

Mapping Security Cooperation in the Pacific Islands

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Introduction

In the 2018 [Boe Declaration on Regional Security](#), Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) leaders recognised that the Pacific Islands region is facing ‘an increasingly complex regional security environment driven by multifaceted security challenges’. This raises the question of how Pacific Island states and territories¹ will respond to these wide-ranging, but frequently interconnected, challenges, including what role regional security cooperation can play. As in other regions, Pacific Island states have recognised through multiple security declarations that security cooperation can help them address the increasingly transnational and globalised nature of threats — such as pandemic diseases, climate change and transnational crime — that are difficult for states to respond to individually. These declarations reflect a broadening understanding of ‘security’ that has occurred globally, particularly in the past decade, with security challenges no longer narrowly defined as primarily military matters, but now cover a wide range of multidimensional and transnational issues.

The purpose of this paper is to identify and map the various cooperative security agreements, arrangements and institutions between and among states and territories in the Pacific Islands region, and their partners. This will aid our ongoing analysis of overlaps and gaps and inform our subsequent proposals on how security cooperation could be best orientated to address current and future regional security challenges.²

Regional entities in the Pacific are themselves diverse, ranging from the comparably populous Papua New Guinea (PNG), with 8.7 million people, to Niue, with 1400 people, and spanning large islands and small archipelagos. They also have differing political systems and levels of economic development. Pacific Island states and territories also span a range of different statuses, from sovereign states through to colonial entities, as well as differing constitutional relationships with metropolitan states and diverse international relationships.

Security cooperation frequently involves the weaving together of state, bilateral and multilateral initiatives. Multilateral cooperation includes formal institutions and other processes, meetings and dialogues at which state officials primarily discuss security concerns. Some of the latter may be ongoing, while others may be formed in response to a specific crisis or event. It should be noted that no formal, region-wide collective security agreement exists in the Pacific. Rather, security cooperation in the Pacific Islands is a patchwork of agreements, arrangements and activities between Pacific Island states and territories and their security partners³ that reflects differing priorities and geopolitical dynamics. In this regard, the resource constraints that most Pacific Island states experience mean that partners are active participants in security cooperation. The roles and focuses of these partners vary tremendously, as do their policy commitments, and the impact and effectiveness thereof.

We have adopted a definition of security cooperation as ‘common action between two or more states to advance a common security goal’ (Bisley 2012:23). We focus on state interactions for analytical simplicity and due to the confines of space; this should not be read as implying that the many intrastate local and community security initiatives and mechanisms practiced in the region are unimportant.

This paper begins by identifying the major regional organisations and partners involved in security cooperation in the Pacific Islands. It is then structured around what our mapping has identified as the major security challenges that are dealt with cooperatively: maritime security, environmental and resource security, humanitarian and disaster relief (HADR), transnational crime and cybersecurity. These challenges are mirrored in the Boe Declaration. We conclude by identifying the questions our mapping has raised to be addressed in our ongoing research.

Abbreviations

AFP – Australian Federal Police
 APG – Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering
 CERT – Computer Emergency Response Team
 CNMI – Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
 CROP – Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific
 EEZ – Exclusive Economic Zone
 EU – European Union
 FAO – United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation
 FFA – Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Association
 FIU – Financial Intelligence Unit
 FLNKS - Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste
 FOC – Pacific Islands Forum Officials Committee
 FSM – Federated States of Micronesia
 FSRS – Pacific Islands Forum Subcommittee on Regional Security
 GCF – Green Climate Fund
 HADR – Humanitarian and disaster relief
 IUU – Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing
 ITU – International Telecommunications Union
 MSG – Melanesian Spearhead Group
 NDC - Nationally Determined Contributions to reduce carbon emissions
 NZDF – New Zealand Defence Force
 OCO – Oceania Customs Organisation
 PaSCON – Pacific Cyber Security Operational Network
 PASO – Pacific Aviation Safety Office
 PICP – Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police
 PIDC – Pacific Immigration Development Community
 PIDF – Pacific Islands Development Forum
 PIF - Pacific Islands Forum
 PILON – Pacific Islands Law Officers’ Network
 PLG – Polynesian Leaders Group
 PMSP – Pacific Maritime Security Program
 PNA – Parties to the Nauru Agreement
 PNG – Papua New Guinea
 PSIDS – Pacific Small Island Developing States
 PTCCC - Pacific Transnational Crime Coordination Centre
 PTCN – Pacific Transnational Crime Network
 RAMSI – Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands
 RMI – Republic of the Marshall Islands

SIDS – Small Island Developing States
 SIDS SAMOA – SIDS Accelerated Modalities of Action Pathway
 SPC – Pacific Community
 SPREP – Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme
 TCU – Transnational Crime Unit
 UK – United Kingdom
 UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
 UNFCCC – United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
 US – United States

Regional security actors

Pacific Islands Forum

The most significant regional organisation focused on politics and security is the **PIF**. The PIF was established in 1971 and now has 18 members⁴ (although this may change if the PIF’s five Micronesian members proceed with their expressed intent to withdraw), plus Tokelau as an associate member. The majority of funding for the PIF Secretariat and its activities has traditionally come from Australia and New Zealand, which are members, but a 2018 agreement to realign the funding model means that from 2021, 51 per cent of funding will come from island member states in order to dilute the influence Australia and New Zealand were perceived to gain over the Secretariat from their funding.

In 2019, the PIF established a **Forum Officials Subcommittee on Regional Security (FSRS)**, which was a reinvention of the Forum Regional Security Committee that operated until 2015. As the name implies, the FSRS is subordinate to the region’s premier officials-level coordinating mechanism, the Forum Officials Committee (FOC). It consists of officials and practitioners and is mandated to ‘develop a Pacific Security Dialogue through the FSRS in order to provide a more inclusive space for regional security discussions’ (PIF 2019a:5). The FSRS is intended to meet regularly to discuss the security issues facing the region; coordinate and monitor the implementation of all PIF security declarations and commitments; prioritise regional security issues and formulate actions to manage the regional security environment; and keep the FOC apprised of regional security issues and initiatives (PIF 2019b).

Regional technical bodies working on security

issues are also allowed to attend the FSRs, including many **Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific** (CROP) agencies and the regional law enforcement bodies, such as the **Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police** (PICP), **Oceania Customs Organisation** (OCO), **Pacific Immigration Development Community** (PIDC), **Pacific Islands Law Officers' Network** (PILON) and relevant international agencies as required. The CROP, which is chaired by the PIF Secretary General, provides high-level policy advice to, and coordinates action between, the executives

of regional organisations. The CROP consists of the **Pacific Community** (SPC), **Forum Fisheries Agency** (FFA), University of the South Pacific, Pacific Islands Development Program, **Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme** (SPREP), South Pacific Tourism Organisation, Pacific Power Association and the **Pacific Aviation Safety Office** (PASO).

Annual PIF leaders' meetings have also addressed security concerns and led to a number of declarations relating to security in the region, as outlined in Table 1.

