

LOBBYING REGULATION AND UNINTENDED  
CONSEQUENCES OF INTEREST  
GROUP INFLUENCE

By

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CONSEQUENCES OF INTEREST  
GROUP INFLUENCE

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Title of Study: LOBBYING REGULATIONS AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES  
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Abstract: This paper studies and analyzes the effects of lobbying and campaign finance regulations on interest group influence in state legislatures. The conventional wisdom supports the belief that lobbying regulations lead to decreased interest group influence. However, this may not be the case; there is some evidence that lobbying regulations may increase interest group influence rather than decrease it. To test these conflicting findings, I utilize the theory of punctuated equilibrium to claim that interest group mobilization is the missing link between these studies. I only end up finding partial support for my theory. Specifically, I find two independent effects. While interest group mobilization does not mediate for lobbying regulations and interest group influence, I do find evidence that interest group mobilization increases interest group influence in the short term. I also find that lobbying regulations increase interest group influence, which is contrary to conventional wisdom. These findings show that more research is needed to fully understand the effects of lobbying regulations on interest group influence in state legislatures. If interest group mobilization is not the cause of rising influence, then there may be some other factors that scholars should consider when studying this in the future.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

'Lobbying has been around as long as our form of government... Unfortunately, with big business starting to control more and more of our form of government, the people... are up against huge moneyed interests' (Darlington 2017). This statement comes from Carla Miller, the Ethics Director for the city of Jacksonville, Florida. Along with many other lawmakers, she has taken a hard stance against interest groups buying influence in the policymaking process. Steve Hamm, the former Ethics Commission Director of South Carolina, said that lobbying regulations give policymakers an idea of 'who's in the room, more importantly, why they're in the room, and what position they might be intending to advance, slow down, or stop' (Darlington 2017). He even went on to say that we 'all like to talk about transparency in our government. Lobbying registration and disclosure laws are an integral part of that, and we ought to be encouraging it. It serves *everybody's* interest' [emphasis added] (Darlington 2017). These quotes provide opposing perspectives about lobbying regulations and campaign finance laws. These officials believe that lobbying regulations benefit everyone involved in politics and that they are effective at limiting how much influence interest groups and lobbyists have in the policymaking process.

However, while scholars have meticulously examined the effectiveness of lobbying regulations, the research results are mixed. For an extended time, scholars agreed

these regulations were successful at increasing transparency in the policymaking process, increasing trust in our institutions, and limiting interest group influence (Flavin 2015; Flavin and Franko 2016; Kanol 2017; Newmark 2005; Ozymy 2010; Rosenthal 2015; Witko 2017). Nevertheless, studies have also found evidence that lobbying regulations and campaign finance laws do not limit interest group influence as successfully as scholars initially believed (Crepaz 2020; Ozymy 2013; Garlick 2016; Massengill 2019; Strickland 2018).

This uncertainty in the literature presents a puzzle about lobbying regulations and campaign finance laws effectiveness: *despite increased regulations on lobbying and campaign finance, why does interest group influence in statehouses persist?* By asking *why* influence persists, I seek to understand the factors that contribute to the different findings in the literature. To be clear, I am not implying these laws were ever enacted to stop interest group influence entirely. Thus, answering this question will help clarify and, if needed, reconsider the conclusions that we draw about the effectiveness of these laws.

I argue that lobbying regulations increase interest group influence overtime via interest group mobilization. As interest groups experience increased regulation from state legislatures, they feel pressure to mobilize to defend their interests. Thus, laws that were initially enacted to improve our democratic system may exacerbate the unequal representation of interest before state government. As mobilization increases due to increased regulation, I also expect interest group influence to increase. I believe interest group mobilization is the key factor missing from the literature that helps clarify the unintended effects of lobbying regulations on interest group influence.

Studying this research question is essential because it provides scholars insight into how interest groups respond when regulated. We tend to think of interest groups as mobilizing in response to policy threats (Truman 1971). However, increased regulation could be viewed as a threat to interest groups' ability to represent their interests before the government. Despite the

goal of limiting influence, the threat of increased regulation could be the catalyst for increased mobilization and, therefore, increased influence.

Studying this question is also essential because it provides insight that policymakers should consider when thinking about future lobbying regulations and campaign finance reforms. For example, Strickland (2018) argues that states should either regulate the campaign finance activities of organized groups more closely or make them disclose their lobbying activities with more transparency, but not both (Strickland 2018) since groups will cooperate until they feel overburdened by regulations. The findings of this study help explain why Strickland's (2018) recommendation may make sense for states to reevaluate their implementation of lobbying regulations.

Ultimately, there are three main contributions that I can make to the current findings in the literature. First, I attempt to identify a mediating mechanism for why lobbying regulations may increase interest group influence. Second, I combine updated measures of lobbying regulations and group mobilization across three different policies to provide the most comprehensive test of the effect of lobbying regulations on interest group influence to date. Third, I find independent and positive effects of lobbying regulations on interest group influence and mobilization's effect on interest group influence.

## CHAPTER II

### KEY CONCEPTS

Before reviewing different aspects of the literature, I want to clarify the definitions and concepts that I will discuss in the following sections. While there are many different definitions of *lobbying* in the political science literature, they all pertain to lobbyists' efforts to influence government officials or influence policy outcomes (Berg 2009). Specifically, Zorack (1990) defines *lobbying* as "the right of any citizen or interest group to petition government or Congress and provide information designed to influence the passage or defeat of any legislation of the United States" (24). This definition is helpful because it describes the actors involved in lobbying, the goals of a lobbyist, and how they might go about it in the policymaking process. Throughout this paper, I think about *lobbying* with this mindset.

Additionally, I often reference actors, like *interest groups*, as *lobbyists* themselves. For this paper, I apply Nownes' (2013) definition of *interest groups*, which he defines as "any non-party organization involved in political activity." Notice that this definition does not even mention any sort of lobbying behavior. This is because not all interest groups lobby, nor are all lobbyists specifically part of interest groups. They can often be separate but closely related things. Interest groups can lobby, for example, or they can hire lobbyists to represent their

interests on their behalf (Arroyo et al. 2002; Berg 2009). However, throughout this paper, I refer to interest groups when I refer to *lobbyists* or *lobbying behavior* unless otherwise stated. I take this approach because I am interested in looking at the effect that lobbying regulations have on overall interest group influence in the policymaking process.<sup>1</sup>

Finally, some laws are passed by state and federal government to regulate lobbying behaviors, provide transparency and increase public trust (Newmark 2005; Witko 2005). These laws are called *lobbying regulations* because they regulate what defines a lobbyist, the types of activities that lobbyists are allowed to do, and how often lobbyists have to register and report their activities to the state government (Newmark 2005). However, like lobbying regulations, there are also *campaign finance regulations*. These laws are similar to lobbying regulations in that they create requirements for reporting and disclosure of activities, assess campaign spending limits and public financing provisions, and assess campaign contribution limits (Witko 2005). Both of these terms will be discussed throughout the rest of the paper. While I do not ever make lobbying and campaign finance regulations interchangeable or synonymous, there are some places in the literature where I discuss them together because they are so similar in their methodological approach to measurement. We can take insights from both types of regulations when viewed in context with each other.

