

Πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα—Sources and Credibility of
De Stoicorum Repugnantiis 8

JOHN GLUCKER

How does one ascertain that a saying ascribed to Zeno of Citium represents a genuine philosophical view of the founder of Stoicism? This is no idle question. By the time of Diogenes Laertius at the latest, most people seem no longer to have read the works of the early Stoics. Having completed the biographical section in his *Life of Zeno* (VII. 1–38), Diogenes proceeds to offer us, not a summary of Zeno's own philosophy, but a Stoic κοινή. His excuse for this (VII. 38)—διὰ τὸ τοῦτον κτίστην γενέσθαι τῆς αἰρέσεως—is feeble. The Stoics were no Epicureans or Pythagoreans, claiming to carry on and disseminate the “true doctrines” discovered once for all by a divine founder: even Diogenes' own doxography enters, from time to time, into details about disagreements and disputes among the various Stoics. Plato was also the founder of a “school of thought.” This does not prevent Diogenes from presenting us with a long summary of Plato's own ἀρέσκοντα (III. 67–109). When Diogenes' source supplies an account of various ἀγωγαί within the same school, he has no hesitation in reproducing his source's doxography with all the shades of difference (III. 86–97). It is merely that by his time, very few people were likely to have read the hundreds of scrolls written by Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus and their disciples and followers—or rather, those of them still readily available. Even by the time of Cicero, the ordinary educated man—even a writer on philosophical themes like Cicero himself—did not attempt to read the original works of the early Stoics, but used summaries and doxographies. What about Plutarch?

It is not my intention here to deal, yet again, with the whole issue of Plutarch's familiarity with early Stoic sources. Much has been written on it, from many different angles, often in terms of such generalities and probabilities as “Plutarch, who read so much . . .” or “Plutarch must have read his Zeno—he quotes him so often” (the examples are my invention, but they are not pure fiction). I have chosen to concentrate on one piece of Plutarchean evidence which, I believe, can be treated as a test case. Here, then, is the text of *De Stoicorum Repugnantiis* 8:

Πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα

‘μηδὲ δίκην δικάσης, πρὶν ἄμφω μῦθον ἀκούσης’

ἀντέλεγεν ὁ Ζήνων τοιοῦτω τινὶ λόγῳ χρώμενος ‘εἴτ’ ἀπέδειξεν ὁ πρότερος εἰπών, οὐκ ἀκουστέον τοῦ δευτέρου λέγοντος (πέρας γὰρ ἔχει τὸ ζητούμενον), εἴτ’ οὐκ ἀπέδειξεν (ὅμοιον γὰρ ὡς εἰ μηδ’ ὑπήκουσε κληθεὶς ἢ ὑπακούσας ἑτερέτισεν). ἦτοι δ’ ἀπέδειξεν ἢ οὐκ ἀπέδειξεν· οὐκ ἀκουστέον ἄρα τοῦ δευτέρου λέγοντος.’ τοῦτον δὲ τὸν λόγον ἐρωτήσας αὐτὸς ἀντέγραφε μὲν πρὸς τὴν Πλάτωνος Πολιτείαν, ἔλπε δὲ σοφίσματα, καὶ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ὡς τοῦτο ποιεῖν δυναμένην ἐκέλευε παραλαμβάνειν τοὺς μαθητάς. καίτοι ἢ ἀπέδειξε Πλάτων ἢ οὐκ ἀπέδειξε τὰ ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ, κατ’ οὐδέτερον δ’ ἦν ἀναγκαῖον ἀντιγράφειν ἀλλὰ πάντως περιττὸν καὶ μάταιον. τὸ δ’ αὐτὸ καὶ περὶ τῶν σοφισμάτων ἔστιν εἰπεῖν.¹

A genuine piece of evidence for an “eccentric” Zenonian doctrine? This is the way in which our passage has been regarded by numerous distinguished scholars in the last hundred years or so. A. C. Pearson includes two parts of this chapter, as Fragments 29 (the anecdote) and 6 (ἔλπε—τοὺς μαθητάς) of Zeno, in his *Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes*.² On the anecdote, he comments: “The argument is couched in the syllogistic form which Zeno especially affected: see *Introd.* p. 33”³—where the specimens of syllogism he adduces are very different from the disjunctive argument in our passage. What matters, however, is that Pearson takes this chapter of Plutarch seriously as a piece of Zenonian doctrine. So does von Arnim, who has the anecdote as *SVF* I. 78 (*Zeno, Rhetorica*), the sentence concerning Plato as I. 259 (*Zeno, Ethica*), and the sentence on sophisms as I. 50 (*Zeno, Logica*). Nicola Festa regards the anecdote as the only surviving fragment of Zeno’s lost work “Ἐλεγχοὶ δύο.”⁴ Alfons Weische takes it to be an argument against Arcesilaus’ practice *in utramque partem disputandi*.⁵ Both are quoted by the late Harold Cherniss in a note to his edition of the text—true, without comments, but with an obvious acceptance of our passage as genuine evidence for a Zenonian doctrine.⁶ To crown it all, we have the clear statement of Professor Daniel Babut in his great work on Plutarch and the Stoics:

¹Text: Pohlenz-Westman. I have omitted the apparatus, since there are no readings relevant to the argument.

²*The Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes*, with introduction and explanatory notes . . . by A. C. Pearson . . . (London 1891) 80–81; 60–61.

³*Ibid.* p. 60.

⁴Nicola Festa, *I frammenti degli Stoici antichi*, vol. I (Bari 1932) 115–16.

⁵Alfons Weische, *Cicero und die neue Akademie* (Münster 1961) 77–78.

⁶Plutarch’s *Moralia*, vol. XIII, part II, ed. by Harold Cherniss (Loeb Classical Library 1976) 429, note a. See his Introduction, 373–74.

En revanche, *De Stoic. rep.* p. 1034 E (7) [misprint for 8—J. G.], de portée beaucoup moins générale, et où Plutarque semble reproduire presque littéralement le raisonnement par lequel Zénon démontrait qu'il est inutile dans un procès—ou en débat philosophique—de prêter l'oreille aux deux parties ou d'écouter le point de vue de l'adversaire, doit être considéré comme une véritable citation, bien que Plutarque n'ait pas pris la peine ou n'ait pas pu indiquer de quel livre elle provenait, et bien qu'il ne prétende pas la reproduire mot à mot.⁷

Doit être considéré comme une véritable citation. After all this, one finds it surprising that this piece of "Zenonian doctrine" has not yet found its way into the standard histories of Greek Philosophy or of the Stoa.⁸

But hold. If the argument in our anecdote were to be regarded as representing a genuine philosophical position of Zeno, it would land him, not merely in the contradictions indicated by Plutarch. It would also imply a wholesale rejection of the task of dialectic as described by Zeno himself in *SVF* I. 48–49—both independent of Plutarch. It would also imply that such Chrysippean fragments as *SVF* II. 127–29 (all taken from Ch. 10 of *Stoic. Rep.*) constitute a complete departure from a doctrine of the founder of the school and a total rejection of that doctrine.

