

American University in Cairo

## AUC Knowledge Fountain

---

Archived Theses and Dissertations

---

November 2021

### The Jester's Frame: The role of political satire in shaping Egyptians' perceptions of current issues (Case of Bassem Youssef's "Albernameg")

Salma T. Ismail

*The American University in Cairo AUC*

Follow this and additional works at: [https://fount.aucegypt.edu/retro\\_etds](https://fount.aucegypt.edu/retro_etds)



Part of the [Journalism Studies Commons](#), and the [Social Influence and Political Communication Commons](#)

---

#### Recommended Citation

##### APA Citation

Ismail, S. T. (2021). *The Jester's Frame: The role of political satire in shaping Egyptians' perceptions of current issues (Case of Bassem Youssef's "Albernameg")* [Thesis, the American University in Cairo]. AUC Knowledge Fountain.

[https://fount.aucegypt.edu/retro\\_etds/2556](https://fount.aucegypt.edu/retro_etds/2556)

##### MLA Citation

Ismail, Salma T.. *The Jester's Frame: The role of political satire in shaping Egyptians' perceptions of current issues (Case of Bassem Youssef's "Albernameg")*. 2021. American University in Cairo, Thesis. *AUC Knowledge Fountain*.

[https://fount.aucegypt.edu/retro\\_etds/2556](https://fount.aucegypt.edu/retro_etds/2556)

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by AUC Knowledge Fountain. It has been accepted for inclusion in Archived Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AUC Knowledge Fountain. For more information, please contact [fountadmin@aucegypt.edu](mailto:fountadmin@aucegypt.edu).

The American University in Cairo  
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy

**THE JESTER'S FRAME:  
THE ROLE OF POLITICAL SATIRE  
IN SHAPING EGYPTIANS' PERCEPTIONS OF CURRENT ISSUES  
(CASE OF BASSEM YOUSSEF'S "ALBERNAMEG")**

A Thesis Submitted to  
The Department of Journalism and Mass Communication

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for  
the degree of Master of Arts

by Salma Tharwat Ismail

under the supervision of Dr. Hussein Amin

December 2014

The American University in Cairo  
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy

**THE JESTER'S FRAME:  
THE ROLE OF POLITICAL SATIRE  
IN SHAPING EGYPTIANS' PERCEPTIONS OF CURRENT ISSUES  
(CASE OF BASSEM YOUSSEF'S "ALBERNAMEG")**

A Thesis Submitted by

Salma Tharwat Ismail

to the Department of Journalism and Mass Communication

December/2014

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the  
Degree of Master of Arts

has been approved by

Dr. Hussein Amin  
Thesis Adviser  
Affiliation: American University in Cairo  
Date: December 21, 2014

Dr. Naila Hamdy  
Thesis Second Reader  
Affiliation: American University in Cairo  
Date: December 21, 2014

Dr. Rasha Allam  
Thesis Third Reader  
Affiliation: American University in Cairo  
Date: December 21, 2014

Dr. Naila Hamdy  
Department Chair  
Date: December 21, 2014

Ambassador Nabil Fahmy  
Dean of GAPP  
Date: December 21, 2014

## DEDICATION

*In loving memory of my dear friend, Mahitab Khalil*

*Mahi was a role model in every sense of the word...  
as a teaching assistant, later on as a work colleague and friend,  
and ultimately as the beautiful human being that she was.*

*You will always be alive in our hearts.*

*May your lovely soul rest in peace.*

## **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

I would like to extend my sincere thanks and gratitude to everyone who has helped me through my master's.

My dear family, for putting up with the ups and downs through it all...

My dad, for his sacrifice and endless support. You always gave me that extra push whenever I felt that I wanted to give up. I have learned from you that the greatest investment anyone can leave their children is a good education, as no one can take that away.

My mom, for her relentless love and care, for teaching me that education is much more than books and classes, information and a degree; for always telling me that every situation and person we meet has something to teach us. Most of all, for showing me that true education is a change in our way of thinking.

Yusra, my sister and lifelong best friend... You were always there whenever I needed to vent. You managed to put a smile on my face by offering a helping hand or with your wonderful sense of humor. You always reminded me to take time for myself, and that when I do, I should have fun to the fullest and not feel guilty about it.

Marwan, my husband and my love, for showing me the true meaning of compromise. You have made everything easier with your love, patience and understanding. You've given me a peaceful home where I could concentrate on work when I needed to, or just leave all the stress behind... Thank you for being my sky full of stars.

Yara, we started out as work colleagues and winded up the closest of friends. Sharing this experience with you made it a whole lot easier. You have taught me that there comes a point after a great deal of hard work when one has to stop worrying and just believe that everything will work out for the best.

To my professors for their encouragement, and my dear friends at work for their care and support, sharing the stress right before the deadlines and the happiness and relief when each semester came to an end.

Dr. Hussein Amin, my thesis supervisor, for being an epitome of hard work. I have learned a great deal from you, from being a sea of knowledge to the way you deal with your students, always encouraging us to reach our full potential and treating us as young scholars. Thank you for everything.

## ABSTRACT

This study investigates the socio-political characteristics of the Egyptian political satire show, *Albernameg*'s audience, as well as whether the audience considers the show a source of news. This is studied in relation to the effects of the show on its viewers' perceptions of current issues. The uses and gratifications approach and the framing theory are used as a theoretical framework. Qualitative content analysis resulted in choosing perceptions of two issues: the AIDS & virus C detection device, and coal introduction as an alternative source of generating electricity in Egypt, as the media frames that were used as a basis for the survey questions. The qualitative content analysis revealed that the two issues were framed negatively on *Albernameg*. The survey findings show that *Albernameg* audience is politically interested and attentive, exhibits low internal political efficacy and slightly high levels of external political efficacy, with levels of political knowledge ranging between medium and high. More than 50% of the sample considers *Albernameg* a source of news. The results suggest the presence of framing effects in relation to the two issues under consideration. Heavy viewers exhibit more negative perceptions of both issues. Viewers who watched the show for information and those who watched for entertainment both have negative perceptions of the two issues. There is an inverse correlation between perceived credibility of Bassem Youssef and viewers' perceptions of both issues. The higher the level of political knowledge, the more negative the perceptions of the two issues. More politically knowledgeable viewers are also slightly more likely to perceive Bassem Youssef as a credible source of information than less politically knowledgeable ones. These results pose political satire, and more specifically *Albernameg*, as a media literacy platform and a strong tool for influencing public opinion.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>1</b>
INTRODUCTION	1
PROBLEM STATEMENT	4
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY	4
<b>CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>A. USES &amp; GRATIFICATIONS</b>	<b>5</b>
1. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS	5
2. MOTIVATION & MEDIA CONSUMPTION	6
3. MEDIA ORIENTATION	8
<b>B. FRAMING</b>	<b>10</b>
1. THE THEORY & FRAME TYPOLOGY	10
2. MEDIATING PROCESSES	11
3. FRAMING & PUBLIC OPINION	12
4. MODERATORS OF FRAMING EFFECTS	13
5. A PROCESS MODEL OF FRAMING	15
<b>CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>A. THE SATIRE GENRE</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>B. PARODY AS MEDIA CRITICISM</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>C. POLITICAL SATIRE &amp; DEMOCRATIC CULTURE</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>D. SATIRE AUDIENCES' POLITICAL PROFILES</b>	<b>19</b>
1. AFFINITY FOR POLITICAL HUMOR	19
2. POLITICAL EFFICACY	20
3. POLITICAL INTEREST & KNOWLEDGE	22
<b>E. POLITICAL SATIRE IN EGYPT</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>F. OVERVIEW OF BASSEM YOUSSEF &amp; <i>ALBERNAMEG</i></b>	<b>24</b>
1. HOW IT ALL STARTED	24
2. TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF THE SHOW	25
3. <i>ALBERNAMEG</i> IS BACK	26
4. HONORS & AWARDS	27
5. THE PLAGIARISM INCIDENT	27
6. <i>ALBERNAMEG</i> GOES OFF THE AIR	28
<b>CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH QUESTIONS &amp; HYPOTHESES</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS</b>	<b>34</b>
<b>B. HYPOTHESES</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>C. OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES</b>	<b>37</b>



<b>CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY</b>	<b>45</b>
<b>A. QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS</b>	<b>45</b>
<b>B. SURVEY</b>	<b>53</b>
<b>C. DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE</b>	<b>53</b>
<b>CHAPTER 6: DATA ANALYSIS</b>	<b>55</b>
<b>RESEARCH QUESTION 1</b>	<b>55</b>
<b>RESEARCH QUESTION 2</b>	<b>63</b>
<b>HYPOTHESIS 1</b>	<b>67</b>
<b>HYPOTHESIS 2</b>	<b>70</b>
<b>HYPOTHESIS 3</b>	<b>74</b>
<b>POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE &amp; AUDIENCES' PERCEPTIONS</b>	<b>77</b>
<b>CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION &amp; DISCUSSION</b>	<b>83</b>
<b>LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY</b>	<b>90</b>
<b>SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH</b>	<b>91</b>
<b>STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS</b>	<b>93</b>
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b>	<b>94</b>
<b>APPENDIX</b>	<b>107</b>
<b>QUESTIONNAIRE – ARABIC VERSION</b>	<b>108</b>
<b>QUESTIONNAIRE – ENGLISH VERSION</b>	<b>113</b>

## TABLES

<b>Table 1:</b> Age	<b>55</b>
<b>Table 2:</b> Gender	<b>56</b>
<b>Table 3:</b> Educational level	<b>57</b>
<b>Table 4:</b> Occupation	<b>58</b>
<b>Table 5:</b> Interest in politics and public affairs	<b>59</b>
<b>Table 6:</b> Attention to politics and public affairs	<b>59</b>
<b>Table 7:</b> Political interest and attention	<b>60</b>
<b>Table 8:</b> Political knowledge	<b>61</b>
<b>Table 9:</b> Internal political efficacy	<b>62</b>
<b>Table 10:</b> External political efficacy	<b>62</b>
<b>Table 11:</b> Reasons for watching <i>Albernameg</i>	<b>63</b>
<b>Table 12:</b> News Sources	<b>64</b>
<b>Table 13:</b> Credibility of Bassem Youssef	<b>66</b>
<b>Table 14:</b> Mean scores of watching for information and watching for entertainment in terms of perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device	<b>67</b>
<b>Table 15:</b> Difference between watching for information and watching for entertainment in terms of perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device	<b>68</b>
<b>Table 16:</b> Mean scores of watching for information and watching for entertainment in terms of perception of using coal to generate electricity	<b>68</b>
<b>Table 17:</b> Difference between watching for information and watching for entertainment in terms of perception of using coal to generate electricity	<b>69</b>
<b>Table 18:</b> Mean scores of level of viewership in terms of perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device	<b>70</b>
<b>Table 19:</b> Significance between different levels of viewership in terms of perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device	<b>70</b>
<b>Table 20:</b> Difference between levels of viewership in terms of perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device	<b>71</b>
<b>Table 21:</b> Mean scores of level of viewership in terms of perception of using coal to generate electricity	<b>72</b>
<b>Table 22:</b> Significance between different levels of viewership in terms of perception of using coal to generate electricity	<b>72</b>

<b>Table 23:</b> Difference between levels of viewership in terms of using coal to generate electricity	<b>73</b>
<b>Table 24:</b> Correlations between perceptions of the AIDS & virus C detection device and using coal to generate electricity, and perceived credibility of Bassem Youssef	<b>74</b>
<b>Table 25:</b> Mean scores of viewers who perceive Bassem Youssef as credible and those who do not, in terms of perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device	<b>75</b>
<b>Table 26:</b> Difference between viewers who perceive Bassem Youssef as credible and those who do not, in terms of perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device	<b>75</b>
<b>Table 27:</b> Mean scores of viewers who perceive Bassem Youssef as credible and those who do not, in terms of perception of using coal to generate electricity	<b>76</b>
<b>Table 28:</b> Difference between viewers who perceive Bassem Youssef as credible and those who do not, in terms of perception of using coal to generate electricity	<b>76</b>
<b>Table 29:</b> Mean scores of different political knowledge levels in terms of perception of the AIDS & virus C device	<b>77</b>
<b>Table 30:</b> Significance between different political knowledge levels in terms of perception of the AIDS & virus C device	<b>78</b>
<b>Table 31:</b> Difference between political knowledge levels in terms of perception of the AIDS & virus C device	<b>78</b>
<b>Table 32:</b> Mean scores of different political knowledge levels in terms of perception of using coal to generate electricity	<b>79</b>
<b>Table 33:</b> Significance between different political knowledge levels in terms of perception of using coal to generate electricity	<b>79</b>
<b>Table 34:</b> Difference between political knowledge levels in terms of perception of using coal to generate electricity	<b>80</b>
<b>Table 35:</b> Mean scores of different political knowledge levels in relation to perceived credibility of Bassem Youssef	<b>81</b>
<b>Table 36:</b> Significance between different political knowledge levels in relation to perceived credibility of Bassem Youssef	<b>81</b>
<b>Table 37:</b> Difference between political knowledge levels in relation to perceived credibility of Bassem Youssef	<b>82</b>

## FIGURES

<b>Figure 1: Age</b>	<b>55</b>
<b>Figure 2: Gender</b>	<b>56</b>
<b>Figure 3: Educational level</b>	<b>57</b>
<b>Figure 4: Occupation</b>	<b>58</b>
<b>Figure 5: Political interest and attention</b>	<b>60</b>
<b>Figure 6: Political Knowledge</b>	<b>61</b>
<b>Figure 7: Reasons for watching <i>Albernameg</i></b>	<b>63</b>
<b>Figure 8: News sources</b>	<b>65</b>

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

*“Jesters do oft prove prophets”*

William Shakespeare

King Lear (Act 5, Scene 3)

During Medieval times, kings kept jesters for amusement and telling jokes. Jesters played the role of both entertainers and advisers, sarcastically mocking reality to entertain and amuse. The jester’s unique position in the court allowed him to tell the king the truth upfront that no one else dared to speak, under the cover of telling it as a jest (Glenn, 2011). In this sense, contemporary political satire has given birth to many modern-day jesters, one of the most famous worldwide being Jon Stewart, and on a more local scale but also gaining widespread popularity, Bassem Youssef.

Political satire is a global genre. It dates back to the 1960s, originating in Britain, and has now become transnational, with cross-cultural flows of the format popular and flourishing across various countries (Baym & Jones, 2012). The Daily Show with Jon Stewart and The Colbert Report are examples of popular political satire shows in the United States. Both shows have won Emmy awards and Jon Stewart was named one of Time magazine’s 100 most influential people in the world.

Research on political satire shows that it does not have unified effects on its audiences. Different types of satire lead to distinct influences on viewers (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; Baumgartner & Morris, 2008; Holbert et al, 2013; Lee, 2013). Moreover, viewers of different comedy shows are not homogeneous in nature. The Daily Show's audience was found to be more politically interested and knowledgeable than Leno and Letterman viewers (Young & Tisinger, 2006). Even with exposure to the same show, different audience characteristics, such as varying ages, political affiliations and levels of political knowledge, may result in varying effects on viewers (Young, 2004; Young & Tisinger, 2006; Lee, 2013).

In Egypt, political satire was present in the media arena with Mohamed Azab, an Egyptian comedian, launching his program *The Azab Show* in 2010, mocking the Egyptian government and Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif's cabinet, but the program was banned until the 25 January 2011 revolution. TV presenter, Akram Hosni, also started a satirical program in which he created a character called *Sayed Abu Hafiza*, a news presenter reporting the news in a comedic way and mocking famous figures (ElGabry, 2014; Younis, 2014). The genre, however, really started flourishing with Bassem Youssef's show "*Albernameg*", which literally translates into "The Show". Bassem Youssef is a cardiac surgeon. He started his satire show on YouTube in 2011, going from there to a TV show on several satellite channels, beginning with ONTV, moving to CBC and finally MBC. In 2013, Youssef was crowned "Man of the Year" at the Esquire Middle East Awards ("Bassem Youssef: Egypt's freedom-of-speech icon"), was chosen by Foreign Policy magazine among its global thinkers ("Bassem Youssef, Heba Morayef and Hossam Bahget among 2013 FP global thinkers") and was Google's top trending search for people in Egypt (Aggour, 2014). He was also one of four journalists presented with the 2013 International Press Freedom Awards by The Committee to Protect Journalists (Astor, 2014). Moreover, *Albernameg* was the most searched TV show on Google (Aggour, 2013) and the top trending Arabic talk show on YouTube ("Videos: YouTube reveals top Middle East videos"). Bassem Youssef and his show have reached over 2 million followers on Twitter and 6 million fans on Facebook.

Throughout its operation, Bassem Youssef's show has been a matter of strong debate and controversy, being sometimes hailed for revealing inconsistencies and hypocrisies in the news media and at other times attacked for taking it too far. From being named on Time magazine's list of the 100 most influential people in 2013, having the show suspended on the Egyptian private satellite channel CBC and protests erupting against its host, and then reappearing shortly after on the media conglomerate MBC, *Albernameg* has been drawing a lot of attention among Egyptians along the way.

*Albernameg* has faced a lot of opposition. The suspension of the show on CBC, and afterwards the jamming of MBC's signal during the airing of *Albernameg*, ending with the complete suspension of the show and taking it completely off the air raise questions about the ability of the show to affect Egyptian public opinion. Do Bassem Youssef and *Albernameg* pose a threat to the authorities leading them to seriously pursue shutting down the show and taking its host off the airwaves? Then, another issue comes into play, which is the credibility of Bassem Youssef as a source of information, especially after he was involved in a plagiarism incident related to his weekly column in *Al Shorouk* newspaper.

This study examines the characteristics of *Albernameg* audience, their motivations for watching the show, and whether they consider *Albernameg* a news source. Furthermore, the study investigates the framing effects of the show on its audience, by exploring whether media frames presented on the show correspond to audience frames, in relation to perceptions of current issues. In this sense, this study plays a role in bridging the gap between uses and gratification research and effects studies, since it examines *Albernameg*'s audience characteristics and motivations for viewing the show from a Uses & Gratifications perspective and links it to framing effects of the show on its audience.

## **PROBLEM STATEMENT**

*Albernameg* is a satirical format. However, if its audience considers it a source of news and perceive Bassem Youssef as a credible source of information, their perceptions of current issues may be affected by the way social and political issues are framed on the show. This could ultimately reflect on Egyptian public opinion. This study explores the sociopolitical characteristics of *Albernameg*'s audience, how they perceive the show and its presenter in terms of information credibility, as well as whether their perceptions of current issues correspond to the way these issues are framed on the show. Hence testing the presence of framing effects on the show's audience, or lack thereof.

## **SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY**

This study plays a role in bridging the gap between “uses & gratifications” and “media effects” research. It also sheds light on the important role of political satire in shaping audiences' perceptions of current issues. In addition, the study associates literature on political satire, which is largely based on Western shows in the genre, to its uses and effects in a Middle Eastern context.



## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

#### **A. USES & GRATIFICATIONS**

##### **1. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS**

Audience activity is the cornerstone of uses and gratifications research. It refers to the audience's intentionality, selectivity and involvement with the media (Blumler, 1979). The uses and gratifications approach to media effects considers the user as an active goal-oriented participant in the communication process, not merely a passive receiver of media messages. The medium is one of various sources of influence on the user. The characteristics, motivations, selectivity and involvement of users influence their purposes, functions and uses of the media. These factors, in turn, work as mediators or moderators of media effects. Users' personal traits and social environment help shape their expectations and desires in terms of media consumption. They then actively and purposefully select media or messages that satisfy these expectations and desires (Katz, Blumler & Gurevitch, 1973).

According to Katz, Blumler and Gurevitch (1974), there are three main objectives for uses and gratifications research: explaining how people use the media to gratify their needs, understanding motivations behind media behavior and identifying the consequences that follow from needs, motivations and behavior.

Katz, Haas & Gurevitch (1973) classified 35 media-related needs into five categories: cognitive needs, affective needs, personal integrative needs, social integrative needs and tension release needs. Cognitive needs are related to gaining information, knowledge and understanding. Affective needs are related to pleasurable, emotional and aesthetic experience. Personal integrative needs include strengthening status, stability, credibility and confidence. Social integrative needs relate to strengthening contacts with family and friends. Tension-release needs have to do with escape and diversion (Katz, Haas & Gurevitch, 1973). According to Katz, Blumler & Gurevitch (1974), surveillance and enjoyment, which relate to the

aforementioned cognitive and affective needs respectively, are the principal and most fundamental audience motivations for consuming media content.

Katz, Blumler & Gurevitch (1973) argue that media-related needs and media uses can be deduced from the gratifications they satisfy. For example, the need for security or the drive for satisfying curiosity and exploration could lead to the surveillance function of the media, seeking reassurance that one is right results in using the media to reinforce values and attitudes, needing to develop cognitive mastery of one's environment can lead to using the media to correlate information. Using the media for personal reference could be the result of need for self-esteem, social utility function a result of need for affiliation and escape functions a result of the need to reduce anxiety and release tension. They also contend that the link between needs and need gratification through media use is not fully understood. An example of this is the motives behind some people's use of the media to gain political information versus others avoiding it. They suggest that the interaction of psychological, sociological and environmental factors can lead audience members to use the media in certain ways (Katz, Blumler & Gurevitch, 1973).

