Sharia, Arab Gul and Nasim Begum pose by a mural of a Kalasha woman, Mumuret Valley. (Photograph with kind permission of Llantén Nó Cisneros).

To Change Is to Be: The Kalasha of Pakistan's Afghan Frontier and the Age of Heritage

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This thesis is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Declaration

This thesis is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except as declared in the preface and specified in the text.

It is not substantially the same as any work that has already been submitted before for any degree or other qualification except as declared in the preface and specified in the text.

It does not exceed the prescribed word limit of 80,000 stipulated by the Archaeology and Anthropology Degree Committee.

Abstract

This thesis examines the relationship between heritage and borders. It argues that the study of heritage has a tendency to overlook important aspects of the borders of heritage discourses. The dissonance and conflict which occurs at the meeting points of different heritages is well worn academic territory. What is less comprehensively understood are the other products which issue from these meeting points.

Taking as its case study the Kalasha, a non-Muslim community of only 4000 members positioned on the Pakistani side of the Afghan border, I demonstrate how in certain settings different heritages can come together in creative combinations. The theoretical underpinnings of my argument are drawn from borderland studies, a discourse which has much to offer the critical discussion of heritage, but which has thus far been underutilised. I also make use of the ecological principal of the ecotone, a methodology which allows me to abstract what I learnt from my case study into a format which is applicable to the wider study of heritage.

The thesis makes several novel contributions to the academic discourse. The first is to draw attention to the potential of indeterminate borderlands for advancing critical heritage studies in productive new directions. The second is to produce a methodology for studying the meeting points of different heritages which offers the conceptual space to explore both dissonant and creative outcomes. The final contribution is to argue for a theorisation of heritage narratives as malleable and capable of being combined and in so doing nuance the prevalent understanding of heritage narratives as immutable and immiscible.

Acknowledgements

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In Cambridge I must first thank my supervisor, Dacia Viejo Rose for her careful and conscientious guidance throughout the full four years it took me to produce this thesis. Her insights were indispensable when it came to making sense of what I had discovered in the Kalash Valleys and my analysis owes a great deal to her concept of the ecotone. I must also thank my secondary supervisor Mark Elliott for his equally thoughtful and indispensable feedback. I owe a great debt too to Jess Rippengal for helping me get the necessary permissions to conduct fieldwork where no other University would let me go.

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In Pakistan due to my ethics policy sadly I have to start leaving names out. But *baya* and *baya* in the Regale in Lahore, your friendship and Kal'as'amondr tuition was so much appreciated. Arbab bhai, thank you so much for your help in trying to expedite my permissions to return to the Kalash Valleys. Thank you too for your repeated and extravagant Pashtun hospitality. Sohaib thank you for your excellent company and hospitality in Islamabad and (different) Sohaib thank you for your hospitality in Rawalpindi. Shiraz thank you for your help with my research permissions and rest in peace.

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In the Kalash Valleys I owe thanks to so many. But to single out a few friends: Aya and Dada and the rest of the *duray moc*, thank you for taking care of me over the years, for your help with many, many different things and for teaching me Kal'as'amondr. Dhiñt'a baya, thank you for guarding me and showing me so much of the Valleys and for your friendship. Karim baya, thank you too for your friendship and your thoughts. Gul baba, all the very best for your exciting future. Taj and Sikandar*, tai madat as bati bo, bo, meherbhani*.

Finally, I don't think my application to Cambridge would have been funded without the tough love of Johanna Zetterstrom-Sharp and Constance Wyndham.

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Note to Transliteration

In transliterating Kal'as'amondr words I have used the system published by Ronald Trail and Gregory Cooper (Trail and Cooper 1999). The Trail and Cooper alphabet is used to teach the writing of Kal'as'amondr in the Kalasha Dur school and in this sense has been adopted by the Kalasha as an 'official' system of transliteration. Kal'as'amondr is generally not transliterated into Urdu script, either by the Kalasha themselves or by scholars of their language and culture.

I prefer "Kalasha" over "Kal'as'a" or the Urdu "Kalash" (کالاش) as this is the version most commonly used in writing by the Kalasha themselves and has been consistently adopted by scholars since the 1980s. The exception is to describe the homeland of the Kalasha, where I use the anglicised "Kalash Valleys" as this is the common usage for both Kalasha (when speaking English) and non-Kalasha.

Glossary

Al'as'ĩg – for a Kalasha woman to leave her husband for another man.

Bhut – Kalasha woman's trousers.

Bonj – *Quercus baloot*, holly oak, an important source of fodder for the Kalasha's livestock.

Biriu – the most southerly of the Kalash Valleys, often referred to by non-Kalasha as Birir.

Bud'al'ak – a now defunct practice whereby a chosen young man, on his return from a prolonged stay in the high pastures, was given licence to have sex with certain married women, perhaps those who were having trouble conceiving, but this is unclear.

Cawmos – the Kalasha winter solstice festival and the most important celebration of the year.

Cew – Kalasha woman's dress.

Chitrali – the majority ethnic group of Chitral District.

Chitral District – District in north-western Pakistan which encompasses the Kalash Valleys. (See Map 1).

Charpoy – string bed.

Dashman boli – A series of forced conversions suffered by the Kalasha at the time of the creation of Pakistan.

Dehar – shaman.

Ditc – the most sacred time of the Cawmos festival.

Gandau – life-sized funerary effigy carved of wood.

Gurjar – an ethnic group found across India central, western and north western India, Pakistan and north-eastern Afghanistan.

Kafiristan – Historical non-Muslim region spanning what is today northern Pakistan and north-eastern Afghanistan. Synonymous with Peristan. Is also used more specifically to refer to the non-Muslim region of Afghanistan which became Nuristan. (See Maps 3-6)

Kal'as'amondr – the Kalasha language.

Kam – clan-like lineage group.

Kateh – an ethnic group who predominantly live in the region of Afghanistan immediately to the west of the Kalash Valleys as well as in the westernmost settlements of Rukmu and Mumuret valleys.

Kupas – Kalasha woman's ceremonial headdress.

Madojaw – graveyard.

Mahandeo – shrine above many Kalasha villages, named after the supernatural being it honours.

Ma'hi'k – Kalasha woman's necklaces.

Markhor – *Capra falconeri*, a large mountain goat the range of which stretches from Central Asia to the Western Himalayas. Called *shara* by the Kalasha, it is a considered by them to be among the most onjes't'a of creatures.

Mehtar – ruler of Chitral before the region was incorporated into Pakistan in 1969.

Mumuret – the middle of the three Kalash Valleys, often referred to by non-Kalasha as Bumburet.

Nuristan – Region in northeast Afghanistan, immediately to the west of the Kalash Valleys and Chitral District. Until its conversion Nuristan was often called Kafiristan. (See Maps 3-6).

Onjes't'a – one of the two spheres into which the Kalasha divide their world. Onjes't'a is the responsibility of men.

Pat'i – Kalasha woman's sash.

Perian – supernatural beings that live on the mountain tops, *suci* in Kal'as'amondr.

Peristan – Historical non-Muslim region spanning what is today northern Pakistan and north-eastern Afghanistan. Synonymous with Kafiristan. (See Maps 3-6).

Pragata – one of the two spheres into which the Kalasha divide their world. Women bear the responsibility of keeping pragata separate from onjes't'a, the other sphere.

Phusti – Kalasha men's trousers of homespun wool. Rarely worn today.

Rukmu – the most northernly of the Kalash Valleys, often referred to by non-Kalasha as Rumbur.

Saras – *J. excelsa* subsp. *Polycarpos,* juniper, a plant which is sacred to the Kalasha.

Shalwar kameez – widely worn Muslim dress in South Asia.

Shek – a designation for Kalasha who have converted to Islam in their lifetime or the descendants of converts.

Suci – supernatural beings that live on the mountain tops.

S'us'utr – Kalasha woman's beaded headdress.

Thom kuchek – "bow asking", the practice of divining using a small bow, carried out by Kalasha men.

Zhoshi – the Kalasha Spring festival.

Maps



Map 1. Rukmu, Mumuret and Biriu, the three Kalash Valleys. Chitral Town, the district capital is also shown as is the N45 which connects Chitral District with the rest of Pakistan to the south. (Adapted from Google Maps).



Map 6. Mumuret Valley. (Adapted from Google Maps). To the west is the border with Afghanistan. Immediately across this border in Afghanistan is the homeland of the Kateh people. To the east is the rest of Chitral District, where the majority of the population are ethnically Chitrali. Sheks are Kalasha who have converted to Islam in their lifetimes or the descendants of converts. Whilst some Sheks remain close to their Kalasha relatives and speak Kal’as’amondr, others distance themselves and speak only Khowar, the Chitrali language. The Gurjar ethnicity is extremely diverse and people who identify as Gurjar are to be found across north-western South Asia and north-eastern Afghanistan.

Locations of the Kalasha villages (a,b,c,e,f) and the Kalasha Dur (d) are accurate, other settlement locations and mosque locations are approximate (the Pakistan Army forbade me from using GPS devices). Kalasha nucleated settlements represent very dense areas of housing, other settlement is variously condensed or dispersed and is represented here abstracted into disks of equal size. I did not survey each home in the valley as my hosts suggested that to do so might exacerbate ethnic tensions and also since this would almost certainly have aroused the suspicion of the Pakistan Army. Population distribution is therefore also approximate.



Map 2. Peristan circa 1500 (Cacopardo 2016, 85). The solid line running north south represents the present-day Afghan-Pakistan border. The area marked Nuristan I refer to as Kafiristan up until its conquest by Abdur Rahman in 1896. (Reproduced with the kind permission of Alberto M. Cacopardo).



Map 3. Peristan circa 1680 (Cacopardo 2016, 89). The solid line running north south represents the present-day Afghan-Pakistan border. The area marked Nuristan I refer to as Kafiristan up until its conquest by Abdur Rahman in 1896. (Reproduced with the kind permission of Alberto M. Cacopardo).



Map 4. Peristan circa 1790 (Cacopardo 2016, 92). The solid line running north south represents the present-day Afghan-Pakistan border. The area marked Nuristan I refer to as Kafiristan up until its conquest by Abdur Rahman in 1896. (Reproduced with the kind permission of Alberto M. Cacopardo).



Map 5. Peristan circa 1890 (Cacopardo 2016, 95). The solid line running north south represents the present-day Afghan-Pakistan border. The area marked Nuristan I refer to as Kafiristan up until its conquest by Abdur Rahman in 1896. (Reproduced with the kind permission of Alberto M. Cacopardo).

Chapter 1

Heritage Boundaries and Looking Beyond Them

This thesis addresses the relationship between heritage and the creation of boundaries between people. The relationship becomes particularly acute when we examine questions around heritage, ethnic identity, and power. Rejecting depoliticised, universalist conceptions of heritage, the critical turn has charted a multiplicity of instances in which heritage manifests as a force that divides. Such divisions often occur along questions of whose heritage, or which conceptualisation of heritage value is given primacy within a particular framework. We can broadly group the ways in which heritage has been observed to divide into three categories, each of which has been profoundly shaped by the ideology of nationhood.

The first category concerns the uses of heritage which occur within the borders of the nation-state. Here the discussion revolves around state-sanctioned heritage narratives and disenfranchised groups. Often the state promulgates a national heritage discourse tailored to the identity of the nation's majority ethnicity, (or if not the majority, the ethnicity which holds the most power). In such cases the heritage discourses of ethnic minorities / subaltern ethnicities are placed in a subordinate position to that of the power-holding ethnicity.

The second category concerns institutions built with concept of universal heritage in mind. The most significant of these is the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). UNESCO attempted to deploy heritage as a common ground to heal the rifts of a post war world, yet its conception of universal heritage has been perceived as a Eurocentric construct and challenged by those who imagine their identity in opposition to the West.[1] UNESCO's claim to universality is further compromised as proposals for listing come via the governments of nation-states rather than direct from the populous. Listed sites therefore tend to reflect the national heritage discourses of member states and often disregard the perspectives of minority groups, thus reiterating the divisions of the first category.

The third category concerns the use of heritage by independent nation-states or state-like entities in demarking their difference from each other. Such uses of heritage become particularly acute in times of international conflict, especially when heritage sites are targeted in symbolic acts of violence. Equally, competition over the ownership of the same heritage site or narrative can bring two nations into a state of conflict or even outright warfare.[2]

[1] An issue discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.
[2] Two examples, the Thai-Cambodian dispute over the Preah Vihear temple and the Greek-Macedonian dispute over the name of Macedonia and the associated legacy of Alexander the Great, are discussed at several points later in the thesis.

The events discussed and analysed in this thesis certainly reveal particular forms of heritage production to be deeply divisive. We will see how heritage practices can drive a wedge between different ethnicities, prising apart people and discourses that are otherwise closely intertwined. By delineating identities in this way heritage creates opposed entities which are more likely to clash than to compromise. However, what follows looks not only at the collisions which occur when different heritage discourses meet, but also asks what other characteristics these meeting points might possess. Could heritage intersections represent sites of hybridity and creativity as well as dissonance and conflict?

The theoretical tools which I will use to tackle my questions are drawn from the wide-ranging multidisciplinary body of work which investigates what happens at the borders of nations. The study of borders steps outside of concepts which have been formulated with the geographical integrity of the nation-state in mind. Instead the subjects of investigation are flows of people, culture, discourses and commodities which transcend, yet are shaped by the nations they move through. Since the nation and the production of heritage are so closely entwined, it follows that research questions which interrogate the borders of the former may be productively turned to investigate the meeting points of the latter. What kind of heritage emerges in the spaces in-between nations? Could these borderlands foster the sort of productive relationship between heritage, difference, and identity which this thesis hypothesises?

The Kalasha

The place in which I have pursued my research questions has been shaped both by its location at the edge of a nation and by the presence of powerful heritage narratives.

The three Kalash Valleys[3] are pressed up against Pakistan's border with Afghanistan. Their name relates to their most famous inhabitants: the Kalasha, followers of a unique religion who number around 4000 people[4]. All the communities in the immediate region are Sunni Muslim and the Kalasha live on the border between two countries, both of which have Sunni Islam as their national religion. The Kalasha's religion, both globally in terms of its uniqueness and regionally in terms of the fact that it is not Islam, constitutes the preeminent maker of their identity. The fundamental importance of religion for defining Kalashaness is illustrated by the fact that a Kalasha person may abandon almost all characteristics associated with their culture and leave the Kalash Valleys, but still be identified as Kalasha by both the Kalasha community and their Muslim neighbours, so long as they do not convert to another faith. Concomitantly, the significance of characteristics associated with 'Kalashaness', is influenced by how closely they map onto the Kalasha's religious difference. The Kalasha have distinctive architectural and wood-caving practices for example, but although these do relate to a non-Muslim heritage, they are shared by neighbours across the Afghan border who converted to Islam at the end of the nineteenth century. Kalasha people therefore, whilst

[3] The Kalasha use 'Kalasha' to describe themselves and sometimes *Kalashadesh* to describe their three valleys. However, Kalasha say 'Kalash Valleys' rather than 'Kalasha Valleys', preferring the English / Urdu 'Kalash' in this instance.
[4] See footnote 158 on page 89 for a discussion of Kalasha population estimates.

appreciating their ties to these practices do not define them as an inviolable marker of their identity. Language, often one of the most important factors when it comes to demarking ethnicity, is, in the case of Kal'as'amondr -the language spoken by all Kalasha- similarly diminished as it is also used by Kalasha who have converted to Islam. In fact, there is only one conspicuous marker which, without exception, corresponds to the Kalasha's religious difference and that is the distinctive clothing worn by Kalasha women.

Many people in the Kalash Valleys find it a struggle to generate enough income to live off. Farming and livestock rearing remain the staple of the local economy. Population growth, however, has put pressure on pasture and arable land meaning that it is harder and *harder* to get by. The strain on traditional means of production has created an urgent need for employment, yet inhabitants complain of how limited opportunities are for making money. The situation is further compounded since compared to more central regions of Pakistan the area suffers from a lack of state investment.

A significant cause of the economic difficulties faced by the communities which live in the Kalash Valleys stems from issues related to inaccessibility. The one road in and out of the three valleys is regularly blocked by landslides or heavy snowfall in the winter and even in the most favourable conditions it takes nearly three hours to reach Chitral Town, the District capital, and the nearest settlement with amenities such as a hospital, court of law or a substantial bazaar (Map 1). Although from there on connectivity improves somewhat, it is still a long day's drive to the nearest city. On returning from visits to more populous places my Kalasha friends at times dream out loud of what better government provision and a stronger local economy could do for their valleys. For now, however, inhabitants must endure the fate of a marginal population and balance as best they can the desire to keep their community together with the need to go elsewhere in order to seek opportunities.

The Kalash Valleys' geographical isolation and economic impoverishment belies the fact that they are very well known, both within Pakistan and beyond. Furthermore, every year a considerable number of tourists make the long and difficult journey there (the income which they produce is largely siphoned off by hotel owners who are from the outside). Tourists are drawn partly by the beauty of the surroundings and the serenity which they find there, but also by the idea that in meeting the Kalasha one has the chance to 'discover' the last survivors of a lost culture. Although, as we shall see, there are fundamental issues with how the rest of the world perceives the Kalasha, it *is* true that there were once many more people who followed a related way of life. The territory inhabited by these people, sometimes termed 'Peristan',[5] extended in all directions from the current home of the Kalasha, reaching to the edges of Hindu Kush and Hindu Raj mountain ranges. Over the past 500 years however, Peristan steadily dwindled as its population either by force or by choice converted to Islam (see Maps 2-5).

Exactly what the cultural characteristics of Peristan were are unclear. Although languages and practices varied from region to region, inhabitants do appear to have shared a belief in mountain-top supernatural[6] beings or *perian*

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[5] I follow the example set by Alberto and Augusto Cacopardo's and prefer 'Peristan' over 'Greater Kafiristan' or 'Kafiristan' (Cacopardo and Cacopardo 2001a).

[6] The characteristics attributed to perian vary between cultures and over time (F. M. Smith 2012, 570; Bonnefoy 1993, 322).

(singular *peri*), which gives us the origins of Peristan, 'Land of the ‚Peri'. Other commonalities were aspects of an animist worldview that included a role for shamans and some cultures also worshiped a pantheon of gods related to the Vedic deities.[7] By the time (1890-91) the first thoroughly documented investigation of a Peristani society was conducted[8] only the Kalasha and a larger group of interrelated cultures to their west remained. Then in the winter of 1895-6 Abdur Rahman, the Amir of Kabul, launched a combined jihad and bid to expand his state, at once conquering and converting the last remaining non-Muslims within his sphere of influence and creating the new Afghan province of Nuristan or 'Land of Light'.[9] While their neighbours succumbed to the Amir's army the Kalasha were left untouched since two years previously Britain and Afghanistan had agreed on a border to demarcate their respective territories, and as fate would have it the Kalasha had fallen on the British side.

Cultural Conservation Programmes and Conflict in the Kalash Valleys

As well as drawing tourists to the Valleys, the idea of the Kalasha as the sole survivors of a 'lost' culture has inspired a number of heritage conservation programmes. The sponsors of these programmes have been remarkably diverse. Extra to the Pakistani state's involvement, many other national development agencies have launched cultural preservation projects, whilst several small-scale, foreigner-led Kalasha-specific charities have also been active. The greatest impact of all has come from far afield in the form of an impressive suite of projects funded by Hellenic Aid, the international development body of the Greek Government.

Conservation projects focused on the Kalasha have the potential to exacerbate pre-existing intercommunal tensions. Although referred to as the 'Kalash Valleys' the three valleys are, in fact, remarkably diverse. In Mumoret Valley, where I conducted most of my fieldwork, for example, Kalasha people live alongside four other ethnicities speaking three mutually unintelligible languages as their mother tongue, and that is within an area of only ten square kilometres (Map 6). Despite this ethnic complexity, however, is only along the Kalasha-Muslim divide that outside intervention has been disruptive.

The majority of local Muslims understand religion in absolute terms, you are either Muslim or you are not. There is no scope for being part Kalasha and part Muslim. Nor would the Muslim communities ever allow one of their own to become Kalasha. As one might imagine in a place where religious identities contrast so starkly, intercommunal relations are not always harmonious and every Kalasha has stories of attempts at conversion by the less tolerant of their neighbours as well as accounts of having suffered discrimination at the hands of Muslims. Although Kalasha people often told me of the difficulties they face, I had not properly appreciated quite how vulnerable their religious isolation has made them until shortly before I started fieldwork.

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[7] For a wide-ranging study of the religions of Peristan see Karl Jettmar's monumental *Die Religionen Des Hindukusch* (1975) and Jettmar et al. 1986 for an English translation of Volume 1. For discussion of particular characteristics see Jones 1974; Edelberg and Jones 1979; Allen 1991; Parkes 1991; 1990; Klimburg 1999; Cacopardo and Cacopardo 2001b.
[8] This was George Scott Robertson's *The Kafirs of the Hindu Kush* (1896).
[9] For a detailed discussion of the conversion of Nuristan see Jones 1974 1-20 and Klimburg 1999.

In June 2016 a teenage Kalasha girl was rumoured to have converted to Islam, but then appeared to have changed her mind and returned to her original community. A group of Muslims led by a local Imam attempted to persuade her to come back with them but were rebuffed by the Kalasha family sheltering the girl. I watched videos of the riot which ensued on a friend's mobile phone. Around fifty Muslim men can be seen running across a meadow towards the house in which the girl was staying. It is an area I know well. Nearby is a line of shops where every day the different ethnicities of the valley interact, sharing greetings and sometimes a cup of tea, setting up business deals or helping each other with chores: a busy, convivial and cooperative place. In the video the rioters approach the house, shouting and hurling stones, whilst in the background one can hear the sickening clatter of automatic rifle fire. A Kalasha interlocuter told me how he met the mob and recognised most of the people in it. Some were even Sheks, the name given to Kalasha who have converted to Islam and who still have strong ties to their old community. Despite the bonds linking the journalist to those he was trying to reason with the mob turned on him and he was forced to flee for his own safety. The next day the situation had calmed, fortunately without the loss of any lives, although several Kalasha had been injured by rioters. Inevitably, in the end might won out and the girl was taken back by the Muslim community, this time for good.[10]

The riot was the most extreme example of inter-communal conflict in recent years, but less dramatic eruptions of the underlying tensions between Kalasha and Muslim are commonplace. One of the first published accounts to be written by a Western visitor[11] dates from the mid-1930s and records that the Kalasha were under pressure to convert and were also "bullied" by incomers, so we can assume that difficulties for the Kalasha presented by coexistence with a dominant and often hostile Muslim population have been a reality for generations (Parkes 1983, 23–26). Whilst the riot was not directly linked to the actions of any cultural conservation organisation and is representative of a long-running friction between Muslim and Kalasha communities, the tensions which fuelled it nevertheless are connected to external drives to 'preserve' Kalasha culture.

As we shall see the motivations behind many of the cultural preservation projects which have been active in the Valleys are inextricably entangled in a far-reaching web of interests. Within Pakistan the Kalash Valleys have become something of a proxy for a conflict between secular and Islamic lobbies which engulfs the whole country. This conflict extends beyond the Nation's borders and into Afghanistan, intersecting with the ongoing war which followed the US-led invasion of 2001. The Kalasha have also been implicated in the rhetoric of European Islamophobes and in the naming dispute which flared up between Greece and present-day North Macedonia following the breakup of Yugoslavia. The complexity of interests which converge on the Valleys are responsible for the diversity of the projects which have sought to position themselves in a role of stewardship over the Kalasha's heritage. Equally, the wider secular-religious struggles which the projects are implicated in have led to interventions which seek to convert the Kalasha and create a uniformly Sunni Muslim region. Trapped between these competing interests the bonds which unite the Kalasha with the Muslim communities they live amongst are placed under enormous pressure.

[10] Luke Rehmat (Ishpata News) in discussion with the author, Mumoret, 5 April, 2018.

[11] See Reginald Schomberg's (1938) account of aggression directed at the Kalasha by Kateh incomers from Afghanistan (68) as well as attempts at conversion by proselytising mullahs (12).

The Kalash Valleys' positioning along an international border has facilitated the dynamic which we find there. The diffuse nature of the Pakistani state along its frontier and the permeability of the border has created space for multiple contrasting interests to come together. Perhaps the most dramatic manifestation of this 'borderland effect' was a Taliban cross-border raid on a Greek-built Kalasha museum in 2009, a key event in the argument presented by this thesis. Yet whilst their heritage has manifested as a battleground on a national and international level, the convergence of conflicting discourses has also presented the Kalasha with opportunities. Indeed, the very instability of their environment has brought the Kalasha new avenues through which to explore the expression of their identity.

Heritage and the Kalasha

In several ways the Kalasha's situation corresponds closely to many other case studies explored in the critical heritage literature which pit disenfranchised minorities against a monolithic state. Their geographical and cultural marginality has seen them economically disadvantaged and subjected to discrimination by the majority. Their heritage has also been appropriated and manipulated by powers much greater than themselves. However, where the example of the Kalasha differs from the majority of what has been discussed so far is in the nature of the power of the state. Whilst Pakistan may still exert the single greatest influence over life in the Valleys, its power is compromised by the other interests which flow in from beyond the border. The power-scape which the Kalasha negotiate is much more heterogeneous than in the contexts which have been hitherto modelled in heritage studies where the hegemony of the state tends to be far more intact

In terms of identity dynamics this means that state-led attempts to incorporate the Kalasha are in competition with other identity discourses derived from outside of Pakistan which also lay claim to the Kalasha. Thus, in the Valleys we have a situation more complex than the established binary notion of small / disenfranchised minority wrestling with big / hegemonic nation. The dissonance between the different streams of interest that converge on them allows the Kalasha to engage with and incorporate elements of each without fully succumbing to their agendas. As we shall see this has fed a Kalasha identity discourse which is remarkably heterogeneous: a mosaic of different narratives which never-the-less continues to mark them out as a highly distinct community. We shall also see how the practice of borrowing from the identities of those who have an interest in them has allowed Kalasha actors to access opportunities and realise ambitions which would be otherwise hard to imagine for such an economically impoverished community.

The Kalasha's blending of conflicting heritage and identity narratives suggests that we might begin to understand heritage as something altogether more malleable than typically conceived of in the critical heritage discourse. The environment which hosts this kind of accommodating identity-work is one in which the relationship between hegemony, ethnicity and heritage begins to unravel. These are ingredients which are not unique to the Kalash Valleys. If other meeting spaces between multiple heritages can be explored with similar tools to those which I have used to conduct this study, then there is the potential to further draw out the creative as well as the dissonant characteristics of heritage.

Structure of the Thesis

In the following chapter I delve deeper into the scholarly work which has shaped this thesis. I interrogate what has been written to date on the Kalasha, acknowledging my debt to it but also drawing out its limitations. I then turn to heritage studies, briefly outlining the circumstances which brought about its critical turn. I summarise the characteristics of critical heritage studies, focusing on the idea of heritage as inherently dissonant before moving on to recent work which has challenged some of the assumptions made by this discourse. In particular, I examine the output of commentators who argue that in its drive to expose the antagonistic nature of heritage, the critical discourse is in danger of *uncritically* reproducing the essentialising logics which fuel the dissonance that it studies. Heritage, according to this counter discourse, is not always as monolithic as the critical discourse has it to be. Scholars are encouraged to challenge the identity containers which the discourse thinks within, especially to eschew 'methodological nationalism' and to give greater consideration to the agency of the individual. It is amongst these texts that I position my thesis, asking that if heritage narratives are not always homogenous and neatly bounded, then what characteristics might we expect to find at their margins and meeting points?

The second part of the chapter turns to the methodology which I draw on to tackle my question. I demonstrate how researching a borderland population allows me to bring a set of thus far underutilised methodological tools to the critical study of heritage. Whilst the academic discourse has extensively explored relationships between marginal groups and the nation-state, it has not touched on the dynamics of marginality which we find on the geopolitical limits of the latter.

Work on borders over the past two decades has developed a distinctive set of methodologies. These methodologies decentre the nation and other territorial definitions, re-imagining borderlands as zones of fragmentation and interconnection rather than as places which skirt the abrupt limit of one nation and the equally abrupt start of another. In terms of how this framing of borderlands leads us to conceptualise their inhabitants, we see analytical models emerge which understand borderland dwellers to be at once subject to constraints imposed by the state, whilst also having access to creative opportunities which are hard to imagine in more homogenous settings. The discourse of marginality in these contexts often appears as a two-sided coin: on one side it oppresses, whilst on the other it can be repurposed and put to productive use by those who are marginalised.

To bring together the conception of marginality which borderland studies offers and the critical heritage discourse I draw on the metaphor of the ecotone. A term originally coined by ecologists, the ecotone describes zones of contact in which different ecosystems comingle, often resulting in the emergence of species which are not present elsewhere. Within the humanities the concept has been used in the discipline of ecocriticism to highlight the potential for both conflict and hybridity along borders conceived in the broadest sense (for example between genders, between academic disciplines, between art forms, between the natural and the man made, or indeed between nations). Transmuted to heritage studies the metaphor of the ecotone prompts us to move away from

conceptualisations which frame heritage boundaries only as binary zones of dissonance in which two monolithic blocks collide and instead examine them for evidence overlap and creativity.

Following on from my discussion of the ecotone I turn to my choice of terminology. The thesis borrows from the lexicon of postcolonialism, as this is a discourse which has dealt extensively with questions of dominant narr atives and the marginalisation of groups, colonised by imperial powers or subjected to the homogenising agenda of the nation state. Terms such as 'subaltern' and 'hybridity' have their own complex and at times fraught intellectual biographies and I make clear where I stand in relation to these discussions.

In the final part of the Chapter I explore the myriad factors which impact my analysis and outline the ways I have negotiated the ethical issues raised by my project. These are questions which are especially significant as I had been involved in a charity which operated in the Kalash Valleys before starting my doctoral fieldwork and had many well-established relationships with Kalasha people. A further factor of great importance discussed is the potential which my research has to endanger people in the Valleys and the mitigation measures which I have taken.

My data chapters open with a vignette on Greek involvement in the Valleys, an account which reveals how Greece deployed the Kalasha in its dispute with present day North Macedonia over the legacy of Alexander the Great, a project which was brought to an abrupt close with the Taliban attack on the museum. Chapter 3 draws on the vignette in presenting a discussion of how the Kalasha have been seen from the outside. It charts early Muslim perceptions of the Kalasha and their non-Muslim neighbours before moving on to discuss British and later Pakistani attitudes. All these discourses marginalise the Kalasha in the sense that they are projected onto them from dominant societies. Yet whilst some discourses 'other' the Kalasha, some claim them as kin, casting them as a population of 'uncorrupted' ancestors.

In the second part of the chapter we see what happens when discourses about the Kalasha materialise on the ground, principally in the form of cultural preservation projects. Competition and dissonance characterises this part of the story. At one scale, largely western-funded projects vie to present themselves as guardians of the Kalasha's culture. At another we see the Pakistani state unravelling in the Valleys, revealing the deep tensions which exist between its Islamic and secular components. Finally, at the largest scale of all we see the Kalasha entangled in the 'War on Terror'. Across all scales we can observe heritage's capacity to drive people apart, both through its weaponization in pre-existing conflicts, and through its capacity to generate dissonance where none existed before.

My focus then turns to the Kalasha and how they have negotiated the discourses and phenomena just discussed. A vignette introduces the Kalash Culture Saving Society (KCSS), a Kalasha-administered organisation with the ambition of forging ethnic unity and in so doing ensuring cultural viability in the future. Through examining the work of the KCSS it emerges that the Kalasha have a more fluid conception of their culture than that which has informed the NGO-led preservation projects that have also been active in the Valleys.

Chapter 4 expands on the Kalasha's fluid approach, demonstrating how it has helped them adapt to the various marginalising discourses which have impacted their lives over the past two hundred years. This adaptive process has

been both defensive and acquisitive. In discussing how the Kalasha have responded to evangelical and at times actively aggressive manifestations of Sunni Islam we learn of skilful modes of resistance to oppressive aspects of marginalisation. But equally, we see how marginalising discourses can be repurposed by the marginalised. Eloquent illustrations of this process come in the careers of Kalasha individuals who have made innovative use of the discourses projected onto them. Here we learn of creative opportunities which have been engendered by exploiting the importance which the margins hold for the centre.

The final vignette relates how women's clothing has become one of the principal markers of Kalasha ethnicity. Yet we also learn that much of what makes the clothing distinctive derives from the Kalasha's exposure to far reaching phenomena including tourism, mass media and even Islamic norms of dressing. The admixture of disparate elements which comprises the identity discourse of Kalasha women's clothing recalls the overlap of biological communities which is characteristic of ecotones.

Chapter 5 continues with the metaphor of the ecotone, tightening focus on material, textual and institutional manifestations of heritage linked to the Kalasha. The same exclusionary heritage narratives which were discussed in Chapter 3 are examined from a different angle and discourses which in one index generate dissonance, are in another revealed to be malleable and amenable to admixture. This phenomenon is traced in the histories of official buildings, the experiences of visitors to the Valleys, and most significantly, in the heritage discourses of the Kalasha themselves.

Chapter 6 brings together the data discussed in Chapters 3-5 and analyses it in light of the theoretical work presented in Chapter 2. I demonstrate how the Kalash Valleys have been a productive place through which to think about heritage. The fragmented dynamic of the borderland calls into question the essentialised understanding of heritage that the critical discourse has been critiqued for reproducing. In the Valleys we certainly observe heritage discourses clashing and implicated in conflict. But we also see more fluid and miscible dimensions of the same discourses. In my discussion of the Kalash's negotiation of these and other interlinked discourses a different conception of marginalisation emerges to that typically utilised by critical heritage studies. In the critical discourse marginality has been framed as a site of dissonance; a position equally as homogenous as the hegemony which it opposes. However, this framing does not adequately reflect the Kalasha's experience. In its final analysis the chapter proposes the ecotone as a metaphor capable of incorporating the fragmented power dynamic of the Kalash Valleys, the heterogeneity of the discourses which we find there and a borderland conception of marginality. The ecotone, I argue, helps condense the complexities of my case study into a concept which has space for both conflict and creativity. As such it has the makings of a methodology through which to explore the meeting points of heritage discourses that offers us more than the current dissonance-focused framework.

Chapter 7 concludes the thesis, returning to the research questions presented in Chapter 1. I summarise how the case study of the Kalasha has enabled me to nuance existing models of heritage boundaries and draw out their more productive characteristics and I demonstrate how a methodology developed by the study of borderlands has

facilitated this analysis. Finally, I very briefly reflect on what practical outcomes my thesis might contribute to producing.

Chapter 2

Literature Review and Research Methodology

This chapter is divided into two parts. Part I opens with a review of existing research on the Kalasha. We then move onto a discussion of the critical turn in heritage studies. The latter section of Part I engages with recent publications which take issue with certain aspects of the critical discourse, especially its propensity to work within rather than challenge essentialising identity frameworks. It is amongst the commentaries that make up this counter critique that I position my contribution.

Part II outlines my methodological approach to tackling my research questions. Running through Part I is a critique of conceptual models which order culture and society into neatly demarked units. My methodologies for data collection and analysis respond to this critique, drawing from arguments developed by the study of borderlands which present identity as a fluid and mutable phenomenon. I also discuss my terminology, especially the concept of hybridity, which I position in the context of the debates which have characterised postcolonial discourse. In the second section of Part II, I examine my positionality in relation to my subject, discussing how my long-standing relationship with the Kalasha has shaped my research. Finally, I turn to ethical considerations raised by my fieldwork, an important concern since the Kalasha are at risk of persecution.

Part I: Literature Review, studies of the Kalasha and the Critical Heritage Discourse

The Kalasha

The Kalasha have been the subject of a significant body of scholarly literature.[12] Initially discussed only briefly as a subsection to studies concerning the wider region (Biddulph 1880, 132; Robertson 1896, 4), the first article based on original research to be devoted solely to the Kalasha was published by the Norwegian linguist Georg Morgenstierne in 1947. By the 1960s scholarly interest in the Kalasha was growing, a trend which continued through until the 1990s.[13] With the attack on the Twin Towers of September 11th 2001 and the consequent 'War on Terror' however,

[12] See Klimburg 2008, 169–70 for a brief discussion of scholarship concerning the Kalasha over the second half of the twentieth century.
[13] The proliferation of scholarly work on the Kalasha through the second half of the twentieth century is discussed in Chapter 3.

research demanding extensive fieldwork dwindled as the wider region became increasingly unsafe, although linguistic scholarship continued[14] and the turn of the twenty-first century saw the first of several genetic investigations published.[15] Restored security in recent years has led to something of a revival of activity and it was planned to hold the 4th International Hindu Kush Cultural Conference in Chitral, until that is, the COVID 19 pandemic intervened. The conference would have been a particularly poignant event as it was originally scheduled nearly twenty years previously in late 2001 but was cancelled at the last minute following the US-led invasion of Afghanistan.

The first substantial ethnographies of the Kalasha focus on the classic structuralist preoccupations of political economy, kinship, subsistence, ritual and cosmology.[16] Peter Parks (1983) for example, who conducted his doctoral fieldwork in the Kalash Valleys in the 1970s investigated the role which the institution of elopement plays in Kalasha social organisation and cross-kin allegiance making, whilst the French anthropologists Jean-Yves Loude and Viviane Lièvre (1988) took great pains to record the intricacies of Kalasha religio-cultural practice. Reading through these early works one also occasionally gets the impression of the ethnographer trying to document as much as possible of a culture which was new to science and the concomitant fear that exposure to modernity might eradicate a good deal of what the Kalasha had to offer scholarship.[17] Later research, in step with developments in anthropology, moved away from attempts to understand Kalasha culture and society in its entirety and instead focused on specific phenomena or less quantifiable concerns. Wynne Maggi's *Our Women Are Free* (2001) for example, discusses gender, identity and agency, whilst other publications drawing on research also carried out in the 1990s have examined the impact of development projects and tourism (Parkes 2000; Frembgen 2008).

Following the post September 11th hiatus only Alberto and Augusto Cacopardo have remained significantly active in terms of detailed anthropological research. The recent revival has seen the historian Muhmmad Kashif Ali submit his PhD (2018) at the University of the Punjab, Lahore. Ali's thesis provides a detailed and valuable account of the Kalasha's history and their assimilation over centuries into surrounding Muslim communities. Ali's initiative to write a history is especially significant given the propensity -which we are about to touch on- of ethnography to bind the Kalasha in an atemporal framework.

In Denmark there has been renewed interest in the archives and collections of Halfdan Siiger, -the first scholar to attempt prolonged ethnographic research in the Kalash Valleys- leading to a conference[18] and a subsequent edited volume (Høj Johnsen et al. 2016). Arguably the most significant of recent developments has been the contribution of Taj Khan Kalash,[19] the first Kalasha academic. Kalash's PhD thesis, which is in its early phases, explores the processes through which members of his society convert. This is a topic which reflects a fundamental concern for all Kalasha.

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[14] See Cooper 2005; Petersen 2006; Carol and Mela-Athanasopoulou, and Theodosiadou 2011.
[15] Qamar et al. 2002; Kivisild et al. 2003; Quintana-Murci, 2004; Schroeder et al. 2007; Sadaf and et al. 2007; Li et al. 2008.
[16] See Darling 1979; Parkes 1983; Loude and Lièvre 1988.
[17] See for example Darling 1979, ii and 6 and Parkes 1983, 3; 1990, 639.
[18] The conference was held from the 18th to the 20th of November 2011 and hosted by both the University of Copenhagen and the National Museum of Denmark.
[19] For a contribution made by Kalash to the academic discourse around his culture see Kalash and Petersen 2016.

The indigenous perspective which Kalash brings represents a particularly welcome contribution, and hopefully heralds the start of a new era in which Kalasha authors will begin to influence the substantial academic discourse around their culture.

I owe a considerable debt to previous scholarship concerning the Kalasha. The methodical documentation carried out by my predecessors has allowed me to analyse change in culture and society over the past fifty years. The first structuralist ethnographies have revealed the workings of the Kalasha's social, political and ritual worlds. More recent research has provided invaluable insights regarding the lives of women or offered enlightening perspectives concerning Kalasha perceptions of the past. My project quite simply, would not have been possible without all the work which has gone before it. But I should also acknowledge that for me, the output of previous researchers has not just represented data to be processed. In the lyricism of Maggi's ethnography, the depth of investigation pursued by the Cacopardo brothers and the untiring and exacting approach to fieldwork taken by Parkes, I have found both inspiration and exemplars to goad me forward. However, despite how indebted this thesis is to all that has preceded it an important part of the overall argument presented comprises a critique of previous outputs. The focus of this critique is not the quality of the work so much as the boundaries which it has -more often than not- been operating within.

Running in parallel with almost everything published on the Kalasha has been an ongoing deconstruction within anthropology of the concept of cultures as discrete, neatly bounded entities which merit study as coherent wholes.[20] This view, which Renalto Rosaldo has characterised as the 'classic' understanding (1989, 208) of culture was further problematised in light of the associated propensity to describe cultures in a way which does not account for their capacity to morph through time. By temporally isolating their subjects, ethnographers have been accused of perpetuating an artificial and denigrating evolutionary framework which places the society being studied in an inferior position to that of the researcher (Fabian 1983).

Although anthropology's propensity to bind and temporally isolate were already subject to critique when the major ethnographies of the Kalasha were being written,[21] these works have generally remained remarkably immune. Furthermore, a tendency to archaicise and primitivize the Kalash is evident in the output of several linguists and even geneticists.[22] In the next chapter we will see the impact which scholarship has had on popular representations of the Kalasha and observe how the two have combined to create a narrative which tells us much more about the preoccupations of the outside world than it does about what it is to be Kalasha.

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[20] See for example: McLuhan 1964; Clifford 1988; Rosaldo 1989; Gupta and Ferguson 1992; Marcus 1995; Olwig and Hastrup 1996; Gupta and Ferguson 1997.
[21] See Parkes 1983; Loude and Lièvre 1988; Maggi 2001.
[22] See Chapter 3.

Critical Heritage Studies

My concern with critical heritage studies resonates with my critique of Kalasha-related scholarship in that it too problematises bounded conceptions of identity. In the case of heritage studies however the framing of identity which I'm interested in can be characterised not so much as the persistent survival of an outmoded concept, but rather as a critical reaction to a former incarnation of the discipline.

Heritage's 'critical turn' gathered momentum in the 1990s. Against a backdrop of the post-cold-war rise in the politics of recognition, postcolonialism's probing of Eurocentric discourses (De Cesari 2010) and the targeting of heritage sites in the Yugoslav Wars (Meskell 2015b:1) works like Tunbridge and Ashworth's *Dissonant Heritage* (1996) reformulated the academy's conception of heritage. Under critique was the 'expert discourse' (De Cesari and Herzfeld 2015: 171) which framed heritage as a 'thing' of self-evident value that had the potential to unite through the ideology of humanity's shared patrimony. The intellectual roots of this perception of heritage reach deep drawing on its association with unifying projects including the emergence of civic identities in the eighteenth century (Sorensen and Carman 2009) and its instrumentalization as a tool of nation-building during the nineteenth century. More recently heritage has been imagined to be something which transcends national boundaries. The most influential advocate of this conception has been UNESCO which has increasingly drawn on heritage preservation projects in its mission "to produce peace in the minds of men" (UNESCO 1945).