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<sup>1</sup> To be clear, *any* groups involved in the legislative process experience regulations and checks on their political activities. Thus, even though interest groups may not necessarily lobby or concern themselves with lobbying activities, any actions they make to sway political influence will be regulated by lobbying regulations.

## CHAPTER III

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### ***OVERVIEW OF LOBBYING AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATIONS***


Because there are different regulation approaches, some states have more stringent lobbying regulations than others. Despite the differences and effects they have on policy, there are three critical dimensions of lobbying regulations that scholars need to be mindful of these laws: these dimensions include gift bans, prohibited activities, and disclosure requirements (Newmark 2005)<sup>2</sup>. Newmark (2005) has identified eighteen different activities that fall under these three main categories of regulation. For example, many states have enacted laws that ban *any* expenditures that could be used for a legislator’s benefit, including lodging, transportation, entertainment, food, meals, beverages, contributions, or anything else of monetary value (“Lobbying: General Information”). These rules often apply to even something as cheap as a cup of coffee (Garrahan 2016)! South Carolina, one of the states that used to have the least restrictive

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<sup>2</sup> Adam Newmark (2005) laid the foundation for many scholars studying lobbying regulations today with his Newmark Index. This index examines how lobbying regulations vary across states and over time. His index provides This is a measure to test how these regulations impact the lobbyist-legislator relationship. Regulations included are gift bans, prohibited activities, and disclosure requirements. There is a total of 18 different regulations in his index, and each state receives a score of 0 – 18.

lobbying regulations now have some of the most extensive measures (Newmark 2005). The maps in Figures<sup>3</sup> 1.1 and 1.2 below illustrate these changes.

*Figure 1. Lobbying Regulation Stringency (1990-2003)*



Additionally, there are similar approaches to how scholars have studied campaign finance laws. Lobbyists have to be mindful of three main dimensions of campaign finance laws: campaign contribution limits, spending limits/public financing, and disclosure requirements (Witko 2005). Like Newmark, Witko (2005) creates an index with a total of twenty-two possible points. His analysis is eventually expanded by Kulesza, Witko, and Waltenburg (2016). They ultimately show that most states have increased their regulation stringency, but only at an incremental rate. You can see this represented in Figures<sup>4</sup> 2.1 & 2.2 below.


The authors also note that a significant change in reform was often due to a recent campaign contribution scandal (Kulesza, Witko, and Waltenburg 2016). Thus, it would make sense that states would try to enforce legislation that countered these efforts. In some cases, like Oregon and New Hampshire, the courts deemed state legislatures went too far in their campaign

<sup>3</sup> Figures 1.1 & 1.2 visualize the data from Newmark's (2005) Index on Lobbying Regulations. The data for the years 1990-1991 and 2003 is provided in columns in Table 1 of his data (p. 186).

<sup>4</sup> Figures 2.1 & 2.2 are similar to the figures found within Kulesza, Witko & Waltenburg's (2016) study on campaign finance regulations. The data for these figures comes from these authors, but I adapted the scale to look similar to my shading scheme for Newmark (2005). This makes the four figures more comparable.

finance reforms and mandated the courts overrule some of their restrictions (Kulesza, Witko, and Waltenburg 2016). Besides the incremental approach to campaign finance law, this is the main factor the authors believe contributed to the modest change in reform (Kulesza, Witko, and Waltenburg 2016). This applies to both the efforts made by the state courts as well as the United States Supreme Court.

*Figure 2. Campaign Finance Regulation Stringency (1992-2012)*



Both types of regulations, then, have had interesting histories over the last twenty years. States have gone through many changes, and some have gone through more than others. States have had the opportunity to experiment and try different methods of lobbying and campaign finance regulations. As a result, there have been many different regulation approaches, which have created unintended consequences, specifically regarding interest group influence and mobilization. I first discuss original intentions regarding these laws and then provide an overview of why the original intentions do not match up with the results.



## ***ORIGINAL INTENTIONS OF LOBBYING REGULATIONS***

Lobbying regulations and campaign finance laws have been actively implemented in the United States since the 1990s with the primary goal of trying to limit interest group influence in the policymaking process (Newmark 2005; Rosenthal 2015). Scholars like Lowi (1979) and Truman (1971) discussed the theoretical implications of interest group influence on policy. Lowi (1979) has a more negative view than Truman (1971), believing that interest groups have been too involved in the policymaking process. He believes this was preventing Congress and state legislatures from operating with institutional autonomy. Truman (1971) has a more neutral view of interest groups and discusses the importance of pluralism and representation in politics. When there are many interests wanting representation, it is only natural that many voices are vying for influence. Thus, it is easy to see why Congress and the state legislatures would have felt the need to regulate groups, limiting their scope and their methods of influence.

Lobbying regulations were not just enacted to limit interest group influence on policy, however. The very nature of representation involves Members of Congress and state legislators listening to the voices of their constituents, and by extension, their interests. Thus, lobbying regulations were also enacted to promote fairness and equality in representation (Flavin 2015; Newmark 2005; Rosenthal 2015). This is particularly important because there is evidence that the elite and members of the business community are more likely to have their voices heard than other constituents (Flavin & Franko 2016; Gilens 2012; Witko 2017).

If, however, these laws can successfully promote equality and representation in the policymaking process, it may go a long way in restoring citizens' faith and trust in our political system. This is another reason these laws were enacted (Newmark 2005; Kanol 2017). Suppose they provide transparency and accountability on interest groups. In that case, they should restore some faith in our public officials to regulate how much influence interest groups have and who gains access to politics. Kanol (2017) examines this relationship more closely, wanting to know if knowledge of lobbying regulations curbs perceptions of political corruption and increases

citizens' trust in politicians<sup>5</sup>. Interestingly, he finds a difference between “trust” and “perception.” Only when lobbyists fully disclose their activities is there a substantive increase in trust (Kanol 2017). In some cases, the perception of political corruption can be altered significantly with only partial disclosure, but full disclosure must be a substantive difference. Despite the mixed findings, Kanol (2017) shows that lobbying regulations may help increase the public's faith and trust in our institutions.

