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## November 28, 1984 Lecture by Edward Lansdale

Cecil B. Currey

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Side 1, Recorded November 28, 1984, page 1--Edward G. Lansdale

C: Good afternoon. I am Professor Currey and I am very honored today not only to have all of you here, but because of the individual you came to hear who is in town as my guest. The individual spent long years in the Philippines and I would like for you to meet Mrs. Lansdale, a member of the...a citizen of the Philippines and more recently, the United States. Our speaker this afternoon is Major General Edward Gary Lansdale, who has been involved with America's intelligence activities since about 1942. He has led an extraordinary life. He became a close friend and confidant of Ramond Magsaysay, the hero of the Philippines in the years right after World War II, when Magsaysay was trying to bring democracy to that land. General Lansdale was then Lt. Colonel or Major or...?

L: Lt. Colonel.

C: Lt. Colonel Lansdale became a very close friend of Magsaysay. The two of them for many years were almost like brothers. When he finished his work in the Philippines, General Lansdale went to Viet Nam and became an adviser to Ngo Dinh Diem, the first President of the Republic of South Viet Nam, a position he maintained for some years. And at that point, I would like to give you General Lansdale.

L: Thank you

APPLAUSE

L: ...(illegible)...like to sit down back there.

What I thought I'd do is just talk for a little and then answer any questions. And since my wife is here as a surprise to me, I have revised my talk. Usually when I talk about the Philippines or Viet Nam, she says, I have heard it before, and bored, and she either gets up or tells all of you that you'll get bored, too, so I am going to talk about something else and you can ask any questions later you want about Viet Nam or the Philippines. I want to talk about South America

L: a little. I'll tell you...I'll tell you how the Communist party got started down in Venezuela, a few stories that is not known about that by very many people. It was started by an American from Philadelphia, named Joseph Cornfetter (?) and he was one of the very early American Communists and was asked by the Russians to go to the Lenin School in Moscow where revolutionaries are trained. And he was in the second class there. One of his classmates was Ho Chi Mihn from Viet Nam and many of the other early Communists who became leaders <sup>throughout</sup> ~~around~~ the world later. I had gone through a period of so many trips out to Asia that the U.S. government was getting a little worried about my... what I was doing in these countries and suggested I go some other place. We were getting ready to intervene in Viet Nam so they told me to keep strictly away from Viet Nam and pay no attention to it and (illegible phrase). So I picked South America as a good place to visit and at the time they were blowing up the oil rigs on Lake Maracaibo ( ) and Cuba was training saboteurs to go in and I got in touch with the officials down in Venezuela and the Defense Minister asked me to come down and visit. So before going down there I, I did my own type of research very quickly, and checking what Americans had been down there to Venezuela before and I discovered Standard Oil and a number of the oil companies and U.S. Steel, Sears Roebuck and Company, quite a big American.... but one of them was an ex-Communist from Philadelphia, Joseph Cornfetter, so I invited him down to my office in the Pentagon and started talking to him and he told me the story of how he started the Communist Party in Venezuela after his training in Moscow. The Russians, you know, wanted a revolution by the proletariat, so their organizers were all trained to go down to where their factories and industrial workers, the proletariat had to be city workers, labor, and he had been a labor leader in the U.S. early on so they sent him down to

L: Caracas, Venezuela, to organize the proletariat there. It was a very small proletariat, because there weren't too many workers there. There and in Columbia was the next, country. So he started working away organizing labor and , and getting close to various people in the labor movement down there, and he had been there a couple of weeks and they started getting suspicious of some of the people he was meeting and having beer with at night and so forth and trying to talk over. And there was a Dictator, Gomez, in Venezuela at the time and he suddenly started discovering that all these people that were so nice to him and listening to him, joining in with him and everything, were all Secret Police under Gomez, and that he was on the list to be arrested and not deported, but thrown in jail and the key thrown away . So he started getting very worried; he was an American boy a long way from home. And he had only one non-Communist person to turn to down there. He didn't have any Communists to turn to, he just had these secret agents of the Dictator, police, police-types down there, but when he left Philadelphia the family friends of his folks had said, when you are in Caracas, our cousin is teaching at the University, Central University down there in Caracas, and look him up sometime. Maybe you two can have dinner together or something, and you'll like him, and have a beer or something; he is a nice guy. At the moment of desperation, Cornfetter got out and looked up this guy who was a professor at the University in Caracas, Central University, and told him the story, and the professor said, well, I'm not a Communist. I'm not a Socialist, I'm nothing, but as a friend of my folks, why, sure, I'll put you up. So he hid out at this professor's house for about three months, and after some weeks of being in seclusion at this guy's house, the professor started inviting some of his friends over from the faculty at the University,

