

3

Five Textual Notes

F. H. SANDBACH

I. HERACLITUS FR. 126 DK, 39 BYWATER, 42 MARCOVICH

ὁ παλαιὸς γὰρ Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος ἐκαλεῖτο δεινὸς διὰ τὸ τῶν λόγων αὐτοῦ σκοτεινόν· τὰ ψυχρὰ θέρεται, θερμὸν ψύχεται, ὑγρὸν ἀναίνεται, καρφαλέον νοτίζεται.

This comes from a note by John Tzetzes on his *Commentary on the Iliad*, at present published only from an incomplete 15th-century ms. of that *Commentary*,¹ belonging to the University of Leipzig's library, by G. Hermann in *Draco Stratonicensis et Tzetzes* (Leipzig, 1812). The notes are mutilated; the letters in the angled brackets above were supplied by Hermann.

G. S. Kirk, *Heraclitus* (Cambridge, 1954), 150–151, remarks on the abruptness with which the quotation is introduced and the arbitrary change of number. L. Bachmann, *Scholia in Homeri Iliadem* (Leipzig, 1835), reprinted Hermann's text with some emendations, probably conjectural, but unmarked and unexplained. Here he made all the adjectives neuter plural. That Kirk's unease and Bachmann's change were justified is shown by a carefully written ms. of the 14th century in the library of Trinity College, Cambridge (R.16.33).² It contains Tzetzes' notes undamaged, and reads ὁ παλαιὸς γὰρ Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος ἐκαλεῖτο δεινὸς διὰ τὸ τῶν λόγων αὐτοῦ σκοτεινόν, λέγων ψυχρὰ θέρεται, θερμὰ ψύχεται, ὑγρὰ ἀναίνεται, καρφαλέα νοτίζεται.

This is how the fragment should be printed, with some confirmation from *Epist. Heracliti* 5, ὑγρὰ ἀναίνεται, θερμὰ ψύχεται. But I think that Tzetzes wrote or intended to write ἐκαλεῖτο σκοτεινός, since Heraclitus

¹ On this ms. see E. Maass, *Hermes* xix (1884) 264 ff. and *RE* 2 vii. col. 1967.

² Noted in *RE*, *loc. cit.*, and used by O. Masson, *Parola del Passato*, v (1950) 71, who found in it some new fragments of Hipponax. Unlike the Leipzig ms., it contains the whole of the commentary on *Iliad* A.

was notoriously nicknamed *ὁ σκοτεινός*, *Suda* s.v., Strabo xiv 25 p. 642, Cicero, *Fin.* ii.15, cf. Livy xxiii.39. The mistake arose from the previous sentence, *δεινός ἐνταῦθα ὁ σοφὸς διὰ τὸ μέγαρα ἐναβρύνεσθαι*, which refers to the other Heraclitus who wrote on Homer. He, says Tzetzes, was clever and effective because he took pains to show off; (the truth of this appears from a comparison), since Heraclitus of Ephesus got the name of Obscure because of the obscurity of his writing. The word *δεινός* stuck in the memory either of Tzetzes or of a copyist and replaced the correct *σκοτεινός*. *σκο* may have been overlooked after *ειτο*.

II. PLATO, *Politicus*, 259 d.

At 258 e the Eleatic stranger says that one can distinguish practical and cognitive sciences. He then asks whether the statesman (*πολιτικός*), the king, the master of slaves, and the master of a household exercise different arts, just as they have different names. He continues as follows (I omit the assenting replies of the young Socrates):

- 259 a If a private citizen were competent to advise a doctor in public practice, should we not necessarily give the same name to his expertise as to that of the man he advised? Similarly if a private citizen is clever enough to give good advice to one who is king of his country, shall we not say that he possesses the science which
- b the ruler should himself have had? But the science of the true king is the science of kingship; and will not the man who possesses this science, whether he be a ruler or a private citizen, be rightly called “kingly,” so far at least as his expertise is concerned?*
- A further point: the master of a household and the master of slaves are one and the same thing. Now you will hardly say that there is any difference between a large household and a small city with
- c respect to their government. So there is a clear answer to our question: there is a single science applicable to all these fields, and whether anyone calls it the science of kingship or of statesmanship or of household management, let us not quarrel with him. But it is also clear that no king can do more than a trifle to maintain his rule by manual work or the whole sum of bodily effort compared with what mental power and strength of personality can do. So we shall agree that the king has a closer connection with cognitive science than with manual and practical science.
- d *Shall we then associate statesmanship and statesman and kingship and kingly men in the same class as being all a single entity? We should therefore proceed methodically if we were next to define cognitive science.*

