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# Suspension of nuclear weapons programs by enduring rivals

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# SUSPENSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS BY ENDURING RIVALS

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*To My Parents*

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# INTRODUCTION

Since the introduction of nuclear weapons the spread of these weapons has continued to represent a serious concern of international security. For only a few years, the United States remained the only nuclear power. It was then followed by the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China. More states throughout the last few decades, mainly developing countries involved in enduring rivalries, such as Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Israel, Iran, Iraq, India, Pakistan, South Korea, North Korea and Taiwan, have pursued the development of nuclear weapons as well. By doing so, these countries push forward the proliferation of nuclear weapons "[that] would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war."[1] Moreover, the 2001 Kashmir crisis in which the world has reached the threshold of nuclear exchange, denial and deception practiced by some countries (like Iraq and North Korea) and the growing possibility of nuclear weapons acquisition by terrorist groups especially after the events of September 11, 2001, all indicate that the dangers entailed in horizontal nuclear proliferation are increasing.

There were positive signs towards nuclear non-proliferation. In the last decade some countries (Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan) have chosen to give up their existing nuclear weapons programs. At the same time, some other countries, like South Korea and Taiwan, have committed themselves not to develop nuclear weapons through global as well as bilateral contractual agreements and declarations.

Despite these positive signs, nuclear proliferation still poses a threat to world security. Meanwhile, international non-proliferation arrangements have their own flaws. Thus, it is important to examine experiences in which the pursuit of nuclear weapons has been reviewed. Exploration of the determinants for such revisions will provide alternative non-proliferation policies to be addressed. A full analysis of why states acquire or give up nuclear weapons is beyond the scope of this study, which focuses on nuclear proliferation/ non-proliferation policies by regional enduring rivals. Here, it is more important to ask whether some regional enduring rivals, adopting non-proliferation policies, have permanently abandoned the nuclear weapons programs or have simply *suspended* them.

My argument is that, one the one hand, a regional enduring rival may initiate a nuclear weapons program when the rivalry passes an increasing tension phase. Enduring rivalry's increasing phases are resulted from the deterioration of international status and the rising of security threats. On the other hand, the rival may consider the suspension of its nuclear weapons program during the rivalry's decreasing tension phases. Enduring rivalry's decreasing tension phases are resulted from the improvement of international status and the mitigation of security threats. Enduring rivals may suspend, rather than give up, their nuclear weapons programs as long as the rivalries are not yet terminated.

The first part of this thesis develops a theory that explains the phenomenon under question. PART I demonstrates that none of the previous works has focused either on this puzzle or the proposed variables. CHAPTER ONE displays the conceptions and dynamics of enduring rivalry and the levels and patterns within it. This includes an elaboration on the differentiation between interstate rivalry types and a detailed examination of the term and

CHAPTER TWO reviews the literature on nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation in general and on nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation policies in regional conflicts in particular. Second, it distinguishes between "giving up" and "suspension" of nuclear weapons programs. Third, it explicates the causal link between enduring rivalry dynamics and the suspension of nuclear weapons programs. Finally, this chapter lays out the conceptual framework, which surveys theories and approaches this study utilizes, and the terms it employs. It also displays the research problem, questions and hypotheses and concludes with an analysis of the aims this study intends to demonstrate. The conceptual framework is followed by a methodology section that displays the methods of analysis and variable-measurement means explaining how this study approaches the research problem.

The second part of this thesis examines some enduring rivalry cases and investigates the initiation and the development of the rivals' nuclear weapons programs. PART II is divided into three chapters: CHAPTER THREE examines the cases of North Korea and South Korea, CHAPTER FOUR examines Taiwan's case, and CHAPTER FIVE examines the South African case. Each of these chapters includes a display of the rivalry initiation and its phases. This display is followed by an analysis of the enduring rivalry fluctuations and their impact on nuclear proliferation/ non-proliferation policies.

# PART I

# THEORY

CHAPTER ONE

THE NATURE OF ENDURING RIVALRIES

This chapter displays the conceptions and dynamics of enduring rivalry and the levels

and patterns within this type of rivalry. First, I elaborate on the differentiation between

interstate rivalry types. Then I examine in detail the term and dynamics of enduring

rivalry. Second, I explain the conditions under which enduring rivalry fluctuates.

**Enduring Rivalry Conceptions**

Interstate rivalries are divided into three types; isolated rivalries, protorivalries,

and enduring rivalries. Isolated rivalries are referred to as these "sporadic conflicts of

very brief duration, sometimes representing very severe conflict, but whose bases of

conflict are resolved in a short period or wither away, such that recurring conflict and war

are not longer central in the relationship."[2] For the frequency of conflict, an isolated

rivalry involves "one or two dispute rivalries in a period 10 years or less."[3] However, "[Its

adversaries] appear to be very different from those that have no disputed issues at stake or

those that always resolve their disputed differences peacefully."[4] Protorivalries are

defined as those conflicts that "persist for a moderate amount of time, but the history of

hostility has less an effect than in enduring rivalries, although more than in isolated

[2] Paul F. Diehl, ed., *The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press

competition."[5] Protorivalries "generate three to five disputes in a 15-year period."[6] At the same time, protorivals "engage in numerous confrontations over time… but [their] relationships would seem difficult to classify in the same category as 'isolated conflict.'"[7] Enduring rivalry is defined as "a competition between the same pair of states resulted by well-entrenched causes and represented in severe and repeated conflicts over an extended period of time. It involves six or more militarized disputes between the two states over a period of 20 years."[8] Enduring rivalry participants "adopt longer-term strategies and have a greater expectation that the competition will persist"[9] and each perceives the other as its "principal opponent."[10] In enduring rivalries, "competitions [are] over some stakes that are viewed as important."[11]

This study accepts these definitions of enduring rivalry except the component concerning the temporal dimension as being attached to the number of militarized disputes. Militarized interstate disputes are "disputes between sovereign states below the threshold of war and include: explicit threats to use force, display of force, mobilization of force, or the use of force short of war."[12] History suggests that an enduring rivalry may *endure* without necessarily being embraced with militarized disputes for a long period of time and then restart.[13] For example, "Chile and Argentina had a peaceful interlude of thirty-six-years, Greece and Turkey of fifty years, before their rivalries restarted … in one of the more dramatic, Russia after a twenty-eight-year interlude,

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[5] Diehl, ed., *The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries*, 6.

[6] Goertz and Diehl, "The Initiation and Termination of Enduring Rivalries," 33.

[7] Hensel, "Interstate Rivalry and the Study of Militarized Conflict," 164.

[8] Goertz and Diehl, "The Initiation and Termination of Enduring Rivalries," 31-33.

[9] Diehl, ed., *The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries*, 6.

[10] William R. Thompson, "Principal Rivalries," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39, no. 2 (June 1995): 201.

resumed pressuring Turkey in 1946."[14] This observation refutes Goertz and Diehl's notion that "the endpoint of the rivalry is the date of the last militarized dispute in the rivalry plus ten years."[15] Bennett shares the same argument in his rivalry termination coding rules; either an agreement recognizing a mutually accepted settlement of the issues at stake followed by ten years without a militarized dispute, or the renouncement by one rival (or both) of its claims at stake followed by ten years without a militarized dispute.[16] Nonetheless, the condition included in these rulings (the following of ten years without a militarized dispute) is insufficient to determine the rivalry termination unless the issues at stake are truly resolved. An illustrative example is that the Treaty of Versailles lasted without any abrogation for eighteen years (from 1918 until 1936 when Germany had begun rearmament) and then followed by the Second World War in 1939. Goertz and Diehl's argument has little to explain, for example, why mainland China/ Taiwan, India/ Pakistan and Iraq/ Israel rivalries (which, according to the model proposed by Goertz and Diehl, should have ended by 1977, 1981 and 1983 respectively) witnessed the recurrence of militarized disputes in 1987, 2001 and 1991 respectively. According to Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) Data Set of Correlates of War (COW) Project 1996, there were fourteen militarized disputes between mainland China and Taiwan from 1949 to 1987, while militarized disputes were absent between 1967 and 1987.[17] However, their relationship could still be considered enduring rivalry not only because neither a surrender by one side of the dyad nor a truly acceptable compromise over the disputed issue(s) was achieved, but also because it was characterized by a high probability of war, high military readiness and endemic crises. Accordingly, enduring

[14] Ib.d

rivalry ends when its deep-rooted causes cease to exist, either by total surrender of one rival or by a truly acceptable compromise over the disputed issue(s).

For the operationalization of the term "enduring rivalry," categorization of rivalries in the existing literature has mainly dealt with rivalry types, but little attention has been paid to levels *within* a given type of rivalry. The few works differentiating between enduring rivalry types give insufficient explanations. Thompson proposed two types of enduring rivalries, spatial (regional) and positional (global). The former type includes these rivalries whose participants dispute over territory while the latter includes rivalries whose participants dispute over leadership positions.[18] Khan adopts a similar typology that divides protracted conflicts (or enduring rivalries) into territorial and non-territorial ones.[19]

However, both typologies are rigid enough not to recognize the possibility of spatial and positional disputes' confluence at the regional level (such as Argentina/ Brazil and Algeria/ Morocco rivalries). In addition, some of the "spatial rivalries" or "territorial protracted conflicts" proposed by these typologies (Indo-Pakistani, Greco-Turkish, and Arab-Israeli rivalries) can hardly be understood as originated merely from territorial disputes. Indeed, territorial disputes are there in these rivalries but they evolved in principal either from a denial of the other's right to exist, accompanied by an existential threat perception, or from a competition over regional hegemony. It is true that territory and existence are linked, but claiming a part of a country is by no means equal to claiming sovereignty over a whole country. Moreover, Thompson's and Khan's typologies fail to correctly categorize mainland China/Taiwan and North Korea/South Korea rivalries, which are over territorial issues but were basically caused by each

party's denial of the other's right to exist and/or irreconcilable political ideologies. Enduring rivalries of Argentina/ Brazil and Algeria/ Morocco shed more light on this point.

## Argentina/ Brazil Enduring Rivalry

According to MID/COW data, since the beginning of the twentieth century until 1996, Argentina and Brazil were involved in only one militarized dispute against each other.[20] However, this is not to say that their dyadic relationship was a moderate or low conflict one as T.V. Paul has argued.[21] Paul has done so depending on the number of militarized disputes between the dyad while ignoring other dimensions of their enduring rivalry, that are causes, perceptions, and temporal domain. This dyadic rivalry dates back to more than one century ago as the first militarized dispute occurred in 1851. The issue at stake was indeed important, regional hegemony in Latin America. Argentina and Brazil represented the principal security threat for each other rather than any extra-regional power as "shared understanding of the principles that ought to regulate coexistence among states and the United States dominance …kept many aspects of the East-West conflict from being felt in the [South American] region."[22] Moreover, territorial disputes such as those over Itaipu Dam and Beagle Channel fueled mutual sense of insecurity and mistrust.[23] Security threat perception was of no less significance:

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[20] See "Militarized Interstate Dispute Data (1/1/96)," [on line]; available from: http://pss.la.psu.edu/MID_DATA.HTM; Internet; accessed on 12/2/2002.
[21] See T.V. Paul, *Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000), 100-101.

> Each country [Argentina and Brazil] viewed the other as a competitor, as an opponent in many areas, and even as a possible enemy. For many years the possibility of conflict between Argentina and Brazil was a favorite case study in the military headquarters and the war colleges of both countries; the location and distribution of military assets reflected this line of thought.[24]

## Algeria/ Morocco Enduring Rivalry

The same can be said about Algeria/ Morocco rivalry. According to MID/COW data, from 1962 to 1980, these two countries were engaged in six militarized disputes.[25] These disputes were seemingly over border territories and Algiers's vital support and refuge for the Polisario, the militant group challenging Morocco's alleged sovereignty over Western Sahara since 1975. However, as Lahouari Addi once put it, "sand dunes and tracts of land, whether in Tindouf in 1963 or in Western Sahara, are just pretext for the rivalries between the two regimes, each of which sees the other as a threat."[26] The real causes of the rivalry were regional hegemony and Algiers's desire to export the socialist revolution to its western neighbor:

> The two countries each sought primacy in the Maghrib. Their claims were rooted in part in ideology: Morocco's claim to regional leadership derived from its centuries-old national identity, whereas Algeria's stemmed from the prestige of winning its War of Independence. The ideological differences between the new socialist republic and the ancient monarchy were sharpened when, almost immediately after independence, Ben Bella began to trumpet his country's socialist-revolutionary doctrines and its opposition to conservative governments such as Morocco's.[27]

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[24] See Pedro Louis De la Fuente, "Confidence-Building Measures in the Southern Cone: A model for regional stability," [Article on line]; available from: www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/1997/winter/art3wi97.htm#ettop; Internet; accessed on 12/26/2002.

Thus, each one considered the other as its principal security threat and struggled to prevent it from achieving its regional ambitions.

The above-mentioned two enduring rivalries of Argentina/ Brazil and Algeria/ Morocco are of a lower level than those of North Korea/ South Korea, India/ Pakistan, Arabs/ Israel or pre-1990 South Africa/ Southern African countries. That is because: (1) in former cases, issues at stake are important, but of a lower value than those in the latter group (for example regional hegemony *vs.* national survival), (2) militarized disputes in the former group occur with a lower frequency than that in the latter, and (3) existential threats are missing among rivals like Argentina, Brazil, Algeria and Morocco while they clearly exist in North Korea/ South Korea and Arab/ Israeli rivalries. At first glance, low-level enduring rivalries seem similar to protorivalries. Yet what differs low-level enduring rivalries from protorivalries is that, first, the causes of the former level are more important than those of the latter. The second difference lies in the temporal domain. In other words, low-level enduring rivalries, exactly as high-level ones, last longer than protorivalries.

## Enduring Rivalry Dynamics

On the one hand, the bulk of the literature on enduring rivalry dynamics has focused on enduring rivalry initiation and termination processes rather than the development of the rivalry. Goertz and Diehl have argued that political shocks, either at the systemic level (world wars, changes in territorial sovereignty and rapid shifts in the power distribution) or state level (achievement of independence and the occurrence of civil wars), are necessary to start or to end an enduring rivalry.[28] They concluded by

[Political] shocks at the system or state level were associated with almost all of the beginning and endings or enduring rivalries ... Almost 87% of enduring rivalries began with at least one shock. Over 90% of the enduring rivalries that ended within the time period of the study did so immediately following a political shock.[29]

Thompson has specified mutual identification as rivals, the desire to have exclusive control over the same territory, conflict over relative positions at or near the apex or a power hierarchy and geographical proximity as rivalry origins. Meanwhile, his reasons for rivalry termination were one rival's conviction of the other that their exclusive territorial control expectations are no longer reasonable, one side's conviction of the other that its claims to leadership are superior and one or both rivals being forced to move down the capability hierarchy significantly and permanently.[30] Bennett has set enduring rivalry termination coding rules as either an agreement recognizing a mutually accepted settlement of the issues at stake followed by ten years without a militarized dispute, or the renouncement by one rival (or both) of its claims at stake.[31] And in the results of his 1998 "Integrating Testing Models of Rivalry duration," Bennett has concluded that "domestic political factors and issue salience are the most likely causes of rivalry termination ... findings on political shocks and security concerns [as factors affecting the probability of rivalry termination] are sensitive to operationalization. Some causal relationships appear to differ between pre- and post-WWII rivalries."[32] Finally, in Wayman's view, enduring rivalries originate from factors that include geographic contiguity and conflicting claims to sovereignty, but he has left the question of rivalry termination unanswered and concluded that "deciding whether a rivalry is over is a bit

like deciding whether a volcano is extinct. Any conclusions, or analyses based on them, must be treated with caution."[33]

On the other hand, most scholarly works seem to adopt the "volcano model" - which asserts that enduring rivalries persist in an ever-increasing escalatory process - in order to analyze the development of enduring rivalry. There are two schools of thought within this "evolutionary approach" that argues for rivalry escalation rather than deescalation, the first of which focuses on the effect previous interactions have on subsequent relations between the dyad. According to this school, after each dispute "the winners attribute their victory to effective strategy and hence tend to repeat past behavior; the losers change their strategy in favor of using higher levels of hostility in an attempt to restore their damaged reputation."[34] The second one argues that "beyond the effects of past dispute outcomes or escalation levels ... relations between adversaries will tend to become more conflict-prone and more escalatory later in a rivalry relationship, regardless of the outcome or severity level reached in their single most recent dispute."[35] By so doing, these works fail to recognize the possibility that rivalries, while going on constantly, fluctuate or pass phases of "increasing tension" and "decreasing tension." The Korean and Chinese rivalries fit in this regard.

The Korean Enduring Rivalry

According to MID/COW data, North Korea and South Korea were involved between 1949 and 1992 in twenty militarized disputes at a constant frequency.[36] However, one can still identify phases of increasing tension and decreasing tension in their rivalry. For example, the late 1960s and the 1970s witnessed increasing tension between the dyad. This can be attributed to three major reasons. First, the deterioration of relations between North Korea and its principal ally, the Soviet Union, that continued until the late 1970s.[37] Second, both Koreas suspected their superpower allies' credibility and security commitments due to the détente between the United States and the Soviet Union since the early 1970s. Third, South Korea's international isolation was on the rise at the time.[38] Manifestations of this included, first, the intensification of North Korean use and threat of use of force against South Korea and the United States from 1968.[39] Second, the United States covertly introduced tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea and committed them to the defense of South Korea. Moreover, in 1977 the United States and South Korea agreed to conduct the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises annually.[40] Economic conditions in the two Koreas during this period seem to have little impact over the rivalry's fluctuations. On the one hand, some problems in the North's economy are reported prior to the increase of tension, due to the deterioration of relations between North Korea and the Soviet Union until the late 1970s.[41] However, evidence suggests that

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[36] See "Militarized Interstate Dispute Data (1/1/96)," [on line]; available from: http://pss.la.psu.edu/MID_DATA.HTM; Internet; accessed on 12/2/2002.

[37] See Donald S. Macdonald, *The Koreans: Contemporary Politics and Society* (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1988), 244; M.P. Srivastava, *The Korean Conflict: Search for Unification* (New Delhi: Prentice Hall of India Lt., 1982), 58.

[38] For more details see Barry K. Gills, "Prospects for Peace and Stability in Northeast Asia: The Korean Conflict," in *Rivalry and Revolution in South and East Asia*, ed., Partha S. Ghosh (Aldershot:

there was no economic crisis, in the proper sense of the word, in North Korea at the time. In fact, "the national income of North Korea has increased considerably since 1946. In 1967 it was nearly 12.5 times that of 1946 and 8.6 times that of 1953, registering an annual growth rate of 12.7 percent and 16.6 percent, respectively, during 1947-67 and 1954-67."[42] On the other hand, South Korea has witnessed unprecedented economic improvement, proved by many indicators, throughout the 1960s and the 1970s.[43]

This period was followed by a decreasing tension phase until the late 1980s. The decrease of tension can be attributed to the gradual decline of South Korea's international isolation,[44] the improvement of North Korean-Soviet military and economic relations,[45] and the enhancement of the United States' security commitment to South Korea.[46]

Another increasing tension phase took place during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Reasons for it were the growing international isolation of Pyongyang as a result of the shift of the policies of the Soviet Union and China, in favor of the South,[47] the collapse of the communist camp from 1989 onwards and the breakup of the Soviet Union itself in 1991. The clearest manifestation of this increasing tension was the North Korean nuclear crisis in 1992-1994 which ended with the U.S. – North Korea Agreed Framework on the nuclear issue in October 1994. This agreement has had the political, economic, and military implications that defused the crisis.[48]

Many scholars have argued that the severe economic problems that North Korea faced during this period were the real motivations behind launching the nuclear weapons

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[42] Joseph Sang-hoon Chung, *The North Korean Economy: Structure and Development*, (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1974), 145.

[43] See Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Indianapolis: Basic Books, 2001), 37.

program. That is in the sense that Pyongyang used its nuclear weapons program as a bargaining chip in return for economic aid. However, major economic indicators of North Korea before and after the nuclear crisis show a continuous worsening of the economy, rather than an improvement.[49] Thus, it was not the deterioration of North Korean economy *per se* that led the regime in Pyongyang to initiate the nuclear weapons program, as the country's economy was already in shambles years ago, but it was the loss of political and economic support from the two communist giants.

Tension had increased once again in the Korean peninsula in 2002 when the United States categorized North Korea as a member of the so-called "Axis of Evil" that the Unites States is determined to prevent it from threatening America or its allies. What gave credibility for that was the unprecedented belligerent attitude the United States has shown after the events of September 11th, 2001. The United States' military campaigns against Afghanistan in 2002 and Iraq in 2003 under the pretext of combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the same allegation the United States makes against North Korea, have contributed to the increase of the Pyongyang's sense of insecurity. This increase of tension has apparently been manifested in the current nuclear crisis in the Korean peninsula resulting from North Korea's reactivation of its nuclear weapons program.[50] Later on, North Korean government expelled IAEA inspectors and in January 2003, it officially withdrew from the NPT. In response, the IAEA in February 2003 turned the case over to the United Nations Security Council.

As for internal political systems, evidence suggests that they have played no role in affecting the two Koreas' enduring rivalry fluctuations. On the one hand, South Korea was being ruled undemocratically until 1987. Thus, it is clear that the phases of the half-

a-century Korean rivalry do not correspond to Seoul's type of regime. On the other hand, North Korea underwent all rivalry phases under the same communist regime. It initiated the nuclear weapons program in the early 1990s when Kim Il Sung was the president and it suspended it under the leadership of his heir and son, Kim Jong Il. The reactivation of the North Korean weapons program in 2002 was also under Kim Jong Il's leadership. Of course, such a hereditary succession does not entail any kind of regime change, let alone democratic transition. Throughout almost a decade since the death of his father, Kim Jong Il has not shown any remarkable change in his country's policies.

<center>The Chinese Enduring Rivalry</center>

According to MID/COW data, there were fifteen militarized disputes between mainland China and Taiwan from 1949 to 1991 and there were no militarized disputes between 1967 and 1987.[51] Phases of increasing tension include the period between 1964 and 1976. This was due, first, to China's detonation of its first nuclear device in 1964 that resulted in raising Taiwan's fears of being subject to nuclear attack or blackmail. Second, the change of the United States' foreign policy at the beginning of the 1970s which induced improvement of relations with mainland China had the effect of deepening Taiwan's isolation. This increasing tension was manifested, first, in Taiwan's decision to launch its nuclear weapons program.[52] Second, military confrontations between the two sides intensified to an unprecedented level since 1958.[53] The few changes in Taiwan's economy did not go parallel to the tension phases. For instance,

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[51] See "Militarized Interstate Dispute Data (1/1/96)," [on line]; available from:

Taiwan enjoyed rapid growth rate throughout the 1960s and the early 1970s, but this improvement was interrupted for a short time by the 1973 oil crisis.[54]

This phase of China/ Taiwan rivalry, however, was followed by a decreasing tension phase between the mid-1970s and the early 1980s mainly as a result of Beijing's preoccupation with internal struggle over power and, shortly later, its signals to reform and opening after the death of Mao Zedong.[55] The latter phase of decreasing tension was expected to persist but for the deterioration of Taiwan-U.S. relations again in the early 1980s that further complicated Taiwan's political isolation and military vulnerability.[56] Manifestations of this increasing tension phase included communist China's growing threats against Taiwan as the former considered the latter as a possible military target.[57] Also, militarized disputes between the two sides were resumed in 1987 after a pause of

## Enduring Rivalry: Levels and Phases

What can be discerned form the above-mentioned examination of North Korea/ South Korea and mainland China/Taiwan enduring rivalries is that enduring rivalry fluctuates between phases of increasing and decreasing tension. On the one hand, the determinants for increasing tension are international isolation (including alliance shift) and the rising of security threat of at least one side of the dyad. On the other hand, determinants for decreasing tension are the integration in the international system (including reassurance of alliance commitment) and security threat mitigation.

Economic conditions appear to have little to do with the rivalry's fluctuations. Instead of independently affecting rivalry phases, the consideration of economic benefits/losses, at best, plays a partial role within the international status framework of the rival, either international isolation or integration. Bennett concludes his 2000 article "Foreign Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic Problems in Enduring Rivals," by stating:

> States experiencing slower rates of growth in their per capita GDP appear to be more likely to initiate a conflict against a rival than do states with higher growth rates... Diversionary conflict was a more likely reaction to internal problems than was rivalry termination; rivalry termination actually appeared most likely in the context of good economic problems conditions within the rivals.[58]

Nevertheless, the cases examined above show, as will be explained in much detail in PART II, that this is not necessarily the case with enduring rivals. Indeed, some previous works have examined the notion of enduring rivalry development. Stinnett and Diehl have identified six factors (balance of military capabilities, major power status, the role of territorial issues, geographic contiguity, exogenous political shocks, and pacifying

effect of democracy) that influence enduring rivalry development.[59] However, they have regarded these factors as conditions that exist prior to the initiation of the rivalry. Consequently, these factors (except the military capabilities) may identify the *initiation* of a rivalry rather than the phases it pass throughout its *development*.

Others have introduced the terms of "rivalry phases" or "rivalry patterns."[60] Goertz and Diehl proposed six patterns of rivalry (increasing, flat, concave, convex, decreasing and wavy) and their examination of a population of cases concluded that there is a Basic Rivalry Level (BRL) around which "periods of conflict and détente are 'random' variations."[61] Yet an operationalization of the BRL term is missing, while questions concerning the determinants of rivalry fluctuations and their impacts on the rivals' policies were left unanswered. Cioffi-Revilla has been successful in identifying three distinct phases of enduring rivalry evolution; "lock-in," "maturation," and "termination."[62] However, I propose an alternate to this "convex" pattern that he supports because the "wavy" one seems more appropriate as it outlines a rivalry that "goes through clearly defined periods of escalatory and de-escalatory conflict over the course of its life."[63] What is argued here is that some enduring rivalries follow this pattern (according to Goertz and Diehl, the wavy pattern range runs from 8.9 to 26.9 percent of all enduring rivalry cases from 1816 to 1976) and thus it is worth studying. Furthermore, Cioffi-Revilla has used large-*N* analysis that leaves little space for the determination of the conditions of each phase.