L: and some of them were quite sympathetic to his point of view and thus instead of getting...his seed work for the party among the proletariat, he did it among the intellectuals in Venezuela in the University, and the first Communist party was formed there in the professor's house. He didn't join himself, the American professor from Philadelphia, but the others from the Central University joined together and so....so it wasn't the proletarian revolution at all; it was an intellectual one. And I had noticed that elsewhere in South America; I don't think it is quite true in Central America. But down in South America the universities are the real haven of the hotbed of the Communists and rebels and people that are out to cause trouble. When I went down some years later, Central University had a campus right in the middle of Caracas, a very big city, and in the morning when the people were going to work along two of the main streets that bypassed the campus, on the outskirts of it, the students used to set up machine guns and fire into the traffic, be a real hazard. And they were not trying to shoot people except the people that got in the way, they got shot. But they were trying to knock out the cars. The main male dormitory on campus was called by the students, Stalingrad, and they went out in the morning and raised the Communist flag up over the University campus. And they ran the campus. They completely ran it. And while I was there the students decided to start a revolution in Venezuela, and they had read Mao, Mao Tse Tung, so they went out to do it the way Mao Tse Tung said. Mao said, you go to a remote place and you start your revolution there where it would be safe. So these kids were all city kids, mind you, at the University. They didn't know the outdoors in Venezuela very well, and so they picked the Falcan Hills (SP.?), which is a coastal area, and remote enough. There are no people up in there, except one farmhouse in that whole region. So they waited until summer vacation

L: so they could start a revolution, out camping, so, boys and girls together, they went up to start the revolution. The United States military, among others, were advising on counter-insurgency down there so, oh boy, this is an insurgency all of a sudden. They were advising the Venezuelan Army and Air Force how to go in and put down the insurgency. So when I got down there to look into the bombing of the rigs on Lake Maracaibo and see what was going on, I saw this grand show of military...artillery booming away, aircraft going over and bombing, and these were empty hills. They looked like Arizona and New Mexico or parts of southern California, dry hills up there, and when I went down to ask...is the enemy up there; is he shooting at you or what, you're firing at them. They hadn't seen the enemy at all and...3-man patrol, national guard, the national guard down there is the only regular military in Venezuela, and they are sort of a combination of military police, state police, park service, county agents, and so forth. They are very close to the people. And they were coming down out of the hills and I went over to talk to them, and they were looking with great astonishment at this great military display out there, and they were sending troops up in the hills and everything. They said, well, the Communists aren't there. They are all over at so- and - so's farmhouse. They got up in there and they camped out overnight and were going to start their revolution...until their canteens were all empty and they ran out of water to drink, nothing to wash their teeth in the morning, no water for coffee or anything, so they had gone to the only place where there was a well in the whole Falcan Hills (?) was this farmhouse and they were staying there and where they had been was getting bombed, now they can't go back there and they want to know how to come in. And I said, well, let's go over and tell these Generals over here with their American advisers that you will go up there,

L: take them up there, and invite the Communists to come on back and go back to the University and you aren't going to kill them this afternoon. So they went up and stopped the whole rebellion. It was very ludicrous to me. But the Americans fought in Viet Nam the same way...at times on the thing. But I wasn't permitted to stay in the country very long, but by that time I had gotten enough of a lugubrious reputation to be a little bit like Lenin and Trotsky in the old days when the Germans let them through to start the Russian revolution when they put them on sealed box cars through Germany, and they couldn't stick their heads out the windows even or the doors. And they used to let me go in countries if I promised not to stay longer than five days. Our State Department did that to me. And I asked them, why five days? Well, it seems it takes longer to start a revolution than five days, and I couldn't stay longer...long enough to start a revolution. I said, I've never started a revolution in my life, and they thought that's what I was going to do, I guess. So I...I had a vacation from insurgency and guerilla warfare and so on in the Far East. But I'm just going to talk a little and open it up for any questions, either about that or about Asia or about Viet Nam, the Philippines...