For proponents of the critical turn, heritage is more accurately conceived of as a force to push people apart than a glue which might hold them together, an approach succinctly summarised by Lyn Meskell, when as part of a wider critique of UNESCO's heritage policy, she writes: "the creation of heritage is also the creation of heritage conflict" (Meskell 2015:1). Fundamental to this understanding is the appreciation that heritage is not, as previously assumed, a thing of self-evident value, but a process by which things are given value (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1995). The process is inherently political, the power to apportion value to heritage being closely tied up in the exercise of hegemony.[23] Several theorists of heritage have given this concept form. Stewart Hall for example in his discussion of the alienation of 'ethnic minority' heritages within the context of Britain chooses to capitalise 'Heritage' and preface it with 'The', thereby drawing attention to the fact that heritage as it is generally promoted in Britain represents a singular narrative and a rejection of many other heritages, which could be sought out, yet which inevitably are not, since they are incompatible with the white majority's imagining of itself[24] (Hall 1999). Most influential of all has been Laura Jane Smith's concept of the Authorised Heritage Discourse (AHD), which she describes as "a consensus version of history by state sanctioned cultural institutions" (Smith 2006, 3–4). At a national level, Smith's AHD and Hall's 'The Heritage' closely map, both representing the state's power to recognise or not to recognise the heritage of its citizens. Smith, however, goes further with her concept and applies it to UNESCO's categorisation of World Heritage

[23] See Smith 2006, 281; Emerick 2014, 190 and Logan and Wijesuriya 2015, 569.
[24] Cf. Anderson 1983.

(2006, 87–113), critiquing it[25] for privileging a Western concept of culture, despite professing to safeguard the patrimony of all.

Whilst acknowledging heritage's deep entanglement in hegemonic projects, in recent years some commentators have argued that heritage discourses are not always as sharply defined as suggested by framings like Hall's 'The Heritage' and Smith's AHD. In *Dimensions of European Heritage and Memory* for example, Christopher Whitehead and his co-editors state that,

> "there is hardly one monolithic European heritage, and therefore, discursively and effectively, no single Europe. This multiplication of meanings is produced through an array of dimensions that are much more numerous and pervasive than conventional bracketings of where heritage 'sits' within public, cultural and social life. This makes 'European heritage' difficult to contain, to regulate and to measure out" (2019, 19).

This challenge to the concept of a clearly delineated European heritage is echoed by authors who take issue with the singular way in which the nation state is framed within the critical discourse.[26] Chiara De Cesari and Michael Herzfeld are representative of this critique when they identify a tendency towards "methodological nationalism", arguing that much of the study of heritage "takes the nation for granted as unit of analysis", thereby reproducing an artificial lens which comprehends the world as neatly divided up into a set of discrete national containers (De Cesari and Herzfeld 2015, 175).

The propensity to think within neatly bounded frameworks, be they a singular conception of Europe or the nation is reflected in the dominance of certain types of research context. The study of heritage has been accused of overrepresenting formalised, readily quantifiable settings, for example museums, galleries and sites which have been officially listed and interpreted (Andrews 2009, 142; Dellios and Henrich 2020, 9). Such 'authorised' research contexts reproduce authorised frameworks and leave us with data which replicates the parameters produced by hegemonic discourses rather than challenging them. To counter this tendency there has been a call to give greater consideration to the role of personal heritage narratives in shaping how heritage is experienced more generally (Harvey 2015, 579). Returning to *Dimensions of European Heritage and Memory* for example, Christopher Whitehead and his co-editors argue that "[p]eople are, in some ways, heritage actors irrespective of official attempts to enable this, and while they do not tend to benefit from 'authorised' status nor count as the expert figures responsible for producing and upholding the AHD, they may certainly wield power within the physical, digital, social and public spaces of their own lives" (14-15).

[25] See also similar critiques offered by Byrne 1991, Cleere 2001 and Harrison 2010.
[26] See Littler and Naidoo 2004; De Cesari 2010; Harvey 2015; Byrne 2016b; Dellios and Henrich 2020, 4-5.

I am interested in what an appreciation of the heterogenous as well as the homogenous aspects of heritage can tell us about the meeting points of different heritages. Are these always sharply drawn divisions, or can we imagine more plural zones of overlap? Work on diaspora heritage[27] has a contribution to make here. Hall's counterpoint to The Heritage are the "new hybrid and crossover cultural forms of tremendous vitality and innovation" generated by the 'ethnic minorities' of the UK (1999, 9). Hall argues for a reimagining (and deconstruction) of the national identity of the UK to accommodate the diversity and fluidity of the heritages which he describes. A similar call for a dismantled national heritage has been issued by Jo Littler and Roshi Naidoo who ask, "what are the possibilities for radical heritage agendas that can imagine decentred, hybrid and culturally diverse narratives?" (2004, 2). Although Hall and Littler and Naidoo juxtapose diaspora heritages with that of a monolithically conceived nation, they nevertheless draw attention to the hybridity and fluidity of heritage within certain contexts[28]

Paul Gilroy's conceptualisation of 'roots and roots' has influenced a strand of investigation that explores diaspora heritage as a phenomenon which transcends national borders. In *The Black Atlantic* (1993) Gilroy adopts an "explicitly transnational and intercultural approach" (15) to situate black diaspora identity as both within and transcendent of national identities. Gilroy justifies this approach through the construction of a black history which moves back and forth, across the Atlantic between Africa, the Americas and Europe. Work within the critical heritage discourse like Ann Reed's (2015) *Of Routes and Roots: Paths for Understanding Diasporic Heritage* and the chapters in Part I of Alexandra Dellios' and Eureka Henrich's *Migrant, Multicultural and Diasporic Heritage: Beyond and Between Borders* (2020, 9-10) applies an approach similarly shaped by histories of transnational movement to the conceptualisation of other diasporic identities. The discussion of dissonance forms an important component of this work, both in the context of the nations which represent the current home of the diasporic community and between the diasporic community and the places which they perceive to be their 'roots'. Equally, however, we learn of "the active creation of hybrid identities that embrace transnational belonging" (Dellios and Henrich 2020, 4). The study of diaspora therefore presents us with examples of coherent heritage narratives that assemble diverse discourses within the nation *and* transcend the nation, encompassing multiple national discourses drawn together by a history of migration.

Critical heritage studies has recently begun to look to the edges of nations and other constructed identity containers in the search for similar examples of crossover and fluidity. In *Dimensions of European Heritage and Memory* for example, we hear of Islamic and Christian narratives overlapping in the interpretation of heritage sites located on the fringes of Europe (Whitehead et. al 2019b, 96-121). The edited volume *Heritage and Borders*, whilst not targeted specifically at the boundaries of the nation nevertheless presents a number of discussions of heritage on national borders (Källén 2019). Of the contributions to the book, the most relevant for this thesis is Dacia Viejo Rose's chapter *The Ecotones and Edge Effects of Heritage Borders* (2019). Viejo Rose draws on work by the social anthropologists

[27] Dellios and Henrich argue that the concept of diaspora heritage has greater scope for hybridity than the concept of migrant heritage (2020, 4).
[28] See also Ashworth, Graham and Tunbridge 2007.

Anna Tsing (1993) and James Scott (2009) which argues that borders can be places of productivity (in the case of Tsing) and that the margins of certain states have represented zones of great heterogeneity and admixture (in the case of Scott). In search of a metaphor to bring together her agenda of complicating existing understandings of heritage borders and the insights offered by Tsing and Scott, Viejo Rose turns to the ecotone, which she -borrowing from the Ecological Society of America- defines as a "border zone, where ecological systems meet and mingle, sometimes forming a new community of species" (49). Viejo Rose's insight that the study of borderlands has the potential to develop the way in which critical heritage studies conceptualises the meeting points of discourses and her use of the ecotone as a means of demonstrating the creative potential of border zones represent something of a starting off point for this thesis.

Part II: Methodological Approach

Borderland Studies

The qualities which differentiate borderlands from the state holistically imagined have led champions of borderland studies to argue that their work constitutes one of the most effective academic arenas for the deconstruction of methodological nationalism and related 'container' perceptions of identity.[29] In her review of the *Routledge Handbook of Asian Borderlands* for example Nadine Plachta states that it asks, "readers to rethink and question the categories of state, nation, and periphery, and to thereby challenge the conventional assumption that borders are bounding frames and geographical containers for societies" (2020, 127). That we might stop thinking of national borders as boundaries between two clearly differentiated entities and instead understand them as spaces with their own distinct, yet far reaching dynamics is an insight which has steered my methodological approach to understanding how heritage has manifested in the Kalash Valleys.

Borderland studies range across political, economic, legal and social areas of research. These areas are entangled with heritage and in the following chapters I will explore the political, military, and economic environment of my field site. However, the primary insight which I want to draw out from borderland studies relates to what the border does to identity. Broadly speaking there are three topics engaged with by border studies that I have examined to help me investigate this question. The first concerns the permutations which the ideology of the state goes through in borderlands, the second explores the identities of people who live in borderlands and the third -drawing on the

[29] See Saxer et. al for a brief discussion of borderland studies and "the larger project to think beyond geographical containers" (2013, 2).

study of marginality- unites the first two questions and asks how the identity discourses of the state and the identity discourses of the borderland relate to and influence each other.

In recent years several works have discussed the ways in which the technologies and epistemologies of colonialism in British India mutated and fragmented along the Empire's frontiers. Zak Leonard, for example, writing of the Afghan frontier describes the reinterpretation of imperially sanctioned ethnographic typologies by scholars working on borderland communities. In Leonard's account we learn of ambitious and competitive scholars who use the space of the frontier to challenge the socio-cultural evolutionism promulgated by metropolitan folklore societies, offering up instead "studies that represent borderland societies as dynamic cultural entities reactive to British encroachment" (2016, 175). A similar challenge to the hegemony of colonial epistemology issued by the agents of empire is recorded by Tom Simpson. Discussing the frontiers of British India more generally Simpson tells a story, which, as with Leonard's account, affords significant importance to the actions of individuals rather than a faceless, monolithic imperial state. Writing of frontier surveyors, he observes that, "far from assuming that their techniques and technologies held out the promise of accurately representing terrestrial space, [they] engaged in their own critical assessments of cartography. They acknowledged, and even revelled in, the shortcomings of their high imperial science. And they saw frontiers as spaces in which standard methods went awry and, therefore, romanticism and mysticism could commingle with quantification and empiricism" (2020, 18).

Other work on the borderlands of British India records trans-cultural processes through which colonial subjects exert agency in the realm of the coloniser. Emma Martin has written about the role which the Himalayan frontier hill stations of Darjeeling and Kalimpong played in the development of modern Tibetan studies. Describing her two sites as places which were "dynamic and continually reconfigured by local and colonial politics" (2016: 86), Martin relates how these unstable environments led to the production of scholarship which although European authored, never-the-less was profoundly shaped by local intellectuals. Clare Harris has also investigated trans-cultural processes in Darjeeling at the end of the nineteenth century (2017). Her subject is photography, a technology which has elsewhere in British India been discussed as a reproducer of the "severe power imbalance" inherent in colonial rule[30] (Harris 2017, 95). In Darjeeling, however, Harris reveals how local actors adopted and repurposed the colonial touristic aesthetic of hill station photography for their own ends.

The agents of empire discussed above were often fully signed up to the project of imperial rule.[31] Yet never-the-less we have seen how some of their actions ran counter to the discourses by which the British attempted to establish what they perceived to be their epistemological superiority. Surveyors revelled in the limitations of their science, ethnographers presented as dynamic (and therefore like Europeans) communities which were meant to be framed as static (and therefore 'less advanced' than Europeans), Tibetologists made important concessions to local scholars, and in Darjeeling the British even lost control of their 'tourist gaze' (Urry 1990). Challenges to the perceived

[30] See for example David MacDougall's article *Photo Hierarchicus* (1992).
[31] See for example Leonard 2016, 186-187.

epistemological superiority of empire equate to challenges to the identity discourse by which the colonisers sought to demark themselves from the colonised. In the borderlands of the empire therefore we begin to see fractures in the monolithic narrative by which the colonial state defined both what it was and what it wasn't.

When national borders reflect the ethnic identity of those who live along them, they may serve to reify that identity.[32] For the purposes of this thesis, however, I am interested in people whose identities transcend the borders they live by. South Asia is rich in such cases, from the communities divided by the boundaries drawn to separate Pakistan and India at partition to ethnic groups which already straddled the imperial frontiers inherited by the new nations. Whilst two ethnicities which live in the Kalash Valleys, the Kateh and the Gurjar (see map 6), have settlements on both sides of the border, the Kalasha's villages are all located within Pakistan. Yet, despite this geographical fact, in the coming chapters we will see how in many important ways Kalasha identity extends far beyond Pakistan's borders.

There are several studies of frontier communities in South Asia which are useful when it comes to understanding how the Kalasha's borderland positioning influences the narratives by which they define themselves. These studies discuss communities, which, like the Kalasha, have small populations and minority identities, and which also like the Kalasha live on frontiers which are relatively inaccessible. The closest of these studies to the Kalash Valleys in geographical terms concerns the Ismaili Muslim community of northern Pakistan, whose faith places them in a position of marginality since the state's majority religion is Sunni Islam. Till Mostowlansky relates how the Ismaili community looks beyond Pakistan's northern border and a slim sliver of Afghanistan to their coreligionists in Tajikistan in order to demonstrate the existence of coherent Ismaili cultural zone which has been dismembered by international boundaries (2019). In so doing the Ismailis of northern Pakistan create a transnational identity which exists in parallel to that offered by the nation of which they are part.

Similar use of a regional identity which crosses national boundaries is discussed by Swargajyoti Gohain in her work on the Monpa communities who live in the state of Arunachal Pradesh on India's border with China (2020). In the case of the Monpa, who are Buddhist, it is a wider discourse of Himalayan Buddhism which positions them both within and beyond India's borders. Gohain looks in detail at this discourse and points out that an important element of it stresses kinship with Tibetans, a relationship which although reflected in cultural similarities is at odds with the Monpa's historical (i.e. pre border) antagonistic relationship with Tibet. Gohain also discusses a Monpa discourse which ostensibly runs counter to the idea of then as part of a wider Himalayan Buddhist community in that it aligns them with the other minorities of Arunachal Pradesh, societies "with whom they otherwise share little cultural or historical bonds" (15). The common identity in this case is that the minorities and the Monpa share scheduled cast status under Indian legislation.

Whilst the groups discussed by Mostowlansky and Gohain imagine themselves as part of a wider community which transcends the nation they live within, Sara Shneiderman has worked with people who regularly physically cross an

[32] See for example Pelkmas 2006, Gellner 2013: 47 and Smith 2013.

international border (2015). The Thangmi move between India and Nepal in the course of their migrations and as such 'belong' to two nations at once. Engaging with the legal frameworks which govern ethnicity in two countries means that the Thangmi's identity is twice constituted in relation to a national discourse. Yet Schneiderman makes the important point that there is more to the production of Thangmi ethnicity than the adoption two national conceptions of who they are. Instead, she describes the Thangmi as "circular citizens" (125), framing their ethnicity as a "transcendent object" (171), constructed through the *process* of moving between nations.

The identity discourses of northern Pakistan's Ismailis, the Monpa and the Thangmi all evidence what Magnus Marsden has characterised as, "indeterminate modes of being" generated by "culturally complex settings" (2016, 290). In each case we see how this unsettling of identity is curiously enough partly facilitated by an international boundary. Rather than paring away complexity the border adds to it. For Pakistan's Ismailis the border facilities a liminality which has them as being neither fully part of a wider religious community nor or fully part of Pakistan. Even more enigmatic is Thangmi ethnicity, constructed through movement across a boundary. Finally, in the case of the Monpa we see how several narratives can be brought together by a single border. The national discourse of India, the dependent discourse of India's scheduled casts, the sense of a wider transnational Himalayan Buddhist identity and a historically fraught relationship with Tibet are, despite their apparent dissonances, all combined under the umbrella of 'Monpaness'. For both those who live in borderlands and the agents of the power which creates the border, therefore, the edge of the state can be a place where the boundaries between what you are and what you are not become profoundly indistinct.

Marginality and the Ecotone

Several scholars of borderlands have attempted to tie their work into the wider academic discourse around marginality.[33] Perhaps the most influential texts in this project are those written by Anna Tsing,[34] about her field site in the Meratus mountains. The people whom Tsing has worked with do not live on the border between nations, but they do live on the geographical (as defined by their inaccessibility) and the social (as defined by their religion and ethnicity) margins of Indonesia. Despite the specific characteristics of her field site however, Tsing develops a concept of the margins as a broad ranging "analytic placement" which transcends "geographical, descriptive location" and takes in "both the constraining, oppressive quality of cultural exclusion and the creative potential of rearticulating, enlivening, and rearranging the very social categories that peripheralize a group's existence" (1994, 279).

Tsing and others have built on her concept of the margins as a tool of analysis to argue that marginality is often not simply imposed, but that it is actively negotiated and at times even fostered by those marginalised. As Tsing

[33] See Mostowlansky and Karrar 2018 for a discussion of the intersection between the discourse around marginality and border studies.
[34] For examples of works on borders which draw on Tsing's framing of the margins see Green 2005, 3; Mostowlansky and Karrar 2018 and Gohain 2020.

observes, “The cultural difference of the margins is a sign of exclusion from the center; it is also a tool for destabilizing central authority” (1993, 27). By cultivating their difference from the centre, those marginalised by it stress their cultural autonomy. This leveraging of marginality exercises considerable agency by dint of the importance of the margins for the centre’s self-definition. Indeed, the idea of a centre, of a superior way of being, is dependent on the opposed concept of a marginal, inferior way of being (Green 2005: 2). Cultural activism on the margins therefore is seldom culturally peripheral as it strikes at the heart of the centre’s identity discourse.

A permutation of the margin-centre dynamic comes in the fact that some members of the centre valorise the margins. Sarah Green summarises this as, “(Euro-American) modernity in its self-pitying mode: the sense of having lost something through being modern, usually something involving authenticity, and wanting to have it back” (2005, 3-4). It is in the margins that what has been lost is looked for, the other by which the centre defines itself imagined as “space or gap in which it is imagined a lost “authenticity” might still exist” (2005, 4). In this manifestation the margin’s agency lies less in its power to disrupt the centre’s sense of ‘centredness’ and more in its capacity to offer salvation of sorts to disaffected elements of the centre.

The insight that discourses of exclusion can be repurposed by the excluded and used as leverage over the centre is of great utility in understanding the situation in my field site, but it is not, however, enough to account for the whole story. The unravelling of imperial narratives of superiority on the frontiers of British India is, as we will see, mirrored by a similar fragmentation of erstwhile hegemonic discourses in the Kalash Valleys. Equally, in the Kalasha’s construction of their identity we see them drawing on discourses other than those which Pakistan projects onto them. In this they closely resemble the Monpa who have absorbed multiple, seemingly dissonant identity narratives. In the Kalash Valleys then, the state does not always manifest in a coherent form, and when it comes to creating their ethnic identity the Kalasha engage with more than is external to them than their marginality to Pakistan. Whilst there is certainly a centre-margins dynamic evident, there are facets to the discourse of Kalasha identity which operate outside of this binary. To account for what I came across on fieldwork and in archival research therefore, I need a model which encapsulates the complexities of the borderland more fully. To this end I have returned to the metaphor of the ecotone.

Outside of ecology, the ecotone has been used most extensively in ecocriticism, an academic discipline which studies the intersection between the environment and literature as well as the arts more generally. Although commentators are inconsistent[35] in exactly which characteristics of the ecotone they stress, many pick up on the etymology of the ‘tone’ part of the word, which derives from the Greek *tonos* or tension. As well as acknowledging the comingling and creative aspects of the flagged in the Viejo Rose qoute, therefore, ecocritics draw attention to the tension inherent in the coming together of difference.[36] In terms of the model of marginality just discussed this tension accounts for the dissonance between the centre and its margins. It also however reflects the other dissonances which

[35] See for example Balachandran Orihuela and Hageman 2011, 170 vs Buell 2007, 140.
[36] See for example David Gessner’s definition of the ecotone as a place of “danger and opportunity” (2021).

characterise many border zones -including the Kalash Valleys- for example, conflict between different marginal groups living on the same side of the border, cross-border conflict, conflict between different manifestations of the state, or indeed the kind of dissonance between the state and its agents which we have seen in discussions of the frontiers of the British India. As for the capacity of the ecotone to create something new through the bringing together of difference, the metaphor also resonates with Tsing's model: in the repurposing of discourses of marginality narratives produced by the centre and the narratives of those living on its margins are to some extent combined. Equally, the creativity of the ecotone accounts for the more complex combinations of narratives which circulate in places like the Kalash Valleys.

The metaphor of the ecotone is of further utility in its scalability. As Sharada Balachandran Orihuela and Andrew Carl Hageman point out, in ecological science ecotone communities "may be precisely defined according to a single plant or animal species, or they may be more broadly conceived according to multiple inhabitant species and other factors" (2011, 179). This framing of the ecotone prompts us to seek out its manifestations on multiple levels, starting at personal identity discourses, moving on to organisations and institutions and finishing up with a more overarching sense of ethnic identity.

In its scalability and in its capacity to take in the full borderland dynamic of the Kalash Valleys, the ecotone offers me an overarching methodology through which to unite my data with my research question. The ecotone's accommodation of different scales allows me to investigate the individual experiences which critical heritage studies has been accused of overlooking as well as the formal settings more commonly explored by the discourse. Thus, I can account for the ways in which heritage manifests more comprehensively than if I were to opt for a narrower focus and concomitantly arrive at conclusions that have a wider relevance. The etymology of 'ecotone' as well as its use by scholars of ecocriticism draws attention to the tension inherent in meeting points and creates conceptual space for the dissonant aspects of heritage so comprehensively theorised in the critical discourse. In juxtaposition, the creative combinations evident in ecotone encounters allow us, as Viejo Rose has argued, to think beyond the binaries so often reproduced by the study of heritage and imagine another, more productive side to the meeting points of heritage. By replacing the artificial concept of borders as points of division with a more complex and dynamic model, the ecotone as a methodology moves the academic discourse in the direction of a more nuanced account of the fundamental nature of heritage.

Terminology

In discussing and analysing the data presented in the following chapters I borrow from the terminology of the postcolonial discourse. For the past three decades scholars of postcolonialism have debated and refined a lexicon which encompasses many of the themes pertinent to this thesis. A central concept both to postcolonialism and what I explore here is hybridity. As developed by Homi K. Bhabha in his foundational text *The Location of Culture* (1994), hybridity is divested of its colonial connotations of degeneration and reimagined as a placement through which to

challenge the essentialism inherent in colonial ontologies. The very existence of hybridity, so Bhabha's argument goes, demonstrates the artificiality of any essentialist identity discourse.

Subsequent to the publication of the *The Location of Culture* however, Bhabha's conceptualisation of hybridity came under sustained critique. At a philosophical level critics have argued that hybridity is an example of 'dependent thinking' (Young 1995): you cannot believe in hybridity unless you first believe that there are essential discourses to be hybridised. Thus, the discourse of hybridity represents an acquiescence to an essentialised perception of culture. At a more practical level, Marxist critique of hybridity argues that it neglects the importance of essentialism as a tool of resistance for the marginalised.[37] Characterized by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak in *Can the Subaltern Speak?* (1988) as 'strategic essentialism',[38] this use of essentialism resonates with Tsing's observation that those marginalised may actively negotiate the discourse which marginalises them.

I continue to use hybridity in what follows, but I do so advisedly. When I describe discourses hybridising, I do not suggest that those discourses represent coherent cultures, but rather that they represent attempts at producing an essentialised version of culture. Thus, for example, later when I write about Greek and Pakistani heritage discourses hybridising, I do not imagine that these discourses are homogenous. Instead, I mean that they represent attempts at homogeneity; authorised versions of what it is that makes someone Greek or Pakistani, produced by the respective states in the hope of coagulating the identities of their citizens. With regards to the materialist critique of hybridity, I certainly do not reject the utility of resistance through essentialised identity narratives, but as will become apparent I also identify other ways in which the Kalasha exercise agency that rely on the blurring rather than the hardening of their ethnic boundaries.

Two further terms used later which derive from the postcolonial discourse also require definition. The first is 'subaltern'. Here I follow Spivak's definition of subaltern as a group 'othered' by the dominant ethnic identity. This usage excludes the application of 'subaltern' to groups which are otherwise disenfranchised, but whose ethnicity is dominant within a particular power structure (de Kock 1992, 45). The second term is 'mimicry'. In this case I break with Bhabha's framing of the term in *Of Mimicry and Man* (1984), as a form of hybridity which -often unwittingly- subverts the coloniser's essentialism by revealing its artificiality and instead follow the more widely accepted usage of mimicry as a way in which subaltern groups achieve their ends by adopting elements of the dominant discourse (Singh 2009).

Sources of Data

To organise my data as I was collecting it and during analysis, I grouped it into two sets: that pertaining to the actions of Kalasha people and that pertaining to the actions of outsiders. This approach does not reflect a conceptual framing which seeks to divide Kalasha and non-Kalasha discourses and indeed at times my two datasets overlap,

[37] For discussions of Marxist critiques of Bhabha's conception of hybridity see Huggan 2013, 16 and Nederveen Pieterse 2015, 105.

[38] In *Other Asias* (2008) Spivak disavowed the term citing its misuse by those promoting essentialist nationalist discourses.

instead they reflect the (generally speaking) different methods required to collect data relating to the actions of the two groups.

When researching the actions of outsiders I have drawn on a variety of texts: scholarly, administrative and popular as well as documentaries and YouTube videos. Examining these sources, I do not treat scholarly work differently from other outputs since, taken collectively, all evidence -to a greater or less degree- a shared cultural perspective.[39] A central concern of my discussion is the Greek funded and administered Kalasha Dur, a museum, school and culture centre dedicated to the preservation of the Kalasha way of life. Here the focus moves to the impact which a monumental manifestation of a Greek national discourse has had on the Kalash Valleys. Insights from 'hard' sources have been supplemented by interviews with heritage professionals and academics in Pakistan, NGO workers who have led projects in the Kalash Valleys and four days of participant observation as a cover teacher in the school section of the Kalasha Dur.

When researching the actions of Kalasha people I have generally drawn on a combination of previous ethnography, travel writing, and my own ethnographic fieldwork, although I have also examined social media and YouTube videos. Cultural change constitutes an important area of enquiry here and the long-term perspective offered by a review of all that has been written on the Kalasha has helped me map out some of the mutations that their culture has undergone. Whilst past ethnography, especially its earlier iterations is inflected with the conceptual biases discussed at the start of this chapter, my critique of it goes some way to quantifying the impact which it might have on my thinking. When I have drawn on the work of previous scholars of the Kalasha, I have done so with its limitations in mind.

In addition to existing commentaries on the Kalasha, my own repeated visits to the Valleys over the past thirteen years have provided a supplementary perspective on change in the shorter term. A principal case study here is the distinctive clothing worn by Kalasha women. The information I gathered was informed by a collecting trip and video on Kalasha women's clothing which I made for the Horniman Museum and Gardens in 2013 (Crowley 2013) and the process of commissioning as well as recording the manufacture of an entire set of women's clothing which I carried out for the Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology in Cambridge during my doctoral fieldwork. Collecting, filmmaking and commissioning all brought with them diverse conversations around women's clothing with subjects ranging from the fluctuating prices of yarn, to the year's most fashionable designs or the unwanted attention of tourists. The sustained focus on women's clothing engendered by the two museum projects allowed me to build up a holistic understanding of just what clothing means for the Kalasha.

The amalgamation of text, video, material culture and ethnography which characterises my data set is typical of much recent research in heritage studies (Filippucci 2009, 323–24). Indeed, the study of how heritage impacts society, demands such a hybrid methodology. However, until the last twenty years or so people have been the missing piece in this assemblage of sources. Following the growing appreciation that heritage is less an immutable

[39] Cf. Caron 2016, 327–28.

concept and more a cultural phenomenon (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1995), heritage researchers have turned to ethnographic methodologies to better grasp their subject (Rowlands 2002; Butler 2006; Smith 2006, 5; Carman and Stig Sørensen 2009). The move to apply a lens designed for the study of culture to the analysis heritage allows for the greater societal contextualisation of subjects, and importantly acknowledges heritage's origins in a Western cultural milieu. Ethnography's capacity to account for the nuances and dynamism of cultural production is especially relevant to our analysis of the Kalasha's approach to the maintenance of their identity and the approaches of those who have claimed to act on the Kalasha's behalf.

Multi-sited Ethnography

Earlier we discussed how previous academic writing on the Kalasha had perpetuated an artificial, bounded view of culture. An important way anthropology has moved beyond such reductive conceptions has been to develop the methodology of the multi-sited ethnography (Marcus 1995). In response to a world which was perceived to be becoming ever more 'globalised', anthropologists have been forced to reconsider how they choose their field sites. Whilst a classic approach as espoused by the 'founding fathers' of the discipline -especially Bronislaw Malinowski-[40] stresses the importance of immersion in a single site, such methodologies became increasingly untenable as anthropologists attempted to trace the complex mobilities and interlinkages of contemporary cultural phenomena (O'Reilly 2009, 145). Multi-sited works cast their nets far beyond the local and in so doing, whilst arguably loosing detail, set up a network of research loci that reflects the dynamism of their subject. Such an approach is especially appropriate for the study of borderlands. Whilst the physical tangibility of an international border suggests a distinct site of research, to account for the far-reaching process which make borderlands a wider lens is required.

In this thesis I employ something of a combination of the classic and multi-sited approaches. The field site at which I spent most time during my doctoral fieldwork is the village[41] in Mumuret Valley where I have stayed on every visit that I have made to the Kalasha over the past thirteen years. Whilst before starting my PhD my longest stay was for a month, for my doctoral fieldwork I spent approximately four months in the village, all the time living with my host family. My familiarity with this community has allowed me to at times offer areas of thick description (Geertz 1973) when presenting my data, for example in my discussion of projects initiated by well-educated Kalasha, or in my discussion of women's clothing.

I have also spent time with Kalasha people living far away from the Valleys. I stayed for two months in Lahore at a hostel run by Kalasha students and accompanied my host family on trips to Islamabad and Peshawar, there staying in Kalasha homes. Early on in my PhD I investigated the possibility of conducting research among the handful of Kalasha spread across Greece, the principal Kalasha diaspora outside of Pakistan. To this end I spent a week staying with Kalasha friends in Thessaloniki. Finally, and most significantly, two Kalasha who had become naturalised Greek

[40] See the first chapter of *Argonauts of the Western Pacific* for Malinowski on his methodology (1922).
[41] I have not named the village to further anonymise my host family and informants.

citizens came to join me in Cambridge for the last year of my PhD. Taj Khan Kalash and Sikander Kalas' interests overlapped with mine and rarely a day went by when we did not discuss something Kalasha-related. Their insights have proven invaluable in writing this thesis and in return I hope I have been of help in their projects. Taj and I have thought carefully together about his own research interests and I have been involved in editing a short story written by Sikandar. The story follows its young female Kalasha protagonist as she draws on the elders' ritual knowledge to try and prevent deforestation and save the Valleys from the devastating effects of flash flooding. I provided the illustrations for the story, drawn whilst on fieldwork and included here to be read along with the text of this chapter as a means through which to gauge the nature of my relationship with the Kalasha (figures 2.1-6).

My various field sites describe an arc of increasing familiarity. Starting with the classic ethnographic locus of a rural community in the 'developing world', by degrees my encounters with the Kalasha became less 'other', first the urban setting of Lahore, then another European country and finally as Cambridge housemates. This trajectory evolved more or less serendipitously: I left the Valleys to live in Lahore because the Pakistan Army became uncomfortable with my presence and I was in Greece because I was worried that the University would not grant me permission to research somewhere as potentially dangerous as the Pakistan-Afghan border. Yet ultimately there is little coincidence in the course which this journey took. My 'secondary' field sites reflect the interconnection which has developed between the Kalasha and the West. The hostel in Lahore was at the time the only one in a Pakistani city to cater for Western backpackers and its Punjabi owner typically employed Kalasha staff since the Kalash Valleys are a major stop off on the tourist trail of Pakistan. The Kalasha diaspora in Greece is directly linked to Greek fascination with a legend that has the Kalasha as descendants of soldiers Alexander the Great's army (something discussed in detail later), and even Taj and Sikandar's presence in Cambridge, although built on friendship, is, if we pull the focus back further, a reflection of the long term-scholarly interest in the Kalasha (I am not even the first Cambridge student to have conducted fieldwork in the Kalash Valleys).[42]

Where I have come across Kalasha people might be viewed as a map, or even read as a document, that charts both the currents of international interest which have flowed into the Kalash Valleys and the counter currents of Kalasha people who have followed those flows out of the Valleys and across the world. I owe the 'discovery' of my at once serendipitous and interconnected sites to the unstructured nature of the ethnographic methodology, to its capacity to accommodate and adapt to surprises (Tsing 2005, x) and to the space which it allows for the researcher to 'follow their nose'. Without such a methodologically fluid approach I would have been unable to account for the equally fluid nature of Kalasha identity.

Willem Van Schendel, arguably the most influential commentator in Asian border studies and his co-author Michel Baud have called for scholars to treat "the region on both sides of the border as single unit" (Baud and Van Schendel 1997, 231). Van Schendel and Baud's appeal represents an effective approach to aligning one's choice of field site to border study's mission, which borrowing from Plachta I described earlier as challenging "the assumption that

[42] Parkes carried out fieldwork in the Kalash Valleys in 1972 for his BA in Anthropology and Archaeology at Cambridge (1972; 1973).

borders are bounding frames and geographical containers for societies". I did not cross the border with Afghanistan at the end of the Kalash Valleys since to do so would have violated Pakistani regulations and there are no Kalasha on the other side of it. My time spent with Kalasha people in the Valleys, in Lahore and in Europe did, however, expose me to their experiences in contexts which transcended the geographical containers of both the environs of the border itself and the nation of Pakistan.

Whilst Kalasha living outside of the Valleys have followed economic opportunities, as we have just learnt the places they choose to settle are often linked in less material ways to the Valleys. The interest which outsiders, especially Westerners have taken in the Kalasha is reciprocal. Westerners identify with the Kalasha and, as we shall see, the Kalasha also identify with Westerners, their "indeterminate mode of being" partly made up by a diffuse sense of Europeanness. Cambridge, Greece and the backpacker hostel in Lahore are sites which reflect the same kind of transnational agglomerated identity discourse as the Central Asian Ismaili world we learn of from Mostowlansky or the Himalayan Buddhist community Gohain discusses. In the Kalasha's case the European part of how they imagine themselves has played a role in steering the life courses of those who have chosen to migrate out of the Valleys. In a very real sense, especially in the example of Taj and Sikander and their adoption of Greek citizenship, some Kalasha have actually lived out the European, transborder part of their identity. My exposure, therefore, to Kalasha people in Lahore, Greece and Cambridge has led me to a much deeper appreciation of the transcendent nature of Kalashaness than would have been the case if I had not moved beyond the confines of the Valleys.

Reflexivity

For over thirty years anthropology has debated the relative subjectivity of the ethnographic method.[43] Whilst on one extreme of the spectrum early postmodern zealots argued for the complete eradication of the 'authoritative voice', on the other, recalcitrant modernists held fast to their belief in the scientific value of the ethnography (O'Reilly 2009, 189). This study, as with most contemporary work which utilises ethnography, positions itself somewhere between the two poles. Certainly, I draw firm conclusions from my data. Yet not to interrogate how my own story has shaped my conclusions would seriously compromise my argument. Acknowledging my position in relation to my subject is especially important. Rather than arbitrarily selecting the Kalash Valleys as the perfect case study through which to critically examine pressing issues for the field of heritage studies, I chose to conduct research in a place which I had become increasingly involved with over the previous ten years.[44]

In the course of researching this thesis I have read the vast majority of what has been written about the Kalasha, academic or otherwise. More than once I was struck by the similarity between my background and my experiences, and the background and experiences of the author whose work I was reading. One of the most heavily romanticised accounts of the Kalasha published in recent decades appears in Jonny Bealby's *For a Pagan Song* (1998). The opening

[43] See Clifford and Marcus 1986, Geertz 1988 and Clifford 1988 for early and influential texts of the 'reflexive turn'.
[44] See Akhil Gupta's and James Ferguson's introduction to their edited volume *Anthropological Locations: Boundaries and the Grounds of a Field Science* for a discussion of the processes by which the anthropologist comes to decide their field site.

passage of Bealby's chapter on the Kalash Valleys contains a description of a Kalasha woman shaking an apricot tree so that the fruits pitter patter down onto the ground (1998, 200). The description reminded me of my early impressions on arriving in the Kalash Valleys and when I referred to the notebook I kept at the time I found that the first thing I had recorded about my stay was exactly the same activity.

Jolted by the similarity between what Bealby and I had chosen to record, I flicked to the author's profile at the back of his book. Like me he was a privately educated Englishman, who, uncannily had also like me, been a courier in London before travelling in Asia. Our shared trajectories of middle class young Englishman, who had dipped a toe in the slightly 'edgy' world of the London courier scene and become enamoured with the Kalasha brought home to me just how typical I was of those whose output and attitudes I was critiquing. Bealby went on to found a very successful adventure travel company, Wild Frontiers, which as one of its core packages offers a trip to the Kalash Valleys, whilst I founded a considerably less successful charity, Kalash Welfare, which mostly paid for educational fees, although through its auspices I have occasionally linked up donors who wish to contribute to the 'preservation' of Kalasha culture with Kalasha cultural activists.

I write then about the Kalasha from a perspective informed by a very particular trajectory, and this thesis, whilst an attempt to give an objective account of certain aspects of Kalasha life could easily be argued to represent yet another book written by yet another Westerner about a people, whom thus far have barely had the opportunity to contribute to the significant body of text which has accumulated around them. However, my past experiences with the Kalasha also furnish some of what I write with a certain authority. Although when discussing the Kalasha I am clearly offering an outsider's perspective, when I turn to how outsiders have come to perceive the Kalasha and how those perceptions have manifested in outputs which impact the Kalash Valleys, I offer a perspective which is in part autobiographical. Thus, my positionality shifts with the evidence presented. When discussing the ethnographic elements of my dataset I speak for a culture which is not my own and which has long had its representation dominated by authors very much like myself. Whilst when I examine the actions of outsiders in the Valleys, I comment on a phenomenon which I have had a small part in producing.

My history of involvement with the Kalasha and my wider cultural background certainly preclude any claims to objectivity. However, the next chapter provides something of an archaeology of the ideas and events which collectively produced a bundle of narratives around the Kalasha that have drawn in people like me. By presenting and analysing the story of how these narratives came to be I offer a more holistic synthesis of my research than that provided by the majority of those who have previously published on the Kalasha.

A great deal of the reflexive discussion around ethnography concerns itself with how the final publication is written. Avoidance of the first person, for example, has been criticised for giving an overly scientific impression of the work, glossing over the issue of the ethnographer's subjectivity -besides leading to rather ponderous wording such as 'this author argues…' (O'Reilly 2009, 189). Other methods of situating the ethnographer in the final output are for the author to 'write themselves in' to certain passages through anecdotes from research locations or clearly situated personal reflections on the experience of ethnography (O'Reilly 2009, 191). In this thesis I consistently use the first

person, both for ease of expression and to flag the important fact that what the reader is encountering has been heavily filtered and interpreted by me. I also employ the odd anecdote, again both to make the thesis more readable and also to offer a brief snapshot into the process of my research.

Conducting Research in Pakistan and Among the Kalasha

Interviews

My research started with a review of the readily available ethnography and travelogue which had been written on the Kalasha as well as a trip to the archives at Moesgaard Museum in Aarhus. For the second half of the twentieth century Moesgaard had functioned as something of a hub of research concerning both the Kalasha and neighbouring communities across the Afghan border. The archives held almost everything which had been published about the Kalasha, along with unpublished ethnographic notes made by Halfdan Siiger who had visited the Kalash Valleys in 1948 (Siiger 1956; Høj Johnsen et al. 2016). After processing the data that I had come across in the archives I put together a list of interview questions which I took to Thessaloniki and worked through over several days with Taj and Sikandar. Taj and Sikandar's answers fleshed out early hypothesises I had made concerning the flexibility and heterogeneity of Kalasha attitudes to their ethnic identity. I continued to use the questions as a base for discussions during fieldwork in Pakistan.

The interviews I conducted during fieldwork were unstructured, thus allowing the conversation to flow in potentially fruitful directions (Andrews 2009, 155). Although interviews with certain informants such as officials were one off events, many other interviews turned into ongoing discussions picked up again and again over several weeks or even months. I made audio recordings of interviews and notes of interesting conversations which I was unable to record. Whilst my Kal'as'amondr was sufficient for everyday communication, it fell below the standard needed to conduct detailed interviews, so although some data I have used is derived from Kalasha people speaking in their mother tongue, all formal interviews were with Kalasha who could speak English. I had tried to remedy this situation by applying for and being granted funds to take Taj with me to the Valleys to act as an expert translator for a week of interviews with Kalasha who could not speak English. However due to complexities brought about by Taj's recent adoption of Greek citizenship this was impossible. My resultant data set therefore is biased towards the relatively small proportion of the Kalasha population fluent in English, either because they have been to private school, undergone higher education, or worked as tourist guides. However, my initial research design took this into consideration and a major focus of my fieldwork was Kalasha who had either worked with foreign or government cultural preservation projects or set up their own culture-related initiatives, all of who spoke conversational English.

Sikandar's story is the only sustained work in Kal'as'amondr which is on its way to being published and it has an English-language version which I helped edit. Later I discuss books of tradition which some of the Kalasha teachers envision writing, these will be in Kal'as'amondr but they are currently more speculation than reality. School books used to teach Kal'as'amondr contained the odd sentence, but mainly they are concerned with implementing a

standardised alphabet (an initiative which has had only limited success). My level of Kal'as'amondr therefore did not bar me from accessing a substantial Kalasha textual tradition. Only in my inability to contribute in a sustained way to discussion in Kal'as'amondr on social media and in my inability to read past posts did I miss out on potentially valuable data.

Gender Bias

The Kalasha do not observe purdah, so in comparison to neighbouring Muslim communities relatively little stood in my way when it came to communicating with Kalasha women. Several of my key informants were women and the research which I carried out around women's clothing was predominately based on discussions with women. A survey of everyone I have recorded speaking to, however, reveals a bias towards men. Indeed, the fact that my social circles outside of my host family were largely male dominated reflects the importance of the gender divide which bisects Kalasha society. One counter to this preponderance of the male voice in my ethnography has been to make frequent reference to *Our Women Are Free*. Although Maggi conducted her fieldwork just over twenty years ago, much of what she discusses remains relevant to the present situation and without her insights certain sections of this thesis would be significantly compromised.

Village, Valley, Kin and my Relationship with the Kalasha

The majority of previous ethnographies have been situated in Rukmu Valley.[45] Rukmu has the highest ratio of Kalasha to non-Kalasha of all the three valleys and one section of it has almost no Muslim homes. Rukmu Kalasha or *Rukmula* consider themselves to be the most 'Kalasha' of all and it is no coincidence that ethnographers who have studied the Kalasha largely in isolation from their wider context have focused their research here. Mumuret, the valley in which I conducted most of my research by contrast is underrepresented in the academic literature. It has the largest population of the three valleys, is the most easily accessible, has the greatest ethnic diversity (Map 6) and is home to many of the best-educated and most entrepreneurial Kalasha. The village where I stayed in Mumuret has the reputation for being the most outward looking village in the valley with the most commercially minded and well-educated population. Thus, the locus of my research represents the opposite pole of the Kalasha world from Rukmu and just as the choice of Rukmu reveals a certain bias in past researchers, my focus on Mumuret reflects my interests in hybridity, change and interconnectivity. Neither I nor those who have come before me, therefore can claim to objectively represent the Kalasha as a whole, instead we each speak -in part- from the perspective of a particular corner of the Valleys.