Table 1. Pacific Islands Forum declarations relating to security

Declaration	Security issues addressed
Honiara Declaration (1992)	Transnational crime Law enforcement cooperation
Aitutaki Declaration (1997)	Enhanced security cooperation Widened regional security agenda to include threats from natural disasters, environmental damage, economic, social and environmental policies and external threats to state sovereignty
Biketawa Declaration (2000)	'Good governance' and the rule of law Acknowledged the principle of 'non-interference in the domestic affairs of another member state' Asserted that in a 'time of crisis or in response to members' request for assistance, for action to be taken on the basis of all members of the forum being part of the Pacific Islands extended family'
Nasonini Declaration (2002)	International counterterrorism measures
Auckland Declaration (2004)	Greater regional cooperation on security issues
Niue Declaration (2008)	'Growing threat posed by climate change to the economic, social, cultural and environmental well-being and security of Pacific Island countries'
Waiheke Declaration (2011)	Sustainable economic development and enhanced regional cooperation and integration
Rarotonga Declaration (2012)	Gender equality
Majuro Declaration (2013)	Committed forum members to 'demonstrate climate leadership'
Palau Declaration (2014)	Ocean sustainability
Port Moresby Declaration (2015)	The threat 'posed by climate change to the economic, social, environmental and cultural well-being and security' of the region
Boe Declaration (2018)	'Expanded concept of security inclusive of human security, humanitarian assistance, prioritising environmental security, and regional cooperation in building resilience to disasters and climate change, including through regional cooperation and support' Under the Boe Declaration Action Plan, PIF member states are encouraged to develop national security strategies that are expected to create an 'overarching framework that outlines the nation's strategic context, identifies security challenges and opportunities, articulates the nation's vision and agenda, sets priorities for coming years, and sets in motion reforms to strengthen the national security community' (George 2021:12). Samoa, Vanuatu and Solomon Islands have launched national security strategies in the past two years. ⁵ More are due in 2021 from Tonga and the Cook Islands, which are expected to shape further the regional security agenda through national prioritisation (Keen 2021).
Kainaki II Declaration (2019)	Urgent climate change action

Source: compiled by the authors.

Since 2000, the Biketawa Declaration has provided the framework for regional crisis management and has been endorsed by all members of the PIF. Most significantly, it was invoked to support the **Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands** (RAMSI) (2003–13) that responded to escalating instability in Solomon Islands in 2003. RAMSI was made up of police personnel from the Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Fiji, Kiribati, Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), Nauru, Niue, Palau, PNG, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Australia and New Zealand, military personnel from Australia, New Zealand PNG, Fiji and Tonga, and civilian personnel from Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Tonga and PNG. The **Pacific Regional Assistance to Nauru** initiative (2005–10) that responded to a deterioration in governance in Nauru was also authorised under the Biketawa Declaration.

Pacific Community

The **Pacific Community** (SPC) is the principal scientific and technical institution in the region. It plays a key role in the management of, and promoting cooperation in, the fields of human and resource security in the Pacific Islands. It has a wider membership than the PIF,⁶ as seen in our [interactive map](#) of regional organisation membership.

Pacific Islands Development Forum

The **Pacific Islands Development Forum** (PIDF) was formed in 2013 after Fiji was suspended from the PIF in 2009. The PIDF sits adjacent to the existing regional CROP architecture. Membership includes Fiji, FSM, Kiribati, Nauru, RMI, Palau, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Timor-Leste. Although Fiji has since resumed active membership of the PIF, the PIDF has continued.

Subregional groupings

Pacific Island states have also developed subregional groupings. The **Melanesian Spearhead Group** (MSG), which includes Fiji, PNG, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS),⁷ is the most established, having been formed in 1988 and with a secretariat located in Vanuatu, the construction of which was funded by China.

The **Polynesian Leaders Group** (PLG) was established in 2011 and includes Samoa, Tonga, French Polynesia, American Samoa, Cook Islands, Tokelau, Niue

and Tuvalu. It has also hosted Māori delegations from New Zealand, as the organisation is open to Polynesian societies rather than nations. Unlike the MSG, the PLG maintains a working relationship with the PIF and holds its meetings on the margins of PIF fora.

The **Micronesian President's Summit** was established in 2001 and involves leaders of Palau, Kiribati, Nauru, RMI and FSM meeting annually to discuss issues of 'Micronesian solidarity'. A similar **Micronesian Chief Executives Summit** was initiated in 2003 and includes the presidents of Palau, FSM and RMI, as well as governors from the US territories of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Guam and the FSM states of Chuuk, Kosrae, Pohnpei and Yap.

Of all the established subregional political organisations, the MSG has demonstrated the broadest ambition to develop a role in the area of security cooperation, although to date this ambition has yet to be realised in a significant way.

Major regional partners

Partners have many reasons for engaging with the Pacific region, ranging from colonial legacy to geographical proximity and geopolitical interests. However, it is notable that interest in the Pacific Islands has increased over the past decade.

Australia — 'Pacific Step-Up'

Australia is the largest donor to the Pacific Islands region (Lowy Institute 2020). Its most recent policy, a 'Pacific Step-Up', was announced in 2017 and is coordinated by a specially created inter-agency Office of the Pacific (within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade). The step-up includes increased opportunities for labour mobility and infrastructure investment, and a commitment to have a diplomatic presence in all PIF member states. The step-up has also included the creation of the **Pacific Fusion Centre**, to be located in Port Vila, Vanuatu, to provide strategic assessments and analysis of open-source material to Pacific Islands senior leadership, policymakers and senior security officials on Boe Declaration themes, and the **Australia Pacific Security College**, an educational institution intended to strengthen regional security through collaborative learning and enhanced people-to-people links.

The step-up provided that a specific Pacific unit of the **Australian Defence Mobile Training Team**

would be created to help facilitate capacity building in the region. Australia already has a network of defence attachés located in Vanuatu (working with the Vanuatu Mobile Force, a paramilitary branch of the police), Tonga, Solomon Islands, PNG, Fiji and Hawai'i, as well as its longstanding **Defence Cooperation Program**, which has projects and personnel in many Pacific Island states.

Australia has a bilateral security treaty with Solomon Islands that enables the rapid deployment of troops and assistance (including by third states), one with Vanuatu that enables additional support for the Vanuatu police, and a memorandum of understanding on security cooperation with Nauru. In addition, the Fiji–Australia Vuvale Partnership⁸ is intended to encourage cooperation in a range of areas, including security. In 2020, Australia agreed to a Comprehensive Strategic and Economic Partnership with PNG. This built on the 1987 Joint Declaration of Principles, under which the two governments undertook to ‘consult, at the request of either, about matters affecting their common security interests’.

Australia is a full member of the PIF.


New Zealand — ‘Pacific Reset’

Launched in 2018, New Zealand’s ‘Pacific Reset’ seeks to re-orient New Zealand as a Pacific nation and deepen its regional involvement across diplomatic spheres, defence engagement, policing and economic development. In addition to diaspora and people-to-people links, the initiative also builds on New Zealand’s long-standing labour mobility program with the region. The reset also includes 10 new diplomatic positions in the region and four to promote Pacific policy globally.

Niue, Cook Islands and Tokelau are part of the Realm of New Zealand. New Zealand has a Treaty of Friendship (1962) with Samoa, including a 2019 Statement of Partnership on security cooperation. The New Zealand Defence Force’s (NZDF) **Mutual Assistance Programme** includes eight technical advisors in Pacific states, including Tonga, Fiji and PNG, and a civilian focus on leadership and professional development. The NZDF is seeking to enhance its cooperation in the region under its **Vaka Tahī Pacific Partnership Model**.

