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**FILLING THE RANKS: RECRUITING, TRAINING AND  
REINFORCEMENTS IN THE CANADIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE  
1914-1918**

Richard Gottfrid Larsson Holt

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THE UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO  
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES

**FILLING THE RANKS:  
RECRUITING, TRAINING AND REINFORCEMENTS  
IN THE CANADIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 1914-1918**

(Spine title: Filling the Ranks: Manpower in the CEF 1914-1918)

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Volume I

by

**Richard Holt**



Graduate Program in History

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy

The School of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies  
The University of Western Ontario  
London, Ontario, Canada

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THE UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO  
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES

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Entitled:

**Filling the Ranks: Recruiting, Training and Reinforcements in the  
Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918**

Is accepted in partial fulfillment of the  
Requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy

Date \_\_\_\_\_

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Chair of the Thesis Examination Board

## ABSTRACT

This dissertation deals with the evolution of manpower management in the Canadian Expeditionary Force from 1914 to 1918: recruiting, entry-level training and the provision of reinforcements from Canada to England and England to France. The central theme is the increasing professionalism in the Canadian Forces with the development of an efficient and comprehensive system of recruiting, training and reinforcing units at the front.

This work argues that from first to last, the government did not appreciate the need to husband manpower although the Canadian Forces made continual efforts to manage the pool by altering recruiting criteria and seeking alternative sources for recruits.

Training was based on British army programs that were well-suited to conditions on the Western Front. However, training in Canada was largely a waste of time because of obsolete equipment and by the end of the war, depot units were responsible only for recruiting and forwarding men to the reserve units. Initially the reinforcement structure was based on British army policies but these did not accommodate the structure of the Canadian Forces. However, with the creation of the Ministry of the Overseas Military Forces of Canada, was rationalized and modified to suit Canada's needs.

This dissertation relies on extensive primary sources in both Canada and Great Britain to conclude that by 1918, Canada had developed an efficient and comprehensive system for managing the national manpower pool. The dissertation also notes profound changes in both the state and society.

**Key words: Canadian Expeditionary Force, manpower, training, reinforcements**

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Much of the discussion in Chapters 6 and 9 makes use of a data base listing more than 29,000 reinforcements posted to nine select infantry battalions. The data base was taken from printed nominal rolls published in regimental histories supplemented by data drawn from embarkation rolls, sailing lists and Daily Routine Orders Part II for reserve battalions in England. I am grateful to my son, William, for devising a program to handle this data and for taking the time from his busy schedule to scan some of the rolls from the regimental histories into Excel format.

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## Table of Contents

Certificate of Examination	Reinforcements: Canadian Expeditionary Force	ii
Abstract	Reinforcements to England 1914-1918	iii
Acknowledgements	Author's Introduction	iv
Table of Contents	Organization of the book	vii
List of Tables	Organization of the Department of Militia and Artillery, 1917	ix
List of Figures	3rd Canadian Division (1914-1918)	xv
Abbreviations	3rd Canadian Division (1914-1918)	xvii
Preface		1
Chapter 1	Militia Roots	15
Chapter 2	Manpower and the Canadian Expeditionary Force	64
Chapter 3	Recruiting Structures 1914-1918	118
Chapter 4	Recruiting Criteria	162
Annex	Pre-enlistment Chronic Conditions	208
Chapter 5	The Manpower Pool	228
Annex	Health: Canadian-born and Immigrants	283
Chapter 6	Training	287
Annex A	Training Syllabi	361
Annex B	Training Standards	377
Annex C	Characteristics of weapons and ammunition	388
Annex D	Weapons Holdings	397
Chapter 7	Reinforcements: Policy,	404



		Procedures and Wastage	
Chapter 8		Reinforcements: Canada to England	429
Chapter 9		Reinforcements in England and France	472
	Annex A	Statistics: Reinforcements	551
	Annex B	Organization of Shorncliffe 1916	558
	Annex C	Organization of Headquarters Overseas Military Forces of Canada 1917	559
	Annex D	3 <sup>rd</sup> Canadian Division syllabus for partially trained Reinforcements 1916	562
Conclusion			564
Bibliography			577
Curriculum Vitae			607
Table 9			96
Table 10			100
Table 11			103
Table 12			104
Table 13			110
Table 14			150
Table 15			160
Table 16			170
Table 17			171
Table 18			176
Table 19			181

List of Tables

<u>Table</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Page</u>
Table 1	Militia Headquarters Staff Appointments 1914 and 1918	24
Table 2	Prewar Districts and Divisions 1914	25
Table 3	Summary of militia units 31 March 1914	26
Table 4	Militia units authorized but not formed 31 March 1914	27
Table 5	Allied Reservists called up in Canada	80
Table 6	Summary – Canadians with the British Army	87
Table 7	Summary – Canadian recruits with foreign armies	92
Table 8	Summary – Canadians in other armies	92
Table 9	Infantry Strength 5 <sup>th</sup> Canadian Division 1917	96
Table 10	Increase to Canadian Corps Engineer and Machine Gun units 1918	100
Table 11	Summary of Canadian units in France serving outside the Canadian Corps	101
Table 12	Militiamen on full time duty	104
Table 13	Enlistments by Corps 1914-1920	119
Table 14	Estimated number of underage recruits	167
Table 15	Underage fatalities	168
Table 16	Estimated number of overage recruits	170
Table 17	Enrolment of overage soldiers	171
Table 18	Personnel disposition – Bantam battalions	176
Table 19	Unfit recruits 1914-1918	181

Table 20	Foreign-born recruits 1914-1918	194
Table 21	Sample – Black recruits	201
Table 22	Sample – visible minorities	206
Table 23	Summary of releases	208
Table 24	Selection – recruits with chronic diseases	210
Table 25	Summary – medical rejections in Ontario 1917	212
Table 26	Summary – medical rejections of 48 <sup>th</sup> Highlanders recruits 1915 and 1917	214
Table 27	Summary – Canadian manpower between the ages of eighteen and forty-five	230
Table 28	Summary of workers with major industries eligible for military service	231
Table 29	Summary of Military Service Act medical boards 1917	233
Table 30	Summary – revised manpower pool of eligible Canadian males between the ages of eighteen and forty-five	234
Table 31	Enlistments in Great Britain	240
Table 32	Allocation by district of recruits from the British-Canadian Recruiting Mission 1917	248
Table 33	Allocation of British-Canadian Recruiting Mission recruits by Corps in Toronto 1917	249
Table 34	British-Canadian Recruiting Mission reinforcements posted to select battalions 1917-1918	250
Table 35	Place of birth of Canadian males 1911	257
Table 36	Sample of foreign-born recruits	258
Table 37	Medical categories	265
Table 38	Non-infantry reinforcements posted to select infantry battalions	268

Table 39	Manpower pool – final balance 1915	271
Table 40	Enlistments by place of birth 1913-1918	283
Table 41	Summary of recruits processed in Toronto for Week ending 10 February 1917	284
Table 42	Summary – male infirmities 911	284
Table 43	Militia volunteers 1914	294
Table 44	Training level of battalions arriving in England 1917	330
Table 45	Infantry training syllabi 1914-1915	361
Table 46	Infantry fourteen week training syllabi	363
Table 47	Infantry emergency training syllabus 1918	365
Table 48	Infantry final assault course 1917	366
Table 49	General Musketry Course 1916	367
Table 50	Cavalry training syllabi 1916-1917	368
Table 51	Engineer training syllabi 1914 and 1918	369
Table 52	Cyclist training syllabus 1917	373
Table 53	Machine gun training syllabus 1918	374
Table 54	Lewis gun syllabus 1917	375
Table 55	Tests for infantry drafts 1917-1918	377
Table 56	Cavalry recruit tests 1917	380
Table 57	Artillery reinforcement tests 1917	382
Table 58	Engineer recruit tests 1918	384
Table 59	Refresher training and testing at Base Training Schools (known as bull-rings)	386
Table 60	Carbine Holdings in Canada 1913-1918	397

Table 61	Rifle holdings in Canada 1913-1918	398
Table 62	Machine gun holdings in Canada 1913-1918	399
Table 63	Artillery holdings in Canada 1913-1918	400
Table 64	Ammunition holdings in Canada 1913-1918	401
Table 65	Weapons used by the Canadian Corps but not held in Canada	402
Table 66	Average draft times from England to France 1917	416
Table 67	Wastage in select corps	418
Table 68	Postings out of select infantry battalions	420
Table 69	Monthly average of non-effectives from select corps 1916-1918	423
Table 70	Infantry arrivals in England January-December 1915	440
Table 71	Comparison of a sample of reinforcements that arrived with formed battalions in 1916 and with drafts in 1915	444
Table 72	Comparison of a sample of reinforcements that arrived with formed battalions with drafts in 1917	444
Table 73	Infantry arrivals in England January-December 1916	448
Table 74	Depot battalions in Canada April 1918	458
Table 75	Depot battalions and recruit population	459
Table 76	Infantry arrivals in England January-December 1917	461
Table 77	Infantry arrivals in England January-October 1918	462
Table 78	Sample of infantry reinforcements – service in Canada prior to embarkation 1916, 1917 and 1918	464
Table 79	Unfit men with reserve battalions in England 1915	477
Table 80	Reinforcement structure in England March 1915	480
Table 81	Reinforcements processed by the Canadian General	494

Base Depot in France August 1916 to May 1917

Table 82	Provincial representation in France March 1917	523
Table 83	Provincial representation in France November 1918	525
Table 84	Partially trained infantry reinforcements with select battalions 1915-1918	551
Table 85	Canadian Corps infantry reinforcements February 1916 to November 1918	553
Table 86	Infantry reinforcements in England February 1915 to August 1918	555
Table 87	3 <sup>rd</sup> Canadian Division training syllabus for partially trained reinforcements December 1916	562

Figure 5	Map of the Base Depot in France, August 1916	578
Figure 7	Map of the Base Depot in France, August 1917	580
Figure 8	Organization of Base Depot, December 1916	583
Figure 9	Organization of Base Depot, February 1917	586
Figure 10	Organization of Base Depot in England, February 1915	588
Figure 11	Organization of Base Depot in France, August 1916	590
Figure 12	Organization of Base Depot, August 1918	593
Figure 13	Organization of Base Depot in England, August 1918	594
Figure 14	Organization of Base Depot Training, August 1916	595

<u>Figure</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Page</u>
Figure 1	Prewar British reinforcement structure	407
Figure 2	British infantry reinforcement structure July 1915	410
Figure 3	British reinforcement structure for all arms September 1917	411
Figure 4	Simplified organization chart of the reinforcement flow September 1917	412
Figure 5	CEF infantry reinforcement organization March 1915	481
Figure 6	Simplified outline of casualty rehabilitation and disposal 1916	488
Figure 7	CEF reinforcement structure November 1916 to August 1917	500
Figure 8	Organization of Canadian training camps December 1916	513
Figure 9	Organization of Headquarters Overseas Military Forces of Canada 20 March 1917	516
Figure 10	CEF reinforcement structure in England 20 March 1917	518
Figure 11	Reserve camps and units in England 1918	519
Figure 12	Elements held by Canadian Corps Reinforcement Camp 1918	533
Figure 13	Reinforcements dispersed in the Canadian Corps area	534
Figure 14	Organization of Canadian Training Division at Shorncliffe 1916	558

AS	Assistant Adjutant General
AD	Army Department
ADMS	Director of Army Medical Services
ADP	Director of Army Postal Service
AC	Adjutant General
AF	Assistant Adjutant General
AO	Army Order
ACC	Army Postal Corps
BAC	British Army of the Rhine
BC	British Commonwealth
CC	Chief of Staff
CCM	Chief of Army Medical Corps
CCMC	Chief of Army Postal Corps
CCNS	Chief of Army Postal Service
CCVC	Chief of Army Veterinary Corps
CCWC	Chief of Army Postal Service
CCY	Chief of Army Postal Service
CCZ	Chief of Army Postal Service
CCRC	Chief of Army Postal Service
CCRL	Chief of Army Postal Service
CCF	Chief of Army Postal Service
CC	Chief of Army Postal Service



Abbreviations

AAG	Assistant Adjutant General
ACI	Army Council Instruction
ADMS	Assistant Director of Medical Services
AEF	American Expeditionary Force
AG	Adjutant General
AIF	Australian Imperial Force
AO	Army Order
ASC	Army Service Corps
BAC	Brigade Ammunition Column
BCRM	British-Canadian Recruiting Mission
BEF	British Expeditionary Force
CADC	Canadian Army Dental Corps
CAMC	Canadian Army Medical Corps
CAPSC	Canadian Army Permanent Service Corps
CASC	Canadian Army Service Corps
CAVC	Canadian Army Veterinary Corps
CCAC	Canadian Casualty Assembly Centre
CCD	Canadian Command Depot
CCRC	Canadian Corps Reinforcement Camp
CCRD	Canadian Corps Railhead Depot
CDF	Canadian Defence Force
CE	Canadian Engineers

CEF	Canadian Expeditionary Force
CETD	Canadian Engineer Training Depot
CFA	Canadian Field Artillery
CFC	Canadian Forestry Corps
CGA	Canadian Garrison Artillery
CGBD	Canadian General Base Depot
CGR	Canadian Garrison Regiment
CGS	Chief of the General Staff
CIBD	Canadian Infantry Base Depot
CLC	Chinese Labour Corps
CMGC	Canadian Machine Gun Corps
CMR	Canadian Mounted Rifles
CO	Commanding Officer. Also known as OC or Officer Commanding
COC	Canadian Ordnance Corps
CRA	Commander Royal [Canadian] Artillery
CRT	Canadian Railway Troops
CTD	Canadian Training Division
CWAAC	Canadian Women's Army Auxiliary Corps
CWGC	Commonwealth War Graves Commission
DAC	Division Ammunition Column
DAG	Deputy Adjutant General
DGMS	Director General of Medical Services
FGH	Fort Garry Horse

GHQ	General Headquarters
GMC	General Musketry Course
GO	General Order
GOC	General Officer Commanding
GSO	General Staff Officer
HQ	Headquarters
IGC	Inspector-General of Communications
IMB	Imperial Munitions Board
IWT	Inland Water Transport
JAG	Judge Advocate General
KR&O	King's Regulation and Orders for the Canadian Militia
L of C	Lines of Communication
LdSH	Lord Srathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians)
LHQ	Local Headquarters
MD	Military District
MGO	Master General of the Ordnance
MSA	Military Service Act
MT	Mechanical Transport
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NSR	Nova Scotia Regiment
OA	Officer Administering Royal Canadian Engineers (OA RCE) or Royal Canadian Artillery (OA RCA)
OC	Officer Commanding. Also known as CO or Commanding Officer

OMFC	Overseas Military Forces of Canada
PF	Permanent Force
PPCLI	Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry
PT	Physical Training
QMAAC	Queen Mary's Army Auxiliary Corps
QMG	Quartermaster General
RAF	Royal Air Force
RAMC	Royal Army Medical Corps
RCD	Royal Canadian Dragoons
RCE	Royal Canadian Engineers
RCGA	Royal Canadian Garrison Artillery
RCHA	Royal Canadian Horse Artillery
RCR	The Royal Canadian Regiment
RFC	Royal Flying Corps
RNAS	Royal Naval Air Service
SMLE	Short magazine Lee-Enfield rifle
WAAC	Women's Army Auxiliary Corps
WO	War Office
WOI	War Office Instruction

The Canadian Expeditionary Force was a division created for the purpose of the First World War, and was the only Canadian formation to see combat in the war. It was composed of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, the Canadian Mounted Rifles, the Canadian Trenchers, and the Canadian Trenchers.

## Preface

Manpower is the lifeblood of armies regardless of time or place. The importance of this resource has been emphasized by Charles Messenger, a British historian, who has concluded that "irrespective of what happened on the battlefield, the [British] army's greatest struggle during 1914-1918 was obtaining and maintaining the necessary strength to meet increasing commitments."<sup>1</sup> As with the British army, much of Canada's military effort in the First World War was engaged in the struggle to provide the trained soldiers necessary to sustain the Canadian Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium - not just the Canadian Corps, but the Canadian Cavalry Brigade and the legions of administrative units in the rear areas as well. However, the struggle to do this has been largely overlooked by Canadian historians, a surprising omission considering that, all things being equal, success on the battlefield ultimately depended on the supply of manpower.

This is an organizational study and is therefore impersonal. This is not to say that the experiences of individual soldiers are not important; clearly they were, and Canadian historians have devoted considerable effort to examining their hopes, fears and experiences. But, military life as experienced by these soldiers was shaped not only by organizations created by the Canadian Forces throughout the war but also by personnel policies that dictated their terms of service. Understanding the experiences of the private soldier, therefore, demands some knowledge of the administrative and bureaucratic environment in which the soldier lived, worked and fought.

The Canadian Expeditionary Force was a wartime creation, but had its roots in the peacetime army, both the Permanent Force and the Active Militia. While the influence of peacetime army diminished as the war ground on, the attitudes, beliefs and outlooks at all

levels from Militia HQ to individual units were shaped in varying degrees by prewar customs and policies. Chapter 1 is therefore devoted to a discussion of the prewar Canadian military, the organization, recruiting and training. War is very much a 'come as you are' affair, and for that reason Chapter 1 also discusses not only the training state of the militia, but also the weapons and equipment on which the training was based.

A recent study of Germany's Panzer arm by Dennis Showalter discusses philosophical approaches to war and notes that military planners who view war as an exercise in management believe that "Military effectiveness depends on the rational mobilization and application of human and material resources."<sup>2</sup> God may be on the side of the big battalions, as Napoleon is said to have remarked, but the men for these battalions were drawn from the manpower pool of the nation and the extent to which they were available depended very much on the nation's manpower policies. Chapter 2 is therefore devoted to a discussion of how Canada and the Canadian military managed manpower. The failure of the Borden Government to balance the competing interests of industry, agriculture and the military is considered as well as the inability of the Canadian Expeditionary Force to husband its most important asset – manpower.

Recruiting, with its monster rallies, strident newspaper stories, public demonstrations and recruiting sergeants equipped with white feathers on every street corner, was a highly visible process that has been studied by a wide variety of historians. Their conclusions have varied, but in general, they have regarded recruiting, at least in 1915-1916, as patriotic chaos with Militia and District HQ assigning quotas, but otherwise providing little in the way of direction or assistance.<sup>3</sup> But, this overlooks the role of the military hierarchy in formulating and disseminating policy as well as

monitoring and coordinating recruiting efforts at all levels in the chain of command. District commanders, for example, enjoyed substantial powers and could be ruthless with unit commanders and others who did not toe the line. The obituary for Major-General Logie of Military District 2 in Toronto, an outstanding district commander, said in part: "Although stern with his officers and frowning upon battalion commanders who considered their appointments as social adornments, General Logie was ever considerate of the shortcomings of raw recruits."<sup>4</sup> In short, Logie must have been a holy terror to commanding officers who had difficulties meeting his expectations. Brigadier-General Cruikshank of Military District 13 in Alberta was equally impatient with commanding officers who crossed him. In July 1915, for example, he discovered that the 63<sup>rd</sup> Battalion was not recruiting in Calgary as directed. His letter to the offending commanding officer was couched in no uncertain terms: "This to say the least is very extraordinary and would indicate a desire to evade my instructions."<sup>5</sup> Brigadier-General Hemming of Military District 3 in Eastern Ontario was even more direct and in January 1917 sent a blood-curdling letter to the commanding officer of the 252<sup>nd</sup> Battalion and other units that had failed to meet their recruiting quotas. "It is pointed out," Hemming wrote, "that the present progress of recruiting will take some four years to recruit to the required strength, and it is regretted that this length of time cannot be allowed. I wish to inform you personally that unless immediate improvement is made I shall recommend the removal of the majority of the Officers of the 252<sup>nd</sup> and replace them with others who will show some initiative and action."<sup>6</sup> With district commanders such as these, it is clear, notwithstanding the public manifestations of the recruiting effort, that the military, not

the community, controlled recruiting. Chapter 3 discusses the extent to which this control was exercised as well as the growth of the various recruiting organizations in Canada.

Chapter 4 examines recruiting criteria: the standards that had to be met by those who joined. Not surprisingly, these standards changed continually as the war went on. Height, age, vision and citizenship requirements were all revised while groups marginalized by society, including natives, Asians, Orientals and blacks, became increasingly welcome. Militia Headquarters was not a passive participant in this process of change but actively sought to modify criteria to suit changing circumstances. Chapter 4 concludes that recruiting criteria were dynamic, evolving to meet perceived needs, and were, by and large, firmly controlled by the military,

Chapter 5 discusses the application of recruiting criteria and its impact on the number of potential recruits in the national manpower pool. The need of key industries for manpower is reviewed and an estimate is made of the number of men that could reasonably be expected to be available for military service. Efforts to augment the manpower pool by enlisting criminals and recruiting outside of Canada are also discussed. Of particular interest is the British-Canadian Recruiting Mission, an agency that established recruiting offices across the United States and enlisted more than 33,000 men for the Canadian Expeditionary Force – about 6% of all enlistments. Also considered is the use of women to replace able-bodied men for service at the front and the half-hearted attempt in 1918 to create the Canadian Women's Auxiliary Army Corps.

Chapter 6 concerns entry-level training. Critical issues dealt with include control – directing the training, setting the standards, and implementing administrative procedures. Little is known of the subjects taught to the new recruits and for that reason



the chapter contains a detailed discussion of training programs and their evolution. The difficulties of training in Canada because of equipment shortages, administrative policies and obsolete weapons are examined at length, as are the effects of the inefficient training structure in England. These difficulties, at least in England, were finally resolved when the Ministry of the Overseas Military Forces of Canada was created in December 1916, although the effect was to create two armies, one in Canada and the other overseas. Coordinating these two armies was difficult since neither controlled the other and it was not until Militia Headquarters acquiesced to the Overseas Forces in December 1917 that some measure of unity was achieved.

Little has been written of the policies and procedures for providing reinforcements from England to units at the front and Chapter 7, therefore, discusses this at length. Also considered in this chapter is the nature of the wastage which dictated the need for reinforcements: battle losses, sickness and postings to other units. Even when this wastage was promptly replaced, battalions were still short of men because of those on command, on course or left out of battle. All in all, the average battalion, even when fully manned, could put only two-thirds of its strength into the trenches, a manning shortfall that was of deep concern to the units at the front.

Chapter 8 discusses the evolution of the reinforcement system in Canada from regional depots in 1914 to territorial depot battalions in 1918. This chapter argues that no long-lasting coherent reinforcement structure could be created because of manning decisions made by Sam Hughes, the Minister of Militia and Defence, and Sir Robert Borden, the Prime Minister. Arguably it was not until Hughes resigned that Militia Headquarters, after an ill-fated experiment with militia depot companies, was able to

create territorial depot battalions affiliated with reserve battalions in England, an organization that stood up well under the unprecedented demands of the Hundred Days. Chapter 9 argues that at the beginning of the war, the reinforcement system was based on prewar doctrine with training units in England and base depots in France along the Channel coast. These two components were neither well-organized nor coordinated, with the result that units were either starved of men or provided with reinforcements who only partially trained. By late 1917, however, the prewar system had been largely discarded and the reinforcement structures in England and France were well-organized and coordinated. Within the limitations imposed by external factors such as the irregular flow of men from Canada, this system was able to provide sufficient numbers of well-trained reinforcements in a timely manner. Moreover, part of this system, the Canadian Corps Reinforcement Camp, was largely designed by Canadians to suit Canadian requirements.

A number of Canadian historians have dealt with the Canadian Expeditionary Force, but, with the exception of Desmond Morton, most have viewed Canadians in isolation without considering if the experiences of other dominions were similar.<sup>7</sup> Canadian Forces overseas were treated as an integral part of the British army and were governed by British policies and instructions. To put developments in Canadian policies and organizations into context, therefore, parallel developments elsewhere in the British Expeditionary Force have been considered. In a few instances, developments in the Australian Imperial Force have also been considered since the Australians were governed by British instructions as well.

...not only the ... had developed ...

Some of what has been written about the Canadian Corps in particular not only views the Corps in isolation but relies on numbers and is tinged with patriotic chauvinism. Canadian historian Shane Schreiber, for example, has attributed much of the success of the Corps in 1918 to the fact that, unlike the British Expeditionary Force that reduced infantry divisions to nine battalions, Canadian divisions retained twelve infantry battalions each.<sup>8</sup> This claim does not stand up to scrutiny. The New Zealand Division also maintained twelve infantry battalions throughout the war.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, these battalions were maintained at full strength and the average monthly strength of the New Zealand Division during the Hundred Days was 11,496 infantrymen as compared to the average Canadian division with 10,027 infantrymen.<sup>10</sup> But, it appears that the New Zealand Division was not as effective during the Hundred Days as the Canadian Corps. It seems clear, therefore, that the size of the Canadian divisions was not the decisive factor that made them superior to other divisions.

Peter Simkins, a British historian, has analyzed battles fought by British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand divisions during the Hundred Days and has concluded that the average success rate in opposed attacks by British divisions in the Fourth Army was "70.7 percent – identical to the average success rate of the five Australian divisions (70.7 percent), only slightly lower than the average for the four Canadian divisions (72.5 percent) and higher than that of the New Zealand Division (64.5 per cent)."<sup>11</sup> While other analysts may arrive at different conclusions, the fact remains that some of the British divisions were virtually as effective as the Canadians. This in no way detracts from the outstanding achievements of the Corps during the Hundred Days, but it does indicate that by 1918, it was not only the Canadians who had developed hard-

hitting, professional assault divisions. The level of competency in the Canadian Corps needs to be firmly situated within developments elsewhere in the British Expeditionary Force to put matters into context.

To date, there has been no comprehensive study of administration in the Canadian Expeditionary Force or the British Expeditionary Force, apart from Ian Brown's groundbreaking study of British logistics in France and Belgium.<sup>12</sup> However, Brown was concerned only with the organization of transportation and the supply of materiel and did not touch on the vital question of reinforcements.

Seldom considered by historians is the development of Canadian staffs, both in Canada and overseas, as well as the subordination of military interests to civil direction. Stephen Harris's book Canadian Brass provides a good overview of the development of a professional army in both peace and war and is essential to understanding the functions of the Minister of Militia and Defence, the Militia Council and Militia Headquarters itself.<sup>13</sup> Canadian Brass includes the development of staff functions in Canada and overseas, but given the chronological scope (1860-1939), only the broad outline of developments in the Great War are discussed. Richard Walker's dissertation on Canadian military and political relations also provides some useful insights, but is concerned with developments from 1898 to 1945 and discussion on the Canadian Expeditionary Force is therefore limited.<sup>14</sup>

Both official histories are indispensable. The Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-1919 and the accompanying volume of appendices and maps contain a wealth of information.<sup>15</sup> However, the sole volume of the projected eight-volume series covers only the period up to the arrival of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Division in

Belgium in September 1915 and is therefore limited. Colonel Nicholson's Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919, on the other hand, is concerned with matters in Canada, England, France and Siberia from the creation of the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Division in 1914 to demobilization in 1919.<sup>16</sup> The book is a 'must' for any serious historian, but much of what is discussed concerns Canadian Corps operations on the battlefield and as Nicholson himself admitted, the scope was such that events could be covered "only in broad outline, for the limitations imposed by the covers of a single book have ruled out the inclusion of much detail."<sup>17</sup> There is also a one-volume history of Canadian medical services produced by Sir Andrew Macphail in 1925.<sup>18</sup> While the book contains some valuable information and background, it is by no means clear if Macphail had complete access to the relevant documents. Moreover, in the case of Canadian Command Depots, it has not been possible to reconcile Macphail's account with the archival evidence.

Desmond Morton's book A Peculiar Kind of Politics discusses the Ministry of the Overseas Military Forces of Canada at length and is the only comprehensive history of the development, structure and impact of this Ministry, unique in Canadian military history. Broad in scope, the book offers a sweeping, definitive summary of the Ministry and its operations. However, Morton's approach is top-down and does not include the effect of the Ministry on training or the provision of reinforcements at the individual or unit level.

There are several divisional histories that deal with training. Shoestring Soldiers by Andrew Iarocci is concerned with the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Division: mobilization, training and operations in France and Belgium in 1915.<sup>19</sup> But the book is an operational history and the discussion of mobilization and training is used only to put the performance of the

division in battle into context. Despite this, Shoestring Soldiers is a useful introduction to the issues of individual and collective training in the early stages of the war. We Lead, Others Follow by Kenneth Radley is also concerned with the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Division.<sup>20</sup> Unlike Iarocci, Radley discusses developments in the division from mobilization in 1914 to the Armistice in 1918. Radley is one of the few Canadian historians to acknowledge that the Canadian Corps was but one of twenty-three corps in the British Expeditionary Force and he has considered the effects of some British policies and direction. We Lead, Others Follow, however, is limited since it deals only with the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Division and not the Canadian Corps or the Canadian Expeditionary Force as a whole. No academic studies of the remaining three divisions in the Corps have been published, although David Campbell of the University of Calgary produced a dissertation in 2003 on the 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Division.<sup>21</sup> The dissertation offers some useful insights into the way in which the division handled untrained reinforcements in December 1916 and briefly considers the role of the base depots but his terminology is questionable. Campbell considers 'wastage', for example, but it appears that he refers to battle casualties only and not the overall losses, all of which had to be replaced.

Training depended to a very great extent on the availability and use of both equipment and weapons. Both Tim Cook's No Place to Run and Bill Rawling's Surviving Trench Warfare contain useful insights into gas warfare as well as technology and its impact on operations.<sup>22</sup> Unfortunately both deal with the Canadian Corps in France and not to the Canadian Expeditionary Force as a whole. A useful summary of Canadian infantry equipment is contained in Jack Summers's Tangled Web.<sup>23</sup> There is, however, no authoritative account of the types, characteristics and limitations of Canadian weapons

used in the First World War apart from Roger Phillips's and Francis Chadwick's The Ross Rifle Story.<sup>24</sup> The book is useful, but is concerned mainly with the Ross Rifle Factory and not the use of the Ross rifle by the Canadian Expeditionary Force. Although dated, Major Reynolds's The Lee-Enfield Rifle contains some useful information on what became the standard Canadian rifle in 1916.<sup>25</sup>

Several historians have produced statistical analyses of recruiting and manpower in the Canadian Expeditionary Force. Robert Craig Brown and Donald Loveridge in 1982 examined regional variations in recruiting, the role of the militia and local organizers and the factors which forced the government to adopt conscription in 1917.<sup>26</sup> Their article contains some useful insights, but their analysis is confined to the infantry only and ignores the many battalions allowed to recruit outside of their parent district. Census data of males age 15 and older is also used, although The Canada Year Book 1918 contains a summary by province of all males of military age (18-45).<sup>27</sup> Nor is any allowance made for immigrants from enemy countries who, for the most part, were unable to join in 1914-1917, but were freely conscripted in 1918 provided they had been naturalized. No attempt has been made to account for American residents who trekked north to enlist nor do the authors differentiate between those enlisted in Canada and those enlisted in Bermuda, Britain, France, Belgium and the United States.

Chris Sharpe has produced a regional analysis of enlistments in the Canadian Expeditionary Force from 1914 to 1918.<sup>28</sup> Like Brown and Loveridge, his article offers some food for thought. However, his analysis suffers from the same shortcomings. As well, he makes no attempt to reconcile census figures with the summary of enlistments, presumably prepared by military districts whose boundaries did not always coincide with

provincial boundaries. Nor does he consider the fact that two districts were not created until 1917: Military District 7 in New Brunswick and Military District 12 in Saskatchewan.

This dissertation deals with recruiting, training and the provision of reinforcements as separate, although closely related, functions. However, in some cases, the same agency was responsible for two or more of these functions. The creation of Headquarters Overseas Military Forces of Canada, for example, is discussed in both Chapters 6 and 9. However, the former discusses the influence of the Headquarters on training while the latter is concerned with the impact of the Headquarters on the reinforcement structure. Similarly, the same agencies in Canada appear in both Chapters 3 and 8. But, one chapter deals with recruiting while the other is concerned with reinforcements. The emphasis, then, is on the function and not the entity.

The dissertation is lengthy although efforts have been made to reduce the length. However, manpower has not been examined in depth by Canadian historians and there is no body of published works to draw from. For that reason it has been necessary to discuss various aspects of personnel administration in detail.

Prior to 1916, Canada was organized into six divisional areas and three military districts. To avoid confusion with divisions of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, the term 'military district' is used in place of 'divisional area' from Chapter 2 onward although, strictly speaking, the term is inaccurate in discussing developments in 1914-1915.



This dissertation deals with non-commissioned reinforcements and ignores the complex issues of training and providing officer reinforcements. Similarly, the discussion is restricted to entry-level training only. It is acknowledged that there was considerable specialist training as well as training conducted in the forward area by the Canadian Corps, but these are separate subjects best dealt with elsewhere.

As noted earlier, all things being equal, success in battle depends on an ample supply of well-trained reinforcements. However, providing these reinforcements meant the creation of an efficient system of recruiting, training and forwarding men to replace wastage at the front. Developing this system was not easy. In the early years, arrangements were ad hoc and inefficient. By 1918, however, Canada had created an efficient system of providing reinforcements that stood the test of battle. In the process, the Canadian Forces moved from an amateur militia force to a professional army. There were broader aspects as well that touched on both the state and society. This dissertation is the story of how Canada's wartime military manpower policies marked these changes.

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- <sup>2</sup> Showalter, Dennis. Hitler's Panzers: The Lightning Attacks that Revolutionized Warfare. (New York: The Berkley Publishing Group, 2009) p.9
- <sup>3</sup> Haycock, Ronald. Sam Hughes: The Public Career of a Controversial Canadian, 1885-1916. (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1986) p.200;
- <sup>4</sup> Toronto Globe 7 June 1933 p.1
- <sup>5</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4718 File 448-14-169, DOC MD 13 to CO 63<sup>rd</sup> Battalion 9 July 1915
- <sup>6</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4426 File 26-5-64-2 Vol 2, GOC MD 3 to OC 252<sup>nd</sup> Battalion 2 January 1917
- <sup>7</sup> Morton, Desmond. A Peculiar Kind of Politics: Canada's Overseas Ministry in the First World War. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982) pp.207-209
- <sup>8</sup> Schreiber, Shane. Shock Army of the British Empire: the Canadian Corps in the last 100 days of the Great War. (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1997)
- <sup>9</sup> Wicksteed, Major M.R. The New Zealand Army: A History from the 1840s to the 1980s. (Wellington, New Zealand: Government Printer, 1982) p.23; Stewart, Colonel H. The New Zealand Division 1916-1919: A Popular History Based on Official Records. (Auckland, New Zealand: Whitcombe and Tombs Limited, 1921) pp.328 and 610
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- <sup>12</sup> Brown, Ian Malcolm. British Logistics on the Western Front, 1914-1919. (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1998)
- <sup>13</sup> Harris, Stephen. Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army 1860-1939. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988)
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- <sup>15</sup> Duguid, Colonel A. Fortescue. Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-1919: General Series, Volume 1. (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1938)
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- <sup>17</sup> Nicholson. Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919 p.xii
- <sup>18</sup> Macphail, Sir Andrew. Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-1919: The Medical Services. (Ottawa: F.A. Acland, 1925)
- <sup>19</sup> Iarocci, Andrew. Shoestring Soldiers: the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Division at War, 1914-1915 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008)
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- <sup>27</sup> Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics. Canada Year Book 1918. (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1919) pp.99-101
- <sup>28</sup> Sharpe, C.A. "Enlistment in the Canadian Expeditionary Force: A Regional Analysis' in Revue d'Études Canadiennes/Journal of Canadian Studies Volume 18 Number 4 (Hiver 1983-1984 Winter) pp.15-29

## Chapter 1 Militia Roots

From first to last, the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) was a product of the peacetime militia. Admittedly militia influence diminished as the war ground on, but nonetheless it persisted throughout. The growth and development of the CEF was influenced by a wide variety of factors, but most of it was shaped by its peacetime roots — the Permanent Active Militia (known as the Permanent Force or PF), Canada's tiny full-time army and the part-time soldiers in the Active and Reserve Militia.

The PF was small and, in the case of technical corps, inexperienced in field operations. Despite the linguistic duality of the nation, the PF had little or no French language organizational or instructional capability, a shortcoming that persisted throughout the war. Command was difficult and co-ordination by Militia Headquarters was limited. The staff, both in Ottawa and at the various divisions and districts, was small and devoted mainly to administration. The upshot was a considerable degree of decentralization and a sense of autonomy on the part of subordinate units and formations, characteristics that were later evident in the CEF.

Militia regiments were not simply military units, but social organizations that provided diversions for members. In many cases, the need to prepare for war was overlooked and considerable emphasis was placed on public ceremony, which did much in the minds of the participants to justify the existence of the unit. The bonds forged in peacetime were carried over into war, and there was considerable confusion and inefficiency as regiments tried to maintain their corporate identity. Because of these bonds, loyalty to members took precedence over regulations, and men who were overage or physically unfit were enrolled or retained.

Training was severely limited by funding and ceremonial activities together with a lack of equipment served only to reduce the standard further. The high absentee rate at summer camps and the annual turnover in units also played a part. The training standard in many cases was poor, but there were also conscientious and dedicated officers who tried to make training as comprehensive and realistic as possible.

Although logistics is vital in wartime, there were few technical units and little or no training for specialists in administration. In many cases, accommodation for militia units was inadequate and there was also a lack of central training camps. Mobilization for war demanded both equipment and training facilities; in 1914, Canada had neither.

Unlike the CEF, which in the early stages of the war, was predominantly British-born, the militia was more representative of the nation in terms of ethnicity. Moreover, ethnicity was not necessarily a bar to enrolment, and a handful of visible minorities and Aboriginals were able to enlist. This does not mean that racism did not exist; obviously it did, but, for some units, the colour line was not a barrier. The militia was also much more youthful than the CEF, and was also prepared to accept recruits who were manifestly underage. There was the paradox of 1914-1918: the militia that provided the foundation for the CEF was not the force that went to war.

In 1914, Canada's army was known as the Canadian Militia and was divided into an Active and a Reserve Militia. The former consisted of volunteers between the ages of 18 and 45 and paraded either on a part-time basis (Militia) or was embodied on a full-time basis (PF). Both the Militia and the PF were armed, equipped and paid. The Reserve Militia was the vestige of the nineteenth-century Sedentary Militia, and consisted of all

males between the ages of 18 and 60 who were British subjects and capable of bearing arms in the event of a *levée en masse*. The Reserve Militia, with no arms or equipment, was for all intents and purposes defunct by 1914, although a number of units were authorized during the First World War. These war-time units received little or no support from the Department of Militia and Defence, but their existence diverted local enthusiasm for the CEF and added to the workload of the small, over-stretched staff at Militia Headquarters.<sup>1</sup> Rifle clubs and associations were not part of the Canadian Militia, but were provided with weapons and ammunition, and, in an emergency, could be drafted into the Militia. Men could also be balloted under the Militia Act although this was rejected in 1917 in favor of selective conscription.<sup>2</sup>

The PF was the logical base for mobilization, but was hampered by its dual role and limited size. Intended to provide instructors for the Militia and garrisons for Halifax, Québec, and Esquimalt, the PF had only 247 officers and 2,656 men in scattered garrisons across the country.<sup>3</sup> PF units consisted of an under-strength infantry battalion, the Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR), two small cavalry regiments, the Royal Canadian Dragoons (RCD) and Lord Strathcona's Horse (LdSH), two Royal Canadian Horse Artillery (RCHA) batteries at Kingston, and companies of the Royal Canadian Garrison Artillery (RCGA) at Halifax, Québec and Esquimalt. There were also small detachments from the technical corps attached to each division and district.<sup>4</sup> The PF should have been an invaluable source of expertise for the Militia but in practice, the high turnover rate limited the number of instructors that could be provided. In 1912, "the percentage of men discharged [from the PF] was greatly in excess of enlistments."<sup>5</sup> As well, service in the PF did not appeal to most Canadians; between 1905 and 1913, 458 volunteers from the

British Army joined the RCGA and RCR which had a combined establishment of about 900 men.<sup>6</sup> PF technical corps were limited because they had to spend much of their time on house-keeping duties. In the case of the Canadian Engineers (CE), the routine maintenance of works and buildings prevented any training in field engineering, their primary raison d'être in war. The Canadian Army Service Corps (usually referred to as the CPASC, or Canadian Permanent Army Service Corps) had the same problems. More than half of the corps supported the Halifax garrison and the CPASC was neither trained nor equipped for field operations. The Inspector-General considered individual members of the CPASC to be proficient, but British Army instructors were needed if the Corps was to progress beyond a basic level.<sup>7</sup>

While Militia units were responsible for their own training, the PF Instructional Cadre provided assistance and staffed central schools to train officers and NCOs. The Cadre was small, however, and in 1913 there were only 115 infantry and cavalry NCOs available for the whole of the Militia, not even one NCO per unit.<sup>8</sup> Despite this, PF Instructors could be vital to unit efficiency. In St Catharines, for example, the 7<sup>th</sup> Field Battery was issued with the new 18-pounder field gun on 3 May 1912 and simultaneously warned of an artillery concentration at Camp Petawawa starting 8 June 1912. But thanks to Sergeant-Instructor W. Hopkins from the RCHA who taught gun drill three nights a week, the battery was able to master the new equipment and perform creditably at camp.<sup>9</sup> The virtues of the PF Instructor were also celebrated in fiction, such as a short story about an anonymous RCR drill-sergeant published in 1910 by Lieutenant Frederick Curry of the 41<sup>st</sup> Brockville Rifles.<sup>10</sup>

Apart from the limited number of instructors available, there were other problems. The PF was an English-speaking force with no room for unilingual francophones, and few members of the Instructional Cadre could speak French.<sup>11</sup> As a result, English-speaking NCOs were sometimes detailed to francophone units.<sup>12</sup> The RCR maintained eight francophone instructors at No. 5 Regimental Depot in Québec City, but this benefited infantry units in the 5<sup>th</sup> Divisional Area only, and ignored French-speaking units elsewhere, such as the 65<sup>th</sup> Carabiniers Mont-Royal in the 4<sup>th</sup> Divisional Area.<sup>13</sup> The language problem was exacerbated by the lack of training manuals. Only Regulations et Ordonnances à l'usage de la Milice du Canada, Manual d'Infanterie à l'usage de la Milice Canadienne, Traite de tactiques à l'usage des Trois Armes: traduit du Combined Training 1905, and an English translation of the standard pre-war reference, Infantry Training 1911 were available before 1914.<sup>14</sup>

The Canadian Militia had seen tremendous changes in the decade before 1914, in part because of deficiencies exposed during the Boer War, a need to curb the powers of the General Officer Commanding the Canadian Militia, a British officer frequently at loggerheads with the Canadian government, and a desire to modernize the Militia.<sup>15</sup> The most important of these changes was embodied in a new Militia Act introduced in 1904 by Sir Frederick Borden and based on recent reforms in the British Army prompted by Lord Esher's War Office (Reconstitution) Committee. In brief, the British reforms did away with the position of Commander-in-Chief and created a general staff, with four branches headed by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), the Adjutant-General (AG), the Quartermaster-General (QMG), and the Master-General of Ordnance (MGO). None of these branches had primacy, although the CIGS was considered *primus inter*

*pres.* Coordination and general guidance was provided by an Army Council headed by the Secretary of State for War as chairman, with the CIGS, AG, QMG and MGO as military members and two civilian appointees who cared for financial matters and civil matters.<sup>16</sup>

In Canada, the new Militia Act followed the British model with a Militia Council broadly similar to the Army Council.<sup>17</sup> The Minister of Militia and Defence was President, while the Deputy Minister acted as Vice-President. The Accountant and Paymaster General (a civilian appointment) was the Finance Member and the Assistant Deputy Minister was secretary. Military members consisted of the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) who was responsible for operations and training, the AG who was responsible for personnel policies, medical services and cadets, the QMG who handled supply and transport, and the MGO who looked after surveys, engineer services, works, and buildings.<sup>18</sup> Like his British counterpart, the CGS did not have primacy and each military member was responsible to the Minister for his particular branch.<sup>19</sup> Unlike the Army Council which had some executive authority, however, the Militia Council was restricted to advising the Minister "on all matters relating to the Militia which are referred to the Council by the Minister."<sup>20</sup>

In principle, the new organization was sound, with the Minister and his staff meeting frequently on a weekly or fortnightly basis. Although the Council was advisory in nature and (in theory at least) restricted to discussing only those issues raised by the Minister, Borden adopted a collegial approach and under his direction, "the Militia Council met often [and] produced serious political-military consultation."<sup>21</sup> But the



success of the system depended entirely on the personality of the Minister and his willingness to meet with his Council.<sup>22</sup>

The collegial atmosphere established by Borden abruptly changed in 1911 with the appointment of Sam Hughes, a forty-five-year-old newspaper proprietor and long-standing militia officer, as Minister of Militia and Defence. Under Hughes, the Militia Council was reduced to impotence, and after a clash with the CGS, Major-General Colin Mackenzie, Hughes either disregarded the Council or used it simply to implement his orders. The upshot was that staff branches at Militia HQ operated in isolation and there was no effective consideration of problems or coordination of effort, a situation that continued to exist as long as Hughes was in office.<sup>23</sup>

Hughes was a controversial figure, although his biographer has described him as "popular, dynamic, progressive and decisive."<sup>24</sup> This may have been true to some extent, but Hughes was impulsive, eccentric, and ruthless, and did much to bring about chaos, particularly after the war broke out. Some of what he did had a positive effect on the Militia but, as Sir George Foster wrote in 1915, his methods brought about "widespread feelings of bitterness and insecurity induced by the continuous displays of strong and insulting language and indiscretions."<sup>25</sup> From first to last, Hughes did not understand the nature of his position. As one historian has commented, "the opportunities for damage were incalculable when the minister of defence happened to be impetuous, imperious, and unable to understand the peculiar complexities of managing armed forces in a democratic polity."<sup>26</sup> After the war, W.A. Griesbach, a prominent Edmonton lawyer and Conservative Party organizer, acknowledged Hughes's accomplishments, but added that "He had little or no idea of the proper functioning of the staff and was despotic, if not

tyrannical. How the wretched staff at National Defence Headquarters carried on, I do not know. I suspect that they did not carry on at all."<sup>27</sup>

The "wretched staff" at Militia HQ staff was small in relation to their responsibility for a large and complex organization that stretched from one coast to the other. In March, 1914, on the eve of war, there were only thirty-five staff officers at Militia HQ, including the Director of Cadet Services in the AG Branch. Surprisingly, the largest was the MGO Branch with thirteen staff officers, although this included eight officers employed on survey and inspection duties. The CGS Branch had seven officers employed in Operations, Training, Musketry, Intelligence, and Signalling. Significantly, there was no staff officer with responsibility for mobilization, although in practice this was handled by Major G.C.W. Gordon-Hall, the Director of Military Operations.<sup>28</sup>

Command and control with such a small staff was difficult, and responsibility for training had to be delegated to subordinate Headquarters. Militia HQ issued annual instructions outlining the conduct of training, but these were not mandatory and were "merely a guide to officers, in the training of those units under their command."<sup>29</sup> To compensate for this, there was an Inspector-General charged with general supervision, but the sheer number of units meant that most of the inspections had to be carried out by local commanders.<sup>30</sup>

Decentralization of training meant that Divisional and District Commanders enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy, which in turn was passed on to units. At Camp Sewell in 1914, for example, "Every effort was made to decentralize the work of training, and to make the Officers of the Militia responsible for the training of their Units."<sup>31</sup> Under the circumstances, decentralization with its attendant autonomy may

have been inevitable, but it meant that uniformity was difficult to achieve. This was not an issue in peacetime, when units operated only within the bounds of their particular division or district, but later became a major problem during the war, when units from across Canada arrived in England with varying standards of training.

The need for a larger staff was recognized during the war; as summarized in Table 1, there were eighty-nine staff officers at Militia HQ by July 1918. But at this point in the war, responsibilities had shifted. The *Military Service Act* (MSA) which provided draftees was administered by the Military Service Branch of the Department of Justice and responsibility for training had been largely handed over to Headquarters Overseas Military Forces of Canada (OMFC) in England.<sup>32</sup> The revised HQ organization reflected the new division of responsibilities, and most of the increase (forty-two officers) was in the AG Branch and the newly created Judge Advocate General Branch. Only four officers were added to the General Staff Branch, which indicates that Militia HQ had become an administrative body only. Despite the increase during the war, the HQ remained understaffed in relation to its responsibilities. The CGS, Major-General Sir Willoughby Gwatkin, routinely worked until well after midnight and shouldered a workload that brought him to the verge of a nervous breakdown.<sup>33</sup> Others suffered as well. In 1920, the AG wrote to Brigadier-General R.J. Gwynne, who was forced to leave because of ill-health, to express his regrets "that your unremitting devotion to your duties during the war made it necessary for you to retire."<sup>34</sup> Under the circumstances it is, perhaps, no surprise that coordination of specific issues was sometimes fumbled.

Table 1  
Militia HQ Staff Appointments 1914 and 1918<sup>35</sup>

Branch	31 March 1914	1 July 1918	Difference
CGS	7	11	+4
AG	7	40	+33
QMG	4	6	+2
MGO	13	12	-1
Finance	4	3	-1
Inspectors-General	0	8	+8
Judge Advocate General	0	9	+9
Totals	35	89	+54

Notes: (1) In 1914, the Inspector-General was part of the CGS Branch.

(2) In 1915 the War Purchasing Committee assumed responsibilities for equipment procurement from the MGO.

Militia HQ did not exercise command directly, but through divisions and military districts, each with specific boundaries. Divisions, located in the Maritime provinces, Québec, and Ontario, were intended to counter the threat of an invasion by fielding formed bodies of troops. Each division was divided into brigades and, on paper, had the requisite number of arms units.<sup>36</sup> But the structure was not balanced and the divisions were administrative and not operational entities. Units such as cavalry regiments were therefore allocated to divisions other than their own. This seems to have been a paper exercise, however; there is no record, for example, of the 24<sup>th</sup> Grey's Horse, from the 1<sup>st</sup> Divisional area, training with the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division.<sup>37</sup> Districts, on the other hand, were intended to be geographic entities responsible for training and administering units.<sup>38</sup>

Table 2  
District and Divisional Organization  
31 March 1914<sup>39</sup>

Division of District	Headquarters	Province	Remarks
1 <sup>st</sup> Divisional Area	London	Ontario	South-west Ontario
2 <sup>nd</sup> Divisional Area	Toronto	Ontario	Central and northern Ontario
3 <sup>rd</sup> Divisional Area	Kingston	Ontario	Eastern Ontario and western Québec
4 <sup>th</sup> Divisional Area	Montréal	Québec	
5 <sup>th</sup> Divisional Area	Québec	Québec	
6 <sup>th</sup> Divisional Area	Halifax	Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island	
Military District 10	Winnipeg	Manitoba and Saskatchewan	Included Districts of Thunder Bay and Rainy River in Ontario
Military District 11	Victoria	British Columbia and Yukon Territory	
Military District 13	Edmonton	Alberta	Included the Territory of Mackenzie

Notes: (1) Divisions were redesignated as districts in 1916.

(2) Military District 12 (Saskatchewan) was created in 1916.

(3) Military District 7 (New Brunswick) was created in 1917.

The structure of each Divisional or District HQ was similar to Militia HQ, with a small staff that reflected the emphasis on administration rather than operations and training. HQ 6<sup>th</sup> Division in Halifax, responsible for the Maritime provinces, was perhaps typical, with three staff officers handling operations, training, signals, and intelligence with eleven other officers employed in administrative positions. Like Militia HQ, the ability of the 6<sup>th</sup> Division HQ to plan and conduct operations or training was limited, and much of this responsibility had to be delegated to units. Most of the units in the 6<sup>th</sup> Division were grouped into three infantry brigades (16<sup>th</sup>, 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup>), but the brigade commanders were part-time militia officers, had no HQ staff beyond a part-time brigade-

major, and, like their subordinate commanding officers, were lieutenant-colonels; depending on the personalities involved, this could turn command into an exercise in tact and diplomacy.<sup>40</sup> Under the circumstances, close supervision was impossible, and units had a substantial amount of discretion and autonomy.

In 1914, there were 235 Militia units scattered across the country. The force was dominated by the arms, the 163 artillery, cavalry and infantry units. The remaining seventy-two units were provided by the Canadian Army Medical Corps (CAMC), CASC, Canadian Engineers (CE), and the Canadian Signal Corps. Although small Militia detachments of the Canadian Ordnance Corps (COC) and Canadian Army Veterinary Corps (CAVC) were in the process of being formed by 1914, most of the technical corps existed in the PF only. Units were predominantly English-speaking and there were only seventeen infantry battalions, one regiment of garrison artillery, and one field battery with French as the working language.<sup>41</sup>

Table 3  
Militia Units 31 March 1914<sup>42</sup>

Corps	Number
Artillery	32
Cavalry	35
Field Engineer	22
Infantry	96
Canadian Signal Corps	6
CAMC	23
CASC	21
Total	235

Apart from these units which actually existed, a further seventy-four units had been authorized but not organized.<sup>43</sup> For the most part, these were technical and administrative units without the glamour attached to the infantry, cavalry, and artillery,

an important consideration in a volunteer force with few material benefits. Still, they were necessary if the Militia ever mobilized and took to the field for more than a few days.

Table 4  
Authorized Units Not Formed  
As of 31 March 1914

Unit Type	Number Authorized and Not Formed	Number Authorized and Formed	Total
Artillery Ammunition Columns	14	3	17
Artillery Division HQ	6	0	6
Artillery Brigade HQ	9	17	26
Engineer Field Companies	7	13	20
CE Telegraph Detachments	4	8	12
Wireless Detachments	5	1	6
CAMC Units	5	21	26
CASC Companies	12	21	33
Mounted Company Corps of Guides	6	0	6
Divisional Train HQ	6	0	6
Total	74	84	158

For practical reasons, some of these units could not be fully organized in peacetime. The six CASC Divisional Trains, for example, had a combined establishment of 1080 vehicles and 1,920 draught horses.<sup>44</sup> The cost of purchasing and housing all of these animals and vehicles would have been prohibitive. A reduced establishment could

have been adopted for training purposes, but there is no evidence that this was ever considered.

Most Militia units had a high annual turnover, which affected both administration and training. There is an abundance of anecdotal evidence, but statistics are available for only a few units, such as the 7<sup>th</sup> Fusiliers of London, 22<sup>nd</sup> Oxford Rifles of Woodstock, and the 13<sup>th</sup> Royal Regiment in Hamilton. The 13<sup>th</sup> seems to have had the highest turnover. Based on a sample of 897 men who joined between 1899 and 1909, the 13<sup>th</sup> Regiment took in 75 recruits annually to replace its losses. However, this is only a partial sample of men with surnames between 'A' and 'E', and it is probable that, on average, about 200 recruits joined every year.<sup>45</sup> In the 7<sup>th</sup> Fusiliers, which had six companies and an establishment of about 400 all ranks, 1,563 recruits were enrolled between 1899 and 1909 – an average of 142 every year.<sup>46</sup> Lastly, in the 22<sup>nd</sup> Regiment, with a smaller establishment of only four companies, 301 men joined between 1910 and 1913.<sup>47</sup>

The poor retention rate, and the pressure on units to attend camps with as many men as possible, meant that recruiting was geared to the collective training cycle. In the 7<sup>th</sup> Fusiliers, there were two distinct intakes every year. The spring draft averaged 108 recruits and was intended to bring the unit up to strength for summer camp, while the fall draft, which averaged 34 men, served to reinforce the unit for the annual Thanksgiving sham battle.<sup>48</sup> The 13<sup>th</sup> Regiment had a similar routine, with intakes in spring and autumn. Both units paraded from March to October only, and the two intakes meant a proportion of the unit's NCOs were permanently devoted to recruit training. As well, recruits tended to join over a two- or three-month period. Those who joined in March, for example, were reasonably well trained for the summer camp at the end of June, while



those who were enrolled in May were virtually raw recruits. Units spent a disproportionate amount of their time and energy on recruiting and basic training at the expense of refresher training for the trained soldiers. More importantly, the large numbers of inexperienced soldiers effectively prevented the unit from conducting advanced training in a meaningful way.

Not all recruits were untrained. In the 13<sup>th</sup> Regiment, 185 (or 21%) of the 897 men who joined between 1897 and 1909 were re-enlistments (177) or serving militiamen re-engaging after their three-year term of enlistment (8). The high proportion of recruits with former service suggests that, in the 13<sup>th</sup> at least, militia service had some attractions, but whether these were economic, patriotic or militaristic is not clear. This is an isolated example, however, and further research into other regiments may present a substantially different picture.

