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Self Defense and Sea Power:

The Provincial Navies of the British Atlantic World, 1689-1763

By

Benjamin Cameron Schaffer

BA in History, College of Charleston, 2015

MA in History, University of New Hampshire, as Part of Joint Masters/Ph.D. Program, 2018

DISSERTATION

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This thesis/dissertation was examined and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in history by:

Dissertation Director, Eliga Gould, Professor of History

Cynthia Van Zandt, Associate Professor History

David Bachrach, Professor of History

Jessica Lepler, Associate Professor of History

Patrick Griffin, Professor of History, University of Notre Dame

On 28 July 2021

Approval signatures are on file with the University of New Hampshire Graduate School.

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ABSTRACT

"Self Defense and Sea Power: The Provincial Navies of the British Atlantic World, 1689-1763," explores the ways in which Anglo-American colonial governments in North America and the West Indies managed naval defense during imperial and border conflicts between the late seventeenth and mid-eighteenth centuries. With limited military assistance from the imperial government in London, provincial leaders built their own semi-permanent and temporary navies to protect commerce from Franco-Spanish privateers, pirates, and Native American naval forces. Provincial governments also utilized these fleets to spearhead sieges of enemy ports, support infantry operations on land, and to transport troops and supplies to warzones.

By the mid-1740s, administrative changes within the British Admiralty along with increased Parliamentary oversight of colonial military campaigns led metropolitan authorities to massively increase the Royal Navy's presence throughout the Western Atlantic world. By the 1750s, the Crown's 'Royalization' of coastal defense made the existence of numerous local American navies unnecessary. While increased imperial support for colonial military operations should have pleased Anglo-American officials, tensions between provincial authorities and Royal Navy officers over the impressment of American sailors and prize distribution soured this defensive partnership. When the Crown began to use the Royal Navy to enforce unpopular trade and tax policies in the 1760s, the legacy of a century of provincial naval defense played an important role in shaping the ways American dissidents resisted British authority at sea in the years leading up to the American Revolution.

GLOSSARY OF NAVAL TERMINOLOGY

Note: The following glossary relies on modern scholarly descriptions of vessels from the period, c. 1680-1770. Period sources frequently diverged in how they classified various vessels. Most of the vessels listed below were primarily trading ships, and only became warships when impressed or hired out by colonial governments. Vessels were often classified by their 'rig,' or the ways in which the sails were arranged. For instance, a 'fore-and-aft' rigged vessel has a sail pointing towards the front (fore) of the vessel to the back (aft). The term "ship" usually referred to a "ship-rigged" vessel with three large masts with square sails. See image below for an example.



Diagram of Masts on a Tall Ship, by author. Photograph of La Gloria*, a modern Spanish Navy tall ship, taken by the author in Charleston, S.C. at the beginning of his dissertation research, Summer 2018.*

Brigantine: Brigantines were typically small vessels under 100-tons. They had two masts. The foremast was square-rigged while the mainmast had a fore-and-aft rig. This differed slightly from a **Brig,** which was a two masted vessel that typically had square-sail rigs on both of its masts.[1] After sloops, brigantines may have been the most common merchant vessel employed in provincial fleets.

Frigate: A large, ship-rigged warship usually belonging to the Royal Navy, and in very rare cases, provincial navies. Typically, Royal Navy frigates sent to America were among the smallest "rated" warships. While first or second-rate warships with nearly one hundred guns would be reserved for European service, smaller fifth or sixth-rate frigates that carried between twenty and forty guns would serve in the New World.[2]

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[1] William Avery Baker, "Vessel Types of Colonial Massachusetts" in *Collections of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Vol. 52: Sea Faring in Colonial Massachusetts* (March 1980), pp. 18-20. Colonial Society of Massachusetts https://www.colonialsociety.org/node/1973#fore, and John Robinson, George Francis Dow, *The Sailing Ships of New England, 1607-1907* (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2007), pp. 28-29. Retrieved from Google Books

[2] David Wilson "Protecting Trade by Suppressing Pirates: British Colonial and Metropolitan Responses to Atlantic Piracy, 1716-1726," in *The Golden Age of Piracy: The Rise, Fall, and Enduring Popularity of Pirates,* ed. David Head. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2018), p. 91. Google Play eBook edition.

Galley: The term 'galley' has been used to describe light-drafted rowing vessels since Classical Antiquity. In the British Atlantic world, the term had various meanings. Occasionally, a vessel named "X *Galley"* would simply be a regular trading vessel that had a hull specifically shaped for swifter sailing. On the other hand, some colonial governments particularly in the Southeast built light-draft "galleys" which relied on oars as their primary source of propulsion.[3] See Chapter I and Chapter III for varying uses of galleys in New England's and South Carolina's provincial naval establishments.

Ketch: A very small ocean-going trading or fishing vessel with a main mast and mizzen mast, but no foremast. In New England, these vessels were typically under 70-tons.[4] See Chapter I for the use of ketches in New England's early provincial navy.

Periagua/Periauger/Piragua: Inspired by Native American dug-out canoes, periaguas (spelled and pronounced in myriad ways) were small, swift vessels similar to galleys in that they were primarily powered by oars and occasionally by sails. These vessels were particularly common in the Southern colonies and the West Indies and were the main vessels of the South Carolina Scout Boat navy.[5]

Schooner: Vessel with two masts that are rigged in a fore-and-aft pattern. Square sails could be added on top of the masts to make them topsail schooners. They were somewhat similar in appearance to brigantines but had narrower hulls, and their masts were more slanted.[6] See Chapter III for examples of schooners used for provincial service in the War of Jenkin's Ear.

Shallop: typically, a very small, open-decked coastal work boat. Larger vessels often times carried shallops onboard to serve as auxiliaries when needed.[7]

Sloop: The most common vessel in provincial navies, and perhaps the most commonly employed vessel in the British Atlantic world. In the North American (and provincial navy) context, a sloop usually describes a single-masted trading vessel with a fore-and-aft rig that could involve any number of sail types. These smaller vessels were typically under 100-tons and could operate in shallow waters off the coasts or on ocean-going missions.[8]

Snow: A vessel extremely similar to a brig except for vessel with its rear mast (known as the 'trysail-mast' due to its prominent fore-and-aft trysail that jutted out of the rear of the vessel)

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[3] Baker, "Vessel Types," p. 22 and Benerson Little, *Pirate Hunting: The Fight Against Pirates, Privateers, and Sea Raiders from Antiquity to the Present* (Washington: Potomac Books, 2010), p. 147. Google Play eBook Edition

[4] P.C. Coker, *Charleston's Maritime Heritage, 1670-1865: An Illustrated History* (Coker Craft, 1987), pp. xii-xiv and Baker, "Vessel Types," pp. 12-13.

[5] Little, *Pirate Hunting,* pp. 140-141 and Larry Ivers, *This Torrent of Indians: War on the Southern Frontier, 1715-1728* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2016), pp. 104-105. Kindle eBook edition.

[6] Coker, *Charleston's Maritime Heritage,* pp. xii-xiv.

[7] Baker, "Vessel Types," pp. 13-15.

[8] Baker, "Vessel Types," pp. 18-19, Coker, *Charleston's Maritime Heritage,* pp. xii-xiv. Confusingly, the Royal Navy also used the term 'sloop-of-war' to describe a wide array of small-warships in this era. See Ian McLaughlan, *The Sloop of War, 1650-1763* (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2014) for more information on Royal Navy sloops.

close to its mainmast. The Massachusetts province snow *Prince of Orange* in Chapter III is a prime example.[9]

Whale Boat: Whaleboats were extremely common small-craft employed primarily by New England mariners for whale-hunting but were also used throughout the colonies for various military missions. They were particularly useful for troop transport and could be powered by oars or sails.[10]

[9] Waldo Lincoln*, The Province Snow "Prince of Orange"* (Worcester: Press of Charles Hamilton, 1901), p. 4

[10] Ivers, *This Torrent,* pp. 106-107.

Source: Public Domain Image. The Miriam and Ira D. Wallach Division of Art, Prints and Photographs: Print Collection, The New York Public Library. “A view of Charles Town the Capital of South Carolina” New York Public Library Digital Collections. https://digitalcollections.nypl.org/items/510d47da-2d13-a3d9-e040-e00a18064a99.

This eighteenth century depiction of Charles Town, South Carolina’s waterfront includes many of the vessels that were common in provincial navies. On the far left is a typical single-masted trading sloop. Just behind the sailors in the foreground is a very small coastal sailing vessel, similar in structure to the periagua sailing canoes of the South Carolina provincial navy. In the center is a fully rigged ship, similar to British Royal Navy frigates. The two-masted vessel to the right of the ship is likely a coastal trading schooner.

1747 MAP OF NORTH AMERICA AND WEST INDIES

Source: A zoomed-in section of Bowen, E., “A complete system of geography. Being a description of all the countries, islands, cities, chief towns, harbours, lakes, and rivers, mountains, mines, &c. of the known world …, 1747 edition.” While most of the regions consulted in this study are visible in this map, Halifax, Nova Scotia is not depicted as it would not be established until 1749. The full map is part of the Public Domain, and was retrieved at Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:1747_Bowen_Map_of_North_America_and_South_America_(_Western_Hemisphere)_-_Geographicus_-_America-bowen-1747.jpg

INTRODUCTION

Philadelphia was in danger. It was the autumn of 1747—the eighth year of the third global imperial war Britain had fought against its Franco-Spanish enemies in half a century—and French and Spanish privateers prowled for local commerce off the Pennsylvania coast. While the hundreds of thousands of Anglo-American colonists between Newfoundland and Barbados faced occasional terrestrial threats from hostile French, Spanish, and Native American armies, the largely coastal British American colonies and their ocean-bound commerce suffered even more so from Franco-Spanish commerce raiding. In the face of this imminent threat, the Pennsylvania legislature struggled to find a solution to protect vulnerable local merchant ships.

While debates over coastal defense measures were common in every British province, the Quaker-dominated proprietary colony of Pennsylvania was unique. On the one hand proprietary colonies were essentially American fiefdoms that were privately owned by absentee landlords living in England, and thus were never guaranteed Royal military protection that colonies directly under the auspices of the Crown enjoyed.[11] On the other hand, Pennsylvania's governors struggled to convince the pacifistic and tight-fisted Quakers that dominated the Pennsylvania Assembly to expand the colony's naval defenses.[12]

What military measures could a colony without Royal Navy protection take to combat enemy privateers? The colony's government could fund and direct the construction of a local *provincial navy.* As early as 1634, the infant Massachusetts government had fitted out a guard

[11] David Wilson "Protecting Trade by Suppressing Pirates: British Colonial and Metropolitan Responses to Atlantic Piracy, 1716-1726," in *The Golden Age of Piracy: The Rise, Fall, and Enduring Popularity of Pirates,* ed. David Head. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2018), pp.98-99.

[12] Carl E. Swanson, *Predators and Prizes: American Privateering And Imperial Warfare, 1739-1748* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990), pp. 160-161.

ship with local resources and men.[13] With Royal Navy involvement in North America and the West Indies limited before the second decade of the eighteenth century, Anglo-American governments frequently used local funds and sailors to build regional defense fleets to protect ports and commerce from enemy navies and pirates.[14] On occasion, these provincial fleets could also be deployed in offensive campaigns against enemy port cities. While the American precedent for provincial navies extended back to the beginning of the seventeenth century, colonial governments found even more reason to build these local fleets when naval threats amplified during four global conflicts between Britain and its imperial/ Native foes: King William's War (1689-1698), Queen Anne's War (1702-1713), The War of Jenkin's Ear/King George's War (1739-1748), and the Seven Years War (1754-1763). With each ensuing conflict, the North American and West Indian provinces were drawn more and more into deadly battles for maritime hegemony in the New World.

Early twentieth century historian Howard Chapin once remarked that "The American Navy did not spring forth full-fledged at the outbreak of the Revolution, like Pallas Athene from the head of Zeus. Its roots go back to the Colonial privateersmen and the naval expeditions against the French and Spanish."[15] And so it is in Philadelphia in 1747 where we find the 41-year-old printer and politician, Benjamin Franklin—a future founder of the United States and Continental Navy—arguing for Philadelphians to support a local warship to hunt down Franco-Spanish privateers. In a pamphlet entitled *Plain Truth,* Franklin warned that the "Absence of [Royal Navy] Ships of War, during the greatest Part of the Year, from both Virginia and New-

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[13] Charles O. Paullin, *Colonial Army and Navy,* Unpublished Manuscript. Charles Oscar Paullin papers, 1931. MSS53033, Library of Congress, p. 45.

[14] N.A.M. Rodger, The *Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), p. 232.

[15] Howard Chapin, "New England Vessels in the Expedition against Louisbourg, 1745," in *The New England Historical and Genealogical Register,* Vol. LXXVI (January, 1922), pp. 59-60.

York" left the port city vulnerable to maritime assaults. To secure their coast, Philadelphians should work together to bear the "Expence of a Vessel to guard our Trade."[16]

Similar debates occurred throughout much of the British Atlantic when enemy privateers lurked off the coast, when pirates captured local merchant ships, or when the Crown called on colonial governments to initiate assaults on enemy port cities. Constructing and financing a local navy was no small task for colonial governments, and the manner in which provincial navies were created and funded varied from colony to colony. When provincial governments resorted to unpopular measures such as impressment of vessels and sailors, or when they instituted burdensome taxes to fund local defense measures, they risked igniting the potentially violent anger of the populace. Even when colonial governments successfully established a temporary or semi-permanent defense fleet, the associated costs often times aggravated already-potent internal sociopolitical tensions throughout the American colonies.

If the organization of provincial navies elevated tensions within Anglo-American colonies themselves, they also raised larger questions over the provincial-Royal relationship. Was the Crown or the colonies responsible for coastal security? Who would pay for provincial ships? Were American provincial ships equal to British warships, or subordinates? Who would man Royal Navy frigates in American waters? What could colonial governments do if Royal captains did not actively patrol for enemy vessels? These questions were never adequately answered in the pre-Revolutionary era, and numbered among the myriad cracks in the relationship between periphery and center that would shatter in the imperial crisis of the 1760s and 1770s.

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[16] Benjamin Franklin, "Plain Truth, 17 November 1747," Founders Online, National Archives,. https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-03-02-0091. [Original source: *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 3, January 1, 1745, through June 30, 1750,* ed. Leonard W. Labaree (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), pp. 180–204]

This dissertation makes the case that between the 1680s and 1740s, Royal military neglect led Anglo-Americans throughout the British Atlantic world to build and utilize their own provincial navies against French, Spanish, Native, and piratical maritime threats. For the better part of a century, these provincial fleets secured Britain's weak grasp on its American coastlines. Even when metropolitan authorities finally expanded the Royal Navy's presence in its American colonies between the 1740s and 1750s, their piecemeal attempts to 'royalize' coastal defense were hampered by violent tensions between the Royal Navy and provincial authorities and sailors. When imperial authorities used the Royal Navy to enforce unpopular trade policies in the 1760s, long-held anger at Royal Navy excesses coupled with a long legacy of local naval defense helped to shape the ways American Patriots resisted British authorities in the imperial crisis.

Making a Historical and Historiographical Case for the Study of Provincial Navies

In his 2012 monograph *American Naval History, 1607-1865*, renowned American naval historian Jonathan R. Dull argued that Anglo-Americans undertook "little independent naval activity." While admitting that colonists frequently employed **privateers—**"privately built, owned, and manned but government-sanctioned armed vessel used chiefly to capture enemy merchant ships"—he still concluded that the "colonies did not have permanent armies or navies, and there was not even a maritime equivalent to the rudimentary military training provided by colonial militias."[17] I argue that this latter assertion overlooks the difference between local government-controlled war fleets—**provincial navies—**and private commerce raiders. I also contend this testifies to the increasingly problematic nature of the term "privateering" in colonial

[17]John R. Dull, *American Naval History, 1607-1865: Overcoming the Colonial Legacy* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2012), pp. 2-10.

maritime scholarship. What was a vague and controversial term in the era covered by this dissertation continues to plague maritime military scholarship to this day.

Part of the historical and historiographical confusion over the differences between provincial navies and privateers can be traced back to the multitudinous forms of naval warfare in the late medieval and Renaissance eras. Historian N.A.M. Rodger, who has done more than any other recent scholar to examine the origins of privateering and modern naval warfare, has argued that before the seventeenth century, there were several types of naval organization in European kingdoms. These included Royal impressment or hiring of vessels in times of war – "Requisitioning" and "Chartering"—feudal or territorial customs that required certain regions or fiefdoms to build ships for a lord or king—"Feudal navies" and "Ship Musters, "local navies" built by regional governments, and "private" naval warfare (i.e. commercial vessels that took part in various types of combat with or without governmental permission). Rodger argues that when the Spanish Crown forbade any other European powers from accessing the riches or trade of the New World in the sixteenth century, England and other Northern European kingdoms encouraged private commercial warfare against the Spanish throughout the Atlantic world. This meant that irregular private naval warfare was "artificially preserved [in the Americas] long after it had disappeared from European waters."[18]

It was from 'private naval warfare' that Rodger contends that the seventeenth century term "privateer" originated. Up to the seventeenth century, private merchant ships often armed themselves and fought defensive actions against enemy raiders, took part in occasional pirate raids, or sought out permission for "reprisals" from their monarchs to retrieve stolen property. By

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[18] Rodger, "The New Atlantic: Naval Warfare in the Sixteenth Century," in John B. Hattendorf and Richard W. Unger, eds. *War at Sea in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance* (London: Boydell & Brewer, 2003), pp. 238-247. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7722/j.ctt81rtx

the sixteenth century, various European monarchs—plagued by constant religious warfare and their own lack of warships—began to license private warships to raid enemy commerce for profit. Despite these early cases of government-sanctioned commerce raiding, it took the English Crown until the late seventeenth century to fully codify the state's role in private naval warfare, and more specifically to use the term "privateer" to describe private commerce raiders.[19] While Rodger contends that northern European-style private naval warfare continued into the Americas, this dissertation also holds that older medieval traditions such as the impressment of local vessels and "local navies" also persisted in the Anglo-American colonies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

In my own research, I have found Roger's lament that "generations of scholars have made difficulties for themselves and their readers by using vague, anachronistic and contradictory language about private naval warfare" to ring true.[20] In particular, I have found that the definition of the word "privateer" has only grown more expansive and vaguer throughout the centuries. In a 1720 dictionary, privateering was simply defined as "a Vessel fitted out by one or more private Persons, with a Licence from the Prince or State, to prey upon the Enemy; also the Commander or Captain of such a Ship." A few decades later, the famous British writer Samuel Johnson defined a privateer as a "a ship fitted out by private men to plunder enemies. He is at no charge for a fleet, further than providing *privateers*, wherewith his subjects carry on a pyratical

[19] N.A.M. Rodger, "The Law and Language of Private Naval Warfare," *The Mariner's Mirror,* Issue 100, No. 1 (2014), pp. 5-13. Also see Shinsuke Satsuma, *Britain and Colonial Maritime War in the Early Eighteenth Century: Silver, Seapower and the Atlantic* (London: Boydell & Brewer, 2013), pp. 9-10. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7722/j.ctt31nj7r.6.

[20] Rodger, "The Law and Language," p. 5.

war at their own expence."[21] In both definitions from the period this dissertation covers, privateering was seen as an independently controlled activity, with tacit government acceptance.

For the most part, I have found that provincial governments in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries followed the aforementioned definitions, using the term "privateer" or "private men of war" to describe privately licensed commerce raiders. When describing war vessels fitted out by colonial governments, they typically used terms like "sloop of war," "province sloop," "vessel fitted out at the expense of the government," etc. This was not always the case, and I have certainly found many cases where provincial authorities built warships and called them "privateers." Nevertheless, Anglo-American insistence that tax-funded provincial fleets were something more than privateers seems to have grown over time as these fleets grew in complexity. As will be seen in Chapter III, the battle over what made a vessel a "privateer" or a "warship" led to a transatlantic legal battle between provincial and Royal Navy captains in the 1740s.

If privateering was an ill-defined term in the colonial era, later historians have done nothing to narrow its categorical grasp. As early as the mid-1920s, historian Howard Chapin argued that privateer ships were "privately owned armed-vessels, which sailed under the flag and commission of some recognized government." Chapin also maintains that by the 1700s, privateers included both sailors who mainly chose to attack enemy shipping with legal permission (privateers), and merchants who occasionally exercised the right as a sort of side job

[21] Edward Phillips, *The New World of Words: Or Universal English Dictionary* (London: King's Arms, 1720), no page number given. Google Books eBook. Samuel Johnson, *A Dictionary of the English Language: A Digital Edition of the 1755 Classic* (1755, Reprint., Johnson Dictionary Online, 2012), p. 1573.

(letter-of-marque ships). Chapin includes in this ‘privateering’ category colonial government-owned ships, and even ships impressed for emergency reasons.[22]

Despite Chapin’s inclusion of these government-directed naval activities within the scope of “privateering,” one begins to wonder how “private” a government-directed expedition could be. The vagueness of Chapin’s handling of “privateering” becomes especially apparent when he calls New England Governor Edmund Andros’s privateering fleet the “beginnings of a colonial navy.”[23]

Historian Charles O. Paullin complicated the definition of “colonial navies” in the next decade. Where Chapin groups government-sponsored naval expeditions in with privateering, Paullin separates the two with great nuance. In his unpublished 1930s manuscript, *Colonial Army and Navy,* Paullin argues that “The war vessels of the American colonies were of two general classes: (1) vessels under the control of the state, and (2) privateers. The former were of three classes: (1) vessels owned by the state, (2) vessels hired by the state, and (3) vessels freely loaned to the state.” For Paullin, privateers were sailors given private commissions to pursue enemy commerce, while colonies maintained their own “war vessels.” Unlike Chapin, Paullin extends his examination of Anglo-American fleets well into the Seven Years War, and notes increasing complexity and naval organization in some cases throughout various colonies.

Despite his nuanced handling of the different Anglo-American naval forces throughout the pre-Revolutionary era, Paullin’s unpublished account seems to be a mere rough draft, and concludes on a very questionable claim. While admitting that colonial fleets could barely be called proper “navies” at all, and while admitting that Massachusetts had something of a

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[22]Howard Chapin, *Privateer Ships and Sailors: The First Century of American Colonial Privateering, 1625-1725* (Martino Fine Books, 2017 Repr. 1926), pp. 7-8.

[23]Chapin, *Privateer Ships,* p. 96.

"rudimentary navy" in the mid-18th-century, Paullin concludes that Anglo-Americans were "practically without a naval defense, except such as could be extemporized in emergencies." Nevertheless, Paullin contends that from 1690 "they had the protection afforded by a few ships of the Royal Navy; and potentially of course, they, being a part of the British empire, were defended by the whole British Navy."[24] As I will discuss in this dissertation, the Royal Navy was anything but a reliable ally before the mid-18th-century.

Later in the twentieth century, colonial military and naval historians such as W.A.B. Douglas, Larry Ivers and Carl Swanson used terms such as "sea militias," "coast guards" and "provincial navies" to differentiate between provincial government-funded warships and commerce raiders with letters of marque.[25] Nevertheless, more recent scholars seem to increasingly ignore the distinctions these twentieth century historians made between privateers and provincial navies. For instance, in a 2011 historiographical article, Starkey grouped merchantmen commissioned by governments to attack enemy vessels on a regular trading mission, "private men-of-war" dedicated to attacking enemy vessels and shipping lanes, and even government-managed private fleets in which "states collaborated with the private sector in a *guerre de course*" under the broad category of privateering.[26] As the definition of privateering has widened in this way, it has become possible for scholars such as Jonathan Dull to ignore the

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[24] Paullin, "Colonial Army and Navy," p. 71. This also contrasts with N.A.M. Rodger's recent argument that the Royal Navy rarely even patrolled American waters before 1713. See Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), p. 232.

[25] W.A.B. Douglas, "The Sea Militia of Nova Scotia, 1749-1755: A Comment on Naval Policy," *The Canadian Historian Review,* Volume 47, Number 1, March 1966, pp. 22-37, Larry E. Ivers, *British Drums On the Southern Frontier: The Military Colonization of Georgia, 1733-1749* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1974), p. 165. and Carl E. Swanson, *Predators and Prizes: American Privateering and Imperial Warfare, 1739-1748* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990), p. 50

[26] David J. Starkey, "Voluntaries and Sea Robbers: A Review of the Academic Literature on Privateering, Corsairing, Buccaneering and Piracy," *The Mariner's Mirror* 97:1 (2011) pp. 132-133.

fact that Anglo-Americans had semi-permanent, state-funded naval forces in the century preceding the American Revolution.

All in all, with few exceptions, historians over the last century have largely only mentioned provincial navies in passing, or have allowed them to become assimilated into the ever-growing and murky category of privateering. While admitting the blurred lines between colonial navies and *privateers*—which I define as private commerce raiders operating independently with letters of marque—with this dissertation I propose to resurrect elements of Chapin's and Paullin's early twentieth century categorizations of provincial navies. In this study, I define a *provincial navy (or provincial navy vessel)* as a war vessel or group of war vessels directly funded by colonial American governments and crewed by Anglo-American sailors. These vessels could be guard ships used to protect commerce, temporarily impressed flotillas in emergencies—*emergency fleets*—or hastily assembled invasion fleets that colonial authorities armed to attack enemy ports. In most cases, these vessels were primarily small merchant vessels that were taken into service rather than purpose-built warships.

Admittedly, even the term "provincial navy" has its limitations. While one could make the case that colonial transport and supply vessels should be included in this definition, I have decided to limit its scope in this definition to vessels that colonial governments specifically designated for combat missions. Additionally, there were times when colonial governments hired or impressed *privateer* ships into direct state service during emergencies. During situations in which independent privateers came under direct government control or command, I consider these vessels and their crews to be part of provincial navies.

Ultimately, no comprehensive study has been completed up to this point about colonial British America's provincial navies. While various studies about "privateering" writ large have

broached the topic of state-funded navies in colonial America, the vagueness of this category has limited their ability to fully analyze the ways in which provincial American governments built their own unique fleets.

Historiographical Context of this Dissertation

At its broadest level, *Self Defense and Sea Power* is a study of how Anglo-Americans managed coastal defense in the century preceding the American Revolution. Over all, this dissertation's focus on how Anglo-American efforts to construct their own navies fits within larger historiographical discussions of the military relationship between periphery and center in the British Atlantic world, and contributes to a growing body of scholarship on the broader intersection between naval warfare and society in early America.

A common debate throughout Atlantic world historiography throughout the last half century has been "To what extent did the English (and later British) Crown exert military authority over its American colonies in the century preceding the Revolutionary War?" Ultimately, two schools of thought have arisen to answer this question. On the one hand, a minority viewpoint is advanced by Stephen Saunders Webb. In the 1979 book *Governors-General,* Webb contests the early 20th-century historian Charles M. Andrew's view that mercantilism guided Britain's colonial policy in America. Instead, Webb contends that English colonization efforts were largely driven by military concerns, and that military governors used force to advance the Royal prerogative in their colonies. Webb maintains this style of military

government continued into the 1720s, and—after a short period of imperial military neglect—reappeared during the War of Jenkin's Ear in 1739.[27]

Webb's theory has been largely panned by Atlantic world historians throughout the last five decades. Historian Owen Stanwood has summarized scholarly opposition to Webb's theory best by stating that most early American scholars operating under "Atlantic and continental approaches, [have] tended to argue for the diffuseness and weakness of empires."[28] One representative example of a Webb critic is Jack Sosin. In his monograph *English America and the Restoration Monarchy of Charles II,* Sosin makes the case that in the 1680s Charles II abandoned an attempt to rule Jamaica by Royal prerogative when he realized the impossibility of funding a major Royal garrison to enforce his will there.[29] Regarding Webb's contention that the Crown ruled through military might in the Atlantic world, Sosin has argued that Royal officials "hardly demonstrated an intention, much less an ability, to dominate [their American subjects] by [military] force," and that Anglo-American assemblies grew *increasingly* more autonomous over time.[30]

While critics have panned Webb's contention that the Crown ruled colonial America via military might, they have largely come to accept a vision of the British Empire wherein Royal power and plans were limited by provincial political customs. This viewpoint has been most clearly advanced by Jack Greene, who has made the case that "pronouncements from the centers of early modern extended polities like the British Empire acquired constitutional legitimacy for

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[27] Stephen Saunders Webb, *The Governors-General: The English Army and the Definition of Empire, 1569-1681* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1979), p. xviii

[28] Owen Stanwood, Review of *Marlborough's America, William and Mary Quarterly* 3, Vol. 71 (July 2014), pp. 484-85. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5309/willmaryquar.71.3.0484.

[29] Jack M. Sosin, *English America and the Restoration Monarchy of Charles II: Transatlantic Politics, Commerce, and Kinship* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1980), pp. 180-181.

[30] Sosin, Review of *1676…,The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* Vol. 93, no. 2 (1985), pp. 213-214. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4248807

the whole only through implicit or explicit ratification by the peripheries."[31] In essence, throughout much of the era covered in this study, Royal authority was only moderately enforced in the American colonies.

While historians who disagree with Webb's 'garrison government' theory of Royal military rule point to the weakness of Royal executive authority throughout the colonies, they do not entirely discount that the metropole did ultimately expand its military and legislative reach. It would take time, however. Jack Greene has made the case that by the late 1740s, the Crown began to slowly retreat from its former laissez-faire attitude toward American governance, and began to intervene in colonial affairs more forcefully—i.e. giving colonial governors more specific instructions on how to run their provinces.[32] In other words, Webb's contention that the British government wanted to more directly rule its colonies is accurate, but was several decades premature.

If historians have noticed a stronger authoritarian legal shift in London by the mid-eighteenth century, they have also noticed a growing use of Royal military power to enforce metropolitan goals during this era. Scholars have largely agreed that prior to the War of Jenkin's Ear (c. 1739-1748), the British Royal Navy's presence was minimal in the New World.[33] While the Admiralty slowly increased the Royal fleet's footprint in the Western Atlantic world (particularly in the West Indies), it would not be until the mid-century when Admiralty reformers would make the Royal Navy a dominant fighting force in the New World.

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[31] Jack Greene, *Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development In the Extended Polities of the British Empire and the United States, 1607-1788* (New York: Norton, 1990), p. xi https://hdl-handle-net.unh.idm.oclc.org/2027/heb.01359.

[32] Greene, *Peripheries and Center,* pp. 47-52.

[33] See Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, p. 232.

Historians have taken note of Britain's mid-century use of military power to support metropolitan aims in different ways. For instance, in his study on the evolution of British colonial military policy in the Americas, historian Kurt Nagel makes the case that by the 1730s London had come to realize the value of the American colonies to its imperial vision and became more willing to dispatch Royal troops to assist in military campaigns. Nagel contends that American colonial leaders were oblivious to the fact that greater Royal military involvement meant decreased provincial autonomy as imperial officials began to manage American military affairs more and more after the 1740s.[34]

While Nagel's focus was primarily on the involvement of British *soldiers,* other historians have seen the mid-eighteenth century as a period when the British government used the Royal Navy to enforce its vision of a centralized empire. Scholars who see the Royal Navy as an important tool of British imperial might in the second half of the eighteenth century generally follow Daniel Baugh's conceptualization of Britain's 'Blue-water' strategy, in which Parliament came to support Britain's military expansion vis-a-vis Royal Naval military power rather than through land warfare on the continent.[35] For instance, Eliga Gould has argued that Prime Minister William Pitt adopted a Blue-water strategy that emphasized the usage of British sea power to help seize French possession in the Americas rather than in continental Europe. Britain's successful shift to maritime war in the Americas ultimately inspired Parliament's postwar attempt to subject the American colonies to greater metropolitan jurisdiction.[36]

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[34]Kurt Nagel, *Empire and Interest: British Colonial Defense Policy, 1689-1748* (Ph.D. Dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University, 1992), pp. 449-452, 511-513

[35] Daniel Baugh, "Great Britain's 'Blue-Water' Policy, 1689-1815." *The International History Review* Vol. 10, no. 1 (1988), pp. 33-5. Jstor http://www.jstor.org/stable/40107088.

[36] Eliga Gould, *The Persistence of Empire : British Political Culture in the Age of the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), pp. 38-59 https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unh/detail.action?docID=4322025.

Ultimately, scholars throughout the last several decades have made the case that while Britain's military might was less pronounced in America prior to the mid-eighteenth century, the metropole did attempt to subject autonomous colonial governments to Parliamentary jurisdiction via a stronger Royal military presence after the Seven Years War.

Where in this well-trod field of scholarly discussion about Britain's military and political influence over its American colonies does this dissertation fit? *Self Defense and Sea Power* aims to examine the nearly century-long period (c. 1689-1754) in which the Royal Navy's influence on American coastal defense was minimal. This dissertation ultimately revisits a frequently discussed topic (the level of British military intervention and metropolitan power projection in the colonies) within the scope of a widely ignored context (Anglo-American naval defense). I argue that Anglo-American governments were forced to defend their own coasts because of Royal military neglect and that they played a fundamental role in securing Britain's fragile hold on its maritime frontiers in the New World. Even as Royal guard ships started to appear in North American and West Indian waters with greater frequency after Queen Anne's War, Royal captains constantly depended on provincial navy vessels to support their missions throughout the Atlantic world. When the metropolitan government attempted to use the Royal Navy to enforce unpopular policies during the imperial crisis of the 1760s-70s, the long legacy of independent American naval defense (coupled with an equally long legacy of resentment at Royal Navy inaction and impressment policies) helped to shape the ways in which American Patriots protested British authority.

While this dissertation revisits Britain's imperial military weakness in America from a new perspective, it also joins a growing scholarly discussion about the ways in which naval warfare transformed the course of the First British Empire in America (c. 1607-1783). Of course,

studies about the intersection between maritime history and British America's political development are not new. Take for example Robert C. Ritchie's 1986 monograph *Captain Kidd and the War against the Pirates,* which examines the ways in which shifts in party politics in London in the 1690s transformed how the British Empire dealt with pirates throughout the Atlantic world and beyond.[37] Nevertheless, scholars throughout the last decade in particular have shown a renewed interest in the intersections between matters of naval defense and colonial development.

Much of this increased interest has come from historians of the Golden Age of Piracy. A prime example is Mark Hanna's 2015 book *Pirate Nests and the Rise of the British Empire, 1570-1740.* Hanna argues that the rise and gradual fall of Anglo-American support for Atlantic piracy throughout the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries points to larger trends in the relationship between the imperial center and colonial peripheries at the time. While colonial support for pirates was rife in the late seventeenth century and at the turn of the eighteenth century, various changing economic factors and imperial attempts to include colonial forces in the larger War on Pirates helped to unite Anglo-American opinion against the sea rovers. By the War of Jenkin's Ear (c. 1739-1748), a "sense of shared imperial goals and economic advantage united both English and American sailors and soldiers in defense of commercial predations against the Spanish."[38] In essence, initial support and the later rejection of Atlantic piracy testified to larger centralizing trends within the British Empire in America. On a similar note, this dissertation makes the case that American colonies consistently fitted out provincial navies

[37] Robert Ritchie, *Captain Kidd and the War against the Pirates* (Boston: Harvard University, 1986), pp. 233-234 in particular

[38] Mark Hanna, *Pirate Nests and the Rise of the British Empire, 1570-1740 (*Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), pp. 18-19 https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unh/detail.action?docID=4322232.

on a wide scale until the Royal Navy expanded its presence in the New World after the War of Jenkin's Ear.

This examination of Britain's early American empire from a naval lens has not been limited to studies of the Golden Age of Piracy. For instance, in his 2019 book *Storm of the Sea: Indians and Empires in the Atlantic's Age of Sail,* Matthew Bahar argues that between the seventeenth and mid-eighteenth centuries, the nations within the Wabanaki confederacy in New England and Canada defended their sovereignty from Anglo-American colonization by utilizing naval warfare and raids against their enemies.[39] While the history of naval combat in colonial America has largely only focused on European combatants, Bahar reminds us that Native Americans not only utilized sea power, but could shape the course of colonization with naval warfare.

It must be noted here that while this dissertation focuses on naval warfare, it is not a traditional military history account of battles and tactics. Additionally, while this dissertation considers social factors when discussing the plight of common sailors, it is not a work of maritime social history in the vein of historians such as Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh. Because no historians have yet fully examined colonial defense policies of Anglo-American governments, this dissertation aims to fill that ship-sized hole in the historiography of early America.

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[39]Matthew Bahar, *Storm of the Sea: Indians and Empires in the Atlantic's Age of Sail* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2019), Kindle eBook edition, pp. 1-5.

Sources and Chapter Layout

Considering that this dissertation is more or less an institutional history of early American navies (and the broader impact the operations of these fleets had on the provincial-Royal relationship), I have largely relied on primary sources from provincial and Royal governmental records. Some of the best sources for the origins and financing of provincial navies come from the minutes and transcriptions of colonial legislative sessions. In other cases, I have relied on Admiralty trial records, particularly where provincial sailors and officers took part in court battles over prize money. More than any other source, these judicial proceedings give us an idea of the concerns provincial sailors had for their economic welfare, and the larger societal ramifications of local naval service.

While American provincial records have been fairly accessible on digital databases, limited access on this side of the Atlantic to British (and Caribbean) government records necessitated archival research in the United Kingdom itself. At The National Archives in Kew, I examined Royal Navy ship logs, captains' letters, and other naval records that mentioned serving alongside provincial navies. While few Royal Navy sources were particularly verbose regarding Anglo-American provincial navies, there are some sections within these naval records where Royal officers' opinions on their provincial compatriots is especially clear.

This dissertation unfolds over the course of four chapters. Chapter One traces the role provincial navies played in the first two imperial conflicts of this era: King William's War (1689-1698) and Queen Anne's War (1702-1713). It was in these early imperial conflicts where American governors and legislatures developed the prototypes of provincial fleets that they would draw on for every future colonial conflict. While Anglo-American officials demonstrated

the utility of temporary and semi-permanent local navies during these conflicts, they also came to realize the economic and social costs that came with maintaining these forces.

In Chapter Two, I examine how provincial governments on British America's borderlands (Nova Scotia, New England, South Carolina, and the West Indies) continued to employ provincial navies even during a time of tacit imperial peace (c. 1713-1739). While Britain, France, and Spain largely avoided lengthy imperial wars during this era, Anglo-American governments were still forced to defend their coasts and commerce from Native American and piratical threats, as well as from Spanish *guarda costas.* These provincial fleets not only secured Britain's marginal grasp on its American maritime frontiers during fierce border conflicts, but they did so largely unassisted by imperial forces.

Chapter Three in many ways is the most pivotal chapter of the dissertation and explores the increasing divide between imperial center and colonial peripheries over the proper course of naval defense during the War of Jenkin's Ear (1739-1748). While Britain agreed to establish a North American Royal Navy station for the first time (and even to bankroll some provincial navies), numerous difficulties arose that limited the effectiveness of this 'Royalization' of coastal defense. Royal Navy captains did not always cooperate with their provincial counterparts, Royal Navy impressment policies infuriated Americans, and inconsistent Parliamentary legislation regarding prizes all limited the potential of the provincial-Royal Navy defense partnership.

In Chapter Four**,** I explore how the expanded Royal Navy presence in North America during the Seven Years War (1754-1763) made extensive provincial navies unnecessary. As will be seen in the concluding chapter, even though overextended provincial governments should have welcomed the Royal Navy's complete assumption of coastal defense with open arms, many of the issues from the last war—namely over impressment of American sailors—remained

unresolved and complicated provincial relations with the metropole. To add insult to injury, Britain's use of the Royal Navy to enforce unpopular trade policies during the imperial crisis aroused the ire of Anglo-Americans from Massachusetts down to Georgia. As Patriot legislators and seamen took to the streets and seas to protest British authority, the long legacy of provincial naval warfare would help to shape the ways in which Anglo-Americans responded to centralization attempts by the metropole.

Chapter I: The Rise of Provincial Navies in the First Imperial Wars, 1689-1713

In 1688, English rebels dethroned the unpopular Catholic and absolutist King James II and installed the Dutch Protestant William of Orange and English Mary as the empire's new monarchs. Shortly thereafter, Anglo-Americans initiated similar uprisings against the former king's officials throughout several colonies. This religious and political revolution on both sides of the Atlantic not only transformed England's Atlantic political make-up but triggered nearly two and a half decades of imperial conflict with France.[1] Anglo-American provincial leaders from Canada to Barbados had previous military experience, but were woefully unprepared for the global conflicts with England's imperial enemies known as the King William's War (1689-1698) and Queen Anne's War (1702-1713).

Historians have long recognized that these lengthy and expensive conflicts forced colonial governors to repeatedly rely on long standing civilian militias in lieu of red-coated Royal troops.[2] In a 1987 historiographical synthesis of recent scholarly works regarding early American military defenses, Don Higginbotham observed that scholars had largely come to the conclusion that provincial militaries "had advanced from seventeenth-century militia to...eighteenth-century semiprofessional forces" in the decades preceding the American Revolution.[3]

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[1] Richard S. Dunn, "The Glorious Revolution and America," *Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century*, ed. Nicholas Canny.. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). pp. 445-447. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unh/detail.action?docID=102745.

[2] Robert K. Jr. Wright, *Continental Army,* p. 6. (Washington: Center of Military History., 1983). U.S. Army, https://history.army.mil/books/RevWar/ContArmy/CA-fm.htm. Also see Douglas Leach, *Arms for Empire: A Military History of the British Colonies in North America, 1607-1763* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 1-41. Google Play eBook.

[3] Don Higginbotham, "The Early American Way of War: Reconnaissance and Appraisal," *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Apr., 1987), p. 253. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1939664.

Arguably, a similar 'military evolution' is evident in colonial Anglo-American maritime defenses during the imperial clashes of 1689-1713 as well. This, however, can only be understood in light of Britain's growing imperial naval commitments in North America. William R. Miles has argued that this period saw an increasing deployment of Royal Navy guard ships in the Anglo-American colonies alongside a colonial tendency to deploy "private warships, either carrying letters of marque (privateers) or ships owned, hired, commandeered or volunteered for duty at the behest of local government."[4] I make a distinction between privateers and government-controlled warships here, the latter being able to be broken down between regular standing 'provincial navies' and temporary 'emergency fleets.' Provincial leaders commissioned privateers and provincial fleets at various points, and the categorical difference between the two methods of provincial naval defense (especially during Queen Anne's War) were not always clear. While scholars have long recognized that independent privateering expanded from King William's War to Queen Anne's War, I will make the case that provincial governments from New England to Barbados also expanded their capacity to create standing and temporary provincial navies during these two conflicts.[5]

Some provincial authorities (particularly in New England) had limited experience building their own fleets in previous conflicts. However, the widespread adoption of either standing or temporary provincial navies throughout the English Atlantic world in the long period

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[4] William R. Miles, *The Royal Navy and Northeastern North America, 1689-1713.* Unpublished Master's Thesis. (Halifax, Nova Scotia: Saint Mary's University, 2000), p. 43. www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp01/MQ56715.pdf

[5] For more on the increase in privateering, see Miles, *The Royal Navy and Northeastern North America,* p.p.53-54. In the 1960s, W.A.B. Douglass contended that the "use of a local naval force or sea militia...was well established in the American colonies" by the 1740s, but does not explain how. This chapter largely seeks to qualify that statement. See Douglass, "The Sea Militia of Nova Scotia, 1749–1755: A Comment on Naval Policy," *The Canadian Historical Review* Vol. 47, no. 1 (1966), p. 25. https://www.muse.jhu.edu/article/568408.The dichotomy between temporary and semi-regular provincial naval fleets first appears in Howard Chapin's *Privateer Ships and Sailors: The First Century of American Colonial Privateering, 1625-1725* (Toulon: Imprimerie G. Mouton, 1926), p. 8.

of war with the French and Spanish (c. 1689-1713) ensured that local naval expeditions—ranging from the commissioning of provincial guard ships to provincial naval assaults on cities—would be a fundamental part of future Anglo-American military planning. Despite the utility of provincial navies, the financial and social costs of fitting them out often exacerbated long-standing tensions within Anglo-American communities and highlighted larger weaknesses in the imperial-provincial military relationship.[6]

Function of Provincial Navies in the Atlantic World

The New England colonies were among the first mainland provinces to outfit provincial naval forces in this era. Naval historian Oscar Paullin once remarked, Massachusetts "spent more upon ships of war than any other colony" and had provincial naval defense vessels as early as 1634.[7] Nevertheless, colonies throughout the Atlantic world began to follow their example during the long imperial conflicts between 1689 and 1713. During the first two imperial wars, provincial governments from Massachusetts to Barbados fitted out semi-permanent and temporary provincial warships to guard commerce, defend coastal cities in emergencies, support infantry campaigns, and to spearhead assaults on enemy ports. These functions would go essentially unchanged for the rest of the period covered by this study.

Before any examination of provincial guardships is possible, one must understand the role of English metropolitan military intervention in the Atlantic world in the late seventeenth

[6] Even though I will make the case that provincial authorities campaigned for an increased Royal Navy presence throughout the English Atlantic, Mark Hanna has also demonstrated how provincial authorities could see corrupt Royal Navy captains who did little to defend the colonists as "pirates" of sorts. See Hanna, *Pirate Nests and the Rise of the British Empire, 1570-1740* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), pp. 223-227.

[7] Charles O. Paullin, *Colonial Army and Navy,* Unpublished Manuscript. Charles Oscar Paullin papers, 1931. MSS53033, Library of Congress, p. 45.

century. In this period, Royal Navy visitation to the North American continent (which as yet had no Royal Navy bases) before 1713 was largely limited to individual station ships and small fleets. Prior to the latter years of the War of the Spanish Succession, the English government devoted more military and financial resources to European battlefields than American campaigns. Imperial authorities typically only sent extensive Royal military assistance if Anglo-Americans or their agents could create cost-effective plans for joint expeditions. All told, Crown officials typically expected Anglo-Americans to facilitate their own local defenses.[8]

Even though Westminster occasionally sent Royal squadrons to strike enemy targets in North America and West Indies during wartime, most Royal Navy vessels in the New World were assigned to convoy duty or acting as regional "station ships." Royal ships escorting merchant fleets or guarding specific ports were typically smaller warships than those utilized for larger fleet operations in Europe. These smaller frigates included fourth rate frigates that had more than fifty guns, fifth rates that had between 30 and 48 guns, and sixth rates that had between 10 and 30 cannon guns aboard. On occasion, larger third rate warships that carried between 60 and 80 guns were sent on missions to the Caribbean, but they were a rare site in North America.[9]

In fact, the Royal Navy presence was always larger in the West Indies than in North America—a trend that would continue throughout much of the next century. 1701, while there were only a few Royal Navy station ships on the North American coastline, there were nine Royal Navy ships at Jamaica in addition to a Royal force of twenty-two vessels led by Admiral Benbow. The reasons for this uneven military distribution were many, including the colder conditions in mainland North America, the higher revenue of the plantation islands, the necessity

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[8] Miles, *Royal Navy,* pp. 3-4, 46-40.
[9] Miles, *Royal Navy,* pp. 7-8.

of threatening Spanish pretensions in the heart of its New World empire, and the British government's yearning for control over the Spanish bullion trade in the Caribbean.[10] As Queen Anne's War progressed, Royal Naval involvement in the West Indian theatre also increased. Various factors led to the deployment of more Royal ships and the construction of more permanent victualling facilities in the Caribbean, including Royal interest in safeguarding ever-expanding British commerce, a larger metropolitan desire to expand British control over the slave and bullion trade with the Spanish empire.[11] While the seeds of greater Royal Naval involvement were being sown by the early 1700s in the Caribbean, the full 'royalization' of naval warfare in America would take more than half a century.

Even with the presence of a Royal ship in port, tranquility and coastal security was never guaranteed. This was the case in 1686, when Admiralty authorities sent Captain John George

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[10] See Ruth Bourne, *Queen Anne's Navy in the West Indies* (New Haven: University of New Haven, 1939), pp. 56-59, G.S. Graham, "The Naval Defence of British North America, 1739-1763," pp. 95-96. *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Vol. 30* (1948), Jstor https://www.jstor.org/stable/3678700, Peter T. Bradley, *British Maritime Enterprise in the New World From the Late Fifteenth to the Mid-Eighteenth Century* (Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, 1999), pp. 197-200, and Miles, *Royal Navy,* p. 66.

[11] Christian Buchet, "The Royal Navy and the Caribbean, 1689-1763," *The Mariner's Mirror*, Vol. 80, No. 1, p. 37. Taylor and Francis https://doi.org/10.1080/00253359.1994.10656482. In *The British Maritime Enterprise*, Peter T. Bradley qualifies the notion that the Royal Navy expanded its numbers in the West Indies: "During the reign of Queen Anne...a significant shift in the deployment of English naval vessels was the decision to endeavour to keep a regular striking force in those waters...thereby converting the Jamaica squadron into a permanent institution. Other individual warships were regularly attached to colonies such as Barbados and the Leeward Islands" (p. 202). The Royal Navy also expanded the sorts of ships it deployed in the West Indies. Ian McLaughlan had found that the Royal Navy began to send smaller vessels including sloops to the Caribbean during the latter stages of the conflict. For more, see Ian McLaughlan, *The Sloop of War, 1650-1763* (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2014), Google Play eBook, p. 79. For further reasons that imperial expansion occurred during Queen Anne's War, See Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean,* pp. 163-165, and Richard Harding, *Seapower and Naval Warfare, 1650-1830* (Routledge, 1999) pp. 164-168. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unh/detail.action?docID=165215.