Let us now consider the form of the anecdote in our chapter. It is a story about Zeno answering with a counter-argument (*ἀντέλεγεν*), a literary quotation. Whether the hexametric line *μηδὲ δίκην δικάσης κτλ.* is Pseudo-Phocylides⁹ or Hesiod,¹⁰ it is not very likely that the ancient poet would have been introduced by Zeno as *ὁ εἰκῶν*, and that Zeno would quote him simply to contradict him. Zeno is not Socrates of the "aporetic dialogues." When Zeno wishes to quote poetry—even to alter its order or its sense—other expressions are used: *συνεχῆς τε προεφέρετο . . . τοὺς . . . Εὐριπίδου στίχους* (DL VII. 22); *τοὺς θ' Ἡσιόδου στίχους μεταγράψαι οὕτω* (ib. 25); *φησὶ τὸ ἐκ τῆς Νιόβης* (ib. 28). No. It is far more likely that what we have here is not a quotation from one of Zeno's own works, in which the ancient hexameter is brought in only to be confuted, but an anecdote about Zeno. Someone, on some occasion, quoted this line of poetry against Zeno. Zeno countered him with his disjunctive argument—showing, by the way, in the very act of refuting him that he *had* listened to the other side: but on this later.

What we have here looks far more like the sort of literary anecdote called by ancient rhetoricians *χρεία*. A number of rhetorical manuals from

⁷ Daniel Babut, *Plutarque et le Stoïcisme* (Paris 1969) 222–23.

⁸ I find no mention of it, for example, in any edition of Zeller, Ueberweg-Praechter, or Pohlenz.

⁹ Diehl, *Anth. Lyr.*³ 2, p. 98, v. 87—cited in double square brackets. See his apparatus of testimonia to this line.

¹⁰ Fr. 338 Merkelbach-West.

late antiquity deal at some length with *χρεία* as a rhetorical device.¹¹ Their treatment of this sub-literary form is almost entirely the same, with many sentences and passages repeated virtually word for word (except for the more lengthy discussion of Theon, which is probably his own extension of what he had found in his source). The question of their common source (Hermogenes?) should be investigated elsewhere.¹² For our purpose, it would be enough to quote at random a definition of *χρεία* offered by one of these late rhetoricians:

χρεία ἐστὶ λόγος ἢ πρᾶξις εὐστοχος καὶ σύντομος, εἷς τι πρόσωπον ὀρισμένον ἔχουσα τὴν ἀναφορὰν, πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσίν τινος τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ παραλαμβανομένη.¹³

It may also be of some use for our passage of Plutarch to note that one of these rhetoricians realized that not each and every *χρεία* has to be serious and to contain a moral: ἔστι δὲ χαριεντίζεσθαι τὴν χρείαν ἐνίστε μηδὲν ἔχουσαν βιωφελές.¹⁴ For the rest—as one could expect from handbooks of rhetoric for the instruction of beginners—*προγυμνάσματα*—much of their discussion is devoted to such exercises as turning a *χρεία* from one grammatical case to another; and their standard division of *χρεία* is into *λογικαί*, *πρακτικαί*, *μικταί*—a “literary,” rather than a “philological” classification. Fortunately, we have an earlier and very

¹¹ Hermogenes, *Progymn.* ch. 3; Aphthonius, *Progymn.* ch. 3, pp. 23–25 Rabe; Theon, *Progymn.* chs. 5–6, Spengel, *Rhet. Graeci* 2, pp. 96–106; Nic. Soph., *Progymn.* ch. 3, Spengel 3, pp. 458–63. Modern literature: G. von Wartensleben, *Begriff der griechischen Chreia und Beiträge zur Geschichte ihrer Form* (Heidelberg 1901) (with a collection of philosophers' *χρεία* on pp. 31–124—which does not include our anecdote in the Zeno section, pp. 128–30); Gustav Adolf Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon, Texte und Untersuchungen* (Leipzig und Berlin 1909) 247–53; 269 ff.; Heinrich Lausberg, *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetoric* (München 1960) vol. I, 536–40. Gerhard supplies numerous references to modern literature. Lausberg cites a wide range of ancient sources, both Greek and Latin. For more recent literature, see also Klaus Berger, “Hellenistische Gattungen im Neuen Testament,” *ANRW* II. 25. 2, 1031–1432, with an extensive bibliography, pp. 1379–1432. (The section relevant to our discussion: pp. 1092–1110, and bibl. 1092); Robert C. Tannenhill, “Types and Functions of Apophthegms in the Synoptic Gospels,” *ANRW* II, 25. 2, pp. 1792–1829 (bibl. pp. 1826–29). Berger has a “taxonomy” of *χρεία* in Greek pagan and Jewish sources and the NT, according to “Frage und Anlass der Chrien” and “Struktur der Antwort” (pp. 1096–1103), which comes close to that of Quintilian, and many of his examples are helpful. On p. 1095, he also refers to literature on *χρεία* in Rabbinic sources. Tannenhill's division of *χρεία* according to their purpose (“correction stories,” “quest stories,” “objection stories,” and the like) has more to do with modern literary theory than with ancient technique and practice. I owe the last two references to Professor Frederick E. Brenk.

¹² This common source is most likely to be later than Quintilian (see below), whose whole treatment is hardly aware of it. The great reputation of Hermogenes in late antiquity suggests that he may be the source.

¹³ Nic. Soph. (n. 11 above) 459.

¹⁴ Theon (n. 11 above) 96. See also his discussion of the “jocular” type of *χρεία*, pp. 99–101.

different discussion of *χρεία*, clearly independent of these later manuals, which divides *χρεία* into more "philological" groups: Quintilian I. 9. 4:

Chriarum plura genera traduntur: unum simile sententiae, quod est positum in uoce simplici: "dixit ille" aut "dicere solebat"; alterum quod est in respondendo: "interrogatus ille," uel "cum hoc ei dictum esset, respondit"; tertium huic non dissimile: "cum quis dixisset aliquid" uel "fecisset."

