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States Of Discontent

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8

States of Discontent

State Crises, Party System Change, and Inclusion in South America

Samuel Handlin

INTRODUCTION

Latin America's recent inclusionary turn centers on changing relationships between the popular sectors and the state, which may adopt and implement policies and institutions that bestow recognition, promote access, and enhance redistribution to popular constituencies. Yet the new inclusion unfolds in a region in which most states are weak and prone to severe pathologies, such as corruption, inefficiency, and particularism. As Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar note in the introductory chapter of this volume, state weakness conditions the inclusionary turn in several ways. The pathologies of weak states fuel demands for inclusion from popular sector constituencies dissatisfied with poor services and unequal citizenship while the persistence of these pathologies also constrains and hampers the implementation of inclusionary measures. More broadly, the politics of state weakness has powerfully shaped trajectories of political contestation and development in some parts of the region, particularly the nature of the parties and politicians that have emerged on the Left and become principal protagonists in furthering political inclusion. To understand variation within the inclusionary turn, we need to appreciate the role of "states of discontent" in shaping the political trajectories of the inclusionary turn era.

The first part of the chapter outlines an argument, developed at more length elsewhere, regarding how "state crises" helped drive the consolidation of three distinct party system trajectories among the eight South American countries where the Left would eventually win power (Handlin 2017). Highly polarizing party systems consolidated in Bolivia, Ecuador,

and Venezuela, which saw the emergence of radicalized left-wing out-siders combining sharply anti-neoliberal programs with sweeping anties-tablishment appeals. Elsewhere on the continent, countries moved on very different paths. In the trio of Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, the Left turn saw the ascendance of long-established left parties that had evolved over time to embrace a moderate and pragmatic orientation. Their presence anchored weakly polarized party systems. And in a third pattern, evident in Paraguay and Peru, outsiders on the Left emerged to win power but their rise introduced far less polarization into national party systems.

State crises, situations in which states were plagued by inefficiency and corruption while populations lost confidence in basic governmental insti-tutions, drove this party system variation. Where prolonged state crises were avoided, party systems stabilized as political outsiders found little traction and established left parties successfully consolidated strong pos-itions on the center-left, thereby anchoring weakly polarized and largely stable party systems (Brazil, Chile, Uruguay). Where state crises occurred, in contrast, the entrance of political outsiders, including those on the Left, disrupted established party systems. Whether these outsiders took the form of radicals who sharply polarized the political environment (Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela) or relative pragmatists with modest policy goals willing to work within established institutions (Paraguay and Peru) rested on the options left outsiders faced for building movements and coalitions. Where outsiders could build movements on top of an extant robust infrastructure of left-wing political mobilization, they took radical forms. Where such infrastructure did not exist, outsiders on the Left were forced to recruit centrist allies and political advisors, a coalition-building dynamic that lent itself to greater pragmatism and moderation. In sum, party system change during the Left turn was driven by state crises but conditioned by the infrastructure of left-wing politics in each country in the early days of the post–Cold War era.

These alternative trajectories possessed disparate characteristics along three dimensions that likely conditioned how the concomitant inclusion-ary turn unfolded in each case: the institutionalization of major left-wing parties, state transformation through constitutional reform, and the level of state performance or capacity. The second part of the chapter discusses variation in these three characteristics, with two broad analytic goals in mind. First, this discussion helps us better consider the deeper roots of variation in the independent variables that might have shaped some of the inclusionary outcomes discussed in this book, particularly with respect to social policy and participatory innovations. To be clear, then, whereas

other chapters in this volume – for example those by Elkins, Garay, Mayka and Rich, and Etchemendy – focus on those inclusionary outcomes themselves, this chapter – much like that by Mazzuca – examines key variables that shaped those inclusionary outcomes and how variation in those key factors was generated. Second, this discussion helps highlight the central role of the state and its pathologies in both driving alternative paths of political development and in conditioning the politics of inclusion. By putting the emphasis on the state and its pathologies in this way, we can better consider not just the sources of sociopolitical exclusion but also the limits of sociopolitical inclusion.

PARTY SYSTEM VARIATION DURING SOUTH AMERICA'S LEFT TURN

South America experienced a consequential turn to the Left during the first decade of the twenty-first century, with parties or candidates of the Left winning office in eight of the region's ten largest countries (Cameron and Hershberg 2010; Weyland et al. 2010; Levitsky and Roberts 2011; Handlin 2017).[1] The Left turn unfolded quite differently across these eight countries, however, with party systems following three trajectories distinguished by their levels of polarization and whether or not outsiders played a significant role.

I conceptualize polarization as the left–right differentiation between component parties in a party system, viewed in terms of both distance (the spread of the distribution) and intensity (the willingness of opposing parties to compromise).[2] To measure distance, I adopt a commonly utilized approach that combines data on the strength of parties in the lower house of Congress and their ideological position on the left–right

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[1] This chapter, like the book to which it relates (Handlin 2017), focuses on these eight countries, leaving aside Argentina and Colombia. As discussed at greater length in that book, the rationale for the case selection was not that party system outcomes in Argentina and Colombia failed to conform of the predictions of the theory (which they largely do). Rather, these two cases possessed highly idiosyncratic features – respectively, the remarkably durable and amorphous Peronist movement and a civil war involving the Left – that powerfully conditioned how the Left turn unfolded, setting them off from the rest of the region. In sum, while these two cases exhibit the outcomes broadly predicted by the theory, they also serve as reminders of its limitations. These sorts of cases, and the limitations they suggest, should be openly acknowledged.

[2] This approach, considering both distance and intensity, follows that of Sartori (1976) and can be found in other works such as Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñan (2012).

TABLE 8.1 *Party system polarization in South America (c. 2010–2011)*

Country	Polarization (Distance)	Polarization (Intensity)	Polarization (Combined)	Highly Polarized
Ecuador	4.96	5.56	10.51	Yes
Venezuela	5.09	5.23	10.32	Yes
Bolivia	5.30	4.99	10.29	Yes
Chile	4.05	3.74	7.79	No
Peru	3.64	4.01	7.65	No
Uruguay	4.21	3.41	7.61	No
Paraguay	1.39	4.64	6.03	No
Brazil	2.43	3.54	5.97	No

spectrum.[3] To measure intensity, I draw upon a useful indicator from the Varieties of Democracy project, which captures the degree to which major political actors respect or do not respect the counter-arguments of their opponents.[4] These two dimensions were then rescaled to be of equal weight and added together to produce a combined polarization score. As Table 8.1 suggests, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela came to outpace all others in terms of polarization by the end of the new century's first decade.[5] This trio scored highest on both component measures of distance and intensity. On the aggregate measure, the gap between Bolivia, the third highest scoring country, and Chile, the fourth highest scoring country, was greater than the gap between Chile and Brazil, the lowest scoring country.