The sentence in italics runs in Greek: *τὴν ἄρα πολιτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικὴν καὶ βασιλικὸν εἰς ταῦτόν ὡς ἐν πάντα ταῦτα συνθήσομεν*; It is strange that no-one seems to have noticed that it is out of place, breaking irrelevantly into the argument about cognitive science which begins in the middle of 259 c. That irrelevance is more noticeable because the Eleatic makes it a point that he is proceeding methodically. Nor can it be defended as an absent-minded parenthesis, for the particle ἄρα marks it as a conclusion or inference, the only usage admitted by E. des Places, *Etudes sur quelques particules de liaison chez Platon*. On page 245 he classes this passage among those where the principal speaker sums up after the respondent has assented to his views. But this will not do. The sentence does not sum up the previous statements, and it is narrower than the conclusion already reached at the beginning of 259 c. Where it would be in place is at the earlier point in 259 b marked by an asterisk. If we transfer it there together with the phrase *τί μὴν*; which precedes it, we shall have *ταύτην δὲ ὁ κεκτημένος οὐκ, ἄντε ἄρχων ἄντε ιδιώτης ὧν τυγχάνη, πάντως κατὰ γε τὴν τέχνην αὐτὴν βασιλικὸς ὀρθῶς προσρηθήσεται;—τί μὴν;—τὴν ἄρα πολιτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικὴν καὶ βασιλικὸν εἰς ταῦτόν ὡς ἐν πάντα ταῦτα συνθήσομεν;—δίκαιον γοῦν*.

An omission might have been caused by a scribe's eye jumping from *-θήσεται* to *-θήσομεν*. A minor advantage of replacing the passage here is that this removes the only instance in Plato where *δίκαιον γοῦν* answers a question containing the word *ὀρθῶς*. To say anything *ὀρθῶς* must be *δίκαιον*. Once suspicions have been aroused, they tend to multiply. What follows is less well-based than what has already been said, yet I cannot resist a doubt whether the original Platonic text has been completely restored. The ms. T originally did not have *καὶ* before either *πολιτικὸν* or *βασιλικὸν*. This cannot have been due to deliberate omission; it may have been due to accident, although an unlikely double accident. But if it is a reading which goes back to the archetype and has received an obvious "correction" in the mss. B and W, the modern critic would prefer to bracket the words *πολιτικὸν* and *βασιλικὸν* as explanatory additions. The preceding argument has shown that *πολιτικός* is equivalent to *βασιλικός*; from this equivalence is deduced the equivalence of *πολιτικὴ* and *βασιλική*.

The omission of *πολιτικὸν* and *βασιλικὸν* would make *ὡς ἐν πάντα ταῦτα* a strange phrase, since it would refer merely to the pair *πολιτικὴ* and *βασιλική*, and this may be a reason for retaining the words. But, as the late Professor R. Hackforth said when I once discussed the passage with him, the phrase is in any case disturbing, since even if four terms precede it there are in reality only two entities to be identified. He

suggested that the phrase had been wrongly repeated, as an explanation of εἰς ταῦτόν συνθήσομεν, from 258 e, where it was in place, since there four entities are identified.

III. PLUTARCH, QC 645 F-646 A

καθάπερ <γὰρ> οἱ μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν κεκλημένων ἀγόμενοι φίλων ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖπνον ἔθει φιλανθρώπῳ τυγχάνουσιν τῶν αὐτῶν . . . εἰ δέ τις ἀφ' αὐτοῦ βαδίζοι, τούτῳ δεῖ τὴν θύραν κεκλείσθαι, οὕτως αἱ μὲν περὶ τὴν ἐδωδὴν καὶ πόσιν ἡδοναὶ κεκλημέναι ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως ταῖς ὀρέξεσιν ἐπόμεναι τόπον ἔχουσιν, ταῖς δ' ἄλλαις ἀκλήτοις καὶ σὺν οὐδενὶ λόγῳ < . . . > φιληδονίας ἀπήλλακται.

The simile does not work. The contrast between the so-called ἐπίκλητοι, persons brought to a feast by invited guests, and would-be gate-crashers does not form a parallel to the contrast between invited and uninvited pleasures. Hiatus such as that in κεκλημέναι ὑπὸ is not unparalleled in Plutarch, but it is not common. Restore normality and sense by reading κεκλημέναις ὑπό. "The pleasures of eating and drinking follow the appetites for food and drink, which are invited by nature, and so find a place." Nature is the host and invites the appetites for food and drink to her table; the pleasures of eating and drinking come along in their company and are welcomed also.