My status as an honorary member of a family granted me a privileged degree of access to Kalasha daily life, yet it also implicated me to some extent in the divisions which dissect society. Village and clan represent the principal

[45] See Siiger 1956, Parkes 1983, Loude and Lièvre 1988 and Maggi 2001.

political units in the Valleys (Ali 2018, 28) and my nominal attachments to a specific family and village no doubt in many ways influenced my experience of fieldwork. A disproportionate number of my informants came from the same village and the family which I stayed with have had a great influence on my attitudes towards Kalasha identity. Compared to many other Kalasha families their attitude to ethnicity was markedly relaxed and it did not come as the greatest surprise when they announced via Facebook that they had converted en masse to Islam. Had I spent the same amount of time with a family who were more zealous in their adherence to the codes of Kalasha tradition my perspective may well have been less orientated towards the outward-looking aspects of Kalashaness. Nevertheless, I do not wish to overstate the influence which my family and village had on my research. Many of my informants were deeply concerned with the 'weakening' of Kalasha identity and I spent a considerable amount of time with Kalasha from elsewhere in the Valleys who were very critical of my village. Throughout my thesis I also make frequent reference to the work of past researchers, thereby incorporating the perspectives and experiences of other fieldworkers in my overall argument.

Whilst my long-standing relationship with the Kalasha certainly helped facilitate the access I needed to carry out my research, it also brought with it the potential to distort my data. My previous charity work had established a relationship of patronage with a handful of Kalasha, whom I remained close to throughout my fieldwork. However, by the time I left the Valleys I had spoken to and forged relationships with so many Kalasha whom I did not know before that I believe my past work in the Valleys has had little influence on my ethnographic data taken in aggregate.

Currently foreigners in the Kalash Valleys are required to be accompanied by a police bodyguard. This could have disrupted my fieldwork, especially if the allocated policeman was not a Kalasha. Fortunately, however, it was possible to engineer it so that my bodyguard was a not only Kalasha, but a respected member of my village. Dhiñt'a Khan ended up becoming a valued friend and guide who often took it upon himself to introduce me to people whom he thought that it might be interesting for me to meet, both Kalasha and Muslim.

There is a dissonance between an important thread to my research and the perspectives of many of the Kalasha whom I have lived among and worked with to produce this thesis. Central to the collection of ideas which have come to represent the Kalasha for the outside world is the narrative that they represent a remarkable survival from the distant past, an unaltered conduit to the beliefs and lifestyles of our long-lost ancestors. I deconstruct this narrative, exposing its artificiality and revealing the vested interests which led to its emergence. The narrative also, however, has great significance for the Kalasha. Part of this significance is negative: the narrative is bound up in the outside interests which destabilise life in the Valleys. But there are positive manifestations too. The narrative brings income and opportunities in the form of cultural preservation projects, tourism, and a more nebulous sense that the Kalasha are something special, an asset to Pakistan and worthy even of listing by UNESCO. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the narrative has entered into the discourses by which the Kalasha define themselves.

At times I have felt like I was walking on eggshells when writing this thesis. On the one hand there has been the prerogative to fully explore the manifold implications of the narrative, whilst on the other there has been the desire to maintain a respectful and compassionate attitude towards the beliefs of my Kalasha friends and informants. Many

Kalasha readers, will, I fear disagree with much of what I have written. But I hope that whilst I undermine the value which comes with the Kalasha's perceived ancientness, I add in its place an alternative source of prestige, derived from what I perceive to be the Kalasha's remarkable creativity in making their culture anew.

Position with Regards to Research Ethics

Prior to conducting my first interview I spent an evening with Nabaig Sharakat, the only Kalasha lawyer and together we discussed my University ethical approval form as well as a more detailed document that I had put together which addressed ethical issues particular to fieldwork in the Kalash Valleys. Nabaig kept several copies of both documents and before starting each interview I explained to the interviewee as best I could about my project, but also suggested that they contact Nabaig for further clarification, both he and I agreeing that he was best placed to 'translate' the essence of the relevant ethical issues to other Kalasha. Following the interview, in accordance with the University's ethics guidelines files were kept on a password encrypted device which was accessible only by me.

Both Taj and Sikandar have had their families back in the Kalash Valleys threatened after the publication of newspaper articles they have written or the broadcast of short films they have made. I have worked on the assumption that anything openly available online, as my thesis will be, will get back to the Valleys. To this end I have anonymised all informants with the exception of Dr Samad, the Director of the provincial Directorate of Archaeology and Museums, the Kalasha 'celebrities' discussed in Chapter 5 and Taj and Sikandar who, it is common knowledge are living with me in the United Kingdom and whom will be able to read this thesis before its submission. To further obscure the identity of my informants the same informant will appear under varying pseudonyms. Some data which I have deemed to be potentially too inflammatory has not been included in the thesis.

Many more written sources concerning the Kalasha are available to me here in Cambridge than to researchers in Pakistan. To try and bridge this inequity in the availability of scholarly resources I have offered to find and share publications and archival materials which are inaccessible them. Several have taken up my offer. I have also attempted to foster collaboration with colleagues in Pakistan through visiting them at their universities to discuss our overlapping research interests and presenting my work to their students.

Summary: Borderlands, Heritage Binaries and the Challenges of Research in the Kalash Valleys

Through the course of this chapter it has emerged that scholarship of the Kalasha as well as the academic discourse around heritage have been influenced by a reductive conception of identity which has long been contested by anthropologists and borderland specialists. I have discussed the output of commentators who have responded to this critique, arguing that in its drive to expose the antagonistic nature of heritage, the critical discourse is in danger

of reproducing the essentialising logics which fuel the dissonance that it studies. It is amongst these texts that I position my thesis, asking that if heritage narratives are not always neatly bounded, then what characteristics might we expect to find at their margins and meeting points?

Work on borders over the past two decades has developed a distinctive set of methodologies. These methodologies decentre the nation and other territorial definitions, re-imagining borderlands as zones of fragmentation and long-range connections rather than as places which skirt the abrupt limit of one nation and the equally abrupt start of another. In terms of how this framing of borderlands leads us to conceptualise their inhabitants, we see analytical models emerge which understand borderland dwellers to be at once subject to constraints imposed by the state, whilst also having access to creative opportunities which are hard to imagine in more homogenous settings. The discourse of marginality in these contexts often appears as a two-sided coin: on one side it oppresses, whilst on the other it can be repurposed and put to productive use by those who are marginalised.

The metaphor of the ecotone allows us to conceptualise the identity dynamic of the frontier, bringing together theories of marginality and wider scholarly understandings of the other processes which shape borderlands. Transmuted to heritage studies the metaphor of the ecotone prompts us to move away from framings of heritage boundaries *only* as binary zones of dissonance and instead examine them for evidence of both conflict *and* productivity.

The data collection methodologies which I have used to pursue the questions raised above respond to the limitations of models which divide the world into neatly bounded units. Multi-sited ethnographic research first emerged during the 1980s in an attempt to account for the interconnectivity of culture in an increasingly 'globalised world'. Studies of borderland spaces have championed a related approach which puts great emphasis on crossing geopolitical boundaries. I have applied a similarly transcendent methodology in framing my field sites, arguing that their locations were well placed to appreciate the indeterminateness of Kalasha identity.

Finally, I have considered the developments in ethnographic writing which have followed on from anthropology's 'reflexive turn', reflecting on how my status as a foreigner, my gender, my level of proficiency in Kal'as'amondr and my closeness to a particular section of Kalasha society have impacted my research. The process of self-interrogation is particularly necessary given my history of previous involvement with the Kalash Valleys, often along the lines of the activities which I critique in the thesis. I have also acknowledged and in a small way attempted to transcend the divide in access to resources which distinguishes me from scholars in Pakistan who have similar research interests to mine.

Figure 2.1. Map of the Kalash Valleys for Sikandar's story.

Figure 2.2. The protagonist, looking out towards the watershed from which the flash floods issue.

Figure 2.3. A *bonj mut'* or holly oak tree (*Quercus baloot*), famous for its size and known locally as the *Pehlwan* or wrestler. Sitting at its roots is Dhiñt'a Khan, my bodyguard and also a respected maintainer of Kalasha customs.

Figure 2.4. A Kalasha diviner or *thom kuchek moc*.

Figure 2.5. Dhiñt'a Khan in the high forest, an area which has suffered from heavy logging and as a result contributed to flash flooding.



Figure 2.6. The village of Daras Guru in a rainstorm.

Vignette 1

The Kalasha and Alexander the Great

Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s Athanasius Lerounis was one of the most powerful people in the Kalash Valleys. His NGO, The Greek Volunteers[46] had educated a generation of Kalasha children, supplied Mumuret Valley with clean water and constructed several distinctive and beautiful buildings. Their flagship project was the Kalasha Dur[47], a structure which dwarfed the other buildings in the Valleys and which incorporated accommodation for members of staff, a school, a library, two museums, a doctor's clinic, and an open air amphitheatre (Figure 3.1). The Kalasha Dur was where Lerounis lived and where, on the night of the 8th of September 2009 he was kidnapped by a Taliban unit which had crossed the border with Pakistan at the head of Mumuret Valley.

Six months later Lerounis was released, heavily traumatized by his ordeal. It is rumoured that in exchange for their hostage the Taliban had demanded, and were given, certain prisoners held in Pakistani goals and a ransom from the Greek government. Lerounis was forbidden to return to the Kalash Valleys by the Pakistani authorities and this, along with the nascent Eurozone crisis, put an end to almost all of the Greek Volunteers' projects. Some Muslim inhabitants of the Kalash Valleys were glad to have seen the back of Lerounis, indeed it is very likely that local Muslims assisted in his kidnap. The core reason for this resentment is clear: although a significant proportion of the projects funded by the Greek Volunteers benefited all the communities living in the Valleys,[48] the clear majority of help went to the Kalasha.[49]

Privileging the Kalasha

The Greek Volunteers' choice to fund the Kalasha over all the other neighbouring communities helped to maintain a boundary which is of fundamental importance for Kalasha people. That their culture might one day disappear before a tide of Islam is a constant worry for the Kalasha and things which are understood to encourage people to maintain

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[46] The Greek Volunteers was established in 1999. Previously many of the members of the charity had worked together under the name 'Friends of the Kalasha', an organisation which was founded four years earlier in 1995 (see Appendix I).

[47] Construction of the Kalasha Dur started and 2002 and the complex was completed in 2004 (See Appendix I).

[48] The clean water supply which the Greek Volunteers funded benefited Kalasha and Muslim alike, as did the doctor's clinic in the Kalasha Dur, although this is reported to have only run for four summers. The Greek Volunteers also paid for a mosque in the Nuristani Muslim community of Shekanandeh to be rebuilt and constructed two Government Muslim Schools (see Appendix I).

[49] Those who support the Greek Volunteer's decision to concentrate on the Kalasha would point out that there are sources of support available for Muslim communities which are not accessible to the Kalasha. The relative weights of Muslim-specific funding versus Kalasha-specific funding are, however, something which is very hard to assess.

their faith are very much valued. Religious identity, however, does not always constitute the primary category of allegiance in the Valleys. Often the most significant loyalties relate to an individual's village and their *kam* (clan), the latter representing a subdivision of the village. When Kalasha convert to Islam and become Shek, they generally keep up at least some of their kinship ties and often stay in the same village. A recent example of the capacity of village loyalties to trump religious difference came in a dispute between the villages of Batrik and Daras Guru, both communities with mixed Kalasha and Shek populations. The issue at stake was a contested area of pasture in the mountains above the respective villages. Things came to a head when Batrik's stable was burnt down in the night. In the ensuing confrontation groups combined of Kalasha and Shek men from the opposing villages fired on each other and a man from Daras Guru was killed.

Other ties, less fundamental than kinship and village also unite the Kalasha with their Muslim neighbours. Kalasha people have workmates, shepherding companions, lovers and friends drawn from all the Muslim communities of the three Valleys and come election time, Kalasha and Muslims often campaign side by side for the same parties. Religion, therefore, represents a reductive framework by which to classify the Kalasha and one which certainly does not reflect the complexity of allegiances and bonds that tie the Kalasha to other communities. Equally, however, the riot over the Kalasha girl discussed in Chapter 1 demonstrates how easily religious identity can eclipse the multitude of relationships which unite Kalasha and non-Kalasha residents of the three valleys.

Figure 3.1. The Kalasha Dur. (Photograph the author).

What the Kalasha Mean to Greece

One of several ancestry stories surrounding the Kalasha attributes their origins to the soldiers of Alexander the Great's army.[50] Although this theory has been dismissed by creditable scholarship for over 150 years,[51] it has maintained a remarkably tenacious hold on the popular imagination. In Greece especially, the Kalasha are very well-known, their place in the public consciousness established by a steady stream of newspaper articles, travelogues, TV news features and documentaries, many of which offer spurious analogies between contemporary Kalasha culture and that of the Hellenes.[52] The immediacy with which Greeks associate the Kalasha and Alexander comes across in a story told to me by Sikandar of his time living in Greece. One afternoon he was sitting at the base of the monumental statue of Alexander the Great in Nea Paralia, Thessaloniki. At the same time a local artist happened to be painting the statue. Curious to see the work, Sikandar approached the artist and they started chatting. During their conversation it emerged that Sikandar was Kalasha and the artist became very excited, pointing out how similar Sikandar's nose was to that proudly sported by the statue. Unbeknown to Sikandar, the artist had connections in TV and the next day local news ran a piece on the encounter between a painter, the famous statue and a real-life descendant of one of Alexander's soldiers. Sikandar's story is just one of many similar accounts told to me by the handful of Kalasha who have spent time in Greece. There was also the occasion when a Kalasha friend was being given a hard time at Greek customs because of his Pakistani passport, until, that is, it emerged that he was Kalasha, at which point the customs officer called his colleagues over to meet a living relic of the Hellenic past. Most eloquent of all the stories perhaps, is that of the old lady who was waiting for a bus with Sikandar. She asked where he was from and when he told her she started weeping, relating how much the story of the Kalasha and Alexander meant to her.

The accounts told to me by my Kalasha friends about their time in Greece reflect the wider significance of the classical past and its heroes for contemporary Greek identity.[53] Integral to the narrative of the Greek nation-state has been the long-running struggle to reclaim its classical heritage from other, historically more powerful Western nations. These nations imagined and to some extent continue to imagine the legacy of ancient Greece to be as much their inheritance as that of contemporary Greeks[54] (Hamilakis 2007). Many of the same powerful nations played a vital role in supporting the Greek rebellion against Ottoman rule of 1821 and the subsequent creation of the state of

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[50] See Cacopardo 2011 on Kalasha origin stories.

[51] See Augusto Cacopardo's excellent discussion of the development of the myth which links the Kalasha to Alexander the Great (Cacopardo 2011).

[52] Dimitris Alexandrou's (1996) book *Kalash, the Greeks of the Himalayas* is particularly well known in Greece and has been reprinted several times. More recently *Traditions and Customs of the Kalash* (2006), a collaboration between Efstathia Karabatsou, a Greek author and Yasir Bazik, a Kalasha man living in Greece has picked up the theme of the Kalasha's decent from ancient Greek stock. Through the late 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s several Greek TV stations aired documentaries and discussion shows around the topic of the Kalasha and their link to classical Greece, typically in these programmes the work of the Greek Volunteers is featured (see for example (Logothetis 1998), (*Vouli* n.d.) and (*Alpha Channel* n.d.)). More recently Hellenic Radio and Television commissioned *The Nymphs of the Hindu Kush*, a feature-length documentary which tells the story of the Kalasha with a great deal of reference to the Greek Volunteers and concludes with Lerounis' kidnap (Papathanasiou 2011).

[53] For a detailed discussions of the role which Greece's classical past has played in the construction of the identity of the modern Greek nation see Herzfeld 1986 and Hamilakis 2007.

[54] See also Bernal 1987 and Astour 1967 for the 'Westernisation' of Ancient Greece in the European imagination.

Greece in 1827. Unsurprisingly, the putative archaeological establishment of the newly independent Greece was also founded and administered by non-Greeks. Although for generations the shape of archaeology in Greece has answered to a Greek agenda, Greece's stewardship of its heritage continues to be subject to disproportionate scrutiny from the outside world (Hamilakis 2007). It follows that the project of identifying classical heritage as the absolute patrimony of the Greeks is of fundamental importance to the vison of Greece as a fully autonomous nation.

The Vergina Sun

The breakup of the former Yugoslavia gave Greece fresh cause to defend its claim on antiquity. In 1991 a new government based in the old administrative capital of Skopje declared the Republic of Macedonia[55] a sovereign nation and officially ceded from the former bloc. For its flag the new state chose the Vergina sun, a symbol which had become closely associated with ancient Macedonia and its Argead rulers Phillip II of Macedon and his son Alexander the Great (Hamilakis 2007). Both the name Macedonia and the use of the Vergina sun clearly evoked the new nation's vision of continuity with the ancient kingdom. For many Greeks however, the name and flag presented a deeply provocative challenge to their national identity since they believed ancient Macedonia to be Greek and in no way the patrimony of the Slavic-speaking people who made up the majority of the population of the new state. Furthermore, it was also feared by elements of the Greek administration and public that the name and flag of the Republic of Macedonia might presage a territorial claim on the Greek region immediately to the south of the country, which was also called Macedonia and also used the Vergina sun as its symbol (Neofotistos 2011, 297). Greece immediately demanded that the Republic of Macedonia change its name and flag and when the latter refused, a dispute flared up between the two nations, culminating in the Greek imposition of a nineteen month trade embargo[56] on its northern neighbour (Floudas 1996). Although relations improved somewhat following an interim accord signed by both parties in 1995, tensions continued to simmer until the Prespa Agreement of 2018.

A curious episode in the Greek-Macedonian dispute came in the form of Macedonian attempts to make connections between their nation and Hunza, a mountainous region around 300 kilometres to the east of the Kalash Valleys, the population of which also have an ancestry story that stretches back to Alexander the Great.[57] The driving force behind Macedonian interest in Hunza was the Macedonian Institute for Strategic Research 16.9 (MISR 16.9), an organization with a strongly ethnonationalist agenda.[58] In 2005 MISR 16.9 organised an expedition to Hunza resulting in a film that made repeated links between Alexander, Hunza and modern-day Macedonia, and which was aired on Macedonian television, generating a great deal of interest from the Macedonian public (Neofotistos 2011, 305–9).

[55] The Socialist Republic of Macedonia had been one of the six countries that made up the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
[56] Greece agreed to lift the embargo on the 14th of September 1995 (Wren 1995).
[57] See Vasiliki Neofotisto's article *Going Home to Pakistan* which discusses Greek and Macedonian uses of the Kalasha and Hunza in the context of the Macedonia naming dispute (Neofotistos 2011).
[58] See Brunwasser 2008 and 'Hunza Delegation Travels to Macedonia' 2008.

Following on from the success of the expedition and the film, MISR 16.9 invited a Pakistani delegation to visit Macedonia, which was to be led by Ghazanfar Ali Khan, the Mir (or titular ruler) of Hunza.

On the 11th of July 2008 the Mir touched down at the revealingly named Skopje International Alexander the Great Airport. Waiting for him and his delegation were the obligatory flag-waving members of the public and a guard of honour made up of twenty men decked out in poorly fitting attempts at ancient Macedonian soldiers' uniforms[59] (Brunwasser 2008). During the eight days of the Mir's visit he was gifted a plot of land, blessed by an Archbishop and entertained by Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski who offered ten scholarships for Hunza students at Macedonian universities (Brunwasser 2008).

The visit, the expedition and the high profile afforded to both should be understood in light of the considerable resources which the Greek government allocated to the Greek Volunteers and the extensive coverage which its projects attracted in the Greek media. The charity's early attempts at fundraising were relatively modest and limited to the efforts of its members, who were clearly primarily motivated by the desire to improve Kalasha people's quality of life. However, less than three years into its existence its activities had begun to gain substantial political significance. In the winter of 1997 to 1998 a major televised publicity drive[60] was launched, centred on a three month tour of Greece organised for a Kalasha delegation by Lerounis and his colleagues. Kalasha who went on the tour told me how they attended Greek lessons, were flown around business class or taken to islands on chartered ferries. When the time came to visit the Acropolis museum, the closed building was opened especially for them. Following the success of their initial projects, the charity received further funding from the European Union via Hellenic Aid,[61] the branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs charged with international development. The charity's work, which was by this time focused on education and school-building, constituted a significant component of Hellenic Aid's portfolio and continued to feature regularly on Greek television right up until Lerounis' kidnap.[62]

By positioning itself as a patron of Kalasha culture and widely publicising its efforts to help the Kalasha maintain their identity, Greece presented a narrative through which it further legitimised its claim over ancient Macedonia.[63] The presence of a similar story of Alexandrian descent in Hunza however, offered Macedonia the opportunity to set up a counter claim. Whilst the Macedonian purse may not have stretched to projects as ambitious as those funded by Hellenic Aid, the Mir's tour and the premier's offer of university places demonstrated that the new country could also act as benefactor to a -fantastical- community of ancient Macedonians. Recently, Greek ethnonationalist organisations have argued that both the Kalasha *and* Hunza constitute the patrimony of a Hellenic Macedonia[64]

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[59] See pesijazal n.d. and Alexe 2016.
[60] The tour was the subject of a television 'marathon' of programmes broadcast by ET3 now ERT3, a Greek state-owned TV channel (Logothetis 1998).
[61] Hellenic Aid started funding the Greek Volunteers in 2000 (see Appendix I).
[62] ET3 helped to raise funds for the Kalasha Dur as well as contributing directly to building costs (see Appendix I).
[63] See also the fourteen point declaration issued at the 9th International Convention of the Pan-Macedonian Associations (July 26-31, 2005) which is mainly taken up with statements about the Greekness of ancient Macedonia, but which concludes with two points concerning the preservation of the Kalasha ('Pan-Macedonian Association USA Holds 59th Annual National Convention in Kavala' 2005).
[64]. They were invited to participate in the parade by the Federation of Associated Laconian Societies, a Spartan/Greek ethnonationalist organisation and were accompanied by supporters bearing a large banner reading "Macedonia is only one and

(Figure 3.2). So staggers on the somewhat surreal situation whereby two nations in south-eastern Europe utilise two tiny populations in the mountains of northern Pakistan in their competing claims to a kingdom which existed over two millennia ago.

Figure 3.2. Screen capture from the Facebook page "Macedonia is Greek and will always be Greek" (*Kalasha Declare 'Macedonia Is Greek'* 2019). The video records New York City's Greek Independence Day parade which took place on April 14th, 2019. In the still are Lakshan Bibi[65] (right), a Kalasha woman who lives in New York, a Greek woman dressed as a Kalasha woman (left) and a man (centre) presumably from Gilgit-Baltistan, the region of Pakistan in

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Greek. Kalasha and Bactrians – Gilgit Baltistan"(*Kalasha Declare 'Macedonia Is Greek'* 2019). Three months later the Federation of Associated Laconian Societies joined New York City's Pakistan Independence Day Parade (August 4th), this time with a banner which read "Sparta, Greece – Kalasha Gilgit Baltistan Friendship"('Laconians with Kalasha and Gilgit Baltistan at the Pakistan Parade – FEDERATION OF ASSOCIATED LACONIAN SOCIETIES' 2019).

[65] Lakshan Bibi was invited to participate in the parade by the Federation of Associated Laconian Societies, a Spartan/Greek ethnonationalist organisation. Three months later the Federation of Associated Laconian Societies joined New York City's Pakistan Independence Day Parade (August 4th), this time with a banner which read "Sparta, Greece – Kalasha Gilgit Baltistan Friendship" ('Laconians with Kalasha and Gilgit Baltistan at the Pakistan Parade – FEDERATION OF ASSOCIATED LACONIAN SOCIETIES' 2019).

which Hunza is located. The banner reads “Macedonia is only one and Greek. Kalasha and Bactrians – Gilgit Baltistan”

Against this backdrop it is very hard to take seriously statements issued by Lerounis which claim that the theory of Alexandrian ancestry bore no relevance to the activities of his organization.[66] Indeed, the legacy which the Greek Volunteers left in the Kalash Valleys provides ample evidence to the contrary.[67] The majority of the twenty-two structures[68] built by the charity, from communal toilets to the monumental Kalasha Dur are full of little nods to the classical world: Greek inscriptions, pediments, Ionic capitals, fluted columns and meandros motifs are all present (Appendix III). Most prevalent of all however, is the Vergina sun, a symbol which appears to have served as an unofficial logo for the organisation and one which is recognised as the mark of the charity’s work by many locals (Figure 3.3). Yet an official notice produced by the Greek volunteers concerning their architectural choices states that, “the local style was the sheer influence for […] construction”.[69]

[66] See Rickett 2011 and Appendix II for a statements by Lerounis and the Greek Volunteers distancing their work from the theory of the Kalasha as ancient Greek survivals. Elsewhere however, Lerounis has made explicit links between Kalasha and Greek culture (Neofotistos 2011, 299).
[67] It is important to add the caveat here that many Greeks as well as other nationalities volunteered with the charity over the years, some of whom were far more interested in addressing very real humanitarian issues than living out a fantasy among lost ancestors.
[68] See Appendix I.
[69] See Appendix II.

Figure 3.3. The Entrance to Kraka' Kalasha School, built by the Greek Volunteers in the mid 1990s. A Vergina Sun has pride of place, just below the apex of the pediment. (Photograph the author).

Lerounis' Greco-Kalasha Heterotopia

The Kalasha Dur represents the culmination of Greek architectural experimentation in the Kalash Valleys. In the more modest structures designed by the Greek Volunteers a Greco-Kalasha style begins to emerge, but it is in their grandest project that this hybrid aesthetic reaches its fullest expression (see Appendix III). Some elements of the Kalasha Dur are purely Greek in inspiration, including the amphitheatre, numerous architectural features, grape vine trellising and olive trees (polythene-wrapped to protect against the harsh winters of the Hindu Kush). Other elements draw on the local vernacular, especially the 'woven' motifs and roundels which are common on older, high prestige buildings both in the Kalash Valleys and in Bashgal, the neighbouring region of Afghanistan.[70] In certain

[70] Carved decoration on prestigious Kalasha homes was executed by the Bari, a caste of craftsmen from the Bashgal region of Nuristan. High status buildings in both the Kalash Valleys and Bashgal are therefore near identical, although the latter examples

features, classical and local traditions are combined, the most conspicuous examples of this are the carved plank columns[71] or *cot'ala thũ'* which span the façade of the building. The designs on cot'ala thũ' are known as *gok s'ing* (snake[ing] horns) and represent the horns of two different species: he-goats, which are the most prized livestock for the Kalasha, and markhor (*Capra falconeri*), the great mountain goat of the Hindu Kush. Patterns representing markhor and goat horns are one of the most significant motifs for the Kalasha, in the past reflecting both spiritual and worldly attainment and today very much resonant of Kalasha identity. The Kalasha Dur cot'ala thũ' are the same as those which can be seen on the most heavily decorated Kalasha houses, except that in the Greek-designed versions the traditional roundel at the base of the column has been replaced by a Vergina sun. Such attempts at hybridity reflect more than a sense of playfulness. By incorporating a symbol as politically charged as the Vergina sun into an architectural feature which holds such local significance, the Kalasha Dur makes two interlinked claims. The first is that Kalasha are the descendants of Alexander's army and the second is that modern Greece is the rightful heir to Alexander's legacy.

Lerounis, to my knowledge, is one of only three[72] outsiders to have 'become' Kalasha. The process is simple: the aspiring convert applies to the elders stating that he or she believes in the Kalasha religion and wishes to follow the Kalasha *dastur*. Since Lerounis lived year-round in the Valleys and attended the major Kalasha festivals, in terms of impact on his everyday life, becoming Kalasha would not have represented a dramatic transition. Ontologically however, the transformation was very significant indeed. By becoming Kalasha Lerounis was both embodying and performing the Greco-Kalasha heterotopia[73] which he sought to bring into being through his buildings. The transformation also gave him greater legitimacy in his work around Kalasha cultural 'preservation'. Rather than representing an outsider imposing his vision, Lerounis became something more akin to a benevolent family member, returning after a couple of millennia to help his long-lost relatives. Certainly, many of his culturally orientated projects appear to be the work of someone who imagined himself to be a custodian of the Kalasha.[74] Indeed, the entire institution of the Kalasha Dur is a self-professed attempt at shaping the course of the Kalasha's future: the same notice which neglects to mention the classical elements in the Greek Volunteer's architectural language states that the edifice, "was constructed after Kalasha people's request to preserve their tradition which they could see […] disappearing".[75]

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tend to be larger and exhibit more decoration internally (Edelberg 1984, 119; Klimburg 1999, 17). For a discussion of and detailed plans of Kalasha buildings see Harrison 1994.

[71] This term is borrowed from Edelberg (1984, 92)

[72] The others are Jordi Magraner, a Spanish national who lived in Mumuret from around 1998 until his death in 2002 and Akiko Wada, a Japanese national who first came to the Kalash Valleys in the 1980s and still lives in Rukmu.

[73] I draw here on Michel Foucault's (1971; 1984) concept of the heterotopia as an enacted utopia and Yannis Hamilakis use of it in discussing contemporary Greece's relationship with its classical past (2007, 17).

[74] Lerounis was very involved in the details of the day-to-day running of the Kalasha Dur, to the extent that he even designed the patterns which girls attending the school were to have embroidered on their dresses. Outside of the Kalasha Dur the Greek Volunteers occasionally strayed into activities which betray a proprietorial attitude towards Kalasha culture. For example, at the *dewa dur* shrine above Brũ'a village, the charity commissioned an improvement in the form of a row of highly stylised and simplified figures holding springs of juniper, or *saras*, the scared plant of the Kalasha. Although there was no reference to classical world in the work it still drew on no Kalasha precedent in its style or concept and very much represented a break with tradition.

[75] See Appendix II.

Given that the story of modern Greece has been so bound up in the nation's attempts to defend what it perceives as its heritage from the claims of others there is a certain irony in the readiness with which The Greek Volunteers incorporated the Kalasha into their national discourse and appointed themselves as stewards of Kalasha culture. As we shall see later, however, the Kalasha response to Greek custodianship has been less uniform in its opposition than one might imagine. Certainly, some Kalasha were opposed to the charity's culturally-orientated projects. One teacher told me that he resented Lerounis for claiming a "monopoly on our culture" and a village leader I interviewed related to me that how through their buildings he feared the Greek Volunteers were attempting to create a false Greek-inflected archaeological record in the Kalash Valleys. Yet for many others Lerounis remains a hero, a man whom they were proud to welcome as a Kalasha.

Ten Years After the Kidnap

When I first visited the Kalasha Dur in 2011 its perimeter wall was topped with razor wire and the entrance was defended by a strategically placed heavy machine gun set behind sandbags. Although following the kidnap of Lerounis the building had been left almost entirely empty and had largely ceased to function as the Greek Volunteers intended, the Taliban had, according to the soldier I spoke to, recently placed it on an attack list. The intent projected by the structure alone was apparently provocation enough to warrant its destruction, its immutability perceived as a challenge to the Taliban's hegemonic vision of the greater region united under the banner of (their kind of) Sunni Islam.

By the time of my doctoral fieldwork (2017-19) the situation at the Kalasha Dur had relaxed considerably. The principal museum which the building houses was teeming with visitors, whilst the rest of the complex had been taken up by two Kal'as'amondr-medium schools. The museum functioned as a base for the provincial Directorate of Archaeology and Museums. The Directorate has been very active in the Kalash Valleys, surveying and registering sites of historic and archaeological interest as well as buying up buildings which it deems to be of heritage value and therefore in need of preservation. When I spoke to Dr Samad, the head of the Directorate, he told me that he thought the time had come for Pakistan to take the lead in the conservation of Kalasha culture. During our conversation Dr Samad related many of his plans for the Kalasha, including setting up a special Kalasha-staffed tourist police which would help guide and keep an eye on the Valleys' many visitors. He also had ambitions to conserve and manage two of the Kalasha's distinctive graveyards or *madojaw*, both of which suffer from the effects of heavy tourism at certain times of the year and to inscribe as much as possible of Kalasha on the UNESCO list. Central to Dr Samad's scheme was to relocate the two schools with which the Directorate currently shares the Kalasha Dur and take over the entire complex.

Michael Herzfeld has observed that monuments attempt to subvert the passage of time. Their massiveness, or as Herzfeld puts it their "ponderous ontology" suggests that they constitute a hereditary and eternal order of things, thereby naturalising whatever ideology or narrative it is that they represent (Herzfeld 2006, 129). These characteristics certainly resonate with the Kalasha Dur. The building's scale along with the conspicuous symbolism

incorporated into its structure project the authority of the Greco-Kalasha discourse. Equally, the building makes an emphatic statement about the perpetuation of the Kalasha's difference to the Muslim communities around them, reifying the aspiration to 'preserve' the former. It follows that those who wish to see an end to Kalasha culture have also desired the destruction of the Kalasha Dur, whilst conversely, the Directorate in its ambition to position itself as the new guardian of the Kalasha, seeks to claim the whole building for itself. Although the intent behind the Kalasha Dur was to transform a set of intangible beliefs and aspirations into irrefutable, material fact, rather than perpetuating stability, it has instead over the first fifteen years of its life, served as a catalyst for competition and discord.

Chapter 3

Heritage and the Borderlands

Since the year 2000 there have been at least six publications[76] touching on the subject of Kalasha DNA. With a Kalasha population of only 4000 souls that works out to roughly one publication per 600 people. This must make the Kalasha, per capita, one of the most intensely discussed ethnicities on the planet. The recent work by geneticists on Kalasha origins follows a precedent set by linguists, anthropologists and Indologists who have been asking similar questions for close to one hundred years. Yet this intensity of scholarly enquiry concerning the distant ancestry of the Kalasha appears unjustifiable when the following are considered: Kalasha people look the same as the populations living around them, speak a language related to neighbouring languages[77] and historically, were not culturally exceptional in the context of the greater region. The idea, however, that the Kalasha have come from a faraway place is persistent. Both scholarship and popular commentary have all too often been blinkered by a myopia which perceives the Kalasha's past through the lens of their current cultural exceptionalism.

Speculation over distant origins forms the backbone of a bundle of myths which have come to represent the Kalasha for much of the outside world. The first half of this chapter traces the history of these myths and reveals a story authored by a diverse cast of actors, which as well as scholars includes *Daily Telegraph* journalists, a French Member of the European Parliament (MEP) and the 'Bard of Empire'- Rudyard Kipling. Conspicuously absent from the story are the voices of the Kalasha as well as those of their previously non-Muslim neighbours. The material which this chapter discusses is that written by the literate about the illiterate. The contributors have enjoyed the privilege of making history, whereas their subjects, people who in the past lived beyond the borders of the state and who today remain peripheral, have not had the means of being heard.

As the Kalash Valleys became more accessible and therefore better known, paradoxically perhaps, the mythology surrounding them blossomed. We have already discussed how rumours of descent from the army of Alexander the Great inspired both the Greek public and the NGO the Greek Volunteers. Many other outsiders have also imagined an ancestral connection with the Kalasha, often projecting visions of their own idealised, arcadian past onto the Kalasha's present day. The readiness with which the Kalasha are imagined into stories of pertinence for the outside

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[76] See Qamar et al. 2002; Kivisild et al. 2003; Quintana-Murci, 2004; Schroeder et al. 2007; Sadaf and et al. 2007; Li et al. 2008. See also Razib Khan's three contributions specifically concerning the subject of Kalasha genetics for the online version of the popular science magazine, *Discover* (R. Khan 2013; 2012a; 2012b).

[77] Kal'as'amondr, the Kalasha language, forms part of the Dardic subgroup of Indo-Aryan languages. Other Dardic languages are spoken to the west of the Kalash Valleys in a chain stretching all the way to Kashmir and some Dardic languages are also spoken to the east in present-day Afghanistan. The attribution of Kal'as'amondr the Dardic group has been widely accepted by linguists since it was first proposed by Georg Morgenstierne in 1965 (See Morgenstierne 1965, as cited in Bashir 2007, 905).

world has fuelled substantial representation of the Kalasha in the media. As the information revolution progresses these stories are consumed and reproduced with ever greater speed. The result is that the Kalasha are now known to millions of people world-wide, but that what is known by those millions is derived more from their own fantasies and preoccupations than the reality of life in the Kalash Valleys.

The second half of the chapter discusses the impact of the way the world sees the Kalasha on life in the Valleys. Several NGOs have engaged in cultural 'preservation' projects directed at the Kalasha. Competition among different NGOs and between individual NGOs and the state has characterised the development sector presence in the Kalash Valleys. Equally, as the case of the Greek Volunteers illustrates, disproportionate focus on the Kalasha has the capacity to bring religious jealousies to the fore and foster sectarian conflict. This localised conflict intersects with a larger struggle between secular and Islamic lobbies within the Pakistani government and over the past twenty years the Kalasha have become entangled in the competition between those who demand a more cosmopolitan Pakistan and those who aspire to steer the country towards a uniformly Sunni identity. Finally, threats from the Taliban like those directed at the Kalasha Dur demonstrate how the imaginary of the Kalasha has become implicated in the wider geopolitics of the region.

Part I: How the Kalasha Came to be European Heritage

"If the Kalasha can do anything it's make people miss what they think they've lost" - Taj Khan Kalash, Cambridge, 11.05.2020.

The Land of the Unbelievers

Historically, Kafiristan[78] was the name which the scholars and populace of the Muslim states surrounding the Hindu Kush and Karakoram ranges gave to the non-Muslim region which I have thus far referred to as Peristan. *Kafir* is an Arabic term which is often translated as 'unbeliever'[79] and the ending '*-stan*' denotes 'place/land' in Persian, so Kafiristan can be approximately rendered in English as the Land of the Unbelievers. Whilst other regions in the Persianate world were characterised by ethnicity or religion, for example Baluchistan, 'Land of the Baluch' or 'Hindustan', 'Land of the Hindus', the name Kafiristan reveals nothing of the population except that they followed no

[78] The term *kafir* can have derogatory connotations in Muslim societies. Furthermore, today many Kalasha argue that it is inaccurate when applied to them since they believe in the same god as the Abrahamic faiths (see also Wada 2003, 8). The Italian brothers Alberto and Augusto Cacopardo have argued for the replacement of Kafiristan with Peristan (see Chapter 1). Although I fully support this initiative, for the purpose of clarity in the main text of this chapter I use Kafiristan.

[79] Exact definitions of what constitutes a *kafir* have varied over time and from commentator to commentator.

identifiable religion.[80] This definition in the negative reflects how little was known about the region or its inhabitants. Indeed, several historical sources reveal that some Kafir groups actively sought to keep Muslims out,[81] an ambition helped by the region's extremely rugged terrain and easily defendable passes.[82]

It is perhaps unsurprising then that early Muslim commentators tended to reiterate a limited selection of attributes when attempting to describe Kafiristan. Of these the most interesting for the present discussion is the idea that the population contained Christians or was of European extraction, a story which has been in existence since at least the seventeenth century (Alberto Cacopardo 2016, 73). It seems likely that associations between the Kafirs and the distant world of Christendom are a reflection of how 'other'[83] Kafiristan was for the inhabitants of neighbouring Muslim states. For the Western imagination however, rumours that Kafiristan harboured Europeans or Christians were deeply compelling, suggesting the possibility of long-lost kin waiting to be discovered in the one of the last unexplored places in Asia.[84]

The potential of Kafiristan to captivate his audiences was recognised by Rudyard Kipling and realised to remarkable effect in perhaps his most enduring short story, *The Man Who Would be King* (Kipling [1888] 1987). The narrative follows Kipling's two vagabond protagonists, Peachey Carnehan and Daniel Dravot, who make the dangerous journey to Kafirstan, a place yet to be penetrated by European exploration. There they forge a short-lived kingdom for themselves, an adventure which comes to a predictably sticky end.

Kipling's writing reflects a growing awareness in the British consciousness[85] of Kafiristan, which by this point had dwindled to the Kalash Valleys and the region of Afghanistan which is today called Nuristan (see Map 5). Existing Muslim speculations concerning the Kafirs appear to have been adopted and elaborated on by the British. Kipling, for example takes the idea of the Kafir's Europeanness and magnifies it, reimagining them as "fairer" than his English protagonists with "yellow hair" and "remarkable well built" (261), suggesting, perhaps, that in Kafiristan Carnehan and Dravot had stumbled across a community of original and -according to the racist typologies of the day- 'uncorrupted' ancestors. Alexander the Great also comes in and out of Kipling's narrative (265; 266; 267), again a reflection of musings by contemporary British commentators. In this case the stories of descent from Alexander and his army which are found across Central Asia, had become closely associated with Kafiristan,[86] presumably because of the supposed Europeanness of the population.

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[80] Cf Alberto Cacopardo 2016, 73.
[81] See for example 'Kafiristan' 1884.
[82] See Alberto Cacopardo 2016, especially pages 78-79.
[83] See Alberto Cacopardo's excellent discussion of Muslim 'urbanocentric' cultures' attempts to classify the population of Peristan (Cacopardo 2016, 73–74).
[84] Cf. *Aryans and British India* (1997), Thomas R. Trautmann's discussion of British orientalism and the colonial-era study of Indian languages. In summary, Trautmann charts how the discovery of shared Indo-European linguistic roots at the end of the eighteenth century led to many British Indologists and administrators imaging a sense of kinship with Indians. By the latter half of the nineteenth century, however, linguistic data had been manipulated to suggest that Sanskrit was a 'corrupted' form of European language, an argument which was used to legitimise British governance.
[85] Indeed, Kipling has Carnehan and Dravot consult some of the existing sources on Kafiristan before starting out on their adventure, going so far as to name each source by author. (See Yule 1882, Bellew 1879, Wood 1841 and Raverty 1859, cited in Marx 1999, 48–49).
[86] See Raverty 1859, 366–68; Yule 1882 and Bellew 1879, 14.

Table 1 presents excerpts from articles written about the Kalasha and published since 2005 in respected and widely circulated British newspapers and magazines. The excerpts are striking in the consistency of the themes which they employ, and in the similarity of these themes to those picked up by Kipling and incorporated in *The Man Who Would Be King*. Out of six articles, four mention the Kalasha's 'European looks' and four mention the story of descent from Alexander the Great's army.[87] Although some Kalasha people are indeed very fair and have blue eyes or blonde hair, this does not mark them out from other communities in north-eastern Pakistan or north-western Afghanistan. Equally, as previously mentioned, descent from Alexander the Great's army has long been dismissed by creditable scholarship. The tenacity of the themes, despite their well-established fallacy, can be partially explained by how readily they have been consumed by Western audiences. Lost soldiers from Alexander's army, blonde-haired, blue-eyed people in a region where the population is imagined to be of dark complexion, these ideas both hum with the excitement of 'discovery' and are intensely relevant to white people for whom the Classical world continues to represent something of a foundational narrative. The lack of a popular challenge to this discourse has allowed fallacies to thrive, resulting in an echo chamber around which the same fantastical stories reverberate again and again. The information revolution has only exacerbated this propagation of untruths. Whilst previously circulation was limited to books, newspapers, magazines and the odd televised documentary, today the themes are cast across countless YouTube videos, blog posts, forum threads and Facebook pages, as eagerly devoured in the second decade of the twenty-first century as they were in Kipling's time (see Appendix IV).