Party systems also differed substantially in terms of the rise of political outsiders, both in general and specifically on the Left. By outsiders, I mean viable presidential candidates who either possessed no prior background in politics or who possessed some political experience but ran outside

[3] I draw upon party ideology data from Baker and Greene (2011), who aggregated several previous data sources, leaning most heavily on Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2007). To calculate polarization, I use a common formula which takes the absolute deviation of the seven largest parties from the party system mean, weighs those values by the vote share of each party in the lower house, and sums those weighted values.

[4] To generate these measures, expert coders from the Varieties of Democracy project assign values to each country–year case with reference to an ordinal scale that captures different levels of respect or disrespect for counter-arguments in political discourse and contestation. I took those values and rescaled them from 0–6 to match the range of distance scale. For more information and discussion of all these choices, see Handlin (2017, 278–283).

[5] I present data circa 2010–2011 because by this point the Left turn had fully unfolded across the region. In many cases, new left parties and movements did not emerge until the second half of the decade.

TABLE 8.2 *Three party system trajectories*

Country	Highly Polarized	Outsiders Prominent
Ecuador	Yes	Yes
Venezuela	Yes	Yes
Bolivia	Yes	Yes
Paraguay	No	Yes
Peru	No	Yes
Uruguay	No	No
Chile	No	No
Brazil	No	No

established political parties.[6] Party systems in Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay were distinguished by the absence of political outsiders during the new century. In the other five countries, outsiders on the Left won the presidency in contexts where outsider candidacies had become an established phenomenon. In Venezuela, Chávez came to power in a 1998 election contested by two other outsiders, former beauty queen Irene Sáez and businessman Henrique Salas Römer. In Bolivia, Morales broke into national politics in the 2002 election and subsequently in 2005, continuing a trend toward outsider politics that had begun with Carlos Palenque and Max Fernández in the 1990s. In Ecuador, Rafael Correa came to power in 2006, following a series of other outsiders such as Abdalá Bucaram and Lucio Gutiérrez. In Peru, Ollanta Humala nearly won the presidency in 2006 and triumphed in 2011, continuing a pattern of outsider politics that had begun with the rise of Alberto Fujimori. And in Paraguay, "Bishop of the Poor" Fernando Lugo won the presidency in 2008, following the breakthrough outsider candidacy of businessman Pedro Fadul in the prior 2003 election.

Putting these two dimensions together, we can see three distinct party system trajectories during the Left turn (see Table 8.2). In Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, radical outsiders arose to contest power, raising the intensity of politics and presenting steep challenges to the neoliberal economic model favored by their competitors: With some variation, they implemented highly distributive and statist programs that Mazzuca (this volume) has insightfully termed "rentier populism." In Paraguay and Peru, pragmatic outsiders arose to contest power, introducing far less polarization into national party systems. And in Brazil, Chile, and

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[6] This definition is similar to that employed by Carreras (2012).

Uruguay, long-standing left parties that had moderated their programs came to power in the context of stable party systems.

EXPLAINING PARTY SYSTEM DIVERGENCE

The diversity of the Latin American Left in the new century, and attendant variation in party systems, has inspired a large set of research seeking to characterize and explain this variation, with the most prominent body of explanatory research focusing on economic variables related to neoliberalism, such as the success or failure of reforms, patterns of economic voting, the degree of social mobilization against neoliberalism, the effects of natural resource rents and endowments, or the particular political dynamics of market reform (Weyland 2003, 2009; Silva 2009; Madrid 2010; Roberts 2014). This section of the chapter summarizes a new political-institutional explanation for disparate trajectories of party system change, developed at more length elsewhere (Handlin 2017). The theory focuses on the occurrence of state crises and the strength of left-wing political infrastructure in the period between the end of the Cold War and each country's national left turn. State crises undermined established parties, including those on the Left, and created opportunities for political outsiders, particularly on the Left, to enter politics and construct new political movements and majorities. Whether left outsiders built movements that took highly radical and polarizing forms, however, depended on the institutional and political context in which they emerged, especially the existence of a robust infrastructure of left-wing political mobilization.

The section first discusses the two key variables (state crises and left political infrastructure), the scoring of these variables across cases, and their general role in the argument. The discussion then more explicitly shows how different combinations of these variables drove the three different party system trajectories described previously.

State Crises

Most South American states have long been plagued by severe pathologies. They struggle to provide basic services and public goods to large portions of their populations. Frequently, state agencies are rife with particularism and corruption, such that officials often prey on the populations they ostensibly serve. And these pathologies are notoriously uneven over both geographic and social terrain, such that the

consequences of state dysfunction are born disproportionately by less advantaged popular sector groups while political and economic elites enjoy privileged relationships with officialdom. As such, state pathologies color the lived experience of citizenship, contribute to various forms of social exclusion, and have been an important underlying driver of the inclusionary turn in the region (as Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar note in this volume's introductory chapter).

When these "objective" state pathologies are combined with a more "subjective" deficit of citizen confidence in basic state institutions and government in general, a "state crisis" – a concept borrowed from Guillermo O'Donnell (1993) – occurs. During the period between the late 1980s and the early years of the new century in South America, long-standing state pathologies flared into prolonged "state crises" across much of South America as this subjective element was added to the equation. Several factors were likely responsible for driving this latter subjective dimension of state crisis in the post–Cold War period. Democracy generated high – perhaps unrealistic – citizen expectations regarding what democratic governance could deliver while also opening up channels for shining greater light on the conduct of state officials. Economic hardship and the tumultuous politics of market reform fueled citizen discontent with state institutions and increased the salience of corruption scandals, as citizens experiencing tough times became particularly attuned to the malfeasance of the political class (Seawright 2012).

