)[46], however, like in many other fields in the country meant to be unified, differences persisted. The more militant and privileged trade unionists of the south did not want to lose their influential positions and also protested against the extension of Islamic law (Schnabel, 2005, p.395).

Unions since the 1990s: Locally Restrained and Lacking National Unity

The weakening of trade union organisations in Yemen since the mid-1990s can be attributed to different reasons: The regime's strategy to completely control the official trade union framework, the defeat of the YSP in 1994 with NGOs and the Islah party filling the void it left. Additionally, serious trade union activities were restricted to the industrial urban centres of Aden, Ta'iz, and Al-Hodeida.

Trade unions in the south, still serving as the power base for the YSP after unification, remained first basically autonomous and organisationally resistant to interacting with new authorities, similar to tribal militias loyal to Saleh and al-Ahmar in the north (Blumi, 2009, p.9). Between 1991 and 1993, independent trade union structures experienced a revival in their traditional strongholds Ta'iz and Al-Hodeidah where the first coordinating council for the union work was founded and headed by Ali Mohammed Al-Misni, the head of the workers' union in Ta'iz.[47] The council was loosely affiliated with the YWTUF branch in Aden, attempted to set up nationwide networks, and coordinated and organised several strikes in the pre-1994-war period.

After the defeat of the secessionist movement in 1994, the political and financial fold of the YSP led to a decline of such networks (Bonnefoy and Poirier, 2009, p.13). At the same time, the government in Sana'a had adopted the same strategy it used to bring the former trade union federation of the north under its control: Harassment,

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[45]An example of this suppression is the crash of the "Al-Seigel" union. It was was formed by Abdullah al-Seigal Hodeidah as a "leftist intellectual" and influenced by Abdullah Bazib during the latter's visit to Al-Hodeidah. The union included port, electricity, and mill workers (Al-Sama'i, 2019*b*).

[46]The national federation is labelled differently in literature, such as General Union of Yemen Workers (GUYW), Yemen Trade Union Confederation (YTUC), or General Federation of Yemeni Workers (GFYU). The original is *Al-Ittihad al-'Aam al-Naqabat al-'Umal al-Yamani* and the abbreviation YWTUF is taken from the federation's own current (2019) Facebook page.

[47]The council included several unions, foremost consisting of oil workers, transport workers, electricity workers, municipal workers, workers and employees of the Yemen Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and water corporation employees. Within this structure, also professional unions grew strong, particularly the Medical Professionals Union, the Educational Professions Union, Engineers Union, and the Doctors and Pharmacists Union (Al-Sama'i, 2019*c*).

interference in staffing policies, strict centralisation[48], and, by that way, the purge of trade union ranks from progressive forces. Official unions became state institutions and were often chaired by members of the ruling GPC (Yadav, 2013, p.106).

In the wake, trade unionism as a mass mobilising phenomenon muted, and many smaller trade unions disintegrated and gave way for a generation of NGOs with a broader agenda than classical trade unionism. By fact, the 1990s witnessed a boom in new civil society organisations due to a newly relaxed and more pluralist legislation and political climate. Also the influx of remittances of international donors made the sector grow fast (Elayah and Verkoren, 2019, p.9). As the grip of the state on the NGO sector was far less tight than the grip on trade unions, many activists who formerly supported trade unionism made an evasive manoeuvre into the NGO sector. This, consequently, led to official trade union institutions that were more loyal to the regime, less militant, and also less powerful in key sectors of the economy.

Professional Associations between Activity and Split

While this strategy helped the regime to disperse the worker's union or take control of its remainders, especially after a tightening of legislation concerning trade unions in 2002, white collar associations where more difficult to control. The Journalists Union and the Bar Association soon came to terms with the new emerging NGOs, and cooperated in particular in the field of human rights. Both organisations managed to preserve an intact nationwide basis. Especially the Journalists Union constantly protested the violation of the freedom of press and harassment of journalists and also threatened to strike against corruption.

Other projects of cooperation were, if at all, locally restricted. For instants, a coordination council named *metin* (Arab word for "abstract body") emerged first in 2005 for the coordination of trade unions and civil society organisations led by Ali Mohsen al-Dumaini, and Abdul Jalil Mohammed Othman Zureiqi from competing unions of the health sector. Metin managed to attract a number of other unions[49] and operated mostly in the region of Ta'iz (Al-Sama'i, 2019c).

The coordination efforts in Ta'iz where, however, an exception in a union landscape that was deteriorating and also increasingly split. While the YSP struggled financially and could not uphold its networks, the Muslim Brotherhood affiliated Islah Party - even having an own department for labour union affairs - filled that gap. They focussed,

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[48]The labour law of 1995 repealed the monopoly of the YWTUF which was reintroduced in the labour law of 2002, stipulating that the YWTUF was the sole federation of federations. No alternative organisation has been formed (Schnabel, 2005, p.395) and no nationwide conference has been held since (Al-Sama'i, 2019c).

[49]Most of its members were branches of professional white-collar unions such as the Physicians and Pharmacists Union, the Medical Professionals Union, the Educational Professions Union, the Union of workers of the power plant Asifra, the Yemeni Bar Association, the Yemeni Teachers Union, or the Yemeni Engineers Union. Other groups included the Yemen Women's Union, the Yemeni Students Union (Ta'iz University), and the Yemen Youth Union. The Carpenters Association joined in 2014.

similar to the Islamic Action Party in Jordan, on white collar associations. The small remainders of progressive and independent forces inside the trade union movement were now, additionally to the harassment by the regime, riddled by ideological disparities. In the health sector, the Union of Physicians and Pharmacists broke into the Medical Professionals Union, the Diagnostic Medicine Union, and the Laboratories Union. The same happened in the education sector where the the Educational Professions Union, the Teachers Union and the Educational Professions Union were active (Al-Sama'i, 2019c).

As a consequence, trade union activities became more sparse and also more particularistic, focussing on local agendas rather than a national vision. Outside the strongholds of Ta'iz and Al-Hodeida, unions mostly became visible only when they jumped on the bandwagon of - or were co-opted by - other political players. When in Amran in 2007 ten thousand members of the Hashid confederation demanded governmental reform, trade unions foremost of the medical and the educational sector joined the protests.

A Marginalised Role in a Tribal Rentier System

The branches in which activists critical of the regime were still organised did barely affect the economic performance of the country which was heavily dependent on foreign remittances and transfer payments of Yemeni guest workers abroad (Colton, 2010). Apart from that, natural resources contributed 22 per cent to the GDP in 2010, and crude oil and gold were the most important export goods accounting for more than 70 per cent of all exports. Government revenues stemmed about 70 per cent from the oil industry. Agriculture and its downstream industries were the main source of income of the population (about 70 per cent), employing more than half (54 per cent) of the labour force (The World Bank, 2015, p.77).

The movements' overall bargaining power and militancy has to be assessed as weak regarding the entire case. Oil production is barely touched by trade unionists, which might be due to the remoteness of the aforementioned industrial centres in which trade union were active. The Yemeni oil fields and production facilities were almost all located in the rather rural Shabwa, Masila, and Jeza basins in the centre and east of the country. Besides, the Oil production in Yemen did not account for more than 20,000 employees.

Among the professional white collar organisations, the teacher's unions managed to push successfully for a wage increase fixed by Law No.43/2006 which also included a stepwise salary increase in the following years. Other professional associations, riddled with splits caused by aforementioned government policies jamming wedges into the movement, did barely engage in strikes or could force the state into concessions. Due to their geographical fragmentation and weakness, the few existing trade union initiatives could not unfold power on the national level. It was furthermore the tight grip of the state on the official trade union framework, a lack of nationwide solidarity as well as

internal, historical, ideological, and geographical division that decreased the movements bargaining power. In the words of (Blumi, 2009, p.22-23):

> [...] the plethora of union workers, urban poor and rural voiceless have not been institutionally or organizationally incorporated; rather they have been left stuck addressing parochial concerns and often to the state through an intermediary. In other words, there has been no nation-wide effort to consolidate the political forces of society. In many ways, Yemen has remained largely a fragmented country [...].

The case of Yemen is therefore coded KEYS = (0).

6.9.3 2011: Saleh losing the Youth, the Tribes, the Parties, and the Clergy

By end of 2010, nerves were already on edge in Yemen. Government employees protested against wages that had been frozen since 2005, poverty and mismanagement became more openly addressed, and the authoritarian nature of the regime got under attack. Disputes escalated also between Marib Refineries Company and its workers because of workers' demands to improve their living conditions. Their strikes in October 2010 were put down violently. Young activists in the south, together with some of the old YSP cadres mobilised and uttered discontent with what they perceived as the exploitation of the south by the Saleh regime, especially regarding the oil wealth. Also the imposition of northern "style of life" including Islamic law and tribal customs were addressed, and by 2010 protests in the south were widespread (Dahlgren, 2010). The discontent was also an outgrowth of a socio-economic deterioration of living conditions the country had witnessed for at least two decades (Bonnefoy and Poirier, 2012, p.899). Consequently, concerning the variable SOEC, the country is the most clear case of the sample. Since 2000, both, inflation and total unemployment rose constantly, and the burden of health expenditure out of pocket was the highest in the entire sample. Also indicators for poverty and transparency are among the lowest in the sample (see table A.1 in the appendix). These features were openly addressed by the early risers of the protests and formed the initial incentives for many protesters. The case of Yemen will be coded SOEC = (1).

Early Protests, high Expectations

Yemen witnessed first mass demonstrations in January 2011 when the GPC-dominated parliament agreed to constitutional reforms that would allow President Saleh to candidate for a further term. Against that background, and spurred by the events in Tunisia, mobilisation of protesters in 2011 began comparatively early, cumulating in a first Day of Rage already on February 3, 2011. While the JMP was eager to accept concessions made by Saleh the day before (Bonnefoy and Poirier, 2012, p.907), about

20,000 joined a demonstration in Sana'a and several thousands protested across the country, most palpably in Ta'iz, as well as in many cities in the south. While in the rallies in the capital remained peaceful, security forces resorted to tear gas to disperse a gathering in the port city of Aden (Ghobari and Abdullah, 2011). The protests were mainly announced, organised, and supported by online-activists and university students. Many youth groups formed these days, such as the *February 3 Revolutionary Youth Movement in Yemen* or *The Peaceful Yemeni Youth Movement.*

February 11, when the fall of Husni Mubarak in Egypt became public, was another catalyst for anti-government resentments. Slogans included "long live the Egyptian people" and "revolution until victory", as well as "Yesterday Tunisia, today Egypt, tomorrow Yemen," and "Revolution, oh Yemen, from Sana'a to Aden". Aware of its symbolic importance, security forces and pro-government supporters occupied the Tahrir Square in Sana'a. As a reaction, the demonstrators took the University Square[50], labelled it "Taghayr-Square" (Square of Change), and turned it into a place for events like political festivities, songs, stage plays, poems, exhibitions and dance (Fattah, 2011, p.81). After clashes with opponents and security forces, the willingness to proceed with the protests grew even stronger, spreading a spirit of resistance and defiance. Hashem al-Abara, figure of the February 3 Revolutionary Youth Movement clearly stated: "If the protests in Egypt continued for 18 days, we are not worried to carry on for a month, or two, or three" (Al-Watan Oman 12.02.2011).

The next juncture in the sequence of events took place of February 18, when the regime decided to intervene violently and sent security forces accompanied by roof snipers to disperse the protest, causing 52 death and several injured. Additionally to the national outcry from many political sides and regions in the country, the action turned to be a boomerang for the regime, as the influential member of the triumvirate, and iron fist of the regime, General Abdullah Muhsin, defected in its aftermath. He turned against the regime, dispatched military staff and tanks to protect the protesters. On February 25, the day on which many Arab countries witnessed large-scale protests, also in many Yemenis took the streets. About 20,000 people gathered outside Sana'a University campus, and about 50,000 took the Tahrir Square in the city center. They shouted "no dialogue until the fall of the regime!" and "the beginning of the end of the regime", adhering to the credo of the day which was "the day of the launching" (*yaum al-itlaq* (Al-Watan Oman, 2011)). In Aden, several thousands protested against regime violence, stating "we promise, we promise to the martyrs" and towards the regime "death and disgrace[51] to the cowards". The protest in the capital also comprised a prayer

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[50]To avoid misunderstandings it should be noticed that University Square was not a square that clearly belongs to a campus of any university. It is a public crossroads in Sana'a where the "Justice Road" (Shara' al-'Adal) meets the Ring road. The closest university building is the Computer and Information Technology College, which is about five minutes by foot away.

[51]Disgrace is maybe the best translation for the traditional term "'ayb", meaning the loss of honour (sharaf) of a tribesman. A tribesman can commit an 'ayb by acting in a way demeaning to himself-for example, by killing a woman or person of inferior standing to his own, or, on the contrary, he can have an 'ayb inflicted upon him.

ceremony and preach led by Sheikh 'Abdallah Sa'atar, a leading figure of the Islah Party, and a prominent chairman of several charity organisations, who stressed the importance of sticking to the demand of regime change. Also in Ta'iz and Hadramaut tens of thousands protested.

Three Opposition Camps Riddled with Mutal Mistrust

In the aftermath of these events, Ali Abdullah Saleh ran out of allies. His attempts in order to contain the protests by offering his retreat in 2013 (which he would have been obliged to do according to the 2001 constitution anyway), or the offer to set up a coalition government with the opposition parties were rather perceived as deriding or blunt attempts to buy time. He experienced a huge setback, when the National Solidarity Council (NSC), which was founded as first organisation of its kind in order to coordinate tribal action in 2007, sided with the protesters. Already one day before February 25 the Al-Hashid dominated NSC signalled clear support for the protesters in an announcement showing solidarity with the "Yemeni people that is desirous for reform and change", mentioning explicitly the "Taghyr Square" in front of the University, meanwhile NSC chairman Hussein Al-Ahmar clearly stated addressing the regime (Tariq Al-Sha'ab, 2011*b*)

> I assure support by the tribes of Yemen for change, and their succour for the peaceful popular revolution demanding the fall of the regime that broke out in multiple governorates of the republic. And I assure the capacities of the tribes to protect the peaceful demonstrators against those who depict them as "thieves" of state power.

The second member of the triumvirate, Sheikh Abdallah al-Ahmar had shown growing discontent with Saleh already in the past years. He blamed him for "wrong headed policies" and contributing to "Yemen's myriad problems". The tribal leader had shown signs of preparing for a post-Saleh era before (Carapico, 2011). Hence, given the shaking balance of power, it was also only consequent for him to side with the protesters. A further pillar of Saleh's rule fell when Abdul Majeed al-Zindani, a senior leader of Islah, the head of Yemen's largest association of Sunni clerics, and a historical supporter of Saleh held a speech in front of the young protesters close to the University. He clearly stated (Filkins, 2011):

> Our Prophet predicted that, one day, a ruler will oppress his people, and the people will take the power from him. We are now living with a leader who rules by force, and we need to get him out. After we get rid of this oppressor, there will be justice — and the caliphate![52]

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[52]The stance of the Islah party was, although often misunderstood by Western observers, by no means also the stance of the clergy of the country. In a conference of the Association of Yemeni Ulemas (Jam'iyya 'ulama al-Yaman) initiated by Saleh in September 2011, a final statement declared that the demonstrators were aggressors who were obliged to repent. Salafis from the self-declared apolitical current founded by Muqbil al-Wadi'i and connected to Saudi religious networks also confirmed the illegitimacy of the protest (Bonnefoy and Poirier, 2012, p.907)

After this incident, three main camps could be identified among the protesters (Fattah, 2011, p.82). First, a large peaceful youth movement inspired by the Arab Spring. Most of them stemmed originally from the central and southern governorates, displaying a higher level of education and political awareness than most citizens in the rest of the country. Although sharing some common goals, they had discrepancies with parts of the second group - the official opposition parties - and foremost with the conservative religious elements of Islah. After Zindani's speech, youth at Sana'a University started to chant "No GPC, No Islah". An increasing number of students from al-Iman University (headed by Zindani) joined the protests, stressing the importance of religious behaviour and demanding, for instance, segregation of men and women. The secularists of the movement saw the situation get out of their hands.

The third group, the tribal organisations, proved to be the most powerful in terms of mobilisation potential and finance, especially in the rural areas and small towns of the country. Most important, by turning their back to Saleh, also vast parts of the Army defected, as the military was a means of patronage and thus composed mainly of tribesmen from the northern highlands (Dresch, 1990; Fattah, 2011, p.23). Meanwhile, the Huthis also resorted to their ability to mobilise and organised rallies in Sa'ada (Socialist Net, 2011*b*). Saleh was left alone. Neither his announcement of 50,000 new, civil service jobs nor his suggestion for elections monitored by international observers could change the stance of his former allies nor the youth movement (Carapico, 2011).

The Treaty of Riadh and the Institutional Revolution

The agreement signed by Ali Abdullah Saleh in September gave the conflict, which had turned violent in many areas, including fighting between tribal militias and loyalist of the regime, another dimension. Dissatisfied with the outcome, and especially with the complete immunity the treaty of Riadh would grant the President, and claiming to "save the revolution", the actions of civil society and especially of the youth movements entered a new phase which was labelled the revolution of the institutions (thawra al-muassassat).

A first and decisive step was undertaken by the union of Yemeni Airlines which managed to overthrow its Chairman Abdul Khaleq Al-Qadi who was President Saleh's son-in-law. This opened the way for a wide range of collective actions in military and public institutions (Abdulla, 2011), including the Department of Political and Moral Guidance of the Ministry of Defence where eventually Brigadier Ali Hassan Al-Shater was replaced due to internal pressure of the employees.[53] All over the southern provinces and also in al-Hodeidah and Ta'iz high ranking officials who had been placed strategically by Saleh - or who stood too close to the regime in the eyes of the protesters - were prompted to leave office. These collective actions benefited betimes from old, atro-

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[53]For a valuable and more comprehensive overview of the dismissals that followed inside the military and bureaucracy see Gordon (2012).

phied trade union networks, however, they were mostly ad-hoc endeavours, especially as the Trade Union law of 2002 excluded members of the armed and security forces and employees at the level of higher authorities and ministries (Art.4) from forming unions. There is even no evidence that these actions came along with calls for the right to organise in general. Hence, in many cases trade union measures like enterprise or institution connected demands, or work stoppage, were used while trade union structures as such did not play a major role.

This phenomenon is foremost due to the nature of the protest that emerged especially after September 2011. The different currents of the revolution, as described above, did not oppose and block each other only but also cross-fertilised and produced a new understanding of protest inside the entire opposition camp. The "new language" of the youth movements which was coined by peaceful action, consultation, and intense networking, soon spilled over to many other fractions of the opposition and reached out for many parts of the country (Bonnefoy and Poirier, 2012). Abdallah (2012) cites an interviewee from the youth movements, stating that the agreement of Riadh sparked a state of discontent among many Yemenis workers in government institutions, who, eventually, transferred the revolution from the street to the institutions. Indeed, the organisation of strikes and blockades but also the stigmatisation of employees linked to the regime in administrations or in public companies, such as the airline Yemenia, were largely inspired by the culture and forms of mobilizations developed on the Taghayr Square, on which several workshops on civil disobedience and industrial action had been held (Bonnefoy and Poirier, 2012, 911).

6.9.4 Worker's Action Without Systematic Trade Unionism

Against that background, commercial stoppage, say, strike, became a widespread means of protest. On the 17th anniversary of the begin of the war of 1994, April 27, all shops and government offices were closed in Aden and protesters blocked the main roads. Also Ta'iz witnessed strikes on a regular basis; about half of the stores remained closed in April. In Ibb, Mukalla, Ataq and Beidha commercial life was disrupted in protests on Wednesdays and Saturdays for a few hours in the morning. In Sana'a, still one of the most outspoken pro-Saleh areas of the country, general strikes were difficult to organise, however (Kasinov, 2011). Such collective action can, if it occurred, barely be attributed to trade union activity, especially as about 72 per cent of all Yemeni employees were self employed, running small stalls or shops. Furthermore, as outlined in section 6.9.2, trade unionism had lost its sexyness concerning political activism.

On September 9 2011, the local branch of the YWTUF in Aden signalled support for the revolution of institutions. The branch announced that it affirmed its support for the youth revolution "in order to reformulate the modern Yemeni state with all its human, democratic, political and social values in which justice and fairness crystallise and

the power of the people prevail" (Mareb Press, 2011*b*), and called on all professional and geographic trade union bodies in all governorates of the Republic to reappraise the trade union leaders who had "abused trade union work, froze its activities, and dwindled the rights of workers". This move, however, should not be read as a progressive step of a progressive union branch pushing for the revolution of institutions, but rather as an *outcome* of the latter, especially given the lack of presence of the branch in the course of the protests.

Other YWTUF branches seemed also to remain silent. The few statements that exist from the YWTUF headquarters in Sana'a do not aim at changing the logic of power inside the country and stuck for a long time to rhetoric of unity that had been used by the regime. On June 3, 2011, the federation condemned the attack on Saleh in a noticeable harsh tone. The federation pointed at a "terrorist minority that deprived our people of the blessing of unity, [that was achieved] twenty eight years after the era of the immortal revolution of September and October", however, also speaking about the "legitimate demands of the independent and conscious Yemeni youth" (YWTUF, 2011).

Professional Associations between Human Rights and Struggle for Benefits

After the protests gained mass and momentum, also some professional white-collar associations started to become active, whereas much of its struggle focussed on the harassment of the free press and human rights issues. Consequently, the Journalists Union, which had come into rows with the Saleh regime already in the years and decades before the uprising of 2011, acted most progressively. Led by famous opposition leader Abdul-Bari Taher, the union demanded the fall of the regime in an early stage, called the killings of the regime a "stigma on the forehead of the regime", and sided with the "young people who, through its blessed uprising, decided to put the last chapter of tyranny in Yemen" (Socialist Net, 2011*a*). The Journalists Union, albeit not exceeding a membership of a about two thousand countrywide, organised and led rallies in order to address harassment of Journalists and violations of freedom of press, and its members, consequently, increasingly suffered continuous repression by authorities.

In a similar vein, the Bar Association condemned violence, and organised protests and events that broached the issue of human right violations. Also the Yemeni Doctors and Pharmacists Union - especially after killings of civilians by security forces became public, or when the Army later looted hospitals and used them as military command posts - condemned violence, or in exceptional cases like in Ta'iz, sided with the protesters. They had also, together with the Bar Association and 23 other civil society organisations, signed the a statement already on February 23 2011 against the brutality on the Taghayr square (YCHR, 2011). Although in some cases these organisations joined anti-regime protests like the Bar association on February 23 2011 in Hodeidah (Al-Jazeera Studies, 2011), the overall attitude was not focussed on regime change. They

also lacked a coherent vision on how to change the institutional equilibrium apart from a higher protection of human rights, and did not visibly appear as change agents during the critical juncture.

Another leading professional white-collar association was the teacher's union which called for a nationwide strike on February 23 where eventually ten thousand employees stopped working and engaged in sit-ins. In the capital Sana'a, however, their demands widely remained socio-economic. They included the implementation of the increase of wages and salaries according to Law No.43/2006 and salary adjustments for all workers in the sector also in remote areas of the country (Mareb Press, 2011a). Again, even when in some towns the teacher's protest turned into a clear confrontation of the regime, like in Beidaa' where chants like "sit-in sit-in ... until the regime falls" were sung (Al-Tawil, 2011), the powerful teachers' unions did not become a significant agent for change.

The Particular Difficulties in Assessing the case of Yemen

If a tree falls in the forest and no one is there, does it still make a sound? This question is the start of some highly abstract and theoretical discussions and can also be used for the trade union movement in Yemen, albeit in a different fashion. If a tree falls in the forest and no one hears or sees it, did it really fall down? And if it did, does it really matter, if no one realised it?

The last sections have focussed on some mechanisms, results, and actions concerning trade unions in Yemen, however, the most striking argument for the weakness of trade unions in Yemen is maybe also the weakest argument itself: A lack of report of trade union activities. Indeed, the relevant academic literature, as well as the grey literature of magazines and newspapers, online and offline, did barely mention trade union activities as decisive element of the Yemeni upheavals. They were mostly preoccupied to give a sound picture of what is actually going on in a country that is historically, ideologically, and geographically split, and in which a diverse number of tribal associations, NGOs, parties, local networks, and religious groups muscle in the political arena on different levels. Inside this Yemeni babble of voices, trade unions did not strike the right notes and were apparently not loud enough to be heard and understood as a decisive part of the revolutionary ensemble.