Therefore, lobbying regulations appear to be driven by public officials' desire to curb excessive influence, promote equality, and increase public trust. Yet, there is disagreement on whether lobbying regulations have successfully limit how much influence groups have on policy.

### ***FINDINGS IN SUPPORT OF ORIGINAL INTENTIONS***

A few key findings in previous literature support the effectiveness of lobbying regulations and campaign finance laws at achieving their goals. One of these findings is that lobbying regulations and campaign finance laws can mitigate interest group influence and biases towards certain groups in the policymaking process (Ozmy 2010; Flavin 2015; Flavin & Franko 2016; Witko 2017). This literature suggests that lobbying regulations and campaign finance laws provided a check on groups' power and influence.

Concerning lobbying regulations specifically, Ozmy (2010) found that as lobbying regulation stringency increased, interest group influence in US state legislatures decreased<sup>6</sup>.

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<sup>5</sup> Previous studies have shown that citizens' trust in public officials has been steadily declining over the last 20 years (Kettl 2018; “Distrust in America Viewed” 2020). Some of the reasons for this include government performance, party polarization, and leadership behavior.

<sup>6</sup> Ozmy's (2010) findings should be examined more closely. Specifically, I question the reliability of his results. His sole measure of interest group "influence" was based on the opinions of survey respondents. He asked respondents (staffers who served in US State Legislatures during the 1993-1994 legislative sessions) to rate how they believed interest group influence was affected since lobbying regulations had been implemented in 1990. I take issue with this operationalization of influence because over fifteen years had passed since these staffers had served during that legislative session, which brings up questions regarding the reliability of the results through recall bias

Ozmy's (2010) findings are important because it backs up previous authors' claims (Newmark 2005) about the impact of lobbying regulations on interest group influence. Before this point, there was more speculation and gesture, particularly among politicians. Ozmy (2010) extended Newmark's (2005) Regulation Stringency Index and provided validity to it and other policymakers' claims about the benefits of lobbying regulations.

Additionally, scholars have found evidence that campaign finance laws can help mitigate concerns that interest groups can buy influence in the policymaking process (Flavin 2015; Flavin & Franco 2016; Witko 2017). These authors, especially Flavin (2015), have found evidence that when campaign finance laws place limits on campaign contribution limits, it can successfully mitigate opportunities for legislators to feel they need to "pay back" their campaign donors by providing special attention to their interests (Flavin 2015). This finding is important, not only because it provides a check on representation but because it means there could also be more equitable policy outcomes for different peoples and groups.

Suppose this set of findings best describes the effect of lobbying regulations on interest group influence. In that case, it will make sense that lobbying regulations and campaign finance laws have shown to increase public faith and trust in the democratic process (Kanol 2017). However, other research shows that groups have been able to get around these regulations through group mobilization (Crepaz 2020; Ozmy 2013). There is also evidence that lobbying regulations have silenced certain groups entirely, like nonprofit organizations (Berry and Aarons 2005).<sup>7</sup> These findings contradict previous research and point to potential flaws that may be present in their studies.

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<sup>7</sup> Under federal law, 501(c) organizations have to follow a strict set of federal guidelines. For example, 5013(c)(3) organizations are prohibited from excessive lobbying, campaigning, or participating in any other similar types of political activity; otherwise, they risk losing their tax-exempt status ("Center for Nonprofits").

## ***THE IMPACT OF MOBILIZATION ON GROUP INFLUENCE***

Despite studies that show that lobbying regulations and campaign finance laws mitigate interest group influence, there are also contradictory findings in the literature. For example, in his 2013 piece, Ozymy (2013) wanted to expand on the literature and offer explanations for *how* state legislatures overcame the mobilization of interest groups to pass more restrictive lobbying regulations. He notes that political environments, especially in the wake of a campaign finance scandal, are one way this can happen. However, he concludes that group mobilization is often able to overcome political pressure in legislatures to mitigate the passage of more stringent lobbying regulations and campaign finance laws. This finding is interesting because it seems to go against previous works, like Ozymy's (2010) piece that discussed the effectiveness of lobbying regulations in mitigating group influence.

Moreover, research shows that groups benefit from working with political parties, and groups may even feel like they have to as a result of increased regulation (Crepaz 2020). More specifically, Crepaz (2020) wants to know *how* parties and groups work together to get around lobbying regulations. She shows that when groups are mobilized and seek the help of political parties – see Schattschneider (1960)<sup>8</sup> – not only are they much more likely to get around lobbying regulations to achieve their policy goals, but groups are also benefitted by doing it. Thus, it is a mutually beneficial relationship, and it makes sense that they would take advantage of this opportunity. It also helps legislators, not just groups, get things accomplished in the face of added political pressure.

Therefore, mobilization appears to have an impact on group influence. These findings contradict things found in the original literature. While regulation appears to be successful, the laws are supposed to help reduce bias and increase public trust in the democratic process (Flavin

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<sup>8</sup> Schattschneider (1960) argues that elites encourage groups to mobilize and join their electoral coalition (which is an argument against pure pluralism).

2015; Flavin and Frank 2016; Kulesza, Witko and Walternburg 2016; Ozymy 2010; Witko 2017). However, added regulations decrease cooperation and group registration with state governments (Strickland 2018). It also appears that these laws mobilize groups and push them to seek new avenues to exert their influence (Crepaz 2020; Garlick 2016; Massengill 2019; Ozymy 2013; Strickland 2018), which may help groups overcome the status quo (Enns et al. 2014).

Despite the conflicting findings, I believe it is possible that lobbying regulations and campaign finance laws can temporarily mitigate group influence while also pushing groups to mobilize, leading to their long-term influence. In this way, the literature is not inconsistent so much as incomplete.

## CHAPTER IV

### THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Lobbying regulations are supposed to provide transparency and increase public trust in the policymaking process (Darlington 2017; Flavin 2015; Nemark 2005; Rosenthal 2015; Ozymy 2010). It is possible that, instead of increasing transparency and trust, policymakers are not anticipating the impact that these laws have on interest group cooperation with the law (Strickland 2018). Evidence shows that overregulation can negatively impact interest group cooperation, especially about obeying registration and reporting requirements (Strickland 2018). Thus, it may be true that lobbying regulations are doing more harm than good in that they are becoming contributors to group influence rather than tools used to increasing transparency and trust.