Q: On the Philippines. I was kind of interested in your thoughts on what position the United States should take vis a vis the Marcos regime in case of a popular uprising by the Filipino people.

L: Well, first of all, I don't think there is going to be an uprising. My wife (illegible phrase) she would come up here and beat me up. We have got to be very careful in how we handle the Filipino people. They are very sensitive with their pride. They love the United States and love Americans, but don't want anybody to say that, except themselves. If an American says that, they will deny it, and they will have big parades out in front of the Embassy,

L: Americans Go Home, and so forth, and then the next day they will be in trying to get exit visas and get visas to the United States, to come over here, ...My wife used to work at the Embassy and watch these parades, and they were the same people that leave off the lines trying to get visas to come to the United States, and go out and join the parade, you know, Yankee Go Home, and they would carry signs around and so forth. But this to them is heaven, here in the United States, and they would like to get here. They...they share the same ethics that we do, the same principles and dreams that we believe in, ideals, including democracy. And they don't have it now. The Communists are offering one way out. I don't think that they will want to go with them at all. I don't think they will go, follow them, but it is the only open way to go, other than going along with Marcos, so a lot of the people are uneasy in themselves on what to do next. When something happens there, I think it's going to be when something happens to Marcos himself. Physical ailments or debilitation or something, he will have to sit down and it's going to be an "iffy" sequence then. But if the United States steps in to do something, we are going to be making mistakes there with the people and we can't win... we'd join whoever it would be against at that time, show an open enmity, which wouldn't be a true one but it would be evident there and it would be wrong so, we have got a very ticklish row to hoe. The Soviets are in there now...they have got a lot of military attaches, they have got a lot of KGB people with their Embassy in there. They have learned the local language. They are getting all around the country, getting to meet people and go with them, but I don't think they have made that much of a headway with them at all. I think that the loyalties, the deep-down feeling of the Filipino people, are still towards the United States and what they have with us. But they are coming up to a very



L: tragic moment when something happens to Marcos. And it's too bad that he hasn't prepared his country better for his demise than he has. He thinks he has a scheme but I don't know that it is good. Yeah?

Q: I wonder if you (illegible phrase) techniques, psychological techniques, that were used in counter-insurgency (illegible phrase).

L: Yeah. Incidentally we called almost everything that we did Psy War in those days. And I used to get kidded every place, you know, you and your God damned Psy War they would tell me, you know. But the Communists fought using psychological operations as the...psychological political operations is their main activity and in order to fight them, fight them successfully, you had to go back along the same veins to do that. We...do anything that would force the enemy troops and groups to do certain things, and either go the wrong places or be misdirected and so forth. One of them was my friend, Colonel Valeriano. I introduced loud hailers from the Navy, beach masters in them World War II, I got some old surplus ones, had them carry it up in a liaison aircraft, and get out and talk with the enemy troops when he was fighting a Huks' squadron and yell at them. We'd get very good intelligence on them, so he would go up and yell at them, call several of them by name so he could spot them out in the...they'd be running from his troops, and calling several of them by name, and said well, the next time you are here, we are going to handle it a little different and then Goodbye to our friends in the ranks, I'm sorry I can't call you by name. But they would get to a rest area, the enemy getting away from his troops and look for his friend in their ranks and shoot two or three of the Huks there. And he didn't have a friend in their ranks, but he had enough information on them. That was a very live...of doing... I remember in the elections of '51, we got the Army in to

