Mining, Power and Sustainable Development: Micro-Politics of Benefits Sharing in Ghana

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Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my sisters, Evelyn and Bernice Ofori who made it possible for me to reach this milestone but unfortunately passed away before the completion of the thesis.

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Abbreviations

BND	Birim North District
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
DACF	District Assembly Common Fund
EIR	Extractives Industries Review
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
FGD	Focus Group Discussions
GEITI	Ghana Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
GMI	Global Mining Initiative
HDI	Human Development Index
ICMM	International Council on Mining and metals
IGF	Internally Generated Funds
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MMSD	Minerals and Mining for Sustainable Development
MDF	Mineral Development Fund
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MP	Member of Parliament
NAKDeF	Newmont Akyem Development Foundation
NADeF	Newmont Ahafo Development Foundation
NHMRC	National Health and Medical Research Council
REDD	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SDC	Sustainable Development Committee
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SRF	Social Responsibility Forum
UN	United Nations
WECD	World Commission on Environment and Development
WACAM	Wassa Association of Communities against Mining

Abstract

The last two decades has witnessed the adoption of sustainable development principles within the mining industry, following the publication of the industry's minerals and mining for sustainable development (MMSD) report in 2002. It has been argued by scholars and industry actors that mining companies can contribute to sustainable development by being environmentally responsible, improving the economic and social well-being of people affected by mining projects as well as creating mechanisms for a plurality of decision-making processes throughout the entire mining life cycle. Sustainable development however, is a contested development concept with no implementation blueprint. Unsurprising therefore, the exact meaning and application of sustainable development in the mining industry has been the subject of increasing academic debate. From the burgeoning literature that explores the links between mining and sustainable development, it is difficult to ascertain what sustainable development means to different actors, and how differences in its conception influences the extent to which mining may or not contribute to sustainable development in practice at the community level. This is critical given that at the community level, unequal power relations may exist and potentially shape how mining led sustainable development costs and benefits are shared. Thus, to fully discern the link between mining and sustainable development, it is imperative to unveil first the sustainable development rationalities of various actors and then how those rationalities or agendas are ritualised in practice taking into account contextual influences such as unequal power relations.

Taking the sharing of mining benefits by governments and mining companies as a point of departure, this thesis explores how mining contributes to the sustainable development of communities affected by mining projects in Ghana. It does so by focussing on how mine benefits, in the form of redistributed revenues, are accessed, controlled and used by beneficiary communities. The thesis uses a political ecology analytical approach and draws on qualitative primary research data collected from three communities affected by Newmont Mining Corporation's project in the Birim North District of Ghana. This thesis argues from the findings that, underlying the limited contribution of mining to sustainable development of mining communities in Ghana is a crisis of mining benefits sharing.

The findings of this research show that, different actors including the government, mining companies and mining communities have different conceptions and agendas of sustainable development. Furthermore, within the communities, there are different conceptions of what sustainable development is between the elites and poor or non-elites. Overall, the government defines sustainable development in terms of economic growth; the mining companies, influenced by the need to maintain a social license, consider sustainable development to be about the creation a legacy. Community elites, such as chiefs, consider sustainable development to be about community infrastructure; whereas non-elites within the community, many of whom have lost access to their own farmlands due to mining developments, see sustainable development as that which will improve their livelihoods and economic outcomes.

This study reveals that, community power imbalances have ensured that the mineral revenues allocated for community driven sustainable development, are ultimately controlled by local elites. The elites, through their unfettered powers, capture both the decision-making processes and the revenues to pursue their sustainable development agendas, to the detriment of the poor and marginalised non-elites. The elites do this by deploying different strategies to counteract the structures governing the use of the revenues. This thesis contributes empirically to understanding how benefit sharing for sustainable development processes work in practice and explains why some people gain while others lose in this equation. This thesis recommends the redesign of the current benefit sharing models being used by Newmont Mining and the government. The suggested new design will provide opportunities to correct the existing power imbalances and ensure that a sustainable development that benefits the communities as whole is achieved.

CHAPTER ONE
Introductory Background

1.0 Introduction

In the developing world where many economic activities are agrarian in nature, land (including land resources, such as forests) is a defining element in the social, political and economic life of individuals and society as a whole. In Ghana, it is estimated that 71 percent of the working population in rural areas are engaged in agriculture (Ghana Statistical Service 2014). Availability and access to land thus play a significant role in the socio-economic life of the people, especially those in rural communities. However, such land also contains an enormous amount of high-value natural resources which are of interest to the extractive industries and therefore the government. Mining of such lands often entails the dispossession of the original owners, with host mining communities bearing much of the socioeconomic and ecological costs of the eventual mining project. Thus, large-scale mining in Ghana, as is the case in other resource-dependent countries, is very contentious.

The mining sector plays a significant role in Ghana's economy. Ghana is endowed with substantial mineral resources such as diamonds, bauxite, manganese and gold. In 2018, Ghana produced some 101 tons of gold, an output bettered in Africa only by South Africa and amounting to the 10th highest global output (Thomson Reuters 2018). The country collected $243 million dollars in taxes from the mining sector in 2009 (Kapstein & Kim 2011). In 2017, the sector contributed 43 percent of gross merchandise export making it the country's top foreign exchange earner (Ghana Chamber Of Mines 2018). Since the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) in the mid-1980s by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), there has been extensive foreign investment in the mining sector in Ghana (Aryee 2001; Hilson & Potter 2003; Ofori & Ofori 2018a). It is estimated that US$4 billion was invested in the sector between 1983 and 1998 alone (Aryee 2001). This figure increased significantly to $11.6 billion dollars in 2015 (Ghana Chamber of Mines 2015). In response to this flow of foreign capital, the Government has contracted and continues to contract large concessions of *stool lands*[1] to transnational mining companies.[2] Some estimates suggest that up to 70 percent of agricultural lands in Ghana are under mining concessions (Hilson & Banchirigah 2009).

1.1 Mining conflicts and costs to host communities

Despite the significant contribution of mining to Ghana's economy, studies indicate that most people within mining communities remain generally poor and have had their livelihoods disrupted by mining projects (Akabzaa 2001; Akabzaa & Darimani 2001; Akabzaa, Seyire & Afriyie 2007; Balfors *et al.* 2007; Hilson & Hilson 2017; Ofori & Ofori 2018a). For example, the impact of mining on local livelihoods include the loss of access to farmlands, a reduction in the fallow periods of agricultural lands and environmental pollution. Furthermore, the reported environmental impact of mining includes cyanide spillages, the pollution of water bodies, the loss of biodiversity and land degradation (Awudi 2002; Erdiaw-Kwasie, Dinye & Abunyewah 2014; Meyer 2019). The poor state of most mining communities compared to their counterparts in other resource-rich countries is described by Akabzaa, Seyire and Afriyie (2007 p. 12):

> …the mining towns of Obuasi, Tarkwa, Prestea, Konongo, Bibiani among others, provides a classic picture of the typical mining towns in Ghana. These towns are far from affluent, an aberration of what communities endowed with mineral resources, are or should be like. The towns are very much unlike other gold mining towns such as Johannesburg in South Africa, Noranda city in Ontario, Canada, Reno in the USA or Perth in Australia, where the scars of mining are sealed by the beauty and riches of these cities, built out of mining.

Communities in Ghana have expressed their dissatisfaction with the effects of mining projects especially in the past 15 years as gold prices have risen (Hilson & Hilson 2017). There have been reports of protests in local communities against the further leasing of their lands for new mining projects (Asiedu 2018; Bomfeh 2010). Similarly, the frequent disruption to existing mining operations by local inhabitants has been extensively reported (Bush 2009). For example, this has often included those local community members encroaching upon the large-scale mining concessions by conducting illegal small-scale extraction of mineral resources. Many of those involved justify their actions by citing their ancestral and cultural ties with the land and their lack of alternatives to access an agricultural livelihood (Hilson 2002a; Hilson &

[1] Stool lands refer to communal lands held in trust for the local community by the occupant of the stool (i.e. village chief).

[2] By 1998, 23 mining companies were in operation and some 237 others were engaged in vigorous exploration (Aryee, 2001). As at 2015, there are 10 large scale mining companies with about 16 active mining projects (ICMM, 2015).

Potter 2003; Hilson & Yakovleva 2007; Ofori & Ofori 2018a). Violent clashes often occur between local community people and the state and/or industry security apparatus, leading to the destruction of property, often running into several millions of dollars in losses to the mining companies (Hilson 2002a; Hilson & Yakovleva 2007).

The overwhelming evidence from the negative socioeconomic and environmental impacts of mining has led some scholars to suggest that, governments should shun extractives altogether and focus on agriculture and manufacturing sectors (Ross 2001b). However, it has also been suggested that the mining industry can play a significant role in bringing local development to indigenous communities by generating additional economic opportunities, which may not have otherwise existed in such communities without the mining sector (Ballard & Banks 2003; Franks 2015).

1.2 Benefit sharing as an instrument for sustainable development of mining communities

Generally, there has been a growing recognition by governments, extractive industries and donor agencies, such as the World Bank, that communities need to be much more involved in the process of mining projects and more importantly, compensated for the costs of mining (Arellano-Yanguas 2011a; Eggert 2001; McMahon & Remy 2002; Otto & Cordes 2000; Wan 2014). Especially in the case of mining in the developing world, there has been an increased demand for mining companies to meet the developmental needs of mining communities. This increased demand can be attributed to rising concerns over negative environmental impacts of mining; the boom in mineral prices since 2000; the need for mining companies to obtain social license to operate; and the demand for companies to contribute to community development (Humphreys 2000; Kemp 2010; Söderholm & Svahn 2015; Wall & Pelon 2011). Corder (2017 p 226) outlines that, the policy response to the challenges that face the mining industry must be undergirded by “a sound and workable sustainable development agenda that aims to deliver benefits to all stakeholders” tailored to specific contexts and environment.

The publication of the industry-sponsored Mining, Minerals, and Sustainable Development (MMSD) report (MMSD 2002), resulted in significant policy changes with a focus on local communities. The report laid the foundation for the industry’s incorporation of sustainable development goals into its activities (Kemp & Owen 2018). The report recognizes that benefits from mineral developments must sustain communities beyond the life span of a mining project

(MMSD 2002). Large-scale mining companies increasingly have embraced the concept of sustainable development as part of their corporate social responsibility strategy. Since 2002 when the report was published, concepts such as ‘sustainable mining’(Azapagic 2004; McPhail 2009), ‘Sustainable mining communities’(Veiga, Scoble & McAllister 2001) have become operational terms within the global industry, and also importantly in Ghana.

The consensus has been to develop strategies for a win-win solution for all stakeholders by increasing the benefits of mining to host communities (MMSD 2002). Benefit sharing initiatives are central to this sustainable development approach in the mining industry (Söderholm & Svahn 2014, 2015). It involves either governments redistributing their share of the mineral rents, or mining companies doing so voluntarily within the framework of corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Söderholm & Svahn 2015). Mining benefits may take various forms, both monetary and non-monetary and include compensation for lands, payment of mineral royalties, joint use of mine infrastructure and services. There have been several policy papers and reports published recently that have discussed the benefit sharing schemes and how they should be approached (Barrera-Hernandez & Rnne 2016; International Finance Corporation 2014, 2015; Wall & Pelon 2011).

Over the years, extractive companies operating in underdeveloped economies have made a concerted effort to demonstrate their contribution to their host communities (Addison & Roe 2018). In Ghana, large-scale mining companies such as Newmont Mining Corporation pride themselves on being environmentally friendly and making a significant contribution to the sustainable development of their local host communities, as evidenced in their CSR reports (Andrews 2016; Newmont Africa 2017). One significant means by which this company claims to contribute to sustainable development is through a redistribution of their mining revenues through a Community Development Fund. Newmont Mining Corporation pays USD$1 on every ounce of gold mined, plus one percent of their profits before tax[3] (Kapstein & Kim 2011). The fund is used by the community for the development of both present and future generations. This initiative has received wide publicity and awards (Andrews 2016).

The central government in line with its mining policy of ensuring that mining contributes to the sustainable development of mining communities has a benefit sharing initiative in place. The government of Ghana redistributes part of its mining revenues to the mining communities

[3] This excludes their payments to government in the form of royalties and taxes.

as a means of benefit sharing for local development through the Mineral Development Fund. Under the current mining laws of Ghana, the government is obligated to give a share of the mineral royalties to the communities from whose lands have been acquired for mining projects ('Mineral Development Fund Act' 2015). Specifically, the communities receive 10 percent of the mineral royalties through the Office of the Administrator of the Stool Lands.

1.3 Sustainable development and benefit sharing

Cernea (2008) makes the argument that the entitlement of communities to a share of mining benefits and participation in decision making is not because they hold property rights to the minerals. Rather, it is because they have rights to the land within which the minerals are located and/or bear the greater costs of mining operations compared to the larger national population. If mineral benefits are distributed equitably within local host communities, they have the potential of improving community cohesion and development as well as catering for the needs of future generations after the life span of the mine. Procedural and distributive equity can be achieved if the mining benefits reach those who bear the present and future costs of mining. Without this incentive, conflicts between communities and mining companies will continue.

On the contrary, however, scholars such as Altman (2009) do not see benefit sharing as the instrument through which development can be attained. It has been noted that even though such initiatives may be appealing, they do not deliver the promised sustainable development because they often do not acquiesce to the culture or developmental needs of local communities (Whiteman & Mamen 2002a). It has also been noted that the sharing of mining benefits in themselves can potentially produce negative outcomes such as distrust and factionalism, if not done properly and fairly at the community level (Filer 1990; Standing 2014). Consequently, claims of sustainable development *vis a vis* benefits sharing have been contested and debated. Corporate social responsibility initiatives reported by the mining industry as a means of contributing to sustainable development have been heavily critiqued. Critical literature on CSR in mining argues that mining companies are ineffective or deceptive in their approach to community development and usually do not involve beneficiary communities in project decisions (Devenin & Bianchi 2018; Gilberthorpe & Banks 2012; Hamann & Kapelus 2004; Slack 2012). Studies by Sydow (2016) and Rajak (2011) on the CSR performance of companies such as Newmont, have argued that mining companies are using CSR as a tool to have more control and power over both local communities and the state.

1.4 Community socio-political context in benefit sharing

Community polity, including internal governance arrangements are key in how benefits and costs of resource extraction are shared (Barton & Goldsmith 2016). While critics of CSR have described the projects that mining companies undertake as being merely public relations stunts, or simply 'greenwashing', or basically ineffective, there has been less emphasis on the social, economic and political context of the mining communities themselves, and how this context impacts on the CSR outcomes. The influence of communities and the agency of local actors is greatly underestimated and thus under-researched in the literature on CSR and the literature on benefits sharing (Sydow 2016; Wilson 2015). Indeed, the majority of the studies examining CSR within the African context fail to analyse and illuminate the impact of local conditions and politics on CSR outcomes. Thus, less is known about how the social structures and power dynamics within mining communities influence the actual processes of benefit sharing, and how access to benefits and participation in decision-making processes in turn, leads to the sustainable development of mining communities. Do, for example, existing social institutions and cultural values of rural mining communities influence how benefits are delivered and who gets to obtain these benefits? Alternatively, as it has often been reported in studies on community-based natural resources management (Baumann 2000), has the sharing been ineffective because of the local politics of resource distribution? If so, how can procedural and distributive equity, which is fundamental to sustainable development, be improved upon in the sharing of the mining benefits? This present thesis, therefore, situates the sharing of mining benefits at the community level, within the broader social, cultural and political context in which it occurs.

In addition, sustainable development literature indicates that it is a contested concept, with people attaching different meanings, applying different principles and taking different approaches towards achieving it (Agyeman 2013; Connelly 2007). It has been suggested that the limited impact of the sustainable development agenda globally, is in part due to the different stakeholders having different interpretations of the term (Bansal 2002). Within the mining sector for example, there is a lack of consensus on what sustainable development means to the industry and how it can be achieved (Bebbington & Humphreys Bebbington 2018; Han Onn & Woodley 2014; Hilson & Basu 2003). Yet much of the research on sustainable development and for that matter, its application in the mining industry fails to demonstrate what sustainable development means to different actors at the local level, and how these differences in interpretation affect the sharing of mining benefits for sustainable development practice. Different views within communities on what constitutes sustainable development, its governance and implementation, can also be different from how companies and even the government view it.

In 2018 for example, based on its operations in Ghana the company Newmont was recognized as a top performer in the mining sector for sustainability and community development initiatives, (Andrews 2016; RobecoSAM 2018). This acknowledgment for Newmont was preceded by consecutive industry awards (2015-2017) on the Dow Jones Sustainability World Index, as the industry's global leader in sustainability performance. These global recognitions have been heralded by the company as proof of its commitment to sustainable development (Newmont Mining Corporation 2018). If sustainable mining is about the responsibility of companies to other stakeholders such as host communities, it is reasonable to expect that these stakeholders would have their own expectations and interests of what sustainable development should be. However, and as this thesis will explore, does Newmont's conception of sustainable development align with those of local actors particularly mining communities?

The central focus of this thesis is the exploration of whether benefits are shared, and in what ways, as well as how decisions are made about the use of the benefits, taking into consideration the social and political context of mining communities as well as the subjective local interpretations of sustainable development. This focus provides an avenue to appreciate the roles of different actors, institutions, social differentiation and power asymmetries in the process and outcomes of the sharing of mining benefits for sustainable development. This is because it has been argued that the distribution of mining benefits must be judged to be fair, not distort social cohesion and limit 'elite capture' (discussed in Chapter Two) (Manteaw 2008; MMSD 2002; Sommerville *et al.* 2010). Fairness or equity at the community level entails that the costs and benefits, and the opportunities and access to resources of mining, should equally be shared amongst everyone (Beder 2000). The unequal distribution of the benefits can lead to social conflict and tension within local communities (Auty & Mikesell 1998). Thus, the benefits of mining must flow to even the most vulnerable in society such as women and indigenous minority groups. Even though governments and mining companies may seem to be engaged in the sharing of mining benefits for the sustainable development of mining communities, as Manteaw (2008 p.439) acknowledges "it is the logic and backstage activities of these seemingly symbiotic relationships that have not been fully explored as a social justice issue". Therefore, this research study goes 'behind the scenes' to examine how equity in access to benefits and participation in decision-making processes are underpinned by the social context and power relations in and between various actors in mining communities. This thesis thus asserts the importance of how these actors understand sustainable development and ways in which they strategically influence benefits sharing decisions within their community contexts, to actualise their sustainable development agendas.

Social context and power understandably play a significant role in the management, access, control and use of natural resources (Agrawal & Gibson 1999; Barton & Goldsmith 2016; Nursey-Bray 2011). In Ghana, for example, Amanor (2006 p.1) notes that "it is usually the wealthy and powerful within local communities who control the process of land administration and allocation and the definition of the customary interests". More so, it has become a global norm that activities or projects geared towards sustainable development must be bottom-up rather than top-down (Leach, Mearns & Scoones 1997b; Macdonald 2017). Understanding how mining benefits are shared within such contexts is an important focus of this study. Achieving equity and sustainable development will depend on the benefits both reaching those impacted by the mining, and importantly being used to implement what local people consider to be their sustainable development expectations. Do the powerful few who control access to the lands also control the mining benefits, or does the entire community have equal gain? What is the role of local customary institutions in shaping the governance and outcomes of benefits shared through the mineral funds? What are the roles of local level actors to appropriate these funds? Considering the social differentiation evident in rural mining communities, how do the benefit-sharing initiatives undertaken by governments and mining companies lead to improved participatory governance (social sustainable development) and economic wellbeing of the people?

The social context of communities within which benefit sharing takes place as a unit of analysis, is fundamental to understanding how mining contributes to sustainable development. It provides an opportunity for a more nuanced understanding of how a society, its cultural values, history, social organization, rules, and norms, as well as embedded local power relations, shapes whose interests, ideas or conceptions of sustainable development gets implemented through the sharing of mining benefits. In other words, the contextual dimension of benefit sharing analysis provides a lens to appreciate the underlying forces that may be at work in benefit sharing processes and outcomes which are not revealed in studies that simply document the impact of CSR projects and the decentralization of government revenues.

In Ghana and across other African countries the negative impacts of mining on host communities is well documented (Amponsah-Tawiah & Dartey-Baah 2011; Aryee 2001; Hilson & Hilson 2017). Governments and companies have been blamed largely for the lack of development in mining communities. What has been lacking, however, are empirical studies that document the actual processes, contextual influences and outcomes underlining benefit-sharing initiatives and its implication for the achievement of sustainable development (Vivoda & Kemp 2019). That is, the benefits generated from mining projects and how these benefits are shared (i.e. who gets what, when and how) has not fully been explored in the literature. This thesis, therefore, responds to this limitation by providing a deeper understanding of how benefit sharing practices are enacted at the community level (Jacka 2018; Perreault 2015; Vivoda & Kemp 2019; Welker 2009).

1.5 Statement of research aims

Within natural resource governance and sustainability research, it is agreed that benefit-sharing must constitute a key element in policy discussions in the developing world (Nkhata, Breen & Mosimane 2012; Norgaard 2010). Eggert (2000) however identifies that sharing of mining benefits can be disproportionate across society, with some getting more or less. Attention thus is being directed to questions of distributional equity in order to understand who the ultimate beneficiaries of benefit-sharing initiatives are (Wynberg & Hauck 2014). This research, therefore, aims to examine the local level conceptualisation of sustainable development, the processes underlying the sharing of mining benefits and whether sustainable development of rural mining communities in Ghana is achieved. This thesis will analyse how decisions are taken, and what motivations led to these decisions, and examine the participation of community members and the roles played by different actors in these decisions. Fair and equitable participation in benefit sharing processes has been linked to effective, equitable and legitimate outcomes (Hernes, Jentoft & Mikalsen 2005; Wynberg & Hauck 2014).

1.6 Research questions

The research hinges on the overarching question "*does the sharing of mining benefits in Ghana lead to sustainable development outcomes for mining communities?"* The scope for answering this question will be limited to investigation of current payments of mining revenues by the government of Ghana and Newmont mining Corporation to mining communities in the Birim North District of Ghana. This research explores the nexus between mining benefits sharing and sustainable development through four subsidiary questions:

1. How is sustainable development understood and interpreted by different actors in mining areas locally?
2. Does the sharing of mining benefits by the government lead to the sustainable development of mining communities in the Birim North District?
3. Who gains and who loses out from the sharing of mining benefits by Newmont Mining Corporation in the Birim North District of Ghana?
4. What actions or strategies could better ensure that the sharing of mining benefits reaches the people (including future generations) who bear or will bear the greatest costs of mining?

1.7 Research objectives

The general objective of the research is to contribute to the understanding of mineral benefit sharing and the pursuit of sustainable development in Ghana paying attention to the political, sociocultural and economic contextual influences within mining communities. The specific objectives of the study are:

1. To understand what sustainable development means to different actors locally and how their interpretations are shaped by community differences.
2. To understand how benefits distributed by the government are accessed and used in the Birim North District and whether it leads to sustainable development outcomes.
3. To examine the mechanisms (including the dimensions of power) by which different actors gain or lose out from the sharing of mining benefits in the Birim North District by Newmont Mining Corporation.
4. To identify potential opportunities or mechanisms of improving the distribution of mining benefits to ensure equity and sustainable development if necessary.

1.8 Organisation of the thesis

Chapter One has thus provided a background and rationale for the study and examined the research questions and objectives which define the scope of the research. Chapter two will review the literature on mining and sustainable development, with a focus on the so-called 'resource curse', sustainable mining and benefit sharing approaches in the mining sector Corporate Social Responsibility. Chapter three discusses the research methodology used in this study. Political ecology as an analytical framework is discussed in the context of the wider research design, data collection and analysis. Chapter four provides a background context of the study. The chapter provides information about mining in Ghana, Newmont's project in the Birim North District and the social context of the study communities.

Chapter five presents the result of how sustainable development is construed by different actors. The chapter reveals that sustainable development is socially constructed such that the government, Newmont Mining Corporation and mining communities have different views of what should constitute mining led sustainable development. Further, within the mining communities, class differences in interpretations can also be discerned between local elites (highly educated and well-to-do community leaders) and non-elites (less educated poor people). Further results are presented in Chapter Six that shows the process of redistributing royalties from the national government to mining communities is entangled in bureaucratic politics. Political elites at the national level significantly delay and underpay the royalties to the communities by using the funds for other priorities. Further, this chapter shows that the partial funds that do get to the community are also appropriated mostly by the village chiefs for their personal use or the procurement of expensive trappings of royalty. Chapter seven focusses on the CSR practices of Newmont and reveals that inviting beneficiary communities to participate in CSR project decisions does not necessarily translate into equitable and sustainable development outcomes as envisaged in the literature. Whilst the company Newmont shifts decision-making power to the communities, powerful local elites using different strategies capture the decision-making structures and resources to implement their own sustainability agendas (community infrastructure) to the detriment of the poor non-elites in need of livelihoods.

Chapter eight provides an overall discussion of the research findings including implications and recommendations. Chapter nine provides a summary of all the findings mapped against the research objectives. This chapter also highlights some limitations of the research and suggestions for future research. Overall, this thesis argues that whilst mining communities in Ghana need sustainable development, the sharing of mining benefits has not been a panacea for it. This is not because of a paucity of resources or a lack of initiative by government and mining companies. Rather, inequitable and skewed redistribution of the mineral benefits, undergirded by the agency of powerful elites and by the disenabling local contexts, accounts for the limited impact of benefit sharing for sustainable development.

CHAPTER TWO

Literature Review: Mining, Sustainable Development and Benefits Sharing Nexus

2.0 Introduction

This chapter provides a review of the literature on mining and sustainable development. It seeks to outline the trend in the literature about the nexus between high-value natural resources and the attainment of sustainable development of mining communities through benefits sharing. This chapter will review the literature on the concept of the 'Resource Curse' and will explore the effects of resource exploitation on resource-dependent countries. This will lead to a paradigm shift within the literature from accounts of the 'resource curse' to notions of 'sustainable development', and the subsequent discussion in this chapter will highlight the various controversies surrounding the ability of the mining and extractive industries to contribute to sustainable development. However, rather than being overly drawn into these controversies, this thesis will argue that mining through fair and equitable benefit sharing schemes can contribute to some level of sustainable development. This chapter specifically focusses on two main approaches to benefit sharing in Ghana: Corporate Social Responsibility by mining companies and the decentralization of mining revenues by the state.

2.1 Natural resource-led development

The central question underlying most discussions about development and extractive industries, such as mining, revolves around utility. That is, whether mining and other extractive projects are profitable and can lead to development for those who are bestowed with high-value natural resources. Governments in developing countries endowed with mineral resources have traditionally viewed foreign investment in the minerals sector as a means to end their underdevelopment (Bomsel 1990; Bridge 2004). Yet, as early as 1556, Georgius Agricola discussing the first treatise on mining in the Western world notes the general view at the time that 'there is a greater detriment from mining than the value of the metals which the mining produces' (Georgius 1556 p.8). Similarly, Adam Smith in the 18th century emphasised that:

> …of all those expensive and uncertain projects which bring bankruptcy upon the greater part of the people that engage in them, there is none more ruinous than the search for new silver and gold mines. It is perhaps the most disadvantageous lottery in the world (as quoted in Whitmore 2006, p.311).

Social scientists have thus over the years been keenly interested in the link between extractive industries and development.

2.1.1 The Resource curse thesis

The resource curse thesis explains why against natural wisdom, possession of natural resources will induce adverse economic, political and social impacts instead of improving development. The term 'resource curse' was coined by Auty (1993). Ross (2015 p.2) defines it as 'the adverse effects of a country's natural resource wealth on its economic, social, or political well-being'. Over the last few decades, a number of researchers have demonstrated this 'curse' as impacting those countries with natural resources such as minerals, oil and gas. That is, despite their wealth of resources, they have performed negatively in terms of political, social and economic indicators compared to less endowed countries (Auty 1993; Collier 2003; Gylfason 2001; Ross 1999; Ross 2003; Sachs & Warner 2001; Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian 2008). The resource curse literature identifies four impact mechanisms of high-value natural resources on development. These include (i) economic growth impacts (ii) Civil conflicts (iii) Poor social investments and poverty (iv) Effects on democratic governance

Economic growth impacts

Resource abundance has been found to have a debilitating effect on economic performance of endowed countries (Auty 1990; Auty 1993; Sachs & Warner 1995, 1997, 2001). A pioneering study by Auty (1993) highlighted this inverse relationship. In his study based on data from six mineral exporting countries, he concluded that countries that are less endowed with mineral resources performed economically better than those with natural resources. Similarly, studies by Sachs and Warner (1995) indicated a strong negative correlation between natural resource exports and economic growth between 1970-1990. In 2002, Weber-Fahr (2002) concluded among others that "the growth performance of mining countries as a group seems indeed to suggest that countries with substantial incomes from mining performed less well than countries with less income from mining"(Weber-Fahr 2002 p.7). Economic growth impacts are noted to be caused by inefficient spending by government, rent-seeking behaviour and the Dutch Disease[4] (Stevens & Dietsche 2008).

Linkages to Civil Conflicts

Natural resource exploitation plays a role in the onset, duration, and finance of civil conflicts (Collier & Hoeffler 1998, 2004, 2012; Humphreys 2005; Lujala 2009). Collier and Hoeffler (2004) show that reliance on natural resources exports significantly increases the probability of a country being plunged into conflict. Fearon and Laitin (2003) also demonstrate that resource dependence increases the duration of civil conflicts. In Africa, the 'blood diamonds' of Angola and Sierra Leone served as a financial stream piped by warring factions (especially rebel groups) to fuel their violent conflicts (Bannon & Collier 2003). These violent conflicts result from the greed and/or grievances of local actors in the affected countries (Collier & Hoeffler 2004, 2012).

Effects on Social investments and poverty

Some studies have found that natural resource exploitation (paradoxically) reduces investments in the social sector and increases the level of poverty (Gylfason 2001; Pegg 2006; Stevens & Dietsche 2008). The high levels of poverty in African countries such as the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Niger and Sierra Leone have been attributed to mineral production (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2002). Gylfason (2001) demonstrated that in some resource-dependent countries, poor levels of investment in important social sectors such as education resulted in less secondary school enrolments and a reduction in the expected number of school years for the girl child. According to Gylfason (2001) this neglect in the investment in human resources was a result of the governments viewing their natural resource assets more important than their human resources (Gylfason 2001).

Effects on democracy and governance

A large part of the resource curse literature has focused on resource wealth and democratic governance (Dunning 2008; Karl 1997, 2007; Ross 2001a), concluding that dependence on oil and mineral revenues is often associated with authoritarian regimes. Ross (2001a) in his

[4] Dutch disease is a term used to the economic malaise where a rise in one sector of an economy (such as the extractives sector) leads to a decline other productive sectors of the economy (such as manufacturing). See Humphreys *et al*. (2007) and Larsen (2006).

analysis of 113 countries found that not only did resource wealth impede democracy in the oil-rich Middle East, but also in the case of African countries where nonfuel minerals were exported. One reason for these findings is that the reliance on resource wealth rather than taxes makes governments less transparent and accountable to their citizens. This, in turn, fosters bad governance practices such as rent-seeking and corruption (Karl 1997, 2007).

2.1.2 Enriching the debate: Focus on local community level development

For most economists and political scientists, the translation of mineral wealth into a 'blessing' rather than a 'curse' lies in the improvement of the quality of state institutions. Barma, Kaiser and Le (2012 p.4) summarise this line of thinking by suggesting that:

> …the resource curse is inherently a governance challenge: the credibility, quality, transparency, and accountability of policy-making processes, public institutions, the legal and regulatory climate, and sector governance are major determinants of how successfully countries can channel their resource wealth into sustainable development.

The much-touted antidote thus has been to improve public governance and management of the resource revenues through greater transparency and accountability systems at the national level (Karl 2007). Even though this antidote is popular internationally, more focus on regional and local community level activities in resource-rich countries has been identified to be important in dealing with the resource-development nexus, and yet this has often been overlooked in discussions (Banks 2001; Ofori & Lujala 2015; Stevens & Dietsche 2008). Ofori and Lujala (2015) for example have identified that, what local people perceive as transparency and development are quite different from what is advocated for on the global and national stage. Local people want to see tangible changes in their lives as a result of the extraction of resources in their communities rather than the mere implementation of transparency laws and policies (Ofori & Lujala 2015). These laws and initiatives especially in the developing world context do not have much impact on improving the wellbeing of those affected by extractive projects (Ofori & Lujala 2015). Studies identify that weak governance at the sub-national level is a key impediment to the ability of mining industries to impact positively at the local level (McPhail 2008). In the view of Andrews (2018), the overemphasis placed on the quality of institutional governance at the national level, has led to a neglect of the role of sub-national attributes, such as the influence of local elites in mining and development discussions.

Emergent studies, therefore, are increasingly paying attention to processes, actors and institutions at the sub-national level to fully help discern the link between extractive industries and development (Arellano-Yanguas 2011a, 2011b; Asante 2016; Bebbington 2015; Williams & Le Billon 2017). In developed mineral economies such as Australia and Canada, there is attention to the engagement with indigenous communities, particularly in relation to benefit sharing agreements negotiations, implementation and its impact on communities (Harvey 2018; Keenan, Kemp & Ramsay 2016; O'Faircheallaigh 2004, 2013). The literature on these issues has developed alongside the adoption of the concept of sustainable development by the mining industry, following the 2002 World Summit on sustainable development in Johannesburg. Thus, the new ethos in the industry since then has been to champion a sustainable development agenda within the extractives sector. Benefit sharing mechanisms are increasingly being adopted by the industry, such as negotiated community development agreements, however, are emergent initiatives in developing countries such as Ghana and the scholarship on how they relate to the sustainable development of mining communities remains underdeveloped. This thesis focusses on mining benefits sharing and sustainable development in the developing world context.

2.2 Sustainable development as a development paradigm

Sustainable development has emerged as the mainstay of theories and approaches to tackling development (Redclift 1992; Redclift & Springett 2015). Redclift (1992 p.1) acknowledges its pervasiveness by noting that 'like motherhood and God it is difficult not to approve of it'. Sustainable development is an evolving developmental model that seeks to integrate environmental, economic and social goals (Baker 2006). Much of this developmental thinking emerged in the 1980s. A laborious account of how the concept emerged, whilst interesting is not explored in this thesis but extensively discussed by other scholars (Corder 2017; Redclift & Springett 2015).

The World Commission on Environment and Development (WECD) report, published in 1987 largely informed mainstream thinking of development which encompasses the environmental, economic and social development ethos (Baker 2006; Costanza 1991; Lafferty & Meadowcroft 2000). The report of the commission also known as the Brundtland Report emphasized human development as opposed to ecological concerns and saw the environment as an integral part of realizing human ambitions (Brundtland 1987; Elliott 2012). It stressed the urgent need to prioritize the satisfaction of the basic needs of poor people in the third world as a development objective and way of improving their quality of life. Development agendas that focus on tackling environmental concerns without addressing structural issues of poverty and inequality are thus counterintuitive because poverty and inequality are largely precursors for environmental degradation (Brundtland 1987).

Over the years, several actions have been undertaken at the global level to enhance the practice of sustainable development and to consolidate the gains achieved. The 1992 Rio Earth Summit for example, led to the Agenda 21 Action Plan, which is a blueprint aimed at improving the well-being of people, whilst simultaneously halting environmental degradation through the synergy of different groups at local, national and global levels., At the UN Millennium summit in 2000, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were adopted as a targeted means towards achieving sustainable development. These goals were reviewed and replaced in 2015 by the Sustainable Development goals (SDGs) with a further time frame of 15 years for their realisation (Filho *et al*. 2018; Fraser 2018). The SDGs are made up of a framework of 17 goals and 169 targets to be implemented selectively by individual countries depending on their local developmental and sustainability priorities (Gusmão Caiado *et al*. 2018; Salvia *et al.* 2019). The goals define an agenda for the development of countries in a way that is socially inclusive, ecologically sound and promotes economic growth (Gusmão Caiado *et al*. 2018; Stafford-Smith *et al*. 2017).

In spite of decades of research and practice, the meaning of sustainable development and how it can be achieved remains contested (Connelly 2007; Kristoffersen & Langhelle 2017; Moon 2007). It is a very abstract and normative principle. The different ways it is viewed goes beyond just definitions, but includes essentially how to conceptualise and measure what is to be sustained, and how it should be done (Beland Lindahl *et al.* 2016; Faucheux, O'Connor & Van Der Straaten 1998; Moon 2007). Being subject to multiple interpretations due to its vagueness (Bruyninckx 2006), sustainable development is used to justify diverging and oftentimes opposing views or interests (Bruyninckx 2006). Van den Bergh and van der Straaten (1994) notes that the broad nature of what is meant by development and the evolving nature of social change accounts for the contested meaning of the concept. Van Zeijl-Rozema *et al.* (2008) see sustainable development as being normative in nature and involving the making of context-dependent choices that balance ecological, economic and social concerns. Focusing on the SDGs only, Spaiser *et al.* (2017) notes inconsistencies in their formulation and predicts the potential of their failure. Viewing sustainable development as being made up of three pillars or objectives, even though also contested (Bruyninckx 2006), is a useful conceptual approach that has been adopted over the years in both academic papers and policy documents to overcome the seeming confusion about what it is. In this conceptual model, sustainable development is understood to be a type of development that integrates environmental, economic and social concerns or principles (Barbier 1987; Elliott 2012). Figure 2.1 provides a snapshot of the key principles in each of the three domains.

Figure 2. 1 Sustainable Development Objectives



Source: Based on Barbier (1987) and Elliott (2012)

Generally, ecological sustainability is concerned with maintaining the earth's carrying capacity to ensure future development and to protect nature for itself, thus creating a society that lives in harmony with nature (Baker 2006). Important areas of emphasis include biodiversity conservation, and the protection of the ozone layer, soil, and water systems. On the other hand, economic sustainability is generally concerned with the need to recognise the biophysical limits (both in terms of renewable and non-renewables resources) to economic growth (Baker 2006; Goodland 1995). Particularly for industrialised nations, this means cutting back on the intensive use of natural resources and changes to consumption patterns (Baker 2006). A key concern also within this domain according to Barbier (1987) is that poor people especially in developing countries should have access to sustainable and secure livelihoods. This is based largely on the understanding that, most of the pernicious environmental conditions in those countries are first of all connected to livelihood struggles.

Tolba (1984) believes sustainable development is about helping the very poor in society who have limited options other than encroaching upon the environment. The World Council of Churches (WCC) in 1976 also reflects this view:

> The twin issues around which the world's future revolves are justice and ecology. 'Justice' points to the necessity of correcting maldistribution of the products of the Earth and of bridging the gap between rich and poor countries. 'Ecology' points to humanity's dependence upon the Earth. Society must be so organised as to sustain the Earth so that a sufficient quality of material and cultural life for humanity may itself be sustained indefinitely. A sustainable society which is unjust can hardly be worth sustaining. A just society that is unsustainable is self-defeating. Humanity now has the responsibility to make a deliberate transition to a just and sustainable global society (WCC quoted in Redclift 2005 p.419)

These ideas which were built on notions of needs and equity, and were identified by the Brundtland Commission Report, have been developed over the years to link sustainability to social outcomes. For example Agyeman (2013), reemphasised that sustainable development policies should promote social justice within and between countries. Social sustainability should thus be concerned about fairness and equity in the processes and outcomes of development, both for the present and future generations. The sharing of resources must also be fair for both generations. For poor societies in particular, fair and equitable redistribution and sharing of benefits of development or resources is required for sustainability (Atuguba 2013), and this is clearly important to consider in relation to rising global inequality (Gupta & Vegelin 2016; Ravallion 2019).

2.2.1 Equity, social justice and sustainable development

Equity is an important underlining principle of sustainable development (Gupta & Vegelin 2016; Langhelle 2000). Gupta and Vegelin (2016) suggest that any progress towards achieving social inclusions in the implementation of the SDGs must be based on the adoption of equity principles in the distribution of development benefits. Within the context of the mining industry, Moran and Kunz (2014) outline that, progress towards achieving sustainable development must be measured in terms of how well mineral wealth is equitably distributed amongst actors. According to equity theorists, social relationships are considered fair when the distribution of gains and losses in society are done fairly (Adams 1963; Leventhal 1980). The concept of equity, therefore, is concerned with the issue of fairness and social justice. According to Beder (2000 p. 2):

> Equity derives from a concept of social justice. It is a belief that there are some things which people should have, that are basic needs that should be fulfilled, that burdens and rewards should not be spread too divergently across the community, and that policy should be directed with impartiality, fairness, and justices towards these ends

An equitable society can be understood to be one in which all members of the society can participate economically, socially and politically without any form of exclusionary or discriminatory practices (Fraser 1999; Gupta & Vegelin 2016; Ofori & Ofori 2018a; Pierson 2002). At the community level, it implies that all members must have equal access to development opportunities and benefits (Gupta & Vegelin 2016) whilst at the same time no individual or subgroup of the community is made to carry greater environmental burdens or risks (Beder 2000). Unequal distribution of the costs or benefits can lead to social conflicts and tensions within local communities (Auty & Mikesell 1998).

Achieving equity in sustainable development means that 'the benefits and burdens of sustainable development should be widely accessible and distributed fairly across different facets of society' (Trudeau 2018 p. 601). According to Anand and Sen (2000), sustainability is a matter of distributional equity involving the sharing of wellbeing capacity between the present (intra-generational equity) and future generations (inter-generational) (see also Brundtland 1987). In the 2002 International Law Association (ILA) New Delhi declaration of principles relating to sustainable development, it was outlined that:

> The principle of equity is central to the attainment of sustainable development. It refers to both inter-generational equity (right of future generations to enjoy a fair level of the common patrimony) and intra-generational equity (the right of all peoples within the current generation of fair access to the current generation's entitlement to the Earth's natural resources) (International Law Association 2002, p. 213).

French (2010) views the notion of equity as a justice principle which must be an underlying framework within which any form of sustainable development debate can be organized. He goes on to clarify that the equity principle is what differentiates sustainable development from environmental protectionism. Also, the idea of development must be viewed as doing what is right and fair both within and between nation states (Agyeman, Bullard & Evans 2003).

Intragenerational equity is about equity among the present generation (Weiss 1990). That is, the fair access to and use of environmental resources and the benefits derived thereof. It is concerned with the redistribution of resources to bridge the gap between the haves and the have-nots by prioritising the socially disadvantaged in society. Ensuring fairness within the present generation is key to the achievement of sustainable development. This is because the state of inequalities in development has the potential of causing environmental degradation which sustainable development aims at quelling (Beder 2000). When people are made poor as a result of inequalities in development, they will destroy the environment as a survival strategy (Beder 2000; Brundtland 1987). Scholars working within the political ecology tradition, for example, have long been concerned with and documented environmental degradation as an outcome of marginalization and inequalities in development (Benjaminsen 2015; and see Robbins 2011). Consequently, equity or fairness in society within the present generation is required to guarantee the long-term sustainability of environments (Dobson 1998; French 2010).

Sustainable development policy and discussions also intimate the need to focus attention on the interest of future generations as much as is done for the present (Anand & Sen 2000). Weiss (1990) points out that the commitment to the principle of equity in sustainable development is a means to constrain the use of natural resources by the present generation which may not have a consideration for future generations. The notion of intergenerational equity within the annals of sustainable development, therefore, is about ensuring the distribution and use of resources for development in a way that safeguards the interest and needs of future generations. In theory, intergenerational equity means that current generations are both trustees and beneficiaries of natural resources and responsible for maintaining stock levels for use by future generations (Weiss 1990). Solow (1993 p.15) illuminates and clarifies this notion:

> The duty imposed by sustainability is to bequeath to posterity, not any particular thing with rare exceptions such as Yosemite, for example-but rather endow them with whatever it takes to achieve a standard of living at least as good as our own and to look after their next generation similarly. We are not to consume humanity's capital, in the broadest sense.

For Solow, sustainability is about ensuring future generations are not left poorer by the present generation, and this is achieved by adhering to a moral obligation of distribution equity across generations (Solow 1974, 1991, 1993). Discussion and analysis of the costs and benefits of development, therefore, must include the perspectives of both the present and future generations. Thus, in this sense, the distribution and use of benefits derived from mining must not only flow to the present generation but to the future generations as well. This must be an important element within any idea of sustainable mining espoused by governments and mining companies.

Discussions of fairness in the sharing of resources of development outcomes (both for future and present generations) are interlinked to distributive justice and procedural justice. The two forms of justices are separate and yet interrelated. Distributive justice which is rooted in notions of economic structuring of society focuses on outcomes of distributive processes, whereas procedural justice focuses on the underlying process and politics of the distribution. According to Greenberg and Cohen (2014), distributive justice or fairness focuses on the outcomes of how benefits or things are shared amongst different parties. It is concerned with a fair allocation (Cook & Hegtvedt 1983) or the feeling of people about whether or not they have obtained their fair share of benefits based on certain criteria (Welsh 2004).

The allocation of benefits could be defined based on equality, social welfare, merit and need (McDermott, Mahanty & Schreckenberg 2011; Miller 1992; Rawls 1971). For Rawls (1971), the allocation of resources should be in a way that ensures those most disadvantaged obtain more. These criteria form the basis for the identification of recipients and the grounds for distribution. The extraction of natural resources as development activity, usually is accompanied by costs and benefits. The fairness in the allocation of these costs and benefits in society overtime underpins distributive justice (Gebara 2013; Whiteman 2009) or as others term it, 'economic justice' (Anand & Sen 2000; Poteete 2004). The allocation of costs and burdens of development are usually unequal, and studies show that poor people and often indigenous groups tend to bear disproportionate costs of resource developments (Martinez-Alier 2014; Whiteman 2009). Resolving such inequities would mean that benefits of extractive industries must be redistributed in such a way that it reaches those it was intended for (such as indigenous groups) and improve their wellbeing.

According to Leventhal (1980) equity must extend beyond the fair distribution of resources or rewards and punishments, to also include the procedures that underline the initial distribution. Procedures in this sense include the complex sets of events underlining a distribution, decision-makers (and how they are selected) and the structure of group decisions making process (Leventhal 1980). It has thus been suggested for example that sustainable development is achieved only through systematic community participation and strong civil society (Goodland

1995; Helming & Wiggering 2013). Multi-stakeholder participation especially including vulnerable communities has become a cornerstone in both the sustainable development discourse and practice, at the global and local levels. The concept of participation is explored further in subsection 2.4.4 of this chapter.

2.3 Sustainable development, mining and communities: The linkage

By the turn of the decade in 1990, the world witnessed calls by different stakeholders for businesses to contribute to wider social goals (Faucheux & Nicolaï 2003; Vivoda & Kemp 2019). This demand was in consonance with the general recognition that achieving sustainable development required partnership amongst different stakeholders, not least the private sector (Glasbergen 2007; Gray 2007). Writing about the SDG targets, Sachs (2012) strongly emphasised the need to engage the private sector if the 2030 targets are to be achieved. The UN Secretary-General underscored this point at a forum to discuss financing of the SDGs by stating that "without the private sector and the business community the goals [SDGs] are simply not achievable" (United Nations 2018). Especially in the case of developing countries, there is the understanding that such partnerships leads to positive outcomes for local people such as sustainable community development (Franco, Puppim de Oliveira & Ali 2018; Muthuri 2007).

In response, most corporations are increasingly getting involved in the implementation of sustainable development. The private sector's interest in sustainability is evidenced, for example by the 7700 companies in 130 countries signing the Global Compact (Lozano 2015), a public-private initiative that serves as a framework for participating organisations to develop, implement and disclose their sustainability practices and policies. This growing business behaviour is well documented in the corporate sustainability literature (Elkington 2004; Epstein 2018; Hahn *et al.* 2018; Lozano 2015; Van Heel, Elkington & Fennel 2001). Corporate sustainability is understood as "…meeting the needs of a firm's direct and indirect stakeholders (such as shareholders, employees, clients, pressure groups, communities, etc.), without compromising its ability to meet the needs of future stakeholders as well" (Dyllick & Hockerts 2002 p.131). It is viewed as a process by which corporations achieve sustainable development in environmental, social and economic aspects of society (Epstein 2018). Despite its negative environmental sustainability records, the mining industry has also adopted and emphasised its commitment to promoting sustainable development principles in its operations (Himley 2010;

Vivoda & Kemp 2019). Newmont Mining Corporation for example stresses its commitment to sustainable development by stating that:

> We recognize that sustainability risks are business risks, and our strategy focuses on integrating key sustainability considerations – human rights, water, energy and climate change, to name a few – into all stages of the mine lifecycle and informing business decisions (Newmont Mining Corporation 2019 p. 6).