The question remains, coming back to the allegory of the tree in the forest, whether the fact that no one really reported about regime critical trade unionism in Yemen is enough to state that it did not really happen.

Given that in 2010 there were 29 trade unions (also including professional white-collar associations) registered in Yemen according to the National Information Center, and Al-Sama'i (2019c) counts over four thousand councils in the country, it is bewildering that these institutions did not play a more visible role during the uprisings. Obvi-

ously they lacked the strength, infrastructure, members, or willingness to do so. Also the impression that actions of professional associations lacked continuity, coordination, and an overall goal, runs like a red thread through Yemen's critical juncture. Classical trade union activities like demands concerning management of enterprises and institutions or work stoppage were used frequently during the critical juncture. Different from Jordan, where independent trade unionism altered the landscape of civil society, and new emerging unions set up structures and fought for official recognition, it seems that the collective actions of the institutional revolution in Yemen consisted of ad-hoc endeavours of workers without aiming at a sustainable and long lasting independent infrastructure. The trade union resources and activists had, as described in part 6.9.2, diffused into a network of NGO's, albeit losing its unique scope of worker's representation, or they had just been co-opted by the official trade union framework of the YWTUF.

True, Al-Sama'i (2019*a*) reports from a newly established coordinating council for private sector workers and self-employed workers in Ta'iz in 2012[54]. But although he gives valuable information about the very existing of embryonic trade union structures, he omits the degree of militancy and the impact these structures had during the critical juncture, and eventually states with a latent tone of disappointment that "[...] the February 11 revolution removed the objective obstacle and opened the door wide for the trade union movement to regain its roles and reorganise its ranks, independently and free, but none of this was achieved".

The outcome for Yemen is hence coded (0). Furthermore, among those workers' networks that did not diffuse beyond recognition into NGO's and hence lost their institutional fingerprint as trade unions, the majority was state controlled in 2011. The YSP, a traditional political partner of trade unions, had lost its influence already at the end of the 1990s, and the Islah party managed to get its foot into the door of some professional associations, however, this did never happen to an extent as witnessed in Jordan or Bahrain. Following that reasoning, the variables INOPP and CEN are set to (0) and (1) respectively.

6.10   Bahrain (1)

Bahrain has witnessed major upheavals in 2011 which aimed at curtailing the rule of the Al-Khalifa family to different extents. The official trade union federation supported a camp of moderate dialogueists and actively attempted to influence the stance of the regime by threatening and conducting general strikes. In contrast to Yemen, trade union institutions played a major role during the upheavals of 2011. Bahrain as a case

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[54]The founding members of the council were amongst others the Sponge & Plastic Factory Workers Union, the Ghee & Soap Factory Workers Union, the Workers Union of Miscellaneous Companies, the Al-Jund Workers Union, the Union workers Red Sea Company (Hashidi), Hazza Taha Workers Union, and the Workers union Abdul Jalil Radman. In total it claimed to represent 14,000 workers in 12 trade unions.

is coded (1) according to the QCA outcome dichotomisation.

SOEC	INOPP	CEN	TRI	KEYS	**Outcome**	Decimal
0	1	1	1	0	**1**	BAH(14)

Table 6.12: Truth table row for the case of Bahrain

The traditional tribal element which legitimised the rule of the Al-Khalifa family as will be outlined in section 6.10.1 had been a contentious issue and historically attracted criticism from leftists and religious activists inside the country. The variable TRI is therefore coded (1). The structure of the General Federation of Bahraini Trade Unions (GFBTU) which emerged out of centralised Joint-Management Committee system as will be outlined in part 6.10.3, became a highly centralised union federation after 2002. The variable CEN is therefore coded (1). This federation had, as shown in part 6.10.5, due to legal restrictions and organisational inexperience, no tangible bargaining power in the country's key sectors. Consequently, KEYS is coded (0). Still, strong party-union coordination could be witnessed, especially between the GFBTU bodies and the reform oriented bloc led by the Al-Wefaq party. As will be argued in part 6.10.7, the GFBTU joined the moderate opposition camp of the sevenfold Dialogueists, used the threat of a general strike to move the government to make concessions, provided legal assistance for dismissed workers, and never took the stance of the radical or theocracy oriented camp. The politicisation of the union body had already begun in the years before the 2011 uprising, and it was spurred and fostered by political forces from the ideological orbit of Al-Wefaq. This circumstance was taken as a justification by the government to implement and support a second trade union federation to counterbalance and contain the power of the GFBTU from March 2011 onwards. The case of Bahrain is therefore coded INOPP = (1).

6.10.1 The Equilibrium between the Tribalism and Sectarianism

Bahrain shows clear pattern of tribalism that penetrates society, forms part of the national narrative, and constitutes a pillar of the legitimacy inside the institutional equilibrium. This kind of tribalism is a form of organisation and decision making as well as a form of inclusion and exclusion into circles that have access to power. Different from Algeria and Tunisia, where upward mobility is possible to a certain extent without the recurring on family bonds, the 'Al-Khalifa network seemed rather hermetical which is also due to a instrumentalisation of the sectarian Sunni-Shi'i cleavage as technique

of power. Harik (1990, p.6;13) labels the country *traditional secular system* in which tradition is pre-eminent and decision making processes heavily rely on kinship.

Heterogeneous Tribalism and the Al-Khalifa Family

In 1783 Ahmed bin Muhammad bin Khalifa became Hakim of Bahrain, breaking the influence of the Persian Empire whose protection the local elite had searched after having expelled the Portuguese in 1602. After Bahrain's independence in 1971 the title of the ruler was changed to Amir, held by Al-Khalifa family members until today. The Al-Khalifa family belongs to the same clan as the As-Sabah, the nomadic 'Utub, and are thus a part of the Annizah. The 'Utub were at no good terms with the Wahabis who clashed several times with the tribe, and eventually forced them to settle almost completely in Bahrain.

The tribes that were formally in power back the days, and that were ousted by the Al-Khalifa clan were foremost Sunni and followed the Shafi'i School of Law (Meinel, 2003, p.146). They tended to shy away from agricultural work[55], engaged mostly in trade, and can be subsumed under the term *Huwala*. The Huwala would form a diverse yet politically active and educated middle class working in the private sector, the governmental Administration, the oil company, and the educational field of the modern state of Bahrain.[56] Additionally, some Sunni dwellers followed the Hanbali School of Law. The Al-Khalifa had until today trouble to bond and co-opt these parts of society that bears some revolutionary potential (Lawson, 1989, p.3-4). Furthermore, a low double-digit percentage number of merchants were Shi'i emigrants from Persia who mingled with the Hawula in business and - to a lesser extend - in private affairs. The populace that was engaged in agriculture and simple labour, and that labelled itself *Bahrana*, belonged mostly to Shi'i tribes that, however, did not exceedingly bond with the Persian merchant class. This Shi'i section is divided religiously as, for instance some follow the Usuli while others the Akhbari legal tradition (Fearon and Laitin, 2005, p.2). Additionally, there were mostly Sunni individuals, that were not organised in tribes and that were called *Baiseri* by the al-Khalifa clan and their tribal allies[57]. The upper class around the Al-Khalifa, following the Al-Maliki School, labelled itself *Adjwad*, say, pure (Al-Rumaihi, 1973, p.50;p.62 fn.33), in the tradition of Bedouin who trace their ancestry to figures of the old testament.

Although the Al-Khalifa family showed some craftiness in surviving inside the net of

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[55]Indeed, Bahrain was not only a center for commerce in the gulf, moreover, many water sources on its terrain allowed for limited nonetheless notably agriculture. Due to a natural balance that causes a horizontal barrier (*barzakh*), sweet fossil water can be found under a salty or brackish layer in wells and even in coastal areas beneath the sea water. These two qualities of water form in the local vernacular two kinds of seas which lead to the name Bahrain, the two seas (Cook, 2015, p.72)

[56]Famous Huwala Families are the Kanoo, the Fakhro, and the Shirawi who all run successful business and/or have high positions in government (Gillespie, 2009, p.63)

[57]Allied with the Al-Khalifah and building the upper class are the following tribes: Al-Jalahima, Al-Fadhl, Al-Bin Ali, Al-Mosalam, Al-Naime, Al-Sadah, Al-Rumahi, Al-Bu Aynain, Al-Manana, and Sudan(Al-Rumaihi, 1973, p.50)

interests of the great powers Oman, Persia, the Wahabis, the Ottoman Empire, and Great Britain, family disputes were quite common and provided a fertile ground for instability. This was amongst other things due to the lack of a fixed rule concerning the line of throne succession - as it can be found, for instance, in Kuwait after Mohammad the Great. In 1869, Britain, fearing instability in the region, eventually tightened the grip on Bahrain in the course of a inner-Khalifa crises and managed to install the Britain-friendly 21-year-old Sheikh Sheikh Isa ibn Ali Al-Khalifa (Al-Rumaihi, 1973, p.13).

The Historical Instability of a Riven Society

The complicated tribal, religious, and class structure was amended by different Pan-Arab and Arab Nationalist movements when modern education led to a large educated middle class. The country witnessed several attempts of reform by local grass root movements between the 1930s and the 1960s, cumulating most palpably and visibly in the protests and strikes 1954-1956 and 1965. In the former phase, the al-Ha'yah organisation (National Union Committee *Bahrain* (NUC)) managed set up links between young nationalists, the Hawula, and the popular base in the country. Showing the potential to paralyse the entire island by general strikes in 1954, and again in 1956, the NUC demanded political representation, the codification of Bahraini law, the right to form trade unions, and the implementation of a higher appeal court (Al-Rumaihi, 1973, p.367). Despite some concessions of the government, no path breaking reforms were really implemented. This period of turmoil, that was mainly led by the middle class, was followed by a turbulent year 1965, in which more violent and working-class led political agitation took place.

The discontent about British influence in Bahrain, that already played an important role in the upheavals 1954-1956, got pushed to a higher level in 1965. After mass dismissals from the Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO), demonstrations of students emerged, that were dispersed violently, and Ba'athists, Arab Nationalists, Communists and other secular groups took also the streets and eventually joined forces to form an underground organisation which became known as the National Front for Progressive Force *Bahrain* (NFPF) (Al-Rumaihi, 1973, 384). The response of the ruling was harsh: Great Britain sent troops to quell the protests, triggering critique from the local British press. Bahrain was to become Britain's main military harbour in the Gulf, so London was very eager to achieve stability. However, in 1968 the British government announced to close all bases east of the Suez Canal within three years and eventually withdrew all military and political presence (Gillespie, 2009, p.49).

The state building process turned to be difficult in the first years after full independence in 1971. Heterogeneous ideas of a heterogeneous society combined with the unconditional will of the Al-Khalifa family to maintain power caused disruptions that

remained under the surface of the country until 2011, breaking out every now and then in the decades before. After the first five years began promising with the formation of an elected National Assembly in 1972, and a constitution drafted and ratified in 1973, the country witnessed an autocratic setback. The 1973 parliament, uttering its discontent with the security bill issued by the Amir, that would have given state authorities the right to imprison any person on the ground of being a threat to national security, as well as with the newly established naval base of the US-Navy in Bahrain, was dissolved in 1975. Additionally Art.65, regulating new elections was suspended until a new election law was issued. That way, the Amir could rule by decree, due to his prominent role in the constitution. The 1973 constitution granted vast rights to the Amir, stating in Art.32 that "Legislative power shall be vested in the Amir and the National Assembly in accordance with the Constitution; and the Executive power shall be vested in the Amir, the Cabinet and the Ministers. Judicial decrees shall be passed in the name of the Amir, all in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution". The Amir was immune and inviolable, appointed the Prime Minister and could release him (Art. 33), and the Amir had the right to initiate laws and the sole right to ratify and promulgate laws (Art.34). Isa ibn Salman al-Khalifa did not allow the Assembly to meet again or hold elections until his death in 1999.

6.10.2 Shi'ism as Threat and as a Technique for Power Maintenance

The 1970s saw a growing influence of Shi'ite religious currents that had their roots in the decades before. Initially meant as an interconfessional, religious movement against the perceived leftist and nationalist mainstream, Shi'i influence grew steadily, got a push with the revolution in Iran 1979, and appealed to many Bahrana. In 1981 the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB) was accused of having sought to topple the ruling Al Khalifa and replace the tribal system with a religious theocracy resembling the new system of Iran.

On the one hand, as Alhasan (2011) demonstrates convincingly, the IFLB had access to Iranian support and recurred to a Shi'i rhetoric and base. The Shi'i consciousness had grown significantly and had become a force that was able to challenge the Al-Khalifa rule on sectarian grounds. Indeed, Shi'ism would still remain a powerful category to mobilise the masses inside Bahrain and impact the political landscape. On the other hand, as Meinel (2003) states, a tendency can be observed that the ruling family has since been continuously working on letting appear any opposition against its own rule as an exclusively Shi'ite issue. The spectrum of Iranian influence and Shi'ite fanaticism is easy to be used as a smokescreen to disguise what the Bahraini regime may be afraid of the most: a universal and cross-sectarian call for cutbacks of the powers of the family. This view was reinforced by the fact that among the many political and

societal activists who were tortured to death, deported, or intimidated in the 1980s and 1990s, there were disproportionally many Shi'ite activists, even when the protests were jointly Shi'i and Sunni (Amnesty International, 1995; Fearon and Laitin, 2005). Simultaneously, these narratives are used and embellished on the other side of the Gulf by the Iranian government to fuel anti-Sunni and anti-Saudi resentments to consolidate its own base of power. Hence, acknowledging Shi'ite identity and groups as playing a prominent and significant role in the Bahraini institutional equilibrium, it has also to be acknowledged the function of the Shi'a threat as a main pillar for justification of repressive measures by the ruling family. Furthermore, the summoning of the Shi'a threat rendered a broad coalition of those Sunni forces possible that were normally fragmented, including the Hannbali elements of the populace, the Shafi'i Huwala, and the Maliki Al-Khalifa clan and its tribal allies.

The vicious circle (Bayat, 2009, p.11) of exclusion due to mistrust, the feeling of deprivation, and resistance provides the background for the emergence of unrest in the 1980s. Following the Israeli occupation of south Lebanon in 1982 several political motivated physical attacks took place that can be traced back to Shi'i groups. The aim to overthrow the Al-Khalifa regime was uttered more visibly in clandestine media, foremost recurring on the fact that a tribal society would be un-Islamic, depicting Shi'ism as democratic and just, and Sunnism as authoritarian and hereditary (Louër, 2008, 27-29). This current continued playing an important part in the democratic movement that emerged during the wave of democratization in the early 1990s. The movement, which was calling for the re-establishment of the parliament, embraced different political currents from the far left to political Islam.

The year 1994 saw protests that ended violently in the course of a Marathon of the Rotary Club that included also lightly dressed woman passing conservative Shi'ite neighbourhoods[58]. In its aftermath, a wave of incidents was unchained that haunted the country for the next four years. The swing-swing of government criticism, violent demonstrations, and bomb attacks on the one side, and repression, banishment, torture, and executions on the other formed background and atmosphere of the country when Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa succeeded his father in 1999.

Reformism and Hybridisation under Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa

The new Amir that declared himself King in 2002 influenced the pre-2011 era massively by his reforms. He submitted his reform programme to a popular referendum in February 2001 when it was approved by enthusiasm and a majority of 98.4 per cent. The

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[58]The nature and sequence of events in this episode is contested. Allegations reach from an aggressive Shi'i mob attacking participants of the Marathon to violent riot police that provoked peaceful protesters to deliberately cause a religious incident and thus justify drastic measures against the Shi'i community of the past years retroactively. The most reasonable and elaborate description can probably be found in the Amnesty International report of 1995 (Amnesty International, 1995)

implementation turned to be sobering. A kind of two chamber system was introduced in which the consultative council - a committee consisting of members appointed exclusively by the King - was the dominant institution. Additionally, similar to Jordan and other hybrid systems coined by a high degree of tribalism, the electoral constituencies were redrawn, benefiting the allies of the Al-Khalifa. Moreover, citizens of the Gulf Cooperation Council and other foreigners, working in the security forces and being loyal to the orbit of the al-Khalifa family, were naturalised in order to broaden the Al-Kalifa's support in elections (Louër, 2008). The political associations in Bahrain that dominated the political landscape in the pre-2011 era, mirror the diverse history of struggle inside the country. The following players were active in 2010-2012, being the most visible advocates of their currents during the critical juncture:[59].

Al-Wifaq   Wifaq demands a Westminster-style constitutional Monarchy and agitates openly against Shi'a discrimination. The party was regarded as strongest opposition against the government. Ties to the Iranian government have never been proven, although often alleged by Al-Khalifa and its allies. Al-Wifaq boycotted the 2002 elections querying the incomplete reform process. It had a broad base among the Bahrana and is the most powerful Shi'i inclined association.

Al-Haq   Al-Haq was a split off consisting of Al-Wifaq's hard-liners who were dissatisfied with the participation of Al-Wifaq in the 2006 elections. In their opinion, no real progress had been achieved on the reform front and, hence, the system should not be supported. Consequently, Al-Haq has never applied to become an officially recognised political association according to the laws. The group competed with Al-Wifaq for the same Shi'a supporters and gets support whenever Al-Wifaq was perceived as unsuccessful, while losing popularity when Wifaq appears stronger.[60]

National Brotherhood Society (Al-Ikha'a)   Al-Ikha'a represents Shi'ites of Persian descent (Ajmis) who ascended socially and belong to the upper strata of society. Being reform willing, progressive, and religious, they avoided contact to Iran and stress loyalty towards the Bahraini nation. It is also focussed on Ajmi's specific concerns, and an end to sectarian discrimination.

Islamic Action Society (Amal)   IAS leader Shaykh Muhammad 'Ali Mahfudh was the head of the IFLB - the Islamist Shi'i group that was accused of having planned a coup d'etat in 1981. Amal was founded by members of the Shirazi movement[61]

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[59]The description is a short version of the more elaborate enumeration of Peterson (2009, p.164-166), amended by (International Crisis Group, 2011)

[60]Another party with a similar inclination is Al-Wafa'a. Some go as far as to argue that al-Wafa'a essentially was founded in order to have a second militant organisation that could then ally itself with al-Haq and create the impression of additional support (International Crisis Group, 2011, p.19).

[61]After the death of Muhammad Mahdi al-Shirazi in 2001, the Shirazi movement split into followers of his brother, Sadiq al-Shirazi, and followers of his nephew Muhammad Taqi al-Mudarrisi. Sadiq

in 2002. The 1981 alleged coup was accused of attempting to install Iraqi Ayatollah Hadi al-Modarresi as the spiritual leader of a new theocratic state. The association remains critical towards the government, holds ties to Tehran, however, it is not the most powerful Shi'i association and has had little electoral success. This might be due to the historically bloody appearance in the memories of many Bahrainis.

Wa'ad Wa'ad or the National Democratic Action Society (NDAS) was a broad alliance that aimed at unifying secular and leftist groups. It was founded by former leaders of the NFPF - the clandestine organisation that played a major role in the uprisings of 1965 - who were allowed to return to Bahrain after the amnesty of 2002. The Communists left after some month, and the party did win seats in the national assembly in the election of 2006. The party boycotted the election of 2002 and can be regarded as cross-sectarian opposition. The association was supported by Huwala families, amongst others of parts of the Fakhro clan.

Progressive Democratic Tribune The PDT is dominated by Communist forces and its roots can be traced back to the National Progressive Front (NFP), which was one of the first leftist groups of the 1950s. As it did not boycott the 2002 elections, the association won 3 seats in Parliament in 2002, but lost these seats to Wifaq four years later. The association was supported by an elder generation of leftists and openly criticised the government.

Al-Aslah Al-Aslah held ties to the Salafi Movement although the leadership, foremost Adel Al-Ma'awida, seeks to give the impression of a rather moderate Sunni Muslim inclination. Political competitors allege an undue preference by state authorities and even direct support by the ruling family. Criticism of the government or the political system of Bahrain is sparse among its rank and files. The association is one of the most successful political groups in the country and won six seats in the 2006 elections.

The Islamic Platform or Al-Minbar, was the second most successful association with Sunni inclination and is linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. It is also assumed to benefit from governmental support and the blessing of the ruling family. It was supposedly influenced by Shaykh 'Isa bin Muhammad Al Khalifa, a former Minister of Labour and Social Affairs and uncle of the King.

The Islamic League The Islamic League is supported by Shi'i individuals of the society that are satisfied with the performance of the system or hold ties to the

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al-Shirazi adopted an increasingly non-confrontational approach toward the Gulf governments, while Muhammad Taqi al-Mudarrisi and his brother Hadi al-Mudarrisi had a more radical stance. The latter current would be called the *mudarrisiyya* by its followers (Matthiesen, 2013, p.39).

centres of power. The association is competing with Al-Wifaq about the moderate and wealthier Shi'i voters.

6.10.3   The long Fight for Trade Unionism

Different from many other Gulf Countries, trade unionism did play a role at an early stage in the country. Meant as a compromise, Joint-Management-Committees were implemented at the beginning of the 1980s in order to address workers' demands. These apolitical committees served later as a blueprint for other countries in the region such as Saudi Arabia or Qatar. Eventually in 2002, a labour law was introduced that allowed for trade unions (naqabat) in its actual sense.

Bahrain's Worker as Trailblazers of Organised Labour in the Gulf

The fight for workers rights and trade unionism in Bahrain has a long history and is an indelible part of the country's history. The discovery of oil changed the structure of the labour market. The Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) and also the government demanded high skilled workers in the 1930s and 1940s. As a result, in 1938 the first labour strike in the Gulf area was conducted. Strikers demanded apart from higher wages, less working hours, and fringe benefits also the prioritization of Bahraini Workers in employment. Under the auspices of al-Ha'yah, the first federation of labour unions was established in 1955 (Fuccaro, 2009, p.180), even before the legal status of unions as such was recognised. In fact, as Beling (1959) states, the labour movement became an inherit part of al-Ha'yah's total strategy to force concessions from the government. The newly established Bahrain Labour Federation (BLF) mobilised and took also actively part in the popular uprisings of 1954-1956 before it was dissolved in 1956 and some of its leaders were exiled or imprisoned. Nonetheless, in 1957 the Bahrain Labour Ordinance was issued, being one of the earliest documents in the Gulf that allowed for trade unions. To keep some manoeuvring space for interference, the law did not allow explicitly for federations, and embraced a proviso that made unions accountable for any kind of tortuous acts, unless it was proved that they had been committed without its knowledge, participation or approval (Beling, 1959, p.167).
Compared to other Gulf states, three observations about Bahrain help to clarify the differences in the economy and thus the basis trade unions could latch onto. First, the Bahraini economy has been more diverse. The oil industry has since been important, however is has never been the main pillar of the GDP. The private sector played a greater role and has been also a fertile ground for trade unions. Second, in fact almost half of the total workforce was employed in only seven establishments, all somewhat connected to the construction sector and BAPCO (Beling, 1959, p.160). This allowed for economies of scale concerning trade union endeavours. Third, there has been an influx of foreign workers, however, it was lower than in other oil producing Gulf countries. This was due to the less important role the oil sector played, but also due to

the lower wages BAPCO paid compared with other oil companies of the region (Al-Rumaihi, 1973, p.154). The lesser influx of foreign workers combined with a higher quality of the latter led to a stratification of the labour market especially in the larger establishments. Westerners prevailed in management positions, Indians and Pakistanis in intermediate positions and Bahraini workers at the bottom in lower administrative and labour jobs (Beling, 1959, p.159).

Consequently, the official recognition of trade unions had been a predominant demand of the nationalist movement, and was finally acknowledged in article 21 of the constitution of 1973. A wave of mass protests followed after the withdrawal of the British in 1971 due to the struggle between civil society and the al-Khalifa clan for the corridors of power. In that struggle, new emerging trade unions played a crucial role, foremost in professions in the aluminium smelter, the electricity department, the Ministry of Health and the construction industry (Khalaf, 1985). The state reacted harshly, put down the strikes with the "Decree Concerning Matters of State Security" of October 22 1974. The decree was issued when it became clear that the State Security Law would be rejected as a bill by the National Assembly (see above). It gave authorities means to suppress the labour movement and its activists more easily, and paved the ground for the human rights violations by the state authorities in the decades to follow.