Quintilian goes on to mention also what the later rhetoricians called *πρακτικὴ χρεία*: *etiam in ipsorum factis esse chriam putant . . .* This should not detain us. For our purpose, the important type of *χρεία* is Quintilian's second category, in which someone was asked (*ἐρωτηθείς*) or was told something by someone else (*πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα*), and he responded (*εἶπεν*, *ἔφη*, *φησὶν* and the like). We shall soon return to this type of *chria* in *respondendo* and cast an eye on the numerous examples of it in Diogenes Laertius and some pseudo-Plutarchean collections of apophthegmata. Let us first consider the nature and development of *χρεία* as a literary form.

The derivation of *χρεία* from the Homeric and Hesiodic *αἶνος* and the Aesopian fables, maintained by some modern scholars,¹⁵ seems to me unlikely. A fable employing animals as symbols of human character and behaviour and a story about a clever repartee by some great man—albeit that the purpose of both is "to point a moral and adorn a tale"—are two different things. *Χρεία* starts not immediately after the age of epic poetry but a few hundred years later, and in a philosophical *milieu*. The books of *χρεία* ascribed to Diogenes of Sinope by Diogenes Laertius, quoting Sotion (DL VI. 80) are given in a "dissenting list": it is not in the main list of his works, probably derived from the Alexandrian catalogues, which precedes it. Von Wartensleben may be right in regarding Metrocles the Cynic (DL VI. 33) as the first compiler of a book of *χρεία* known to us by title.¹⁶ With Zeno of Citium we seem to be on surer ground. Diogenes Laertius quotes one anecdote about Crates the Cynic, Zeno's own teacher, on the authority of Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεὺς ἐν ταῖς χρείαις (VI. 91). Aristo of Chius is reported by Diogenes (VII. 163) to be the author of *χρειῶν ιά*; and Persaeus (VII. 36) as the author of *χρειῶν δ'*. It is far from certain that the *χρεία πρὸς Διόνυσον* ascribed by Diogenes (II. 84) to Aristippus of Cyrene is a collection of apophthegms: why the singular? The other work, *Χρειῶν τρία*, is ascribed to him in Sotion's alternative list (II. 85). It thus appears that the practice of gathering such anecdotes and publishing them arose first in the circles of the Cynics and the early Stoics. By the time we reach the first century BCE, we have five anecdotes ascribed expressly to the *Χρεία* of Hecato, the pupil of Panaetius (DL VI. 4; 32; 95; VII. 26; 172), and two

¹⁵ Von Wartensleben (n. 11 above) 8–27; Gerhard (ib.) 247–53.

¹⁶ Von Wartensleben 29.

anecdotes likely to have been lifted from the same collection (VII. 2; 181).¹⁷ One can assume that in the three or four centuries which separate Diogenes Laertius from Hecato, such collections of *χρεῖαι* must have increased and multiplied as philosophy was leaving its private enclaves and becoming part of a gentleman's education. The pseudo-Plutarchean collections of apophthegms belong to this literary form and most probably to this period. So does much of the material which went into the making of *Gnomologium Vaticanum* and other *gnomologia*.¹⁸

When we come to Diogenes Laertius, we note, not merely that he recounts innumerable *χρεῖαι* of various types—virtually hundreds of them. We would rather have been surprised if he did not. What is more significant is that most of his *χρεῖαι* tend to come in series, or in clusters, in one or two places in each life. Since I have not seen this phenomenon noted before,¹⁹ I supply here a provisional list of these clusters of *χρεῖαι* in Diogenes Laertius:

Book I	Thales: 35–36; Solon: 58–59; 60; 63; Chilon: 68–69; 77; Bias: 86–87; Cleobulus: 91–92; Periander: 97–98; Anacharsis: 103–05; Myson: 107–08; Pherecydes: 117.
Book II	Anaxagoras: 7; 10; Socrates: 30–36; Aristippus: 66–82; Stilbo: 114–18; 119; 127–28.
Book III	Plato: 1–5.
Book IV	Xenocrates: 10; Arcesilaus: 43; Bion: 47 (with the significant introduction: <i>πλεῖστά τε καταλέλοιπεν ὑπομνήματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποφθέγματα χρεῖωδη πραγματείαν περιέχοντα.</i>) ²⁰ ; 48–51.

¹⁷ See Heinz Gomoll, *Der stoische Philosoph Hekaton* (Leipzig 1933) 90–91; 112–13.

¹⁸ As suggested already by Gerhard (n. 11 above) 252–53.

¹⁹ Richard Hope, *The Book of Diogenes Laertius* (New York 1930), deals mainly with Diogenes' probable sources for anecdotes in the various *Lives* (pp. 71, 82–83), and with a literary "taxonomy" of anecdotes according to their purpose and function (pp. 169–74). Eduard Schwartz, article *Diogenes Laertius* (*Diogenes* 40), *RE* V (= *Realencyclopädie*, vol. v) (1905) 738–63, finds it sufficient to say: "Dass Diogenes Apophthegmensammlungen vorlagen, sah schon Bahnsch; diese Untersuchungen lassen sich nur auf Grund handschriftlichen Materials weiterführen" (758). But why? Bahnsch has not been available to me. I find no reference to *χρεῖαι* in our latest book on this theme of the sources, Jørgen Mejer, *Diogenes Laertius and his Hellenistic Background*, *Hermes Einzelschriften* 40 (Wiesbaden 1978)—where one might have expected something in the section "Biographies of Philosophers," 90–93.

²⁰ Confirming, in similar words, the etymology offered by Theon (n. 11 above) 97: ὅτι μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων χρεῖωδης ἐστὶ τῷ βίῳ. Von Wartensleben (n. 11 above) 28–29, argues for this etymology, against the fantastic derivation from *χρησμός* suggested by Wilhelm Goettling, but he does not refer to this passage of Diogenes. The derivation of *χρεῖα* from *χρεῖωδης*—although not much else about its nature and history—was already taken for granted by Isaac Casaubon, *Animadversiones in Athenaeum* (Lugduni 1645) ("the last edition revised by the author!") 4, line 22 ff.

Book V	Aristoteles: 17–19; Demetrius: 81.
Book VI	Antisthenes: 3–9; Diogenes: 22–28; 30; 33–69; 80; 91.
Book VII	Zeno Citieus: 16; 19–26; Aristo Chius: 163; Cleanthes: 171–74; Chrysippus: 182–84.
Book VIII	Pythagoras: 9; Theano: 43.
Book IX	Zeno Eleaticus: 27; Pyrrho: 64; 66; 113.