2.3.1 Brief evolution of sustainable mining

The mining industry, generally, has responded to outside pressures to integrate sustainable development goals into their operations, most notably, due to the sustained and targeted campaigns by environmental activist groups that highlight the effects of mining on local communities and the environment (Richards 2003). Friends of the Earth, for example, as a global environmental organization, has called for a moratorium on public funding of mining and other extractive projects. They contend that extractive projects have little contribution to sustainable development (Friends of the Earth International 2001). Protests and anti-mining campaigns have in some cases also escalated into lawsuits resulting in the award of significant sums of money against mining corporations. One example of this can be seen in the class action lawsuit against BHP in Australia, over environmental damage caused by their OK Tedi mine in Papua Guinea (Australian Joint Standing committee on Foreign Affairs 1999; Connelly 2007). In some cases, environmental activists' protests have led to the total closure of mines, as was the case in Newmont's Conga Project in Peru (BBC 2011; Jorge 2016; Taj 2014).

A number of studies carried out in the 1990s have provided well-documented impacts of the industry on local communities, necessitating a change in mining policies by governments, companies, and financial lenders (Arellano-Yanguas 2011a). Most notable amongst these studies was a World Bank commissioned study (see McMahon & Remy 2002). This study documented significant environmental and social impacts of mining on local mining communities in the developing world. The World Bank's publication of the Extractive Industries Review (EIR) report in 2004 and consequent change in the Banks funding policy was also a major milestone in the transition to the sustainable development era for mining corporations. The review was in response to the debate about the World Banks's financing of extractive projects and if this was congruent with its overall objective of poverty alleviation through sustainable development. The final EIR report concluded that financing of Extractive projects can contribute to sustainable development but only when certain conditions are met (Salim 2004). The report stressed that funding should only be provided to extractive projects that could guarantee benefits reach local communities, and especially reach vulnerable groups such as women and ethnic minorities, and should be contingent upon companies meeting a host of environmental protection standards (Salim 2004).

As a direct result of the above-mentioned drivers for change, sustainable mining and the integration of sustainable development into the operations of mining companies emerged. At the same time, the concepts behind this change also emerged out of discussions held by nine executives of large-scale mining companies[5] who came together in preparation for the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development, which resulted in the Global Mining Initiative (GMI) (Danielson 2006). The GMI was aimed at unearthing how the mining and minerals industries could contribute to sustainable development through its operations (Danielson 2006; Eggert 2001). Specifically, the GMI aimed to unearth the challenges the industry was facing and the changes required to make the industry more responsible. The Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development (MMSD) project was a landmark outcome of the GMI. The project was aimed at identifying and analysing the issues facing the mining industry and how it can contribute to sustainable development (MMSD 2002). It laid the foundation for the transition into the sustainable mining era. It also prompted the establishment of the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM). The ICMM represents 19 multinational large-scale mining companies and works with 30 other national and multinational industrial groups to implement the sustainable mining agenda.

Follow up studies and meetings after the MMSD publication led to the publication of what can be described as the industry's policy document on sustainable development- *The Breaking New Ground Report* (MMSD 2002). The publication identified nine key challenges facing the industry as it seeks to contribute to sustainable development (See Table 2.1).

[5] These included: Andrew Vickerman (Rio Tinto), George Littlewood (WMC Resources), David Colton(Phelps Dodge), John Groom (Anglo American), Dave Rodier (Norander), Bob Muth (Asarco), Tony Wells (BHP), Santiago Torres (CODELCO) and Dave Baker (Newmont) (Franks, 2015).

Table 2. 1 Challenges facing the mining industry

Viability of the Minerals Industry.	The minerals industry cannot contribute to sustainable development if companies cannot survive and succeed. This requires a safe, healthy, educated, and committed work force; access to capital; a social licence to operate; the ability to attract and maintain good managerial talent; and the opportunity for a return on investment.
The Control, Use, and Management of Land.	Mineral development is one of a number of often competing land uses. There is frequently a lack of planning or other frameworks to balance and manage possible uses. As a result, there are often problems and disagreement around issues such as compensation, resettlement, land claims of indigenous peoples, and protected areas.
Minerals and Economic Development.	Minerals have the potential to contribute to poverty alleviation and broader economic development at the national level. Countries have realized this with mixed success. For this to be achieved, appropriate frameworks for the creation and management of mineral wealth must be in place. Additional challenges include corruption and determining the balance between local and national benefits.
Local Communities and Mines.	Minerals development can also bring benefits at the local level. Recent trends towards, for example, smaller work forces and outsourcing affect communities adversely, however. The social upheaval and inequitable distribution of benefits and costs within communities can also create social tension. Ensuring that improved health and education or economic activity will endure after mines close requires a level of planning that has too often not been achieved.
Mining, Minerals, and the Environment.	Minerals activities have a significant environmental impact. Managing these impacts more effectively requires dealing with unresolved issues of handling immense quantities of waste, developing ways of internalizing the costs of acid drainage, improving both impact assessment and environmental management systems, and doing effective planning for mine closure.
An Integrated Approach to Using Minerals.	The use of minerals is essential for modern living. Yet current patterns of use face a growing number of challenges, ranging from concerns about efficiency and waste minimization to the risks associated with the use of certain minerals. Companies at different stages in the minerals chain can benefit from learning to work together exploring further recycling, re-use, and re-manufacture of products and developing integrated programmes of product stewardship and supply chain assurance.
Access to Information	Access to information is key to building greater trust and cooperation. The quality of information and its use, production, flow, accessibility, and credibility affect the interaction of all actors in the sector. Effective public participation in decision-making requires information to be publicly available in an accessible form.
Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining.	Many millions of people make their living through artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM). It often provides an important, and sometimes the only, source of income. This part of the sector is characterized by low incomes, unsafe working conditions, serious environmental impacts, exposure to hazardous materials such as mercury vapours, and conflict with larger companies and governments.
Sector Governance:	Roles, Responsibilities, and Instruments for Change. Sustainable development requires new integrated systems of governance. Most countries still lack the framework for turning minerals investment into sustainable development: these need to be developed. Voluntary codes and guidelines, stakeholder processes, and other systems for promoting better practice in areas where government is unable to exercise an effective role as regulator are gaining favour as an expedient to address these problems. Lenders and other financial institutions can play a pivotal role in driving better practice.

Source: MMSD 2002

The MMSD report identified that the mining sector fell short of the objectives of sustainable development given its negative environmental and social legacy. The report proposed a set of actions required to bring about change that makes mining more responsible and sustainable (MMSD, 2002). The first of these principles were outlined in the MMSD report, but later refined into ten core principles, developed further by the ICMM (See Table 2.2)

Table 2. 2 ICMM 10 Core Sustainability Principles / Sustainable Development Framework

1. Corporate Governance	Implement and maintain ethical business practices and sound systems of corporate governance.
2. Corporate Decision-Making	Integrate sustainable development considerations within the corporate decision-making process.
3. Human Rights	Uphold fundamental human rights and respect cultures, customs and values in dealings with employees and others who are affected by our activities.
4. Risk Management	Implement risk management strategies based on valid data and sound science.
5. Health and Safety	Seek continual improvement of our health and safety performance.
6. Environment	Seek continual improvement of our environmental performance.
7. Biodiversity	Contribute to conservation of biodiversity and integrated approaches to land use planning.
8. Material Stewardship	Facilitate and encourage responsible product design, use, re-use, recycling and disposal of our products
9. Community Development	Contribute to the social, economic and institutional development of the communities in which we operate.
10. Independent Verification	Implement effective and transparent engagement, communication and independently verified reporting arrangements with our stakeholders.

Source: ICMM (2015)

These ten principles have been well received by global mining corporations who have made attempts to align their corporate level policies to it (Corder 2017).

Standard practice for most large-scale mining companies is to now provide information about their sustainability performance to the public and their shareholders. These are in line with sustainable development standards or frameworks developed by mineral industry groups and NGOs to measure the performance of companies on issues such as environmental governance, human rights and other social outcomes. Some identifiable reporting frameworks used in reporting include Global Compact; ISO standards; AA1000; Global Reporting Initiative (GRI); Integrated Reporting; ICMM principles for sustainable development; and Enduring Value (Moran & Kunz 2014).

2.3.2 Meaning of sustainable development to industry and other stakeholders

From an industry perspective, the integration of sustainable development principles into the mining industry is viewed as an agenda for change and a means to identify best practice standards within the industry (MMSD, 2002). Industry stakeholders contend that mining can contribute to sustainable development by impacting positively on local communities and the environment (Fitzpatrick, Fonseca & McAllister 2011; MMSD 2002). Divergent views on how sustainable development can be applied in mining have been discussed by both scholars and stakeholders within the industry (Hilson & Basu 2003).

Initial attempts to conceptualize sustainable development within the context of mining were by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in 2002. They argued that

> …a mining project that is developed, operated and closed in an environmentally and socially acceptable manner could be seen as contributing to sustainable development. Critical to this goal is ensuring that benefits of the project are employed to develop the region in a way that will survive long after the mine is closed (United Nations 2002 p.6).

Sustainable mining in their view should be about the use of advances in technology to safeguard the environment during mining in addition to providing benefits to society.

From an industry perspective the goals of development *vis a vis* mining is:

> … to maximize the contribution to the well-being of the current generation in a way that ensures an equitable distribution of its costs and benefits, without reducing the potential for future generations to meet their own needs. The approach taken to achieve this has to be both comprehensive – including the whole minerals chain – and forward-looking, setting out long-term as well as short-term objectives. (MMSD 2002 p.XVI)

Han Onn and Woodley (2014) examined ‘sustainability’ and ‘sustainable development’ within the mining industry and analysed the use of these terms in academic publications and industry reports. They identified eleven sustainability agendas for mining, and then classified them into three tiers, namely -

Tier 1-Perpetual Sustainability: this relates to the use of the terms in reference to benefits to shareholders and the continuation of mining.

Tier 2-Transferable Sustainability: this encapsulates the use of the terms in relation to extending the benefits to the broader community and environment.

Tier 3-Transitional Sustainability: this category includes the use of the terms in reference to the provision of intergenerational benefits including after the mine closes.

From these three tiers, they found that the second tier was commonly associated with a sustainable mining agenda. Han Onn and Woodley (2014) concluded that a sustainable mining agenda is largely about the provision of social benefits and maintenance of environmental standards, but without much focus on intergenerational equity.

Dubiński (2013) conceptualises the practice of sustainable development in the mining sector in relation to the three pillars of sustainable development. Thus, economic sustainability or growth within the mining industry means maintaining production volumes to match demand from customers in the long term. Ecological sustainability on the other hand entails taking steps to minimise the impact of the extraction process on the natural environment. Social sustainability in Dubiński’s view relates to ensuring the safety of mine employees and their families as well mining communities.

Strongman (2002) on the other hand, points out the lack of consensus on exactly what sustainable development means within the context of mining. For him, sustainable mining development entails a project that is financially viable, adheres to environmental standards, and maintains a positive legacy of socially responsibility. Strongman’s view is similar to that of Deb and Sarkar (2017) who consider sustainable mining to be investments in mining projects that are technically appropriate, environmentally sound, financially profitable and socially responsible.

Another way of looking at what sustainable mining entails is through the guiding principles that have been put forward by mining industry players as a guide to achieving sustainability (see Table 2.2 above). The principles emphasize environmental responsibility, improvement in the economic and social well-being of people affected by projects as well as creating mechanisms for a plurality of decision-making processes. Analytically, they provide a baseline for reviewing the performance of large-scale mining companies at the local level relative to their implementation of sustainable development. Considering Dubiński's (2013) conceptualisation and the ICMM’s sustainable mining framework, it is clear that the practice of sustainable development in the mining industry is multidimensional.

It is important therefore to clarify at this juncture that, this thesis is concerned with sustainable mining relative to mining communities, rather than for example other broad areas such as mine development (Corder, McLellan & Green 2010), supply chains (Yakovleva, Frei & Rama Murthy 2019), or sustainability reporting (Fonseca, McAllister & Fitzpatrick 2014). This narrow scope is significant when situated within the overwhelming evidence of the disproportionate power of multinational mining companies backed by state governments over local people whose lands, critical to their livelihoods, are often used for mine development (Franks *et al*. 2010; UNDP and UN Environment 2018). The social and economic burdens of mining carried by mining communities are profound (Mayes 2014). How the practice of sustainable development within the industry responds to the reported externalities of mine development such as impoverishment of local populations is of paramount importance to the legitimacy of the industry itself (Deb & Sarkar 2017).

As well established in the literature, sustainable development remains conceptually difficult to define and how it can be achieved remains contested (Agyeman 2013; Kemp & Martens 2007). The lack of congruence on the meaning of the concept does not only expose its polysemic nature but importantly risks in its practice (Alexander 2018; Krauss 2018). The implementation of sustainable mining would involve the intervention of different actors (such as mining companies) with their own principles in the lives of other actors (such as communities) (Bebbington & Humphreys Bebbington 2018). Taking the SDGs as case in point, they are considered too broad to provide tailored guidance to corporations seeking to internalise them in their operations (Yakovleva, Frei & Rama Murthy 2019). The likelihood of ‘sustainable development’ thus being defined or interpreted to suit the interests of mining companies rather than mining communities is real. Dale, Bay-Larsen and Skorstad (2018) note the lack of a coherent understanding of and strategy to achieve sustainable mining. The principles from the ICMM are only a guide for companies to develop their own sustainable development action plans. Business management systems allow managers of companies to choose, organise, deploy and monitor renewal strategies (Gazzola & Colombo 2014; Simons 1994). In effect, individual companies interpret and decide how they operationalise sustainable development in their local projects (Dale, Bay-Larsen & Skorstad 2018).

The issue is that if corporate sustainability is about the responsibility of companies to other stakeholders such as host communities, it is reasonable to expect that these stakeholders would have their own expectations and interests of what sustainable development should be (Boutilier 2017). Within mining communities there are differences in terms of class, demographics, and economic aspirations. This means there is the possibility that even within specific mining communities, different classes of people would have different interpretations and goals of sustainable development. A holistic view of sustainable mining thus would be one that ensures that the broadly different views of stakeholders, especially at the community level, are all accounted for. However, emergent studies are drawing attention to the often narrow conceptualisation of 'community' by mining companies which serves their interests rather than the wider society (Kapelus 2002; Mayes, McDonald & Pini 2014; Ofori & Ofori 2018b; Welker 2009). In view of this, it is necessary to understand if the conceptualisation of sustainable mining by companies reflect the needs and interests of all the different classes of people within the communities where their operations are based. As Jentoft (2000) notes:

> …although the idea of sustainable development has become a critical rhetoric at the global level, it may nevertheless find little expression at the local level. User communities and organizations may be encouraged by the vision, but they are rarely involved in defining what sustainable development could possibly mean (Jentoft 2000 p.146)

The implementation of sustainable development should imply policy action at the local community level (Baker 2012). In order to operate sustainably, mining companies are required to act at their local level unit of operation (Moran & Kunz 2014). Despite the above noted concerns and the point raised by Jentoft (2000), until this present thesis, research documenting how sustainable development is understood, interpreted and practiced at the mining community level has generally been lacking. This is despite the socioeconomic and political differences within mining communities as well as the contested nature of the concept of sustainable development. The key questions then are sustainable development for whom, on whose terms, and whose interests count?

One of the central objectives of this study therefore is to address what sustainable development means to different stakeholders involved in the mining sector and whether their interpretations are shaped by differences within communities. This is consistent with arguments put forward by Que *et al*. (2018) and their call for research that engages with community differences in the sustainable mining literature. Addressing this research objective also aligns with views that suggests that the path to sustainable development must depart from the top-down approach (where development objectives such as the SDGs are handed down by powerful global elites) to one that embraces views of other stakeholders (Gusmão Caiado *et al.* 2018; Sachs 2012). Achieving socially just sustainable development would require a good understanding of what different stakeholders regard as their goals of sustainable development (Agyeman, Bullard & Evans 2003). Therefore, this thesis does not just follow one specific definition of sustainable development but aims to show how different conceptions and agendas of sustainable development are held by actors, and how these become ritualised in practice, especially through benefit sharing decision-making processes.

2.3.3 Mining and sustainable development debates

Within the mining and sustainable development literature, a strong debate has emerged about the contribution of the industry to sustainable development (Benson & Kirsch 2010; Devenin & Bianchi 2018; Gilberthorpe, Agol & Gegg 2016; Vivoda & Kemp 2019). Critics view the entire sustainable mining agenda as a greenwash (Baue 2002; Moody 2002; Sethi 2005; Whitmore 2006). The MMSD process and the *Breaking New Ground* report are all seen as a stage-managed media propaganda by the industry to enhance its image. Sustainable mining is viewed as a "a slogan of little practical value" (Hendrix 2006 p.52) and an oxymoron used strategically by corporations to "conceal harm and neutralize critique" (Kirsch 2010 p.92). Critics point to the fact that the change promised by the sustainable mining agenda is self-serving and only a means for large scale mining companies to continue to mine under the guise of providing development (Frynas 2005; Hamann 2003; Hilson 2006; Kirsch 2010). A study by Vivoda and Kemp (2019) documents the use of sustainable development statements by mining industry actors as a public relations spin without any real policy commitments. For others, the notion of mining and sustainable development is contradictory (Hilson & Murck 2000). Mining it is argued, leads to not only unjust social consequences for its host communities, but also a depletion of the natural resources base of the earth, which is contrary to the principles of sustainable development. Sustainability from this view point means that extraction of mineral resources must be either reduced significantly or stopped completely (Auty & Mikesell 1998; Cowell *et al.* 1999). Furthermore, it has been made clear that there is an absence of any institutional framework required to ensure mine development and the benefits thereof contribute to the sustainable development of society (Bebbington & Bury 2010; Devenin & Bianchi 2018).

Contrary perspectives however, argue that sustainable mining must be measured in terms of how it contributes to society. Shields, Wagner and Van Zyl (2003 p. 36) make this point by clarifying that:

> The goal of sustainability as applied to mineral resources is not to sustain a given deposit, but rather to sustain the flow of services provided by mineral resources and to do so in a manner such that over a commodity's life cycle, the net contribution to society is positive.

Therefore, the key point of emphasis in the linkage between mining and sustainable development, is the industry's net contribution to society and the environment. According to Eggert (2009) the goals of sustainable mining should be about facilitating the creation of mineral wealth; ensuring that mineral development occurs in an efficient manner; mining surpluses are distributed fairly; and the derived benefits are sustained even after the life of the mine. The success or failure of the sustainable mining agenda, therefore, lies in the impact it has on local communities affected by mining operations. Indeed, it is obvious from the literature that, there is a significant social expectation on mining corporations to contribute to social and environmental development in lieu of the negative externalities that results from mine development (Devenin 2018; Ofori & Ofori 2018b; Prno & Scott Slocombe 2012; Vivoda & Kemp 2019).

A central feature of the sustainable mining agenda, therefore, is sustainable community development. This is alluded to explicitly in the ICMM's ten principles framework (MMSD 2002). The ninth principle enjoins member companies to contribute to the socioeconomic and institutional development of the communities in which they operate, throughout the project life cycle from the development stage to the closure stage. Eggert (2000) points out that mining can contribute to sustainable development by improving the wellbeing of communities where mining takes place. According to ICMM (2013), the aim of contributing to community development must be geared towards poverty reduction. The MMSD report notes that, mining should enhance the physical, financial, human and information resources available to host communities. Van Der Veen and Strongman (2003) also suggests that a sustainable mining community is one that is able to translate the wealth of mining into an asset for its benefits both during the lifetime of the mine and is able to secure its economic future post the mine closure. Investments in the extractive industries could contribute to sustainable development if the benefits from mining are well-used for local development (Pedro 2004).

Even though some of the issues raised by critics are valid, one cannot discount or dismiss the potential of mining companies contributing to the sustainable development of the communities where they operate. This is against the background of many such communities being less likely to experience any substantial socio-economic development in the absence of the mining industry, and thus sometimes mining may be an option sought after by local communities themselves (Imbun 1994; MMSD 2002). Governments in developing countries are increasingly less likely to provide needed infrastructural development for example in mining regions (Franks 2015; McMahon & Remy 2002). Thus, rather than dismissing sustainable mining outright, attention must be paid to how the benefits of mining are shared and how that leads to sustainable development outcomes for communities.

2.4 Benefit-sharing for sustainable development: Concept and practice in Ghana

The focus of this chapter now shifts to the concept of benefits sharing and specifically, the two main approaches to benefits sharing in Ghana: Corporate Social Responsibility by mining companies and the decentralization of mining revenues by the state.

2.4.1 The concept of benefit sharing

Benefit sharing emerged as a concept in the international development policy arena in the 1970s as a means of ensuring a fair distribution and use of some natural resources (De Jonge 2011; De Jonge & Louwaars 2009). De Jonge and Korthals' (2006) concept of benefit sharing emerged in the international legal principles[6] governing the shared use of common resources alongside the idea of the common heritage of humankind (also see Schroeder 2007). Benefit sharing in its early conceptual stages was understood within the notion of the distribution of benefits and burdens amongst stakeholders, but has evolved to denote a means of compensation

[6] United Nations' Agreement governing the activities of states on the Moon and other celestial bodies (1979) and Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982).

or exchange (De Jonge & Korthals 2006) and social accountability as well as responsibility (Pham *et al.* 2013).

Hayden (2005, p. 113) examining the concept within the field of biological genetic resources defines it as:

> … a commitment to channel some kind of returns—whether monetary or non-monetary—back to a range of designated participants: affected communities, source communities or source nations, participants in clinical trials, genetic disease patient groups.

Wynberg and Hauck (2014 p.1) discussing benefit sharing through the lens of coastal ecosystems, define the concept as "the division and distribution of monetary and non-monetary benefits in a way that has equitable outcomes and is procedurally fair". From their definition, it becomes obvious that it is not enough simply to distribute benefits to recipients, but the outcomes of the sharing must be equitable and the process of doing so must be fair. This resonates with the agenda of sustainable development which also stresses equity and participation.

2.4.2 Characteristics and dimensions of benefit sharing systems

The implementation of any form of benefit sharing within the minerals sector or other natural resource sector occurs within a well-structured framework. Such a framework can be described as the benefit sharing system. The central objective of a benefit sharing system is to ensure that benefits are distributed to targeted populations. For a benefit sharing system to deliver on this objective, it must be effective and efficient. Lindhjem *et al*. (2010) identifies five features of effective and efficient sharing systems that (1) engages the right stakeholders; (2) determines the right forms and levels of incentives; (3) creates legitimate mechanisms for management of benefits; (4) enforces effective transparency provisions; and (5) develops effective dispute settlement mechanisms. Van Noordwijk and Beria (2010) also suggest benefit sharing systems must be pro-poor in nature. According to them, a system that allocates benefits or payments to landowners, for example, is likely to increase social inequality within local communities. To ensure sustainability and development, benefit sharing schemes should be able to address the concerns of poverty.

Cernea (2007) also stresses the need for benefit sharing to address concerns of poverty as a means to achieving development. In addition, Cernea also points out that, benefit sharing approaches or systems, must be politically sound, equitable and satisfactory to reduce conflicts. Reduction in social conflict has been linked to community perception of receiving adequate benefits from mine development (Arango-Aramburo et al. 2017; Bebbington *et al.* 2008). The Bonn Guidelines on access and benefit sharing of genetic resources under the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) also stress a distributional system that ensures environmental sustainability, promotes fairness and equity as well as having inbuilt accountability measures (CBD Secrétariat 2002). This variety of identified features are made manifest in the different aspects or dimensions of a benefit sharing system. Benefit sharing systems may vary depending on the resources under consideration and the context in which the sharing is taking place, nevertheless, it can be considered to consist of two main dimensions. These include the benefit sharing process (allocation mechanisms, decision-making processes) and outcomes.

2.4.3 Benefit sharing: Mining's contribution to sustainable development

Benefit sharing has been identified as a means through which development can be brought to the local level as part of the new sustainable mining model (Humphreys 2002; Söderholm & Svahn 2014, 2015). According to Wang (2012), benefit sharing as a means to sustainable development entails a shift away from compensation payments as a mitigation measure to ensuring optimizing local development opportunities and equity as well as deliberate engagement with communities. From the logic of the economic theory of rents, mining projects, like other extractive projects, generate windfall revenues or surplus profits (over and above the cost of capital, labour and other factors of production) in the form of resource rents, often referred to as supernormal profit (Rothman 2000). Rothman (2000 p.5) makes the point that:

> …resource developers, therefore do not 'earn' rent as they do normal profits (i.e., return to capital and entrepreneurship). Rather, rent is a windfall created by exploiting the bounty of nature.

It is generally accepted therefore within benefit sharing literature that, funding for benefit sharing schemes and for projects dependent on natural resources, should come from the resource rents generated (Cernea 2007). Thus, one of the key contributions that mining makes to sustainable development can be seen as a product of how mineral rents are distributed and used (Auty & Mikesell, 1998). This is achieved by ensuring that the mineral rents are efficiently distributed and used in such a way that it enhances the long-term economic and social well-being of the targeted communities and their environment (Epps 1996). Mineral rents or resource rents are the net mineral revenues available to governments and mining companies after deducting all costs of production including labour and capital. How the mineral rents are invested or distributed and used and its consequent impact on sustainable development underlines the concept of benefit sharing in mining.

2.4.4 Benefit sharing and community participation in the context of sustainable development

Target 16.7 of the SDGs emphasises the need to "ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels". Public participation, especially the participation of individuals and groups at the community level in development processes is core to sustainable development and the discourse of development in general. It is now a fundamental principle of sustainable development to involve communities in decision-making processes. It is important to explore further the concept of community participation not just because of its centrality to sustainable development, but also because the quality of participation is central to benefit sharing processes (Gebara 2013; Llewellyn 2019). This is key to the contextual understanding of mining communities that have historically been marginalized, not just economically, but also politically, especially within the context of discussions about distribution and the use of mineral wealth (Humphreys 2002).

Community participation has been described by Addison and Roe (2018 p.44) as "the ability of the intended beneficiaries of programmes to influence their design and implementation"(also see Agarwal 2001). A more succinct definition followed in this research is provided by (Mulwa 1988 p. 52) as "a process whereby the marginalised groups in a community take the initiative to shape their own future and better their lives by taking full responsibility for their needs and asserting themselves as subjects of their own history"'. What this means is that, local people affected most by mine development must play a central role in determining how redistributed mineral rents are utilised for the sustainable development of their communities. According to Clark, Biggeri and Frediani (2019 p. 44) effective participation involves "putting people at the centre of the process…empowerment of people to own their development… [and] a vision of change that places individuals and community freedom at its centre". Enabling communities to be involved in decisions is generally linked to positive mine development processes (Erzurumlu & Erzurumlu 2015; Prno & Scott Slocombe 2012).

According to Cornwall and Coelho (2007) and Gaventa (2006), communities or individuals can be included in decisions through claimed or invited spaces of participation. For grassroots actors to thrive in these participatory spaces however, accountability mechanisms and access to information are fundamental (Ishii, Hossain & Rees 2007; Kasimba & Lujala 2019). To ensure sustainable development is achieved, local people must be included from the start of the project (Erzurumlu & Erzurumlu 2015). Baker and Chapin (2018) add to this by suggesting that enabling social and cultural contexts are equally important. A study by Maconachie (2012) affirms this by arguing that, community participation in resource governance including revenues in Africa cannot be divorced from the social, cultural and historical context in which it occurs (Ofori & Lujala 2015). In effect, one cannot view the spaces of participation as apolitical romantic democratic spaces (Maconachie 2012).

Participation is considered as a way of improving the delivery and effectiveness of developmental interventions or programs. Advocates of the participatory approach to development such as Stiglitz (1998) argue that participation ensures that choices made are a reflection of the needs and cultural preferences of local communities as well as sustainability in terms of commitment to and acceptance of the choices made. In addition, participation is seen as a means of empowering local people, especially marginalized groups (Clark, Biggeri & Frediani 2019; Gebara 2013; Hentschel & Lanjouw 1996), and also encouraging mutual learning (Cornwall 2000). In the context of African traditional societies, participation is considered as a mechanism to redistribute the powers of traditional leaders to their subjects, thereby ensuring the latter are given a voice in development decisions (Llewellyn 2019). In this regard, the sharing of mining benefits should not be the sole preserve of local elites such as traditional leaders but include marginalised groups and individuals within the beneficiary communities.

Research shows that participation in decision-making processes is central to benefit sharing within communities (Cornwall 2000; Gebara 2013; Peskett *et al.* 2008). In a study that examined the importance of participation in benefit sharing processes within REDD+ for example, the investigator found that the goals of the REDD+ program are more likely to be achieved through democratic and interactive processes of local participation (Gebara 2013). Gebara (2013) suggests that such participatory processes will make the distribution and definition of benefits more flexible. Schreckenberg and Luttrell (2009) similarly find that, equity in decision-making correlates with equity in benefits. Decisions about what values or benefits communities are entitled to must be based on the reasoned decisions of people rather than the company or government (Epps & Brett 2000). The goal of participatory plurality in the provision of sustainable development projects is that it produces outcomes such as community empowerment and acceptance of mining projects (Humphreys 2002; Mnwana & Akpan 2009).

According to Deb and Sarkar (2017) the implementation of sustainable mining must include actions that enhance the participation of stakeholders such as local communities in decisions throughout the life cycle of a mine's operations. The MMSD report upon which the sustainable mining agenda is predicated, recommends that companies engage communities by initiating appropriate processes to ensure access to information and participation for all. Whiteman and Mamen (2002b) summarise some of the key attributes of effective participatory processes that may be useful within the mining sector, and they include: a recognition of Indigenous people's right to consultation and participation in natural resources management, and the right to prior informed consent; commitment to building strong consultation processes; and commitment to building long-term participatory relationships with local indigenous communities, including indigenous women, elders, and youth (Whiteman & Mamen 2002b, p. 75) In this regard, Suopajärvi *et al.* (2016) called for 'fate control', that is, the need for mining communities to control their own destinies by being involved in decisions related to benefits sharing that impact their communities. In order to achieve the sustainable development of mining communities, the literature suggests that governments and the mining industry should help communities to overcome participation barriers such as information asymmetries (Franco, Puppim de Oliveira & Ali 2018; Khadiagala 2015).

Even though increasing grassroots participation in decision-making processes is welcomed as a means of ensuring the acceptance of projects (Macdonald 2017), and that the community is empowered (Craig & Mayo 1995), its actual effectiveness and impact has been questioned (Balslev Clausen & Gyimóthy 2016; Cooke & Kothari 2001; Li 2006). Indeed, participation has been described as messy (Clark, Biggeri & Frediani 2019), and the new 'tyranny' (Cooke & Kothari 2001). According to Cooke and Kothari (2001) and Perreault (2015), participatory development in practice reinforces power relations rather than empowers less powerful groups, as is often envisaged. Likewise White (1996) sees participation as a means to challenge dominance but at the same time as a mechanism that entrenches existing unequal power relations. In White's view, the politics of participation can be considered by asking 'who participates' and by questioning the quality of their participation, and thus by doing so it demonstrates the heterogeneity of communities (White 1996), and the need to carefully reconsider terminologies such as 'community participation'.

The creation of participation spaces does not necessarily mean that everyone in the community will get to participate (Cornwall & Coelho 2007). Studies have shown that those who participate in decision-making processes at the community level are usually those who are relatively rich, educated and politically connected (Gaventa & Martorano 2016; Mansuri & Rao 2012). Kelly and Burkett (2008) found that it is difficult to facilitate participation in communities given the large divergence of interest groups. Abram (1999) also contends that, participatory decision-making in the development process is usually not a process where stakeholders come together to reach an agreement instead it is an arena for contest over resources where the powerful, usually local elites, gain the most benefits. Similarly, Kemp (2010) points out that participatory approaches as practiced by mining companies do not necessarily address pre-existing power imbalances evident in mining communities, nor those existing between the mining company and the other community stakeholders, but rather reinforces elitism and inequality. Likewise, Chambers (1974) suggested that participation in local planning or development committees is only an avenue for those with interests and power to obtain their goals. He emphasized that "all too often participation proclaimed on the platform [of development discourses] becomes appropriation and privilege when translated into action in the field" (Chambers 1974, p. 109). Studies such as those by Li (2006) provide ample evidence to the effect that decision-making actually is the preserve of those who control power within the local community system. The effect of power imbalances relative to participation, makes achieving sustainable development including the mitigation of social inequalities, impossible (Baker & Chapin 2018; Kenny 2010).

Thus, the participation literature noted here underscores the need to examine the procedural processes underlining benefit sharing practices in terms of who participates and the quality of their participation, if we are to fully understand the contribution of mining to sustainable development. It is not sufficient to say mining companies and governments have used mineral rents to provide projects for communities hence sustainable development has occurred. It is important to know how those development projects or programs are a reflection of the values and sustainability objectives of the beneficiary communities.

2.5 Benefit sharing in practice: Approaches and challenges

This sub-section of the chapter reviews some of the dominant approaches that have been used by governments and mining companies to share benefits with mining communities.

2.5.1 Corporate social responsibility and mining companies

Voluntary social investments of mining companies represent one approach to the distribution of mining benefits and have received copious attention from both academics and practitioners. This literature is largely situated within the broad field of corporate social responsibility (CSR) of businesses (Louche, Idowu & Filho 2017; Porter & Kramer 2006; Raimi 2018; Vollero *et al. 2019)*. CSR is defined by the World Bank as:

> …the commitment of business to the contribute to the sustainable economic development, working with employees, their families, the local community and society at large to improve their quality of life, in ways that are both good for business and good for development (World Bank 2004 p.71).

Earlier arguments by Friedman (1970) articulated the notion that corporate managers should be solely concerned with making profit for their shareholders. According to Friedman (1970) CSR activities are pure socialism and the preserve of governments rather than role of capital. The evolution of CSR however, has closely been associated with Freeman's (1984) theory of 'stakeholders' developed shortly after the release of the Brundtland Commission Report (Claydon 2011). In Freeman's view, corporations have a fiduciary responsibility not just to their shareholders but to other stakeholders who are impacted by (e.g. communities) or involved in (e.g. employees) in their business activities.

Consequently, CSR represents a departure from the traditional function of companies which essentially is to create value and make a profit for their shareholders (Louche, Idowu & Filho 2017; Porter & Kramer 2006). Instead, companies are taking on functions which were hitherto the preserve of governments. As the role of governments in the creation of wealth and the provision of social services reduces, stakeholders are increasingly looking toward corporations to fill the gap (Jacka 2018; Muthuri, Moon & Idemudia 2012). In the developing world context, CSR is increasingly viewed as a cogent mechanism for resolving existing socio-cultural, political and environmental problems (Raimi 2018). CSR hence has been described by Labonne (1999) as burden-sharing for social hedging, while Porter and Kramer (2006) have described it as the creation of shared value. It is considered as a means through which principles of social, economic and environmental responsibilities are integrated into the operations of companies (Gazzola & Colombo 2014; Porter & Kramer 2006). Thus, CSR has become the framework to translate businesses' 'bottom line' - profits - into a triple bottom line - profit, people and the planet (Elkington 2004; Jacka 2018). CSR generally is considered to be good for growth and competitiveness of businesses (Kotler & Lee 2008), and has become core to contemporary enterprises both in the developing and developed world.

One key characteristic of CSR is that it is voluntary in terms of implementation. The European Commission (2001 p.5) for example conceptualizes CSR as "a concept whereby companies decide voluntarily to contribute to a better society and a cleaner environment". They are activities that businesses need to comply with but are neither regulated nor enforced as a requirement. The motivations for businesses to engage in CSR voluntarily has been well documented in the literature as the business case for CSR activities (Barnett 2019; Kurucz, Colbert & Wheeler 2008; Porter & Kramer 2006). It is generally thought that four considerations underlie businesses' motivations to undertake CSR. These include moral obligation, sustainability, social license to operate and corporate reputation (Hilson, Hilson & Dauda 2019; Porter & Kramer 2006). The literature suggests that companies that are considered socially responsible by stakeholders are more likely to thrive and perform well in modern markets (Idowu, Vertigans & Burlea 2017).

Despite CSR being a voluntary initiative, it can be understood as a company's commitment and mechanism for contributing to the sustainable development agenda (European Commission 2001; Fox 2004; Vivoda & Kemp 2019). In the mining sector, firms have largely pushed the agenda of sustainable mining relative to a contribution to community development through their CSR performance (Vivoda & Kemp 2019). Mining companies assume some form of responsibility for the communities affected by their operations and implement intentional development interventions for them under the banner of CSR (Bebbington & Humphreys Bebbington 2018; Cowen & Shenton 2017; Vivoda & Kemp 2019). It is estimated that the top 15 mining companies in the world contribute a total of about US$1.7 billion dollars for corporate social investments (Franks, 2015).

There is a large and growing literature on CSR by mining companies (Corrigan 2018; Gamu & Dauvergne 2018; Gilberthorpe, Agol & Gegg 2016; Hilson, Hilson & Dauda 2019; Jacka 2018; Littlewood 2014; Slack 2012; Velásquez 2012). CSR like the concept of sustainable development is highly contested and open to endorsement or critique by different stakeholders

(Moon 2007). Particularly in the mining sector, its implementation and impact has been fiercely debated (Devenin & Bianchi 2018; Hilson 2006; Moon 2007; Rajak 2011). The critical literature on CSR in mining argues that the practice is nothing more than a greenwash or public relations gimmick by mining companies to continue their unsustainable extractive activities (Gilberthorpe & Banks, 2012; Hamann & Kapelus, 2004; Manteaw, 2008; Slack, 2012). The general view is that, sharing mine benefits by investing in community development projects is a mere business tool used to gain competitive market advantage or social license to operate, rather than as a committed contribution to sustainable development. In the view of Gamu and Dauvergne (2018) it is a strategy adopted by the ruling class and businesses to perpetuate private gains through a neoliberal mode of resource extraction. Companies use CSR strategically as a tool to shift the community's focus away from any outright rejection of mine development, and instead to how much material benefits they can gain (Gamu & Dauvergne 2018). Utting (2005) sums up this general perspective:

> CSR allows ample scope for 'free-riding' (whereby economic agents benefit from a particular initiative without bearing the costs) and 'greenwash' i.e. the ability of companies, through PR and minimal adjustments to policy and practice, to project an image of reform while changing little, if anything, in terms of actual corporate performance. The capacity of big businesses to modify its discourse is often considerably greater than its capacity to improve its social and environmental impacts. Many instances have been documented of companies saying one thing and doing another or adopting but not effectively implementing environmental policies or codes of conduct. Hence corporate responsibility policy and practice are often characterized by piecemeal and fragmented reforms and window dressing (p. 383).

Critics generally point to mining companies being ineffective or deceptive in their approach to community development. Owen & Kemp (2017) distinguished between what mining companies claim to do as social interventions in policy statements and what they do in reality. Hamann and Kapelus (2004) investigated the impact of mining benefits shared within some mining communities in South Africa, and found that even though the company provided benefits as a contribution to development through social investments in education, health, and small businesses, they had little impact in addressing the real social concerns of the communities. They put this down to inefficiency within the organizational structure of the mining company responsible for the CSR projects. Their study mirrors Franks' (2015) suggestion that even though companies are encouraged to undertake CSR, their lack of background knowledge in development practice makes their effort a waste of potential. The general thinking is that mining companies are not well-equipped to undertake development activities (Esteves 2008).

Critics also point out that mining companies are more committed to meeting global standards of CSR reporting norms as opposed to genuinely addressing the concerns of mining communities (Maconachie & Hilson 2013). Gilberthorpe and Banks (2012) investigated community investments by mining companies in Papua New Guinea. They concluded that there was little evidence of tangible real socio-economic development at the local community level. This was explained as being due to the strategic business model of CSR which emphasizes the achievement of global performance standards rather than the specificities of the contest in which the investments were made. Similarly, Devenin and Bianchi (2018) documented how a mining company in the north of Chile constructed football pitches for an aging population. These unwanted projects were revealed to be the norm rather than an exception of mining corporations' activities in that country.

The critical CSR literature also highlights the lack of community participation in CSR program decision-making (Addison & Roe 2018; Banks *et al*. 2013; Maconachie & Hilson 2013; Mutti *et al.* 2012). There is a disparity between CSR programs and the local needs of the community, due to the absence of community participation in decision-making. In relation to Newmont's Yanacocha mine in Peru, Gamu and Dauvergne (2018) identified the exclusion of key local populations and groups from their CSR program decisions as accounting for some of the violent protests that led to the closure of the mine. Other studies further suggest that in most cases, even when local populations are given opportunities to participate in decision-making, the process may not actually be inclusive (Devenin 2018; Maconachie & Hilson 2013; Wilson 2015). Banks *et al.* (2013) found that, CSR programs from mining companies in PNG, were unsuccessful due to a disparity between the motivations underlying the programs being implemented and the actual needs of the beneficiaries, and this can be traced back to weak community input. Banks *et al.* (2013) came to the conclusion that companies must ensure more community participation in project identification, design, monitoring and evaluation. This line of thinking is replete in the CSR literature (Littlewood 2014; Macdonald 2017). Discussing the sustainability of mining communities in Namibia after mine closure, Littlewood (2014) likewise emphasised the need for communities to be involved in sustainability planning and ownership of development interventions by mining companies.

In the face of these criticisms and challenges, scholars such as Coumans (2002) have concluded that the voluntary nature of CSR means it is incapable of bringing about any long-lasting change or impact in the absence of mechanisms to hold mining companies to account. Jacka (2018) argues that CSR is severely challenged, as long as companies remain as those implementing, evaluating and providing feedback on CSR programs or projects. Hilson (2012) also concludes that "the exact function of CSR in the [mining] sector remains unclear, and even less so in the case of operations based in the developing countries" (p.133). Likewise Mutti *et al.* (2012), suggests that CSR has a negligible impact on society as it neither reduces poverty nor improves environmental management.

The above criticisms expose the inadequacies of CSR programs from a narrow perspective that focuses on corporate behaviour. The critical literature of CSR practices in the mining sector fails to account for the role of communities and local stakeholders in CSR programming and the outcomes. The literature indicates the potential of large scale mining firms dominating local communities and even the state (Rajak 2011) and calls for more community participation. A number of papers over the years undoubtedly have acknowledged the importance of communities as key stakeholders (Evans & Kemp 2011; Fordham, Robinson & Van Leeuwen 2018; Kapelus 2002; Keenan, Kemp & Ramsay 2016; Kemp 2010), but they do not adequately explore the role of community in the success or failure of CSR programs. Fordham, Robinson and Van Leeuwen (2018) broached this area of the literature by looking at how Australian mining communities conceptualise CSR. They identified participation as an important mechanism for community empowerment and realisation of community values through CSR. It is clear from the literature that increased participation of mining communities in CSR decision making processes is highly desirable (Devenin & Bianchi 2018; Fordham, Robinson & Van Leeuwen 2018; Zvarivadza 2018). Yet this literature is silent on the crucial role of power and politics *from below* in CSR programs and benefit sharing, when communities are given the opportunity to participate. This is despite Hunter's (2017 p.2) "strong conviction that the community is a primary power centre and a place in which power relations can be most easily observed". Hunter's idea taken together with the generally accepted observation that communities are not homogenous, means that a focus on the internal community dynamics, including the local decision-making processes, are crucial to understanding CSR beyond what is currently known. If recent studies within the mining sector are anything to go by, there is evidence to suggest that inclusion of community stakeholders do not necessarily lead to all the needs of the community being met (Sarfo *et al*. 2016).

Besides Corrigan (2018) and Wilson (2015), there is little or no discussion of how community social contexts including the dynamics of power influences CSR outcomes. Wilson (2015) makes an important contribution by bringing to the fore the need to focus on power analysis even though his scope was not far reaching beyond unequal power relations between mining companies and the communities. Corrigan (2018) on the other hand highlights the importance of specific elements of the local social context such as the history and geography of communities contributing to CSR outcomes. She however fails to empirically demonstrate how these factors work in actual processes of CSR program implementation.

It is critical at this juncture within the literature therefore, to evaluate the role of other stakeholders especially those within mining communities and the context of those communities in CSR program implementation and its outcomes for sustainable development. This will add to the critical CSR literature that seeks to explore the nuanced effect of the sociocultural context of communities and power on CSR outcomes (Corrigan 2018; Wilson 2015). Focusing on this aspect of the CSR literature will provide avenues to fully contextualise and grasp the mining benefit sharing processes, including how and why some people may get more or less benefits, and examine their level of participation in decision arenas. Above all, it would improve the limited understanding of how contextual factors influence participation processes (Baker & Chapin 2018).

2.5.2 CSR in the Ghanaian mining context

CSR in the mining sector in Ghana gained currency following complaints from mining communities and incessant pressure from civil society organizations within the mining sector (Boon & Ababio 2009; Sarpong 2017). Civil society organizations such as Wass Association of Communities Against Mining (WACAM) and Third World network-Africa have been instrumental in highlighting the plight of mining communities in Ghana. In response, mining companies have gradually warmed up to the idea of distributing the benefits of mining to local mining communities through social investments in the communities that they operate in. In the absence of significant investments in the development of mining communities, the companies are seen as substitutes for government and CSR has become an engine for rural development (Jenkins & Obara 2006; Sarpong 2017).

Regulatory frameworks are key to CSR and could shape how benefits flow to beneficiary communities (Fordham, Robinson & Van Leeuwen 2018). Given the lack of formal guidelines for CSR over the years in Ghana, the implementation of CSR by businesses has been haphazard and unfocused (Ofori 2007; Ofori & Hinson 2007). This is consistent with the trend in Africa in general which has been described as being messy and chaotic (de Jongh & Prinsloo 2005; Visser, McIntosh & Middleton 2017). What is regarded generally by companies as CSR projects in Ghana can range from cash donations for funerals to social investments in infrastructure (Ofori & Hinson 2007). In 2015 for example, large scale mining companies invested a total of $17.83 million dollars in mining communities on projects in the education, health and roads sectors as well as to finance alternative livelihoods initiatives (Ghana Chamber of Mines 2015). Yet there have been complaints from local district assembly authorities about a lack of proper coordination between social investments of mining companies and local development plans of district assemblies (Roe & Samuel 2007).

A recent review of the CSR practices of large mining companies in Ghana concludes that most of the program implemented are not innovative and grassroots-centred hence less impactful (Hilson, Hilson & Dauda 2019). According to Hilson, Hilson and Dauda (2019) this is due to the enclave nature of large scale mining which invariably disconnects the mine managers responsible for implementing the CSR programs from the beneficiary communities. Similarly, scholars such as Hilson and Banchirigah (2009) have identified problems with CSR projects in Ghana to include the lack of adequate consultation with the beneficiary communities. In the absence of adequate engagement with communities, investments in social projects are seen largely as cosmetic, philanthropic and unsustainable especially after the mine closes (Hilson, Hilson & Dauda 2019). SRC Consulting (2010 p.85) in their study found that some companies are only interested in 'managing external perceptions and maintaining good reputation' (p.85). Much of the CSR rhetoric in Ghana is characterized by the significant investments of mining companies in alternative livelihoods projects such as snail rearing, vocational trades among others. These are done as means of providing other forms of livelihoods to people in mining communities who may have lost their livelihoods assets because of mining projects. Studies indicate however that these projects being touted by the mining companies are not sustainable, failed to improve living standards, at best-provided subsistence wages and remain unpopular in mining communities (Carson *et al*. 2005; Hilson & Banchirigah 2009).

Sarpong (2017) also notes that some social investments of mining companies in Ghana are only in response to the damage they have caused to the environment of the communities. He reveals that the provision of boreholes in some communities is not a demonstration of commitment to sustainable development as companies may tout but rather a response to the pollution of water bodies used by the communities (Sarpong, 2017). According to him, in some cases also, development projects provided for mining communities as benefits of mining in actual fact are intended to meet the needs of the company itself rather than the community. Citing the example of Manganese mining in Ghana, he argues that the investments of a mining company in railway infrastructure and some social services reported as CSR investments for local communities actually was to satisfy the needs of the company and its employees.

In response to these criticisms, recent evidence suggests that mining companies and project-affected communities in Ghana and globally are increasingly entering into benefit sharing agreements (Nwapi 2017; O'Faircheallaigh 2013, 2015; Rodon, Lemus-Lauzon & Schott 2018). Impact benefit agreements or community development agreements as they are popularly called is considered a systematic means for mining companies to contribute to the sustainable development of their host communities (Nwapi 2017; Viveros 2017; Whiteman 2009). These negotiated agreements define structured payments the companies make to the affected communities and how they should be used. Community development agreements have been discussed in depth elsewhere (Conteh & Maconachie 2019; O'Faircheallaigh 2013; Otto 2018).

This approach especially in the Ghanaian context appears to be a means to bridge the gap between the real needs of affected communities and what mine managers consider to be appropriate CSR (Hilson, Hilson & Dauda 2019; Hilson & Hilson 2017). This is also particularly key for foreign mining companies given the notion that the priorities of CSR in Africa are quite different from those of western countries (Visser 2006). A central feature of this emerging approach is the creation of a mechanism whereby beneficiary communities control and direct the use of the funds. This approach to CSR is relatively new in the Ghanaian mining context compared to other mineral economies such as Australia and Canada. In Ghana, Newmont Mining Corporation is one of few multinational mining companies to have successfully negotiated benefit sharing agreements with its affected communities. They are implementing these agreements by setting up development Foundations to channel revenues to beneficiary communities which the communities in turn can use to pursue their sustainable development objectives (Andrews 2016; Sydow 2016).