These considerations are important because they point toward punctuated equilibrium to explain what happens to the interest group community when new regulations are imposed. Lobbying regulations could be spurring interest group mobilization. If so, they may be pushing groups to feel the need to lobby and mobilize to protect their interests in ways they did not feel previously necessary. This increase in pressure to invoke collective action is consistent with Truman's (1979) theory of pluralism and representation in American politics, in that he argued that groups would mobilize in response to government action

Once interest groups are mobilized, they can use outsourcing, social networks, and party influence to achieve their policy goals (Strickland 2018; 2019).<sup>9</sup> These tactics are essential because they create opportunities for interest groups to engage with members of the legislative process. This includes lobbyists, policymakers, and even other interest groups. This means that mobilization creates influence through access. Moreover, as access grows, so does the opportunity for groups to have their voices heard.

Furthermore, these aspects of networking and increasing their sphere of influence provide avenues for interest groups to mobilize and overcome the status quo (Strickland 2018; s2019). Specifically, I suspect that as groups have time to learn new laws and adapt to their environment, they will also come up with new avenues to exert their influence, particularly by working with members in the legislature and also other interest groups that are working towards similar policy goals (Crepaz 2020). Thus, I expect interest group influence to persevere despite lobbying and campaign finance regulations because of interest group mobilization.


***Hypothesis 1:** as lobbying regulations increase, there is a long-run increase in interest group influence through increased group mobilization.*

My contribution to the literature is the addition of interest group mobilization. As you can see in Figure 3 below, there is a causal connection between Interest Group Mobilization and Influence. I suspect that as groups are mobilized in response to lobbying regulations, their influence will increase. I believe that it will increase past levels it was at previously due to enhanced mobilization opportunities and access to the policymaking process. Thus, my theory very much focuses on the mediated effects of group mobilization on influence.

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<sup>9</sup> By outsourcing, I am referring to multi-client lobbyists. Multi-client lobbyists are often used by interest groups when they are trying to have lobbyists cover multiple policy concerns. It also allows groups to network and expand their local community (Strickland 2019).

*Figure 3. Illustration of Theory*



Finally, I predict these relationships exist because I believe increased regulations will encourage groups to find new ways to meet their policy goals, whether through social networks, other groups, or even political parties. This is not to say that I believe these laws are inadequate. Rather than effectively limiting group influence, I believe lobbying regulations and campaign finance laws limit the methods that groups are using to achieve influence more so than the amount they will ultimately gain.



## CHAPTER V

### MEASURES AND METHODS

#### ***INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES***

The independent variable is “Lobbying Regulations.” I operationalize “Lobbying Regulations” as *Lobbying Regulation Stringency*, and I use Newmark’s (2005) Regulation Index to conduct this analysis. In short, Newmark (2005) uses data from the “Book of the States.”<sup>10</sup> to create an 18-point Index that measures regulation stringency from 1990 through 2003. The different types of regulations include "Gift Bans," "Prohibited Activities," and "Disclosure Requirements." This index can be expanded to present day<sup>11</sup> But it is not possible to use data from the Book of the States after 2005. Thus, to conduct my own analyses, I use Strickland's (2017; 2018; 2020) updated data through 2013. This data is available for all 50 states. *Lobbying Regulations Stringency* is lagged one year compared to the rest of the variables to test its temporal effect on mobilization and influence.

My intervening variable is “Group Mobilization.” I operationalize “Group Mobilization” as the number of *Registered Groups* within each state. This allows me to track the number of registered groups across states and over time.

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<sup>10</sup> The Book of the States publishes annual data on various topics in state policy research, which previously included lobbying regulations and codes of ethics

<sup>11</sup> James Strickland (2017; 2018; 2020) updated this measure for his study. See *A Paradox of Political Reform* for more information.

Garlick and Cluverius (2020) have already published data that tracks lobbying regulations in the United States.<sup>12</sup> Thus, implementing their data allows me to see how the number of registered groups changes as lobbying regulations increase (or, in some cases, decrease). In my literature review, I discussed methods that groups use to get around lobbying regulations. If groups are mobilizing and trying to engage members of the legislature, I expect there to be a general trend in the increase in the number of registered groups as well.

Finally, my dependent variable is “Interest Group Influence.” I operationalize “Interest Group Influence” as *Bills Enacted*, specifically with the number of bills that get enacted during each legislative session. Several points in my literature review emphasize the importance of lobbying on the floor. Thus, for each year in my dataset, I include the number of bills enacted for a specific policy, like Education, Environment, and Election Reform. Examining the number of *Bills Enacted* over time will allow me to see which bills are emphasized (by interest groups) and which types of interest groups can get more accomplished in the legislative process. This is potentially more advantageous than *Bills Introduced* or even *Dollars Spent* because *Bills Enacted* show which bills were able to make it through the policymaking process, whereas these other options like *Bills Introduced* do not<sup>13</sup>. It is also difficult to track how much influence lobbying expenditures have since state tracking is varied. Thus, it may be potentially more advantageous to operationalize “Interest Group Influence” as *Bills Enacted*, and it may provide an additional perspective that other works have not yet considered.

Fortunately, much of the information surrounding *Bills Enacted* is available on the NCSL 50 State Bill Database, where I collected this data. Not all data is readily accessible, however. Some years are missing due to holes in reported data, and there were other issues finding data that fit the types of policies I wanted for 2005-2013. Thus, I used the three policies mentioned above:

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<sup>12</sup> Garlick and Cluverius (2020) have compiled a dataset with group registrations across various sectors within each state from 2005-2018.

<sup>13</sup> There is also the fact that policymakers will not want to waste their time on every bill introduced.

Education Policy, Environmental Policy, and Election Reform. Each of these has policies contained trackable *Bills Enacted* for the years above.

### ***CONTROL VARIABLES***

For my controls, several variables could be utilized to check for potential confounds. The first variable is *Real Gross State Product* (or GSP).<sup>14</sup> I operationalize this variable by measuring it in terms of real US Dollars. Research shows that interest group registrations tend to be the largest in states with the largest economies and have been cited as the “chief determinant” of registration totals (Gray and Lowery 1996; Strickland 2018). Thus, it is essential to control for economic output, and the Bureau of Economic Analysis makes it easy to download this data (Strickland 2018).

