

Piety, Dogs and a Platonic Reminiscence:
Philo, *Quod Deterius* 54–56 and
Plato, *Euthyphro* 12e–15a

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ἐὰν μὲν οὖν ἦς εἶπον ἑκάτερον λάξη τιμῆς αἰσθησίς τε καὶ νοῦς, ἀνάγκη τὸν κεχρημένον ἀμφοτέροις ἐμὲ εὐεργετῆσθαι· ἐὰν δὲ πόρρω τὸν λόγον ἀπὸ νοῦ καὶ αἰσθήσεως ἀπαγαγὼν πατέρα μὲν τὸν γεννήσαντα <τὸν> κόσμον, μητέρα δὲ τὴν σοφίαν, δι' ἧς ἀπετελέσθη τὸ πᾶν, τιμῆς ἀξιώσης, αὐτὸς εὐ πείσῃ· δεῖται γὰρ οὐδενὸς^a οὔτε ὁ πλήρης θεὸς οὔτε ἡ ἄκρα καὶ παντελῆς ἐπιστήμη, ὥστε τὸν θεραπευτικὸν^b τούτων μὴ τοὺς θεραπευομένους ἀνενδεεῖς ὄντας ἀλλ' ἐαυτὸν μάλιστα ὠφελεῖν.^c ἵπικὴ μὲν γὰρ καὶ σκυλακευτικὴ, ἐπιστήμη θεραπείας ἡ μὲν ἵππων ἡ δὲ σκυλάκων οὕσα,^d πορίζει τοῖς ζῴοις τὰ ὠφέλιμα,^e ὧν ἐκεῖνα δεῖται·^f μὴ πορίζουσα δὲ ἀμελεῖν ἂν δοκοίη. τὴν δὲ εὐσέβειαν θεοῦ θεραπείαν ὑπάρχουσαν^g οὐ θέμις ποριστικὴν εἰπεῖν τῶν ὠφελησόντων τὸ θεῖον.^h ὠφελεῖται γὰρ ὑπ' οὐδενός,ⁱ ἅτε μήτε ἐνδεεῖς ὄν^j μήτε τινὸς τὸ ἐν ἅπασιν αὐτοῦ κρεῖττον πεφυκότος ὄνησαι, τούναντίον δὲ τὰ σύμπαντα συνεχῶς καὶ ἀπαύστως ὠφελεῖ.^k ὥστε ὅταν τὴν εὐσέβειαν λέγωμεν εἶναι θεοῦ θεραπείαν,^l ὑπηρεσίαν τινὰ^l τοιαύτην φαμέν, ὁποῖαν δοῦλοι δεσπότηαις τὸ κελευόμενον ἀόκνως ποιεῖν ἐγνωκότες ὑπηρετοῦσι.^m διοίσει δὲ πάλιν, ὅτι οἱ μὲν δεσπότηαι ὑπηρεσίας ἐνδεεῖς, ὁ δὲ θεὸς οὐ χρεῖος.ⁿ ὥστε ἐκείνοις μὲν τὰ ὠφελήσοντα αὐτοὺς ὑπηρετοῦσι, τῷ δ' οὐδὲν ἔξω φιλοδεσπότου γνώμης παρέξουσι· βελτιῶσαι μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν εὐρήσουσι,^o τῶν δεσποτικῶν πάντων ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὄντων ἀρίστων, μεγάληα δ' αὐτοὺς ὄνησουσι γνωρισθῆναιαι θεῷ προμηθοῦμενοι. (Philo, *Quod Deterius* 54–56)

- 14e1–2: ὧν ἐκεῖνοι τυγχάνουσιν δεόμενοι παρ' ἡμῶν. 14e2–4: οὐ γὰρ τεχνικόν γ' ἂν εἴη δωροφορεῖν διδόντα τῷ ταῦτα ὧν οὐδὲν δεῖται.
- 12e5: τὸ περὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαν κτέ.
- 13b8–9: ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ τινί ἐστι καὶ ὠφελία τοῦ θεραπευομένου.
- 13a4–5: ἵππους οὐ πᾶς ἐπίσταται θεραπεύειν, ἀλλὰ ὁ ἵπικός. 13a8: ἡ γὰρ ἵπικὴ ἵππων θεραπεία. 13a9–10: οὐδέ γε κύνας πᾶς ἐπίσταται θεραπεύειν ἀλλὰ ὁ κυνηγετικός. 13a12: ἡ γὰρ που κυνηγετικὴ κυνῶν θεραπεία.