Whether Diogenes compiled these large clusters of anecdotes from various collections available to him, or copied them from one or two *gnomologia* which already existed in his time, is a moot question. We simply do not know about the structure of these early collections of *χρεῖαι*. Some of the later *gnomologia* which have reached us are arranged in a “doxographical” manner, by themes; some are arranged by philosophers.²¹ The existence of clusters of *χρεῖαι* in Diogenes, and his general manner of work, would suggest that such a collection of *χρεῖαι* arranged under the names of individual philosophers (Hecato’s?) was employed. What is of far greater interest to us is the very large number of *χρεῖαι* in Diogenes and other sources which employ the formulae *ἔρωτηθεῖς* or *πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα* in their “protasis,” and *ἔφη*, *εἶπεν* (or the like) in their “apodosis”: Quintilian’s *chia in respondendo*. Again, I have not seen this issue of the formulaic structure of *χρεῖαι* treated anywhere in this particular fashion. I therefore supply here another provisional list of three types of *χρεῖαι*: the plain *dixit* or *dicere solebat*, Quintilian’s first category; *interrogatus ille*, his category II. 1; and *cum hoc ei dictum esset*, his II. 2. I have taken my examples, for what is, after all, a provisional list, from Diogenes Laertius, and from the pseudo-Plutarchean *Ἀποφθέγματα βασιλέων καὶ στρατηγῶν* (BΣ) and *Ἀποφθέγματα Λακωνικά* (AΛ).

- I. *dixit; dicere solebat* (ἔφη, ἔλεγε, ἔφασκε and the like).
DL I. 35; 58; 63; 69; 77; 86; 87; 91; 103; 104; 105; 108;
II. 30; 31; 32; 33; 34; 36; 67; IV. 48; 49; 50; 51; V.
18; 19; VI. 3; 5; 6; 8; 27; 28; 30; 33; 35; 38; 46; 49;
51; VII. 21; 22; 23; IX. 64.
- II. *interrogatus ille . . . respondit* (ἔρωτηθεῖς and the like . . . ἔφη and the like).

²¹ Some, like the famous *Gnomologium Vaticanum*, are arranged by “doxographical” headings. Since doxography started with Theophrastus, it is not impossible that even some of the earliest books of *χρεῖαι* may have been arranged in this manner. But it appears that this literary form began in Cynic and Stoic circles. Disciples of the early Cynics and Stoics were at least very likely to arrange their collections by names of philosophers, to glorify their own masters. For a recent discussion of *gnomologia*, with copious references to manuscript material and modern research, see Dimitri Gutas, *Greek Wisdom Literature in Arabic Translation, A Study of the Graeco-Arabic Gnomologia*, American Oriental Society (New Haven, Conn. 1975) 9–35.

DL I. 35; 36; 58; 59; 68; 77; 86; 87; 103; 104; 105; II. 10; 33; 68; 69; 70; 72; 73; 76; 80; III. 38; IV. 48; V. 17; 18; 19; VI. 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 27; 47; 49; 50; 51; 52; 54; 55; 56; 60; 62; 63; 67; 68; 69; VII. 23; 24; 26; 172; VIII. 43; IX. 113.

BE 176D; 184C; 185A; 190D; 194A.

AA 210E; F; 212C; 213C; 215D; 216C; 217D; 218F; 220A; F; 222E; 224D; 225D; 227B; C-D; 231F; 232B.

III. *cum hoc ei dictum esset . . . respondit* (πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα . . . ἔφη and the like).

DL I. 35; 36; 63; II. 7; 10; 35; 36; 71; 74; 75; 76; 79; 80; 81; 119; 128; IV. 49; 50; V. 19; VI. 4; 8; 9; 33; 34; 36; 39; 42; 45; 49; 52; 54; 55; 59; 60; 61; 64; 68; VII. 19; 20; 21; 23; 171; 172; 174; VIII. 182; IX. 113.

BE 175C; D; E; 176D; 182C; 186E-F; 189E; F; 190D.

AA 208B; 217D; E; 218C; F; 221D-E; 224D; 228A; D; 229E.

A note of warning. I have not included here Quintilian's third category, *cum quis dixisset aliquid uel fecisset*. The number of χρεῖαι of this type is roughly the same as their number in the other categories—with a slight preponderance of it in the Cynic Lives of Diogenes, as one could only expect. Nor—since this is merely a provisional list—have I given the numbers of χρεῖαι of each type in each paragraph of Diogenes or Stephanus page of Plutarch. Many χρεῖαι of the same category tend to come in twos or threes in the same region of the text, just as groups of χρεῖαι of the same category tend to cluster together within a wider area. It may well be that Quintilian's classification represents divisions and chapter-headings already existent in collections available to him—and to Diogenes later. This should be further investigated. For my present purpose, suffice it if I have shown that χρεῖαι beginning with the formulae ἐρωτηθεῖς and πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα are as frequent in some of our major sources as are plain maxims or sayings.

I shall not weary the reader with specimens of χρεῖαι beginning with πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα. Almost any of the dozens in my list will do. But our particular χρεῖαι in Plutarch has two unusual characteristics: a) instead of the usual beginning of the "apodosis" with ἔφη, εἶπεν or the like, Plutarch has here ἀντέλεγεν; b) the "protasis" is no mere saying or question by someone, but a literary quotation.

It is true that ἀντέλεγεν is unusual. I have found no other example of it in χρεῖαι I have checked.²² This may be due to Plutarch's literary art,

²² The same anecdote is reported with the same words in some MSS of the scholia on Lucian *Cal.* 8 in Jacobitz' *editio maior*, vol. IV (Leipzig 1841) 232-33, beginning with the words Πλούταρχος ἐν τῷ περὶ Στωϊκῶν ἐναντιωμάτων. It is therefore of no independent value. I cannot see why v. Arnim should cite this scholion at the end of *SVF* I. 78, as if it were a different source.

wishing to emphasize that, despite the matter of his argument, Zeno did listen to the other side and refuted it. Or he may have wished to emphasize that Zeno's refutation was couched in the "antilogistic," disjunctive form. We shall return to this.

As to *χρεῖαι* with literary quotations, they are not all that rare. Here is a partial list of some such *χρεῖαι* in Diogenes Laertius: II. 78; 82; 117; IV. 9; 46; 47; VI. 36; 44; 50; 52; 53; 55; 57; 63; 66; 67; 104; VII. 172; IX. 59.