Shinsuke Satsuma's examination of ever-shifting attitudes regarding a "pro maritime war argument" is also extremely significant for this study. Satsuma argues that a distinctive argument for maritime warfare in Spanish America (for reasons of economic gain and due to military disadvantages during land campaigns) spread throughout the English government during Queen Anne's War. While the adherence to this paradigm rose and fell based on political events and alternating political parties in power throughout the conflict, the widespread push for maritime war encouraged various maritime campaigns against Spanish America, and significant legislation such as the America Act of 1708. While the push for maritime war against the Spanish Empire fluctuated and even declined after the conclusion of Queen Anne's War in 1713, it would reappear with force in 1739 at the beginning of the War of Jenkin's Ear. For more, see Satsuma, *Britain and Colonial Maritime War in the Early Eighteenth Century: Silver, Seapower, and the Atlantic* (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2013), pp. 244-247.

with the small frigate H.M.S. *Rose* to guard Boston in 1686 after King James II's establishment of the Dominion of New England. With enterprising administrators such as Edward Randolph and Governor-General Andros at the helm of the Dominion, James II hoped to consolidate royal power by combining the administrations of every colony between Massachusetts and New Jersey.[12] Despite being a Royal Navy station ship captain in Boston, George allegedly used his position for profiteering, served as a yes-man to Edmund Andros and Massachusetts official Joseph Dudley, and did little to secure the region's frontiers, or to pursue pirates.[13]

During the late seventeenth century, Royal Navy recalcitrance in pirate hunting coincided with widespread provincial support for piracy against Spanish trade. As early as the 1670s when rulers in West Indian colonies such as Jamaica and Barbados began to shun pirates that had made sport of peacetime raids on Spanish targets, enterprising Anglo-American pirates sought out new markets in North American ports. These pirates found willing customers among proprietary and charter colonies with looser royal Royal governance, including Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Carolina. Royal centralizers such as Edward Randolph began to associate support for piracy in traditional charter colonies such as Massachusetts with a worrisome provincial desire for political autonomy.[14]

New Englanders welcomed pirates primarily for economic reasons. Spanish coinage was especially welcome in Boston during the postwar economic depression that followed the destructive King Philip's War of the mid-1670s. During this conflict, Massachusetts authorities even employed a few former West Indian buccaneers familiar with guerilla combat as Indian-

[12] Mary Lou Lustig, *The Imperial Executive in America: Sir Edmund Andros, 1637-1714* (Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2002), pp. 134-139

[13] Charles McLean Andrews, ed. "Introduction" in *Original Narratives of Early American History: Narratives of the Insurrections 1675-1690* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915), pp. 213-214.

[14] Hanna, *Pirate Nests* pp. 144-148.

hunters on a few land-based missions. The region's flirtation with piracy would soon come to an end, however. With increasing Spanish pressure on James II by the late 1680s, the king ordered Edmund Andros and his ally, the administrator Edward Randolph, to crack down on piracy. Ultimately, the king's proclamation lacked the legal specifics on how the officials were to proceed against pirates.[15] Nevertheless, Andros remained determined to use the Royal frigate H.M.S. *Rose* and the temporary station ship H.M.S. *Kingfisher* to crack down on pirates, and English merchants violating the Navigation Acts. These Acts required Anglo-Americans to use English intermediaries to trade with other European empires.[16]

Dominion authorities also hoped to bolster the Royal Navy's patrols with provincial naval forces. This utilization of provincial warships to supplement Royal Navy patrols and cruises would ultimately become commonplace throughout the English Atlantic world. On 25 May 1687, Randolph suggested that "itt is necessary a Small vessell be provided for his Majesties Service On the Coasts…"[17] Randolph's suggestion ultimately led to the government's purchase of the *Speedwell* ketch.[18] Throughout the next several years, provincial authorities used the *Speedwell* for many tasks that would become routine for Massachusetts provincial navy vessels for years to come: transporting soldiers, supplies, and even high ranking officials to the contested Maine borderlands and Canada.[19] While provincial governments could occasionally

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[15] Hanna, *Pirate Nests,* pp. 157-158, pp. 170-171, 179-181.

[16] Lustig, *The Imperial Executive,* pp. 49, 167-168.

[17] Council Minutes, Dominion of New England, 25 May 1687 in "Proceedings of the Council of the Dominion of New England from 4th May to 28th July 1687" (Minutes, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/785 [[1687]]/05/04-[[1687]]/07/28), http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_785_003.

[18] Council Minutes, Dominion of New England, 28 July 1687, in "Proceedings of the Council of the Dominion of New England from 4th May to 28th July 1687" (Minutes, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/785 [[1687]]/05/04-[[1687]]/07/28), http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_785_003. This vessel was evidently later reclassified as a sloop. For a succinct description of differences between coastal trading vessels see P.C. Coker, *Charleston's Maritime Heritage, 1670-1865: An Illustrated History (Coker Craft, 1987), pp. Xii-xiv*

[19] Edmund Andros to John Cooke, 6 August 1687, Massachusetts State Archives, v. 127, p. 420, Family Search https://www.familysearch.org/ark:/61903/3:1:3Q9M-C9Y5-GVMW?i=226&cat=1055547 and "Orders for

hire privateers to conduct such missions, military vessels under their immediate control and supervision would prove to be more reliable for immediate strategic needs.

By early 1688, Anglo-American tensions with the French and Native Americans on the Maine borderlands convinced Andros to increase the English military presence in that sector.[20] Part of Andros's military preparations included expanding the provincial fleet. In 1690, Andros reported that throughout 1688-9, "The severall Vessells Imployed for the security of the Coast and fishery of that time were His Ma[ties] Sloope *Mary*[21] John Alden Comand[r]," the sloop *Sarah*, the Brigantine *Samuel*, and "His Maties New Sloope *Speedwell* John Cooke Comand[r] finished and ready to take in stores and provisions for the Eastward."[22] It is worth noting that Andros neglected to mention at least one other provincial vessel that was in service, the sloop *Resolution.* Sloops were typically small, swift, single-masted merchant vessels.[23] Andros's navy, then, was largely built with lightly armed and quick vessels for coastal patrols and reconnaissance rather than large naval battles.

In essence then, Andros's sizable provincial navy served as a variegated general coastal defense force that could juggle multiple tasks alongside Royal Navy station ships. Despite its utility, however, international and local political controversies would soon end the operations of this fleet. Puritan New Englanders had begun to grow weary of Andros's strict military discipline

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John Cooke…" Massachusetts State Archives, v. 127, p. 266. *Family Search*. https://www.familysearch.org/ark:/61903/3:1:3Q9M-C9Y5-GVXB?i=698&cat=1055547

[20] Lustig, *Imperial Executive,* p. 174.

[21] I have chosen to use the modern standard of italicizing vessel names even when the original sources do not in order to prevent confusion with the names of officers or other individuals.

[22] "Sir Edmund Andros' account of the force raised in the year 1688 for the defence of New England against the Indians" (Report; Military Document, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/855 1690/05/29). http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_855_098

[23] P.C. Coker, *Charleston's Maritime Heritage, 1670-1865: An Illustrated History (Coker Craft, 1987), pp. Xii-xiv.* For more on the Royal Navy's 'Sloops of War' during this era which differed from merchant sloops in rigging and classification, see Ian McLaughlan, *The Sloop of War, 1650-1763* (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2014).

on the Maine frontier as war broke out with hostile Native forces, and fumed over rumors that the Catholic King James II had a new child and heir.[24] Additionally, many New Englanders had grown disillusioned with Andros's widespread eradication of provincial legal autonomy and his Anglicanism. With news that the Dutch Protestant William of Orange had landed in England and dethroned King James II, Protestant rebels led bloodless revolts against James II's officials throughout many of the American colonies. In April, provincial authorities led over 2,000 militiamen in a coup against Andros, and imprisoned him and other Dominion officials before sending them to England in early 1690.[25]

The Royal Navy frigate H.M.S. *Rose* and Andros's provincial navy both attracted the ire of the rioters that imprisoned Andros and his allies. Deserters from the *Rose* reported that the unpopular Captain George (with a Catholic lieutenant under him) planned to attack Boston with Andros and hand Boston over to the French. Deserters from the Royal frigate and Boston rebels dismasted the ship during the chaos of the April uprising.[26] The rebels also seem to have disbanded the majority of Andros's small provincial navy of a half-dozen provincial warships, and one shipbuilder even complained that they took the sails off an unnamed sloop that he had built for the Andros regime.[27] While this sloop's name was never mentioned, it is possible that this vessel was the *Mary.* With widespread contemporary rumors that one of Andros's soldiers (unsurprisingly a Roman Catholic) planned to seize the *Mary,* it seems that New England

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[24] Lustig, *Imperial Executive,* pp. 174-179.

[25] Dunn, "Glorious Revolution," p. 452, pp. 455-456.

[26] Richard R. Johnson, *Adjustment to Empire: The New England Colonies, 1675-1715* (Rutgers: Rutgers University Press, 1981), pp. 90-92., Miles, *Royal Navy,* pp. 107-108.

[27] "Sir Edmund Andros account of the forces raised in the year 1688 for the defence of New England against the Indians" And "The Humble Peticon and Request of John Cooke," c. Summer 1689, Massachusetts State Archives Collection, Colonial Period, 1622-1788, V. 107, Revolution, 1689-1700, P. 79. Family Search. https://www.familysearch.org/ark:/61903/3:1:3Q9M-C9YY-VRLM?cat=1055547]., and Lords of Trade and Plantations to King William III, 12 June 1690, in "New England patents and grants, 1690" (Submission; Order, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/905 1690/01/03-1690/06/12). http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_905_003

authorities had equal reason to fear that their "Papist" enemies would use Royal vessels and their own provincial ships against them.[28]

Whatever the political motives of the New England rebels, the revolutionary government in Boston—with Simon Bradstreet as its new governor—would soon have its hands full with fallout from this uprising, an outbreak of piracy, and the beginning of an imperial war with France and its Native allies. While they disbanded the *Rose* and Andros's provincial navy, Massachusetts authorities quickly reemployed some of the colony's sloops to meet these threats. The new regime's willingness to employ provincial vessels for naval defense highlights the fact that New Englanders were more than willing to employ provincial navies, but they did not want their political and religious enemies to have control over their local warships.

Massachusetts officials continued Andros's policy of depending on provincial vessels to guard the coasts after the Glorious Revolution, and even expanded on it. This was particularly evident in the mid-1690s, when the provincial government—concerned that Royal Navy ships would be useless in shallow shoal waters off the coast—commissioned the *Province Galley.* The *Province Galley* was a two-masted, ten-gun, warship that had oars to propel it through shallow waters and to pursue enemy craft. New England authorities designed the craft when Royal Navy frigates proved too large to pursue enemy craft in shoal waters off the coast. As it would happen, there would be two such *Province Galleys* throughout the rest of King William's War and Queen Anne's War.[29]

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[28] Elisha Cooke, Thomas Oakes. "An Answer to Sr: Edmond Andros's Acco: of the Forces Raised in New England for Defence of the Country against the Indians…" 30 May 1690, in "New England patents and grants, 1690", (Submission; Order, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/905 1690/01/03-1690/06/12).. http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_905_003

[29] Harriet Silvester Tapley, *The Province Galley of Massachusetts Bay, 1694-1716: A Chapter of Early American Naval History* (Salem: Essex Institute, 1922)pp. 1-2. and Chapin, *Privateer Ships,* pp. 108-109.

One contemporary critic complained that the initial *Province Galley* (which would later be replaced with a vessel of the same name) was a "small vessell about 70 Tuns...she carrys no Gunns close and to wit not be able to make any considerable Defence if [a number] should board for she may do sirvice upon some small priviters but is not compariable" to a prize vessel that the Royal Navy had captured the year before and that had been in the service of the province.[30] Despite this criticism, the *Province Galley* would prove to be a major addition to Massachusetts' defense capabilities. By the end of King William's War, Massachusetts Governor Stoughton was able to brag that the *Province Galley's* Captain Cyprian Southack and his crew were "constantly employed to cruise about the Capes and convoy vessels from Virginia, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, etc. between Massachusetts, Martha's Vineyard and Rhode Island. She has been of great service and the Commander has acquitted himself with great care and diligence, none of the vessels under his charge having miscarried." The *Province Galley* not only served as a provincial guard ship for Massachusetts, but as a regional guardian for English commerce throughout the northern Atlantic.[31]

Massachusetts was not alone in its commissioning of provincial warships during the first two imperial wars in the Americas, as West Indian governments frequently fitted out local defense fleets. Early twentieth historian Ruth Bourne argued that Anglo-American governments in the Caribbean during the Queen Anne's War were "helpless and open to the enemy, unwilling and almost unable to cooperate with each other." For Bourne, neither "local sloops, merchantmen, privateers, nor convoys adequately reenforced the few naval cruisers" in the West

[30] "Byfield's letter to Dudley about assemblies" 12 June 1694. (Correspondence, The National Archives, Kew, [[CO]] [[5/858]] 1694/06/12).
http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_858_011

[31] Lieutenant Governor William Stoughton to Council of Trade and Plantations, 30 September 1697 in. C*alendar of State Papers* **[hereafter referred to as CSP],** *Colonial Series, America and West Indies, 15 May, 1696-31 October 1697,* ed. J.W. Fortescue, (London: Mackie and Co. Ld., 1904), pp. 624-625. British History Online https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol15/pp611-626

Indies.[32] Despite this broad assertion, both primary evidence and subsequent scholars have emphasized the importance of provincial naval vessels in the West Indian theatre during King William's and Queen Anne's Wars.[33] The importance of these vessels was heightened by the fact that the region's Royal Navy forces struggled with tropical disease and a haphazard provisioning system.[34] Depletion of Royal Navy manpower and supplies meant fewer Royal Navy warships could defend the island colonies. Fewer Royal guard ships necessitated the presence of more provincial guard vessels.

With hostile French or Spanish forces often only a few islands away, West Indian officials frequently went to great expense to shore up coastal defenses while waiting for much-desired Royal Navy assistance. In a 1689 letter to the Lords of the Committee for Trade and Foreign Plantations (later known as the Board of Trade), the Leeward Islands' Governor Christopher Codrington lamented that his government was forced to levy a heavy "Tax of one million of Sugar" to supply infantry units and provincial naval vessels, but also bragged that a "Privateer and my own two Sloopes are arrived here with a French Briganteen and two French Sloopes...."[35] Codrington's letter reveals not only one common source of funding for provincial guardships—local commerce taxes—but also the vague distinction between provincial warships and "privateers." The malleability of terms describing government commissioned warships

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[32] Bourne, *Queen Anne's Navy,* pp. 32-33, 68-70.

[33] For an example of a scholar who notes the importance of provincial naval vessels in the West Indies, see Norton H. Moses "The British Navy and the Caribbean, 1689–1697," *The Mariner's Mirror,* Vol. 52, No. 1, pp. 13-40

[34] Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean*), pp. 160-161.

[35] Governor Christopher Codrington to Lords of Trade and Plantations, November 1689, The National Archives (Kew, U.K.). Hereafter The National Archives will be shortened to TNA. CO 153/4.

became so vague by Queen Anne's War, that one of Codrington's successors—Governor Daniel Parke—would refer to a government-commissioned private raider as a "publick privateer."[36]

While categorical haziness between "privateers" and "provincial navies" would persist throughout much of the next century, most provincial officials seemed to draw a distinction between government-operated naval forces and privately-commissioned warships. One of the most dramatic instances of this distinction came at the beginning of Queen Anne's War in 1702, when Barbadian authorities complained about the "inconveniences of granting Commissions to privateers at this time, for that the vessels taken up for the service of this Island and defending our coasts do want sailors," and decided to prevent privateer ships from sailing while officials fitted out provincial "vessels of war."[37] While privateers were useful for raiding enemy commerce, local governments often preferred to have at least some vessels under their immediate command during emergencies and sustained military expeditions.

While colonies throughout the English Atlantic built provincial navies to guard their commerce from enemy raiders whether or not Royal Navy forces were nearby, they also used provincial warships to spearhead expeditions against enemy ports and to support infantry operations on land. One clear example of provincial naval support of infantry operations occurred in the spring of 1703/4, when Massachusetts Governor Joseph Dudley expanded his colony's militia and naval forces, and ordered the famous colonial ranger Colonel Benjamin Church to assault French-aligned Wabanakis on the Maine borderlands.

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[36] Governor Parke's Reply to the 22 Articles of Complaint, 26 June 1709, in. *CSP*, Vol. 24, 1708-1709, ed. Cecil Headlam (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1922), pp. 370-408. British History Online. http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol24/pp370-408

[37] Minutes of Council in Assembly of Barbados, 8 September 1702 in *CSP Vol. 20,* 1702, ed. Cecil Headlam. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1912), pp. 581-588. https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol20/pp581-588

Dudley and his partners in the provincial assembly cooperated to establish a provincial naval pay scale entitled an "Establishm^{t} of the Pay for Vessels Taken up for War & Transports & Officers & Mariners Pay." Aside from the *Province Galley* itself and a couple of Royal Navy frigates, the Massachusetts government's financial establishment allowed the colony to fit out over twenty-five provincial warships and troop transports, and thirty-nine smaller whaleboats.[38] During the expedition, Church himself convinced the Royal Navy captains on his expedition that it was "very expedient and serviceable to the crown, that Captain Southack in the [*Province Galley]* should accompany them [on a patrol], which they did readily acquiesce with him in."[39] Far from resenting the presence of provincial vessels on campaigns, Royal Navy officers came to depend on them for vital assistance.

While provincial warships were useful for offensive naval patrols and offensive campaigns, colonial governments also used them for diplomacy with various coastal Native nations. For instance, in the spring of 1701 as war seemed more and more likely with France and Spain, the Massachusetts governor and council made various military preparations including reinforcing Castle William in Boston Harbor and the *Province Galley.* The *Province Galley* was to then escort government commissioners to "Casco bay, there to meet with and discourse the Eastern Indians; and to endeavour to hold them Steady to his Ma^{tys} Interests and That the value of One hundred Pounds be sent by them for Presents."[40] While provincial naval power could be used for "soft power" expeditions such as this diplomatic voyage, New England's provincial

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[38] Unnamed Editor, Notes to Chapter 112, *The Acts and Resolves, Public and Private, of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay, Volume VIII;, Being Volume III. of the Appendix, Containing Resolves, Etc. 1703-1707* (Boston: Wright & Potter Printing Co., 1895), pp. 337-338.

[39] Benjamin Church, *The history of King Philip's war ; also of expeditions against the French and Indians in the eastern parts of New-England, in the years 1689, 1690, 1692, 1696 and 1704. With some account of the divine providence towards Col. Benjamin Church* (Repr., Boston: Howe & Norton, 1825), p.235.

[40] Massachusetts Council Minutes, 2 May 1701, "Minutes of the council of the Massachusett's Bay from 9th January to 13th May 1701" (Minutes, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/788 1701/01/09-1701/05/13).]. http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_788_002

naval forces were also used for military strikes on the colony's Indigenous enemies. For instance, in May of 1705, the *Boston Newsletter* newspaper reported that Governor Dudley sent the *Province Galley* and another local vessel to pursue "5 or 6 Canoo's of Indians" that had attacked an English fishing shallop near Winter Harbor, Maine.[41] In essence, provincial navies were both useful for diplomatic missions and punitive expeditions with New England's Native American partners and opponents.

It is important to note that provincial naval protection of the coasts and support for offensive military expeditions did not occur in vacuums. In fact, even as Dudley's administration planned a major offensive against the Wabanaki, the Massachusetts government outfitted small sloops to guard merchant vessels between late 1703 and early 1704, and commissioned provincial warships to hunt down infamous privateer-turned-pirate John Quelch.[42] Massachusetts' ability to wage three different provincial naval campaigns and patrols within the space of a few months points to a growing provincial commitment to naval warfare as long imperial wars dragged on. Yet this did not come without economic and political costs. For instance, in July of 1704 Dudley bragged that the General Court had "very frankly granted [£23,000]" to the fitting out of Church's naval and land expedition, but neighboring colonies were slow to help. He worried that citizens within Massachusetts were "oppressed with hard marches and great taxes" while its neighbors did not share the burden.[43] As will be discussed below, concerns over taxes and insufficient naval assistance from other colonies were among the many larger sociopolitical and economic costs of provincial naval warfare.

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[41] *Boston News-Letter* (Boston, Massachusetts), no. 59, June 4, 1705: [2]. Readex: America's Historical Newspapers.

[42] Chapin, *Privateer Ships,* p. 148. Chapin notes that one of these sloops, the *Anne,* served with Church's expedition. For more information on Quelch's background, see Hanna, *Pirate Nests,* pp. 334-336.

[43] Joseph Dudley to the Board of Trade, 13 July 1704 in *CSP, Volume 22, 1704-1705*, Cecil Headlam, ed. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1916), 211-223. *British History Online* http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol22/pp211-223 .

While colonial governments constantly employed provincial navies to facilitate diplomacy, to hunt down enemy raiders and to assist military expeditions (often simultaneously), the most consequential and controversial deployment of provincial navies during these first two imperial wars would be naval assaults on enemy port cities. In victory or defeat, provincial naval and land assaults on cities like French Quebec or Spanish St. Augustine were always costly in terms of money, shipping, munitions, and most importantly manpower. The Massachusetts government's painless capture of the French Nova Scotian base at Port Royal (later Annapolis Royal) in early 1690 was uncharacteristic as far as colonial sieges went. In the late spring of 1690, Sir William Phips led a force of more than 700 men on five vessels (including the provincial navy vessels Six Friends, Porcupine, and sloop Mary) to capture the French port. After the force arrived on 9 May, the small French garrison surrendered the town and ramshackle fort without firing a single shot. Phips's men sacked the town and enjoyed the simple victory.[44]

While Port Royal had been relatively easy to capture, the subsequent New England assault on Quebec later that summer would be an utter failure. Without Royal Navy ships at their disposal, colonial officials from Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York planned a joint land assault on Montreal and Massachusetts-led naval assault on Quebec.[45] This autonomous military alliance was more of a necessity than a preference for local military expenditure and command. In fact, from the very moment William and Mary took the throne, both New York and Massachusetts had made constant appeals for Royal military supplies.[46] New Englanders in particular desired assistance from the Royal Navy as well. For instance, as early as March 1690,

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[44] Owen Stanwood, *The Empire Reformed : English America in the Age of the Glorious Revolution.* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), pp.157-159. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unh/detail.action?docID=3441958&pq-origsite=primo

[45] Miles, *Royal Navy,* pp. 49-50.

[46] Nagel, *Empire and Interest*pp. 25-30. University Microfilms International.

Bostonian Elisha Hutchinson argued that "If his maj:tie would please Speedily to furnish us with two ffrigatts and Amunition" the taking of French Canada would be possible.[47]

Despite the absence of Royal Navy ships, the expedition proceeded as planned. It is interesting that the editor of the first issue of the first newspaper ever published in English North America, the short-lived *Publick Occurrences* of Boston, boasted that that Massachusetts native Sir William Phips commanded a "Navy of two and thirty Sail; which went from hence the beginning of the last August" against Quebec.[48] Phips's massive colonial navy was largely made up of impressed vessels, was bankrolled by a large loan from Boston merchants, and involved as many as 2,300 soldiers and sailors.[49] Unfortunately for the Anglo-Americans, the land assault on Montreal never fully materialized, and the sea attack on Quebec failed due to late-Autumn storms, a lack of supplies, and over 400 casualties due to disease and shipwrecks.[50]

Authorities in Boston were distraught, and were quickly overwhelmed by angry mariners and soldiers, and a hefty expedition-related debt. Connecticut issued the first major taxes since Edmund Andros's rule, and the colony of Plymouth (which was soon to be subsumed by Massachusetts) raised taxes so high that they equaled nearly 10% of all taxed properties in the colony. Massachusetts' debt was compounded by the fact that its provincial authorities had borrowed so much from merchants, and some estimates placed its total debt at nearly £40,000. In response, the government in Boston took the controversial step of issuing paper bills of credit to

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[47] "Extract of a [Letter] to Mr. Elisha Cook," in "Extracts and abstracts of letters from Boston" (Correspondence, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/855 1690/03/29-1690/04/11) http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_855_078.

[48] *Publick Occurrences* (Boston, Massachusetts), September 25, 1690: [2]. *Readex: America's Historical Newspapers*.

[49]. "Massachusetts Documents, 1689-1692," ed. Robert Moody, pp. 252-255. Colonial Society of Massachusetts. https://www.colonialsociety.org/node/1786#rpt02. For information on the loan and on the number of soldiers and sailors, see Stanwood, *Empire Reformed,* p. 164.

[50] Miles,*Royal Navy,* pp. 49-50

stimulate the shattered economy.[51] One merchant, worried over the fervor of unpaid sailors and soldiers from the expedition, claimed "...we have found a way to stop ye mouths & aswage ye passion of y^{e}: soldiers & seamen by a new mint raised here of paper money...there are not many yt take it & they yt have it scarce know now what to do with it."[52] Despite these criticisms, scholars have long recognized that Massachusetts's novel adoption of paper money—partly inspired by provincial naval costs—set a standard for many other colonies to adopt paper currency to pay for immediate war-time measures throughout King William's War and Queen Anne's War.[53]

Not every provincial naval assault on enemy ports occurred without imperial assistance. In 1707, Massachusetts and Royal Navy forces attempted to capture French Port Royal (which had reverted back to French control in the previous conflict). After the expedition's defeat, a Scottish merchant and adventurer named Samuel Vetch campaigned for imperial officials to spearhead a major invasion of Louis XIV's Canadian strongholds.[54] Despite having largely ignored the Anglo-American war effort in the New World from 1702 to 1707, Whig authorities

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[51] For more problems with this paper currency, see Johnson *Adjustment to Empire,* New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1981. pp. 197-199.

[52] "News from New England" in "Extracts and news from New [[England]]", (Correspondence, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/856 1690/12-1691/02/05). http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_856_005

[53] Daniel Vickers, "The Northern Colonies: Economy and Society, 1600-1775," in *The Cambridge Economic History of the United States, Vol. I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 243-244, Retrieved from Google Books. Also see Dror Goldberg "The Massachusetts Paper Money of 1690." *The Journal of Economic History* 69, no. 4 (2009): 1092-1106 for how this strategy impacted future international usage of paper currency.

[54] Miles, *Royal Navy* pp. 56-57. Also see Vetch's 1708 pamphlet "Canada Survey'd…" in which he proposes a joint Royal Navy expedition with provincial transport ships to take Quebec See Samuel Vetch, "Canada Survey'd...," 27 July 1708 in *CSP, Vol. 24, 1708-1709,* ed. Cecil Headlam. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1922), pp. 40-56. British History Online http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol24/pp40-56.

in London took Vetch's proposals seriously due to an increasing war of attrition on the battlefields of Europe and thanks to pressure from various interested merchant groups.[55]

By 1709, imperial officials approved Vetch's plans to drive the French from Montreal and Quebec and expected provincial naval forces to play a major role. Queen Anne herself ordered Vetch to ensure that forces from New York, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania build "six or more large Boats" and contract with the Iroquois to build canoes to help transport soldiers. Additionally, Queen Anne requested that New England build various flat-bottomed transport vessels, and that provincial authorities provide "able Pilots, whereof Cap[t] Southweek [sic] to be one, & to go in his own Galley…"[56]

That Queen Anne (or one of her Royal officials acting in her name) knew Southack by name is unsurprising considering the queen's predecessor, King William, had personally rewarded Southack for effective privateering against the French in early 1693/4.[57] What is striking, however, is her outright support of and dependence on provincial and Native naval resources throughout the northern colonies to support the proposed expedition against French Canada. Unfortunately for Vetch and his colonial partners, imperial authorities cancelled the 1709 joint expedition without warning when peace talks seemed likely with Louis XIV that summer.[58] Vetch protested that preparations had been costly, and that "our transports, flatt-bottom'd boats, whale-boats, as well as our troops being all ready att 12 hours warning; and because the fleet is so long a coming that the lateness of the Expedition may endanger some of

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[55] James D. Alsop, "Samuel Vetch's 'Canada Survey'd': The Formation of a Colonial Strategy, 1706-1710." *Acadiensis* 12, no. 1 (1982): pp. 45-46. https://www.jstor.org/stable/30302714. Also, Adam Lyons: *The 1711 Expedition to Quebec: Politics and the Limitations of British Global Strategy (*New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), p. 27. Google Play eBook.

[56] "Instructions to Coll. Vetch to be observed in his Negociations with the Gov'r of the several colonies dated March 1st. 1708/9" (Order, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/9 1709/03/01). http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_9_023

[57] Chapin, *Privateer Ships,* p. 83.

[58] Satsuma, *Britain and Colonial Maritime War,* p. 118.

the ships in their return to be blown off the coast…"[59] Anglo-American and Iroquois diplomats traveled to London and convinced a new Tory administration in 1710 to recommit to Vetch's plan.[60] Royal officials sent two frigates and a bomb vessel from England to assist provincial forces take Port Royal, and three station frigates from New York and Boston joined the attack in early 1710.[61]

For the first time on the North American continent, significant provincial and Royal Navy forces assaulted a major target together. The fact that provincial naval forces would defer to Royal Navy command is evident when Dudley and his Council advised that the *Province Galley* be "Disposed in the fleet at the Direction of the Commadore so Soon as they Shall be ready to proceed."[62] Royal Navy officials themselves asked for specific provincial naval support. For example, the captain of the H.M.S. *Dragon* asked the Massachusetts council for a local sloop to act as a "tender" to the Royal Navy vessels on the expedition.[63] All told, over thirty provincial transports with 3,500 troops from New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Massachusetts joined Royal Navy vessels and the *Province Galley* in the successful capture of Port Royal in the autumn of 1710.[64]

While provincial and imperial authorities alike rejoiced over the successful campaign, victories were not always guaranteed for even the largest joint expeditions. The following year, another Anglo-American campaign against Quebec failed after a major storm destroyed much of

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[59] Col. Samuel Vetch to [?the Earl of Sunderland.], 2 and 12 August 1709, in *CSP, Volume 24, 1708-1709*, ed. Cecil Headlam, pp. 437-457. British History Online https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol24/pp437-457

[60] Lyons, *1711,* p. 28.

[61] Miles, *Royal Navy and Northeastern North America,* pp. 57-58.

[62] Council Minutes, Massachusetts, 19 July 1710, in "Minutes of council of the Massachusetts Bay, Jul-Nov 1710" (Minutes, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/791 1710/07/01-1710/11/10). http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_791_004

[63] Council Minutes, Massachusetts, 7 August 1710

[64] David Marley, *Wars of the Americas: A Chronology of Armed Conflict in the New World, 1492 to the Present* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1998), pp. 233-234.

the Royal and provincial fleet.[65] Even before the storm, the disastrous operation was rife with desertion, and internecine disputes between Royal and provincial military officials over supplies and perceived dedication to the expedition.[66] In particular, Royal military officials accused New Englanders of not providing sufficient naval support for the expedition—a barb more often fired by provincial authorities at the Royal Navy than the reverse.[67]

While all the discussions of provincial naval warfare thus far have involved planned naval expeditions, Anglo-Americans often relied on impromptu and temporary impressment or hiring of vessels—*emergency fleets*—to ward off immediate threats. One of the clearest cases of this phenomenon occurred in Charles Town, South Carolina in the summer of 1706. A Franco-Spanish invasion force—emboldened by news that a yellow fever epidemic had weakened Charles Town's defenders—launched a major assault on the seaport.[68] It is uncertain what level of resistance the Franco-Spanish invaders expected, but they were likely aware that the colony was a proprietary English colony without a Royal Navy guard ship.[69]

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[65] Lyons, *1711,* pp. 133-134. See the rest of Lyon's book for more information on strategic and operational failures during the expedition.

[66] Lyon, *1711,* p. 151 and Douglas Edward Leach, *Roots of Conflict: British Armed Forces and Colonial Americans, 1677-1763* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1986), Kindle eBook edition, pp. 46-53.

[67] Nagel, *Empire and Interest,* p. 286 and Lyons, *1711,* pp. 156-157. For more information on the funding dispute with the *Province Galley,* see Sinclair Hitchings, "Guarding the New England Coast: The Naval Career of Cyprian Southack," pp. 43-59, in *Publications of The Colonial Society of Massachusetts Volume 52: Seafaring in Colonial Massachusetts, A conference held by The Colonial Society of Massachusetts November 21 and 22, 1975* (Boston: The Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 1980). Colonial Society of Massachusetts [https://www.colonialsociety.org/node/1970

[68] Note: Much of the South Carolina material for the first two chapters of this dissertation has been adapted from a manuscript I have submitted for publication at an academic journal, entitled "Pirates, Politics, and Provincial Navies: Colonial South Carolina and Its Naval Forces, 1700-1719."

Theodore Jabbs, *South Carolina Colonial Militia, 1663-1733.* (Ph.D. diss., Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1973), pp. 260-262. Kenneth R. Jones discusses the three major sources that described this battle in his article " A 'Full and Particular Account' of the Assault on Charleston in 1706," *The South Carolina Historical Magazine,* Vol. 83, No. 1 (Jan., 1982), pp. 1-11. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27567719. Jones includes a transcription of the primary source "A Full and Particular Account of an Invasion Made by the French and Spaniards upon South Carolina, with the Disappointment and Disgrace they Met With in it, Contain'd in a Letter from Charles Town, in Carolina, September 12, 1706."

[69] Walter B. Edgar, *South Carolina: A History* (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), pp. 39-40. And Alan Taylor, *American Colonies: The Settling of North America* (New York: Penguin, 2001), p. 226.

With an advanced warning from a New York privateer in the area, Governor Nathaniel Johnson organized a council of war, readied militia forces on land, and the "Vessels that lay in harbour were ordered to be fitted (viz) three ships one Briganteen & two Sloops + a fire ship…" The fact that Johnson "ordered" these vessels to defend the colony implies they were impressed on the spot. Johnson commissioned Rhett as a Vice Admiral of this emergency fleet, and Rhett "hoisted ye Union Flag on board ye Crown Galley."[70] Rhett's usage of that flag is particularly noteworthy considering its legal and political implications. Under English law, only Royal Navy vessels could fly the Union Jack. Merchant vessels were limited to flying a similar banner with a "white escutcheon" in the center.[71] By flying the "Union Flag," Rhett flouted imperial law, but perhaps intended to represent his makeshift fleet as the legitimate substitute for distant English forces.

Ultimately, Rhett's makeshift fleet of impressed merchant ships was successful. Upon seeing Rhett's hasty armada, the Franco-Spanish fleet retreated "in great hast + Confusion…" without any resistance. Soon thereafter, Rhett took command of both the New York privateer ship and a local sloop to chase off scattered Spanish vessels. Even with the impressment of the aforementioned merchant ships, more volunteers joined Rhett in this final assault. One contemporary bragged of the "severall Gentlemen and others who were willing to share in the Danger and [honor] of that design…" Rhett's naval forces were so successful that another observer boasted that with the "Providence of Almighty God," the colony's foes "like a Second Spanish Armada" met with destruction before the "flourishing colony."[72] While not every

[70] "An Account of the Invasion of South Carolina by the French & Spaniards in the Month of August 1706," in *Records in the British Public Record Office Relating to South Carolina 1701-1710,* indexed by A.S. Salley (Columbia, Historical Commission of the State of South Carolina, 1947.1947), pp. 161-5.

[71] See Barlow Cumberland, *History of the Union Jack and Flags of the Empire* (W. Briggs, 1909), Pp. 281-282 and Chapin, *Privateer Ships*, pp. 10-11

[72] "An Impartial Narrative of ye Late Invasion of So Carolina by ye French + Spaniards, in the Month August 1706" in *Records in the British Public Record Office Relating to South Carolina, 1701-1710* pp. 181-185.

emergency fleet in colonial America stopped enemy invaders with such ease, Rhett's straightforward success against a joint European invasion with mere merchant vessels and militia forces attests to the utility of makeshift provincial naval defenses throughout the first two imperial wars.

Ultimately, as two long imperial conflicts raged between 1689 and 1713, the traditional New England habit of fitting out local defense vessels became an Atlantic world phenomenon. Colonists from New Hampshire to Barbados built semi-permanent guard vessels and impressed emergency fleets to conduct diplomacy, hunt pirates, assist the Royal Navy, besiege enemy settlements, support offensive operations, and to defend ports from imminent attack. While these provincial navies were useful for military purposes, these expensive fleets would also amplify internal colonial controversies and challenge the fragile relationship between periphery and center in the nascent British Empire.

The Social and Economic Costs of Provincial Navies

Provincial navies often had social, political, and economic costs beyond what any colonial government had anticipated or expected. Although provincial governments built local fleets with the ostensible goal of defending their coastlines, the expenses and stresses associated with naval warfare amplified internal disputes over taxation, religion, race, and class. On a larger scale, provincial reliance on local naval defense and the Royal Navy's inadequate protection of Britain's possessions in the New World highlighted larger weaknesses in the imperial-provincial military relationship.

Perhaps fewer historical examples better highlight the wider sociopolitical ramifications of provincial naval defense than the dramatic fate of Edmund Andros's provincial navy after the Glorious Revolution of 1689, and the even more eventful story of his provincial sloop *Mary*. In June 1689, not long after New England rebels deposed Andros and dispersed his military forces, pirates began to attack local commerce. Provisional Governor Bradstreet and other officials ordered that "one Suitable Vessel be forthwith fitted out to Clear our Coast of Pyrats, which may be after Improved to transport Souldiers, Ammunition, and provisions for the Eastern Expedition, and from thence to Range the Coasts of Arcadia to Secure our fishing Vessels."[73] Because Boston authorities refused to restore the local Royal Navy guard ship (due to its captain's alleged Jacobitical and pro-Andros sentiments), they decided to use Andros's remaining provincial vessels to hunt pirates.[74]

In August, provincial officials decided to send Captain Joseph Thaxter with the provincial sloop *Resolution* to go hunting for a pirate named Thomas Pound who had captured two vessels off the coast.[75] Intriguingly, Pound was the former captain of the provincial sloop *Mary and* had even served as a pilot for the now-deposed Royal Navy Captain George. It is worth noting here that provincial authorities rotated captains and officers of provincial ships on a frequent basis. After an initially unsuccessful hunt, in late September provincial authorities sent Captain Samuel Pease with the sloop *Mary* to search for the same vessel's former-captain-

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[73] "Massachusetts Documents, 1689-1692," ed. Robert Moody, p.100 https://www.colonialsociety.org/node/1776

[74] John Henry Edmonds, *Captain Thomas Pound,* (Cambridge: John Wilson and Son, 1918), pp. 31-32. Ironically, the same anti-Catholic anxieties and prejudices that led New Englanders to overthrow Andros also led them to limit their naval defenses to small provincial sloops. For the connection between anti-popery and the Glorious Revolution and King William's War, see Stanwood, *The Empire Reformed*

[75] The sloop *Resolution* was used by provincial forces early on, but in *Captain Thomas Pound,* John Henry Edmonds claims that "somehow or other [it] had got [sic] into private hands" (p. 34). In *Privateer Ships and Sailors (*p. 96), Howard Chapin claims that the *Resolution* was sold by 1693.

turned-pirate.[76] Pound's forces, confident of their prowess, sent word to Boston via one of their victims that they would slaughter the entire crew of any "government sloop" sent out against them.[77]

By early October, Pease and the crew of the *Mary* discovered and overpowered Pound's pirates near Martha's Vineyard, but Captain Pease lost his life in the battle. Ultimately, the Boston court only executed the pirate responsible for killing Pease, and spared Pound and the rest of his men.[78] New England divine Increase Mather praised that "small Vessel of Brisk *Bostoneers*, who in Their Majesties Name and under Their Colours, maintained a Bloody Fight with the Rogues and took them…" but alleged that Captain George of the H.M.S. *Rose* supplied the pirates with ammunition. It is not clear if this accusation is true, but some contemporaries including one of the accused pirates substantiated this claim.[79]

At the start of the new decade, New England agents defended their political revolution against Andros before the new king in London (William III), and also traded barbs with their former provincial overlord over his handling of the region's coastal defense. In an undated letter from Bradstreet to the king, the aged governor detailed his plans to send Andros back to England, asked for the restoration of Massachusetts' original charter, and briefly noted that he had been "necessitated to grant Commissions to suppress, bring in and secure" Pound and other

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[76] Chapin, *Privateer Ships* p. 96. Chapin contests John Henry Edmonds's argument that Pound's piracy was a mere cover for his political opposition to the Glorious Revolution.

[77] Edmonds, *Captain Thomas Pound,* p. 33.

[78] Alan Rogers, *Murder and the Death Penalty in Massachusetts* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2008), pp. 15-16.

[79] Increase Mather, "A Vindication of New England" in. *The Andros Tracts: Being a Collection of Pamphlets and Official Papers... Volume 6*, ed. William Henry Whitmore, Boston: Prince Society, 1869), p. 37. See Edmonds, *Captain Thomas Pound,* for that historian's view that Pound was part of a larger farcical attempt by some colonial leaders to get the Massachusetts government to restore the H.M.S. *Rose.* No other historians have concurred with Edmonds's claims.

pirates.[80] In contrast to Bradstreet's promise that he was doing all that he could to hunt pirates, Andros blamed the new Massachusetts government for coastal insecurity. He took responsibility for the initial creation of the colony's provincial navy, including the *Mary* and *Speedwell*) alongside two private vessels before the "subversion" of his regime. Andros complained that the rebels dispersed his forces, which led to Franco-Indigenous incursions that endangered the lives of Anglo-American colonists on the northern borderlands, the fisheries, and even the New England forests that helped supply raw materials for the Royal Navy. Without King William's intervention, Franco-Indigenous forces would destroy colonies that lacked "Provisions...Ships, Vessells, Seamen, and other Necessarys in New England Capable to supply or Transport any force…"[81]

Massachusetts's agents in London contested Andros's criticisms, and insisted that Andros himself had mismanaged provincial naval forces during his controversial reign. They alleged that one of Andros's Catholic military officers "had [been] suspected to be in a Plott for deserting and runing [sic] over with the Sloop Mary to the French." They further accused Andros of mismanaging the provincial navy, namely having impressed private vessels for inane tasks without planning to use these forces for extensive coastal defense. Finally, they argued that Andros never paid his sailors, which added to the myriad internal issues in the colony. These accusations highlighted Massachusettsans' growing anxiety over a suspected Franco-Catholic conspiracy to destroy their godly commonwealth.[82]

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[80] "The humble Address and Petition of the Governor and Councille and the Representatives of the Colony of the Massachusetts Bay; convened in General Court at Boston" in *The Andros Tracts: Being a Collection of Pamphlets and Official Papers, Vol. II*. Ed. William Henry Whitmore (Boston: The Prince Society, 1874), pp. 43-44.

[81] "Sir Edmund Andros' account of the force raised in the year 1688 for the defence of New England against the Indians"…

[82] "An Answer to S^{r}: Edmond Andros's Acc^{o}: of the Forces Raised in New England for Defence of the Country against the Indians & c in the year 1688"…

While Massachusetts's agents resented what they believed were Andros's lies, they would soon face a much more material challenge connected to the revolt of 1689. New York's newly appointed governor, Henry Sloughter, insisted that one of the Boston government's two publicly funded sloops (likely referring to the *Mary* and *Speedwell)* should be given to his colony since Andros had commissioned them under the guise of the Dominion of New England—the mega colony which New York had just recently been a part of. Based on the advice of the Lords of the Committee for Trade and Foreign Plantations (the future Board of Trade that would handle colonial affairs), in April 1690 King William ordered that one of the publicly funded sloops be sent to Sloughter.[83]

What ensued was a lengthy transatlantic argument over who owned the first provincial navy that Andros employed in 1688, whether they were publicly funded by taxpayers or not, and which vessels were in service by the time King William intervened in these disputes in early 1690. The sources are often too contradictory or clear enough to make sense of.[84] Perhaps this is

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[83] "At the Court at Whitehall, the 26th: Aprill 1690" in "New England patents and grants, 1690," pp. 229-30. (Submission; Order, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/905 1690/01/03-1690/06/12). http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_905_003

[84] In *Privateer Ships and Sailors,* pp. 95-96, Chapin very simply remarks that Bradstreet's government refused to surrender the *Mary* and had already sent the *Speedwell* to England. When I examined the original documents however, I was struck with how they were rife with many documentary and logical inconsistencies. While the actors frequently omitting the names of the disputed vessels certainly added to the confusion, many of the sources simply don't supply a comprehensible narrative of the dispute. For instance, a year after King William ordered Bradstreet to give Governor Sloughter one of the sloops, Bradstreet claimed that Andros never had sloops built at the "publick charge," but had made use of one sloop (presumably the *Mary).* Bradstreet alleged that the *Mary* had been jointly funded by New England governments before New York was added to the Dominion, and had another sloop (presumably the *Speedwell*) in construction when the revolution happened. Neither Andros, the New England agents, or Bradstreet made mention of the *Resolution* sloop--a third provincial sloop. Evidently, both the *Speedwell* and the *Resolution* were sent to England and sold by provincial agents. To add to this contradictory morass, Governor Sloughter wrote the king to inform him that he had received the *Mary,* but then immediately dispatched a vessel to seize the *Mary* even after he admitted acquiring the vessel. What is clear from the chaotic sources is that the only Dominion-era vessel left in Boston as of 1691 was the sloop *Mary,* captained by John Alden.

For some of these sources, See "Letter concerning a sloop of war" (Correspondence, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/856 1691/05/08). http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_856_040 , "Account of moneys disbursed and paid for a new sloop built by John Cooke for their majesties service" (Financial Document, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/856 1691/05/08). http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_856, and "Exceptions to

unsurprising considering the sociopolitical chaos that has followed political revolutions throughout history. Nevertheless, by 1691, Governor Sloughter's successor in New York had at least considered sending one of the Royal Navy's hired sloops, the *Archangel,* to go and seize the sole remaining sloop from Andros's fleet—the *Mary.*[85] While it appears that this seizure never happened, it is worth noting that extended debates over small provincial warships not only complicated the fallout from Massachusetts' experience during the Glorious Revolution, but nearly led to bloodshed between New Englanders and Royal Naval forces from New York.

If Massachusetts authorities thought their legal troubles with the sloop *Mary* were over, they were sadly mistaken. While the *Mary's* former captain Thomas Pound had turned to piracy, its new skipper John Alden faced charges of witchcraft in the Salem witchcraft trials of 1692. In the years leading up to the witchcraft crisis, provincial authorities entrusted John Alden with various missions on the northern borderlands, including helping to free captives from Franco-Indigenous forces. Critics claimed that Alden had done little to help captives, and only wished to trade with New England's enemies. This became especially apparent when Alden fled with ransom money for captives held by French authorities in 1691, and when he attacked a French vessel despite being granted safe passage by French negotiators. Alden's selfishness led to the continued captivity of various provincial officials, including his own son (John Alden, Jr.). It is possible that this corrupt behavior, coupled with accusations that Alden was responsible for an

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the Province Acco^t of John Phillips Esqr Late treasurer" in *The Acts and Resolves, Public and Private, of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay, Vol. VII* (Boston: Wright & Potter Printing Co., 1892), pp. 409-410. and Increase Mather, The Present State of the New English Affairs, 3 September 1689, in *The Andros Tracts: being a collection of pamphlets and official papers issued during the period between the overthrow of the Andros government and the establishment of the second charter of Massachusetts, Vol. III, ed.* William Henry Whitmore (Boston: The Prince Society, 1868-1874), p. 62.

[85] *Calendar of Historical Manuscripts, in the Office of the Secretary of State, Part II,* ed. E.B. O'Callaghan, (Albany: Weed, Parsons and Company, Printers, 1866), p. 226. And "Archangel" at Three Decks-Warships in the Age of Sail Database https://threedecks.org/index.php?display_type=show_ship&id=14445 [Accessed 2 December 2019].

Indigenous attack on York, Maine (and other miscellaneous charges including the fact that he had Indigenous lovers) inspired girls in Salem to accuse him of having a leading role in satanic rituals alongside accused-warlock and former minister George Burroughs.[86]

While misdeeds on the northern borderlands may have inspired some of the accusations against Alden, historians have long seen the accusations against Alden within the context of larger provincial fears of incompetence or malevolence among the region's leaders during the turbulent early years of King William's War. Paul Boyer and Stephen Nissenbaum have made the case that accusations against Alden, who was one of the "best-known men in New England," came at a time when the girls in Salem were starting to accuse sundry provincial leaders of sorcery.[87] Mary Beth Norton has made the case that many of the accusers at Salem were childhood survivors of massacres in King Philip's War, and "saw Alden's collusion with the Wabanakis, devil worshippers who had devastated their families, as an indication of his fidelity to Satan."[88] Louise A. Breen contends that Alden's misdeeds while entrusted with his very real position of military authority coupled with his alleged role as an officer in a spectral legion of evil spoke to a growing "elite fear of pacts with Satan that could endanger the civil state" of New England.[89] All told, Alden's abuse of his position of authority within the colony's provincial navy led to fears that the region's coastal and spiritual security were both compromised. This fear was evident even before the 1692 witch craze, when the provincial government decided to

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[86] Louise A. Breen, *Transgressing the Bounds : Subversive Enterprises among the Puritan Elite in Massachusetts, 1630-1692* (Cary: Oxford University Press, 2001) pp. 203-208. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unh/detail.action?docID=3051842.

[87] Paul Boyer and Stephen Nissenbaum, *Salem Possessed.* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 32. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt6wpn71. For other treatments on Alden in the trials, see Benjamin C. Ray. *Satan and Salem : The Witch-Hunt Crisis of 1692* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2015), pp. 199-200 and John McWilliams, "Indian John and the Northern Tawnies." *The New England Quarterly 69, no. 4* (1996), pp. 588-590.

[88] Mary Beth Norton, *In the Devil's Snare: The Salem Witchcraft Crisis of 1692* (New York: Vintage Books, 2002), Kindle eBook. Loc. 3815.

[89] Breen *Transgressing the Bounds,* pp. 205-208

impose restrictions on his voyages with the *Mary* including forbidding him to transport trade goods or extra ammunition that might be given to the enemy, etc.[90]

During the trial, Alden put up a fiery resistance to both the judges and his accusers—some of whom were young girls and women descended from victims of Indigenous raids. When the accusers claimed that he made them fall to the ground by looking at them, Alden boldly asked the judge Bartholomew Gedney why he did not face a similar fate when he looked at him. Despite his initial plan to resist the witchcraft charges in the court room, Alden made the wise choice of escaping from confinement, weathered out the trials, and lived to be eighty years old.[91]

Despite Alden's ultimately happy fate, mistakes made during his provincial naval service contributed to the dramatic and lethal climate surrounding the infamous trials. Ultimately, from 1689 to 1692, Massachusetts's small provincial navy played an oversized role in amplifying colonial disputes surrounding the Glorious Revolution, battles with pirates, intercolonial rivalries, and even the Salem witchcraft trials. These examples showed the widespread impact provincial navies played in the first major imperial contests of this era.

If the sociopolitical ramifications of provincial naval warfare were high, so were the economic costs. In fact, the upkeep of a provincial warship could be just as expensive as the costs of paying a provincial militia unit. For instance, on 3 October 1704, Governor Joseph Dudley and his council ordered the colony's treasurer to pay £191 to Captain Nathaniel Jarvis and the crew of the brigantine *John & Abiel*—a private vessel that had been hired as a "Vessel of War, in the late Expedition into the Bay of Fundey." This accounted for 113 days of crew wages and vessel hire costs between April and August of 1703. The sum was reduced to £167 to

[90] Norton, *In the Devil's Snare,* Loc. 3719-3751.
[91] Ray. *Satan and Salem* pp. 199-200 and Breen, *Transgressing the Bounds,* p. 208.

account for supplies taken from the commissary. That same day, Dudley's council ordered the treasurer to pay a militia company £90 for a month of wages between June and July of 1703.[92]

While it is true that the government paid the infantry company more money for a shorter service period, one must also consider that the colony had to pay for the constant upkeep and repair of its provincial warships as well. For instance, on 4 September 1702, Dudley and his council ordered the treasurer to pay Captain Cyprian Southack and various Boston businessmen £294 for "materials as cables, Sails, a new Boat...for his Maty Ship the *Province Gally*...and for workmanship of Carpenters and others in fitting said Ship...and Provisions for victualling the same."[93] Ultimately, the construction, hiring, upkeep, and provisioning of provincial naval vessels could rival if not exceed the costs of maintaining provincial regiments on land.