- e. 13b8: ἐπ' . . . ὠφελία. 13b10: ὠφελοῦνται. 13c4: ἐπ' ὠφελία. 13c6: θεῶν ὠφελία. 15a2: ἃ δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσιν, τί ὠφελοῦνται; 15a5–6: ἀλλ' οἷε . . . τοὺς θεοὺς ὠφελεῖσθαι ἀπὸ τούτων, ἃ παρ' ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσιν;
- f. 14d9–10: ὧν δεόμεθα παρ' ἐκείνων. (See also a.)
- g. 12e5–7: τοῦτο . . . τὸ μέρος τοῦ δικαίου εἶναι εὐσεβές τε καὶ ὄσιον, τὸ περὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαν.
- h. See c, e.
- i. See a, c, e.
- j. See a.
- k. 15a1–2: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν ὅτι ἂν μὴ ἐκείνοι δῶσιν. ἃ δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσιν, τί ὠφελοῦνται;
- l. 13d7: ὑπηρητική τις ἂν, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴη θεοῖς (and context).
- m. 13d5–6: ἦνπερ . . . οἱ δοῦλοι τοὺς δεσπότης θεραπεύουσιν.
- n. See a, c, f.
- o. 13b10: ὠφελοῦνται καὶ βελτίους γίνονται. 13c7: καὶ βελτίους τοὺς θεοὺς ποιεῖ. 13c8–9: βελτίω τινὰ τῶν θεῶν ἀπεργάζη;

I have followed the Philonian text with parts of the relevant pages of Plato's *Euthyphro*, where verbal similarities are close enough. To the best of my knowledge, Professor John Dillon is the only one so far who has noted the similarities. His context is that of "the canon of two virtues," and he only notes briefly: "That Philo had the *Euthyphro* well in mind is shown by the echoes of *Euth.* 13A ff. in *Det.* 55–6."¹

This, however, is only the beginning of our story. When Philo is echoing a source—even Plato—what matters is what he does, in each case, with his Platonic materials. Even on a cursory reading, it should be clear that these pages of Plato have passed through a serious transformation. *Euthyphro* is an aporetic dialogue, where questions and refutations are the order of the day, and where answers, in the few cases where they are given, are not answers to the central questions, but usually part of the refutation. Philo provides us, within the space of one page or less, with more answers (and no questions whatsoever) than the whole of Plato's dialogue. This, as well as Philo's own context and theological framework, would account for the many differences between his passage and its "source." Let us point out some.

1. Philo says clearly and repeatedly that God lacks nothing. Plato's *Euthyphro* would take it for granted that one cannot make the gods better

¹ J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (London 1977) 150. Even a great expert (and author of the entry "Platon" in Pauly's *RE*) like Hans Leisegang remarks on τὴν δ' εὐσέβειαν θεοῦ θεραπείαν ὑπάρχουσαν in our passage: "Die Philo vorschwebende Definition ist stoisch: Sextus Adv. Math. IX.123." (*Die Werke Philons von Alexandria in deutscher Uebersetzung*, ed. L. Cohn [Breslau 1919] III 294 n. 1—in Leisegang's translation with notes of *Quod Deterius*.) Sextus *ibid.* does have ἔστι γὰρ εὐσέβεια ἐπιστήμη θεῶν θεραπείας, and his source may have been Stoic (see *SVF* III 264, 272, 604, 608). But Philo's source is clearly Plato.

(e.g. 13c6–10); but he does initially accept that one can offer them *ὠφελία* (13c4–5)—and, indeed, that there are things which the gods require from us (14e1–5), with the consequence that *ὀσιότης* is *ἐμπορικὴ τέχνη* (14e1–5), however grudgingly he admits that. It is only under more pressure from Socrates that he realizes that the gods cannot obtain any *ὠφελία* from us (15a5–6).

2. Philo takes it for granted that *εὐσέβεια* is *θεοῦ θεραπεία*. This definition (of *εὐσεβὲς καὶ ὄσιον*—whereas *ὄσιον* and its cognates are entirely absent from our passage of Philo), offered by Euthyphro at 12d5–8, is the one refuted by Socrates from that point in Plato's dialogue until the crisis of 14a11.

