

An Alternative Analysis of the Discourse by Descartes, Kant and Hegel in terms of the Ethical Structure of the Kanun

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ABSTRACT

The ethical structure of the Albanian customary code, the Kanun, is deemed to represent the ethical value system of a society without state power. In spite of the appearance of civilizations and the resultant advent of an incipient state power, humans seemed to have known only the ethical value system of a society without state power until Gotama, Socrates, Plato and Jesus proposed new religious and philosophical doctrines. The basic trait of these religious and philosophical doctrines, which try to antagonize the ethical value system of a society without state power by eliminating the emotional aspect of humanity from the ethical value system, has been inherited by western philosophers such as Descartes, Kant and Hegel. The discourses by Descartes, Kant and Hegel were reviewed while paying attention to how they dealt with the sensuous and emotional aspects of humanity. The metaphysical implications of the ethical structure of the Kanun surfaced through the critical reviewing of their philosophy, and a hypothesis concerning its origin was presented.

Key words: Kanun, emotion, reason, humanity, ethics, philosophy.

Introduction

The ethical structure of the Albanian customary code, the Kanun, is deemed to represent the ethical value system of a society without state power¹. There will be no contradiction to surmise that anatomically modern humans (*Homo sapiens*), who are believed to have originated in Africa between 150,000 and 200,000 years ago, and dispersed to Eurasia sometime after 65,000 years ago²⁻⁴, had lived in a society without state power before state power appeared among human society. The ethical structure of the Kanun is supposed to be the first ethical value system that humans have ever had, since it can be safely assumed that there was no state power with a viable coercive force which was able to antagonize the ethical value system of a society without state power before around 3000 B.C., when civilizations began to appear^{5,6}. In spite of the appearance of civilizations and the resultant advent of an incipient state power, humans seemed to have known only the ethical value system of a society without state power until the fifth century B.C. when Gotama on the Indian continent preached the Eightfold Path such as Right Aim, which means attaining the being set on renunciation, on non-resentment and on harmlessness, and Right Action, which means abstaining from taking life,

from taking what is not given, from wrong-doing in sexual passions⁵. In the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., Socrates and Plato in the Greek world forged the philosophy of dialectic in the form of the Idea of Good in order to fight the logic of a society without state power, as represented by Homeric epics¹. According to Plato, the ethical value system of Homeric epics is alienated from the Idea of Good, as it put much emphasis on the emotions, such as grief, anger and pleasure, as the foundation of its ethical value system instead of reason and the rational elements in the soul. He proposed to expel the honeyed music and Homeric epics from the polis, which were deemed to be the most powerful tool to imbue the ethical value system of a society without state power into the souls of the young^{1,6}.

In the fourth century B.C., Aristotle conversed about the political institution of the polis, following Plato's discourse that the ethical value system of Homeric epics was alienated from the Idea of Good⁶. According to Aristotle, governments with a regard for the common interest were to be constituted in accordance with strict principles of justice. In order to achieve justice, i.e., the common interest and a good, through the functioning of the state, he

claimed that the quality of the ruler in the state was crucial. The ruler ought to have an excellence of character in perfection, i.e., reason and the rational elements in the soul. One of the most important issues was how to imbue the excellence of character into the young through education. In regard to this issue, Aristotle expressed his concern about the emotion-inspiring effects the poems, such as Homeric epics, exerted on the character of the youth. Accordingly, he proposed to reject the professional mode of education in music, while he did not propose the expulsion of the honeyed music from the polis altogether, acknowledging the healing and purgatorial effects of them on the soul⁶.

In the first century A.D., Jesus in Galilee preached »Whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn him the other also. Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you« (Matthew 5.39–44), thus exhorting the cessation of a retributive action. Gotama's and Jesus' preaching, as well as Plato's Idea of Good, which eventually exhorted people not to take revenge themselves, is deemed antithetical to the ethical structure of the Kanun, which consists of six concepts: »oath«, »honor«, »guest«, »blood«, »food«, and »revenge«^{1,5}. However, since these six concepts are related to bodily sensations, the emotions and primordial customs, which may represent the pristine nature of humans, the ethical value system of a society without state power seems, in a sense, more pertinent and relevant to the nature of humans than that of a society with state power, which does not accept the retributive action of the offended party as a due sanction^{1,7}.

The basic trait of these religious and philosophical discourses, which try to antagonize the ethical value system of a society without state power by eliminating the emotional aspect of humanity from the ethical value system, has been inherited by western philosophers such as René Descartes (1596–1650), Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) through the Catholic theology of Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) who tried to amalgamate Aristotle's philosophy with Christianity in the thirteenth century. It is a well-known fact that Platonism and Aristotelianism had been revived by Muslim thinkers such as al-Farabi and Averroës (1126–1198) in Moorish Spain between the tenth and twelfth centuries^{8,9}. The philosophical discourse of Plato and Aristotle seems to have wielded power in western philosophy for more than two thousand years, in which it has been the general rule that the emotional aspect of humanity is deleted as the basis of ethical value system, while reason and the rational elements of humanity are valued. Here, a question may be raised regarding the mental health of humans, who are apparently admonished to incessantly lessen the emotional aspect of humanity while honing the rational aspect in their everyday way of thinking and behavior. Is it good for humans to live with paying attention to the rational aspect of humanity while deleting the emotional aspect? Are they happy with living like that?

In contrast to the ethical value system based chiefly on reason and the rational elements of humanity, the ethical structure of the Kanun, which is considered to function well in a society without state power, apparently incorporated sensuous elements, such as pain and agony, and emotional aspect, such as anger, fear and sorrow into its ethical value system. The logic of the Kanun has the potential to convert these feelings into ethical resentment, which may impel the wronged to wield a sacred force against the offenders or forgive them. At the same time, the ethical structure of the Kanun could bring emotional catharsis among the people provoked in the conflict, and therefore may pacify the conflict through reconciliation¹. The ethical structure of the Kanun may lead us to discern how important and indispensable the sensuous and emotional aspects of humanity are for the life and mental health of humans. Since the sensuous and emotional aspects may constitute a pretty good portion of humanity, it will be hard or almost impossible for humans to live without them. Descartes, Kant and Hegel are the philosophers who have exerted a huge amount of influence on the way of thinking, philosophical consciousness and social systems of modern society^{10–14}. There have been few studies which analyzed their discourse from the viewpoint that they might have deleted an important portion of humanity. In an attempt to address the issue of humanity in regard to philosophy and ethics, the discourses by Descartes, Kant and Hegel were reviewed while paying attention to how they dealt with the sensuous and emotional aspects of humanity. Through the critical reviewing of their philosophy, the metaphysical implications of the ethical structure of the Kanun were unearthed. At the same time, a hypothesis concerning its origin was presented.

Descartes' Discourse on Passions, and *Cogito, Ergo Sum*

Descartes first proposed the well-known principle of his philosophy, »I think, therefore I am«, in the Discourse on the Method. After having published the Discourse on the Method in 1637, he seems to have found that he must elaborate on the discourse regarding the issues around the principle »I think, therefore I am«, in order to make it firm and understandable. Therefore, Descartes discussed in detail the sensuous and emotional aspects of humanity and the body's association with them in the Meditations on First Philosophy and The Passions of the Soul, which were published in 1641 and in 1649, respectively. This suggests that it might be appropriate to review his discourse from the later one to the earlier than to review it chronologically, which is expected to clearly reveal what Descartes discussed in his philosophical discourse. Therefore, this review starts from The Passions of the Soul, which was published one year before his death in Sweden.

One of the most important contributions that Descartes made for western philosophy is the fact that he had definitely introduced the concept of soul-body dualism, and thoroughly discussed how the issue of emotions related to it. First, Descartes, alleging that what the Ancients

taught about the Passions is so little, and for the most part so little believable, declares that he will take into consideration a Passion with respect to the subject it happens to, and an Action with respect to what makes it happen (Passions Article 1¹). He insists that since no subject acts more immediately upon our soul than the body it is jointed to, what is a passion in the soul is commonly an action in the body (Passions Article 2). Accordingly, Descartes thinks that the path for arriving at an understanding of our passions is to examine the difference between the soul and the body in order to understand where each of the functions within us should be attributed (Passions Article 2), machinating to shift passions to the side of the body. Descartes asserts both that every kind of thought within humans belongs to the soul (Passions Article 4) and that there remains nothing in us that should be attributed to the soul but our thoughts, which are principally of two genera: the actions of the soul and passions (Passions Article 17). The actions of the soul are all of our volitions, while all the cases of perception or knowledge to be found in us can generally be called passions, because it is often not our soul that makes them such as they are, and because it always receives passions from things that are represented by them (Passions Articles 17). Claiming that the soul has passions within it (Passions Articles 26) and the passions of the soul differ from all other thoughts (Passions Articles 27), Descartes defines passions as perceptions, sensations or excitations of the soul (Passions Articles 27). The passions are numbered among the perceptions which the close bond between the soul and the body renders confusing and obscure, which may be named excitations of the soul (Passions Article 28). Reiterating that the actions of the soul are tantamount to volitions, that is, the will, and that thoughts other than volitions are passions, Descartes asserts the former are absolutely in its power and can only indirectly be altered by the body, whereas the latter depend absolutely on the actions that produce them and can only indirectly be altered by the soul (Passions Article 41), though the soul is truly joined to the whole body (Passions Article 30).

In regard to the relationship between the passions and the volitions, Descartes claims that our passions cannot be directly excited or displaced by the action of our will, but they can be indirectly affected by the representation of things which are usually joined with the passions we will to have and opposed to the ones we will to reject (Passions Article 45). However, if the passions are vigorous or strong, the soul cannot readily alter or check the passions. The most the will can do while the excitation is at its full strength is not to consent to its effects and to restrain many of the movements to which it disposes the body (Passions Article 46). He criticizes the customary imagination of people: all the struggles between the lower part of the soul, which is called sensitive, and the higher, which is rational, or between the natural appetites and the will. He asserts that there is only a single soul in us, and this soul has within itself no diversity of parts; the very one that is

sensitive is rational, and all its appetites are volitions (Passions Article 47). According to Descartes, the error which has been committed in having it play different characters, usually opposed to one another, arises only from the fact that the soul's functions have not been rightly distinguished from those of the body. He insists that everything to be found in us that is opposed to our reason must be attributed to the body (Passions Article 47). By introducing the concept of a little gland in the middle of the brain, which is capable of being driven from one side by the soul and from the other by the animal spirits, which are only bodies (Passions Article 47), he distinguishes reason from the body and the animal spirits. Descartes, who explains that the animal spirit is composed of the very fine parts of the blood, which undergo a change in the brain to be separated there from the other parts of the blood that are not so fine (Passions Article 10), elaborates on the differences between man and beast, saying »even though they (beasts) have no reason and perhaps no thought either, all the movements of the spirits and the gland that excite the passions in us still exist in them, and serve in them to maintain and strengthen, not the passions as in us, but the nerve and muscle movements that usually accompany them« (Passions Article 50).