The voluntary nature of the Militia called for a considerable degree of consensus on the part of those involved. Commanding officers might have had substantial autonomy, but they were not omnipotent and could be forced to resign if there was no consensus among the officers. Lieutenant-Colonel R.B. Hamilton, for example, was removed from command of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Regiment (Queen's Own Rifles of Canada) in 1896, largely because he did not enjoy the support of the officers and senior NCOs.<sup>49</sup> In 1915, disagreements arose between Lieutenant-Colonel F.B. Ross and the officers of the 13<sup>th</sup> Regiment which led Ross to resign, "believing it to be in the best interests of my old regiment."<sup>50</sup> The need for collegiality and consensus within units was generally recognized, and inspection reports frequently commented on this aspect. Comments made in 1913 by the AAG 2<sup>nd</sup> Division about the 48<sup>th</sup> Highlanders were typical: "An excellent

Esprit de corps prevails throughout all ranks and the Commanding Officer [J.A. Currie, MP] is well supported by his officers in all matters affecting the welfare of the Regiment."<sup>51</sup>

But there were drawbacks to Militia collegiality and consensus, especially in rural units, as Lieutenant-Colonel A.W. Currie noted in 1913: the 104<sup>th</sup> Regiment was "largely recruited from small towns and rural districts where the officer and private are often intimately associated in civil life. Too often the officer fears that insisting on things being done in a regimental way may interfere with his relations with his men in civil life."<sup>52</sup>

The same trend was evident in other corps. In Winnipeg, the 79<sup>th</sup> Cameron Highlanders was perhaps more fraternal than military. Recruits were charged a five dollar enrolment fee, while officers, who contributed their pay to Regimental funds, had to pay \$12.87 per soldier to make up the difference between the actual cost of highland uniforms and the Government grant.<sup>53</sup> The 79<sup>th</sup> was an exclusive unit: "The selection process for candidates closely paralleled that of such men's organizations as the St. Andrew's Society; no outside man was permitted to join companies without the approval of the members of that particular company. Each name was put before a committee, voted on by the company, and finally approved by the officers of that company."<sup>54</sup>

Most units insisted on financial contributions from members. The 7<sup>th</sup> Fusiliers demanded that all ranks, with the exception of bandsmen, contribute their pay to Regimental Funds. But in compensation, all Fusiliers were able to take advantage of the Regimental Rifle Association and the Men's Recreation Room, while the Athletic Association organized a series of sporting events.<sup>55</sup> Regimental institutes such as these were an important part of unit life, as Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell emphasized in 1911:

“the Officers were unanimously of the opinion that a man’s reading and recreation room was absolutely necessary in order that the Regiment might be able to compete in some measure at least with the numerous outside attractions.”<sup>56</sup> In Kamloops, A Squadron of the 30<sup>th</sup> British Columbia Horse, presumably using funds donated by members of the squadron, “rented rooms to establish a mess and club room, and although the men were to sponsor frequent dances in the drill hall, it was at the mess where the riflemen and their friends had their ‘smokers’ and more intimate entertainment.”<sup>57</sup> Elsewhere, the 63<sup>rd</sup> Halifax Rifles not only fielded a baseball team, but leased the Reform Club Hall in Dartmouth and fitted up a gymnasium and club room “where the men have been able to get physical instruction and to spend many a social hour.”<sup>58</sup>

The recreational side of the Militia not only encouraged retention, but helped bring in recruits. A study of the 22<sup>nd</sup> Oxford Rifles in Woodstock, Ontario, suggests that organized sports broadened the appeal of militia service by allowing workingmen to participate in activities normally reserved for non-manual workers. With the camaraderie of the mess and canteen, the 22<sup>nd</sup> was, in effect, “a male social club, without the dues of a fraternal order.”<sup>59</sup> In military terms, militia recreational activities were thought to benefit the unit directly. The Commanding Officer of the 7<sup>th</sup> Fusiliers believed that the low rates of pay at summer camps discouraged recruiting, and that city corps should “be provided with reading-rooms, gymnasiums and swimming baths for the men in order to offset the attractions which are being offered them in other directions and, thereby, preventing them from enlisting.”<sup>60</sup>

Recreational activities and messes were necessary in a chronically under-funded volunteer organization that paraded from March to October only, and units organized a

wide variety of activities for the benefit of their members. In Toronto, each unit fielded an officers' baseball team which competed for the Toronto Garrison Championship at the University Avenue Armoury, while in London, the 7<sup>th</sup> Fusiliers stood down after Thanksgiving and spent "a few months of relaxation and pleasure in the form of athletic contests, basketball and baseball, on the floor of the Armouries, shooting competitions in the gallery [indoor range], and Company dinners."<sup>61</sup> Rural units without armouries made a valiant effort to find facilities. In 1912, the 12<sup>th</sup> York Rangers (a rural unit) was allowed to use unheated municipal buildings in Toronto, although it was not "easy to enjoy club and gymnasium privileges in a room without heating or lighting, and the reek of horse manure from the city stables below."<sup>62</sup> The 12<sup>th</sup>, however, was better off than other rural units, such as the 23<sup>rd</sup> Northern Pioneers which borrowed agricultural halls for drill and had no recreational facilities to keep the units together.<sup>63</sup>

Who were these militiamen? Few memoirs exist, and those that do were written by officers. Archival holdings are scanty and most units appear to have destroyed their personnel records. Still, enough has survived that some general observations can be made. Records of the 22<sup>nd</sup> Oxford Rifles indicate that 63% of those who joined between 1910 and 1913 were British-born, but this may have been an anomaly.<sup>64</sup> The Commanding Officer of the 7<sup>th</sup> Fusiliers complained that 75% of the recruits in 1910-1911 and 60% of the recruits in 1912 were British-born, but this is at odds with earlier recruiting patterns.<sup>65</sup> In the 7<sup>th</sup> Fusiliers, 85% of a sample of 157 men enrolled between 1900 and 1902 had been born in Canada while 4% were born in the United States and 11% in Great Britain. The 13<sup>th</sup> Royal Regiment had a similar pattern, with 79% of those joining between 1894 and 1909 born in Canada and 18.5% in Britain. There was also a

small number from Germany and Russia.<sup>66</sup> The birthplace of recruits in the 7<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> is roughly consistent with the 1901 Census which showed that London was 18% British-born and Hamilton 19.6% British-born.<sup>67</sup>

The peacetime militia was a youthful force. The age of recruits in the 13<sup>th</sup> Royal Regiment between 1894 and 1909 ranged from thirteen to fifty-eight, with an average of 23.2 years or 22.5, if men over forty-five are discounted. In the 7<sup>th</sup> Fusiliers, ages ranged from sixteen to forty-four with an average of 21.4. However, the 157 Fusilier recruits found in the 1901 Census present a somewhat different picture. Ages varied from fourteen to forty-three, with an average of 20.6. Forty-four of the recruits, or 28%, were under the minimum enrolment age of eighteen, a trend that continued during the war.<sup>68</sup>

Regulations specified that recruits had to be between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, but boys of good character aged fourteen to seventeen (or in special cases thirteen) could be enrolled as musicians with the consent of their parent or guardian.<sup>69</sup> While no doubt some of these youthful soldiers had their parents' consent, it seems unlikely that the 7<sup>th</sup> Fusiliers needed forty-four bandmen in a three-year period.

Why were these boys enrolled? Many of them must have been obviously underage. Neither the unit history nor surviving unit records refer to a shortage of recruits, nor is there any apparent correlation between ages and enrolment dates. The simplest explanation may lie in the fact that units saw no harm in using enthusiastic juveniles, either in or out of uniform. At the Thanksgiving maneuvers in 1912, for example, Colonel Logie's brigade from Hamilton employed boy scouts as messengers on the battlefield.<sup>70</sup> There was also a contradiction between the minimum enrolment age of eighteen and the school-leaving age, which in Ontario was fourteen.<sup>71</sup> Perhaps recruiting

sergeants (and others) felt that if a boy could legally make his own way in the world at fourteen, there was no reason why he could not serve with the militia.

Although Canada has been regarded as an intrinsically racist nation, there was a small number of visible minorities in the militia. 'B. Devisie' from India joined the 13<sup>th</sup> Royal Regiment in Hamilton in 1905, while the 23<sup>rd</sup> Alberta Rangers took Privates Chang Soo and Wong Hung as cooks to summer camp in 1907, and Privates Quan Quam and Lee Sing in 1909.<sup>72</sup> The enrolment of Chinese Canadians did not violate any regulations or orders. Militia HQ were well aware the men were Chinese, and were only concerned that they were British subjects who had been properly enrolled.<sup>73</sup>

Blacks had been part of the Canadian Militia as early as 1793, when a number enrolled in the Kent County Militia in Ontario. A Coloured Company fought at Queenston Heights in 1812 and the Coloured Corps of the Incorporated Militia was stationed along the Ontario border from 1838 to 1850.<sup>74</sup> In British Columbia, blacks formed the Colony's first militia unit, the Victoria Pioneer Rifle Corps, in 1860.<sup>75</sup> Although it has been argued that this tradition was not continued after Confederation, blacks served in the militia as individuals, although the names of only a few are known: Willard Taylor of the 7<sup>th</sup> Fusiliers, Joseph Madden of the 19<sup>th</sup> Lincoln Regiment, Edward Murree of the 29<sup>th</sup> (Yarmouth) Field Battery and William Robinson of the 56<sup>th</sup> Grenville Regiment, to name a few. There was at least one black in the PF: Ernest Smyth, from Antigua, who enlisted in the RCR at Three Rivers in 1913.<sup>76</sup> No doubt there were others but, given the relatively small number of blacks in Canada at that time, there could not have been very many.

In the case of the First Nations, much has been made of a supposed national policy issued in 1914 prohibiting Indians from enlisting in the CEF. However, very little has been said about First Nations military service before the war, a tradition that extended back to the American Revolution. The 37<sup>th</sup> Haldimand Rifles, in particular, had a very strong Native component and by 1913, six of the eight companies were recruited exclusively on the Six Nations Reserve.<sup>77</sup> In the 26<sup>th</sup> Middlesex Light Infantry, four companies were based on Reserves at Moraviantown, Muncey, and Sarnia. Aboriginals also served in the regimental band.<sup>78</sup> Further north, the 32<sup>nd</sup> Bruce Regiment band was drawn from the Cape Croker Reserve while C, F and G Companies recruited at the Cape Croker and Chippewa Hill Reserves.<sup>79</sup> Other units recruited native soldiers as well. E Company of the 49<sup>th</sup> Hastings Rifles, based in Tyendinaga, recruited men from Deseronto, while B Company of the 18<sup>th</sup> Franc Tireurs de Saguenay recruited from the Roberval Reserve.<sup>80</sup>

First Nations militiamen were regarded as good soldiers who took their training seriously and showed an aptitude for scouting and night operations. In 1912, the Six Nations companies of the 37<sup>th</sup> were regarded as very good, while the "White Companies [were] young & not up to the others."<sup>81</sup> Native soldiers were regarded as a valuable commodity, and in Québec, the 18<sup>th</sup> Franc Tireurs de Saguenay were pressured by the Division Commander to raise at least one company of Montagnais.<sup>82</sup>

First Nations militiamen were not only soldiers; some were commissioned as officers in the 37<sup>th</sup> Haldimand Rifles, such as A.G.E. Smith (joined later by his brother, C.D. Smith), T.P. Galbraith, J. Cronk, and C.D. Brant.<sup>83</sup> Inspecting Officers considered them to be capable officers, and in 1908 A.G.E. Smith was singled out as a "Clever

officer with good judgment & tact, even temper and self-reliant.”<sup>84</sup> Native soldiers were also employed as NCOs and specialists. In the 32<sup>nd</sup> Bruce Regiment, Color-Sergeant Walter Shawbedees, of the Chippewa Hill Reserve, was responsible for discipline in C Company, while Corporal Alex Johnston of Cape Croker commanded a section in G Company.<sup>85</sup> In the 26<sup>th</sup> Middlesex Light Infantry, First Nations militiamen were also employed as NCOs, with most, if not all, of the Stretcher Bearer section being native as well.<sup>86</sup>

Training in the peacetime militia depended on a number of factors, of which the most important was whether the unit was urban (a city corps) or rural. The former were concentrated entirely in cities, while the latter were dispersed in small towns, villages, and townships in companies, batteries, or squadrons of about fifty men each. The 102<sup>nd</sup> Rocky Mountain Rangers was based entirely in Kamloops, while the 26<sup>th</sup> Middlesex Light Infantry, a rural unit, had isolated companies scattered throughout Middlesex County in Ontario.<sup>87</sup>

City Corps were able to train throughout the year using dedicated armouries. Most of the rural units, however, were usually able to gather only for the annual or bi-annual twelve-day summer camp. Some of the rural companies had drill halls but for many, this was a luxury. In Lethbridge, the 25<sup>th</sup> Independent Field Battery had “no building in which to house the guns, for these were lean years for the Militia. [Major] Stewart [Battery Commander] stowed them in the open behind his house, protected only by muzzle and breech covers. The full establishment of harness he kept in his barn, which thus became the first artillery armoury on the western prairies.”<sup>88</sup> In Central Ontario, the 12<sup>th</sup> York Rangers approached the City of Toronto and was able to scrounge “various odd corners



in its buildings where the captains [company commanders] can store their forty-two rifles and their stocks of coats, overcoats, canteens, water bottles, and all other the pomp of glorious war entrusted to their charge.”<sup>89</sup>

To a great extent, training was dependent on whether or not the unit was concentrated in an armoury with offices, a drill hall, lecture rooms, and Quartermaster Stores. General Sir Ian Hamilton noted in 1913 that, ideally, city corps would have access to drill halls, rifle ranges, miniature ranges,<sup>90</sup> and “a site where week-end camps can be held.”<sup>91</sup> Most city armouries offered these facilities but, as Sir John French noted in 1910, only Ottawa and Halifax had a nearby maneuver area.<sup>92</sup> Considerable use was therefore made of private property at both the unit and District level. The 30<sup>th</sup> British Columbia Horse, for example, built a rifle range on private property near Vernon.<sup>93</sup> In the 1<sup>st</sup> Divisional Area, use was made of “leased ground known as the Attrill Farm near Goderich which lacks area for maneuver notwithstanding the use of 2 farms nearby.”<sup>94</sup> Private property was a useful stopgap, but field firing could not be conducted, trenches could not be dug, and the need to avoid damage inhibited training.

Central training camps were limited and not all provinces had adequate training facilities. In Prince Edward Island, the Charlottetown Camp Commandant wrote in 1914 that the Prince Edward Island Light Horse had made average progress in their training, although “there is not a sufficiently large training area available.”<sup>95</sup> Camps at Barriefield, Farnham, Lévis, and Sussex were too small for brigade-level training, while others such as Carling Heights in London and Sarcee near Calgary were slowly being engulfed by development.<sup>96</sup> In 1914, Major-General F.L. Lessard reported that “The restricted area of this training ground [Niagara-on-the-Lake] is well known, and has been fully reported

upon in the past. Nevertheless, with the kind co-operation of the inhabitants, and the appointment of a committee of adjustment, it has been found possible to maneuver and practice Field Training within an area of some 20 miles from Niagara-on-the-Lake."<sup>97</sup>

Large camps with artillery ranges and maneuver areas suitable for brigades existed only at Camp Sewell, Manitoba, and Petawawa, Ontario, although these were usable only in the summer.

Militia training comprised local Headquarters [LHQ] training (at least for the city corps) and central summer camps. In general, artillery units were authorized to train for sixteen days at summer camps and all other corps for twelve days. But there were exceptions. In 1913, the 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup>, and 11<sup>th</sup> Brigades Canadian Field Artillery, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Regiment Canadian Garrison Artillery, and the Prince Edward Island Heavy Brigade, Canadian Garrison Artillery, had to demonstrate their efficiency by training for four days at local headquarters before going to camp for twelve days. City corps were allowed to combine LHQ and central training, provided that the total did not exceed sixteen days, but rural units were given only twelve days in total.<sup>98</sup>

In 1913, for example, the 57<sup>th</sup> Peterborough Rangers trained for eleven days at home and five days at camp.<sup>99</sup> The eleven days spent at LHQ were not calendar days, but rather evenings, each of which counted for a half day. The unit training schedule could be fairly intense, considering that the majority of militiamen worked during the day. In 1914, the 57<sup>th</sup> recruit course started in Peterborough in April 1914 and ran three nights a week for twenty-two evenings until mid-June, when the Regiment went to a five-day camp at Barriefield, near Kingston. Other units followed a similar routine. In 1904, the 41<sup>st</sup> Brockville Rifles trained for twenty-four evenings before attending summer camp at

Rockcliffe, while in 1912-13, the 7<sup>th</sup> Battery in St Catharines recruited in March and April and trained three evenings a week in preparation for summer camp at the end of June.<sup>100</sup>

Spring training for experienced militiamen was intended to cover as much ground as possible to gain the maximum benefit from summer camp. In the 1<sup>st</sup> Division, units were advised that "In order that the best value may be obtained from the period spent in Camp, efforts should be made to perform some of the preliminary training at Company, Squadron or Regimental Headquarters before June."<sup>101</sup> At Edmonton, Major Griesbach of the 19<sup>th</sup> Alberta Dragoons wrote that, in 1914, "Although only twelve days were spent in camp, we endeavored to bring our troops into camp with a good deal of the syllabus of training completed before arrival. Therefore, we were able to get on with maneuvers in the field without loss of time."<sup>102</sup>

But the 19<sup>th</sup> was fortunate. Rural units were usually unable to train throughout the year, and during their twelve-day stint at summer camp, recruits had to be trained, musketry practices fired and collective skills exercised with a one- or two-day sham fight - a tall order considering that the twelve-day camp did not represent twelve training days. Sunday was a day of rest and traveling time (usually two days) was also included.<sup>103</sup> In the case of city corps, this effectively reduced their training to three days or less. In 1913, the Governor General's Foot Guards arrived at Petawawa on a Saturday, rested Sunday, trained Monday and Tuesday, and returned to Ottawa on Wednesday. The unit had "no knowledge of field work and it was quite impossible to [sic] in two training days to carry out tactical or field training with any profit. It seems questionable whether it is worthwhile to pay a unit for five days in order to do two days training."<sup>104</sup> The combination of

training in drill and ceremonial at LHQ and five days at camp, in most cases, did not produce either trained soldiers or trained units.

Training problems were exacerbated not only by the high proportion of new recruits, but also by a high absentee rate from summer camp. At Barriefield in 1913, only 60% of the militia turned out for camp, although the 3<sup>rd</sup> Divisional Commander thought that "excellent progress was made considering that a very large proportion of those trained, probably 80%, were recruits without previous training."<sup>105</sup> The problem existed elsewhere. In 1912, the 5<sup>th</sup> Division found only a small proportion of the men attended more than one camp,<sup>106</sup> while at Halifax, the Inspecting Officer despaired of any progress in Number 2 (Montréal) Siege Company: "Given each year a large proportion of green men of but little education it is obviously impossible to make any steady and continuous progress in raising the standard of training to what is required for Siege Artillery."<sup>107</sup>

Absenteeism from summer camp varied between units. The 12<sup>th</sup> York Rangers historian thought that the turnout in rural units was higher than in city corps, because "the night drilling population and the camp going population are two rather distinct classes."<sup>108</sup> There was some truth in this statement. At the Nova Scotia camp in 1912, two city corps (63<sup>rd</sup> and 66<sup>th</sup> Regiments) paraded 386 all ranks with 708 absent. The remaining fourteen units, all rural, had 2,652 with only 369 absent.<sup>109</sup> On the other hand, in 1912, only 65% of the troops of eight rural units in the 1<sup>st</sup> Division turned up at Goderich as opposed to 72% in the five city corps. At Lévis, Québec, the same year, 69% of the rural militia appeared at camp, while at Barriefield in 1913, rural units were able to field only 59% of their establishment. In Military District Number 10, only 283 all ranks from the newly-organized 52<sup>nd</sup> Prince Albert Volunteers, a city corps, attended Camp

Sewell out of an establishment of 540. In Calgary, 2,635 men attended summer camp with only 674 absent. It is striking, however, that 466 of the absentees, or 69%, came from two city corps, the 101<sup>st</sup> Edmonton Fusiliers and the 103<sup>rd</sup> Calgary Rifles.<sup>110</sup> The strength of Militia units tended to vary widely because of personalities and local circumstances, but it appears that city corps, generally considered to be more efficient, had lower attendance rates at summer camps. Since summer camps were intended primarily for collective training in the field, the general standard within these units could not have been very high.

The apparent reluctance of city dwellers to attend camps may have been due to other factors. In 1908, a company of the 28<sup>th</sup> Perth Regiment refused to attend "on account of prohibition of sale of beer. The men of it were mostly Germans."<sup>111</sup> Camps were traditionally held at the same time every year and rural units, in particular, had difficulties in adapting to changes. F Company of the 23<sup>rd</sup> Northern Pioneers, for example, could not attend summer camp in 1908 when the date was changed from July to June, because the men were absent on 'river drives' and could not be contacted.<sup>112</sup> Similarly, the 4<sup>th</sup> Chasseurs Canadien complained in 1912 that attendance was low because the camp was held before the lumber drives and seeding had been completed.<sup>113</sup>

Militia pay was low in comparison to civilian wages. In 1911, Lieutenant-Colonel A.A. Campbell of the 7<sup>th</sup> Fusiliers in London thought "It is unreasonable to expect a mechanic, or a man, who is earning, at least, from \$3 to \$4 a day to give up his work and go out to camp for twelve days and receive the magnificent sum of 50 cents per day" and "it is unreasonable to expect that you can get first class men to make such a sacrifice even for the honour and integrity of their country."<sup>114</sup> At Lévis, Québec, in 1913, attendance

was thought to have dropped because men working as unskilled labourers on construction projects were paid up to \$3 a day. The same year, at Barriefield, the 46<sup>th</sup> Regiment paraded with only 224 all ranks, an abysmal turnout attributed by Lieutenant-Colonel John Hughes to high wages for all classes of labourers.<sup>115</sup> A year later, the high absentee rate in the 103<sup>rd</sup> Calgary Rifles was attributed to an 'unusual' speculation in oil stocks.<sup>116</sup> These were not merely peacetime problems; both occupational and economic factors would hinder recruiting for the CEF.

City Corps tended to emphasize the ceremonial aspects of the military in contrast to less glamorous field work. The 48<sup>th</sup> Highlanders managed to avoid summer camp altogether in 1913, and the AAG 2<sup>nd</sup> Division wrote a damning report on the unit, saying that morale was high but the Regiment had not taken the time to conduct field firing: "There is a tendency to indulge in too much ceremonial which I hope in time will give place to more Infantry training."<sup>117</sup> The tendency is, perhaps, understandable. With no immediate threat on the horizon, a club-like atmosphere and a desire for public parades to bolster self-confidence, it was difficult to avoid spending training days on ceremony and drill. The emphasis on drill was reinforced by Sam Hughes, who directed the CGS to notify Divisions and Districts that "Officers will be judged by their bearing on parade, and their powers of command and leadership will be tested by the number of different movements their units can complete, in rapid succession but without confusion, in a given space of time."<sup>118</sup>

The last annual Militia training plan issued in February 1914 directed that training was to be "systematic and progressive; [with] that at local headquarters leading up to the training in camp, which will be devoted entirely to tactical instruction."<sup>119</sup> The LHQ

schedule for infantry battalions was a mixture of individual and collective training and emphasized basic drill from squad to battalion level, with and without arms.<sup>120</sup> For some obscure reason, funeral drill was also included.<sup>121</sup> Units were directed to fire their annual musketry practice prior to camp, but weapons handling was not included in the schedule. The field portion of the prescribed syllabus covered a variety of topics including scouting, minor tactics, entrenching, and construction of obstacles, all of which demanded a convenient maneuver area, which most city corps did not possess.<sup>122</sup> The actual routine likely varied, but most units probably divided their preparatory evenings at LHQ between drill and lectures on tactical subjects, leaving the actual practice to summer camp. Field training was a practical and not a theoretical subject. The more experienced and receptive militiamen may have benefited from LHQ training, but not the newly enrolled men from remote areas, such as those at Lévis Camp in 1913, who thought the newly-installed shower baths were latrines.<sup>123</sup>

Other corps were required to complete refresher training as well. In the 1<sup>st</sup> Division, CASC companies were expected to parade twice a week for two months to review both musketry and corps training. The evening parades, which lasted for two hours, were evenly divided between drill and lectures on judging meat, flour, hay and oats, ration accounting, care of horses, and fitting of harness. In addition, NCOs were expected to master wagon drill.<sup>124</sup> The scope of training did not cover CASC responsibilities in the field, but was rather an accurate reflection of the peacetime role of the Corps at summer camps.

Specialist training was a problem in general, not only because of the limited training time available but also because many of the men attended only one camp. In

1912, the CGS asked the QMG for recommendations on farrier training because "The Farrier Sergeants who go to camp have, as a rule, no knowledge of farrier work and I do not consider it is worth while trying to instruct them in camps, especially if it is realized that the same men are not likely to turn up year after year."<sup>125</sup> Farrier training at summer camp continued however and in Calgary at least, short courses were conducted by officers from the newly-organized Canadian Army Veterinary Corps.<sup>126</sup>

There were no cooks' courses in the Militia, although the CASC ran a Cookery School for unit Cook-Sergeants in Kingston.<sup>127</sup> For the most part, units had to rely on men who were cooks in civil life. In general these men did well although some had difficulties coping with such esoteric subjects as portion control and ration scales. In 1908, an Inspecting Officer wrote a scathing report on cooks at the Three Rivers Camp: "I found the cooks at Three Rivers were very stupid. It is true enough some of them were old bushmen and seemed to be fairly good cooks, but when asked if they knew whether or not they had the right quantity...nearly all of them said they ignored the fact, except the men complained that they had not enough to eat."<sup>128</sup> However, not all cooks were this bad and the same report noted that kitchens at both Charlottetown and Sussex, New Brunswick, were exemplary.

Individual training at summer camps was problematic, not only because of the limited time available but also because the purpose of the camps was to conduct collective training. Both infantry and cavalry units at Sussex in 1913 devoted fewer than three of the ten days available to individual training.<sup>129</sup> Artillery units, in particular, had difficulties, and in 1912, the Inspector-General commented on the low standard of gunlayers, range-takers, and signalers.<sup>130</sup> In London, Colonel W.E. Hodgins, Commander of



the 1<sup>st</sup> Division, thought in 1912 that "At present, most specialists are unfit to carry out their duties in the field, as the whole time in Camp is devoted to the preliminary training of their branch, and little, if any, combined work [collective training] is possible."<sup>131</sup> To remedy this, he recommended that all specialists be trained at local Headquarters during the winter. In the case of rural units, specialists were to be recruited in the same location to facilitate winter training.

Training in the peacetime Militia may have been spotty and focused on ceremonial, but there were conscientious and imaginative units that were surprisingly progressive, considering the institutional limitations. The OC 16<sup>th</sup> Light Horse in Saskatchewan, Lieutenant-Colonel R.J. Gwynne not only published his own training manual in 1907, but attempted to enroll women to ride with the unit and provide first-aid on the battlefield.<sup>132</sup> Not surprisingly, nothing came of this proposal for a Canadian version of the First Aid Nursing Yeomanry.<sup>133</sup>

Other units made a conscious effort to make training as realistic as possible. In 1912, the Composite Cavalry Brigade conducted field firing at Petawawa, "firing 15 rounds per man. Three screens were placed as targets, representing the successive positions taken up by a rear guard retreating, while the cavalry squadrons acted as the advanced guard of a pursuing force."<sup>134</sup> The same year, the 26<sup>th</sup> Middlesex Light Infantry made a point of marching fifty miles under active service conditions from their Headquarters in Strathroy to the Divisional camp at Goderich, a feat made possible, according to one observer, by the fact that the "men, farmers and Indians, were well hardened."<sup>135</sup> Western units were also innovative, and in 1912, the 22<sup>nd</sup> Saskatchewan Light Horse suggested a two-day exercise in the field under active service conditions.

The plan was promptly approved by Militia Headquarters, although it was specified that the General Staff Officer Western Canada should have a hand in planning the scheme.<sup>136</sup>

The following year, in Nova Scotia, the 63<sup>rd</sup> Halifax Rifles completed eight days' training in 1913 under canvas, a tactical scheme in October, and "a night's bivouac in July, under service conditions."<sup>137</sup>

Exercises at LHQ were sometimes regarded as public spectacles; in 1912 1<sup>st</sup> Division units had difficulty maneuvering during the Thanksgiving maneuvers because of the crowds of spectators.<sup>138</sup> However, field training involved considerable ingenuity. An exercise in 1910 for units in the Toronto and Hamilton area saw the 10<sup>th</sup> Royal Grenadiers using a section of motorcycle scouts, while the unit's baggage and camp equipment was transported in a borrowed truck at the amazing speed of seven miles per hour.<sup>139</sup> In 1912, Thanksgiving maneuvers included a machine-gun detachment from the 2<sup>nd</sup> Queen's Own Rifles and wireless detachments from Hamilton.<sup>140</sup>

The 1<sup>st</sup> Division summer camp in 1914 was both ambitious and imaginative. Rural units were to train at Goderich for eleven days, at the end of which city corps would gather at Lucan. The two forces would then advance and meet in an encounter battle. Both forces were equally balanced in terms of composition, with infantry, artillery, cavalry, medical, and service corps elements. The rural units were to use horse transport, while the city corps would employ trucks provided free of charge by the Gramm Motor Truck Company, with the Department of Militia and Defence paying for wages and fuel. The aim of the exercise was not only to train units in an all-arms setting, but also to demonstrate the superiority of motor transport. Unfortunately, the exercise, scheduled to take place 22-27 August 1914, was overtaken by the outbreak of war and had to be

cancelled. Perhaps, it was just as well. Gramm trucks taken overseas by the First Contingent in 1914 were later condemned as unserviceable in England.<sup>141</sup>

The question of whether or not the Canadian Militia was well trained on the eve of war is difficult to answer. Training standards, after all, are relative. However, the value of both local and summer training seems questionable, if basic subjects such as proficiency with firearms are considered. Inexperienced and poorly trained militiamen called out in August 1914 had difficulties handling their weapons, sometimes with tragic consequences: fifteen year-old Private Gordon Betts of the 5<sup>th</sup> Regiment, Royal Highlanders of Canada, was accidentally killed by another sentry at the Soulanges Canal.<sup>142</sup> At Depot Harbour, Ontario, the picquet furnished by a rural unit, the 23<sup>rd</sup> Northern Pioneers, was withdrawn by 21 August 1914, after the Chief Commissioner of Police in Ottawa received a complaint that a number of shots had been accidentally fired by sentries and "the lives of the people around the elevator are unsafe."<sup>143</sup>

The Militia was also hampered by a chronic shortage of equipment. While the Departmental budget had leapt from \$6,909,211 in fiscal year 1910-11 (the last Liberal budget) to \$10,988,162 in fiscal year 1913-14 (an increase of 59%), three-quarters of this increase was accounted for by pay, engineer services, and building maintenance. 'Warlike stores' more than doubled, from \$334,548 to \$703,375, but much of this must have been attributable to the purchase of 18-pounder and 60-pounder guns. The budget for construction of some fifty-four armouries, drill halls, and gun sheds increased over the same period by 143% to \$1,611,180 (or 277% if Department of Public Works funds are included), but this was offset by the creation of new companies, squadrons, and batteries. The budget for uniforms did not increase in proportion and amounted to

\$916,991 in fiscal year 1913-14. To put this into perspective, the budget allowed for the purchase of about 26,000 new and replacement uniforms for the PF, Militia, and reserve stocks.<sup>144</sup>

Uniforms may seem like a trivial concern, but they are utilitarian in the field and, as a visible mark of modernity, important for morale. Traditionally, the militia wore scarlet, green, or blue serge uniforms, both in the field and on ceremonial parades. The drawback to these uniforms became evident in the late nineteenth century, and in 1899 the 2<sup>nd</sup> (Special Service) Battalion of the RCR wore khaki in South Africa. Following the Boer War, Canada adopted khaki uniforms for general wear by the militia in 1903.<sup>145</sup>

The issue of new uniforms proceeded at a glacial pace, and some units purchased their own. The 13<sup>th</sup> Royal Regiment in Hamilton was one of the first, and in 1903 adopted khaki because the scarlet uniforms "smacked too much of the parade ground and church parades and not enough of the stern realities of war."<sup>146</sup> The 86<sup>th</sup> Three Rivers Regiment, on the other hand, expected members to buy their own, although as late as 1913, there were a number of holdouts who still wore the old scarlet.<sup>147</sup>

Most units were content to wait until uniforms were issued. In Toronto, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Queen's Own Rifles did not receive khaki uniforms until the eve of their departure to England to participate in the 1910 British Army maneuvers.<sup>148</sup> The following year in Québec, the 11<sup>th</sup> Argenteuil Rangers attended summer camp wearing the "new khaki issue"<sup>149</sup> The 52<sup>nd</sup> Prince Albert Volunteers and the newly-organized 60<sup>th</sup> Rifles of Canada were issued with khaki in 1913, although the 60<sup>th</sup> asked that the brass buttons on the new uniforms be replaced by rifle-regiment black buttons.<sup>150</sup> The 48<sup>th</sup> Highlanders in Toronto received khaki service dress in June 1914, just in time for summer camp at

Petawawa, but many units that spring went to camp partially clothed in the traditional uniforms.<sup>151</sup> The 4<sup>th</sup> Chasseurs Canadiens at Lévis had only one company with khaki shirts and trousers, while the Prince Edward Island Light Horse at Charlottetown had squadrons wearing both the old and the new.<sup>152</sup> At Niagara-on-the-Lake, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Field Company thought "the red serge is very unsuitable for Engineers during training"<sup>153</sup> while Major-General Lessard urged "that an early issue be made to those Corps not yet furnished with this clothing. The red and green clothing is obviously quite unsuitable for work in camp."<sup>154</sup> Even after the outbreak of war, old uniforms remained in use. As late as 1915, the 63<sup>rd</sup> Regiment manning the Halifax defences still had men dressed in the old uniforms, while CEF recruits from Cobourg, Ontario, appeared at the Artillery Depot in Montréal clothed in the peacetime blue serge.<sup>155</sup>

Other uniform items, such as boots, were non-existent in the pre-war militia and members were expected to provide their own.<sup>156</sup> Not surprisingly, many could not afford to purchase boots that would stand up to use in the field. In 1913, Major-General W.H. Cotton inspected the 38<sup>th</sup> Dufferin Rifles and found that "About 50% of the boots worn would be useless for active service."<sup>157</sup> At Camp Aldershot, Nova Scotia, the Commandant noted in 1914 that "Dress used by troops in camp was satisfactory with the exception of boots, none being issued. It is respectfully submitted that a regulation boot be issued, on Repayment, to every NCO and man training, at a nominal price."<sup>158</sup> The same year, Major-General Lessard noted similar conditions at Niagara-on-the-Lake and recommended to Militia HQ that boots be issued with repayment provided the soldier attended at least three summer camps.<sup>159</sup>

Unit equipment was also in short supply. CASC companies, amalgamated in 1913 at the summer camp at Sussex, New Brunswick, to form a Division CASC Train, lacked vehicles and had to rent forty wagons from local farmers. Water carts were non-existent and sugar barrels were temporarily mounted on some of these wagons as a substitute.<sup>160</sup> The composite CASC Train was issued with obsolete military pattern harness from Divisional stocks; "A number of old pattern head-collars were recently issued to this unit from 6<sup>th</sup> Division", complained Colonel R.W. Rutherford. "These head-collars are very old, evil-smelling of old manure, and are not fitted to take the bit."<sup>161</sup> CE Telegraph Detachments also lacked equipment. By 1914, each of the eight authorized detachments was equipped with two cable wagons for carrying reels of telephone line and one airline wagon for stringing telephone lines in the field, a scale of issue perhaps adequate for training individuals but inadequate to support collective training.<sup>162</sup>

Wireless Detachments came into being before 1914, although there was a shortage of equipment and enthusiastic militiamen had to purchase equipment out of their own pocket.<sup>163</sup> A communications demonstration staged by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Engineer Field Company of Toronto in November 1910, for example, was possible only because a unit enthusiast, Lance-Corporal Richardson, provided the wireless sets. By 1914, "Wireless telegraphy stores became an Ordnance supply"<sup>164</sup> but left unsaid was the actual amount of equipment available. As well, the establishment of a specialist unit or detachment did not necessarily mean that equipment would follow. In 1913, the QMG did "not approve issuing Signalling Equipment to newly organized units [60<sup>th</sup> Regiment] – not until they have shown proficiency in other work."<sup>165</sup> In the event, the 60<sup>th</sup> received the equipment, but only after the CGS intervened.<sup>166</sup>

Mounted units did not possess horses on a year-round basis and these had to be rented; during the summer months, this could be difficult unless riding horses were available from local farmers or commercial stockyards. Horses obtained under these circumstances were not trained and had to be broken before training could start. In Alberta, the 25<sup>th</sup> Field Battery used untrained horses from a local stockyard to pull their vehicles and equipment to Sarcee from the Calgary train station, but at the end of the day "only one gun had arrived in camp; the rest of the guns and wagons were strewn all over Calgary."<sup>167</sup> Horses were also rented during the winter for city mounted corps for equitation training. This could be both expensive and difficult to arrange, depending on local prices and availability. In Charlottetown, both driving and equitation in the 4<sup>th</sup> Regiment Garrison Artillery was considered to be weak because of lack of training at local Headquarters.<sup>168</sup> In the Okanagan, on the other hand, the 30<sup>th</sup> British Columbia Horse did not conduct mounted training during the winter because they were "much superior to the average Eastern cavalry as these men *can* ride and therefore have only to put their horses into their places and learn their duties."<sup>169</sup>

The most serious deficiencies were in weapons and associated ancillary stores. The standard weapon after Confederation was the single-shot breech-loading Snider-Enfield rifle. In 1896, it was replaced by the Mark I Lee-Enfield magazine rifle, which in turn was replaced by the Ross rifle in 1905.<sup>170</sup> The reasons for the adoption of the Ross rather than the Lee-Enfield are not clear. Sir Frederick Borden claimed that British companies either could not or would not establish a factory in Canada to manufacture Lee-Enfields, but Australia had no difficulty in establishing a Lee-Enfield factory in 1909 at Lithgow, after calling for tenders in Britain and the United States.<sup>171</sup>

The Ross was obsolete when it first appeared because, unlike the British Short Magazine Lee-Enfield introduced in 1902, chargers could not be used and the magazine had to be loaded with individual cartridges, as noted in Annex C to Chapter 6.<sup>172</sup> The Ross magazine also held five rounds as opposed to ten with the Lee-Enfield. The small magazine and lack of a charger guide made it impossible to fire fifteen rounds a minute, an important part of the pre-war British musketry course. Significantly, a recommended syllabus for musketry submitted in 1913 by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division did not include a rapid-fire practice.<sup>173</sup> A bewildering variety of Ross rifles was issued, but none were designed for charger loading until the Ross Mark III was approved in late 1912.<sup>174</sup>

The adoption of a non-charger loading rifle created other problems. Unlike Canadian ammunition, British ammunition was packaged in chargers. British webbing equipment, purchased in 1910 to replace the leather Oliver equipment, needed special cartridge carriers to hold Canadian ammunition that was produced in ten-round paper packages.<sup>175</sup>

The issue of modern small arms to the Militia proceeded unevenly. Lee-Enfield Mark I rifles were first issued in 1896, but it was eight years before the 59<sup>th</sup> Stormont and Glengarry Regiment were able to hand in their forty-year-old Sniders, while the 55<sup>th</sup> Megantic Light Infantry had to wait until 1906 before they received their Lee-Enfields.<sup>176</sup> In the meantime, the Ross was being issued to other Militia units as early as 1905.

Procurement of all marks of the Ross was painfully slow, and by 1914 the Militia was armed with a variety of weapons. The lucky units, such as the 56<sup>th</sup> Grenville Regiment with Lee-Enfields and the 63<sup>rd</sup> Halifax Rifles with the Ross Mark II, had only one type of rifle to contend with.<sup>177</sup> Others were less fortunate. The 91<sup>st</sup> Canadian



Highlanders in Hamilton had 436 Lee-Enfields and 83 Ross Mark II rifles, made obsolete by the introduction of the Mark III in 1913. Similarly, the 48<sup>th</sup> Highlanders had 200 Lee-Enfields and 230 Ross rifles Mark II. Astonishingly, in Québec, the 65<sup>th</sup> Carabiniers Mont-Royal were equipped with 373 Lee-Enfields, 375 Ross rifles Mark II (short), and 55 modern Ross rifles Mark III.<sup>178</sup>

The profusion of weapons created training problems and the CGS directed in April 1914 that musketry training had to be carried out with the Ross rifle and special issues should be made to units equipped with the Lee-Enfield.<sup>179</sup> However, the supply of Ross rifles was inadequate, and newly-organized militia units arriving at Camp Sewell in 1914 had to be equipped with the Lee-Enfield.<sup>180</sup> The CEF in Canada had much the same problems and at least one unit, the 43<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, arrived in England in 1915 carrying the Ross Mark II which could not be loaded with chargers.<sup>181</sup>

Artillery units were, perhaps, more fortunate than the infantry. The 12-pounder field gun, which had been the standard gun in the artillery during the Boer War, had a number of disadvantages. With no recoil mechanism, the gun had to be repositioned for each shot, despite the use of a recoil spade. Older models of the 12-pounder had a 'three motion' breech mechanism, although the few Mark IV 12-pounders purchased in 1902 had a 'single motion' breech. The biggest drawback, however, was the lack of a sighting mechanism for indirect fire, which meant the target had to be visible from the gun position before it could be engaged. The 18-pounder, introduced in 1907 to replace the 12-pounder, was an infinitely superior weapon with hydraulic recoil mechanism, dial sights, and an indirect fire capability.<sup>182</sup> A total of 136 guns were purchased, but deliveries from England were slow and as late as November 1913, only 88 had been

delivered.<sup>183</sup> With the introduction of the new gun, the old 12-pounders were not disposed of, but were placed into storage to be issued later to the CEF.

Ancillary equipment was also in short supply. At the heavy artillery camp in Halifax in 1913, Lieutenant-Colonel H.C. Thacker noted that the 2<sup>nd</sup> Montréal Siege Company was "Armed with two B[reech] L[oaded] 6" Mk 1\* Howitzers which are not yet fully equipped." The company also arrived in Halifax without its technical equipment, "as all was available locally, but I am informed by the CO that Dial Sights, Observation of Fire Instruments and other technical equipment [are] not yet fully issued."<sup>184</sup> The same problem existed in the field artillery, and in 1912 a number of batteries arrived at Petawawa lacking equipment such as dial sights and aiming posts.<sup>185</sup> In some cases, guns were available but were issued only for summer camp. In 1914, the Aldershot Camp Commandant recommended "That the guns and equipment of the 11<sup>th</sup> Brigade, CFA, be sent to their local Headquarters" and that the brigade should be sent to Camp Petawawa where the guns could be fired.<sup>186</sup>

The absence of guns and ancillary equipment at local Headquarters had an adverse effect on training. General Sir Ian Hamilton noted in 1913 that, although he was surprised by the standards attained by artillery units, "in many batteries the detachments are not properly grounded in elementary gun drill" and went on to suggest that all gun crews receive instruction in basic drills at home armouries to allow them to receive the maximum benefit from summer camp.<sup>187</sup>

In 1914, the militia was of uneven quality in terms of equipment and training. Many of its characteristics - decentralization, collegiality, regimental identity, loyalty to members, pomp and circumstance, initiative and dedication - were to be carried over to

the CEF. The basic organization was sound, but how well Canada tapped this potential depended very much on war-time manpower policies.

The basic organization of the CEF was sound, but how well Canada tapped this potential depended very much on war-time manpower policies. The CEF was organized in a way that allowed for a high degree of flexibility in the use of manpower. This was achieved through the use of a system of conscription and the establishment of a large reserve force.

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<sup>1</sup> Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. General Orders Number 78 of 15 June 1915 authorized the establishment of Reserve Militia units affiliated with existing units. LAC RG 24 Vol 4260 File 42-16-1, AG to OC 1<sup>st</sup> Division 9 November 1915 discusses amendments to GO 78/1915 and authorizes the formation of Reserve Militia units in the 1<sup>st</sup> Division. LAC RG 24 Vol 4740 File 448-14-263, GOC MD 13 to Brigadier-General Senator J Mason, Chief Organizer for Canada 22 April 1916 contains an undated pamphlet with Reserve Militia Regulations. LAC RG 24 Vol 1819 File GAQ 4-124 contains an unsigned summary The NPAM 1914-1921 4 December 1940 which notes that five Reserve Militia battalions still existed on paper in June 1919. Recruits for the Reserve Militia had to meet CEF enrolment criteria but were not paid or equipped by the Department. After Hughes' departure in November 1916, Reserve Militia units were gradually closed down.

<sup>2</sup> Canada, Dominion of. 'An Act Respecting the Canadian Militia' in The Revised Statutes of Canada 1906. (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1907) Chapter 41. Sections 2, 16, 22, 24, 26.

<sup>3</sup> Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Sessional Paper No 25: Report of the Militia Council for the Dominion of Canada for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31 1914, (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1915). p.26

<sup>4</sup> Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. The Quarterly Militia List of the Dominion of Canada (Corrected to 31<sup>st</sup> March 1914). (Ottawa: np, 1914) pp.11-32 provides a breakdown of all PF detachments.

<sup>5</sup> Sessional Paper No 35: Report of the Militia Council for the Dominion of Canada for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31 1913. Report by Major-General WD Otter, Inspector-General 30 November 1912, p.95

<sup>6</sup> Fetherstonhaugh, RC. The Royal Canadian Regiment 1883-1933. (Montréal: Gazette Printing, 1936) pp.177 and 190; Nicholson, Colonel GWL. The Gunners of Canada: The History of the Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery: Vol I, 1534-1919. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1967) p.168

<sup>7</sup> Sessional Paper No 35: Report of the Militia Council for the Dominion of Canada for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31 1913. Report by Major-General WD Otter, Inspector-General 30 November 1912, p.96; Warren, Arnold. Wait for the Waggon: The Story of the Royal Canadian Army Service Corps. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1961) pp.39 and 45. Warren notes that five instructors from the British Army Service Corps arrived in November 1912 for a two year tour.

<sup>8</sup> Hamilton, General Sir Ian. Report on the Military Institutions of Canada. (Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1913) p.38. The table on p.38 of Hamilton's report suggests that the Instructional Cadre consisted of Infantry and Cavalry NCOs only, although it appears that Artillery and perhaps other corps provided NCOs as well.

<sup>9</sup> Steel, James R. and Gill, Captain John A. The Battery: The History of the 10<sup>th</sup> (St Catharine's) Field Battery Royal Canadian Artillery. (St Catharine's: 10<sup>th</sup> Field Battery Association, 1996) p.46

<sup>10</sup> Curry, Frederick. 'The Recruiting of Ten Ike' in Canadian Magazine. Vol XXXVI Number 2 (December 1910) pp.161-162

<sup>11</sup> Pariseau, Jean and Bernier, Serge. French Canadians and Bilingualism in the Canadian Armed Forces: Vol I, 1763-1969: the Fear of a Parallel Army. (Ottawa: Directorate of History, 1988) p.64

<sup>12</sup> Sessional Paper No 35: Report of the Militia Council for the Dominion of Canada for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31 1913. Report by Major-General WD Otter, Inspector-General 30 November 1912, p.94

<sup>13</sup> Fetherstonhaugh The Royal Canadian Regiment 1883-1933. p.185

<sup>14</sup> Freve, J. David(trans). Manuel des Exercices et Evolutions d'Infanterie: Revises par ordre de sa Majestie 1877 (avec les derniers changements). (Québec: J. Demers, 1885); Canada, Ministère de la Milice et de la Defense. Reglements et Ordonnances a l'usage de la Milice du Canada. (Ottawa: Imprimeur de sa très Excellente Majesté la Reine, 1887); Papineau, Capitaine D.B. Traite de Tactiques a l'Usage des Trois Armes: Traduit du Combined Training 1905. (np: c1908); TNA CO 42/987, Department of Militia and Defence to Secretary Governor General 9 February 1915 notes that Infantry Training 1911 had been previously translated into French and that permission was needed from the British Comptroller of Stationary to do the same for Infantry Training 1914.

<sup>15</sup> Harris Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army 1860-1939. p.71.

<sup>16</sup> Jenkyns, Sir H. 'History of the Military Forces of the Crown' in Great Britain, War Office. Manual of Military Law 1914. (London: HMSO, 1914) Reprint edn 1916. pp. 162-163

<sup>17</sup> Morton, Desmond. Ministers and Generals: Politics and the Canadian Militia 1868-1904. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970) p.197 notes that copying British customs and uniforms was an effort to match the model. Harris. Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army 1860-1939. pp.71-72 notes that the abolition of the GOC and establishment of the Militia Council strengthened Canadian control over the Militia.

- <sup>18</sup> Morton. Ministers and Generals: Politics and the Canadian Militia 1868-1904 pp. 186 and 193; Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Quarterly Militia List of the Dominion of Canada (Corrected to 31<sup>st</sup> March 1914). pp.3-9; Hitsman, J. Mackey. Attempts to Integrate Canada's Armed Forces Before 1945: Report No 15, Directorate of History November 1967, pp.11-13
- <sup>19</sup> Thorgrimson, Thor. Office of the Deputy Minister in the Departments Responsible for Canadian Defence: Report No 11, Directorate of History 22 August 1966, p.5
- <sup>20</sup> Militia Act. Section 7
- <sup>21</sup> Morton, Desmond. A Military History of Canada. (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1985) p.120
- <sup>22</sup> Hitsman. Attempts to Integrate Canada's Armed Forces Before 1945. p.12
- <sup>23</sup> Harris. Canadian Brass. pp.88-89 notes the CGS concern that by disregarding his professional advisors and issuing instructions directly to units, Hughes had become a de facto commander-in-chief although his appointment as Minister was political and not military. As well, by the end of 1912, the Militia Council met infrequently and when it did, matters of policy were simply not discussed. The same situation arose with the British Army Council in 1914 when Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener became the Secretary of State for War, but was resolved in 1915 when the newly appointed CIGS, General Sir William Robertson insisted on responsibilities being spelled out in writing. See Bonham-Carter, Victor. The Strategy of Victory 1914-1918: The Life and Times of the Master Strategist of World War I. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963) pp.383-386. Unfortunately, the Canadian CGS, Colonel WG Gwatkin was in no position to insist on similar terms.
- <sup>24</sup> Haycock. Sam Hughes: the Public Career of a Controversial Canadian 1885-1916. p.151
- <sup>25</sup> Foster to Sir Robert Borden 1915, quoted in Wallace, W. Stewart. The Memoirs of the Rt Hon Sir George Foster, PC, GCMG. (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1933) p.177
- <sup>26</sup> Willett, T.C. A Heritage at Risk: The Canadian Militia as a Social Institution. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1987) p.60
- <sup>27</sup> Griesbach, William Antrobus. I Remember (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1946) p.345
- <sup>28</sup> Griesbach I Remember pp.5-9
- <sup>29</sup> Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Sessional Paper No 35: Report of the Militia Council for the Dominion of Canada for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31 1913. (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1914) p.85
- <sup>30</sup> Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. General Orders. Number 54 of April 1913
- <sup>31</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 365 File 33-96-84 'Commandant's Report Sewell Camp 1914. The camp was conducted 22 June-8 July 1914.
- <sup>32</sup> Machin, Lieutenant-Colonel HAC. Report of the Director of the Military Service Branch (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1919). p.2. Initially the MSA was administered by a Military Service Council chaired by the Deputy Minister of Justice, but from 15 June 1918 onwards, the Military Service Branch reported directly to the Minister of Justice. Report of the Ministry: Overseas Military Forces of Canada 1918. (London: OMFC, c.1919). p.9
- <sup>33</sup> Hamilton, Colonel CF. 'Lieutenant-General Sir Willoughby Gwatkin - An Appreciation' in Canadian Defence Quarterly. Vol II Number 3 (Apr 1925). pp.228 and 230
- <sup>34</sup> LAC RG 24 Series C-1 Reel C-4859, HQ Combined File 1295: AG to Brigadier-General Gwynne 30 June 1920
- <sup>35</sup> Quarterly Militia List...31<sup>st</sup> March 1914 and Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. The Militia List of the Dominion of Canada: Corrected to 1<sup>st</sup> July 1918 (Ottawa: np. 1918)
- <sup>36</sup> In modern terminology, arms units include artillery, cavalry, engineer and infantry units.
- <sup>37</sup> Quarterly Militia List...31<sup>st</sup> March 1914. p.18
- <sup>38</sup> Morton Ministers and Generals pp.131 and 138 notes that Lake had been a member of a committee under Colonel EP Leach, former Commander Royal Engineers of the British garrison in Halifax, which recommended restructuring the Militia in 1898 to counter the American threat. Harris. Canadian Brass pp.73-74
- <sup>39</sup> Taken from Quarterly Militia List...31<sup>st</sup> March 1914
- <sup>40</sup> Quarterly Militia List...31<sup>st</sup> March 1914 pp.26-27
- <sup>41</sup> Pariseau and Bernier. French Canadians and Bilingualism in the Canadian Armed Forces: Vol I, 1763-1969: the Fear of a Parallel Army. p.54
- <sup>42</sup> The list may not be entirely accurate. Established units tended to wax and wane depending on local circumstances and personalities. Duguid, Colonel A. Fortescue. History of the Canadian Grenadier Guards

1760-1964. (Montréal: Gazette Printing Company Limited, 1965) p.55 notes that the 1<sup>st</sup> Regiment Prince of Wales Fusiliers was disbanded 1 February 1911 and reconstituted as the 1<sup>st</sup> Regiment Canadian Grenadier Guards on 29 December 1911. Duguid glosses over the reasons, but suggests that it may have been due to conflicts between Lieutenant-Colonel WH Evans and his officers. General Order Number 60 of 1 April 1914 disbanded the 86<sup>th</sup> Regiment "with a view to its re-organization." Robert Rutherford in Hometown Horizons: Local Responses to Canada's Great War. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004) p.xvi notes that the 86<sup>th</sup> had not been reconstituted when war broke out but was still called upon to provide men for the First Contingent.

<sup>43</sup> Quarterly Militia List...31<sup>st</sup> March 1914 pp.11-42

<sup>44</sup> Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Canadian Militia War Establishments (Provisional) 1914. (np: c1914)

<sup>45</sup> Archives of Ontario. Royal Hamilton Light Infantry Fonds Service Roll Ms843(19) Reel 14. The 7<sup>th</sup> Fusilier Service Roll shows that surnames between 'A' and 'E' amounted to 29% or approximately one-third of the overall recruit intake. Assuming the same distribution of surnames in the 13<sup>th</sup>, the partial sample of 75 recruits annually suggests the overall intake was about 200.

<sup>46</sup> ARCC Box X1541-43 '7<sup>th</sup> Battalion Service Roll 1899-1909'

<sup>47</sup> Anstead, Christopher J. 'Patriotism and Camaraderie in a Peacetime Militia Regiment 1907-1954' in Histoire Sociale-Social History Vol XXVI, Number 52 (November 1993), p.255

<sup>48</sup> Anstead, Christopher J. 'Patriotism and Camaraderie in a Peacetime Militia Regiment 1907-1954' in Histoire Sociale-Social History Vol XXVI, Number 52 (November 1993), p.255

<sup>49</sup> Morton, Desmond. The Canadian General: Sir William Otter. (Toronto: Hakkert, 1974) pp.152-156

<sup>50</sup> Archives of Ontario. Ms843(19) Reel 14, Royal Hamilton Light Infantry Fonds, Series D-2 'Regimental Orders 1874-1926', Regimental Order No 21 of 1 March 1915.

<sup>51</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 6427 File 257 Vol 1, 'Report of the Annual Inspection of the 48<sup>th</sup> Regiment Highlanders' 10 October 1913.

<sup>52</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 366 File 33-101-7 'Commandant's Report Mcaulay Plains Camp 1912'. Forwarded by HQ MD 11 to Militia HQ 22 August 1912.

<sup>53</sup> Tyler, Charles Grant Alexander. The Lion Rampant: A Pictorial History of the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada 1910-1985. (Winnipeg: The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada, 1985) pp.1-3

<sup>54</sup> Tyler. The Lion Rampant: A Pictorial History of the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada 1910-1985. p.2

<sup>55</sup> Canada, Seventh Regiment Fusiliers. Standing Orders. (London, Ontario: np, 1906). pp. 11, 13 and 19.

<sup>56</sup> ARCC Box 4416 File 'Correspondence 1911', OC 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment Fusiliers to DGA MD No 1 9 March 1911

<sup>57</sup> Roy, R.H. Sinews of Steel: The History of the British Columbia Dragoons. (Brampton: Charters Publishing Company, 1965) p.17

<sup>58</sup> Quigley, John Gordon(ed). A Century of Rifles, 1860-1960: The Halifax Rifles (RCAC) (M) (Halifax: Wm McNab & Son Ltd., 1960) p.41

<sup>59</sup> Anstead 'Patriotism and Camaraderie' p.251

<sup>60</sup> ARCC Box 4416 File 'Correspondence 1911', OC 7<sup>th</sup> Fusiliers to DSA MD No 1 9 March 1911

<sup>61</sup> Ware, Colonel Francis B. The Story of the Seventh Fusiliers of London, Canada, 1899-1914. (London: Hunter Printing Company, 1946) p.157; Barnard, Lieutenant-Colonel WT. The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada, 1860-1960: One Hundred Years of Canada. (Don Mills: The Ontario Publishing Company Limited, 1960) p.134. The League started about 1895 and was still in existence during my tour as G4 at Toronto Militia District HQ 1990-93. Frank Owens, a Queen's Own Rifles catcher before 1914, went on to play for Boston and Chicago. There was a similar league in London and, no doubt, in other cities as well.