The Barbadian government's troubled attempt to keep a flotilla of guardships in 1702 and 1703 highlighted the economic and social woes a large provincial navy could bring even in the wealthiest of England's sugar colonies. In August of 1702, the Barbadian assembly resolved "that a levy of 6d. a head on negroes, be raised for a fund for setting out ships of war, and also that 6d. per tun on every ship arriving to this island shall be levied…" The next day the Barbados Council and Assembly together agreed to pass an act to encourage privateers, and to impress guns and men "for fitting out two vessels of war," and believed it was "lawful and justifiable, it being" for Her Majesty, Queen Anne's service.[94] Provincial officials proceeded to compile an

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[92] Council Minutes, Massachusetts, 9 October 1704, "Minutes of the Massachusetts council, Jun 1704 - Mar 1705" (Minutes, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/789 1704/06/06-1705/03/03). http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_789_015

[93] Council Minutes, Massachusetts, 4 September 1702, "Minutes of the council of the Massachusett's Bay from 30th May to 17th September 1701" (Minutes, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/788 1701/05/30-1701/09/17). http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_788_003

[94] "Minutes of Council [in Assembly] of Barbados," 25-26 August 1702, and "Journal of Assembly of Barbados," 25 August 1702, in *CSP, Vol. 20, 1702*, ed. Cecil Headlam. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1912), pp. 548-566. British History Online. http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol20/pp548-566.

impressive fleet of four galleys, sloops, and brigantines.[95] By early September, even as both legislative houses of the Barbadian government contemplated impressing men from privateer vessels because of manpower shortages, the Assembly paid for another vessel—the brigantine *Larke.* Around that same time, provincial officials fired Captain John Smith from his role as skipper of the provincial sloop *Constant Jane.* His sailors complained that he had beaten them during an attempt to impress them into provincial service.[96]

With rising costs, dismissals of officers, and complaints from sailors, it was becoming apparent that this provincial navy brought more woes for the Barbadian government than it was worth. As if insufficient manpower and the abuse of sailors were not problematic enough, a week later the Barbadian Council and Assembly learned that the *Constant Jane* sloop had shipwrecked. Some in the government came to suspect that it was "wilfully run on shore by Thomas Driffield, Lt. of the vessel, and others" and initiated an investigation.[97] To add insult to injury for the provincial government, by the end of September the crew of the brigantine *Madeira* mutinied and ran away with the ship.[98] Nevertheless, despite these setbacks, the provincial government pushed on with matters of defense. Various assemblymen volunteered personal funds to repair a provincial vessel, and one official volunteered his own sloop to carry a warning about French privateers to a Royal Navy ship cruising with one of the island's brigantines. Civic volunteerism could be costly, however, and the Assembly filed a petition to

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[95] Chapin, *Privateer Ships,* p. 249.

[96] "Minutes of Council in Assembly of Barbados, 8 September 1702", and "Journal of the Assembly of Barbados", 9 September 1702, in Cecil Headlam, ed. *CSP Vol. 20,* 1702, . (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1912) pp. 581-588. British History Online http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol20/pp581-588.

[97] Minutes of Council in Assembly of Barbados, 15 September 1702 , in *CSP Vol. 20, 1702,* ed. Cecil Headlam, . (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1912).pp. 588-592. British History Online https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol20/pp588-592

[98] Chapin, *Privateer Ships,* p. 249.

London to consider the “growing charge of fitting out vessels of war to [Her Majesty’s] service…”[99]

Despite the fact that provincial navies amplified sociopolitical and economic crises within the British colonies, the Royal Navy’s meek presence in the New World continued to force colonial governments to rely on provincial naval defense. Throughout King William’s War and much of Queen Anne’s War, Royal military assistance to the colonies (particularly outside of the West Indies) had been extremely limited. Nevertheless, as seen above, even those few Royal Navy guardships in colonial seaports during this era did not guarantee coastal security. Disputes between provincial authorities and Royal Navy captains could break out over several issues, including traditional battles over the chain of command, the business ventures of Royal Navy officers outside the parameters of their military duties, and the ever-controversial issue of impressment.[100]

Arguments over Royal Navy impressment policies in particular would remain a major cause of provincial-Royal Navy tensions for decades even after Parliament’s passage of the ‘America Act of 1708,’ (a.k.a. The ‘Sixth of Anne’). With pressure from Caribbean merchant captains who lost untold numbers of sailors to Royal Navy press gangs, Parliament decided to act and limit Royal Navy impressment lest it damage lucrative Caribbean commerce. The Royal Navy was forbidden from impressing merchant sailors and privateersmen in the New World.

While the legislation may have been intended to ease provincial tensions with Royal Navy commanders, the Sixth of Anne created more problems than solutions for Royal Navy

[99] Minutes of the Council in Assembly of Barbados, 18 September 1702, and Journal of Assembly of Barbados, 19 September 1702, *CSP Vol. 20, 1702*, ed. Cecil Headlam. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1912).pp. 592-599. British History Online https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol20/pp592-599

[100] Leach, *Roots of Conflict,* pp. 235-243.

manpower. On the one hand, the law essentially limited Royal Navy commanders to the initial crews they left England with. On the other hand, the law did not specify whether or not provincial governors had the right to impress men for provincial naval service or for Royal Navy ships when requested. In response to numerous provincial queries over whether or not colonial governors had the right to initiate impressment, the Board of Trade gave inconsistent and vague answers. Westminster's silence over the full extent of the ban encouraged the Admiralty to ignore the prohibition and to continue allowing its officers to impress at will by the 1720s.[101] While the Royal Navy's leadership took until the 1720s to reinstate its impressment policies, provincial governments had never truly stopped the impressment of men and vessels into colonial service.

Aside from disagreements over impressment, personality conflicts between provincial governors and Royal Navy officers often exacerbated an already bad working relationship between colonial and Royal military officials. Once again, a dramatic encounter involving the provincial sloop *Mary* serves as an illustrative example of growing tensions between provincial and Royal military leaders in this era. When King William appointed Sir William Phips—the veteran general of the 1690 Quebec expedition—as Massachusetts's new governor in 1692, he gave him two Royal Navy ships—the H.M.S. *Conception Prize* (captained by Robert Fairfax) and the H.M.S. *Nonsuch* (captained by Richard Short). The captains and the governor disputed over joint failed business ventures, locations for coastal patrols, and over the provincial government's material support for the Royal ships. The breaking point in this strained relationship came when Phips asked Short to send Royal Navy sailors to serve on the provincial

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[101] Denver Brunsman, *The Evil Necessity: British Naval Impressment in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World.* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2013), pp. 107-112. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unh/detail.action?docID=3444100 and Satsuma, *Britain and Colonial Maritime War,* pp. 134-135, 145-146.

sloop *Mary,* and Short refused to help crew the provincial vessel. A physical altercation broke out between the two men on 4 January 1692/3 that would ultimately lead to Short's imprisonment by provincial authorities and the Royal government's eventual dismissal of Phips from his office.[102]

Despite consistent tension over other matters with the Royal Navy, it was Phips' forceful command to the Royal Navy to provide four sailors for the ever-unlucky sloop *Mary* that served as the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back. Provincial naval officers proved their loyalty to Phips in subsequent legal proceedings. The sloop *Mary's* current Captain Nathaniel Hatch and a fellow officer deposed in court that Governor Phips struck Captain Short only after the latter used "Impertinent reflecting words" and leaned very close to the governor's face.[103] On the same token, Phips had replaced Short with his gunner, Thomas Dobbs. Historians have suggested that he was a "favorite" of Phips, and it is unsurprising that Phips not only gave him the command of the *Nonsuch,* but also of the *Province Galley* by early 1694. It was in this latter capacity that Dobbs also testified on behalf of Phips.[104] Ultimately, Governor Phips' jealous battle for naval command with his Royal Navy station captains led to a near-riot on the Boston harbor front. This violent encounter and the participation of provincial naval officers in the legal proceedings

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[102] Miles, *Royal Navy and Northeastern North America,* pp. 110-124, 137.

[103] "Cap.[t] John March Comand.[r] of their Maj[ts] Fort at Pemaquid Called Fort William Henry & Cap[t] Nathan^ll Hatch Comand[r] of their Majesties Sloope Mary in behalf of S[r] William Phips," in "*Material relating to legal procceedings against]Sir William Phips, governor of Massachusetts Bay, by the Board of Trade, relating largely to several ships*" (Petition; Correspondence; Report; Minutes; [[Legal]] Document, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/858 1692/07/01-1694/01/19). http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_858_003

[104] See Miles, *Royal Navy and Northeastern North America,* pp. 135-136, Tapley, *The Province Galley,* p. 2, and "The Deposition of Cap[t] Thomas Dobins late Comander of their Maj[ties] Ship Nonsuch now Commander of their Maj[ties] Gally called the Province Gally…" in "Affadavits of various sailors and officials relating to the complaints of Jahleel Brenton and Richard Short against Sir William Phips" (Legal Document, The National Archives, Kew, [[CO 5/858]] 1692/07/01-1694/11/15). http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_858_020.

thereafter foreshadowed similar altercations that would occur between Anglo-American and Royal Navy officials throughout the Atlantic world in subsequent years.

While disputes between provincial and Royal Navy officers damaged the military partnership between periphery and center on a microlevel, inconsistent messages from London regarding future Royal military intervention would foster confusion on a macro level. While the Crown did slowly increase Royal military intervention in some sectors by Queen Anne's War, it never abandoned its "insistence on colonial military self sufficiency." [105] This ethos, along with the still-limited nature of Royal military assistance encouraged Anglo-Americans to continue to rely on their own provincial navies.

Ultimately, throughout King William's War and Queen Anne's War, Anglo-Americans came to depend more and more on temporary and semi-permanent provincial navies to secure their coasts and to wage offensive campaigns against enemy ports. While these forces were useful for immediate defense needs, their social and economic costs often outweighed their military utility. Despite these setbacks, continued imperial insistence on Anglo-American self defense coupled with poor relations with Royal Navy guard ships forced provincial authorities to continue to depend on these provincial navies throughout the first two imperial wars and beyond.

Beginning with the Glorious Revolution in 1689, Anglo-Americans from New England to the West Indies continuously improvised flexible systems of provincial naval defense. Spurred on by a largely inactive Royal Navy, governors, councils, and legislatures impressed, hired, and built provincial naval vessels to attack enemy ports, and to defend local shipping. While these acts were often done out of necessity, the creation of provincial navies frequently amplified

[105] Nagel, *Empire and Interest,* p. 291.

already existing imperial, religious, political, and social tensions between colonists, and between Anglo-American governments and the Royal Navy. Despite these drawbacks, Anglo-Americans frequently created provincial navies and emergency fleets outside the realm of better-studied privateers for immediate security and long-term gain.

While Anglo-Americans always preferred the protection of the Royal Navy, they came to find that during emergencies without immediate Royal help, they had no other resources to turn to but their own. At least in New England and Caribbean, even when large Royal Navy squadrons appeared in colonial ports, provincial governments still supplied vessels to supplement those vessels. By Queen Anne's War, Royal knowledge of provincial naval strengths had expanded so much that Queen Anne herself personally requested that various late-war expeditions be accompanied by Anglo-American naval officers like Cyprian Southack. After Queen Anne's War ended in 1713, imperial warfare technically ended between Britain and its enemies for twenty-six years. Nevertheless, the already troubled partnership between provincial navies and Royal military officials would be put to the test again when faced with dangerous and irregular maritime threats in this interwar period.

Chapter II. Provincial Navies and Irregular Warfare, 1713-1739

When Great Britain and its foes signed the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht that ended the War of the Spanish Succession, there were plenty of reasons why imperial officials hoped to avoid future wars with the French and Spanish. With the British South Sea Company's newly acquired rights to trade slaves to Spanish colonies coupled with the profitability of illicit trade with Spanish colonists, imperial planners in London discouraged aggression against the Spanish in the Americas to protect these fragile new trade avenues.[1] Additionally, even though Queen Anne's government had expanded its financial borrowing and taxation powers during the war, Britain's coffers were drained by the enormous costs of the conflict. Even though Britain possessed a total standing fleet of nearly sixty serviceable ships in the navy by 1714, it would not be in any position to wage a major war for some time.[2]

Despite post war weariness, various tensions—particularly over trade—throughout the Americas would constantly threaten this fragile period of imperial 'peace' from 1713 to 1739. Even with Spain's grant of the *asiento* to Britain along with the right to trade one shipment of goods to Spanish colonies per year, myriad English smugglers continued to trade with Spanish-American colonists in excess of this rule. Spanish colonial authorities allowed coast guard vessels known as *guarda costas* to seize English vessels with suspected Spanish trade goods on board. The potential for these seizures to boil into warfare emerged when Lord Archibald Hamilton--the governor of Jamaica—encouraged some extralegal reprisals against the Spanish

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[1] Satsuma, *Britain and Colonial Maritime War,* p. 187.

[2] John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp. 139-140. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7722/j.ctt14brsfm. Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean,* pp. 291-292. Clive Wilkinson, *The British Navy and the State in the Eighteenth Century* (London: Boydell & Brewer, 2004) pp. 68-69.

with his own privateers. Far from merely enforcing trade laws within Spanish territories, *guarda costas* frequently employed violence against English traders throughout the Americas. *Guarda costa* violence ranged from raiding English shipping within English territorial waters, to particularly barbaric attacks—including the noteworthy incident in which Spanish sailors cut off the left ear of the merchant Captain Robert Jenkins.[3] While some of these *guarda costas* had legitimate commissions from Spanish provincial officials, Anglo-Americans suspected that many of the Spanish captains feigned official support in order to justify outright piracy.[4]

Spanish authorities themselves faced many of the problems with coastal defense as their British opponents. The Spanish Crown was rarely willing to dispatch warships from the Spanish Armada (the Spanish Navy) to defend its West Indian possessions, and even those few large warships that did make it to the Caribbean were often ineffective in pursuing quick smuggler vessels.[5] By the 1680s, Spanish authorities in the West Indies began to create local fleets of small boats and vessels to defend their ports against attacks by buccaneers and to patrol against foreigners illegally harvesting logwood. These sort of Spanish provincial navies were deployed sporadically for the next forty years, but by the 1720s, Spanish authorities privatized the *guarda costa* fleets to save money—essentially making them privateers that thrived on seizing suspected foreign smugglers.[6]

Spanish coast guard violence against English sailors was accompanied by a major scourge of piracy in the second and third decades of the century. Without military employment

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[3] Richard Pares, *War and Trade in the West Indies, 1739-1763* (London: Frank Cass & CO LTD, 1963), pp. 11-14. Hanna, *Pirate Nests,* p. 411.

[4] Adrian Finucane, *The Temptations of Trade: Britain, Spain, and the Struggle for Empire* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), p. 71. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unh/detail.action?pq-origsite=primo&docID=4540258

[5] G. Earl Sanders, "Counter-Contraband in Spanish America: Handicaps of the Governors in the Indies." *The Americas 34, no. 1 (1977),* pp. 59-72. www.jstor.org/stable/980812

[6] John D. Grainger, *The British Navy in the Caribbean (*Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2021), pp. 120-122. https://www-jstor-org.unh.idm.oclc.org/stable/j.ctv1850j2f

after 1713, thousands of English sailors found work in Newfoundland fisheries or in log cutting in Belize. Scores of Anglo-American sailors also began independent and largely profitable campaigns against Spanish shipping. With rising opposition to illegal swashbuckling in formerly welcoming colonial ports, Anglo-American pirates also began to attack their own countrymen to fund their 'trade.'[7] From 1715 to 1725, in what historians have come to call the 'Golden Age of Piracy,' thousands of these renegade English sailors and mariners from other nations would use the weakly-governed Bahamas to pillage and plunder throughout the Atlantic world. [8]

Aside from constant raids by *guarda costas* and pirates in the West Indies, imperial and provincial officials also faced terrestrial and maritime threats from powerful Native American nations within the borderlands of Britain's continental empire. For nearly a decade after their former French allies ceded their Acadian lands to the English, Wabanaki mariners waged their own naval war against Anglo-American colonists well into the late 1720's.[9] Around the same time, Anglo-American officials in South Carolina faced terrestrial and maritime attacks by aggrieved Yamasee warriors after years of Carolinian trade corruption and enslavement of their Native American neighbors.[10]

Even as Anglo-American and imperial officials faced ongoing piratical and Native threats, they worried over the constant specter of the return of imperial conflict. On occasion during this epoch of 'imperial peace,' Great Britain and Spain engaged in limited open warfare with one another (from 1718 to 1721, and from 1726 to 1729). Because standard European

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[7]Hanna, *Pirate Nests,* pp. 366-367.

[8] Peter Earle, *The Pirate Wars* (Macmillan, 2003), pp. 158-161. Kindle eBook edition. There is considerable dispute about the proper periodization of the 'Golden Age of Piracy.' For the sake of this study, the 1715-25 framework is most applicable. For more on the scholarly debate, see Hanna, "Well-Behaved Pirates seldom make history: a reevaluation of the Golden age of English Piracy," in *The Sea in the Early Modern Era Essays in Honor of Robert C. Ritchie*, eds. Peter C. Mancall, Carole Shammas. (San Diego, University of California, 2015).

[9] Bahar, *Storms of the Sea,* pp. 160-162.

[10] Ivers, *This Torrent of Indians: War on the Southern Frontier, 1715-1728* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2016). Kindle eBook edition. p. 109

dynastic tensions were the official causes of these short conflicts, the British Empire made no significant initiatives in the Western Hemisphere.[11] Ironically, it would be during a time of tacit peace in the early 1730s when Britain made its most successful move against Spain: the creation of the Georgia colony.

This tense era also highlighted the continued pitfalls of Royal Navy intervention in the Americas. To be certain, the Royal Navy did make a number of important advances following the Treaty of Utrecht. Historian N.A.M. Rodger contends that during Robert Walpole's premiership in the 1720's and 30's, the "British Admiralty...achieved...the stability which had so long eluded it." Advances during this period included various financial innovations, the presence of naval experts within the First Lords of the Admiralty, the growth of naval yards throughout the empire (including at Jamaica and Antigua), and more organized supply procurement.[12] Additionally, from 1721 to 1722, the Royal Navy expanded its fleet of agile sloops in the West Indies to counter threats from pirates and *guarda costas*.[13]

Notwithstanding its many administrative advances, internal political controversies within Britain and the wide array of irregular threats throughout the Atlantic world limited the Royal Navy's effectiveness in the interwar period. At home, opposition to the Walpole administration grew after his lackluster and non-aggressive utilization of the Royal Navy during the late 1720s conflict with the Spanish. Historian Sarah Kinkel questions the notion that the Royal Navy was stronger than the French or Spanish navies in the 1720s and 1730s.[14] Along with these

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[11] Harding, *The Emergence of Britain's Global Naval Supremacy: The War of 1739-1748* (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2010), pp. 17-18. Jstor. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7722/j.ctt14brrf4. The dating of the second imperial conflict discussed in this chapter has been controversial among historians. Harding seems to mistakenly place the end of the second Anglo-Spanish conflict as 1727, when in reality (as will be seen below), it ended in 1729. I follow Shinsuke Satsuma's dating of 1726-9

[12] Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean,* pp. 294-303.

[13] McLaughlan, *Sloop of War,* pp. 143-144.

[14] Sarah Kinkel*, Disciplining the Empire: Politics, Governance, and the Rise of the British Navy* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2018) pp. 54-58. https://www-jstor-org.unh.idm.oclc.org/stable/j.ctv2867vn. Kinkel's

administrative limitations, several historians have also highlighted Britain's inability to curb the multitude of military threats during this period. Historian Eliga Gould makes that case that while the British Empire was effective in curbing maritime piracy in the 1720s, its fights with *guarda costas* and Natives on the continent "underscored the limits on Britain's ability to enforce its agreements with other European governments, one along the inland reaches of North America, the other in the coastal waters and shipping lanes of the Caribbean and the Western Atlantic."[15] Additionally, historian Jeffers Lennox has recently challenged Ian K. Steele's description of the Atlantic as a "highway that was crossed with increasing safety and regularity over the seventeenth and eighteenth century…" Jeffers contends that even if the British did develop mastery of "The Atlantic highway," Native maritime power and weak British naval defenses challenged imperial control over "local coasts and rivers" in the interwar period.[16]

For all these reasons, British imperial officials still required provincial naval support—particularly when it came to the war on piracy. Historian Mark Hanna describes the disruption of the Anglo-American 'Golden Age of Piracy' as a result of "one of the first unified imperial projects." For Hanna, this war on pirates pitted both the Royal Navy and "colonial captains" against pirates.[17] More recently, David Wilson has made the case that pirate-hunting was not a unified military effort. For Wilson, private "colonial expeditions were small-scale-and reactionary...necessitated by the failures of metropolitan measures to curb piracy" and were

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recent study contrasts starkly with Richard Harding's contention that by 1730 by "the apparent power of the Royal Navy in the Caribbean was seen to be so great that merchants wanted operations curbed to prevent the Spanish trade being destroyed." See Harding, *Seapower and Naval Warfare,* pp. 189-192.

[15] Eliga Gould, *Among the Powers of the Earth : The American Revolution and the Making of a New World Empire*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), pp. 91-92. ProQuest Ebook Central. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unh/reader.action?docID=3301062#

[16] Jeffers Lennox, *Homelands and Empires : Indigenous Spaces, Imperial Fictions, and Competition for Territory in Northeastern North America, 1690–1763,* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017). pp. 70-71, https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/cofc/detail.action?docID=4845014&pq-origsite=primo

[17] Hanna, *Pirate Nests,* p. 370.

"pragmatic responses by colonial governments…" Nonetheless, he contends, they often "proved much more effective in suppressing pirates than measures coordinated from the metropole."[18] While Hanna and Wilson disagree as to the level of coordination between metropolitan and provincial authorities in the war against piracy, they both highlight a growing scholarly awareness of the continued importance of provincial navies during the interwar period.

A note must be made here about the fluidity of the names of various maritime actors in this period. As has been previously mentioned, British authorities often accused Spanish coast guards of outright piracy and some scholars have recently demonstrated how New England officials called Wabanaki mariners "pirates" to delegitimize their foes as mere criminals.[19] Other historians have also categorized 18th-century piracy as one choice along a "continuum" of legal and illegal maritime activity.[20] Such categorical fluidity was present amongst provincial naval forces as well, particularly in the West Indies. As during the previous two imperial wars, colonial officials referred to provincial naval operations with language varying from "private men of war" to "guard sloops" to "privateers" to "publick privateers." With the onset of Spanish *guarda costas* after Queen Anne's War, some colonial officials even called their own provincial guard vessels by derivations of that title.

With strict definitions of privateering and piracy still very much up for debate in this period, it is unsurprising that Anglo-Americans continued to use many different names for their maritime defense options. As in the previous chapter, I argue there was a "provincial naval continuum" that ranged from state-funded and controlled warships to privateers with letters of

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[18] David Wilson "Protecting Trade by Suppressing Pirates: British Colonial and Metropolitan Responses to Atlantic Piracy, 1716-1726," in *The Golden Age of Piracy: The Rise, Fall, and Enduring Popularity of Pirates,* ed. David Head. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2018), pp.100-102. Google Play eBook.

[19] Bahar, *Storms of the Sea,* pp. 161-2.

[20] Kevin P. McDonald "Sailors from the Woods: Logwood Cutting and the Spectrum of Piracy," in. *The Golden Age of Piracy:* pp. 52-54

marque. While the argument over what made one a "privateer" versus a provincial "warship" was of minor importance during the interwar period, this debate would cause major legal tensions between imperial periphery and center in the future War of Jenkin's Ear.[21]

Between 1713 and 1739, Anglo-Americans fought a series of irregular conflicts with Native Americans, pirates, and Spanish *guarda costas* on the contested borderlands in Canada, Maine, South Carolina, and the West Indies. Spurred on by continued insufficient naval assistance from the parsimonious Royal government, provincial leaders relied on provincial navies to secure their coasts and Britain's still tenuous hold on its American maritime frontiers.

Provincial Navies and Imperial Borderlands: New England and Nova Scotia, 1715-1728

In the wake of Queen Anne's War, violent clashes with Native Americans on the South Carolina and Acadian/New England borderlands forced Anglo-American officials on opposite ends of the mainland colonies to utilize provincial naval forces in similar ways. These border wars coincided with the ongoing Golden Age of Anglo-American piracy, and it was not uncommon for officials in both regions to have to navigate a complex of Native, piratical, and traditional imperial threats all at the same time.

While Anglo-American officials in both regions continued to prefer elusive Royal military assistance, imperial authorities did little to ensure adequate Royal Navy protection for its many North American ports in the years following Queen Anne's War.[22] New England's (and by

[21] Mark Hanna maintains that British recognition of the legal difference between privateering and piracy had not even crystallized until the end of Queen Anne's War, in 1713. See Hanna, "Well Behaved Pirates," pp. 150-151. Historian David Wilson groups all of local pirate hunting missions together into "private colonial expeditions," which I follow to an extent here. See Wilson, "Protecting Trade," p. 98

[22] Wilson makes the point that South Carolina (like Rhode Island and Pennsylvania) was not guaranteed a Royal Navy ship as a proprietary colony. Massachusetts on the other hand had a station ship due to its status as a Royal colony. While this did not guarantee political stability (as we have seen in the last chapter), this would make a

extension Nova Scotia's) maritime expeditions against Native and piratical foes during this epoch demonstrated growing provincial naval self-reliance in the wake of inadequate Royal protection. This is not to say that provincial officials eschewed Royal assistance en total. For instance, when a pirate vessel was spotted off the coast during the spring of 1717, Massachusetts's governor dispatched "Capt. Cayley of His Majesty's Ship *Rose,* and Capt. Coffin in a Sloop well Arm'd and Man'd with 90 Men to go out in quest of the said Pirate."[23] Not long thereafter, however, the colony's House of Representatives voted to continue the sloop "in the Service for the Defence of the Coast" *until* the next Royal Navy ship was to arrive.[24] The Massachusetts legislature was willing to pay for a provincial sloop, but hoped to delegate the responsibility of naval defense on a Royal Navy frigate if possible.

Notwithstanding the preference for Royal Navy assistance, Anglo-Americans from Nova Scotia to Massachusetts found themselves largely alone in their borderland conflicts with the Wabanakis. After the English capture of Port Royal (later Annapolis Royal), Nova Scotia, in 1710, imperial officials for the first time had to face how to exercise control over French colonists (Acadians), and various Wabanaki tribes (including the Mi'kmaq, Abenaki, and Maliseets), all the while still dealing with military threats from French authorities.[25] When French officials deeded much of their former Acadian colony to the English at Utrecht in 1713, angry Wabanaki leaders initiated a decade-long maritime war against their Anglo-American neighbors throughout the coastline stretching from Newfoundland to Maine. Historian Matthew

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major difference when it came to anti-pirate expeditions and their political ramifications. See Wilson, "Protecting Trade," pp. 98-99.

[23] *Boston News-Letter* (Boston, Massachusetts), 27 May 1717: [2]. Readex: America's Historical Newspapers.

[24] Legislature Minutes, Massachusetts, 4 June 1717, in *Journals of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, 1715-1717* (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1919), pp. 186-187. Hathi Trust https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015062907996&view=1up&seq=7

[25] John Grenier, *The Far Reaches of Empire: War in Nova Scotia, 1710-1760* (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2008), pp. 12-15.

Bahar contends that while the Wabanaki raided English vessels in order to preserve their regional hegemony, English officials considered Indigenous assaults on English shipping in the region to be outright 'piracy.'[26]

The Wabanaki confederacy had nearly two centuries of experience in operating European vessels. As early as the sixteenth century, Wabanaki fishermen and mariners captured small sailboats called shallops that had been abandoned by European explorers. Throughout the following centuries, Wabanaki mariners stole or purchased similar small craft, and employed them in raiding or in trade missions. Interestingly, by the mid-seventeenth century, some Wabanaki naval officers even started to don European gentlemen's clothing to assert their social status as leaders of naval crews.[27]

By appearance, these raids mimicked the ongoing pirate scourge in the Caribbean in that Wabanaki mariners used light craft ranging from canoes to better armed shallops and sloops to swiftly move on their English prey.[28] While shallops and other small craft were the preferred craft of Native naval forces, their colonial pursuers in New England's provincial naval forces often had the same sort of craft. Historian Matthew Bahar's description of Massachusetts's "hulking, heavily armed, and consequently slow warships...[which] failed in their pursuit of more agile Indian mariners" over emphasizes the differences between both sides' vessels.[29] For instance, in 1723, a militia leader named Captain Heath led several men in whaleboats to ambush Wabanaki mariners in canoes. While many of the Natives escaped, the militiamen captured one "Canoo, one Gun, their Ammunition, and other stuff: the Canoo was shot through where the

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[26] Bahar, *Storm of the Sea,* pp. 160-162.

[27] Andrew Lipman, *The Saltwater Frontier : Indians and the Contest for the American Coast.* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015), pp. 80-82 http://search.ebscohost.com.nuncio.cofc.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=e900xww&AN=1088922&site=ehost-live&scope=site

[28] Bahar, *Storm of the Sea,* pp. 171-172.

[29] Bahar, *Storm of the Sea,* p. 127.

Indians sat…"[30] At the end of the day, both Wabanaki mariners and their provincial naval opponents relied on the same sorts of small sail-and-oared vessels to pursue their prey.

While independent Wabanaki raids could be devastating, tacit Franco-Acadian support of these raids amplified Anglo-American anxieties for their coastal security. Thanks to territorial vagueness in the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht, both Anglo-American and French officials claimed to own the island fisheries between the main peninsula of modern Nova Scotia and Cape Breton Island. In the treaty, the French had agreed to surrender 'Acadia'—a region that they believed only included mainland Nova Scotia. Interwar disagreements over the status of the Canso Island fishery just off mainland Nova Scotia led to a state of near war between French and Anglo-American authorities.

After Massachusetts dispatched a Royal Navy guard ship to destroy the French fishery at Canso in 1716, Governor Saint-Ovide of Île Royale on Cape Breton Island—with French Royal support—encouraged Mi'kmaq forces to attack New England vessels in return.[31] One dramatic episode in 1720 highlighted the dual threat posed by Franco-Indigenous raiders on the northern borderlands. An English report from Canso in the late summer detailed an attack by a "Company of Indians with some French assisting them." The raiders surprised the English residents in their beds, stole their valuables, and transported the goods on French vessels. Even though the French governor at Cape Breton promised to prosecute any of his countrymen involved, the English correspondent believed that there was a "plain Confederacy between the French and Indians, to ruin the people and fishery here." Subsequent interviews with French prisoners revealed that many of the Franco-Acadian sailors involved in the raid were fishermen angry over the loss of

[30] "Boston, April 15." *American Weekly Mercury* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), no. 176, May 2, 1723: [2]. Readex: America's Historical Newspapers.

[31] Grenier, *The Far Reaches,* pp. 40-45,

the French fishery at Canso.[32] By 1722, violent borderland tensions such as these would help fuel a four-year conflict with French-aligned Natives in the area known as 'Father Rale's War' (named for a renegade French priest) or 'Dummer's War' (so called for the governor of Massachusetts after 1723).

During the conflict, provincial naval forces would be vital to securing Britain's feeble hold on its northern borderland. In August of 1720, Nova Scotia Governor Richard Philipps was confident that he could save the British government significant money by hiring a sloop to guard the coast against Anglo-American smugglers attempting to covertly trade with the French.[33] Not long thereafter, he forwarded a petition from various colonists which described a merchant being forced to fit "out two small vessells in pursuit" of Franco-Indigenous robbers. The colonists had begged for "men, arms and ammunition to enable them to defend the "rights of the Crowne of England," and claimed that Native captains confessed to acting on official orders from the French-Canadian Governor Doucet. Alongside this account of provincial naval struggles with enemy raiders, Philipps sent a standard plea for Royal Navy assistance.[34] Interestingly, Philipps both asserted that Anglo-Americans *could* defend their shores independently, but reiterated their desire for outside aid.

Nova Scotians' ability to defend their own shores was not lost on imperial officials. In December of 1720, the Board of Trade suggested that Nova Scotia Governor Richard Phillipps

[32] *Boston News-Letter*, September 19, 1720: [4]. Readex: America's Historical Newspapers. And Governor Richard Philipps to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 27 September 1720 (and attachments), in Headlam, ed. *CSP, Vol. 32, 1720-1721* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1933), pp. 144-165. British History Online https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol32/pp144-165

[33] Governor Richard Philipps to the Council of Trade and Plantations, [6?] August 1720 in *CSP, Vol. 32, 1720-1721,* ed. Cecil Headlam. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1933), pp. 77-97. British History Online. https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol32/pp77-97

[34] Governor Richard Philipps to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 27 September 1720 in *CSP, Vol. 32, 1720-1721,* ed. Cecil Headlam. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1933), pp. 144-165. British History Online, . https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol32/pp144-165

should "be allow'd according to his own proposal to hire a sloop for the defence of that coast and the preventing of illegal trade there." [35] Despite grumbling over delivery times from Boston shipmakers, Governor Philipps did note that the "obtaining thereof [was] cheifly oweing to your Lordshipps."[36] Even if the Board of Trade was influential in Philipps obtaining a military vessel (the *William Augustus)*, differing imperial and provincial expectations for that vessel would cause transatlantic disagreements. Much of this is evident in Phillips' petition to the Board of Trade begging for financial compensation for the guard vessel's operating costs. According to Philipps, the Board of Trade asked Boston's Royal Navy post captain, Thomas Durell, to survey coasts around Nova Scotia and Placentia. Durell said that such a thing was "impracticable with [His] Majesty's ship under his command and advised that a small vessel might be built at Boston. This the Governor [Philipps] was instructed to do, and gave a letter of credit to Capt. Durell, who contracted for it at Boston."[37]

Even though the Lords of the Treasury were of the "opinion that the Governor Col. Philips's charges should be reimbursed by the Navy," the Lords of the Admiralty argued in 1724 that the Navy was not responsible for the sloop's costs. Describing what would be imperial policy for the next two decades, the Lords declared that they would not assist Nova Scotia with its provincial navy project because "when vessels have been fitted out by the Governors of his

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[35] Council of Trade and Plantations to Mr. Secretary Craggs, 14 December 1720 (No. 322), in*, CSP Vol. 32, 1720-1721,* ed. Cecil Headlam. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1933), pp. 212-228. British History Online https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol32/pp212-228

[36] Governor Richard Philipps to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 16 August 1721 in *CSP, Vol. 32, 1720-1721*, *ed.* London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1933), pp. 388-402. British History Online, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol32/pp388-402.

[37] "Petition of Governor Philipps to the King" in *CSP, Vol. 34, 1724-1725,* Cecil Headlam and Arthur Percival Newton, eds. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1936), pp. 86-105. British History Online. http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol34/pp86-105. Also see Sinclair Hitchings, "Guarding the New England Coast: pp. 58-61. and Jeffers Lennox, *Homelands,* pp. 70-71. Some sources (such as Hitchings above) call the *William Augustus* a "schooner," and contemporary sources call it a "sloop." During the interwar period, the Royal Navy operated some schooner-rigged vessels that were called "sloops," and it is likely the *William Augustus* fell into this category. See See McLaughlan, *Sloop of War,* p. 143

Majesty's Islands or Plantations abroad, the inhabitants have [always] borne the charge thereof." They did, however, make the meek promise that when Royal vessels were sent to guard the Newfoundland fishery that one of them would be "appointed to attend on Placentia and Nova Scotia" in winter months when it was too icy to operate in Newfoundland.[38] The Lords of the Admiralty made it known that Anglo-American authorities were allowed to fit out their own provincial navies, but that they were to fund and operate them on their own. This vague statement would reflect the Royal policy towards provincial navies for the next two decades.

It is important to note that the Royal Navy did not leave Nova Scotia entirely undefended during the troubles with the Wabanakis. W.A.B. Douglas writes that while the *William Augustus* and various governmentally hired privateers were vital for Canso's survival, the Royal Navy's occasional presence during the period also "played an important part in resolving the Anglo-French confrontation at Canso." To illustrate this point, he describes one case from late 1725 in which the new lieutenant-governor of Nova Scotia—Lawrence Armstrong—created a squadron of whaleboats to defend the Canso fishery. The diverse crews of these armed whaleboats included hired Native mariners from New England, Royal Navy sailors, and some of Armstrong's own forces.[39] Other scholars have also recognized provincial naval forces' and privateers' contributions to the Canso fishery's survival. Historian Jeffers Lennox has recently made the case that even though imperial authorities wanted the *William Augustus* to be used for survey purposes, imperial expectations clashed with provincial needs to fit out the vessel to protect undefended shipping routes. For Lennox, provincial and imperial disagreements over the

[38] J. Burchett to the Lords of the Treasury, 19 December 1723 (NO. 49) in "Volume 248: July 3-December 31, 1724," in *Calendar of Treasury Papers, Volume 6, 1720-1728,* ed. Joseph Reddington (London: Her Majesty's Stationery OFfice, 1889), pp. 276-298. British History Online. http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-treasury-papers/vol6/pp276-298

[39] W.A.B. Douglas, *Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy, 1713-1766* (Unpublished Diss., Queen's University, 1973, Microfilm), pp. 25-30.

William Augustus highlighted the lack of firm control that the British government had over North American waterways.[40] Anglo-Americans did use the opportunity, however, to "fill in the gap" and defend their own coasts in this case. Historian John Grenier has argued that the "funds that Philipps devoted to [the] *William Augustus* proved money well spent." Captain Cyprian Southack, previous captain of Massachusetts' *Province Galley* and subsequent captain of the *William Augustus*, defended the fishery from "Indian attacks and [kept] open a line of communication between Canso and Annapolis Royal."[41] Not for the first time, provincial authorities supported British imperial aims without Royal funds and with limited Royal Navy assistance.

Nova Scotia's southern neighbors in New England also harnessed their own provincial naval power to simultaneously fight Wabanaki mariners throughout Dummer's War and the ongoing scourge of Anglo-American pirates. Contemporary observers critiqued the New England colonies' naval response to this complex array of threats. For example, in June of 1722, James Franklin, a newspaper printer and older brother of the future founding father Benjamin Franklin, was arrested by Massachusetts authorities for mocking the colony's many delays in fitting out a vessel to hunt the pirate Edward Low.[42]

More recently, Matthew Bahar has written that it was only "exceptional colonists who gathered enough fortitude and firepower to hunt Indians at sea" but that they quickly "became the hunted." He cites a case where Governor Dummer commissioned a small provincial sloop and fishing shallop to pursue an Indigenous schooner, only for both vessels to return empty

[40] Lennox, *Homelands and Empires,* pp. 71-72.
[41] Grenier, *The Far Reaches, p. 63.*
[42] Hanna, *Pirate Nests,* p. 377. A special thanks to Dr. Eliga Gould for bringing my attention to this example.

handed and heavily damaged. [43] While colonial forces did make numerous tactical blunders in the war of 1722-1726, Anglo-American authorities throughout the New England colonies succeeded in mustering several make-shift fleets to simultaneously fight both Wabanaki and Anglo-American piratical enemies with limited Royal Navy assistance. Massachusetts' naval expansion at the beginning of the conflict in the summer of 1722 illustrates the region's ability to harness multiple naval resources to combat disparate threats on a whim.

On 6 June 1722, Massachusetts Governor Samuel Shute and his council discussed news from Rhode Island about a "Pyrate Vessel on the Coast" which had captured a vessel from Charlestown, Massachusetts. They ordered Royal Navy Captain Thomas Durrel to take the H.M.S. *Seahorse* on a cruise to hunt for the "said Pyrate Vessel, and to guard and to Protect this Coast."[44] By that point, Rhode Island's government had already sent two provincial sloops after the pirate.[45] On 7 and 8 June, a committee from both of Massachusetts's legislative houses decided to expand the hunt against the pirate and voted to impress a sloop, and appointed Captain Peter Papillion to lead the expedition. Aside from guaranteeing a month's worth of provisions and funding for one hundred men, the committee promised a fair share of the "Goods, Wares & Merchandizes...that Shall be found on Board...So far as is Consistent with the Acts of, Parliament...And for Further Encouragement; That they be paid out of the publick Treasury" £10 for every pirate killed or captured, as well as insurance for possible injuries.[46] The colony's

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[43] Bahar, *Storms of the SEa,* p. 183.

[44] Council Minutes, Massachusetts, 6 June 1722, in "Minutes of Council of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay 2 Mar - 20 Aug 1722" (Minutes, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/794 1722/03/02-1722/08/20). http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_794_004

[45] *Boston News-Letter* (Boston, Massachusetts), no. 958, June 11, 1722: [2]. Readex: America's Historical Newspapers.

[46] "Order on Committees Report About Ye Defence of the Coast Agst Pyrates" and "Vote for Encouraging the Prosecution of Ye Pyrates" in *The Acts and Resolves, Public and Private of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay, Volume X: Resolves, Etc. 1720-1726 (Boston*: Wright & Potter Printing Co. State Printers, 1902), pp. 163-164.

ability to raise a sloop and raise a crew with such speed while also funding expeditions against Natives was only possible because of its continued circulation of paper money.[47]

This growth of the web of maritime operations is evident in a 20 June letter from Archibald Cumings, a Boston custom officer, to William Popple, the Secretary of the Board of Trade. Cumings reported the "government of Rhode Island, fitted out two Sloops, in quest of" two pirate vessels while "this government fitted out a Ship, to go after them, the man of war being gone to Canso, to protect the fishery." In a postscript, Cumings remarked that Massachusetts had deployed "200 Men at ye Eastward and are Sending an 100 more as an Additional force" to fight Wabanaki mariners, and that the pirates continued to take prizes off the New England coast.[48] Cumings's letter hints at the multifaceted New England naval war against Anglo-American pirates and Wabanaki sailors.

Massachusetts' naval involvement and cooperation with the Royal Navy only grew from there. Within a week of Cuming's letter, on 27 June, a committee from both legislative houses met to discuss the specifics of the campaign. Among the naval recommendations of the committee were that "Ten Whale Boats with very good Oars be provided, and sent to the Forces, for Enabling them to manage a sufficient Scout" and that a "Sloop be taken into the Province Pay for Transporting Men and Provisions…" Over the next few days, the governor and assembly

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[47] Paper money was a controversial subject in this era, and its larger implications reach beyond the scope of this chapter. For a more thorough discussion of both South Carolina's and New England's concurrent battles over paper money, see Sirmans, *Colonial South Carolina,* and Margaret Ellen Newell, *From Dependency to Independence: Economic Revolution in Colonial New England* (Cornell University Press, 2015). Aside from paying sailors who captured pirates (who were also eligible for Royal rewards), the colony reimbursed vessels impressed by the Royal Navy to hunt pirates with paper money. See "Chapter 313. Resolve Allowing £31 to Nathl. Masters" in *The Acts and Resolves, Vol. 10,* p. 388.

[48] D. B. Quinn, "CUMINGS, ARCHIBALD," in *Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 2 (*University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003), http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/cumings_archibald_2E.html., [Accessed 6 September 2020]. and Archibald Cumings to William Popple, 20 June 1722, in "Letters from Samuel Shute and Archibald Cumings to the Board of Trade, enclosing Council Minutes" (Correspondence; Minutes, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/868 Part 1 1721/11/21-1722/06/20). http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_868_PART_2_004

also extended Captain Papillion's pirate hunt for a month and ordered Captain Durell to patrol as well with the H.M.S. *Seahorse.*[49] By late July, Massachusetts authorities decided to dispatch two sloops as far north as Nova Scotia to search for Wabanaki mariners that had kidnapped New England fishermen.[50] The following month, Captain Durell, who had previously suggested Nova Scotians utilize provincial forces to defend their coasts, offered to man small provincial vessels with Royal Navy sailors to hunt down the same foes.[51] Durell likely realized his own warship was too large to pursue the swift Abenaki light craft, and tapped into provincial naval resources to supplement his own mission to defend the coast.

Not all maritime campaigning that summer originated with the Massachusetts government or the Royal Navy. On 27 June 1722, two civilians named Christian Newton and Margarett Blin [also spelled Blyn] informed the House of Representatives that they had fitted out a sloop and crew to recapture loved ones taken by Wabanaki forces and requested arms from the provincial government for their crew. The next day, a committee from both houses agreed that thirty soldiers "under a proper Officer (whom His Excellency [Samuel Shute] be desired to Commissionate) with Provisions, Arms and Ammunition to be put on Board the Sloop offered by *Margaret Blin*...to repair as soon as may be to *Passmaquada*, and there to use their best Endeavours to recover [captives] from the Indians…" They also suggested that the militiamen

[49] Legislature Minutes, Massachusetts, 28 June 1722, in *Journals of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, Vol. IV, 1722-1723* (Boston Massachusetts Historical Society, 1923), pp. 54-58. and Council Minutes, Massachusetts, 29 June 1722, in "Minutes of Council of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay 2 Mar - 20 Aug 1722" (Minutes, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/794 1722/03/02-1722/08/20). http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_794_004

[50] Council Minutes, Massachusetts, 25 July 1722, in "Minutes of Council of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay 2 Mar - 20 Aug 1722" (Minutes, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/794 1722/03/02-1722/08/20). http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_794_004

[51] "Vote for Fitting out Two Shallops Against the Indians," 18 August 1722, in *The Acts and Resolves, Public and Private of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay, Volume X, Resolves, Etc., 1720-1726,* p. 217.

capture Indigenous captives if they could not liberate the New England captives.[52] The rescue mission never commenced as Margarett's husband—the sloop captain James Blin—and the other captives made a successful escape.[53]

Throughout the rest of the summer, Wabanaki sailors captured scores of English vessels and kidnapped large numbers of Anglo-American colonists. This was only the beginning of what would be a four-year onslaught that would see Native chiefs leading formidable fleets—including flotillas of a half dozen sloops and schooners—against New England and Nova Scotia mariners. In some cases, Wabanaki mariners found a willing market for English vessels at the French fortress of Louisbourg. For French authorities, Wabanaki raids on English shipping damaged their imperial competitors without requiring overt French involvement.

Such widespread Wabanaki raiding with tacit French support inspired an expansion of New England's provincial naval capabilities. Not long after Blin was rescued by a naval force from Boston, Governor Shute and his council impressed Captain Blin along with another ship captain to take militiamen and sailors to "Proceed...to [Chebucto, Nova Scotia], or Such harbour as they may hear the Vessels are in" to regain some ships and captives.[54] The *Boston Newsletter* of 3 September 1722 reported that Blin succeeded in ransoming upwards of a dozen English crews. When Wabanaki mariners sought to execute some English prisoners in retaliation for recent English killings of their own people, Blin threatened to hang his own Native prisoners if

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[52] Legislature Minutes, Massachusetts, 27-28 June 1722, *Journals of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, Vol. IV,* pp. 51, 55.

[53] Emma Lewis Coleman, *New England Captives Carried to Canada Between 1677 and 1760 During the French and Indian Wars, Vol. I (*Heritage Books, 2008), p. 99.

[54] Bahar, "People of the Dawn, People of the Door: Indian Pirates and the Violent Theft of an Atlantic World," *The Journal of American History,* Vol. 101, No. 2 (September 2014), pp. 417-418, and Bahar *Storm of the Sea,* pp. 172-178. Council Minutes, Massachusetts, 25-26 June 1722, in "Minutes of Council of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay 2 Mar - 20 Aug 1722" (Minutes, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/794 1722/03/02-1722/08/20). http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_794_004

they did so—the threat of which convinced the Wabanakis to release their own prisoners.[55] With Margaret Blin's organization of a naval rescue mission for her husband, and James Blin's own naval service on behalf of Governor Shute, records of the Blin family's experiences give historians a rare glimpse into the impact provincial naval warfare had on families.

It is important to note that provincial navies throughout the New England colonies often met their match when fighting relentless Wabanaki crews. For instance, militia officer Samuel Penhallow reported that after New Hampshire authorities dispatched two shallop crews to hunt down successful Wabanaki mariners in the summer of 1724, "through cowardice and folly were afraid to engage them." A physician from Kittery, Maine led a smaller crew in pursuit of the same raiders, but the "enemy had two great guns and four pateraroes [swivel guns], which cut their shrouds and hindered [the English] pursuit for some time…" The Maine crew was forced back by Native reinforcements and severe casualties.[56] Another contemporary observer noticed that provincial schooner crews had a hard time recruiting in Marblehead, Massachusetts as "so many of [the town peoples'] freinds and relations being now in the hands of the Indians are very backward to goe against them in a Hostile manner."[57] For residents in New England port cities, the naval war disrupted their economic and social networks to the core.

While provincial naval forces and detached militia "marines" onboard local vessels were able to score some important victories by the end of 1722, including securing the Canso fishery from Native warriors, the Wabanaki confederacy continued a devastating offensive by land and sea on the northeastern borderlands for years to come. Even after New England forces

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[55] "Shipping News." *Boston News-Letter* (Boston, Massachusetts), no. 970, September 3, 1722: [2]. *Readex: America's Historical Newspapers*.

[56] Samuel Penhallow, *The History of the Wars of New-England with the Eastern Indians* (1726, Reprint. Oscar H. Harpel, Chestnut Sreet, Boston, 1859), pp. 101-102.

[57] John Minot to William Dummer, 16 July 1724, in *Letters of Colonel Thomas Westbrook and others relative to Indian affairs in Maine 1722-1726*, ed. William Blake Trask, (Boston: G.E. Littlefield, 1901), pp. 64-65.

assassinated the Wabanaki's Acadian ringleader, Father Rale, in 1724, Maliseet warriors levelled many Anglo-American homesteads on the Maine frontier.