Of all these, perhaps the nearest in form to Plutarch's story of Zeno is Diogenes Laertius' anecdote concerning Diogenes of Sinope and his master Xenias (VI. 36):

Τῷ πριαμένῳ αὐτὸν Ξενιάδῃ φησί, "ἄγε ὅπως τὸ προσ-
ταττόμενον ποιήσεις," τοῦ δ' εἰπόντος

ἄνω ποταμῶν χωροῦσι παγαί,

"εἰ δὲ ἱατρὸν ἐπρίω νοσῶν, οὐκ ἄν," (ἔφη)²³ "αὐτῷ ἐπειθου,
ἀλλ' εἶπες ἄν ὡς ἄνω ποταμῶν χωροῦσι παγαί;"

Plutarch himself was not unaware of the nature of *χρεῖα*. At least in one passage of his writings, his view of its value is far from complimentary. In Chapter 7 of *Progr. Virt.*, Plutarch speaks of those who begin to apply themselves to the study of arguments (*λόγοι*)—and begin, usually, by choosing one of the wrong types of arguments. Those who begin by collecting anecdotes are the last on this list (78F):

... ἔνιοι δὲ χρεῖας καὶ ἱστορίας ἀναλεγόμενοι περιίασιν, ὥσπερ Ἀνάχαρσις ἔλεγε τῷ νομίσματι πρὸς οὐδὲν ἢ τὸ ἀριθμεῖν χρωμένους ὄραν τοὺς Ἕλληνας, οὕτως τοῖς λόγοις παραριθμούμενοι καὶ παραριθμοῦντες, ἄλλο δ' οὐδὲν εἰς ὄνησιν ἀπ' αὐτῶν τιθέμενοι.

Not that Plutarch himself is above using some *χρεῖαι* when it suits him. At least in one place in his *Lives* (*Demosth.* 11. 2-7), he recounts some *χρεῖαι* of Demosthenes, ending with the words (7), ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων καὶ ἐτέρων γελοίων καίπερ ἔτι πλείω λέγειν ἔχοντες, ἐνταῦθα παυσόμεθα. This sounds almost as though Plutarch had a collection of *χρεῖαι* before him. He could not resist the temptation to tell some of them; but being a serious writer of "morality biographies," he soon checked himself and remembered his real task. He continues: τὸν δ' ἄλλον αὐτοῦ τρόπον καὶ τὸ ἦθος ἀπὸ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῆς πολιτείας θεωρεῖσθαι δίκαιόν ἐστιν.

It is clear that Plutarch knows what a *χρεῖα* is, and that he attaches no great value to it as a source of serious information and edification either to

²³ Supplied by Stephanus and obviously right, as the formula of the "apodosis."

the historian or to the philosopher. Did he, then, simply slip and forget all he knew about this sub-literary form and its value when he came to our story about Zeno? Or did he, in his zeal to amass as many Stoic contradictions as possible, overlook the fragile nature of this kind of source? Since we can only guess where he may have found this particular *χρεία* (Hecato, or one of the early compilations by a pupil of Zeno?), and since it is not unlikely that when he wrote the work before us, he was already relying on his own notes and excerpts rather than on his sources,²⁴ we can only guess.

This is not the end of our enquiry. Having told his anecdote, Plutarch continues: τοῦτον δὲ τὸν λόγον ἐρωτήσας κτλ. Cherniss translates: "after having propounded his argument (1034E)." But is ἐρωτᾶν simply "to propound an argument?" Nor is it simply "to pose a question," as translated by Amyot ("& ce pendant luy mesme qui faisoit cest demande" . . .) and translators who follow him. Zeno poses no question in Plutarch's story. It has a more technical sense, some traces of the history of which are indicated in LSJ, s. v. ἐρωτάω II. 2:

In Dialectic, opp. demonstration, *question* an opponent *in order to refute him from his answers*, Arist. *APr.* 24^a 24; τὶ ib. 42^a 39; hence later, *submit, set forth, propound* an argument, λόγον Gal. 5. 257 :—Pass., ὁ λόγος . . . ἠρωτῆσθαι φαίνεται Arr. *Epict.* 2. 19. 1; ἐρωτηθέντος τοῦ σοφίσματος S.E. P. 2. 237.

Even this is to simplify matters. It is true that Sextus frequently uses the combination λόγον ἐρωτᾶν (ἐρωτᾶν and variants). But he always uses this expression for a *refutation*, usually in the form of a syllogism, of a "dogmatic" position. The refuting λόγος offered by Sextus is more often than not a plain syllogism, but sometimes it is a disjunctive argument in the form of "either . . . or", concluding with "neither . . . nor" at the point of final refutation. Here is a provisional list:

Plain syllogistic refutation: PH I. 20; 33–34; II. 134; 239; 248; 250; 254 (where it is distinguished from σοφισμα); III. 66; 116; 280; M VIII. 215; 216; 227; 234; 444–45; IX. 92; 133; 182; 205; X. 171.

Disjunctive refutation: PH II. 185 (+ M VIII. 465); 186; III. 76; 127; 163; 239 (referring back to 172); M X. 94; 110.

What is, perhaps of greater interest is that in most of these places, Sextus applies this expression, ἐρωτᾶν λόγον and variants, to the Pyrrhonian's own refutation of his "dogmatic" opponent. Diodorus Cronus is mentioned more than twenty times by name in Sextus' works. Only at

²⁴ See Cherniss (n. 6 above) 369–401, who argues for the use of "note-books" containing excerpts made by Plutarch himself, as his main immediate source for passages quoted in his Stoic books.

X. 87, 94 and 110 does Sextus apply this expression to a disjunctive argument by Diodorus—in all three cases, to the same argument against the existence of motion. Yet it is precisely to Diodorus Cronus and his Megaric friends that we must turn if we are to trace the origin of this peculiar expression—which, by the time of Sextus, has been watered down to imply any “structured” argument used in refuting an opponent.

Of Euclides of Megara, we are told by Diogenes Laertius (II. 106):

... καὶ οἱ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ Μεγαρικοὶ προσηγορεύοντο, εἴτ' ἐριστικοί, ὕστερον δὲ διαλεκτικοί, οὓς οὕτως ὠνόμασε πρῶτος Διονύσιος ὁ Χαλκηδόνιος διὰ τὸ πρὸς ἐρώτησιν καὶ ἀπόκρισιν τοὺς λόγους διατίθεσθαι.²⁵

Of Eubulides of Miletos, Diogenes writes:

... ὃς καὶ πολλοὺς ἐν διαλεκτικῇ λόγους ἠρώτησε, τὸν τε ψευδόμενον κτλ. (II. 108; Giannantoni IIB. 13, p. 53; Muller 64, p. 31).