Evidence however from community driven development initiatives by donor agencies and governments in the developing world provides mixed results. Khwaja (2009) finds well designed projects managed by communities led to sustainable outcomes. Other studies reveal that enabling reverse of power imbalances and creating a voice for the poor have not in most cases materialised (Mansuri & Rao 2012; Platteau & Gaspart 2003). Reasons advanced for this include the embedded role of sociocultural contexts of beneficiary communities and poor understanding of the local context by external project facilitators, among others (Mansuri & Rao 2004). Further, case studies demonstrate not only a failure of projects but a prevalence of funds being appropriated by community elites (Platteau 2004; Platteau & Abraham 2002). Newmont's approach which is to share benefits through negotiated agreements and promote community control therefore requires further investigation to establish whether it contributes to the sustainable development of the affected communities.

Besides, even in developed mineral economies such as Australia and Canada where benefit sharing agreements with a strong focus on indigenous community involvement are prevalent, there is an awareness amongst stakeholders that a successful negotiation of a benefit sharing agreement does not necessarily lead to expected outcomes (Conteh & Maconachie 2019; O'Faircheallaigh 2003, 2013; O'Faircheallaigh & Kelly 2001; Sosa & Keenan 2001). It cannot be taken for granted then that benefit sharing agreements are improvements to previous top-down CSR practices of mining companies and would lead to sustainable development outcomes.

Against this background, it is important to investigate how (or whether) the sharing of mining based on agreements and community driven approaches benefits by companies such as Newmont in Ghana leads to sustainable development outcomes. The second objective of this research then is to understand the process and outcomes of these new forms of benefits sharing in Ghana with particular attention to the role that contextual influence (such as culture, power, poverty etc.) plays in their implementation and outcomes. Understanding the context in which these benefit sharing agreements are implemented is crucial to fully appreciate how and why mining may or may not contribute to sustainable development.

2.5.3 The State, mineral revenues and sustainable development

Much of the discussion so far has centred on mining companies. However, Governments also have a key role to play in ensuring that the costs of mining to communities are mitigated and communities are sustainably developed (Addison & Roe 2018). In recent times, the policy intervention of governments redistributing a portion of their mineral revenues back to communities affected by mining is gaining momentum (Dupuy 2017). This is against the backdrop that between 15 per cent and 20 per cent of the production value of minerals extracted in mineral economies accrues to governments (Addison & Roe 2018). A World Bank commissioned study specifies that governments should do more by redistributing a portion of the national mining revenues back to producing local areas; promoting social responsibility among mining companies towards communities; and be proactive in initiating development within communities directly or indirectly (McMahon & Remy, 2002). It is the view of some scholars that governments must play a leading role in the development of mining communities by redistributing the wealth of mining (Bahl & Tumennasan 2004; Khadiagala 2015; McMahon & Remy 2002). These arguments are premised on the view that a redistribution of mineral rents will ensure national unity, equity, and compensation for environmental disruptions occasioned by mining (Bahl & Tumennasan 2004). It has also been discussed as a policy option for peace building in post-conflict resource-rich countries (Le Billon & Nicholls 2007; Lujala & Rustad 2012).

Many governments in resource-rich countries are increasingly redistributing a portion of their mineral revenues in line with social welfare policy. The redistribution of mining revenues to mining communities thus is a common government approach to benefit sharing. Under this approach to benefit sharing, governments prioritize and transfer part of tax revenues from the mining sector back to the mineral producing localities. Even though the redistribution of mining revenues by central governments has produced successful outcomes in developed countries like Canada, experiments in the developing world have been cautioned (Ross 2007).

In the developed world, the success of the Canadian direct mineral cash transfers to its citizens, has been well documented (Rangarajan & Srivastava 2004; Rodon, Lemus-Lauzon & Schott 2018). In the developing world, however, results of redistribution of mineral rents has been mixed. Peru's 'Canon Minero' for example, the Peruvian government redistributed $1.6 billion dollars in 2007 back to producing areas (Loayza, Mier y Teran & Rigolini 2013). Loayza *et al.* (2013) found that these redistributed revenues on mining districts had no effect on poverty alleviation in the mining districts compared to non-mining districts. Arellano-Yanguas (2011a) showed that increases in the transfer of rents by the Peruvian central government to mining localities corresponded with a surge in conflicts in the mining localities. Conflicts increased from 47 in 2004 to 197 in 2008 (the period when the payments were highest due to a mining boom). Arellano-Yanguas (2011a) identified that some of the reasons for the conflicts were demands by the communities for their share of the resource benefits and local people contesting how local authorities utilized the monies paid by the government.

Filer (1990) also examined the Bougainville crises and demonstrated that the breakdown of social cohesion in Paguna was because of poor distribution and use of resource rents paid by governments as royalties to community leaders. Among other explanations, he argues that class struggle amongst different constituents of the Paguna community resulted from the unequal distribution of the monies paid by the government. Title holders, usually the aged and community leaders were accused of hoarding the monies for personal interest as opposed to sharing with their community. This created a sense of inequality and power differentials amongst the different classes of people in the community and ultimately degenerated into conflict. Even though Filer's study was done long before the advent of the sustainable mining agenda, his study provides an indication that benefits intended for development of local mining communities can be captured by the elites at the community level.

'Elite capture' refers to the situation where the privileged and higher classes within communities dominate decision-making spaces and gain access to benefits over the less privileged (Ribot 2016; Saito-Jensen, Nathan & Treue 2010), and this process has been empirically proven in community-based natural resources management studies (Fritzen 2007; Kumar 2005; Lund & Saito-Jensen 2013). 'Elite capture' can thus be understood as the situation where "elites control, shape, or manipulate decision-making processes or institutions in ways that serve their self-interests and priorities, typically resulting in personal gain at the expense of non-elites and local communities" (Labonte 2012, p. 91). In the mining sector, particularly within the 'resource curse' literature, most discussions of elite capture is limited to actors at the national level (Karl 1997; Kolstad & Søreide 2009; Kolstad & Wiig 2009). However, studies such as those by Filler show that 'elite capture' of revenues may not only occur at the national level but also at the community level with detrimental effects such as conflicts. McMahon and Remy (2002) have acknowledged that uneven distribution of mining benefits (and costs) can upset existing cultures and the community's social cohesion.

The impact of government redistributed revenues in Africa have been of concern to scholars (Dupuy 2017; Maconachie 2012; Standing 2014). Much of this interest is linked to the peculiar nature of mining communities where traditional systems of administration play a significant role in resource and development governance. Through the control of territory and material resources, traditional authorities are exerting enormous influence determining who gets access to resources and the terms of access (Berry 2018). Mnwana (2014) argues that where traditional leaders of mining communities are responsible for development, access to and use of mineral revenues paid to communities leads to unwanted consequences. These may include tensions, conflict and exclusion of community members from decisions (Mnwana 2014). A study by Branson (2016) suggests that, traditional leaders in South Africa for example control all the benefits that accrue from mine development on communal lands to the detriment of their subjects who bear most of the costs of mining. Studies conducted on Sierra Leone's Diamond Area Community Development Fund (DACF) demonstrate that the funds provided by government are captured by village chiefs rather than used for the development of the affected mining communities (Dupuy 2017; Maconachie 2012; Zulu & Wilson 2012).

Similarly, Dupuy (2017) suggests that government redistributed mineral funds in Ghana is replete with corruption and more often than not captured by local traditional elites. Standing (2014) makes a similar conclusion. The empirical evidence for these conclusions is however scant and often anecdotal in nature. Researchers have shied away from documenting the actual processes underlining the flow of the revenues including the making of decisions at the national level all through to the local community level. It is thus imperative to look beyond benefit sharing by mining companies to also consider the government's initiatives in Ghana. Benefit sharing within mining communities may have its own unique local level 'resource curses' which although are less emphasized, do require attention. This makes the study of local-level processes of benefit sharing crucial to understanding the link between benefit sharing and sustainable development. The third objective of this research is therefore to understand how benefits are distributed by the government and its implications for local sustainable development. This adds to recent scholarships that examines the influence of traditional chiefs in sub-Saharan Africa (Berry 2018; Comaroff & Comaroff 2018; Holzinger, Kern & Kromrey 2017).

2.6 Towards a mineral-led development: Community context as a focus

Van Der Veen and Strongman (2003 p.18) argue that sustainable mining development is the provision of projects that are "financially viable, environmentally sound, socially responsible, and implemented with sound governance as well as having a lasting developmental value especially at the community level". There is a general need for understanding first and foremost whether benefits being shared reach those it was intended for, what they are used and how their usage reflects what local beneficiaries consider to be sustainable development. This requires unpacking the actual processes of benefit sharing in mining communities including the contextual influence of communities on the sharing process. Whether the sharing of mining benefits leads to sustainable development outcomes cannot be limited to activities of macro-level institutions such as governments and mining companies alone. In fact, if the studies that have looked at problems associated with the payment of mining royalties is anything to go by, the role of the sociocultural and political contexts of communities is an important area that requires further attention if mining benefits are to translate into sustainable development. This is particularly relevant in view of the emerging trend of sharing benefits through more participatory methods such as community development trust funds and benefit sharing agreements, where communities or their representatives are given greater roles in the sharing process.

Cultural content plays a significant role in social welfare or development (Auty, 1993). That is, the social values of a community must be recognized in any contribution towards sustainable development. Social values may include both the spoken and unspoken norms of the community. Social values can differ from community to community. The implication of this is that what is sustainable will differ from one community to another. Whereas a mining community may consider its native culture and protection of its traditional lands as being sustainable development another may see the opening of its community to new infrastructure, improved housing, health care and immigrants as an improvement in its life. Likewise, social values can also shape who gets to benefit from the distribution of benefits and development in general. For example, gender inequalities as a result of culture have been well noted in development discourses (Nussbaum & Glover 1995) as well as in access to communal property (Agarwal 1994). The World Bank's review of benefits sharing within the extractive sector based on the use of trust funds, for example, concludes that such approaches to benefit sharing must be adapted and integrated into the context of mining communities (Wall & Pelon 2011). Thus, a proper and in-depth assessment of whether mining contributes to sustainable development cannot be devoid of a critical examination of processes of benefit sharing within communities themselves.

This chapter has thus highlighted the links between mining, benefits sharing and sustainable development. It has shown that procedural and distributional equity are fundamental to sustainable development and that for benefits sharing to contribute to sustainable development, the different conceptualisation of sustainable development at the local level must be considered. Whether or not this is achieved in practice requires an empirical investigation of actual benefit sharing initiatives being undertaken by governments and mining companies that looks at how the community social context including power imbalances shapes who gains and how they gain from the benefit streams. The next chapter provides details of the methods used while conducting the research and investigation into these important issues in Ghana.

CHAPTER THREE
Methodology

3.0 Introduction

This study draws largely from political ecology, which has been utilised by a number of scholars to investigate and document access to and control over mineral resources (Bebbington 2012; Bebbington & Humphreys Bebbington 2018; Horowitz 2010). The strength of this approach with respect to this study lies within its ability to account for the processes through which different actors distribute, access (including appropriation) and contest material resources within the sociocultural, economic, environmental and political milieus of their local communities and the consequent outcomes. A 'political ecology' approach to the study of benefit sharing and sustainable development will help provide a more nuanced illumination of the hidden processes and power plays underlining the patterns of distribution and access to mining benefits observed in mining communities in Ghana. In simple terms it clarifies why some people may or may not benefit from the sharing of mining wealth. To complement this analytical approach, a qualitative methodology based on semi-structured interviews, focus groups, participatory activities, participant observation and document analysis was used to collect data from the case study communities. This chapter thus outlines the 'political ecology' approach used and the methods used in collecting data for the study.

3.1 Political ecology

Perreault, Bridge and McCarthy (2015) suggest political ecology is rooted in the seminal works of (Watts 1983a, 1983b), (Bunker 1985) and (Blaikie & Brookfield 1987). Drawing from fields such as cultural ecology, radical development geography and natural hazards research, these early works in political ecology challenged the apolitical mainstream neo-Malthusian environmental viewpoints (Ehrlich 1970; Hardin 1968; Meadows *et al.* 1972). For early political ecologists, the neglect of political economy and social inequalities was fatal to understanding and preventing environmental crises. Their goal therefore, was to highlight the politics or power imbalances of access to and use of natural resources that underline environmental degradation and conflicts. A more elaborate *exposé* of the deep roots of political ecology has been provided elsewhere (see e.g. Robbins 2012).

According to Blaikie and Brookfield (1987 p.17):

> ...the phrase 'political ecology' combines the concerns of ecology and a broadly defined political economy. Together this encompasses the constantly shifting dialectic between society and land-based resources, and also within classes and groups within society.

Watts (2000 p.257) later suggests political ecology to be concerned with a way

> …to understand the complex relations between nature and society through a careful analysis of what one might call the forms of access and control over resources and their implications for environmental health and sustainable livelihoods.

Political ecology emphasises the analytical importance of social justice and equity issues (Holifield 2015). The political ecology literature overall seeks to understand how social (e.g. class, ethnicity and gender) and power differences mediate knowledge, access to and control over resources (Dietz 2017). The analytical focus of political ecology thus over the years have included issues such as power relations among different actors, struggles over knowledge and resources and how these have had differential impacts on different classes of people (social justice) and their environments (Bebbington & Bury 2013; Engels & Dietz 2017; Robbins 2012; Swyngedouw & Heynen 2003). Further, it also analyzes and documents how individuals and groups respond to change (including collective action) by examining, for example, social systems of resource distribution (Behnke & Mortimore 2016; Ribot & Peluso 2003; Robbins 2012). In a strict sense therefore, political ecology is not a single body of theory (Robbins 2012) nor is it based on a grand theory (Biersack 2006). Empirical analysis is preferred to theory, especially for political ecology research done in the developing world context (Bryant & Bailey 1997). Political ecology therefore is a unique analytical synthesis or approach to research shared by researchers from varied backgrounds. Researchers within this field are unified through their key assumptions and ways of approaching research concerns.

3.1.1 Assumptions underlining political ecology

Political ecology researchers are guided in their interpretation of specific research problems based on a set of assumptions. Following the work of Bryant and Bailey (1997), four central assumptions are outlined below which are key to this present research., but which are by no means an exhaustive list due to the evolving nature of political ecology studies .

One of the fundamental consensuses within the field of political ecology is that environmental problems (as well as those of socio-economic nature, e.g. poverty) facing developing countries are linked to political and economic forces such as the global spread of capitalism and government interventions rather than policy failure (Bryant & Bailey 1997). This assumption is drawn from neo-Marxist arguments and based on extensive studies documenting links between global capitalism from the North and socioecological problems of the South. Examples include dumping of industrial waste from developed industrial countries in poor third world countries (Oteng-Ababio & Amankwaa 2014). The clearest example of the impact of first world capital on the developing countries is seen in the extractive sector. The extraction of natural resources by multinational companies in developing countries has left behind documented adverse environmental, social and economic impacts felt most by vulnerable local people (Bebbington & Williams 2008; Cuba *et al.* 2014; Hilson, 2002). Political ecologists also agree that states or governments play a significant role in the environmental crises of the third world, most often complicit with global capital forces (Ayelazuno & Mawuko-Yevugah 2019; Bryant & Bailey 1997). The political ecology of extraction, a growing domain within political ecology has thus sought to bring attention to the sustained "attempts to expand the reach and depth of capitalist commodification" (Castree 2007 p.27) and the accompanying environmental impacts and social conflicts (Ayelazuno & Mawuko-Yevugah 2019; Bebbington & Williams 2008).

Political ecology researchers also believe that costs and benefits of environmental change are unequally distributed (Bryant & Bailey 1997; Tsuma 2009). In other words, environmental change occasioned by mineral extraction, conservation projects among others create winners and losers (Gerique, López & Pohle 2017; Matthews 2012). Political ecology texts thus track stories of winners and losers in struggles over environmental and material resources to document underlying social injustices (Mostafanezhad *et al.* 2016; Robbins 2012). Studies have shown that whilst poorer people bear greater costs associated with exploitation of the environment, powerful and wealthy people are those that enjoy the benefits (Bryant & Bailey 1997; Martinez-Alier 2014; Tsuma 2009). This assumption is fundamental to this research study. The geographically focused nature of resource extraction means that the accompanying significant environmental and social costs are unequally distributed between and within communities as well as among actors (Bebbington & Bebbington 2010; Canel, Idemudia & North 2010). Those closest to a mine bear greater costs of the extraction rather than investors or consumers of the mine product. In reverse, based on this assumption, it is also possible that not all people affected by a mining project are likely to benefit equally even when the benefits are redistributed (Canel, Idemudia & North 2010). This thesis therefore attempts to unearth and map out the distribution of the costs and benefits of environmental change, reveal the winners and losers, as well as explain why such unequal patterns of distributions come about.

Linked to the above, political ecologists also assume that unequal allocation of environmental costs and benefits either reinforce or reduce socioeconomic inequalities (Bryant & Bailey 1997). The distribution of costs and benefits have the potential to either bring about improvements in the quality life of people or lead to their marginalization. The concept of marginalization is key within political ecology texts. Marginalisation according to Robbins (2012, p. 91) is "a process whereby politically and socially marginal (disempower) people are pushed into ecologically marginal (vulnerable and unstable) spaces and economically marginal (dependent and narrowly adaptable) social positions". Much political ecology work has thus sought to show the linkages between the distributions of environmental costs and livelihood impacts for example (Bebbington & Williams 2008; Cuba *et al.* 2014). To do this, political ecologists examine the vicissitudes of historical processes, legal, political and institutional arrangements as well as discourses that underline environmental changes (Robbins, 2012). This also demonstrates that much of the work within this field is shaped by concerns for vulnerable social groups and social justice concerns.

Finally, political ecologists also work from the assumption that the socioeconomic impacts of the unequal distribution of costs and benefits of environmental change have consequential political impacts. It leads to the alteration of the power dynamics amongst actors (Bryant & Bailey 1997; Robbins 2012). Thus, not only do some people become poor or richer following environmental change but also the "the ability of actors to control or resist others" '(Bryant & Bailey 1997 p.44) is significantly altered. The operations of powerful actors in the extractive industries such as multinational companies for example alters significantly the control and access of other actors such as local populations to resources such as land and water (Bury 2004; Canel, Idemudia & North 2010). At the same time the distribution of the benefits that arise from extractive activities have the potential to create not just new forms of inequality but also alter or reinforce existing local power relations. Analysis of power dynamics is, therefore, a central focus of political ecology analysis.

3.1.2 Analytical approaches/Themes of third world political ecology

3.1.2.1 Knowledge production and contestation

One of the analytical themes in political ecology is the focus on the politics of discourse that examines how knowledge is conceived and represented in academic scholarships, policy arenas and implementation of nature-based projects and programmes at the local level (Escobar 1996; Scoones 2016). This involves focusing on a particular concept that has important political-ecological ramifications (Bryant & Bailey 1997). The goal of such analysis is to understand how ideas or concepts are conceived, interpreted and understood by different actors and how they are used to impede or foster the interests of particular actors with regards to access to resources (Bryant & Bailey 1997; Escobar 1996; Sullivan 2017). Ideas, concepts or discourses are considered to be shaped by knowledge and power asymmetries (Krauss 2018). Indeed, political ecologists, can project what knowledge is significant (Krauss 2018). Marx and Engels noted that the ideas that shape society are those of the ruling class (see. Antonio 2003). Most of these ideas have been found to be hegemonic reflections of class interests and often rooted in particular powerful institutions (McAfee 1999; Wade 1997; Watts 2000). Through critical examination of concepts and environmental discourses often considered to be scientific, political ecologists are able to unearth the hidden assumptions, cultural biases, class, ethnic, or gendered interests that underlie them and how they are fuelled by politics.

Sustainable development is one such concept that has occupied the attention of political ecology researchers. The adoption of the concept as the solution to the world's environmental and socioeconomic crises is deemed problematic by political ecologists (Bryant & Parnwell 1996). Whilst there is much disagreement about what the concept means and how to achieve it, its subterfuge usage in negotiating access to natural resources is of concern to political ecologists. It has become evident that state actors and other powerful actors (such as extractive companies) have camouflaged traditional natural resource extraction as sustainable development (Bryant 2015). In South-East Asia for example, despite fierce opposition, political elites have promoted ecotourism as an epitome of sustainable development which has resulted in devastating local environmental and economic impacts suffered by vulnerable local populations (Bryant & Parnwell 1996; Cochrane 1996).

Unsurprisingly, therefore, political ecologists have made it a point not only to be skeptical of technocratic western concepts such as sustainable development but also to critically examine its implementation. The approach is to deconstruct and examine the true meaning, assumptions, knowledge-power asymmetries and contradictions that underlines such concepts. Redistribution of mining benefits in general and CSR projects in particular, have been linked to sustainable development by mining companies especially. Thus, one of the analytical pillars of this research is to examine the construction and meaning of sustainable development by different actors within the complexity of mining benefit sharing in Ghana. Such an analysis provides valuable insight into understanding how particular conceptions of sustainable development shapes the enactment of power and the making of benefits sharing decisions (Skorstad, Dale & Bay-Larsen 2018). Examining the meaning of sustainable development as a relationship between knowledge and power is key to the political dimension of sustainable development often ignored by researchers and practitioners (Redclift 2015).

3.1.2.2 Actors, structures, and agencies: Politics of resource redistribution

Bryant (1991) suggests that the asking of political questions is necessary if sustainable development is to go beyond being mere rhetoric. Explicit and core to political ecology explanations is the point that access to, control and use of resources is shaped by competing interests from different actors (Ahlborg & Nightingale 2018). This, in turn, produces patterns of unequal distribution of costs and benefits associated with environmental change (Ahlborg & Nightingale 2018; Tsuma 2009). Sociologists suggest that interactions amongst actors in society are constituted within social structures. Thus, to fully understand the patterns of distribution and access to resources and their socioeconomic and ecological impacts involves unpacking the interplay between interests of actors and social structures within which they are constituted and negotiated. Consequently, one of the central analytical approaches employed by political ecologists is to examine social structures and agencies of actors as a way of understanding the [unequal] distribution of costs and benefits. Bryant and Bailey (1997) describe this analytical prism as the actor-oriented approach which seeks to understand the ways in which actors interact in a given locality in pursuit of their distinctive interests. In this regard, politics, understood broadly as the perversion of power relations in human interactions characterized by interests, negotiation, and struggles, is given a central place in the analysis (Bryant 2015; Bryant & Bailey 1997; Kansanga *et al.* 2018; Paulson & Gezon 2004; Paulson, Gezon & Watts 2003). The political ecology literature is replete with studies that document empirically and theoretically how actors try to control, gain access to or obtain benefits from resource systems (Ahlborg & Nightingale 2018; Kansanga, Arku & Luginaah 2019; Ribot &

Peluso 2003; Tsuma 2009). The study by Ahlborg and Nightingale (2018) for example demonstrates how local elites in Mawengi in Tanzania benefit from electrification projects whereas poor people, especially women, are excluded from benefiting. The examination of the interests and strategies of actors including how they wield power helps bring an understanding to the access, control and use of resources including mine benefits (Kansanga *et al.* 2018).

Structures and agencies conceptually are rooted in a long-standing sociological debate. One side of the debate upholds the primacy of social structures by arguing that, human behavior is conditioned by social factors whilst the other side argues human behavior is contingent upon the individual actions of people (Aston 2012; Elder-Vass 2010; Steven & Barry 2001). Structures can be understood as the various means through which society shapes the actions of actors (Giddens 1984; Kalipeni & Oppong 1998). Proceeding from this school of thought, it would appear that, the distribution and access to mining benefits would be based on existing social structures. Social structures may include for instance historical processes of decision-making in mining communities, institutional arrangements put in place by benefactors such as mining companies or government as well as legal frameworks if any that guide such activities or behavior.

Political ecologists however assert that the distribution of resources, and for that matter inequality, is shaped by the ability of actors to intervene in the workings of social structures by the deployment of strategies that achieve their personal or organizational interests. Thus, political ecologists fundamentally acknowledge the enabling and constraining role of structures, but go further to posit that actors can deploy their agency to override the constraints of structures if it suits their interests (Ahlborg & Nightingale 2018; Kansanga *et al.* 2018; Tsuma 2009). Actors are constrained and enabled by social structures, but through their agencies, that is their subjectivities and strategic actions, they are able to overcome barriers to access resources (Ahlborg & Nightingale 2018). Political ecologists are thus aligned with the agency argument advanced by scholars such as Giddens (1976 p.75), who defines agency "as the stream of actual or contemplated causal interventions of corporeal beings in the ongoing process of the events-in-the world". Whilst actors are free to act as they wish, their ability to do so is conditioned on their *capability* to intervene or make a difference in existing states of affairs (Giddens 1984). Whether one gains more or less of a resource, is determined by one's ability or agency to negotiate existing structures of redistribution.

Political ecologists theorize that an actor's agency is linked to the possession of and wielding of power in human-interactions. Agency according to the political ecology literature arises from dynamic, multiple and situated moments where power is exercised or resisted (Ahlborg & Nightingale 2018). The distribution of benefits or costs in a community is thus a product of unequal power relations amongst actors rather than structures of exchange (Tsuma, 2009). As Bryant and Bailey (1997 p. 39) put it, power is the "ability of an actor to control their own interaction with the environment and the interaction of other actors with the environment. It is above all, the control that one party has over the environment of another party". Examining ways in which power is distributed and contested helps to explain actor agency in the distribution, access to and use of resources. The politics of redistribution focusing on how actors deploy their agencies to influence structures in order to gain more from a benefit stream is central to political ecology analysis. This thesis, therefore, emphasises the analysis of decision-making structures and other processes underlining the sharing of mining benefits, by paying close attention to the agencies of the various actors involved especially at the community level. The goal is to highlight the strategies of inclusion and exclusion from processes of redistribution and access to the mining wealth.

From a political ecology perspective, decision-making at the local level that ensures social justice and sustainable development should be done by grassroots actors (Bryant & Bailey, 1997). These may include farmers, fishers, and petty traders, rather than powerful non-place based and traditional actors such as state officials, and mining companies. This thesis asks if this is really the case, and do existing institutional and legal structures of benefit sharing empower local participation? If they do, are more powerful actors such as local elites able to circumvent such structures to pursue their vested interests? What strategies do these elites deploy and how is this a reflection of unequal power relations amongst the different actors? These are central questions to this analysis of the processes and outcomes of benefit sharing by both government and mining companies from a political ecology perspective.

3.1.2.3 Differentiated benefit-sharing outcomes

This research is not only concerned with the examination of the outcomes of benefit sharing within the scope of sustainable development in general but also how these impacts are felt by different classes of people. This analytical scope is in tandem with political ecology's normative commitment to social justice (Perreault *et al*., 2015). The significant essence of the research conducted using a political ecology approach is to bring to the fore the struggles, interests, and conditions of vulnerable actors such as the poor, women, peasants, minority ethnic groups, and those that are less educated. One dimension of such analysis is to undertake an analysis of the struggles amongst different actors in society on the basis of class, gender, and ethnicity. Examples include a struggle over resources such as land, capital, and labor between men and women, or state and peasant farmers (Bell & Braun 2010; Peters 2004; Tsikata & Yaro 2014). Another dimension is to categorize outcomes of struggles over resources relative to socio-economic characteristics such as class, gender, and ethnicity or what can be termed as differentiated impacts (Daley 2011; Martin, Akol & Gross-Camp 2015). Examining the processes and outcomes of benefit sharing by focusing the lens on social differences within communities helps to illuminate the social (in)justices that exists in the redistribution of mining benefits, and how they are reinforced by existing structures and the agency of actors.

Central to the third world political ecology research is the "idea that politics should have analytical pride of place" (Bryant & Bailey, 1997, p. 5). Pursuing a political ecology analytical approach in analyzing benefit sharing and sustainable development, therefore means that, exploring the micro-politics that condition the distribution and access to mining benefits is primary. The actions and interests of various actors involved in the processes underlining the sharing of the benefits are key, as this would help illuminate the internal complexity and differentiated concerns of those involved. Politics, however, directly reflects power relations within human interactions. The meaning of power and how it can be understood remains contentious conceptually (Andreassen & Crawford 2013; Gaventa 2005). More explicit conceptualisation of power in political ecology texts is thus fundamental (Ahlborg & Nightingale 2018; Paulson & Gezon 2004). Consequently, to ensure the analytical effectiveness of the political ecology approach, it is important to dovetail it with a better understanding of power relations. This would help in a critical analysis and contextual understanding of the interactions of different actors in the sharing of the mining benefits.

3.2 Weaving power into analysis

Even though power is a central feature of natural resources management literature, it is notable that less scholarly attention has been paid to its application in mining benefits sharing in general and negotiated benefits sharing agreements or schemes in particular (Caine & Krogman 2010). Till now, there has been a paucity of research that analyses how benefits sharing arrangements within the mining industry are influenced by and reinforce existing power relationships within mining communities. Within the context of Ghana for example, only Tsuma (2009) has undertaken any work in this regard although he focused on a compensation payment rather than sharing of benefits *per se*. The paucity of interest in this type of analysis is of concern. This is especially so because Ribot and Peluso (2003) have theorised that access to resources is negotiated in a 'bundle of power' historically and socially constituted and undergirded by a range of social, cultural, economic and importantly political factors.

To fully understand the interactions amongst different individuals or groups within society who pursue disparate or common goals, understanding the power relations are key. As a theoretical concept, power has been discussed and theorized extensively, the goal here is not to present a detailed review. Rather, the aim is to highlight some contours of power and how this conditions human interactions especially in relation to benefit sharing processes and outcomes. Having already made the point that power relations amongst actors are asymmetrical (unequal) from a political ecology perspective, it is important to understand what forms power takes, how power operates and what are its effects, as well as whether it can be resisted or challenged.

3.2.1 Dimensions and operation of power

Power can be understood as "the attribute of the person, as potency or the capability" of an actor (Wolf & Silverman 2001 p.384). Weber defines power as "the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which their probability rests" (Weber 1978 as quoted in Heiskala 2001 p.242). This view supports the notion that in society, there are more powerful actors who may exact their influence (agency) in the distribution of resources. Nevertheless, power is relational and context-dependent (VeneKlasen *et al.* 2002). Thus, while an actor may be able to exert influence in a particular domain, he or she may be powerless in another domain. The power that an actor wields can stem from sources such as possession of capital (natural, economic, social or political capital). Power may also be derived from sources such as cultural values (as in the case of village chiefs), information asymmetries, education (e.g. village elites), social class and identity (e.g. age, ethnic background, gender) (VeneKlasen *et al*. 2002).

Drawing from Dahl (1957), Polsby (1959), Gaventa (1982), Bachrach and Baratz (1962) and Lukes (1974), it can be summarised that there are three forms or dimensions of power within social interactions amongst actors. A fourth dimension is suggested by Johal, Moran & Williams (2014) but is not considered here. The three dimensions of power suitably explains who gets to participate in benefit sharing decisions, and how and why some people get more or less of the benefits.

The first dimension is the overt or visible form of power (Dahl 1957; Polsby 1959) and will be viewed through a decision-making approach (Akram, Emerson & Marsh 2015). Power in this sense is exercised by a particular person in a community over others. In other words, it is the power that A has over B (Dahl, 1957) and is consisitent with Weber's conception of power. Power manifests itself through influential actors getting less powerful actors to do things they would not normally do or accept decisions they would not otherwise have made. When applied in relation to decision-making processes, it means there is an actual, observable and often conflictual difference in the preferences of actors occasioned by class or individual interests (Andreassen & Crawford, 2013, Lukes, 1974). Studying power in this sense means that one can observe explicitly who participates in decision-making processes, who benefits and who loses out, by examining formal rules, structures, authorities, institutions and procedures of decision-making (Gaventa, 2005). Benefits sharing schemes such as those that involve the use of an agreement are usually accompanied by the introduction of new local institutions and the creation of spaces for inclusiveness and procedural equity. Overt power analysis therefore "is critical to understanding the extent to which new spaces for participatory governance [if any] can be used for transformative engagement, or whether they are more likely to be instruments for reinforcing domination and control" (Gaventa 2004 p.34).

Power, however, extends beyond the visible and also includes hidden or overt forms as a second dimension (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962) and can be viewed through the agenda setting approach (Akram, Emerson & Marsh 2015). According to the later, decision-making processes may not always be open and easy to observe the actors that wield influence. Instead, they believe that power is deployed covertly when some actors through a strategy of mobilizing bias, prevent discussion of certain issues and consequently shape what are the important and unimportant issues. In other words, powerful people with vested interests exclude the concerns of the poor and issues deemed detrimental to themselves, by setting the political agenda. Analytically, covert power is difficult to discern because it is out of sight and its operations defy clear articulation (Scott-Villiers & Oosterom 2016). Analysing such forms of power implies looking beyond who prevails in a struggle over resources or mining benefits *per se*, to examining how the agenda of the struggle is predetermined. Predetermination of agendas may be done through unwritten rules of society, co-optation, intimidation, misinformation (or concealment) among others (Gaventa, 2005, VeneKlasen & Miller, 2002).

The third dimension of power is invisible or latent power (Lukes, 1974), or hegemonic power (Johal, Moran & Williams 2014). It is a form of power that operates through preference shaping (Akram, Emerson & Marsh 2015). According to Lukes (1974), it is the power A has over B by getting B to do what B does not want to do and shaping B's wants. This third dimension of power thus relates to the ability to influence people's minds with interests, believes or desires that are contrary to their own good. By accepting such contrary interests ensures an unjust status quo is maintained (Lukes, 1974). It involves socialising through cultural and ideological issues, vulnerable or disadvantaged actors into a false view of their own interests (Akram, Emerson & Marsh 2015; Lukes 1974), and the perpetuation of inequality and exclusion (Gaventa 2006; Mehta 2016). This is the most difficult to analyze as those under such influence of power do not even recognize it (Sadan 1997). In this sense, powerful actors do not only exert influence in the discussion of issues (overt power) or pre-vailing the issue (covert power), but shape how the issues are conceived by less powerful people (latent power). The view of Hayward (2000, p. 3), invisible power is a "network of boundaries that delimit…what is socially possible".

Power in its various forms can serve as a means to not only control or exercise authority over others but even more importantly to control access to resources (Ribot & Peluso, 2003) and decision-making processes (Eyben, Harris & Pettit 2006). The effect of this is that less powerful actors would benefit less from the distribution of resources. Power works through different means (such as brute force) to include or exclude people from accessing resources and participating in decision-making processes. However, power is deployed through discursive means (Bryant & Bailey 1997), as the actors exert their influence by shaping issues or discourses. It has been suggested by Hunter (1993 p.36) that "differences in the distribution of knowledge are a source of power and knowledge may be used to generate and maintain differences in the distribution of power". Crucial to the underlying power relations in social relationships is understanding which actor can project what knowledge or ideas (Krauss 2018). Knowledge for political ecologists is a form of 'power resource' used by actors to "create, legitimize and disseminate perspectives on topics in influential ways" (Svarstad, Benjaminsen & Overå 2018 p.353).

The writings of Foucault shed much light on how power operates through knowledge. He states that:

> ...the exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces effects of power... It is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power. (Foucault 1980 p.52).

In Foucault's view knowledge and power in society are connected through discourses. According to him, those that possess knowledge have power and exhibit that power through the application of knowledge or the shaping of discourses. In addition, the application of knowledge by powerful actors does not only create rituals of truth but importantly also disciplines (Fletcher 2010; Foucault 1995). That is, knowledge linked to power can be used to shape (constraint, regulate) the conduct of others and practice (Foucault 1977). Likewise the enactment of power can also lead to the inclusion and exclusion of knowledge often held by less powerful actors (McGee 2016). Power and knowledge consequently reinforce each other in disciplining behaviour or practice. Foucault's concept of knowledge-power relations has particularly resonated with political ecologists. It has been applied in studies that seek to understand how specific ideas and knowledge of nature, resources and society shape behaviours of actors, power relations and forms of resource governance (Arturo Escobar 1999; Dietz 2017; Escobar 2008).

With regard to the relationship between knowledge and power, Scott (1990) further highlights the workings of power by introducing the idea of public transcripts. According to Scott, power is deployed by powerful actors to control access to and use of resources (such as mining benefits) through the use of 'public transcripts. Public transcripts describe the open interaction between powerful and less powerful actors which is based on socially accepted misrepresentations (Scott, 1990). Public transcripts are "socially accepted version of events represented in public documents, legal political ideologies …and so on" (Bryant & Bailey, 1997, p. 40). By controlling the public transcript, powerful actors make their vested claims to and access to resources justifiable, a given and difficult to challenge by less powerful actors in society (Escobar, 2002; Peet & Watts, 2004). Powerful actors dominate the weak through the appearance of unanimity in public transcripts which usually aligns with the former's interests (Scott, 1990).

Power within a community setting may also operate through the institutions of culture being used by influential actors to dominate disadvantage or less powerful groups (Entwistle 2009; Lears 1985). Culture can be understood as "the set of attitudes, values, beliefs, and behaviors shared by a group of people …communicated from one generation to the next" (Matsumoto 1996 p.16). The important role played by cultural influences in power relations in society has caught the attention of some researchers such as Harris (2004); Kopelman (2009); and Ortner (2006). It shapes patterns of domination and subordination within society and hence defines who is powerful, as well as forms a basis for determining access to resources (VeneKlasen *et al*., 2002). Power can be embedded into culture, such that behaviors defining relations of power are internalized and accepted by all actors, but often go unchallenged or recognized (latent Power). For example, in patrimonial societies, cultural values have shaped relations between men and women in such a way that has limited women's access to land and other forms of capital (Kabeer 1997; Kalabamu 2006; McDonough & Harrison 2013). Culture does not only constrain behavior but acts as a conduit for an agency for the wielding of power.

According to Foucault (1978 p.95) "where there is power there is resistance". Political ecologists draw from the works of James Scott, who has argued that one of the means disadvantaged groups resist power is through 'hidden transcripts. Hidden transcripts describe the criticism of powerful actors 'offstage' (outside public domain) by the less powerful. This may be characterized by offstage speeches, gestures, and practices that confirm, contradict or deflect what appears in the public transcript (Scott 1985). They are means through which specific actors or groups respond to, react or express their disapproval to the enactment of power by other actors. The concept of 'hidden transcripts', therefore, is indicative of the fact that power is not unidirectional or unchangeable. Less powerful actors can resist domination through their hidden transcripts which may entirely be unknown to powerful actors. It occurs under the veneer of compliance (Scott 1985). Resistance to power, however, can also take more overt forms and usually is a manifestation of what has been rehearsed in the 'offstage' (Scott, 1985; 1990). Scott (1985) explains that, within rural communities, there are subtle and powerful means of resistance to power. Weak actors deploy what he calls weapons of the weak to challenge their dominators. These weapons may manifest in the form of "foot-dragging, evasion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, and sabotage". Such forms of resistance are common to rural societies who are socially dispersed and lack community organization.

A political ecology approach with a focus on actors and power relations provides an overarching framework to fully understand the nexus between benefit sharing and sustainable development. It provides an opportunity to bring to the fore the hidden processes and power plays underlining the patterns of distribution and access to mining benefits observed in mining communities in Ghana. To achieve this however requires in-depth understanding of the social context of mining communities and the interactions amongst the key actors involved in the benefit sharing process. For this thesis, this was done through the collection of primary data over an extensive period in selected mining communities. Subsequent subsections of this chapter describe the methods used in the collection of the data.

3.3 Research design and methods

To critically examine the outcomes of benefit sharing, interaction with various actors within and outside the mining communities was required. Knowledge about their experiences and power dynamics involved in the sharing of benefits could only be gained through dialogic methods. Indeed, most researchers who have examined the distribution of and access to resources as a product of unequal power relations have done so using qualitative methods (see Tsuma, 2009).

Qualitative research is oriented towards understanding people's experiences as a whole rather than as variables and within the social context they are produced in (Blaxter, Hughes & Tight 2010). For qualitative researchers, social context and social experiences are linked such that it is impossible to understand behavior outside of its context (Neuman & Robson, 2007). This fits the goal of this present research as benefit sharing was looked at as a context specific issue. Qualitative methods provide the methods or tools suitable for understanding in detail the experience of mining communities in the sharing of benefits within their specific context (Neuman & Robson 2007). Methods such as in-depth interviews, observation and focus group discussions were therefore more suitable to gaining an understanding of benefit sharing within mining communities compared to quantitative methods like experimentation.

Indeed, given the context of the research, qualitative methods of data collection were more appropriate. The research sites were rural mining communities where respondents mostly were less educated farmers. The use of quantitative methods such as a survey could have been more advantageous as it could theoretically cover a large sample size and ensure generalization of findings. However, as Walliman (2006) points out, survey questionnaires tend to be returned mostly by literate respondents. Hence given the rural context of the study where illiteracy was high, qualitative methods involving direct interaction between the researcher and the respondents was much more useful.

3.3.1 Research design: Case study

A research design provides the framework within which data is collected and analysed and must be decided early on in a research process (Bryman 2012; Walliman 2006). The choice of a design from amongst a variety of options (such as experiments, case studies, longitudinal design, or comparative designs) is dependent on what the researcher seeks to achieve. These may include objectives such as the need to establish causal relationships; generalize findings to a larger population; understand the behavior of phenomenon within its context; or a temporal assessment of a social phenomenon (Bryman, 2012). This research is primarily interested in understanding a particular social phenomenon in its social context. Therefore, the research focus, the questions and theoretical background required a case study research design. As Stake (2005) points out, a 'case' in case studies is a complex social phenomenon embedded in a context where researchers may be interested in examining its various facets including its historical, social, economic, physical cultural and political contexts.

Despite the popularity of case studies within social science research, exactly what it means is contested (Burton 2000). It is important therefore to emphasize from the onset that some authors view case studies as not a methodological design (Stake, 2005) whereas others do (Creswell 2007; Denzin & Lincoln 2005; Yin 2011). Case studies in this research are considered more broadly to be a methodological research design in qualitative research, an object of inquiry and the results of the inquiry (Creswell, 2007). To this end, Creswell (2007, p. 73) defines case studies as a

> …qualitative approach in which the investigator explores a bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time, through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information (e.g. observations, interviews, audio-visual material and documents and reports), and reports a case description and case-based themes).

Case study designs are a means of undertaking an empirical investigation of an issue within its real-life context (Yin, 2011)). It is a preferred option when the issue at hand or phenomenon being investigated is immersed with its context such that the two cannot easily be distinguished (Yin, 2011). The use of case study design thus helps to illuminate how a complex social phenomenon such as benefits sharing takes place practically in a mining community. It helps shed light on how the social context of the communities and power relations influences the processes and outcomes of the sharing of the benefits. Schramm (1971) points out that, the central goal of case studies is to bring an understanding to a decision, or set of decisions, why they were taken, how they were implemented and with what results (As quoted in Yin 2002 p.12). Thus, understanding the how (the process of sharing and decision making), who (who benefits or who does not) and why (mediating variables in benefit sharing) questions, are well suited for case study designs (Feagin, Orum & Sjoberg 1991; Yin 2002).

Depending on the intention of the research, three types of case study designs can be used in a qualitative research project (Creswell, 2007). These include the single instrumental case study design, collective or multiple case study design and the intrinsic case study (Creswell, 2007). Single instrumental case design involves focussing on an issue and selecting one case as an analytical unit to demonstrate that issue. In this present research, the case of benefits sharing in Ghana for sustainable development was the main issue studied. The analytical unit was mining communities in Ghana's Birim North District where large scale mining takes place. The intrinsic case study design, on the other hand, focusses on the case itself due to its uniqueness or peculiarity. The collective or multiple design also focuses on one issue, and the investigator selects one or more cases to illustrate the issue at hand based on data from multiple sites or a single site (Creswell, 2007). This research study utilized a multiple case study design.

3.3.2 Data collection and fieldwork

The research was conducted in the Birim North District (BND) of Ghana from September 2017 to January 2018. The BND is one of many mining districts in Ghana. The BND was chosen for several reasons. First, research shows that the cost of mining to a community is most severe in the early and late stages of a mine cycle. The BND currently is one of the newest areas to experience mining projects. Newmont Gold Ghana began its operations in the district in 2013. Furthermore, Newmont is implementing a benefit sharing scheme (Newmont Akyem Development Fund) in this district. At the same time, beneficiary mining communities also receive monetary benefits from the government. Thus, the BND was a good test case for understanding how benefits are shared to counteract the costs of mining. It also provided an opportunity to make good policy recommendations for development early on, before this mining project closes.

The selection of the specific communities for this research was important. To do this, the narrow definition of mining communities provided by Veiga, Scoble and McAllister (2001 p.30) was followed. They define a mining community as,

> one whose population is significantly affected by an associated mining operation. This may be through the provision of direct employment or some impacts arising from mining, albeit environmental, social or economic impact.

The selected communities, therefore, are those closest to the mine and have most of their lands appropriated for the mining project. They included Adausena, Hwekwae and Resettlement Community. Table 3.1 provides some details on the selected communities.

Table 3. 1 Characteristics of study communities

Study Community	Population	Economy	Standard of living	Education
Hwekwae	1,803	Predominantly farm based rural economy. Subsistence farming of food crops and cash crops.	17.5 % of population facing extreme poverty	Low
Adausena	1,815	Predominantly farm based rural economy. subsistence farming of food crops and cash crops	77.5 % population have incomes below the upper poverty line;	Low
Resettlement Community	1,191.	Predominantly farm based rural economy. Subsistence farming of food crops and cash crops	26.7 % of the population have incomes below the upper poverty line	Low

Source: Based on Community Development Plan Reports of the three communities.

These rural communities are predominantly based on agricultural livelihoods. The Resettlement Community is a newly built village that is comprised of hamlets and small communities that were displaced by the mine. Figure 3.1 shows the study communities in relation to the mine site.

Figure 3.1: Birim North District in the National and Regional Context

Source: Birim North District Assembly

Figure 3. 2 Location of Study communities



Source: Birim North District Assembly

3.3.3 Qualitative interviews

A key tool for data collection for case studies is through interviews (Yin, 2002; 2011). Interviews are conversational processes creating situated understandings of a social issue through interactional dialogues between the researcher and respondent (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). Different types of information that can be obtained from interviewees may include: interviewee's own behavior or that of others; attitudes; norms; beliefs; and values (Bryman, 2012). Simply put, interviews are ways to explore the interviewee's "individuality and seeing the world through his [her] eyes" (Corbetta 2003 p.264). That is, gaining knowledge about the respondents' perceptions, feelings and experiences as well as the motivations informing their actions (Corbetta 2003; Frey & Fontana 2005). In this study both unstructured and semi-structured interviews were used.

Unstructured interviews are open-ended interviews. It is a way of gathering data from respondents without imposing any a priori categorization that may delineate the boundaries of the inquiry (Frey & Fontana, 2005). Unstructured interviews are not conducted using interview guides or already prepared set of questions. Often, the investigator may ask just a single question and the respondent chooses to respond freely, 'rambling' in a conversational style (Bryman, 2012). Unstructured interviews are very valuable in qualitative research as they provide breadth to the issues being discussed hence generating in-depth information (Frey & Fontana, 2005).

Semi-structured interviews as the name suggests are structured to an extent. It involves the use of a prepared interview schedule or checklist as a guide for the researcher during the interview to ensure that all the important matters are covered (Crang & Cook 2007). The interview schedule for semi-structured interviews as used in this research is distinct from survey questionnaires or those used in quantitative structured interviews. They were designed in such a way that most of the questions were open-ended and did not pigeonhole respondents into providing standardized responses such as 'yes' or 'no'. This was an important element within the research design geared towards collecting a rich and in-depth data. Semi-structured interviews, despite deploying a checklist however, are flexible and allow the interviewer to probe further responses that seem interesting and significant (Bryman, 2012). Thus, emergent issues arising during interviews which were not thought about or identified in the review of literature were probed as and when it became necessary.

All semi-structured interviews were audio-recorded with the prior consent of the interviewees. This was important for two reasons. First, to ensure that a complete uninterrupted version of interviews was accurately retained for analysis. This is fundamental as the number of interviewees and hours of interviews that were conducted in this research made it practically impossible to retain all information in memory for later analysis. Secondly, audio records were needed to ensure quotes used as references in the write-up of this thesis were accurate. These notwithstanding, tape recording interviews despite their value for the research equally were cumbersome. Transcribing recordings was time-consuming and laborious as Bryman (2000; 2012) has indicated, one hour of recorded interview can take up to six hours to transcribe. In view of this, the workload of transcribing was distributed over the period of the data collection and analysis.

Unstructured interviews: Initial informal conversations

The collection of data for this study began with informal conversations with members of the selected mining communities. Sampling for this initial conversation was based on convenience sampling (Bryman 2012). That is, respondents were selected as and when they were available, and the opportunity presented itself. Thus, at the bus stations, local food outlets, in the *trotros* (local minibus transportation popular in Ghana), and other public places where conversations were held with as many people who were willing to share their experiences. In all about twenty-five (25) of these random conversations were had. The conversations revolved around people's general perceptions of mining in the area.