My second control variable is *One-Party Dominance*. Prior literature has examined the effect of party dominance on mobilization (Lowery and Gray 1995; 1997). There is also evidence that groups are more active and mobilized when there is more electoral competition because there is more motivation for groups to push their agendas. The same can be said for less competition as well. (Gray and Lowery 2000; Lowery and Gray 1998). Thus, I employ Folded Ranney Indices<sup>15</sup> from Strickland’s (2017) downloadable dataset. It runs on a scale of 0 to 1 and represents partisan divisions within state legislatures over the previous six years (Strickland 2017; 2018b). The data is folded so that the higher values represent more party dominance.<sup>16</sup> I incorporate this data into my analysis to control for party dominance and see what effect it may have on interest group mobilization and interest group influence.

My third control variable is *Initiative State*. Research has shown that states that allow ballot initiatives have more interest group activity than states without them (Boehmke 2005;

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<sup>14</sup> It is important to note that regulatory policies are lagged one year compared to all other variables.

<sup>15</sup> The data runs from 1940 to 2010, and it offers data in two, four, six, eight- and ten-year moving averages

<sup>16</sup> For more information on Ranney Indices, see Holbrook and Van Dunk (1993).

Strickland 2018). Thus, I follow this example and control for states with this activity. Like the authors above, I believe states with ballot initiatives will also see increases in group mobilization. I use Strickland's (2017; 2018) operationalization of *Initiative State*. A state receives a "1" if they have Initiatives or Referendums and a "0" if they do not. This is important in terms of influence because states with initiatives and referendums may have identifiable patterns of organized activity, which could influence the outcome of the analysis.

My fourth control variable is *Legislative Turnover*. Research shows that interest group influence is much more significant in term-limited legislatures because new members are more likely to rely on lobbyists for assistance as they learn to navigate the legislative process (Cain and Kousser 2004). I operationalize this term as a percent of legislators that left office in a given year. Percentages give a better perspective at how drastic turnover is when comparing chambers and states over time. I track turnover from 1996 to 2014 with NCSL research data (Underhill n.d.).

My fifth control variable is *Political Polarization*. Research shows that political polarization may affect group mobilization. Both Garlick (2016) and Massengill (2019) find evidence that political polarization increases group mobilization. They also find evidence that lobbying takes place in direct response to party action on legislation. Thus, political polarization is measured by looking at the change in state legislature's political composition over time. The NCSL has published data on the partisan composition of state legislatures for the years 1978-2014 (Mahooney & Williams 2020). When the party composition is relatively equal, I expect polarization to be higher due to there being less party control.

My final control variable is *Problem Severity*. States that experience more severe conditions in specific policy areas are more likely to have legislators seeking to address these issues. Thus, bills that have been enacted may not be solely due to interest group activity but due to legislators pushing to set the agenda instead. In the case of Election Reform, I utilize Voter Turnout by state during US General Elections (McDonald 2020). This data spans from 1984 through 2014 and covers turnout from the Voting Eligible Population (VEP) for the Highest

Office. I suspect that a lack of voter turnout could lead to legislative reforms in state legislatures, like the extension of registration deadlines or creating more opportunities for voters to access the polls. Like the other variables that came before, I examine *Voter Turnout*.

Additionally, for Education Policy, or *Education Fiscal Funding*, I examined a lack of public education funding over time. This data was collected from the Institute of Education Sciences and the US Department of Education ("State Fiscal Reports"). The US Government tracked this data from 1997-2017. I suspected the Fiscal Funding was a good measure for problem severity because we know from various sources in the literature that funding for public education, both secondary and post-secondary schools, is lacking. Thus, I would have suspected that an increase in concern would have spiked a devotion to education funding if it became a severe enough issue.

Finally, I used air pollution data from the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA 2020). The EPA has annual data that breaks down pollution levels by city, state, or county for the years 1980-2020. The advantage of this dataset is that it provides a comprehensive examination of different types of air pollution across the United States. I suspected that I could find patterns of increased enacted legislation in states where air pollution was a more concerning issue. Thus, I utilized *Air Pollution* as my control for environmental reforms.

In the tables that follow, all variables are measured at one-year leads ( $t+1$ ), except lobbying regulation stringency, which is measured at time  $t$ . I made this choice because I suspected that interest groups would begin adjusting their lobbying strategies in the first year following the adoption of new lobbying regulations.

## CHAPTER VI

### ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

#### *ANALYTICAL STRATEGY*

I used a series of OLS regression models<sup>17</sup> to test whether the effect of lobbying regulations on group influence was mediated by group mobilization. This mediation analysis will help me isolate the factors that impact interest group influence and whether some factors—like lobbying regulations—only impact influence via other factors. After running multiple models, I should have a clear understanding of which factors impact their influence and in which combination.

The steps in the mediation analysis are represented in Figure 3 below.<sup>18</sup> Baron and Kenney (1985) recommended this approach, and I opted for this analysis because it estimates a unique model for each step in the mediation process.<sup>19</sup> I estimated five different models for each of the three policies discussed previously: education policy, election reform, and environmental policy.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> I opted for OLS regression due to the consistency across models and ease of interpretation. The dependent variable is also nearly continuous despite being a count. We also ran Poisson regression models to check for robustness. The analysis did not alter my findings.

<sup>18</sup> Figure 3 is a recreation of Mediation Analysis from Newsom (2020).

<sup>19</sup> In analysis not shown here, I also used the *sem* package in Stata to estimate the mediated effect using just two models and obtained the same results (StataCorp 2021).

<sup>20</sup> According to Baron and Kenney (1985), a significant relationship is only found if the data is statistically significant across all five models. Thus, while there may be significant relationships at the individual level, I cannot reject the null hypothesis unless I find significant data across all five models.

This allows me to compare findings across different types of legislation and make the results more generalizable to other policies if I can find significant relationships. It will also, allow me to draw better conclusions about where scholarship should direct its attention with future research.

**Figure 4. Mediation Analysis**

	<b>Visual Depiction</b>	<b>Explanation (Testing for the Effect of...)</b>
Model 1	$X \rightarrow Y$	Lobbying regulations on interest group influence (represents conventional wisdom)
Model 2	$X \xrightarrow{a} M$	Lobbying regulations on interest group mobilization
Model 3	$M \xrightarrow{b} Y$	Interest group mobilization on interest group influence
Model 4	$X \xrightarrow[M \rightarrow]{b} Y$	Lobbying regulations AND interest group mobilization on interest group influence
Model 5	Model 4 w/Controls	Model 4 with control variables included

### **THE RESULTS**

The results are surprising in that I found evidence that confirms and disconfirms different aspects of my theory. After running mediation analysis for all three policies, I find that the results are consistent across two of the three issues studied. For both election reform (Table 1) and environmental policy (Table 2), I found positive and statistically significant relationships for both lobbying regulations on interest group influence (Model 1) and interest group mobilization on interest group influence (Model 3). I also found some evidence in Model 5 that suggests that two of my control variables, Real *GSP* and *Legislators Termed Out*, may be impacting the significance of my overall relationship. These findings are discussed in further detail below.