New Zealand is a full member of the PIF.

Figure 1. Pacific constitutional relationships



Source: designed in partnership with Karina Pelling, CartoGIS ANU.

United States (US) — ‘Pacific Pledge’

The US’ 2019 Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy included a ‘Pacific Pledge’ to increase its involvement in the region, particularly through development assistance. The US has territories in the region (Guam, CNMI and American Samoa), and the independent states of FSM, RMI and Palau maintain Compacts of Free Association with the US (granting access to live and work in the US and aid support in return for American oversight of their security and defence interests). The funding elements of the compact agreements are due to expire for FSM and RMI in 2023 and Palau in 2024. The US also has military bases in the region, including Anderson Air Force Base on Guam and the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defence test site on Kwajalein Atoll. The **US Indo-Pacific Command** is located in Hawai’i and provides strategic and operational direction to the US Pacific Fleet, US Pacific Air Forces, US Army Pacific and US Marine Corps Forces, Pacific (approximately 375,000 personnel).

The US is a dialogue partner of the PIF.

France — ‘Une stratégie Indo-Pacifique’

France sees the Pacific Islands as key to its ‘*Une stratégie Indo-Pacifique*’, under which it seeks to create ‘a security continuum which extends from Djibouti to French Polynesia’ (Guitton 2019). France has three territories in the region, New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna. France has hosted periodic Oceania Summit meetings;⁹ the most recent in 2020 focused on the legacy of French nuclear weapons testing.

France is a dialogue partner of the PIF, but its engagement was boosted in 2016 when New Caledonia and French Polynesia became full members.

Japan — ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’

Japan sees the region as part of its ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ strategy, although its interests are more squarely focused on the South China Sea and Southeast Asia. Japan has a significant and long-standing development assistance program to the region, although it is not seen as a significant security partner. Japan has hosted the Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting every three years since 1997.

Japan is a dialogue partner of the PIF.

China

China has diplomatic relations with 10 Pacific states (Cook Islands, FSM, Fiji, Kiribati, PNG, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu). China has extensive development assistance and lending programs in the region, including through its Belt and Road Initiative, and Chinese state-owned enterprises are engaged in the commercial sector. Chinese military and security cooperation in the Pacific has concentrated on the PNG, Tongan and Fijian militaries (the only Pacific states with military capabilities), as well as Vanuatu’s mobile police force, including through renovating infrastructure, port visits, training, grants and officer exchanges. China also funds the annual China–Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum; the most recent was held in Samoa in 2019.

China is a dialogue partner of the PIF.

Taiwan

Taiwan has diplomatic relations with Tuvalu, Nauru, RMI and Palau. Taiwan provides development assistance, technical assistance and support for small-scale infrastructure projects.

Taiwan is a dialogue partner of the PIF. The PIF Post-Forum Dialogue Partners’ Meeting is one of the very few international fora that both Taiwan and China attend, although Taiwan meets with its partners at separate venues.

Indonesia — ‘Pacific Elevation’

Indonesia presents itself as part of the region by virtue of five provinces it characterises as Melanesian (Papua, West Papua, Maluku, North Maluku and East Nusa Tenggara) (see May 2020:12). In 2019, it convened an Indonesia South Pacific Forum in Jakarta and subsequently announced a ‘Pacific Elevation’ strategy intended to enhance economic engagement, promote greater cooperation on common concerns such as climate change and respond to the changing geostrategic environment.

Indonesia is a dialogue partner of the PIF.

United Kingdom (UK) — ‘Pacific Uplift’

Since 2018 the UK has been engaged in a ‘Pacific Uplift’ strategy, which has included re-establishing diplomatic missions in Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu that were closed down earlier in the century and doubling the size of its diplomatic presence in Fiji. The UK retains

Pitcairn Island as a territory in the Pacific.

The UK is a dialogue partner of the PIF.

India — ‘Act East’

India adopted an ‘Act East’ policy in 2014 that has included a greater strategic focus on the Pacific Islands, although there have been few tangible outcomes to date. India established the Forum for India–Pacific Islands Cooperation, which met in 2014 in Fiji and in 2015 in India.

India is a dialogue partner of the PIF.

Other PIF dialogue partners

Canada, Cuba, the European Union (EU), Germany, Italy, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Spain, Thailand and Turkey are also PIF dialogue partners.

Development assistance

Bilateral and multilateral development assistance programs play a major role in addressing the full spectrum of security challenges in the Pacific. These range — as much of the following discussion will illustrate — from ‘hard’ security programs (building the capacity of

police forces) to environmental and resource security (for example, disaster response and fisheries) to human security (health and biosecurity) and everything in between. As one Pacific Islands scholar has observed, the ‘development and the security agendas are the flip sides of the same coin, and the outcome of one is reliant on the other’ (Koro 2021). It is estimated that from 2010 to 2018, bilateral donors and multilateral institutions spent US\$20.44bn in aid in the region (Lowy Institute 2020).¹⁰

Maritime security

Fisheries are the most important maritime security issue for the Pacific Islands, as they provide a significant source of government revenue, employment, nutrition and economic development. The Pacific Ocean is the largest tuna fishery in the world, and tuna from the western and central Pacific Ocean has a market value of US\$6.01bn (Williams and Reid 2019). For many Pacific Island states, fisheries revenue contributes over 50 per cent of their gross domestic product (Connell and Lowitt 2019). It should not come as a surprise, therefore, that there is a long history of regional cooperation in this

Figure 2. State-based donor aid to the Pacific 2010–18



Source: compiled by the authors from figures in Lowy Institute 2020.

Figure 3. International organisation donor aid to the Pacific 2010–2018



Source: compiled by the authors from figures in Lowy Institute 2020.

sector, and relations between Pacific Island countries and security partners are deep and well-established.

Seventeen Pacific states¹¹ are members of the **Forum Fisheries Agency** (FFA), based in Solomon Islands. The FFA provides policy and regulatory support for fisheries management in the region and coordinates an Australian-funded aerial and satellite surveillance centre to monitor fisheries compliance and detect illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. The **Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission**¹² has responsibility for managing migratory fish stocks (such as tuna) and is based in FSM. The **South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation**¹³ is responsible for the management of non-migratory fish species (such as orange roughy and jack mackerel). It only includes two Pacific states (Vanuatu and Cook Islands), but is headquartered in New Zealand.

The **Parties to the Nauru Agreement** (PNA)¹⁴ is the only legally binding regional agreement regarding fisheries management in the Pacific. The parties (and Tokelau) follow the Vessel Day Scheme, which limits the number of days each party can have active fishing boats. The alternative **Te Vaka Moana Group**¹⁵ advocates limits on the quantity of fish caught (rather than days fishing). It is said to have developed to 'cushion the growing influence of the [PNA]', but, alongside the **MSG Fisheries Committee**, has limited influence (Aqorau 2015:225, 2020).

