

IMMIGRANTS' POLITICAL SUITCASES:
A THEORY OF IMPORTED SOCIALIZATION

BY

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DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT

People's experiences throughout their lives influence their later thoughts and actions, including thoughts and actions about politics. This straightforward logic motivates attention to childhood political socialization, habitual voting, and a host of other phenomena. Yet, when it comes to studies concerning the political behaviors of immigrants to the United States, the scholarly norm has been to assume that these individuals entered the nation as political blank slates; that is, we ignore the possible influence of experiences in immigrants' nations of origin. By contrast, this study develops and tests a theory of imported socialization in an effort to understand how immigrants' political socialization experiences *before* they left their countries of origin shape the way they view the new polity *after* migration; the extent to which this imported socialization affects their degree of post-migration political engagement; and finally for how long the content of immigrants' political suitcases remains consequential during their civic lives in their new home. Specific questions examined include the extent to which immigrants' political baggage affects the *intensity* and the *directionality* of that post-migration political engagement. My findings suggest that *political suitcases* indeed play a key role on the political acculturation of the newcomers.

A Natalia y Carlos

A Mamá y Papá

A Mario Iván y Luis Eduardo

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: IMMIGRANTS' POLITICAL SUITCASES: A THEORY OF IMPORTED SOCIALIZATION	1
CHAPTER 2: LOST IN TRANSLATION? IMMIGRANTS' POLITICAL ATTITUDES	27
CHAPTER 3: TRAVELING HEARTS AND MINDS: IMMIGRANTS' POLITICAL PREDISPOSITIONS.	54
CHAPTER 4: BRINGING DEMOCRACY ALONG? IMMIGRANTS' POLITICAL PARTICIPATION	90
CHAPTER 5: "EL OTRO LADO" OF IMMIGRANTS' POLITICAL BEHAVIOR	110
REFERENCES.....	134
FIGURES AND TABLES.....	148
APPENDIX A: THE CONSTRUCT OF LIKELIHOOD OF MIGRATION.....	199
APPENDIX B: THE CONSTRUCT OF IMPORTED SOCIALIZATION	202
APPENDIX C: THE EXPERIMENT ON IMPORTED IDEOLOGY	204
APPENDIX D: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS	208
AUTHOR'S BIOGRAPHY	215

CHAPTER 1
IMMIGRANTS' POLITICAL SUITCASES:
A THEORY OF IMPORTED SOCIALIZATION

From 1965 to 2000, international migration flows more than doubled. Estimates show that during this period, roughly 100 million people migrated from their countries of origin to a new home. These migration flows were far from steady over this period of time. Indeed, fifty-five percent of those 100 million left their homelands between 1990 and 2000 (Ueda 2007). At the end of the twentieth century, clearly migration flows were on the rise.

Amazingly, at least one in four of those 100 million individuals chose the United States as their new host country. This influx of immigrants over the past forty years made the United States the leading destination for the second consecutive century in terms of total of immigrants received. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, by 2006, the foreign-born population in the United States had increased to 37.5 million, accounting for 12.5 per cent of the total. In spite of this fact, there are noteworthy gaps in our knowledge about this important population. For instance, the literature on immigrants' political attitudes and behaviors dwells on post-arrival patterns in America. There is much to be learned about whether and how political experiences *before* migration influence these individuals' decision to become political actors *after* they have crossed nations' borders.

The United States is a nation of immigrants, a nation in which the cultural and political contours have been shaped and defined by its policies regarding large-scale waves of immigration. For instance, in 1965, the United States radically redefined immigration policies by abolishing national origin quotas, establishing new criteria for selecting immigrants, and providing for an unlimited number of family reunification

visas. In debate on the floor of Congress, no one admitted to believing that the Immigration and Nationality Act would have a marked effect on the ethnic makeup of America. Just the same, the reality was an unprecedented influx of immigrants from Latin America, the Caribbean, and Asia (Pachon and DeSipio 1994; Gerstle and Mollenkopf 2001; Ueda 2007). As a consequence, the Caucasian proportion of the population has been in steady decline, and, indeed, is on pace to lose its majority status in the next fifty years.

Immigrants represent an increasing group of recruits (DeSipio 1996) for the American polity. In other words, they are “prospective citizens” who will decide either to engage or to ignore the ebb and flow of the political tide in their new home. Their engagement in politics, however, need not wait until they are eventually enfranchised through naturalization. In a nation with norms of robust free speech and free assembly, public demonstration is a tactic open not only to citizens, but to all residents. In the spring of 2006, for instance, congressional debate on immigration reform spawned protests and demonstrations. Participants included many individuals who had not lived long in the United States, let alone obtained citizenship. In addition to joining demonstrations, non-citizens also can volunteer on behalf of political campaigns, attend political meetings, participate in community groups, and so on. In short, political participation is not the exclusive privilege of the citizen.

Not long ago, there was skepticism regarding the relevance of this topic in contemporary American politics. Today, though, following the events of 2006 and beyond, it has become much easier to make the case that immigrants provide a unique opportunity to revisit and further analyze key questions in the social sciences, including

those concerning the foundations of political participation and the origins of political attitudes. Immigrants, after all, are individuals whose world views were learned from and nurtured by experiences in their countries of origin. Whether the imprint brought by these experiences endures following migration is the key empirical question pursued in this study. This work, in fact, is one of the first efforts of what seems to be an emerging academic interdisciplinary movement, one that attempts to untangle culture from other factors in attitude formation (see Luttmer and Singhal 2009) by acknowledging the key role of pre-migratory forces and by incorporating these factors into our conceptualizations and models of behavior.

Regarding attitude formation, for instance, psychological attachments toward political parties in the new host country may develop among some of these individuals shortly after their arrival in America. The *Pew Hispanic Center/Kaiser Family Foundation 2004 National Survey of Latinos: Politics Engagement* (NSL 2004) shows that more than half of first-generation immigrants (54 percent) who have spent three years or less in the United States already claim to hold a partisan attachment with either the Democratic or the Republican parties. If we turn our attention to the *National Bank of Mexico's Division for Economic and Sociopolitical Studies 2003 Mexican Values Survey* (MVS 2003), the same pattern holds. More than half of first-generation immigrants (53 percent) who have spent three years or less in the United States already claim to think of themselves as either Democrats or Republicans.

How might we account for this partisan attachment? One explanation is that political assimilation takes place quite rapidly. The immigrant enters the United States as a political blank slate, and yet is transformed into a partisan affiliate in the short space of

three years. But note that the data change only slightly when one focuses only on immigrants who have been in the United States one year or less. According to the NSL 2004, more than half of these brand new residents (54 percent) already identify as either Republicans or Democrats. The proportion is not that different (44 percent) when analyzing the MVS 2003.

Although it is possible that blank slates experienced a hyper-assimilation process, that transformed political novices into partisan affiliates in only months, one must consider the alternate thesis that the proclivity toward political engagement was at least partly in place before these individuals ever set foot in the United States. Specifically, I ask whether it is plausible that along with their cultural baggage, immigrants travel with political suitcases that shape their attitudes toward the new host political system. Hence, this study should contribute new insight to the broad literatures on topics fundamental to our discipline such as political socialization, political trust, partisanship, ideology and political participation.

Protesters and partisan identifiers illustrate the point that immigrants can and do engage in political action well before they obtain citizenship and the right to vote. This should be sufficient to derive and support two initial considerations. First, one must acknowledge political engagement by immigrants is not a rare occurrence. Second, one should wonder what drives such seemingly fast-paced engagement. In other words, this engagement signals a need for reconsideration of the familiar accounts of immigrants' political attitudes and behaviors.

Why Study Pre-Migration Politicization?

Scholarly efforts to understand the immigrant's journey of acculturation and political incorporation to the United States are by nature multifaceted. Social scientific accounts range from examinations of family memoirs of individuals coming from very different regions in the world (e.g. Dublin 1993) to more systematic monographs regarding particular immigrant groups with shared ethnic backgrounds and shared host communities (e.g. Mondello 1980; Pinderhughes 1987; Morris 1991; Anderson and Blanck 1992). The main goal, though, has been to explain the similarities and dissimilarities in acculturation patterns given the backgrounds of particular individuals or groups.

In approaching acculturation, up until recently, scholarly expectations were driven by the idea that immigrant groups to the United States should assimilate as monolithic blocs. In other words, immigrants from any given country of origin were generally expected to relinquish their cultural backgrounds in order to adjust and perform more and more like mainstream Americans at the same rate (e.g. Park 1930). The scholarly notion of assimilation, though, has evolved considerably. Recent work suggests that assimilation processes take place "at different rates within different ethnic and racial groups, so that within the same ethnic group there is very considerable variation in the extent of assimilation" (Alba and Nee 2003, 38). However, what has yet to be explored is whether the extent to which the pace at which acculturation occurs relates to pre-migration political experiences. It is my contention that attention to pre-migration factors holds the potential to improve our understanding both within and across different immigrant groups.

In political science, pioneering explanations of immigrants' political behavior have heavily focused on *post*-arrival factors such as mobilization efforts (Garcia and de la Garza 1985), immigrants' minority status, levels of economic advancement and foreign policy concerns (Cain, Kiewiet and Uhlaner 1991). More recent work on this post-arrival tradition addresses the role of English language skills, media exposure to politics (Wong 2000), the naturalization process and the relevance of the political atmosphere (Michelson and Pallares 2001), and dual nationality (Jones-Correa 1998; Staton, Jackson and Canache 2007). Although these factors surely do contribute to patterns in political behavior, it is important to note that these forces may be influenced by both the migration and the pre-migration experiences themselves. With regard to the former, immigrants' self-sense of identity in the new land is profoundly influenced by the experience of crossing one or multiple borders (Garcia Bedolla 2005). As to the latter, I contend that immigrants do not enter the United States as political blank slates. Instead, pre-migration political experiences may shape or modify the effects of these post-migration factors. For instance, if an individual emigrated from a country in Latin America where the views on U.S. foreign policy were generally negative, one should not assume that pre-arrival attitudes will vanish once the person arrives in the United States. In fact, McClain et al.'s (2006) findings suggest that Latino immigrants' pre-arrival knowledge of their own countries' racial hierarchies may be coloring to some extent their attitudes once in America.

Another line of research has studied the impact of *pre*-arrival factors such as ethnic or national backgrounds. Under this framework, attention has focused on comparisons *across* national and even regional or pan-ethnic groups (e.g. Wilson 1973;

Black 1987; Pachon and DeSipio 1994; Lien 1994; Wong 2000; Ramakrishnan 2005).

Although national and ethnic backgrounds are of importance for immigrants' political behavior, much remains unknown regarding the nature of these background effects.

Immigrants' backgrounds encompass a broad set of potential explanatory factors that remain unexplored. Most critically, by focusing on general differences across countries of origin, we gloss over what may be important differences *within* those countries.

Some past works have considered, in fact, the possible impact of political experiences in the countries of origin on post-migration political behavior. Noteworthy works in this tradition include Wilson (1973), Black (1982, 1987), Gitelman (1982), Finifter and Finifter (1989), and White et al. (2008). Unfortunately, none of these studies addresses immigrants to the United States. Wilson (1973) and Finifter and Finifter (1989) study immigrants to Australia. Gitelman (1982) evaluates the experience of Americans and Soviets following migration to Israel. Black (1982, 1987) and White et al (2008) scrutinize immigrant groups to Canada. Thus, any lessons learned from these works may be of only indirect relevance to the American case. Moreover, whereas all of these scholarly efforts coincide in that pre-migration experiences matter for post-migration political behavior their conceptual and methodological approaches could be improved substantively, in my view, with two additional steps. The first of these steps would be to walk away from the emphasis on immigrants' political re-socialization process following migration. This is to say that the main focus of analyses should privilege the process of transference or "importation" of political attitudes itself over the process of political acculturation/assimilation that follows. For instance, Gitelman does expect differences in political assimilation patterns between Soviets and Americans following migration to

Israel given these individuals' political backgrounds, namely "socialist authoritarian" and "capitalist democratic" backgrounds, respectively. However, in the words of this author, his main goal is to explain these immigrants' experience in terms of "a process of resocialization, specifically, adult political resocialization" (1982: 14). Furthermore, although the in-depth interviews conducted for this research project provide important insights into these individuals' experiences, they are not well suited to detect systematic differences on post-migration attitudes generated by divergent pre-migration experiences across individuals *within* the same country of origin.

On this latter point, Wilson (1973) did have survey data available. This work even tries to establish what causes differences in patterns of individuals' participation in the country of origin when contrasted with those found among these individuals following migration to the new host country. The analyses, though, are limited to comparisons across immigrant groups, namely, the British and the Italians to Australia. Also, when differences across individuals from the same country of origin are approached, these differences are explained in terms of socioeconomic status and educational effects. In other words, these immigrants' backgrounds are conceptualized and measured from an individual perspective but leaving out a whole set of pre-migration forces such as the political context. The idea that perhaps Italians from the North and Italians from the South (Putnam 1993) have been exposed to opposing political contexts is simply glossed over.

In sum, prior scholarly accounts have mostly focused on post-arrival factors. Among those scant seminal works in which pre-migration experiences are acknowledged as an important factor producing post-migration behaviors, the main analyses are

conducted through comparisons *across* groups such as British vs. non-British (Black 1982); British, South Europeans, East Europeans, and West Indians (Black 1987); or immigrants coming from “industrial democracies” vs. “other countries” (White et al 2008). At least, in the latter account, the idea is to test whether industrial democracies provide other host nations with prospective citizens who are better equipped to adapt politically to the new context. However, under any of these approaches, one is still left to wonder the extent to which the shared pre-migration experiences produced differences across individuals within the same country of origin.

Given some of these prior findings and the speed at which immigrants’ political hearts and minds seem to develop, one has to allow for the possibility of an additional explanation. This is a *critical distinction* between my perspective and past research. As stated earlier, prior work has focused almost exclusively on factors that operate *after* migration. Again, post-migration factors make sense as a starting point. However, there has not yet been widespread recognition of the possibility that experiences before migration might shape political behavior once the person arrives in the United States. For instance, typically the immigrant from Nicaragua is viewed identically regardless of whether this person came of political age under the Somozas, the Sandinistas, or during the post-Sandinista presidencies of Violeta Chamorro or Arnoldo Alemán. My approach, in contrast, calls attention to the possible significance of pre-migration experiences. I contend—and test empirically—that differences in pre-migration political experiences such as those represented by exposure to politics in Nicaragua’s recent eras may influence patterns of political behavior following migration to the United States.

Toward this end, this dissertation seeks to understand how immigrants' political experiences in their countries of origin shape the way they view the new polity; the extent to which immigrants' political baggage affects their degree of political engagement and the direction of that engagement; and finally for how long the content of immigrants' political suitcases remains consequential during their civic lives in America. The present inquiry focuses on Latino immigrants to the United States. A great deal of the analyses is conducted by focusing only on first generation Mexican immigrants, the largest immigrant cohort during the past 40 years. In fact, as of 2000, Mexican immigrants accounted for roughly 30 percent of the foreign-born population of the United States (Bloemraad 2006). However, there is no reason to believe that the findings of this research project are necessarily limited to this immigrant group alone. To the contrary, this research should shed light on processes that may operate on multiple immigrant groups in the United States.

The Intuitive Notion of Imported Socialization

In order to lay out the straightforward logic and intuitive notion behind the core concept of this dissertation, let me begin with an illustration. Let us consider the experiences of a hypothetical immigrant, "Mr. Mitote."¹ Mr. Mitote, a native of Mexico, lived in Mexico in the era of the Institutionalized Revolutionary Party's (PRI) dominance. Thus, in contrast with what he later experienced in the United States, Mitote came of age in a very different context, a less democratic one characterized by single-party dominance. In that context, Mitote did learn about the electoral process even if not about partisan political competition. After all, although non-competitive in nature,

¹ "Mitote" is a slang form of Spanish to denote a "public meeting" or a "public demonstration."

elections under the one-party regime were recurrent and were always referred to as the “heart” of the Mexican political system.

Let us imagine Mr. Mitote migrating from Mexico to the United States, pursuing the American dream. Immigration certainly has the potential to involve a very complex psychological process that can be expected to produce lifelong effects on an individual’s identity. Among these effects, immigration processes may involve identity transformation; at the very least, cultural identity transformation (Akhtar 1999). However, it is less clear at what pace the transformation will occur for different individuals, let alone *across* and *within* different immigrant groups. Thus, whereas it is true that an immigration process is one that demands some loss of cultural identity, the immigration process in and of itself does not necessarily wipe out all of the baggage that an immigrant carries over from the country of origin. Moreover, the content of such baggage may account for great differences across individuals’ attitudes and behaviors once in the new host country.

Given the political context that Mr. Mitote experienced in Mexico during his pre-adult socialization years, one might speculate that he should be less likely to become politically engaged once in the United States than an immigrant who comes from a highly democratic context. However, Mr. Mitote should still be more likely to become politically engaged than an immigrant who experienced a militarized authoritarian regime during his pre-adult socialization years. Figure 1.1 illustrates this point. This figure represents the predicted post-migration political behavior for three hypothetical immigrants to the United States. The first came to the United States from an authoritarian nation. Having had no prior practice in democratic politics, this person is projected to

have a low likelihood of engagement once in the United States. The second person is Mr. Mitote, who came from a nation with a relatively less authoritarian context than the first person. For instance, given its exposure to recurrent elections rather than to military rule, Mr. Mitote is expected to have relatively higher likelihood of engagement in politics than the first hypothetical immigrant after both of them cross borders. Finally, the third person came from a democratic nation. Hence, this third person is the one expected to have the highest likelihood of engagement in politics following migration to the United States.

Why does pre-migration context account for the differences suggested here? It is because past experience possibly has engrained in the immigrant a sense of the value of political engagement, and perhaps even practice in actual political activity. Critically, I contend that these lessons are not forgotten once the person arrives in the United States. One must consider the possibility that the prior context helps in shaping an individual's cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations toward politics, and therefore these orientations should remain with this individual and, perhaps more importantly, should travel if the individual becomes an immigrant to a new country. If an individual decides to migrate to a different country, that person will be packing and bringing along these cognitive, affective, and evaluative political orientations. These orientations then may help the person to make sense of the new political sphere.

To demonstrate that this hypothetical example is neither abstract nor unrealistic, let me offer a real-life illustration. Between September and November of 2005, I conducted a series of in-depth face-to-face interviews with Mexican immigrants in the

Urbana-Champaign area.² Here is a quotation from one of those encounters. This individual commented regarding his partisan ties in the United States: “In Mexico I consider myself to the left of the scale, especially about social issues [...] Here (in the U.S.) I would never be a Republican just like I would never be a Panista³ there (in Mexico)”. According to an accompanying questionnaire, he actually leans towards the Democratic Revolution Party (PRD) and also finds that the Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI) resembles the Democratic party the most. This immigrant also claimed: “Republicans do not represent my interests here, and even though I have doubts about the Democrats (they resemble the PRI), I cannot find another option.”

Figure 1.2 illustrates visually the latter statements from the common immigrant from Champaign-Urbana. On the bottom, one can see the logos of the three main parties in Mexico (the country of origin). The logos are lined up from left to right according to this immigrant’s perception of these parties’ placement along the left-right continuum of social issues. The immigrant’s ideological stance on the same continuum is denoted with a yellow star, right above the PRD logo, which is the party of his preference regarding Mexican politics. Bidirectional red arrows are drawn from both the PRI logo to the Democratic Party logo and from the PAN logo to the Republican Party logo accounting for the analogies offered by the immigrant to make sense of the American political arena.

² This pilot study offered an opportunity to provide some qualitative insights for this dissertation project. All of the interviews were questionnaire-based and had an average length of 38 minutes. Given that, in my view, the ten participants included in this pilot study resemble in several ways those twelve “common men of Eastport” interviewed for Lane’s (1962) *Political Ideology*, I came to refer to them as the ten common immigrants of Urbana-Champaign. All of these immigrants are men. They are 27 years old on average. Their education levels range from elementary school to college studies. They also show considerable differences in terms of how many years they have lived in the United States: from a very few months up to 19 years.

³ “Panista” stands for PAN partisan. PAN stands for National Action Party.

There are three main features to highlight in this immigrant's words, as illustrated by Figure 1.2. First, he is directly translating the ideological stance he assumed in his country of origin to the ideological stance he displays once in the United States. Second, that ideological stance helps him find which American party he identifies with the most. Finally, he uses his attachments and dislikes of Mexican political parties to make sense of the American ones.

These examples support my initial claim that any comprehensive account of post-migration political behavior demands attention to pre-migration experiences. Treating immigrants as identical blank slates washes away an entire array of possible explanatory forces. Again, this research project strives to bring attention to these pre-migration factors. Of course, the claims will be empirically tested later in this dissertation, but before examining these, the conceptual framework of imported socialization is presented in the following section.

A Theory of Imported Socialization

Ever since it entered our discipline during the 1960s, the term “political socialization” has occupied a fundamental role in our discipline, particularly for those scholars interested in understanding the formation of political attitudes, and more generally, interested in political behavior. In spite of its centrality (or perhaps due to it), there is no universally accepted definition of what constitutes a “socialization” process. As a starting point, let me define “political socialization” in the following terms. A political socialization process starts taking place when an individual learns about one's role and the role of authority in a given polity through regular direct or indirect exposure to certain political information, stereotypes, and practices. Political information can be

obtained from family (parents), school teachers, college professors or peers, or from more formal sources such as newspapers, radio and television, but can also be acquired through discussion partners within individuals' social networks. Simple exposure to dramatic events may leave lasting imprints on the political learning process of an individual. Practices relevant to political socialization include, of course, activities such as signing a petition, joining a rally or voting. However, there are other activities, not necessarily political in nature, that nevertheless provide individuals with skills that can become politically consequential, such as becoming an active member of a club, church or organization. Continuous exposure to political information, stereotypes, and practices should lead to familiarity, familiarity to engagement (or lack thereof), and if engagement is the choice, socialization processes should supply individuals with a sense of directionality. Individuals then rely on both that intensity and directionality when confronted with recurring political situations.

Some scholars would argue that “virtually every aspect of adult political behavior can be studied in terms of its pre-adult antecedents” (Greenstein 1965: 128).⁴ Other scholars, of course, offer more moderate views on the effects of pre-adult socialization. Even these more moderate views, however, advance that mere exposure to political events such as presidential elections are conducive to sizeable gains in political learning and attitude formation during the pre-adult socialization years (Sears and Valentino 1997). If “regular” events have the potential to leave lasting imprints during the pre-adult years of socialization, “dramatic” events such as the Watergate scandal have even greater chances to generate an impact on any individual’s political views during this individual’s

⁴ For an alternative approach on pre-adult antecedents, see for instance Alford and Hibbing 2004 and Alford et al 2005.

pre-adult years and beyond (Dennis and Webster 1975; Hawkins et al 1975; Rodgers and Lewis 1975).

The vast literature on political socialization is far from being a monolithic body. It accommodates diverging views on several topics. For one, it offers different points of view concerning which agents during the pre-adult socialization years are the most consequential in attitude formation. Some scholars argue that parents play the key role during the socialization process, leaving to peers merely a reinforcing role (e.g. Tedin 1974, 1980). By contrast, another line of research advances that, under certain circumstances, peers' influence can actually trump that of the parents (e.g. Sebert et al 1974).

Another stream of the socialization literature that encompasses diverging views is the one focusing on "political education." There appears to be consensus regarding the critical role of schools in providing young individuals with political education. For instance, schools are key agents when it comes to the formation of attitudes towards authorities (e.g. Hess and Torney 1967). However, some scholars have contended that schools' emphasis on political education varies as a consequence of the nature of times (Bereday and Stretch 1963). In addition, some scholars question whether the content of political education equips individuals with the proper tools for political participation (Niemi and Junn 1998).

There is also ample debate in the literature regarding whether socialization processes are ever "complete." Suffice it to illustrate with the contrast between scholarly efforts on early childhood socialization vs. adult socialization. The former view argues that children's political views start taking shape well before individuals enter elementary

school and are expected to become major determinants of their adult behavior (e.g. Easton and Hess 1962; Greenstein 1965). The latter view does not deny that socialization starts at an early stage of life. However, under this other framework, individuals continue updating their political orientations throughout their lives given a changing environment (e.g. Verba and Nie 1972; Jennings and Niemi 1974, 1981).

After a brief perusing of the literature, one thing is clear: political socialization is a wide-ranging and multifaceted concept, and consequently one that is somewhat elusive. Although the diverse streams of literature on socialization may disagree on *how* the socialization process matters, there is no disagreement as to *whether* pre-adult socialization years influence individuals' adult political behavior.

Theoretical guidance on this point comes from multiple perspectives. Indeed, it would be difficult to make a strong theoretical case that prior experience should *not* matter. I have not yet encountered a compelling rationale for why everything a person experienced for years should vanish from memory simply because the person has crossed an international border. The central claim of this dissertation is consistent with the guiding tenets of research on socialization. As stated above, in that literature it is posited that learning in one's early years helps to shape the person's values, attitudes and actions, producing effects that may endure throughout life. However, one can also conceive of this central thesis in more psychological terms. For one, early experiences inform the construction of cognitive frameworks. Subsequently, we process new information and make sense of new situations with guidance from the relevant considerations we can bring to mind. One particular mechanism, exemplified with the quotation from one of the "common immigrants from Urbana-Champaign" in-depth interviews (Figure 1.2), is

analogical reasoning. People cope with novel situations in part by drawing parallels to past experiences. Political elites make sense of novel foreign policy situations --such as those presented by international crises but not limited to them-- by drawing on past conflicts as analogies (e.g. Khong 1992; Houghton 1996, 1998; Hemmer 1999). If elites rely upon analogies to make sense of the political world under crises, it certainly seems reasonable that individuals who are facing a critical process such as the immigration process would rely upon analogies, too. All of these various theoretical perspectives point to the conclusion that prior experience matters, and our intuition should do the same. For example, when we move to a new city, one way that we engage the new locale is through comparison with our prior home. We are not blank slates when moving from Urbana or Bloomington to Lincoln, and we should not expect immigrants to be blank slates merely because their moves crossed national borders.

In other words, in the case of immigrants who underwent political socialization processes in their countries of origin, one should expect that along with their cultural baggage they will bring political suitcases (attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors) that shape their behavior once they unpack in their new home. It should be regular expectation of the political scientist and not the exceptional one that immigrants' attitudes about politics back in their countries of origin will be used (consciously or not) to make sense of the new political landscape. If the content of these suitcases provides the individual with a sense of *intensity* and *directionality* establishing analogical links between views of immigrants' old and new political worlds, it can be said that an *imported socialization* is present.

An Expanded View of Political Behavior

Cultural psychologists describe an immigrant's experience as one involving dual realities that constantly interact. After all, immigrants are exposed to cultural practices from both the country of origin and cultural practices from the new host country. Hence, the interaction of the two worldviews is what defines how these immigrants come to understand the context of the new home and the way they adapt to it (Mahalingam 2006). In political terms, this idea can be better understood using Lippmann's (1922) concept of *pseudo-environments*. Several decades ago, Lippmann posited that a vast majority of the public can only experience the political world in an indirect fashion, and that in so doing, their conceptualizations of the political world (their political worldviews) could be described as pseudo-environments. These pseudo-environments do not necessarily match the "reality" of the political world. In fact, these perceptions of the political world could be confidentially held even if they are mismatched to the available facts (Kuklinski et al 2000). In spite of this latter point, pseudo-environments are the mental representation individuals rely upon when processing new political information. Immigrants' political attitudes are nurtured both by the pseudo-environment resulting from their exposure to the political system *before* they left their countries of origin and by the pseudo-environment derived from their civic lives *after* they have settled in the new host country. As stated before, a comprehensive account, which incorporates immigrants' pre-migration pseudo-environments (experiences and perceptions) to understand these individuals' post-migration attitudes and behaviors is still lacking.

Take for instance the pioneering and path-breaking work by Cain, Kiewiet and Uhlaner (1991) referenced earlier in this chapter. These authors used Fiorina's (1981)

model to explain the acquisition of partisanship among first generation Latinos and Asians in California. Fiorina's argument has two key components. In this framework, two factors underlie partisan preferences. One represents a direct comparison of the parties, and thus constitutes a summary of past experiences or views of those parties. The second is a socialization component, *but a component that captures only socialization that took place here in the United States*. Implicit in this framework is the view that accumulating direct experiences eventually will dominate the impact of prior socialization. Thus, these authors posit that when citizens first attain political awareness in the United States, the socialization process might indeed dominate partisan attachments, but as time goes by such attachments should come to reflect more and more the current conditions that surround individuals. The distinction between the socialization component and the updating component (understood as exposure to new political information available to the individual during one's adulthood) of Fiorina's argument seems crucial, especially in the case of first-generation immigrants, because many of them were socialized in a different country.

From this perspective, one can devise a full account of the immigrant's political behavior in the United States without ever contemplating experiences in the nation of origin. In other words, immigrants are political blank slates. And this, of course, differs fundamentally from my perspective. I contend that *we must not assume* that immigrants are political blank slates. We need to incorporate in our accounts a new concept, one I have labeled *imported socialization*. This concept is intended to represent the enduring effects of political experiences for the individual in the country of origin, including, but not limited to, past political experiences regarding political parties and ideological

perspectives in the home country, and, more broadly, encounters with different forms of political regimes.