Model 1 in both Table 1 and 2 show that lobbying regulation stringency has a positive and statistically significant effect on interest group influence. The coefficient indicates that the effect is not significant, but it is interesting to find that lobbying regulations are associated with increased interest group influence over time. Previous works have indicated that lobbying regulations *decrease* interest group influence (Newmark 2005; Ozymy 2010). However, as indicated in my hypothesis, I was expecting to find this relationship and that it would be explained by interest group mobilization. However, as shown in Model 2 in both Table 1 and 2, lobbying regulations do not appear to impact mobilization. If anything, regulations may negatively affect mobilization, which is consistent with previous works in the literature (Strickland 2018). However, it is not statistically significant, and the effect is not very large. Something else must explain the relationship found in Model 1.

**Table 1. Election Reform Policy**

	(1) DV=INFLUENCE	(2) DV=MOBILIZATION	(3) DV=INFLUENCE	(4) DV=INFLUENCE	(5) DV=INFLUENCE
Stringency Level	0.00120* (0.000502)	-0.000162 (0.000940)		0.000422 (0.000593)	-0.000308 (0.00111)
Mobilization			0.117*** (0.0220)	0.148*** (0.0305)	0.120*** (0.0358)
Voter Turnout					-0.592 (0.799)
Real GSP					0.0000457** (0.0000157)
Initiative State					0 (.)
Party Dominance					-1.599 (5.605)
Party Difference					0.809 (0.724)
Termed Out					-9.094* (4.061)
_cons	4.813*** (0.167)	67.54*** (0.309)	-2.949 (1.505)	-5.144* (2.067)	-14.72*** (3.832)
N	707	480	627	480	419
R <sup>2</sup>	0.009	0.000	0.046	0.054	0.099

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$



**Table 2. Environmental Policy**

	(1) DV=INFLUENCE	(2) DV=MOBILIZATION	(3) DV=INFLUENCE	(4) DV=INFLUENCE	(5) DV=INFLUENCE
Stringency Level	0.00164* (0.000637)	-0.0000213 (0.000628)		0.000675 (0.000645)	0.0000399 (0.000828)
Mobilization			0.177*** (0.0407)	0.139** (0.0502)	0.0440 (0.0420)
Air Pollution					-0.344 (0.231)
Real GSP					-0.0000627*** (0.0000149)
Initiative State					0 (.)
Party Dominance					-1.457 (6.492)
Party Difference					-0.437 (0.569)
Termed Out					-3.102 (3.414)
_cons	2.507*** (0.244)	15.23*** (0.207)	0.114 (0.657)	0.441 (0.781)	20.81*** (4.620)
N	356	480	500	353	264
R <sup>2</sup>	0.021	0.000	0.040	0.028	0.093

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Model 3 shows that group mobilization also increases interest group influence. This finding is consistent with my general theory and prior works in the literature (Crepaz 2020) but not my specific hypothesis about a mediated relationship between lobbying regulations and group influence via mobilization. Instead, the evidence supports an independent effect only. This finding is robust to the inclusion of control variables in the electoral reform case but not environmental policy.

In Table 2<sup>21</sup>, Real GSP is shown to have a negative and statistically significant effect on interest group influence. This is interesting considering prior research has found that cities with higher interest group registration numbers typically have larger economic outputs (Gray and

<sup>21</sup> There is no estimate for Initiative State in Model 5 due to collinearity in the data.

Lowery 1996; Strickland 2018). Perhaps this can be explained by the fact that Real GSP is essential for environmental policy because environmental policy becomes less of an issue as GSP increases, meaning that fewer bills are being introduced and enacted by the legislature to resolve environmental issues.

And finally, the only other control variable that appears to have a noticeable effect on interest group influence were states that had legislators termed out the following year, which is only true for election reform, not environmental policy. This could be explained by the fact that more experienced legislators have greater impacts on policy outcomes than younger members of the legislature. Thus, junior legislators may be more susceptible to influence from senior members of the legislature and other parties like constituents and interest groups. As you can see in Table 3, the findings presented above do not hold for Education Policy where no variable was a significant predictor at the conventional  $p < .05$  level.

**Table 3. Education Policy**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	DV=INFLUENCE	DV=MOBILZIATION	DV=INFLUENCE	DV=INFLUENCE	DV=INFLUENCE
Stringency Level	0.00226 (0.00226)	-0.000111 (0.00390)		0.00263 (0.00251)	0.00199 (0.00442)
Mobilization			0.0260 (0.0241)	0.0299 (0.0312)	0.0313 (0.0461)
Fiscal Funding					0.00000214 (0.00000253)
Real GSP					-0.0000326 (0.0000824)
Initiative State					0 (.)
Party Dominance					-4.596 (32.02)
Party Difference					-2.366 (3.034)
Termed Out					-24.57 (17.76)
_cons	22.83*** (0.866)	83.21*** (1.283)	20.73*** (2.197)	20.45*** (2.690)	24.30 (19.20)
<i>N</i>	356	480	500	353	291
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.003	0.000	0.003	0.007	0.016

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.00$

## CHAPTER VII

### DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND LIMITATIONS

#### ***MEANING OF THE RESULTS AND POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS***

The first thing we can conclude about these results is that my hypothesis is not fully supported. Interest group mobilization does not directly mediate the effect that lobbying regulations have on interest group influence. This means that interest groups do not mobilize or increase their registration numbers in the states due to being regulated. In trying to make predictions to understand the results better, we could turn to Strickland's (2018) work on *A Paradox of Political Reform*. In this piece, he concludes that state legislatures should either increase registration requirements or increase the frequency of reporting periods, but not both, as they often decrease interest group cooperation with the law when they are utilized simultaneously. It may be possible that I did not find a relationship between lobbying regulations and interest group mobilization because, as Strickland (2018) finds in his piece, increased regulations can result in decreased group registrations over time. I had not considered that regulation stringency, as an aggregate score, may have had an effect on my measure for interest group mobilization. If I had considered a different measure for group mobilization, it might have resulted in a different outcome for this relationship.