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[59] See Douglas M. Stinnett and Paul F. Diehl, "The Path(s) to Rivalry: Behavioral and Structural Explanations of Rivalry Development," *Journal of Politics* 63, no. 3 (August 2001): 723.

[60] See Hensel, "Interstate Rivalry and the Study of Militarized Conflict," 176-179; Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, "The 'Volcano Model' and Other Patterns in the Evolution of Enduring Rivalries," in *The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries*, ed., Paul Diehl (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1998).

[61] Ibid., 198.

In summary, the previous literature on enduring rivalry lacks a satisfactory distinction between levels and patterns within this type of rivalry. These works fail to explain the conditions under which enduring rivalry fluctuates. They focus exclusively on large-$N$ analysis while lacking sufficient examination of individual enduring rivalry cases, which this study does.

Consequently, I propose the following as to remedy the inadequacies of the existing literature:

1. There are two levels of enduring rivalry (high and low) determined according to four parameters: (1) causes, (2) manifestations, (3) perceptions, and (4) temporal domain. Both high and low levels of enduring rivalry share the same temporal domain, long duration (to be seen as enduring rivalry common denominator). But the two levels differ on other parameters. On the one hand, high-level enduring rivalry is caused either by a dispute over a non-negotiable territory, denial of the other's right to exist, irreconcilable political ideologies, or a combination of them. Manifestations of this level include a high rate of militarized dispute frequency. Threat perception in high-level enduring rivalry includes the existential threat perceived by at least one side of dyad. An existential threat reflects a state's anticipation of loss of its existence or survival. If "the magnitude of threat perception is a function of the magnitude of anticipated losses and of the importance of the values or assets affected,"[64] existential threat ranks the highest in any state's security calculations. Metaphorically, it mirrors a "death threat" for humans. On the other hand, causes of low-level enduring rivalry include disputes over political prestige and influence, regional hegemony, or a combination of

both. Moderate rate, or even absence of militarized disputes, high probability of war, and severe diplomatic confrontations express the manifestations of this level. In low-level enduring rivalries, threat is perceived by the dyad as a "zero sum" game, as is the case in the high-level rivalries, but it is only confined to the issues at stake.

2. Enduring rivalries fluctuate between increasing and decreasing tension phases. This fluctuation depends on the state of international status and security threats. On the one hand, international isolation and rising security threats of at least one side of the dyad lead to the intensification of security threat perception. Insecure, because they already have a high probability of war, enduring rivals take specific coercive and hostile steps that could enhance their sense of security. The intense security perception at that time and the steps that follow constitute what I call "increasing tension phase." On the other hand, international integration and mitigation of security threats lead to a reduction of the security threat perception. A reduced security threat perception in its turn induces enduring rivals to retreat from steps taken during the increasing tension phase. Just like the increasing tension phase, the reduced security threat perception and the following relaxation steps constitute the "decreasing tension phase." However, this retreat – due to the persistence of rivalry causes and high probability of war- is of temporal nature (See Figure 1).

Fig. 1. Enduring Rivalry Fluctuation

CHAPTER TWO

EXPLAINING THE SUSPENSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS

This chapter, first, reviews the literature on nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation in general and nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation policies in regional conflicts in particular. Second, it distinguishes between nuclear weapons programs' "renunciation," "forbearance," "giving up" and "suspension." Third, it explicates the causal link between enduring rivalry's phases and the suspension of nuclear weapons programs. Finally, this chapter lays out the theoretical framework and the methodology of this study.

**Nuclear Proliferation Literature**

There is a large and complex body of literature on nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation that could be classed under two main categories, the first of which focuses on the impact of nuclear proliferation on international security, embodying a controversy between nuclear optimism and nuclear pessimism. The second category, which is the subject matter of this thesis, is concerned with the incentives and disincentives for nuclear weapons proliferation. Through reviewing the literature on nuclear proliferation incentives and disincentives, scholars have distinguished between three distinct models,[1] with variations, that explain the politics of nuclear proliferation

1. Realist/ Systemic/ Security Model: This model is based on the realist explanations of international politics whose major assumption is that "states are unitary actors that seek to maximize their power in order to survive in a competitive [and anarchical] international system."[2] Some scholars confine this model to the "security reason" according to which states pursue nuclear weapons acquisition in quest for security.[3] It follows that "because of the enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons, any state that seeks to maintain its national security must balance against any rival that develops nuclear weapons by gaining access to a nuclear deterrent itself."[4] Other scholars widen the scope of this model to include other motivations for nuclear weapons acquisition such as seeking regional hegemony, gaining international prestige and obtaining bargaining advantages.[5] By extension, security model suggests that drastic changes in external security threats cause policy reversal, that is, giving up nuclear weapons.[6]

2. Bureaucratic/ Domestic Model: This model draws on the organizational theory in International Relations which "views government leaders as intending to behave rationally, yet envisions their beliefs, the options available to them, and the final implementation of their decisions as being influenced by powerful

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[1] See Scott D. Sagan, "Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons?," *International Security* 21, no. 3 (winter 1996/1997): 55-57; Tanya Ogilvie- White, "Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the Contemporary Debate," *The Nonproliferation Review* (fall 1996): 44; Saira Khan, *Nuclear Proliferation Dynamics in Protracted Conflict Regions*,
[2] Ogilvie- White, "Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation?," 44.
[3] See William Epstein, "Why States Go and Don't Go Nuclear," *Annals*, no. 430 (March 1977):

organizational actors."[7] In this model, bureaucracies such as the military institutions and nuclear scientists are portrayed as interest groups that push forward the pursuit of nuclear weapons as a way to increase their own influence and prestige. At the same time, this model includes other factors such as public opinion, domestic economic considerations and technological momentum.[8] Through the lens provided by the domestic model, non-proliferation decisions could be seen as resulting from the adoption of democratic forms of government.[9]

3. Cognitive/ Individual Model: Like the previous two, this model follows one of International Relations approaches, which is the "belief system" approach. "[This] approach is based on the assumption that beliefs and actions are linked, and that foreign policy decision-making (and instances of irrationality) cannot be fully understood unless the beliefs of the decision-makers are taken into account."[10] According to this model, the options available to states to go or not to go nuclear are influenced primarily by the personal attitudes and beliefs of decision-makers. For example, Meyer asserts that "countries go nuclear because specific individuals come to power at specific times and create the proper conditions for nuclear proliferation."[11]

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[7] Scott D. Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," *International Security* 18, no. 4 (spring 1994): 71.

[8] See Khan, *Nuclear Proliferation Dynamics in Protracted Conflict Regions*, 18-19; Ogilvie-

These three models are closely parallel to the three levels of analysis of International Relations.[12] So, as it is the case with foreign policy decisions, many scholars agree that singular explanations for nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation are by no means sufficient. Reiss asserts that motivations for and against nuclear weapons acquisition vary from one state to another, and that it is unwise to generalize about proliferation dynamics.[13] Despite the study's concurrence with this argument, what appears to be missing is the application of multi-causality to each case. In other words, the confluence of several factors may offer better explanations for nuclear proliferation or non-proliferation policies. The case of North Korea is quite illustrative in this regard. Pyongyang's decision to initiate its nuclear weapons program in the late 1980s and the early 1990s cannot be solely attributed to a mere desire to obtain bargaining advantages. Any analysis that seeks to explore the motivations of this decision should not disregard international isolation and rising security threats facing North Korea at that time.

## Nuclear Proliferation and Non-Proliferation in Regional Conflicts

On the one hand, the general approach of most of discussion so far has essentially argued for the likelihood of nuclear weapons proliferation by countries that are principally engaged in regional conflicts. In 1982, Mohan stated "two categories of countries … are widely recognized as serious potential proliferators. The first is the so-called 'garrison' or 'pariah' states – Israel, South Africa, Taiwan and South Korea – which may have aggravated security problems. The second is the 'prestige states' – India, Brazil, and Argentina – which are the most advanced among Third World

nations."[14] Throughout an examination of the South Asian and Middle Eastern nuclear cases, Khan concluded that "deterrence need in a territorial protracted conflict drives states to acquire nuclear weapons ... [and] states involved in more than one Protracted Conflict are more likely to search for such weapons."[15] Scholars have analyzed the decisions to go nuclear through the realist/ systemic approach with special stress on the regional security threats these countries face.[16] For example, William Epstein writes:

> Countries facing serious threats to their survival or security pose the greatest challenge [to the non-proliferation regime]. Those non-nuclear countries that are not under the nuclear umbrella of any of the superpowers and have no alternative means of ensuing their security feel that they may ultimately have to rely on nuclear weapons and in the meantime are developing nuclear weapon option.[17]

This study adopts the realist/ systemic approach with some modifications since studies in this approach failed to focus on the timing of decisions. In other words, they tend to perceive the decision to nuclearize as one to be taken once and forever. Meanwhile, Khan has been successful in building a theory that gives more comprehensive explanation for nuclear proliferation in protracted conflict/enduring rivalry regions. Nevertheless, her discussion on protracted conflict/enduring rivalry dynamics presupposes the continuity of the conflict in a stable pace with little attention being paid to the possibility of conflict fluctuation.

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[13] Mitchell Reiss, *Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Non-Proliferation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 268.

[14] Raja C. Mohan, "Why Nations Go Nuclear: An Alternative History," in *Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s: Perspectives and Proposals*, ed., William Kincade and Christoph Bertram (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), 36.

[15] Khan, *Nuclear Proliferation Dynamics in Protracted Conflict Regions*, 286.

[16] See Lewis Dunn, *Controlling the Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s*; Robert A. Strong,

Moreover, certain scholars have interpreted some countries' non-proliferation policies as a function of domestic pressures, bilateral incentives and the general consensus against nuclear weapons.[18] Paul developed a theory that views these policies as resulting from changes in regional security environments, but this theory was only limited to the low and moderate conflict zones.

In fact, this study adopts the two main pillars of Paul's theory:

1. A non-great power decision to acquire or go without nuclear weapons is determined largely by the level and type of security threats that it faces.

2. Nations under certain circumstances may prudently forgo military capabilities that other states see as threatening.[19]

However, this research differs from Paul's in the perception of enduring rivalry. Paul seems to presuppose that enduring rivalry maintains stability along its life course in the sense of the "rivalry's capacity to endure or persist despite the many international and domestic changes that occur naturally over time."[20] But, as I explained earlier, this is not necessarily the case with enduring rivalries. At the same time, categorization within enduring rivalry type is disregarded altogether in Paul's work. That is why this theory has little to explain why some states involved in enduring rivalries revisit their nuclear policies. It is true that India, Pakistan and Israel did not forgo their nuclear weapons. Yet others, like Egypt, South Korea, and Taiwan, committed themselves to not developing such weapons although their respective adversaries keep declared or ambiguous nuclear weapons programs. Indeed, Paul has pointed out that "if a technologically capable state in a high-conflict region forswears nuclear arms, it does so largely as a function of

countervailing deterrent capability… [and that] an ally under a security umbrella would desist from acquiring nuclear weapons."[21] But he did not address how enduing rivalry developments affect the decision to forgo nuclear weapons.

Previous literature on the nuclear cases of South Korea, North Korea and Taiwan demonstrate the above-mentioned shortcomings. Regarding South Korea, the bulk of scholarly work interprets its nuclear policy as a result of changes in the security guarantees provided by its superpower ally, the United States. For instance, Paul asserts that South Korea's decision in the late 1970s to give up its plans for nuclear weapons program and its reluctance in the 1990s to reinitiate the program in the face of North Korean nuclear threats was due to security guarantees and economic incentives offered by the United States.[22]

Engelhardt, Suh, and Oberdorfer share the same argument. They view South Korea's decision in 1970 to initiate its nuclear weapons program through the lens of the Nixon Doctrine that entailed the United States' retreat from its security commitment to South Korea. At the same time, they argue that security commitment assurances and economic incentives/disincentives offered by the United States were the factors behind South Korea's decision to forgo its nuclear weapons program in 1980. Explaining the South's non-proliferation policy, Engelhardt's view was that the "South's economic dependence upon the United States and its allies was clearly a factor,"[23] while Suh has asserted that "South Korea was kept from developing nuclear weapons … not by heavy

pressure but mainly by the continued military presence of the US, including the nuclear umbrella."[24]

Of course, the alliance shift played a major role in determining South Korea's nuclear decisions. But this theory, while it deals basically with a regional enduring rivalry case, lacks the display of the regional context of the case and the incorporation of the alliance relationship within its larger framework. In other words, it could not answer how the enduring rivalry phases affect the decision to go or not to go nuclear. While these analyses have invested heavily in explaining the role of the United States, they have ignored what was happening in North Korea and the how the latter's interactions with its southern neighbor contributed to these decisions.

As for North Korea, most researchers, including Engelhardt, Mansourov, Mazarr and Snyder, view the initiation of its nuclear weapons program in the late 1980s as a bargaining chip to get external support, both economically and politically. The following statement summarizes this argument:

> Beginning in the late 1980s, officials in Pyongyang learned how useful an ambiguous nuclear capability could be in getting the attention of the world community, wringing security concessions out of Seoul and Washington and acquiring pledges of economic assistance and expanded diplomatic relations.[25]

Similarly, they assert that the 1994 Agreed Framework, for the security assurances and economic aid that it provided to North Korea, was the reason why Pyongyang abandoned its nuclear weapons program. However, the economic variable has been given much more stress as a factor in defusing the nuclear crisis in the Korean peninsula in the 1990s. In this view, "the North, as one State Department official noted, had an opportunity to

'pry open access' to the world economy in return for proliferation restraint.[26] Analyzing the North Korean nuclear case, Scott Snyder has concluded that "among the bolder prescriptions designed to induce change in the DPRK have been recommendations to proceed with economic incentives."[27]

I have no dispute with this argument except for two points. First, as the South Korean nuclear case, it lacks the incorporation of the security motivation within the larger framework of the Korean enduring rivalry. Second, evidence suggests, as will be explained below, that the economic factor influenced Pyongyang's decision to initiate and later freeze its nuclear weapons program only within the context of its international isolation. Thus, the aforementioned literature on the two Koreas' nuclear cases fails to recognize the "larger framework," i.e., enduring rivalry phases, of the two Koreas' nuclear-relevant decisions. By so doing, this literature offers only narrow explanations.

The Taiwanese nuclear case has been subject to very few scholarly works. Spector, Burr, Albright and Gay all have argued for the same notion, that is Taiwan decided to initiate its nuclear weapons program as a direct response to communist China's development of nuclear weapons, and that Taipei later abandoned the program in the late 1970s when pressured by its major ally and protector, the United States. According to William Burr, "Taiwan was generally responsive to U.S. pressures, although Washington would have to exert them repeatedly."[28]

Just as the two Koreas' cases, the alliance shift has played a major role in determining Taiwan's nuclear decision, but previous analyses lack the display of the

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[26] Engelhardt, "Rewarding Nonproliferation," 36.

[27] Scott Snyder, "North Korea's Nuclear Program: The Role of Incentives in Preventing Deadly

regional context of the case and the incorporation of the alliance relationship within its larger framework. In other words, they cannot answer what effects the enduring rivalry dynamics had on the decisions to go or not to go nuclear. A deeper examination of the Chinese enduring rivalry would reveal that Taiwan's nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation policies were mainly influenced by the fluctuations of its rivalry with communist China rather than merely by changes in the United States' policies, even though the latter played an important role.

On the other hand, analyses of these three countries' non-proliferation policies have perceived these policies as either "giving up," "forbearance," or "renunciation" of nuclear weapons programs.[29] But the possibility of *suspending* nuclear weapons programs was never addressed. These analyses have incorrectly viewed the non-proliferation policies of South Korea, North Korea and Taiwan as expressing an "abandonment" of their respective nuclear weapons programs, without realizing that reactivations of the programs indicate that these countries were only *suspending* the weapons programs.

Adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)[30] and acceptance of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards[31] by countries previously suspected of developing nuclear weapons capabilities do not certainly mean giving up nuclear weapons programs indefinitely. The cases of Iraq, Iran, South Korea, North

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[29] See Mitchell Reiss, *Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities*; Sagan, "Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons?," 60-61; Paul, *Power versus Prudence*, 3.

[30] The NPT was opened for signature in 1968, and it entered into force in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely. A total of 188 parties have joined the NPT, including the five nuclear-weapon states. Only three states, namely India, Israel and Pakistan, did not sign the NPT.

[31] The IAEA has safeguards agreements in force with 145 States and with Taiwan, China, as of January 2003. States that do not have a safeguards agreement with the IAEA are: Angola, Bahrain, Benin,

Korea and Taiwan show that the above-mentioned non-proliferation arrangements did not preclude these states from pursuing nuclear weapons capabilities even though they have committed themselves not to do so.

Non-proliferation cases studied by these scholars and their justifications for the use of the terms "abandon," "dismantle," "forbear," "forgo," "forswear," "give up," "relinquish," and "renounce," combined with an understanding of the linguistic meanings of these terms, indicate that there is no unequivocally substantial difference between them. In effect, they are almost synonyms with very little semantic dissimilarities and are used interchangeably to convey the same message, a retreat from conducting nuclear weapons programs. Scholars have used almost the same terms to describe the same idea. Mitchell Reiss has used both the verb "relinquish" and, more technically, the verb "dismantle" to describe South Africa's case. Scott Sagan has defined the cases of South Africa, Argentina and Brazil by using the terms "give up" and "abandon." The terms "abandon" and "dismantle" were put by Tanya Ogilvie-White as to describe the cases of South Africa, Ukraine, and North Korea. Paul has used the terms "forgo" and "forswear" to explain, among other cases, those of Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, and Ukraine. Here, it is notable that Paul's justification for the use of these terms is inconsistent with the linguistic meanings of the terms. Paul writes:

> I do not use the verb 'renounce' to describe the phenomenon of nuclear forbearance because it implies giving up nuclear weapons 'definitely'. Instead, I use the 'forgo' and 'forswear' interchangeably, as national decisions in this realm are contingent and context-dependent.[32]

But these terms are, by definition, definite and have nothing to do with the "contingent" or "context-depending" nature of the non-proliferation decisions. Thus, attention should

policies. The term *suspend* is thought to be the most suitable. The dictionary definition of the verb "suspend" is "to debar or cause to withdraw temporarily from any privilege, office, or function ... to cause (as an action, process, practice, use) to cease for a time: stop temporarily."[33]

Consequently, I propose the following as to remedy the inadequacies of the previous literature:

1- Regional enduring rivals' security policies are determined mainly by the level and type of regional security threats that they face, while domestic politics, such as democratic transitions, regime change, decision-makers succession or economic situation, have little to do with these policies.

2- Enduring rivals' nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation policies correspond to the level and different phases of their rivalries. On the one hand, in low-level enduring rivalries, the possibility of nuclear weapons programs abandonment is greater than in high-level enduring rivalries whereby nuclear weapons program suspension is more likely. On the other hand, coercive and hostile steps taken during the increasing tension phase may include pursuing nuclear weapons capability (either in the form of initiation or reactivation) as a way of deterrence. While the relaxation steps taken during the decreasing tension phase may include the suspension of these programs instead of giving them up.

3- Enduring rivals may give up their nuclear weapons programs only when the causes of rivalry cease to exist. Otherwise nuclear non-proliferation policies they might take indicate the suspension of these programs.

## Conceptual Framework

Based on the literature surveyed earlier, there are three major models that have been used to analyze nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation policies (Realist/ Systemic/ security Model, Bureaucratic/ Domestic Model, and Cognitive/ Individual Model). This study utilizes the realist/ systemic approach. However, this study does so through some modifications by integrating and building upon two notions that have been introduced separately in the previous literature, namely multi-causality and prudential elements of realism.

To elaborate:

1. Singular explanations for nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation are not sufficient. As Sagan put it:

> Multi-causality, rather than measurement error, lies at the heart of nuclear proliferation problem. Nuclear weapons proliferation and nuclear restraint have occurred in the past, and can occur in the future, for more than one reason: different historical cases are best explained by different causal models.[34]

The research project at hand argues that in enduring rivalries, some reasons included in the "systemic model," namely the quest for security, seeking regional hegemony, and obtaining bargaining advantages, may all push a state towards pursuing the development of nuclear weapons. That is in the sense that security comes first in the calculations of a state pursuing the development of nuclear weapons. However, "security threat perception" does not only evolve from direct military threats alone. It is also influenced by other key variables such as international status (international isolation/ international integration).

2. For international status (international isolation/ international integration),

suffer from international isolation, may consider the development of nuclear weapons out of the perception that they would not receive external support in their respective conflicts.[35] This study builds upon these two notions by utilizing both in analyzing enduring rivals' nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation policies.

3.  This study adopts T.V. Paul's "Prudential Realism" theory. This theory argues that:

> States are security-conscious entities, but their military policies are driven by "most probable threat" assessments, as opposed to the worst-case assessments offered by hard realism. Cautiousness and enlightened self-interests characterize states' behavior ... States accordingly balance their interests and capabilities so as to minimize the security challenges they pose to others and in the expectation of reciprocal benign behavior in return.[36]

As far as nuclear weapons are concerned, prudential realism asserts that "a non-great power decision to acquire or go without nuclear weapons is determined largely by the level and type of security threats that it faces ... [and that] Nations under certain circumstances may prudently forgo military capabilities that other states see as threatening."[37] This study builds upon this theory in the sense of, first, examining its application to enduring rivalry regions and, second, replacing the possibility of "forbearance" with "revision" that allows considering the possibility of suspension of nuclear weapons programs.

[34] Sagan, "Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons?" 85.

## Terminology

Terms employed in this study include the following expressions:

*Enduring rivalry's increasing tension phase*

The "increasing tension" phase refers to a period in which threat perception intensifies and the rivals consider tougher security policies to correspond to the changes in security threat perception. During this period, at least one side of the dyad takes coercive actions or commits specific practices that are considered by the other side as very threatening.

*Enduring rivalry's decreasing tension phase*

The "decreasing tension" phase refers to a period in which the threat perception is reduced and the rivals halt previous coercive actions and take relaxation steps. During this phase, however, diplomatic confrontations and verbal hostility continue.

*Nuclear-capable state*

It is a state that has the potential to produce nuclear weapons. This nuclear potential comprises the first two (out of eight) steps in the nuclear ladder: 1) the establishment of a basic nuclear infrastructure (reactor and personnel); and 2) the development of an infrastructure to produce weapon- grade material (a separation plant for the production of plutonium, or uranium enrichment facility).[38]

*Abandonment of nuclear weapons program*

It means the perpetual and complete giving up of existing nuclear weapons capability by a state that once possessed it. However, since no inspection regime could ever be developed that would eliminate the possibility of secret conversion from civilian

nuclear energy production to military weaponization,[39] the abandonment of nuclear weapons program is only assured when the causes of rivalry cease to exist.

*Suspension of nuclear weapons program*

This refers to a situation in which a nuclear-capable state's previously initiated (or reactivated) nuclear weapons program is dormant. A nuclear weapons program is considered suspended when the aforementioned nuclear capability is maintained while the efforts pertaining to produce nuclear devices, including weapon-grade uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing, are kept inoperative.

Embedded in the "suspension of nuclear weapons program" concept is the non-declaratory nature of the intention to suspend. Unlike the possession of nuclear weapons (declared by testing a nuclear device) or the abandonment of nuclear weapons (expressed through an official commitment to prohibit testing, manufacture, production of nuclear weapons and assured through the termination of the rivalry), the suspension of nuclear weapons programs is not made public. Rather, in case of suspension, the commitment not to produce nuclear weapons or the adherence to the NPT is used as a camouflage. Simply, a state whose intention is to continue the development of its nuclear weapons program, in violation of its previous official commitment, is not expected to declare such an intention, lest of the repercussions of that, such as losing credibility and possible international sanctions. That is why one can hardly find any document that refers to a state's suspension of its nuclear weapons program. However, interestingly, only the case of North Korea may have insinuated to that. Article 3 of the 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea provided for the *freeze* of North Korea's graphite-moderated nuclear reactors and related facilities, but the *eventual dismantlement*

of these reactors and facilities was conditioned by the completion of the Light-Water Reactors (LWRs) that were intended to replace the graphite-moderated reactors.[40] Thus, reliable evidence of "suspension" could be discerned from: (1) observing the existence of a nuclear capability, when the enduring rivalry is not terminated, and/or (2) the reactivation of the weapons program after being, nominally, abandoned according to a previous official declaration. Then, what takes place during the period between the country's "official commitment to abandon the program" and its "reactivation of the program" would be nothing but suspension.

Suspension of nuclear weapons programs goes parallel to decreasing tension phases of enduring rivalry. The rationale standing behind nuclear-capable enduring rivals' consideration of the suspension of their nuclear weapons programs is that the other two probable alternatives, the abandonment of the program or continuing its development, would not be available during this phase. On the one hand, enduring rivals cannot afford giving up their nuclear weapons programs permanently as long as the motivations to pursue the development of nuclear weapons, i.e., their respective enduring rivalries, still persist. On the other hand, they are motivated by other incentives, which are international integration and mitigation of security threats, not to continue the development of the program. When the latter incentives disappear, as a result of heightened tension between the rivals, enduring rivals find themselves in a position that necessitates the reactivation of their dormant nuclear weapons programs.

## Research Problem

Some regional enduring rivals, such as North Korea, South Korea and Taiwan, decide to initiate nuclear weapons programs and then suspend them. The existing literature on enduring rivalries, according to which the latter go on constantly with little possibility of retreat unless they are terminated, cannot explain these suspensions. Also, the existing literature on nuclear proliferation ignores the possibility of the suspension of nuclear weapons programs altogether.

## Research Questions

1. Why does a nuclear- capable state, engaged in an enduring rivalry, initiate a nuclear weapons program and then suspend it?