Descartes claims that there is only a single soul in us, in which a struggle between the passions or the movements of the body that accompany them, and the volitions that oppose them may occur (Passions Article 47). He adds that those in whom the will can naturally conquer the passions most easily and stop the accompanying movements of the body have the strongest souls with firm and decisive judgments concerning the knowledge of good and evil, while the weakest souls of all are those whose will does not decide to follow certain judgments, but continually allows itself to be carried away by present passions (Passions Article 48). While there are very few men so weak and irresolute that they will nothing but what their passion dictates to them, the greater part have decisive judgments which they follow in regulating a part of their actions (Passions Article 49). However, there is still a great difference between resolutions that proceed from some false opinion and those that rest on knowledge of the truth alone, since we are sure never to have either regret or repentance if we follow the latter, whereas we always have them upon following the former, when we discover the error therein (Passions Article 49). Thus, Descartes divides the function of the soul into two parts: the first is the actions of the soul, the volition, the will, reason and the rational, and the second is the passions associated with the movements of the body which accompany them and the animal spirits. Though he claims that there is only a single soul in us, in which a struggle between the two occurs, it is clear that Descartes introduced the body-soul dualism into western philosophy in *The Passions of the Soul*, appreciating the value of the volition, the will, reason and the rational, which seem to be associated with the actions of the soul as, the foundation of his philosophical discourse, while depreciating the value of the passions, the

¹ Citations of Descartes' discourse concerning passion here are from *The Passions of the Soul*, Hackett Publishing Company, 1989.

natural appetites and the animal spirits which seem to be associated with the body.

It doesn't seem too farfetched to surmise that Descartes tried to establish the foundation of his philosophy in the Discourse on the Method and the Meditations on First Philosophy, bearing the discourse made in The Passions of the Soul in mind, though the Discourse on the Method and the Meditations on First Philosophy were published earlier than The Passions of the Soul. Accordingly, Descartes discusses the distinction between the soul and the body in the Meditations on First Philosophy, which contains a discourse similar to that of The Passions of the Soul. In the Meditations on First Philosophy, he first tries to find just one thing, however slight, that is certain and unshaken by putting aside everything that admits of the least doubt (Meditations 24^{2*}). After everything has been most carefully weighted, he notices that the pronouncement »I am (think), I exist« seems necessarily true every time he utters it or conceives it in his mind (Meditations 25). Descartes thinks that he is therefore precisely nothing but a thinking thing; that is, a mind, or intellect, or understanding, or reason, truly existing as a thinking thing (Meditations 27). In contrast, everything belonging to the nature of the body could turn out to be nothing but dreams (Meditations 28). Even »sensing«, precisely so taken, is nothing other than thinking (Meditations 29). He claims that he knows that even bodies are not, properly speaking, perceived by the senses or by the faculty of imagination, but by the intellect alone, and that they are not perceived through their being touched or seen, but only through their being understood. That is, nothing can be perceived more easily and more evidently than one's own mind (Meditations 34).

As a thing that thinks, one is a thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, and that also imagines and senses (Meditations 28). Descartes claims that the power of imaging that is in him, insofar as it differs from the power of understanding, is not required for his own essence, that is, the essence of his mind. He conjectures that, were a body to exist to which a mind is so joined that it may apply itself in order to look at the body anytime it wishes, it could happen that it is by means of this very body that he imagines corporeal things. The mind, when it understands, in a sense turns toward itself and looks at one of the ideas that are in it, whereas when it imagines, it turns toward the body, and intuits in the body something that conforms to an idea either understood by the mind or perceived by sense (Meditations 73). In regard to sense, Descartes says that he senses that his body is found among many other bodies, by which his body can be affected in various beneficial or harmful ways (Meditations 74). When Descartes gauges what is opportune by means of a certain sensation of pleasure and what is inopportune by a sensation of pain, and when he senses within him hunger, thirst, and appetites as well as certain bodily tendencies toward mirth, sadness, anger and other

affects, he notices that it is not without reason that he thought that he sensed things that were manifestly different from his thought, namely, the bodies from which these ideas proceeded (Meditations 74, 75). Concerning the questions of why a certain sadness of spirit should arise from some sensation or other of pain, and why a certain elation should arise from a sensation of excitement, or why that particular twitching in the stomach, which he calls hunger, should warn him to have something to eat, or why dryness in the throat should warn him to take something to drink, Descartes has no explanation other than that he has been taught this way by nature (Meditations 76). Though nature seems to have taught him everything else as well that he judges concerning the objects of the senses, he determines in countless other such instances that judgments in matters of the external senses as well as the internal senses are in error (Meditations 76, 77), because the senses would naturally be deceived (Meditations 88). Since he does not think that what he was taught by nature deserves much credence because he seems driven by nature toward many things about which reason tries to dissuade him, he is of the opinion that he must not rashly admit everything that he derives from the sense (Meditations 77, 78). He has a body that is very closely joined to him. Nevertheless, because on the one hand he has a clear and distinct idea of himself, insofar as he is merely a thinking thing and not an extended thing, and because on the other hand he has a distinct idea of a body, insofar as it is merely an extended thing and not a thinking thing, he concludes that he is really distinct from his body, and can exist without it (Meditations 78). There is a great difference between a mind and a body in that a body, by its very nature, is always divisible, and that on the other hand, the mind is utterly indivisible (Meditations 85, 86). Thus, Descartes explicitly declares that the nature of man is composed of mind and body (Meditations 88), appreciating the value of thinking, the mind and reason as the foundations of his philosophical discourse while depreciating the value of the body and senses in the Meditations on First Philosophy.

In the Discourse on the Method, Descartes seeks the first principle of his philosophy, which he can accept without scruple. He tries to attain the first principle by rejecting as absolutely false everything in which he can imagine the least doubt (Discourse 31, 32). Descartes resolves to pretend that all the things that have ever entered his mind are no truer than the illusions of his dreams. Then, he notices that while he wants to think that everything is false, it necessarily has to be the case that he, who is thinking this, is something. Finding that »I think, therefore I am« is so firm and so assured that all the most extravagant suppositions of the skeptics are incapable of shaking it, he accepts it without scruple as the first principle of his philosophy (Discourse 32). Claiming that he is a substance the whole essence or nature of which is simply to think, and which, in order to exist, has no need of any place nor depends on any material thing, Descartes declares that this »I«, that is to say, the soul through which one is what he is, is entirely distinct from the body (Discourse 33). His reflection upon the fact that he doubts and

² Citations of Descartes' discourse here are from Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy16, Hackett Publishing Company, 1998.

that, as a consequence, his being is not utterly perfect, compels him to search for the source from which he has learned to think of something that is more perfect than himself. He postulates that the source has to be from some nature that is in fact more perfect than his own self because it is a manifest contradiction for him to receive the idea from nothing, and because it is a contradiction that something more perfect should follow from and depend upon something less perfect (Discourse 34). Since it is an obvious fact that something should not come from nothing, and Descartes cannot obtain it from himself, this idea that has within itself all the perfections, should have been placed in him by a nature truly more perfect than his own. Descartes regards it to be God (Discourse 34). Furthermore, he postulates that none of those ideas which indicate any imperfection are in God. Therefore, doubt, inconstancy, sadness, and the like can not be in God. Descartes claims that though he has ideas of a number of sensible and corporeal things, he recognizes intelligent nature as distinct from corporeal nature, in which its composition attests to dependence. Since dependence is manifestly a defect, and being composed of these two natures would be a contradiction in God, God is not thus composed (Discourse 35), which indicates that God is not composed of a corporeal nature, but only of an intelligent nature. Since God is a perfect being from which all that is in us comes from, the things we very clearly and very distinctly conceive are assured to be all true for the reason that God is or exists (Discourse 38). All our ideas or notions must have some foundation of truth, for it would not be possible that God, who is all-perfect and all-truthful, would have put them in us without truth (Discourse 40). As God is supposed to have created a rational soul and joined it to the body in a particular manner (Discourse 46), we should never allow ourselves to be persuaded except by the evidence of our reason, whether awake or asleep (Discourse 39). Accordingly, Descartes decides to spend his whole life cultivating his reason and advancing, as far as he can, in the knowledge of the truth, following the method he has prescribed, himself (Discourse 27). The principle he adopts in his attempt at governing his moral conduct by means of reason is that when he assures himself of the maxims and puts them to one side along with the truths of the faith, he can freely undertake to rid himself of the rest of his opinions (Discourse 28). Descartes felt so assured of his method that he bragged his sagacity, saying “if there is any task in the world that could not be accomplished so well by anyone else but the same person who began it, it is the one which I am working” (Discourse 72).

Kant’s Critique of Reason, and Ethics

In the eighteenth century, Kant made an utmost effort to search for the foundation of morality in his masterpieces such as the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), the Critique of Practical Reason (1788) and the Critique of Judgment (1790), following Descartes’ penetrating insights, such as cogito, ergo sum. Kant made critical remarks on the Cartesian cogito, ergo sum in the Critique of Pure

Reason, which seem to have enabled him to come across rational psychology, which could serve not only to reveal such properties that do not belong to possible experience at all, but also to teach apodictically about thinking beings, in general, touching on their nature (Pure Reason A347, B406³). Kant, who criticized Descartes’ logic as a species of the psychology of inner sense which would explain the appearances of inner sense, in other words, a merely transcendental use of the understanding which excludes every admixture of experience, launched to realize the proposition I think, which, if taken problematically, seems to contain the form of every judgment of understanding whatsoever and accompanies all categories as their vehicle, with a critical eye through all the predications of the pure doctrine of the soul (Pure Reason A347, B406, A348). According to Kant, those whose existence can be inferred only as a cause of a given perception have only a doubtful existence, for the existence of a real object outside one’s mind is never given directly in perception, but can only be added in thought to what is a modification of one’s inner sense as its external cause, and hence can only be inferred (Pure Reason A367). All outer appearances are of this kind, as their existence cannot be immediately perceived, but can be inferred only as the cause of given perceptions (Pure Reason A367). Since it is clear that we cannot encounter the external that is not in us in our apperception, Descartes rightly limited all perception in the narrowest sense to the proposition of »I (as a thinking being) am« (Pure Reason A367, A368).

