

Trends in Organized Crime

Covid-19 and Child Criminal Exploitation in the UK: Implications of the Pandemic for County Lines --Manuscript Draft--

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Abstract:	<p>In March 2020, the UK was placed in lockdown following the spread of the Covid-19 virus. Just as legitimate workplaces made changes to enable their employees to work from home, the illicit drugs trade also made alternative arrangements, adapting its supply models to ensure continuity of operations. Based upon qualitative interviews with 46 practitioners, this paper assesses how front-line professionals have experienced and perceived the impact of Covid-19 on child criminal exploitation and County Lines drug supply in the UK. Centring around three main themes, we highlight perceived adaptations to the County Lines supply model, as well as exploring the impact of lockdown restrictions on detection and law enforcement activities aimed at County Lines, and the safeguarding of children and young people who are, or are at risk of, criminal exploitation through County Lines. Our participants generally believed that the pandemic induced shifts to County Lines that reflected ongoing evolution of the drug supply model and shifts in understanding or attention because of the Covid-19 restrictions, rather than a complete reconstitution. Practitioners perceived that Covid-19 has had, and continues to have, a significant impact on some young people's vulnerability to exploitation, on the way in which police and frontline practitioners respond to County Lines and child criminal exploitation, and on the way illegal drugs are being moved and sold.</p>	

Covid-19 and Child Criminal Exploitation in the UK: Implications of the Pandemic for County Lines

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Research involving human participants: Our research complies with the University of Nottingham's code of research conduct and ethics, and was approved by the School of Social Science and Social Policy's research ethics committee under reference 1920-089-STAFF.

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Keywords

Organised crime, drug supply, law enforcement, safeguarding, covid-19.

Abstract

In March 2020, the UK was placed in lockdown following the spread of the Covid-19 virus. Just as legitimate workplaces made changes to enable their employees to work from home, the illicit drugs trade also made alternative arrangements, adapting its supply models to ensure continuity of operations. Based upon qualitative interviews with 46 practitioners, this paper assesses how front-line professionals have experienced and perceived the impact of Covid-19 on child criminal exploitation and County Lines drug supply in the UK. Throughout the paper, we highlight perceived adaptations to the County Lines supply model, the impact of lockdown restrictions on detection and law enforcement activities aimed at County Lines, and on efforts to safeguard children and young people from criminal exploitation. Our participants generally believed that the pandemic had induced shifts to County Lines that reflected an ongoing evolution of the drug supply model and shifts in understanding or attention because of the Covid-19 restrictions, rather than a complete reconstitution of the model itself. Practitioners perceived that Covid-19 has had, and continues to have, a significant impact on some young people's vulnerability to exploitation, on the way in which police and frontline practitioners respond to County Lines and child criminal exploitation and on the way illegal drugs are being moved and sold.

Introduction

The onset of the Covid-19 pandemic in March 2020 was closely followed by substantial media speculation (Eastwood, Spicer, and Aldridge 2020; Grierson and Walker 2020; Pidd 2020; Tidy 2020), as well as reports from frontline practitioners (National Youth Agency 2020; Wedlock and Melina 2020), that lockdown restrictions imposed to stem rates of infection were having a clear impact on 'County Lines' drug distribution and child criminal exploitation in the UK. National lockdowns and other restrictions limited people's capacity to move freely without creating suspicion, and reports suggested that the County Lines distribution model, which typically relies on the transportation of drugs and money between larger metropolitan and provincial or coastal areas, had been disrupted during periods of national lockdown (Caluori 2020).

The perceived impact of the pandemic also extended beyond the business side of drug supply. Reductions in reports of missing children were initially taken as a sign that fewer young people were being exploited through County Lines (Caluori 2020), while other reports hypothesised that drug distribution networks may have instead developed a variety of new approaches and supply tactics to avoid detection by police (Caluori 2020; Pidd 2020; Saggars 2020). Youth justice, youth work and child protection practitioners all outlined concerns that lockdown restrictions may also have made some young people more vulnerable, and in particular increasingly susceptible to grooming and criminal exploitation through County Lines (National Youth Agency 2020; Wedlock and Melina 2020).

1 In this paper, we seek to inform efforts to safeguard children and vulnerable adults, as the
2 impacts of Covid-19 continue to unfold. Based on interviews with practitioners whose work
3 intersects with County Lines and Child Criminal Exploitation, we assess possible shifts in
4 County Lines offending patterns resulting from measures introduced in response to the
5 pandemic, as well as their impact on efforts to detect, prevent and combat crime, and on the
6 safeguarding of victims of exploitation. The paper attempts to understand how front-line
7 professionals have experienced and perceive the impact of the pandemic on their work and
8 those they engage within the context of County Lines and child criminal exploitation.
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10 County Lines (CL)