The initial conversations were important to the research strategy in general. It served as a preparatory work before the actual data collection that provided an opportunity to scope the field (Lancaster 2017). The conversations were an invaluable source for understanding the issues surrounding mining in the communities. Listening to the ordinary community people express their feelings about mining was a critical source of background knowledge about mining in the area prior to the data collection proper, which could not sufficiently have been realized from the literature review. More importantly, as mining can be a controversial and conflictual issue at the local level, these initial conversations provided an opportunity to gauge the mood of the communities and the appropriateness of the research timing as well as the focus on benefit-sharing issues. In terms of the research strategy, the initial conversations helped identify key actors in the communities who have the power to influence benefit sharing decisions in addition to those targeted for interviews. Similarly, it helped refine interview questions to suit the context, taking into consideration the local cultural specificity.

Semi-structured interviews with key informants and elites

Government and mining company officials

Even though the focus of the research was the sharing of benefits at the community level, it was necessary to collect information from institutions involved in the sharing of mining benefits. The government and mining company thus constituted important sources of information for the research. Key officials from Newmont Golden Ridge Ghana Ltd were interviewed at the mining site at New Abirem. Interviews were conducted with senior level staff within the sustainability and external relations department involved in the distribution of mining benefits. Senior Management officials and project officers from the Community Development Foundation set up by the Company were also interviewed. These interviews aimed at understanding the company's benefit sharing and sustainable development policy, how they are being implemented through the Foundation and their experiences in terms of interaction with the local communities and significant local actors. The interviews were conducted using a prepared interview schedule (See Appendix 3 and Appendix 5).

At the level of government, the focus of the interviews was on understanding the processes involved in the administration of the Mineral Development Fund and government's general policy on benefits sharing. Collecting such information required interviewing key government officials in different government institutions who play a role in the administration of mining benefits and formulation of mining policy in general. Some of the identified government institutions that were approached for interviews are listed in Table 3.2 below. All those interviewed were at the senior management level.

Table 3. 2 Key Informant Interviews with Government Officials

Institution	Role in the Sharing of Mining Benefits	Number of Key Informants Interviewed
Ministry of Mines and Natural Resources	Mineral Policy Formulation and oversight responsibility for the sector	1
Ghana Minerals Commission	Regulatory Body, Policy Advice	1
The Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands	Distributes communities' share of the fund as royalties to mining communities	1
Birim North District Assembly	Receives and uses part of the payments from the Mineral Development Fund	1

Local Elites

Local elites were interviewed because of their relative level of power and ability to influence decisions concerning the distribution and use of community resources. Here, the goal was to examine the critical positioning and role of the elites within the governance structures of their community and local power *vis a vis* decision making processes. That is, to elicit information about the influences they may or may not exert in the process and outcomes of benefit sharing in their communities. The focus was not simply on the highly educated in the communities but those who have influence in decision-making processes and can decide the direction and outcome of mining benefits.

To be precise, the conceptual definition of elites by Khan (2012 p.362) as "those who have vastly disproportionate control over or access to resources" was followed. This definition combines both the Weberian view of elites as those with power and resources and the Marxist view of elites as those who occupy dominant position in society (Khan 2012). Different elites may exist in the different social domains of local communities (Jupp 2006). However, of concern to this research are those with influence relative to the sharing of mining benefits. The traditional village chiefs were identified *a priori* and confirmed through the informal conversations as community elites central to benefit sharing. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with the traditional chiefs in each of the study communities. Themes for these interviews included, the history of mining in the area; traditional structures of decision-making; governance; the use of community allocated mineral revenues; and the impact of mining on the communities. An interview guide was prepared and utilised during these sessions (see Appendix 4).

Semi-structured interviews with local people

Extensive and detailed data were also collected from residents of the communities studied. These involved ordinary local people who were affected by mining in one way or the other by virtue of simply being in the respective communities. It is important to capture their voices in relation to whether they benefitted from the various benefit sharing schemes under consideration. The complexity of mining means that different categories of people may be affected differently and may or may not stand to benefit from the sharing of benefits. For example, it was desirable to talk to people whose farmlands have been impacted by the mining project to know if they benefited from the sharing of benefits. However, this would have excluded other important categories of people such as women who may not own land, but may be affected by mining in some other way. To ensure the views of different categories of people were captured in the study, a simple random sampling procedure was used to select respondents from the three communities. This was done by interviewing every other household in each community. Sampling for further households ceased at the point of saturation when no new information was coming up in each community (Crang & Cook 2007). In all, fifty-two (52) local people or non-elites (20 female and 32 male) were interviewed from the three study communities. These interviews were conducted using another interview guide (see Appendix 2). Interview themes included perceptions of mining; awareness and participation in mineral benefits sharing decisions; and transparency and accountability of community mineral revenues.

3.3.4 Focus group discussion (FGD)

This research also made use of focus group discussions in the collection of data. According to Hennink (2014), focus group discussions method is useful for studies such as this one which focusses on understanding the context surrounding a social issue and group processes such as decision-making which may be underpinned by power relations. They are "carefully planned series of discussions designed to obtain perceptions on a defined area of interest in a permissive, non-threatening environment" (Krueger & Casey 2014 p.18). They are a form of interview but differentiated from individual interviews in terms of their embodying characteristics, which includes the use of a small group of people who possesses certain features, can provide qualitative data; in a focused discussion, can help understand an issue at hand (Krueger & Casey 2014). A well-designed focused group discussion is a useful and interactive means of collecting information about people's perceptions, attitudes and experiences and beliefs concerning an issue (Hennink, 2014, Krueger & Casey, 2014). They enable participants to access the views of others, refine their own, share experiences and seek clarifications in an interactive process that produces a unique in-depth and rich data that is not available through other qualitative methods (Hennink, 2014).

Focus group discussions are instrumental in qualitative data collection as they provide an opportunity to collect data from a large number of participants in a relatively brief period of time (Burton, 2000). Research shows that a single focus group discussion can generate 70 per cent of data that can be obtained from several in-depth interviews with the same participants (Fern, 1982). More importantly, data obtained are participant driven, as FDG creates the avenue for participants to highlight issues of importance to them as they share their perspectives on the topics raised (Hennink, 2014). At the same time, it allows the researcher to gauge individual interactions in a group as issues are raised (Burton, 2000). This latter point was an important element in the creation of knowledge from the FGD sessions for this research. How discussants interacted amongst themselves on issues that were raised, provided a good indication of how they felt about the topic. For example, how they easily came to a consensus on who were the decision makers when it comes to the sharing of benefits, and whether they felt the community had benefited from the payments from the MDF and community development fund was illuminating. These observations were consistent with the established view that group interaction is an important aspect of focus group methods (Kitzinger & Frith 1999).

The FGD I conducted revolved around two central themes. Firstly, the discussions sought to obtain views about the benefit sharing process - whether participants feel they are engaged in the process, who they consider has power to influence decision-making processes, whether they feel they are benefiting and what actions they have taken in the past to demand benefits etc. Secondly, the FGD served as a participatory action process where discussants identified mechanisms to make future benefit sharing more responsive to their community needs.

One of the key concerns highlighted in focus group discussions literature is the problem of voice and representation (Smithson 2000). That is, how to ensure that discussions are not dominated by the opinions of few, which may erroneously be taken as the articulated viewpoint of the group (Smithson, 2000). This concern had been carefully incorporated into the design of the focus group discussions. It was dealt with by organizing separate FGD sessions for males and females (Bloor *et al.* 2001). This ensured that females did not feel intimidated during the discussions especially because of the patriarchal nature of rural communities in Ghana.

3.3.4.1 Preparation for FDG

In conducting the focus group discussions, several preparations were made ahead of time. Key amongst these include recruitment of participants and the venue. Research participants were selected using purposeful sampling technique to ensure that key constituents of the communities had a voice in the discussions. It was important for the discussant pool to include farmers, people who have lost lands to the mining projects, members and leaders of community groups, and natives who work in the mines. The selection of these participants was done after the initial semi-structured interviews had provided enough information about benefit sharing in the community and the key actors or stakeholders. In each community, two focus groups sessions were organized based on gender. On average, each focus group consisted of about 10 discussants each. This is a good group size for FGD because groups must be small to create an opportunity for all discussants to share their views or experiences and at the same time large enough to ensure diversity of information (Bloor *et al.,* 2001, Krueger & Casey, 2014). The discussions were moderated by the investigator and held in public venues such as community social center, classrooms. Proximity to discussants was key in the selection of venues recommended by literature ((Bloor *et al.,* 2001, Hennink, 2014; Krueger & Casey, 2014). A Focus Group discussion guide (see Appendix 6) was also prepared prior to fieldwork and used during the discussions.

3.3.5 Observation

Observations provided another means of collecting first-hand empirical information about a social phenomenon. Observation involves the immersion of researchers in the phenomenon being studied in order to experience it and describe it from their perspective (Corbetta, 2003). Direct observations were an effective means of understanding processes underlining benefit sharing.

Spradley (1989) suggests that every social context consists of three elements, a place, actors, and activities. In this research, each of these three elements were observed. The research communities constituted the 'place' of this research. Important observations made in this regard included assessing the physical build of the communities. Key things observed included how the communities have developed, livelihood activities ongoing in the community, social stratification of the communities, the culture and social norms of the communities guiding behavior among others. These observations were important for analyzing the research findings and also providing a good description of the case communities.

By spending a long period of time in the research communities (about six month), it was possible to observe and understand how males relate to females, how community leaders relate with the ordinary people, how mining executives relate with the people, and how community resources such as land are distributed and used. The important observation of relationships amongst different actors at the community level helped to understand the specific issue of benefit sharing. Prior to conducting the fieldwork, this researcher was under the assumption that the sharing of mining benefits within the communities may not be so peculiar, but rather existed as an extension of existing patterns of community relations. It was important therefore to make observations about interactions amongst the different actors in the community in other spheres of community life beyond the sharing of mining benefits. This was one advantage of using the case study design.

The third element of a social situation according to Spradley (1989) is the activities or events (sets of activities) that take place in communities. In this regard, the specific focus was to observe all activities relating to the sharing of mining benefits. One important observation was made while this researcher was attending a once off stakeholder meeting where the community development agreement was being reviewed. Sitting in such a community meeting where decisions were made about mining and benefits was a valuable source of information for this research. First-hand observations were made of the power dynamics within such meetings, of how consensus building was developed, and of whose interests were being served. In this case, the meeting was not recorded for ethical reasons however, observations were noted in the researcher's fieldwork notebook.

3.3.6 Document analysis

Documents pertaining to payments and beneficiaries of the Newmont Gold Ghana Community Development Foundation and government payments also constituted a key secondary data set for this research. From these, it was possible to compare for example who benefited in the past and possibly infer who will benefit in the future. The study by way of literature review also relied on publications and reports of mining institutions in Ghana such as the Ghana Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, Ghana Chamber of Mines, Ghana Minerals Commission and the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands.

3.3.7 Data analysis

Data obtained through qualitative methods differs from numerical quantitative data which are more amenable to rigorous analysis. Nevertheless, the analysis of qualitative data must be systematic and rigorous and incorporate the views of all interviewees, not just those that suit the interest of the researcher (Bloor *et al.,* 2001). The sheer volume of the interview and FGD data that was obtained required that data analysis begin early. Much of the data analysis therefore began during the data collection period while this researcher was in the field. This approach was advantageous as it provided the opportunity to further interrogate new issues that arose during the data collection and to involve the research participants in 'validating' the data collected (Ezzy 2002). Thus, preliminary data analysis involved making summary notes after each interview and observation. From these daily summaries, cues were sought that spoke to the research questions and objectives. Based on the study's theoretical framework, emerging themes, concepts and codes were developed from the cues early on and refined as the fieldwork progressed.

The taped data obtained from the interviews were transcribed as the fieldwork went on. At the end of the fieldwork, the transcribed data were combined with the field notes taken during observations and FGD. A theme analysis was conducted using NVivo 10 software. While the software does not conduct the actual analysis (Castleberry & Nolen 2018) it does provide the platform for the collection, organization and visualization of qualitative data (Castleberry

2014). The preliminary concepts and themes that were identified from the cues were used to guide the coding of the data into the software. These were then developed into thematic matrices and interpreted within the scope of the theoretical framework of the study. The software's mind mapping function was also useful in the organisation of the research findings and write up of the thesis.

3.4 Evaluation of research findings

Qualitative research is such that it "produces findings not arrived at by means of statistical procedures or other means of quantification" (Strauss & Corbin 1990 p.17). Rather, they produce findings that seeks to explain, explore or understand a social phenomenon as it occurs in its natural setting (Bryman, 2012, Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). Consequently, unlike quantitative findings that may be evaluated for rigor-based on concepts such as validity and reliability, qualitative studies must be evaluated differently. Even though these concepts do not apply to qualitative research, it is important that qualitative research findings are rigorous, and an honest interpretation of the social issue investigated.

Given that qualitative data are based on meanings which are context situated, a research is trustworthy and rigorous when it can be demonstrated that the researcher made efforts to understand the context from which participants construct meanings (Ezzy, 2002). To this end, Lincoln and Guba (1985) have suggested that qualitative research should be evaluated for trustworthiness based on the criteria of credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. These criteria are a counterpart to quantitative research evaluation criteria. Table 3.4 provides details of how these were achieved.

Table 3. 3 Evaluation of Research Process and Findings

Criteria	Description	Researcher Evaluations
Credibility	Evaluation of the truthfulness of the research finding. The interpretations of interviews for example must reflect the true meanings the participants sought to convey	At the end of each FGD session, a summary of findings were read out to the discussants to verify that the key findings being taken away are a reflection of their views. Also, analysis began alongside the data collection which provided an opportunity to cross-check findings from respondents whilst still on the field. Use of Audio recordings ensured quotes used in write-up were accurate
Transferability	It is concerned with the applicability of the research findings or the extent to which it can be generalized to other research settings.	Adequate information has been provided to describe the research case study and context to ensure that others can evaluate contextual similarity before applying this research to other contexts. Nevertheless, the caveat must be established firmly that, social context and power dynamics assessed in this study as moderating benefit sharing and sustainable development are variables that can be peculiar and vary from community to community hence similar findings cannot be guaranteed in other contexts.
Dependability	The ability of the research findings to be replicated consistently under similar conditions severally	Dependability of qualitative research findings is strengthened through the use of overlap methods. The use of different methods does not necessarily imply dependability but rather the methods must converge similar findings. For this reason, the use of FGD and interviewing of the ordinary people were deployed to ensure dependability. Both methods sampled ordinary people rather than elites of government and company representatives. At the same time, both sought to elicit similar information about the experiences of the ordinary people relative mining benefit sharing. Dependability of the study will imply that the views expressed during the structured interviews of the people should not be too divergent from those shared by discussants.
Confirmability	Objectivity through characteristics of the data	Through audit trail. This study made use of audio recordings and field notes detailing methodological processes, daily reflexive notes, and observations. These resources were important for ensuring that interpretations and reporting of findings truly reflect the views of the respondents ensured value free report of the findings.

3.6 Ethics and the research process

Well conducted qualitative research that generates in-depth data requires ‘getting in and getting close’ to research participants using different data collection strategies (Welland & Pugsley 2019). This often results in close interactions between the researcher and the research participants which raises considerable ethical issues. Without being exhaustive, these may include privacy concerns, informed consent, accurate representation of the participants’ lived experiences, and use of the data among others. The significance of these ethical issues have given rise to both the development of research guidelines by research institutions (NHMRC 2018b) and a growing scholarly literature that addresses ethical concerns in qualitative research (Flick 2018; Guillemin & Gillam 2004; Reid *et al.* 2018). The goal of these texts is to help researchers to reflexively identify, plan for and address ethical issues head on. Doing so ensures the integrity of the research, respect for the participants, risks to participants are minimised and above all the research is beneficial to the participants and society at large (NHMRC 2018a). In this research conducted through an Australian university, much effort was made to ensure these ethical principles, in particular the Australian Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research (NHMRC 2018a) were adhered to throughout the research process. For example, the names of the study communities and respondents were anonymised in the presentation of the results of this study to protect their identities.

The Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) of the University of Adelaide reviewed the research methods, process, and statement for ethical standards, and how ethical issues were to be addressed in the research prior to data collection. The HREC was satisfied that this research could be conducted in line with these ethical guidelines (NHMRC 2018b; 2018a; and see the final HREC approval letter in Appendix 1). To ensure rigour and strict compliance to the ethical standards, two further annual reviews were done by the HREC to ensure that the guidelines were followed throughout the three-year period of this research project.

3.7 Conclusion

This methodology chapter described how the data for this study was collected and analysed. To fully understand how the sharing of mining benefits contributes to sustainable development, the study found utility in the use a political ecology lens complemented by an analysis of power. This analytical approach thus provides an opportunity to reveal who gains from the benefits of mining redistributed, how they gained from it, and the differentiated impacts. The methods used in the collection of the interviews, focus group discussions, observation and document analysis for this study were also described in this chapter. It was made clear that qualitative methods provide the most appropriate strategy to collect a rich and in-depth data required for this study.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Study Context: Mining, Communities, and Benefit-sharing in Ghana

4.0 Introduction

This chapter provides background information about Ghana in general and specifically the mining sector in the country. It also provides information about the case communities and Newmont Mining Corporation. The goal of this chapter is to ensure that the results presented in subsequent chapters are situated and understood within its proper context.

4.1 A Brief profile of Ghana

Geographically, Ghana is situated in West Africa bordered by Togo, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast and the Gulf of Guinea Sea (see figure 4.1). The relatively small country occupies a land size area of 238,533 sq km. The most recent census data puts the country's population at about 26 million (Ghana Statistical Service 2014). Ghana was colonised from about 1821 until 1957 when the country gained independence from British rule following a strong campaign for self-determination led by its first president Dr. Kwame Nkrumah.

Figure 4. 1Political Map of Ghana

Source: Focus Africa (2011)

Ghana, is rated highly within the continent for its relative peace, good governance and strong institutions (Cooke, Hague & McKay 2016). In 1992, following three decades of political instability the country adopted a new national constitution including a multiparty democratic system of elected government. Between 1992 and 2019, five different presidents have been elected through the ballot. These presidents have come from the two dominant political parties in the Country, the National Democratic Party (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP).

The country's governance system is two tiered with formal and informal structures. The formal structure consists of the central government headed by the President, an independent legislature and ten regional coordinating councils headed by ministers appointed by the president. Administrative power is further decentralized to the Municipal, Metropolitan and District Assemblies levels which are headed by a mayor or chief executive appointed by the President. The second tier of governance is the informal system of traditional authority. The traditional authorities are made up of chiefs who wield a lot of power and influence at the local community level. Their positions and power in society are derived from traditional values and culture backed by customary law. They play an active role in local development even though their role in society is not recognized by the constitution beyond being custodians of customary lands (Ankisiba 2013).

In terms of the economy, Ghana like many developing countries suffered its own share of the economic meltdown in the 1980s due to poor management, political upheavals and lack of foreign investment. However, through the implementation of various Bretton Woods Institutions led economic policies including the Structural Adjustments Program, coupled with its vast mineral and petroleum resources, the country attained middle-income status in 2010 (Moss & Majerowicz 2012). The middle-income status, nevertheless is not a true reflection of the socioeconomic affairs of most Ghanaians. Ghana's 2017 Human Development Index value is 0.59 which places the country at 140 out of 188 countries globally (UNDP 2016). It is estimated that 23 percent of the population are living in poverty (Ghana Statistiscal Service 2018). An additional twenty-five percent are close to the poverty line (UNDP 2016). Studies indicate that poverty levels are not spread evenly but concentrated very much in the rural areas of the country (Cooke, Hague & McKay 2016; Ghana Statistiscal Service 2018). For those that are employed, the majority are in the agricultural sector, as that sector accounts for 44 percent of total employment in the country (Ghana Statistical Service 2014).

4.2 History and contribution of mining to economy

Ghana is endowed with substantial mineral resources such as diamonds, bauxite, manganese, and gold. Ghana produced some 108 tons of gold in 2015, an output bettered in Africa only by South Africa and is the 10th highest globally (Thomson 2015). Formerly known as the Gold Coast, the country has a long rich tradition in mining that dates back over a 1000 years (Garvin *et al*. 2009; Sweeting & Clark 2000). It is estimated that between 1471 when the Europeans first arrived and 1980, 1404 million ounces of gold have been produced (Sweeting & Clark, 2000). Prior to British rule, indigenous people were engaged in gold mining and this was key to the traditional economies of precolonial towns such as Asante, Denkyira, Akyem, and Wassa, and represented a symbol of power and wealth (Dumett 1987; Ofosu-Mensah 2011, 2016). The extraction of minerals at this historical point in time was done on a small-scale basis using rudimentary methods (Dumett, 1987).

The arrival of the Europeans in 1471 marked the beginning of foreign interest in Ghana's mineral resources. The Europeans, fascinated by the vast mineral resources named the country Gold Coast and were deeply involved in the extraction of minerals from the country. The colonial British government enforced several policies in the sector including the Mercury ordinance which banned indigenous small-scale mining. The mineral policies of the British were aimed at ensuring sufficient supply of minerals to the Empire, generate tax revenues and provide a framework to guide large-scale mining by British investors which began in the 19th century (Akabzaa & Darimani 2001; Tsikata 1997).

After independence in 1957, there was a significant decline in the mineral sector due to the nationalisation of mines in the country (Akabzaa & Darimani, 2001b). Gold production plummeted from 900,000 ounces in 1960 to 280,000 ounces by 1983 (Sweeting & Clark, 2000). The principal reasons behind the acquisitions of the mining companies by the state included protection of employment and access to foreign exchange generated by the mine (Tsikata, 1997). After four decades of independence however, with the state in charge of the mineral sector, no new mines were opened. Existing mines either closed or production slowed due to poor management, unfavorable mining regime, lack of investments, and poor maintenance. By the 1980s, Ghana was experiencing a general economic downturn and political instability which made the country less attractive to foreign investments (World Bank 2007).

Into the economic downturn, Ghana implemented the World Bank sponsored Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). The intervention by these Bretton Woods institutions was to arrest the deteriorating economy and to improve the general standard of living (Hilson, 2004). The mining sector was identified as one of the key industries to resurrect the country's fortunes. The main policy initiatives under the SAPs within the mining sector was to deemphasize state participation in mineral companies and also to a create conducive framework to attract foreign investments (Akabzaa & Darimani, 2001b, Hilson, 2004). The implementation of the program was to lead sweeping reforms in the mining sector which according to Sweeting and Clark (2000) included:

- Enactment of the Minerals and Mining Law in 1986
- Provision of tax allowances, exemption from customs duties and 75 percent write-off on capital investments for investors in the mining sector
- Removal of legislation restricting foreign ownership of mines
- Privatization of state-owned mining enterprises
- Permission for companies to retain up to 80 percent of foreign exchange offshore

These reforms aimed to develop the mineral industry sustainably to generate wealth for the country (Weber-Fahr, 2002). Also, it was to ensure community participation and equitable distribution of the mineral wealth in mining areas (Songsore, Yankson & Tsikata 1994; Weber-Fahr 2002). The former aim was achieved. The industry has experienced a phenomenal growth in terms of investments and the opening of new mines (Aryee, 2001, Hilson & Potter, 2003). It is estimated that US$4 billion was invested in the sector between 1983 and 1998 alone (Aryee, 2001). This figure has increased significantly to US$11.6 billion dollars in 2015 (Ghana Chamber of Mines, 2015a). From just five companies prior to the implementation of the structural adjustment program, there are now about sixteen large-scale mining companies. They are mostly multinational large-scale mining firms.

Researchers such as Ayee *et al.* (2011) have documented and alluded to the significant benefit that Ghana has received following the reform. Through royalties and income taxes, the government since the economic reforms in the 1980s has received substantial mineral revenues (Hilson & Hilson 2017). Data on mining exports as shown in Figure 4.2 indicates that since the reforms, the sector has contributed significantly to Ghana's exports. In 2014, total mineral exports were estimated at USD$4.516bn which represented 35 percent of the country's total merchandise exports (GHEITI, 2014). In terms of revenue, the government obtained Ghc 1.25bn (GHEITI, 2014).

Figure 4. 2Total mineral exports compared to total exports from 1984-2014



Source: Based on data from (GHEITI 2014)

4.3 Costs of mining to communities

At the same time, the reforms have brought significant costs to mining communities in Ghana. The economic, social and environmental footprints of the increased investments in the mining sector are felt most within the local mining communities. A report by Oxfam International and the Bank Information Center for example points out that costs of mining to local communities far outweighs the benefits of mining in Ghana investigated (Sarin, 2006). Table 4.1 summarises some of the impacts of mining in the country over the years.

Table 4. 1 Local Impacts of Mining

Type of impact on community	Specifics	Literature
Environmental Impacts	Cyanide spillages, pollution of water bodies, loss of biodiversity and land degradation	Action Aid Ghana 2006; Awudi 2002; Azcue 2012; Balfors *et al.* 2007; Boocock 2002; Erdiaw-Kwasie, Dinye & Abunyewah 2014
Social Impacts	Social conflicts, increasing rate of social vices and crime, human rights abuses and spread of HIV-AIDs.	Agyapong 1998; Bomfeh 2010; CHRAJ 2008; Hilson 2002a, 2002b; Hilson & Yakovleva 2007; Ofori & Ofori 2018a
Economic Impacts	Loss of farmlands and livelihoods	Akabzaa 2001; Amponsah-Tawiah & Dartey-Baah 2011; Bhattacharya *et al.* 2002; Owusu-Ansah 2011; Owusu-Ansah & Smardon 2015

These reported impacts of mining on communities in Ghana reinforce the need to use case studies to investigate and document whether or not mining contributes to sustainable development in Ghana.

4.4 Sharing mining benefits in Ghana: A historical context

Historical accounts demonstrate that prior to colonialism and indeed before the arrival of the Portuguese in 1471, indigenous Ghanaians were mining for precious minerals such as gold (Dumett, 1987, Sweeting & Clark, 2000). The sharing of the benefits from the minerals obtained by the local people was defined by chief-subject relations. These relations were structured within the context of traditional society. That is, there was no national government or large-scale foreign mining companies and mining was carried out on small scales as a complimentary livelihood activity to farming. Indigenous people mined for minerals during the off-farming season to complement their household income (Dumett 1998). The mining was done on communal lands for which the village chiefs or kings hold allodial rights depending on the traditional governance system.

The traditional governance system now and then, is largely structured in a pyramid manner (Amoatia 2010; Dumett 1998). The following Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 demonstrate this structure.

Figure 4. 3 General structure chieftaincy system



Source: Author's Construction based on the literature

Figure 4. 4 Chieftaincy structure in Study Area



Source: Author's Construction based on fieldwork interviews

At the top is a king or paramount chief (popularly called *Omanhene*) who heads a close knit of communities (also towns or cities). Each of these communities in turn are designated as stools of the paramountcy and ruled by a chief (popular called *Ohene*). Below this level are some smaller villages usually occupied by settlers who do not have native rights to the land in that area but owe allegiance to the chiefs or king by virtue of their stay there. Such settler communities are headed by village headmen (popularly called *Odikro*).

Village chiefs have benefited directly from the proceeds of minerals over a century. Table 4.2 below summarises various appropriation mechanism that has been at play before, during and after colonialism.

Table 4. 2 Historical mechanisms for Sharing Mineral Royalties

Time Period	Dominant Actors	Redistribution of Mineral Rents/benefits	Legal Regime
Pre-colonial Period	Kings, Chiefs, Clans, families, individuals	1/3 to miner 1/3 to chief 1/3 to King/paramountcy	Native Customs
1874-1957 Colonial period	British Mining Companies Chiefs	Chiefs in the South received a negotiated Rate. Chiefs in the Northern Territory received £1 per square mile of land mined. The Crown in Britain received £4 pounds per square mile of land mined.	Concessions Ordinance of 1900 Mineral Rights Ordinance of 1903 Mineral Rights Ordinance of 1903
1957-1985 Post-Independence	Government, State-owned mining corporations		Concessions Ordinance of 1962 and the Stool lands law of 1962
1990-Present	Multinational Companies Government	5% Royalty to Government 10% of Government Share=1.8% to traditional Council (paramountcy), 2.25% to Chiefs/stools)	Minerals Act 126 of 1962 Minerals and Mining Act 703 of 2006 Administration of Lands Act 123 of 1962 Mineral Development Fund Act

Source: Author's construction based on historical data

Chiefs and kings as trustees of the land on behalf of the people had significant interests in the proceeds of the minerals extracted from their jurisdiction (Dumett, 1998). Dumett (1998) identified three principal strategies used by the traditional authorities (kings, chiefs and headmen) prior to the colonial period to obtain rents from the mining activities of the local people. These included the *Abusa* rents sharing system, direct taxation and forced labour. The *Abusa* system of sharing which was akin to a royalty payment system was structured such that, the indigenous miners retained one third of the rents, the local village chief or stool received also one-third and the remaining one-third was paid to the king or the paramount chief ruling over that area. This pathway of appropriation was generally the major means through which traditional authorities in those days received a share of the mineral windfall[7]. Traditional authorities also gained a share of the mineral rents by levying taxes on their people. Dumett (1998) describes one such tax as the poll tax, through which chiefs or kings levied their subjects at the rate of one-tenth of an ounce of gold. Historical accounts also reveal that, special days were designated on which all subjects were made to mine solely for the paramount chiefs or kings as a form of communal labour (Daaku 1970; Dumett 1998).

The evidence from the historical accounts suggests that resources generated from mining provided the traditional authorities with material power (Dumett 1998; Wilks 1975). During this ancient period, the rents provided the traditional authorities resources to administer the areas under their jurisdiction and undertake development in the absence of any national government. Historians, however point out that, the amount of wealth derived by the traditional authorities from gold during this period did not produce significant development (Arhin 1978). According to Arhin this was because much of the rents generated were, used in the building of state power, a means of further wealth-acquisition…the wealth so acquired was shared mainly by the powerholders and the authority-holders, the commonalty only peripherally benefitting from the material gains acquired from warfare (Arhin 1978, p. 97).

The practice of paying a share of the mineral rents to the traditional authorities continued during the period of colonialism. The period of colonialism under the British rule saw the mining of minerals on a large scale by British mining companies. Chiefs in mineral rich areas commercialised their lands by leasing it to foreign mining companies. The foreign companies dominated and benefited significantly from the extraction of gold by influencing the mineral related laws and policies of the colonial government (Tsikata, 1997). Nonetheless, Chiefs and kings were paid their entitlement from the extraction of minerals from their land. This was made possible through a set of minerals and land regimes put in place by the colonial government. Key among these was the Gold Coast concessions ordinance of 1900 and the Northern Territory mineral rights ordinance of 1903. The concessions ordinance of 1900 designed for the British colonies in the south at that time allowed chiefs to negotiate the rate

[7] There were variations however, when large nuggets of gold were found for example, it was confiscated by the traditional authorities and the miner only obtained a small fee for his labour (Dumett, 1998).

and the payment of rents by the foreign mining companies. The payment of these rents, however, had to go through the colonial government. The 1900 ordinance stipulated that;

> Any rent or other periodical sum payable under any certified concession to any native shall be paid in the prescribed manner by the holder of such concession to the Treasurer and by the Treasurer to such native…(The Concessions Ordinance 1900).

Even though the ordinance did not specify who was entitled to receive the rents, the chiefs and kings generally were the recipients as the allodial title holders of the land on behalf of their communities. Thus, Ofosu-Mensah (2016) reports how in 1922, a chief of Akwatia negotiated a ninety-nine year mining concession in return for the payments of £100 to £200 a year royalties.

The chiefs in the Northern Territory also enjoyed mineral rents although under a different legal regime. In 1904, the colonial government enacted the mineral rights ordinance which outlined what mining companies must pay to the colonial government and the chiefs in whose area the mining is carried out. The ordinance stipulated that:

> There shall be payable in respect of every mining option an annual payment at the rate of four pounds for each square miles or fractional part thereof comprised within the area named therein, and at the discretion of the Chief Commissioner a further annual sum not exceeding one pound per square mile by way of disbursement to such native Chiefs or other native persons_as in the opinion of the Chief Commissioner have by native customary law any part to any part of the profits derived from the land in the mining option. (The Mineral Rights Ordinance 1904)

4.5 Post-Independence: Mineral benefits, Chiefs and land relations

Under the current mineral regime in Ghana, all public mineral revenues are centralised in the national government. This contrasts with other jurisdictions where a portion of the state's share of the mineral revenues are directly paid to subnational entities by mining companies. Examples of jurisdictions with such systems of revenue governance include Australia and Mozambique. Ghana's 1992 Constitution outlines that "all revenue or other moneys raised or received for the purpose of, or on behalf of, the Government' and 'any other moneys raised or received in trust for or on behalf of, the Government' are to be paid into the Consolidated Fund as enshrined in Chapter 13 Clause 1 of the Constitution (Ghana Constitution, 1992). Following independence in 1957, legislation was enacted that ensured the government benefitted from mineral projects in the country through several revenue streams. Figure 4.5 highlights some of the principal mineral revenue streams for the Government.

Figure 4. 5 Mineral Revenue Flows in Ghana



Source: Author’s Construction

Royalties and income taxes constitute the main revenue sources for the government. Royalties are a percentage payment of the total minerals produced by a mining company (Otto *et al*. 2006). Mining companies in Ghana pay a royalty rate between 3-6%. In real value terms for example, the central government received benefits from the mining sector in 2017 amounting to GHC 969.6 million for corporate income tax and GHC 702.4 million in royalties (Ghana Chamber Of Mines 2018).

Post-independence, the trend of paying a portion of the mineral rents to chiefs continued. Since then the state recognised the rights of the chiefs over land but vested its management and the resources found with the President. Consequently, negotiation of mineral concessions with companies became the prerogative of the state. The chiefs nevertheless still gained rents from the mines. The earliest legal regime to this end was the Minerals Act 126 of 1962 and the Administration of Stool Lands Act 123 of 1962. These legislative Acts vested all minerals to the president, on behalf of the people.

Early post independent Acts were the first to recognise the need to develop mining communities and made clear provisions for the return of some part of the mineral rents albeit through the chiefs:

> Moneys in any Stool Lands Account remaining after payment of the sums due under section 19 shall be applied in accordance with this Act for the benefit of the people in the areas in which the particular lands are situated and in particular
> (a) in the maintenance of the Stool or other traditional authority including a traditional council; and
> (b) in the making of grants for projects, including scholarships for the benefit of the people of the area. (Administration of Lands Act 1962)

In 1993, the government established the Mineral Development Fund (MDF) to provide revenues to communities where mining takes place for their development and environmental mitigation. This benefit sharing arrangement entails government returning a percentage of the mineral royalties back to the mining areas based on a formula. The Mineral Development Fund receives 20 percent of the mineral royalties paid by the companies. From this amount, 10 percent is used to finance state institutions and universities involved in the development of the mineral sector. The remaining 10 percent of the mining royalties are transferred to the mining communities for local development through the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands (OASL), and this 10 percent is further subdivided as follows: 10 percent as an administrative fee for OASL; of the remainder, 55 percent to the local government (district assembly); 20 percent to the traditional councils of the respective mining communities; and 25 percent to the customary land title holder. The 25 percent to the customary title landholder usually goes to the local village chief who holds the customary land (stool lands) in trust for the people. Figure 4.6 shows a summary of the sharing scheme.

Figure 4. 6 Redistribution of Mineral Royalties



Source: Author's Construction based on literature

Benefits in the form of royalties paid by the government to the communities are however linked to the Stool lands acquired for mining, making the question of land ownership paramount. The revenues by law are considered as accruing to the communities through the use of the community's stool lands for mining. Specifically, Chapter 21, Clause 267 of the Constitution outlines how much revenue derived from customarily held lands should be returned to the affected communities. The Constitution outlines that:

> Ten per cent of the revenue accruing from stool lands shall be paid to the office of the Administrator of Stool Lands to cover administrative expenses; and the remaining revenue shall be disbursed in the following proportions:
> (a) twenty-five per cent to the stool through the traditional authority for the maintenance of the stool in keeping with its status;
> (b) twenty per cent to the traditional authority; and
> (c) fifty-five per cent to the District Assembly, within the area of authority of which the stool (The Constitution of Ghana, 1992)

It is estimated that about 80 percent of all lands in Ghana are communal lands, legally referred to as stool lands and owned under customary land tenure (Kansanga *et al.* 2018). Under this land tenure system, there are no landowners *per se* but rather multiple hierarchically structured property rights (or bundles of rights) holders (Andrews 2018; Kunbuor 2003). This means that different groups of people within the community have some customary property right and interests in the community land. These rights range from allodial rights held by the village chief (occupant of the stool), usufruct rights[8] held by native families to leasehold rights held by non-natives. The complexity of these rights produces a situation where powerful and vulnerable actors negotiate, claim and dispute access and control over the lands (Berry 1989, 2018; Kansanga *et al.* 2018; Ubink 2008). It is within this context that local land politics and sharing of mining benefits meet. Exactly who is entitled to the communities' share of the royalties accruing from resource extraction from the lands is ambiguous and open to exploitation by actors within the community (Andrews 2018; Kidido *et al.* 2015). It is trite knowledge from community resource management studies that, entitlements (or rights) over community-based resources do not metamorphose automatically into actual access and control but often involves negotiations and contestation (Kansanga *et al.* 2018; Leach, Mearns & Scoones 1997a). This is an important issue of focus especially when sustainable development is underscored by principles of procedural and distributive justice.

The argument by Amanor (2006) that customary land relations are politically embedded is apposite here. Amanor states that "it is usually the wealthy and powerful within local communities who control the process of land administration and allocation and the definition of the customary interests" (Amanor, 2006, p. 1). A powerful few play key roles in the commodification of the land which often leads to the marginalization of poor vulnerable groups (Amanor, 2006). Largely, control over customary lands is exercised by community traditional leaders and heads of clans (Berry 2018; Biitir & Nara 2016; Ubink 2008). Mining companies and government are confronted with the challenge of dealing with competing interests with varied claims to the land both at the point of negotiating the land deal and thereafter sharing of the benefits. Thus, it becomes interesting to understand how mining benefits in the form of royalty payments are shared within this context and its outcomes, as equity and sustainable development will depend on the benefits reaching those impacted by the mining. Do the powerful few who control access to the lands also control the mining benefits or the entire community gains equally? Does the current arrangement mirror the precolonial and colonial era where chiefs monopolised the mineral benefits? This is important to know because in Africa some traditional leaders have been documented to neglect the interests of their communities for personal benefits from mining companies (Capps & Mnwana 2015; Llewellyn 2019; Mnwana 2014). This has notably been linked to the lack of efficient regulatory frameworks

[8] Rights of usage which can be held by an individual or family that enables him or her to farm the land

that ensure consultation, consent and downward accountability in the use of resource funds in mining communities (Llewellyn 2019). Llewellyn (2019) notes without equivocation that rarely do traditional leaders act in the interests of their communities by supporting the government and mining industry in community development.

Tsuma (2009) offers a nuanced view and empirical demonstration of how benefits are shared in Ghana and why some people or groups may not benefit, and thus why there is a lack of development in mining communities. Writing from a political ecology perspective, the central argument of Tsuma's research is that, distribution of benefits in mining communities in Ghana is unequal, and this inequality is an outcome of unequal power relations amongst different social actors rather than a governance challenge. His empirical study focused on the payment of a €600,000 in 2001 as a compensation package for the spillage of mercury in Tarkwa, a mining town in Ghana by Gold Fields Ghana. His research showed how powerful strategic groups such as traditional chiefs, staff of the mining company, a professor from a local mining university, the Minister of Environment, and an international NGO, strategically benefited more from the funds rather than the local people who suffered the effects of the mercury spillage. The study showed that distribution and use of mining benefits can be highly influenced by powerful groups who wield a lot of influence in decision-making processes. This present study therefore, adds to Tsuma's study by extending knowledge beyond compensation matters to specific and ongoing benefit-sharing initiatives by the government through the Mineral Development Fund.

4.6 Newmont mining corporation and its CSR policy

Newmont Mining Corporation is one of the largest multinational mining firms headquartered in the United States of America. With mining operations in North America, South America, Asia-Pacific and West Africa, the company's mining footprint is felt globally in different local contexts. Ghana represents its significant investments in Africa. The company is one of the newest large-scale mining companies to have begun operations in the country recently. Currently, it operates two large-scale mining concessions, the Ahafo mine in the Brong Ahafo region and the Akyem Mine in the Eastern region of Ghana. Even though Newmont faced stiff resistance to its operations in Ghana, especially in the case of the Akyem mine, the projection of its CSR as a commitment to sustainable development of local communities in Ghana stands out compared to other large-scale mining companies.

A company's approach to doing CSR and its governance is contingent upon the underlining philosophy of the company (Hope & Kwarteng 2014; Prno & Scott Slocombe 2012). This is evident in Newmont's policy statements and social responsibility guidelines. Newmont's social responsibility policy states that,

> Newmont's future is dependent on its ability to develop, operate and close mines consistent with our commitment to sustainable development, protection of human life, health, the environment, and to adding value to the communities in which we operate (Smith & Feldman 2009 p.188).

In addition to respecting the socioeconomic rights and culture of indigenous people, the company identifies consultation and partnership with relevant stakeholders in implementing community development programs as key to actualizing its social responsibility policy. This is consistent with its expressed commitment to the principles of sustainable development and corporate social responsibility in its mining host communities. The company list its commitments in this regard as;

- The conservation and preservation of natural resources and of the environment;
- The equitable sharing of the benefits of economic activity; and
- The enhancement of the well-being of people. In particular, we must make every effort to ensure we add value to host communities and that those communities believe they are better off as a result of Newmont operating in their area. (Smith & Feldman, 2009, p. 189)

The corporate social responsibility strategy of Newmont is highly centralized and standardized (Sydow, 2016). That is, its approach to delivering social investment in mining communities in Australia, for example, will not differ significantly from the case in Ghana. Ultimate responsibility for developing and managing its community relations lies with its Environmental and Social Responsibility (ESR) committee in Denver, USA (Smith & Feldman, 2009, Sydow, 2016). The CSR blueprint from Denver is operationalized and implemented locally by its staff in the various countries they operate in. Thus, each Newmont mine delivers sustainable benefits to the community it is situated in through financial or in-kind assistance based on the blueprint from Denver.

4.6.1 Global CSR policy in local context: Community development foundations

Newmont obtained US$957 million in revenues from its mining operations in Ghana in 2013. Out of this, some $8.8 million was invested in the communities they operate in according to its 2013 sustainability report (Newmont Mining Corporation, 2013). Much of this amount goes ostensibly into its flagship two community development foundations set up in each of the two mine sites.

The company has set up two community development foundations in each of its two mining sites in Ghana. The Ahafo Development Foundation NADeF was set up in 2008 while the Akyem version was set up in 2012. The foundations are part of the benefit sharing agreement between the mining company and the local communities in which they operate in. Newmont funds the Community Development Foundation with $1 for every ounce of gold that is sold from the respective mine plus one percent of the net profit of the mining operation. Additional funding is also obtained from other organizations such as Newmont mine contractors. The funds are to be used for funding developmental activities based on identified priority areas and application from the communities. What has made this initiative popular compared to other similar mining foundations in the country is the opportunity for community representation and the independence of the foundation from the company (Andrews 2016).

Besides the board of trustees for the Foundation, there is also the Social Responsibility Forum (SRF) which helps in the governance of the funds. The SRF is considered a best practice and a novelty within the mining industry *vis a vis* community engagement (Sydow, 2016). The Ahafo Social Responsibility forum was the first of its kind in Ghana, more recently, the second being the Akyem social responsibility forum. The forum in both cases is made up of community representatives, members of Parliament for the mine area, village chiefs, members of the district assembly and officials representing the company. It serves as a conduit through which the local communities can participate in decision-making processes, identify key sustainable development issues that need to be addressed by the company and helps allocate the community development fund (SRC Consulting, 2010). This governance approach to CSR aims to cure the lack of community participation that has characterized other CSR projects of mining companies in the Country.

4.7 The Akyem mine context

The Akyem mine site is an important test case for this study not only because it generates the biggest government mine revenues (Ghana Chamber Of Mines 2018) but also because the setting up of the mine received much global and national attention. One of the underlining tensions was the location of the mine in the Adjenua Bepo Forest Reserve which was opposed by several environmental groups and local activists (GhanaWeb 2010; GNA 2008). In 2008 for example, local Ghanaian mining community advocacy organization WACAM nominated Newmont for the Public Eye Award[9] to shame the company for the environmental and social disruption that will arise from its mining project in Akyem (Newmont Ghana 2009). Newmont was also alleged to have bribed local chiefs even though this was refuted (Newmont Ghana, 2009).

Interestingly, local chiefs and people in the communities affected by the mine opposed the resistance to the mine and claimed it was an opportunity for the community to be developed by the mining company. They wrote a letter to the UN Commissioner for Human Rights in Switzerland against the local NGO and asked that the project be approved. They emphasized that "these NGOs are against progress and development in our District, pure and simple" (Akyem Community Group 2009).They concluded that "we the people of Akyem trust Newmont and support the Newmont Akyem project given the company's excellent commitment to its social responsibility" (Akyem Community Group, 2009, p. 3).

Much of these sentiments or positive reception of the community leaders and the local people to Newmont has been attributed in part to the company's community engagement practices. A study by Obeng-Baah (2018) notes that most of the local people were full of hope and optimism for the future based on the promises of job and community development. According to some residents, the company promised to employ at least one person from each household in each of the affected communities (Ofori & Ofori 2018b). The expectations of the local people were also raised by the size and early payment of compensations by the company to those affected by the mine (Ofori & Ofori 2018b). The development of the mine on about 1903 hectares of land led to the displacement of some communities, loss of farm crops and land use rights. Besides the redevelopment of a new community for those displaced, a total US$14,3039,050 was also paid to about 3000 individual farmers (Ayitey, Kidido & Tudzi 2011). The payments

[9] The "Public Eye Awards", given out from 2005 to 2015, shame companies with the worst human rights and environmental records (Public Eye, 2017).

of these compensations are discussed elsewhere and thus will not be described here (Ayitey, Kidido & Tudzi 2011; Kidido *et al.* 2015).

In short, the mine was developed and began production in 2013 and CSR programs including the flagship community development foundation rolled out. This present thesis thus provides the rest of the story, whether the people in the mining communities in Akyem, experienced the sustainable development promised and how Newmont's global sustainable development-based CSR is integrated into the local politics and sociocultural context of Ghana mining communities.

4.8 Conclusion

This chapter has thus provided a contextual background to the issues under consideration. Specifically, it described the mining context in Ghana including the costs and benefits of mine development in the country. The chapter also provided important background information about the distribution of mine benefits by the Government and Newmont. This information is most useful for understanding the results presented below in subsequent chapters. Overall, this chapter has provided background details about the context of the study communities in relation to mining in the area, as well Newmont's global corporate social responsibility imperatives.

CHAPTER FIVE

Class Differences and Contested Interpretations of Sustainable Development

5.0 Introduction

> Sustainable development means different things to ecologists, environmental planners, economists and environmental activists…Like 'motherhood' and 'God' sustainable development is invoked by different groups of people in support of various projects and goals, both abstract and concrete (Redclift, 2015, p. 44)

The concept of sustainable development remains in flux. Its meaning is difficult to pin down and how to achieve it keeps evolving given the changing dynamics of human-environment interactions and context specificity. This above quote from Redclift (2015) succinctly mirrors the variability and discretionary use of sustainable development. That it is a contested concept is not in doubt (Kemp & Martens 2007). This chapter five presents results of how different actors within Ghana's mining industry including mining communities interpret or understand what should constitute sustainable development.

The results presented in this chapter demonstrate that what global and national actors may consider to be sustainable development, is different from what local actors perceive it to be. Sustainable development is essentially a social question and remains very subjective. Analysis of interview data from mining communities shows the construction of sustainable development parallels social class stratification. Within the context of mining communities in rural areas, what is understood to be sustainable development is complex and more connected to the everyday lives of rural people. Before exploring the sustainable development subjectivities of different actors, this chapter first establishes how rural populations in mining communities in Ghana come into knowledge about sustainable development. Four strategies used by Newmont in this regard are described. The chapter delves deeper into how different actors, differentiated by class, interpret the concept to align with their agendas or circumstances. The results in this chapter provide excellent background for subsequent chapters that illuminate the actual practices of how mine benefits are shared for sustainable development including the power struggles to enact the sustainable development agendas identified here.

5.1 Sustainable development as knowledge and policy transfer

During fieldwork it was clear that sustainable development as a concept had gained currency within the local mining communities. As an outsider entering these rural mining communities, it was rather interesting to observe how conversant most local people were with the concept (not necessarily its meaning) and how the mining company was popularising the concept. Sustainable development as a development ethos plays an important role within the local arena and defines the relationship between Newmont and the communities studied. The concept of sustainable development is a key narrative for framing the engagement practices between the mining company and its host communities and more specifically, the initiation of social investments as part of benefit sharing. This is demonstrated and made explicit for example in benefit sharing agreements signed between the company and the host communities. For example, in the benefit-sharing agreement which defines the operations of the community development foundation set up by the company, it outlines the fact that the funds are "…to finance sustainable social investment in 10 communities within its [Newmont] operational area" (Newmont Ghana 2014).