## **2. MOTIVATION & MEDIA CONSUMPTION**

According to Rubin (2009), media consumption choices are driven by media consumption motivations. People's motivations are derived from many factors, such as their needs and interests. These motivations influence the uses of and gratifications obtained from various media.

Palmgreen's (1984) examination of a variety of uses and effects studies concluded that there is a relationship between audience motivations and various media effects, including knowledge, attitudes and perceptions of social reality. So (2012) argues, however, that this link between motives of media use and effects of that use, which was originally intended to be bridged by Uses and Gratifications research, has been neglected in Uses and Gratifications studies. These studies have focused instead primarily on measuring the impact of audience motivation on "consequences of media exposure rather than effects."

So (2012) proposes a model of motivated media exposure and its impact on risk perception, based on the two principal motivations for media consumption as identified by previous literature: surveillance and enjoyment. The study tested the effects of each motivation on risk perception separately, and then the effect of mixed motivation. The central premise of the model is that audience motivation serves as a “frame” through which audiences filter, interpret and process information they receive from the mass media. The model entails four propositions. Firstly, that audience’s motivation to consume media serves as a mental frame that guides processing and interpretation of the media content. The first proposition is recommended by the study for use in political communication research due to their rapid diversification, more specifically into infotainment shows such as *The Daily Show with Jon Stewart*. Secondly, that when audiences who consume media with surveillance as a primary motivation are exposed to risk information through the media, their social risk perception is more influenced than their personal risk perception. Thirdly, that when audiences who consume media with enjoyment as a primary motivation are exposed to risk information through the media, their personal risk perception is more influenced than their social risk perception. Fourthly, that when audiences consume media with mixed motivation of surveillance and enjoyment, both social and personal risk perceptions are influenced to the same degree. The fourth proposition is also discussed in light of infotainment shows such as *The Daily Show with Jon Stewart*, as audiences seek these kinds of shows with mixed motivation of both surveillance and enjoyment.

Lee (2013) measured the link between audience motivations and news consumption. The study focused on four main types of motivation-driven news consumption: information-motivated, entertainment-motivated, opinion-motivated and social-motivated. Information-driven motivations relate to gaining new information, following up on government performance, being an informed citizen and satisfying one’s need to know. Entertainment-driven motivations include entertainment, laughter, habit and having nothing better to do. Opinion-driven motivations encompass helping form one’s opinion on different issues and being

exposed to other people's opinions, between like-minded and different views. Social-driven motivations include appearing informed to others, being more sociable, because most of one's friends do and having something to talk about. Results suggest that age is an important predictor of motivations. Entertainment and social purposes were the main motivations for news consumption for younger adults, whereas older adults were more likely to consume news for information and opinion reasons. Moreover, political satire was linked to entertainment and opinion-driven motivations. Those with information-driven motivations were least motivated to watch them. The study also found slight differences in motivations within different programs inside the political satire genre. Audience members with entertainment and opinion motivations were equally driven to watch *The Colbert Report*, whereas entertainment-motivated consumption was slightly higher for *The Daily Show with Jon Stewart*.

### **3. MEDIA ORIENTATION**

Media use can be ritualized or instrumental. Ritualized use suggests a less active or less goal-oriented state with the user being engaged with the medium in order to consume time and for diversion, out of habit. Instrumental use, on the other hand, entails intention, selectivity and involvement, with the user actively seeking certain message content for informational reasons, such as greater exposure to news, and perceiving that content to be realistic (Rubin, 1983).

Moody's (2011) study on whether Australians' political communication choices are influenced by credibility or convenience indicates that media use patterns are influenced by habit, as a result of everyday life practices, rather than consciously and thoughtfully seeking information. The findings revealed that people repeatedly refer to media they do not trust for political news and information. These findings show that convenience trumps credibility when it comes to information selection.

Van Der Wurff (2011) also highlights the role of habit in media selection. His study on online news media's displacement of traditional ones shows that this process depends on three factors. Firstly, it is influenced by users' accessibility to the medium. Secondly, time spent using a medium depends on the amount of

gratifications sought and obtained by that medium. The more the gratifications the user seeks and obtains from a medium, the more time they spend using that medium. Thirdly, for media that are not limited by accessibility, habit plays an important role in determining time spent using those media.

Instrumental orientations may produce stronger attitudinal and behavioral effects than ritualized orientations because they include more motivation and involvement with media messages, as well as perception of media messages to be realistic (Rubin, 1983). According to Rubin and Perse (1987a, 1987b), instrumental television use resulted in cognitive, affective and behavioral involvement with soap opera programs and news. More specifically, it led to more active thinking and consideration of the content, parasocial interaction with media personalities and deliberating with others over content (Rubin & Perse, 1987a, 1987b).

This shows that media uses and effects are related. According to Windahl (1981), media uses and media effects research are similar in terms of their attempts to explain results and outcomes of media use. Media effects research does this by looking at the communication process from the communicator's perspective, whereas uses research starts with the audience member and recognizes how far audience's activity and involvement can influence the communication process and its outcomes (Windahl, 1981).

As previously noted, it is important to relate media uses and effects research in order to bridge the gap between these two research areas (Windahl, 1981; Palmgreen, 1984; So, 2012). Hence, this study investigates the Egyptian political satire show, *Albernameg*, from a uses and gratifications perspective, as well as some of its possible framing effects.

## **B. FRAMING**

### **1. THE THEORY & FRAME TYPOLOGY**

The framing literature distinguishes between two types of frames: audience frames and media frames (Scheufele, 1999). Within the context of audience frames, framing can be defined as a process that can lead people to conceptualize an issue in a specific way or re-evaluate the issue differently (Chong and Druckman, 2007a). In this case, “the frame determines whether most people notice and how they understand and remember a problem, as well as how they evaluate and choose to act upon it” (Entman, 1993).

As for media frames, “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (Entman, 1993).

Media frames can increase the salience of information as a result of the way information is placed in terms of order, repetition or association to culturally familiar symbols (Entman, 1993). Sources can also contribute to increasing salience. More specifically, overrepresentation of certain sources can dictate a specific media frame, especially when opposing voices are underrepresented or absent in media coverage (Ross, 2003). This has significant consequences on audience frames because it means the audience is only being exposed to one repetitive frame and not competing ones. This can, in turn, increase the accessibility of this frame and consequently raise the chances of its use in making judgments and attributions of responsibility (Baden and Lecheler, 2012).

Media frames can be further broken down into episodic and thematic frames. Episodic frames are event-oriented and take the form of case studies, such as stories about the suffering of a homeless person or a drug addict. Thematic frames are more universal, presenting abstract and general evidence, such as changes in government welfare expenditures (Iyengar, 1994). Episodic and thematic frames can direct attribution of responsibility for the framed issue either to the individual or society at

large. In an experimental study about television news framing of poverty and audience's attribution of responsibility, Iyengar's (1990) findings show that when poverty is framed episodically, individuals are more likely to attribute responsibility for poverty to the poor people themselves. Thematic frames, on the other hand, result in throwing the blame on societal factors, such as failed governmental programs or economic conditions (Iyengar, 1990).

## **2. MEDIATING PROCESSES**

In order for a framing effect to occur, a given belief about an issue under consideration has to be available, accessible and applicable. Out of all the beliefs available and stored in an individual's memory, framing renders only some accessible when evaluating an issue. If the individual is motivated enough or faced with opposing arguments, forming a stimulating competitive environment, he/she will evaluate the applicability of the beliefs and form a judgment about which beliefs are most applicable to the issue at hand (Chong and Druckman, 2007a).

Baden and Lecheler (2012) also discuss availability and applicability, and add one more dimension: belief content change. Availability and applicability operate on existing information in the receiver's mind, whereas belief content change either alters content of existing beliefs or adds new beliefs. The three processes are complementary; they each contribute to the total framing effect. For example, highly accessible information can be disregarded if it is deemed inapplicable. Also, using applicable information and beliefs means that they were selectively activated and are thus more accessible. Furthermore, relations can be built between previously disconnected beliefs, as well as newly acquired beliefs being integrated into the cognitive structure through applicability. This does not necessarily mean that all the processes have to operate simultaneously. For example, framing effects can occur based solely on accessing one set of unchallenged beliefs in a person's mind rather than another (Baden and Lecheler, 2012).

### **3. FRAMING & PUBLIC OPINION**

Iyengar (1991) states that controversial issues offer a challenge in the process of attribution of responsibility. He argues that the public is incapable of determining whom to blame for various incidents. The media, depending on how they frame the event, can shape attributions of responsibility for social and political issues. Moreover, individuals do not draw on all possible information they ever encounter to form opinions about issues they are faced with; judgments, opinions, and decisions are determined based on the information most easily retrievable from memory (Iyengar, 1991).

When individuals are exposed to competing frames, their response will likely be one of two alternatives. They will either respond to the louder frame or to the stronger frame. A loud frame is the frame most frequently repeated. Repetition can be influential due to the fact that individuals do not always weigh the information they receive consciously. They form opinions based on what they hear regularly and thus most readily comes to mind. Repetition increases the accessibility of the frame. A strong frame can be determined based on several factors. For example, a frame can be deemed strong if it is communicated via a credible source and/or conforms to strongly held beliefs (Chong and Druckman, 2007b).

Effects of competing frames are dependent upon whether the first frame was stored and is accessible during exposure to the second frame, in order to be used as context. If effects of the first frame had dissipated by the time of exposure to the second frame, recency effects dominate competitive framing (Baden and Lecheler, 2012).

In an experimental survey design study that measured repetitive and competitive news framing by tracing effects of two different frames across delayed points in time: immediately after the first exposure, after 15 minutes, 1 day, 1 week and 2 weeks, results showed that repetition did not have a substantial effect on opinion unless the delay between two exposures is short. Competitive news framing was strongly influenced by recency effects with the latest frame exposure being



decisive for opinion formation (Lecheler and de Vreese, 2013). This is in agreement with Baden and Lecheler (2012) who suggest that framing effects are more durable when some sort of learning occurs, such as by forming new applicability relations or when belief content is changed (Baden and Lecheler, 2012).

#### **4. MODERATORS OF FRAMING EFFECTS**

Personal traits and individual differences can act as moderators of framing effects. It is important to account for these variables in order not to assume powerful media effects based on findings of framing effects research, when these factors can be acting as confounding variables. There are several moderators to framing effects. These include values and prior beliefs (Chong and Druckman, 2007a), source credibility (Druckman, 2001), knowledge about the issue (Baden & Lecheler, 2012; Lecheler & de Vreese, 2013; Lecheler & de Vreese, 2012; Druckman & Nelson, 2003; Nelson, Oxley & Clawson, 1997; Detenber et al, 2007) and intensity of emotional reactions (Aarøe, 2011).

Values constitute one of the clearest limits on framing effects. “In general, strong dispositions reduce framing effects by increasing one’s resistance to disconfirming information.” However, even individuals who have strong values on some issues are subject to framing effects on new issues that they do not have a firm opinion on yet (Chong and Druckman, 2007a).

Source credibility is also a moderator of framing effects, with perceived source credibility acting as a requirement for successful framing. Druckman (2001) conducted two experiments in order to measure the impact of source credibility on framing effects. The first experiment included two statements (humanitarian vs. government expenditures) from two different sources (Colin Powell vs. Jerry Springer) in order to measure the effect of source credibility on framing. The statements tackled U.S. Congress consideration of proposals that would alter the amount of federal assistance to the poor. Participants received one of four statements: a Colin Powell humanitarian statement, a Colin Powell government expenditures statement, a Jerry Springer humanitarian statement or a Jerry Springer

government expenditures statement. A pretest indicated that Colin Powell was perceived as a highly credible source, while Jerry Springer was a low credible source. Results showed that participants who read a Colin Powell humanitarian statement exhibited significantly greater support for assisting the poor than those who read a Colin Powell government expenditure statement. The difference in opinion among respondents who read a Jerry Springer humanitarian vs. government expenditure statement was not significant (Druckman, 2001).

In the second experiment, participants were asked to read articles about a Ku Klux Klan's request to hold a rally, framed in terms of either freedom of speech or public safety. Articles were portrayed as if they were from The New York Times and The National Enquirer's websites. A pretest showed that The New York Times was rated as highly credible and The National Enquirer as a low credibility source. Participants who read The New York Times public safety article were considerably less tolerant of the rally than participants who read The New York Times free speech article. In contrast, the difference between the responses of the participants who read The National Enquirer public safety article and the responses of the participants who read The National Enquirer free speech article was insignificant. Results of both experiments show that perceived source credibility is a requirement for successful framing (Druckman, 2001).

The level of knowledge a person has about an issue moderates framing effects. However, the literature is indecisive as to the exact kind of these effects. On the one hand, Baden and Lecheler (2012), argue that individuals with medium-knowledge about an issue exhibit the most lasting framing effects, compared to those with high or low knowledge (Baden & Lecheler, 2012). On the other hand, Lecheler and de Vreese's (2013) study, on the effects of repetitive and competitive news framing over time, showed that participants with a higher level of political knowledge exhibited greater accumulation of framing effects and weaker recency effects when the delay between the first and second exposures was short (Lecheler & de Vreese, 2013). They argue that susceptibility to framing effects increases for individuals with higher levels of knowledge on an issue (Lecheler and de Vreese, 2012). The knowledge

they have assists in processing the frames they are exposed to, resulting in stronger framing effects (Druckman and Nelson, 2003). Framing activates existing beliefs and cognitions among individuals familiar with frames (Nelson, Oxley & Clawson, 1997). On the other hand, according to Detenber et al (2007), knowledge can sometimes limit framing effects. Respondents who had knowledge about abortion, studied in their research as a pro-life or pro-choice issue, along with feeling strongly about it through personal experience or past exposure to news stories, showed limited influence by framing effects (Detenber et al, 2007).

According to Aarøe (2011), the intensity of individuals' emotional reactions determines the extent of the effect episodic or thematic frames have on them. The study indicates that episodic frames elicit stronger emotional reactions towards the given framing of the issue. They also have more capacity to influence opinion because they provide a specific focal point of reaction, towards which receivers can channel their emotional reactions. However, when no emotional reactions are elicited, thematic frames have a stronger influence on opinion (Aarøe, 2011).

### **5. A PROCESS MODEL OF FRAMING**

Scheufele (1999) argues that framing can be viewed as a process model incorporating inputs, processes and outcomes, wherein outcomes of certain processes serve as inputs for subsequent processes. More specifically, the model includes four processes: frame building, frame setting, individual-level effects of framing and a link between individual frames and media frames. This process model argues that organizational pressures, ideologies, attitudes and other elites (input) engage in a process of frame building that results in media frames (outcome). Media frames engage in a process of frame setting, or increasing the salience and importance of specific frames, which, in turn, produces audience frames. Individual-level effects of framing then lead to attributions of responsibility, attitudes and behaviors. Journalists are also susceptible to these effects, taking them back full circle into the ideologies and attitudes that shape media frames. Taking a closer look at the two processes of frame building and frame setting, frame building refers to the process by which frames applied by journalists are created or altered. The main concern here is the

kinds of organizational or structural factors of the media system, or the individual characteristics of journalists, that can influence how media content is framed. Within the frame setting process, there is a distinction between frame salience and perceived importance of the frame. Perceived importance of frames is a result of conscious information gathering and processing, unlike frame salience, which has to do with the accessibility of the frame and how available and easily retrievable it is from memory (Scheufele, 1999).

This process model concurs with Entman's (1993) notion that a frame is an "imprint of power", reflecting the interests of politicians or elite groups who exert their influence on media texts in an attempt to gain public support for their policies (Entman, 1993). Hamdy and Gomaa's (2012) discussion of the findings of their content analysis study about how the Egyptian uprising was framed in state-run newspapers, independent newspapers and social media, also coincides with Scheufele's (1999) model. Their study shows that different, and sometimes contrasting, frames were used in each medium, with independent newspapers using the widest variety of frames in all three media. The researchers refer this to the ownership and nature of the publications themselves, as well as the journalists' attitudes, and social and political loyalties (Hamdy and Gomaa, 2012). This is referred to in Scheufele's (1999) model as part of the frame building process, which results in media frames.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **A. THE SATIRE GENRE**

The political satire genre reveals a new face of infotainment, mixing news with entertainment and introducing politics to comedy in a fusion of humor and argument. It offers a new form of hybrid political media for conceptualizing and contextualizing news and politics (Baym, 2007).

Shows within this genre, such as *The Daily Show* and *The Colbert Report*, present, criticize and parody the news, leading to their labeling as “fake news” (Borden and Tew, 2007). They are also referred to as news parody (Baym & Jones, 2012), sociopolitical satire (Anderson & Kincaid, 2013) and late-night comedy (Baek and Wojcieszak, 2009).

#### **B. PARODY AS MEDIA CRITICISM**

This genre acknowledges “news as representation rather than reality,” with its hosts acting as media critics (Meddaugh, 2010). Parody serves as a watchdog of the news media and current affairs programs, scrutinizing their claims at offering the absolute truth with the utmost professionalism, and breaking down hegemonic discourses by drawing attention to the agendas that drive mainstream media (Baym & Jones, 2012), as well as how the news is framed in ways in keeping with commercial interests (Anderson & Kincaid, 2013).

Traditional and fake news both require a degree of civic participation, by following the news and trying to comprehend the important issues. However, with traditional news comes an expectation that the news presented is perceived by the audience as “the truth,” without second-guessing the importance or context of the version of the truth they are being offered. Fake news, on the other hand, deals with its audience as competent equals (Borden and Tew, 2007).

By acting as a form of media criticism, fake news contributes to media ethics. Journalistic routines; namely gatekeeping, factuality and objectivity have their pitfalls. Journalists try to ensure quality and reliability by choosing what is significant through gatekeeping practices. They strive for factuality by only including facts that can be checked out, and always aim for objectivity. This leads journalists to become controlled by their sources, reproducing and with time solidifying official views and dominant discourses. Because fake news is not constrained by the same journalistic routines, it is able to demonstrate how the same “facts” can be understood and contextualized differently. It also speaks of what is left unsaid and highlights the absurdity of what is sometimes said (Borden and Tew, 2007).

However, these shows are dichotomous in nature with their content reflecting strong hegemonic elements, as well as anti-hegemonic ones (Anderson & Kincaid, 2013). Fedechko & Vandenberg (2011) argue that Jon Stewart poses as a counter-hegemon to the system by merely appearing to challenge it. However, what he really does is offer a façade of democracy, pacifying viewers by laughing at the media and politics, without any substantial content that could lead to real opposition or action (Fedechko & Vandenberg, 2011). Furthermore, although the show is hailed as subversive and dissident, in many instances its humor relies on demeaning stereotypes of foreigners (Ross & York, 2007) “serving to legitimate jingoistic American normativity” (Anderson & Kincaid, 2013).

### **C. POLITICAL SATIRE & DEMOCRATIC CULTURE**

Satire acts as a media literacy platform, involving its audiences in observing the deficiencies inherent in media and politics, “through participation rather than instruction” (Meddaugh, 2010). Discourse analysis of the two American satire shows: *The Daily Show with Jon Stewart* and *The Colbert Report*, using the Propaganda Model, shows that although the two programs are in line with the Propaganda Model’s predictions regarding structural constraints on the media, they did in fact dissect mainstream news content in a way that could promote informed discussion and democratic culture (Anderson & Kincaid, 2013).

A survey study of The Daily Show with Jon Stewart and The Colbert Report showed that respondents who watch the show for its humor, also report that they watch to learn about the news. This suggests that the two processes of learning and laughter may occur simultaneously. Moreover, those who tune in for background and context on previously acquired information show a higher need for cognition, casting the parody genre as an educational platform encouraging critical thinking and linking constructs together to gain insight (Young, 2013).

Not all effects of satire are intended. Exposure to satire can result in unintended positive effects. These include "positive democratic communicative activities" such as political discussion and viewing debates. Viewing debates was found to be a crucial link between watching late night comedy and political discussion. Moreover, viewing late night comedy encourages debate viewing, and this in turn facilitates post-debate political discussions. These effects are stronger on younger audiences (Landreville, Holbert & LaMarre, 2010).

Nevertheless, these unintended effects can sometimes backfire. With young viewers failing to understand the implicit messages of The Colbert Report, the show tends to publicize and increase support for the conservative right-wing messages that it is mocking (Baumgartner & Morris, 2008). Similarly, while The Daily Show increases internal efficacy and cynicism, which could be healthy in terms of democracy and citizenship, it lowers trust and confidence in the electoral process and the media, which may in turn reduce political participation among young adults (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006).

#### **D. SATIRE AUDIENCES' POLITICAL PROFILES**

##### **1. AFFINITY FOR POLITICAL HUMOR**

Hmielowski and Holbert's (2011) study on factors predicting audiences' exposure to political satire identified exposure to satirical sitcoms, exposure to liberal cable news programming and affinity for political humor as important variables. In their research, they identify four dimensions that can determine an individual's affinity for political humor: humor's ability to highlight incongruity, to provide to a

sense of superiority, to relieve stress or anxiety and to help connect with others (Hmielowski and Holbert, 2011).

Incongruity refers to laughter at the unexpected or when other people call attention to social inconsistencies. People have to be familiar with and understand a society's norms in order to recognize inconsistencies. The superiority dimension is related to people's tendency to laugh at matters when it gives them a sense of superiority or triumph over others. The anxiety dimension has to do with humor's ability to ease tension of socially awkward situations (Meyer, 2000). The last dimension is related to social functions of humor as a way to connect with others (Hmielowski and Holbert, 2011).

