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*Essays*

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## Segmented or "Entrenched" Electoral Systems<sup>1</sup>

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*Summary*

The author discusses the problem of segmented or "entrenched" electoral systems, which are not widely known or applied in the electoral practice of democratic states. However, in the post-communist states of Eastern Europe they have come to the forefront. Their main purpose is to combine the principles of the majority and the proportional electoral systems as well as to both highlight the advantages and mitigate the shortcomings of both. The main finding of the study is that there isn't a universal model of relations between segmented electoral systems and parliamentary party systems. Segmented systems have in some countries produced the effects of the majority system and in others of the proportional systems. Institutional factors causing those differences cannot be positively established.

*The concept and structure of segmented electoral models*

Segmented electoral systems are not widely known and have so far been relatively rarely applied in the history of democratic elections. In the Anglo-Saxon tradition they are usually referred to as "mixed electoral systems", whereas in the German tradition they are known as "die Grabensysteme".

They were most extensively discussed in Germany in the fifties and sixties, when the existing electoral system was about to undergo a reform, and this form of elections emerged as a reform option. The name resulted from the conviction that this electoral model combines two political principles separated by a huge gap, a "trench" ("der Graben"). The majority and the proportional systems represent "two entirely different concepts of the state as a whole, particularly of the nature and the purpose of the parliament, of the kind of people's participation which have been juxtaposed" (Sternberger, 1964, 139). In this context,

<sup>1</sup> This paper was written during the author's visit to the Institute for Political Science, University of Heidelberg, based on the research grant of the German foundation Alexander von Humbolt.

representation principles of the majority and plurality systems are antithetical, and therefore no compromise between them is possible. (Meyer, 1973, 181).

The segmented model is an electoral pattern attempting to combine two goals: the representation of all political tendencies, which should be guaranteed by proportional elections, and the creation of parliamentary majority capable of forming the government, which should be guaranteed by the majority elections. Such an option resulted from its very structure which incorporates the main structural elements of the majority and the proportional electoral system that affect the political results of elections: single-mandate and multi-mandate constituencies, competition of individual candidates and party lists, decision-making based on both the majority and the proportional principle.

In accordance with such a structure, the segmented electoral model is supposed to highlight the advantages and avoid or mitigate the shortcomings of both basic types of electoral systems. This was the main intention of its advocates. This model was supposed to encourage parties-movements and honorary parties to develop into modern political parties, which will play dominant parts in the elections at the same time avoiding a complete depersonalization of elections by introducing single-mandate constituencies<sup>2</sup> it was as well supposed to allow small parties to take part in the elections and enter the parliament, but also to encourage concentration of political parties and parliamentary party systems; furthermore to enable the voters to express their primary and secondary political preference by means of the two-vote voting mechanism, but also provide them with a clear choice between the leading party and the opposition; finally to "justly" distribute parliamentary seats among political parties according to the number of votes gained from voters, but also "reward", in terms of mandates, the party gaining the most votes.

Politically speaking, the segmented model is generally viewed as a compromise between the party in power and the opposition. However, this is not always the case. In the countries of Eastern Europe it has often reflected insecurity expressed by the leading political forces as to which

<sup>2</sup> H. Meyer showed that the personal dimension of elections vanished simultaneously with their local dimension, i.e. with the changed significance of local constituencies. The local character of majority elections as well as their personal dimension is suppressed in favour of the importance of the election procedure for the constitution of the parliament as well as for election odds of the parties. Majority elections gradually ceased to perform their primary function of representing local units, as political parties got more and better developed and supraregionally organized, as ideological and supraregional interests prevailed over local, as functions of the centralist parliament multiplied and as more attention was paid to its party structure. Political parties "mediated" the importance of the constituency as well as the importance of the local and personal dimensions of majority elections (Meyer, 1973, 162).

electoral system would be best suited to their interests and would provide them with a new electoral victory. As a result of such doubts segmented electoral systems emerged, which provided the political forces in power with a lot of maneuvering space, primarily in terms of reducing the opposition's election chances. For example, in Croatia the segmented electoral model seemed to be, formally speaking, an expression of the compromise between the party in power and the opposition; the leading party came into power through majority elections, which, since it was the strongest political party, remained best suited to its political interests, while all opposition parties advocated the proportional electoral system. The choice of the segmented electoral model was based on the political estimate of the party in power that its electoral victory might be threatened if faced with a united opposition in majority elections. This was supported by the fact that the electoral system of relative majority, which was supposed to be used for the second parliament house, was replaced by the proportional electoral system in small (three-mandate) constituencies only ten days before the elections. The change was motivated by the announcement made by the opposition that they would form a unified electoral bloc against the party in power in the elections for that parliamentary body.