<sup>62</sup> Hunter, Captain A.T. History of the 12<sup>th</sup> Regiment, York Rangers with some account of the different raisings of the Militia. (Toronto: Murray Printing Company Limited, c1912) p.74

<sup>63</sup> Macfie, John. Sons of the Pioneers: Memories of Veterans of the Algonquin Regiment. (Parry Sound, Ontario: The Hay Press, 2001) p.iv

<sup>64</sup> Anstead. 'Patriotism and Camaraderie' p.255

<sup>65</sup> Ware. The Story of the Seventh Regiment Fusiliers. p.142; ARCC Box 4416 File 'Correspondence 1911', OC 7<sup>th</sup> Fusiliers to DSA MD No 1 9 March 1911

<sup>66</sup> Royal Hamilton Light Infantry Fonds, Service Roll Book and 7<sup>th</sup> Fusilier Service Roll

- <sup>67</sup> Canada, Dominion of. Fourth Census of Canada 1901. (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1902) Vol I: pp. 427 and 430
- <sup>68</sup> Regulations consistently specified an age range of 18 to 45 for enrolment. See Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. The King's Regulations and Orders for the Militia of Canada: 1904 (Provisional Edition). (Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1904). Section 261
- <sup>69</sup> Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. King's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Militia (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1910) Paragraphs 243, 246.
- <sup>70</sup> Hamilton Spectator 29 October 1912, p.4
- <sup>71</sup> Ontario, Province of. Statutes of the Province of Ontario (Toronto: King's Printer, 1909) 'An Act Respecting Truancy and Compulsory School Attendance, Assented to 13<sup>th</sup> April 1909' Section 3.
- <sup>72</sup> Royal Hamilton Light Infantry Fonds, Service Roll Book; LAC RG 9 II F6 Vol 222, 'Alberta Rangers – Annual Drill Pay List 25 June-6 July 1907; 'Annual Pay List of 23<sup>rd</sup> Alberta Rangers for the Year 1909'
- <sup>73</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 271 File 2-27-4, APMG Militia Headquarters to DOC Military District 13 18 November 1909. In a letter to the District Commander 18 November 1909, the OC 23<sup>rd</sup> Alberta Rangers claimed to have routinely employed Chinese soldiers as cooks since his unit was first organized as an independent squadron.
- <sup>74</sup> Wilson, Barbara M.(ed). Ontario and the First World War 1914-1918: A Collection of Documents. (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1977) p.cviii
- <sup>75</sup> Jackman, SW. 'The Victoria Pioneer Rifle Corps, British Columbia, 1860-1866' in Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research. Vol 39 (1961). p.41
- <sup>76</sup> Foy, Sean Flynn. Underside of Glory: African Canadian Enlistment in the CEF 1914-1917. (University of Ottawa: MA Thesis, 1999) pp.22-23; LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Boxes 5833 and 6543 8400; Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Royal Canadian Regiment: Nominal Roll of all Ranks Serving in Bermuda (corrected to November 19<sup>th</sup>, 1914). (Issued with Militia Orders 1915) lists Pte Smyth; ARCC Box X1541-43 '7<sup>th</sup> Battalion Service Roll 1899-1909'; LAC Reel T-6482, Fourth Census of Canada 1901, District of Middlesex South Number 89, Sub-District D9 (Westminster) p.9 notes that Willard Taylor was Black.
- <sup>77</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 6297 File 39 Vol 1, 'Report of the Annual Inspection 1913 of the 37<sup>th</sup> Haldimand Rifles'
- <sup>78</sup> Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Quarterly Militia List of the Dominion of Canada (Corrected to 30<sup>th</sup> June 1914). (Ottawa: np, 1914) pp.214, 222, 228, 233, 245; LAC RG 9 II F6 Vol 78 File '26<sup>th</sup> Regiment 1913-1914'
- <sup>79</sup> LAC RG 9 II F6 Vol 89 File '32<sup>nd</sup> Regiment 1913-1914'; Wiarion Echo 18 June 1913, p.5
- <sup>80</sup> RG 24 Vol 6420 File 207, 'Report of the Annual Inspection of the 18<sup>th</sup> Regiment Franc Tireurs de Saguenay' 29 June 1914; Quarterly Militia List 31 March 1914, pp.212, 220, 226, 231 and 243
- <sup>81</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 6298 File 39 Vol 1, 'Report of the Annual Inspection 1912 of the 37<sup>th</sup> Regiment' 11 June 1912; 'Report of the Annual Inspection 1913 of the 37<sup>th</sup> Regiment' 10 June 1913; LAC RG 24 Vol 6420 File 207 'Report of the Annual Inspection 1911 of the 18<sup>th</sup> Regiment Franc Tireurs de Saguenay'
- <sup>82</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 6420 File 207, 'Report of the Annual Inspection 1911 of the 18<sup>th</sup> Franc Tireurs de Saguenay'
- <sup>83</sup> Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Quarterly Militia List of the Dominion of Canada (Corrected to 1<sup>st</sup> April 1910). (Ottawa: np, 1910) p.183; Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Quarterly Militia List of the Dominion of Canada (Corrected to 1<sup>st</sup> January 1915). (Ottawa: np, 1915) p.241
- <sup>84</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 6298 File 39 Vol 1, 'Report of the Annual Inspection 1908 of the 37<sup>th</sup> Regiment' June 1908
- <sup>85</sup> LAC RG 9 II F6 Vol 89 File '32<sup>nd</sup> Regiment 1913-1914'; Shawbedees was later to join the 160<sup>th</sup> Battalion. LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 8828
- <sup>86</sup> LAC RG 9 II F6 Vol 78 File '26<sup>th</sup> Regiment 1913-1914'
- <sup>87</sup> Quarterly Militia List..1914.
- <sup>88</sup> Nicholson. The Gunners of Canada. p.179
- <sup>89</sup> Hunter. History of the 12<sup>th</sup> Regiment York Rangers p.73
- <sup>90</sup> Usually a .22 rifle game in the drill hall for use with sub-caliber ammunition.
- <sup>91</sup> Hamilton. Report on the Military Institutions of Canada. p.18

- <sup>92</sup> French, General Sir John. Report by General Sir John French, GCB, GCVO, KCMG, Inspector-General of the Imperial Forces upon His Inspection of the Canadian Military Forces. (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1910). p.14
- <sup>93</sup> Roy. Sinews of Steel. p.17
- <sup>94</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 363 File 33-43-32, Inspector-General to Militia Headquarters 16 July 1912
- <sup>95</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 341 File 33-7-97, Charlottetown Camp Commandant to AAG 6<sup>th</sup> Division 11 July 1914
- <sup>96</sup> French. Report p.14
- <sup>97</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4267 File 14-1-17 Vol 1, GOC 2<sup>nd</sup> Division to Militia HQ 10 August 1914
- <sup>98</sup> Canada, Militia Headquarters. General Orders Number 46 of 15 March 1913. In general, it appears that city corps were allowed to combine local and central training; rural units were trained entirely at central camps.
- <sup>99</sup> Peterborough Centennial Museum and Archives. Dobbin, Frank. 57<sup>th</sup> Regiment Peterborough Rangers: A History, written and compiled under direction of Officers of the Regiment. (mss c1916). p.251
- <sup>100</sup> Steel and Gill. The Battery pp.46-47; Watson, Lieutenant-Colonel WS(ed). The Brockville Rifles, Royal Canadian Infantry Corps (Allied with the King's Royal Rifle Corps): Semper Paratus, An Unofficial History. (Brockville: The Recorder Printing Company, 1966) p.22
- <sup>101</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4257 File 19-1-24, 'Memorandum: Training -1<sup>st</sup> Division - 1912' by GSO 1<sup>st</sup> Division 30 March 1912
- <sup>102</sup> Griesbach I Remember pp.352-353
- <sup>103</sup> Canada, Department of Militia and Defence Militia Orders Number 56 of 7 February 1914
- <sup>104</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 349 File 33-20-224, 'Commandant's Report Petawawa Camp 1912'. The Governor General's Foot Guards arrived 15 June 1912 (Saturday) and left on 19 June 1912 (Wednesday). Sunday was a day of rest, which left only Monday and Tuesday for training.
- <sup>105</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 339 File 33-6-107, OC 3<sup>rd</sup> Division to Militia Headquarters 28 July 1913
- <sup>106</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 6420 File 205, 'Abridged Annual Report upon 4<sup>th</sup> Regiment 'Chasseurs Canadiens' at Lévis Camp 2 July 1912'
- <sup>107</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4537 File 3-15-6-1 'Report of the Annual Inspection of the No 2 (Montréal) Siege Company CGA' at Halifax 30 August 1913.
- <sup>108</sup> Hunter, History of the 12<sup>th</sup> Regiment, York Rangers. p.71
- <sup>109</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 343 File 33-11-87 'Date and Detail of Troops Aldershot Camp 1912'
- <sup>110</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 339 File 33-6-108 'Return showing number of Officers and Men of Rural Militia trained in the year 1913 in Camp Barriefield'; LAC RG 24 Vol 346 File 33-16-78 'Date and Detail of Troops Lévis Camp 1912'; LAC RG 24 Vol 358 File 33-24-79 'Return showing number of Officers and Men of the Active Militia City & Rural Corps trained in the year 1914 in camp & Local Hqrs in Central Camp at Calgary Alta.; LAC RG 24 Vol 363 File 33-43-28 'Return showing number of Officers and Men of the Rural & City Corps trained in the year 1912 in camp at Goderich, Ont.'; LAC RG 24 Vol 5872 File 7-54-7 'Report of the Annual Inspection of the 52<sup>nd</sup> PA Volunteers' at Camp Sewell 30 June 1913.
- <sup>111</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 6420 File 203 Vol 1 'Abridged Annual Report upon 28<sup>th</sup> Perth Regiment' at the London Camp 18 June 1909
- <sup>112</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 5861 File 7-25-18, OC 23<sup>rd</sup> Regiment to Commander Western Ontario 18 June 1908
- <sup>113</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 6420 File 205, 'Abridged Annual Report upon 4<sup>th</sup> Regiment 'Chasseurs Canadiens' at Lévis Camp 2 July 1912'
- <sup>114</sup> ARCC Box B4416 File 'Correspondence 1911', OC 7<sup>th</sup> Fusiliers to Divisional Commander 10 November 1911
- <sup>115</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 6408 File 116 Vol 1, 'Report of the Annual Inspection of the 46<sup>th</sup> Regiment' Barriefield Camp, 23 June 1913
- <sup>116</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 358 File 33-24-89, DOC MD 13 to Militia Headquarters 17 July 1914
- <sup>117</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 6427 File 257 Vol 1, 'Report of the Annual Inspection of the 48<sup>th</sup> Highlanders' 10 October 1913.
- <sup>118</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4257 File 19-1-24, CGS Circular Letter 4 December 1913
- <sup>119</sup> Canada, Militia Headquarters. Militia Orders Number 56 of 7 February 1914
- <sup>120</sup> The reference for drill cited in Militia Orders Number 56 was Great Britain, War Office. Infantry Training (London: HMSO, 1911) Sections 1-22, 24-49



- <sup>121</sup> The reference cited in Militia Orders Number 56 was Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Rifle and Musketry Exercises for the Ross Rifle 1914. (Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1914). Sections 1-26, 28-35. Funeral drill is contained in Section 35
- <sup>122</sup> Great Britain, War Office. Infantry Training 1911. (London: HMSO, 1911) Sections 172-175; Great Britain, War Office. Manual of Field Engineering 1911. (London: Jas Truscott and Son Ltd, 1916) Sections 28-44
- <sup>123</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 346 File 33-16-101 'Commandant's Report Lévis Camp 1913', OC 5<sup>th</sup> Division to Militia HQ 10 July 1913
- <sup>124</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4257 File 19-1-24, 'Memorandum: Training - 1<sup>st</sup> Division - 1912' by GSO 1<sup>st</sup> Division 30 March 1912
- <sup>125</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 363 File 33-43-32, CGS to QMG 29 August 1912
- <sup>126</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 358 File 33-24-89, 'Commandant's Report, Calgary Camp 1914'
- <sup>127</sup> Warren. Wait for the Waggons pp.44-45. The school, which opened in 1911, trained only ten students at a time.
- <sup>128</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 6409 File 124 Vol 1, '83<sup>rd</sup> & 85<sup>th</sup> Regiments - HQ No C 849' No date or addressee, but stamped 24 November 1908 by Militia Headquarters Central Registry.
- <sup>129</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 342 File 33-8-116, Sussex Camp Commandant to OC 6<sup>th</sup> Division 21 July 1913
- <sup>130</sup> Sessional Paper Number 35 (1913) Inspector-General to Militia Headquarters 30 November 1912, p.100
- <sup>131</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 363 File 33-43-38, OC 1<sup>st</sup> Division to Militia Headquarters 9 August 1912
- <sup>132</sup> Gwynne, Lieutenant-Colonel R.J. Explanations and Details for Movements in Cavalry Training. (Winnipeg: Colonial Press, 1909); LAC RG 24 Vol 263 File 2-10-14 OC 16<sup>th</sup> Light Horse to DOC MD 10 13 July 1909. Gwynne, a Saskatchewan farmer, later joined the Permanent Staff in 1912 as the Director of Cadet Services. During the war, he was appointed Director-General of Mobilization and was promoted to Brigadier-General.
- <sup>133</sup> Adie, Kate. Corsets to Camouflage: Women and War. (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2003) pp.20-21 provides a lively account of the origins and purpose of the First Aid Nursing Yeomanry. The corps was open to men and women, but given the emphasis on nursing, consisted predominantly of women.
- <sup>134</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 349 File 33-20-224, 'Commandant's Report Petawawa Camp 1912'
- <sup>135</sup> Ware. The Story of the Seventh Regiment, Fusiliers.. p.149; LAC RG 24 Vol 363 File 33-43-32, Inspector-General to Militia Headquarters 16 July 1912
- <sup>136</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 266 File HQ 2-23-5, OC 22<sup>nd</sup> Saskatchewan Light Horse to District Staff Adjutant Military District Number 10 4 March 1912, CGS to Officer Commanding Military District Number 10 19 March 1912. The General Staff Officer was responsible for operations and training.
- <sup>137</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 6409 File 120 Vol I, 'Report of the Annual Inspection 1913 of the 63<sup>rd</sup> Regiment Halifax Rifles' 22 October 1913
- <sup>138</sup> London Advertiser. 29 October 1912, p.4
- <sup>139</sup> Toronto Globe 31 October 1910, p.9; Bull, William Perkins. From Brock to Currie: The Military Development and Exploits of Canadians in General and of the Men of Peel in Particular 1791 to 1930. (Toronto: George J McLeod Ltd., 1935) p.325
- <sup>140</sup> Toronto World 29 October 1912, p.3; Hamilton Spectator 29 October 1912, p.4. Most Toronto newspapers did not report the story because of an accident involving the 48<sup>th</sup> Highlanders troop train which saw two men killed and over thirty injured.
- <sup>141</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 363 File 33-43-45, Vice-President Gramm Motor Truck Company of Canada to OC 1<sup>st</sup> Division 20 February 1914; OC 1<sup>st</sup> Division to CGS 23 February 1914; GOC Canadian Contingent to GOC Southern Command 11 January 1915 noted that all twenty-four Gramm trucks were in the workshops awaiting repair. Quoted in Duguid Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-1919: Chronology, Appendices and Maps. p.151
- <sup>142</sup> Montréal Gazette 29 August 1914, p.5
- <sup>143</sup> LAC MG 30 E51 Willoughby Garnons Gwatkin Fonds File Correspondence A-K 1914-1916, WM Reid of Depot Harbour to Chief Commissioner of Police 18 August 1914; GOC 2<sup>nd</sup> Division to CGS 21 August 1914
- <sup>144</sup> Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Report of the Militia Council... 1914 p.56 for Departmental budgets 1910-14; Duguid. Chronology, Appendices and Maps. p. 70 for the cost of individual uniform

items; Great Britain, War Office. Field Service Pocketbook 1914. (London: HMSO, 1914) for clothing scales.

<sup>145</sup> Summers, Jack L. and Chartrand, Rene. Military Uniforms in Canada. (Ottawa: Canadian War Museum, 1981) p.132; Fetherstonhaugh The Royal Canadian Regiment. p.90

<sup>146</sup> Greenhous, Brereton. Semper Paratus: History of the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (Wentworth Regiment) 1862-1977. (Hamilton: RHLI Historical Association, 1977) p.122

<sup>147</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 6404 File 100, 'Report of the Annual Inspection of the 86<sup>th</sup> Regiment (Three Rivers)' 8 September 1913

<sup>148</sup> Barnard. The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada. p.92

<sup>149</sup> LAC RTG 24 Vol 6409 File 123, 'Abridged Annual Report upon 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment Argenteuil Rangers' 2 July 1911

<sup>150</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 5873 File 7-62-4. DOC MD 10 to Militia Headquarters 26 May 1913; File 7-62-5, DOC MD 10 to Militia HQ 30 December 1913

<sup>151</sup> Beattie, Kim. 48<sup>th</sup> Highlanders of Canada, 1891-1928. (Toronto: 48<sup>th</sup> Highlanders of Canada, 1932) p.16

<sup>152</sup> RG 24 Vol 6420 File 205, 'Abridged Annual Report Upon 4<sup>th</sup> Regiment' 29 June 1914; RG 24 Vol 341 File 33-7-97, Charlottetown Camp Commandant to AAG 6<sup>th</sup> Division 11 July 1914

<sup>153</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4267 File 14-1-17 Vol 1, OC 2<sup>nd</sup> Field Company to AAG Camp Niagara 26 June 1914.

<sup>154</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4267 File 14-1-17 Vol 1, GOC 2<sup>nd</sup> Division to Militia Headquarters 10 August 1914

<sup>155</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 6409 File 120 Vol 1, 'Report of the Annual Inspection 1914 of the 63<sup>rd</sup> Regiment Halifax Rifles' 1 March 1915; LAC RG 24 Vol 1396 File 593-6-2 Vol 5, OC Heavy Battery Depot Montréal to AAG i/c Administration 4<sup>th</sup> Division 21 July 1915. The Depot OC had just inspected a draft from Cobourg.

<sup>156</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 338 File 33-5-140, OC 4<sup>th</sup> Division to Militia Headquarters 7 July 1914 notes that "Boots being the personal property of the men were, of course, of varying shape and serviceability."

<sup>157</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 6427 File 256 Vol 1, 'Report of the Annual Inspection 1913 of the 38<sup>th</sup> Regiment Dufferin Rifles of Canada' 19 November 1913

<sup>158</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 344 File 33-11-120, 'Report on Aldershot (Artillery) Camp' 22 June-3 July 1914

<sup>159</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 338 File 33-3-194, GOC 2<sup>nd</sup> Division to Militia Headquarters 10 August 1914

<sup>160</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 342 File 33-8-116, Commandant Sussex camp to OC 6<sup>th</sup> Division 21 July 1913

<sup>161</sup> RG 24 Vol 6427 File 261 Vol 1, 'Abridged Annual Report upon No 3 Battery & Ammunition Column of PEI Heavy Brigade' 12 June 1913

<sup>162</sup> Moir, John S.(ed) History of the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals 1903-1961. (Ottawa: Corps Committee Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, 1962) p.7

<sup>163</sup> All data is taken from Quarterly Militia List...31<sup>st</sup> March 1914

<sup>164</sup> Rannie, William F.(ed). To the Thunderer His Arms: The Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps. (Lincoln, Ontario: WF Rannie Publisher, 1984) p.35; Toronto Star 4 November 1910, p.13

<sup>165</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 5873 File 7-62-5, QMG to CGS 8 November 1913

<sup>166</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 5873 File 7-62-5., CGS to QMG 17 November 1913.

<sup>167</sup> Nicholson. Gunners of Canada. p.179

<sup>168</sup> RG 24 Vol 6427 File 261 Vol 1, 'Abridged Annual Report upon No 3 Battery & Ammunition Column of PEI Heavy Brigade' 12 June 1913

<sup>169</sup> 'Report of the Annual Inspection' 30<sup>th</sup> BC Horse 10 June 1911, quoted in Roy Sinews of Steel p:25

<sup>170</sup> Upper Canada Historical Arms Society. The Military Arms of Canada. (West Hill, Ontario: Museum Restoration Service, 1963) pp.29, 40-41

<sup>171</sup> Duguid. Chronology, Appendices and Maps. p.78; Reynolds. The Lee-Enfield Rifle. p.188

<sup>172</sup> Reynolds. The Lee-Enfield Rifle.pp.82-85. Chargers are steel clips holding five rounds that can be inserted into the magazine in one smooth motion. Mr Phil White, Small Arms Curator of the Canadian War Museum gave me a guided tour of the Museum weapons vault and provided considerable information on the various specimens of the Ross held by the Museum.

<sup>173</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4267 File 14-1-22 Vol 1, GOC 2<sup>nd</sup> Division to Militia Headquarters 11 march 1913

<sup>174</sup> Military Arms of Canada. p.41

<sup>175</sup> Summers. Tangled Web: Canadian Infantry Accoutrements 1855-1985. pp.42, 61-63

<sup>176</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 5873 File 7-61-3, 'Deficiencies in Arms and Equipment 59<sup>th</sup> Regt old issue' 4 January 1904; LAC RG 24 Vol 5872 File 7-57-6 Vol 1, 'Equipment Inspection Report -55<sup>th</sup> Megantic LI' October

1905 and November 1906 and File 7-57-10 DOC MD 7 to CSO Québec 16 May 1906 noted that the unit was still armed with obsolete weapons.

<sup>177</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 6408 File 118 Vol 1, 'Report of the Annual Inspection of the 56<sup>th</sup> Regiment' 25 June 1914; LAC RG 24 Vol 6409 File 120 Vol 1, 'Report of the Annual Inspection 1913 of the 63<sup>rd</sup> Regiment Halifax Rifles' 22 October 1913

<sup>178</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 6404 File 101, 'Report of the Annual Inspection 1914 of the 65<sup>th</sup> Regiment CMR' 11 June 1914; LAC RG 24 Vol 6427 File 257 Vol 1, 'Abridged Annual Report upon 48<sup>th</sup> Regiment' 13 November 1914 and File 258 Vol 1, 'Abridged Annual Report upon 91<sup>st</sup> Regiment Canadian Highlanders' 28 October 1914

<sup>179</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4267 File 14-1-22 Vol 1, CGS Circular Letter 29 April 1914

<sup>180</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 365 File 33-96-84, 'Commandant's Report Sewell Camp 1914'

<sup>181</sup> The Canadian War Museum has a specimen of a Ross Mark II with a 43<sup>rd</sup> Battalion stamp on the butt.

<sup>182</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1831 File GAQ 8-15, Lieutenant-Colonel CE Long to Historical Section 28 February 1928

<sup>183</sup> LAC RG 24 Series C-1-b Reel C-5050 Parts 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 'Naval, Military and Air Resources - Annual Returns'

<sup>184</sup> RG 24 Vol 4537 File 3-15-6-1, 'Report of the Annual Inspection 1913 of the No 2 (Montréal) Siege Company CGA' 30 August 1913

<sup>185</sup> Sessional Paper Number 35 (1913). Inspector-General to Militia Headquarters 30 November 1912, p.100

<sup>186</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol3 344 File 33-11-120, 'Report on Aldershot (Artillery) Camp' 22 June-3 July 1914

<sup>187</sup> Hamilton. Report on the Military Institutions of Canada p.20

## Chapter 2

### Manpower and the Canadian Expeditionary Force

The First World War was Canada's first modern war in the sense that the whole of society was involved, not just the armed forces. Inevitably there were competing demands for manpower from agriculture, industry, and, above all, the military. The problem was not unique to Canada. Manpower allocation was perhaps the most difficult economic problem faced by combatant states, all of which found it difficult to strike the right balance between the needs of the armed forces and the domestic production of food and material.<sup>1</sup>

Although most nations were eventually able to impose some measure of control on manpower, the Canadian government, from first to last, was never able to come to grips with the need to control manpower resources and instead relied on gradualism, voluntarism, and expediency. Competing demands of agriculture, industry and the CEF were never resolved, the growth of the CEF continued right up to the end of the war, and thousands of Canadians were diverted to British industry or other armies with the blessing of the Canadian government. The effect of this was to create a military manpower crisis in 1917 with profound and long-lasting effects on the nation. The crisis, however, could have been averted had the nation adopted a coherent manpower policy early on.

To be fair, the need for a national manpower policy was not apparent in 1914-1915. The war was expected to last a few months only and, with an abundant supply of volunteers for the CEF, there was no apparent need for manpower controls. Instead,

government manpower policies were concerned with offsetting the effects of the 1913-1914 recession. These were particularly severe in western Canada, where the construction industry had collapsed and both the Grand Trunk Pacific and Canadian Northern Railways had ceased laying track, idling thousands of company workers and contract labourers.<sup>2</sup> The outbreak of war and the initial economic uncertainty aggravated this problem and large employers, such as Massey-Harris, laid off thousands of workers in Toronto and Brantford because European markets were effectively closed.<sup>3</sup> The effect on the CEF was immediate, and many of those who volunteered for the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Divisions in 1914 did so because they were unemployed.<sup>4</sup>

Men did not enlist simply because they were jobless, but concerns with unemployment were pervasive. In London, Lieutenant-Colonel L.W. Shannon, AAG 1<sup>st</sup> Division, asked for instructions in dealing with "cases of hardship caused by volunteers for the first Expeditionary Force giving up their permanent employment and not being accepted. Many of these men find a difficulty at this time of year in securing employment."<sup>5</sup> In reply, Militia HQ simply reminded Shannon that another overseas division had just been authorized and presumably would provide jobs for the unemployed volunteers.<sup>6</sup> A similar attitude prevailed in Winnipeg, where recruiting was viewed as a khaki relief project, and militia units recruiting for the CEF were instructed that "the first choice is to be made out of all unemployed members of their corps or other unemployed who present themselves for enlistment. The above are to be enlisted prior to any men who already hold positions or who are in good circumstances."<sup>7</sup> In Toronto, the 13<sup>th</sup> (Militia) Brigade CFA assembled a full-strength battery in anticipation of mobilization and requested permission to keep the men in the University Avenue Armoury because "The

men being out of work are apt to drift off.”<sup>8</sup> No detailed statistics are available, but one historian has estimated that perhaps 20% of all recruits came from the long-term unemployed.<sup>9</sup>

Despite the general surplus of manpower in the early stages of the war, there were local shortages of specific trades. CASC recruiting was suspended 18 August 1914, but it took until 3 September to enlist almost 500 Mechanical Transport (MT) drivers, cleaners, and artificers, and in the Maritimes, advertising funds had to be allocated to attract sufficient drivers.<sup>10</sup> Even so, the 1<sup>st</sup> Division was short thirty farriers, saddlers, and shoeing-smiths and in January 1915, special authority had to be sought from the War Office to recruit these specialists in Britain.<sup>11</sup> At about the same time, the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Field Butchery was organized at Larkhill and had to call on the 9<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Battalions for men who had been butchers in civil life.<sup>12</sup> In Canada, men were enlisted in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Divisional Supply Train as MT drivers, although some had never driven before.<sup>13</sup> The shortage persisted and in April 1915, the 4<sup>th</sup> Brigade CFA in Toronto, which had no difficulty finding would-be gunners, had to appeal to Militia HQ for advertising funds to attract shoeing-smiths.<sup>14</sup>

The economic downturn persisted for much of 1915, particularly in areas with large numbers of transient workers. In Vancouver, thousands of unemployed workers, mostly immigrants, rioted in April 1915, when city officials decided to stop providing relief to non-residents.<sup>15</sup> But by the end of the year, employment had been restored to normal peacetime levels, because of increasing employment in munitions plants, enlistments, and a sharp reduction in immigration.<sup>16</sup> But there was still considerable slack in the labour force, and in Alberta, the 63<sup>rd</sup> Battalion reported in July 1915 that although

recruiting had ceased, the unit was still "over-run with applications for enlistment."<sup>17</sup> In Medicine Hat, there were 250 applicants for 100 positions and the AG at Militia HQ directed that these men be enlisted and, if necessary, another battalion would be authorized for MD 13.<sup>18</sup>

The general slack that persisted for much of 1915 meant there were skilled workers who were not gainfully employed, and over 3,000 Canadians were hired to work in Britain and Russia. The largest group was the Canadian Munition Workers Unit, hired on behalf of British factories in the spring of 1915 by two Britons, G.N. Barnes, MP and William Windham of the Board of Trade. A total of 1,699 workers were hired, mainly machinists or members of allied trades. Hiring was done directly by Barnes and Windham, or their agents, but the Canadian Department of Labour paid separation allowances to the workers' families in Canada, retained copies of the contracts, and provided offices and clerical staff for the recruiters. The Canadian Munition Workers Unit was not regarded as a burden, but as an opportunity for employment.<sup>19</sup> Additional workers followed and in January 1917, Prime Minister Borden announced that at least 3,000 munitions workers had been sent overseas.<sup>20</sup> Although men sent overseas were British workers, the Canadian government retained a vested interest and in 1917 made arrangements for some of those drafted under the British *Military Service Act* to be transferred to the CEF.<sup>21</sup>

In addition to the Canadian Munition Workers Unit, at least 600 track layers, blacksmiths, locomotive drivers, fitters, and bridge carpenters were hired in September-October 1915 by the British firm of Pauling and Company, to help build the Murman Railway in northern Russia.<sup>22</sup> The enterprise was civilian in nature, but had been

approved by Andrew Bonar Law, Secretary of State for the Colonies, who encouraged the Canadian government to cooperate.<sup>23</sup> The first group of 500 sailed from New York on 13 October 1915, and the remainder followed shortly thereafter. Difficulties arose in Russia, however, because of poor equipment, harsh conditions and injudicious decisions by Russian authorities and in March 1916, the group, considered by the Russians as incompetent troublemakers, returned to Canada.<sup>24</sup>

Employment picked up considerably in 1916 and in November, labour bureaus reported that only 45% of all unskilled labour positions had been filled, perhaps because the labour force had been further diminished by 176,919 enlistments.<sup>25</sup> War contracts continued to flow and the Dominion Bureau of Statistics described 1916 as "a year of almost abnormal activity."<sup>26</sup> Skilled labour was increasingly hard to come by and in Brantford, "it was found very difficult to secure men for war work, so difficult that wages up to \$8 and \$10 a day were paid to machinists working on munitions."<sup>27</sup> The problem existed elsewhere and in August 1916, there were general complaints from manufacturers in Ontario that orders could not be filled because of the lack of skilled workers.<sup>28</sup> Interned aliens were released in April 1916 to reinforce the labour force and the *Alien Labour Act* was suspended to allow employers to import skilled workers from the United States.<sup>29</sup> The relief was short-lived, however; relatively few aliens had been interned in the first place and the supply of American labour dried up in April 1917 when the United States entered the war.<sup>30</sup>

But despite the increasing shortages of skilled industrial workers, the Canadian government made no real effort to regulate manpower or to redirect workers from non-essential industries, although the Department of Militia and Defence attempted to restrict



the enrolment of skilled workers. The reasons for the Department's interest in manpower are not clear, but emerged fairly early in August 1915, when Militia HQ directed that expert mechanics could be enlisted only if their expertise was required for technical positions. The policy, which was limited in scope, was subsequently expanded and in November 1915, the AG forwarded lists of munitions firms to all Districts and Divisions, with instructions to "keep in touch with these firms with a view to ascertaining whether they are in need of skilled labour, in order that all such men offering their services will not be enlisted until it is ascertained whether they can be of use to these manufacturers."<sup>31</sup> To some extent, this had the effect of turning recruiting offices into employment bureaus and Recruiting Officers in Toronto, Hamilton, and St Catharines were directed to "take all possible steps for mechanics offering at your Depot to be placed with the above firms. They are only to be enlisted if unable to be so placed."<sup>32</sup>

Although the AG's instructions clearly applied only to potential recruits, employers were under the impression the CEF was a manpower pool that could be tapped as needed. In Toronto, for example, the District AAG was deluged with letters from factories looking for skilled workers. Headquarters 2<sup>nd</sup> Division was sympathetic to these requests, but at the same time was reluctant to lose soldiers. Very few seem to have been released at the request of their former employers, although a handful of soldiers were given furlough to return to their workbenches.<sup>33</sup> Recruiting officers and commanding officers were understandably reluctant to cooperate and in January 1916, the Waterous Engine Works Company Limited of Brantford complained that units were refusing to release men: "We propose taking this up with the local corps but at the same time our previous efforts along these lines have not been crowned with any success. The Officers

are anxious to get men and they have no inclination, and seem to have no power, to allot the men offering for enlistment, as is indicated in your circular letter of November 29<sup>th</sup> they should do."<sup>34</sup> Commanding Officers elsewhere were as obstreperous as those in Brantford and in June 1916, a battalion commander in Toronto told the head of a munitions plant that a skilled tool-maker would be released only if the plant provided two recruits to take the man's place.<sup>35</sup>

Further restrictions followed and Recruiting Officers were forbidden to enlist officers, engineers, and wireless operators of the merchant navy, as well as sailors from the Royal Navy. In 1916, cable operators could not be enlisted without the consent of Militia HQ, steel and coal employees in Cape Breton could not be recruited without permission from District HQ, recruiting was prohibited in the coal, smelter, and coking areas of southern British Columbia, and in 1917, it was ruled that telegraph operators could not join without the consent of their employers.<sup>36</sup> It was not only manufacturers who were concerned with the shortage of skilled workers. In 1918, the GOC MD 11 in British Columbia recommended that recruiting for the Canadian Forestry Corps and Railway Construction Corps be stopped because of the importance of these industries to the province.<sup>37</sup>

Even with the full co-operation of units, the military's efforts to coordinate manpower could have not succeeded, simply because there were no legislative or regulatory means to force ex-soldiers to return to their former jobs. The AAG 2<sup>nd</sup> Division remarked in April 1916, "This is a free country and a man cannot be compelled to work on Munitions if he does not so desire."<sup>38</sup> The AAG's remarks were echoed by others, such as Private O'Brien in Kingston, who defied his commanding officer and said

that if he were released at the request of the Canadian Locomotive Works, he would work elsewhere.<sup>39</sup> Other soldiers were equally intransigent and threatened to join units elsewhere under assumed names, while others were careful not to declare their true occupation on enrolment. In some cases, men who had been identified as skilled workers by various companies claimed to have been common labourers, thus leaving the military in the unenviable position of adjudicating conflicting claims. In the face of such resistance, the policy was clearly unworkable, a fact recognized in May 1916, when Headquarters MD 2 advised the 129<sup>th</sup> Battalion that men who refused to return to their former jobs would not be discharged.<sup>40</sup>

Apart from the soldiers' reluctance to cooperate, departmental efforts were doomed to failure because there was no comprehensive inventory of essential jobs. In effect, all jobs had the same priority and, had this been followed to its logical conclusion, few workers in Canada would have been eligible for the CEF. The problem was neatly summarized by the OC 129<sup>th</sup> Battalion in December 1915, when he complained that "The farmers argue that they are being asked by the Minister of Agriculture to produce, produce, produce, and that if they enlist they cannot produce. The manufacturers, whether engaged in munition work or not, complain every time an employee talks about enlisting. This leaves only the clerks in the stores and labourers available."<sup>41</sup>

The agricultural sector was probably worse off with workers moving to urban centres from 1915 onwards to take advantage of steady jobs with higher wages. In Brant County, for example, it was estimated that the needs of industry and the CEF had left only one experienced farm worker for every 250 acres.<sup>42</sup> Moreover, farming was also seasonal and considerable numbers of labourers were required for short periods to assist

with seeding and harvesting. Estimates vary, but across the country it was thought that about 42,000 seasonal workers were needed in the spring and 54,500 in the fall.<sup>43</sup> Under ordinary circumstances, there was an ample supply of workers from eastern Canada, but by 1916-1917, many had joined the CEF or found more lucrative jobs in the growing munitions industry.<sup>44</sup> The shortage of workers affected recruiting and in Alberta, the GOC MD 13 commented in January 1917 that farmers were actively discouraging men from joining the CEF.<sup>45</sup>

The shortage of seasonal labour persisted throughout the war and by 1917, radical solutions were being adopted. In Ontario, the provincial government set up employment bureaus to find 3,530 agricultural workers, 8,000 high school students were given standing, provided they performed three months' farm work, and the Provincial Women's Farm Department recruited 1,126 young women to work as berry pickers.<sup>46</sup> To some degree the CEF was able to relieve seasonal shortages by sending soldiers on seeding and harvesting furlough as early as 1915.<sup>47</sup> The policy remained in effect throughout the war, but as men were drafted overseas, the number available for farm work declined dramatically. An attempt was made in 1917 to limit harvest leave to 10% of unit strength in addition to farmers' sons, but a large number of men continued to be lost to the CEF every spring and fall.<sup>48</sup> Even in 1918 when there was an urgent need for reinforcements overseas, 12,744 draftees were given thirty-day furloughs, while ex-farm workers were allowed an additional two weeks.<sup>49</sup>

The policy that had the most effect on manning in the CEF was the *Military Service Act* [MSA], introduced in the House of Commons in June 1917 by Prime Minister Borden. Although the primary purpose of the MSA was to secure

reinforcements for the CEF, the Act also gave lip service to national manpower needs. As Borden explained in the House of Commons, new legislation was needed because the existing *Militia Act* provided only for balloting, which did not allow for "an intelligent consideration of the country's needs and conditions."<sup>50</sup> The MSA was needed, therefore, to allow men to be called up selectively, with provisions to exempt essential workers. The preamble emphasized the dual purpose of the MSA: "by reason of the large number of men who have already left agricultural and industrial pursuits in Canada to join such Expeditionary Force as volunteers, and of the necessity of sustaining under such conditions the productivity of the Dominion, it is expedient to secure the men still required, not by ballot as provided in the *Militia Act*, but by selective draft."<sup>51</sup> The dual purpose of the MSA was further emphasized by the Department of Justice manual that stressed the need for CEF reinforcements, but added that local tribunals were required to consider both the civil and military requirements of the nation in granting exemptions to military service. However, the manual continued, the needs of the nation were complex, circumstances varied widely depending on local and individual situations, and no detailed guidance could be offered. Instead, local tribunals should consider the importance of the production of food, coal, steel, metal, wood, and other manufactured articles as well as the need for the continued operation of railways, steamships, telegraphs, telephones, light, heat, and power plants, and financial institutions. All were equally important and local tribunals were expected to exercise common sense, "having regard to local conditions and to their general knowledge of the domestic and world situation from the point of view of production, manufacturing and commerce."<sup>52</sup>

In effect, the bulk of the labour force enjoyed some degree of immunity from conscription, as borne out by a sample of 469 MSA infantrymen. Only 6% (28 men) were industrial or munitions workers while 61% (286 men) were either farmers or labourers. Even allowing for the scale of agriculture in Canada at this time, the difference is striking. However, not only individuals but employers as well were allowed to submit requests for exemption, a process that favored wage-earners but not the self-employed.<sup>53</sup> There may have been some intent to use the MSA as a means of rational allocation of manpower, but it does not appear that this was translated into practice. However, despite its shortcomings as a means of controlling national manpower resources, the MSA made a considerable difference to manning within the CEF. The most obvious difference was that under the volunteer system, men were free to apply to whichever unit took their fancy. By 1917, this invariably meant almost any corps but the infantry, which had the highest casualty rate, a fact that the majority of applicants realized. But the MSA, for the first time in the war, made it possible to allocate recruits where they were needed, not where they wished to serve. Men who were medically unfit for the infantry were no longer rejected outright, but directed to less demanding positions where their medical category was acceptable. The MSA, together with the adoption of standard medical categories in 1917 and the transfer of all men on full-time service to the CEF in 1918, made it possible to comb out the fit men in Canada and replace them with those who could not be sent overseas.<sup>54</sup> In April 1918, the Canadian Garrison Regiment (CGR) with eleven battalions was formed as part of the CEF, to guard vital points and internment camps. Militiamen on full-time duty were invited to transfer to the CGR; those who declined were released, and

in a few cases simultaneously drafted under the MSA.<sup>55</sup> The CGR contained a large number of unfit men; a study of 134 members who died between 1918 and 1922 shows 67 MSA draftees, 38 of whom were unfit, and 26 volunteers, only one of whom was fit to go overseas.<sup>56</sup>

Unlike militiamen, members of the CGR were also members of the CEF and could be sent overseas if their medical category was raised. They could also be redirected to other areas, regardless of whether or not they consented. In July 1918, MD 10 and MD 12 provided 146 troops from the local CGR to guard prisoners of war working on Nova Scotia railways, while MD 10 provided an additional company to augment the Halifax Garrison.<sup>57</sup> Apart from the number of reinforcements provided by the MSA, the act made the intelligent and rational allocation of manpower possible within the CEF.

At the end of 1917, the newly returned Union Government was aware of the need to address the problem of "more fully and intelligently utilizing Canada's man and woman power in the prosecution of the war."<sup>58</sup> Government action was prompt, and on 16 January 1918 a conference was convened with representatives from provincial governments, industry, and unions to consider "ways and means of quick and effective mobilization of Canada's man-power."<sup>59</sup> Unfortunately, there was no unanimity and the results of the conference were inconclusive. T.H. Auld, Deputy Minister of Agriculture for Saskatchewan, encouraged the use of tractors to reduce the need for labourers while a special committee recommended that conscripts rejected as medically unfit should be drafted to farms. It was also felt that federal labour exchanges should be established and a registration scheme put in place to determine the availability of labour. The Railway War Board asked that members of the Chinese Labour Corps, in transit from Victoria to

Halifax for service in France, be detained for essential track laying, while farmers from Ontario and British Columbia wanted to make use of indentured Chinese workers.<sup>60</sup> However, most of these proposals were rejected by union representatives who opposed the conscription of labour and the use of Chinese workers, although they grudgingly agreed to national registration and coordination of the labour supply.<sup>61</sup>

Faced with this intransigence, the government backed off and no attempt was made to emulate the British Ministry of National Service, set up in the fall of 1917 with the power to allocate manpower for both military and civilian purposes.<sup>62</sup> A sub-committee of Cabinet was formed in January 1918 to deal with registration of labour and classification of industries, but the emphasis was placed on cooperation and not compulsion.<sup>63</sup> A Dominion-Provincial Employment Service was set up, but this was intended only to facilitate the exchange of information between the provinces and the federal government. Sixty-six employment offices were organized by the end of the year, but the Employment Service had an annual budget of only \$50,000, which suggests the priority assigned by the Union Government.<sup>64</sup> An Order-in-Council (the Anti-Loafing Law) was passed in April 1918, making it an offence not to be gainfully employed or actively seeking employment, and a few months later, in June, some five million men and women were registered. Names and addresses were passed to employers and local authorities, but no attempt was made to make use of the information to redirect labour, effectively leaving the MSA as the only control over national manpower.<sup>65</sup>

Whether or not Canada was in a position to control manpower is very much a moot point since the government was in no position to control the war-time economy. Canada's ambiguous status as a Dominion meant that the British government felt free to



place orders in Canada without reference to the Canadian Government. As early as 1914, orders were placed by the War Office in Canada and the United States for 1,300,000 uniforms and 900,000 greatcoats with no regard for the needs of the CEF.<sup>66</sup> The contracts were viewed as beneficial, and the *Toronto Globe* felt that "as a result of war contracts which will be placed in Canada from the other side of the Atlantic many important industries throughout the Dominion will be in a position to keep their men in steady employment during the coming winter."<sup>67</sup> In other cases, however, British contracts were an obvious intrusion. In 1914, without consulting the Canadian Government, the Admiralty ordered ten H-class submarines from Canadian Vickers of Montréal. American supervisors and technicians were provided by Bethlehem Steel and local militia units furnished a security detail. Informed of this in January 1915, Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden was livid, especially when he found out that repairs to the Canadian icebreaker *J.D. Hazen* had to be suspended because the shipyard was fully occupied with the submarines.<sup>68</sup>

The largest commitment of Canadian manpower under British control was the Imperial Munitions Board [IMB], established in November 1915 to coordinate the purchase of munitions for the British Government. Under the direction of Sir Joseph Flavelle, a Toronto businessman, the IMB flourished and by 1918 almost 700 Canadian plants with 300,000 workers were churning out supplies, not only for the British Ministry of Munitions but also for the United States Ordnance Department. The IMB did not answer to the Canadian Government, but to the Ministry of Munitions.<sup>69</sup> The relationship seems to have been regarded with equanimity by the Canadian government and by 1918, military work parties were being provided to IMB plants in MD 2, MD 3, and MD 6.<sup>70</sup>

However, the establishment of the IMB meant that "the most significant economic activity generated in Canada by the Great War was not supervised by the Government of Canada."<sup>71</sup>

Apart from men diverted to industry, substantial numbers of potential recruits were lost to the CEF because they were reservists or had been recruited by other nations in Canada. The total number of potential recruits lost to the CEF is uncertain but was probably in excess of 60,000 men, or substantially more than the number of MSA conscripts posted to the Canadian Corps in 1918. However, not all of these men could have been diverted to the CEF. It would have been difficult if not impossible, for example, to have prevented the 21,000 British and Allied reservists in Canada from returning to their home countries. To do so would have required a rigid manpower policy from the beginning and a degree of independence in foreign affairs that Canada did not enjoy. However, there were substantial numbers of men recruited in Canada by other nations, representing a genuine loss to the CEF.

The most prominent group were British Army reservists who had permission to reside in Canada during their five-year stint in the Army Reserve.<sup>72</sup> At the outbreak of war in 1914, there were 3,294 of these men living in Canada, of whom 149 were members of the PF.<sup>73</sup> The latter, all of whom were experienced soldiers, were clearly important to the CEF as it mobilized, a fact eventually recognized by the War Office, which ruled in March 1915 that "all imperial reservists now serving in the Canadian Permanent Force shall be allowed to continue in such employment."<sup>74</sup> But the situation was different for Reservists who were not members of the PF, and the British Army

Council ruled that "Army Reservists reported to be in Canada should not be used in the formation of Canadian units which may be placed at the disposal of the War Office. They should be sent home as soon as possible."<sup>75</sup> Notwithstanding this decision, at least 150 reservists joined the CEF and in December 1914, the War Office made an unsuccessful attempt to recall medically fit reservists serving with the First Contingent.<sup>76</sup>

British authorities coordinated the repatriation of reservists using the peacetime militia camp at Lévis, presumably staffed by the PF, as a transit camp. By the end of August 1914, more than 2,000 men had been returned to England with another 106 accompanying the First Contingent at the end of September.<sup>77</sup> The final number returned is not certain, but in early 1917, the Minister of Militia and Defence told the House of Commons that 2,779 reservists had been returned to Britain.<sup>78</sup>

Not all reservists domiciled in Canada were British. By January 1917, 18,100 French, Russian, Belgian, and Italian citizens living in Canada had been returned to their homelands. As with the British reservists, the Canadian Government assisted where possible, going so far as to commission two French doctors as militia officers in November 1916 for the express purpose of examining French reservists before their departure for France.<sup>79</sup> Not all reservists returned to France and at least twenty-nine, including Raymond Brutinel who later became head of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps, joined the 1<sup>st</sup> Division. One, Private Klein, who had joined the 14<sup>th</sup> Battalion, was served with his call-up papers by the French Consul in Montréal. Concerns were expressed about the legal status of these men, some of whom were naturalized British subjects, but after some discussion, the British Ambassador in Paris reported that French authorities would not press for the return of their reservists if the men concerned were

serving with the CEF.<sup>80</sup> An estimated 5,000 Russian reservists living in Canada were also returned under arrangements made by the Russian Consul General in Montréal, although the trip could not have been easy. The Russian Government also took the position that Russian subjects were liable for military service regardless of their residence but this was resisted by both the CEF and the men concerned. In June 1915, therefore, the Russian Government relented, and all Russian subjects domiciled in Canada, including reservists, were allowed to join the CEF.<sup>81</sup>

Table 5  
Reservists Called Up in Canada<sup>82</sup>

Country	Reservists	Remarks
Great Britain	2,779	
Russia	5,000	Estimate
France	5,000	Estimate
Belgium	600	Estimate
Italy	7,500	Estimate
Total	20,879	

Apart from reservists, other Canadians also served with British forces, although the number is far from certain. In June 1919, E.H. Scammell, Assistant Deputy Minister for the Department of Soldiers' Civil Re-establishment, estimated that about 50,300 Canadians served with the British. On the other hand, in January 1942, Edwin Pye of the Historical Section claimed a total of 17,498.<sup>83</sup> Neither Scammell nor Pye outlined their methodology or sources. However, the Veterans Affairs Canada data-base lists 1,794 Canadians who died while serving with the British Army.<sup>84</sup> Assuming the British death rate to have been roughly the same as the Canadian death rate (9.6%), then approximately 18,500 Canadians served with the British Army.<sup>85</sup> Pye's estimate appears to exclude members of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force as well as civilian physicians and

nurses while if these groups are deducted from Scammell's estimate, then the total of those who served with British forces can be reduced to 27,500.

However, Scammell's figures include an estimated 2,000 men who made their own way to Britain to enlist and 12,000 who left the CEF in England to join the British forces. Neither figure can be confirmed, but there is no doubt that many Canadians managed to join the British Army one way or another. There were a small number of expatriate Britons who joined the CEF because they could not afford the passage home, such as Alwyn Bramley-Moore from the 11<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Battalion who joined the 23<sup>rd</sup> (Sportsmen's) Battalion of the Royal Fusiliers on arrival in England, and Charles de Fallot of the 12<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Battalion who joined the 6<sup>th</sup> Battalion Loyal North Lancashire Regiment and was killed at Gallipoli in July 1915.<sup>86</sup> Others, such as Lieutenant V. Michie of the 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Battalion and Captain G.M. Brew of the 1<sup>st</sup> Regiment CGA, made their own way back to England to rejoin their old regiments.<sup>87</sup>

The largest group of Canadians serving with the British Forces were those in the Royal Flying Corps [RFC], the Royal Naval Air Service [RNAS] and (after 1 April 1918), the Royal Air Force [RAF]. Some were seconded from the CEF, but most were enlisted in Canada. The total is far from certain. Some years ago, the Directorate of History compiled a data-base listing 13,160 aircrew, including 1,736 known non-Canadians, primarily Americans, who were enlisted and trained in Canada. Together with 7,453 men enlisted in Canada as mechanics for the RFC/RAF training scheme, the total is 20,613. On the other hand, a panel in the Memorial Chamber of the Parliament Buildings in Ottawa claims that 22,812 men served with British flying services. An exact total,

therefore, is impossible to determine, but it would be reasonable to assume that about 22,000 Canadian officers and men served with the RFC, RNAS or RAF.<sup>88</sup>

Recruiting of personnel for the RFC and RAF was done with the agreement of the Canadian government. No quota was imposed, but by October 1918, the drain on the CEF was such that restrictions had to be placed on transfers to the RAF.<sup>89</sup> RFC recruiting in Canada was initially coordinated by Lieutenant-Colonel E.A. Stanton, the Governor-General's private secretary, with the assistance of Militia Headquarters, and successful applicants were sent to England for training. In the case of the RNAS, potential pilots were recruited by Naval Service Headquarters in Ottawa and then trained at Curtiss Aeroplanes and Motors Limited of Toronto before proceeding overseas. A special holding company of the Royal Navy Canadian Volunteer Reserve was established at Halifax for potential naval aviators waiting for training.<sup>90</sup>

In December 1916, the War Office decided, without consulting the Canadian government, to establish a large RFC training organization in Canada. In the event, the Canadian Government had no objections and for the remainder of the war, the Department of Militia and Defence provided administrative and logistical support for RFC Canada, as the new organization became known. The IMB constructed airfields at Camp Borden, Rathbun, Tyendinaga, Armour Heights, and Leaside with ground training facilities at the University of Toronto. Two of these facilities (Camp Borden and Tyendinaga) were established militia training areas, while the remainder were leased or donated to the Department of Militia and Defence for use by RFC Canada.<sup>91</sup> The manpower cost of supporting not only RFC Canada, but British flying services in general, was significant. Although the Canadian contribution directly aided the Empire war effort,

the unchecked diversion of manpower was a direct loss to the CEF and precluded any control over national manpower resources.

Canadians served with a wide variety of other British units including a number that catered to men from the Dominions: 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> King Edward's Horse (The King's Overseas Dominions Regiment) and the 17<sup>th</sup> (Empire) and 25<sup>th</sup> (Frontiersmen) Battalions of the Royal Fusiliers.<sup>92</sup> However, apart from British flying services, the two largest contingents were those with the Inland Water Transport (Royal Engineers) and the mechanical transport section of the Army Service Corps [ASC].

The Inland Water Transport [IWT], from its humble beginnings in 1914, grew rapidly and by 1918 had 10,164 men in France and Mesopotamia as well as 41,940 African and Asian labourers.<sup>93</sup> A large proportion of the IWT was Canadian and Captain W.W. Murray, a Canadian who served in the Middle East, later wrote about the IWT crews on the Tigris River: "just to illustrate Canadian ubiquity during the war, let it be known that a large percentage of the officers and men of those river craft [on the Tigris River between Basra and Baghdad] was made up of British Columbians."<sup>94</sup>

Recruiting for the IWT in Canada did not start until November 1916, when Royal Engineer Detachments were established in CEF recruiting offices in Montréal, Toronto, Fort Frances, and Vancouver with instructions from Militia HQ that districts were expected to facilitate recruiting.<sup>95</sup> From 1916 to 1918, at least 3,108 men were either recruited in Canada by the Royal Engineers or transferred from Canadian units.<sup>96</sup>

Recruits had to be skilled mariners and advertisements called for master mariners, marine engineers, bargemen, riveters, and calkers. Men were paid according to British pay scales (less than Canadian) and medical standards were less stringent, although this seems to

have boomeranged in 1917, when the IWT complained that CAMC doctors were passing men with tuberculosis, Bright's Disease, chronic heart disease, and rheumatism.<sup>97</sup> Once enlisted, the men were Royal Engineers and not members of the CEF. Nonetheless, they seem to have retained their Canadian identity and ex-Sergeant-Major R.W. Gornall of Vancouver later claimed that men recruited in Canada wore Canada badges on their shoulder straps during their service with the IWT.<sup>98</sup> Not all IWT recruits were civilians and some came from the CEF, with the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Pioneer Battalion, for example, providing a draft of twenty-three men.<sup>99</sup>

At least 1,035 men were also recruited in Canada for the Mechanical Transport section of the British ASC. Recruiting started in October 1916 with the agreement of the Canadian government with a hoped-for quota of 2,470 men, although in the end only 1,100 were enlisted.<sup>100</sup> Applicants had to be skilled driver-mechanics, wheelers, fitters, electricians, or blacksmiths and an elaborate system was set up in Canada to test trade proficiency.<sup>101</sup> However, Canadian standards were evidently suspect and further tests at the Grove Park ASC Depot in England weeded out some 500 Canadian volunteers who were unsuitable for one reason or another.<sup>102</sup>

Disposing of unsuitable Canadian volunteers was a problem and initially they were sent to the CASC Training Depot at Shorncliffe, where a batch of ninety-eight men, many of whom had been without a bath or change of underclothing for a month, arrived with no warning. The incident provoked an outburst from Major-General J.W. Carson, Hughes's representative in London:

I would think that with the terrific demands that are being made on Canada for the purpose of keeping up the present and future Divisions in the Field, we can use all the men that Canada can give us, without turning over these fine boys to the



British Service and then find that they are treated in anything but the proper spirit.<sup>103</sup>

The rejected volunteers were eventually given the opportunity to join the CEF at Shorncliffe, but more than half declined the offer and were returned to Grove Park for repatriation to Canada.<sup>104</sup>

Many of those who were accepted at Grove Park were drafted to British forces in German East Africa, where a British officer thought Canadians were "A little difficult at first, apt to chafe at the restrictions that, though perhaps not necessary for themselves in particular, were yet essential in preserving discipline."<sup>105</sup> Like their counterparts in the IWT, Canadian ASC men maintained their Canadian identity and Corporal J.R. McNeice of Toronto wrote that he and his comrades felt they were only on loan to the British Army and that some wore CASC badges rather than ASC insignia.<sup>106</sup>

Apart from the ASC and IWT, other units recruited in Canada as well, including the Jewish Legion, which originated in September 1917 at the behest of the Jewish community in Britain. The original intention on the part of the War Office was to raise five battalions of Royal Fusiliers (38<sup>th</sup>, 39<sup>th</sup>, 40<sup>th</sup> and 41<sup>st</sup> with the 42<sup>nd</sup> as a regimental depot) from British Jews.<sup>107</sup> However, it soon became evident that the pool of recruits in Britain was too small to sustain the Legion, and the War Office decided to recruit in both Canada and the United States.<sup>108</sup>

Recruiting for the Jewish Legion in Canada was controlled by the British-Canadian Recruiting Mission [BCRM] in New York City, an unusual arrangement that was approved by Militia Headquarters in March 1918. To assist recruiting, the BCRM organized Jewish Recruiting Committees in Montréal, Toronto, and Winnipeg.<sup>109</sup> Each Committee was to "enquire into the antecedents and bona fides of the applicants and

furnish each applicant with a Certificate to the effect that he is not within a class called out for service under the Military Service Act of Canada, and that he is in all respects a suitable recruit for enlistment in the British Army."<sup>110</sup> There was some ambivalence about ethnicity and religion and the BCRM instructed local committees that Russian, Polish, and Rumanian Jews were acceptable, but "Armenians and Syrians ought to be classed as enemy aliens."<sup>111</sup> Recruits attracted by the Committees were processed by CEF recruiting centres and then transported by the Department of Militia and Defence to the Imperial Recruit Depot at Windsor, Nova Scotia.<sup>112</sup>

However, there was no rush to the colours, perhaps because Jews who were British subjects were eligible for conscription under the MSA while many had already joined the CEF.<sup>113</sup> Canadian Jewry was also divided and Zionist support for the Legion may have inhibited recruiting, particularly in the Orthodox community. In Winnipeg, Rabbi Herbert J. Samuel of the Shaarey Zedek synagogue not only recruited on behalf of the Legion, but announced he would volunteer as well.<sup>114</sup> However, in a confidential letter to Prime Minister Borden, he opposed the Legion unless Jews born in enemy countries were included as well.<sup>115</sup> By mid-July 1918 it was apparent that recruits were few and far between and the Jewish Recruiting Committees were disbanded.<sup>116</sup> The number of men enlisted in Canada is uncertain and official figures were never compiled, although Vladimir Jabotinsky, a former officer of the Jewish Legion, estimated that about 300 Canadians were recruited, a figure confirmed by another veteran, Hyman Sokolov of Winnipeg.<sup>117</sup>

A handful of men joined other British units. In December 1916, three men from the 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Pioneer Battalion and the 72<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Battalion joined the

Royal Engineer Wireless Detachment at GHQ while four others managed to join Number 6 Wireless Depot Company, Royal Engineers, by May 1917.<sup>118</sup> There were also 182 veterinarians, eight chemists, twenty-five men with the motor boat patrol and Lieutenant F.C.C. Devlin of the 102<sup>nd</sup> Regiment (Rocky Mountain Rangers) in Kamloops, who was seconded to the Gambian Company of the West African Frontier Force and died at Dar Es Salaam in 1917.<sup>119</sup>

Table 6  
Canadians Serving with British Army

Component	Number	Remarks
Flying Services	22,000	
Inland Water Transport	3,108	
Mechanical Transport	1,035	
Jewish Legion	300	
Minor units	250	Estimate
Sub-total – confirmed cases	26,293	
Joined from CEF	12,000	Scammell's estimate
Made their way to Britain	2,000	Scammell's estimate
Sub-total Scammell's estimate	14,000	
Total	40,293	

Canadian expatriates also served with other nations. It is estimated that about 200 Canadians served with the French Army, although some of these may have been pre-war Regulars.<sup>120</sup> Contrary to popular belief, only a handful served with the Foreign Legion such as Harley Gianelli Smith, a Toronto broker serving as an officer with the 12<sup>th</sup> Canadian Reserve Battalion at Shorncliffe, who was court-martialled in May 1917 for scandalous behavior, desertion, drunkenness, and escaping from custody. Smith made his way to France after being cashiered, joined the Foreign Legion, and was killed in 1918 after being decorated for gallantry.<sup>121</sup> Some 2,485 Montenegrin and 8,894 Rumanian recruits were sent overseas from Canada under arrangements made by the Department of

Militia and Defence.<sup>122</sup> The majority were probably from the United States but judging by the Polish Legion which drew 1.7% of its recruits from Canada, about 193 were Canadians.