Further direction is given that describes how "The board shall allocate monies for **s**ustainable development projects at the beginning of each year…" (Newmont Ghana 2014 p.14).

Again, Newmont makes sustainable development as a guiding principle to its project contractors intending to contribute to development within the communities. The company makes it clear that: "Every contractor employed by Newmont shall be notified of the opportunity and persuaded to support sustainable development projects through the foundation" (Newmont Ghana 2014 p.11).

Interviews with different stakeholders highlighted the awareness and the need to pursue a sustainable development agenda within the communities. An interviewee in one of the communities, for example, mentioned that:

> …since Newmont came here, they have said they will give us sustainable development. Something different from what the government has been doing and other mining towns have experienced. (Respondent 6, Community B, 2017)

This interviewee was an 'opinion leader' and explained further that, prior to his interaction with the mining company, he had only come across the concept in local newspapers and had limited understanding of its applicability to his local community. His view was echoed by other research participants across the three study communities and demonstrates that awareness of sustainable development as a developmental ethos was transferred onto the local setting through the arrival of Newmont. Thus, before exploring how the different actors interpret the concept locally, it is necessary to first highlight some of the key strategies used by the company to create awareness about sustainable development.

5.1.1 Through local institutions

An observable means through which the term 'sustainable development' has been made popular in the communities is through its linkage to development institutions, activities and processes. Newmont as part of its CSR strategy has set up key local institutions to oversee some of its development activities. Most of these local institutions have been given names that reference sustainable development. Classic examples include the *Sustainable Development Committees* and *Sustainable Livelihoods Committee* formed by the company. These committees which are made up of local people could have been given local names, yet they have been linked to sustainable development. Many local respondents explained that as they interacted with these committees, they became more aware of the concept. One participant explained that:

> When Newmont came, they helped us form the group called the sustainable development people [formally known as sustainable development committee]. That is how I also came to know about it [sustainable development]. They are here to help bring good things to our community and make our lives better (Respondent 21, Community C, 2017).

Some local people also became aware of the concept through training as members of the various committees. A member of one of the sustainable development committees during a focus group discussion said:

> We became familiar with the issue of sustainable development after Newmont's arrival. When the committee was formed, the consultant educated us about sustainable development and how to go about it in our community. (FGD Participant, Community B, 2017).

5.1.2 Branding through pictures and labels

Observations during fieldwork revealed that Newmont had mounted a large banner strategically on the public road that led to their offices and the mine site. This banner highlighted the company's core values. Figure 5.1 shows a picture of a banner highlighting the 'sustainability' value of the company. This banner was very conspicuous and positioned at a vantage point so that it could easily be sighted by various community members. While the banner can be considered as a marketing tool for Newmont, it has played a key role in providing visibility to the word 'sustainability'. It was cited by some members of the communities as another means by which they became aware of the concept.

Figure 5. 1 Company Banner

Photo by the Author.

5.1.3 Through documentation

It is now a standard practice amongst multinational mining firms to produce sustainable development reports to demonstrate their commitments to social and environmental responsibility (Alberto 2010; Fonseca, McAllister & Fitzpatrick 2014; Parsons, Lacey & Moffat 2014). Likewise, document analysis conducted in this study revealed that, the concept is highly referenced in community-engagement documents and made available to the local people. Local people who can read (especially the elites) have accessed these documents and have been introduced to the concept as the company's preferred goal for the various local communities. Analysis of documents such as the community development agreement, community development annual reports, and community development plans reveals the many ways in which the concept is referenced. These include phrases or words such as 'sustainable development', 'sustainable community development' 'sustainable development projects', 'sustainable development committee', 'sustainability', 'sustainable way' 'community sustainable development projects', sustainable economic development, sustainable social investment and 'sustainable alternative livelihoods' (Newmont Ghana 2014).

5.1.4 Through the company's community-engagement interactions

The concept of sustainable development also became popular within the local context as a result of interactions between the company and communities. A number of those interviewed pointed out that they became conversant with the concept through their meetings with the company. Some of these meetings referred to by the locals predated the onset of actual mining activities in the area. An opinion leader in one of the study communities stated for example that:

> This thing about sustainable development first came about during our initial negotiations with the company when they wanted to set up. They said it is something they adhere to and want to do to help our community when we allow them to come [establish their operations]. They said it will improve our lives. (Respondent 17, Community A, 2017)

To a large extent, analysis showed that Newmont has introduced a new discourse of sustainable development to the local arena. This, in turn, has shaped the expectations of the local people. Thus, a critical evaluation of what sustainable development means to the different actors and how it plays out within the local arena became necessary.

5.2 Local interpretations of sustainable development

Interviewees were asked what they understood sustainable development to mean, and their expectations of outcomes following such a development policy paradigm. To put their responses into better perspective, it is important to note that at the community level, most research participants were less educated and whilst they had an awareness of the term sustainable development, they could not provide scientific/technial definitions of it. Thus, to get their viewpoints or understanding of the concept during discussions, I drew from their responses on what they considered to be ‘good development’ ‘long-term changes to their life, society, children and the environment’ and ‘changes they would like to see from the use of mining revenues’. The analysis of their viewpoints (categorised as Non-elites’ views) presented below should in no way be construed as their scientific understanding of sustainability. Whilst this may be considered as a limitation of the study, it only highlights the variance between techno-scientific knowledge and local people’s ability to comprehend fully such knowledge. For the few educated ones (elites mostly), they were asked directly what they understood to be sustainable development or asked to explain what they mean by the term when they used it during interviews. The analysis of the results reveals that actors had not just different understandings of the concept but importantly different sustainability agendas. These agendas are summarised in Figure 5.2.

Figure 5. 2 Actors and their Sustainability Agendas



These differences when analysed critically, reveals that not only do these agendas align with what actors generally consider to be sustainable development but differences also reflect crucially class differences. Hence before proceeding further to present analysis of the differences in interpretation, it is important to highlight the class differences within the communities.

5.2.1 Community class differences

From the three study communities, two broad classes or actor groups were identified: the local elites and non-elites. The local elites were those identified by interviews and Focus Group Discussants to be highly influential in decision-making. In the actor mapping exercise during FGD, respondents commonly identified the village chief and the assemblymen as those who influence decisions in the communities**.** Table 5.1 illustrates this point.

Table 5. 1 Social Differentiation of community-level Actors

Actor Group	Educational level	Economic Status	Political Influence
Non-Elites	Low (basic education)	Low	Low
Local Elites	High	Medium	High

Interviews with chiefs and assemblymen also revealed that they were relatively more educated and well to do compared to the non-elites. The non-elites had little or no formal educational background. For those who were educated, the highest level attained on average was basic school level. This is consistent with other studies that show there are low levels of education and literacy in rural Ghana (GSS, 2014). On the contrary, the local elites were found to be highly educated. For example, one of the village chiefs has a PhD and has worked as a professor in the UK for a considerable number of years. Most of the assemblymen were also not just educated but some were teachers in a senior high school in a neighboring town. Unsurprising, therefore, whilst most non-elites said they were unemployed and poor, the elites were relatively well off. This difference in terms of economic status is a crucial factor in the differences of interpretations and highlighted in subsequent sections.

5.2.2 Social construction of sustainable development

The study finds that sustainable development is interpreted differently by members of the communities, the mining company, and the government. Based on the above class differences and categorization of actors within the local communities, community interpretations of sustainable development were further analyzed. The results revealed that those who were relatively better educated, with secured income and politically influential (elites) understood sustainable development differently from those with lower levels of education and precarious livelihood status (non-elites). How each actor group understood sustainable development, is presented in detail in subsequent sections. The analyses are presented as three questions: 1) what is to be sustained and developed? 2) how can it be sustained? and 3) how long should it be sustained? These categories of questions align generally with those identified by the

National Research Council (1999) as important questions within the sustainable development literature.

5.2.3 Non-Elites

5.2.3.1 What is to be sustained and developed?

The non-elites within the mining communities linked their interpretation of sustainable development to securing their livelihoods or household income to meet their everyday consumption requirements. Thus, securing livelihoods through income generating opportunities was central to what they believed should be sustained and developed using mineral benefits. About two out of every three of the non-elites interviewed or who participated in FGDs agreed that they and other members of the communities consider sustainable development to be a type of development that is linked to, for example, the fulfillment of their basic needs of food, money, employment. For most of them, if Newmont and the government through the mining project can provide them with secured employment or monetary benefits, sustainable development would have been realized. Some of the local people expressed their understanding of sustainable development to be:

> *For me, sustainable development is about more viable companies to employ the people. Newmont can help set up a quarry company to help the community because we travel a long distance to Akwatia for stones for construction. But a quarry company here will give employment to generate income for the many poor people. The quarry can make use of the rocks excavated by Newmont (Respondent 30, Community A, 2017).*

> *The type of development Newmont has been talking about for me I don't see it. It should be about rehabilitating our oil processing facilities for us. Also, they should try and open new ventures for us, so we can get money to feed ourselves. That is the kind of positive change I want to see in the community (Respondent 5, Community B, 2017).*

In a focus group discussion, a female participant added:

> *For me, I would prefer if they give us some money every month instead. Most of us do not have any other source of income apart from the farms that have been taken away from us (FGD Participant, Community C, 2017).*

Indeed, the suggestion of a monthly or quarterly payment was recurrent in most interviews with the non-elites in the three study communities. There were also suggestions especially amongst female interviewees that the mineral benefits should be provided in the form of loans or grants that can be invested in community social enterprises.

Despite the overwhelming suggestions relating to the priority of developing local livelihoods, it is important to highlight that less than 20 percent of the participants pointed to education or human resource development and the future of their children as being important areas of sustainability for them. This is evident in the following quotes:

> *To me, sustainable development is the scholarship. It is the best thing to have happened to us. Because the schools they are building if you don't have the means it would not be useful to your children. So the best is the scholarship. Apart from that, all the other things will not help us, we need to go into productive ventures that will bring employment and finally bring some money to the community. (Respondent 17, Community B, 2017).*

> *For me, my concern is about my children and their future. Now that our family farmland has been taken over, am worried about my children because I don't have anything to bequeath to them. We inherited the cocoa farm from our mother and we have been surviving on it, but now it is gone. What would we give to our children? Not all of my children are academically good to benefit from the scholarship they are giving, so how will they benefit? The development should be about the future of our children, not the big buildings being put up. (FGD Participant, Community C, 2017).*

5.2.3.2 How to sustain it?

Non-elites generally emphasized their sustainable development goals outlined above rather than the process that produced them. That is, they generally were less interested in the processes of how to achieve the things they have identified as central to their sustainable development outlook. As many of them indicated, all they wanted was for Newmont to use the mineral resources to alleviate their poverty.

> *As for us we were here surviving on our farmlands when they came for our lands for the mining project. So it is up to the company to restore our lives. How they do it is not our concern. They made the promises of improving our lives so is up to them to fulfil it. (Respondent 6, Community C, 2017)*

Most of these ordinary people considered Newmont and their chiefs to be responsible for bringing about the sustainable development. They felt because it was Newmont who "took away" their lands for the mining project, the later should also be responsible for bringing about the needed developmental change. Their chiefs are those who should impress on Newmont to do what is required of them.

5.2.3.3 How long should it be sustained?

Apart from the focus on material objects or governance processes as key elements of sustainable development, the interviews with the non-elites also revealed the temporal dimensions of sustainable development. That is, how long they thought their sustainable development objectives ought to be sustained.

The non-elites mostly viewed sustainable development in the short term. A few indicated the need to ensure that the use of the mineral funds for development benefited their children and those yet unborn. However, the majority were concerned about how to survive within the short term. For many, finding solutions to their present needs through the benefits of the mine was of paramount concern to them than ensuring the longevity of the benefits. As one interviewee summed up in a focus group discussion:

> *How would investing in things that would last long benefit us if we all die of hunger presently? (FGD Participant, Community B, 2017)*

Another participant also said:

> *How the youth of this community are loitering aimlessly is a concern for us. They no longer have farmlands to cultivate. Newmont must find a solution to their present circumstances. At least some jobs to keep them occupied for the time being before government brings the one district one factory to us. (FGD Participant, Community B, 2017)*

The quotes above epitomizes the observation that most of the local people are concerned with short-term developmental needs rather than long-term developmental goals.

5.2.4 Local Elites

5.2.4.1 What is to be sustained and developed?

The local elites strongly emphasized ongoing physical development projects or those they wish to see in their communities as sustainable development. All three chiefs interviewed linked sustainable development to investment in physical infrastructural projects. For most of these elites, the building of the community infrastructure such as school buildings, community centers, chief palaces, bus stops, and football pitches, provides a sense of developmental change. All of them recognize the seeming lack of job prospects and poverty in their communities but believed the investments in physical infrastructure are achievable goals of sustainable development. Some emphasized the point that these developments were key to enhancing the image of their communities as mining towns or communities. The quote below summarises some of the key understandings of the local elites of what sustainable development should be about.

> *We want to put up infrastructure for our communities. Things like vocational training centres, community social centres and new schools. I hear one community also want to put up a mortuary, so all the surrounding communities can use. These things are what is sustainable and will be there long after Newmont is gone. We don't want to be like Obuasi where after so many years of mining they have nothing to show for it except a big welcome to Obuasi sign. The football pitch is also sustainable. People would play football and become like Michael Essien[10]. Apart from this, there is also a certain percentage of money that is invested by NAKDEF which is not touched for the future generation. This is also sustainable because when the mine is not there we can invest still in education, infrastructure, industry etc. (Chief, Community B, 2017)*

Apart from the infrastructure and educational investments considered to be sustainable development, the elites also mentioned investments in cultural heritage as an area that required investment as part of sustainable development. They maintained that the protection of their indigenous culture by investing mineral revenues in things such as palace renovation, buying expensive regalia and other trappings of the chieftaincy system was valuable to them and their communities at large. A chief, for example, justified such expenditures by linking it to sustainable development by emphasizing that:

> *We have a thematic area that looks at cultural heritage. It includes clothes and regalia that the chief uses during festive occasions. Sustainable development is about culture. Sustainability has an aspect of culture. In our setting, everything is connected to the land. Alternative sources of income connected to the land that Newmont has taken should have funded these things. (Chief, Community B, 2017)*

5.2.4.2 How to sustain it?

The local elites agreed that mining should take place in their communities and the revenues be used to fund the sustainable development initiatives they seek. Unlike the non-elites however, the local elites were very much interested in the governance process underlining sustainable development initiatives. Most of the elites interviewed shared a strong belief that they and for that matter, their communities should be involved in the development process. They revealed their strong desire to influence decisions about how the mining revenues allocated to their communities should be utilized.

[10] A famous Ghanaian Footballer whose wife hails from the chief's community.

It should be we the nanamon (chiefs) and the people that should decide what the mining money should be used for not Newmont (Chief, Community A, 2017).

We cannot sit down for Newmont and the government to take our lands and give us peanuts in return. So right from the beginning, we have been involved in ensuring that the communities benefit. Changes we want in our communities cannot be left to the company and the government alone. That is the mistake other communities made in the past. We want to take our destiny into our own hands, which is how we want to develop our area (Chief, Community B, 2017).

5.2.4.3 How long should it be sustained?

The chiefs, unlike the non-elites, emphasize a long-term perspective to their understanding of sustainable development. They did this in two ways. First, they highlighted the need to ensure the long-term viability and durability of the projects invested in as part of the sustainable development of their communities. Within this scope, one chief provided a clear variation between what they considered to be sustainable development and what Newmont is doing. For him, investment in infrastructure was not enough but rather its durability and ability to outlive several generations was key if is to be considered sustainable.

That language [sustainable development] is subjective. Newmont preaches virtues and practices vice. They paint a nice picture for the outsiders to see but when you are within you will see is a bleak future. The word sustainability doesn't exist on the ground but in their books it does. But we are also trying to do our best out of a worse situation. How do you define sustainability? If you build a school, how do you maintain it? The lifespan of a building is supposed to be a minimum of 25 years but with the materials they use, it starts deteriorating before 10 years. That is not sustainability (Chief, Community A, 2017).

Second, the local elites also understand sustainable development to be long-term in scope relative to intergenerational equity and growth of their community. They are of the view that their emphasis on infrastructural investments is based on the vision that their communities should not remain the same but grow in future. According to the elites, even though investments in certain infrastructure may not appear useful now, the community stands to benefit in the future. The quote below highlights the struggle of a local elite to highlight this future perspective:

…we came up with a design for a building [social centre] and they [Newmont] say why do you seek this much money. But we will not be like this in the next five years. But they [Newmont] don't see the future. Development is about the future (Chief, Community A, 2017).

5.2.5 Industry perspective

5.2.5.1 What is to be sustained and developed?

Newmont not only actively promotes the notion of sustainable development within the local context but has its own understanding of sustainable development. For Newmont, their understanding of sustainable development is about leaving behind a legacy through the creation of shared value. Consequently, for Newmont, it can be understood that sustainable development is not about education, infrastructure or environment *per se*, rather outcomes that are tangible, which can outlive their stay in the area and be managed by the people. The Newmont representative interviewed espoused their understanding of sustainable development as:

> *For us is about legacy. Something that when we put in place and we are off the scene, we would still be remembered. Something that when we establish and we are off the scene the people have the capacity to continue, it will not be a white elephant. We don't want it to be like previous mining towns [in Ghana] and people lambast the company without any shared value, the community did not benefit in any way because when you go now what you see is nothing to write home about. So, we want sustainability, something they can live on for a long time. So that is our understanding of sustainability. (Newmont Representative 1, 2017)*

The Ghana Chamber of Mines, the umbrella body for large-scale mining companies in Ghana interestingly also provides some further clarity as to what sustainable development means to the mining industry. They link the industry's understanding and interest in sustainable development to gaining and maintaining a positive relationship with the mining communities to secure their investments. According to the Chamber's representative, sustainable development for its members [including Newmont] relates to:

> *Social investments that would sustain the investments of the mine [company] and how they are collaborating with host communities (Ghana Chamber of Mines Representative 1, 2017).*

5.2.5.2 How should it be sustained?

A key area of Newmont's understanding of sustainable development is the governance process. Newmont like the local elites also sees sustainable development as a process with end results. Newmont has the understanding that sustainable development should be about projects that are determined by the communities themselves through grassroots participatory strategies; and also, projects that are self-sustaining and affordable. Newmont sees community self-determination and grassroots participation as central to its sustainable development strategy.

That is the local communities must play a central role in the management of development funds, selection of projects and its implementation.

> *To ensure sustainability, we need to ensure the community owns it, we partner with the district assembly to also own it …with NAKDeF [Newmont Akyem Development Foundation], we didn't want a situation where we decide everything for them. So, we set up the foundation NAKDeF, we provide the funds and they actually based on their needs use the funds. So, sustainability is also about the process of delivering the projects. People must take ownership of the projects and should be part of the implementation process (Newmont Representative 1, 2017).*

The Newmont and NAKDeF officials also emphasized in their discourse of sustainable development a language of affordability. That is, it should be a type of development that can be financed through the finite resources available. The social investments or projects should be such that besides the initial investments, the project should be able to generate funds that would be used to maintain the project over a long period of time. As well, sustainable development projects should be those that can be financed within the scope of the finite funds provided rather than simply based on what the communities may demand. Thus, one of the key criteria for acceptance of a development project for funding is on the basis that communities can demonstrate how the project can be self-sustaining. This point was made clear when the NAKDeF representative explained what he understands by sustainable development:

> *To make it sustainable, we as the project sponsors and project implementers may not necessarily be the owners of the project, so the project should be such that it can self-sustain, finance itself depending on the type of project it is. It should be able to regenerate funds for it to be sustained. (NAKDeF Representative 1, 2017)*

5.2.5.3 How long should it be sustained?

In line with Newmont's construction of sustainable development as a legacy, they also have a long-term perspective on sustainable development. In this regard, they emphasized the longevity of the projects implemented and its impacts on the local communities. A representative of NAKDeF alludes to such an understanding of sustainable development when he explains sustainable development to be,

> *Projects that can stand the test of time. A project which when implemented over many years will still be running, a project which will not die after a short while of its implementation… If it is an infrastructure project, it must be maintained over time. If it is a soft project, it must realize the objectives for which it was established, so longevity-ability of the project to stand the test of time so that the benefits can be continued to be realized is important. (NAKDeF Representative 1, 2017)*

5.2.6 Government perspectives

5.2.6.1 What is to be sustained and developed?

The mining and minerals policy of the government has a strong linkage to sustainable development, and the main theme it presents is 'ensuring mining contributes to sustainable development'. The policy seeks to establish a comprehensive and forward-looking framework for mining that utilizes the extraction of minerals to catalyze sustainable development. The representative of the government interviewed threw more light on the government's vision of sustainable development as it relates to the mining sector**:**

> *…is to ensure that mining contributes to the sustainable development and rapid transformation of Ghana's economy. So, the vision is that mining should serve as a catalyst for sustainable development in all areas. That is the conversion of the natural capital into other forms of capital-human, infrastructure etc. All the three legs of sustainable development are covered (Government Representative 1, 2017).*

The policy outlines various areas of social, economic and environmental sustainability and how it relates to mining. Thus, government understanding of sustainable development is broad in scope. Beyond this, however, the policy document clearly adopts a language that emphasizes economic sustainability. For example, it outlines that:

> *Government wishes to foster the development of a thriving mining industry that will contribute to sustainable economic development, economic empowerment of Ghanaians, the alleviation of poverty and improvements to the standard and quality of life (Government of Ghana 2014 p.7).*

From the policy document and the interview with government officials, it is apparent that the government's vision or understanding of sustainable development is about economic development through mining wealth.

Even though much emphasis is laid on economic development at the national level, some consideration is given to the needs of local host communities. The mining policy document, for example, states that:

> *The government further recognizes that the benefits generated by mining in the form of fiscal receipts must be utilized to ensure an equitable sharing of benefits having regard, in particular to the needs of local communities most directly affected by mining (Government of Ghana 2014 p.41).*

5.2.6.2 How should it be sustained?

The government outlines several means by which it could meet its broad vision of economic development through mining as an end to sustainable development. These include diversifying the mineral production base, creating a conducive environment to attract more investment into the sector, integrate the mining sector into other sectors of the economy and optimize revenue generation. For the sustainable development of mining communities, the government shifts the task to the communities and the companies. The government encourages a participatory and partnership process between the actors. The mining policy states for example that:

> *Mining should be an important pillar to support the development or rural Ghana. To improve their livelihood, mining communities and mining companies should be partners in development and must tap into the unique expertise that mining companies bring along to that end. Mining companies shall be encouraged to actively participate in and support the achievement of community initiatives…. (Government of Ghana 2014 p.48).*

To a lesser extent, government recognizes the need to redistribute its share of the fiscal receipts to the mining communities in a transparent and accountable manner to local development. There is however limited information about how the revenues are to be used to achieve sustainable development.

5.2.6.3 How long should it be sustained?

From the government perspective, it can be deduced that they hold both short term and long term understandings of sustainable development. It is obvious from the policy document and interviews with government officials that they are interested in the long-term economic development of the nation. They hope to achieve this by using the mineral revenue to finance infrastructure. More so, government hold the view that mineral wealth redistributed to mining communities be invested to meet the needs of the future generations. A government official also makes the longevity exposition and the need to ensure intergenerational equity by stating that:

> *So like this money which is coming today is for tomorrow people's use. They [mining communities] can think of innovative ways of monetizing the funds [royalty payments from government] such that generation to generation to come it will be there for them. They can set up foundations and funds for themselves so that if today they have some money they can use about 40% and put 60% into something that can be growing for the community and the dividends they can use whilst the principal remains there. It depends on the leadership. The district assemblies and chiefs are the leaders. But we here cannot determine for to them how they should*

use the money. When we meet and sensitize them, we advise them on sustainable use of the funds (Government Representative 2, 2017).

Yet they also hold the view that local mining communities require socioeconomic development within the short term. Hence, they hope to use mining to create job opportunities for the local people in the mining areas. Overall, the results presented in this Chapter Five demonstrate that sustainable development is construed differently by all the local actors and stakeholders. Table 5.2 summarises the key differences across the actor groups.

Table 5. 2 Divergences and convergences in Actors' interpretations

Actor Group/Sustainable development dimension	Actual developmental Outcomes (what is to be sustained/developed	Governance (How should it be sustained)	Time Limits (How long should it be sustained)
Non-Elites	Livelihoods	Company-Chief Led	Short term perspective
Elites	Community Infrastructure	Community driven/Participatory approach	Long term Perspective
Company	Legacy Projects	Community driven/Participatory approach	Long term perspective
Government	Economic Development	Community-Company partnership approach	Long term perspective

Source: Author's Construction

Generally, there are differences in how the different actors understood sustainable development within the context of mining. Nonetheless, it is also instrumental to point out that in terms of the sustainable development governance processes, the elites and Newmont have similar understandings. Likewise, all of the actors, except the non-elites held views consistent with a long-term perspective.

5.3 Multiple realities: Opportunities or constraints?

The results presented in this chapter suggests there is an agreement amongst the actors that natural capital in the form of minerals be extracted and converted into other forms of capital to improve the well-being of the people (Eggert, 2000, 2009; Solow, 1991). Thus, the actors' views contrast with the notion that mining and sustainable development is contradictory as asserted by some scholars (Hilson & Murck, 2000). All actors are agreeable to a certain notion of mining-led sustainable development. Investigating what constitutes sustainable development however, reveals the vagueness and how highly the concept can be contested in practice. Tolba (1989) noted early on that sustainable development as a policy within the context of global and national development discourse is "an article of faith, a shibboleth; often used but little explained" (as qouted in Lele 1991 p.607). A review of the current literature reveals likewise. To an extent, sustainable development remains conceptually difficult to define and how it can be achieved remains contested (Agyeman, 2013). This present study confirms the view that sustainable development means different things to different people in different contexts (Bebbington & Gray, 2001; Laine, 2005). Differences in interpretations and priorities can serve as justification for elaborate popular participatory strategies. This can in turn, lead to the opening up of spaces for deliberative and consensus decision-making to bring on board both the needs of the present and future generations. On the other hand, the absence of a clear interpretation and framework for sustainable development means that the mere distribution of mining benefits may not lead to desirable social, economic and environmental outcomes for all. This is because, decisions must be made as to whose sustainability agenda must be pursued with the limited mineral revenues provided as mine benefits to the communities. How these actor differences play out in the benefit sharing process thus becomes key in understanding whether mining contributes to the sustainable development of the communities.

This chapter has painted a picture of what different actors think about sustainable development. Sustainable development, however, is defined by practice (Kates, Parris & Leiserowitz 2005). The following chapters reveal how sustainable development is practiced through benefit sharing and how the differences in interpretations are manifest on the ground. Specifically, the chapters below explore how processes of benefit sharing are used by the different actors to meet their interests and sustainable development agendas.

CHAPTER SIX

Sharing Royalties for Sustainable Development: Politics of Bureaucracy, Histories and Capture

6.0 Introduction

Sustainable development is central to the policy outlook of the Ghanaian government. As noted in previous chapters, central to the country's mining policy is a mine-led sustainable development agenda. The redistribution of mining revenues back to producing communities represents one of the stated mechanisms for achieving sustainable development by the government.

This Chapter Six explores the interplay between the politics and structural arrangements that govern the redistribution of the mineral royalties to the subnational level at macro and micro levels. The macro analysis reveals the limitations and the politics that underpins the redistribution of the royalties at the national level and shows that a downward redistribution of royalties is entangled in bureaucratic politics that lead to significant delays and underpayment of the royalties to the subnational recipients. This provides an example of how political elites at the national scale circumvent structural arrangements to the detriment of vulnerable poor populations at the community level.

The micro analysis focuses on occurrences at the local community level and reveals how the redistributed royalties are accessed and used at that geographic level when they eventually get there from the central government. The findings indicate that local elites (i.e. chiefs) use the mineral revenues to finance the expensive trappings of royalties rather than the sustainable development of their communities. Furthermore, the use of the funds by the chiefs is shrouded in secrecy and neither the non-elites nor the government subject the chiefs to accountability.

6.1 The benefit sharing approach: Mineral Development Fund (MDF)

The Mineral Development Fund described above in Chapter Four is the main mechanism used by the government to share the mineral royalties that accrues to the state with mining communities. The disbursements to specific mining communities are based on the royalties generated by the projects in those specific communities. An official of the OASL explained that the allocation to the various mine areas is done such that:

> *The size of the money depends on the resourcefulness of the land in the area. Lands that are very resourceful receive more. Thus, we share according to what the area is generating (OASL Official 1, 2017).*

Using Newmont as a test case for example, the company paid $35.1 million dollars in royalties for its two mine projects[11] in the country in 2017. It can be estimated that the communities in the company's two mining projects areas (including the study areas) in theory should receive approximately $3.1 million dollars as their share of the mining benefits for development. This coupled with funds provided by Newmont through its Foundation (to be discussed below in a subsequent chapter) should constitute significant resource rents for the sustainable development of the communities affected by the mine project if properly managed.

6.3 Institutional and regulatory context of the benefit sharing approach

In order to fully understand how communities access and use the revenues from the government, it is necessary to unpack the institutional and regulatory arrangements that underpin the payments. This will help to better situate the results presented in subsequent subsections and help to explain why some people benefit from the revenue stream and why others do not.

6.3.1 Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands (OASL)

The Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands administers revenues that accrue from the commercial use of stool lands in Ghana. This state institution is responsible for maintaining an account into which government pays a share of revenues (usually royalties) that are generated from mining on stool lands. On receipt of the revenues from the government, this state institution is responsible for distributing it to the district assemblies and traditional authorities in mining areas of the country. The office however has a limited role in monitoring how the revenues are used by the subnational recipients.

[11] Project specific payments of royalties' data are not readily available. However, one can estimate that the communities within the Akyem project would receive more of the royalties as more gold is produced from that project compared to the Ahafo project.

6.3.2 Administrative fiat and the MDF law

The mineral development Fund until 2016 operated under an administrative Fiat. Thus, it was created and managed based on a government directive rather than a law. Most authors refer to the Administrative Fiat of 1999 (letter no.AB.85/156/01) policy directive establishing the Fund. Both the administrative Fiat and the Constitution however fail to provide specific directions as to how the funds can be channelled into development projects and mitigation of environmental impacts in the mining areas. Discretionary control over resources and its use, according to Van de Walle (2001), fuels patronage networks at different levels and misuse of development resources in Africa. As will be shown and discussed in subsequent subsections, this regulatory lapse is central to how the royalties have been disbursed and utilised in the past and presently.

Indeed, the poor governance arrangement coupled with poor evidence of what the funds have been expended on for more than three decades has led the government to enact the Mineral Development Fund law in 2016. The MDF law outlines general areas to which the monies from the fund should be applied to and these include: promotion of economic development and alternative livelihoods in mine affected communities; mitigation of mine related environmental impacts; and research and development of the mining sector. In order to achieve the goal of economic development of mining communities, the fund is to finance mining community development schemes in each district. In terms of implementation however, this relatively new MDF has not significantly altered the governance lapses which necessitated its enactment.

6.4 Benefit-sharing in practice

Even though the Mineral Development Fund law sought to provide a proper institutional and regulatory framework for the effective utilisation of the mineral funds at the subnational level, three years since its enactment, it is yet to be fully implemented. In practice therefore, the current sharing arrangement is largely based on the provisions of the administrative Fiats. This study finds that the subnational share of the royalties remains as a source of immense struggle by actors both at the national and subnational level. This struggle (to be discussed below) by powerful state and non-state actors over the rents, plays out both in open and in closed arenas and at different scales-national level and subnational level. Therefore, despite the significant amounts involved, very little of the funds trickle down to the mining areas affected most by mining activities. Most of the populations in these mining areas do not gain tangible material benefits. The findings of this research contrast with recent statements of the ruling government officials that, "…the government is committed to utilising the fund for community and infrastructure development as part of the framework for alleviating the sufferings of mining communities and enhancing their standards of living" (Korankye 2018).

To unpack the complexities of the struggle and appreciate the process underlying access to and use of the funds, two levels of analysis are required-macro-level analysis and micro level analysis. As would be realised both levels are not mutually exclusive but intertwined to serve the interests of certain actors across scales.

6.4.1 The State, political elites and contested royalties: Macro level analysis

During the commodity price booms in 2009 and beyond the ruling government introduced several fiscal measures including increases in royalty rates and introduction of 'windfall tax'[12] for certain companies including those in the mining sector. These measures to increase the government's mineral revenue base were justified by the ruling political elites[13] as being necessary for national development (Abdulai 2018). In a budget statement outlining these fiscal measures, a government official argued that:

> *The issue with mining is about fair and transparent sharing of the benefits and windfall gains from the exploitation of the country's precious and irreplaceable natural resources…during the recent global financial crisis, prices of gold, cocoa and oil reached their peak levels ever. Yet, the country did not benefit at all from the price hikes…The Government has, therefore, taken a bold step to critically review the fiscal regimes and mining agreements, with the view to ensuring that the country benefits adequately and fairly from the gains in the mining sector (Republic of Ghana, 2011: 54, as quoted in Abdulai, 2018).*

A government minister further reiterated the interest of government to increase their ability to capture more mineral revenues from companies by mentioning that:

> *The mining sector is an important contributor to the economy of this country, but we have been short-changed for a long time now… 'As a government, we feel strongly that our royalties, taxes and rents have not been properly recorded and accounted for, so we are going to do an audit of all companies that engage in mining to be able to determine the real picture on the ground to be able to reverse this ugly trend' (cited in Ngnenbe 2018).*

[12] A type of tax levied on unforeseen large profit
[13] Political Elites here refers to government officials such as president and ministers

Consequent to these recent fiscal measures, since 2010, the government has experienced an incremental growth in its mineral income receipts. Figure 6.1 shows how much government collected as revenues from the mining sector over the recent past seven years.

Figure 6. 1 Government Mining Receipts



Source: Author's construction based on data from GEITI reports

The actions of the government to appropriate for itself more revenues without considerations for the possible long term effects has been described by Hilson and Hilson (2017) as "rentier behaviour". These increased revenues however have not translated into increased benefits for areas where these minerals are mined in terms of their share of the royalties. This was made evident for example, in a speech by the President of Ghana who acknowledged the state of mining communities in Ghana as a disgrace:

> *…it is difficult for the average Ghanaian to appreciate that the country gains substantially from mining. It probably has to do with the fact that the communities in which mining has been done remain largely underdeveloped, and do not show signs of being the origins of what brings wealth to so many people and places…The distressed state of communities in which mining companies operate is nothing short of a disgrace and we must work to change the situation. (Akuffo-Addo 2018 p.2-3).*

Within the public sphere, the political elites at the national level allude to their commitment to ensuring mining communities receive their share of the mineral revenues as exemplified by the quote from the President. There is however a discrepancy between the *public transcripts* of the political elites and the practice of sharing the royalties for development. For populations in mining areas, the harsh reality is that access to their share of the mineral royalties remains a struggle between the subnational actors such as chiefs and the ruling political elites. This present study finds that the political elites' *power over* the revenues ensures that populations in the mining areas do not gain access to the funds in a timely and prudent manner. The political elites exercise their power over the resources by ensuring that the revenues remain centralised at the state level using various strategies, which will be discussed below.

6.4.2 Delays in transfers and underpayment of royalties to subnational level

One means by which the political elites ensure that the revenues remain centralised at state level is through delays in transfers. According to the mineral legislations, mining companies are to pay their mineral royalties to the government quarterly (every three months). Per the sharing arrangement, government would then also transfer the subnational levels percentage share to them. Interviews with Newmont officials and representatives of the Ghana Chamber of Mines, confirm that, Newmont and the other mining companies pay the royalties to government regularly and on a timely basis. For instance, one official from the Ghana Chamber of Mines said:

> *Our members, the mining companies do not delay in the payment of their royalties and corporate taxes. Government would not permit it at all. We transfer the mineral royalties to the government on a regular basis (Ghana Chamber of Mines Official 1, 2017).*

The view of the official is supported by published payments from Newmont to the Government shown in Table 6.1

Table 6 1 Royalty payments from Newmont to Government of Ghana (US$Millions)

Year	Royalties	Taxes	Total
2017	**35.1**	**62.3**	**97.4**
2016	**36**	**42**	**78**
2015	**31.9**	**28.6**	**60.5**
2014	**38.79**	**74.15**	**112.94**
2013	**24.1**	**103.9**	**128**

Source: Compiled from annual Newmont Sustainability Reports (Beyond the mine)

The Government therefore should be able to pay the subnational levels their share of the royalties. The Chiefs of two[14] of the study communities however revealed that the government delays the disbursement of their share of the funds. One chief stated that:

> *The royalties we are supposed to be getting are not coming. From 2013 when the Newmont mine started to 2016, I got 3 months payments only. The rest the government owes me about Ghc100 million in royalty arears (Chief, Community A, 2017).*

A chief of a second study community also confirmed the delays in payment by stating that:

> *The government gives small royalties but not regularly. The previous administration [government] didn't pay at all (Chief, Community B, 2017).*

Clearly, whilst Newmont fulfils its obligations of paying out to the government, the government on the other hand has not met its obligations to the mining communities, as confirmed by the chiefs. The political elites' control of and delay in disbursing the funds is not limited to the study communities, but reflects a general trend in all other mining areas in the country as captured by several reports and studies (GHEITI, 2014, 2015; Morgandi, 2008; Roe & Samuel, 2007). These delays in payment over the years are not short-term setbacks but have become the norm defining this benefit sharing scheme. The reports of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) for example show that the political elites at the national level

[14] The chief of the Third community does not receive mineral royalty payments. His community's situation in relation to the royalties is further discussed below.

hold on to the funds sometimes for as much as over two to three years (GHEITI 2014, 2015). In 2014 for example, the central government only transferred one payment to the subnational entities covering just one quarter of the previous two years (July-September of 2012). It is estimated that about Ghc 115 million of the mineral royalties ought to have been paid to the subnational entities, remains unpaid by the government (Korankye, 2018).

The disbursement of the funds by the political elites is highly political and does not follow the set legislations and mining policy. Those with higher positions within government institutions such as the Ministry of Finance have more power to decide when and how much of the mineral royalties is to be released to the subnational level. Such that, even officials of the OASL responsible for making the payments to the chiefs and the district assemblies have little power to persuade or influence the transfers. An official of the OASL described how they must rely sometimes on respected chiefs to lobby the powerful national political elites who control the royalties:

> *For a long time, there has been no legal regime to govern the release of the royalties until 2016. There are till now arrears of about two to three years. The delays or irregularity of the release of the funds from the ministry of Finance sometimes makes us to invite the chiefs to come and lobby for the release of the money. Because in Ghana, everyone respects the chiefs. When they come to speak to the Minister of Finance, the money is released quickly (Government Representative 2, 2017).*

However, not all chiefs are equally powerful or able to successfully lobby government officials directly for the payments. In order to put their demands across, some chiefs strategically demand the money during public events where the media is present and can report it. The quotes below represent a sample of some of the statements some chiefs in other mining areas in Ghana have openly made to draw the government's attention to the delays in payments:

> *…the percentage of royalties paid to the traditional authorities and the district assemblies is just about 9 percent. In DR. Congo, it's about 35 percent, in Nigeria, it's about 30 percent, in other domains, it is 100 percent, and the 100 percent is taxed. Unfortunately, even the 9 percent is not released on time… As I speak, government owes us GH120m. I am told two weeks ago government released GH4m. How can we all the district assemblies and traditional authorities in the country spend GHC 4m, what can we do with it... isn't it possible to ask the mining companies to pay royalties directly to Nananom [chiefs] and the district assemblies such that, the delays and the bureaucracies will be curtailed and fasten the development of the mining communities? (Acquah 2016).*

> *As we speak at this forum, the payment of mineral royalties to the institutions mentioned herein is in arrears for almost two years now though the mining companies have dutifully paid up the royalties due from them to the Ghana Revenue*

Authority... We know that the companies are not in arrears of the payment of royalties due from their operations (Awuah 2014).

The delays in payment to date are evidence that the public outcries by the chiefs have not worked. Given these significant delays and often incomplete payments of the royalties to the mining areas it is unclear how the government's vision of sustainable development of the mining communities is to be realised. Whilst senior government officials (i.e. political elites) are eager to increase the states' share of mineral royalties, the same commitment is not shown to redistributing the royalties efficiently to the subnational level where the costs of mining are experienced most.

6.4.2.1 Discretionary powers and allocation preferences

The national political elites' power over allocation of resources ensure that over the years mining areas do not get the full and timely payments of their share of the royalties for sustainable development. The political elites have relied on the lack of legislation over the distribution and use of the Fund (until 2016) to deploy their discretional powers to allocate the mineral royalties for other government expenditures they deem more important. Thus, rather than a lack of mineral funds from the companies to make the payments, the payments are shaped by the priorities or preferential choices of the political elites. In other words, the political elites as actors, ensure the revenues are used to finance their policy preferences[15] or development choices as opposed to sending it the subnational entities for the development of the mining communities.

A government official at the Minerals Commission of Ghana confirmed this by stating that;

It is true, government does not release the funds on time…the delay is because the money is not available. Because there was no law regulating the fund, government can use the royalties for something else and pay later. The MDF act is to rectify it. The law will ensure government does not delay because anyone can sue (Government Representative 1, 2017).

It is clear from the admission of the government official that the dichotomy between government officials, agencies and their administrative functions with respect to the transfer of the revenues is blurred. Discretionary power and the agencies of the political elites over the years have played a key role in ensuring that the revenues do not get to the local level. Rather than simply performing their administrative function of transferring a percentage share of the

[15] Preferences such as national debt servicing or payment of emoluments for workers on the government pay roll.

revenues for the development of mining communities, the political elites use their power to allocate the revenues ‘for something else’ and pay ‘later’ when they deem fit. This largely undermines the sustainable development of the communities and the government’s own vision of ensuring the communities develop. Further, it shows the state (whose interest is defined by the policy to redistribute the revenues) is to a degree losing its autonomy to the interests of the political elites and the bureaucratic machinery who are tasked to implement the policy (Thorp *et al.* 2012).

6.4.2.2 Maintaining the status quo through non-operationalisation of the MDF law

Prior to the MDF law in 2016, the administrative fiat governing the payments made the payments non-obligatory for the political elites. Subnational entities thus could not sue the government to demand for the payment of the funds. The enactment of the MDF law however, changed this dynamic. The law makes it explicitly clear that the payments must be effected almost immediately. The law outlines that:

> A person who receives money intended for the Fund shall, not later than the next business day, pay the money into the bank account opened under subsection 2 [MDF bank account](Mineral Development Fund Act, 2015 p4).

This notwithstanding, the political elites are maintaining their discretionary powers and continuing the delay of transferring royalties to subnational entities through bureaucratic politics. They have achieved this by tactically not operationalising the MDF law in two ways.

First, the political elites have in the last three years since the law was passed failed to appoint a governing board for the operations of the Fund. Between March 2016 when the law was passed and now, two national governments have been in power[16], yet none have demonstrated a practical commitment to the law by setting up the board. Without the Fund’s governing board, disbursement into and out of the Fund is impossible. Thus, the royalties are still being administered from the consolidated fund as before the law. Apart from setting up an account for the Fund, the board is principally responsible for ensuring the “proper and effective performance of the functions of the Fund” (Mineral Development Fund Act 2015 p.5).

The law also enjoins the political elites (in this case the minister responsible for mines) to make regulations for the effective implementation of the Mineral Development Fund Act:

[16] The National Democratic Party (2009-2016) and the New Patriotic Party (2017 till now)

> The minister shall, on the advice of the Board and within one year after the coming into force of this Act, by legislative instrument make regulations to prescribe generally for the effective implementation of this act.(Mineral Development Fund Act' 2015 p.12)

The political elites however, have maintained the status quo of exercising power over the royalties by not making the regulations to ensure the MDF law becomes operational. Given these tactical manoeuvres, the status quo has remained, and political elites distribute the royalties to the mining areas as and when they deem necessary. Due to the non-operationalisation of the Fund, several years down the line, the community development schemes prescribed by the MDF Act, critical to the development of mining communities are yet to be implemented. Consequently, as and when some of the funds are released by the political elites, the OASL distributes the monies using the same formula in the Administrative Fiat. This situation largely shows that enacting a law to ensure communities benefit from mine development is one thing and implementing it is another. Between the two is the crucial intermediating role of power, politics and actor agencies.

6.4.3 Village Chiefs, culture and the capture of mineral royalties: Micro-level analysis

It is clear from the above that the subnational share of the mineral royalties is delayed and underpaid due to the agencies of the political elites at the national level. Despite the delays, it is also true that some of the mineral revenues do get to the subnational actors such as the chiefs and the district assemblies for the development of the mining communities. How local people access and use these funds in pursuit of their sustainable development goals is important. Within this context one political elite pointed out in an interaction with the media that:

> *It is not only public officials and politicians who misappropriate funds; some chiefs are equally culpable. They must be accountable to their subjects and society at large (Frimpong 2018).*

This subsection traces the processes underlying access to and use of the funds transferred to the mining communities through the chiefs. This present study finds that the process for the distribution and use of the revenues for the development of the communities is non-participatory with the bulk of the funds being appropriated by the village chiefs. This study also finds that the appropriation of the funds is deeply rooted in historical cultural practices dating back to before the period of colonialism (as described in Chapter Four above).

6.4.3.1 Path-dependency and continuity of traditional elite's control of mineral benefits

Interviews with the chiefs in the study communities reveal that since 2013, when mining began, two out of the three chiefs interviewed for this study had received some mineral royalties from the government. However, local access to and use of the revenues is highly controlled by the chiefs. As pointed out by Arhin (1978), the resources obtained in the form of royalties by the chiefs in the ancient period and during colonialism did not benefit the general population in the mining areas. The primary data from this study demonstrates that the pattern of traditional elites (i.e. Chiefs) controlling mineral royalties has not significantly changed over time. Indeed, not only is the practice of giving a share of the mineral royalties to the chiefs reminiscent of historical norms, but more importantly, how chiefs within the modern era use the royalties is a continuity of historical chief-subject relations. To maintain this continuity and capture of the royalties, chiefs have adopted various strategies and, in some cases, invented traditional knowledge to ensure their hold over the royalties remains. These are discussed in detail in the subsequent subsections.

Participation of grassroots in decisions

One of the key strategies used by the chiefs to ensure their monopoly of the royalties is to exclude members of their communities from participating in the process of deciding what the revenues are used for. Most of the non-elites interviewed in the two communities which received the royalties said they have never been asked about how the monies should be used to benefit them.

> *No. what they get from the government, I have no idea of how they utilize it. I know what comes to the district Assembly is being used for the construction of a teachers' bungalow (Respondent 19, Community A, 2017).*
>
> *We have attended community meetings where we discuss matters about the ongoing mining project in our village. However, I do not remember any time that the chiefs asked about how we can use the mining revenues from the government for the development of our village. Today is my first time of hearing that such money has been given to the village (Respondent 6, Community A, 2017).*

In study community B, the lack of participation in decisions relative to the revenues was not so different from community A. Almost all the non-elite community members did not recall being part of the process to decide what the revenues are used for. Most of the respondents, including one female trader quoted below, were surprised about the money:

If there is any such money, we don't know how it is used and we have never been consulted about how it should be used (Respondent 5, Community B, 2017).

It is apparent that, the lack of institutional mechanisms during the pre-colonial and colonial periods to involve the wider members of mining communities in determining what the revenues should be used for has continued until now. Successive legal regimes over the years including the administrative fiats have failed to acknowledge the role of ordinary people in deciding with their chiefs what to do with the mineral revenues. This epitomises precolonial chief-subject relations where indigenous miners simply gave one-third of their mined gold to the chiefs without being engaged about what the chief would use it for. It thus becomes clear that, pursuing modern development objectives such as sustainable development which encourages participation is at variance with benefits sharing mechanisms or approaches aligned with precolonial chief-subject relationships. When all decisions as to what the funds can be used for is limited to the local chiefs to determine with very little input from the ordinary people it is unclear how the envisioned sustainable development goals of the later (as outlined above in Chapter Five) can be achieved.

Lack of transparency and accountability mechanisms

Advocates for transparency and accountability in natural resource revenue management argue the need to inform citizens about how resource revenues are utilised for their benefits (Haufler, 2010; Ofori & Lujala, 2015). This is important not only for prudent use of resource revenues but greater participation of citizens in resource management. This study reveals that in addition to the lack of participation in decision-making, the use of the royalties is also shrouded in such secrecy that the local people do not know when the chiefs receive the money and what they use it for. Some interviewees pointed out that;

They told us at a community meeting that government gives some mining money to the District assembly. They use it for the collection of our rubbish. But I don't know that the chiefs also receive any money from the government (Respondent 36, Community A, 2017).

Our chief does not tell us how much he receives and what he uses it for. What we know is that, Newmont gives the community some money through the Foundation they have set up. But if the government also gives some money to the community through our chief then we are not aware (Respondent 12, Community A, 2017).