Second, the fact that lobbying regulations do not impact interest group mobilization does not mean that they do not affect interest groups' overall influence. Quite the

contrary. As demonstrated in Tables 1 and 2, there is evidence that lobbying regulations and group mobilization independently impact the number of bills enacted. This means that each variable has an independent effect on the number of bills enacted in US state legislatures. In the case of the first relationship, lobbying regulations have an independent effect on interest group influence is intriguing. As states increase their regulations over time, they appear to increase group influence as well. This finding is consistent with my hypotheses and shows up in two of the three tests in this study.

I suspect that lobbying regulations increase the number of bills that get enacted for a couple of different reasons: it may be possible that lobbying regulations do not discourage interest group participation in the democratic process, even though they may not directly spur group mobilization. It could also be true that other avenues contributed to policy outcomes that were not tested in this study. Both are discussed in the paragraph below.

If I were to conclude that lobbying regulations do not discourage interest group participation in the democratic process, it would be because there is other evidence in the literature that shows that lobbying regulations are ineffective (Bunea 2017). Referencing back to Strickland's (2018) work on *A Paradox of Political Reform*, interest groups are more likely to cooperate with regulation if it is reasonable and not overburdensome. The fact that other actors in the policymaking process offer avenues to groups to influence policy, whether that be other interest groups or legislators, shows that groups can use these other avenues to their advantage. Thus, it may be entirely possible that groups are still involved in the policymaking process despite increased regulations; we just may not see that in this dataset.

In the case of the second relationship, the fact that interest group registrations positively impact the number of bills that get enacted may be a sign that, when groups are mobilized, they can influence legislative outcomes. This finding is expected as interest groups seek to influence the legislative process. If I had not found this to be a statistically significant relationship, I would have been concerned about interest groups' effectiveness. Thus, it may be entirely possible that

groups are mobilized for other reasons outside of regulation. They may have been mobilized to either defend or change the status quo (Baumgartner et al. 2009) on behalf of their policy goals. This would be consistent with Baumgartner et al. (2009) and their theory on punctuated equilibrium. It may also be possible that there was an increase in group registrations for no other reason than groups were organizing and needing to get registered with their state governments.

Either way, two things are clear: interest groups were mobilizing despite lobbying regulations, and both lobbying regulations and group mobilization had an independent impact on policy outcomes.

### ***LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH***

There are three main things I would do in future research. The first thing would be to change my operationalization of interest group mobilization. In its current form, my operationalization of "Group Mobilization" is simply the total number of registered groups within a state. I decided to go with registered groups because I thought that the ability to track increases over time would indicate mobilization. I also thought it might provide evidence that groups were striving to overcome some barrier or address some issue. In this case, I thought that issue was lobbying regulations. However, it might be beneficial to try a different approach, like performing qualitative interviews with lobbyists in different states to assess how motivated they feel in response to specific lobbying regulations. Alternatively, I could develop other quantitative measures of interest group activity, like logging their spending or even their time spent at the Capital building.

I recognize that I found evidence that as group registrations increased over time, so did the number of enacted bills. That is an important finding, and I am glad I could find that in this study. However, if I were to change this operationalization in a future study, it would give me insight into how lobbying regulations impact group spending, and it would give me insight into

how spending impacts policy outcomes (or group influence). Thus, I think it would be beneficial to change this operationalization if I decided to conduct this study again.

Second, I would consider adding variables to my analysis as well. Not only would I consider adding interest group spending to my dataset, but I would also add the total number of bills that were introduced in committee, not just those that were enacted by the legislature. Unfortunately, there were some challenges with this when I was creating my original dataset. Because there were very few sites that tracked bills introduced for an extended period, it was difficult to find data for my analysis. If I were to conduct this study again, I would go ahead and include any information on bills introduced because I believe there is an advantage to comparing the number of bills introduced relative to those enacted. Often, bills fail to make it through the legislative process and die before being signed into law. I believe having the opportunity to compare these two pieces of data could provide an additional layer of information regarding the amount of influence groups may have at different points in the policymaking process.

Third, I would consider extending my one-year lead in the data to three or even five years. There are certain advantages to this decision. One advantage could be that it would give me more time to evaluate changes in lobbying behavior. It is possible that the one-year lag I used in my analysis is not long enough to detect substantial changes in behavior. Another advantage could be comparing my outcome variables across different sets of time. If I were to examine the impact that one, three- and five-year lags have on interest group behavior, it would give more a more wholistic picture about the effects that lobbying regulations are having on interest group influence in state legislatures.

All of these changes, then, could provide additional information about the role interest groups play in gaining influence and access. I hoped that my decisions in this study would reveal information about the effects group mobilization plays in the policymaking process. To a certain extent, they did. I found that lobbying regulations do not directly affect interest group registrations. I also found that interest group registrations affect policy outcomes. This is

valuable information to draw conclusions about the effects that lobbying regulations have on group mobilization and influence. However, more work needs to be conducted in order to draw more conclusions about this topic. I think these changes would help with that analysis and provide more contributions to the lobbying literature.



## CHAPTER VIII

### CONCLUSION

As I stated at the outset of this thesis, lobbying regulations and campaign finance laws play an essential role in the policymaking process. They not only strive to increase transparency and improve public trust in our political system, but they also strive to regulate how much influence lobbyists have on the outcome of legislative decisions (Newmark 2005; Kulesza, Witko and Waltenburg 2017; Witko 2005).

One of the fascinating aspects of the lobbying literature is that there are many times it feels like scholars are writing their papers in conversation with one another. Because scholarship is always building on previous ideas and offering connections with different aspects of the literature, I came up with new ideas about how my research could expand on their conclusions. I decided that the connection between lobbying regulations and interest group influence was one area that could be explored more completely.

While I acknowledge that interest groups are not made up completely of lobbyists, they often seek ways to represent their interests through lobbying efforts. As a result, they often hire lobbyists to lobby on their behalf, or they may decide just to lobby themselves (Arroyo et al. 2002; Berg 2009). Either way, interest groups seek to exert their influence and impact legislative decisions. Thus, I began theorizing different ways in which lobbying regulations and campaign finance laws may impact interest group influence in the policymaking process.

More specifically, I wanted to know *how* lobbying regulations and campaign finance laws were impacting interest group influence. And, after surveying the literature and realizing different conclusions were being drawn about that impact lobbying regulations have on interest groups influence (Newmark 2005; Ozymy 2010; Ozymy 2013; Strickland 2018; Witko 2017), I proposed that there was a potentially more advantageous way to theorize the relationship between lobbying regulations, campaign finance laws, and interest group influence: interest group mobilization.