### *Segmented electoral models of East European countries*

Segmented electoral model came into the forefront in elections held in post-communist countries of Eastern Europe. Among eighteen states<sup>3</sup> it was applied in as many as in seven: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Yugoslavia, Lithuania, Hungary and Russia. In two countries it was applied only in the first free elections: Bulgaria (1990) and Yugoslavia (May 1992), only to be abandoned in the following preterm elections in both being replaced by the proportional electoral system. In Albania, on the other hand, the segmented electoral model was introduced in the second elections (1992) after the system of absolute majority was abandoned, which was used in the first organized elections (1991) (Szijakowski, 1991; Hoppe, 1992). Segmented electoral model was also applied in Croatia in the second (1992) and the third elections (1995) after the system of absolute majority was abandoned, which was used in the first organized free elections in 1990 when Croatia had not yet become an independent state.

<sup>3</sup> Bosnia and Hercegovina was not included in the analysis, because since its proclaimed independence elections could not be held due to the war. The analysis includes only elections in independent states, i.e. elections on the national and not subnational level. The first free elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina were held in November of 1990, when it was still formally a part of the Yugoslav federation. The elections were organized according to the proportional electoral system for the lower house of parliament and for the upper house of parliament they were held according to the absolute majority system.

The first and the second free elections in Russia (1993, 1995) were organized in accordance with the segmented electoral model (Schneider, 1993; Mikhailovskaia and Kuzminski, 1994; Wyman et al., 1994), and so were those in Lithuania (1992) when it became an independent state (Lucky, 1994). This model was used in both the first (1990) and the second (1994) elections only in Hungary (Körösenyi, 1990; Arato, 1994) (Table 1).

Table 1: Distribution of electoral model type in Eastern European countries 1990-1994 (\*)

States	Electoral Models		
	Majority	Proportional	Segmented
Albania	*		*
Belorussia	*		
Bulgaria		*	*
Czech Republic		*	
Estonia		*	
Croatia			*
Yugoslavia		*	*
Latvia		*	
Lithuania			*
Hungary			*
Macedonia	*		
Moldavia		*	
Poland		*	
Romania		*	
Russia			*
Slovakia		*	
Slovenia		*	
Ukraine	*		

(\*) Electoral models for the first parliament houses in states with bicameral systems

Segmented electoral models in Eastern Europe differed quite significantly. The first difference concerned the type of the majority electoral pattern within the models. In three states (Croatia, Yugoslavia, Russia) the segmented electoral model embraced elections by relative majority and proportional elections. In the four other states (Albania, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Hungary) it combined elections by absolute majority and proportional elections.

Another difference results from various structural elements of the proportional electoral pattern. The difference was mostly reflected in the size of constituencies, in the level of the electoral threshold and the method of calculating votes into mandates.

Regarding the constituency size, two subtypes emerged: at-large system, according to which the whole state represents only one electoral unit (Albania, Croatia, Latvia and Russia) and several plurinominal constituencies (Bulgaria, Yugoslavia<sup>4</sup> and Hungary).

In all these states without exception the electoral threshold was legally prescribed either on the national level or on constituency level. Although doubts about the compatibility of the threshold with the basic principle of proportional elections were more or less overcome,<sup>5</sup> its legitimacy in the segmented electoral model is more questionable. Supposing the main purpose of the electoral threshold in "complete" proportional elections is to prevent overfragmentation of the party and parliamentary systems, in the segmented model this is done primarily by majority elections. Therefore, the threshold is taking over the function of an additional mechanism for the reduction of the parliamentary in favor of the elective party system.

<sup>4</sup> Yugoslavia somehow represented a special case due to the fact that two constituencies in two federal units were established: in Serbia and Montenegro. As elections were held and their results are shown separately, in my analysis I will use the Serbian example because it is critical for Yugoslavia: in Serbia there were 6.9 million and in Montenegro about 430,000 voters. Serbia gave 106 and Montenegro 30 mandates in the lower house of the Federal Parliament (Vasović/Goati, 1993, 226).