The Serbian Army also recruited in Canada. The campaign was headed by Nicola Pavlovich, an agent of the Serbian Legation in Washington, who had been authorized by the CGS in February 1917 "to superintend the recruiting of Serbians resident in Canada, not for the Canadian Expeditionary Force but for the Serbian Army."<sup>123</sup> Like the Jewish Legion, recruiting was done by local committees formed by the *Srpska Narodna Odbrana* or Serbian National Defence League. Recruits were interviewed, provided with identity cards, and quartered at the nearest Militia District HQ before proceeding to a central Serbian Mobilization Camp, originally at the Sussex militia camp in New Brunswick, and then at Lévis, Québec. Costs were shared by the British and Serbian Governments.<sup>124</sup>

The Serbian National Defence League, however, had a pan-Serbian outlook and considered all ethnic Serbs, including those born in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, as potential recruits. But the League's efforts to recruit men who were classed as enemy aliens created difficulties and in June 1918, the Serb Legation asked that the Canadian government certify ethnic Serbs as friendly aliens despite their formal citizenship.<sup>125</sup>

The League's activities were not confined to Canada and men were recruited in the United States, a gross violation of American neutrality condoned in February 1917 by the CGS who wrote "efforts will be made to enlist Serbians in Canada and (the fact is not to be disclosed) in the United States [and] it is desirable to attract as little attention as possible."<sup>126</sup> The number of Serbs recruited in Canada and the United States is not

certain; although returns submitted by the Commandant of the Serbian Mobilization Camp at Lévis between 17 March 1917 and 28 November 1918 show 6,203 Serbs were sent overseas.<sup>127</sup> To this can be added an additional thirteen men who died at the Lévis Mobilization Camp: ten from influenza, two in an altercation, and one who was accidentally electrocuted.<sup>128</sup> Again, using the Polish Legion as an example, it is probable that about 106 Canadian Serbs were recruited.

In some cases, national armies were raised for nations that did not exist. Czechoslovakia, part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, was recognized by Britain as a distinct nation in August 1918, but did not have an army, although Czech units were serving on both sides with the Russian, French, Italian, and Austro-Hungarian armies.<sup>129</sup> There is no evidence that Czech legions actively recruited in Canada, although an estimated 3,000 Czechs were recruited in the United States, and it would be surprising if some of these were not Canadians.<sup>130</sup> However, Czech-Canadians in the CEF were willing to join one of the Czech Legions and in October 1918, a handful of men from the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion Canadian Engineers were discharged and sent to the Czech Legion Depot at Cognac.<sup>131</sup> At the same time, Czechs and Poles with the CEF at Bramshott, England, were given the option of waiving demobilization entitlements and joining the new national armies. The policy did not last long, however, and in December 1918, transfers to the Czech Army were banned, although men could still join the Polish Army.<sup>132</sup>

Although Poland had not existed as an independent state since 1792, the ideal of a Polish nation persisted throughout the nineteenth century and was given considerable impetus on the outbreak of war. In the United States, Polish nationalism was fostered by paramilitary groups such as the *Zwiazek Wojsk Polskich* or Polish Military Alliance

formed in 1894, and other groups, including the Polish Falcon Alliance based in Pittsburgh, that conducted military training from 1913 onwards.<sup>133</sup> With the outbreak of war and the possibility of Polish independence, the Falcons actively searched for a sponsor for a Polish national army. In October 1916, Vincent Skarzynski, a member of the Falcons, and Andrzej Malkowski, an associate of Joseph Pilsudski, the Polish nationalist who devoted much of his life to Polish independence, were introduced to Sam Hughes by a mutual acquaintance and took advantage of the opportunity to suggest that Canada take steps to train recruits for a new national army. Hughes took their proposal seriously, and after some discussions with London, the Department of Militia and Defence agreed to train Polish volunteers, with the first batch of twenty-three starting at the University of Toronto on 3 January 1917.<sup>134</sup>

Facilities at the University of Toronto were inadequate and after spending the summer at Camp Borden, the Polish School of Infantry moved to Niagara-on-the-Lake in October 1917, where a Polish Army Camp had been established by Lieutenant-Colonel A.D. LePan of the Canadian Officers Training Corps [COTC]. Recruiting, at least in the United States, was initially brisk, Niagara Camp very quickly became overcrowded, and at the end of November, 1917, the 1<sup>st</sup> Depot Battalion under Major H.H. Madill, COTC, was moved to the PF barracks at St John's, Québec. Additional barrack accommodation was also made available by the United States Army at Fort George, New York, leaving LePan with the job of coordinating Polish Army activities with two nations and two Canadian military districts.

Between October 1917 and March 1919, the three camps handled 22,395 Polish recruits, of whom 20,720 were sent overseas. The majority of these men were Americans,

with only 384 claiming Canada as their home.<sup>135</sup> Financial costs were borne by the French Government, but Canada had to provide the physical infrastructure, equipment, and uniforms (some men were issued with peace-time scarlet uniforms withdrawn from militia units). Twenty-five officers and several hundred NCOs and soldiers were attached to the Polish Legion, many of whom presumably could have been employed elsewhere by the CEF.<sup>136</sup>

Polish recruiting centres were opened in Winnipeg, Toronto, and Montréal in October 1917 with the approval of Militia HQ.<sup>137</sup> But, with only 384 Polish-Canadians joining between October 1917 and December 1918, recruiting could not be described as brisk and Polish recruiters turned to the CEF. In March 1918, informal arrangements were made with the CO 1<sup>st</sup> Depot Battalion, Manitoba Regiment, to discharge Polish conscripts from the CEF if they agreed to join the Polish Legion.<sup>138</sup> Evidently this did not produce the number of recruits expected and in June 1918, the Polish Recruiting Centre in Winnipeg asked for permission to browse personnel files of MSA draftees and post advertisements in the Manitoba Regiment barracks at Minto Armoury. The Recruiting Centre also suggested that Polish-speaking MSA draftees who had been born in Germany or Austria and who did not speak fluent English should be transferred to the Polish Army where they would be more useful. Initially, HQ MD 10 balked at the idea, but by July 1918, MSA draftees of Polish origin were being handed over to the Polish Recruiting Centre.<sup>139</sup>

In Montréal, Number 44 Polish Army Recruiting Centre also sought recruits from the CEF and in May 1918, was able to persuade MD 3 to hand over twenty-one soldiers from the Polish settlements at Wilno and Barry's Bay in Ontario. Presumably, the men

concerned agreed to their discharge from the CEF and enlistment in the Polish Legion, although this is far from clear.<sup>140</sup>

Table 7  
Canadian Recruits in Foreign Armies

Foreign Armies	Canadian Recruits	Remarks
Poland	384	22,395 recruits overall
Montenegro	42	Estimated. 2,485 from Canada and United States
Romania	151	Estimated. 8,894 from Canada and United States
Serbia	106	Estimated. 6,216 from Canada and United States
Czechoslovakia	?	
Total	683	

Note: At least 1.7% of the Poles lived in Canada and it has been assumed that the same proportion applied to other nationalities.

The total loss of Canadian manpower to other nations is difficult to determine, but the estimated numbers are summarized in Table 8.

Table 8  
Canadians in Other Armies

Nation	Estimated Number	Remarks
British reservists	2,779	
Italian reservists	7,500	
French reservists	5,000	
Russian reservists	5,000	
Belgian reservists	600	
Recruits – British army	18,500	Includes Jewish Legion
Recruits – British flying services	22,000	Includes men enlisted by British-Canadian Recruiting Mission
Recruits – Polish army	384	
Recruits – Romanian army	151	
Recruits – Serbian army	106	
Recruits – Montenegrin army	42	
Total	61,956	

Note: (1) Table 8 excludes a handful of men from neutral countries who were recalled. At least two reservists serving with the CEF in Saskatchewan were discharged after being recalled by the Dutch army.<sup>141</sup>



(2) George Forgeon, an Italian reservist, was discharged from the CEF after being recalled by the Italian army although he was a naturalized British subject. No doubt there were a handful of other foreign reservists in the same position.<sup>142</sup>

Valuable as these contingents were, Canada's major contribution was the CEF in general and the Canadian Corps in particular. Almost 620,000 officers and men were enrolled, no small feat for a nation of fewer than eight million people.<sup>143</sup> But "neither Borden nor his ministers appreciated the strain this large commitment would place upon the voluntary system of recruitment and upon the nation's economy."<sup>144</sup> It can also be added that neither Borden nor his ministers had a clear idea of the size, purpose, composition, or control mechanisms of the forces required. Politics ruled all and Borden has received considerable credit for cleaning up the chaos created by Sam Hughes and asserting control over Canadian Forces overseas by creating the Ministry of Overseas Military Forces of Canada, [OMFC]. However, while the OMFC may have solved the immediate problem of the administrative control of Canada's army overseas, it also meant that effective command of the bulk of Canada's army was exercised by a cabinet minister in England, far removed from Militia HQ in Ottawa, who did not have to concern himself with the larger problem of coordinating national requirements for manpower.

Most of Canada's soldiers overseas were concentrated in five divisions, all raised under differing circumstances. The 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Divisions were offered to Britain in 1914 as independent forces with no plan to join the two to form a corps. However, in April 1915, Hughes, apparently on his own initiative, suggested the creation of a corps to the

Canadian representative at GHQ in France. The offer was promptly passed by GHQ to the War Office and on 13 September 1915, the Canadian Corps under the command of Lieutenant-General E.A.H. Alderson was formed in France. Alderson, an experienced professional officer, considered that a corps with only two divisions was unbalanced and, at his suggestion, Canada offered two additional divisions to bring the corps up to four divisions.<sup>145</sup> The offer was accepted and the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division arrived in France in December 1915, with the 4<sup>th</sup> Division, delayed by the need to provide reinforcements to the Canadian Corps, arriving in the summer of 1916.<sup>146</sup> Subsequently, in August 1916, Hughes ordered a fifth division to be organized, with a sixth division to follow.<sup>147</sup> But manpower was becoming increasingly limited and the creation of the 5<sup>th</sup> Division was delayed until January 1917, largely because the men earmarked for the division had to be sent to France in November to replace the losses on the Somme.<sup>148</sup>

The 5<sup>th</sup> Division was perhaps the most visible indication of the lack of manpower planning. It was not formed to meet any identifiable national or operational need but simply, it would appear, to save face by honouring a commitment made by the Minister of Militia and Defence. Both Hughes and the War Office thought the 5<sup>th</sup> Division would be sent to France but OMFC staff, wrestling with the ongoing problem of finding reinforcements for the Canadian Corps, thought otherwise. As early as March 1917, the Deputy Minister OMFC warned the War Office that casualties could not be replaced if the 5<sup>th</sup> was sent to France and that it would be difficult to keep the Canadian Corps up to strength, even if the 5<sup>th</sup> were tapped for reinforcements.<sup>149</sup> The warning was repeated three months later when the Minister of the OMFC, Sir George Perley, again advised the War Office that it would be necessary to use the 5<sup>th</sup> Division to keep the four divisions in

France up to strength.<sup>150</sup> By November 1917, it was evident that maintaining the 5<sup>th</sup> was pointless and Perley recommended that the division be broken up to provide reinforcements. Prime Minister Borden concurred, but Perley avoided taking action until February 1918, perhaps, as one historian has suggested, to avoid losing 5<sup>th</sup> Division votes in the December election.<sup>151</sup>

Whether or not the 5<sup>th</sup> Division tied up manpower that could have been better used in France seems doubtful and in practice, the division was an extension of the Canadian reserve organization in England. For example, the 5<sup>th</sup> Division was used as a holding unit for underage soldiers starting in January 1917, when minors at Shorncliffe, who were not employed as drummers and buglers, were posted to 5<sup>th</sup> Division units. By the end of February 1917, the division held 698 juveniles with 951 on strength at the end of March 1917. These were the peak months, however, and when the division was broken up in February 1918, there were only fifty-nine minors on strength.<sup>152</sup>

The 5<sup>th</sup> was also used as a training formation and during its twelve-month existence, almost one-third of its infantrymen at any given time were undergoing basic training. Needless to say, units were unhappy with this state of affairs and in May 1917, the 119<sup>th</sup> Battalion complained about a batch of 513 men from the 8<sup>th</sup> Canadian Reserve Battalion: "This draft is largely made up of men enlisted in Canada as artillerymen. Many of these men have had no shore leave; no P.T., no route marching, no BF [bayonet fighting], no armed drill and no squad drill."<sup>153</sup> The Division was also periodically called upon to provide reinforcements and War Office returns suggest that about 4,800 men were drafted to France with the largest batch of 1,400 sent in May 1917, a drain

commented on by one historian who wrote that in the 134<sup>th</sup> Battalion, "Drafts were called for regularly and then the numbers would be replaced from reserve battalions."<sup>154</sup>

**Table 9**  
**Infantry Strength 5<sup>th</sup> Division<sup>155</sup>**

Month	Trained	Untrained	Underage	Total	Non-Effective
February 1917	3,004	7,156	697	10,857	72.3%
March 1917	6,878	3,519	951	11,348	39.4%
April 1917	7,434	3,300	407	11,141	33.3%
May 1917	5,289	3,546	405	9,240	42.8%
June 1917	4,760	5,990	309	11,059	57%
July 1917	6,319	4,489	392	11,200	43.6%
August 1917	9,142	1,681	301	11,124	17.8%
September 1917	9,469	1,204	312	10,985	13.8%
October 1917	9,450	2,842	245	12,537	24.6%
November 1917	9,222	1,157	161	10,540	12.5%
December 1917	9,226	1,130	91	10,447	11.7%
January 1918	7,309	1,717	76	9,102	19.7%
February 1918	7,256	865	59	8180	11.3%
Average	7,289	2,969	339	10,597	31.2%

Note: The term non-effective is used to denote soldiers who were underage, medically unfit, untrained or otherwise not immediately available for drafting to France.

Canada's willingness to be a helpful member of the British Empire created other manpower problems. In March 1917, the Cabinet agreed to a British request for drafts of the Chinese Labour Corps [CLC] to land in British Columbia and travel under escort to Atlantic seaports for onward passage to Europe. The decision meant that a staging area and depot had to be organized on Vancouver Island and transit facilities provided at Camp Petawawa. Guards, medical orderlies, and support staff for the various camps, together with a thousand men for the Railway Service Guard, also had to be found. While

most of these men were unfit for overseas service, many could perhaps have been used elsewhere in Canada to replace fit men.<sup>156</sup> Guards and medical orderlies were also needed for CLC transports, most of which sailed from Atlantic ports although a few proceeded to Europe via the Panama Canal. Providing the men for these ships was a minor headache and small detachments had to be detailed, many with little or no training; a CLC officer later commented, "Canadian recruits, still quite raw. They had only their rifles given to them a week before they sailed."<sup>157</sup> Despite this, the detachments seem to have done well and in May 1917, a platoon from the 122<sup>nd</sup> Battalion was singled out for successfully putting down a CLC mutiny on the SS *Missinabie*.<sup>158</sup>

Canada was also willing to help with the expansion of the Tank Corps and in March 1918, agreed to form the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Tank Battalion.<sup>159</sup> Subsequently, a second tank battalion was offered and then, at the request of the War Office, a third. OMFC, however, understood what Ottawa apparently did not: apart from the initial cost in manpower and future reinforcement needs, three tank battalions meant a Canadian Tank Brigade, with the need to find 388 men for a brigade headquarters, supply company, signal company, and mechanical transport company. The OMFC CGS, Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Turner, thought the job would be difficult "Unless the numbers to be enlisted under the Military Service Act are likely to be increased."<sup>160</sup> Fortunately, the war ended before all three battalions and the brigade components were formed.

Other increases and changes to establishments had manning implications that to all appearances were not considered by either OMFC or Ottawa. In 1918, infantry battalions in the Canadian Corps were increased by 100 men each, while engineer field companies and brigade machine gun companies were grouped into battalions.<sup>161</sup> Much

has been made of these increases and one historian has claimed that the effect was to give each Canadian division the hitting power of a small British corps.<sup>162</sup> But the claim does stand up to scrutiny. Divisions did not operate independently and additional firepower resources were allocated from corps and army resources as required. In the opening stages of the Battle of Arras on 26 August 1918, for example, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Division was supported by sixteen guns from the 1<sup>st</sup> Life Guards Machine Gun Battalion, while the divisional artillery was tripled with the addition of the 16<sup>th</sup> (British) Divisional Artillery, a field brigade from the 15<sup>th</sup> (British) Divisional artillery, and the 52<sup>nd</sup> and 126<sup>th</sup> (British) Army Field Brigades.<sup>163</sup> Nor did the increase in infantrymen have a significant effect and in July 1918, the average Canadian battalion with 1,018 men had only eighty-nine more infantrymen than the average British battalion with 929 men.<sup>164</sup>

Nor was the much-vaunted addition of 100 men to every Canadian infantry battalion new or original. In 1916-1917, battalions within the BEF (including the CEF) had been deliberately over-manned. The purpose is not clear, but was probably intended to compensate for the number of men routinely detached from their battalions for other purposes.<sup>165</sup> Overmanning started as early as January 1916, when a visitor to the Canadian Corps reported that untrained supernumerary men were serving with brigades in the Canadian Corps. Official sanction, however, does not seem to have been granted until March 1916, when the War Office recommended that Canadian battalions in the Canadian Corps carry an additional fifty soldiers, presumably to ease congestion in England and position reinforcements closer to the front.<sup>166</sup>

The number of supernumeraries with each battalion varied over time. In August 1916, the Canadian Training Division at Shorncliffe provided an additional 200 men to

each battalion in France while in December 1916, GHQ directed that all infantry battalions (including Canadians) would be "brought up to a strength of 100 other ranks above establishment."<sup>167</sup> The policy was further refined in June 1917 to 100 men per battalion in addition to the First Reinforcements held by Entrenching Battalions.<sup>168</sup> The practice ended in August 1917 over Lieutenant-General Currie's protests when GHQ withdrew all supernumeraries to form part of the reinforcement pool at the base.<sup>169</sup>

The addition of 100 men to each Canadian battalion in February 1918, therefore, simply restored an out-dated policy. However, the devil is in the details, and OMFC did not authorize a temporary increase but amended the battalion establishment, probably at Currie's suggestion.<sup>170</sup> Reserve units in England, therefore, became obligated to provide more men since reinforcement demands were tied to establishments. Nor did the battalions benefit to any great extent from this increase. As discussed in Chapter 7, men still had to be detached to a variety of miscellaneous duties and in April 1918, each battalion had to provide fifty men to the newly formed machine gun battalions, a shortfall that the Canadian Corps Reinforcement Camp could not make up until the eve of the Battle of Amiens in August.<sup>171</sup> The Canadian policy of over-manning did not last long, and was quietly done away with in August 1918.<sup>172</sup>

Other aspects of the Canadian establishment changes created problems and new units such as the twelve engineer battalions and four machine-gun battalions required an additional 12,243 men to bring them up to strength.<sup>173</sup> There were other consequences as well, since the increased establishment meant an increase in wastage which had to be replaced.<sup>174</sup> The exact manpower cost is difficult to calculate, but it is estimated that the reorganization required an additional 13,868 men, which may explain why "the Corps

was considerably under strength on the date when operations began [8 August 1918]".<sup>175</sup>

To put this figure into context, 24,132 MSA draftees were needed in 1918 to maintain the Canadian Corps.<sup>176</sup>

**Table 10**  
**Engineer and Machine Gun Increases 1918**<sup>177</sup>

<b>Strength</b>	<b>Divisional Engineers</b>	<b>Machine Gun Corps</b>
31 January 1918	11,545	4,219
31 July 1918	15,551 (note 2)	8,572
Increase	4,006	4,353
Percentage Increase	35%	51%
Wastage -Hundred Days	8,477	5,006
Added Wastage	2,967	2,542
Summary (increase and added wastage)	6,973	6,895
Total increase-Engineers and Machine Gun Corps	13,868	

Notes: (1) I am grateful to Doctor Bill Rawling of the Directorate of History and Heritage for reviewing the initial calculations.

(2) The engineer strength for 31 July 1918 and the wastage during the Hundred Days have been adjusted to compensate for the pioneer battalions absorbed during the reorganization.

(3) Twenty-three new units were sent to France in 1918 including three engineer field companies and three machine gun companies which were absorbed by the Corps.<sup>178</sup>

Canada also provided a large number of troops that did not directly benefit the Canadian Corps or the CEF in general. Unlike Australia, which made a conscious decision to provide troops for the Lines of Communications [L of C] only when they would directly benefit the Australian Imperial Force [AIF], Canada provided L of C troops throughout the war, regardless of whether or not there was any benefit to the Canadian Corps.<sup>179</sup> As summarized in Table 11, by November 1918, there were an astonishing number of men deployed with units that did not directly support the Canadian Corps in France.



Table 11  
Canadian Units Outside of Canadian Corps 11 November 1918<sup>180</sup>

Element	Total
Railway Troops	14,881
Forestry Corps	11,751
Cavalry Brigade	2,860
CAMC	2,827
CASC	1,732
CAVC	447
CADC	156
Miscellaneous	544
Totals	35,198

Notes: (1) The table does not include small detachments such as the nine man section with the Royal Engineer Messenger Dog Service or the two Auxiliary Horse Transport Companies employed as Army Troops.<sup>181</sup>

(2) The 8<sup>th</sup> Army Brigade CFA were army troops but spent most of their efforts supporting the Canadian Corps.

There were also troops deployed in other theatres, with the Siberian Expeditionary Force being the largest with almost 5,000 officers and men. Two field artillery batteries, together with 108 instructors and twenty-six dog drivers with their 251 dogs, served with British forces at Murmansk and Archangel, as well as forty-one instructors with Dunsterforce in the Middle East. Artillery detachments served in St. Lucia throughout the war, while Bermuda was garrisoned by a Canadian infantry battalion from 1914 to 1916.<sup>182</sup> Perhaps the oddest diversion were the instructors sent to Russia in April 1917 to teach men to drive Caterpillar tractors used to pull siege guns provided by the British Army. Fifteen Russian-speaking soldiers were selected but in the event, only two were actually sent. Both were promoted to sergeant, paid in rubles, and required to wear their Canadian uniforms. Amazingly, despite the chaos in Russia, the two were able to make their way to a training school near Petrograd and then back to England after four months of instructing Russian drivers.<sup>183</sup>

A substantial number of troops were also tied up in Canada during the war. For the most part, this was decided upon by Canada, not Britain, although clearly the need to maintain garrisons at Esquimalt and Halifax, which on the outbreak of war "had immediately become the principal base for British forces that protected transatlantic shipping,"<sup>184</sup> was unavoidable. The number of troops required in Canada for home defence was indeterminate, but by 1916, government policy was to retain 50,000 CEF troops in Canada in addition to militia units called out for guard duties, although the CGS, for one, thought this was unnecessary.<sup>185</sup>

The use of militiamen for guard duties started as early as 4 August 1914, when 10,000 men were called out: all coast defence artillery units, the Prince Edward Island Heavy Brigade CGA, five infantry units complete, and detachments from fifty others.<sup>186</sup> Guards were deployed along the Welland Canal, at the Niagara Falls power stations, the Vickers floating dock in Montréal, the Soulanges Canal, and a variety of other vital points in Port Arthur, Fort William, Sydney, and Canso.<sup>187</sup> The number grew steadily as additional responsibilities, such as guards for internment camps, were added and peaked on 5 August 1915 when 14,782 militiamen were on full-time service. Thereafter, the numbers slowly dwindled to 11,084 men on 1 April 1917.<sup>188</sup> With the introduction of Special Service Companies in 1917 to handle guard duties and their replacement by district battalions of the Canadian Garrison Regiment in April 1918, militia units were relieved of the responsibility of finding men for full-time service. In June 1918, all militiamen on full-time duty, as well as the PF, were compulsorily transferred to the CEF, a move that effectively created a unified national army.<sup>189</sup>

The number of militiamen on full-time duty suggests a fairly large pool of manpower that could have been tapped for the CEF, but this was not the case. Initially, many of the militiamen called out seem to have been fit for the CEF, but as time went on, manpower became scarcer and fitness declined as medical standards were relaxed. By April 1916, there were sufficient concerns over the quality of militia manpower that the Militia Council decided to use members of the CEF rather than militia wherever possible.<sup>190</sup> Their concerns were justified. In 1918, for example, members of the thirty-five man detachment of the 107<sup>th</sup> East Kootenay Regiment at the Morrissey Internment Camp in British Columbia, were, on average, forty-nine years old. Twenty-five were well beyond the maximum age for enrolment (the oldest was sixty-seven) and of the remaining ten, eight were medically unfit.<sup>191</sup> The Welland Canal Force had similar problems and in September 1918, Major-General Lessard, the Inspector-General for Eastern Canada, wrote, "These men were all of lower category than 'A' and were not particularly intelligent. There was a sprinkling of aliens in the Force, some of whom could not speak English. As a whole the men were of rather poor class and physique."<sup>192</sup>

There are no definitive strength returns for militia on full-time duty during the entire war, but the following partial return illustrates the extent to which the militia was used between 1915 and 1917.

Table 12  
Militiamen on Full-Time Duty<sup>193</sup>

Date	Strength
5 August 1915	14,782
1 October 1915	12,831
1 November 1915	12,753
30 November 1915	11,874
31 January 1916	11,321
18 March 1916	13,000
1 September 1916	12,500
30 November 1916	11,783
28 February 1917	11,050
1 April 1917	11,084

By 31 December 1916, there were almost 50,000 members of the CEF still in Canada, a strength consistent with the government policy discussed previously. Recruiting, which had fallen off since June 1916, appeared to have stabilized and in December 4,930 men joined the colours.<sup>194</sup> Since Militia HQ was planning to send 5,000 men overseas every month, the anticipated intake of recruits meant the strength of the CEF in Canada would remain roughly the same. But as the CGS noted on 7 January 1917, if the newly formed 5<sup>th</sup> Division was committed to battle and there was intense fighting with heavy losses in a short period of time, there was a distinct possibility that all CEF troops in Canada would have to be sent overseas regardless of the need to retain troops for home defence. The manning issue as seen in January 1917 was two-fold: providing the requisite number of reinforcements for overseas; and maintaining a force of 50,000 men for home defence. The Canadian Defence Force [CDF] was therefore established in March 1917 with the twin aims of recruiting 50,000 militiamen for home defence and stimulating CEF recruiting by allowing select militia units to form recruiting depots. The plan was a stunning failure and three months of recruiting managed to

produce only 565 militiamen and 1,293 CEF recruits.<sup>195</sup> Apart from the lack of recruits, the US entry into the war in April 1917 reduced the need for a large home defence establishment and by July, the CDF, or 'Canadian Damn Fool Force,' as Major-General S.C. Mewburn called it, had been absorbed by the CEF.<sup>196</sup>

Manpower shortages were of concern not only to Canadians, but also to the British who actively sought to substitute East Indians, women, and juveniles for physically fit men who could then be sent to the front. In April 1917, GHQ suggested that blacks could be attached to divisional ammunition columns, reserve parks, and auxiliary horse transport companies. The issue was examined by the War Office and the upshot was a program to place 134 Indian drivers in each of the fifty-two British and ten Dominion divisional ammunition columns.<sup>197</sup> There were concerns over the abilities of non-whites, however, and it was not until May 1918 that the 36<sup>th</sup> (Ulster) Division, for example, received "a proportion of Indian personnel for its DAC to replace English drivers. These were thereupon sent back for training as gunners."<sup>198</sup> By November 1918, Indian soldiers had been posted to thirty-one British ammunition columns.<sup>199</sup> While no Indian soldiers were sent to Canadian ammunition columns, GHQ manpower planning included the Canadian Corps and it is entirely possible that had the war dragged on into 1919, the shortage of reinforcements may very well have led to the acceptance of non-white substitutes.

The principle of substitution was applied elsewhere in the BEF after Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Lawson completed his report on manpower utilization in January 1917.<sup>200</sup> There is no indication that the report was considered or adopted by Canada, but copies appear in OMFC files and it appears that his principles were taken to heart. As

early as April 1917, HQ OMFC considered the use of British boy scouts or underage Canadian soldiers at HQ OMFC as orderlies and messengers, while in 1918, provision was made for fourteen-year-old boys and girls to work at OMFC.<sup>201</sup> Women were also employed as substitutes and by May 1917, there were fourteen female drivers at OMFC Headquarters. The experiment was a success and the following year, CASC Mechanical Transport Companies were opened to British women serving with the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps [WAAC].<sup>202</sup> Other British women from the WAAC, Voluntary Aid Detachments, and the Almeric-Paget Military Massage Corps were also employed with Canadian hospitals in Britain.<sup>203</sup> The WAAC or Queen Mary's Army Auxiliary Corps as it was later known, also provided mess staff for the Canadian Training School at Bexhill and the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Tank Battalion, while a proposal to use women with Canadian Forestry Corps companies was only scotched by the Armistice.<sup>204</sup>

In the First World War the Canadian government was never able to come to grips with the thorny issue of controlling manpower. No attempt was ever made to allocate manpower on a rational basis and no measures were taken to economize manpower. Nor was there any serious consideration of the size and composition of the military forces that could be raised and sustained. Instead, national policies and measures focused almost exclusively on allocation, as though the nation's manpower resources were infinite and simply had to be pointed in the right direction. The only meaningful manpower policy that emerged was the MSA which, in the short term, may have headed off a military manpower shortage, but in the long term, helped to create problems that later came to a head in the Second World War.

Clearly the government had no rational basis understanding for manpower needs in wartime. Despite this, the government nevertheless embarked on an ambitious recruiting program. The military management of this program forms the central theme of

### Chapter 3.

<sup>1</sup> Ferguson, Niall. The Pity of War: Explaining World War I. (New York: Basic Books, 1999) p.267

<sup>2</sup> Thompson, John Herd. The Harvests of War: The Prairie West, 1914-1918 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1981) pp.48-49

- <sup>3</sup> Toronto Globe 26 August 1914, p.4; Toronto Star 25 August 1914 p.3; Reville, F. Douglas. History of the County of Brant: Vol II. (Brantford: Hurley Printing Company, Limited, 1920) p.480; Hopkins, J. Castell. The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs: 1914. (Toronto: The Annual Review Publishing Company, 1915) p.249
- <sup>4</sup> Morton, Desmond. Canada and War: A Military and Political History. (Toronto: Butterworth & Co., 1981) p.57
- <sup>5</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1221 File 593-1-5 Vol 5, OC 1<sup>st</sup> Division to Militia HQ 6 October 1914
- <sup>6</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1221 File 593-1-5 Vol 5AG to OC 1<sup>st</sup> Division 8 October 1914
- <sup>7</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4593 File 20-10 Vol 10, DOC MD 10 to 79<sup>th</sup>, 90<sup>th</sup>, 100<sup>th</sup>, 106<sup>th</sup> Regiments 22 December 1914
- <sup>8</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4320 File 34-3-18, OC 13<sup>th</sup> Brigade CFA to AAG 2<sup>nd</sup> Division 12 November 1915
- <sup>9</sup> Morton. Canada and War: A Military and Political History. p.57
- <sup>10</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4536 File 3-1-143, AG to OC 6<sup>th</sup> Division 18 August 1914, Militia HQ to AD of S&T 6<sup>th</sup> Division 27 August 1914, QMG to OC 6<sup>th</sup> Division 2 September and 3 September 1914; QMG to OC 6<sup>th</sup> Division 30 August 1914
- <sup>11</sup> DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 8 File 74/672-II-39, GOC 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Division to War Office 11 January 1915, HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Division to War Office 19 January 1915 and reply 19 January 1915
- <sup>12</sup> LAC RG 9 III D3 Vol 5023 File 808 Reel T-10908, War Diary 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Field Butchery, 21 January 1915
- <sup>13</sup> Libby, Frederick. Horses Don't Fly. (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2000) pp.108, 111
- <sup>14</sup> RG 24 Vol 4320 File 34-3-18, OC 4<sup>th</sup> Brigade CFA to HQ 2<sup>nd</sup> Division 1 April 1915, 2<sup>nd</sup> Division to Militia HQ 6 April 1915, Militia HQ to 2<sup>nd</sup> Division 13 April 1915
- <sup>15</sup> Vancouver Sun 7 April 1915 pp.1 and 2, 9 April 1915 p.2
- <sup>16</sup> Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics. Canada Year Book 1914. (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1915).. p.86; Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics. Canada Year Book, 1915. (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1916) p.522; Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1918. p.546; Canada, Department of Labour. Sessional Paper No 37: Report of the Department of Labour for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31 1919. (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1919), p.6. Immigration was reduced from 383,878 in 1914 to 144,789 in 1915. At the same time, 209,443 men joined the CEF.
- <sup>17</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4718 File 448-14-169, OC 63<sup>rd</sup> Battalion to DOC MD 13 29 July 1915
- <sup>18</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1396 File 593-6-2 Vol 4, AG to DOC MD 13 13 July 1915
- <sup>19</sup> Edmonton Journal 23 July 1915 p.8; LAC RG 24 Vol 1847, File GAQ 11-71c 'Summary 17 May 1939'; Canada, Department of Labour. Sessional Paper No 36: Report of the Department of Labour for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31 1916. (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1916) pp.8-9
- <sup>20</sup> Canada, Parliament, House of Commons. Official Report of the Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada, Vol CXXVI (1917). (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1918) p.28
- <sup>21</sup> LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 92 File 10-12-33, Canadian High Commission to Deputy Minister OMFC 12 September 1917.
- <sup>22</sup> Luzin, Gennady P, Pretes, Michael, Vasiliev, Vladimir V. 'The Kola Peninsula: Geography, History and Resources' in Arctic Vol 47/1 (March 1994) p.5; A very brief reference to the military importance of this railway can be found in Ames, Edward 'A Century of Russian Railroad Construction: 1837-1936' in American Slavic and East European Review Vol 6 Number 3/4 (December 1947) pp..64-65; DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 4 Folder 15 File 'Canadian Railwaymen'; Toronto Star 29 September 1915 p.13, 30 September 1915 p.17, 2 October 1915 p.15; Toronto Globe 29 September 1915 p.13
- <sup>23</sup> Secretary of State for the Colonies to Governor-General 28 September 1915, quoted in DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 4 Folder 15 File 'Canadian Railwaymen'
- <sup>24</sup> Comments made by Chief Press Censor to Halifax Morning Chronicle 3 March 1916 quoted in DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 4 Folder 15 File 'Canadian Railwaymen'; the same letter appears in LAC RG 24 Vol 2352 File HQ C-1585-19; LAC RG 25 B-1-b Vol 152, File C10-20, HMS Albemarle to Admiralty 4 February 1916. The ship was based in Murmansk and the captain had been instructed to investigate complaints by the Canadian workers.
- <sup>25</sup> Labour Gazette January 1917, p.34
- <sup>26</sup> Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics. Canada Year Book, 1916-17. (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1917) p.493
- <sup>27</sup> Reville. History of the County of Brant: Vol: Vol II p.480



- <sup>28</sup> Toronto Globe 16 August 1916, p.7
- <sup>29</sup> Revised Statutes of Canada 1906: Vol II, p.1753 *An Act Respecting the Importation and Employment of Aliens*, Section 2 prohibited the prepayment of transportation expenses for Aliens to work in Canada; Morton. The Canadian General p.341
- <sup>30</sup> Avery, Donald. 'Ethnic and Class Relations in Western Canada during the First World War: A Case Study of European Immigrants and Anglo-Canadian Nativism' in MacKenzie, David (ed). Canada and the First World War: Essays in Honour of Robert Craig Brown. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005) p.279; Thompson. Harvests of War. p.79
- <sup>31</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4427 File 26-5-64-3 Vol 1, AG Circular Letter 16 November 1915
- <sup>32</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4376 File 34-7-61-1, AAG 2<sup>nd</sup> Division to civilian firms 20 November 1915, AAG 2<sup>nd</sup> Division to Chief Recruiting Officers Toronto, Hamilton, St Catharine's 29 November 1915
- <sup>33</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4375 File 34-7-61 Vol 1, AAG 2<sup>nd</sup> Division to OC 92<sup>nd</sup> Battalion 21 October 1915 concerning Private S Brown, OC 92<sup>nd</sup> Battalion to 2<sup>nd</sup> Division 9 November 1915 and reply 11 November 1915; LAC RG 24 Vol 4376 File 34-7-61-1, AAG 2<sup>nd</sup> Division to the Steel & Radiator Company Limited 6 December 1915 concerning the rejection of R.M. Dover, a skilled worker and OC 86<sup>th</sup> Machine Gun Battalion to AAG 2<sup>nd</sup> Division concerning the release of Private R.D. Berry, a machinist. LAC RG 24 Vol 4376 File 34-7-61-1, AAG 2<sup>nd</sup> Division to OC 205<sup>th</sup> Battalion 13 April 1916; Ingersoll Machine Company Limited to Maj-Gen Logie 5 September 1916 asked that Private FW Elston's furlough be extended to allow him to continue working on shells. Logie refused.
- <sup>34</sup> LAC RG 4376 File 34-7-61-1, Waterous Engine Works to AAG 2<sup>nd</sup> Division 25 January 1916
- <sup>35</sup> Toronto Star 14 June 1916 p.2
- <sup>36</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4427 File 26-5-64-3 Vol 1, AG Circular Letter 16 May 1916; LAC RG 24 Vol 4552 File 125-1-14, Chief Recruiting Officer MD 6 to all Recruiting Officers and Deputies in Cape Breton County 5 October 1916; LAC RG 24 Vol 6600 File 1982-1-24, OC 107<sup>th</sup> Regiment to AAG i/c Administration MD 11 20 December 1916 noting that recruiting was not conducted in the area in accordance with instructions issued previously; LAC RG 24 Vol 4509 File 17-1-49 Vol IX, AG Circular Letter 7 February 1917
- <sup>37</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1437 File 593-6-31 Vol I, GOC MD 11 to Militia HQ 11 January 1918
- <sup>38</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4376 File 34-7-61-1, AAG 2<sup>nd</sup> Division to OC 129<sup>th</sup> Battalion 26 April 1916
- <sup>39</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4427 File 26-5-64-3 Vol 1, AD of S&T 3<sup>rd</sup> Division to AAG 3<sup>rd</sup> Division 1 April 1916; LAC RG 24 Vol 4376 File 34-7-61-1 Vol 2, Bandsman F. Howlett to OC 129<sup>th</sup> Battalion May 1916 in which he refused to return to his former job
- <sup>40</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4376 File 34-7-61-1 Vol 2, AAG MD 2 to OC 129<sup>th</sup> Battalion 10 May 1916
- <sup>41</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4376 File 34-7-61-1, OC 129<sup>th</sup> Battalion to AAG 2<sup>nd</sup> Division 15 December 1915
- <sup>42</sup> Reville. History of the County of Brant: Vol: Vol II. p.481; Canada, Department of Labour. Sessional Paper No 37. p.6
- <sup>43</sup> Toronto Globe 30 January 1918 p.1; Grain Growers' Guide 20 March 1918 p.592, estimated 23,000 men for seeding in the Prairie Provinces with a further 32,000 needed for harvesting.
- <sup>44</sup> Crerar, Adam. 'Ontario and the Great War' in MacKenzie, David (ed). Canada and the First World War: Essays in Honour of Robert Craig Brown. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005) pp.234 and 237. Crerar notes that 2,400 'Farmerettes' were needed in 1918 to pick fruits and vegetables in Niagara Region to replace Six Nations workers who moved to war industries.
- <sup>45</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4740 File 448-14-262 Vol 2, GOC MD 13 to Militia HQ 18 January 1917
- <sup>46</sup> Ontario Legislature. Sessional Papers: Vol L, Part IV. 'Report of the Trades and Labour Branch, Department of Public Works' (Toronto: King's Printer, 1918). pp.33, 37,51
- <sup>47</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4372 File 34-7-45, AG to OC 2<sup>nd</sup> Division 10 July 1915 enclosed a an advance copy of a General Order granting harvest leave to a maximum of thirty days.
- <sup>48</sup> CEF General Instructions Number 73 of 24 September 1917
- <sup>49</sup> Machin. Report of the Director of the Military Service Branch. p.17; CEF Routine Order 882 of 7 August 1918
- <sup>50</sup> Quoted in Nicholson. Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919. p.344
- <sup>51</sup> The MSA was reprinted in Canada, Department of Justice. The Military Service Act 1917: Manual for the Information and Guidance of Tribunals in the Consideration and Review of Claims for Exemption. (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1918) p.22

- <sup>52</sup> The Military Service Act 1917: Manual for the Information and Guidance of Tribunals in the Consideration and Review of Claims for Exemption. p.11
- <sup>53</sup> The sample consists of MSA infantrymen who died in Canada in 1918 before proceeding overseas and was taken from the Commonwealth War Graves Commission data base and the CEF data base. It could be argued that industrial workers were more likely to serve in technical corps such as the artillery, although this is not certain.
- <sup>54</sup> CEF General Instructions Number 50 of 6 August 1917; CEF Routine Order Number 795 of 12 July 1918 (effective 22 June 1918)
- <sup>55</sup> CEF Routine Order Number 464 of 20 April 1918; DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 1 File 'Composite Battalion Military District #6 -Active Militia' Edwin Pye to Major Cummins 30 November 1940; LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 6363, Personnel file 2693649 John Morgan. Private Morgan was a guard at the Kapuskasing Internment Camp from 18 May 1915 to 1 September 1918 when he was drafted.
- <sup>56</sup> A search of the Commonwealth War Graves Data Base produced the names of 132 members of the CGR, while the Book of Remembrance showed two members dying in 1922 for a total of 134. A total of 93 attestation forms were found on the CEF Data Base with medical categories listed.
- <sup>57</sup> LAC RG 9 III D3 Vol 5059 File 969 (Reel T-11121), War Diary AG Militia HQ 22 July 1918 and DAAG (\$) to AAG 30 July 1918
- <sup>58</sup> Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics. The Canada Year Book 1918. (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1919) p.662
- <sup>59</sup> Toronto Globe 17 January 1918 p.1
- <sup>60</sup> Toronto Globe 18 January 1918 p.5; Toronto Star 9 January 1918 p.2 and 11 January 1918 p.20
- <sup>61</sup> Labour Gazette February 1918 p.54; Toronto Globe 16 January 1918 p.2, 4 February 1918 p.1, 5 February 1918 p.6
- <sup>62</sup> Grieves, Keith. The Politics of Manpower, 1914-1918. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988) pp.149, 154, 155
- <sup>63</sup> The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs: 1918.. p.490
- <sup>64</sup> Report of the Deputy Minister of Labour for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31, 1919. pp.21-22
- <sup>65</sup> The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs: 1918. p.491
- <sup>66</sup> Simkins, Peter. Kitchener's Army: The Raising of the New Armies 1914-1916. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988) p.257
- <sup>67</sup> Toronto Globe 20 October 1914 p.2
- <sup>68</sup> Sarty, Roger. 'Canada and Submarine Warfare' in Sarty, Roger(ed). The Maritime Defence of Canada. (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Affairs, 1996) pp.186-187; Hadley, Michael L. and Sarty, Roger. Tin-Pots and Pirate Ships, Canadian Naval Forces and German Sea Raiders 1880-1918. (Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991) p.102?
- <sup>69</sup> Bliss, Michael. A Canadian Millionaire: The Life and Business Times of Sir Joseph Flavelle, Bart., 1858-1939. (Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1978) pp.257-258; The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs: 1918.. p.408 notes a speech by N.W. Rowell, President of the Privy Council at Bowmanville, Ontario on 17 December 1918 in which he gave statistics of the IMB effort; Bliss, Michael. 'War Business as Usual: Canadian Munitions Production 1914-1918' in Dreisziger, N.F.(ed) Mobilization for Total War, The Canadian, American and British Experience 1914-1918, 1939-1945. (Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier Press, 1981) p.53
- <sup>70</sup> LAC RG 9 III D3 Vol 5059 File 969 (Reel T-11121), War Diary AG Militia HQ, 30 August 1918 and memorandum DAAG(4) to AAG 21 October 1918
- <sup>71</sup> Bliss. 'War Business as Usual: Canadian Munitions Production 1914-1918' p.47
- <sup>72</sup> Jenkyns, Sir H. 'Enlistment' in Manual of Military Law. (London: HMSO, 1914) p.200
- <sup>73</sup> TNA WO 73/97 'General Monthly Return of the Regimental Strength of the British Army (including the Territorial Force: Part V, Number of Army Reservists Who Have Permission to Reside Abroad' [July 1914]; TNA CO 42/987, Deputy Minister Department of Militia and Defence to Under Secretary of State for External Affairs 6 January 1915. There were three Reservists who were living in Germany.
- <sup>74</sup> TNA WO 293/2 'War Office Instructions' Number 13 of 2 March 1915; TNA CO 42/987, Deputy Minister Department of Militia and Defence to Under Secretary of State for External Affairs 6 January 1915
- <sup>75</sup> TNA WO 163/21 'Minutes of the Proceedings of and precis prepared for the Army Council' 11 August 1914

<sup>76</sup> TNA CO 42/985, War Office to Colonial Office 11 December 1914; LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 28 File 8-1-15, Unknown correspondent to AA & QMG HQ Canadian Contingent 7 December 1914 reported about 150 British reservists serving with the 1<sup>st</sup> Division

<sup>77</sup> Duguid. Official History. p.61

<sup>78</sup> Canada, Parliament, House of Commons. Official Report of the Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada, Vol CXXI. (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1918) p.28 debate 22 January 1917

<sup>79</sup> LAC RG 9 II A2 Vol 33 Minutes of the Militia Council 22 November 1916, p.377

<sup>80</sup> LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 416 File E-6-1, OC A Company to OC 5<sup>th</sup> Battalion 1 December 1914 noted some French reservists had been naturalized; Major R. Brutinel to HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Division 30 December 1914; British Ambassador to Foreign Office 13 January 1915; OC Details to HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Division 29 December 1914 reported that 26454 Private Pierre Klein had been called up by the French Consul in Montréal.

<sup>81</sup> DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 4 Folder 14 File 'Recruiting', Russian Consul General to Under Secretary of State 7 November 1914, AG Circular Letter 21 November 1914; RG 24 Vol 4331 File 43-2-18, AG Circular Letter 2 July 1915

<sup>82</sup> Official Report of the Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada Vol CXXI. p.28 Debate 22 January 1917;

<sup>83</sup> Canada, Department of Soldiers' Civil Re-establishment. Sessional Paper Number 14: Report of the Department of Soldiers' Civil Re-establishment 1920. (Ottawa: np, c1920) p.75

<sup>84</sup> The advanced search engine can be found at <http://www.vac-acc.gc.ca/remembers/sub.cfm?source=collections/virtualmem/advsearch>

<sup>85</sup> Nicholson. Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919. pp.546 and 548 gives CEF enlistments as 619,636 and fatalities as 59,544

<sup>86</sup> Bramley-Moore, Alwyn. The Path of Duty: the Wartime Letters of Alwyn Bramley-Moore 1914-1916. (Calgary: Historical Society of Alberta, 1997) p.xx Bramley-Moore was able to rejoin the CEF in September 1915; The Times 22 July 1915 p5; RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 2406 22691 Carl Defallot(sic)

<sup>87</sup> LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 449 File L-1-1, AAG to OC 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Brigade 16 September 1914, OC 6<sup>th</sup> Division to Militia HQ 14 September 1914

<sup>88</sup> Wise, S.F. Canadian Airmen in the First World War: The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, Vol I. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981) pp.633-634; In Memoriam: The Memorial Chamber, Canadian Houses of Parliament, Ottawa, Canada. (Ottawa: Photogelatine Engraving Co., Ltd., c1920) has illustrations of panels giving numbers.

<sup>89</sup> Wise. Canadian Airmen in the First World War. p.643

<sup>90</sup> Wise. Canadian Airmen in the First World War. pp.30-31, 33-34

<sup>91</sup> Wise. Canadian Airmen in the First World War. p.80 notes that land was donated by the Town of Leaside and the York Land Company. The airfield at Rathbun was located on a farm. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. 'Pay No Attention to Sero: The Mohawks of the Bay of Quite and Imperial Flying Training during the Great War' in Ontario History. Vol XCVI Number 2 (Autumn 2004) p.146 notes that land was first leased from the Tyendinaga Reserve in 1897 for use by the militia.

<sup>92</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1835 File GAQ 9-11-E, 'King Edward's Horse'; James, Lieutenant-Colonel Lionel. History of King Edward's Horse (The King's Overseas Dominions Regiment). (London: Sifton, Praed & Company Limited, 1921) p.83. In November 1914, the unit managed to recruit at least sixty-six colonials with the Legion of Frontiersmen. Some of these men were, no doubt, Canadian although the author is not specific; DHH 74.672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 5 Folder 20 File 'Statistics', Summary prepared by Edwin Pye of the Historical Section 24 January 1942 claimed 7,045 Canadians joined the BEF. Barrie, Alexander. War Underground: The Tunnellers of the Great War. (Staplehurst, Kent: Spellmount Limited, 2000) pp.17-19. The book, originally published in 1962, was based in part on interviews with soldiers recruited by Major Norton-Griffiths M.P. who also raised 2<sup>nd</sup> King Edward's Horse; James, Brigadier E.A.. British Regiments, 1914-1918. (London: Samson Books Limited, 1978) pp.16, 49 and 111. Times 6 September 1914 p.4, 16 September 1914 p.5. 2<sup>nd</sup> King Edwards Horse served with the Canadian Cavalry Brigade 1 February 1915 to 27 January 1916; TNA WO 32/18709, Lt Col J.R. Roysot and Lt Col I. Thord-Cray to War Office Director of Organization 4 January 1916, Director of Organization to AG 10 January 1916, ACI 4154, undated/unsigned note suggests about 400 Canadians and 1,500 other colonials were available for enlistment in London; Farwell, Byron. The Great War in Africa 1914-1918. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1986) pp.257-258 provides a lively account of the 25<sup>th</sup> Battalion. Among the recruits was a

naturalist, Angus Buchanan, who had been collecting botanical specimens near Hudson Bay in August 1914.

<sup>93</sup> Hall, Lieutenant-Colonel L.J. *The Inland Water Transport in Mesopotamia* (London: Constable and Company Limited, 1921) pp.39-40; TNA WO 158/851 'France: History of Inland Water Transport Directorate 1914-1919'

<sup>94</sup> Murray, Captain W.W. 'Canadians in Dunsterforce' in *Canadian Defence Quarterly* Vol VIII Number 2 (January 1931) pp.214-215

<sup>95</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4603 File 20-10-68, AG Circular Letter 21 November 1916; In Toronto at least, the IWT recruiting detachment appear to have opened their own office in 1917. *Toronto Star* 26 May 1917 p.12. The same article reported that three drafts of IWT recruits had been sent overseas in the preceding week.

<sup>96</sup> DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 5 Folder 20, Summary of Canadians in British service prepared 24 January 1942. The CEF and the British Army were separate entities and men could not transfer, but had to be discharged from force and enrolled in the other. The process could be as simple as completing several forms. It is likely that many of those who claimed they 'transferred' were aware of these administrative niceties; *Canadian Railway and Marine World* May 1917 p.192, reported that it was estimated that 80% of the Canadian contribution to the IWT was recruited in British Columbia

<sup>97</sup> *Toronto Star* 28 November 1916 p.15; LAC RG 24 Vol 4603 File 20-10-68, Major W.H. Owen RE to CGS 18 May 1917

<sup>98</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1840 File GAQ 10-28, Sergeant-Major R.W. Gornall to Director Historical Section 17 March 1931; LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 3660, 490676 RW Gornall joined the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Pioneer Battalion in Victoria 25 May 1916

<sup>99</sup> Swettenham, John. *Allied Intervention in Russia 1918-1919*. (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1967) p.44 footnote; MacLaren, Roy. *Canadians in Russia 1918-1919*. (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1976) p.14; *Toronto Star* 15 August 1918 p.2

<sup>100</sup> LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 27 File 7-7-14A, A/DD S & T to D S & T 13 October 1916; DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 5 Folder 20, Summary of Canadians in British service prepared 24 January 1942; LAC RG 24 Vol 4380 File 38-72-80 QMG to OC 2<sup>nd</sup> Division 6 November 1915; LAC RG 24 Vol 1835 File GAQ 9-22 contains a draft history of the CASC by Captain Leach dated 17 December 1930 in which he claims 10,351 MT drivers were transported to England. The number seems dubious unless he included BCRM recruits from the United States.

<sup>101</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4380 File 34-7-87 Vol 1 QMG to OC 2<sup>nd</sup> Division 21 November 1915; LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 27 File 7-7-14A, D of S & T to Secretary HQ CEF 10 October 1916

<sup>102</sup> LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 708 File I-3-2, Canadian Records Office to HQ Canadians Shorncliffe 17 February 1916 refers to 575 men, Canadian Records Office to HQ Canadians 17 February 1916 refers to 452 men

<sup>103</sup> LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 27 File 7-7-14, Carson to Hughes 12 May 1916; LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 708, AD of S & T to AA & QMG HQ CTD 2 March 1916, CASC TD to AD of S & T 4 March 1916

<sup>104</sup> LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 708 File I-8-36 Vol 1, HQ Overseas Canadians to War Office 2 March 1916

<sup>105</sup> Dolbey, Captain Robert V. *Sketches of the East Africa Campaign*. (London: John Murray, 1918) p.56

<sup>106</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4380 File 34-7-87 Vol 1, Corporal J.R. McNiece ASC to Great War Veterans Association, Yorkdale Branch 28 March 1919

<sup>107</sup> Watts, Martin. *The Jewish Legion and the First World War*. (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) pp.115-117. Watts cites ACI 1415 of 12 September 1917 as the War Office authority for the Legion. I am grateful to Mr Harold Pollins, former reader at Ruskin College for drawing my attention to this book. James. *British Regiments*. p.50

<sup>108</sup> Watts. *The Jewish legion and the First World War*. p.148. Watts notes that Jews who were American citizens could not be recruited; Gilner, Elias. *War and Hope: A History of the Jewish Legion*. (New York: Herzl Press, 1969) pp.184-185

<sup>109</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4490 File 48-21-3, DAG Organization to GOC MD 4 5 March 1918, DAG Militia HQ to GOC MD 4 1 May 1918. The BCRM, intended to recruit British subjects in America for the British Army and the CEF, is dealt with more fully in Chapter 3. This is the only known instance where the BCRM coordinated recruiting activities in Canada.