The Dual Dimensionality of Imported Socialization

One should expect that socialization processes lead, at the very fundamental stage, to the eventual decision of individuals to either engage or not to engage in political matters. In other words, socialization processes are conducive to “engagement” (or lack thereof), but perhaps more consequentially, engagement (both psychological and physical) is a matter of both *intensity* and *direction*. Thus, once the decision regarding “how much engagement” an individual considers appropriate, political socialization processes are also conducive to decisions regarding “which side to take” on the political landscape. In other words, pre-migration experience may influence political attitudes and behavior on two dimensions: intensity and directionality. Hence, in order for this study to offer a comprehensive account, both of these dimensions will be incorporated into the analyses. For example, in considering the possible influence of pre-migration experiences on partisanship, I will assess both the existence of immigrants’ partisan attachments in the United States, and, for those immigrants who do view themselves as affiliates of an American party, the direction of that affiliation.

Overcoming the Obstacles to Approaching Imported Socialization

The claim that immigrants bring political views with them to their new nations holds powerful intuitive appeal. Nonetheless, as I have noted earlier, scholarly attention to this possibility has been scant. In part, the problem has been a simple lack of data. The ideal data to test this thesis would include pre-migration observations of individuals’ political attitudes and actions in their nations of origin, coupled with corresponding post-

migration data once they have settled in their new countries. Simply put, the set of expectations that will be advanced in the following chapters of this dissertation would be ideally tested with panel data. With a three-wave panel, for instance, it would be possible to monitor individuals' political attitudes and political engagement prior to migration, soon after migration, and then some years later once these immigrants have become more fully entrenched as residents of the United States. Acquisition of such data, though, would be an extraordinary undertaking, both for its magnitude and for the many years that respondents would need to be tracked before meaningful and instructive results could be obtained. Absent such ideal data, one must utilize the viable alternatives that are available.

Given the pioneering nature of this study, a variety of pre-migration experiences must be assessed. For instance, it may be that the most consequential experiences trace to the individual's youth. Thus, we would need a measure that can capture pre-adult socialization experiences. Alternately, actual political attachments exhibited in adulthood may be more consequential. Casting the net widely, both forms of prior political experience will be considered here. Indeed, the greatest support for this dissertation's core thesis would be found if strong effects of imported socialization can be identified using starkly different specifications of pre-migration political experience.

The effects of imported socialization are tested utilizing two fundamentally different approaches. Under the first approach, *imported socialization* is operationalized as immigrants' political attitudes and beliefs in the country of origin. Specifically, pre-migration experiences will be operationalized based on survey respondents' self-reports. Under the second approach, imported socialization is operationalized indirectly via data

on the degree of democracy (or lack thereof) that the individual was exposed to during the pre-adult socialization years in the country of origin. This latter approach is based on external indicators regarding the political context in the individual's country of origin. Although more coarse than respondents' self-reports, these external indicators regarding the political context do not suffer the limitations with respect to causal inference that are characteristic of data drawn solely from cross-sectional surveys. Once again, if consistent results emerge from such disparate tests, support for my core thesis should be much more compelling than if only one form of data was available.

Empirical Tests before and after Migration

Another innovative manner in which this study attempts to overcome the lack of ideal data is by offering the empirical analyses in two stages, namely *before* and *after* migration. That is, by taking advantage of both newly available data and original data collection efforts, I offer *before migration* sections in both Chapters Two and Three.⁵ I utilize two different national random samples of Mexicans currently living in Mexico, one of which allows me to account for each respondent's likelihood of migration to the United States. For the *after migration* section, I utilize four different datasets, which allow me to test the link between pre-migration political experiences and post-migration attitudes and behaviors.

The rationale for incorporating the *before* migration analyses is straightforward. An argument can be made regarding the possibility that something about the immigration experience altered respondents' views of Mexican politics while already living in the United States. As a means to address this latter possibility, this study compares the views

⁵ Data availability did not allow me to structure Chapter Four's empirical analyses in the same manner.

of Mexicans now living in the United States with those who still reside in Mexico. The comparisons control for key demographics. Also, the analyses control for individuals' likelihood of migration to the United States. If these individuals' attitudes about Mexico (while still living in Mexico) are found to be connected with those concerning the United States political arena, the results would strongly suggest that views of Mexican politics are indeed causally prior to political engagement in the United States. Moreover, recall that the second approach to *imported socialization* in the *after* migration portions of the analyses will entail modeling survey respondents' pre-migration political experiences with data on the political climate in their nations of origin at the time that they left for the United States. For instance, does it matter for future political behavior if a Nicaraguan migrated during authoritarian rule, socialism or democracy? This approach should render a less precise account of individuals' political views than does the one survey-based method. However, this alternate also offers a strong response to questions of causal order, as it cannot be, to take one example, that a person's post-migration voting behavior in the United States caused the individual to flee the Somoza regime in the mid 1970s. Also, this approach would allow one to test whether democratic regimes equip individuals any better than authoritarian ones to become politically engaged after migration. Political engagement can be measured beyond electoral participation by incorporating other political acts as dependent variables. By the same token, this alternative approach would allow one to test whether democratic regimes produce citizens who are more likely to trust political institutions than their counterparts who are faced with authoritarian rule.

The Roadmap for the Study of Immigrants' Political Suitcases

The thesis outlined here is tested in the following chapters. Specifically, Chapters Two to Four are concerned with better understanding the process of immigrants' imported socialization. The empirical tests developed and reported in each of these chapters address different facets of political behavior. Chapter Two is designed to provide a better understanding of the impact of the imported socialization process on immigrants' political attitudes. Chapter Three aims for the same goal but concerning political predispositions, whereas Chapter Four focuses on political participation. The final chapter, Chapter Five, is divided into three sections. The first of these sections is meant to provide the reader with a brief review of this dissertation's main findings and contributions to the discipline. However, the review of findings, rather than a mere summary, is an effort to suggest a broader framework regarding how the imported socialization process should shed light on (and help us reconsider) key concepts central to the study of individual political behavior. The second section advances my insights regarding what the following steps under this research agenda should be considering this study's findings. I offer my thoughts as to how this study's claims can be further tested and enhanced via subsequent inquiry. Finally, I conclude by discussing a few policy implications derived from the findings offered in the empirical chapters and the potential ways in which these findings may alter how political actors in the United States—and other immigrant nations--think of and approach the immigration and naturalization processes. My hope, of course, is that ultimately these findings will inform policy makers' decisions, which in turn may result in improved institutions that facilitate and encourage the political acculturation of immigrants to this nation and around the globe.

Immigrants are living witnesses to the existence of an imported socialization process, and it is time to inform our understanding of this phenomenon with systematic empirical evidence. In his foreword to *Barrio Ballots* (de la Garza et al 1994), Sidney Verba points out that the recent waves of immigration to the United States are a “major natural experiment,” and yet, I claim, we have not taken full advantage of this social experiment to enhance our understanding regarding fundamental topics of relevance in an increasingly globalized world. The dissertation constitutes one key step in conducting research of the sort Verba envisions.

The challenge of studying the effects of prior political socialization is considerable. My assessment is that development of a full account of how immigrants’ past experiences influence political behavior in the United States will require multiple complementary studies using multiple methodological strategies. Admittedly, the present dissertation is but one among the very many efforts required for the task at hand. However, my intention is that the following pages will join with contributions from other scholars to test more comprehensively the claims advanced here. If the reader finds the content of this dissertation an important first step in establishing clear links between views of immigrants’ old and new political worlds, my main goal when I first started on this research project will have been reached.

CHAPTER 2 LOST IN TRANSLATION? IMMIGRANTS' POLITICAL ATTITUDES

The preceding chapter offers a theoretical rationale for why one should take into account immigrants' political experiences in their countries of origin if one's aim is to develop a complete understanding of these individuals' political attitudes and behaviors once in their adopted homes. By introducing the concept of *imported socialization*, I intend to call scholarly attention to a relevant topic, which has remained largely underexplored mainly due to the combination of the prevalence of theories that center on post-migration experiences and the lack of ideal data to account for pre-migration factors. In the preceding chapter, I took the first steps toward development of a theory of political behavior that incorporates pre-migration factors. It also should be clear from the preceding chapter that overcoming the lack of ideal data in creative ways is in order. In the present chapter, I begin empirical exploration of the possible significance of pre-migration experiences. The initial focus of attention is immigrants' political attitudes. Specifically, I test the extent to which prior political experiences affect one's political attitudes toward the United States government. Also, I assess whether this effect is of enduring or of fleeting nature.

The present chapter is divided into three sections. The first offers my expectations regarding the connection between pre-migration political attitudes, such as trust in one's country of origin, and immigrants' political attitudes toward the U.S. government. The second section offers empirical tests devoted to understanding the effects of trust in Mexican political institutions on political attitudes towards American politics *before* migration. These empirical tests take place in a two-step process. First, I assess the extent

to which individuals' trust in the U.S. government is explained by these individuals' trust in the Mexican government. Next, I conduct a test to assess the extent to which trust in Mexican political institutions in general produces positive attitudes toward key political figures in the American political arena. The third section focuses on the post migration side of the story. First, I test whether immigrants' levels of trust in the American government are indeed driven by in political institutions in a given individual's country of origin. Second, I test whether individuals who are socialized under a more democratic context display higher levels of trust than their counterparts who were socialized under more authoritarian conditions. Following these analyses, I lay out some final considerations concerning the impact of prior political experiences on immigrants' political attitudes towards the U.S. government.

Can Political Attitudes Be Imported? The Expectations

Scholars have long observed that attitudes toward government are politically consequential (e.g. Citrin 1974; Miller 1974; Citrin and Green 1986; Chanley et al 2000; Hetherington and Globetti 2002; Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Rudolph and Evans 2005; Keele 2007; Rudolph 2009). Individuals who display higher levels of trust in government, for example, are more likely to hold more positive orientations toward elected officials (Hetherington 1998), which in turn makes these individuals more likely to become and remain engaged in the ebb and flow of the political system. The existence of relatively positive attitudes toward government translates into better prospects for engaged input from the citizenry to governing elites in a democratic setting. This is not to say that it never can be reasonable for citizens to hold critical views of government. In fact, some scholars would argue that a certain amount of skepticism is required for a

healthy democratic system to be in place. In other words, without skepticism, there is a risk that elites will take advantage of naively trusting citizens and misbehave (For an illustration, see Levi 1998).

In the case of the American context, positive orientations toward government reached a high mark during the 1960s, but with the exception of a short window immediately following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, public views of government have been much more negative ever since (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2001; Hetherington 2005). This trend is present not only among the native-born population of the United States, but also among the first-generation immigrant cohorts (Michelson 2007). The fact that first-generation immigrants display the same pattern of increasingly negative orientations toward the new host political system as their native-born counterparts is interesting for at least two reasons. First, one might wonder whether the United States' political system is failing to provide these "recruits" (De Sipio 1996) with enough/proper institutional means to feel politically embraced by their new host country. Second, and more importantly for the core of my expectations in this study, the general pattern of decreasing trust begs the question whether it is possible that these immigrants' political experiences *before* migration are coloring the way they come to understand and assess the institutions of the new political context *after* they crossed nations' borders.

Take as an illustration the concept of political trust. Michelson (2003, 2007) shows that there are different mechanisms through which Latino immigrants can become distrustful of American government. However, we still need to know what these immigrants' baseline values of trust are as they enter the American polity. In other words, were these individuals already distrustful of political institutions in general when entering

the nation? Also, and not mutually exclusive, were they specifically distrustful of American government given their political experiences in their countries of origin?

Political trust can be defined as “the degree to which people perceive that government is producing outcomes consistent with their expectations” (Hetherington 2005: 9).⁶ Under this conceptualization, political trust encompasses two elements: expectations about government performance and the assessment of government outcomes. Although these two elements certainly can be updated as new events unfold and new information becomes available to individuals later in their lives once in America, both immigrants’ expectations about government performance and the standards by which immigrants assess government’s performance are potentially nurtured by their pre-migration political experiences.⁷

It is my central contention that immigrants do not cross nations’ borders as political blank slates. Instead, pre-migration political experiences may shape or modify the effects of political acculturation processes (Wilson 1973; Black 1987; Finifter and Finifter 1989). If an individual immigrated to the United States from a country in Latin America where the views on U.S. foreign policy were generally negative, one should not

⁶ As pointed out by this author himself, Hetherington’s (2005) definition of political trust is in line with those works of Stokes (1962) and Coleman (1990).

⁷ An argument can be made that Hetherington’s definition of trust is one which stresses the dynamic nature of trust by focusing on two elements that require individual’s information updating. Alternative definitions of political trust, such as Bianco’s (1994), stress out that trust is supposed to be present when constituents hold positive evaluations of their representatives regardless of the connection between actual outcomes and expectations. However, it should be noted that even when trust is conceptualized and characterized with the most dynamic nature, one cannot rule out a priori that the way immigrants form trusting/distrusting judgments of their new political home may be colored by their pre-migration political experiences.

assume that those pre-arrival attitudes will fade away easily just because the person now resides in the United States.⁸

A handful of hypothetical illustrations should help clarifying the logic of my argument and the empirical expectations of this chapter. Let me introduce you to some hypothetical immigrants who currently live in the United States. “Jose” and “Juan” were both born in Mexico, in the town of Los Mochis, in the State of Sinaloa. Jose grew up in the 1960s under the dominance of the Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI). There was certainly political activity in Los Mochis, where he lived all of his life until he decided to migrate “*al otro lado*.”⁹ However, all of the political activity Jose encountered centered on only one party, the PRI. By contrast, Juan grew up during the Mexican transition to democracy. This stage of Mexican political history was marked by the urge for and need of political change. Electoral vibrancy and heightened expectations of political competitiveness were the norm rather than the exception. In fact, Juan actually witnessed the PRI losing some elections at the local and the state levels before he migrated to the United States. Now, let me introduce you to “Nacho.” Nacho was also born and grew up in Los Mochis in the 1960s. However, Jose and Nacho have a significant political dissimilarity. Jose was an active member of the local PRI youth organization before migrating, whereas Nacho never became engaged in party politics at all. The political socialization Jose experienced, although authoritarian in nature, still may have allowed him to believe that he could trust the political system. This is a belief

⁸ While it is plausible that the individual’s political knowledge could have increased and sources of information could have changed, one cannot assume a priori that individual’s pre-arrival attitudes will necessarily fade.

⁹ “Al otro lado” is a very common phrase used among Mexican immigrants to the U.S.: it refers to the fact that they have crossed “to the other side” (literal translation of “al otro lado”) of the border.

that Nacho did not develop. This latter example illustrates the first of this chapter's prediction regarding the impact of imported socialization on an immigrant's political attitudes towards the political institutions in a new nation following migration. Higher levels of trust in the political institutions of their countries of origin increase the likelihood that immigrants to the U.S. will exhibit political trust in the American government.

After considering their backgrounds, one can say that our hypothetical immigrants "Jose" and "Nacho" were socialized under a more authoritarian context than the one under which "Juan" grew up. Immigrants are exposed to and socialized under different political contexts depending upon their age and countries of origin. Countries do not necessarily remain stable over time. Particularly, countries with transitions to democracy and political upheavals may provide their citizens with very different political experiences even within relatively short periods of time. As outlined in the introductory chapter, immigrants from the same country of origin may display differences in attitudes toward politics, differences that largely hinge upon the degree of democracy under which they were first politicized. In turn, exposure to more or less democratic regimes could bring differences in individuals' levels of trust in the country of origin's political institutions, which in turn might have an effect on levels of trust toward American political institutions once immigrants have landed and unpacked in their new home.

In general, one should expect that immigrants coming from more democratic contexts should display lower levels of trust towards American political institutions than their counterparts coming from more authoritarian contexts for at least two reasons. First, consider the novelty element. People coming from less democratic contexts, such as

Nacho, might have hopeful expectations regarding their civic life in the new host country. They might even have chosen the United States as a migration destination precisely on the basis of aspirations of more political freedom. This element should not be present among individuals, like Juan, who already have been exposed to the benefits (and disappointments) of the workings of democracy. Second, there is a skepticism factor to be considered as well. Immigrants who were socialized under more democratic regimes might be relatively more aware of the fact that democratic systems –let alone a transitional regime- have problems of their own, and that even in a well-greased democracy political outcomes are achieved in a rather slow-paced fashion. Thus, arguably, immigrants who come from more democratic contexts should be more likely to be skeptical of American political institutions from the very moment they enter this nation. This contextual effect experienced in their country of origin might in turn affect Juan's and Nacho's individual levels of political trust. If this is indeed the case, all else being equal, Nacho should display higher levels of trust in American political institutions than Juan does. Simply put, immigrants who come from more democratic contexts should be less trustful of American political institutions than their counterparts coming from more authoritarian democratic contexts.

The two different conceptualizations of imported socialization outlined here follow the theoretical framework offered earlier in the introductory chapter. It is important to recall, however, that these two different approaches are not mutually exclusive. Thus, it could be that both regime type and trust in one's country of origin's political institutions matter once the individual migrates to the United States. Moreover, although different in nature, both approaches –individually and combined— attempt to

provide strong support for this dissertation's central contention: immigrants' prior political experiences are consequential for these individuals' attitudes and behaviors once in the United States.

Another glance to our hypothetical immigrants' experiences will reveal additional insights regarding key aspects of the imported socialization process. The following illustration concerns not the process itself but rather for whom this process works. I contend that the impact of pre-migration factors on post-migration political behavior should be strongest for immigrants with relatively lower levels of education or political sophistication. Recall the discussion in the introductory chapter regarding the psychology of socialization, where I interpreted socialization in terms of cognitive efficiency.

According to this framework, it should follow that trying to make sense of politics in a second, or post-migration, national context should be made easier and more efficient by drawing on lessons from prior political experiences. In other words, the impact of pre-migration experiences should be greatest for those individuals who are most in need of assistance in making sense of politics in their new nation. Whereas immigrants who are highly educated and/or highly sophisticated should be able to decide whether or not to trust the U.S. political institutions on their own terms and rights, immigrants with lower levels of education are expected to be more prone to engage in analogical reasoning, thus directly translating their levels of trust from one context to the other.

Finally, if one acknowledges that political trust is an attitude which can experience change over time, one should not expect—at least not a priori—that the initial levels of trust displayed by immigrants as they enter the United States will remain intact as these individuals' civic lives unfold in their new host nation. Take for instance the case

of our hypothetical immigrants. Nacho should be the most hopeful of the three of these hypothetical immigrants in terms of novelty of the U.S. political system. In other words, Nacho is the most hopeful granted two conditions. First, he was disengaged from politics in Mexico precisely due to his disappointment in the way politics were conducted there, in his country of origin. Second, now that he has crossed the border to the United States, Nacho's expectations on the American political system are high because in his mind, U.S. politics are very novel to him; they seem to be conducted in the most different way when contrasted with Mexico's politics and therefore his expectations in his new host country are driving a sense of hope regarding both the new political setting and the way his own engagement in politics might be worthy. If as time goes by, and contrary to his expectations, Nacho finds himself exposed to a political setting with imperfections that trigger memories of why he was disengaged from politics in Mexico in the first place, one should expect him to start displaying lower levels of trust with the passage of time.

In contrast with Nacho, Juan might be the most skeptical at the beginning of his civic life in America, for at least two reasons. On the one hand, although Juan experienced electoral vibrancy and shifts in power during the Mexican transition to democracy, this exposure could have led him to believe that corruption was a problem that not only pertained to the former single-ruling-party, the PRI, but also to politics in general. On the other hand, Juan might have come to believe that Mexican democracy reached a stage that not even the U.S. democratic system has to offer him. For instance, a multi-party system might look more attractive than a two-party system after so many years of PRI rule. Under the first scenario, Juan's expectations regarding the U.S. system should not be as high and therefore disappointment is less likely to occur. Under the

second alternative, Juan might come to realize that the two-party system works just fine. Note however that, taking into consideration their prior political experiences, under either of these two routes, Juan should be expected to have relatively higher levels of trust than Nacho as years go by. In sum, the effects of political experiences in one's country of origin on political trust in the United States are likely to attenuate over time.

If we ask "can political attitudes be imported?" our intuitive answer should be yes. I would certainly expect that all of our hypothetical immigrants, Jose, Juan, and Nacho, consciously or not, packed their suitcase of political trust and brought it along when they crossed the border and entered the United States. Hence, by accounting for variance in pre-migration attitudes and experiences, I contend that we will be able to develop more comprehensive accounts of immigrants' political attitudes and actions in the United States.

The empirical analyses offered below are divided into two main sections: *before* and *after* migration. For the *before migration* section of this chapter's analyses, I utilize two different national random samples of Mexicans currently living in Mexico, one of which allows me to account for each respondent's likelihood of migration to the United States. For the *after migration* section, I utilize the *MVS 2003*. I begin with pre-migration data, with tests regarding both trust in the U.S. government and opinion about President Bush.

Attitudes towards the U.S. Government *before* Migration

According to the National Bank of Mexico's (Banamex) Division for Economic and Sociopolitical Studies 2003 Mexican Values Survey (*MVS 2003*), the Mexican public mostly revealed having "no trust at all" in the U.S. Government (42.7 percent of

respondents) or trusting it “not very much” (35.1 percent); roughly two out of ten respondents expressed trusting the U.S. government “somewhat” (18.2 percent), and only a handful (4.0 percent) revealed trusting it “a great deal.” In Table 2.1, we see that these data seem to suggest a connection between attitudes towards the Mexican Government and attitudes towards the U.S. government. The first empirical task of this chapter is to pursue this matter in further depth.

Trust in the U.S. Government before Migration

As I have argued, there is reason to believe that individuals who display higher levels of trust in their own country’s political institutions will display higher levels of trust elsewhere. In fact, my core thesis posits that by holding positive political attitudes in one nation the person will become relatively likely to form positive orientations in other contexts following migration. In short, one should expect individuals who hold higher levels of trust in any country to be more likely than their counterparts who hold lower levels of trust to develop relatively higher levels of trust in American political institutions.

The *MVS 2003* sample of Mexicans living in Mexico contains one item asking respondents about their levels of trust in the U.S. government. This item permits me to test whether those individuals who hold any sort of trust in the Mexican government are more likely to exhibit higher levels of trust in the U.S. government even before migration. Specifically, respondents were asked “how much trust” they have in a number of institutions, including the U.S. government. The dependent variable is constructed as follows. Responses are recoded, with a value of 0 indicating that the respondent expressed “no trust at all” in the U.S. government (42.7 percent of respondents), 1

indicating that the respondent trusts the U.S. government “not very much” (35.1 percent), 2, that the respondent trusts it “somewhat” (18.2 percent), and 3 that the respondent has “a great deal” of trust (4.0 percent).

The chief independent variable in this model is an index of trust in the three different levels of government in Mexico. Table 2.2 displays the descriptive statistics for the three items included on the survey regarding trust in the three levels of government in Mexico. The striking similarity suggests that respondents perhaps did not differentiate greatly across levels of government. A factor analysis was then run to assess whether all of the items could be used to build an index of trust in the Mexican government. The items loaded on a single factor, with a minimum factor loading of 0.86; the items combine to form a reliable scale with an alpha of 0.92. A simple additive index was constructed, adopting a minimum value of zero and a maximum of nine, where zero indicates the lowest level of trust and nine stands for the highest level of trust. The expectation here is that respondents who are more trusting in the Mexican government will be relatively more likely to display higher levels of trust in the United States government. Additional variables included in the model are attentiveness to the news, interpersonal trust, efficacy, age, education, income, and frequency of attendance at religious services. An interaction between attentiveness to the news and the index of trust in Mexican levels of government is also included in the model. This interaction is included in recognition of the possibility that exposure to information will influence the respondent’s propensity to link views concerning different national governments. With more information, people should be less likely to connect views of the Mexican and U.S. political systems.

Interpersonal trust is measured with an indicator variable to account for whether each respondent believed “most people” can be trusted, coded 1 (9.9 percent) for yes and 0 if otherwise.¹⁰ This is an important control variable, because it helps me to account for the possibility that people vary in their general tendencies to be trusting. Inclusion of this control therefore minimizes the risk that any association detected between trust in the Mexican and U.S. governments is spurious, tracing to a general inclination rather than a specific linkage between the two political trust judgments.¹¹ Efficacy is measured with an item in which respondents were asked to assess whether citizens can have an influence on government by engaging in different political activities. The item is a four-category response one, where 1 indicates the lowest level and 4 indicates the highest level. Attentiveness to the news is measured with an additive index, which ranges from 0 to 12, built with data from four different four-category response items concerning TV, radio, newspapers, and talk with others. Income reflects estimates of respondents’ household income in thousands of pesos per month. The mid point of the range of every category was the value assigned for every respondent. The resulting variable contains some measurement error, but I have no reason to believe it to be systematic. And the variable is now in a metric with interval and ratio properties. In the case of education, the variable values reflect the number of completed school years by every respondent. Upper cap values were assigned when any given level was indicated as complete. However, if

¹⁰ The original item’s answers in the survey are “yes” or “no.”

¹¹ The control variable is helpful in this regard, but it should be clear that even with the control for interpersonal trust, caution will be needed in interpreting the coefficient on the Mexican trust variable. First, given the skewed distribution on the control, coupled with the fact that it is a dichotomous measure, it clearly does not provide an ideal representation of the general tendency to be trusting. Second, and less problematically, I cannot rule out the possibility of reverse causality. It is possible—but certainly not likely—that respondents in Mexico draw on their attitudes about the U.S. government when forming appraisals of the Mexican political system, thereby reversing the causal arrow.

respondents indicated truncated studies at the elementary level, they were assigned with the mid point value between no studies and completed elementary. The same coding rule was applied to all subsequent levels. Religious attendance was also recoded following the logic of the income and education categorical variables and produced a measure that provides an estimate number of days per year the respondent attended religious services. For instance, if respondents indicated attending once a week they were assigned a value of 52. Table 1 in Appendix D displays the descriptive statistics for all of the variables included in the model.

As shown in Table 2.3, the results of the ordered logit regression analysis indicate that trust in the U.S. government is indeed driven, as expected, by individuals' levels of trust in the Mexican government. In other words, the coefficient for Trust in the Mexican Government is positive, and statistically significant. This result holds after controlling for levels of interpersonal trust and efficacy. Figure 2.1 illustrates the impact of trust in the Mexican government on trust in the U.S. government in yet a clearer manner. Among those individuals with the lowest levels of trust in the Mexican government, the predicted probability of holding any level of trust in the U.S. government is just above 40 percent. This figure more than doubles, reaching 90 percent among those individuals with the highest levels of trust in the Mexican government. In short, holding the highest level of trust in the Mexican government makes individuals over twice as likely as their counterparts with the lowest level of trust in the Mexican government to display any kind of trust in the U.S. government before migration.

Opinion on President Bush before Migration

Thus far, I have focused my attention and analyses on political trust. However, the rationale of my theoretical framework applies equally well to a broader set of political attitudes. Let us turn our attention to another political attitude concerning American politics: an individual's opinion regarding the president of the United States. According to a national survey of the Mexican public's political attitudes conducted by *Reforma* newspaper's Department of Survey Research during November of 2007 (*Reforma 2007*), roughly six out of every ten respondents expressed an unfavorable opinion about President George Bush (59.9 percent), one of out ten expressed a neutral opinion (11.0 percent), and the rest expressed a favorable opinion (29.1 percent).¹² My second empirical task in this chapter is to test the extent to which this opinion is influenced by levels of trust in Mexican political institutions.

The dependent variable for this portion of my analyses is built using this item. Responses were originally coded in a scale that ranges from 0 to 10, where a value of 0 was used to indicate the most unfavorable opinion and a value of 10 indicates the most favorable opinion. The descriptive statistics for this dependent variable are offered in Table 2 in Appendix D.

The main independent variable in this model is an index of trust in different political institutions in Mexico, namely: the Supreme Court, the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies, the Federal Institute of Elections, and political parties in general. The five original survey items each included four response options. These were recoded, assigning

¹² Responses to this item were originally coded in a scale that ranges from 0 to 10, where a value of 0 was used to indicate the most unfavorable opinion and a value of 10 indicates the most favorable opinion. For the sake of simplicity, in the above summary, I am taking 0-4 to mean unfavorable, 5 to be neutral, and 6-10 to mean favorable.

a value of 0 to indicate the lowest level of trust and a value of 3 for the highest level. Table 2.4 displays the descriptive statistics for these five items. I ran a factor analysis to assess whether these five items could be used to build an index of trust in Mexican political institutions. The items loaded on a single factor, with a minimum factor loading of 0.54; the items combine to form a reliable scale with an alpha of 0.83. A simple additive index was constructed, adopting a minimum value of zero and a maximum of fifteen, where zero indicates the lowest level of trust and fifteen stands for the highest level of trust. The expectation again is that respondents who are more trusting in Mexican political institutions will be relatively more likely to display more positive attitudes toward United States politics, in this case specifically toward President George Bush. The model also includes a measure of likelihood of migration, in order to account for the possibility that individuals who are more likely to migrate to the United States may be inclined to be more trusting of the U.S. presidency. Additional variables included in the model are attentiveness to the news, age, education, income, and frequency of attendance at religious services. In this case, of course, a control for presidential approval in Mexico is deemed important. Also, an interaction term between attentiveness to the news and the index of trust in Mexican political institutions is included in the model. A measure of interpersonal trust was not available in this dataset.

Originally, likelihood of migration¹³ is a self-assessed four-category response item that ranges from “not at all likely” to “very likely.” This item was recoded to be incorporated in the model as three different indicator variables: “very likely,” “somewhat likely,” and “not very likely.” The reference category is “not at all likely.” Attentiveness to the news is measured with an additive index, which ranges from 0 to 15, built upon

¹³ For a detailed account of the validity of this measure, please see Appendix A.

five different four-category response items concerning TV, radio, newspapers, talk with others, and the internet. Income again reflects estimates of respondents' household income in thousand of pesos per month. The mid point of the range of every category was the value assigned for every respondent. In the case of education, the variable values reflect the maximum number of completed school years by every respondent. Religious attendance was recoded producing a measure that provides an estimate of the number of days per year the respondent attended religious services. Table 2 in Appendix D displays the descriptive statistics for all of the variables included in this model.