3. In the course of that refutation, by Socrates, of Euthyphro's *ἡ τῶν θεῶν θεραπεία*, Euthyphro offers *ἦνπερ . . . οἱ δοῦλοι τοὺς δεσπότης θεραπεύουσιν* as an explanation of this particular *θεραπεία*. This is not so much refuted as brushed aside by Socrates, who, almost with a sleight of hand, concentrating on *ὕπηρετική*, moves on to another example. Philo takes it for granted that *εὐσέβεια* is *θεραπεία θεοῦ* in this sense: *ὁποῖαν δοῦλοι δεσπότης τὸ κελευόμενον ἀόκνως ποιεῖν ἐγνωκότες ὑπηρετοῦσιν*.

4. Philo's idea that those who serve God properly do so only for their own improvement and benefit would be incomprehensible to the Euthyphro of Plato's dialogue—and, on this point, Euthyphro would not be eccentric, or different from the average Athenian or pagan in general.²

Yet, perhaps surprisingly at first sight, some of those points, made so positively and decisively by Philo, are points which may well emerge (other things, between Plato and Philo, being unequal) out of reading between the lines of Plato's dialogue.³

The idea that the gods lack nothing and require nothing of us is, of course, alien to Euthyphro's whole attitude to life. He is suing his father because he is afraid of *μίαισμα* (4b7 ff.). For him, *τὰ ὄσια* (14a11 ff.—forgetting yet again that Socrates had asked him at 5c–d for the *one* *ὄσιον*, always *ταὐτόν . . . ἐν πάσῃ πράξει . . . αὐτὸ αὐτῷ*, and that, at 6d10, he had reminded him that he does not want *τὰ πολλὰ ὄσια, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος*) consist in the correct knowledge of acts which please the gods and, therefore, save individuals and cities, while their opposites destroy them. Yet even Euthyphro, under pressure from Socrates (and with the help of the socially unpleasant *ἐμπορικὴ τέχνη*) asks at last: *ἀλλ' οἶει, ὦ*

² But Philo's point would have been perfectly intelligible to some Palestinian Sages. Antigonus of Socho used to say: "Be not like the servants who serve the master in the expectation of receiving a reward," etc. (Mishna Aboth 1. 3). This is not to say that Philo knew this saying, or Hebrew—problems which should not concern us here—merely that such an idea was probably current in Jewish pious circles at the time.

³ In what follows, I shall draw heavily on a book in preparation on Plato's *Euthyphro* by Mr. Ivor Ludlam and myself, and I hope to be more precise and detailed there.

Σώκρατες, τοὺς θεοὺς ὠφελῆσθαι ἀπὸ τούτων ἂ παρ' ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσιν; (15a4–6). In response to Socrates' further question he explains that we only give them τιμὴ καὶ γέρα.

Socrates' refutation, from now on, is based on the distinction, accepted by Euthyphro, that any "gifts" we give to the gods are either ὠφέλιμα or φίλα. Since ὠφέλιμον is out, φίλον remains. But we have already refuted the definition of τὸ ὅσιον as τὸ θεοφιλές, in various stages and senses (6e10–11b8). Thus, the dialogue ends in ἀπορία.

But hold. Have we really, from Euthyphro's outburst at 14a11–b7, been discussing τὸ ὅσιον, or was it rather τὸ εὐσεβές? Plato's Socrates is, in some measure, responsible for this confusion. At 5c8 he starts his request for a definition with ποῖόν τι τὸ εὐσεβές φησ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀσεβές καὶ περὶ φόνου καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων;—and then passes, almost imperceptibly, to τὸ ὅσιον alone, whereas τὸ εὐσεβές is not mentioned again until 12e. There, the combined εὐσεβές τε καὶ ὅσιον is employed by Euthyphro in his definition, but not before Socrates had asked, τὸ ποῖον μέρος τοῦ δικαίου ὅσιόν ἐστιν, ἵνα . . . μήτε ἀσεβείας γράφωσθαι. Euthyphro falls into the trap, since he, unlike Socrates, makes no distinction between acts like prosecuting a suspected murderer and sacrificing. For him, both are equally done for the sake of divine reward and for eschewing divine punishment.