## **2. POLITICAL EFFICACY**

Political efficacy relates to an individual's belief that he/she is competent enough and capable of influencing the political system. Political efficacy has two dimensions: internal and external. External political efficacy has to do with how far the individual sees governmental authorities and institutions as effective and responsive, and the political environment at large as trustworthy. Internal political efficacy deals with the individual's level of confidence in his/her ability to participate in the political process. The higher the internal political efficacy of an individual, the more confident they are in their ability to engage in political activities and influence the political system (Zimmerman, 1989; Niemi, Craig & Mattei, 1991).

Applying a uses and gratifications approach to a study of The Daily Show with Jon Stewart and The Colbert Report suggests that audiences who watch the show for entertainment, also tune in for information. Those who avoid the shows are low on political knowledge and efficacy, so they do not have the necessary knowledge to understand the jokes (Young, 2013). Hoffman & Young (2011) suggest that viewing political parody and satire could increase political efficacy and participation, because it focuses on issues and policies, making them more salient to their viewers (Hoffman & Young, 2011).



These effects are not universal among all the shows within the satire genre. Baumgartner & Morris (2008) argue that *The Colbert Report* leaves its young viewers less confident in their capability to comprehend politics. This is a result of confusion between the show's implicit and explicit messages (Baumgartner & Morris, 2008). *The Daily Show*, on the other hand, simplifies politics for young adults, clarifying it and making it more understandable. Thus, it raises viewers' internal political efficacy (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006).

Moreover, exposure to satire and traditional news sources can affect one another. According to Young (2013), viewers of *The Daily Show* and *The Colbert Report* who report watching because these shows make the news fun, acknowledge that they are referring to news they acquired elsewhere (from reading newspapers or watching the news). This suggests that the shows made already-acquired information entertaining in a secondary way (Young, 2013). Furthermore, experimental analysis of the primacy effects of watching *The Daily Show* and *CNN Headline News* shows that both media forms influence the perception of each other. Watching one form prior to the other leads to decreasing the perceived political gratifications associated with the second form the viewer is exposed to. In addition, viewers with low internal political efficacy are more vulnerable to being affected by what *The Daily Show* says about national TV news, leading them to think less of national news as a source of political information (Holbert et al, 2007).

Hoffman and Thomson's (2009) study about the effect of TV viewing on adolescents' civic participation shows that internal political efficacy mediates the positive relationship between viewing local news and late-night comedy and adolescents' civic participation. Although external political efficacy decreased, with youth having negative feelings towards the government and politics, the increase in their internal political efficacy left them feeling more empowered and competent in their ability to participate in the political arena (Hoffman and Thomson, 2009).

### **3. POLITICAL INTEREST & KNOWLEDGE**

Experimental research on political comedy programs suggests that when less politically interested viewers are exposed to a certain political issue on a comedy program, they are more likely to become motivated to pay more attention to and pursue knowledge of that issue in other media. Since comedy helps in breaking down complex political issues, it facilitates understanding these topics in other media. Hence, exposure to political comedy can increase political awareness and knowledge among its less politically interested viewers (Xenos & Becker, 2009).

Young & Tisinger (2006) contend that young late-night comedy viewers are not using satire shows as their sole source of news and political information. They are watching both late-night comedy as well as traditional news. Significant positive correlations were found between watching and learning from late-night comedy (including *The Late Show with David Letterman*, *The Tonight Show with Jay Leno* or *The Daily Show with Jon Stewart*) and watching and learning from traditional forms of news (including local news, cable news and national network news). One limitation to these findings is that general media use could be acting as a confounding variable, since heavy TV viewers are more likely to report higher viewing of all forms of TV programs. However, the results still prove that late-night viewers are at least not less likely to watch news (Young & Tisinger, 2006).

When it comes to political campaigns, young viewers identify comedy and late-night shows as a source of news about the campaigns. Exposure to these shows is associated with recognition of information about the campaign, rather than recall of information. This means that the information young people already know is enhanced by viewing comedy shows, with little increase in actual recall of campaign-related information (Hollander, 2005).

Political candidate interviews on late night shows can engage initially politically uninterested viewers due to their entertainment aspects. This facilitates learning about political issues, making policy considerations more accessible and can

hence be used, when seen as relevant, in assessing presidential candidates (Parkin, 2010).

Baum (2003) argues that politically inattentive low-education soft news viewers are more likely to gain political knowledge from late-night comedy than politically attentive higher educated ones (Baum, 2003). Baek and Wojcieszak (2009) also contend that watching late-night comedy increases knowledge about widely known, relatively easy political issues. This effect is especially pronounced among politically inattentive viewers. Politically attentive viewers, on the other hand, do not gain more political knowledge. Late-night viewing for these viewers results in entertainment and diversion. However, since the survey employed in this research measured political knowledge using multiple-choice questions, the results can only be discussed in terms of recognition rather than recall of information. This begs the question of whether the same results would emerge if respondents are asked to recall information from memory (Baek and Wojcieszak, 2009).

Cao (2010) established a link between watching Jon Stewart's *The Daily Show* and the public awareness of two main issues covered by the program at that time, the war in Afghanistan and the 2004 presidential elections. The research concluded that Jon Stewart's show was one of the main sources that provided political information for the American public (Cao, 2010). Furthermore, Brewer and Cao (2006) found that the appearance of presidential candidates on political comedy shows correlated with an increase in viewers' knowledge of these candidates' campaigns (Brewer & Cao, 2006).

#### **E. POLITICAL SATIRE IN EGYPT**

In Egypt, political satire was present in the media arena with Mohamed Azab, an Egyptian comedian, launching his program *The Azab Show* in 2010, mocking the Egyptian government and Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif's cabinet, but the program was banned until the 25 January 2011 revolution. TV presenter, Akram Hosni, also started a satirical program in which he created a character called *Sayed Abu Hafiza*, a news presenter reporting the news in a comedic way and mocking famous figures

(ElGabry, 2014; Younis, 2014). The genre, however, really started flourishing with Bassem Youssef's show "*Albernameg*", which literally translates into "The Show".

Research on *Albernameg* shows that the audience's main motive for watching it is entertainment, but that they also consider it a source of news, to gain a better understanding of politics. In addition, the show has an influence on viewers' perceptions of the political situation, but does not affect their political engagement or participation (ElGabry, 2014; Younis, 2014).

## **F. OVERVIEW OF BASSEM YOUSSEF & ALBERNAMEG**

### **1. HOW IT ALL STARTED**

Bassem Youssef started his show on YouTube in March 2011. At the time, the show was called B+. He gained widespread popularity through his satirical criticism of the hypocrisy and inconsistency of traditional media in their coverage of the 25<sup>th</sup> of January revolution. The show got more than five million views in its first three months on YouTube and Youssef started being referred to as the Egyptian Jon Stewart. The Egyptian private channel ONTV offered Youssef a deal to air his show, making Youssef the first person in the Middle East whose show makes the transition from social media to television. The first episode of "*Albernameg*", the new name the show took on, aired in Ramadan 2011. In January 2012, Jon Stewart interviewed Bassem Youssef on The Daily Show. The segment in which Stewart interviewed Youssef was one of the highest viewed videos on Stewart's website (*Albernameg*). Today, Bassem Youssef and his show have over two million followers on Twitter and six million fans on Facebook.

Youssef then moved from ONTV to CBC. Mohammed Morsi was the president at the time. Youssef mocked Morsi and his Islamist allies for their mixing of politics and religion. This contributed to the show's soaring popularity. However, his mockery of the president led him to get detained for a short while and released on bail under Morsi's rule for insulting the president and Islam (Rizk, 2014).

## **2. TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF THE SHOW**

CBC stopped airing *Albernameg* in November 2013 after the season's first episode, following protests calling for Bassem Youssef's removal, because he poked fun at the army chief Abdel Fattah El Sisi and his supporters. The channel argued that Youssef violated its editorial policies and contractual obligations, as well as attacked symbols of the state (Rizk, 2014). The Egyptian government said that the decision was between Youssef and the station, and that the government had nothing to do with the show's cancellation ("German TV to give Egypt satirist pan-Arab airing"). Presidential media advisor Ahmed Al-Moslimany emphasized the interim government's support of freedom of speech, adding that the CBC decision was an internal matter (T. Rose, 2013).

Youssef himself did not relate the show's cancellation to direct orders from the government, but rather referred it to the political environment after Morsi's overthrow. "You can always implement some sort of a mood, without actually giving direct orders," Youssef said in an interview with the Observer. He said that even if the authorities were not directly involved, this reflects badly on freedom of speech in Egypt. Youssef also added that CBC had his back throughout Morsi's rule, supporting him all the way before 30 June, but things changed when it came to Sisi, and CBC cancelled the program. "They said I was speaking about things I should not be speaking about... insulting national symbols. But, you know, Morsi was the president: he was a national symbol" (Kingsley, 2014).

Several political figures, parties and organizations condemned and denounced the show's suspension, including Misr Al-Qawia, Mohamed ElBaradei and the 6<sup>th</sup> of April Movement. The Arab Network for Human Rights Information (ANHRI) considered the show's suspension "a blow to the freedom of expression after 30 June and confirms the return of businessmen owning the media to impose self-censorship in order to preserve their interests with authority" and demanded that Youssef goes back on air (T. Rose, 2013). Reporters Without Borders regretted the suspension of Bassem Youssef's show, saying that "Freedom of satirically critical expression, especially in the context of a humor program, must have a place in a country that

aspires to democracy” (“Watchdog slams Egypt for curbing press freedom”).

### **3. ALBERNAMEG IS BACK**

Following the show’s suspension on CBC, Youssef and his team moved to MBC Egypt in February 2014. On the premiere of his show on MBC Egypt, Youssef made fun of the Sisi mania that was taking over the country and how TV programs, completely unrelated to politics, go out of their way to mention Sisi. He humorously included Sisi in all aspects of life from cooking to songs (“Egypt comedian back on air, mocking Sisi mania”; Rizk, 2014; “German TV to give Egypt satirist pan-Arab airing.”).

This upset some of his fans, but Youssef said in an interview with the Associated Press that he thinks people were upset because the show took a unique tone, not siding with the regime but not totally against it at the same time. He added that he does not consider his show “a tool to bring down regimes,” but that he sees his show as a “healthy cathartic way of freedom of expression” and a way of dealing with people’s differences. He argued that allowing this kind of programming reflects well on the government. Youssef also referred to how it has become very sensitive to tackle all sorts of issues, with the split in the country and the army nationalism fervor being sky high, him and his team have to tiptoe around any issues they address, but that they are not intimidated and do not self-censor (Rohan, 2014).

Deutsche Welle, the German-based broadcaster, also decided to start airing *Albernameg* on its international Arabic channel and online immediately after its premiere on MBC Egypt. Deutsche Welle Director General Peter Limbourg said that this way Youssef's show will reach people across the region and that the decision was meant as "a clear stance in favor of freedom of the press and opinion" (“German TV to give Egypt satirist pan-Arab airing”).

However, even after the transition to MBC Egypt, the channel’s signal was jammed two weeks in a row, while *Albernameg* was airing. Although the source of

jamming was unknown, MBC's spokesperson Mazen Hayek said that they believed it was deliberate (Rizk, 2014; T. Rose, 2014).

#### **4. HONORS & AWARDS**

Bassem Youssef and his show have won several awards. In 2013, Youssef was named by TIME magazine one of the 100 most influential people in the world and was crowned "Man of the Year" at the Esquire Middle East Award on Dec. 5, 2013 ("Bassem Youssef: Egypt's freedom-of-speech icon"). According to Google's 2013 top search report Zeitgeist, the top trending search for people in Egypt was Bassem Youssef and the most searched TV show was *Albernameg* (Aggour, 2013). YouTube Rewind report, which reports on the top trending and most talked about videos of the year, also revealed Youssef's show as the top trending Arabic talk show in 2013 ("Videos: YouTube reveals top Middle East videos").

Bassem Youssef was one of four journalists presented with the 2013 International Press Freedom Awards by The Committee to Protect Journalists. The committee said in a statement that the Press freedom Awards seek to recognize the type of "courageous reporting that defines free media." Jon Stewart presented Youssef with the award which Youssef was amazed at receiving "considering the fact that I am not even a journalist," he said (Astor, 2013). Foreign Policy magazine also chose Youssef among its global thinkers in 2013, highlighting his contribution through his weekly column in Al Shorouk newspaper, as well as his satire show ("Bassem Youssef, Heba Morayef and Hossam Bahget among 2013 FP global thinkers").

#### **5. THE PLAGIARISM INCIDENT**

Bassem Youssef used to write a weekly column in Al Shorouk newspaper. However, his column led him to trouble. One of Youssef's columns in March 2014 was discussing Russia's ties with the West. This column, however, turned out to be plagiarized from an article published on the website politico.com by journalist Ben Judah. According to Judah, Youssef lightly rephrased whole chunks of his work and did not cite him as a source. Upon confrontation on Twitter by Judah, Youssef

claimed he had forgotten to cite Judah due to work stress. This plagiarism scandal took social media by storm, with lots of audience members refusing Youssef's twitter apology that followed hours after, even though the original article owner had accepted Youssef's apology. Some audience members tweeted that Youssef only apologized because he was busted and that he was a hypocrite for pointing out media's lack of professionalism and ethics when he was doing the same (Judah, 2014; "Scourge of Egypt media mocked for plagiarism"). On the following episode of *Albernameg*, Youssef brought up the incident and apologized for his actions, thanking audiences who criticized him and put him back in his place, and announced that he will be taking a break from writing his column for a while.

#### **6. ALBERNAMEG GOES OFF THE AIR**

On June 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2014, Bassem Youssef held a press conference announcing that *Albernameg* is stopping for good. He thanked MBC for their support and their transparency in telling them that the channel was under immense pressure to stop the show, without trying to blame it on the audience being angry or other reasons that were not real. He said that officials decided to stop airing the final episode of *Albernameg* without even reviewing or watching it, which means that the problem is with the show itself, not the content of specific episodes. He added that *Albernameg* got offers to air on foreign channels, but he and his team decided not to go down that road because they would be called traitors. On whether the show would continue on YouTube, he said that it is not financially possible due to the size of the team and the production. Bassem Youssef said that *Albernameg* is supposed to be a comedy show and that he wasn't an activist, but despite that, he was summoned by the public prosecutor, the show was suspended and its signal jammed several times, and more lawsuits were filed against the show during the rule of the Muslim Brothers and afterwards, than any other show in history. He added that even though *Albernameg* was faced with a lot of intimidation, the show still went on air every week, but that this is not a suitable environment for a comedy show. Youssef said that he was tired of struggling, stressing and always fearing for his own safety, and his family's and the people surrounding him. He concluded by saying that suspending *Albernameg* is



a victory for the show because it sends a much stronger and louder message than its continuity.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **RESEARCH QUESTIONS & HYPOTHESES**

Research on political satire indicates that different types of satire lead to distinct influences on viewers (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; Baumgartner & Morris, 2008; Holbert et al, 2013). For example, Baumgartner & Morris (2006) argue that The Daily Show increases its audience's internal political efficacy because it simplifies politics (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006), whereas The Colbert Report decreases viewers' confidence in their ability to comprehend politics as a result of confusion between the show's implicit and explicit messages (Baumgartner & Morris, 2008).

Viewers of different comedy shows are not homogeneous in nature. The Daily Show's audience was found to be more politically interested and knowledgeable than Leno and Letterman viewers (Young & Tisinger, 2006). Even with exposure to the same show, different audience characteristics, such as varying political affiliations and levels of political knowledge, may result in distinct effects on viewers (Young, 2004; Young & Tisinger, 2006).

Watching political satire can raise its viewers' internal political efficacy as it makes politics more understandable (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006), leaving viewers feeling more empowered and competent in their ability to participate in the political arena (Hoffman and Thomson, 2009). On the other hand, external political efficacy decreases, with an increase in negative feelings towards the government and politics (Hoffman and Thomson, 2009).

Viewers' uses and gratifications sought from watching satire also differ according to their characteristics. For example, The Daily Show and The Colbert Report viewers who report watching the shows for background and context on previously acquired information show a higher need for cognition (Young, 2013). Exposure to political comedy can also increase political awareness and knowledge among its less politically interested viewers (Xenos & Becker, 2009; Parkin, 2010). Baum (2003) argues that politically inattentive low-education soft news viewers are

more likely to gain political knowledge from late-night comedy than politically attentive higher educated ones (Baum, 2003). Baek and Wojcieszak (2009) also contend that watching late-night comedy increases knowledge about political issues among politically inattentive viewers, whereas for politically attentive ones, viewing results in entertainment and diversion (Baek and Wojcieszak, 2009). This coincides with the assumptions of the uses and gratifications approach.

According to the uses and gratifications approach, the characteristics, motivations, selectivity and involvement of users influence their purposes, functions and uses of the media. These factors in turn work as mediators or moderators of media effects (Katz, Blumler & Gurevitch, 1973). Users' personal traits and social environment help shape their expectations and desires in terms of media consumption. They then actively and purposefully select media or messages that satisfy these expectations and desires (Katz, Blumler & Gurevitch, 1973).

According to Rubin (2009), media consumption choices are driven by media consumption motivations. These motivations influence the uses of and gratifications obtained from various media. Palmgreen's (1984) examination of a variety of uses and effects studies concluded that there is a relationship between audience motivations and various media effects, including knowledge, attitudes and perceptions of social reality.

Since *Albernameg* is a new satire show operating in a different sociopolitical and cultural context than the satire programs researched in existing literature; an Arab Egyptian context rather than the largely Western context researched in previous studies, it is important to examine who watched *Albernameg* and why did viewers tune in to watch it? More specifically, the characteristics of the audience who tuned in to watch *Albernameg*, as well as how these characteristics shape viewers' expectations of the show and their motivations to watch it. This leads to the following research questions:

**RQ1:** What are the socio-political characteristics of *Albernameg* audience?

**RQ2:** What are *Albernameg* audience's motivations for watching the show?

Previous studies are not in agreement when it comes to motivations behind watching political satire. So (2012) postulates that audience's motivation to consume media serves as a mental frame that guides processing and interpretation of the media content, arguing that when it comes to infotainment shows such as *The Daily Show* with Jon Stewart, audiences are expected to consume media with mixed motivation of surveillance and enjoyment. Nevertheless, Lee's (2013) study on the link between audience motivations and news consumption showed that political satire was linked to entertainment and opinion-driven motivations, with audiences who are information-driven being the least motivated to watch them. Due there is a discrepancy in literature on the motivations behind watching political satire, as aforementioned, and since surveillance and enjoyment being the principal and most fundamental audience motivations for consuming media content in general (Katz, Blumler & Gurevitch, 1974), this study focuses on examining these two main motivations and their possible consequences in terms of framing effects.

According to Rubin (1983), viewers who seek media content for informational reasons tend to perceive that content to be realistic, and are thus more likely to be influenced by the media messages they are exposed to. This leads to the assumption that viewers who watch *Albernameg*, for informational reasons may be more likely to exhibit stronger framing effects in relation to issues presented on the show, than those who tune in for entertainment. This leads to the first hypothesis:

**H1:** There is a relationship between viewing motivations and perceptions of issues presented on the show.

The media, depending on how they frame the event, can shape attributions of responsibility for social and political issues. Moreover, individuals do not draw on all possible information they ever encounter to form opinions about issues they are faced with; judgments, opinions, and decisions are determined based on the information most easily retrievable from memory (Iyengar, 1991). When individuals are exposed

to competing frames, they either respond to the louder frame or to the stronger frame. A loud frame is the frame most frequently repeated. Repetition can be influential due to the fact that individuals do not always weigh the information they receive consciously. They form opinions based on what they hear regularly and thus most readily comes to mind. Repetition increases the accessibility of the frame (Chong and Druckman, 2007b). This leads to the second hypothesis:

**H2:** There is a relationship between the level of viewership and perceptions of issues presented on the show.

A strong frame can be determined based on several factors. For example, a frame can be deemed strong if it is communicated via a credible source and/or conforms to strongly held beliefs (Chong and Druckman, 2007b). According to Druckman (2001), perceived source credibility is a requirement for successful framing (Druckman, 2001). This relates to the question of whether the audience considers Bassem Youssef a credible source of information, especially after his involvement in a plagiarism incident. This builds up to the third hypothesis:

**H3:** There is a relationship between perception of Bassem Youssef as a credible source of information and perceptions of issues presented on the show.

## **A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

The study is concerned with two main research questions. Each research question has several sub-questions.

**RQ1:** What are the socio-political characteristics of *Albernameg* audience?

- **RQ1a:** What are *Albernameg* audience's demographic characteristics?
- **RQ1b:** Is *Albernameg's* audience interested in politics and public affairs?
- **RQ1c:** Is *Albernameg's* audience attentive to politics and public affairs?
- **RQ1d:** Is *Albernameg's* audience politically knowledgeable?
- **RQ1e:** Do *Albernameg* audience have internal and external political efficacy?

**RQ2:** What are *Albernameg* audience's motivations for watching the show?

- **RQ2a:** Does the audience consider *Albernameg* a source of news?
- **RQ2b:** Is *Albernameg's* audience being exposed to traditional news sources, or is *Albernameg* their sole source of news?
- **RQ2c:** Does the audience perceive Bassem Youssef as a credible source of information?