<sup>5</sup> The opponents of the electoral threshold claimed that it strengthens the party in power and weakens the influence of smaller parties, prevents the establishment of new parties and thus petrifies the existing parties and parliamentary systems having a negative impact on the development of modern society in general. Furthermore, they claimed that the threshold restrains equality and justice that the lawmakers proclaim through the plurality electoral system, and that it is "counter to the system and unjust" (Sternberger, 1965, 165). Advocates of that mechanism rejected those objections claiming that they were a result of "purist interpretation of proportional elections", which lead to an absurd situation (Jesse, 1985, 238). The electoral threshold is an institutional mechanism by which government stability is protected from threats that could come from small parliamentary parties, it increases the concentration of political forces and it represents some kind of compromise between the proportional and majority principles.

In the states with the at-large system, the electoral threshold varied from 3 to 5 percent. In the states which were divided into constituencies, the threshold varied between 4 and 5 percent. Interestingly, in the 1995 elections in Croatia different electoral thresholds for political parties (5 percent) and electoral coalitions (8 to 11) were introduced, which was characteristic of those East European countries that selected the proportional electoral system. In the second elections in Poland (1993) the threshold of 5 percent was prescribed for parties and 8 percent for coalitions (Tworzecki, 1994); in former Czechoslovakia the level of the threshold was even more differentiated and the parties were expected to win at least 5 percent, coalitions of 2 and 3 parties 7 percent, coalitions of 4, 5 and more parties as much as 10 percent of votes; in Romania the threshold was 3 percent and for coalitions up to 8 percent of votes (Lucky, 1994). Such a variety of electoral thresholds represented novelty in the electoral practice of democratic states and experts interpret it as one of the rare forms of "creative reproduction" of Western political institutions in East European countries after the fall of socialism.

Regarding the methods of calculating votes into mandates, D'Hondt's procedure dominated (Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary in terms of the division of "compensation" mandates). However, other methods of simple electoral number and simple quota were used as well (Russia), Hagenbach-Bischoff's method (Hungary) and Droop-Quota (Lithuania). Since the latter three methods do not imply automatic distribution of all mandates in the first procedure, they were supplemented by the method of the largest remainder according to which mandates were divided in the second distribution procedure.

Besides the stated differences, another factor differentiated segmented models. It is the number of mandates won in majority and proportional elections. Generally speaking, segmented electoral models varied in terms of levelling the majority and proportional principles of representation or in giving priority to one of them. If the majority and proportional principles were made equal, then the same number of mandates was obtained in majority and proportional elections (Bulgaria, Croatia 1992, Russia); if priority was given to the proportional principle, more parliamentary seats resulted from proportional elections (Yugoslavia, Hungary, Croatia 1995); finally, if the majority principle outweighed the proportional principle, more parliamentary seats resulted from majority elections (Albania, Lithuania) (Table 2).

### *Political effects of segmented electoral models*

The structure of segmented electoral models which have been applied in seven stated countries of Eastern Europe provides the basis for some general hypotheses about their impact on the party parliamentary system.

First, the political effect of segmented electoral models on parliamentary party systems is basically majoritarian, which implies that there is a significant disproportion of votes and mandates.

*Table 2:* Relation between mandates in majority (single-mandate constituencies) and proportional elections (multi-mandate constituencies) (\*)

State	Total of mandates	Single-member constituencies	Multi-member constituencies
Albania	140	100	40
Bulgaria	400	200	200
Croatia 1992	120	60	60
Croatia 1995	120	28	92
Yugoslavia	136	58	78
Lithuania	141	71	70
Hungary	386	176	210
Russia	450	225	225

(\*) Number of seats in the lower house of parliament in Croatia, Yugoslavia and Russia

Second, disproportions are created predominantly by the majority electoral systems, with relative majority elections having a stronger impact than absolute majority elections.

Third, disproportions depended directly on the relations of the proportional and majority principles within the segmented electoral model. If the majority principle prevailed, the disproportion was bigger, and if the proportional principle prevailed, the disproportion was smaller.

Fourth, mechanisms which were built in the proportional patterns, particularly the type of the constituency and the level of the electoral threshold, contributed to disproportionate effects. Since all cases involved large constituencies, including national constituencies as well, the impact of this element of the electoral system was significantly reduced. Therefore, the electoral threshold had a stronger impact on electoral results: the higher the threshold the smaller the number of parliamentary parties and the bigger the disproportion of votes and party mandates which managed to reach the set threshold.