A System of Labour-Management Committees as Trade Union Substitute

As a substitute for the purpose of collective bargaining and basic worker representation a system of Joint Labour-Management Committees *Bahrain* (JLC) was established by the state authorities since 1981, consisting half of employers and half of employees. Committees were already mentioned in the Labour Law of the Private Sector (Amiri Decree Law No. 23 of 1976). This step aimed at easing the tensions of working struggles and appeasing the lower strata of society with the possibility of influencing working conditions at least in a narrow frame. In 1983 the General Committee of Bahraini Workers (GCBW) was established by law, being a central committee consisting of of workers only, and which was controlled closely by the ministry of labour to monitor and coordinate the work of the JLCs. By 1995, the JLC-GCBW system represented nearly 70 percent of the island's indigenous industrial workers, while non-industrial and foreign workers were clearly under-represented. The frequent elections appeared to be fair, transparent, and non-manipulated (Amnesty International, 1995). However, the committees restricted their work to socio-economic issues and refrained from mingling in politics, despite the turbulent years of the 1990s. Sectarian strife or broad macro-political reforms did not play a major role in the committees. Nonetheless, single currents and groups lobbied subtly and peacefully for a reform of the legislative framework for organised labour and submitted a first memorandum in 1996 that demanded deep reforms (General Federation of Bahraini Trade Unions (GFBTU), 2012)

and that was a blueprint for the implementation of the new labour code under Sheikh Hamad Al-Khalifa in 2002.

Similar to Jordan and Egypt, professional white-collar associations were subject to a different legislation (Amiri Decree Law No.21/1989). Hence, they did not count as trade union bodies, and, consequently did not have the right to strike. The Ministry of Social Development was responsible for licensing and regulation and was allowed to check the protocols of all meetings and to dismiss the board of any such organisation. Additionally, they had a particular difficult standing, as the law technically did not allow for associations based on class, sect, religion, or profession. Nonetheless, as the example of the Bar Association shows, there were loopholes by which professional associations had been able to form even before the issuance of the law, as long as they could prove a charity based inclination (Radhi, 2003). The Law No.21 formed a framework many associations could agitate within, such as the Bahrain Society of Engineers that was already established and officially incorporated by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in 1972, and also other important professional associations as the Bahrain Teachers' Association (BTA), that struggled for better education and conditions in schools, the Bahrain Nursing Society (BNS), and the Bahraini Journalists Association, which provided training courses for journalists and that struggled for a new media law. Similar to the JLC-GCWB bodies, associations refrained from positioning themselves or mingle in political struggles.

6.10.4 The Harmonious and Apolitical Beginning of Trade Union Institutions

The legal framework, that eventually was implemented in 2002 seemed a success of the progressive forces inside the contained labour movement. Art.27 of the new constitution granted explicitly the right to form unions, and by Decree No.33 (2002) chapter 17 of the Labour Law for the Private Sector of 1976 (Decree No.23) - being the chapter that formed the basis for the JLC-GCBW system - has been revoked for the sake of allowing the establishment of trade unions. The establishment of unions in the public sector was initially contested between public sector workers and government officials as the law of 2002 Art.2 explicitly included public sector workers, and Art.10 granted them the right to join unions. As unions began to form in governmental institutions, the government clarified in its Circular No.(1/2003) that these workers would only have the right to *join* unions of the private sector with a similar profession and that they had no right to form unions of their own. This is an important restraint, as the share of Bahraini Workers inside the private sector had become relatively low (18.5 per cent in 2017) and particularly high inside the public sector (84.5 per cent in 2017) (Salibi, 2018, p.12).

Despite these contested issues, the atmosphere in the years to follow was positive. In

2004 the *General Federation of Bahraini Trade Unions* (GFBTU) was founded. It benefited from the efforts of former JLC-GCBW members, the legal support of the Bar Association, and consulting services from the Kuwaiti Trade Union Federation (KTUF), and even was supported by the government and the ruling family. It received real estate from the King personally as a gift to set up the headquarters of the association (General Federation of Bahraini Trade Unions (GFBTU), 2012, p.95). Consequently, at that particular time, the GFBTU stressed its political independence and unwillingness to mingle with national politics as such, following the tradition of the JLC-GCBW bodies. In 2004, Abdul Ghaffar Abdul Hussain, chairman of the GFBTU clearly stated about the relation to other associations and the political strata in general (Abu Safi, 2004):

> We, as a general union of Bahrain trade unions, respect and appreciate all civil society institutions, including political associations, and we have an exceedingly good acquaintance and relationship with them. There is a right for every worker to belong to any political association according to his aspirations or vision, but not to enforce or to realise the politicisation of trade union work. We respect the admission of individuals to political associations, but we do not accept that they come with ideas of the political association they belong to and impose them upon the union, and this is something we have not seen in the general secretariat so far.

From Bander-Gate to the Pearl Roundabout: The Politicisation of Trade Unions

This attitude seemed to have changed slowly already after 2005 when the disappointment began to grow noticeably among the population about the reforms of the new ruler. Increasing popular protests and demonstrations since the summer of 2006 were accompanied by a return to violent suppression tactics by the security forces. The discontent embraced the feeling of being betrayed, as the opposition insisted that the referendum had implied a return to the 1973 constitution at a minimum (Peterson, 2009, p.170). Additionally, the audience of trade unions became increasingly Shi'i due to the factual proportions of the communities on the island. This became a visible political issue in 2006 when the so called "Bander-Gate" scandal haunted the country: A paper published by the Gulf Centre for Democratic Development (GCDD) revealed activities and intentions of high ranking government officials to deprive the Shi'i population by demographic engineering and penetration of civil society organisations. As Busfan and Rosiny (2016, p.15) summarise, these secret actions aimed at:

> [...] undermining the influence of Shi'ia forces and containment of the opposition by an increase of naturalisation of Sunni foreigners and a penetration of non-governmental organisations and trade unions that mostly were subject of Shi'i as well as to a lesser extent of leftist and liberal Sunni influence, and the intention of the establishment of parallel civil society organisations [...]

The Bandar Report, being technically an agglomeration of private memos, private correspondence, receipts, and bills of high ranking government officials, steered attention to a different reading of the reform process in general and the overtures of the regime concerning the trade union movement in particular. This included the changes that were implemented by Law No.49/2006 allowing for plurality of unions and unions associations, and Law No.62/2006 establishing strike bans in 12 sectors, including in the oil and gas, healthcare, education, pharmaceutical and bakery sectors.

The Bander Report claimed a willingness of the regime to deprive Shi'i forces from the trade union movement and against that background it reported about the intention to activate the role of the Bahrain Institute for Political Development in order to create trade union awareness among members of the Sunni community, encouraging members to engage in various trade unions. In contrast to Yemen, where the state controlled the trade union institutions, however, kept them on low gear, the Bahraini elites actively attempted to use trade union activities to secure their power. The Bandar report clearly produced mistrust among the trade unionists, while at the same time, the charity-oriented wing of the Islamic political strata began to show interest in the trade union movement as a means to mobilise. As a consequence, the PDT - which had been a driving force behind the trade union movement after 2002 - finally lost its influence inside the general assembly of trade unions to the al-Wifaq party in 2008. This also mirrored the tendency of many voters to shift from classical leftism to the welfare-oriented wing of political Islam, as already witnessed in the national parliamentary elections of 2006.

6.10.5   The Relative Weakness of the Union Movement concerning its Bargaining Power

Bahrain is the Gulf country which depends the least on natural resources, however, their contribution to the GDP of 2010 was still 6 per cent. Concerning government inflows, oil revenues still accounted for about 80 per cent of the total state revenues in 2010 (Financial Stability Directorate, Central Bank of Bahrain, 2010, p.57), whereas Bahrain's only oil field, Awali, is constantly depleting and most of the revenues stem from refining crude oil imported from Saudi Arabia. Being aware of the fact that Bahrain will probably be the first Gulf state to run out of oil, the government already started to diversify the economy in the late 1970s. Aluminium Bahrain (ALBA) runs one of the largest Aluminium smelter of the world and contributed between 10 and 12 per cent of the national GDP in 2010. The company employed more than 3,000 workers, of which more than 80 per cent are Bahraini nationals. About 12,000 workers (about 1.5 per cent of the total workforce) work in the entire Aluminium industry including ALBA's downstream industries. Since the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975, the country became a hub for Islamic Banking in the region. Being the

holiday destination of many Arabs and beyond, tourism is another important pillar of the economy, contributing about 4.5 per cent of the GDP in 2010.

The mobilisation potential of trade unions in Bahrain is heavily hampered due to the exclusion of guest workers from the right to unionise. In 2010, foreign residents accounted for up to 54 per cent of the total population and foreign workers for about 75 per cent of the workforce. Also the denial of the right to organise in the public sector hampers unionisation. Given these facts, and given the relative youth of the trade union movement especially compared with its republican counterparts in Algeria or Tunisia, but also in the linchpin monarchies of Morocco and Jordan, it is little surprising that observers assume that the trade union density did not exceed four per cent in 2007 (Saleh, 2007).

Strike activities in significant key sectors started nonetheless in 2006, when Sheikh Hamad Bin Isa Al Khalifa issued a decree banning the dismissal of workers because of trade union activities. The ALBA trade union, being the largest union of the country and covering about 80 per cent of the company's employees, achieved a 20 per cent wage increase in the same year (Khaleej Times Business, 2006). Copycat strikes broke out at BAPCO, Batelco and other companies. As a reaction, aforementioned Decree 62 actively prohibited union activities and punished strike activities that jeopardise the economic performance in vital sectors. This legislative change had an impact on the willingness of workers to strike, as could be witnessed at BAPCO in 2010: When the union staged a protest over pay and working conditions on February 10 2010, only several hundreds of workers showed up instead of the thousands that were anticipated by union officials.

Frequent dismissals for union activities and breaches of agreements with the union had also contributed to increased scepticism among workers about the bargaining power if their new federation. The lack of a mutual strategy, cohesion and solidarity among workers were another severe obstacle to develop this bargaining power. The move closer to the al-Wifaq party (see part 6.10.7) that already started in 2008 did not better that situation, especially against the background of a highly fragmented society as outlined in part 6.10.1. Consequently, GFBTU official spokesman Jaffar Khalil Ibrahim stated in 2007 when asked about the bargaining power of the trade unions (Saleh, 2007):

> One of the most important things here is that unions closely stick to their rules, which we still miss in Bahrain. In the United States, for example, when a union like the Truckers Union declares a strike, this means a major paralysis in a part of the American economy, which gives the strike and union movements quick fruits caused by the strong connection[62] between the union and its workers base, and such connection is not possessed by our union movement [...]

The low density, the discrepancies within the young union movement, the abatement of strike activities between 2006 and 2010, and the little negotiation successes in that

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[62]Khalil uses here the word *tarabit* which also means coherence, interrelationship, cohesion, or linkage.

period mirror the comparatively weak bargaining power vis-a-vis employers and the state. The case of Bahrain is thus coded KEYS = (0).

6.10.6   From Calls for Political Freedoms to Foreign Intervention

In the shadow of the turmoil in the Arab world that started in December 2010, a youth movement formed by the help of social media that called itself *14th February Revolution Bahrain*, calling for a "Day of Rage" on 14th February of 2011. Its aims targeted clearly at a change of the institutional equilibrium of power inside the country. Besides the demands for basic freedoms and the release of political prisoners, the movement called for the disbandment of the National Assembly and the implementation of a Constituent Assembly to draft a new constitution that should also embrace an independent judiciary, a freely elected parliament that elects the Prime Minister, and the abolition of the second chamber. Maybe most threatening to the regime, the activists also urged for a debarment of access to top positions in the three branches of government for members of the Royal Family. Similar to Jordan where protesters called for a "King that reigns but does not rule, Bahrain should stay a constitutional Monarchy ruled by the al-Khalifa family.(Bassiouni et al., 2011, p.66)[63] The activists - who in the early phase clearly distanced themselves from any political or religious inclination - received the support of al-Haq until February 13, and maybe more important, of the officially recognised Wa'ad party. Al-Wifaq, back then the largest fraction in parliament, merely stressed the right of citizens to protest peacefully.

6.10.7   A Fragmented Opposition with Diverging Demands

Events on the 14th of February 2011 escalated quickly. Emphasizing the argument that the demonstrations were not registered in advance as required by Amiri Decree No.18/1973, the police tried to disperse the demonstrations that erupted throughout Bahrain. This turned to be more difficult as expected as single demonstrations did not exceed more than 800 participants and the hot spots of action of the in total 6000 participants were sparkled all over the island and constantly moving. After the death of one participant, more protests followed the next day, and clashes with the police in the course of the funeral rally. The demonstrators took the CGG (Pearl) Roundabout, al-Wifaq members of Parliament threatened to resign, and on the same day, the GFBTU

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[63]The source of the informations of the following passages - the Report of the Bahraini Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) - was firstly initiated by King Hamad by Royal Order No. 28 to evaluate the protests and the reaction of the security forces in 2011. Although criticised by the opposition in the course of the investigation as biased, and as not holding anyone in particular accountable for the misconduct of the security forces, the result published in November 2011 was "perhaps the most self-critical analysis of repression against an ongoing struggle ever published by an Arab government" (Zunes, 2013, p.156)

announced a general strike for February 17. The strike was postponed by three days as the island was under lock-down after the Pearl Roundabout was cleared violently at 3am on February 17, causing 4 deaths and over 300 injured.

After criticism from inside and outside the country, the regime allowed the protesters to reoccupy the Pearl Roundabout on February 19. The next day, about 80 per cent of the Bahraini workforce (nationals) followed the call of the Teachers' Society, and the Bar society and went on strike.

The slogans shouted during the demonstrations and the demands and desires of the protesting crowd varied in their content and radicalism. The most palpable currents of the fragmented movement are the following (Abdulla, 2011; Matthiesen, 2013):

Groups who demanded reform without the regime (Radical Reformists) embraced the majority of the initial 14th February Movement, as well as their early supporters among the unlicensed opposition including Al-Haq, Al-Wafa'a, and Al-Ahrar. They refused a dialogue with the ruling family without far reaching concessions and a large number of protesters called for the fall of the Al-Khalifa rule. This attitude was hardened in the course of the weeks to come, following the line of Hasan Mushayma, al-Haq's leader, who said he could basically accept a European-style constitutional Monarchy (which he described as not very different from a republic), however, as the regime would never accept such a reform, it might be necessary to topple it (International Crisis Group, 2011, p.18). Their struggle focussed on the implementation of the rights granted by the 1973 constitution.

Groups who demanded reform within the regime (Dialogueists) included the licensed political societies of the parliamentary opposition that jumped on the bandwagon with the protest of the 14th February Movement. Leading parties were Al-Wifaq, Wa'ad, the Islamic Action Society, Al-Ikha'a National Society and the Al-Menbar. On 19th February, amongst others the al-Wifaq, Wa'ad, the Islamic Action Society, the PDT, and the al-Minbar Society issued a mutual statement reaffirming their support for the protests, demanding an end of sectarian hatred in the state and the media, and political reforms that would lead to a constitutional Monarchy. This cross-sectarian alliance uttered clear demands such as the formation of a national coalition interim government, release of political prisoners, and the security of the protesters (Abdulla, 2011) while also clearly urging the government to engage in dialogue.

Groups who advocated for a religious (Shi'i) form of government (Theocrats and Semi-Theocrats) were relatively small in number, however, strongly visible during the protests and on the Pearl Roundabout. The most palpable group was a Shirazi movement, say, the Islamic Action Front (Amal) that did not dissimulate its inclination towards an Iranian model of government. The movement as such was rather peripheral to the wider world of Shi'a political movements, however, they were well or-

ganised and benefited from their own media. While al-Wifaq rejected all accusations of foreign links and tried not to be instrumentalised by foreign Shi'a actors, the Shirazis had put a screen up on the Pearl Roundabout on which several of their political figures spoke out in the harshest ways against the Al Khalifa ruling family and later also against the Saudi ruling family (Matthiesen, 2013).

The first days of the protests, the regime seemed to be unprepared. Especially the pace and impact of the ongoing events made it struggle for the best answer. Eventually, it resorted to three strategies. First, it tried to calm the masses by socio-economic benefits while more or less ignoring the political demands. King Hamad promised a gift of 1,000 Bahraini Dinars (approx. 2,900 Euro) for each Bahraini family, the creation of 20,000 jobs, and announced 50,000 new housing units (Abdulla, 2011, p.166). Second, members of the regime and loyalist organised a counter-mobilisation. The National Unity Bloc *Bahrain* (NUB) was formed, a loyal political bloc, consisting mainly of wealthy Sunni citizens (Lulu, 2011). And while the anti-government protest camp was located at the Pearl Roundabout, the pro-government demonstrators gathered in front of the al-Fateh Mosque already on February 21, using the hash tag #fateh in social media as a response to #lulu (Arabic: pearl), which had become the hash tag of the anti-government camp. The pro-government rallies and the NUB got also support by prominent Sunni clerics. Sheikh Abdulatif al-Mahmud was appointed as NUB head, benefiting from all state support and patronage networks (Abdulla, 2011, p.166). His attitude was also part of the third strategy used by the regime to encounter the protests. Al-Mahmud publicly denounced the anti-government movement as a "threat to the very existence of Sunnis" a reading that became more and more prominent among state authorities and that also became more viral in the state-controlled media. It was a consequent continuation of the rhetoric that could be witnessed in Bahrain since the 1980s.

The Political Nature of the Protests

In the weeks to follow, the situation in Bahrain got stuck in a gridlock. Each of the aforementioned currents tried to advocate for their future vision of the country. Marches with 100,000 anti-government protesters on February 22, and with 200,000 on February 23 followed. The government, being keen to lose its suboptimal reputation it earned inside and outside the country because of its hard line stance, allowed the demonstrators to march. Smaller protests with different extent of radicalism continued in February and March, mounting in a small group of demonstrators attempting to blockade the state television headquarters and the parliament building (Zunes, 2013, p.155). Although making some smaller political concessions and promises, the regime's keenness to implement change seemed to have been limited. In the words of Abdulla

(2011, p.167) about King Hamad:

> He refused the demand to dismiss the government and to form a coalition gov-
> ernment, and he opposed demonstrations outside the Pearl circle. Instead, he
> stressed the need to satisfy the demands for jobs, housing and other socio-
> economic needs, which could be met with the GCC Marshall Plan – a plan
> which is underway to support Oman and Bahrain to overcome the roots of un-
> rest, through the improvement of living conditions, job opportunities and housing
> schemes. What he [...] did not realize, was that the root of the protests is a po-
> litical one and a quest for dignity across all the GCC states.

A look at the economic data of the country before 2011 supports the thesis that
the protests were mainly political and to a lower extend socio-economical. Unemploy-
ment remained under 1.2 per cent since the 1990s, and youth unemployment remained
between 4 and 5 per cent during that period. Although the inflation rates increased by
trend since 2000, they never surpassed 3.5 per cent, while purchasing power of the min-
imum wage increased by 120 per cent between 2000 and 2010. Even if socio-economic
demands may have played a role among particular strata of society, the leading fractions
of the upheavals all uttered political demands first and foremost, as shown previously
(6.10.7). Because of that, and especially in comparison with the other countries of the
sample, the variable SOEC is coded (0) for the case of Bahrain.

The GFBTU as Reform Oriented Player

Eventually, the regime started to use violence against anti-government protesters, and
on March 17 it received military support from the Gulf Cooperation Council. Arguing
with regional stability, pointing at vast pro-government marches, and also pointing at
a possible Shi'i threat the Shirazi movement had given good footage for, the regime
pulled the emergency brake. Protests were quelled and the country was brought vio-
lently under control again. The date of the intervention of about 5000 foreign troops
from Saudi Arabia and the UAE was not a mere coincidence. For that date, the GF-
BTU had announced another general strike and was supported by the radical reformist
(see above) groups. This "precarious unity" (Holmes, 2015, p.111) posed a thread to
the ruling family, as the Radical Reform groupings had announced to march towards
the presidential palace.

During all the turmoil, the GFBTU can be classified as belonging to the Dialogueists,
forming thus a part of the "sevenfold" together with most parliamentary opposition
groups. This meant clear political demands for reform and tries to reinforce dialogue
with the regime. The GFBTU never adopted the radical slogans of the March 14 Move-
ment. In fact, the general strike that took place on February 20 was carried out by the
local populace despite its call off by the GFBTU, after security forces had withdrawn
from the Pearl Roundabout. Following this strategy of dialogue, and acting often in a
similar manner as al-Wifaq, the general strike was technically not *announced*. It was
rather a *threat* in case tanks would not be removed from the streets and people were
not allowed to protest freely. When foreign troops set boots on Bahraini ground, the

federation upheld their call for a general strike. Then, just as the GFBTU withdrew the announcement of the general strike on February 20 in a last-minute decision, it did so also with the extension of the general strike on March 23. GFBTU Chairman Salman Mahfoudh announced this latter decision after a meeting with Shura Council chairman Ali Saleh As-Saleh and Labour Ministry officials, stating "we discussed several key issues workers were facing for the past few weeks, with their safety on top priority" (CW-Staff, 2011). What made the trade union association nonetheless an inconvenient opponent of the ruling regime was the fact that the GFBTU started to campaign for workers that were dismissed due to their participation in the protests. Thousands of workers and dozens of high union officials were dismissed and banned from work as part of the confrontations. The GFBTU estimated the total number of dismissed workers and arrests to be over 4.000. The association filed a complaint against the Bahrain government at the ILO for violating Convention 111 (discrimination in employment).

In the aftermath of the protests, union leaders faced fierce discrimination and punishment. Fifteen members of the executive board and more than forty union leaders, including the heads of the Teachers Union, the Nurses Association and the Bahrain Petroleum Company Union, were sacked. Moreover, leaders of the most active unions were sentenced to prison, such as the leaders of the Teachers Union: Abu Dheeb went to prison for some 18 months and Al-Salman was held in custody five and a half months before being released on bail (Beinin, 2011a).

The role of the professional associations can be exemplified by the Teacher's Society (BTA) which had been the most active of the professional unions. In April 2011, the Ministry of Social Development dissolved the Union as its leaders took part in the February-March 2011 pro-democracy protests. Indeed, teachers protesting at their school gates starting at 7.30 am were the first strikers recorded, and the BTA members went on strike even after the call off of the general strike by the GFBTU - with an estimated 80 percent of the schools and 6500 teachers taking part (Holmes, 2015, p.109). In fact, teachers were demanding for the investigation of the death of the protesters among which were also students, and later, according to a statement, they supported the demonstrators who were protesting the "barbaric practices of the authorities" (Bassiouni et al., 2011, p.92). Other demands included the deteriorating standards of education in Bahrain and the resignation of the Minister of Education.[64]. This attitude, which was less focussed on political issues, could also be found among other professional associations [65]. The Physicians and Nurses Society, that had set up a

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[64]However, the BTA's activities were seen critically by many Dialogueists. A joint statement of the seven largest Dialogueist opposition groups on March 2 called on teachers and students to carry on with normal school schedules and pledged for schools free of politicisation (Bassiouni et al., 2011, p.102)

[65]The Bahrain Journalist Association is an exemption. Being quiet during the entire protests, the association did not even raise voice - neither in favour nor against the regime measures - when Mansoor al-Jamri, editor in chief of al-Wasat newspaper was put under pressure because of "unethical" media coverage of the uprisings. The entire newspaper was shut down for a day. Al-Jamri was considered as moderate mediator and was also critical of protesters for blocking a main highway. Also the lawyers

tent on the Pearl Roundabout to give medical supply to the protesters had a similar less political stance. And after facing harassments and blockade of medical supply by government authorities, issued a statement condemning the attack on peaceful protesters as well as the withholding of medical aid, and demanded the resignation of the Minister of Health, Faisal Al-Hammar. Although at SMC members of the medical staff participated in demonstrations demanding for constitutional reform, social justice and economic equality, and expressions of support for the demands of the February 14 movement(Bassiouni et al., 2011, p.85), the organisation itself refrained from making statements with a radical political wording.