## **B. HYPOTHESES**

Based on the literature review, the researcher formulated three hypotheses. Framing effects are measured, in all three hypotheses, in relation to two issues, one responding to frame repetition and the other to frame strength. The frame used to test repetition is perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device and frame strength is measured on the issue of using coal in Egypt to generate electricity. These frames were chosen based on qualitative content analysis of *Albernameg* episodes.

**H1:** There is a relationship between viewing motivations and perceptions of the AIDS & virus C detection device and using coal to generate electricity.

- **H1a:** Viewers who watched *Albernameg* for information are more likely to have a negative perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device than those who watched for entertainment.
- **H1b:** Viewers who watched *Albernameg* for information are more likely to have a negative perception of using coal to generate electricity than those who watched for entertainment.

**H2:** There is a relationship between the level of viewership and perceptions of the AIDS & virus C detection device and using coal to generate electricity.

- **H2a:** Heavy viewers of *Albernameg* are more likely to have a negative perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device than light viewers.
- **H2b:** Heavy viewers of *Albernameg* are more likely to have a negative perception of using coal to generate electricity than light viewers.

**H3:** There is a relationship between perception of Bassem Youssef as a credible source of information and perceptions of the AIDS & virus C detection device and using coal to generate electricity.

- **H3a:** Viewers who perceive Bassem Youssef as a credible source of information are more likely to have a negative perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device.
- **H3b:** Viewers who perceive Bassem Youssef as a credible source of information are more likely to have a negative perception of using coal to generate electricity.



### C. OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES

**RQ1: What are the socio-political characteristics of *Albernameg*'s audience?**

**RQ1a: What are *Albernameg* audience's demographic characteristics?**

*Albernameg* audience's demographics are measured by asking respondents the following questions on the questionnaire:

▪ **Variable: Age**

Age: (less than 18, from 18 to 25, more than 25 to 35, more than 35 to 45, more than 45 to 55, more than 55)

***Level of measurement:*** Interval

▪ **Variable: Gender**

Gender: (male, female)

***Level of measurement:*** Nominal

▪ **Variable: Education**

Educational level: (illiterate, certificate for illiteracy, primary, preparatory, secondary degree or its equivalent, university degree, master's degree, doctorate [Ph.D.], other)

***Level of measurement:*** Nominal

▪ **Variable: Average Income**

Average monthly income of the family: (less than 1000, from 1000 to 2000, more than 2000 to 5000, more than 5000)

***Level of measurement:*** Ordinal

▪ **Variable: Occupation**

Occupation: (student, not working, private sector, public sector, retiree, other)

***Level of measurement:*** Nominal

**RQ1b: Is *Albernameg*'s audience interested in politics and public affairs?**

▪ **Variable: Political Interest**

Political interest is measured by asking respondents the following question: How interested are you in what is going on with politics and public affairs? (extremely, somewhat, not at all)

**Level of measurement:** Interval

**RQ1c: Is *Albernameg*'s audience attentive to politics and public affairs?**

▪ **Variable: Political Attention**

Political attention is measured by asking respondents the following question: How often do you pay attention to information about politics and public affairs? (very often, sometimes, never)

**Level of measurement:** Interval

**RQ1d: Is *Albernameg*'s audience politically knowledgeable?**

▪ **Variable: Political Knowledge**

Political knowledge is measured using multiple choice questions related to local, regional and international politics.

1. Who was appointed as interim Egyptian president after Morsi? (Ibrahim Mahlab, Adly Mansour, Essam Sharaf, Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, I don't know)
2. What is the nationality of the airline whose plane went missing last March? (Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, I don't know)
3. Who won the latest Algerian presidential elections? (Moncef Marzouki, Abdel Aziz Bouteflika, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Omar Al Bashir, I don't know)
4. Which city were Russia and Ukraine fighting over? (Crimea, Moscow, Bucharest, Minsk, I don't know)

Respondents who do not answer any questions correctly are categorized as having low political knowledge, those who answer one or two questions correctly are in the category of medium political knowledge, and those who answer three or four questions correctly are categorized as highly politically knowledgeable.

***Level of measurement:*** Nominal

**RQ1e: Do *Albernameg* audience have internal and external political efficacy?**

▪ ***Variable: Internal Political Efficacy***

Internal political efficacy is measured following Niemi et al's (1991) scheme.

Respondents are asked to rate the extent of their agreement or disagreement to the following statements on a five point Likert scale wherein 1= Strongly disagree and 5= Strongly agree.

1. I consider myself to be well qualified to participate in politics.
2. I think that I am better informed about politics than most people.
3. I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country.
4. Sometimes politics seems so complicated that a person like me cannot really understand what is going on. (reverse coding)

***Level of measurement:*** Interval

▪ ***Variable: External Political Efficacy***

External political efficacy is defined as the extent to which an individual sees governmental authorities and institutions as effective and responsive, and the political environment at large as trustworthy (Zimmerman, 1989; Niemi, Craig & Mattei, 1991). It is measured following Hoffman and Thomson's (2009) scheme for measuring political cynicism.

Respondents are asked to rate the extent of their agreement or disagreement to the following statements on a five point Likert scale wherein 1= Strongly disagree and 5= Strongly agree.

1. Elected officials almost never keep campaign promises.
2. Politicians will say almost anything to get elected.
3. The government wastes a lot of the taxpayer's money.

*Level of measurement:* Interval

**RQ2: What are *Albernameg* audience's motivations for watching the show?**

**RQ2a: Does the audience consider *Albernameg* a source of news?**

This is measured in the questionnaire using the following question: Why did you watch *Albernameg*? You can choose more than one answer (it's funny and entertaining, to learn the news, it presents the news in an interesting and funny way, it's unbiased and truthful, it simplifies the news and makes it easier to understand, other).

*Level of measurement:* Nominal

**RQ2b: Is *Albernameg*'s audience being exposed to traditional news sources, or is *Albernameg* their sole source of news?**

This is measured in the questionnaire using the following question: Where do you get the news? You can choose more than one answer. (Radio stations, Print Newspapers, Online newspapers, Egyptian TV talk shows, Arabic news channels [such as Al Arabeya, BBC Arabic or Al Jazeera], Foreign news channels [such as BBC and CNN], Social media [such as Facebook and Twitter], Satire shows [such as *Albernameg*], None of the above. I don't follow the news. , other).

*Level of measurement:* Nominal

**RQ2c: Does the audience perceive Bassem Youssef as a credible source of information?**

Respondents are asked to rate the extent of their agreement or disagreement to the following statements on a five point Likert scale wherein 1= Strongly disagree and 5= Strongly agree.

1. Bassem Youssef shows truthful videos without manipulation.
2. After Bassem Youssef's plagiarism incident, I see him as untrustworthy.  
(reverse coding)
3. Bassem Youssef's courage in apologizing after his plagiarism incident makes him credible.
4. I consider Bassem Youssef a credible source of information.
5. *Albernameg* is objective in its coverage of public affairs.
6. *Albernameg* has political inclinations. (reverse coding)

***Level of measurement:*** Interval

**H1: There is a relationship between viewing motivations and perceptions of the AIDS & virus C detection device and using coal to generate electricity.**

**H1a: Viewers who watched *Albernameg* for information are more likely to have a negative perception of the virus C detection device than those who watched for entertainment.**

***Independent variable: motivations for watching Albernameg***

This is measured in the questionnaire using the following question: Why did you watch *Albernameg*? You can choose more than one answer. (It's funny and entertaining, To learn the news, It presents the news in an interesting and funny way, It's unbiased and truthful, It simplifies the news and makes it easier to understand, Other)

***Level of measurement:*** Nominal

**Dependent variable: Perception of the virus C detection device**

Respondents are asked to rate the extent of their agreement or disagreement to the following statements on a five point Likert scale wherein 1= Strongly disagree and 5= Strongly agree.

1. The virus C detection device is one of the most important Egyptian inventions to date.
2. The virus C detection device gives new hope for many patients.
3. The virus C detection device has nothing to do with science. (reverse coding)

**H1b: Viewers who watched *Albernameg* for information are more likely to have a negative perception of using coal to generate electricity than those who watched for entertainment.**

**Independent variable: motivations for watching *Albernameg***

***Level of measurement:*** Nominal

**Dependent variable: Perception of coal introduction as an alternative source of generating electricity in Egypt**

Respondents are asked to rate the extent of their agreement or disagreement to the following statements on a five point Likert scale wherein 1= Strongly disagree and 5= Strongly agree.

1. I consider coal introduction as an alternative source of generating electricity is an effective way to solve our electricity problem.
2. Using coal to generate electricity will add to our problems due to the pollution it will result in. (reverse coding)
3. I support the idea of introducing coal as an alternative source of generating electricity.
4. I support the call to stop using coal. (reverse coding)

***Level of measurement:*** Interval

**H2: There is a relationship between the level of viewership and perceptions of the AIDS & virus C detection device and using coal to generate electricity.**

**H2a: Heavy viewers of *Albernameg* are more likely to have a negative perception of the virus C detection device than light viewers.**

***Independent variable: viewership of Albernameg***

This is measured in the questionnaire using the following question: How often did you watch *Albernameg*? (All the time [I used to watch the episode every week], Occasionally [one or two episodes every month], Rarely [one episode every few months])

***Level of measurement:*** Nominal

***Dependent variable: Perception of the virus C detection device***

***Level of measurement:*** Interval

**H2b: Heavy viewers of *Albernameg* are more likely to have a negative perception of using coal to generate electricity than light viewers.**

***Independent variable: viewership of Albernameg***

***Level of measurement:*** Nominal

***Dependent variable: Perception of coal introduction as an alternative source of generating electricity in Egypt***

***Level of measurement:*** Interval

**H3: There is a relationship between perception of Bassem Youssef as a credible source of information and perceptions of the AIDS & virus C detection device and using coal to generate electricity.**

**H3a: Viewers who perceive Bassem Youssef as a credible source of information are more likely to have a negative perception of the virus C detection device.**

***Independent variable: perceived credibility of Bassem Youssef***

Respondents are asked to rate the extent of their agreement or disagreement to the following statements on a five point Likert scale wherein 1= Strongly disagree and 5= Strongly agree.

1. Bassem Youssef shows truthful videos without manipulation.
2. After Bassem Youssef's plagiarism incident, I see him as untrustworthy.  
(reverse coding)
3. Bassem Youssef's courage in apologizing after his plagiarism incident makes him more credible.
4. I consider Bassem Youssef a credible source of information.
5. *Albernameg* is objective in its coverage of public affairs.
6. *Albernameg* has political inclinations. (reverse coding)

***Level of measurement:*** Interval

***Dependent variable: Perception of the virus C detection device***

***Level of measurement:*** Interval

**H3b: Viewers who perceive Bassem Youssef as a credible source of information are more likely to have a negative perception of using coal to generate electricity.**

***Independent variable: perceived credibility of Bassem Youssef***

***Level of measurement:*** Interval

***Dependent variable: Perception of coal introduction as an alternative source of generating electricity in Egypt***

***Level of measurement:*** Interval



## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **METHODOLOGY**

The study started with qualitative content analysis in order to choose the media frames that were on *Albernameg*. These media frames formed the basis of the survey questions to examine whether audience frames correspond to the media frames in the show.

#### **A. QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS**

Controversial issues offer a challenge in the process of attribution of responsibility. The media, depending on how they frame the event, can shape attributions of responsibility for social and political issues (Iyengar, 1991). When individuals are exposed to competing frames, their response will likely be one of two alternatives. They will either respond to the louder frame or to the stronger frame. A loud frame is the frame most frequently repeated. Repetition increases the accessibility of the frame. A strong frame can be determined based on several factors (Chong and Druckman, 2007b). These include values and prior beliefs (Chong and Druckman, 2007a), source credibility (Druckman, 2001), knowledge about the issue (Baden & Lecheler, 2012; Lecheler & de Vreese, 2013; Lecheler & de Vreese, 2012; Druckman & Nelson, 2003; Nelson, Oxley & Clawson, 1997; Detenber et al, 2007) and intensity of emotional reactions (Aarøe, 2011).

Values, prior beliefs, knowledge about the issue and intensity of emotional reactions are all related to the audience and may vary from one person to the other. Therefore, the researcher opted to choose source credibility as the determinant of the strong frame on which to analyze framing effects, since source credibility is an attribute of the message itself.

In order to choose a repetitive frame and a strong frame, one that is communicated through a credible source, the first step in the methodology was to

conduct a qualitative content analysis of *Albernameg*. The media frames that were selected would then be the basis on which the survey questions were constructed. The main aim was to examine whether there is a correlation between the media frames on *Albernameg* and the audience frames in relation to viewers' perceptions of the issues under analysis.

The researcher analyzed the content of the third season of the show. Since it was the last season of the show, this meant it would be the freshest in the minds of the audience. The analysis resulted in choosing "perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device" as the repetitive frame, and "perception of using coal as an alternative source of generating electricity in Egypt" as the strong frame. The AIDS & virus C detection device was brought up in every episode since the announcement of the device until the show went off the air, a total of seven episodes. The issue was covered in varying degrees of intensity, sometimes covered in whole segments of the show, or just in passing as a reminder for the audience. Using coal as an alternative source of generating electricity was covered through interviewing an expert on the issue, Ahmed El Derouby, coordinator of the "Egyptians against coal" movement. El Derouby introduced himself on the show saying that he's been working in the field of environmental protection for nine years, he currently works in an organization that aims to protect the environment in Egypt and has worked before in international environmental protection organizations. The analysis also showed that both issues were framed negatively on *Albernameg*.

The choice of these two issues was based on the analysis of the following episodes:

### **Season 3 – Episode 4 - Second segment**

Bassem Youssef showed video segments of talk shows announcing that the military spokesman revealed that the military has succeeded in inventing a device that diagnoses AIDS & virus C without needing a blood sample from the patient. He then makes fun of this, saying that he as a doctor is truly surprised that "someone just points this antenna-looking device at you and discovers if you have AIDS or virus C from a distance." Then, he shows segments of TV presenter, Amr Adib, blaming

newspapers for announcing that the device can cure diseases, whereas the military only said that it diagnoses. This is followed by talk show segments saying that the device indeed cures AIDS & virus C, referring to its inventor, Lieutenant Abdel Atti's explanation of how the device works: "I take the AIDS from the patient, then I give it back to him to feed on in the form of a sausage. I take the disease and give it back as nutrition. And this is the epitome of scientific achievement." Bassem Youssef follows up on this, sarcastically commenting, "this is scientific achievement, the virus has become a sausage!"

The official video that was released by the military was then shown. Bassem Youssef pokes fun at it pinpointing how the narration on the video declares that the device can diagnose diseases that may affect humans or "other creatures", and how the device was pointing at the doctor in the video, which meant he must be sick too. He then referred to the name of the invention: "Completed Cure Device" (CCD). This was followed by several video segments of talk shows discussing how the CCD can cure all kinds of viruses, including diabetes, skin diseases and cancer. Bassem commented on this saying that cancer isn't a virus, and that he's been so stunned since the beginning of the show, that he doesn't think anything else can stun him further. Then videos of further explanation of how the device works indicate the extent of its sensitivity, with a doctor explaining that "It's so accurate that one of the patients had said hi to me before we started, and his fingerprint was left on my jacket, so the machine detected this fingerprint," to which Bassem replied "I'm sorry guys I dropped some virus on myself earlier."

This was followed by a comic sketch similar to a detergent advertisement depicting a housewife saying that her husband is a doctor, and always comes home with his clothes full of virus stains, but now with Complete Cure, with the power of scientific achievement, she beat the viruses, and his clothes are as good as new. Bassem then adds that "it's available in jasmine scent and sausage flavor."

The segment ends with video segments of talk shows saying that although the military medical team has said that we have beaten virus C, the President's scientific consultant has said that this is a catastrophe for Egypt!

### **Season 3 – Episode 4 - Third segment**

In this segment, Bassem Youssef talks seriously about the device. He says that before announcing such a medical breakthrough, it should go through a process of submitting a scientific research paper, publishing it and presenting it in conferences. He points out that there is a difference between a theory, an idea, and having a functioning cure available.

He mentions that he will not dwell on the fact that this alleged doctor owned a herbal clinic that was shut down, or that he had a show on *Al Nas* TV channel, which was also shut down. He speaks of the promise to the millions of people in Egypt and hundreds of millions worldwide to cure them of AIDS & virus C. He refers to the military spokesman who announced that on June 30<sup>th</sup> military hospitals would commence mass treatment of the disease. Bassem Youssef also stresses on the fact that this promise is bound by a time frame and that it is not vague talk about making progress in a year or two and checking if it works, but a promise for this year. He adds that with this promise, Egypt should see billions of dollars flow into its economy to treat these diseases, and that we will no longer need the Suez Canal or tourism.

Bassem Youssef ends the segment by saying that before anyone goes on to accuse him of insulting the achievement and depressing the people, they should keep their eyes on those who promised. He says that if the promise is fulfilled, there would be nothing more to ask and that the show would not matter in the least. However, “if the promise that came from the largest institution in Egypt is broken on June 30<sup>th</sup>, then all the doctors on the committee and every media person who propagated the devices should be held accountable.” He points out that until the promise is fulfilled, he will be reminding people of what happened, every week, until there is a worthy reaction, adding that if anyone is hoping that the people will forget, they won't because we will be reminding them, in reference to *Albernameg*.

### **Season 3 – Episode 5 – First segment**

Bassem Youssef was showing a video of the TV presenter Amani El Khayat in which she was saying that she has been called a sergeant for voicing her opinions, but that she is not afraid of swimming against the current. Bassem Youssef followed up on the video by saying “I take Amani El Khayat and make her swim against the current, then return her as a policewoman and sergeant at the same time, just like AIDS and virus C, and this is the epitome of scientific achievement.” A picture of Lieutenant Abdel Atti, the inventor of the AIDS & virus C device was displayed beside him on the screen as he talked.

### **Season 3 – Episode 6 – First segment**

A counter is displayed on the screen beside Bassem Youssef, showing that it has been 14 days since the announcement of the invention. He then started talking about the AIDS & virus C device and made fun of its inventor’s description of it as being similar to feeding the patient sausage. He then moved on to discuss how everyone on the media approved of the device and were attacking interim President Adly Mansour’s scientific consultant, Dr. Essam Heggy, who came from NASA and did not like the invention. This was followed by videos of different TV presenters attacking Heggy for opposing the AIDS & virus C detection device. Bassem Youssef then continued to make fun of the issue saying that Dr. Essam Heggy is mistaken since we’ve never heard of a scientific consultant giving a scientific consultation regarding a scientific matter!

Bassem Youssef then talked about Lieutenant Abdel Atti and his latest statement that he was a pyramid in the midst of cockroaches. This was followed by a comic sketch, featuring a pyramid and two people dressed as cockroaches singing a nursery rhyme whose words had been altered to fit the issue. He then showed a video segment of Lieutenant Abdel Atti talking to TV presenter Mostafa Bakry over the phone, saying that his family comes from the lineage of Prophet Mohamed. Bassem Youssef then commented, as if talking to Essam Heggy, telling him to go ahead and be an infidel for the sake of science. He continued that it turns out he is not only doubting an invention, but doubting a legend. He said “Abdel Atti is a lieutenant, so you’re

doubting the army; from the lineage of the prophet, so you will be labeled an infidel; a pyramid, so tourism workers will hate you. All that for what? Science? To hell with science!”

Then he went back to Abdel Atti boasting with his proclaimed 100% success rate of curing AIDS and saying that one day AIDS patients will be boasting about the fact that they once had AIDS. This was followed by a sketch mocking Abdel Atti’s declarations. Bassem Youssef then said that when someone comes up with a new medicine or invention, there have to be accompanying certificates and tests run by a specialized neutral party to verify it, not just any passerby. This was followed by Mostafa Bakri saying that he himself asked Marshal Sisi about the device and he swore that when he saw it his eyes overflowed with tears. Bassem then said “to hell with certificates. We can give the device the ISO.”

Bassem Youssef moved on to say that it’s more than just an issue of a device. “It’s about anyone who was educated abroad, well-read or speaks foreign languages. That’s the real danger to the country. How come people travel abroad and earn degrees, awards and Nobel prizes and then want to come back and benefit the country?” sarcastically mocking TV presenters who referred to Baradei, Mostafa Hegazy and others as traitors and spies. He then directed his words to the youth telling them to stay ignorant in order to live in bliss.

### **Season 3 – Episode 7 – First segment**

The counter is displayed on the screen beside Bassem Youssef, showing that it has been 21 days since the announcement of the invention.

### **Season 3 – Episode 8 – First segment**

The counter is displayed on the screen beside Bassem Youssef, showing that it has been 28 days since the announcement of the invention.

### **Season 3 – Episode 9 – Second segment**

Bassem Youssef was talking about Qatar and how we should be dealing with it, referring to Qatar as cancerous and trying to play the role of a virus. He then dwells on the idea of cancerous cells and viruses saying that “if Qatar will give us a headache, we have the invention, and in one second we can turn it into a sausage!” The counter is displayed on the screen beside Bassem Youssef, showing that it has been 35 days since the announcement of the invention.

### **Season 3 – Episode 10 – Second segment**

Bassem Youssef started the segment by making fun of people who are against the use of coal. He then showed videos from other talk shows discussing the benefits of using coal. This was followed by a video of the minister of environment declaring that the ministry of environment is against the use of coal because it would cause various kinds of diseases. He then went back to talk show segments discussing clean coal technology (CCT). This prompted Bassem Youssef to refer to the CCD (complete cure device), the AIDS & virus C device. The device was mentioned in passing, with the counter appearing on the screen indicating that it’s been 42 days since the announcement of the invention.