The Descartes’ »I think«, deemed to be an empirical proposition, contains within itself the proposition »I exist«. However, we cannot say »Everything that thinks, exists«, for then the property of thinking would make all beings possessing it into necessary being. Since it is apparent that the major premise, »Everything that thinks, exists« cannot be tenable, our existence cannot be regarded as inferred from the proposition »I think«, as Descartes held (Pure Reason B422). The unity of consciousness, which grounds the categories, is here taken for an intuition of the subject as an object, and the category of substance is applied to it. But this unity is only the unity of thinking, through which no object is given. Thus the category of substance, which always presupposes a given intuition, cannot be applied to it, and hence this subject cannot be cognized at all (Pure Reason B421, B 422). Cogito, ergo sum is deemed to express an indeterminate empirical intuition, i.e., a perception, preceding the experience that is to determine the object of perception through the category in regard to time (Pure Reason B422, B423). Here, existence is not yet a category, which is not related to an indeterminately given object, but rather to an object of which one has a concept, and about which one wants to know whether or not it is posited outside the concept (Pure Reason B423). While the proposition »I think« is an empirical proposition, it does not mean that the »I« in this proposition is an empirical representation. Kant thinks that the »I« in the proposition is rather purely intellectual, because

³ Citations of Kant’s discourse here are from Critique of Pure Reason 17, Cambridge University Press, 1999.

it seems to belong to thinking in general (Pure Reason B423). However, since the act »I think« would not take place without any empirical representation, which provides the material for thinking, the empirical is deemed to be only the condition of the application, or use, of pure intellectual faculty (Pure Reason B423). Then, Kant notices that an indeterminate perception in *cogito, ergo sum* signifies only something real, which is given, and indeed only to thinking in general, thus not as appearance, and also not as a thing in itself, but rather as something that in fact exists and is indicated as an existing thing in the proposition »I think« (Pure Reason B423). This seems to be the starting point of Kant's philosophical exploration.

Here, the question of whether or not any truth exists with the forming of the empirical representation in Descartes' proposition »I«, arises. Descartes raised the question himself, saying »...having noticed that there is nothing at all in this I think, therefore I am that assures me that I am speaking the truth, except that I see very clearly that, in order to think, it is necessary to exist«, and began to search for "what is needed for a proposition to be true and certain« (Discourse 33). Then, Descartes came across what was needed for the proposition to be true and certain, i.e., God. While Descartes desperately needed God in order to give substance to *cogito, ergo sum*, Kant criticized it, saying »the concept of an absolutely necessary being is a pure concept of reason, i.e., a mere idea, the objective reality of which is far from being proved by the fact that reason needs it,... « (Pure Reason A592/B620). Kant claims to have found that the illusion consisting in the confusion of a logical predicate with a real one nearly precludes all instruction. In a logical predicate, even the subject can be predicated of itself, for logic can be abstracted from all content (Pure Reason A598/B626). Since the determination is a predicate which goes beyond the concept of the subject and enlarges it, it must not be included in the subject already. Being is obviously not a real predicate, i.e., a concept of something that could add to the concept of a thing, but merely the positing of a thing or of certain determinations in themselves (Pure Reason A598/B626). According to Kant, though the proposition »God is omnipotent« contains two concepts that have their object, i.e., God and omnipotence, the little word »is« is not a predicate in it, but only that which posits the predicate in relation to the subject (Pure Reason A598/B626, A599/B627). When we think of this object (God) as given absolutely (through the expression, »it is«), nothing is added to the concept, which expresses merely its possibility, where the actual contains nothing more than the merely possible (Pure Reason A599/B627). Even if nothing at all is missing in our concept of the possible real content of a thing in general, something is still missing in relation to our entire state of thinking, namely that the cognition of this object should also be possible *a posteriori*. On the contrary, if we try to think existence through the pure category alone, then it is no wonder that we cannot assign any mark distinguishing it from mere possibility (Pure Reason A600/B628, A601/B629). Kant tries to overcome this conundrum by proposing the idea that every existential proposition is synthetic, i.e., with actuality, the object is not

merely included in our concept analytically, but adds synthetically to our concept (Pure Reason A598/B626, A599/B627). According to Kant, whatever and however much our concept of an object may contain, we have to go out beyond it in order to provide it with existence. While with objects of sense, this happens through the connection with some perception of ours in accordance with empirical laws, for objects of pure thinking there is no means whatsoever for cognizing their existence, because it would have to be cognized entirely *a priori* (Pure Reason A601/B629). If we succeed in cognizing *a priori* the existence of the object of pure thinking such as God, *cogito, ergo sum* may be regarded as signifying something that in fact exists, and is indicated as an existing thing in the proposition »I think« (Pure Reason B423). Kant, who excoriated the ontological (Cartesian) proof of the existence of a highest being from concepts, with his saying »a human being can no more become richer in insight from mere ideas than a merchant could in resources if he wanted to improve his financial state by adding a few zeros to his cash balance«, concludes that it is only so much trouble and labor lost (Pure Reason A602/B630). There has been an urgent need for Kant to find how human cognition, independent of all experience and even of all impressions of the senses, is possible (Pure Reason B2), because he seems to have keenly realized that this cognition should be closely linked with the general and pure logic that constitutes the pure doctrine of reason with no empirical principles (Pure Reason B78, A54). Pure logic in which everything must be completely *a priori* is a proven doctrine, while applied logic is a representation of the understanding and the rules of its necessary use *in concreto*. Kant thinks that general and pure logic is related to applied logic as pure morality, which contains merely necessary moral laws of free will in general. It is also related to the doctrine of virtue proper, which assesses these laws under the hindrances of feelings, inclinations, and the passions to which human beings are more or less subject, and which can never yield a true and proven science, since it requires empirical and psychological principles just as much as applied logic does (Pure Reason A54, B79, A55).

Is it possible to have a general and pure logic, which is supposed to be the basis of Kant's morality? How did he try to formulate it? According to Kant, in all judgments in which the relation of a subject to the predicate is thought, this relation is possible only in two different ways: either the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something that is (covertly) contained in this concept A, or B lies entirely outside concept A, though to be sure it stands in connection with it. The first case is called the judgment »analytic«, and the second is »synthetic«. The analytic judgments seem to be the judgments of clarification since through the predicate, these do not add anything to the concept of the subject, but only break it up by means of analysis into its component concepts, which were already a part of the concept, while the synthetic judgments seem to be the judgments of amplification since they add a predicate to the concept of the subject, which was not a part of the original concept at all, and could not have been extracted from it through analysis (Pure Reason B10, A7,

B11). In the expectation that there can perhaps be concepts that may be related to objects *a priori*, not as pure or sensible intuitions but rather merely as acts of pure thinking, that are thus concepts neither of empirical nor aesthetic origin, Kant provisionally formulates the idea of transcendental logic, which is a science of pure understanding and of the pure cognition of reason, by means of which one thinks objects completely *a priori* (Pure Reason A57). Does it contain truth? Kant, nominally defining truth as the agreement of cognition with its object, still has a problem in regard to the merely logical criterion of truth, which suggests that the agreement of a cognition with the general and formal laws of understanding and reason, is certainly the *conditio sine qua non* and thus the negative condition of all truth. The error that concerns not form but content cannot be discovered by any touchstone of logic (Pure Reason A58, B84, A60). But since the mere form of cognition, however well it may agree with logical laws, is far from sufficing to constitute the material (objective) truth of the cognition, nobody can dare to judge objects or to assert anything about them with more logic and without having drawn on antecedently well-founded information about them outside of logic in order, subsequently, merely to investigate its use and connection in a coherent whole according to logical laws, or, better, solely to examine them according to such laws. Nevertheless, there is something so seductive in the possession of an apparent art for giving all of our cognitions the form of understanding, even though, with regard to their content, one may yet be very empty and poor, that humans are tempted to use a general logic, which is merely a canon for judging, as if it were an organon. As a putative organon, Kant calls the general logic »dialectic«. (Pure Reason B85, A61, B86). In order to befit the dignity of philosophy, »dialectic« may be designated as a critique of dialectical illusion, which is counted as part of logic (Pure Reason A62). It may be inferred from the actual use of dialectic that it was nothing other than the logic of illusion – a sophisticated art for giving to ignorance, indeed even to intentional tricks, the air of truth, by imitating the method of thoroughness, which logic prescribes in general, and using its topics for the embellishment of every empty pretension (Pure Reason A61, B86). It seems tantamount to nothing but idle chatter, asserting or impeaching whatever one wants to speak about with some plausibility (Pure Reason B86, A 62). According to Kant, in a transcendental logic, we isolate the understanding and elevate from our cognition only the part of our thought that has its origin solely in the understanding. The use of this pure cognition depends on this as its condition: that objects are given to us in intuition, to which it can be applied. For without intuition, all of our cognition would lack objects, and therefore remain completely empty. Kant insists that the part of transcendental logic that expounds the elements of the pure cognition of the understanding and the principles without which no object can be thought of at all, constitutes the transcendental analytic, a logic of truth, for no cognition can contradict it without at the same time losing all content, i.e., all relation to any object, hence all truth (Pure Reason B87, A63). Also, the part of transcendental logic which

uses pure understanding for synthetically judging, asserting, and deciding about objects which are not given to us, is called transcendental dialectic, which is a critique of the understanding and reason in regard to their hyperphysical use (Pure Reason B88). Kant seems to have expected that the transcendental dialectic may show us the way to reach the unknown = X on which the understanding depends when it believes itself to have discovered a predicate beyond the concept of A, that is foreign to it, yet which it nevertheless believes to be connected with it (Pure Reason A9, B13). Why does Kant have to formulate such an apparently enigmatic, odd, and equivocal procedure as the transcendental dialectic in order to search for his own »truth«? Kant answers himself, saying »although the supreme principles of morality and the fundamental concepts of it are *a priori* cognitions, they still do not belong in transcendental philosophy, for, while they do not, to be sure, take the concepts of pleasure and displeasure, of desires and inclinations, etc., which are all of empirical origin, as the ground of their precepts, they still must necessarily include them in the composition of the system of pure morality in the concept of duty, as the hindrance that must be overcome or the attraction that ought not to be made into motive« (Pure Reason A14, A15, B29).