L: protect the elections and bring the people and government closer together. And the Communists had a movement before that in the previous elections of boycotting them, and some of the intelligence, Filipino intelligence people, found an agitprop cell of the Communists in the Manila area, and let me know about it. And we introduced Boycott the Elections propoganda into them in leaflets, which they started distributing and the Politburo bawled this agitprop cell out for doing something not authorized. But meanwhile they had all adopted it, it had been a familiar slogan from two years before, so they all went in and adopted it: Boycott the Elections because it would be dishonest. Well, we made a very honest election. The people recognized its honesty, and the people against the administration all won in the election, and it became very obvious that the Communists had been wrong in wanting to boycott it. So then we said, well, get your leaders on your side. So that pride about the elections and so forth, they must be the same way about what they want you to do in the future and so forth. Do you still trust them? Well, a lot didn't and we had gotten a lot of people over to join our side because of it. We did a lot of things like that. We...I think the biggest thing wasn't propaganda as such, but we started a program to get land to the landless over there, which is a big Communist slogan, at the time. Many of the Communist recruits and so forth were farm kids whose parents had been in debt and paying off on family debts and were tenant farmers, and they were paying off debts that their fathers had, so it was about two or three generations back that usury and so forth, and paying off debts. And when the Communists said, we are going to...everyone of you is going to get some land of your own if you join us; in the beginning was a very popular thing to do. We got some land down in Mindanao and took people retiring from the Army and got the prisoners who looked all right to us,

L: sent them down to Mindinao, along with the Army retirees, and we started some agricultural settlements down there. And they...I remember the first group of prisoners we took down there. One of them was a young guy and we had everybody aboard an LST going down to Mindinao, and I was watching this young Communist prisoner going around talking secretly to an awful lot of people aboard this LST, and it looked to me as though he was organizing something. I told the Secretary of Defense, Magsaysay, I said, I think we're making a mistake just taking this rebellion, Luzon where they have been fighting, down to Mindinao now and this guy is going to make future trouble for us down there. So he went and talked to him and he said, yeah, he is trying to line up a little bit of hard core down there. And we got down to Mindinao, and this is like California is to us here, is to Florida (illegible) But when we got down there, the trees, fruit trees, fruit was ten times as big as anybody had ever seen up in Luzon. The fish and everything were big. And everybody's expression, you know, this big and what have you, to show how big everything was. And this guy who started, and worried us, prisoner, finally told him we were going to take him back to Luzon and he couldn't stay on there and...a place for him. He looked at this and there's a little band of local people on the landing strip that we pulled up to in the LST. They had a 3- piece band out there playing Welcome to Mindinao to us, and we got down...and this guy came up and he had tears in his eyes and he begged Magsaysay to please, couldn't he stay there. He didn't know that it was for real ...and he said well, Magsaysay said well, take him along with us. We went in to where they were going to colonize in the jungle there, clear a jungle out and he was looking at the trees and everything. He stayed on and finally begged Magsaysay so much to stay on we left him there. Word of this

L: thing that we were doing spread all over Asia. I was surprised at how far it went. And the British down in Malasia were having trouble apparently with their problems there, the Communists and the people in Malasia working with the British and either helping them or fighting against them were all talking about what we were doing. We called--(illegible) the Headquarters and the Headquarter was the wonderful place we had. We had a generator...  
SIDE 2 ...and one of the persons that came over was a New York Times correspondent and he said, well, I'd like to talk to somebody that was a real dyed in the wool Huk down there. All I see are happy, smiling people and half of them are Army and half of them claim they're former Huks. I'd like a real die-hard Huk to talk to. So I said, well, here's one of them. I introduced him to this guy that we'd had real doubts about having him stay there, and he talked to him. And I left them alone and went on and finally this New York Times correspondent came over and saw me and started cussing me under his breath, and I said, what's the trouble? He said, well, that guy is one of your propaganda agents. And I said...he was a Communist, why he fought real hard up in Central Luzon area. And he said the way he talked to me, he was raving about this place and asked me to please write it up and so forth. Well, I'm sorry, but he was a real hard core Communist, and he changed completely. So with that, I said to Magsaysay, let's try him out. Let's send him back home and talk to the folks at home, to Central Luzon where he was from. So he went up then and talked in his home barrio to his uncles, and then went up to where all the Huks were recruiting from and so on and telling them about this headquarter down there and he was telling stories, you know, about everything was this big and this big and so on. It was like some