2. How does the nature of enduring rivalry influence the decisions to initiate and suspend a nuclear weapons program?

These questions are important for contemporary policy as well as for theory. "More than 45 percent of disputes have occurred within the context of enduring rivalries … [and] the propensity for war grows dramatically as one moves from isolated conflict to the most severe enduring rivalries."[41] At the same time, nuclear weapons acquisition by enduring rivals is seen as a deterrent power in many cases like Argentina, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Israel, South Korea, North Korea and Taiwan. According to T.V. Paul, "nuclear deterrent relationships are most pertinent among enduring rivals...Nuclear weapons are presumed to reduce the opportunity and willingness of enduring rivals to initiate war, as the cost of attack is higher than any perceived benefits

gained through battle."[42] There are other factors that further enhance these questions' theoretical and policy relevance. First, the interplay between economic benefits and security interests of enduring rivals parallels contemporary theoretical debates between liberalism and realism. Second, the proposed topic addresses the question of the relationship between domestic politics and non-proliferation. Because Argentina and Brazil have forgone their nuclear weapons programs after having made the transition to democratic government, some scholars, like Reiss, tried to link democracy to nuclear non-proliferation.

## Hypotheses

1. Different levels and phases of enduring rivalry, which depend on the fluctuation of international status and security threats, determine the nuclear policies of the nuclear-capable rivals.

2. In high-level enduring rivalries, the likelihood to initiate/ reactivate nuclear weapons programs is high when the rivalry passes an increasing tension phase.

3. High-level enduring rivals may consider suspension of their nuclear weapons programs when the rivalry passes a decreasing tension phase.

   Thus, the dependent variable is the suspension of nuclear weapons programs by high-level enduring rivals. The independent variables are the fluctuation of international status (international isolation/ international integration) and security threats. The intervening variable is "different phases of enduring rivalry."

## Methodology

This study draws on comparative case- study and process-tracing methods. On the one hand, the selection of case-study method is based on the merits it has as compared with other methods, i.e., large-$N$ analysis and experimentation.[43] Using large-$N$ analysis would repeat the inadequacies of the previous literature, such as leaving little space for the determination of the conditions of rivalry phases and policy change. Moreover, it is much more practical to use case study method in this research as long as nuclear-capable enduring rivals' cases are numerically few. Meanwhile, multi-case comparison will allow generalization for the findings and facilitate a more thorough theory testing. Experimentation is not favored out of the lack of control over independent variables.

On the other hand, process-tracing method constitutes an exploration of chain of events in a process that links initial conditions to outcomes. The link between the independent variables and the dependent variable is found in the sequence and structure of the process steps. Each of these steps should be given observable evidence by the investigator.[44] Given that, this method is chosen because of the following reasons:

1. It allows the deliberate following of changes throughout a long period of time, as it is the case with *enduring* rivalries.

2. It enables this research to sequentially connect independent variable, intervening variable and dependent variable together.

3. "By providing more observation to the implications of a theory, such a method can help to overcome the dilemmas of small-$n$ research."[45]

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[43] See Janet B. Johnson and Richard Joslyn, *Political Science Research Methods* (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 1995). Chapter 5.

Also, using process-tracing and case-study methods is consistent with the notion that nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation must be studied with the relevant political-historical context.

The case studies include four countries: North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, and South Africa. Indeed there are other nuclear-capable enduring rivals, such as India, Iran, Israel and Pakistan. However, an examination of all these cases is beyond the scope of this study. The cases of North Korea, South Korea and Taiwan are expected to show that because of their respective on-going enduring rivalries, these countries have simply *suspended* their nuclear weapons programs. South Africa's case is studied as a control case to demonstrate the difference between the suspension and the abandonment of nuclear weapons programs. As South Africa's nuclear case shows, it *gave up* its nuclear weapons program because its enduring rivalry was terminated.

Case- selection is based on two criteria. First, these countries share similar characteristics. They have been involved in enduring rivalries since the late 1940s, except South Africa whose rivalry began in the early 1960s. The four countries have been nuclear-capable for many years, and they have initiated and later suspended (or given up) nuclear weapons programs. *North Korea* launched a nuclear weapons program in the early 1990s but shortly in 1994, it promised to dismantle it. Nevertheless, Pyongyang retreated from this commitment in 2002 and reactivated its nuclear program. *South Korea* first initiated its nuclear weapons program in 1970 and continued its development with ups and downs along the 1970s until 1980 when it suspended it. *Taiwan* did conduct, with ups and downs, a secret nuclear weapons program since the late 1960s. However, it promised the United States in 1976-1977 that it would not engage in any activities related

program in the mid-1970s while it has chosen to dismantle it only in the early 1990s as a result of its enduring rivalry's termination.

Second, they are outlier cases whose nuclear policies are poorly explained by existing theories. Scholary works on these countries interpret their non-proliferation policies either as a result of security guarantees provided by a superpower ally (such as South Korea and Taiwan cases), or in return for economic incentives (such as North Korea's case). Previous literature fails to recognize the "larger framework," i.e., enduring rivalry dynamics, of these countries' nuclear-relevant decisions. By so doing, previous literature offers only narrow explanations.

This study employs several measurement means of independent variables. The 1996 version of Militarized Disputes Data Set of Correlates of War Project and other relevant sources provide the number and level of militarized disputes. Annual growth rates of Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, combined with the economic history of the case in hand, shall provide a reliable indicator for economic conditions.

# PART II

# CASE STUDIES

CHAPTER THREE

THE TWO KOREAS


**Enduring Rivalry Context**

According to the four parameters of enduring rivalry displayed in CHAPTER

ONE, that are causes, manifestations, perceptions, and temporal domain, conflict in the

Korean peninsula constituted a full-fledged high-level enduring rivalry.


Causes

This is a dyadic enduring rivalry between North Korea, or the Democratic

People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and South Korea, or the Republic of Korea

(ROK). It resulted from a dispute over a nonnegotiable territory, irreconcilable political

ideologies, and the denial of the other's right to exist. Since the proclamation of the two

Koreas in 1948, each of them claimed the right to exclusively represent the entire

nation and these claims still persist today. Furthermore, the two Korean brethren's

regimes are a replica of the Cold War world division, with all the political and

economic implications it entailed; a capitalist South *vs.* a communist North:

> The people of the ROK are passionately anticommunist. It is the
> basic ingredient of their faith and the root of their political and social
> action. They *hate* communism and the Communists for the destruction and
> death they caused by the Korean War... The anticommunist atmosphere in
> the ROK is reminiscent of McCarthyism at an earlier period in the United

As for the North Koreans, "the [communist] ideology of the North resembles a religious creed far more than a political dogma. Passionately hostile to the ROK, the North is intensely security conscious."[2] Besides holding totally antagonistic systems, both Koreas adopted irreconcilable approaches to the unification of their nation. In the words of M.P. Srivastava:

> South and North Korea took essentially 'irreconcilable' approaches to the unification of Korea. The North has persistently insisted upon the withdrawal of foreign troops and non-interference of foreign powers, including the United Nations, in the Korean conflict... South Korea, however, consistently linked the unification problem basically with the question of security of the South against communism and has put forward an aggressive posture against the communization problem.[3]

The importance each party attached to its claim, that is reunification under its own regime, made it impossible to reach a compromise and, consequently, each party denied the other's right to exist.

## Manifestations and Temporal Domain

According to MID/COW data, between 1949 and 1992 South Korea and North Korea were involved in twenty militarized disputes in a constant frequency rate.[4] As such, it fits the enduring rivalry temporal dimension of at least twenty years of conflict.

## Perceptions

Bearing in mind the aforementioned causes of rivalry, each Korea perceived its survival at stake. Technically, the two Koreas are still in a state of war against each other, as the armistice agreement of July 27, 1953 ending the Korean War (1950-1953) constitutes a mere cease-fire which did not touch upon the disputed issues. Each Korea,

claiming that the other was the one which initiated the Korean War, suspects that the other may launch a second Korean War in order to destroy its opponent's political and economic system. On the one hand, the DPRK views its security situation as following:

> A triangular alliance of the United States, Japan, and south Korea is conspiring to repeat what north Korea claims to have been the aggression of 1950 against the peace-loving people of the Democratic Republic ... North Korea therefore holds that it must maintain a high state of readiness to repel this aggression.[5]

On the other hand, South Korea's threat perception is no less intense than that of North Korea. The ROK's fear that North Korea might resort to force, as was the case in the Korean War, to reunify the country under its political system, led the ROK to depend on its own strength to deter possible military aggression from the North and defeat the latter's invading forces should deterrence fail.[6] The situation across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between the two countries gives a clear indication of the dyad's threat perceptions:

> On hair-trigger alert behind the fortifications are two of the world's largest aggregations of military force -- 1.1 million North Koreans facing 660,000 South Koreans and 37,000 Americans, the latter backed by the full military power of the world's most powerful nation. All sides are heavily armed and ready at a moment's notice to fight another bloody and devastating war.[7]

There are several other factors that have further aggravated the two Koreas' threat perceptions. These included the protractedness of the rivalry in the sense that it fluctuated between escalation and deescalation many times for more than half a century without a foreseeable end. Repeated failures of reunification attempts and the

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[4] See "Militarized Interstate Dispute Data (1/1/96)," [on line]; available from:

superpowers' involvement during the Cold War have also deepened the dyadic mistrust and suspicion. Finally, throughout their long-standing rivalry, the two Koreas have reached the threshold of a general war more than once. For example, after the discovery of a vast network of underground tunnels beneath the DMZ in 1974, "American and South Korean forces faced a threat of surprise attack from beneath behind their forward defense lines."[8] The two Koreas now face a similar situation in which a nuclear war in the Korean peninsula is not a remote contingency.

## The Korean Enduring Rivalry: Initiation and Phases

Following the surrender of Japan at the end of World War II, the Japanese colony in the Korean peninsula was divided at the thirty-eighth parallel between the two major Allied Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, in August 1945. Each of the superpowers had supported the political independence of its zone of occupation. The U.S.-backed Republic of Korea, in the South, was proclaimed on August 15, 1948 while the Soviet-backed Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in the North, was proclaimed on September 9, 1948.[9] Each Korea claimed sovereignty over the entire peninsula. For still controversial reasons, the North invaded the South on June 25, 1950 – in an attempt to reunify the country under the communist rule in Pyongyang – marking the onset of the Korean War. The U.S.-led United Nations forces confronted the Soviet and Chinese-backed Northern forces in a three-year war that had massively devastating consequences on the Korean population and infrastructure. The fighting was ended by an armistice in 1953 and the Demilitarized Zone was established between the two Koreas at the thirty-eighth parallel.

Since the end of the Korean War, each of the Koreas followed a totally different track, in political and economic terms as well. On the one hand, North Korea adopted a totalitarian, communist and one-party political system dominated by the Korean Workers' Party under the absolute leadership of Kim Il Sung, and later his heir and son, Kim Jong Il. This autocratic regime, which hardly permitted any political freedoms or civil rights, remains in power today. North Korea's state-led economy was "more centralized, more controlled, and more ideologically orthodox and monocratic than those of the world's other communist states."[10] North Korea was, politically and economically, guided by the so-called *Juche* philosophy – introduced for the first time by Kim Il Sung in 1955 and defined by Kim as "independence in politics, self-sustenance in the economy and self-defense in national defense."[11] On the other hand, South Korea "had been dominated by strong rulers exercising virtually unchecked powers [except the period between July 1960 and May 1961 when it was governed by democratically elected leaders] … During General Park Chung Hee lengthy reign and the successor rule of General Chun Doo Hwan, the South experienced dramatic economic gains, but its political arrangements seemed frozen in time."[12] Though not being ruled democratically until 1987, citizens of the South enjoyed many civil rights, as the margin of freedoms of thought, expression and religion was larger by any measurement than those in the North. Seoul adopted the capitalist economy formula, including the privatization of the means of production, the diversification of decision-

[10] Eui-Gak Hwang, *The Korean Economics: A Comparison of North and South* (Oxford:

making processes and the built-in stabilization mechanism, which operates principally in accordance with market laws.[13]

## Phase I

Throughout almost a decade ahead from the Korean War, there was little hostility between the two Koreas. According to MID/COW data, there were four militarized disputes between North and South Korea between 1954 and 1964.[14] Neither military incidents nor other provocations were reported during this period. After the conclusion of the armistice agreement, "Seoul was convinced of all possible political and economic support as well as a Mutual Defense Pact [in 1953] against any communist aggression."[15] Seoul gained further security assurances through the Declaration of the Sixteenth of July 27, 1953, which stated that "if there should be a renewal of hostilities, they [the nations that contributed troops to the United Nations action in 1950-1953] would be prompt to resist."[16] Also, a U.S./ROK Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation was concluded in 1956.[17] Over and above, "two American divisions [about 62,000 troops], with sophisticated equipment and substantial support units in and about Korea, remained on station in the ROK after 1955."[18] Of utmost importance was the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea in 1957.[19]

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[13] See Hwang, *The Korean Economics*, 26.

[14] See "Militarized Interstate Dispute Data (1/1/96)," [on line]; available from: http://pss.la.psu.edu/MID_DATA.HTM; Internet; accessed on 12/2/2002.

[15] Srivastava, *The Korean Conflict*, 44.

[16] Macdonald, *The Korean*, 229.

For North Korea, the last Chinese troops – who came during the Korean War to rescue the DPRK from a serious defeat - were withdrawn from there in 1958. Yet Pyongyang was able to compensate for that in 1961 by the conclusion of treaties with both China and the Soviet Union that provided considerable security guarantees. This came out of Kim Il Sung's maneuverability between the two communist giants:

> In July 1961 he went to Moscow and persuaded Nikita Khrushchev, who was seeking to recruit him as an ally against China, to sign a treaty of "friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance," pledging to come to Pyongyang's aid in case of a new war on the divided peninsula. This done, Kim proceeded to Beijing, where he presented Chinese leaders with his Moscow treaty and asked them to match it, which they did by signing their own treaty nearly identical accord.[20]

The credibility of these treaties came through the provision of Chinese and Soviet extensive support. This included the supply of military experts, armaments upgrading programs and other security ties.

On the international level, both Koreas were balanced concerning their respective international status at the time. However, this balance leaned relatively toward South Korea's favor. For South Korea:

> [Between 1948 and 1960] the ROK pursued 'a rigid, self-isolating foreign policy of the cold-war years', designed to consolidate relations with friendly countries only. [ROK President] Rhee's dictum was 'no contact with the Communist block; no contact with North Korea, and no contact with the Third World. Resident embassies were established in only 17 countries in these years.[21]

Thus, South Korea preferred exclusively the development of relations with the United States and other Western countries rather than a larger international integration. In the United Nations, both Koreas were denied full membership, but "South Korea had

nonetheless acquired permanent observer status in 1949."[22] In addition, the UN voting pattern on resolutions regarding the Korean question was in favor of South Korea during this period. Gills writes:

> From 1947 to 1961, the composition of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) was such that an overwhelming majoring was in favor of the US-South Korea interpretation of the Korean Question: i.e. that South Korea was the only legitimate government of Korea recognized as such by the UN; that only South Korea be allowed to participate in UN debates on the Korean question; that the UNC/US military presence in South Korea was necessary to keep the peace.[23]

As for North Korea, it applied in 1949 for membership in the United Nations, but the international organization rejected the application. "Kim Il Sung attended the Bandung conference in 1955 … In 1960 (according to DPRK material) the state was a member of 49 international organizations."[24] In 1961 and 1963, full diplomatic partners of the DPRK were 15 and 18 respectively.[25]

## Phase II

Since the mid-1960 until the late 1970, hostility intensified between the two Koreas. According to MID/COW data, there were seven militarized disputes between North and South Korea between 1964 and 1979.[26] Military incidents and other severe provocations were also reported. With the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States being effective, the ROK was secure from a possible North Korean attack. Buss

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[22] Ibid., 72.
[23] Gills, "Prospects for Peace and Stability in Northeast Asia," 305.
[24] Hazel Smith, "North Korean Foreign Policy in the 1990s: the Realist Approach," in *North*

reported on the military cooperation between the ROK and the United States before 1969 by stating:

> In addition to marinating troops and bases in the ROK, The United States energetically pushed a program to strengthen the Korean armed forces… A large part of the U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP) expenditures went directly to meet the budgetary needs of the ROK, providing money for the ROK defense forces and building up the ROK's defense-related infrastructure.[27]

International status balance appeared to lean to South Korea's favor in the mid-1960s. President Park Chung Hee, who took office in 1961, changed his predecessor's diplomatic course in pursuit of international integration of South Korea. Hee's motto was to "boldly open the doors of the nation to the world."[28] But it was not until the mid-1960s that this new policy got its results. The number of South Korea's full diplomatic partners was 67 and 76 in 1963 and 1967 respectively.[29] Notably, South Korea normalized relations with Japan through the Korea-Japan Basic Treaty of 1965.[30] In the United Nations, the voting pattern on the Korean question was in support of South Korea in 1965 and 1966.[31] At the same time, the ROK remained the sole legitimate government of Korea in the eyes of the United Nations. This automatically indicates a low level of international support for North Korea and a high degree of international isolation at the time. The competition over diplomatic recognition was no better than the situation in the UN, as North Korea had only 18 and 25 full diplomatic partners in 1963 and 1967 respectively.

That coincided with the fading support from North Korea's principal sponsor, the Soviet Union. The great communist schism between the Soviet Union and China in

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[27] Buss, *The United States and The Republic of Korea*, 71-72.

1961 obliged North Korea to select one of the two communist giants to ally with. The DPRK preferred to choose China because of Kim Il Sung's dissatisfaction with the reformist policies of Khrushchev, that contradicted the Stalinist model North Korea was following in its internal and external politics as well. The split was pushed further by Soviet declamations against the Stalinist "cult of personality" which Kim emulated (these were used against Kim Il Sung by his political opponents in 1956).[32] Consequently, Soviet security commitment to the DPRK was shaken following the deterioration of relations with Moscow. For example, "after Kim Il Sung's falling out with Soviet leader Khrushchev in 1962, the Soviets withdrew their advisers and refused to upgrade Korean armaments."[33] In addition, "the Soviet Union suspended economic assistance to North Korea after 1962, and Kim Swang-hyop, who had been sent to the Soviet Union in that year with a request for military aid, returned to Pyongyang empty-handed."[34]

By the late 1960s, the Korean peninsula witnessed an intensification of military confrontations, incidents and other provocations mainly initiated by North Korea. The most notable one was the North's attempted assassination of the ROK's President in January 1968 by a thirty-one-man commando team, which was aborted by the ROK's security. These accidents also included the North Korean landing of 120 provocateurs on the eastern seacoast in October 1968.[35] Interestingly, North Korea made no effort to hide the aim of such a campaign. Macdonald reports:

> Kim Il Sung in 1970 called for "revolutionary violence" and "mass struggle against fascism" in South Korea. The might of the north Korean

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[31] Ibid., 306.

[32] See Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, 154; A. James Gregor and Maria Hsia Chang, *The Iron*

army has been said to be poised to strike the "main blow" against imperialist lackeys in the south in support of popular revolution when it comes.[36]

These acts were also accompanied by provocative actions by the North against the United States, South Korea's ally and protector:

> The height of North Korea anti-Americanism came in the late 1960s, when the United States was embroiled in Vietnam... [In January 1968] the North Koreans captured a U.S. naval intelligence vessel, the USS *Pueblo* and held it and its crew for eleven months, finally extracting a statement of guilt and apology from the United States ...The following year [1969], the North Koreans shot down an unarmed U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft over the East Sea (Sea of Japan), with the loss of its entire thirty-one-man crew.[37]

However, the situation turned to the North's favor in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. The United Nations General Assembly, mainly due to the admission of large number of newly independent African states, showed growing tendency towards adopting pro-DPRK resolutions. Therefore, "South Korea was ... placed somewhat on the defensive in the UNGA throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, a period during which South Korean combat involvement in Vietnam cost it the support of many non-aligned governments."[38] For the competition over international recognition, North Korea did prevail as the number of its full diplomatic partners rose from 25 to 87 between 1967 and 1975, while that of South Korea rose only from 76 to 92.[39] Oberdorfer displays a clearer picture of the shift in the diplomatic situations of the two Koreas at the time:

> At the end of 1970, before the move toward [the two Koreas' bilateral] talks began, North Korea had diplomatic relations with only thirty-one countries, nearly all of them socialist regimes, while South Korea had diplomatic relations with eighty-on countries. Immediately following the start of North-South dialogue, Pyongyang gained recognition from five Western European nations and many more neutral countries, on a par with

South Korea's relations with ninety-six. The North also gained entry for the first time to the UN's World Health Organization and, as a result, sent its first permanent UN observer mission to New York and Geneva.[40]

In addition, geopolitical changes in Southeast Asia deriving from the Nixon Doctrine of 1969 and the détente between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as China in 1971, resulted in dissatisfying implications for South Korea. In broad terms, Nixon Doctrine ruled out direct involvement of U.S. forces in other countries' wars, and East Asia in particular. "The Nixon Doctrine provided that the United States would systematically and deliberately lower its military profile in East Asia and the western Pacific. Nixon made it clear that the United States would make a greater effort for peaceful coexistence with its communist adversaries, but would not bear the responsibility for stability and peace alone."[41] Notably, this coincided with the United States' decision to gradually withdraw from the Vietnamese conflict. So, in accordance with Nixon Doctrine and despite vehement protests by the ROK, the United States withdrew 20,000 of its 62,000 troops stationed in South Korea[42] (according to other estimates the force reduction was from 70,000 to 44,000 troops).[43] It shook South Korea's confidence in U.S. credibility and security commitment to the extent that "[ROK President] Park took these developments as 'a message to the Korean people that we won't rescue you if North Korea invades again.'"[44]

Détente between the superpowers in the region, the United States, the Soviet Union and China, had its negative repercussions as well. On the one hand, Sino-American rapprochement began with Henry Kissinger's secret visit to Beijing in 1971, and reached its culmination with Nixon's subsequent visit in 1972 and the long-awaited

U.S. recognition of the People's Republic of China. For South Korea, this implied "the U.S. acceptance of a hostile, powerful, and revolutionary country in South Korea's immediate neighborhood, tied by a military alliance to North Korea."[45] Even before Nixon's visit to Beijing, South Korea felt betrayed by its closest ally. In a letter to President Nixon, ROK President wrote: "This series of developments contained an unprecedented peril to our people's survival."[46] To make the situation worse, the United States and China "reached an agreement on the principle of self-determination for Korea, making possible the unanimous decision of the UNGA in 1973 to allow the DPRK to participate in the UN debate for the first time."[47] Also, Nixon's simultaneous push for détente with the Soviet Union seem to have had similar effects but not to the extent resulted from that with China.

It could be argued that the détente between the United States, the Soviet Union and China has also negatively affected North Korea's sense of security as it was the case with South Korea. Nevertheless, this effect was less than that on South Korea because, first, the DPRK split with the USSR was already there some years ago. Second, North Korea gained further political and security assurances from China. The Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai's efforts are illustrative in this regard:

> In 1970 Zhou and Kim jointly announced their conviction that the presence of U.S. troops in Korea and the revival of Japanese militarism were the greatest threats to peace and security in Asia. They called on the United States to withdraw its troops and on Japan to abrogate its treaty with the United States and to abolish its military bases... When the DPRK and the ROK began reunification talks after the U.S.-China détente, Zhou Enlai gave his unequivocal support to all proposals of the DPRK. He endorsed the "just stand of the Korean people" for withdrawal of U.S. troops, the mutual reduction of the armed forces of the DPRK and the ROK, and a political

consultative conference between democratic elements in North and South leading to a confederation government for a unified Korea.[48]

These political assurances were accompanied by effective military and economic aid to North Korea:

> Later in the year [1971], the Chinese approved new economic aid and signed the first agreement on military aid to North Korea in fifteen years. The results began to appear the following April, when newly arrived Chinese tanks clanked through Pyongyang's Kim Il Sung Square in the parade for the North Korean leader's birthday. At the same time, China began supplying North Korea with its models of Russia's MiG-19 supersonic fighter planes.[49]

At the same time, some progressive developments on the bilateral level between the two Koreas in the early 1970s should not be disregarded. Following reciprocal secret visits in 1971, the ROK and the DPRK began an official dialogue in 1972 (known as the Red Cross Talks) and reached an agreement on new principles to achieve national unification, as manifested in their Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972. In 1973, the two Koreas exchanged national unification proposals. The most important of these were President Park's Seven-Point Declaration of June 23, 1973 and the subsequent President Kim Il Sung's Five-Point Program.[50]

However, it would be misleading to conclude that these contacts were indicators for actual improvement in the dyadic relationship. The frailty of the dialogue was soon exposed by violent and provocative actions that shortly followed, and sometimes even synchronized, the dialogue activities. In addition, and most importantly, the two Koreas mistrusted each other and perceived the dialogue as a mere tactical move in their long duration rivalry. In an interesting display of the two sides' views and approaches to the dialogue, Oberdorfer reports:

Kim Il Sung saw the North-South dialogue as a way to wean the South Korean regime away from the United States and Japan and to bring about the withdrawal of U.S. troops. Shortly after the July 4, 1972, joint statement, Kim's ambassador in Berlin, Lee Chang Su, in a confidential presentation to the East German Politburo, said that "the party and government of North Korea will concentrate on forcing South Korean leaders into agreement, to free them from U.S. and Japanese influence and to allow no U.S. intervention." ... President Park, according to his longtime aide, Kim Seong Jin, saw the dialogue as a helpful tactic in a harsh environment in which North Korean military power was a serious threat. "As long as you can touch an opponent with at least one hand," said Park, "you can tell whether he will attack." Park had no belief or interest in unification in his lifetime, his aide said, and little interest in making compromises to bring fruits from the North-South contacts.[51]

That is to say that, unlike widespread optimistic expectations at the time, neither Kim Il Sung nor Park Chung Hee was keen to extract serious results out of these talks. That is why it is plausible that what motivated Pyongyang and Seoul towards such a dialogue was the need to balance the détente between the two superpowers rather than a willingness to compromise their fiercely competing policies as a step towards reunifying their divided nation.