By 1725, however, Nova Scotia and Massachusetts emissaries made diplomatic headway when they threatened French officials at Montreal and Louisbourg with a general assault on Franco-Acadian shipping and settlements if they did not cease their support of the Wabanaki war effort. The threat of a new European conflict in the region coupled with growing dissension within the Wabanaki ranks forced the French officials' hand on the matter. By 1726, war-weary Anglo-American officials and their Native enemies had agreed to separate ceasefires in Nova Scotia and New England. Father Rale's War was over, yet without any real victor. Historian John Grenier suggests that far from having a major victory, Massachusettsans and Nova Scotians had "merely survived the war and had grown as tired of it as the Indians had…"[58] That survival, in a large part, depended on various New England authorities' consistent deployment of transport sloops, guard vessels, whale boats, along with occasional cooperation with Royal Navy Captain Durell to pursue Anglo-American pirates—a threat that had never truly dissipated, even as the Massachusetts government directed most of its military attention to the fight against the Wabanaki.[59]

The Massachusetts provincial navy's typically amiable interwar relationship with the Royal Navy would sour in 1726 with new post captain James Cornwall. On 28 June 1726, after denying a request by Royal Navy Captain John St. Lo of the H.M.S. *Ludlow Castle* to impress

[58] Grenier, *The Far Reaches,* pp. 57-69. Grenier's view of the peace terms is more positive than Bahar's. Grenier suggests that New Englanders succeeded in achieving favorable terms, while Behar (pp. 183-185) has recently made the case that Wabanaki leaders overwhelmed Anglo-American shipping and made peace from a stronger position.

[59] See various transport vessel muster rolls in William Blake Trask, ed. *Letters of Colonel Thomas Westbrook: And Others Relative to Indian Affairs in Maine, 1722-1726* (Littlefield, 1901), pp. 171-179. Google Books eBook and *American Weekly Mercury* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), no. 228, April 30, 1724: [2]. *Readex: America's Historical Newspapers*.

men to serve on his beleaguered vessel, Governor Dummer and his council discussed the activities of the pirate William Fly off the coast, and ordered that “a good Sailing Sloop or other Suitable Vessel be taken up for his Maj^{ties} Service agst the S^{d} Pirate…” The council appointed William Atkinson (himself a victim of the pirate) as the captain and established a pay table of £8 a month for the captain, his officers in “proportion,” £4 for sailors, a twenty shilling bounty for volunteering for service, and the usual promises of insurance for the wounded.[60] The lieutenant-governor would later boast about the “cheerful and ready appearance of [forty] voluntiers upon the bounty offer'd for that service” within six hours of the commencement of the recruitment drive.[61] The sloop, *Loyal Heart,* was ready to sail.

The next day, Dummer and the council dismissed Atkinson due to suspicions he had associated with the pirates and replaced him with Captain Thomas Little. They also discussed “threatening” letters that Lt. Governor Dummer had gotten from Captain St. Lo regarding the attempts to outfit a pirate-hunting sloop. They were shocked to find that Captain Cornwall had stopped the *Loyal Heart* with the H.M.S. *Sheerness* in the middle of Boston Harbor.[62] According to a subsequent complaint by the Massachusetts governor to the king, Cornwall had demanded to know their business and threatened to fire on them. When Captain Little told them that they had a provincial commission to hunt pirates and tried to continue his voyage, Cornwall ordered his sailors to fire on the little provincial sloop. According to the lieutenant governor and

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[60] Council Minutes, Massachusetts, 28 June 1726. in “Minutes of the Council of Massachusetts Bay” (Minutes, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/797 1726/03/03-1726/08/26). http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_797_006

[61] “Memorial of the Lt. Governor and Council of the Massachusetts Bay to the King,” 8 July 1726, in *CSP Vol. 35, 1726-1727, eds.* Cecil Headlam and Arthur Percival Newton. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1936) pp. 96-115. British History Online. http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol35/pp96-115.

[62] Council Minutes, Massachusetts, 29 June 1726, in “Minutes of the Council of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay," 29 June 1726. in "Minutes of the Council of Massachusetts Bay" (Minutes, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/797 1726/03/03-1726/08/26). http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_797_006

council, Cornwall could not have been ignorant of their mission as Massachusetts authorities had already denied his own request to impress sailors to hunt pirates the day before. Dummer and his council argued this was "very far from answering your Majesties gracious intentions" in providing Royal Navy protection and complained that Cornwall had done little to actively defend the coast for the last two years. They asked for a new captain, and that governors have control over future Royal Navy guard vessel officers.[63]

Cornwall's narrative of the events was notably different. In the *Sheerness's* logbook entry for 1 July 1726, Cornwall wrote that that a "Sloop hauld of [sic] from ye Wharfe...Arm'd wth 6 Guns & 4 Patterreroes, & as near as I could Guess about 40 hands, So unexpected a Sight could not but be Very Surprizing to me having not ye Least Infirmation…" Cornwall claimed that the sloop's master [Little] promised he was going no farther than Castle William, ignored calls to board the *Sheerness,* and proceeded to sail anyway. This prompted Cornwall, who believed them to be "going a Pyrating," to fire four times on the sloop, which anchored near the safety of Castle William with only limited damage to its sails. The drama was far from over, however. On 22 July, Cornwall recorded that the "Sloop Said to be fitt'd out at ye Expence of this Goem^{t} Arriv'd here & this Morning...hoisted a King Jack…" As will be recalled, this flag was solely reserved for Royal Navy vessels, but provincial warships frequently flouted this rule during operations. When Cornwall sent his men to forcibly take the King's Jack down, a minor brawl occurred, and thirty provincial sailors with pistols and swords forced the Royal Navy men back.[64]

While one might conclude that Cornwall's belligerence would substantially sour provincial opinions of the Royal Navy itself, this was far from the case. In their complaint to an aging King George I, Lt. Governor Dummer and his council asked for a new post captain and

[63] "Memorial of the Lt. Governor and Council of the Massachusetts Bay to the King"
[64] Logbook of H.M.S. *Sheerness*, ADM 51/898, TNA

greater provincial control over station ships. Furthermore, in the wider scope of provincial-Royal Navy relations in New England, the scuffle between the sailors of the *Loyal Heart* and the *Sheerness* was a departure from the mutually cooperative norm. When discussing an earlier dispute between New Englanders and a Royal Navy captain, historian Douglas Edward Leach wrote that such disputes "may not typify the behavior of royal naval officers in America, but they do illustrate the kind of self-assured arrogance that naval authority seemed to generate and that was so offensive to many colonists."[65] This resentful attitude was certainly evident in late August 1726, when the governor's council and the colony's legislature both commended Captain Little for "*having handsomely Asserted and Defended the Honour of this His Majesty's Government of this Province, and of the Commission he had born...notwithstanding the Violent Opposition given him by Capt. James Cornwall...*"[66]

In the minds of New England and Nova Scotia officials, their provincial navies had secured their coastlines from Native and piratical threats for the "Honour of this His Majesty's Government" even when the Royal Navy had stood in the way or neglected their defense. Despite occasional help from a limited number of Royal guard ships, provincially funded and designed navies from New England and Nova Scotia made greater efforts to protect British commerce and Canadian fisheries than imperial forces.

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[65] Douglas Edward Leach, *Roots of Conflict: British Armed Forces and Colonial Americans, 1677-1763* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1986), p. 141, Kindle eBook Version.

[66] Legislature Minutes, Massachusetts, 27 August 1726, *Journals of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, 1726-1727* (Boston: The Massachusetts Historical Society, 1926), p. 103.

Provincial Navies and Imperial Borderlands: South Carolina, 1715-1727

Even before Massachusetts and Nova Scotia authorities waged war against pirates and Native American naval forces on the northern borderlands, similar borderland maritime violence erupted to the south and southwest of Charles Town, South Carolina in 1715. Native nations such as the Yamasee began to resent the South Carolina government's expansive goals, rumored plans of conquest, and abusive traders that threatened to enslave debtors.[67] By April of 1715, disaffected Yamasee officials killed two South Carolina traders and fired the proverbial first shots of the bloody Yamasee War. While the naval theatre of the war that will be considered below primarily pitted South Carolinians against their Yamassee foes south of Charles Town, the colony also warred against other disaffected Native groups on land such as the Creeks and Choctaws.[68]

While disputes between Southern colonists and their Indigenous neighbors were not as tied to maritime matters as those in the northeast, both South Carolinians and the Yamasee had strong ties to the sea. Natives living on the South Carolina coast had long engaged in maritime endeavors and were particularly skilled in crafting periagua canoes for trade. Yamasee mariners

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[67] In *Empire and Interest,* Kurt Nagel makes the case that while New York and Massachusetts faced Indian conflicts after the Queen Anne's War, " neither colony was as harried as the southern frontier." (p. 295). While both Massachusetts and South Carolina dealt with piratical and Native maritime attacks throughout the late 1710's-early 1720's, the costs of provincial naval defense were more dramatic for South Carolina thanks to its near destruction during the Yamasee War.

[68] Steven J. Oatis, *A Colonial Complex : South Carolina's Frontiers in the Era of the Yamasee War, 1680-1730* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), pp. 114-126 Ebscohost http://search.ebscohost.com.nuncio.cofc.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=118223&site=eds-live&scope=site. It should be noted that the Yamasee pitted South Carolinians against other tribes as well, including the Apachiolas (p.141). For other causes of the conflict and for more information on the region-wide causes of the war, see Allan Gallay, *The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South, 1670-1717* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 329-337. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unh/detail.action?docID=3419877. And M. Eugene Sirmans, *Colonial South Carolina: A Political History 1663-1763* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966), pp. 114-115.

had even helped to man South Carolina's scout boat navy until the 1715 war.[69] Long before their conflict with the Carolinians, the Yamasee also frequently employed canoes to transport war parties to capture slaves from enemy tribes in the Florida hinterlands.[70]

In yet another challenge to the prevailing notion that Indian wars were limited to land, the Yamasee nation and their Carolinian foes fought many of their battles on the coastal waters and streams near modern day Beaufort and Port Royal, South Carolina. Both the Yamasee and their South Carolina opponents preferred small craft like their contemporaries in the northeast, and typically fought from periaguas and small whale boats. After Governor Charles Craven led infantry forces to make a land-based stand against Yamasee onslaught south of Charles Town in mid-April of 1715, he directed the experienced frontiersmen Alexander Mackay and John Barnwell to lead a naval assault against the Yamasee village of Pocotaligo. By the end of April, Barnwell and Mackay led militiamen on small craft to seize Pocotaligo, and then seized a well-defended Yamasee fort after scaling its walls amidst a hail of musketry.[71]

By September, South Carolina scout boat crews had conducted several successful ambushes against Yamasee warriors on canoes, including actions that involved coordinated land-based ambushes and musket/swivel gun fire from provincial vessels. The colony's scout boat navy was essentially purpose built for these campaigns on the colony's tidal borderlands. In historian Larry Ivers' view, the scout boat mariners had evolved from mere scouts in the Queen Anne's War to "marine commandos" by the end of 1715.[72] While this modern analysis may

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[69] Lynn B. Harris, *Patroons and Periaguas: Enslaved Watermen and Watercraft of the Lowcountry* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2014), pp. 2-3, pp. 23-25. http://search.ebscohost.com.nuncio.cofc.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=e025xna&AN=750184&site=ehost-live&scope=site.

[70] Alexander Y. Sweeney, "Cultural Continuity and Change: Archaeological Research at Yamasee Primary Towns in South Carolina," *The Yamasee Indians: From Florida to South Carolina*, ed. Denise Bossy. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2018), p. 121. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv7vct9s.11

[71] Oatis, *Colonial Complex,* pp. 144-145, and Ivers, *This Torrent,* pp. 64-67.

[72] Ivers, *This Torrent,* pp. 107-109.

sound overly boastful of the provincial navy's progress, at least one contemporary South Carolina parson bragged in October of 1715 that the worst of the crisis was over because "[as soon as a] party of Indians appear our Scouts give notice and they are beaten back."[73]

South Carolina's swift deployment of scout boats and militiamen on canoes was effective in stemming the initial Native onslaught, but these victories belied the large extent to which South Carolina depended on outside assistance from neighboring governments and imperial forces throughout the conflict. For instance, in May of 1715, Governor Craven's administration begged Governor Spotswood of Virginia for reinforcements, while also asking Captain Samuel Mead of the HMS *Success*—a passing Royal Navy warship—for supplies and to request direct help from London. While Mead refused both requests, he did agree to facilitate the purchase of weapons from Governor Joseph Dudley of Massachusetts.[74] Dudley agreed to the arms sale despite his own ongoing fights with Wabanaki mariners. Ironically, only a month after sending the South Carolinians arms as they waged a naval and land war against the Yamasees, Dudley himself deployed "two sloops...with 30 men, each well arm'd…" to hunt down Wabanaki mariners that had captured New England fishermen.[75] Even as New Englanders struggled against their own Native foes on the northern borderlands, they extended military aid to their compatriots facing similar issues on the Southern borderlands.

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[73] Francis Le Jau to the Society of the Propagation of the Gospel, qtd. in Edgar Legare Pennington, "The South Carolina Indian War of 1715, as Seen by the Clergymen," *The South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Oct., 1931), p. 257. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27569871

[74] Ivers, *This Torrent,* pp. 82-83.

[75] Council Minutes, Massachusetts, 7 June 1715, in "Massachusetts: Minutes of Council 21 Mar - 11 Oct 1715" (Minutes, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/792 1715/03/21-1715/10/11). http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Images/CO_5_792_006/7 and Governor Joseph Dudley to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 31 July 1715, in. *CSP, Vol. 28, 1714-15*, ed. Cecil Headlam. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1928), pp. 235-253. British History Online, https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol28/pp235-253.

Despite outside assistance and some tactical success against the Yamasees by late 1715, South Carolina's military situation was still dire. No account better describes the chaos than Captain Mead's December 1715 letter to the Lords of the Admiralty. Upon a subsequent trip to Charles Town, Mead reported that he was shocked to find the city bereft of defenders, with "the [governor] gone to the Army, and a great many to [dive at] the Spanish Wreck off Cape Florida." With rumors that African slaves planned to use the chaos to stage their own uprising, the lieutenant governor implored Meade to "send on Shore every night Twenty five, or thirty Men with Arms" to guard the city's powder magazine. The previously reticent Mead agreed to this plea.[76]

Mead's alarming description of the chaos in the proprietary capital would have been one of many flooding imperial offices in London in 1715 and 1716. Many South Carolinians themselves were beginning to resent the alleged military neglect of the colony's Lords Proprietors and their expectations that the colonists should orchestrate their own defense. In response, many provincial leaders began to campaign for direct Royal governance and military aid. Historian Steven Oatis makes the case that when the Board of Trade conducted a formal inquiry into the supposed neglect in the summer of 1715, the Lords Proprietors demonstrated a financial unwillingness to assist their colonists coupled with an outright ignorance of the colony's dire straits.[77] This ignorance and neglect was especially apparent when it came to the proprietary opinion regarding South Carolina's naval capabilities. In response to the Board of Trade's query as to whether the Lords Proprietors would provide shipping to carry British troops

[76] Captain Samuel Mead to Admiralty Secretary Josiah Burchett, 27 December 1715, ADM 1/2095, TNA.
[77] Oatis, *Colonial Complex,* pp. 162-163.

to the colony, they responded that "we do not doubt but the Governmt. of Carolina will send ships and provisions for their transportation."[78]

The Lords Proprietors' rosy view of South Carolina's ability to transport British regulars across the Atlantic clashed with the growing human and economic costs of the conflict. Because the Yamasees had found refuge with sympathetic Spanish authorities in St. Augustine, Florida, they continued to harass South Carolinians, and even successfully ambushed one of the colony's scout boat crews near Port Royal in the summer of 1716.[79] By 1716, South Carolina officials convinced the Cherokee—the traditional foes of the Yamassee nation's own Creek allies—to join the war effort. This alliance with one of the strongest Southern Indigenous nations inspired several smaller neighboring tribes to join the English cause, and played a signal role in the colony's pyrrhic victory over the Yamasee and Creek in 1717. Victory for the Carolinians came at a high cost, indeed; wartime losses included the deaths of over seven hundred colonists, food shortages, and nearly £116,000 sterling in war debt.[80] Among the many expensive war measures that elevated this debt was South Carolina's continuous deployment of "two scout boats of 10 men each" beyond the conflict's end.[81] Growing military costs would also play a signal role in the colony's decision to revolt against the Lords Proprietors in 1719.

While the fight with the Yamasee nearly brought the colony to ruin, it would soon face an equally daunting threat: pirates. While Anglo-American pirates did little to cripple South Carolina's economy during the height of the Golden Age of Piracy, local anxiety over pirate

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[78] Lords Proprietors of Carolina to the Council of Trade and Plantations (No. 517), in *CSP Vol. 28,* ed. Cecil Headlam, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1928) pp. 215-235. British History Online https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol28/pp215-235

[79] Oatis, *Colonial Complex,* pp. 180-182.

[80] Sirmans, *Colonial South Carolina,* pp. 114-115.

[81] Governor Robert Johnson to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 12 January 1720, in *CSP, Vol. 31, 1719-1720,* ed. Cecil Headlam. (London: His Majesty's Staionery Office, 1933), pp. 293-311. British History Online. https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol31/pp293-311

attacks was much more profound. The political ramifications of piracy for Charles Town were most colorfully illustrated by Captain Edward 'Blackbeard' Teach's June 1718 blockade of the unguarded port city and subsequent attacks by Teach's associate Charles Vane.[82] Without any Royal Navy vessels nearby, Governor Robert Johnson "thô very unable both for want of men and money," decided to commission militia officer Colonel William Rhett as a temporary Vice Admiral, and authorized him to assemble an emergency fleet of pirate hunters. Johnson recorded that "two sloops [the *Henry* and *Sea Nymph*], one commanded by Capt. [John] Masters and the other by Capt. [Fayrer] Hall with about, 130 men were gott ready wth. all the dispatch wee cou'd."[83] Even though the Royal Navy was far away from Charles Town at the time, Johnson clearly wanted Rhett's provincial fleet to carry the trappings of a Royal Navy squadron when he ordered Rhett to fly "his Majesties Union Flagg" on his vessels. Royal mandates had long prohibited colonial vessels from flying the plain Royal Union Jack as that banner was reserved for Royal Navy ships alone. By flouting this law, perhaps Johnson consciously saw himself as an active substitute for the Royal Navy in their absence.[84]

Rhett's fleet never found Blackbeard or Vane, but they did capture the infamous 'Gentleman Pirate,' Stede Bonnet, in a pitched naval battle off the coast of Cape Fear, North

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[82] Carl E. Swanson, "The Unspeakable Calamity this poor Province Suffers from Pyrats": South Carolina and the Golden Age of Piracy," *The Northern Mariner/Le Marin Du Nord* Vol. 21, no. 2 (2011), pp. 119-123. https://www.cnrs-scrn.org/northern_mariner/vol21/tnm_21_117-142.pdf

[83] Governor and Council of South Carolina to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 21 October 1718, in *CSP, Vol. 30, 1717-1718,* ed. Cecil Headlam. (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office 1930), pp. 359-381. British History Online https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol30/pp359-381 It is not entirely clear if these vessels were impressed in this first round of pirate hunting, but the fact that Johnson lamented a lack of manpower in this letter and the fact that several vessels in Charles Town were impressed for a subsequent pirate hunting expedition towards the end of the year brings into question Mark Hanna's notion that Rhett's initial expedition was comprised of "volunteers" (see Hanna, *Pirate Nests,* p. 371).

[84] Robert Johnson to Colonel William Rhett, 4 September 1718, "South Carolina Probate Records, Bound Volumes, 1671-1977," images, FamilySearch--*Charleston Wills, 1716-1721*, Vol. 057 > image 96 of 152; South Carolina Department of Archives and History, Columbia. https://familysearch.org/ark:/61903/3:1:939L-JJSQ-N5?cc=1919417&wc=M6N4-CTP%3A210905601%2C211324. For more on flag regulations, see Chapin, *Privateer Ships,* p. 11.

Carolina in September of 1718.[85] The government's appropriation of Royal Navy trappings continued into the trial of Bonnet's crew. For instance, when one of the accused pirates claimed they only engaged Rhett's fleet because they thought they were being attacked by pirates themselves, South Carolina Chief Justice Nicholas Trott retorted: "And so one pirate might fight with another. But how could you think it was a Pirate, when he had King George's Colours?"[86] Even though provincial naval vessels were not part of the Royal Navy themselves, they adopted this exclusive Royal banner to legitimize their pirate hunting mission.

Aside from provincial compensation, sailors on pirate hunting missions could also expect some level of reward from the home government in London. Thanks to King George I's 1717 promise of rewards for any sailors who captured unrepentant pirates, crews could expect financial gains up to £100 for the capture of a pirate captain, and lesser amounts for lower officers.[87] The provincial government's burden of repaying its sailors was also lightened by the division of 'booty' in vice admiralty hearings after Bonnet's capture. Almost simultaneously with trial and execution in late 1718, Trott ensured that plunder from Bonnet's vessel was split equitably among the sailors.

Oddly enough, Trott required some of Bonnet's victims (merchant captains rescued by the South Carolina provincial Navy) to pay salvage fees. This forced at least two 'rescued'

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[85] Swanson, "Unspeakable calamity," pp. 129-130.

[86] Charles Johnson, *A General History of the Pirates, From Their first Rise and Settlement in the Island of Providence, to the Present Time* (London: T. Warner, 1724), pp. 98-100 and Nicholas Trott, "The Lord Chief Justice's Speech, upon his pronouncing Sentence on Major Stede Bonnet," in Johnson, *A General History,* pp. 107-108.

[87] *The London Gazette*, 14 September to 17 September 1717. The Gazette: Official Public Record. https://www.thegazette.co.uk/London/issue/5573/page/1. While Royal rewards for distant pirate captures sounded generous to enterprising colonial mariners, they inevitably ran into years of red tape. Records from Calendar of Treasury Papers from 1723 indicated that the provincial sailors who hunted down Stede Bonnet were still seeking payment five years after his capture! See "27 August," in 'Volume 244: July 1-December 30, 1723', in *Calendar of Treasury Papers, Volume 6, 1720-1728,* ed. Joseph Redington (London, 1889), pp. 218-237. British History Online http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-treasury-papers/vol6/pp218-237

merchant captains to surrender their vessels to the South Carolina government due to their inability to afford these fees. During these proceedings, Trott also ruled that an enslaved African named Ned Grant would be publicly auctioned off, and the proceeds of his sale would be used for prize money for the pirate hunters. Grant had been captured by Bonnet after escaping from his South Carolina master, and then had the misfortune of being recaptured by South Carolinians during the Battle of Cape Fear. Ironically, throughout these proceedings, the South Carolina government rewarded pirate hunters by seizing vessels from pirate victims, and by depriving humans of their freedom.[88]

As the provincial government was able to ensure that pirate hunters were adequately reimbursed for their services, larger piratical and political threats awaited the ever-embattled colony as an eventful 1718 drew to an end. With reports of new pirate fleets off the coast Governor Johnson opted to expand his naval defenses and ordered a unique combination of scout boat patrols in the harbor and the impressment of an emergency fleet of merchant vessels to prevent the expected assault.[89] This would be one of the few times where South Carolina combined its regular naval forces with an impressed merchant fleet.

Worried about the damages that could come to their vessels after being impressed, several mariners complained to the provincial government and demanded assurances that they would be reimbursed for damages in battle. As financial negotiations continued, two pirate vessels under the command of Richard Worley appeared outside the harbor. Johnson dispatched the colony's scout boats to prevent their landing on the city's barrier islands, and then led three

[88] These are highlights from a larger court transcript that can be found in *Records of the South Carolina Court of Admiralty, 1716-1732.* (National Archives, Washington, D.C., N.D.), Microfilm, pp. 306-390. Accessed at Charleston County Library, South Carolina History Room. I would like to express my sincere thanks to Dr. Nic Butler and the staff there for their assistance.

[89] Richard P. Sherman, *Robert Johnson: Proprietary & Royal Governor,* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1966) pp. 34-35.

hundred sailors on four ships, and swiftly defeated the piratical duo. Johnson immediately split the "small booty" from the captures amongst the captors.[90] Once again, a timely deployment of an emergency fleet prevented Charles Town's foes from sacking the city.

While provincial victories over Bonnet and Worley raised Charlestonians' morale, increased tensions with the Lords Proprietors prevented any true respite. Many within the provincial government were infuriated with the Proprietors for a number of reasons. High on the list of grievances was the fact that the Lords Proprietors vetoed the Assembly's military finance laws from the Yamasee War, and that they failed to provide adequate military protection for their beleaguered and embattled colony.[91]

International politics would also play a role in heightening the crisis between the provincial government and its proprietary overlords. In response to Spanish attempts to expand their Mediterranean holdings in 1718, Britain and France had jointly declared war on the Iberian kingdom in the short-lived War of the Quadruple Alliance.[92] As the South Carolina militia gathered to prevent a rumored Spanish invasion, angry politicos formed an 'Association' to discuss their dissatisfaction with the Lords Proprietors, fomented a bloodless coup, and installed a sympathetic governor that helped them to call for direct Royal governance. This coup would

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[90] Johnson, *The History of the Pyrates, Vol. II* pp. 325-328.

[91] Theodore H. Jabbs, *South Carolina Colonial Militia, 1663-1733*. Ph.D. diss., (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1973) pp. 280-281, 340-345. Historians have recently challenged the notion that the primary issue with the Lords Proprietors was ineffective military protection. For instance, Hanno T. Scheerer has made the case that "constitutional issues rather than questions of defense lay at the core of the quarrels between the Carolina proprietors and their settlers." See "The Proprietors Can't Undertake for What They Will Do: A Political Interpretation of the South Carolina Revolution of 1719," in *Creating and Contesting Carolina: Proprietary Histories*, Michelle LeMaster and Bradford J. Woods, eds. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2013). https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unh/detail.action?docID=2054770.

[92] Harding, *Seapower*, pp. 189-190.

forever be known in South Carolina as the 'Bloodless Revolution of 1719,' or simply the 'Revolution of 1719.'[93]

For at least some anti-proprietary polemicists, proprietary indifference that necessitated provincial naval defense was a large justification for the 'Revolution of 1719' against the Lords Proprietors. For instance, in a 1726 pamphlet that challenged Proprietary attempts to retake the colony, South Carolinian Francis Yonge argued that one of the turning points that led to the coup was the Proprietors' dismissal of a legislative session that had convened to find ways to settle military debts including the two missions against the pirates.[94] For men like Yonge, Royal military protection was the only solution to their inadequate defenses. Even before King George I's privy council agreed to "provisionally" facilitate Royal governance of the proprietary colony in August of 1720, Captain John Hildesley with the H.M.S. *Flamborough* became the first Royal Navy post captain in Charles Town.[95] Seven years later, Yonge praised the king for having "Protected...Trade by His Ships of War, and [the] Country by His forces" ever since the Royal take-over.[96]

While Yonge was quick to praise Royal Naval protection in his anti-Proprietary pamphlet, he neglected to mention that South Carolina's provincial naval forces still continued to operate both alongside *and* independently of their new Royal Navy allies, and that the presence of the Royal Navy did not guarantee internal stability. This was especially apparent during the

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[93] Jabbs, *South Carolina Colonial Militia,* pp. 349-354, and "The Humble Address of the Representatives of the Inhabitants of the Said Province, Now Conven'd at Charles Town" in Francis Yonge*, A Narrative of the Proceedings of the People of South-Carolina, in the Year 1719: and of the True Causes and Motives that Induced Them to Renounce Their Obedience to the Lords Proprietors, as Their Governors, and to Put Themselves Under the Immediate Government of the Crown*, Volume 1 (London: 1726), pp. 31-32. Google Play eBook.

[94] Yonge, *A Narrative,* pp. 8-10.

[95] Charles Christopher Crittenden, "The Surrender of the Charter of Carolina" *The North Carolina Historical Review, Vol. 1, No. 4* (October, 1924), pp. 393-395. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23514374.pdfand Log Book of H.M.S. *Flamborough,* TNA, ADM 51/357

[96] Yonge, *A Narrative,* p. 40.

period stretching from 1715 to 1732, which early twentieth historian Verner Crane called South Carolina's era of "Defense and Reconstruction." Crane argued that South Carolina expanded its southern frontier defenses during this era with numerous forts to challenge Franco-Spanish and Native American incursions, including the 1716 establishment of a more permanent base at Port Royal for South Carolina's two scout boats to operate out of.[97]

Despite provincial protestations in early 1720 that naval defense costs on the Florida frontier continued to exacerbate South Carolina's debt, the Board of Trade hinted at their desire for continued provincial naval efforts in September of that year. The Board expressed their desire that a fort should be built on the Altamaha River to the south of the colony (in what would become the colony of Georgia in the next decade), and were of the opinion that it would be difficult to do that without a Royal Navy guard ship. However, they proposed that in case a Royal ship was not available, "that the [new Governor Francis Nicholson] be impower'd and have directions to hire a sloop or brigantine for this purpose upon his arrival in Carolina."[98] In essence, imperial authorities expected provincial authorities to fund their own naval defenses even as the Royal military presence expanded in the region. As it would happen, the king's parsimonious Privy Council only provided a small unit of invalid redcoats, building materials, and a few officials to help with the fort's construction. Ultimately provincial authorities not only

[97] Verner W. Crane*, The Southern Frontier, 1670-1732* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1928), pp. 187-191.

[98] "An Answer to the Queries sent by the Honble the Lords Comissioners of trade and plantations relating to the State of South Carolina," in William R. Coe Collection, 1699-1741, South Carolina Historical Society (Hereafter referred to as SCHS), and Council of Trade and Plantations to the Lords Justice 23 September 1720, in. *CSP, Vol. 32, 1720-1721*, ed. Cecil Headlam. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1933), pp. 144-165. British History Online. https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol32/pp144-165. It is important to note that the Board of Trade did not initiate the plans for the southern fort on the Altamaha, but this plan was developed by South Carolina agent/war veteran John Barnwell. See Sirmans, *Colonial South Carolina,* pp. 134-6.

hired a merchant vessel and sailors to assist the expedition to build the fort, but used mariners from the scout boat navy to help build the fort.[99]

While South Carolina authorities continued to rely on their own mariners to secure imperial aims in the interwar period, they also came to realize that the presence of the Royal Navy could exacerbate internal political issues and instability. For instance, some Royal Navy guard captains enmeshed themselves in local corruption and political dramas. Some provincial officials accused Captain John Hildesley of the H.M.S. *Flamborough* of partnering with provincial naval hero William Rhett in an illegal arms cartel to the Spanish in St. Augustine. The controversial Royal Navy captain also conspired with ousted governor Robert Johnson in an aborted attempt to retake his office in 1721.[100]

Provincial authorities would be forced to draw on their own naval resources again when imperial conflict with Spain resurfaced for a second short time in the late 1720's. Between 1727 and 1729, South Carolinians faced an onslaught of Spanish privateer raids on their merchant shipping as well as ongoing fights with Yamasee and Creek forces on the southern borderlands. In a letter from September of 1727, one South Carolina merchant lamented that despite this combination of foes, heavy provincial taxation, and political uncertainty (namely the Lords Proprietors in London trying take back the colony) the citizens of Charles Town had "fitted out, at their own Expence, a Sloop [the *Palmer,* captained by one Thomas Montjoy] with 100 Men"

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[99] Ivers, *This Torrent,* pp. 175-176. Also see "An Agreement made by order of HIs Excellency Francis Nicholson...By Coll: John Barnwell...With Jonathan Collings Commander of the Sloop Jonathan and Sarah..." 9 June 1721, in "Letters and papers relating to the landing of his Majesty's Independent Company now in south Carolina, and likewise concerning Colonel Barnwell's going to Altamaha river in order to build a fort there" (Correspondence; Submission; Warrant, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/358 Part 1 1721). www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Images/CO_5_358_PART_1_018/7

[100] Sirmans, *Colonial South Carolina,* pp.`30-3

to hunt Spaniards alongside a Royal Navy guard ship, H.M.S. *Scarborough*.[101] While other colonies with Royal Navy station ships occasionally fitted out their own provincial vessels (e.g. Massachusetts), it is ironic that South Carolina—a colony that had orchestrated a political coup in part to secure Royal naval protection—still felt the need to employ these vessels.

Historian Nic Butler has found that the South Carolina Council's decision to outfit that sloop coincided with the Royal Navy post captain George Anson's requests to impress local sailors for the *Scarborough.* Butler contends that the overextended captain was already tasked with both hunting Spanish privateers and protecting merchant vessels, and likely found comfort in the colonial government's decision to outfit a temporary "privateer" to defend the coast. The governor's council allowed the captain to impress sailors for his warship, even though contemporary British law (the 1708 'America Act,' which was also known as the 'Sixth of Anne') forbade Royal Navy impressment in the Americas. Despite this prohibition, the extent to which it forbade *all* impressment was unclear, and no imperial guidance existed to clarify when it was acceptable for colonial governors and Royal Navy captains to impress seamen. By the 1720s, after a decade of limited clarification over the law from Parliament, Admiralty officials had officially stopped requiring Royal Navy captains to avoid impressment—a unilateral decision that Parliament did little to challenge and which would have major ramifications in the decades to follow. [102] Not for the last time, a Royal official depended on provincial naval forces to support the Royal Navy's meagre presence in the area.

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[101] Harding, *Emergence,* pp. 17-18, Ivers, *This Torrent,* pp. 187-188, "Extract of a Letter from a Merchant in Carolina, to his Friend in London, Dated, Sept. 14, 1727" *Boston Gazette* (Boston, Massachusetts), no. 428, February 5, 1728: [1]. Readex: America's Historical Newspapers. For more information on proprietary attempts to retake the colony, see Sirmans, *Colonial South Carolina,* pp. 153-154.

[102] Dr. Nic Butler, 'Anson and the Privateer Emergency of 1727," Unpublished MSS. Dr. Butler, a leading archivist at the Charleston Archives and author of an upcoming monograph on Admiral George Anson, was kind enough to share some of his discoveries from the Admiralty archives at Kew with me, and his insight has been invaluable for this chapter. For more on impressment policies at the time, see Denver Brunsman, *The Evil Necessity:*

By late September 1727, the South Carolina General Assembly passed a comprehensive act that allocated funds for provincial naval and land forces to campaign against both Native and Spanish privateers, and included a specific pay table for sailors aboard the *Palmer* "Sloop of War Employ'd in Guarding These Coasts." This was to be funded by taking paper currency returned to the treasurer from a previous "Act for Calling in and Sinking the Paper Bills," and backing the paper money expenditure with renewed duties on the slave trade and liquor sales.[103] This financial package of over £25,000 (in South Carolina currency) was especially impressive considering Middleton's and the Commons House's disagreements over expanding paper money then in circulation, as well as a recent Royal prohibition on extending paper money circulation in the colony.[104]

Ultimately, Charles Town would wage a successful counteroffensive against Spanish and Indigenous forces throughout late 1727 and early 1728. In early January 1727/8, a Philadelphia newspaper reported that Mountjoy and the crew of the sloop *Palmer* retook a "ship belonging to London, which the Spaniards were carrying to the *Havana*; the ship and Goods was Praised and

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British Naval Impressment in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2013), pp. 109-11. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unh/detail.action?docID=3444100.

[103] "An act for carrying on several expeditions against the Indian and other enemies and for defraying the charge thereof" (Legislation, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/387 1727/09/30). http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_387_105. While this law called the *Palmer* a "sloop of war," President Middleton's commission to Captain Mountjoy called his vessel a "Private Sloop of War" (a term often applied to privateers), limited the territories in which he could patrol, and cautioned Mountjoy to "pay due regard" to any Royal Navy vessel that might stop him. In an April 1727 petition asking for monetary compensation for various expenses, Mountjoy himself called his vessel a "Guard de Coste," a term fairly similar to the Spanish *guardacostas* then so prevalent throughout the West Indies and continental coastline. It seems that Mountjoy's mission straddled the line between traditional 'letter of marque' privateering and a provincial navy. See "Copy of Captain Montjoys commission and instructions" (Commission; Order, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/387 1727/09/05-1727/09/11). http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_387_110 and Journal of the Commons House of Assembly, 4 April 1728, (Minutes, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/430 1727/01/31-1728/05/11). www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Images/CO_5_430_003/73

[104] Sirmans, *Colonial South Carolina,* pp. 151-157 and Joseph Albert Ernst, *Money and Politics in America 1755-1775* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina, 1973), pp. 30-31. Retrieved from Google Books.

one Half was allowed for Salvage," though other Spanish privateers still cruised off the coast.[105] Soon thereafter, an Indigenous attack on a militia patrol boat south of Charles Town coupled with an allegedly insulting letter from Florida's Spanish governor convinced President Middleton to launch the long-planned assault on Yamasee lands near St. Augustine. Scout boat veteran Colonel Robert Barnwell—leading nearly one hundred English and allied Indigenous warriors on periaguas and other small craft—devastated several Yamasee villages there.[106] This raid not only demoralized Spanish authorities in the area, but convinced many Spanish-aligned Natives that their imperial ally could not adequately protect them.[107]

Not long thereafter, provincial officials would use local naval forces to assist a Royal Navy survey mission that would set the stage for future relations between both the Royal Navy and South Carolina navies. President Middleton informed the Upper House of Assembly and the Commons House that he had news that the Lords of the Admiralty were planning to make Port Royal, South Carolina, a harbor for Royal Navy vessels to rendezvous in. Middleton contended that it "behove us to get Proper Persons and Craft to sound the Channels and make Such discovery as may Encourage the right hon[ble] the Lords of the Admiralty to prosecute their design…" A few days later, a joint committee from both houses consulted with both station captains Anson and Arnold, and concluded that the provincial government should provide the Royal Navy with "A Small Sloop [,] Two of the Largest Pilot Boats [,] The Two Scout Boats"

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[105] *American Weekly Mercury* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), no. 419, January 9, 1728: [2]. Readex: America's Historical Newspapers.

[106] Ivers, *This Torrent,* pp. 189-197 and Oatis, *Colonial Complex,* p. 283. Primary evidence on the acquisition or potential impressment of transport vessels for the expedition is limited, but in early September 1727, the Commons House of Assembly did suggest that property craft "be taken up" to take the soldiers and supplies to Florida. See Legislature Minutes, South Carolina, 1 September 1728, in "Proceedings in the Upper House of assembly" (Minutes, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/429 Part 2 1727/08/01). http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Images/CO_5_429_Part2_002/25

[107] Oatis, *Colonial Complex,* pp. 284-5

and buoys to complete the survey.[108] One Royal Navy observer remarked that these "Scout Boats (in Number two) are maintained by the province, to guard the Rivers & Inlets from Indians, they are both periaguas, one wth ten oars the other wth eight; they Sail & row very well."[109]

This seemingly mundane survey highlights an interesting trend in this era: while provincial authorities campaigned for greater Royal Navy protection of their coasts, Royal Navy officials continued to rely on provincial naval forces to support their own assignments. This negotiation of responsibility for coastal defense between provincial and Royal Navy forces echoes concurrent arguments within the Board of Trade over whether or not to deploy more Royal troops to the colonies. While some authorities within the Board of Trade had developed an extensive plan for increasing Royal military forces in the colonies, many other imperial officials dissented from this view and expected the colonies to maintain the majority of their own defenses. The Royal Navy's dependence on provincial naval assistance at Fort King George and in the Port Royal survey, as well as South Carolina's continued independent naval expeditions in this period all highlight this reality.[110]

On the empire's contested northern and southern continental borderlands, imperial officials encouraged provincial officials to shore up imperial weaknesses with locally raised navies. While Anglo-Americans in Nova Scotia, New England, and South Carolina always pined for elusive Royal Navy assistance, they continued to pass legal and economic measures to ensure that provincial naval forces could fight simultaneous Native and piratical threats with or without

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[108] See Legislature Minutes, South Carolina, 10-13 July 1728, in "Proceedings in the Upper House of assembly" (Minutes, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/429 Part 2 1727/08/01). http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_430_001

[109] James Gascoigne, qtd. in W.E. May, "The Surveying Commission of Alborough, 1728-1734," *The American Neptune*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (October 1961), p. 264.

[110] Nagel, *Empire and Interest,* pp. 309-312.

Royal assistance. Occasionally violent interactions between both naval forces foreshadowed larger rifts between imperial and provincial officials over the definitions and purposes of provincial navies in the next imperial war.

Provincial Navies, Privateers, *Guarda Costas,* and Pirates: The West Indies, 1713-1739

West Indian authorities faced an entirely different interwar situation than their North American compatriots. For instance, despite some North American naval expansion, the Royal Navy continued to devote more ships and resources to the rich Caribbean islands than their continental neighbors. While the Royal Navy expanded its operations in the West Indies during the previous two imperial wars, it ensured a more permanent presence in the West Indies with the construction of careening bases at Port Antonio, Jamaica and English Harbour, Antigua in the late 1720s.[111] Historian Peter Earle has found that by the early 1720s, there were "nine Royal Navy vessels in the West Indies, five on the American coast and two or three in Newfoundland during the fishing season."[112] Another major difference from the continent was that Anglo-American officials in the West Indies did not face major conflicts with Native tribes. They primarily dealt with Anglo-American pirates and Spanish *guarda costas.* It was also rare that Caribbean authorities ever deployed land forces or used provincial vessels to transport troops like their continental compatriots. Finally, Caribbean authorities relied on privateering far more than provincial officials on the mainland.[113] These differences between operational theatres can

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[111] Daniel A. Baugh, ed. *Naval Administration, 1715-1750* (London: Navy Records Society, 1977), pp. 328-330.

[112] Peter Earle, *Pirate Wars,* (Macmillan, 2003), p. 183, Kindle eBook.

[113] Anglo-American officials in North America also deployed privateers during the two short conflicts with Spain in this period, but West Indian governments seemed to deploy "private men of war" far more frequently when fighting *guarda costas* and pirates than their continental brethren. In *Command of the Ocean* (pp.228-229), N.A.M. Rodger discusses New England privateers active in the West Indies during the War of the Quadruple Alliance

be overplayed, however. Despite the regular presence of Royal Navy warships, imperial commanders were not always willing or able to pursue the light craft of Spanish *guarda costas* or English pirates. Just as with their compatriots on the mainland, Anglo-American officials in the Caribbean still often had to utilize their own naval resources to defend their shores and to secure British commerce between 1713 and 1739.

Provincial naval efforts during this period were far from unified or consistent. Scholar David Wilson attributes the Royal and provincial governments' eventual victory over Atlantic piracy to a "series of fragmented and distinctive campaigns, shaped and influenced in metropolitan and colonial contexts." Building on this narrative of disjointed naval campaigns, I will make the case that Anglo-American provincial navies and privateers forged an uneasy and often tense partnership with the Royal Navy to secure the West Indian islands from piratical, *guarda costas,* and regular Spanish imperial threats throughout the interwar period. Even as the Royal Navy's footprint increased in the region, Anglo-American authorities in the West Indies deployed provincial fleets and privateers when emergency situations required it.[114]

This alliance must be understood in the context of inconsistent messages from the metropole regarding naval defense. Noting that historian David Wilson has argued that London had little in the way of an organized plan to eradicate piracy during this period, other historians such as Shinsuke Satsuma and Sarah Kinkel have also recently emphasized that British naval policy was restrained. Satsuma has made the case that the ruling Whig party in London worried over offending potential trade opportunities during the two short conflicts with Spain and avoided an overly hostile naval policy. Kinkel has expanded on this point in arguing that the policy made the Royal Navy a "passive force focused on deterrence." Kinkel has also argued that

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[114] Wilson, "Protecting Trade," p. 104.

Prime Minister Walpole's administration detested privateering and considered it a pathway to piracy.[115] This reticence was especially visible in the West Indies, where most of the tension with the Spanish Empire in the Americas came to a head.

Imperial authorities did not, however, discourage provincial naval defense as a tool. As previously mentioned, when the Lords of the Admiralty refused to fund a provincial guard vessel in Nova Scotia in 1724, they argued "when vessels have been fitted out by the Governors of his Majesty's Islands or Plantations abroad, the inhabitants have borne the charge thereof." This laissez-faire attitude towards provincial naval defense was also apparent in the West Indies. In March of 1723, Barbadian Governor Worsley wrote to the Board of Trade about his fitting out a sloop "in the nature of a guarda costa" to assist the customs officer in pursuing smugglers. He wrote that he and the customs officer both had shares in the sloop and that the "expence will not be much to H.M. besides the maintaining the third part of the sloop..."[116] In August, an unnamed imperial official (the editor of the *Calendar of State Papers* assumed this correspondent to be Charles Delafaye, the undersecretary of state for the Northern Department) responded that the Worsley's deployment of the sloop "employed in the Custom house affairs to prevent the running of goods, leave[s] no room to doubt but that step will be approved of," and doubted even if the king would ask for a share in "so necessary a service."[117] With attitudes ranging from apathetic to enthusiastic, imperial officials neither strongly supported nor discouraged provincial naval defense in this period.

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[115] Satsuma, *Britain and Colonial Maritime War,* pp.230-43 and Kinkel, *Disciplining the Empire,* pp. 62-66.

[116]Governor Henry Worsley to the Council of Trade and Plantations., 26 March 1726 in *CSP, Vol. 33, 1722-1723, ed. Cecil Headlam* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1934), 221-238. British History Online http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol33/pp221-238.

[117][Charles Delafaye?] to Governor Henry Worsley, August 1723 *CSP, Vol. 33, 1722-1723,* ed. Cecil Headlam. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1934), 221-238. British History Online https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol33/pp318-337

Any study of interwar provincial naval defenses in the Caribbean must first consider Governor Lord Archibald Hamilton of Jamaica's major privateering debacle of 1715-1716. In 1715, Hamilton commissioned around ten privateers with the declared purpose of curtailing Spanish *guarda costa* and other pirate activity around Jamaica. Despite these declared aims, many of these privateers engaged in outright piracy against Franco-Spanish shipping. Historian E.T. Fox points out that far from being altruistic, Governor Hamilton had financial shares in these privateering-pirate voyages. Additionally, Hamilton was implicated with loyalties to Jacobite rebels, and Fox surmises that he may have intended this fleet to support that Stuart insurrection in 1715. Author Colin Woodward suggested this may have even been the start of a "colonial Jacobite navy."[118]

Whatever Hamilton's actual motivations, one of his main defenses of his actions was the necessity of provincial naval defense when the Royal Navy's presence had been lackluster immediately following Queen Anne's War. To be certain, Hamilton could draw on his own past to substantiate this declared aim. During the final months of the war in 1712, Hamilton dispatched provincial "advice sloops" that acted as intelligence scouts.[119] When questioned by Jamaican politicians in 1716 "what motive he had for granting ten Comissions in ye Space of a month for Suppressing of Pyrates when a Kings Ship and a Sloop attended this Island," Hamilton gave a questionable answer: while he could not remember if one or more of the vessels were gone, he assumed that they probably were gone at the time, and that the station frigate was in bad shape.[120] In a subsequent 1718 pamphlet, Hamilton clarified this answer and declared that local

[118] E.T. Fox, "Jacobitism and the "Golden Age" of Piracy, 1715-1725" in *International Journal of Maritime History*, XXII, No. 2 (December 2010), pp. 282-284. And Colin Woodward, *The Republic of Pirates* (Orlando: Harcourt, 2007), pp. 100-103. Kindle eBook.

[119]Council and Council in Assembly Minutes, Jamaica, 29 September 1712, TNA, CO 140/11

[120] Council and Assembly Minutes, Jamaica, 7 September 1716, TNA, CO 140/13.

merchants reeling from *guarda costa* attacks had complained about the "want of Ships of War...[and desired that] such a Naval Strength may be order'd for the Protection of the Island."[121] Whatever the truth behind Hamilton's accusation, the fact that this was one of his main arguments of self-defense suggests that this was a common struggle throughout the West Indies.

In a twist of historical irony, Hamilton's privateer fleet—ostensibly created for provincial naval security from Spanish 'pirates'—helped to spearhead the Caribbean theatre of the Anglo-American 'Golden Age of Piracy.' Even though Hamilton had dictated strict parameters in his letters of marque (including requiring his privateer captains to fly a privateer jack rather than the Royal Navy union jack), some of his captains eventually turned to outright piracy against their own countrymen. This group of Anglo-American pirates (including the likes of Benjamin Hornigold, and Edward "Blackbeard" Teach) would eventually transform the Bahamas into a major pirate base by 1716.[122] Whatever Hamilton's initial motives in commissioning his "privateer" fleet, his actions helped to spur on a wave of pirates that would force governors throughout the West Indies to expand their own provincial fleets to go pirate hunting.

Historians have largely characterized Britain's immediate reaction to the growing pirate threat of 1716-1718, ranging from general amnesties to disorganized Royal Navy cruises, as inadequate. David Wilson has recently argued that Royal authorities did not respond to the pirate base in the Bahamas for nearly two years primarily because of postwar debt and general parsimony. By 1718, Wilson argues, Crown authorities finally supported a major campaign

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[121] Lord Archibald Hamilton, *An Answer to an Anonymous Libel, Entitled, Articles Exhibited Against Lord Archibald Hamilton, Late Governour of Jamaica: With Sundry Depositions and Proofs Relating to the Same* (London: 1718), p. 46.

[122] Hamilton, *An Answer,* p. 73, and Fox "Jacobitism," pp. 283-4.

against the Bahamian pirate base because renowned privateer captain Woodes Rogers and private investors devised a colonization plan that required "minimal public expenditure."[123] Even though Royal Navy vessels helped Rogers to clear New Providence Island of pirates during his July landing, by September all of his Royal Navy escorts had departed.[124]

With few naval defense options remaining, the experienced privateer and new governor of the Bahamas utilized local naval strength in creative (albeit dangerous) ways. With threats from Spanish Cuba and the unrepentant English pirate Charles Vane, Governor Rogers resorted to hiring former pirates including Benjamin Hornigold and John Cockram to hunt down their old associates, and ultimately met with some operational success. In a late October 1718 letter to the Board of Trade, Rogers—still bereft of Royal Naval aid, and limited to help from local ex-pirates and his own private ship the *Delicia*—suggested that any future Royal Navy vessels sent to the island should be under the direct command of the local government. With a small Royal Navy cruiser, Rogers "could joyne a sloop or two and men from the guarrison [sic] with the best of the people here and soon be out after any pirate…"[125]

Rogers' idea of a cooperative Royal-provincial pirate hunting force highlights what historian Mark Hanna has called "one of the first unified imperial projects."[126] Historians generally agree that a combination of provincial naval campaigns and Royal Navy cruises helped to mitigate the worst of the Anglo-American pirate threats by the 1720's, but David Wilson has recently made the case that provincial campaigns (ranging from state-hired vessels to individual merchant captains who fought pirates while on trading journeys) were often more successful than

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[123]Wilson, "Protecting Trade," pp. 96-97. See Earl, *Pirate Wars,* pp. 181-190 for another scholar's view of the problems with Royal Navy pirate patrols, the 1717 Pardon, etc.

[124]Woodward, *Republic,* pp. 264-271.