L: guy selling real estate in, I'll say California, and really amused me. But... (illegible) he brought his mother down and his sister, and the first time in his family's history, he is out of debt and he's paid off... and he owns his own place now. And the new peoples' army is trying to recruit down there and isn't getting any recruits in that area at all and won't have anything to do with them. I believe you had a question, too.

Q: I was going to change the scene a little bit; add a much more tough political question. You were the acknowledged expert on South Viet Nam during the Eisenhower administration, ...discussed by Professor Currey's introduction; something happened when Kennedy took office. I don't know; I don't understand what it was. I wonder if you would explain it to us. According to (illegible) when Taylor was sent, General Taylor was sent to South Viet Nam to do an appraisal of what would be needed there, you went along as part of the mission. There was a power play of some kind (illegible) wherein you were assigned some asinine objective, defense feasibility study, I don't know, for building a... wire around Viet Nam or something to stop the insurgent... to stop infiltration and this didn't sit very well with you for obvious reasons. It appears to me that somebody had it in for you, probably... is that because of your background in the Eisenhower administration or what, and as near as I can tell, once again from my limited access through David Elderspan (sp.?) and other miscellaneous sources, from... during the Kennedy administration you were essentially cut out of effective policy input.

L: That is correct.

Q. What happened?

L: I don't know. I don't know. I should know, and I don't. I had just come back from Viet Nam, a visit there, at the end of the Eisenhower administration,

L: and I got back to Washington a week before the inauguration of Kennedy. And he was inaugurated and then that first weekend after he was inaugurated, McNamara was the new Defense Secretary. He called me at home on Saturday morning and asked me to get down to the White House immediately where he was. And I went down, there was a meeting there, and they...Kennedy had my report in front of him, and he was ...it was in the...I think it was in the Cabinet Room...but he had a strange assortment of Cabinet and Assistants, about 20 or 30 people, and one of them was the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk. And Kennedy said he had read my report on Viet Nam, and he said, what do you think of going over there as Ambassador? No, he said, did Dean tell you, did Dean Rusk tell you that I'd like you to go over there as the Ambassador? No, he didn't, which he hadn't, hadn't mentioned at all. And then I thought, my gosh, the guy is asking me to go over as...well, thank you very much, finally, I stumbled, and I said, I'm a regular military officer and I don't think my place is in diplomacy. And that was..later I was in Bolivia talking to the Charge of the U.S. mission there, of the Embassy, and he had been Dean Rusk's Assistant at that time, up in Washington. And he said, let me tell you what happened after you left the White House. He said Dean Rusk told the new President that he would resign as Secretary of State if I was appointed to go over as Ambassador. And I said, why? He said, well, we don't want you military types taking over and running our foreign affairs. And I said, well, I had no intention (illegible phrase) and I agree with you, I don't want that either. Evidently it caused a big fuss that I had no idea of doing that. And right after that they set up a task force on Viet Nam in Washington and McNamara, who has got a bigger ego than any of us, and many of us have very big ones, he had a bigger one, he