In Table 3 election results of the three strongest political parties (parties, coalitions and movements) in parliaments of seven East European countries in which elections were held in accordance with the segmented pattern are shown.

First of all, we should establish — and this is not evident in the Table — that the segmented electoral model in all the studied countries had a significant impact on the reduction of the elective in favor of the parliamentary party system. Only three of the stated parties or coalitions entered the Albanian parliament after the elections, four entered the Bulgarian, five entered the Lithuanian, six entered the Hungarian, seven the Croatian in 1992 and six in 1995, eight the Yugoslavian and nine political parties or coalitions entered the Russian parliament.<sup>6</sup> On the other hand, far more, dozens of political parties, groups and associations participated in the elections but did not manage to reach neither the natural electoral threshold that characterizes majority elections nor the legal threshold that has been built in proportional elections.

The starting hypothesis, according to which segmented electoral models act as majority elections, i.e. result in a high disproportion of votes and seats was only partly confirmed. Majoritarian effects of elections were most strongly pronounced in Yugoslavia, i.e. Serbia, Hungary and Croatia, and much less in Lithuania, Bulgaria and Albania. In countries with the strongest majoritarian effects, overrepresentation referred primarily to the winning parties and it was: in Yugoslavia/Serbia +25.9, in Hungary in 1990 +18.0 and in 1994 +21.1, in Croatia 1992 +16.9 and 1995 +13.9, in Lithuania +6.7, in Bulgaria +5.6 and in Albania +3.4 percent.

The position of the second strongest parties varied from country to country. In Hungary and Albania they were also slightly overrepresented (+3 i.e. +2.1%), in Bulgaria the second party achieved a perfect proportion and in Hungary, Serbia and Lithuania they were slightly underrepresented (about -2%). Croatia in 1992 was an extreme example of underrepresentation of the second strongest party which was as high as -8.3%, but not in the 1995 elections.

On the other hand, Russia as a whole represented a case of its own. The first party was slightly underrepresented (-0.6) and the second was extremely underrepresented (-12.0) and only the third party was overrepresented (+3.1).

<sup>6</sup> The few independent representatives who entered the parliament through majority elections, representatives of ethnic minorities elected according to special election regulations as well as political parties who participated in mandates with less than 2 per cent, have not been taken into account.



*Table 3:* The shares of the three strongest parliamentary parties or coalitions in votes and mandates resulting from segmented electoral models

State/party	% Votes*	% Mandates
<b>Albania</b>		
Democratic Party	62.3	65.7
Socialist Party	25.0	27.1
Socialdemocratic Party	4.3	5.0
<b>Bulgaria</b>		
Bulgarian Socialist Party	47.2	52.8
United Democratic Forces	36.2	36.0
Movement for Rights and Freedoms	6.0	5.7
<b>Croatia**</b>		
Croatian Democratic Union	44.7	61.6
	45.2	59.1
Croatian Social-Liberal Party	17.7	9.4
	11.6	12.5
Croatian Party of Rights	7.1	3.6
Coalition of the Peasant, Popular, Christian-Democratic and Regional parties	18.2	20.0
<b>Yugoslavia/Serbia***</b>		
Socialist Party of Serbia	43.0	68.9
Serbian Radical Party	30.0	28.0
Democratic Unity of Voivodinian Hungarians	3.0	2.0
<b>Lithuania</b>		
Democratic Workers Party	45.1	51.8
Sajudis	21.7	19.9
Christian-democratic Party	12.9	12.8
<b>Hungary****</b>		
Hungarian Democratic Forum	24.7	42.7
	11.7	9.8
Union of Free Democrats	21.4	24.4
	19.7	17.9
Hungarian Socialist Party	10.9	8.5
	33.0	54.1
<b>Russia</b>		
Russian Selection	17.8	17.2
Liberal-democratic Party	26.2	14.2
Peasant Party	9.3	12.4

\* The shares of party lists in votes in proportional elections

\*\* Results of the 1992 elections in Croatia are shown in the first line, and that of the 1995 elections are shown in the second line

\*\*\* Election results for the Parliament of Yugoslavia in Serbia

\*\*\*\* Results of the 1990 elections in Hungary are shown in the first line, and that of the 1994 elections are shown in the second line

According to the political effects resulting from segmented electoral models in seven countries, East European party systems can be divided into two groups:

a) systems in which those models produced effects of majority elections and caused the creation of manufactured majority parties in parliaments (Yugoslavia/Serbia, Hungary and Croatia),

b) systems in which those models basically produced effects of proportional elections and created earned majority parties in parliaments (Albania, Bulgaria, Lithuania). Although an absolute mandate majority of one party was not established in the Russian parliament, Russia belongs to this group due to the proportional effects resulting from the segmented electoral model.