The Kalasha as Endangered Relics

Before the conversion of Kafiristan the Kalasha had attracted relatively little interest from Western commentators. Firmly under the control of the local Muslim ruler, the Mehtar of Chitral, the Kalasha did not conform as closely as their independent Kafir neighbours to colonial valorisations of the 'noble savage'. George Scott Robertson, the author of the only comprehensive account of Kafiristan, for example, was unimpressed when he passed through the Kalash Valleys, dismissing the Kalasha as "[a] most servile and degraded race" [88] (1896, 4). Following the conversion of Kafiristan however, there occurred a distinct shift in how the Kalasha were perceived by Western commentators. As the twentieth century dawned, of all the Kafirs of the Hindu Kush only the Kalasha remained. Once overshadowed by their neighbours, the Kalasha now represented the sole surviving link to a lost world.

[87] The frequency with which popular commentaries on the Kalasha mention descent from Alexander the Great's army has also been remarked on by Augusto Cacopardo: "there is no article in geographic or photographic magazines and no documentary film – of the many that have recently been produced – that fails to report that the Kalasha claim descent from a group of soldiers of Alexander" (Augusto Cacopardo 2011, 57).

[88] A quote which has attained a small degree of infamy since it has been repeatedly reproduced in anthropological literature concerning the Kalasha. See for example, Maggi 2001, 20; Parkes 2001, 5 and Darling 1979, 4. See also Biddulph 1880, 130 for a similar attitude towards the Kalasha.

Table 1: Excerpts from British Newspaper Articles Published Since 2005

> "Reputed to have descended from the armies of Alexander, the Kalasha have lived for thousands of years in a nest of idyllic valleys near the Afghan border."
>
> "About 4,000 of them survive in three majestic valleys that awe visitors as a sort of paradise lost."
>
> "Turquoise streams rush through leafy glades of giant walnut trees and swaying crops. Clusters of simple houses cling to steep forested slopes. Compared with many compatriots beyond their valleys, the Kalasha are charmingly liberal: drinking wine, holding dancing festivals and worshipping a variety of gods."

'Lost Tribe Struggles for Survival', in *The Guardian* (Walsh 2005).

> "The Kalash tribe is said to descend from Alexander the Great's army, but now it is fighting to preserve its traditions in a Taliban stronghold"

'Culture Kalash' (Editor's introduction), in *The Observer Magazine* (Rickett 2011).

> "Many of the Kalash claim descent from the armies of Alexander the Great, and indeed their faces do look strikingly similar to those you would encounter in Croatia or Montenegro […] To observe their lives is to be transported far from today's North-West Frontier, with its increasingly militant, misogynistic brand of Islam, to a world that Homer's contemporaries might have recognized."

'Titan of the Kalash', in *The Daily Telegraph* (Foreman 2007).

> "For centuries, the blond-haired, blue-eyed people of the Kalash tribes of North West Pakistan have lived a libertine lifestyle."

'Taliban targets descendants of Alexander the Great', in *The Daily Telegraph* (Nelson and Khan 2009).

> "[T]he pagan Kalash, an ancient people who have whiter skins than the Muslims who live around Chitral."

'Search for the Yeti art your peril', in *The Spectator* (Wheeler 2017).

> "The pale-skinned, blue-eyed Kalash people"

'Dancing in the hills: a journey to meet Pakistan's Kalash people', in *Financial Times* (Dalrymple 2018).

The change in how the Kalasha were imagined post the conversion of Kafiristan becomes apparent in a travelogue written by Reginald Schomberg, a British soldier who visited the Kalash Valleys about forty years after Robertson (Schomberg 1938). Whilst Robertson and Schomberg both exhibit paternalistic and often explicitly racist attitudes

towards the inhabitants of the region, Schomberg characterises the Kalasha very differently to his predecessor, writing that they represent "the great interest [of the immediate region] for the outside world". He also goes on to launch an appeal for the conservation of Kalasha culture: "I hope that my narrative will interest readers, especially those who can help these Kafirs to preserve the customs and creed of their ancestors" (1938, 12).

Schomberg's concern over preservation was echoed by M.A. Shakur, a curator at Peshawar Museum who published a paper in 1946 after visiting the Valleys. Shakur was worried about the rate of change which he observed, writing that: "Presently [the Kalasha] are coming into contact with civilised influences and hence they cannot preserve the customs and creeds of their ancestors[89] […] there is a great revolution in the ideas of the younger generation of these Kafirs, and the future historians would find nothing of the old and picturesque in them if they change as fast as they are doing now" (Shakur 1946, iv). Shakur's singling out of "future historians" as beneficiaries of an 'old and picturesque' Kalasha culture presages a growing interest among scholars in what the Kalasha might reveal about the distant past.[90]

Ten years after the publication of Shakur's paper, Karl Jettmar, an influential scholar of Dardic religions, described pre-conversion Kafiristan as a ''lost paradise" for anthropologists and the Kalasha (among others) as a living ''ethnographic museum'' (Jettmar 1959, 85 and 93). Similar interests were expressed by Halfdan Siiger, a Danish ethnographer of religion, who travelled to the Kalash Valleys in 1948 on the hunt for clues which might shed light on the "original Indo-European" culture, and by Robert Heine-Geldern, a well-known Austrian ethnologist and ancient historian (Høj Johnsen 2016, 9 and Heine-Geldern 1957, 281–82 cited in Jettmar 1959, 85). Although more recent anthropological interest in the Kalasha tends to be present-focused,[91] the idea of the Kalasha as an endangered conduit to an indistinct European 'era of origins' continues to inflect scholarship,[92] most conspicuously the genetic studies cited in the introduction to this chapter.

The tendency to focus on the perceived 'archaic' nature of Kalasha culture which persists in some academic research is reflected in the far more substantial body of popular commentary. As with the trope of the Kalasha's Europeanness, the idea of the Kalasha's 'primitiveness' has persisted from its first expression in the nineteenth century right up to the present day. The nature of this fantasy has, however, evolved somewhat. Colonial-era writing wavers between interest in the Kafirs as imagined ancient, primal kin and the dismissive gaze of the Imperialist weighing up potential subjects; two conflicting attitudes encapsulated by Carnehan as reads out the Encyclopaedia

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[89] Presumably Shakur had Schomberg's travelogue open in front of him as he wrote this since his wording is almost identical.
[90] See Cacopardo (2016) for a discussion of the work of Indologists and Iranologists on the cultures of Peristan from the mid-twentieth century up to the present day.
[91] See also critiques by Parkes, Frembegn, Rovillé and Maggi of "archaizing themes" (Parkes 2001) in both academic and popular writing concerning the Kalasha (Parkes 2001; Frembgen 2008; Rovillé 1988; Maggi 2001, 104–5).
[92] See for example Trail 1996, Augusto Cacopardo 2011 and Parkes 1990, 639. Particularly acute is Elizabeth Mela-Athanasopoulou's discussion of Ancient Greek routes for Kal'as'amondr in *Selected Papers of the International Conference on Language Documentation and Tradition, with a special interest in the Kalasha of the Hindu Kush valleys, Himalayas. 7-9 November 2008* (Carol, Mela-Athanasopoulou, and Theodosiadou 2011) and the subsequent online debate over Mela-Athanasopoulou's interpretation at http://blogs.usyd.edu.au/elac/2008/11/duelling_languages_peter_k_aus.html (Austin 2008).

Britannica's entry for 'Kafiristan'[93]: "they're a stinking lot of heathens, but this book here says they think they're related to us English" (Kipling 1888, 253-254).

European visitors to the Valleys from the middle of the twentieth century onwards have tended to identify much more readily with the Kalasha / Kafirs than their colonial-era counterparts. Perhaps the earliest and certainly among the most exuberant example of this new kind of account is that written by the Italian anthropologist and adventurer Fosco Maraini, who visited the Kalasha briefly in 1959. Parkes blames Maraini for setting an unfortunately "grandiloquent" precedent for future accounts (Parkes 2000, 268). One can get an idea of what might have irked Parkes about Maraini's style in the following passage, which describes his party's arrival in Mumuret Valley: "Wind and sunshine lapped us and our surroundings in a mood of mid-day happiness. We wanted to sing, or dance—to weep even, in some way to echo the feeling of pagan abandon that was in the air" (1964, 249).

Although it is unlikely that the "feeling of pagan abandon" washing around Mumuret on a sunny afternoon was enough to actually move Maraini and his compatriots to tears, the strength of feeling expressed here is significant. The title of Maraini's account, "On the Trail of Dionysus", suggests that the "pagan abandon" to which he refers draws from a Hellenic-Roman, pre-Christian sense of the of pagan, rather than a Central Asian, pre-Muslim understanding of the same. Furthermore, later Maraini somewhat elusively states that "any oddity in the [Kalasha] or their customs hinted at antiquity rather than mere exoticism" (1964, 257). The force of the encounter for Maraini therefore appears to partly come from the sensation that among the Kalasha he is brushing shoulders with his society's forebearers.

Forty years later, visiting at the height of the backpacker presence in the Kalash Valleys, Jonny Bealby gives an especially candid account of the affinity he felt with the Kalasha: "[…] surrounded by my new-found Kalash friends, I realised that at that moment I wasn't changed at all. I was myself, completely myself – as though I were sitting […] with my oldest friends in a London pub" (1998, 205). As with Maraini, Bealby's encounter is heavily inflected with the sensation that in the Kalasha he has met a survival from his own distant past. He writes, "[s]urrounded by the rugged mountains of the Hindu Kush, I was sitting on a stool, drinking wine, surrounded by pagans – whose faces were indeed as pale as any Englishman's – who claimed their ancestry from Alexander the Great. I glanced up at the stars and smiled" (1998, 220). Similar archaising and idyllic visions to those produced by Maraini and Bealby are also evident in some of the British newspaper articles quoted in Table 1. Declan Walsh for example writes of "a sort of paradise lost" and informs us that "the Kalasha have lived for thousands of years in a nest of idyllic valleys" (Walsh 2005).

The Kalasha's world as depicted by Maraini, Bealby and Walsh presents us with a vision of magnificent and fecund mountain valleys, home to a simple, happy and 'untouched' people. These attributes have their legacy in the anti-rational counternarratives which followed modernity's first stirrings in the seventeenth century, for example in Romanticism's fascination with sublime landscapes, or in the ideal of the uncorrupted Noble Savage. Building on colonial cultural typologies, one perspective in the complex debate around globalisation has argued that the spread

[93] Henry Yule's contribution in the 1882 edition (Yule 1882).

of industrialisation and capitalism beyond the West has obliterated previous social systems which are imagined to be ancient or even 'timeless' and therefore closer to a vaguely imagined primal or 'authentic' human state. A comparable viewpoint has been projected onto the past through 'alternative archaeologies' ,[94] fantasies that often actively ignore scientific arguments in their desire to construct idyllic histories in which ancestors were blissfully 'at one' with nature.[95] It is in the context of this ongoing disenchantment with the modern world and the concomitant valorisation of 'simpler' and more 'natural' times that Western descriptions of the Kalash Valleys should be understood. The utopic existence which many imagine the Kalasha to enjoy therefore, is less an objective reflection of their quality of life, so much as a manifestation of contemporary society's preoccupation with what it believes to have lost.

Nostalgia for a premodern era is not the only existential concern which we can detect in Western-authored accounts of the Kalasha: the idea of a tiny community of ancient Europeans besieged by Islam has intersected neatly with fears over the 'Islamisation' of Europe in the output of several journalists. To return to Table 1, Jonathan Foreman writing for *The Daily Telegraph* comments:

> "Many of the Kalash claim descent from the armies of Alexander the Great, and indeed their faces do look strikingly similar to those you would encounter in Croatia or Montenegro […] To observe their lives is to be transported far from today's North-West Frontier, with its increasingly militant, misogynistic brand of Islam, to a world that Homer's contemporaries might have recognized" (Foreman 2007).

In comparing the Kalasha both physically and culturally to Homer's Greeks, Foreman sets them up as archetypal Europeans who can then be held in contrast to what he frames as the 'militant' and 'misogynistic' Islam of the Frontier (although if Foreman were to read Homer he would find militancy and misogyny in abundance). This particular representation of the Kalasha and their situation reflects a racist, Eurocentric and Islamophobic discourse which claims that both a commitment to gender equality and whiteness are fundamental characteristics of Europeanness and that these characteristics are under threat from Muslim migrants. Given that *The Daily Telegraph* sits firmly on the right of the British political spectrum it is likely that the metaphor which Foreman draws using the Kalasha would have resonated with a significant proportion of his readership. Indeed, a similar interpretation of the Kalasha is evident in *Taliban targets descendants of Alexander the Great,* Dean Nelson and Emal Khan's article, which was also written for *The Daily Telegraph*. Here we learn that, "For centuries, the blond-haired, blue-eyed people of the Kalash tribes of North West Pakistan have lived a libertine lifestyle", under which is an image of a Kalasha girl, one of the tiny proportion of the total population who fits the physical characteristics prescribed by the authors (Nelson and Khan 2009). Again whiteness, in this case the hyper-white attributes of blonde hair and blue eyes, and 'liberal' society are represented as vulnerable in the face of an aggressive manifestation of Islam.

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[94] See Nick Merriman's discussion of alternative archaeologies, disillusionment with science and the creation of contemporary meaning through the fabrication of imaginary prehistories (Merriman 1991, 115–18).

[95] Cf. Tom Williamson's and Liz Bellamy's discussion of belief in ley lines and nostalgia for an imagined 'Golden Age' when rural Britain was untouched by modernity (Williamson and Bellamy 1983, 177–81).

Taliban targets descendants of Alexander the Great

For centuries, the blond-haired, blue-eyed people of the Kalash tribes of North West Pakistan have lived a libertine lifestyle.

News
World News » Asia »
Pakistan »

Children of the Kalash tribe in Northern Pakistan Photo: EPA

By Dean Nelson in New Delhi and Emal Khan in Peshawar
6:48PM BST 21 Sep 2009

The group, believed to be descendants of Alexander the Great's invading army, were shielded from conservative Islam by the steep slopes of their remote valleys.

Figure 3.4. The opening section of Dean Nelson's and Emal Khan's article for *The Telegraph*.

Islamophobic (and explicitly racist) manipulations of the Kalasha are beginning to appear in contexts other than journalism. In 2018 Nicolas Bay, a French MEP for the far-right National Rally (formerly National Front) started lobbying the European Parliament to pressurise Pakistan to better protect the Kalasha[96] and predictably the Kalasha have also attracted the attention of at least one Neo-Nazi online forum.[97] Since Islamophobia is demonstrably on the rise in Europe,[98] sadly it seems likely that the future will hold many more instances of the political use of the Kalasha by those who define Western identity as exclusively white and non-Muslim.

[96] See Bay 2018; 2019.
[97] See Atkins 2015.
[98] See, for example, the European Islamophobia Report 2018, funded by the European Union (Bayrakli and Hafez 2019).

Forging a Supra-narrative of the Kalasha

Despite the diversity of sources which have contributed to the ways in which the Kalasha have been imagined there is a commonality to their perspectives. The fetishization of antiquity and the focus on the Kalasha's supposed Europeanness points to origins in a shared Western cultural milieu. The common ground held by the perspectives warrants the use of the umbrella term 'narrative' under which they might all be collected, whilst the multiplicity of these voices as well as their distance from their actual subject suggests the term 'supra'. What we have discussed then can be collectively described as a supra-narrative, an amorphous collection of interrelated voices that both passes over and smothers the actual lives and actual history of the Kalasha.

The supra-narrative of the Kalasha is closely linked to colonial discourses and a wider European-authored imaginary of South Asia. The archaicising narratives produced by both scholars and popular commentators reflect the lens through which the non-European world was perceived by those influenced by the development of cultural evolutionism and related theories (Christian 2019, 175). Evolutionary typologies ordered the world by degrees of civilizational development, with Western Europe at the apex. Ethnography played an important role in this system, deployed as a means to study colonial subjects, whilst history was reserved for the study of the nations of Europe (Dirks 2001). The discrepancy between these two analytical tools contributed the wider understanding that Western culture was 'evolved' and 'dynamic', whilst the culture of colonial subjects was 'unevolved' and 'static'. The inaccessible and unexplored nature of Kafiristan and to a lesser extent the Kalash Valleys placed them in category of extreme stasis in the colonial imagination. Tibet offers an eloquent parallel here, a place also on the fringes of imperial knowledge which was also framed as a 'land which time forgot'. It is telling that Jettmar's description of former Kafiristan and the Kalash Valleys as a living "ethnographic museum" is echoed almost verbatim in colonial-era commentaries on Tibet (Harris 2012, 1).

Cultural and racial evolutionary typologies closely corresponded, combining to offer colonisers an ontological framework through which they could distance themselves from their subjects (Dirks 2001). At times, however, the scholarly framing of colonised societies as atemporal produced outputs which disrupted colonial othering discourses. In the second half of the nineteenth century, for example, folklorists drew links between ancient British and contemporary Indian cultural practices (Leonard 2016). Earlier in the nineteenth century linguists who had revealed the shared origins of Sanskrit and European languages produced similar narratives of cultural commonality between colonised and coloniser (Trautmann 1997). Although in both cases discourses of hierarchy were maintained through the arguments that either Indian cultural practices were 'regressive' or that Indian languages had become 'corrupted', the work of linguists and folklorists nevertheless demonstrated the shared patrimony of South Asians and Europeans. The perception that first the Kafirs and more recently the Kalasha represent an atavistic population of ancient Europeans draws on these narratives of shared patrimony. The case of the Kafirs in unusual however in how readily colonial-era commentators made direct links between themselves and people who might end up being their imperial subjects. The reason for this unusual degree of familiarity was the understanding that the Kafirs were white, a perception which eliminated racially construed arguments for the inalienable difference between coloniser and colonised.

The roles which the discourse of whiteness and scholarship which identified shared patrimony played in creating the supra-narrative were complimented by two narratives that predated the colonial presence in South Asia. One is the story of descent from Alexander. This idea marries particularly well with the hierarchies of evolutionism as the supposed sophistication of classical antiquity was presented as evidence of the 'superiority' of European cultural origins (Acheraiou 2008). The other is the rumour that in Kafiristan there might survive a population of lost Christians (Alberto Cacopardo 2016, 73), a story which resonates strongly with medieval European accounts of a lost Christian kingdom existing somewhere in Asia or Africa ruled over by a monarch called Prester John. Again, there is a parallel with Tibet here as one of the speculative locations for Prester John's kingdom was the Himalayas (Brewer 2015). In this case we can argue that the limited and inaccurate knowledge which Europeans held about both Tibet and Kafiristan made them convenient places for the imagination to locate fantastical communities of co-religionists.

The legend of Prester John represents the first in a proliferating series of fantastical roles projected onto Tibet by the West. More recently these fantasies have blended disparate themes including the belief in a subterranean theocracy located beneath the Himalayas, an occult-inflected Nazi pact with the Dalai Lama and a Tibetan conspiracy to conquer the world (Engelhardt 2008). For Kafiristan and later the Kalasha, European-authored fantasies have also proliferated. Rather than diverging however, the themes have remained largely consistent. Narratives relating to classical antiquity and whiteness still hold great potency for certain essentialising European identity discourses. Equally an archaicising perspective remains relevant for those who hope in the Kalasha to have found an antidote to their disaffection with the 'modern world'.

Part II: Heritage and Conflict in the Kalash Valleys

On the 28th of May 1935, the German Hindu Kush Expedition set off from the garden of their national Legation in Kabul and began the journey to Nuristan (Ruttig 2015). Expedition anthropologist Albert Herrlich's objectives were to collect botanical samples and anthropological data pertaining to the local population. In the same year Heinrich Himmler had founded *Ahnenerbe* or 'Ancestral Heritage', an archaeological and anthropological organisation charged with proving the global supremacy of the 'Nordic Race'. The motivation behind the creation of *Ahnenerbe* was to provide 'scientific' evidence for Adolf Hitler's theory that contemporary Germans were the direct descendants of an Aryan people who were responsible for most of the major developments in human history including agriculture and writing. *Ahnenerbe* theorists were especially keen to demonstrate the past extent of Aryan 'homelands' and to attribute ancient empires like that of Rome to Nordic peoples since such arguments were seen to provide justification for the Nazis' expansionist ambitions.[99]

[99] See Pringle 2006.

Although the German Hindu Kush Expedition predates the establishment of *Ahnenerbe*, the ideological backgrounds of both overlap. Herrlich's report pays particular attention to "early Aryan stock" and classifies Nuristanis into a three-tiered racial hierarchy, surmounted by -surprise, surprise- "[the] Kafir type […] tall with blonde hair and blue eyes" ('The German Hindu Kush Expedition, 1935' 1936, 468; Ruttig 2015). Even the botanical investigation was strongly coloured by a racist agenda, the overall objective being to find an 'uncorrupted' *urweizen* or original wild wheat, the cereal equivalent of stranded ancient Aryans. The identification of Aryan ancestors in Afghanistan also carried clear political implications. If Germany was to attack British India, a complicit Afghanistan would be of great strategic assistance. Twenty years previously the 1915-16 Niedermayer-Hentig Expedition had tried and failed to secure Emir Habibullah Khan's support for Imperial German plans to foster revolution in India. In 1935, Kurt Ziemke, a member of the Nazi Party and the German Ambassador to Kabul was again trying to make an ally of a new Emir. This time Germany's diplomatic agenda appears to have been more ideologically infused: in his memoirs Ziemke describes Afghans as "the Prussians of Central Asia" and of "Aryan origin",[100] the implication being that Afghanistan had potential as both a strategic and a racial ally *(*Ziemke 1939 *cited in* Ruttig 2015*).*

Herrlich and his team certainly seem to have aroused the suspicion of the British, especially since the Expedition's itinerary included crossing the Afghan border and taking in Chitral and the Kalash Valleys. A summary of the Expedition published the following year in the *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society* describes how the Germans were met at the border by an escort, "thanks to the excellent organization of the British military authorities" ('The German Hindu Kush Expedition, 1935' 1936, 468). The Expedition was allowed to proceed, but it is probable that from then on they were travelling under surveillance. Indeed, while the Germans were passing through the Kalash Valleys and Chitral, Schomberg was making a tour of the same areas, taking notes which would be published three years later in his travelogue. Since Schomberg had a history of working for British intelligence,[101] his overlap with the Expedition is unlikely to have been a coincidence.

The German Hindu Kush Expedition's incursion into British India and its alignment to the Nazi's bid to write Germany a radical new ethnohistory implicate Western imaginings of Kafiristan and the Kalasha in the wider context of the build up to the Second World War. This entanglement of what was hitherto a set of fantasies conceived on an unstructured individual-scale, with greater geopolitical concerns presages the next phase in our story. The events of the Expedition also reveal the influence which the border had begun to exert on the relationship between the Kalasha and the rest of the world. Herrlich and his team may well have been emboldened to pass through Chitral and the Kalash Valleys because British power was fairly dilute along this far-flung part of its Afghan frontier. With the creation of Pakistan, little changed regarding the reach of the state in the region, indeed Chitral was only officially incorporated into Pakistan in 1969. Although the presence of the Pakistani state in the Kalash Valleys steadily increased over the last years of the twentieth-century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Valleys have continued to be permeable to extra-national interests.

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[100] An idea which was already supported by the Afghan state and its cultural institutions (Green 2018).
[101] See Llewellyn-Jones 2018.

NGO Preservation Projects

The discourse which frames the Kalasha as a vulnerable link to an archaic past has inspired a plethora of non-governmental 'heritage preservation' projects over the past thirty years. Whilst the Directorate of Archaeology and Museums already plays a significant role in the Valleys and as we have seen has ambitions to expand its presence further, it has not enjoyed the hegemonic authority which one might expect of a state-sponsored institution. Rather, the Directorate has been just one of many organisations with the self-appointed prerogative of 'preserving' the Kalasha. Indeed, until Lerounis' kidnap, The Greek Volunteers, a charity following an agenda set by a different nation, played by the most significant conservation role in the Valleys.

Of any NGO, the Greek Volunteers has left the most substantial and distinctive impact on the built environment of the Kalash Valleys. However, other less ambitious organisations have also been keen to advertise the role which they have had -or rather, which they profess they have had- in the maintenance of Kalasha culture. Funding allocated for cultural conservation has seen Kalasha temples rebuilt and open-air shrines walled and gated.[102] The entrances to most villages are crowded with white-painted metal boards bearing the logos of a host of organisations above text boasting of projects successfully completed, (given what we discussed in the first part of this chapter, it is unsurprising to note that European embassies and charities are well represented). Most intrusive of all are the examples presented in Figure 3.5 of Kalasha ritual structures inscribed with the names of their NGO sponsors. Such branding represents a permanent, material claim on Kalasha religiosity.

The marks left on the landscape of the Kalash Valleys by organisations keen to be seen to be preserving Kalasha culture have their parallel in interventions made by those who wish to bring an end to the Kalasha way of life. Several Pakistanis who know the Kalash Valleys well and who are invested in the welfare of the Kalasha have expressed their concerns to me over the construction of new mosques in Mumuret Valley. Although I acknowledge that this is something which is hard to assess, I have been repeatedly informed that the number of mosques in the valley has been surplus to requirement for some time (see Map 6).[103] It is also argued that mosques are being built in dominant positions and that the increasingly large scale of the buildings reflects external funders' ambitions to stamp an Islamic identity onto the last vestige of 'Kafiristan'. In the buildings and structures of the Kalash Valleys then, we can detect the intersection of two conflicting agendas. One aligns to the concept of the Kalasha's exceptional cultural value, whilst the other seeks to create a uniformly Muslim Pakistan.

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[102] Writing of the 1990s Parkes bemoans how development funding has been directed towards "the needless rebuilding of altars with dressed stone and cement, the construction of new concrete 'clan temples' or tin-roofed 'dancing pavilions'" (Parkes 2001, 3). Through the first two decades of the twenty first century little has changed. See also Maggi 2001, 125.

[103] See also Muhammad Kashif Ali's discussion of the building of madrassas in the three valleys (2018, 104).

Figure 3.5. Left: plaque on the central pillar of Batrik dancing place, a principal focus of the Zhoshi and Caumos celebrations. The plaque credits the Royal Norwegian Embassy, the Chitral Integrated Area Development Programme and the Ayun and Valleys Development Programme. Right: plaque beside the entrance to Anish jestakhan (clan temple). The plaque credits the Kingdom of Netherlands Embassy, the Royal Norwegian Embassy, the Chitral Integrated Area Development Programme and the Ayun and Valleys Development Programme. The initials of the Chitral Integrated Area Development Programme and the Ayun and Valleys Development Programme are carved into the door. (Photographs the author).

The Kalasha and the Pakistani State

In a process initiated by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's administration (1971-77) and implemented to a much more comprehensive degree under his successor Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq (1978-88), Sunni Islam was propagated as a means of forging a homogenous national identity. This initiative was at odds with the more cosmopolitan-minded founding ideology of Pakistan and the 'Islamisation'[104] of the state remains a major concern for a considerable and influential proportion of the country's population.[105]

The significance of the Kalasha for those who oppose the 'Islamisation' of their country becomes apparent when we consider the number of well-publicised trips which Pakistani presidents have made to the Kalash Valleys. Indeed, that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto -the then leader of the seventh most populous country on the planet- took the time to visit a few thousand Kalasha on two separate occasions is symptomatic of a premiership which was something of a balancing act between the secular traditions of his political party and increasing pressure from the Islamic lobby. In the early 2000s the secular orientated President Pervez Musharraf also made two visits. More recently, in the 2018 general election the two principal candidates, Bilawal Bhutto Zadari and Imran Khan circulated videos of themselves

[104] 'Islamise' is an imperfect, but widely used term in the context of Pakistan. Many of those who oppose the 'Islamisation' of the Pakistani state argue that to do so transgresses Muslim's religious duty to ensure the wellbeing of religious minorities.
[105] For critiques of efforts to 'Islamise' Pakistan written during the Zia-ul-Haq regime, see M. A. Khan 1985 and Ahmed 1996.

meeting voters in the Kalash Valleys thereby broadcasting their commitment to the protection of religious minorities.

The role which the Kalasha play for Pakistani presidential candidates in demonstrating their secular credentials mirrors a similar utility which they hold for the nation of Pakistan as a whole. The appeal of the Kalasha to the West has long been understood by the state, an appreciation clearly illustrated in a memo to a central government ministry written in the early 1980s by Shakil Durani, the official then in charge of Chitral District: "[w]e must recognise that the Kalash people are a foreign exchange resource of the country. Nothing in Pakistan, not even the Khyber, holds the fascination for the western [sic] or the Japanese tourist as the Kalash Kafirs" (Durani 1982, 1).[106] The Kalasha certainly help to bring foreign income to a particularly poor part of the country, but their significance transcends localised economic concerns. By maintaining its unique and celebrated minority, Pakistan works to legitimise its identity as an Islamic Republic in the eyes of both non-Muslim foreign tourists and their governments. Given how reliant the country has been on military aid from the USA, development and investment from Japan and business links with the UK, the Kalasha's diplomatic utility as an accessible face of Pakistan becomes very much apparent.

Fears over the Kalasha's vulnerability to conversion periodically prompt affirmative action from some sectors of government. Currently, for example, evangelist Muslim organisations are banned from operating in the three valleys. Equally, however, other sectors of government are opposed to such measures which they define as 'anti-Islamic'. The tension between secular and Sunni-orientated ideology in Pakistani politics is especially apparent in the history of state-funded education in the Kalash Valleys. Schools have, since they first arrived, constituted an arena for casting the seeds of doubt in the minds Kalasha children. Many Muslim teachers, especially those who originate from outside the Valleys openly preach to their Kalasha pupils, whilst also denouncing Kalasha cultural practices as shameful. In response to this problem, in the early 1990s the Ministry of Minorities commissioned a series of Government Kalasha Primary Schools. The schools were to be Kal'as'amondr medium and all the staff made up from unconverted Kalasha. It was also hoped to replace the compulsorily subject of *Islamiyat*, which we can gloss here as 'Islamic Studies',[107] with a course on ethics. Although there is official provision for teaching ethics instead of Islamiyat and indeed, other non-Muslim schools in Pakistan do teach ethics instead of Islamiyat, it was not possible to make the change in the new schools. Furthermore, all Government Kalasha Primary Schools are now Kalasha in name only, staffed by mixed Kalasha and Muslim teachers and providing education for all of the three valleys' different ethnicities. Whilst at first the advantage was held by the Ministry of Minorities, a bastion of secular Pakistan, later District and Provincial governments, which were heavily influenced by a Sunni agenda, successfully dismantled the Ministry's initiatives.

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[106] Reproduced in Alauddin 1992, 283-90 and Parkes 2000, 273.
[107] Islamiyat was a made a compulsory part of the school syllabus under President Zia-ul-Haq's regime (Ahmed 1996).

The Kalasha and the 'War on Terror'

Although District, Provincial and indeed Federal government contains elements which would be happy to see the Kalasha converted, these parties are limited in their means to act by dint of their ties to the state. In theory -if not, perfectly in practice- those who constitute the Government of Pakistan are bound by policies and laws, some of which they will certainly not agree with. The power which politicians wield is therefore coloured by the compromises which are inherent in non-totalitarian government, indeed by engaging in mainstream politics politicians implicitly acknowledge the necessity of compromise. A small, but significant segment of the Islamic-leaning part of the political spectrum, however, operates outside of the mechanisms of government and eschews any compromise with the secular lobby. Since the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, the principal actors in this extra-state movement have been the Pakistani Taliban or *Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan* (TTP).

The late 2010s saw the zenith of Taliban power in the regions surrounding Chitral. The Afghan Taliban and their allies had forced NATO and the Afghan army out of Nuristan. Swat, a region of Pakistan to the southeast of Chitral was under TTP control and Dir, immediately to the south of Chitral suffered an incessant onslaught of insurgent-led attacks, assassinations and bombings. Although the hinterland of the Chitral District remained free of violence, the presence of the Taliban to the south and immediately across the highly permeable border with Nuristan became a cause of great anxiety in the Kalash Valleys. This anxiety was revived in 2014 when the TTP issued a 50-minute-long video demanding that both the Kalasha and Chitral's Ismaili Muslim minority convert to (Sunni) Islam or else face extermination. The video accuses the Kalasha of manufacturing alcohol -which is true- and being under the protection of anti-Islamic Western agents (France-Presse 2014). The latter allegation refers, no doubt, to the activities of Kalasha-centric foreign NGOs, which by the time of the video's creation had constituted a conspicuous presence in the Valleys for twenty years.

The use of 'anti-Islamic' when describing the NGOs may well reflect the understanding that in supporting the Kalasha, foreign-funded projects have turned potential converts away from Islam. Equally, however, the condemnation of the NGOs could be inspired by an appreciation of how the Kalasha have become entangled with and representative of secular and Western-orientated identity and values. The video combined with the kidnap of Lerounis and the subsequent Taliban threats of further attacks on the Kalasha Dur argue a sustained interest in targeting Western NGO activities in the Kalash Valleys. This focus is very much in line with the Taliban's attitude to what it characterises as the aggressive influence of Western culture, an attitude which has become increasingly militant following the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.[108] Key acts in what the Taliban frames as its resistance to Western cultural hegemony have been attacks on secular centres of learning, museums and ancient monuments; most infamously the destruction of the carved Buddhas and related sites at Bamiyan.[109] From the Taliban's

[108] In a statement released after the 2014 attack on the French Cultural Centre in Kabul the Taliban outlined their position: "We are fully aware of the aggressive nature of western thought and culture […] We know that those working for the West are disguising their attempts to promote western culture. From now on, those working in this arena will be understood as military invaders and will be eliminated in similar attacks" (Mujahid 2014). (Many thanks to Constance Wyndham for supplying this quote).

[109] See Harrison 2012, 182–91 and Wyndham 2015.

perspective, it therefore seems likely that the NGOs and especially the Kalasha Dur represented yet another manifestation of Western cultural imperialism and therefore a legitimate target for destruction.

The Next Phase

For now, and perhaps for a long time to come, the international border at the head of the Kalash Valleys is sealed. An army base sits above the village closest to Afghanistan and across the Province more generally there is a sense that the -albeit imperfect- peace which the Pakistani state has won is here to stay. Imran Khan, the current prime minister, has begun to reinvest in promoting Pakistan as a tourist destination[110] and the Kalasha are being utilised as a lure to attract Western visitors.[111] Concomitant to this 'opening up' of Pakistan has been the inscribing of a Kalasha practice on the UNESCO List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding (UNESCO 2018). S*uri jagek* (sun watching) is a practice which performs many different roles, but to summarise -and simplify- one might say that it is the art of knowing when to sow seeds, or to harvest, or to start a festival or to carry out a great deal of other activities, by observing, from particular positions, at which point the sun rises over the mountainous skyline of the Hindu Kush. Significantly, suri jagek was the first Pakistani-proposed intangible cultural heritage practice to be inscribed by UNESCO, (Vandal 2016) and there is optimism that more Kalasha customs will follow it onto the list.

Whilst the inscribing of suri jagek marks the Pakistani state's greater involvement with and control over the preservation of Kalasha culture, paradoxically it may also represent the start of a new chapter in the story of the Kalasha's implication in extra-state interests. Lynn Meskell among others[112] has looked critically at the fallout of UNESCO inscription. In her discussion of the Preah Vihea Temple on the Cambodian-Thai border we see how a site which was previously principally of regional significance was thrust up into the stratosphere of international relations when in 2008 it was added to the UNESCO list (Meskell 2016). Whilst the Kalasha have been internationally significant for generations, the UNESCO listing brings with it integration into a new set of global interests and tensions. 'World-making'[113] projects like UNESCO generate their own political economy characterised by the challenges and opportunities inherent in inter-governmental collaboration. Drop a heritage site or intangible practice into this vast, amorphous economy and it becomes, to borrow Meskell's terminology, 'hyperconnected' (2016, 72). The fallout of this process is that heritage is implicated in things which it would otherwise bear little relevance to, in the case of Preah Vihea for example, we see the site entangled in military alignments and

[110] In 2019 Khan's government invited Western social media 'influencers' to tour Pakistan and create content encouraging others to visit (Smith 2019).
[111] The Kalash Valleys were a much publicised stop off on the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge's royal tour of Pakistan in 2019 (English 2019; 'Royal Visit: Britain's Prince William And Kate Tour Pakistan' 2019; Barcelona 2019; *BBC News Round* 2019; Farmer and Furness 2019; Weston 2019). Two years earlier several London double decker buses plied their routes covered in enormous images of the landscapes, monuments and people of Pakistan. The bus branding had been commissioned to mark the country's 70th year by Emerging Pakistan, a government-led initiative charged with increasing investment in and tourism to Pakistan. Pride of place, occupying about a third of one of the buses was an image of a group of Kalasha women decked out in their special festival-time kupas headdresses ('Mindblowing Pakistan Branded Buses famous in Central London' 2017).
[112] See Meskell 2015; 2016 and Joy 2016.
[113] I am borrowing Meskell's terminology here (Meskell 2016, 72).

negotiations around gas and steel contracts as well as armed conflict and political intrigue (Meskell 2016, 72) . Thus, -whilst acknowledging that Preah Vihea represents an extreme example- we can speculate that the Kalasha's 'promotion' to the transcendent state of World Heritage, may introduce new currents to further disrupt the already turbulent waters of the Kalash Valleys.

Summary: Marginalising Discourses and Dissonant Heritage

The first part of this chapter charted the development of what I characterise as the Kalasha supra-narrative. Authored over centuries by pre-colonial Muslim commentators, British administrators, travellers and writers, Greek journalists, Nazi explorers, Pakistani politicians and a host of other actors, the supra-narrative represents a marginalising discourse in that it has been projected by various dominant societies onto a place which is peripheral to them. The nature of the ideological marginalisation of the Kafirs and later the Kalasha varies with the author. For the Muslim states to the south of Kafiristan, the Kafir's religious difference represented the main 'othering' narrative. This discourse of religious difference continues to be important today in demarking the Kalasha's marginality, both in terms of the Muslim identities of the wider region and the official role which Islam has in defining the Pakistani state. In the context of British India, the Kafirs were marginalised along with the other inhabitants of the 'non-European world' through the colonial logics of cultural evolutionism. The perception of the Kalasha as especially archaic stems from these logics and remains the backbone of how the Kalasha are perceived by virtually everyone who has commented on them up until the present day.

Whilst the Kalasha may have been marginalised on multiple levels, this chapter has revealed many instances of the boundary blurring between what might be considered marginal and what might be considered central. Preserving the Kalasha's religious otherness has, for example, become a vital tool in demonstrating the legitimacy of Pakistan, both to secular-minded citizens and important western allies / trading partners. Thus, a geographically and socially peripheral community within Pakistan finds itself at the heart of the national discourse. The idea of the Kalasha as a culture in stasis is even more transgressive of a margins-centre binary. For many foreigners and Pakistanis alike, the value of the Kalasha is deeply bound up in the understanding that they represent a survival from an indeterminately ancient time. For these people, the Kalasha's supposedly invariant lifestyle preserves something which has been lost during course of modernity. To visit the Valleys or to engage in what is perceived to be the 'preservation' of Kalasha culture becomes a means of overcoming loss and therefore in a sense, becoming whole again. In this case we see a discourse which constitutes the margins transforming into a missing piece in the identity of the centre.

The second part of the chapter focused on the complex relationship which has developed in the Kalash Valleys between cultural 'preservation' projects and conflict of varying scales and severity. Denis Byrne's discussion of the abstraction which accompanies the creation of heritage is useful in untangling this relationship (2016, 54-85). In Byrne's synthesis the heritagization (Walsh 1992) of a site or practice represents a process of increasing decontextualization as through it control transfers inexorably from local contexts to an official, typically state-

authorised, realm. This chapter has shown how the Kalasha have been appropriated as the heritage of the Pakistani and Greek nations, and less directly as the heritage of Europeans defined via the essentialising lens of racial and cultural whiteness. This decontextualization of Kalasha heritage and its recontextualization within a framework of national identity and international ethnicity has seen it repeatedly implicated in either the justification or the contestation of political power. At the minor end of the spectrum are the white-painted metal boards which jostle with each other at the entrance to Kalasha villages, many proclaiming a European nation's role in the completion of a relatively modest project. A step up in scale brings us to the Greek Volunteers and the Directorate of Archaeology and Museums, each of which, following its respective national agenda, has attempted to position itself as the preeminent guardian of the Kalasha. Within the Pakistani political economy, the Kalasha have come to be understood as a potent symbol of secular values, a development which has seen them leveraged in prime ministerial contests or else targeted by those with an Islamising agenda. Jumping to southeast Europe, the projects of the Greek volunteers were utilised by Greece to counter North Macedonia's claim to the patrimony of ancient Macedonia. If we look further back in time, we see how during the build up to World War II, the Kalasha drew a German expedition across the border into British India, among its objectives the search for ancient ancestors to be woven into Himmler's fantastical historical narratives. Seventy years later the Taliban crossed the same section of border, their subsequent messaging framing the Kalasha Dur as a legitimate target their wider war against Western culture. If the Kalasha had not become heritagized, if their identity had not been translated into the patrimony of others, the Valleys would have been spared implication in such a diverse series of conflicts.

Vignette 2

The Kalash Culture Saving Society

> "There would be like 100, 150 people coming [to our meetings], it was huge […] then we went to [Biriu] and we went to [Rukmu] and we somehow recruited all of them […] and then [for the first time to one of our meetings] came the [Biriu] and [Rukmu] [people] and it was like a huge thing, it had never happened something like this before in the Kalasha Valleys [Kalasha from all three valleys had united together], so it was, it was a good cause, but we lost it somewhere…" (Sikandar Kalas, Cambridge, 29 March, 2019).

Sikandar had been one of the handful of Kalasha who founded the Kalash Culture Saving Society (KCSS) early in 2001. I had heard a lot about the KCSS on fieldwork in the Kalash Valleys and also previously from Sikandar, but I wanted greater clarity on a few points, so I was recording our conversation. What struck me then and again strikes me now as I listen to the recording is the exhilarating sensation of making history which Sikandar and the other founders must have felt as the KCSS came into fruition.

Conceiving of the KCSS

The founders of the KCSS were among the very few Kalasha who had been educated at schools in Pakistan's cities, indeed some of them, including Sikandar, were still of school age when they launched the organisation. Distance from home appears to have sharpened the founders' sense of their Kalasha identity. In the Valleys more localised or kin-based allegiances[114] like the ties of kam and village discussed in the previous vignette are often of greater relevance to everyday life than an abstract sense of Kalashaness. At school in the cities however, it was the founders' Kalasha ethnicity that marked them out as different from everyone around them. The cities also provided a far higher quality of education than was available in the Valleys. Whilst at the time, and still today, secondary education in the Kalash Valleys is limited, the founders -through the auspices of benefactors- underwent the sort of schooling normally reserved for the children of the wealthy. It was thus with the confidence and ambition installed in them by their education and a collective sense of their Kalasha identity fostered by their time spent away from home that the founders set about conceiving of the KCSS.

[114] See Augusto Cacopardo on the Kalasha's "three levels of social integration" kam, valley and tribe -i.e. the Kalasha tribe-, (Alberto Cacopardo 1991, 313).

Forging a Civic Kalasha Organisation

There is no centralised system of Kalasha government and whilst individuals may rise to prominence, a leader of the Kalasha people as a whole has yet to emerge, save in the quasi mythological narratives of Kalasha folktales.[115] Political organisation instead tends to manifest in factions, with followers aligning themselves to an influential leader who is often from the same kam, village or valley.[116] The 1990s may well have been an especially fractured time for Kalasha political identity. NGO and government-administered development projects had become a common feature of life in the Valleys and existing political divides had been exacerbated by competition between faction leaders, each of whom wanted to win the lucrative contracts associated with realising the projects.[117] Equally, the late 1980s and 1990s had seen new factions introduced through the presence of several foreigners, each of whom had set up semi-permanent residence in the Valleys and each of whom headed up their own charitable initiatives. The foreigners' access to substantial resources had brought them their own dedicated groups of followers. Whilst in public the foreigners maintained ostensibly cordial relationships, in private they were often critical of each other.