<sup>110</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4490 File 48-21-3, DAG Militia HQ to GOC MD 4 1 May 1918

<sup>111</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4490 File 48-21-3, BCRM to GOC MD 4 10 May 1918

- <sup>112</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4490 File 48-21-3, AG to GOC MD 4 23 April 1918
- <sup>113</sup> Morton, Desmond. When Your Number's Up: The Canadian Soldier in the First World War. (Toronto: Random House of Canada Ltd., 1993) p.279 notes that 2,712 Jews served with the CEF. However this does not include converts influenced by the Reverend Henry Singer of the Toronto Jewish Mission.
- <sup>114</sup> Chiel, Arthur A. The Jews in Manitoba: A Social History. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961) p.161
- <sup>115</sup> Kay, Zachariah. 'A Note on Canada and the Formation of the Jewish Legion' in Jewish Social Studies Vol XXIX Number 3 (July 1967) pp.174-176
- <sup>116</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4490 File 48-21-3, BCRM to AG 16 July 1918
- <sup>117</sup> Jabotinsky, Vladimir. The Story of the Jewish Legion. (New York: Bernard Ackerman Incorporated, 1945) p.164; Gilner. War and Hope. p.186; Sokolov, Hyman 'The Jewish Legion for Palestine' in Jewish Life and Times: A Collection of Essays. (Winnipeg: Jewish Historical Society of Western Canada, January 1983) p.56. Sokolov served with the 39<sup>th</sup> Battalion Royal Fusiliers, but gave no source for his estimate.
- <sup>118</sup> LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 1232 File D-21-5 Vol 1, GHQ Wireless Detachment to OIC RE Records 4 December 1916 and Canadian Section GHQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Echelon to GHQ Wireless Detachment Commander 20 May 1917. There is a possibility that the four men with the 6<sup>th</sup> Wireless Depot were attached on a temporary basis.
- <sup>119</sup> DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 5 Folder 20; Commonwealth War Graves Commission data base [http://www.cwgc.org/search/casualty\\_details.aspx?casualty=898084](http://www.cwgc.org/search/casualty_details.aspx?casualty=898084) read 24 May 2006
- <sup>120</sup> <http://www.memoirdeshommes.sga.defense.gouv.fr/> read 6 April 2006. This is an on-line database listing all men of the French Army who died in World War I. A search turned up nineteen men who claimed to have been born in Canada. With an overall death rate of slightly more than 10%, about 200 Canadians probably served with the French.
- <sup>121</sup> DHH KE 6848 A329 C309 Minutes of the Militia Council 26 June 1917, p.860; LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 9051; LAC RG 150 Series 8 File 338-1-26; Toronto Star 2 September 1918, p.8 claimed Smith had been awarded the Croix de Guerre and Medaille Militaire.
- <sup>122</sup> DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 4 Folder 14 File 'Reservists British and Allied'
- <sup>123</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4517 File C/156, CGS to GOC MD 5 16 February 1917; LAC RG 24 Vol 4426 File 26-5-64-2 Vol 3, CGS to GOC MD 3 16 February 1917 contains similar instructions
- <sup>124</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 425 File 54-21-1-48 Vol 1, CGS to GOC MD 6 22 February 1917
- <sup>125</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4517 File C/156, Serbian Legation to British Embassy Washington 13 June 1918; Lawrence, Margot. 'The Serb Divisions in Russia, 1916-1917' in Journal of Contemporary History Vol 6, Number 4 (1971) pp.183-184, 191-192 notes that the Russian Army also recruited men born in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
- <sup>126</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4517 File C/156, CGS to GOC MD 5 22 February 1917. A handwritten note on the letter by the AD S & T MD 5 24 February 1917 says "This matter is to be kept confidential." QMG to GOC MD 5 26 May 1918 advised that the Serbs would be moved to Lévis in June.
- <sup>127</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 23187 File 'Nominal Roll - Serbians Mobilized in Canada' contains 54 nominal rolls of Serb drafts sent overseas from Sussex and Lévis
- <sup>128</sup> LAC RG Vol 425 File 54-21-1-48 Vol 3, Commandant Serbian Mobilization Camp to CGS 18 January 1919
- <sup>129</sup> Haythornthwaite, Philip J. The World War One Source Book. (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1994) pp.167-168
- <sup>130</sup> Ford, Nancy Gentile. Americans All! Foreign-Born Soldiers in World War I. (Texas A&M University Press, 2001) p.34
- <sup>131</sup> TNA WO 106/693, Conseil National des Pays Tcheques & Slovaques to British Military Attache 20 September 1918, Attache to War Office 21 November 1918, War Office to Attache 27 November 1918; LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 1325 File P-77-5, War Office to OMFC 14 October 1918, OMFC to AAG Canadian Section GHQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Echelon 24 October 1918
- <sup>132</sup> LAC RG 9 III C1 Vol 4597 Folder 2 File 4, HQ Bramshott to all reserve units 8 November 1918 and 13 December 1918
- <sup>133</sup> Hapak, Joseph T. Recruiting a Polish Army in the United States, 1917-1919. (University of Kansas: PhD Thesis, 1972) pp.15-16 and 22
- <sup>134</sup> Hapak. Recruiting a Polish Army in the United States, 1917-1919. pp.30-32

<sup>135</sup> The Polish Genealogical Society of America maintains a searchable data base of the Polish Legion at <http://www.pgsa.org/haller.php> based enrolment papers. At least 384 recruits claimed to be Canadian residents; LAC RG 24 Vol 1759 File DHS 10-22, Commandant Polish Army Camp to CGS 26 March 1921 estimated that 220 Polish-Canadians enlisted in the Legion.

<sup>136</sup> Details have been taken from LAC RG 24 Vol 1759 File DHS 10-22, Commandant Polish Army Camp to CGS 26 March 1921. The report was reprinted verbatim in Niagara Historical Society Vol 35 (1923) together with articles by the Camp Adjutant and local residents who helped to provide recreational amenities for the Polish recruits; DHH Minutes of the Militia Council 18 April 1918 p.321 states that salaries of CEF members working with the Poles amounted to \$168,000. Using CEF pay scales, officers pay amounted to \$34,474.25 leaving \$133,525.80 for 332 privates at \$1.10 per day. Many of these men were NCOs with a higher pay scale, however it would be safe to assume that about 225-250 CEF soldiers were involved. Hapak Recruiting a Polish Army in the United States, 1917-1919 p.108 claims there were 236 staff members.

<sup>137</sup> Hapak. Recruiting a Polish Army in the United States, 1917-1919. p.138; LAC RG 24 Vol 4606 File 20-10-91, Militia HQ to GOC MD 10 13 October 1917 approving the Polish Recruiting Centre in Winnipeg

<sup>138</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4606 File 20-10-91, Militia HQ to MD 10 13 October 1917, Polish Recruiting Centre to MD 10 14 March 1918 confirming arrangements made with CO 1<sup>st</sup> Depot Battalion, Manitoba Regiment. There appear to have been several agencies recruiting Poles, and letters bear the letterhead 'Obywatelski Komitet Rekrutacyjny dla Polskiej Armii we Francji' and 'Armia Polska we Francji Centrum Rekrutacyjne'

<sup>139</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4606 File 20-10-91, Polish Recruiting Centre to AAG MD 10 1 June 1918 and reply 3 June 1918 noting that men could not be discharged, Polish Recruiting Centre to AAG MD 10 17 June 1918 and reply 25 June 1918 that only men with a 'C' category could be discharged, CO 1<sup>st</sup> Depot Battalion, Manitoba Regiment to Polish Recruiting Centre 11 July 1918 concerning volunteers for the Polish Legion; LAC RG 24 Vol 6553 File HQ-808-1, GOC MD 10 to AG 15 July 1918, DAAG 3 to GOC MD 10 23 July 1918 granting authority for release of three Poles drafted under the MSA; The practice of coercing men to join the Polish Legion was also common in the United States. See Ruskoski, David. The Polish Army in France: Immigrants in America, World War I Volunteers in France, Defenders of the Recreated State in Poland. (Georgia State University: PhD dissertation, 2006) pp.50-53

<sup>140</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 6553 File HQ-808-1, Polish Recruiting Centre Montréal to GOC MD 3 17 April 1918 saying the centre opened two weeks ago and forwarding nominal roll of MSA draftees from Wilno and Barry's Bay, GOC MD 3 to Militia HQ 24 April 1918 and reply 1 May 1918 granting authority to discharge the men concerned

<sup>141</sup> LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 4298 (886620 Leo Hertog) and Box 5253 (886191 George Kracht)

<sup>142</sup> LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 3200 (147606 George Forgeon)

<sup>143</sup> Nicholson. Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919, p.546. Numbers vary, but this figure seems to be the one most consistently used. The actual total is somewhat higher because of missing documents

<sup>144</sup> English, John. Borden: His Life and World. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1977) pp.110 and 112

<sup>145</sup> Nicholson. Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919, pp.114, 133

<sup>146</sup> LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 44 File 8-5-8D, War Office to Colonial Office 29 January 1916

<sup>147</sup> LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 45, 8-5-10H, Brigadier-General F.S. Meighen to Major-General J.W. Carson 5 October 1916 explaining that Hughes had discussed a fifth division with Major-General Whigham of the War Office during a dinner at the Savoy Hotel and that Whigham accepted the offer on the spot

<sup>148</sup> Morton. A Peculiar Kind of Politics.. pp. 91, 101; LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 45 File 8-5-10H. Overseas Sub-Militia Council to AAG Argyll House 13 November 1916 noting that men earmarked for the 5<sup>th</sup> Division would be designated as reinforcements once they had finished their musketry course

<sup>149</sup> LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 104 File 'Fifth Division Reinforcements', Deputy Minister to War Office 2 March 1917

<sup>150</sup> LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 104 File 'Fifth Division Reinforcements', Perley to War Office 30 May 1917

<sup>151</sup> LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 104 File 'Fifth Division Reinforcements', Borden to Perley 7 November 1917 and reply 8 November 1917; Morton A Peculiar Kind of Politics. p.153

<sup>152</sup> TNA WO 114/31, Weekly Returns of the British Army and Dominion Contingents at Home other than the Territorial Force 26 February 1917, 26 March 1917; TNA WO 114/34, Weekly Returns of the British Army and Dominion Contingents at Home other than the Territorial Force 25 February 1918

<sup>153</sup> LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 687 File E-266-2 Vol 2, OC 119<sup>th</sup> Battalion to HQ 15<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade 28 May 1917 and File E-266-2 Vol 1, OMFC to HQ Canadian Troops Shorncliffe 20 January 1917

<sup>154</sup> Beattie. 48<sup>th</sup> Highlanders of Canada: 1891-1928. p.417; TNA WO 114/33, Weekly Returns of the British Army and Dominion Contingents at Home other than the Territorial Force April-July 1917

<sup>155</sup> TNA WO 114/31 Weekly Returns of the British Army and Dominion Contingents at Home other than the Territorial Force contains strength returns for February-March 1917, WO 114/32 contains strength returns for April-July 1917, WO 114/33 Weekly Returns of the British Army and Dominion Contingents at Home other than the Territorial contains strength returns for August-December 1917, WO 114/34 Weekly Returns of the British Army and Dominion Contingents at Home other than the Territorial contains strength returns for January-February 1918. Returns were rendered weekly by units but I have used only returns provided for the last week of each month

<sup>156</sup> DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 1 File 'Composite Battalion Military District # 6 -Active Militia', 'Short History of Work Performed by the 23<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Brigade, MD 11'; LAC RG 24 Vol 2553 File HQC-2103-Chinese Coolies, Inspector General Western Canada to AG 17 September 1917 notes none of the 539 members of the Railway Service Guard were 'A' category and most were 'C' (home service only); Tancock, Elizabeth A, 'Secret Trains Across Canada' in Beaver Vol 71 Number 5 (October-November 1991) p.40; Mitchell, Peter H. 'Canada and the Chinese Labour Corps 1917-1920: The Official Connection' in Chen, Min-sun and Shyu, Lawrence N.(eds) China Insight: Selected Papers from the Canadian Asian Studies Association Annual Conference Proceedings, 1982-1984. (Ottawa: Canadian Asian Studies Association, c1984) pp.12-13; LAC RG 24 Vol 1833 File GAQ 8-36, contains an undated summary by Edwin Pye in which he claims that a 'Coolie Camp' was established at Petawawa.

<sup>157</sup> Klein, Daryl. With the Chinks. (London: John Lane, 1918) p.208. Klein also notes on p.229 that the Chinese labourers preferred to consult the Chinese doctor on board the ship rather than the CAMC orderlies

<sup>158</sup> LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 806 File R-159-2, AG OMFC to War Office 26 May 1917; LAC RG 24 Vol 2553 File HQC-2103-Chinese Coolies, Camp Commandant Petawawa to Militia HQ 23 September 1917 gives details of services provided to a draft of 2288 labourers in September 1917, AG to CGS 16 August 1917 concerning guards for a shipment of labourers from Petawawa to Halifax

<sup>159</sup> LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 54 File 'OMFC Progress Report March 1918', the AG Branch reported that at a conference with the War Office on 16 March 1918, a request was made for a Canadian tank battalion and that subsequently the Canadian Government agreed to do so

<sup>160</sup> LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 82 File 10-9-73, CGS OMFC to Deputy Minister OMFC 21 September 1918, Deputy Minister OMFC to BGGs OMFC 26 September 1918

<sup>161</sup> LAC RG 9 III D3 Vol 4821, War Diary Canadian Corps AQ, May 1918 Appendix F, DAAG Circular Letter 8 May 1918 forwarded copies of the revised infantry battalion establishment

<sup>162</sup> Schreiber. Shock Army of the British Empire: The Canadian Corps in the Last 100 Days of the Great War. p.21. Schreiber's enthusiastic comparison of British and Canadian divisions overlooks the fact that British corps included heavy trench mortar batteries and an additional machine gun battalion unlike the Canadian Corps which allocated these units to divisions on a permanent basis. His claim that Canadian divisions had one automatic weapon for every 13 men while British divisions had one for every 61 men is ludicrous.

<sup>163</sup> LAC RG 9 III D3 Vol 4986, War Diary 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Machine Gun Battalion August 1918, Appendix 15A 'Report on Operation August 26<sup>th</sup> to 29<sup>th</sup> 1918'; Nicholson. The Gunners of Canada. p.349

<sup>164</sup> Schreiber. Shock Army of the British Empire. p.20; TNA WO 106/411, CGS GHQ to First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth Armies and IX, XXII Corps 14 June 1918 with comparative machine gun strengths of Allied armies. British machine gun units were periodically allotted to Canadian divisions. For the attack on Arras 26 August 1918, for example, 16 guns of the 1<sup>st</sup> Life Guards Machine Gun Battalion fired in support of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Division. LAC RG 9 III D3 Vol 4986, War Diary 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Machine Gun Battalion August 1918, Appendix 15A 'Report on Operation August 26<sup>th</sup> to 29<sup>th</sup> 1918'; The British Army maintained corps and army machine gun battalions and companies which were allocated to divisions as required; Grafton, Lieutenant-Colonel C.S. The Canadian Emma Gees. (London: Hunter Printing Company, 1938) p.204 contains a table showing the distribution of heavy machine guns in the Canadian Corps in July 1918; TNA WO 95/26 AG GHQ War Diary 'Monthly Statement of Casualties, Reinforcements and Strengths by Divisions. Infantry and Cavalry Only: July 1918' The average excludes the 15<sup>th</sup>, 34<sup>th</sup>, 39<sup>th</sup>, 50<sup>th</sup>, 51<sup>st</sup>, 62<sup>nd</sup> and 66<sup>th</sup> Divisions which were cadre strength only. The worst off were the Australians with only 771 men per battalion

<sup>165</sup> Units without an approved establishment such as trench mortar batteries, divisional baths, agricultural companies, brigade machine companies and a host of others could not demand reinforcements, but were compelled to turn to units with approved establishments for men. Infantry units in particular had to provide a large number. LAC RG 9 III B3 Vol 3764 File 'October 1916' shows the 1<sup>st</sup> Division with 2,859 men or 18% of the posted strength attached to other units. These strength returns were current as of the last day of the month and appear to have been submitted to the Canadian Records Office at Millbank by the middle of the following month.

<sup>166</sup> LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 73 File 10-8-18, Lieutenant-Colonel W.E. Thompson, AAG MD 6 to F.B. McCurdy, MP, Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of Militia and Defence 17 February 1917 commenting on his visit to the Canadian Corps in January 1916; LAC RG 9 III C1 Vol 3887, War Office to GHQ 1<sup>st</sup> Echelon 3 March 1916 and AG GHQ to 2<sup>nd</sup> Army 6 March 1916

<sup>167</sup> LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 52 File 8-7-1B, MacDougall to Steele 25 August 1916; TNA WO 95/26, War Diary GHQ AG 20 December 1916

<sup>168</sup> LAC MG 30 E133 (Andrew George Latta McNaughton Collection) Vol I File 'Reinforcements General 1917-1918', AG OMFC to AAG Canadian Section GHQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Echelon 21 June 1917

<sup>169</sup> LAC MG 30 E100 (Arthur William Currie Fonds) Vol 35 File 161, DAG GHQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Echelon to Canadian Corps 3 August 1917, Currie to DAG GHQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Echelon 9 August 1917 and Currie to Canadian Representative GHQ 2<sup>nd</sup> Echelon 29 August 1917

<sup>170</sup> LAC MG 27 II D9 (Albert Edward Kemp Fonds) Vol 142 File 4, Currie to Kemp 7 February 1918

<sup>171</sup> Rawling. Surviving Trench Warfare: Technology and the Canadian Corps, 1914-1918. p.178; LAC RG 9 III D3 Vol 4821, War Diary AA & QMG Canadian Corps August 1918, Appendix H Reel T-7181

<sup>172</sup> LAC MG 27 II D9 (Albert Edward Kemp Fonds) Vol 177 File 'OMFC Decisions 1-300', Meeting held 6 August 1918

<sup>173</sup> All figures are taken from strength returns for 31 January 1918 and 31 July 1918 in LAC RG 9 III B3 Vol 3765

<sup>174</sup> The term 'wastage' refers to losses from battle casualties, sick, accidentally injured, desertion and postings to other units.

<sup>175</sup> LAC RG 9 III D3 Vol 4821, War Diary AA & QMG Canadian Corps August 1918, Appendix H Reel T-7181

<sup>176</sup> Nicholson. Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919. p.551

<sup>177</sup> LAC RG 9 III B3 Vol 3765, strength returns as of 31 January 1918 and 31 July 1918

<sup>178</sup> Canada, Ministry of the Overseas Military Forces of Canada. Report of the Ministry, Overseas Military Forces of Canada 1918. (London: np, 1919) p.65

<sup>179</sup> Bean, C.E.W. Official History of Australia in the Great War of 1914-1918: Vol III, The AIF in France 1916. (Sydney, Australia: Angus and Robertson Ltd., 1920) p.55 notes that in February 1916, General Sir William Birdwood, Commander I ANZAC Corps and the AIF decided to provide only those units which were needed if the AIF were to be autonomous. The policy was instituted by the GOC Australian troops overseas and did not apply to a handful of railway operating companies and tunnelling companies.

<sup>180</sup> Report of the Ministry: Overseas Military Force of Canada 1918. p.375. The Base Signal, Labour and Engineer Reinforcement Pools have not been included since these elements were destined for the Canadian Corps

<sup>181</sup> LAC RG 9 III A2 Vol 352 File 21, War Office to OMFC 24 January 1918 asks if the men could be transferred to the Royal Engineers and reply 29 January 1918 stating the men could not be transferred, Canadian Section GHQ 1<sup>st</sup> Echelon to Canadian Corps 2 November 1918 suggested the nine men be grouped in one section and reply 8 November 1918 asked that the men be returned to their units; LAC RG 9 III A2 Vol 352 File 25, OMFC to Canadian Section GHQ 1<sup>st</sup> Echelon 20 October 1918 asked that the two Auxiliary Horse Transport Companies be attached to the Canadian Corps and reply 1 November 1918 explained that while the two companies might be employed in the same Army as the Corps, there was no guarantee they would accompany the Corps if it were transferred to another Army

<sup>182</sup> Swettenham. Allied Intervention in Russia 1918-1919. p.52; MacLaren. Canadians in Russia, 1918-1919 pp.9-10; LAC RG 24 Vol 4472 File 20-1-79, AAG to OC 4<sup>th</sup> Garrison Battalion 24 October 1918 reporting the arrival of Captain O'Kelly with 251 dogs, Acquittance Roll 19 November 1918 lists 26 men; Nicholson. Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919. p.519 claims that about five thousand officers and men served with the Siberian Expeditionary Force



<sup>183</sup> RG 9 III A1 Vol 90 File 10-12-17, Major-General Charles Callwell at Canada House to OMFC 17 January 1917 and 14 February 1917, CGS OMFC to Callwell 12 February 1917, Accountant General to Deputy Minister OMFC 12 January 1918; LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 790 File R-46-2 contains administrative information relating to the selection of instructors; LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 9506 (216799 Gregory Taszchuk or Tischuk) and Box 10674 (Pete Zacharhuk)

<sup>184</sup> Sarty, Roger. The Maritime Defence of Canada. (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1996) p.65

<sup>185</sup> RG 24 Vol 1819 File GAQ 4-124, 'The N.P.A.M. 1914-1918' compiled 4 December 1940 by the Historical Section, p.4

<sup>186</sup> Duiguid, Official History p.15; LAC RG 24 Vol 1819 File GAQ 4-124, 'The N.P.A.M. 1914-1921' probably prepared by Edwin Pye of the Historical Section c1940

<sup>187</sup> LAC MG 30 E 44 (Loring Cheney Christie Fonds) Vol 2 File 3, Number 1143 of 12 August 1914

<sup>188</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1819 File GAQ 4-124, 'The N.P.A.M. 1914-1921' with handwritten notes probably by Edwin Pye of the Historical Section c1940

<sup>189</sup> CEF Routine Order Number 464 of 20 April 1918 replaced District Special Service Companies with battalions of the Canadian Garrison Regiment. The order allowed men who were unwilling to serve with the Canadian Garrison Regiment to join composite units; CEF Routine Order Number 795 of 12 July 1918 declared that all personnel on full time duty were automatically transferred to the CEF as of 22 June 1918.

<sup>190</sup> LAC RG 9 II A2 Vol 33 Militia Council Minutes 27 April 1916 p.70

<sup>191</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4655 File 99-44 Vol 4, '107<sup>th</sup> East Kootenay Regt - Details called out' nd but appears to be late 1917 or early 1918

<sup>192</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4364 File 34-7-19 Vol 1, Major-General Lessard to Militia HQ 19 September 1918

<sup>193</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1819 File GA 4-124, Handwritten notes on the strength of the militia

<sup>194</sup> DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 4 Folder 13 File 'CDF', CGS to AG 15 January 1917; Nicholson. Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919. p.546

<sup>195</sup> DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 4 Folder 13 File 'CDF', 'Canadian Defence Force' prepared by Edwin Pye of the Historical Section 25 March 1943

<sup>196</sup> Archives of Ontario Sydney Chilton Mewburn Fonds Ms798 Reel 1, Series 1, Mewburn to Arthur Meighen 26 November 1941

<sup>197</sup> TNA WO 32/5094, GHQ to War Office 18 April 1917, GHQ to War Office 23 August 1917

<sup>198</sup> Falls, Cyril. History of the 36<sup>th</sup> (Ulster) Division. (Belfast: McCaw, Stevenson & Orr Ltd., 1922) p.244

<sup>199</sup> TNA WO 162/6 'History of the Development and Work of the Directorate of Organization: August 1914 - December 1918' p.250

<sup>200</sup> TNA WO 106/362 'Report by Lieutenant-General H.M. Lawson' 16 January 1917

<sup>201</sup> LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 98 File 10-14-13, AG to Deputy Minister OMFC 4 April 1917, QMG to Deputy Minister OMFC 18 April 1917, OMFC Accountant General Circular letter 31 October 1918

<sup>202</sup> LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 98 File 10-14-18, Accountant-General to Deputy Minister OMFC 2 October 1917 with suggested regulations based on ACI 221, OMFC Council decision 6 August 1918 approved the employment of women drivers in the CASC; LAC RG 24 Vol 1848 File GAQ 11-79, 'Employment of Women with the Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-1918' compiled by Edwin Pye 16 October 1940

<sup>203</sup> LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 97 File 10-14-06, HQ Canadians Routine Order Number 2882 of 14 November 1917, Surgeon-General to QMG OMFC 7 February 1917 recommended that additional women be taken on to free up able-bodied men

<sup>204</sup> LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 96 File 10-13-9, Accountant-General to Deputy Minister OMFC questioning the authority for women with the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Tank Battalion, AG to GOC 5 April 1918 concerning women at the Canadian Training School; LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 98 File 10-14-18, Accountant-General to Deputy Minister OMFC 28 November 1918. The chief stumbling block to the employment of women seems to have been a cheese-paring reluctance to pay for uniforms

### Chapter 3 The Recruiting Structure 1914-1918

CEF recruiting, with its monster rallies, strident newspaper stories, public demonstrations, posters and recruiting sergeants on the streets, was a highly visible process that has been examined by a wide variety of historians. But, this ignores the organizational framework created by Militia HQ and the nine district headquarters across the country that made recruiting possible. Recruiting was not simply a social or cultural event, but also a military process controlled and guided by the Canadian Forces with varying degrees of success until 1918 when the Military Service Branch of the Department of Justice assumed responsibility for calling up recruits conscripted under the *Military Service Act*.

Many of the studies of recruiting for the CEF have focused on the recruiting crisis of 1915-1916 and the chaos, confusion and gross inefficiency that resulted when Sam Hughes created almost a hundred infantry battalions overnight. Without denying that there was a genuine recruiting crisis, it should be noted that more than one-third of all recruits (36.8%) were not infantrymen. These men were recruited by a variety of agencies: corps depots, reserve squadrons, depot batteries, district recruiting offices and in the case of some of the forestry and railway units, by the unit itself. For these units, there was no crisis. Having said this, the infantry was not only the largest component but the one that had the most difficulties.

Table 13  
Enlistments by Corps  
Other Ranks  
1914-1918<sup>1</sup>

Corps	Enlistments	Proportion
Infantry	378,070	63.2%
Artillery	42,237	7.1%
Engineers	37,759	6.3%
Forestry Corps	22,195	3.7%
Railway Troops	21,768	3.6%
Medical Corps	17,593	2.9%
Service Corps	16,719	2.8%
Machine Gun	14,954	2.5%
Labour	11,263	1.9%
Cavalry	8,344	1.4%
Forestry and Railway Construction	6,212	1.0%
Miscellaneous	20,906	3.5%
Total	598,020	

From August 1914 to November 1916, recruiting was periodically modified as a result of snap decisions by Sam Hughes, the eccentric Minister of Militia and Defense, and it is easy to see him as the cause of all problems. But in practice, Hughes's authority was not absolute. First of all, he did not concern himself with the overall policy and organization but instead dealt with specific issues as they arose. Secondly, the staff at Militia HQ, to their credit, persisted in trying to put CEF recruiting on a rational basis. In April 1916, for example, the Militia Council took advantage of Hughes's absence from Ottawa and decided that new battalions would not be created until the existing ones had reached full strength. The action ran counter to Hughes's penchant for creating new units at the drop of a hat and, not surprisingly, A.E. Kemp, the acting president of the Council, deferred any action until Hughes returned to Ottawa.<sup>2</sup>

As discussed in Chapter 1, district commanders expected to be consulted on matters concerning units in their district and to be kept informed of any decisions affecting their district. Not even Hughes could ignore these long-standing conventions without provoking a backlash. In August 1915, for example, Colonel W.A. Logie, the commander of MD 2, complained to the AG that he had been directed to organize the 92<sup>nd</sup> Battalion in Toronto with a full slate of officers but that Hughes had appointed Colonel J.A. Currie as the CO. Even worse, Logie learned of the appointment from Currie and not Militia HQ. Logie's outrage was palpable: "I am at a loss to know whether I am organizing this Battalion or whether he [Currie] is organizing it...May I be informed therefore, authoritatively, what status I have."<sup>3</sup> The reply from the AG was succinct: Currie would not command the 92<sup>nd</sup> and a CO would be appointed based on Logie's recommendations.<sup>4</sup> The issue here was not Currie's suitability to command the new battalion, but adhering to established military conventions. A few months later, in November 1915, Hughes appointed Lieutenant-Colonel R. Belcher as the CO of the 138<sup>th</sup> Battalion in Edmonton although Colonel Cruikshank, the District Commander, thought that Belcher was not fitted for command because he was sixty-six years old and "occasionally drinks to excess and then becomes unmanageable. I have been obliged to admonish him for this on two occasions."<sup>5</sup> In this case, there was no protest from Brigadier-General Cruikshank because he had been consulted and allowed to make recommendations.

The district commanders' powers with regards to creating of new units remained unchanged throughout the war. However, the means by which men were enlisted to fill the ranks varied widely: militia units, the newly-mobilized CEF units themselves (unit-

based recruiting) and district-controlled recruiting offices. These agencies were not created sequentially and at various times all three operated together, sometimes in the same place. In many cases, recruiting agencies had multiple functions. Militia units not only enlisted men but processed them or, in other words, conducted medical examinations, completed documentation and then drafted the recruits to their new units. CEF units, on the other hand, not only recruited and processed volunteers but also trained them for overseas deployment. Lastly, district-controlled recruiting offices had the same responsibilities as militia units, but starting in 1915, acted as personnel depots by holding recruits until they could be drafted to units.

Large-scale recruiting was not a wartime phenomena but had been considered as early as 1911 when Canada's first mobilization plan was drafted by Lieutenant-Colonel W.G. Gwatkin, who later became CGS. Two possibilities were considered; a levée en masse in the event of war with the United States and an overseas contingent with an infantry division and a cavalry brigade drawn from the militia in the event of a European war.<sup>6</sup> Plans were drafted for the latter contingency, but there is no evidence that a levée en masse was seriously considered.

Ideally, the overseas contingent should have been formed by select militia units to preserve regimental and regional identities but as discussed previously in Chapter 1, peacetime units were nowhere near full strength. Some of the stronger units could have been brought up to full strength with new recruits, but there would have been howls of protest across the country from units not selected, many of which had politically well-connected honourary colonels. In the end, Militia HQ decided to form the overseas

division with composite units made up of men from ninety-six militia infantry regiments with quotas ranging from a machine gun section to five companies.\*

Volunteers for the planned overseas division were required to be single, physically fit and between the ages of twenty and thirty-five, standards that excluded a significant number of serving militiamen.<sup>7</sup> Perhaps because of this, the mobilization plan also provided for recruiting. Both district and unit commanders retained a general oversight, but the actual recruiting was to be done by the squadron, battery and company commanders who would actually command the men enlisted. In effect, the prewar mobilization plan relied not only on militia units for recruiting, but also the newly-mobilized units themselves, almost precisely what happened in the early days of the war. Finally, in keeping with British practice [Chapter 7], composite units were to form regimental depots to hold both recruits and reinforcements.<sup>8</sup>

The prewar scheme was not perfect: there were limited reserve stocks of clothing, equipment and weapons, no plans existed for detailed reports or pay services, and the reliance on militia units with inexperienced staffs left much to be desired. Still, the plan was useful, because it was based on a rational consideration of national manpower resources and provided a clear start point. Unfortunately, the scheme was abruptly cancelled by Hughes on 31 July 1914 and the orderly mobilization envisaged before the war was replaced by an improvised concentration at Valcartier, a temporary camp created on the spur of the moment.<sup>9</sup> In the short term, the abrupt cancellation of the scheme had little effect on the structure of the First Contingent, which resembled the 1911 plan with an infantry division and a cavalry brigade.<sup>10</sup> But, in the long term, the abandonment of

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\* The peacetime establishment called for eight companies.

prewar plans meant that recruiting and mobilization would be an improvised business until alternative arrangements could be put into place.

The story of the First Contingent and the resultant chaos at Valcartier in August 1914 is too well known to be repeated here. Raising and dispatching the contingent in less than six weeks was a considerable achievement, but the process was anything but orderly and in practice amounted to nothing more than shoveling militia volunteers into Valcartier, leaving a hard-pressed group of twenty-five staff officers under the direction of the camp commandant, Colonel V.A.S. Williams, the AG, to sort things out as the troops arrived.<sup>11</sup>

Calling on the militia to provide recruits for the First Contingent was not a straightforward process. Few, if any, units had a full-time staff and instructions from Ottawa had to be sent to commanding officers at their home or business and then passed to the troops by runners or through newspaper advertisements. City corps could react quickly but rural units could not. Urgent telegrams from Militia HQ took two or more days to reach the 26<sup>th</sup> Middlesex Light Infantry in south-western Ontario, for example, because the CO lived near Ilderton, "a considerable distance from a telegraph station."<sup>12</sup> Elsewhere in Prince Edward Island, the CO of the 36<sup>th</sup> Light Horse complained that his men were scattered across the province and it was impossible to contact all of them in a reasonable period of time.<sup>13</sup>

Units also had some initial difficulties with recruiting and processing because Hughes chose to bypass district headquarters.<sup>14</sup> As a result, ordnance officers had no authority or basis on which to distribute uniforms and equipment from district stocks while district paymasters lacked the authority (and funds) to pay recruits or to call out

unit staff. The 24<sup>th</sup> Kent Regiment in Chatham, Ontario, for example, was forced to recruit in the evenings when officers and NCOs were free from their civilian jobs.<sup>15</sup> But, this was only a temporary glitch and by mid-August 1914, many units had called out staff to handle the influx of recruits.

The number called out by each unit varied. In Stratford, the 28<sup>th</sup> Perth Regiment called out the CO, second-in-command, medical officer and quartermaster together with nine clerks, medical orderlies and storemen to process 156 volunteers from 12-23 August 1914.<sup>16</sup> In Galt, the 29<sup>th</sup> Regiment used the CO, adjutant, medical officer, Quartermaster and Regimental Quartermaster-Sergeant to process 117 volunteers, while the 25<sup>th</sup> Regiment in St Thomas was content to rely only on the CO and an orderly room sergeant.<sup>17</sup> Even small units called out regimental staff; in Calgary, Sergeant-Major Barker supervised recruiting for the 14<sup>th</sup> Company, CASC.<sup>18</sup> In a few cases, support personnel were also called out by rural units that chose to concentrate recruits from outlying companies at regimental headquarters. In Parry Sound, for example, the 23<sup>rd</sup> Northern Pioneers called out unit cooks to feed the influx of recruits.<sup>19</sup>

Some militia units were needed for home defence duties and were unable to recruit for the First Contingent. In New Brunswick, the 73<sup>rd</sup> Regiment, a rural corps, abandoned its outlying armories when the regiment was called out at the beginning of the war, leaving nobody behind to take in recruits. Providing guards for strategic installations was important, but so was recruiting for the First Contingent and HQ MD 6 ordered one officer from each outlying company to return home and reopen the local armoury to receive recruits.<sup>20</sup>



One unit was unable to call on the militia for recruits. Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) was a wartime creation with no ties to the peacetime militia. But regimental enthusiasts opened improvised recruiting offices in Montréal, Toronto, Winnipeg, Edmonton and Calgary and the regiment was quickly brought up to full strength.<sup>21</sup>

Almost immediately after the First Contingent sailed to England, Canada offered a Second Contingent. Unlike the First which had been concentrated at Valcartier, the Second was dispersed across the country in improvised barracks under the command of district commanders. In the case of the fifteen infantry battalions, each district was assigned a specific quota by Militia HQ on 18 October 1914.<sup>22</sup> MD 1 (South-Western Ontario), MD 3 (Eastern Ontario), MD 5 (Eastern Québec) and MD 13 (Alberta) were responsible for recruiting one battalion each, MD 2 (Central Ontario), MD 4 (Western Québec), MD 6 (Atlantic Canada) and MD 11 (British Columbia) were tasked to recruit two battalions each, while MD 10 (Saskatchewan, Manitoba and North-Western Ontario) had to raise three battalions.<sup>23</sup>

As with the First Contingent, militia units were called upon to provide recruits and district commanders kept a grip on the process. In Toronto (MD 2), twenty militia regiments provided recruits to the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> Battalions. City corps in Toronto, the Niagara Peninsula and Sault Ste Marie sent men to the 19<sup>th</sup> while rural corps sent their men to the 20<sup>th</sup> Battalion.<sup>24</sup> Further west in Winnipeg, HQ MD 10 assigned quotas to all infantry and cavalry units in Saskatchewan, Manitoba and the Lakehead. The 79<sup>th</sup>, 90<sup>th</sup>, 100<sup>th</sup> and 106<sup>th</sup> Regiments in Winnipeg as well as the 98<sup>th</sup> Kenora Light Infantry and the 99<sup>th</sup> Manitoba Rangers in Brandon recruited men for the 27<sup>th</sup> (City of Winnipeg)

Battalion while four Saskatchewan regiments and the 96<sup>th</sup> Lake Superior Regiment from the Lakehead recruited for the 28<sup>th</sup> Battalion. Lastly, each of the nine cavalry regiments in the district was required to provide 116 recruits for the 32<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Battalion.<sup>25</sup> In Québec, both MD 4 and MD 5 sent French-speaking recruits from the 9<sup>th</sup>, 65<sup>th</sup> and 85<sup>th</sup> Regiments to the 22<sup>nd</sup> Battalion.<sup>26</sup> Militia units were also provided specialists as required and October 1914, for example, the 79<sup>th</sup>, 90<sup>th</sup> and 100<sup>th</sup> Regiments were each given a quota of two cooks, four buglers and four signallers for the 27<sup>th</sup> Battalion at Tuxedo Barracks near Winnipeg.<sup>27</sup>

Not all districts were able to rely on the militia for recruits. In the Maritimes, the 25<sup>th</sup> and 26<sup>th</sup> Battalions had to recruit for themselves, probably because the strongest militia units had been called out for home defence and the remaining units were not sufficiently well organized to process recruits.<sup>28</sup>

In contrast, Colonel Cruikshank of MD 13 (Alberta) used a variety of methods to find recruits for the 31<sup>st</sup> Battalion. Edmonton recruits, for example, were enlisted by a battalion officer, Major Hewgill, originally from the 16<sup>th</sup> Light Horse (a Saskatchewan unit).<sup>29</sup> Further south in Calgary, Captain Morfitt of the 103<sup>rd</sup> Calgary Rifles was appointed by Hughes to recruit men for the 31<sup>st</sup> and then the 56<sup>th</sup> and 63<sup>rd</sup> Battalions.<sup>30</sup> Outside of Edmonton and Calgary, recruiting was delegated to militia units. In Lethbridge, Major Stewart of the 25<sup>th</sup> Independent Field Battery enlisted a hundred infantrymen for the 31<sup>st</sup> while in Medicine Hat, Captain Oakes of the 21<sup>st</sup> Alberta Hussars and his medical officer, Captain Orr, recruited another hundred volunteers, also for the 31<sup>st</sup> Battalion.<sup>31</sup>

For those units that recruited for the Second Contingent, procedures were broadly similar to those followed in August 1914. In Stratford, five members of the 28<sup>th</sup> Regiment (second-in-command, medical officer, hospital sergeant and two sergeant-clerks) were called out on 22 October 1914 to process ninety-three recruits from Perth County for the 18<sup>th</sup> Battalion at Queen's Park Barracks (today's Western Fair grounds) in London. The recruiting campaign was brief and on 4 November 1914, the 28<sup>th</sup> staff downed tools and returned to their civilian jobs.<sup>32</sup> Other militia regiments in MD 1 also called out staff to recruit for the 18<sup>th</sup> Battalion: the 24<sup>th</sup> in Chatham, 29<sup>th</sup> in Galt, 33<sup>rd</sup> in Goderich and the 27<sup>th</sup> in Sarnia.<sup>33</sup> In some cases, outlying companies were used; the 30<sup>th</sup> Wellington Rifles opened recruiting detachments at company armories in both Fergus and Guelph.<sup>34</sup> Other districts also called out militia staff for recruiting purposes. In MD 2 the 23<sup>rd</sup> Regiment in Parry Sound, the 32<sup>nd</sup> in Walkerton and the 34<sup>th</sup> in Oshawa all recruited on behalf of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> Battalions.<sup>35</sup> Non-infantry units also recruited for the Second Contingent and in Alberta (MD 13), the 14<sup>th</sup> Company CASC employed two officers and one private from 30 November to 3 December 1914 to recruit and process thirty-two volunteers for the 2<sup>nd</sup> Divisional Train.<sup>36</sup>

Prewar French-speaking militia units in eastern Québec were weak and in 1914 were unable to recruit enough men for the 22<sup>nd</sup> Battalion. The shortfall was made up by posting men from two western Québec battalions (the 23<sup>rd</sup> and 24<sup>th</sup>) to the 22<sup>nd</sup>, but English-speaking recruits then had to be transferred from other districts to replace the losses in the 23<sup>rd</sup> and 24<sup>th</sup>. A draft of 135 recruits for the 23<sup>rd</sup> Battalion came from far-off Alberta (MD 13) while Lindsay, Ontario, (MD 3) provided a complete platoon for the

24<sup>th</sup>. Other recruits from MD 11 (British Columbia) and MD 10 (Manitoba) also joined the 23<sup>rd</sup> and 24<sup>th</sup> Battalions.<sup>37</sup>

The 2<sup>nd</sup> Divisional Artillery also relied on recruits from militia units. In Fredericton, recruits for the 23<sup>rd</sup> and 24<sup>th</sup> Field Batteries came from all three militia field artillery brigades in Atlantic Canada.<sup>38</sup> In Toronto (MD 2), five batteries in the local area sent their recruits directly to the 4<sup>th</sup> CFA Brigade. Further west in Winnipeg (MD 10), only one of the three local militia batteries (13<sup>th</sup> Independent Field Battery) was required to enlist men for two batteries and the ammunition column of the 5<sup>th</sup> CFA Brigade while the third battery was raised by the 26<sup>th</sup> (Militia) Field Battery in Regina.<sup>39</sup>

Men with technical skills not found in peacetime militia units were also needed and a variety of methods were used to recruit these men. In Montréal, the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Heavy Battery turned to the Canadian Pacific Railway shops to find skilled artificers.<sup>40</sup> There was also a shortage of skilled electricians to operate searchlights and electrical equipment in the Halifax fortress. Fortunately, in August 1914, the Canadian General Electric Company offered to recruit and pay for twenty-five electricians. Militia HQ accepted the offer and the men were enlisted in the Royal Canadian Engineers (PF) and sent to Halifax, where they remained until at least February 1916.<sup>41</sup> In Toronto, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Field Butchery did not turn to local militia units but recruited experienced civilian butchers from December 1914 to April 1915 with the aid of Sergeant Lilley, an ex-Royal Marine butcher trained at the Army Service Corps School at Aldershot, England.<sup>42</sup> Further east, Number 5 Depot Unit of Supply<sup>†</sup> in Montréal did not turn to the

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<sup>†</sup> The Depot Unit of Supply was concerned with ration accounting at the corps railhead. The staff therefore needed both clerical and accounting skills, talents not usually found in a peacetime CASC company responsible for delivering rations to a camp kitchen at an annual summer camp.

militia either and conducted its own recruiting campaign from December 1914 to February 1915.<sup>43</sup>

The role of militia units in recruiting for the CEF in 1914 was not a flash in the pan and the practice continued for much of 1915, albeit on a more organized and systematic basis for longer periods of time. In Ottawa, the Governor General's Foot Guards actively recruited for the 38<sup>th</sup> and 59<sup>th</sup> Battalions from February to July 1915.<sup>44</sup> Further west, in Owen Sound, the 31<sup>st</sup> Regiment recruited for the 37<sup>th</sup> and 58<sup>th</sup> Battalions in February 1915 and again from April to June 1915.<sup>45</sup> In some cases, militia units were literally manning depots in that they not only recruited men, but held them until drafts could be assembled and dispatched to CEF units. In MD 3, the 57<sup>th</sup> Peterborough Rangers provided men to the 39<sup>th</sup> and 80<sup>th</sup> Battalions from February to September 1915. For much of this period, recruit drafts were forwarded weekly, but in September 1915, recruits were forwarded on a daily basis to the 80<sup>th</sup> Battalion in Belleville. As a recruiting agency, the 57<sup>th</sup> was remarkably successful, bringing in as many as fifteen men a day and 198 in the month of September 1915.<sup>46</sup>

After the initial rush in 1914, the fixed affiliations between militia units and CEF battalions were largely done away with and those enlisted by the militia were posted on the basis of need. In August 1915, for example, the 109<sup>th</sup> Regiment of Toronto, tasked to recruit for the 84<sup>th</sup> Battalion could not find enough volunteers and a draft from the 108<sup>th</sup> Regiment, intended for the 83<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, was diverted to make up the shortfall. This was not an isolated case. Men recruited by the Governor General's Body Guard in Toronto for the 75<sup>th</sup> Battalion were sent instead to the under-strength 58<sup>th</sup> Battalion. The shortfall in the 75<sup>th</sup> was then made up when HQ MD 2 gave Toronto militia regiments a fresh quota

of 255 men each.<sup>47</sup> Not all of these quotas were needed by the 75<sup>th</sup> and by September 1915, local militia units were holding a substantial number of unallocated recruits leading the District Commander, Colonel Logie, to request authority to raise another because "There are at present about 2,500 recruits in this Division of which I am handing over the authorized establishment to the 81<sup>st</sup> Battalion."<sup>48</sup>

Units in MD 6 (Atlantic Canada) had little confidence in militia recruiters. As a company commander of the 55<sup>th</sup> Battalion in New Brunswick explained in July 1915, civilians were preferred because they would "do much better work than an Officer of the Militia, who, as the people would say, should be away himself. Furthermore I consider it has a dampening effect on recruiting to have in the centres Recruiting Officers who are of age and are not volunteering for overseas service and have no intention of doing so."<sup>49</sup> HQ MD 6 shared this belief and by the end of July 1915 all but four militia recruiting officers in New Brunswick had been sacked because they were unable to produce a reasonable number of recruits.<sup>50</sup> Civilians were appointed as recruiting agents in their place but this led to other problems.

In Woodstock, five recruiting agents were appointed, including the town constable, a bank manager (who was also head of the Woodstock Board of Trade), the caretaker of the Woodstock armoury, a Canadian Pacific Railway engineer and a private from the 55<sup>th</sup> Battalion who was at home recovering from an appendectomy.<sup>51</sup> But, nobody was responsible for coordination and all enjoyed equal status. As well, none of these men were officers and could not attest recruits or provide them with public funds for transportation to the nearest CEF unit. In the case of the armoury caretaker, the job was considered to be part of his normal duties and there was no increase to his pay. Not

surprisingly, he tried "to make money out of the recruits indirectly through his pool room."<sup>52</sup> Further north in Edmunston, a local commission merchant was considered well-qualified as a recruiter since he spoke both French and English, was too old for military service and had a son with the 55<sup>th</sup> Battalion. On the other hand, "he occasionally gets on a drinking bout, which though over fairly quickly is pretty bad while it lasts."<sup>53</sup> The man may have been well qualified, but he was a civilian and could not be controlled or disciplined by the military.

Using militia units as recruiting agencies worked well in the short term, but in the long term part-time staff could not sustain the pace since most militia officers and NCOs had jobs and could not be called out for prolonged periods of time. The 28<sup>th</sup> Regiment in Stratford was able to call out staff in July and August 1915 to recruit a draft for the 34<sup>th</sup> Battalion, but this was the last time the regiment was able to respond, although one subaltern and two sergeants were called out that autumn to assist the 71<sup>st</sup> Battalion.<sup>54</sup>

By the fall of 1915, militia units that had been foremost in recruiting had closed, as those officers who had been instrumental in recruiting joined the CEF. In Alberta, Major Stewart from Lethbridge joined the CEF in November 1914 and six months later, Captains Oakes and Orr from Medicine Hat followed suit.<sup>55</sup> There is no record of any further drafts from either the 25<sup>th</sup> Independent Field Battery or the 21<sup>st</sup> Alberta Hussars.

Other militia units were in a similar position and by June 1916, most had lost a large proportion of their officers to the CEF: the 28<sup>th</sup> Regiment in Stratford had lost nine of its eighteen officers, the 50<sup>th</sup> Regiment in Victoria had lost seven of its eleven officers; the 8<sup>th</sup> Regiment in Québec City seven out of fifteen and the 7<sup>th</sup> Company CASC in Saint John, New Brunswick, five out of six officers.<sup>56</sup> With so many key officers joining the

CEF, many units stopped parading and were dormant by mid-1916. Their status was acknowledged in August 1916 by the Militia Council, which approved a request from the QMG to transfer stores and equipment from these units to district ordnance depots for redistribution to CEF units.<sup>57</sup>

Despite the loss of key officers to the CEF, the militia continued to be involved in recruiting. In Toronto, HQ MD 2 was given authority by Militia HQ in June 1915 to recruit on a continuous basis. Militia units as such were not responsible for this but instead, each provided one lieutenant and four sergeants to work for the Toronto Recruiting Depot.<sup>58</sup>

With the end of militia recruiting, CEF infantry battalions started to recruit for themselves. The concept was not new, but had been the custom in the peacetime militia and was part of the prewar mobilization plan scrapped by Hughes in July 1914. No instructions concerning recruiting were issued at the beginning of the war, although it seems to have been understood that militia units would be responsible for finding recruits for the CEF. However, this changed 29 March 1915 when Militia Order 161 was issued charging CEF commanding officers with the responsibility "for the recruiting, organization, clothing, equipment and training of their units."<sup>59</sup>

CEF unit-based recruiting became the norm after the autumn of 1915, not only because the militia was declining in strength but also because of two successive increases to the CEF. The first increase, announced by Hughes on 30 October 1915, boosted the CEF ceiling to 250,000 men, while the second, announced 1 January 1916 by Prime Minister Borden, set an establishment of 500,000. In neither case was there much



forethought. As one historian has remarked, Borden's announcement in particular was made "without any serious consultation with his [cabinet] colleagues. Certainly his decision was made without the benefit of any planned study of all that this large-scale commitment of Canada's manpower would involve."<sup>60</sup>

The two announcements were a substantial headache for the Department of Militia and Defence. The War Purchasing Commission, for example, was caught off-guard and did not discuss the purchase of additional uniforms, let alone other equipment, until the end of January 1916. As late as 19 April 1916, contracts had not been let for the kit needed to provide for Hughes's increase announced in October 1915.<sup>61</sup>

With only 191,654 officers and men with the CEF at the end of December 1915, the new establishment announced by the Prime Minister was clearly unreasonable. After factoring in the average monthly wastage rate for 1915, (1,918 men), the CEF would have to enlist 26,613 recruits every month to reach Borden's goal by the end of 1916.<sup>62</sup> In other words, the CEF needed a lot of men in a very short period of time. Moreover, the Prime Minister did not concern himself with details such as the desired establishment for each corps. The result was, perhaps, inevitable. Recruiting offices had been created for non-infantry corps, but they were small and few in number and the simplest way to meet the Prime Minister's goal was to create a large number of infantry battalions with the expectation that each could recruit its own men.

From November 1915 to July 1916 181,438 men were enlisted in the CEF, a large number that placed a considerable strain on both Militia HQ and district headquarters which had not been given any warning of the increases.<sup>63</sup> A Recruiting Officer was added to each district HQ in August 1916 but this appointment had little effect since

responsibilities were largely advisory.<sup>64</sup> In Toronto, Major-General Logie of MD 2 suggested in August 1916 that a system of deferred recruiting be adopted, patterned after the earlier Derby Scheme in Great Britain.<sup>65</sup> Militia HQ staff supported the idea and in early September 1916 the AAG submitted a proposal to the AG calling for "enlistment for the CEF on a deferred basis, i.e. subject to call for training and service on notice of one, two or three months; the men remaining in their civilian occupations, but after medical examination and acceptance, receiving say twenty-five cents a day, to be paid when called and possibly receiving elementary training at night during the interim."<sup>66</sup>

The proposal was then forwarded to districts for comment, but only four of the ten districts were in favor and by the end of October 1916, the idea was effectively dead. The concept may have been useful if it had been introduced to coincide with the increases announced in October 1915 and January 1916 but, by the fall of 1916, as HQ MD 4 pointed out, there were not enough men to fill existing units and deferring recruiting, therefore, did not make sense.<sup>67</sup>

Recruiting men for the new battalions was complicated by Hughes's policy of allowing units to recruit outside of their parent district without, however, coming under command of the district commander concerned. The practice started in October 1915, when the AG, probably at the behest of Hughes, announced that CEF battalions were free to recruit outside of their parent district with no reference to Militia HQ. District commanders involved had to be notified, but not consulted.<sup>68</sup> The policy caused no end of confusion and animosity and was cancelled in March 1916. However, specialist units such as pioneer battalions, forestry units and tunnelling companies were still allowed to recruit outside of their area as were infantry units favoured by Hughes or, as the acerbic

Director of Mobilization later described them, "marginally Gilt edged Infantry Battalions."<sup>69</sup>

Even though the number of units allowed to recruit outside of their parent district was limited, the policy still hampered local recruiting efforts. In December 1916, for example, HQ MD 11 complained to Militia HQ that nine units from outside of British Columbia were recruiting in Vancouver and Victoria: the 174<sup>th</sup> and 197<sup>th</sup> Battalions from Winnipeg, the 230<sup>th</sup> Battalion from Brockville, the 236<sup>th</sup> Battalion from Fredericton, the 239<sup>th</sup> Battalion from Valcartier, the 244<sup>th</sup> Battalion from Montréal and the 253<sup>rd</sup> Battalion from Kingston. To add insult to injury, several of these units were Highlanders and "Local Highland Regiments 50<sup>th</sup> and 72<sup>nd</sup> and 231<sup>st</sup> Battn strenuously protest against 236<sup>th</sup> and 253<sup>rd</sup> Highlanders coming here to recruit."<sup>70</sup> Further east, Major-General Logie of HQ MD 2 had the same concerns and in December 1916 complained that six units from outside of his district were recruiting in Toronto. Commanding Officers of Toronto-based units "have communicated to me that this recruiting by outside units is seriously interfering with their recruiting campaigns," noted Logie, who went on to add, "I would ask that as many of these units as possible be asked to cease further recruiting in this District."<sup>71</sup>

Civilian agencies were also concerned about the effects of units recruiting away from their home base. In October 1916, for example, the Nova Scotia Recruiting Association complained that "recruiting appeals from outside the Province is not only a mistaken policy but absolutely certain to result in confusion and harm."<sup>72</sup> The following month, the Union of Alberta Municipalities went so far as to submit a resolution to Prime Minister Borden complaining that a large number of Alberta men had been allowed to

transfer to battalions in other provinces "which tends to retard our local battalions from attaining full strength and battalions from other parts of Canada are permitted to recruit men in this province." The solution, the Union thought, was obvious, transfers should cease and "no battalions organized outside the province be permitted to recruit men in this province until all local battalions are up to full strength."<sup>73</sup> The policy of allowing infantry battalions to recruit outside of their parent districts was clearly counter-productive. But it was not until Hughes resigned that the policy was cancelled. In January 1917 Militia HQ announced that units were forbidden to recruit outside of their parent district and local commanders were able to restore some measure of control to the recruiting process.<sup>74</sup>

In keeping with peacetime militia habits, a few of the newly-formed units were not above poaching recruits from other battalions. In one incident, Majors Hughes and Knox-Leet from the Montréal based 199<sup>th</sup> Irish-Canadian Rangers boarded a troop train at Smiths Falls, Ontario, and tried unsuccessfully to convince men of the 192<sup>nd</sup> Battalion from northern Alberta, to join the 199<sup>th</sup>. Despite this unsuccessful raid, another detachment from the Irish-Canadian Rangers met the troop train in Montréal but, as the 199<sup>th</sup> recruiting officer noted, "not one man was persuaded to leave the 192<sup>nd</sup>, all seeming to much prefer to remain with their own officers and men."<sup>75</sup> There were other attempts at poaching, but none were as brazen as the 199<sup>th</sup> raid on the 192<sup>nd</sup>.

The confusion resulting from units recruiting in other districts was compounded by Hughes's willingness to accommodate local organizers. In October 1915, the 88<sup>th</sup> (New Brunswick) Battalion was renumbered as the 104<sup>th</sup> at the request of the CO of the peacetime 88<sup>th</sup> Irish Fusiliers in Victoria, who had been charged with raising a CEF

battalion. The rationale for the CO's request was simply that numbering his CEF battalion to correspond with the militia regiment would boost recruiting by linking the peacetime militia with the new CEF unit.<sup>76</sup> In November 1915, Militia HQ authorized the creation of two new battalions: the 119<sup>th</sup> Battalion in Manitoulin District and the 134<sup>th</sup> in Sault Ste Marie, Algoma District. Subsequently, W.R. Smyth, the Conservative M.P. for Algoma East suggested to Hughes that a second battalion should be recruited in the Algoma District. For some reason, Hughes did not approve the suggestion but on 27 November 1915, only three weeks after the 134<sup>th</sup> had been authorized, directed that the two districts would constitute one recruiting area with only one battalion. The 119<sup>th</sup> then absorbed the 134<sup>th</sup> and Smyth was commissioned by Hughes and appointed Chief Recruiting Officer for the new 119<sup>th</sup> Battalion.<sup>77</sup> The number '134' was allocated almost immediately to a new battalion being formed in Toronto by the 48<sup>th</sup> Highlanders.<sup>78</sup> In October 1915, a deputation from Simcoe County, Ontario, visited Ottawa and received Hughes's permission to recruit a new battalion in Simcoe County. Known as the 122<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, the new unit was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel D.M. Grant, the peacetime CO of the 35<sup>th</sup> Simcoe Foresters. Grant moved quickly. Seven recruiting detachments were organized across the Simcoe County and by the end of November 1915, the 122<sup>nd</sup> Simcoe Battalion had recruited 600 men. However, Hughes then decided that a battalion should be recruited in the Muskoka District. Grant, who lived in Huntsville, Muskoka District, was a logical choice as CO and he was therefore transferred to the new unit together with the title '122<sup>nd</sup> Battalion.' D.H. MacLaren, also an officer with the 35<sup>th</sup> Simcoe Foresters, was then appointed CO of the Simcoe Battalion which was henceforth known as the 157<sup>th</sup>.<sup>79</sup> The effect of these changes on HQ MD 2 is

unknown but must have been one of 'order, counter-order and disorder,' a state of affairs that, to some degree, must have hindered recruiting.