On the ground, and despite the ongoing dialogue, the conflict not only persisted, but also escalated as a result of the reciprocally provocative actions and policies of the two Koreas. In a direct response to the departure of the U.S. Seventh Division from South Korea, "President Park immediately implemented his controversial emergency decrees. He felt that these would minimize the dangers of subversion... [In 1973], he recalled the South Korean troops from Vietnam to assume defense responsibilities in South Korea that had previously been borne by Americans."[52] In 1974, North Korea retried to get rid of the ROK's President after its aborted attempt of 1968. A North Korean agent attempted in vain to assassinate President Park on August 15, 1974, the

ROK's national day, in the National Theatre in Seoul.[53] Three months later, in November

1974, South Korean soldiers discovered a vast network of underground tunnels beneath

the DMZ. The North Korean-made tunnels were capable of infiltrating well-armed

troops to the South if the decision was made in Pyongyang to launch an attack. A

testimony of a North Korean defector in September 1974 further shows the irrelevance

of the 1971-1972 Korean dialogue to the actual situation:

> The defector, Kim Pu Song, said that extensive tunnel digging had
> been ordered from the highest echelons of the party in late 1972, not long
> after the North-South joint statement in which the two sides agreed to work
> for peaceful unification and "not to undertake provocations against one
> another, whether on a large or small scale.[54]

Here, it is of particular importance to know the extent to which Seoul was alarmed by

the discovery of these tunnels under the DMZ. For instance, "on one occasion, the

[ROK's] minister of defense remarked: 'In regular warfare North Korea can dispatch

division-strength forces through the largest tunnels in a single hour, capture strategic

positions behind the forward defense line, and completely isolate the advance defense

contingent.'"[55]

One of the most provocative measures taken by South Korea was the initiation

of its nuclear weapons program. In effect, the ROK's nuclear program began in 1956

with the conclusion of the U.S.-ROK Atomic Energy Agreement. In March 1959 the

Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute was established as an affiliate of the Office

of Atomic Energy. South Korea completed its first nuclear research reactor in 1962. In

1968, South Korea opened bids on its first nuclear power plant (whose construction

started in the early 1970s), and the decision was taken in 1969 to study nuclear fuel cycle requirements.[56]

Information is not available on the exact date of making the decision to start the nuclear weapons program. Yet it is safe to say that the South Korean nuclear weapons program began at some point between 1970 and 1971. President Park instructed the establishment of "a clandestine Weapons Exploitation Committee [WEC], answerable only to the Blue House, after faster and better armed North Korean speedboats overwhelmed a South Korean patrol boat in June 1970 and forced it to the North."[57] Also, a former high-ranking member of the WEC is reported to telling U.S. investigators that in 1970 "the WEC voted unanimously to proceed with the development of nuclear weapons."[58] What confirms such a testimony is that "South Korea began work on its first nuclear reactor in September 1970 …[and] a parallel secret weapons research begun at about the same time on the orders of President Park Chung Hee."[59] In any case, other scholars agree that just after the United States' decision to withdraw its Seventh Division from South Korea in 1971, President Park decided to start the nuclear weapons program.[60]

The ROK's civil nuclear program was based on American equipment and technology, with the US policy steered towards anti-proliferation, and hence the equipment lacked spent fuel reprocessing facilities. Consequently, South Korea approached France for cooperation in this regard in 1972, and both countries negotiated the purchase of a reprocessing facility. South Korea also started informal efforts abroad for its nuclear weapons program. For example, "in 1973, South Korea began a quiet drive

[56] _____, "Wild Courses of US Korea Policy," 38.

to recruit ethnic Korean nuclear, chemical and engineering specialists from the United States and Canada. It also began shopping abroad for exotic materials and equipment useful for nuclear weapons."[61] The nuclear weapons program remained secret until the United States learned about it in 1974-1975. Being highly alarmed by the possible destabilizing effects of a nuclear-armed South Korea, the United States exerted heavy pressure on the ROK to cancel the program – threatening to withdraw all American forces from South Korea. The latter yielded to the pressure and the project was shut down.[62] In addition, the ROK acceded to the NPT in April 1975. Nonetheless, it sought anew to get the French reprocessing facility in 1975. The United States response was immediate:

> The Ford administration threatened to withhold U.S. Export-Import Bank credits worth $275 million in direct low-interest loans and another $277 million in loans guarantees for South Korea's nuclear energy program, and it warned that the proposed deal [with France] would jeopardize U.S-South Korean security relations.[63]

Moreover, "the U.S. got Canada to hold up the proposed sale of a heavy water reactor to South Korea."[64] Again, South Korea backed off and canceled the contract with France.

The Korean rivalry witnessed some indicative developments shortly later. On the international level, "South Korea suffered a major diplomatic setback when its application to join the Non-Aligned Movement [in 1975] was rejected owing to its perceived status as a client state of America. North Korea's simultaneous application was, however, accepted."[65] In the United Nations, "the UNGA passed a resolution which in effect called for the end of the UN and the UN Commission's (UNC) role in Korea

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[60] See Mark B.M. Suh, *The "Korean Question" and problems of Nuclear Nonproliferation in East*

and the removal of foreign troops."[66] In general, the North Korean international status

improved tangibly:

> The DPRK became a member of various international
> organizations and from the mid-1970s, an active participant in various UN
> agencies such as WHO and UNESCO ... [it] by 1975, was a member of
> 141 international organizations. These organizations ranged from the
> International Telecommunications Organizations through the 'Group of
> 77' to the International Parliamentary Union.[67]

Moreover, "after 1975, the DPRK managed for a short time to sustain rough parity with

South Korea in the competition for diplomatic partners – 87 for the DPRK and 92 for the

ROK."[68] The fall of Vietnam and Cambodia in 1975 in the hands of communists

questioned anew the credibility of the United States' security guarantees to South Korea.

North Korea quickly got the message and was ready even to escalate if it had the

opportunity. When being received in Beijing in April 1975, Kim Il Sung declared:

> If revolution takes place in South Korea we, as one and the same
> nation, will not just look at it with folded arms and will strongly support the
> South Korean people... If the enemy ignites war recklessly, we shall
> resolutely answer it with war and completely destroy the aggressors. In this
> war we will only lose the Military Demarcation Line and will gain the
> country's unification.[69]

At this point, South Korean suspicions became unquestionable. The United States'

Ambassador in Seoul, Richard Sneider, "appealed [in April 1975] to Washington for an

urgent review of American policies in view of 'declining ROK confidence in [the] U.S.

commitment,' accompanied by a 'risk of North Korean provocation to test both U.S.

intentions and ROK capabilities.'"[70]

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[65] Geldenhuys, *Isolated States,* 73.

[66] Gills, "Prospects for Peace and Stability in Northeast Asia," 307.

In 1976, North Korea escalated the situation when its forces, on August 18, killed

two U.S. Army officers in the Joint Security Area (JSA) of the DMZ. This atrocious

accident, known as the "ax murder," was the first to take place in the JSA. Even before

the ax murder, the DPRK raised concerns over its intentions when it accused the United

States and the ROK of preparing for invading the North:

> On August 5 [1976] … North Korea issued a lengthy government
> statement charging that the United States and South Korea were stepping
> up plans to invade the North. Pyongyang claimed they "have now finished
> war preparations and are going over to the adventurous machination to
> directly ignite the fuse of the war." The declaration was highly unusual,
> being only the third official government statement on a Korea peninsular
> issue since the armistice.[71]

Nonetheless, after reviewing military retaliation options, "the Ford [administration]

decided against any military reprisals because of their potential for escalation into a

general war on the Korean peninsula."[72] For South Korea, this episode reached its

culmination when the Carter administration declared in 1977 that it would withdraw all

U.S. troops from South Korea, and decided to remove the U.S. nuclear weapons

stationed there. According to Carter's plan, only the U.S. air forces would remain in the

ROK.

The push that the ROK's nuclear weapons program received at this point is

remarkable. For example, "in August 1977, the South Korean Ministry of Science and

Technology announced plans to build its own reprocessing plant, without foreign

assistance."[73] A Korean testimony reveals the evidence that the purpose of such plan

was nothing but military:

> In 1993 Sunu Ryun, a legislator who had been an aide to President
> Park, revealed the existence of a report for the Defense Ministry that South

the weapon's existence during the Armed Forces Day ceremony in October 1981. This report was prepared in response to Carter's plan.[74]

Here, as was the case in 1974-1975, South Korea retreated from going ahead with its nuclear weapons program due to American pressures – including the threat of economic sanctions.[75] Later on, the United States officially suspended the withdrawal plan in 1979:

> On July 20 … [National Security Advisor] Brezizinski announced at the White House that further withdrawal of U.S. combat elements was being suspended until 1981… In the two and half years of the withdrawal program, only one combat battalion of 674 ground troops was actually withdrawn, while twelve more air force F-4 flights and their crews, totaling 900 troops had been sent to augment those already in Korea. Including various noncombat units and some that had previously been scheduled for reduction, Carter reduced the total U.S. military strength in Korea by only about 3.000 troops leaving nearly 37,000 in place. While Carter did not achieve his fervent aim of eliminating all U.S. nuclear weapons from Korean soil, he did reduce their number from nearly 700 to around 250.[76]

Nonetheless, the South Korean civil nuclear program was progressing between 1977 and 1979. In particular, "the ROK entered the age of nuclear energy in June 1977, when its first nuclear power plant [of 587 megawatts] went critical… In mid-1979 two nuclear power plants were under construction …Contracts for another two plants were awarded in August 1979."[77] At the same time, in 1979, the ROK had no fuel cycle facilities other than its first power reactor, two research reactors (one of 2-megawatt and the other of 0.25-megawatt capacity), and a limited fuel fabrication plant.[78]

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[74] Paul, *Power versus Prudence*, 121.

[75] See Ibid.

Phase III

Throughout almost a decade, from the late 1970s until the late 1980s, the Korean rivalry was notably mitigated. According to MID/COW data, there were five militarized disputes between North and South Korea between 1979 and 1989.[79] Only two provocations were reported during the same period.

The United States' cancellation of the withdrawal plan complemented other previous developments that enhanced the ROK's sense of security. In particular, "[in the late 1970s] the U.S. government covertly introduced tactical nuclear weapons in the southern part of the Korean peninsula and committed these to the defense of South Korea. Moreover, both sides agreed to conduct the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises annually (from 1977 on)."[80] In addition, bilateral coordination turned to be more institutionalized during the 1980s. For instance, "as of the mid-1980s, there were annual conferences at cabinet level on security, on economic and trade matters, and on foreign relations."[81]

At the same time, there were clear features of the improvement of relations between North Korea and its major allies, the Soviet Union and China. On the one hand, the Chinese help for North Korea went ahead effectively. Meanwhile, "the visits of the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] Chairman and Premier Hua Huofeng, in May 1978, and Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping in September 1978 to North Korea were believed to have further 'cemented' the mutual relationship."[82] On the other hand, after

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[79] See "Militarized Interstate Dispute Data (1/1/96)," [on line]; available from: http://pss.la.psu.edu/MID_DATA.HTM; Internet: accessed on 12/2/2002.

rejecting the Brezhnev Doctrine – that allows Soviet intervention in other socialist camp countries – North Korea began to support direct and indirect Soviet interventions. For example:

> On the 20th anniversary of the establishment of North Korean-Cuban relations [in 1979], "Nodong Simmun" praised the Vietnamese people and expressed the hope that friendly relations between "our two peoples" would continue to develop favorably... North Korea attitude on Soviet intervention in Afghanistan [in 1979] has been to praise the "victory" of the "revolution" as "an event of great significance in the struggle of the Afghan people for consolidating national independence and achieving the independent development of the country," significantly without any reference to the Soviet Union ... in spite of the fact that the "revolution" and the reported "success" involved about 80,000 Soviet armed personnel with constant live-link support from north of the Afghan border.[83]

The DPRK's relations with the USSR took further momentum during the early 1980s, indicating the first rapprochement since the early 1960s. This improvement was clearly manifested in Kim Il Sung's visit to Moscow in 1984, the first in twenty years, and Soviet Vice Premier's visit to Pyongyang in 1985 which had remarkable implications on their bilateral relations. In this regard, Macdonald reports:

> [In 1985] The Soviets started supplying MiG-23 aircraft. In return, they have enjoyed over flight rights, and gained access to North Korean ports for naval use... The Soviet Union has helped in the construction of a number of plants on an output-sharing basis; in the 1980-1985 period, sixteen projects were completed or in progress on this basis ... The Soviets [were] assisting in the construction of North Korea's first nuclear plant.[84]

On the international level, a balance between the two Koreas was taking place. President Park's "open doors" policy, that endorsed the acceptance of establishing diplomatic ties with countries that recognize North Korea, began to extract positive results. That is why in 1980, the DPRK had 100 diplomatic partners as compared to the

ROK's 112 – of these, 61 recognized both Koreas.[85] This trend continued over time. For

instance:

> By October 1982, it [South Korea] enjoyed diplomatic relations
> with 117 states, compared with North Korea's 105; North and South Korea
> had concurrent relations with 68 of these countries... Both countries also
> belonged to various specialized agencies and other functional
> organizations in the UN family. By 1982, the ROK had been admitted to
> 17 of the 26 bodies in these categories. South Korea had by then also
> joined a further 40 inter-governmental organizations. [86]

In the United Nations, "the annual UN debate [on the Korean Question] was suspended

from 1976 by mutual agreement of the parties concerned including North Korea."[87]

Consequently, neither the UN Security Council nor the General Assembly issued any

resolutions concerning the two Koreas.

Thus, at this period of time between the late 1970s and the late 1980s, both

Koreas have enjoyed reinforced alliance relationships and a balanced international status.

South Korea not only got the U.S. forces withdrawal plan cancelled but also received

U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. North Korea regained its alliance with the Soviet Union at

a time when the Chinese were already supporting it.

As for the dyadic conflict, from 1976 until the late 1980s only two provocative

actions are reported – these are the killing of South Korean ministers in Burma in 1983

and the bombing of Korean Airlines flight in 1987. Notably, the ROK's President Chun

Doo Hwan decided to shut down his country's nuclear weapons program in 1980.[88]

Phase IV

The late 1980s and early 1990s was a period of rising tension between the two

Koreas, despite MID/COW data, which reported only three militarized disputes involving

both sides between 1989 and 1992.[89] The reasons behind this rising tension include the

accelerated growth of North Korea's international isolation - mainly as a result of the

shift in the policies of its principal allies, the Soviet Union and China, in favor of the

South - and the collapse of the communist camp from 1989 onwards culminating in the

breakup of the Soviet Union itself in 1991.

Motivated mainly by economic incentives and Michael Gorbachev's pragmatism,

the Soviet Union began considering the normalization of relations with South Korea in

1988.[90] In an accelerated course of dramatic developments, a surprise summit was held

between Gorbachev and the ROK's President Roh Tae Woo in San Francisco in June

1990, where the leaders of both countries agreed to establish full diplomatic relations in

September. In the Moscow Declaration in December of the same year, the USSR

endorsed South Korea's reunification policy and a nuclear- free Korea.[91] An excellent

description of the impact the Soviet shift had on North Korea is found in the words of the

DPRK's foreign minister in a meeting with his Soviet counterpart in 1990. The North

Korean official stressed on the exact following points:

1. Recognition [of South Korea] would embolden South Korea to try
   harder to destroy socialism in the North and swallow it up, along the
   lines of the East German scenario. It would lead to deepening
   confrontation in the peninsula.
2. Soviet recognition of the South would destroy the basis of the 1961
   security treaty. Then the North would feel free to take its own actions

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[88] See Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, 151.

in the Asia-Pacific region and not be obligated to consult the USSR in considering its policy.

3. With the alliance a dead letter, North Korea would consider itself no longer bound by pledges not to create any weapons it desired.[92]

Of no less significance was the Chinese shift towards South Korea. Both China and the Soviet Union accepted the ROK's desire to join the United Nations as a full member, and agreed not to veto its application in September 1991. Indeed, North Korea joined the UN simultaneously with South Korea but "[its] entry into the UN did not occur 'willingly' … on the contrary, its admission alongside with its rival was a reflection of its weak position."[93] To the North's shock, the People's Republic of China established full diplomatic relations with the ROK on August 24, 1992, and the South Korean President Roh Tae Woo conducted a state visit to Beijing two months later.[94]

This dual shift had unprecedented and disastrous effects on the DPRK's diplomacy. Traditionally, as was the case in the 1960s and the 1970s, North Korea had been successful in playing one nation off the other, so it could gain the support of at least one of the two communist giants. With *both* the Soviet Union and China going ahead for enhancing relations with the South, despite Pyongyang's vehement objections, the country was totally abandoned. The Soviet and Chinese shifts had also decisive implications for the DPRK's security. What made it more complicated for North Korea was the collapse of the communist camp from 1989 onwards and the breakup of the Soviet Union itself, North Korea's ally and protector, on December 25, 1991. Here, it is noteworthy that by then North Korea lost the security guarantees provided by the Soviet Union according to their 1961 Alliance Treaties on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance.

At the same time, the United States appeared to enhance the DPRK's sense of insecurity by direct and indirect means. In 1988, the United States placed North Korea on its terrorist list and imposed further economic and political sanctions.[95] Indirectly, the impact of the first Gulf War in 1991 and the belligerent attitude the United States took against Iraq was also believed to have further alarmed North Korea. In an interview in May 1991, the US General Robert RisCassi, then Commander of the US, UN and US-ROK Combined Forces Command in South Korea revealed the following:

> The swiftness with which the US reacted in the Middle East, the speed with which a multinational coalition was formed and the ability of the US and South Korea to conduct the large Team Spirit military exercise in South Korea during the Gulf War were object lessons for the Korean peninsula, 'I don't think those three aspects were lost on Kim Il-Sung.'[96]

Simply, the message North Korea received was that the United States might wage a war against the DPRK if its behavior went against the U.S. interests. The Second Gulf War has set a precedent for the United States to unilaterally interpret the international behavior of other countries, especially after the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Block as a whole.

At this crucial time, North Korea's heightened sense of insecurity resulted in its decision to initiate its nuclear weapons program based on its latent nuclear capability. In fact, the North Korean nuclear program dates back to the 1950s. In 1956, the Soviet Union and North Korea signed two agreements on nuclear cooperation according to which North Korean scientists began to receive training at the Soviet Dubna Nuclear Research Center. While in accordance with the 1959 Soviet/DPRK protocol, the Soviet Union provided North Korea with a small research reactor (completed in 1965).[97] In

1964 North Korea established a nuclear research complex in Yongbyon, and the DPRK's Atomic Energy Institute was founded. The progress of the North Korean nuclear program all along the 1960s and the 1970s is really impressive:

> From 1965 through 1973 fuel (fuel elements) enriched to 10 percent was supplied [by the Soviet Union] to the DPRK for this reactor. In the 1970s it focused on the nuclear fuel cycle including refining, conversion and fabrication. In 1974 Korean specialists independently modernized Soviet IRT-2M research reactor in the same way that other reactors operating in the USSR and other countries had been modernized, bringing its capacity up to 8 megawatts and switching to fuel enriched to 80 percent. Subsequently, the degree of fuel enrichment was reduced. In the same period the DPRK began to build a 5 MWe research reactor, what is called the "second reactor." In 1977 the DPRK concluded an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], allowing the latter to inspect a research reactor which was built with the assistance of the USSR.[98]

North Korean efforts in the nuclear field continued unshakably during the 1980s. According to Don Oberdorfer, the site preparations for the first North Korean indigenous reactor began in 1979, and the U.S. satellites detected in 1982 what appeared to be a nuclear reactor vessel under construction at Yongbyon site.[99] In addition, North Korea in 1984 began the construction of a 50-200MW reactor at Yongbyon (which was completed in 1986). In 1985, a North Korean team traveled to France to learn about technology used in designing nuclear reactors, and the DPRK is reported to have obtained nuclear technology from France, as well as nuclear technology and information needed for weapons developments from Australia.[100] The same year, the Soviet Union agreed to supply four light-water nuclear power reactors to

North Korea – provided that it would join the NPT, which it did on December 12, 1985.[101]

However, it was not until the early 1990s that North Korea's nuclear program raised suspicions over the real intentions behind it. Although the DPRK was a member of the NPT since 1985, it did not sign the safeguards agreement with the IAEA, as it had pledged to. As such, the progressive North Korean nuclear program combined with the changing international environment at the time – the collapse of the Soviet Union and Pyongyang's loss of outside support, especially with the then economic crisis in North Korea – led the United States to suspect a nuclear-armed North Korea's attack on South Korea. Accordingly, the United States urged the North Koreans in the first bilaterally political meeting between the two countries, held in January 1992, to permit IAEA inspections. And "under enormous pressure from the international community and after almost seven years of delay, the North Korean government finally agreed to sign a nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA."[102] Later on, the DPRK declared in March 1993 its intention to withdraw from the NPT after the IAEA inspectors "found 'clues' that plutonium had indeed been diverted from the Yongbyon reactor,"[103] which subsequently caused the IAEA to demand mandatory "special inspections." But shortly later, in June 1993, the United States and North Korea "signed a statement which 'suspended the effectuation of the DPRK's withdrawal from the NPT' at the eleventh hour in return for the U.S. pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against North Korea."[104]

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[101] See Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, 254.

[102] Mansourov, "The Origins, Evolution, and Current Politics of the North Korean Nuclear

However, this was not the end of the crisis. The United States still did not trust the DPRK's commitments as "the CIA estimated at the end of 1993 that North Korea might have obtained enough plutonium for one or two bombs of about ten kilotons of explosive power each, similar to those exploded by the United States at Hiroshima in 1945."[105] At the same time, little progress was being made as far as the IAEA inspections were concerned. North Korea struggled hard over the mandate of the inspections, and the IAEA inspectors were denied access to nuclear facilities. Finally, "[the IAEA] Board of Governors determined once again on March 21, 1994, that the IAEA was no longer in a position to assure that no fissionable material was being diverted and turned the matter over to the Security Council."[106]

When the United States set aside both the military and the sanctions options,[107] it began a prolonged process of negotiations with North Korea to halt the latter's nuclear weapons program. This was accompanied by a successful informal diplomacy by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter who, in his visit to Pyongyang in June 1994, received Kim Il Sung's approval on three principles. First, the IAEA inspectors would return to North Korea. Second, the U.S./DPRK talks on the nuclear issue would reconvene on the basis of the provision of light-water reactors in return for the DPRK's scrapping of its graphite-moderated reactors. Third, the U.S. would pledge not to use nuclear weapons against North Korea. The two sides reached an official agreement to that effect, known as the Agreed Framework, on October 21, 1994. This agreement provided mainly for the exchange of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors with light-water reactors that were to be offered through a U.S.-led international consortium,

[105] Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, 307.

the DPRK would remain a party to the NPT and obliged to the latter's safeguards system. In return, the United States pledged not to use or threat to use nuclear weapons against the DPRK. Furthermore, both parties agreed to establish a liaison office in the other's capital, and agreed to reduce barriers to trade and investment, including restrictions on telecommunications services and financial transactions.[108]

This phase witnessed some notable developments. For example, on December 18, 1991, the United States completed the removal of all its nuclear weapons from South Korea. Later in the same month, the two Koreas signed the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Under the Joint Declaration, both North and South "shall not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons" and they "shall not posses nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities," and agreed to establish an inter-Korean inspection mechanism, the Joint Nuclear Control Commission.[109] Yet, there are enough reasons to question the impact of these developments on reducing the tension in the Korean peninsula. After the United States withdrew its nuclear weapons from the ROK's territory, "[President] Bush privately informed South Korean president Roh Tae Woo ... that the United States would continue to provide the nuclear umbrella ... whether or not American nuclear weapons were in place on the peninsula."[110] Moreover, the two Koreas implemented neither the Agreement on Reconciliation nor the Joint Declaration. To the contrary, the North

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[108] *...work Between the United States of America and the Democratic People's*

Korean subsequent behavior concerning the nuclear issue clearly contradicts with the provisions of both documents.

Thus, it can be said that it was only the Agreed Framework between the United States and the DPRK, in particular for its provision of political and security guarantees for North Korea, that have laid the basis for reducing the tension in the peninsula at the time.

## Phase V

Since 1994 until 2002, the rivalry in the Korean peninsula calmed down relatively. Each Korea has received sufficient political and security assurances during this period from the United States. As for South Korea, the United States persisted in its traditional role as the country's security guarantor. A total of 37,000 U.S. troops remained to serve in the ROK while the American nuclear umbrella extended over South Korea. For North Korea, the 1994 Agreed Framework had the following implications:

> On the political side, the nuclear deal with the United States allowed the DPRK to attempt to break out of its international isolation, to normalize diplomatic relations with major Western countries, and to apply for membership in key international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, Organization of Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, etc. On the military side, the DPRK government received the U.S. guarantee that the United States would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Pyongyang as long as the latter remained part of the NPT... On the economic side, Pyongyang basically exchanged the nuclear freeze for $4.5 billion worth of potential economic assistance (in the form of the construction of two 1,000 megawatt electric LWRs), a Western pledge to transfer some advanced technologies to the North, a 10-year supply of oil, and an easing of the economic embargo.[111]

During the same period, only two military incidents were reported (the North Korean submarine incursion in September 1996 and the launching of a North Korean ballistic missile in August 1998).

On the international level, North Korea could receive considerable aid from the international community, including the United States, the ROK and Japan, when it faced a near-famine situation in 1995-1996. Most importantly, a historical Korean summit – the first ever between the two Koreas' leaders - was held in Pyongyang in June 2000. Subsequently, there was a wide spectrum of inter-Korean cooperative activities ranging from family reunification through economic pacts to conducting joint military working groups.[112] This summit has also had remarkable results for the North Korean foreign relations:

> In July, a month after the Pyongyang summit, North Korea joined its first regional security organization, the Asian Regional Forum sponsored by Southeast Asian nations. A month after that, it renewed its previous application for membership in its first international financial organization, the Asian Development Bank. Meanwhile, Kim Jong Il received Russian President Vladimir Putin, and prepared for his second journey in a year to meet Chinese leaders. In September his foreign minister sent letters to the European Union and every European country proposing the opening of relations. Just prior to the summit, the DPRK established diplomatic relations with Italy and Australia. Between the summit and early 2001, North Korea established diplomatic relations with the Philippines, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Canada, Spain, and Germany, and moved toward opening relations with several others.[113]

Hence, both Koreas have enjoyed balanced security and foreign relations. In particular, the DPRK status has notably improved internationally and the United States itself guaranteed its security.