Thus, it becomes clear that the momentum of Kant's philosophical discourse is directed toward formulating or finding the foundation of his pure morality through the critique of pure reason, to which everything that constitutes transcendental philosophy belongs. His discourse goes only so far in the analysis as is requisite for the complete estimation of synthetic *a priori* cognition (Pure Reason A14/B28), which seems tantamount to the transcendental dialectic. According to Kant, while performing actions from immediate inclination or in conformity with duty does not have moral content, performing actions from duty does (Groundwork 4:397-398⁴). Action from duty has moral worth if it is performed, merely depending upon the principle of volition in accordance with which the action is performed without regard for any object of the faculty of desire (Groundwork 4:399–400). The moral worth of the principle of volition lies in the principle of the will, which stands between its *a priori* principle, which is formal, and its *a posteriori* incentive, which is material, as at a crossroads. It must be determined by the formal principle of volition as such when an action is done from duty, where every material principle has been withdrawn from it (Groundwork 4:400). Since an action from duty is to entirely put aside the influence of inclination and with it every object of the will, there is left for the will nothing that could determine it except objectively the *law* and subjectively pure respect for this practical law. Therefore, the maxim of complying with such a law even if it infringes upon all our inclinations, is the will of a rational being, in which the highest and unconditional good alone can be found (Groundwork 4:400-401). The representation of the law can occur only in a rational being. If the will is de-

⁴ Citations of Kant's discourse concerning morals here are from »Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals« in Practical Philosophy¹⁸, Cambridge University Press, 1996.

prived of every impulse that could arise from obeying some law, nothing would be left but the conformity of actions, as such, with universal law: that is, »I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law« (Groundwork 4:402). Only a rational being has the capacity to act in accordance with the representation of laws, that is, in accordance with principles, or as a will. The will is a capacity to choose only that which reason, independently from inclination, cognizes as practically necessary, that is, as good. The representation of an objective principle, insofar as it is necessitating for a will, is called a command (of reason), and the formula of the command is called an »imperative« (Groundwork 4:412-413). There is one imperative that, without being based upon and having as its condition any other purpose to be attained by certain conduct, commands this conduct immediately, which is the »categorical imperative« (Groundwork 4:416). Kant asserts that a moral imperative, which appears to be categorical and unconditional, would in fact be only a pragmatic precept that makes us attentive to our advantages and teaches us to take only these into consideration (Groundwork 4:419). Who can prove by experience the nonexistence of a cause, such as the moral imperative, when all that experience teaches is that we do not perceive it? Kant answers himself again by saying »we shall thus have to investigate entirely a priori the possibility of a categorical imperative« (Groundwork 4:419-420). The categorical imperative is tantamount to the principle of autonomy: to choose only in such a way that the maxims of your choice are also included as universal law in the same volition. However, that the will of every rational being is necessarily bound to it as a condition cannot be proved by mere analysis of the concepts to be found in it, because it is a synthetic proposition. This means that one would have to go beyond cognition of objects to a critique of the subject, that is, of pure practical reason, since this synthetic proposition, which commands apodictically, must be capable of being cognized completely *a priori* (Groundwork 4:440). According to Kant, will is a kind of causality of living beings insofar as they are rational, and freedom would be that property of such causality that it could be efficient independently of alien causes determining it (Groundwork 4:446). The proposition that the will is, in all of its actions, a law for itself, indicates only the »principle« to act, on no other maxim than that which can also have itself as an object in its universal law. This is precisely the formula of the categorical imperative and is the principle of morality; hence, a free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same (Groundwork 4:447). Kant thinks that a rational being counts one's self, as intelligent, as belonging to the world of understanding, and only as an efficient cause belonging to this does he call his causality a will. On the other side one is also conscious of one's self as a part of the world of sense (Groundwork 4:453). Kant tries to find an answer to the difficult question of how the categorical imperative is possible among humans who are both rational beings in intelligence and beings conscious of themselves as a part of the world of sense as follows: »that the idea of freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world and

consequently, if I were only this, all my actions would always be in conformity with the autonomy of the will; but since at the same time I intuit myself as a member of the world of sense, they ought to be in conformity with it; and this categorical ought represents a synthetic proposition a priori, since to my will affected by sensible desires there is added the idea of the same will but belonging to the world of the understanding – a will pure and practical of itself, which contains the supreme condition, in accordance with reason, of the former will« (Groundwork 4:454). According to Kant, the idea of freedom seems inseparably combined with the concept of autonomy, as does the universal principle of morality (Groundwork 4:452-453). Here, there is a huge obstacle, which looks almost impossible to get over: the incentive must be quite lacking; for this idea of an intelligible world would itself have to be the incentive, or that in which reason originally takes an interest; however to make this comprehensible is precisely the problem that we cannot solve (Groundwork 4:462). In the end, Kant comes to the conclusion that human reason cannot make comprehensible, as regards its absolute necessity, an unconditional practical law (such as the categorical imperative must be); for, that it is unwilling to do this through a condition – namely by means of some interest laid down as a basis – cannot be held against it, since then it would not be the moral law, that is, the supreme law of freedom, and we can comprehend only its incomprehensibility (Groundwork 4:463).

Hegel's Logic

The contradiction between autonomy of the will and freedom of the will led Kant to the conclusion that human reason could not make comprehensible, as regards its absolute necessity, an unconditional practical law, such as the categorical imperative must be (Groundwork 4:461-463). Kant elaborated on this *aporia*, stating »it is quite beyond the capacity of any human reason to explain how pure reason, without other incentives that might be taken from elsewhere, can be of itself practical, that is, how the mere principle of the universal validity of all its maxims as laws (which would admittedly be the form of a pure practical reason), without any matter (object) of the will in which one could take some interest in advance, can of itself furnish an incentive and produce an interest that would be called purely moral; it is impossible for us to explain...« (Groundwork 4:461). Hegel tried to overcome this *aporia* with his own original idea. He claims the fact that Critical Philosophy holds on to the factum that universality and necessity, being essential determinations, are found to be present in what is called experience, led Kant to think that because this element does not stem from the empirical as such, it should belong to the spontaneity of thinking, or, be *a priori* (Encyclopaedia Logic §40⁵). Accordingly, Kant adopted the transcendental dialectic as the grounds of his philosophy, which expounds

⁵ Citations of Hegel's discourse here are from The Encyclopaedia Logic 19, Hackett Publishing Company, 1991.

the elements of the pure cognition of the understanding and the principles without which no object could be thought at all (Pure Reason B87), which is tantamount to the proposition of the synthetic *a priori* cognition (judgment). Why does Kantian philosophy need this apparently enigmatic proposition? Hegel believes that when Critical Philosophy subjects to investigation the validity of the concepts of the understanding or the thought-determinations, it does not deal with the determinate mutual relationship of these thought-determinations between each other. Critical Philosophy examines these thought-determinations according to the antithesis of subjectivity and objectivity, which relates to the distinction of the elements within experience. In this context, »objectivity« refers to the elements of universality and necessity, i.e., of thought-determinations themselves – the so-called *a priori*. Critical Philosophy extends the antithesis in such a way that experience in its entirety falls within subjectivity; i.e., both of these elements together are subjective, and nothing remains in contrast with subjectivity except the thing-in-itself (Encyclopaedia Logic §41). Here, thoughts, although they are universal and necessary determinations, are still only our thoughts, and are cut off from what the thing is *in-itself* by an impassable gulf (Encyclopaedia Logic §41 addition 2). Since the true objectivity of thinking may consist in this: that thoughts are not merely our thoughts, but, at the same time the In-itself of things and of whatever else is objective (Encyclopaedia Logic §41 addition 2), Critical Philosophy, which contains momentum, explicitly directs toward finding the foundation of morality, desperately needs the spontaneity of thinking or the synthetic *a priori* cognition (judgment) as a presupposed fact in order to pass the impassable gulf between subjective cognition associated with experience and the thing-in-itself.

Therefore, the first task for Kantian philosophy is to investigate how far the forms of thinking are capable of helping us reach the cognition of truth, probing their own limits and their own defects. In other words, the faculty of cognition is to be investigated before cognition begins. There soon creeps in the mistaken project of wanting to have cognition before we have any cognition, or of not wanting to go into water before we have learned to swim (Encyclopaedia Logic §41 addition 1). Kant seems to think that the original identity of the »I« within thinking (the transcendental unity of self-consciousness) is the determinate ground of the concept of understanding, which means that the thought-determinations have their source in the Ego, which furnishes the determinations of universality and necessity. In Critical Philosophy, the representations that are given through feeling and intuition are manifold with regard to their content, and they are equally manifold through their form, i.e., through the mutual externality of sensibility in its two forms, space and time. They are as forms of intuiting (as what is universal in it) *a priori*, called the transcendental aesthetic by Kant. Since the »I« relates this manifold of sense-experience and intuiting to itself and unites it inwardly as within One consciousness (pure apperception), this manifold is brought into an identity, into an original combination. The determinate modes of this relating are the pure concepts of the understanding,

or the categories (Encyclopaedia Logic §42). The categories that elevate mere perception into objectivity, into experience, are the unities merely of subjective consciousness, i.e., the concepts conditioned by the given material. The categories, which are empty on their own account, have their application and use only in experience, whose other component, the determinations of feeling and intuition, is equally something subjective (Encyclopaedia Logic §43). Therefore, the categories seem unfit to be the determinations of the Absolute which is not given in perception, suggesting that the understanding, or cognition through the categories cannot become cognizant of things-in-themselves (Encyclopaedia Logic §44). The faculty that sees what is conditioned in all of this empirical awareness of things is reason, which is the faculty of the unconditioned. The unconditioned or infinite, which seems to be the object of reason, is nothing but the self-equivalent, original identity of the »I« in thinking, the abstract »I« itself. Our empirical cognitions are not appropriate for this identity that lacks determinations altogether (Encyclopaedia Logic §45). However, the need arises to be cognizant of this identity or of the empty thing-in-itself, which means nothing else but the knowing of an object according to its determinate content. Since the Kantian reason has nothing but the categories for its determination of the thing-in-itself, or of the infinite, the reason, which wants to use the categories for the purpose of being cognizant of the thing-in-itself or of the infinite, flies off and becomes »transcendent« (Encyclopaedia Logic §46), reaching the place of proposing the synthetic *a priori* cognition. According to Hegel, this is the first side of the critique of reason which is only a subjective idealism, one which has nothing to do with the content, and has before it only the abstract forms of subjectivity and objectivity; on top of that, it sticks one-sidedly with the former, i.e., subjectivity, as the ultimate, and thoroughly affirmative, determination. On account that in the Kantian philosophy the categories have their source in the unity of self-consciousness, Hegel criticizes it, saying that, in fact, cognition through the categories contains nothing objective, and that the objectivity that is ascribed to them is itself only something subjective (Encyclopaedia Logic §46).