Muller translates properly: “arguments de forme interrogative.” This is confirmed by an anonymous comic fragment—most probably by a contemporary of Eubulides—cited by Diogenes in the same passage:

οὐριστικός δ' Εὐβουλίδης κερατίνας ἐρωτῶν
καὶ ψευδαλαζόσιν λόγοις τοὺς ῥήτορας κυλίων κτλ.

This is not the place to discuss in any detail the seven paradoxes of Eubulides counted in this passage of Diogenes.²⁶ But it should be fairly clear by now that some, at least, of these arguments were couched in the form of disjunctive questions, the answer to any of which is “yes” or “no.” A good example—probably the nearest we have to the original form—of this Megaric practice, is supplied by Diogenes Laertius (II. 116), in the form of a *χρεία* about Stilbo of Megara:

τοῦτόν φασιν περὶ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς τῆς τοῦ Φειδίου τοιοῦτόν τινα λόγον ἐρωτήσαι· “ἄρα γε ἡ τοῦ Διὸς Ἀθηνᾶ θεὸς ἐστι;” φήσαντος δέ, “ναί,” “αὐτὴ δέ γε,” εἶπεν, “οὐκ ἔστι Διός, ἀλλὰ Φειδίου.” συγχωρουμένου δέ, “οὐκ ἄρα,” εἶπε, “θεὸς ἐστιν.”

One notes the expression *λόγον ἐρωτήσας*. A similar expression, *συνερωτᾷ λόγον*, is employed by Sextus in reporting the disjunctive

²⁵ I cannot see why Gabriele Giannantoni, *Socraticorum Reliquiae* vol. I (Naples 1983) 129, quotes the last part of this sentence only in IIP 3 (Dionysius Chalcedonius). Robert Muller, *Les Mégariques, Fragments et témoignages* (Paris 1985) 25, quotes the whole passage as 31, the first fragment in Section IC, “Développement et situation dans l'histoire de la philosophie de l'école issue d'Euclide.”

²⁶ For the latest detailed discussion, with the relevant sources (alas, in translation only!), see Muller (last n.), *Annexe I*, 75–90, and his notes to Frs. 64–65, pp. 113–19; 193 (n. 128)–196 (n. 168).

argument of Diodorus Cronus against movement (*M X*. 87; repeated with ἡρωτήσθαι φασιν τὸν λόγον at 94, and ἡρώτηκε δὲ ὁ Διόδωρος τὸν . . . λόγον at 110).

If Diodorus was the inventor of so many *Fangschlüsse*, he was, according to Diogenes Laertius, still no match for Stilbo of Megara. The story of how Diodorus died of shame because he could not solve dialectical problems put to him by Stilbo is well-known today: it has been spread around by logicians who, even if they would not go as far themselves, look with envy on the serious manner in which those ancient Megarians took their logic. Fact or fiction—this should not detain us here.²⁷ What is of greater importance is the language (DL II. 111):

οὗτος παρὰ Πτολεμαίῳ²⁸ τῷ Σωτῆρι διατρίβων λόγους τινὰς διαλεκτικούς ἡρωτήθη πρὸς Στίλπωνος· καὶ μὴ δυνάμενος παραχρήμα διαλύσασθαι κτλ.²⁹

We have already seen one ἐρώτησις of Stilbo. Diogenes Laertius II. 119 supplies us with two more of this sort. These ἐρωτήσεις are so similar in nature to the long string of *Fangschlüsse* reported by Diogenes at VII. 186–87, that I am inclined to think they may well be also Stilbonian in origin. Diogenes reports them with the opening sentence ὁ δὲ φιλόσοφος καὶ τοιοῦτους τινὰς ἡρώτα λόγους, and ends with the words οἱ δ' Εὐβουλίδου τοῦτο φασιν. Since, in the first part of 186, we have been given the names of some ὁμώνυμοι—two doctors and one writer on agriculture also named Chrysippus—it looks, at first glance, as if what we have here is something like “but to return to Chrysippus the philosopher . . .” It is therefore taken to be a Chrysippean testimonium by modern scholars.³⁰ But these could hardly be Chrysippus' own arguments. After all, Chrysippus objected to the Μεγαρικὰ ἐρωτήματα (*SVF* II. 270–71); and the only argument in this passage which has a *Sitz im Leben* of a sort is “the Man in Megara” paradox. Add to this the fact that the last of these arguments is ascribed to another Megarian, Eubulides. Quite clearly, ὁ φιλόσοφος at the beginning of this passage is a “bad stitch,” probably by

²⁷ See Muller 128, on Frs. 99–100—who also rightly remarks: “On note, d'autre part, à propos de la dialectique en général, que ces fr. offrent l'avantage de contenir explicitement plusieurs des traits caractéristiques évoqués ailleurs: les arguments en forme de question, l'obligation de répondre sur le champ, et aussi le caractère de jeu de société que révétaient volontiers un entretien dialectique.” (My emphasis).

²⁸ Misprinted Πτολεμαίῳ in Long's *OCT*.

²⁹ Pliny the Elder, *NH* VII. 180, translates the report he must have found in a similar Greek source: . . . pudore [obiit] Diodorus sapientiae dialecticae professor, lusoria quaestione non protinus ab interrogatione Stilponis dissoluta. A reader of this Latin testimonium alone would have to guess hard in order to arrive at the terminology of its Greek *Unterlage*. Both Greek and Latin passages: Giannantoni II F 1–2, vol. I, pp. 73–75.

³⁰ Von Arnim, *SVF* II. 279, p. 92, with the “man in Megara” argument—of all things—in spaced letters signifying genuine Chrysippus. Giannantoni III B 13, p. 53, referring to this *SVF* fragment in evidence of Chrysippean origin. Muller 65, p. 31.

Diogenes himself, who may have found this passage among his notes for his Chrysippus book, without indication of the source. Why not? *Il est capable de tout*. If there is any truth in Heraclides' report (DL II. 120; Giannantoni II 0 4; Muller I67) that Stilbo was also a pupil of Zeno of Citium, one possible explanation is that a string of ἐρωτήσεις formulated by Stilbo, and perhaps "solved" by Chrysippus, found its way into some late doxographic source concerned with Chrysippus. It may have been truncated in that source—or it may be Diogenes who copied only the "juicy" paradoxes. But enough of this.