He then interviewed Ahmed El Derouby, the coordinator of the “Egyptians against coal” movement. He introduced himself saying that he’s been working for nine years in the field of environmental protection, currently works in an organization to protect the environment in Egypt and has worked before in international organizations aiming to protect the environment.

El Derouby then discussed how the world is dealing with coal in generating electricity, giving the U.S. and China as examples of major countries that use coal to generate some of their electricity. However, both countries are currently trying to cut back on their use of coal after experiencing the drawbacks on health that result as a consequence. This in turn leads them to spend billions to make up for the damage to the environment and citizens’ health. He went on to explain that research done in Egypt estimates that Egypt will have to spend around 3.2 billion dollars per year on

damages to health as a result of using coal, which would constitute 75% of the health ministry's budget.

El Derouby also added that building coal plants would take around five years. This means that it will not solve the electricity problem, since the gas problem leading to electricity outages is expected to end within three to four years. He then said that the cement companies are the ones pushing for introducing coal and that they are using a public relations country to propagate the benefits of using coal.

He finally discussed alternative solutions, using Germany as an example, explaining that they use garbage and agricultural waste to power their cement plants. He ended by giving the use of solar energy as an efficient solution for generating electricity, saying that the price of generating electricity through solar energy decreased by 80% from 2008 to 2013.

Bassem Youssef ended the segment by encouraging people to join in the movement against coal by using the hash tag “#Stop Coal” on Twitter.

### **Season 3 – Episode 11 – Second segment**

The counter is displayed on the screen beside Bassem Youssef, showing that it has been 49 days since the announcement of the invention. Bassem Youssef introduced a video of what was previously discussed about the device on *Albernameg*. The video showed snap shots of Lieutenant Abdel Atti talking about the device on various channels and TV shows. Bassem Youssef then made fun of the device, giving it various names that resemble names of movies, such as “An invention from security forces”, “AIDS & Dr. Nooman”, “Talk of the sausage and the evening” and “AIDS Dabbour”.

Bassem Youssef showed segments of other TV talk shows discussing the credentials and certification of the device's inventor, coming to the conclusion that no one is sure whether Abdel Atti is actually a doctor or not. He then moved to segments of interviews with officials from the Egyptian military discussing the success and



potential of the device. This was followed by news segments announcing that the Egyptian health ministry will start importing a new American drug to treat virus C patients. Then, Bassem Youssef acts confused and starts asking numerous questions about why we need this new expensive imported drug if we already have an Egyptian device that the military says can deliver the same results. He argues that science is not like politics, and that propaganda will not work on such a scientific issue. He ends the segment with a series of TV hosts calling those who second-guess the scientific basis of the device traitors.

## **B. SURVEY**

The second step was designing a survey based on the frames determined through the qualitative content analysis. The survey was administered in Arabic language because this is the mother language of the target audience. The questionnaire starts with a filtering question addressing the viewership of *Albernameg* in order to exclude non-viewers from the sample. It included 36 questions addressing the main variables of the study. These included the level of viewership of *Albernameg*, motivations for watching the show, participants' news sources, political interest and attention, political knowledge, internal and external political efficacy, perceptions of the virus C detection device and coal introduction as an alternative source of generating electricity in Egypt, perceived credibility of Bassem Youssef, and finally participants' demographics.

## **C. DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE**

A non-probability purposive sample was used to collect the data. The researcher opted for a purposive sample in order to ensure that only *Albernameg* viewers are included in the sample. The choice of this non-probability sample type was due to the difficulties of obtaining a probability sample in Egypt, more specifically lack of a list of the population and the lack of a research culture that would allow the researcher to conduct a cluster sample.

An online questionnaire was posted on Facebook and sent to friends and family by email. They were asked to answer the questionnaire and send it to their

friends as well in order to reach the largest possible number of participants. Since the online questionnaire requires access to and literacy of computers, it was mainly targeting higher socioeconomic classes. Printed questionnaires were used as well in order to reach lower socioeconomic classes who may not have access to or literacy of computers.

Four hundred self-administered and online questionnaires were distributed. After excluding 78 questionnaires for answering “No” on the filtering question, the final sample size was 322. The sample included Egyptians, 47% males and 53% females. The educational levels of participants ranged between 45% university degree holders, 16% having a secondary degree or an equivalent, 11% master’s holders, 11% having a preparatory degree and the remaining 17% was between Ph.D. holders, primary degree holders, having a certificate for illiteracy or illiterate. Average monthly income of the family was distributed between 25% less than 1000, 28% from 1000 to 2000, 23% more than 2000 to 5000 and 24% more than 5000. Participants’ occupations ranged between 15% students, 23% unemployed, 40% working in the private sector, 15% working in the public sector and 7% retirees.

**CHAPTER SIX**  
**DATA ANALYSIS**


**RQ1: What are the socio-political characteristics of *Albernameg's* audience?**

- *RQ1a: What are Albernameg audience's demographics?*

**Table 1:**

**Age**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Less than 18	34	10.6	10.6	10.6
From 18 to 25	96	29.8	29.8	40.4
More than 25 to 35	95	29.5	29.5	69.9
More than 35 to 45	39	12.1	12.1	82.0
More than 45 to 55	27	8.4	8.4	90.4
More than 55	31	9.6	9.6	100.0
Total	322	100.0	100.0	




**Figure 1: Age**

**Table 1** and **figure 1** show that 29.8% of the sampled audience is between the ages of 18 to 25, 29.5% are between the ages of 26 to 35, 12% are between the ages of 36 and 45, 10.6% are less than 18 years old, 9.6% are above 55 years old and 8.4% are between the ages of 46 to 55.

**Table 2:**

**Gender**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Male	151	46.9	46.9	46.9
	Female	171	53.1	53.1	100.0
	Total	322	100.0	100.0	




**Figure 2: Gender**

**Table 2** and **figure 2** show that 47% of the sampled audience is males and 53% is females.

**Table 3:**  
**Educational level**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Illiterate	18	5.6	5.6	5.6
Certificate for illiteracy	12	3.7	3.7	9.3
Primary	15	4.7	4.7	14.0
Preparatory	35	10.9	10.9	24.8
Secondary degree or its equivalent	51	15.8	15.8	40.7
University degree	145	45.0	45.0	85.7
Master's degree	34	10.6	10.6	96.3
Doctorate (Ph.D.)	12	3.7	3.7	100.0
Total	322	100.0	100.0	




**Figure 3: Educational Level**

**Table 3** and **figure 3** show that 45% of the sample hold university degrees, 15.8% have a secondary degree or its equivalent, 10.9% have a preparatory degree, 10.6% have a master's degree, 5.6% are illiterate, 4.7% have a primary degree, 3.7% have a Ph.D. and 3.7% have a certificate for illiteracy.

**Table 4:**  
**Occupation**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Student	49	15.2	15.2	15.2
	Unemployed	75	23.3	23.3	38.5
	Private sector	128	39.8	39.8	78.3
	Public sector	48	14.9	14.9	93.2
	Retiree	22	6.8	6.8	100.0
	Total	322	100.0	100.0	



**Figure 4: Occupation**

**Table 4** and **figure 4** show that 39.8% of the sample work in the private sector, 23.3% are unemployed, 15.2% are students, 14.9% work in the public sector and 6.8% are retirees.

To sum up, in response to RQ1a, 60% of the sampled audience is between the ages of 18 and 35, with almost equal representation of both genders (47% males and 53%

females). Almost half the sample (45%) hold university degrees and their occupations range between working in the private sector (40%), being unemployed (23%) and being a student (15%) or working in the public sector (15%).

- *RQ1b: Is Albernameg’s audience interested in politics and public affairs?*

**Table 5:**  
**Interest in politics and public affairs**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Not at all	62	19.3	19.3	19.3
Somewhat	144	44.7	44.7	64.0
Extremely	116	36.0	36.0	100.0
Total	322	100.0	100.0	

**Table 5** shows that 19.3% of the sample is not interested in politics at all, 44.7% is somewhat interested and 36% is extremely interested.

- *RQ1c: Is Albernameg’s audience attentive to politics and public affairs?*

**Table 6:**  
**Attention to politics and public affairs**


	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Never	66	20.5	20.5	20.5
Sometimes	156	48.4	48.4	68.9
Very often	100	31.1	31.1	100.0
Total	322	100.0	100.0	

**Table 6** shows that 20.5% of the sample never pays attention to politics, 48.4% sometimes pay attention and 31.1% very often pay attention.

**Table 7:**

**Political interest and attention**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Low	74	23.0	23.0
Medium	124	38.5	38.5
High	124	38.5	38.5
Total	322	100.0	100.0



**Figure 5: Political Interest and Attention**

Since there was no big difference between measures of political interest and measures of political attention, they were both combined into one measure. **Table 7** and **figure 5** show that political interest and attention among *Albernameg's* audience ranges between high (38.5%) and medium (38.5%).




- *RQ1d: Is Albernameg’s audience politically knowledgeable?*

**Table 8:**

**Political knowledge**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	low	55	17.1	17.1	17.1
	medium	142	44.1	44.1	61.2
	high	125	38.8	38.8	100.0
	Total	322	100.0	100.0	



**Figure 6: Political Knowledge**

**Table 8** and **figure 6** show that the level of political knowledge among the surveyed sample was 17% low, 44% medium and 39% high.

- ***RQ1e: Do Albernameg audience have internal and external political efficacy?***

**Table 9:**

**Internal Political Efficacy**

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Internal Political Efficacy	322	2.7811	.79610

The table shows that the audience has low internal political efficacy since the mean score is less than 3 (mean= 2.78).

**Table 10:**

**External Political Efficacy**

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
External Political Efficacy	322	3.4648	1.04567

The table shows that the audience has neutral towards high external political efficacy since the mean score is slightly above 3 (mean= 3.5).

In summary, in response to RQ1, the socio-political characteristics of *Albernameg's* audience include their gender being equally distributed between males and females, with their ages ranging between 18 and 35. Most audience members are university degree holders who primarily work in the private sector or are unemployed, with a smaller percentage being students or working in the public sector. The level of political interest and attention among the audience ranges between medium (38.5%) and high (38.5%), with the level of political knowledge ranging between medium (44%) and high (39%). The audience exhibits low levels of internal political efficacy (mean= 2.78) and neutral leaning towards slightly high levels of external political efficacy (mean= 3.5).


**RQ2: What are Albernameg audience’s motivations for watching the show?**

- *RQ2a: Does the audience consider Albernameg a source of news?*

**Table 11:**

**Reasons for watching *Albernameg***

	Frequency	Percent	Rank
It’s funny and entertaining	151	46.9	1
It presents the news in an interesting and funny way	100	31.1	2
To learn the news	82	25.5	3
It’s unbiased and truthful	44	13.7	4
It simplifies the news and makes it easier to understand	26	8.1	5



**Figure 7: Reasons for watching *Albernameg***

**Table 11** and **figure 7** show that the highest ranking reason for the audience to watch *Albernameg* is because it is funny and entertaining (46.9%), followed by because it presents the news in an interesting and funny way (31.1%), to learn the news ranked


third (25.5%), because it's unbiased and truthful ranked fourth (13.7%) and finally because it simplifies the news and makes it easier to understand ranking fifth (8.1%).

This means that in response to RQ2a, whether the audience considers *Albernameg* a source of news, 56.6% of the audience considers it a source of news. This is the sum of the respondents who chose that they watched the show because it presents the news in an interesting and funny way (31.1%) and those who chose that they watched it to learn the news (25.5%). These two reasons ranked second and third, after watching the show because it's funny and entertaining, which ranked first (46.9%).

- ***RQ2b: Is Albernameg's audience being exposed to traditional news sources, or is Albernameg their sole source of news?***

**Table 12:**  
**News sources**

	Frequency	Percent	Rank
Radio stations	56	17.4	4
Print newspapers	69	21.4	2
Online newspapers	83	25.8	1
Egyptian TV talk shows	64	19.9	3
Arabic news channels (such as Al Arabiya, BBC Arabic and Al Jazeera)	56	17.4	4
Foreign news channels (such as BBC and CNN)	20	6.2	6
Social media (such as Facebook and Twitter)	44	13.7	5
Satire shows (such as <i>Albernameg</i> )	19	5.9	7
None of the above. I don't follow the news.	13	4.0	8



**Figure 8: News Sources**

**Table 12** and **figure 8** show that the audience's news sources rank as follows: online newspapers rank first (25.8%), print newspapers rank second (21.4%), Egyptian TV talk shows rank third (19.9%), radio stations and Arabic news channels (such as Al Arabiya, BBC Arabic and Al Jazeera) both rank fourth (17.4%), social media (such as

Facebook and Twitter) rank fifth (13.7%), foreign news channels (such as BBC and CNN) rank sixth (6.2%) and satire shows (such as *Albernameg*) rank seventh (5.9%).

This means that in response to RQ2b, *Albernameg*'s audience is being exposed to traditional news sources, with the top ranking sources being online newspapers, print newspapers and Egyptian TV talk shows.

- ***RQ2c: Does the audience perceive Bassem Youssef as a credible source of information?***

**Table 13:**  
**Credibility of Bassem Youssef**

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Credibility of Bassem Youssef	322	3.1087	.76591

The table shows that the credibility of Bassem Youssef is towards neutral with a mean score of 3.1.

In summary, this shows that in response to RQ2, the audience's highest ranking motivations for watching the *Albernameg* include that they watch it because it's funny and entertaining (46.9%). Also, 56.6% of the audience considers it a source of news; between watching it because it presents the news in an interesting and funny way (31.1%) and watching it purely to learn the news (25.5%). *Albernameg*'s audience is being exposed to traditional news sources, with the top ranking sources being online newspapers (25.8%), print newspapers (21.4%) and Egyptian TV talk shows (19.9%). However, Bassem Youssef's credibility as a source of information did not prove to be a significant factor behind watching the show since his credibility was towards neutral, with a mean score of 3.1.

**H1: There is a relationship between viewing motivations and perceptions of the AIDS & virus C detection device and using coal to generate electricity.**

The motivations for watching the show were measured using a multiple response question (i.e. respondents could choose more than one answer). So, in the analysis, motivations are measured on the highest ranking answers, which also represent the two main motivations the hypothesis is testing: watching for entertainment (with the response on the question being: “I used to watch *Albernameg* because it’s funny and entertaining”) and watching for information (with the response on the question being: “I used to watch *Albernameg* because it presents the news in an interesting and funny way”, and “to learn the news” combined).

- *H1a: Viewers who watched *Albernameg* for information are more likely to have a negative perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device than those who watched for entertainment.*

**Table 14: Mean scores of watching for information and watching for entertainment in terms of perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device**

	motivations	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Perception of device	Ent.	151	2.7572	1.04416	.08497
	Info.	124	2.7419	1.01732	.09136

**Table 15: Difference between watching for information and watching for entertainment in terms of perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device**

Independent Samples Test										
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
ind15_18	Equal variances assumed	.272	.602	.122	273	.903	.01524	.12509	-.23102	.26150
	Equal variances not assumed			.122	265.149	.903	.01524	.12477	-.23042	.26090

**Table 14** shows that viewers who watched *Albernameg* for entertainment and those who watched for information both have negative perceptions of the AIDS & virus C detection device, with their mean scores being 2.76 and 2.74 respectively. **Table 15** shows that there is no significant difference between perceptions of viewers who watched for entertainment and those who watched for information, with the significance level being 0.903. This indicates that H1a is rejected.

- *H1b: Viewers who watched Albernameg for information are more likely to have a negative perception of using coal to generate electricity than those who watched for entertainment.*

**Table 16: Mean scores of watching for information and watching for entertainment in terms of perception of using coal to generate electricity**

	motivations	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Using coal	Ent.	151	2.5497	.90001	.07324
	Info.	124	2.6976	.83147	.07467



**Table 17: Difference between watching for information and watching for entertainment in terms of perception of using coal to generate electricity**

Independent Samples Test										
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
Ind19_22	Equal variances assumed	.625	.430	-1.403	273	.162	-.14791	.10541	-.35543	.05961
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.414	269.203	.158	-.14791	.10459	-.35384	.05801

**Table 16** shows that viewers who watched *Albernameg* for entertainment and those who watched for information both have negative perceptions of using coal to generate electricity, with their mean scores being 2.5 and 2.7 respectively. **Table 17** shows that there is no significant difference between perceptions of viewers who watched for entertainment and those who watched for information, with the significance level being 0.162. This indicates that H1b is rejected.

According to the results of H1a and H1b, this concludes that H1 is rejected. There is no significant difference between viewers who watched *Albernameg* for entertainment and those who watched for information. Both groups have negative perceptions in relation to both issues under investigation, perceptions of the AIDS & virus C detection device, and using coal to generate electricity.

**H2: There is a relationship between the level of viewership and perceptions of the AIDS & virus C detection device and using coal to generate electricity.**

- *H2a: Heavy viewers of Albernameg are more likely to have a negative perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device than light viewers.*

**Table 18: Mean scores of level of viewership in terms of perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device**

q2) How often did you watch AI Bernameg?		t15_18-Perception of device
Rarely (one episode every few months)	Mean	3.1933
	N	50
	Std. Deviation	1.10059
Occasionally (one or two episodes every month)	Mean	2.6989
	N	124
	Std. Deviation	.94894
All the time (I used to watch the episode every week)	Mean	2.5698
	N	148
	Std. Deviation	1.03034
Total	Mean	2.7164
	N	322
	Std. Deviation	1.03032

**Table 19: Significance between different levels of viewership in terms of perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device**

**ANOVA**

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
t15_18-Perception of device	Between Groups	14.591	2	7.296	7.135	.001
	Within Groups	326.169	319	1.022		
	Total	340.761	321			

**Table 20: Difference between levels of viewership in terms of perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device**

Dependent Variable	(I) q2) How often did you watch AI Bernameg?	(J) q2) How often did you watch AI Bernameg?	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
t15_18-Perception of the virus C detection device	Rarely (one episode every few months)	Occasionally (one or two episodes every month)	.49441 <sup>*</sup>	.16940	.004	.1611	.8277
		All the time (I used to watch the episode every week)	.62351 <sup>*</sup>	.16540	.000	.2981	.9489
	Occasionally (one or two episodes every month)	Rarely (one episode every few months)	-.49441 <sup>-</sup>	.16940	.004	-.8277-	-.1611-
		All the time (I used to watch the episode every week)	.12910	.12310	.295	-.1131-	.3713
	All the time (I used to watch the episode every week)	Rarely (one episode every few months)	-.62351 <sup>-</sup>	.16540	.000	-.9489-	-.2981-
		Occasionally (one or two episodes every month)	-.12910-	.12310	.295	-.3713-	.1131

**Table 18** shows that light viewers of *Albernameg* who rarely watched the show, watching an episode every few months, have a neutral leaning towards positive perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device (mean= 3.2). Moderate viewers, who occasionally watched the show, watching one or two episodes every month, have a negative perception of the device (mean= 2.7). Heavy viewers, those who watched the show every week, had a slightly more negative perception than moderate viewers (mean= 2.6).

**Table 19** shows that there is a significant difference between different levels of viewership in terms of perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device, with a significance level of 0.001. **Table 20** indicates that the significant differences in perception of the device are between light and moderate viewers (p= 0.004), and between light and heavy viewers (p= 0.000). However, there is no significant

difference between heavy and moderate viewers ( $p= 0.295$ ). This indicates that H2a is accepted.

- *H2b: Heavy viewers of Albernameg are more likely to have a negative perception of using coal to generate electricity than light viewers.*

**Table 21: Mean scores of level of viewership in terms of perception of using coal to generate electricity**

q2) How often did you watch AI Bernameg?		t19_22-Perception of using coal to generate electricity
Rarely (one episode every few months)	Mean	2.7500
	N	50
	Std. Deviation	.82839
Occasionally (one or two episodes every month)	Mean	2.7359
	N	124
	Std. Deviation	.75594
All the time (I used to watch the episode every week)	Mean	2.4358
	N	148
	Std. Deviation	.95392
Total	Mean	2.6002
	N	322
	Std. Deviation	.87378

**Table 22: Significance between different levels of viewership in terms of perception of using coal to generate electricity**

		ANOVA				
		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
t19_22-Perception of using coal to generate electricity	Between Groups	7.404	2	3.702	4.969	.007
	Within Groups	237.678	319	.745		
	Total	245.082	321			

**Table 23: Difference between levels of viewership in terms of using coal to generate electricity**

Dependent Variable	(I) q2) How often did you watch <i>Al Bernameg</i> ?	(J) q2) How often did you watch <i>Al Bernameg</i> ?	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
t19_22-Perception of using coal to generate electricity	Rarely (one episode every few months)	Occasionally (one or two episodes every month)	.01411	.14460	.922	-.2704-	.2986
		All the time (I used to watch the episode every week)	.31419*	.14119	.027	.0364	.5920
	Occasionally (one or two episodes every month)	Rarely (one episode every few months)	-.01411-	.14460	.922	-.2986-	.2704
		All the time (I used to watch the episode every week)	.30008*	.10509	.005	.0933	.5068
	All the time (I used to watch the episode every week)	Rarely (one episode every few months)	-.31419-*	.14119	.027	-.5920-	-.0364-
		Occasionally (one or two episodes every month)	-.30008-*	.10509	.005	-.5068-	-.0933-

**Table 21** shows that light, moderate and heavy viewers of *Albernameg* all have negative perception in terms of perception of using coal as an alternative source of generating electricity. Higher levels of viewership lead to a slightly more negative perception of the issue. This is reflected in the mean scores of light, moderate and heavy viewers. The mean score of light viewers is 2.75, the mean score of moderate viewers is 2.74, and the mean score of heavy viewers is 2.44.