According to Hegel, the application of the categories by reason in the cognition of its objects is the second side of the critique of reason, in which the content of the categories becomes a topic of discussion, at least with regard to some of their determinations (Encyclopaedia Logic §46). Hegel is interested in how Kant judged the application of the categories to the Unconditioned. The first unconditioned that Kant considers is the soul. The empirical determinations are: »in my consciousness I always find myself (1) as the determining *subject*, (2) as a singular or as something abstractly simple, (3) as what is One and the same in everything manifold of which I am conscious – as something-identical, (4) as something that distinguishes me as thinking from everything outside me« (Encyclopaedia Logic §47). In the procedure of the traditional metaphysics, the corresponding categories, or thought-determinations are set, which give rise to four propositions: (1) the soul is a substance; (2) it is a simple substance; (3) it is

numerically identical with respect to the various times of its being-there; (4) it stands in relationship to what is special. Kant, who draws attention to the flaw involved in this transition, indicates that since two types of determinations are confounded (paralogism), namely, empirical determinations with categories, concluding from the former to the latter, or replacing the first with the second, is unjustified (Encyclopaedia Logic §47). Hegel asserts that Kant's criticism expresses nothing other than the comment of Hume, which indicates that thought-determinations in general – universality and necessity – are not found in perception, and that, both in its content and in its form, the empirical is diverse from the determination of thought (Encyclopaedia Logic §47). If thought and appearance do not completely correspond with each other, we have a choice, initially, as to which of them to regard as the deficient one. Hegel criticizes Kant's idealism by saying that so far as the idealism concerns the rational, the defect is shifted onto the thoughts; thoughts are found to be unsatisfactory because they do not match up with what is perceived (Encyclopaedia Logic §47).

The next discourse of Kantian philosophy, which Hegel tries to criticize, is the issue of antinomy. When reason attempts to be cognizant of the unconditioned in the world, it gets involved in antinomies, i.e., in the assertion of two opposed propositions about the same object. Since each of the propositions must be affirmed with equal necessity, what follows from this is that content of this »world«, whose determinations give rise to contradictions of this sort, cannot be in-itself, but can only be appearance. Kant's solution to this issue, i.e., that contents themselves, namely, the categories, on their own account, bring about the contradiction, is that the contradiction does not lie in the object in and for itself, but is only attributable to reason and to its cognition of the object (Encyclopaedia Logic §48). Hegel claims that the solution, which consists merely in a tenderness for the things of this world, is as trivial as the viewpoint is profound. Accordingly, Kant's solution implies that the stain of contradiction ought not to be in the essence of what is in the world while it has to belong only to thinking reason, to the essence of the spirit. It is not considered at all objectionable that the world as it appears shows contradiction to the spirit that observes it since the way the world is for a subjective spirit, for sensibility, and for the understanding, is the world as it appears. However, when the essence of what is in the world is compared to the essence of spirit, it surprises Hegel to see how naively the humble affirmation that what is inwardly contradictory is not the essence of the world, but belongs to reason, the thinking essence, has been advanced and repeated (Encyclopaedia Logic §48). In the perspective of the older metaphysics, it was assumed that, where cognition fell into contradictions, it was just an accidental aberration and rested on subjective errors in inferring and arguing. Kant asserts that it lies in the very nature of thinking to lapse into contradictions (»antinomies«) when it aims at cognition of the infinite (Encyclopaedia Logic §48 addition). It seems tantamount to saying that reason only falls into contradiction through the application of the categories. In order to rescue reason from being ultimately reduced to an empty identity, Kant frees

it from contradiction through the easy sacrifice of all import and content by simply subsuming the determinations of an object under a ready-made schema, instead of deducing them from the Concept (Encyclopaedia Logic §48). This is Kant's »critique of dialectical illusion«, called transcendental dialectic, i.e., the advent of the synthetic *a priori* cognition. In contrast, Hegel states that the finitude of the determinations of the understanding does not lie in their subjectivity; on the contrary, they are finite in themselves. Therefore, their finitude should be exhibited in these determinations themselves. Kant believed that our thought are false just because we think it (Encyclopaedia Logic §60 addition 1). Here, Hegel proposes the idea that the genuine infinite is not merely a realm beyond the finite, but contains the finite sublated within itself (Encyclopaedia Logic §45 addition). This is the starting point of Hegel's philosophy. Hegel notices that antinomy is found not only in the four particular objects taken from cosmology by Kant, but rather in all objects of all kinds, in all representations, concepts, and ideas. The true and positive significance of the antinomies is that everything actual contains opposed determinations within it, and in consequence the cognition and, more exactly, the comprehension of an object amounts precisely to our becoming conscious of it as a concrete unity of opposed determinations (Encyclopaedia Logic §48 addition). Hegel's task is to understand this, and to be cognizant of this property of objects, which would constitute what will determine itself in due course as the dialectical moment of logical thinking (Encyclopaedia Logic §48).

In Critical Philosophy, thinking is interpreted as being subjective, and its ultimate, unsurpassable determination is abstract universality, or formal identity. Thus, thinking is set in opposition to the truth, which is inwardly concrete universality. In this highest determination of thinking, which is reason, the categories are left out of account. From the opposing standpoint, thinking is interpreted as an activity of the particular, and in that way, it is declared to be incapable of grasping truth (Encyclopaedia Logic §61). Thinking as an activity of the particular has categories as its only product and content. However, Kant does not pay attention to the fact that these categories are restricted determinations, forms of what is conditioned, dependent, and mediated. Thought-determinations are called »concept«, and to »comprehend« an object means nothing more than to grasp it in the form of something conditioned and mediated. Inasmuch as it is what is true, infinite, or unconditioned, it is transformed into something conditioned and mediated. Instead of truth being grasped in thinking, it is perverted into untruth in Kantian philosophy, which therefore cannot make the passage to the infinite (Encyclopaedia Logic §62). Hegel claims that being is what is true only as mediated by the Idea and conversely, that the Idea is what is true only as mediated by being. When we notice that one of the determinations has truth only through its mediation by the other, or, in other words, that each of them is mediated with the truth only through the other, since the determination of mediation is deemed to be contained in every immediacy, the unity of the Idea with being will be attained through the process of sublating itself in the mediation (Encyclopaedia

Logic §70, §75). The antithesis between an independent immediacy of the content or of knowing, and, on the other side, an equally independent mediation that is irreconcilable with it, must be put aside because it is a mere presupposition and an arbitrary assurance. Also, all other presuppositions or assumptions must equally must be given up (Encyclopaedia Logic §78), where Hegel's dialectical moment (the *speculative* or positively rational moment) emerges. The dialectical moment is the self-sublation of the finite determinations on their own part, and their passing into their opposites (Encyclopaedia Logic §81).

Hegel claims that the dialectic has a positive result, because it has a determinate content, or because its result is truly not empty, abstract nothing, but the negation of certain determinations, which are contained in the result precisely because it is not an immediate nothing, but a result (Encyclopaedia Logic §82). This rational result, although it is something-thought and something-abstract, is at the same time something-concrete, because it is not simple, formal unity, but a unity of distinct determinations. In the speculative Logic, the dialectical and the rational are omitted, resulting in a descriptive collection of determinations of thought put together in various ways, which in their finitude count for something infinite (Encyclopaedia Logic §82). The most conspicuous feature of Hegel's philosophy is that he claims to have made clear the speculative Logic, which is supposed to enable the finite and the infinite to unite through the mediatory process of sublation, i.e., that the infinite is the affirmative, preserving itself as the finite, which is sublated. (Encyclopaedia Logic §95). Since Hegel is afraid that the expression »the finite and the infinite are therefore One, that the True, or the genuine Infinity, is determined and expressed as the unity of the infinite and the finite« may be misleading, though the expression contains something correct, he emphasizes that the finite, when posited as one with the infinite, could surely not remain what it is outside of this unity, and would at the very least be somewhat affected in its determination, and the same would happen to the infinite, which, as the negative, would, for its part, also be blunted upon the other (Encyclopaedia Logic §95). Thus, Hegel seems to have made an utmost effort to rescue reason from being reduced to an empty identity with the use of logic different from Kant's transcendental dialectic. Why does Hegel need »the speculative« in his discourse like Kant needs »the transcendental«? Hegel's answer is that finitude is under the determination of reality at first, while the truth of the finitude is rather its ideality. In the same way, the infinite of the understanding, which is put beside the finite, is itself also only one of two finites: something-untrue or something-ideal (Encyclopaedia Logic §95). As regards to »the speculative«, Hegel explains that though apparently it looks mystical, when the abstract thinking of the understanding is regarded as synonymous with the speculative, the mystical becomes tantamount to the concrete unity of just those determinations that count as true for the understanding only in their separation and opposition. In this way, the abstract thinking of the understanding is a constant sublating of itself and an overturning into its opposite, whereas the rational as such is

rational precisely because it contains both opposites as ideal moments within itself. Thus, everything rational can equally be called »mystical«; however, this only amounts to saying that it transcends the understanding (Encyclopaedia Logic §82 addition).

Hegel states that subjective representing and thinking posits the antithesis between itself and the world, which is in-itself null and void for it as null and void (Encyclopaedia Logic §224). Here, Reason comes in, which would enable, through the process of cognition, the antithesis of the one-sidedness of the subjectivity together with the one-sidedness of objectivity, to be implicitly sublated within One activity. Initially, this sublating happens only in-itself, then, it starts to fall apart into the doubled movement of sublating drive, posited as two diverse movements (Encyclopaedia Logic §225). One is the movement to sublimate the one-sidedness of the subjectivity of the Idea by means of the assumption of the world into subjective representation and thought; and to fill the abstract certainty of oneself with this objectivity as content. Then, the converse movement occurs, in which the one-sidedness of the objective world, which therefore counts only as a semblance, a collection of contingencies and of shapes which are in-themselves null and void, is sublated, resulting in determining this world through the inwardness of the subjectivity, which here counts as what is truly objective and to »in-form« it with this subjectivity. The first movement is the drive of knowledge toward truth, or cognition as such – the theoretical activity of the Idea – while the second is the drive of the *good* toward its own accomplishment – willing, the practical activity of the Idea (Encyclopaedia Logic §225).