The last two words have been variously and unsatisfactorily emended. I suspect that they are genuine but separated from the foregoing by a lacuna.

IV. PLUTARCH, QC 646 C

σκόπει δ' ὅτι τοῖς φρομένοις καὶ βλαστάνουσι τὰ μὲν φύλλα σωτηρίας ἔνεκα τοῦ καρποῦ καὶ ὅπως ὑπ' αὐτῶν τὰ δένδρα θαλόμμενα καὶ ψυχόμενα μετρίως φέρη τὰς μεταβολὰς γέγονεν, τοῦ δ' ἄνθους ὄφελος οὐδὲν ἐπιμένοντος, πλὴν εἴ τι χρωμένοις ἡμῖν ἐπιτερπέες ὀσφρέσθαι καὶ ἰδεῖν ἡδὺ παρέχει, θαυμαστὰς μὲν ὁσμάς ἀφιέντα, ποικιλίαν δ' ἀμιμήτοις χρώμασι καὶ βαφαῖς ἀνοιγόμενα.

τὰ δένδρα del. Paton, ut subiectum sit τὰ φυόμενα καὶ βλαστάνοντα ἀφιέντα et ἀνοιγόμενα inter se transp. Wyttenbach ἀνοιγόμενα Turnebus ἀμπεχόμενα Pohlenz ποικιλία . . . βαινόμενα Reiske.

The speaker is arguing that flowers, not leaves, should be used to make garlands. The leaves used in garlands were predominantly those of what the Greeks called δένδρα: bay, pine, myrtle, oak, vine, and ivy. Hence, although leaves are useful to all plants and not merely to "trees," he may well have introduced δένδρα as the subject of the verb. He will very

shortly say οὐ μόνως . . . 'τῆς δάφνης τῶν φύλλων ἀπὸ πάμπαν ἔχουσαι' χρῆ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων φεῖδεσθαι δένδρων.

In the last sentence ἀφιέντα and ἀνοιγόμενα are written as if τῶν ἄνθων had preceded, not τοῦ δ' ἄνθους. This is easy, but there are other difficulties, one of which I cannot solve, the other I think I can.

What leaves me uncertain is the question whether ποικιλίαν can be governed by ἀφιέντα, for which Plato, *Lysis* 222 B, ὑπὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς παντοδαπὰ ἡφίει χρώματα offers a weak support. If so ἀνοιγόμενα, "when they open," might be a not very happily placed participle, to be taken both with the μέν-clause and the δέ-clause. Otherwise the final word must govern ποικιλίαν and, since ἀνοιγόμενα can hardly be transitive, it must be corrupt.

ποικιλίαν needs an epithet to balance θαυμαστάς before ὁσμάς. Translators attempt to supply the need by renderings such as "a variety of inimitable colours and hues," or "l'inimitable jeu de couleurs et de tons qu'elles déploient." But βαφαί does not mean "hues," and the dative of description is not a Greek construction, although ablatives of description are common in Latin. Plutarch must have written ποικιλίαν δ'ἀμίμητον χρώμασι καὶ βαφαῖς, "a variety inimitable by pigments or dyes," meaning that painters and other craftsmen, with a limited range of colours available, are unable to reproduce the variety offered by nature's flowers. Cf. *Μορ.* 58 c, οἱ γραφεῖς ἀνθηρὰ χρώματα καὶ βάμματα μιγνύουσιν.

V

Gregory of Nazianzus, *Epist.* xii, addressing Nikoboulos, who had scoffed at the small stature of his wife, Alypiane, reproves him, and after enumerating her merits concludes, according to the mss., followed by editors, ὄντως οὐ μετρεῖται ψυχῇ, καὶ δεῖ τὸν ἐκτὸς εἶντα πρὸς τὸν ἐντὸς βλέπειν ἄνθρωπον. There is no reason why Gregory should have used the epic form εἶντα for ὄντα, as seems to be assumed in the recent Budé edition, which translates the second clause "et l'extérieur doit se juger d'après l'intérieur." But by the fourth century A.D., Gregory's time, confusion of ο and ω was common. What he meant was δεῖ τὸν ἐκτὸς εἶντα πρὸς τὸν ἐντὸς βλέπειν ἄνθρωπον, "one ought to disregard the outer man and look to the inner." I hope that the false spelling was that of a copyist and not his own.

Trinity College, Cambridge