**Table 22** shows that there is a significant difference between different levels of viewership in terms of perception of using coal to generate electricity, with a significance level of 0.007. **Table 23** indicates that the significant differences in

perception of using coal as an alternative source of electricity are between light and heavy viewers ( $p= 0.027$ ), and between moderate and heavy viewers ( $p= 0.005$ ). However, there is no significant difference between light and moderate viewers ( $p= 0.922$ ). This indicates that H2b is accepted.

According to the results of H2a and H2b, this concludes that H2 is accepted. There is a relationship between the level of viewership and perceptions of the AIDS & virus C detection device, and using coal to generate electricity. The higher the level of viewership, the more negative the perceptions of both issues. There are significant differences between light, moderate and heavy viewers of *Albernameg* in terms of their perceptions of the AIDS & virus C detection device ( $p= 0.001$ ), and using coal to generate electricity ( $p= 0.007$ ).

**H3: There is a relationship between perception of Bassem Youssef as a credible source of information and perceptions of the AIDS & virus C detection device and using coal to generate electricity.**

**Table 24: Correlations between perceptions of the AIDS & virus C detection device and using coal to generate electricity, and perceived credibility of Bassem Youssef**

		<b>Correlations</b>		
		t15_18- Perception of the virus C detection device	t19_22- Perception of using coal to generate electricity	t23_28- Credibility of Bassem Youssef
t15_18-Perception of the virus C detection device	Pearson Correlation	1	.345**	-.308**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000
	N	322	322	322
t19_22-Perception of using coal to generate electricity	Pearson Correlation	.345**	1	-.252**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000
	N	322	322	322
t23_28-Credibility of Bassem Youssef	Pearson Correlation	-.308**	-.252**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	
	N	322	322	322

- *H3a: Viewers who perceive Bassem Youssef as a credible source of information are more likely to have a negative perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device.*

**Table 25: Mean scores of viewers who perceive Bassem Youssef as credible and those who do not, in terms of perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device**

	credibility	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
t15_18-Perception of the virus C detection device	low	126	2.9894	.97519	.08688
	high	112	2.4911	1.07008	.10111

**Table 26: Difference between viewers who perceive Bassem Youssef as credible and those who do not, in terms of perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device**

		Independent Samples Test								
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
t15_18-Perception of the virus C detection device	Equal variances assumed	1.459	.228	3.759	236	.000	.49835	.13258	.23715	.75954
	Equal variances not assumed			3.738	226.006	.000	.49835	.13331	.23566	.76103

**Table 24** shows that there is a weak inverse correlation between perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device and perceived credibility of Bassem Youssef, with a significance level of 0.000 and correlation value of -0.308. This means that the more viewers perceive Bassem Youssef as a credible source of information, the more negative their perception of the AIDS & virus C device. **Table 25** shows that viewers who perceive Bassem Youssef as a credible source of information have a negative perception of the device (mean= 2.5), whereas those who perceive him as a low credibility source have a neutral perception of the device (mean= 3). **Table 26** shows

that there is a significant difference between viewers who perceive Bassem Youssef as a credible source of information and those who do not, with a significance level of 0.000. This indicates that H3a is supported.

- ***H3b: Viewers who perceive Bassem Youssef as a credible source of information are more likely to have a negative perception of using coal to generate electricity.***

**Table 27: Mean scores of viewers who perceive Bassem Youssef as credible and those who do not, in terms of perception of using coal to generate electricity**

	credibility	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
t19_22-Perception of using coal to generate electricity	low	126	2.7520	.78962	.07034
	high	112	2.4888	.93505	.08835

**Table 28: Difference between viewers who perceive Bassem Youssef as credible and those who do not, in terms of perception of using coal to generate electricity**

Independent Samples Test											
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means							
		F		t						95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper	
t19_22-Perception of using coal to generate electricity	Equal variances assumed	5.112	.025	2.353	236	.019	.26314	.11183	.04284	.48345	
	Equal variances not assumed			2.330	218.398	.021	.26314	.11294	.04056	.48573	

**Table 24** shows that there is a weak inverse correlation between perception of using coal to generate electricity and perceived credibility of Bassem Youssef, with a significance level of 0.000 and correlation value of -0.252. This means that the more viewers perceive Bassem Youssef as a credible source of information, the more negative their perception of the use of coal as an alternative source of generating electricity. **Table 27** shows that viewers who do not perceive Bassem Youssef as a credible source of information have a negative perception of the use of coal (mean= 2.75), and those who perceive him as a credible source have a slightly more negative



perception of the use of coal (mean= 2.5). **Table 28** shows that there is a significant difference between viewers who perceive Bassem Youssef as a credible source of information and those who do not, with a significance level of 0.019. This indicates that H3b is supported.

Since H3a and H3b are both accepted, this concludes that H3 is accepted. There is a relationship between perception of Bassem Youssef as a credible source of information and perceptions of the AIDS & virus C detection device, and using coal to generate electricity. Results indicate that there is a weak inverse correlation between perceived credibility of Bassem Youssef and viewers' perceptions of both issues. This means that the more viewers perceive Bassem Youssef as a credible source, the more negative their perceptions of the two issues.

**POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE & AUDIENCES' PERCEPTIONS**

**Table 29: Mean scores of different political knowledge levels in terms of perception of the AIDS & virus C device**

Political knowledge		t15_18-Perception of device
low	Mean	3.0848
	N	55
	Std. Deviation	1.00864
medium	Mean	2.7676
	N	142
	Std. Deviation	.93693
high	Mean	2.4960
	N	125
	Std. Deviation	1.09300
Total	Mean	2.7164
	N	322
	Std. Deviation	1.03032

**Table 30: Significance between different political knowledge levels in terms of perception of the AIDS & virus C device**

		ANOVA				
		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
t15_18-Perception of device	Between Groups	13.911	2	6.955	6.788	.001
	Within Groups	326.850	319	1.025		
	Total	340.761	321			

**Table 31: Difference between political knowledge levels in terms of perception of the AIDS & virus C device**

Dependent Variable	(I) politicalknw	(J) politicalknw	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
t15_18-Perception of device	low	medium	.31724 <sup>*</sup>	.16076	.049	.0010	.6335
		high	.58885 <sup>*</sup>	.16379	.000	.2666	.9111
	medium	low	-.31724 <sup>*</sup>	.16076	.049	-.6335-	-.0010-
		high	.27161 <sup>*</sup>	.12415	.029	.0274	.5159
	high	low	-.58885 <sup>*</sup>	.16379	.000	-.9111-	-.2666-
		medium	-.27161 <sup>*</sup>	.12415	.029	-.5159-	-.0274-

**Table 29** shows that viewers who exhibit low levels of political knowledge have a neutral leaning towards a slightly positive perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device (mean= 3.1), viewers with medium levels of political knowledge have a negative perception of the device (mean= 2.8), and those who exhibit high levels of political knowledge have the most negative perception of the device (mean= 2.5).

**Table 30** shows that there are significant differences between the perceptions of those who exhibit low, medium and high levels of political knowledge, with a significance level of 0.001. **Table 31** shows that the difference is significant between all three groups, between the low and the medium (p= 0.049), between the low and the high (p= 0.000), and between the medium and the high (p=0.29).

These results indicate that there is a significant relationship between level of political knowledge and perception of the AIDS & virus C device. The mean scores show that the higher the level of political knowledge the audience exhibit, the more negative their perception of the device.

**Table 32: Mean scores of different political knowledge levels in terms of perception of using coal to generate electricity**

Political knowledge		t19_22-Perception of using coal to generate electricity
low	Mean	2.9455
	N	55
	Std. Deviation	.68498
medium	Mean	2.7570
	N	142
	Std. Deviation	.78604
high	Mean	2.2700
	N	125
	Std. Deviation	.93735
Total	Mean	2.6002
	N	322
	Std. Deviation	.87378

**Table 33: Significance between different political knowledge levels in terms of perception of using coal to generate electricity**

		ANOVA				
		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
t19_22-Perception of using coal to generate electricity	Between Groups	23.678	2	11.839	17.058	.000
	Within Groups	221.404	319	.694		
	Total	245.082	321			

**Table 34: Difference between political knowledge levels in terms of perception of using coal to generate electricity**

Dependent Variable	(I) politicalknw	(J) politicalknw	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
t19_22-Perception of using coal to generate electricity	low	medium	.18841	.13231	.155	-.0719-	.4487
		high	.67545 <sup>*</sup>	.13480	.000	.4102	.9407
	medium	low	-.18841-	.13231	.155	-.4487-	.0719
		high	.48704 <sup>*</sup>	.10218	.000	.2860	.6881
	high	low	-.67545 <sup>*</sup>	.13480	.000	-.9407-	-.4102-
		medium	-.48704 <sup>*</sup>	.10218	.000	-.6881-	-.2860-

**Table 32** shows that viewers who exhibit low levels of political knowledge have a neutral perception of using coal to generate electricity (mean= 3), viewers with medium levels of political knowledge have a negative perception of the use of coal (mean= 2.8), and those who exhibit high levels of political knowledge have the most negative perception of the issue (mean= 2.3). **Table 33** shows that there are significant differences between the perceptions of those who exhibit low, medium and high levels of political knowledge, with a significance level of 0.000. **Table 34** shows that the difference is significant between the low and the high (p= 0.000), and between the medium and the high (p= 0.000). There is no significant difference between the low and the medium (p= 0.155).

These results indicate that there is a significant relationship between level of political knowledge and perception of using coal as an alternative source of generating electricity. The mean scores show that the higher the level of political knowledge the audience exhibit, the more negative their perception of the use of coal.

**Table 35: Mean scores of different political knowledge levels in relation to perceived credibility of Bassem Youssef**

Political knowledge		t23_28-Credibility of Bassem Youssef
low	Mean	2.8788
	N	55
	Std. Deviation	.73734
medium	Mean	3.1843
	N	142
	Std. Deviation	.65133
high	Mean	3.1240
	N	125
	Std. Deviation	.87705
Total	Mean	3.1087
	N	322
	Std. Deviation	.76591

**Table 36: Significance between different political knowledge levels in relation to perceived credibility of Bassem Youssef**

		ANOVA				
		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
t23_28-Credibility of Bassem Youssef	Between Groups	3.748	2	1.874	3.239	.041
	Within Groups	184.559	319	.579		
	Total	188.307	321			

**Table 37: Difference between political knowledge levels in relation to perceived credibility of Bassem Youssef**

Dependent Variable	(I) politicalknw	(J) politicalknw	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
t23_28-Credibility of Bassem Youssef	low	medium	-.30548 <sup>*</sup>	.12080	.012	-.5432-	-.0678-
		high	-.24521 <sup>*</sup>	.12308	.047	-.4874-	-.0031-
	medium	low	.30548 <sup>*</sup>	.12080	.012	.0678	.5432
		high	.06027	.09329	.519	-.1233-	.2438
	high	low	.24521 <sup>*</sup>	.12308	.047	.0031	.4874
		medium	-.06027-	.09329	.519	-.2438-	.1233

**Table 35** shows that viewers who exhibit low levels of political knowledge have a negative leaning towards neutral perception of Bassem Youssef as a credible source of information (mean= 2.9), viewers with medium levels of political knowledge have a neutral slightly leaning towards positive perception of Bassem Youssef’s credibility (mean= 3.2), and those who exhibit high levels of political knowledge also have a neutral slightly leaning towards positive perception of Bassem Youssef’s credibility (mean= 3.1). **Table 36** shows that there are significant differences between the perceptions of those who exhibit low, medium and high levels of political knowledge, with a significance level of 0.041. **Table 37** shows that the difference is significant between the low and the medium (p= 0.012), and between the low and the high (p= 0.047). There is no significant difference between the medium and the high (p= 0.519).

These results indicate that there is a significant relationship between level of political knowledge and perceived credibility of Bassem Youssef. The mean scores show that more politically knowledgeable viewers are slightly more likely than less politically knowledgeable ones to have a neutral leaning towards positive perception of Bassem Youssef as a credible source of information.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### CONCLUSION & DISCUSSION

The study set out to investigate the audience characteristics of the Egyptian political satire show *Albernameg*, in terms of demographics and political traits. It also examined the audience's motivations for watching the show, particularly focusing on information-motivated and entertainment-motivated consumption, as well as whether the audience consider *Albernameg* a source of news and perceive its presenter, Bassem Youssef, as a credible source of information. These uses and gratifications-related concepts were then taken a step further to explore whether they relate to the presence of framing effects for the show on its audience, or lack thereof. Hence, this study plays an important role in bridging the gap between Uses and Gratifications research and media effects studies.

*Albernameg* was chosen for research due to the literature on political satire being largely based on Western shows in the genre, leaving out a gap in literature about political satire when it comes to its uses and effects in a Middle Eastern context. This particular show was selected due to its soaring popularity, as well as the vigorous controversy that encircled it throughout its operation and after its suspension. The suspension of the show raised even more questions about its role in influencing and shaping Egyptian public opinion.

This study sought to inspect the following research questions in relation to Bassem Youssef's show *Albernameg*: (RQ1) *What are the socio-political characteristics of Albernameg audience?* The sociopolitical characteristics of the audience were examined in terms of demographics, interest and attention to politics and public affairs, political knowledge and political efficacy. (RQ2) *What are Albernameg audience's motivations for watching the show?* The concepts considered under the second research question included whether the audience considers *Albernameg* a source of news, their exposure to other traditional news sources, or lack thereof, and their perceptions of Bassem Youssef's credibility as a source of information.

The study also posited three main hypotheses testing framing effects with regards to two issues, one related to frame repetition and the other to frame strength. (H1) *There is a relationship between viewing motivations and perceptions of the AIDS & virus C detection device and using coal to generate electricity.* Viewing motivations under investigation were watching for information versus watching for entertainment. (H2) *There is a relationship between the level of viewership and perceptions of the AIDS & virus C detection device and using coal to generate electricity.* (H3) *There is a relationship between perception of Bassem Youssef as a credible source of information and perceptions of the AIDS & virus C detection device and using coal to generate electricity.*

The methodology started out with qualitative content analysis of the final season of *Albernameg*'s episodes in order to determine the media frames, which were then used as a basis for the rest of the study. According to Iyengar (1991), the media can shape attributions of responsibility for social and political issues depending on how they frame the event. Moreover, Chong and Druckman (2007b) argue that when individuals are exposed to competing frames, they will either respond to the louder frame or to the stronger frame. A loud frame being the frame most frequently repeated and a strong frame is a frame communicated via a credible source and/or conforms to strongly held beliefs. The analysis resulted in choosing "perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device" as the repetitive frame, and "perception of using coal as an alternative source of generating electricity in Egypt" as the strong frame. The AIDS & virus C detection device was brought up in every episode since the announcement of the device until the show went off the air, a total of seven episodes. Using coal as an alternative source of generating electricity was covered through interviewing an expert on the issue, Ahmed El Derouby, coordinator of the "Egyptians against coal" movement. The analysis also showed that both issues were framed negatively on *Albernameg*. These media frames were then used as a basis for the survey questions. A non-probability purposive sample was used to collect the data. Four hundred self-administered and online questionnaires were distributed. The final sample size was 322.



The main findings were discussed in details, using tables and charts, in the data analysis chapter. This section synthesizes the results and relates them to the theoretical framework and previous studies.

Data analysis showed that *Albernameg*'s audience consists mainly of youth between the ages of 18 to 35, of both genders, with the majority being university degree holders. They are politically interested and attentive, with levels of political knowledge ranging between medium and high. The ages of *Albernameg*'s audience falling between 18 and 35 corresponds to Lee's (2013) study which argues that political satire consumption is primarily linked to entertainment-driven motivations, with younger adults being more likely than older adults to consume news for entertainment reasons. The characteristics of the audience being highly educated youth correspond to the flexible mentality expected for an audience of a satire show, such as *Albernameg*. These results are consistent with Borden and Tew (2007) who maintain that satire demonstrates how the same "facts" can be understood and contextualized differently, as well as Meddaugh (2010) who says that satire involves its audiences in observing the deficiencies inherent in media and politics, "through participation rather than instruction." Higher levels of education prompt a mindset that is capable of accepting different contextualization, and participation in evaluating issues and how they are presented in the media, rather than taking them at face value and accepting them as undisputable facts. Moreover, the medium towards high levels of political knowledge agree with Young (2013) whose study suggests that audiences who avoid watching satire are low on political knowledge, so they do not have the necessary knowledge to understand the jokes on the show.

The audience exhibits low levels of internal political efficacy (mean= 2.78) and neutral leaning towards slightly high levels of external political efficacy (mean= 3.5). The low levels of internal political efficacy correspond to Baumgartner & Morris's (2008) study, which argues that some satire shows, such as *The Colbert Report*, leave its young viewers less confident in their capability to comprehend politics as a result of confusion between the show's implicit and explicit messages.

Moreover, given the Egyptian context the study is held in, the low levels of internal political efficacy, reflecting the lack of participants' confidence to participate in and influence politics, is understandable. Many Egyptians participated in voting and elections for the first time in their lives after the 2011 revolution. They have also been experiencing shifting political systems since the revolution and have been through various elections whose results have not always led to clear and concrete outcomes. This may be the reason behind their low confidence in their ability to contribute to and have a say in the political system.

The higher levels of external political efficacy may be reflective of Egyptians' faith in and trustworthiness of the new government under President Sisi, with a 96% win in the presidential elections, hoping that this regime will be more effective and responsive than previous regimes. This is in line with the different results studies have found when it comes to the levels of political efficacy satire audiences exhibit, with viewers of some shows exhibiting high levels of political efficacy, whereas others exhibit low levels (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; Baumgartner & Morris, 2008; Hoffman and Thomson, 2009; Hoffman & Young, 2011). This emphasizes the idea that effects of political satire are not universal among all the shows within the genre.

The audience's highest-ranking motivation for watching *Albernameg* is entertainment, because the show is funny. Watching for information ranked second, between watching the show because it presents the news in an interesting and funny way and watching it purely to learn the news. The information-related motivations combined lead to 56.6% of the audience considering *Albernameg* a source of news. The more than 50% information-motivated consumption of *Albernameg* contradicts with Lee (2013) whose study suggests that political satire is linked to entertainment and opinion-driven motivations, whereas audiences with information-driven motivations are least motivated to watch them. Nevertheless, these findings are in agreement with Young (2013) and So (2012) who suggest that satire audiences are expected to consume these shows with mixed motivation of surveillance and

enjoyment, and that audiences who watch for humor, also report watching to learn the news, suggesting that laughter and learning may occur simultaneously.

Moreover, *Albernameg* is not the sole source of news for its audience. They are being exposed to traditional news sources as well, with the top ranking sources being online newspapers, print newspapers and Egyptian TV talk shows. This agrees with Young and Tisinger (2006) who contend that late-night comedy viewers do not exclusively depend on satire for information about politics and public affairs; they watch both late-night comedy as well as traditional news.

There is no significant difference between viewers who watched *Albernameg* for entertainment and those who watched for information in terms of their perceptions of the AIDS & virus C detection device, and using coal to generate electricity. Both groups have negative perceptions in relation to both issues. However, since in both cases audiences' perceptions of the two issues were negative, which is in line with how these two issues were framed on *Albernameg*, this may suggest strong framing effects regardless of the viewer's motivation for watching the show. If both, audiences who tune in for information and those who tune in for entertainment, exhibit audience frames corresponding to the media frames portrayed on *Albernameg*, this could lead to the conclusion that audiences do not have to be consciously aware of and actively engaging in a learning process during watching satire. The two processes of laughter and learning may be occurring simultaneously (Young, 2013), with the audience consuming satire with mixed motivation of surveillance and enjoyment (S0, 2012).

There is a relationship between the level of viewership and perceptions of the AIDS & virus C detection device, and the use of coal to generate electricity. There are significant differences between light, moderate and heavy viewers of *Albernameg* in terms of their perceptions of the AIDS & virus C detection device ( $p= 0.001$ ), and using coal to generate electricity ( $p= 0.007$ ). On both issues, heavy viewers were more likely to exhibit more negative perceptions than light viewers. This suggests that heavy viewers of *Albernameg* exhibit stronger framing effects than light viewers.

This agrees with the existing literature, which suggests that people's opinions are determined based on the information they hear regularly and thus most readily comes to mind and is easily retrievable from memory. In addition, competitive news framing is strongly influenced by recency effects with the latest frame exposure being decisive for opinion formation (Iyengar, 1991; Chong and Druckman, 2007b).

There is a significant relationship between perception of Bassem Youssef as a credible source of information and perceptions of the AIDS & virus C detection device, and using coal to generate electricity. Results indicate that there is a weak inverse correlation between perceived credibility of Bassem Youssef and viewers' perceptions of both issues. This means that the more viewers perceive Bassem Youssef as a credible source, the more negative their perceptions of the two issues. This suggests that the higher the perceived credibility of Bassem Youssef as a source of information, the stronger the framing effects for both repetitive and strong frames. This concurs with Druckman (2001) who indicates that source credibility is a pre-requisite and moderator of framing effects.