From the year 2002, tension increased once again in the Korean peninsula as a result of the change of the United States' policy towards the DPRK and the unfulfilled commitments under the Agreed Framework. Through its direct involvement since the onset of the Korean conflict and its continued military presence on the South Korean soil, the United States was no longer an outsider. In addition, the 1994 Agreed Framework, with its implications for the Korean rivalry, was negotiated *bilaterally* between the United States and the DPRK, all indicate that the U.S. has made itself almost a party to the Korean rivalry. South Korea and Japan had the lion's share of the costs of providing the LWRs through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), but both were *absent* from the negotiation table at Geneva in 1994.

In his January 28, 2002, the State of the Union Address, the United States' President George W. Bush labeled North Korea, along with Iraq and Iran, a member of the so-called "Axis of Evil" that is threatening the United States through developing weapons of mass destruction and supporting international terrorism. This declaration could have passed without further implications for the Korean rivalry, since the United States had already categorized North Korea among the so-called "rouge states" since 1999. The reason it did not pass is the unprecedented belligerent attitude the United States has shown after September 11th, 2001. Based on the impact of the Second Gulf War on North Korea's threat perception, one can expect that the U.S. military campaigns against Afghanistan in 2002 and Iraq in 2003 have increased the DPRK's sense of insecurity. Notably, these U.S. campaigns were waged under the pretext of developing weapons of mass destruction, the same allegation the United States makes against North Korea. This was perfectly reflected in the DPRK's response. In January 2003, North

phase. After the appearance of the Bush administration, the United States listed the DPRK as part of an "axis of evil", adopting it as a national policy to oppose its system, and singled it out as a target or preemptive nuclear attack, openly declaring a nuclear war.[114]

The DPRK's official statements later leave no doubt about the impact of the United States' invasion of Iraq and its "war on terrorism" on North Korea's threat perception. For example, KCNA stated on June 9, 2003, that "after the Iraqi war the U.S. is stepping up the preparations for the second Korean war, regarding the DPRK as a new target of state terrorism and a main target of armed intervention."[115]

This coincided with the unfulfilled commitments that were provided for in the 1994 Agreed Framework. In fact, "Pyongyang waited in vain for the political windfall it had expected – expanded economic and political contacts with Washington in the hope of replacing the 1953 cease-fire with a peace treaty with the U.S."[116] Although North Korea has expanded its international base of support after 1994, its relations with the United States after the Agreed Framework did not match the DPRK's expectations. During the Bush administration, the United States halted contacts aiming at normalizing relations with the DPRK that were taking place during Clinton's term. At the same time, the light-water reactors deal was going so slowly that it could not meet its target date in 2003.

This increasing tension has apparently been manifested in the current nuclear crisis in the Korean peninsula derived from North Korea's reviving of its nuclear weapons program. In early October 2002, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James

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[114] "Statement of DPRK Government on its Withdrawal from NPT," [on line]; available

Kelley informed North Korean officials that the Unites States was aware that North Korea had a program underway to enrich uranium for use in nuclear weapons. Initially North Korea denied this, but later confirmed the veracity of the U.S. claim.[117] Later on, the parties lifted the level of tension as developments went on in an escalating way that further deteriorated the DPRK's security situation and international status. On November 14, 2002, KEDO's Executive Board, made up by the European Union, the United States, Japan and South Korea, declared that it would suspend heavy-fuel oil shipments to North Korea "beginning with the December shipment," and they will be resumed only if Pyongyang takes "concrete and credible actions to dismantle completely its highly-enriched uranium program."[118] In response, North Korea reactivated its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, declaring the Agreed Framework nullified. In December 2002 the DPRK government expelled the IAEA inspectors and on January 10, 2003, the DPRK officially withdrew from the NPT. Just like the 1994 crisis, the IAEA declared in February 2003 that North Korea was not adhering to the safeguards agreement and the IAEA turned the case over to the UN Security Council.[119]

On January 16, 2003, the ROK's Defense Minister said that "if the current crisis could not be resolved peacefully, war on the Korean peninsula will be unavoidable … our army is prepared for the worst case scenario."[120] On June 1, 2003, Paul Wolfowitz, the U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary announced in Seoul the U.S. determination to

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[117] See "North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program," [on line]; available from: www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/index.html; Internet; accessed on 4/2/2003.
   [118] Paul Kerr, "KEDO Suspends Oil Shipments to North Korea," [Arcile on line]; available from: www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_12/kedo_dec02.asp; Internet; accessed on 1/12/2003.

realign combat forces in the ROK south of Seoul. This was believed to tighten U.S. military stance against North Korea:

> South Korean officials see the move as part of an elaborate American plan, one that would allow the United States to stage a preemptive strike on North Korean nuclear facilities without fear of the North's artillery. The 16,000 [U.S.] troops in the 2d Infantry Division, which includes armored, artillery and helicopter units, are within artillery range of North Korea, whose guns could also target Seoul, 50 kilometers south of the line.[121]

In a prompt response, North Korea declared on June 9 that it would develop a nuclear deterrent force. The KCNA announced:

> If the U.S. keeps threatening the DPRK with nukes instead of abandoning its hostile policy toward Pyongyang, the DPRK will have no option but to build up a nuclear deterrent force ... The DPRK will build up a powerful physical deterrent force capable of neutralizing any sophisticated and nuclear weapons with less spending unless the U.S. gives up its hostile policy toward the DPRK.[122]

However, both parties agreed to join six-party talks (the United States, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, Russia and China) in August 2003 in Beijing. Nevertheless, the talks failed to produce serious results as the DPRK insisted on its demand that the United States should abandon its "hostile policy" and sign a mutual non-aggression pact in return for the dismantlement of its nuclear deterrent force. At this writing, the crisis is still open for further developments.

As a final note, at the beginning of the twenty-first century both Koreas have developed sufficiently advanced nuclear capabilities. The North Korean nuclear infrastructure is quite large and impressive. According to the Federation of American Scientists:

There are reportedly as many as 22 nuclear facilities in 18 locations in North Korea. These include uranium mines, refinery plants, nuclear fuel plants, nuclear reactors, reprocessing facilities, and research facilities. North Korea has atomic energy research centers in Yongbyon and Sunchon and a atomic power plant in Sinpo. Nuclear weapons development organs include the Atomic Energy Department of Kim Il-song University; the Physics Department of Kanggye Defense College; the metal science department under the Chemical Department of and the physics Research Institute of Pyongsong College of Science; the college of physics in Yongbyon atomic research center; and uranium mines in Kusong in North Pyongan province, an unidentified place in North Hwanghae province, and Sunchon in South Pyongan province. Natural uranium has been processed near the cities of Sunchon and Pyongsan since the 1960's.[123]

As far as nuclear weapons are concerned, "in December 2001, the U.S. National Intelligence Council reported its assessment that North Korea had produced one to two nuclear weapons...While North Korea has not conducted a full nuclear test, various reports indicate that the DPRK has successfully completed the high explosives tests required for nuclear weapons."[124] Table 1 illustrates the pace with which North Korea could build a nuclear arsenal in the next four to five years:

Table. 1

North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Capability

| Time Span | Material Source | Number of Additional Weapons | Total Number |
|---|---|---|---|
| Now (Jan 2003) | • Plutonium from 1989 extraction (material for 1 to 2 weapons) | -- | 1-2 |
| plus 1 to 3 months (April 2003) | • Reprocessed 8,000 spent fuel rods in storage (estimated material for 5 weapons) | 5 | 6-7 |
| plus 1 year | • 5MW(e) Experimental Reactor: 5.5 | 1 | 8-9 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| (2004) | kg plutonium per year (approximately enough for 1 weapon) | | |
| plus 2 years (2005) | • 5MW(e) Experimental Reactor: 5.5 kg plutonium per year <br> • HEU program: approximately 100 kg HEU per year | 1 <br><br> 6 | 15-16 |
| plus 3 years (2006) | • 5MW(e) Experimental Reactor: 5.5 kg plutonium per year <br> • HEU program: approximately 100 kg HEU per year <br> • Completed 50MW(e) Nuclear Power Plant in Yongbyon-kun: 55 kg of plutonium per year (7-10 bombs) | 1 <br><br> 6 <br><br> 7-10 | 29-33 |
| plus 4 years (2007) | • 5MW(e) Experimental Reactor: 5.5 kg plutonium per year <br> • HEU program: approximately 100 kg HEU per year <br> • Completed 50MW(e) Nuclear Power Plant in Yongbyon-kun: 55 kg of plutonium per year <br> • 200MW(e) Nuclear Power Plant located in T'aech'on: 220 kg of plutonium per year | 1 <br><br> 6 <br><br> 7-10 <br><br> 30-40 | 73-90 |

Source: Daniel A. Pinkston and Stephanie Lieggi, "North Korea's Nuclear Program: Key Concerns," [Article on line]; available from: http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/korea/keycon.htm; Internet; accessed on 2/21/2003.

As for South Korea, it has been engaged in a successful nuclear energy program, with sophisticated nuclear infrastructure and technology. According to the IAEA 2002 annual report, the ROK has 30 nuclear facilities in 6 locations in the country. These include nuclear power reactors, research reactors and critical assemblies, conversion plants and storage facilities. South Korea runs 18 nuclear power reactors, located in

Taejon as well.[125] However, "Seoul does not possess any reprocessing or enrichment facilities and acquires plutonium and enriched uranium from the United States for energy programs."[126]

## The Korean Enduring Rivalry Fluctuations and Nuclear Proliferation/ Non-Proliferation Policies

The two Koreas' nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation policies, in particular those of North Korea, have been subject to an extensive examination by many scholars. However, the two nuclear cases, as explained earlier in CHAPTER TWO, are inadequately explained by existing theories.

Between the end of the Korean War in 1953 and the mid-1960s (*Phase I*), the Korean enduring rivalry passed through a decreasing tension phase. Feeling secure and enjoying balanced international status, threat perceptions of both Koreas' were mitigated. That is why both North and South Korea refrained from taking provocative actions during this period.

However, this situation turned into an increasing tension phase starting from the mid-1960s until the late 1970s (*Phase II*). During this phase, the two Koreas switched positions in the rising security threat perception, depending on their international status and the security threats each party faced. In the beginning, it was North Korea that had an intensified security threat perception. The DPRK's intensified security threat perception at the time resulted in its initiation of coercive and hostile steps in the late 1960s. In the late 1960s and early 1970s it was South Korea's turn to suffer from rising international isolation and security threats. This situation is thought to have aggravated the ROK's

security perception. To enhance its sense of security, South Korea took the step of initiating a nuclear weapons program in 1970. Recalling the criteria of nuclear weapons capability mentioned earlier in CHAPTER TWO, South Korea was a nuclear-capable state by that time. Indeed, South Korea retreated from developing its nuclear weapons program twice in this period, in 1975 and in 1977, but that should be considered neither an "abandonment" nor a "suspension" of the program. First, it was not an "abandonment" because the weapons program resurfaced later. Second, it was not a "suspension" because in both of these situations, the ROK was induced through pressure rather than incentives to give up its nuclear weapons program (the United States exerted heavy pressure on the ROK to cancel the program – threatening to withdraw all U.S. forces from South Korea and to impose economic sanctions). Pressured by its security guarantor and unable to get alternative external support due to a series of diplomatic setbacks, the ROK felt its international isolation growing. That also came at a time when the security threats from the North were on the rise. That is why progressive developments on the bilateral level between the two Koreas in the early 1970s could only be seen as disingenuous public relations and propaganda.

In the late 1970s (*Phase III*), the rivalry began to find its way towards a decreasing tension phase. Here, it is safe to assume that the security assurances and international integration of the two Koreas helped reduce their respective security threat perceptions. With that in mind, the ROK's decision in 1980 to shut down the nuclear weapons program is the one that could be considered "suspension." First, unlike the 1975 and 1977 cases, by the year 1980 South Korea received further security guarantees from its superpower ally – that could be considered as incentives instead of pressure. These

status as manifested in its diplomatic relations with the outside world in 1980. Second, South Korea continued the development of its civil nuclear power program, as the nuclear infrastructure and personnel remained in place.

Again, in the late 1980s and early 1990s the Korean rivalry witnessed an increasing tension phase (*Phase IV*) although there were only three militarized disputes involving both sides between 1989 and 1992. The DPRK's intensified security threat perception (resulted from the accelerated growth of North Korea's international isolation) then pushed it toward the development of nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless, as a consequence of the 1994 Agreed Framework (*Phase V*) that addressed North Korea's security concerns and its desire to join the international community, the DPRK's security threat perception mitigated. As a result, since 1994 until 2002, the Korean peninsula witnessed a decreasing tension phase. That is why the DPRK chose to suspend its nuclear weapons program. Interestingly, this is the only case in which there is an insinuation to the "suspension" of nuclear weapons programs. Article 3 of the 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and the DPRK provided for the *freeze* of North Korea's graphite-moderated nuclear reactors and related facilities, but the *eventual dismantlement* of these reactors and facilities was *conditioned* by the completion of the LWRs that were intended to replace the graphite-moderated reactors.[127] In contrast, when in 2002 (the beginning of *Phase VI*) the security situation of North Korea deteriorated due to the U.S. threats and the unfulfilled political and economic provisions of the 1994 Agreed Framework, the DPRK's security threat

perception intensified once again. That resulted in Pyongyang's decision to reactivate its nuclear weapons program.

Here, it is important to examine alternative explanations held by other scholars. As noted earlier, the security reason as a motivation to acquire nuclear weapons is not challenged. Rather, it is the economic factor that needs to be reviewed in order to clarify its role as a pro- proliferation motivation. In addition, domestic politics, though not being used in previous literature to analyze the two Koreas' nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation policies, is worth examining.

With regard to South Korea, economic indicators of the country reveal the irrelevance of the economic factor in its decisions either to initiate or to suspend its nuclear weapons program. Oberdorfer's display of the ROK's economic progress during the 1970s, the period in which South Korea initiated its nuclear weapons and continued its development with ups and downs along the 1970s until it suspended it in 1980, affirms this notion:

> The overall results of the development program that Park put in place between 1961 and 1979 were spectacular. In broad terms, according to the World Bank, South Korea's inflation-adjusted GNP tripled in each decade after Park's first year in office, thereby condensing a century of growth into three decades. At the same time, the country dramatically reduced the incidence of poverty, from more than 40 percent of all households living below the poverty line in 1965 to fewer than 10 percent in 1980. Per capita income shot up from less than $100 annually when Park took power to more than $1,000 at the time of his death.[128]

Moreover, South Korea's major national economic indicator, the GNI per capita annual growth rate (See Figure 2), hardly supports a correlation between South Korea's economic conditions and its enduring rivalry developments (either decreasing tension or

Fig. 2. South Korea's GNI per capita ($ US)
**Source**: Bank of Korea

As Figure 2 shows, the ROK's GNI grew constantly since 1970 until 2002 except for the years 1996 and 2000. At the same time, fluctuations in the GNI per capita since 1970 correspond neither to the increasing tension and decreasing tension phases nor to the decisions to go or not to go nuclear.

As for North Korea, Pyongyang's regime rarely issues public statements on the country's economic statistics. Thus, unlike the ROK, a comprehensive estimate of the DPRK's GNI and other economic indicators throughout the previous half-century is not available. Nevertheless, one can still rely upon other sources on the North's economic history in order to get the clearest possible picture of the country's economy. For the

Soviet Union at the time negatively affected the North Korean economy. For example,

Macdonald reports:

> Following Kim Il Sung's falling out with Soviet leader Khrushchev in 1962, the Soviets withdrew their military advisors and refused to upgrade North Korean armaments. North Koreans decided to give equal emphasis to military buildup and economic development. The delay in achieving the targets of the First Seven Year Plan (1961-1967) – which had to be extended three additional years, to 1970 – was publicly attributed to this policy. Subsequently, the North Korean economy seems to have run into trouble. The government stopped publishing quantitative production statistics in the mid-1960s.[129]

However, other sources indicate the improvement of the North Korean economy during

the same period:

> The national income of North Korea has increased considerably since 1946. In 1967 it was nearly 12.5 times that of 1946 and 8.6 times that of 1953, registering an annual growth rate of 12.7 percent and 16.6 percent, respectively, during 1947-67 and 1954-67. Since the population has not increased substantially owing to war losses and the outflow of refugees to South Korea, the growth rate in per capita national income is equally impressive, amounting to 11.0 and 31.1 percent, respectively for the two periods – 1947-67 and 1954-67... North Korea's per capita income for the same four years runs to $273, $292, $301 and $316, respectively, ranking her favorably among the world's developing economies."[130]

What can be discerned from these opposing estimates about the North Korean economy

during the 1960s is that the negative effect of the USSR/DPRK split was confined to a

limited degree. That is to say that if the economic factor had ever affected North Korea's

tendency to lift the level of tension, it did so within the context of international isolation

at the time rather than being derived from the country's internal economic conditions.

As for North Korea's economy in the late 1980s and early 1990s (*Phase IV*),

there was an apparently severe crisis. The already stagnate North Korean economy

North Korean economic crisis in the early 1990s, all expressing almost this view. However, this crisis was best described by Gills who concluded that the North Korean economy by then has been in a spiral of contraction that represented an intensification of North Korea's long-standing structural crisis.[131] In December 1993, the secretive regime in Pyongyang made an uncharacteristically surprising admission on the economic situation. "At a meeting marking the end of the country's current seven-year economic plan, the party announced publicly that the major targets of the plan had not been met, and it warned that the DPRK economy was in a 'grave situation.'"[132]

However, there is little evidence that shows a direct link between the DPRK's deteriorating economic conditions and the increasing tension phase, including the nuclear crisis. First, had the severity of the economic crisis been a major factor in initiating the nuclear weapons programs in pursuit of energy supplies, North Korea could have requested LWRs from the outside world as it did in the mid-1980s when it concluded an agreement with the USSR for that purpose. Under Article IV (2) of the NPT, which calls on state parties to "facilitate ... the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy ... with due considerations for the needs of the developing areas of the world,"[133] North Korea, a party to the NPT since 1985, had the option to do so. Logically, Pyongyang was in no need to initiate a nuclear weapons program as a bargaining chip to get the LWRs. Here, North Korea's approval to receive the LWRs can be best explained in terms of "face saving." At the mid of the nuclear crisis in November 1992, Oberdorfer reported:

> At risk was the sensitive issue of respect, what Koreans call
> *ch'emyon* and Westerners call "face", a matter of tremendous, almost

overwhelming, importance to the reclusive North Korean regime. 'For us, saving face is as important as life itself,' a senior North Korean told Representative Ackerman during his visit to Pyongyang, and experts on North Korea say that may not be much of an exaggeration. For although the 'special inspections' were unlikely to clear up the inconsistencies in Pyongyang's program, they would almost certainly provide overwhelming evidence that North Korea had not told the IAEA the whole truth about its nuclear facilities and then had sought to cover up its misstatements. In the court of international opinion, North Korea would face demeaning condemnation. Such a prospect was intolerable for Pyongyang. As the tension increased, the country's minister of atomic energy, Choi Hak Gun, told IAEA inspectors, 'Even if we had done it [cheated], we would never admit it.'[134]

By accepting the LWRs project as a substitute for its graphite-moderated reactors, North Korea saved its international reputation when it portrayed itself, at least publicly, as conducting a peaceful nuclear program without the aim of producing nuclear weapons.

Second, major economic indicators of North Korea before and after the nuclear crisis show a continuity of deterioration, rather than improvement, of the North Korean economy:

> The BOK [Bank of Korea] said the situation facing the North Korean economy in 1995 was worse than in the preceding year, with the economic growth rate as measured by gross domestic product (GDP) registering an estimated minus 4.6 percent. In 1994, the economic growth rate as computed by the BOK was minus 1.8 percent. The North Korean economy has continued to shrink since 1990, according to the BOK. The BOK estimated North Korea's gross national product (GNP) last year [1995] at $22.3 billion, bringing the per capita GNP to $957. This compares with $451.7 billion or South Korea's GNP that year and about 10,000 for its per capita GNP. North Korea's GNP and per capita GNP ranked around 60th and 100th in the world, respectively in 1995.[135]

In the final analysis, however, the economic factor cannot be disregarded altogether. For example, the annual supply of 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea (which was provided for in the Agreed Framework besides the LWRs project),

was given top priority by Kim Il Song himself in July 1994 to ease the shortage of energy.[136] But the relevance of North Korea's economic crisis in the late 1980s and early 1990s to the increasing tension of its enduring rivalry, and in turn the nuclear issue at the time, can be best explained in terms of the international isolation (including alliance shift) the country was suffering from. That is clear from the words of DPRK's chief negotiator with the United States on the nuclear issue:

> DPRK negotiator Kang, in private conversation with Gallucci [U.S. chief negotiator], referred to several key items as "our chips": the eight thousand irradiated fuel rods that had been unloaded earlier in the year from the 5-megawatt nuclear reactor; the processing facility that could extract from those fuel rods enough plutonium for four or five nuclear weapons; and the mandatory of IAEA "special inspections" of the disputed nuclear waste sites, which might cast light on whether North Korea already possessed hidden plutonium. The United States also had some important bargaining chips, especially the possible establishment of political and economic ties that could create a new environment for North Korea and substitute, to some degree, for the lose of the Soviet Union and the shifts in the policies in China.[137]

That is to say that it was not the deterioration of North Korean economy *per se* that led the regime in Pyongyang to bargain for economic aid. The North's economy was already in shambles years ago. But it was the loss of political and economic ties with the two communist giants that was important at the time. In the past, North Korea had coped with economic crises by seeking support from its communist allies. Such support was no longer available when the Soviet Union broke up and China was far from being eager to bear the burden of its east southern neighbor. As was the case in the late 1960s, international isolation (here, the temporary loss of Soviet military and economic aid) resulted in economic troubles. The North Korean economic situation was not such an

independent factor to affect the country's security policies, but it was always dependent on the international status it had; isolation or integration.

The start of the increasing tension phase in 2002, and consequently the reactivation of the DPRK's nuclear weapons program, could also be seen through this lens. The North Korean economic indicators in the late 1990s show little improvement:

> In 2000, according to South Korean estimates, the DPRK's gross national product (GNP) was about US $16,800m., equivalent to some $757 per head. It was estimated that in 1998 the North Korean economy declined for a ninth successive year, contracting by 1.1%, in real terms. In 1999, however, it was estimated that the economy grew by 6.2%, and in 2000 by 1.3%.[138]

In addition, the Newsweek reported in January 2003 that "famine could claim hundreds of thousands of life this winter... More than 2 million people have died of starvation in North Korea over the last decade."[139] Viewing the larger context, the United States' hostile policy was accompanied by a severe economic crisis in North Korea. However, one can hardly find evidence that suggests a direct causation between the economic situation in the DPRK and its decision to reactivate its nuclear weapons programs after being suspended for seven years.

Here, the early 1990s nuclear crisis may provide a useful insight. In retrospect, if Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program was traded for economic incentives in principal, the North Korean economy should have responded positively to the incentives that the 1994 Agreed Framework offered. What gives more credibility to this argument is Pyongyang's conduct in 1995-1996. During this period, North Korea faced a near nationwide famine that presented an unchallenged indicator for economic crisis:

> As a result of failed policies, [North Korean] economy continued to

Monetary Fund mission that visited Pyongyang in September 1997 issued a confidential report, on the basis of data largely provided by DPRK officials, that the economy had suffered "a severe contraction," with total national output in 1996 only half of what it had been five years earlier. Industrial output had fallen by two thirds, according to the report, and food production by 40 percent. Estimates of starvation varied widely, but U.S. Census Bureau estimates suggested that about 1 million North Koreans died as a result of famine between 1994 and 1998.[140]

Pyongyang did not opt for the resumption of its nuclear weapons program in order to get the world attention or to use it as a bargaining chip in return for economic aid. Rather, North Korea finally preferred to appeal peacefully to the international community for immediate food and fuel shipments. In particular, "in late August [1995], for the first time in its history, the bastion of self-reliance openly appealed to the world for help, asking the United Nations for nearly $500 million in flood relief as well as fuel and medical assistance."[141] Thus, it can be safely assumed that in 2002 it was the security threats and international isolation, rather than domestic economic problems, which propelled Pyongyang to reactivate its dormant nuclear weapons program.

As for internal political systems, evidence suggests that they have played no role in affecting the two Koreas' enduring rivalry fluctuations and, consequently, their respective nuclear proliferation and non-nuclear proliferation policies. On the one hand, South Korea "had been dominated by strong rulers exercising virtually unchecked powers... during General Park Chung Hee's lengthy reign and the successor rule of General Chun Doo Hwan, the South experienced dramatic economic gains, but its political arrangements seemed frozen in time."[142] Notably, the decisions to initiate the nuclear weapons program in 1970 and to continue it along the 1970s were taken by President Park. Park's successor, Chun Doo Hwan, who also ruled undemocratically,

was the one who took the decision to suspend the program in 1980. On the other hand, North Korea in the 1990s nuclear crisis has initiated the nuclear weapons program when Kim Il Sung was the President and it suspended it under the leadership of his heir and son, Kim Jong Il. And the reactivation of the program in 2002 was also under Kim Jong Il's leadership. Of course such a hereditary succession in the "democratic republic" does not entail any kind of regime change, let alone democratic transition. Throughout almost a decade since the death of his father, Kim Jong Il has not shown any remarkable change in his country's policies.

In summary, the two Koreas' nuclear cases demonstrate that each Korea initiated or reactivated its nuclear weapons programs when its security threat perception was intensified (*Phase II* for South Korea and *Phases IV* and *VI* for North Korea). The ROK suspended its nuclear weapons program when its security threat perception was mitigated (*Phases III, IV, V* and *VI*). Also, The DPRK suspended its nuclear weapons program when the rivalry was passing a decreasing tension phase as well (*Phase V*). It also suggests that domestic conditions, either political or economic, have little impact on enduring rivalry developments as well as nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation policies.