That the Megarians were not only, or chiefly, logicians, but first and foremost dialecticians—this has been noted (although not as often as it should have been) by some historians of logic, and by the latest editor of the Megaric testimonia. They also note that these Megaric ἐρωτήσεις were originally couched in the form of alternative questions to be answered with "yes" or "no."³¹ But almost all the Megaric ἐρωτήσεις which have reached us are already formulated in the form of a disjunctive syllogism—in fact, in the form of a Stoic disjunctive argument, using ἢ or ἤτοι as the disjunctive particles.³² Why, then, call them ἐρωτήσεις?

A clue to this problem may be found in two versions of the same syllogism, ascribed by Diogenes Laertius to Diogenes of Sinope. In both versions, the argument is almost word for word the same—but the opening formula is distinctly different. Let us have the two:

VI. 37

συνελογίζετο δὲ καὶ οὕτως·

τῶν θεῶν ἐστὶ πάντα·
φίλοι δὲ οἱ σοφοὶ τοῖς θεοῖς·
κοινὰ δὲ τὰ τῶν φίλων·

πάντα ἄρα ἐστὶ τῶν σοφῶν

VI. 72

πάντα τῶν σοφῶν εἶναι λέγων καὶ
τοιούτους λόγους ἐρωτῶν οἴους
ἄνω προειρήκαμεν·

πάντα τῶν θεῶν ἐστὶ·
φίλοι δὲ τοῖς σοφοῖς οἱ θεοί·
κοινὰ δὲ τὰ τῶν φίλων·

πάντα ἄρα τῶν σοφῶν

The variations in wording are insignificantly small. But when, at 37, Diogenes Laertius presents this argument as a plain syllogism (συνελογίζετο), he says plainly οὕτως. When, at 72, he presents it as an ἐρώτησις, he uses a more careful language: τοιούτους λόγους ἐρωτῶν οἴους—indicating that this is not the exact form of Diogenes' original

³¹ Carl Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande*, Bd. I (Leipzig 1855) 42 ("ἐρωτῶν ist der stehende Ausdruck"), taking such passages as Isocrates 15. 45, ἄλλοι δὲ τινες περὶ τὰς ἐρωτήσεις καὶ τὰς ἀποκρίσεις γεγόνασιν, οὓς ἀντιλογικούς καλοῦσιν, Arist. *Soph. El.* 17. 175b ff.; 176a14 ff.; *Top.* VII. 7. 160a32; Alex. ad *Soph. El.* 50 ff, to refer to the Megarics. One could add to this Polemo's warning against some dialecticians of his age, including the words κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἐρώτησιν θαυμάζεσθαι, DL IV. 18. Michael Frede, *Die stoische Logik* (Göttingen 1974) 19–23, esp. 20–21. Muller, loc. cit. n. 27 above, and 113.

³² Frede (last n.) 93–96.

ἐρώτησις. I do not accuse Diogenes Laertius of such fine distinctions. He must have found them in his sources. Such language is not restricted to this particular passage. Stilbo's ἐρώτησις at II. 116—although it opens with a proper question (but carries on with two plain συμπεράσματα) is also prefaced with τοιοῦτόν τινα λόγον ἐρωτήσαι. So is the string of ἐρωτήσεις at VII. 186–87, just discussed. It opens with τοιοῦτους τινὰς ἡρώτα λόγους—and indeed, these are already couched in plain disjunctive form.

These are only a few traces of such a distinction. By the time of Sextus Empiricus, ἐρωτᾶν had already lost its original sense and was merely used for any refutation—disjunctive or plainly syllogistic. A formula like ἐρωτᾶται δὲ καὶ οὕτως (e.g. *M* VII. 340) or οὕτως συνερῶτα (X. 87) is quite regular. At X. 110, Sextus can even say of Diodorus Cronus ἡρώτηκε δὲ ὁ Διόδωρος τὸν ἐκκείμενον λόγον—referring back to the argument of 87 (τὸν περιφορητικὸν συνερῶτα λόγον . . . λέγων—followed by a plain disjunctive argument) and 94 (ὅταν λεγῇ ὁ Διόδωρος—followed by the same disjunction). But could one assume that the more careful formulation, using τοιοῦτος and variants in the passages cited in our last paragraphs (and one can add, e.g., *DL* VI. 69), is an indication of an earlier practice, at a stage when reports of Megaric ἐρωτήσεις were already being “translated” into the forms of Stoic syllogisms, but when the “translators”—to indicate that this was a reformulated version of the original dialectic argument, used a cautionary τοιοῦτος rather than a plain οὗτος? It is, in any case, not without interest that in our passage of *Stoic. Rep.*, Plutarch opens his story with the cautious τοιοῦτω τινὶ λόγῳ χρώμενος, although he follows it at the end with τοῦτον δὲ τὸν λόγον ἐρωτήσας. Is it possible that what he found in his source was τοιοῦτος in both cases—and that Zeno had couched his refutation, in the original setting, in the form of Megaric ἐρώτησις?³³

How exactly did Zeno do that? In our passage of Plutarch, he asks no questions: he already uses the “translation” into a disjunctive argument. Almost all the ἐρωτήσεις ascribed to the Megarics and Diogenes of Sinope have also reached us in such “translations.” The only exception I know is the opening question of Stilbo's argument at *DL* II. 116, beginning as it does with ἀρά γε.

Yet we have a number of such ἐρωτήσεις, beginning with ἀρα or ἀρά γε, ascribed by Aristotle (*Soph. El.* 20. 177b10–26) to Euthydemus. The immediate context (177a33 ff.) is that of λόγοι παρὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν καὶ σύνθεσιν. But the wider context (175a1–4 ff.) is that of ἀποκρίσεις to

³³ That Plutarch is not invariably careless may, perhaps, emerge from a comparison of *Stoic. Rep.* 16. 1041C–D, τοιοῦτους ἡρώτηκε λόγους (where the original arguments may have been disjunctive and put in the form of questions—but where, in any case, Plutarch may simply have changed and shortened the various stages of the original syllogisms), with 10. 1036A, where the quotation from Chrysippus is followed by ταυτὶ γὰρ αὐταῖς λέξεσιν εἴρηκεν.