The findings of the study also pose political knowledge as a strong moderator of framing effects. Results indicate that there is a significant relationship between level of political knowledge and perception of the AIDS & virus C device, perception of using coal to generate electricity, and perceived credibility of Bassem Youssef. The higher the level of political knowledge, the more negative the perception of both the repetitive and the strong frames under consideration in the study, and the more positive the perception of Bassem Youssef as a credible source of information. These results agree with Lecheler and de Vreese's (2013) study on the effects of repetitive and competitive news framing over time, which showed that participants with a higher level of political knowledge exhibited greater accumulation of framing effects and weaker recency effects (Lecheler & de Vreese, 2013). The results also agree with Young (2004) and Young & Tisinger (2006) who argue that different audience characteristics, such as varying political affiliations and levels of political knowledge, may result in varying effects on viewers, even with exposure to the same show.

Overall, the findings of the study indicate that *Albernameg*'s effects on its audience differ according to audience characteristics. However, the results show that for a large portion of the sample, *Albernameg* is considered a source of news. Strong correlations between the media frames on the show and audience frames suggest the presence of framing effects regarding perceptions of the two issues under consideration in the study. This places *Albernameg* as a possible force in shaping Egyptian public opinion and sheds light on the important role that political satire can play in shaping audiences' perceptions of current issues.

In light of this study, the researcher expects the satire genre to flourish in Egypt and the Arab region. The results of the study suggest that it has a significant impact on its audience. This is reflected in the presence of framing effects on the audience, even though these effects were tested after *Albernameg* had stopped airing. This shows that the program's influence on its audience is long run and suggests that some kind of learning has taken place. In this sense, the show has been an eye-opener when it comes to viewers' consumption of traditional media forms, acting as a media literacy platform and involving the audience in evaluating news, rather than taking it at face value, without second-guessing or analyzing it. Satire's entertainment quality also engages politically uninterested viewers and could play a role in increasing political awareness, especially among young adults, with laughter and learning occurring simultaneously without viewers having to actively seek political information. Taking all these points into consideration, audience demand for political satire is expected to boost more production of programs within this genre. This is already starting to appear in Egyptian TV presenter, Akram Hosni's, satirical program "*As'ad Allaho Masa'akom*" (Have a Good Evening), which is rapidly gaining popularity.

## LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

- A non-probability purposive sample was used to collect the data, so the results cannot be generalized beyond the sample. The choice of this non-probability sample type was due to the difficulties of obtaining a probability sample in Egypt, more specifically lack of a list of the population and the lack of a research culture that would allow the researcher to conduct a cluster sample.
- The use of coal as an alternative source of generating electricity in Egypt, which was used as one of the two frames under analysis, was only discussed on one episode of *Albernameg*. Some viewers may not have watched this episode. The choice of this frame was due to the fact that it was the only frame on which an expert was interviewed on the show and could thus be chosen as a frame communicated via a credible source and be deemed a strong frame.
- The survey was distributed over a period of two months after *Albernameg* had stopped. So, the immediate framing effects may have dissipated and the effect being tested was long run.
- Framing effects were examined in relation to perceptions of two issues only, which are the perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device and introduction of coal as an alternative source of generating electricity in Egypt.
- Political knowledge was measured using four questions asking about politics and current affairs. This may not be an accurate reflective measure of political knowledge levels among the audience.
- The study does not prove the presence of framing effects, as survey studies cannot establish cause and effect relations between variables. The results of the study only show a correlation between the media frames on *Albernameg* and the audience frames regarding perceptions of the two issues under

investigation. Exposure to the show may not be the main reason behind the audience's perceptions; it can be the result of one or more intervening variables, such as pre-existing beliefs and attitudes or prior knowledge about the issues.

#### **SUGGESTIONF FOR FUTURE RESEARCH**

First, the variables could be studied using a probability sample to be able to generalize the results.

Second, since this study focused primarily on information and entertainment-motivated consumption of, or cognitive and affective needs related to, *Albernameg*, future research could conduct more in-depth uses and gratifications oriented studies in order to measure the link between various types of motivations in relation to political satire consumption. These could include opinion and social motivations, and tension release needs. According to Lee (2013), political satire was linked to entertainment and opinion-driven motivations. Those with information-driven motivations were least motivated to watch them.

Third, testing framing effects in relation to more issues to determine whether the results are only relevant to the two topics under investigation in this study, or hold across many issues.

Fourth, since the findings of the study pose political knowledge as a strong moderator of framing effects, it is recommended to build a more thorough scale for measuring political knowledge as a variable and how it relates to framing effects. According to previous studies, varying levels of political knowledge may result in different effects on viewers (Young, 2004; Young & Tisinger, 2006). Lecheler and de Vreese's (2013) study showed that participants with a higher level of political knowledge exhibited greater accumulation of framing effects and weaker recency effects when the delay between the first and second exposures was short. Young's (2013) study of *The Daily Show* with Jon Stewart and *The Colbert Report* suggests

that audiences who avoid the shows are low on political knowledge and efficacy, so they do not have the necessary knowledge to understand the jokes (Young, 2013).

Fifth, discourse analysis of *Albernameg* throughout all its three seasons to analyze the discourse on the show. This could help in exploring whether the show really offers critical criticism of politics and current affairs. Also, it could be cross-examined with the different political regimes that were in place with each set of episodes to identify differences in manner and tone of presentation in relation to changing political regimes, if any. This point was debatable among previous studies. On the one hand, Meddaugh (2010) argues that satire acts as a media literacy platform, involving its audiences in observing the deficiencies inherent in media and politics. Anderson & Kincaid's (2013) study agrees with that direction; their discourse analysis of *The Daily Show* with Jon Stewart and *The Colbert Report* showed that the two programs did in fact dissect mainstream news content in a way that could promote informed discussion and democratic culture. On the other hand, according to Anderson & Kincaid (2013), satire shows can be dichotomous in nature with their content reflecting strong hegemonic elements, as well as anti-hegemonic ones. Fedechko & Vandenberg (2011) argue that Jon Stewart poses as a counter-hegemon to the system by merely appearing to challenge it, but in reality he is offering a façade of democracy, pacifying viewers by laughing at the media and politics, without any substantial content that could lead to real opposition or action.

Sixth, since the study found that *Albernameg* audience are also being exposed to traditional news sources, not just to satire, it is recommended to investigate how exposure to satire and traditional news sources can affect one another. According to Young (2013), viewers of *The Daily Show* and the *Colbert Report* who report watching because these shows make the news fun, acknowledge that they are referring to news they acquired elsewhere, from reading newspapers or watching the news. Furthermore, Holbert et al's (2007) experimental analysis of the primacy effects of watching *The Daily Show* and *CNN Headline News* shows that watching one form prior to the other can lead viewers to think less of the second form they are exposed to, as a source for political information.



## **STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Encourage production of satire shows with different perspectives, since political satire has proven to be a strong tool for influencing public opinion, in order to promote freedom of expression & debate, rather than suppress dissonant voices.
- Political candidates can appear on satire shows as part of their election campaigns.
- Focus on the use of satire as a tool for increasing political awareness and media literacy, since it can engage politically uninterested viewers and can encourage more political participation than traditional news sources, as well as encourage viewers to analyze rather than take news at face value.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aarøe, L. (2011). Investigating Frame Strength: The Case of Episodic and Thematic Frames. *Political Communication*, 28(2), 207-226.
- Aggour, S. (2013, December 16). Egyptians' politics-related online searches surge in 2013. *Daily News Egypt (Cairo, Egypt)*. Retrieved May 3, 2014, from NewsBank on-line database (Access World News)  
[http://0-infoweb.newsbank.com.lib.aucegypt.edu/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p\\_product=AWNB&p\\_theme=aggregated5&p\\_action=doc&p\\_docid=14ABD7669E33E348&p\\_docnum=1&p\\_queryname=16](http://0-infoweb.newsbank.com.lib.aucegypt.edu/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p_product=AWNB&p_theme=aggregated5&p_action=doc&p_docid=14ABD7669E33E348&p_docnum=1&p_queryname=16)
- Albernameg. *Albernameg*. (n.d.). Retrieved May 18, 2014, from  
<http://www.albernameg.com>
- Anderson, J., & Kincaid, A. D. (2013). Media Subservience and Satirical Subversiveness: The Daily Show, The Colbert Report, The Propaganda Model and the Paradox of Parody. *Critical Studies In Media Communication*, 30(3), 171-188. doi:10.1080/15295036.2013.771276
- Astor, M. (2013, November 27). 4 foreign journalists get Press Freedom Awards. *Associated Press State Wire: New York (NY)*. Retrieved May 3, 2014, from NewsBank on-line database (Access World News)  
[http://0-infoweb.newsbank.com.lib.aucegypt.edu/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p\\_product=AWNB&p\\_theme=aggregated5&p\\_action=doc&p\\_docid=14A56333051C8860&p\\_docnum=1&p\\_queryname=18](http://0-infoweb.newsbank.com.lib.aucegypt.edu/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p_product=AWNB&p_theme=aggregated5&p_action=doc&p_docid=14A56333051C8860&p_docnum=1&p_queryname=18)
- Ayyad, K. (2011). Internet usage vs traditional media usage among university students in the United Arab Emirates. *Journal of Arab & Muslim Media Research*, 4(1), 41-61.

Baden, C., & Lecheler, S. (2012). Fleeting, Fading, or Far-Reaching? A Knowledge-Based Model of the Persistence of Framing Effects. *Communication Theory* (10503293), 22(4), 359-382.

Baek, Y. M., & Wojcieszak, M. E. (2009). Don't expect too much! Learning from late-night comedy and knowledge item difficulty. *Communication Research*, 36(6), 783-809.

Ball-Rokeach, S. J. (1985). The origins of individual media-system dependency: A sociological framework. *Communication Research*, 12, 485–510.

Ball-Rokeach, S. J. (1998). A theory of media power and a theory of media use: Different stories, questions, and ways of thinking. *Mass Communication & Society*, 1, 5–40.

Bassem Youssef, Heba Morayef and Hossam Bahget among 2013 FP global thinkers. (2013, December 12). . Retrieved May 18, 2014, from <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/88951/Egypt/Politics-/-Bassem-Youssef,-Heba-Morayef-and-Hossam-Bahget-am.aspx>

Bassem Youssef: Egypt's freedom-of-speech icon. (2013, December 26). *AlArabiya.net (Dubai, United Arab Emirates)*. Retrieved May 18, 2014, from NewsBank on-line database (Access World News) [http://0-infoweb.newsbank.com.lib.aucegypt.edu/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p\\_product=AWNB&p\\_theme=aggregated5&p\\_action=doc&p\\_docid=14B01FB955A09348&p\\_docnum=1&p\\_queryname=6](http://0-infoweb.newsbank.com.lib.aucegypt.edu/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p_product=AWNB&p_theme=aggregated5&p_action=doc&p_docid=14B01FB955A09348&p_docnum=1&p_queryname=6)

Baum, M. A. (2003). Soft news and political knowledge: Evidence of absence or absence of evidence? *Political Communication*, 20, 173–190.

- Baumgartner, J.C., & Morris, J.S. (2006). The Daily Show effect: Candidate evaluations, efficacy, and American youth. *American Politics Research*, 34, 341-367. doi:10.1177/1532673X 05280074
- Baumgartner, J.C., & Morris, J.S. (2008). One "nation," under Stephen? The effects of the Colbert Report on American youth. *Journal of Broadcasting of Electronic Media*, 52, 622-643. doi:10.1080/08838150802437487
- Baym, G. (2007). Representation and the politics of play: Stephen Colbert's Better Know a District. *Political Communication*, 24, 359-376. doi:10.1080/10584600701641441
- Baym, G., & Jones, J. P. (2012). News Parody in Global Perspective: Politics, Power, and Resistance. *Popular Communication*, 10(1/2), 2-13. doi:10.1080/15405702.2012.638566
- Blumler, J. G. (1979). The role of theory in uses and gratifications studies. *Communication Research*, 6, 9- 36.
- Borden, S. L., & Tew, C. (2007). The Role of Journalist and the Performance of Journalism: Ethical Lessons from "Fake" News (Seriously). *Journal Of Mass Media Ethics*, 22(4), 300-314. doi:10.1080/08900520701583586
- Brewer, P. R., & Cao, X. (2006). Candidate appearances on soft news shows and public knowledge about primary campaigns. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, 50(1), 18-35.
- Cacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1982). The need for cognition. *Journal Of Personality And Social Psychology*, 42(1), 116-131. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.42.1.116

- Cao, X. (2010). Hearing it from Jon Stewart: The impact of The Daily Show on public attentiveness to politics. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 22(1), 26-46.
- Chong, D. & Druckman, J. (2007a). Framing Theory. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 10(1), 103-126.
- Chong, D. and Druckman, J. N. (2007b). A Theory of Framing and Opinion Formation in Competitive Elite Environments. *Journal of Communication*, 57: 99–118. doi: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.2006.00331.x
- Detenber, B. H., Gotlieb, M. R., McLeod, D. M., & Malinkina, O. (2007). Frame Intensity Effects of Television News Stories About a High-Visibility Protest Issue. *Mass Communication & Society*, 10(4), 439-460.
- Druckman, J. (2001). On the limits of framing effects: Who can frame? . *The Journal of Politics*, 63(4), 1041-1066. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2691806>
- Druckman, J., & Nelson, K. (2003). Framing and deliberation: How citizens' conversations limit elite influence. *American Journal of Political Science*, 47(4), 729-745. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3186130>
- Egypt comedian back on air, mocking Sisi mania. (2014, February 8). *Agence France-Presse*. Retrieved May 3, 2014, from NewsBank on-line database (Access World News)  
[http://0-infoweb.newsbank.com.lib.aucegypt.edu/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p\\_product=AWNB&p\\_theme=aggregated5&p\\_action=doc&p\\_docid=14BDD4B76EFFBD00&p\\_docnum=1&p\\_queryname=9](http://0-infoweb.newsbank.com.lib.aucegypt.edu/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p_product=AWNB&p_theme=aggregated5&p_action=doc&p_docid=14BDD4B76EFFBD00&p_docnum=1&p_queryname=9)

- ElGabry, R. (2014). *Political Satire in Egypt after 2011: The effect of the second season of the satirical show "Al-Bernameg" (2012-2013) on the Egyptian audience* (Unpublished master's dissertation). The American University in Cairo, Egypt.
- Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Towards clarification of a fractured paradigm. *Journal of Communication*, 43(4), 51-58.
- Fedechko, J., & Vandenberg, S. (2011). Communication and Power: Plutocratic Hegemony and Political Discourse. *Human Communication*, 14(2), 117-125.
- German TV to give Egypt satirist pan-Arab airing. (2014, February 3). *Associated Press News Service*. Retrieved May 3, 2014, from NewsBank on-line database (Access World News)  
[http://0-infoweb.newsbank.com.lib.aucegypt.edu/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p\\_product=AWNB&p\\_theme=aggregated5&p\\_action=doc&p\\_docid=14BBEC465E960460&p\\_docnum=1&p\\_queryname=3](http://0-infoweb.newsbank.com.lib.aucegypt.edu/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p_product=AWNB&p_theme=aggregated5&p_action=doc&p_docid=14BBEC465E960460&p_docnum=1&p_queryname=3)
- Glenn, C. (2011, February 24). *The History of the Court Jester*. Retrieved December 5, 2014, from <http://travelingwithintheworld.ning.com/m/group/discussion?id=2185477:Topic:105089>
- Grant, A. E., Guthrie, K. K., & Ball-Rokeach, S. J. (1991). Television shopping: A media system dependency perspective. *Communication Research*, 18, 773–798.
- Hamdy, N. and Gomaa, E. (2012). Framing the Egyptian Uprising in Arabic Language Newspapers and Social Media. *Journal of Communication*, 62(2), 195–211.

- Hmielowski, J. D., Holbert, R., & Lee, J. (2011). Predicting the Consumption of Political TV Satire: Affinity for Political Humor, The Daily Show, and The Colbert Report. *Communication Monographs*, 78(1), 96-114.  
doi:10.1080/03637751.2010.542579
- Hoffman, L. H., & Thomson, T. L. (2009). The effect of television viewing on adolescents' civic participation: Political efficacy as a mediating mechanism. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, 53(1), 3-21.
- Hoffman, L. H., & Young, D. G. (2011). Satire, Punch Lines, and the Nightly News: Untangling Media Effects on Political Participation. *Communication Research Reports*, 28(2), 159-168. doi:10.1080/08824096.2011.565278
- Holbert, L., Lambe, J.L., Dudo, A.D., & Carlton, K.A. (2007). Primacy effects of The Daily Show and national TV news viewing: Young viewers, political gratifications, and internal political self-efficacy. *Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media*, 51, 20-38. doi:10.1080/08838150701308002
- Holbert, R., Tchernev, J. M., Walther, W. O., Esralew, S. E., & Benski, K. (2013). Young Voter Perceptions of Political Satire as Persuasion: A Focus on Perceived Influence, Persuasive Intent, and Message Strength. *Journal Of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, 57(2), 170-186. doi:10.1080/08838151.2013.787075
- Hollander, B. A. (2005). Late-night learning: Do entertainment programs increase political campaign knowledge for young viewers?. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, 49(4), 402-415.
- Iyengar, S. (1990). Framing responsibility for political issues: The case of poverty. *Political Behavior*, 12(1), 19-40.
- Iyengar, S. (1991). *Is anyone responsible? How television frames political issues*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Iyengar, S. (1994). Framing effects of news coverage. *Is anyone responsible?: How television frames political issues* (pp. 11-16). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Judah, B. (2014, March 30). Machinegunned on Twitter for upbraiding a megastar - The London-based commentator Ben Judah forgave a leading opponent of the regime in Egypt for plagiarism but still the mob bayed for his blood. *The Sunday Times (London, England)*. Retrieved May 18, 2014, from NewsBank on-line database (Access World News)  
[http://0-infoweb.newsbank.com.lib.aucegypt.edu/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p\\_product=AWNB&p\\_theme=aggregated5&p\\_action=doc&p\\_docid=14CE11924A4FF038&p\\_docnum=1&p\\_queryname=4](http://0-infoweb.newsbank.com.lib.aucegypt.edu/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p_product=AWNB&p_theme=aggregated5&p_action=doc&p_docid=14CE11924A4FF038&p_docnum=1&p_queryname=4)

Katz, E., Blumler, J. G., & Gurevitch, M. (1973). USES AND GRATIFICATIONS RESEARCH. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 37(4), 509.

Katz, E., Blumler, J. G., & Gurevitch, M. (1974). Utilization of mass communication by the individual. In J. G. Blumler & E. Katz (Eds.), *The uses of mass communications: Current perspectives on gratifications research* (pp. 19–32). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Katz, E., Haas, H., & Gurevitch, M. (1973). On the use of the mass media for important things. *American sociological review*, 164-181.



- Kingsley, P. (2014, January 26). Egypt's censorship of comedian Bassem Youssef sends 'wrong message' - Three years after pro-democracy protests began, freedom of speech faces a new challenge, says TV satirist. *The Observer* (London, England). Retrieved May 3, 2014, from NewsBank on-line database (Access World News)  
[http://0-infoweb.newsbank.com.lib.aucegypt.edu/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p\\_product=AWNB&p\\_theme=aggregated5&p\\_action=doc&p\\_docid=14BF9DA9596962E8&p\\_docnum=1&p\\_queryname=7](http://0-infoweb.newsbank.com.lib.aucegypt.edu/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p_product=AWNB&p_theme=aggregated5&p_action=doc&p_docid=14BF9DA9596962E8&p_docnum=1&p_queryname=7)
- Landreville, K. D., Holbert, R. L., & LaMarre, H. L. (2010). The influence of late-night TV comedy viewing on political talk: A moderated-mediation model. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 15(4), 482-498.
- Lecheler, S., & de Vreese, C. H. (2012). News Framing and Public Opinion: A Mediation Analysis of Framing Effects on Political Attitudes. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, 89(2), 185-204.  
 doi:10.1177/1077699011430064
- Lecheler, S., & de Vreese, C. H. (2013). What a Difference a Day Makes? The Effects of Repetitive and Competitive News Framing Over Time. *Communication Research*, 40(2), 147-175.
- Lee, A. M. (2013). News Audiences Revisited: Theorizing the Link Between Audience Motivations and News Consumption. *Journal Of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, 57(3), 300-317. doi:10.1080/08838151.2013.816712
- Meddaugh, P. (2010). Bakhtin, Colbert, and the Center of Discourse: Is There No 'Truthiness' in Humor?. *Critical Studies In Media Communication*, 27(4), 376-390. doi:10.1080/15295030903583606
- Meyer, J. C. (2000). Humor as a double-edged sword: Four functions of humor in communication. *Communication Theory*, 10(3), 310-331.