L: came over from a meeting with Kennedy two days later and said, they cut out the National Operations Board which (illegible) and we're sort of stuck now on how to get the different departments together on foreign policy and come to some quick decisions among themselves, and I promised Kennedy that I would show up at the next White House meeting and give him the answer to it. And he had two of us in there, and he said, I want you to come up in the next couple of days with the answer to what I tell the President, and so he could go back and boast to him, what a great idea he had. The other guy was reorganizing the military in the Pentagon. He said, Boss, you have got me snowed under with work now. I said I'll come up with an idea so we can both give it to him. I came up with the idea of a task force, that would do it. So Kennedy took the idea and he set up his first one for Viet Nam. He asked the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Gilpatrick, to chair it, as long as I would be the Executive / <sup>Officer</sup> and make it work. Well, we held meetings at the Pentagon and we had all the brass in from State and other agencies and departments and Gilpatrick told me, said, I don't think, we are under such serious pressures here; you go in and chair the meeting. I said, no, you are the chairman; you do it. No, you go. I said, look these guys are just waiting for a big fight with me, I feel it in my bones. So I went in and all the speeches from the State Department officials, what a big bum I was; it started that way, not on Viet Nam at all but why I shouldn't be mixed up in it. So the second, third meeting, when I couldn't get Gilpatrick in, I started off the meeting, I said, now I'm going to give each of you two minutes rebuttal on the thing; I'm going to tell you in the beginning what I think of you. I have refrained from that up to now. So I told them. And I said, now, each of you have got two minutes to say what

L: you want to say and then we'll get on with the main business here and cut out all of this foolishness. Well, those things don't go in big conferences, and I made some enemies there. They would say the craziest things, making up policy. One of them was ambassadorial rank, a very good friend of mine, got up and he was trying to be appointed Ambassador over in Viet Nam. He was Ambassador closeby there. He got up and said, I think we should have a two-wheel, we are going to have a two-wheel foreign policy, and I said, you mean one bicycle with two wheels?...or two bicycles with one wheel? And he said, no, don't be foolish now, we ought to have a two-wheel policy. I still don't know what that means, but...imagine these are grown-up Americans deciding the future of the country, what we fought a war about, and these are serious discussions. I couldn't even understand it. So I said, please get me out of this and fortunately they did. Then when I...we moved all over the ...State was screaming so at Defense that we moved it all over to State. But I discovered then that I was scheming and taking over all of the State Department functions over in Defense in the Pentagon, which I never did, but, imagine people thinking that. But I was just trying, arguing for common sense and everything...but some feel that the people...receiving end of our efforts...and I felt very much for the Vietnamese people, then and now, so much so that my wife in the Philippines said that the Vietnamese aren't worth it, your worrying about them all the time, but I feel that way, and I feel the same way about the Filipinos. And I think that you students particularly, and I know that you are interested in foreign policy and foreign affairs and some in the military service and so on, when you get to a foreign country, which you will, start working...people there expect something from Americans ; the current attitudes will never show it. They might be very



L: anit-American in their mobs and demonstrations and everything, deep within them they have another view of the United States and of Americans; it means something to them. It's not something (illegible). So when you start work and the closer you come to ideals that we have in the United States, the things that we really believe in, and your work, translate that into what you are saying to them and your own behavior, it's just amazing what happens next with them. You start speaking a universal language to them and you become very close to them and I have become like brothers and sisters with many people around the world simply because as they have later confessed to me, you acted as though we always thought Americans should. And....a lot of American military there and so forth, but when you stand up for something and the going gets tough and you still stand up for these things, it rings out loud and clear and it's the strongest moral force that argument and psychological forces an individual could have. So, let me pass that along to you as something to hang on to and remember at a time of need in the future. Anybody else have a question?

Q....Do you believe that, in your opinion, are there a lot of (illegible) similarities between the situation in Viet Nam and the current situation in Central America and (illegible). Do you think, as you were saying before, that the Communists or any of these parties, their major aim is psychological and political; that we are kind of over-emphasizing the military solution to this and we are de-emphasizing the psychological and political aspects of the, in the conflict?