CHAPTER FOUR

TAIWAN

**The Chinese Enduring Rivalry Context**

According to the four parameters of enduring rivalry displayed earlier in

CHAPTER ONE, that are causes, manifestations, perceptions, and temporal domain,

conflict across the Taiwan Strait constituted a full-fledged high-level enduring rivalry.

Causes

This is a dyadic enduring rivalry between mainland China, or the People's

Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan, or the Republic of China (ROC). It resulted from

a dispute over a nonnegotiable territory, irreconcilable political ideologies, and the

denial of the other's right to exist. Since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, both

parties claim to represent the entire nation and being the legitimate government of

China:

> Beijing considers China to be the Communist People's Republic and
> contends that Taiwan must be brought back to the fold – by peaceful or, if
> necessary, by military means. For the old-style Nationalists in Taiwan,
> China meant the Nationalist Republic, temporarily based in Taiwan, which
> would sooner or later be restored to its rightful place on the mainland.[1]

In addition, each party has repeatedly refused to accept the other's political ideology.

Mainland China had fully adopted communism to guide its internal as well as external

policies, and even developed a separate version of communism, the so-called Maoism after the name of Mao Zedong. To the contrary, in Taiwan "all political and economic activity was dedicated to 'the annihilation of Communism and the glorious recovery of the mainland.'"[2] The importance each party attached to its claim, that is reunification under its own regime, made it impossible to reach a compromise and, consequently, each party denied the other's right to exist.

## Manifestations and Temporal Domain

According to MID/COW, data, there were fifteen militarized disputes between China and Taiwan from 1949 to 1991 and there were no militarized disputes between 1967 and 1987.[3] As such, it fits the enduring rivalry temporal domain dimension of at least twenty years of conflict.

## Perceptions

This rivalry is characterized by asymmetrical threat perceptions. While Taiwan has every reason to feel its survival threatened by mainland China, as the former is lagging behind the latter in military capabilities, the PRC knows full well that its survival is by no means at stake due to its rivalry with the ROC:

> A comparison between the military capabilities of Taiwan and China... establishes two facts. First, the ROC is not a military threat to the PRC ... And second, the PRC is so overwhelmingly superior to Taiwan in virtually all categories of military force that the outcome of a struggle between the two Chinese governments is more likely to be decided by Peking's determination to pursue the fight than by actual contest of military superiority.[4]

However, that is not to downgrade the salience of the issue to the PRC. First, China is historically obsessed with its national unity. If mainland China were to allow self-determination for Taiwan, it would set a precedent for other parts of the country, like Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong Kong, to follow suit.[5] Second, the PRC perceives the threat posed by Taiwan in non-military terms. The Chinese theory holds the following:

> Taiwan had posed a direct political and strategic challenge ... to communist China and that it also provided an "attractive alternative" vis-à-vis a communist system and way of life. The Chinese view was understandable that as long as Taiwan claimed sovereignty over all of China, followed anti-communist policies, and conducted both "open propaganda" and "clandestine activities" against mainland China, it would continue to constitute a potential threat to the mainland.[6]

What makes the contingency of war ever present in the Chinese enduring rivalry is that the Chinese Civil War was never officially declared over by any of the two rivals. At the same time, mainland China had never abandoned the right to use force against Taiwan to restore China's national unity.

## The Chinese Enduring Rivalry: Initiation and Phases

The defeat of the Chinese Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT), at the hands of the communist People's Liberation Army (PLA) in 1949 marked the end of the Chinese Civil War. The remnants of the Nationalist government of the Republic of China (proclaimed in 1912) fled from mainland China to the island of Taiwan. Nevertheless, this was not the end of conflict across the Taiwan Strait. The People's Republic of China was proclaimed on October 1, 1949 in mainland China, while the Nationalists established a separate Chinese entity in Taiwan where the government of

the Republic of China was settled. Both the PRC and the ROC claimed to represent the entire nation and to be the legitimate government of China. Mutual hostilities shortly followed the Chinese Civil War in 1952 (the rivalry then produced one major war from 1953 to 1956), and the PRC initiated the Taiwan Strait Crises in 1954 and 1958 expressing the PLA's "massing for an invasion of Taiwan to complete its task of unifying China."[7]

Since then, each of the Chinas followed a totally different track, in political as well as economic terms. On the one hand, the PRC adopted a totalitarian, communist and one-party political system dominated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under the absolute leadership of Mao Zedong. The CCP is still in power in the PRC today. Under communist rule, the PRC had established a state-led economy as in 1949 the "Chinese Communist Party chose to rely heavily on Soviet models of economic structure and development strategy."[8] Although the PRC has adopted a modified version of economic development later, known as the "socialist market economy," central planning remained the essence of the system. On the other hand, the ROC had been dominated by the iron fist of General Chiang Kai-shek until his death and succession by his son, Chiang Ching-kuo in 1975. Though being ruled under a non-democratic one-party system until 1987 – during the period between 1949 and 1987, Taiwan was under martial law - the country experienced dramatic economic gains through its gradual movement toward capitalism and free-market economy.

Phase I

Since the end of hostilities that followed the Chinese Civil War in 1958, the two Chinas entered into a decreasing tension phase until 1964. According to MID/COW data, the two Chinas were involved in only two militarized disputes between 1958 and 1964.[9] Neither military incidents nor other provocations were reported during the same period. This was the result of security assurances and improved international status the ROC enjoyed at the time. In December 1954, the United States signed a defense pact with the ROC. The purpose of the 1954 U.S./ROC Mutual Defense Treaty was as following:

> To "declare publicly and formally" their 'sense of unity and ...common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack"; it also allowed the United States "the right to dispose such United States land, air and sea forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores as may be required."[10]

Though not committing large U.S. combat forces to station in Taiwan, unlike South Korea for example, "in 1957 Washington deployed on Taiwan Matador surface-to-surface missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons and began construction of a major air force base near Taichung, on central Taiwan, capable of handling B-52 strategic bombers.[11] In addition, Taiwan's sense of security was reinforced as a result of the United States' intervention to stand by Taiwan vigorously in the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958. In particular, "The United States provided naval escort to KMT shipping to Jinmen [island] and warned Beijing that it might use nuclear weapons if the conflict escalated... [Then] Zhou Enlai announced China's willingness to negotiate

with the Unites States to reduce tensions in the Taiwan area."[12] The United States had

previously assured its determination to protect its Chinese protégé when it declared in

1953 "any demand that it 'abandon' its 'commitment to the defense of Taiwan ... was

not ... and is not ... open to negotiation.'"[13]

On the international level, the ROC was superior to the PRC in both

international recognition and diplomatic representation. First, the international

community's endorsement of the ROC's claim to be the legitimate government of

China has been manifested in its membership in the United Nations and, consequently,

occupation of China's permanent seat in the UN Security Council. The United States

has further protected the ROC's status in the United Nations. Geldenhuys reports:

> The US also took the lead in moves to keep the PRC out of the UN.
> The PRC had already submitted its claim for UN representation as the sole
> legitimate government of China in November 1949. Repeated Soviet
> initiatives to secure the PRC's admission at the expense of the Republic of
> China, which retained representation after 1949, were consistently thwarted
> by the US and its supporters.[14]

At the same time, the ROC had got much more international recognition than that of

communist China. Full diplomatic partners of the ROC counted 53 and 58 in 1950 and

1963 respectively. In comparison, the PRC's diplomatic partners were 26 and 42 in

these two years.[15]

## Phase II

Throughout the period between 1964 and 1976, the Chinese enduring rivalry witnessed an increase of tension. According to MID/COW data, there were three militarized disputes between the two adversaries during this period.[16] Nevertheless, the two parties were engaged in a process of reciprocally provocative actions. This increase of tension was due, first, to the 1964 China's detonation of its first nuclear device. This was by no means targeting Taiwan in the first place. However, whether a nuclear weapon was ever intended to be used is irrelevant, as the mere existence of the weapon poses a serious security threat to Taiwan. Here, it is also worth mentioning that China was once threatened by U.S. nuclear weapons in defense of the ROC. In any case, nuclear-armed communist China resulted in raising Taiwan's fears of being subject to nuclear attack or nuclear-backed political blackmail aiming at forcing the island to be reunified within the communist mainland.

Second, the shift in U.S. foreign policy in the late 1960s and early 1970s had the effect of deepening Taiwan's isolation. This shift began with the 1969 Nixon Doctrine, aiming at reducing the American large military involvement in Southeast Asia, and continued with momentum. The Sino-American rapprochement began with Henry Kissinger's secret visit to Beijing in 1971, and reached its culmination with Nixon's subsequent visit in 1972 and the long-awaited U.S. recognition of the People's Republic of China. The final outcome of this rapprochement was the Shanghai Communiqué of February 27, 1972. In this communiqué, the United States "acknowledged that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China." The United States also expressed

its "interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves."[17] As John Hartman pointed out:

> The 1970s brought a reversal of the close relations [between Taiwan and the U.S.] of the mid 1960s. Richard Nixon signed the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972, which signaled the eventual normalization of diplomatic relations and the progressive withdrawal of U.S. military force. The United States agreed that the future of Taiwan would be an internal Chinese matter. In October 1972, in the absence of strong U.S. support, Taiwan was forced to withdraw from the United Nations.[18]

All of that had sharply shook Taiwan's confidence in the United States' credibility and security commitment. In simple terms, the ROC could no longer rely on the United States to ensure its security as the latter had expressed its willingness to consecrate Taiwan in pursuit of its global balance of power. For example, speaking to his ambassador in Washington after Nixon's visit to Beijing, the ROC's president Chiang Kai-shek said: "Henceforth we must rely on ourselves more than ever before."[19]

Furthermore, the ROC's international status deteriorated in a gradually accelerated rate that began in the early 1960s. The number of the ROC's diplomatic partners dropped from 58 in 1963 to 39 in 1973, while that of the PRC increased from 42 to 85 in the same two years.[20] In the United Nations, the situation was no better. "[The] Western backing for the American position [to reject the PRC's application for UN membership] in the due course began to crumble... In 1961, Britain, Denmark, Sweden and Norway supported an Assembly motion calling for the PRC's admission to the world body."[21] However, it was not until the early 1970s when Taiwan's international isolation reached its culmination following the United States'

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[17] Nathan and Ross, *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress*, 66.

rapprochement with the People's Republic of China that not only affected negatively

the security of Taiwan but also deepened its international isolation:

> Although the United States proclaimed its continuing commitment to Taiwan, other countries began diplomatically to desert the ROC as soon as Henry Kissinger's 1971 secret visit to the PRC became public. In 1970 China had been rejected in its annual bid for the UN China seat; in 1971 it was voted in by an overwhelming vote. More and more countries, including Japan and many West European countries, switched their diplomatic recognition to the PRC.[22]

The change was swift and dramatic at the same time. In only one year, 1971, the ROC

was out of the United Nations and lost its permanent membership in the UN Security

Council through a vote endorsed by the majority of countries. Second, military

confrontations between the two sides intensified during this period to an extent

unprecedented since 1958:

> Several military incidents occurred between 1965 and 1967, centering again on the Straits. In particular, 1965 was an active year for the Taiwanese navy, as it sank four communist gunboats and damaged two others near Matsu in May. Two months later two Taiwanese gunboats sank five mainland vessels and damaged two others near Kinmen; in November the navy sank another four gunboats near the Chinese mainland. These events were followed in January 1967 by the Taiwanese air force shooting down two MiG-19s near Kinmen.[23]

One of the most provocative measures taken by the ROC was the initiation of its

nuclear weapons program. In fact, the ROC's nuclear capability dates back to the

1950s:

> Following the establishment of National Tshinghu University in Taiwan in 1956, the university built the nation's first research nuclear reactor and began training atomic energy specialists. More than a decade later, the Taiwan Power Company established a nuclear energy department and laid plans for a nuclear power plant. Thereafter the Atomic Energy Council and the Nuclear Energy Research Institute were established [in 1965], and the

development of nuclear energy gradually progressed to the stage of large reactors used for the generation of power.[24]

However, evidence suggests that it was not until 1967 that the ROC began considering the development of nuclear weapons. "Professor Ta-You Wu, former president of the Academia Sinica in Taipei and then-director of the Science Development Advisory Committee of Taiwan's National Security Council said that in 1967 in response to China's test and worsening tensions across the Taiwan Strait, the defense ministry floated a $140-million proposal for developing nuclear weapons."[25] In 1969, Canada supplied a 40-megawatt- natural-uranium heavy water moderated reactor to the ROC.[26] Notably, this Canadian reactor was of the same type that enabled India to conduct its nuclear test in 1974.[27] At the same time, Taiwan was also reported to have begun work on nuclear fuel reprocessing:

> In 1969 work began on other iner [Institute for Nuclear Energy Research] facilities – a plant to produce natural uranium fuel, a reprocessing facility, and a plutonium chemistry laboratory. Taiwan built these facilities itself, with equipment acquired from France, Germany, the United States and other countries. The fuel-fabrication plant began operation in 1972 or 1973, using a supply of natural uranium from South Africa. It was expected to produce about 20-30 metric tons of fuel a year – roughly twice as much as the research reactor required. From 1972 to 1974, Taiwan bought about 100 metric tons of South African uranium.[28]

Although the ROC was a party to the NPT since 1968, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency by 1974 "concluded that 'Taipei conducts its small nuclear program with a

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[24] "Taiwan: Nuclear Weapons," [on line]; available from www.fas.org/nuck/guide/taiwan/index/html; Internet; accessed on 12/28/2002.

weapon option clearly in mind, and it will be in a position to fabricate a nuclear device

after five years or so."[29]

Phase III

Tension in the Chinese enduring rivalry began to decrease once again in 1974-

1975 and continued as such until the early 1980s. This was a result of security assurances

the ROC received from the United States after the latter's rapprochement with China. In

a 1974 meeting with the ROC's Ambassador to Washington, U.S. President Nixon told

the former: "Between our two countries we have a Mutual Defense Treaty. Please tell

your government that the United States is determined to abide by its commitments to the

Republic of China."[30] In addition, American arms supplies uninterruptedly continued. For

example, "between 1949 and 1981, according to one estimate, Taiwan obtained some

90% of its arms from the US."[31] The United States decided to stop its arms sales to the

ROC only in 1982. Moreover, the security threat posed by the PRC has been mitigated

due to communist China's government preoccupation with internal struggle over power

and, shortly later, its signals to reform after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976.[32] In

particular, "with the rise to paramount leadership of Deng [Xiaoping] regime ... Beijing

shifted to a policy of détente and peaceful overtures toward Taiwan."[33]

Here it is important to examine the impact of the 1979 United States'

derecognition of the ROC and its official recognition of the People's Republic of China.

In 1979 the United States cancelled its 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan as well.

[29] "Taiwan: Nuclear Weapons," [on line]; available from www.fas.org/nuck/guide/taiwan/index/html; Internet; accessed on 12/28/2002.

Seemingly, these developments in Taiwan-U.S. relations have complicated Taiwan's political isolation and military vulnerability.[34] Nevertheless, further examination of these developments reveals that their impact was much less than expected on Taiwan's security threat perception. First, these developments were just the implementation of what the United States pledged to do in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué. Thus, any negative impacts on Taiwan's security threat perception have already occurred at the time of the Sino-American rapprochement in the very early 1970s rather than in 1979. In effect, there was nothing new in the 1979 developments as they were long expected by the ROC which knew in advance that sooner or later the United States would undertake what it committed itself to in 1972.

Second, and most importantly, the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) in March 1979 to regulate America's relations with the ROC after the United States' severance of diplomatic relations with Taipei. Analyzing the substance of this law, scholars have reached a conclusion that it compensated, politically and militarily, both the withdrawal of recognition and the cancellation of the Mutual Defense Treaty. According to Deon Geldenhuys:

> As Chang King-yuh pointed out, 'it is hard to imagine that arms sales, nuclear power cooperation, most-favored-nation treatment, and existing Eximbank loans can be offered between the US and the ROC without involving official contacts.' One analysis of the Taiwan Relations Act- passed by Congress in 1979 to regulate relations between the US and Taiwan after derecognition – concluded that the measure's effect is to 'treat the ROC as a state and the governing authorities on Taiwan as a government.' ... The Taiwan Relations Act, 'both in letter and spirit, implies the US intention to grant the ROC on Taiwan recognition sui generis, if not recognition de facto or de jure,' it was argued. The US is the only one of the 'derecognizers' that has officially spelled out the nature of its relations with the ROC in such detail.[35]

The security provisions of the TRA were in one respect more comprehensive than the Mutual Defense Treaty. The latter did not cover coercion other than military, whereas the TRA explicitly referred to such forms of coercion as boycotts and embargoes, and implicitly alluded to military force.[36]

In James Gregor's reading, the U.S. security commitment to the ROC has been reinforced through the TRA:

The act clearly identified Taiwan as being essential to U.S. economic and security interests. It also defined and strengthened the future U.S. commitment to the defense of Taiwan; by affirming the U.S. intention to "resist any resort to force" employed against the island, it communicated to Peking that any use of violence or coercion to achieve reunification would be a matter of "grave concern" to the United States.[37]

Simultaneously, the security threat posed by the communist mainland has been mitigated due to the PRC's successive steps. For example, "Beijing announced it would stop shelling ROC-held islands in the Taiwan Strait and enunciated a set of comparatively generous terms under which Taiwan and the PRC could peacefully reunify."[38] In addition, and more importantly, "with the normalization of relations between Beijing and Washington in 1979, the PRC began to emphasize the use of political means for reunification."[39] On January 1, 1979, the date of the establishment of the U.S.-PRC diplomatic relations, Beijing issued the so-called "Letter to Taiwan Compatriots." This letter "called for an end of the state of enmity between the two sides and quick, peaceful

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[35] Geldenhuys, *Isolated States*, 129-130.

[36] Ibid., 448.

reunification; announced the end of the light, symbolic bombardment of the offshore islands of Jinmen and Mazu, which had continued since 1958."[40]

Nevertheless, it should be noted that, unlike the reassurance of security commitment and mitigation of security threat, the ROC's international recognition has not witnessed any remarkable improvement. In 1977, Taiwan's full diplomatic partners counted only 23 while, as mentioned earlier, the PRC assumed the Chinese membership in the United Nations since 1971.

At this point, the ROC's nuclear weapons program was subject to major changes. After the IAEA inspections into Taiwan's nuclear facilities raised suspicions about the intentions of the program, the United States learned about the military applications of it. In 1976, Taiwan promised the United States not to acquire nuclear reprocessing facilities. "On September 14 then-Premier Chiang Chiang-kuo made a promise to the U.S. ambassador - followed three days later by a diplomatic note to the same effect – that Taiwan would not acquire its own reprocessing facilities or engage in any activities related to reprocessing."[41] In 1978, Taiwan agreed to dismantle its reprocessing facilities and the same year it returned its U.S.- supplied plutonium.[42]

At the same time, the ROC's civil nuclear program got along constantly during 1977-1979. "[Taiwan's] first nuclear power plant began commercial operation in 1977 and the second in 1978. Four more plants are being built … the two existing nuclear power plants and the four under construction have light water reactors (LWRs) fueled by low enriched uranium."[43] Besides the two nuclear reactors (one of 40-megawatt and the

other of 10-megawatt capacity) under INER, the National Tsing Hua University had

three other small research reactors.[44]

## Phase IV

The latter phase of decreasing tension was seemingly expected to continue but for

the decline of Taiwan's relations with the United States again in the early 1980s. This

decline further complicated Taiwan's political isolation and military vulnerability:

> The 1980s brought new challenges, as the PRC continued to protest
> any arms sales to Taiwan and made renewed military threats. In 1982 the
> United States decided ultimately to cease all arms sales to Taiwan. In the
> joint Washington-Beijing Communiqué, the United States said it would not
> increase arms sales to Taipei in quantitative or qualitative terms in the
> interim. And so, during the period 1981-1986, U.S. arm sales to Taiwan
> decreased from $1.4 billion to $720 million.[45]

The security threat coming from the mainland rose clearly when communist China put

Taiwan as a possible military target:

> In his list of priorities for the 1980s, Teng- Hsiao Peng set the
> recovery of Taiwan as second only in importance to the curbing of Soviet
> expansionism. Teng has also initiated the PRC might use force, "first, if
> Taiwan persisted in refusing to enter into discussions with Peking, and
> second, if the Soviet Union became involved in Taiwan."[46]

Moreover, Taiwan's blunt rejection of the 1981 PRC's reunification proposal resulted in

heightening the tension across the Taiwan's Strait. When the PRC's Chairman of the

Standing Committee of the National People's Congress displayed a nine-point proposal to

implement Beijing's policy of unification of Taiwan, the ROC's President announced:

"We shall never 'negotiate' with the Chinese Communists."[47] The ROC further reiterated

its "three no's" policy; no contact, no negotiation, and no compromise with Beijing. In

response, "Chinese leaders stated that the mainland would use force against Taiwan if it

declared independence, offered itself as a base for a foreign power, or developed nuclear weapons."[48]

At a time the communist Chinese security threat rose, the ROC's international status witnessed no improvements. As compared to other rivalry phases, information on the international status of Taiwan in the early 1980s is not that rich in the literature. Yet a comparison between the number of the ROC's diplomatic partners in 1977 (23 countries) and in 1988 (22 countries)[49] reveals that there was very little change in the country's international status.

This increase of tension has been manifested in the resumption of militarized disputes between the two sides in 1987 – the first after a pause of twenty years.[50] Also, the ROC is reported to reactivate its nuclear weapons program in the mid-1980s. David Albright and Corey Gay reported: "For reasons that are still unknown, in 1987 iner began building a multiple hot cell facility in violation of its 1976 commitments [to the United States]."[51] Taiwan was suspected of constructing this facility in order to extract plutonium from its reactor's spent fuel as a part of the attempt to develop nuclear weapons.[52]

## Phase V

This phase began in 1988 and still persists today. Little changes occurred in Taiwan's international status in the late 1980s. In 1988, Taiwan's full diplomatic partners

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[47] Quoted in Ibid., 45.
[48] Nathan and Ross, *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress*, 209.

counted only 22 while the PRC had 104 diplomatic partners.[53] At the same time, the ROC

had never regained the Chinese membership in the United Nations since it lost it to the

PRC in 1971. Nonetheless, unlike previous phases, this did not negatively affect the

ROC's security threat perception. That is because of the change of the way the ROC used

to conduct its foreign relations, that is towards a more flexible and pragmatic foreign

policy. Taiwan adopted the practice of "substantive diplomacy" in order to use its limited

international presence in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives. In the late 1980s, for

example, "work normally done by diplomatic offices – most importantly the issuance of

visas – was carried out by organizations ranging from airlines to specially created quasi-

diplomatic bodies."[54]

Taiwan's "substantive diplomacy" has had its effect as well on the country's

mainland policy. In particular, "towards the end of the 1980s, flexibility was indeed the

watchword in Taiwan's foreign relations, manifested above all in its willingness to

reverse its earlier position and accept the idea of dual recognition [of the ROC and the

PRC]."[55] In addition, along with encouraging mutual economic cooperation, the two

opposing regimes across the Taiwan Strait sought ways for political dialogue aiming at

political accommodation.[56] For instance, in 1991, the two Chinas established quasi-

official organizations, the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) on behalf of the ROC and

the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits on behalf of the PRC, in order to

hold bilateral talks.[57] Of particular importance was the growing acceptance of PRC-

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[53] See Geldenhuys, *Isolated States*, 128.

proposed "one country, two systems" formula, to be applied to Taiwan as it was the case with Hong Kong in 1997.[58]

At the same time, this improvement in the dyadic relationship coincided with another improvement of the ROC's relations with the United States, including the resumption of the U.S. military supplies to Taiwan:

> In 1992 President Bush all but openly breached the 1982 communiqué by agreeing to sell 150 F-16 fighter planes to Taiwan. In 1994 the Clinton administration upgraded the protocol status of Taiwan officials in the United States. Finally, under congressional pressure in 1995 the White House authorized an unofficial visit by President Lee-Teng-Hui to his alma mater, Cornell University, to receive an honorary degree.[59]

This decrease of tension in the dyadic rivalry has been manifested in two ways. First, according to MID/COW data, the last militarized dispute between the ROC and the PRC took place in 1987. Neither military incidents nor other severe provocations were reported except for the PRC's conduction of a series of military exercises in the Taiwan Straits in 1995. Second, and more importantly, after reactivating its nuclear weapons program in 1987, Taiwan preferred later to suspend the program once again. In 1988-1989, "Taiwan told the IAEA that [the facility] would be shut down for conversion to a light-water reactor,"[60] and "the heavy water in the reactor was removed and returned to the United States."[61] Since then, there were no reports of Taiwanese efforts pertaining to uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing.[62] Nonetheless, the ROC still maintains a large and advanced civil nuclear program. According the IAEA 2002 annual report, "the Agency [IAEA] was also applying safeguards in Taiwan, China, at eight power reactors,

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[58] See Goldstein, "Terms of Engagement," 73-74.

four research reactors/critical assemblies, one uranium pilot conversion plant, one fuel fabrication plant, one storage facility and one R&D facility."[63]

## The Chinese Enduring Rivalry Fluctuations and Nuclear Proliferation/ Non-Proliferation Policies

The ROC's nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation policies have been subject to a limited scholarly examination. At the same time, Taiwan's nuclear case, as explained earlier in CHAPTER TWO, is inadequately explained by existing theories.

Between 1958 and 1964 (*Phase I*) the Chinese enduring rivalry had undergone a decreasing tension phase due to the satisfying security situation and the international status of the ROC. This was the result of security assurances, including the 1954 US/ROC Mutual Defense Treaty, the U.S. support during the Taiwan Strait Crisis and the presence of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait. On the international level, the ROC was superior to the PRC in both international recognition and diplomatic representation. This has apparently resulted in the mitigation of the ROC's security threat perception.