As shown in Table 2.5, the results of the OLS regression analysis indicate that trust in Mexican political institutions influences individuals' opinion about President George Bush. The coefficient for the Index of Trust in Mexican Political Institutions is positive, and statistically significant. Moreover, this result holds after controlling for approval of the Mexican president and for likelihood of migration. Figure 2.2 illustrates the impact of trust in Mexican political institutions on individuals' opinion concerning the president of the United States. Among those individuals with the lowest levels of trust in Mexican political institutions, the expected score for President Bush on the eleven-point favorability scale is 2.63. By contrast, the expected opinion on President Bush among those individuals with the highest levels of trust in Mexican political institutions reaches a mark of 5.87. In short, there is an effect of more than three full points.

Up to this point, I have provided empirical evidence in support of my contention that even before migration individuals' political attitudes toward their country of origin's political institutions influence their orientations toward the U.S. political stage and actors. First, I showed how trust in the Mexican government indeed helps account for levels of

trust in the U.S. government. Next, I showed how trust in Mexican political institutions affects individuals' opinion about the president of the United States. In the following section, I offer the empirical tests regarding the after migration side of my core story.

Attitudes towards the U.S. Government *after* Migration

The analyses in this section rely upon the National Bank of Mexico's (Banamex) Division for Economic and Sociopolitical Studies 2003 Mexican Values Survey (*MVS 2003*). The next subsection will focus only on Mexican immigrants. The following one will shift attention to Latino immigrants in general, as data availability permits me to do so. The analyses offered in both of portions of the analysis approaches the imported socialization phenomenon by studying the same key dependent variable, namely political trust in the U.S. government.

Political trust in both subsections is operationalized as an index of immigrants' levels of trust in the three different levels of government in the United States. However, the effects of imported socialization are tested utilizing two different approaches. Under the first approach, imported socialization is operationalized as immigrants' levels of trust in the country of origin's government. As noted before, data availability restricts my analyses to only the Mexican immigrants' subsample. Under the second approach, imported socialization is operationalized as the degree of democracy (or lack thereof) that the individual encountered during the early years of childhood and those of young adulthood in the country of origin. In this case, given data availability, the analyses are conducted considering the full sample of Latino immigrants.

Political Trust: Echoes from Abroad

The *MVS 2003* includes three items regarding trust in government in the United States (at the federal, state and local levels) as well as a measure of trust in the Mexican government.¹⁴ Table 2.6 displays the descriptive statistics for the three items regarding trust in the United States. Just as in the case of Mexicans still living in Mexico, the Mexican immigrants in the sample apparently did not differentiate greatly across levels of government as suggested by the striking similarities of the distributions of these variables.¹⁵ A factor analysis was then run to assess whether all of the items could be used to build an index for trust in American government. The items loaded on a single factor, with a minimum factor loading of 0.81; the items combine to form a reliable scale with an alpha of 0.90. A simple additive index was constructed, adopting a minimum value of zero and a maximum of nine¹⁶, where zero indicates the lowest level of trust and nine stands for the highest level of trust. This additive index of “Trust in U.S. Government” is the dependent variable used in the following empirical tests.

¹⁴ First-generation immigrants were administered the survey questionnaire in their language of preference, namely, either Spanish or English. Roughly seven out of ten preferred to be interviewed in Spanish (69.8 percent). In Spanish, the question wording utilizes the term “confianza,” which properly translated into English should be “trust.” However, the English version of the questionnaire incorporated the term “confidence.” In an effort to determine whether this question wording may have altered the results, I compared the distribution of the dependent variable across groups. The distributions are substantively similar. In addition, I re-ran the analyses incorporating an indicator variable to account for the preferred language for the interview, with a value of 1 to indicate if the interview was conducted in English and a value of 0 if it was conducted in Spanish. Although, the sign of the coefficient was negative, which is in line with other research suggesting that acculturation (measured here with English language skills) generally leads to more distrusting attitudes toward the U.S. government, the coefficient for this indicator variable did not attain statistical significance.

¹⁵ In a related paper, Tom Rudolph and I explore these three items as different dependent variables and also explore a different manner to account for acculturation and the interaction between imported socialization and acculturation processes. Please, see Wals and Rudolph (2008).

¹⁶ Responses to the three original items were arbitrarily coded 1 “none at all” through 4 “a great deal.” They were rescaled to range from 0 to 3 and then summed, giving a final range from 0 to 9.

Trust in the Mexican government, the key predictor, is measured with responses from a four-category item. This item was recoded to obtain a set of indicator variables: “A Great Deal”, “Somewhat”, and “Not Very Much” – using “None at All” as the reference category.

Considering the possibility that the impact of pre-migration political experiences attenuates over time, the initial models, reported in Table 2.7, include a count of years spent in the United States. In a second round of tests, depicted in Table 2.8, the count of years spent in the United States is included along with interactions between this variable and the set of indicator variables of trust in the Mexican government. Regarding the possibility that the impact of pre-migration political experiences is strongest among the least educated, the model in Table 2.7 includes interaction terms between education and the set of indicator variables accounting for different levels of trust in the Mexican government. Additional variables included in the models are age upon arrival, interpersonal trust, efficacy, income, education, and frequency of attendance at religious services.

Here again, interpersonal trust is measured with an indicator variable to account for whether each respondent believed “most people” can be trusted, coded 1 for yes and 0 if otherwise. Efficacy is measured with a four-category response item, where 1 indicates the lowest level and 4 indicates the highest level. Income reflects estimates of respondents’ household income in thousand of dollars per year. The mid point of the range of every category was the value assigned for every respondent. In the case of education, the variable values reflect the number of completed school years by every respondent. Upper cap values were assigned when any given level was indicated as

complete. Religious attendance¹⁷ was also recoded to obtain an estimate number of days attended per year for every respondent. In order to account for language skills two indicator variables were operationalized, bilingual and English dominant at home, where the reference category is Spanish dominant at home. These indicators are included in the analyses as proxies for immigrants' acculturation in the new communities. Table 3 in Appendix D displays the corresponding descriptive statistics for all of the variables included in the models.

As I have contended elsewhere, immigrants who express trust in the government of their country of origin will be more likely to express trust in their new nation following migration. Also, I have argued that this effect should be strongest among immigrants with relatively lower levels of education or sophistication. Finally, I have posited that the effect of trust in one's country of origin's government is likely to attenuate over time. Tables 2.7 and 2.8 present results of three OLS regression models designed to test these predictions. The first two models, included in Table 2.7, offer the central test. The third one, included in Table 2.8, is an attempt to account for the possibility of attenuation of effects over time, acknowledging the limitations of the cross-sectional nature of the data at hand. Results demonstrate that political experiences travel with immigrants. In other words, immigrants do import their political attitudes. The inclusion of an "Interpersonal Trust" control variable in the model boosts confidence regarding this claim. A logical counterargument to my interpretation of the core finding is that more trusting people in any given setting will be more trusting elsewhere once they have crossed nations'

¹⁷ This variable was recoded in two different ways. The first procedure is denoted in the body of the text. The second one was a binary option, where regular attendants are differentiated from non-regulars. Regular attendants are here defined as those who attend religious services one or more times per week. Regardless of the two different recoding schemes, this control variable rendered substantively similar and statistically identical results.

borders¹⁸. However plausible this explanation may be, the persistence of my finding after controlling for interpersonal trust suggests that individuals who came to trust political institutions in their countries of origin are indeed more likely to become trusting of political institutions in the United States (or another host country) regardless of any variance in their more general tendencies to be trusting.

Recall that the dependent variable has values ranging from 0 to 9. Trust in the Mexican government, the key independent variable, is coded as a set of indicator variables for distinct (ordered) responses, namely: “A Great Deal”, “Somewhat”, and “Not Very Much”, with “None at All” as the reference category. Thus, as can be seen in Figure 2.3, as trust in the Mexican government rises from its lowest to its highest category, the predicted trust in government in the United States increases by more than one full point on the nine-point scale. Contrary to my expectations, though, the model in Table 2.8 reveals no evidence whatsoever that this effect diminishes over time. This is easily confirmed when contrasting the predicted levels of trust in the U.S. government for immigrants who have spent one year in the United States with the predicted levels of those immigrants who have spent already 17 years in their new home, as also depicted in Figure 2.3. Also, contrary to my expectations, the results in Table 2.7 provide no evidence that the effects of imported political trust are any stronger for immigrants with

¹⁸ Consistent with my thesis, some research on social capital (Putnam 1995; 2000) suggests a possible transference of trust across contexts. My argument is that this transference occurs because the effects of prior socialization experiences endure following migration. An alternate possibility is that trust is partly rooted in forces apart from socialization, such as personality (e.g., Mondak and Halperin 2008). Controlling for interpersonal trust addresses any general tendency of some individuals to be more trusting than others. Importantly, note that even if trust is influenced by factors such as personality, the implication would be the same regarding my general thesis that immigrants do not come to the United States as political blank slates.

relatively low levels of education when contrasted with their counterparts who hold higher levels of education.

Political Trust: Democratic vs. Authoritarian Socialization

The key independent variable in the models included in this section's analyses is the construct of "imported socialization." The challenge is then apparent: if we are to find any relationship between immigrants' political attitudes toward the U.S. government and the political context under which these individuals were politicized, how are we to capture the country of origin's political context? Here, I define immigrants' *imported socialization* via context in terms of gradations of democracy (Elkins 2000). In order to measure such gradations, the analysis draws upon the *Polity IV* dataset scores.

The measure of "imported socialization" was constructed by calculating, for every respondent, an average of the *Polity* scores for their country of origin, factoring in their age upon arrival and the year of arrival in the United States. In order to reflect only the earlier socialization process, the measure only takes into consideration *Polity* scores for up to the first 18 years of the respondent's life. It should be clear that with this construction, the measure is intended to capture the effects of pre-adult socialization. However, given data availability constraints for the study of pre-migratory political experiences' effects on post-migration attitudes and behavior, this construct offers an important opportunity to shed light on a yet much unexplored area of our discipline.

An alternative to measure pre-migratory context could have been the use of a hierarchical linear model analysis with focus on a fixed indicator of context, but the individualized measure, I argue, is a better approach for at least two reasons. On the one hand, the *n* of some countries of origin is very small and one cannot simply assume that

individuals from those nations are necessarily representative of the immigrant groups coming from those countries of origin; on the other hand, the imported socialization construct tries to capture the lasting imprint that the context surrounding these immigrants during their early socialization experiences left on them. This individual imprint should be best captured by individualized scores rather than country-level ones because respondents differ in both year of birth and year of migration. Table 1 in Appendix B displays how much variance the *imported socialization* construct encompasses among immigrants from the same country of origin for each of the 19 countries of origin available in the MVS 2003 survey. Although this variable has a conceptual minimum value of zero and a maximum of 20, the actual observed values, range only from 1 to 20.

In order to keep the results of these models, shown in Table 2.9, comparable to the models offered earlier in the preceding subsection of this chapter, additional variables include a count of years spent in the United States, interpersonal trust, efficacy, age upon arrival, income, education, and frequency of attendance at religious services. An interaction term between the imported socialization measure and the count of years spent in the United States is included to test for the possibility of attenuation effects over time. Finally, the two indicator variables bilingual and English dominant at home, where the reference category is Spanish dominant at home, were included to account for language skills and as a proxy for immigrants' degree of acculturation.

The results of the OLS regression analysis displayed in Table 2.9 provide support for my original expectations. The negative sign on the coefficient for imported socialization indicates that individuals who are politicized under more democratic

contexts are indeed more likely to display relatively lower levels of trust in the U.S. government than their counterparts who are politicized under more authoritarian conditions. However, the coefficient of imported socialization does not attain statistical significance in the model without interactions. When the possibility of attenuation of effects over time is considered, the coefficient still possesses a negative sign, as expected, and it reaches statistical significance. Moreover, the interaction term between the count of years spent in the United States and the construct of imported socialization has a positive sign and it attains statistical significance as well. In other words, both the expectation regarding the impact of imported socialization on trust in the U.S. government and the expectation concerning attenuation of effects receive corroboration.

Figure 2.4 illustrates the latter points even further. Let us focus on immigrants who have arrived recently in America, first. Among those individuals who were exposed to the most democratic conditions during their early socialization years, the expected level of trust in the U.S. government is 3.81. Recall that the scale ranges from 0 to 9. By contrast, the expected level of trust in the U.S. government among those individuals who were politicized under the most authoritarian conditions is 5.49. This is to say that there is a difference of almost two full points on a ten-point scale between individuals whose prior political experience was starkly different. Once again, the clear lesson is that immigrants do travel with political suitcases. Next, consider the expected levels of trust in the U.S. government among those immigrants who have spent an average of 17 years in their new host country. Although the pattern remains the same, the gap between expected levels of trust for immigrants who were politicized under the most democratic conditions versus those who were politicized under the most authoritarian conditions

narrows to only .40 of a point: the expected levels of trust is 5.06 and 5.46, respectively. Although this result is in line with my expectation regarding potential attenuation effects over time, it is admittedly a result which contradicts one of the processes through which the attenuation was expected to occur: the novelty effect. Whereas it is true that among “new arrival” immigrants one can say that the most hopeful are the ones with authoritarian backgrounds, one also need to acknowledge that precisely among these individuals with authoritarian backgrounds their levels of trust in the U.S. government look remarkably similar regardless of how many years they have spent in the United States.

Conclusions

The main thesis posited in this work is that immigrants’ political experiences concerning their countries of origin will influence post-migration political attitudes, predispositions and behaviors once these individuals cross nations’ borders. This thesis encompasses multiple facets of political life. The first one of those facets has been examined in this chapter, namely political attitudes. I examined whether levels of trust in the country of origin’s government influences an individual’s broader views of the political sphere, including trust in the U.S. government. Also, I tested whether prior political experiences, defined in contextual terms, have an impact on levels of trust in the U.S. government.

In this chapter, I showed that trust in one’s country of origin’s government increases the prospects of becoming more trusting of the American government following migration. Acknowledging the limitations of the cross-sectional nature of the data, the analyses presented hints to the possibility that the “imported trust” effect might not wane

with the passage of time. Results also provided support for this chapter's contention that trust in the U.S. government is at least partially explained by the level of democracy encountered during the socialization process in one's country of origin. Immigrants who were socialized under highly democratic regimes exhibit less trust in government once they arrive in the United States. Bearing in mind these initial findings regarding political attitudes, let me focus now on another matter: whether an immigrant's political predispositions in the country of origin influence the prospects that the individual will be politically engaged once in the United States.

CHAPTER 3 TRAVELING HEARTS AND MINDS: IMMIGRANTS' POLITICAL PREDISPOSITIONS

Partisanship and ideology long have stood as cornerstones of American politics. Scores of scholars have devoted decades of effort to understanding the antecedents and consequences of ideological preferences and partisan attachments. Although the significance of these phenomena is well established, our understanding of the origins of both ideology and partisanship potentially could be improved. My interest, of course, is in the development of ideological preference and partisan attachments among immigrants to the United States. In the previous chapter, we saw that immigrants' levels of political trust in the United States are influenced by trust in their nations of origin. In short, trust is at least in part imported. Building on this same logic, the present chapter considers whether ideology and partisanship in one's nation of origin influence an immigrant's political views and level of political engagement once the person comes to the United States.

The rationale motivating the analyses reported in this chapter will be outlined here with focus on partisanship, but it should be clear that a very similar perspective also applies to ideology. Under the same logic by which an immigrant relies upon imported trust, and as outlined in the introductory chapter, I hypothesize that the immigrant also might utilize (consciously or not) *imported partisan attachments*. In fact, it is hard to imagine the opposite situation, where all of what an individual learned regarding political parties in the country of origin suffers a sudden black out by the mere act of migrating to a new nation. Here, I argue that the immigrant might draw on partisan attachments in the nation of origin in both a general (*intensity*) and a specific (*directionality*) manner.

Concerning *intensity*, the immigrant who held a partisan attachment in the country of origin, regardless of the party's ideological placement on the political continuum, should hold the role of parties in a nation's political life in relatively high regard. Therefore, the presence of a partisan attachment in the country of origin should make this immigrant more likely to develop a sense of attachment with one of the parties in the new setting. In short, in general terms, the person who is a partisan in one country is expected to once again become a partisan following migration; conversely, the individual who refrained from developing a partisan affiliation in the nation of origin should be relatively unlikely to become a partisan following migration.

Regarding *directionality*, by developing partisan affiliations, people place themselves on a political continuum. A partisan attachment both summarizes and organizes the individual's political views. In the extreme case, I believe it would be illogical to suppose that a person who supported a leftist party before migration would be equally likely to side with a party on the left, right or center once in a new nation. But if we view immigrants as political blank slates, then we must acknowledge no continuity in their political views as they move from one nation to another. My thesis stands at odds with the depiction of immigrants as blank slates. In terms of directionality, I predict that the partisan in one nation will gravitate toward a party espousing similar views following migration.

The present chapter is divided into five sections. The first offers a brief recount of the theoretical rationale for why one should pay attention to pre-migration political predispositions in order to understand more fully immigrants' partisan preferences once in the United States. The second and third sections offer empirical tests devoted to

understanding the effects of Mexican partisan attachments and ideological predispositions on preferences regarding American parties *before* migration. More precisely, it is tested whether a partisan attachment helps explain an individual's potential to become politically engaged with the American parties. These empirical tests occur in two steps. The second section focuses on intensity, whereas the third section takes up the issues of directionality. The fourth and fifth sections explore the extent to which partisan attachments and ideological predispositions among Mexicans *after* migration to the United States predict patterns in electoral participation in American elections. The analyses again differentiate between intensity and directionality, with intensity the subject of the fourth section, and directionality the subject of the fifth. Following these analyses, I offer some brief conclusions regarding the impact of prior political experiences on immigrants' prospects for engagement in American partisan life.

Imported Political Predispositions: The Expectations

Historically, scholars have construed partisanship either as an affective attachment or as a rational calculation of party performance. From the former perspective, citizens' partisan identifications come to life through a socialization process. These social identities remain remarkably stable over time (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 1960; Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002).¹⁹ From the latter perspective, citizens react to short-term party performances and choose to identify with the party that better represents their interests. In

¹⁹ Admittedly, the inclusion of Green et al (2002) in the "socio-psychological" school is open to debate. I decided to include them for two main reasons: the authors' claim of partisan identification as a social identity and the further implication of stability over time that the social identity theory embraces. That said, *Partisan Hearts and Minds* is the most integrationist of all the scholarly efforts. Thus, not surprisingly, it is the one that departs the most from the other two socio-psychological schools and the one that shares a set of common assumptions with the rationalist approach.

this case, partisan attachments change as performance and “party differentials” vary (Downs 1957; Fiorina 1981).

The two “classic” approaches to the study of partisan identification, which apply largely to native U. S. citizens, offer only limited insight into the attitudes and predispositions of immigrants. That said, we should not assume that a single process account for the development of partisan attachments among all immigrants. Those who come to the United States at a very early age may simply inherit their parents’ American partisan attachments. Immigrants who arrive in the country as adults cannot experience such a process. Among these adult immigrants one possibility is that they import the sense of (non-) partisanship that they already held in their countries of origin to the new polity.²⁰ After all, partisanship is a rather enduring and consistent attachment across time (Berelson et al 1954; Campbell et al 1960; Sears and Funk 1999), and partisanship can be an important predictor of political behavior in emerging democracies such as Mexico (Moreno 2003), just as it is in the United States. Therefore, one should expect that immigrants’ partisan affiliations may endure after the migration process. More importantly, partisanship may help immigrants make sense of the new political landscape. In other words, immigrants may pack pre-migration partisan views in their political suitcases, and then draw on these contents later to help navigate American politics.

As outlined before, two aspects of partisanship must be distinguished, *directionality* and *intensity*. Directionality refers to the individual’s preference among parties—for most Americans, whether one identifies with the Democrats or the

²⁰ Therefore, it will be important to account for age upon arrival in the analyses conducted throughout this chapter.

Republicans. As argued below, pre-migration experiences may matter for directionality, although it should be clear that there rarely will be a perfect match between party systems in a person's old and new nations. Intensity involves the strength of attachment. Partisans of all stripes can hold weak, moderate or strong attachments to their preferred parties. What is most pertinent for present purposes is that a person's tendency to hold a partisan attachment is expected to endure from pre to post migration.²¹

Partisan attachments developed in one's country of origin should survive the migration process, even if the individual was socialized under relatively more authoritarian conditions. Take for instance the case of Mexican children under the single-party era: among fifth-graders, on average, seven out of ten expressed their willingness to participate in elections when they reached voting age. Among ninth-graders the average almost reached the ninety percent level (Segovia 1975). To reinforce the latter point, consider that in two former Soviet republics, Russia and Lithuania, the highest levels of turnout after the communist breakdown have occurred among those citizens who were socialized into the habit of voting under utterly non-competitive but regular elections. These symbolic elections seem to have created positive political experiences for these older cohorts of the electorate, and induced a habit of participation (Chernykh 2007).

A few hypothetical examples should help again to demonstrate the key logic of this perspective. Let us recall "Jose" and contrast him with "Nacho." Both of them were born in Los Mochis in the 1960s. However, Jose and Nacho have a significant political dissimilarity. Remember that Jose was an active member of the local PRI youth organization before migrating, whereas Nacho never became engaged in party politics at

²¹ Due to data constraints, the following analyses' tests regarding *intensity* are limited to the dichotomy attachment/non-attachment, as distinction between weak and strong partisans was not available for the U.S. context in either of the datasets.

all. The political socialization Jose experienced, even if authoritarian in nature, may have allowed him to develop a sense that “party matters,” which Nacho plainly cannot have, at least not to the same extent as Jose. This first example illustrates the logic motivating this chapter’s first prediction regarding the impact of imported socialization on an immigrant’s likelihood of engaging in political activity in a new nation following migration: holding a partisan attachment in one’s country of origin increases the likelihood of political engagement following migration to the United States.

In this first illustration, note that prior political experience is defined purely in terms of the individual’s own self-reported engagement in the home country. As an alternative, in contrast with the first prediction, the second illustration considers prior political experience in terms of individual’s encounter with the political context in the nation of origin. Put differently, here the key construct is defined in a manner that is wholly external to the individual. Let us contrast “Jose” with “Juan.” Remember that Juan grew up in a context of electoral vibrancy and change, during the Mexican transition to democracy. This first-hand experience fueled Juan’s sense of personal efficacy, which in turn made him more likely to engage politically. One facet of this political engagement may be the development of a partisan attachment. It should follow that immigrants who were socialized under more democratic contexts are more likely to be politically engaged once in the United States than their counterparts who were socialized under more authoritarian contexts.

Following the structure of my empirical tests in the preceding chapter, the conceptualizations of imported socialization outlined by this chapter’s first two expectations clearly are quite different. Note again, however, first, that they are not

mutually exclusive. That is, it could be that both regime type and prior partisan affiliation matter once the individual migrates to the U.S. Second, although very different, both hypotheses speak squarely to this study's contention that immigrants do not come to the United States as political blank slates.

A third expectation does not concern how imported socialization operates, but rather for whom. Consequently this prediction acts as a refinement to both of the first two. Recall that I argue that the impact of pre-migration factors on post-migration political behavior will be strongest for immigrants with low levels of education because it is less costly for them to try to make sense of life in a next context by drawing on lessons from elsewhere. It should follow that immigrants who are highly educated or highly sophisticated will be able to engage politics in the United States on its own terms, whereas immigrants with lower levels of education will be more inclined to rely upon analogical reasoning.

Finally, if one acknowledges that partisan attachments are rather enduring ones, it should follow that both "Jose" and "Juan" have an advantage over "Nacho" if the three of them decide to engage in politics once in the United States. Intuitively, both "Jose" and "Juan" have a sense that party matters, which Nacho simply lacks. Therefore, even if the three of them walk in darkness regarding the specifics of the American parties, both "Jose" and "Juan" may have an easier way in coming to trust or identify with either the Democrats or the Republicans. "Nacho" may simply stay on the sidelines of the political arena, continuing to perceive, as he did when in Mexico, that party politics is not worth his time.

One caveat is that the scenarios suggested in these examples may change over time. If pre-migration experiences influence post-migration behavior, the strength of that influence may become diluted as the immigrant spends years, and even decades, in the United States. In the case of my specific examples, “Nacho” will be exposed to a new socialization process once he enters the United States, a process that can reshape his initial attitude towards political parties. Under this hypothetical scenario, “Nacho” may eventually come to identify with either the Democrats or the Republicans. However, this new socialization experience also will be available to both “Jose” and “Juan.” In their case, they were already more likely than Nacho to engage in partisan politics and given the enduring effects of partisan attachments one can safely expect that “Jose” and “Juan” will become even more likely to engage in partisan politics as years go by in their new host country. In other words, imported partisan attachments are expected to provide a baseline that will exert enduring effects even among immigrants with many years in the new country. In other words, it should be expected that the impact of partisan affiliation in an immigrant’s country of origin on post-migration political engagement will persist even for long-term residents of the new host nation.

Thus far, the expectations have focused on partisanship. However, as noted at the outset of this chapter, a very similar logic applies with respect to ideology. When thinking about ideology, one can also expect both intensity and directionality effects. Here, at question is whether ideological predispositions developed in the country of origin exert effects that endure following migration. Concerning intensity, for instance, in general it should be expected that immigrant “ideologues” will have an advantage over their “non-ideologue” counterparts in adapting to the new political system and in

developing political attitudes and affiliations. After all, “ideology” provides the individual with a cognitive organizing device. This device allows the individual “to make sense of a wider range of (political) information” than one would find possible in the absence of such device (Converse 1964: 214). Regarding directionality, the story is more complex. It also has been argued that in order for an individual to use ideological labels or terms in an efficient manner, the individual “must bring a good deal of meaning to the term” (Converse 1964: 214). In an important sense, ideological labels find their political meanings in particular and specific contexts. For instance, although the use of “left” and “right” is widespread worldwide, the specific meanings attached to those labels by different individuals in diverse party systems may vary. Moreover, there is no reason to assume that the range of ideological continuums is constant across nations. Thus, if an individual seeks to make sense of politics in a new nation by drawing on a sense of ideology developed in the country of origin, some adaptation may be needed.

The first possible need for adaptation hinges upon the differential between ranges of ideological continuums in the country of origin and the new host country. The ideological continuum in the American context might appear truncated to most observers when contrasted with other countries’ continuums. That is, the Democrats and the Republicans may be viewed as center-left and center-right to individuals from nations where much more divergent parties gain salience in mainstream politics. If indeed it is the case that the “radical” options from both the “left” and the “right” are absent in the American setting, one should expect individuals who were moderates (“center”) in their respective countries of origin to be more likely to adopt partisan attachments in the United States. Conversely, ideologues with more extreme views are expected to find little

to embrace in the American two-party system. This prediction captures my general expectation regarding the impact of ideological predispositions in one's country of origin on post-migration political engagement. This initial expectation perhaps requires refinement. In some nations, the ideological continuum might extend well to the left of that in the United States, but not to the right. The opposite pattern is possible in other nations. For instance, when comparing the ideological continuums of Mexico and the United States, the U.S. continuum might appear truncated only on the left side given its lack of "socialist" options. The Republicans on the right side of the spectrum can offer a likeable match to both the PRI and the PAN followers depending upon the historical context under which these individuals were politicized.

The second source of potential adaptation is based upon the specific meanings individuals attach to ideological labels. To illustrate this point, let me introduce two new immigrants, "Pedro" and "Miguel." "Pedro" and "Miguel" both were born in Mexico in the early 1970s. They both grew up in households with strong opposing views to the PRI-led one-party system. Pedro's family was supportive of the PAN. Miguel's family was supportive of the PMS (Mexican Socialist Party), and eventually got engaged with the PRD by the time Miguel reached voting age. Given that the two families' main political goal was to oppose the political *status quo*, the two families considered their parties to be on the "left" of the political arena. Although Pedro stands to the "right" of Miguel on most social and political issues, Pedro still considers himself on the "left" of the political continuum. In other words, both "Miguel" and "Pedro" may perceive themselves as residing on the "left" in ideological terms in spite of the fact that there remains a difference in the ideological positions of their respective preferred parties. In short,

ideological proximity between a person's preferred political party in the country of origin and the preferred political party in the new nation following migration will increase the likelihood of post-migration political engagement.

Now, let us focus only on "Miguel." He was a PRD supporter in Mexico and he was socialized by a family with "socialist" political orientations. This background might lead Miguel to two plausible scenarios. On the one hand, "Miguel" might use his "leftist" ideological label as a cue and follow a direct translation pattern, in which case he is very likely to come to identify with the Democratic Party. On the other hand, he might feel himself out of options in the American setting given that neither of the main two political parties supports a "socialist" agenda. Under this scenario one should expect "Miguel" to have a harder time engaging with either of the mainstream parties once in the United States. However, this situation might change over time. As Miguel learns more about the new political context, he might experience a process of adaptation either by attaching new meanings to his prior ideological label or by simply moderating his original ideological stance. There is no reason to believe that these two mechanisms of adaptation are mutually exclusive. If any of these processes (or both) take place, one should expect "Miguel" to become more likely to acquire a partisan attachment with the American parties as time goes by. This said one should expect that the effect of one's country of origin's ideological predispositions on one's political engagement following migration is likely to decrease with the passage of time.