11 The Independent review by Dame Carol Black (Black 2021) estimated that the UK’s illicit
12 drugs market is worth £9.4 billion a year. Substantial national attention has been paid to the
13 evolution of the UK’s drug markets, largely centring on the development and expansion of
14 drug supply networks from urban centres into provincial towns, a process termed ‘County
15 Lines’ (Harding 2020).
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17 Specifically, the issue of ‘County Lines’ refers to the migration of illegal drugs from urban to
18 rural and coastal areas. Drugs are often transported across different ‘county’ jurisdictions using
19 a branded mobile phone ‘line’, and is often recognised as involving the exploitation of young
20 people and/or vulnerable adults to move and hold drugs and cash (National Crime Agency
21 2015). The mobile phone is key to CL. Dealing networks typically use mobile phones to
22 establish a database of active drug users, using the phone as a ‘deal line’ which connects new
23 customers to the ‘out of town’ dealers operating in their area (Coomber and Moyle 2018;
24 Harding, 2020).
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26 While the term ‘County Lines’ (henceforth CL) has been in use since at least 2015 (National
27 Crime Agency 2015), there remains significant debate (Spicer, Moyle, and Coomber 2020;
28 Turner, Belcher, and Pona 2019) about its inception. Some suggest that the model emerged in
29 response to the saturation of drug availability in major metropolitan areas (Robinson, McLean,
30 and Densley 2019; Windle and Briggs 2015), where a ‘growing number of dealers’ is not
31 matched by growing numbers of dependant users (Ruggiero 2010, 51). Research by Coomber
32 and Moyle (2017) goes further, and suggests that the motivations for ‘outreach supply’ methods
33 like CL are associated with increased opportunities for profit (Van Daele and Vander Beken,
34 2010). Geographically distant areas where there is a captive market of addicted drug users
35 which are selected to avoid organized competition that might be present in the dealers’ home
36 locales (Windle and Briggs, 2015; NCA, 2015; 2016).
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38 Since becoming a national priority in 2018, CL has been officially situated as a form of
39 organised crime. This narrative, reinforced in the Government’s Serious Violence Strategy
40 (HM Government 2018), placed gangs and organised criminal networks at the centre of rising
41 levels of violence, exploitation, and CL activity. In the policing response that followed to
42 reduce CL and its associated harms, territorial police forces were supported by regional
43 organised crime units (ROCUs) and by the National Crime Agency. In their most recent
44 strategic assessment, the National Crime Agency (2019) associated CL with increases in both
45 gun and knife crime, “an expansion of gangs and organised crime outside of urban centres”,
46 and the increase in the “coercive control and exploitation of vulnerable populations for the
47 purposes of drug dealing” (McLean, Robinson, and Densley 2019, 4).
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49 Official definitions of organised crime are vague. The UK’s Serious Crime Act 2015 identifies
50 an organised crime *group* as that which (1) “has at its purpose, or one of its purposes, the
51 carrying on of criminal activities” and (2) “consists of three or more people who agree to act
52 together to further that purpose”. Yet the extent to which many CL networks are organised is
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1 contested. In a ‘rapid appraisal’ of CL in a seaside town in Essex, Jaensch and South (2018: 1)
2 asserted that the gangs involved in CL presented themselves as a “hybrid between traditional
3 street gangs and organised crime groups”, noting that those involved were “visible, known to
4 police and operated at street level where organised criminals tend not to operate” (ibid, 13).
5 While this may hold true for many of the networks involved in CL across the UK, the
6 proliferation of the trafficking of children, the above-mentioned increase in gun and knife
7 crime, as well as rising cases of money laundering and cybercrime (O’Hagan and Long 2019)
8 suggest that CL activity does involve some elements of organised crime.
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10 Indeed, Windle and Briggs (2015a: 1178) observed that drug dealing is separate to gang
11 activity. However, due to the overlap between actors in gangs and CLs it can be hard to
12 establish where a gang ends and where an organised crime group (OCG) begins (Densley,
13 2012: 44–45). Bonning and Cleaver (2020: 14) assert that gang membership is potentially more
14 likely to be associated with being a perpetrator of violence, while association with county lines
15 is more highly associated with being a victim of it.
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18 The direct attribution of youth violence and drug market participation to gangs has itself been
19 contested as problematic (Densley 2011). It is contended that the ‘gang’ narrative continues to
20 be used to legitimise the over-policing of black communities, and contributes to the differential
21 treatment of young black men in the criminal justice system (Williams 2015). Williams also
22 suggests (2015, 19) that the gang label ‘others’ specific groups and communities as problematic
23 and requiring of police intervention. ‘Gang’ rhetoric fails to situate youth violence and CL
24 within broader issues such as socio-economic inequalities, austerity policies and intensified
25 social exclusion (Spicer 2020). The demographics of young people involved in CL suggests
26 that many “come from socially and economically disadvantaged backgrounds” (Windle,
27 Moyle, and Coomber 2020, 73). Thus, their participation in CL for either money or drugs may
28 actually at times demonstrate a rational form of resilience to these life challenges. That is,
29 young peoples’ involvement in CL can be less an attraction to a criminal lifestyle, but more a
30 representation of their being “instrumental in providing shelter and sustenance for themselves”
31 (Ellis 2018, 161).
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36 Criminal Exploitation in County Lines

37 CL is also increasingly a concern for child welfare agencies, as reports suggest children aged
38 as young as seven are being used as ‘runners’ to move and sell drugs in areas far away from
39 their homes (Turner, Belcher, and Pona 2019; Wroe 2019). The use of children in these
40 operations offers distance and anonymity for dealers, who can manage the supply from their
41 local areas without having to remain present in market areas themselves (National Crime
42 Agency 2015). Adults are also known to be exploited as drug ‘runners’ and ‘commuters’,
43 particularly in circumstances where existing drug users are controlled as ‘user dealers’
44 (Harding 2020a). There is also acknowledgement of sexual exploitation within some CL
45 environments, particularly where females are involved (Robinson, McLean, and Densley
46 2019), or indeed through the practice of ‘plugging’ - where drugs are packed and inserted into
47 bodily cavities for transportation (Glover Williams and Findlay, 2019; Reginelli et al 2015).
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51 Criminal exploitation through CL goes beyond the distribution and retrieval of illicit drugs and
52 money, and includes wide range of criminal activities, such as the possession and concealment
53 of weapons, the perpetration of violence (using knives and firearms), the harbouring of
54 offenders, and providing false alibis for others. While these activities vary in terms of level of
55 involvement and severity of offence, the individuals at the root of the criminal exploitation of
56 children and young people are often conceptualised as organised criminals (individuals) and
57 criminal gangs/groups (The Childrens Society 2019). HM Government (2018, 8) contends that
58 child criminal exploitation
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1 “occurs where an individual or group takes advantage of an imbalance of power to
2 coerce, control, manipulate or deceive a child or young person under the age of 18 into
3 any criminal activity (a) in exchange for something the victim needs or wants, and/or
4 (b) for the financial or other advantage of the perpetrator or facilitator and/or (c) through
5 violence or the threat of violence. The victim may have been criminally exploited even
6 if the activity appears consensual.”
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8 Existing research reveals that, despite their exploitation, young people often also exhibit
9 agency and entrepreneurialism in their engagement with CL, seeing it as a way to earn money,
10 gain kudos and maintain their identity with peers (Harding 2020a; Hesketh and Robinson
11 2019). However, the harms to those involved can be substantial, and they may experience
12 threats to their lives, physical and psychological abuse, and increased involvement with the
13 Criminal Justice System (UK Home Office 2018).
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16 Understandings of child criminal exploitation and CL are still developing. There is a relatively
17 small but growing field of academic literature (Coomber and Moyle 2018; Hesketh and
18 Robinson 2019; Robinson, McLean, and Densley 2019; Spicer 2019; Stone 2018; Windle and
19 Briggs 2015; Windle, Moyle, and Coomber 2020), in addition to government agency reports,
20 threat assessments and guidance (HM Government 2018; National Crime Agency 2015, 2016,
21 2017), third sector evaluations (Caluori 2020; Hudek 2018; Rescue and Response 2020; Spicer
22 2019; Turner, Belcher, and Pona 2019; Wroe 2019) and journalistic accounts (Daly 2017;
23 Hymas 2020; Jones 2018).
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27 The participation of children and young people is often facilitated through the offer of money,
28 luxury consumer items, clothes, drugs and accommodation (Robinson, McLean, and Densley
29 2019; see also Rees 2011). Debt bondage may be used to maintain control of victims, in which
30 drug debts are used to manipulate and coerce young people to participate in CL operations
31 (Robinson, McLean, and Densley 2019). The centrality of money is also emphasised by
32 Pinkney, who remarks that:
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36 “Young people want things just like we as adults do. But they can’t afford it. They don’t
37 have jobs, there is a lack of resources. CL, robbery, and fraud are quick ways to make
38 money” (Craig Pinkney, quoted in Wedlock and Melina 2020, 53).
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41 Windle, Moyle, and Coomber (2020, 4) offer that CL dealers seek to exploit children because
42 they “represent a cheap, easily recruited workforce”. Young people exploited through CL often
43 present with a number of vulnerabilities, including high rates of missing episodes, being looked
44 after/in the care system, exclusion from mainstream education, and experiences of being
45 victimised and/or having perpetrated serious youth violence - factors which are also associated
46 with increased likelihood of criminal offending (Sturrock and Holmes, 2015).
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49 Some young peoples’ appearance as consensual participants in the illegal drug supply
50 contribute to inconsistencies in the current criminal justice responses to child criminal
51 exploitation, and official rhetoric about treating children that are identified as involved as
52 victims often does not translate into practice (Wedlock and Melina 2020, 66).
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55 The CL model also often relies on the establishment of a local base, referred to as a ‘trap house’
56 (Turner, Belcher, and Pona 2019). Borrowed from the street term for drug dealing (‘trapping’),
57 these are often residential addresses owned, or rented, by individuals in the drug market area.
58 Properties are subsequently taken over and used to package and distribute drugs – a process
59 referred to as ‘cuckooing’, (Coomber and Moyle 2018; Stone 2018), “named after the nest
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invading tendencies of cuckoo birds” (Spicer, Moyle, and Coomber 2020, 2). Cuckooed victims may be specifically targeted, with CL networks seeking out properties belonging to vulnerable adults, such as those with existing addictions, physical disabilities, and severe mental health issues, including the elderly (NCA 2017). Like the criminal exploitation of children, cuckooing has also been framed as a form of modern slavery (Stone 2018).