During the winter of 1915-1916, recruits were billeted in their home towns, provided that at least twenty-five men or more enlisted.<sup>80</sup> The policy was probably the result of a general shortage of barrack accommodation, but there was also the hope that potential recruits would be attracted by the sight of local boys parading in uniform. The concept was well-intentioned but inevitably, in some units, billeting areas were widely dispersed. The 151<sup>st</sup> Battalion in Alberta had men quartered in eleven communities, a state of affairs that lasted until the unit was concentrated at Sarcee in the spring of 1916.<sup>81</sup> The 119<sup>th</sup> Battalion in the Algoma District of northern Ontario was even worse off, with outlying detachments in fourteen communities spread out over 200 miles.<sup>82</sup> There were some advantages to this policy, particularly when troops were billeted in communities where there was no militia unit, a factor that the 135<sup>th</sup> Battalion historian thought "undoubtedly helped recruiting to a considerable effect"<sup>83</sup> On the other hand, routine administrative suffered. Recruiting was difficult to coordinate, training could not be supervised on a routine basis and quartermaster sergeants had to struggle to supply the outlying detachments. Lastly, small detachments did not have medical officers or clerical staff to process recruits and in many cases, detachment officers (if there were any) were too junior to complete and approve attestation forms. The presence of uniformed troops may have attracted potential recruits, but delays created by administrative complications may have deterred some prospective recruits.

With the two increases to the CEF announced in October 1915 and January 1916, the number of men joining every month increased steadily, reaching a peak of 33,960 recruits in March 1916.<sup>84</sup> Combined with Hughes's management style, the result was chaos with new battalions being continually created, changes brought about after local organizers petitioned Hughes directly with real or imagined grievances and the continual competition with units from outside of the district who had been given special dispensation by Hughes. In the end, a large number of men were enlisted in a remarkably short time but only at the cost, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 8, of bringing in thousands of men who were manifestly unfit and of swamping reserve units in England.

District commanders tried to bring order to chaos although each adopted a different solution. In eastern Ontario, Brigadier-General Hemming noted in August 1916 that there were nine well-defined recruiting areas within his district, six of which were assigned to newly-formed battalions. Rather than shuffle the recruiting areas to suit existing units, Hemming requested that Militia HQ create three additional battalions. Not surprisingly, the request was turned down by an unsympathetic AG who suggested a generic depot battalion to recruit in the three unallocated areas.<sup>85</sup>

In Toronto, Headquarters MD 2 chose not to divide the city among the newly-formed battalions, but to restrict unit recruiting campaigns to specific periods. The 123<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, for example, was allowed to recruit 6-26 December 1915, and the 124<sup>th</sup> from 27 December 1915 to 18 January 1916. However, the system fell apart when the 134<sup>th</sup> and 166<sup>th</sup> were authorized and allowed to start recruiting as early as 12 January 1916. By the beginning of March 1916, there were five battalions in Toronto competing for volunteers as well as three battalions from nearby Peel County that were recruiting

outside of their assigned areas.<sup>86</sup> Under the circumstances, any attempt to allocate recruiting periods to each battalion was futile. As late as December 1916, Major-General Logie complained that the 236<sup>th</sup> McLean Highlanders from Fredericton were recruiting in the city although "my arrangement with the Commanding Officer was for him not to recruit in Toronto until after one month from the authorization of the 255<sup>th</sup> Overseas Battalion CEF."<sup>87</sup>

Headquarters MD 11 used several methods to control recruiting. In August 1916, militia recruiters were instructed to operate only within their parent regiment's district. CEF units, on the other hand, could detail special recruiting parties to tour designated areas within the district.<sup>88</sup> Despite the apparent freedom given to CEF units, there was little competition for recruits. Admittedly five battalions were recruiting simultaneously in Vancouver and Victoria, but three had specialized interests: the 143<sup>rd</sup> was a bantam battalion, the 211<sup>th</sup> an American Legion battalion and the 218<sup>th</sup> were railway troops. The only real competition was in Vancouver where both the 158<sup>th</sup> and 231<sup>st</sup> Battalions were trying to build up their strength.<sup>89</sup>

HQ MD 5 in Eastern Québec chose to divide the district into six recruiting areas, each manned by militia officers. However, the officers proved to be inefficient and in December 1915, the 57<sup>th</sup>, 167<sup>th</sup>, 171<sup>st</sup> and 189<sup>th</sup> Battalions were each assigned specific districts.<sup>90</sup> But with the departure of the 57<sup>th</sup>, 171<sup>st</sup> and 189<sup>th</sup> Battalions for England in 1916, the recruiting structure fell apart and the district had to be reorganized with a Director of Recruiting to control district recruiting detachments.<sup>91</sup> Three primary district offices were established at Québec, Lévis and Rivière du Loup with satellite offices at



Chicoutimi and Grand Mère. Travelling medical boards were also created, each manned by two CAMC doctors, to visit to visit recruiting offices as necessary.<sup>92</sup>

In Alberta, HQ MD 13 allocated specific areas to battalions and then tried to suspend recruiting by new units until the existing ones were full. In January 1916, the 113<sup>th</sup> Lethbridge Highlanders had enlisted 350 men after a three-month recruiting campaign. Despite this dismal showing, Hughes authorized two new battalions (the 191<sup>st</sup> and 192<sup>nd</sup>) to recruit in the same area as the 113<sup>th</sup>. Since there were now too many battalions chasing too few recruits, the district commander, Brigadier-General Cruikshank, recommended to Militia HQ that recruiting be deferred for the 191<sup>st</sup> and 192<sup>nd</sup> until the 113<sup>th</sup> was up to strength. But his efforts were unsuccessful and Hughes directed that the 191<sup>st</sup> and 192<sup>nd</sup> continue recruiting.<sup>93</sup> Not surprisingly, none of these battalions reached full strength. The 113<sup>th</sup> sailed in September 1916 with 883 men, the 192<sup>nd</sup> in October 1916 with 424 men and the 192<sup>nd</sup> followed in 1917 with a total of 316 men in two drafts.<sup>94</sup>

In some cases, battalions imposed controls on recruiting by the individual companies. The 135<sup>th</sup> Battalion, for example, divided Middlesex County, Ontario into company areas with Middlesex East allocated to B Company. But Middlesex East was a rural area and only 10,666 males of all ages had been enumerated in the 1911 Census. B Company was therefore allowed to recruit in the City of London where 21,901 males had been counted in 1911.<sup>95</sup> Other companies were apparently given the same privilege and when the battalion embarked for England in August 1916, 496 men or 54.5% of the battalion had been enlisted in London.<sup>96</sup> Needless to say, recruiting for the 142<sup>nd</sup> (City of London's Own), which was restricted to London, suffered and that unit embarked for

England on 31 October 1916 with only 574 men, 95% of whom had been enlisted in the city.<sup>97</sup>

Creating community-based battalions broadened the recruiting base with impressive results but paradoxically reduced recruiting. In brief, all of these units were organized as conventional battalions with no allowance for recruiting officers and NCOs. Recruiting, therefore, was done by officers and NCOs temporarily seconded from their platoons and sections. As long as the units remained at their home station conducting individual training, these individuals could be spared from their primary duties. But in the spring of 1916, the new battalions were removed from their home stations and concentrated at central camps to conduct collective training from section to brigade level. Officers and NCOs employed on recruiting, therefore, had to return to their platoons and sections which meant that recruiting was effectively halted.

The removal of battalions from their home stations in the spring of 1916 had a significant effect on recruiting. In March 1916, 33,960 men enrolled and thereafter, the numbers fell as battalions moved to central training camps: 20,200 in April, 14,572 in May, 10,059 in June, 7,961 in July and 6,597 in August.<sup>98</sup> While there may have been other reasons for declining enrolments, a major cause was the removal of the battalions from their home bases, a point made by Brigadier-General Hemming of HQ MD 3 (Eastern Ontario) in August 1916. "With reference to the 130<sup>th</sup>, 136<sup>th</sup>, 139<sup>th</sup> and 146<sup>th</sup> Battalions [from MD 3] at Valcartier" Hemming wrote to Militia HQ, "I have the honour to state that it is impossible to recruit men for these units in view of their present location."<sup>99</sup>

The 110<sup>th</sup> Battalion from Perth County, Ontario, enrolled 850 men between November 1915 and May 1916 while they were stationed in the County, but only thirty-two after the battalion was concentrated, first at London on 22 May 1916 and then at Camp Borden on 20 July 1916.<sup>100</sup> Significantly twenty-one of those enlisted after 22 May 1916 joined in London or Camp Borden while only eleven were enlisted in Perth County.<sup>101</sup> In Saskatchewan, the diarist of the 232<sup>nd</sup> Battalion remarked that with the unit's move to Camp Hughes on 20 July 1916, the battalion recruiting campaign had to be discontinued because "the movement [to Camp Hughes] necessitated the bringing in of all our men from outlying points."<sup>102</sup> The unit diarist did not exaggerate. Of the 450 men who sailed with the 232<sup>nd</sup> in April 1917, 380 had enlisted before the battalion went to Camp Hughes while a further seventeen joined before the unit moved to winter quarters at Battleford and North Battleford on 20 October 1916. Recruiting was resumed, but the momentum had been lost and only fifty-three additional volunteers joined the battalion before embarkation.<sup>103</sup>

The policy of creating new battalions ended shortly after Hughes resigned his portfolio in mid-November 1916. His departure was not mourned at Militia HQ, particularly by the CGS who openly deplored "the lack of well-regulated and firmly administered system of organization [that] has interfered with the provision of reinforcements and impeded the upkeep of battalions overseas."<sup>104</sup> As early as 29 November 1916, the AG rejected a request from HQ MD 10 for a new battalion in Selkirk, Manitoba, because if additional units "were raised, they would merely be draft-giving Depot Battalions."<sup>105</sup> A month later, in December 1916, the DG Mobilization, Brigadier-General Gwynne, recommended that a proposal to raise another battalion in

New Brunswick be scotched, adding that "No new battalions have been raised [since] General Hughes left, and it would be fatal to once open the door again to do so."<sup>106</sup> Gwynne's recommendation was understandable, but the battalions being shipped to England [Chapter 8] as soon as troopships could be organized, constituted the infantry recruiting structure. Once they were gone, there was nothing.

Both Militia HQ in Ottawa and the newly-organized HQ of the Overseas Military Forces of Canada (OMFC) in London were well aware of the need for a new recruiting and reinforcing structure to replace the battalions being shipped overseas and there was an exchange of ideas between the CGS and Major-General R.E.W. Turner, the newly-appointed GOC Canadians in England.<sup>107</sup> Both felt that the infantry should be organized on a territorial basis with three linked battalions: a recruiting unit or depot in Canada, a training battalion in England, and a fighting battalion in France. The two differed only on the details, with Turner recommending generic recruiting centres and Gwatkin favouring militia units.<sup>108</sup>

Gwatkin's trust in the militia at this stage of the war was odd, but with the small staffs at both Militia and district HQ, creating a large-scale national recruiting organization would have taken time whereas the militia was available immediately.

Linking militia regiments to CEF battalions, Gwatkin thought, might boost recruiting and there was also the matter of the hard-won battle honours and achievements of CEF units that should be perpetuated in the post-war army.<sup>109</sup> Others shared the CGS's faith in the militia and in January 1917, Colonel H. Osborne at Militia HQ wrote, "our greatest hope in the present situation lies in the Militia of Canada. Although dormant, with the

exception of a few Regiments at the present time, it is a powerful agency, if wisely employed, not only for providing a defensive force, but also for furnishing recruits for Overseas."<sup>110</sup>

Gwatkin's faith in the militia seemed reasonable at the time since a number of militia units had already succeeded in recruiting overseas contingents in 1915, as discussed in Chapter 8. Militia units had also been able to raise drafts; in 1915, for example, the 79<sup>th</sup> Cameron Highlanders, 90<sup>th</sup> Winnipeg Rifles and 34<sup>th</sup> Fort Garry Horse raised six overseas drafts of about 250 men each.<sup>111</sup> At the same time, the 66<sup>th</sup> Regiment in Halifax recruited a draft of 250 men while the 63<sup>rd</sup>, also from Halifax, recruited three drafts of 100 men each.<sup>112</sup> With these examples in mind, the CGS circulated a proposal to Militia HQ staff on 15 January 1917 to use militia units as recruiting agencies. In brief, the CGS noted that sixteen infantry regiments were already recruiting for the CEF and that an additional thirty-nine urban regiments should be invited to form "regimental depots with a view to raising and training reinforcements for service overseas."<sup>113</sup> There was no disagreement with the proposal at Militia HQ and three days later, districts were formally instructed to invite city regiments to form regimental depots to recruit and train drafts for the CEF overseas.<sup>114</sup>

Despite Gwatkin's optimism, expectations were not high and regiments were expected to provide small drafts rather than delay the movement of reinforcements until company-sized drafts could be recruited. In February 1917, the 43<sup>rd</sup> Regiment in MD 3 was allowed to form a regimental depot, but drafts were limited to one officer and fifty men.<sup>115</sup> Similarly, in April 1917, the 32<sup>nd</sup> Regiment in MD 1 was given authority to establish a depot in Walkerton, Ontario, to recruit reinforcements for the 160<sup>th</sup> (Bruce)

Battalion, then serving with the 5<sup>th</sup> Division in England. But, as the AG noted when he approved the new depot, "It is understood that if men are needed they will be sent over in batches of fifty under a lieutenant."<sup>116</sup>

The number of recruits obtained by the militia depots was disappointing. The 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment in Vancouver was able to find only fifty-one infantrymen, while in MD 1, the District Commander reported in July 1917, that six militia regiments had provided drafts but the number of recruits "is so small that it is impossible to train them separately and get satisfactory results."<sup>117</sup> The effort to maintain the regimental identity of the militia drafts was obviously a lost cause and in August 1917, the AG directed that all recruits should be posted to the newly-formed depot battalion in London and thus form part of the general reinforcement stream.<sup>118</sup>

As discussed in Chapter 2, efforts were also made to use the militia to recruit men for the Canadian Defence Force (CDF) for both home defence and the CEF overseas. But there was little appetite in Canada for the CDF and even less in England where the War Office was concerned that the new force would siphon off potential recruits for the CEF.<sup>119</sup> It was widely expected from the start that the CDF would fail because the supply of volunteers had long since dried up. The Director-General, Major-General S.C. Mewburn, for one, was "convinced that it will be impossible to raise 50,000 men for the Home Defence of Canada on the voluntary enlistment plan."<sup>120</sup> His sentiments were shared by the CO of the 53<sup>rd</sup> Regiment in Sherbrooke, Québec, who said flatly "Compulsory training is the only way in which my Regiment can be gotten together."<sup>121</sup> Further west in Winnipeg, the CO of the 174<sup>th</sup> Battalion wrote to Militia HQ that "this latest scheme for mobilizing the Militia as the CDF is going to prove absolutely

useless.”<sup>122</sup> But the concerns were disregarded since the CDF had a political as well as a military purpose. “It has not been made clear to me” wrote the new Minister of Militia and Defence to the CDF Director-General in March 1917, “why we should proceed by force to enlist men for Home Defence...without first proceeding in a voluntary way.”<sup>123</sup>

As a recruiting venture, the CDF was a miserable failure. Forty-seven militia infantry regiments organized depots, but managed to enlist only 565 men for the CDF and 1,293 for the CEF after a three-month recruiting campaign. Some districts, such as MD 5 (Eastern Québec) and MD 13 (British Columbia), were able to find recruits for the CDF but not the CEF, while MD 6 (Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island) was unable to find volunteers for either component.<sup>124</sup> However, a few units enjoyed some success and by the end of June 1917, the 48<sup>th</sup> Highlanders in Toronto had found 133 recruits: 116 for the CEF and seventeen for home defence. But the overall quality of applicants was poor. At least sixty-four had been rejected, a quarter of whom were both underage and medically unfit - boys such as Harry Brennan, an under-sized, fifteen-year-old labourer with lung cancer, and seventeen-year-old Victor Callebert who weighed only ninety-five pounds. Underage recruits, particularly for the home defence component, were also a problem and in June 1917, Lieutenant Haldenby of the 48<sup>th</sup> wrote “We are to have a medical board examine the Depot on Wednesday and I think we will kiss the CDF good-by on Friday if they stick to the 18 [year-old] age limit.”<sup>125</sup> After three months of effort, it became apparent that few Canadians were willing to volunteer for the CDF and recruiting was therefore suspended on 22 May 1917. However militia depots continued to recruit for the CEF and over the next three months, the recruits were transferred to the newly-organized territorial depot battalions.<sup>126</sup>

As the CDF and the militia depots wound down, Militia HQ took stock of CEF manpower in Canada. The results were depressing. In May 1917, 6,407 men enlisted in the CEF but only 1,208 in the infantry. Figures for June 1917 were similar with only 1,126 of 6,363 volunteers choosing the infantry. It was clear that the pool of able-bodied men in Canada willing to volunteer was virtually drained and that no recruiting organization that relied on volunteers, no matter how efficient, would be able to produce the numbers required. There was some relief when the British-Canadian Recruiting Mission was established in June 1917 (see Chapter 5) and thousands of American residents joined the CEF, but this supply of manpower was dependent on the goodwill and cooperation of the US Government.<sup>127</sup> The only solution was conscription under the *Military Service Act*. However, calling men up (a form of compulsory enlistment) was not the responsibility of the military but of the Military Service Branch of the Department of Justice. Thus, for the final year of the war, the Canadian Forces lost control of the principal means for finding recruits.

A vital part of the process of enlisting men was the conduct of medical examinations, completion of personal documentation and the issue of kit to the new recruits. Initially this was done by militia regiments or CEF units, or a combination of the two. But in practice, this arrangement could not have been very efficient. It is doubtful, for example, that many militia units had adequate stocks of khaki service dress uniforms. CEF units, on the other hand, could draw from district ordnance stocks. But with the requirement to stock uniforms of various sizes, quartermasters inevitably held more uniforms than there were soldiers in the battalion. With the overall shortage of uniforms,



it made no sense to allow units to maintain a surplus. Unit medical sections and orderly rooms, staffed to provide services to the unit, must have also been hard-pressed at times to handle the influx of recruits. Inevitably, the CEF started in mid-1915 to centralize administrative recruiting functions.

The first recruiting depots were established in Toronto and Hamilton after the introduction of continuous recruiting in July 1915. The functions of these new depots, as described at the time by the Toronto Star, were straightforward:

Recruiting is to go on even after the quotas for new units have been raised. According to the present plans, the [militia] regiments will continue to gather Men as rapidly as possible and send them to the central and permanent Recruiting stations which are to be opened. From the recruiting depot these Men will be sent to Niagara in batches to be trained there until formed into battalions.<sup>128</sup>

Details of the actual process are sketchy, but in the case of the 48<sup>th</sup> Highlanders, recruiters filled out a regimental form for each recruit with the data needed for documentation and then sent the man to the Recruiting Depot for a medical examination, documentation, attestation and issue of basic kit. In some cases, 48<sup>th</sup> staff also ensured that consent forms were completed by the next of kin of married men and minors.<sup>129</sup> Close ties were maintained between the depot and the militia units that provided the recruits. The Hamilton Recruiting Depot, for example, had eight companies to hold recruits, two for the infantry and the remaining six for the cavalry, artillery, engineers, CASC and CAMC. Each company was affiliated with a specific militia unit.<sup>130</sup>

Other districts established recruiting centres as well. In Ottawa the MD 3 Base Recruiting Office on Sparks Street under Captain A.H. Thoburn opened in August 1915 with a staff of one medical officer, a stenographer (Miss B. Thoburn) and four recruiting sergeants.<sup>131</sup> MD 1 followed in the fall of 1915 with a recruiting depot in London and the

following year established a district office in Windsor as well as the 1<sup>st</sup> Hussars Recruiting Depot in Amherstburg that, despite the name, processed recruits for all corps.<sup>132</sup>

Further west, in British Columbia, HQ MD 11 opened the Vancouver Recruiting Centre in the fall of 1915, under the command of Charles Grant Henshaw, a local commission merchant who retained his civilian status and was paid as a lieutenant-colonel.<sup>133</sup> His wife, Julia Willmothe Henshaw, was commissioned as a militia officer at about the same time by Sam Hughes and called out on a permanent basis as a captain with a vague mandate to promote recruiting. Captain Henshaw was later dismissed by the Militia Council in October 1917, largely because it was not apparent what she did or who she reported to.<sup>134</sup> The Henshaws were, perhaps, the only officially sanctioned husband-and-wife recruiting team in either world war.

MD 10 under Brigadier-General H.N. Ruttan adopted a more systematic approach to recruiting and in November 1915, with the approval of Militia HQ, established four 'regimental areas' with headquarters in Winnipeg, Dauphin, Moose Jaw and Prince Albert.<sup>135</sup> Each area was responsible for establishing outlying detachments to find volunteers and a central headquarters to process the new recruits. Recruiting Area 'D', for example, had eight recruiting detachments and a central headquarters in Prince Albert staffed by a Quartermaster, Medical Officer and Adjutant together with clerks and storemen. The remaining three areas were similarly organized. Whether or not this organization would have been an efficient means of recruiting is unknown since Hughes almost immediately authorized new battalions to recruit in the same areas. The four areas

were therefore disbanded in February 1916 and the men used to provide the nucleus for the new battalions: 222<sup>nd</sup> (Area A), 226<sup>th</sup> (Area B), 188<sup>th</sup> (Area C) and 229<sup>th</sup> (Area D).<sup>136</sup>

By mid-1916, as discussed in Chapter 4, the number of unfit men sent overseas had become a matter of serious concern and Hughes appointed a newly-commissioned CAMC officer, Colonel H.A. Bruce, as a 'Special Inspector General' to investigate the situation in England.<sup>137</sup> The matter was politically sensitive and in August 1916, after reviewing a proposal from the AG, Prime Minister Borden suggested to F.B. McCurdy, the Parliamentary Secretary to Hughes, that the Militia Council should establish mobilization centres across the country to ensure recruits were medically fit. Militia HQ reacted promptly, Hughes did not interfere, perhaps because he was in England, and three weeks later, on 12 September 1916, the AG directed that all districts form mobilization centres where recruits would be documented and medically examined.<sup>138</sup>

The new mobilization centres were intended mainly to ensure that all recruits were medically fit. Medical examinations by unit medical officers and civilian physicians were regarded as preliminary only and the final decision regarding fitness was to be made at the mobilization centre. Each centre was to be commanded by a combatant officer with at least three medical officers, one of whom had to be an eye and ear specialist. Recruits determined to be fit would be returned to their parent unit while those who were unfit would be compensated for their time and provided with free transportation home.<sup>139</sup>

In practice, districts were free to establish mobilization centres to suit local conditions as they saw fit. In October 1916, the newly formed MD 12 (Saskatchewan) created a total of eight centres across the province while MD 11 (British Columbia) considered that centres were required only in Vancouver and Victoria. MD 5 (Eastern

Québec) on the other hand was made up chiefly of rural parishes and from March 1917 onwards recruits were processed at the Recruiting Depot in Québec City.<sup>140</sup>

In MD 2, four mobilization centres were formed to service specific regions. The Toronto Mobilization Centre handled Peel, York, Simcoe, Halton, Norfolk, Ontario, Dufferin and Grey Counties as well as the District of Muskoka, while the Hamilton Mobilization Centre processed recruits from Wentworth, Dundas, Brant and Haldimand Counties. Smaller offices were established in Sudbury to handle recruits from Northern Ontario and St Catharines to process volunteers from the Niagara Peninsula.<sup>141</sup>

Temporary mobilization centres were also formed as necessary, such as the detachment that operated in Owen Sound from April to June 1917 to process recruits for the 248<sup>th</sup> Battalion.<sup>142</sup>

Unlike the early days of the war when militia units processed recruits in peacetime orderly rooms, Mobilization Centres were both large complex organizations that reflected the increased sophistication of the Canadian Forces. In June 1917, the Toronto centre was staffed by 102 officers and men together with twenty female clerks. The Sudbury Mobilization Centre was much smaller, but in June 1918 was staffed by nine officers and men and one female clerk as well as two NCOs and ten men to escort recruits to one of the depot battalions in Toronto.<sup>143</sup> The Toronto Centre had four sections. The administrative section provided for the needs of the individual recruit and consisted of the Main Orderly Room with the OC, adjutant, paymaster and clerks as well as quartermaster stores and an attestation room with six clerks. Another section was responsible for medical examinations and consisted of thirteen 'boards', each with a medical officer and an orderly. Lastly, there was a special duties section headed by the

sergeant-major and a general duties section staffed with eight soldiers that looked after routine fatigues.<sup>144</sup>

In essence, recruiting was the means by which the CEF tapped the national manpower pool. The extent to which this pool could be utilized, however, depended not only the size of the pool but on the number of men who met the criteria for military service. These standards varied throughout the war and both the changes and the effect on recruiting form the principal themes of Chapter 4.

<sup>1</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1847 File GAQ 11-58. Figures were compiled by J. Scanlon of the Historical Section 28 July 1927

<sup>2</sup> LAC RG 9 II A2 Vol 33 'Minutes of the Militia Council 1916', p.45 with decisions from meeting of 6 April 1916.

<sup>3</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1396 File 593-6-2 Vol 6, OC 2<sup>nd</sup> Division to Militia HQ 2 August 1915. Currie, the peacetime commander of a militia regiment, the 48<sup>th</sup> Highlanders, had previously commanded the 15<sup>th</sup> Battalion until he was allowed to resign in May 1915 after the Second Battle of Ypres under somewhat cloudy circumstances that suggest he fled the scene of the battle. No doubt Logie, a long-time militia officer from Hamilton, was aware of the allegations.

<sup>4</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1396 File 593-6-2 Vol 6, AG to OC 2<sup>nd</sup> Division 5 August 1915

<sup>5</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1398 File 593-6-2 Vol 9, DOC MD 13 to AG 8 November 1915 recommending that Belcher should not be appointed to command the 138<sup>th</sup>, AG to DOC MD 13 18 November 1915 advising that the Minister had approved Belcher's appointment

<sup>6</sup> Duguid. Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-1919, Chronology, Appendices and Maps. p.11 notes that the overseas division and mounted brigade required 24,352 all ranks with an additional 20% for future reinforcements.

<sup>7</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1810 File GAQ 1-4, 'Notes re Pre War Mobilization Scheme for raising of a Canadian Division'. The 5<sup>th</sup> Regiment contribution would have served with a composite infantry battalion since the Canadian establishment called for eight companies in each battalion; LAC RG 24 Vol 4536 File 3-1-143, AG to OC 6<sup>th</sup> Division 11 August 1914 notes that battalions were to be mobilized on an eight company basis; Duguid. Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-1919, Chronology, Appendices and Maps. p.11-13; Duguid notes on p.11 that the proposed overseas division and mounted brigade together with a 20% increment for future reinforcements required 24,352 officers and men.

<sup>8</sup> LAC MG 30 E44 Loring Cheney Christie Fonds, Vol 2, pp.1165-1167; Mobilization Regulations 1913. pp.9, 18, 22

<sup>9</sup> AG Circular Letter 31 July 1914 quoted in Duguid. Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-1919, Chronology, Appendices and Maps. pp.10-11; Haycock. Sam Hughes: The Public Career of a Controversial Canadian 1885-1916. p.182; Harris. Canadian Brass. p.95 suggests that Valcartier was selected to benefit two of Hughes's friends, Sir William Mackenzie and Donald Mann who owned the only railway link to the camp

<sup>10</sup> In comparison to the 1911 mobilization scheme, the First Contingent had an additional infantry brigade but only two cavalry regiments. On arrival in England, one of the infantry brigades became the Canadian Training Depot for the purpose of providing reinforcements while the mounted brigade was brought up to strength with a British unit, 2<sup>nd</sup> King Edward's Horse.

<sup>11</sup> Cook, Tim. At the Sharp End: Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1914-1916: Volume One. (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007) p.37. The removal of the AG to Valcartier probably added to the confusion at the unit level since the chief personnel officer for the Militia was no longer at the national HQ.

<sup>12</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1221 File 593-1-5, OC 1<sup>st</sup> Division to Militia HQ 8 August 1914

<sup>13</sup> LAC RG 4536 File 3-1-143, OC 36<sup>th</sup> Light Horse to AAG 6<sup>th</sup> Division 11 August 1914

<sup>14</sup> Brown, Colonel J. Sutherland. 'Military Policy of Canada, 1905-1924 and Suggestions for the Future' in Canadian Defence Quarterly Vol 1 Number 4 (July 1924) p.27; Brown, Atholl Sutherland. Buster: A Canadian Patriot and Imperialist, The Life and Times of Brigadier James Sutherland Brown. (Waterloo, Ontario: Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies, 2004) p.51 notes that Brown was employed as the AAG & QMG of the 1<sup>st</sup> Division

<sup>15</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1221 File 593-1-5, AG to Lieutenant-Colonel A.R. Lavergne of Québec 7 August 1914 refusing a request for funding; LAC 24 Vol 4536 File 3-1-143, Major F.T. McKean of Saint John, New Brunswick to AAG 6<sup>th</sup> Division 14 August 1914 with an unsuccessful bid for funds; Chatham Daily Planet 7 August 1914 p.1

<sup>16</sup> LAC RG 9 II F9 Vol 30, File '28<sup>th</sup> Regiment' pay sheets 12-23 August 1914. The Regiment called out a total of thirteen members.

<sup>17</sup> LAC RG 9 II F9 Vol 30, File '29<sup>th</sup> Regiment Headquarters August 1914 to December 1914' pay sheets 6-22 August 1914; LAC RG 9 II F9 Vol 29 File '25<sup>th</sup> Regiment Details October 1914 to August 1915' Despite the title, the file contains pay sheets 7-22 August 1914

<sup>18</sup> LAC RG 9 II F9 Vol 1535 File 'CASC No 14 Company' pay sheet 12-21 August 1914

<sup>19</sup> LAC RG 9 II F9 Vol 224 File 'MD 2 - 23<sup>rd</sup> Regiment Aug 1914-July 1915' pay sheets 12-20 August 1914

<sup>20</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4536 File 3-10143, 73<sup>rd</sup> Regiment to AAG 6<sup>th</sup> Division 17 August 1914 noting that volunteers could not be outfitted because the armouries were closed and reply 17 August 1914 instructing the 73<sup>rd</sup> to return one officer to each company armoury

<sup>21</sup> Newman, Stephen K. With the Patricia's in Flanders 1914-1918: Then & Now. (Saanichton, British Columbia: Bellewaerde House Publishing, 2000) pp.2-5. Captain (Ret) Newman was formerly the PPCLI Regimental Adjutant.

<sup>22</sup> Duguid. Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-1919, General Series Volume I p.425

<sup>23</sup> Duguid. Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-1919, General Series Volume I, p.161

<sup>24</sup> LAC RG 9 III D3 Vol 4926 Reel T-10722, War Diary 19<sup>th</sup> Battalion; Diary entry 6 November 1914; LAC RG 9 II B5 Vol 5 File 'CEF: 18<sup>th</sup>, 19<sup>th</sup>-22<sup>nd</sup>, 24<sup>th</sup>-27<sup>th</sup> Bns' 'Examination - Board of Officers. Canadian Expeditionary Forces. Report on 20<sup>th</sup> Batt' 29 January 1915

<sup>25</sup> Tascona, Bruce. From the Forks to Flanders Fields: The Story of the 27<sup>th</sup> City of Winnipeg Battalion, 1914-1919. (Winnipeg: Bunker to Bunker Books, 1995) p.10; Calder, Major D.G. Scott. The History of the 28<sup>th</sup> (Northwest) Battalion CEF (October 1914 - June 1919). (Regina: np, 1961) pp.16-17; LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 52 File 8-7-1A, OC 32<sup>nd</sup> Battalion to GOC Canadians 23 March 1915

<sup>26</sup> Bernier, Serge. The Royal 22e Regiment 1914-1999. (Montréal: Art Global, 2000) p.31. The PF barracks had been vacated when the RCD were sent to England with the First Contingent.

<sup>27</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4593 File 20-10 Vol 10, AAG i/c Administration to 79<sup>th</sup>, 90<sup>th</sup>, 100<sup>th</sup> and 106<sup>th</sup> Regiments 24 October 1914. The 106<sup>th</sup> had to provide two signallers but only one cook and two buglers. Tuxedo Barracks, located on Tuxedo Boulevard, was the former Manitoba Agricultural College and was later renamed Fort Osborne Barracks. My family occupied married quarters in Fort Osborne Barracks 1957-59. Some of the buildings occupied by the 27<sup>th</sup> and 28<sup>th</sup> Battalions were still in use by the Canadian Army at that time.

<sup>28</sup> Hunt, Captain M.S. Nova Scotia's Part in the Great War. (Halifax: The Nova Scotia Veteran Publishing Co. Limited, 1920) p.71. The 63<sup>rd</sup>, 66<sup>th</sup> and 94<sup>th</sup> Regiments were fully occupied with home defence duties. The remaining six militia infantry regiments in the province were rural units with detachments in forty-two communities. It is likely that none of them were capable of recruiting drafts for CEF units. The 25<sup>th</sup> Battalion opened recruiting stations in Sydney, Amherst, New Glasgow, Truro and Yarmouth; McGowan, S. Douglas. New Brunswick's Fighting 26<sup>th</sup>. (Saint John, New Brunswick: Neptune Publishing Co., 1994) p.5 notes battalion recruiting offices in various communities, all of which had militia units; Saint John (HQ 62<sup>nd</sup> Regiment), Chatham (HQ 73<sup>rd</sup> Regiment), Fredericton (HQ 71<sup>st</sup> Regiment), Charlottetown (HQ 82<sup>nd</sup> Regiment), Newcastle (B Company of 73<sup>rd</sup>), Campbellton (F Company of 73<sup>rd</sup>) and Moncton (D and H Companies of 74<sup>th</sup>). There is no evidence that the militia units were involved as such in recruiting for the 26<sup>th</sup>.

<sup>29</sup> Attestation papers of men enlisted in Edmonton for the 31<sup>st</sup> Battalion were signed off by Major Hewgill, who also raised a draft for the 23<sup>rd</sup> Battalion; Edmonton Daily Bulletin 3 November 1914, p.1; 4 November 1914, pp.4, 8, 10; Quarterly Militia List Corrected to 1<sup>st</sup> July 1914 lists Major Hewgill with the 'Reserve of Officers' for the 16<sup>th</sup> Light Horse; Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Canadian Expeditionary Force: 31<sup>st</sup> Battalion, Nominal Roll of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. (Issued with Militia Orders 1915) p.2 shows that Hewgill was taken on strength of the 31<sup>st</sup> Battalion on 16 November 1914.

<sup>30</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1398 File 593-6-2 Vol 9, Hughes to AG 14 November 1915 directed that Morfitt be selected to raise a battalion in Calgary. Most of the attestation forms for Calgary men recruited for the 31<sup>st</sup>, 56<sup>th</sup> and 63<sup>rd</sup> Battalions were approved by Captain Morfitt.

<sup>31</sup> Lethbridge Daily Herald 11 November 1914, p.1; Medicine Hat News 19 November 1914 refers to Orr, but not to Oakes; Attestation papers for 31<sup>st</sup> Battalion recruits in Lethbridge and Medicine Hat were approved by the officers concerned.

<sup>32</sup> LAC RG 9 II F6 Vol 68, pay sheets 'Recruiting 2<sup>nd</sup> Overseas Expeditionary Force 22 October-4 November 1914'; Stratford Daily Herald 23 October 1914 p.1

<sup>33</sup> LAC RG 9 II F9 Vol 29 File '24<sup>th</sup> Regt Details August 1914 to October 1914' paysheets for CO, Adjutant and three sergeants 22 October-4 November 1914; LAC RG 9 II F9 Vol 30 File '29<sup>th</sup> Regiment Headquarters August 1914 to December 1914' paysheets for 21 October-4 November 1914 with CO, MO,

Orderly Room Sergeant and two privates; RG 9 II F9 Vol 31 File '33rd Regiment August 1914 to October 1916' paysheets for CO, one major and one private at Clinton 23 October-4 November 1914, Despite the title, this file also contains pay sheets for 27<sup>th</sup> Regiment detachment of five at Sarnia 22 October-4 November 1914

<sup>34</sup> LAC RG 9 II F9 Vol 30 File '30<sup>th</sup> Regiment August 1914 to December 1914' paysheets 24 October-3 November 1914 for Fergus (CO and one clerk) and Guelph (Adjutant, MO and Orderly Room Sergeant)

<sup>35</sup> LAC RG 9 II F9 Vol 224 Files 'MD 2 - 23<sup>rd</sup> Regiment Aug 1914-July 1915' paysheets for unit staff and recruits for varying periods 27 October-4 November 1914 and 'MD 2 - 34<sup>th</sup> Regiment Aug 1914-April 1915' paysheets for CO, MO, one captain and one sergeant 26 October-9 November 1914; RG 9 II F9 Vol 31 Files '32<sup>nd</sup> Regiment September 1914 to June 1917' paysheets for CO, MO and one private for varying periods 26 October-3 November 1914 and File '47<sup>th</sup> Regiment October 1915 to November 1915' Despite the title, the file contains a paysheet for Captain Tronsdale of D Company, Napanee 1-31 October 1914.

<sup>36</sup> LAC RG 9 II F9 Vol 1535 File 'MD 13 - CASC No 14 Company April 1914-July 1915' paysheets 30 November-3 December 1914

<sup>37</sup> Duguid. Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-1919, Chronology, Appendices and Maps. pp.344-345, 'Note on 22<sup>nd</sup> Battalion CEF'; Canada, Department of Militia and Defence.

Canadian Expeditionary Force: 23<sup>rd</sup> Battalion: Nominal Roll of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. (Issued with Militia Orders 1915); Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Canadian Expeditionary Force: 24<sup>th</sup> Battalion: Nominal Roll of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.

(Issued with Militia Orders 1915); A total of 135 men with the 23<sup>rd</sup> Battalion were enlisted in Calgary or Edmonton, the remainder were enlisted in the Province of Québec. In the 24<sup>th</sup> Battalion, one platoon was enlisted in Lindsay, Ontario while the rest of the battalion enlisted in Québec. Reinforcements from MD 10 and 11, therefore, must have been militiamen when they travelled to Montréal for attestation.

<sup>38</sup> Hunt. Nova Scotia's Part in the Great War. p.41 notes that the 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> CFA Brigades (Militia) forwarded recruits for the 23<sup>rd</sup> and 24<sup>th</sup> Batteries (CEF) in Fredericton. There was no prewar militia battery in Fredericton and the city was probably selected as a mobilization point because the PF barracks had been vacated when the RCR were sent to Bermuda in September 1914.

<sup>39</sup> Quarterly Militia List...corrected to 1<sup>st</sup> July 1916. pp.191-210 shows location and date of establishment of each militia battery; Strictly speaking, the 13<sup>th</sup> and 38<sup>th</sup> Batteries were located in Winnipeg, with the 36<sup>th</sup> housed on the other side of the Red River in St Boniface (now known as Saint Boniface). Nicholson. The Gunners of Canada: Volume I. pp.236-238; Duguid. Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-1919, Chronology, Appendices and Maps. p.373 lists date and place of mobilization for each battery in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Divisional Artillery.

<sup>40</sup> Carr, Lieutenant-Colonel N.O. 'The Man Behind the Gun' in Canadian Defence Quarterly Vol VIII Number 3 (April 1931) p.374. Carr claimed that the battery's outstanding maintenance record was entirely due to CPR artificers. The author was a PF artillery officer who changed his name from Reiffenstein to Carr after the war broke out.

<sup>41</sup> Toronto Globe 8 August 1914 p.7 reported the initial offer from General Electric; LAC RG 24 Vol 4331 File 34-1-14, OA RCE Ottawa to CRCE 2<sup>nd</sup> Division 7 September 1914; GOC 2<sup>nd</sup> Division to Militia HQ 16 September 1914 explains that two men did not meet enrollment standards but were sent to Halifax regardless. The file contains correspondence up to February 1916 regarding the replacement of GE workers who were discharged or joined the CEF

<sup>42</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1166 File 64-82-1 Vol 3, 'Report of the Annual Inspection 1915 -Field Butchery - Toronto' 1 March 1915 commented on the technical skills of the NCOs; Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Canadian Expeditionary Force: Field Bakery and Field Butchery C.A.S.C.: Nominal Roll of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. (Issued with Militia Orders 1915); Collins, Major G.R.N. Military Organization and Administration. (London: Hugh Rees Ltd., 1918) p.214 for a short explanation on the function of a Field Butchery; Canadian Militia War Establishments (Provisional) 1914. p.94 notes that a field butchery consisted of one officer and twenty men divided into three butchery squads capable of killing and dressing sufficient meat for one division each day.

<sup>43</sup> LAC RG 9 III D3 Vol 5021 File 784 Reel T-10906 'War Diary Number 6 Depot Unit of Supply' 3 December 1914 and 20 January 1915.

<sup>44</sup> LAC RG 9 II F9 Vol 551 Files 'MD 3 Governor General's Foot Guards Nov 1914-Jan 1916' and MD 3 Governor General's Foot Guards June 1915 - July 1915' with GGFG Regimental Order Number 15 of 11



June 1915 with a nominal roll of forty-three men under the heading 'The following men enlisted for Overseas Service were transferred to 59<sup>th</sup> Battn CEF, Barriefield [Kingston], on 8<sup>th</sup> June 1915'. Pay lists are stamped 'GGFG (Recruits CEF)'.

<sup>45</sup> LAC RG 9 II F9 Vol 224 File 'MD 2 - 31<sup>st</sup> Regiment Overseas Contingent Sept 1914' with pay list '31<sup>st</sup> Regt quota of 37<sup>th</sup> Provisional Bn Feb 1915', and File 'MD 2 - 31<sup>st</sup> Regiment Apr 1915-June 1915' with pay lists of men recruited for the 37<sup>th</sup> and 58<sup>th</sup> Battalions.

<sup>46</sup> LAC RG 9 II F9 Vol 563, Data taken from pay lists in files '56<sup>th</sup> Regiment (A & E Company) MD 3 Daily Orders March-December 1915', '57<sup>th</sup> Regiment Overseas Detachment MD 3 Daily Orders Aug 1914-Aug 1915' and '57<sup>th</sup> Regiment Overseas Detachment MD 3 Daily Orders Sept 1915-April 1917'. The latter file contains a note that HQ MD 3 had instructed that all recruits for the 80<sup>th</sup> Battalion would be transferred as soon as enlisted. The file also contains 57<sup>th</sup> Regiment Daily Orders for September 1915 showing men sent to the 80<sup>th</sup>.

<sup>47</sup> Toronto Star 5 August 1915 p.2

<sup>48</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1397 File 593-6-2 Vol 8, OC 2<sup>nd</sup> Division to Militia HQ 27 September 1915

<sup>49</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4552 File 125-1-13, OC Depot Company 55<sup>th</sup> Battalion to AAG 6<sup>th</sup> Division 31 July 1915

<sup>50</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4552 File 125-1-23, GOC 6<sup>th</sup> Division to Militia HQ 20 July 1915 pointed out that between 19 June and 3 July 1915, Lieutenant-Colonel J.D. McRae, for example, received \$132 for pay and expenses, but failed to secure any recruits. It is perhaps significant that permission was required from Militia HQ to relieve recruiting officers. AG to GOC 6<sup>th</sup> Division 28 July 1915 approved firing all but four officers employed on recruiting duties.

<sup>51</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4552 File 125-1-13, Provincial Recruiting Officer to AAG 6<sup>th</sup> Division 12 August 1915

<sup>52</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4552 File 125-1-13, Lieutenant-Colonel Armstrong to AAG 6<sup>th</sup> Division 12 August 1915, Armstrong to AAG 6<sup>th</sup> Division 17 August 1915

<sup>53</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4552 File 125-1-13, Lieutenant-Colonel Armstrong to AAG 6<sup>th</sup> Division 14 August 1915.

<sup>54</sup> LAC RG 9 II F9 Vol 30, Pay sheets 'Recruiting for CEF July 2, 1915 - July 27, 1915' and 'Recruiting for CEF August 6, 1915 - August 30, 1915'; Stratford Daily Beacon 4 September 1915 p.1; LAC RG 9 II F9 Vol 30, Pay sheets 'Recruiting Men for 71<sup>st</sup> Battalion' 23 September-9 November 1915 and 2-21 September 1915

<sup>55</sup> RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Vols 7487 (H Orr), 7393 (HK Oakes) and 9318 (JW Stewart).

<sup>56</sup> Quarterly Militia List Corrected to 1<sup>st</sup> July 1916 pp. 262, 288, 317 and 409

<sup>57</sup> DHH KE 6848 A329 C309 Minutes of the Militia Council 1916 p.196 10 August 1916.

<sup>58</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1396 File 593-6-2 Vol 4, AG to Minister of Militia and Defence 28 June 1915 recommended that Logie's earlier request (not on file) should be granted. A marginal note says 'Yes. SH'; Toronto Star 21 August 1915 p.5

<sup>59</sup> Militia Order 161 of 29 March 1915

<sup>60</sup> Nicholson. Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919. p.216

<sup>61</sup> Canada, War Purchasing Commission. Report of the War Purchasing Commission: Vol 2, Minutes from Minute No. 1, May 4 1915 to Minute No 6616, April 28, 1916. (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1916) pp.603-605, QMG to War Purchasing Commission 19 April 1916 referred to Borden's announcement of an additional 250,000 men for the CEF

<sup>62</sup> DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 5 Folder 20 File 'Statistics'. Wastage is not confined to battle casualties but includes losses from all causes.

<sup>63</sup> Nicholson. Canadian Expeditionary Force. p.546

<sup>64</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4508 File 17-1-49 Vol VI, AG to GOC MD 5 31 August 1916 enclosing a copy of PC 10944 of 16 August 1916 allowing the Governor in Council to appoint a director of recruiting in each district; TNA CO 42/994 contains a copy of PC 2688 of 23 September 1916 concerning the same issue.

<sup>65</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 858 File 54-21-12-33, GOC MD 2 to Militia HQ 26 September 1916 referring to an earlier proposal of 9 August 1916 which was not retained in the file.

<sup>66</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 858 File 54-21-12-33, AAG(1) to AG 8 September 1916 outlining the scheme. District returns commented on an AG circular letter of 21 September 1916 but no copy of this letter has been found.

<sup>67</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 858 File 54-21-13-33, AG to Parliamentary Secretary 30 October 1916 comments that only MD 1, 2, 10 and 11 were in favor; GOC MD 3 to Militia HQ 25 September 1916 and 13 October 1916 recommended compulsory callout under the Militia Act, GOC MD 4 to Militia HQ 10 October 1916 noted

- that existing units were short 3,570 men and went on to recommend conscription or some form of compulsory service. The file ends 30 October 1916 and it appears no further action was taken.
- <sup>68</sup> RG 24 Vol 4552 File 125-1-23, AG Circular Letter 1 October 1915 saying, in part, "Officers Commanding Divisions or Districts will, however, be responsible for seeing that no Unit in their Command takes steps for recruiting in another Division or District before the Officer Commanding such other Division or District has been furnished with information to this effect."
- <sup>69</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 6600 File 1982-1-24 Vol 1, Director of Mobilization to AG 27 December 1916 commenting on Hughes's favored infantry battalions and AG circular telegram 8 March 1916.
- <sup>70</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 6600 File 1982-1-24 Vol 1, DOC MD 11 to Militia HQ 6 December 1916
- <sup>71</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 6600 File 1982-1-24 Vol 1, GOC MD 2 to Militia HQ 5 December 1916
- <sup>72</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 6600 File 1982-1-24 Vol 1, Nova Scotia Recruiting Association to OC 6<sup>th</sup> Division 30 October 1916, GOC MD 6 to Militia HQ 1 November 1916 saying in part "...I am in sympathy with the stand taken by this Association."
- <sup>73</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 6600 File 1982-1-24 Vol 1, Union of Alberta Municipalities to Sir Robert L. Borden 9 November 1916
- <sup>74</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 6600 File 1982-1-24 Vol 1, AG Circular Telegram 2 January 1917 directing that the 174<sup>th</sup>, 197<sup>th</sup>, 223<sup>rd</sup>, 236<sup>th</sup>, 244<sup>th</sup> and 253<sup>rd</sup> Battalions confine recruiting to their own district after 15 February 1917; LAC RG 9 II A2 Vol 33 'Minutes of the Militia Council 1916', p.439 with decisions of 27 December 1916. Six battalions (174<sup>th</sup>, 197<sup>th</sup>, 223<sup>rd</sup>, 236<sup>th</sup>, 244<sup>th</sup> and 243<sup>rd</sup>) lost the right to recruit outside of their district.
- <sup>75</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1402 File 593-6-2 Vol 21, Captain G.S. Balfour, i/c Recruiting Detachment to OC 199<sup>th</sup> Battalion Irish-Canadian Rangers 30 October 1916
- <sup>76</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1397 File 593-6-2 Vol 7, AG to Director of Mobilization 20 October 1915 saying that Hughes had authorized a battalion in Victoria to be known as the 88<sup>th</sup> and that the 88<sup>th</sup> (New Brunswick) Battalion would have to be renumbered, AG to OC 6<sup>th</sup> Division 20 October 1915 saying that the 88<sup>th</sup> Battalion would now be known as the 104<sup>th</sup> Battalion.
- <sup>77</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1397 File 593-6-2 Vol 8, AG to 2<sup>nd</sup> Division 6 November 1915 directing that a battalion be raised in Sault Ste Marie and asking the District Commander to recommend a suitable CO; LAC RG 24 Vol 1398 File 593-6-2 Vol 9, Hughes to AG 27 November 1915 directing the 119<sup>th</sup> and 134<sup>th</sup> Battalions be amalgamated with the title of 119<sup>th</sup>, the appointment of W.R. Smyth and adding that the number '134' should be used elsewhere; LAC RG 9 III D1 Vol 4700 Folder 70 File 20 '119<sup>th</sup> Battalion', 'Provisional Major' Smyth was the recruiting officer and the first recruiting meeting was held in Sault Ste Marie 27 December 1915. Smyth was a fifty-eight year old lumberman and former member of a Volunteer unit in Scotland. He formally joined the CEF in June 1916, when he became the CO of the 238<sup>th</sup> (Forestry) Battalion.
- <sup>78</sup> LAC RG 9 III D1 Vol 4700 Folder 72 File 12, '134<sup>th</sup> Battalion Historical Records' completed 8 January 1917 noting that the battalion had been authorized 4 December 1915
- <sup>79</sup> LAC RG 9 III D1 Vol 4700 Folder 71 File 6, '122<sup>nd</sup> Battalion' with historical summary produced 3 July 1917 by the CO, Lieutenant-Colonel D.M. Grant; Quarterly Militia List corrected to 1<sup>st</sup> July 1916, p.197; LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 3726 personnel file Lieutenant-Colonel D.M. Grant, Box 7015 personnel file Lieutenant-Colonel D.H. MacLaren
- <sup>80</sup> University of Western Ontario Area Research and Collections Centre Box 5100, Divisional Orders issued by Colonel L.W. Shannon, Administering the 1<sup>st</sup> Divisional Area 27 November 1915 quoting instructions from Militia HQ.
- <sup>81</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1583 File 683-239-5, 'Report of the Annual Inspection 1916 of the 151<sup>st</sup> Overseas Battalion CEF, Sarcee Camp 23 September 1916
- <sup>82</sup> LAC RG 9 III D1 Vol 4700 Folder 70 File 20 '119<sup>th</sup> Battalion', Historical summary prepared by Lieutenant-Colonel T.P.T. Rowland 16 May 1917.
- <sup>83</sup> LAC RG 9 III D1 Vol 4700 Folder 72 File 14 '135<sup>th</sup> Battalion', Canadian War Records Office questionnaire complete by Captain J.H.C. Woodward 21 March 1917.
- <sup>84</sup> Nicholson. Canadian Expeditionary Force, p.547.
- <sup>85</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1401 File 593-6-2 Vol 19, GOC MD 3 to Militia HQ 22 August 1916 outlining his proposal which based on the premise that areas with an approximate population of 80,000 should constitute a battalion area, AG to GOC MD 3 30 September 1916 rejecting the proposal and suggesting that a base battalion could be formed to help fill existing infantry battalions which were all under strength.

<sup>86</sup> LAC RG 9 III D1 Vol 4700 Folder 71 File 8 (123<sup>rd</sup> Battalion) and Folder 71 File 11 (124<sup>th</sup> Battalion; Toronto Globe 1 March 1916 p.8 noted that five battalions were recruiting in the city; Morton. When Your Number's Up: The Canadian Soldier in the Great War. p.59

<sup>87</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 6600 File 1982-1-24 Vol 1, GOC MD 2 to Militia HQ 5 December 1916

<sup>88</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4670 File 99-4-7 Vol 3, AAG i/c Administration to Militia HQ 30 August 1916.

<sup>89</sup> DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 13 Folders 143, 158, 172, 211, 218 and 231

<sup>90</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4508 File 17-1-49 Vol III, OC 5<sup>th</sup> Division to Militia HQ 16 November 1915 lists six officers recruiting in Eastern Québec. Judging by the surnames, five were French-Canadian. Three of the officers, Lieutenants PJC de Gruchy, Lévi Bourassa and E. Jalbert did not serve in the CEF. Major P.A. Piuze of the 20<sup>th</sup> (Québec) Battery joined the CEF in September 1916 while his brother, Captain Azarie Piuze of the 89<sup>th</sup> Temiscouta and Rimouski Regiment was attested in the CEF in April 1918. The last, Captain Abel Whitehead of the 7<sup>th</sup> Hussars in Bury, joined the 117<sup>th</sup> Eastern Townships Battalion in September 1916; LAC RG 24 Vol 4509 File 17-1-49 Vol XV, GOC MD 5 to Militia HQ 18 January 1917 outlines the history of recruiting in the District from 1915 onwards.

<sup>91</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4509 File 17-1-49 Vol XV, GOC MD 5 to Militia HQ 18 January 1917

<sup>92</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4509 File 17-1-49 Vol VIII, GOC MD 5 to Militia HQ 22 September 1916 and GOC MD 5 to Militia HQ 11 November 1916 outline Fages's intent and the final results.

<sup>93</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1398 File 593-6-2 Vol 11, DOC MD 13 to Militia HQ 26 January 1916, AG to Minister 28 January 1916 asking if the 191<sup>st</sup> and 192<sup>nd</sup> should be allowed to recruit and undated minute by Hughes saying 'Go ahead.', AG to DOC MD 13 3 February 1916 directing the 191<sup>st</sup> and 192<sup>nd</sup> to continue recruiting.

<sup>94</sup> DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 12 Folder 113, Box 13 Folders 191 and 192; Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Canadian Expeditionary Force: 191<sup>st</sup> Battalion 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Reinforcing Drafts, Nominal Roll of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. (Issued with Militia Orders 1917)

<sup>95</sup> LAC RG 9 III D1 Vol 4700 Folder 72 File 14, Canadian War Records Office questionnaire completed 21 March 1917 by the former adjutant of the 135<sup>th</sup> Battalion; Canada, Dominion Bureau of Canada. Fifth Census of Canada 1911: Areas and Population by Provinces, Districts and Subdistricts. (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1912) pp.80-81

<sup>96</sup> Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Canadian Expeditionary Force: 135<sup>th</sup> Battalion, Nominal Roll of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. (Issued with Militia Orders 1917)

<sup>97</sup> DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 13 Folder 142; Canada, Department of Militia and Defence.

Canadian Expeditionary Force: 142<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, Nominal Roll of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. (Issued with Militia Orders 1917)

<sup>98</sup> Nicholson. Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919. p.546

<sup>99</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1402 File 593-6-2 Vol 21, HOC MD 3 to Militia HQ 26 August 1916

<sup>100</sup> London Free Press 22 May 1916 p2; St Marys Argus 20 July 1916 p.1

<sup>101</sup> Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Canadian Expeditionary Force: 110<sup>th</sup> Battalion: Nominal Roll of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. (Issued with Militia Orders 1915). Despite the publication date, the embarkation roll is dated 31 October 1916 ; LAC RG 9 II B10 Vol 22, '110<sup>th</sup> Battalion Canadian Roll' with weekly returns of recruits 26 November 1915 to 29 October 1916.

<sup>102</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4680 File 18-29-2 'Historical Record of the 232<sup>nd</sup> Overseas Battalion CEF'

<sup>103</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4680 File 18-29-2 'Historical Record of the 232<sup>nd</sup> Overseas Battalion CEF'

The 232<sup>nd</sup> was based in North Battleford but had outlying detachments in Saskatoon, Rosetown, Wilkie, Kerrobert and Kindersley; DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 13 Folder 232; Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Canadian Expeditionary Force: 232<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, Nominal Roll of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. (Issued with Militia Orders 1917)

<sup>104</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 413 File 54-21-1-20 Vol 1, draft 'Statement by Department of Militia and Defence From 1<sup>st</sup> February to 31<sup>st</sup> December 1916' signed by CGS 1 December 1916

<sup>105</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1402 File 593-6-2 Vol 21, AG to DOC MD 10 29 November 1916 after reviewing a proposal to raise a battalion in Selkirk, Manitoba.