Five of the eight South American countries explored in this chapter (Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela) experienced prolonged state crises in the period between the end of the Cold War and the start of their own national Left turn. Three other countries avoided deep state crises, either possessing highly functioning states throughout the period and therefore never being threatened by crisis (Chile, Uruguay) or falling into crisis during the early 1990s but then experiencing significant improvements over time such that a prolonged crisis was avoided (Brazil). Table 8.3 displays data from two aggregate indices of state crisis, an "objective" measure that aggregates and averages three of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (rule of law, control of corruption, and government effectiveness) and a "subjective" measure that aggregates and averages measures of institutional confidence (in the judiciary, the police, and Congress) from the Latinobarómetro.[7] This table

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[7] The WGI indicators aggregate a wide variety of data sources on state performance. More information about data sources and aggregation techniques can be found at the WGI web

TABLE 8.3 *State crisis in South America before the Left turn*

Country	State Performance (Pre-Left Turn Average)	Confidence in Institutions (Pre–Left Turn Average)	Prolonged State Crisis?
Ecuador	–0.80	2.67	Yes
Venezuela	–0.85	3.18	Yes
Paraguay	–1.08	3.33	Yes
Bolivia	–0.50	2.76	Yes
Peru	–0.41	3.04	Yes
Brazil	–0.12	3.75	No
Uruguay	0.59	4.66	No
Chile	1.23	4.73	No

shows each country's average score on these indices in the period between 1995 or 1996 (when data is first available) and the year in which they elected a leftist executive. I then translate these quantitative scores into a more qualitative assessment of whether the country suffered or avoided a prolonged state crisis during this period.[8]

As discussed at greater length below, state crises greatly challenged established political parties and fueled the rise of political outsiders. This argument builds upon a variety of research that has examined aspects of state crisis and their impact on party politics. Scholars show that phenomena like corruption have tended to undermine party identification and lead to voter defection from established parties (Hawkins 2010; Seawright 2012; Chong et al. 2015). Other studies have demonstrated the close connection between the perceived legitimacy of political institutions or "state deficiencies" and the rise of political outsiders

site (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#doc) and a more in-depth discussion about the usage of this data can be found at Handlin (2017, 271–274).

[8] This translation is largely intuitive. Uruguay and Chile possessed highly capable states and mass publics that expressed high levels of confidence in state institutions. They clearly are nowhere near the threshold for state crisis. On the other side, Ecuador, Venezuela, Paraguay, Bolivia, and Peru were characterized by highly incapable states and populations that expressed low levels of confidence in state institutions. The trickiest case is that of Brazil, which lies in the middle of these groups. While this level of detail cannot be presented here, a closer look at the data for Brazil shows substantial change over time, with improvements in both objective levels of state capacity and subjective assessments of confidence in institutions. Brazil is therefore best considered a case in which a state crisis did occur in the late 1980s and early 1990s but, unlike in other countries in the region, the crisis was not prolonged. For a much more extensive discussion, see Handlin (2017, 105–109, 274–275).

(Mainwaring 2006). My work conceptualizes the syndrome more broadly, as a state crisis, and demonstrates how state crisis drove outsider politics on the Left during the early twenty-first century through two primary mechanisms. First, state crises undermined established left parties where they existed (such as LCR and MAS in Venezuela, FADI and PSE in Ecuador, and MIR and IU in Bolivia).[9] Second, state crises fueled the electoral campaigns and shaping the strategic direction of left outsiders.

I also depart from other research on this topic by emphasizing the role of state crisis in enabling political polarization. By their nature, state crises are conducive to high intensity clashes between outsiders promising to shake up the system and members of the political status quo threatened by the entrance of new actors. In fostering clashes along this systemic versus anti-systemic dimension of politics, however, state crisis also can enable polarization along other dimensions of contestation. When the electorate is upset enough with status quo parties and candidates, outsiders capitalizing on such discontent might still win elections while offering radical programmatic platforms that are themselves electorally suboptimal. Strategic choice by outsiders therefore likely depends on the nature of their own ideal points and their appetite for risk. But when would outsiders pick particularly radical and polarizing programs and when would they adopt more pragmatic strategies? Outsider coalition building hinged on a second key variable.

Left Infrastructure

The occurrence (or not) of deep state crisis in the post–Cold War period unfolded in countries that differed greatly in the robustness of the infrastructure of left-wing political mobilization they possessed as the 1990s began. This term primarily refers to political parties of the Left, defined as parties and movements with socialist or Marxist roots (or new parties founded by leaders and activists with those roots) that also possessed a

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[9] Importantly, this dynamic held even when left parties were not governing. State crises tended to inflame factional divisions among moderates and radicals within left parties in general, undermining the attempts of the former to decisively consolidate parties around a pragmatic, pro-systemic orientation while encouraging the latter to adopt even more hardline postures. Further, state crises often led voters to punish all parties perceived as part of the political status quo, not just those who had joined governing coalitions like Venezuela's MAS. This was especially true for parties that had significant legislative delegations and/or wielded real power by negotiating with coalition partners to hold important legislative posts, such as Venezuela's LCR and Ecuador's PS.

TABLE 8.4 *Left political infrastructure, post–Cold War democratic conditions*

Country	Left Party Vote Share	Very Strong Left-Wing Social Movements	Strong Left-Wing Infrastructure
Uruguay	25.6	No	Yes
Bolivia	24.7	Yes	Yes
Venezuela	24.3	No	Yes
Chile	22.3	No	Yes
Brazil	15.3	Yes	Yes
Ecuador	14.3	Yes	Yes
Paraguay	2	No	No
Peru (post-Fujimori)	<1	No	No

substantial programmatic commitment to the reduction of social and economic inequality.[10] This infrastructure can also be understood to encapsulate strong left-wing social movements that might have been important political actors if not (yet) participants in the electoral arena.

Table 8.4 shows the infrastructure of left-wing politics across the eight countries under study as the post–Cold War era began or, in the partially aberrant case of Peru, during the first extended period of post–Cold War democratic rule, after the Fujimori years (1990–2000), during which the Left was "virtually wiped off the map" (Cameron 2011, 376).[11] Left party vote share reflects the average of the total gained by the Left in the closest lower house elections before and after January 1, 1990. The presence of particularly strong left-wing social movements in the early 1990s is a more qualitative measure drawn from examination of the secondary literature. As we can see, there were six countries that began the post–Cold War era marked by relatively substantial infrastructures of

[10] This definition fuses two common criteria for defining the "Left," the former emphasizing a historical definition of the Left as possessing a socialist and/or Marxist origin and the latter emphasizing the programmatic content commonly associated with left-of-center parties. Notably, since we want the definition to encompass both radical and moderate parties of the Left, the extent to which parties emphasize the reduction of inequality can differ significantly within this definition, ranging from those who make huge changes to the status quo a centerpiece of their programs to those committed to only relatively marginal forms of redistribution.