As noted in Chapter One, the set of expectations posited in this dissertation would be ideally tested with a different kind of data, namely panel data. With a three-wave panel, for example, it would be possible to monitor political attitudes and political

engagement prior to migration, soon after migration, and then some years later once the person has become more fully entrenched as a U.S. resident. However, in light of the lack of such ideal data, a series of functional alternate tests must be devised. The logic of the empirical analyses reported below follows the same structure as in the second chapter. The analyses are again divided under two main sections: *before* and *after* migration. For the *before migration* section of this chapter's analyses, I utilize a national random sample of Mexicans currently living in Mexico and the analyses are conducted accounting for each respondent's likelihood of migration to the United States. For the *after migration* section, I utilize three different datasets: the *MVS 2003*, the *NSL 2004*, and the *LNS 2006*. I begin with pre-migration data, with tests concerning both the intensity and directionality of partisan attachments and ideological predispositions.

Political Predispositions *before* Migration

As shown in both of the first two chapters, many citizens around the world have formed conceptions of U.S. politics even though the vast majority of these individuals do not have the slightest intention of migrating to the United States. According to a national survey of the Mexican public's political attitudes conducted by *Reforma* newspaper's Department of Survey Research during November of 2007 (*Reforma 2007*), the Mexican public revealed being either somewhat (19.2 percent of respondents) or very interested (12.1 percent) in the 2008 U.S. presidential election. According to the same survey, more than half of respondents expressed a specific preference for either the Democrats (36.0 percent) or the Republicans (19.0 percent) to win the 2008 presidential election. In Table 3.1, we see that nearly 50 percent of Mexican non-partisans either had no preference in the U.S. election or were indifferent between the Democrats and Republicans, whereas

the comparable mark among Mexican partisans is just over 40 percent. At least at first glance, these data suggest a connection between politicization in Mexico and engagement with American politics. My first empirical task in this chapter is to pursue this matter more closely.

Intensity of Political Engagement before Migration

Typically, when individuals are categorized by the intensity of their partisan attachments, the outcome of this exercise is a dichotomy: *weak* and *strong* partisans. As acknowledged earlier in the chapter, given data constraints my analyses here will be limited to a different dichotomy, namely *attachment/non-attachment*. In other words, intensity of political engagement will be operationalized in order to reflect whether or not an individual possess an attachment with a political party, regardless of whether the attachment is a weak or a strong one.

There is no reason to believe that individuals holding a partisan attachment in their own country necessarily will display strong preferences regarding the specifics of party politics in the United States. That is, it is logically possible for one to be a strong partisan in Mexico and yet utterly unconcerned about U.S. politics; likewise, the Mexican non-partisan conceivably still might follow the news about U.S. politics to an extent sufficient for a preference to be formed. However, as outlined above, my thesis holds that by holding a partisan attachment in one nation the person will become relatively likely to form partisan preferences in other contexts. In other words, all else equal, one should expect partisans in any country to be more likely than non-partisans to express a preference towards either the Democrats or the Republicans when contemplating American politics. By the same token, one should expect ideologues in any country to be

more likely than non-ideologues to express an opinion regarding the American parties. One caveat regarding this thesis concerns individuals who support ideologically extreme parties in their home countries. A person on the extreme left or extreme right might view the Democrats and Republicans as relatively indistinct. If so, this person would not be inclined to express a partisan preference in the American context.

The *Reforma 2007* survey contains one item asking respondents about their preferred outcome regarding the 2008 U.S. presidential election. This item permits me to test whether those individuals who hold any sort of partisan attachment in Mexico are more likely to exhibit preference for either of the two main American parties. I have argued that holding partisan attachments and ideology in one's country of origin increases the likelihood that the person will be politically engaged once in the United States. I believe my argument will be supported by showing that even before migration, and controlling for the respondent's likelihood of migration to the United States, partisan attachments and ideology in the country of origin help explain preference for either the Democrats or the Republicans. The dependent variable used to test this is a measure of preferred electoral outcome in the United States. Specifically, respondents were asked what would be more advantageous for Mexico, "that the next U.S. presidential election is won by a candidate of the Republican party or by a candidate of the Democratic party?"²² Responses are recoded, with a value of 1 used to indicate that the respondent would prefer either of the two main parties' candidates to win (55 percent of respondents), and 0 used to indicate that the respondent would not have a preference (45 percent).

²² Admittedly, this is an item which does not necessarily measure personal preference. However, it is the only item available in the original survey questionnaire and I decided to use it here as a proxy.

The first key independent variable in this model is an indicator variable for whether each respondent had an attachment with any of the three main Mexican political parties, coded 1 (58.7 percent) for yes and 0 if otherwise. The expectation is straightforward: respondents who are engaged in politics in Mexico to a sufficient extent that they hold partisan attachments will be relatively more likely to display a clear preference for either of the two major political parties in the United States. The second key group of predictors is a set of indicator variables to account for both intensity and directionality of ideology. The original ten-point ideology item included in the survey ranges from 1 (left) to 10 (right). I recoded it to produce indicators for “non-ideologues,” “extreme left,” “center left,” “center right,” and “extreme right,” keeping “centrists” as the reference category.²³ Additional variables included in the model are the same as the controls included in the before migration analyses offered in Chapter Two, namely: likelihood of migration, attentiveness to the news, age, education, income, and frequency of attendance at religious services. Interaction between attentiveness to the news and Mexican partisan status is included in the model.

Recall that likelihood of migration²⁴ is a self-assessed measure, which is recoded to be incorporated in the model as three different indicator variables: “very likely,” “somewhat likely,” and “not very likely.” The reference category is “not at all likely.” Again, attentiveness to the news is measured with an additive index, which ranges from 0

²³ “Non-Ideologues” are all of those respondents who failed to place themselves on a left-right continuum. Only respondents who considered themselves a 1 were assigned to the “Extreme Left” category. By the same token, only those respondents who considered themselves a 10 on that scale were assigned to the “Extreme Right” category. “Center Left” includes respondents who placed themselves on the 2, 3, and 4; “Center,” 5 and 6; “Center Right,” 7, 8, and 9. Also, I tried a different coding scheme where the extremes included the two most extreme categories. Results, however, were statistically similar and substantively the same.

²⁴ For a detailed account of the validity of this measure, please see Appendix A.

to 15, built upon five different four-category response items concerning TV, radio, newspapers, talk with others, and the internet. Income reflects estimates of respondents' household income in thousand of pesos per month. The mid point of the range of every category was the value assigned for every respondent. In the case of education, the variable values reflect the number of completed school years by every respondent. Upper cap values were assigned when any given level was indicated as complete. However, if respondents indicated truncated studies at the elementary level, they were assigned with the mid point value between no studies and completed elementary. The same coding rule was applied to all subsequent levels. Religious attendance was also recoded following the logic of the income and education categorical variables and produced a measure that provides an estimate number of days per year the respondent attended religious services. For instance, if respondents indicated attending once a week they were assigned a value of 52. Table 2 in Appendix D displays the descriptive statistics for all of the variables included in this model.

As shown in Table 3.2, the results of the logistic regression analysis indicate that preference for either of the two main American parties is driven, as expected, by individuals' partisan attachments to the Mexican parties. That is, the coefficient for Mexican Partisan is positive, and statistically significant. Moreover, this preference is not affected by these individuals' likelihood of migration to the United States. The coefficient of the interaction term between Mexican partisan status and likelihood of migration, though positive, does not reach statistical significance. Also, as expected, non-ideologues are less likely than ideologues, in general, to express a preference for either of the two American parties. Figure 3.1 illustrates this point even further. Every single

category of the ideologues outnumbers the non-ideologues, in a ratio of at least two to one, when it comes to probabilities of indicating a preference for either of the American parties. Older generations are less likely to display a clear preference for either Democrats or Republicans than their younger counterparts, suggesting that younger cohorts in Mexico are more interested and engaged in the political events taking place in their neighbor to the north.

Directionality of Political Engagement before Migration

Thus far in this chapter, using the case of the Mexican public, I have shown that partisan attachments as well as ideological predispositions in one's home country increase the prospects for intensity of political engagement with either of the two main American parties before migration. Next, I explore whether or not these partisan preferences and ideological predispositions in one's country of origin account for directionality of political engagement as well. In other words, it will be tested whether a specific attachment to the PRD, or the PRI, or the PAN makes individuals more or less likely to develop a specific preference for either the Democratic or the Republican parties before migration. By the same token, it will be tested whether an ideologue from the left is more or less likely to develop an attachment to either the Democrats or the Republicans.

The dependent variable used to test this relies upon the same measure of preferred electoral outcome in the United States. However, given the focus on directionality rather than on intensity, a different recoding was necessary. Responses are coded to retain all original values of the survey item, with a value of 0 used to indicate that either the respondent holds no opinion on the matter or sees no difference between a victory by the

Democrats and one by the Republicans (45.0 percent of respondents), a value of 1 if the respondent would prefer a candidate from the Democratic party to win the U.S. presidential election (36.0 percent), and a value of 2 if the respondent would prefer a candidate of the Republican party to win the race (19.0 percent).

The first set of key independent variables in this model are indicator variables to represent the respondent's attachment with any of the three main Mexican political parties, namely the PRD (13.1 percent of respondents), the PRI (22.0 percent), and the PAN (23.7 percent). The reference category is non-partisans (41.2 percent). The expectations here are not as straightforward given that it would be naïve to expect a perfect match between the U.S. and Mexican party systems. However, given the history of party politics in Mexico, I would expect the PRD to provide individuals with the most likely baseline to develop an affinity for the Democrats. By the same token, I would expect the PAN to provide its partisans with the strongest impetus to become Republican followers. The second key independent variable is a set of indicator variables to account for both intensity and directionality of ideology: "non-ideologues," "extreme left," "center left," "center right," and "extreme right," with "centrists" as the reference category. Variables also included in the model are the same set of controls used in the intensity analysis: likelihood of migration, attentiveness to the news, age, education, income, and frequency of attendance at religious services.

Multinomial logistic regression estimates are reported in Table 3.4. As expected, PRD partisans are more likely to develop affinity with the Democrats. Also, PAN partisans provide suitable basis for affinity with the Republicans, but so do PRI partisans and even PRD partisans. In fact, it is the PRI partisans who display the highest levels of

specific preference for the Republicans, followed by the PAN partisans in second place, and finally the PRD partisans in a surprisingly not so distant third place. Regarding ideology, on the one hand, extreme leftists rather than center leftists are more likely to develop affinity with the Democrats. On the other hand, center right ideologues are more likely to develop affinity with the Republicans.

Attentiveness to the news reaches statistical significance for every category under analysis (expected Democrat, and expected Republican), thus suggesting corroboration that, while still in their country of origin, individuals' preference about American parties will be heavily influenced by the amount of attention these individuals devote to political news. This is an intuitively satisfying finding. Absent exposure to the news, it should be difficult for respondents to develop preferences among the U.S. parties. The strong findings for the news attention variable support this view.

Predicted probabilities derived from these results are reported in Figure 3.2. Results are disaggregated by Mexican party affiliation and ideological predispositions. Two key points should be highlighted from these figures. First, generally speaking, individuals holding a partisan attachment to any of the three main Mexican parties are more likely than their non-partisan counterparts to prefer either the Republicans or the Democrats than to say that there is no difference between these two political options in the United States. Second, these results should be considered a call for further data collection and study to have a better understanding of these partisan and ideological translations. More importantly, it is yet to be explored whether or not these patterns hold among Mexican individuals who have crossed nations' borders. After all, the main focus of this dissertation is on political behavior *after* migration.

Political Predispositions *after* Migration

The analyses in the section devoted to intensity of political engagement rely upon three different datasets: the National Bank of Mexico's (Banamex) Division for Economic and Sociopolitical Studies 2003 Mexican Values Survey (*MVS 2003*), the Pew Hispanic Center/Kaiser family Foundation 2004 National Survey of Latinos (*NSL 2004*), and the Latino National Survey 2006 (*LNS 2006*). Intensity still is conceptualized and operationalized as a dichotomy, differentiating between attachment and non-attachment with regard to the two main American parties. The effects of imported socialization are tested utilizing two different approaches. Under the first approach, and using the *MVS 2003*, imported socialization is operationalized as immigrants' partisan attachments in the country of origin. Under the second approach, and using the *NSL 2004* and the *LNS 2006*, imported socialization is operationalized as the degree of democracy (or lack thereof) that the individual was exposed to during the early years of childhood and young adulthood in the country of origin. The analyses regarding directionality rely only upon the *MVS 2003* dataset. For intensity, the availability of two different types of tests is highly advantageous. Pre-migration experiences will be operationalized in two fundamentally different manners, one based on survey respondents' self-reports and one based on external indicators regarding the political context in the individual's country of origin. If consistent results emerge from such disparate tests, support for my thesis would be much more compelling than if only one form of data were available.

Intensity of Political Engagement after Migration

The *MVS 2003* has one key advantage for the purpose of this chapter. This original study is, to the best of my knowledge, the only one available that includes

questions on vote intention in both countries (Mexico and the U.S.) for its sub-sample of 399 first-generation U.S. residents who were born in Mexico. Such questions do not provide ideal representations of partisan preferences. However, particularly given the scarcity of data such as these, the vote intention measures certainly provide reasonable proxies.

The vote intention items permit me to test whether those immigrants who held any sort of partisan leaning in Mexico are more likely to exhibit American partisan ties. Specifically, I have posited that holding a partisan attachment in one's country of origin increases the likelihood that the person will be politically engaged in the United States. The dependent variable used to test this hypothesis is a measure of expected electoral participation in the United States. Respondents were asked if "elections were held today," would they expect to vote for a Democratic candidate, a Republican, a candidate other than a Democrat or a Republican, or would they opt not to participate. These responses are recoded, with a value of 1 used to indicate that the respondent would expect to vote (64.7 percent of respondents), and 0 used to indicate that the respondent would not expect to vote (35.3 percent).

The chief independent variables are two set of indicator variables. The first set accounts for whether each respondent had an attachment with any Mexican political party, coded 1 (57.4 percent²⁵) for yes and 0 if otherwise. Again, my expectation is that respondents who were politicized in the country of origin to a sufficient extent that they held partisan attachments will be relatively more likely to become politically engaged once in the United States. The second set of indicator variables accounts for both

²⁵ Note how the proportion of partisans among Mexican immigrants in the U.S. resembles the proportion of partisans in the national sample of the Mexican public; it is 57.4 percent for the U.S.-based sample, versus 59.5 percent for the national sample of the Mexican public.

intensity and directionality of ideology: “non-ideologues,” “extreme left,” “center left,” “center right,” and “extreme right,” with “centrists” as the reference category. Here, the expectation is that if ideological spectrums in the two countries are similar in range, centrists should be more likely to engage politically than their extremist counterparts. However, if the American ideological continuum appears truncated to the Mexican immigrants, I would expect individuals from the extreme left to be the least likely to engage politically once in the United States.

In addition to conducting tests of my core hypotheses, a second round of tests will be run to gauge whether the impact (if any) of pre-migration political experiences attenuates over time. To consider this possibility, models include a count of years spent in the United States, along with interactions between this variable and the indicators of Mexican partisan attachment and ideological predispositions. Other variables included in the models are age upon arrival, indicators of language skills, income, education, and frequency of attendance at religious services. Income reflects estimates of respondents’ household income in thousand of dollars per year. The mid point of the range of every category was the value assigned for every respondent. In the case of education, the variable values reflect the number of completed school years by every respondent. Upper cap values were assigned when any given level was indicated as complete. Religious attendance was also recoded following the logic of the income and education categorical variables and produced a measure that provides with an estimate number of days attended per year for every respondent. Again, to account for language skills two indicator variables were operationalized, bilingual and English dominant at home, where the

reference category is Spanish dominant at home. Table 3 in the Appendix D displays the corresponding descriptive statistics for all of the variables included in the models.

Table 3.5 presents a simple cross-tabulation of the item gauging expected U.S. electoral participation and the measure of Mexican partisan identification. A strong relationship is evident. Among Mexican partisans, nearly 81 percent expect to hold a partisan vote preference in the U.S. elections; conversely, among Mexican non-partisans, nearly 55 percent indicate that they likely would not vote were the U.S. elections held today. At the bivariate level, these results offer solid corroboration of my core expectation. Pre-migration politicization predicts patterns of post-migration political engagement.

To test whether this same effect emerges when other factors that also predict participation are considered, Table 3.6 presents results from two logistic regression models. The first model offers the central test, whereas the second model adds an interaction between years in the U.S. and Mexican partisanship as well as years in the U.S. and ideological predispositions to account for any possible attenuation of socialization effects over time. In Table 3.6's initial model, the coefficient for Mexican partisan affiliation attains statistical significance. Thus, even with a battery of control variables, the evidence still provides corroboration for my core expectation. Politicization in one's home country—captured here with a measure of prior partisan attachment—predicts post-migration political engagement. Immigrants are *not* political blank slates when they enter the United States. Instead, their prior experiences yield effects that resonate across national borders. Further, the second model in Table 3.6 provides no evidence that this effect evaporates over time. The coefficient on the interaction term is

statistically insignificant, and, contrary to the logic of an attenuation effect, its sign is positive.

A follow-up question begs for an answer: are partisan attachments from all over the ideological spectrum in one's country of origin equally likely to provide immigrants to the United States with enduring suitcases? Intuitively, as laid out earlier in this chapter my answer is no. Immigrants whose prior political views were extreme relative to those of mainstream Democrats and Republicans in the United States may find little that engages them following migration. These matters, however, will be addressed later on the directionality section of this chapter.

Arguably, immigrants' ideological self-placements on the American political continuum were not necessarily learned in the new host country, but rather in these individuals' countries of origin. In order to justify the inclusion of the set of indicator variables accounting for ideological predispositions in my analysis, I conducted an experiment²⁶ among Mexican immigrants to the United States to determine the extent to which these individuals differentiate between the two ideological continuums. For now, it is sufficient to note that nearly seven out of every ten immigrants (68.1 percent) do not make distinctions between ideological continuums. Moreover, roughly six out of ten of the remaining immigrants that do adjust their placement on a context-specific basis do so to only a moderate extent.²⁷ Thus, in the vast majority of cases, ideology as constituted in a person's country of origin strongly anchors ideology in the United States following migration.

²⁶ For a full explanation of the experiment conducted among Mexican immigrants currently living in the United States regarding ideology differentials, please see Appendix C.

²⁷ "Moderate" adjustment is here defined as the distance between ideological continuums up to three points in a ten point scale.

As Table 3.6 shows, the coefficient for non-ideologues also attains statistical significance. Its negative sign indicates that non-ideologues are less likely than ideologues in general to engage politically once in the United States. Among ideologues, immigrants on the center right and right of the spectrum are more likely to engage politically. Figure 3.3 highlights both of these points even further. Roughly two out of ten immigrants who held no partisan attachment and who place themselves at the center of the ideological spectrum in their countries of origin will decide to participate electorally in the United States. This proportion doubles for their counterparts who actually held some sort of partisan attachment. The pattern is substantively the same for both immigrants who have arrived recently in the United States and for those who have spent an average of 17 years in their new host country. In short, prior partisan attachments not only make immigrants approximately twice as likely to be politically engaged once in the United States, but also provide them with an enduring political suitcase, with content that does not vanish with the passage of time.

In the case of ideological predispositions, the enduring nature of the suitcase hinges upon the individuals' self-placement along the political continuum. Figure 3.3 highlights that both among non-partisans and partisans, immigrants who recently arrived in the United States see their probabilities of engaging politically increase as they move from left to right on the spectrum. However, as can be seen in the same figure, this pattern is lost as time goes by. After 17 years of life in the United States, an average stay for these individuals, the predicted probabilities of political engagement look pretty much the same for immigrants all across the spectrum, non-ideologues included.

Recall that I argue that it should be expected that the impact of pre-migration factors on post-migration political behavior are strongest for immigrants with low levels of education. In order to test this, an interaction term between partisan status in Mexico and education levels was included in the model shown in Table 3.6. The coefficient of the interaction term is negative as expected. However, the coefficient does not attain statistical significance, which means that the imported socialization effect is present for both immigrants with relatively low and relatively high levels of education.²⁸ Figure 3.4 illustrates this point further. Immigrants who held a partisan attachment in their country of origin are twice more likely to be politically engaged than their non-partisan counterparts, regardless of their education levels. In short, thus far, contrary to my expectations, immigrants who are highly educated or highly sophisticated do not seem to engage politics in the United States on its own terms. Regardless of educational status, immigrants seem prone to engage in analogical reasoning.

Intensity of Engagement: Democratic vs. Authoritarian Socialization

Recall that I posit that immigrants who were socialized under more democratic contexts will be more likely to participate in American politics than their counterparts who were socialized under more authoritarian contexts. Under this expectation, as noted earlier in this chapter, prior political experience is defined purely in terms of the individual's encounter with the political context in the nation of origin. The construct of "imported socialization"²⁹ used here is the same as the one in the preceding chapter.

²⁸ In Figure 3.4, relatively "low" and relatively "high" levels of education were calculated by subtracting/adding one standard deviation to the mean, respectively.

²⁹ For a full description of the construction of this measurement, please see the corresponding section in the preceding chapter. Also, see Appendix B for more details regarding the distribution of the imported socialization scores by country of origin and by dataset utilized in this study.

Here, I also define the immigrant's prior political context in terms of gradations of democracy, by taking advantage of the Polity IV dataset. The Polity-based indicator is now integrated with data from two surveys, the Pew Hispanic Center/Kaiser family Foundation 2004 National Survey of Latinos (*NSL 2004*) and the Latino National Survey 2006 (*LNS 2006*). These two other datasets were chosen for the analysis given the sizeable sub-samples of first-generation Latino immigrants (1,068 and 5,653, respectively) and the availability of items on both surveys regarding partisan attachments in the United States. See Tables 2 and 3 in Appendix B for further detail regarding the descriptive statistics of the construct by country of origin for each one of the datasets.

The dependent variable in this portion of the analysis defines political engagement as partisan attachment with either of the two main parties in the United States. In other words, the dependent variable uses a binary scale where 1 denotes identification with either the Democratic or the Republican parties (67.7 percent for the *NSL 2004*, and 36.5 percent for the *LNS 2006*), and 0 denotes otherwise. The chief independent variable, imported socialization, ranges from 0 (most authoritarian context) to 20 (most democratic context). Recall that this measure provides an indicator that is specific to the individual. For example, if two respondents both came to the U.S. from Chile and both migrated at age 18, my measure scores them very differently if one was born in 1955, and thus lived in Chile under democracy, while the other was born 20 years later in 1975 just after Pinochet rose to power.

Table 3.7 presents the results of the estimated logistic regression models where the dependent variable is partisan affiliation in the United States, and independent

Table 2, in the Appendix, contains the information on the *NSL 2004*. Table 3 contains the details regarding the *LNS 2006*.

variables include a series of individual-level controls, plus the respondent-specific measure of imported socialization. The coefficient of the key independent variable is positive and reaches statistical significance under every specification in both data sets. The results are summarized graphically in Figure 3.5, where I report predicted probabilities of partisan affiliation. The vertical axis in each case is the predicted probability and the horizontal is the respondent-specific Polity-based measure of imported socialization. All other variables are held constant at their mean or at their modal category in the case of indicator variables. The estimates provide strong corroboration of the core expectation. Simply put, immigrants who were exposed to more democratic contexts during their pre-adult socialization years are more likely to become partisans in the United States than their counterparts who grew up under more authoritarian conditions.

Depending upon which dataset, the construct of imported socialization reveals that being socialized under the most democratic conditions (contrasted with the most authoritarian ones) increases the probability of an immigrant's partisan affiliation in the United States by at least 42 per cent points (*LNS 2006*) or by 81 per cent points (*NSL 2004*). The effects are noticeably sharper in one dataset, where, due to sampling differences, the overall level of politicization among respondents is higher. However, the pattern is substantively similar in both cases, and as stated before, statistically significant in both.

The model in Table 3.7 includes an interaction term between the construct of imported socialization and education. The coefficient of the interaction term in both datasets is negative as expected. However, the coefficient attains statistical significance

in only one of the datasets. Figure 3.6 help illustrate the results of the model. The predicted probabilities of political engagement among immigrants with higher levels of education are nearly constant across the full range of the imported socialization measure in both datasets. This is to say that immigrants with higher levels of education have a tendency to develop partisan attachments regardless of the nature of the political system under which they were socialized. However, and although present in only one of the datasets (NSL 2004), there is one pattern that cannot go without mention. Among those immigrants with relatively lower levels of education, those who were socialized under the most democratic conditions are almost twice more likely to be engaged politically than their counterparts who were socialized under the most authoritarian conditions.

An interaction term between the imported socialization measure and age upon arrival was included in models two and three in Table 3.7. The sign of the corresponding coefficient is negative under every specification for both datasets, suggesting that immigrants who arrived in the United States at a relatively younger age will be the ones displaying the strongest effects of imported socialization. In other words, immigrants who arrived at an early stage of their lives and who were socialized under a more democratic context will be more likely to engage politically than their counterparts who were socialized under more authoritarian conditions. However, this effect only attains statistical significance in one of the datasets, the LNS 2006.

A couple of final remarks should be made regarding the results offered in Table 3.7. First, the coefficient of the interaction term between the imported socialization construct and years spent in the United States does not reach statistical significance in either of the two datasets analyzed here, thus suggesting enduring effects of prior political

socialization. Also, as acknowledged in the preceding chapter, in spite of the rudimentary nature of the construct of imported socialization, this construct has provided strong evidence in support of the core hypotheses of this study. Improved measures can only be expected to establish stronger relationships between prior political experiences and immigrants' political behaviors once in the new host country.

Directionality of Political Engagement after Migration

The final round of tests included in this chapter concern the directionality of political engagement once in the United States. Recall that the *MVS 2003* includes questions on vote intention in both countries (Mexico and the U.S.) for its sub-sample of 399 first-generation U.S. residents who were born in Mexico. On these final analyses, I rely on these items but with a different coding scheme.

The dependent variable is constructed as follows. Respondents were asked if “elections were held today,” would they expect to vote for a Democratic candidate, a Republican, a candidate other than a Democrat or a Republican, or would they opt not to participate. For these final models, these responses are recoded, with a value of 0 used to indicate that the respondent would opt not to participate (34.1 percent of respondents) or that the respondent would vote for a candidate other than a Democrat or Republican (1.2 percent), with a value of 1 used to indicate that the respondent would expect to vote for a Democratic candidate (44.6 percent), and 2 used to indicate that the respondent would expect to vote for a Republican candidate (20.1 percent).

The first key independent construct in these analyses is represented via a set of indicator variables that account for each respondent's attachment with any of the three main political parties in Mexico, the PRD (8.0 percent of respondents), the PRI (17.0

percent), or the PAN (30.8 percent). The expectation is that Democrats should be nurtured by the PRD partisans, the PRI partisans, and the PAN partisans in that order. By the same token, Republicans should be nurtured by the PAN partisans, the PRI partisans, and the PRD partisans, in that strict order. Table 3.8 displays the bivariate relationship between the dependent variable and the key independent variable described above. As it should be evident from that table, the expectation regarding preference for the Democratic Party might hold. However, the expectations regarding the Republican identification seem to be set up for a surprising result.

The second key independent construct is included via the set of indicator variables accounting for both intensity and directionality of ideology: “non-ideologues,” “extreme left,” “center left,” “center right,” and “extreme right,” with “centrists” as the reference category. Here, the expectation is that if ideological spectrums in the two countries are similar in range, centrists on the left should be more likely to display an affinity with the Democrats whereas centrists on the right should be more likely to display an affinity with the Republicans. However, if the American ideological continuum appears truncated to the Mexican immigrants, I would expect individuals from the extreme left to be the least likely to engage politically once in the United States.

In an effort to keep models comparable throughout my analyses, other variables included in the models both in Table 3.9 and Table 3.10 are age upon arrival, two indicator variables accounting for language skills (Bilingual and English, with Spanish as the reference category), education, income, and frequency of attendance at religious services. In order to test whether or not the impact of pre-migration factors on post-migration political behavior are strongest for immigrants with low levels of education, an

interaction term between partisan attachments in Mexico and education levels was included in the models on Tables 3.9 and 3.10. Also, in Table 3.10 I explore possible attenuation effects, therefore the model includes not only the count of years spent in the United States, but also the corresponding interactions between this variable and the set of key indicator variables accounting for Mexican partisan attachments (with the PRD, the PRI, and the PAN) as well as with ideological predispositions.

Results from the multinomial logistic regression analysis on Table 3.9 suggest that, though to varying degrees, all of the three main partisan identifications in Mexico provide an important baseline to become engaged with either of the two main political parties in the United States. This result to a certain extent is striking, but is in line with previous findings in the *before* migration analyses of this chapter. If indeed this is the case, these two sets of results together strongly suggest that translation of partisan attachments from one's country of origin to the new host country are rather complex, and further studies are in order to understand the underpinnings of such a translation process. It is clear, though, that non-ideologues are less likely than ideologues in general to become politically engaged with either of the two main American parties. Moreover, results from Table 3.10 displayed in a graphic manner in Figure 3.7 deserve some final consideration. First, with the only exception of non-ideologues and according to my expectations, immigrants who held a partisan attachment with the PRD in Mexico are consistently more likely, in a proportion of at least two to one, to hold a preference toward the Democratic Party in the United States than to hold a preference toward the Republican Party. The pattern described above is observed among immigrants who are considered "new arrivals," individuals who have spent one year or less in the United

States. By the same token, with the only exception of individuals who place themselves to the center-left of the ideological continuum, immigrants who held a partisan attachment with the PRD in Mexico and who have spent an average of 17 years in their new home experience a decline in their probabilities of holding a preference toward the Republican Party. The average magnitude of this decrease over time, though, is rather negligible. In fact, all things considered this result is politically striking and potentially consequential.