Plato, however, has no intention of confusing his perceptive reader (and he writes for none else). Such a reader has noticed that even Euthyphro (4b9) has conditioned ὅσιον in his particular case on εἴτε ἐν δίκῃ ἔκτεινεν ὁ κτείνας εἴτε μή, thus paving the way, even at that early stage, to Socrates' suggestion (11e4 ff.) that ὅσιον is part of δίκαιον. This had been brought out by Socrates' argument (7b2 ff.) that if the gods quarrel among themselves, it is about τὸ τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν (7d1–2), a widespread contemporary expression for what we, after Aristotle, would call ethical problems⁴—but an expression which contains τὸ δίκαιον. At 8b6 ff. Euthyphro is certain of the gods' agreement that a murderer should be brought to justice, and Socrates convinces him that all men agree as well. It is, I think, because of this close connection between ὅσιον and δίκαιον that Euthyphro agrees (10e1–2) ὅτι . . . τὸ . . . ὅσιον διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖσθαι [ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν] ὅτι ὅσιόν ἐστιν—and not the opposite. This would make no sense if applied to prayers, sacrifices and εὐσέβεια in general, whose whole existence would be meaningless without the gods as recipients.

Yet from 14a11 to the end of the dialogue, the discussion had been turned by Euthyphro (as Socrates hints at 14b8–c6) from acts of justice with religious overtones to acts of pure worship—that is, from ὅσιον to εὐσεβές. This would imply that the final refutation, relying as it does on Euthyphro's

⁴ On this and related issues, see my forthcoming article, "Τὰ ὀνόματα τῆς ἠθικῆς πρὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους," to be published (with a brief English summary) in the *Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Greek Philosophy, Samos, August 1990*.

admission at 10e1–2, is not valid if applied to acts of ritual like prayers and sacrifices. Even here, one could claim that if such things are τοῖς θεοῖς φίλα, the gods need them in some way and are somehow made βελτίους for them. But if we take 14e10–15a10 to imply that, since the gods give us all the good things we have, they deserve honor and respect from us *even though they need, and get, nothing out of them*, we would be getting near enough to Philo's position—without, of course, Philo's transcendental one God, and without Philo's idea, so central to his thought, that worshiping God is a step in a man's progress towards his aim in life, knowledge of God.

Would all this imply that Philo had unravelled so much of the dramatic and dialectic side of this aporetic dialogue? That, for example, he saw the distinction between εὐσεβές and ὀσιον; understood that the final ἀπορία applied only to the latter and did not refute the former; that it was the former which needed refuting in the last part of the discussion—or even the “small detail,” that the example of slaves serving their masters has not been really refuted? I doubt it. Even a brief glimpse at Leisegang's indices will remind us that, for Philo, εὐσέβεια and ὀσιότης are one and the same virtue. From examples which can be brought by the bushel I cite only one clear one. At *Spec. Legg.* 4. 135 we have περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἡγεμονίδος τῶν ἀρετῶν, εὐσεβείας καὶ ὀσιότητος. It is, I suspect, precisely because Philo makes no distinction between εὐσέβεια and ὀσιότης, and because he does not read the dialogue as drama—how many did in his age?—that he can take for granted what Euthyphro admits only under pressure, that God cannot benefit from anything we do; that he can accept (and extend in his own language) Euthyphro's description of θεραπεία as the one given by slaves to masters—indeed, that he can retain θεραπεία θεοῦ (for Plato's θεῶν, of course) as the definition of . . . but of what? Of εὐσέβεια, what else? This may not be very far from sentiments expressed by Plato's Socrates elsewhere; see especially *Phaedo* 62b1–8. But once again, within Philo's general framework of man's progress from worship of God to a different life consisting of contemplating God, this acquires a new dimension.

Philo has prepared the ground. From 46 on, the argument has been that the virtuous man, symbolized by Abel, cannot be killed in any sense by the earthly “sophist” Cain—and was not killed even on a plain ῥῆτῃ ἐρμηνεία (47). At 49 we are told that the wise man lives an incorruptible life by dying to the corruptible life. That is, the wise man does *himself* good by living the life of striving after God. The argument from ποιῶν and πάσχον in 49 may already echo *Euthyphro* 10a–d, but I doubt it. There, only πάσχον is mentioned at c3–4. It is more likely to be of Aristotelian or Stoic provenance.⁵ Certainly, the distinction between διεστηκότα and ἠνωμένα at 50 is Stoic.⁶ But once we have shown that the soul is one unit, where τὸ

⁵ See, e.g., *SVF* II 161. 30 and context.