County Lines during the pandemic

The first national lockdown in March 2020 triggered an immediate drop in reported crime rates across England, with two notable exceptions: drug offences and domestic violence (National Police Chiefs’ Council 2020b). Reductions in violent crime in London, including knife and firearms offences, as well as homicides, were described as a “silver lining” of the pandemic (London Metropolitan Police Commissioner Cressida Dick in Dodd 2020). In the capital, recorded knife crime fell by more than 50% and stab wounds among people under 25 by 69%, causing some to suggest that the pandemic was itself acting as a significant inhibitor of crime (Dodd 2020). A decrease in missing children reports (National Police Chiefs’ Council 2020b) were cited as possible evidence that exploitation linked to CL may have reduced during the lockdown (Caluori 2020). Others argued that the number of missing vulnerable children had in fact *increased* as safeguarding capacity was cut because of the pandemic (Townsend 2020). However, the overall picture is unclear, and changes in recorded incidence may have been a reflection of the pandemic’s impact on reporting behaviour, rather than an actual change in crime prevalence. Moreover, the increase in recorded drugs offences in England and Wales may be a representation of the re-orientation of policing resources towards such ‘visible’ street crimes, as police benefited from the availability of extra resources becoming available as other policing activities, such as their monitoring of the night-time economy, were curtailed (Langton, Dixon and Farrell, 2021).

There remains an absence of clarity regarding Covid-19 attributable shifts in CL behaviour (and in the relative risk it poses to children and young people), reflecting the lack of evidence about changes to illicit drug markets in general. It is perhaps unsurprising that there are no studies predating covid-19 that attempt to establish how a global pandemic might affect illicit drug markets, and the accounts available upon which the pandemic’s impact can be assessed are mostly speculative predictions such as media reports, anecdotal and individual examples, and opinion pieces by sector commentators. It is therefore, “altogether unclear whether (many of) statements derive from some general observations, theoretical argument, or are simply the author’s opinion” (Gimmoni 2020, 1).

Whatever the changes in the levels of CL activity and exploitation, young people continued to be found on the country’s rail networks, far away from their homes, and carrying significant sums of money and/or drugs (Grierson and Walker 2020). Despite a 94% reduction in rail travel generally, British Transport Police claimed they had “not seen a reduction” of CL activity involving “juvenile drug runners” on trains (Grierson and Walker 2020). However, it is unclear how this is related to any changes in the level of CL operations themselves, as although fewer young people might be using the rail networks to move drugs, those that remained were increasingly visible to police. Indeed, the British Transport Police acknowledged that the reduction in train services and the requirement to have an essential purpose for journeys made it “incredibly easy” for them to detect and disrupt activity on the rail network (Grierson and Walker 2020).

The increased visibility of children and young people moving drugs on public transport may also have encouraged distribution networks to change their tactics. Superintendent Andy O’Connor of Merseyside police commented in media reporting that drug distribution networks

1 were avoiding public transport and using cars instead (Pidd 2020). This was corroborated by
2 Tidy (2020) who conducted media interviews with middle-tier drug dealers. Moreover,
3 Harding (2020b) detailed how his drug-market involved sources had advised that the supply of
4 drugs from metropolitan centres to provincial or seaside towns now more commonly involved
5 “medium bulk deliveries in cars rather than sending boys down on empty trains and buses,
6 where they would be more likely to be spotted by authorities”. This suggests that ‘runners’
7 might have been travelling less often, but with larger quantities of drugs and money (Caluori
8 2020), and remaining in rural or coastal distribution areas for longer.
9

10 There was also speculation that drug distribution networks and some drug users anticipated
11 restrictions and began stockpiling drugs in rural and coastal towns before lockdowns were
12 introduced in the UK (Hamilton, 2020; Saggars 2020; Tidy 2020). The possibility that children
13 and young people were involved in fewer journeys and longer stays might also have had
14 implications for the number of children reported missing. A reduction in missing children
15 reports may disguise the possibility that those who were missing could have been forced to
16 stay in county bases for longer periods of time (Tidy 2020). This could also serve as an
17 indicator of continued or enhanced cuckooing risk. Interviews conducted by Tidy (2020) also
18 suggested that some drug runners were frustrated at making fewer journeys, as it reduced
19 opportunities to make money, while those in provincial bases were bored and irritated at the
20 prospect of spending extended periods of time in trap houses.
21

22 Reductions in the availability of other types of property for use as dealing bases, such as Airbnb
23 accommodation and hotels, might also further increased cuckooing risk (Saggars 2020).
24 However, this change also comes with a trade-off, as increased footfall at residential properties
25 may rouse suspicion, at a time when people were not supposed to be visiting other households
26 (Harding 2020b). Liminal spaces, such as car parks, industrial warehouses and unused railway
27 land, were also cited as locations where drug sales were increasing (National Youth Agency
28 2020), as was the technique of ‘stacking’, which involves assembling groups of customers
29 together at the same time and place (Caluori 2020).
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31 There were also been reported shifts towards the local recruitment of young people in
32 distribution areas, rather than relying on the traditional model of trafficking people from urban
33 areas, marking the emergence of a new “local franchised model of CL” (Caluori 2020).
34 Reported widely was the use of key worker disguises by runners (Harding 2020b; Pidd 2020),
35 and daily exercise as an excuse for movement (Saggars 2020). Interestingly, there were also
36 reports CLs were practising social distancing, wearing masks and gloves (Lowe 2020), and
37 even refusing to accept cash (Eastwood, Spicer, and Aldridge 2020; Harding 2020b), indicating
38 some adherence to covid-19 protocols.
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40 Criminal Exploitation during the pandemic