I have never heard that the chiefs receive any money from the government. If they do receive and they are not using it is to help us then it is not good at all. Because we are suffering a lot in this village despite the mine (Respondent 11, Community B, 2017).

The chiefs strategically use traditions and cultural values to justify why they do not account for the revenues to the non-elites. One chief for example argued that:

> *The royalties is not for the public domain. Our share is for the stool. In our tradition, the chief is not supposed to render account to the community. As a chief, I go for litigations, perform rituals and things like that are secretive. Do you want me to go to the community and tell them all these? No. if the chief chooses, it is only the family members and the elders that he can tell them that this is what he has done with the money. But is not for the public domain. The chieftaincy institution doesn't allow that (Chief, Community B, 2017).*

It is the case that chiefs govern with a council of elders and are accountable to the elders on how the mineral revenues are expended. This means that the ordinary people have limited opportunity to gain information and participate in decisions about the revenues by virtue of not being a member of the close-knit royal family. A government official however, offers insight into how limited internal accountability measures involving palace officials such as elders and queen mothers is. Confirming the wide spread opacity relating to how chiefs use the royalties in Ghana, she outlines that:

> *Some chiefs assume the money belongs to them. In some cases, even the nearest persons to the chiefs, such as the queen mother and elders do not know about the payments. Some chiefs ascend the throne with the assumption that all the money belongs to them (Government Representative 2, 2017).*

The notion that the chiefs do not have to be accountable to their subjects, however, is a myth and appear to contradict their oath of office which warns against autocracy. A sample of the oath of office for a village chief in Ghana instructs chiefs during their enstoolment against despotism in the following manner as the chief linguist makes these pronouncements to the incoming chief during the enstoolment process:

> *Konti, Akwamu, Bokoro, Konton, Asere, Kyidom, Benkum,*
> *Twafo, Adonten, Nifa—all the elders say that I should give you the Stool (the throne).*
> *Do not go after women.*
> *Do not become a drunkard.*
> *When we give you advice, listen to it.*
> *Do not gamble.*
> *We do not want you to disclose the origin of your subjects.*
> *We do not want you to abuse us.*
> *We do not want you to be miserly; we do not want one who disregards advice; we do not want you to regard us as fools;*
> *we do not want autocratic ways; we do not want bullying;*
> *we do not like beating. Take the Stool. We bless the Stool and give it to you. The Elders say they give the Stool to you (Busia 1951 p.12).*

The autocratic and unaccountability of the chiefs thus is not supported by their own values except that it follows practices of how mineral revenues have been treated by chiefs over the years.

6.5 Politics of stool land ownership

As mentioned earlier, within the three study communities, only two chiefs receive the royalty payments from government. This is because those are chiefs who occupy stool lands. In other words, their communities have the right over the lands in the area including those being used for the mining project. The third chief however is an Odikro (see figure 4.3 and figure 4.4) who superintends over a community whose members are mostly migrant farmers and do not have rights over the land. Interestingly, though this community of mostly migrant famers are those most affected by the mine project as a result of loss of access to farmlands, the community and their caretaker chief however do not receive any royalty payments. This is because they are not stool landowners. The chief of the community explained that they are under the chief of community A hence it the latter’s choice to give them some of the royalties or not.

> *[Community C] is not on its own, it is under [community A], so we are not stool land owners. The money goes to the chief of [Community A] and he decides what to do with it (Chief, Community C, 2017).*

Analysis of the interviews show that despite the hardship they are going through, they have not received any benefits from the royalties flowing to the mine area. It can therefore be argued that not all the chiefs are equal and access to the royalties is also shaped by power inequalities amongst the chiefs. Chiefs with stool land ownership rights can gain from the benefit stream whereas chiefs and communities without stool land rights are deprived within the sharing process.

6.5.1 The stool and the Chief: Resource capture through invented meanings

It was clear from the interviews with the chiefs that a tactic they deploy to use the mineral revenues mostly for their own benefit was through an invented meaning of stool lands. The national constitution vaguely mentions that revenues accruing from the use of stool lands are ‘for the upkeep of the stool’ (The Constitution of Ghana 1992). Chiefs with their power and agency have interpreted this to mean their upkeep and the maintenance of the chieftaincy system as demonstrated in the quotes below.

What comes to the chief is for the maintenance of the stool. When we talk about the stool, it is the chief and the people. So the chief can decide what to give a little to the people or refuse to. We use it for travelling, buying regalia, attending invitations, funerals etc. Normally, I give some to the sub chiefs (elders) (Chief, Community B, 2017).

My share is supposed to be used to support the stool. My going out, my coming in, travelling, and regalia etc. is what it is for (Chief, Community A, 2017).

Customary law dictates that communal lands belong to the stool and chiefs hold allodial rights over the land (Biitir & Nara 2016; Kansanga *et al.* 2018). Drawing from this land-stool-chief relationship, the chiefs interpret narrowly their fiduciary role to mean that the benefits that accrue to the stool (e.g. mineral or forestry royalties) as belonging to them. Interpretatively, they merge their person and the office of the stool they occupy (chieftaincy) by arguing that they as chiefs represent the stool. This provides a continued justification for their claim to and control over the mineral royalties.

This interpretation by the chiefs regarding resources accruing to the stool is however contested if not flawed. The official of the OASL explains in-depth that:

There are two broad categories of land ownership in Ghana-public and private lands. Under the private lands is the customary lands which includes stool lands…Therefore stool lands are a type of communal lands which are private and the authorities over these lands are the stools and the occupants. The occupants of the stool are the chiefs. In other words, the land belongs to the stool headed by the chief, but I must state that the land is not for the chief. They are lands held by the group of people who are under the stool headed by the occupant of the stool…so the payment [royalties] is for the stool (Government Representative 2, 2017).

If stool land is a communal property held in trust by the chiefs, it follows then that the royalties accruing from the land similarly belong to the people. Thus, when the law dictates that these resources accruing from the land are 'for the upkeep of the stool', it means wellbeing of the subjects of the stool (Opoku, 2006). The constitution also outlines that:

ownership and possession of land [under customary tenure] carry a social obligation to serve the larger community and in particular…the managers of...stool…lands are fiduciaries charged with the obligation to discharge their functions for the benefit respectively of the people of Ghana, of the stool…concerned and are accountable as fiduciaries in this regard (The Constitution of Ghana, 1992 p.33)

An interview with an official of the Minerals Commission of Ghana debunks the narrow interpretation of the chiefs:

If you read the constitution, it says it is to keep in line with the status of the stool not the chief. Therefore, payments to the stool and traditional authorities is aimed at the development of the communities. In the new MDF law however extra allocation is made for mining community development schemes. These schemes are however yet to become operational (Government Representative 1, 2017).

The use of the revenues by the chiefs for the promotion and maintenance of the chieftaincy system rather than the interests of the vulnerable poor is a reproduction of how precolonial chiefs use the rents obtained from mining for building state power and further accumulation of wealth (Arhin, 1978). The invented interpretations of the chiefs serve to justify and maintain the historical status quo of social injustice relative to mine benefits.

6.6 Enabling political context

The continued monopolisation of the mineral royalties by the chiefs for their own benefits is fertilised through two principal factors: 1) Lack of rules and 2) political clientelism.

6.6.1 Lack of rules as enabling tool

The government has ensured and enabled the monopolisation of the royalties by the chiefs through intentionally or unintentionally not providing rules to define the use of the revenues paid to the chiefs. The vague constitutional provision that the royalties are for the maintenance of the stool coupled with a lack of definitive rules in both the administrative Fiat and the MDF law have provided chiefs with the leeway to appropriate the revenues. This structural limitation does not only enable the agency of the chiefs but also the means to for the chiefs to continue the historical appropriation of the revenues. It also ensures the chiefs are immune to any form of accountability to the state government. That is, if there are no rules telling them exactly what they are to use the revenues for, then they cannot be asked what they used it for. A chief for example points out the lack of rules defining what the royalties are to be used for as the basis for how he spends it:

The government doesn't tell the chiefs how to use their share of the money from the royalties. For the chef no one tells us what to do with it. It is left with the chief to decide (Chief, Community B, 2017).

In addition to the general lack of rules defining what the revenues are to be used for, there are also no legal mechanisms such as legislation or institutional oversight to check how the chiefs use the revenues. There are no standards or mechanisms which the chiefs must use to report their use of the royalties. Once the revenues hit the accounts of the chiefs, no government institution is mandated to follow up on it. The interviewee at OASL who makes the transfers of the royalties to the chiefs for example points out that:

> *So the law says pay the chiefs through the traditional councils. What happens to the money after that is not our mandate. The law says that it must be paid in order to keep up the status of the stool. That status is no longer our work (Government Representative 2, 2017).*

Another government official at the Minerals Commission also points out that:

> *They are not accountable to us. They are supposed to account to their subjects. You cannot just take money and not account to your subjects (Government Representative 1, 2017).*

It is obvious from the interviews with the different government institutions that there is a general lack of commitment holding the chiefs to account. The chiefs' use of the money falls outside national audit rules on public finance. More so, the chiefs are outside the remit of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which is an important multi-stakeholder international mechanism for tracking extractive revenue payments. Thus, with respect to these revenues, chiefs are neither accountable to their people or the government. These general lack of rules and institutional mechanisms to hold the chiefs accountable ensures the powerful chiefs have absolute control over the use of the funds to the detriment of the larger populations in the mining areas.

It could be argued that the government or political elites do not exact transparency and accountability of the chiefs because they do not want to meddle in traditional politics and wants to respect the autonomy of the chiefs and their authority. The guarantee of such freedoms to the chiefs inadvertently robs local people most affected by mining of the sustainable development they need and that envisaged by the government's mining policy.

6.6.2 Political clientelism

The rent-seeking behaviour of chiefs is also legitimised through the client-patron relationships between the government and the chiefs. Abdulai (2018) identifies the distribution of mineral royalties as a cogent example of the political alliances between the political elites and the chiefs in Ghana. In this study political clientelism relating to expropriation of land and royalties can also be deduced.

Mainstream national political actors rely on chiefs to gain political power. It was noted previously that Chiefs wield significant control over their subjects in Ghana especially in rural areas. The competitive nature of national politics means that politicians require the support of chiefs to sway the electoral choices of their subjects (Gyampo 2008; Jonah 2003). Empirical data on the role of chiefs in Ghana's politics, confirm chiefs play a significant role in election outcomes (Gyampo, 2008). It is the rule rather than the exception that politicians including presidential candidates would visit chiefs in their palaces during election campaigns. The purpose of these visits is so that chiefs can mobilize their subjects to vote for them (Gyampo, 2008). The importance of chiefs in electioneering process thus means that successive governments feel reluctant to either cut off the transfer of royalties to chiefs or allocate same to communities directly for development or even initiate reforms to hold chiefs to account on how they utilise the revenues. Thus, while politicians rely on chiefs for political power, chiefs on the other hand depend on the political elites to maintain the flow of the revenues to them without any changes to the structures.

Chiefs who wield power over stool lands are especially important to the political elites in the granting of mining contracts. This is because, even though government has rights to the minerals found in these lands, the land itself is owned by the communities and held in trust by the chiefs. The government thus needs the chiefs to be cooperative in the granting of mine permits and for mining to proceed. This unwritten rule or social contracting process gives the chiefs some leverage or power over the government. The payments of the royalties thus become a conducive medium to ensure that the chiefs remain cooperative and government is able to expropriate the lands of the rural poor for mining projects without much resistance. This is a plausible underlining factor for successive government's failure to hold the chiefs to account on how they spend the royalties.

6.7 Conclusion

The mining policy of Ghana outlines the commitment of the state to national economic growth and the development local mining communities with mining revenues. Statements from national political actors such as the president reinforces the state's commitment to improving the wellbeing of the vulnerable poor in mining areas. It is further evident from this present study that mining companies fulfil their mineral revenue commitments to the state in a timely manner. The state through political actors have the simple responsibility of redistributing a portion of the mineral royalties to mining communities for the actualisation of their sustainability development priorities. This chapter has demonstrated that access to and the use of the redistributed revenues is not straight forward. The agencies of political actors at the national level and those local elites limits any chance of the local people benefiting from this benefit sharing scheme. Thus, sustainable development as understood by local non-elites remains unachieved even though they have borne most of the costs of the mine development.

CHAPTER SEVEN

In Pursuit of Sustainable Development: Micro-politics of Benefits Sharing by a Multinational Company

7.0 Introduction

This Chapter Seven presents analysis of the results of how sustainable development is practiced through the sharing of mining benefits by foreign mining companies and describes the ways in which Newmont undertakes benefits sharing in the study area. This chapter will then provide an analysis of the governance arrangements which structure the interactions of the various actors in relation to the benefit-sharing approach. The findings here highlight the ways in which these governance arrangements reconfigure existing decision-making structures. An empirical analysis follows which details how powerful actors deploy different strategies in the sharing process to actualise their interests. This chapter provides in-depth illumination by sharing 'episodic' events detailing how actors interact with the benefit sharing structures to influence decisions and outcomes in relation to the mineral benefits shared by Newmont. It shows how the local elites view of sustainable development as a long-term investment in physical infrastructure is actualized, and is to the detriment of the poor non-elites. The results of this study indicate that decision making over benefits is not even, despite the structural arrangements in place. Consequently, whereas the actors such as the elite are able to implement their sustainability agenda, the non-elites are unable to.

7.1 The Benefit-sharing approach

In line with Newmont's agenda and strategy of sustainable development and CSR, this company undertakes benefit sharing in its host communities through a community development foundation called Newmont Akyem Development Foundation (NAKDeF). The community development foundation approach was born in response to a congruence of factors such as initial engagement with the communities for social license, industry best practices and pressure from the communities affected by the mine. During the initial engagement with the local communities, Newmont sold the idea of sustainable development to the communities. This involved the ferrying of community leaders and some inhabitants to its sister mine in Ahafo. At the Ahafo site, a community development foundation had been established. This influenced the perceptions and expectations of the Akyem site communities, their acceptance of the mine project and the demand for similar benefit-sharing scheme. As recalled by the Newmont representative:

> *Before even the mine started, at a point there was some delay on the part of the Minerals Commission and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for the approval of the Environmental Impact Statement. The communities put some pressure on the regulators, the government based on what they expected as benefits from the mine. They foresaw that when the mine began they would benefit through the interactions that we had with them (Newmont, Respondent 1, 2017).*

The prospect of the mining project in the area spurred the communities and their leaders to ensure they maximized the benefits the project would generate. It emerged during interviews with community leaders that, during pre-mine negotiations with Newmont, they demanded a retention of resource rents in the communities as well as an assertion for the communities to be involved in how the retained rents would be used for local community development. There was strong insistence by community leaders during pre-mine negotiations that they should not to be cut off from the mineral rents as has been the fate of other mining communities in Ghana. The Community Development Foundation thus represented a suitable outcome for retaining the mineral rents and at the same time giving the opportunity to local communities to determine for themselves how to use the revenues for their development. The Community Development Foundation was therefore a means of making the communities the masters of their own future.

Moreover, the community foundation model implemented at Newmont's other mining site in Ghana-Ahafo, has been considered a success and heralded as industry-wide best practice globally[17] (Andrews 2016). It is therefore not surprising that Newmont would replicate the same model at the Akyem site. Indeed, research shows Community Development Foundations as emergent approaches to CSR and benefits redistribution within the extractive sector with great promise (Wall & Pelon 2011). In Ghana, the use of community development foundations is novel in the mining sector. Interviews with both the government and the Ghana Chamber of Mines reveal that they support and highly regard this approach to benefit sharing.[18]

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[17] In 2014, the NAKDeF was awarded the Best Social Impact Project in Africa by the EU-Africa Chamber of Commerce.

[18] Besides Newmont however, only one other large-scale mining company has used a similar approach in its CSR strategy.

7.1.1 Significance of the foundation to local development

The Community Development Foundation serves as the primary vehicle for sustainable development in the ten communities affected by Newmont's operations in the area. According to Newmont, the community development foundation concept does not only encourage community ownership of the projects but most importantly it ensures the sustainability of the communities long after the mine closes (Andrews, 2016). The foundation, called the Newmont Akyem Development Foundation (NAKDeF) is funded principally by Newmont. The funding arrangement is the product of a benefit-sharing agreement between the company and the communities. Newmont contributes USD$1 per every ounce of gold sold and 1% of its annual pre-tax profits (Newmont Ghana 2014). This for example translated into USD$1.94 million contribution to the Foundation in 2016 alone. From 2013, when Newmont began the contribution up to 2016, a total of $5.8 million had been contributed to the Foundation. The retention of these resource rents in the local communities constitutes a significant revenue stream that can create opportunities for place-based investments and potentially lead to the development of these communities.

The significance of the resource revenues to the sustainable development of the 10 communities who stand to benefit was analyzed in relation to the revenues available for the entire development of the district in which the communities are located. The Birim North district is made up of over 25 rural communities. The district receives budgeted revenues from the national government for development under the decentralization system through the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF) and Members of Parliament (MP) Common Fund. In addition to these two main revenue streams, the district also has its own internally generated Funds (IGF) to use for development. Table 7.1 below provides a comparison between revenues available to just the ten communities from the Foundation and revenues available to the entire District Assembly for 2015 when comparable data existed.

Table 7. 1 Comparable Revenue Streams for 2015 (Ghc)

Revenue source/Beneficial Entity	MP's Common Fund	IGF	DACF	Newmont	Total
District Assembly	69,569	313,363	535,149	-	918,081
Community Development Foundation (10 beneficiary communities)	-	-	-	1,379,929[19]	1,379,929

Source: Author's construction based on data from NAKDeF 2015 Annual report and Birim North District composite budget for 2016.

The data in Table 7.1 shows that the 10 communities through the Community Development Foundation had more revenues for development than the district for that year. The role of these revenues in transforming the communities, however, are dependent on how they are governed and used. As (O'Faircheallaigh 2004) identifies, large quantum of payments from mine developers to indigenous host communities is favorable but the more complex and important issue is the outcomes of the expenditure of the payments. Larger payments used in a socially destructive manner could lead to unfavorable outcomes for the local people.

7.1.2 Governance structures: Regulatory and institutional context

Sustainable development debates are not only concerned about outcomes for society and the environment but more so the quality of the governance structures that produce those outcomes (Glasbergen, Biermann & Mol 2007). In this regard, governance here can be understood as the "the processes and institutions, both formal and informal that guide and restrain the collective activities of a group" (Keohane & Nye 2002, p. 12). A good governance framework that encapsulates accountability, legitimacy, transparency, rule of law and grassroots participation in decision-making is noted to be central to the achievement of sustainable development outcomes (de Waart & Ginther 1995; Gupta 2006). Governance for sustainable development in practice relates to how social interactions or relationships of different actors are structured to produce desirable outcomes (Eckersley 1998; Glasbergen, Biermann & Mol 2007). The interactions of multi-actors at the local level with often conflicting interests and different views

[19] Payments received from Newmont for 1st, 2nd and 3rd quarters per ounce of gold sold and excludes 4th quarter sales and 1% Pre-tax revenue for 2015 financial year.

of sustainable development suggests that good governance measures are necessary requirements if the retained mineral rents (Foundation funds) are to be translated into sustainable development outcomes. A starting point for analysing the process involved in how the community development foundation funds are utilized for sustainable development is through an examination of the governing structures.

In Ghana, there is no legislation that defines how mining companies should undertake CSR and for that matter how community development foundations may be governed.[20] However, the results show that to a large extent there are formal structures in place within the local setting that spell out how the foundation funds should be used and the powers and limitations of the various actors. These include a benefit-sharing agreement and new community-level institutions.

7.1.3 The benefit sharing agreement

Benefit sharing agreements have constituted a central feature within the mining sector in countries such as Australia and Canada where they have been used to structure the relationship between indigenous communities and mining companies. The use of benefit sharing agreements is a novelty in the Ghanaian mining sector. As in many other contexts, the relationship between mining companies and their host communities can be highly politicized and conflictual. In the case of the Akyem project communities, even though the communities have agreed to accept the mining project, they have been very vocal through their local elites in ensuring their benefits are optimized and realized. Whilst the community development foundation is the vehicle for rolling out development, a benefit-sharing agreement was negotiated and agreed to in 2012 which defines the relationship between the stakeholders, that is, Newmont as the main actor and the ten communities that it operates in. The agreement provides a formalized and structured approach to the sharing of benefits through the community foundation. The agreement was negotiated between Newmont and a multi-stakeholder group called the Social Responsibility Forum (SRF)[21]. The SRF consists of representatives of the

[20] As is the case in other mineral producing economies such as Australia and Canada.

[21] The members, functions and operations of the SRF are defined in a separate agreement called the Akyem Social Responsibility Agreement.

various communities[22], local government officials and community-based associations within the mine area.

Content analysis of the agreement document reveals that the formal agreement steers the relationship between the different actors in four main ways: defining the rules of sharing; redistribution of decision-making power; determination of development thematic areas; and new village level institutions. These aspects will be discussed in the next sections.

7.1.4 The sharing rules: Equity pathway and conflict reduction

The ten beneficiary communities vary in many dimensions. For example, the communities vary in terms of land size, population and the extent to which each is affected by the mining project. Hence, one of the key features of the benefit-sharing agreement is an agreed formula for the sharing of the revenues amongst the communities. The formula, termed '*sharing for peace'* is based on an application of agreed four-factor weights. These factor weights include equity, population, stool land impact, and pre-mining socioeconomic interest factors. The sharing formula largely provides transparency by helping the communities to understand why some are receiving more or fewer funds.

Primary data collected from all the three study communities indicates that the communities are satisfied with the sharing formula and there have been no conflicts over this sharing arrangement. None of the communities have so far contested their share of the revenues from the foundation.

> *As for how the money is being shared amongst the communities, we have no problem with Newmont about that. It is fair and we all understand (Respondent 8, Community A, 2017).*

The Newmont representative confirmed this by stating that:

> *The Social Responsibility Forum came out with the modalities or framework for how the NAKDeF should operate. They determined how the money was to be shared, the proportion to be received by all the communities. So far there is no problem with that (Respondent 1, Newmont, 2017).*

[22] Each community is represented on the forum by 2 people and their chief. The SRF is responsible also for the amendment of the agreement.

7.1.5 Redistribution of decision-making power

Green and Chambers (2006) assert that broad-based participation via the involvement of a plurality of actors is necessary for the attainment of sustainable development. A central critique in the literature over the years of the CSR strategy of mining companies is its top-down nature (Gilberthorpe & Banks 2012). Usually, the companies decide and implement social investments for the host communities without much input from the latter. This way, decision-making powers are concentrated in the company as opposed to communities. The benefit sharing agreement, in theory, realigns this power asymmetry between the company and the local communities. The agreement provides that the communities determine their own needs through consultations amongst inhabitants. The Newmont representative interviewed confirmed their reduced role in directing the use of the foundation funds:

> *For NAKDeF, I will say it is 100% community. We have given them the money and NAKDeF board is in place. Projects are developed by the SDCs by sitting down with their community members before presenting to the board (Respondent 1, Newmont, 2017).*

The quote above highlights a reconfiguration of social investment decision-making processes in relation to the interactions between mining companies and their host communities. Thus, rather than the company formulating, designing and initiating social investment interventions for the communities, the communities are supposed to be in the driving seat.

Even at the community level, power imbalances between elites and non-elites is further curtailed judging by the agreement and structural arrangements in place. Within rural communities in Ghana, traditional chiefs have been noted to be those most influential in decisions about development initiatives for their subjects. The resources or funds through the Foundation are sufficiently large to attract interests from powerful local elites. Yet, the governance structure of the Foundation also reconfigures this traditional decision-making structure. Each beneficiary community is to decide, present community needs and direct the implementation of projects through elected representatives on a village level committee called the Sustainable Development Committees (SDCs) rather than through village chiefs. This dilutes the influence of local elites such as the village chiefs. However, village chiefs like any other member of the community can make his views known through the committees.

7.1.6 Thematic areas for investment

The Foundation agreement also outlines thematic areas within which communities can come up with needs-based projects for investments. Seven thematic areas emerge: 1) Education, 2) Agriculture, 3) Health, 4) Water and Sanitation, 4) Enterprise Development and Promotion, 6) Natural Resources conservation and protection, 7) Sports, youth development and voluntary organizations, safety and security and support for cultural heritage. Project suggestions from the communities must fit within these thematic areas for funding from the Foundation (Newmont Ghana 2014 pp.12-13). Furthermore, the Foundation is also obliged to allocate ten percent of all funds to an Endowment Fund to cater for the needs of future generations.

7.2 New village level governance institutions: The SDCs

The Sustainable Development Committees (SDCs) are central to the governance structure defined in the benefit-sharing agreement. The SDCs have the core responsibility according to the agreement of assessing the needs of their respective communities through meetings and deliberations with the local people. Through consultations with community members, they jointly identify and rank possible projects or programs to be financed by the Foundation to improve their wellbeing. In this regard, the SDCs can be described as participatory planning institutions (Sheely 2015). They are also responsible for initiating and monitoring the implementation of community projects funded by the Foundation. This new village level institutional arrangement serves as a means for achieving deliberative and collaborative decision making and impart targeted outcomes. The SDCs are made up of seven members representing various constituencies of each community. Table 7.2 provides an overview of the membership of the SDCs.

Table 7. 2Membership of SDCs

Segment of community	Number	Gender	Mode of Selection
Youth	2	1 male and 1 female	Elected
Women Group	1	Female	Elected
Office of the Chief	1	Not assigned	Nominated by Chief
Community SRF member	1	Not assigned	Elected
Community Assembly member	1	Not assigned	Already existing through election to District Assembly
Community Unit Committee	1	Not assigned	Already existing through election to District Assembly

Source: Author's construction based on Foundation Agreement

Outside of the two automatic members[23] and the village chief's representative, all four other members are elected by the community members. Most people interviewed in the communities confirmed participating or remembered the election of SDC members for their communities. They described the process as involving village members volunteering to be elected at a community meeting, then an open vote is cast through raising of hands in support of one's choice.

7.3 Oversight institutions: The Board and Secretariat

The agreement also defines the specific roles and responsibilities of the Foundation's board and secretariat. This is to ensure conflict-free smooth running of the Foundation. The board which oversees the activities of the foundation is composed of nine members. Out the nine members, four are appointed by the communities and the remaining five appointed by Newmont, including the Chairperson. The board is responsible for the approval of projects presented through the SDCs, investments of the Foundation's funds and evaluation of the progress of sustainable development projects. To ensure transparency and accountability, the board is obliged to submit annual reports including audited accounts to the Social Responsibility Forum at the end of each year. This is an accountability mechanism designed to

[23] These are the communities' assembly member and unit committee member. Even though they are automatic choices for membership on the SDC, it must be stated that they would have already gone through a community level election in order to represent the community at the District assembly level.

hold the board in check and enable people to monitor how the revenues are being utilized. Figure 7.1 shows the organizational structure of the Foundation in relation to all the actors. The arrows indicate interactions amongst the actors.

Figure 7. 1 Simple Organisational Structure of Foundation



Source: Author's construction.

The Foundation's secretariat is responsible for the day to day running of the Foundation. They also serve as a link between the local SDCs and the board. They are also responsible for providing technical support to the SDCs including the facilitation of project implementation. The executive secretary[24] of the secretariat is appointed by Newmont in consultation with the Board.

7.4 Access to and use of funds: The decision-making chain in theory

This benefit sharing agreement also spells out how decision-making takes place in communities with respect to funds. In theory, the benefits agreement grants communities greater influence over what types of benefits they want in terms of the projects the funds are used to implement.

[24] He or she does not necessarily need to be an employee of the company or hail from the local communities.

This decision-making process occurs when the communities express their needs, needs are ordered and prioritized and selected needs are formulated into project plans which are submitted for funding approval. Figure 7.2 shows the decision-making chain under this benefit sharing governance framework.

Figure 7. 2 Decision-making Chain



Source: Authors Construction

The decision loop begins with the ordinary community people suggesting their needs to their SDCs. The SDCs prioritize these needs and the communities have a second opportunity to finalize their choice at open community forums before the plans are presented to the Foundation for implementation. In terms of scales of participation, the benefit-sharing process indicates a high level of participation as a strong relationship with local people is envisaged at the early stages of the decision-making chain.

7.5 Beyond the rhetoric: micro-politics of participation and access to resources

One might assume that the creation of new village level institutions would lead to a participative and prudent utilization of the funds for the achievement of sustainable development. As described above, in theory the institutional arrangements of the benefit-sharing mechanism are participatory in nature and have the potential to address social exclusion by including the voices of a wide range of community interest groups. However, the mere creation of spaces for participation, consultation and representation does not necessarily ensure local people's access to resources, a reconfiguration of deep-rooted power imbalances and further, sustainable development outcomes (Cleaver 2001; Whiteman & Mamen 2002b). Whilst the 'rules of the game' are standardized in the form of the benefit-sharing agreement, there are few guarantees that the rules will be followed to the letter as exemplified in case studies from Australia and Canada where such agreements have even been legislated (Altman 2009; Langton & Palmer 2003; O'Faircheallaigh 2013). Governing institutions may in fact not be enough for broad-based participation and equitable redistribution of resources.

Understanding how the resource benefits are accessed and used *vis a vis* the participatory decision-making approach demands that attention is not only paid to the participatory rhetoric of Newmont and the Foundation Agreement. Instead, attention should be focused on how participation occurs within actual practices as well as how it influences the distribution, access, and use of the resources.

Interviews with Newmont officials, Chiefs and non-elites indicates that there have been substantial social investments in all three study communities. Table 7.3 highlights some of these significant investments towards sustainable development of the communities.

Table 7. 3 Social Investments by NAKDeF

Project	Beneficiary Community
Modern Office for the Secretariat of the Foundation.	Foundation Secretariat
Award of Scholarship	All three study Communities
Construction of Community Centre	Hwekwae
Construction of Community Centre	Adausena
Construction of Chief's Palace	Resettlement Community
Renovation of Kindergarten School	Adausena
laptops, projectors and projector stands for Schools	All three study communities
Renovation of Primary School Block	Adausena
Construction of Boreholes	Resettlement Community
Construction of Junior High schools	Hwekwae
Water system	Adausena/Hwekwae
10-seater Vault Chamber Toilet	Resettled Community

Source: Based on Fieldwork Interviews

Whilst one cannot discount the value of these social investments, apart from the award of scholarships, most of the non-elites felt these projects did not meet their sustainable development goals. It was important then to analyse how decisions about these projects were arrived at. Analysis of primary data from interviews and focus group discussions reveals that the structural arrangements designed to include grassroots voice and local knowledge do not radically challenge existing power asymmetries due to contextual influences and more especially veiled enactments of power by local elites to capture decisions and resources. Thus far, the implementation of a benefit-sharing process based on procedural equity in decision-making that would ostensibly contribute to sustainable development is a work in progress. Stated differently, the benefit-sharing structures are good governance measures and could promote equity, but in practice, contextual constraints and power asymmetries constitute obstacles for full grassroots participation and fair distribution and use of benefits.

This conclusion is drawn from four general findings from the field data, namely that:

I. Despite the spaces of participation created, the agency of ordinary local people to influence the direction and use of the resources is very limited due to contextual constraints.
II. The SDCs, central to the benefits sharing process lack the capacity to make a meaningful impact and are redefining their role.
III. Powerful actors with vested interests are strategically capturing decisions and resources.
IV. Less powerful actors are only able to counterbalance power through acts of resistance.

7.5.1 Contextual constraints: local people and decision making in practice

High levels of participation is usually linked to the extent to which people at the village level are truly given the opportunity to make a choice about the type of project they want, when they want it and how they want it (Prokopy 2005). This present study found that participation in the decision-making processes was uneven as fewer non-elites who were not members of SDCs and had little or no input in the decisions arrived at. Interviews with all three village chiefs revealed that the onset of the mining project and roll out of community development initiatives has been accompanied by an increase in local participation in decision making processes-specifically in terms of villagers' presence at meetings. According to all of them, community meetings including those organized by Newmont are well attended by the local people. Interviews with the non-elite local people however painted a different picture and revealed that whilst initial community meetings witnessed high attendance, recent times have seen a decline in the number of individuals who attend these meetings.

> *When New Newmont first came, we in this village were all interested to know what they had to say. So is true that most of us were attending community meetings. But now most people do not come for such meetings (Respondent 19, Community A, 2017).*

The lack of attendance in recent times is a common occurrence in all three communities and hinges on several contextual reasons that are explained below.

7.5.1.1 Community fragmentation due to deep-seated conflicts

Analysis from interviews with the local people reveals that deep-seated chieftaincy disputes are a significant barrier to the participation process. This was particularly the case in Community A. In this community, the chief who was in office during the initial negotiations for the mine development was 'destooled' (deposed from office) due to disagreements within the royal family, and subsequently a new chief was 'enstooled' (put in office). The entire process of destoolment and enstoolment however was considered unfair and disputed by different segments of the community (indeed the destooled chief is currently contesting the issue in the courts). This, like similar cases of chieftaincy disputes in other Ghanaian communities (see for example Tonah 2005), has created factions within the community. Some people hold a strong view that the current chief is not legitimate. Consequently, according to some of the interviewees from Community A, they and others in the community do not attend community meetings where the chief would have to be present because of the ongoing chieftaincy dispute. These meetings usually are held in the chief's palace further making it inconvenient for opposing factions to attend. A member of the community's SDC describes how they find it difficult to meet with the local people:

> *In my community, we have a challenge. There is a chieftaincy problem, so when we are supposed to meet for public discussions, the opposing side does not come. So most people do not come to meetings. Is now a practice that when the chief calls the elders, the few that go take the decisions and it binds on all of us. We no longer meet in public like we use to do where everyone can share their ideas. That is the challenge. Those who don't want to go to the palace do not come even though they may have fantastic ideas. Until we solve the problem it shall continue (Respondent 10, Community A, 2017*).

For these people, even though the opportunity exists for them to participate in deciding on the benefits they can obtain from the mine, this contextual situation hinders them from participating fully. Ignorance of this problem or inability of those in position of power to negotiate around this situation has meant that some people are left out of the decision-making process entirely hence defeating the procedural equity the structural arrangements of the benefit-sharing process envisaged.

7.5.1.2 Community differentiation: Outsiders vs. Insiders

The limited participation of many of the research participants in the public forums was also related to broader sentiments of 'not belonging' to the sociocultural fabric of their communities. This was particularly seen in the case of community C, which is a resettled village. Most people felt reluctant to participate in the public forums because they lacked the sense of belonging to the community. This particular community is an amalgamation of an indigenous community and settler hamlets made up of migrant farmers. Most of the migrant farmers resettled into this community felt their views were not respected because they are not natives. Their perceptions are shaped by talks in the community in which they are often referred to as 'visitors'.

> *Whatever we say or complain about they [community leaders] don't care. They see us as visitors whom they are doing a favour to. They say one day we would all go back to our hometowns so we don't deserve to be treated like the original people of this village (Respondent 13, Community C, 2017).*

According to the migrants, the natives believe they (the migrants) are likely to migrate back to their hometowns with any form of non-landed benefits they may obtain from the mine. This assumption by the natives is because some other migrant farmers left community C after receiving their crop compensations from Newmont. The migrants therefore feel their views and suggestions are considered illegitimate due to such sentiments held by the natives and hence their views would not be taken on board by the community leaders and the SDCs.

7.5.1.3 Prioritisation of livelihood pursuits and changing dynamics of social setting

The participation literature posits that individual resources such as civic skills, time and money are influential in the being involved in participatory processes (Scott-Villiers & Oosterom 2016). In this present study, it emerged that the lack of interest in public meetings shown by the local people, related back to their pursuit of livelihoods. This problem related to all three study communities. All non-elite interviewees and focus group discussants considered such public meetings to be important but indicated that their livelihood activities were of greater significance to them. They believe going to the farm (those who still have farms) or engaging in other livelihood activities is more useful than attending such meetings. According to them, the times for these meetings often conflicts with the times they engage in their livelihood pursuits.

> *…if I go and sit at this meeting and I don't go to the market to sell my goods how would my children and I eat? My household depends on the income I would get from the market hence I cannot afford to go and sit at the community durbar (Respondent 3, Community B, 2017).*

It can be argued or suggested that such community engagements be arranged for days that are traditionally designated as non-farming days in the communities or during the evenings. However, it appears the mine project has significantly influenced the social and economic fabrics of the community.

> *Before Newmont came [the onset of mining], we had days that culturally we do not go to our farms to work. On such days we rest and usually hold community meetings to discuss issues affecting us. This is no longer the case, people do different activities most days of the week now (Respondent 9, Community C 2017).*

Before the mine, the communities were predominantly into farming, hence community engagements could be arranged around farming activities. However, the onset of the mine and the loss of farmlands has meant that most local people are branching out into other economic activities for survival such as trading of petty goods. This has contributed to making the community more heterogeneous in terms of economic activity. In turn, this makes community engagement more fluid and is much more difficult to include all community stakeholders in meetings.

7.5.1.4 Poverty and weakening of grassroots through co-optation.

Closely associated with the prioritisation of livelihood issue is the general poverty in the communities which has invariably affected participation. About two out of every three of the interviewees from the three study communities pointed out that they are generally poor and find it difficult making ends meet since the onset of the mine and the loss of their farmlands. Community meetings with their leaders and SDCs provide avenues for these people to articulate their needs and how to properly invest the Foundation funds into improving their living standards. It emerged however, from the interviews that Newmont strategically weakens the communities' decision-making abilities by co-opting those who are vocal, attend meetings and can articulate the position or needs of the communities. When those who can better articulate the needs of the communities are identified and offered jobs at the mine site by

Newmont, they cease to attend meetings and contribute to discussions, hence reducing the voice of the communities. A member of one of the study communities explains that:

> *…those that are brave to talk, once Newmont sees that you can talk, they give you employment at Newmont. Then you become quiet. So, all those that can talk, they have given them jobs at Newmont. They look through the town for those who are troublesome. Newmont has agents in the town. They call them representatives. They identify the activists and lobbyists-those vocal at meetings and inform Newmont to cool them. They give them jobs in the mine. So if he earns Ghc 2000 a month when previously he can't earn even 500 a month then he is quiet. All those that have a voice and are brave have jobs at the Newmont. The vulnerable old people left can't talk (emphasis added: Respondent 2, Community A, 2017).*

This situation is generally not surprising when situated within the context that poverty has been recognised as an underlining cause of social exclusion (Kummitha 2017) or what is generally referred to as the 'participation paradox' (Scott-Villiers & Oosterom 2016; Verba & Nie 1987). The special Rapporteur on Human Rights reflects on this situation by stating that "material deprivation and disempowerment create a vicious circle: the greater the inequality, the less the participation; the less the participation, the greater the inequality" (quoted in Scott-Villiers & Oosterom 2016 p.13).

7.5.1.5 Informational nature of meetings

About one in three of the non-elites interviewed across all three communities indicated that most of the community meetings with their chiefs, SDCs and NAkDeF officials are usually informational in nature. They are mostly informed about development initiatives ongoing or those to be initiated by the Foundation. It was obvious from the response of the interviewees and focus group discussions that key developmental decisions have already been taken by those with power such as the chiefs or other community leaders prior to the community meetings.

> *The chiefs and committee people [SDC] meet first in the palace before coming to inform us. We as ordinary people cannot challenge what the elders (elites) have agreed on. They decide before coming to inform us. They allow us to speak but our views usually do not change the plans (Respondent 2, Community B, 2017).*

It was noted above that most of the local people hold the view that their village chief is the most influential person in decision-making about local development with regards to the mining benefits. Based on this, most of those interviewed believed their participation in such community meetings would have little influence on the decision-making process, hence they felt that their attendance was of little value. The belief that their views would be discounted or not valued poses a significant challenge to achieving participation parity.

7.5.2 Limitations of the SDCs

The sustainable development committees are pivotal in the use of the funds and channeling of the voice of the villagers in decisions concerning the funds. To understand the tensions surrounding the decisions they make relative to the funds, there is the need to take a closer look at the SDCs themselves. Group interviews with the SDCs obtained from the three communities suggested that there are several problems limiting the committees from fully achieving the objectives of the benefit sharing agreement. These include the two factors of 1) covert power; and 2) low level capacity and lack of independence; which will now be addressed below.

7.5.2.1 Covert power: setting the agenda or just role confusion?

It emerged from the interactions with the different SDCs that their framing of participation varies from the stipulations of the Foundation agreement. Focus group discussions with them suggested that most members saw their role relative to the local people as being information-giving as opposed to collectively deciding with the people on projects. The following quotes demonstrate how different SDCs understood their role:

> *Our role is to coordinate with the community members to select viable projects. So basically, the SDCs are the mouthpiece of the community. They liaise with the community. We capture the priority projects and present it to NAKDeF (SDC, Community A, 2017).*

This SDC however further explained that:

> *We meet. We call for public durbar and ask the people for proposals. We all discuss. <u>This is the process, but we don't do it all the time.</u> Initially, we use to do it but when we call for meetings most people don't come. <u>So now we decide and let the people know</u> (emphasis added: SDC, Community A, 2017).*

Another community's SDC explained their approach and role as:

> *We decide on it [projects]. <u>We do the plan, send it to the community</u> at a durbar and discuss with them about what we want to do with the current money that we have. The community will also bring their input then we go to NAKDeF (emphasis added: SDC, Community B, 2017).*

A third SDC further revealed that:

> *The SDCs role is to send the community's development projects to the NAKDeF. Before we select a project, we have to inform the entire community and the chiefs" not only one person decides. The SDCs sends its suggestions to the chiefs. If they agree then we inform the community (emphasis added: Community C, SDC, 2017).*

The quotes above demonstrate that the committees to an extent are aware of the need to include community members in the making of the decisions. However, more importantly, it also reveals that the inclusion of the wider community members mostly occurs after initial plans have already been set at the committee level. As such, the SDCs think their role is to present proposals[25] or options to the community for deliberation instead of consulting with community members at the very onset before proposals are formulated. This confirms the suggestions by the wider communities' members that most of these meetings about the mine benefits are often informational.

Looked at differently, it also shows the committees are exercising covert power (Bachrach & Baratz 1962; Lukes 1974). They are setting the agenda in advance and making decisions prior to meeting with the community members. They are limiting the wider members of the communities in the decision-making process to only the approval of projects as opposed to co-jointly developing projects based on the needs of everyone. They decide what to include or not to include as in the form of project proposals that the community members have no choice but to select from. Thus, they shape in advance what is put on the discussion table at community public forums. The enactment of such covert power ensures that those in position of power are able to get their way without the use of force or struggle but by simply predetermining the agenda that the masses have to decide from (Gaventa 1982).

7.5.2.2 The low level of capacity and lack of independence

Even though the committees appear to be exercising covert power in their operations, the study also finds that their authority and role in liaising with their community members to decide on projects is undermined due to how the local elites perceive them. Two out of three chiefs interviewed viewed their community's SDC as lacking the capacity to contribute meaningfully to the development of their respective communities. For example, one chief expressed his view about his community's SDC as:

> *We have the SDCs formed at the inception of the Foundation. They will discuss with the communities in a forum our needs. They will then present this to the NAKDeF*

[25] Proposals is used here loosely to mean presentation of development ideas in a non-written formal format

and then there will be budgetary allocations and invite tenderers to bid. <u>So far it hasn't worked the way we expected it. Because most of the SDCs members are not technocrats. Some of them are not highly educated to even high school.</u> And also, the staff of the Foundation are not cooperative. They have means of by which they frustrate the SDCs. Most of the projects are not done to the standard we wanted. (emphasis added: Chief, Community A, 2017).

Interactions with the various SDCs shows that the capacity of the members vary. Whilst few of the members have some formal education most of them had little or no education which is not surprising given the low levels of education in the study communities. An annual report of the Foundation similarly identified that, "nearly all the individuals elected or nominated by the ten communities to serve on the SDCs lacked the expertise and experience necessary for the planning and development of their respective communities" (NAKDeF 2014).

Interviews with Newmont and members of the SDCs reveal that the SDCs were trained by consultants hired by the company when they were newly formed to remedy this capacity constraint. Figure 7.3 shows a cross-section of SDC members during a training session.

Figure 7. 3 SDC capacity building session

Source: NAKDeF (2014)

They were taught how to undertake community needs assessments, planning projects and undertaking monitoring as well as evaluations. Yet, the Foundation report indicates that the training sessions were fraught with threats of boycotts by the trainees due to the low remuneration provided by Newmont. The five weeks of training was also plagued by poor attendance especially by members who were in formal employment (this group of members was almost always absent from the training).

The level of education of the SDC members and the challenges that surrounded the capacity building exercise suggests that the chief is right in noting the lack of capacity of the SDC members to undertake their tasks. The lack of capacity undermines the authority and independence of the SDCs. From interviews with the SDCs, it became clear that they were not truly independent of the local elites. There was the tendency of the SDCs having to rely on the chiefs to push through project proposals for implementation. The SDCs view the elites who are relatively better educated to be better placed to articulate their plans and projects to the Foundation for a favorable outcome. The assessment of needs, prioritization and selection of projects which the SDCs must co-jointly decide with the wider community members is instead shaped by the expertise of the local elites. The elites are thus better positioned to influence decisions through the SDCs.

The results and discussions so far demonstrate that even though the structural governance arrangements provide opportunities for procedural equity, in reality, the limited involvement of the local people in the decision-making process discourages a needs-based utilization of the resources. It is clear that getting the local people's visions of sustainable development (which is largely based on economic needs discussed in the previous chapter) to the discussion table for implementation is limited.

Attention is now turned to more obvious enactments of power that shape decisions long before they are presented to the non-elites and even after the communities have decided on certain projects. Drawing from specific projects funded by the Foundation, empirical evidence is presented showing how decisions are captured by the elites and other interest groups as they pursue their own objectives and understanding of what sustainable development should be.

7.5.3 Elite capture of decision-making and resources

Research shows that when non-elites fail to attend meetings and participate in the planning process, other interest groups are more easily and likely to capture decision making processes and planning institutions (Agrawal & Gupta 2005; Lund & Saito-Jensen 2013; Mansuri & Rao 2012; Sheely 2015). There is a general agreement in community development literature that local-level participatory processes are prone to elite capture. Even though elite capture often is closely associated with misappropriation of resources by powerful few, a small number of case studies demonstrate that elite capture actually leads to favorable outcomes for the wider community and the poor especially (Balooni *et al.* 2010; Dasgupta & Beard 2007).

Chiefly authority in Ghana constitutes a key node of political and social power (Aning *et al.* 2018).Traditional rulers under the chieftaincy system have long been embedded into the political and social fabric of Ghanaian society and are recognized for their role in local governance, dispute resolution, and development (Addo-Fening 2008; Ankisiba 2013; Dunn & Robertson 2009). The chieftaincy system in Ghana is often understood to be closely associated with rural development where they are most strong. Traditional chiefs are considered to be key advocates for and initiators of development (Ankisiba 2013). The relationship between the chieftaincy system and development however remains contested (Amanor 2006; Ubink 2008). Amanor (2006) provides a nuanced perspective that rejects the idea that chiefs as local elites pursue the interests of their subjects:

> *Traditional rulers frequently belong to the business and professional classes. They are intermarried with the political elites and often have their own business empires…Many chiefs have closer social ties and share similar mindsets with business and political contacts than with their own subjects. Yet, they are promoted as an independent civil society groups standing up for the rights of the rural poor (Amanor 2006, p. 4).*

The evidence from this case study shows that decisions about local development in relation to the use of the mineral funds is political and highly influenced by the local chiefs. Chiefs adopt several strategies to influence decisions and implementation of projects some of which generates benefits for them personally. Some of these strategies are discussed below using specific project examples.

7.5.3.1 Backdoor channeling

The chiefs' representatives on the SDCs is a key conduit through which the chiefs influence project decisions. In the Ghanaian setting, it is the norm to value and respect traditional authorities such as chiefs. This perhaps explains why the committees were designed to include a representative of the chief as a member. The chief's representative is usually a close associate of the chief such as his linguist in some cases. It was gathered from interviews with the SDC members that the chiefs' representatives serve as a link between the chiefs and the committees. The representatives bring ideas about development from the chiefs and send outcomes of their deliberations to the chiefs.

The chief has a representative on the committee so whatever happens, goes back to the chief. If the chief wants something to be included, he passes the information through his representative. If the chief brings up an issue, we must include it. The whole community would then come together to approve it (SDC, Community B, 2017).

In another village, an SDC member mention that:

Every community has SDC. They meet and the chiefs present to them through their representative what they think should be done. Then the SDC sends it to the community and then NAKDeF offices for discussion. If the NAKDeF agrees, then the project is awarded (SDC, Community C, 2017).

Most members of the SDCs admitted they had equal voice in the committee deliberations but must take on board the 'messages' of the chief as his subjects and cannot object to his proposals. This is especially so because the chief's representative potentially would report any form of dissent to the chief. This 'backdoor' arrangement provides opportunity for the chiefs to influence the decision-making process. Thus, the public deliberations with the local people become a charade as those with power have already influenced the proposals through the back door. From the first quote above, the SDC member refers to collective decision making but the wider committee only approves the decision 'collectively' made by the chiefs and the committee in advance.