It is against this fractured political backdrop that the KCSS founders set about planning an organisation which would bring the Kalasha together. Two innovations were essential to achieving this ambition. The first was a democratic administrative system in which a new president would be elected every two years, thereby limiting the power which any one individual could have over the organisation. The second, and perhaps most significant innovation came in the KCSS' funding model. Instead of looking to external funders to finance the organisation, the KCSS set out to generate its own income.[118] The principal sources here were donations given by participants at KCSS meetings and an ingenious system whereby Kalasha tourist guides would donate 20%-30% of their earnings to the KCSS, whilst in return the KCSS lobbied outside-owned hotels and tour companies to ensure that all tour groups in the Valleys were accompanied by a Kalasha guide. By relying solely on their membership for income the KCSS distributed the power which comes with control over resources, the ambition being to create an organisation in which the Kalasha as a whole would feel invested.

To the founders' credit their system worked. Within a few months the KCSS had expanded from a group of eight or nine young people who had spent most of their lives in cities to an organisation with wide membership from across all three valleys. Hundreds of Kalasha people attended the organisation's frequent meetings and the coffers began to fill up. With momentum building fast the KCSS was in a strong position to start implementing its own projects.

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[115] Kalasha songs and stories speak of a Kalasha king, Raja Wai, who existed at an indeterminate time before the start of genealogical knowledge (Alberto Cacopardo 1991, 273–74; Parkes 1991, 78). For speculation concerning Kalasha past social structure see Parkes 1983, 205–8, Klimburg 2008, 182 and Augusto Cacopardo 2016, 257–58.

[116] See Parkes 1983 for a detailed discussion of Kalasha political structure.

[117] See Parkes 2000.

[118] The only external material support which, to my knowledge, the KCSS received came in the form of food, covertly provided by Athanasios Lerounis to feed participants at some of the KCSS' meetings.

The Projects of the KCSS

Initially the KCSS' principal concern was to increase the number of Kalasha tour guides. As well as this constituting an integral part of their financial strategy, the founders' had concerns regarding what Muslim tour guides might be telling their groups about the Kalasha. The corollary of this objective was less work for Muslim guides and the first president of the KCSS began to receive threats from members of the Muslim community. Despite the threats however, the KCSS was able to exert enough pressure on hotels and tour companies to ensure that their demands were met.

Buoyed up by early successes with the promotion of Kalasha guides, the KCSS turned its attention to an issue which had long been of concern to many Kalasha- the cost of funeral feasts. At the time the lavishness of a feast was up to the family of the deceased and a culture of competitive feasting was leading some families to overstretch resources in order not to lose face. Whilst the KCSS demanded reform, most elders resisted, arguing that to change the practice would be a violation of custom. In the end a compromise was met whereby the entire kam shares the cost of each of its inhabitant's funerals, every funeral feast being equal in size, with the proviso that the wealthier families can add more meat if they wish and thus maintain their powerful position. This system has subsequently been adopted across the Kalash Valleys and constitutes one of the KCSS' most enduring achievements.

Later KCSS projects made use of the financial contributions which the organisation had accumulated. Worried that Kalasha children were learning nothing of their culture in the Valleys' schools, the KCSS recruited and provided salaries for *kazi* (Pakistan government appointed elders) to share their knowledge of Kalasha customs during special classes. The KCSS also offered loans for Kalasha students to study outside of the Valleys and was open to applications which were perceived to be in the general interest of the Kalasha. For example, the KCSS loaned a Kalasha farmer the money to buy his ancestral fields back from a Muslim landowner. Since during the middle decades of the twentieth century many unsavvy Kalasha had sold fields to outsiders at well below market value, the project of buying back land was understood as righting an historic wrong which had impacted the Kalasha collectively.

It was the loans, which, according to Sikandar, brought the KCSS down. The problem was that whilst people were happy to accept loans, repayment was on good faith alone and inevitably the organisation's coffers ran dry. Members quickly began to lose confidence in what became a financially crippled KCSS and attendance at meetings fell. The weakened organisation was unable to assert the pan-Kalasha pull it had once exercised and old factional allegiances began to reassert themselves. Within six years of its foundation the first organisation to have united all three Kalash Valleys had disintegrated.

The KCSS Compared with Government and NGO-Funded Projects

In its first year the KCSS ratified a fourteen point "Aims and Objectives" manifesto (Appendix V). The contents of the manifesto combined with the projects discussed above offer us a Kalasha perspective on what was needed to sustain their culture heading into the future. Items from the KCSS manifesto such as 4. "To provide good education to the Kalasha students and try to provide the able students scholarships and also give them technical education", 8. "To develop the agricultural, using new technologies and new products" or 9. "To request quota for Kalasha people in employment schemes" betray the frustrations of a society keen to partake in the perceived benefits offered by the state and modernity, but held back by their geographically and culturally marginal position. Item 2. "To publish schoolbooks about the Kalasha tradition and religion for the Kalasha student" reflects a fear, expressed to me by several Kalasha, that schooling will lead to young Kalasha drifting away from their culture towards a more generic Pakistani identity, unless the Kalasha 'update' the ways in which they transmit their religion and customs. Across the manifesto there is an emphasis on both modernising Kalasha culture and making it economically and socially sustainable. Conspicuously absent is the focus on the preservation of buildings, artefacts and 'folklore' which we see in the work of NGOs and the Pakistani government. Indeed, if deemed necessary the KCSS could be actively anti-preservation, as demonstrated by its overriding of kazi's protests when it came to reforming the custom of funeral feasting.

The absence of a preservation agenda in the manifesto is indicative of two factors. The first is that the Kalasha's sense of patrimony is as often conceptualised through a framework of family or kam as it is along ethnic lines. Elaborately decorated old houses for example are valued by the descendants of those who built them since they demonstrate the prestige of their ancestors. For those not related to the builder, the houses are much less significant. Equally, although the Kalasha share little sense of collective history, many can recite the names of their male kam ancestors stretching back for a remarkable number of generations.[119] Each lineage also has its own associated semi-mythological stories and origin accounts.[120] A focus on the preservation of specific aspects of Kalasha patrimony therefore runs the risk of bearing greater relevance to the maintenance of kin-based identities than to realising the KCSS's ambition of building a system of pan-Kalasha cooperation.

The second factor relating to the absence of cultural preservation in the manifesto is the importance of change for the KCSS. As their "Aims and Objectives" demonstrate, the KCSS feared that Kalasha cultural practice as it stood was unsustainable. What the KCSS and its followers wanted was not the imposition of stasis around certain manifestations of their culture, but comprehensive cultural overhaul. This evidences a very different conception of culture than to that which informed the NGO projects discussed in the pervious chapter. Rather than something which can be identified, fixed and archived, the KCSS' approach suggests that the Kalasha conceive of their culture in

[119] See Parkes 1991 and 1994 and Augusto Cacopardo 2011.

[120] See Augusto Cacopardo 2011 for a detailed discussion of Kalasha lineage and collective origin stories and Parkes 1991 for a discussion of Kalasha lineage mythology and stories.

far more fluid terms as something which has to undergo mutation in order to be viable. Although much of what the KCSS did was without precedent, in the next chapter we will see how their appreciation of the necessity of adaptation has represented a fundamental Kalasha characteristic for generations.

Chapter 4

Flexibility and Resilience

In his journey through pre-conversion Nuristan, Robertson spent a night with an important Kafir man called Karlah Jannah. Keen to educate Robertson about his people's religion, Karlah Jannah related a story concerning one of the most important Kafir deities, Gish,[121] the god of war. In Karlah Jannah's account Gish had fought with and decapitated Hazrat Ali (the son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad and his immediate successor according to Shia doctrine). Hazrat Ali duly disposed of, Gish then went on to visit London[122] whilst his servants settled in Kafiristan (Robertson 1896, 308). This story reveals a remarkably adaptive conception of one of the Kafir's principal deities. Gish's move to London must have been inspired by the growing presence of the British Empire on the eastern fringes of Kafiristan, or perhaps even was an embellishment by the storyteller designed to engage his British guest. In either case we see how readily the story of Gish could be modified to fit changing circumstances.

What we know of Kafiristan suggests that despite the presence of a priestly caste, the absence of both religious texts and overarching religious authority[123] would have allowed for a significant amount of latitude in how individuals interpreted their religious traditions. Following the conversion of Kafiristan to Islam there would be far less scope for the kind of creative reinterpretation of a religious narrative which we see in Karlah Jannah's account. Even as it was experienced in this inaccessible region, the Islam practiced by the new converts was bound by an authoritative text and interpreted by trained Imams.

Over a hundred and twenty years on from the conversion of Nuristan, the Kalasha have maintained an approach to their religious discourses which is not dissimilar to that of Karlah Jannah. As was the case with the Kafirs, the Kalasha faith is not enshrined in text and there is no centralised Kalasha religious authority. Indeed, Kalasha religious practice is arguably even less prescribed than that which was followed by the Kafirs, since they do not have priests to interpret their religious traditions. In Kalasha custom those who conduct religious ceremonies are virgin boys (*onjes't'a moc*), low ranking members of a society stratified by age, whose agency lasts no longer than the ritual which they are engaged with. Until recently Kalasha men might become shamans (*dehar*) with the power of interpreting the will of supernatural beings and deities. Dehar, however, operated as individuals rather than collectively, their influence confined to the force of their personal charisma. The closest thing which Kalasha society

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[121] Transcribed by Robertson as 'Gísh'.

[122] Alberto and Augusto Cacopardo record a similar account in a story told by Halim Ullah, an elder from Jinjeret Kuh -a valley whose population is made up of Muslims of Kalasha ancestry-. In Halim Ullah's account his Kalasha forbears had travelled to London, where they had founded a kingdom (Alberto Cacopardo and Cacopardo 1992, 336).

[123] With the apparent exception of the people of Parun, who according to Max Klimburg lived under theocratic rule until the end of the nineteenth century (2008, 181) Kafir tribes were acephalous (Alberto Cacopardo and Cacopardo 2011, 319).

has to an authority on the practice of religion and tradition are the kazi. Whilst the kazi do meet to collectively pronounce on issues of custom, and as we have seen in our discussion of the KCSS, they can appoint themselves as cultural guardians, their power is more often limited to their village or kam rather than exerted over the Kalasha as a whole. Concomitantly, dogma is relatively underdefined[124] and there is a great deal of heterogeneity in Kalasha religious and cultural discourses.

This chapter asks how the Kalasha's heterogenous and fluid approach to what constitutes their heritage has shaped their relationship to the discourses and pressures discussed in the previous chapter. The first part of the chapter interrogates ethnographic data stretching back over eighty years to identify ways in which the Kalasha have adapted to their changing context. The focus here is on Kalasha responses to critiques levelled at their culture by Muslim neighbours and the threats which those neighbours have at times posed. The chapter then examines one of the most fundamental concepts by which the Kalasha define themselves: the idea that they are 'freer' than Muslims. In analysing the data presented in the first part of the chapter, I turn to anthropological theory concerning tribal interactions with the state. A series of models are developed to explain how the Kalasha have managed to avoid assimilation into the majority faith which surrounds them.

The second part of the chapter discusses the Kalasha's relationship with the Pakistani state, discourses of shared heritage with Greeks and Europeans more generally, and the idea that their culture represents a survival from a past era. I demonstrate how the Kalasha have accommodated many of the identities which have been projected onto them. This process has allowed certain Kalasha actors to achieve a great deal of success in their chosen careers. It has also helped the Kalasha negotiate the pressures discussed in the first part of the chapter. Key to these processes has been the Kalasha's appreciation of the varying values which they hold for the outside world. In concluding the chapter, I draw attention to the roles which heritage has played in what I have discussed and contrast these manifestations with those presented in the last chapter.

Part I: Adapting to an Increasingly Muslim World

In his account of his visit to the Kalash Valleys in the mid-1930s Schomberg records the activities of proselytising Sunni mullahs (Schomberg 1938, 86). Schomberg's observations suggest that the Kalasha were under pressure to convert during the first decades of the twentieth century and perhaps the last years of the nineteenth century. Linguistic and historical data further demonstrate that the Kalasha population has been declining -in part at least- due to conversion since the sixteenth century,[125] so it must be safe to say that evangelism has impacted Kalasha lives

[124] See Parkes 1991, 76 and Maggi 2001, 45 on the lack of mythical exegesis for Kalasha religious practice.
[125] See Parkes 1983, 16 and 20–23; Loude and Lièvre 1988, 20–22, and Alberto Cacopardo 2016, 88, 93–94.

for generations.[126] However, the twentieth century may have been particularly traumatic in this regard. Over the past 120 years or so we see the Kalasha's territories shrink dramatically and become more permeable to the outside world.

The first half of the twentieth century witnessed the last Kalasha of Urtsun, Jinjeret Kuh and perhaps also Shishi Kuh and Suwir valleys convert to Islam (Alberto Cacopardo 1991, 280–81; 2016, 71 and 97). Urtsun, Jinjeret Kuh, Shishi Kuh and Suwir comprised four of seven valleys making up the sum total of the Kalasha territories, so their loss to Islam represented a considerable reduction in the Kalasha population (Map 5). Concomitantly two of the three remaining Kalasha valleys were coming under pressure from an influx of Kateh immigrants who had crossed the Afghan border. The Kateh people, although fellow non-Muslims, had been the traditional foes of the Kalasha (Schomberg 1938, 68; Parkes 1983, 125–26). Whilst the Kateh had originally entered the Kalasha's territories as refugees fleeing the Islamisation of their homeland, within a couple of generations all the Kateh living in the Kalash Valleys had converted (Schomberg 1938, 37 and 40). Unsurprisingly the traditional enmity between Kateh and Kalasha had not abated since the Kateh's occupation of Kalasha lands and Schomberg recalls acts of vandalism against Kalasha monuments carried out by Muslim Kateh zealots, a subject which we will return to below.

The loss of territory represented by the Kateh incursions and the conversion of the four other valleys was compounded later in the twentieth century by a steady increase in the Muslim population of the remaining valleys, comprising both incomers and Kalasha who had converted to Islam[127]. The arrival of Kateh and other Muslim outsiders has contributed to a wider phenomenon of population growth[128] and today there is great pressure on resources such as arable land, grazing and firewood, thereby exacerbating the potential for Muslim-Kalasha conflict. In addition to the stresses discussed above, a series of incidents which occurred during the creation of Pakistan, may have marked an all-time low point for the Kalasha. These incidents, remembered as the *dashman boli* or 'mullah's invasions',[129] represent a pivotal moment in the Kalasha's story, a time perhaps, when their survival seemed to hang in the balance.[130]

The dashman boli took place at a moment of great uncertainty for Chitral. Only officially incorporated into Pakistan in 1969, Chitral enjoyed a semi-autonomous status under the British Raj, with the majority of decision making remaining in the hands of its hereditary ruler, the Mehtar. With the creation of Pakistan, the status quo in Chitral was disrupted and a period of instability ensued. It was during this time -around the early 1950s- that aggressively evangelist mullahs and their supporters conducted a series of raids on the Kalasha villages closest to Chitral, forcibly converting a considerable number of people (Parkes 1983, 27). A sense of just how threatening the dashman boli were comes across in a pan-Kalasha survey recorded in the 1970s by Peter Parkes in the course of research for his

[126] See Cacopardo 2016, 84 for a brief discussion of early Muslim evangelism in Kalasha areas.
[127] The growth of the Muslim population in the Kalash Valleys is a phenomenon which can be traced through published accounts of the Kalasha written over the course of the twentieth century (see Schomberg 1938, 32, 37 and 181 and Parkes 1983, 23–26).
[128] See Parkes 1983, 23–26; Loude and Lièvre 1988, 6 and 'Pakistan Census 1998' n.d.
[129] Peter Parkes' translation (Parkes 1983, 27).
[130] See Darling 1979, 6.

DPhil. According to Parkes over 70% of all conversions of Kalasha people living at the time of the survey could be attributed to the dashman boli (Parkes 1983, 27).

Forgetting Polytheism

> "If you bring up the polytheism thing now [Kalasha] people in the Valleys will get so mad […] they'll want to kill you" - Sikandar Kalas, Thessaloniki 17.08.2017.

Every Kalasha I spoke to during my fieldwork in the Valleys maintained that they follow a monotheistic religion in which one god, Desau is served by several messengers. If I tentatively raised the point that past researchers[131] had recorded the Kalasha worshiping as gods the supernatural beings which are today classified as messengers, the repost was invariably that the researchers had got it wrong, probably because they were deliberately misinformed by local Muslims keen to represent the Kalasha in a negative light. Presuming that the researchers had their facts right however, it appears to be the case that over the past fifty years or so the Abrahamic faiths' abhorrence of multiple deities has had a transformative effect on Kalasha conceptions of divinity.[132]

Taj and Sikandar have a very different take from the rest of their community on the question of the Kalasha's past polytheism. Both were brought up with the belief that the Kalasha were monotheists, worshiping the same god as the Abrahamic faiths,[133] but as they progressed into adulthood slowly their perspectives shifted. For Sikandar the process began in the Valleys as an assistant to Jordi Magraner, a Spaniard who was conducting research regarding the Kalasha's religion.[134] Magraner had access to recordings from the middle of the twentieth century of a man offering prayers to names which are now considered to be those of Desau's messengers. The prayers, however, were of the sort which today would be directed solely to Desau. With Sikandar's assistance Magraner played the recordings to the son of the man recorded. The son, who by then was an old man, reacted with anger claiming that the recordings came from a time when the Kalasha were ignorant of the true nature of their religion. This was news to Sikandar who had never had reason to doubt that the Kalasha had always worshiped a single god. Sometime later Sikandar, who was still adamant in his monotheism, interviewed a second man who had grown up in the polytheistic era. Although this man declared that he followed Desau alone, Sikandar related to me that, "deep down, when I was digging […] it was all polytheistic, and I got so pissed off, I was like "how could you [say] this!?"". The old man went on to explain how after the dashman boli, the former polytheistic pantheon had been relegated to the status of messengers of the one true God, Desau. Reflecting on his conversation with the second man, Sikandar told me,

[131] See for example Snoy 2008.

[132] See Georg Buddruss on a similar phenomenon in Kafiristan whereby gods may have been reimagined as prophets of the principal deity Imra (Buddruss 2008, 18).

[133] Kalasha today use *Khoday* from the Persian *Khuda* (God) or the Arabic *Allah* just as readily as Desau.

[134] To my knowledge this research is unpublished.

> "… and what I have realised […] was that they were really adaptive to change … they just took it, the monotheistic thing, [but] they kept the rest. Their songs were polytheistic, their rituals very polytheistic … but in normal conversation they were absolute monotheistic."

Thus, there appears to have been a time when at least some Kalasha people were externally monotheistic whilst in the more coded language of ritual they still paid homage to the old pantheon.

To externally profess one belief, whilst to privately maintain the contrary is a well recorded tactic of what James C. Scott has termed 'hidden transcripts' of resistance (Scott 2009a). However, such a ploy is only viable when it is possible to keep the hidden transcripts hidden.[135] The increasing permeability of the Kalash Valleys to a dominant and erosive discourse, especially during the second half of the twentieth century has stripped the Kalasha of their privacy. Ethnographers from the 1970s onwards have recorded what Wynne Maggi, writing in the 1990s describes as a "daily barrage of hellfire and damnation" directed at the Kalasha by the more intolerant of their Muslim neighbours (Maggi 2001: 29). The classroom, at a time when all teachers were Muslim, was a site of particular humiliation. Returning to Sikandar's narrative, he recalls that,

> "… my way of looking at the Kalasha way of life started to shape up when I went to [...] school, […] all the teachers, they were targeting us … the polytheism wasn't a thing [by then], we [the Kalasha pupils] were really monotheist, the thing is they were targeting other things: the funeral rituals […] how sinful they are, our everyday lives, how our women interact with other people, how our houses were open for everyone, these kind of things."

For some Kalasha the humiliation ends up being too much to bear. A strong sense of inferiority to the Muslim community remains a major motivation for conversion.

Dealing with Shame: Intangible Heritage, Transmission and Rupture

> "For me the song… is normal… no problem, my wife is there, my daughter is there, the man who is… performing he respects a lot all Kalash families, he is just acting like this… I know his heart, it's clear… but I can't tolerate outsiders thinking something wrong about my community" – Sher Hardi, Kalash Valleys, 17.04.2018.[136]

Sikandar is in the process of editing a documentary[137] which he has shot about his village, Kraka'. The subject of the documentary is Sher Hardi, a kind, charismatic and imaginative man whom Sikandar likes and admires. The documentary's story, however, follows an ongoing disagreement between the two men.

[135] See Darling 1979, 10 and Parkes 2000 on Kalasha techniques and idioms of subterfuge in their dealings with outsiders.
[136] This was said to the author during a fieldwork interview and does not feature in the documentary.
[137] Working title: *Pride and Shame*.

For several years now Sher Hardi has been trying to bring about the end of a practice which is part of Cawmos, the Kalasha's celebration of the winter solstice and the most important festival of the year. What Sher Hardi has in his sights is the singing of improvised lewd songs by Kalasha men and women. Often the songs are antagonistic, pitting genders against each other, occasionally they are sung simply for the illicit pleasure of being publicly obscene. Unsurprisingly, these songs provide ammunition for the Kalasha's enemies. Furthermore, many young Kalasha who have been through school are embarrassed by the songs, their sense of morality informed to a much greater extent by Muslim values than that of the elder generation. Whilst the songs now are generally only sung during the *ditc*[138] part of the festival, when all Muslims are required to leave the village, Sher Hardi would like to see them abandoned altogether.[139]

Sikandar, who is now much more concerned about the preservation of cultural practices than he was in his KCSS days, argues that the songs are of great cultural significance. For him, their loss represents part of a bigger process whereby the Kalasha are slowly letting go of their distinct heritage. In the documentary we see him visiting his friends back home, trying his best to persuade them of the songs' value. Whilst some understand the songs to be an embarrassing anachronism, others like Sher Hardi are more sympathetic, but bring up the impossibility of maintaining them in a society so exposed to Islam. Only members of the older generation agree with Sikandar and join him in the argument that the songs must be kept.

Sikandar's documentary offers us a fine-grained insight into how the Kalasha have responded to the persistent criticisms directed at their culture by many of the Muslims who live among and around them. Increasing exposure to Islam changes the moral outlook of a younger generation whilst the older generation comes to realise that a practice is untenable. The practice withers and then disappears completely, recorded only in the memories of elders. As the generation which remembers the practices dies off, a new generation grows up with no knowledge of what has been, and what it is to be Kalasha is irrevocably altered. We see this process underway in the case of the Cawmos songs and as a fait accompli in the shift from polytheism to monotheism.

Living with Iconoclasts: Tangible Heritage, Transmission and Rupture

> "Listen, some people from other communities [i.e. local Muslims] cut the heads off our idols in *mahandeo* [a type of shrine] … the man was unknown, and some [Kalasha] youths were enraged and wanted to harm the other community … So, I stopped them, saying that we can carve such idols with wood again, but we cannot develop peace in this place again … I said that peace and best relations with each other are first priority, not these idols, we can remake, no problem … because it is flexible, there is not any strict order." - Wali Ajis, Kalash Valleys, 17.04.2018.

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[138] The nucleated Kalasha settlements marked on Map 6 are also the villages which observe ditc during Cawmos.
[139] See also the abandonment of the role of the *bud'al'ak* at the Phũ' festival of Biriu Valley (Di Carlo 2007, 62).

The Kalasha make -or more often commission from professional Muslim craftsmen- wooden figures as part of their religio-cultural practice. Wali Ajis' description of these figures as idols is slightly misleading as the Kalasha conceive of them as focuses for prayer which is then transmitted on to divine beings rather than animate objects to be worshiped in their own right.[140] Many Muslims do, however, understand the figures to be idols and therefore perceive the Kalasha to be complicit in the sin of *shirk*, which covers polytheism and idol worship. Presumably, it was this rationale which led to the vandalism of the mahandeo.

The figures which Wali Ajis was taking about were abstracted horseheads,[141] set into the stone wall of the shrine. The most conspicuous figures made or commissioned by the Kalasha, however, are *gandau*, which, since they represent people, have the capacity to be even more provocative to those who accuse the Kalasha of shirk. Gandau celebrate achievements of the deceased and are carved, paraded and dressed as part of funerary preparations, at the end of which they are generally left planted upright near the grave. These striking statues are approximately life-sized and are often carved from a single section of Himalayan cedar (*cedarus deodara*), (Klimburg 2008, 171 and 189–91). Gandau are still, very occasionally, commissioned although for a considerable time in the second half of the twentieth century the practice of making them appears to have undergone a hiatus.

Schomberg's account of the Kalash Valleys in the 1930s describes a landscape full of gandau. Indeed, it is the presence of these figures which alerts him to the fact that he has entered the territory of the Kalasha: "we came upon our first idols, proof that we were in a pagan country" (1938, 36). Later in his narrative, we hear that many gandau had been damaged or toppled by Kateh converts to Islam[142] (1938, 40). Writing of his fieldwork in the 1970s Parkes states that the practice of gandau-making "appears to have been abandoned" in the late 1960s, "after the desecration of the statues by Muslims and their rapid acquisition by European collectors" (Parkes 1983, 486). Reflecting on the accounts of Schomberg and Parkes one can speculate[143] that the combined conspicuousness and vulnerability of gandau rendered them unviable as the twentieth century progressed. Immutable beacons of the Kalasha's difference, they were to intolerant neighbours both provocative and easy to vandalise, and to foreign collectors both interesting and straightforward to transport out of the Valleys.

When I have raised the case of the gandau hiatus with Kalasha interlocuters, the consistent reply I receive is that the practice has never stopped, although they do often mention that the lavish funeral feasts associated with the commissioning of gandau have made the practice prohibitively expensive. Despite decades when there were no

[140] Although see Augusto Cacopardo's (2006, 148) argument that "the [Kalasha's] denial of the existence of 'idols' is part of a conciliatory version of the Kafir religions aimed at reinterpreting them in terms more acceptable to Islam".
[141] Perhaps representing the double headed horse of the supernatural being Bal'ima'in. Although also note that Parkes records that Kalasha deities are conventionally described as mounted on horseback, so the horseheads could also refer directly to Mahandeo, the supernatural being after which the shrine is named (Parkes 1991, 76).
[142] See Cacopardo and Cacopardo 1992, 348 for an account of destroyed gandau in Jinjeret Kuh and Klimburg 2008, 172–73 on gandau decline.
[143] In her MSc thesis *Notes to Funerary Rituals and Sites of the Ancient Kalasha Tribe in Pakistan*, Gul Arab, a Kalasha woman writes: "one of the reasons the effigy culture had died was; the effigies were burned and slashed down by religious zealots who misunderstood them for idols" (Gul Arab 2015, 9). See also Klimburg 2008, 180.

gandau commissioned, my interlocuters point to two recently installed figures[144] standing in Brũ'a *madojaw* (graveyard) as evidence that gandau are still very much a part of Kalasha life[145] (see Figures 4.1-4.3). I have also asked Kalasha people if they would like to see the many old gandau on display in museums in Pakistan and around the world returned to the Kalash Valleys. It is a question which the people I spoke to did not seem to be very interested in, even Kalasha working at the Kalasha Dur museum -which does not hold any gandau in good condition- did not think that repatriation was necessary. Echoing Wali Ajis' attitude to the vandalised figures, several Kalasha suggested that bringing back old gandau is pointless since it is easier just to make new examples.

The Kalasha's readiness to make figures anew rather than focus on what has been vandalised or taken from the Valleys may not be explained in its entirety as a pragmatic response to the increased influence of Islam. Material manifestations of their religion and culture may have represented little more than replaceable symbols of much more fundamental and intangible concepts long before Muslim immigration started in earnest. However, the readiness to move on from such explicit attacks on their way of life resonates with the flexibility we have seen in the case of the shift to monotheism or changing attitudes towards the Cawmos songs.

The examples of the mahandeo horse heads and gandau argue an implicit understanding of the risks of investing too much in cultural practices which are easily targeted. Equally, Kalasha people's perception of gandau commissioning as a consistent practice despite a hiatus of decades, demonstrates the ability to take a long-term view on the manufacture of culture. If a practice becomes problematic because it is vulnerable to attack by those who oppose the Kalasha's right to exist, or perhaps simply because it is understood to be too much of an economic burden, then rather than being abandoned the practice is hibernated, only to spring up again when conditions are more favourable. A further example of the capacity to resurrect heritage is provided by the recent history of Kalasha burial practices. In the past the Kalasha left their dead in coffins (*bahaga*) placed on the ground. From the mid-twentieth century onwards, criticism of this practice from Muslims as well as an increase in incidents of grave robbing led the Kalasha to bury their dead below ground (Gul Arab 2015, 9). In the past ten years however, Kalasha from Batrik and Brũ'a villages have returned to the practice of leaving their dead above ground, although this time the coffins are far more difficult to open (see Figure 4.4).

Interestingly, the effects of rupture have played out differently in the case of tangible as opposed to intangible heritage. Whilst the intangible heritage of polytheism is now no longer transmitted between generations and the Cawmos songs appear to be on their way out, the tangible heritage of the mahandeo horse heads, gandau, and funerary practices continues to be transmitted despite having undergone rupture. It is possible to speculate, therefore, that in the case of the Kalasha, at least, tangible heritage is less easily forgotten and more likely to be resurrected than its intangible counterpart.

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[144] Parkes records a similar revival of gandau-making in the valley of Rumbur in the late 1970s (1983: 486).

[145] The gandau were commissioned in 2007-8 by Fazi Khan of Brũ'a to honour his father and uncle (Gul Arab 2015, 10; Ali 2018, 216), a cage built around them testifies to the fact that gandau are still believed to be vulnerable to attack (see Figures 4.1 – 4.3).

Figure 4.1. Gandau erected by Fazi Khan in 2008 to commemorate his father and uncle. Brũ'a madojaw. (Photograph the author).

Figures 4.2 and 4.3. The investiture of Fazi Khan's gandau. (Photographs reproduced with kind permission of Luke Rehmat).

Figure 4.4. Three phases of burial practice in Brũ'a madojaw. The practice of leaving the dead in coffins above ground was discontinued at roughly the same time as gandau, again vandalism and critique from Muslims are likely causes. In the past ten years however, some coffins have again started to be left above ground. In the photograph we can see a recent above ground coffin, the remains of old coffins with their lids removed by vandals, and an upturned *charpoy* (bottom left) marking the site of an inhumation. (Photograph the author).

Women's Freedom as Kalasha Heritage

At the beginning of *Our Women Are Free* Maggi gives a candid and disarming account of how her research question changed during the course of her doctoral fieldwork. In the following excerpt she recalls that her initial enquiries failed to resonate with her Kalasha interlocuters:

> "My Kalasha friends, both men and women, brushed aside my questions about 'female subordinate practice.' They were resolutely uninterested in issues of gender 'equality' or 'women's power and autonomy.' It wasn't that these issues were not important. And it certainly is not the case that men and women live in balanced harmony. But rather, for Kalasha people, comparing the relative positions of men and women—ritually, socially, politically—is not very interesting, is not a focus of identity for Kalasha, as it is for many Westerners. On the other hand, the related concepts that Kalasha women are

> 'free' (*azát*)[146] and have 'choice' (*čitl*)[147]—especially compared to women from neighboring communities—are compelling concerns [...] The idea of women's 'freedom' emerges spontaneously in conversation, explains a wide range of behaviors and motivations, and touches the heart of individual women's identities and the collective identity of the Kalasha community" (2001, 17).

Maggi's realisation that gender becomes interesting for the Kalasha when it serves to demark their difference from Muslims steered her thesis. A key element of her discussion is of significant freedom as defined through a Kalasha lens: acts which are constituted by the fact that they are forbidden to Muslim women whilst they are not to Kalasha women. There are two things which Kalasha women can do, but which most local Muslim women cannot, that Kalasha are particularly thinking of when they -both women and men- proudly declare that "our women are free" ("*homa istrizha azat asan*"). The first is that Kalasha women do not observe purdah which means that they are free to travel unaccompanied (within the confines of the Valleys) and that they may speak freely to men whom they are not related to. The second is that women have the right to leave their husbands for another man[148].

Whilst much is made of women's freedom, there are many rules which are unique to the Kalasha and which dictate what women should or should not do. The guiding principal behind these rules is the Kalasha's division of their cosmos between two spheres, *onjes't'a* and *pragata.*[149] There are onjes't'a landscapes and pragata landscapes: generally the higher places are onjes't'a whilst the valley bottom is pragata. Living things are also split into onjes't'a and pragata, generally, but by no means uniformly this division is dictated by whether or not the thing is to be found in a onjes't'a or a pragata part of the Valleys. S*aras* (juniper) for example, which grows high up the valley sides and which is used in Kalasha rituals is onjes't'a, as are goats, markhor and the *suci* (supernatural beings) which keep an eye on the markor - all of these are also to be found (most of the time) at high altitude, or at least above the villages. On the other hand, chickens, which are an import from outside of the Valleys, madojaw (graveyards) and many different parts of the village and home are all to be found at low altitude and are considered to be pragata. The binary also manifests along gender lines: the onjes't'a sphere is the preserve of men, whilst pragata is the preserve of women. Since pragata is considered dangerous to onjes't'a, much of the ritual responsibility which women take on comes in keeping pragata separate from onjes't'a. Women's bodies, especially during menstruation and childbirth are considered to be powerful sources of pragata so many of the rules which women abide by relate to places which they can and cannot go and things which they can and cannot touch depending on what stage of their reproductive cycle they are in.

Maggi describes practices relating to onjes't'a and pragata as "the most meaningful aspect of Kalasha religion" (57), an assertion which probably still holds true today. Whilst as we have seen, the dogmatic aspects of Kalasha religio-

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[146] 'azat' in the Trail and Cooper transliteration.

[147] 'cit' in the Trail and Cooper transliteration.

[148] The right to elope or *al'as'ĩg*, described by Maggi as the "the prototypic act that defines Kalasha women's freedom" (168) is arguably less significant now than when she was conducting her fieldwork. Whilst Kalasha women may still leave their husbands without needing anyone's permission, the practice of al'as'ĩg in the sense defined by Maggi -i.e. to go from one husband immediately to another- has almost completely disappeared (the first in Kraka' village in almost twenty years happened in early 2018 while I was on fieldwork).

[149] For a detailed discussion of onjes't'a and pragata see Parkes 1983 and Maggi 2001.

cultural practice remain underdeveloped, the everyday performances necessary to keep onjes't'a and pragata separate comprise a fundamental component of Kalasha people's lives (Maggi 2001, 44–45). Both Maggi and Parkes convincingly argue that the considerable effort which the Kalasha devote to maintaining the boundary between onjes't'a and pragata relates to the metaphorical relationship which this boundary has to the boundary between the Kalasha and the Muslim world surrounding them.[150] Indeed, Muslims are also understood to be a source of pragata and the occasional spikes in conversion rates which the Kalasha experience are often attributed to slips in the discipline necessary to keep onjes't'a and pragata separated. It is worth noting here that the maintenance of the onjes't'a-pragata divide is largely invisible to the outside world, making it a relatively safe way of drawing a boundary around Kalasha identity.

Despite the fundamental importance of onjes't'a-pragata practice for the Kalasha, many women are far from strict in their observance of its rules. Although it is very hard to imagine a Kalasha woman carrying out a transgression of the more fundamental onjes't'a-pragata obligations, the fringes of the onjes't'a-pragata spectrum are subject to constant renegotiation by women exercising their right to choose whether or not to follow an existing practice.[151] An example recorded by Maggi which I have also observed, relates to the institution of the *bashali,* a building which women are supposed to go to during menstruation or childbirth and which is located at a distance from each Kalasha village (62). Although controversial, occasionally women choose not to go to the bashali during their periods, arguing that to do so is inconvenient. They do, however, confine themselves to their homes, thereby limiting their exposure to the rest of the community and going some way to conforming to the rules.

May Cit (My Choice): the Kalasha Heritage of Free Will

> "Why I do not convert to Islam? The first thing is Islam is a religion […] you are bound […] you are surrounded in one circle, you have to pray, you have to be doing something according to the religion, what's written there, so I think I could not do that. […] The best thing about Kalasha […] the best thing is no religion" Gul Asman, Lahore, 02.03.2018.

When a Kalasha person chooses not to follow a particular practice, she or he often comes in for a lot of criticism. There is even a word for people perceived to be only partly committed in their Kalashaness: '*nimnim*' or 'half-half'.[152] Ultimately however, disapproval is the only sanction which Kalasha society imposes on those who bend the rules, since its capacity to coerce is limited by the fact that every Kalasha has the option of converting to Islam. Indeed, Kalasha people convert to Islam all the time and keep their friends and their livelihoods, in many instances they even continue to live in the same home alongside their Kalasha relatives.

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[150] Maggi and Parkes both draw on Mary Douglas' characterisation of an 'enclave culture' in their analyses (Parkes 1994, 159–60; Maggi 2001, 31 and 71; Douglas 1996).
[151] Cf. Maggi 2001, 57, 62 and 148.
[152] The antonym of which is '*kushushi*' or a 'tryer'.

That it is so easy to become Muslim lends a great deal of importance to the fact that people choose to remain Kalasha. One of the fundamental concepts of Kalasha self-definition is that they are '*azat roi*', a 'free people', the followers of '*azat mashab*', a 'free religion', a belief which is a source of significant cultural pride. More important than the act of obeying society's rules is the belief that when they follow the rules, they are doing so of their own free will, as opposed to Muslims, whom are argued to have little choice in whether or not to honour their religious obligations. This framing of free will as an identity discourse allows for seemingly paradoxical productions of identity such as when women contravene the system of onjes't'a and pragata which serves to demark the Kalasha from Muslims through the exercise of their right to choose, another discourse by which the Kalasha define their difference from Muslims. In instances such as these, the free will discourse allows the violation of identity inherent in choosing not to follow a particular practice to be recuperated by dint of the understanding that the exercise of choice constitutes a quintessentially Kalasha act. Through this mechanism the Kalasha as a whole can steadily change their cultural practices, whilst remaining Kalasha.

So far in this chapter and the vignette preceding it, a picture has begun to emerge of Kalasha society, religion and identity as profoundly heterogeneous. Whilst certain discourses like that of onjes't'a–pragata encompass all Kalasha, their implementation rests on very much on the disposition of the individual and to violate them ultimately does not void membership of Kalasha ethnicity. Identity is at its strongest when organised by kam or village, and the political economy of the Kalasha tends to pit these units against each other. When kam or village is not the common factor, Kalasha might ally under the umbrella of a shared valley, or another network of allegiance, but as the fate of the KCSS demonstrates, for the Kalasha to come together as a coherent political body remains more of a dream than a reality. Whilst this absence of unity in cultural practice and perceptions of identity might appear to be the symptom of a society that has been slowly disintegrating, in what follows I suggest that quite the opposite is true.

Divide That Ye be Not Ruled

The struggles of states to integrate tribes and of tribes to avoid states have long been a topic of scholarly enquiry. One thread to this discourse is particularly relevant to the case of the Kalasha, summed up in the much requoted aphorism which Ernest Gellner used in his seminal ethnography, *Saints of the Atlas* to describe the Berber approach to surrounding states: "divide that ye be not ruled" (Gellner 1969, 41–49). In this brilliant inversion of the imperial maxim, Gellner points our attention to the relative ease with which societies administrated by a centralised authority can be taken over, juxtaposed with the difficulties faced by a state when it attempts to incorporate a society with no pre-existing system of government to co-opt. Malcolm Yapp discusses the same phenomenon in his analyses of the Pashtun (or Pathan) tribes of the Khyber region, which links present day Pakistan and Afghanistan: "in the end the divided character of Pathan tribal organisation defeated the efforts both of the British to subdue the

tribes and of [other local agents] to manipulate them. Like the jellyfish, the absence of a backbone to be broken was the greatest defence of the tribes against the waves of state power which beat upon them"[153] (Yapp 1983, 186).

The tribes discussed by Gellner, Yapp and others[154] lived either outside of state power or were only subject to partial domination by the state. The Kalasha on the other hand, as we have seen, have been subjects of the Mehtar of Chitral since the eighteenth century (Alberto Cacopardo 2001, 136; 2016, 84). In terms of the Kalasha's political and economic independence then, we are talking about a people who have been comprehensively integrated into the state for generations. Whilst subjugation by the state in the case of Kafiristan also meant conversion, this, of course, has not been the case with the Kalasha. Historical circumstance and geography no doubt play an important role here. Until the start of the nineteenth century the three Kalash Valleys which remain today were almost completely surrounded by fellow non-Muslim communities (see Maps 2-5). Whilst Peristan steadily shrunk as its edges were converted[155] the Kalasha remained relatively insulated. Equally, the Kalasha may well have enjoyed a degree of protection from the Chitrali state as their non-Muslim status allowed for their exploitation through disproportionate taxation, *corvée labour* (Parkes 1990, 11) *and perhaps also the enslavement and subsequent sale of individuals.*[156] From the creation of Pakistan onwards, however the control exercised by the Mehtar withered and the Kalasha were 'on their own', completely encircled by Muslim communities and initially at least, offered no protection from Islamic missionary activity.[157] Consequently, the last seventy years may have been particularly intense with regards to evangelism and whilst the dashman boli represents a peak, attempts at conversion remain an everyday experience for the Kalasha. Yet without a religious or political leadership to co-opt,[158] or to borrow Yapp's terminology without a backbone to break, the evangelists have been limited in their impact, able only to erode the Kalasha one convert at a time. Given that the Kalasha population[159] has either remained constant or even grown over recent decades, it seems to be the case that presently at least, those who wish to eradicate the last vestiges of 'Kafiristan' have been thwarted by the Kalasha 'jellyfish'.

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[153] Both Gellner's "divide that ye be not ruled" and Yapp's analogy of Khyberi Pashtun tribal organisation to the anatomy of a jellyfish are quoted in Tapper 1990, 66–67 and Scott 2009, 209–10.

[154] See for example James C. Scott's *The Art of Not Being Governed* (2009a) and the various contributions to *The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan* (Tapper 1983) and *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East* (Khoury and Kostiner 1990).

[155] See Alberto Cacopardo's reconstruction of an ever-shrinking Peristan in *Fence of Peristan* (2016).

[156] Jean-Yves Loude and Viviane Lièvre (1988, 21–22) have argued that the Kalasha's status as non-Muslims made it easier to enslave them, a particularly salient point if we consider that a major income for the mehtars was the sale of slaves (Ali 2018, 69–70). Parkes (1995) has also suggested that the mehtars valued the Kalasha's services as diviners, so their utility may not have been entirely constituted by the ease with which they could be exploited (quoted in Maggi 2001, 23).

[157] Dr Inayatulah Fazi (Principal Chitral Model College, Chitral) in discussion with the author, Chitral, 10 April, 2018.

[158] In his introduction to Robertson's *The Kafirs of the Hindu Kush*, Louis Dupree writes of the conversion of Kafiristan that "[m]any Kafir priests slipped easily into new roles as mullahs" and that "many sons of the power elite [were taken] to Kabul as hostages" (Dupree 1974, xx), two methods of leverage which could not be applied to the Kalasha due to the highly egalitarian nature of their society.