⁶ See the translators' note in the Loeb edition of Philo, II 494, on 49.

ποιούν and τὸ πάσχον are one and the same, what better example than the greatest of virtues, εὐσέβεια?

For some of Plato's dialogues we have ample ancient evidence: quotations, references, verbal reminiscences and paraphrases, beginning sometimes with Aristotle and Xenocrates and including papyri, Cicero, Plutarch, Church Fathers and other authors. One need only look at the "apparatus of citations" in the text of Dodds' great edition of *Gorgias* for such a catalogue. Other dialogues are less fortunate. For *Euthyphro* our only pieces of ancient evidence—apart from its inclusion in the lists of Aristophanes and Thrasyllus—have so far been Plutarch, *De Genio Socratis* 10 (*Moralia* 580d), Diogenes Laertius 2. 29 and Numenius ap. Euseb. *PE* 13. 5 (fr. 30 Leemans = 23 des Places).⁷ This scarcity of ancient evidence was one of the grounds—when this was the fashion around the middle of the last century—used by those who wished to athetize the dialogue.⁸ Chief among those athetizers was the—then young—Friedrich Ueberweg, who took the scantiness of ancient testimony as his starting-point, and went on to suggest, on "internal grounds," that *Euthyphro* was a forgery—an early one, since it was already Platonic to Aristophanes—and to offer the obscure Pasipho of Eretria as the likely culprit.⁹ The fact—I hope we have shown it is a fact—that another ancient author, a contemporary of Thrasyllus and earlier than Plutarch, Numenius and Diogenes, has also made use of this dialogue, would make no difference to an athetizer, if one is still around. Philo does not mention Plato—he may have read it as someone else's work. In any case, a Pasipho, a Simon the Shoemaker, or any other Socratic whose name is known to us, would do for an early forger. But I still find it almost aesthetically satisfying to discover another reader of this dialogue.

How does Philo make use of these pages of *Euthyphro*? Not, I believe, with Plato's (or Pasipho's) text before him. Not just because he does not follow, in his reminiscences, the order of Plato's text; he is under no obligation to do so in what is not expressly a paraphrase. Nor is it because

⁷ See M. Croiset (ed.), *Platon, Oeuvres Complètes* I (Paris 1946) 179.

⁸ For a comprehensive bibliography (for its time) on this and other issues related to *Euthyphro*, see E. Wagner, "Ueber Platons Euthyphron, zur Frage seiner Echtheit und zu seiner Erklahrung," in *Festschrift Ludwig Friedlaender* (Leipzig 1895) 438–55, esp. 438–39. On the whole of that fashion of athetizing dialogues and the methods and criteria employed, one of the best summaries is still that of S. Ribbing, *Genetische Darstellung der platonischen Ideenlehre* II: *Untersuchungen ueber die Echtheit und die Reihenfolge platonischen Schriften* (Leipzig 1864) 3–78. The book is a translation of the Swedish original of 1858, and therefore has no account of Ueberweg (see next note). For what is still one of the clearest and best argued rejections of this fashion, see G. Grote, *Plato and the other Companions of Sokrates*, 2nd ed. (London 1867) I 132–211.

⁹ F. Ueberweg, *Untersuchungen ueber die Echtheit und Zeitfolge platonischen Schriften* (Vienna 1861) 250–51; see also 201. I had the good fortune to read this book in London University Library in George Grote's own copy, with his copious annotations in pencil. Very often, Grote underlines, and then copies in the margin, the expression "innere Gruende." See his sardonic remarks on this issue in his *Plato* (previous note) 189–90, 198, 206.