[11] Note that the Peruvian experience was greatly different than that of countries like Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, where established left parties declined or fell apart during the 1990s but, in the context of democratic rule, this infrastructure was quickly reintegrated into new leftist parties and/or movements.

left-wing political mobilization (Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Venezuela), one country (Paraguay) in which the Left had made almost no inroads, and a final case (Peru) in which the Left was substantial during the 1980s, fell into turmoil by the end of the decade, and then was all but destroyed by a regionally anomalous period of authoritarian rule, such that it was virtually nonexistent once democracy returned and left outsiders could compete for the presidency.

Interactive Mechanisms and Trajectories of Change

The interaction of these two variables (occurrence or not of prolonged state crisis, presence or not of a robust infrastructure of left-wing politics) put into motion two mechanisms that shaped how the political left adapted and was incorporated into politics, setting party systems on different trajectories. The first mechanism related to the prospects of extant major left parties (if they existed) successfully entrenching themselves as major pro-systemic actors in the evolving party systems of the post–Cold War era. Where the political left was weak, major left parties did not exist almost by definition, so this mechanism was not relevant. Where such parties existed, however, the occurrence (or not) of state crises loomed large in determining their fates. Where a prolonged state crisis did not occur, established left parties had easier times consolidating positions as major pro-systemic actors, as they were not punished by the electorate for ownership of the state crisis and as the absence of state crisis tended to favor moderate factions who preferred to work within institutional channels to achieve partisan goals. Where state crisis struck, in contrast, major left parties attempting to consolidate such positions tended to break under the weight of voter rejection and factional strife.

The second mechanism related to whether or not conditions were propitious for political outsiders and the strategic landscape faced by outsiders on the Left. Where state crises did not occur, the political arena was essentially closed to the entrance of outsiders. Where state crises occurred, outsiders of various stripes emerged and challenged for power, including those on the Left. Whether the emergence of left outsiders was highly polarizing, however, rested on the strength of extant left-wing infrastructure and the coalitional logic it spawned. Where a strong infrastructure existed, left outsiders were incentivized to build new movements on the Left: They forged alliances with extant left parties, recruited advisors that were seasoned in left-wing political mobilization, and found allies in anti-neoliberal social movements. This coalitional dynamic

TABLE 8.5 *Mechanisms connecting explanatory variables to party system trajectories*

Explanatory Variable Combination	No State Crisis, Strong Left	State Crisis, Strong Left	State Crisis, Weak Left
Cases	Brazil, Chile, Uruguay	Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela	Paraguay, Peru
Fate of Extant Major Left Parties	Succeed	Fail	Do not exist
Coalitional Logic for Left Outsiders	Outsiders blocked	Build new movements on the Left	Forge alliances with centrist actors
New Party System Trajectory	Weakly polarizing, no outsiders	Highly polarizing, radical outsiders	Weakly polarizing, pragmatic outsiders

incentivized outsiders to embrace more radical economic positions and to take particularly harsh and confrontational anti-systemic stances. In contrast, where left infrastructure was weak, left outsiders had to court centrist parties and advisors in the search for allies and were consequently incentivized to attenuate their anti-systemic rhetoric and adopt more moderate economic policies.

The subsections below discuss briefly how these mechanisms played out more specifically across the three trajectories of party system development, summarized in Table 8.5.

No State Crisis, Strong Left Infrastructure. The first group of cases consists of those in which prolonged state crises were avoided and a strong infrastructure of left-wing politics existed as the post–Cold War era began. The complete absence of state crisis in Chile and Uruguay, or the avoidance of a prolonged state crisis in Brazil, put two mechanisms into motion.

A context without state crisis greatly buttressed the attempts of established major left parties – the Partido Socialista (PS) in Chile, the Frente Amplio (FA) in Uruguay, and the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) in Brazil – to successfully consolidate positions as major pro-systemic actors on the center-left during the period leading up to the Left turn in each country. Unlike elsewhere on the continent, major left parties in these countries were not punished by the electorate in the 1990s for pro-

systemic actions such as participating in governing coalitions or assuming positions of institutional power within legislatures and engaging in horse-trading with opponents. Rather, each party improved its legislative vote share and presidential prospects over time. Further, the absence of state crisis helped each party temper factional disputes and ultimately resolve them decisively in favor of moderate groups. As elsewhere on the continent, left parties entered the post–Cold War era deeply divided between radical factions seeking fundamental transformations to society and harsh confrontations with the neoliberal order, and moderate factions preferring pragmatic solutions and more incremental policy gains. In the absence of state crisis that might lead the electorate to reject status quo politics, moderates were able to win internal partisan battles within the PS, FA, and (more gradually) PT by arguing that pragmatic centrism offered the only viable path to electoral success (Luna 2007; Motta 2008; Hunter 2010).

The avoidance of prolonged state crisis in these three countries also created little room for the entrance of political outsiders. With states relatively functional and populations relatively confident in basic state institutions by regional standards, anti-systemic appeals had little attraction for electorates, depriving outsiders of their most basic strategies of mobilization. In Chile and Uruguay, where state crises never threatened, outsiders were essentially absent in presidential politics in the post–Cold War period. No outsider won enough of the vote to even play the spoiler in a presidential election in either country, much less to challenge for power, during the 1990–2015 period.[12] In Brazil, outsiders played prominent roles in the late 1980s and early 1990s as the country experienced a brief state crisis, but then disappeared from the political landscape after 1994 as institutional performance and public confidence in government improved.

The ascendance of the Left to power in this trio of countries – with the victories of Ricardo Lagos in Chile in 2000, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil in 2002, and Tabaré Vázquez in Uruguay in 2004 – helped consolidate weakly polarizing and relatively stable party systems in which

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[12] Marco Enríquez-Ominami, a former PS deputy and the son of a famous PS politician, won nearly 20% of the vote in the first round of Chile's 2009–2010 election while running as an independent. I do not count him as an outsider because he spent the first half of 2009 angling to run in the *Concertación* primaries and be the official candidate of the coalition, first under the banner of the PS and then as an independent. As such, his ultimate candidacy was not conducted as an outsider to the status quo but as an insider who had simply failed to secure the nomination he desired.

outsider politics played little role. The presence of these strong center-left parties ensured some level of programmatic competition: Perhaps most notably, in Brazil the PT played an important role in advancing programmatic politics in a context in which competitors were more likely to mobilize voters through clientelism and personalism (Mainwaring and Bizarro 2018). But the blocking of outsiders and the strong position of center-left parties committed to the rules of the game placed substantial limits on the level of polarization.