[159] Kalasha-initiated censuses agree that the current population is currently around 4,000 (Luke Rehmat, Director, Kalasha People's Development Network, Anish, Kalash Valleys in discussion with the author, 5 April, 2018). In Parkes DPhil he puts the Kalasha population at around 1,700 and notes that the population is expanding, this is based on a census which he carried out in 1976 (Parkes 1983, 26). In 1991 Alberto Cacopardo puts the Kalasha population at 2,500 (Alberto Cacopardo 1991, 273). The Pakistan Census of 1998 puts the population at 3,700 ('Pakistan Census 1998' n.d.). Other, less reliable sources give the following estimates: 1955 – 2,000 Kalasha, 1984 – 4,000 Kalasha (Ahmed 1986, 24–25) and 1974 – 2,500 (Darling 1979, vii). In his PhD thesis Muhammad Kashif examines a wide range of sources and concludes that the Kalasha population has remained quite stable since the 1950s (Ali 2018, 22–26).

In his discussion of the Onabasulu of Papua New Guinea, Thomas M. Ernst touches on the problem of how to conceptually delimit mutually contingent social groups (1999). His solution is to turn to the language of texture and volume, describing the "edges and boundaries" of Onabasulu society as "soft (or 'thick') rather than hard (or sharp)" (88). Kalasha identity is similarly ill-defined around its edges. There is a haziness to where Kalasha culture stops and Muslim culture starts. Some practices, for example onjes't'a-pragata, betray no influence from Islam and work to define the Kalasha in opposition to Muslims, other practices however have clearly responded to elements of Islamic ideology.[160] The most significant example thus far discussed of Islamic influence is the shift from polytheism to monotheism, but other less fundamental instances are common. For example, Kalasha women quite often veil in the presence of non-Kalasha men, even though purdah plays no part in the 'traditional' Kalasha world view. The reason most often given for veiling is that many local Muslims will comment on the shame which Kalasha women bring upon themselves by going about with their faces uncovered.

The soft edge of Kalasha culture can also be identified in the abandonment or hibernation of practices which in the local context are perceived to be particularly un-Islamic. I am thinking here of the pragmatic attitudes to both tangible and intangible heritage. Taken to an extreme, Islam-orientated accommodations would have a severely erosive effect on the Kalasha's difference to the communities around them. However, in practice, at any one time only part of what makes the Kalasha Kalasha is subject to change. The erosive effects of compromise are also mitigated by the Kalasha's capacity to naturalise external concepts. In the absence of a unified Kalasha dogma there is little to stand in the way of this process of incorporation. In the case of the shift to monotheism we saw how within the space of a generation what was once a response to a critique can be turned on its head and reframed as a fundamental Kalasha belief. Indeed, this import has been so comprehensively naturalised that today it manifests as an oppositional discourse: many Kalasha like to point out how their religion has something over that of the Abrahamic faiths since followers of the latter have their relationship with God mediated by clergy and prophets, whilst Kalasha people enjoy a much more direct relationship with the same deity.[161]

[160] Pervious scholarship has recorded many examples of Kafir and Kalasha cosmology and cultural practice displaying the influence of Islam, see for example Darling 1979, 9; Sperber 1990, 3; Di Carlo 2007, 62; Maggi 2001, 232; Snoy 2008, 55; Alberto Cacopardo and Cacopardo 1992, 370; Augusto Cacopardo 2016, 253.

[161] I experienced an example of how close some Kalasha people believe their relationship with God to be during my first stint of fieldwork (2017-2018). My parents had come to visit me, and I was keen to show them an unusual Kalasha divination practice called *thom kuchek* (bow searching). In thom kuchek a certain gifted man makes a small bow out of juniper (*saras*) or holly oak (*bonj*) and after ritually preparing himself enters a trance-like state. During his trance, with the aid of the bow, he asks a question which his patient has put to him. The trance ends when the diviner has an answer to the question. The patient in this case was my father and the question related to his recovery from a recent operation. The thom kuchek *moc* (bow searching man) produced a positive prognosis and I asked him if he had contacted the *suci*, as I had heard that it was they with whom Kalasha diviners generally consulted. The thom kuchek moc replied however, -perhaps with his foreign audience in mind- that he had bypassed such lesser beings and gone straight to God.

Part II: Europe, Greece and Pakistan from the Kalasha Perspective

Fictive Kinship

> "Kalasha like foreigners because they hear Europeans, white people, will also go to hell" – Calak Nawaz, Mumuret 26.04.2018.

The earliest English language sources to record Kafirs proposing a link between themselves and Europe date from the build up to the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-42). Captain John Wood writes briefly of a Kafir who he came across when exploring Afghanistan for the government of British India and shortly afterwards states that the Kafirs have a "claim of brotherhood to Europeans" (J. Wood 1841, 286–88). Twenty years later Captain H.G. Raverty mentions a Kafir delegation which went to greet the invading British forces in 1839. In Raverty's account the Kafirs welcome the British "as relatives", an association which perplexes the officer who receives them (Raverty 1859, 345–46). Certainly, by citing ties of kinship, both the Kafir who spoke with Wood and the delegation discussed by Raverty could have been trying to lay the foundations of a potential alliance with representatives of a superpower which had recently begun to exercise a great deal of influence on the edges of their world.[162] The 'unbeliever' status which both the Kafirs and the British shared in the eyes of the Muslim majority may well also have suggested the possibility of cooperation. Indeed Raverty records that Sir Alexander Burnes, one of the principal diplomats concerned with the invasion, had written, "Since the British entered Afghánistán, one of the Káfirs near Jellalabad, sent a congratulatory message at the arrival of so many Káfir [i.e. non-Muslim] brethren as ourselves" (Raverty 1859, 319). Although the construction of a narrative of shared kinship would certainly have been politically expedient for the Kafirs, it may equally have been the case that this idea reflected a belief which predated the British invasion. As touched on in Chapter 3, Muslims had long speculated that the population of Peristan was made up of lost Christians. Given the permeability of Peristan to outside concepts, it is quite possible that this idea was absorbed by at least some Kafirs and incorporated into the stories by which they forged their own identities.[163]

With the conversion of Kafiristan, the outside world's speculations over the Kafirs' European ancestry shifted en masse to the Kalasha. From the middle of the twentieth century onwards, the Kalasha increasingly came into contact with European visitors who were drawn to them by the relevance of the encounter to their own senses of self. During the early days of tourism, the memory of exploitation under the Mehtar and the trauma of the dashman boli would still have been fresh and the arrival of influential outsiders who valorised rather than despised them must have been very welcome to the Kalasha. Just as the Kafirs sought to make allegiances with the British through narratives of kinship, the Kalasha were quick to accommodate the shared sense of identity felt by tourists, Maggi, for

[162] Augusto Cacopardo suggests a similar motivation behind the Mir of Nagar's claim to Alexandrian descent in his dealings with British who had a generation before annexed his Karakoram kingdom (Augusto Cacopardo 2011, 49). Cf. also Augusto Cacopardo 2011, 56.

[163] Cf. Augusto Cacopardo 2011, 54–55.

example, records that, “Countless times my Kalasha friends said something like this to me or to other visitors: “We are all Kafirs after all. We are all one *kam*, one lineage”” (Maggi 2001, 29).

Part of the attraction of forging such ties of fictive kinship was and continues to be economic. A particularly neat illustration of the Kalasha’s capacity to make both kin and benefactor out of their Western admirers comes with the number of foreigners who are *dari* to a Kalasha family (myself included). The process of making dari, which is marked by a special ceremony, allows the establishment of kin-like allegiances between individuals of different kam. The ties of dari imply a level of mutual support and in the case of Westerners who are dari to a Kalasha family, remittances are often expected for years after the initial ceremony.

It is possible that, as was arguably the case with the Kafirs, Muslim and later British perceptions of Peristanis as being in some way European had permeated the Kalasha consciousness before their valleys became so heavily exposed to Western tourism. If this seed of an idea did exist, its exponential growth must have been fed by the obvious advantages of forging close connections with comparatively powerful and wealthy non-Muslim outsiders. Yet whilst there is clearly a degree of cynicism in Kalasha dealings with Westerners, it is equally true that the discourse of fictive kinship has, in several significant ways, come to inflect Kalasha understandings of who they are.

In Chapter 3 we discussed how the Kalasha have had contemporary nativist preoccupations with the ‘Islamization’ of Europe projected onto them. The authors of this discourse imagine the Kalasha as their avatars and describe them as both whiter and more liberal than their Muslim neighbours. Whilst the Kalasha do describe themselves as white, this keys in with a Hindu Kush-wide discourse of whiteness and therefore does not, from a Kalasha perspective, distinguish them from Muslim communities. The idea of the Kalasha as more liberal than Muslims does, however, marry well with the Kalasha’s own perceptions of themselves. The belief that they follow a relaxed way of life in contrast to the more ‘rule heavy’ practice of Islam, chimes with European definitions of liberal society and my interlocuters often brought up the point that like Europeans they drink and that their women, like European women, are ‘free’.

Europeans and Pakistanis certainly also believe that Kalasha women are free. Unfortunately, there is also a substantial body of less enlightened Pakistani commentary which reconstrues the discourse of freedom to focus on Kalasha women’s sexuality and imagined sexual availability.[164] Neither Pakistani men looking for sex, nor Pakistani and Western visitors hoping to find something of a matriarchal utopia, however, have their expectations met when they arrive in the Valleys. Almost every Kalasha woman has a story or several stories of having to rebuff the advances of licentious male Pakistani tourists and many visitors whom I have spoken with have expressed their disappointment on discovering that the Kalasha appear to categorise women’s bodies impure and follow a whole raft of restrictions relating to what women can and cannot do. The kind of freeness which the outside world imagines Kalasha women to have, therefore, exists only partially in the case of a secular, liberal understanding of the word and not at all in the case of sexual availability.

[164] See for example the quotes in Appendix IV, especially those taken from *Kalash the Vanishing Culture*, by the widely published journalist A. Sayeed Khan Qamar (Khan Qamar 1999).

The Kalasha are of course anxious to dispel fantasies of promiscuity. Women's freedom however, in the sense that is valorised by secular society, despite being somewhat at odds with the rules of onjes't'a and pragata is readily grafted on to the Kalasha's image of themselves as a free people, who chose out of their own will to follow their customs, who do not observe purdah and whose women may leave their husbands without asking for permission. If the Kalasha sat amongst communities with a strong commitment to gender equality, one would imagine that it could be difficult to maintain the rules governing onjes't'a and pragata alongside a discourse of women's emancipation. The fact that they are surrounded by conservative communities, however, works to soften the secular discourse as it is experienced in the Valleys allowing an understanding of women's freedom to develop, which accommodates both Kalasha perceptions of womanhood that uphold onjes't'a and pragata, and watered-down definitions of gender equality.

Being Kalasha, Pakistani and an Ancient Macedonian

> "Because our women are free and strong… maybe we are descended from Alexander" – Gamburi Shabash, Lahore 02.03.2018.

In his article *Are the Kalasha Really of Greek Origin?* Augusto Cacopardo argues that the Kalasha only incorporated the idea that they could be descended from the army of Alexander the Great into their stories after they were exposed to it by Western visitors (2011, 58). The evidence Cacopardo provides is compelling: none of the first six scholars and travellers to have visited the Valleys mention the Kalasha telling any story which links them to Alexander, this is despite the fact that all six made enquiries regarding the Kalasha's origins (2011, 57). Indeed, it is only after tourists and other visitors had begun to arrive in the Kalash Valleys in considerable numbers that we have records of Kalasha alluding to descent from Alexander's army.[165] Today Kalasha opinion is mixed on the subject with some fervently adhering to the idea they are related to Alexander's soldiers and others dead set against it, whilst many, quite reasonably, state that they do not know who their ancient ancestors were.

Certainly, as with the propagation of ties of fictive kinship between themselves and Westerners more generally, there are practical considerations behind some Kalasha's adherence to the Alexandrian story. Many of those who most vocally advocate for the story worked for the Greek Volunteers, whilst some are still in the pay of the charity. Indeed, several Kalasha who during fieldwork told me that they are uncertain or actively against the story, were according to other interlocuters avid supporters of it at the time when the Greek Volunteers were most active. It is also true however, that there are those who never had anything to do with the Greek Volunteers who claim descent from Alexander's army and that Kalasha interest in the story predates the charity. A friend, for example, told me of how when he was a little boy in the late 1980s his father had told him not to be sacred of the inhabitants of a non-Kalasha village since he, as a Kalasha, was descended from the fearless soldiers of Alexander's army. Although this friend is now uncertain of the Alexander story's veracity, for a long time he never questioned it, especially since, he

[165] See, for example, Bealby 1998, 218.

added, that both Pakistani and foreign tourists were always bringing it up.[166] Whilst my friend's father may have been born at a time when the story was not told, by the time his son was growing up the story was so prevalent that it was coming to be accepted as reality. Thus, as with the example of the Kalasha's move to monotheism, what was at first a novel concept, with the arrival of a new generation may be naturalised.

A generational gap is also apparent in attitudes towards national identity. Kalasha in their late fifties and older remember the time before Chitral became part of Pakistan. Many in this age group told me they don't feel especially Pakistani, although they often had a favourable perception of the more secular elements of the state. Younger informants were more likely to have a stronger sense of national identity, especially if they had government jobs. One schoolteacher in his early 40s for example showed me a poem that he had written in Kal'as'amondr in praise of his country. Amongst those who have been to school, national feeling appears strongest and now that all Kalasha children are passing through public education we can imagine that in the future it will be the norm for Kalasha to identify as Pakistani. There remains a sense however that loyalty to the state is contingent, as one student about to graduate from secondary school told me, "yes I feel proud to be Pakistani, if these people preserve our culture, then I feel proud. Otherwise, I don't".

"We are the Antiques of the World"

The quote above has stuck with me ever since I recorded it on my first trip to the Kalash Valleys. I was researching the dissertation for my master's degree (Crowley 2011) and was asking difficult to answer (and potentially annoying) questions along the lines of "what does it mean to be Kalasha?" The man who I was speaking to didn't hesitate in his answer however and demonstrated what struck me at the time as an exceptionally acute understanding of why people like me travelled so far to experience his culture. On subsequent visits and during my doctoral fieldwork my perspective developed, and I came to understand that being "antiques" was not just something which the Kalasha felt to be projected onto them, but also something which they had incorporated into their identity discourse.

Amongst the abuse which Kalasha complain of receiving from some Pakistanis is that they are *jangali* (primitive / rustic). Whilst this and related slurs are at times also directed at other remote and economically impoverished communities in South Asia (Rycroft and Dasgupta 2011), the Kalasha feel that they get more than their fair share. Indeed, neighbouring communities who are no better off and equally as isolated, also direct this kind of abuse at the Kalasha, singling them out as 'less advanced' by dint of their cultural difference.

Despite its origins in a similarly evolutionally framed othering discourse the sense of antiquity which my interlocuter expressed falls into a different category. Part of this difference, I suggest, stems from the Kalasha's entanglement with European atavistic discourses in general and the classical world in particular. This inflects the Kalasha's antiquity with a 'civilizational' dimension which counters the critique issued by their neighbours that they are 'uncivilised'. The

[166] Cf. Maggi (2001, 116) writing of the early 1990s: "Greek tour groups, for example, come to the Kalasha valleys in large caravans searching for their cultural heritage and passing out little vials of perfume in bottles decorated like Greek vases and coins sporting Alexander the Great's head".

other (and interlinked) aspect of its difference relates to the value which invariance holds for a modernity preoccupied with loss. This value is understood by the Kalasha and the corresponding perception that their culture is worthy of 'preservation' is seized upon to demonstrate its legitimacy. Thus, the Kalasha weather the more locally constructed critique of being of being 'backward' and therefore inferior partly by drawing on a parallel discourse of which views them as a link to a past of great importance.[167]

Kalasha Celebrities

> "Kazi Khosh Nawaz was like the Tolkien of the Kalash Valleys … he drew so many different stories together into a great constellation" - Taj Khan Kalash, Cambridge, 21.10.2019.

> "Long[,] long ago, before the days of Islam, Sikander e Azam came to India. The Two Horned One whom you British people call Alexander the Great. He conquered the world, and was a very great man, brave and dauntless and generous to his followers. When he left to go back to Greece, some of his men did not wish to go back with him but preferred to stay here. Their leader was a general called Shalakash. With some of his officers and men, he came to these valleys and they settled here and took local women, and here they stayed" - Kazi Khosh Nawaz, quoted in Wood 2001, 8–9.

In her celebrated ethnography *In the Realm of the Diamond Queen* (1993) Anna Tsing paints a vivid picture of Uma Adang, a charismatic shaman and also her principal informant. Uma Adang is a member of the Meratus Dayak, a society which shares many similarities with the Kalasha. Like the Kalasha, the Meratus live in a mountainous, geographically marginal location and are also socially marginal, in their case to the Muslim majority population of Indonesia. As with the Kalasha, contrasting identities intersect in the Meratus homelands and when Tsing writes of them that "there is no consensus […] over the terms of community formation but only a cacophony of commentary" (1994, 285) the Kalasha's heterogeneity and individualism are brought to mind.

Reading Tsing's account of Uma Adang reminded me of what I know of the life of Kazi Khosh Nawaz, the Kalasha tradition bearer and storyteller quoted above. Tsing tells us how Uma Adang drew inspiration from the boundaries which crisscross the Meratus' everyday, (she lists "the boundary between Pagan Dyak and Muslim Banjar, the boundary between women's roles and men's, [and] the boundaries of state rule at the edge of 'the wild'" (1993, 20)). We also learn that Uma Adang's perspective was "syncretic and playful" and that she was ready to "unite the old religions and create new ones" (1993, 20). Similarly, Kazi Khosh Nawaz found inspiration for his stories in the varied perspectives which meet in the Kalash Valleys. Past ethnography has recorded how he borrowed extensively from Islamic traditions in order to construct a detailed Kalasha cosmology (Parkes 1991, 88) and the quote above has him incorporating the story of Alexander's army into an existing Kalasha narrative about a military leader called Shal'ak S'a (mistransliterated in the quote as 'Shalakash').

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[167] Cf. Townsend Middleton's discussion of the Gorkha community in Darjeeling leveraging arguments of ancientness in their demand for ethnic recognition (2015).

Kazi Khosh Nawaz and Uma Adang differ however, in the scale of the audiences which their outputs engaged. Tsing observes that Uma Adang had "quite a number of followers" among the Meratus, thanks in part to the relevance which her performances had to the lives of her listeners (1993, 20). Kazi Khosh Nawaz on the other hand told stories which were certainly of relevance to the Kalasha, but which were also pertinent to the agendas of foreigners who had an interest in his culture. Parkes observes that he incorporated Islamic narratives into his versions of Kalasha mythology partly to meet the demands of inquisitive outsiders -especially scholars-[168] on the hunt for coherent cosmologies through which to contextualise Kalasha ritual practice (Parkes 1991, 91). Augusto Cacopardo goes further and although not naming him directly, suggests that that it was he who was initially responsible for spreading the idea among researchers that the Kalasha believe themselves to be descended from Alexander's soldiers (Augusto Cacopardo 2011, 58). Certainly, the Kazi's interpretations were cast far and wide: his words repeatedly crop up in both popular and academic writing on the Kalasha,[169] and in 1998 he even made it into British living rooms when he appeared in the BBC series *In the Footsteps of Alexander the Great* (M. Wood 1998). The quote above comes from the eponymous book written to accompany the series by its presenter, the public historian Michael Wood (2001). [170] It is an indication of how extensively Wood's book has circulated that I first came across the quote, not in one of the many copies held in the University of Cambridge's libraries, but when reading the master's degree thesis of Gul Arab (2015), a member of the extended Kalasha family with which I was staying.

The biographies of both Uma Adang and Kazi Khosh Nawaz demonstrate how the margins can be a productive place for those in the business of creating engaging stories or performances. The "cacophony of commentary" which characterises both their societies allowed them a space free of hegemonic dogma in which to play with different identities and the discourses that intersect in their borderland homes offered them rich sources of inspiration. In one fundamental aspect however, the experience of life on the margins differs between our two subjects. Tsing dwells on majority perceptions of the Meratus as both archaic and fundamentally other (Tsing 1993, 22–23; 1994, 284–89), and certainly the same could be said of Pakistani perceptions of the Kalasha. Yet whilst their marginality has distanced the Meratus from the state-sanctioned discourse of Indonesia, the Kalasha, although marginal in a local context have been claimed as kin by people born half the world away. Through his stories Kazi Khosh Nawaz at once perpetuated and exploited this bond with Westerners.[171] By feeding outsiders what they wanted to hear he gained a source of income as he often charged his listeners, whilst also ensuring that his stories eclipsed those told by other members of his community, winning for himself fame and a legacy like no other Kalasha of his generation.[172]

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[168] See also Maggi 2001, 45.

[169] See, for example Bealby 1998, 210 and 218; Sperber 1992, 112–13 and 118–26; Parkes 1991, 95–100; Loude and Lièvre 1988, 187–96.

[170] In his travelogue *For a Pagan Song* Jonny Bealby records Kazi Khosh Nawaz saying something very similar: ""And we have been here l*ooo*ng time," said the Khazi, shaking his head in a reflective manner. "L*ooo*ng time. Before Mussilman." He rubbed his chin and smiled. "We come with Sikander many time ago: before, before"" (Bealby 1998, 218).

[171] Cf. Parkes (2001, 5) and Frembgen (1993, 50) on Kazis and 'shamans' performing for visitors to the Valleys for a fee.

[172] Of Kazi Khosh Nawaz, Loude and Lièvre write "Kasi seeks recognition of his learning and would like, on that account, to be dispensed from everyday tasks. What he likes most is to go from house to house, to converse and display his knowledge.

Kazi Khosh Nawaz's last broadcast[173] to the world came in an interview for a short documentary released online in 2019.[174] The rheumy-eyed, but still energetic storyteller retold his version of Kalasha origins with the soldiers of Alexander and speculated about his people's future. The codirector and coproducer of the documentary was Sayed Gul, a Kalasha woman in her early thirties who has risen to prominence over the past decade. The documentary represents something of a crossover between two Kalasha modes of engaging with outside interest in their culture. Today, the Kazi's approach feels very much like a past way of doing things: his medium, storytelling, drew from the long-established Kalasha custom of linage-based historical oratory and his fabrications, designed to beguile Westerners, sit within the Kalasha tradition of cultivating misleading knowledge as a means of manipulating relationships with those more powerful than themselves.[175] Sayed Gul by contrast had partnered with Iara Lee, a well-established Brazilian filmmaker and activist to produce a twelve-minute documentary specially designed to be easily shared online.

Sayed Gul's career began to gather momentum whilst she was studying for a master's degree in Archaeology at Hazara University and her potential was noticed by senior academics. Following her degree, she started work for the provincial Directorate of Archaeology and Museums where she was championed by its head, the same Dr Samad whom we discussed in Chapter 3. Currently she is the director of Chitral Museum and since 2013 she has been associated with the National Geographic explorers scheme, a position which has brought her to Washington D.C. several times. Concomitant with her success in the heritage sector has been steady press coverage of her career. Articles in national papers with titles including *Women at Work: Meet Tomb Raider From Kalash* (Khan 2014) and *A Shining Example for Chitral* (Editorial 2014) have been quick to sing her praises, focusing especially on the idea of her as a home-grown saviour of an ancient culture and also presenting her as a successful role model for Pakistani women more generally. In 2016 Sayed Gul rose to prominence again with the release of *Daughter of the Kalash* (Asad 2016), a documentary which takes her as its subject and which thus far has had over a quarter of a million views on YouTube.

Sayed Gul is occasionally mentioned in the same breath as Lakshan Bibi, a decade older and someone whose life has been the subject of much speculation. As a young woman she trained to be a pilot. A Pakistani archaeologist I interviewed told me that 'they say' whenever she took the passenger flight to Chitral she would appear in the cockpit and demand to be handed over the controls so that she could divert course in order to give her natal valley a flyover. After gaining her pilot's licence she set up the Kalash Indigenous Support Programme, an NGO which managed to secure considerable funding. Her development work and growing fame attracted the attention of Pervez

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Courtesy demands that he be treated as a guest. […] His neighbours how him the respect due to his learning, even if they make fun of his eccentricities" (1988, 46).

[173] Kazi Khosh Nawaz died in the night of the third of May 2015 (The Kalasha Times 2015).

[174] *Kalash: Core of Culture* (Kalash and Lee 2019).

[175] Past ethnographers have recorded how rich the Kalasha language is in idioms of subterfuge and I can confirm that many of my Kalasha friends continue to delight in the triumph of a successful lie, the more implausible, the greater the satisfaction. Parkes has convincingly argued that such a culture of deception is -in part- necessitated by the challenges of life as a minority, which has few options when it comes to influencing interactions with more powerful neighbours (Parkes 2001, 3). See also Darling 1979, 10 and Marsden (2005, 34) on "tricks, ploys and hidden devices" in neighbouring Chitrali society.

Musharraf, the then President of Pakistan whom she apparently had some influence over, and here the veil of myth descends again as some claim that he was helplessly in love with her.

Lakshan Bibi was quick to embrace the story of descent from Alexander's solders and on a visit to Greece she is reported to have remarked on similarities between Kalasha and Greek culture. Today she lives in New York but maintains strong connections with the Greek diaspora and recently she has become something of a mouthpiece for Hellenic claims to Macedonian heritage. Her involvement with this issue appears to be closely tied to the activities of the Federation of Associated Laconian Societies, a USA-based Spartan/Greek ethnonationalist organisation. On the 26th of June 2019 at the Grand Prospect Hall, Brooklyn, the Federation sponsored the launch of her book *Kalasha: What I Know*[176] as part of an event titled *Olympic Hellenism: From Leonidas to Alexander and the Kalasha* (Pamir Times 2019; Macedon 2019). In April of the same year she had joined the Federation's float at New York City's Greek Independence Day Parade alongside a banner which read "Macedonia is only one and Greek. Kalasha and Bactrians – Gilgit Baltistan", declaring in an interview released on the Federation's Facebook page that, "I am a proud Kalasha and I am a proud Hellene" (Figure 3.2).

During the course of my doctoral fieldwork three more Kalasha rose to fame. The first was Wazir Zada, a Kalasha development worker who ran for and won a seat in the Provincial Assembly with the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party. This was the first time a Kalasha person has held any significant political power beyond the confines of the Valleys. The elections (2018) in which he campaigned also installed Imran Khan, the PTI candidate as Prime Minister of Pakistan. Wazir Zada has gained considerable popularity across Chitral, so his ability as a politician should not be doubted, but it is also important to take into consideration the political value which the Kalasha had in Pakistan's last general election: we saw in Chapter 3 that both Khan and his rival Bilawal Bhutto appeared in the Valleys as part of their campaigns. Indeed, Wazir Zada has proven to be something of a publicity triumph for PTI with multiple stories in major papers and news outlets celebrating his success.[177]

As Wazir Zada was about to assume office millions of Pakistanis were watching the music video for *Pareek*,[178] a Kalasha song[179] performed by two teenage girls from Kraka' and produced with added instrumentals by Coke Studio, a major Pakistani production company. The girls, who are called Ariana and Amrina -the former having recently changed her name from Pharsi Gul, partly in honour of the American R&B star Ariana Grande- were talent spotted by Coke Studio producers on the hunt for regional musicians to include in their *Explorer* project. Such was the popularity of the song that a string of reporters made the journey from distant Pakistani cities to find and interview the girls,[180] whilst one of the country's major subscription channels, Geo Pakistan, brought them to the studio be the subject of their extremely popular breakfast news show (*Geo Pakistan* 2019).

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[176] I have been unable to find publication details for the book.
[177] See Latif 2018; "PTI Makes History by Appointing First Kalashi as MPA on Reserved Minority Seat" 2018; "Pakistan's First Kalash Lawmaker Wazir Zada Takes Oath" 2018; Hoti 2018 and Ali 2018.
[178] *Pareek, Ariana & Amrina* 2018.
[179] The song's refrain, a transliteration of *parik* "we go" in Kal'as'amondr.
[180] See *BBC News Urdu* 2018; *Inasaf News* 2019; *Khoji TV* 2019.

In the careers of the 'celebrities' we can see particular perceptions of the Kalasha providing avenues for advancement. Thus, first Kazi Khosh Nawaz and later Lakshan Bibi worked with the story of Alexander, Sayed Gul the archaeologist found opportunity in the idea of the Kalasha's ancientness, Wazir Zada benefited from the significance of his people to the country's secular lobby and Ariana and Amrina have their culture's status as one of the most conspicuous minorities within Pakistan to thank for bringing them to the attention of Coke Studio. That four out of our five Kalasha 'celebrities' are women is also significant. Interviews with Sayed Gul and Ariana and Amrina all dwell on the status and roles of women within Kalasha society. The belief, in Pakistan, that Kalasha women offer emancipated role models has therefore provided another route to success.

The wider Kalasha community's perceptions of the 'celebrities' inevitably vary but are generally positive. The anthropologists Jean-Yves Loude and Viviane Lièvre wrote of Kazi Khosh Nawaz that "his neighbours show the respect due to his learning even if they make fun of his eccentricities" (Loude and Lièvre 1988, 46). They also observe that the Kazi was "recognised as a guardian of tradition by the community as a whole" (29). This certainly resonates with the impressions which I gathered after his death: a man who for the majority of the Kalasha represented perhaps the preeminent cultural authority. The success which the other Kalasha discussed have achieved more often than not constitutes a source of cultural pride and is held up as evidence of what members of the community have managed to achieve despite the difficulties it faces. The election of Wazir Zada is the most obvious example of this and was widely celebrated, not least because it is hoped that he will be able to direct greater government resources towards the Valleys. The collusion with the state and with Pakistani culture more generally which gaining success can entail is not necessarily seen as a negative. As discussed above, being Pakistani is not problematic for much of the community, especially if membership of the nation brings with it opportunities which are more likely to be taken by Kalasha than by their neighbours.

Summary: Fluidity and Resilience

This chapter has charted how the Kalasha have negotiated the various discourses which have been projected onto them. We have also seen how they have adapted to the experience of becoming a minority in an increasingly Muslim region. In their responses to this unfolding experience they have demonstrated a great deal of fluidity in how they imagine themselves. When outmanoeuvring evangelists and countering critiques they have deployed the subterfuge of hidden transcripts, but also adapted the narratives by which they define who they are through absorbing elements of Islamic discourse. Aided by an acephalous social structure and a pragmatic approach to potential conflicts, this mutability has made them very resilient to attempts at conversion. A similar process of subterfuge and absorption is evident in their responses to the archaicising discourse and narratives of cultural and genetic kinship. In terms of absorption, national and ethnic origin stories and a more diffuse nostalgia for an imagined pre-modern era have been repurposed into a series of narratives by which they imbue their own culture with value. The opportunities which are engendered by the Kalasha's fluid approach become apparent in the biographies of the

'celebrities'. In their cases we see how remarkable successes has been achieved by actors working with the various ways in which their culture is imagined.

The Kalasha's permeability to multiple identity discourses and their creativity in reimagining their identity recall the borderland communities and theories of marginality discussed in Chapter 2. Through this chapter we have seen how the margins as exemplified by the case of the Kalasha can represent a site of oppression and danger, but we have also observed examples of resilience brought about by an 'indeterminate' way of being. An essential ingredient of this resilience has been the Kalasha's ability to exploit the significance which their variously constructed characteristics hold for dominant discourses in Europe and Pakistan.

Heritage practice weaves in and out of the examples presented above. The KCSS's recruitment of kazis to teach Kalasha customs in the Valleys' schools, and their aim "[t]o publish schoolbooks about the Kalasha tradition and religion for the Kalasha student", Sikandar's film and Sher Hardi's attempts to change the festival songs, Wali Ajis' attitude to the horse heads at the mahandeo, Kazi Khosh Nawaz's adapted origin stories, Syed Gul's documentary and Lakshan Bibi's book are all instances of Kalasha engagement with their heritage. These instances differ greatly from the decontextualised manifestations of heritage discussed in the previous chapter. There we observed how the Kalasha have been instrumentalised in discourses which demark national and ethnic identities. In this chapter we certainly see heritage used as a means to shape and reproduce Kalashaness, but it does not manifest as a singular or especially coherent narrative. Instead, as with the other examples of identity-making it comes across as indeterminate, encompassing disparate elements including ancestral customs as remembered by elders, Islamic concepts and discourses of fictive kinship with Greeks and Europeans.

Vignette 3

Kalasha Fashion

I still remember my first sight of a Kalasha woman. She was heavily pregnant and as my jeep trundled by, she leant against a fence to take a break from her solitary walk up the valley. I had seen very few women over the past few weeks and those who I had noticed were either veiled or more often wearing the regional *chadri* style of *burqa*. Kalasha women rarely veil, but it was not the sight of the woman's uncovered face which stayed with me so much as the clothing she was wearing.[181] Her simple black cotton dress was embellished around the hem, cuffs and neck with geometric patterns, appliquéd in neon-bright green, yellow and orange yarn. Around her waist was wrapped a wide woven and tasselled sash, also brightly coloured and on her head was a yellow and red beaded cap with a cowrie-studded tail which fell halfway down her back.[182] The ensemble was like nothing I had come across so far in Pakistan. As I watched the lady, the excitement of encountering a 'unique' culture bubbled up inside me.

Men and Women's Fashion in the Twentieth Century

Every Kalasha woman wears the same basic elements of clothing: a beaded headdress (*s'us'utr*), a woven sash (*pat'i*), a selection of glass bead necklaces (*ma'hi'k*), trousers (*bhut*), and an all-enveloping dress (*cew*). On ritual occasions or sometimes as a shade from the summer sun Kalasha women wear an extra headdress on top of the *s'us'utr,* this is the *kupas*, the only element of women's clothing that could be described as ceremonial (Figures 5.1 and 5.2). Everything else is worn every day, although indoors the heavy s'us'utr is occasionally taken off and hung up. In the twelve years I have had the privilege of staying in the home of my host family, I never once saw a woman wearing anything but her cew and pat'i. When women leave the Valleys for more than a day or so and especially when they travel to one of Pakistan's cities, they abandon their Kalasha clothing and adopt Muslim fashions,[183] but when in the Valleys, Kalasha women always dress as Kalasha. If a woman converts to Islam, one of the first things she does is discard every aspect of her Kalasha clothing, even her necklaces. This is despite the fact that there is nothing in how Kalasha women dress which contravenes qur'anic codes of modesty.

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[181] See also Wynne Maggi's first impressions on arriving in the Kalash Valleys (Maggi 2001, 16).
[182] See Wynne Maggi's chapter on Kalasha fashion in *Our Women are Free* and Brigitte Sperber's publication, *Kalash Dresses, Body Decorations, Textile Techniques*, produced for the Second International Hindukush Cultural Conference, a copy of which is held by the archive of Moesgård Museum, Denmark (Maggi 2001, 94-116; Sperber 1990).
[183] This can be fun. Once when visiting a Kalasha family who were staying in Peshawar I took the women on a trip to visit the Museum. At home the women wore practical and comfortable *shalwar kameez*, but before we headed out they had changed into a remarkably diverse array of Islamic fashions from a Gulf-inspired all black *abaya* complete with *niqab* to a chintzy *kurta* and cashmere shawl.

In photographs taken by visitors during the first half of the twentieth century only a few men can be seen wearing *shalwar kameez*, (the traditional Muslim dress of South Asia), most are in *phusti*, wide legged, short woollen trousers with a tasselled waist flap that were unique to the Kalasha and their non-Muslim neighbours (Figure 5.3). For several generations, however, Kalasha men have abandoned phusti in favour of shalwar kameez or other more Western-derived fashions.[184] The explanation that I have most often heard for the wholesale adoption of outside fashions is that over the course of the last fifty years or so, men have spent an increasing amount of time outside the Valleys, often working in Pakistan's cities for months or even years on end. This consistent exposure to the rest of the country apparently dictated not only how Kalasha men dressed when travelling or working away, but also how they clothed themselves when they returned home.

The same 'opening up' of the Kalasha experience to the outside world which led men to change how they dress also prompted a dramatic reinterpretation of their clothing by Kalasha women. The women, however, who until recently rarely left the Valleys for long, opted to do the opposite, dressing to accentuate rather than hide their ethnic identity. In the photographs which show men wearing phusti, women can be seen in clothing made up of the same basic elements as those worn today (Figure 5.4). What has changed however, are the materials from which women now make their clothing. Of all the elements in Kalasha women's costume the cew (dress) has proven to be the most dynamic. Heavy brown-black woollen cloth was quickly abandoned in favour of cheap black nylon-cotton mixes[185] and synthetically dyed woollen knitting yarn provided a strongly contrasting element with which to embellish the cew. Designs were filled in with vibrant blocks of colour achieved through a laborious appliqué technique whereby individual threads of yarn are stitched directly onto the cew. Yet despite the labour involved in decorating a cew, fashions change yearly. This dynamism also means that traditional motifs have long been abandoned as Kalasha women search for ever-new sources of inspiration.

The powerful visual appeal of cew and the rest of the ensemble worn by Kalasha women marries well with tourists' desire to record their visits to the Valleys through video and photography. The annual high point for tourism coincides with the Zhoshi festival, a time when men and women come together at a small number of sites to dance, a tradition which provides visitors with the best opportunity for observing Kalasha fashion.[186] Indeed today, the presence of tourists filming the Zhoshi dances has become so ubiquitous that when I asked a class of Kalasha school children to make drawings of the festival, many of the students included crowds of smartphone-wielding spectators (Figures 5.5a and b). Beyond the Valleys, within Pakistan, Kalasha women and their costume have entered the visual

[184] The only stipulated time when phusti are worn at present is during the gos'tnik ceremony when young Kalasha boys are 'traditionally' dressed as part of their transition into adulthood, although occasionally an adult male enthusiast might wear a specially commissioned or lovingly preserved pair of phusti during one of the Kalasha's major festivals.

[185] Brigitte Sperber and Wynne Maggi record slightly varying accounts of the first adoption of cotton cew. In both accounts the first cotton cew are made and worn by a delegation of Kalasha women visiting a Pakistani city -and therefore somewhere considerably hotter than the Valleys- for a cultural festival at some point in the 1970s. Maggi has the delegation visit Karachi, whilst in Sperber's account it is Islamabad (Sperber 2008, 139 and Maggi 2001, 108–9).

[186] See *Dressing to Keep From Disappearing*, an online article and video about Kalasha fashion and Zhoshi, commissioned by the Horniman Museum and Gardens (Crowley 2013).

texture of daily life, regularly featuring in tourism promotions, news programmes, national papers, music videos[187] and even serving as inspiration for a designer clothing line.[188] For the rest of the world too, what Kalasha women wear has come to be intrinsically entwined in how their culture is imagined. Newspaper articles, travel blogs and coffee table books featuring the Kalasha are inevitably illustrated with images of women in colour-saturated dresses. A google search for “Kalasha” brings up almost exclusively the same sort of imagery, in Figure 5.6 for example, only one Kalasha man is visible, whilst the first twenty results all show Kalasha women.

Fashion, Authenticity and the Importance of Being Admired

The increased proximity of the Kalasha to the global market from 1970s onwards provided ready and cheap access to the synthetically dyed yarns and nylon-cotton mixes which characterised the new cew. The material means to produce the cew do not on their own, however, fully account for the way in which Kalasha women reimagined how they dressed. The 1970s also saw tourism begin in earnest (Darling 1979, 6), a process rapidly accelerated by the construction of jeep roads to each of the three valleys. The growing exposure of the Kalasha is an important factor in explaining the explosion of creativity represented by the evolution of Kalasha women’s clothing over the past forty years. Although Kalasha women make dresses to impress and inspire each other and often give or exchange dresses in the strengthening of friendships, many women are also very much aware of their audiences beyond the confines of the Valleys.

Before heading to the field, I was commissioned by Cambridge University’s Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology to collect a contemporary Kalasha woman’s costume. I chose a mother and her daughter whom I knew well, to make an outfit from scratch and recorded the process for the Museum. This happened during the build-up to the Zhoshi festival, which felt like a particularly appropriate time as the village was humming with the whirring of sewing machines as women stitched new designs onto the cew which they were planning to dance in. Zhoshi is one of only two moments in the year when Kalasha from all three valleys get together and it is particularly important for young adults as it represents the best opportunity to find a potential husband or wife. Men and women therefore strive to look their best at Zhoshi. The occasion also represents a pivotal moment for Kalasha fashion as at each Zhoshi a few women will try out new yarn-appliqué or beading designs and if they prove popular and are adopted by others, the innovator has the satisfaction of having become a trend setter.[189]

For the Museum dress the daughter stuck with a beautiful if conventional foliate design, albeit with the addition of striking spiral patterns which no one had yet tried and which she thought might attract positive attention from other

[187] The most prominent musicians to have used Kalasha women in a video were the Pakistani ‘mega group’ Vital Signs who shot the video for their song *Gori* in the Kalash Valleys, released on their first album *Vital Signs 1* in 1989 (Vital Signs 1989; *Gori by Vital Signs* 1989). In 2018 Kalasha women again featured in a hit music video, this time signing a track based on a Kalasha song, albeit heavily produced by Coke Studio, the biggest recording studio in Pakistan (Ariana and Amrina 2018; *Pareek, Ariana and Amrina, Coke Studio Explorer* 2018).
[188] The now defunct label Shubinak had boutiques in Lahore, Islamabad and Chitral town as well as an outlet in Canada.
[189] Brigitte Sperber observed how individual women initiate wide ranging change in Kalasha fashion based on observations made between 1983 and 1990 (Sperber 1990, 2).

women. It was not just Kalasha women that the daughter was keen to impress however, as she also told me that the presence of tourists and even the odd TV crew at Zhoshi adds to the excitement and sense of occasion. For the mother on the other hand, the furore was too much and despite being an innovative designer herself, she chose to stay at home rather than face the crowds of camera-wielding strangers.

As the mother's response demonstrates, the heavy tourist presence at Zhoshi can be unwelcome. This is especially the case since tourists are often pushy in demanding Kalasha pose for photos, and every year a few try to grope or proposition Kalasha women. Corrosive tourism at Zhoshi represents the sharp end of the globalisation of Kalasha culture, a phenomenon in which the clothing Kalasha women wear has clearly played an important part. Although every Kalasha woman I have spoken to on the subject takes great pride in the beauty of her costume, many men and women are not entirely comfortable with contemporary cew. One well-known Kalasha activist for example, told me that most of what women wear today has "nothing to do with the culture" whilst his acolyte, herself resplendent in a cew yarn-appliquéd in deep red added "yes, dresses are just fashion".

During other conversations I have heard the healthiness of old 'traditional' cew contrasted with the unhealthiness of new cew. The materiality of the old versus the new appears to be especially pertinent here. Whilst previously cew were made with wool sheared from sheep grazed in the Valleys, which was then spun and woven in the village, as we have seen, the new incarnation is an amalgamation of generic, globally available products and designs. For some Kalasha then, women's fashion is too outwardly constituted to feel properly of their culture. The old cew represented the product of an economy which was confined in its entirety by the Kalasha's world, whereas the new cew are dependent on a globalised flow of resources and the hunger to consume of domestic and international tourists. Bound up in how the new cew are perceived by those who are troubled by them is the sensation that they embody a loss of Kalasha agency in the means through which their identity is constructed. As one young man told me, "soon there will be no Kalasha culture, only the dresses".

Equally, however, the attention generated by women's clothing plays an important role for the Kalasha. Even those who are especially concerned about the negative connotations of tourism acknowledge that it constitutes an important source of income. It is also true that clothing is significant in less quantifiable ways. The crowds and TV crews at Zhoshi do more than just provide women like the daughter with a vastly expanded audience when the time comes to show off their creations. The celebrity of the festival along with the wide circulation of images and videos of women in their costumes demonstrate to all the residents of the Valleys that this aspect of Kalasha culture commands the admiration of a significant international audience. Bearing in mind that dealing with the critique directed at them by local Muslims represents an ongoing struggle, the fame generated by women's costumes can be understood to be particularly valuable. If people from around the world eagerly consume stories and images of Kalasha culture, or else come to the Valleys to experience it for themselves,[190] then surely it cannot be as bad as it is made out to be.