<sup>106</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1402 File 593-6-2 Vol 22, DG Mobilization to CGS 30 December 1916

<sup>107</sup> Turner was promoted to Lieutenant-General in June 1917 and later became CGS for OMFC.

<sup>108</sup> LAC MG 27 II D9 (Albert Edward Kemp Fonds) Vol 73 File 68, Summary of memorandums from Gwatkin and Turner compiled by the Parliamentary Secretary 15 January 1917. The original correspondence from Gwatkin and Turner has not been found.

- <sup>109</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 413 File 54-21-1-20 Vol 1, draft 'Statement by Department of Militia and Defence From 1<sup>st</sup> February to 31<sup>st</sup> December 1916' signed by CGS 1 December 1916
- <sup>110</sup> LAC MG 27 II D9 (Albert Edward Kemp Fonds) Vol 73, Colonel H. Osborne to A. Claude Macdonnell M.P. 18 January 1917
- <sup>111</sup> RG 24 Vol 1819 File GAQ 4-124, Edwin Pye to DHS 3 December 1940
- <sup>112</sup> Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Canadian Expeditionary Force: 66<sup>th</sup> Regiment Reinforcing Draft: Nominal Roll of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men Issued with Militia Orders 1918 and Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Canadian Expeditionary Force: 63<sup>rd</sup> Regiment 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Reinforcing Drafts: Nominal Roll of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men Issued with Militia Orders 1918. The 66<sup>th</sup> Regiment draft sailed 22 January 1916 and the 63<sup>rd</sup> drafts sailed 22 January 1916, 26 February 1916 and 15 July 1916; Hunt Nova Scotia's Part in the Great War. p.261 discusses the 66<sup>th</sup> Regiment draft with dates and strength.
- <sup>113</sup> DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 4 Folder 13 File 'CDF', CGS to AG 15 January 1917
- <sup>114</sup> DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 4 Folder 13 File 'CDF', AG Circular Letter 18 January 1917.
- <sup>115</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1403 File 593-6-2 Vol 21, AG to GOC MD 3 5 February 1917. The 43<sup>rd</sup> was given permission to "...form a regimental depot for the purpose of raising and training drafts."
- <sup>116</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4257 File 6-14-10, AAG MD 1 to OC 32<sup>nd</sup> Regiment 28 February 1917 referring to a resolution passed by the officers of the 32<sup>nd</sup> Regiment, OC MD 1 to Militia HQ 30 March 1917 asking for approval and AG to OC MD 1 4 April 1917 granting authority.
- <sup>117</sup> Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Canadian Expeditionary Force: 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment 1<sup>st</sup> Reinforcing Draft: Nominal Roll of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. Issued with Militia Orders 1917. The draft sailed from Halifax 2 June 1917; LAC RG 24 Vol 336 File 33-2-117, OC MD 1 to Militia HQ 15 May 1917, OC MD 1 to Militia HQ 10 July 1917 reporting that drafts from the 7<sup>th</sup>, 21<sup>st</sup>, 22<sup>nd</sup>, 25<sup>th</sup>, 32<sup>nd</sup> and 108<sup>th</sup> Regiments were training in London.
- <sup>118</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 336 File 33-2-117, AG to DOC MD 1 23 August 1917
- <sup>119</sup> TNA CO 42/1004, War Office to Under Secretary of State for the Colonies 9 May 1917
- <sup>120</sup> LAC MG 27 II D9 (Albert Edward Kemp Fonds) Vol 73, Colonel S.C. Mewburn to Kemp 6 March 1917.
- <sup>121</sup> LAC R 24 Vol 5872 File 7-55-23, OC 53<sup>rd</sup> Regiment to GOC MD 4 30 March 1917
- <sup>122</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1403 file 593-6-2 Vol 25, OC 174<sup>th</sup> Battalion to DG Mobilization nd but late March 1917
- <sup>123</sup> Archives of Ontario Sydney Chilton Mewburn Fonds, Ms 798 Reel 1, Series 1, Kemp to Mewburn 8 March 1917
- <sup>124</sup> DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 4 Folder 13 File 'CDF', summary prepared by Edwin Pye 25 March 1943
- <sup>125</sup> 48<sup>th</sup> Highlanders of Canada Regimental Museum Box 'CDF', R.E. Haldenby to Mr. White 17 June 1917, 48<sup>th</sup> Highlanders 'Semi-Monthly Statement of Strength of Canadian Expeditionary Force' 30 June 1917, the box also contains forms for unsuccessful applicants such as Harry Brennan.
- <sup>126</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4547 file 78-1-1, AG circular letter 22 May 1917; 48<sup>th</sup> Highlanders Regimental Museum Box 'CDF', Daily Orders Part II Number 83 of 12 August 1917 noted that 287 men with the CEF Company had been posted to 1<sup>st</sup> Depot Battalion of the 1<sup>st</sup> Central Ontario Regiment as instructed by HQ MD 2 on 2 August 1917; Depot battalions were authorized by General Order Number 89 of 1 September 1917, but had been formed some weeks before.
- <sup>127</sup> LAC MG 27 II D9 (Albert Edward Kemp Fonds) Vol 116 File 6, GOC MD 11 to Militia HQ 5 July 1917 reporting that 95% of the recruits for June 1917 had been found by the British Canadian Recruiting Mission
- <sup>128</sup> Toronto Star 20 July 1915 p.2
- <sup>129</sup> 48<sup>th</sup> Highlanders Regimental Museum Box 'CDF' contains the regimental forms for 203 men who were rejected between May 1915 and June 1917. The forms were originated by unit recruiters and subsequently annotated by officers from the Toronto Recruiting Depot. The dates suggest the form was first used by unit recruiting parties prior to the opening of the Toronto Recruiting Depot. Several of the forms have the written consent of wives or parents attached.
- <sup>130</sup> Hamilton Spectator 6 August 1915 pp. 1 and 14
- <sup>131</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4425 File 26-5-64-2 Vol 1, GOC MD 3 to Militia HQ 1 June 1917 noted that Miss Thoburn had been working at the Ottawa Base Recruiting Office since August 1915. The general comment

regarding staff is taken from scattered correspondence in RG 24 Vol 4425 Files 26-5-64-2 Vols 1-3. In May 1917, Miss Thoburn complained that her pay had been reduced to \$1.70 a day, but with a reduction in staff, she was now doing jobs formerly done by sergeants. Since she was now doing the work of a sergeant, Miss Thoburn felt she deserved the same rate of pay.

<sup>132</sup> LAC RG 9 II F9 Vol 39 File 'Recruiting March 1916 to November 1916'. Pay lists exist for the London Recruiting Depot 1 October 1915 to 30 November 1916, the Windsor Recruiting Officer for September 1916 and the Windsor Mobilization Centre 1 October 1916 to 31 October 1917; LAC RG 9 II F9 Vol 39 File 'Recruiting March 1916 to November 1916' contains pay lists for the '1<sup>st</sup> Hussars Recruiting Depot' in Amherstburg 1 July-30 November 1916; London Advertiser 29 December 1916 p.11 describing the work of the 1<sup>st</sup> Hussars Depot

<sup>133</sup> LAC RG 9 II F9 Vol 1383 File 'MD 11 Recruiting Staff Nov 1915-March 1917' contains monthly pay lists for Mr Charles Henshaw, Recruiting Officer, from 1 November 1915 to 31 March 1917. Henshaw received the same pay as a lieutenant-colonel. There may be additional pay lists for Henshaw which have not survived. Parker, C.W. Who's Who in Western Canada: A Biographical Dictionary of Notable Living Men and Women of Western Canada. (Vancouver: Canadian Press Association Limited, 1911) p.205 described Charles Henshaw as a commission merchant.

<sup>134</sup> DHH 'Minutes of the Militia Council 1917' p.1172, Henshaw had been a lieutenant and captain in the militia and CEF since 20 September 1915 with the approval of Sam Hughes. On 18 October 1917, the Deputy Minister pointed out that she had been paid \$3 per diem since then, as well as field pay and subsistence allowance when absent from home. Her services were terminated 1 November 1917 and she was directed to cease wearing uniform

<sup>135</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4593 File 20-10 Vol 10, AG to GOC MD 10 4 November 1915 granting approval and referring to the original proposal dated 25 October 1915 which, unfortunately, is not in the file.

<sup>136</sup> LAC RG 9 II F9 Vol 1296, Files 'MD 10 Recruiting Area B February 1916', 'MD 10 Recruiting Area C December 1915-January 1916' and 'MD 10 Recruiting Area D November 1915-February 1916'; LAC RG 9 II F9 Vol 1297 'MD 10 Recruiting Area D February 1916'; LAC RG 24 Vol 4593 File 20-10 Vol 10, AAG i/c Administration HQ MD 10 to OC 188<sup>th</sup> Battalion 10 February 1916 instructing him to absorb all recruits in Area C and OC D Recruiting Area Moose Jaw to AAG i/c Administration HQ MD 10 21 February 1916 asking that his area be authorized as a CEF battalion; The commanding officers of Areas A, B and D went on to command CEF battalions.

<sup>137</sup> Macphail. Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-1919: The Medical Services. p.154

<sup>138</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1311 File 593-3-7, Prime Minister to F.B. McCurdy 18 August 1916 referring to an earlier proposal from the AG concerning mobilization centres (not in the file) and asking if Militia Council had considered the idea, AG to Militia Council 23 August 1916 noting the Prime Minister's approval and AG Circular Letter 12 September 1916 instructing districts to establish mobilization centres;

<sup>139</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4311 File 34-1-59-M; AG Circular Letter 12 September 1916 'Mobilization Centre, Administration of'

<sup>140</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1311 File 593-3-7, DOC MD 12 to AG 25 October 1916 noting that funds had not been allocated to rent accommodation for centres in Regina, Saskatoon, Prince Albert, Battleford, Moosimin, Moose Jaw, Swift Current and Weyburn, OC MD 11 to Militia HQ 28 September 1916; LAC RG 24 Vol 4509 File 17-1-49 Vol XII, GOC MD 5 to Militia HQ 29 March 1917 explaining that MD 5 was largely rural and a central depot was more efficient and less expensive.

<sup>141</sup> Toronto Star 1 February 1917 p.14 announced the Depots would be replaced by 'Mobilization Centres'; LAC RG 24 Vol 4311 File 34-1-59-L contains an undated list probably from the spring of 1918 showing the three original mobilization centres as well as one in St Catharine's.

<sup>142</sup> LAC RG 4311 File 24-1-59-M Vol 1, OC 248<sup>th</sup> Battalion to Chief Recruiting Officer MD 2 23 April 1917

<sup>143</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4311, File 34-1-59-M Vol 1, OC Toronto Mobilization Centre to DAA & QMG MD 2 28 November 1917 and File 34-1-59-L, MD 2 to Militia HQ 18 July 1918 reporting the manning of the Sudbury Mobilization Centre

<sup>144</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4310 File 34-1-59 Vol 2, OC Toronto Mobilization Centre to AAG MD 2 20 August 1917

## Chapter 4 Recruiting Criteria

Chapter 3 discussed the CEF recruiting structure from mobilization in 1914 to the influx of draftees under the *Military Service Act* (MSA) in 1918. The period was one of constant change and turmoil with recruits being enlisted by militia units, CEF units and district offices at various times and places, sometimes simultaneously. Some of these changes were the result of snap decisions by the erratic Minister of Militia and Defence, Sam Hughes, while other changes were introduced by the staff in Ottawa and at the district headquarters to impose order on the whole system.

Throughout the change and turmoil, recruiters were expected to enlist men who met standard criteria, which also changed and evolved as the war went on. While some of these changes increased the number of men eligible for combatant service, other changes simply increased the number available for administrative duties. Some of the criteria were also based on national prejudices although as the war progressed, these were discarded and aliens, visible minorities and natives came to be viewed as valuable additions to the manpower pool. The recruiting criteria were also ignored by thousands of men who were anxious to serve and deliberately lied in order to enlist.

At first glance, the criteria were the model of simplicity. Men had to be between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, a standard consistent with *King's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Militia* (KR&O).<sup>1</sup> Boys were excluded although KR&O allowed fourteen-year-olds (and thirteen-year-olds in exceptional cases) to join the militia with their parents' or guardian's consent. These boys were excluded from the CEF, but peacetime habits died hard and in August 1915, Militia HQ modified the age standard to

allow fourteen-year-olds to enlist as bandsmen, drummers, buglers and trumpeters. The reduced aged standards did not last long and were cancelled in January 1917 because juveniles were of no use as reinforcements for units in France.<sup>2</sup>

The upper age limit was amended in June 1916 to allow forestry workers to enlist up to age forty-eight because they were "labourers only, and are not to be considered as enlisted for General Service overseas."<sup>3</sup> In January 1917, the same age range was extended to skilled railway workers, although medical officers were reminded that "the apparent age rather than the age given is to be taken into account and the condition of the arteries of all men 41 years of age and over is to determine acceptance or rejection."<sup>4</sup> Those men serving with combatant units who were overage but managed to reach England were not returned to Canada, but were drafted to labour units providing they were medically unfit for the trenches.<sup>5</sup>

Canadian age standards created problems in England where the CEF was governed by British regulations. British policies were quite clear; active service in France or Belgium was restricted to those between the ages of nineteen and forty-two.<sup>6</sup> The effect of this was that on arrival in England, those between thirteen and eighteen were too young for active service and those between forty-two and forty-five were too old.

Canadian authorities in England were initially unconcerned with the conflict in age limits. In December 1916, Sir George Perley advised Prime Minister Borden that there was "No maximum age limit for Canadian soldiers proceeding from England to [the] seat of war."<sup>7</sup> However, the staff at HQ OMFC was not as sanguine and in January 1917, the Surgeon-General noted the discrepancy between British and Canadian age limits.<sup>8</sup> Militia HQ also picked up the matter and both the DGMS and AG expressed

[L of C] were held at the appropriate base depot while those who had arrived in the front line could remain with their units but not in the trenches. The latter policy was clearly impractical. Infantry battalions had enough on their hands without worrying about young soldiers in the transport lines and, in any event, the possibility of long-range shelling meant the boys were exposed to danger. In November 1916, therefore, GHQ directed that soldiers who were eighteen or younger would be returned by their units to the appropriate base depot where they would remain until of age.<sup>13</sup> The policy was further modified in May 1917 when boys between the ages of eighteen and nineteen were allowed to serve with one of the many army schools, forward of the base depots but still within the L of C. The policy was firm and a proposal from the Canadian Corps in August 1918 to employ minors with a demonstration platoon at the Corps railhead (forward of the L of C) was firmly scotched by HQ OMFC.<sup>14</sup>

Underage soldiers in France who concealed their age remained with their units, unless angry parents or guardians produced birth certificates. But these cases were relatively few and there is no record of a concerted effort to weed these minors out. In January 1918, HQ OMFC authorized Canadian Corps HQ to transfer 500 men under the age of eighteen years and six months to Britain but judging by unit war diaries, there was no mass exodus of juveniles.<sup>15</sup> Regimental histories support this. In 1917-1918, for example, the 85<sup>th</sup> Battalion lost seventeen minors, the 102<sup>nd</sup> Battalion lost twenty-one and the 18<sup>th</sup> and 72<sup>nd</sup> Battalions lost twenty-four teens each.<sup>16</sup>

At the other end of the spectrum were the older men who could not be drafted to France. Many were identified by medical boards before embarkation to Britain and retained in Canada or discharged. However, some were not identified until they arrived in



England and these men were employed on general duties with reserve battalions. But it was illogical for seniors to serve with units whose sole purpose was to feed reinforcements to Canadian units in France or Belgium and in November 1916, these men were posted to the 37<sup>th</sup> Reserve Battalion.<sup>17</sup>

The 37<sup>th</sup> was not a conventional infantry battalion, but became the basis for the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Labour Battalion, which was posted to France in 1917 where it was joined by three other labour battalions. These units were not composed exclusively of overage men, but rather of those whose medical categories (including age) precluded front-line service.<sup>18</sup> Still, it is striking that of the 106 Canadians from various labour units who are buried in France or Belgium, thirty-two were over forty-two years of age.<sup>19</sup>

Not all seniors who served in France or Belgium did so with labour units. Railway troops, for example, were exempt from the upward age limit of forty-two, although the Canadian General Base Depot in France insisted on rejecting Canadian Railway Troops (CRT) reinforcements over forty-three "unless they looked young and were going to a specialized job."<sup>20</sup> There were also men with front-line units who were retained by their units. Peter Comego, a forty-seven year-old native soldier, and Johnston Paudash, a fifty-two-year-old native soldier, for example, were retained by the 21<sup>st</sup> Battalion because both were accomplished scouts and snipers. Others, such as Sergeants Geddes and Ritchie of the 78<sup>th</sup> Battalion, were removed from their units but retained in the forward area with the 4<sup>th</sup> Divisional baths and the 4<sup>th</sup> Division entrenching battalion respectively.<sup>21</sup>

These then were the policies and procedures concerning those who were over or under age. But these policies were frequently ignored, either because individual recruits were anxious to serve or because commanding officers were trying to fill the ranks. In all,

it is estimated that more than 33,000 men who were too young or too old enlisted in the CEF. While some of these men made a valuable contribution to the war effort, others instead became a significant administrative burden.

A total of 6,548 underage soldiers were discharged from the CEF during the war.<sup>22</sup> But these were only the ones who were detected. The total of those who served is unknown although a reasonable estimate can be made using Commonwealth War Graves Commission [CWGC] cemetery and memorial registers. These registers were compiled in the 1920s and about 61% of the entries in these registers include the age on death provided by the soldier's next of kin. The information provided by the next of kin is likely correct – why would they lie?<sup>23</sup> There are 1,412 men listed who were under the age of nineteen when they died.<sup>24</sup>

Table 14  
Estimated Total Underage Enlistments 1914-1920<sup>25</sup>

Age on Death	CWGC Registers	Estimated Deaths	Estimated Enlistments
15	14		
16	75		
17	296		
18	1,027		
Totals	1,412	2,315	24,369

Notes: (1) The overall death rate for all ages was 9.5% and it is assumed this applied to underage soldiers as well.<sup>26</sup>

(2) Estimated deaths and enlistments are slightly overstated. Non-battle deaths for the CEF as a whole amounted to 13% of all deaths. The average age of the CEF was 26.3 years, a cohort with an annual death rate of 3.9 per thousand in 1921. However, the annual death rate for male teens was slightly less at 3.1 per thousand.<sup>27</sup>

There were at least two ten-year-olds, both of whom enlisted in March 1916:

Wesley Mickey, a schoolboy from Wadena, Saskatchewan, and Reuben Rosenfield, a bugler from Winnipeg who enlisted to be with his father, Sergeant Arthur Rosenfield of

the 101<sup>st</sup> Battalion.<sup>28</sup> Neither Mickey nor Rosenfield served overseas, either in Britain or on the continent.

The youngest to serve in Flanders was probably William Hutchison of Vancouver who enlisted in the 211<sup>th</sup> Battalion at the age of twelve and was discharged in Vancouver as underage on 2 December 1916. However, Hutchison's mates were reluctant to lose their battalion 'mascot' and were able to smuggle him to England where he somehow managed to join the 8<sup>th</sup> Battalion, CRT and at the age of thirteen, was sent with his new unit to Belgium.<sup>29</sup> The youngest who died in France was fifteen; there were eight with that melancholy distinction while six others died in Britain or Canada.

Table 15  
Underage Fatalities  
Estimated Age on Enlistment<sup>30</sup>

Estimated Enlistment Age	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918	Totals	Proportion
13		1	1			2	0.2%
14	3	9	10	2		24	2.0%
15	8	71	61	2	1	143	12.1%
16	32	175	194	26	10	437	37.0%
17	57	261	193	52	12	575	48.7%
Total	100	517	459	82	23	1,181	
Proportion	8.5%	43.8%	38.9%	6.9%	1.9%		

Notes: (1) A few of the attestation forms are marked with the soldier's true date of birth but in the majority of cases, the age on enlistment had to be estimated based on length of service. A boy who died at seventeen, for example, with more than two years of service was probably fifteen years old or younger when he enlisted.

(2) It is acknowledged that the longer a boy served, the more likely he was to die.

Attestation papers show that 1,025 (86.8%) of the teens included in Table 14 claimed to be eighteen or older when they enlisted, which suggests the boys were anxious

to go while recruiters were willing to look the other way.<sup>31</sup> Surprisingly, more of these boys enlisted in 1914-15 when volunteers were plentiful than in 1916-17 when there was a shortage of recruits. A total of 156 boys (13.2%) admitted they were seventeen or younger when they enlisted. But the majority of these self-confessed minors (134) enlisted between August 1915 and January 1917 when boys were allowed to join with their parent's consent as bandsmen, drummers, buglers and trumpeters.<sup>32</sup>

At the other end of the spectrum were the older men, those over forty-five, some of whom were able to enlist because seniors were welcomed, at least for home defence duties. A total of 226 militiamen on full-time service, for example, died during the war and are buried in Canada. A third of these men were too young or too old to enlist in the CEF and the average senior was 53.6 years old.<sup>33</sup> In Toronto, twenty-one men served with the District Sanitary Corps. Seventeen of these men were between the age of forty-eight and seventy-five with an average age of 54.5 years.<sup>34</sup> These soldiers were not members of the CEF until July 1918 when all militiamen on full-time service, including seniors, were transferred to the CEF.<sup>35</sup>

No record was kept of the number of men over the age of forty-five who enlisted. Post-war tabulations showed that 1,471 men were released as overage, but there must have been many others who were not discharged.<sup>36</sup> However, as with the minors, CWGC records can be used to provide an estimate of the overall number.

Table 16  
Estimated Overage Enlistments 1914-1920

Age on Death	CWGC Registers	Estimated Deaths	Estimated Enlistments
47-50	331	543	5,712
51-55	135	221	2,330
56-60	46	75	794
61-65	15	25	259
66-68	6	10	104
Totals	533	874	9,198

Notes: (1) Table 16 is based on those who died and not those who enlisted.

Estimates are therefore approximate and not absolute.

(2) Estimated deaths and enlistments are slightly understated. Non-battle deaths for the CEF as a whole amounted to 13% of all deaths. The average age of the CEF was 26.3 years, a group with a natural death rate of 3.9 per thousand. The 48-55 cohort, however, had a natural death rate that was somewhat more at 8.4 per thousand.<sup>37</sup>

(3) The majority of those who died at age forty-six or forty-seven (144) likely enlisted at age forty-five. They have therefore been excluded from Table 15.

(4) Rounding off has produced a discrepancy of ten estimated enlistments.

In terms of individuals, the oldest man to offer his services was probably ninety-two-year-old Sir Mackenzie Bowell, a former prime minister who offered to join the 224<sup>th</sup> (Forestry) Battalion in 1916 as a lance-corporal although this was probably a publicity stunt to shame younger men into joining.<sup>38</sup> The oldest to actually enlist was probably eighty-year-old Alexander Muir, an ex-soldier of the British 11<sup>th</sup> Hussars who joined the CASC Detachment at Militia HQ in June 1916. He was demobilized in 1920 at the age of eighty-four.<sup>39</sup> The oldest soldier buried in France is probably Sapper John Kirkwood of the 4<sup>th</sup> Field Company who died in July 1917 at the age of sixty-eight.<sup>40</sup>

Table 17  
Enrolment  
Overage Soldiers

Age Cohort	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918	Totals	Proportion
47-50	44	133	100	23	12	312	64.9%
51-55	13	44	44	10	6	117	24.3%
56-60	3	10	20	2	3	38	7.9%
61-65		1	8	1		10	2.1%
66-67		1	2	1		4	0.8%
Totals	60	189	174	37	21	481	
Proportion	12.5%	39.3%	36.2%	7.7%	4.4%		

Notes: (1) Based on CWGC cemetery and memorial registers.

(2) Thirty-eight men who died at the age of forty-six have been excluded since they were probably under the age of forty-five on enlistment.

A total of 458 or 86% of the men listed in Table 17 claimed to be forty-five years or younger when they enlisted in the CEF. In theory these lies should have been picked up during the enrolment medical, but birth certificates were not required; doctors noted the 'apparent age' only and most felt they had "no option but to accept the statement [of age]."<sup>41</sup> In any event, recruiting staff were often willing look the other way. In May 1917, for example, Charles Harrigan joined the Canadian Forestry Corps at Revelstoke, British Columbia. His date of birth was given as November 1869 and his 'apparent age' as forty-seven. Harrigan also claimed to have served with the militia during the 1870 Fenian raids when he was only one year old according to his declared date of birth. Neither his age nor his former service was challenged by the recruiters.<sup>42</sup>

The enrolment of older men suggests efforts to address a shortage of recruits, but more seniors enlisted in 1915 at a time when there were plenty of recruits, which suggests that the motivation was a product of enthusiasm and not the need to fill the ranks one way or another. The reasons why the older men chose to join up can only be guessed at -

patriotism, the need for a job and, for the old soldiers, a chance to return to a settled life with known expectations. The latter was not an inconsequential factor; 263 of those who died, or more than half, were ex-servicemen while 67 others were current members of the militia. In round numbers, about two-thirds of the seniors were already familiar with military service when they enlisted in the CEF. There was also, like today, an unwritten obligation to help deserving ex-soldiers and there were cases of commanding officers who went out of their way to accommodate the old sweats who wanted to soldier again.<sup>43</sup>

Together, more than 33,000 men who were outside of the normal age range enlisted in the CEF; about 5% of all recruits - a significant addition to the manpower pool, although not all served in France or Flanders. About 84% of the underage soldiers who died were buried in France and Flanders, 5% in Britain and 11% in Canada. On the other hand, 34% of the overage men who died were buried in France or Belgium, 14% in Britain and 51.9% in Canada.<sup>44</sup> It would be reasonable to conclude, therefore, that a much larger proportion of the underage soldiers saw active service.

From an administrative point of view, the need to cater to the under-age and over-age soldiers detracted from their usefulness. Both juveniles and seniors in England or France had to be combed out and returned to Britain or repatriated to Canada where they were discharged. It is true that many of the young soldiers eventually reached nineteen and were deployed to France, but had they been enlisted at the proper age, a great deal of administrative effort could have been saved. In the case of the older men, particularly in England, it can be argued that their presence freed up younger men for service in France. However, these jobs could have been done by substitutes such as those who were unfit

for service at the front and women. On the other hand, those who concealed their age, perhaps as many as 20,000 were a genuine addition to the manpower pool.

Age was not the only criteria for enlistment. Men also had to be medically fit and Militia HQ continually altered the standards throughout the war in an effort to expand the manpower pool. Medical fitness is a multi-faceted subject, but height requirements, dental health and eyesight serve as useful proxies.

The initial standard, announced on 17 August 1914, was 5' 3" for all corps with the exception of artillery (5' 7"), engineers (5' 4") and CASC horse transport drivers (5' 5").<sup>45</sup> The standard for infantry lasted less than a year, however, and in July 1915, was reduced to 5' 2", a reduction that has been attributed to a shortage of recruits.<sup>46</sup>

However, this was not the case. In brief, Major Francis Milton, a militia officer serving with the 44<sup>th</sup> Battalion in Winnipeg, wrote to Sam Hughes and suggested that a new battalion should be raised of men under the regulation height. Hughes was enthusiastic about the proposal but the AG noted in June 1915 that there was no need "for herding them [undersize soldiers] in separate battalions" and suggested that it would be better to reduce the minimum height to accommodate shorter men. The district commander responsible for the 44<sup>th</sup> Battalion (Colonel H.N. Ruttan) was then consulted and he recommended a one-inch reduction in the minimum height. Hughes accepted the advice, recruiting regulations were amended and as of 21 July 1915, the minimum height for infantrymen was 5' 2".<sup>47</sup>

Later reductions after the summer of 1916 were directly related to declining enlistment figures.<sup>48</sup> In December 1916, the minimum height for infantrymen was



reduced to five feet and a year later, the standard for non-combatants was dropped to 4' 11", four inches shorter than the minimum height established in August 1914.<sup>49</sup> The artillery was also affected by the slump in recruiting and in June 1917, the requirement for artillery drivers was lowered to 5' 3", to be followed in September 1917 by another reduction to 5' 2".<sup>50</sup> Also in September 1917, the height standard for field gunners was lowered to 5' 6" (a reduction of one inch) but garrison and siege gunners had to be at least 5' 7".<sup>51</sup> All of these changes were part of a deliberate effort to enlarge the pool of potential recruits.

Was the reduction of the infantry height standard to five feet a profitable change to the medical standard? The experience of the bantam units suggests that the benefits, if any, were limited.

The idea of bantam battalions was not original, but an imitation of the British bantams, originally formed in the fall of 1914 when the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> Battalions of the Cheshire Regiment were raised in Birkenhead from men standing 5' to 5' 3" (later 5' 2").<sup>52</sup> The concept was a popular one in Britain and by mid-1916, there were two bantam divisions serving in France. Neither division, however, was composed wholly of bantams; those serving with artillery, engineer, pioneer and signals units had to meet normal height standards.<sup>53</sup> Bantams were not intended to supplement the British manpower pool but reflected popular enthusiasm for the war effort by providing shorter men with an opportunity to serve their country.

Not surprisingly the CEF followed suit in 1916 by raising the 143<sup>rd</sup> and 216<sup>th</sup> Bantam Battalions as well as a bantam company for the 167<sup>th</sup> Battalion.<sup>54</sup> As with the British bantams, neither of the two battalions were created because of a recruiting

shortfall but instead resulted from lobbying by two enthusiasts who were captivated by the notion of something new.<sup>55</sup> Both Captain A.B. Powley of Victoria (OC 143<sup>rd</sup> Battalion) and Major F.L. Burton of Toronto (OC 216<sup>th</sup> Battalion) had served in France and likely both had first-hand knowledge of the British bantam divisions.<sup>56</sup> Both the 143<sup>rd</sup> and 216<sup>th</sup> were formed at a time when there was no shortage of recruits. On the other hand, the bantam company of the 167<sup>th</sup> Battalion was authorized in November 1916 at a time when recruiting, especially for Québec-based units, had fallen off sharply.<sup>57</sup>

The concept of bantam battalions was contrary to Militia HQ's preference for homogeneous units that could be shipped overseas and absorbed by any battalion that required reinforcements. Perhaps for this reason, no one in Ottawa laid down a uniform height requirement for Bantams, unlike in Britain, where standards were laid down by the War Office. Instead, the height standard reflected the commanding officer's preference. The 216<sup>th</sup> recruited men who stood 5' to 5' 1 ½", the 143<sup>rd</sup> accepted those who were 5' 4" or shorter and the 167<sup>th</sup> was willing to take volunteers under 5' 2".<sup>58</sup>

The bantam concept was not as popular in Canada as it was in Britain and some of the men in the 143<sup>rd</sup> considered 'bantam' to be a pejorative term.<sup>59</sup> Both battalions, therefore, had to recruit outside of their parent districts to find enough men. The 216<sup>th</sup> recruited mainly in MD 2, but 29% of its strength came from four other districts in Eastern Canada. Similarly, the 143<sup>rd</sup> recruited primarily in MD 11, but also enlisted 125 men or 10.6% in MD 13.<sup>60</sup> The idea did not find favor with Militia HQ, however, probably because of the cost of transporting recruits from Alberta to British Columbia and from March to May 1916 the 143<sup>rd</sup> had to confine its activities to MD 11.<sup>61</sup>

On the surface, the two battalions were successful and recruited almost a thousand men who were not part of the potential manpower pool by virtue of their height.

However, not all of these men were a useful addition to the reservoir. There were 163 recruits who could not be posted to infantry battalions overseas because they stood less than five feet tall. Three of these men were only 4' 7". There were also 141 boys between the ages of twelve and seventeen, many of whom were under the minimum height for bantams.<sup>62</sup>

Some of the Bantams seem to have been stunted and not merely short and in July 1916, almost two hundred unfit men from the 143<sup>rd</sup> were weeded out by medical officers at the Sidney Mobilization Camp in British Columbia.<sup>63</sup> Later, in England, the battalion was examined again and at least 155 men were consigned to the Canadian Railway Troops Depot as unfit for the infantry.<sup>64</sup> The 216<sup>th</sup> had problems as well and in May 1917, doctors with the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Reserve Brigade at Shorncliffe declared 217 men unfit for the infantry.<sup>65</sup> This was just the beginning and ultimately, 300 bantams from the 216<sup>th</sup> were transferred to the Forestry Corps.<sup>66</sup> Obviously these men were not an efficient addition to the manpower pool.

Table 18  
Personnel Disposition – Bantam Battalions<sup>67</sup>

<b>Disposition</b>	<b>143<sup>rd</sup></b>	<b>216<sup>th</sup></b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Proportion Of Enlistments</b>
Recruited	1,174	1,123	2,297	
Sailed to UK	883	783	1,666	51%
Served in France	604	318	922	40%

Note: The 216<sup>th</sup> provided two hundred drivers to the Reserve Brigade CFA in June 1917.<sup>68</sup> These men have been included in 'Served in France'.

Would bantams have been useful in the front lines? In the British army the 35<sup>th</sup> (Bantam) Division found that trench parapets had to be lowered to allow men to shoot, meaning that conventional units relieving the bantams had to rebuild the parapets. Eventually, the 35<sup>th</sup> had to issue a divisional order requiring every man to carry two sandbags to build up the fire step. Bantams also had difficulties handling the service rifle (Lee-Enfield) because of its length and a special butt one inch shorter than normal was eventually produced in 1918.<sup>69</sup> Presumably Bantams also had the same problem handling the Lewis gun, but there is no evidence that the gun was ever modified.

It was also difficult to find physically fit reinforcements. In August 1916, the GOC 105<sup>th</sup> (Bantam) Brigade wrote that most of the new arrivals were underdeveloped men "who were unfitted, both morally and physically to take their places in the fighting ranks of the British Army."<sup>70</sup> Subsequently in December 1916, medical boards inspected the 35<sup>th</sup> Division and found 2,784 men with "Deficient Physique – physical incapacity to perform the normal duties of a soldier in the fighting line."<sup>71</sup> The evidence is indirect, but the experience of the 35<sup>th</sup> Division suggests that throwing open the CEF to shorter men was of minimal benefit.

Dental standards were relaxed as well to allow men with faulty teeth or dentures to enlist. The changes started in March 1915 when the ADMS at HQ MD 2 directed that men with defective or deficient teeth would be retained in Canada for treatment, "including the provision of such artificial dentures as are necessary to admit of efficient mastication."<sup>72</sup> The policy made sense and in May 1915, Militia HQ directed that men with partial plates or who required dental treatment could be enlisted, a regulation modified in August 1915 to allow men with full dentures to join the CEF.<sup>73</sup> Oddly

enough, dental care was not mandatory and those who refused treatment were passed as 'fit', "provided they are not suffering from malnutrition or digestive trouble, and are otherwise physically fit."<sup>74</sup>

To meet the increased demand for dental services, the Canadian Army Dental Corps (CADC) was established in April 1915, but for overseas duty only. Districts were authorized to appoint dentists to the CAMC on a temporary basis, but this was evidently unsatisfactory and in July 1916, CADC detachments were formed in every district.<sup>75</sup> The detachments, however, were used to treat serving soldiers and not to screen recruits. The determination of dental fitness remained the purview of the medical officer conducting the examination.<sup>76</sup>

Did the relaxation of dental standards and the creation of the CADC add significantly to the number of men who joined the CEF? In December 1916, 20,365 Canadian soldiers at Shorncliffe, Seaford and Crowborough were classified by medical boards and 8,385 or 41.2% were found to be dentally unfit.<sup>77</sup> There is no evidence that the findings of the medical boards reflected Canadian oral health in general, but it seems reasonable to conclude that the relaxation of standards and the provision of dental care allowed several hundred thousand men to join the CEF who might have been rejected in 1914.

Vision standards were modified as well. Initially recruits had to have D15/20 in the right eye and D30/20 in the left eye.<sup>78</sup> In November 1915, the regulations were modified. Recruits with D60/20 in either eye (uncorrected) were fit for general service while those with D120/20 in the right eye could be enrolled in the CASC, CAMC and COC.<sup>79</sup> The following year, recruiting slumped and the standards were relaxed even

further. In August 1916, the general standard was lowered to D80/20 for all and D200/80 for drivers. Those with only one eye were routinely turned away until January 1917 when they were allowed to enlist in pioneer, labour, construction, forestry and railway units provided that the missing eye had not been lost because of an organic disease.<sup>80</sup>

Enrolling recruits with poor eyesight implied that eyeglasses had to be provided and from March 1915 onwards, men posted to Flanders were issued with two pair as required.<sup>81</sup> But, this applied only to those serving overseas and recruits in Canada were expected to provide their own glasses, an illogical policy that was corrected in May 1916, when the Militia Council decided to provide glasses to all those who needed them.<sup>82</sup>

The initial dental and vision standards were simple and straightforward but significantly reduced the pool of potential recruits. Changes to these standards allowed more men to join the CEF but the need to provide dentures and eyeglasses increased the administrative overhead. Regardless of this, the changes more than benefited the CEF.

Not all of those who joined were employed with infantry units, but it took almost two years before Militia HQ recognized that skilled workers who did not meet infantry standards were useful in specialist corps. From June 1916 onwards, Forestry Corps recruits missing no more than one finger on each hand (other than thumb and forefinger) and one or two toes on each foot (other than the great toe) were acceptable. At the same time, the maximum age limit for skilled forestry workers such as millwrights and saw filers was extended from 45 to 48.<sup>83</sup> Men with flat feet were unacceptable to the infantry but Militia HQ made an exception for the Skilled Railway Employees because "Any men who are good enough for the railway companies are good enough for us."<sup>84</sup>

Not all of these changes were beneficial and overlooked the fact that forestry recruits, for example, were expected to work "harder than infantry in the trenches, as far as the physical end is concerned."<sup>85</sup> Railway troops were able to cope with flat feet but according to the Senior Medical Officer of the CRT Depot in England, most of those over forty-two or forty-three who were posted to France could not physically cope with the job while those with only one eye had difficulties with night operations.<sup>86</sup>

Many of those who joined the CEF were unfit on enrolment and were subsequently discharged. But, the designation as 'unfit' was relative and it has to be kept in mind that standards were relaxed throughout the war. Arguably a man judged to be unfit in 1914 could very well have been declared fit in 1918. Fitness was also a function of the man's corps and those discharged from infantry battalions might very well have been fit for the CASC or another specialist branch of the service.

The number of men released as medically unfit is not certain. In September 1916, Colonel Bruce produced a scathing report on the problem of unfit men in England, but although he gave numerous examples in his report he did not indicate the extent of the problem.<sup>87</sup> In a postwar speech in Montréal, General Sir Arthur Currie claimed "100,000 men were enlisted and sent to England who were of no use to us in the field"<sup>88</sup> but the source of his data is unknown. In any event, although General Currie and Colonel Bruce may have exaggerated their claims, the problem was still a serious one. Between 6 October and 5 November 1916 alone, almost one in six of all infantrymen who arrived in England were found to be medically unfit.<sup>89</sup>

Table 19  
Unfit Recruits 1914-1918<sup>90</sup>

Description (1)	Served Canada only (actual) (2)	Served overseas (estimate) <sup>91</sup> (3)	Total (4)
Unfit	42,897	33,155	76,052
Found unfit by unit MO	859	21	880
Found unfit within 3 months of enrolment	4,301	15	4,316
Found unfit on reaching 18	54	16	70
Unfit for his special duties	90	41	131
Totals	48,201	33,248	81,449

Notes: (1) The term 'unfit for his special duties' presumably refers to those who were unfit for their corps.

(2) Column 3 applies to those who served in England but not in France or Flanders. It is appreciated that some of these men may have been injured in training accidents.

The medical conditions that resulted in the release the men in Table 19 are unknown although Annex A lists some of the leading causes. Regretfully it has not been possible to determine if these causes were due to nutritional, occupational, environmental or hereditary factors.

There were other factors that resulted in unfit men being enlisted, according to a well-reasoned report produced in October 1916 by Colonel Marlow, ADMS MD 2:

"Careless examination by medical officers or civilian practitioners, undue pressure on the part of commanding or recruiting officers anxious to increase the number in their units, attestation without further medical examination, and retention of men at small billets."<sup>92</sup>

There were other reasons as well which Colonel Marlow did not comment upon. The prewar CAMC was small and there were too few medical officers to cope with the flood of recruits, a problem recognized on the eve of war by the ADMS of MD 6.<sup>93</sup>



Hiring civilian physicians made up for the lack of medical officers, but this in turn helped to increase the number of unfit recruits.

Physicians were paid fifty cents for each recruit examined and not all doctors considered the tariff to be acceptable.<sup>94</sup> Some refused to examine recruits while others, at least in MD 5, openly said that a fifty-cent fee warranted a fifty-cent examination.<sup>95</sup> There was also a shortage of civilian physicians in remote areas who were willing to examine recruits. In the Gaspé, for example, there was only one doctor available. For some reason, he was willing to examine recruits but not sign the attestation forms.<sup>96</sup>

Even if physicians were willing to examine recruits, they sometimes applied their own standards. In the Algoma District of Northern Ontario, the 119<sup>th</sup> Battalion complained of local doctors who either misunderstood or ignored CAMC instructions.<sup>97</sup> Further south in Victoria County, the ADMS of MD 3 reported that civilian physicians also ignored instructions, preferring to judge a man's fitness by his ability to do a day's work.<sup>98</sup> CAMC medical officers would have resolved these problems, but there were only a few hundred available on the outbreak of war and most of them were absorbed by the greatly expanded medical establishment overseas. In any event, the dispersal of the CEF in small detachments scattered across the country in the winter of 1915-1916 meant that there was no choice but to rely on civilian practitioners.

Medical officers and civilian physicians were hampered by an absence of diagnostic tests and medical examinations depended to a large extent on the candor of the recruit. In 1917 the GOC MD 11 noted that "many men are reported to be untruthful. Such men may very easily escape the notice of the Medical Officer of the Unit for a considerable time."<sup>99</sup> Alcoholics, drug addicts, epileptics and men with chronic

conditions, anxious to serve their country, were therefore able to enlist, although in many cases, the stress of military life brought their condition to the notice of the authorities.

For the most part, doctors conducted external examinations only. To some degree, this was not important since most physicians could recognize obvious signs of disability such as irregular heartbeat, chronic rheumatism or weeping chancres. But detecting other diseases called for specialized tests. Tuberculosis tests were available, but cost three dollars (almost three times the daily pay of a private soldier).<sup>100</sup> Wasserman tests for syphilis were also available and by 1916 were common enough that the Toronto General Hospital routinely screened all admissions.<sup>101</sup> Whether or not every recruit could have been screened by these tests is uncertain, at least during the winter of 1915-1916 when detachments were scattered across the country. It would have been impossible for the 119<sup>th</sup> Battalion in the remote Algoma District of Ontario, for example, to send blood samples to a laboratory (probably in Toronto) for analysis. However, by the end of 1916, centralization of units in Canada and the creation of mobilization centres meant that standing medical boards were able to make use of specialized equipment such as x-ray machines.

There were also the mentally disabled who were able to hoodwink the doctors and enlist in the CEF. In all, a total of 1,486 men were released because of mental disorders. Presumably these were cases of insanity and do not include the mentally deficient and learning disabled. A handful of examples of the latter categories are known such as the soldier with the 4<sup>th</sup> Divisional Train in British Columbia who had been "given a great deal of individual attention and instruction but does not seem to be able to absorb anything and has shown no improvement whatever."<sup>102</sup> Another soldier from the 181<sup>st</sup>

Battalion was examined by a medical board in England and found to be "a high grade imbecile, his intelligence is weak, memory of defective(sic) and he is untidy and dirty in his habits."<sup>103</sup> Obviously neither man was of any benefit to the CEF.

These unfortunates were an added burden on units in England and France and in 1916-1917 there were complaints that newly arrived reinforcements were suffering from 'senility, 'dementia', 'mental deficiency' and 'delusional insanity.'<sup>104</sup> The number is not certain, but a total of 6,828 men were hospitalized or released with mental disorders not related to battle. There were also 6,432 men discharged as 'inefficient & undesirable' without leaving Canada and some of these may have been mentally deficient.<sup>105</sup>

Together, the mentally disabled and the mentally handicapped probably accounted for about 2% of all enlistments, a lower rate than Canadian males in general.<sup>106</sup> The ratio was roughly consistent with the American Expeditionary Force [AEF] which found that about 1.5% of all draftees were either mentally deficient or suffering from some form of mental disease.<sup>107</sup>

The lack of testing was not because Canadian psychiatrists were unaware of the problem. Clearly they were and in 1917, the AEF adopted psychological testing based, in part, on recommendations from Canadian doctors who "indicated the urgent desirability of the application of psychological methods in the selection of recruits and in the studying of incapacitated soldiers."<sup>108</sup> But there was no psychiatrist with the DGMS staff at Militia HQ and thus no advocate for testing. In any event, intelligence tests would have been problematic with the CEF dispersed across the country in small detachments, a problem not faced by the AEF, which concentrated large numbers of recruits in relatively few central camps.

Despite the absence of formal testing, authorities were concerned with mental health and medical officers were reminded in 1917 that "Great care is to be taken in ascertaining the mental capacity of a recruit."<sup>109</sup> Training officers were required to assess the mental capacity of recruits and classify their intelligence as above average, average or under-average, while remembering that "a man may be naturally intelligent although owing to lack of educational opportunities he may appear stupid."<sup>110</sup> Those classified as below average in intelligence were to be referred by the training officer to the medical officer for observation and subsequently, if necessary, to a standing medical board for disposal.<sup>111</sup>

Mental health was not assessed and medical officers were cautioned in October 1917 that it was unwise to ask men if they had ever been admitted to a psychiatric institution. Despite this, medical officers were expected to scrutinize recruits carefully for mental disorders, although the DGMS admitted this would be fruitless if the individual was in remission.<sup>112</sup> The Military Service Branch of the Department of Justice, however, had no concerns about mental health and in June 1918 MSA registrars were instructed to ascertain the names of potential draftees confined to "asylums, institutions for the feeble minded [and] hospitals."<sup>113</sup> At least one psychiatric hospital in Ontario is known to have forwarded a list of suitable inmates but there is no evidence that men were removed from hospitals and placed in uniform.<sup>114</sup>

The number of unfit men sent overseas to England was considerable, and by mid-1916 had become something of a scandal, so much so that Militia HQ directed that special medical boards be formed in every district to review unit medical examinations that were to be regarded as preliminary. These boards had the authority to alter the

original findings of the unit medical officer or local physician and direct that men be sent overseas, discharged or transferred to duties in Canada more suited to their physical capabilities.<sup>115</sup> This did not solve the problem entirely but kept the number of unfit men embarking for England to a minimum.

Initial criteria published in 1914 did not stipulate that recruits be British subjects, perhaps because they were drawn from the militia which accepted British subjects only.<sup>116</sup> Nor was citizenship a formal requirement for the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division authorized in October 1914, perhaps because the units were declared to be temporary corps of the Active Militia.<sup>117</sup> However, not all units raised in the fall of 1914 were part of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division and the matter was finally codified for the CEF in August 1915 by a general order requiring all recruits to be British subjects.<sup>118</sup>

More than 500 men in the First Contingent were from non-English-speaking countries and since the majority of the foreign-born in the general population had been naturalized (see Chapter 5), most were probably British subjects.<sup>119</sup> A total of thirty-eight men were from enemy states or were thought to be German sympathizers. Described as 'undesirables', these men were returned to Canada in November 1914.<sup>120</sup> None of the others were repatriated, however, perhaps because the CEF in Britain was subject to the British *Army Act* which allowed one man in every fifty to be an alien.<sup>121</sup>

Canadian requirements, however, were more stringent than British. In October 1914 Militia HQ directed that "it is considered inadvisable to enlist persons of foreign birth or nationality."<sup>122</sup> Specific nationalities were singled out. In November 1914, Militia HQ announced that Russian subjects could not be enlisted and those who had been

attested were to be discharged forthwith. A few months later, in February 1915, HQ MD 10 advised the 105<sup>th</sup> Regiment in Saskatoon that CEF recruits born in the United States had to be naturalized British subjects and of British descent, an interesting exercise in genealogy.<sup>123</sup>

Given the decentralized nature of the Canadian Forces and the relative autonomy of military districts, regulations regarding aliens were not uniformly applied. At one end of the spectrum was HQ MD 2 which in early 1915 ordered the discharge of all Italians, Danes, Greeks and Russians serving with Second Contingent units in Toronto. At the same time, militia units recruiting on behalf of the CEF in St Catharines and Brantford were forbidden to enlist foreigners while the 51<sup>st</sup> Regiment in Sault Ste Marie was instructed to release all CEF recruits from Belgium, the United States, France and Russia.<sup>124</sup> The policy was firmly applied and of twenty-six Russians with the 37<sup>th</sup> Battalion, only two, presumably British subjects, sailed to England in August and November 1915.<sup>125</sup>

Not all districts were as hard-nosed as MD 2. In eastern Ontario (MD 3), the 59<sup>th</sup> Battalion enlisted more than sixty Russians, virtually all of whom sailed to England with the battalion or in one of two reinforcing drafts.<sup>126</sup> In MD 5, the 57<sup>th</sup> Battalion at Québec City enlisted about a hundred Russians; sixty-four sailed to England. In total, 27.2% of the men in the 57<sup>th</sup> Battalion were not British subjects by birth.<sup>127</sup> The 41<sup>st</sup> Battalion, also from Québec City, was able to reach full strength only because of a company of Russian-born recruits from Western Canada.<sup>128</sup> A total of 221 men who were not British subjects by birth sailed in 1915 with the main body of the 41<sup>st</sup> or the reinforcing draft – about 20% of the unit.<sup>129</sup> But even in Québec, the policy was not consistent. Kostos Bastas, born in

Greece, enlisted in the 24<sup>th</sup> Battalion in 1914 but was discharged because he was an alien. A determined man, Bastas immediately applied for naturalization and in March 1915, was able to join the 41<sup>st</sup> Battalion as a newly-minted British subject.<sup>130</sup>

As the war, with its interminable demand for men, ground on, every district found it increasingly difficult to recruit. In Alberta, for example, Brigadier-General Cruikshank noted the shortage of recruits in January 1917. A large proportion of the British subjects living in MD 13 had already enlisted while up to 50% of those applying to district mobilization centres were medically unfit. Farmers were actively discouraging recruiting while high wages, bumper crops and an increased demand for labour all combined to keep men at home.<sup>131</sup> Not surprisingly, recruiters became more ready to accept foreigners without inquiring too closely into their status as British subjects.

The formation of the 97<sup>th</sup> (American Legion) Battalion brought the first changes to citizenship criteria. Intended to attract Americans domiciled in Canada, it quickly became apparent that potential recruits were discouraged by the need to be British subjects. In November 1915, therefore, citizenship requirements were waived for the 97<sup>th</sup>, and eventually other American Legion battalions were accommodated as well.<sup>132</sup> With the American Legion battalions as a precedent, it was only a matter of time before other aliens were also accepted.

Recruiting regulations were not formally amended, but the idea that aliens were acceptable in the CEF was finally recognized in April 1917 when an Order-in-Council was issued authorizing a revised form of enlistment oath for men who were not British subjects because of "the large number of men [enlisted who are] not Citizens of Canada, or British subjects."<sup>133</sup> Neither KR&O nor the *General Order* of August 1915 was

formally suspended or amended, but the Order-in-Council was a de facto admission that foreign-born soldiers were welcome in the CEF.

There was a further change in 1918 with the introduction of conscription under the *Military Service Act 1917*. In brief, draftees were required to be British subjects. Immigrants who had not been naturalized could still be drafted, but only for non-combatant service. Since the demand was for infantrymen, it can be safely assumed that relatively few non-British subjects were drafted.<sup>134</sup>

A number of those drafted in 1918 were enemy aliens from Germany or the Austro-Hungarian Empire. An apparent contradiction of previous regulations, the provision was consistent with the spirit of the *Naturalization Act 1914* which reminded those naturalized that they were "subject to all obligations, duties and liabilities to which a natural born British subject is subject."<sup>135</sup> The sentiment was repeated in the *Wartime Elections Act* of 1917 which disenfranchised all those born in enemy countries naturalized after 31 March 1902 but allowed those who had joined the CEF or who had been rejected as medically unfit, together with their families, to retain the vote.<sup>136</sup> In effect, citizenship with its attendant rights carried with it an obligation to serve the state.

Eligibility for the CEF was clouded by the fact that foreign nations felt free to control immigrants resident in Canada. Italy allowed Italian citizens living in Canada to join the CEF but only after obtaining a Consular certificate that they were exempt from service in the Italian army. Serbs and Montenegrins were also allowed to enlist, but were subject to recall by their home countries for military service.<sup>137</sup> In Ottawa, the 5<sup>th</sup> Field Company had to release seven Belgians in January 1915 after representations from the Belgian Consul.<sup>138</sup> On the other hand, Frenchmen were not claimed by their parent



country unless they were reservists, in which case they were expected to report to their unit regardless of whether or not they were naturalized British subjects. Those serving with the 1<sup>st</sup> Division, such as Major Raymond Brutinel, were faced with the prospect of arrest if they deployed with their units to France. The issue was quickly resolved, however, when the French government agreed that those serving with the CEF would not be 'bothered'.<sup>139</sup>

Enlistment of Russians was a bureaucratic nightmare mainly because of the conditions imposed by their home country. In October 1914, the Russian ambassador in Washington notified the Montréal consulate that Russians living in Canada who had fulfilled their military obligation were free to join the CEF. But this may have been an error and a few days later, the consul notified External Affairs that the policy applied only to Russians living in Britain or France. Those living in Canada, therefore, could not enlist in the CEF and those who had should be discharged forthwith.

Militia HQ promptly notified all districts and only twenty-two Russians are known to have been enlisted in November and December 1914, mainly in the Maritimes and Western Canada. However, judging by a request from the Russian attaché in London in December 1914 to allow twenty-nine Russians with the 1<sup>st</sup> Division to attend Greek Orthodox services, the restriction did not apply to those serving overseas.<sup>140</sup>

The Russian government insisted on maintaining a grip on all Russians, regardless of individual circumstances and Canada's status as a nation. In March 1915, the CEF recruiting officer in Humboldt, Saskatchewan, asked if Russians who came to Canada as young children could enlist in the CEF. The response from the consul was swift: these men were expected to return to Russia to perform their military service. "The

communications between Russia and Canada have never been interrupted," wrote the consul, and "they are able to reach Russia, by their own means."<sup>141</sup> Similarly, in June 1915 Sergeant-Major Haynes of Roblin, Manitoba, was advised that former members of the Russian army living in Canada were not allowed to join the CEF but were expected "to join their own regiment in Russia, and have to go there by their own means."<sup>142</sup>

The Russian policy was clearly impractical because of the closure of the Baltic and Black Sea ports and the difficulties of an ocean voyage from Canada to Archangel or Vladivostok. In July 1915, the Imperial Russian Consulate in Montréal notified External Affairs that the Czar had issued a decree on 18 June 1915 authorizing Russian subjects in Canada, including reservists and territorials, to enlist in the CEF. But, the edict announced, these men had to apply to the Consulate for an identification certificate in order to enlist.<sup>143</sup> To obtain this certificate, men had to produce Russian identification papers (passport, military booklet or birth certificate), provide a photograph and pay consular fees of \$1.63 – more than a day's pay for a private soldier.<sup>144</sup> Not surprisingly, Canadian authorities were not consulted in the process of modifying CEF enlistment procedures. Nor is there any record of any arm of the Canadian government protesting what amounted to an infringement of Canadian sovereignty.

Inevitably there were problems with the process put in place by the Russian consul apart from the volume of requests (more than 6,600 Russians enlisted in the CEF). In March 1916, the CGS noted that a number of Russian subjects in Saskatchewan had lost or destroyed their papers and feared that "good men and true may be lost to the Canadian Expeditionary Force because they have the misfortune to be without papers."<sup>145</sup> He suggested that Hawryl Slipchenko in Saskatoon could verify they were genuine

Russians, but the consul dismissed the idea and insisted that local authorities at the recruit's place of birth in Russia would have to investigate the man's claims.<sup>146</sup> For their part, some of the Russian-born soldiers who enlisted detested the requirement for a certificate from the consul, were reluctant to provide their photograph to Russian authorities and were opposed to letting the consul know they were members of the CEF.<sup>147</sup> The system was cumbersome, and in practice amounted to an inefficient farce despite the avowed purpose of weeding out enemy aliens trying to pass themselves off as bona fide Russians.<sup>148</sup>

Enemy aliens, those born in enemy countries, were automatically suspect and all concerned understood that these men could not be enlisted. But the policy was not applied uniformly and a handful of those with former service in the Canadian Forces were allowed to join the CEF. Examples include George Merkel from Bamberg, a skilled harness maker who had served with the PF in the Canadian Ordnance Corps since 1906, and Rudolph Back from Magdeburg who had served for eighteen years with the militia and had fought in South Africa with the 2<sup>nd</sup> (Special Service) Battalion of the RCR.<sup>149</sup>

Aliens were barred from enlistment on the basis of nationality and not ethnicity. Andi Brod from Berlin, for example, was discharged from the 5<sup>th</sup> Battalion because he was German-born. However, both Adolph Messerschmidt, a Baltic German, and Reinhold Krinke, a Volhynia German, were technically Russians and therefore acceptable.<sup>150</sup> There was a tacit recognition that some ethnic groups from enemy countries could be safely enlisted: those from Alsace-Lorraine, the Balkan provinces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Bohemia, Moravia and Christians from the Ottoman Empire.