The Politically Jogged Split of the Union Movement

Another sign that the regime perceived the GFBTU as a threat becomes evident when in July 2011 the trade union movement split. The newly issued Law No.35 of 2011 allowed for multiple trade unions on enterprise levels and for multiplicity of federations by the end of March 2011. As a consequence, a new federation was formed, mostly of unions in state owned enterprises. The official reason for the foundation of the Bahrain Free Labour Union Federation (BFLUF), initially called BLUF, was the high politicisation of the GFBTU. In a slightly encrypted manner the growing dominance of al-Wifaq and an alleged Shi'i predominance since the transition of the JLC-GCBW system into the GFBTU was addressed and criticised in the chapter "Who We Are" at its official website (Bahrain Free Labour Unions Federation, 2019), yielding valuable insights into its narrative:

> [...] the trade union formation in the dominant institutions was limited to a political current with unilateral tendencies and political and sectarian representation, which were reflected in the Secretariat of the General Union of Bahrain Trade Unions. Thereby, the turn of the General Committees into the General Union turned into an irrational and suspicious transformation having the purpose to continue politicising, controlling and directing union work and to make workers one of the tools of the political associations.

The text proceeds with criticism of the GFBTU, making it responsible for the mass dismissals and being a threat to the national unity. Especially its role in the general strike in March is attacked, claiming that the leadership of the federation did not act unanimously with its affiliated unions, and even against the free will of the Bahraini workers. It can not completely be determined to which extend the government has been involved into the foundation of the BLUF, as, on the one hand, there has indeed been dissatisfaction with the role of the GFBTU among many workers. By end of March 2011 more than 400 BAPCO Trade Union members have threatened to quit after the enterprise union supported another nationwide strike without their consent

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association remained relatively silent, as they were still riddled with a conflict with the government about lawyers that refused to defend Bahraini citizens in trails that dated from 2010. Additionally, the association had a rather government-friendly board.

(Trade Arabia Online, 2011). On the other hand, the ILO doubted the independence
of the new Bahrain Free Labour Federation BFLUF and points to irregularities in the
founding and accession procedure (Bahrain Center for Human Rights, 2012). Addi-
tionally, suppression of BFLUF alternative unions in state enterprises, harassment and
dismissals of GFBTU affiliated trade union leaders, or the pressuring of migrant work-
ers into the newly established BFLUF framework have been reported in several state
owned enterprises[66].Nonetheless, given the politically active role of the GFBTU, espe-
cially compared with other states of the sample, the outcome for the case of Bahrain
is coded (1).

6.11   Egypt (1)

As will be shown in section 6.11.3, trade unions clearly attempted at interfering in
the institutional equilibrium in Egypt, justifying the coding of the outcome (1) for the
country. As explained in section 6.11.3, two truth table rows will be used for the case
of Egypt, one for the time before the Muslim Brotherhood became active in the reform
process and after:

SOEC	INOPP	CEN	TRI	KEYS	**Outcome**	Decimal
1	0	1	0	1	**1**	EGY(21)

Table 6.13: Truth table row for the case of Egypt(23)

SOEC	INOPP	CEN	TRI	KEYS	**Outcome**	Decimal
1	1	1	0	0	**1**	EGY(29)

Table 6.14: Truth table row for the case of Egypt(29)

Egypt's hybrid system, as described in section 6.11.1 does not necessarily rely on
family or tribal bonds. Family does surely play a role in the patrimonial capitalist
system, however, it is not as pivotal as in the systems of Jordan or Libya. The variable
TRI is therefore coded (0). Section 6.11.2 shows how the trade union organisations were

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[66]These enterprises include Aluminium Bahrain (ALBA), the Bahrain Airport Services (BAS),
Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard (ASRY), Aluminium Rolling Mill, Bahrain Telecommunications
Company (BATELCO), Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO), Yokogawa Middle East, and the
Bahrain Aviation Fuelling Company (BAFCO)(Bahrain Mirror, 2015)

historically centralised, leading to the coding of the variable CEN as (1). Especially part 6.11.3 demonstrates that the breach of the authoritarian bargain was a crucial issue among the population; hence, SOEC is coded (1), and the same part gives an insight into the strength of clandestine worker's organisations in economic key sectors, especially inside the textile industry.

6.11.1 From Nasserism to Patrimonial Capitalism

By 2010, Egypt was officially a single-party presidential republic that showed clear features of authoritarianism of a mass mobilising party regime according to Linz (2000). Due to the emergence of a caste of businessmen and military that benefited from privatisation policies especially in the 1990s, the regime has also been labelled *Patrimonial Capitalism* (Schlumberger, 2008) or *Patrimonial Authoritarianism* (Albrecht, 2012) respectively. The logic of power maintenance rests on the strong role of the Army, personalised politics and liberalisation as means to maintain power, the electoral framework, as well as the emergency law and the fight against terror to suppress and sue political opponents.

The Army as Important Pillar of Power

Gamal Abd Al-Nasser was the first military leader that relied on the Army to gain and secure power. He shaped an entire Arab generation by his political views that would go down in history as "Nasserism", which is a rather Arab nationalistic than leftist inclination. He gained recognition by achieving the nationalisation of the Suez Channel and won over the masses with his charismatic appearance. At the same time the Free Officers, who had formed their Revolutionary Command Council *Libya* (RCC) began to secure their power against other important political players: A large strike in the textile sector that was, at least, inspired by the Communist Party in 1952, was put down violently and the leaders were hung in public; the land owning Bourgeoisie was weakened by land reforms; and the influential nationalist party *Wafd* could be crushed after the new Law of Political Parties (1952) came to force. It forced parties to reveal their programme, internal organisation, and funding sources, plunging the Wafd into into internal struggle (Mansfield, 1973, pp.672-673). Nasser also moved against the Muslim Brotherhood that reached a peak of radicalism with the writings and preaches of Sayyid Qutub, who was executed in 1965.

The authoritative control of the military proved to be crucial for regime survival ever since 1952, even when Nassers successor, al-Sadat, tried to curtail military influence (Karawan, 2011, p.45). Mubarak, being also an Army officer, brought the Army back in, and especially since the 2000s an increasing number of retired officers entered the public administration. Furthermore, the Army holds economic power, in particular as

three bodies intervene into civil markets: The Ministry of Military Production *Egypt* (MOMP), founded in 1951, the Arab organisation for Industrialization (AOI, which was actually meant to coordinate economic activities between members of the Arab league - Egypt became sole owner of AOI in 1993), and the National Service Products Organisation (NSPO, which was set up under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence after Egypt signed the Camp David treaty with Israel in 1979). These bodies contribute to public infrastructure projects and the production of cheap civil goods for the lower strata of society (Abul-Magd, 2013, p.1)[67], and many infrastructural projects of security relevance - from airports to long distance roads - could only be build by enterprises owned by the military. As the military benefited from connections into the administration, understandably, it turned down economic reform aiming at higher domestic competitiveness and became an adversary of the liberalisation project. Mubarak had to balance international reform demands and internal interests of his power base. However, before 2011, the Army was too big to be a hazard for the president's circle: A coup d'etat by a small group of officers was always at risk to be countered and neutralised by another group of officers. The required amount of generals that had to be involved to ensure success would be too large, making this possible endeavour too dangerous and cumbersome to plan. Nonetheless, a residual risk always remained.

Hybridisation of the System by the *Infitah*

Politics of liberalisation entered the political strata of Egypt when Al-Sadat initiated the policy of opening (*Infitah*). Economically, the concept included a strengthening of the private sector and attracting Arab and foreign investment capital, while politically controlled pluralism was introduced (Aoudé, 1994). The economic opening followed a fiscal crisis that clearly marked the end of expropriation policies the Nasserist State had relied on, and that would not cede after the end of the oil boom in the late 1970s. The political opening helped to cast a positive light on Egypt, meanwhile the constitution of 1971, which was still in force in 2011, contained increased presidential powers among other things *vis-á-vis* the Prime Minister (Art. 142), the the civil and military officials and the diplomatic representatives (Art.143), the police (Art.145), and the armed forces (Art.150). The powers reached an extent that gave president Sadat the power to reverse any kind of political development he considered to get out of hand. In this context, the Arab Socialist Union *Egypt* (ASU*)[68] broke up into a centrist, rightist, and a leftist wing, building the core blocks of a multi-party system.

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[67]Their most important products include steel, cement, chemicals, luxury Jeeps, butane gas, cylinders, kitchen stoves, home appliances, gas pipelines, infant incubators, mineral water, pasta, olive oil, and other foodstuffs. Furthermore, their real estate properties include gas stations, hotels, wedding halls, supermarkets, parking lots, domestic cleaning offices, transportation and shipping companies across the country (Abul-Magd, 2013, p.2).

[68]The Arab Socialist Union was founded in Egypt in December 1962 as the country's sole political party. It served as a role model for the ASU in Libya.

The strategy of Sadat to transform the Egyptian economy into a more straightforward model of capitalism while giving the impression of democratic opening was followed up by Husni Mubarak who became president in 1982. He also bundled many powers in the office of the president, and, due to Sadat's assassination, Mubarak instituted a state of emergency (Law 162/1981), that would still be in force in the beginning of 2011. Economically, the country was still suffering from under-performance, high inflation rates, unemployment, and a level of government liabilities that jeopardised its capacity to act. When the IMF tied new loans on governance, imposing a structural adjustment programme (SAP), the Egyptian government held the wolf by the ears, as a main pillar of its legitimacy since Nasser was a bargain rule, as Abdallah (2017, p.11) observes:

> During the post-colonial era, Nasser built a populist authoritarian political formula based on what Schmitter calls "State Corporatism": a representation system so as to link the associative interests of the civil society with the governmental structure of the State [...] The intention was to provide the workers (or those social sectors) supporting the regime with certain benefits, such as job security, better working conditions, and free education and health. The distribution of these goods and services was through an expanded public sector, as mentioned earlier. In return, workers had to give up their political freedoms.

Against this background, Sadat and later Mubarak adopted a posture that ostensibly rejected some or all of the recommended reforms, while quietly pursuing their implementation (Richards and Waterbury, 2014, p.221), risking charges of hypocrisy and subterfuge in case the masquerade was revealed. This development was bearing ever stranger fruit especially in the 1990s, when an economic model developed in Egypt that Schlumberger (2008) labelled *Patrimonial Capitalism*. Stressing the predominance of informal rules, the polit-economical order was characterised by rent-based economies, patrimonial socio-political structures on the one hand and the ability of incumbents to politically instrumentalise structural reform on the other (p.633). According to this reading, the absence of the rule of law in the face of prevailing informal rules was an integral feature to maintain power, and formal rules are used to oust competitors in an atmosphere of highly personalised politics. When the IMF tied the issuance of new loans to measures of privatisation, members of the tight network around Mubarak profited despite their economical inexperience. The effect was that soon public enterprises performed better, compared with private enterprises, and the letter were more frequently responsible for non-performing loans (Schlumberger, 2008, p.631). Businessmen of the country who managed to maintain enterprises and who knew how to use the support of the ruling elite benefited from liberalisation and joined the core elite of the country. Most members of this group were advocates of privatisation and more or less close associates of Gamal Mubarak, the second son of President Hosni Mubarak (Demmelhuber, 2011, p.145). This became especially true after the government had announced a new wave of economic liberalisation after 2004.

Egypt's Electoral Authoritarianism

Additionally to strengthening the role of the military and using economic opening as means to forge loyalties, Mubarak managed to contain the plurality of parties that emerged after the controlled opening under Al-Sadat. The 1978 set up National Democratic Party *Egypt* (NDP), the centrist successor of the ASU, dominated politics until 2011 and gained over 80 per cent of the parliamentary seats in the parliamentary election of 2010. The leftist remainder of the ASU, the National Progressive Unionist Party (Hizb al-Tagammu' al-Watani al-Taqadomi al-Wahdawi, short: *Tagammu*), led by the last survivor of the coup of 1952, Khaled Mohieddin, received 5 seats. The Muslim Brotherhood - which could only send "independent" candidates anyway due to its ban in 1954 - and the New Wafd boycotted the second round of the elections in protest of irregularities.

Different from countries like Algeria, Jordan, or Kuwait, the success of the forces favoured by the ruling elite was not mainly assured by electoral by-laws. It rested on control over the electoral process including the counting procedures - especially since 2007, when a constitutional amendment removed full judicial supervision of the elections, and international observers were almost completely excluded in 2010. The control is an important pillar for the institutional equilibrium, as according to Art. 76 of the constitution the nomination of a presidential candidate must be supported by a fixed number of representatives of the People's Assembly, the Shura Council[69] and the elected regional assemblies. The same article also states that only political parties, first, with more than 3 per cent in the parliament, second, that have been established at least five years before the announcement of the candidacy, and third, that have been operating without interruption during this period may nominate for President a member of their leadership council.

Basically, Law No. 40/1977 prevented the foundation of parties that could possibly appeal to a widespread regional, religious or working-class constituency. In order to inhibit the emergence of potential counter-candidates against Mubarak, the government also repeatedly interfered in the party spectre. Let alone between 1998 and 2004, seven of Egypt's sixteen legalised opposition parties were de-facto paralysed (Stacher, 2004, p.220). The Political Parties Committee *Egypt* (PPC), a subunit of the Shura Council and controlled by NDP members, rejected nearly all party applications, however, many got legal status due to rulings of State Council courts, starting from the 1990s (Moustafa, 2007, p.154). The judiciary, although having an impressive record of decisions that contradict the will of the ruling elite, remained toothless whenever an election was annulled due to irregularities, the People's Assembly can invoke Art. 93 of the Constitution that states that "the People's Assembly shall be competent to decide upon the validity of the membership of its members. [...] Membership shall not be

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[69]The Shura Council was created as second chamber in 1980. Two thirds of its members are elected directly while one third was appointed by the President of the Republic.

deemed invalid except by a decision taken by a majority of two-thirds of the Assembly members."

Intimidation of Civil Society and Opposition Groups

These mechanisms to prevent the opposition from jeopardising the networks of the higher echelons of power were reinforced by violence and repression. It was a main feature of the the country in which a well developed secret service operated that closely monitored dissent. Uttering criticism of the regime or the social, economic, or political circumstances in public often led to harassment and trial which was particularly mirrored in how the authorities handled the free press. 'Adel Hamuda, editor-in-chief of Rose al-Yusuf, an influential newspaper whose leadership was appointed by the Shura Council clearly states in 1995 (Moustafa, 2007, p.144 fn.86):

> When we discuss the issues of the poor who live in graveyards, or the feigned oversight of the National Democratic Party to include Copts in nominations for the Shura Council elections, or issues of social justice, we may be taken to court for 'undermining public peace'. When we discuss rotten meat, contaminated water, buildings on the verge of collapse, quack medicine, or hormone injected chickens, we will be put in jail on the charge of 'spreading panic among the people.' Each and every news story [...] may be considered as a crime.

Against that background, the authorities often used the emergency laws or anti-terrorism laws to intimidate opposition activities. In the 1990s, the Gama'a Islamiyya seized control of parts of the country and suburbs of Cairo. It was an organisation initially supported by the Egyptian state under Sadat as a political counterweight to the Arab socialist who posed a threat to his centrist ideology and the politics of *Infitah*. In the light of Sadat's assassination in 1981 by a radical Islamist, Mubarak tightened the grip on the Islamist movement again. As a consequence, while in the 1970s and 1980s mostly "soft" targets like leftist students, Copts, or "places of sin" were attacked by radical Islamists, in the 1990s the state and its institutions including policemen, security forces, and prominent government officials were targeted (Hafez and Wiktorowicz, 2004). These military struggles served as reasons to maintain the state of emergency, also after the leadership of the Gama'a had renounced violence in the 2000s (Hamzawy and Grebowski, 2010). The Egyptian constitution dedicates the entire Chapter (VI) to the fight against terrorism, granting the security forces special rights to fulfil their duties. Terrorism accusations were often launched against inconvenient Islamic candidates before elections (Moustafa, 2007, p.195).
Also Islamic organisations suffered much discrimination, especially as they were capable of undermining the legitimacy of the regime. Especially the relationship between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood with its charity programmes, medical care, schooling and safe spaces for people persecuted by the state authorities was complex. Actually banned since the 1950s, the Brotherhood could expand its influence in civil

society and the party system in the 1980s by combining its Islamic agenda with criticism of internal security measures, economic planning, foreign relations, the use of torture, and the lack of democracy and human rights in Egypt (Hafez and Wiktorowicz, 2004). In the tradition of balancing between the attempted impression of a liberal state on the road to democracy on the one hand and power maintenance on the other, these critics were tolerated, and, rewarded with political access to counterbalance more militant groups. After the Cairo earthquake of 1992 that made more than 50.000 people homeless, the regime faced much criticism from welfare oriented Islamic currents. In order to undermine the financial base of these organisations, Presidential Decree 4/1992 stipulates that accepting foreign funds without permission is punished with a sentence of seven to fifteen years without the option of an appeal. The law became another tool for opposition repression, and was used against the secretary general of the Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights (EOHR) Hafiz Abu Sa'da in December 1998, and against the Egyptian-American intellectual Saad Eddin Ibrahim in 2000 (Stacher, 2004, p.217). Compared to Jordan, in which the Royal House can resort to legitimacy that goes beyond the authoritarian bargain and where discontent could be steered away from the King, Egyptian rulers were more dependent on the perception that the authoritarian bargain was held.

6.11.2   Trade Unions: The Boiler under Pressure

The inter-war period in Egypt witnessed a strong labour movement and several hundreds of unions that were mostly dominated and supported by the Wafd party. They formed an important part of Wafd's struggle against the British rule and later against authoritarian tendencies of the palace. With the disperse of the Wafd in 1952 the labour movement lost an important ally, as, demonstrated by Deeb (1979), in the long run, "whenever the Wafd was driven out of power the activities of trade unions were curbed and their power curtailed". The new regime led by the Free Officers soon discovered the workers fate as a base of legitimacy for the government and unions as mass mobilising organisations worthwhile to be controlled. At the same time they were aware of the dangers an independent trade union movement could bear. Consequently, the RCC turned down the attempt to form a nationwide trade union federation by the Foundation Committee for a General Federation of Egyptian Trade Unions (FCGF) in 1952, although the FCGF uttered its support for the Free Officers already a few weeks after the coup (Posusney, 1997, p.44). Instead, the newly founded ASU fixed in its founding charter that fifty seats in "all elected ASU structures at all levels shall be filled by 'farmers and workers'" and established elected ASU committees in factories, agricultural cooperatives, business firms, professional associations, and ministries (Aoudé, 1994, p.10). In the 1957 founded Egyptian Federation of Trade Unions (ETUF), ASU membership was mandatory to run for any official union office, and the union leadership was expected to refrain form independent protest and to support the President.

Economic Liberalisation and the ETUF's Credibility Problem

The ETUF became an integral part of the state, membership for workers was mandatory in almost all sectors, and high ranking staff of the federation played an important role in administration and politics of the country. Until 1986, the president of the ETUF, Sa'ad Mohammad Ahmad from the food workers union, was at the same time the Minister of Manpower and Migration, just like Ahmad Ahmad Al-'Umawi from the chemical workers union who was ETUF President from 1987-1992. Assayid Mohammad Rashid from the textile workers union, ETUF president from 1992-2006, who was also deputy speaker of parliament. Hussein Qasim 'Ali Mugawar from the construction union, ETUF president from 2006-2011, suffered from corruption allegations targeting him and his family since 2000 and became *only* the chairman of the board of directors in the Suez Cement Company. These leaders, however, all started as simple workers in their teenage years and made a career through the bureaucratic apparatus of the ETUF. The organisation built a pool of loyalists who could make a career and freshen up the ranks of the ruling elite. This was particularly possible and also a part of the system-logic, as, according to the constitution, 50 per cent of the parliament had to consist of farmers and workers.

With the incumbency of Al-'Umawi, who supported state privatisation, patrimonial capitalist ideas began to trickle also into the ETUF, leading to a significant blow to its credibility (Buaba Al-Ahram, 2015). In 1995, the leadership of the federation endorsed Law 203 which paved the way for widespread privatisation politics on the expense of the public sector. This was a major shift, as the federation had spearheaded the campaign against privatization in the late 1970s and 1980s (Posusney, 1997, Chap. 4), and still a vast part of its rank and file and also some high ranking officers opposed the new relations between state and labour. The question of economic opening jammed a wedge into the ETUF which was additionally weakened by internal power struggles and struggles with the Ministry of Manpower. As soon as the federation was weakened and controlled by loyalists, the regime was quick off the mark to keep the staffing. Act No. 12 of 1995 made ascendency of opposition forces - or elements who simply wished for a more trenchant watchdog of the old authoritarian bargain - inside the union apparatus more difficult. The term in office of high ranking union officials was extended to five years, and ,thus, making it possible to maintain union offices even after retirement (Taha, 2014, p.183). Also new blood was disciplined quickly, however, as Salibi (2017, p.11) puts it, while the Jordanian Trade Union Federation was held together by the "stick", the Egyptian regime rather used "carrots" to facilitate loyalty among the union representatives especially on the lower levels. Whenever a worker was elected for the first time into an official post of a company union, an immediate job-promotion would follow, increasing his wages and privileges. These benefits were threatened to be withdrawn whenever the new unionist showed discontent, and in case of collective action he would risk to be transferred or even fired (Shehata, 2009). This system remained until

2011 when the federation comprised 25 single workers unions, a cultural committee, a social committee, a state owned workers' university, and a workers' emergency benefit fund to cushion liberalisation by paying "benefits to workers whose wages are stopped due to the orders determined by the executive administration" (Law No. 156/2002 Art.2(4)).

From 1993 until 2003 the government, the unions, and business organisations struggled for a new labour legislation that should give way for a more rigorous level of liberalisation. In 1995, the labour draft also called the attention of the ETUF, as it aimed at reorganising the national labour federation, softening up job security of public-sector workers, and setting even more stringent conditions for legal strikes. In 1999, several members of the Tagamu' party who encouraged workers to oppose the new labour law draft also outside the ETUF framework, were jailed and charged with "threatening national security" (Shehata, 2009, p.104, en.40). This shows the strategy of the regime concerning the ETUF. While on the one hand, the government aimed at reducing the influence of the EFTU over policy making with regard to privatisation by including private business people in the official consultations (Pratt, 2001, p.117). On the other hand, similar to the regime in Jordan, it protected the ETUF's monopoly of worker's representations. Egyptian Law 153/1999, which was later declared unconstitutional, even stipulated that NGO's were not allowed to engage in "any political or unionist activity, the exercise of which is restricted to political parties and trade unions," and those organisations that threatened "national unity" or violated "public order or morals" could be dissolved by the Ministry of Social Affairs (Moustafa, 2007, p.187). The ultimate labour law of 2003 eventually permitted strikes - if approved by a two-thirds majority of the responsible branch federation - in exchange for the removal of job security provisions (Taha, 2014, p.182).

Clandestine Worker's Action in Key Sectors

Egypt had witnessed a decline of rent incomes since the 1980s. In the course of the privatisation policies, the state attempted to compensate its losses with the establishment of a profitable tourism-industry (Richter and Steiner, 2008), textile industry, and manufacturing of electronics. Nonetheless, the state's dependence on natural resources was still comparatively high, contributing about 15 per cent to the GDP of 2008, while oil exports still constituted about 60 per cent of the total exports in that year. Other important export goods were gold, nitrogenous fertilizers,and insulated wire, whereas the textile industry was the second most important export sector, accounting for 3 per cent of the GDP, 27 per cent of industrial production, 10 per cent of the country's exports and 15 per cent of the non-petroleum Egyptian exports in 2008. It was home to a fifth of all industrial sector firms and was the largest single employer with over 400,000 workers - which was almost a quarter of the industrial labour force (for all

numbers see: El-Haddad (2012)).

Strikes and collective action of the *official* unions in the key sectors of the economy were absent before 2011. This included the General Union for Tourism and Hotels Workers, the General Union for Mines and Quarry Workers, the General Union of Petroleum Workers, and the The General Trade Union of Metal, Engineering and Electrical Workers, which all were part or the ETUF framework. The oil sector was characterised by subcontracting and outsourcing to subcontracted firms that were founded especially to dump wages and working conditions. Dismissal was a common punishment for showing discontent, as happened with many of the workers that organised a sit-in in front of the Ministry of Petroleum in 2010, and the official petrol union denied workers to address violations of workers' rights (Ramadhi, 2010).