However, this situation turned into an increasing tension phase starting from 1964 until the mid-1970s (*Phase II*). Despite the fact that, according to MID/COW data, there were no militarized disputes between the PRC and the ROC from 1967 until the end of this phase, the ROC took one of the most provocative measures, that is the initiation of its nuclear weapons program in 1967. According to the criteria of nuclear weapons capability mentioned earlier in CHAPTER TWO, Taiwan was a nuclear-capable state by that time. Here, evidence suggests that the increasing tension in the Chinese enduring

rivalry, constituted through the rising military threats from mainland China, unreliability of the U.S. security commitments, and the deterioration of the country's international recognition and diplomatic partnership, led to the intensification of security threat perception. The intensified security threat perception, in turn, resulted in the decision to begin the nuclear weapons program.

In the mid-1970s (*Phase III*), the rivalry began to find its way towards a decreasing tension phase. According to MID/COW data, there were no militarized disputes between mainland China and Taiwan between the mid-1970s and the early 1980s.[64] Neither military provocations nor other incidents were reported. This can be attributed to the mitigation of the security threat due to security guarantees the ROC received from the United States and conciliatory steps taken by communist China at the time, even though Taiwan's international recognition witnessed no improvement during this phase. This in turn was reflected in the mitigation of the country's security threat perception. That is why Taiwan appeared to have decided in 1976-1977 to suspend its nuclear weapons program in response to its reduced security threat perception.

Again, beginning with the early 1980s the Chinese rivalry witnessed an increasing tension phase (*Phase IV*), although there were, according to MID/COW data, no militarized disputes involving both sides until 1987 when they resumed military hostilities. The reasons behind this rising tension include the stalemate in the ROC's international isolation and the rising security threats from mainland China. To make the situation worse for Taiwan, its principle ally, the United States, decided unilaterally to stop its arms transfers to the island in 1982. The ROC's intensified security threat perception then had pushed it toward reactivating its dormant nuclear weapons program.

This reactivation of the program is a hard evidence that proves that the non-proliferation policies pursued by the ROC in 1976-1977 were mere suspension.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s (*Phase V*), the Chinese enduring rivalry entered into a decreasing tension phase due to the improvement of Taiwan's relations with both China and the United States. This dual improvement of relations resulted in the mitigation of the ROC's security threat. At the same time, it was a clear indication of the Taiwan's international integration, especially with the country's newly introduced "substantive diplomacy." Thus, with the ROC's security threat perception being mitigated due to these factors, Taiwan decided to re-suspend its nuclear weapons program. In 1995, the ROC's president Lee Teng-hui told the National Assembly that "everyone knows that we had had the plan before … [Taiwan] has the ability to develop nuclear weapons, but will definitely not develop them."[65] Here, as it is the case with the previous suspension, the ROC's official accounts do not offer any unequivocal reference to that. Rather, it is the sequence and structure of events that provide us with the link between the rivalry decreasing phase and the suspension of the nuclear weapons program.

Here, it is important to examine alternative explanations for the Chinese enduring rivalry fluctuations and, in turn, the ROC's nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation policies. As noted earlier, the security reason considered by other scholars as a motivation to acquire nuclear weapons is not challenged. Rather, it is the economic factor that needs to be reviewed in order to clarify its role as a pro- proliferation motivation. In addition, domestic politics, though not being used in previous literature to analyze Taiwan's nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation policies, are worth examining.

where one can hardly distinguish periods of economic crises in the country. The following paragraph states Taiwan's economic history between 1945 until 1980:

> At the close of World War II, per capita income in Taiwan was about US$70. Such a low per capita income has increased rapidly to reach US$2,280 by 1980. During this period, population grew at the high rate of 3.5 percent until the 1960s and at about 2 percent thereafter. Real gross national product, however, grew at the much higher annual rate of 9.2 percent on the average over the last three decades: 8.2 percent in the 1950s, 8.4 percent in the 1960s, and 9.9 percent in the 1970s. Due to the acceleration of growth in the later periods, real GNP doubled every seven years after 1963.[66]

In any case, the few changes in Taiwan's economy did not go parallel to the tension phases. For instance, Taiwan enjoyed rapid growth rate throughout the 1960s and the early 1970s (the increasing tension phase), but this improvement was interrupted for a short time by the 1973 oil crisis.[67] The Bank of China data show that GNI per capita growth rates grew positively and constantly, except for the year 1974, before and during the same period (See Figure 3).

Fig. 3. Taiwan's GNI per capita (NT$: 1996 constant prices)
Source: Bank of China

At the same time, between the mid-1970s and the early 1980s (the decreasing tension phase), the Taiwanese economy underwent some fluctuations that are inconsistent with the rivalry development. If enduring rivalry phases were to be affected by economic conditions, either positive or negative, economic indicators would go parallel to the rivalry fluctuations. Instead, as Figure 4 shows, the ROC's GNI grew constantly since 1962 until 1990. At the same time, fluctuations in the GNI per capita correspond neither to the increasing tension and decreasing tension phases nor to the decisions to go or not to go nuclear.

As for internal political systems, evidence suggests that they have played no role

party dictatorship ruled Taiwan, and during the same period the country was under martial law that was lifted only in July 1987. The ROC had been dominated by the iron fist of General Chiang Kai-shek until his death and succession by his son, Chiang Ching-kuo in 1975. Chiang Ching-kuo continued to rule undemocratically until 1986 when he tolerated opposition groups to form the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and the first free parliamentary elections were held in December 1986.[68] Nevertheless, the complete democratization of the island took place after Chinag Chiang-kuo's death in 1988 and his succession by President Lee Teng-hui. Thus, under authoritarian governments, Taiwan initiated, suspended and reactivated its secret nuclear weapons program. Notably, President Chiang Chiang-kuo (ruling between 1975 and 1988) who took the decisive step in transforming Taiwan into political pluralism, was reported to stand vigorously behind the development of nuclear weapons.

In summary, the case of Taiwan demonstrates the Chinese enduring rivalry' fluctuations clearly influenced Taiwan's nuclear policies. Only in *Phase III* part of the international status variable does not correspond to the hypotheses, as it witnessed no improvement during this decreasing tension phase. On the other hand, the ROC's economy was in a continuous state of improvement with very little fluctuations that can constitute clear phases of crises. At the same time, neither the island's change of leadership in the 1970s nor the policy change towards democracy in the late 1980s has affected the decision to go or not to go nuclear.

CHAPTER FIVE

SOUTH AFRICA

**The South African Enduring Rivalry Context**

According to the four parameters of enduring rivalry displayed in CHAPTER ONE -

causes, manifestations, perceptions, and temporal domain - conflict in southern Africa

constituted a full-fledged high-level enduring rivalry.

Causes

This was a multilateral enduring rivalry between a coalition of parties on one side

(African national liberation movements and southern African countries) against a single

state on the other side (South Africa). South Africa's apartheid system, racial

discrimination in favor of the country's white minority and against the black majority,

was the disputed issue. On the one hand, South Africa's objective was to maintain this

system. On the other hand, African national liberation movements – the African National

Congress (ANC), the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and South West Africa People's

Organization (SWAPO) – together with the southern African countries wanted to put an

end to this racial regime. Indeed, the essence of the problem may have been domestic,

but it was soon to be regionalized due to the spread of South Africa's perception and

practice of apartheid:

politics in the contest over places once called Rhodesia and South West Africa suggests how racial discrimination was regional and how slowly and how violent was its retreat as fears for security – personal, national, even international – deepened.[1]

The importance each party attached to its claim made it impossible to reach a compromise and, consequently, each party denied the other's right to exist. For South Africa:

> [The Total National Strategy] articulates 12 objectives that cover a wide range of government activities both at home and abroad. The first two are concerned with 'the recognition and acceptance of the existence of multinationalism and of minorities in the Republic of South Africa' as well as 'the acceptance of vertical differentiation with a built-in principle of self determination at as many levels as possible' thus providing the key to the white government.[2]

Thus, "apartheid South Africa's insistence that it was insecure, and its resulting fight for security, became a source of insecurity to the majority of its own citizens and to the people of the region. The state system – in the name of South Africa's minority – waged war on the region's people."[3] For their part, this policy made South Africa's neighbors' dissatisfaction of the status quo and their willingness to change it unquestionable.

## Manifestations and Temporal Domain

According to MID/COW data, there were twenty-one militarized disputes between South Africa and its neighbors throughout the period 1968-1988.[4] As such, it fits the enduring rivalry temporal domain dimension of at least twenty years of conflict. However, tables of enduring rivalries made by Goertz and Diehl (1995) and Bennett

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[1] Peter Vale, *Security and Politics in South Africa: The Regional Dimension* (Boulder; London:

(1997) only register the competition between South Africa and Zambia. Thus, these statistical data do not provide us with the complete picture of the manifestations of this rivalry. Militarized interstate disputes data sets, including those of MID/COW, do not include violence committed by non-state actors even if they were the principle rivals. That is to say that violence committed by non-state actors, such as the ANC, PAC and SWAPO (supported by South Africa's black neighbors) should also be considered as manifestations of this rivalry. This violence included conducting sabotage acts against infrastructure, farming communities and urban commercial and industrial targets. From bases in Zambia and Angola, African national liberation movements also carried out raids and guerrilla attacks against South Africa Defense Forces (SADF).[5]

## Perceptions

As this rivalry was caused by each party's denial of the other's right to exist, each party's threat perception reflected its anticipation of the loss of its survival. On the one hand, Harkavy has described South Africa's threat perception when talking about war contingencies for Israel and South Africa:

> Assuming, at the final moment of defeat, great difficulties in evacuating a significant percentage of their populations, these two states must contemplate the possibility – even the significant probability – of wholesale massacres, perhaps of genocidal proportions. Unavoidably, then, the South African and Israeli governments must deal in worst-case scenario, and they certainly do... [For South Africa] among the critical imponderables; the long-term possibilities for significant military involvement by Mozambique, a black-controlled Zimbabwe, Angola, Zambia, Tanzania, Namibia, et al. regarding either guerrilla havens or actual joint operations; and, of course, the possibility of Cuban and/or Soviet involvement.[6]

That coincided with South Africa's psychological obsessions derived from the apartheid system that was, to a large extent, attributed to the "notion of Afrikaners as God's chosen people."[7] To make it even worse for South Africa, it suffered from growing political and military isolation internationally. That rendered it unable to rely on external support in case of military confrontation with its black neighbors. On the other hand, the continuation of the apartheid system meant the denial to the blacks of their right to live as equals among others. And "the new African states found themselves powerless to do anything about a problem to which they had given an absolute priority."[8] So they later turned to the material support of African national liberation movements whose threat perception of South Africa was even greater:

> The aims and strategy of the national revolution were defined more clearly – the theory of 'Colonialism of a Special Type' was adopted as official policy. This views South Africa as an 'internal colony' in which the white colonizers exploit the black colonized in a capitalist system... the broad purpose of the military struggle in the first phase of the revolution was defined as 'the complete political and economic emancipation of all our people' along the lines set out in the Freedom Charter.[9]

South Africa's initial security threat was aggravated later, as will be explained below, due to the intervention of extra-regional powers, including the Soviet Union, in support of South Africa's opponents.

## The South African Enduring Rivalry: Initiation and Phases

Enduring rivalry in southern Africa began in the early 1960s. This was initially manifested in sabotage acts committed by the African national liberation movements.

These included three maim organizations: first, the African National Congress, dating from 1912. In 1962, the ANC "decided to abandon its traditional strategy on non-violence and opted for armed struggle."[10] The second was South-West Africa People's Organization, that "[in 1960] had been formed and had declared itself at war with South Africa, initiating disorders in the territory of unpredictable consequence."[11] The third organization was Pan-Africanist Congress, founded in 1959. Together with the southern African countries that gained their independence in the 1960s and 1970s (Zambia, Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique), these African liberation movements had two major goals: (1) to eliminate the apartheid system in South Africa, and (2) to liberate South-West Africa (Namibia) from South Africa. The latter "was the mandatory power in South-West Africa [after World War I] and was accused of violating the mandatory agreement by, among other things, introducing *apartheid*."[12]

## Phase I

According to MID/COW data, the period between 1968 and 1974 witnessed only three militarized disputes between South Africa on one side and Zambia and Zimbabwe on the other side.[13] As such, this period was of moderate rate of militarized disputes. Moreover, the security threat to South Africa at the time was low because "[African] liberation movements ... represent no immediate threat to the Republic since they are not likely to acquire – in the near future – the capability to defeat the South Africa's defense

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[10] F.W. de Klerk, *The Last Trek – A New Beginning: The Autobiography* (New York: St. Martin's

forces."[14] At the same time, "the Republic of South Africa continues, as it has for some years, to tower over any current African opponent or African coalition in armed strength."[15]

Regarding its international status at the time, South Africa faced severe diplomatic confrontations throughout the 1960s, but international isolation was still in low-moderate level. For instance, in the early 1960s, the United Nations General Assembly, whose resolutions are not legally binding, continued its solid position against apartheid South Africa:

> The Assembly repeated its censures in 1961 and then in 1962 asked members to break off diplomatic relations, close their ports to South African shipping and their airports to South African aircraft, prevent their own ships from calling at South African ports, boycott all South African products and suspend exports to South Africa.[16]

The newly independent African states' campaign to impose a UN sanctions system on South Africa, which since being a founding member of the UN remained an active participant in the UN organs, was fruitless. In 1963, this campaign ended with a *voluntary* UN arms embargo against South Africa. The wording of the UN Security Council resolution 181 indicated how the Western powers were unwilling to isolate South Africa at that time:

> On the legal side it was argued that the preconditions for such action [imposing sanctions] laid out in article 39 of the Charter (namely, a threat to international peace) existed and had indeed been acknowledged by the members of the Security Council who formally resolved in 1963 that the policies of the South Africa government 'disturbed' international peace. But the substitution of the word 'disturb' for the word 'threaten' was a precise gauge of the political temperature, for it enabled members of the council to say one thing and yet avoid the consequences of their words. Britain and the United States could no longer bring themselves to deny the substance of the

allegations made by the African states but they were determined all the same not to be embroiled with South Africa.[17]

Furthermore, in 1960 the Organization of African Unity (OAU) brought the issue of South Africa's violation of its mandate over South-West Africa before the International Court of Justice. Yet in July 1966, "[the court] non-suited the plaintiffs [Ethiopia and Eritrea]... and ruled by the president's casting vote that they had no standing in the matter before the court."[18] However, "in 1970 the Security Council [in UNSCR 276] declared South Africa's occupation of Namibia illegal on the ground that it contravened the terms of the mandate. In effect the UN annulled the mandate. The Council's western members abstained but cast no veto."[19] At the same time, South Africa succeeded in the 1960s to develop sufficiently good relations with some African countries, these included Malawi, Madagascar and Ivory Coast.[20] For example, President Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast declared in November 1970 that "the existing strategies adopted toward apartheid have ended in total failure and called for the discussion of dialogue as an alternative through an African conference."[21]

## Phase II

It was not until the early and mid-1970s that the rivalry intensified to an extent unacceptable to South Africa. The increased security threat was manifested in the high frequency rate of militarized disputes. Between 1974 and 1988, according to MID/COW data, South Africa and its black African neighbors were engaged in 18 militarized

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[17] Ibid.

disputes.[22] That was triggered by Portugal's withdrawal from Angola and Mozambique in the period 1974-1977. Indeed, there were no bilaterally disputed issues between South Africa and these two newly independent states, but the problem was their regimes' active support to the African national liberation movements. So, on the eve of Angola's independence in 1975, as the Alvor Accords - outlining a peaceful transition in Angola - broke down, South Africa invaded Angola. The SADF fought in support of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) in order to prevent the Marxist People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) from seizing power. But the MPLA appealed for help to Fidel Castro and the 3,000 South African invading troops confronted 15,000 to 20,000 Cuban troops defending the MPLA, and South Africa was eventually forced to withdraw in 1976. Thus, South Africa's failed intervention, consequently, resulted not only in the advent of the MPLA to power in Luanda with open hostility backed by thousands of Cuban troops,[23] but also in the acceleration of insurgent activities by African national liberation movements against it. As Mariam Ahmed put it:

> Since 1976, the ANC had managed through its insurgent activities to reestablish a real presence for the nationalist movement in the Republic [of South Africa] … Determined to oust South Africa from the Namibian territory by force, SWAPO had carried out raids first from Zambia across the Zambezi river and into the Namibian Caprivi region. Later, after the South African attack on Zambia and the independence of Angola, SWAPO began to carry out its guerrilla attacks from bases in the latter; attacks that successfully disturbed the northern parts of the Namibian territory and as far as Tsumeb and Grootfontein by mining roads, bombing administrative buildings and assassinating collaborators.[24]

The implications of that situation were so clear to South Africa:

> After the Angolan debacle of 1976, South Africa was left with an unfavorable regional environment, unfavorable to its interests more than

ever before. Such an environment was created by South Africa's loss of two of her vital links in her cordon sanitaire after the emergence in Maputo and Luanda of regimes ideologically and politically hostile to Pretoria. Furthermore, the new government in Luanda was prompt in demonstrating its material and moral support for SWAPO, and even allowed the Soviet Union and Cuba to retain their massive military presence in its territory.[25]

Here, it is notable that South Africa received no help from the outside world including the West that was, presumably, determined to undermine communist expansionism everywhere. To make it worse for South Africa, in 1975 a "Marxist-Leninist regime assumed power in Mozambique."[26] In addition, "South Africa also perceived high stakes in the increased guerilla warfare in Namibia and Rhodesia and got actively involved in the operations there as well. The West's' abandonment of South Africa and the end of White rule in Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe) in 1979 increased the elite's sense of [international] isolation."[27]

South Africa was by then suffering from an accelerated growth of international isolation, both politically and militarily. Initial successes of establishing dialogue with African countries fell apart. In 1971, the leaders of Central and East African countries adopted "Mogadishu Declaration," "which not only declared armed struggle to be the only means for achieving liberation and freedom in Southern Africa, but also condemned all African states that might forge closer ties with the apartheid regime."[28] For the United Nations, a process of delegitimization of the Pretoria's regime started and continued with momentum. In February 1972, the UN Security Council Resolution 311 "recognized, for the first time, the 'legitimacy' of the 'struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa to

achieve human and political rights.'"[29] Furthermore, the UNGA Resolution 3151 of December 1973 "declared that the 'South African regime' had no right to represent the people of South Africa and that the liberation movements (ANC and PAC) were the 'authentic representatives' of the vast majority of the South African people."[30] In this UNGA particular Resolution, the process of de-legitimization became almost institutionalized:

> The General Assembly requested all UN specialized agencies and other inter-governmental organizations to deny the South African regime membership or privileges or membership. Instead, representatives of South African liberation movements were to be invited to participate in meetings of these bodies. Following this and similar subsequent resolutions, most of the specialized agencies and other UN organizations have either suspended South Africa's membership or limited its rights of membership. South Africa has since 1974 also been denied participation in the proceedings of the General Assembly, following the rejection of its credentials.[31]

This international isolation reached an extremely critical point during and after the Angolan war. According to Crocker:

> The Angolan fiasco of 1975-1976 served to underscore further Pretoria's political isolation and the West's unreliability as a political-military partner in regional conflicts ... Finally, of course, it was Western support for the 1977 UN mandatory arms embargo – including French cancellation of some major naval contracts – that indicated the full extent of South Africa's military isolation.[32]

The UN Security Council Resolution 418 of 1977, mandating the 1963 voluntary arms embargo, called upon states "to review... all existing contractual arrangements with, and licenses granted to, South Africa relating to the manufacture and maintenance of arms, ammunition of all types and military equipment and vehicles, with a view to terminating them." In the same year, "the United States, Britain, France, Canada, and West Germany

formed a 'Contact Group' to pressure Pretoria into withdrawing from Namibia and to manage that country's transition to independence."[33]

In 1981, Harkavy used different measures, including diplomatic ties and the outcomes of critical UN votes, to elaborate on South Africa's international isolation. He mentioned that "South Africa exchanges ambassadors with only some fifteen states …and over the years, it has suffered a cascade of negative votes in the UN on issues related to apartheid and majority rules, arms embargoes, trade relations, 'Bantustans', and the like."[34] Almost simultaneously, in December 1982, the UNGA "reaffirmed the legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa and their national liberation movement by all available means, including armed struggle, for the seizure of power by the majority."[35]

At this crucial time, South Africa is reported to having taken several steps towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons. As a matter of fact, "South Africa has been a pioneer in nuclear research and uranium production… [It] has also been one of the leading producers of uranium and a major supplier to Western countries."[36] Moreover, "in the early 1960s, the South African Atomic Energy Board in Pretoria began to contemplate enriching uranium so as to increase the value of the exported product."[37] However, the period between 1970 and 1974 in particular was critical in the country's development of its nuclear weapons capability:

> On July 20, 1970, Prime Minister John Vorster informed parliament that government scientists had developed a "unique" process for enriching uranium…. In March 1971, the minister of mines, Carel de

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[33] Reiss, *Bridled Ambition*, 33.

[34] See Harkavy, "Pariah States and Nuclear Proliferation," 140-141.

Wet, approved "preliminary investigations" into the feasibility of producing nuclear explosives ... That same year, construction of a small-scale "pilot" enrichment plant began at Valindaba, next to the headquarters of the Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) at Pelindaba, located outside of Pretoria. In 1974, the AEC reported to Prime Minister Vorster that it could build a nuclear explosive device.[38]

In 1974, President Vorster "authorized development of nuclear explosives and approved funds for a test site."[39] Moreover, in 1977, South Africa's Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) "assembled all the non-nuclear components of a nuclear device."[40] Meanwhile, other scholars have reported that "South Africa in 1977 completed the first full device using enriched uranium, which it expected to test at the Kalahari site, but it later abandoned the testing idea."[41] The same year, 1977, both Soviet and U.S. satellites detected that South Africa was preparing for a nuclear explosion test in Kalahari Desert. And, again, in September 1979, South Africa was suspected of conducting a nuclear explosion in the South Indian Ocean in collaboration with Israel.[42] Paul summarizes the nuclear developments in South Africa as following:

> The active militarization of the program began in April 1978, when Vorster approved a document outlining the country's nuclear course. In July 1979 a committee appointed by Prime Minister P.W. Botha recommended manufacture of seven nuclear weapons... [South Africa] built a smaller device in 1978 and manufactured additional weapons at the facility of the Armaments Corporation of South Africa (ARMSCOR) at Pelindaba, near Pretoria, beginning in December 1982.[43]

The latest reported effort by South Africa in pursuit of nuclear weapons took place in June 1988 when President Botha "ordered [nuclear] test preparations at Kalahari site."[44]

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[38] Reiss, *Bridled Ambition*, 7-8.

[39] Ibid., 33.

[40] Ibid.

## Phase III

By the late 1980s, the South African enduring rivalry began to find its way towards the end. Talks began in London in 1988 between South Africa, Angola and Cuba in search for a peaceful settlement of their almost thirteen-year long military conflict. On December 22, 1988, the three parties reached an agreement that included the withdrawal of South African and Cuban forces from Angola according to a timetable (South African forces left Angola during 1989, as did half of the Cubans and the remainder were due to leave by mid-1991). The agreement provided also for the exclusion of armed members of SWAPO from Namibia, the establishment of a joint military patrol of the Angola border with Namibia, and the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435 that calls for granting independence to Namibia.[45] Shortly later, "a constitution was quickly adopted in 1990 and SWAPO's leader Sam Nujoma was elected Namibia's first president."[46]

At the same time, the process of communist disintegration in Eastern Europe began from 1989 onwards. Unsurprisingly, this accelerated change was welcomed in South Africa. For example, former South Africa's president, F.W. de Klerk, noted that "within the scope of few months, one of our main strategic concerns for decades – the Soviet Union's role in southern Africa and its strong influence on the ANC and the SACP [South Africa Communist Party] - had all but disappeared."[47]

Of utmost importance was the momentum South Africa's shift towards giving up apartheid policy was taking. This shift was best displayed in de Klerk's speech on February 2, 1990. This speech represented a package that "apart from the release of Nelson Mandela [on February 11, 1990] it also included the unbanning of the ANC, the

SACP, the PAC and a number of lesser organizations; the release of further category of ANC prisoners and the lifting of the State of Emergency regulations."[48] De Klerk stated: "My speech of 2 February 1990 had opened the way for South Africa to remove one of the main causes for our long confrontation with the international community – the whole question of apartheid."[49] With Pretoria/ ANC negotiations, which began in 1989, going further ahead, the year 1990 witnessed some developments that marked the beginning of the end of apartheid. In April, ANC exiles began their return to South Africa, in July the first official meeting of Mandela and de Klerk took place, in August, the ANC leadership declared the end of armed struggle, and in October, the South African parliament repealed Reservation of Separate Amenities Act.[50]

On the international level, international isolation imposed on South Africa, because of its apartheid system, began to decline. By October 1993 most of the UN sanctions were lifted and by June 1994 South Africa joined the OAU, rejoined the British Commonwealth of Nations, and resumed participation in the United Nations.[51] However, South Africa's President de Klerk had earlier conducted a successful European tour in May 1990, an unmistakably distinct event at the time. De Klerk pointed out:

> When I returned to South Africa on 26 May I could report that we could once again look to the international community squarely in the eye. We could do so because what we were doing in South Africa was based on a moral principal that could hold its own anywhere in the world... The visit had been an unqualified success. After forty years of confrontation and growing isolation South Africa had, at last, taken its first steps toward rejoining the international community.[52]

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[48] Ibid., 163.

[49] Ibid., 170.