Concerning the predicted probabilities of becoming either a Democrat or a Republican voter for PRI partisans who have migrated to the United States, the pattern is not that dissimilar to that one found for PRD partisan immigrants. However, two key differences deserve consideration. First, non-ideologue PRI partisans seem to undergo a dramatic re-socialization process by which their predicted probabilities of developing an attachment with either the Democrats or the Republicans experience a sharp increase over time. On average, the predicted probabilities more than double for both Democratic and Republican preferences. These predicted probabilities move from 0.07 to 0.22 and from 0.22 to 0.37, for expected Democrats and expected Republicans respectively, in the first 17 years of life of PRI partisans in the United States. Second, although the gap between the predicted probabilities of holding a Democratic preference vs. the predicted probabilities of holding a Republican preference is narrower than for PRD partisans, as expected, the wider gaps are found precisely on the right categories of the ideological spectrum rather than on the left ones.

Finally, let us consider immigrants who held partisan attachments with the PAN in Mexico. The pattern is strikingly similar to that one found for PRI partisan immigrants.

First, non-ideologue PAN partisans seem to experience a dramatic re-socialization process as well. Their predicted probabilities of developing an attachment with either the Democrats or the Republicans increase from 0.07 to 0.33 for the Democratic option and from 0.16 to 0.42 for the Republican camp in their first 17 years in the new host country. This is, the first figure more than quadruples whereas the second one more than doubles. Second, in the case of PAN partisans, with the exception of those in the center-left, the predicted probabilities of developing an attachment with the Republicans does not experience substantial changes with the passage of time. Finally, it is to be noted that, on average for the three main partisan identifications in Mexico, the gap between the prospects of becoming either a Democrat or a Republican is at its narrowest among PRI partisans rather than among PAN partisans.

These latter results call for a follow-up study and more in-depth analysis of the translation of partisan attachments from one context to the other. Needless to say, the study should take time seriously (Mitchell 2008), and it should try to encompass partisans not only from Mexico but from other sending countries around the globe. Details regarding suggested follow-up studies are explained in further depth in the final chapter of this dissertation. If present findings were to be corroborated, these latter results in the current chapter would have some potentially relevant political implications for the American parties' strategies of engaging the immigrant population in a more active civic life in the United States. These speculations are also offered in the concluding chapter of this dissertation.

Conclusions

The core thesis advanced in this dissertation is that immigrants' political connections and attitudes with regard to their countries of origin will influence post-migration political predispositions and behaviors once these individuals have settled in the United States. This thesis incorporates multiple specific components. Two of those components have been examined thus far. Specifically, in the preceding chapter I examined whether levels of trust in the country of origin's government influences an individual's broader views of the political sphere, including trust in American politics. Second, in the current chapter, I have considered whether an immigrant's attachment with a political party in the country of origin influences the likelihood that the individual will be politically engaged in the United States. The analyses reported here offer strong evidence to support both of these hypothesized effects. Using our hypothetical examples, it seems fair to say that what happens in Los Mochis does not stay in Los Mochis. Instead, immigrants pack their prior political experiences and views in their political suitcases, later bringing them to bear when those immigrants try to make sense of the new context they face: the American political arena.

Had I ignored survey respondents' prior political experiences, findings thus far establish that our understanding of post-migration political engagement would have been incomplete both in terms of their trust in American government and in their partisan attachments once in the United States. To a substantial degree, what these individuals encountered in their nations of origin shape how they approach the American political system. When immigrants are treated as political blank slates, we completely overlook these important components of political behavior. Building on these findings, the final

matter to be considered is whether pre-migration experiences also matter for patterns in post-migration political participation.

CHAPTER 4 BRINGING DEMOCRACY ALONG? IMMIGRANTS' POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

In democracies, mass participation in politics plays a central role in ensuring political accountability and the effective representation of citizens' interests.

Accordingly, students of political behavior have long recognized the importance of research on the antecedents of participation. The literature on political participation has widely documented the relevance of socioeconomic status, mobilization efforts and civic skills (Verba and Nie 1972; Leighley and Nagler 1992; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba et al 1993; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). Pioneering explanations of immigrants' political behavior embraced this framework focusing on such post-arrival factors, as well as immigrants' minority status, economic advancement, and foreign policy concerns (Cain, Kiewiet and Uhlaner 1991). However, as outlined in the preceding chapters, this line of research fails to acknowledge that all of those post-arrival factors can be directly influenced by the immigration experience itself, thus falling short of linking how pre-migration political experiences may be coloring not only those post-arrival factors, but also post-migration behaviors themselves.

In the present chapter, I conclude the empirical exploration of the impact of pre-migration experiences on post-migration attitudes and behaviors. This chapter shifts attention from attitudes to behaviors, by studying immigrants' political participation *after* migration. Specifically, I test the extent to which prior political experiences affect one's engagement in political activities once in the United States. The analyses presented in this chapter focus on a wide range of political activities, some of which can be performed by any immigrant to the United States, such as participating in a public meeting or

demonstration, and some of which can be performed only by naturalized immigrants such as the act of voting. The idea is to test whether the imported socialization process helps us understand immigrants' political behaviors in general, regardless of these individuals' migratory status in their new host country. Of course, as in the previous two chapters, I also test whether the impact of pre-migration experiences fades over time.

The present chapter is divided into three sections. As in the preceding two empirical chapters, the first section offers the expectations regarding the connection between pre-migration political attitudes, measured here with the pre-adult imported socialization construct, and immigrants' political engagement –measured in this chapter as participation in political activities. However, given data availability, this chapter's empirical tests are devoted only to *after* migration analyses.

The second section of the chapter offers empirical tests devoted to understanding the effects of imported socialization on political activities such as contacting officials, contributing money to political campaigns, working for candidates, attending public meetings or demonstrations, and attending political party meetings. In this section, the analyses are conducted considering the full sample of first generation immigrants. The results should help us understand whether pre-migration political experiences affect post-migration political participation in activities that do not require citizenship in the new polity.

The third section focuses on immigrants' participation at the polls; that is, whether immigrants vote in American elections. Thus, the tests are conducted restricting the analyses to only those immigrants who report having become American citizens. The idea here is to test the extent to which immigrants' prior political experiences affect their

propensity to vote in elections taking place in the U.S. context. I conclude this chapter with some general considerations concerning the impact of prior political experiences on immigrants' political participation.

The Impact of Imported Socialization on Political Participation: The Expectations

In *Participation in America*, Verba and Nie (1972) argue that individuals' decisions to participate in politics hinge upon social circumstances, which they label as "life space," including factors such as education, race, the place they live and what they do for a living. My argument is that, for immigrants, we must account not only for the person's present life space, but also for the prior life space—that is, for aspects of the context in the immigrant's nation of origin. Indeed, in order to better understand first generation immigrants' political behavior once in the United States, such prior life space is key to making sense of their decisions to be politically engaged. After all, although they are facing a different life space from the one in which they were originally socialized, it surely is not the case that all memory and impact of the prior life space will vanish at the moment of migration. Furthermore, if pre-migration experiences are posited to influence post-migration patterns in political participation, then the persistence of the effects of those effects also deserves thoughtful inquiry.

In another classic work, *The Civic Culture*, Almond and Verba (1963) explore how differences in political systems lead to different kinds of cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations towards politics in general. They conducted cross-national survey research in five nations and classified political systems into three subtypes,³⁰ two of

³⁰ The three subtypes are the following: parochial, subject and participant. Parochial cultures refer to those found in tribal societies or autonomous local communities. Under subject political cultures, Almond and Verba argue, the individual "is aware of specialized governmental authority; he is affectively oriented to it, perhaps taking pride in it, perhaps disliking it; and he

which will be particularly relevant for the discussion to come, namely: the *subject* and the *participant* subtypes. Although these authors acknowledge that political systems display degrees of heterogeneity in the kind of individuals that integrate them, all else equal, citizens of subject political systems are expected to show a more passive role whereas those from participant ones are more likely to display a more active role in the polity. In short, these authors find that certain political systems have the potential to better equip their citizens to deal with the task of navigating and engaging in the political world.

Evaluating the findings of these two major works from the American and the Comparative subfields of our discipline, some implications follow that deserve further consideration. At the most obvious level, one needs to acknowledge that “context” (life space) is fundamental to understanding individual political behavior. However, this is already a very widely documented claim in the discipline (e.g., Huckfeldt 1986; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Huckfeldt et al 1995; Canache 1996; Kuklinski and Quirk 2001; Gay 2004; Gimpel and Lay 2005; Zuckerman 2005; McClurg 2006; Cho et al 2006; Mutz and Mondak 2006; Cho and Rudolph 2008). But if context is so consequential when accounting for an individual’s attitudes, beliefs and behaviors, one is certainly left to wonder why so little attention has been paid to the role of pre-migration political context once individuals cross a nation’s borders.

As illustrated in earlier chapters, the social and political situations in immigrants’ original contexts potentially could have changed over time, providing individuals from

evaluates it either as legitimate or as not. But the relationship is toward the system on the general level [...] it is essentially a passive relationship, although there is [...] a limited form of competence that is appropriate (for the individual) in a subject culture” (1963: 17-18). Finally, under the participant culture, individuals are aware of both the system as a whole as well as of the political and administrative processes. Moreover, individuals tend to display an “activist” role of the self, which can range from acceptance to rejection.

the very same country with different conditions and experiences. As should be clear by now, as posited in the introductory chapter, the immigrant from Nicaragua should not be viewed identically regardless of whether this person came of political age under the Somozas, the Sandinistas, or during the post-Sandinista presidencies of Violeta Chamorro or Arnaldo Aleman. In other words, and as shown empirically in the two preceding chapters, one should expect that pre-migration political experiences should affect post-migration political engagement, but also that those influences will be best understood if we account for nuance. Socialization under different gradations of democracy in one's country of origin has a lasting imprint on an individual's decision to navigate politics once in the United States. Thus far, I have tested this claim with focus on political attitudes and beliefs. Following the same straightforward logic, let me turn the discussion now to political behaviors. So now the question seems obvious: is it indeed the case that individuals who were politicized in a more authoritarian context are necessarily ill equipped to perform any kind of political activity once they migrate to a more democratic context? Is it indeed the case that individuals who were exposed to more democratic contexts during their pre-adult socialization years will outperform their counterparts who were exposed to more authoritarian backgrounds in terms of political participation? Are individuals with more authoritarian backgrounds just as likely as their counterparts with more democratic backgrounds to engage in a public demonstration but not as likely to turn out to vote? By addressing these questions, the present chapter's empirical analyses delve into the question of how democracy (or the lack thereof) affects individual political behavior. Recall that in the words of Sidney Verba, the recent waves of immigration to the United States are a "major natural experiment" (1994). Building upon this idea, I

argue that taking pre-migration political experiences into account allows us to uncover whether differences in political participation patterns are due to the fact that some individuals received the “treatment” of exposure to democratic contexts whereas other individuals simply didn’t.

In order to start addressing these questions concerning the effects of imported socialization on political participation, let me use some hypothetical examples one final time to lay out the empirical expectations of this chapter. Recall “Jose,” “Juan,” and “Nacho.” Both Jose and Nacho grew up under the dominance of the hegemonic party system in Mexico whereas Juan grew up under more democratic conditions. Jose and Nacho’s opportunities to participate in politics were limited to the specific channels allowed and provided by the PRI regime. By contrast, Juan’s pre-migration political experiences encompassed witnessing political efforts from the opposition to the hegemonic system, which eventually resulted in PRI defeats in local elections. If one considers that political participation has potential to form habitual behaviors only when individuals engage in activities in more democratic contexts, then, all else equal, fueled by this pre-migration experience, Juan should be expected to be more likely to participate in politics following migration than Jose and Nacho. In other words, under this consideration, one should expect that immigrants coming from more democratic contexts should be more likely to become politically active in the American political arena than their counterparts coming from more authoritarian contexts.

An argument has been made in earlier chapters, though, that certain authoritarian regimes might have attempted to socialize individuals into political participation for legitimacy-seeking purposes. That is indeed the case of the old regime under the single-

party dominance in Mexico, where from the very foundation of the PRI in March of 1929 (PNR at the time of its foundation – National Revolutionary Party), one of this party’s main goals was to build up a rather complex system produced by individuals and organizations from very diverse sectors of society such as peasants, factory workers, and bureaucrats, and their corresponding unions and associations (Garrido 1982, for related work also see Davis 1976). These individuals, unions, and associations were used to bring about “ideological” cohesiveness within the party’s rank and files, thus facilitating more effective leadership and means of mass mobilization during the electoral processes. but it is not exclusive to the experience of this country alone. Also in Chapter Two, I showed that, all else equal, immigrants coming from more democratic contexts display relatively lower levels of trust toward American political institutions than their counterparts coming from more authoritarian contexts. Think again of Nacho. Among these three hypothetical immigrants, Nacho is the one who arguably holds the highest expectations regarding the workings of the U.S. political system. He may find it so dissimilar to the Mexican one on account of both competitiveness and efficacy that, in spite of background in an authoritarian political context, Nacho may decide to engage in politics given that this time the venture seems worth the effort. Thus, one cannot rule out, at least not a priori, the potential effects of being exposed to political activities experienced by individuals in their countries of origin even if they took place under relatively authoritarian conditions.

Now, let me introduce two final hypothetical immigrants, “Pablo” and “Pancho.” First, Pablo, just like Juan, experienced the novelty and upheavals associated with the vibrancy of the Mexican political transition to democracy. However, unlike Juan, Pablo’s

sense of personal efficacy was not heightened by this pre-migration experience. To the contrary, his original expectations regarding political change in Mexico after Vicente Fox's victory were shattered. Pablo became highly disappointed in national politics after the PRI was *kicked out from Los Pinos*,³¹ which seemed, in his view, to indicate that Mexico was back to business as usual. Pablo's disappointment made him walk away from politics in general, in spite of the unprecedented changes that were taking place before his own eyes. Under this scenario, one should expect Pablo to be the least likely to engage in politics following migration to the United States. It is a matter of empirical test whether Pablo can be as likely to engage in political activities as Juan once in America.

Pancho is a close friend of Jose. In fact, Pancho and Jose met back in their days as members of the PRI youth organization. Pancho was a very active member who constantly participated in street demonstrations and party meetings. Unlike Pablo, Pancho was not affected by the fact that politics looked to be "more of the same"³² after Vicente Fox took office. Pancho still participated in public demonstrations called by the PRI. In other words, the only real change that took place for Pancho was that these demonstrations were no longer massive displays of support for the PRI administrations, but rather demonstrations against the newly elected Fox administration. This experience could make Pancho at least as likely as Juan to be engaged in certain political activities following migration to the United States. Thus, as a refinement to my first expectation,

³¹ Los Pinos is the presidential house in Mexico City – equivalent to the White House in the United States or la Casa Rosada in Argentina. The phrase is a direct reference to the famous motto promoted by Vicente Fox on the campaign trail. Fox repeatedly said that true change in Mexico had to start by "kicking out the PRI from Los Pinos." In Spanish: "*Vamos a sacar al PRI a patadas de Los Pinos.*"

³² One of the slogans run by the opposition to the PRI during the 2000 campaign asked the voters whether they wanted six years of "more of the same," or as it was originally aired in Spanish: *seis años "más de lo mismo."*

immigrants coming from highly democratic contexts should be just as likely as those coming from authoritarian contexts to become politically active in the American political arena.

Recall here that in the preceding chapters I have advanced an expectation regarding for whom the imported socialization process operates the strongest. This prediction posits that the impact of pre-migration factors on post-migration political attitudes, beliefs and behaviors will be strongest for immigrants with low levels of education. Thus far, this expectation has found little empirical support. However, given the widely documented role of education on political participation, it seems especially important to test for the possibility that immigrants with relatively lower levels of education may engage in analogical reasoning when it comes to deciding whether to participate in American politics.

Finally, let me lay out one last expectation, which has been discussed earlier at length. The effects of imported socialization may not remain stable over time. Thus, just as in the preceding chapters, it will be necessary to test for potential attenuation effects. Up to this point, I have found little evidence in support of attenuation effects, suggesting that the content of imported political suitcases does not fade as time goes by. However, it remains an empirical question whether that is indeed the case when it comes to political participation.

Making Their Voices Heard and Known

Recall that in general one should expect that immigrants who were socialized under more democratic contexts will be more likely to participate in American politics than their counterparts who were socialized under more authoritarian contexts. However,

a revised version of this expectation reads as follows: individuals coming from both highly democratic contexts as well as those coming from authoritarian contexts should be more likely to become politically active following migration than their counterparts coming from transitional contexts. Under either of these expectations prior political experience is again defined purely in terms of the individual's encounter with the political context in the nation of origin. Thus, I will rely again upon the construct of pre-adult "imported socialization."³³ However, given these initial expectations, I will use both a linear and a squared term of the construct throughout the empirical tests.

The dependent variable in this portion of the analysis defines political participation as a self-reported count of political activities in which respondents engaged during the last calendar year. The NSL 2004 contains five items concerning political participation beyond the act of voting, which were used for the construction of this first dependent variable. Specifically, the five items asked respondents regarding their own engagement in the following political activities during the past calendar year: 1) whether respondents have contacted government officials; 2) contributed money to campaigns; 3) worked for political candidates; 4) attended public meetings or demonstrations; and 5) attended political party meetings. Table 4.1 displays the descriptive statistics for the five political activities in which first generation immigrants engaged in the last year prior to the survey. Note that from the total number of self-reported activities (425), 56.7 percent (241) of them are either "attending a public demonstration" or "attending a party meeting." These two activities may drive the results presented later, thus, the more

³³ Again, for a full description of the construction of this measurement, please see the corresponding section in the preceding chapter. Also, see Appendix B for more details regarding the distribution of the imported socialization scores by country of origin and by dataset utilized in this study. Table 2, in the Appendix, contains the information on the *NSL 2004*.

important it becomes to test whether immigrants coming from authoritarian contexts also become politically active in the United States given that these types of activities are not unusual practices even under single-party systems.

A factor analysis was used to determine whether all of the five items could be used to build an index of political participation. Indeed, all items loaded on a single factor, with a minimum factor loading of 0.44; the items combine to form a reliable scale with an alpha of 0.68.³⁴ For simplicity in the interpretation of results, a simple additive index was then constructed, adopting a minimum value of zero and a maximum of five, with each value representing the count of activities in which respondents engaged in the past calendar year. Table 4.2 displays the distribution of cases for the political participation index, comparing the observed count of activities among Latinos that were born in the United States with the observed count of activities among first generation immigrants. Not surprisingly, first generation immigrant Latinos are less likely to engage in all of these political activities than Latinos who were born already in the United States. However, we know that participation in politics generally is characterized by lower levels of engagement, meaning that a preponderance of cases coded “0” and “1” should be expected. Latino immigrants are no exception to this general pattern. Moreover, my main goal here it is not to test the levels of immigrants’ political engagement in and of themselves, but rather how much of political engagement among these individuals is driven by pre-migration political experiences.

³⁴ Both the minimum factor loading and the alpha are somewhat low. Thus, I considered the possibility that a more reliable scale could be constructed using only four of the five items. Toward this end, reliability analysis was performed on all of the different four-item subsets of the five items. The highest value of alpha was in fact reached when all of the five items were included.

The chief independent variable in the following models is the construct of “imported socialization.” The construct of imported socialization³⁵ used here is the same as the one in the preceding chapters. Here, I also define the immigrant’s prior political context in terms of gradations of democracy, by taking advantage of the Polity IV dataset. Recall that in order to reflect the pre-adult socialization effects, the measure takes into consideration only up to the first 18 years of life of the respondents. This variable ranges from a conceptual minimum value of zero (most authoritarian) to a maximum of 20 (most democratic), however the actual observed values in these data range from 1 to 20. Again, given my mixed expectations, a squared term of this construct is incorporated into the analyses.

In addition to those tests concerning the core of this chapter’s empirical expectations, a round of tests is incorporated to estimate whether the effects of pre-migration political experiences are any stronger among immigrants with lower levels of education and whether the imported socialization effects, in general, attenuate as time goes by. To consider the former possibility, models three and four in Table 4.4 incorporate the interaction between the imported socialization measure and education. To test the latter possibility, the final model (four) in Table 4.4 includes not only the count of years spent in the United States, but also the interaction between this count and the imported socialization construct.

Again, in an effort to keep the models across this dissertation’s empirical chapters comparable, other variables included in the models are efficacy, age upon arrival,

³⁵ For a full description of the construction of this measurement, please see the corresponding section in the preceding chapter. Also, see Appendix B for more details regarding the distribution of the imported socialization scores by country of origin and by dataset utilized in this study. Table 2, in the Appendix, contains the information on the *NSL 2004*. Table 3 contains the details regarding the *LNS 2006*.

indicators of language skills, income, education, and frequency of attendance at religious services. Efficacy was measured with an item through which respondents were asked to assess whether citizens can have an influence on government by engaging in different political activities. Income reflects estimates of respondents' household income in thousand of dollars per year using the mid point of the range of every category for every respondent. In the case of education, the variable values reflect the number of completed school years by every respondent. Religious attendance was also recoded to produce a measure which provides with an estimate number of days attended per year for every respondent. In order to account for language skills two indicator variables were operationalized, bilingual and English dominant at home, where the reference category is Spanish dominant at home.

Table 4.3 presents the results of the estimated Poisson regression models where the dependent variable is the count of political activities in which the respondent has engaged during the last calendar year, and independent variables include the series of individual-level controls described above, plus the respondent-specific measure of imported socialization and its squared term. In models one and two the coefficient of the key independent variable does not reach statistical significance under either of the first two specifications. In other words, neither the linear nor the squared specification of the imported socialization measure reaches statistical significance. However, in model 3 in Table 4.4 both coefficients attain statistical significance along with the interaction term involving education. For simplicity purposes on the interpretation, the results of model 3 in Table 4.4 are summarized graphically in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, where I report predicted probabilities of political participation in terms of engagement in a number of political

activities in one given year. The vertical axis in each case is the expected count of activities and the horizontal is the respondent-specific Polity-based measure of imported socialization. In both figures, all other variables are held constant at their mean or at their modal category in the case of indicator variables. In Figure 4.2, though, education levels are varied to represent relatively low (9 years of schooling) and relatively high levels (13 years) of education.

Figure 4.1 suggests that, all else equal, immigrants who come from more democratic contexts are slightly less likely than their counterparts who come from more authoritarian ones to become engaged in political activities following migration. Figure 4.2 provides a nuanced reading to this story. Contrary to my expectations, the pattern just described above is sharper for immigrants with relatively high levels of education than for those with relatively low levels of education/sophistication. In other words, immigrants with low levels of education display a constantly medium-low propensity to engage in politics regardless of the context under which they were politicized, whereas immigrants with relatively high levels of education who come from more authoritarian contexts are slightly more likely to engage in politics following migration than their counterparts who come from more democratic contexts. Although caution is warranted regarding the conclusions one can draw from these results, one can speculate that these results suggest that among the best educated there might be two different patterns of immigration. Among this category, those who were socialized under more authoritarian contexts might have indeed migrated to America for political reasons, thus pursuing the freedom to participate, whereas for those who were socialized under more democratic conditions, and that presumably are not seeking political freedom, the motivation to

migrate might be a rather economic one. In short, utilizing Almond and Verba's (1963) terms, it is plausible that among those immigrants who have better educational resources, some participant citizens may still emerge from authoritarian contexts of socialization.

The interaction terms between age upon arrival and the imported socialization terms never attain statistical significance under any specification, thus suggesting that regardless of their age upon arrival in their new home, immigrants' political suitcases are relevant to understand their proclivity to engage or not in political activities following migration. By the same token, in model four in Table 4.4, neither of the coefficients of the interaction terms between years spent in the United States and the imported socialization terms (linear and squared) reach statistical significance, suggesting again that the effect of prior socialization might actually endure the passage of time.

Immigrants' Political Suitcases at the Polls

Thus far, the analyses on political participation have focused on activities that can be performed long before immigrants are enfranchised through the process of naturalization. However, it remains to be tested whether pre-migration political experiences may have an effect on these individuals' propensity to show at the polls on Election Day once they have become citizens of their new home. In order to test this latter possibility, the analyses in this section rely upon the Latino National Survey 2006 (*LNS 2006*). The dependent variable in the following section of the analyses defines political participation as a self-reported account of having voted in the 2004 presidential election in the United States. The analyses hereafter are thus restricted to the sub-sample of respondents who claim to be naturalized citizens of the U.S. In other words, instead of

analyzing the 5,653 original cases of immigrants available in the sample, the focus is on those 1,875 individuals who self-report already holding citizenship in their new home.

The dependent variable uses a binary scale where 1 denotes having reported voting in the 2004 election (63.3 percent) and 0 denotes otherwise. The main independent variable again is the construct of imported socialization. Recall that although this variable has a conceptual minimum value of zero and a maximum of 20, the actual observed values range from 1 to 20. Given my mixed expectations, a squared term of this construct again is included in the models.

Following the same structure of the preceding section, I first offer tests concerning the impact of imported socialization on levels of electoral participation. Next, the analyses incorporate tests to estimate whether the effects of pre-migration political experiences are any stronger among immigrants with lower levels of education/sophistication and whether the content of these immigrants' political suitcases wane with the passage of time. Models three and four in Table 4.6 incorporate the interaction terms between the imported socialization measure (both linear and squared terms) and education to assess the first possibility, whereas the fourth and final model also includes the interaction between the count of years spent in the United States with the imported socialization construct to assess the second possibility.

The other variables included in these models are again efficacy, age upon arrival, indicators of language skills, income, education, and frequency of attendance at religious services. Efficacy was measured with an item in which respondents were asked to assess whether citizens can have an influence on government by engaging in different political activities. Income reflects estimates of respondents' household income in thousand of

dollars per year using the mid point of the range of every category for every respondent. In the case of education, the variable values reflect the number of completed school years by every respondent. Religious attendance was again recoded to produce a measure of an estimate number of days attended per year for every respondent. In order to account for language skills two indicator variables were operationalized, bilingual and English dominant at home, where the reference category is Spanish dominant at home.

Table 4.5 presents the results of the logistic regression models where the dependent variable is the indicator variable accounting for respondent's self-reported participation in the 2004 election, and the independent variables include the series of individual-level controls described above, in addition to the respondent-specific measure of imported socialization and its squared term. In model one in this table the coefficient of imported socialization is positive and attains statistical significance. In other words, this result suggests that, all else being equal, immigrants whose pre-migration political experiences were nurtured by more democratic contexts are indeed more likely to vote in American elections once they have become naturalized citizens of their new home than their counterparts whose experiences were nurtured by more authoritarian contexts.

Model two in Table 4.5 offers a slightly modified version of the original one, where the only difference is the inclusion of the squared term of the imported socialization measure. As it can be seen, both coefficients fall short of reaching statistical significance. Therefore, one can conclude that when it comes to voting, democratic contexts appear to equip individuals in a better fashion than do authoritarian ones. Again, these results should be considered in context. While the negative slope in the preceding section of this chapter refers to immigrants in general, regardless of their migratory status

in the United States, the positive slope in this section of the chapter refers to only those immigrants who have become citizens to the new host nation. For instance, the average length of stay among immigrants in general is 17 years, whereas the average years spent in the United States for those individuals who have become citizens is 27 years.

The results of model one in table 4.5 are summarized graphically in Figure 4.3, where I report predicted probabilities of having voted in the 2004 U.S. presidential election. The vertical axis is the predicted probability of the respondent reporting having voted in such election and the horizontal axis is the respondent-specific Polity-based measure of imported socialization. All other variables are held constant at their mean or at their modal category in the case of indicator variables. The estimates provide strong corroboration of the core expectation. In very simple terms, immigrants who were exposed to more democratic contexts during their pre-adult socialization years are more likely to vote in American elections than their counterparts who grew up under more authoritarian conditions.

Note that once the squared term of the imported socialization measure is incorporated, the measure never attains statistical significance under any other specification, suggesting the presence of only direct and linear effects. The interaction terms between age upon arrival and the imported socialization terms never attain statistical significance under any specification. Also, in model four in Table 4.6, neither of the coefficients of the interaction terms between years spent in the United States and the imported socialization terms (linear and squared) reach statistical significance, suggesting one last time that the effect of prior socialization might actually endure in these individuals' political hearts and minds as their new civic lives unfold in their new

home. This latter finding is unsurprising in the present case, given, as noted above, that immigrants who are eligible to vote have resided in the United States for an average of 27 years.

Conclusions

Both illustrations offered at the beginning of the introductory chapter should be recalled as we have come full circle to the final section of the final empirical chapter of this study. Both the massive public demonstrations by Latino immigrants and their sometimes “early” identification with one of the two major American parties should stress the fact that political engagement (both psychological and physical) among first generation immigrants takes place regardless of how little time they have lived in the United States and regardless of their legal status. In fact, as shown throughout this dissertation’s pages, these individuals can and do become engaged in political activities long before they are enfranchised through the naturalization process once in the United States. Consequentially, and perhaps more importantly, immigrants’ political behavior can be better understood by peeking into immigrants’ political suitcases. This is to say, we gain important new insight by acknowledging the presence of an imported socialization process and by incorporating immigrants’ pre-migration political experiences into our models.

This study has focused on the intensity and directionality of engagement by looking at the effect of both “contextual” and “individual” forces that shape the size and content of immigrants’ political suitcases. Given the different tests and the recurrence of some findings across the different datasets, this study’s findings and core conclusions are believed to stand upon solid ground. Immigrants should not be treated as political blank

slates. These individuals come to the United States with political suitcases, which are important, if not fundamental, components of their political behavior. Admittedly, further research is still required to determine the specific weight of such suitcases on particular political activities and whether this study's findings can be extended to immigrants from other regions of the world. However, after three empirical chapters, several dependent variables and two very different ways to approach the imported socialization phenomenon, I feel comfortable to say that this theory was laid out to generate "as many observable implications as possible," which allowed to "put the theory at risk of being falsified more times" (King et al 1994: 19). Now, building on all of these findings, let me turn our attention to some final considerations both in terms of the next research steps to follow and certain policy consequences that may be derived from this study's findings.