7.5.3.2 Co-opting the youth and overt use of power

The case study data reveals that in two communities, the chiefs capitalize on the loyalty of some of their subjects (non-elites) to influence the award of projects contracts and hence their access to the resources. Under the benefit sharing agreement, projects (once approved) are to be implemented by local contractors from within the communities. It was confirmed by the chiefs and other community respondents that the chiefs are also registered as contractors and bid for these projects. The chiefs sometimes use their strategic position as traditional authorities to ensure certain projects are allocated to them. They do this by steering the youth to demonstrate against Newmont. The Newmont representative describes one of such instances with a chief of Community A:

When he (the chief) needs a contract, he will mobilize his people to put pressure on the company through demonstration threats so that the company would move quickly to assign the project to him and he will be the beneficiary. He becomes the contractor and after finishing the job, he always wants another. Sometimes we don't know where the pressure is coming from [Threats from the youth] … it just emerges… he insists that this is what the community wants and eventually Newmont

> *must award him the contract. But at the end of the day, he is the beneficiary. Because no one else can do that work or will be allowed to do it apart from him if we want to have our peace (Respondent 1, Newmont, 2017).*

A member of the community confirms this by sharing an experience:

> *As I speak to you, only the chief [in his community] has a generator in his house and uses it when the light is off. All the town people sleep in darkness. It tells you he is getting more from Newmont. He is a contractor for Newmont. One time, he said they [Newmont] will not give him a contract. He organized the people to demonstrate. When they demonstrated, it was not easy, they were going into the factory [mine]. The following day, they called him that they have given him the contract. He gave money so that food is bought for the demonstrators (Respondent 10, Community A, 2017).*

The company and the local non-elites are thus both positioned in this scenario as a victim of the power of the chiefs. In other words, the chief exercised *power over* Newmont and the non-elites based on their position and ability to mobilise the youth for demonstrations. It shows the fluidity of power within the local context where Newmont is not necessarily the most powerful actor despite having financial power.

7.5.3.3 The use of knowledge and custom as power

Actors can establish their interests in social interactions using knowledge processes which reflect power, authority, and legitimation (Long 2003). In this case study, one way the chiefs also influence the decisions and directions of the benefits is by calling on their superior knowledge and their cultural superiority positioning (chief-subject relations). Given that the local elites are better educated than the non-elite members of the communities, the former are able to reference their technical knowledge especially in explaining why their decisions must stand. The non-elites have limited options than to agree to what the chiefs consider to be developmentally appropriate even if it may not be what the non-elites are in favor of.

This is further complicated by the chief-subject relationship that already exists. Most community non-elites interviewed including members of the SDCs felt they were culturally constrained to challenge what their chiefs say. According to them, they cannot question the opinion of the chiefs as it would be a sign of disrespect and may threaten aspects of their individual relationships. A member of an SDC confirms their inability to challenge the chief due to his customary position when asked if the chiefs influence their decisions:

> *Yes…if we propose something and they [chiefs] disagree then we cannot do it. The community is under the chief, so we cannot disregard his opinion. Is against our customs (SDC, Community B, 2017).*

The situation is complicated further by the fact that within the context of rural Ghana, chiefs do not just control access to resources such as land which the people may be dependent on but also perform important functions such as adjudicating over disputes amongst their subjects. It is important thus not to be an opponent of the chief. The use of knowledge superiority and customary value system are made most evident in the case of a community social center in one of the communities.

7.5.3.4 The case of the social center in two of the studied communities, buildings have been put up using the Foundation funds to serve as a community social center to be used by the communities for social events. The issues that surrounds the building of these social centers demonstrates how sustainable development choices are made in practice. In particular how the elites' view of sustainable development as a long-term investment in physical infrastructure was actualized. The social center in Community A as an example, has become one of the most controversial use of the Foundation funds and most non-elites in that community are angry about it. According to all those interviewed in that community, what they were informed of and agreed to was a small durbar ground where they can organize funerals and have community meetings. However, what they are getting from the usage of the mining funds is completely different. Work on the center is currently at a standstill due to lack of funds. The community has exhausted its share of the Foundation funds so far on the project. The multipurpose social center is shown in Figure 7.4 below.

Figure 7. 4 A picture of a Community Social Centre

Source: Author, Fieldwork 2017

The social center represents the domination of the local elites over decision making processes and the entrenchment of what the elites consider to constitute sustainable development (*long-term development needs and physical infrastructure*). The Social Center project financed from the community's share of the development fund is a big project which consists of several ensuite guest rooms, conference rooms, and other amenities. The edifice is significantly huge for a village of about 1500 people and from the perspective of Newmont officials, it is a waste of resources. They described the project and the overbearing power of the local chief on having the project as follows:

> *Everyone who comes here wonders what they are going to use this for [referring to the social center]. That center originally had 40 toilets, has accommodation for guest rooms, conference halls etc. The project cost started at Gh1.5 million now ending up at about Ghc 3million[26]. We were initially not in support but gave in because the chief is someone who is very vocal and if you don't give in to his demands, he will find all sorts of means to force you. The chief is the contractor, so if you look at his personal interests, he wants to spend all that t money on this kind of thing (Respondent 1, Newmont, 2017).*

[26] Approximately USD$626,184 based on exchange rate on 9th October 2018

From talking with most of the local people in that village, it was not their idea to have a social center of that nature. Interestingly, interviews with the SDC members of that village also confirm it was not entirely their idea but that of the village chief.

> *That one [social center] was facilitated by the chief. But when it came [the building plan] we saw the building was too big. So initially we asked the architect to reduce it and it was reduced. It got to a point the chief said <u>this is what he deems fit for the community. He said</u> he envisions that the community would grow in the near future, so for that matter, if you do something small it will not be useful in future. He was having a lot of excuses not to reduce it [the scale of the building]. So even the siting and those things are a challenge to us because it is sited far from the community. The place too is waterlogged area and required excavation and filling. All this came with costs even though we could have gotten a place where we would not have spent that much. <u>Because he is the leader of the community</u>, <u>we could not challenge him on everything…</u>so something small for the community has metamorphosed into something big altogether, eating all our money and we can't do anything. (Emphasis added: SDC member, Community A, 2017)*

The Chief's perspective follows:

> *We had a social center we wanted to build. We had our own designs with lots of rooms. They [Foundation] came out with a budget. I was doing it as a contractor but eventually, they saw that the original design they [Foundation] brought was not fit for purpose. If you have a social center, you need to have hotel rooms, you need a cafeteria, conference rooms, and meeting rooms so that when somebody comes to hire, they will have all the facilities. But these were not in their plan. You have a student [architect] to do something <u>for me a former professor, who has been in the same fraternity [engineering profession]</u>. <u>I am a civil engineer</u> and you want a student to show me how it is done, you will see that it is not fit for purpose. However, it is an indication of what we want…It took us over a year and they delayed and when they approved, the community didn't understand why we put this money in it. Because they [community] can't see the benefit. Within 4 years they can recuperate the entire money.*
>
> *But you see both the board, the Foundation and SDCs, and <u>even the community didn't understand why I should come up with this</u>. They looked at it as if it was too luxurious but if you build a social center with about GHC2.6 million, you haven't thrown away money because you will be reaping about GHc400000 a year as a return over if you advertise well but they don't see it that way<u>. So, if you look at sustainability, this is a project that can sustain you</u> (emphasis added: Chief, Community A, 2017).*

The three quotes above suggest the uneven decision-making that goes into the sharing of benefits, whose interests are trumped through the open enactment of power and who gains. Importantly the quotes demonstrate four important things:

- the use of overt power
- the pursuit of the sustainable development objectives of the elites
- alignment between sustainable development objectives and personal interests
- the maintenance of power through cultural values and patronage systems

The scenario of the social center exemplifies the workings of overt power exercised by the local chief over the non-elite community members. It is interesting to note how the chief references '*we*' in his statements to denote a collective decision. Yet the non-elites in this community had little influence over the decisions that were eventually made concerning the use of their mine funds. Besides their limited inclusion in the decision-making process concerning the approval for the project (a social meeting place in this instance), they did not participate in important decisions during the implementation of the project such as the scope, design, and choice of the community center's location. It is clear from the quote of the chief that one of his key strategies to get the community and the SDCs to agree to his choices was the use of his superior knowledge (professor of civil engineering) and position as a chief. The chief through his knowledge superiority creates a 'knowledge encounter' where he enrolls the non-elites against their wish to accept his framing of the project (Long 2003). Long (2003) describes this legitimation of power where less powerful people delegate power to powerful actors as a reification of power and knowledge in social life.

Power is not only enacted in this scenario but more importantly, reflects struggles over opposing sustainable development views and whose view gets to be implemented. How the different actors viewed sustainable development was addressed in above chapters. The case of the social center demonstrates how sustainable development choices are made in practice. In this community like in many other cases, the elites' view of sustainable development as a long-term investment in physical infrastructure was actualized. The non-elite community members, who have been affected most by the mine due to loss of farmlands have rather lost out on the mine benefits (funds). A member of the community's SDC puts this situation in perspective when he talks about how due to lack of funds and the opinion of the chief, they cannot implement a livelihood project suggested by other non-elite members of the community:

the youth have projects they feel should be done. When we met them, they said they want the money invested in enterprises like pure water factory (drinking water production) to enable them to gain employment. It is a good idea, so we captured it in our plans for 2017 but unfortunately for us the social center has taken all our money. Besides our chief also said community B and community C are already doing it so it will be replication. So he said it should not be done (SDC, Community A, 2017).

A member of the community also recounts her recollection of events about the social center:

They brought the idea before the community. But we the women wanted loans to be provided to us using the funds. They collected our names and details but later they said some people would not repay the loan because they think it is community money. So they decided to use the money for that project [social center] for the benefit of the entire village. If they had given us the money, we would have been happy. We take loans from microfinance institutions with high interests and still repay…so there was no reason for us not to pay back the community money. (Respondent 6, Community A, 2017).

These interviews reveal how livelihood interests of the largely poor inhabitants of the communities are relegated to the background in pursuit of the interests and sustainable development goals of the local elite. The basic needs of the people which are underlined by lack of employment (for which they wanted credit or a small-scale enterprise) are sidelined as exemplified by the quotes.

However, the chief does not only gain by achieving his sustainable development objective for the community, but the pursuit of that particular project also results in economic gains for him as well. For instance, the social center is being built by the chief's construction company. As such, the bigger the scope of the project, the more profit he is likely to gain. Besides, the construction also strengthens the position of his company to bid for other projects from the Foundation compared to other local community members who are also contractors but continue to command fewer resources and experience to bid for bigger projects.

7.5.4 Sustaining elite capture

The control of the elite over decisions and choice of projects appears more complex than the mere enactment of power. The dominance of the chiefs is sustained through the workings of cultural values and patronage. Local cultural values and norms legitimize the actions of the chief. The chief-subject relationship ensures that non-elites as subjects of the chief must respect the wishes of the chief as custom and tradition demands. Thus, even though non-elites and SDC members could oppose the choices of the chief they rarely do because he is their 'community leader' as custom demands. This chief-subject relationship, in turn, relates closely to two forms of patronage - *Chief-Newmont Patronage system* and *Chief-subject Patronage system* (see Figure 7.5).

Figure 7. 5 The Patronage System



Source: Author's Construction

First, the chief-subject relation ensures the Chiefs have a strong control over the local people, an asset key to Newmont. Newmont taps into this asset by enlisting the local chiefs to perform important functions for them which includes ensuring the non-elites (subjects) do not agitate or disrupt the activities of the company. The chiefs serve as mediators between the company and the community when disputes arise. This is important for Newmont to maintain their social license. Thus, even though Newmont has the relative power to say no to the demands of the chiefs like in the case of the social center, it is obvious they hardly challenge the status quo. Newmont may not want to unsettle their relationship with the chiefs by refusing to challenge the actions of the later. Thus, as the chiefs benefit, the company also reaps the benefit of the chiefs maintaining a stable community relation.

The larger community also is unable to challenge the power of the chiefs because of a similar patronage relationship. The communities rely on the chiefs to ensure the flow of resources to the community. The community inhabitants view the chief as a key actor in holding Newmont to account on their promises and ensuring they exact benefits from the mine development. This is particularly so in the absence of any legislation regulating benefit sharing agreements and de facto absence role of the government in this local level micropolitics of benefit sharing.

Besides, as mentioned earlier, the SDCs also rely on the chiefs to push through proposals at the Foundation level. The study finds therefore that the non-elites are inclined not to resist openly the local elites for fear of losing the few benefits they stand to gain. Consequently, the chiefs are important within the loop ensuring both the community's and the company's interests are met. The chiefs as patrons thus have a strong bargaining lever upon which they can enact their power, capture decisions making processes and control the use of their community's share of the funds.

7.5.5 Recuperating power-NAKDeF

The elites have significant influence over the sharing of the benefits in terms of decisions about community projects. However, the study shows that they are not alone in influencing which project gets to be implemented or not and when. The board of the foundation according to the structural arrangement provides final approvals for projects presented by the communities through the SDCs to the secretariat and awards contracts. However, it emerged from the interviews with the members of the different SDCs and the chiefs that officials of the secretariat and the board also influence the process often for their vested interests as opposed to the interests of the communities, and thus effectively taking away the ultimate decision-making power away from the local communities. They achieve this by deploying their financial power (power based on their supervisory role over the funds) to determine which projects are worth funding.

> *The problem we are having with them [secretariat of NAKDeF] is that they have to also send it [proposals] to the board. Thus, when we have decided to do a project, the board can also decide that the project is not necessary and that is our problem. When we send it, they don't see the need. So many times [number of times they have been rejected]. For example, we wanted to get some land to do community farms. Initially, they didn't want to agree. But we wanted them to just take our word and do it for us. Why should they question us and say we can't do it? We know what we are going to do is what will help us… if they think what they say is what we should take, they shouldn't have even created the SDCs. You created it to decide on the projects that we want but when we bring it you then you reject it. How? (SDC, Community A, 2017).*

In a focus group discussion with the SDC of another community, the members of the committee shared their experience of how their needs were rejected and not funded with their portion of the funds:

Yes, it is often [rejected]. Most of the proposals we send, they say they are sending it for board approval. The board can reject it. For example, our community farm is far, so we wanted to put up a building there to house someone there permanently. This is to ensure the produce are not stolen. Also, we wanted a processing plant, so our women can work there on processing the palm fruits when they are harvested. But we never got what we wanted (SDC, Community C, 2017).

An official of NAKDeF provides an explanation for the rejection of projects:

Severally [they rejecting proposals]. The communities think about piecemeal projects. For example, they have a culture they want to celebrate [using the funds] but we think that culture doesn't qualify to be supported. Another is extra classes [special after school hours tuition] they wanted to organize for pupils in their communities…their approach we thought was not right. We wanted a more holistic approach by doing a study and addressing the problem [poor educational performance in the communities]. There was a struggle but, in the end,, we were able to convince them (Respondent 2, NAKDeF, 2017).

The Foundation strategically uses technocratic language such as 'holistic approach' to recuperate the decision-making power away from the local people. The Foundation appears to use their expert knowledge of development planning to redefine the needs of the people. Rather than projects flowing from the needs of the people, the Foundation suggests doing studies to redefine the needs of the people as the quote above suggests. This is not the role of the Foundation per the benefit-sharing agreement and takes away the power of the communities. The selection and design of projects from the local community people is thus shaped indirectly by the techno-managerial perspective of the Foundation. By controlling the strings to the purse, the board and Secretariat of the foundation are able to influence the final outcomes of what gets to be implemented as development projects.

Whilst the Foundation argues their actions as a way of shaping the decisions of the community to ensure proper use of the funds, the situation also reflects importantly the use of power to implement an actor's perspective of sustainable development. This is made evident in a quote from the Foundation's staff who is also a member of the board:

the fact that you have done needs assessments and established that you need this project-for example if you want to establish an oil processing factory…. you listed it as a project and provided the reasons you want to do it. But it must be designed holistically... So the board may ask for more information. The project objectives and benefits may be known but the management process of the project, its ownership etc needs to be known. <u>Sometimes when you look at some of the projects proposed, it doesn't fit into the sustainable development kind of projects we want to execute. So sometimes the board will raise an issue that it is not sustainable and</u>

if you are not careful, it can incur recurrent expenditure making it problematic (emphasis added: Respondent 1, NAKDeF, 2017).

The quote reveals that project choices are influenced by the Foundation's wider institutional understanding of sustainable development which is largely based on what is affordable and would not necessitate recurrent running costs as well as what can be long lasting to showcase to other towns. This is in tune with what Newmont considers to be sustainable development as discussed in chapter five. The need to set the sustainable development agenda thus provides one explanation for the recuperation of decision-making power from the communities by the foundation.

7.6 Weapons of the weak: Resistance and contested narratives from below

The creation of new village level institutions and set of benefit sharing rules should imply that more people are given the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process about the use of the mine benefits. The results of the study so far indicate the decision making over benefits is not even despite the structural arrangement in place. Importantly, these decisions have been shown to reflect existing power relations and pursuits of interests. Figure 7.6 summarises the level of participation of the various actors in the decision-making process and how they influence the utilization of the community benefit funds.

Figure 7. 6 Level of Participation and Mine Impact Matrix



Source: Author's Construction based on Interviews

Even though the non-elites constitute those most affected by the mine development through the loss of their farmlands, they are unfairly less influential in the decision-making process. Hence, they are also less likely to have their interests and sustainable development goals met. As shown by this study, the board and the elites have more power and influence decisions, resource allocation and use.

Dynamics of the power relationships amongst the different actors is such that, the non-elites are obviously less powerful. This, however, does not mean that they are in tacit agreement with how the benefits are being shared. As Scott (1985) points out, weak actors have their own tactics which they use to register their displeasure. Analysis of the research data reveals two central tactics are used by the non-elites to register their displeasure at how the mining benefits are utilised. These include backstage talks and abandonment of projects.

7.6.1 Speaking truth behind power: The backstage talks

The backstage talks approach is one of the popular observable tactics used by the non-elites to demonstrate their resistance to power. Backstage talk encapsulates how the non-elites perceive those with power and what they say behind their backs. This approach is non-confrontational and is employed by the non-elites to avoid outcomes that can further jeopardize their interests. That is, without sacrificing the little gains they stand to receive from those that control the resources and decision-making arenas. The following quotes reflect how they show their resentment in relation to the sharing of benefits:

Non-elites' views of chiefs:

The non-elites across the three communities made negative if not disparaging remarks of their chiefs some of which include:

> *...they are getting their share, so their effort for the communities is a laughingstock. The chiefs think the people are fools. They always say they will do something, but they don't. As I speak to you only the chief has a generator in his house and uses it when lights go off. All the towns sleep in darkness, only the chief uses a generator. It tells you he is getting enough from Newmont. The leaders must love the town and the town must be first before their interests (Respondent 4, Community B, 2017).*
>
> *The chiefs don't tell us anything. The chiefs don't care about us. When we were at the hamlets they said they would build big houses for us. Now that they have brought us here they have abandoned us. They put on their expensive clothes and go to meet with Newmont officials and collect their share [money] and use it on their families forgetting about us (Respondent 5, Community C, 2017).*
>
> *Is the chiefs that share it [mine benefits]? They sit on it [appropriate] for their personal benefits. Look at community A and community B durbar grounds. Ours they are building is like a shackle. This is because our leaders don't think about us like other chiefs. We wanted market but they didn't do it for us, without any explanation (Respondent 7. Community C, 2017).*

Non-elites' views about Newmont:

The local people also expressed negative sentiments about Newmont, some of which include:

> *Newmont doesn't mind us anymore because they think they have finished with us. They don't mind. They just pretend. If you go to them they will tell you many things as if they are taken care of us. Now that they have created the Foundation, they don't mind us anymore (Respondent 2, Community C, 2017).*

> *Usually, there are conflicts due to the lies Newmont told the people about jobs. Even the few who get jobs are the lowest paid people in the company (Respondent 3, Community B, 2017).*

> *There are no jobs in this community. If I get the opportunity, I would sell this house and relocate. All the youth are just lying idle at home. I swear I am suffering in this community that Newmont has brought us. We want to do a demonstration. Is only the Newmont staff in the community that are working and enjoying (Respondent 5, Community C, 2017).*

On the surface, Newmont and the elites may present stories of development and fairness. They control the on-stage narrative which most often gets published in the corporate social responsibility reports of the company and annual reports of the foundation. However, the non-elites counterbalance this narrative with their own stories and views of the elites and how the resources are used. The sentiments shared by the non-elites embody their symbolic show of power and often outside the purview of powerful local elites. Their use of slander, accusations, and stories of hopelessness in the community amount to their own demonstration of power against the powerful. These backstage talks or 'infrapolitics' (Courpasson & Vallas 2016; Scott 2005) provide avenues for them to let out their frustrations of the situations they find themselves in. According to Scott (1985, p. 74) "it is only here that the terrain is relatively favorable to the meager arsenal of the disadvantaged".

7.6.2 Abandonment of projects

The use of words is not the only strategy used by the non-elites in showing their disapproval and resistance. They also do so in subtler covert ways. One way of doing so is by abandoning projects. As part of Newmont's sustainable development agenda, they have invested heavily in improved portable water systems for the communities. These include mechanized boreholes with electric pumps to deliver water to the resettled community. The clean water however, comes at a cost to the community as the system runs on electricity. The local people interviewed in the community revealed that they have to pay 50 *pesewas* per bucket of water fetched. This arrangement aligns with the company's sustainable development view that the projects should be self-sustaining and self-financing beyond the initial investments provided by the company. However, this arrangement is not acceptable to most of the people. They are of the view that the charge per bucket of water is beyond their means and does not reflect their poor income levels. It was explained that:

> *They promised to construct water for us…when we were in our hamlets we fetched water for free to drink but here you have to buy the water from the tap constructed by Newmont (FGD Participant, Community C, 2017).*

Another person in the FGD conducted in that community also remarked that:

> *They say they have done water for us as part of the package to resettle us here. But [my brother] can you imagine paying 50 pesewas for a bucket of water? In my house, my family is six [six-person household], so if all of us bathe one bucket in the morning how much will that be? How can I ford this? How is this development and improvement in my living condition as promised? (FGD Participant, Community C, 2017).*

It was agreed amongst the members of the focus group discussion held in that study community that fetching water freely from the streams and rivers when they were in their hamlets prior to the arrival of Newmont was more sustainable and beneficial in the long term (see Figure 7.7).

Figure 7. 7 An abandoned and rusting water system in Community C

Photo: Author, Fieldwork, 2017

According to the local villagers, they were more amenable to simple boreholes which would cost nothing to fetch the water from, rather than having the expensive systems put in. They also revealed that the only way they could challenge the water development decision was to find alternative ways of meeting their needs and abandoning the water project.

> *Newmont can do what they wish with the water, in any case, their workers who are residing in the community with us are able to afford it, so is useful to them (Respondent 3, Community C, 2017).*

This is interesting when it is contrasted with a quote from the African sustainability report of the company which highlights their investments in Water and Sanitation in mining communities in Ghana as part of meeting SDG-6 which calls for clean water and sanitation for all people.

> *We…work to integrate the relevant United Nations Sustainable Development Goals into our business. For the 'water and sanitation' goal (SDG-6)-one of our five priority SDGs and <u>for which we have in place many existing systems and projects such as our investments in potable water systems in host communities (emphasis added).</u>*

Here we see how community members are resisting the so-called sustainable development by Newmont. The irony of this is that the company contends that its sustainable development approach is in part reinforced by the desire to ensure that the communities own and use the projects and avoid the problem of abandonment as reported by other project sites of other companies.

7.7 Conclusion

This chapter has presented data outlining the processes involved in the distribution of mining benefit by Newmont. The chapter demonstrated that Newmont put in place governance measures to ensure the benefit-sharing process increases the participation of local people, both local elites and non-elites in decision-making. This is consistent with calls for greater participation of grassroots in decisions about their wellbeing and development. However, the results presented in this chapter also highlighted that despite Newmont's structural changes within the local communities, there is limited non-elite participation in the decision-making forums and actual influence on the direction and use of the foundation funds. The political realities of the communities underscored by their sociocultural context and enactment of power by powerful elites, ensures that benefit sharing decisions remain uneven. The results presented here and discussed in later chapters suggests that the nuances of context and the agency of actors are central factors in the linkages between mineral benefits sharing and sustainable development of mine-affected communities.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Discussion

8.0 Introduction

This research study set out primarily to investigate whether the sharing of mining benefits in Ghana is equitable and leads to sustainable development. This has become necessary in view of policy changes within the mining industry supported by organisations such as the International Council on Mining and Minerals to translate the mining industry from an enclave enterprise to a sustainable development model with a strong community focus. As highlighted in the literature review, not only is the concept of sustainable development highly contested, but some scholars and activists believe that the practice of mining is simply not compatible with a sustainable development ethos (Hamann & Kapelus 2004; Whitmore 2006). From an industry perspective, the sharing of benefits as a part of corporate social responsibility initiatives, along with a respect for local culture and grassroots participation are strong indications of the industry's contribution to sustainable development within host communities. Yet, opponents point to the environmental damages caused by mineral extraction, as well as the social disturbances at mining sites, taking these as signs that mining does not produce sustainable development outcomes for local people. The overwhelming evidence of these negative impacts has been well documented in the broader resource curse literature.

Beyond this, not much attention has been paid to how mineral windfalls are redistributed at the micro-community level or to the roles that social, political and economic complexities play in shaping the processes of mineral wealth redistribution and the consequent outcomes for sustainable development. This is despite the fact that sustainable development in the mining industry is intricately linked to the protection of local communities' benefits (Patel & Pressend 2002; Que *et al.* 2018). Understanding local-level processes and the roles of political and socioeconomic contextual factors is therefore important if redistributed mineral wealth is to translate into sustainable development for recipient mining communities.

This study has made important findings and makes a significant contribution to the literature. This discussion now synthesises these findings which can be termed the 'crisis of sharing' thesis. The argument is that, whilst mining communities in Ghana need sustainable development, the sharing of mining benefits has not been a panacea for it. This is not because of a paucity of resources or a lack of initiative by government and mining companies. Rather, inequitable and skewed redistribution of the mineral benefits, undergirded by the agency of powerful elites and by the disenabling local contexts, accounts for the limited impact of benefit sharing for sustainable development.

The 'crisis of sharing' thesis is developed around three themes: 1) class differences and sustainable development; 2) power; and 3) the importance of contexts.

Political ecology texts do not only disrupt normal expectations and reveal paradoxes, but also, and most importantly, help to plant the seeds of alternative ways of managing resources (Robbins 2012). In keeping with this approach, an important dimension of the 'crisis of sharing' thesis is to proffer alternative measures for managing and distributing mining benefits to the betterment of the rural poor in mining communities. Therefore, a discussion of alternative policy choices will be provided, recommending a benefit-sharing model for the Ghanaian context.

8.1 Class differences and sustainable development

The literature on sustainable development indicates that the concept remains contested, with people attaching different meanings, applying different principles and taking different approaches towards achieving it (Agyeman 2013; Connelly 2007). Scholars such as Agyeman (2013) have advanced the idea of a just sustainability that ensures that sustainable development is grounded on socially and environmentally just policies both within and between countries. Yet, much of the research on sustainable development and, for that matter, on its application in the mining industry fails to highlight what sustainable development means to different actors at the local level and how these differences in interpretation affect sustainable development practice. Differences within communities may mean that different groups of people are likely to view what constitutes sustainable development, its governance and implementation differently. Such community-level analysis is lacking in sustainable-mining literature (Que *et al.* 2018). Without properly illuminating differences or divergences at that level, achieving a sustainable development that is just and that engages the needs and aspirations of all groups of people would be difficult. As suggested by Que *et al.* (2018), the failure to identity community differences renders the understanding of sustainable development in mining one-dimensional.

This study makes an important contribution towards this limitation in the literature, by revealing that even within communities in one nation, there is no consensus on what should constitute sustainable development, or the approach that is required to achieve it. The study results have indicated that what constitutes sustainable development is a social construct aligned with class. This recognition of sustainable development as being normatively defined is an important starting point in the process of developing governance strategies that may lead to equity and social justice outcomes (Dale, Bay-Larsen & Skorstad 2018; Leach, Mearns & Scoones 1999). Analysis of the results shows that the construction of sustainable development parallels social class stratification within the mining communities. The results, based on interactions with different actors within the community, show that an actor's socioeconomic status has considerable influence on how they construe sustainable development. Figure 8.1 shows how different actors view sustainable development.

Figure 8. 1 A pyramid of sustainable development goals and timelines



Source: Author's Construction

The majority of the non-elites in the study group ground their understanding of sustainability on how to meet their livelihoods. Thus, their narrative of sustainable development is informed by their livelihood struggles. The majority of interviewees within this group share a difficulty in making ends meet and revealed that their living conditions have worsened since the onset of mining activities. It is not suprising, then, that interviews and focus group discussions with the non-elites revealed a preference for development based on mining wealth that could alleviate their livelihood struggles.

Conversely, the local elites are less worried about livelihood struggles, as they have relatively secure streams of income. They are more concerned with the infrastructural needs of their respective communities and with the promotion of culture. They see the proceeds from mining activities as a tool that can be used to elevate the status of their communities relative to other surrounding communities. They believe that the fact that they are a mining community should come with a higher level of socioeconomic status, associated with quality infrastructure and economic enterprises.

Thus, rather than prioritising the improvement of the basic livelihoods of the non-elite group, most of the people in the elite group view investment in social centres, school buildings and training colleges as key to achieving sustainable development in their mining communities. They regard mining benefits as an opportunity to repair the infrastructural deficits within their communities, due to the historical lack of developmental attention from the government. In addition, mining is construed by the local elite group as an avenue for maintaining and promoting cultural values. They place great emphasis on both material and non-material culture. While the local elite group value culture and its promotion as part of a sustainable development agenda, the same cannot be said of the non-elite group.

Newmont shares the livelihood concerns of the local people. However, sustainability for them is more about creating a legacy and securing social licence. This narrative of sustainable development is more in tune with profit-making motives and less about the wellbeing of the local people and their environment. Whilst their social investments may benefit the communities in the long term, Newmont also stands to reap some advantages from such investments. Investments in the form of infrastructure, for instance, could be a means of showcasing the company's track record and building both local and international credibility to obtain social licence for mining ventures in other communities. For example, Newmont gained credibility and consequently social licence for the Akyem project by ferrying the inhabitants of Akyem to its sister mine at Ahafo to view so-called sustainable development legacy projects, such as schools and water systems (Ofori & Ofori 2018b; Sydow 2016). This played a key role in convincing the inhabitants of Akyem to accept the mining project by Newmont.

Thus, when Newmont talks about sustainable development as being 'legacy creation', this may reflect their own interests rather than an act of benevolence to their host communities or an act of sustainable mining. This confirms an industry study conducted by Price Waterhouse Coopers (2001). In their study, which surveyed 32 large-scale mining companies, the majority of respondents identified financial success, enhanced shareholder value and long-term viability of the business as key factors for incorporating sustainable development into their operations (Price Waterhouse Coopers 2001). Within the industry, therefore, there is a strong link between business interests (gaining competitive advantage, maintaining the bottom line) and sustainability practices carried out as CSR at the local level (Louche, Idowu & Filho 2017; Porter & Kramer 2006).

The government's perspective on benefit sharing and sustainable development is encapsulated in the government policy document (Minerals and Mining Act of Ghana 2006). An analysis of the government's mining policy document discloses that promoting economic growth through the expansion of the mining industry is the main priority of the government's sustainable development agenda. The principles outlined in the document emphasise the need for environmental and social stewardship and the promotion of a sound economic environment to attract foreign investment into the mining sector. It is expected that the intensification of mining and the expansion of the mining industry will lead to increased mineral revenues and consequently economic growth. Yet, conventional economic growth has been documented to be unreliable in delivering a fair and just quality of life for all segments of society (Agyeman, 2013; Easterlin, 2015). The government's perspective on benefit sharing and sustainable development as outlined in the policy document does not clearly show how economic growth as a result of mining revenues may translate into positive social change for local mining communities and the protection of communal environmental resources.

This study also reveals that actors have short-term and long-term views of sustainable development, as reflected above in Figure 8.1. Sustainability from the ecological perspective means "the ability of the whole or parts of a biotic community to extend its form into the future" (Ariansen 1999 p. 84). What constitutes that 'future' however, depends on the actor in question. For most of the non-elite groups, the 'future' is rather short and could even mean tomorrow. This short-term perspective is influenced by the exigencies of the day (livelihood needs) rather than by a lack of concern for the future. The group of local elites, in contrast, envisage future growth for the communities, and hence hold a long-term perspective on sustainable development because their personal present-day livelihoods are secured. Newmont and the government also hold a relatively long-term view of sustainable development. They are looking beyond just the present needs of the people and envisaging how positive impacts of the mine can outlive the lifespan of the mine.

A long-term view of sustainable development is key to realising the objective of intergenerational equity, because mineral reserves deplete over time as extraction is carried out. This limits the opportunities available to future generations to carry out their own development based on mineral resources. A long-term view thus factors in the needs of such future generations who would be without mineral resources. The problem is how to marry such an objective with the short-term necessities of the non-elite group, who require investments in their livelihoods. Anand and Sen (2000) argument is most relevant here. According to them:

> *Not working toward guaranteeing the basic capabilities to the future generations would be scandalous, but in the same way, not working toward bringing those elementary capabilities within the reach of the deprived in the present generation would also be outrageous (p. 2030)*

8.1.1 Whose knowledge, whose development?

The dialectical debates or differences about what constitutes sustainable development thus foreshadow the crisis of sharing, because the lack of consensus among the different social stakeholders, particularly within the communities, means that it is difficult to determine what contribution by mining counts as sustainable development. Whilst plurality of ideas is good and should be encouraged, it also means that whatever shape development may take, one cannot guarantee that the outcomes would be accepted by all as constituting sustainable development. When we consider that community actors, businesses and governments have different interpretations of sustainable development, the pertinent issue is: whose knowledge or idea of development is being implemented as sustainable development? This study addresses this quandary by demonstrating that, within the local mining community setting, different actors possess divergent views of what should constitute sustainable development. The very fact that there are different meanings for the concept means also that it is a political question as much as the sharing of benefits is. Given that resources are limited, and that choices have to be made, it is to a large extent the interests and sustainability agendas of the local elite group that get implemented, to the detriment of the vulnerable non-elite group, who carry the greater burden of the mining impacts.

Consequently, sustainable development is a reflection of how power is aligned in society. What constitutes sustainable development and whether it is being achieved is based on the influence of the actor making such claims. Thus, Newmont for example, can confidently project to the wider global audience their social investments as sustainable development, and can be awarded for it. Yet, poor people for whom Newmont may speak in international arenas such as investment forums, have different ‘truths’ about sustainable development. This was made evident in Chapter Seven, in which it was shown that, besides the community leaders and Newmont, other stakeholders such as the local people viewed the current redistribution of mineral wealth as unfair; they felt that it was not producing sustainable development outcomes for them. This was because the leaders and to some extent the NAKDeF board were able to control the decision-making arenas to ensure that what they regard as sustainable development was achieved using the resources.

This thesis thus argues that the link between sharing mineral benefits and sustainable development comes down to who controls the decision-making arenas and how they view sustainable development. In other words, if you control decisions about how benefits are shared (i.e. access to and use of funds), you are more likely to see your version of sustainable development implemented. This is significant for the narrative on mining and sustainable development. From a political ecology perspective, sustainable development has frequently been viewed as a tool used by powerful actors such as the state and multinational corporations to perpetuate extractive relations (Bebbington 2012; Bebbington & Bury 2013; Bebbington & Williams 2008; Horowitz 2010) to the disadvantage of vulnerable local people, and as a form of resource enclosure in conservation policies to wrest resources from local people (Escobar 1998; Fletcher 2010; Khan 2013; Martin, Akol & Gross-Camp 2015).

This study adds to these narratives in a unique way by going beyond the dominant actors (i.e. companies and the state) to reveal how powerful local actors use the narrative of sustainable development to exclude members of their own local communities. It is clear from this research that the challenge in accounting for the underdevelopment of mining communities is not so much about resources or a lack of commitment to development by foreign mining companies but more about how the resources are shared, who does the sharing, and what priorities are deemed important as sustainable development outcomes. In this regard, we see the important role of local traditional leaders and, to an extent, of company officials in shaping the way that mineral wealth is redistributed.

Nonetheless, the divergence in interpretations provides useful lessons for understanding the concept of sustainable development as different actors view it. First, embodied in these different interpretations of sustainable development are powerful representations of actors’ experiences, values and interests, along with their interpretations of the problems of their social world and its possible solutions. Often, the interests of people within mining communities in developing countries are predefined by foreign mining companies and development consultants, making it almost impossible for local people to define their interests on their own terms. Several studies have alluded to this and have questioned the top-down approach of social investments by mining companies as part of CSR (Banks *et al.* 2013; Devenin & Bianchi 2018; Fordham, Robinson & Van Leeuwen 2018). In essence, what local people consider as their needs differs from what experts propose as their needs (Macdonald 2017). To resolve this 'expert ignorance' (Macdonald 2017 p.603), Warhurst (2001) has advocated for a tri-sector partnerships approach to the undertaking of sustainable development initiatives within the mining sector. It is evident therefore that communities or rural settings are the appropriate settings for tackling issues of sustainable development based on their views rather than corporate board rooms, national government cabinet forum or international development summits.

Second, it is worth noting that the variations in how sustainable development is interpreted also demonstrate that community knowledge systems, interests and values are not homogeneous. What community leaders claim to be the interests of their communities is likely to be different from the reality for ordinary people. This supports other studies that suggest that community leaders should be given less priority in development decisions that affect their subjects (Capps & Mnwana 2015; Mnwana & Akpan 2009). It also reinforces recent studies that seek to demonstrate community differences and expose the limitations of the narrow conceptualisations of mining communities by companies which often reinforce the power of community leaders (Kapelus 2002; Mayes, McDonald & Pini 2014; Welker 2009).

Third, the concentration of economic power within corporations means that they can wield enormous power over societies. There is therefore, a real danger of businesses such as Newmont entrenching their view of sustainable development into the dominant discourse of society (Cerin 2003; Laine 2005). The indoctrination of sustainable development within local discourse as the path to development by Newmont attests to the significant control that such global corporations have over local discourses. The challenge is that while these local communities may outstrip their environmental resources in the name of sustainable development, the critical aims of the concepts such as social equity and poverty alleviation may never be met, due to how the concept of sustainable development is perceived differently and how its practice is political.

The point made in this thesis, similar to other political ecology texts, is that it is not just a matter of who possesses certain knowledges or ideas about sustainable development, but how those ideas, knowledge and agendas are ritualised in practice (Escobar 1998; Fletcher 2010; Krauss 2018; McGee 2016). The divergence in interpretation of what should constitute sustainable development is a recipe for tensions in practice and for unequal access to benefits (Krauss 2018). In this study, it was evident how interpretations of sustainable development are deployed through different strategic means by powerful actors in the sharing of the mining benefits. Thus, it is subjective views, rather than collective decisions, that are central to what gets implemented.

8.2 Power, resources and elite capture

The sharing of mining benefits has to an extent failed to improve the living conditions of the case study communities as a result of how power mediates access to, and use of, the mineral funds provided by the government and Newmont. Thus, at the heart of the crisis of sharing mineral benefits for sustainable development is the implicit workings of power within the mining communities and between communities and external stakeholders such as government and mining companies.

In Chapter Three, it was noted scholarly attention has paid less attention to the role of power relations in the process of mining benefit-sharing analysis (Caine & Krogman 2010). The findings of this research, which shed light on the politics and power relations between actors (Chapters Six and Seven), make significant contributions to the literature on the dynamic relationship between power and access to resources at the community level (Caine & Krogman 2010; Ribot & Peluso 2003; Tsuma 2007). This research demonstrates that the sharing of mining revenues for the purposes of sustainable development takes place within the dynamics of power and operates at a tangent to the broad political economy of mining and development in Ghana.

Whilst government, the company Newmont, traditional chiefs, local elites and other actors interviewed, claim to subscribe to the sustainable development agenda through benefit sharing, important questions that need to be asked are ‘whose idea of sustainable development is being pursued;’ and ‘what constitutes such a sustainable development?’ The findings here show that sustainable development through benefit sharing is largely influenced by power rather than real needs of the local poor people. This research therefore lends credence to the broader argument by Ribot and Peluso (2003) that access to resources or benefit streams are constituted within a 'bundle of power' that constrains or enables people to gain, control and maintain access to benefits. Drawing from the political ecology and the three faces of power framework as outlined in Chapter Three, the micropolitics of access to and control over the streams of mining benefits are discussed subsequently. The discussion underscores the significance of actor agency and unequal power relations in the creation of winners and losers in the distribution of benefits and costs of mining (Ahlborg & Nightingale 2018; Ribot & Peluso 2003; Tsuma 2009). The use of the actor-oriented perspective in this research as is the case with many political ecology texts have shed light on the injustices occasioned by actor agencies that underlie the benefit sharing schemes (Svarstad, Benjaminsen & Overå 2018).

8.2.1 Pseudo and actual access (and control): Overt power manifestations

It has been suggested that the sure means by which social investments by the extractive industries can have sustainable development impact in project affected communities is by giving beneficiary communities the opportunity to make autonomous decisions and opportunities to choose their own projects (Macdonald 2017). This according to Macdonald (2017) is the essence of participation and an argument well established in the CSR literature (Gilberthorpe & Banks 2012; Kemp 2010; Suopajärvi *et al.* 2016). Without recapitulating the tenets of this argument, generally, the point is to align CSR practices to the sustainable development principle of participatory equity by giving mining communities more voice and control over mining led development processes. Whilst not underestimating the significance of community participation in decision making structures, the results of this study are indicative that the mere participation of community populations in decision making structures does not translate into actual access to and control over mine benefits or development resources. The communities it appears have their fate in their hands (Suopajärvi *et al.* 2016) however, they do not necessarily control it. Juxtaposed to calls for community 'fate control' in CSR literature (Suopajärvi *et al*. 2016), this present thesis contends that there is a difference between having your fate in your hands and controlling that fate. The invitation for the communities into the decision-making spaces by Newmont provided opportunities for the communities to gain benefits, however this did not guarantee that the poor would benefit significantly (McDermott & Schreckenberg 2009). People need both access to the decision-making arenas and a control over the resources. From the analysis of the decision-making structures, an important distinction can be made between pseudo access (and control) and actual access (and control) of resources.

The decision of Newmont to share power with the communities by giving them control to choose their own development projects to be implemented with the Foundation funds is consistent with calls for an end to the 'top-down approach' to CSR, and the adoption of a community driven approach. The communities as a whole obviously have gained to a large extent, access to and control over the development resources through the foundation. This however is pseudo access and control when decision making structures within the communities are analysed critically. Newmont may not have power over the ultimate decisions in the use of the resources, but this only represents a shift in power base from the company to other dominant local actors. The shift of power from Newmont as the dominant actor creates the false impression that communities have access to and control over resources when in fact it is the community leaders who command these resources. The inclusion of chiefs' representatives on the SDCs (guaranteed by rules of Newmont), their superior education and knowledge about development exhibited, as well as the reverence non-elites (including SDC members) bestow on the chiefs, broadly suggests who has power over the decision making structures and indeed actual access to and control over the resources.

The case study revealed instances where chiefs from their superior knowledge exercise influence overtly in the selection of projects such as community social centre over non-elites' preferences. The study results reinforce previous studies that indicate that decision-making actually is the preserve of those who control power within the local community system (Li 2006). Democratising CSR programming by including communities in decision-making structures without paying closer attention to how decision-making power is negotiated within the mining communities is therefore problematic. The push to implement CSR programs that promote community participation may not always result in equitable and sustainable development outcomes such as poverty alleviation if differences within communities are not given attention. This is because communities by their nature are made up of power blocks where power imbalances are determinants in access to resources and benefits (Cooke & Kothari 2001; Hunter 2017; Kummitha 2017). Community elites usually are fully aware of these power asymmetries in their communities which they can take advantage of (Gaventa 2005; Mnwana 2014).

The push for greater community participation in CSR practices and benefits sharing in general must therefore be contextualised within the social power dynamics that exist in mining communities. Demands for greater participation is insufficient without a consideration of the rules that govern the participation process and their balancing effect on pre-existing unequal power relations in society as well as the agencies of actors. The design of new participatory structures that can give actual access and control to poor vulnerable groups within communities must pay key attention to community differences (Adhikari, Kingi & Ganesh 2014) and how power is negotiated in decision making arenas locally (Borrini & Jaireth 2007). In relation to CSR approaches that adopt benefits sharing agreements, it must be clearly understood from the onset that the impact of the revenues generated on the beneficiary communities goes beyond the governance system adopted (O'Faircheallaigh 2018). It is important to focus attention on the community polity as well.

8.2.2 Struggle for resources vs struggle over resources: Manifestations of covert power

Overtly, by looking at decision making structures including the rules of engagement and the actors involved, it is clear who the dominant actors are and who potentially controls access to community resources. How the actual access and control over the resources are negotiated however can also occur in subtle ways such as agenda setting or deployment of covert power relations (Akram, Emerson & Marsh 2015; Andreassen & Crawford 2013; Gaventa 2005). The second dimension of power, covert power, manifests in instances where important issues are ignored or not tabled for discussion. This type of power is exercised by the local elites by defining what are the important issues or struggles in the local company-community relations. The mining and sustainable development discourse in Ghana is largely dominated by the demand of local communities for more mining resources from the government and large-scale mining companies. In academic literature, this struggle both in relation to Ghana and other resource-dependent countries is defined and constructed by asking the question - 'are communities getting enough from extractive industries?' (Aubynn 2004; Hilson & Banchirigah 2009; Jenkins & Obara 2006). In Ghana, Chiefs for example have led a sustained campaign to demand their share of mineral royalties (as seen Chapter 6). These questions or demands are not negative in themselves given the externalities of mining borne by mining communities (Hilson 2002a; Hilson & Potter 2003; Hilson & Yakovleva 2007).

However, the question can be turned on its head and posed as 'what do communities do with the benefits obtained from mining'? From this study, besides the overarching struggle for resources between communities on one hand, and the state and companies on the other, it is clear that there is another important struggle going on. That is, the struggle over the resources provided by the state and companies from extractives. This struggle is defined by the important questions of procedural and distributive equity as it relates to finding out who gets what and how within the communities. This sub-struggle is important for the achievement of sustainable development because resources are limited and there are different sustainability agendas within the local context. This study shows that the struggle for resources is in fact by itself an important tool used by powerful elites to conflate and covertly draw attention away from the struggle over resources. The chiefs through 'mobilisation-bias' set the agenda (what issues are included and what issues are excluded) of the local mining politics (Lukes 1974).

Co-optation of the youth by the chiefs reported in this study is a classic example of covert power being deployed to control actual access to the mineral benefits through agenda setting. Rather than the youth being engaged in an agenda of 'framing what to do or how to share' the available resources provided by Newmont and the government, they are directed covertly by the chief into a struggle with the company over 'how much' resources are being obtained by the communities. As indicated in interviews chiefs are usually behind community protests against the company. The youth through the protests are immersed in the narrative of Newmont not doing enough for their community (struggle for resources). Consequently, they (youth/non-elites) become less engaged in the important discussion of what the available resources already being provided are used for (struggle over resources). This effectively, pits the community against the company rather than non-elites (youth inclusive) against their community leaders (elites) and SDCs. Indeed, the control of the agenda by the local elites ensures effectively that how the resources are used in the communities become non-issues (Gaventa 1982). This ensures that the interests of the local elites are protected at the expense of the community interest without the necessity of an open confrontation within the communities. This covert strategy of the chiefs perhaps explains why even though they capture decisions and resources, there are no conflicts compared to other similar studies that report conflicts (Arellano-Yanguas 2011b; Filer 1990). More importantly, with regards to the participation and CSR literature, it can be realised that marginalization of poor people in decision making is not just about community apathy or a lack of invitation from mining companies to decision making arenas. Instead, it is essentially, a product of how powerful actors within communities control what gets onto the public agenda in the first place (Akram, Emerson & Marsh 2015).

Further to the co-optation of the youth, the inclusion of the chief's representatives on the SDCs has invariably ensured that the powerful local elites control the decision-making process in 'less obvious ways' (Gaventa 2005). The SDCs constrain the development options available to the communities whenever they make the communities choose from a set of ideas or projects. By presenting to the communities few options of projects to choose from, the power of the communities to select their preferences of projects is significantly undermined. This is akin to Hay's (2002) conceptualisation of covert power as content shaping. Likewise, Hayward's (2000) understanding of power as the ability to define boundaries of possibilities is also most relevant here. Holding constant other factors such as poverty and community conflicts that limits the participation of non-elites in decision making, even if everyone were to attend meetings, their ability to proffer their sustainability agendas or needs is greatly bounded by the scope of options the SDCs present to them. Other options of projects that they may have are effectively foreclosed. Thus, even though it appears there is community participation in the selection of projects, there is no participation parity (Fraser 1999), and opportunities for distributive equity are curtailed. The non-elites are participating in the benefit sharing process not as equals. The subtle ways in which power is used to influence the benefit sharing process creates a sense of community participation which is central to the sustainable development agendas of Newmont and the chiefs but in fact it only reinforces in disguise social exclusion and marginalisation of vulnerable people in the communities. It can be said that while participation of communities was intended to correct the top-down company led model of CSR (Gilberthorpe & Banks 2012; Macdonald 2017), it subtly perpetuates social exclusion and inequalities.