Here, human factors, such as life, come in. Hegel states that life is comprehensible as the Idea that exists as the Concept, the immediate Idea, which, however, expresses at once the defects of life as well. The defect consists in the fact that the Concept and reality still do not correspond with one another, since the concept of life is the soul, and this concept has the body for its reality (Encyclopaedia Logic §216 addition). In other words, the Concept is realized in a body as the soul, which is the immediate self-relating universality of the body's externality and the particularizing of the body, and the singularity is realized as infinite negativity (Encyclopaedia Logic §216). According to Hegel, the living individual is presupposed to be immediate, emerging as something-mediated and generated, but while conversely being a living singularity. The living singularity, which on account of its initial immediacy stands in a negative relationship to universality, or the genus, goes under in this universality as what has power over singularity (Encyclopaedia Logic §221). The immediate living being mediates itself with itself in the process of the genus, and in this way, it elevates itself above its immediacy, but always just to sink back into it again. What is brought about through the process of life is the sublation and overcoming of the immediacy in which, as life, the Idea is still entangled (Encyclopaedia Logic §221 addition). If we agree with the argument that the objects are »true« when they are what they ought to be (Encyclopaedia Logic §213 addition), what is achieved as

truth is deemed good. Universality, having been posited first as genus and also as the range of its various species as totality (Encyclopaedia Logic §177), is necessary for achieving what ought to be. The necessity, which finite cognition produces in its demonstration, is to begin with an external one, directed only at subjective insight. However, in necessity as such, finite cognition itself has abandoned its presupposition and starting point, the simple finding and givenness of its content, leading the subjective Idea to arrive at what is determinate in and for itself, not-given, and hence immanent in the subject, resulting in its passing over into the Idea of willing (Encyclopaedia Logic §232). The subjective Idea, as what is in and for itself determinate and as a content that is equal to itself and simple, is the good (Encyclopaedia Logic §233). The good, which aims rather to determine the world that it finds already there according to its own purpose (Encyclopaedia Logic §233), has the drive toward its own accomplishment as willing, the practical activity of the Idea (Encyclopaedia Logic §225) which exists freely for it-self inasmuch as the Idea has itself as its object (Encyclopaedia Logic §223). This will is concerned with finally making the world into what it ought to be (Encyclopaedia Logic §234 addition). As for the unity of the theoretical and the practical Idea, the Idea of life is united with the idea of cognition, which is the absolute Idea that is in and for itself (Encyclopaedia Logic §236). Thus, the truth of the good is posited eternally as purpose (Encyclopaedia Logic §235). Here, skepticism or irony starts to torment Hegel, who asserts that when the purpose is an infinite one, we can neither experience nor see in the sphere of the finite that the purpose is genuinely attained. Hegel expressed the irony himself, stating »The accomplishing of the infinite purpose consists therefore only in sublating the illusion that it has not yet been accomplished. The good, the absolute good, fulfills itself eternally in the world, and the result is that it is already fulfilled in and for itself, and does not need to wait upon us for this to happen. This is the illusion in which we live, and at the same time it is this illusion alone that is the activating element upon which our interest in the world rests« (Encyclopaedia Logic §212 addition).

Discussion

The philosophical discourse of Descartes, Kant and Hegel have been reviewed, focusing on the following: 1) how Descartes dealt with the issue of passions and the body, and how he explicated *cogito, ergo sum* and used this logic for finding the foundation of his moral conduct: 2) how Kant criticized Descartes' *cogito, ergo sum*, and reached the transcendental dialectic as the foundation of his morality for the rational: 3) how Hegel criticized Kant's proposition of the synthetic *a priori* cognition, and reached the speculative Logic as the foundation of his reorganizing worldview and the fabric of human society. Why should we start our critical review from Descartes? It is explicitly explained in the preface of *The Passions of the Soul*, which says »in your first *Essais*, which contains hardly anything but the Dioptrique and the *Météores*, you'd already explained over six hundred problems in Philosophy which no

one before you had been able to explain so well, and that even though many had looked askance at your writings and sought all sorts of means of refuting them, you nevertheless knew of no one who had yet been able to discover anything in them which wasn't true. To this you add that if anyone wants to count one by one the problems which all the other ways of philosophizing that have been in vogue since the world began have been able to solve, he will perhaps not find that they are so numerous or so notable. You assert besides that no one has ever been able to find the true solution of any problem through the principles peculiar to the Philosophy attributed to Aristotle, which is the only one now taught in the Schools...« (Passions Preface, First Letter). When we believe what was said in the preface, Descartes' discourse seems to be a legitimate starting point of our critique. Clarifying how Descartes treated the sensuous and emotional aspects of humanity and the body is critically important for achieving our aim to present an alternative analysis of western philosophy and to clarify its implications on humans and society in modern times, since apparently Kant and Hegel accepted Descartes' stance regarding the sensuous and emotional aspects of humanity and the body to be the basis of their discourse.

In *The Passions of the Soul*, first Descartes posited passions at the site near the body, insisting that since what is a passion in the soul is commonly an action in the body, there is no better path for arriving at an understanding of our passions than to examine the difference between the soul and the body (Passions Article 2). Thus, introducing the concept of body-soul dualism, he insists that though the soul is truly joined to the whole body, the soul whose function consists of the actions of the soul, defined as thinking or volitions, and passions, defined as perceptions, sensations or excitations of the soul, should be differentiated from the body, which seems to have an affinity with the animal spirit and passions, while thinking seems to be coupled with reason, intellect and the understanding. In the *Meditations on First Philosophy*, Descartes, who apparently had the discourse which was revealed in *The Passions of the Soul* in mind, came across the finding that the nature of man is composed of mind and body, appreciating the value of a thought, the mind and reason as the foundation of his philosophical discourse while depreciating the value of the body and senses. Upon the body-soul dualism, which put senses and passions on the site near the body, Descartes expounded in the *Discourse on the Method* that he was nothing but a thinking thing after rejecting as absolutely false everything in which he could imagine the least doubt. Descartes, who believed to have found just one thing that was certain and unshaken, pronounced »I think, therefore I am«, and declared that he would spend his whole life in order to advance, as far as he could, in the knowledge of truth following the command that he should never allow himself to be persuaded except by the evidence of his reason. However, a serious problem arises here. Since he, as a thinking »I«, seemed to lack substance, he needed something outside himself which could bestow the thinking »I« substance. Descartes came across the idea that since he who may not be perfect can think of something perfect which should have originated from something perfect outside of himself, i.e., God, his

thinking faculties, such as reason, intellect and the understanding, should be associated with what is perfect, i.e., God. Descartes asserted that as God is a perfect being, the source bestows substance to the thinking »I« which is capable of thinking of something perfect in spite of its being not perfect.

Following Descartes' discourse of »I think, therefore I am (*cogito, ergo sum*)«, Kant explored a form of logic, which was expected to endow substance to the thinking »I« without the prop of »God« in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant stated that the proposition »I think«, which is an empirical one, did not mean that the »I« was an empirical representation, indicating that Descartes' »I think, therefore I am« may be an indeterminate empirical intuition, i.e., a perception, in which the proposition »I think« contains within itself the proposition »I exist«, and the »I« seems to lack content. Kant asserted that sensation, which belongs to sensibility, cannot ground the existential proposition (Pure Reason B422). In regard to the propping up of the thinking »I« by God, Kant criticized it as the confusion of a logical predicate with a real one, saying »Anything one likes can serve as a logical predicates, even the subject can be predicated of itself; for logic abstracts from every content« (Pure Reason A598/B626). In place of »I think, therefore, I am«, which seems to lack content, Kant submitted the idea that every existential proposition is synthetic, i.e., with actuality, the object is not merely in our concept analytically, but adds synthetically to our concept. Here the questions, such as whether Kant's synthetic *a priori* cognition succeeds in adding content or substance to the thinking »I« or not, and if it succeeds, what the evidence of its success would be, will arise. However, Kant's answer to these questions remains equivocal. According to Hegel, Kantian philosophy, which examines the validity of the concepts of the understanding or the thought-determinations according to the antithesis of subjectivity and objectivity, extends it in such a way that experience in its entirety falls within subjectivity. Therefore, nothing remains in contrast to subjectivity except the thing-in-itself. The Kantian categories which are manifold, the representations with a tinge of content which may be accrued through the intercourse with time and space, themselves *a priori*, seem unfit to be the determinations of the infinite which is not given in perception. Accordingly, the unconditioned or infinite is nothing but the self-equivalent, original identity of the thinking »I«, or the abstract »I« itself which seems empty. In an attempt to overcome this predicament, Hegel, who machinated to shift the defects from the faculty of thinking and perception to the object itself, made a proposition that the genuine infinite is not merely a realm beyond the finite, but which contains the finite sublated within itself. Since the infinite results from the negation of certain-determinations, i.e., the finite, it may not be empty, not be an immediate nothing, but have a determinate content (substance). Hegel expounded that being is the Concept only in-itself; its determinations are; in their distinction they are others vis-à-vis each other, and their further determination is a passing-over into another. This process is both a setting-forth and an unfolding, of the Concept that is in-itself, and at the same time the going-into-itself of be-

ing. The explication of the Concept in the sphere of Being becomes the totality of being, just as the immediacy of being is sublated by it (Encyclopaedia Logic §84). Does this speculative Logic bestow content to the thinking »I«, succeeding in rescuing reason from being reduced to the empty identity? Hegel's own answer is that a constant sublation of itself and overturning into its opposite is the abstract thinking of the understanding, and thus becomes speculative and rational, while appearing mystical because it transcends the understanding. Hegel's speculative Logic seems equivocal regarding its potential of enabling the unconditioned or infinite, i.e., the original identity of the thinking »I«, or the abstract »I« to attain content or substance.