- Moody, K. (2011). Credibility or convenience? political information choices in a media-saturated environment. *Media International Australia*, 35-46.
- Nelson, T., Oxley, Z., & Clawson, R. (1997). Toward a psychology of framing effects. *Political Behavior*, 19(3), 221-246 . Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/586517>
- Niemi, R. G., Craig, S. C., & Mattei, F. (1991). Measuring internal political efficacy in the 1988 national election study. *American Political Science Review*, 85, 1407–1413.
- Palmgreen, P. (1984). Uses and gratifications: A theoretical perspective. *Communication Yearbook*, 8, 20–55.
- Parkin, M. (2010). Taking Late Night Comedy Seriously How Candidate Appearances on Late Night Television Can Engage Viewers. *Political Research Quarterly*, 63(1), 3-15.
- Rizk, M. (2014, February 7). Egypt's top satirist back on air after suspension. *Associated Press News Service*. Retrieved May 3, 2014, from NewsBank on-line database (Access World News)  
[http://0-infoweb.newsbank.com.lib.aucegypt.edu/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p\\_product=AWNB&p\\_theme=aggregated5&p\\_action=doc&p\\_docid=14BD6332B5719078&p\\_docnum=1&p\\_queryname=2](http://0-infoweb.newsbank.com.lib.aucegypt.edu/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p_product=AWNB&p_theme=aggregated5&p_action=doc&p_docid=14BD6332B5719078&p_docnum=1&p_queryname=2)
- Rizk, M. (2014, March 8). Network says signal of Egyptian satire show jammed. *Associated Press News Service*. Retrieved May 18, 2014, from NewsBank on-line database (Access World News)  
[http://0-infoweb.newsbank.com.lib.aucegypt.edu/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p\\_product=AWNB&p\\_theme=aggregated5&p\\_action=doc&p\\_docid=14C6E940028A6BD0&p\\_docnum=1&p\\_queryname=1](http://0-infoweb.newsbank.com.lib.aucegypt.edu/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p_product=AWNB&p_theme=aggregated5&p_action=doc&p_docid=14C6E940028A6BD0&p_docnum=1&p_queryname=1)

- Rohan, B. (2014, January 9). AP Interview: Egypt's top satirist prepares return. *The Associated Press News Service*. Retrieved May 3, 2014, from NewsBank on-line database (Access World News)  
[http://0-infoweb.newsbank.com.lib.aucegypt.edu/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p\\_product=AWNB&p\\_theme=aggregated5&p\\_action=doc&p\\_docid=14B39B94B46BB168&p\\_docnum=1&p\\_queryname=10](http://0-infoweb.newsbank.com.lib.aucegypt.edu/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p_product=AWNB&p_theme=aggregated5&p_action=doc&p_docid=14B39B94B46BB168&p_docnum=1&p_queryname=10)
- Ross, S. D. (2003). Framing of the palestinian-israeli conflict in thirteen months of new york times editorials surrounding the attack of september 11,2001 . *Conflict and communication online*, 2(2), doi: ISSN 1618-0747
- Ross, M.L., & York, L. (2007). 'First they're foreigners': The Daily Show with Jon Stewart and the limits of dissident laughter. *Canadian Review of American Studies*, 37, 351-370. doi:10.3138/cras.37.3.351
- Rubin, A. M. (1983). Television uses and gratifications: The interactions of viewing patterns and motivations. *Journal of Broadcasting*, 27, 31-57.
- Rubin, A. M., & Windahl, S. (1986). The uses and dependency model of mass communication. *Critical Studies in Mass Communication*, 3, 184–199.
- Rubin, A. M., & Perse, E. M. (1987a). Audience activity and soap opera involvement a uses and effects investigation. *Human Communication Research*, 14(2), 246-268.
- Rubin, A. M., & Perse, E. M. (1987b). Audience activity and television news gratifications. *Communication research*, 14(1), 58-84.
- Rubin, A. M. (2009). The uses-and-gratifications perspective on media effects. In J. Bryant & M. B. Oliver (Eds.), *Media effects: Advances in theory and research 3rd ed.* (pp. 165-184). New York, NY: Routledge.

- Scheufele, D. (1999). Framing as a theory of media effects. *Journal of Communication*, 49(1), 103-122.
- Scourge of Egypt media mocked for 'plagiarism'. (2014, March 20). *Agence France-Presse*. Retrieved May 18, 2014, from NewsBank on-line database (Access World News)  
[http://0-infoweb.newsbank.com.lib.aucegypt.edu/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p\\_product=AWNB&p\\_theme=aggregated5&p\\_action=doc&p\\_docid=14CB004E8396CAF0&p\\_docnum=1&p\\_queryname=5](http://0-infoweb.newsbank.com.lib.aucegypt.edu/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p_product=AWNB&p_theme=aggregated5&p_action=doc&p_docid=14CB004E8396CAF0&p_docnum=1&p_queryname=5)
- So, J. (2012). Uses, Gratifications, and Beyond: Toward a Model of Motivated Media Exposure and Its Effects on Risk Perception. *Communication Theory* (10503293), 22(2), 116-137. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2885.2012.01400.x
- T. Rose, A. (2013, November 18). Youssef and company seek to terminate ties with CBC. *Daily News Egypt (Cairo, Egypt)*. Retrieved May 3, 2014, from NewsBank on-line database (Access World News)  
[http://0-infoweb.newsbank.com.lib.aucegypt.edu/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p\\_product=AWNB&p\\_theme=aggregated5&p\\_action=doc&p\\_docid=14A29CDAC2949560&p\\_docnum=1&p\\_queryname=4](http://0-infoweb.newsbank.com.lib.aucegypt.edu/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p_product=AWNB&p_theme=aggregated5&p_action=doc&p_docid=14A29CDAC2949560&p_docnum=1&p_queryname=4)
- T. Rose, A. (2014, March 8). MBC Misr signal jammed while airing 'El-Bernameg'. *Daily News Egypt (Cairo, Egypt)*. Retrieved May 18, 2014, from NewsBank on-line database (Access World News)  
[http://0-infoweb.newsbank.com.lib.aucegypt.edu/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p\\_product=AWNB&p\\_theme=aggregated5&p\\_action=doc&p\\_docid=14C6DDC331BCE900&p\\_docnum=1&p\\_queryname=2](http://0-infoweb.newsbank.com.lib.aucegypt.edu/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p_product=AWNB&p_theme=aggregated5&p_action=doc&p_docid=14C6DDC331BCE900&p_docnum=1&p_queryname=2)
- van der Wurff, R. (2011). Are News Media Substitutes? Gratifications, Contents, and Uses. *Journal Of Media Economics*, 24(3), 139-157.  
 doi:10.1080/08997764.2011.601974

- Videos: YouTube reveals top Middle East videos. (2013, December 12). *7 Days (Dubai, United Arab Emirates)*. Retrieved May 3, 2014, from NewsBank on-line database (Access World News)  
[http://0-infoweb.newsbank.com.lib.aucegypt.edu/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p\\_product=AWNB&p\\_theme=aggregated5&p\\_action=doc&p\\_docid=14AA5B7404C417C0&p\\_docnum=1&p\\_queryname=17](http://0-infoweb.newsbank.com.lib.aucegypt.edu/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p_product=AWNB&p_theme=aggregated5&p_action=doc&p_docid=14AA5B7404C417C0&p_docnum=1&p_queryname=17)
- Watchdog slams Egypt for curbing press freedom. (2013, November 5). *Agence France-Presse*. Retrieved May 3, 2014, from NewsBank on-line database (Access World News)  
[http://0-infoweb.newsbank.com.lib.aucegypt.edu/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p\\_product=AWNB&p\\_theme=aggregated5&p\\_action=doc&p\\_docid=149E851D787BABC8&p\\_docnum=1&p\\_queryname=8](http://0-infoweb.newsbank.com.lib.aucegypt.edu/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p_product=AWNB&p_theme=aggregated5&p_action=doc&p_docid=149E851D787BABC8&p_docnum=1&p_queryname=8)
- Windahl, S. (1981). Uses and gratifications at the crossroads. *Mass communication Review Yearbook*, 2(2), 174-85.
- Xenos, M. A., & Becker, A. B. (2009). Moments of Zen: Effects of The Daily Show on information seeking and political learning. *Political Communication*, 26(3), 317-332.
- Young, D. (2004). Late-night comedy in election 2000: Its influence on candidate trait ratings and the moderating effects of political knowledge and partisanship. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, 48(1), 1-22.
- Young, D. G. (2013). Laughter, Learning, or Enlightenment? Viewing and Avoidance Motivations Behind The Daily Show and The Colbert Report. *Journal Of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, 57(2), 153-169.  
 doi:10.1080/08838151.2013.787080

Young, D. G., & Tisinger, R. M. (2006). Dispelling Late-Night Myths News Consumption among Late-Night Comedy Viewers and the Predictors of Exposure to Various Late-Night Shows. *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*, 11(3), 113-134.

Younis, D. M. (2014). *Egyptian Audience's Perception of Political Satire Show: An Analysis of the Perceived and Actual Influence of Political Comedy Programming* (Unpublished master's dissertation). The American University in Cairo, Egypt.

Zimmerman, M. A. (1989). The Relationship Between Political Efficacy and Citizen participation: construct Validation Studies. *Journal Of Personality Assessment*, 53(3), 554.

# APPENDIX

# الجامعة الأمريكية بالقاهرة

## استمارة موافقة مسبقة للمشاركة في دراسة بحثية

عنوان البحث: تطور و اثار البرامج السياسية الساخرة المصرية مثل برنامج البرنامج لباسم يوسف

الباحث الرئيسي: سلمى ثروت اسماعيل / معيدة بجامعة مصر الدولية  
البريد الالكتروني: salmatharwat@aucegypt.edu  
الهاتف: 01227909606

انت مدعو للمشاركة في دراسة بحثية عن البرامج السياسية الساخرة المصرية مثل برنامج البرنامج لباسم يوسف.

هدف الدراسة هو معرفة اثار البرامج السياسية الساخرة المصرية مثل برنامج البرنامج لباسم يوسف على آراء الجمهور

نتائج البحث ستنتشر في دوريه متخصصه أو مؤتمر علمي أو ربما كليهما.

المدة المتوقعة للمشاركة في هذا البحث ١٠ دقائق. إجراءات الدراسة تشتمل على حل مجموعة اسئلة في استمارة استبيان

المخاطر المتوقعة من المشاركة في هذه الدراسة : لا يوجد

الاستفادة المتوقعة من المشاركة في البحث: لا يوجد

السرية واحترام الخصوصية: المعلومات التي ستدلى بها في هذا البحث سوف تكون ( ستكون هويتك غير محددة)

أي أسئلة متعلقة بهذه الدراسة أو حقوق المشاركين فيها أو عند حدوث أي اصابات ناتجة عن هذه المشاركة يجب ان توجه الى سلمى ثروت اسماعيل 01227909606

ان المشاركة في هذه الدراسة ماهي الا عمل تطوعي، حيث أن الامتناع عن المشاركة لايتضمن أي عقوبات أو فقدان أي مزايا تحق لك. ويمكنك أيضا التوقف عن المشاركة في أي وقت من دون عقوبة أو فقدان لهذه المزايا.

الإمضاء: .....

اسم المشارك : .....

التاريخ : ...../...../.....



## استمارة استبيان

- (١) هل كنت تشاهد برنامج "البرنامج" لباسم يوسف؟  
١. نعم  
٢. لا (شكرا برجاء عدم استكمال الاستبيان)
- (٢) كم عدد المرات التي كنت تشاهد فيها برنامج "البرنامج"؟  
١. طوال الوقت (كنت أشاهد الحلقة كل أسبوع)  
٢. بعض الأحيان (حلقة أو اثنتان كل شهر)  
٣. نادرا (أشاهد حلقة واحدة كل بضعة أشهر)
- (٣) لماذا كنت تشاهد برنامج "البرنامج"؟ يمكنك اختيار أكثر من اجابة.  
١. للترفيه و التسلية  
٢. لمعرفة الأخبار  
٣. لأنه يعرض الأخبار بطريقة جذابة و كوميدية  
٤. لأنه صادق و حيادي  
٥. لعرضه الخبر على نحو أقل تعقيدا يسهل فهمه  
٦. أخرى. تذكر .....
- (٤) ما موقفك من إيقاف برنامج "البرنامج" لباسم يوسف؟  
١. مع إيقاف البرنامج  
٢. محايد  
٣. ضد إيقاف البرنامج
- (٥) أي وسيلة تتبع لمعرفة الأخبار؟ يمكنك اختيار أكثر من اجابة.  
١. الاذاعة الصوتية  
٢. الجرائد المطبوعة  
٣. الجرائد على الانترنت  
٤. البرامج الحوارية المصرية  
٥. القنوات الاخبارية العربية (مثل العربية، أو الجزيرة، أو بي بي سي العربية)  
٦. القنوات الاخبارية الأجنبية (مثل بي بي سي، أو سي أن أن)  
٧. مواقع التواصل الاجتماعي (مثل فيسبوك و تويتر)  
٨. البرامج الساخرة (مثل برنامج "البرنامج")  
٩. لا شيء مما سبق ذكره. أنا لا أتابع الأخبار.  
١٠. أخرى. تذكر .....
- (٦) ما مدى اهتمامك بما يجري في السياسة و الشؤون العامة؟  
١. شديد الاهتمام  
٢. مهتم بعض الشيء  
٣. غير مهتم
- (٧) ما مدى متابعتك لما يجري في السياسة و الشؤون العامة؟  
١. شديد المتابعة  
٢. أتابع بعض الشيء  
٣. لا أتابع

فيما يلي عدد من العبارات التي تحدد رأيك واتجاهاتك. من فضلك، اختر الإجابة التي تمثل رأيك.

الجملة	أرفض بشدة	أرفض	محايد	موافق	موافق بشدة
٨ أعتبر نفسي مؤهل جيدا للمشاركة في الحياة السياسية					
٩ أعتقد أن عندي معرفة سياسية أكثر مقارنة بمعظم الناس					
١٠ أشعر أنني علي درجة عالية من الفهم بالموضوعات السياسية الهامة التي تواجه البلاد					
١١ في بعض الأحيان تبدو السياسة معقدة لدرجة أن شخص مثلي لا يستطيع فهم ما الذي يحدث					
١٢ المرشحون المنتخبون لا يوفون بوعدهم الانتخابية في معظم الأحيان					
١٣ السياسيون يقولون أي شيء ليتم انتخابهم					
١٤ الحكومة تهدر الكثير من أموال دافعي الضرائب					
١٥ أعتبر جهاز الكشف عن فيروس سي واحد من أهم الاختراعات المصرية إلى يومنا هذا					
١٦ جهاز الكشف عن فيروس سي يجدد الأمل للكثير من المرضى					
١٧ جهاز الكشف عن فيروس سي لا علاقة له بالطب					
١٨ أعتبر استخدام الفحم طريقة فعالة لحل أزمة الكهرباء					
١٩ أؤيد إدخال فكرة استخدام الفحم لتوليد الكهرباء في مصر					
٢٠ استخدام الفحم لتوليد الكهرباء سيزيد من مشاكلنا بسبب التلوث الذي سينتج عنه					
٢١ أنا مع دعوة إيقاف الفحم					
٢٢ باسم يوسف يعرض مقاطع فيديو حقايقية دون أي تلاعب					
٢٣ برنامج "البرنامج" له انحيازات سياسية					
٢٤ أعتبر باسم يوسف غير موثوق فيه بعدما نقل مقال كاتب آخر بدون حق					
٢٥ برنامج "البرنامج" محايد في تغطيته للشئون العامة					
٢٦ شجاعة باسم يوسف في الاعتذار بعدما نقل مقال كاتب آخر تجعله موضع ثقة					
٢٧ أعتبر باسم يوسف مصدر معلومات موثوق منه					

٢٨) من الذي تم تكليفه بتولي منصب رئيس الجمهورية بعد محمد مرسي؟

١. إبراهيم محلب
٢. عدلي منصور
٣. عصام شرف
٤. محمد حسين طنطاوي
٥. لا أعلم

٢٩) ما هي جنسية الطائرة التي فقدت في مارس ٢٠١٤؟

١. سنغافورية
٢. فييتنامية
٣. ماليزية
٤. اندونيسية
٥. لا أعلم

٣٠) من الذي فاز في الانتخابات الرئاسية الأخيرة في الجزائر؟

١. منصف المرزوقي
٢. عبد العزيز بوتفليقة
٣. محمود أحمددي نجاد
٤. عمر البشير
٥. لا أعلم

٣١) ما هي المدينة التي كانت موضعا للنزاع بين روسيا و أوكرانيا؟

١. القرم
٢. موسكو
٣. بوخارست
٤. مينسك
٥. لا أعلم

**برجاء ملء البيانات التالية:**

٣٢) السن:

١. أقل من ١٨
٢. من ١٨ إلى ٢٥
٣. أكثر من ٢٥ إلى ٣٥
٤. أكثر من ٣٥ إلى ٤٥
٥. أكثر من ٤٥ إلى ٥٥
٦. أكثر من ٥٥

٣٣) النوع:

١. ذكر
٢. أنثى

**(٣٤) المستوى التعليمي:**

١. أمي
٢. شهادة محو أمية
٣. ابتدائية
٤. اعدادية
٥. ثانوية عامة أو ما يعادلها
٦. شهادة جامعية
٧. ماجستير
٨. دكتوراة
٩. أخرى. تذكر .....

**(٣٥) متوسط الدخل الشهري للأسرة:**

١. أقل من ١٠٠٠
٢. من ١٠٠٠ - ٢٠٠٠
٣. أكثر من ٢٠٠٠ - ٥٠٠٠
٤. أكثر من ٥٠٠٠

**(٣٦) الوظيفة:**

١. طالب
٢. لا أعمل
٣. أعمل بالقطاع الخاص
٤. أعمل بالقطاع العام
٥. متقاعد
٦. أخرى. تذكر .....

## Questionnaire

**1) Did you watch Bassem Youssef's *Al Bernameg*?**

1. Yes
2. No (Thank you. Please do not answer the rest of the questions)

**2) How often did you watch *Al Bernameg*?**

1. All the time (I used to watch the episode every week)
2. Occasionally (one or two episodes every month)
3. Rarely (one episode every few months)

**3) Why did you watch *Al Bernameg*? You can choose more than one answer.**

1. It's funny and entertaining
2. To learn the news
3. It presents the news in an interesting and funny way
4. It's unbiased and truthful
5. It simplifies the news and makes it easier to understand
6. Other. Please specify .....

**4) What do you think about the decision to stop Bassem Youssef's *Al Bernameg*?**

1. With the decision
2. Neutral
3. Against the decision

**5) Where do you get the news? You can choose more than one answer.**

1. Radio stations
2. Print Newspapers
3. Online newspapers
4. Egyptian TV talk shows
5. Arabic news channels (such as Al Arabiya, BBC Arabic or Al Jazeera)
6. Foreign news channels (such as BBC and CNN)
7. Social media (such as Facebook and Twitter)
8. Satire shows (such as *Al Bernameg*)
9. None of the above. I don't follow the news.
10. Other. Please specify .....

**6) Generally speaking, how interested are you in what is going on with politics and public affairs?**

1. Extremely
2. Somewhat
3. Not at all

**7) Generally speaking, how often do you pay attention to information about politics and public affairs?**

1. Very often
2. Sometimes
3. Never

Please select one choice for each statement according to your personal view

Statement	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
8) I consider myself to be well qualified to participate in politics.					
9) I think that I am better informed about politics than most people.					
10) I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country.					
11) Sometimes politics seems so complicated that a person like me cannot really understand what is going on.					
12) Elected officials almost never keep campaign promises.					
13) Politicians will say almost anything to get elected.					
14) The government wastes a lot of the taxpayer's money.					
15) The virus C detection device is one of the most important Egyptian inventions to date.					
16) The virus C detection device gives new hope for many patients.					
17) The virus C detection device has nothing to do with science.					
18) I consider coal introduction as an alternative source of generating electricity an effective way to solve the electricity problem.					
19) I support the idea of using coal to generate electricity in Egypt.					
20) Using coal to generate electricity will add to our problems due to the pollution it will result in.					
21) I support the call to stop using coal.					
22) Bassem Youssef shows truthful videos without manipulation.					

23) <i>Al Bernameg</i> has political inclinations.					
24) After Bassem Youssef's plagiarism incident, I see him as untrustworthy.					
25) <i>Al Bernameg</i> is objective in its coverage of public affairs.					
26) Youssef's courage in apologizing after his plagiarism incident makes him credible.					
27) I consider Bassem Youssef a credible source of information.					

**28) Who was appointed as interim Egyptian president after Morsi?**

1. Ibrahim Mahlab
2. Adly Mansour
3. Essam Sharaf
4. Mohamed Hussein Tantawi
5. I don't know

**29) What is the nationality of the airline whose plane went missing last March?**

1. Singaporean
2. Vietnamese
3. Malaysian
4. Indonesian
5. I don't know

**30) Who won the latest Algerian presidential elections?**

1. Moncef Marzouki
2. Abdel Aziz Bouteflika
3. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
4. Omar Al Bashir
5. I don't know

**31) Which city were Russia and Ukraine fighting over?**

1. Crimea
2. Moscow
3. Bucharest
4. Minsk
5. I don't know

**32) Age:**

1. Less than 18
2. From 18 to 25
3. More than 25 to 35
4. More than 35 to 45
5. More than 45 to 55
6. More than 55

**33) Gender:**

1. Male
2. Female

**34) Educational level:**

1. Illiterate
2. Certificate for illiteracy
3. Primary
4. Preparatory
5. Secondary degree or its equivalent
6. University degree
7. Master's degree
8. Doctorate (Ph.D.)
9. Other. Please specify .....

**35) Average monthly income of the family**

1. Less than 1000
2. From 1000 to 2000
3. More than 2000 to 5000
4. More than 5000

**36) Occupation**

1. Student
2. Unemployed
3. Private sector
4. Public sector
5. Retiree
6. Other. Please specify .....