[190] Cf. Maggi 2001, 30.

Figure 5.1. The tails of six s’us’utr and two kupas hanging out to dry outside a family home. Note the variety in the patterns and colours of the beading on the s’us’utr. (Photograph with kind permission of Llantén Nó Cisneros).

Figure 5.2. Jon and Nabaig of the Sharakat kam drumming for dancers at Zhoshi 2013. Women wear ceremonial kupas over their s’us’utr. (Photograph the author and Alex Robertson).

Figures 5.3 and 5.4. Above: the man on the left wears phusti, whilst his neighbour is in shalwar kameez. Below: women in cew, pat'i and kupas. The photographs were taken in Rumbur Valley during Zhoshi by Halfdan Siiger in 1947. (Copyright Moesgaard Museum, Denmark).

Figure 5.5a. Gul Nizar's drawing of Zhoshi, featuring dancers and a mixed audience of Kalasha men and tourists, both filming on their smartphones. (Spring 2018, Kalasha Dur School).

Figure 5.5.b. Tourists at Zhoshi 2013. (Photograph the author and Alex Robertson).



Figure 5.6. Screen capture of Google Images results for the search “Kalash Pakistan” taken on 16 September 2019. A clear illustration of how images of women and their clothing dominate visual representations of the Kalasha.

Chapter 5

The Ecotone and the Kalash Valleys

Each Kalasha clan has a jestakhan, a 'temple' dedicated to the goddess Jestak, who acts as something of a community guardian. During my last stint of fieldwork I had a chance to visit the jestakhan of Batrik village (Figures 5.1-5.5). It had been completed two years previously and was commissioned by villagers to replace a much older predecessor. As with other jestakhan in the Kalash Valleys its entrance and supporting columns were elaborately carved. Most of the carvings reflected the wider Kalasha vernacular. The gok s'ing patterns which we discussed in Vignette 1, for example, were especially evident, but there were also several innovations.

The inside of the jestakhan's doors bore a clockwise swastika and a counterclockwise sauwastika below which was a double representation of a horned head (Figure 5.3). I had seen none of the symbols before in the Kalash Valleys, but their significance was clear. The swastika and sauwastika reference the Kalasha's wider Indo-European cultural setting whilst the horned heads are taken from the woodcarving tradition of Waigal,[191] an area of former Kafiristan around 100 kilometres to the southwest of the Valleys. Waigal is significant as many Kalasha tell a story handed down through the generations which locates the area as a past homeland. Further into the building more innovations were visible. Representations of the tall *rha mut'* or Himalayan cedars (*Cedrus deodara*) which are so distinctive of the Valleys appeared as did *gringa'* a sort of torc which was worn by Kalasha women in the days of the woollen cew (Figure 5.4). What stuck me most however was the treatment of one of the *onjes't'a* wã, the most sacred parts of the jestakhan (Figure 5.5). There, above the usual carved ram and sheep heads and the sprig of the sacred herb *saras* (juniper / *Juniperus*) were the moon and star of Pakistan (and Islam) and the Vergina sun joined together by a heart.

It is hard to imagine a neater crystallisation of the intersection of heritage discourses which make up contemporary Kalasha identity than Batrik's jestakhan. The mixture of pre-existing Kalasha symbolism and the references to the former ecumene of Kafiristan anchor the building in ancestral memory. The swastika and sauwastika reflect the Kalasha's entanglement in the European atavistic imagination and the symbols of Pakistan and ancient Macedonia tie into the national discourses

[191] See Klimburg 1999 for examples of Waigali horned heads.

which have claimed them. This combination of so many different identities in a single space brings to mind the overlap and comingling of systems and species which characterises the ecotone. Although the jestakhan was a heavily used ritual space and deeply grounded in village life, it also had an indeterminate quality, the symbolism of its fabric making it impossible to attribute in its entirety to a single identity. Whilst it was clearly principally Kalasha, it was also to varying degrees Pakistani, Muslim, Macedonian, Greek, Wagali and European.

Nothing else that I have come across encapsulates the discursive complexity of Kalasha identity so explicitly as Batrik jestakhan, but similar condensations are evident elsewhere in the Valleys. In this chapter I will examine a series of examples, first returning to the clothing worn by Kalasha women before revisiting the formal settings of Government Kalasha Primary Schools and the Kalasha Dur. What follows draws on the metaphor of the ecotone to demonstrate that the heritages combine both in the cultural outputs of the Kalasha and in the projects of outsiders once they enter the Valleys.



Figure 5.1. Sketch plan of Batrik jestakhan.

Figure 5.2. Batrik jestakhan looking across the central hearth. On the far wall are drawings, made with a paste of mixed soot and water during the Caumos festival. The drawings represent ibex and markhor. (Photograph Llantén Nó Cisneros).



Figure 5.3. The doors to Batrik jestakhan. The upper image shows the door in context. At the top half of the door are the swastika and sauwastika, below are the Waigali horned heads. (Photograph Llantén Nó Cisneros).

Figure 5.4. A supporting column in Batrik jestakhan. On the upper section of the column is a representation of a Himalayan cedar. Framing the roundel in the centre of the column are two representations of gringa'. (Photograph Llantén Nó Cisneros).

Figure 5.5. Onjes’t’a wã in Batrik jestakhan. Above the ram and sheep heads and the sprig of juniper, splattered with the libationary blood of sacrificed animals are the moon and star of Pakistan and the Vergina sun. (Photograph Llantén Nó Cisneros).

Returning to Cew

As we have just seen Kalasha women’s clothing as worn in the Valleys exactly maps the boundary between their community and Islam. However, whilst taken as a whole, each Kalasha woman’s outfit proclaims her difference from her Muslim counterparts, individual components of the costume tell a different story. Two elements in women’s clothing bridge the gap between Kalasha and Muslim. The first is the shalwar trousers which all Kalasha women have worn for the past two or three generations. Not evident in the era of woollen cew, shalwar are a quintessential part of traditional South Asian Muslim clothing for both men and women. By adopting them, Kalasha women, in part, conformed to wider Islamic standards of dressing. The second element is the use of shawls by many Kalasha women. Whilst there is nothing particularly Islamic about wearing a shawl, in recent years younger Kalasha women have also started to pull their shawls up over their faces when in spaces which are shared with tourists or Muslim neighbours. In so doing they adapt a costume which proclaims their difference from Muslims to conform to regional interpretations of purdah.

The responsiveness of what Kalasha women wear to the presence of tourists and the role which Zhoshi plays in driving change in fashion offers another example of admixture. The vast majority of the tourists and TV crews at Zhoshi are Pakistani. Their motivations for making the trip to the Kalash Valleys of course vary, but almost all relate in some way to the Kalasha's difference from the Islamic norm of Pakistan. Kalasha complain that some are there to get drunk and gawp at what for them is an unusual spectacle, or worse still, they have been drawn to Zhoshi by fantasies of Kalasha women's sexual availability. Most of the Pakistani tourists I met were more sensitive to their surroundings. They were often keen to stress how important it was that the Kalasha should be supported by the state in their efforts to maintain a distinct religious and cultural identity. These visitors are the kind of people who valorise Kalasha women like Syed Gul or Amrina and Ariana. They are the voters whom Pakistani presidents and presidential candidates attempt to woo when they stage visits to the Valleys. For them, being at Zhoshi resonates with their aspirations for a cosmopolitan, tolerant Pakistan.

The development of Zhoshi into an event which is engaged in -albeit from a spectator's point of view- by the rest of Pakistan and the contingency of Kalasha fashion on this blurs the boundary between what is Pakistani and what is Kalasha. Whilst there are aspects to this interrelation which make many members of the community uncomfortable, Pakistani perceptions have never-the-less played a role in shaping Kalasha cultural practice. Without an audience drawn by the otherness of the Kalasha to the Muslim norm of Pakistan the clothing worn by Kalasha women, whilst still no doubt remaining distinct, would not be what it is today.

Kalasha are not the only people to wear cew in the Valleys. At times Kalasha women will dress a foreign or Pakistani friend in their spare clothes. This might last only for a few hours or until the visitor returns to her hotel. In instances when a -typically Western- outsider stays with a Kalash family for a prolonged period of time however, it is not uncommon for her to be given cew and encouraged to wear it on a daily basis. Occasionally there might be an underlying economic agenda as Kalasha women do well by selling old, out of fashion cew to visitors, but generally speaking dressing friends is a financially disinterested act. In these moments Kalasha women materialise the bonds which link them to outsiders, combining their identities with those of their friends. Such crossovers of differing heritages are reminiscent of the feeling of 'coming home' which Maraini and Bealby record about their visits to the Valleys, or even Lerounis' conversion to the Kalasha religion. They demonstrate that the Kalash Valleys can be a place of blurred identity not only for those who are from there, but also for those who pass through.

The phenomena relating to Kalasha women's clothing which we have just discussed reflect Viejo Rose's definition of the ecotone as a space where "ecological systems meet and mingle, sometimes forming a new community of species" (2019, 49). To continue with the metaphor, the 'ecological systems' which we have seen 'meeting and mingling' in the examples of the shalwar and the shawls are the heritage discourses of Kalasha women's clothing and South Asian Muslim women's clothing. In the example of Zhoshi and cew, we see the same Kalasha 'system' mixing with a different 'system', this time a discourse which draws on the cosmopolitan vision of Pakistan promoted by the nation's founders. Finally, in the example of women dressing their friends in cew, the non-Kalasha part of the mix can be any of the discourses by which outsiders identify with the Kalasha, including a sense of shared European heritage. The 'new communities' which form as a result of the 'systems' intermixing in these examples are all temporally limited except in the case of their one tangible manifestation: the wearing of shalwar. In the drawing of veils, the celebration of Zhoshi, or the dressing of friends we see moments of combination that are engendered by particular circumstances, but which last only as long as those circumstances dictate.

Kraka' Government Kalasha Primary School and the Kalasha Dur

In Chapter 3 and the Vignette preceding it we discussed the dissonant aspects of the Kalasha Dur and the Government Kalasha Primary Schools. The Primary Schools, it emerged, had been embroiled in a long-standing tussle between the Ministry of Minorities and more Islamic-leaning elements of the provincial government. The Kalasha Dur and associated projects had been leveraged by Greece in its dispute with North Macedonia. The building itself had been targeted by the Taliban and was being eyed up by the Directorate of Archaeology and Museums, the head of which told me it was high time that state of Pakistan took full control over what had become the de facto centre of efforts aimed at 'preserving' the Kalasha. In what follows I will return to the same sites, and whilst conflict is certainly not absent from what comes to light, we will see another side to the sites' ontology as zones of complex intersection.

The idea of the Government Kalasha Primary Schools had been in the pipeline for some time but stalled over building costs. In the late 1990s Lerounis and his colleagues filled the breach and constructed a series of buildings that the government could use as schools. The first of these was completed in 1997 and is located just outside Kraka' village. The gate into the school compound entrance displays the same Greco-Kalasha style as evidenced in the Kalasha Dur (Figure 3.3.) and alongside the school building the water supply (which was also provided by the Greeks) has been constructed to resemble a traditional communal fountain in a Greek village (Figure 5.6). To one side

of the fountain is an empty alcove which I was told originally housed a bust of Alexander, until it was either taken or smashed by people presumably motivated by it's idol-like qualities. Above the fountain is a dedication in Greek to future Kalasha school children and to the endurance of Greek and Pakistani friendship (Figure 5.7).

When I first visited the school in 2008 it did not strike me as a place of dissonance. It was morning assembly and the students, all of whom were Kalasha, were standing to attention as the Pakistani flag was raised (Figure 5.8). The teachers, all of whom were also Kalasha, told me about how the Greeks and the Pakistani government both provided the funds to create a school where Kalasha students would feel free of victimisation. Later, along with the other Government Kalasha Primary Schools the school at Kraka' would become entangled in the conflict between Sunni and cosmopolitan lobbies and after the kidnap of Lerounis in 2010 ongoing Greek education funding ground to a halt. In 2008 however, the dedication above the fountain felt like it rang true. For a moment, at least, Greek, Pakistani and Kalasha agendas had aligned.

Figure 5.6. The fountain at Kraka’ Government Kalasha Primary School. (Photograph Llantén Nó Cisneros).

Figure 5.7. Inscription on the fountain at Kraka’ Government Kalasha Primary School. (Photograph Llantén Nó Cisneros).

Figure 5.8. Raising the flag at morning assembly in summer 2008, Kraka' Government Kalasha Primary School. To the right of the flagpole is the entrance shown in Figure 3.3. (Photograph the author).

A similar, but less harmonious overlay of multiple discourses was evident in the Kalasha Dur when I briefly taught at one of its two schools in the spring of 2018. The school which I was associated with was the only school in the Valleys to have been directly founded by Kalasha teachers. It was also the only middle school attended exclusively by Kalasha children and staffed exclusively by Kalasha teachers. It was the brainchild of two men in their thirties and when I was there, they were struggling to achieve government recognition and funding. The other school in the Kalasha Dur was a primary school which was also made up of entirely Kalasha staff and students. The primary school represents the last vestige of Greek involvement in the Valleys since its teachers' salaries are still covered by funds from Greece. The rest of the complex was taken up by the Kalasha Dur Museum, the curation of which had originally been a Greek and Kalasha collaborative operation. Since opening the museum has been staffed by Kalasha who are employed by the Directorate of Antiquities and Museums, which, as we know has aspirations to move both schools out and take over the entire Kalasha Dur complex.

There is a narrative of succession to the story of the Kalasha Dur, first almost entirely a Greek operation, it may soon become an entirely Pakistani operation. Currently it appears to be in an in-between phase with elements of Greek, Pakistani and direct Kalasha control all evidenced in different aspects of the space. The Kalasha people who work in the various institutions of the Kalasha Dur to some extent reflect the building's divisions in their loyalties. But they also pass information on to each other, and in this sense function as a single community united by their Kalasha identity. Further coherence across institutions comes in the knowledge that everyone, in their own way, is pro-Kalasha. Given the Taliban's recent targeting of the building, this in and of itself represents a shared identity engendered through the risk posed by a common enemy.

The fabric and material contents of the Kalasha Dur reflect its social complexity. The potent external symbolism of the building we have already discussed at length. Within the museum however the messaging is far more neutral. The bulk of the displays are made up of contemporary Kalasha objects and a selection of heirlooms which Kalasha families have donated. There are also artefacts which came to light during the digging of a nearby watercourse and a permanent exhibition of photographs taken by Morgenstierne during his visit to the Kalash Valleys at the end of the 1920s. The centrepiece of the museum is a carefully reconstructed Kalasha house, which had been lived in and maintained for generations, but which was due to be demolished as its owners felt it was no longer fit for purpose. The labelling in the museum is sparse and describes each object rather than attempting to establish an overall narrative. The general impression I got from the wider community was that they were happy with the museum as it was useful to have a repository for their material culture and because it was understood to funnel the interests of tourists away from actual Kalasha people and their homes. There was also a sense that the museum is something to be proud of. It is indeed a beautiful space and the comments in the visitors book tend to be very complimentary about both the displays and the culture represented.

Above the museum is the library, equipped with a comprehensive selection of books concerning the Kalasha and the cultures of the wider region. In the middle of the room sits a tabletop display case, adapted to fit within a carefully carved but heavily worn door from another part of Pakistan (Figure 5.9). The case presents a genealogical arrangement of the Greco-Bactrian kings, where possible illustrated with a coin depicting the ruler. At the top of the case a label states that the arrangement is by Professor Ahmad Hassan Dani.

Dani (1920-2009) was amongst Pakistan's best known and most influential archaeologists, and for the first twenty years of the country's existence he was instrumental in forging for it a pre-Islamic national identity. Building on the interests of British archaeologists whom he had trained under, Dani

focused on two aspects of Pakistan's pre-Islamic past as it was then understood: the Aryan invasions and the Buddhist culture of Gandhara (Zahir 2012, 92-134). For Dani, the Aryans and Gandhara shared the advantage that they orientated the country towards Central Asia and therefore contributed to the nationalist project of suppressing cultural and historical links with India (Amstutz 2019).

Gandhara had left a rich and highly distinctive archaeological legacy of monuments and sculpture, often carved in the locally occurring schist. These carvings had long interested European archaeologists, art historians and collectors (Amstutz 2019, 3) as they displayed strong Hellenistic influences, derived from Gandhara's absorption into the Greco-Bactrian empire, which, in the second and third centuries BCE spread Hellenic culture across what is today Central Asia and northwestern Pakistan. Museums established by the British often foregrounded displays of Gandharan material, a tendency which Pakistani curators built on, reinterpreting the artefacts as the patrimony of the new nation. Museum displays combined with gallery guides, popular histories and television broadcasts to reinforce this narrative and Gandhara came to be widely understood - domestically at least- as distinctly Pakistani heritage (Amstutz 2019, Bhatti 2012, 83-112; Zahir 2012, 96-97; Joffe 2009).

The Gandharan civilization had its centre in the area around Peshawar, the capital of the province in which the Kalash Valleys are located. The archaeology department at the University of Peshawar has for generations been dominated by work on Gandhara. Peshawar Museum holds one of the country's most impressive collections of Gandharan material and functions as the headquarters of the provincial Directorate of Archaeology and Museums. The Directorate also runs a substantial museum in the town of Mingora which is in a large part dedicated to locally found Gandharan artefacts. Across the province Gandharan sites including several impressive stupas are administered by the Directorate.

The placing of a Greco-Bactrian themed display case at the epistemological heart of the Kalasha Dur has significant symbolic importance. It achieves a crossover between the discourse propagated by the Greek Volunteers and the Hellenic aspects of Gandhara. In so doing it links the fabric and the original narrative of the building to the other museums administered by the provincial Directorate and to the wider archaeological discourse of the province. The case's association with Dani also reminds us of the integral role which Gandhara plays in the nation's imagining of its pre-Islamic heritage and situates the Kalasha Dur in a discourse by which, in its early years, Pakistan strove to differentiate itself from India.

As with the examples relating to cew, the heritage combinations -or ‘new communities’ in the language of the ecotone- which we have just discussed have intangible and tangible manifestations. Although lasting considerably longer than the fleeting admixtures represented by acts like veiling in the presence of Muslims, intangible alignments like that which happened at Kraka’ school and that which is current at the Kalasha Dur are, nevertheless, limited in their duration by a great many factors. In Kraka’ school, whilst Kalasha teachers, Pakistani officials and Greek development workers collaborated, agendas came together which were inspired by three different heritage discourses: those of the Kalasha as a united ethnicity, those of a cosmopolitan Pakistan and those of the Greek nation. Shifts in domestic politics and the withdrawal of the Greek Volunteers from the Valleys saw the end of this particular ‘community’ of heritages. Across the three institutions of the Kalasha Dur a comparable ‘community’ of heritage-inspired agendas currently exists. But if the Directorate has its way, or if Greek funding dries up, then the work carried out within the Kalasha Dur will become considerably more homogenous in terms of the heritage agendas which drive it.

The tangible heritage of Kraka’ school bears testimony to the combination of agendas which brought it into being. Although no longer subject to Greek influence, it still displays the symbolism and inscriptions inspired by the Greek heritage discourse. In the case of the Kalasha Dur, a particularly rich material assemblage of different heritage discourses is currently extant and may well continue to be even after the intangible dynamic of the building shifts. The symbolism of the building’s fabric represents contemporary Greece’s claim to its classical antecedent as well as its claim to the Kalasha’s heritage. The artefacts in the museum represent Kalasha family heritages (especially potently in the reconstructed house), and the case attributed to Dani represents Pakistan’s pre-Islamic heritage and the institutional heritage of the provincial Directorate of Archaeology and Museums.

Figure 5.9. The case of Greco-Bactrian kings in the Kalasha Dur library. (Photograph the author).

Schoolbooks

> "From Primary level school [...] we are reading and listening about the history of Pakistan and history of the Muslim peoples, so therefore we are following them, […] they are saying you know this is good, this is better, this religion is good […] so therefore we are following their […] books because we have no book" - Takl'a Khan (a Kalasha teacher in training), Lahore, 27.01.2018.

Many Kalasha who teach in the Valleys' primary and middle schools are concerned about the state-mandated syllabus. Extra to the subject of Islamiyat, which we discussed in Chapter 3, there is also the heavily Islam-orientated compulsorily course of Pakistan Studies and even schoolbooks on subjects like the sciences and English exhibit a strong Islamic-nationalist agenda (Figure 5.10). The fear is that the current syllabus will turn youngsters away from their culture.

In response there is a move to create a Kalasha schoolbook which will cover the community's history, culture and religion. There is provision in education legislation for minorities to create courses about their own culture and several teachers told me that they have started work on a book.

When I asked about what might go into the book instances came up of the kind of heritage fusions which we have just been discussing. One teacher for example interpreted petroglyphs pecked onto rocks in the mountains above the Valleys as a Kalasha holy script, combining both ancient Greek and Hebrew characters. Another claimed that only the Kalasha of his valley, Mumuret, are descended from Alexander's army, using this as justification for why his interpretation of Kalasha tradition is superior to that of Kalasha from other valleys.

Whilst five teachers told me that they had either started work on a book or had aspirations to do so, only one expressed the desire to produce a collaborative effort with input from across the Kalasha community. He shared his frustrations, claiming that his colleagues were reluctant to pool information and even recounted how some of his notes had been stolen by a rival, jealous of the research which he had accumulated. Several teachers also complained of elders who refused to impart their traditional knowledge, stating that there was a general climate of mistrust around the creation of the schoolbook. At the core of this mistrust is the same wariness which the projects of the Greek Volunteers had engendered in some Kalasha. Just as it was believed that Lerounis had gained a "monopoly" over the representation of Kalasha culture, it is now feared that the author of the successful schoolbook will realise the power to define Kalasha heritage.

The one Kalasha-centric publication which does circulate in Valleys' schools is the alphabet book. This book, or rather collection of small books was printed with funds from Hellenic Aid and is used to teach Kalasha primary school children a standardised Kal'as'amondr orthography. The book has its origins in a conference held in Islamabad in December 2000 which brought together Kalasha teachers and an international group of linguists. At the conference, the Kalasha delegates decided to adopt an adapted Roman script, rather than employ the originally Arabic-derived script, which is used to write Urdu, the national language of Pakistan. The reason given for this was twofold: firstly that it was more straightforward to add the necessary phonetic symbols to Roman script and secondly that a Roman script would help the Kalasha students learn European languages.[192] This second reason resonates with the Kalasha's European orientation and suggests that alongside practical considerations, Urdu might not have been favoured because of its Islamic connotations.

Accompanying the creation of the alphabet book there was an initiative, spearheaded by the Greek Volunteers, to seek out original Kal'as'amondr versions of words which had been loaned from other languages. If a Kal'as'amondr antecedent could not be found then a Kal'as'amondr word with a different, but relatable meaning might be used instead. This preoccupation with the purity of language is at odds with spoken Kal'as'amondr which is full of loanwords from Khowar (the majority

[192] Taj Khan Kalash, pers. comm. July 2021.

language of the district), Urdu and to a lesser extent English. The idea of an 'authentic' Kal'as'amondr has, however, caught on among some Kalasha and when I was learning the language my teachers would actively avoid loans, sometimes even going away and consulting those considered to be especially knowledgeable in order to furnish me with the 'correct' version of a word.

In Government Kalasha Primary Schools the alphabet book is taught alongside coursebooks on the principal languages of the national curriculum: Urdu, Arabic and English. Each language has its own distinct connotations. Arabic allows students to read the Quran undistorted through translation, Urdu is heavily symbolic of South Asian, Persianized Muslim identity and the teaching of English reflects both Pakistan's colonial heritage and its utility as a global lingua Franca. To this already complex mix the alphabet book adds a version of Kal'as'amondr which in its Roman orthography and ideological inflections of linguistic purity signals the Kalasha's religious difference and an essentialised conception of their ethnicity.

The multiplicity of identities represented by the language books taught in the Kalasha Primary Schools could presage a comparable cultural complexity across the curriculum more widely if the Kalasha schoolbook ever came to fruition. For now, however, the rest of the syllabus promotes a singular, Islamic-nationalist identity narrative, Kalasha attempts to intervene stalled by mistrust and jealousies engendered by the understanding that whoever creates the Kalasha schoolbook has realised the power to dictate a Kalasha authorised heritage discourse.

Chapter 2 discussed the scalability of the ecotone, its definition possible according to a single species, up to the intersection between whole ecosystems. The idea of the meeting of ecosystems is pertinent here in the sense that ecosystems are composed of interconnected, but widely varying and at times antagonistic elements. The examples of the Kalasha schoolbook and language teaching in Government Kalasha Primary Schools demonstrate that the systems/heritage discourses which come together to form the ecotone can be ecosystem-like. In the case of the schoolbook we saw that what is ostensibly the unified heritage discourse of a community of only 4000 people is, in fact, so heterogenous that no authorised version of it can be decided upon. Equally, the superficially unitary discourse of the languages officially taught in Pakistani schools is in reality an aggregate of three languages, each with its own distinct heritage.



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2	Scientific Inventions	Ibn-e-Seena	Muslim scientists Vocabulary development	Speaking skill Reading skill Comprehension	14
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5	Importance of Apparently Small Things	Little Drops of Water	Love for Poetry Rhyming Words Grammar Vocabulary development	Understanding Reading skill	36

Figure 5.10. A Class 6 English schoolbook which was being studied by one of the children of the Kalasha family I stayed with. Note Units 1-3 in the Table of Contents. (Photograph the author).

Summary: Bringing the Discussion Back to the Ecotone

In this chapter I have modelled the ecotone-like characteristics of a series of spaces and cultural practices in the Kalash Valleys. In terms of the tension which the etymology of ecotone highlights, in Chapter 3 we saw the conflicts engendered by the coming together of multiple identity discourses in the Valleys. In this chapter I returned to two sites of conflict previously discussed: Kalasha Primary Schools and the Kalasha Dur. Interrogating the finer grain of these case studies brought to light integrative aspects of identity discourse intersections but also revealed further instances of dissonance. In the Kalasha Dur we learnt of tensions between Kalasha working in its three institutions and in the case of teachers and the schoolbook we saw competition between differing interpretations of Kalasha heritage.

The rest of the chapter focused on the heritage combinations which the metaphor of the ecotone points to. We saw how certain moments in time could align discourses which are otherwise juxtaposed. When Kalasha women draw their shawls across their faces, for example, they momentarily bridge the identity divide which their clothing creates and in 2008 Kraka' school appeared to be enjoying a period of relative harmony which would be disrupted as the influence of

the Ministry of Minorities and the Greek Volunteers waned. Equally we saw how within a specific case study combinations could happen along some indexes and not others. In Government Kalasha Primary Schools Kal'as'amondr is taught alongside the other languages of the curriculum but the rest of the school syllabus will continue to feel weighted against the Kalasha until there can be consensus regarding the schoolbook. The shared pro-Kalasha stance in the face of violent intimidation unites the otherwise divided institutions of the Kalasha Dur as does the ethnicity of staff, and perhaps the most straightforward example: Kalasha women's shalwar matches those of Muslim women whilst the rest of their outfit proclaims their religious difference.

We also saw how alignments vary in their fragility. The institutional settings of Karaka' school and the Kalasha Dur appear to be especially precarious in this regard, the intangible combinations which they host subject to the volatile political dynamic of the Valleys. In both cases however, a fleeting coming together of differing heritage agendas has resulted in a more durable material record. Along with Batrik jestakhan and the Islam-influenced elements of women's clothing, the fabric of Kraka' school and the fabric and displays of the Kalasha Dur contribute to the Kalash Valley's combinative tangible heritage discourse.

The breadth of the data drawn on reveals the variety of scales at which heritage combinations happen as well shedding light on the actors that catalyse them. In terms of scale, at the larger end of the spectrum we have the entire Kalasha ethnicity represented in women's clothing, its materiality in part a response to a Pakistani-authored discourse of marginalization. There also is the monumental and multifaceted combined artefact of the Kalasha Dur and the collections it houses. At the other end of the spectrum there is the tiny plaque declaring Greek-Pakistani friendship above the fountain in Kraka' school or the brief moment when a Kalasha woman dresses her non Kalasha friend. In terms of actors we have seen the agency of individuals: the best example here came in the previous chapter with the remarkable influence of Kazi Khosh Nawaz's innovative story linking Alexander's army with the ancient Kalasha military leader Shal'ak S'a. Equally, however, we have also seen the role which top-down processes can have, the most significant example being the Pakistani government's and the Greek Volunteer's collaboration over the Kalasha Primary Schools.

Some of what we have discussed above evidences a clear fusion of discourses: the placement of the Greco-Bactrian kings display in the Kalasha Dur library, or the preeminent example of the moon and star linked by a heart to the Vergina sun above the onjes't'a wã in Batrik jestakhan. Other instances appear to represent more of an assemblage of disparate narratives in the same space: the languages taught in the Government Kalasha Primary Schools for example, or the three institutions currently occupying the Kalasha Dur. The salient issue here, however, is that whilst on one level the narratives

may appear distinct, they sit within coherent conceptual or even physical containers. The languages are taught together as part of the syllabus in a special category of school and the Kalasha Dur institutions each work in their own way towards the perpetuation of Kalasha identity in a building which was purpose built to do the same. We can consider these containers to be heritage products: a combination of heritage discourses united by a binding factor. Viewed as such they exhibit similar characteristics to the more obvious fusions of discourses. In both cases discourses which in a different context might be opposed are brought together within a distinct framework.

In the natural world ecotones tend to be more complex than the biological communities which meet at them. Typically zones of overlap rather than abrupt transition, ecotones often contain an unusually high number of species which interact with each other in correspondingly diverse ways. Similarly this thesis has revealed the Kalash Valleys to be a place where a startling diversity of discourses meet, and this chapter has pointed to the complexity of the ways that these discourses relate to each other. At certain times and in certain spaces in competition, whilst at other times and in other spaces in alignment, the discourses which permeate the Valleys are in a constant state of flux. Equally, the metaphor of the ecotone, whilst emphasising the diversity of meeting points, also encourages a heterogenous conception of the heritage discourses which come together to form it. Through the ecotone, therefore, we can comprehensively model the complexities and contradictions that make up a case study like that of Kalasha heritage.

Chapter 6

Analysis: What the Kalash Valleys and Borderland Methodologies can do for Critical Heritage Studies

This chapter brings together the examples and arguments presented in Chapters 3 to 5 and examines them in light of the academic discourses discussed in Chapter 2. The aim is to uncover how the story of the Kalasha and their borderland context relates to and builds upon current understandings of the relationship between heritage, identity and borders. To this end I have organised my arguments under three headings.

The first heading, *Thinking Outside of the Nation* relates to the counter critique of critical heritage studies which we discussed in Chapter 2. I demonstrate how the nation as conceived as a unitary entity ceases to be a meaningful analytical unit for understanding the dynamics of heritage and identity in the Kalash Valleys. Four phenomena are particularly significant for my argument: the Kalasha's membership of a culturally coherent 'community' which is not part of Pakistan, the presence of more than one nation in the Valleys, the fragmented nature of the nation's power and the potential of different national discourses to combine and be combined around narratives of Kalasha heritage. How these phenomena transgress national borders resonates with other work in critical heritage studies which challenges essentialising analytical frameworks and I argue that the study of borderlands expands this discourse in valuable new directions.

The second heading, *Marginality and Strategic Hybridity* focuses on the way which marginality tends to be framed within critical heritage studies and discusses the role which theories of hybridity have in nuancing this framing. Work which examines how heritage is leveraged by the disenfranchised often conceptualises its case studies through a model of 'strategic reversibility'. The story of the Kalasha's survival over generations offers us a different model of resilience. Chapter 4 demonstrated how through fluidity and strategic heritage hybridisations the Kalasha have maintained their religious independence and found opportunities, in part through leveraging their marginalised position. In Chapter 5 examples emerged of hegemonic discourses hybridising around Kalasha heritage. Aligning with the first heading's critique of methodological nationalism, this section argues

that borderlands can present versions of hybridity which also address a tendency in the critical discourse to reproduce essentialising frameworks.

The final heading, *The Heritage Ecotone* demonstrates how borderland sites like the Kalash Valleys complicate the perception that different heritages relate to each other only in terms of dissonance. I argue that the metaphor of the ecotone facilitates a framing of heritage borders as wide and plural spaces rather than binary fault lines. This understanding of the intersection of heritages brings with it the promise of a new line of enquiry for the critical discourse. The combined heritages which germinate in the discursively complex setting of the Kalash Valleys suggest that borders can generate their own distinct, and thus far overlooked, manifestation of heritage.

Thinking Outside of the Nation

This thesis has charted the influence of multiple states, two religions and several ethnic discourses in the geographical space of three Valleys. Equally, it has recorded how the heritage of the inhabitants of those Valleys has resonated with the identities of people in several countries and even influenced the actions of their governments. To understand the Kalash Valleys in relation to a single hegemonic national identity discourse, therefore, would be to take in only a small fraction of their heritage dynamic.

The Kalasha are unusual for a borderland community in that the trans-border elements of their heritage bear almost no relation to a shared history with geographically connected communities. In Chapter 2 we saw Mostowlansky's identification of a coherent Ismaili cultural zone which had been dismembered by international boundaries and Gohain's comparable discussion of the pan-national discourse of a Tibetan-influenced Himalayan community. In contrast to instances such as these, the sense of kinship which has developed between Kalasha and Europeans over the course of the past 150 years appears more attenuated: like that joining cousins, long-lost and separated by half a continent, the only ties being an indistinct story of common origins. The lack of specificity to this story has meant that it has appealed to a wide variety of European-authored identity narratives over the past 150 years.

It has been asked whether borderlands are "multiple-state places" or "non-state places" (Schneiderman 2013, 28; Bruslé 2016, 5). In the case of the Kalash Valleys both descriptions appear relevant. The presence of several states within the Valleys is represented in the diverse projects foreign nations and organisations have launched aimed at 'preserving' Kalasha culture. The number of these projects linked to European embassies or development programmes evidences the

influence of the kinship discourse of shared origins. Eclipsing other foreign projects and the Pakistani state's attempts at similar initiatives has been the work of the Greek Volunteers, a charity founded and run by a man with an especially strong conviction that he and the Kalasha shared a common patrimony. Despite being relatively short term and limited to certain spheres, the influence of Greece in the Valleys was significant enough to give weight to the argument that, for a while at least, the Kalasha experienced a space that was part-Greek, part-Pakistani.

A further sense of the hegemonic plurality of the Valleys comes with the episode of the Taliban raid and subsequent threats. Although only physically present for the night of Lerounis' kidnap, the Taliban exerted enough influence to effectively cease Greek involvement in the Valleys. Here however the status of the Taliban muddies the conceptual waters. Part state, part cross border insurgency, their involvement in our story signals the fragility of Pakistan along this section of its frontier and therefore points to 'non-state' as well as 'multiple-state' characteristics. A compromised Pakistan is also apparent in instances like the tussle over schools between the Ministry of Minorities and elements of government with a religious agenda. An example which we have not yet discussed, but which further demonstrates the unravelling of the state followed the deployment of the army in the Valleys after the kidnap of Lerounis. Interlocuters told me how the army had blocked efforts by local government to encourage Foreign NGOs to work in the Valleys, claiming that they constituted a security risk. Both examples demonstrate that whilst the state certainly exercises a great deal of control in this part of the borderland, its power is inconsistent and fragmented.

The plurality of state and state-like influences in the Valleys and the fragmentary nature of state power has produced complex and diverse heritage discourses. Many of these transcend the limits of Pakistan. Some have manifested far beyond the national border. In the case of the Macedonia naming dispute for example, the Kalasha have been leveraged in a patrimony-based conflict which Pakistan has no interest in. Other discourses have manifested in the Valleys and brought together narratives authored beyond the border with those of the nation. I'm thinking here particularly of the Greek-Pakistani alignments we saw in Chapter 5.

The Kalasha's membership of a wider European cultural 'community', the 'multiple-state' and 'non-state' characteristics of the Valleys and the trans-border nature of heritage narratives which include the Kalasha collectively demonstrate how a place which is geographically and politically encompassed by a nation can nevertheless be constituted in significant ways by things which come from beyond the border. The Kalash Valleys thus described resonate with the scholarship which I discussed in Chapter 2 that has striven to move the critical discourse beyond the confines of essentialising logics, especially methodological nationalism. The fragmented and mutable state

discourses evident in the Valleys align with work which argues for a greater appreciation of the heterogeneity of the heritage narratives that constitute erstwhile monolithic categories like the nation, or Europe. Equally, other aspects of what I have discussed in the previous three chapters correspond with observations which have been made concerning diasporic heritage. The indeterminate nature of Kalasha heritage with its links to cultures far beyond the limits of Pakistan resembles the transnational dimension to the heritage of diaspora. Furthermore, the cultural combinations which we saw in Chapter 5 reflect work that acknowledges the distinctly hybrid identity of diasporic groups. This final observation is significant in that it draws attention to the heterogenous aspects of minority as well as national heritages.

The characteristics of heritage in the Kalash Valleys, therefore, have the potential to open up new avenues for work already underway in critical heritage studies. However, as I am about to demonstrate, the focus on borderlands and spaces with their own distinct dynamics introduces concepts and methodologies which the critical discourse has not yet been exposed to and which bring with them fresh approaches to the challenge of decoupling the scholarly discussion of heritage from essentialising frameworks.

Marginality and Strategic Hybridity

In *Theatres of Memory* Raphael Samuel (1994) identified the Foucauldian 'strategic reversibility' of heritage.[193] The understanding that heritage can be used both as a tool to exert hegemony and a tool to resist hegemony has been extremely influential in subsequent discussions of the relationship between heritage and marginality[194] and comprises a fundamental element of the conception of heritage as an inherently dissonant "always-already contested terrain" (De Cesari and Herzfeld 2015, 175; Tunbridge and Ashworth 1996). The strategic reversibility of heritage as it has been framed by the critical discourse aligns to Spivak's (1988) original model of 'strategic essentialism': the creation of an essentialised identity discourse by members of a subaltern group to challenge the hegemony which marginalises them. We can summarise therefore that in the critical heritage discourse the resilience of the margins has been modelled in terms of binary opposition: the exercise of power bound up in an essentialising (typically national) identity narrative is challenged by a discourse authored by the margins in the same essentialist language.

[193] Cited in De Cesari and Herzfeld 2015, 175.
[194] See De Cesari and Herzfeld 2015, 175 for a summary of these discussions.

The previous chapters certainly presented us with examples of how the Kalasha signal their opposition to the hegemonies which engulf them. The binary of onjes't'a and pragata categorises Muslims along with sources of metaphysical pollution and the discourse of freedom juxtaposes the perceived rights of Kalasha and Muslim women as a means of drawing a religio-cultural boundary. Equally, enthusiasm for language purity among some Kalasha signals the desire to create a Kal'as'amondr which excludes influences from dominant languages. Such oppositional positionings, however, tend to be somewhat hidden from the outside and represent only one thread in the story of how the Kalasha have maintained their religio-cultural independence through generations of subjugation.

Chapter 4 demonstrated how important cultural fluidity has been in the Kalasha's negotiation of their existence on the geographical, political, economic, religious and social margins. We saw how subterfuge has helped them dodge the critiques of hostile Muslims and get the most out of their relationships with wealthy and influential western visitors. We also learned how the Kalasha have supressed, or even abandoned certain cultural practices which made them a target for criticism. Most significant for this thesis, however, has been their capacity to absorb elements of other discourses and thereby add to as well as take away from what it is that makes them Kalasha.

The choice of terminology to discuss this process of absorption is fraught. With its connotations of admixture between different religions 'synchronicity' seems appropriate for the Kalasha's borrowing from Islam, especially the move to monotheism. Yet Islam also represents the national identity discourse of Pakistan and in this context the Kalasha can be understood as a subaltern group, which suggests the postcolonial terms of 'mimicry' or 'hybrid' for the same process. Hybridity also seems appropriate for the Kalasha's absorption of the discourse of ancientness with its roots in colonial era evolutionary typologies and it resonates with their accommodation of essentialist Greek and white European identity discourses.

The relationship of the hybridising which the Kalasha do to their resilience is important for my argument as it nuances the framing of marginality predominant in critical heritage studies. A significant body of the critical discourse examines state-minority relations where heritage has become a battleground. Often these are cases where heritages differ markedly, for example in the settler versus indigenous heritages of North America, Australia and New Zealand, or in the case of Palestinian heritage in Israel.[195] In instances such as these, the authorised heritage discourse of the state threatens the heritage of the minority with assimilation and/or suppression. Minorities

[195] See for recent commentaries see: Zarandona 2020, McCarthy 2016, De Cesari and Herzfeld 2015 and Onciul 2015. For earlier commentaries see: Karp and Lavine 1991, Peers and Brown 2003 and Smith 2006.

therefore contest the discourse of the state by demarking their difference. In these instances the concession of ambiguity by the minority equates to a loss of agency.

The term 'strategic hybridisation' has cropped up in the postcolonial discourse in commentaries which take issue with the uncritical use of hybridity as a concept through which to challenge essentialist hegemonies (Acheraiou 2011, 3). Strategic hybridisation from this perspective is presented as the phenomenon whereby hybridity is used as means to maintain or secure hegemony. Examples discussed in the scholarly literature include racial classification systems implemented to "secure the coloniser's superiority" (Pirott-Quintero 1997) or intermarrying with subject populations as a means of consolidating imperial rule (Acheraiou 2011, 3). Closer to home there is a tinge of this kind of strategic hybridity in the work of the Greek Volunteers. The hybridising acts of Lerounis becoming Kalasha and the Greco-Kalasha symbolic language of his buildings served to strengthen Greek hegemony within the realm of Kalasha heritage conservation. Equally, within the arenas of Pakistani domestic politics and foreign relations we have seen the Kalasha's conspicuous non-Muslimness strategically leveraged to present a hybrid vision of the country through which to woo voters and reassure wary non-Muslim foreign allies. Evidence of just how complex the intersections are between power and identity in the Valleys comes with another strategic use of hybridisation, this time embodied in the display of Greco-Bactrian kings in the Kalasha Dur library. Here the Greek claim to the Kalasha is absorbed within a Pakistani nationalist identity discourse, thus bringing the products of Greek investment in the Kalash Valleys under Pakistani ideological hegemony.

Paul Sharrad (2007) offers a different context for the use of strategic hybridity which resonates with the Kalasha's strategic absorption of externally authored discourses. Sharrad discusses modern writing in the Pacific region which he argues "permit[s] an assertion of indigenous difference" whilst also allowing for some ambiguity (99). Sharrad plays with Spivak's strategic essentialism, arguing that in socially complex or "messy" (118) contexts such as the one which he examines hybridity does not necessarily equate to an "assimilation that can be used to disallow indigenous claims" (117), but that it does have strategic applicability in that it also "allows for modern globalised complexity" (99) in a way that a more reactionary production of difference would not. We have the idea of a hybridity sketched out here that perpetuates difference, but which is dependent on a complex setting.

The Kalasha's context represents an environment which is conducive to a comparable modality of strategic hybridity. It is a place where a strong oppositional stance is of limited utility as there is no heritage discourse which is consistently monolithic enough to be meaningfully juxtaposed against. As we have discussed, the state of Pakistan unravels in the Valleys and to varying degrees and at varying times, shares the space with other nations. Equally the Kalasha's positioning with regards to

the hegemonic heritage discourses which circulate around them is inconsistent. They are subaltern: excluded from the Islamic identity of Pakistan by dint of their religious difference and othered by 'modern' imaginations through the perceived invariance of their culture. Yet the same hegemonic discourses which other them, in different manifestations seek to be at one with them through narratives of cultural and biological kinship. For the Kalasha to hybridise therefore does not necessarily represent acquiescence to the agenda of an intact hegemony and it has the advantage of allowing access to the resource rich world of those who identify with them.