Here, a question of why skepticism is not entirely erased from the discourse of Descartes, Kant and Hegel in regard to the identity of the thinking »I«, which they explained has content or substance, arises. No one seems to have tried to find an explicit answer to this question so far. It has been shown that Descartes restricted the foundation of his moral conduct within the knowledge of truth that reason allows him to be persuaded. Reason, operating within the thinking »I«, is the rational aspect of humanity, composed of an intelligent nature, which is supposed to be unaffected by corporeal nature such as sensation and emotion. And the principal line of this idea has been accepted by Kant and Hegel, who apparently made their philosophical discourse on the basis of the intellectual nature of humans such as reason, the thinking »I«, the rational, and the understanding. Kant betrayed himself as to why he dealt with only the rational aspect of humanity, composed of an intelligent nature, admitting »the mere analysis of the concepts that inhabit our reason *a priori*, is not the end at all, but only a preparation for metaphysics proper, namely extending its *a priori* cognition synthetically, and it is useless for this end, because it merely shows what is contained in these concepts, but not how we attain such concepts *a priori* in order thereafter to be able to determine their valid use in regard to the objects of all cognition in general« (Pure Reason B23, B24). Kant stated that the supreme principles of morality and the fundamental concepts of it are the synthetic *a priori* cognition, into which no concept that contains anything empirical must enter, which is tantamount to the transcendental dialectic, i.e., philosophy of pure, speculative reason (Pure Reason A14/B28, A15, B29), while the applied logic, a representation of the understanding and the rules of its necessary use *in concreto*, is related to the doctrine of virtue proper which assesses these laws under the hindrances of the feelings, inclinations, and passions to which human beings are more or less subject. In the similar context, Hegel had to deal with only the rational aspect of humanity, composed of an intelligent nature, because he was thinking about the distinction of the purpose, called a concept-of-reason, as the final cause from the mere efficient cause (Encyclopaedia Logic §204). The purpose requires a speculative interpretation, as the Concept which itself contains the judgment or negation, i.e., the antithesis of the subjective and objective – and which is just as much their sublation (Encyclopaedia Logic §204). Here, Hegel's teleology emerges as the final cause. Hegel conceded that

his philosophy was on the lines of those of Descartes and Kant, admitting »Speculative Logic contains the older logic and metaphysics; it preserves the same forms of thought, laws, and object, but it develops and transforms them with further categories« (Encyclopaedia Logic §9). Thus, it becomes clear that Descartes, Kant and Hegel have no choice other than to deal with only the rational aspect of humanity, composed of an intelligent nature, in their discourse: their moral law and ethics command them to face with it.

What kind of moral law Descartes, Kant and Hegel had in mind when they launched to make philosophical discourse is critically important, and it is waiting to be clarified. This was Kant's answer: his aim was to work out for once a pure moral philosophy, completely cleansed of everything that may be only empirical and that belonged to anthropology (Groundwork 4:389). This discourse made so far, in conjunction with Kant's saying, enables the assumption that Kant's moral law, which is supposed to have nothing to do with the laws cognized in anthropology, is antithetical to the ethical value system of Homeric epics, which consists of six concepts: »oath«, »honor«, »guest«, »blood«, »ood«, and »revenge«¹, which apparently belongs to anthropology. The fact that Hegel appreciated Kantian practical reason was expressed in his statement: »The free self-determination that Kant denied to theoretical reason, he expressly vindicated for practical reason. It is this aspect of the Kantian philosophy especially that has won great favor for it, and that is, of course, perfectly justified« (Encyclopaedia Logic §54 addition). This suggests that Hegel's moral law of practical reason was on the lines of Kantian moral law, though Hegel's speculative Logic is different from Kant's transcendental dialectic. Thus, it becomes clear that it is the moral law and ethics which are antithetical to the ethical value system of Homeric epics that incessantly call Descartes, Kant and Hegel to focus on reason and the rational aspect of humanity, composed of an intelligent nature, while deleting the sensuous and emotional aspects of humanity and the bodily factors associated with them. When they started their discourse with the presupposition of the thinking »I« and with deleting the sensuous and emotional aspects of humanity, the end result was that thinking is always interpreted as being subjective, and cannot reach its ultimate, unsurpassable determination, which is abstract and infinite. Therefore, thinking is set in opposition to the truth, which is inwardly concrete universality (Encyclopaedia Logic §61). However, no one seems to be able to erase the doubt that this thinking »I« may be empty and void. Kant expressed his own doubt, saying »it is very enticing and seductive to make use of these pure cognitions of the understanding and principles by themselves, and even beyond all bounds of experience, which however itself alone can give us the matter (objects) to which those pure concepts of the understanding can be applied, the understanding falls into the danger of making a material use of the mere formal principles of pure understanding through empty sophistries« (Pure Reason A63, B88). In an attempt to fill the void by bestowing content or substance to the thinking »I«, Descartes brought up God, Kant the transcendental dialectic

and finally, Hegel brought up the speculative Logic. Did they succeed in filling the void? Could Kant's transcendental idealism really thwart his critical remark on Plato, which refers to the fact that Plato abandoned the world of the senses because it set such narrow limits for the understanding, and dare to go beyond it on the wings of the ideals, in the empty space of pure understanding (Pure Reason B9), to return to himself? Kant might have uttered his verdict in advance, saying »The light dove, in free flight cutting through the air the resistance of which it feels, could get the idea that it could do even better in airless space« (Pure Reason A5, B9). Does Descartes' God or Kant's transcendental dialectic or Hegel's speculative Logic prevent the light dove from thinking to fly in airless space? No, it is not the logic, but the moral law and ethics that are expected to do it. According to Kant, since all moral concepts have their seat and origin completely *a priori* in reason, moral law is to hold for every rational beings as such, to derive them from the universal concept of rational being as such, and in this way set forth completely the whole of morals, which needs anthropology for its application to human beings (Groundwork 4:411-412). When moral law and ethics as what Descartes, Kant and Hegel cherished are assumed to constitute the whole of morals from anthropology, they are deemed to represent universality of the principle of humanity, i.e., the truth which is inwardly concrete universality. This universality is expected to give content to their discourse. Kant might have expressed his expectation in his saying that proceeding analytically from common cognition to the determination of its supreme principle in turn proceeds from the examination of this principle and its source to the common cognition (Groundwork 4:392). Hegel also expressed it in his saying that a content has its justification only as a moment to the whole, outside of which it is only an unfounded presupposition or a subjective certainty (Encyclopaedia Logic §14). Since their moral law and ethics have been assumed to be the only ones that humans have had, the »sole« ones are seen to be propping up their discourse as the universality and »the whole«.

In contrast to the moral law and ethics, which Descartes, Kant and Hegel seem to have in mind, the ethical value system of a society without state power, as represented by the Albanian customary code, the Kanun²⁰, is supposed to serve well for creating a sense of justice, peace and order in society if it has social and cultural conditions as follows: 1) there is no functioning state power; 2) the kinship system is of great importance; 3) the kin group is a transcendental commune consisting of the living and the dead; 4) the kin group has the obligation to keep its existence in the community; 5) animism and ancestor worship are prevalent; 6) the ethos of warriors is highly regarded; 7) spoken words are appreciated more than written words; 8) the population of the area where the Kanun operates is not crowded so that the segmentary, acephalous lineage society is neatly preserved. A sense of justice is the indispensable element for human society to preserve its lasting and peaceful existence on Earth, without which it is impossible to guard peace and order based on humanity¹. A society without state power has been found to have moral-

ity and logic of its own, which have spontaneously developed on the basis of pagan religions. The disciplinary force in a society without state power is the retributive action by the offended party on the offending party¹. This action is regarded as legal only when it is carried out by the offended party in the outburst of ethical resentment. The ethical structure of the Kanun incorporates the urge for action of the offended party, which is arising from their (rational) thinking coupled with sensation and emotion, into the ethical value system, converting the retributive action into a sacred force, supposedly wielded by the gods. In a society without state power, such as ancient societies, archaic societies and tribal societies, the retributive action of the offended party is the ultimate sanction, engendering a sense of justice among people in that society. It is a self-perpetuating ethical value system, which is logically equivalent, as well as antithetical to, that of a society with state power, which does not accept the retributive action of the offended party as a due sanction¹. Previously, we found in the ethical structure of the Kanun the three pillars: the concept of a consanguine commune, the concept of continuity and growth of the consanguine commune, and the concept of filial piety and loyalty to the consanguine commune¹. Through a comparative study between the ethical structure of the Kanun and the value system of ultra-nationalism in prewar Japan, we elaborated on its structure as follows: 1) the consanguine commune: individuals in the society belong to their consanguine commune, which has its own ancestor. If they ascend their family tree, the family tree would merge into the divine obscurity of the Universe. In the ritual, they accept their ancestor as a guest-god and offer the guest-god food and hospitality. The guest-god utters blessings in return for the hospitality, which ensures their divinity and the prosperity of the consanguine commune; 2) the continuity and growth of the consanguine commune: the consanguine commune is an ethical commune because it is the commune which has originated from the divine obscurity of the Universe. At the same time, it is the transcendental commune which comprises the dead, the living, and those yet to be born. The ethical and transcendental commune, originating from and comprised of the divine world, has the obligation to continue to exist in the world forever. The extinction of this consanguine commune is the highest violation of the divine law, tantamount to the denial of the ethics and the order of the Universe; 3) filial piety and loyalty: when the consanguine commune is in peril, its members are to stand up for its defense. If the consanguine commune has insoluble conflicts with another commune, it could thus annihilate the obstructing commune in order to secure its existence. Any act defending or improving the consanguine commune is ethical, while any act damaging or negating it is unethical. Its members swear an oath that they would remain loyal to the commune. If any member breaks the oath, he is to be expelled from the commune. The soul of the member who remains loyal and dies in the battle for the commune could go to Heaven where it would mingle with the dead ancestors who are worshiped as gods, and soothed by the rituals performed by the commune^{1,21}.

Hegel criticized Empiricism, saying »From Empiricism the call went out: »Stop chasing about empty abstractions, look at what is there for the taking, grasp the here and now, human and natural, as it is here before us and enjoy it!« And there is no denying that this contains an essentially justified moment. This world, the here and now, the present, was to be substituted for the empty Beyond, for the spiderwebs and cloudy shapes of the abstract understanding. That is precisely how the firm footing, i.e., the infinite determination that was missing in the older metaphysics was gained. The understanding only picks out finite determinations; these by themselves are shaky and without footing, and the building erected on them collapse upon itself. To find an infinite determination was always the impulse of reason,...this drive took hold of the present, the »Here«, the »This«, which has infinite form in it, even though this form does not have its genuine existence« (Encyclopaedia Logic §38 addition). Is Hegel's discourse that the »Here«, the »This«, the here and now, the present are only the infinite form without content or substance (genuine existence) true? Here, we will posit the ethical structure of the Kanun to Hegel's discourse. In a world where the ethical value system of a society without state power prevails, the thinking »I« is coupled with sensation, emotion and the body, and is the finite (if we borrow Hegel's word, »it«, which originally seems infinite, is made finite through the finite form of the understanding). This world, the here and now, the present, which are considered to be the infinite determination as a form, are picked up by the thinking »I« coupled with sensation, emotion and the body, through perception and the understanding. In contrast to the infinite determination of Empiricism as well as to that of Descartes, Kant and Hegel, this infinite determination, which apparently seems merely a form, is associated with content or substance, because this thinking »I« coupled with sensation, emotion and the body represents a link which connects to both infinity, i.e., the divine obscurity of the Universe bygone and infinity, i.e., the divine obscurity of the Universe that is to come. This link as »I« is a representation given through feeling and intuition, which is manifold with regard to its content, and which also contains time and space that are *a priori* as forms of intuiting. The thinking »I« coupled with sensation, emotion and the body is not void or empty, but is filled with content or substance, while the thinking »I« without the sensuous and emotional aspects of humanity looks always void and empty. In this context, the verdict is that God, transcendental dialectic and speculative Logic are destined to fail in filling the emptiness of the thinking »I«, because it is originally empty as a result of its original defects. When something is added to nothing, nothing does not breed anything more than the something that is added. This is the disaster which western philosophers from Plato to Descartes, Kant and Hegel have failed to fix. It is the *aporia*, which Kant might have already implied: »it is a presupposition that we cannot justify through anything« (Pure Reason A601/B629). The discourse of western philosophers such as Descartes, Kant and Hegel looks brilliant provided the presupposition that there is only one type of ethical value system in human society is justified.