This suprising review raised the following questions: What was, institutionwise, the common denominator of the first, and what of the second group of countries? Which mechanisms of segmented electoral models could have an impact on such political effects?

Considering the group of countries where majoritarian effects were produced, there is hardly any common institutional factor that caused those effects. In Croatia and Yugoslavia segmented electoral models consisted of relative majority and proportional systems, and the Hungarian model consisted of absolute majority and proportional systems. Therefore, the relative majority system was eliminated as a sufficient factor for creating majoritarian effect on the whole. Furthermore, in Hungary, Yugoslavia and Croatia 1995 the proportional principle of representation predominated over the majority principle within the segmented electoral model, while in Croatia 1992 they were of equal significance. The disproportion was not a result of the predomination of the majority over the proportional principle, which was a logical starting hypothesis. Neither the size of constituencies, nor the electoral threshold could have an important role: in Croatia there was only one national constituency with the lowest threshold among all the studied countries and both basically fostered a higher degree of proportional representation; in Yugoslavia there was actually an at-large system on a substate level and a legal threshold which in Serbia, considering the size of the electorate, was not too high; in Hungary there were a few constituencies and one large national constituency with 58 mandates as well as an adequate legal threshold. In brief, in the first group there were no institutional mechanisms within the segmented electoral models which would be common to all the three states. The fact that in this group segmented model with relative majority systems prevailed is indicative.

In the second group of states, where proportional effects were basically achieved, segmented electoral models differed accordingly. In Albania, Bulgaria and Lithuania they consisted of the absolute majority and proportional systems and in Russia of the relative majority and proportional sys-

tems. The majority principle of representation was significantly prevalent in Albania and only slightly prevailing in Lithuania over the proportional principle, and in Bulgaria and Russia they were equally represented. In Albania, Lithuania and Russia proportional elections were held within at-large systems and in Bulgaria they were held in a few plurinominal constituencies. Differences between electoral threshold were not significant. Accordingly, there are no institutional factors in this group which would be common to all the countries. In this example the fact that in segmented models absolute majority systems prevailed and that within proportional election patterns at-large systems prevailed is highly indicative.

### *Electoral results and political polarizations*

Since it is evident that party configurations were not only the result of the institutional factor, it is possible to assume that their creation was influenced by their socio-cultural and cultural-political background. In other words, certain political polarization, the political division of the electorate, which characterizes some countries or groups of countries had an impact on party relations.

1) In most of the analysed countries — particularly in Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Lithuania — the chief political polarization was formed around the axis socialism-antisocialism.<sup>7</sup> The fact that before the collapse of the socialist regime those countries had no tradition of opposition antisocialist movements and groups and the fact that political polarization of advocates and opponents of socialism became more evident prior to the first free elections and completely articulated during the elections, is a common denominator of these countries. Furthermore, in all these countries in the first free elections, the communist or left-wing successor parties won. This led to the "preservation" of cleavages and their repeating in the second elections. However, in Lithuania communists did not win the first elections, but then it was formally not yet an independent state; despite the opposition's victory in the first elections this polarization was obviously "preserved", which was confirmed by its presence in the second election, although with different results. An additional indicator of the "freezing" of this political cleavage is the repeated victory of the successor Socialist Party in the third elections in Bulgaria, in December of 1994.