State Crisis, Strong Left Infrastructure. Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela also possessed strong infrastructures of left-wing politics as the Cold War began but experienced prolonged state crises, a combination that put them on a very different trajectory. Once again, two mechanisms were critical.

The occurrence of prolonged state crises severely undermined the attempts of extant left parties in these countries – MAS and LCR in Venezuela, MIR in Bolivia, and FADI and PS in Ecuador – to successfully consolidate positions as major partisan actors on the center-left during the 1990s. In each case, voters harshly punished left parties for pro-systemic activity, such that a familiar pattern emerged. Left parties in the late 1980s and 1990s ascended in popularity while they could credibly frame themselves as challengers to the political status quo. As soon as they became part of that status quo by either joining governing coalitions or wielding legislative power in opposition, however, voters turned on them and their electoral fortunes plummeted. Just as problematically, state crises also tended to inflame factional discord within the Left. Anti-systemic sentiment in the electorate emboldened radical factions, who believed that more confrontational strategies might find an audience, and undercut attempts by moderate pragmatists to consolidate control. In sharp contrast to the fates of left parties in the prior trio of cases, major left parties in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela all imploded under the weight of voter rejection and factional strife during the 1990s.

State crises also drove the rise of political outsiders in all three countries, including those on the Left. In Bolivia, outsider candidates first came to prominence in 1993. Eventually, Evo Morales and the MAS built a left-wing outsider movement that would challenge for power in 2002 and win the presidency in 2005. In Ecuador, presidential elections were dominated by outsiders from the mid-1990s until the victory of Rafael Correa and AP in 2006. And in Venezuela outsiders emerged in 1993 and then dominated the presidential election of 1998, in which Hugo Chávez and the MVR came to power. In all three cases, left outsiders rose to power

while employing a "doubly polarizing" strategy, which combined harsh indictments of the political status quo and calls for state reform (an overt politicization of the state crisis) with radical attacks on the neoliberal economic model.

The programmatic and strategic orientation of left outsiders in each case was shaped by the environment in which they built movements, especially the existence of a strong infrastructure of left-wing political mobilization. Left outsiders forged coalitions with extant left parties, made alliances with (or emerged from) anti-neoliberal social movements, and recruited experienced left-wing politicians and activists to run their campaigns and design their policy programs. In Venezuela, the initial orientation of Chávez and his Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario-200 was strongly shaped by their alliances and linkages with radical leftists in the 1980s. Subsequently, Chávez forged a coalition with the radical factions of LCR and MAS that provided his campaign with crucial organizational resources, recruited seasoned leftist politicians like Alberto Müller Rojas to manage his campaign, and relied upon other leftist intellectuals and politicians to design much of the program he presented for public consumption. In Ecuador, Correa recruited many different small leftist parties and social movements into his Alianza País coalition, which provided critical sources of organization support during the 2006 campaign (Larrea 2008, 129–130; de la Torre and Conaghan 2009). He also drew upon seasoned leftist advisors such as Alberto Acosta, Fander Falconí, and Ricardo Patiño to develop his program and guide his political strategy. In Bolivia, Evo Morales and the MAS emerged from social movements that themselves were deeply influenced by an influx of seasoned activists with backgrounds in the anti-neoliberal protests and leftist politics of the 1980s (Van Cott 2003a, 2005; Yashar 2005). Building the movement into one capable of winning majoritarian elections then required bringing a variety of other leftist intellectuals and politicians into the fold – perhaps most notably future vice-president Álvaro García Linera – who were given substantial influence over the party's program and strategy. In all three cases, then, the existence of a robust infrastructure of left-wing politics allowed outsiders to build movements on the Left, obviating the need to strike moderating deals with centrist allies and keeping movements tethered to more extreme policy orientations as radical left intellectuals and activists guided the strategic course.

The Left turn therefore saw the consolidation of highly polarizing party systems in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, with radical outsiders

on the Left coming to power and following through on mandates to transform states through constitutional reform. The arrival of the radical Left to power typically provoked strong reactions from opponents and counter-reactions from the new governments, but party systems eventually stabilized around a central cleavage that pitted the radical insurgents and the parties they constructed against a heterogeneous and often fragmented opposition.

State Crisis, Weak Left Infrastructure. The third set of cases featured prolonged state crises and left outsiders building movements in contexts bereft of left-wing political infrastructure. These conditions clearly characterized Paraguay, where left parties were non-factors in the party system that emerged in the 1990s after democratic transition. Peru represents a more complex, and partially aberrant, case. The country began to experience state crisis in the 1980s, a time when the Peruvian left was very strong by regional standards, led by Izquierda Unida (IU). At this point, political dynamics in Peru – including the rise of outsiders and the trouble that state crisis caused for IU – mirrored those in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. The harsh authoritarian rule of Alberto Fujimori, however, decimated the Peruvian left and effectively put the country on a different trajectory once democracy was restored, closer to that of Paraguay.

The combination of state crisis and a context bereft of left-wing infrastructure in Paraguay and Peru (post-Fujimori) fostered the rise of political outsiders but created a very different strategic logic of movement and coalition building on the Left. Outsiders first entered politics in Paraguay in 2003, with the emergence of businessman Pedro Fadul and the Unión Nacional de Ciudadanos Éticos (UNCE), a Colorado splinter faction led by controversial ex-general Lino Oviedo. The 2008 elections then saw the rise and triumph of Fernando Lugo, the former Bishop of San Pedro, who had risen to national prominence in early 2006 by leading a march of social movements on Asunción to protest the alleged corruption of the Duarte government and who had earned a strong reputation as the "bishop of the poor" owing to his longtime advocacy of land redistribution. In theory, Lugo could have adopted a highly polarizing strategy combining harsh anti-systemic denouncements of the political class and radical anti-neoliberal appeals. Yet the coalitional context strongly shaped and limited his options. Without leftist allies to form coalitions with and recruit into his movement, Lugo was forced to enter an alliance with the center-right PLRA to have a chance to win the 2008 election and to recruit a variety of centrist, established politicians into his government. This pragmatic approach did not prevent Lugo's enemies from conspiring

against him and eventually removing him from office on trumped-up impeachment charges. But the impeachment controversy should not distract us from the relatively moderate and pragmatic course that Lugo chose to take.