Only under this condition, do their moral law and ethics keep projecting a bright light onto their discourse as universality and necessity. Kant seems to have firmly believed that humans should not have had moral laws other than what he regarded to be the moral law, of which apparent universality might have given content to his discourse. Hegel asserted that his philosophical encyclopaedia would not deal with philosophy, which is positive, though it contained a rational component. He stated »what is positive in the sciences is of diverse kinds:... The philosophy that wants to base itself on anthropology, on facts of consciousness, on inward intuition or outward experience, belongs here too« (Encyclopaedia Logic §16). It is unfortunate that no one, except the people who have been in the world where a state power does not exist or does not function appropriately, has noticed an alternative transcendental dialectic or an alternative speculative Logic, i.e., the ethical value system of a society without state power. When alternative ethical value system, which seems universal in a society without state power, is made manifest¹, the discourse of Descartes, Kant and Hegel seems to have lost some luster because their ethical value system which is firmly believed to be the only one that humans could have had, receded on account of positing alternative ethical value system and resulting in the relativism of ethics. However, Hegel seemed to have given his verdict on this kind of discourse in advance, claiming »Who is not smart enough to be able to see around him quite a lot that is not, in fact, how it ought to be? But this smartness is wrong when it has the illusion that, in its dealings with objects of this kind and with their »ought«, it is operating within the concerns of philosophical science. This science deals only with the Idea – which is not so impotent that it merely ought to be, and is not actual – and further with an actuality of which those objects, institutions, and situations are only the superficial outer rind« (Encyclopaedia Logic §6). Was it really possible for Hegel to see around him how it ought to be, like the ethical structure of the Kanun? No, he could not or would not see it because of his cultural background, which *a priori* declines to acknowledge the presence of alternative ethical value system.

This is an appropriate juncture in this discourse, in which we will make a proposition explicitly that there have been two types of ethical value systems among humans: one which is antithetical to the ethical structure of the Kanun, which began emerging in the fifth century B.C., and that of the Kanun, which began emerging in the obscurity of the remotest past. The history of western philosophy, which spans more than two thousand years, is supposed to be one of struggle between the ethical structure of the Kanun and the forces trying to destroy it¹. This struggle between the ethical structure of the Kanun and western philosophy, which began in the fifth century B.C. in the ancient Greek world^{1,6}, culminated in the discourse of Descartes, Kant and Hegel. Kant, who seems to have intuitively discerned the possibility of the alternative transcendental dialectic when he made his arduous critique of pure reason, says »human reason, without being moved by the mere vanity of knowing it all, inexorably

pushes on, driving by its own need to such questions that cannot be answered by any experiential use of reason and of principles borrowed from such a use; and thus a certain sort of metaphysics has actually been present in all human beings as soon as reason has extended itself to speculation in them, and it will also always remain there. And now about this too the question is: How is metaphysics as a natural predisposition possible?« (Pure Reason B21, B22). Have humans been capable of having metaphysics as a natural predisposition? If so, what sort of metaphysics is the *metaphysica naturalis*? Has it arisen from the nature of universal human reason? Kant confessed that unavoidable contradictions have always been found in all previous attempts to answer these natural questions (Pure Reason B22). Here, we attempt to make an alternative answer to these questions. According to Hegel, the human being distinguishes itself from the animals by thinking: if so, then everything human is human because it is brought about through thinking, and for that reason alone (Encyclopaedia Logic §2). When humans appeared on this planet as human, they should have had »thought« and »reason« already. It can be safely assumed that humans had a *metaphysica naturalis* and ethics which have spontaneously developed on the basis of a pagan religion from the early stage of prehistoric times. It is impossible to assume that humans have had only one type of ethical value system which is antithetical to the ethical structure of the Kanun from the early stage of prehistoric times for at least two reasons. One reason is that ethical value system began to drastically change in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. when Gotama preached a new religious doctrine on the Indian continent, and Socrates and Plato developed the dialectic of the Idea of Good in the ancient Greek world^{5,6}. The *metaphysica naturalis* and ethics which humans have had until the fifth century B.C. should be assumed to be the ethical value system of a society without state power, which had been functioning in human society from time immemorial. The second is that the metaphysics which Descartes, Kant and Hegel had in mind is associated with the ethical value system which is antithetical to that of a society without state power. It was impossible for this type of metaphysics to exist among human society throughout their whole history, or even if it existed from the early stage of their presence on this planet, it could not be viable at least before civilization appeared in human society, around 3000 B.C., when an incipient state power is believed to have emerged^{1,5}. The unavoidable contradictions in all previous attempts to answer the natural questions which Kant raised would disappear when we acknowledge that two types of metaphysics have posited side by side with a parallel value among humans for more than two thousand years. Which type of metaphysics is more natural? The answer is obvious. The *metaphysica naturalis* associated with the ethical value system of a society without state power is deemed to be more natural because it spontaneously developed on the basis of the pagan religion in prehistoric times⁵, and seems to have been lasting for tens of thousands of years. What is the evidence that enables us to say that it had emerged tens of thousands of years ago? It comes from the literature of ancient and me-

dieval times, as well as from the results of anthropological research carried out in the twentieth century, which show that the ethical value system of a society without state power has survived in various parts of the world from antiquity until modern times. This ethical value system has a structure, which is the same as or similar to that of the Kanun, consisting of six concepts: »oath«, »honor«, »guest«, »blood«, »food«, and »revenge«^{1,5}.

It has been assumed that modern humans (*Homo sapiens*) originated in Africa between 150,000 and 200,000 years ago, and dispersed to Eurasia sometime after 65,000 years ago, resulting in their further expansion all over the world, including Australia, North and South America²⁻⁴. Two hypotheses regarding the emergence of anatomically modern humans have been proposed: the multi-regional hypothesis, which states that the transformation of archaic to anatomically modern humans occurred in parallel in different parts of the Old World, and the Africa origin hypothesis, which states that anatomically modern humans originated in Africa 100,000–200,000 years ago³. Currently, the latter is believed to be the case. As was indicated before, the ethical value system of a society without state power, as represented by the ethical structure of the Kanun, is assumed to be the first form of ethics that humans have ever had¹. People who are or were in such various parts of the world, such as Australia²², North America^{22,23}, the Arctic Circle²², the Middle East²⁴⁻²⁶, Central Asia²⁷, the Southern Pacific region^{22,28,29}, Southeastern Asia^{22,30}, Transcaucasia^{31,32}, the Mediterranean area^{33,34}, and Africa^{35,36} have been found to have the ethical value system, which is similar to or the same as the ethical structure of the Kanun^{1,5}. Here, we propose another hypothesis that humans who had been living in a small region in Africa came across a cultural apparatus, such as »guest« and »food«, through their primordial, crucial experiences, which enabled them to establish a friendly

relationship between people issuing from different backgrounds^{1,7} tens of thousands of years ago, before their dispersal to a wide area. This is the starting point from which humans fully developed the ethical value system of a society without state power, which would be the guarantor, enabling people to keep order and peace in the society. People who founded the system prospered, multiplied, and spread all over the world, being accompanied by this cultural apparatus. The ethical value system of a society without state power has such a finely tuned structure and versatility for solving any problems occurring in that society that it seems difficult to assume that it appeared tens of thousands of years ago in parallel at multiple regions. Human beings are not human beings if it were not for ethics among them, which is the basic trait of humanity. In this sense, it can be said that anatomically modern humans truly became human beings when they acquired the ethical value system of a society without state power.

It is time to conclude this discourse. Hegel explicated his logic tersely, saying »Within Being the abstract form of the progression is an other and passing-over into an other; within Essence it is shining within what is opposed; in the Concept it is the distinctness of the singular from the universality which continues itself as such into what is distinct from it, and is present as identity with the latter« (Encyclopaedia Logic §240). If we proceed our discourse with the use of this idea, it is concluded that the ethical value system of a society without state power and »an other« which is antithetical to the ethical structure of the Kanun should oppositely posit each other and reciprocally pass-over into another, thus sublating through the infinite progress, and the result would be preserved as universality. Whether it is possible for the two ethical value systems to sublimate, achieving the status of universality, i.e., One Totality, remains to be seen.

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ALTERNATIVNA ANALIZA DISKURSA DESCARTESA, KANTA I HEGELA U SMISLU ETIČKOG USTROJSTVA KANUNA

SAŽETAK

Etička struktura albanskog običajnog kodeksa, Kanun, smatra se da predstavlja etički vrijednosni sustav društva bez državne vlasti. Unatoč izgledu civilizacija i posljedične pojave jedne početne državne vlasti, ljudi kao da su poznavali samo etički sustav vrijednosti društva, bez državne vlasti sve dok su Gotama, Sokrat, Platon i Isus predložili nove religijske i filozofske doktrine. Osnovna značajka tih vjerskih i filozofskih doktrina, koje pokušavaju antagonizirati etički sustav vrijednosti u društvu bez državne vlasti, eliminira emocionalni aspekt čovječanstva od etičkog sustava vrijednosti, naslijeđena je od strane zapadnih filozofa poput Descartesa, Kanta i Hegela. Pregledani su diskursi Descartesa, Kanta i Hegela su, dok je pozornost na to kako su se bavili senzualnim i emocionalnim aspektima čovječanstva. Metafizičke implikacije etičke strukture Kanuna isplivale su kritičkim preispitivanjem njihove filozofije i predstavljen je hipoteza u vezi njegovog porijekla.