The opportunities for individuals which come with aligning to narratives of kinship were made apparent in our discussion of the Kalasha 'celebrities' in Chapter 4. But equally in the same chapter we saw how hybridising has served a collective purpose. By appropriating the monotheistic god of Abrahamic faiths and by adopting discourses of invariance, Europeanness, Alexandrian descent and Pakistaniness, Kalasha actors have influenced both the way that their culture is perceived by outsiders and their own society's perception of itself. This has served the purpose of contesting a critique which has them as culturally inferior by dint of their religious difference to the majority. Given that in this case study religion represents the preeminent marker of identity, we can argue that hybridisation has played an important role in ensuring that the Kalasha are still here despite generations of attempts at conversion.

Tsing has written of her initial struggles to adapt her appreciation of identity politics back home in the US to the political dynamic of her marginal field site in the Meratus Mountains. For her the situation in the US and comparable places was "easily intelligible": "minorities are marginalized by exclusion from the assumption of being ordinary - and often the jobs, housing, or political opportunities that "ordinary" (white) people expect. At the same time, minority cultural and political movements are launched from reinterpretations of these same exclusions" (1994, 279-280). In the Meratus Mountains however, Tsing writes that such dichotomies were "useless", the reality resembling a more "complex conversation between exclusion and empowerment" (280).

The story of the Kalasha signals the potential for a comparable shift in the critical heritage discourse from situations where the relationship between heritage, hegemony and marginality is "easily intelligible", to more complex settings. Tsing writes of marginality "weaving and wandering" (280) between essentialism and a rejection of essentialism[196] and the same process is evident in the Kalasha's negotiation of their marginality. The leveraging of heritage remains an important tool in this negotiation, but like the discursive environment of the Valleys, the Kalasha's use of heritage is

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[196] Tsing's writes: "[a]re notions of culture and identity a Eurocentric imposition of disciplinary logic and status difference? Or do they signal an empowering recognition of the right to speak?"

inconsistent. Occasionally a Kalasha heritage discourse rejects hybridity, but in most demonstrations of Kalashaness one can find elements of what the outside understands the Kalasha to be. Strategic essentialism therefore represents only a constituent part of the Kalasha's lexicon of resilience, the hybridised remainder is fresh territory for critical heritage studies. Equally new to the critical discourse is the complex intersection of strategic hybridisations which we see in Geek and Pakistani involvement in Kalasha heritage. In the cases of both the Kalasha's hybridisation as resilience and the hybridisation of multiple hegemonic narratives around the Kalasha, we see a mutable aspect of heritage which complicates the assumption that it represents an "always-already contested terrain".

The Heritage Ecotone

I introduced the ecotone in Chapter 2 as a metaphor through which to combine the strands of borderland studies discourse which I felt were relevant to the example of the Kalasha. The tension generated by the coming together of systems in the ecotone accounted for the violence (symbolic and actual) so often characteristic of borderlands be it between the diverse communities of the borderlands, between opposing states, or perpetrated by the state with borderland inhabitants as the victims. The tension of the ecotone also allowed for the conflict between different manifestations of the same state which we see in some borderlands. The idea of a zone where systems meet and mingle aligned with work which has demonstrated the unravelling of some states along some parts of their borders (the examples I gave concerned the frontiers of British India). The same aspect of the ecotone also accommodated the plurality which some borders generate when they bisect pre-existing zones of communal identity (I referred to the cases of the Ismailis of northern Pakistan, the Monpa and the Thangmi). The combination of different discourses which can accompany plurality in borderlands is reflected in the ecotone's capacity to foster species and phenomena which are not found elsewhere. This generative capacity also resonates with the particular kind of combination that happens when marginal groups repurpose the discourses which marginalise them.

In chapter 5 I used the metaphor of the ecotone to help me process the complex and contradictory data which I had collected relating to heritage in the Kalash Valleys. The analogy of ecosystems to describe identity discourses allowed for the heterogeneity in erstwhile homogenous categories like 'Kalasha heritage' and 'Pakistani heritage'. The conceptual space which the ecotone provided for both friction and productivity made sense of the apparent chaos of discourses aligning and misaligning according to time, context or scale. Equally the ecotone had the breadth to account for the variety of combinations which the Valleys presented me with. Framed as a zone where systems

overlap, the ecotone embraced relationships between the Kalasha and Pakistan, and between all the other discourses which come together in the Valleys. Under the umbrella of the ecotone, therefore, I could find a place for the Kalasha's strategic hybridity as well as the other alignments which have happened around them.

As we have seen, the dynamics which I have explored in the Kalash Valleys are evidenced in many other borderlands. The utility of hybridity in such settings has been highlighted by Marsden, whose descriptor of "indeterminate modes of being" for borderland populations in "culturally complex settings" I made use of in Chapter 2. Marsden writes that such positionalities "valorise the ability of people to forge relations, ties, and to join in practices across boundaries'" (2016, 290). The model of the ecotone leads us to speculate what the heritage outputs might be of these sort of collaborative behaviours. What composite heritages would manifest in each study? Where else do we find the kind of mixed symbolism which we have discussed in the case of the Kalasha? How readily do institutions set in borderlands reflect their hybridity? Are intangible heritage practices like story-telling more likely to evidence admixture than material practices? Are the moments of alignment between intangible discourses in the Kalash Valleys uncharacteristic in their fragility and fleetingness? What constellations lead discourses to align and what pull them apart? How common is the use of strategic hybridity as a mechanism of resilience by borderland populations?

The stream of questions which the model of the heritage ecotone prompts multiples if we consider that the characteristics of national borderlands are reflected in other marginal situations. In her construction of marginality as an "analytic placement" Tsing frames the margins as "zones of unpredictability at the edges of discursive stability, where contradictory discourses overlap, or where discrepant kinds of meaning-making converge" (1994, 279). Although the "discursive stability" which Tsing has in mind is between hegemonic discourse-maker and those peripheralized by it, Tsing's placement is equally applicable to the more plural contexts which commentators like Marsden describe. Tsing's wide-ranging conceptualisation of marginality therefore allows us to group together things that happen on national borders and things that happen elsewhere as potentially productive environments for the ecotone model. We might look, for example, to geographical spaces where the state-sponsored discourse weakens. Separatist regions within the nation, inaccessible places, cosmopolitan cities and refugee camps all spring to mind. Equally, purely social definitions of space could provide the right environment. We have already touched on how closely the cultural crossovers and transnational narratives discussed by the study of diaspora heritage resonate with the identity dynamics of the Kalash Valleys. Other socially hybrid settings may also prove to be fruitful ground for the application of the heritage ecotone.

To facilitate the conceptual breadth of the ecotone requires a distinct approach to data collection. In Chapter 2 I discussed the methods/methodologies of borderland studies, ethnography and multi-sited fieldwork. How these approaches have contributed to the drawing out of the complexities of my case study allows us to begin to assess them as tools for the investigation of heritage ecotones.

Baud and van Schendel's call to treat "the region on both sides of the border as single unit" (1997, 231) which I referred to in Chapter 2, had the frontiers of nations in mind, but it can also be applied to more broadly conceived zones where different discourses meet. Whether the borders are political, geographical or social, looking past them when gathering data challenges their coherence and enables their analysis as zones of intersection rather than sites of delineation. In terms of choice of research loci the prerogative of 'looking past' borders suggests multiple sites that transcend the relevant borders. My fieldwork took me to Lahore and Greece as well as the Kalash Valleys. With Taj and Sikandar's move to the UK circumstances also conspired to turn our shared house in Cambridge into another, unexpected, but fruitful field site. Within the Kalash Valleys I moved between settings strongly influenced by Greek and Pakistani agendas (the Kalasha Schools and the Kalasha Dur) and more comprehensively Kalasha settings like the village where I stayed and the family life which I was part of. This constellation of research sites crossed a variety of identity boundaries ranging from those of nations to the differing institutional identities encompassed by the Kalasha Dur. The breadth of contexts in which I experienced Kalasha heritage led me to appreciate the formidable extent of just how varied its meanings could be.

The experience of multiple field sites had further utility for my research in that as well as allowing me to cross identity boundaries it also led me to experience manifestations of Kalasha heritage at different scales. My time spent in the Kalasha Dur versus my immersion in the wider Kalasha community was particularly significant in this regard. In Chapter 2 I observed that critical heritage studies has been critiqued for being overly reliant on discursively homogenous formal settings and under-representing the wide array of alternative heritages produced by individuals. Incorporating heritage as it manifests in institutions and in the identity discourses of individuals allowed me to include settings which are well represented in critical heritage studies and those which are currently underrepresented. This made for a more robust analytical model than would have an approach which focused exclusively on the personal or the institutional.

Whilst I had some of my research sites in mind before leaving for Pakistan most developed organically during fieldwork. This unstructured approach was made possible through the adoption of an ethnographic method which gave me the space to engage with interesting situations as they emerged. Without such a fluid method I do not think I could have begun to sufficiently account for

the dynamics around Kalasha heritage as to have pre-empted my research sites would have been to pare away much of its complexity.

My experiences of fieldwork suggest the beginnings of a suite of methods through which to investigate the ecotone in new contexts. For clarity I will break these down into three elements:

1) Border studies' directive to transcend boundaries when choosing research loci enables the researcher to account for the indeterminate nature of identity in the ecotone.
2) The multi-sited approach also reflects the indeterminate nature of the ecotone and accommodates the variety of scales which it can embrace.
3) The fluidity of the ethnographic method allows for the dynamism of the ecotone and facilitates the capture of fleeting moments of alignment or dissonance which might be lost with a more pre-emptive approach.

Summary: Combined Heritages

In *Understanding the Politics of Heritage* Rodney Harrison offers his interpretation of critical heritage studies' mission: "to question the unwritten suggestion within most contemporary *western* societies that heritage is necessarily 'good'" (2010, 1). He then goes on to ask the reader, "what if we were to consider the possibility that heritage is not about truth or authenticity but about deliverable political objectives- about reinforcing social cohesion through the construction of myths of origin, identity and moral example?" (1). These statements in the introduction of a major summative work are a demonstration of how deeply engaged the critical discourse is in the project of revealing the epistemic violence bound in the concept of national, or even global patrimony. In this thesis I do not mean to suggest that the relevance of this project is in any way diminished. Hegemonic orders continue to use heritage to forge "social cohesion through the construction of myths of origin, identity and moral example" (1) and for those aligned to the hegemony in question heritage continues to be understood in unreflexively positive terms. Equally, for many of those who are not aligned, the process of making their own, oppositional essentialised heritage discourses represents a powerful tool of resistance.

The contribution I make is to a different thread, recently emerged within the critical discourse, which investigates spaces like those identified by Tsing where the relationship between identity and power is less "easily intelligible". My survey of the literature has demonstrated that thus far this thread has touched on the agency of individuals in dictating their personal heritages, the fractures within ostensibly monolithic narratives, and the heritages of diaspora. Shared by this work is the

understanding that focusing only on the hegemonic aspects of the nation risks overlooking those heritages which transcend it or ostensibly sit within it, yet also in some ways run a different course. The potential of national borderlands to contribute to this reflexive strand within the critical discourse has only just begun to be appreciated. As sites which have spawned a methodology that specifically aims to decentre the nation as a unit of analysis, borderlands offer the potential of productive new directions for the discussion of the kind of nuances which the critical heritage discourse is now turning its attention to.

The concept of the ecotone as adapted by Viejo Rose and further explored in this thesis represents an attempt to condense some of what can be learned from the study of borderlands into a methodology which is of wider applicability for critical heritage studies. Viejo Rose suggests that the utility of the ecotone lies in the fact that it “offers the opportunity to critically examine the binary thinking that so permeates the field” (2019, 56). This supposition has certainly borne fruit over the past three chapters. The case study of the Kalasha has demonstrated the limitations of the dissonant model of heritage. A conception of heritage boundaries as the meeting points of essentialised discourses -be they those of the nation, or those leveraged by subaltern groups in resistance to the nation- would only have offered a partial account of the dynamic which I found during fieldwork.

Excluded by the dissonant model, but inherent to the ecotone conception of heritage are the creative outcomes which can be generated by the coming together of heritage discourses. The example of the Kalasha has offered us some suggestions of what catalyses these outcomes. Strategic hybridity looms large here, as used by both a marginal population and the multiple hegemonies which claim its heritage. But there are other generative dimensions to the combining of discourses that have no obvious strategic aim. The significance of the margins for the centre crops up repeatedly in my discussion of heritage and the Kalasha. The idea that the margins as exemplified by the Kalasha offer access to something lost through modernity has been a consistent driver of combination, as has the valorisation of the otherness of the Kalasha by Pakistani citizens who are resistant to Islam-inspired efforts at homogenising their national identity. In these cases the act of combination (as realised by outsiders coming to the Valleys rather than the Kalasha) appears to have less to do with the exercise or contestation of power and more to do with individuals’ quests for personal fulfilment.

The observations that I offer here provide at best a partial sketch of the processes which have driven the combining of heritage discourses around the Kalasha. Nor do they account for what the creative characteristics might be of the ecotone imagined as an overarching model. They do however indicate a future research direction. The application of the ecotone methodology to other case

studies which share the (broadly framed) borderland characteristics of the Kalash Valleys would bring a vital comparative dimension to the discussion of the capacity of different heritages to be creatively combined. Comparative data could help build theories of heritage as mutable and amenable to admixture. These in turn would add valuable nuance the prevailing conception of heritage as fundamentally dissonant and move the critical discourse towards a fuller appreciation of its subject.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

This thesis opened with the observation that the capacity of heritage to divide is profoundly linked to the ideology of nationhood. My question was whether it was possible that as well as demarking difference there might be another, more blurred or even combinative aspect to the boundaries made by heritage. In answer I turned to a borderland, somewhere where it becomes difficult to discern what is and what is not the nation.

In Chapter 2 I interrogated critical heritage studies scholarship for arguments which resonated with my question. I identified several commentaries which suggested that the critical discourse often overlooks important manifestations of heritage in its focus on the hegemonic aspects of national and other authorised discourses. To build on the arguments presented in these commentaries I turned to the methodologies of borderland research. I discussed studies which demonstrate some borderlands to be indeterminate places where the discourses of the state unravel and where the identities of borderland dwellers reach far beyond the limits of the nation. Such sites enable scholars to conceptualise spaces and identities outside of a framework which takes the nation as self-evident.

A subtheme of the study of borderlands engages with the wider academic discussion of marginality. This work argues that some borderland dwellers are at once subject to state-authored discourses of otherness, yet also find agency in the experience of being othered. This process questions the starkly asymmetrical power dynamic which the process of bordering by the state has often been perceived to reproduce.

To translate the insights of borderland research over to the context of heritage borders I turned to the ecotone. This ecological metaphor offered a framework through which to bring together theories of marginality and wider scholarly understandings of the other processes which shape borderlands. As an abstract means of conceptualising what a border can be, I hypothesised that it could be applied to the borders produced by heritage discourses, its utility being that it offered a model predicated on overlap and complexity which might be inserted in place of the conception of borders as points of binary division.

Chapter 3 explored the remarkable number of identity discourses which have intersected in the Kalash Valleys. Each discourse staked a claim on the Kalasha. Most claims came through calls or projects to 'preserve' Kalasha culture, but some came in their opposite: attempts at conversion and thereby the eradication of the principal marker of Kalasha identity. The diversity of claims reflects the heterogeneity of 'authorised' Pakistani identity, the fragility of the Pakistani state in this section of its frontier, and the extent to which people outside Pakistan (especially in Europe) have felt a sense of cultural commonality with the Kalasha. Through the course of the chapter the Kalash Valleys emerged as a place where Pakistan becomes indistinct and other nations (and the Taliban) move in and out of the picture. As such the Valleys closely resemble the extra-state and multi-state spaces of other borderlands and correspond to the overlapping and intermingling characteristics of a border defined through the ecotone.

With the unravelling of the idea of the nation as a coherent whole came a related blurring of the boundaries between what might be considered 'central' and what might be considered 'marginal'. We saw how discourses authored by states and projected onto the Kalasha at once othered them *and* drew them closer. In the minds of many Pakistani citizens and politicians, for example, preserving the Kalasha's religious otherness has become essential to justifying their nation's Islamic identity.

The Chapter also discussed how claims to the Kalasha's heritage facilitated its decontextualization from the context of the Kalasha themselves and its recontextualization as the patrimony of claimants. This process saw the heritage of the Kalasha deeply entangled in the political struggles which the various claimants were embroiled in. Greece's dispute with North Macedonia for example, or in competition between secular and Sunni lobbies in Pakistan. Heritage from this 'outside looking in' perspective appeared as has been modelled by much of the critical discourse: a source of dissonance, always implicated in the justification or the contestation of political power. In terms of the ecotone this part of the chapter demonstrated the inter-system tensions which can be generated by zones of overlap.

Chapter 4 shifted perspective from the 'outside looking in' to the 'inside looking out' and examined how the Kalasha have negotiated the discourses discussed in Chapter 3. The chapter told two stories which spanned the course of the twentieth century, and which unfolded against the backdrop of the creation of Pakistan. The first followed the Kalasha's developing relationship with Islam and the second charted their responses to increasing exposure to Western visitors. Through both processes we learnt of how it has been strategic for the Kalasha to be flexible in how they interpret their religion, culture and heritage. A key component to this flexibility has been the capacity to

incorporate elements of external discourses into their own identity narratives. In some cases these incorporations have served to defend the Kalasha from critique, as we saw in the move from polytheism to monotheism. In other cases the incorporations enabled the Kalasha to exploit the significance which their variously constructed characteristics hold for dominant discourses in Europe and Pakistan. In this latter process we see examples of the Kalasha leveraging the influence bestowed on them -paradoxically enough- by their marginality.

Chapter 5 continued with the theme of cultural combination and expanded it to include not just the Kalasha's absorption of external discourses, but also admixture between the other discourses which meet in the Valleys. Examples of combination were discussed across different indexes, spatial scales and periods of time. I conceptualised the heritage products which resulted from these combinations as parallel to the species and phenomena which are unique to the ecotone, their existence predicated on the coming together of separate systems. Applying the metaphor of the ecotone also allowed me to model the discourses which meet in the Kalash valleys as ecosystem-like: made up of interconnected, but widely varying and at times antagonistic elements.

The narrative of the nation's heritage as a coherent whole is productive of conflict as it affords no space for ambiguity between it and other nations and between it and those groups which are encompassed by its boundaries, but which it does not represent. In critically engaging this narrative, heritage scholarship reveals its role in the perpetuation of hegemony and the contestation of political power, but currently it all too often fails to challenge its conceptual boundaries. This has resulted in a theorisation of heritage which overlooks the less coherent manifestations of its subject.

By conducting my doctoral research in a place which had both 'multiple-state' and 'non-state' characteristics I was able to produce an analysis which decentred the nation and argue for the theoretical possibilities of the spaces in between nations. Perceived through the borderland, nationhood unravels, manifesting as malleable, fragile and inconsistent. This unravelling of the nation sees a similar unravelling of the heritage discourses by which it defines itself and opens up space for the conceptualisation of heritage's ambiguities.

My centring of the ambiguous aspects of heritage offers two novel contributions to its study. The first is the ecotone, an analytical model of heritage which is predicated on rather than precluding complexity. The second is a related conceptualisation of heritage narratives as malleable and capable of being combined. I have begun to sketch out what it is that brings heritage narratives into combination with each other. The strategic utility of such unions is clear, but there is still much to explore here, and it is in this direction which I suggest future research might be most productive.

Creating conceptual space for heritage's ambiguities has the potential to result in practical applications. Acknowledging the fluidity and heterogeneity of heritage discourses suggests distinctive approaches to heritage conservation. In the establishment of the Kalasha Dur we saw a framing of heritage as a static and coherent object which could be 'preserved' through a museum. Whilst the Kalasha Dur may not be without its benefits for the community, its monumental language and its associated power to essentialise could not be more at odds with the shifting dynamics of the Kalash Valleys. Indeed the building's very intransience lead to be its being targeted by the Taliban. An alternative framing of heritage which gave space for its evolution and renegotiation in response to changing contexts could have inspired a conservation policy that ran with, rather than against the grain of the Valleys. A model such as the ecotone therefore could be adapted to map out the complexities of heritage in a way that informs action.

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Appendix I

Information concerning the Greek Volunteers, presented to visitors to the Kalasha Dur. This example was collected on a visit to the Kalasha Dur in February 2011.

The N.G.O. "GREEK VOLUNTEERS"

Our organisation was established in 1999 and aims to collaborate with Institutions in Greece and with other nationalities of the developing countries for the benefit of help in terms of friendship, solidarity, communication and cooperation with other nations. Since 1995 till its foundation as "Greek Volunteers" it functioned as a team of individual called "the friends of Kalasha" with the support of the teachers' and students' Association.

It has performed activities in the N.W.F.P Pakistan, in the mountain range of Hindukush, in the borders with Afghanistan at an altitude of 2,500m. in the region of Kalasha. Their resources were ensured by the voluntary efforts and activities of their members, their friends and their collaborators as well as by the donations from various Institutions with which they have constructed many projects of social welfare in the above area respecting always the local architecture. The N.G.O. has no professional members. Those who take part in the above activities work voluntarily, being responsible themselves for their transport, accommodation and food. The photos in this leaflet present some of the **22** projects that have been constructed mainly during their summer missions. These projects respond positively to the educational and health problems of both religious communities who peacefully co-exist in the region. Since the year 2000 they are financed by the **HELLENIC AID** of the **Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs.**

THE ACTIVITIES OF OUR MEMBERS, OUR FRIENDS AND OUR PARTNERS

- They organize events and speeches about the country of Pakistan and the Kalasha tribe referring to the problems they face.
- They promote plans of "Financial adoption" and scholarships in order to improve the Kalasha students' education.
- They provide the local residents with the needed medicine in cooperation with the local doctor.
- They equip the schools with stationery, desks, stoves etc.
- They respect the traditions and customs of the region and cooperate with the Kalasha people and the Local Authorities for the construction of their projects..
- They work themselves and supervise the projects during the time they are performed and they deal with the money intended on this project.

ABOUT KALASHA TRIBE

The Kalasha tribe which numbers about 3,000 members lives in 30 little villages built in 3 isolated valleys of the Hindukush range in Chitral District in N.W.F.P Pakistan.

They are polytheists and keep a unique tradition with many rituals and festivals throughout the year. An obsolete oral tale, which still remains alive, associates the tribe with the passing of Alexander the Great's soldiers from these areas. Brochures from the Pakistan Tourism Board and various other books regarding the Kalasha tribe refer to this legendary origin.

The people in these valleys work on the small fields the valleys provide and they are mainly occupied with cattle-breeding. Their means are not enough to supply their basic needs. Their houses are built with stone, mud and wooden beams without any water, drainage or sanitation system which aggravates their health condition. Their temples, sacred places and shrines need support and restoration.

Most of the families are malnourished, their children suffer from vitamin deficiency, young mothers suffer from anaemia, the elders from rheumatism and arthritis, many from goiter due to iodine deficiency while other skin and eye infections are more than often. Life expectancy is short while the death rate percentage remains high.

Tourism along with New Technology and Ideology have invaded the Kalasha valleys. Their Tradition is at risk. When making pleas for help, they consider education as priority in minority schools. They believe that their language, their religion, their tradition and customs and the heritage left to them by their ancestors should become the new generation's property so that they will be able to resist the new way of life which will degrade their beliefs and traditions. Despite the serious problems they face, they try to survive expecting a better future for their children.

"KALASHA DUR"

The kalasha Cultural Centre 2002-2004

The N.G.O. " Greek Volunteers" completed the KALASHADUR in 2004. It is an **Institution** which belongs to the Kalasha tribe and aims to the improvement of Health conditions and Education betterment of the inhabitants of the valleys. It will also support any study and research in this unique tradition. The Institution will try to give solutions to the problems which the people of the Kalasha valleys face by constructing public welfare projects.

It has been erected on a 2000 sq.m. acreage and it contains a Museum, a First Aid Health Centre, Private School of Kalasha Tradition, Seminar Halls for professional training of the traditional crafts and other occupations, Study and Research Centre and a Library.

The beginning of the construction of Kalasha Dur was after the financial assistance of ET3 (a Hellenic TV Channel) and a TVmarathon which was organized by them. The project was completed due to the financing of HELLENIC AID of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs which covered the 75% of the whole budget while the rest was donated by the members, friends and partners of the N.G.O. "Greek Volunteers".


ACTIVITIES AND PROJECTS BY THE N.G.O
"GREEK VOLUNTEERS" IN THE KALASHA VALLEYS IN N.W.F.P. PAKISTAN
KEFALLINIAS 23, 135 61 AGII ANARGIRI, ATHENS GREECE tel. 0030 210 8329067
GOVERNMENT KALASHA SCHOOL IN KRAKAL 1996
GOVERNMENT MUSLIM SCHOOL IN SHEHANADEH 1998
LATRINES AND BATHS IN KRAKAL BASHALI 2000
GOVERNMENT MUSLIM SCHOOL IN BUMBURATE VALLEY 1997
WATER TANK IN SHEHANADEH 1998
WATER TANK IN BUMBURATE VALLEY 2000
LATRINES IN KRAKAL SCHOOL 1997
WATER TANKS IN KALASHA VILLAGES 2005
WOMEN'S LATRINES IN KRAKAL 2000
MATERNITY HOUSE – BASHALI IN BROON VILLAGE 2006-2007
GOVERNMENT PRIMARY KALASHA SCHOOL IN BIRIR VALLEY 1999
MATERNITY HOUSE – BASHALI IN KRAKAL VILLAGE 2001
TOILETTES AND BATHS IN KRAKAL 1998
TOILETTES AT THE HIGH SCHOOL IN BROON 1999
RESTORATION OF THE TEMPLE IN KRAKAL 2001

Appendix II

The notice on the entrance to the Kalasha Dur. (Photograph the author). The frame reflects the "heraldic knot", a popular local motif[197]. The notice reads as follows:

The Institution of KALASHA DUR

The institution of KALASHA DUR was constructed after Kalasha people's request to preserve their tradition which they could see be disappearing.

The name KALASHA DUR means "House of the Kalasha people" and it is a cultural centre to preserve their past.

Two NGOs have cooperated for the construction of this building. The "Greek Volunteers" and the "Kalasha People Welfare Society". The whole project was funded by HELENIC AID of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It started being erected in the year 2002 and it was finally completed in the year 2004.

ARCHITECTURE
The local style was the sheer influence for its construction. KALASHA DUR combines the local architecture which was used to build their residential houses, their cattle houses, as well as their temples and altars, using however modern methods of construction so that it will be a strong and resistant building. The concrete skeleton is covered with a traditional wall, (stones and parallel wooden beams) and wooden carved verandas.
In detail: - The U shape design of the two isles of the building along with the 'darano' long beams on the roof (in order to make an open air verandah) has been borrowed from the Kalasha cattle houses. - The triangle pediment on the central roof is a welcoming symbol for the villagers of Hindu Kush (gates with this symbol of hospitality are up to the present, at the entrance of some Nuristani villages). - The "Kumbapur"

[197] See Klimburg 1999, 299 and Harrison 1994, 17.

(the hole on the central roof) is a sacred symbol for the Kalasha tradition and a particular roof design for many villages in the North of Pakistan.
- The wooden without any nail carved veranda is a unique architectural ornament of the Hindu Kush houses.
- The double ram horn symbol carved on the capitols of the columns is a sacred symbol for the Kalasha and a fertility symbol for many societies whose economy is based on sheep and goat breeding. - The “shigchotr” meaning the “goat horn design” carved on the 17” wide columns of the verandahs, is also the design of the balcony.
- The round solar designs which decorate the verandahs are symbols of protection and wealth. - The geometrical carving on the body of the column is a symbol of brotherhood.
- The “mayiak”. The stone shelves on the walls, are very useful in both residential and cattle houses.

KALASHA DUR was built with stones and wood coming mainly from old houses of Bumburate valley. A few authentic and original wood columns and other wooden pieces from old houses are found in the Museum and in the rest departments of the KALASHA DUR.

The Managing Committee thanks the Greek Ministry of foreign Affairs and HELLENIC AID for their great contribution to the Kalasha tribe.

Appendix III

Below are examples of hybrid Greco-Kalasha features in buildings commissioned by the Greek Volunteers over a ten year period from the mid-1990s to 2004. (All photographs were taken by the author).

Kraka' Kalasha School

Door handle on the entrance gate to the school. The handle itself is executed in traditional form as evident on high-status Kalasha houses. The roundels are also locally derived[198], except for the example highest on the handle, which is a simplified Vergina Sun. Around the edge of the panel is the iconic classical Greek meandros pattern.

[198] For comparable local examples see Edelberg 1984, 80, Frembgen 2005, 143 and Kalter 1991, 177.

Kraka' Bashali



Plaque built into the wall of the entrance to the building. At the top is a Vergina Sun and below the inscription is a panel of locally derived decoration[199].

[199] Cf. Edelberg 1984 and Klimburg 1999.

Batrik Public Fountain

Ionic voluted capitols on supporting pillars and a locally derived motif bordering the plaque on the back wall.

Batrik Public Toilets

Simplified Vergina sun above locally derived roundel and supporting column with ionic voluted capitol.

The Kalasha Dur

Main building elevation and amphitheatre to the right of the main building.

Entrance to the Kalasha Dur museum. The notice replicated in Appendix I is repeated on both sides of the door.



Detail of the façade above the museum entrance. Note the ionic volutes and ovolo on the column capitals. Note also how Vergina suns replace the traditional roundels on the cot'ala thũ' plank columns (see examples in Kalasha houses below). The other motifs are local.

First floor of the building. Columns with ionic voluted capitols support a roof construction and smoke-hole that is typical of the wider region[200]. The flanks of the columns bear panels of locally inspired ‘woven’[201] decoration, surmounted by Vergina suns.

[200] See Harrison 1994, 16; Edelberg 1984, 20 and Frembgen 2005, 133.
[201] See for example Edelberg 1984, 108.

Pillars from removed from Kraka' Jestakhan and built in to the Kalasha Dur, juxtaposed with a version of an ionic column displaying a voluted capital and fluted shaft.

The Kalasha Dur pediment supported by dentils, below which is a frieze with triglyphs and roundels.

Elements of the Classical Cannon Replicated in the Kalasha Dur



Triglyphs and roundels highlighted in green (adapted from Palladio 1997, 28).





Left: Ionic order with volutes highlighted in green and ovolos in pink, the column shaft is fluted (adapted from Fletcher 1961, 127). Right: Ionic order with dentils highlighted in green (adapted from Palladio 1997, 339).

Houses of Prestigious Kalasha Families with Cot’ala thũ' Verandas

Elevation and close up, cot’ala thũ' house, Kraka’. (Note the roundel at the base of the cot’ala thũ' which in the Kalasha Dur is replaced with a Vergina sun).

Elevation and close up, cot’ala thũ' house, Batrik. (Note the roundel at the base of the cot’ala thũ' which in the Kalasha Dur is replaced with a Vergina sun).

Appendix IV

Presented below are excerpts from a variety of non-academic publications and television programmes. They have been organised by genre. The excerpts illustrate themes that are common in representations of the Kalasha. What I have collected is by no means exhaustive, rather it is intended as a selection of eloquent examples.

Four assemblages of themes are present: the first two appear in both Western and Pakistani representations whilst the third and fourth are largely limited to less reputable Pakistani publications.

The first assemblage is characterised by interlinked themes of the Kalasha's ancientness, uncorruptedness, freeness and the Edenic setting of the three Kalash Valleys.

The second assemblage consists of references to Aryan and especially Alexandrian descent and the related idea that the Kalasha are exceptionally fair. Particularly prominent is the attribution of blue eyes and blonde hair, presumably because these traits have come to be associated -in certain racist ideologies- with purity.

The third assemblage focuses on Kalasha women's bodies and Kalasha sexuality, especially the much misconstrued and now defunct practice of bud'al'ak, whereby a chosen young man, on his return from a prolonged stay in the high pastures, was given licence to have sex with certain married women, perhaps those who were having trouble conceiving, but this is unclear (see Di Carlo 2007, 62).

The fourth assemblage incorporates ghoulish fascination with Kalasha above-ground burial practices and a misunderstanding of gandau -Kalasha funerary monuments- as idols. Both above-ground burial and 'idol worship' are conspicuously un-Islamic practices and therefore conjure the Kalasha's otherness for some domestic audiences.

Travel Writing

In his epilogue to *Where Four Worlds Meet* -an account of an expedition to the Hindu Kish-, Fosco Maraini runs riot with the themes of Greek origins and primordial bliss:

"We might have supposed ourselves to be setting foot in the realm of the faëry, where legendary races dwell"

"The presence of the vine- the plant that was sacred to Dionysus- at once invested the valley with as subtly mythological atmosphere. Could this be a genuine memento left by the Greek god on his expedition to India- that journey which proved so lyrical an inspiration to Alexander the Great?"

"The air breathed was real and basic, the whole scene was eloquent of fundamental realities, of a life that accepted labour and suffering with love and laughter"

"Wind and sunshine lapped us and our surroundings in a mood of mid-day happiness. We wanted to sing, or dance- to weep even, in some way to echo the feeling of pagan abandon that was in the air. Here Dionysus held sway: this was his domain"

(Maraini 1964, 247 and 249).

Jonny Bealby's account of a walk across Nuristan ending in the Kalash Valleys was partly inspired by *The Man Who Would Be King*. Bealby draws on the tropes of fairness, Alexandrian descent and is eloquent in his expression of the sense of kinship he felt on meeting his first Kalasha (Bealby 1998).

"But it wasn't the fading anxiety that made me feel so calm. When travelling you are forced to adapt, constantly to change your ways in order to blend in and get on. During the course of this journey I'd discovered that this is as true with those of your own nationality as it is with people from a different race and creed. But surrounded by my new-found Kalash friends, I realised that at that moment I wasn't changed at all. I was myself, completely myself – as though I were sitting … with my oldest friends in a London pub."

"Surrounded by the rugged mountains of the Hindu Kush, I was sitting on a stool, drinking wine, surrounded by pagans – whose faces were indeed as pale as any Englishman's – who claimed their ancestry from Alexander the Great. I glanced up at the stars and smiled."

(Bealby 1998, 205 and 220).

Amateur Ethnography

A. Sayeed Khan Qamar's *Kalash the Vanishing Culture* includes thirty-two illustrations depicting Kalasha women and two depicting Kalasha men. Captions include:

"1. A young attractive kafir [sic] girl in her traditional headgear […]

4. A typical Kalash woman with distinct Greek feature.

6. Charming docile girls attracting tourists.

7. A beautiful Kalash girl beautifully dressed waiting for someone.

10. An old Kalash woman in Birir vividly remembers the dances organized to welcome the arrival of the Budalac in which she always full participated.

11. A Budalac over the hills counting days to return to the village on an appointed day and time to receive a hearty welcome by pretty girls.

22. A young charming Kalash girl.

25. The charming girls with rugged hills in the background.

30. A Kalash blonde with heavy necklaces entering the age of puberty.

32. A pretty young Kalash girl."

(Khan Qamar 1999, 2–4)

Unsurprisingly, given the above, a significant proportion of the book is devoted to the author's speculation about Kalasha sexuality. Passages discuss fantastical Kalasha sexual stimulants, the sexual proclivity of old men and -a favourite theme- the role of the budalak (Khan Qamar 1999, 3, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 37, 39, 40 and 41). Even the story of descent form Alexander's army is eroticised:

"[A] few of the Alexander's generals fascinated by the terrain and the beauty of the Kalash girls conveyed to the Macedonian king their desire to settle down in the Kalash area"

(Khan Qamar 1999, 11)

Idol worship also crops up occasionally (7, 14) as do open coffins as a subject of ghoulish fascination:

"[O]ften the crows living near the cemetery enjoy feast over the dead body"

(Khan Qamar 1999, 26)

State Literature

"The Kalash are a people about whose origins there are varying opinions, from their being the descendants of Alexander's soldiers, to their belonging to one of the pastoral Aryan tribes…"

Raja Tridiv Roy, Minister for Minorities in the 1980s. In Alauddin 1992, ii.

"Kalash Kafirs of Chitral, descendants of Alexander's soldiers or belonging to one of the pastoral Ayran tribes meandering South from the Central Asian steppes… present their versions of life in Kafiristan, those idyllic valleys closer to heavens above… the Spartan hero, Budhaluk, crowned Don Juan of the season, is shying out of visible existence"

Alauddin, an ex civil servant and government advisor on the Kalasha. In *Kalash; The Paradise Lost* (Alauddin 1992, blurb).

Guidebooks

"The Kalasha claim legendary ancestry as descendants of Alexander the Great's armies left behind after his campaigns in the area".

Pakistan & the Karakoram Highway. Lonely Planet (Singh et al. 2005, 228).

"The Kalash are basically idolators. It is believed to be one of the oldest religions."

"The Kalash are considered to live very close to nature without any sophistication"

"Overexposure of the pristine Kalash culture to the facilities of the modern age has altogether changed their erstwhile simple behavior"

The Kalash of Chitral: Yesterday & Today (Baig, n.d., 8, 17 and 27).

Tour Operators

"Descended, they maintain, from the armies of Alexander the Great…"

Introduction to the Kalasha page of Wild Frontiers a 'bespoke' tour operator ('Kalash' 2011).

British Newspaper Articles

"The Kalash tribe is said to descend from Alexander the Great's army, but now it is fighting to preserve its traditions in a Taliban stronghold"

'Culture Kalash' (Editor's introduction), in The *Observer Magazine* (Rickett 2011).

"Many of the Kalash claim descent from the armies of Alexander the Great, and indeed their faces do look strikingly similar to those you would encounter in Croatia or Montenegro. They make wine, revere animals and believe in mountaintop fairies. To observe their lives is to be transported far from today's North-West Frontier, with its increasingly militant, misogynistic brand of Islam, to a world that Homer's contemporaries might have recognized."

'Titan of the Kalash', in *The Daily Telegraph* (Foreman 2007).

"For centuries, the blond-haired, blue-eyed people of the Kalash tribes of North West Pakistan have lived a libertine lifestyle."

'Taliban targets descendants of Alexander the Great', in *The Daily Telegraph* (Nelson and Khan 2009).

"More than 2,000 years ago Alexander the Great tore across the mountains of northern Pakistan, plundering, conquering and, according to legend, sowing the seeds of a tribe that endures to this day."

"Reputed to have descended from the armies of Alexander, the Kalasha have lived for thousands of years in a nest of idyllic valleys near the Afghan border."

"About 4,000 of them survive in three majestic valleys that awe visitors as a sort of paradise lost."

"Turquoise streams rush through leafy glades of giant walnut trees and swaying crops. Clusters of simple houses cling to steep forested slopes. Compared with many compatriots beyond their valleys, the Kalasha are charmingly liberal: drinking wine, holding dancing festivals and worshipping a variety of gods."

'Lost Tribe Struggles for Survival', in *The Guardian* (Walsh 2005).

"[T]he pagan Kalash, an ancient people who have whiter skins than the Muslims who live around Chitral."

'Search for the Yeti at your peril', in *The Spectator* (Wheeler 2017).

"The pale-skinned, blue-eyed Kalash people"

'Dancing in the hills: a journey to meet Pakistan's Kalash people', in *Financial Times* (Dalrymple 2018).

Pakistani Newspaper Articles

"Most historians concur that they are the descendants of Greeks who came over with Alexander the Great and just stayed on. Their flaxen hair, very fair skins, and light eyes further endorse this theory, in addition to the many customs and nature-oriented rites and festivals that were said to be common in ancient Greece".

'Kalash: a vanishing cultural treasure', in *The News* (Datta 2010).

"Anybody who has ever read a Pakistan guidebook will have seen a picture of the Kalash women with their colourful headdresses adorned with cowrie shells – shells that speak of this being an ancient trade route as they are thousands of kilometers from the sea in any direction. But no photograph prepares you for the sight of these rainbowed women moving about in their landscape, with their pale almost Mediterranean complexion indicating their probable genetic origins in the armies of Alexander the Great who passed this way over two thousand years ago".

"Walking gently uphill in a sparkling autumn morning that is vibrant with the colours of the turning season, there is a sense of peace and tranquillity that is rarely experienced in these troubled times. Everywhere there is the sound of water and birdsong, and our small group moved along mostly in silence as we drunk from the cup of new experience."

'Kalash', in *The News* (Cork 2010).

"Reputed to have descended from the armies of Alexander, the Kalash have lived for thousands of years in a nest of idyllic valleys near the Afghan border."

'Greeks return to land conquered by Alexander: Kalash Valley project', in *The Dawn* (Aseer 2005).

Television

In his BBC series Himalaya With Michael Palin, Palin opens his description of the Kalasha as follows: "Their pale skin and light coloured eyes have led some to suggest descent from the armies of Alexander the Great" ('Himalaya with Michael Palin' 2004).

In his BBC series In the Footsteps of Alexander the Great, Michael Wood visits the Kalasha and suggests that they could be descended from the soldiers of Alexander's army (Wood 1998).

Posters Promoting Tourism

There are many posters depicting Kalasha in travel agencies, hotels and even alongside airport roads in Pakistan. Of one example the German anthropologist Jürgen Frembgen (2008) writes:

"A Kalasha girl and two children are depicted on a new poster printed in 1997 by WJ classics (Rawalpindi), the accompanying text leaves no doubt: "The Kalash tribe, remnant of the Greek army which accompanied Alexander the Great in 326 B.C. The fair features of the Kalasha race are

especially obvious in some of the young children with blond hair and blue eyes. Their centuries old traditions and culture has not changed with the passage of time”.

Appendix V

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF K.C.S.S.
(Kalasha Culture Saving Society)

The K.C.S.S. members, signatories of this document, present the aims and objectives of K.C.S.S. Decided at K.C.S.S. meeting in 15th July 2001, in Krakal village, Bumburet, Chitral district, N.W.F.P.

1. To unite all the Kalasha community to preserve the Kalasha culture according to the Pakistani rights of minorities.
2. To publish schoolbooks about the Kalasha tradition and religion for the Kalasha student.
3. To manage the tourism in the Kalasha places:
   -To guide the tourists in the Kalasha villages and Kalasha religious places.
   -To provide right information about the Kalasha culture and religion.
   -To preserve the Kalasha villages and the Kalasha festivals as human cultural particularities and zoological attraction.
   -To develop an eco-tourism, more adopted to a small population as the Kalasha.
4. To provide good education to the Kalasha students and try to provide the able students scholarships and also give them technical education.
5. To work for the welfare of Kalasha people and try to get their rights from the government of Pakistan.
6. To identify the social problem of the Kalasha people and try to solve main problems.
7. To preserve the natural resources by the respect of environment and to develop the reforestation.
8. To develop the agricultural, using new technologies and new products.
9. To request quota for Kalasha people in employment schemes.
10. To protect the use of wine in the Kalasha culture and to request the free circulation of this product between the three-Kalasha valleys for Kalasha use only.
11. To request the permission to use guns for:
    -To protect the livestock in the pastures against wild predators livings in our mountains.
    -To firing during the born and the funerals, that is an essential part of the Kalasha tradition.
12. To rehabilitate and preserve the right use of the Kalasha maternity homes and try to provide better first medical aid.
13. To help the Kalasha orphans and widows.
14. To request a talk about the usefulness and the use of the toll tax at the entries of the Kalasha valleys.