Pacific Island states' efforts to improve maritime security receive considerable support from partners. Most significantly, under its **Pacific Maritime Security Program** (PMSP), Australia is providing (and sustaining) Guardian-class patrol boats to PNG, Fiji, FSM, Tonga, Solomon Islands, Cook Islands, Kiribati, RMI, Palau, Samoa, Tuvalu and Vanuatu to help them police their extensive exclusive economic zones (EEZs), primarily for IUU fishing. These boats are replacing those provided under the program's precursor, the Pacific Patrol Boat Program. The PMSP is the largest single component of Australia's defence cooperation program in the Pacific Islands region. Under the auspices of the PMSP, Australia is also redeveloping the Lombrum Naval Base on Manus Island in PNG. It was announced this would occur in cooperation with the US; however, this does not appear to have occurred. The PMSP is an AU\$2bn commitment over 30 years and includes aerial surveillance of EEZs coordinated by the FFA

for up to 365 days per year (DoD 2018). The NZDF complements the work of patrol boats in Fiji through Operation Wasawasa. The Australian Defence Force also complements the PMSP with efforts such as Operation Solania, which deploys ships and aircraft for regional fisheries surveillance efforts (DoD 2021). Similarly, the **Royal New Zealand Navy** monitors EEZs for IUU fishing alongside compliance officers from Pacific Island states under Operation Calypso (MPI 2013). The U.S. Coast Guard also has a presence in the region, supporting US territories such as CNMI and American Samoa. The US helps Pacific Island states manage fisheries compliance through **Shiprider Agreements** that allow law enforcement officers from participating Pacific Island states¹⁶ to embark on U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Navy vessels to observe, board and search vessels suspected of violating laws or regulations within their EEZs or on the high seas. Partner states also support annual FFA exercises (FFA 2008).

Australia, New Zealand, France and the US also cooperate as the **Quadrilateral Defence Coordination Group** to conduct regional surveillance operations on IUU fishing, support the work of the FFA and combat transnational crime maritime interdictions, as will be discussed shortly.

Environmental and resource security

Beyond fisheries, Pacific Island states face a number of environmental and resource security challenges, most notably from climate-related change and relating to the sustainability of natural resources.

At the regional level, a number of relevant bodies are focused on scientific and policy support. The PIF hosts the **Office of the Pacific Ocean Commissioner**, which advocates on behalf of the region on ocean issues in collaboration with CROP agencies. SPC manages the **Centre for Pacific Crops and Trees**, the **Pacific Community Centre of Ocean Science** (funded by New Zealand) and a fisheries laboratory, providing scientific expertise to strengthen policy and advocacy measures.

The **Secretariat for the Pacific Regional Environment Programme** (SPREP), a CROP agency, is the most inclusive of all regional organisations.¹⁷ SPREP is based in Samoa and provides scientific and policy support for protecting and managing the environment and natural resources within the Pacific. SPREP is the secretariat for the [Noumea Convention](#)

(1986), which aims to protect, manage and develop the marine and coastal environments of the Pacific Islands. Its projects are wide-ranging, from waste management to biodiversity losses in terrestrial and marine flora and fauna to coral bleaching and erosion. SPREP is also responsible for climate change policy and information and funding distribution for projects related to climate change mitigation and adaptation. SPC manages the **Regional Pacific Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) Hub**, which helps members determine their Paris Agreement climate targets — RMI, Fiji, PNG and Tonga have all submitted their NDCs to the **United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)**.

Regional groupings have evolved to negotiate climate issues on the global stage. The most prominent is the **Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS)**, which was established after the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. Since 2010, the PSIDS have been active in global climate negotiations. The PIF highlighted PSIDS' role in 2013 with the [Majuro Declaration on Climate Leadership](#).

Individual Pacific Island states have also taken leadership roles on climate issues in the global arena. Samoa hosted the UN's **Third International Conference on Small Island Developing States (SIDS)** in 2014, which promoted global partnerships for sustainable development, including on the issue of climate change through the [SIDS Accelerated Modalities of Action \(S.A.M.O.A.\) Pathway](#). This pathway influences how international organisations prioritise their work; for example, the **Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO)** has undertaken programming based on the Samoa Pathway (FAO 2018). The **World Bank** has mobilised US\$140m towards climate change mitigation and adaptation initiatives in the Pacific region, which range from coastal infrastructure in Samoa to climate-resilient agricultural development in Vanuatu (World Bank 2013). The UNFCCC undertakes specific climate-related projects in the Pacific, as does the **Green Climate Fund (GCF)**, to which many partners contribute (although not Australia or the US). In 2020, 14 Pacific Island states had projects funded by the GCF, to which SPREP is an accredited entity; it develops and implements climate projects on behalf of the GCF (SPREP 2020). The **Commonwealth Finance Access Hub** helps states within the Commonwealth access funding for

climate-related projects and expertise to build local capacity. The [Commonwealth Blue Charter](#) supports states to take action on climate change and ocean pollution; Fiji and Vanuatu have taken leadership roles. Pacific Island states are also taking a leadership role in the [United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea](#) to develop international law in response to the challenges posed by climate change.

Further, Pacific Island states are advocating to take action to address climate change as part of international coalitions, including the **Alliance of Small Island States**,¹⁸ the **Cartagena Dialogue**,¹⁹ the **G77**,²⁰ the **Climate Vulnerable Forum**,²¹ the **REEEP**²² and **MRV International Partnership**.²³ The **International Union for Conservation of Nature and the Coalition of Atoll Nations on Climate Change** are also important voices in the climate change and environmental negotiations in which Pacific Island states participate (Carter 2015).

Key bilateral partners in supporting climate change adaptation and environmental preservation in the Pacific Islands are Australia, New Zealand, the EU and France, followed by Japan and the US. India and China have so far made only modest efforts in this field.

Humanitarian and disaster relief (HADR)

The Pacific Islands are vulnerable to natural disasters and there is evidence that such events may increase with climate change. Yet despite an escalating number of natural disasters, the Pacific has no regional HADR function. In 2013, the MSG established the **Humanitarian and Emergency Response Coordination Centre** within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the MSG Secretariat in Vanuatu, focused on coordinating responses to disasters in the region (MSG 2013). It appears this centre has never functioned. Instead, HADR tends to be conducted primarily by partners in cooperation with affected states, as illustrated in Annex 1. Indeed, alongside Australia's PMSP, HADR is one of the most visible ways military forces from partner countries engage with Pacific Island countries.

France, Australia and New Zealand have coordinated their HADR responses in the Pacific Islands under the FRANZ Arrangement since 1992. Partners also conduct joint humanitarian exercises in the region regularly, including the annual US-led **Pacific Partnership** mission, which also includes NGOs and humanitarian agencies.

The lack of a regional HADR function is partly explainable by the fact that there are only three Pacific military forces: the Republic of Fiji Military Forces, His Majesty's Armed Forces of Tonga and the PNG Defence Force. In addition, the Vanuatu Mobile Force is a paramilitary force that supports the police. To date, none of these organisations has had the resources (whether financial or personnel) to undertake significant HADR cooperation beyond their national borders without external support. That is not to say, however, that the aspiration for mutual cooperation does not exist: in 2013, for instance, PNG and Fiji agreed to engage in closer military collaboration under a defence cooperation agreement, initially involving Fijian personnel providing training assistance to the PNG Defence Force (ABC 9/5/2013; Belden 5/7/2013). Fijian forces are trained at **Blackrock Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Camp**, which Australia is upgrading with a view to transform it into a regional hub for police and peacekeeping training and pre-deployment preparation (DoD 2019). In 2015, with the assistance of New Zealand, Fijian soldiers deployed to assist with Cyclone Pam rehabilitation in Vanuatu. Tonga's armed forces also provided emergency response support to Vanuatu following Cyclone Pam and to Fiji following Cyclone Winston in 2016.