CHAPTER 5 “EL OTRO LADO”³⁶ OF IMMIGRANTS’ POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

The final paragraphs of Isabel Allende’s *De Amor y de Sombra*³⁷ describe the struggles faced by the main characters of the story as they are leaving their country of origin. *Francisco Leal* and *Irene Beltrán* are forced to flee their home country given their involvement in a chain of events that revealed the authoritarian regime’s efforts to suppress political opposition using all means imaginable. As they prepare to leave everything behind to seek refuge in a new host nation, the young journalists stand in the midst of a valley in between two nations. The image could not be any more appropriate to illustrate the core thesis of this dissertation. Their last words before leaving their homeland suggest they have hope they will be able to return one day, but the dialogue also conveys their sense of fear, uncertainty and nostalgia. Those feelings, of course, do not vanish once *Francisco* and *Irene* cross the border. The byproducts of their political experiences in their home country--political attitudes, beliefs and behaviors—stay with expatriates.

This dissertation is a study of political attitudes and behaviors of Latino immigrants to the United States. It offers an innovative approach both conceptually and methodologically to the study of one key facet of American political behavior. The project brings an important comparative flavor and offers potential contributions to the vast literatures on political socialization, political attitudes toward democratic institutions, partisanship, and political participation. In the following pages I offer a brief overview of this study’s main findings, its conceptual implications as well as some

³⁶ The Spanish phrase “El otro lado” translates into the English phrase “The other side.”

³⁷ The Spanish phrase “De amor y de sombra” translates into the English phrase “Of love and shadow.”

potential policy consequences, and some ideas concerning the path I envision to further advance this research project in the years to come. Accordingly, the chapter is divided into three main sections. The first one offers the review of main findings. It is an effort to summarize the results and to go beyond them by discussing them in light of how the logic of imported socialization lead us to a better understanding of fundamental concepts of political behavior. Next, the second section is devoted to laying out the steps to follow up on this research project. Finally, the third section incorporates some potential policy implications of my findings into the overall discussion. A case is made that this dissertation's findings may come to alter how political actors in the United States should think of and approach the political incorporation of immigrants to this nation.

Immigrants' Political Suitcases Do Clear Customs

In spite of the fact that the United States has led the world in the total number of immigrants received for the past two centuries (Ueda 2007), political science efforts to provide a systematic account regarding how these individuals use their prior political experiences to navigate and adapt to the new political context in which they land have been scant. My dissertation addresses this important question by examining the political attitudes, beliefs and behavior of immigrants to the United States, with attention to both whether immigrants become politically engaged in their new home and the direction of their political engagement. Just as individuals are not blank slates when they come into this world (Alford et al. 2005; Mondak 2010), I contend that immigrants are far from being political blank slates when they step foot in the United States. To the contrary, my research provides evidence that immigrants' experiences in the nation of origin shape behavior across the border.

The major contributions of this research project are two-fold. Substantively, building upon Lippmann's (1922) concept of pseudo-environments,³⁸ I show that immigrants' pseudo-environments *before* migration help these individuals understand the political world with which they are presented *after* migration. The results hold for a wide range of dependent variables and across different datasets, strengthening the confidence in my findings. By testing the effects of *imported socialization* on trust in the U.S. government on political predispositions (including both intensity and directionality) and on political participation, this dissertation is among the first works to shed light on the subject matter. My treatment of these issues certainly is the most comprehensive and multi-faceted to date.

Equally important are the methodological contributions of this project. The major obstacle to conducting this kind of study in the past has been the absence of *pre-* and *post-*migration panel data. To overcome this, my general strategy entailed a basic two-step process. First, I depicted these immigrants' social and political experiences, or related attitudes and behaviors, in the nation of origin. Then, I use these indicators as predictors of political activity in the U.S.

Throughout the empirical tests offered in this dissertation, I have operationalized *imported socialization* in two very different ways, and yet both sets of tests yielded strong evidence that past experiences bring enduring effects. Hence, I contend that any serious effort to devise a comprehensive account of immigrants' political behavior needs

³⁸ Recall that Lippmann (1922) posited that, when thinking of the political world, individuals would form a "picture in their heads" to which he referred as pseudo-environments. The concept of pseudo-environment implies that, if at all, individuals will experience the political world only in an indirect manner and that their perception of reality is what drives these individuals' assessments of political reality.

to contemplate their prior political experiences. Immigrants' political experiences in their countries of origin play a key role in defining their political behavior once in the United States.

Imported Trust

Chapter Two offers evidence that even *before* migration, holding the highest level of trust in the Mexican government makes individuals more likely than their counterparts with the lower level of trust in the Mexican government to display any kind of trust in the U.S. government. This pattern is also found among Mexican immigrants who are living in the United States. Immigrants who express trust in the government of their country of origin are more likely to express trust in their new nation's political institutions following migration. In fact, as trust in the Mexican government increases from its lowest to its highest levels, the predicted trust in government in the United States increases by more than one full point on a nine-point scale. However, contrary to my expectations, I found neither evidence that this effect diminishes over time nor that the effects of imported political trust are any stronger for immigrants with relatively low levels of education when contrasted with their counterparts who hold higher levels of education.

When *imported socialization* is captured with the Polity-based individual-specific construct, results show that individuals who are politicized under more democratic contexts are indeed more likely to display relatively lower levels of trust in the U.S. government than their counterparts who are politicized under more authoritarian conditions. However, under this approach, I found evidence of attenuation of effects over time. Among those individuals who have spent one year or less in the United States and who were exposed to the most democratic conditions during their pre-adult socialization

years, the expected level of trust in the U.S. government is lower than the level of trust in the U.S. government among those individuals who were politicized under the most authoritarian conditions. The story reads a bit differently when those immigrants who have spent an average of 17 years in America. Although the pattern remains the same, the gap between expected levels of trust for immigrants who were politicized under the most democratic conditions versus those who were politicized under the most authoritarian conditions narrows considerably. It remains a matter for further inquiry why that it is immigrants who have democratic backgrounds and not those with authoritarian backgrounds who experience adjustment in their levels of trust toward the U.S. government with the passage of time.

Imported Partisanship

Chapter Three offers empirical evidence to support that Mexicans who are engaged in politics in Mexico to a sufficient extent that they hold partisan attachments are indeed relatively more likely to display a clear preference for either of the two major political parties in the United States. This relationship observed *before* migration is observed as well among Mexicans *after* migration to the United States. Holding a partisan attachment in one's home country predicts post-migration political engagement. Moreover, again, there is no evidence that this effect vanishes over time. Nor is there evidence that this process operates only among immigrants with low levels of education/sophistication. In other words, the process of imported socialization by which immigrants establish a cognitive link between their old and new political worlds seems relevant for any given individual regardless of the person's levels of

education/sophistication, and the said link between old and new political worlds will accompany these individuals throughout their civic lives in their new host nation.

Under a different methodological approach by which imported socialization is measured with the Polity-based individual-specific scores, the core finding remains: pre-migration political experiences matter for post-migration political predispositions. Immigrants who were exposed to more democratic contexts during their pre-adult socialization years are more likely to become partisans in the United States than their counterparts who grew up under more authoritarian conditions. This effect is found in the analyses conducted using two different datasets. Also, although present in only one of the datasets, there is one finding that deserves one's attention. When it comes to partisan attachments, it seems to be the case that among those immigrants with relatively lower levels of education, those who were exposed to more democratic conditions during their pre-adult socialization years are almost twice more likely to be engaged politically as their counterparts who were exposed to the most authoritarian conditions during the same periods of their lives.

Concerning the possibility of attenuation of effects over time, I found no evidence whatsoever in either of the datasets available for this portion of the analyses. Under the corresponding specifications, the coefficients on the interaction terms between the imported socialization construct and the count of years spent in the United States do not reach statistical significance in either of the two datasets, thus providing further corroboration of enduring effects of prior political socialization.

Imported Ideology

Chapter Three also offers empirical evidence to support that Mexican non-ideologues are less likely than Mexican ideologues, in general, to express a preference for either of the two American parties *before* migration. In fact, ideologues outnumber non-ideologues, in a ratio of at least two to one, when it comes to probabilities of indicating a preference for either of the main two American parties. The story remains the same following migration. Mexicans living in the United States display the same pattern described above. Mexican immigrant non-ideologues are less likely than their ideologue counterparts, in general, to display partisan attachments toward the two main American parties once in the United States. Among Mexican ideologues, immigrants on the center right and right of the spectrum are more likely to engage politically in terms of the formation of partisan attachments.

Imported Participation

Due to data availability, Chapter Four does not offer any empirical tests devoted to the before migration side of the story. Analyses concerning political participation are divided in two sections. The first one deals with political activities open to all residents of the United States, regardless of immigration status in the country. The second one tests the effects of imported socialization on the prospects that naturalized citizens will vote in American elections following migration.

The tests offered in the first section described above are less comprehensive, and yield less compelling results, than those reported elsewhere in this dissertation. However, even here there is some evidence that the core expectation also holds for political participation when this concept is measured as a count of political acts. Pre-migration

political experiences account, at least in part, for post-migration political behavior. If one asks the question, “can immigrants bring democracy along?” the results shyly whisper a negative answer. Results in the first section of Chapter Four suggest that immigrants who come from more democratic contexts are slightly less (and not more) likely than their counterparts who come from more authoritarian ones to become engaged in political activities following migration.

Also, contrary to my expectations, the said pattern is sharper for immigrants with relatively high levels of education than for those with relatively low levels of education/sophistication. More specifically, immigrants with low levels of education display a constantly medium-low propensity to engage in politics regardless of the context under which they were politicized, whereas immigrants with relatively high levels of education who come from more authoritarian contexts are slightly more likely to engage in politics following migration than their counterparts who come from more democratic contexts. It is yet to be tested whether those immigrants with authoritarian pre-migration experiences, and who presumably migrated to America for political reasons, are systematically pursuing the freedom to participate. In other words, are immigrants with authoritarian backgrounds relatively more likely to engage in certain political activities than their counterparts with more democratic backgrounds because the latter individuals might have migrated to America for economic rather than for political reasons? Finally, the effects of imported socialization on political participation do not fade as years go by.

Does the patterns described above hold when the effects of imported socialization on the probability of an immigrant engaging in American elections are considered? If one

has to ask the question again, “can immigrants bring democracy along?,” the answer is straightforward. All else being equal, immigrants who were exposed to more democratic contexts during their pre-adult socialization years, and presumably were nurtured by such political experiences, are more likely to vote in American elections once they have become naturalized citizens of their new home than their counterparts whose experiences were nurtured by more authoritarian contexts. This latter finding highlights again the enduring nature of the imported socialization process as immigrants who are eligible to vote (in the dataset available for this analyses) have resided in the United States for an average of 27 years. Also, this effect is present indistinctively among individuals with relatively low and relatively high levels of education/sophistication.

The incorporation of the concept of imported socialization into our understanding of Latino immigrants’ political behavior in the United States substantially strengthens our understanding of one core facet of American political behavior. In my view, imported socialization is a term that has been absent (and was much needed) in our conceptualizations and models of immigrants’ behavior. It provides us with “the other side” of these individuals’ stories. It helps us account for those pre-migration political experiences, which shape in an important manner the attitudes, beliefs and behaviors of these individuals after they cross nations’ borders. The concept of imported socialization should call our attention to the fact that immigrants do bring political suitcases when they enter the United States. Moreover, the content of these suitcases yield effects that resonate just the same in the beginning of these individuals’ lives in America as many years later, following the passage of time—and presumably following first-hand experience with U.S. politics.

Although the obstacles inherent in studying the effects of prior political socialization are sizeable, the content of this dissertation provides an important first step in establishing clear links between views of immigrants' old and new political worlds or pseudo-environments (Lippmann 1922). Of course, the development of a full account of how immigrants' past experiences influence political behavior in the United States requires a multi-method (perhaps even an interdisciplinary) approach and multiple complementary studies. Although the present dissertation is but one among the very many efforts required for the task at hand, the following section is an effort to provide some potential avenues to keep building upon and to further enhance this study's findings.

Looking Ahead

I have called attention to a new constellation of forces possibly operating to influence political behavior. Thus, a great deal remains to be done. Certainly the work will extend beyond this dissertation project. So far, I have discussed the effects of pre-migration political experiences on immigrants' political attitudes, predispositions and participation after migration. Down the road, greater work will be needed to uncover the processes that give rise to enduring effects. Beyond the education interaction tested throughout the empirical analyses here, many more questions exist regarding possible situational variance, including identification of for which people and under which conditions pre-migration experiences are most consequential.

For instance, in a related paper, co-author Tom Rudolph and I (Wals and Rudolph 2008) delve into the question of situational variance. We show that the effects of acculturation on attitudes toward government are moderated by both income and the level

of democracy in one's country of origin. The negative effects of acculturation on trust in government are attenuated and, in some cases, reversed among the affluent and among those who originated from more democratic regimes. These results hold across the three different levels of government, namely, local, state and federal. This is but one illustration regarding the myriad possibilities yet to be explored on this subject matter. The following two sections of this chapter address the question of situational variance in further depth and from different perspectives.

Imported Socialization and Fundamental Differences

Concerning the effects of *imported trust* on attitudes toward the U.S. government, my argument is that this importation process occurs because the effects of prior socialization experiences are rather enduring ones, not be erased by the mere act of migration. However, as laid out earlier, an alternate possibility is that trust is partly rooted in forces apart from socialization, such as personality or even genetics. Numerous recent studies have examined the impact of biology (e.g., Alford et al. 2005; Fowler and Dawes 2008) and personality (e.g., Mondak and Halperin 2008; Mondak 2010) on political attitudes and behavior. These influences therefore also might contribute to the stability I have observed in immigrants' political orientations as they move from one nation to the next. That is, it may be that fundamental orientations present at birth provide structure that persists irrespective of national context.

In the analyses conducted here, I controlled for interpersonal trust in an effort to address this issue. The preferred alternative would be to obtain data that include information on the variables needed for my analyses while also including personality indicators, or, better yet, to use twin studies—the preferred data source for students of

biology and politics. But these alternates understandably are not presently available for research on the political behavior of immigrants.

If intrinsic forces such as biology or personality influence the political behavior of immigrants, what would the implications be for my thesis? A two-fold answer is needed. First, such influences would stand as alternatives to socialization. From this perspective, pre-migration political predispositions would not be entirely learned, but instead would trace at least partly to factors present at birth. But second, the fundamental point would remain that immigrants are not blank slates upon arrival in the United States. Thus, the importance of attending to pre-migration experiences would still hold.

Because I view it as important that future research parse out the effects of various factors that contribute to immigrants' political orientations, follow-up work that accounts for enduring influences is to be encouraged. For instance, I would be interested in incorporating the "Big Five"³⁹ framework (as suggested by Mondak 2010) into my analyses of immigrants' political behavior. The idea of this incorporation is two-fold. First, as posited earlier, the incorporation of such framework should allow me to disentangle the effects of personality trait factors from socialization-driven forces on individuals' attitudes and behaviors *after* migration. Second, but not less importantly, this framework should allow me to approach situational variance from a new angle. For instance, it might be the case that the imported socialization process operates differently on individuals due to their personality traits rather than due to their education/sophistication levels. In the following paragraphs, I elaborate a bit further on this point.

³⁹ The "Big Five" are: openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and emotional stability.

Depending on which I approach I use to test the effects of imported socialization on immigrants' levels of trust in the U.S. government, I find opposite results regarding over-time attenuation of these effects. This result might strictly be explained by the fact that the two different approaches I utilized to measure prior political experiences are starkly different in nature, which in turn might produce diverging effects on longevity. Nonetheless, this difference of results led me to consider other potential avenues for further empirical tests regarding alternate processes. As a result, I cannot but wonder whether different personality traits may lead certain individuals to carry over political suitcases with content that is heavier and longer lasting than those of other immigrants. For example, an argument could be made that individuals who score high in openness to experience are more likely to display over-time attenuation. In other words, if an individual is "by nature" more open to experience, this individual may be more willing to update perceptions of the new political world in its own terms and rights, relying less and less on prior views of the old political pseudo-environment as time goes by. By the same token, more conscientious individuals might feel the need to understand the new political world in light of new information as time goes by, which in turn should make these individuals more likely than their less conscientious counterparts to experience imported socialization effects that fade with the passage of time.

Concerning agreeableness, first, I argue that individuals who score low on this dimension are more likely to display imported negative orientations toward the political institutions of the new host country than their counterparts who are considered "agreeable." The rationale behind this expectation is very straightforward. All else constant, "disagreeable" people should be more likely than their "agreeable" counterparts

to develop negative affective and evaluative orientations toward political institutions in general. If for no other reason, this pattern will emerge because “disagreeable” people should be prone to develop adversity toward government’s policies and outcomes on a wider range of issues than “agreeable” people will do. This pattern, I contend, should emerge regardless of the context to which these individuals were exposed during their pre-adult socialization years. Second, and perhaps more importantly, disagreeable people should be less likely than their agreeable counterparts to reverse these negative orientations with the passage of time.

From a psychological perspective, the immigration process involves the constant interaction of dual realities (Mahalingam 2006) as well as loss and transformation of identity (Akhtar 1999). One can argue that individuals who score high on emotional stability might be better equipped to handle these stressful and life-altering situations surrounding the immigration process. If that is indeed the case, one can speculate that, all else constant, the imported socialization effects should be stronger among immigrants who score low on emotional stability. Why? Because these individual will be less likely to deal with a “true” interaction of the dual realities and/or the loss of their cultural identities, thus relying more on a direct importation of attitudes and behaviors by which these individuals will be linking the old and the new worlds more heavily.

Finally, another possibility of situational variance rooted in personality traits might be found related to extraversion. It might be the case that extraverts, in general, are more likely to engage in political activities such as joining a public demonstration both before and after migration. However, it is not hard to imagine that an individual who scores high on extraversion and who was exposed to an authoritarian regime during this

individual's pre-adult socialization years would probably value more the opportunities offered by a new (and more democratic) context than a person who scores low in extraversion and who would have not engaged in certain political activities even if the political system has provided with such rights and freedoms.

One final point is worth considering concerning the possibility that personality is linked to the decision to migrate itself. If it is the case that individuals who score high on extraversion and openness to experience are indeed more likely to migrate, then this would mean that the people who come to the U.S. are not a random draw in terms of personality. This latter situation could have political implications. For instance, if people who are extraverts are more likely to migrate, that would have a positive effect on levels of political participation. Also, if individuals who score high in openness tend to migrate, that would mean that immigrants would lean toward ideologically liberal.

Traveling Cognitive Frameworks?

The results offered in Chapter Three regarding the effects of pre-migration partisan attachments and ideological predispositions on the directionality of political engagement following migration call for further research. Recall that my findings suggest that, though to varying degrees, all of the three main partisan identifications in Mexico provide an important baseline to become engaged with either of the two main political parties in the United States. This result is also present among Mexicans in the *before* migration portion of my analyses in that chapter. These two sets of results imply that translation of partisan attachments from one's country of origin to the new host country are rather complex, thus new studies are in order to better capture the underpinnings of such a translation process. The same can be said regarding the translation of ideological

predispositions from the old political world to the new political world. The possibility of two interrelated follow-up studies comes to mind.

The first one of these follow-up studies would require additional data gathering utilizing Implicit Association Tests (IATs). The second one entails additional data gathering by very different means, namely, focus groups. Let me offer a general overview of both of them in the following two sub-sections. Recall here my core expectations about imported partisan attachments and imported ideology. More specifically, recall that, in terms of directionality, I predict that both the partisan and the ideologue in one nation will gravitate toward a party espousing similar views following migration. At first glance, my results do not find corroboration for this expectation. However, I argue that this may be because the data available to me do not allow me to test the extent to which the “views” of the old world actually correspond with the “views” of the new world. In other words, I need a different set of tools to peek inside these immigrants’ political suitcases. Both the IATs and the focus groups should allow me to do so.

The Immigrants’ IAT Follow-Up Study

An Implicit Association Test (IAT) is an experimental method first introduced by social psychologists (Greenwald et al 1998; for an example of related work in political science, see Lodge and Taber 2005). The IAT is designed to provide the researcher with measures of the strength of association between mental representations of objects (concepts) in an individual’s memory. Specifically, the IAT provides measures of strength of “automatic” association between “target concepts” and a list of attributes. On a standard IAT, the individual is required to categorize various stimulus or target objects, such that easier pairings of these objects with attributes (and thus faster responses) are

interpreted as being more strongly associated in memory than more difficult pairings of object-attributes (with slower responses). The task, of course, ought to be performed as quickly as possible by the individuals who decide to participate in the experimental setting. One of the interesting properties of the IAT is that the data collected through this method is resistant to individual's self-presentation strategies such as those driven by social desirability bias (Kim 2003; but see Greenwald et al 1998). Another main advantage of this type of study is that, due to the experimental nature of this method, small number of participants can still provide for reliable and systematic evidence.

This type of study would have two main goals. First, the researcher could gather data that could be of use to more effectively examine the content of immigrants' political suitcases. By this I mean, the data that would allow me or others working in this area to explore and understand the content of the old political worldviews and the extent to which this content is linked to the views of the new political world. In other words, this kind of test would allow approaching the nature of the cognitive links between the pseudo-environment in the country of origin and the pseudo-environment in the new home. For instance, what does it mean for an immigrant to be on the "left" of the political spectrum in the country of origin? What does it mean for that same individual to be on the "left" in the new host country? Second, this additional data gathering effort should also allow further tests regarding the enduring nature of the imported socialization process.

The strategy to pursue the longitudinal component of the study would entail two different stages. Ideally I would have access to data with as much variance as possible regarding length of stay in the United States among the participants of the first wave of

the study, which leads me to the second key element of this follow-up project. The goal would be to persuade participants who have spent one year or less in the United States to come back to the lab to perform at least one other IAT after a certain period of time, most likely in between one or two years. The first part of the strategy would allow me to readily draw comparisons of the structure of cognitive frameworks *across* individuals by length of stay in the new host country. The second part of the strategy would allow me to test whether and the extent to which cognitive frameworks of the old and new worlds experience change over time *within* individuals. If the findings included in this dissertation that suggest that all of the three main partisan attachments provide important bases for attachments after migration to both of the main American parties were corroborated under the IAT study, these results would have potentially very relevant political implications for the American parties' strategies of reaching out to the immigrant population and seeking to engage this community in a more active political life in America. A few speculations on this latter point are offered in the concluding section of this chapter.

The Immigrants' Focus Group Follow-Up Study

As argued elsewhere throughout the pages of this dissertation, the main expectation of this study seems to stand upon solid ground. The nuances of the story, though, have left many questions open and waiting for answers. One method which may allow me to capture nuances and insights regarding the process of imported socialization would involve the use of focus groups. The main goal would be to capture as much detail as possible regarding situational variance in immigrants' own words, in order to complement and inform the formal statistical analyses –both present and future. One of

the greatest advantages of this method is that it would allow me to gather relatively large amounts of qualitative data at a relatively low cost. More importantly, the insights provided by focus group participants might suggest interpretations and hypotheses that would add nuance to presently-available survey-based analyses, and also generate information about possible additional issues that could be probed in future surveys.

A Panel Study with Mexican Immigrants

Of course, this study would benefit immensely from a three-wave panel survey as suggested earlier in this dissertation. The key challenge is in identifying and gathering data from the same individuals both prior to and following migration. Potentially, building upon the construct of likelihood of migration, this study could be plausible. If the self-assessed item regarding likelihood of migration is incorporated into enough surveys administered to random national samples of the Mexican public, the possibility would open for such a study to be conducted. The ideal dataset would be built by gathering the responses of those individuals who are “very likely” to migrate to the United States in the following years. Thus, the first wave would be conducted among those individuals in Mexico who are “very likely” to migrate to the United States in the near future. The second wave should be conducted on a rolling basis, thus taking place one year after the respondent was first contacted and following migration to the United States. Potentially, the second round can be conducted from Mexico if the respondent is willing to answer the survey questionnaire over the phone and if such means of communication are available to the immigrant in the individuals’ new home in the United States. Of course, depending upon availability of funds and attrition rates, ideally the

study would continue with yet a third and final wave, which would take place two or more years after the respondent was contacted for the first time.

Some people may raise the question whether this study's findings are specific only to first generation Latinos (and particularly Mexicans) in the United States. In my view, even if this is the case, these findings are academically and politically consequential. However, I have no reason to believe that the same patterns would not be found among other immigrant groups here in the United States. Both the IAT study and the focus group study could incorporate in their original designs immigrants from countries other than Mexico. Yet another possibility would be to replicate the present study with Mexicans who have migrated to other host countries such as Canada or Spain to determine whether the destination nation matters for the types of effects observed in research on imported socialization.

The idea to potentially expand my research within (by incorporating other immigrant groups) and beyond (by incorporating other host nations) the United States borders is not a capricious one. After all, in order to provide support for broad conclusions, "it is necessary to include a wide range of contextual variations in a comprehensive research plan" (Abelson 1995: 12). As an emerging scholar, my research agenda is driven by overarching questions. One of main goals, for instance, is to provide insights into how democracy (or the lack thereof) affects individual political behavior. Is it the case that individuals who are socialized under less favorable contexts, namely authoritarian ones, are ill equipped to deal with the works of democracy once a democratic transition takes place in their home countries or if they decide to migrate to a more democratic setting such as the one the United States provide? This dissertation, I

believe, offers my first tangible contributions on the topic. The idea of expanding my research as noted above should generate even further insight on these issues.

Should Imported Socialization Influence the American Political Arena?

As noted in the introductory chapter of this dissertation, immigrants represent an increasing group of recruits (DeSipio 1996) for the American polity. These individuals are “prospective citizens” who will decide either to engage or to ignore the ebb and flow of the political tide in their new home. The latter statement has two components. The first one stems from the potential citizen status of these individuals. The second one deals with these individuals’ decisions to engage in any manner in the political affairs of their new host country. Regarding the potential for citizenship, evidence suggests that naturalization rates are on the rise (Lee and Rytina 2009), especially among more recent cohorts (Baker 2009). As for the potential for political engagement among these individuals, this study’s findings have steadily corroborated throughout numerous empirical tests that immigrants’ levels of engagement in politics once in the United States do not, in fact, activate only once these individuals are enfranchised following navigation of the naturalization process. To the contrary, both psychological attachments and physical engagement in political acts can occur quite rapidly following migration.

On the Current Trends of Political Participation

As highlighted in Chapter Three and Four, immigrants whose pre-adult socialization experiences were nurtured by relatively more democratic contexts are more likely to engage in politics—both in terms of partisan attachments and self-reported levels of turnout during the 2004 presidential election—once in the United States than are their counterparts who were exposed to more authoritarian contexts before migration. If these

results were to be further corroborated, one important implication follows. Past cohorts of first generation Latin American immigrants were more likely to have been exposed and nurtured by more authoritarian regimes. In other words, more recent immigrant cohorts from this region of the world—and the largest one for the past four decades—are providing the United States with “prospective citizens” or “recruits” who are more likely to participate in politics than were their older cohort counterparts. Although the trend is certainly not necessarily irreversible, recent cohorts have experienced more democratic contexts during their pre-adult socialization years. Thus, following the logic of imported socialization that I have articulated in this study, I predict increasing levels of political engagement, turnout levels included, among first generation Latino immigrants in the years to come.

On Political Parties’ Outreach and Mobilization Efforts

Relevant to this topic, again, my findings suggest that, though to varying degrees, identifications with any of the three main Mexican parties provide an important baseline to become engaged with either the Democrats or with the Republicans. Also, my findings suggest that “ideologues” from all across the spectrum have the potential to develop a psychological attachment with either of the two main American parties. Whereas it is true that even among Mexicans in the *before* migration portion of my analyses preference for Democrats outnumbers preference for Republicans by a ratio of two to one, there is no single rationale inherent in my results that this asymmetrical pattern could not be altered if the Republican party were to succeed in implementing more effective means to reach out and engage this segment of the population. This latter possibility becomes even more apparent if one considers that among ideologues, immigrants on the center right and right

of the spectrum are more likely to engage politically once in America. This speculation based upon my findings could be a reason for hope among the Republican camp and a fable with a feel of warning for the Democratic Party.

On Political Incorporation and Naturalization Policy

The core thesis advanced in this dissertation is that immigrants' political suitcases (views on the political world of their countries of origin) will influence post-migration political predispositions and behaviors once these individuals have crossed nations' borders. If one decides to ignore the existence of the imported socialization process by which those views of the old political world are linked to the views of the new political world, one's understanding of post-migration political engagement necessarily will be incomplete. When immigrants are treated as political blank slates, we completely overlook these important components of political behavior. By the same token, if policy-makers ignore "*el otro lado*" of immigrants' political behavior, their policy choices will be myopic, at best. For one, when treated as blank slates, immigrants may be required to fulfill unnecessarily long residency requirements before applying for citizenship. Although current policies are designed to ensure political incorporation, an incomplete understanding of immigrants' behavior may have actually led to flawed policies, which deter rather than encourage political assimilation.

It is my expectation that the potential implications of my findings outlined above may be of interest to academics, activists, journalists, politicians and policy-makers alike. The United States is a nation whose greatness has been nurtured in significant part by large-scale waves of immigration. Academic attention to immigrants' prior political experiences and the impact of those experiences on post-migration political incorporation

has been rather scant. It is fundamental to acknowledge that immigrants are not political blank slates if one is interested in developing comprehensive accounts of their behaviors, and if one is interested in incorporating them into the American polity in a more efficient fashion. To the extent that engagement in the American political arena is something that we generally value, it is vital that we identify the factors contributing to such engagement. It is my hope that these pages have fulfilled the mission of taking an initial and yet critical first step in this direction.