he rewrites much of what is in Plato in his own words; Philo does that even to Biblical passages he is expressly commenting on. The more pedestrian and “external” clues are always better, and I think one exists here: Philo’s and Plato’s dogs and their breeders. In *Euthyphro* 13a1–c10 Plato has only κύνες and κυνηγετική. In our passage of Philo it is only σκύλακες and σκυλακευτική.¹⁰ Now, σκύλαξ and σκυλάκιον and cognates exist in Plato,¹¹ but only six times, as against the far more frequent κύων and cognates—and Plato knows only of κυνηγετική. Philo, according to Mayer’s index, has κύων sixteen times, κυνηγός and cognates seven times (and never κυνηγετική), while he has σκύλαξ and cognates seven times (and our σκυλακευτική). This is just what one would expect. In today’s Greek, σκυλί(ον) and σκυλάκι(ον) are the normal words for “dog”; only the most persistent purist would use κύων. The “demotic” use of σκύλαξ—originally meaning “puppy” or “puppy dog”—to mean simply “dog” started probably in Plato’s time, or somewhat earlier. Like a few other “demotic” words, it occasionally finds its way to Plato’s texts. Philo has already a few more instances of σκύλαξ as against κύων, most probably since, in his time, he was already using more regularly the more “demotic” form. Yet κύων is more frequent even in his works—probably whenever he remembers that this is the “good Attic” word. Had Philo the Platonic text before him, he would have used the more δόκιμον καὶ Ἀττικόν word and its cognates, since *they were*, in that case, in his text.¹²

What, then, did he have? The verbal reminiscences, sometimes almost exact, suggest that he is not quoting from memory. The scarcity of ancient testimonies to *Euthyphro* makes it unlikely that this dialogue was frequently read and studied even by Platonists; after all, the same issues are dealt with in a simple exposition, without the irritation of a dramatic and aporetic dialogue, in Book 10 of the *Laws*. The same consideration would also preclude a piece of a Middle Platonist handbook as Philo’s source. If I may be bold, I would like to suggest that what Philo had before him were notes he had taken—with his own interpretations and conclusions—some time before he wrote this work, of the last pages of Plato’s *Euthyphro*. I do not exactly remember now whether the suggestion that Philo may be using *notes de lecture* from time to time when he seems to follow his sources has been made, and I have not checked my von Arnim, Bousset and Heinemann for such a suggestion. That such notes were used by writers in late antiquity is now commonly acknowledged. Scrolls were far too hard to roll and unroll for every reference and reminiscence.

¹⁰ According to our dictionaries a *hapax eiremenon* in the whole of Greek literature.

¹¹ *Rep.* 2. 375a2, 7. 537a7, 539b6, 5. 451d7, *Parm.* 128c1.

¹² It is a pity that Phrynichus has no entry like κύων δόκιμον · σκύλαξ ἀδόκιμον. The fact that Plato has the “wrong” word—and in central dialogues like *Republic* and *Parmenides*—may have deterred him.

In a famous passage of a famous book, the greatest Philonian scholar of the last generation wrote:

Nous considérons donc que la recherche de parallèles philosophiques grecs est pour l'historien de Philon une tâche à coup sûr extrêmement importante et, tant qu'elle est maintenue dans ses limites raisonnables, tout à fait fructueuse. Mais les contradictions mêmes qui la divisent montrent sans ambiguïté que pour une quête de Philon elle ne saurait venir qu'en deuxième ligne, à la façon d'une discipline auxiliaire.¹³

Yet even the most dedicated Philonian scholar today would hardly maintain that he or she can accept Philo's allegorical interpretation of Scripture as proper exegesis.¹⁴ Besides, not every reader of Philo reads him *sui ipsius causa*, or merely so. Many of us read Philo—with all our admiration for his personality and our sympathy for his dedication to a righteous way of life—also as one of our main sources for the works and opinions of Greek philosophers existing and available in his age—an age for which our philosophical sources, at least the contemporary ones, are not abundant. This is just the way in which most of us would read, say, many of the Church Fathers, with all their importance as evidence for the spirit of their age and their own community, also as sources of evidence for Hellenistic-Roman philosophy—and for the Pre-Socratics.

All of us have learned many things from the numerous works published by Miroslav Marcovich in the course of an astonishing career which is still at its zenith. One thing he has taught us is that fragments and testimonia have not been born equal. Even what passes, or is passed, for a fragment may be an exact quotation, a paraphrase, or what Marcovich has labelled "Respicit": a close, or not so close, verbal reminiscence. In comparison with work of this kind done by Marcovich himself, I would be happy if the present note is considered as "Respicit."

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¹³ V. Nikiprowetzky, *Le commentaire de l'Écriture chez Philon d'Alexandrie* (Leiden 1977)

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¹⁴ See Leopold Cohn's words in his general introduction to the great German translation (above, note 1) 4: "Die Methode seiner Ausgleichsbestrebungen war verfehlt, aber die Reinheit und Lauterkeit seines Charakters leuchtet aus seinen Schriften hell hervor."