Moreover, de Klerk made a breakthrough in the United States during his visit to Washington in September 1990. A week after this visit, "on 2 October, President Bush reported to the American Congress that the process of reform in South Africa was irreversible, dramatic and remarkable and that the further application of stringent sanctions was fast becoming irrelevant."[53] Finally, in July 1991, most sanctions under U.S. CAAA – the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act - were lifted, and in January 1992, most European sanctions were lifted as well and the UN General Assembly ended restrictions on cultural and academic exchanges.[54]

This coincided with major developments in South Africa's nuclear policy towards a radical revision of its nuclear weapons program. Following his inauguration as President of the republic in September 1989, F.W. de Klerk "established an 'Experts Committee' to outline procedures for dismantling the country's nuclear capabilities,"[55] and "in late 1989, the [nuclear] testing site was completely abandoned."[56] Furthermore, "beginning in July 1990, the uranium-enrichment plant at Pelindaba East was decommissioned, the six [nuclear] devices were dismantled, the hardware and technical documents were destroyed, and Advena, the weapons manufacturing site, was decontaminated and converted for commercial use."[57] Finally, on July 10, 1991, South Africa joined the NPT and signed in September a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. However, South Africa has only made the nuclear issue officially public in March 24, 1993, when de Klerk declared: "At one stage South Africa did develop a

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[53] Ibid., 189-190.

[54] See "South Africa: Chronology of Important Events," [on line]; available from:http://memory.loc.gov/cgibin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+za0005; Internet; accessed on

limited nuclear deterrent capability … of seven nuclear fission devices."[58]

## The South African Enduring Rivalry Fluctuations and Nuclear Proliferation/ Non-Proliferation Policies

There is almost a consensus among scholars about the relationship between South Africa's regional conflict developments and its nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation policies, that is through the lens provided by the security model. On the one hand, with regard to South Africa's motivations to acquire nuclear weapons, Albright, Fischer, Paul, and Reiss, all have assumed that South Africa's incentives for going nuclear were the regional security threat and international isolation imposed on it, combined with the psychological obsessions of total extinction. On the other hand, with regard to South Africa's motivations to give up its nuclear weapons, these scholars have focused on the mitigation of regional security threats, with the withdrawal of Cuban forces and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the main supporter for South Africa's hostile neighbors.

Here, the contention is to trace South Africa's enduring rivalry developments with the decisions to acquire and then to abandon nuclear weapons. This serves two major objectives: (1) to elaborate on the causal link between the two through the hypotheses of this study and (2) to examine other alternatives, held by various scholars, asserting that change in South Africa's domestic politics was the main motivation behind its decision to abandon its nuclear weapons program.

The whole of 1960s (*Phase I*) was a decreasing-tension phase in South Africa's enduring rivalry. First, the frequency rate of militarized disputes was low. According to

neighbors throughout the period 1968-1974.[59] Second, African liberation movements and the African neighbors could not challenge South Africa's military superiority. Of equal significance, the country's international isolation, though growing, was in low-moderate level. South Africa had survived many attempts by African countries to isolate it regionally and internationally, and it could still seek international assistance, in political and military terms, in case of an immediate security threat. Hence, South Africa's threat perception was reduced, and it needed no nuclear weapons for its national defense as it could deter any immediate military threat conventionally.

This situation changed drastically in the early and mid-1970s (*Phase II*). South Africa's threat perception by then was extremely intensified due to the factors that have constituted an increasing tension phase. These factors were the harboring of African liberation movements by newly independent black African states, the Soviet backed communist encroachment in South Africa's regional neighborhood, and growing international isolation. The African liberation movements had by then presented a military threat to South Africa, thanks to the Soviet support and the Cuban forces fighting on their side. The deteriorated international status of South Africa helped convince the country that it would not get outside support, whether politically or militarily, in the event of an attack initiated by the surrounding African countries.

These developments had certainly a direct relationship with South Africa's decision to go nuclear. South Africa faced a situation according to which it had to develop a self-sufficient military option for deterrence. Although South Africa had an advanced military industry, that provided the SADF with many of its equipments, either through indigenous development or foreign licenses, the newly introduced military threat

in Southern Africa and the rising international military isolation lessened the possibility

of military self-sufficiency. In this regard, Crocker writes:

> Should Pretoria permit itself to be drawn into a position where its forces are continuously called upon to strike distant targets, there is the possibility that it would face improved defenses manned by Cuban or other proxy forces. The SADF inventories of such key consumables as antitank weapons, helicopters, artillery pieces, and ground attack/fighter planes are not yet adequate to enable it to deal with a prolonged war of attrition. Nor are its industries yet turning out such hardware in quantity, and it could be three to four years before they are capable of doing so, even assuming the decision has been made to press ahead all these fronts.[60]

The intensified security threat perception was further reinforced by South African

society's "defiant siege mentality… [that is] coupled with a defensive psychology."[61]

Bearing in mind that South Africa has had an abnormal emergence as a state,

immigrants' society and an internal system suppressing the Black majority population

and depriving it from, roughly, all its rights, South Africa's society had heavy security

obsessions:

> It has been argued that South Africa might also regard nuclear arms as necessary weapons of last resort. Like Israel, it may be prey to a 'Masada' or 'Laager' complex, foreseeing the day when surrounded by advancing black armies backed up by Cubans, East Germans, or Russians, it would have to use the bomb as a last desperate act of defiance.[62]

The above-noted factors were clearly admitted by South Africa's officials later as

motivations to opt for the development of nuclear weapons. According to de Klerk:

> The decision to build nuclear weapons was taken as early as 1974, against the background of a Soviet expansionist threat in Southern Africa, the deployment of Cuban forces in Angola from 1975 onwards and the knowledge that because of our international isolation, we would not be able to rely on outside assistance in the event of an attack.[63]

Recalling the criteria of nuclear weapons capability mentioned earlier in CHAPTER TWO, it is safe to assume that South Africa by 1974 was a nuclear-capable state. A sequentially tracing account of the events of this period would reveal causation between the security threats, international isolation and South Africa's decision to go nuclear. The measures that South Africa took in the nuclear field symbolized the country's bedeviled situation.

After Portugal began withdrawal from its colonies in Southern Africa in 1974 – in the mid of an intensive campaign for isolating South Africa internationally - the same year President Vorster "authorized development of nuclear explosives and approved funds for a test site."[64] When the threat further increased later between 1975 and 1979, South Africa's going-nuclear policy reciprocated positively. As mentioned earlier, in 1977, South Africa is reported to having completed the first full nuclear device, and prepared for a nuclear explosion test in Kalahari site. The year 1978 witnessed President Vorster's approval of the country's nuclear course and a governmental committee recommended to build seven nuclear weapons.[65] In 1979, international suspicions were raised about the conduction of a nuclear explosion in the Indian Ocean by South Africa and Israel. Another example took place in 1988 when the increasing military threat as a result of the presence of Cuban forces in Angola helped push the South African nuclear program ahead. Riess writes:

> In early June 1988 Castro warned South Africa that it risked "serious defeat" and implied that his forces might cross the border to northern Namibia. It appears that Castro's threat provoked President Botha to respond in a mach more potent manner -- he ordered test preparations at Kalahari site that same month.[66]

On the other hand, when South Africa's enduring rivalry began to find its way

towards the end by the late 1980s (*Phase III*), the country reversed the nuclear course. Here, like the rivalry increasing tension phase conditions that have pushed South Africa to go nuclear, the termination of this enduring rivalry was reflected perfectly in South Africa's abandonment of its respective nuclear weapons program. Again, a sequentially tracing account of the events of this period would reveal the relationship between the mitigation of security threat, international integration and South Africa's abandonment of nuclear weapons. During this period, not only the military disputes between the belligerents ended in 1988 due to agreed settlements of conflicts in Angola and Namibia, but also the international isolation imposed on South Africa was in decline. Most importantly, South Africa reviewed the cause of the rivalry, apartheid, until it was abandoned totally.

The implication of the collapse of the communist camp was of no less importance to South African planners. Simply, South Africa's hostile neighbors would no longer be able to receive military assistance able to match, let alone defeat, South African forces as the East European communist countries were in sharp decline and were later to disappear completely. In particular, the regional security environment returned back to the pre-1974 situation whereby there was "an extensive vacuum in conventional military power- a vacuum that African states are not in a position to fill by themselves."[67] But later this security vacuum was to be filled by South Africa itself as it regained its military superiority over its neighbors.

On the regional level, and as a result of abandoning apartheid, African neighbors became no longer hostile countries. That is because the hostility of African national liberation movements (all by then were legalized by South Africa's government) and

occupation) originated from South Africa's racial discrimination against the Black majority population. The goal of the Blacks' struggle was to eliminate the apartheid regime and to provide an equal status for the Blacks in the country. South Africa itself has indeed achieved this goal as its government committed itself to abandon such system and to start dialogue with the ANC. Vale brilliantly comments on this unprecedented change of the regional security environment in southern Africa:

> In the absence of apartheid southern Africa, the region faced no defined external security threat. Insecurity in post-apartheid southern Africa seemed so obviously rooted in economics- uneven development, inequalities of resource access and allocation, unemployment, and poverty. Problems – later to be securitized – such as drugs, arms and illegal migrant labor flows were named as symptoms of structural inequalities. In these circumstances, therefore, security in southern Africa could obviously not be ensured through arms acquisitions and traditional forms of interstate military cooperation. Instead, it was forcefully argued, security should be promoted by a concerted attempt to address the region's and the continent's subordinate place within the global economy.[68]

In sum, the whole regional enduring rivalry was over. The regional setting has been transformed from conflict into peaceful and normal relations. The above-noted measures that South Africa took in the nuclear field in the late 1980s and early 1990s reflected the country's changing security threat perception. These measures have almost gone hand in hand with the regional and international developments. De Klerk comments on these developments by stating:

> By the time that I became state president, the global and regional strategic situation had changed dramatically. On 22 December 1988 we had signed an agreement with Cuba and Angola, which provided for the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of 50,000 Cuban troops from Angola. The Cold War had come to an end with the collapse of Communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Also, I expected that the reform policies which I intended to introduce would help to end the confrontation with our neighbors in southern Africa and with the

—and had become an obstacle to the development of our *international* relations. I accordingly decided to dismantle our capability.[69]

This statement leaves no doubt that with the end of the causes of its enduring rivalry and the decrease in its security threat perception due to the mitigation in security threats and growing international integration, South Africa became in no need for nuclear weapons. The features that have characterized this period are similar to a large extent to those of a "decreasing tension" phase of enduring rivalries, but what distinguishes it from that is the end of the causes of the rivalry. Consequently, South Africa's nuclear non-proliferation policy at the time indicates that it *abandoned,* rather than *suspended*, its nuclear weapons program because the regional enduring rivalry was terminated.

Here, it is important to examine alternative explanations held by very few scholars. These scholars asserted that change in South Africa's domestic politics was the main motivation behind its decision to abandon nuclear weapons programs. Through the lens provided by the neo-liberalist theory, some scholars argue, "the transition from apartheid to democracy coincided with de Klerk's decision to dismantle Pretoria's nuclear weapons and terminate the program."[70] Sagan's idea is quite similar but it focuses on the change of government rather than democratic transition:

> The timing and details of actions concerning the decision to dismantle and destroy the existing bomb stockpile also suggest that domestic political considerations were critical. In September 1989, de Klerk was elected president and immediately requested a high-level report on the possibility of dismantling the existing six nuclear devices. It is important to note that this request came before the Cold War was unambiguously over (the Berlin Wall fell in November 1989), and that de Klerk's action was considered by officials in South Africa as a sign that he had already decided to abandon the weapons program.[71]

That is nominally true, yet the preceding events in Eastern Europe prior to the fall of

Berlin Wall were quite illustrative on the decline of communism. Also, this came *after* Namibia-Angola accords were signed in December 1988.

In particular, there are three major flaws in the domestic explanation argument. First, South Africa's successive governments, though practicing apartheid against the Black majority of the population, were democratically elected and have shown civilian control over the military. Second, abandoning the apartheid system can be considered an internal matter of the country, but the whole enduring rivalry in southern Africa was basically linked to the apartheid regime in South Africa and that was manifested clearly in South Africa's Total National Strategy of 1979. Those who support the domestic explanation have notably admitted this factor, the inherent external dimension of apartheid. Riess stated that the internal characteristics of the state drove Pretoria's nuclear diplomacy and that "it was the maintenance of the distinctive Afrikaner *volk* that commanded the country's internal policies, but also dominated its external affairs."[72] Third, holding nationwide elections open to all races in April 1994 did not mark the beginning of this reform. Rather, they were the results of it. Actually, the process began earlier in the late 1980s when de Klerk was elected as the president in 1989. It was "de Klerk's strategy, first outlined to the country at the opening of parliament in February 1990, [that] envisioned South Africa reentering the community of nations by abolishing apartheid, entering into a new political dialogue with the country's black majority, and abandoning attempts to destabilize countries in the region."[73]

As for internal economic problems, evidence suggests that they have played only a marginal role in affecting South Africa's enduring rivalry and, consequently, its respective nuclear proliferation and non-nuclear proliferation policies. South Africa's

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major national economic indicator, the GNI per capita annual growth rate hardly supports

a correlation between South Africa's economic conditions and its enduring rivalry

developments, either decreasing tension and increasing tension phases or rivalry

termination (See Figure 4).



Fig. 4. South Africa's GNI per capita (Rand: current prices)
**Source**: South Africa Reserve Bank

As a matter of fact, "[A period of recession] commenced late in 1974 and only

started to abate in 1979."[74] If the economic variable was critical in initiating the

increasing tension phase, and in turn the nuclear weapons program in 1974, the economic

problems should have been obvious *before*, not *after*, the tension phase. Mainly due to

international isolation. UN embargoes and political and military confrontations in

Southern Africa, "the last quarter of the [twentieth] century was a period of dismal economic performance with falling standards of living as real economic growth lagged behind population growth, punctuated only by minimal booms between 1979 and 1981 ... and in 1984."[75] Here, it is notable that these economic booms did not correspond to any kind of decreasing tension.

On the other hand, as Figure 4 shows, there were no sharp fluctuations in the GNI per capita during the 1980s. To the contrary, there were some improvements. Consequently, this leads to conclude that it was not the South African economy's problems *per se* that have led the rivalry towards the end, but it was the imposed international sanctions on Pretoria. Accordingly, the relevance of South Africa's economic problems in the late-1980s to the termination of its enduring rivalry, and in turn the nuclear abandonment at the time, can be best explained in terms of the international isolation the country was suffering from.

In summary, South Africa's nuclear case demonstrates that South Africa initiated its nuclear weapons programs when its enduring rivalry with regional neighbors was passing an increasing tension phase (*Phase II*). It gave up its nuclear weapons program only when the causes of rivalry ceased to exist (*Phase III*). South Africa's domestic conditions, either political or economic, had little impact on enduring rivalry developments as well as nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation policies.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this thesis was to discover the conditions under which some nuclear-capable states, involved in high-level regional enduring rivalries, decide to suspend their nuclear weapons programs after initiating them. The literature review revealed that most scholars have insufficiently explained these revisions of nuclear policies by nuclear-capable enduring rivals. Previous literature on enduring rivalry lacks a satisfactory distinction between levels and patterns within this type of rivalry. These works could not explain the conditions under which enduring rivalry fluctuates. They focus exclusively on large-$N$ analysis while lacking sufficient examination of individual enduring rivalry cases. At the same time, scholarly works on nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation in regional conflicts tend to perceive the decision to nuclearize as one to be taken once and forever. T.V. Paul has developed a theory that views non-proliferation policies as a result of changes in regional security environments, but this theory was only limited to the low and moderate conflict zones. Paul and other scholars have invested heavily in analyzing the security guarantees provided by a superpower but they did not address how enduring rivalry developments affect the decision to forgo nuclear weapons. These inadequacies are mainly due to the scholars' negligence of the dynamics of enduring rivalries. Scholars examining nuclear-capable enduring rivals' cases conceive their enduring rivalries as either continuing in a stable pace or terminated.

proposed that there are two levels of enduring rivalry (high and low) and that enduring rivalry passes phases of increasing tension and decreasing tension along the course of its life. Also, it proposed that suspension of nuclear weapons programs in high-level enduring rivalries goes parallel to decreasing tension phases of enduring rivalry.

My hypotheses were: (1) different levels and phases of enduring rivalry, which depend on the fluctuation of international status and security threats, determine the nuclear policies of the nuclear- capable rivals, (2) in high-level enduring rivalries, the likelihood to initiate/ reactivate nuclear weapons programs is high when the rivalry passes an increasing tension phase, and (3) high-level enduring rivals may consider suspension of their nuclear weapons programs when the rivalry passes a decreasing tension phase. The dependent variable was the suspension of nuclear weapons programs by high- level enduring rivals. The independent variables were the fluctuation of international status (international isolation/ international integration) and security threats. The intervening variable was "different phases of enduring rivalry."

**Findings**

Throughout an extensive examination of four case studies (North Korea, South Korea, South Africa and Taiwan), the hypotheses of this thesis proved valid. This study confirms that different levels and phases of enduring rivalry (depending on the fluctuation of international status and security threats) determine the nuclear policies of the nuclear- capable rivals. In particular, it suggests that enduring rivals give up their nuclear weapons programs only when the causes of rivalry cease to exist. Otherwise, nuclear- capable enduring rivals suspend their nuclear weapons programs when the

states' nuclear policies. However, the fact remains that the sequence and structure of events establishes the link between the rivalry decreasing phases and the suspensions of the nuclear weapons programs. Internal political conditions did not affect the rivalry fluctuations or the nuclear policies in all cases. Nor was there a significant role for economic conditions, unless within the international status framework.

On the one hand, the nuclear cases of the two Koreas and Taiwan confirm the hypotheses of this study. Each Korea initiated or reactivated its nuclear weapons programs when its security threat perception was intensified (*Phase II* for South Korea and *Phases IV* and *VI* for North Korea). The ROK suspended its nuclear weapons program when its security threat perception was mitigated (*Phases III, IV, V* and *VI*). Also, the DPRK suspended its nuclear weapons program when the rivalry was passing a decreasing tension phase as well (*Phase V*).

The ROK's economic progress during the 1970s, the period in which South Korea first initiated its nuclear weapons and continued its development with ups and downs along the 1970s until it suspended it in 1980, was spectacular. At the same time, fluctuations in the ROK's GNI per capita since 1970 correspond neither to the increasing tension and decreasing tension phases nor to the decisions to go or not to go nuclear. For the Korean nuclear crisis in the early 1990s, Pyongyang was in no need to initiate a nuclear weapons program as a bargaining chip to get the LWRs. North Korea, a party to the NPT since 1985, could have asked the international community for nuclear technology for energy purposes. However, it did not. In addition, major economic indicators of North Korea before and after the nuclear crisis show a continuity of deterioration, rather than improvement, of the North Korean economy. However, the

context of the international isolation (including alliance shift) the country was suffering from.

For the current Korean nuclear crisis, one can hardly find evidence that suggests a direct relationship between the DPRK's economic situation in 2001 and its decision to reactivate its nuclear weapons programs after being suspended for seven years. Here, the early 1990s nuclear crisis may provide a useful insight. In retrospect, if Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program was traded for economic incentives in principal, the North Korean economy should have responded positively to the incentives that the 1994 Agreed Framework offered. Moreover, facing a nationwide famine in 1995-1996, Pyongyang did not opt for the resumption of its nuclear weapons program in order to get the world attention or to use it as a bargaining chip in return for economic aid. Rather, North Korea finally preferred to appeal peacefully to the international community for immediate food and fuel shipments.

South Korea's decisions to initiate the nuclear weapons program in 1970 and to continue it along the 1970s were taken by the autocratic regime of President Park. Park's successor, Chun Doo Hwan, who also ruled undemocratically, was the one who took the decision to suspend the program in 1980. North Korea initiated its nuclear weapons program in the late 1980s and early 1990s when Kim Il Sung was the President and it suspended it under the leadership of his heir and son, Kim Jong Il. And the reactivation of the program in 2002 was also under Kim Jong Il's leadership. Of course such a hereditary succession does not entail any kind of regime change, let alone democratic transition. Throughout almost a decade since the death of his father, Kim Jong Il has not shown a remarkable change in his country's policies.

variable - international integration - does not correspond to the hypotheses, as it witnessed no improvement during this decreasing tension phase. Finally, the ROC's economy was in a continuous state of improvement with very little fluctuations that can constitute clear phases of crises. At the same time, neither the island's change of leadership in the 1970 nor the policy change towards democracy in the 1980s has affected the decision to go or not to go nuclear.

On the other hand, the nuclear case of South Africa, as a control case, proved the hypotheses of this thesis as well but indirectly. South Africa initiated its nuclear weapons programs when its enduring rivalry with regional neighbors was passing an increasing tension phase (*Phase II*). It gave up its nuclear weapons program only when the causes of rivalry ceased to exist (*Phase III*). South Africa's domestic conditions, either political or economic, had little impact on enduring rivalry developments as well as nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation policies.

## Theoretical Implications

First, inasmuch as the interplay between economic and security interests of enduring rivals parallels contemporary theoretical debates between liberalism and realism, the findings of this thesis indicate the strength of realism's explanatory power. As the case studies have shown, economic conditions have little to do with the fluctuation of enduring rivalries and the rivals' nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation policies. At the same time, internal political changes appeared to be irrelevant to enduring rivals' decisions to initiate, suspend or give up nuclear weapons programs. As such, domestic changes, either political or economic, fail to correlate well

nuclear policies. Thus, one can fairly state that the Security Model, modified by the addition of the international status variable, is still paramount in explaining nuclear proliferation in regional conflicts.

Second, the findings of this thesis prove the applicability of Paul's "Prudential Realism" theory to enduring rivalries. Prudential realism appeared to be flexible enough to explain nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation in a different type of conflict other than low and moderate conflict zones. But bearing in mind the severity of enduring rivalry, expressed through its aforementioned four parameters, enduring rivals opt for suspension of their respective nuclear weapons programs instead of giving them up, as it is the case with low and moderate conflict zones. Albeit the primacy of security considerations in their strategic calculations, enduring rivals proved to be sufficiently "prudent" to take relaxation steps when the regional and international environments provided them with satisfactory positions.

## Policy Implications

The findings of this thesis are important for contemporary non-proliferation policy. First, there is a rationale to question the credibility of nuclear-capable enduring rivals' non-proliferation policies. There appears to be no compelling reason to believe that these rivals' adherence to the international non-proliferation regime or official commitments not to develop nuclear weapons are intended to give up the nuclear option. To the contrary, evidence suggests that there are some cases whereby non-proliferation commitments are used as a mere camouflage to conceal the development of nuclear weapons programs, in order to avoid would-be undesirable international reactions. As

Accordingly, enduring rivals' non-proliferation policies should not be taken for granted unless their respective enduring rivalries are resolved.

Second, as far as nuclear weapons proliferation is concerned, this kind of "prudence" that regional enduring rivals have shown refute the notion that Third World proliferators behave "irrationally" and, consequently, are more ready to risk nuclear confrontation. Conducting a cost -benefit analysis and making decisions that are responsive to the changing circumstances, indicate a high degree of rationality. By extension, this rationality, a basic assumption of nuclear deterrence, leads to the conclusion that Third World proliferators would be capable of practicing nuclear deterrence as well.

Third, existing international nuclear non-proliferation regimes, are incapable of achieving their goals. Using primarily on technical tools, such as international inspections or export control on nuclear materials, non-proliferation regimes could not prevent some countries from the development of nuclear weapons programs. Thus, it is recommended that international nuclear non-proliferation tools should be accompanied by conflict resolution efforts. Combating nuclear weapons proliferation requires the international community to widen its perspective as to seek primarily the resolution of conflicts, especially those among enduring rivals. As the case studies suggest, technical restrictions did not, and probably will not, prevent a state committed to acquire nuclear weapons from so doing unless its respective enduring rivalry is terminated. According to the IAEA Director-General, Mohammed El-Baradei:

> States attempt to acquire nuclear weapons because they have a kind of insecurity. We have to secure these states as well. Part of our job is not only to monitor [nuclear activities of] these states but also to understand

Here, North Korea's nuclear case appears to have echoed internationally so that a conviction is being established about the need to provide proliferators with security guarantees.

Fourth, it is extremely necessary for national non-proliferation strategies also to invest more on interstate conflict resolution instead of using technical tools or incentives/ disincentives tactics that proved to be inefficient. For example, former deputy chair of the CIA's National Intelligence Council in the first Clinton administration writes:

> America's capacity for ISR – intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance – is unparalleled, truly in a class of itself. It is also improving rapidly. However, existing ISR is not good at detecting objects that are hidden under foliage, buried underground or concealed in other ways. Nor is it good at precisely locating objects by intercepting their signals. Would-be proliferators can exploit these weaknesses.[2]

At the same time, the cases of South Korea and Taiwan illustrate that the security guarantees, provided by the United States in some phases, pushed these two countries to suspend, rather than to give up, their nuclear weapons programs. As such, prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation requires national strategies to address the root causes of this proliferation, which are the causes of enduring rivalries. That could be done through an incremental conflict resolution approach according to which: (1) security threats are to be mitigated, (2) a serious peace process begins to tackle all disputed issues, and (3) a comprehensive and lasting peace treaty should be reached.

Otherwise, it could be expected that recent national non-proliferation policies would meet the same fate of international non-proliferation regimes. The United States is a case in point. The U.S. "National Strategy To Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction [WMD]" of December 2002 predominantly employs military and sanctions options to

counter WMD threats. In the same vein, U.S. President George W. Bush ordered the deployment of the National Missile Defense (NMD) in December 2002. Justifying the deployment of the NMD system, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated that: "A policy of intentional vulnerability by the Western nations... could give rogue states the power to hold our people hostage to nuclear blackmail."[3]

These policies will, almost certainly, intensify the security threat perceptions of other countries, especially the so-called rogue states. The U.S. "National Strategy To Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction," offers only threats, rather than incentives, to existing and would-be proliferators.[4] Most importantly, it totally ignores the most salient motivations of nuclear proliferation, interstate conflicts and the states' quest for security. For the NMD, some analyses concluded that the NMD deployment is not likely to decrease the probability of a nuclear attack on the United Stats. Rather, it would raise it.[5] At the same time, being immune from missile attacks would make the United States show tougher foreign and military policies. Many other countries, like North Korea and Iran, would probably consider developing or continuing to develop weapons of mass destruction in order to deter the United States either from launching an attack on their territories or from trying to change their regimes.

[3] Donald H. Rumsfeld, "Prepared Testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee," June 21, 2001, [on line]; available from: http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2001/s20010621-secdef-html; Internet; accessed on 11/2/2003.

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