The situation became, however, different in other sectors of the economy, in which protests started to become significant in the mid 2000s. Although the ETUF remained its hands-off approach concerning the workers grievances, and the foundation of independent unions was restricted, union-like organisations with a non-bureaucratic, democratic leadership approach (Alexander, 2010*a*) were formed by the workforce. These loose organisations soon began to target the neuralgic points of the Egyptian economy and state system. Protests started in the textile sector in 2006, when more than 25,000 workers were mobilised and frequent protests continued until 2010. Most noteworthy - besides the sheer number of protesters which reached a critical mass that impeded a harsh response by the security forces - many of the protests also enjoyed the support of local committees of the official General Union for Spinning and Weaving Workers. During the protests in the Tanta Linen Company, for instants, the union paid strike money to striking workers (Omar et al., 2010), and in Mahalla al-Kubra local union officials took part in formulating and submitting the workers' demands to the company administration (Hussein, 2010).

Since 2008 protests also emerged in the public sector[70]. The bargaining power of the protesters was high enough to force the government to make concessions, and consequently, the independent trade union organisations. This stands in sharp contrast to Jordan and Libya where workers did not have a strong leverage against the regime due to their weakness in key sectors. The case of Egypt is therefore coded KEYS = (1).

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[70]Kahlid Ali (2011*a*) provides the most comprehensive enumeration of sectors involved between 2009 and 2010, including teachers, educational administrators and university professors in the education sector, doctors, nurses, paramedics and health insurance employees in the health sector, rail-road and metro-workers in the transportation sector and property-tax collectors in the financial sector. He also mentions servants of al-Azhar, the waqf administration, data collectors at the Central Accounting Agency, as well as workers with the revenue department in Alexandria, revenue collectors and cashiers in Asyut, civil servants with the Ministry of Manpower, workers with the Forensic Medicine Department and prosecutor's offices and workers and navigators of the Suez Canal Authority.

Professional Associations and the Democratic Opening

Similar to Jordan, and in sharp contrast to Libya, the history, stance, and environment of professional associations in Egypt was different from the fate of the worker's unions. Professional associations have a comparatively long history in Egypt and the politically most active were founded during the 1940s and 1950s. The Lawyers Union pioneered in 1912 and was followed by the Medical Union (1940), the Press Union (1941), the Engineering Union (1946), and finally the Teacher's Union (1954) (Reid, 1974, p.24). Twenty one other professional white-collar associations were formed until 1994 according to official Egyptian numbers (SIS Egypt, 2009). From 1958 onwards, similar to government positions and trade union positions, membership in the union councils was tied to ASU membership and, after 1977, to a permission by the General Attorney (Fahmy, 1998, p.555). Additionally, Army officers from the engineering units and the medical corps took charge of high ranking posts in the respective associations, and also the newly established Teacher's Union was set up and heavily influenced by a number of Army officers. This happened with the help of repeated crackdowns on the associations councils under Nasser and Sadat, as many professional associations, especially lawyers and journalists, repeatedly pushed for a curtail of Army influence and an independent party system (Fahmy, 1998, p.555).

With the (restricted) political liberalisation of the 1980s, the manning of the association's councils changed, as opposition parties like the liberal New Wafd or smaller socialist parties managed to send representatives into the councils. Additionally, the increased legitimacy of the Muslim Brotherhood in parliament and in civil society spilled over into the associations, especially into the professional associations of engineers, lawyers, journalists, and doctors. These organisation became a major platform for criticism of the government and mobilisation (Hafez and Wiktorowicz, 2004, p.74).[71] The 1987 parliamentary elections which allowed for independent candidates led to the relative success (60/346 seats) of a leftist-Islamist coalition of the Islamist Labour Party, the Liberal Socialists Party (another remainder of the ASU), and the Muslim Brotherhood. Trying to benefit from this upwind, the Brotherhood participated - albeit with limited success - for the first time in the ETUF trade union elections that followed (Beinin, 2011c, p.158). Despite this limited success in workers' unions, the Islamic current managed to gain a foothold in the professional white-collar unions, although its members rarely ran for the office of the council president. They rather supported the governmental candidate instead - in return for the candidate's mediation with the regime on the Brotherhood's behalf (Fahmy, 1998, p.553).

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[71]This has to be put into the context of the authoritarian environment the unions operated in. Professional association also suffered from fraud in elections, corruption scandals, government intervention, and so forth. Still, especially due to the weakness of political parties, although to a lesser extent than in Jordan, the associations functioned as a limited substitute for political participation and a platform for political discussions (Fahmy, 1998, p.556).

6.11.3 Trade Unions and Regime Change: The Hesitating Change Agent

The activity of the Egyptian worker's movement during the protests 2012 - 2013 has attracted much attention among scholars and policymakers. The following section argues, that trade union organisations indeed attempted to alter the institutional equilibrium inside the country. Moreover, the relation to opposition forces will be discussed in order to find a reasonable coding for the variable INOPP. As will be shown, the relationship is difficult to assess and eventually two periods of time will be identified. Before the emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood as dominant player on the political stage and after.

The Foremath of the Protests of 2011: People in Motion

By tracing the history of Egypt before the 2011, one quickly discovers that Egypt was already characterised by instability and politicised civil society activity before the pictures of the successful mass protests from Tunisia arrived on the mobile phones of its population. Beyond the institutionalised frameworks of ETUF and professional associations, independent labour action grew steadily. During 1971-1972 workers struck at numerous large public-sector enterprises in the textile, iron, and port sector. Those union leaders that were involved were mostly fired and the ETUF condemned the collective actions. Food riots in 1977 due to suspended subsidies on flour, sugar, rice and cooking oil caused Sadat to purge the union ranks from leftists (Aoudé, 1994, p.13). Nonetheless, major strikes followed in 1985, 1986, and 1989 (Beinin, 2011c, p.128;158). The workers received moral and legal support from opposition parties and also from the courts. After the 1986 train driver's strike, Tagammu' Party lawyers argued successfully that international human rights agreements could override domestic legislation. This would also include a legalisation of the right to strike that had not been granted before (Taha, 2014; Posusney, 1997).

Also political discontent grew continuously in Egypt since the 2000s and several pillars of the institutional equilibrium were targeted. First, the electoral process got into the focus of reformist endeavours of parts of the judiciary, the New Wafd, the Islamic Labour Party, the Nasserist Party, Tagammu', and different NGO's. Their agenda for reform also called for a lifting of the state of emergency, the freedom to operate independent media, and guarantees for the independence of civil society (Moustafa, 2007, p.188). Second, after Bashar Al-Assad's ascendency to power in Syria in 2000, rumours emerged about the willingness of Husni Mubarak to position his son Gamal as his successor in a similar manner. Additionally, the announcement of Husni Mubarak to candidate again in 2005, although the constitution had to be changed, caused resistance. In 2004, a loose alliance of Egyptian intellectuals set the cornerstones for a movement called "enough" (Arabic: *Kefaya*) that became a coalition of political parties

united by their demand for a shift in the balance of power (Oweidat, 2008, p.11). Roots of the movement can be found already at the beginning of the solidarity committees that spread throughout Egypt following the start of the Second Intifada in October 2000. Their demands, which were unprecedented since 1952, included a call for a parliamentary republic with real separation of power, an independent judicial system, and free elections (Oweidat, 2008; Al-Din Sha'ban, 2006, p.11). Their main slogans - and at the same time the mutual base the heterogeneous movement could agree on - was "no inheritance, no extension!". Their call to boycott the referendum, which was held in 2005 to empower Mubarak to run for a further term, was joined by the New Wafd Party, the Nasserist Party, the Tagammu' Party, Ayman Nur's al-Ghad Party, and the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite this broad alliance and regular street protests erupting throughout the country, the referendum was accepted on May 25 2005. Kefaya became weaker in the following years, however, reappeared during the protests of 2011.

Third, in addition to the challenge of the electoral system and the rule of Mubarak from new emerging youth movements without explicit ideology, activists of the Revolutionary Socialists *Egypt* (RS), a Trotzkist group, that was founded in the 1980s, grew in numbers since the second Intifada (2000-2005), and developed a network of online and offline publications (Alexander and Auragh, 2014, p.903). Anti-Israeli protests as well as protests against the Iraq war 2003 served as rehearsals for the upheavals that would take place in 2011.

Fourth, the patrimonial capitalist structure of the country and its implications with regard to the disparities between the rich and the poor became more obvious. Nader Fergany, responsible author for the UNDP Arab Human Development Report 2002 describes the situation of Egypt as (King, 2009, p.9):

> a very sinister cohabitation of power and capital. [...] The middle class has been shrinking while there has been an enlargement of the super-rich. State owned enterprises have been sold to a minority of rich people. The record of private sector enterprises creating jobs is very poor. We are not reaping the benefits of an energetic bourgeoisie, what we have is a parasitical, comprador class.[...] The consequences will be no less than catastrophic. This society is a candidate for a difficult period of intense, violent social conflict, and the kind of government we have will not do.

A Young Trade Union Movement Stressing its Political Independence

As shown above, similar to Jordan, and in sharp contrast to Libya, the late 2000s witnessed a palpable growth of civil society activities also connected to collective labour action. Especially in the context of the eroding authoritarian bargain rule, the number of socio-economic protests and strikes increased. Taking a look at the economic figures of Egypt, this endeavour seems understandable. Egypt had, with about 24 per cent, the fourth highest degree of youth unemployment in the region in 2010, excluding the Gulf Region. The total unemployment rate of about 9 per cent had not decreased

significantly, but had been stagnating since 2000. Inflation took an average of 9 per cent per year since 2000, and peaked in a hyperinflation of 18 per cent in 2008 and 11 per cent in 2009 and 2010 respectively. These are the highest inflation values in the entire sample. The purchasing power of the minimum wage has dropped about one third since 2000. As a breach of the authoritarian bargain can be assumed - that also had been addressed by multiple voices - the variable SOEC is coded (1) for Egypt.

The handling of the variable INOPP is rather difficult. The connection of the socio-economic centred labour unrest to the more political Kefaya movement or to young online activists is contested. Oweidat (2008) states that these protests were independent of Kefaya but inspired by it, others like Taha (2014) or Beinin (2015) stress that the trajectory of labour unrest was detached from it and yet older than the politicised groups of the 2000s. Indeed, the demands of the Mahalla Al-Kubra textile workers, of which between 2006 and 2008 up to 25.000 went on strike, aimed mostly at short term socio-economic enhancement. At this stage, institutionalisation, both of the political and the workers movement, was still underdeveloped (Oweidat, 2008, p.39), but the question of the separation of economic and political demands already riddled the activists of all camps. A group of activists that aimed at enhancing communication and networking among the new emerging movements, called *Tadamun* split over the issue of the workers struggles, some calling the workers politically immature, others pushing for a broader alliance (Abdelrahman, 2014). The emerging *February 6 Youth Movement* set up an influential Facebook page in order to support the striking workers of Mahalla al-Kubra. They also called - albeit without explicit agreement of the local workers' leaders - for a general strike on that date in 2008, on which a large strike in Mahalla Al-Kubra had already been scheduled.

Other post-Kifaya youth movements like the *Youth for Justice and Freedom* (Arab.: Hanghiar), or the RS-offshoot *Popular Democratic Movement for Change* (Arab.: Hashd) perceived and criticised the separation between political-intellectual demands of change and socio-economic workers' struggles (Abdelrahman, 2014). An unofficial draft of a new alternative labour law, that was supported by a broad alliance 25 organisations comprising the Tagammu Party, the Nasserists, the Ghad Party, the Kefaya Movement, and the Muslim Brotherhood, was published a year after the Mahalla-incident ('Ali, 2009, p.73-74). Slowly more and more ties were established between political activists and leaders of the workers' struggle. However, the advances made by the Youth movements towards the labour movement were often regarded with discontent among workers, especially as Mubarak intensified harassment on workers' organisations after the April 6 strike (Abdallah, 2017, p.17).

Workers organisation got pushed to a higher level when in April 2009 the Union of Real Estate Tax Authority Employees *Egypt* (URETAE) was set up ignoring the legal prohibition for free unions in Egypt, that was in force since 1957. In 2007, already 5000 members of the official ETUF bodies in Mahalla Al-Kubra resigned and formed

workers' committees, however, they had not tried the official path to be recognised as trade union. The tax collectors union was, after a successful struggle about benefits, officially acknowledged and even supported by the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Manpower. Only the ETUF leadership and the official union of bank and finance employees refused to accept an independent union in their realms of influence (Al-Misri Al-Yaum, 2009). The same was true for the Independent Teachers' Syndicate *Egypt* (ITS), that was founded in July 2010. The first step into more political waters was undertaken by a group called "Democratic Engineers", who stated that "unionisation is a major arm of achieving democracy" and struggled in the entire country for achieving the independence of the Engineers Union from state intervention (Abdelrahman, 2014, p.616). In the same year, politicised protests became slightly more common also among workers, however, remained exceptional. On May 1 2010 some hundred workers and other protesters demanding the implementation of a minimum wage chanted "a fair minimum wage, or let this government go home," and "down with Mubarak and all those who raise prices" in front of the Peoples' Assembly in Cairo (Beinin, 2015).

Trade Union Activities During the Protests

During this atmosphere of alliance forging, disobedience, and discontent, the news about the ouster of Ben Ali arrived in Egypt. Various youth organisations[72] scheduled protests on January 25 2011, coinciding with the annual "Police Holiday". The protests took place in front of the Ministry of Interior and criticised foremost police brutality, the emergency law, and demanded the resign of the Ministry of the Interior. About 15,000 moved further and occupied the Tahrir-Square. Among the first to utter the clear will to remove Mubarak from office was the RS, in public often represented by famous opposition journalist Hossam El-Hamalawy. Also Asmaa Mahfouz, leading figure of the 6 April Youth Movement demanded on behalf of the movement the immediate resign of Mubarak and the dissolution of the national assembly and senate. Fuelled by police violence the demonstrators faced at the Tahrir square, and characterised by a higher degree of organisation, the "Friday of Rage" followed on January 28. Also an increased number of members of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Tagammu' Party, who now supported the protests unanimously, joined the rallies of hundreds of thousands of protesters. The protests that proceeded for many weeks were eventually protected by the Army, that on February 13 technically overtook the country, and that became the most powerful player in the transition process.

At the beginning of the uprisings, organised labour did not play a major role, as workers rather participated as individuals than as representatives of a particular craft (Beinin,

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[72]The number of youth organisations and ad-hoc networks before, during, and after the revolutionary period of January 25 until March 11 is multitudinous and only few scholars bothered to disentangle the various alliances when making conclusions about the course of the revolution. An approximately comprehensive overview can be found in Joya (2011, p.368-370).

2015). However, two days after the Friday of Rage, the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU) emerged directly from Tahrir Square. It was mainly initiated by the clandestine and independent unions of Real Estate Tax Authority workers, healthcare technicians, and teachers, and was joined by the 8.5 million-member retirees association. Also representatives of the economically important textile sector, as well as pharmaceutical, chemical, iron and steel, and automotive workers from the industrial zones in Cairo, Helwan, Mahalla Al-Kubra, Tenth of Ramadan, and Sadat City joined (Beinin, 2011b, p.189). Fearing that the protests might enter the enterprises and shop floors, the government had already ordered a closure of all public business enterprises from January 28 until February 5 2011. After that period, fifty to sixty thousand workers started strikes at dozens of workplaces (Beinin, 2015).

On March 2 2011 leaders of the new federation gathered and set up a number of demands in their statement "What Workers Want from the Revolution" which included mainly socio-economic calls for social justice, but also demanded the dismantling of the old regime, including the ETUF structure. The new organisational platform eased and accelerated collective, collusive, and coordinated action. The EFITU called for a general strike on March 9 demanding the ouster of Hosni Mubarak. Tens of thousands of workers joined all over the country, including those employed at large and strategic workplaces like the Cairo Public Transport Authority, Egyptian State Railways, the subsidiary companies of the Suez Canal Authority, the state electrical company, and Ghazl al-Mahalla — answered the call, engaging in some 60 strikes and protests in the final days before Mubarak's fall on February 11 (Beinin, 2012). On May 1, 2011, protesters on the Tahrir Square distributed a signed statement from 49 trade union organisations, political parties and non-governmental organisations calling for a minimum wage of 1,500 pounds (about 250 dollars) a month and a maximum wage to ensure a "fair distribution of wealth" in the country. They also demanded to freeze the union assets of the ETUF (AFP, 2011).

By demanding the fall of the regime and deep economic changes that jeopardised the crowny elite (Abdelrahman, 2014, p.614), the majority of the about 400 unions that emerged after the foundations of the EFITU, clearly uttered demands that went beyond socio-economic particular enhancement and that targeted the institutional equilibrium of the country. The outcome of the case of Egypt is therefore (1).

The New Trade Union's Movement Difficult Relation to Opposition Groups

The relationship to the democracy movement and the political sphere as such remained complicated though. ETIUF founder Kamal Abu Eita, founder of the Union of Independent Real Estate Tax Officers, became a leader of the National Dignity Party and a member of the post-revolution parliament until it was dissolved in June 2012. He was one of the few bridges between the workers movement and political parties. The ETIFU structure was weak from the beginning, top-down driven, and often lacking

contact to the workers' bases. Leading figure of the RS, Sameh Naguib, had already
uttered on January 23 2011 his hopes to build a workers party with the help of in-
dependent trade unions (Ali, 2011*b*), but there were still concerns. Abdallah (2017,
p.16-17) pins it down stating:

> The experience of Mahalla Al-Kubra intensified the split between worker issues
> and the political issues and it ingrained workers' scepticism about everything
> that is political. Despite the relative openness of the political sphere in the
> aftermath of the January Revolution, the leadership of the new unions insisted
> on the separation of workers and politicians while rejecting the union movement's
> affiliation with any of the political parties.

The turmoil disbanded by the uprisings 2011 did not cease for many years, while
the newly established trade union organisations struggled for a mutual strategy. One
of the results was the departure of the Pensioners Association from the EFITU for
the sake of the foundation of a new federation called Egyptian Democratic Labour
Congress (EDLC) that followed a series of intestine strife among other things about
the degree of international intervention into the trade union organisations.[73] The two
federations announced an alliance in October 2012. Trade unions also participated in
the push towards the June 30, 2013 elections, and the EFITU and EDLC collected to-
gether with the Permanent Congress of Alexandria Workers (PCAW) signatures against
Muhammad Morsi and hosted events of Tamarrod, the most important alliance aiming
at toppling the newly elected president (Beinin, 2013*a*).
Indeed, with the growing dominance of the Muslim Brotherhood on the poltical stage,
the attitudes of the bulk of independent union leaders changed. Prominent union lead-
ers encouraged in popular television talk shows workers to join the Tamarrod campaign
and to strengthen their presence on the political scene (Selim, 2015, p.72). When the
Muslim Brotherhood eventually ascended to power, the Brotherhood's loose support
for the union movement ceased, especially many white-collar unions pulled out of the
political arena, and workers' unions became more politicised and close to the leftist
parties (later "Labour Bloc") (Abdallah, 2017, p.18). The refusal of the Brotherhood's
Labour Minister, Khaled al-Azhari, to pass a law drafted by Ahmed al-Borai in favour
of trade union freedoms has made the EITUF and the EDLC form an alliance together
with the National Salvation Front[74]. The polarisation between the Brotherhood and
the unions was exacerbated by the attempt of the Muslim Brotherhood to increase its
influence in the old union Structure of the ETUF. After the fraudulent union elections

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[73]The problems caused by international grants, training courses, workshops, and other incentives is
rarely discussed in anglophone literature. Abdallah (2017) gives valuable insights, for a more rigorous
and well-researched statement about the problems faced by the newly established unions that includes
the harmfulness of foreign influence causing scandals, struggles, and corruption see 'Uz (2019).

[74]The NSF Egypt was an alliance of secular parties chaired by Al-Baradei and aiming at making
Mursi annul his constitutional declaration of November, to cancel the referendum on the new con-
stitution scheduled for late December, and the formation of a new constitutional assembly. Most
prominent parts were Nasserist parties, the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, Free Egypt Party, the
Wafd Party, the Free Egyptians Party and even the General Farmers Association, a body that had
been highly co-opted into the pre-2011 system.

of 2006 were annulled on August 2011, the cabinet had appointed a committee including members of the Muslim Brothers to run the federation on an interim basis until the next elections (Beinin, 2012, p.10). A decree also authorised Muslim Brother Khalid al-Azhari, the new minister for manpower, to appoint functionaries for vacant union posts, leading to some 150 Brotherhood-affiliated appointees at the helm of important ETUF unions (Beinin, 2013*b*).

Trade Union Strategies before and after the the Muslim Brotherhood came to the Fore

As seen in the previous section, concerning the variable INOPP, Egypt is the case which is the most difficult to assess. The largest opposition block, the Muslim Brotherhood participated in Egypt's ETUF trade union elections of 2001 and 2006. Already since the late 1980s, members of the organisation were successfully participating in elections of the boards of the lawyers', engineers' and the physicians' associations. This mirrors their strategy to start their march through the institutions instead of relying on revolutionary rhetoric. It has also be seen as a rehearsal for future parliamentary elections (Al-Taweel, 1994, p.17). This strategy did not remain unnoticed inside the Islamic Camp and was heavily criticised by Salafi leader Hazem Salah Abu Ismail stating that the Muslim Brotherhood would only sham silence while trying to get control of the Egyptian economy, trade unions, student organisations, and the media (Al-Taweel, 1994, p.104). However, the influence on professional associations did not reach the extent as witnessed in Jordan.

In 2009, Muslim Brotherhood member of parliament Yosri Mohamed Bayoumi openly criticised the trade unions law No. 12 of 1995, as well as the government interference in the ETUF trade union elections of 2006 (Gilal, 2009). The interference that included harassment and exclusion of candidates of the Muslim Brotherhood was officially justified by state authorities as step to contain Islamism. Given the very limited chances of Muslim Brotherhood candidates in the elections anyway, the complains can be read as strategy to discredit the government instead of a true avowal to workers unionism. Indeed, despite the apparent emergence of Islamic forces in professional white-collar associations, political Islam did not manage to constitute an effective force within the workers unions. First, the grip of the state and, also different from Jordan, secular currents inside these organisations still seemed to be too strong. Second, the Mahalla Al-Kubra experience as outlined in section 6.11.3 made most workers avoid political involvement. Third, similar to chambers of commerce and industry, workers unions were traditionally perceived by leading Islamists as strongly connected with the Western world, especially the United States of America, and the basic strategy became to isolate rather than to integrate them into a future Islamic project (Al-Sayid, 1988, p.426). By fact, in the years before the Uprising of 2011, the Egyptian NGO sector

was flooded with foreign donors often linked to the US-backed "democracy agenda" supporting the work of campaigners, human rights organisations, and labour rights initiatives (Blackburn, 2018). The Muslim Brotherhood did not gain much influence among the emerging government critical organisations, and consequently, attempted to take over the old ETUF structure after the fall of Mubarak faced fierce resistance of the workers movement that had gained self-confidence and still feared political co-optation.

In contrast to Jordan, Egyptian professional associations remained, just like the Muslim Brotherhood itself, relatively silent during the peak of the upheavals, the political left tried to take advantage and mobilise the workers for their purposes. The politicisation of the trade union movement advanced glacially, and despite of being pushed forward by youth movements, Nasserists, or the RS, first mutual mistrust prevailed. Kamal Abu Eita, founder of URETAE in 2009, activist during the 25th January Revolution, and co-founder and General Secretary of the first independent trade union federation EFITU was a high member of the Nasserist Dignity Party. But he largely remained an exception at the higher levels of politics. The alliance forging with the National Salvation Front and the Labour Block, however, indicate strong ties to opposition movements, especially in the years 2012-2013. Cooperations for instance with the Tagammu' Party and Tadamoon were intensified during that period of time. Therefore the case of Egypt will be coded INOPP = (0) for the time before 2012 in a first minimisation and INOPP = (1) in a second one for the time after 2012. By that way the results can be compared and interpreted on a qualitative basis.

6.12   Syria (0)

Syria is a mixture of a mobilising party system with official mass organisations and tribal policies that are a decisive element of the composition in the ruling elite. Additionally, the regime resorted to violence and repression to an extraordinary extent in order to maintain the status quo. It is a system where the ruling class regards the maintenance of the monopoly of government as the most important factor to secure its survival, so its basic interest is tied directly to its domination of the state (Marks, 1992, p.403). The case of Syria is coded (0), according to the QCA codification. This is due to the lack of independent grass-root unions supporting protests, and a clear pro government stance of the state controlled unions - which form a part of the logic of legitimacy of the regime itself.