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
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
FIGURES AND TABLES

Figure 1.1. Expected Probability of Mr. Mitote's Political Engagement in U.S. Politics given Pre-Migration Political Experiences



Note: This figure represents the predicted post-migration political behavior for three hypothetical immigrants to the United States. The first came to the U.S. from an authoritarian nation. This person is projected to have a low likelihood of engagement once in the U.S. The second person is Mr. Mitote, who came from a relatively more democratic context than the first person, thus Mr. Mitote is expected to have relatively higher likelihood of political engagement than the first hypothetical immigrant given their diverging pre-migration political experiences. Finally, the third person came from a democratic nation. Hence, this third person is the one expected to have the highest likelihood of engagement in politics following migration to the United States.

Figure 1.2. Unpacking Political Suitcases: A Visual Representation



Note: This figure illustrates in a visual manner the statements from the common immigrant from Urbana-Champaign. On the bottom, one can see the three logos of the three main parties in Mexico (the country of origin). The logos are lined up from left to right according to this immigrant's perception of these parties placement along the left-right continuum of social issues. The immigrant ideological own stance on the same continuum is denoted with a yellow star, right above the PRD logo, which is the party of his preference regarding Mexican politics. Bidirectional red arrows are drawn from both the PRI logo to the Democratic Party logo from the PAN logo to the Republican Party logo accounting for the analogies offered by the immigrant to make sense of the American political arena.

Table 2.1. Observed Trust in the U.S. Government among the Mexican Public by Levels of Trust in the Mexican Government

Trust in Mexican Government	Trust in the U.S. Government				Total
	None at all	Not very much	Somewhat	A great deal	
None at all	67.7 (356)	19.8 (104)	10.8 (57)	1.7 (9)	100.0 (526)
Not very much	36.8 (315)	48.6 (416)	12.4 (106)	2.2 (19)	100.0 (856)
Somewhat	35.5 (238)	29.6 (198)	31.2 (209)	3.7 (25)	100.0 (670)
A great deal	31.7 (64)	28.2 (57)	22.3 (45)	17.8 (36)	100.0 (202)
<i>N</i>					2,254

Source: Mexican Values Survey 2003

Table 2.2. Observed levels of Trust in the Mexican Government among the Mexican Public

Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Trust in Federal Government	2,347	1.240	0.917	0	3
Trust in State Government	2,339	1.230	0.922	0	3
Trust in Local Government	2,347	1.200	0.917	0	3

Source: Mexican Values Survey 2003

Table 2.3. The Impact of Trust in the Mexican Government on Trust in the U.S. Government before Migration


	Trust in the U.S. Government	
Trust in the Mexican Government	0.202	***
	(0.051)	
Attentiveness to the News	0.114	***
	(0.028)	
Trust in the Mex. Govt. × Attentiveness to the News	-0.000	
	(0.006)	
Interpersonal Trust	-0.202	
	(0.144)	
Efficacy	0.174	
	(0.049)	
Age	-0.008	**
	(0.003)	
Religious Attendance	-0.001	
	(0.001)	
Education	-0.017	
	(0.012)	
Income	0.056	***
	(0.011)	
Threshold (D.V. = 0)	1.324	***
	(0.288)	
Threshold (D.V. = 1)	3.037	***
	(0.294)	
Threshold (D.V. = 2)	5.088	***
	(0.312)	
	<i>N</i>	1,987
	$LR \chi^2 (14)$	266.93
	$Prob > \chi^2$	0.000
	pseudo <i>R</i>	0.126

Ordered Logit Regression

Standard errors are in parentheses.

$p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 2.1. Predicted probabilities of Trust in the U.S. Government among the Mexican Public by Levels of Trust in the Mexican Government



Note: Predicted probabilities were computed using the model in Table 2.3. Levels of trust in the Mexican government were varied for this calculation. The rest of the predictors were held at their mean values or at their modal category in the case of indicator variables.

Table 2.4. Observed levels of Trust in Mexican Political Institutions among the Mexican Public

Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Trust in the Supreme Court	1,431	1.500	0.945	0	3
Trust in the Senate	1,422	1.130	0.908	0	3
Trust in the Chamber of Deputies	1,427	1.080	0.920	0	3
Trust in the Federal Institute of Elections (IFE)	1,463	1.610	1.002	0	3
Trust in political parties	1,454	0.980	0.909	0	3

Source: Reforma 2007

Table 2.5. The Impact of Trust in Mexican Political Institutions on Mexicans' Opinion of President Bush


	Opinion of President Bush	
Likelihood of Migration (Very likely)	0.243 (0.274)	
Likelihood of Migration (Somewhat Likely)	-0.013 (0.851)	
Likelihood of Migration (Not Very Likely)	0.308 (0.247)	
Trust in the Mexican Government	0.216 (0.032)	***
Attentiveness to the News	-0.028 (0.047)	
Trust in Mex. Govt. × Attentiveness to the News	0.000 (0.003)	
Presidential Approval (President Calderón)	0.241 (0.061)	***
Age	-0.001 (0.005)	
Religious Attendance	0.004 (0.002)	#
Education	-0.054 (0.021)	*
Income	-0.019 (0.027)	
Constant	2.284 (0.412)	***
	<i>N</i>	1,315
	<i>F(10, 1304)</i>	18.23
	<i>Prob>F</i>	0.000
	<i>Adjusted R²</i>	0.116

OLS Regression

Standard errors are in parentheses.

$p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 2.2. Expected Opinion of President Bush among the Mexican Public by Levels of Trust in Mexican Political Institutions



Note: Predicted probabilities were computed using the model in Table 2.5. Levels of trust in Mexican political institutions were varied for this calculation. The rest of the predictors were held at their mean values or at their modal category in the case of indicator variables.

Table 2.6. Mexican Immigrants' Trust in the U.S. Government

Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Trust in Federal Government	391	2.990	0.874	1	4
Trust in State Government	394	2.934	0.880	1	4
Trust in Local Government	393	2.842	0.875	1	4

Source: Mexican Values Survey 2003

Table 2.7. The Impact of Trust in the Mexican Government on Trust in the U.S. Government

	Model I. Without Interactions		Model II. Including Interactions with Education	
Trust in Mexican Government (A Great Deal)	1.303	***	0.975	
	(0.384)		(0.976)	
Trust in Mexican Government (Somewhat)	0.714	*	-0.486	
	(0.355)		(0.963)	
Trust in Mexican Government (Not Very Much)	0.606	#	0.826	
	(0.368)		(1.132)	
Interpersonal Trust	-0.358		-0.349	
	(0.304)		(0.304)	
Efficacy	0.381	*	0.364	*
	(0.161)		(0.161)	
Years in the U.S.	0.028	*	0.030	*
	(0.014)		(0.014)	
Trust in M.G. (A Great Deal) × Education	----	----	0.134	
	----	----	(0.099)	
Trust in M.G. (Somewhat) × Education	----	----	0.127	
	----	----	(0.099)	
Trust in M.G. (Not Very Much) × Education	----	----	-0.016	
	----	----	(0.107)	
Age Upon Arrival	0.049	***	0.049	***
	(0.013)		(0.013)	
Bilingual	-0.826		-0.839	
	(0.530)		(0.530)	
English	0.118		0.107	
	(0.375)		(0.377)	
Religious Attendance	0.003		0.003	
	(0.003)		(0.003)	
Education	-0.001		-0.075	
	(0.035)		(0.074)	
Income	0.004		0.006	
	(0.007)		(0.007)	
Constant	2.705	***	3.394	***
	(0.713)		(0.932)	
	<i>N</i>	376	<i>N</i>	376
	<i>F</i> (12, 363)	3.92	<i>F</i> (15, 360)	3.41
	<i>Prob>F</i>	0.000	<i>Prob>F</i>	0.000
	<i>Adjusted R</i> ²	0.085	<i>Adjusted R</i> ²	0.088

OLS regression. Standard errors are in parentheses. # $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$


Table 2.8. The Impact of Trust in the Mexican Government on Trust in the U.S. Government (Longitudinal Attenuation)

	Trust in the U.S. Government
Trust in Mexican Government (A Great Deal)	0.855 (0.720)
Trust in Mexican Government (Somewhat)	0.120 (0.698)
Trust in Mexican Government (Not Very Much)	0.357 (0.705)
Interpersonal Trust	-0.365 (0.305)
Efficacy	0.393 * (0.162)
Years in the U.S.	0.005 (0.031)
Trust in M.G. (A Great Deal) × Years in U.S.	0.028 (0.037)
Trust in M.G. (Somewhat) × Years in U.S.	0.036 (0.037)
Trust in M.G. (Not Very Much) × Years in U.S.	0.016 (0.036)
Age Upon Arrival	0.048 *** (0.013)
Bilingual	-0.868 (0.533)
English	0.109 (0.377)
Religious Attendance	0.003 (0.003)
Education	0.001 (0.035)
Income	0.004 (0.007)
Constant	3.056 *** (0.837)

<i>N</i>	376
<i>F</i> (15, 360)	3.19
<i>Prob>F</i>	0.000
<i>Adjusted R</i> ²	0.081

OLS regression. Standard errors are in parentheses. # $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 2.3. Expected Levels of Trust in the U.S. Government by Levels of Trust in the Mexican Government and Years in the U.S.



Note: Predicted probabilities were computed using the longitudinal attenuation model in Table 2.8. The following predictors were varied for this calculation: a) the set of indicator variables regarding respondents' levels of trust in Mexican Government; b) the number of years spent in the U.S., with values of either 1 (New Arrivals) or 17 (Average); and c) the corresponding interactions between these terms. The rest of the predictors were held at their mean values or at their modal category in the case of indicator variables.

Table 2.9. The Impact of Imported Socialization (Authoritarian vs. Democratic) on Trust in the U.S. Government


	Model I. IS w/o interactions	Model II. Longitudinal Attenuation
Imported Socialization (IS)	-0.027 (0.021)	-0.088** (0.034)
Years in the U.S.	0.027* (0.011)	-0.003*** (0.017)
IS × Years in the U.S.	----- -----	0.004* (0.002)
Interpersonal Trust	0.127 (0.231)	0.145 (0.230)
Efficacy	0.708*** (0.118)	0.701*** (0.118)
Age upon Arrival	0.034*** (0.009)	0.033*** (0.008)
Bilingual	-0.707 (0.487)	-0.695 (0.485)
English	-0.439# (0.259)	-0.442# (0.258)
Religious Attendance	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)
Education	-0.024 (0.025)	-0.023 (0.025)
Income	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)
Constant	3.383*** (0.544)	-3.937*** (0.597)
<i>N</i>	621	621
<i>F</i> (10, 610); <i>F</i> (11, 609)	8.73	8.43
<i>Prob>F</i>	0.000	0.000
<i>Adjusted R</i> ²	0.111	0.116

OLS Regression

Standard errors are into parentheses.

p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Figure 2.4. Expected Levels of Trust in the U.S. Government by Imported Socialization and Years in the U.S.



Note: Predicted probabilities were computed using the longitudinal attenuation model in Table 2.9. The imported socialization predictor was varied for this calculation. It was assigned values ranging from 0 (Authoritarian) to 20 (Democratic). The rest of the predictors were held at their mean values or at their modal category in the case of indicator variables.

Table 3.1. Observed Preferences for Political Parties in the U.S. among the Mexican Public by Partisan Status in Mexico

Mexican Partisan Status	Preference among U.S. Political Parties			Total
	No Preference	Democrat	Republican	
Non-Partisan	49.7 (304)	35.3 (216)	15.0 (92)	100.0 (612)
Partisan	41.5 (373)	36.5 (328)	21.9 (197)	100.0 (898)
<i>N</i>				<i>1,510</i>


Source: Reforma 2007

Table 3.2. The Impact of Partisan Attachments and Ideology in Mexico on Intensity of Expected Political Engagement with U.S. Parties

	Expected U.S. Partisan	
Likelihood of Migration (Very Likely)	0.158 (0.214)	
Likelihood of Migration (Somewhat)	-1.246 (0.592)	
Likelihood of Migration (Not Very)	-0.101 (0.191)	
Mexican Partisan	0.715 (0.259)	**
Non-Ideologue	-1.086 (0.184)	***
Extreme Left	0.827 (0.304)	**
Center Left	0.319 (0.200)	
Center Right	0.344 (0.154)	*
Extreme Right	0.126 (0.193)	
Attentiveness to the News	0.170 (0.031)	***
Mexican Partisan × Attentiveness to the News	-0.078 (0.038)	*
Age	-0.012 (0.004)	**
Religious Attendance	-0.001 (0.002)	
Education	-0.004 (0.017)	
Income	0.038 (0.021)	
Constant	-0.533 (0.312)	#
<hr/>		
	<i>N</i>	1,466
	<i>LR</i> χ^2 (15)	220.86
	<i>Prob</i> > χ^2	0.000
	pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.140

Logistic Regression. Standard errors are in parentheses. # $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 3.1. Expected Intensity of Political Engagement in the U.S. by Partisan Status in Mexico and Ideology



Note: Predicted probabilities were computed using the model in Table 3.2. Partisanship status in Mexico was assigned values of either 0 (Non-Partisan) or 1 (Partisan). The rest of the predictors were held at their mean values or at their modal category in the case of indicator variables, except for the indicators of ideological predisposition.

Table 3.3. Observed Preferences for Political Parties in the U.S. among the Mexican Public by Partisan Attachments in Mexico

Mexican Partisan Attachment	Preference among U.S. Political Parties			Total
	No Preference	Democrat	Republican	
Non-Partisan	49.7 (304)	35.3 (216)	15.0 (92)	100.0 (612)
PRD	35.0 (70)	47.0 (94)	18.0 (36)	100.0 (200)
PRI	46.7 (157)	28.0 (94)	25.3 (85)	100.0 (336)
PAN	40.3 (146)	38.7 (140)	21.0 (76)	100.0 (362)
<i>N</i>				1,510

Source: Reforma 2007

Table 3.4. The Impact of Partisan Attachments and Ideology in Mexico on Directionality of Political Engagement with U.S. Parties

	Democrat		Republican	
Likelihood of Migration (Very Likely)	0.032 (0.243)		0.383 (0.259)	
Likelihood of Migration (Somewhat)	-1.150 (0.658)		-1.454 (1.054)	
Likelihood of Migration (Not Very)	0.000 (0.209)		-0.193 (0.257)	
PRD Partisan	0.509 ** (0.197)		0.418 # (0.252)	
PRI Partisan	-0.187 (0.175)		0.551 ** (0.199)	
PAN Partisan	0.164 (0.165)		0.427 * (0.203)	
Non-Ideologue	-0.968 *** (0.207)		-1.250 (0.288)	
Extreme Left	0.881 ** (0.321)		0.538 (0.403)	
Center Left	0.294 (0.220)		0.390 (0.259)	
Center Right	0.339 * (0.170)		0.435 * (0.201)	
Extreme Right	0.179 (0.215)		0.173 (0.258)	
Attentiveness to the News	0.121 *** (0.022)		0.127 *** (0.027)	
Age	-0.007 (0.005)		-0.021 *** (0.006)	
Religious Attendance	-0.001 (0.002)		0.001 (0.003)	
Education	0.002 (0.018)		-0.013 (0.023)	
Income	0.044 # (0.023)		0.027 (0.028)	
Constant	-0.901 *** (0.316)		-1.068 ** (0.387)	
	<i>N</i>	1,466	$LR \chi^2 (32)$	252.81
	$Prob > \chi^2$	0.000	pseudo R^2	0.158

Multinomial Logistic Regression. Reference Category: Expected Non-Partisan in the U.S.
Standard errors are in parentheses. # $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 3.2. Expected Directionality of Political Engagement in the U.S. by Mexican Partisan Attachments







Figure 3.2. Expected Directionality of Political Engagement in the U.S. by Mexican Partisan Attachments (cont'd)

PRI Partisans



PAN Partisans



Note: Predicted probabilities were computed using the model in Table 3.4. Partisanship attachment in Mexico was assigned values of either 0 or 1, depending upon the specific party, namely the PRD, the PRI, or the PAN. The rest of the predictors were held at their mean values or at their modal category in the case of indicator variables, except for the indicators of ideological predisposition.

Table 3.5. Immigrants' Expected Electoral Participation in the U.S. by Partisan Status in Mexico

Expected Electoral Participation in the U.S.			
Mexican Partisan Status	Projected U.S. Non Voter	Projected U.S. Voter	Total
Mexican Non-Partisan	57.1 (97)	42.9 (73)	100.0 (170)
Mexican Partisan	19.2 (44)	80.8 (185)	100.0 (229)
<i>N</i>			399

Source: Mexican Values Survey 2003

Table 3.6. The Impact of Pre-Migration Partisan Attachments and Ideology on Intensity of Post-Migration Political Engagement


	Model I. Expected Electoral Participation		Model II. Longitudinal Attenuation	
Mexican PID	2.550	***	2.499	**
	(0.770)		(0.937)	
Non-Ideologue	-0.973	*	-2.118	*
	(0.456)		(0.975)	
Extreme Left	0.136		-1.350	
	(0.690)		(1.349)	
Center Left	0.492		0.374	
	(0.436)		(0.862)	
Center Right	1.025	**	1.297	#
	(0.346)		(0.689)	
Extreme Right	1.429	**	3.458	**
	(0.478)		(1.157)	
Years in the U.S.	0.040	**	0.032	
	(0.015)		(0.023)	
Mexican PID × Years in the U.S.	----	----	0.013	
	----	----	(0.028)	
Non-Ideologue × Years in the U.S.	----	----	0.068	
	----	----	(0.050)	
Extreme Left × Years in the U.S.	----	----	0.109	
	----	----	(0.086)	
Center Left × Years in the U.S.	----	----	0.006	
	----	----	(0.040)	
Center Right × Years in the U.S.	----	----	-0.017	
	----	----	(0.035)	
Extreme Right × Years in the U.S.	----	----	-0.126	*
	----	----	(0.059)	
Age Upon Arrival	0.012		0.011	
	(0.014)		(0.014)	
Bilingual	0.163		0.327	
	(0.603)		(0.617)	
English	0.569		0.645	#
	(0.391)		(0.402)	
Religious Attendance	0.006	#	0.007	#
	(0.004)		(0.004)	
Education	0.030		0.031	
	(0.051)		(0.051)	

Table 3.6. The Impact of Pre-Migration Partisan Attachments and Ideology on Intensity of Post-Migration Political Engagement

	Model I. Expected Electoral Participation		Model II. Longitudinal Attenuation	
Mexican PID × Education	-0.075		-0.089	
	(0.073)		(0.075)	
Income	0.017 *		0.017 *	
	(0.008)		(0.008)	
Constant	-2.651 ***		-2.543 **	
	(0.723)		(0.805)	
	<i>N</i>	394	<i>N</i>	394
	<i>LR</i> χ^2 (14)	119.87	<i>LR</i> χ^2 (20)	130.80
	<i>Prob</i> > χ^2	0.000	<i>Prob</i> > χ^2	0.000
	pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.262	pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.283


Logistic Regression. Standard errors are in parentheses. #*p* <0.10; **p*<0.05; ***p*<0.01; ****p*<0.001

Figure 3.3. Expected Electoral Participation in the U.S. by Partisanship Status and Ideology in Mexico and Years in the U.S.



Note: Predicted probabilities were computed using the longitudinal attenuation model in Table 3.6. The following predictors were varied for this calculation: a) partisanship status in Mexico, which was assigned values of either 0 (Non-Partisan) or 1 (Partisan); b) the number of years spent in the U.S., with values of either 1 (New Arrivals) or 17 (Average Stay); and c) the corresponding interaction between these two terms. The rest of the predictors were held at their mean values or at their modal category in the case of indicator variables.

Figure 3.4. Expected Electoral Participation in the U.S. by Partisanship Status and Levels of Education



Note: Predicted probabilities were computed using the longitudinal attenuation model in Table 3.6. The following predictors were varied for this calculation: a) partisanship status in Mexico, which was assigned values of either 0 (Non-Partisan) or 1 (Partisan); b) education coded as the number of years of formal education, with values of either 7 (Low) or 11 (High); and c) the corresponding interaction between these two terms. The rest of the predictors were held at their mean values or at their modal category in the case of indicator variables.

Table 3.7. The Impact of Imported Socialization (Authoritarian vs. Democratic) on Intensity of Post-Migration Political Engagement

	Model I.		Model II.	
	IS w/o interactions		IS with interactions	
	NSL	LNS	NSL	LNS
	2004	2006	2004	2006
Imported Socialization (IS)	0.068** (0.025)	0.020* (0.009)	0.286** (0.096)	0.090* (0.040)
Years in the U.S.	0.048*** (0.007)	0.049*** (0.003)	0.053*** (0.008)	0.051*** (0.003)
IS × Years in the U.S.	----	----	----	----
Age upon Arrival	0.019** (0.006)	0.022*** (0.003)	0.030* (0.015)	0.034*** (0.007)
IS × Age upon Arrival	----	----	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001* (0.000)
Bilingual	0.265 (0.210)	0.227** (0.077)	0.286 (0.212)	0.224** (0.077)
English	0.821 (0.652)	0.377*** (0.106)	0.793 (0.659)	0.373*** (0.106)
Religious Attendance	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)
Education	0.085*** (0.019)	0.069*** (0.010)	0.195*** (0.045)	0.091*** (0.021)
IS × Education	----	----	-0.017** (0.006)	-0.003 (0.003)
Income	0.007# (0.004)	0.011*** (0.002)	0.006 (0.004)	0.011*** (0.002)
Constant	-2.009*** (0.389)	-3.139*** (0.183)	-3.536*** (0.802)	-3.718*** (0.362)
<i>N</i>	978	4,828	978	4,828
$LR \chi^2(8); (11)$	112.46	596.55	120.10	601.12
$Prob > \chi^2$	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.092	0.093	0.098	0.094

Logistic Regression.

Standard errors are into parentheses. # p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001


Table 3.7. The Impact of Imported Socialization (Authoritarian vs. Democratic) on Intensity of Post-Migration Political Engagement (cont'd)

	Model III.	
	Longitudinal Attenuation	
	NSL	LNS
	2004	2006
Imported Socialization (IS)	0.346*** (0.105)	0.090* (0.044)
Years in the U.S.	0.073*** (0.017)	0.051*** (0.006)
IS × Years in the U.S.	-0.003 (0.002)	0.000 (0.001)
Age upon Arrival	0.036* (0.016)	0.034*** (0.007)
IS × Age upon Arrival	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001* (0.000)
Bilingual	0.286 (0.212)	0.224** (0.077)
English	0.736 (0.661)	0.373*** (0.106)
Religious Attendance	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)
Education	0.206*** (0.046)	0.091*** (0.021)
IS × Education	-0.018** (0.006)	-0.003 (0.003)
Income	0.005 (0.004)	0.011*** (0.002)
Constant	-4.090*** (0.902)	-3.715*** (0.401)
<i>N</i>	978	4,828
$LR \chi^2 (12)$	121.98	601.12
$Prob > \chi^2$	0.000	0.000
pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.100	0.094

Logistic Regression.



Standard errors are into parentheses. # p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Figure 3.5. Predicted Probabilities of Partisan Attachments in the U.S. by Imported Socialization



Note: Predicted probabilities were computed using the longitudinal attenuation model in Table 3.7. The imported socialization predictor was varied for this calculation. It was assigned values ranging from 0 (Authoritarian) to 20 (Democratic). The rest of the predictors were held at their mean values or at their modal category in the case of indicator variables.

Figure 3.6. Predicted Probabilities of Partisan Attachments in the U.S. by Imported Socialization and Levels of Education



Note: Predicted probabilities were computed using the longitudinal attenuation model in Table 3.7. The following predictors were varied for this calculation: a) imported socialization was assigned values ranging from 0 (Authoritarian) to 20 (Democratic); b) education coded as the number of years of formal education, with values of either 9 (Low) or 13 (High); and c) the corresponding interaction between these two terms. The rest of the predictors were held at their mean values or at their modal category in the case of indicator variables.

Table 3.8. Immigrants' Expected Directionality of Electoral Participation in the U.S. by Partisan Attachments in Mexico

Expected Preference among U.S. Political Parties				
Mexican Partisan Attachment	Expected Non Partisan in the U.S.	Expected Democrat Voter	Expected Republican Voter	Total
Non Partisan	56.8 (100)	32.4 (57)	10.8 (19)	100.0 (176)
PRD	12.5 (4)	62.5 (20)	25.0 (8)	100.0 (32)
PRI	23.5 (16)	48.5 (33)	28.0 (19)	100.0 (68)
PAN	17.1 (21)	55.3 (68)	27.6 (34)	100.0 (123)
<i>N</i>				399

Source: Mexican Values Survey 2003

Table 3.9. The Impact of Pre-Migration Partisan Attachments and Ideology on Directionality of Post-Migration Political Engagement

	Expected Democrat Voter		Expected Republican Voter	
PRD Partisan	4.154	#	6.951	**
	(2.200)		(2.530)	
PRI Partisan	1.188		2.608	*
	(1.056)		(1.225)	
PAN Partisan	2.338	*	4.194	***
	(1.066)		(1.251)	
Non-Ideologue	-0.752	***	-1.773	*
	(0.489)		(0.819)	
Extreme Left	0.324		-0.632	
	(0.734)		(0.975)	
Center Left	0.859	#	-0.114	
	(0.457)		(0.588)	
Center Right	1.156	**	0.601	
	(0.365)		(0.449)	
Extreme Right	1.651	***	1.016	#
	(0.500)		(0.584)	
Years in the U.S.	0.037	*	0.041	*
	(0.016)		(0.019)	
Age Upon Arrival	0.012		0.008	
	(0.015)		(0.019)	
Bilingual	0.434		-0.664	
	(0.607)		(0.942)	
English	0.352		1.226	*
	(0.418)		(0.507)	
Religious Attendance	0.009	*	0.006	
	(0.004)		(0.005)	
Education	0.041		-0.019	
	(0.054)		(0.079)	
PRD Partisan × Education	-0.220		-0.459	#
	(0.188)		(0.239)	
PRI Partisan × Education	0.011		-0.035	
	(0.105)		(0.125)	
PAN Partisan × Education	-0.052		-0.159	
	(0.098)		(0.121)	
Income	0.017	#	0.021	*
	(0.009)		(0.010)	

Table 3.9. The Impact of Pre-Migration Partisan Attachments and Ideology on Directionality of Post-Migration Political Engagement

	Expected Democrat Voter	Expected Republican Voter
Constant	-3.075 *** (0.771)	-3.723 *** (1.018)
<i>N</i>	394	
$LR \chi^2 (36)$	157.99	
$Prob > \chi^2$	0.000	
pseudo <i>R</i>	0.330	

Multinomial Logistic Regression

Reference Category: Expected Non-Partisan in the U.S.

Standard errors are in parentheses.

$p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

*Table 3.10. The Impact of Pre-Migration Partisan Attachments and Ideology
on Post-Migration Directionality of Political Engagement
(Longitudinal Attenuation)*

	Expected Democrat Voter		Expected Republican Voter
PRD Partisan	5.257 *		8.446 **
	(2.420)		(2.943)
PRI Partisan	1.219		2.512 #
	(1.311)		(1.522)
PAN Partisan	1.938		3.838 **
	(1.278)		(1.505)
Non-Ideologue	-2.417 *		-0.895 *
	(1.129)		(1.762)
Extreme Left	-1.468		-3.126 *
	(1.512)		(2.441)
Center Left	0.726		-0.284 *
	(0.920)		(1.247)
Center Right	1.177 #		1.630 #
	(0.732)		(0.893)
Extreme Right	3.762 **		3.244 *
	(1.222)		(1.418)
Years in the U.S.	0.023		0.044 *
	(0.025)		(0.031)
PRD × Years in the U.S.	-0.053		-0.079
	(0.061)		(0.084)
PRI × Years in the U.S.	0.001		-0.005
	(0.040)		(0.047)
PAN × Years in the U.S.	0.050		0.039
	(0.041)		(0.045)
Non-Ideologue × Years in the U.S.	0.091 #		0.045
	(0.055)		(0.047)
Extreme Left × Years in the U.S.	0.127		-0.065
	(0.093)		(0.126)
Center Left × Years in the U.S.	0.004		0.168
	(0.043)		(0.131)
Center Right × Years in the U.S.	-0.003		-0.057
	(0.037)		(0.045)
Extreme Right × Years in the U.S.	-0.137 *		-0.139 #
	(0.065)		(0.077)

Table 3.10. The Impact of Pre-Migration Partisan Attachments and Ideology on Post-Migration Directionality of Political Engagement (Longitudinal Attenuation)

	Expected Democrat Voter	Expected Republican Voter
Age Upon Arrival	0.009 (0.015)	0.006 (0.019)
Bilingual	0.633 (0.636)	-0.416 (0.973)
English	0.402 (0.433)	1.341 ** (0.527)
Religious Attendance	0.009 * (0.004)	0.006 (0.005)
Education	0.046 (0.055)	-0.032 (0.079)
PRD × Education	-0.246 (0.204)	-0.482 # (0.256)
PRI × Education	0.002 (0.110)	-0.015 (0.129)
PAN × Education	-0.073 (0.104)	-0.175 (0.125)
Income	0.017 # (0.009)	0.022 * (0.010)
Constant	-2.852 *** (0.865)	-3.732 *** (1.128)
N		394
$LR \chi^2 (52)$		177.94
		$Prob > \chi^2$
		pseudo R ²
		0.000
		0.363

Multinomial Logistic Regression. Reference Category: Expected Non-Partisan in the U.S.
Standard errors are in parentheses. # $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 3.7. Expected Directionality in Electoral Participation in the U.S. by Partisan Attachments and Ideology in Mexico and Years in the U.S.