41 Despite the difficulties in measuring prevalence, government, media and sectoral reporting
42 have all been unified in their articulation that the pandemic’s restrictions heightened some
43 vulnerabilities and risks of children and young people to being groomed into, and criminally
44 exploited, through CL. The early stages of lockdown in March 2020 brought fears that children
45 would be targeted by CL networks, as schools and colleges closed, and youth services became
46 severely disrupted or unable to operate entirely. Commentators suggested that these factors
47 would result in a “heightening of risks for those already exploited”, “increasing risks of
48 exploitation”, and the “disruption of response efforts” (Smith and Cockayne 2020). The closure
49 of schools and colleges, as well as much youth service provision, potentially reduced the time
50 that children and young people could spend in relative safety (Coles 2020; National Youth
51 Agency 2020).
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1 Missing from home and care reports also dropped during lockdown (Caluori 2020), with a
2 study by the University of Liverpool reporting a 35% decrease in reports of missing children
3 (Shalev Green et al. 2020). While this may have been expected, concerns remain around the
4 increasing vulnerabilities of those who do go missing, especially children under the care of the
5 local authority, who comprise a significant proportion of all missing cases.
6

7 Pandemic-induced periods of lockdown restrictions removed opportunities for professionals to
8 notice possible risks, gather information, and provide space for disclosures, exacerbating the
9 existing ‘postcode lottery’ of service provision, that already leaves many young people at risk
10 (Wedlock and Melina 2020, 82).
11

12 The National Youth Agency reported that lockdown was used as a cover for a recruitment drive
13 by criminal networks (National Youth Agency 2020, 7). Increased time spent on the internet
14 was also seen as a potential risk factor for the grooming of children and young people (Harding
15 2020b; Saggars 2020), especially those previously unknown to child protection services or law
16 enforcement. More time at home meant that some were at increased risk of exposure to
17 domestic violence (National Police Chiefs’ Council 2020a), an issue previously attributed as a
18 push factor towards CL activity (Wedlock and Melina 2020).
19

20 CL networks’ tactics may have augmented the vulnerability of children and young people in a
21 variety of ways. National reporting has claimed that gender biases associating CL with males
22 has served to overlook the experiences of girls and women (National Youth Agency 2020;
23 Wedlock and Melina 2020), and it is suggested that females are increasingly used by CL
24 networks to avoid suspicion from law enforcement (National Youth Agency 2020; see also:
25 Saggars 2020). Indeed, the National Crime Agency (National Crime Agency 2017) noted a
26 significant, but not fully quantified, increase in the number of suspected female victims of
27 sexual exploitation under the age of 18, which according to Windle, Moyle, and Coomber
28 (2020, 5) can be “attributed to the rise of CL activity”. Acknowledging the role of agency in
29 female participation, Harding (2020a) coined the term ‘survival narrative’ to refer to an
30 “unexpected change in circumstance[s] lead[ing] women, and men, to engage in behaviours
31 they may not previously have considered”. Such circumstances include, for example, a sudden
32 and unexpected loss of employment, long-term poverty and the UK’s shift from legacy
33 benefits¹ to Universal Credit which, according to d’Este and Harvey (2020, 19), will worsen
34 the financial conditions of many recipients, and lead to an increase in financially motivated
35 crime.
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37 It is clear the pandemic has had some impact on methods employed to maintain the UK’s illicit
38 drug supply and the associated exploitation of young people. However, it cannot be concluded
39 whether reported changes are speculative, based on anecdotal examples only occurring in one
40 place, regionally variant, or reflective of wider (non Covid-19 specific) trends to avoid
41 detection by law enforcement. Gaps in quantitative reporting mean it is also difficult to
42 ascertain whether reports, which appear to corroborate one another, are drawing on speculative
43 or anecdotal evidence from the same places. Such reporting may obscure the possibility that
44 frontline professionals actually lack full awareness of what has happened to CL operations
45 during Covid-19. Indeed, reduced face-to-face interactions with young people, significant court
46 backlogs and changes in policing priorities are a likely source of much ambiguity. The
47 assumption that CL operations must have changed because of Covid-19 restrictions, the sense
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58 ¹ The six legacy benefits being replaced by Universal Credit include: Housing Benefit, income-related
59 Employment and Support Allowance (ESA), income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA), Child Tax
60 Credits (CTC), Working Tax Credits (WTC) and Income Support
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1 of it being an unusual and extraordinary moment, arguably skews the literature away from
2 considering possible continuities.

3 Methods

4 Our research takes a primarily descriptive approach, as a response to develop understanding of
5 a clear and emergent social issue (Silverman 2015, 113) – that of perceived adaptations to CL
6 drug supply and child criminal exploitation during the pandemic. We used qualitative data from
7 interviews with key frontline and analytical practitioners (N = 46), aiming to elicit their
8 experiences of the pandemic to understand perceptions of possible and sudden shifts in
9 perpetrator behaviours, and the resulting emergence of new safeguarding challenges related to
10 CL and CCE. Participants included a) practitioners involved in frontline (statutory or non-
11 governmental) service provision with young people currently or previously involved in CL, or
12 considered at-risk of becoming involved; b) law enforcement officers with portfolio
13 responsibility for policing CL and illegal drug supply; and c) practitioners from law
14 enforcement, non-governmental or other statutory bodies working in analytical roles with
15 responsibility for CL and illegal drug suppl. In total, we interviewed 21 police officers (ten
16 from territorial police forces across England, five from within the Regional Organised Crime
17 Units, four from the British Transport Police, and two from the National Police Chiefs
18 Councils), 10 local authority employees, 13 youth workers from non-governmental
19 organisations and two private sector workers. Participants were purposively sampled, and
20 further participants were identified via a snowball referral approach. Out of the nine English
21 administrative regions where our participants were based, East Anglia and the North East were
22 the least represented locations within our sample. The East Midlands and Greater London were
23 most represented.