The experience of Ollanta Humala in Peru was ultimately similar. A former military officer from a leftist family background, Humala first emerged as a presidential contender in 2006 and initially tried to copy the Chávez playbook, combining anti-neoliberal politics with denouncements of the status quo and calls for state reform (Cameron 2007). Humala faced favorable conditions, confronting a weak field of opponents and running at a time when the radical Left was on the rise in the Andean region more generally. In a country bereft of left-wing political infrastructure, however, he faced severe limitations in building a political movement. He ended up running a dysfunctional campaign marked by several strategic gaffes, that lacked the support of significant parties beyond the tiny Unión por el Perú (UPP), and which had little articulation with left-wing social movements. At a time when radicals in Bolivia and Ecuador won presidential elections by 13 and 26 points, Humala lost by 5.5 in the second round runoff. In 2011, he learned from this experience and ran a very different campaign. Without leftist allies to draw upon, Humala adopted the pragmatism of Lugo, striking deals with establishment figures such as Alejandro Toledo and Mario Vargas Llosa to win their support and greatly moderating his platform, such that he would promise broad continuities with extant economic policies and give up his call for constitutional reform and state transformation (Cameron 2011; Levitsky 2011; Tanaka 2011).

The ascendance of left outsiders to power in Paraguay and Peru had very different implications for party system change than in the prior trio of cases. Rather than reorienting party systems in a highly polarizing direction along a radical left versus opposition cleavage, the presidencies of Lugo and Humala introduced relatively little change to party systems. Given the near total absence of left-wing alternatives at the presidential level prior to their rise, Lugo and Humala did increase programmatic competition in national party systems. But such polarization was curbed by the relatively pragmatic course taken by the two presidents. Further, dependent upon centrist parties for legislative majorities and pursuing limited goals with short time horizons, neither Lugo nor Humala invested significant resources in party building and institutionalizing their movement. As such, party systems remained relatively fluid and marked by low polarization in the aftermath of their presidencies.

IMPLICATIONS FOR INCLUSION

These three political trajectories differed in ways that had significant implications for the inclusionary turn in each country. The following discussion does not focus attention on inclusionary measures per se, a subject addressed at length by many other chapters in this volume. Rather, like Cameron's chapter, it highlights how longer-standing trajectories of political development (although much shorter than those considered by Cameron) entailed important characteristics that likely shaped different patterns of inclusion: whether the trajectory involved the emergence or further consolidation of an institutionalized major left-wing political party; whether the trajectory involved state transformation; and the quality of state performance in each country during the new century.

Left Party Institutionalization

One important difference across the three case categories involved the presence and institutionalization of major left-of-center parties. In the trio of Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, highly institutionalized left parties existed prior to the inclusionary turn and maintained a prominent place in party systems throughout. As such, these cases were marked by the most consistent presence of major left parties and the greatest degree of institutionalization of those parties. In Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, outsiders came to power and built parties – either from scratch or through consolidating extant but weak partisan vehicles – once in office. The transformational agendas and lengthy time horizons of these left outsiders provided incentives for party building to cement their rule while the intense polarization that attended their arrival also facilitated party building, with such searing conflicts helping forge strong partisan attachments among supporters (Levitsky et al. 2016). In this trio of cases, left parties still lacked high levels of formal institutionalization but came to possess real organizations and attracted high numbers of party identifiers. Finally, in Paraguay and Peru, the arrival of left outsiders to power did not yield meaningfully institutionalized left parties. With modest agendas and short time horizons, outsiders did not make the same investments in party building and lower levels of polarization were not conducive to the formation of such strong partisan attachments.

These differences in the presence and institutionalization of left parties had predictable consequences for the frequency with which the political

Left would hold the presidency during the inclusionary turn. Numerous scholars have pointed to the spread of left-wing government as a key factor in advancing inclusion, through extending social policies (Huber and Stephens 2012; Pribble 2013), supporting more generous social policy benefits (Garay 2016), developing participatory innovations promoting access (Goldfrank 2011), and pushing constitutional changes advancing recognition (Elkins, this volume). We should not overstate the case: As pointed out in this volume's introductory chapter, left governments were neither necessary nor sufficient for the introduction of substantively meaningful inclusionary policies. We can find instances of right-of-center governments pushing inclusionary policies and we can find examples of left governments that did little to advance inclusion, or at least certain dimensions of inclusion. Nevertheless, in aggregate, few would argue that left governments have been *more likely* than their competitors to promote inclusionary policies. Therefore, the degree of left government during the inclusionary turn overall – the proportion of years in which the Left governed – clearly bore on the extent of inclusion.

Where strong left parties existed from the start of the inclusionary turn, the Left was best positioned to win and retain power. During the inclusionary turn period (1999–2018), the Left held the presidency for fourteen years in Brazil, fifteen years in Chile, and fourteen years in Uruguay. Where left outsiders took power and invested heavily in institutionalizing their movements, the Left was also well positioned to hold the presidency for extended periods. Left governments ruled for twenty years in Venezuela, thirteen years in Bolivia, and twelve years in Ecuador. Both these political trajectories created conditions for left-wing dominance of presidential politics during the inclusionary turn period and, even where the Left eventually lost power as in Brazil and Chile, positioned the Left to be major players in politics well into the future.

The major contrast is with Paraguay and Peru. In these countries, left outsiders took longer to win power, due partly to the absence of a strong left-wing infrastructure on which they could build their movements. Just as importantly, since outsider presidents had little incentive to build and institutionalize political parties, their arrival to power did not set the Left up for future electoral successes. The Left held power for only four years in Paraguay (until Lugo's ouster) and five years in Peru. While other factors have likely played roles as well (low levels of social mobilization and institutional rules against presidential reelection, for example), the relatively short tenure of the Left in office likely helps explain why these

two countries have experienced less inclusion than the others, whether assessed in terms of resources, access, or recognition.

Needless to say, the absence of stable, reasonably institutionalized left-wing parties in these two countries may also dampen their prospects for future political inclusion. In Peru, Humala's Peruvian Nationalist Party completely collapsed in advance of the 2016 elections. The newly-founded Broad Front, a coalition of small left-wing parties led by Verónika Mendoza, surged to a surprising showing, winning twenty seats in Congress and with Mendoza just missing the runoff in the presidential election. A year later, however, the coalition split in half, with ten of the deputies leaving to form the new Peru party, now lead by Mendoza. The future of these parties and movements remains very much in doubt, especially in the context of Peru's extremely fluid party system. In Paraguay, Lugo's Patriotic Alliance for Change fell apart during his term, such that the Left had less institutionalized partisan representation after his impeachment than it had before his political ascendance. Two alliances of small leftist parties contested the 2013 elections, Avanza País and Frente Guasú. While the fracture left consolidated into the latter in 2018, its electoral fortunes were meager, winning only six seats in the Senate and none in the Chamber of Deputies. As in Peru, this new left-wing coalition lacks institutionalization and its future in the party system remains very uncertain.