SOEC	INOPP	CEN	TRI	KEYS	**Outcome**	Decimal
0	0	1	1	0	**1**	SYR(6)

Table 6.15: Truth table row for the case of Syria

As will be depicted in part 6.12.1, tribalism played a pivotal role in the system, although the official rhetoric of the regime is coined by Arab Socialist and nationalist slogans. Also the initial uprising of 2011 was mainly conducted by tribal networks. The variable TRI is hence coded (1). The economic indicators introduced in part 6.12.4 justify the coding of SOEC as (0), as Syria was, especially when compared with the other countries of the sample, economically relatively stable. Part 6.12.3 will show that trade unions were heavily controlled and centralised by the regime from its very beginning, and, similarly to Yemen, it put substantial effort in maintaining this centralisation; hence CEN is set to (1). Part 6.12.5 will show that the opposition was fragmented and too weak to build alliances with a hypothetical independent workers movement. Moreover, the extraordinary extent of violence that is used to repress discontent plays a role in this context, leading to the coding of INOPP as (0). The totalitarian nature of the regime did not allow for manoeuvring space for bargaining outside arranged and pre-decided paths, as will be shown in part 6.12.3. The unions' bargaining power was not built upon worker's militancy but was, if at all, clearly delimited in advance by the regime. KEYS is hence set to (0).

6.12.1   The Equilibrium: The Party, the Army, and Mass Mobilisation

In the constitution of 1973, the president was the pivotal element of the state. He was elected directly by the people, appointed the Prime Minister, the ministers, and their deputies (Art. 95), was allowed veto the laws issued by the Assembly (Art.98) and to issues decrees, decisions, orders (Art.99) and laws (Art.111), declare and terminate a state of emergency (Art.100), and he was allowed to dissolve the People's Assembly (Art.107). The People's Assembly or Syrian People's Council, which resembles the parliament, played a limited role, was convened in three ordinary sessions yearly only (Art.61), and could overrule the decisions of the President with a two-third majority. In the elections that were held every four years, the Ba'ath Party - labelled by the constitution the "leading party in the society and the state" (Art.8) - gained between half and two thirds of the seats between 1973 and 2007, and saw its share of deputies increased every term.

The Army as Stepping Stone for a Tribal Regime

The Army proved to be a non-circumventable power with the coup of February 23, 1966, that split the Ba'ath party in two. Military circles of the Ba'ath could oust the rather civil wing of Michel 'Aflaq, and, in 1970 Defence Minister Hafiz Al-Assad overtook the government in a bloodless coup. He had been informed in November 1970 that a party congress had voted to remove him from his party and government posts, so he decided to initiate a "correction" inside the party and the country (Devlin, 1991, p.1403-1404). Assad was of the heterodox Shi'i sect of the 'Allawis, likely the historically least-favoured rural community in Syria at that time. 'Alawis have been prominent in the military and security services since the mid-1960s, as the military provided a chance for upward mobility. Additionally, between 1965 and 1968, a power struggle inside the militant Ba'ath wing rendered an 'Allawi group around Salah Jadid supreme against a group of rural Sunni officers who were loyal to Sunni General Amin al-Hafiz. In the decades that followed, Assad would improve the standard of living of rural areas, and, first and foremost, select trusted men such as brothers, cousins, or clansmen for sensitive posts, of which especially his 'Allawi Qalbiyya clan and the Al-Matawira tribe would benefit.

To consolidate power, the regime resorted to two major strategies. First, the state supplied its citizens with social security benefits and job opportunities in exchange for political quiescence - accordingly to the often aforementioned authoritarian bargain. To that end, it interfered heavily in the economy through regulations, nationalisations, the establishment of state-owned industry and job opportunities in the public sector Conduit (2016, p.76). By fact, Article 36 of the Syrian constitution states that "[w]ork is a right, as well as a duty, to every citizen, that the state shall provide for all citizens".

Second, since the 1970s, the regime co-opted local leaders into the state apparatus. Strategic official appointments of sheikhs and subsidies for loyalty became a major strategy to keep vast parts of the society in check. Standing in contrast to the official national slogans of "no sectarianism" and "no tribalism", such flexibility broadened the power base of Hafez Al-Assad (Dukhan, 2014; Chatty, 2013). The reliance on kinship and the party became a main pillar of power, together with pro-Palestinian and Pan-Arab rhetoric, secularism, and the protection of religious minorities - especially Christians - against discrimination. Moreover, domestic security, increased social justice often tied to hints at the land reforms were stressed(Wieland, 2012, p.80-92).

Opposing the Middle Class and Poltitical Islam

About five years after its seizure of power, the regime had to face its first radical threat from the inside, jeopardizing the regime's pillars. It is often associated with the Muslim Brotherhood that had grown in importance since the 1950s. It was probably the most visible part of the population that criticised economic and social performance of

the regime - hinting at many empty promises, mismanagement, and corruption. After the nationalisation of vast parts of the economy, Syria's small merchant class was especially prone to making such a criticism. (Conduit, 2016, p.74). The Brotherhood and left wing parties also criticised the role of Syria in the Lebanese war in 1976, whilst many also questioned the imbalance of distribution of posts favouring 'Allawis. The Brotherhood, for instance, claimed that a country run by less than 10 per cent of the population would be against the "logic of things" (Batatu, 1982). In 1976, a wave of violence broke out when radicals of the Brotherhood attacked 'Allawi functionaries in hit-and-run killings, as well as security agents and professionals, and also targeted government buildings, police stations, Ba'ath party institutions, and Army units. Moreover, in June 1979, 83 'Allawi cadets of the Artillery Academy at Aleppo were killed in a spectacular assault, and, in 1980 Hafiz Al-Assad escaped an assassination attempt.

The actions of the Brotherhood were conducted in a time of discontent, and were particularly a threat to the regime as they were technically part of a wider, yet peaceful protest movement that was backed by a secular opposition including lawyers, merchants, professional unions, Nasserites, Communists and dissident Ba'athists (Conduit, 2016, p.75). They were able to organise large demonstrations and large-scale shut-downs of shops and schools notably as at Hama and Aleppo in 1980. At the same time, the militant wing of the Muslim Brotherhood conducted hit and run attacks on officials and worsened the security situation in the country.

The response on the part of the government was ferocious. As early as June 1980, security forces killed over 400 men in Palmyra, most of them radical Islamists, in a alleged escape attempt from a prison in Palmyra. The membership of the Muslim Brotherhood was put under death penalty by Decree 49 of 1980. In February 1982, so as to suppress an expected rising by the Muslim Brotherhood, government forces erased in an air-strike supported offensive up to 20,000 people in three weeks. In many cities, armed clashes broke out, in which about 1,000 government troops are said to have died, and in which Al-Assad also resorted to militias of loyal tribes (Rae, 1999; Dukhan, 2014). The brutal crackdown in Hama, Homs, Aleppo and elsewhere in the country was followed by years of stability by suppression. This also led Syria to remain paralysed in shock when the third wave of democratisation rolled over many parts of the world after 1989.

6.12.2   An Authoritarian Hybridisation of the System

Secret service structures were extended, penetrating the lives of Syrian citizens in all possible strata of life. Although the regime never reached a status of rigorous totalitarianism and personal cult, like Iraq under Saddam Hussein, the state that Hafiz Al-Assad left behind in 2000 had clear authoritarian characteristics. Opposition in civil

society was minimised or co-opted, and all official political parties had to be members of the National Progressive Front, which consisted, by 2011, of nine member parties, including the ruling Ba'ath Party. By law, the president of the republic is also the head of the National Progressive Front and Secretary General of the Ba'ath Party. Political parties are required to support the principles of the revolution, which include socialism and Arab nationalism.

As the successor, the hopes that were put into Bashar Al-Assad would vanish some years after the beginning of his incumbency. True, he showed signs of loosening the grip of the security apparatus on the country, such as the closing down of the notorious Mezzah political prison which had become a symbol of the regime's brutality (Landis and Pace, 2007, p.47). However, the short flaring-up of civil society and intellectuals demanding reform of the regime in the so-called "Damascus Spring" between 2000 and 2001 was followed by a new wave of incarceration, police violence, and repression. In the "Damascus Declaration" of 2005, the opposition could wrest off a number of concessions from the government in a time of strategic shifts in the region and government strategies (Landis and Pace, 2007, p.46-48). The assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri of which individuals close to the Assad clan were accused of being involved, polluted the relationship with the US significantly. Additionally, it triggered a popular upheaval in Lebanon that forced the Syrian troops out of the country, ending a 30-year military presence. Opposition movements can often achieve their goals in times of government weakness, however, in 2007 another crackdown on the opposition followed. By 2010, the system of Syria seemed extraordinarily stable, prompting many observers to speak of "The Syrian Exception" (Donati, 2011).

6.12.3   Trade Unions as a Regime's Pillar

Syrian trade unionism had to emancipate from feudal structures and family bonds, whilst facing difficulties to set up unions independent of the petit bourgeoisie, the craft masters, and against the efforts of the French authorities to prevent them. The watersheds of Syrian labour history occurred in the 1930s, and, in 1938 three unions representing the working classes of Damascus, Aleppo and Homs set up the first nationwide general Federation of Trade Unions (Hanna, 1973).

The Ba'ath and the Unions: Cooperation turning Domination

The program and strategy of the newly emerged Ba'ath party provided a fertile ground for trade unionism, with the calls for social justice of the 1947 program coinciding with many workers demands. It included the limitation of agricultural holdings, worker participation in management as well as state ownership of heavy industry, natural resources, and public utilities (Devlin, 1991, p.1398). The existing trade unions were dominated by the Communists and Nasserists, but came under greater control of the

Ba'ath in the course of its consolidation of power (Perthes, 1995, p.38-39). Eventually, unions became a regime supporting part of the institutional equilibrium themselves when the Ba'ath set up their popular organisations (munazzamat sha'biyya). The Syrian regime had, in contrast to other governments of that time, highly subsidised the emergence and organisation of unions as early as the 1950s in order to "provide social and industrial peace" (Halpern, 1963, p.319). Peasants, youth, and women were - partly by force, partly willingly - incorporated, as well as many trade unions, in which party cadres happened to dominate the leadership after some time (Hinnebusch, 1993, p.247). In 1968, the regime cemented through Decree No.84 a rigid trade union structure with a single national federation: the General Federation of Trade Unions *Syria* (GFTU). This legal framework allowed practically allowed no union plurality in the trades, and implemented a system of local and regional branches that were obliged to report to the higher level. These organisations are supported to this day by the government and serve also as a recruitment basis for posts.

Dissimilar to Yemen, and resembling the logic of the Egyptian ETUF, the official trade union structure was an inherent part of the logic of power whereby the composition of the parliament was tied to quotas, and according to the constitution, at least half of the deputies have to be workers and peasants (Art. 53). First, however, the law does not stipulate from which part of the country, sect, or tribe the delegates have to be, creating the possibility to place 'Allawi allies in high ranking positions. Second, the formation of the trade union officials was at least as professional and straightforward as in Egypt; Decree No.16 of 1972 established special trade union schools for the formation of junior party members.

Concerning the political role of unions, the regime implemented the ideas from the 10th Congress of the Russian Communist Party that had declared to make trade unions schools for the sustaining of the ideology in the long run. The 1972 Conference of the GFTU thus defined the role of trade unions as less "political" and rather "demanding" or "postulative" (Perthes, 1995, p.174), resembling the role that was ascribed to trade unions by the Gaddafi regime in Libya.

Indeed, the union structures - especially the Women's Union and the Peasant's Union - showed little opposition to the regime, perhaps due to a broader lack of support from other regimes to this part of society. This is mirrored in the extent to which membership numbers grew between 1975 and 1990: the number of trade union members tripled, the members of the Engineers Union sextupled, and the number of members of the Agricultural Union even increased twelve-fold (Hinnebusch, 1993, p.247). These numbers have to be read with care, as union membership is generally not compulsory by law, however, to a certain extent, it could prevent being regarded as suspicious by the security apparatus. Moreover, union membership gave access to fringe benefits, such as pensions and public healthcare (Perthes, 1995, p.176), following the logic of the "Ghent System" of Scandinavian countries that also display high union density.

The Watershed of Hama

For the Syrian trade union movement as a whole, the uprisings between 1978-1982 were also decisive. The prominence of the Muslim Brotherhood at this time, according to the lion's share of the literature - and the propaganda of the regime - often distracts from other pivotal forces and groups (Seale, 1992, p.321-322). Indeed, the Brotherhood was one of the most visible players during the waves of discontent that had already started in the 1960s and peaked in the 1980s. However, already in 1965, professional associations conducted vast demonstrations which criticised the lack of democracy in the country (Meininghaus, 2016, p.76). In order to restrict brain drain, the regime had granted professional white-collar associations more rights of self-administration, so they could act more independently. The rhetoric of the Muslim Brotherhood had quite some appeal for parts the working class and, especially, of the well-educated strata of society in socially and economically weak peripheries of the country. Similarly to many other parts of civil society, the organisation labelled freedom as a basic need, and strongly condemned martial law, arbitrary decrees and inhuman police practices. The freedom of the citizens would include to think, publish, assemble, protest, oppose and form political parties and even independent trade unions (Batatu, 1982). With this attitude, it not only delimited itself from the dominant Muslim Brotherhood wing in Egypt, but also actively started to promote unionism and use workplace organisation as a means to mobilise. This fitted into their programme, as the Brotherhood opposed state ownership and suggested to give workers more responsibility. They advocated for ownership of the land by the farmers and the abolishment of middlemen, guardians and officials who would "suck blood in the name of the state, party and socialism" (Batatu, 1982).

When the first Muslim Brothers were elected into parliament in 1947, they soon attempted to set up ties with the trade union movement and advocated in the favour of the latter. In return, when a nationwide general strike was called on March 31 1980, branches of the bar associations, teachers, dentists, pharmacists, agricultural engineers, and physicians professional associations in the strongholds of the uprisings supported the call and demands of the Brotherhood. Already in early 1980, a coalition of several trade unionists close to the Islamic spectre and clerics issued a manifesto in Hama which called for the regime to honour the Human Rights Charter, abolish the state of emergency, and hold free elections (Friedman, 2012, p.77). However, the Brotherhood also resorted to intimidation of shopkeepers to force them to join the strike (Seale, 1992, p.325), meanwhile, on the other side, the official trade union bodies of the GFTU formed armed militias that helped to put a stopper on the uprisings in Hama (Perthes, 1995, p.176). Eventually, after the military campaign, the government dissolved all hostile unions, including their councils and branches, and a large number

of university professors, lawyers, doctors, pharmacists, teachers and religious scholars were arrested (Ikhwan-Wiki, 2012).

After the uprising abated, not only the professional associations were purged of regime critics. The workers unions suffered repression as well, foremost because of anti-government statements during the campaign against the uprisings. Although they did not show solidarity with the protesters and their demands, they condemned the violence used against the Syrian working class. After the following crackdown of government sceptic unions and the replacement of their leadership with Ba'ath appointees, the union movement would never recover its old grit.

The Ministry, the Union, and the Absence of Strikes

The General Federation for Trade Unions consists of 13 branch federations in each governorate, amounting to 202 unions in the entire country. This net reaches out to almost all branches of the country. However, the bargaining power of the union, especially from the rank and file members on the lower levels, is heavily restricted. While the union enjoys some independence in its self-organisation, it is still bound to, and in many aspects intertwined with, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour. The Central Department of Labour inside the ministry contains the Department of Labour Inspection, the Department of Trade Unions, the Department of Working Conditions, and the Department of Wages. In this light, the relationship between the state - represented by the ministry - and the union resembles a well studied play where everyone knows his place, text, and time to speak. There is little to no maneuvering space in which bargaining power could play a role.

This is also true for the key sectors of the economy. Rents from natural resources contributed about 21 per cent to Syria's GDP (2007), and half of the products were designated for exports. Moreover, agriculture is also an important part of Syria's economy, accounting for 22.9 of all exports in 2010. Besides crude oil, minerals, and petroleum products, top exports included spice seeds, pure olive oil, fruits, nuts and non-retail pure cotton yarn. Therefore, the economy, although relatively diversified, is the least complex one of the entire sample and in the ECI ranking (2008 -2012) on the penultimate rank of all its 121 countries. [75]. The grip of the Syrian regime on the economy and its population was comparatively strong. The share of tax revenues of the state incomes nearly doubled between 1993 and 2004 (Schwartz, 2008, 606).

In none of these sectors did strikes take place. Due to the emergency legislation since

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[75]The assessment of the case of Syria is a particularly thankless task, as official numbers, numbers from the CIA Factbook, and numbers of the World Bank often contradict one another. Even the share of GDP of the oil exports varies. According to some calculations, oil revenues never exceeded a lower double digit of the share of total exports, while many scientists still consider oil revenues the most important income source of the regime. Given its totalitarian-like nature, and the uncontested control of the official trade union bodies by the state, the assessment of key sectors in order to determine union strength loses its necessity.

1963, harsh repression of the population, and given the potential heavy penalties and
the repression of any activity deemed to be critical of the government, workers dared
not to exercise the right to strike (ITUC 2009). Whoever searches the internet for key
terms such as "Syrian oil workers strike" is redirected to an article of the New York
Times from 1965. Nothing left to say: the case of Syria is coded KEYS = (0).

6.12.4   2011: From Protest to Civil War

Focussing on 2011, two major phases can be determined. First, peaceful, civil, and
unarmed protests between February and April and, second, militarisation of the oppo-
sition and the mingling of militant groups into the struggle against the government in
the time that followed.

Dissimilar from Yemen, economic indicators were relatively stable in Syria. Youth un-
employment had dropped from its peak of 28 per cent in 2001 to 20 per cent in 2010,
and general unemployment dropped from about 11 per cent in 2000 to about 8.5 per
cent in 2010 - which is the lowest value of the sample excluding the Gulf countries.
Moreover, inflation rate recovered and remained between 3 and 4 per cent in 2009 and
2010 after having reached a peak of 15 per cent during the financial crisis of 2008. Fi-
nally, between 2000 and 2010, the purchasing power of the minimum wage increased by
almost 70 per cent. The variable SOEC is therefore coded (0) for Syria. Consequently,
the protests did not focus on socio-economic demands but on political freedom and
condemning the violence of the regime.

6.12.5   An Uprisings Starting in the Peripheries

Although a Facebook page named "The Syrian Revolution against Bashar Al-Assad"
was set up on January 18 2011 which called for a "Day of Rage" on February, 5, that
particular date only witnessed small scale protests that were dispersed and suppressed
quickly by security forces (Hinnebusch et al., 2016, p.226). Intellectual figures well-
known from the Damascus Accord of 2005 participated in different small-scale demon-
strations in February in front of symbolic buildings like the Ministry of Interior or the
Egyptian and Libyan Embassies. However, according to the main opposition narrative,
the key root of grievance emerged in the southern city of Dar'a. Schoolchildren had
sprayed anti-Assad slogans on walls, were arrested and tortured. The children's action
mirrored discontent of many citizens with the business dealings of Rami Makhlouf,
a cousin of the President. When a delegation of notables trying to free the children
laid down their headbands on the table of local head of the secret service Atef Najib
- which is a sign of submission in local tribal culture - they received a humiliating
response: Najib took the headbands from the table and threw them into the rubbish
bin. This triggered the first demonstration in Dar'a which was organised by networks

of tribesmen from al-Zu'bi and al-Masalmeh tribes (Dukhan, 2014, p.8).[76]

Protests emerged quickly across the region and spread over the country (Hinnebusch et al., 2016, p.226). Dissimilar to Libya, where protests turned quickly violent, several peaceful protests followed in the entire country and eventually peaked in March. Harsh reactions of security forces gave material for footage, which enraged the masses and led to even larger demonstrations, causing a vicious circle of action and reaction. At the same time, protests had also begun to sprout in Damascus where online activists declared Friday March, 18 a "Day of Dignity".

On March 23, security forces attacked a mosque of Dara'a which had been the headquarters of the activists. According to locals, at least 60 people were killed, security forces entered hospitals in order to torture and kill those who were hospitalised, whilst also targeting ambulances. As a reaction, thousands of protesters took to the streets, especially from 25 March 2011 onwards, generally expressing solidarity with Dara'a and fury against the regime (Leenders and Heydemann, 2012). Slogans against violence like "Who kills his own people is a traitor!" were more and more amended by concrete action, Ba'ath party headquarters were set on fire, and statues were torn down. The well known slogan "With heart, with blood, we will sacrifice us for you, oh Bashar!" was altered to "[...] we will sacrifice us for you, oh martyr" on funeral marches.

Protests did not concentrate in single hot-spots like in Tunisia or in Egypt, as the reaction of the security forces was mostly harsh and often lethal. They became more decentralised and clandestine whilst taking place in peripheral areas and provincial towns such as Idlib, Deir-a-Zoor, Homs or Hama, which also have strong tribal or clan-like forms of organisation. The extraordinary violence of the regime is repeatedly mentioned in order to explain the quick escalation of the conflict. Leenders and Heydemann (2012, p.142) depicts the situations vividly:

> All accounts of the events suggest a level of coercion in Dar'a in early 2011 that was only to be seen elsewhere in the country much later in the uprising, including mass arrests, torture, the use of live rounds against crowds and targeted individuals suggesting a 'shoot-to- kill' policy, the deployment of snipers on rooftops and the prevention of medical treatment for the injured. Regime violence peaked between the end of April and mid- May when, during a siege of Dar'a, tanks were deployed and entire neighbourhoods were shelled. The number of detainees was so large they could barely be contained in Dar'a's municipal stadium where they were rounded up and, according to several accounts, sometimes shot.

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[76]The local intelligence chief of Dar'a who has earned a reputation of ruthlessly even before, and who is also a relative of Assad, responded to earlier efforts to free the children with contempt: he extended an insulting invitation to send Dar'a's women to his office so "I can make them conceive some new children" (Leenders and Heydemann, 2012, p.147-148). This also triggered the wrath of many tribe leaders, in a region that actually was pro-Assad with many high ranking co-opted local leaders.

From Civil Protest to Armed Fragmentation

By mid June, the strategy of peaceful protests seemed to have failed in the eyes of many participants. The number of dead approached the mark of two thousands, and there was no change of regime strategy in sight. Additionally, the reaction of the international community failed to appear. The video footage that was meant to trigger a concrete diplomatic reaction, or even a humanitarian military intervention, missed that purpose. At that moment, many protesters retreated or began to arm, leading to the beginning of clashes in several cities. While in December 2011 rallies could attract about 70.000 peaceful protesters, this kind of protests vanished - especially after the militarisation of the Syrian opposition in the aftermath of the regime's brutal crackdown against Homs and others cities from early 2012[77] (Lefevre, 2013, p.186). During the protest, grass-root workplace organisation did not play a role, as labour related action would have required a nucleus inside the enterprises which the regime could easily access and suppress. Moreover, three reasons can be mentioned as being all related to the aforementioned split, weakness and decentralisation of the opposition. First, the initial online mobilisation fanned out into coordination committees that managed to bridged divides of sect, religion and class to try to formulate a leadership, However, the de-central character of the movements turned to be a weakness in the end. As Fares (2015) observes:

> Confusion and lack of clarity were reflected in the formation of different organizations and committees which emerged during the second month of the revolution. However, the establishment of such organizations and committees increased considerably in the fifth month of the revolution. It even became difficult for those following the revolution to tell the difference between the different groups and committees that emerged. [...] A database documenting of the names all coordination committees and / or the FSA brigades remains non-existent.