Sophistic ἐρωτήματα.³⁴ Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are described in Plato's *Euthydemus* (e.g. 272b) as experts in the ἐριστική τέχνη. Their mode of investigation and refutation is clearly that of posing a question of "either . . . or" (e.g. 275d: πότεροί εἰσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μανθάνοντες, οἱ σοφοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς;) to which the other side can only answer with one of two alternatives. The refutation (in this example, 276a–b) is conducted in terms of questions, some of which naturally begin with ἄρα. These questions are so often called ἐρωτήσεις or ἐρωτήματα in that dialogue, that one need not bring any reference. That Socrates himself also poses ἐρωτήματα (e.g. 278e), and some of his own questions begin with ἄρά γε (ibid.), is only part of the whole purport of this dialogue, pointing out the difference between Socrates' questions and refutations, which lead to some positive advancement, and those of the eristics, aimed merely at an easy refutation. The main point is that, at the hands of such Sophists as Euthydemus and his brother, this technique of refutation by a series of questions with alternative answers is clearly described as eristic—the very name given to the Megarians in DL II. 106. We can draw some support for these antecedents of the Megaric eristic in that famous passage of *Meno* (80d–e), where Meno poses to Socrates two questions, each of which can be described as potentially disjunctive. Socrates, identifying Meno's argument as ἐριστικός λόγος (80e2), proceeds to "translate" them into a proper disjunctive argument. Euthydemus' arguments, all beginning with ἄρα questions, as reported by Aristotle in *Soph. El.* 20, are very similar in type to the Megarian ἐρωτήσεις we have discussed. Whatever the part played by the Eleatics, and especially by Zeno of Elea, in the formation of the dialectic, both of Euthydemus, Dionysodorus and their like and of the School of Megara—and this is not the place to enter into this old problem—it is clear that one can draw a fairly straight line from the question-and-answer technique of refutation of the two brothers to the technique of Megaric ἐρωτήσεις.³⁵

The technique of "translating" Megaric ἐρωτήσεις into Stoic syllogisms—first, with a cautious τοιοῦτος and variants—may well have been instituted by the Stoics themselves, in order to facilitate logical refutation. What is clear is that the Stoics studied such *Fangschlüsse* and

³⁴ In *Rhet.* II. 24. 1400a28 ff., Aristotle reproduces the "trireme in Piraeus" ἐρώτησις, as well as some other ἐρωτήσεις of Euthydemus, in shorthand syllogistic form. But then, in his *Rhetoric*, he is not concerned with the questioning technique of the dialectician, but rather with depicting the same fallacy, τὸ διηρημένον συντιθέντα λέγειν ἢ τὸ συγκείμενον διατρούντα (1401a25–26) as employed by the orator in "straight" speeches.

³⁵ Muller, 113, on 64–65, notes that no argument ascribed to Eubulides in our sources appears in Plato's *Euthydemus*, while two of his paradoxes are presented in Aristotle's *De Sophisticis Elenchis*. This would strengthen the assumption that Euthydemus and Dionysodorus—some of whose arguments, as we have just noted, are reported by Aristotle independently of Plato—were indeed "eristics" in their own right. One can, therefore, also assume that their techniques may well have influenced the Megarians.

employed the whole armoury of their own dialectic to refute them. The zeal of Chrysippus and his disciples in refuting such Μεγαρικά ἐρωτήματα or σοφίσματα is richly attested in *SVF* II. 270–87, assembled by von Arnim from such diverse sources as Cicero, Plutarch, Galen, Lucian, Diogenes Laertius, Sextus, Epictetus and some of the commentators on Aristotle. But we remember that even in our chapter of Plutarch (= *SVF* I. 50), we are told of Zeno: ἔλυε δὲ σοφίσματα καὶ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ὡς τοῦτο ποιεῖν δυναμένην ἐκέλευε κτλ. From *SVF* II. 271 (Plutarch), and especially from 272 (Galen), it seems clear that such σοφίσματα are mainly those Megaric paradoxes. It is not unlikely that such Megaric paradoxes were the main preoccupation of Chrysippus' περὶ τῶν σοφισμάτων πρὸς Ἡρακλείδην καὶ Πόλλιν (*DL* VII. 198 = *SVF* II. 16). Yet we have seen that in our chapter of Plutarch, Zeno is made to employ precisely this type of Megaric σοφίσμα to refute his unfortunate opponent. Plutarch had noted as much as that, and accused Zeno of contradiction. Should we?

Of course not. The anecdote as we have it is no piece of philosophical doctrine, taken out of one of Zeno's serious books, but an amusing χρεῖα, in which Zeno is reported by someone else as refuting an adversary who thinks he is "too clever by half," and he does this by using precisely that sort of Megaric dialectic which he spent much of his time refuting. Moreover, by listening to the other man's argument and spending some time in answering it with a counter-argument (Plutarch's emphatic ἀντέλεγεν),³⁶ Zeno shows in practice that he has, in this case, listened to the other side.

If our χρεῖα is a genuine anecdote, recounting something which really happened to Zeno—and we must remember that Plutarch is our only source—³⁷one can now use one's imagination and reconstruct roughly what may have happened.

Zeno was most probably expounding in public some of his own ideas and referring with contempt to those of someone else, which he described as "not worth listening to." Someone in the audience challenged him by quoting the hexametre line, to the effect that one should listen to the other side. Zeno—far from not listening to the other side—even bothered to refute him. In his refutation, he used—quite consciously, I would guess—the Megaric mode of refutation which, as a teacher of dialectic, he did his best to confute. Those of his proper pupils standing around must have realized—and most probably enjoyed—both the fallacious nature of Zeno's argument, and the "refutation in practice" offered by his very action. But

³⁶ If Prantl (n. 31 above) is right in regarding Isocrates 15. 45 as a reference to the Megaric technique—and the similarity in terminology to passages we have examined, where the Megarians are explicitly mentioned, is compelling—then the term ἀντέλεγεν in our passage of Plutarch echoes ἀντιλογικοί of Isocrates, thus confirming our suggestion that in the original form of this anecdote, Zeno was depicted as using a Megaric ἐρώτησις technique.

³⁷ See note 22 above.

here was a clever piece of repartee. It would be a pity not to record it. Someone did. It found its way into some collection of *χρεῖαι*, where—when he was collecting materials for his books against the Stoics—Plutarch found it. By the time he came to write *Stoic. Rep.*, Plutarch most probably had forgotten his source. He either paid no attention to the obvious form of this *χρεῖα*, or forgot (what Theon, at least, knew) that a *χρεῖα* can sometimes be a mere joke. In his zeal to refute Zeno, he treated this clever little joke as a serious piece of Zenonian doctrine. Unfortunately, he has been followed in this by modern scholarship.

Tel Aviv University