There are, however, ongoing discussions under the auspices of the **Pacific Islands Emergency Management Alliance** project (supported by Australia and New Zealand, with SPC) to develop a Regional Strategic Emergency Management Roadmap.

The **South Pacific Defence Ministers' Meeting** sees defence ministers from Australia, New Zealand, France, Fiji, PNG, Chile and Tonga meeting annually (biennially until 2020) to discuss defence and security cooperation in the region, ranging from policy to HADR (Reynolds 2020). In 2015, the group agreed to a cooperative exercise framework named POVAI ENDEAVOUR that provides a coordinating mechanism for HADR-related exercises in the region, as well as maritime security, stabilisation operations and peacekeeping (Andrews 2015).

There has recently been a significant focus on disaster resilience. In 2016, the Pacific region adopted a [Framework for Resilience Development in the Pacific](#) (SPC 2016:2) that seeks to provide strategic guidance and integrated approaches to 'enhance resilience to climate change and disasters in ways that contribute

to and are embedded in sustainable development'. It is expected that a HADR concept paper will be presented at the 2021 **South Pacific Defence Ministers' Meeting**. In addition, the FSRS is tasked with developing a regional mechanism for HADR response (PIF 2020).

The US has committed US\$10m towards disaster resilience initiatives and hosts the **Pacific Tsunami Warning Center** in Hawai'i that alerts Pacific states to threats. Australia assists the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center and hosts the **Australian Tsunami Warning System**, which provides an early warning system to Australia and facilitates tsunami warnings for the Pacific Islands (BoM 2016). Japan has developed a tsunami early warning system for Tonga.

Transnational crime and border management

The most common transnational crimes in the region are drug trafficking, human trafficking, small arms trafficking, money laundering and environmental crimes, such as the illegal trade in endangered species, IUU fishing and logging. Regional cooperation is well developed in this field.

To address transnational crime and other border management challenges, the **Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police** (PICP), the **Oceania Customs Organisation** (OCO) and the **Pacific Immigration Development Community** (PIDC) work closely together as part of a 2018 Declaration of Partnership. That declaration recognises the 'urgent need for border control agencies to collaborate and meet in regional and national security forums to promote cooperation and general understanding of security issues in the Pacific' (PIDC 2019).

The Australian-led **Joint Heads of Pacific Security** was established in 2019, bringing together 14 nations' heads of immigration, customs, policing and defence agencies to discuss shared security concerns and approaches.²⁴ The **Southwest Pacific Heads of Maritime Forces**²⁵ have met annually since 2017 to link security agencies with navies in the spirit of 'friendship and kinship' (Radio New Zealand 16/8/2019). The agenda is wide-ranging, covering transnational crime, safety challenges and climate change.

To facilitate the ability of Pacific Island states to build and maintain legislative frameworks to regulate criminal behaviour, the **Pacific Islands Law Officers' Network** (PILON) shares current legislative challenges and initiatives across the region. The PIF also has officers who assist individual members of this network with

drafting appropriate legislation to secure criminal prosecutions. Australia and New Zealand have also funded the **Pacific Judicial Development Programme** to support courts and judges to strengthen the judicial systems in Cook Islands, FSM, Kiribati, RMI, Nauru, Niue, Palau, PNG, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Australia and New Zealand remain the key providers of law and justice assistance across the region.

To investigate and combat transnational crime, there are 28 **transnational crime units** (TCUs) spread across Pacific Island states and territories. The TCUs share intelligence and investigation information, particularly if there is an issue that crosses state borders. Some states, such as Kiribati, have multiple TCUs, due to the geographical (and temporal) distance between islands, such as Tarawa and Kiritimati. Australia and New Zealand also have newly established TCUs to facilitate regional intelligence sharing; New Zealand's multiagency TCU has an advisor specifically for capacity building Pacific TCUs.

TCUs are part of the **Pacific Transnational Crime Network** (PTCN), which is one of the seven networks²⁶ of the PICP²⁷ located in New Zealand. The PTCN's physical centre, the **Pacific Transnational Crime Coordination Centre** (PTCCC), is based in Samoa. It is headed by a Pacific national and made up of Australian and New Zealand policing advisors, as well as seconded Pacific law enforcement staff (from police, customs and immigration agencies). The PTCCC collates intelligence from states and international partners to analyse regional trends, create connections between states for joint investigations and provide support if required. The PTCCC has close connections with law enforcement organisations that also have intelligence networks for information sharing, including the **PIDC**, comprising 20 Pacific heads of immigration agencies, based in Samoa²⁸ and the **OCO**, comprising 23 heads of customs agencies, based in Fiji.²⁹ All three transnational crime organisations are funded mostly by Australia and New Zealand, with some state contributions. The Pacific Aviation Safety Organisation (PASO) comprises 10 Pacific states³⁰ that are signatories to the **Pacific Islands Civil Aviation Safety and Security Treaty**. It is the only anti-transnational crime related organisation that is a CROP member, and is based in Vanuatu, focusing on training in compliance and safety for airport officials.

The regional TCU model is emulated by **financial**

intelligence units (FIUs) around the region that provide research and analysis on money laundering and other financial crimes. The FIUs are similarly networked via the **Association of Pacific Island FIUs**, within the **Asia/Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering** based in Bangkok. The **Egmont Group** is an international organisation combatting money laundering with a similar Asia–Pacific grouping of 28 FIUs, including Pacific FIUs, and is closely associated with the APG.

The placement of **Australian Federal Police** and **New Zealand Police** advisors in many Pacific Island states both underpins the regional networks previously described and supports those countries' extensive bilateral capacity-building programs in the region. Australians are located in PNG, Fiji, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, while New Zealand has advisors in Solomon Islands, Pitcairn Island, PNG, Fiji (roaming) and Tonga. From time to time, Australia and New Zealand also support the creation of ad hoc groups to address specific criminal security challenges. An example is the **Transnational, Serious and Organised Crime Pacific Taskforce**, which was launched in 2019 by Australia, New Zealand, Tonga and Fiji to 'investigate and disrupt organised crime groups operating in the area, target groups using small craft to move illicit drugs through the region, share operational intelligence, and strengthen cooperation to conduct expanded and complex investigations' (AFP 2019).

Organisations such as **Interpol**, the **International Organization for Migration** and the **United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime** provide intelligence and regional assessments of transnational crime threats to the region, and often attend regional border security conferences. They also provide training in international frameworks and complex areas, such as people smuggling. In that space, the **Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime** is an Asia–Pacific regional grouping based in Bangkok, of which many Pacific states are members.³¹ Several Pacific states are active members, including Fiji, which is the co-chair of the Bali Process Working Group on the Disruption of People Smuggling and Trafficking in Persons Networks alongside New Zealand.