24 Interviews were semi-structured, with flexibility that enabled the exploration of insights on
25 issues where participants had specific first-hand experience or knowledge. All interviews
26 followed the semi-structured template, with slight variances in the phrasing of questions,
27 depending on the participant’s professional role. Interviews lasted between 30 and 90 minutes,
28 and were recorded using videoconferencing software (Microsoft Teams or Zoom) for
29 transcription by the researchers. Data was initially grouped by the professional role of the
30 participant (police, NGO, Youth Justice, etc.). Data was also cross read to discover and
31 corroborate latent themes (Ryan and Bernard 2000). In some cases, email correspondence was
32 used to elaborate or further clarify points made during the interviews. All interviews were
33 thematically coded (Creswell 2014) giving the researchers flexibility to “identify, analyse, and
34 report patterns (themes) within data” (Braun and Clarke 2006, 6) without being tied to any
35 “pre-existing theoretical framework[s]” (ibid, 9). All coding and analysis was completed by
36 two researchers. Braun and Clarke’s six-step guide to thematic analysis was adopted, enabling
37 the researchers to familiarise themselves with the data by way of transcription, reading and re-
38 reading transcripts, and making notes about general ideas and patterns. Initial codes were
39 generated and arranged into potential themes. Codes included, for example, ‘reduced police
40 intelligence’, ‘dealers using disguises’ and ‘increased social media use’. Potential themes
41 included those that answered the over-arching research question (i.e. how Covid-19 had
42 impacted upon child criminal exploitation and county lines). For example, those relating to
43 ‘safeguarding’, ‘detection’, ‘missing reports’, ‘social media’, etc. The researchers then
44 revisited the interview data in order to review and refine the potential themes, removing any
45 that did not speak to the aims of the research, and merging themes where possible. As will
46 become clear in the subsequent section of the paper, thematic analysis of the data identified
47 three themes from across our sample of practitioners.

1 The research was not without limitation. Proximity to the Covid-19 pandemic, and the
2 unprecedented nature of major and sustained interruptions to travel and in-person interaction,
3 meant that peer-reviewed academic literature upon which to ground significant proportions of
4 our findings was largely absent, increasing our reliance on other sources, such as journalistic
5 accounts and expert opinions.

6 Furthermore, we positioned the issue of CL drug supply, and thus our research, as an
7 exploitation (modern slavery) issue. This was made clear in our recruitment materials and
8 meant that prospective participants (for example police) who did not share this framing may
9 have been less inclined to participate. This potentially skews our sample to participants who
10 are more likely to want to express their own promising/effective practices in providing
11 protection for exploited young people, than those who might have insights into the disruption
12 and prosecution of lower-level (exploited) drug runners.

13 We were also acutely aware that circulating media reports would possibly influence some
14 participants' views on what changes were (likely) taking place. Therefore, we tried to ensure
15 that questioning was framed so that they would relay information about actual cases they were
16 involved in as part of their roles. In recognition of this, we probed participants for further details
17 on specific instances to ensure they were not just repetitions or presumptions based on what
18 was being reported elsewhere and in the media. With those in analytical roles this was more
19 difficult – but questions were framed so that participants were asked to relay information from
20 their experience, and we were careful to ask for acknowledgement that relayed information
21 was in-fact representative of that organisation/individual's experience, and from within their
22 jurisdiction. In geographic areas where we interviewed multiple organisations – we also
23 attempted to corroborate shifts, perceptions, and assumptions across multiple organisations.

24 In interpreting the results, reasonable assumption was made as to the likely knowledge of the
25 participant based on their current occupation and professional experience. For example, child
26 protection professionals would likely not hold first-hand information on drug market
27 mechanics. Throughout our reporting, we have made effort to ensure that the language used
28 around particular reports and perceptions is indicative of our confidence levels in the
29 information reported to us by participants.

30 Results and Discussion

31 Upon thematic analysis of the data, we identified three main themes relating to the effect of
32 Covid-19 on the CL environment. These were (1) perceived adaptations to the CL distribution
33 methodology, (2) the ability of law enforcement to effectively detect and enforce against CL
34 activity, and (3) the impact of lockdown restrictions on the capacity of frontline professionals
35 to efficiently safeguard children and young people involved in CL drug supply.

36 There was stark contrast between the interviews we conducted with law enforcement
37 participants and those tasked with safeguarding young people. Owing to a generally quieter
38 working space (e.g. closure of the night-time economy and fewer travellers on the rail
39 network), the police appeared enthusiastic in their perceived ability to adapt to lockdown,
40 sharing the many successes that they had experienced in pursuing CL dealers (Dodd 2021),
41 and claiming that they were delivering a “business as usual” service. Conversely, there was a
42 feeling of frustration and disquiet during interviews with practitioners in roles related to youth
43 work. They described having ongoing concerns regarding deteriorating mental health in
44 children and young people, and recognised an increase in the potential for exploitation and
45 harm – particularly via online social media platforms. Participants also commonly commented
46 on a decline in engagement from children with whom they had previously worked to build trust
47 and rapport. The remaining sections will explore these themes further.

Adaptations to County Lines

1
2 Across our sample of police participants, it was consistently stated that there was no ‘one size
3 fits all’ adaptation to CL operations in response to Covid-19. We were able to corroborate
4 certain insights across different areas of the country, indicating that some aspects of CL
5 operations had responded similarly to Covid-19 related disruptions. For example, a number of
6 participants believed that cuckooed properties had become potentially easier to detect, making
7 it difficult for networks to set up a base for any significant period of time, and resulting in an
8 increase in ‘day-tripping’ by drug supply lines, rather than establishing a local supply base.
9 One police officer remarked:

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12 “Another issue that a lot of the lines had was that it was becoming too easy to identify
13 the cuckoo addresses from which they were dealing,” they explained. “...before we
14 would see addresses cuckooed for maybe a week, two weeks, and dealers would set up
15 residence, we saw a shift to a quick cycle. So, they’d set up in an address for maybe
16 one [or] two days, and then move because it was too obvious.”
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20 Consistent with media reports (see for example Pidd [2020]) our participants reported that CL
21 actors had attempted to use disguises in order to make their travel seem legitimate. Uniforms
22 that included delivery service drivers, supermarket staff, healthcare workers and builders were
23 commonly mentioned by our participants. One police officer described facemasks as “brilliant
24 for CL” as it provided actors with justification to keep their faces covered, and inhibited police
25 familiar with local areas from recognising known individuals.
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28 Police across different areas of the country reported having encountered the use of novel
29 methods of transport to move drugs. It was believed that as supply tactics have the potential to
30 be highly localised, CLs may have responded differently in response to local enforcement
31 efforts and restrictions, and the availability of diverse forms of transportation, infrastructure
32 and local geography. For example, a police officer in the East of England informed us of
33 intelligence suggesting that some networks had relied upon canal barges and drones. Police in
34 the North West of England reported the belief that some networks were reluctant to travel as
35 restrictions added undue risk, and they were instead requesting drug users and commuters to
36 travel to them to collect drugs, though this claim was not corroborated with other regions across
37 England.
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41 Across all groups of those we interviewed, it was believed that CL operations were increasingly
42 looking to the use of private rented vehicles to circumvent enforcement, with ‘clean skins’
43 (those people without existing criminal records) and females directed to rent vehicles in person
44 by perpetrators, and the use of online (vehicle) ‘flexi rentals’, either using stolen or fraudulent
45 identification documents. One participant from a car rental business spoke of a typical
46 exploitation scenario that they encountered working in the car rental industry prior to Covid-
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51 “So you'd have a young person or a person that's being coerced that would be there
52 trying to arrange for a hire vehicle. They would have someone either on the phone to
53 them, or behind them, basically telling them what to hire, where to hire it, giving them
54 a (credit) card. And you know, more often than not, I'd have fairly switched-on branch
55 staff that would prevent that rental from going out, or would seek advice. But don't get
56 me wrong, there was equally just as many that went through.”
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1 While it is not possible from our research to ascertain the extent to which shifts away from
2 railways were purely pandemic induced, reporting from practitioners was consistent in that, at
3 street level, those moving drugs and completing transactions had been forced to adapt their
4 tactics in order to remain inconspicuous to authorities. The police officers that we interviewed
5 indicated that reductions in footfall along high streets and in residential areas, particularly
6 during the initial lockdown of March 2020, had led to drug runners following the public's
7 movements, referencing cases where supermarket and shopping centre car parks had been used
8 to avoid detection. Using the cover of daily exercise and key-worker disguises became common
9 methods for hiding in plain sight. As the country's railways became quieter, it was believed
10 that greater reliance was placed on using the roads to move drugs around, with drug runners
11 themselves conscious of the need to appear to adhere to national restrictions to avoid attracting
12 unwanted attention from law enforcement.
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16 Participants working in strategic areas of national law enforcement suspected that the retail
17 price of Class A drugs would increase due to the closure of importation routes and difficulty in
18 accessing supply. It was also suspected that the successes of Operation Venetic (NCA 2020),
19 the National Crime Agency's campaign as part of an international police operation into the
20 EncroChat encrypted messaging platform (Europol 2020), would have had a noticeable impact
21 on the availability, and thus price, of heroin and crack cocaine (Daly 2020). However, our
22 participants did not report a noticeable change in retail drug prices, mirroring the inelasticity
23 of street-level price's experienced during the 2011 opioid drought (Ahmad and Richardson
24 2016). Price fluctuations were felt at wholesale, and one police interviewee estimated that the
25 price of cocaine and heroin had risen by up to £10,000 per kilogram in some regions. Similar
26 price rises were also speculated by Sagers (2020). Again, mirroring the effects of the 2011
27 drought, our police interviewee suggested that those buying drugs in bulk would circumvent
28 retail unit price increases by increasing the use of adulterants, reducing the purity of the drug
29 received by users. Participants in our research did not indicate that the availability of drugs had
30 been disrupted at street level.
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35 While forces acknowledge the exploitation of children for financial purposes, the broader issue
36 of how transactions are made, the location of profits, where they are held, and by whom, remain
37 unclear. One interviewee told us: "[There are] bits of information around card readers... and
38 suggestions of some moving towards cryptocurrencies" to reduce the risk of Covid-19
39 infection. These suggestions are partially corroborated by Daly (2020). Gaps in participants'
40 knowledge related to the larger operations behind CLs may also be connected to a lack of
41 recognition and understanding surrounding the middle tiers of drug supply. However, our
42 research did not produce enough evidence to demonstrate whether the pandemic had an effect
43 on these shifts.
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46 [Detection and enforcement](#)

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48 Police participants generally reported confidence in their ongoing ability to detect and carry
49 out enforcement against CL activity throughout the pandemic, taking advantage of a
50 reallocation of resources and relying on neighbourhood policing, increased community
51 intelligence and stronger partnership work. This confidence was expressed most explicitly in
52 engagement with the British Transport Police (BTP), who followed a disruption strategy that
53 focused on making the use of trains increasingly difficult for CL networks. One officer
54 discussed this issue:
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58 "I police the railway. So the numbers on the railway dramatically dropped. Also
59 because the numbers dropped I think there were less people generally less people
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1 running right at the beginning, I think... In terms of people that did get on the trains,
2 they stand out like a sore thumb, because they are going through, we have had cases
3 where they started dressing up as builders go through. The only problem for them is the
4 team recognised them. As always, if there's a reward for the drug market, which there
5 clearly is, there's still going to be people running.”
6

7 Indeed, the belief that the BTP were able to spot unaccompanied young people travelling alone
8 provided enhanced opportunities for officers to question their reasons for travel, and they
9 reported being faced with young people in possession of false documentation, incorrect or
10 invalid tickets, and a lack of credible justification for their journeys. The frequency with which
11 young people were being questioned at the beginning of lockdown is a factor that may be
12 considered contributory to the increased reliance of CL on the roads. However, one officer
13 described increased intelligence gathering opportunities when drugs were trafficked via the
14 roads:
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18 “We have seen the movement away from the trains; when they go off the trains, they
19 go on the road again [and] the tactics that we can deploy significantly increase on the
20 road. Because you have cameras, you have a car, you have a vehicle registration
21 number and you have a driver who has a driving licence.”
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24 On the other hand, Covid-19 restrictions made some areas of policing more challenging. Police
25 respondents reported that their ability to conduct interviews with suspects (and the speed at
26 which they could be carried out) was affected due to a lack of available personnel, in particular
27 with lawyers who were working from home or unable/unwilling to attend police stations while
28 self-isolating. Existing backlogs to court processes have been significantly exacerbated by the
29 pandemic (Desroches 2020; House of Lords 2021), and continue to create uncertainty among
30 frontline service providers, increasing the risk to (and vulnerability of) young people who are
31 left in limbo. Some safeguarding practitioners expressed concerns as their caseloads reduced
32 pending trial dates for young people who would likely receive statutory youth service provision
33 following sentencing.
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37 Our findings raise ongoing concerns about the extent to which young people are identified and
38 appropriately supported as victims of exploitation (HMICFRS 2020). Indeed, whether young
39 people involved in CL are referred to the appropriate support services, particularly by police,
40 is unclear, and knowledge of available referral pathways and support among police we
41 interviewed was inconsistent. This is particularly concerning noting the disruption strategies
42 employed across the country’s rail network. However, the police we interviewed did not
43 necessarily indicate to us a reluctance to support victims of CL, but rather a failure to
44 understand the complexities of child criminal exploitation and the available referral pathways.
45 One officer discussed how their own focus had changed:
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50 “When I joined [the Police], I don't think safeguarding was invented yet. All we would
51 do is focus on locking up bad guys. Now the focus [has] really shifted towards
52 safeguarding and away from arrest figures. Senior leaders are still the same. They still
53 want their arrest figures, which looks good. But the thinking is not about the arrest
54 figures for me anymore. It's about a story behind the arrest, and what we do with it...
55 It all sounds good. But what actually happens and what impacts do we actually want?
56 Which is more important?.”
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1 The ongoing effects of austerity also meant that some forces reported working at full capacity,
2 with smaller numbers of staff and with little time and opportunity to undertake training on such
3 matters. Issues of resource availability were notable among our participants agnostic of their
4 professional background, and was cited as an issue independent of the pandemic. Indeed, the
5 impact of austerity measures on public sector services has been well documented (Gray and
6 Barford, 2018; Jones et al. 2015; Millie, 2013; 2014).