Groups like the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change *Syria* (NCC), the Syrian Nonviolence Movement, Building the Syrian State, Nabd for Syrian Civil Youth, Syrian Leftist Coalition, the Syrian Secular Bloc, the April 17 Youth Movement, or the Popular Front for Change and Liberation were all organising secretly and had no chance for workplace mobilisation. Residues of human rights associations, civil

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[77]For many observers, it remains a puzzle how the country could have been militarised so quickly after the peaceful protests failed. Without going too much into detail, three components hint at an answer. First, and less controversial, the number of Army defectors grew, eventually forming the Free Syrian Army (FSA) that helped to arm the opposition and to form local militias. By 2013, about 2000 Brigades, split due to different ideologies, tribal connections, and funding sources, controlled vast parts of Syria. Second, however less easy to grasp and to prove, human rights organisations report that the regime began to saturate certain areas with arms, to push protesters into becoming the "armed gangs" - which it claimed to be fighting from the outset (Kahf and Bartkowski, 2013). Third, according to several reports, Islamist fighters had used East Syria as a space for retreat during the Sunni uprising in Iraq. Some Iraqi politicians even claimed that the Assad regime had tolerated, if not stimulated, militant Islamist networks inside the country to interfere into the newly established Iraqi order (Al-Malaf, 2013, p.166). Indeed, Syria was charged with sanctions by the United States already in 2004, as the regime was accused of supporting terrorism in Iraq (Landis and Pace, 2007, p.46). By mid-2012 peaceful protests had vanished and the country found itself inside a bloody civil war.

society forums and committees that had emerged especially after 2000 were split and penetrated by regime stoolies (Landis and Pace, 2007). The official parties remained silent, including the communists who had split into three fractions. The Faisal fraction of the Syrian Communist Party, which had faced censorship in 2001, remained silent, just as the Bakdash wing did. The People's Will Party *Syria* (PWP), which ran independent candidates in the 2003 and 2007 elections, joined the protests (People's Will Party, 2012) and suffered repression of its leadership, especially as the party was small, unregistered as a party, and thus technically clandestine. Furthermore, the organisation of protests was conducted by living-room gatherings by tribal clan structures; their importance becomes clear when taking into account, for instance, that protesters across the country dubbed 20 June the "Friday of the Tribes" in appreciation for their role in the uprising (Leenders and Heydemann, 2012). Again, open working place networks did not play a role in this context. An exile opposition group, that met for the first time on May 31 2011 in Antalya, formed on September 15 the Syrian National Council, which was recognised by several states as opposition to the Assad regime. Due to different visions, the contested role of the Muslim Brotherhood, its dependence on Turkey, and a lack of connection into the domestic opposition groups, this group failed too often to speak with one voice.

The clandestine and weak nature of the organisation does not mean that there were no attempts to mobilise at a greater scale. From March 2011, strikes were, besides demonstrations, also part of the repertoire of collective action. Opposition committees called for general strikes for May 18 May, June 23 and December 11, the latter being announced as "Dignity Strike". Not many citizens followed the calls (Radio France International, 2011), but shopkeepers and artisans that closed their shops were often forced violently by security forces to reopen. Similarly to Yemen, however, these strikes were not organised or planned by trade union organisations.

During the time of the uprisings, the regime could count on large parts of the population, having maintained support amongst minority groups and the, the urban middle class of the bigger cities Damascus and Aleppo. Concerning the upper echelons of power, even the defections of high ranking officers did not affect the actual power base of the country (Hinnebusch et al., 2016, p.232). In a speech in Parliament on March 30, Assad dismissed the importance of the protests and blamed them on foreign conspirators, moreover, the professional associations backed the strategy of the regime that was presenting itself continuously as the only real grant for stability, while accusing foreign players and Islamists of bringing chaos into the country. No opposition to Assad has been reported in the higher ranks of these organisations. The vast pro Assad rallies that were mainly held close to Ministry of Defence and the Syrian TV station in Damascus, mobilised many workers from the public sector, as well as teachers and official trade unionists, by top-down order (Wieland, 2012, p.79).

Chapter 7

Minimisation and Interpretation of the Results

Following the qualitative assessment of the cases and their relations to the variables, the truth table 7.1 mirrors the basic findings. Table 7.2 gives an overview of the minimisations, the exact minimisations can be traced in annex B.

	SOEC	INTEROPP	CEN	TRI	KEYS	Outcome	Dec-Nr.
Mauritania	0	0	0	1	0	**0**	(2)
Morocco	0	0	0	1	1	**0**	(3)
Algeria	0	0	1	0	1	**0**	(5)
Syria	0	0	1	1	0	**0**	(6)
Oman	1	0	1	1	0	**0**	(22)
Yemen	1	0	1	1	0	**0**	(22)
Libya	1	0	1	1	0	**0**	(22)
Tunisia	1	0	1	0	0	**1**	(20)
Bahrain	0	1	1	1	0	**1**	(14)
Kuwait	0	1	1	1	1	**1**	(15)
Egypt	1	0	1	0	1	**1**	(21)
Egypt	1	1	1	0	1	**1**	(29)
Jordan	1	1	1	1	0	**1**	(30)

Table 7.1: Truth Table for Activity / non-Activity against the Institutional Equilibrium in MENA 2010 -2013

In addition to the three basic minimisations for each outcome, being the conservative, theory guided, and negative / positive outcome assumption for all logical remainders, the different cases for Egypt have been considered. EGY(21) stands for the case in which Egypt is coded 10101 and EGY(29) stands for the case in which the country is coded 11101. Together with the de Morgan calculations, a total of 16 final equations stands to disposition for interpretation.

As shown in the calculations, centralisation (CEN) and intertwinedness with opposition

parties (INOPP) are the most important factors for the explanation of transformative political trade union activities. (CEN) was the major asset of unions in Bahrain, Kuwait and Tunisia. In Egypt and Jordan, the fight against the old union structures became a mutual project that welded together activists, and the perception of economic crisis (SOEC) gave rise to new independent unions. The presence of (INOPP) is of importance only on the one side which covers the Monarchies, while the second term indicates that centralisation of trade union structures in combination with the absence of strong tribalism in a country is a sufficient condition, whereas there is no need for an alliance with opposition forces. This covers the Republics Tunisia and Egypt(29).

Concerning the outcome (0), the minimisations are more difficult to interpret. They show the absence of bonds between opposition forces and trade unions (inopp) as necessary condition for passivity or weakness of trade unions during the critical juncture 2011 - 2012/13. Besides that, different combination of tribalism and centralisation play a role.

For the sake of parsimony and in order to make the results more clearly laid out, the variables in the equations are abbreviated with their first letter only (SOEC = S, INOPP = I, CEN = C, T = TRI, and KEYS = K).

Type of Minimisation	Outcome = (1)	Assumptions ⇓
Conservative, EGY(21)	C(sIT + Itk + Sit)	none
Conservative, EGY(29)	C(IT + SIK + Sitk)	none
Theory Guided, EGY(21)	C(IT + Sit)	LogRem(31) = 1, LogRem(29) = null
Theory Guided, EGY(29)	C(IT + SIK + Sitk)	LogRem(31) = 1, LogRem(21) = null
Abs. Pos. Outcome Ass.	St + I	∀ x ∈ N : LogRem(x) => 1
De Morgan of T(0): Conservative	I + S(c + t + K) + t(c + k) + CKT	none
De Morgan of T(0): Theory Guided	I + S(c + t + K) + t(c + k)	LogRem(7) = 0
De Morgan of T(0): Abs. Neg. Outc. Ass.	I + St	∀ x ∈ N : LogRem(x) => 0

Type of Minimisation	Outcome = (0)	Assumptions ⇓
Conservative	i(scT + sTk + sCtK + CTk)	none
Theory Guided	i(sT + sCK + CTk)	LogRem(7) = 0
Abs. Neg. Outc. Ass	i(s + T)	∀ x ∈ N : LogRem(x) => 0
De Morgan of T(1): Conservative, EGY(21)	i(s + T) + SK(I + c + T) + c + t(s + I)	none
De Morgan of T(1): Conservative, EGY(29)	i(s + T + K) + c + t(s + k)	none
De Morgan of T(1): Theory Guided, EGY(21)	i(s + c + T) + c + t(s + I)	LogRem(31) = 1, LogRem(29) = null
De Morgan of T(1): Theory Guided, EGY(29)	i(s + T + K) + c + t(s + kI)	LogRem(31), LogRem(21) = null
De Morgan of T(1): Abs. Pos. Outc. Ass.	i(s + T)	∀ x ∈ N : LogRem(x) => 1

Table 7.2: Types of final expressions according to assumptions about logical remainders. T(1) / T(0) refers to the outcome aiming at transformation

7.1 Evaluating Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Outcome (1)

The variable INOPP plays a crucial role throughout almost all final equations for the outcome (1) and is identified as sufficient condition when the minimisation has been

conducted with absolute positive or negative outcome assumptions for the logical re-
mainders. Still, what is striking about the results of the conservative and theory guided
minimisations is that all equations contain the presence of a centralised trade union
body (CEN). That fact renders it a necessary condition and, consequently, in the de
Morgan calculations it becomes a sufficient condition for the outcome (0).

However, two limitations have to be made. First, the final result of the minimisation
with the help of the absolute positive outcome assumption does not include CEN and
is more focussed, as mentioned above, on INOPP. This might be due to the low case
coverage of N which is de facto only 10 cases out of 32 possible configurations, hence
the absolute positive and negative outcome assumptions for the logical remainders are
likely to blur and distort the results. Second, CEN is not a necessary nor sufficient con-
dition in any of the basic minimisation equations of the result (0), whereas it appears
as a sufficient condition in all de Morgan calculations for the conservative and theory
guided outcome of (1). In the conservative minimisation for (0), because of Algeria,
cen is even an INUS condition that builds a part of a path that leads to the absence
of transformative union activity. A possible explanation for these results is that CEN
is never a sufficient condition that leads to the outcome (1) alone and so it has al-
ways to appear in combination with other variables. In the conservative and theory
guided minimisations for the outcome (1) these variables are INOPP, or SOEC, or both.

7.1.1   The Connection between Oppositional Support and Cen-
tralisation

Configurations that include the combination of a nationwide centralised trade union
structure (CEN) and strong ties between oppositional players and trade unions (IN-
OPP) cover the cases of Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan. For both Gulf countries we
can assume a strong influence of oppositional forces on the trade union institutions. In
the case of Kuwait semi-loyalists dominated the councils of the unions and used them
as a platform to organise the middle class that was willing to protect the country's
young and still fragile democratic achievements against authoritarian tendencies of the
royal family. In the case of Bahrain, unions held strong ties to, and were influenced
and supported by the moderate Islamic bloc led by al-Wifaq during the uprisings and
before. The proximity to this political current which turned to be a thorn in many
workers' sides, and the successful exploit of this alliance in order to establish an own,
more regime friendly second trade union center by the regime, lead eventually to a split
and weakening of the entire movement. Comparing the case of Bahrain to the case of
Oman support this thesis. In both countries official and legal trade unions emerged
comparatively late in history. While since at least 2008 the GFTBU and the mod-
erate Islamist camp converged increasingly, the official trade unions in Oman rather
remained apolitical and did not interfere into the conflict between generations around

which the protests of 2011 evolved.

The case of Jordan is slightly different. While in Bahrain and Kuwait political forces could take advantage of the existing centralised trade union structure, in Jordan trade unions became an important player during the protests not because but despite the union centralisation. Parallel structures, supported or set up by local communities and the Muslim Brotherhood became a harbour for regime critics. Nonetheless, a common denominator of all unions, no matter if white or blue collar, was the fight for the right to organise outside the centralised official union infrastructure. In this sense, the nationwide centralised narrow union corset became a mutual and unifying enemy. Comparing the case of Jordan to the case of Syria, unearths additional aspects. The attempt by the Muslim Brotherhood and parts of the middle classes to undermine the nationwide centralised union structure was brutally put down in the 1980s and led to a lack of ties between opposition movements of any kind and trade unionism. In Jordan, in turn, especially white collar unions and political Islam grew more and more together since the 1990s.

7.1.2 The Connection between a Broken Social Contract and Centralisation

Combinations that include a nationwide centralised trade union structure (CEN) and the perception of a non-fulfilment of the authoritarian bargain on the part of the regime (SOEC) cover the cases of Tunisia and Egypt. The evolution of the protests seem to be different at first glance, as - after some hesitation and internal struggles - vast parts of the UGTT turned against the regime, while in Egypt alternative union structures became a nucleus of the revolution - while the ETUF leadership stuck almost entirely to the regime. At least one aspects renders both cases very similar, however.

First, in both cases, a long socio-economic struggle preceded the uprisings of 2011. The UGTT remained rather passive or hostile and only local leaders supported the early protests starting from 2006. Also in Egypt, the ETUF remained close to the regime and only few unions like the spinning an weaving union supported the protests between 2006 and 2010 in a rather hidden manner. During that time, networks emerged that would become main pillars of the revolutions that shook the countries in 2011. In Egypt, Tunisia, and Jordan, formal trade unions were apparently regarded as a proper platform for discontent. Their long lasting role of guardians of the authoritarian bargain had entered the collective memory of many workers and had led in Egypt and Jordan to the perception of a necessity to form independent unions. According to this reading, especially the Egyptian ETFU was unable to cope with the hybridisation of the regime in a manner that satisfied the Egyptian workers who were used to a more militant union movement, at least in socio-economic questions. The moves of the regime freezing the status quo of the manning of the trade union leadership, and the overall domestication of the federation was too bold, blunt, and obvious to be

neglected by local trade unionists. The result was the foundation of a union federation outside the established state-driven structure. In the sample, this is best contrasted by Morocco where the youth movements explicitly distanced themselves from the official trade unions while not spurring new union structures, or in comparison with Yemen, where trade unionism lost much of its appeal and many former unionists focussed on activism in NGOs.

In Tunisia, the course of event was different. The UGTT was characterised by many internal divisions like the split between loyalists close to the regime and a more progressive wing, as well as regional divisions, most prominent between the north, the peripheries in the west and south, and the area around the region of Sfax. Eventually, the progressive forces gained upper hand and, eventually supported the protesters and organised general strikes. The framework of the Tunisian UGTT was not yet as included into the state apparatus and paralysed as the GFJTU in Jordan or the ETUF in Egypt - although the UGTT showed a similar unwillingness to support protesters before 2011 as the ETUF.

A turn of the ETUF against the Egyptian regime was no option during the entire protests. It has to remain unsolved here if the symbolic capital which the UGTT still had due to its role in the independence war protected the confederation from serious splinter organisations, while in Egypt the ETUF lacked such a traditional bonus. In any case, both organisations fulfilled their task as guardians of the authoritarian bargain until the 1990s.

The minimisation with Egypt(21) shows most clearly the pivotal role of tribalism, or, in turn, of upward mobility fostering bureaucracies. The variable (tri) on the right side of the equation indicates that tribalism has to be relatively weak so that bureaucracies and self-conscious trade unions could emerge. Bureaucracies in state corporatist systems gave rise to opportunities of upward mobility regardless of family affiliation, and trade unions careers have often been a very important path for such upward mobility. The relatively limited role of tribalism in the political system sets Egypt and Tunisia apart from the other two examples with a deteriorated authoritarian bargain: Yemen and Libya. In both cases, the dominance of tribal and family affiliations which, as has been proved in the case studies, prevailed despite Panrabist and Arab Socialist rhetoric, hampered the emergence of strong trade unionism.

A QCA theory test supports the importance of (tri) and (TRI) as variables. Assuming that the final equation CI + CS seems a reasonable combination to explain the outcome, the intersection between the most parsimonious theory guided minimisation result, EGY(21), and the configuration to test renders:

$$T(1)_t \cdot T(1)_{(EGY(21))} = CI + CS \cdot CsIT + CItk + CSit$$
$$T(1)_t \cdot T(1)_{(EGY(21))} = CIT + CSit \tag{7.1}$$

The equation supports the thesis of two groups of cases and also confirms that (CI + CS) does matter for the result, however, not as standalone terms. The additional variables allow for a more elaborate thesis: In cases in which tribal structures dominate the institutional equilibrium, trade unions need a strong partner to become active. In countries in which tribalism is of less importance, trade unions did not need a partner and reacted because the social contract with the rulers had been violated. It is also permissible to assume that the combination (it) is no coincidence. For Egypt and Tunisia it can be said that the environment was free of interference from opposition or other interest groups, and trade unionism could develop as guardians of welfare. When this role was not accomplished any more by the official union federation in Egypt, it was reclaimed by the people and led to independent trade union structures.

7.2 Evaluating Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Outcome (0)

Concerning the minimisation equations of the outcome (0), the conservative variant gives little insights. Only the absence of INOPP is a necessary condition for the failure of trade unions to attack the institutional equilibrium in MENA countries 2010 -2013. If the set is divided into three subgroups, the interpretation is more clear: First, the Maghreb states Morocco and Mauritania with their pluralist union strategy, second Libya, Yemen, Oman and Syria with their strict corporatist and state driven arrangements, and third Algeria as a special case.

7.2.1 Tribal Bonds, Violence and Hybridisation

In the case of Algeria, no variable could be eliminated in the conservative minimisation process. As tribalism did not play an as outstanding role in the country compared to the other cases, also the explanation differs: despite some bargaining power in key sectors, in the period between 2010 -2013 the authoritarian bargain was perceived as relatively intact. This can be read against the background of the traumatising civil war and corresponding economic crisis of which the country was still recovering. The economic key data were also more advantageous than those of most cases in the sample. Similar to Tunisia, trade unions could set up an elaborated infrastructure, probably due to the fact that bureaucracy is a crucial pillar of the institutional equilibrium. Workers solidarity, especially in urban areas, also ousted tribal and family bonds more frequently than in other countries. In this environment, the UGTA managed to remain an important player inside the political system. This assessment coincides with observations of Valenzuela (1992, p.462-463), stating that in corporatist arrangements, the labour movement leadership but also many rank-and-file workers would generally

view any possible political change with suspicion, since they might lose their connections into the echelons of power. This interpretation, as a reminder, holds true for 2010 -2013. When Algeria faced another crisis in 2019, the stance of the trade unions turned to be more transformative and the UGTA openly demanded the retreat of the President. This is another indicator, that, by fact, during the critical juncture of 2010 - 2013, Algerian trade unions would possibly have been able - but yet not willing - to become a player who challenges the institutional equilibrium.

Cases with Procyclical Protests of Trade Unions

If Algeria was taken out of the sample, the final equation would be $iT(sc + sk + Ck)$ for the conservative minimisation and $iT(s + Ck)$ for the theory guided minimisation respectively. In this equation, the importance of tribalism inside the political system and the absence of strong allies of trade unions among the critical interference factors are necessary conditions. The subterms indicate some differences:

The left subterm covers Morocco and Mauritania where the socio-economic conditions were comparatively advantageous or in a state of recovery, and people trusted that the current institutional equilibrium was capable of fulfilling the authoritarian bargain. While the variable remains in the configuration of the conservative minimisation that covers Morocco, in Mauritania (cen) is eliminated due to the comparison with the highly centralised union structure of Syria. Violence and tribalism are an important pillar in both countries to maintaining the institutional equilibrium, however, it seems that the highly indebted state of Mauritania never had the resources to set up a corporatist arrangement able to domesticates trade unions. Moreover, although the Mauritanian Intersyndicale issued political statements in 2008, trade unions remained quiet during the critical juncture of 2011 - 2012. The feeling that the socio-economic situation was improving, indicated by the variable (soec), seemed to have hampered attacks on the institutional equilibrium and, additionally, made the CGTM utter procyclical demands.

Morocco, against that background, bears different premisses:

The assumption of $LogRem(7) = 0$ eliminates the variable (cen) in the theory guided outcome assumption. As the variable (cen) is a necessary condition in all results of the de Morgan calculations for the outcome (1), this theoretical assumption has to be read with care. Hybridisation of the political and economic system, and the split of the opposition and also of the trade union movement were parts of the major strategy of power holders to secure power. A major pillar of this strategy was the strengthening of a new class of entrepreneurs during the hybridisation of the system. If this class is strong and well organised, organised labour faces strong opponents often willing to split and hamper workers organisation after hybridisation of the system (Valenzuela, 1989, p.454). This strategy also worked for the most part in Jordan, however, eco-

nomic crisis and a strong opposition of the IAF turned trade unionism into a tool to attack the ruling elite and the institutional equilibrium it was protected by. Similar to Algeria, and excluding the youth movements, Moroccan workers protests can also be regarded as rather procyclical, aiming at the redistribution of resources in times of perceived economic betterment.

Countries with a Adamant Top-Down Grip on Trade Union Structures

On the right side of the subterm a combination of centralisation and low bargaining power of trade unions in key sectors appears, covering Libya, Syria, and Oman. These variables can be regarded as interrelated.

First, an active and dominant role of the state managed to put trade unions under its control. The strategies were heterogeneous including the out-crowding of critical union activists who started to engage in NGOs instead (Yemen), the marginalisation through strong tribalism and the civil society hostile system of the Jamhiriya (Libya), and the state driven top-down implementation of loyalist trade union institutions (Oman). These regimes, which were not characterised by a independent bureaucracy - as tribalism posed a more important pillar of the institutional equilibria - were able to treat trade unions more ruthlessly and achieved a high degree of centralisation and control. This caused weakness of unions in key sectors (keys), and as the state was not willing to allow other political forces to diffuse into the union movement, it also caused missing bonds between unions and opposition movements.

A similar logic can be applied to Syria, where the degree of state repression was probably the highest of the entire sample. The socio-economic situation was relatively advantageous compared to other countries of the sample and, by fact, socio-economic questions played, similar to Kuwait, a subordinate role. The regime managed to have a lock on trade union organisations, shielded them from oppositional influence, and suppressed any kind of workers movement outside the official trade union framework. Protests in 2011 were organised by local and tribal networks and no workers organisation played a crucial role during the uprisings or the war that would follow. In this case, the importance of tribalism inside the inner logic of power of the regime can be taken as an explanation for trade union weakness - if the national trade union structure is seen as an important ally and tool of the ruling Allawi minority. The extent of this tight grip is, however, only possible due to the extraordinary brutality of the regime. This coincides with observations of Valenzuela (1992, p.462-463): if a rupture occurs in a highly repressive regime, social groups, including the labour movement, will be less organised at the moment the change begins. And as none of the Syrian progressive opposition forces managed to bond with trade unions like in Kuwait or Bahrain, there was, consequently, no trade union activity in order to change the institutional equilibrium.

The comparison of the case of Syria with the other countries displaying an adamant grip on the opposition movement (Libya, Oman, Yemen) suggests that the deterioration of living standards in the latter was not enough to trigger union activity critical of the system. Indeed, the variable does barely play a role in the minimisations for the outcome (0) as well as in the de Morgan calculations for the outcome (1)[1].

7.2.2 The Ambivalence of Bargaining Power in Key Sectors

Throughout all minimisation results, the role of bargaining power in economic key sectors is ambivalent. In the cases of Algeria and Morocco, unions did show some bargaining power in the years before, however, they did not use it during the critical juncture in order to attack the institutional equilibrium. While in Morocco the variable is eliminated in all minimisations due to a very similar configuration to Mauritania, it remains in the conservative and theory guided minimisations because of Algeria. It could be speculated that because unions were strong in key sectors, union demands were more frequently met than in other cases of the sample and, hence, there was little need to attack the basic rules of the political system and its distribution mechanisms. To fully prove this assumption, however, more research had to be conducted, for instance about the role of Algerian trade unions during the protests of 2019.

In the cases with high centralisation of trade union frameworks, as has been stated above, the weakness of trade unions concerning bargaining power can be traced back to the strong grip of state authorities on the union movement. The threat of repression that union leaders had to fear if they deviated from the narratives of state propaganda - which often tries to draw a much more favourable picture of the popularity of regime measures - is a clear incentive to refrain from criticism.

Concerning the outcome (1), the sample shows greater variety, still, no clear pattern can be identified. In Egypt, it can be assumed that the strength in the textile sector gave trade unions self-confidence and prominence and raised attention of the media and also of other opposition players like bloggers and leftist parties. It is also reasonable to assume that the broad alliance of unions that also included the important petrochemical sector in Kuwait gave self-confidence to the union movement to protect the constitution and turn against the royal family in 2012. Beyond that, however, it remains questionable if union strength in key sectors leads trade unions to attack the institutional equilibrium. Bargaining power in key sectors appears in the conservative and theory guided final equations of both outcomes, (1) and (0), in different kind of specifications, whereas it does not appear in the final equations with absolute positive / negative remainder assumptions. This is no proof and the QCA analysis does not falsify the assumption that bargaining power leads to politically transformative trade

---

[1] The only exception is the conservative de Morgan calculation ($SKI + SKc + SKT + si + iT + c + ts + tI$). Theoretically, the combination SK could indicate that the bargaining power of trade unions is so high that they receive a privileged treatment by the authorities. Algeria comes close to this hypothetical case, however, further research would be necessary to prove this hypothesis.

union activities in MENA, nonetheless, the analysis does not support this hypothesis either.

Chapter 8

Concluding Remarks

The thesis at hand aimed at analysing the heterogeneous role of trade unions in twelve MENA countries during the "Arab uprisings" of 2011-2013. By implementing a fairly new approach from political science in the field of Middle Eastern Studies, unique insights could be generated of which other studies will be able to benefit.