Such type of political polarization created preconditions for two-party competition in elections and a two-party parliamentary system. In Albania

<sup>7</sup> Researcher of East European party systems, almost with no exceptions note this kind of polarization but they call it differently although the content is equal or very similar: Communism—anticommunism (Roskin), rebolshevism—debolshevization (Markus), the old regime—protransformational regime (Beyme), etc.

there are two main political parties, the Democratic Party and the Socialist Party, which won in proportional elections and not majority elections with about 87 percent of the votes and earned about 93 percent of mandates. In Bulgaria the Socialist Party and the Union of Democratic Forces won together more than 83 percent of votes in proportional elections and earned more than 89 percent of mandates.<sup>8</sup> In Yugoslavia the nature of political polarization was somewhat different and along with Romania it is the only country where the political change did not occur even after three election rounds in Serbia and two rounds in Montenegro and Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, the Socialist Party of Serbia and the Serbian Radical Party together won 73% of votes in Serbia in proportional elections and shared 97% of mandates. In Lithuania the Democratic Labour Party and Sajudis won together about 67% of votes in proportional elections and earned about 72% of mandates. An additional indicator of the domination of the stated type of confrontation is the fact that parties and organizations of ethnic majorities in the respective states emerged as the third strongest political groups: the "Movement for Rights and Freedoms" as the organization of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria and the "Democratic Union of Voivodinian Hungarians" in Serbia; in Albania "Omania", the organization of the Greek minority in Albania, was the third strongest political force in the first elections and in the Lithuanian parliament the "Polish Union" was one of the five relevant factors.

In all these countries two-party parliamentary systems have been established. At the same time, this fact refutes Klaus von Beyme's assumptions that the establishment of two-party system in Eastern Europe is impossible because there are no basic prerequisites for this: majority electoral systems and articulated divisions (1994, 313 id.). Political polarization around the axis socialism — antisocialism, which also included other subpolarization dimensions was so pronounced that in proportional elections it produced a large concentration of votes around two main political forces, which is otherwise typical of majority elections, and two-party competition and a two-party system.

(2) In the second group of countries (Hungary, Croatia and Russia) political polarization socialism — antisocialism did not predominate in the studied elections, but due to different reasons.

In Hungary basic tripolar polarization was created in the first elections and it remained in the second, but with changed relations and results. In the first elections the political cleavage socialism — antisocialism was not central as it was in some countries (particularly Poland and Hungary) that had had a long tradition of opposition and confrontation with the socialist regime before its fall. Since this conflict was "consumed" prior to the

<sup>8</sup> Such parliamentary party relations were not frozen, which can be best illustrated by the Bulgarian example, where processes of fragmentation of parliamentary parties and coalitions were strongly pronounced (Brahm, 1994, 12).

elections, the main polarization line ran through non-communist political forces (Körösenyi, 1993, 88). A large majority of the votes was divided between ideologically and politically divergent non-communist forces (Kitschelt, 1992, 34). In the second elections, the polarization axis socialism — antisocialism "returned" into political life, but the polarization axis, which had dominated in the first elections, did not vanish. So, the majority of votes in Hungary was divided among three to four political parties and unions. Such polarization of the electorate does not allow for the creation of a two-party system and it leads towards the development of moderate party pluralism.

In her second elections Croatia was left without the main polarization axis, which had been characteristic of the first elections, but new cleavages between political forces were not established. The polarization axis socialism — antisocialism, whose important component was the dimension of Yugoslav-Croatian national feelings, completely disappeared after the first elections due to the known reasons (aggression, war, disintegration of the Yugoslav state, and Croatian newly acquired statehood). The Croatian Democratic Union, which won the first elections in 1990 with the project of national-state independence, remained, figuratively speaking, isolated on the political stage (Kasapović, 1994, 182). This was dramatically expressed in majority elections in which it won 90 percent of mandates, and the second strongest party won 1.75 percent or 1 out of 60 seats, which was the main reason for its clear underrepresentation. Proportional elections somewhat "levelled" the political stage but they could not completely neutralize the results of majority elections.

In Russia elections were held too late for the cleavage socialism — antisocialism to have the expected significance. There was no clear polarization of political forces around the axis reform — counterreform and it did not dominate the elections because some political parties, blocs, movements and unions which were not definitely in favor of one orientation found themselves between the two extremes. This led to the segmentation of parties in Russia and nine political protagonists with opaque and changeable interrelations entered the parliament with no clear majority and minority. Such a situation was further complicated by the fact that out of nine protagonists there were four to five loose coalitions and blocs as well as almost 10 percent of independent members of parliament. This will, definitely, lead to the creation of numerous fractions and ad hoc unions and majorities, which will not have a positive impact on the structuring of the Russian party system.

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