State Transformation

Another important difference across cases trajectories with implications for inclusion was whether the Left turn involved state transformation. In the Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay trio and the Paraguay and Peru pair, left candidates came to power promising to work within the established institutional landscape. Left governments in all these countries could use common levers of power such as legislation or executive rulemaking to advance political inclusion. More broadly, however, inclusionary responses were bounded by political institutions and, most importantly, constitutions that were inherited by left governments. In contrast, left outsiders in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela came to power seeking sweeping mandates to transform the state. Each made the convocation of constituent assemblies to write new constitutions a centerpiece of their triumphant presidential campaigns. After arriving in power, each then set out to convene these assemblies, to push forward new constitutions, and, in so doing, to remake the institutional architecture of the state and recast

the formal basis of state–society relations. It should be stressed that the concept of state transformation is meant to capture precisely these kind of changes in the institutional design of the state, and the opening of that architecture to some degree of political contestation, not to entail the strengthening or weakening of the state and its capabilities.

Mandates for state transformation were intrinsically linked to outsiders building radical coalitions in the context of prolonged state crises. In each case, the push for a politics of state transformation came from influential advisors within the radical Left, who had developed such ideas in response to the state's pathologies. In Venezuela, the idea for a constituent process had been pushed since at least the late 1980s by the radical factions of *La Causa R*, as well as radical leftists who played key roles in the formation of Chávez's political worldview during this period, such as Kléber Ramírez (Ramírez 1991; Medina 1992). In Bolivia, influential MAS theoretician and future vice-president Álvaro García Linera overtly advanced the notion of a "state crisis" that the party needed to address and convoked a working group of MASista intellectuals to develop proposals for a constituent process in the years before Morales won power (Llorenti Soliz 2004; Harten 2011, 138). In Ecuador, the idea of running on a platform of radical constitutional reform was pushed heavily by left-wing advisors to Correa who had been involved with the prior constitutional reform process of the late 1990s (Handlin 2017, 196–197). In sum, these radical processes of state transformation occurred where two conditions coincided: state crises that fueled demand for state reform, and processes of outsider coalition building that privileged radical elements of the Left who were long-standing proponents of the use of constituent assemblies to advance transformative change. Where state crises occurred but outsider coalitions took more pragmatic forms, as in Paraguay and Peru, state transformation did not occur. And where prolonged state crises did not occur at all in the 1990s, as in Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay, constituent assemblies were off the table completely.

State transformation via constitutional reform relaxed the institutional constraints faced by left presidents and created more open-ended possibilities for the pursuit of political inclusion on parchment. Such processes were particularly relevant for advancing two dimensions of inclusion as conceptualized in the introductory chapter in this volume, the recognition of previously underrepresented groups and the granting of new channels of access that enhance popular participation. Regarding recognition, new constitutions recognized the rights of a variety of previously minority groups, most notably women and indigenous populations (Van Cott

2003b; Segura and Bejarano 2004; Cameron and Sharpe 2010). Elkins's (this volume) quantitative comparison of Bolivarian constitutions with past Latin American constitutions demonstrates just how much the new documents expanded their "rights portfolios." In Bolivia and Ecuador, these new constitutions also explicitly characterized the state as plurinational, a major demand of indigenous groups that fundamentally reframed what it meant to be Bolivian or Ecuadorian (Becker 2011). Regarding access, Bolivarian constitutions enshrined new forms of direct democracy, such as referenda, the ability to recall officials, and/or citizen legislative petitions (Elkins, this volume). They also placed emphasis on the importance of participatory democracy, establishing the constitutional basis for the creation of local institutions of participation and governance (García Guadilla and Hurtado 2000; Schilling-Vacaflor 2011; see also Goldfrank, and Mayka and Rich, this volume). Evidence suggests that levels of participatory democracy – at least as captured in indicators from the Varieties of Democracy project – increased in the aftermath of constitution making (Stoyan 2018).

The politics of state transformation also had negative implications for inclusion. In each case, a newly elected government steamrolled its opposition to push through constitutional reform, bending or breaking laws and norms governing constitutional change in the process (Coppedge 2002; Lehoucq 2008; Madrid 2012; Basabe-Serrano and Martínez 2014; De La Torre 2014; Handlin 2017). Therefore, while state transformation created new possibilities for the expansion of inclusion on parchment, it also established precedents of political exclusion in practice. This tension between formally inclusionary politics (particularly vis-à-vis previously under-recognized social and ethnic groups) and informally exclusionary practice (particularly vis-à-vis the political opposition) continued to characterize each of these three cases, with variation across cases in the degree of the latter. The key overall point for present purposes is that state transformation differentiated these three countries from the others in terms of how the inclusionary turn proceeded and was intrinsically tied to state crises occurring in contexts where outsiders were incentivized to build radical coalitions on the Left.

State Performance

A final consequential difference across the three trajectories involved state performance, or the objective side of state crisis discussed previously in the chapter. As suggested by Figure 8.1, state performance remained

Note: Data for 2001 is not available. Worldwide Governance Indicators produced annual data starting in 2002. Prior to that, data was collected every other year.

FIGURE 8.1 State performance during inclusionary turn

broadly stable across South America during the inclusionary turn, even in those countries where state crises had catalyzed the rise of outsiders promising to refound states and reorder state–society relations. Chile and Uruguay, blessed with the most capable states by far, maintained that status. Brazil retained its position as the next most functional state during the 2000s, and then saw a subsequent decline that under the weight of the corruption scandal the "*Lava Jato*" investigation has been uncovering. Those countries that experienced prolonged state crises prior to the inclusionary turn continued to possess dysfunctional states. There were a few minor changes within this category: State performance plummeted even further in Venezuela and improved somewhat in Ecuador and Paraguay over time. Overall, however, the picture is one of relative stability.[13]

State performance may have multiple and complex implications for inclusion. Poorly functioning states tend to generate mass demand for inclusion. Frustration with poorly functioning states may fuel calls for the advent of participatory innovations in local governance. Treatment by

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[13] State performance in Colombia, one of the two major South American countries I do not analyze closely, did improve somewhat over the inclusionary turn, from a score of –0.56 in 2000 to a score of 0.21 in 2015.

state officials of minority groups as second-class citizens may drive calls for the constitutional recognition of the rights of ethnic minorities and plurinational communities. And popular demand for at least some redistributive policies may be partially driven by states' ineffectiveness in delivering these services. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that political movements enunciating particularly radical demands for inclusion have tended to emerge in cases where states were highly dysfunctional, such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. As the experiences of Paraguay and Peru show, however, state dysfunction is not sufficient for this kind of radical inclusionary politics.