To test the importance of this factor, I expanded on studies by Newmark (2005) and Kulesza, Witko & Waltenburg (2017). I also added in theoretical components from Strickland (2018) and others. I ended up hypothesizing that as lobbying regulations increase, there would be an initial decrease in interest group influence that would be enhanced over time via interest group mobilization. Specifically, I theorized that lobbying regulations would drive mobilization. I reasoned that there is evidence in the literature that shows that increased regulations result in: less cooperation with the government (Strickland 2018) and increased motivation for groups to work with others to meet their individual goals (Crepaz 2020). There is also evidence showing that mobilization has a positive impact on influence (Crepaz 2020; Ozymy 2013).

Thus, after collecting my data and running mediation analysis, I found that *Lobbying Regulation Stringency* impacts legislative outcomes by increasing *Interest Group Influence* over time. More specifically, I found that when the stringency of lobbying regulations increases over time, there is an associated positive and statistically significant increase in interest group influence that results in increased policies enacted by US State legislatures. I found this effect for both Election Reform and Environmental Policy but did not find a statistically significant effect in either direction for Education Policy.

I also found that *Interest Group Mobilization* has a similar effect on these policies. Like *Lobbying Regulation Stringency*, when *Interest Group Mobilization* increases over time, there is a positive and statistically significant effect on *Interest Group Influence* for Election Reform and

Environmental Policy. The fact that there is consistency in these findings is encouraging. Unfortunately, these effects are independent of one another and fail to confirm my expectations for H1, which is that *as lobbying regulations increase, there is a long-run increase in interest group influence through interest group mobilization.*

Even so, these findings agree with scholars, like Strickland (2018) and others, that think that lobbying regulations may not efficiently limit interest group influence in the policymaking process. While the effects of these findings are not notable, the size of the effects is large enough that future scholarship should continue to test and expand on these ideas.

Additionally, because interest group mobilization also influences policy outcomes, when interest groups are registered and directly involved in the policymaking process, they appear to directly affect which bills are passed. This finding matches up with previous works, like Crepaz (2020) and Ozymy (2013), that show that when groups have more control in legislative decision-making, they can check and influence policy outcomes. Thus, under my operationalization of *Interest Group Mobilization* and *Interest Group Influence*, when there are more interest groups registered within a state, it is also more likely that there will be more bills enacted by the legislature that cover interests similar to those of the groups.

While these findings do not directly indicate that future works will agree with these results, I believe they are a positive step in the right direction. Not only did I test previous ideas along with my own, but I also found evidence that both confirmed and disconfirmed my theories. Going forward, I believe scholars should challenge these ideas to see which ones hold up over time. I do believe that more research will show that lobbying regulations are not as efficient as previous works claimed. This is not an indictment on these authors as much as it is a warning for both policymaking and scholars to consider.

After all, my research shows that interest groups are benefitting from misguided regulation and that they are able to use these regulations to their advantage to increase their power and influence in the political process. Thus, I would argue that my research falls more in line with

Schattscheider (1960) and Truman (1971) than other authors; both have a more negative view of pluralism in American politics and believe that interest group influence has created less autonomy in the legislative process. Thus, while scholars like Lowi (1979) are right to view interest groups as beneficial vehicles for representation, it is possible that lobbying regulations have only enabled interest groups to achieve their policy goals more abundantly than they could have previously.

That is why: if lobbying regulations (and even campaign finance laws) fail to limit interest group influence efficiently, then why are we even enacting them? We must understand the effects that these regulations are having on the policymaking process. That is why I challenge scholars and policymakers to continue studying these laws and consider the effects they are having on policy outcomes. Because, if my findings are correct, like a rock in the river, the rock may divert the flow, but the water continues to flow downstream.

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## APPENDICES

**Table 4. Election Reform (Count Model)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	DV=INFLUENCE	DV=MOBILIZATION	DV=INFLUENCE	DV=INFLUENCE	DV=INFLUENCE
main					
Stringency Level	0.000109** (0.0000345)	-0.0000143 (0.0000418)		0.0000434 (0.0000440)	-0.0000398 (0.0000936)
Mobilization			0.0181*** (0.00213)	0.0229*** (0.00280)	0.0187*** (0.00345)
Voter Turnout					-0.141 (0.0905)
Real GSP					0.00000344** (0.00000118)
Party Dominance					0.144 (0.649)
Party Difference					0.195* (0.0841)
Termed Out					-1.628*** (0.450)
<i>N</i>	707	480	627	480	419
<i>BIC</i>	3767.7	2672.9	3131.5	2351.0	1998.8

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table 5. Environmental Policy (Count Model)**

	(1) DV=INFLUENCE	(2) DV=MOBILIZATION	(3) DV=INFLUENCE	(4) DV=INFLUENCE	(5) DV=INFLUENCE
main					
Stringency Level	0.000316*** (0.0000758)	-0.00000298 (0.0000526)	0.000316*** (0.0000758)	0.000178* (0.0000855)	0.0000192 (0.000162)
Mobilization				0.0244*** (0.00537)	0.0293*** (0.00829)
Air Pollution					-0.101 (0.0573)
Real GSP					-0.0000206*** (0.00000334)
Party Dominance					0.602 (1.754)
Party Difference					-0.333* (0.139)
Termed Out					-1.730* (0.762)
<i>N</i>	356	480	356	353	258
<i>BIC</i>	1544.7	2267.3	1544.7	1450.2	841.7

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table 6. Education Policy (Count Model)**

	(1) DV=INFLUENCE	(2) DV=MOBILIZATION	(3) DV=INFLUENCE	(4) DV=INFLUENCE	(5) DV=INFLUENCE
main					
Stringency Level	0.000118*** (0.0000342)	-0.00000646 (0.0000339)	0.000118*** (0.0000342)	0.000133*** (0.0000366)	0.000107 (0.0000600)
Mobilization				0.00101** (0.000371)	0.00104* (0.000498)
Fiscal Funding					6.01e-08* (2.59e-08)
Real GSP					-0.000000781 (0.000000835)
Party Dominance					-0.260 (0.429)
Party Difference					-0.0963* (0.0395)
Termed Out					-0.965*** (0.216)
<i>N</i>	356	480	356	353	291
<i>BIC</i>	3813.2	4997.9	3813.2	3761.6	2984.0

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

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