7
8 The positive sentiment of the officers we interviewed may be a reflection of limitations in our
9 sampling method, which meant that police officers who felt confident in the victim-centred
10 nature of their response were more likely to respond to our invitations to interview – noting the
11 project’s focus on understanding the implications on young people and criminal exploitation,
12 beyond solely enforcement. Some officers did acknowledge the challenge of working with
13 young people who presented as hostile and/or non-cooperative to police, but who were also
14 likely victims of exploitation in their own right. One officer remarked:
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18 More often than not, we find that we'll arrest [young] people. They won't tell us
19 anything... they'll 'no comment' in interviews, they'll leave it up to us to do the
20 legwork. We have to crack the phones. We have to develop the evidence that we've got.
21 And we go into the phones and if we've got someone on the phone in terms of text
22 message saying, you will do this, you've got a debt and you're gonna pay that back by
23 doing this, that and the other. Then we will use the phone work to get the next person
24 along”.

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28 Another police officer also referenced the use of powers that allowed young people to be
29 arrested for their own protection, in order to remove them from the streets. However, ongoing
30 cases where young people are prosecuted for involvement in CL suggest that the positive views
31 of our police interviewees regarding the victim-centred nature of their work on CL is not
32 necessarily pervasive nationally; a view shared among our NGO participants.
33

34 Vulnerability and Safeguarding

35
36 Our findings indicated that frontline services had perhaps been most directly impacted by
37 Covid-19, due to the complications of providing support and risk assessment during lockdown.
38 Frontline statutory organisations, such as the Youth Justice Service, reported that their
39 resources were stretched even before the pandemic, and the impediments of lockdown had only
40 exacerbated such concerns. Frontline services, including our police and youth offending
41 participants, reported that online and remote working had also given rise to a number of
42 positive outcomes. These included greater flexibility to engage in multi-agency conferences,
43 stronger communication and more cohesive partnership working.
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46
47 One police participant operating in London remarked that they had observed higher-level
48 perpetrators becoming more involved in the operational aspects of the drug supply, completing
49 journeys in the absence of being able to reliably access young people, as so many were confined
50 at home with parents. This was not a trend reported elsewhere. Despite the drop in missing
51 reports, there was evidence of children and young people considered lower risk being reported
52 missing. In the absence of hard data, one participant speculated:
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56 “Children in care get reported missing a lot quicker than children who are with their
57 parents. Staffing levels in care homes were lower because staff were off-sick or self-
58 isolating, so there was nobody to go and look for these kids, and so there was a lot of
59 reporting of those incidents. Now those incidents, they’re not missing kids, they’ve just
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1 gone out to see their mates. They've gone out in breach of the direction to stay at home
2 and are reported as missing."

3
4 A small number of our police participants speculated that parents had been less comfortable in
5 disclosing when their children go missing from home, over fears of possible Covid-19 related
6 sanctions. Social care participants reported that they had encountered increasing cases of
7 missing vulnerable children. In either case, changes in recorded incidence may indicate
8 differences in reporting rather than an actual change. Thus, numbers of missing children, and
9 incidences of violent crime, may not proportionately reflect the total level of CL activity.

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12 While most children and young people remained indoors, the use of social media became one
13 of few modes of entertainment. All of the frontline professionals that we interviewed from non-
14 governmental organisations and youth offending teams reported increasing cases of exposure
15 to online harms and abuse across their caseloads, fuelling ongoing concerns that perpetrators
16 are using platforms such as Snapchat and Instagram as part of their coercive repertoire. The
17 glamorisation of drug-related wealth has been proliferated by increased social media use,
18 aiding perpetrators in their ability to groom and attract varying demographics of young people
19 (National Youth Agency, 2021). Such platforms were increasingly referenced by the majority
20 of our participants as important in the early stages of grooming. Yet the details of the methods
21 of contact, and the imagery and content used to lure potential victims, were less understood by
22 our sample.

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27 Of particular concern to practitioners in safeguarding roles were reports of increased online
28 sexual exploitation. One of our participants with oversight of youth violence-related A&E
29 admissions across Birmingham, Nottingham and London noted:

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31 "We've continued to see incredibly high levels of suicide attempts. What has increased
32 with that is the reason for those suicide attempts being online exploitation."
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36 Aside from their role in the recruitment of young people, certain social media platforms have
37 been linked to the facilitation of drug supply itself, with Instagram allowing the dissemination
38 of drug-related imagery in large quantities and Snapchat providing quick-fire advertisements
39 that often disappear within seconds (Velten, Arif, and Moehring 2017).
40

41
42 Snapchat was also specifically referenced by almost all of our participants as being increasingly
43 important for the logistical movement of drugs to unknown localities, where perpetrators were
44 reported to infiltrate Snapchat groups in the desired location, relying upon young people to
45 map part of their journey and refer their friends for participation in end-user deals. Though
46 there was clear recognition of growth in social media use, participants were typically unable to
47 elaborate on specifics— indicating that it remains a significant knowledge gap among those
48 working directly with young people.
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51 It was reported that young people that remained in remote (online/phone) contact with care
52 providers throughout the pandemic were generally much less comfortable in making
53 disclosures. It was felt among all of those we interviewed in statutory care-facing roles (i.e.,
54 social workers and youth offending practitioners) that the restriction to 'doorstep meetings'
55 and a general reduction in face-to-face engagement was having a significant impact on their
56 ability to safeguard. Where once professionals reported being able to identify potential
57 indicators of familial harm during meetings outside of the home, they had become restricted in
58 their ability to offer the usual safe environment that encourages engagement and disclosures
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1 from young people. Throughout lockdown, many non-statutory organisations were advised to
2 withdraw completely from face-to-face interaction with young people. All of our participants
3 working within non-governmental organisations reported the frustrating loss of engagement
4 with many hard-to-reach young people with whom they had previously spent considerable time
5 building rapport. As a result, many of these young people were deemed ‘lost’ to the grooming
6 tactics of perpetrators, as one participant alluded:

7
8 “We’ve lost young people. They’ve totally disengaged and almost committed to that
9 lifestyle now, because the perpetrators are getting a lot more opportunities than we are.”
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12 Overall, the youth workers that we interviewed expressed dissatisfaction at the constraints the
13 pandemic imposed on their ability to effectively safeguard young people. The restriction to
14 doorstep interactions impeded engagement and further challenged efforts to address sensitive
15 issues such as drug (mis)use. There were also concerns among police participants regarding
16 the reduced level of information that they received about at-risk young people from schools
17 and other agencies, with one police force suggesting they had seen a 30% drop in referrals.
18 This reduction contributed to a lack of intelligence to alert law enforcement as to when a child
19 had gone missing.
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23 It was widely perceived by our law enforcement respondents that criminals adapted their
24 practices in response to police activity and the conditions created by lockdown restrictions,
25 making offending harder to detect. The Children’s Society has highlighted that those falling
26 victim to the enhanced tactics of perpetrators include females and university students (France
27 2020), the latter of which was echoed by one of our police participants in the South East of
28 England. The increased use of females was seemingly also a national trend raised by our
29 sample, but the certainty with which we can attribute that to Covid-19 remains unclear.
30 Statistically fewer females are subjected to stop and search, and thus their exploitation to
31 carry drugs and weapons offers perpetrators greater protection from law enforcement. It is
32 possible that the involvement of females has been increasing without coming to the attention
33 of the authorities. Indeed, in addition to participating at various levels of the CL hierarchy, the
34 exploitation of females for the sexual gratification of male participants is “a normalised and
35 expected part of trap house life” (Harding 2020, 152).
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39 Conclusion