8.2.3 False socialisation: Manifestation of latent power

Latent power is a form of power that operates through socialised consent (Gaventa 2005; Mnwana 2014). Cultural and ideological as well as ideational hegemony are used by powerful actors to influence people's minds into a false view of their own interests, believes or desires (Akram, Emerson & Marsh 2015; Lukes 1974; Scott-Villiers & Oosterom 2016). The deployment of such a power in the sharing of mining benefits for sustainable development works to get the local people to do things they otherwise would not have done.

The idea of sustainable development has been used within the local setting to socialise the people into accepting mining to the detriment of their agricultural livelihoods and loss of farmlands. The narrative of sustainable development through mining is a public transcript controlled by powerful actors such as Newmont. Sustainable development has served as a powerful tool used by the company to shape the mindset of the people (both elites and non-elites) in anticipation of mining benefits and improvement in their wellbeing. The people have been socialised to see employment in the mine and other mine benefits central to their livelihoods compared to farming. This exemplifies how knowledge or what is considered to be the truth has disciplined the mindset and behaviour of the local people (Foucault 1995; Ribot & Peluso 2003). Thus, rather than using coercive means to appropriate the farmlands of the people, the idea of sustainable development through the sharing of benefits has been strategically used to shape mindset and interests of the local people. It appears progressively most of the local people are losing interest in farming not just because of the loss of their farmlands but also the growing sense of dependency on mine benefits popularised through the idea of sustainable development. Ideas and practices that discipline can ensure people act in ways that are against their wishes without use of apparent force (Ribot & Peluso 2003; Svarstad, Benjaminsen & Overå 2018).

8.3 Importance of context: Culture, poverty and weak structures.

According to Lukes (2005) power is significant in as much as it is able to exact compliance. He observes that "the power of the powerful consists in their being capable of and responsible for affecting (negatively or positively) the interests of others" (Lukes 2005, p. 68). This present thesis has demonstrated the significant role of power in shaping the process, actor interactions and eventual outcomes of the sharing of mining benefits. However, power does not operate in a vacuum. Deviating from the views of Lukes, this study concurs with Morriss (1987)'s view that powerlessness and inequality is not only as a result of domination by the powerful, but instead is connected to real world social arrangements. The sociocultural and economic context of the mining communities as well as the benefit sharing structures have provided the stage for the enactment of the unequal access to and use of mining benefits. The social arrangements surrounding the benefit sharing process have played a catalytic role in ensuring the unequal access and use of the mineral benefits or simply the *crisis of sharing*. In this regard, there are four main contextual factors that constrain communities from fully participating as equals in decision making and hinder equal access to resource benefits. These include culture, poverty and structural deficiencies (accountability measures, legal framework,). These will be discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.

Culture is influential in the redistribution of resources. Culture can be understood as the ideas, beliefs, practices and institutions that are passed on from generation to generation (Crehan 2002). Historically, culture can serve as a tool for domination. Gramsci for example postulated the ability of elites to coerce the consent of non-elite population through cultural hegemony (Entwistle 2009; Lears 1985). Whilst actor agency enables powerful actors such as chiefs and national and local political elites to direct and shape the outcomes of the benefit sharing process, the culture of these communities plays a role in maintaining and reinforcing the power of actors. This however does not suggest that culture is to blame for the inequitable distribution of resources. By itself, culture is not inimical to the efficient sharing of resource benefits. Rather, it is how the communities' value systems and norms have been exploited by the elites that ensures a skewed sharing process.

Culturally, it is inappropriate in Ghana to openly question the actions or inactions of chiefs. The inability of the people to openly question the authority of their chiefs and exact accountability has resulted in uneven decision making. The chiefs rely on this value system to ensure that they have the final say. This serves as a countervailing force to the participatory mechanisms put in place by Newmont for example. The inability of people to participate fully in these decisions-making arenas because they believe the chiefs would always have the final word effectively legitimises the dysfunctional power of the chiefs. Dealing with the power of the chiefs would mean significant cultural modifications to check the extent to which chiefs can influence the benefit sharing process. However, as noted previously, the chiefs are so crucial in exacting resources from external actors that it would be difficult to attenuate their influence.

Secondly, the cultural values of the communities do not make provision for mechanisms that require transparency and accountability from the chiefs. As chiefs are not expected by virtue of their position to explain their actions or inactions to communities, they have a greater leeway to capture mineral royalties paid by government. The royalties which were originally meant for the development of the communities is being appropriated for the maintenance of the chieftaincy. Because culturally the chiefs believe they are not obliged to account to the subjects, it was not surprising that in all three study communities' non-elites knew little about the royalty payments. Lack of information limits undoubtedly avenues for accountability (Stiglitz 1999). This opaqueness and poor governance system undergirded by the local norms makes somewhat mockery of the functional power exerted by the chiefs to force the government to pay the royalties.

If governments and extractive companies are enjoined to improve transparency and accountability of extractive revenues (Karl 2007) it is perhaps time chiefs are also held to a similar standard. A starting point for this would be for government to publish locally what they pay to chiefs. That way, even if chiefs from a cultural perspective feel they don't need to account to their subjects, at least the subjects would know what the chiefs are receiving as royalties. Undoubtedly, the mere availability of this information alone will not bring about change for the local people (Ofori & Lujala 2015). Nonetheless, the public availability of such information would serve as a form of deterrence to the chiefs from abusing the resources. Ultimately, there would be the need to reconcile the legal provisions governing the redistributed revenues with the sociocultural realities. It cannot be business as usual where chiefs have the free will to decide what to do with the revenues and the people are culturally handicapped to demand accountability. The law must be amended to clearly define what the royalties are to be used for locally and the procedures to be followed. Alternatively, the royalties must be redeployed into a new scheme as suggested below. Both alternatives will of course require political will from the national political elites or significant pressure from below as a countervailing power. Either ways, the instrumentality of actors, their interests and agencies in the governance of resources in relation to structures is evident (Ahlborg & Nightingale 2018; Tsuma 2009).

Besides culture, the economic inequality of the mining communities also has a bearing on how power influences the sharing of the mining resources. One of the central objectives of sustainable development and for that matter the sharing of mining benefits is the alleviation of poverty. The study results indicate that a vicious cycle of poverty ensures an unequal access to resources and the making of decisions. The results revealed that in some cases, members of the communities are reluctant to take part in decision making forums relative to mining benefits because they prefer to spend their time carrying out livelihood activities. The lack of participation from the wider community therefore encourages the situation where a few people (mostly the elite) make decisions with regards to mining benefits. Unfortunately, these decisions are not always reflective of the needs and interests of the wider community. This reinforces power imbalances within the communities and provides the powerful an opportunity to make decisions and implement projects that are based on their idea of sustainable development. Consequentially, poor segments of the communities lose out on projects that can truly alleviate their poverty. Poverty in itself therefore serves as an impediment to the process of participatory development (Scott-Villiers & Oosterom 2016; Verba & Nie 1987) which in turn leads to more poverty and results in a vicious cycle.

Institutional weaknesses also serve as a catalyst for the observed crisis of sharing. These can be looked at in two ways-procedural weaknesses and practice weaknesses. Procedural weaknesses relate particularly to the government royalty payments. The lack of definitive rules informing the chiefs as two what specifically to expend the royalties on creates opportunities for abuse of the funds to the detriment of the non-elites. If the chiefs have no guidelines to follow, then it is difficult to later hold them to account for misusing the royalties. More so, as identified in chapter six, the state through its various institutions have no procedures in place to hold to account the chiefs. This is possibly linked to the political clientelism relations existing between chiefs and political elites in the country. In terms of practice weaknesses, this is seen largely in the form of a lack of technical capacities of members of the SDCs. This does not only undermine their important role in the sharing process but importantly to the influence of the better educated chiefs.

The discussion so far pulls together the key point that inherent in the sharing of mining benefits for sustainable development of mining communities is a sharing problem. This problem of sharing is linked to differences in how sustainable development is construed locally by actors and how powerful actors within the confines of their social context enact their sustainable development agendas. For sustainable mining debates therefore, it is no longer just a question of whether or not mining can contribute to sustainable development (Fitzpatrick, Fonseca & McAllister 2011; Hilson & Murck 2000; Kirsch 2010; Whitmore 2006). Neither is the debate about extractive relations only about the exploitative activities of the state and global capitalist organisation against poor communities (Addison & Roe 2018; Bebbington 2009; Bebbington *et al*. 2008; Cuba *et al.* 2014; Jenkins 2016). Internal community struggles over resource benefits is central to the effects of extractives. How resource benefits are negotiated within the polity of mining communities must be given more attention in analysis.

8.4 Reflections on and some implications of the research findings

8.4.1 Equity in practice and politics of sustainable development

Central to sustainable development thinking is the emphasis on equity, but what do differences in knowledge mean for equity? The premise of this line of thinking is that the costs and benefits of development must be equally distributed within and between the present and future generations. This thesis agrees with the position that equity in decision-making or procedural equity influences distributive equity (Corbera & Schroeder 2011; Gebara 2013). This is fundamental to the demand for greater community participation in benefits sharing processes particularly CSR. This position is reinforced by the findings of this research that at the local level different actors have different sustainable development priorities. It is without doubt that benefit sharing agreements that promote participatory decision-making processes and community control have merits and are in concert with the goals of sustainable development. Including project beneficiaries in decisions about project selection, design and management are central to achieving participatory and distributional equity (Keenan, Kemp & Ramsay 2016). A number of scholars have stressed the importance of local knowledge in community development and sustainable development in general (Eversole 2010; Kolawole 2001; Sillitoe, Bicker & Pottier 2002; Vitasurya 2016). Outsider experts or company officials may not fully understand the social context and the needs of the communities they are engaging with (Eversole 2010; Uphoff 1993). It would thus appear that, the shift by mining companies from top-down models of CSR in their practice of sustainable mining to bottom-up processes is well grounded both within the CSR and development literature in general. The findings of this research however provide important insights for the community engagement practices of mining companies and the literature in general. Whilst local knowledge is important in community development, mining companies and for that matter development practitioners must constantly be aware of differences in local knowledge. Obtaining information from local people does not necessarily mean that the information is representative of the community's needs or knowledge system. Who provides the information is of significance and practitioners must be aware of unequal power relations that may project one idea or knowledge over another. This study highlighted this by revealing discrepancies between local elites' and non-elites' perceptions of what should constitute sustainable development for their communities. Sustainable development underlined by procedural equity therefore goes beyond the creation of participation spaces or the inclusion of local knowledge in decisions. Whose knowledge is being incorporated, and how that knowledge is representative of wider community aspirations, is the key. Thus, practitioners must hasten with caution in seeking to achieve social equity through participatory approaches.

This thesis has also demonstrated important ramifications for the politics of sustainable development. Sustainable development has emerged as a global ethic or norm (Lafferty 1996). Bäckstrand (2006) contends that the governance of sustainability norms through international forums is a form of deliberative stakeholder practices that has democratic potential. This however, is not always the case as negotiations over sustainability concerns such as climate change usually have pitted governments in the industrialised global north against governments in the global south (Beer 2014). Often in the middle of these negotiations are civil society groups with their own agendas. The role and influence of NGOs in influencing global standards in relation to sustainable development has been extensively discussed and theorised (Edwards & Gaventa 2014; Elliott 2004; Gemmill & Bamidele-Izu 2002). The evolution of sustainable development has provided other stakeholders such as communities an opportunity to reassess their resource use and social justice concerns (Raco 2005). This thesis highlights importantly the different scales at which contestations over sustainable development (policies, programmes and ideas) take place. Disagreements are not only between nation states or between global leaders and civil society organisations at international summits. The politics of sustainable development is multilevel and very much alive at the community level. Scholarly discussions of the politics of sustainable development however ignores the local level nuances and politics. How the interests and ideas of national governments and NGOs for instance intersect with local community interests is often taken for granted. As exemplified in this study, the views of governments can be quite different from those of the people they claim to represent. Suggesting that local notions of sustainable development be incorporated into global sustainable development agendas may be farfetched if not impossible. However, it is important that the local politics of sustainable development is further explored and articulated by civil society actors.

8.4.2 Sharing Power: The reality and rhetoric of participation

Procedural fairness hinged on participation parity is necessary for benefit sharing schemes that produce equitable and legitimate outcomes (Hernes, Jentoft & Mikalsen 2005; Wynberg & Hauck 2014). To achieve this, it is often taken to mean that companies and the state must share power with mining communities. However, at the heart of power sharing is the question of the role of actors in decision-making arenas and project implementation processes (Nursey-Bray & Rist 2009). How power is shared within communities and especially implementation of specific projects is as much relevant as sharing of power between the companies, the state and the communities.

The study results here show that unlike the government's approach to the sharing of benefits, Newmont has made important attempts at sharing power with and within the affected mining communities. However, there is the reality that despite the spaces for participation provided, not all the locals actively engage in the decision-making process and benefit from the shared mineral revenues. Thus, whilst institutional arrangements put in place by Newmont have progressively increased participation, equity in participation (parity of participation) (Fraser 1998) is a long shot from being realised. There are several useful lessons to be learnt from this.

There is the need to recognise the uneasy marriage between culture and democratic processes. Democratising decision making processes through the establishment of formal institutions can control unwanted behaviours of local elites but may not significantly alter embedded power structures within communities (Labonte 2012). Thus rather than viewing community participation as occurring in a 'romanticised democratic space', it is critical to see it as a mirror of the sociocultural and political context in which it is enacted (Maconachie 2012, p. 262). The strong ties of people to traditions has a preserving effect on the hold of power by community leaders. In some societies such as rural Ghana, governance processes must be seen to be intricately linked to enduring value systems such as respect for traditional authority. Thus, western ideals of openness and 'majority rules' have limitations in contexts where traditions ensure community leaders remain influential in decisions making spaces. Thus, when viewed against the counterintuitive transformations and resurgence in chiefly authority taking place in Africa, as documented by Comaroff and Comaroff (2018), it means that more work is required to ensure participatory governance becomes deeply rooted in such societies.

Linked to the above, it is worth noting that institutions take time to be built and to function effectively (Schreckenberg, McDermott & Pottinger 2009). Deep rooted norms, behaviours and socioeconomic factors can prolong the expected time frame that societies yield to change or newly created institutions. Contextual influences for example such as poverty, culture and weak structures have bearings on the time it takes for institutions to take root. It will take time for people to recognise that their participation in the decision-making process relative to their economic wellbeing is as important as their individual pursuit of livelihood strategies. Better education over time can help poor people develop the understanding that their participation in the decision-making processes is key to obtaining benefits that can impact their economic wellbeing and wrest resources from local elites.

Beyond this, participatory approaches are often based on problematic notions of solidarity within communities (Cleaver 2001). They ignore historically embedded conflicts which can be structural constraints to community wide inclusiveness in decision-making. This also prolongs the time it takes for all segments of a community to fully embrace new participatory institutions. Thus, even where elite power is absent and inclusive participatory processes are provided, not everyone would participate as highlighted in one community in this study. The notion that communities are homogenous and the existence of community solidarity must be dispelled (Cooke & Kothari 2001). Resolving such deep-seated conflicts first is essential to any long-term effectiveness of participatory measures.

8.4.3 Sustainable development and community cohesion

Social class differentiation within local communities provides a lens for reassessing goals of sustainability. This study suggests that different classes of people have different needs and goals which must be factored into sustainable development decision-making and planning. Present needs must not be sacrificed for future ambitions and vice versa. The dichotomy between long-term investments in projects such schools as a form of sustainable development and meeting short-term needs of the people proves a challenge. The short-term view held by the non-elites influenced by their living conditions makes it difficult for them to appreciate the long-term view held by the elites. It is hard for most of the local people to accept the idea that investments in physical infrastructure would lead to social progress in the communities. Thus, incongruence of people’s present circumstances and the long-term visions of their leaders makes it difficult to define an acceptable path for sustainable development locally.

The dichotomy between short and long-term goals portends the development of internal social conflict. The pursuit of long-term goals and legacy by the local elites and Newmont based on their understanding of sustainable development can create friction in view of the short-term views or needs of the local people. There is the potential that choices made by the elites can lead to friction within the communities when the ordinary people feel their leaders are not pursuing their interests or needs. Whilst local people have strong resentments towards their chiefs and Newmont, the evidence from this study does not suggest that any open conflicts exist currently. If existing literature is anything to go by, the likelihood of conflicts developing in these communities in future cannot be underestimated (Arellano-Yanguas 2011a; Filer 1990).

8.4.4 Sustainable development and the place of the environment

Agyeman, Bullard and Evans (2003, p.2) outlining their thesis for 'just sustainabilities' argued that "a truly sustainable society is one where wider questions of social needs and welfare and economic opportunity are integrally connected to environmental concerns". Similarly, the Sustainable Development Agenda 21, suggests that actors "must ensure socially responsible economic development whilst protecting the resource base and the environment for the benefit of future generations" (UNCED 1992, p. 807). Over the years, therefore, the sustainable development discourse has been dominated by a concern for ecological sustainability (Åhman 2013). Yet the results of the study indicate that few actors included the idea of environmental sustainability into their local definition of sustainable development. Analysis of actors' interpretation of sustainable development indicates there is very little integration of environmental consideration into their social and economic thought. Neither local elites nor non-elites for example demonstrated any regard for the protection of their environment from mining or their own livelihood practices. This is rather worrying given existing knowledge about poor people and environmental degradation (Benjaminsen 2015; Blaikie 2016; Perreault, Bridge & McCarthy 2015; Robbins 2011).

More so, it also reveals that within the local scheme of things, actors are likely to maximize their mining benefits as compared to the protection of ecological systems. The lack of focus on environmental considerations, as opposed to meeting of socioeconomic sustainability, has led to increased over- utilization of environmental resources of the communities. There is increased consumption of environmental goods/space besides those already taken up by the mining project. This is evident in the increasing clearing of hitherto unencumbered forested lands for farming for the creation of sustainable livelihoods. The company, according to the representative interviewed, helped about 2010 farmers to cultivate new lands. Support in the form of payments for land clearing, free seedlings, and agricultural extension advisory services were provided for the farmers to cultivate new lands. Not only are local people being encouraged and supported with inputs to cultivate new lands as individual households, corporate farming is also being espoused and developed. Some of the communities such as the New Settlement community are also being supported to develop large community farms. This, in theory, would contribute positively to the food security and economic needs of the local people. However, at the same time, it implies the destruction of forest cover and disruption of biodiversity resources as hitherto unfarmed forest lands are cleared. The pursuit of sustainable development with limited consideration of ecological concerns is likely to be self-defeating in the long run (Dernbach 1998).

8.5 Policies for high-value contribution of mine benefits to sustainable development

The results of this study underscore the need for a system that translates the good intentions of mining companies and government into good outcomes. The crisis of sharing which hinders the sustainable development of the mining communities is not a revenue problem. Whilst increasing the revenue share of the communities is desirable, it would not be beneficial if it is not utilised efficiently and in the interest of the majority. Addressing the crisis of sharing therefore means mitigating the challenges associated with the sharing processes which essentially is about balancing local power relations and prioritising the sustainability agendas of the poor vulnerable non-elites in the mining communities. Given the resurgence in the influence of chiefly authority in Africa (Comaroff & Comaroff 2018) and the strong hold of cultural norms, rebalancing power away from local chiefs is no mean task. The recommendations made here are aimed at redirecting the mine benefits away from chiefs (rather than unsettling local norms) and creating avenues for non-elites to gain access to the benefits stream.

Benefit sharing agreements and the use of a foundation generally are most favoured in the literature and the industry as mechanisms for distributing mineral benefits to communities. However, having provided a sound understanding of the workings of this mechanism of benefit sharing schemes and their limitations in Ghana, there is the need for new approaches that ensure not just more procedural and distributional equity but also sustainability. Such a new approach must be one that considers contextual influences including existing structures and power asymmetries. It must be an approach that is holistic and systematic in nature capable of delivering benefits to all stakeholders (Corder 2017) and importantly balances the exercise of power away from elites.

While benefit sharing agreements and foundations are effective instruments for the redistribution on mineral wealth, direct cash transfers to beneficiary citizens (as practiced in Alaska, Canada) have also been suggested as a plausible approach for developing countries (Gelb & Majerowicz 2011; Standing 2014; Widerquist & Howard 2016). This approach would involve paying directly some share of the mineral revenues to all citizens or those located in areas where the minerals are mined. Ideally, this would mean that citizens can decide to invest such revenues by themselves in activities that can meet their perceived sustainable development goals (Rodon, Lemus-Lauzon & Schott 2018). It is without doubt that such suggestions do have merit and can mitigate the governance challenges such as elite capture of decisions and resources. This is particularly even more compelling having noted in this research the differences in what people expect sustainable development outcomes to be. Some evidence of cash transfers suggest that poor beneficiaries actually do invest such monies into productive activities to improve their household wellbeing (Cirillo & Giovannetti 2018). This notwithstanding, in the case of Ghana, sharing ten percent of the government's mineral royalty with all citizens in mining areas would not generate significant income per head for a substantial productive investment at the individual level. It is also unclear the willingness of foreign mining companies to undertake such initiatives given their interest in the creation of legacies to secure their social licence. Such direct payments can also provoke tensions between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries (O'Faircheallaigh 2013; Rodon, Lemus-Lauzon & Schott 2018).

Thus, rather than discarding the current benefit sharing mechanisms for an entirely new system, there is the need to make structural modifications that tackle the crisis of sharing problem. To this end, an Integrated Resource Sharing Policy framework or model which builds on the current benefit sharing system is suggested.

8.5.1 An integrated resource sharing model

The understanding of the dynamics of power and contextual influences on the process and outcomes of the benefit sharing mechanisms that formed the case studies for this research has informed this suggested model. The goal is to develop a benefit sharing system that departs from agency-oriented to one that is not only community involvement oriented but also highly regulated. Central to the Integrated Resource Sharing Model is the recommendation for the setting up of a Mining Area Development Foundation in each mining area of Ghana. Besides the Foundation, it is also recommended several changes are made in terms of the benefit sharing legal context, mobilisation of mineral revenues, project/program implementation and the sociocultural context of mineral communities. These are summarised in Figure 8.2 below and elaborated subsequently.

Figure 8. 2 Integrated Mining Benefits Sharing System



Source: Author's Construction

8.5.1.1 Mining Area Development Foundation (MADF) & revenue mobilisation

This suggested foundation builds on and mirrors the existing one being operated by Newmont. This Foundation should be set up in every mining area in the country and replace all existing ones. Each Mining Area Development Foundation (MADF) should cover communities under the mining lease in the respective mining area.

For the MADF to be successful, there would be the need for the design of new policy on mineral benefit sharing.[27] The current practice of mining companies negotiating on voluntary basis with communities' mineral benefits even though is a standard practice globally is not prudent. It provides company officials and community leaders such as chiefs' extensive leveraging power over the resources and the beneficiary communities. The process and contribution of mining companies to the MADF should be legislated. Provisions for terms and conditions of negotiations and paid legal advice for communities should be enshrined in law. This would increase the bargaining power of communities, reduce the agency of chiefs in negotiations and hence their role in the allocation of the resultant revenues. Mining communities should be represented in negotiations for benefits by consultants or lawyers paid for by the state rather than Chiefs. This would ensure that chiefs do not have much power over the resources obtained because they played the instrumental role in the negotiations. Trained lawyers or consultants would have better knowledge and expertise to bargain with foreign company executives, therefore balancing any power inequalities in the negotiation process.

A key feature of the MADF would be the integration of revenue sources. That is, rather than government and mining companies committing revenues towards the development of mining communities in a disparate and uncoordinated manner, resources from the two stakeholders should be pooled together. This larger pool of resources can then be managed and administered through the foundation as one resource base. There are several advantages that would arise from such an approach. This would ensure not just a bigger pool of mineral revenues for the communities but more importantly, it can be holistically managed. This way community members can know or request for information about how much in total their communities are receiving for the development of their communities. More importantly, it would encourage the holistic planning and development of these communities without the problem of duplication of development initiatives. The pooling of revenues would also solve the situation where the chiefs do not have to account to the people due to their culture. Thus, in this new system, chiefs would no longer have access to royalties.

One of the key problems identified with the current Mineral Development Foundation operated by the Government is the significant delays and underpayment of the monies to the beneficiary communities by the political elites at the state level. In order to control the power and discretion of the political elites, mining companies should deduct and pay a legislated percentage of the

[27] This can also be extended to other extractive sectors such as oil and gas

royalties directly into the proposed MADF in their area of operation. In other words, rather than first centralizing the royalties into the national confers and then returning a percentage to the mining areas, companies should retain and pay the mining areas' share of the royalties rather than government. In effect, this would be an addition to the companies' own negotiated and agreed payments to the communities.[28] This is a more efficient way of contributing to the development of the communities because as indicated in this research, mining companies have been consistent and trustworthy in their payments as opposed to the government.

8.5.1.2 Use of funds and village institutions

The use of the funds from the foundation represents the avenue for the most involvement of community in the sharing process. Obviously, the use of SDCs by Newmont even though good, has not been effective. However, community-based committees such as the SDCs are by far better than leaving decisions in the hands of Foundation officials, company executives or chiefs. It is recommended that all Mining Area Foundations should also be accompanied with the setting up community institutions such as SDCs. For the SDCs to be effective, there is also the need for an accompanying attitudinal change among non-elites relative to their participation in activities of the SDCs. For the SDCs to better respond to their needs, non-elites must be educated on the importance of their participation in such decisions making spaces. This can be done through the local religious groups in the communities and community wide meetings. Community meetings should also be held more frequently and on days that most people in the communities do not work such as Sundays.

8.5.1.3 Harmonising different sustainable development goals into programs

One of the key issues that underlined the crisis of sharing is the different ways different actors envisioned sustainable development of the mining communities. Through Newmont's benefits sharing scheme especially wide range of benefits has been delivered within the communities. These largely have been in the form of infrastructural projects advocated for by chiefs which also aligns closely with the company's idea of legacy creation as sustainable development. The impact of these projects however must be viewed from a long term and short-term perspective. In the long term, these projects can benefit the communities at large including future generations when well maintained. The danger however from this is that, it can create

[28] In effect going by current practice Newmont would pay what they are contributing to NAKDEF in addition to ten percent of mineral royalties that the government would have paid.

community dependency (Jenkins & Obara 2006) and government disengagement from its core social duties to the communities (Rodon, Lemus-Lauzon & Schott 2018).

In the short term, the inability of the poor and marginalised non-elites to realise their sustainability agenda, that is livelihoods, further perpetuates social inequality. It also poses a risk to social cohesion and the company's social license in the long term (Ofori & Ofori 2018b). One way of resolving this conundrum is by making multiple avenues available for people to access the funds. Distributive equity can be achieved directly when the poor and marginalised non-elites acquire decision making power (McDermott & Schreckenberg 2009). It is thus recommended that besides the use of the funds to finance projects decided through the SDCs which is largely controlled by the chiefs, the MADF funds should also have dedicated funds for grant making. Thus, community members whose needs are not met through the SDCs should be able to decide and apply directly to the foundation for funds to invest in activities they deem important, such as the setting up of small-scale social enterprises. This approach would invariable open more spaces for people to make their needs known and met beyond the SDCs which are subject the chiefly control. Being predominantly farmers, transitioning to social enterprises would require the provision of tailored training. This can be done by the government or negotiated into benefits sharing agreements.

CHAPTER NINE
Conclusion

9.0 Introduction

It has been argued that if well managed, mining can contribute to sustainable development especially in developing countries (Pedro *et al.* 2017; UNDP and UN Environment 2018). Corporate reports from multinational mining companies suggest that principles of sustainable development are increasingly being embedded in mining operations. Nevertheless, the idea that mining can contribute to sustainable development has been fiercely debated. Given the negative externalities of mining projects on the environment and host communities, critics are of the view that the adoption of sustainable development by the mining industry is greenwashing and a strategy used by the mining industry to establish legitimacy for their environmentally destructive activities (Baue 2002; Devenin & Bianchi 2018; Sethi 2005; Whitmore 2006). Proponents however, point out that, mining can contribute to the sustainable development of communities and the environment particularly through the redistribution of the mineral wealth (Eggert 2000, 2009; Pedro 2004; UNDP and UN Environment 2018). For this to happen however, the sharing of mining benefits must be based on procedural equity and produce outcomes that improving the wellbeing of those affected most by mining projects. Following from this and with the understanding that internal governance arrangements of communities are central to the governance of natural resources, this study investigated the overarching question 'does the sharing of mining benefits in Ghana lead to sustainable development outcomes for mining communities?' This question was explored within the context of mineral revenues redistributed by the government of Ghana and a mining company, Newmont Mining Corporation, for the local development of mining communities in Ghana. As discussed above in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, the individual findings of the research demonstrated the connections or lack thereof, between the policies and the realities. Chapter 8 provided a discussion of all the results including implications and recommendations. This concluding chapter thus summarises the key gaps in knowledge and the findings of the research against the research objectives of the study.

9.1 Sustainable development interpretations and community differences

In the literature, sustainable development is understood generally to be a type of development that integrates environmental, economic and social concerns or principles (Barbier 1987; Elliott 2012). This notwithstanding, it is also generally established that the concept is abstract, normative and how it can be achieved is highly contested (Connelly 2007; Kristoffersen & Langhelle 2017; Moon 2007). This, coupled with a lack of coherent understanding of what sustainable development means in the mining industry portends that individual mining companies can interpret and decide how to operationalize sustainability at the project level (Dale, Bay-Larsen & Skorstad 2018). Mining communities as ultimate beneficiaries of some of the sustainability policies of mining companies, would have their own expectations and interpretations of what should constitute sustainable development (Boutilier 2017). Thus, whose interest is being served through the implementation of sustainable development programs at the mining community level can be difficult to discern. A review of the literature however, indicates that little or no work has been done to document what sustainable development means to different actors at local project level. This study makes significant contributions to the literature in this regard. The results of the study presented in Chapter 5 above, showed that sustainable development is socially constructed such that the government, Newmont Mining Corporation and mining communities have different views of what should constitute mining led sustainable development. Further, within the mining communities, class differences in interpretations can also be discerned between local elites (highly educated and well-to-do community leaders) and non-elites (less educated poor people). Whereas the elites hold a long-term view of sustainable development in terms of investments in community infrastructure, the non-elites consider it be an improvement in their economic wellbeing, particularly new livelihood opportunities. The Company’s interpretation of sustainable development as legacy creation closely aligns with that of the community elites whilst the government views it as economic growth of the country. Having established the sustainability agendas of the different actors, it was imperative to investigate how these agendas are ritualized in benefits sharing practices to reveal the winners and losers.

9.2 Redistribution of government royalties and sustainable community development

It is estimated that 20 percent of the production value of minerals accrues to governments (Addison & Roe 2018). Governments unsurprisingly have been urged to contribute to the sustainable development of mining communities by redistributing some of the mineral wealth accrued to the state (Bahl & Tumennasan 2004; Khadiagala 2015; McMahon & Remy 2002). In Ghana, mining regulations enjoins the government to return 10 percent of mineral royalties back to mining communities. This revenue stream is considered as a return on the appropriation of the community lands for mining. Community lands or stool lands however, are held under customary land tenure rules. Under this land rights system, different people within the subject community have different property rights and interests in the land. Community head, the chiefs have allodial rights whilst natives and settlers may have usufruct and leasehold rights respectively. Consequently, exactly who is entitled to the benefits accruing from resource extraction from the lands (such as the 10 percent mine royalties) is ambiguous and open to exploitation by actors within the community (Andrews 2018; Kidido *et al.* 2015). From the understanding that different actors have different sustainability agendas, the second objective of the study was to examine how the royalties are accessed and used for the sustainable development of the subject communities.

The study makes several findings and contributions to the literature. First, the study revealed in Chapter Six that the process of redistributing the royalties from the national government to the communities is entangled in bureaucratic politics. Political elites at the national level significantly delay and underpay the royalties to the communities by using the funds for other priorities. Further, the study found that the partial funds that do get to the community are also appropriated mostly by the village chiefs for their personal use or the procurement of expensive trappings of royalty. Drawing from historical data, it was evident that the behaviour of the chiefs was reminiscent of pre-colonial and colonial practices that defined how mineral benefits were shared. This unfair practice continued due to the unwillingness of the national political actors to hold the chiefs to account and the local believe that chiefs are not by culture accountable to their subjects. Ultimately, the sustainability agenda of the poor people remain unachieved despite the sharing of mining benefits.

9.3 Winners and losers of Newmont's benefit sharing (CSR) scheme

Mining firms have largely pushed the agenda of sustainable mining in relation to their host communities largely through CSR (Vivoda & Kemp 2019) by implementing intentional development interventions for them (Bebbington & Humphreys Bebbington 2018). CSR is considered by some scholars as a vehicle for tackling the sociocultural and environmental problems in the developing world (Raimi 2018). Critical CSR literature indicates that the CSR initiatives of mining companies do not have significant local impact due to its voluntary and top-down nature. Scholars point out differences between what companies claim to do in their reports and what they do in reality. A significant amount of these critical studies highlight the lack of participation of beneficiary communities in CSR programming as accounting for the failure of CSR projects (Addison & Roe 2018; Banks *et al*. 2013; Mutti *et al*. 2012). The literature is concerned with increased community participation in CSR programs to ensure community needs rather than company interests are implemented (Banks *et al.* 2013; Littlewood 2014; Macdonald 2017). Yet, this literature is silent on how contextual influences including power imbalances at the community level shapes CSR programs. This is an important limitation in the literature given that companies such as Newmont in Ghana, through benefit sharing agreements, are making mining revenues available to their host communities to invest in the sustainable development of their communities as they deem fit.

Given the differences in sustainability agendas of different actors locally, this thesis contributes to the CSR literature by demonstrating how unequal power relations and context shapes who gets what from the mineral revenues redistributed by Newmont. The results of the study presented in Chapter Seven indicate that inviting beneficiary communities to participate in CSR project decisions does not necessarily translate into equitable and sustainable development outcomes as envisaged in the literature. The study finds that whilst the company shifts decision-making power to the communities, powerful local elites using different strategies capture the decision-making structures and resources to implement their own sustainability agendas (community infrastructure) to the detriment of the poor non-elites in need of livelihoods. The non-elites are also further limited in their ability to participate fully in the process as a result of contextual factors such as existing community conflicts, poverty and low levels of education.

9.4 Policy recommendations to improve benefit sharing practices

The evidence from this study suggests that the challenges accounting for the underdevelopment of mining communities is not a revenue problem. Neither is it a lack of commitment to development by foreign mining companies but instead how the resources provided are shared, who does the sharing and what priorities are deemed important as sustainable development outcomes. There is thus a crisis of sharing rather than a lack of resources accounting for the inability of mining benefits translating into sustainable development outcomes for mining communities. What is required to resolve this challenge is to develop strategies that will prioritise the needs of the poor people whose voice and sustainability agendas are not implemented. To do this, this thesis proposes an Integrated Resource Sharing Model. This model suggests a pooling of the mining revenues redistributed to mining communities into one fund that can be administered to cater for the needs of the poor through grant making initiatives.

9.5 Limitations and suggestions for future research

The use of benefits sharing agreements is an emergent feature within the mining industry in Ghana and for that matter Africa (Nwapi 2017). This thesis explored how benefit sharing works in practice in Ghana. However, it did not document how the agreements are made between the companies and the communities in the first place, which is an important issue in well-established mineral economies (Loutit, Mandelbaum & Szoke-Burke 2016; O'Faircheallaigh 2013, 2015). There is the need for researchers to focus attention on the negotiation process. In Ghana, there are no legal regulations that enjoin mining companies to negotiate with local people, or even the categories of people to include in such negotiations. This legal vacuum can be exploited by powerful actors for their interests to the detriments of affected mining populations. It would be interesting to see what role village chiefs play in the negotiation process and how interests of communities are bargained into these agreements.

It is without doubt that the redistribution of mineral revenues for the sustainable development of affected communities is an important policy decision within the African context. Even though benefit sharing agreements and foundations are emergent preferences, comparative studies that analyse the impact of other alternatives have been lacking (Rodon, Lemus-Lauzon & Schott 2018). In this thesis, the possibility of using other alternatives such as direct cash distribution was briefly discussed. A more detailed and systematic analysis is however required to fully understand how well they will fit within the African context.

The role of political elites in undermining the translation of extractive revenues into development through rent seeking behaviours has received significant attention in the resource curse (Kolstad 2009; Ross 1999; Stevens & Dietsche 2008). Less attention however has been paid to the intersectionality between political elites and local elites in shaping the developmental outcomes of mining revenues. This thesis, and research by Abdulai (2018) gives credence to the notion that political clientelism is an important factor that can influence how mining revenues are applied for development. This however, is an area that requires much further empirical and theoretical enquiry.

9.6 Concluding remarks

Many of the non-elite who were interviewed or participated in the focus group discussions for this study hold the perception that they and others in their communities have not benefited from the mine development in their area. Indeed, many regret the decision to allow the company into their community. This does not negate the fact that significant social investments have been undertaken and funded through Newmont's Foundation. The elites and Newmont officials largely agree that some progress has been made towards the sustainable development of the communities even though there is still some level of mistrust between these two actor groups. What does all this mean for a mine led sustainable development model? It is easy from the perspective of the non-elites to suggest mining does not lead to sustainable development. This is largely because of the lack of opportunities to have their livelihood concerns eventuated through the benefit sharing process. The opposite would be true for the elites, the company and the government whose sustainable development goals are different from those of the non-elites. What this means is that the capacity of mining to lead to sustainable development is dependent on the actor group in question and their interest as well as how those interests are pursued in the sharing process. This reinforces the need to pay attention to how benefits are shared and the social contexts in which they are realised.

In terms of benefit sharing and achievement of sustainable development, it is without doubt that Newmont has made considerable efforts to develop a system that ensures procedural and distributional equity matched with consistent financial payments to the community. Yet the micro politics within the communities and between the communities and the Foundation Board situated within the social context of the mine area have created winners and losers from the benefit sharing system. The government's approach unfortunately remains a long way from achieving equity and sustainable development even though the intentions are there. The suggested Mining Area Development Fund is envisioned to remedy the problems associated with both systems. One cannot discount the fact that actors would also find ways to pursue their interests especially to the detriment of the poor and vulnerable in mining communities. There is above all the need for constant and continual social learning to improve any benefit sharing system being implemented.

Appendix 1: Ethics Approval

THE UNIVERSITY of ADELAIDE

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OFFICE OF RESEARCH ETHICS, COMPLIANCE AND INTEGRITY

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13 April 2017

Associate Professor M Nursey-Bray
School: School of Social Science

Dear Associate Professor Nursey-Bray

ETHICS APPROVAL No: **H-2017-034**

PROJECT TITLE: **Mining, communities and sustainable development: an examination of the processes and outcomes of mining benefits sharing in mining communities in Ghana**

The ethics application for the above project has been reviewed by the Human Research Ethics Committee and is deemed to meet the requirements of the *National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007)*.

The ethics expiry date for this project is: 31 March 2020

Ethics approval is granted for three years and is subject to satisfactory annual reporting. The form titled *Annual Report on Project Status* is to be used when reporting annual progress and project completion and can be downloaded at http://www.adelaide.edu.au/research-services/oreci/human/reporting/. Prior to expiry, ethics approval may be extended for a further period.

Participants in the study are to be given a copy of the Information Sheet and the signed Consent Form to retain. It is also a condition of approval that you **immediately report** anything which might warrant review of ethical approval including:

- serious or unexpected adverse effects on participants,
- previously unforeseen events which might affect continued ethical acceptability of the project,
- proposed changes to the protocol; and
- the project is discontinued before the expected date of completion.

Please refer to the following ethics approval document for any additional conditions that may apply to this project.

Yours sincerely

PP

Professor Paul Delfabbro
Convenor
Human Research Ethics Committee

Appendix 2: Interview Guide

School of Social Sciences
Geography, Environment and Population (GEP)

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR SELECTED MINING COMMUNITIES

SECTION A: Background Information of Respondent

i. Study community…………………………………

ii. Gender of Respondent (RobecoSAM) Male (RobecoSAM) Female

iii. Age………years.

iv. Educational Level Attained

   a. No formal Education

   b. Up to Primary level (standard six/primary class six)

   c. Up to Junior High level (JSS 1 to JSS 3 or Middle School)

   d. Up to Senior Secondary Level (SHS 1 to SHS 3)

   e. Tertiary level (university or Polytechnic)

v. Community membership status:

   a. Native

   b. Migrant

   c. Short term visitor

vi. How long have you stayed in this community…………… (in years/months)

vii. Occupation…………………………

viii. Do you have access to land in the Community?......................

ix. If yes above, what type of ownership or title is held……………………………

SECTION B: Mining Induced Impacts

1. What do you consider to be the most important livelihood asset in your

   a. Household

b. Community

2. Have these assets changed in any way since the inception of large scale mining by Newmont in your community? If so how?
3. Has mining brought any other significant changes to your household or community besides changes (if any) to your livelihood assets?

SECTION C: Benefit Sharing Interventions

4. What do you consider to be sustainable development?
5. How can this be achieved through mining?
6. Do you think large scale mining has benefited your community in terms of development in any way?
7. Are you aware of any mining benefit sharing arrangements in your community?
8. Specifically, have you heard about the Newmont Community Development fund and the payments of mineral royalties to your community?

SECTION D: Process and Political Dimensions of Benefit Sharing

9. Have you or anyone in your community been involved in the making of decisions about who should benefit or what to do with the community fund or payments from the government?
10. Which people or institutions do you think has the most say or influence in how benefits are distributed in your community and why?
11. How will you rank those identified in question 8 above in terms of influence?
12. What do you think motivates the decisions of those identified in question 8 above? (e.g. personal interests, community interests, interest of future generation, legal rules or norms)
13. Do you think you have a voice in how benefits are distributed in your community?

SECTION E: Outcomes of Benefit Sharing Interventions

14. Who do you think in your community is entitled to access or benefit from the government payments and community fund? And why?
15. Have you or anyone you know benefited from the community fund or government royalty payments? If yes, how and why did you or others benefited? If no, why do you think you have not benefited?
16. Who do you think gains the most and loses out the most from the community fund and government payments?

17. Based on the current sharing arrangement, do you think your children can or will benefit in future from large scale mining in your community when the mine closes down?
18. Has there been any disagreements or problems in your community associated with how the community fund or the payments from the government is utilised?
19. Do you think how benefits are currently shared is fair and equitable?
20. What will you consider as mining induced sustainable development? (Explain to respondent: Development that takes care of your needs, children’s needs without destroying the environment and will last after the mine closure)
21. How do you think the sharing of benefits can be improved in your community?

Appendix 3: Interview Guide

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INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR SELECTED GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

SECTION A: Payment of Mineral Royalties to Mining Community

1. What do you consider to be sustainable development?
2. How can this be achieved through mining?
3. What is the motivation for the policy or law to pay a percentage of mineral royalties to mining communities?
4. What are the expected outcomes from this policy initiative**?**
5. What is the institutional structure involved in making these payments to the local mining communities?
6. How often are these payments done?
7. Who are the target or entitled beneficiaries of these payments?

SECTION B: Process and Political Dimension

8. How is the distribution and access to allocated community royalty determined at the community level?
9. What institutional arrangements (e.g. legal rules, accountability mechanisms) has government put in place to enable the entitled beneficiaries gain from the payments?
10. Who are the actors involved in determining how the royalties are distributed, accessed or used at the community level?
11. What is the relationship between the traditional community authorities and government in the benefit sharing process?

12. Do you think that traditional authorities fairly represent the interest of the community when it comes to the use of the royalty payments?

SECTION C: Outcomes of Distribution of Mineral Royalty

13. Do you think the expected outcomes are being met?
14. Who do you think in the mining communities gains the most and losses out the most from the allocated mineral royalties? Why is this the case?
15. Do you think the current arrangement is fair and equitable?
16. Has there been any reported conflict or problems over the sharing and use of the mineral royalties allocated to mining communities?
17. What will you consider as sustainable development induced by large scale mining at the local community level?
18. In which way do you think the current benefit sharing arrangement can be improved?

Appendix 4: Interview Guide

School of Social Sciences
Geography, Environment and Population (GEP)

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR SELECTED TRADITIONAL LEADERS

SECTION A: BENEFIT SHARING INTERVENTION

1. What do you consider to be sustainable development?
2. How can this be achieved through mining?
3. How do you think large scale mining has affected your community?
4. What are the benefit sharing arrangements available to your community?
5. What is your role in ensuring that your community benefits from the mining projects?
6. How are the benefit sharing arrangements implemented in your community relative to
    a. The community funds
    b. The royalty payment from government
7. Who do you think is entitled to these benefits and why?

SECTION B: Process and Political Dimension

8. How are decisions about what to do with the mineral royalties and the community fund taken?
9. What informs these decisions?
10. What organization or individuals do you think has the most say in decisions about how much or who should benefit from the fund or royalty payments?
11. Do you think the community interest is represented in the decisions taken?

SECTION D: OUTCOMES

12. Who in your community benefits the most or loses out from mineral royalties and community fund?

13. Do you think the current arrangement is fair and equitable?
14. Has the people in your community protested against what they are receiving as benefits from mining in their community?
15. Has there been any reported conflict or problems over the sharing and use of the mineral royalties allocated to mining communities?
16. What will you consider as sustainable development induced by large scale mining at the local community level?
17. In which way do you think the current benefit sharing arrangement can be improved?

Appendix 5: Interview Guide

School of Social Sciences
Geography, Environment and Population (GEP)

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR SELECTED COMPANY OFFICIALS

SECTION A: MINING IMPACTS & BENEFIT SHARING INTERVENTION

1. What do you consider to be sustainable development?
2. How can this be achieved through mining?
3. What will you consider to be the significant impacts of your projects on the host communities?
4. What arrangements have been initiated to share benefits to host communities in the Birim North District?
5. Who initiated these benefit-sharing arrangements?
6. What are the motivations/drivers behind the community fund initiative?
7. Who is entitled to benefit from the community fund and why?

SECTION B: Process and Political Dimensions

8. How do host communities have access to or benefit from the fund?
9. Who or which institutions participate in determining who has access to the fund and the making of other related decisions?
10. How will you rank the actors identified in 7 above in terms of influence on decision making?
11. How were the actors in question 7 above identified to participate in the decision-making process?
12. What rules or principles guide decisions?

13. What is your relationship with local traditional leaders relative to the sharing of mining benefits?

SECTION C: Outcomes

14. Who are those that have benefited from the fund? How and why did they benefit?
15. Do you think that some people have not benefited in any way from the fund?
16. Has there been any problems or conflicts over the management and or use of the community fund?
17. Do you think that all affected groups within the community have benefited from the fund and their views well represented by the community leaders?
18. Have you identified any challenges to ensuring that the use of the fund benefits everyone equally?
19. What will you describe as a mining induced sustainable development in your host communities?

Appendix 6: Interview Guide

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FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE

EXERCISE 1: Evaluation of Mining Impacts

Goal: to identify how large-scale mining has impacted on the various aspects of the community's life. Also, to identify if there are variations in how people perceive impacts. For example, variations between landless people and those with land, young and old, males and females etc.

Activity 1: Discussants will be led to identify individually five key elements of their socioeconomic life before large scale mining began. They will do this by writing responses on a note pad in bullet points. Together the discussants will be led to agree on common themes (not more than 10) from their individual 5 points that will represent an overview for the community in general.

Activity 2: Discussants will then be led to identify how large-scale mining has impacted on the elements identified in activity 1.

EXERCISE 2: Benefit Sharing Interventions

Goal: To examine the perception of the people about current benefit sharing arrangements in their communities and power relations.

Activity 1: Discussants to discuss why they think they are entitled to benefits (or not) and types of benefits they will want to receive.

Activity 2: Discussants will be asked to identify and rank key benefits they have obtained from mining so far

a. At the individual level
b. At the household level
c. At the community level.

Activity 3: Discussants will be presented with flash cards. Each flash card will contain a name of an institution or authority (e.g. village chief, Assembly Man, Newmont community relations officer, Myself, Member of Parliament etc.). They will rank each flash card in terms of who they think has the most say in decision making about how benefits are shared or accessed in the community. The group will then discuss the results by sharing their experiences.

Activity 4: Discussants will be presented with a different set of flash cards. These flash cards will contain same information as those used for previous activity. Exception will be to include additional flash cards with content: My children, No one, Entire Community. The discussants will be asked to identify by ranking the flash cards who they think gains the most from mining benefits. This activity will be repeated in each instance for the mineral royalty payment and the community fund in order to obtain two sets of results for analysis.

Activity 5: Discussants will be led in a conversation to identify ways in which benefit sharing can be improved to compensate for or mitigate the impacts they identified in Exercise 1.

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