[125] Woodes Rogers to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 31 October *CSP. Vol. 30, 1717-1718.* Ed. Cecil Headlam. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1930), 359-381. British History Online, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol30/pp359-381 and Woodward, *Republic,* pp. 283-286.

[126]Hanna, *Pirate Nests,* p. 370.

Royal Navy cruisers themselves.[127] Though "unified" in cause against pirates and *guarda costas,* provincial and Royal naval forces were far from unified in mission or tactics in dealing with these threats.

The uneasy relationship between West Indian privateers, provincial navies, and the Royal Navy would continue well into the next two decades as campaigns against pirates continued alongside a larger focus on Spain's imperial threat. No island better exemplifies occasionally unified, but more frequently disparate provincial and Royal paths taken against piratical and Spanish threats than Jamaica's experience from 1718 to 1729. In December of 1718, a pirate captain captured a merchant captain with a lucrative cargo, and Governor Sir Nathaniel Lawes dispatched two provincial crews in pursuit as "none of H.M. ships of war [were] then in harbour." Lawes promised the sailors 1/3 of the shares of "whatever was recovered" as delineated by a recent Royal proclamation against pirates. The crews found the culprit—a Spanish pirate with a multiethnic crew—and fell back in defeat after a bloody engagement with over thirty-five sailors killed, and more wounded.[128]

Soon after this defeat, Lawes informed his council that "Several Merchants had Voluntarily offered their Sloops Tackle and ffurniture and to fit them out on the Credit of the Country towards further pursuing the Pyrates..." The council agreed that "three Sloops should be forthwith sent out...be Arm'd and Victualled by the Government" and that the "Sloops be at the Risque of the Owners, and Mens Wages as the others had been before." The council appointed specific captains, demanded they "Concert together and have the same Commis^{ons} and Instructions as the Two former." What the council suggested was an interesting combination of a

[127] Earle, *Pirate Wars,* p. 196, Wilson "Protecting Trade," pp. 97-99.

[128] Governor Sir Nathaniel Lawes to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 31 January 1719 *CSP, Vol. 31, 1719-1720,* ed. Cecil Headlam (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1933), pp. 1-21. British History Online https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol31/pp1-21

governmentally directed naval assignment and a privateering mission guided by the ethos of "risk and reward."[129]

While the new provincial fleet was on its hunt, six Royal Navy warships arrived in Kingston Harbor. Far from praising the arrival of Royal military aid, Lawes complained to the Board of Trade that he had little control over the warships' captains. In one case, Lawes—still ignorant of the recent declaration of war between Great Britain and Spain—complained that a Royal Navy captain failed to deliver his letter to the governor of Cuba inquiring about Spanish attacks on Jamaican shipping.[130] Luckily for Lawes, those sloops "fitted out at the charge of the country in pursuit of the pirate yt. took the ship *Kingston*, are return'd with pretty good success" and recovered the vessel without firing a shot. Around the same time, Lawes reported that Jamaican "privateers have already made application for Commissions to act against the Spaniards, and I have with the advice of the Council issued some."[131]

Throughout the rest of the short-lived War of the Quadruple Alliance and beyond, Lawes and his successors struggled to harmonize Royal Navy and provincial maritime defense strategies and goals. This became immediately obvious in the Jamaica government's decision to regularly employ guard sloops despite a Royal Navy presence throughout the 1720's.[132] Desperate to fund regular provincial guard sloops while also cutting costs, Lawes informed the Board of Trade in late 1720 that he had agreed to the Jamaican Assembly's levies on slave sales and proposal to tax Jewish residents £1,000 in order to fit two vessels for the "guarding the

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[129] Council and Council in Assembly Minutes, Jamaica, 1718-1720, TNA CO 140/16,

[130] Lawes to Council of Trade and Plantations, 31 January 1719.

[131] Lawes to Council of Trade and Plantations, 24 March 1720 in. *CSP, Vol. 31, 1719-1720*, ed. Cecil Headlam. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1933), PP. 45-66. British History Online https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol31/pp45-66.

[132] Wilson, "Protecting Trade," p. 98.

coasts from pirates and other vessells from Trinidado [Cuba] who frequently commit depradations [sic] and acts of hostility both by sea and land upon us."[133]

While the politics surrounding Jamaica's expansion of its provincial navy could lead to unjust treatment of its citizenry, they could also alienate Royal Navy officers like Admiral Edward Vernon. Tensions were already high between Vernon and Lawes' administration when Vernon consistently involved himself in local affairs—ranging from attempting to extradite alleged Jacobites to England for trial to accusing Governor Lawes and his attorney general of smuggling.[134] In late 1720, in a preface for an act to fit out guard sloops, the Jamaican Assembly made the following barb: "Whereas...H.M. ships of war ordered here for the encouragement of trade and defence of this Island have not so effectually answered the end for which they were sent hither...whereby a great many...vessels as well belonging to this his said Island...have been taken in sight thereof by pirates and vessels fitted out and commissioned by the subjects of the King of Spain under pretence of guarding their own coast…" Vernon responded to this accusation in a letter to the Admiralty, claiming that Royal Navy ships were not equipped to chase after Spanish-sponsored pirates in small craft, and that the Assembly's accusation was a "lying preamble."[135] Just as with the arrival of the Royal Navy in South Carolina in the 1720s, Jamaicans came to believe that not all of their coastal defense measures could be left to imperial authorities alone. By April of 1721, Lawes was confident enough to brag to London that "I am

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[133] Lawes to Council of Trade and Plantations, 13 November 1720 *CSP, Vol. 32, 1720-1,* ed. Cecil Headlam. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1933), pp. 187-195. British History Online http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol32/pp187-195.

[134] Steven C. Hahn, "The Atlantic Odyssey of Richard Tookerman: Gentleman of South Carolina, Pirate of Jamaica, and Litigant before the King's Bench," *Early American Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Summer 2017), pp. 539-590. https://www.jstor.org/stable/90011103

[135] "Extract of Letter from Capt. Vernon to Mr. Burchett, 7 Nov. 1720" and "Copy of Act of Jamaica for Fitting out Sloops for Guarding the Coasts etc.," *CSP Volume 32, 1720-1721,* ed. Cecil Headlam (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1933), 329-346. British History Online http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol32/pp329-346.

told our adjacent Spanish Governors are grown more cautious in granting commissions to guard de la coasts especially since the country sloops have been cruiseing round about the Island."[136]

Despite this pattern of provincial naval defense in Jamaica, the story of the island's maritime defenses in the 1720's was not one of total animosity with the Royal Navy, and as it happened the Royal Navy could also be more dependable than their provincial counterparts at times. For instance, In February of 1724/5, the next governor—Henry Bentinck, the Duke of Portland—disagreed with the Assembly over various legislation and attributed the failure of a new coastal security bill to this dispute. The governor bragged that "I have not sufferd your Coast to lye Naked, The Commadore having at my instance (very readily indeed) commanded his Majesties Snow to that Station..."[137] The duke reported to the Board of Trade that "I prevaild wth. the Commadore to order one of H.M. sloops to supply the want of the guard sloop," that the Assembly accepted this, and hoped to use the initial money for a provincial guard sloop to suppress an ongoing slave rebellion.[138] At least in this case, the Royal Navy was more dependable in terms of coastal defense than their provincial counterparts.

The disparate views over the best course of naval protection became even more evident in 1726. An anonymous pamphleteer appealed to the Royal government for permission to enact reprisals against Spanish *guarda costas* for shipping losses, and later decried the alleged inactivity of large Royal Navy warships to pursue swift foes, as well as the inability of the island to keep financing expensive provincial guard sloops. The governor did admit, however, various

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[136] Governor Sir Nathaniel Lawes to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 20 April 1721 *CSP, Vol. 31 1720-1721,* ed. Cecil Headlam (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1933)pp. 281-297. https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol32/pp260-281

[137] Letter from the Duke of Portland…, 8 February 1724/5, TNA CO 137/16

[138] Governor the Duke of Portland to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 8 February 1724/5 in *CSP Vol. 34, 1724-1725,* Cecil Headlam and Arthur Percival Newton, eds, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1936), 320-335. British History Online http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol34/pp320-335.

political disagreements with the Lords of Admiralty as well as the "negligent and disrespectfull behaviour of most of the Sea Officers" in the area.[139] The pamphleteer and the governor may have disagreed over the Royal Navy's use in hunting *guarda costas,* but they both highlighted major problems that threatened the province's naval security: heavy financial costs for provincial officials in outfitting local defense fleets, and personal disputes between local officials and Royal Navy officers.

Notwithstanding the lack of cohesion between provincial forces and the Royal Navy, both Anglo-American and Royal officials in Jamaica continued to rely on this uneasy balance of provincial and Royal Naval protection when a second (though largely uneventful) imperial conflict broke out again with Spain in 1726. While its causes were imperial disputes in Europe, local tensions in the West Indies—particularly an uptick in *guarda costa* attacks—provided a tense American background for this renewed (though brief) war.[140] From 1726 to 1727, Vice Admiral Francis Hosier led an infamous attempt to blockade the Spanish treasure fleet in Porto Bello, Panama. Over three thousand Royal Navy sailors, including Hosier himself, would die from an epidemic of yellow fever during the failed blockade.[141]

Jamaican participation in Hosier's campaign was limited, but when King George II sent a letter in the spring of 1729 warning that Spain had plans to invade the island, Jamaican authorities scrambled to ready both the Royal Navy and to expand local maritime defenses. The Jamaican government's naval defense plan proved that provincial and Royal Navy vessels could operate in tandem on a large scale if needed. On 7 April 1729, Commodore St. Loe promised

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[139]*The State of the Island of Jamaica. Chiefly in Relation to its Commerce and the Conduct of the Spaniards in the West-Indies* (London: H. Whitridge, 1726), pp. 24-27, and Governor the Duke of Portland to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 1 June 1726 in *CSP, Vol. 35 1726-1727*, Cecil Headlam and Arthur Percival Newton, eds. (London: His Majesty's STationery Office, 1936), pp. 76-94. British History Online https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol35/pp76-94

[140] Harding, *Emergence,* pp. 17-18.

[141] Kinkel, *Disciplining the Empire,* pp. 66-67.

Jamaican Governor Robert Hunter that he "shall be ready to come into any Measure with Your Excellency for its safety, and shall keep those Ships that are with me in readiness to go upon any Service..." and already had some of his vessels scouting for Spanish fleets around the island.

While these ships were cruising, Governor Hunter devised a plan for the defense of Kingston Harbor that relied almost entirely on merchant vessels. He proposed quickly training sailors from each ship to operate artillery at the fort, and that various merchant vessels should be armed, reinforced, and strategically placed to prevent landings. In the case of a successful Spanish incursion, the merchant captains were to fall back to Kingston and land their men. The merchant captains were to keep a "strict discipline amongst their People according to the Law of Arms," and financial insurance would be provided for wounded sailors and the families of sailors killed in action. His council agreed to these proposals, and only added that sailors on land would be put under the command of the local militia.[142] While no Spanish invasion would reach Jamaica's shores, Governor Hunter's simultaneous reliance on Royal Navy cruisers for external scouting and merchant vessels for emergency defense exemplified the ways in which a Royal-provincial naval alliance could work on the field.

Even after the short War of the Quadruple Alliance concluded in 1729, Anglo-American officials in Jamaica and other islands would still rely on both Royal Navy and provincial naval forces to combat *guarda costas.* Historian Richard Harding has found that of the seventy-seven British vessels taken by guarda costas between 1713 and 1731, 34% of these vessels were taken after 1727. Negotiations in the early 1730s between Spain and Britain to end both English smuggling and Spanish *guarda costa* activity failed, and Spain and France renewed their ancient alliance in 1733—a worrisome prospect for the Walpole Administration.[143]

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[142] Council Minutes, Jamaica, 7-9 April 1729, CO 140/21 TNA.
[143] Harding, *Emergence,* pp. 17-19.

Just as tensions were heating up with Spain, Rear Admiral Charles Stewart agreed to dispatch Royal Navy warships to seek restitution for Jamaica ships that had been taken by *guarda costas* in the autumn of 1732.[144] Even this newly proactive stance did not eliminate the need for provincial naval activity. A few months after this decision, a Spanish vessel seized an English sloop in the harbor of Port Morant Jamaica, and "Two Sloops were immediately order'd to go in quest of the said Pirate."[145] Though the master of the sloop was released by the Spanish and restitution made, Anglo-American authorities had still felt it necessary to send what were likely provincial sloops out to look for the missing merchant.[146]

Despite growing Royal Naval involvement in the region by the early 1730s, provincial naval activity continued in many areas. In early 1735, a Spanish *guarda costa* with over 120 Hands "most Negroes and Mollattoes" with two prize sloops in tow, attacked an English sloop and forced it to run ashore on the Isle of Saba. His "Excellency General Matthew...instantly fitted out a Sloop of his own with sixty Men to go in quest of the Pirate and her prizes." Even though he could not find the *guarda costa*, the "Example was followed by another gentleman who fitted out a Sloop at his own Expence," but did not have enough sailors himself. With the *guarda costa* still at large, "till better Measures can be thought of, out of his great Generosity, is fitting out his Sloop a second time for the Security of the homeward-bound Ships..."[147] Even at this late date, merely four years before the next great imperial contest (the War of Jenkin's Ear),

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[144] Bruce P. Lenman, *Britain's Colonial Wars, 1688-1783* (New York: Routledge, 2001), no page numbers given. Google Play eBook

[145] *New-England Weekly Journal* (Boston, Massachusetts), no. CCCXIX, April 30, 1733: [2]. *Readex: America's Historical Newspapers*.

[146] For more information on this case, the involvement of the Royal Navy, and the Spanish reaction, see Robert Hunter's letter to the Council of Trade and Plantations, and its inserts in America and West Indies: March 1733, 16-31, in *CSP, Vol. 40, 1733*, Cecil Headlam and Arthur Percival Newton, eds (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1939), 51-69. British History Online. http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol40/pp51-69.

[147] "Extract, of a Letter from St. Christopher's, March 17. 1734, 5." *Boston News-Letter* (Boston, Massachusetts), no. 1637, July 3, 1735: [2]. *Readex: America's Historical Newspapers*

West Indian officials still felt the need to fit out small provincial vessels "till better Measures" (perhaps adequate Royal Naval assistance) could be thought of.

From 1713 to 1739, colonial governors and assemblies in the West Indies juggled various maritime defense options, ranging from commission privateers to developing standing provincial navies to relying on Royal Navy assistance. With major threats from Anglo-American pirates and Spanish *guarda costas,* they came to rely on a loose combination of provincial and Royal Naval responses to these enemies. While imperial authorities did not discourage provincial naval activity, their restrained naval response to these threats perpetuated regional instability in the West Indies and forced provincial governors to use their own resources to defend their shores—and to help secure the West Indies for the Empire at large.

From the end of Queen Anne's War in 1713 to the beginning of the War of Jenkin's Ear in 1739, Anglo-American officials on Britain's North American borderlands and in the West Indies navigated a maelstrom of piratical, Native, and imperial maritime threats by developing flexible systems of provincial naval defense. Though occasionally deploying privateers, colonial officials on the contested borderlands of New England, Nova Scotia, and South Carolina depended on centrally controlled emergency fleets and guard vessels to pursue Abenaki, Yamassee, and Anglo-American raiders. While occasionally outfitting guard vessels like their continental brethren, West Indian officials dispatched impressed vessels, privateers, and *guarda costas* and pirates. Though imperial officials expanded the Royal Navy's physical presence throughout the Atlantic world in the interwar period, parsimony, operational difficulties, and a guiding ethos of military restraint ensured that provincial naval forces would be necessary to secure the empire's maritime security in the interwar period.

Chapter III. The War of Jenkin's Ear and the Incomplete 'Royalization' of Provincial Navies, 1739-1754

When Great Britain declared war on Spain in 1739 after nearly a generation of relative peace with its traditional foes, few imperial officials could have expected a nine-year conflict that would ultimately pit them against the French as well. This conflict, the War of Jenkin's Ear (which eventually bled into a larger imperial and European conflict called the War of the Austrian Succession/King George's War) was different from the wars against Louis XIV in that it was largely inspired by maritime tensions.[1] By the late 1730s, after a series of failed negotiations over British navigation rights and Spanish *guarda costa* activity, Prime Minister Robert Walpole's political foes convinced his ministry to declare war on the Spanish.[2]

This fight against the Spanish had roots in navigation disputes in the West Indies, but also in territorial disputes on the North American mainland that directly involved provincial naval forces. With borderland conflicts common between South Carolina (Britain's southernmost colony) and the Spanish and their Native allies throughout the last century, British statesman James Edward Oglethorpe and other imperial officials planned a 'buffer' colony for the region south of South Carolina called Georgia. Pleased with this arrangement, South Carolina's legislature immediately sent the scout boat *Carolina* with ten sailors to protect Georgia's earliest settlers in early 1733. The *Carolina*—along with several other small provincial vessels—would

[1] For the sake of simplicity, I have chosen to use 'The War of Jenkin's Ear' as a catch-all term for the wars with the French and Spanish that occurred between 1739 and 1748, though the war with the French is technically known as 'King George's War.' Names for the European theatres of these wars are the War of the Austrian Succession and the War of the League of Augsburg.

[2] Pares, *War and Trade,* pp. 29-64, Kinkel, *Disciplining the Empire,* pp. 84-5, Satsuma, *Britain and Colonial Maritime War,* pp. 220-221.

prove to be vital in Oglethorpe's provocative military expansion south of Savannah at Frederica, Georgia in 1736.[3]

British expansion in Georgia (backed by provincial naval craft) inflamed Spanish authorities at St. Augustine, and competing Anglo-Spanish claims on the Georgia coast had all the potential to blow up into all-out war. This border dispute took on greater imperial dimensions when Oglethorpe and his Spanish counterpart, Governor Francisco de Moral y Sánchez, agreed to cease expansion and let their respective overlords in Europe decide the Florida-Georgia line. The British Secretary of State, the Duke of Newcastle, took a hard line against rumored Spanish military plans to invade Georgia and promised to protect the fledgling colony. He also secured Oglethorpe a place as the overall military commander of both South Carolina and Georgia. When Spain demanded a complete British withdrawal from Georgia, pro-war politicians and even King George II agreed to send Royal Navy reinforcements and British troops to the New World.[4] It is telling that British military expansion in Georgia—largely contingent on provincial naval assistance—would ultimately help propel the British Empire to war against Spain in 1739.

Any study of provincial navies in the War of Jenkin's Ear must consider the massive expansion of the Royal Navy's war making capabilities in this period. By all accounts, the Royal Navy had achieved "naval supremacy" by the end of the war in 1748.[5] When the Newcastle ministry made the final push for war in 1739, the Royal Navy had over 117 vessels in serviceable or nearly serviceable condition, twenty of which were stationed in North America and the West Indies. In terms of finance, Walpole's reduction of the national debt in the interwar period

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[3] Larry E. Ivers, *British Drums on the Southern Frontier: The Military Colonization of Georgia, 1733-1749* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1974), pp. 7-11, 53-61. Ivers was one of the first scholars since Chapin to use the term "Provincial navy" to describe a colonial fleet.

[4] Trevor R. Reese, "Georgia in Anglo-Spanish Diplomacy, 1736-1739," *The William and Mary Quarterly,* Vol. 15, No. 2 (Apr. 1958), pp. 170-178. , https://www.jstor.org/stable/1919439

[5] Daniel A. Baugh, *British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 27.

coupled with a decades-old banking and finance system allowed Britain to bankroll the war effort.[6] Logistical improvements also occurred throughout the war, including the direct Admiralty takeover of victualling for Royal Navy ships in Jamaica—a task that had previously been handled by inefficient private merchants.[7]

The Royal Navy's leadership also made leaps towards professionalization during the nine-year conflict, although the Admiralty's transformation of the Navy into a more regimented and uniform fighting force would take years to complete. In late 1744, when the Duke of Bedford became the first Lord of the Admiralty, he brought with him a host of new Admiralty Lords (Anson, Sandwich, and Grenville) that one scholar has described as a "generation of politician administrators." Between the mid-1740s and early 1750s, the new admiralty politicos successfully cemented the Admiralty at the helm of Britain's disorganized naval bureaucratic web, instituted stricter discipline for the navy, advocated for more offensive naval warfare (particularly in North America), ordered officers to wear uniforms for the first time, and ordered the construction of more powerful warships.[8]

Coinciding with the Royal Navy's administrative reform and expansion in the War of Jenkin's Ear was the massive growth of privateering. In fact, there were more privateers in the War of Jenkin's Ear than in any previous conflict. Even though Britain encouraged the practice, it struggled to codify and enforce new regulations on the rapidly growing practice.[9] Historian

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[6] Baugh, *Naval Administration,* p. 247, Harding, *Naval Supremacy,* pp. 39-40, 52-3.

[7] Christian Buchet, Anita Higgie, and Michael Duffy. *The British Navy, Economy and Society in the Seven Years War* (Woodbridge, Suffolk; Rochester, NY: Boydell & Brewer, 2013.), pp. 142-151. https://www-jstor-org.unh.idm.oclc.org/stable/10.7722/j.ctt24hfwq

[8] The extent of this professionalization is controversial. Most historians, ranging from Daniel Baugh to Richard Harding, point to naval professionalization as a turning point for the Royal Navy's command structure, but do not go as far as Sarah Kinkel, who has attributed this professionalization to the rise of 'Authoritarian' Whiggism in the British Admiralty. See Baugh, *Naval Administration,* pp. 502-503, Harding, *Naval Supremacy,* pp. 305-307, Kinkel, *Disciplining the Empire,* pp. 90-91, 101-104, 117-120.

[9] Carl E. Swanson, *Predators and Prizes: American Privateering and Imperial Warfare, 1739-1748* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990), pp. 29-30, 50-52.

Carl Swanson holds that privateering was especially popular with empires during this period as "belligerents' sea power was augmented, yet national treasuries did not have to pay the cost."[10]

While privateering expanded during this conflict more than ever, so too did the proliferation of colony-funded provincial navies. While borderland colonies had funded some small provincial forces in the interwar period, the war prompted Anglo-American provinces between Nova Scotia and Barbados to fund guard vessels and local navies on a much larger scale than ever before. Dozens of small, medium, and large provincial warships (e.g. the South Carolina galley *Charles Town,* the Massachusetts frigate *Massachusetts,* and the Rhode Island sloop *Tartar)* patrolled shipping routes, intercepted enemy privateers, and spearheaded naval assaults on enemy ports such as Fortress Louisbourg and St. Augustine. In essence, provincial naval forces returned to the offensive and defensive tasks they had taken up in Queen Anne's War, but on a much larger scale. For instance, for the first time, Massachusetts provincial vessels hunted for Spanish prey as far south as the Carolinas, and Rhode Island's guard sloop transported its colony's troops to the West Indies for operations in Cuba.[11]

What is especially astounding for this era, however, is the scale on which provincial navies from various American colonies cooperated with one another, and the extent to which Anglo-Americans throughout the British Atlantic became aware of other provinces' naval activities. Much of this can be attributed to the growth in trade and correspondence in the decades leading up to the War of Jenkin's Ear. By 1740, increasingly regularized ship traffic

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[10] Swanson, *Predators,* p. 27.

[11] For the wide variety of historians who have also noticed this increase during this era, see Howard Chapin, *Privateering in King George's War, 1739-1748* (Providence: E.A. Johnson, 1928), particularly Chapter III, and Chapin, *The Tartar: The Armed Sloop of the Colony of Rhode Island in King George's War* (Providence: Society of Colonial Wars, 1922) (see pp. 11-12 for the *Tartar's* journey to Cuba). See further discussion of Chapin's differentiation between provincial navies and privateers in Chapter I of this dissertation. H.W. Richmond: *The Navy in the War of 1739-48, Vol. III* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1920), pp. 273-4, and W.A.B. Douglas, "The Sea Militia of Nova Scotia, 1749-1755: A Comment on Naval Policy," *The Canadian Historical Review*, Vol. 47, No. 1 (March 1966), pp. 23-25. Swanson, *Predators and Prizes,* pp. 50-52.

along with mail and newspaper circulation increased in the Atlantic world and transformed the British Empire "from a rimless wheel of dissimilar trades into a linked community…"[12] In this growing Atlantic web of commerce and travel, Anglo-Americans became aware of other colonies' provincial naval efforts, and shared experiences of coastal defense. Take for instance a 1743 South Carolina newspaper report that "The *Boston* Province Snow (*Prince of Orange* [Italics mine]) commanded by Capt. [Edward] Tyng, was spoke with on Wednesday last, cruizing off our Bar."[13] Where provincial navies had operated on mostly regional terms before, by the 1740s, colonial vessels had begun to patrol waters far beyond their regional homeports.

The fact that Anglo-Americans from multiple colonies began to coordinate provincial naval warfare on a large scale reflects larger sociopolitical trends occurring throughout the British Atlantic world at the time. By the 1730s, the British government had come to expect Anglo-Americans to defend themselves, but also had become willing to deploy large Royal military forces in the New World. Even though the Admiralty stationed more Royal Navy guard vessels in the colonies, the King's ships were not able to fully meet the colonies' wartime defense needs—a factor that inspired the continued growth of provincial guard ships alongside an increasing Royal Navy presence in North America. The contemporary metropolitan policy of encouraging colonial participation in battle alongside Royal forces inspired the Walpole ministry's 1739-1740 plan to attack an unspecified major Spanish port in the West Indies with both the Royal Navy, British regulars and a large force of provincial soldiers from several colonies. This force famously met defeat in its attempt to take the Spanish South American port of Cartagena.[14]

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[12] Ian K. Steele, *The English Atlantic, 1675-1740: An Exploration of Communication and Community (*New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 93. Epub, https://hdl-handle-net.unh.idm.oclc.org/2027/heb.01402.

[13] *South Carolina Gazette* (Charles Town), 30 May 1743, Accessible Archives

[14] Nagel, *Empire and Interest,* pp. 449-468.

Notwithstanding the ultimate failure of the expedition, the British government not only expected the bulk of Anglo-Americans to build a large army to attack a distant target, but also to "provide victuals, transports, and all other necessaries" for the American soldiers sent to the West Indies until the Crown could reimburse the colonies. British authorities also promised assistance by Royal Navy commissioners in finding private transports.[15] From the precipice of the conflict, imperial officials counted on some level of provincial naval transport for American troops. Nevertheless, this growing imperial reliance on provincial naval assistance would be tempered by the British government's unwillingness to create a coherent policy or strategy regarding Anglo-American navies.

Throughout the War of Jenkin's Ear, two seemingly divergent trends emerged that would forever change the Royal-provincial naval defense partnership. On the one hand, Parliament's willingness to bankroll some provincial fleets and expeditions demonstrated metropolitan recognition of the importance of Anglo-American sea power for the first time. On the other hand, vagueness in Parliamentary legislation regarding prize distribution coupled with Royal Navy misconduct throughout the war angered Anglo-American officials, limited the utility of joint expeditions, and set the stage for future conflict between Americans and the Royal Navy.[16]

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[15] "Expedition Against the West Indies" and "Cost of Preparing West Indies Expedition," Circulars, Sent to Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North CArolina, Rhode Island, and [Virginia?], 2 April 1740, in *Royal Instructions to British Colonial Governors, 1670-1776, Vol. II*, ed. Leonard Labaree (New York: D. Appleton, 1935), pp. 737-740.

[16] In many ways, my argument in this chapter is an extension of historian W.A.B. Douglas's characterization of the "special relationship" between provincial vessels and the Royal Navy in securing the Nova Scotia coastline between 1745 and 1755. Throughout his unpublished dissertation on Nova Scotia's relationship with the Royal Navy, Douglas highlights the importance of both New England and Nova Scotian provincial vessels, especially in light of various strategic oversights by the Admiralty and Royal Navy. With this chapter, I expand upon Douglas's findings and extend the notion of this "special relationship" to the rest of British Atlantic world. See Douglas, *Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy 1713-1766* (Unpublished Diss., Queens University, 1973), p. 473.

"Where the King's Ships Are Not:" Provincial Naval Warfare in the Southern Colonies, and Imperial Involvement, 1739-44

Maritime tensions were the main causes of the War of Jenkin's Ear. Nevertheless, throughout much of the first half of the conflict, Royal Navy vessels failed to adequately protect the North American shoreline from Spanish privateers—prompting nearly universal adoption of provincial guardships, and growing awareness amongst Anglo-Americans of their own (and their neighbors') maritime potential. After paying scant attention to colonial naval defense concerns for the first few years of the conflict, outcries over Royal Navy negligence on the Carolina station coupled with General Oglethorpe's campaign for financial compensation for outfitting a provincial navy inspired Parliament to support provincial naval forces for the first major time.

In an April 1740 report to the Board of Trade, Royal customs surveyor and administrator, Robert Dinwiddie, estimated that Anglo-Americans from Newfoundland to the West Indies operated over 2,000 seagoing vessels, while British vessels travelling to the colonies numbered around 1,000. Dinwiddie guessed there were around 24,680 sailors operating out of Britain's Atlantic colonies at that time.[17] Whatever the accuracy of this report, by the beginning of the War of Jenkin's Ear, imperial officials—and Britons at large—were becoming increasingly aware of the scale of growing provincial naval capabilities.

This growing awareness is also evident in an April 1740 pamphlet by Irish newsman and printer, George Faulkner. Faulkner argued that the American colonies were "so well peopled, and have such a Number of Ships and Sailors, that they are both able and willing to put out 40 or

[17] Robert Dinwiddie, Report to the Board of Trade, April 1740, qtd. in Kenneth Morgan, "Robert Dinwiddie's Reports on the British American Colonies," *William and Mary Quarterly* (Apr. 2008), Third Series, Vol. 65, No. 2, pp. 305-346. Jstor. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25096787

50 large Ships of Force at their own Expence." He maintained that if governments from New England to the West Indies should provide over forty galleys "built in the Nature of the French or Spanish Gallies, their Men exercised to Arms as our Foot are," they could capture St. Augustine and other Spanish ports. Faulkner contended that these swift oared vessels—with roots in Greco-Roman navies of antiquity—would be suitable for action in the West Indies as they had been in the Mediterranean for millennia, and that provincial naval efforts would give the Royal Navy more room to operate elsewhere. Faulkner would later claim that "What gives us the greater Certainty of Success in this War, is, the great Strength and vast Trade our Plantations in America have acquired since the last War...," but did admit Royal military assistance would still be necessary to some extent.[18]

While Faulkner's assumptions that Spanish ports could be easily taken by provincial fleets were belied by the various defeats Anglo-Americans would face throughout the war, he was far from the only European to appreciate Anglo-Americans' growing provincial maritime power at the time. A few years later in April of 1745, Admiral Peter Warren—a Royal Navy official who had previously worked alongside provincial fleets in the failed attack on St. Augustine in 1740 and who would soon fight alongside them in the siege of Louisbourg—wrote Whitehall should encourage every colony to fit out their own provincial navies that would be on the "same footing" as Royal ships.[19]

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[18] George Faulkner, *The Present State of the Revenues and Forces by Sea and Land Of France and Spain, Compared with those of Great Britain...* (Dublin: George Faulkner, 1740), pp. 23-33. Faulkner was almost certainly inspired by France's 'Galley Corps'—a force independent of the French Royal Navy. French galleys were sleek, swift, lightly armed, and depended on mixed crews of both volunteers and convicts. See Rif Winfield and Stephen S. Roberts, *French Warships in the Age of Sail, 1626-1786: Design, Construction, Careers and Fates* (South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2017), pp. 372-374.

[19] Peter Warren to George Anson, 2 April 1745, in . *The Royal Navy and North America: The Warren Papers, 1736-1752*, ed Julian Gwyn. (Navy Records Society, 1973), p. 74. In his article "Sea Militia," historian W.A.B. Douglas emphasizes Warren's unique support for provincial forces helping to set a "precedent" for future "sea militias" in Canada (pp.25-26).

Problematically, imperial officials never created such a standard policy based on Warren's suggestion, and provincial officials continued their forebears' policy of funding local navies on their own. In fact, Anglo-Americans not only took the initiative to defend their coasts from growing numbers of Spanish privateers, but began to appreciate and study the naval efforts of their neighbors for the first time.[20] The scale of this universal provincial naval response is best illustrated by Lt. Governor George Thomas's (and his successors') long battles with the Quaker-dominated Pennsylvania Assembly over maritime defense.

In 1741, Thomas complained to the assembly that it would be "very disreputable to this Province...to remain inactive, When Boston, Rhode Island, & New York, are fitting out Vessels of fforce [sic] to secure their Navigation by attacking the Enemy." Three years later (after France joined the Spanish in the war against the British), Thomas—still at odds with the Quakers over the same issue—argued that Pennsylvania should fit out a provincial guard ship to fight privateers as "the Governments of New-England, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, enter'd early into this Method…Virginia has been lately obliged, from the Disability of the King's Ships upon that Station to do the same." Thomas also argued that the Royal Navy's protection was inadequate.[21] With growing news that other colonies built provincial navies, Thomas contended that Pennsylvania's very honor as an English colony was at stake.

While Thomas's pleas to the assembly reveal growing provincial awareness of Anglo-American naval power throughout the course of the conflict, it was his temporary successor—acting President Anthony Palmer—who best summarized the state of provincial naval activity by

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[20] John Tate Lanning, "The American Colonies in the Preliminaries of the War of Jenkins' Ear*," The Georgia Historical Quarterly* Vol. 11, No. 2 (June 1927), pp. 140-141, Jstor https://www.jstor.org/stable/40575905

[21] Council Minutes, Pennsylvania, 3 June, 16 October 1741 *Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, From the Organization to the Termination of the Proprietary Government, Vol. IV* (Harrisburg: Theo. Fenn & Co., 1851), pp. 494-5, pp. 749-750

the end of the war. In the summer of 1748, Palmer tried to convince the Assembly that the colony should fit out a "Ship-of-War" to assist a Royal Navy sloop in the area. After all, the "neighbouring Colonies of New England, New York, Virginia, South Carolina, or the West India Islands...have almost all at times found it necessary, notwithstanding the Guardships station'd among them, to fit out Vessels of War to act in conjunction with those Guardships, or independant [sic] of them as Circumstances required." Not only were those vessels useful, "being immediately under the Command of their respective Governments...obliged to Cruize...where...the King's Ships are not," but they were also signs that a colony was not unwilling to "do all in its own Power" to assist Royal military efforts.[22] In essence, by 1748, provincial naval defense was not only a wartime necessity for many Anglo-Americans, but a necessary show of loyalty to the Crown.

Naval operations in South Carolina and Georgia in the first four years of the conflict (c. 1740-1744) illustrate not only the tensions between provincial and Royal Navy forces, but the events that led Parliament to consider funding provincial naval forces for the first time. General James Oglethorpe in Georgia and his colleagues in South Carolina had long depended on a loose confederation of standing provincial navies (largely centered around both colonies' scout boat systems) and Royal Navy guard ships. Francis Moore, an English travel writer who spent time in Georgia before the war broke out, described the prewar responsibilities of provincial naval forces on the Georgia coast and the sorts of sailors who manned Oglethorpe's scout boats. He wrote that a scout boat was a "strong-built swift Boat, with three swivel Guns and ten Oars, kept for the visiting the River-Passages, and Islands, and for preventing the Incursions of Enemies, or

[22] Council minutes, Pennsylvania, 14 June 1748, in *Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, From the Organization to the Termination of the Proprietary Government, Vol. V* (Harrisburg, Theo. Fenn & Co., 1851), pp. 277-280. Google Play Ebook. Also see Swanson, *Privateering,* p. 148.

Runaways…" Regarding the sailors, he wrote that the crew was composed of men "bred in America, bold and hardy, who lie out in the Woods...Most of them are good Hunters or Fishers..."[23] All told, by 1736, Oglethorpe employed around four small crews of Georgia and South Carolina scout boat and periagua sailors. These vessels operated under Oglethorpe's direction independently, but also at times in tandem with the resident Royal Navy sloop *Hawk*.[24]

Paying for this substantial provincial fleet was more complicated in Georgia than in colonies with governors and assemblies. Georgia was technically a private colony run by a board of Trustees in London, but these Trustees depended on substantial yearly Parliamentary grants for the colony's civil and military maintenance. By 1738, Walpole promised the Trustees that the imperial government would cover the colony's military costs if the Trustees continued to apply to Parliament for grants for non-military costs.[25] Despite this assurance, no immediate funds came from London for local forces, and Oglethorpe ended up personally funding his provincial navy for the first few years of the conflict while holding out hope that Parliament would eventually reimburse him.[26]

Oglethorpe's naval activities were closely followed by British observers from the very beginning of the war. The 1740 edition of the widely circulated news journal *The Gentleman's Magazine* reported that British privateers were beginning to use Frederica, Georgia as a base to raid Spanish shipping. Additionally, it reported that in November of 1739, Spanish raiders massacred and decapitated some of Oglethorpe's Scottish highlander rangers. One of

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[23] Francis Moore, *A Voyage to Georgia, Begun in the Year 1735. Containing, an Account of the Settling the Town of Frederica, ... With the Rules and Orders ... for that Settlement;...*(London: Jacob Robinson, 1744)

[24] Ivers, *British Drums,* pp. 58-62.

[25] Richard S. Dunn, "The Trustees of Georgia and the House of Commons, 1732-1752," *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Vol. No.4 (Oct, 1954), pp.551-559. Jstor https://www.jstor.org/stable/1923077

[26] Ivers, *British Drums,* pp. 62-63, and Trevor R. Reese, *Colonial Georgia in British Policy, 1732-1756* (Unpublished Diss., London: University of London, 1955), pp. 182-184. ProQuest. https://repository.royalholloway.ac.uk/file/18954578-0cd2-421c-9774-31c3e264bb2f/1/10096600.pdf

Oglethorpe's scout boats reported the alarm to the general, and Oglethorpe immediately "ordered several Boats to be got ready, by which we imagine he intends to retaliate this Hostility."[27]

It was earlier in that tense Autumn of 1739 that Oglethorpe received King George's military instructions: to "make an Attempt upon the Spanish Settlement at S[t] Augustine" if he could get the cooperation of the South Carolina government, and to encourage privateering against Spanish shipping.[28] While Oglethorpe would ultimately lead a major siege of the Spanish city with naval and infantry assistance from both South Carolina and the Royal Navy throughout the first half of 1740, the expedition—like the contemporaneous attack on Cartagena de las Indias—was an utter failure. In the immediate months and years following the defeat, contemporaries and historians alike have argued over who was most responsible for the campaign's failure.[29] Despite controversy over the defeat and tensions between provincial and Royal forces, the unsuccessful siege inspired long-lasting innovations in the provincial naval capabilities of both South Carolina and Georgia.

From the very beginning of the joint campaign, tensions were high. After a successful raid on Spanish forts north of St. Augustine in the late winter, a confident Oglethorpe implored South Carolina to assist him with the capture of the Spanish capital. Even though Oglethorpe and Royal Navy Captain Vincent Pearce consistently tried to convince South Carolina authorities to commit sufficient funds and troops to assist in the siege, it would not be until early April that they agreed to send assistance—notably refusing to provide engineers or a deadline for when

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[27] *The Gentleman's Magazine: And Historical Chronicle, Volume X, For the Year M.DCCXL* (London: Edw. Cave, 1740), p. 139.

[28] "Instructions for Governor Oglethorpe" (Order, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/654 Part 1 [[1739]]/10/09). http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_654_Part1_085 and Rodney E. Baine, "General James Oglethorpe and the Expedition Against St. Augustine," *The Georgia Historical Quarterly* Vol. 84, N0. 2 (Summer 2000), p. 201. Jstor https://www.jstor.org/stable/40584271

[29] For a good overview of the historiography of the siege up to the 21st-century, see Baine's "General James Oglethorpe and the Expedition Against St. Augustine."

they would be ready. Even when the South Carolina legislature agreed to provide assistance, they still required an immediate loan from Oglethorpe in pounds sterling to outfit their troops and vessels.[30]

Despite this haggling, Benjamin Franklin's *Pennsylvania Gazette* reported in May that by early April "the [South Carolina] General Assembly have empower'd...the Lieutenant Governor to raise a Regiment of Foot, and a Troop of Rangers to assist General Oglethorpe...in Conjunction with several of his Majesty's Ships of War: as also to provide Sloops, Boats, Guns" and other necessities.[31] Indeed, contemporary estimates of both colonies' provincial fleets during the expedition highlight the scale of this undertaking. In April of 1740, Oglethorpe reported that he employed three sloops, a long boat, a schooner, and numerous armed small boats including a "Colony Periagua being a Guard De Coast." This fleet included over 140 sailors and officers, and cost Oglethorpe an extraordinary sum of £453 a month.[32] South Carolina's government provided an armed schooner with 54 "Volunteers and their [enslaved] Negroes," and numerous "Craft, Viz: 3 Sloops, one of which attended the [Royal Navy] Men of War," with 20 sailors in total, and "14 Schooners and Decked Boats" which employed over 56 armed men and sailors.[33]

While the *Pennsylvania Gazette* bragged that the naval efforts were done in "conjunction" with the Royal Navy, provincial officials largely placed their naval forces under the command of Commodore Vincent Pearce—captain of the H.M.S. *Flamborough,* and at least

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[30] Baine, "General James Oglethorpe," pp. 208-209.

[31] *Pennsylvania Gazette* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), no. 594, May 1, 1740: [2]. Readex: America's Historical Newspapers.

[32] "Establishment of a company of highland foot etc" (Military Document, The National Archives, Kew, [[CO]] [[5/654]] Part 2 1740/04/30). http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_654_Part2_018

[33] *Report of the Committee Appointed by the General Assembly of South Carolina in 1740 on the St. Augustine Expedition Under General Oglethorpe, Collections of the Historical Society, of South Carolina, Vol. IV,* (Charleston: Walker, Evans & Cogswell, Co., 1887), p. 126.

eight other frigates and smaller Royal Navy vessels.[34] Pearce and his squadron's general relationship with provincial authorities and forces can best be described as tense. Throughout this campaign and the rest of the war, southern provincial authorities and Royal Navy commanders recognized that Royal Navy forces needed provincial naval assistance, but regularly clashed over logistics and tactics. One major operational tension was anger over Royal Navy impressment policies. Even though Parliament had banned impressment in American colonies in 1708 with the 'Sixth of Anne,' Admiralty officials stopped requiring personnel-depleted Royal Navy station captains to follow this act by the mid-1720's. These impressments continued throughout the war, and Parliament gave them official sanction in 1746 when it condoned impressment in mainland North America, but banned it in the more lucrative West Indies colonies—a double standard that infuriated many Anglo-Americans.[35]

While colonial governments did still periodically opt to "Impress a Sufficient number of men and make provision for their subsistence" to man provincial navy vessels, Royal Navy impressment was far more frequent and far more unpopular.[36] This sentiment was particularly evident during the preparations for the attack on St. Augustine. A privateer named Captain Davis sailed south to Tybee Island, Georgia, after "his Men [were] impressed into the Men of War, and himself engaged in much Controversy at Law...[which] put a full End now to any farther Thoughts about privateering…" He chose to "admit the Sloop he had with him into the publick Service, among so many others employed" by Oglethorpe. Davis's decision to join Oglethorpe's provincial navy not only hints at the possibility that provincial service could be an occasional

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[34] Major James P. *Herson, A Joint Opportunity Gone Awry: The 1740 Siege of St. Augustine* (Fort Leavenworth: United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1997), p. 42, n. 32.

[35] Magra, *Poseidon's Curse,* pp. 243-50.

[36] "Vote relating to the Prov: Privateer, June 11 1740," Massachusetts State Archives Collection, Colonial Period, V. 62, p. 596. FamilySearch. https://www.familysearch.org/ark:/61903/3:1:3Q9M-C9Y5-QKWL?cat=1055547

escape from Royal Navy impressment, but also highlights the malleability between independent privateering and provincial navies.[37]

In a more extreme case, the *South Carolina Gazette* claimed that on 17 May, a press gang from the H.M.S *Tartar* tried to impress several sailors from the merchant ship *Caesar* in Charles Town Harbor, and in an ensuing scuffle, Royal sailors killed one of the merchant men.[38] Governor William Bull wanted to have the man responsible for the killing put on trial, but the Royal Navy captain and his crew set sail for St. Augustine before proceedings could begin. This evasion of the law, argues military historian James P. Herson, "made for bad press and may have contributed to poor contemporary and historical hindsight…" regarding the siege—and particularly regarding Pearce and his Royal Navy squadron.[39]

While impressment surely soured some contemporary and future scholarly opinions of Pearce and his squadron, by all accounts the provincial and Royal Navies largely cooperated before, during, and even after the disastrous siege. Royal Navy officers also continued to recognize the utility of provincial navies throughout the campaign. For instance, in late 1739, Captain Peter Warren (who would eventually serve under Pearce's command at the siege) and the crew of the H.M.S. *Squirrel* had captured a Spanish schooner, and Warren asked the South Carolina government to operate the schooner with ten local sailors as an "Advice Boat to bring any Intelligence...for the Service of this Government."[40]

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[37] Colonel William Stephens's Journal, 4 June 1740, in *Colonial Records of the State of Georgia, Volume IV: Stephens' Journal, 1737-40*, ed. in Allen D. Candler (Atlanta: Franklin Printing and Publishing Company, 1906), p. 586.

[38] *The South Carolina Gazette* (Charles Town), No. 326, 17 May-24 May, 1740. Accessible Archives

[39] Herson, *A Joint* Opportunity, p. 36.

[40] Legislature Minutes, South Carolina, 8 November 1739, in *The Journal of the Commons House of Assembly, September 12, 1739-March 26, 1741,* ed. J.H. Easterby (Columbia: The Historical Commission of South Carolina, 1952), pp. 18-19.

During the preparations for the siege in the spring of 1740, Pearce himself surveyed one Captain Thomas Walker's schooner at Governor Bull's request, and made the case that "it would be best for the Province if she should be bought." The colony never purchased the vessel. Nevertheless, a few months later during the final weeks of the siege, Pearce wrote Governor Bull and asked him for the schooner's presence to assist the Royal Navy flotilla. The governor not only hired Walker's schooner, but fitted it with provincial sailors to assist the Royal forces.[41] It is worth noting that the South Carolina government agreed to this task despite having previously purchased another schooner (the *Pearl),* which was captained by a Royal Navy officer, and was likely crewed by local sailors.[42] All in all, it seems Royal Navy officers were more than happy to utilize South Carolina's provincial naval resources—whether through unpopular methods of impressment, or more routine requests for provincial vessels to assist Royal Navy ships.

While provincial and Royal forces faced many challenges throughout the several weeks of the siege, one of their primary obstacles was the presence of six well-armed Spanish half-galleys in St. Augustine's Matanzas's Bay. In a stroke of fortune for the Governor Manuel de Montiano, Cuba's governor had agreed to send him the six sleek vessels, and nearly two-hundred sailors. This assistance came during a period in April when no British ships were patrolling the Florida coast—a critical mistake during the preparations for the siege. These half-galleys had cannons at fore and aft, but Montiano added guns on their starboard and port sides as well. These swift vessels, with only one mast each and a shallow draft, allowed the St. Augustine garrison

[41] Assembly Minutes 2 April 1740, and 18 July 1740, pp. 289-290 and 361-362, *JCHA,* and William Bull to Col. Vanderdussen, 9 July 1740*, in Report of the Committee,* p. 103.

[42] *An Impartial Account of the Late Expedition Against St. Augustine Under General Oglethorpe* (1742, Repr., Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1978), pp. 20-21. and *Report of the Committee,* p. 31.

nearly total command of Matanzas Bay by the time Oglethorpe's invasion force arrived by early May.[43]

By early June, Commodore Pearce feared the upcoming hurricane season, and warned Oglethorpe that he could only expect Royal Navy assistance into early July. By mid-June, this impending deadline, combined with sundry mishaps including the Spanish defeat of the English garrison at nearby Fort Mose and the Royal Navy's failure to prevent Spanish ships from resupplying the city's garrison, left provincial leaders desperate for a quick solution to taking the well-fortified town.[44] Throughout much of the second half of June, Colonel Alexander Vanderdussen—overall commander of South Carolina's troops—continuously offered to spearhead a joint provincial-Royal Navy assault on the Spanish half-galleys. With support from Captain Warren, Vanderdussen promised Commodore Pearce that he could provide at least eight small boats and various canoes to transport his troops, to transport his men alongside the Royal Navy. Pearce wavered between supporting and dismissing the attack, but ultimately decided the assault would be too dangerous. Within days, storms forced the warships out to sea, Cuban resupply vessels once more made it to the St. Augustine garrison, and the siege was all but over.[45]

Contemporaries and historians have long debated whether provincial forces or the Royal Navy was more culpable for the ignominious withdrawal from the siege in early July. Historian Trevor Reese makes the convincing case that imperial support for the expedition was limited as most Royal Navy forces in the Americas were concerned with the concurrent siege of Cartagena de las Indias. Reese contends that imperial preference for control over the more lucrative Spanish

[43] Baine, "General James Oglethorpe," pp. 215-219, Herson "Joint Opportunity," pp. 13-17.
[44] Ivers, *British Drums,* pp. 109-112, Baine, "General James Oglethorpe," pp. 218-220.
[45] Herson, "Joint Opportunity," pp. 22-25.

West Indies prevailed over provincial North American desires for a strong assault on St. Augustine.[46] Whatever fault imperial authorities had for the failure, many of the leading figures in the siege blamed each other for the defeat. Historian Douglas Edward Leach observes that between 1740 and 1743, South Carolinians, British army officers, and Oglethorpe's allies engaged in a pamphlet war over the controversy.[47] Indeed, in one example, a South Carolina legislative committee complained that Commodore Pearce was "always declaring himself ready to give any assistance but never giving any at all," and was unreasonable in his dismissal of Vanderdussen's plan of attack. Perhaps most damning, the Commodore had left South Carolina's "Province Schooner," (presumably the *Pearl*) to "shift for herself" at the mouth of Matanzas Bay without any assistance from the Royal Navy.[48]

Whatever criticism South Carolina legislators had for specific Royal Navy commanders, the colony's Commons House of Assembly still admitted a firm reliance on imperial protection. In a letter to King George II immediately following the withdrawal from St. Augustine, provincial legislators lamented the expedition's costs, but thanked the monarch for the "Assistance of so many of your Majesty's Ships of War, the good Effect of which we have already in many Instances, experienced."[49] Both Pearce's requests for provincial schooners, and provincial willingness to place local ships and crews under the commands of Royal Navy officers demonstrated some of this "Good effect." Even in the wake of disaster, provincial-Royal Naval cooperation was possible to some degree, if clouded by infighting.

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[46] Trevor Reese, *Colonial Georgia: A Study in British Imperial Policy in the Eighteenth Century* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1963), p. 80.