Yet poorly functioning states may also limit or condition the ability of politicians to effectively meet these demands. While political actors may introduce bills or constitutional amendments to advance the recognition of previously marginalized groups, state officials may continue to discriminate against those groups in practice. Politicians may launch initiatives to increase access and foster citizen participation, but those institutional innovations may function poorly and be prone to particularism. Finally, legislatures may allocate resources to enhance social policies and improve infrastructure for the poor, but the impact of such initiatives will be blunted if many of the resources do not reach the intended target populations due to corruption or lack of state capacity. In sum, poor state performance is an important factor maintaining the "parchment–practice gap" that Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar highlight in the introductory chapter of this volume. These harsh realities have been most evident in the case of Venezuela. While initiatives to expand inclusion were particularly ambitious, the most central of them – including both social programs such as the Bolivarian Missions and participatory governance initiatives such as the Communal Councils – have been badly undermined by poor state performance (even before the country's recent economic implosion), which fostered cronyism, inefficiency, and poor policy implementation.

Considered together, these implications of state performance suggest sobering conclusions. Where states are highly functional (Chile and Uruguay, to a lesser degree Brazil), we might imagine the political salience of inclusion fading over time, as state pathologies provide only limited fuel for inclusionary demands and those policies enacted to address inclusionary deficits – such as conditional cash transfer programs and reforms in the health sector – are implemented on sturdy institutional foundations. In the majority of South American countries with much more dysfunctional states, however, battles over inclusion are likely to stretch far into the future: State weakness, which thus far governments

have proven relatively incapable of changing, will continue to fuel exclusionary practices and thus demands for inclusion. Yet policy initiatives to further inclusion will be prone to being undermined by the weak institutional foundations on which they are constructed.

Summary

We can put these three characteristics together to form a more composite picture of how cases differed along dimensions that might have shaped the politics of inclusion. Since many other variables also plausibly influenced the nature and dynamics of inclusion, we should not expect that cases with similar characteristics would all have the same inclusionary outcomes. Yet examining these different variable constellations may still help us think about variation in inclusion across South America.

Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay were marked by a pattern of steady *technocratic incrementalism*. Highly institutionalized left parties competed vigorously for the presidency from the beginning of the inclusionary turn and dominated presidential politics after their initial victories. The specific degree to which social policies were expanded in terms of resource allocation was conditional on other factors, like the nature of competition for outsiders and degree of social mobilization (Garay 2016). But the presence of a strong institutionalized left party guaranteed that at least some meaningful level of expansion would occur. The extent of inclusionary innovations in terms of access and recognition, on the other hand, was limited by the fact that state transformation and fundamental changes to the institutional environment were never on the table. Finally, in the context of highly functional states (less so in Brazil), inclusionary policies were implemented on relatively strong state foundations and were therefore more likely to operate efficiently.

Paraguay and Peru were marked by a pattern of *limited progress on shaky foundations*. The weakness of the political Left as the inclusionary turn began, and the lack of commitment of left outsiders to investing in party building, meant that the Left would control the presidency for only a handful of years, such that the push for inclusionary measures would be less consistent and more reliant on non-left parties and politicians. While other factors may also have played a role, the brief tenure of left-wing governments in aggregate surely contributed to the relatively low levels of inclusion in terms of resources. Meanwhile, the pragmatism of left outsiders ruled out truly transformative inclusionary measures when they did

hold office. Finally, poorly performing states provided dubious foundations for inclusionary initiatives, threatening their long-term viability.

The last composite pattern, evident in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, might be termed *transformative inclusion on shaky foundations*. Left outsiders invested in party building to better carry out their long-term agendas, such that their victories were followed by long sustained periods of holding the presidency. State transformation through constitutional reform greatly broadened the possibilities for advancing inclusion, especially in the realms of recognition and access. But poor state performance raised threats to the successful implementation of these new inclusionary measures, a dynamic especially evident in Venezuela, such that the parchment–practice gap was likely to become particularly wide in this trio of cases.

CONCLUSION

The inclusionary turn in South America unfolded in countries whose party systems were moving on highly variant paths of development. This chapter first summarized an argument, developed at greater length elsewhere, for explaining party system variation in the region during this period. The latter part of the chapter then made the case that divergent party system trajectories possessed characteristics that were likely to be greatly consequential in shaping the dynamics of inclusion. The pathologies of weak states and the political Left represent two common denominators between these discussions. Party system variation was driven by the occurrence (or not) of state crises and the strength of left-wing political infrastructure in each country as the Cold War came to an end, which together conditioned how the Left would be integrated into and transform national party systems. In turn, resultant party system trajectories possessed characteristics likely to condition how inclusion occurred, differing in the institutionalization of left parties (with logical implications for the likelihood of left-wing government), the occurrence of state transformation through constitutional reform, and levels of state capacity.

The complex relationships between state pathologies and the politics of inclusion suggest several general points to draw for this research agenda. As outlined in this volume's introductory chapter, the inclusionary turn was spawned by the coexistence of enduring democracy and deeply exclusionary contextual conditions, especially multidimensional social, political, and economic inequalities. But we should not view the politics of inclusion solely through the simplistic lens of the public voicing

demands that elected officials have incentives to satisfy. Rather, a more realistic – and, admittedly, pessimistic – perspective would emphasize the inability of elected officials to remedy drivers of dissatisfaction like state pathologies, the ways in which these root causes of exclusion often undermine inclusionary initiatives and widen the parchment–practice gap, and the tendency of mass dissatisfaction with state pathologies to disrupt the party-institutional foundations of representation and accountability, arguably making sustainable solutions to social exclusion less likely.

As such, it may not be appropriate to view the inclusionary turn as a delimited epoch in Latin American political development, as scholars often view the neoliberal reform period, the Left turn, or, more distantly, the first incorporation. Rather, the inclusionary turn is marked by an ongoing set of sociopolitical dynamics and processes that are temporally indeterminate. Deep sources of grievance and dysfunctional state institutions are locked in a relationship that is more likely to be self-reinforcing than to end in the elimination or amelioration of the former. It is therefore unclear how, when, or why the inclusionary turn in Latin America might come to a close. But its dynamics and dysfunction will be critical to understanding regional politics well into the twenty-first century.

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