L: Most of our solutions, we send observers from the Pentagon and the State Department to go down and look at a situation, and sometimes a person will, from his own staff, send people to look. In turn, they go in with professional

L: views of Americans on the scene and again get in with the foreign services and the military services. And apparently we didn't learn enough by what we went through. Quite a few of us caught on in Viet Nam. I, I was surprised myself eventually to find people who really knew what was happening and why it was happening and so forth. But the predominant forces that work in the country, policy-wise and something, apparently never did catch on, try to be.....for us. So I hope at some point we would start thinking that these are essentially political movements, aimed toward political goals. They use psyc...psychological means to help them towards that and military again as a help towards that. When you go in just military against it, you can never win it, unless you kill everything in sight. The Communists themselves in fighting their guerillas and insurgents leave a scorched earth behind them. The Chinese, for example, up...when they went against Tibet, they...they told the people in the country to come in to register at the town by such and such a thing, gave them a deadline and when the people... when that dealine passed, they...the troops went out in the countryside and just shot everything that was moving, men and animals. The Soviets do the same thing. But you have got to move your own people in to fill the vacant spots, and we, we can't fight that way, and we shouldn't. We should see it as a political move and see what forces we can bring, including psychological and political forces and moral, and what military force would be understood by the people there and accepted by us. I remember the first time in Viet Nam, I saw artillery being used by the Vietnamese against the enemy villages; in 1960, December 1960, at the end of the Eisenhower administration, and I got so mad I jumped out of the car...a Vietnamese General that I knew, it was his outfit there and they were shooting over the village, and I got him to cease fire, and

L: demanded an explanation of it. My friend there was from the staff of Ngo Dinh Diem, the President, and he was trying to calm me down. He said, you weren't supposed to come out and give orders like that. I said, you should; give them orders to stop. You don't do that against your own people. And the Americans did the same thing, Koreans...and the Koreans did the same thing. Stand off with artillery and shoot <sup>at people</sup>. And I was trying to explain to them, the Communists use, that's a psychological judo there...using. They'll go into the village and teach the people to use slit trenches outside thier homes or under their beds, so when the aircraft or artillery come in, everybody can get in a slit trench and have some chance of luck. Well, after they have trained the people over that, they go on out and shoot an Army convoy with rifles and so on and get the troops mad enough they bring up the artillery and shell this hostile village. Well, the villagers are standing there with their mouths open, you know, looking at these foreigners, the guerillas hidden among them, doing that. And the Communists turn around, get in your slit trenches, you know, we are going to save you. Well, they only save the guys that they got in trouble, see, and if they hadn't been there, that wouldn't have happened. But we oblige and fire back and I said that the enemy was getting us to use jujitsu, as I said at the time, but it was our own efforts turning the people against us. If we had sent infantry in and braved a little fire, and went in after them to protect the people and done it as a conscious ... and protectors it would have been a very different result. But we'd done it enough in Viet Nam so by 1965 when we sent troops in we had a lot of hostile areas that we should never have had and a lot of it was done with American, because we didn't know. When you are shot at, you shoot back,,,,well, that's a good rule, but you shoot back at the guy shooting at you, not the innocent people standing next to him,

L: but we didn't seem to catch on to that at all. And I went back to Viet Nam later on, after I had gotten out of the military and retired, and I went back as an administrator, not like you were a minister, but a minister in the Foreign Service helping save things and I spent some years in Saigon trying to help on these and similar matters. And I go over and have breakfast with Westmoreland and beg him to stop some of the things and he would tell me, you are not a general, forget that, I won't let you be one ....

Unidentified Voice: ...that could be a pain in the light of the situation on the ground. I don't think we could obtain much more, but I must say that very honestly, I did not have much optimism that South Viet Nam was going to...

Second Unidentified Voice: I have developed trouble in the pull back, and we are in a little wooded patch and the son of a bitches just ripped the trees apart, you know, and no way you could...it was just trees, it was roots all over the place. I kept (illegible) alive (illegible)...the second year in a row I .... So we were driven out of there and then the next day we went out there (another voice: Good to see you.) I ran a charge on that box and pulled the charge and it blew, and very rarely when you blew the box they were already <sup>(or were ready to come out?)</sup> come out, that stopped all fire but these bastards kept coming back and (illegible--lot of background noise) so they had a (illegible) go up. Muscatel, do you remember that, there was a tank that went up and he just almost, he was just starting to dig into the dirt, and the guy comes running out of the hole, out of the box, and he throws something on the tank and it burst into flame. Now I am terrified of mortars or artillery fire, I really....I got ...I wasn't worried about the fire, were