[47] Leach, *Roots of Conflict,* p. 47. Kindle eBook Version.

[48] *Report of the Committee,* pp. 143-145.

[49] "...The Humble Petition and Representation of the Council and Assembly of Your Majesty's Province of South Carolina Upon the Present State of the Said Province," 26 July 1740, in *JCHA, 1739-1741.*

With little time to recuperate from the defeat at St. Augustine in 1740, Lt. Governor Bull in South Carolina and General Oglethorpe in Georgia both had to adapt their provincial naval establishments to increasing waves of privateer attacks against the two colonies' shipping. In fact, historian Carl Swanson has attributed the British failure at St. Augustine to an increased onslaught against the Carolina coast. This wave of enemy privateering between 1740 and 1742 stretched as far north as New York. By the end of the war, Spanish and French privateers would capture 736 English vessels in North America and the West Indies. Swanson suggests that while Royal Navy station ships did cruise after enemy privateers throughout the war, the task was sometimes too large for the navy to handle.[50]

Despite the Admiralty Board's October 1740 instructions for Royal Navy ships to expand their patrols off the South Carolina and Georgia coasts, their presence was inadequate to defend local commerce. Provincial anger at alleged Royal Navy indolence would inspire repeated provincial petitions for greater naval assistance from London.[51] This is evident in Lt. Governor Bull's October 1741 letter to the Duke of Newcastle, Lt. Governor Bull, wherein he decried "...the Interruption [Spanish privateers] give to the Trade of this Province; more especially at this time when his Majesty's Ship *Phoenix* is unfit for service...[and] his Majesty's Ship *Tartar"* was due to leave soon—a fact that would leave the province defenceless and ripe for raiding. Even when the Carolina Royal Navy station ships pursued Spanish privateers, they evaded capture by sailing into shallow water. Lt. Governor Bull pleaded with the Duke of Newcastle to send material and laborers to help build shallow-water galleys to pursue these privateers.[52] If imperial

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[50] Swanson, *Predators and Prizes,* pp. 144-152.
[51] Reese, *Colonial Georgia,* p. 80.
[52] "Lieutenant Governor Bull to Duke of Newcastle and the affidavit of Thomas Lloyd and Robert Ford, Mariners, relating to their being taken by a Spanish sloop at St. Augustine, inclos'd" (Correspondence, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/388 Part 2 1741/05/22-1741/10/14). http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_388_Part2_001

authorities provided materials to build light-draft and swift row galleys, South Carolina's government could potentially save money on vessel construction while also fighting enemy vessels in shoal waters where Royal Navy frigates were unable to sail.

In fact, Bull's desire to expand the colony's small-boat service extended back to July of 1740. Immediately following the retreat from St. Augustine in July, the governor informed the Commons House that:

"When I consider the Situation of our Southern Frontier...by the Spaniards in their Row Galleys, which are capable of coming into any of our Inlets...where our larger Vessels cannot get at them; and be ready to intersept any of our Craft, and also encourage the Desertion of our Slaves...The best and cheapest Way to disappoint such Attempts would be to [have] 4 or 6 Boats fitted with a 6 Pounder, and several Swivel Guns, Oars…"[53]

In essence, Bull not only feared that Spanish light craft would raid local commerce, but that they would foment social disarray by encouraging slaves to run away from plantations. This warning should have concerned the planter-heavy Commons House. Only a year before, enslaved Africans along the Stono River—just a few miles south of Charles Town—rose up against their masters and killed several inhabitants in what would become known as the 'Stono Rebellion.' The rebels tried to flee south to Spanish Florida where the governor had promised freedom to any English-held slave that made it to St. Augustine. In their journey southward, the rebels tried to hold off South Carolina militiamen that had been sent to pursue them, but they were overpowered. Soon thereafter, South Carolina authorities executed the captured rebels.[54]

Despite fears of ongoing slave revolts, the Assembly initially tabled the governor's plans for a galley fleet. By mid-December, the assembly agreed to ask the King for six galleys while also reluctantly agreeing to fund local construction of two of the craft. The reasoning for this

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[53] *JCHA 1739-1741*, 16 August 1740, pp. 380-381.

[54] Jack Schuler, *Calling Out Liberty: The Stono Slave Rebellion and the Universal Struggle for Human Rights* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2009), pp. 69-72. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unh/detail.action?docID=515651.

move is unclear, but perhaps provincial authorities hoped for greater imperial assistance while providing for the possibility of being refused.[55] Whatever the assembly's reasoning, the move to finance local galleys was ultimately sound. While the Board of Trade ultimately forwarded the colony's request for galleys to the Duke of Newcastle, there is no indication he ever agreed to the proposal, and Lt. Governor Bull was still campaigning for Royal involvement in the project by the end of 1741.[56] In the spring of 1741, General Oglethorpe also requested galleys (among other supplies) from the home government and lamented the lack of Royal Navy protection on the Georgia station. Imperial officials ultimately did not grant his requests either.[57]

All in all, the British government's opinion on the colonies' provincial navies by the end of 1742 is best summed up by the Privy Council's decision in November of that year to not provide cannon for South Carolina's two newly built galleys (the *Beaufort* and the *Charles Town)*. Upon reviewing a plea from Lt. Governor Bull to provide nine-pound cannon for the vessels, a committee from the Privy Council deliberated on the matter for nearly a year with the colony's agent and with the Ordnance Board, and finally came to the conclusion that "as these [row galleys] are intended to Secure the Inland passages of the Province the said Board

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[55] *JCHA 1739-1741,* 10-16 September, pp. 385-395, pp. 425-6. Evidently the South Carolina government employed two galleys during the latter years of Queen Anne's War, so Bull's proposal was not without precedent. Thanks to Dr. Nic Butler for sharing this with me. See 24 October 1707, *Journal of the Commons House of Assembly of South Carolina, Transcript. Green Copy NO. 3, 1706-1711,* p. 307. *MSS, South Carolina Departments of Archive and History.*

It is noteworthy that Governor Tinker of the Bahamas made the same request for galleys, but seems to have built them locally. See "Journal, July 1741: Volume 49," in. *Journals of the Board of Trade and Plantations: Volume 7, January 1735 - December 1741*, K.H. Ledward ed. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1930), 390-396. British History Online, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/jrnl-trade-plantations/vol7/pp390-396 and *The South Carolina Gazette* (Charles Town), No. [363?], 18 June-25 June 1741. Accessible Archives

[56] "Letter from the Board of Trade to the Duke of Newcastle inclosing an extract from Mr. Bull, President of the Council in South Carolina, stating the danger that province is in from the row galleys which the Spaniards have at St. Augustine" (Correspondence, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/384 1741/01/23-1741/04/16). http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_384_034Also see Bull's letter to Newcastle, 14 October 1741, cited above, CO 5/388 .

[57] Charles C. Jones, Jr. *Collections of the Georgia Historical Society, Volume IV: The Dead Towns of Georgia,* (Savannah: Morning News Steam Printing House, 1878), pp. 98-99.

conceives that the Inhabitants ought to furnish themselves with such Ordnance otherwise the rest of His Majestys Colonys may hereafter Solicit the like favour."[58] This default assumption that Anglo-Americans should fund their own provincial navies mirrored the Admiralty's 1724 refusal to assist a Nova Scotia provincial guard ship, and declaration that "when vessels have been fitted out by the Governors of his Majesty's Islands or Plantations abroad, the inhabitants have borne the charge thereof."[59]

Whereas British authorities expected South Carolina's "Inhabitants" to fund and crew the galleys, it is worth examining who the "inhabitants" of the colony were that crewed these two small warships. The surprising amount of demographic information on the galleys' crews allows us a rare opportunity to examine the diverse backgrounds of sailors within the South Carolina provincial navy. Early on in their service in the summer 1742, neither galley was well-manned, and one of the crews on the provincial establishment was as small as three men. Realizing he needed a light craft to accompany him on one of his cruises, Royal Navy Captain Hamar of the H.M.S. *Flamborough* felt "Obliged to Man her Out of His Majesty's Ship under my Comand."[60]

By July of 1742, provincial authorities hastily impressed and recruited soldiers, sailors, and ships for a relief mission to aid General Oglethorpe as Spanish forces invaded Georgia. News reports and subsequent petitions indicated that there were 126 white and 14 black men (presumably enslaved and free, but sources are unclear) on both galleys. While these unusually large crews likely indicated the presence of soldiers being transported southward in addition to sailors, these numbers also likely attest to the racial diversity of the naval crews as well.[61]

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[58] *Acts of the Privy Council of England, Colonial Series, Vol. III, A.D. 1720-1745* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1910), W.L. Grant, James Munro, and Sir Almeric W. Fitzroy, eds. pp. 708-709. It should be noted that imperial authorities had previously promised to recompense colonies involved in the Cartagena of

[59] See previous chapter for discussion on this policy.

[60] Captains Log, HMS *Flamborough,* 29 June 1742, ADM 51/358, TNA

[61] Legislature Minutes, South Carolina, 19-22 November 1742 and 1 December 1742 *Journal of the Commons House of Assembly September 14, 1742-January 27, 1744,* ed. J.H. Easterby, (Columbia: South Carolina

Despite the colony's recent experience with a major slave rebellion and restrictions on the rights of free and enslaved Africans to carry weapons, it is clear that South Carolina's ruling class still depended on the labor of black mariners and soldiers to support the war effort against the Spanish.[62] In addition to racial diversity, there is evidence that at least one Jewish sailor (known only as Mr. Hart) served on board the *Charles Town* when it sank with its ten man crew in a squall in 1743. Interestingly, Hart was the only man named in the *South Carolina Gazette's* notice of the tragedy.[63]

While imperial authorities were not quite ready to directly support provincial naval efforts, mercantile anger over Royal Navy negligence was beginning to make an impact at Westminster, and provincial naval activity played a role. Particularly useful for the colony's pleas for naval assistance was a rising lobby of London merchants intimately connected with Carolina's trade, and who had powerful connections within the British government.[64] In early 1742, Parliament listened to various testimonies by merchants and ship captains directly affected by alleged Royal Navy negligence in the southern colonies. Virginia merchants and traders claimed privateers purposefully cruised after Chesapeake commerce because they knew the station captain, Sir Yelverton Peyton, was unwilling to cruise after the enemy or protect the trade. One merchant shared a letter from Thomas Lee—a Royal council member in Virginia—that complained that "the guardships guarded them so little, that they hired two sloops to secure

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Archives Department, 1954), pp. 40-3, 81-2. *Pennsylvania Gazette* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), no. 726, November 11, 1742: [2]. Readex: America's Historical Newspapers.

[62] Mark M. Smith, "African Dimensions," in J*: Documenting and Interpreting a Southern Slave Revolt* ed. John K. Thornton (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2005), pp. 79-80. https://www-jstor-org.unh.idm.oclc.org/stable/j.ctvqr1bf0

[63]Barnett A. Elizas, *The Jews of South Carolina: From the Earliest Times to the Present Day* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1905), p. 28.

[64] Huw David, *Trade, Politics, and Revolution: South Carolina and Britain's Atlantic Commerce, 1730-1790* (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 2018), pp. 43-62. https://www-jstor-org.unh.idm.oclc.org/stable/j.ctv6wgkqq

their trade." South Carolina's agent, James Crokatt, briefed Parliament on the Royal Navy's history in Charles Town dating back to the first guard ship in 1719, and argued that they currently had the smallest number of guard ships to date (Captain Charles Fanshawe's *Phoenix,* and Captain George Townsend's *Tartar*—the same captain whose press gang was implicated with the murder of a sailor who resisted impressment in the weeks leading up to the St. Augustine expedition*).*

Crokatt continued in his complaint, noting that Royal Navy captains frequently impressed sailors, extorted local merchants, and rarely left port to cruise after the enemy. At one point before departing for England, Fanshawe refused to lend Royal sailors to fit out a provincial sloop to pursue the Spanish. In response to all these affronts, South Carolina's government acted in the same manner as Virginia, and the "government fitted out two sloops, which, the first time they sailed, took a Spanish privatier."[65] It is noteworthy that one of the private captains Charles Town's government contracted with to defend the coast was New England privateer Captain John Rous, future hero of the 1745 Siege of Louisbourg and future Royal Navy captain. Even though Rous was a privateer by trade, the provincial government (along with local merchants) gave him provisions, guaranteed bounties for Spanish privateers and enabled him to impress sailors. Rouse was, as one scholar has put it, a "quasi-governmental coast guard" captain.[66] Rous's example further testifies to the blurred lines between provincial naval and privateer service, and also demonstrates that Anglo-American officials were supportive of impressment so long as it was by their authority as opposed to the Royal Navy.

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[65]. *Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments Respecting North America, Volume V: 1739-1754* Ed. Leo Francis Stock, (Washington: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1941), pp. 126-129.

[66] Chapin, *Privateering in King George's War,* pp. 32-34.

Ultimately, the Parliamentary committee that heard the complaints concluded that "due and necessary care had not been taken to keep a proper number of his Majesty's ships employed" in protecting English commerce, and wanted the rest of the House of Commons to "bring in a bill for the better protecting and securing the trade and navigation of this kingdom…"[67] Historian H.W. Richmond has argued that Admiralty resistance led to the bill's failure, as it "contained stringent clauses to tie the stationed ships securely to their stations and allow their Captains no liberty of action." In practice, the bill would have given colonial governors and councils near total control over station ships' orders. Despite the legal failure, with rising complaints from many different colonies over Royal Navy performance, stronger instructions were given to Royal Navy captains to work with governors.[68]

With significant pressure from trading interest groups and increasing numbers of ships lost to Spanish privateers in the Americas (on top of numerous accounts of provincial navies forming to fill in for reticent Royal Navy commanders), imperial authorities committed to more than just a change of rhetoric in instructions to new Royal Navy station captains. The 1742 edition of the *Scots Magazine* reported that an Admiralty court martial commenced on 9 June "to inquire into the conduct of Sir Yelverton Petyon, late Captain of the *Hector,* and Captain Fanshaw, late Captain of the *Phoenix,* during the time they were stationed at Virginia and South Carolina. The court adjudged Sir Yelverton to be dismissed as a Captain of the Royal navy; and adjudged Captain Fanshaw to be mulcted six months pay for the use of the chest at Chatham."[69]

Even before court martialing these captains, Admiralty officials had dispatched Captain Charles Hardy with the HMS *Rye* (alongside the sloop HMS *Hawke)* to replace Fanshawe, and

[67] *Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments, Volume V,* pp 130-131.
[68] Richmond, *The Navy in the War of 1739-48 Vol. III,* pp. 270-273.
[69] *The Scots Magazine...For the Year MCCCXLII, Volume IV* (Edinburgh: Sands, Brymer, Murray and Cochran), p. 285.

gave him specific instructions to be more proactive in hunting Spanish privateers and convoying merchant vessels than his predecessor.[70] Whatever the tone change in these instructions, many provincial authorities in Charles Town did not consider Hardy's arrival to be an improvement upon Fanshawe, with some South Carolina elites accusing Hardy of being as inactive as his predecessor.[71] While provincial authorities would never be completely happy with Royal Navy station captains, these actions did signal that imperial authorities were beginning to take coastal defense in the Southern colonies more seriously.

As Charlestonians continued to allege that Royal Navy captains on their station were inactive, General Oglethorpe in Georgia would have appreciated any permanent Royal Navy presence on the Georgia coast. Not long after the defeat at St. Augustine, Oglethorpe formed a "Marine Company of Boatmen" with recruits from Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina, and which operated heavily armed scout boats alongside the regular scout boat service. Whatever the novelty of American marines, small craft could not take on Spanish privateers at sea. With most British warships staying centered at Charles Town, Oglethorpe had expanded his own provincial navy to include the schooner *Walker* and the *Faulcon* and *St. Philip* sloops. He had purchased these ships in Charles Town, crewed them with South Carolina sailors, and used redcoats from the British Army's 42nd Regiment of Foot to act as marines on these larger vessels.[72]

Indeed, Oglethorpe had every reason to be confident in these provincial forces. In a December 1741 letter to the Georgia Trustees' accountant, Oglethorpe had justified his provincial navy's existence by pointing to Captain Fanshawe's and Captain Townsend's inability to curb Spanish privateering outside Charles Town. He bragged that his own provincial forces

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[70]W.E. May, "Capt. Charles Hardy on the Carolina Station, 1742-1744." *The South Carolina Historical Magazine* 70, no. 1 (1969), p. 2. Jstor https://www.jstor.org/stable/27566917?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents

[71] Swanson, *Predators and Prizes,* pp. 173-174.

[72] Ivers, *British Drums,* pp. 144-147.

had "already forced one of the Enemys Sloops on Shore…"[73] In a June 1742 "List of the Military Strength of Carolina & Georgia," Oglethorpe reported thirteen vessels in the colony's service, ranging from the "guard schooner" to small boats that various infantry regiments used. Excluding soldiers that manned the latter craft, Oglethorpe's provincial navy exceeded one hundred sailors. It is telling that he excluded South Carolina's scout boats or galleys, and briefly mentioned the "Men of War Stationed at Charles Town" at the end of the report.[74]

Around the same time Oglethorpe filed that report in June of 1742, the general received intelligence of a large Spanish invasion force that was likely headed for coastal Georgia, and he forwarded the news to Charles Town. Oglethorpe's successful defense of the colony highlighted further flaws in the uneasy relationship between provincial and Royal Navy forces. The invasion threat prompted Governor Bull and his council to summon Captain Hardy and Captain Franklin of the recently arrived H.M.S. *Rose* on 18 June to discuss the best method to assist their southern neighbors. Though Hardy informed the council that his ship was too damaged to sail south at that time, Frankland offered to take his vessel, the H.M.S. *Flamborough* (now captained by Joseph Hamar), and the *Charles Town* galley with him on the way back to his own home station in the Bahamas.

Rather than keeping his promise, Frankland abandoned the flotilla early on, and Hamar himself took his own vessel, two small Royal Navy sloops, and the *Charles Town Galley* to assist Oglethorpe. Hamar made it to St. Simon, Georgia by 13 July, but ordered his flotilla to retreat back to South Carolina when he sighted the numerically superior Spanish invasion force

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[73] General Oglethorpe to Harman Verelst, 7 December 1741, in *Trustees for Establishing the Colony of Georgia in America: "Letters from Georgia, v. 14206, 1741 June-1742 December.*" Digital Library of Georgia http://dlg.galileo.usg.edu/do:guan_ms1786_ms1786-14206. pp. 49-51.

[74] "A list of the military strength of Carolina and Georgia" (List, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/655 Part 1 1742/06/07).
http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_655_Part1_017

of forty vessels. Captain Hardy—having finished the *Rye's* repairs—led a subsequent joint provincial-Royal relief force with six colonial vessels, only to discover that the Spaniards had fled by that point. Much to the chagrin of the South Carolina government, Hardy ordered the provincial vessels to return home, and decided against hunting for what remained of the Spanish forces as he feared they may have sailed to attack South Carolina's weakly defended Port Royal district.[75]

While the provincial relief force that accompanied Hardy did not see much action, the fact that the colony was able to send out six armed vessels with more than 600 sailors and 78 guns testifies to the colony's growing provincial naval establishment. Each provincial naval captain was given a letter that ordered them to obey orders from Captain Hardy. Bull and his council also commanded each captain to follow "Articles and Orders for the regulating and better [Government] of the Vessels & Forces by sea fitted out from Charles Town...pursuant to y[e] direction of the Statute of the 13th of Charles the 2d: Chapter 9th."[76] If these articles of war resembled that late seventeenth century statute for the Royal Navy, they would have mandated public worship for sailors, listed various punishments for sundry crimes, detailed how prizes were to be distributed, etc. In essence, the South Carolina government considered its provincial naval forces subordinate to Royal Navy authority, but also bound by the same standards and rules the Royal Navy operated under.[77]

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[75] W.E. May, "Captain Frankland's Rose", *The American Neptune* Volume XXVI (1966), pp. 43-47. and "Capt. Charles Hardy," p. 6

[76] Council Minutes, South Carolina, 19 July 1742, in "Council minutes relating to Captain Charles Hardy of HMS Rye" (Minutes; Correspondence; Transcript, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/369 1742/03/15-1743/02/07). http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_369_007

[77]"Charles II, 1661: An Act for the Establishing Articles and Orders for the regulateing and better Government of His Majesties Navies Ships of Warr & Forces by Sea.," in John Raithby, ed. *Statutes of the Realm: Volume 5, 1628-80*, (s.l: Great Britain Record Commission, 1819), 311-314. British History Online. http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol5/pp311-314.

While South Carolina's provincial forces and their Royal Navy allies sailed confusedly back and forth between both colonies, Oglethorpe's small army of one thousand men and even smaller provincial navy fended off a Spanish army twice its size, as well as a substantial Spanish fleet. After scattered skirmishes with enemy forces for several days, Oglethorpe found enough time to organize his infantry forces at strategic locations. By 5 July, Spanish Governor Montiano led his force of 36 vessels ranging from ships to galleys into St. Simon's Sound, and set the scene for one of the largest battles an Anglo-American provincial navy would ever engage in.

Aside from a few of his own privately owned vessels, Oglethorpe had impressed several merchant ships and their crews in the sound and fitted out the largest—the *Success*—as his flagship. Oglethorpe added twenty guns on board, crewed it with sailors, British regulars, and his own provincial marine company.[78] According to a member of the *Success's* crew, Oglethorpe "came on board of us, and made a handsome Speech, encouraging us to stand by our Liberties and Country...He was convinced they were much superiour in Number, but then he was sure his Men were much better, and did not doubt (with the Favour of God) but he would get the Advantage."[79] Oglethorpe's provincial navy as well as gunners at Fort St. Simons traded cannon fire with the vastly superior Spanish force for hours, and Oglethorpe's men ably resisted their opponents' attempts to board the vessels. Despite the provincial navy's stand, the Spaniards sunk one of Oglethorpe's sloops, destroyed one of his land batteries, and broke through the Georgian lines—successfully sailing up the sound and landing the main invasion force. Though his naval forces were not adequate to stop the Spanish onslaught, Oglethorpe's land forces defeated the

[78] Ivers, *British Drums,* pp. 153-160, Margaret Davis Cate, "Fort Frederica and the Battle of Bloody Marsh" *The Georgia Historical Quarterly,* Vol. 27, No. 2 (June, 1943), pp. 142-143, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40576871

[79] "Extract of a Letter from Mr. John Smith, on board the Success Frigate, Capt. Wm Thomson...14 July 1742," in *The Gentleman's Magazine and Historical Chronicle, Volume XII, For the Year M.DCCXLII* (London: Edward Cave, Junior, 1742), p. 496.

Spanish invaders in several engagements throughout the next several weeks, and forced them back to Florida. For now, the British hold on Georgia was secure.[80]

While Oglethorpe's victory over the Spanish invasion was noteworthy, some South Carolina authorities criticized Royal Navy Captain Hardy's "returning hither, before so considerable a part of the Service as the destroying the Enemys Strength by Sea: And for which Our Shipping were fitted out at so considerable an Expence…"[81]Some scholars have attributed the colony's dispute with Hardy to the well-established acrimony between the colony and Royal Navy officers, as well as disputes over who had authority over station ships.[82]

As ever, tensions between provincial officials and the Royal Navy could be overplayed, and Hardy did finally agree to lead provincial and Royal Navy vessels in a major expedition in the late summer. The October 1742 edition of *The American Weekly Mercury* reported that Hardy led a mixed force of six Royal Navy ships and sloops, "Four Provincial Vessels," and the two South Carolina galleys to hunt for Spanish forces outside St. Augustine. General Oglethorpe joined the fleet with his own schooner and various "small craft." On 27 August, the "Provincial Vessels received their orders from the Commodore," and a few of them scouted Matanzas bay where they sighted the infamous Spanish half-galleys that had caused both colonies so much trouble. The next day, both colonies' provincial navies opened fire at the galley crews from outside the bay. Although the Spanish wounded a few provincial sailors, the South Carolina galleys were able to cause enough structural damage to force the Spanish back to the protection of the Castillo de San Marcos.[83] Although nothing significant was accomplished in this

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[80] Ivers, *British Drums,* pp. 159-172.

[81] Colonel Fenwicke to Captain Hardy, 30 July 1742, in "Council minutes relating to Captain Charles Hardy of HMS *Rye*" (Minutes; Correspondence; Transcript, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/369 1742/03/15-1743/02/07). http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_369_007

[82] May, "Captain Frankland's *Rose,* pp. 46-47.

[83] "Charles-Town, (South-Carolina) August 30." *American Weekly Mercury* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), no. 1189, October 14, 1742: [2]. Readex: America's Historical Newspapers

scrimmage, it did demonstrate that provincial and Royal Navy forces *could* work together to some extent. Such coordination would have been useful at the Siege of St. Augustine two years earlier.

Even this level of moderate cooperation between the Royal Navy and provincial forces would do little to assuage Anglo-American authorities who were becoming irate over the growing costs of naval defense as the war dragged on. By mid-1743, Oglethorpe had gotten little assurance from London that his extensive military expenditures would be reimbursed, and he travelled to England to directly appeal his case to the House of Commons.[84] In March of 1744, Oglethorpe—himself a veteran member of Parliament—spoke before the House of Commons, highlighted the tenuous position of the empire's southernmost American colony, and effectively convinced the imperial government to reimburse his expenditures of more than £66,000.[85] More than £22,000 of the reimbursement directly covered provincial vessels purchases, upkeep, and pay.[86]

While Parliament reimbursed Oglethorpe, it also officially placed Georgia's soldiers as well as provincial naval forces on a Royal pay establishment similar to that of the British army.[87] For the first time in colonial history, the imperial government officially supported a provincial navy. Imperial funding of Georgia's provincial navy indicated a sea change in imperial attitudes to provincial maritime forces. Though not incorporated into the Royal Navy by any means, the same government that built first-rate warships at Portsmouth, England bankrolled schooners and scout boats in coastal Georgia.

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[84] Ivers, *British Drums,* p. 183.

[85] Amos Aschbach Ettinger, *James Edward Oglethorpe, Imperial Idealist* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), pp. 252-253.

[86] "An Account of Extraordinary Services Incurred in Georgia, for the Preservation and Defence of his Majesty's Dominions on the Continent of North America..." in *Journals of the House of Commons, Volume 24* (Repr., House of Commons, 1803), p. 615.

[87] Ivers, *British Drums,* p. 185

While Parliament agreed to fund provincial forces in Georgia in 1744, this assistance did little to secure the rest of the North American coastline. When France joined Spain in the war that same year, provincial officials from Nova Scotia to South Carolina still relied on local funds to fit out provincial navies to assist Royal Navy station ships. The British government's willingness to hear provincial complaints over Royal Navy inactivity in 1742 and its decision to fund Georgia's provincial navy in 1744 created the potential for a mutually beneficial maritime defense alliance between periphery and center.

Limited Support: The Growth and Limits of Imperial Support for Provincial Navies, 1744-1754.

In 1744, Parliament changed the matrix of provincial naval defense forever by agreeing to fund Georgia's provincial navy. When France declared war on the British in 1744, imperial recognition and support of provincial navies would extend to Nova Scotia and New England. Despite growing metropolitan support for provincial forces, inconsistent imperial policies towards provincial navies combined with growing provincial anger at Royal Navy excesses to limit the effectiveness of the burgeoning Royal-provincial naval partnership.

Legal battles related to provincial navies, prize money, and impressment were the results of various Parliamentary acts such as the 1740 "Act for the more effectual securing and encouraging the trade of his Majesty's British subjects to America, and for the encouragement of seamen to enter into his Majesty's service" (13 Geo 3, c. 4), the 1744 "Act for the Better Encouragement of Seamen in his Majesty's Service, and Privateers, to Annoy the Enemy" (17 Geo. 2. c. 34), and the 1746 "Act for the Better Encouragement of the Trade of His Majesty's Sugar Colonies in America" (19 Geo. 2, c. 30). The 1740 act removed impressment protections for privateers and tightened some admiralty court proceedings but offered bounty money for both

privateers and Royal Navy sailors for enemy captures. The 1744 privateering act created tighter rules for adjudicating prizes in prize courts than had previously been enforced and attempted to enforce discipline on privateers by making crimes and misdemeanors on privateer ships subject to the same punishments as in the Royal Navy.[88]

Even as the British government began to fund Oglethorpe's provincial navy on an official military establishment and support various provincial naval efforts throughout the latter years of the war, it failed to differentiate between privateers and provincial government fleets in one of the imperial government's largest attempts to regulate privateering. Vague language such as "encouragement of the officers and seamen of his Majesty's ships of war, and the officers and seamen of all other British ships and vessels, having commissions, or letters of marque…" did not directly recognize colonial governments' own naval forces even though Parliament was well aware of them by now.[89]

It is important to note that Anglo-Americans themselves still often failed to differentiate between commerce raiders with letters of marque and government-funded warships, calling both "privateers" at random.[90] Even though this dissertation insists on a difference between provincial government-funded naval forces and private commerce raiders with letters of marque, the difference was not always obvious to eighteenth century observers. Nevertheless, Westminster's failure to include the colonies' regular naval forces in prize court legislation would lead to legal battles between agents for New England's provincial navy and the Royal Navy for years to come.

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[88] Swanson, *Predators and Prizes,* pp. 30-38.

[89] "An Act for the Better Encouragement of Seamen in his Majesty's Service, and Privateers, to annoy the Enemy," in. *The Statutes at Large, From the 15th to the 20th Year of George II, Vol. XVIII*, ed. Danby Pickering (Cambridge: Joseph Bentham, 1765), pp. 250-253.

[90] For an example, see "Charles-Town, South-Carolina, July 9." *American Weekly Mercury* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), no. 1129, August 20, 1741: [2]. Readex: America's Historical Newspapers.

While Parliament failed to set an imperial standard for provincial navies in 1744, it also exacerbated the Royal Navy's quickly souring relationship with its Anglo-American subjects with its 1746 act to encourage Caribbean trade. In the act, Parliament banned most Royal Navy impressment in the lucrative Caribbean—notably giving the Royal Navy leeway to impress seamen in North American colonies. Historian Christopher Magra argues that this act "quickly produced a disaffected, rebellious spirit in North America."[91] By 1747, anger at Royal Navy impressment would lead to violent riots in Boston.

Both imperial vagueness regarding provincial navies as well as increasing tensions with the Royal Navy would come to a head as the momentum of the war shifted to the empire's northernmost colonies near French Canada in 1744. While provincial authorities had outfitted navies to fight Spanish privateers in the first few years of the war, the reopening of hostilities with France in 1744 sent the region into a panic. With earlier notification of the commencement of hostilities than their English foes, the French governor of Louisbourg on Isle Royale, the Seigneur Du Quesnel, dispatched two privateers and an invasion force to attack the Anglo-American base at Canso. The force quickly captured the English settlement, as well as its solitary Royal Navy guard sloop.[92]

Almost immediately, authorities throughout the northeastern colonies mobilized their provincial naval forces to counter the French onslaught. Massachusetts Governor William Shirley's quick dispatch of the provincial snow *Prince of Orange* with soldiers played at least some role in repelling Du Quesnel's forces from taking Annapolis Royal that summer.[93] Massachusetts' quick response was a result of the maturation of what could be called New

[91] Christopher Magra, *Poseidon's Curse: British Naval Impressment and Atlantic Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 250-251.
[92] George Rawlyk, *Yankees at Louisbourg* (Orono: University of Maine Press, 1967), pp. 1-5.
[93] Rawlyk, *Yankees,* pp. 6-10.

England's provincial naval network. After nearly a century of commissioning tax-funded ships, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut each could boast of a complex "naval establishment" of sorts that involved bureaucratic government committees that procured vessels and regulated pay for officers and sailors.[94] New England's provincial naval network had reached such a point by mid-1744 that Rhode Island's government was able to facilitate several joint patrol cruises between its province sloop, *Tartar,* and Connecticut's province sloop, *Defence.* At one point, Captain Prentice of the *Defence* even made the friendly boast that "We can out sail the Rhode Island sloop much...We beat their tip top boats at Rhode Island to their great mortification."[95]

Despite this cooperation between New England governments early in the war, the region's provincial navies suffered from the Royal Navy's largest ailment: perennial manpower shortages.[96] To offset this issue, in the summer of 1744, the Massachusetts governor, council, and assembly passed the "Act for the more effectual guarding and securing our Sea Coasts, and for the Encouragement of Seamen to enlist themselves in the Province Snow or such Vessels of War as shall be commissioned and fitted out by this or other of his Majesty's Governments." This act granted sailors of provincial warships total claims over captured French shipping and cargo, and £3 bounties for the capturing or killing of enemy sailors. The act also awarded £3 to provincial navy crews from other colonies, privateers, and merchant ships with letters of marque for every enemy sailor captured or killed off the Massachusetts coast.[97]

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[94] Charles O. Paullin, *Colonial Army and Navy,* Unpublished Manuscript. Charles Oscar Paullin papers, 1931. MSS53033, Library of Congress, pp. 48-55, and Selesky, *War and Society,* pp. 73-74.

[95] Qtd. in Chapin, *Privateering,* pp. 100-101.

[96] Swanson, *Predators and Prizes,* pp. 84-87.

[97] *Pennsylvania Gazette* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania) VII, no. 813, July 12, 1744: [1]. Readex: America's Historical Newspapers.

What was extraordinary about this law was not only that it was the first time a colony promised financial rewards to other colonies' provincial navies, but also that it essentially copied elements of the British government's 1740 "Act for the better Supply of Mariners and Seamen to Serve in His Majesty's Ships of War." The act promised £5 prizes "unto the Officers, Seamen, Marines...Onboard such of His Majesty's Ships of War, as also of Privateers…" that followed the aforementioned 1740 privateering act.[98] While the British act mentioned Royal Navy ships and privateers, the Massachusetts law specifically targeted the crews of provincial "Vessels of War." For the first time, authorities from one colony offered to support the provincial navy of another.

While Massachusetts may have adapted imperial standards for its own provincial naval establishment, the similarities with Parliamentary legislation caught the attention of the Board of Trade. What ensued was the first of many inconsistent imperial rulings on the status of provincial navies. In October of 1744, the Board of Trade requested Francis Fane—a member of Parliament and a commissioner for the Board—to compare Massachusetts' law with the British government's various bounty laws, and to decide if the *Prince of Orange* and similar vessels "are to be deemed ships of war or privateers, and whether they are entituled to the bounties given by the said British acts."[99] Fane did not oppose the act by "point of law," but worried over the vagueness of the act. He argued that the "Province Snow and the other Vessells mentioned in the said Massachusetts Act, will be Entitled to the Bounty given by the said British acts...as Privateers because they are not in his Majesty's Pay." Fane also noted that he worried that the

[98] "An Act for the more effectual securing and encouraging the Trade of His Majesty's British Subjects to America, and for the Encouragement of Seamen to enter into His Majesty's Service," in *The Statutes at Large of England and of Great-Britain: From Magna Carta to the Union of the Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland, Vol IX* ed. John Riathby, (London: George Eyre and Andrew Strahan, 1811), pp. 662-668.

[99] *Journal of the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, From January 1741-2 to December 1749* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1931), p. 132.

colony's legislature had "gone a little too far in disposing of His Majesty's right to the Prizes taken from the Enemy, solely by their own Authority…"[100] Ultimately, Fane argued that provincial ships were privateers if they were not on the Royal payroll—perhaps an oblique reference to the government's recent funding of the Georgia navy.

While Fane dismissed Massachusetts' provincial navy as a fleet of privateers, the Board of Trade was still uncomfortable with simply dismissing the law and decided to table the debate until Governor Shirley and Massachusetts' agent in London could better explain it. By the spring of 1747, the King's Privy Council reviewed the act that had been in bureaucratic limbo for two years. The Privy Council concluded that the act "relates to the public service & security of the said Province and therefore We see no reason why His Majesty may not be graciously pleased to confirm the same…" The king ultimately agreed with the Privy Council and confirmed the act by June of 1747.[101]

Even though the Royal approbation of the Massachusetts law took several years, it highlighted two conjoined trends in the latter years of the War of Jenkin's Ear: Whitehall's increasing recognition of provincial navies, and its confusion over how to classify them or incorporate them in the larger war effort. At the same time, Admiralty officials continued their age-old "laissez-faire" attitude towards provincial navies, particularly when a 'hands-off' approach to colonial naval defense could save them money. For instance, in the spring of 1745, Thomas Corbett—the secretary to the Admiralty—informed Commodore Peter Warren that their

[100] Francis Fane to the Board of Trade, 7 November 1744, in "Documents concerning colonial finances and war with France" (Correspondence; Legislation; Order; Report, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/884 1744/05/31-1744/11/04). http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_884_025

[101] *The Acts and Resolves, Public and Private of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay, Vol. III* (Boston: Albert J. Wright, 1878), pp. 216-218.

"lordships hope that your letter to Gov. Clinton, about the province of New York supporting a guard vessel as the other neighbouring colonies did, has had its due effect."[102]

While Admiralty officials generally continued their hands-off policy in regards to provincial navies, some Royal Navy officers—particularly Warren—began to lobby for greater imperial support for provincial naval forces. He called for colonists to begin:

"…arming some proper vessels to guard their own coast and trade. [Such] vessels should be in some measure on the foot[ing] of the king's ships, or at least [should] never be molested by them…Where the colonies are not in a capacity alone to bear the expense of such vessel, two or more of them might join in it...This I believe, the colonies [might] be brought to, if *strongly recommended by the ministry to their different governors, and by them to their legislatures* [italics mine]. New England has shown the others a very laudable example, by fitting out two or three. If this could be effected, then his Majesty's ships of force...might be employed in distressing the enemy more effectually…"[103]

Warren's support for provincial navies would be evident in the 1745 joint provincial-Royal attack on Louisbourg. This siege, holds historian W.A.B. Douglas, "demonstrated the surprising strength and homogeneity of combined regular and provincial forces."[104] While the siege itself proved to be the best example of provincial-Royal Navy cooperation, interservice rivalries and post-war legal battles related to prizes captured during the siege also highlighted the limits to which Anglo-American and Royal forces could cooperate.

After the British government refused to spearhead an attack on Louisbourg in 1744, Governor William Shirley (with the lobbying of Maine merchant William Vaughan) convinced the Massachusetts legislature to lead an assault on the French stronghold in the spring of 1745. Without direct guarantees of British military assistance, he hoped that neighboring colonies

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[102] Commodore Peter Warren to George Clinton, 6 July 1744 and Thomas Corbett to Commodore Peter Warren, 18 March 1744/5, pp. 33, 64-65 in Gwyn, ed. *The Royal Navy and North America.* Also see Douglas, *Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy,* pp. 46-47.

[103] Commodore Peter Warren to George Anson, 2 April 1745, in Gwyn, ed. *The Royal Navy and North America,* pp. 70-74.

[104] Douglas, *Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy,* p.90.

would lend military assistance, and that the British government would reimburse the colonies for taking France's Canadian privateering base. The Massachusetts government's plan called for a joint land and naval assault with troops and vessels from every northern colony stretching to Pennsylvania. The colony's leaders were perhaps too enthusiastic. Outside of New England, New York forces merely provided an artillery battery. Massachusetts's neighbors, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Connecticut did, however, send several provincial guard sloops as well as units. By May, New England's provincial governments had assembled a fleet of nearly one hundred vessels to carry its large provincial army to attack the French port.[105] Aside from scores of transport vessels, this flotilla would ultimately include a squadron of fifteen provincial naval vessels and privateers from every New England colony, with a combined strength exceeding one thousand sailors.[106] Undoubtedly, one of the most impressive provincial vessels was Massachusetts' recently constructed 400-ton, twenty gun frigate *Massachusetts.*[107]

Even with the largest provincial naval force assembled to date, Shirley did not believe the expedition could be successful without Royal Navy assistance. In a late March letter to the Duke of Newcastle, Shirley described the New England colonies' vast military preparations, and complained that Royal Navy officers in the West Indies were not able to assist the expedition. He continued: "I shall hope that Providence will favour the small Naval Force, which I have been able to muster up here, with Success; and that our Land Forces will still be able to maintain their ground on Cape Breton 'till I shall receive his Majesty's Royal Pleasure upon this matter…"[108]

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[105] Rawlyk, *Yankees at Louisbourg,* pp. 31-54, 78-79. .

[106]Louis Effingham de Forest, ed. "Appendix I: The Fleet," in *Louisbourg Journals 1745* (New York: Society of Colonial Wars in New York, 1932), pp.181-183. and Howard Chapin, "New England Vessels in the Expedition against Louisbourg, 1745"

[107] "Boston, February 25." *Pennsylvania Gazette* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), no. 850, March 26, 1745: [2]. Readex: America's Historical Newspapers.

[108] Governor William Shirley to the Duke of Newcastle, 27 March 1745, in *Correspondence of William Shirley, Governor of Massachusetts and Military Commander in America, 1731-1760*, ed. Charles Henry Lincoln (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1912), pp. 196-198.

Luckily for Shirley, changes in the Admiralty's administration (including the Duke of Bedford's appointment as the First Lord of the Admiralty, as well as Admiral George Anson as one of its commissioners) may have played a role in policy changes in North America. In early 1745, the Duke of Newcastle ordered the creation of the first ever North American Squadron that coordinated the Royal Navy guard ships north of North Carolina. By March, the Lords of the Admiralty received word of Shirley's preparations, and ordered Commodore Warren—a longtime advocate of a stronger Royal Navy presence in the northeast—to assist the provincial forces in taking Louisbourg. When Warren arrived with ten Royal ships of the line and instructions from the Duke of Newcastle to take command of provincial "shipping," Governor Shirley and the provincial military leader William Pepperell placed the Anglo-American vessels under Warren's command—the same decision made by South Carolina authorities during the campaigns of 1740-2.[109]

In many ways, Warren (himself a veteran of the disastrous St. Augustine campaign) reversed the trend so common in southern colonies wherein Royal and provincial naval forces failed to cooperate. Historian W.A.B. Douglas contends that "there is strong evidence that both Warren and Shirley intended to consider the armed colony cruisers and king's ships as a homogenous squadron attached to the expedition." Douglas highlights Warren's inclusion of provincial ships in his line of battle, his inclusion of provincial commanders in councils of war, and the fact that Warren ordered Royal Navy and provincial navy crews to distribute captured prizes equally—a conciliatory tactic never tried by other Royal Navy commanders.[110]

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[109]Douglas, in *Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy,* makes the case that the Admiralty did not suddenly develop interest in military operations in Canada, but its interest in more decisive action in northern waters grew over time (pp. 38-68). For a more concise view of the creation of the North American Squadron, see Julian Gwyn, *Frigates and Foremasts : The North American Squadron in Nova Scotia Waters 1745-1815* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003), p. 9.

[110] Douglas, *Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy,* pp. 62-68.

After a month of deadly assaults, bombardments, and raids, the French garrison at Louisbourg surrendered to the Royal-provincial invasion force on 17 June 1745. Governor Shirley bragged to the Massachusetts legislature that Louisbourg "was won, under the most signal Favour and Direction of the Divine Providence, by the indefatigable Toil of His Majesty's New-England Subjects (chiefly of this Province) supported by a Squadron of his Ships of War at Sea…"[111] Perhaps one of the most concrete examples of the fruits of this partnership was New England privateer Captain John Rous's promotion. Rous was a New England privateer that had previously acted as a coast guard for South Carolina authorities, and now served in the provincial navy of the New England invasion force at Louisbourg. Admiralty authorities were so impressed by news of his fight with a French frigate during the siege that they commissioned him as a captain in the Royal Navy, purchased his vessel the *Shirley,* and made it an official part of the navy.[112]

To be certain, Rous's rise from part-time provincial navy captain and privateer to an officer in the Royal Navy highlights the imperial government's growing appreciation for provincial naval capabilities. This is evident in the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Duke of Bedford's plans for an abortive 1746 conquest of French Canada, in which he ordered that Royal forces should be accompanied by "such ships of war, sloops and such other armed vessels (which may be furnished by the provinces) as his Majesty's admiral commanding in chief shall please to appoint."[113] Even when this joint expedition was cancelled by imperial authorities, Parliament

[111] "Legislative Acts/Legal Proceedings." *Boston Gazette* (Boston, Massachusetts), no. 1221, July 23, 1745: [1]. Readex: America's Historical Newspapers.

[112] Chapin, *Privateering in King George's War,* pp. 90-2.

[113] Bedford to Newcastle, 24 March 1745/6, in Gwyn, ed. *The Royal Navy and North America,* pp. 223-226 and Douglas, *Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy,* p. 198.

still reimbursed the New England colonies for their military expenses (including naval expenditures) for the siege of Louisbourg and the cancelled 1746 expedition.[114]

The evidence presented thus far may create the appearance of a growing and unreserved spirit of support and approbation of provincial navies in the imperial center. However, this growing imperial enthusiasm for provincial forces was inconsistent and often shallow.
Chief among the flaws in the arrangement was the fact that the British government never created a permanent legal standard or definition for these provincial fleets. Legal uncertainties over the status of provincial fleets fostered bitter transatlantic legal battles, particularly after the victory at Louisbourg. A few weeks after the city fell, provincial naval forces captured several French prizes both independently and alongside the Royal Navy. With Commodore Warren's promise that the joint fleet would share in the "common stock" of any prizes captured, questions immediately arose over whether seamen in Royal Navy ships and provincial vessels should have an equal share of the booty. Beyond mere disputes over plunder, major controversy arose over the very nature of provincial navies themselves, and whether provincial vessels should receive the same prize shares as Royal Navy ships or privateers.[115]

The first salvo in the transatlantic dispute over the definitions of provincial navies came in the Massachusetts vice admiralty court of Robert Auchmuty in the early months of 1746. Auchmuty, like the vice admiralty judges of other colonies, was not merely a provincial justice, but "officially appointed at Whitehall with Admiralty warrants."[116] Auchmuty himself was a veteran jurist with training at the Middle Temple in London, but was still ill prepared for the

[114] Nagel, *Empire and Interest,* pp. 502-503 and Glyndwr Williams, *The British Atlantic Empire Before the American Revolution* (London: Taylor & Francis Group, 1980), pp. 78-80. For an example of the specific provincial naval costs that Parliament reimbursed, see *Journals of the House of Commons...Vol. 25* (London: House of Commons, 1803), pp. 1042-1043.
[115] Chapin, *The Tartar*, p. 23, N. 60
[116] Swanson, *Predators and Prizes,* pp. 38-41.

prize claim of Captain Richardson and the crew of the *Resolution*—a private sloop leased to the Massachusetts government for the expedition against Louisbourg.[117] On 2 September 1745, Richardson and his crew recaptured an English vessel called *The Two Friends* from the French. Richardson and his men declared themselves the crew of "his Majesty's Vessel of War and in his Majesty's Pay," and thus entitled to "one Entire Eighth" of the vessel's value as a salvage fee.[118] They based their claim on Parliament's 1744 "Act for the Better Encouragement of Seamen in his Majesty's Service" which guaranteed Royal Navy vessels ⅛ the value of a recaptured English vessel no matter how long it had been in enemy hands. Conversely, the act merely granted privateers that recaptured English vessels shares ("moieties" of the value) that decreased by percentage the longer the English vessel had been controlled by the foe.[119]

It was clear to Richardson and his men that it would be more profitable to be counted as part of the King's Navy rather than as mere privateers. Unfortunately for these provincial sailors, Judge Auchmuty was not convinced by their claim, and held that "Every Kings Ship is in his pay and Service and part of his Royall Navy but Every Ship in the Kings pay and Service is not the Kings Ship or part of the Royal Navy." The judge examined the history of private ships in the Royal service as far back as Edward III's reign, more recent parliamentary legislation, and then Captain Warren's specific prize agreement for his joint fleet before the Siege of Louisbourg, and found nothing to support the argument that the *Resolution* was a Royal ship of war. Auchmuty reasoned that Warren's instructions could not be construed to equate the *Resolution* with Royal Navy ships in the fleet because he "treats those Vessels in Contradistinction to his Majestys

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[117] Chapin, *Privateering in King George's War,* pp. 47-52.

[118] "Richardson & others V. Ship Two Friends & Cargo, Decree," in Suffolk County (Mass.) Court Files, 1629-1797, Court files v. 384, Case 61447 Family Searchhttps://www.familysearch.org/ark:/61903/3:1:3Q9M-CSRW-9Q3C-R?cat=240378

[119] "An Act for the Better Encouragement of Seamen in his Majesty's Service, and Privateers, to annoy the Enemy," in Danby Pickering, ed. *The Statutes at Large,Vol. XVIII*, p. 261

Ships by sometimes Calling them private Ships & Vessels of War and at other Times Colony Cruizers…" Furthermore, the *Resolution's* owners still expected a share despite contracting her to the government—a move that highlighted her status as a privateer rather than a vessel of war. Auchmuty would only grant the *Resolution's* crew a moiety of the value of the prize.[120]

At least some provincial elites were taken aback by the ruling. Nathaniel Sparhawk, the son-in-law of William Pepperell (the overall commander of American soldiers at the siege of Louisbourg who evidently also had some financial interest in the *Resolution),* wrote his father-in-law to lament that "She is, contrary to the expectation of every one, deemed a privateer instead of a King's ship…" and worried that appealing the case in London would cost Pepperell more money than it was worth.[121]

While Auchmuty's ruling was unpopular with some of the expedition's provincial leaders, it also pointed to larger legal uncertainties over the legal status of provincial navies on both sides of the Atlantic, and wider tensions between provincial and Royal military forces over prize distribution. To contextualize the disputes between provincial and Royal Navy forces one must also note the concurrent agitation between New England's land forces and the Royal Navy. While Warren and Massachusetts General Pepperell argued over which force should receive the French surrender, New England troops rioted and brawled with Royal Navy sailors in the streets of occupied Louisbourg. They were angry at alleged condescension from Royal marine officers, not being allowed to plunder French homes, and being left out of prize distribution from captured French ships.[122] Whatever tensions existed between the American land forces and Royal Navy forces during and after the siege, subsequent battles between provincial and Royal Navy officers

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[120] "Richards & others V. Ship Two Friends & Cargo, Decree."

[121] Nathaniel Sparhawk to William Pepperell, 14 January 1745/6, in *Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Sixth Series, Vol. X* (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1899), pp. 428-429

[122] Leach, *Roots of Conflict,* pp. 68-72.

would take on a transatlantic dimension.