Regional Law Enforcement Capacity-Building Programs

Australia and New Zealand are engaged in police capacity-building programs in the region. The Australian-led **Pacific Community for Law Enforcement Cooperation** coordinates training to ensure there is no overlap, duplication or gaps (Rakautoga 8/11/2020). Australia conducts a number of bilateral capacity-building programs with Nauru, PNG, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Samoa, and collaborates with New Zealand on the **Tonga Police Development Programme**. As part of its Pacific Step-Up, in 2018 Australia announced a **Pacific Faculty of Policing at the Australian Institute of Police Management**. New Zealand has a dedicated policing **Pacific Island Prevention Programme** that builds on previous programs, such as the Pacific Prevention of Domestic Violence Programme. New Zealand also has specialist customs and immigration law enforcement capacity-building programs targeting transnational crime in the region. New Zealand and Japan have worked together to establish a law enforcement capacity-building program at the **University of the South Pacific**, where there are also Pacific policing and border security tertiary qualifications for police and border security officials (supported by PICP and PIDC). Other states have an interest in transnational crime, including the US, which has conducted law enforcement training with security agencies throughout the region.

Cybersecurity

Pacific Island states' cybersecurity activities have largely been aimed at the protection of the public online, rather than at possible cyberattacks against institutions and infrastructure (Watson 2021). At present, the preponderance of activity in the field of cybersecurity is at the national and bilateral levels, rather than the regional level. That said, regional cooperation in this area is evolving.

At the national level, Pacific Island states are creating **computer emergency response teams** (CERTs) to protect against, detect and respond to cybersecurity incidents and attacks. Due to the immense cost and effort required to design, install and operate a CERT, many states relied on regional initiatives such as **PacCERT**, a regional CERT that worked with internet service providers to manage incidents. PacCERT is now defunct due to lack of sustainability and ongoing support (PRIF 2019). The **Pacific Cyber Security Operational Network** (PaSCON) launched in 2018 and is a network of 14 national CERTs.³² PaSCON is evolving from a mechanism to share incident response tools to providing an avenue for discussion on broader cybersecurity issues. Cybersecurity is one of the expanded elements of security within the Boe Declaration and to implement it, the FSRS has asked CROP agencies for support to 'develop cybersecurity capacity and capability across the region' (PIF 2020a). The PIF Secretariat led a cyber assessment that recognised that the region has further work to do to improve regional cybersecurity (PRIF 2019:9).

Other regional organisations have considered cybersecurity issues. For example, PILON 2018's conference was themed around cybercrime, and the network has supported information sharing on cyber issues between the regional legal community, judiciary and police (PRIF 2019). One of PICP's key networks is **Cyber Safety Pasifika**, a program of 18 nations that uses local police to promote cyber safety messages within the community, particularly in schools.

Australia is a key partner on cybersecurity in the Pacific. Under its **Cyber Cooperation Program**, Australia has provided support for the development of state-based CERTs. The potential for attacks during the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation Leader's Week in 2018 provided the impetus for PNG and Australia to jointly fund the **National Cyber Security Centre** in Port Moresby. Australia has also been the executive lead on and biggest donor within PICP to the Cyber Safety Pasifika program. This is part of a targeted approach to cybersecurity through the Australian **Cyber Cooperation Program**, established in 2016. The program has five aims: compliance with international law; cybercrime prevention, prosecution and cooperation; cyber incident response; best technology for development; and human rights and democracy online (PRIF 2019). The Australia Pacific Security College in partnership with the Australian National University's Cyber Institute have run short courses on cybersecurity issues for Pacific government officials. Australia also

funds the Oceania Cyber Security Centre to undertake cyber policy assessments and cybersecurity capacity assessments for Pacific Island states, initially focusing on Vanuatu and FSM. The Council of Europe (in addition to Australia) has supported legislative drafting to develop laws targeting cybercrime (PRIF 2019). The US has also hosted cyber capacity-building workshops for Fiji, Kiribati, PNG, Samoa and Tonga, including speciality training from the FBI and US Secret Service (US Embassy Suva 2019), and incorporated cybersecurity priorities in wider projects, such as We Are Young Pacific Leaders.

The **International Telecommunications Union** (ITU) — a United Nations agency — is active in the region, supporting communications technology policy and regulatory cooperation, rural communications in PNG, RMI, Tonga and Nauru, and cybersecurity readiness assessments in Kiribati, Fiji, Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu. The ITU has been involved in the region for many years, undertaking specialist projects such as the installation of telephone connectivity in Tokelau.

Fiji, Kiribati, RMI, Nauru, PNG, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu are all members of **Interpol**, which also has an interest in cybercrime.

Conclusion and next steps

Our mapping reveals that security cooperation in the Pacific Islands is best described as a patchwork of agreements, arrangements and institutions. This patchwork seeks to meet a range of security priorities and ambitions as identified by both the Pacific Islands and partners; whether it always achieves this is less clear.

The forms that security cooperation takes and the targeting of resources devoted to security cooperation are driven by both partners and Pacific Island governments themselves. The resource constraints faced by Pacific Island states mean, of course, that in many ways they rely on partners' support. The way partners direct their assistance differs across the region, reflecting varying constitutional relationships and geographic, historical and strategic factors, as well as partners' own priorities and interests. Even so, it paints an incomplete picture to depict Pacific Island governments simply as passive recipients of security assistance. Both the promulgation of regional statements such as the Boe Declaration and the gradual rollout of national security strategies provide evidence that Pacific Island governments are giving active consideration to their priorities in the area of

security. That said, to date we have virtually no data to determine whether those national security strategies are in fact shaping the allocation of resources by either Pacific Island governments themselves or their security partners. **This raises a set of initial questions: how are the interests of partners and those of Pacific Island states interacting to shape regional security cooperation? For example, are national security strategies influencing the allocation of resources by Pacific Island governments and their security partners, including by promoting greater regional cooperation?**

Another challenge to mapping regional security cooperation is the need to distinguish between the *announcement* of an initiative, whether it is *implemented* and what *outcomes* it has achieved. Indeed, the quantum of resources directed at responding to a challenge does not necessarily signal effectiveness. This is a challenge to analysing both the contributions of partners and the ambitions of Pacific Island governments themselves. Further analysis of the implementation of specific programs and announcements is required to assess their practical outcomes. Relatedly, there are questions about the ability of Pacific Island states and regional institutions to absorb the support being provided by metropolitan powers and international institutions, with a risk that the increased interest from and activity by partners may overwhelm Pacific Island security actors and institutions. **This raises another question: how well coordinated is partners' assistance to the region, and what challenges — including to targeting, overcrowding and absorptive capacity — does this pose to Pacific Island states?**

While a sense of regional solidarity remains strong, for the sake of analytical simplicity, we — like others — frequently refer to 'the Pacific Islands'; however, there is a tendency to overuse this collective expression. Doing so may pay insufficient attention to individual Pacific Island states' interests and concerns and may mask tensions between national, regional and bilateral approaches to managing their security interests. Although it was not related to the management of security issues, the pledge by five Micronesian members to withdraw from the PIF after their preferred candidate was not elected as the next secretary general in early 2021 serves as a reminder that different Pacific Island states have different interests, and regionalism may not always be sufficiently robust to contain such dif-

ferences. **This raises further questions: is there value in seeking to foster a more coherent and comprehensive regional security architecture in the region? Whose interests might this serve? Related to this: might a patchwork of institutions and arrangements that allow a diversity of interests and flexible modes of participation and response to security challenges best suit the region? If so, what are the gaps and overlaps in existing security cooperation?**