Figure 3.7. Expected Directionality in Electoral Participation in the U.S. by Partisan Attachments and Ideology in Mexico and Years in the U.S. (cont'd)
PRI Partisans



PAN Partisans



Note: Predicted probabilities were computed using the model in Table 3.10. The following predictors were varied for this calculation: a) partisan attachment in Mexico, which was set to account for affiliation with the PRD, or the PRI, or the PAN; b) the number of years spent in the U.S., with values of either 1 (New Arrivals) or 17 (Average Stay); and c) the corresponding interaction between these terms. The rest of the predictors were held at their mean values or at their modal category in the case of indicator variables, except for the indicators of ideological predisposition.

Table 4.1. Political Activities among First Generation Immigrants (N=1,068)

	Contacted any elected official	Contributed money to a candidate	Worked for a political candidate	Attended a public demonstration	Attended a party meeting
Yes	8.05% (86)	5.71% (61)	3.46% (37)	15.07% (161)	7.49% (80)
Mode	0	0	0	0	0
S.D.	.272	.232	.183	.358	.263

Source: National Survey of Latinos 2004

Table 4.2. Political Participation: U.S.-Born Latinos vs. First Generation Immigrants

	U.S.-Born Sub-Sample	Immigrants Sub-Sample
0 = None of the activities	56.97% (568)	77.06% (823)
1	20.76% (207)	12.92% (138)
2	11.33% (113)	5.81% (62)
3	6.12% (61)	2.34% (25)
4	2.81% (28)	1.12% (12)
5 = All of the activities	2.01% (20)	0.75% (8)
	<i>N</i> = 997	<i>N</i> = 1,068

Source: National Survey of Latinos 2004

*Table 4.3. The Impact of Imported Socialization
on Post-Migration Political Participation*

	Political Participation	
	Model I: IS Only	Model II: IS and IS ²
Efficacy	0.182** (0.068)	0.186** (0.068)
Imported Socialization (IS)	0.007 (0.017)	0.127 (0.089)
IS² (Squared Term)	-----	-0.008 (0.006)
Years in the U.S.	0.025*** (0.004)	0.026*** (0.004)
IS × Years in the U.S.	-----	-----
IS² × Years in the U.S.	-----	-----
Age upon Arrival	0.006 (0.005)	0.007 (0.005)
IS × Age upon Arrival	-----	-----
IS² × Age upon Arrival	-----	-----
Bilingual	0.636*** (0.142)	0.651*** (0.142)
English	0.854*** (0.243)	0.889*** (0.244)
Religious Attendance	0.004* (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)
Education	0.026# (0.016)	0.026# (0.016)
IS × Education	-----	-----
IS² × Education	-----	-----
Income	0.006*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)
Constant	-3.237*** (0.337)	-3.695*** (0.477)
	<i>N</i>	
	924	924

**Table 4.3. The Impact of Imported Socialization
on Post-Migration Political Participation**

	Political Participation	
	Model I: IS Only	Model II: IS and IS ²
$LR \chi^2 (9, Model I; 10, Model II)$	219.89	221.84
$Prob > \chi^2$	0.000	0.000
pseudo R^2	0.132	0.133
Goodness-of-fit χ^2	944.67	942.72
$Prob > \chi^2 (914, Model I; 913, MII)$	0.234	0.241

Poisson Regression

Standard errors are in parentheses.

p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

*Table 4.4. The Impact of Imported Socialization
on Post-Migration Political Participation*

	Political Participation	
	Model III: IS and IS ² w/Interactions	Model IV: Longitudinal Attenuation
Efficacy	0.186** (0.068)	0.183** (0.068)
Imported Socialization (IS)	-0.666# (0.385)	-0.449 (0.426)
IS² (Squared Term)	0.047* (0.023)	0.037 (0.025)
Years in the U.S.	0.027*** (0.004)	0.048* (0.024)
IS × Years in the U.S.	-----	-0.004 (0.006)
IS² × Years in the U.S.	-----	0.000 (0.000)
Age upon Arrival	-0.005 (0.025)	0.011 (0.028)
IS × Age upon Arrival	0.005 (0.007)	0.002 (0.008)
IS² × Age upon Arrival	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Bilingual	0.664*** (0.144)	0.676*** (0.145)
English	0.915*** (0.248)	0.946*** (0.249)
Religious Attendance	0.003* (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)
Education	-0.133 (0.087)	-0.114 (0.089)
IS × Education	0.055* (0.025)	0.051 (0.026)
IS² × Education	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.003* (0.002)
Income	0.006*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)
Constant	-1.471 (1.407)	-2.532*** (1.655)

**Table 4.4. The Impact of Imported Socialization
on Post-Migration Political Participation**


	Political Participation	
	Model III: IS and IS ² w/Interactions	Model IV: Longitudinal Attenuation
<i>N</i>	924	924
<i>LR</i> χ^2 (14, Model III; 16, MIV)	229.76	231.49
<i>Prob</i> > χ^2	0.000	0.000
pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.138	0.139
Goodness-of-fit χ^2	934.80	933.07
<i>Prob</i> > χ^2 (909, Model III; 907, MIV)	0.269	0.267

Poisson Regression

Standard errors are in parentheses.


p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Figure 4.1. Predicted Count of Political Activities in the U.S. by Imported Socialization



Note: Predictions were computed using model III in Table 4.4. The imported socialization predictor was varied for this calculation. It was assigned values ranging from 0 (Authoritarian) to 20 (Democratic). The rest of the predictors were held at their mean values or at their modal category in the case of indicator variables.

Figure 4.2. Predicted Count of Political Activities in the U.S. by Imported Socialization and Education levels



Note: Predictions were computed using model III in Table 4.4. The following predictors were varied for this calculation: a) imported socialization was assigned values ranging from 0 (Authoritarian) to 20 (Democratic); b) education coded as the number of years of formal education, with values of either 9 (Low) or 13 (High); and c) the corresponding interaction between these two terms. The rest of the predictors were held at their mean values or at their modal category in the case of indicator variables.

*Table 4.5. The Impact of Imported Socialization
on Post-Migration Electoral Participation*

	Electoral Participation	
	Model I: IS Only	Model II: IS and IS ²
Efficacy	0.085# (0.046)	0.084# (0.046)
Imported Socialization (IS)	0.049** (0.017)	0.007 (0.066)
IS² (Squared Term)	-----	0.002 (0.003)
Years in the U.S.	0.080*** (0.006)	0.079*** (0.006)
IS × Years in the U.S.	-----	-----
IS² × Years in the U.S.	-----	-----
Age upon Arrival	0.043*** (0.006)	0.042*** (0.006)
IS × Age upon Arrival	-----	-----
IS² × Age upon Arrival	-----	-----
Bilingual	0.168 (0.140)	0.168 (0.140)
English	0.280# (0.171)	0.272 (0.171)
Religious Attendance	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Education	0.121*** (0.020)	0.120*** (0.020)
IS × Education	-----	-----
IS² × Education	-----	-----
Income	0.010*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)
Constant	-4.593*** (0.391)	-4.397*** (0.486)

**Table 4.5. The Impact of Imported Socialization
on Post-Migration Electoral Participation**

	Electoral Participation	
	Model I: IS Only	Model II: IS and IS ²
<i>N</i>	1,582	1,582
<i>LR</i> χ^2 (9, Model I; 10, Model II)	329.13	329.59
<i>Prob</i> > χ^2	0.000	0.000
pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.160	0.160

Logistic Regression

Standard errors are in parentheses.

p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

*Table 4.6. The Impact of Imported Socialization
on Post-Migration Electoral Participation*

	Electoral Participation	
	Model III: IS and IS ² w/Interactions	Model IV: Longitudinal Attenuation
Efficacy	0.082# (0.046)	0.083# (0.047)
Imported Socialization (IS)	0.073 (0.332)	-0.079 (0.417)
IS² (Squared Term)	0.001 (0.018)	0.004 (0.022)
Years in the U.S.	0.080*** (0.007)	0.071** (0.026)
IS × Years in the U.S.	-----	-0.003 (0.007)
IS² × Years in the U.S.	-----	0.000 (0.000)
Age upon Arrival	0.067** (0.022)	0.058* (0.023)
IS × Age upon Arrival	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.006)
IS² × Age upon Arrival	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Bilingual	0.170 (0.139)	0.177 (0.140)
English	0.273 (0.171)	0.261 (0.171)
Religious Attendance	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)
Education	0.113 (0.080)	0.077*** (0.084)
IS × Education	0.005 (0.022)	0.014 (0.022)
IS² × Education	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Income	0.010*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)
Constant	-4.744*** (1.342)	-3.613* (1.717)

**Table 4.6. The Impact of Imported Socialization
on Post-Migration Electoral Participation**


	Electoral Participation	
	Model III: IS and IS² w/Interactions	Model IV: Longitudinal Attenuation
<i>N</i>	1,582	1,582
<i>LR</i> χ^2 (14, Model III; 16, Model IV)	332.67	339.53
<i>Prob</i> > χ^2	0.000	0.000
pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.162	0.165

Logistic Regression

Standard errors are in parentheses.

p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Figure 4.3. Predicted Probabilities of Voting in the U.S. 2004 Election



Note: Predicted probabilities were computed using model I in Table 4.5. The imported socialization predictor was varied for this calculation. It was assigned values ranging from 0 (Authoritarian) to 20 (Democratic). The rest of the predictors were held at their mean values or at their modal category in the case of indicator variables.

APPENDIX A


THE CONSTRUCT OF LIKELIHOOD OF MIGRATION

In order to capture the likelihood of Mexican individuals migrating to the United States, I had the opportunity to incorporate a few questions in a national survey conducted in November of 2007 by *Reforma* newspaper. One key item asked respondents “how likely” it was that they would “migrate to the United States in the following two or three years.” Other items asked respondents about usual predictors of migration to the United States among Mexican individuals. Specifically, these other items asked respondents whether they have family living in the United States; whether these family members send them money on a regular basis; whether they have visited the United States recently; and whether or not they have a particular host location within the United States in mind. Also, occupational status, as well as education and income levels were available for the analysis. The main idea was to determine if individuals’ self-assessment of likelihood of migration could be incorporated in the before migration portions of my analyses. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of the likelihood of migration among the Mexican population. As can be seen, only 7.1 percent indicate that they are very likely to migrate in the following two or three years. Roughly 15 percent indicate that they are either somewhat or very likely to migrate.

Table 1 displays an ordered logit model where likelihood of migration is the dependent variable and the main explanatory variables are the following. A couple of indicator variables account for whether the respondent’s family sends money from the U.S. The reference category is “no family in the United States.” Another couple of indicator variables account for whether the respondent has visited the United States within the past three years or farther back in time. The reference category here is “have

never visited the United States.” Yet another indicator variable accounts for whether the respondent knows the specific location (city or state) to which the individuals would be arriving in the United States. Finally, a set of indicator variables account for respondents’ occupational status: employed part time, employed occasionally, or unemployed; where the reference category is employed full time. Education is measured in number of schooling years (upper-cap range values). Income is measured in thousand of Mexican pesos per month (mid-range).

Figure 1. Distribution of Mexicans’ Self-Assessment of Likelihood of Migration to the United States



The key result from the model in Table 1, below, is that individuals’ self-assessment of likelihood of migration is far from random. To the contrary, the key predictors of migration seem to account for the individual’s self-assessment, thus boosting my confidence in incorporating this survey item into the before migration portions of the analyses included in this dissertation.

Table 1. Explaining Mexicans' Self-Assessment of Likelihood of Migration

	Likelihood of Migration	
R's Family does NOT send Money from the U.S.	-0.352	*
	(0.168)	
R's Family does send Money from the U.S.	0.504	**
	(0.161)	
R has NOT visited the U.S. within the last 3 years	0.239	
	(0.206)	
R has visited the U.S. within the last 3 years	1.094	***
	(0.180)	
R does know which location in the U.S.	1.442	***
	(0.142)	
Part Time Employment	0.113	
	(0.223)	
Occasional Employment	0.388	#
	(0.228)	
Unemployed	0.330	*
	(0.151)	
Education	0.007	
	(0.017)	
Income	-0.010	
	(0.024)	
Threshold (D.V. = 0)	2.117	***
	(0.228)	
Threshold (D.V. = 1)	2.869	***
	(0.235)	
Threshold (D.V. = 2)	3.820	***
	(0.249)	
	<i>N</i>	1,495
	<i>LR</i> χ^2 (10)	243.26
	<i>Prob</i> > χ^2	0.000
	pseudo <i>R</i>	0.150

Ordered Logit Regression

Standard errors are in parentheses.

$p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

APPENDIX B
THE CONSTRUCT OF IMPORTED SOCIALIZATION

*Table 1. Imported Socialization scores distribution
by Country of Origin – MVS 2003*

	N	Mean	Lowest	Highest	S.D.
Argentina	5	17.44	15.61	18.00	1.04
Bolivia	1	17.94	17.94	17.94	--
Chile	1	4.00	4.00	4.00	--
Colombia	41	16.72	10.22	18.22	2.33
Costa Rica	4	20.00	20.00	20.00	0.00
Cuba	96	4.51	1.00	13.94	3.11
Dominican Republic	24	14.05	5.44	16.71	3.63
Ecuador	13	15.42	9.33	19.00	3.81
El Salvador	13	11.23	8.56	17.00	3.11
Guatemala	10	7.73	4.20	9.39	1.37
Honduras	9	13.37	5.72	15.81	4.00
Mexico	399	6.20	4.00	12.82	1.99
Nicaragua	12	7.17	2.00	14.56	4.56
Panama	5	6.07	3.75	12.61	3.69
Paraguay	1	2.00	2.00	2.00	--
Peru	9	9.42	3.00	17.00	5.05
Spain	9	10.76	3.00	20.00	8.35
Uruguay	1	3.00	3.00	3.00	--
Venezuela	17	18.77	18.06	19.00	0.32
<i>Total</i>	670	7.89	1.00	20.00	4.79

Sources: MVS 2003/Polity IV. Score calculations by the author. Imported socialization scores were calculated according respondents' age upon and year of arrival in the US.

*Table 2. Imported Socialization scores distribution
by Country of Origin – NSL 2004*

	N	Mean	Lowest	Highest	S.D.
Cuba	335	7.04	1.00	13.94	4.16
Dominican Republic	50	9.21	1.00	16.33	3.98
El Salvador	37	9.63	1.00	16.50	3.86
Mexico	597	6.22	4.00	13.11	2.19
Spain	7	7.40	3.00	20.00	6.29
<i>Total</i>	1,026	3.28	1.00	20.00	6.77

Sources: NSL 2004/Polity IV. Score calculations by the author. Imported socialization scores were calculated according respondents' age upon and year of arrival in the US.

**Table 3. Imported Socialization scores distribution
by Country of Origin – LNS 2006**

	N	Mean	Lowest	Highest	S.D.
Argentina	29	8.45	3.89	18.00	4.26
Bolivia	35	8.82	4.50	19.00	4.45
Chile	17	10.98	3.00	15.67	3.94
Colombia	113	15.88	9.62	18.38	2.62
Costa Rica	29	20.00	20.00	20.00	0.00
Cuba	326	7.58	1.00	13.00	4.23
Dominican Republic	278	8.99	1.00	16.86	5.15
Ecuador	74	13.16	8.11	18.92	3.46
El Salvador	344	10.23	1.33	17.89	3.66
Guatemala	135	9.40	5.00	15.67	2.35
Honduras	80	11.66	7.67	16.29	2.70
Mexico	3,612	6.61	4.00	14.59	2.60
Nicaragua	45	4.37	2.00	16.67	4.01
Panama	8	9.74	3.71	14.00	3.76
Paraguay	4	4.32	1.89	10.28	4.01
Peru	56	11.09	6.43	17.00	2.62
Spain	15	6.18	3.00	14.50	4.27
Uruguay	7	14.09	6.89	19.00	5.08
Venezuela	28	16.00	9.00	19.00	3.77
<i>Total</i>	5,235	7.68	1.00	20.00	3.79

Sources: LNS 2006/Polity IV. Score calculations by the author. Imported socialization scores were calculated according respondents' age upon and year of arrival in the US.

APPENDIX C

THE EXPERIMENT ON IMPORTED IDEOLOGY

In order to test whether “ideology” is indeed imported, I had the opportunity to embed an experiment in a telephone survey. The survey research project is led by Professor James McCann at Purdue University. This is a survey of Mexican immigrants, which consists of two sampling sites. One is the north-central region of the state of Indiana and the other one is the San Antonio metropolitan area in Texas. About 500 interviews were conducted in each location (500 in Indiana and 522 in Texas).

Interviewing Services of America (a firm based in Van Nuys, CA), which specializes in polling within the Latino community, administered the surveys. Nearly all of the interviews took place during September of 2008.

The experiment consisted in asking every respondent two questions regarding their ideological self-placement on a country-specific basis. In other words, every respondent was asked about “ideology” when thinking both of Mexican politics and of American politics. Questions 51 and 52 were assigned for these two items in the original questionnaire. The order of these items, though, was randomized. The exact question wording of these items and its proper translation to English are listed below. A few additional demographic items were also available to me to conduct the following analyses.

Question Wording

Spanish Version

1) En política EN MEXICO, generalmente se habla de "izquierda" y "derecha". En una escala del 1 al 10 donde 1 es "izquierda" y 10 es "derecha", en donde se ubicaría usted?

2) En política EN LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS, generalmente se habla de "izquierda" y "derecha". En una escala del 1 al 10 donde 1 es "izquierda" y 10 es "derecha", en donde se ubicaría usted?

English Version

1) In political matters IN MEXICO, people talk of "the left" and of "the right". On a scale that ranges from 1 to 10, where 1 is "left" and 10 is "right", where would you place yourself?

2) In political matters IN THE UNITED STATES, people talk of "the left" and of "the right". On a scale that ranges from 1 to 10, where 1 is "left" and 10 is "right", where would you place yourself?

Imported Ideology

As Figure 1 illustrates, the proportion of “non-ideologues” vs. “ideologues” is substantively the same. The vertical axis is on percentual scale. At first glance, Mexican immigrants to the United States do not seem to differentiate between the two political contexts or pseudo-environments in ideological terms. More precisely, these individuals seem to import ideology at least in terms of “intensity.” When asked about Mexico, 720 respondents (72.4 percent) place themselves on the ideological continuum whereas 282 respondents (27.6 percent) do not place themselves. The proportions are strikingly similar when respondents are asked about U.S. politics: 733 respondents (73.7 percent) place themselves on the ideological continuum whereas 269 respondents (26.3 percent) do not place themselves.

Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of the ideologues along the left-right continuum. The vertical axis represents the raw number of respondents that indicated considering themselves belonging to every category along the ideological continuum. As can be seen, the two distributions are substantively the same.

Figure 1. Proportion of Ideologues vs. Non-Ideologues regarding both the Mexican and the American Contexts





Figure 2. Distribution of Ideologues along the Left-Right Continuum regarding both the Mexican and the American Contexts



Again, at least at first glance, it can be argued that individuals do not distinguish between the contexts of the country of origin and that of the new host nation. However, a closer look at these data is in order. If the individual's placement concerning Mexican politics is considered the "original" position, nearly 7 out of 10 of these individuals (68.1 percent) in fact, place themselves in the same spot along the ideological continuum regardless once they are faced with the new host nation's context. Of those, who actually shift their position, roughly half of them (46.7 percent) adjust their placement to the left whereas the other half (53.3 percent) adjusts their position to the right. Also, a majority (roughly 60 percent) of those "ideological" adjustments are within the three-point range in a ten point scale. Thus, evidence seems to strongly suggest that "ideology" in the country of origin is imported and serves as an anchor for the ideological range from which the individual will choose to adjust (if at all) one's self-placement following migration.

APPENDIX D
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Before Migration

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the Mexican Values Survey 2003 (in Mexico)

Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
<i>Dependent</i>					
Trust in the U.S. Government	2,269	0.83	0.86	0	3
<i>Independent</i>					
Trust in the Mexican Government (Additive Index)	2,331	3.67	2.56	0	9
Trust in Mex. Gov. × Attentiveness to the News	2,324	28.63	24.67	0	108
Interpersonal Trust	2,360	0.10	0.29	0	1
Efficacy	2,330	1.99	0.89	1	4
Attentiveness to the News	2,370	7.48	2.78	0	12
Age	2,380	37.48	15.07	18	99
Religious Attendance (in number of days per year)	2,342	31.63	31.12	0	104
Education (in number of years)	2,375	8.35	4.42	0	17
Income (in thousands of Mexican pesos per month)	2,160	4.19	4.27	1.25	32.50

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for the Reforma Survey 2007

Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
<i>Dependent</i>					
Opinion on President Bush	1,530	4.03	2.78	0	10
Expected U.S. Partisan	1,530	0.55	0.49	0	1
<i>Independent</i>					
Likelihood of Migration (Very Likely)	1,530	0.08	0.27	0	1
Likelihood of Migration (Somewhat Likely)	1,530	0.02	0.13	0	1
Likelihood of Migration (Not Very Likely)	1,530	0.10	0.30	0	1
Trust in the Mexican Government (Additive Index)	1,338	6.32	3.59	0	15
Trust in Mex. Gov. × Attentiveness to the News	1,324	40.16	33.41	0	225
Mexican Partisan	1,510	0.59	0.49	0	1
Mexican Partisan × Attentiveness to the News	1,479	3.59	3.88	0	15
PRD Partisan	1,510	0.13	0.34	0	1
PRI Partisan	1,510	0.22	0.42	0	1
PAN Partisan	1,510	0.24	0.43	0	1
PRD Partisan × Attentiveness to the News	1,506	0.82	2.41	0	15
PRI Partisan × Attentiveness to the News	1,499	1.27	2.85	0	15
PAN Partisan × Attentiveness to the News	1,494	1.45	3.04	0	15
Non-Ideologue	1,530	0.19	0.39	0	1
Extreme Left	1,530	0.05	0.21	0	1
Center Left	1,530	0.11	0.31	0	1
Center Right	1,530	0.26	0.44	0	1
Extreme Right	1,530	0.13	0.34	0	1
Presidential Approval (President Calderon)	1,530	3.47	1.27	1	5
Age	1,529	40.62	15.69	18	91
Religious Attendance (in number of days per year)	1,530	26.03	31.26	0	104
Education (in number of years)	1,530	9.47	4.36	0	19
Income (in thousands of Mexican pesos per month)	1,530	4.19	2.99	0.65	11.90

After Migration

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for the Mexican Values Survey 2003 (in the U.S.)

Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
<i>Dependent</i>					
Trust in U.S. Government Additive Index	388	5.80	2.39	0	9
Expected Electoral Participation	399	0.66	0.47	0	1
<i>Independent</i>					
Trust in Mexican Government (A Great Deal)	392	0.22	0.41	0	1
Trust in Mexican Government (Somewhat)	392	0.34	0.47	0	1
Trust in Mexican Government (Not Very Much)	392	0.26	0.44	0	1
Trust in Mex. Gov. (Great) × Education	389	1.84	3.89	0	17
Trust in Mex. Gov. (Somewhat) × Education	389	3.14	4.85	0	17
Trust in Mex. Gov. (Not Very Much) × Education	389	2.65	4.75	0	17
Trust in Mex. Gov. (Great) × Years in U.S.	392	3.80	8.81	0	47
Trust in Mex. Gov. (Somewhat) × Years in U.S.	392	5.75	9.74	0	49
Trust in Mex. Gov. (Not Very Much) × Years U.S.	392	4.56	9.67	0	55
Mexican Partisan	399	0.57	0.49	0	1
Mexican Partisan × Education	395	5.58	5.54	0	17
Mexican Partisan × Years in the U.S.	399	8.81	10.59	0	51
PRD Partisan	399	0.08	0.27	0	1
PRI Partisan	399	0.17	0.38	0	1
PAN Partisan	399	0.31	0.46	0	1
PRD Partisan × Education	395	0.81	2.90	0	17
PRI Partisan × Education	395	1.55	3.77	0	17
PAN Partisan × Education	395	3.10	5.07	0	17
PRD Partisan × Years in the U.S.	399	1.22	4.82	0	40
PRI Partisan × Years in the U.S.	399	2.66	7.32	0	45
PAN Partisan × Years in the U.S.	399	4.68	8.84	0	51
Non-Ideologue	399	0.11	0.31	0	1
Extreme Left	399	0.03	0.18	0	1
Center Left	399	0.10	0.30	0	1
Center Right	399	0.22	0.41	0	1
Extreme Right	399	0.13	0.34	0	1
Non-Ideologue × Years in the U.S.	399	1.58	5.79	0	55
Extreme Left × Years in the U.S.	399	0.51	3.19	0	28
Center Left × Years in the U.S.	399	2.03	6.86	0	52
Center Right × Years in the U.S.	399	3.93	8.60	0	42
Extreme Right × Years in the U.S.	399	1.94	5.67	0	37
Efficacy	390	2.66	0.77	1	4

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for the Mexican Values Survey 2003 (in the U.S.)

Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Interpersonal Trust	399	0.20	0.40	0	1
Years in the U.S.	399	17.18	10.47	1	55
Age Upon Arrival	399	15.24	12.56	0	57
Religious Attendance (in number of days per year)	399	34.77	35.36	0	104
Bilingual	399	0.05	0.23	0	1
English	399	0.21	0.41	0	1
Education (in number of schooling years)	395	9.45	3.59	0	17
Income (in thousands of dollars per year)	398	34.27	18.02	7.5	125

Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for the National Latino Survey 2004

Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
<i>Dependent</i>					
Partisanship	1,068	0.68	0.47	0	1
Political Participation	1,068	0.40	0.88	0	5
<i>Independent</i>					
Efficacy	1,003	3.31	0.86	1	4
Imported Socialization (IS)	1,026	6.77	3.28	1	20
IS Squared Term (IS ²)	1,026	56.52	53.35	1	400
Years in the U.S.	1,049	18.33	13.82	0	72
IS × Years in the U.S.	1,026	121.91	131.40	0	871.9
IS ² × Years in the U.S.	1,026	1,033.81	1,673.42	0	10,558.9
Age Upon Arrival	1,026	24.44	13.99	0	88
IS × Age Upon Arrival	1,026	173.86	161.72	0	1,134.3
IS ² × Age upon Arrival	1,026	1,538.88	2,161.78	0	14,621.4
Religious Attendance	1,044	31.41	31.53	0	104
Bilingual	1,068	0.26	0.44	0	1
English	1,068	0.03	0.17	0	1
Education	1,045	10.73	4.12	4	18
IS × Education	1,023	72.64	47.38	4	288
IS ² × Education	1,023	609.37	676.71	4	5,600
Income	1,003	33.15	27.21	2.5	200

**Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for the Latino National Survey 2006
(Full Sample of Foreign-Born)**

Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
<i>Dependent</i>					
Partisanship	5,653	0.37	0.48	0	1
<i>Independent</i>					
Efficacy	5,653	2.01	1.32	0	4
Imported Socialization (IS)	5,235	7.68	3.79	1	20
Years in the U.S.	5,256	17.75	12.51	0	85
IS × Years in the U.S.	4,930	120.55	104.77	0	920.0
Age Upon Arrival	4,962	21.63	10.95	0	73
IS × Age Upon Arrival	4,928	160.43	113.91	1	895.7
Religious Attendance	5,567	41.02	35.24	0	104
Bilingual	5,600	0.24	0.43	0	1
English	5,600	0.12	0.33	0	1
Education	5,653	11.04	3.53	0	18
IS × Education	5,235	87.26	56.08	0	360
Income	5,653	22.79	20.67	0	70

**Table 6. Descriptive Statistics for the Latino National Survey 2006
(Only Naturalized Citizens)**

Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
<i>Dependent</i>					
Reported Voting in 2004	1,846	0.63	0.48	0	1
<i>Independent</i>					
Efficacy	1,875	2.15	1.31	0	4
Imported Socialization (IS)	1,743	7.15	3.98	1	20
IS Squared Term (IS ²)	1,743	66.95	76.68	1	400
Years in the U.S.	1,752	27.12	12.67	0	85
IS × Years in the U.S.	1,647	182.51	138.15	0	920.0
IS ² × Years in the U.S.	1,647	1,652.13	2228.01	0	18,400
Age Upon Arrival	1,663	18.87	11.57	0	69
IS × Age Upon Arrival	1,645	135.31	126.96	0	858.4
IS ² × Age upon Arrival	1,645	1,282.16	1,878.75	0	14,400
Religious Attendance	1,842	42.91	36.30	0	104
Bilingual	1,852	0.32	0.46	0	1
English	1,852	0.24	0.43	0	1
Education	1,875	12.15	3.43	0	18
IS × Education	1,743	89.58	60.87	0	360
IS ² × Education	1,743	862.03	1,100.01	0	7,200
Income	1,875	30.87	23.63	0	70

AUTHOR'S BIOGRAPHY

Sergio C. Wals was born in Mexico City. He received his *Licenciatura* in Political Science from Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM). His reasearch thesis *La Opinión Pública y la Huelga en la UNAM, 1999-2000* received a special mention during the IX Ex-ITAM awards ceremony. In 2004, he moved to Urbana, Illinois to begin graduate studies at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign where he completed a Master of Arts in Political Science in 2006. His doctoral dissertation project, *Immigrants' Political Suitcases: A Theory of Imported Socialization*, was distinguished with the Robert Ferber Dissertation Award presented annually by the University of Illinois. In August of 2009, Wals began working as an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and the Institute for Ethnic Studies at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. His research on the emergence of partisan attachments among immigrants to the United States is forthcoming in the *Political Research Quarterly*.