Much of this tension surrounded the prize-court disputes over the French ship *Notre Dame de Deliverance.* The *Deliverance* was one of three French merchant vessels (including the *Heron* and *Charmante)* that fell prey to Anglo-American forces at Louisbourg in the weeks after the city's capture. In August of 1745, Captain Benjamin Fletcher of the provincial brigantine *Boston Packet* spotted what he thought was a French frigate. Realizing his small crew could not take on such a vessel alone, he raised a French flag as a decoy, fired guns to alert the Royal Navy ships nearby, and fled for the protection of Louisbourg. The Royal Navy frigates *Chester* and *Sunderland* quickly captured the "frigate," which turned out to be a treasure-laden vessel worth nearly £400,000.[123]

For more than four years after this lucrative capture, agents for the *Boston Packet, Chester, Sunderland* and other nearby provincial and Royal Navy ships tried to convince various admiralty appeals courts in London of their competing claims to the rich prize.[124] While interested parties argued over which vessels were most responsible for the *Deliverance's* capture, questions over the legal status of the provincial vessels arose time after time. In fact, proctors for the provincial vessels argued in London courts that their clients belonged to vessels that were essentially ships of the Royal Navy. For instance, in one of the earlier hearings in May of 1749, Charles Pinfold, one of the advocates for the *Boston Packet,* argued that the vessel was no privateer as the colony had purchased her. Pinfold continued that "Privateers are fitted out at Private Expence with Letters of Marque, Security is given, and an Agreement made with the owners." He pointed out that the *Boston Packet* was a government-controlled vessel without

[123] J. Revell Carr, *Seeds of Discontent: The Deep Roots of the American Revolution, 1650-1750* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2008), Kindle eBook Edition, Loc. 4476.

[124] Chapin, *The Tartar*, p. 23, N. 60

private owners at the time. Additionally, Pinfold made the accurate observation that no recent Parliamentary legislation differentiated between a "Man of War and a Vessel in his Maty's Pay."[125]

In a subsequent hearing, agents for some of the other provincial vessels interested in the case echoed Pinfold's argument when they said their clients were "not Privateers, belonging to particular Owners, but were Ships of War, of considerable Force, fitted out by the Colonies of the Massachusetts Bay and Rhode Island…" As ships of war, they had played a signal role in the siege and as part of Warren's fleet.[126] While these arguments were made by English barristers in London, they clearly represented the belief among many provincial authorities and sailors that they were vital members of a military mission rather than a privateering enterprise.

Agents for the Royal Navy frigates involved in the *Deliverance's* capture had a different understanding of the role of provincial vessels in the expedition. In one hearing, some of the Royal Navy's legal representatives argued that the "American Privateers, by their Junction with Sir Peter Warren, became no otherwise Part of his Squadron, or subject to his Command…" While spending much time decrying the provincial men as mere privateers, the agents for the Royal frigates did make one sound accusation against their opponents: If the point of the expedition was to capture Louisbourg, and the capture of the *Deliverance* occurred after the fact, why should the provincial ships be considered part of a joint squadron? After all, the provincial

[125] "Notes of Arguments Advanced by Dr. Pinfold and Mr. Yorke," 17 May 1749, in Sir George Lee, ed. *Prize Appeals, 1751-1758, Vol. 2,* Fol. 256. New York Public Library Digital Collections. https://digitalcollections.nypl.org/items/c2af9c90-2483-0136-804e-2dcf8362a6d7

[126] "Notre Dame de Deliverance...The Case of the Three Raspondents," 3 May 1750, in Sir George Lee, ed. *Prize Appeals, 1736-1751, Vol. 1,* Fol. 65. The New York Public Library Digital Collections]. https://digitalcollections.nypl.org/items/5c063220-2483-0136-3f04-0f1c3ee34f8d

governments had been "reimbursed by the Parliament of Great Britain" for fitting out warships to take Louisbourg.[127]

Ultimately, after several years of lengthy litigation, on 5 July 1750, the Lords Commissioners of Appeal for Prizes (including members of the Admiralty's new cohort of reformers, Lords Anson and Sandwich) ruled that the Royal Navy vessels in Louisbourg harbor ("in sight" of the *Notre Dame de Deliverance),* as well as the two Royal Navy frigates that captured the French vessel were all entitled to shares of the prize. The Lords specifically excluded the other American "privateers" that made claims on it. Nevertheless, by November the Lords did declare that the "armed vessel" *Boston Packet* and the Royal Navy warships should all receive equal shares.[128] The Admiralty had awarded an American provincial crew an equal share to the Royal crews, but had also successfully avoided calling the American vessels "Ships of War."

Some historians have made the case that the Admiralty's decision to exclude the other provincial ships was problematic. J. Revell Carr makes the case that while the Admiralty excluded other provincial vessels from the prize, it rewarded Royal Navy vessels that barely participated in the *Deliverance's* capture. Carr brings to light an anonymous 1748 essay (possibly written by the Boston firebrand Samuel Adams), which he believes exemplifies contemporary provincial anger. The anonymous colonial author lambasted the British government for inadequate naval patrols off the New England coast, not sharing plunder from the three captured French vessels with New England infantrymen, and British soldiers for

[127] "The Case of his Majesty's Ships Chester and Sunderland, the actual and sole Captors of the Prize" 5 July 1750, in Lee, ed. *Prize Appeals, 1736-1751,* Vol. I, Fol. 70-73

[128] Untitled Written Notes Below Title Page on "The Appellants Case," in Lee, ed. *Prize Appeals, 1736-1751,* Vol. I, Fol. 75-76, and *The Gentleman's Magazine and Historical Chronicle, Vol. XX, For the Year MDCCL* (London: Edward Cave, 1750), p. 328.

abusing Anglo-Americans during the siege. Britain's most damning affront, the author argued, was its recent decision to return Fortress Louisbourg to the French in the peace negotiations at Aix-la-Chapelle. Carr contends that the letter demonstrated the growth of the "seeds of discontent that brought the Americans to the brink of revolution."[129]

While Carr's description of Anglo-Americans ready to revolt in 1748 is probably excessive, his description of the *Deliverance* prize case as a major hurdle to the Anglo-American defensive partnership is sound. The years of legal battles over the prize's fate demonstrated two diverging imperial and provincial views of the importance of provincial navies. While imperial officials were finally starting to encourage the colonies to build provincial fleets (and even occasionally funding them), they still only thought of these vessels as auxiliaries for the Royal Navy. Thus, they never even made room for provincial navies in imperial legislation.[130]

On the other hand, many Anglo-Americans were increasingly coming to see their provincial navies as equals to (if not superior to) the Royal Navy. This mood is best illustrated in a late 1747 letter from the young South Carolina merchant, Henry Laurens, to his colony's agent in London. Laurens (who would one day be a founding father of the United States), bragged that "we are fitting out two fine Bermuda Sloops on purpose to Cruize on this Coast...As to Men of War, they are out of fashion here."[131] In other words, local provincial fleets were more useful to Laurens than the best-armed Royal Navy guard ships.

It is important to note that North Americans were not alone in commissioning provincial navies throughout the conflict. Even though the Admiralty and Parliament devoted more Royal

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[129] Carr, *Seeds of Discontent,* Loc. 5047-5132.

[130] For the concept of provincial navies and privateers "augmenting" the Royal Navy, see Richmond, *The Navy in the War of 1739-48*, Vol. III, p. 274 and Swanson, *Predators and Prizes*, p. 3.

[131] Henry Laurens to James Crokatt, 28 December 1747 in. *The Papers of Henry Laurens, Vol. One Sept. 11, 1746-Oct. 31, 1755,* Philip M. Hamer, George C. Rogers, Maude E. Lyles, eds (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1968), p. 96.

Navy warships to the West Indies (and even favored Caribbean governments with lax impressment laws), Caribbean governments still felt the need to fit out local ships when Royal Navy vessels were far away. For instance, in the summer of 1746, England's *Gentleman's Magazine* published a letter from an Antiguan who lamented that because of the "indolence of his majesty's ships...the country have fitted out a guard de costa…" The correspondent, echoing contemporary complaints on the North American mainland, further alleged that "pretend that they cannot sail well enough to catch the privateers; but all the world knows, that they can sail well enough to protect and retake the merchant ships, if they would keep cruizing in proper stations."[132]

Whatever complaint some West Indians had over Royal Navy inactivity, the Royal Navy's longstanding policy of stationing more Royal Navy ships in the Caribbean, recent expansion of Royal dockyards throughout the West Indies, and legislation banning Royal Navy impressment in the West Indies all illustrated London's growing naval commitment to its most lucrative provinces in the Americas. With London's increasing commitment to the protection of West Indian commerce throughout the 1740s, the War of Jenkin's Ear would prove to be the last major time West Indian governments would fit out provincial navies for maritime defense.

While the British government's failure to create a consistent legal policy regarding provincial navies threatened future cooperation between provincial forces and the Royal Navy, its 1746 decision to allow Royal Navy impressment in North America inspired violent resistance to the Royal Navy throughout the northeast, and set a precedent for future violent resistance to impressment in North American ports. Of course, this tension did not begin in 1746. Royal Navy

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[132] Extract from a Letter From Antigua, 23 July 1746, Qtd. in Vere Langford Oliver, *The History of the Island of Antigua, One of the Leeward Caribees in the West Indies...Vol. I* (London: Mitchell and Hughes, 1891), p. cv.

commanders had long impressed sailors from North American merchant vessels, privateers, and even their former provincial naval partners with impunity.

One such case occurred in Boston in November of 1745 when Lt. Governor Spencer Phips allowed Captain Arthur Forest of the H.M.S. *Wager* to impress a few men, provided they were nonresident aliens and had not served in the Louisbourg expedition. Ignoring this prohibition, the ship's press gang (along with local sheriffs) attempted to capture several sailors that had served on the provincial vessel *Resolution.* A subsequent melee left two provincial sailors dead, and three members of the press gang in provincial custody (the rest of the press gang escaped with the *Wager* as it left Boston harbor). Historian Jack Tager holds that this violent encounter would be a "rallying cry" for the rioters in the Knowles Riot two years later.

While Governor Shirley vocally opposed the violence, local officials in Boston criticized him and his administration for allowing impressment in the first place, and called it a violation of the Magna Carta and Parliamentary legislation. While Shirley convinced Commodore Warren to cancel calls for impressment throughout the northeast, Royal Navy commanders ignored this directive and continued to rely on the unpopular practice to keep their ships fully crewed. Even locals were not safe from resistance to impressment. When newly minted Royal Navy Captain John Rous (himself a New Englander, former privateer, and former provincial naval hero) tried to impress sailors for the H.M.S. *Shirley* in February of 1746, angry locals (along with a privateer crew from New York) assaulted Rouse and his press gang.[133]

None of these violent clashes in the final years of the War of Jenkin's Ear could compare to the Knowles Riot of 1747. When Commodore Charles Knowles prepared to sail to the West Indies in late 1747, he stopped to impress sailors in Boston because of the recent Parliamentary

[133] Jack Tager, *Boston Riots: Three Centuries of Social Violence* (Boston: Northeastern University, 2001), pp. 61-64.

legislation that had banned impressment in the Caribbean. Nearly three hundred angry privateers fought the press gangs—an act that would ultimately inspire a general urban riot that would last for three days. Bostonians imprisoned Royal Navy officers, destroyed one of the Royal frigates' barges, and forced Governor Shirley to provide refuge for some Royal Navy commanders in his home.

Rioters demanded that Shirley not only deliver them the officers hiding in his house, but also that he execute one of the still-imprisoned members of the press gang that had killed men from the *Resolution* two years previously. Shirley declared he would wait for the king's instructions before putting anyone on trial, and did his best to coax the crowd by promising to get the recently impressed men released.[134] Shirley later reported that along with other local dignitaries, Captain Edward Tyng of the provincial *Massachusetts* frigate "stood some time at the Door parlying [sic] and endeavouring to Pacify 'em…"[135] In a moment of pure historical irony, a prominent provincial navy captain attempted to defend Royal Navy officers from a crowd still angry that Royal sailors had killed provincial sailors.

As the violence of the riot escalated, Governor Shirley only barely convinced Commodore Knowles not to order his ships to fire on Boston. Ultimately, representatives from several factions convened a town meeting, condemned the mob (much to the dismay of the young firebrand Samuel Adams), and arranged for the release of the impressed sailors. While some historians such as Denver Brunsman have seen the riot as the last major violent movement against impressment in North America, Christopher Magra has made the case that the Knowles Riot was the precursor to the violent riots of the Revolutionary-era less than two decades later.[136]

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[134] Magra, *Poseidon's Curse,* pp. 284-286.
[135] William Shirley to the Lords of Trade, 1 December 1747, in *Correspondence of William Shirley,* p. 414.
[136] Magra, *Poseidon's Curse,* pp. 291-293.

Whether or not the riot inspired later riots during the Imperial Crisis of the 1760s, it is certain that much of the original animus that led to the Knowles Riot surrounded Royal Navy abuse of provincial navy veterans. Ultimately, Parliament's decision to condone impressment in North America in 1746 undermined its own limited efforts to support provincial naval warfare throughout the North American colonies and inspired colonial opposition to the Royal Navy's presence in general.

Even as Anglo-American resistance to Royal Navy impressment increased in Boston in the final years of the War of Jenkin's Ear, imperial authorities began to slowly cut back their support for large provincial navies and developed a laissez-faire attitude towards the few small provincial naval forces they did bankroll during peacetime. Even after General Oglethorpe had returned to England, the British government had continued to pay for Georgia's provincial flotilla (including Oglethorpe's provincial marine corps, a merchant ship converted into a frigate, a schooner, a sloop, a periagua, and sundry boats). With peace overtures already beginning by 1746 and in response to shoddy book-keeping by provincial officers, the War Office suspended all support for provincial naval forces in Georgia outside the crew of one scout boat, the *Prince George.*[137] The Crown did offer South Carolina authorities three boats in 1749, but the local assembly (much to the chagrin of the Royal Governor John Glen) decided to take the expense of fitting out the vessels themselves in order to expedite naval patrols for runaway slaves south of Charles Town.[138]

While Parliament did agree to finance some scout boats on the southern borderlands of the continent, it continued to bankroll a more substantial fleet on the Nova Scotia frontier.

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[137] Ivers, *British Drums,* pp. 195-202 and James M. Johnson*, Militiamen, Rangers, and Redcoats: The Military in Georgia, 1754-1776* (Macon: Mercer University Press, 1992), Google Play eBook, p. 12.

[138] Sirmans, *Colonial South Carolina*, p. 276

Provincial vessels had assisted the Royal Navy off of Nova Scotia for several years after the campaign at Louisbourg in 1748. Nevertheless, by 1748, the Admiralty ordered Governor Shirley of Massachusetts to disband two hired vessels (the *Anson* and *Warren)* as it planned to cut costs. Shirley refused to follow the order as he believed they were still necessary for coastal security, and the Board of Trade eventually agreed to help find funds for the vessels.[139] In fact, when Lord Halifax—the new president of the Board of Trade—planned a new settlement in Nova Scotia after the war, he consulted provincial naval (and Royal Navy Captain) John Rous, and even agreed that the new colony needed to employ three provincial guard sloops. Rous would later be appointed the "senior naval officer" of the new port.

Even with Rous at the helm in Halifax, the ever-parsimonious Admiralty refused to station many Royal Navy vessels at Nova Scotia in the postwar years, and Rous and local political officials relied on a "sea militia" of several small sloops and other vessels to guard the coasts. This was especially important as tensions with the Mi'kmaq led flared up in the early 1750s. From 1749 to 1755, the Board of Trade and Parliament funded eleven provincial schooner, sloop, and boat crews on the empire's northern American borderlands. However, imperial authorities barely inquired into the actions of this fleet, and local officials likely avoided mentioning it too much in letters to London as they worried it would convince the Admiralty that Royal Navy warships were not needed in the area. Historian W.A.B. Douglas argues that the Admiralty's noninvolvement was the "essential ingredient of success" in this arrangement.[140] In essence, imperial funds were important for the Nova Scotia sea militia, but London's noninterference allowed local officials to control the fleet to their best advantage.

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[139] Douglas, *Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy, p.* 151
[140]Douglas, "Sea Militia," pp. 22-37.

By the end of the War of Jenkin's Ear, the Board of Trade and Parliament agreed to fund a few provincial small craft and sloops on British America's northern and southern borderlands. While this imperial intervention was novel, the British government never fully respected or harnessed America's provincial maritime potential to its full potential. By excluding provincial navies from major legislation, and by overlooking Royal Navy excesses throughout major port cities, imperial officials soured Anglo-American opinions towards their partners in the Royal Navy.

From 1739 to 1748, the British government agreed to recognize and finance some provincial navies for the first time, thereby creating the potential for a mutually beneficial naval defense partnership between periphery and center. Nevertheless, the British government's failure to include provincial navies in major sea-prize legislation and its failure to limit Royal Navy impressment damaged any potential joint-Royal-provincial naval defensive alliance. Imperial inconsistencies and Royal Navy overreach would continue to plague Anglo-American relations for the few remaining decades before the American Revolution.

Chapter IV. The Decline of Provincial Navies and the Rise of Royal Navy Maritime Hegemony in America, 1754-1763

The War of Jenkin's Ear/King George's War ended in 1748 the same way many of the earlier colonial conflicts had: a return to the *status quo ante bellum*. On the tense imperial borderlands, particularly in Nova Scotia where Britain had returned Louisbourg to the French, Anglo-Americans feared future violence with their French, Acadian, and Native neighbors. To shore up the British position in Nova Scotia, the Board of Trade (led by the Earl of Halifax) created the port town of Halifax, Nova Scotia in 1749. In response to British expansion, Acadian Catholic priest Jean-Louis Le Loutre and his Maliseet, Mi'kmaq, and Franco-Acadian allies led a bloody uprising against British authorities in what became known as 'Father Le Loutre's War.' Between 1749 and 1755, Royal Navy Captain John Rous and Nova Scotia officials continuously augmented the few Royal Navy ships in the area with several small vessels and crews from the region's provincial 'sea militia.'

While the Lords of the Admiralty did little to support these provincial forces, funds from the Board of Trade allowed these provincial crews to bridge communication gaps, support Anglo-American infantry forces campaigning against Le Loutre's forces, and helped prevent smuggling on contested waterways around Nova Scotia. Naval scholar W.A.B. Douglass contends that this provincial naval force's *petite guerre* against Franco-Indigenous forces paved the way for future larger Royal Navy campaigns on the northern borderlands during the Seven Years War.[1]

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[1] A.J.B. Johnson, *Endgame 1758 : The Promise, the Glory, and the Despair of Louisbourg's Last Decade* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), pp. 32-45. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unh/detail.action?docID=313310.Grenier, *War on the Northern Frontier,* pp. 141-171, and Douglass, *Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy,* pp. 176-211.

Despite successful coordination between a few Royal Navy vessels and Nova Scotia's sea militia during the fight with Le Loutre's forces, substantial Royal Navy involvement would be necessary to secure Britain's loose foothold on its northern American peripheries. This was especially true considering the French government's reestablishment of Louisbourg as a major military base after 1749. After Captain Rous seized French vessels accused of smuggling in 1751, both British and French authorities began to send large frigates each year to Halifax and Louisbourg to compete for naval hegemony in northern waters.[2] Ultimately, mutual military escalation in Nova Scotia echoed both empires' larger territorial fights in North America, including the vast swath of land between the Ohio River and the easternmost Great Lakes.[3] By the mid-1750s, with ongoing territorial disputes and active border wars, war with France was inevitable.

Even as the stage was set for renewed imperial struggle with France, a battle raged within the British government itself over the proper role of the Royal Navy in society. By the end of the War of Jenkin's Ear in the late 1740s, Great Britain's new Lords of the Admiralty—including Bedford, Anson, and Sandwich—had initiated dramatic administrative reforms that would transform the Royal Navy into a hegemonic and disciplined fighting force for the rest of the eighteenth century and beyond. The Admiralty's centralization program faced several immediate challenges in the years leading up to the Seven Years War. First and foremost, while having jurisdiction over its own personnel, the Admiralty did not control the empire's general naval

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[2] Johnson, *Endgame,* pp. 47-60, and Douglas, *Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy,* pp. 189-191.

[3] Dull, *The French Navy and the Seven Years War* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), pp. 15-16.

policy itself and followed orders from the King's cabinet ministers such as the First Lord of the Treasury (the period's equivalent of the prime minister) and various Secretaries of State (including the Secretary of State for the Southern Department, who oversaw the empire's Western European and American affairs). In the interwar years between 1748 and 1754, the parsimonious Henry Pelham dominated the ministry, and much to the chagrin of naval reformers called for military spending reductions and favored diplomatic solutions in foreign affairs.[4] During Pelham's tenure, French King Louis XV's government massively expanded its battle fleet while British authorities failed to refit decaying ships or to keep up the pace with their archrival. Even though the British fleet would eventually catch up with their foes, naval unpreparedness would create several logistical problems at the beginning of the Seven Years War in 1756.[5]

In the first few years of the Seven Years War, Anglo-American governments planned to utilize provincial navies on the same scale as they had in the previous imperial conflict. However, by 1758 the Royal Navy's aggressive expansion and campaigning in the New World made the existence of substantial provincial navies unnecessary, and they gradually fell out of use by the early 1760s. While the Royal Navy's expansion and novel aggressive campaigning saved colonists from provincial naval defense costs, the Royal Navy's aggressive enforcement of impressment and postwar imperial trade policies angered American dissidents, and paved the way for the imperial crisis of the 1760s and 1770s.

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[4] Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean,* pp. 259-263.

[5] Baugh, *The Global Seven Years War, 1754-1763* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), Loc. 6165-6350. Kindle eBook edition.

Provincial Naval Planning and the Decline of Provincial Naval Operations, c. 1754-1758.

Throughout the Seven Years War, Anglo-American governments from Nova Scotia to Barbados deployed a few provincial ships to assist Royal Navy forces and to defend their own shores when Royal ships were far away or incapacitated. For the first time, this cooperation even extended to a joint provincial-Royal Navy fleet on the Great Lakes. Despite initial expectations that colonial governments would have to contribute large provincial naval forces to support the imperial war effort as they had done in previous conflicts, the Royal Navy's expanding presence and naval supremacy after 1758 made the existence of extensive provincial navies unnecessary.

By 1754, the British government and Anglo-American governments faced the dual crisis of French military expansion and increasingly strained relations with their traditional Iroquois allies. To solidify the Anglo-American partnership with the Iroquois as war clouds loomed and to facilitate defense plans, the Earl of Halifax and the Board of Trade called on the northern colonial governments to hold a joint conference at Albany, New York that summer.[6] Historians throughout the last two centuries have frequently cited some of the conference participants' calls for a general colonial political union as early birth pangs of the future United States. More recently, however, scholars such as Andrew D.M. Beaumont have made the case that both British and Anglo-American authorities were equally eager to create an organized American political union for mutual military assistance.[7]

While scholars may disagree over connections between the various plans for colonial union at the Albany Congress and the future American Revolution, they have seldom noted the

[6] Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War: the Seven Years' War and the fate of empire in British North America, 1754-1766* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), pp. 72-79.

[7] Andrew D.M. Beaumont, *Colonial America and the Earl of Halifax* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 135-143.

importance of one precocious element of these proposals: an early drive for a multi-colony provincial naval force of some kind. All told, Anglo-Americans and imperial officials seemed interested in a pan-colonial naval force to contest the French on the Great Lakes and on the Atlantic. The most visionary naval plan at Albany came from Pennsylvania delegate Benjamin Franklin. Franklin had previously defied Philadelphia's Quaker elite when he campaigned for the commissioning of a provincial naval warship to guard the colony from French raids in 1747 at the end of the War of Jenkin's Ear.

Expanding on his proposal from seven years before, at Albany Franklin suggested that a prospective American grand council and congress (under the authority of the British government, of course) would fund and construct "guard-vessels to scour the coasts from privateers in time of war, and protect the trade." In his defense of the final Albany Plan, Franklin argued that "small vessels of force are sometimes necessary in the colonies to scour the coast of small privateers. These being provided by the Union, will be an advantage in turn to the colonies which are situated on the sea, and whose frontiers on the land-side, being coverd by other colonies, reap but little immediate benefit from the advanced forts."[8] While other delegates, including Thomas Pownall—an unofficial representative of the Earl of Halifax at the conference and future governor of Massachusetts—made vague arguments for a provincial naval force on the Great Lakes and seacoast, Franklin's proposal—which would ultimately be the basis for the final draft of the Albany Congress's Plan of Union—was the only plan that called for a centralized colonial

[8] See Benjamin Franklin, "Plain Truth, 17 November 1747," and "From Benjamin Franklin to James Alexander and Cadwallader Colden with Short Hints towards a Scheme for Uniting the Northern Colonies, 8 June 1754," and "Reasons and Motives for the Albany Plan of Union, [July 1754]," Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-05-02-0093. [Original source: Leonard W. Labaree, ed. *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 5, July 1, 1753, through March 31, 1755,* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962) pp. 335–338, pp. 397-418]

navy.[9] This plan clearly demonstrated the fact that Anglo-American leaders expected that they would need substantial provincial naval forces in the coming fight with the French.

Despite his plan's novelty, Franklin's proposal for a proto-Continental Navy was premature. On the one hand, the Albany Congress itself met with little support from colonial legislatures who prized local autonomy over a united colonial military alliance.[10] On the other hand, imperial officials seemed to be just as disinterested in a major colonial maritime force as their Anglo-American constituents. The Board of Trade's own simultaneous proposal for a colonial union omitted discussions of naval defense. Additionally, for reasons that are unclear, the Board reported to the king that Albany commissioners had planned a "Naval establishment upon the Lake to secure the navigation," but the Albany Congress's calls for provincial coastal warships as well.[11] While Halifax's Board was not opposed to supporting provincial navies (as evidenced by their support for Nova Scotia's 'sea militia' throughout the interwar period), they were also not prepared to support a pan-colonial provincial navy.

Even though the plans for colonial union came to naught, one element from the discussions survived: imperial support for a naval force on the Great Lakes. In 1755, the Duke of Newcastle ordered British Army General Edward Braddock to take charge of all land-based military operations in the colonies. By April, Braddock met with the governors of Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia in Alexandria, Virginia to coordinate war plans. Braddock informed the governors that imperial officials had called for a multi-pronged

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[9] "Mr. Pownall's Consideration Towards a General Plan of Measures for the Colonies," in Matthew S. Quay, *Pennsylvania Archives, Second Series, Vol. VI* (Harrisburg: Lane S. Hart, 1877), p. 201. For a detailed analysis of Franklin's role in the Albany Congress as well as other delegates' proposals (and naval considerations), see Robert Clifford Newbold, *The Albany Congress and Plan of Union of 1754* (New York: Vantage Press, 1955), pp. 74-131

[10] Beaumont, *Colonial America and the Earl of Halifax,* pp. 149-150.

[11] "Representation to the King on the Proceedings of the Congress at Albany" in *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New-York, Vol. VI,* ed. E.B. O'Callaghan (Albany: Weed, Parsons and Company, 1855), pp.903-918.

attack on both French frontier forts as well as French Canada itself.[12] The various governors agreed with Braddock that a naval force was necessary on New York's contested borderlands, and "advised the building of two Vessels of Sixty Tons upon the Lake Ontario...according to a Draught to be sent By [Royal Navy] Commodore Keppell, who desired that an Account might be laid before him of the Cost of 'em, and undertook to defray it…" The attendees delegated Massachusetts Governor William Shirley (who had substantial provincial naval experience himself) with coordinating the naval plan. The attendees also planned for similar vessels to be built at Lake Erie, with the expenses of naval and land defenses there to be covered by the provincial governments of Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania.[13]

The plans at the Alexandria, Virginia meeting between Braddock and the colonial governors reflected larger British and French concerns over naval mastery of the Great Lakes—a goal that both imperial governments saw as key to winning the war in the northwest. While imperial officials ordered the construction of lake warships to counter the French fleet (particularly on Lake Ontario), lake crews on small craft typically avoided large fights with enemy vessels. Instead, they transported troops and supplies, warned of enemy advances, and attempted to intercept enemy communications.[14] These vessels involved the Royal Navy to an extent, but largely fell under the British Army's aegis as it struggled to force the French out of the American colonies' northwestern frontiers.

The Lake Ontario navy of 1755-6 was a rare example of a fusion between the Royal Navy and colonial provincial naval forces. While Commodore Keppel (and by extension, the

[12]Anderson, *Crucible of War,* pp. 85-90.

[13]"At a Council held at the Camp at Alexandria..." in *Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, Vol. VI* (Harrisburg: Theo Fenn, & Co., 1851), pp. 366-368.

[14] Malcolm Macleod, *French and British Strategy In the Lake Ontario Theatre of Operations, 1754-1760* (Unpublished Graduate Thesis, Grand Lake: University of Ottawa, 1973), pp. 258-272.

Crown) paid the wages of the fleet's predominantly Anglo-American sailors, provincial governments themselves largely financed the construction of the seven-vessel fleet on Lake Ontario. Whereas Royal Navy Captain Housman Broadley served at the small flotilla's "commodore," Governor Shirley—acting as temporary commander of Anglo-American forces—hired merchant captains to act as Broadley's subordinate officers. In late 1755 Shirley even convinced a council of fellow Anglo-American governors to underwrite the expansion of the Lake Ontario fleet without any assistance from the Royal Navy when French naval expansion seemed imminent.

This fusion of provincial and Royal naval resources extended to the Lake George-Lake Champlain theatre as well. Captain Joshua Loring, a former Massachusetts privateer that had transitioned to the Royal Navy organized a similar fleet while British forces laid siege to Fort Carillon—later known as Fort Ticonderoga. While Loring drew on both provincial and Royal financial assistance to construct vessels such as the twenty-gun brig *Duke of Cumberland,* many of his "sailors" included officers and soldiers drawn from provincial and regular Anglo-American and British infantry regiments. British Army commanders such as General Amherst were also largely responsible for metropolitan funds for the eastern lake fleet. Despite Loring's presence, the lake naval forces were largely under the purview of the British Army in that theatre.[15]

While joint provincial-Royal construction and manning of armed vessels on the Great Lakes was certainly novel in the history of provincial naval activity, Massachusetts Lt. Colonel John Bradstreet's "Batteaux Service" in that same theatre of operations reflected some of the

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[15]Robert Malcomson, "Not Very Much Celebrated: The Evolution and Nature of the Provincial Marine, 1755-1813," *The Northern Mariner,* Vol. XI, No. 1 (January 2001), pp. 25-29. and Malcomson, *Warships of the Great Lakes, 1754-1834* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001), pp. 8-11. Special thanks to living historian Sam Ewell for helping me to find a copy of this monograph.

southern colonies' scout boat services. Batteaux were flat, shallow-water cargo boats that had a lengthy pre-war service history on New York's inland waterways and lakes. Bradstreet's flotilla of several thousand provincial bateaux men, which has been characterized by one historian as the "contemporary sister organization" to the famed Roger's Rangers, transported soldiers and supplies to frontier outposts such as Fort Oswego on Lake Ontario. Occasionally, these backwoods sailors even disembarked to fend off large groups of Franco-Indigenous raiders.[16] While often compared to Roger's Rangers, it might also be said they were a distant cousin of South Carolina's provincial scout boat navy.

Convinced by the success of the hardy mariners, in late 1757, Bradstreet—in much the same manner as Franklin's proposed colonial navy—asked the British government to bankroll an even more extensive multi-colony bateaux service led by American officers (Bradstreet reasoned they would hesitate to serve under British officers), and bankrolled by imperial funds. While the British commander of North America at the time, Lord Loudoun, did not accept the petition in its full form, he did promise Crown reimbursement for personal costs for Bradstreet's proposed 1758 naval assault on Fort Frontenac.[17] In fact, British army commanders frequently drew on imperial funds to support lake navies, though various issues with credit and delays in payment had the potential to hamper the Empire's war efforts at times.[18] Nevertheless, by the end of the conflict in 1763, Anglo-American and imperial officials had cooperated to construct or purchase nearly thirty small war and cargo vessels on Lakes George, Ontario, Champlain, and Erie.[19]

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[16]Joseph F. Meany, "Batteau and 'Battoe Men': An American Colonial Response to the Problems of Logistics in Mountain Warfare", pp. 2-10. Manuscript Published Digitally by New York State Military Museum. https://dmna.ny.gov/historic/articles/Batteaux_and_Battoe_Men.pdf

[17] William C. Godfrey, *Pursuit of Profit and Preferment in Colonial North America: John Bradstreet's Quest* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1982), pp. 107-110. Google Play eBook edition.

[18] Daniel R. Bazan, *For Want of Sloops, Water Casks, and Rum: The Difficulty of Logistics in the Canadian Theater of the Seven Years War* (Unpublished Master's Thesis, Liberty University, 2013), pp. 81-91. https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1287&context=masters

[19] Malcomson, *Warships of the Great Lakes,* p. 19.

While combined provincial and Royal efforts maintained fleets near the most active fronts of the war around the Great Lakes, there was no such large-scale naval cooperation on the coasts of North America and in the West Indies. The main reason for this was likely Britain's near-domination of the maritime theatre of the war after 1758, but a survey of those few colonial provincial naval forces that operated up to that point is still warranted. Though on a smaller scale than in the previous imperial conflict, Anglo-American governments throughout the British Atlantic commissioned provincial navies to fight French privateers. This naval effort was understandably more potent in regions directly affected by warfare with the French, particularly in New England. For instance, after news of the 1756 declaration of war against France, Governor Shirley's administration in Massachusetts spearheaded an effort to use local tax money to fund two provincial warships: the *Prince of Wales* snow (captained by Nathaniel Dowse) and the *King George* frigate (captained by Benjamin Hallowell, Jr).

The aptly named Massachusetts frigate *King George* was a particularly useful adjunct for Royal Navy forces operating in northern waters throughout the Seven Years War.[20] In the summer of 1757, Lord Halifax's ally and Shirley's successor as governor, Thomas Pownall, reported to Prime Minister William Pitt that Massachusetts had a "naval Establishment (which no other Province has)." While Pownall apparently did not realize that most British colonies had established provincial navies at some point throughout their history, he did realize their utility, and expressed the hope that they would be useful adjuncts to the Royal Navy.[21] Indeed, near the end of the conflict in October of 1762, the next Massachusetts Governor; Francis Bernard,

[20]Philip Chadwick Foster Smith, "*King George*, The Massachusetts Province Ship, 1757-1763: A Survey" in Frederick S. Allis, Jr., ed. *Seafaring in Colonial Massachusetts, Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Vol. 52* (Boston: Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 1980), pp. 175-185. https://www.colonialsociety.org/node/1989

[21] For more on ministerial politics during this period, see Rodger, *Command of the Ocean,* pp. 266-268. Governor Thomas Pownall to Pitt, 16 August 1757, in *Correspondence of William Pitt When Secretary of State, Vol. I*, ed. Gertrude Selwyn Kimball (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1906), p. 98.

bragged that the *King George* was instrumental to Royal Navy Admiral Lord Colville's victory over the French in Newfoundland. Even though the "junction of the *King George* with Lord Collville appeared to be an accidental meeting instead of a Concerted Measure...I recd from Ld. Colville such an high testimony of Capt.. Hollowel [sic]..."[22]

Whereas provincial governors of Massachusetts envisioned the colony's navy as a useful adjunct for an ever-expanding Royal Navy presence in the North Atlantic, colonies to its immediate south and in the West Indies deployed provincial naval forces on a much more temporary basis in order to stop the widespread threat of French privateers. Even though the Royal Navy effectively eliminated the French navy as a serious threat by the late 1750s, it was unable to fully control elusive French private men of war. By the end of the conflict, French privateers had captured 1,400 British ships in the Caribbean theatre alone.[23]

Between 1757 and 1759, there appeared to be a minor "provincial naval" fever throughout the Atlantic that echoed Anglo-American naval planning in the last conflict. Nevertheless, within a few years, much of the impetus to fit out local provincial forces faded as Royal Navy patrols and fleets gained momentum against the French throughout the Atlantic world. In 1757, the Connecticut government purchased a brigantine, *Tartar,* and assigned Michael Burnham as its captain. Burnham, who had been one of the last captains of the colony sloop *Defence* during the previous imperial war, led his crew on a journey to the West Indies to protect Connecticut trade interests there. By 1758, without any significant debate, the provincial

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[22] Francis Bernard to John Pownall, 20 October 1762, in *The Papers of Francis Bernard, Governor of Colonial Massachusetts, Vol. I: 1759-1763*, ed. Colin Nicolson (Boston: The Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 2007), pp. 278-279.

[23] Rodger, *Command of the Ocean,* p. 277, Thomas M. Truxes, "The Breakdown of Borders: Commerce Raiding during the Seven Years' War, 1756-1763," *Commerce Raiding: Historical Case Studies, 1755-2009,* Eds. Bruce A. Elleman and S.C.M. Paine (New Port: Naval War College, 2013), pp. 16-18. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA591580.pdf

government decided to sell the *Tartar*.[24] To the east in 1757, Rhode Island's government took charge of two vessels (including the privateer brigantine *Abercrombie),* and ordered them to hunt for a French privateer that was harassing English commerce off of Block Island. While Rhode Island's government commissioned numerous private men of war throughout the conflict, it abandoned its only attempt at a provincially-funded guard vessel in late 1758.[25]

Farther south in 1757, the traditionally pacificistic Pennsylvania government agreed to fit out a 22-gun provincial vessel known as the *Pennsylvania Frigate,* with the express purpose of the "Protection of our Trade."[26] Far from answering this purpose, the *Pennsylvania Frigate's* captain John Sibbald faced accusations of inaction and cowardice in colonial newspapers in New York and Pennsylvania. By late 1758, the Pennsylvania House of Representatives Committee of Correspondence wrote the Lords of the Admiralty to complain about the "Losses sustained by the Merchants of this colony...notwithstanding the great Expence they have for some Time past been at in supporting a Ship of War to guard the Coast, and humbly pray the Assistance from our Mother Country, of a Vessel or Vessels of superior Force…"[27] Despite early disappointment with the frigate, the Pennsylvania government kept the vessel cruising to protect the colony's trade for the rest of the conflict. Pennsylvania would prove to be the only colony other than Massachusetts to keep a provincial frigate cruising for this long in the war.[28]

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[24] *The Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut, From May, 1757, to March, 1762, Inclusive*, ed. Charles J. Hoadly, (Hartford: The Case, Lockwood, & Barnard Company, 1880), pp. 9, 62, 109. Google Books eBook

[25] *Records of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Vol. VI, 1757 to 1769,* ed. John Russell Bartlett (Providence: Knowles, Anthony & Co., 1861), pp. 22, 27, 38, 66, 162. and Samuel Greene Arnold, *History of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Vol. II, 1700-1790* (New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1860), p. 204, N.1

[26] *Pennsylvania Gazette* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), no. 1492, July 28, 1757: [3].Readex: America's Historical Newspapers

[27] Legislature Minutes, Pennsylvania, 24 November 1758, in *Pennsylvania Archives, Eighth Series, Vol. VI, October 14, 1756-January 3, 1764*, ed. Charles F. Hoban (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State Library, 1935), p. 4899 and *New-York Mercury,* no. 333, January 1, 1759: [1]. Readex: America's Historical Newspapers.

[28] William H. Egle, *History of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Civil, Political, and Military, From Its Earliest Settlement to the Present Time* (Philadelphia: E.M. Gardner, 1883), p. 1027.

Provincial naval patrols also occurred in the Southern colonies, although the immediate French threat was much more muted there, and Spain's late entry in the war in 1762 also delayed concerted provincial naval expeditions in the Southern colonies along the Florida borderlands. Nevertheless, South Carolina and Georgia did fit out some provincial naval forces. In South Carolina, a committee of concerned merchants and elites discussed creating a voluntary fund from which "one or two Vessels of War may upon any sudden Occasion be immediately fitted out" in case French privateers were to attack Charles Town. They contended that "his Majesty's Ships cannot at all Times go over the Bar, the Consequences of which we need not mention."[29]

Even though locals continued to manage their own coastal defenses when needed, an episode in the summer of 1757 demonstrated just how intermeshed provincial and Royal defense efforts had become. When a French privateer attacked local merchant vessels in the waters of Charles Town, the local government fitted out an emergency fleet of two small vessels to pursue it. While one provincial vessel had a crew of local volunteers and infantrymen from Lt. Colonel Henry Bouquet's 60th Regiment of Foot (the 'Royal Americans'), the other provincial vessel was manned entirely by Royal Navy sailors and marines from the H.M.S. *Arundel.*[30]

Even though the Royal Navy (and elements of the British Army) demonstrated willingness to assist South Carolina's provincial forces in 1757, this cooperation seems to have ended by 1758. A Charles Town correspondent reported that even "Tho' we have not a Man of War or other Vessel cruizing from Port in this Province, to protect our Coasts against the Insults of the French Privateers that may be upon it, we are assured that the Province of Georgia has—a fine Sloop having been impressed there…" Georgia Governor Henry Ellis put the vessel (*Tryal)*

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[29] *Boston News-Letter* , no. 2879, September 8, 1757: [1]. Readex: America's Historical Newspapers.

[30] *Pennsylvania Gazette* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), no. 1493, August 4, 1757: [2]. Readex: America's Historical Newspapers.

under the command of a privateer captain, assigned the captain of the colony's scout boat as a pilot, and added the sailors from the scout boat as well as several volunteers to its crew. The source reported that in a subsequent battle with a French privateer crew (that included escaped African slaves from South Carolina), the *Tryal's* crew suffered many casualties, but successfully withstood several boarding attempts. With this pyrrhic victory in mind, the South Carolina correspondent declared that: GEORGIA has made its Effort; and surely it must now be our Turn! 'Tis true, the Event of our Sister-Colony's Endeavours carries some Disappointment in it, but we cannot think they have been fruitless. We cannot conclude this account without this Observation, that those who go with a sincere Intention of finding the Enemy, seldom fail to meet them.[31] It is likely that the correspondent's conclusion was an acerbic commentary on what he believed to be the Royal Navy's alleged inactivity in patrolling for French privateers.

While it is tempting to see Ellis's provincial navy as an example of colonial self-reliance in the wake of imperial negligence, scholars have largely noted that this period saw increasing colonial reliance on imperial military initiatives. Even independent provincial naval expeditions during the late 1750s should be seen within the context of Britain's growing military strength throughout the Atlantic world. For instance, historian Andrew D.M. Beaumont has argued that Governor Ellis's ability to "act decisively upon his own initiative" was precisely why the Board of Trade's Lord Halifax had made him the governor of Georgia. Beaumont contends that throughout 1756 and 1757, ministerial infighting and military inaction by British commanders such as Lord Loudoun damaged Britain's war effort. To counter this, Lord Halifax depended upon the colonial governors to carry on the fight against the French with local resources. In short, Beaumont holds that even colonial authorities acting on their own initiative could still

[31]*New Hampshire Gazette* (Portsmouth, New Hampshire), No. 100, September 1, 1758, Readex: America's Historical Newspapers

advance metropolitan military goals.[32] By 1759, provincial naval forces in South Carolina and Georgia had made some strides against French privateers, but these minor naval forces paled in comparison to the large Southern provincial navies of the War of Jenkins Ear.

Just as in the last war, provincial navies were only moderately active in the West Indies. In fact, within the first few years of the war, political infighting, arguments over finance, and the overwhelming presence of Royal Navy guardships limited the service lives of even those few provincial ships in the region.[33] That is not to say that there was never any use for local defense vessels in island provinces. For instance, late in the war in 1761, the Bermuda government fitted out two sloops to chase after French privateer sloops. The emergency fleet successfully forced the raiders away.[34] Despite occasional utility for emergency fleets and provincial guardships, the Jamaica governor's 1757 speech to a joint session of his council and the island's assembly provides a poignant picture of the decline of provincial navies in the West Indies:

...I apprehend there will be no Occasion for an Island Sloop, two Vessels having been already commissioned, by an Order from the Lords of the Admiralty, for the immediate Protection of our Coasts[;] The great Sums of Money usually expended in Time of War for that Service will now be saved, the Country relieved from so heavy a Burthen, and the purpose more fully answered…[35]

The decline in provincial naval warfare throughout the Atlantic world in the late 1750s coincided with the decline of its sister institution: privateering. Though Parliament initially

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[32] Beaumont, *Colonial America and the Earl of Halifax,* pp. 198-201.

[33] Pares, *War and Trade,* pp. 296-298.

[34] Michael J. Jarvis, *In the Eye of All Trade : Bermuda, Bermudians, and the Maritime Atlantic World, 1680-1783* (Chapel Hill: Omohundro Institute of Early American History & Culture, 2010), p. 245. Retrieved from Google Books.

[35] Lt. Governor's Speech to Council and Assembly of Jamaica, 27 September 1757. CO 137/30. TNA

encouraged widespread privateering at the beginning of the conflict, and even though it allowed privateers to raid neutral merchant ships that carried French goods, by 1759 the British government decided to limit the issue of Letters of Marque when tensions arose with neutral powers concerned about British assaults on their shipping.

Aside from diplomatic concerns over privateering excesses, Royal Navy vessels were also more efficient in commerce raiding during the Seven Years War than privateers. In his study on British privateers throughout the eighteenth century, historian David Starkey calculated that between 1739 and 1751, British authorities condemned 408 enemy vessels captured by privateers and 449 vessels captured by the Royal Navy. Between 1756 and 1763, British courts condemned 382 privateer prizes and 794 Royal Navy prizes. Starkey connects the decline in British privateering to the Royal Navy's victories in the 1750s and 1760s.[36]

The decline in privateering after 1759 was noticeable in America as well. New York merchants had fitted out three times as many privateers in the Seven Years War than they had in the War of Jenkin's Ear. By 1759, however, over-hunting of enemy commerce reduced the number of prizes available for privateers. New York's Vice Admiralty Judge Lewis Morris—a veteran administrator that had overseen privateering cases since the War of Jenkin's Ear—condemned more prizes in 1758 than in any year in his long career, but saw fewer and fewer cases as British victories and "over-fishing" of French prizes continued.[37] All in all, Royal Navy military victories throughout the Atlantic world by the end of the decade disincentivized

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[36] David Starkey, *British Privateering Enterprise in the Eighteenth Century* (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1990), pp. 137-8, 161-179.

[37]Gary B. Nash, *The Urban Crucible: the Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American Revolution.* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 147--150. https://hdl-handle-net.unh.idm.oclc.org/2027/heb.01387.And Michael Watson, "Judge Lewis Morris, the New York Vice-Admiralty Court, and Colonial Privateering, 1739-1762." *New York History,* Vol. 78, NO. 2 (April 1997), p. 145.

provincial governments from outfitting large provincial navies, and private merchants from pursuing privateering.

Royal Navy Supremacy at Sea, 1758-1763

Even though provincial governments initially believed that they would have to create extensive provincial navies as in the previous conflict, the Royal Navy's expansion and victories over its French enemies after 1757 (coupled with Spain's belated entry into the conflict in 1762) made the creation of extensive provincial navies unnecessary. To fully appreciate why colonial governments consciously decided to cut back on provincial navy spending, one must fully examine the reasons behind the Royal Navy's growing hegemony in the Atlantic world in the late 1750s.

The seeds of Royal Navy squadrons replacing private naval squadrons at sea were sown as early as the mid-1750s, but imperial naval strength would only fully be realized by the end of the 1750s. Historian W.A.B. Douglas argues that when Royal Navy Captain John Rous led a force of Royal ships to help take French Fort Beausejour in Nova Scotia in the summer of 1755, it was "perhaps symptomatic of that state of affairs that [Rous's squadron was] composed entirely of King's ships rather than a mixed force of provincial and [Royal] naval vessels."[38]

The Royal Navy's ultimate maritime hegemony by the end of the 1750s did not come easily. The Duke of Newcastle, Sir Thomas Pelham-Holles (the brother of Prime Minister Henry Pelham, and his successor after 1756) initially hoped to contain French aggression to North America and to avoid an all-out European conflagration. The Newcastle administration feared

[38] Douglas, *Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy,* pp. 208-211.

that if another worldwide imperial war broke out, the battle fleets of the recently expanded French and Spanish navies would potentially outnumber and overpower the Royal Navy. While important members of the Whig opposition such as William Pitt (and naval reformers in the Admiralty such as Lords Bedford and Sandwich) called for an aggressive maritime assault on France, Newcastle and his allies insisted that diplomatic solutions in Europe and limited warfare against the French were preferable. Ultimately, the ministry did not dedicate enough Royal Navy vessels to intercept French reinforcements sailing for the New World—a misstep that played a major role in the expansion of the war beyond the North American continent in 1756.[39]

What had begun as border skirmishes in North America quickly became a major world war between 1756 and 1758. In the English Channel and on the French coast, the Royal Navy's Western Squadron made a few patrols along the French coast and into the Atlantic throughout 1756 and 1757 but failed to stop three major French squadrons sailing for the Caribbean and Canada. The Western Squadron's inactivity allowed the French to heavily reinforce Louisbourg—a fact that delayed the long-planned Anglo-American assault on French Canada. To calm public anger over mediocre progress in the war effort, William Pitt (then the Southern Secretary of State) planned for a major Royal Navy-army assault on the port of Rochefort, France in late 1757. Infighting between the British Army and the Royal Navy, faulty intelligence, and bad weather forced the invasion force to withdraw. A subsequent joint raid on the French port of St. Malo in the summer of 1758 was more successful, and resulted in the destruction of 80 French privateer vessels and merchant ships (along with four French naval vessels under construction).[40]

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[39] Martin Robson. *A History of the Royal Navy : The Seven Years War.* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016), pp. 15-26.http://search.ebscohost.com.nuncio.cofc.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=e000xna&AN=1238586&site=ehost-live&scope=site And Rodger, *Command of the Ocean,* p. 259.

[40] Rodger, *Command of the Ocean,* pp. 268-70.