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41 Clarifications emerging during the initial phases of our research meant that we were able to
42 corroborate some of the issues highlighted by media reporting and other sources. However, the
43 extent and exact impact of Covid-19 in many areas remains unclear. The core findings from
44 our research identify knowledge gaps, particularly regarding the exploitation of children
45 through social media, statutory data collection (e.g., reporting of missing children), and the
46 availability of provisions to protect and safeguard young people. However, in the absence of
47 comparative data, it is difficult to assess whether some of the trends reported throughout the
48 paper are directly a result of lockdown restrictions, or further evidence of gradual changes for
49 which Covid-19 has offered the impetus for them to be noticed.
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53 It also remains difficult to assess whether some of the changes reported by our research
54 participants, and in the literature, are speculative or locality specific, rather than owing to
55 broader pandemic-induced national trends. Despite our efforts to ensure participants were
56 reporting experientially, the lack of frontline administrative reporting and the prevalence of
57 grey literature, it remains difficult to ascertain whether reports which appear to corroborate one
58 another are drawing on speculative or anecdotal evidence from the same places. What is clear
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1 is that the impact of Covid-19 continues to amplify existing issues, and is posing additional
2 challenges for practitioners in their work to support vulnerable people and children.

3
4 We can say with confidence that Covid-19 restrictions have had an impact on the ability of
5 organisations to safeguard those exploited for the purposes of CL – beyond initial periods of
6 lockdown restriction. Findings from practitioners working in care settings with young people
7 indicate that restrictions continue to exacerbate feelings of isolation and disenfranchisement
8 for many children and young people. Peer recruitment remains important in the referral of other
9 young people to perpetrators, and the apparent ease at which CL networks can infiltrate
10 friendship groups is an ongoing concern and knowledge gap.

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12
13 While the interpretation of theory can provide a useful framework for which to understand
14 certain sociological issues, Gimmoni (2020) argues that there are no theories that have yet been
15 developed to explain drug trafficking (as one example) during a pandemic and as such, caution
16 must be paid to making ‘common sense’ predictions about the impact of Covid-19. We must
17 also exercise caution in our analysis of practitioners’ responses to certain aspects of CLs, and
18 not just shifts in the phenomenon itself. Previous work has identified that the policing of drug
19 markets is particular susceptible to amplification theory – as police officers pursue drugs
20 policing activities that reflect what they believe to be occurring in their local markets (Bacon
21 2016). Indeed, recent research by Spicer (2021) suggests that factors such as the prioritisation
22 of police responses and the embedded perceptions of officers may be contributors to perceived
23 increases in the prevalence of cuckooing.
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28 Research by Whitfield et al (2020) highlights similar difficulties in assessing how the pandemic
29 affected levels of drug use, but suggests that apparent reductions in the uptake of regulated
30 needle and syringe programmes may be a worrying indicator that needle and equipment reuse
31 may have increased, exacerbating health risks to drug users (Whitfield et al 2020). In contrast,
32 research from Australia, while raising similar concerns about the potential health-risks to drug
33 users, also indicates that the pandemic had afforded some innovations - including improving
34 access to drug treatment and safer drug supply, reducing the risk of overdose and incarceration
35 (Grebely et al 2020).
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39 The extent to which the trends reported in this paper will be experienced in the longer term are
40 still to be tested. While we have attempted to answer some of the ways in which Covid-19 has
41 impacted upon the illicit CL drug market so far, the reality remains that there is limited
42 knowledge of drug markets and organised crime more broadly, both during and post pandemic.
43 The reason for this is simple; Covid-19 has presented scenarios unlike any other experienced
44 by contemporary society.
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46

47 Notwithstanding this, and despite the limitations of our sample, and the absence of robust data
48 to underpin aspects our findings, our work indicates that the UK’s illicit drug market continues
49 to have a negative impact on communities around the country. The pandemic has posed
50 significant challenges for police and other practitioners, despite reported successes in some
51 areas. Police have had to adapt to the evolving methods and tactics of CL dealers, while
52 themselves working under the constraints of the pandemic. For care practitioners, the pandemic
53 blunted safeguarding tools, causing significant ongoing concerns about the safety and
54 wellbeing of children and young people. However, it is clear that regardless of the extent to
55 which pandemic conditions have exacerbated the prevalence of certain activities linked to
56 County Lines, their very presence further evidences the need to addresses the systemic issues
57 and inequalities that lay at the root of exploitation.
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Response to reviewers (v2)

Reviewer #2: The paper is improved and the author(s) have made a decent attempt at re-orientating some of the original claims they were making and their analysis more broadly. There remains a few points that are worth giving some attention to.

The sections on "County Lines" and "The County Lines Model" could still be tightened up a little. Some critical work on the topic (e.g. [Spicer's papers on scapegoating and cuckooing amplification](#)) might also be worth more consideration (either here or later on in the paper) given the emphasis on professional perceptions that is now more foregrounded in the analysis.

- We have reorganised the literature review sections so there is greater differentiation between them.
- The review now introduces CLs generally and provides contextual information about CLs as an OC issue, before then discussing the exploitative practices linked to it under a separate sub-heading.
- The following sections of the literature is left to present discussion re: CLs during the pandemic, with a final section discussing exploitative practices linked to CL.
- Previously there was overlap between the sections on exploitation and the pandemic, this has now been mitigated by rearranging the review slightly and removing a small amount of duplication.
- Minor adjustments (typos, grammar etc.) have been made throughout to improve flow and readability. An additional sentence related to the practice of 'plugging' has also been added where sexual exploitation is first introduced.
- Spicer's work on amplification theory has also been discussed briefly in the overall conclusion.

At times within the findings sections a lack of data is provided to demonstrate the analysis and bring the findings to light (e.g. in the 'detection and enforcement' section). This creates a sense of anecdote rather than critical systematic inquiry.

- Additional quotations have been included throughout the 'detection and enforcement' section of the findings.
- Minor tweaks to the discussion have been made throughout to further improve signposting.

It is claimed in the conclusion that "There have been no other empirical research projects that have documented the influence of a pandemic on illicit drug markets". This possibly might have been true at the time of writing, but there have been numerous papers now published on the topic from various countries in outlets such as The International Journal of Drug Policy. Ideally, some consideration of how the analysis in this paper relates to the findings of that work would be included. But at the very least a reconsideration of that sentence should be considered.

- We have adjusted that sentence and have included brief reference to Whitfield (2020)'s work into needle and syringe programme provision, and Grebely's (2020) work into the health of drug users in Australia – from the international journal of drug policy.