Security cooperation in the Pacific is occurring in the context of ‘a dynamic geopolitical environment leading to an increasingly crowded and complex region’ (PIF 2018). Our mapping highlights that partners (and Pacific Island governments themselves) often favour bilateral initiatives, and this reflects that, while PIF Secretary General Dame Meg Taylor made a series of public statements regarding regional solidarity, Pacific Island states have not yet created a multilateral mechanism akin to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum to engage great powers’ regional interests and manage relationships with major powers. **While this is explicable by the diversity of states and entities in the Pacific, broader geopolitical tensions suggest that there may be merit in asking: is there value in Pacific Island states collectively managing their geopolitical interests? What role, if any, could Australia play in facilitating this?**

Finally, as we mentioned in our introduction, it is beyond the scope of this paper to analyse the many intrastate local and community initiatives that address security challenges. **The importance of these initiatives to the lives of many Pacific Island people raises our final question: how can security cooperation be meaningfully facilitated between local, national and regional levels?**

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Endnotes

1. The independent states of the Pacific are Fiji, FSM, Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, PNG, RMI, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Territories are shown with their key partners in the map in Figure 2 and include American Samoa, Guam, CNMI, Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau, French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Wallis and Fatuna, Pitcairn Island and Rapa Nui.
2. This research has been undertaken thanks to Department of Defence Strategic Policy Grant 2020-106-040, awarded to Chief Investigator Professor Joanne Wallis at the University of Adelaide.
3. We understand security partners to be neighbouring and metropolitan states with a security interest in the Pacific region, as well as international organisations, such as United Nations agencies, who undertake joint activities with Pacific states to ensure regional security.
4. Member states of the PIF are Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, FSM, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, PNG, RMI, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Tokelau is an associate member. Observer states are American Samoa, Guam, CNMI, Timor-Leste, Wallis and Futuna. Palau, FSM, RMI, Nauru and Kiribati have announced their intentions to withdraw from the PIF by 2022.
5. PNG published a national security strategy in 2013, the only Pacific Island country to have done so prior to the Boe Declaration.
6. SPC members are American Samoa, Australia, Cook Islands, FSM, Fiji, France, French Polynesia, Guam, Kiribati, RMI, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, CNMI, Palau, PNG, Pitcairn Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, the US, Vanuatu and Wallis and Futuna.
7. The FLNKS is a pro-independence movement in New Caledonia.
8. *Vuvale* is a Fijian word meaning ‘family’.
9. The Oceania Summit was attended by Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, RMI, FSM, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, PNG, Solomon Islands, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
10. Note the Lowy data — and this section of our paper — covers Official Development Assistance and does not include assistance delivered through

- defence cooperation programs or their equivalent.
11. Members of the FFA are Australia, Cook Islands, FSM, Fiji, Kiribati, RMI, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, PNG, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
 12. Members of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission are Australia, Japan, the Philippines, China, Kiribati, Samoa, Canada, South Korea, Solomon Islands, Cook Islands, RMI, Taiwan, EU, Nauru, Tonga, FSM, New Zealand, Tuvalu, Fiji, Niue, the US, France, Palau, Vanuatu, Indonesia, PNG, American Samoa, Guam, Wallis and Futuna, CNMI, New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Tokelau.
 13. Members of the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation are Australia, China, Cuba, the EU, South Korea, Peru, Taiwan, Vanuatu, Chile, Cook Islands, Ecuador, Denmark (Faroe Islands), New Zealand, Russia and the US.
 14. The PNA are FSM, Kiribati, RMI, Palau, Nauru, PNG, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu. Tokelau participates in the Vessel Day Scheme through a memorandum of understanding to join the FSM Arrangement, but is not an official signatory to the PNA.
 15. Members of the Te Vaka Moana Group are Samoa, Tonga, Niue, Tokelau, Cook Islands and New Zealand.
 16. States that have Shiprider Agreements with the US are Cook Islands, Kiribati, Fiji, FSM, RMI, Tonga, Samoa, Palau, Vanuatu, Nauru and Tuvalu.
 17. Members of SPREP are American Samoa, Australia, CNMI, Cook Islands, FSM, Fiji, France, French Polynesia, Guam, Kiribati, RMI, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, PNG, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, the UK, the US, Vanuatu and Wallis and Futuna.
 18. Pacific members of the Alliance of Small Island States are Cook Islands, Palau, Niue, Nauru, Fiji, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Tonga, PNG, FSM, RMI and Samoa.
 19. Pacific members of the Cartagena Dialogue are Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Kiribati and Tonga.
 20. Pacific members of the G77 are Fiji, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and PNG.
 21. Pacific members of the Climate Vulnerable Forum are Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Kiribati.
 22. Pacific members of the REEEP are RMI and Samoa.
 23. Pacific members of the MRV International Partnership are RMI and PNG.
 24. Attendees at the Joint Heads of Pacific Security are Vanuatu, Fiji, PNG, Tonga, Solomon Islands, Palau, Timor-Leste, Kiribati, Cook Islands, FSM, RMI, Samoa, Niue, Nauru, Australia and New Zealand. In 2020, it also included Japan and the US along with representatives from the OCO, PIDC, PICP, FFA and PIF.
 25. The Southwest Pacific Heads of Maritime Forces are Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, France, Niue, PNG, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu and New Zealand.
 26. PICP networks are Cyber Safety Pasifika, Pacific Forensics Working Group, Pacific Island Prevention Policing, Pacific Training Advisory Group, Pacific Transnational Crime Network, Road Safe Pacific and the Women's Advisory Network.
 27. Members of the PICP are Australia, Cook Islands, FSM, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, RMI, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, PNG, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Guam, American Samoa and CNMI.
 28. Members of the PIDC (formerly Pacific Immigration Directors' Conference) are American Samoa, Australia, Cook Islands, FSM, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, RMI, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, PNG, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Wallis and Futuna.
 29. Members of the OCO (formerly the Customs Heads of Administration Regional Meeting (CHARM)) are American Samoa, Australia, Cook Islands, FSM, Fiji, French Polynesia, Guam, Kiribati, RMI, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, CNMI, Palau, PNG, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Wallis and Futuna.
 30. Members of PASO are Cook Islands, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, PNG, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. Associate Members of PASO are Australia, Fiji and New Zealand.
 31. Pacific states that are members of the Bali Process are Australia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Palau, PNG, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu.
 32. Pacific states with CERTs that are members of PaSCON are Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, RMI, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, PNG, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.