In the Mediterranean, the French captured the island of Minorca in the spring of 1756. A Royal Navy relief force led by Admiral Byng failed to recover the island, and Byng himself was executed by the Admiralty for his alleged inaction. By early 1758, however, the Royal Navy was able to contain and overpower the main French fleet in the Mediterranean, and prevented it from sailing across the Atlantic to reinforce Louisbourg.[41] Between 1758 and 1759, Royal Navy forces also slowly seized France's West African possessions in Senegal. While the British government considered the Mediterranean an important strategic theatre, the seizure of French slaving colonies in Africa clearly was designed to harm France's economy while also bolstering Britain's transatlantic commerce.[42]

In the East Indies, the French and British East India Companies (along with their respective Indian allies) had long been at war with one another. A Royal Navy force had already been sent to India in 1755 to assist the East India Company's own naval forces (the Bombay Marine) in a fight against their enemies in the Angrian Indian kingdom, and was prepared for the larger fight against the French when news of war arrived in 1756. Between 1756 and 1759, British and French forces (alongside their Indian partners) fought a largely inconclusive war of attrition. Both British and French squadrons fought each other to a standstill on numerous occasions, and both sides captured important trading outposts from one another. By 1761, however, British forces had largely forced the French out of India with the capture of Pondicherry.[43]

While clashes between the British and French empires occurred throughout the world, Prime Minister William Pitt's decision to focus the British war effort on the North American

[41]Robson, *History of the Royal Navy,* pp. 30-42.
[42] Robson, *History of the Royal Navy,* pp.83-85.
[43] Rodger, *Command of the Ocean,* pp. 274-275.

theatre after 1757 proved to be one of the war's major turning points, and the Royal Navy was a key component in this plan. Historian Eliga Gould has made the case that growing resentment against long-standing Whig concerns with political and military involvement in continental European affairs encouraged Prime Minister William Pitt to focus on a "Blue Water" vision of British empire. This vision utilized naval power to expand the British imperial reach into the Americas—a move that would both bolster British wealth and harm the empire's French enemies.[44]

The positive effects of this renewed British attention to the North American theatre became apparent in the summer of 1758 when Admiral Boscawen led over twenty-one battle ships and two frigates—the first Royal Navy fleet that had ever wintered in Nova Scotia—alongside 12,000 soldiers in a successful assault on Fortress Louisbourg. This act would serve as the first step in the larger conquest of Canada that would occur throughout the next two years. It is telling that Massachusetts's government, which had spearheaded a large provincial flotilla in the siege of 1745, did little more for the naval assault on the city than to utilize the provincial frigate *King George* as a scouting vessel and commerce raider on the coast surrounding Louisbourg.[45] The capture of Louisbourg demonstrated that the Blue Water Strategy hinged more on Royal than provincial naval resources.

Even though fighting continued in every corner of the world, the Royal Navy held the advantage over the French in North America and in the West Indies after the 1758 seizure of Louisbourg and subsequent 1759 capture of Quebec. While Pitt's adoption of more aggressive

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[44] Eliga Gould, *The Persistence of Empire : British Political Culture in the Age of the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), pp. 38-59. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unh/detail.action?docID=4322025.

[45] Rodger, *Command of the Ocean,* pp. 276-277, and *Pennsylvania Gazette* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), no. 1544, July 27, 1758: [2]. Readex: America's Historical Newspapers.

naval warfare against French interests certainly aided the British war effort, one other factor worked in the British empire's favor: Spain's continued neutrality. King Filip VI of Spain had long sought to maintain peaceful relations with the British empire. However, when the king died in the summer of 1759, the Spanish government's devotion to neutrality died with him. His half brother and successor, Charles III, hated Britain and sought to restore his kingdom's traditional alliance with France. Charles III oversaw a further expansion of the Spanish navy and sent squadrons to reinforce garrisons in the West Indies.

At the same time, ongoing peace talks between Britain and France proved to be unfruitful. Pitt's desire to continue the war at any cost and to welcome a fight with the increasingly belligerent Spanish was unpopular to the war-weary British public, and the prime minister resigned in the autumn of 1761. Despite his resignation, Spain belatedly formalized a military alliance with France in the winter of 1761.Within weeks of the declaration of war, officials in London planned to use the large British infantry and naval forces already campaigning against the French in the Caribbean to capture Havana, Cuba. They were to be assisted by Anglo-American provincial regiments, volunteer units of free blacks and French Huguenots. On 6 June 1762, the British invasion force surprised Havana's defenders, and began a massive siege. After hundreds of casualties and months of fighting, the weary Spanish garrison finally surrendered to the British on 13 August 1762. The siege of Havana would be the only major British or Anglo-American expedition against the Spanish during their short period of participation in the conflict. News of the British victory would also play a major role in strengthening the British hand in the ongoing peace talks in Paris in the autumn of 1762.[46]

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[46] Richard Harding, "The War in the West Indies," in *The Seven Years' War : Global Views* Eds. Mark Danley and Patrick Speelman, (Leiden: BRILL, 2012), pp. 316-322. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/cofc/detail.action?docID=1081591.

During Spain's brief participation in the conflict, Britain and its Anglo-American subjects faced their traditional French and Spanish enemies together for the first time since 1748. Nevertheless, the military situation was much different at the end of the Seven Years War than during the War of Jenkin's Ear. By 1762, the Royal Navy had overpowered its French rivals in almost every corner of the globe and was more than prepared to take part in an assault on Havana.

It is interesting to note that Southern provincial governments did not engage in any major military campaigns against Spanish Florida. While Anglo-Americans undoubtedly fitted out privateers and occasional provincial fleets, a policy of proactive defense at this late stage in the conflict was preferred over major campaigns against the Spanish. This sentiment was best expressed in a Spring 1762 issue of the *South Carolina Gazette,* which reported that "The general assembly of this province have [sic] resolved to continue both the scout-boats, and the look-outs, during the continuation of the present war with France and Spain."[47] British victories over Franco-Spanish forces throughout the Atlantic world and ongoing peace talks likely made the need for expensive expeditions against St. Augustine (such as had been planned in the previous conflict) unnecessary.

All told, the Royal Navy played a key role in achieving Britain's first imperial victory over its foes in half a century. In London, the Admiralty Board's continued insistence on professionalization, insistence on aggressive strategies, new battleship designs, the capture of large numbers of enemy mariners, British assaults on neutral ships carrying French goods, and French economic collapse all contributed to Britain's growing naval advantage as the long war blazed on. Behind aggressive military expansion throughout the war, new methods for

[47] *The South Carolina Gazette* (Charles Town), 22 May 1762. Accessible Archives

distributing supplies to ships, and Whig Prime Minister's William Pitt's ability to get consistent credit and funding for both the navy and army also played large roles in the British naval victory.[48]

The Admiralty's growing interest in overseas conquests paralleled an even larger shift in the British government's relationship with its overseas empire in America. Throughout the last several decades, a number of scholars have noted an increased metropolitan interest in colonial military defense with the onset of the Seven Years War. Kurt Nagel has argued that by the late 1740s, the British government had begun to take the reins of colonial military defense policies while also continuing to insist on colonial self-defense measures—a contradiction that would play a role in fostering the imperial crisis of the 1760s. London's total involvement in colonial military affairs would crystallize by the Seven Years War with William Pitt's aforementioned adoption of a Blue Water strategy that increased military involvement in America.[49] Thus, the Royal Navy's growing presence in American naval warfare represented a growing metropolitan interest in the governance and defense of its American colonies at midcentury.

Even if the Royal Navy's expanded operations in the Atlantic world supplanted the need for provincial navies, British naval dominance over the French and Spanish required significant American assistance and sacrifice. For instance, in 1759, after Royal Navy Admiral Durell requested men for his ever-undermanned squadron at Halifax, Nova Scotia, Rhode Island's government promised bounties "out of the general treasury, over and above the King's, of forty shillings sterling" for all men who would join the Royal fleet.[50] This sort of spending did not

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[48] Richard Harding, *Seapower and Naval Warfare, 1650-1830*, pp. 206-211.. For more on the Royal Navy's improvements in supplies, see Christian Buchet, Anita Higgie, and Michael Duffy, *The British Navy, Economy and Society in the Seven Years War* (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell & Brewer, 2013).

[49] Nagel, *Empire and Interest,* pp. 502-508

[50] *Records of the Colony of Rhode Island,* p. 209.

come easily. For instance, even though Parliament had reimbursed *some* of Massachusetts's war debts by 1759, the colony continued to employ more than 25% of its adult male population in infantry and naval services (including on bateaus, privateers, and on the *King George)* on its own coin. Even though these charges sapped the colony's economic strength in the short term, the promise of future Parliamentary reimbursement encouraged Massachusetts and other colonial governments to provide thousands of soldiers and sailors for the imperial cause.

While economic reimbursement from London was vital in securing Anglo-American military expenditure throughout the conflict, another force also drove colonial governments to continue to support the imperial cause: a growing belief among Anglo-Americans that they were equal "partners" with the British army in the war against the French. Scholars have noted that this growing patriotic fervor was not shared by British army leaders (particularly General Amherst) who saw colonial governments and their forces as fickle subordinates rather than as imperial partners.[51] While these tensions had existed on land for sometime, they also continued to plague provincial-Royal cooperation at sea. As discussed in the previous chapter, in the early 1750s, Anglo-Americans had failed to convince imperial authorities that their provincial warships at Louisbourg had been the equals of Royal Navy frigates.

As ever, the main controversy between Anglo-Americans and the Royal Navy was impressment. In the aftermath of the 1747 Knowles Riots, Royal Navy captains typically only impressed American sailors already at sea rather than in port. This new strategy did little to assuage colonial authorities, and met with violent resistance near Boston Harbor in 1758 when a merchant vessel fired on a boat carrying a press gang from the H.M.S. *Hunter.*[52] Despite early

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[51] Anderson, *Crucible of War,* pp. 316-324.
[52] Leach, *Roots of Conflict,* pp. 156-157.

reservations, the Royal Navy did not always limit its impressment to sea—a fact that would bring about significant resistance throughout the Northern port cities.

Anger at Royal Navy impressment on land and sea during the Seven Years War must be understood within the wider context of unsavory recruitment policies by imperial infantry and naval forces. Throughout Colonial America's towns and cities, British Army recruiters often relied on coercion and violence to force Anglo-Americans into personnel-depleted regiments. Thus, Anglo-American mobs frequently assaulted regular army recruiting parties; mob violence against Royal Navy press gangs was a simultaneous occurrence.[53] For New Yorkers, these two threats coalesced in the spring of 1757 when Lord Loudon's troops assisted the Royal Navy in impressing over 800 men. While mariners could not resist Royal Navy press gangs that had large red-coated units at their disposal, individual crews did put up hefty resistance when they had the chance. One representative example occurred in 1760, when the crew of the privateer *Samson* engaged in a naval shootout with a Royal Navy crew that tried to impress them. Even though local lawmen tried to help the press gang, the privateer crew was largely able to escape from New York Harbor.[54] It should be noted that sailors also resisted local officials' attempts at impressment, including a case from 1758 in which mariners fired on a New York militia company that tried to force them into the colony's transport service.[55] Nevertheless, as will be seen in the conclusion to this dissertation, Anglo-American anger over Royal Navy impressment would play a major role in the postwar imperial crisis.

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[53] Alan Rogers, *Empire and Liberty: American Resistance to British Authority, 1755-1763* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), pp. 46-48

[54] Jesse Lemisch, *Jack Tar vs. John Bull: The Role of New York's Seamen in Precipitating the Revolution* (New York: Routledge, 1997), Loc. 516-532, Kindle eBook edition.

[55] Lemisch, *Jack Tar,* Loc. 801.

While colonists resented the Royal Navy for its impressment policy, they also grew to despise its role in suppressing illicit Anglo-American trade with the French. As early as 1755, Admiralty officials took note of the widespread North American trade with the French in Louisbourg and the West Indies, and ordered Admiral Augustus Keppel to patrol for smugglers. Anglo-American smugglers often had patronage from colonial governors, including Pennsylvania Governor William Denny. Denny sold 'flag-of-truce' passes to merchant captains who would tacitly go on diplomatic missions to French territories with the understanding that they would engage in illicit trading with the enemy. Metropolitan anger over this smuggling coupled with provincial anger over British attempts to end the practice further strained relations between periphery and center. When British commanders such as Lord Loundon placed embargoes on colonial ports to prevent this trade, Anglo-Americans raised hues and cries over financial losses. By the early 1760s, Parliamentary anger at this widespread trade would prove to be fundamental in its decision to curb provincial autonomy with numerous imperial reforms, beginning with legislation surrounding Writs of Assistance (which will be discussed below).[56]

By the early 1760s, Parliamentary leaders had come to the conclusion that to secure their new possessions in the Americas and to crack down on excessive provincial economic and political autonomy, they would have to expand Royal military forces throughout the colonies while also enacting numerous reforms that would fund these forces. These reforms included expanding vice admiralty court jurisdiction and enforcing customs laws with a fleet of purpose-built coast guard vessels. Historian Eliga Gould argues that Britain's decision to strenuously enforce trade laws and tax policies began to make enemies of important merchants and ordinary sailors who had "cut their political teeth resisting the navy's wartime press gangs during the

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[56]Leach, *Roots of Conflict,* pp. 158-162.

1740s and 1750s."[57] Ironically, the imperial laws destined to bring Anglo-Americans closer in line with British maritime policies would alienate the colonies' sailors to the point of all-out rebellion.

Between 1754 and 1757, provincial governments planned for major provincial naval campaigns against the French as they had in the previous imperial conflict. However, beginning with the capture of Louisbourg in 1758, William Pitt's 'Blue Water Strategy' (which relied on the Royal Navy to spearhead the conquest of French possessions in North America) made the existence of large provincial navies unnecessary. With dozens of Royal Navy warships actively pursuing French privateers and capturing French ports, provincial governments felt that they could finally delegate the responsibilities of coastal defense to their imperial overlords. While an expanded Royal Navy presence may have made Anglo-Americans feel secure while the war raged on, the imperial fleet would play a major role in exacerbating the postwar imperial crisis of the 1760s and 1770s that would ultimately pave the way for the Revolutionary War.

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[57] Gould, *Among the Powers,* pp. 83-93

Conclusion: Provincial Navies and the Imperial Crisis, c. 1762-1775

Even though provincial navies had played only a small role in the British victory in the Seven Years War, the century-long legacy of provincial naval service (coupled with long-held colonial anger at Royal Navy excesses) would play a significant part in shaping Patriot resistance during the imperial crisis of the 1760s-70s. In particular, Anglo-Americans would use stories of their provincial naval service to contest British taxation and would also draw on familiar maritime defense tactics to oppose Royal Navy enforcement of imperial policies.

Unsurprisingly, the first major connection between pre-Revolutionary provincial navies and the imperial crisis occurred in the ever-turbulent port city of Boston. By the middle of 1760, Boston, like many other northeastern ports, faced an economic recession as the war with France began to wind down. It also faced political infighting between conservative elites (and supporters of extending Governor Francis Bernard's prerogative powers) such as the colony's Chief Justice Thomas Hutchinson and populist politicians such as James Otis. Among the sharpest disputes that arose between these political factions was the battle over Writs of Assistance, one of the first controversial imperial reforms of the 1760s. The British government had equipped customs officers with greater authority to utilize search warrants (writs) on vessels suspected of smuggling. Otis's campaign against the writs of assistance and Hutchinson's attempts to ban the popular Boston town meeting endeared him to poorer laborers and merchants concerned with increasing imperial trade restrictions.[1]

Aside from Otis's resistance to what he considered growing imperial overreach, he also opposed Governor Francis Bernard's handling of the colony's provincial navy in the final year of

[1] Nash, *The Urban Crucible*, pp. 157-159, 170-175.

the war against France—a case he documented in the 1762 pamphlet *A Vindication of the Conduct of the House of Representatives of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay.* One early nineteenth century historian made the bold case that this pamphlet "has been considered the original source, from which all subsequent arguments against taxation were derived."[2] With the French having commenced an assault on Newfoundland that summer and with coastal fishermen fearing a renewed assault on the New England fisheries, Governor Bernard and his council expanded the crew of the provincial sloop *Massachusetts* and sent it on various patrols without consulting the colony's assembly. Bernard's unilateral strategy may have appeared harmless to the governor, but what may have seemed like a small quibble over the defense of the coast set the pace for larger constitutional arguments that would resound throughout the next few decades.

Overall, Otis's larger argument was not with the existence of a provincial navy in Massachusetts, though he questioned if "the province's trade has truly received a Benefit from those Vessels equal to the Tax...paid for their Support." Rather, Otis characterized Bernard's fitting out of the sloop without approaching the assembly (coupled with other extra-parliamentary expenditure) as a symptom of arbitrary executive power. A legislative committee responded with the claim that "No Necessity therefore can be sufficient to justify a house of Representatives in giving up such a Priviledge; for it would be of little consequence to the people whether they were subject to George or Lewis, the King of Great Britain or the French King, if both were arbitrary, as both would be if both could levy Taxes without Parliament."[3] Ultimately, as in so many cases throughout the Atlantic world in the preceding century, battles over

[2]Caleb Hopkins Snow, *A History of Boston: The Metropolis of Massachusetts, From its Origin to the Present Period* (Boston: A Bowen, 1828), pp. 251-2.

[3] James Otis, *A Vindication of the Conduct of the House of Representatives of the Province of the Massachusetts-Bay...* (Boston: Edes & Gill, 1762), pp. 11-15

provincial navies reflected larger sociopolitical divisions and tensions within colonial society rather than squabbles over naval policy.

While Otis and his colleagues equated Bernard's naval expenditure with taxing the populace without representation—a clarion cry that would resound throughout colonial protests for the next decade--they also expressed an anxiety common throughout seventeenth- and eighteenth-century British politics: that an executive would keep a standing military force to arbitrarily oppress his subjects. This fear was evident when Otis wondered "If the Governor and Council can fit out one man of war, inlist men, grant a bounty and make establishments, why not for a navy, if to them it shall seem necessary, and they can make themselves the sole judges of this necessity."[4] Historian Sarah Kinkel has made the case that later in that decade, Anglo-Americans dissidents—like their compatriots among the Patriot Whigs in Britain—protested Royal Navy enforcement of metropolitan trade laws partly due to their "preexisting fears about a professional military…"[5] While men like Otis did not oppose provincial navies on principle, they did fear that excessively powerful governors could wield them in the same manner as a standing army to squash the rights of the citizenry.

While it may seem hyperbolic to assume a governor could maintain a private navy to enforce his will (or imperial laws), there were some cases where provincial navies supported unpopular British policies during the imperial crisis. For instance, the Georgia scout boat *Prince George* was fundamental in securing the delivery of stamps after Parliament's infamous 1765 Stamp Act. This act was one of Parliament's first major attempts at external taxation on internal colonial commerce and required colonists to pay a stamp duty on various official documents and licenses. This wildly unpopular act met immediate resistance throughout the American colonies.

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[4]Otis, *A Vindication,* p. 33.
[5] Kinkel, *Disciplining the Empire,* pp. 164-165.

In Georgia, merchants were furious that they could not export rice (the colony's cash crop) without customs papers with the stamps affixed and took to the streets to protest the policy throughout the autumn of 1765.

Throughout the next several months, Wright mobilized the colony's Royally-funded ranger force, elements of the Royal Navy, and volunteers to defend the stamps and his own safety when the local chapter of the Sons of Liberty threatened numerous violent riots. Along with a few colonial rangers, the crew of the *Prince George,* transported and guarded the colony's stamp collector during his initial landing.[6] After the governor's swift response, one anonymous Georgian who opposed the Stamp Act lamented that "Our liberty here is at a very low ebb." Undoubtedly, the governor's ability to utilize a Royally-funded infantry force (and provincial scout boat) in support of the Stamp Act did little to quell colonial fears that their rights were threatened by standing military forces.[7]

While the imperial crisis raised larger questions over the ability of the governor to use provincial navies to enforce unpopular imperial mandates, the legacy of provincial naval service from previous conflicts also shaped the way Anglo-Americans protested British policies. For example, as early as 1764, a committee of Massachusetts politicians from the governor's Council and Assembly (leery of reports that the British ministry and Parliament were plotting a round of taxes on the American colonies) drew on their colony's century-and-a-half of military service to demonstrate their loyalty to the Crown and to decry imperial taxation. In response to Parliament's reason for raising taxes on the colonists, to "defray the charges of a war undertaken for [the colonists'] defence, to which it is said they have never yet sufficiently contributed, the

[6] Johnson, *Militiamen, Rangers, and Redcoats*, pp. 56-58 .

[7] *The Newport Mercury* (Newport, Rhode Island), No. 388 10 February 1766. Readex: America's Historical Newspapers.

Province of Massachusetts Bay deem it proper briefly to set forth their own...exertions and expenses in the common cause…"

Among the major expenses the committee delineated were the various attacks on Canada throughout the previous imperial wars, contributions to campaigns in the Seven Years War, and the commissioning of "armed vessels for the protection of trade, [which] cost 34,795 [pounds]." While still in debt from the most recent conflict, the colony's government could still declare that "From its infancy to the present age, this colony, with no expense to the Crown, has defended the territory granted to it; and thereby mightily extended the British empire and immensely increased the British commerce."[8] While provincial naval expenses were only one factor in the colony's long list of complaints against recent British trade acts, this complaint reiterated long-held provincial anger at bearing the brunt of the costs of naval defense. If the colonies were willing to build their own fleets to defend trade and to advance the cause of the British Empire, why were they being singled out by discriminatory imperial policies?

While Massachusetts explicitly listed its provincial naval expenses as evidence that the colony should not be taxed by Parliament, other colonies drew on more general descriptions of their military exertions to justify their protests. For instance, in his 1764 pamphlet *The Rights of the Colonies Examined,* Rhode Island politician Stephen Hopkins (a future signer of the Declaration of Independence and founder of the Continental Navy) detailed various colonies' historical wartime sacrifices as evidence that they should not be taxed by Parliament. For instance, Hopkins argued that:

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[8] "Extracts from the statement of the services and expenses of the Province of Massachusetts, made by a Committee of the Council and House of Representatives, chosen for the purpose in October, 1764, and sent to the colony's agent in England, to furnish arguments why the colony should not be taxed, &c." in. *Speeches of the Governors of Massachusetts, From 1765 to 1775...* Alden Bradford, ed (Boston: Russell and Gardner, 1818), pp. 25-27.

....in the year 1746, when the Duke D'Anville came out from France, with the most formidable French fleet that ever was in the American seas, enraged at these colonies for the loss of Louisbourg, the year before, and with orders to make an attack on them; even in this greatest exigence, these colonies were left to the protection of heaven, and their own efforts...[9]

While Hopkins made no explicit mention of his colony's naval service in this example, he must certainly have considered the fact that Royal Navy Admiral Warren had personally requested Rhode Island's colony sloop *Tartar* to scout for DuCasse's squadron during the invasion scare.[10] In the mind of Anglo-American dissidents, Parliamentary taxation to fund standing military forces punished colonial governments that had funded their own defense measures for generations.

Whereas Anglo-Americans drew on their history of provincial naval expenses and general military costs to argue against British taxation without representation, this same legacy also defined how many disaffected colonists opposed the metropole's expansive maritime enforcement policies. One critical component of Parliament's plans to levy taxes on American colonists in the years following the Seven Years War was the Admiralty's desire to expand the North American Squadron's peacetime fleet to twenty six vessels (and 3,290 sailors). While France's empire in North America had essentially come to an end in 1763, the British government hoped that maintaining a peacetime garrison of thousands of red-coated regulars (along with an expanded naval presence) would prevent future imperial competition over its new American territories. Aside from military fears, imperial authorities also hoped the Royal Navy could crack down on widespread American smuggling—a potentially lucrative service that would serve immediate imperial interests and allow for peacetime prizes for Royal Navy crews.

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[9] Stephen Hopkins, *The Rights of the Colonies Examined,* (Providence: William Goddard, 1765), pp. 20-21. Evans Early Imprint Collection. https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/evans/N07846.0001.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext and Raymond G. O'Connor, *Origins of the American Navy: Sea Power in the Colonies and the New Nation* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1994), p. 15.

[10] Chapin, *Tartar,* pp. 51-2.

The first peacetime commander of the newly expanded squadron, Lord Colville (who had recently utilized Massachusetts's provincial warship *King George* in the attack on Newfoundland), zealously embraced his new powers to seize and confiscate illicit cargo and trading vessels.[11]

By 1764, Admiralty officials funded the construction of six small sloops and schooners for the Royal Navy to use in the pursuit of North American (and occasionally French) smugglers. While the Royal Navy did fund this small cutter fleet, the most effective (and unpopular) anti-smuggling vessels were "peacetime privateers" commissioned by the American Board of Customs Commissioners. Their crews lived off the proceeds of their captures and tarnished the reputation of the Royal Navy in American waters even though they were independent of the imperial fleet. For many Whiggish American traders and smugglers, Britain's new "sea guard" was little better than the *guarda costas* that had prowled their shores throughout the recent imperial conflicts.[12]

For many traders in Rhode Island (which depended heavily on the molasses trade with the West Indies that was now threatened by Parliament's 1764 Sugar Act), British coast guard vessels were a major threat to lucrative trade routes. Such warlike threats to the colony's commerce had warranted a warlike response. This military response, particularly in the traditionally rebellious colony of Rhode Island , drew on nearly a century of commissioning "emergency fleets'" to face immediate piratical and imperial threats. With ongoing Royal Navy captures of sugar smugglers and rumors of impressment plans, Rhode Islanders began to stage violent resistance to Royal Navy guard ships as early as 1764. Historian Michael R. Deriderian

[11]Neil R. Stout, *The Royal Navy in America, 1760-1775* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1973), pp. 27-30,

[12] Stout, *Royal Navy,* pp. 59, 128-9.

has accurately called this violence pre-revolutionary "maritime skirmishes."[13] When Lt. Thomas Hill and the crew of the revenue schooner St. John tried to recruit sailors in Newport, local peer pressure and threats of violence stalled recruiting. To make up for this loss, Hill seized a local smuggling vessel. Soon thereafter, a rumor arose that when Royal Navy sailors went on shore to claim a deserter and plundered a local farm, the locals had planned to fit out an armed vessel to attack the *St. John.* Allegedly they were only deterred from this attack by the presence of the nearby Royal warship *Squirrell.*

While some scholars have made the case that the planned attack on the *St. John* was a mere rumor, it is clear in Lt. Hill's correspondence that he believed a mob had almost overtaken his vessel. Although Hill had been absent during the violence, some of his subordinate officers reported that a "mob filled a sloop full of men, and bore right down to board us…" While Royal Navy firepower prevented this mob from attacking the *St. John,* gunners at the local fort fired at the mainsail of the schooner and forced it to fall back.[14] The violent battle for navigation in Rhode Island had commenced, and impromptu fitting out of warlike vessels would serve Rhode Islanders in their fight against the Royal Navy just as it had with pirates and other maritime foes before.

Throughout the rest of the 1760s, Rhode Islanders violently resisted impressment attempts by the Royal Navy, and even burned the *Liberty*—the former sloop of the elite Bostonian smuggler which the Royal Navy had captured and turned into a revenue cutter.[15] It is

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[13] Michael R. Derderian, "This Licentious Republic: Maritime Skirmishes in Narragansett Bay 1763-1769," *Journal of The American Revolution,* Electronic Journal (2 October 2017). https://allthingsliberty.com/2017/10/licentious-republic-maritime-skirmishes-narragansett-bay-1763-1769/) and Stout, *Royal Navy,* pp. 69-70

[14] Stout, *Royal Navy,* pp. 66-68, and Lt. Thomas Hill, "Remarks on board His Majesty's schooner, the St. John, in Newport harbor, Rhode Island," *Records of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations in New England, Vol. VI* John Russell Bartlett, ed (Providence: Knowles, Anthony & Co., State Printers, 1861), pp. 428-429.

[15] Derderian, "This Licentious Republic," and Stout, *Royal Navy,* pp. 118-122.

important to note that the customs officer who seized the *Liberty,* Benjamin Hallowell, was the former provincial navy captain of Massachusetts's province ship *King George.* Hallowell's actions led to the plundering of his home during an ensuing riot in Boston, and his loyalty to the Crown ultimately led him to flee to Canada when the Revolutionary War broke out. While riotous traders and Whigs drew on traditional provincial naval strategies to resist the British during the imperial crisis, Hallowell's case reminds us that previous service in Anglo-American provincial navies did not always correlate with resistance to British authority.[16]

Whereas Rhode Islanders used mob violence to secure their shipping and sailors from the Royal Navy throughout the late 1760s, they transitioned to all-out naval assaults on Royal revenue cutters by the early 1770s. This elevation of violence occurred after Lt. William Dudsington and the *Gaspee* schooner (already unpopular in other colonies) seized numerous Rhode Island smugglers and brought them to the vice admiralty court in Massachusetts. In response to these seizures and Dudingston's refusal to show proof of his authority, Governor Wanton of Rhode Island engaged in a vicious war of letters with the lieutenant and his superior, Admiral Montagu.[17] In a letter to Wanton, Montagu claimed that the *Gaspee* was stationed at Rhode Island to protect the locals from piracy and to end smuggling. He also claimed that he had been informed that "the people of Newport talk of fitting out an armed vessel to rescue any vessel the King's schooner may take carrying on an illicit trade. Let them be cautious what they do; for...any of them are taken, I will hang as pirates." Even though Wanton denied knowledge of local preparations to assault the *Gaspee,* Montagu warned that any provincial mob would meet deadly force if they molested the king's ships.[18]

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[16] Smith, "Province Ship," pp. 179-180.

[17] Stout, *Royal Navy,* pp. 141-142.

[18] Admiral Montagu to Governor Wanton, 8 April 1772, and Governor Wanton to Admiral Montagu, 8 May 1772, in *Colonial Records of Rhode Island, Vol. VII,* pp. 62-65.

Even though Montagu feared an attack by a Rhode Island *vessel,* he could never have fathomed the multi-boat attack that would occur against the *Gaspee* in the summer of 1772. Many decades after the raid, the last survivor, Ephraim Bowen, recalled that on one June night in 1772, the *Gaspee* grounded when chasing a suspected smuggler. A Providence merchant by the name of John Brown had a local shipmaster get eight long boats ready to assault the schooner. About the "time of the shutting up of the shops...a man passed along the main street beating a drum, and informing the inhabitants of the fact that the *Gaspee* [italics mine] was aground on Namquit Point...inviting those persons who felt a disposition to go and destroy that troublesome vessel, to repair" to the rendezvous point. The armed mob, including future Continental Navy Admiral Abraham Whipple, ambushed the *Gaspee* by sea*,* wounded Dudingston, and burnt the schooner.[19]

While one might argue that this was merely an angry mob of Whiggish merchants that burnt a King's vessel, this strategy which utilized a drummer rallying volunteers on a whim to fight off an imminent maritime threat actually fit within the region's long history of emergency fleets. Take for example a case from 1704 when a French privateer was reported off the coast, Governor Samuel Cranston was "immediately caused the Drum to beat for Voluntiers, under the Command of Capt. [William] *Wanton*, and in 3 or four hours time Fitted and Man'd a Brigantine, with 70 brisk young men well Arm'd…" Two years later, when Rhode Island came under numerous legal attacks, Cranston would cite Rhode Island's frequent "fitting and sending out vessels upon the discovery, and to secure the coast" as evidence of the colony's utility and

[19] Ephraim Bowen, "Narrative of the Capture and Burning of the British Schooner Gaspee," in Bartlett, ed., *Colonial Records of Rhode Island, Vol. VII,* pp. 68-72. The narrative that a maritime mob assembled by a drum beat in town is echoed by Admiral Montagu himself in a letter to the governor. Ibd. pp. 88-89.

loyalty to the Crown.[20] How ironic that Rhode Island elites would use the same strategy to resist the Crown sixty-eight years later.

For many reasons, the 1772 attack on the *Gaspee* mirrored Rhode Island's emergency fleets of Queen Anne's War. On a familial level, the 1704 emergency fleet captain, William Wanton, was the father of Governor Joseph Wanton—the provincial politician who continually denied that Rhode Islanders had planned a naval assault on the British and who would deal with the immediate fallout from the *Gaspee* riot.[21] On a strategic level, both naval expeditions relied on a local authority (or elite) having a drummer rally volunteers on a whim, and piling them into boats or a vessel to fight off an immediate threat to colonial commerce. Rhode Island, like so many other colonies, had traditionally raised (or impressed) emergency fleets when Royal Navy vessels were absent in order to defend the coasts during the emergency, and had now turned that same strategy on the Royal Navy itself.

For some scholars, the *Gaspee* Affair fits into larger discussions of mob violence in the decade leading up to the American Revolution. In her famous study on pre-Revolutionary War mob violence, historian Pauline Maier argued that the *Gaspee* Affair was one of many typical eighteenth century crowd uprisings throughout the Atlantic world. These uprisings involved elites and commoners acting in concert to solve a local problem (i.e. to fight impressment) rather than to advance "revolutionary goals." Nevertheless, Maier argues, Anglo-American riots against British authorities during this era took on a new meaning as they were fights against impositions from an "external power."[22] While the *Gaspee* riot may have demonstrated how an angry Anglo-

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[20]For more on this case, see the first chapter of the dissertation. *Boston News-Letter* no. 1, April 24, 1704: [2]. Readex: America's Historical Newspapers. and Governor and Company of Rhode Island to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 14 September 1706, in Cecil Headlam, ed. *CSP, Vol. 23, 1706-1708*, pp. 213-230.

[21] Chapin, *Privateer Ships,* pp. 69-70, and John Osborne Austin, *The Genealogical Dictionary of Rhode Island* (Albany: Joel Munsell's Sons, 1887), pp. 215-218.

[22] Pauline Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain, 1765-1776* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), pp. 11-16.

American crowd could use traditional patterns of mob violence against imperial officers, it also demonstrated the continuity of provincial naval defense strategies throughout the eighteenth century. It should be noted here that while Anglo-American dissidents drew on historic examples of provincial naval service to protest British taxation and employed traditional naval tactics to combat Royal Navy commerce vessels, none of these activities or examples would have been possible without a large pool of common sailors willing to resist British authority. For decades, scholars have asserted that the opening moves on the path to the Revolutionary War began on the docks of colonial ports where common sailors had so long taken part in disorderly riots against authorities.[23]

All in all, there were numerous other factors that led Jack Tars to spearhead violent protests against British authority. On a macro-scale, economic issues plagued Northern port cities in particular during the final years of the Seven Years War and after. Just as provincial naval and privateering expeditions declined after 1759, wartime industries in port cities that had blossomed to support the war-effort (i.e. ship building) declined as Anglo-American forces conquered French Canada.[24] Historian Jesse Lemisch has noted that a perfect storm arose for maritime discontent in the mid-1760s: post-war unemployment for tens of thousands of former privateers, new British trade restrictions, and reduced shipping opportunities thanks to colonial nonimportation protests and the Stamp Act Crisis. In New York City during the late 1760s and early 1770s, unemployed sailors engaged in violent protests and riots against the British garrison. Aside from political qualms with the red coated garrison, sailors competed with off-duty British

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[23] For example, see Paul A. Gilje, *Liberty on the Waterfront : American Maritime Culture in the Age of Revolution : American Maritime Culture in the Age of Revolution* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), pp. 99-100. Gilje, Paul A.. Liberty on the Waterfront : American Maritime Culture in the Age of Revolution, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007. ProQuest Ebook Central, https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unh/detail.action?docID=3441652. Rediker and Peter Linebaugh, *The Many-Headed Hydra : The Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000), pp. 220-221.

[24] Nash, *Urban Crucible,* pp. 147-155.

infantrymen for part-time jobs and resented the competition. In essence, common sailors had personal economic and political motives to protest British policies and taxation without representation.[25] It is important to note that Jesse Lemisch has found that one of the many unifying factors for these common seamen was their shared experience of serving on privateer vessels during the Seven Years War. While the difference between privateers and government-funded provincial navies has been maintained throughout this dissertation, it is worth noting that the legacy of private naval warfare—whether involving colonial navies or privateers—continued to shape the way Americans protested British authority throughout the imperial crisis.

Whereas economic and political concerns unique to the 1760s drove some sailors to resist British authority in the streets of port cities, one traditional bogeyman continued to foster common sailors' resentment to British authority: impressment. Numerous scholars have pointed to the 1747 Knowles riot as the prototype for maritime crowd actions against Royal Navy press gangs in later decades. By the late 1760s, violent brawls with authorities, effigy burnings, and bonfires became common tropes in sailor-initiated riots in ports from Maine to South Carolina.[26] It will be recalled that the Knowles riot, one of the largest pre-Revolutionary riots of this sort, had its own roots in the Royal Navy's violent attempts to impress Massachusetts provincial navy sailors. Whether members of privateer crews, provincial guard ships, or merchant vessels, common sailors could find much common cause in the fight against Royal Navy conscription.

This violent resistance to impressment would continue throughout the imperial crisis. With the 1746 impressment act still in place, Royal Navy ships impressed hundreds of American sailors, sometimes even sending them back to Britain. Just as it had in Boston in 1747, this policy led New Yorkers to form a violent mob and burn a Royal Navy tender in the summer of

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[25] Lemisch, *Jack Tar,* Loc.1432-1446, 2064-3502

[26] See Magra, *Poseidon's Curse,* and Paul A. Gilje. *Liberty on the Waterfront,* pp. 99-105.

1764, and inspired similar riots throughout the colonies as far south as Virginia. Violent resistance to impressment could occur on the water, as well. As late as 1775, armed American mariners in whaleboats in Marblehead, Massachusetts surrounded a Royal Navy vessel and rescued their impressed compatriots.[27] Even if provincial navies had largely ceased to function by the 1760s, the vital participation of provincial naval veterans in the Knowles riots of the 1740s helped to stoke the flames of provincial anger against the Royal Navy that still burnt hot two decades later.

All told, Britain's taxation policies and the Royal Navy's attempts at orderly control failed to reduce Anglo-American dissidents to submission. While the customs authorities and the Royal Navy did make some headway in enforcing the Sugar Act, the costs of maintaining a large peace time Royal Navy fleet were probably higher than any revenue made by subsequent imperial tax-laws such as the Townshend Acts. The larger goal of connecting the American colonies to the metropole through increased imperial domination also failed as the thirteen mainland American colonies became more and more alienated.[28] Although Anglo-Americans could not convince the metropole to lighten its taxation policies by invoking their decades of provincial naval service to the Crown, they did use old provincial naval strategies and techniques to violently resist the Royal Navy's enforcement of these new imperial acts

[27] Magra, *Poseidon's Curse,* pp. 294-312.
[28] Stout, *Royal Navy,* p. 144

EPILOGUE

It would be impossible to draw a direct line between the provincial navies of the colonial era and the Continental and State Navies of the Revolutionary War. Nevertheless, one can find some echoes of the legacy of provincial navies in the American war effort at sea in the fight for Independence. This connection becomes even more evident when one realizes that historians throughout the last century have typically placed coastal New England—the region with the earliest and largest provincial naval establishments—as the birthplace of the Continental Navy. While the first shots of the war were fired at Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill throughout the spring and summer of 1775, New Englanders in whaleboats attacked British shipping near Boston. When the Second Continental Congress formed the Continental Army out of New England militia units, and placed General George Washington as commander, the Virginia military veteran drew on the Congress's limited funds to fit out merchant ships as warships to challenge the British stranglehold around Boston.[1]

The initial fleet of New England vessels, like the provincial fleet that attacked Louisbourg in 1745, was one of merchant ships. Historian Christopher Magra has argued that despite their civilian origins, this merchant fleet was "the first American navy" of the war. In a method that "defies classification as privateers," patriotic merchants leased their vessels to the Continental Congress, making them "temporary property of the United Colonies…" As this fleet grew, the need to clothe, feed, and pay sailors and shipwrights were some of the many factors that elevated the Congress's role as a central power.[2] One might recall that in 1690, the costs

[1] Sam Willis, *The Struggle for Sea Power: A Naval History of American Independence* (New York WW Norton, 2016), pp. 40-44. Kindle eBook edition. For an early example of a historian placing the navy's birth in New England, see Charles Oscar Paulin, *The Navy of the American Revolution: Its Administration, its Policy and its Achievements* (Published Dissertation, Chicago: University of Chicago, 1906), pp. 32-36.

[2] Christopher Magra, *The Fisherman's Cause: Atlantic Commerce and Maritime Dimensions of the American Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 177-178. Kindle eBook edition.

associated with the New England assault on Quebec—largely a naval campaign—led the Massachusetts government to issue the first ever paper money in the colonies. Just as with provincial navies of decades past, fitting out what would become the Continental Navy would inspire lasting governmental and financial change.

While the fitting out of merchant ships as warships in Boston in the summer of 1775 would start the slow process of the formation of an American Navy, the concept of commissioning a continental fleet was just as controversial at the beginning of the American Revolution as it had been during the Albany Conference of 1754. That summer, Rhode Island's provincial government—still dealing with ravages by Royal Navy ships—urged its delegates to the Continental Congress to campaign for a Continental Navy to help deter these attacks.[3] Some congressmen such as Pennsylvania's John Dickinson were hesitant to escalate the war effort anymore when there might still be a chance at peace through diplomacy. Firebrands such as Massachusetts's John Adams and his cousin Samuel Adams contended that creating a Continental Navy would be a show of force that would stand a better chance of achieving peace through strength. While one of Pennsylvania's delegates plied for diplomatic resolutions to the violence, one of the colony's other representatives—Benjamin Franklin—backed John Adams and other hawkish congressmen who called for a pan-colonial navy to contest the Royal Navy's growing stranglehold in the northeast. It should come as no surprise that Franklin, who had come up with the idea of a continental navy to support the British war effort twenty-one years before, would be more than willing to use the same idea while fighting them in 1775.[4]

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[3] Paullin, *The Navy,* pp. 34-36.

[4] George C. Daughn, *If By Sea: The Forging of the American Navy: From the American Revolution to the War of 1812* (New York: Basic Books, 2008), pp. 35-42. Kindle eBook edition.

By October of 1775, Congress created a Naval Committee of men representing several colonies, including South Carolina's Christopher Gadsden—a veteran of the Royal Navy, himself, and Stephen Hopkins—the former governor of Rhode Island. Hopkins, then nearly seventy years old, would have been well aware of the benefits of provincial naval warfare, having served as governor while his colony hired a guard vessel during the Seven Years War, and having attended the Albany Congress where talk of a proto-Continental navy had occurred.[5]

While the Continental Congress worked on making a national fleet a reality, eleven of the thirteen state governments (excepting New Jersey and Delaware) took the initiative themselves to build local fleets. While the Continental Congress had greater resources to build larger warships with larger crews than state fleets, local governments bankrolled large flotillas of smaller vessels (i.e. galleys) to defend regional coasts and ports. Just as with colonial provincial navies of previous wars, these state-funded fleets were widely outnumbered by locally commissioned privateers.[6] Nevertheless, regionally focused state navies carried the legacy of provincial navies forward into the fight against the British even more than the Continental Navy.

Even though one can find echoes of provincial naval traditions in the Continental and state navies of the Revolution, it is equally striking that a number of provincial navy veterans served in both state and national naval branches throughout the war. One of the most well-known examples is South Carolina's Captain John Joyner. His experience also exemplifies the contemporary tensions between many American officials over the importance of regional versus national maritime defense needs. Near the end of the Seven Years War, Joyner commanded one of the colony's scout boats, but saw little service other than making coastal surveys. By 1775,

[5] "Stephen Hopkins, 1707-1785," United States House of Representatives Website https://history.house.gov/People/Listing/H/HOPKINS,-Stephen-(H000781)/ [Accessed 18 March 2021].

[6]Paullin, *The Navy,* pp. 315-318.

however, a provincial government committee ordered Captain Joyner and his compatriot Captain John Barnwell to coordinate an assault with Georgia forces on a British supply ship near Savannah. Forces from both colonies captured over 20,000 pounds of gunpowder from the British ship and sent at least 5000 pounds to help George Washington's army then surrounding Boston. Ultimately, both colonies' local naval forces scored a local victory for both their respective governments and the Patriot cause in general.[7]

Although Joyner's Revolutionary career began with promise, it would end in tragedy. By 1778, South Carolina's government hoped to use valuable local staple crops (indigo and rice) and credit to purchase a few frigates from the French government. The state sent its commodore Alexander Gillon and several representatives for the transaction, including the well-experienced Joyner. On the journey over, Joyner faced a mutiny and temporary imprisonment by the British, but was luckily able to take advantage of family connections in Bristol to secure his release.[8] Unfortunately for Gillon and the state government, it would take three years to acquire even a single frigate. After much haggling, Gillon secured the lease for *L'Indien*—later the *South Carolina*— a frigate that the French government had ordered to be constructed in neutral Amsterdam, and which had been placed under the temporary guardianship of the Chevalier de Luxembourg.[9] The French had initially built the frigate with the intention of selling it to the prominent American envoy Benjamin Franklin and his compatriots, but various economic and diplomatic issues (including Dutch neutrality until 1780) delayed this plan. It is interesting that Franklin himself had secured the initial audience with the French government for Gillon,

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[7] D. E. Huger Smith, "Commodore Alexander Gillon and the Frigate South Carolina." *The South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine 9,* no. 4 (1908), p. 194

[8] James A. Lewis, *Neptune's Militia: The Frigate South Carolina During the American Revolution* (Kent: Kent University Press, 1999), pp. 15-18. http://search.ebscohost.com.unh.idm.oclc.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=27571&site=ehost-live.

[9] Smith, "Commodore Alexander Gillon," pp. 195-200.

especially since he had criticized the commodore for seeking such a large vessel for local defense purposes.[10]

By mid-1782, Commodore Gillon reached Philadelphia and there became enmeshed with the Chevalier in legal battles over some of his transactions in Europe. With these troubles in mind, the commodore placed John Joyner as its commander. While the vessel's new captain aimed to bring it back to South Carolina, three Royal Navy vessels captured his vessel and its 450 man crew that December. Only a few months later, the war would be over.[11] Ultimately, Joyner’s tenure as captain of the *South Carolina* was brief, disastrous, and limited to the final months of the Revolutionary War. What is noteworthy for this study, however, is that a state which had previously only built provincial navies for regional campaigns in the southeastern colonies now had the ability to secure warships from European powers, and to do all this while depending on the experience of a provincial navy veteran.

South Carolina’s provincial sailors were not the only veterans who saw service in the Revolution. For instance, historian Philip Chadwick Foster Smith has argued that Massachusetts's provincial navy of the Seven Years War set a “precedent for the Massachusetts State Navy of the Revolutionary War.” While Captain Hallowell of the *King George* frigate stayed loyal to the king, his lieutenant Daniel Souther became a major captain in the state's Revolutionary navy, his pilot Eleazor Giles became a Patriot privateer, a twelve year old servant onboard named Samuel Tucker later captained two of General Washington's schooners and a Continental frigate.[12] Ultimately, provincial naval veterans throughout the colonies provided a small but significant officer corps for the Continental, state, and privateer fleets.

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[10] Lewis, *Neptune’s Militia,* pp. 6-18.
[11] Smith, “Commodore Alexander Gillon,” pp. 215-217.
[12] Philip Chadwick Foster Smith, *King George,* pp. 176-185.

While the legacies and veterans of pre-Revolutionary provincial naval shaped the development of the Continental and state navies, at least one surviving provincial navy vessel—the Georgia scout boat *Prince George*—was still in service during the War for Independence. At more than thirty years old, the *Prince George* had long exceeded the lifespan of most wooden vessels of the era.[13] At the beginning of the conflict, Patriot rebels had forced its Loyalist captain, John Lichtenstein, to surrender the aged boat.[14] Researcher Gordon Burns Smith has found that not long thereafter, Captain John Stanhope of the H.M.S. *Raven* recaptured the vessel during an engagement with Georgia naval forces.[15] Despite this loss, by 1778, Georgia's Patriot House of Assembly ordered the state's commissary general to "make Enquiry whether the Scout Boat which before the revolution was in the Service of this State (then province) can be got up...and also the repairs of the said Boat at the public Charge." While it is not clear if this was the *Prince George* or an earlier scout boat, the fact that Georgia officials recognized the utility of the scout boat service to "this State (then province)" demonstrated an acknowledgement of the importance of the legacy of provincial navies years into the American Revolutionary War.[16]

With likely dozens of provincial navy veterans assuming high commands in both the Continental and state navies, it might be tempting to see provincial naval service as a pipeline into support for the American cause. The case of the Braddock-Lyford family of Georgia and South Carolina challenges this simple assumption and demonstrates how family legacies of provincial naval service had little bearing on one's allegiance. While John Braddock commanded

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[13] Johnson, *Militiamen, Rangers, and Redcoats*, p. 12. For life expectancy of 18th-century vessels, see Fernand Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century, Vol. II: The Wheels of Commerce,* trans. Sian Reynolds (Berkeley: University of California Press), p. 369.

[14] Maya Jasanoff, *Liberty's Exiles: American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World (New York: Vintage Books, 2011), p. 42.*

[15] Gordon Burns Smith, *Morningstars of Liberty: The Revolutionary War in Georgia, 1775-1783* (Milledgeville, G.A.: Boyd Pub., 2006), p.334.

[16] Legislature Minutes, Georgia, 10 February 1778 in *The Revolutionary Records of the State of Georgia, Vol. II* , ed. Allen D. Candler, (Atlanta: The Franklin-Turner Company, 1908), pp. 43-44.

one of the Georgia state navy galleys in 1776, his maternal uncle William Lyford, Jr. was a Loyalist exile that acted as a pilot for numerous Royal Navy vessels throughout the war. Both men's fathers (David Cutler Braddock and William Lyford, Sr.) had been captains in the provincial navy of South Carolina during the 1740s.[17] Even though their fathers fought in the same fleet against the Spanish, differing political loyalties in the 1770s would tragically drive these close relatives to join opposing navies.

The legacy of provincial naval service was also evident beyond the Patriot cause. For example, the governor of Loyalist-aligned East Florida, Patrick Tonyn, faced a traditional dilemma between 1776 and 1778 when Royal Navy vessels either failed to protect his colony's coast, or their vessels were in ill shape to assist him. To defend St. Augustine and the rest of Britain's only fully loyal colony south of Nova Scotia, Tonyn created a fleet of privateers, impressed vessels, and purchased warships that some historians have called the "East Florida provincial navy." Despite the absence of the Royal Navy, the Loyalist provincial navy of East Florida successfully repelled numerous rebel American invasions until the British secured the province by capturing Savannah, Georgia in 1778. In the end, Tonyn's "provincial" navy was no different from historical provincial navies in the now-rebellious colonies, or his opponents' state navies.[18]

Ultimately, while one cannot draw a direct line of continuity between the provincial navies of prior decades and the American fleets of the Revolutionary War, echoes of the colonies' long history of maritime self-defense continued on in some form in the guise of the Continental and state navies of the 1770s and 1780s. For a long period between 1689 and 1754,

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[17] J.G. Braddock, "The Plight of a Georgia Loyalist: William Lyford, Jr." *The Georgia Historical Quarterly* 91, no. 3 (2007), pp. 247-265.

[18] George E. Buker, and Richard Apley Martin. "Governor Tonyn's Brown-Water Navy: East Florida during the American Revolution, 1775-1778." *The Florida Historical Quarterly* 58, no. 1 (1979): pp.58-71.

Anglo-Americans fitted out their own semi-permanent and temporary provincial navies to secure their coasts from French, Spanish, piratical, and Native American maritime threats with limited Royal assistance. During the Seven Years War (c. 1754-1763), the Royal Navy finally gained maritime hegemony in the Western Atlantic world, and made the existence of costly colonial naval establishments unnecessary. Nevertheless, when the British government used the Royal Navy to enforce unpopular trade policies in the 1760s, Anglo-American antipathy for the navy's heavy-handed impressment policies and enforcement of trade laws coupled with a long legacy of local naval defense shaped the ways Americans resisted British authorities in the Imperial Crisis.

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