These results, however, are not a deterministic, all encompassing truth but rather a careful approach in order to bring light into the grey zones of a field in which still reliable data is more than often unattainable. Against that background, QCA has been understood and used as an extension of Comparative Historical Analysis. Moreover, it has been shown why small and very small n studies allow for a qualitative focus when using QCA. This framework is not meant to produce general laws about cases not involved into the sample, however, the results helped to clarify the nature of the cases, revealed parallels and differences, and rendered the internal functioning of the regimes more comprehensible. Moreover, it gave an insight of the embedding of trade unions in the political systems of the sample.

8.1   Remarks Regarding the Methodology

Four methodological remarks can be made. First, this study is easily replicable and aimed at making sources and conclusions as transparent as possible. The credo to hold the case studies as thick as possible and as parsimonious as necessary helped to give a meaningful overview about the empirical and conceptual data that has been used. The level of replicability is also enhanced by an easy introduction to QCA as an approach that gives a comprehensible understanding of what QCA actually is, what it does, and which pitfalls researchers have to be aware of. The approach is comparatively unknown to Middle Eastern Studies, yet bears much value for this discipline. This study also carries an implicit hope that QCA might someday become more widespread among scholars dealing with the MENA region.

Second, the concept of change and non-change of institutional equilibria as level for

comparison was an important assumption for a meaningful comparison to be possible. This was only possible by separating economic demands on the one side, and political demands on the other, whereas the latter aim to alter the institutional equilibrium. Applying a constructivist view on the term trade union helped to understand that trade unions in MENA *may* combine socio-economic demands with pushes for systemic change in the political architecture of their countries; however, they do not necessarily have to, and, in fact, they barely did in the past. The protests for individual socio-economic betterment represent rather an integral part of the game than an effort to challenge its rules, and consequently, trade unions struggling for the compliance of the authoritarian bargain are rather upholder of the status quo than change agents.

Third, concerning the QCA minimisation process of this study, minimisations with standardised assumptions (either (0) or (1) across the board) about all logical remainders have been useful to a marginal extent only. They neglect and conceal too many important interconnections. This supports the claim that QCA applications in small and very small *n* needs careful, elaborate, and deep qualitative interpretation in order to gain appropriate results.

8.2 Remarks Regarding the Content

Concerning the concrete results of the analysis, the research question *Under which circumstances did trade unions adopt a transformative stance during the protests of 2011-2013 in the MENA Region?* can be answered by pointing at different parallels and interconnections.

A high degree of centralisation (CEN) of trade union structures has been an asset when it came to transformative trade union activity. It is a necessary condition of the outcome (1), albeit only the cases of Mauritania and Morocco - in which the trade union movement is heavily politically split - lack such a centralisation. Nonetheless, there is no path dependency, as highly centralised trade union institutions may also be a sign of strict and steadfast state control.

In the Gulf countries with a positive outcome (1), Bahrain and Kuwait, in which tribalism plays an important role in the institutional equilibrium, transformative trade union activities went along with strong ties into the opposition camps. In Tunisia and Egypt it was rather the loss of trust into the ruling elite concerning its willingness and ability to fulfil the authoritarian bargain that caused trade unions to advocate for a change of power structures. The fact that bureaucratic institutions and civil society provided possibilities for upward mobility beyond family ties traditionally gave trade union organisations a strong role within these latter two countries. A tradition of workers' struggle became part of the collective memory, and in times of crisis, people remembered and turned to trade unionism in order to make their claims.

In relation to these two prototypes, Jordan is a remarkable hybrid. On the one hand,

the socio-economic situation of many citizens was constantly deteriorating, leading workers to set up independent trade unions in order to challenge the state controlled national federation. On the other hand, the biggest opposition party (Islamic Action Front) managed to use its networks inside the white-collar associations in order to push for reform of the political system. Both currents eventually merged their demands and the borders started to blur during the critical juncture.

Concerning the cases with a negative outcome (0), the absence of partners among the oppositional interference factors is a necessary condition. The missing link between trade union organisations and youth movements is an important part of that observation. In Mauritania, Morocco, and Algeria, trade unions were not a part of oppositional alliances that attempted to change the power structures and legal frameworks of the countries. Trade unions that became active did not contest state structures but rather attempted to enhance the socio-economic well-being of their members *within* these structures. According to this reading, the protests, especially of Morocco and Algeria in 2011, were *procyclical.* The socio-economic conditions were, at least in the perception of the populace, not reason enough to jeopardise stability, yet, the atmosphere of the Arab uprisings in the entire region provided trade union organisations with a better bargaining position to push for demands.

In Yemen and Libya, the countries that displayed the worst socio-economic conditions in the sample, things were slightly different. The state managed to control or marginalise trade union activities to an extent that trade unionism ceased to be the first choice for workers to utter their demands. These countries have the importance of tribalism and, interconnected, the secondary role of bureaucracies that allow for upward mobility beyond family ties in common. Indeed, a major finding of the study is that tribalism as an important part of the political system hampers the emergence of a transformative stance of trade unions, unless there is a strong political force in the opposition that actively searches to bond with trade unions or even fosters the emergence of new unions more critical of the regime. Although having been influenced by Arab Socialist thought throughout their history, the strategy of the ruling elites in Yemen and Libya shifted towards reliance on tribal associations. This went along with a complete synchronisation of trade unions within the system of the Jamhiriya and state support for (tribal) notables on the local level in Libya, and through an evasive movement of progressive activists from trade unions into the NGO sector after the state had tightened the grip on trade union institutions in Yemen. In Syria, tribalism also played an important role although the state was officially a republic ruled by the Ba'ath party; here, the extraordinary degree of intimidation and violence towards oppositional activities exacerbated the difficulties to engage in independent trade union action that was critical of the state.

Among the negative cases, Oman stands out, as the trade union movement was particularly young and was foremost implemented in a top-down manner. The country

lacked a deep rooted trade union tradition and followed a path that can be observed widespreadly among other Gulf monarchies: As a first step, an apolitical framework of working councils had been implemented, which eventually became the basis for proper trade union institutions. Compared to Bahrain, however, where the trade union movement emancipated from state control, and where the Al-Wifaq Party managed to gain palpable influence within the trade union institutions, trade unions in Oman are still too embryonic and close to the state to cause political controversies. It remains to be seen which route the young Omani democratic institutions as well as the young trade unions will take in the future.

Beyond these interpretations for the cases, some conclusions on the macro level concerning Middle Eastern Studies can be drawn. First, the cases of Tunisia and especially Egypt, which are often taken as an entry point and example for further inferences concerning the entire region, are able to fulfil this particular task to a limited extent only. As the descriptions of the institutional equilibria of the countries have shown, and also as the stance, activities, and self-consciousness of civil society indicates, these countries are rather exceptional to the region. Basic concepts such as patrimonial capitalism and the authoritarian bargain hold across the cases, however, researchers should be more careful when claiming to speak and do research for the entire MENA region when scrutinising Egypt or Tunisia.

8.3   Limitations and Prospects of Future Research

As it is the case with every research scrutinising deeply its cases and using a wide range of material, this study raises at least as many new questions as it answers old ones. From a historical point of view, much has been written about the Arab Uprisings 2011-2013, however, in depth analysis of youth movements, parties, and other civil society organisations is still rare. It is time for the discipline to overcome the misery of indeterminacy as mentioned in the introduction and to, in the words of Catlin (1956), "go out and look at what actually happens". Social Movement Theory seems an appropriate approach to scrutinise players in the political arena in order to disaggregate the internal structures of power of MENA states. A comparative perspective would be fruitful, but also case studies of single institutional equilibria, formal institutions, or social movements could be beneficial in order to gain a better understanding of internal affairs in MENA states.

Having said this, foreign influence in the form of aid to set up institutions could also have be included into this study. Was the highly funded NGO sector, of which also the trade unions benefited, a decisive factor for the rise of independent trade unionism in Egypt? What about the role of international organisations and other donors supporting civil society in Tunisia? Especially, a comparison with other countries of

the MENA region could produce valuable insights, although the conceptualisation and collection of data may be particularly difficult.

Another point which also may bear some problems of measurement and conceptualisation is the very self-perception of trade unions in the region. Qualitative interviews could shed a brighter light on what trade union members expect from a trade union, and these insights could clarify the differences to OECD countries. The study at hand has made a first step into this direction, however, particular comparisons among MENA states could help to round out the picture.

Concerning more recent and future prospects, the subject of trade unions in MENA is a field in constant motion. Much research has been conducted about the pivotal role of the Tunisian UGTT in the transition process after 2011 while other topics still require more inquiry. What made the Algerian UGTA turn against the president of the republic in 2019? How will Egypt develop after the regime has tightened the grip on the opposition and in particular the independent trade union movement since 2014? And how will the systems of workers councils in the Gulf region develop, given the Bahraini experience? All these questions deserve an answer that goes beyond superficiality.

Last but not least, special attention should be given to the Kuwaiti KTUF. The national federation enjoys a surprising amount of independence - measured by the semi-authoritarian environment of the country. It comprises, for instance, prominent committees dealing with women rights or with the situation of guest workers. The federation also gave support in the form of workshops and consulting for the young trade union institutions in Bahrain and Oman. This example of the often neglected KTUF shows that there is still a lot to learn about trade unionism in MENA.

Appendices

Appendix A

Figures and Tables of the Prework

A.1   Indicators for the Variable SOEC

Table A.1: Social-Economic Key Indicators for the Cases of 12 MENA Countries

Country / Indicator	Umep. 2010	β_{Unem}	Infl. 2010	β_{Infl}	CPI 2010	β_{Transp}	HoP 2010	β_{Health}
Mauritania	3,8%	-0,22	6,3%	0,15	2,3	-0,12	64,3%	-1,4
Morocco	9,1%	-0,44	1,0%	-2,6	3,4	0,02	55,6%	0,2
Algeria	10%	-1,68	3,9%	0,29	2,9	-0,06	28,9%	0,5
Tunisia	13%	-0,24	3,3%	0,12	4,3	-0,06	42,1%	0,4
Libya	17,6%	-0,27	2,8%	0,38	2,5	-0,10	30%	-1
Egypt	8,8%	-0,1	11,3%	-0,2	3,1	-0,50	62,2%	-0,7
Jordan	12,5%	-0,22	4,8%	-0,13	4,7	-0,09	21,9%	1,1
Syria	8,6%	-0,24	4,4%	-0,34	2,5	-0,06	54,0%	-0,41
Kuwait	1,8%	0,09	4,5%	0,04	4,5	-0,08	13,9%	1,2
Bahrain	1,1%	-0,01	2,0%	0,10	4,9	-0,15	28,5%	-0,5
Oman	4,7%	-0,05	3,3%	0,11	4,9	-0,11	10,4%	0,3
Yemen	12,9%	0,25	11,2%	0,18	2,2	-0,12	74,0%	0,7

A.2   Truth Table and Distance Matrix

A.3   Truth Table

	SOEC	INTEROPP	CEN	TRI	KEYS	Outcome	Dec-Nr.
Mauritania	0	0	0	1	0	**0**	(2)
Morocco	0	0	0	1	1	**0**	(3)
Algeria	0	0	1	0	1	**0**	(5)
Syria	0	0	1	1	0	**0**	(6)
Oman	1	0	1	1	0	**0**	(22)
Yemen	1	0	1	1	0	**0**	(22)
Libya	1	0	1	1	0	**0**	(22)
Tunisia	1	0	1	0	0	**1**	(20)
Bahrain	0	1	1	1	0	**1**	(14)
Kuwait	0	1	1	1	1	**1**	(15)
Egypt	1	0	1	0	1	**1**	(21)
Jordan	1	1	1	1	0	**1**	(30)

Table A.2: Truth table for QCA minimisation

A.4 Distance Matrix for the Chain of Comparison

Table A.3: Distance matrix showing the number of differing variables

	MAU(2)	MOR(3)	ALG(5)	SYR(6)	OMN(22)	YEM(22)	LIB(22)	BAH(14)	KUW(15)	TUN(20)	EGY(21)	JOR(30)
MAU(2)	×	1	3	1	2	2	2	2	3	3	4	4
MOR(3)	1	×	2	2	3	3	3	3	2	4	3	4
ALG(5)	3	2	×	1	3	3	3	3	2	2	1	4
SYR(6)	1	2	1	×	1	1	1	1	2	2	3	2
OMN(22)	2	3	3	1	×	0	0	2	3	1	2	1
YEM(22)	2	3	3	1	0	0	0	2	3	1	2	1
LIB(22)	2	3	3	1	0	0	×	2	3	1	2	1
BAH(14)	2	3	3	1	2	2	2	×	1	3	4	1
KUW(15)	3	2	2	2	3	3	3	1	×	4	3	1
TUN(20)	3	4	2	2	1	1	1	3	4	×	1	2
EGY(21)	4	3	1	3	2	2	2	4	3	×	1	3
JOR(30)	4	4	4	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	3	×

Appendix B

Basic Minimisations

B.0.1   Minimisatons for the Outcome (1)

Following the truth table, the following equation can be set up for the outcome (1):

$$
\begin{aligned}
&(soec * interopp * CEN * tri * keys) \\
+&(SOEC * interopp * CEN * tri * KEYS) \\
+&(SOEC * INTEROPP * CEN * TRI * keys) \\
+&(soec * INTEROPP * CEN * TRI * keys) \\
+&(soec * INTEROPP * CEN * TRI * KEYS) \\
&= 1
\end{aligned}
\tag{B.1}
$$

For the outcome (1), the minimisation process shows the following results:

$$
\Rightarrow \quad \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 14;15 & 0111\text{-} \\ 14;30 & \text{-}1110 \\ 20;21 & 1010\text{-} \end{array} \right\} \text{prime implicants}
$$

To minimise the equation further, the combination **11111 (31)** will be included. It presumes a hypothetical environment in which the social contract had been perceived as broken by the populace, trade unions and opposition parties were intertwined and possibly allied, the trade union structure centralised, tribalism an important pillar of the institutional equilibrium, and trade unions present and strong in key sectors of economy. Given the cases and minimisations so far, we can safely assume that this combination might have produced a trade union movement that had resources and incentive enough to attack the institutional equilibrium of the state.

$$
\left. \begin{array}{ll} 14;15 & 0111\text{-} \\ 14;30 & \text{-}1110 \\ 15;31 & \text{-}1111 \\ 20;21 & 1010\text{-} \\ 30;31 & 1111\text{-} \end{array} \right\} \Rightarrow \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 14;15;30;31 & \text{-}111\text{-} \\ 20;21 & 1010\text{-} \end{array} \right\} \text{prime implicants}
$$

leading to the following prime implicant chart:

Case (dec.)	14	15	20	21	30	31	Expression
	X	**X**			**X**	**X**	INOPP * CEN * TRI
			X	**X**			SOEC * inopp * CEN * tri
Case (conf.)	sICTk	sICTK	SiCtk	SiCtK	SICTk	SICTK	

Table B.1: Prime Implicant Table for the Outcome "Transformative Trade Unions"

The table identifies the essential prime implicants, being:

$$(INOPP * CEN * TRI) + (SOEC * inopp * CEN * tri) = 1 \tag{B.2}$$

At this point of the minimisation process we can also already identify a necessary condition that leads to the outcome (1), being the centralisation of the trade union bodies, as the following equation indicates:

$$CEN * (INOPP * TRI) + (SOEC * inopp * tri * keys)) = 1 \tag{B.3}$$

A similar result is produced when Egypt is not coded 10101 (21) but instead 11101 (29), taking into account that the trade union movement had been reluctant to bond with opposition forces at the beginning of the juncture, however, third party backed institutions like the Center for Workers and Trade Union Services (CWTUS) might have played a role. If this configuration is used, and also LogRem(31) is added, the following minimisation results:

$$\left.\begin{array}{ll} 14;15 & 0111\text{-} \\ 14;30 & \text{-}1110 \\ 15;31 & \text{-}1111 \\ 20 & 10100 \\ 29;31 & 111\text{-}1 \\ 30;31 & 1111\text{-} \end{array}\right\} \Rightarrow \left\{\begin{array}{ll} 14;15;30;31 & \text{-}111\text{-} \\ 20 & 10100 \\ 29;31 & 111\text{-}1 \end{array}\right\} \text{prime implicants}$$

The configuration can, again, be transformed to show that the centralisation of the trade union structures remains a necessary condition:

$$(INOPP * CEN * TRI) + (SOEC * inopp * CEN * tri * keys) + (SOEC * INOPP * CEN * KEYS)$$
$$= CEN((TRI * INOPP) + (SOEC * INOPP * KEYS) + (SOEC * inopp * tri * keys)) \tag{B.4}$$
$$= 1$$

B.0.2 Minimisations for the Outcome (0)

Following the truth table, the following equation can be set up for the conservative outcome (0):

$$
\begin{aligned}
&(soec * interopp * cen * TRI * keys)\\
+&(soec * interopp * cen * TRI * KEYS)\\
+&(soec * interopp * CEN * tri * KEYS)\\
+&(SOEC * interopp * CEN * TRI * keys)\\
+&(soec * interopp * CEN * TRI * keys)\\
&= 0
\end{aligned}
\tag{B.5}
$$

The minimisation steps for the outcome (0) are:

$$
\left.\begin{array}{ll}
2;3 & \text{0001-}\\
2;6 & \text{00-10}\\
5 & \text{00101}\\
6;22 & \text{-0110}
\end{array}\right\} \text{prime implicants}
$$

The minimisation is rather unsatisfactory as it gets stuck in the first step without rendering a more parsimonious result. Even with the inclusion of the most reasonable assumptions, being LogRem(0) with the configuration 00000 and with LogRem(1) with the configuration 00001 based on the assumption that bargaining strength in key sectors alone would not be enough for unions to challenge the institutional equilibrium, no further parsimony can be achieved. A reasonable assumption would be to include LogRem(7) with the configuration 00111. The basic assumption is that in the case of Morocco(3), the centralisation of the union framework would not have led to a different outcome than (0). This assumption results in the following minimisation steps:

$$
\left.\begin{array}{ll}
2;3 & \text{0001-}\\
2;6 & \text{00-10}\\
3;7 & \text{00-11}\\
5;7 & \text{001-1}\\
6;7 & \text{0011-}\\
6;22 & \text{-0110}
\end{array}\right\} \Rightarrow
\left\{\begin{array}{ll}
2;3;6;7; & \text{00-1-}\\
5;7 & \text{001-1}\\
6;22 & \text{-0110}
\end{array}\right\} \text{prime implicants}
$$

The resulting prime implicant chart:

Case (dec.)	2	3	5	6	22	Expression
	X	**X**		x		soec * inopp * TRI
			X			soec * inopp * CEN * KEYS
				x	**X**	inopp * CEN * TRI * keys
Case (conf.)	sicTk	sicTK	siCtK	siCTk	SiCTk	

Table B.2: Prime Implicant Table for the Outcome "Non-Transformative Trade Unions"

rendering the following final equation after transformation to identify necessary conditions:

$$
\begin{aligned}
soec * inopp * TRI + soec * inopp * CEN * KEYS + inopp * CEN * TRI * keys = 0\\
inopp(soec * TRI + soec * CEN * KEYS + CEN * TRI * keys)
\end{aligned}
\tag{B.6}
$$

B.1 De Morgan Calculations

B.1.1 De Morgan Calculation with Intial Outcome = (1)

The de Morgan calculation for the conservative minimisation for the outcome (1) with EGY(21) renders the following equation:

$$
\begin{aligned}
1 = sICT + ICTk + SiCt \quad\longmapsto\quad (S+i+c+t)\cdot(i+c+t+K)\cdot(s+I+c+T) &= 0 \\
(Si+Sc+St+SK+i+ic+it+iK+ic+c+ct+cK+it+ct+t+tK)\cdot(s+I+c+T) &= 0 \\
(SK+i+c+t)\cdot(s+I+c+T) &= 0 \\
0 + SKI + SKc + SKT + si + 0 + ic + iT + cs + cI + c + cT + ts + tI + tc + 0 &= 0 \\
SKI + SKc + SKT + si + iT + c + ts + tI &= 0 \\
SK(I+c+T) + i(s+T) + c + t(s+I) &= 0
\end{aligned}
$$

(B.7)

The de Morgan caluculation for the conservative minimisation for the outcome (1) with EGY(29) renders the following equation:

$$
\begin{aligned}
1 = ICT + SiCtk + SICK \quad\longmapsto\quad (i+c+t)\cdot(s+I+c+T+K)\cdot(s+i+c+k) &= 0 \\
(is+0+ic+iT+iK+cs+cI+c+cT+cK+ts+tI+tc+0+tk)\cdot(s+i+c+k) &= 0 \\
(is+iT+iK+c+ts+tI+tk)\cdot(s+i+c+k) &= 0 \\
(is+is+isc+isk+iTs+iT+iTc+iTk+iKs+iK+iKc+0+cs+ci+c+ck+ts+tsi \\
+tsc+tsk+tIs+0+tIc+tIk+tks+tki+tkc+tk) &= 0 \\
is+iT+iK+c+ts+tk &= 0 \\
i(s+T+K)+c+t(s+k) &= 0
\end{aligned}
$$

(B.8)

For the theory guided outcome assumption including Egypt coded as (21), the following de Morgan transformation can be made:

$$
\begin{aligned}
1 = ICT + SiCt \quad\longmapsto\quad (i+c+t)\cdot(s+I+c+T) &= 0 \\
is+0+ic+iT+cs+cI+c+cT+ts+tI+tc+0 &= 0 \\
is+ic+iT+c+ts+tI &= 0 \\
i(s+c+T)+c+t(s+I) &= 0
\end{aligned}
$$

(B.9)

For Egypt coded (29) the de Morgan calculation for the theory guided outcome (1):

$$
\begin{aligned}
1 = ICT + SICK + SiCtk \quad\longmapsto\quad (i+c+t)\cdot(s+i+c+k)\cdot(s+I+c+T+K) &= 0 \\
(si+i+ic+ik+sc+ic+c+ck+st+it+ct+tk)\cdot(s+I+c+T+K) &= 0 \\
(i+c+st+tk)\cdot(s+I+c+T+K) &= 0 \\
si+0+ic+iT+iK+cs+cI+c+cT+cK+st+stI \\
+stc+0+stK+tks+tkI+tkc+0+0 &= 0 \\
si+c+iT+iK+st+tkI &= 0 \\
i(s+T+K)+c+t(s+kI) &= 0
\end{aligned}
$$

(B.10)

B.1.2   De Morgan Calculation with Intial Outcome = (0)

De Morgen calculation for the conservative minimisation of the outcome (0):

$$0 = iscT + isTk + isCtK + iCTk \qquad \longmapsto$$
$$(I + S + C + t) \cdot (I + S + t + K) \cdot (I + S + c + T + k) \cdot (I + c + t + K) = 1$$
$$(I + IS + It + IK + SI + S + St + SK + CI + CS + Ct + CK + tI + tS + t + tK)$$
$$\cdot (I + S + c + T + k) \cdot (I + c + t + K) = 1$$
$$(I + S + t + CK) * (I + S + c + T + k) * (I + c + t + K) = 1$$
$$(I + IS + Ic + IT + Ik + SI + S + Sc + ST + Sk$$
$$+tI + tS + tc + 0 + tk + CKI + CKS + 0 + CKT + 0) \cdot (I + c + t + K) = 1$$
$$(I + S + tc + tk + CKT) \cdot (I + c + t + K) = 1$$
$$I + Ic + It + IK + SI + Sc + St + SK + tcI + tc + tc + tcK + tkI$$
$$+tkc + tk + 0 + CKTI + 0 + 0 + CKT = 1$$
$$I + Sc + St + SK + tc + tk + CKT = 1$$
$$I + S(c + t + K) + t(c + k) + CKT = 1$$

(B.11)

The de Morgan calculation for the theory guided outcome assumption of the outcome (0):

$$0 = siT + siCK + iCTk \qquad \longmapsto \qquad (S + I + t) \cdot (S + I + c + k) \cdot (I + c + t + K) = 1$$
$$(S + SI + Sc + Sk + IS + I + Ic + Ik + tS + tI + tc + tk) * (I + c + t + K) = 1$$
$$(S + I + tc + tk) \cdot (I + c + t + K) = 1$$
$$SI + Sc + St + SK + I + Ic + It + IK + tc + tc + tcK + tkI + tkc + tk + 0 = 1$$
$$Sc + St + SK + I + tc + tk = 1$$
$$S(c + t + K) + I + t(c + k) = 1$$

(B.12)

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