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Mapping Security Cooperation in the Pacific Islands

Annex 1

Year	Disaster	Location	Australia	New Zealand	US	Japan	EU	China	France	UK
2009	Earthquake and tsunami	Samoa, American Samoa and Tonga	AU\$2m of humanitarian aid and supplies, including tents, blankets and mosquito nets, as well as a C-17 aircraft and medical teams to assist with aeromedical evacuation and rescue equipment.	NZ\$6m of humanitarian aid and supplies, including rescue dogs for body recovery, navy divers for underwater pipeline, power poles, chainsaws, one C-130, one Boeing 757-200, one P3 Orion and two Iroquois helicopters with 100 defence personnel, 20 police, 30 medical personnel within an EMAT team and HMNZS Canterbury.	American Samoa received 300 people from US government agencies along with supplies of meals, water, blankets, tents and medical supplies via the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Navy. The US donated airhorns and US\$1m through aid non-government organisations to Samoa.	Immediate mobilisation of Japan International Cooperation Agency relief items, including tents and water filters, worth US\$220,000.	Donated €150,000 via the International Red Cross Federation for primary emergency needs in Samoa. In addition, resources from ongoing Water Sector Support Programmes were used for provision of water tanks and sanitation facilities.	Supply of bitumen for roads reconstruction worth US\$300,000.		
2012	Cyclone Evan	Samoa, Fiji and Wallis and Fatuna	C-17A Globemaster aircraft with AU\$1m of humanitarian supplies and four members of the Australian Rapid Response Team (an emergency response team).	P3 Orion aircraft to undertake aerial surveillance and environmental health assessment expertise. NZ\$600,000 to assist with the on-the-ground response.	US\$60,000 to Samoa Red Cross.		€1.8m to fund humanitarian assistance.			
2014	Flooding	Solomon Islands	C-130J Hercules aircraft carrying relief supplies and personnel, including two engineers and two rapid response teams.	C-130 Hercules aircraft carrying NZ\$300,00 of relief supplies and emergency response staff police assisted on the ground.		\$US120,000 in supplies, including blankets, water purifiers and portable jerry cans.		Satellite imaging of damage.		

Year	Disaster	Location	Australia	New Zealand	US	Japan	EU	China	France	UK
2015	Cyclone Pam	Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu	C-17A aircraft transported humanitarian supplies and a C-130J Hercules aircraft and HMAS Tobruk (L50) transported 500 defence personnel, food supplies and equipment, including water pumps and hospital equipment.	Two C-130 aircrafts and the HMNZS Canterbury brought supplies for heavy engineering, electricity supply and repairing infrastructure, as well as personnel for disease control and humanitarian relief. NZ gave US\$1.8m in contributions, in addition to medical supplies, to Tuvalu.	Military transport planes and Black Hawk helicopters were used to bring in US\$2.2m of assistance, including food assistance, emergency relief commodities, water and shelter materials.	US\$1.2m in an emergency grant for tents, sleeping pads and sheets and a team of disaster specialists in Port Vila and Pentecost Island. There was a later US\$5m for rebuilding schools.	€1m to help in the emergency relief efforts towards shelter, clean water and medicine.	\$US100,000 for emergency humanitarian assistance.	French Armed Forces from New Caledonia and French Polynesia used Casa planes, a Puma and an Alouette III helicopter and 4WD vehicles, as well as frigate Vendémiaire and the patrol boat La Glorieuse, to transport 120 personnel and 300 soldiers.	C-17 plane carrying £2million of supplies (shelter and solar lanterns).

Mapping Security Cooperation in the Pacific Islands

Year	Disaster	Location	Australia	New Zealand	US	Japan	EU	China	France	UK
2016	Cyclone Winston	Fiji	Operation Fiji Assist included eight C-17A Globemaster and C-130J Hercules aircraft sorties delivering emergency relief and one AP-3C Orion aircraft undertaking aerial surveillance, while HMAS Canberra brought supplies, 880 personnel and three MRH-90 helicopters. Relief efforts cost AU\$15 million.	Six C-130s and P-3K2s Orion aircraft undertook aerial surveillance and brought 12 tonnes of aid supplies. In addition, two ships, including the HMNZS Canterbury, assisted with bringing 500 personnel. New Zealand spent NZ\$15m on relief and recovery activities.		\$US2.75m in supplies, including tents.	€1m to direct humanitarian aid and US\$4.6m through the SPC for a short-term response.	US\$15m of relief supplies, including tents, waterproof canvases, blankets, pillows, first aid kits, generators, torches and water purification.	Two Casa aircrafts from New Caledonia and the patrol boat La Moqueuse with two tonnes of supplies, including shelter and hygiene kits, and 14 engineers. The Government of New Caledonia pledged FJ\$300,000.	
2018	Cyclone Gita	Vanuatu, Fiji, Wallis and Futuna, Samoa, American Samoa, Niue and Tonga	AU\$14 million, including a C-170 aircraft within 24 hours, and humanitarian supplies such as tarpaulins, generators, health and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) needs. Medical personnel, a disaster response team and electrical technicians were also deployed.	NZ\$3 million to help emergency response efforts, including a P3-K Orion aircraft and six C-130 flights to carry 38 tonnes of supplies and personnel from Fire and Emergency New Zealand disaster response teams.	\$US23m for housing and urban development in American Samoa.	Tents, tarpaulin plastic sheets and generators to Tonga.	€100,000 via the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.		Supplies delivered via French Navy (logistics only).	

Year	Disaster	Location	Australia	New Zealand	US	Japan	EU	China	France	UK
2018	Ambae volcanic eruption	Vanuatu	AU\$5.55m for the evacuated population and host communities, including tents, kitchens, water storage, solar lights, shelters, emergency education and health, brought on the bay-class landing ship HMAS Choules.	P-3K2 Orion aircraft surveyed the mountain to predict eruption in 2017; then, NZ\$2.5m in assistance for the evacuation, including two NZDF aircraft and the HMAS Canterbury carrying 22 tonnes of relief supplies, such as mother and infant kits, family hygiene kits, jerry cans, shelter tool kits and tarpaulins and relief supplies such as water tanks, rainwater harvesting kits, food and water.		US\$900,000 for humanitarian relief.	€120,000 emergency assistance for tarpaulins, shelter tool kits, sleeping mats, blankets, kitchen sets, solar lights, mosquito nets, and hygiene kits.		Three tonnes of non-food items carried by a CASA plane from the French Air Force.	
2018	Earthquake	Hela Province, PNG	AU\$5m for the highlands, including AU\$200,000 of humanitarian supplies, an emergency response team, 60 flights by the C-130J aircraft and three heavy lift helicopter Chinooks to deliver supplies to villages and undertake aerial surveillance of damage.	A C-130 aircraft carried eight tonnes of supplies, including water containers, family hygiene kits, shelter tool kits and tarpaulins.		US\$880,000 cash for humanitarian supplies.				

Mapping Security Cooperation in the Pacific Islands

Year	Disaster	Location	Australia	New Zealand	US	Japan	EU	China	France	UK
2018	Typhoon Yutu	CNMI			A C-130 aircraft carrying 800 personnel food, water, emergency shelters and generators; two 10K adverse terrain forklifts, a K-loader and an R-11 fuel truck; bottled water, meals and emergency shelters					
2020	Cyclone Harold (under COVID-19 conditions)	Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji and Tonga	Eight C-17 Globemaster flights (four each to Fiji and Vanuatu) with humanitarian relief supplies (blankets, lanterns, shelter kits and hygiene kits).	NZ\$500,000 to Vanuatu to procure relief items and dispatch on the ground.			€300,000 of water sanitation and hygiene to Vanuatu.	US\$100,000 to Fiji for cyclone relief.		Humanitarian supplies.

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