Initially immigrants from non-English speaking countries found it difficult to join. But starting in the second half of 1915 the proportion of immigrants enlisting exceeded comparable rates for the CEF as a whole as shown in Table 20. In other words, these men found it easier to enlist which suggests that recruiters were not as zealous in enforcing citizenship requirements as they were in 1914 and the first half of 1915.

**Table 20**  
**Sample of Foreign Born Enlistments 1914-1916<sup>151</sup>**

<b>Born</b>	<b>1914 Aug-Dec</b>	<b>1915 Jan-Jun Recruits</b>	<b>Increase over previous 6 months</b>	<b>1915 Jul-Dec Recruits</b>	<b>Increase over previous 6 months</b>	<b>1916 Jan-Jun Recruits</b>	<b>Increase over previous 6 months</b>	<b>1916 Jul-Dec Recruits</b>	<b>Increase over previous 6 months</b>	<b>Sample Size</b>
Belgium	108	73	68%	109	149%	298	273%	94	32%	682
France	78	85	109%	113	133%	227	201%	100	44%	603
Denmark	53	37	70%	123	332%	242	197%	115	46%	570
Greece	13	5	39%	35	700%	55	157%	65	118%	173
Holland	26	24	92%	53	221%	102	193%	22	22%	227
Iceland	5	7	140%	42	600%	182	433%	7	4%	243
Italy	29	58	200%	227	391%	338	149%	120	36%	772
Japan	1	2	200%	3	150%	59	1967%	118	200%	183
Montenegro	14	1	7%	24	2400%	14	58%	33	236%	86
Norway	42	32	76%	116	363%	616	531%	138	22%	944
Romania	9	4	44%	12	300%	74	617%	58	78%	157
Russia	110	123	112%	906	737%	2,029	224%	870	43%	4,038
Serbia	13	4	31%	32	800%	75	234%	43	57%	167
Sweden	50	36	72%	181	503%	457	253%	131	29%	855
Switzerland	14	12	86%	31	258%	55	177%	23	42%	135
<b>Totals</b>	<b>565</b>	<b>503</b>	<b>89%</b>	<b>2,007</b>	<b>399%</b>	<b>4,823</b>	<b>240%</b>	<b>1,937</b>	<b>40%</b>	<b>9,835</b>
<b>CEF - All</b>	<b>56,584</b>	<b>51,674</b>	<b>91%</b>	<b>100,678</b>	<b>195%</b>	<b>133,614</b>	<b>133%</b>	<b>36,007</b>	<b>27%</b>	<b>378,557</b>

Notes: (1) Percentages have been rounded off to the nearest whole number.

(2) Nations and regions not specified in Table 20 are: Albania, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Central America, Cuba, Germany, Luxembourg, Mexico, North Africa, Ottoman Empire, Portugal, South America and Spain.

In theory, Chinese recruits had to be British subjects, of age and medically fit. However, they were not wanted and there may have been specific rules to prevent them from joining. In April 1917, the AAG at HQ MD 2 wrote that "regulations do not permit of the enlistment of Chinamen into the Canadian Expeditionary Force."<sup>152</sup> The regulations invoked by HQ MD 2 have not been found, but a Military Service Branch Circular in August 1918 notified local registrars that the Department of Militia and Defence policy was not "to enroll men with the CEF, who are obviously Chinese."<sup>153</sup> The Circular also noted that depot battalions had been instructed to return Chinese-Canadian draftees to the Registrar's records (i.e. discharged). Whether the exclusion of Chinese Canadians was a regulation or an informal policy is not certain. Either way, it is quite clear that these men were not welcome in the CEF.

Not surprisingly, very few Chinese Canadians joined the CEF. Marjorie Wong has estimated that about three hundred enlisted, but this is clearly an exaggeration and to date, only five men have been identified.<sup>154</sup> Three were born in Canada: Frederick Lee from Kamloops, who was killed at Hill 70 in August 1917; Wee Tan (William Thomas) Louie, who was drafted into the Alberta Regiment; and Wee Hong (Walter Henry) Louie, who joined the Canadian Forestry Corps in April 1917.<sup>155</sup> Two were born in China: Tung On Hong from Haileybury, who joined the Canadian Forestry Corps in May 1917; and Victor Fong, a Québec City student who enlisted in the 248<sup>th</sup> Battalion in October 1917 and then promptly deserted.<sup>156</sup> There may have been a few others. In 1920, Hugh Guthrie, the Minister of Militia and Defence estimated that about a dozen Chinese Canadians had enlisted in the CEF.<sup>157</sup>

Japanese immigrants also had difficulties with recruiting criteria. Many were transient and intent on earning sufficient money to purchase a farm or house in Japan. No doubt, many of these men were not British subjects. Language was also an issue. Militia HQ was adamant that recruits had to speak English or French but, as late as 1924-1926, almost 74% of Japanese immigrants in British Columbia were unable to read, write or understand English.<sup>158</sup> Most of them lived in British Columbia where the provincial government discouraged enlistment which could lead to enfranchisement, a sentiment echoed by the CGS who thought that "when the war is over & demobilization sets in, those of them who served in the CEF will make themselves a nuisance. *Après nous, le Déluge*".<sup>159</sup> Elsewhere there were no objections to recruiting Japanese Canadians; in March 1916, the men of the 216<sup>th</sup> Battalion in Toronto were asked if they would welcome a Japanese company and "Every hand in the battalion went up in the affirmative."<sup>160</sup>

In Vancouver, the Canadian Japanese Association in Vancouver offered to raise a battalion while others offered to raise an independent company. The battalion was rejected by Militia HQ because there were doubts that the manpower supply was adequate to form and sustain the unit. The proposal was passed to Britain and Japan, but neither government replied and the Militia Council decided not to proceed with forming the battalion.<sup>161</sup> The independent company was also quashed because the idea of a company that could not be broken up for reinforcements was anathema to Militia HQ.<sup>162</sup>

Japanese applicants living in the United States were banned from enlisting with the British Canadian Recruiting Mission, although at least nine were able to join.<sup>163</sup> Ethnicity was not a bar to conscription and at least twenty-four Japanese Canadians or Nisei were drafted under the MSA – almost 11% of all known Japanese enrollments.

Surprisingly, eighteen were residents of British Columbia or the Yukon which formed part of MD 11.<sup>164</sup>

Sikhs also received short shrift. Almost 99% of them lived in British Columbia where they were regarded with suspicion and contempt although they had been born in a British colony and in many cases anxious to enlist.<sup>165</sup> There were no objections to Sikhs enlisting provided they did so in the Indian Army and not in the CEF. In September 1914, W.P. Archibald, the Dominion Parole Officer, for example, reported that he had interviewed a number of ex-members of the Indian Army in the British Columbia Penitentiary and recommended that they be allowed to join the Indian Corps in France: "These men have every appearance of strength and manhood and I am sure they are anxious to serve their country."<sup>166</sup> Archibald missed the point: the men in question were living in Canada and not India.

A few months later, in December 1914, a deputation of East Indians approached the premier of British Columbia, Sir Richard McBride, with an offer to raise a contingent of ex-Sepoys.<sup>167</sup> McBride passed the proposal to Prime Minister Borden, but it was rejected, in part because the CGS believed that finding reinforcements would be difficult and because of concerns "these men are not of the tribe or race of Sikhs who are considered the best fighters in India."<sup>168</sup> The proposal was then passed by Borden to the Governor General in February 1915 with a suggestion that the War Office pick up the offer of Sikh recruits from British Columbia.<sup>169</sup>

The number of East Indians who managed to enlist in the CEF is unknown and one historian has gone so far as to say that none were accepted.<sup>170</sup> However, a search of on-line attestation forms has turned up sixteen men who were clearly not Anglo-Indians



or the sons of British expatriates.<sup>171</sup> The first East Indian joined the 24<sup>th</sup> Battalion at Montréal in January 1915 while the last volunteered at Ottawa in October 1918.<sup>172</sup> The sample reflects the general dislike of East Indians in British Columbia where the overwhelming majority lived. Only two men were residents of British Columbia while one, who joined the British Columbia Regiment, was a California Jew born in India who had been enlisted by the British-Canadian Recruiting Mission.<sup>173</sup> At least one Sikh enlisted at Vancouver under an assumed name.<sup>174</sup> In total, seven volunteers enlisted in Ontario, two in Québec, three in Manitoba and three in British Columbia. As with Chinese Canadians, East Indians were not supposed to be conscripted under the MSA, but there was at least one Sikh, Ram Singh of Grand Forks, who was drafted into the British Columbia Regiment in December 1917.<sup>175</sup>

There were no regulations preventing blacks from enlisting, but many had difficulties. As the AG noted in October 1915 "The final approval of any man, regardless of colour or other distinctions, must, of course, rest with the Officer Commanding the unit."<sup>176</sup> Enlistment, then, depended on the bias (if any) of the recruiter or his commanding officer.

There is an abundance of anecdotal evidence concerning the experiences of individual blacks who were rejected by recruiters and these examples have been used by historians to present a bleak picture of universal racism.<sup>177</sup> Less well known are the experiences of blacks who enlisted as volunteers and served overseas, men such as Miles Dymond from Fredericton who joined the 1<sup>st</sup> Field Company at Valcartier in 1914, John Granito, a sergeant with the 54<sup>th</sup> Battalion, Curley Christian, Canada's only quadruple

amputee, and James Post, an underage black with the 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Mounted Rifles who was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal.<sup>178</sup>

Also unreported are efforts by authorities to ensure that blacks were able to enlist. In November 1915, for example, there were complaints that blacks had been turned away by recruiters in MD 2, and Sam Hughes demanded an explanation. The reply from the district commander was unequivocal: "Last summer [the] question arose here and I ruled they [blacks] must be accepted."<sup>179</sup> The district commander's reply was not a pro forma denial. A few days later, the AAG of HQ MD 2 wrote to the Toronto Recruiting Depot, "If the practice of refusing to accept colored men has been followed, it must be discontinued at once." The reply from the depot was succinct: "We make no discrimination here as to color or creed."<sup>180</sup>

Elsewhere authorities were adamant that there should be no institutional discrimination. In July 1916, the commanding officer of No. 1 Construction Battalion wrote that the designation of a black unit as No. 2 Construction Battalion had resulted in complaints from his men who were upset at being associated with blacks. The reply from the AG was blunt and direct. Those joining No. 2 Construction Battalion were both British subjects and Canadians. Coloured troops were "recognized as comrades in arms both in France and England. It is for you, therefore, to inspire your men with correct ideas on the subject."<sup>181</sup>

Still, attitudes in the CEF (and Canada for that matter) were ambivalent. In November 1915, J.R.B. Whitney, publisher of the black journal *Canadian Observer*, wrote to Sam Hughes asking if the CEF would accept a company of blacks recruited in

Ontario: Hughes was taken by the suggestion but substituted a black platoon grafted on to an existing battalion. The proposal was then passed to HQ MD 2 for review.<sup>182</sup>

HQ MD 2 queried thirty-seven battalions, all of which refused to accept the platoon.<sup>183</sup> Nineteen battalions considered that black soldiers would deter recruiting or would be unpopular with the officers and men, with the 147<sup>th</sup> Battalion in Grey County reporting that "prejudice against negroes in this County is extremely bitter" and the 114<sup>th</sup> Battalion commenting that a black platoon would cause serious friction and discontent within the unit. Twelve battalions reported they were up to strength and did not need recruits while the CO of the 169<sup>th</sup> noted that his unit was up to full strength but he was willing to offer eight blacks in his battalion to help build up the platoon. Three battalions replied that they were recruiting only to fill up existing platoons while the 133<sup>rd</sup> and 177<sup>th</sup> were willing to accept blacks, but only if they were residents of Norfolk or Simcoe County respectively.

The replies reflected CEF ambivalence towards blacks. Prejudice existed but there were military factors as well. Battalions were formed by selecting commanding officers who then appointed a complete slate of officers, including platoon commanders, before starting their recruiting campaign.<sup>184</sup> The addition of a black platoon to an existing battalion, therefore, required the unit to be reorganized. Commanding officers were (and still are) very busy people. Reorganizing the battalion to accommodate a black platoon and then finding reinforcements to keep the platoon up to strength were added burdens that the commanding officer could do without. The platoon may have advanced the status of blacks within Canada but would have been an added complication for over-worked

commanding officers who were under considerable pressure to complete their battalions.<sup>185</sup>

The number of blacks who managed to satisfy both social and military criteria for enrolment is unknown, although the Governor General's military secretary noted in October 1915 that His Royal Highness had inspected a number of units and "come across quite a good number of coloured men."<sup>186</sup> However, a sample of 1,090 men who were probably black has been compiled based on those who served in No. 2 Construction Battalion, a handful who joined other units and men born in the West Indies.<sup>187</sup> The sample suggests that more than 1,200 blacks served in the CEF.

Table 21  
Black Soldiers - Sample

Group	Sample	Mean Enlistment Date	US Residents	Proportion US Residents	MSA	Proportion of MSA
West Indians	440	January 1918	72	16.4%	183	41.6%
Known Canadian Blacks	45	March 1918	4	0.9%	26	58.8%
No. 2 Construction Battalion	605	October 1916	167	27.6%	N/A	N/A
Total	1,090	December 1916	243	22.3%	209	19.2%
CEF		March 1916		10%		21%

Not all of those who enlisted lived in Canada. American blacks accounted for at least 243 men, or 22.3% of all blacks who enlisted - more than one in five as compared to the CEF average of 10%. If only those living in Canada are considered, the enlistment rate was 9.4%, slightly below the Canadian-born rate of 11.2%. The mean enlistment date

for all blacks was December 1916, nine months after the CEF average while 19.2% were conscripts, slightly lower than the national average.

However, these statistics are skewed by the all-volunteer construction battalion recruited between July 1916 and March 1917. If only the West Indian sample is considered, then the mean enlistment date was February 1918 with 183 draftees accounting for 40.7% of all enlistments. Admittedly these numbers are soft. Attestation forms did not specify ethnicity and perhaps there were a few men in the sample groups who were not black. The sample groups themselves are also incomplete. Still, the evidence strongly suggests the mean enlistment date for blacks was significantly later than the CEF as a whole and the MSA rate was somewhat higher. Clearly the CEF was ambivalent about accepting black recruits, an attitude summarized by the AG in April 1918: "We are not hunting for coloured recruits but merely making a place for them as they come in."<sup>188</sup>

Specific criteria were also applied to natives by Sam Hughes, at least in MD 1, from August 1914 to December 1915. In brief, natives were forbidden to enlist for overseas service. The restriction was not a reasoned and deliberate policy but rather a hasty response to a query from MD 1 on whether Indians were eligible for the CEF. Both the query and the response were dated 8 August 1914. That the policy was a spur of the moment decision is supported by the fact that Hughes's military secretary wrote to the Ontario M.P.P. for Huron County on the same day assuring him that natives in his riding who wished to enlist could apply to the 32<sup>nd</sup> Huron Regiment which was recruiting for the First Contingent.<sup>189</sup>

Strictly speaking, Hughes's policy applied only to MD 1 which contained 4,240 natives – about 4% of all natives in Canada.<sup>190</sup> There is some indication that the restriction was applied in MD 2 in February 1915, but this is far from certain.<sup>191</sup> In any event, the policy was not publicized and no evidence has been found of a Militia Order, General Order or circular instruction concerning the matter. Admittedly the Department of Indian Affairs was notified, but not until October 1915 and only in response to a specific question.<sup>192</sup> In any event, the restriction was formally rescinded in December 1915 after MD 1 and MD 2 requested authority for the newly-authorized 114<sup>th</sup> and 135<sup>th</sup> Battalions to recruit natives.<sup>193</sup>

The effect of the supposed ban on native enlistments was limited. In November 1914, the 20<sup>th</sup> Battalion in MD 2 had an Indian company from the 37<sup>th</sup> Regiment as well as two lieutenants, both of whom were status Indians.<sup>194</sup> In 1915, before the restriction was lifted, natives openly enlisted in other MD 2 units including the 58<sup>th</sup>, 76<sup>th</sup>, 81<sup>st</sup> and 84<sup>th</sup> Battalions as well as the Canadian Mounted Rifles Depot in Hamilton.<sup>195</sup> The honour roll of native fatalities published by Fred Gaffen shows seventy-two men who enlisted between September 1914 and the beginning of December 1915 when the restriction was lifted.\* Only three were from MD 1, all of whom joined the First Contingent in September 1914. The remaining sixty-nine came from every other district in the country and enlisted at various times between September 1914 and November 1915.<sup>196</sup> It seems apparent, therefore, that Hughes's direction had little effect outside of MD 1.

The number of natives who joined is unknown although the generally accepted estimate is 3,500 to 4,000 men.<sup>197</sup> Virtually all were status Indians or Métis. Only one

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\* A cursory search of embarkation rolls turned up an additional 128 Natives who enlisted prior to December 1915.

Inuk is known to have joined the CEF although there were two men with the 228<sup>th</sup> Battalion who may have also have been Inuit.<sup>198</sup>

Canadian historian Fred Gaffen has compiled an honour roll of 336 fatalities, mainly status Indians although a few Métis are also included.<sup>199</sup> The roll contains errors and omissions and after these are taken into account, the total is 314 natives who died during the war.<sup>200</sup> Given the overall death rate of 9.6% in the CEF, this number suggests that only 3,271 natives were enlisted. But the honour roll is probably not complete and the commonly accepted estimate of 3,500 native enlistments seems reasonable. Assuming that 3,500 natives joined, the enlistment rate was 6.5% of all males or 7.6% if those living in the Northwest Territories are excluded (no recruiting parties are known to have visited this region.)<sup>201</sup> In comparison, the enlistment rate for Canadian-born males was 11.2%.

Part of this difference may be due to the fact that status Indians could be conscripted into non-combatant corps only, at least from 17 January 1918 onwards.<sup>202</sup> Since there was little demand for men in non-combatant corps, it is likely that few natives were drafted. Only four men of the men on Gaffen's honour roll, or 1.2% of all deaths, were draftees. In contrast, to pick four regions at random, 67 or 4% of the 1,676 CEF men commemorated on cenotaphs in Perth, Oxford, Huron and Middlesex counties in Ontario were draftees.<sup>203</sup>

Informal rules were set by some reserves that saw the war as a chance to advance their cause. On the Cape Mudge Reserve of British Columbia, an impromptu gathering of young men on 6 January 1916 resulted in a declaration that "as the Indians were not voters, and as they had not been consulted either with regard to the taking away of their original heritage, or in the formation of any of our [Canadian] laws they did not feel

called upon to take up arms for the flag.”<sup>204</sup> Other bands supported the notion that their young men were free to decide if they should leave the CEF after enlisting, or, in other words, desert. At Caughnawaga, Québec, residents were sufficiently militant that Indian Affairs advised Militia HQ that military police should not enter the reserve to apprehend deserters, thus creating a safe haven on Canadian soil.<sup>205</sup> In British Columbia, some natives could not enlist unless they had permission from their chief, leading one volunteer to retort in 1917 “that the only chief he recognized was King George V.”<sup>206</sup>

Many reserves were isolated. Recruiting parties could not visit on a routine basis and would-be recruits had difficulty reaching recruiting stations. The 228<sup>th</sup> Battalion, for example, enlisted at least seventeen men at Moose Factory, Ontario, accessible at the time only by water. In Manitoba, a recruiting party from the 203<sup>rd</sup> Battalion probably used a lake steamer to secure sixteen native recruits at Norway House in June 1916. In August 1917, Forestry Corps recruiters enlisted John Semple, a native from Berens River “On the S.S. Wolverine on Lake Winnipeg.”<sup>207</sup> Communities on James Bay and Hudson’s Bay were also difficult to reach and in 1917 Lieutenant C.M. McCarthy hired a ‘gasoline boat’ at an estimated cost of \$1,500 to go down the Albany River and recruit forty-five men at Attawapiskat, Albany River and Fort Albany.<sup>208</sup>

Militia HQ constantly made efforts throughout the war to expand the pool of potential recruits but their efforts were inconsistent and unfocused. Asians were routinely turned away while no attempt was made to tap the black community. Some remote reserves were visited by recruiting officers but there was no concerted effort made to enlist natives who did not live in southern Canada. In all, the reluctance to enlist minority groups probably cost the CEF about 8,500 recruits, as shown in Table 22.



Table 22  
Sample - Visible Minorities<sup>209</sup>

Group	Males of all Ages	Potential Recruits	Actual Recruits	Proportion of all Males
Chinese	26,813	3,995	5 (minimum)	>0.1%
East Indians	2,315	345	16 (minimum)	0.6%
Japanese	7,522	1,121	227 (minimum)	3%
Blacks	8,807	1,312	1,200 (estimated)	13.6%
Natives	44,939	6,695	3,500-4,000 (estimated)	7.8% -8.9%
Total	90,396	13,468	4,948	5.5%
CEF	3,626,621		539,210	14.9%

Notes: (1) CEF enlistments exclude those who were American residents or who were enlisted outside of Canada.

(2) Natives in the Yukon and Northwest Territories have been excluded since there was no active recruiting with the exception of the Yukon Infantry Company.

(3) The number of black and native enlistments is based on estimates.

(4) Chinese and East Indian enlistments include men who were Chinese or East Indian as well as those who were born elsewhere but were obviously Chinese or East Indian in origin.

(5) Japanese recruits include two men born in Korea which was then a Japanese possession.

(6) Men whose parents were British or Canadian expatriates have not been included regardless of their birthplace.

Recruiting criteria were continually modified throughout the war. A number of changes were initiated by Militia HQ in an effort to broaden eligibility for enlistment, but not all changes were productive. The reduction in height standards for the infantry, for example, produced few soldiers who were fit for the trenches. Other changes, such as the age range, failed to take into account British standards that governed the CEF overseas. Other criteria that inhibited recruiting and regulations concerning non-English speaking immigrants and visible minorities probably turned many would-be recruits away.

Militia HQ was not a passive participant in the effort to find recruits but actively sought to modify criteria to suit changing circumstances. The evolving changes had effects on the manpower pool and these effects are examined in Chapter 5.

The population of the militia was not static. As the militia grew, the pool of potential recruits was also growing. It is difficult to determine the exact number of potential recruits at any one time, but it is clear that the pool was large and diverse. The militia was not limited to a specific geographic area, and recruits came from a wide range of backgrounds and social classes.

### Recruits

Year	Number of Recruits	Percentage of Total
1792	1,000	100%
1793	1,200	120%
1794	1,500	150%
1795	1,800	180%
1796	2,000	200%
1797	2,200	220%
1798	2,500	250%
1799	2,800	280%
1800	3,000	300%

These figures show a steady increase in the number of recruits over the period from 1792 to 1800. This increase was due to a combination of factors, including a growing population and a more active recruitment effort by the militia.

In 1792, the militia was composed of a small number of men, but by 1800, it had grown to a size that allowed it to undertake more extensive operations. The militia was not limited to a specific geographic area, and recruits came from a wide range of backgrounds and social classes. The militia was not limited to a specific geographic area, and recruits came from a wide range of backgrounds and social classes.

The militia was not limited to a specific geographic area, and recruits came from a wide range of backgrounds and social classes. The militia was not limited to a specific geographic area, and recruits came from a wide range of backgrounds and social classes. The militia was not limited to a specific geographic area, and recruits came from a wide range of backgrounds and social classes.

Annex A  
Chapter 4

Medically Unfit  
Pre-Enlistment Chronic Conditions

The general state of health of Canadian males during the First World War is not certain, but without a detailed description of underlying causes, it is difficult to draw any conclusion other than there were a large number of men enlisted who were unfit for military service.

Table 23  
Releases – Other Ranks<sup>210</sup>

Description	Overseas	Canada Only	Total
Medically unfit	85,673	42,897	128,570
Rejected by unit MO	7	746	753
Rejected by unit MO although accepted elsewhere	14	113	127
Unfit within three months of enlistment	15	4,301	4,316
Unfit on reaching 18 years of age	16	54	70
Totals	85,725	48,111	133,836

Note: Those who were wounded or injured in France and Belgium are included with the medically unfit who served overseas.

In considering specific causes of medical unfitness, a clearer picture emerges that illustrates aspects of public health in general. It is probable that most of the diseases shown in Table 23 were acquired in civilian life and were not the result of military service, although only an examination of individual personnel files would prove this.

Diagnostic tools available in 1914-1918 could have detected some of these conditions such as defective teeth, nutritional and metabolic disorders, anemia, foot deformities, mental disorders, parasites, tuberculosis, gonorrhoea and syphilis. However, the general lack of laboratories and the dispersal of many units in small detachments

throughout rural areas made any sort of systematic testing difficult, if not impossible.

Many of the diseases listed are readily treatable today and it is difficult to imagine soldiers being released in modern times because conditions such as venereal diseases or parasites.

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Table 24  
 Chronic Diseases - Selection  
 Other Ranks of CEF<sup>211</sup>

Condition	Discharges	Deaths	Total	Percentage of all diseases
Heart and pericardium	3,502	323	3,825	18.1%
Defective teeth	101		101	0.5%
Stomach inflammation and ulcers	959	45	1,004	4.8%
Other stomach diseases	22	6	28	0.1%
Liver disease	21	15	36	0.2%
Hernia	1,153	13	1,166	5.5%
Gall and bladder disease	56	6	62	0.3%
Pancreas		2	2	
Ductless glands	233	8	241	1.1%
Nutritional and metabolic disorders	88	62	150	0.7%
Tumors (general) and cysts	84	19	103	0.5%
Diseases of reproductive system	824	17	841	4%
Anemia and other blood disorders	73	29	102	0.5%
Muscles and fascia	200	1	201	1%
Spinal diseases (excluding cerebral spinal disease)	79	1	80	0.4%
Bones and periosteum	1,729	6	1,735	8.2%
Flat foot	414		414	2%
Other foot deformities	402	2	404	1.9%
Diseases of lymphatic system	147	7	154	0.7%
Spleen	5	1	6	
Mental disorders (including suicides)	1,486	123	1,609	7.6%
Epilepsy	629	16	645	3.1%
Other diseases of the nervous system	829	93	922	4.4%
Parasites (including scabies)	357		357	1.7%
Alcoholism	70	63	133	0.6%
Other intoxicants and drugs	81	54	135	0.6%
Tuberculosis (lung)	2,602	376	2,978	14.1%
Other tubercular diseases	292	101	393	1.9%
Gonorrhea	1,804	22	1,826	8.6%
Tertiary syphilis	11	2	13	0.1%
Rheumatism (acute or chronic)	1,446	9	1,455	6.9%
Totals	13,885	627	21,121	

Notes: (1) Mental disorders exclude men suffering from shell shock or neurasthenia.

(2) Men with below average intelligence were released as 'unlikely to

become an efficient soldier', a catch-all description that included a wide variety of causes.<sup>212</sup> A total of 6,700 other ranks were discharged as 'inefficient & undesirable.'

(3) Not included are cases of cancers, new growths and tumors. A total of 360 men were discharged under these categories and 197 died for a total of 557 soldiers.

However, Table 24 shows those who were accepted for enlistment and were then subsequently discharged. In other words, the table may not accurately reflect the general medical state of Canadian males between the ages of eighteen and forty-five. Regrettably no comprehensive statistics appear to exist, since medical care was not centralized.

However, an intriguing picture emerges from a report prepared by an enterprising medical officer in Ontario (probably Windsor) of 889 men who applied for enlistment. A total of 289 men or 32.5% of those who applied were rejected for reasons set out in Table 25.

Table 25  
Medical Rejections – Ontario - 1917<sup>213</sup>

Reason for Rejection	Number	Percent of all Rejections
Hernia	42	14.5%
Underweight or undersized	38	13.1%
Deformed – old accident or disease	28	9.7%
Hemorrhoids	21	7.3%
Mental Deficiency	20	6.9%
Varicose veins	20	6.9%
Tuberculosis	18	6.2%
Asthma	4	1.4%
Osteomyelitis [bone infection]	4	1.4%
Old Pott's Fracture [ankle]	3	1%
Grave's Disease [hyperthyroidism]	3	1%
Defective knee joints	3	1%
Rheumatic Fever	11	3.8%
Chronic otorrohea [chronic ear discharge]	10	3.5%
Valvular disease of the heart	10	3.5%
Defective sight or hearing	9	3.1%
Various amputations	9	3.1%
Infantile spinal paralysis [Polio]	5	1.7%
Epilepsy	5	1.7%
Stammering	2	0.7%
Active syphilis	2	0.7%
Underage	2	0.7%
Overage	1	0.3%
Anal fistula [abscess]	3	1%
Chronic eczema	2	0.7%
Diseases of the spine	2	0.7%
Congenital torticollis [wryneck present at birth]	1	0.3%
Discharging neck sinus [Pilonidal cyst]	1	0.3%
Chronic laryngitis	1	0.3%
Chronic gonorrhoea	1	0.3%
Scoliosis [curved spine]	1	0.3%
Insanity	1	0.3%
Diabetes	1	0.3%
Night blindness	1	0.3%
Tachycardia [rapid heart beat]	1	0.3%
Deaf mutism	1	0.3%
Extensive foot calluses	1	0.3%
Prolapsed rectum [protrusion of lower bowel through the anus]	1	0.3%
Total	289	32.5%

Note: The table does not include multiple causes of disability.

The majority of conditions described were chronic or long-standing, a disturbing view of Canadian manhood in 1917. The reasons for these conditions are uncertain, although some were probably related to economic status and the availability of medical care. Assuming that literacy is a rough proxy for social class, many of those rejected must have been lower class or working-class men who could not afford adequate medical care, a telling comment on public health at the beginning of the twentieth century. Only 29 or 4.8% of the 600 recruits accepted were illiterate whereas 71 or 24.6% of those rejected were illiterate.

A somewhat different picture emerges from a small sample of men recruited by the 48<sup>th</sup> Highlanders who were rejected by the Toronto Recruiting Centre.



Table 26  
Medical Rejections – 48<sup>th</sup> Highlanders  
1915-1917<sup>214</sup>

Cause of Rejection	Number	Proportion of Sample
Eyesight and squint	35	29.7%
Varicose veins	10	8.5%
Hernia	8	6.8%
Poor development	8	6.8%
Underweight	8	6.8%
Flat feet	6	5.1%
Heart defects	6	5.1%
Requires operation	5	4.2%
Deformed	4	3.4%
Hammer toes	4	3.4%
Underage	4	3.4%
Rheumatism	3	2.5%
Epilepsy	2	1.7%
Old injury	2	1.7%
Overage	2	1.7%
Tuberculosis	2	1.7%
Undersized	2	1.7%
Asthma	1	0.8%
Bunions	1	0.8%
Cancer – lung	1	0.8%
Goiter	1	0.8%
Measles	1	0.8%
Spinal defect	1	0.8%
Tubercular right elbow	1	0.8%
Total	118	

Note: some men had multiple defects. Harry Brennan, for example, was rejected not only because he had cancer but because he was 17 years-old. Medical conditions only are listed to give an indication of public health at that time.

Some of the defects listed in Table 26 were probably the result of inadequate medical care. Certainly bunions, goiters, measles and tuberculosis could have been treated while those with hernias could be given trusses. The number of men who were rejected as poorly developed or underweight (13.6% of the sample) also suggests poor nutrition while the old injuries and perhaps the deformities suggest work-place injuries.

<sup>1</sup> King's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Militia 1910 paragraph 252 specifying an age range of eighteen to forty-five and King's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Militia 1917 paragraph 299 with the same age limits.

<sup>2</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1311 File 593-3-7 Vol 3, General Orders 13 August 1915 with recruiting regulations; LAC RG 24 Vol 4509 File 17-1-49, AG Circular Letter 18 January 1917 directing that boys under the age of eighteen were not to be enlisted as buglers or drummers.

<sup>3</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4642 File 99-4-62, AG Circular Letter 16 June 1916

<sup>4</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4509 File 17-1-49 Vol IX, AG Circular Letter 22 January 1917. This age limit applied only to the four sections of Skilled Railway Employees.

<sup>5</sup> LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 439 File E-102-1, DAG OMFC to HQ Canadian Troops Brighton 4 December 1916

<sup>6</sup> King's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Militia 1910 paragraph 252 specifying an age range of eighteen to forty-four; TNA WO 293/4 ACI 1186 of 13 June 1916 codified age limits; With regards to those under nineteen, there are numerous references in OMFC file. See also TNA WO 293/3, War Office Instruction 46 of 6 September 1915; Messenger. Call to Arms: The British Army 1914-1918, p75 quoting an ACI of 23 December 1914; Van Emden, Richard Boy Soldiers of the Great War: Their Own Stories for the First Time (London: Headline, 2005) p.27 suggested that the restriction on soldiers younger than nineteen serving abroad had been adopted before the war but did not provide a source.

<sup>7</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 6600 File 1982-1-78, Perley to Borden 21 December 1916

<sup>8</sup> LAC RG 9 III B2 Vol 3483 File 10-14-1 Vol 2, Surgeon-General to OMFC 29 January 1917

<sup>9</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 6600 File 1982-1-78, DGMS to AG 3 February 1917 and AG to Militia Council 8 February 1917 concerning the discrepancy in age limits. The files contains a number of queries from Militia HQ to HQ OMFC which were never definitively answered; Military Service Act 1917 article 3(1); LAC RG 9 II B3 Vol 77, CEF Routine Orders, Number 83 of 22 January 1918, Number 330 of 19 March 1918.

<sup>10</sup> LAC RG 9 II B3 Vol 77, CEF Routine Orders, Number 83 of 22 January 1918, Number 330 of 19 March 1918; TNA WO 114/35 Weekly Returns of the British Army and Dominion Contingents at Home other than the Territorial Force 26 August 1918 showing 2,087 trained soldiers under the age of nineteen.

<sup>11</sup> LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 90 File 10-12-8, AG Canadians to Secretary OMFC 23 February 1917 with the policy that boys under 16 ½ would be repatriated; LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 53, File 'Monthly Reports: July 1917', Progress Report of AG Branch for July 1917 advised that boys under 17 would be returned to Canada, those between 17 and 18 ½ would be posted to the 'Boys' Battalion while those over 18 ½ would be retained by a reserve battalion until they turned 19.

<sup>12</sup> Militia Order 146 of 22 May 1917 paragraph VIII. Special Service Companies were general duty men assigned to duties by District HQ as required.

<sup>13</sup> TNA WO 123/200, BEF GRO 1754 of 24 August 1916. The policy of leaving underage soldiers with their units was cancelled by GRO 1963 of 25 November 1916 which directed that underage soldiers would be returned to the appropriate base depot.

<sup>14</sup> LAC RG 9 III D3 Vol 5046 File 910 Reel T-10938, War Diary Canadian Section GHQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Echelon, 20 May 1917 noting instructions from the AG dated 20 April 1917 and from the DAG dated 29 April 1917, 1 January 1918 noting OMFC concurrence with the proposed evacuation to England of five hundred minors; LAC RG 9 III D3 Vol 5047 File 911 Reel T-10939, War Diary Canadian Section GHQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Echelon; 13 August 1918 noting rejection of an earlier proposal from Corps HQ.

<sup>15</sup> LAC RG 9 III D3 Vol 5046 File 910 Reel T-10938, War Diary Canadian Section GHQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Echelon 1 January 1918; LAC RG 9 III B3 Vol 3765, Strength as at end-January 1918. No record has been found of the actual number of minors evacuated following the OMFC decision.

<sup>16</sup> University of Western Ontario, Area Research and Collections Centre, 18<sup>th</sup> Battalion Record Book. (Compiled by 18<sup>th</sup> Battalion Orderly Room 1916-1919). This book consists of a nominal roll of all reinforcements who arrived between July 1916 and December 1918 and has been augmented by Daily Orders Part II September 1915 to June 1916 in LAC RG 9 III D3 Vol 5046 File 910; Details concerning the 72<sup>nd</sup> and 85<sup>th</sup> Battalion were taken from nominal rolls published in regimental histories: McEvoy, Bernard and Finlay, Captain A.H. History of the 72<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders of Canada. (Vancouver: Cowan & Brookhouse, 1920), Hayes, Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph. The Eighty-Fifth in France and Flanders, (Halifax: Royal Print & Litho Limited, 1920) and Gould, L. McLeod. From B.C. to Baisieux: being the narrative history of the 102<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Battalion. (Victoria: Thos. R. Cusack Presses,

1919). Bennett, Captain S.G. The 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Mounted Rifles 1914-1919. (Toronto: Murray Printing Company Limited, 1926).

<sup>17</sup> LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 420 File E-102-1, A/OC Canadians Shoreham to HQ Canadians Brighton 29 November 1916 reported that the overage battalion had arrived, DAG OMFC to HQ Canadian Troops Brighton 4 December 1916 noted the 37<sup>th</sup> was intended to be a collecting agency for overage men who would be then be posted to labour units.

<sup>18</sup> LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 420 File E-102-1, DAG OMFC to HQ Canadian Troops Brighton 4 December 1916. Overage men with 'B' categories were posted to the 37<sup>th</sup> for eventual service in France with labour units while those with 'C' categories would be employed in England.

<sup>19</sup> Starling, John and Lee, Ivor. No Labour, No Battle: Military Labour During the First World War. (Stroud, Gloucestershire: The History Press, 2009) p.252; Canadian Labour Corps fatalities from the Canadian Virtual War Memorial at <http://www.vac.acc.gc.ca/remembers/sub.cfm?source=collections/virtualmem>

<sup>20</sup> LAC RG 9 III C7 Vol 4470 Folder 7 File 8, SMO CRT to OC CRT 8 October 1917.

<sup>21</sup> LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 1004 File R-7-3, HQ 12<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade to HQ 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Division 24 August 1917; Canadian Section GHQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Echelon to HQ Canadian Corps 18 August 1917 referring to Sergeants Geddes and Ritchie of the 78<sup>th</sup> Battalion who were both too old to withstand the trenches and were therefore employed in the 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Entrenching Battalion and Divisional baths respectively; LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 1004 File R-7-3, HQ 12<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade to HQ 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Division 24 August 1917; OC 21<sup>st</sup> Battalion to HQ 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Brigade 26 January 1917 concerning Paudash and Comego, Canadian Section GHQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Echelon to HQ Canadian Corps 18 August 1917 with details concerning Johnston Paudash, a fifty-two year old native sniper with the 21<sup>st</sup> Battalion. It was eventually decided that he was physically fit and should therefore remain with the 21<sup>st</sup> despite his age; LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 1899 personnel file 59191 Peter Comego and Box 7655 personnel file 59799 Johnston Paudash. Both men were eventually repatriated to Canada in 1918 and discharged as medically unfit.

<sup>22</sup> DHS 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 1 Folder 3 'Disposition on Discharge'

<sup>23</sup> Van Emden. Boy Soldiers of the Great War p.316. Some of the ages for BEF soldiers appear to have been rounded up.

<sup>24</sup> Commonwealth War Graves Commission. Annual Report 2006-2007. (np, c2007) Section VI; I am indebted to Ms Johanna Neville of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, Canadian Agency for providing the initial list of overage and underage soldiers based on Commission records. The list included fifteen militiamen on active service. Her enthusiasm and co-operation is typical of the Canadian Agency in Ottawa. Thanks are also due to Major (Retired) Brad Hall, C.D., formerly Secretary-General of the Canadian Agency and now Director of the Commission's Outer Area (East). A review of all 3,190 surnames beginning with 'Mc' indicated that 61.1% of all entries had personal information. It is therefore safe to say that about 61% of all entries in cemetery registers included age on death.

<sup>25</sup> A preliminary estimate with somewhat different figures was provided to Doctor Tim Cook of the Canadian War Museum and used (with acknowledgements) in 'He was determined to go: Underage soldiers in the Canadian Expeditionary Force' in Histoire Sociale-Social History Vol 41 Number 81 (May 2008) pp.41-74. The same information appeared in Doctor Cook's book Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War 1917-1918. (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2008) p.591 citing the article as the source. —

<sup>26</sup> Nicholson. The Canadian Expeditionary Force. pp.520, 523. A total of 56,555 other ranks died of the 598,020 men who were enlisted.

<sup>27</sup> Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War 1917-1918. (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2008) p.xxxiii; Nicholson The Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919 p.523; Morton When Your Number's Up p.279

<sup>28</sup> LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 6153 (267541 Wesley Mickey) and Box 8464 (701232 Reuben Rosenfield). Rosenfield was discharged as underage on 11 March 1916, nine days after he enlisted while Mickey served in Canada until 17 October 1916; Morton When Your Number's Up. p.279 suggests that only one ten year was enrolled.

<sup>29</sup> LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 4663, personnel file 258572 William Henry Hugh Hutchison, Director of War Service Records to Department of Veterans Affairs 26 November 1953; DHH Minutes of the Militia Council 2 January 1918 p.21 concerning Hutchison's pay; LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 90 File 10-12-8, PC 83 of 12 January 1918 authorizing back pay; Hutchison had been discharged from the 211<sup>th</sup> Battalion in December 1916 but was smuggled on board the troopship as a form of 'mascot'. On arrival in England,

he was posted to the 8<sup>th</sup> Battalion Canadian Railway Troops. After being repatriated to Canada, Hutchison was discharged as underage on 31 March 1918. The issue with pay arose because he had been formally discharged on 2 December 1916. He subsequently served with the 11<sup>th</sup> Canadian Garrison Regiment from February to July 1919. Hutchison died in Vancouver 23 November 1969.

<sup>30</sup> Based on attestation forms available at <http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/databases/cef/001042-100.01-e.php>

<sup>31</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4376 File 34-7-61 Vol 2, AG Circular Letter 9 August 1917 noting that "In most of the cases these boys enlist giving a false age."

<sup>32</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1311 File 593-3-7 Vol 3, General Orders 13 August 1915 with recruiting regulations; LAC RG 24 Vol 4509 File 17-1-49, AG Circular Letter 18 January 1917 directing that boys under the age of eighteen were not to be enlisted as buglers or drummers.

<sup>33</sup> Details from the CWGC at [http://www.cwgc.org/debt\\_of\\_honour.asp?menuid=14](http://www.cwgc.org/debt_of_honour.asp?menuid=14).

<sup>34</sup> The LAC website at <http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/databases/cef/001042-100.01-e.php> was searched for men with service numbers ranging from 2607022 to 2607049. Twenty-one attestation forms of militiamen transferred to the CEF in May 1919 were found.

<sup>35</sup> LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 91, CEF Routine Order 795 of 12 July 1918 repeating Order in Council PC 1569 of 22 June 1918

<sup>36</sup> DHS 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 1 Folder 3 'Disposition on Discharge'

<sup>37</sup> Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics. Vital Statistics 1923: Third Annual Report. (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1925) p.xxxiii; Nicholson The Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919 p.523; Morton When Your Number's Up p.279

<sup>38</sup> Toronto Globe 10 March 1916 p.9. It is difficult to believe Mackenzie Bowell's offer was anything more than a publicity stunt to shame younger men into enlisting.

<sup>39</sup> LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 6459 1282269 Alexander Muir. A former member of the British 11<sup>th</sup> Hussars and the Canadian 5<sup>th</sup> Princess Louise Dragoon Guards, Muir was old enough to have served in the Crimea although his name does not appear on the roll for the Charge of the Light Brigade in 1854. He was demobilized in June 1920 at the age of eighty-four.

<sup>40</sup> LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 5206, 505381 John Webster Kirkwood; The CWGC lists his age as sixty-eight while the Veterans Affairs website at <http://www.vac-acc.gc.ca/remembers/sub.cfm?source=collections/virtualmem> claims that Kirkwood's age on death was 44; The same website gives Hunter's age as forty-seven while the CWGC and British Columbia Archives agree he was sixty-seven.

<sup>41</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1144 File 54-21-51-9 Vol 1, ADMS MD 10 to AAG i/c Administration MD 10 11 January 1917

<sup>42</sup> LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 4076, 2368456 Charles Frederick Harrigan. Not surprisingly, the medical board noted that Harrigan had grey hair. His true age on enlistment was sixty-seven according to his death registration at the British Columbia Archives website at <http://search.bcarchives.gov.bc.ca/sn-22E55/gbsearch/>

<sup>43</sup> LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93 boxes 330 (9759 Edward Bacon), 1792 (602397 William Clements) and 8193 (189701 William Rendle); LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 412 File D-52-1, OC CDD to Director Recruiting and Organization 30 June 1916; Canada, Canadian Contingent Pay and Record Office. List of Officers and Men serving in the First Canadian Contingent of the British Expeditionary Force 1914. (London: Pay and Record Office, c1915) p.42; Quarterly Militia List...1 July 1916 p.289. Sixty-eight year old Edward Bacon, a member of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Queen's Own Rifles was enlisted by his peacetime commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Rennie. On arrival in England, Bacon was employed as the F Company cook. Seventy-nine year old William Clements was not only the ex-RSM of the 30<sup>th</sup> Wellington Rifles, but had formerly served with Royal Artillery. He must have been well known to senior officers of the 34<sup>th</sup> such as Major W.M. Head who had been with the 30<sup>th</sup> since 1892. On arrival in England, Clements was employed as an officer's servant. Fifty-five year old William Rendle, a member of the 25<sup>th</sup> Elgin Regiment and a former gunner of the Royal Field Artillery, enlisted in the 91<sup>st</sup> Battalion commanded by the CO of the 25<sup>th</sup> Elgins.

<sup>44</sup> One boy died in a prisoner of war camp and is buried in Germany. Another died with the Canadian Siberian Expeditionary Force and is buried in Russia.

<sup>45</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4536 File 3-1-143, AG to OC 6<sup>th</sup> Division 6 August 1914, AG Circular Letter 17 August 1914 with an advance copy of a Militia Order 372 setting out the standards.

<sup>46</sup> Morton When Your Number's Up p.56

<sup>47</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1396 File 593-6-2 Vol 4, Major Milton Francis to Sam Hughes 15 June 1915, Sam Hughes to AG 22 June 1915 saying "I think it a good idea.", AG to Private Secretary 23 June 1915 saying that there was no need "...for herding them [shorter soldiers] in separate battalions" and suggesting it would be better to reduce the height standard in general; DOC MD 10 to AG 10 July 1915; LAC RG 24 Vol 4593 File 20-10 Vol 10, AG Circular Letter 21 July 1915

<sup>48</sup> DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 1 Folder 3 'Dates of Enlistments' notes that the number enlisted steadily increased to a peak of 33,960 men in March 1916 and then fell off to 7,961 recruits in July 1916.

<sup>49</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4509 File 17-1-49 Vol VIII, AG to GOC MD 5 22 December 1916 with advance notification of a forthcoming Circular Letter; RG 24 Vol 1836 File GAQ 9-25, AG Circular Letter 8 December 1917 announcing new height standards. The non-combatant corps referred to were the CAMC, CADC, Pioneers, labour units, construction units, forestry units and skilled railway workers.

<sup>50</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4510 File 17-1-49 Vol XV, AG Circular Letter 3 September 1917; There were concerns about artillery recruiting as early as October 1916. See LAC RG24 Vol 1402 File 593-6-2 Vol 21, Inspector of Artillery to Militia Council 12 October 1916 with recommendations for a reorganization of depot batteries to facilitate recruiting

<sup>51</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4510 File 17-1-49 Vol XV, AG Circular Letter 3 September; repeated in LAC RG 24 Vol 1836 File GAQ 9-25, AG Circular Letter 8 Dec 1917

<sup>52</sup> Allinson, Sidney. The Bantams: The Untold Story of World War I. (Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1983) pp.38-44; The maximum height for bantams was lowered to 5' 2" in June 1915. See TNA WO 162/6 'Headquarters: Directorate of Organization 1914-1918, p.89

<sup>53</sup> Davison, Lieutenant-Colonel H.M. History of the 35th Division in the Great War. (London: Sifton, Praed & Co. Ltd., 1920) p.3

<sup>54</sup> LAC RG 9 III D1 Vol 4701 Folder 73 File 9, '143<sup>rd</sup> Battalion Historical Records' and RG 9 III A1 Vol 49 File 8-5-122, CO 143<sup>rd</sup> Battalion to R.F. Green, M.P. 5 October 1916. The battalion was authorized 29 November 1915 but recruiting did not start until 20 February 1916 because barracks were not available; LAC RG 24 Vol 1398 File 593-6-2 Vol 11, AG to OC 2<sup>nd</sup> Division 17 February 1916 advised that the Minister of Militia and Defence had authorized the immediate formation of the 216<sup>th</sup> Bantam Battalion; LAC RG 24 Vol 1403 File 593-6-2, AAG(1) to GOC MD 4 7 November 1916 authorized a bantam company for the 167<sup>th</sup> Battalion.

<sup>55</sup> Both the 143<sup>rd</sup> and 216<sup>th</sup> were enlisting men before recruiting peaked in March 1916.

<sup>56</sup> LAC RG 150 acc1992-93/166 Box 7950, personnel file Lieutenant-Colonel A.B. Powley and Box 1324, personnel file Lieutenant-Colonel F.L. Burton. Ironically both men stood 5' 9"

<sup>57</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1403 File 593-6-2, AAG(1) to GOC MD 4 7 November 1916 referred to an earlier request from the district for a bantam company for the 167<sup>th</sup> Battalion.

<sup>58</sup> LAC RG 9 III D1 Vol 4701 Folder 73 File 9, '143<sup>rd</sup> Battalion Historical Records'; LAC Rg 24 Vol 1398 File 593-6-2 Vol 11, AG to OC 2<sup>nd</sup> Division 17 February 1916; LAC RG 24 Vol 1403 File 593-6-2, AAG(1) to GOC MD 4 7 November 1916

<sup>59</sup> LAC RG 9 III D1 Vol 4701 Folder 73 File 9, '143<sup>rd</sup> Battalion Historical Records'

<sup>60</sup> Composite nominal rolls of the 143<sup>rd</sup> and 216<sup>th</sup> Battalions were compiled based on attestation forms with service numbers in the blocks 826001 to 829000 and 273001-276000.

<sup>61</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4741 file 448-14-275, HQ MD 13 to 137<sup>th</sup> Battalion 16 March 1916 advising that Militia HQ had cancelled all transport for 143<sup>rd</sup> Battalion recruits, HQ MD 11 to HQ MD 13 4 April 1916 noting that the 143<sup>rd</sup> was restricted to MD 11, Militia HQ to MD 11 20 May 1916 authorizing the 143<sup>rd</sup> to recruit in Alberta

<sup>62</sup> Based on a survey of 2,297 attestation forms of men enlisted in the 143<sup>rd</sup> and 216<sup>th</sup> Battalions. Unless otherwise noted, personnel statistics are based on this survey.

<sup>63</sup> RG 24 Vol 365 File 33-95-7, OC MD 11 to Militia HQ 21 December 1916

<sup>64</sup> LAC RG 9 III C7 Vol 4470 Folder 6 File 6, ADRT0 CRT to GOC CRT GHQ 12 March 1917. The letter noted that with the exception of 155 bantams who had been retained by the CRT Depot, all bantams serving with railway units had been 'traded' for full-sized reinforcements from the 211<sup>th</sup> Battalion

<sup>65</sup> LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 687 File E-266-2, 'Battalions Recently Arrived From Canada in 1<sup>st</sup> Can Reserve Brigade at May 17<sup>th</sup> 1917'

<sup>66</sup> DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 13 File '216<sup>th</sup> Battalion'

<sup>67</sup> Figures taken from DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 13 File '143<sup>rd</sup> Battalion'; Box 13 File '216<sup>th</sup> Battalion'

<sup>68</sup> LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 1539 File T-103-7, DAA & QMG Shorncliffe to HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Reserve Brigade 16 June 1917

<sup>69</sup> Davison. History of the 35<sup>th</sup> Division, p.9; Reynolds. The Lee-Enfield Rifle p. 120

<sup>70</sup> Quoted by Davison. History of the 35<sup>th</sup> Division. The comment was made following the failure of a raid by the 14<sup>th</sup> (Bantam) Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment on 21 August 1916.

<sup>71</sup> TNA WO 95/2472, War Diary ADMS 35<sup>th</sup> (Bantam) Division 9 December 1916. Diary entries 9-15 December 1916 noted that 1,439 bantams were found to be unfit. Davison History of the 35<sup>th</sup> Division p.82 noted that 2,784 bantams were found to be unfit by the ADMS during inspections 8-21 December 1916.

<sup>72</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1144 File 54-21-51-9 Vol I, MD 2 24/Gen No 3600 (AMD 2) 1 March 1915

<sup>73</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4507 File 17-1-149 Vol I, AG Circular Letter 19 May 1915; LAC RG 24 Vol 4507 file 17-1-149 Vol II, AG to OC 5<sup>th</sup> Division 13 August 1915

<sup>74</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1144 File 54-21-51-9 Vol I, MD 2 24/Gen No 4113 (AMDS 2) 6 August 1915

<sup>75</sup> Militia Order 162 of 19 March 1915 allowed dentists to be appointed to the militia on a temporary basis; Payment for civilian dentists was evidently slow. Doctor R.J. Pennal of Winnipeg, for example, was not paid for services in 1915 until June 1917. See Minutes of the Militia Council 1917 Vol 1, p.785 8 June 1917; Militia Order 219 of 29 April 1915 provided the establishment for the CADC overseas; Militia Order 287 of 31 July 1916 authorized CADC detachments in Canada

<sup>76</sup> Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Physical Standards and Instructions for the Medical Examination of Recruits for the Canadian Expeditionary Force and for the Active Militia of Canada. (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1917) p. 6

<sup>77</sup> LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 789 File R-42-2 with reports on various units; Further returns are available in LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 395 File C-70-1

<sup>78</sup> Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Regulations for the Canadian Medical Service 1914. (Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1915) p.46. This pamphlet was probably written in late 1914. Militia Order 149 of 22 March 1915 announced the pamphlet had been received from the printer and was now available for distribution.

<sup>79</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4508 File 17-1-49 Vol III, AG to OC 5<sup>th</sup> Division announcing new standards. Artillery and engineer drivers were on the same footing as the CASC. I am grateful to Doctor L.M. Newell, O.D. of Courtice for pointing out that by today's standards, a driver with D120/20 would be considered to be visually impaired.

<sup>80</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4508 File 17-1-49 Vol VI, AG Circular Letter 24 August 1916; RG 24 Vol 4509 File 17-1-49 Vol XI, AG Circular Letter 22 January 1917.

<sup>81</sup> Macpherson, Major-General Sir W.G. History of the Great War based on official documents: Medical Services General History Vol 1. (London: HMSO, 1921) p.136; This was a British policy but presumably applied to the CEF as well. See Macphail Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War, 1914-1919: The Medical Services p.282

<sup>82</sup> DHH KE 6848 A329 C309 Minutes of the Militia Council 1916, p.82 16 May 1916; DHH KE 6848 A329 C309 Minutes of the Militia Council 1917, p.671 12 April 1917 concerning PF soldiers and militiamen on active service; LAC RG 24 Vol 4510 File 17-1-49 Vol XIII, AG Circular Letter 31 March 1917 reminded all concerned that members of the CEF were entitled to glasses, AG Circular Letter 17 April 1917 authorized glasses for militiamen on active service, AG Circular Letter 4 May 1917 authorized glasses for members of the PF; The idea of infantrymen wearing glasses caused some concern in England. See LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 711 File I-27-2, 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Reserve Brigade HQ to HQ Canadian Training Division 11 January 1917 noted that the newly arrived 142<sup>nd</sup> Battalion had an unusually high proportion of men wearing glasses.

<sup>83</sup> LAC RG 4642 File 99-4-62, AG to OC MD 11 16 June 1916

<sup>84</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1402 File 593-6-2 Vol 22, DG Mobilization to AAG(1) 2 January 1917 concerning recruits for Number 1 Section Skilled Railway Employees

<sup>85</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1437 File 593-6-31 Vol 1, OC Forestry Depot to OA RCE Militia HQ 29 January 1918

<sup>86</sup> LAC RG 9 III C7 Vol 4470 Folder 7 File 8, SMO CRT Depot to Officer i/c RTS Canadians 1 December 1917, SMO to OC CRT Depot 8 October 1917

<sup>87</sup> Bruce, Colonel Herbert A. Report on the Canadian Army Medical Service. (London: np, 1916). The report made one recommendation concerning medical examinations in Canada and twenty recommendations concerning the overseas administration and organization of the CAMC.

<sup>88</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1813 File GAQ 4-12 'Gen Currie's Speeches', typed mss of a Montréal Gazette article of 12 September 1924 reporting a speech by Currie to the Citizens' Research Institute of Canada

<sup>89</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1842 File GAQ 10-16, DHS to C of S 13 January 1925 noting that 32,200 infantrymen arrived in England between 6 October and 5 November 1916 of whom 5,000 were medically unfit.

<sup>90</sup> DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 1 Folder 3; TNA WO 114/30 Weekly Returns of the British Army and Dominion Contingents at Home other than the Territorial Force 28 August 1916, 25 September 1916, 30 October 1916, 27 November 1916 and 25 December 1916; TNA WO 114/31 Weekly Returns of the British Army and Dominion Contingents at Home other than the Territorial Force 29 January 1917, 26 February 1916 and 26 March 1916; TNA WO 114/32 Weekly Returns of the British Army and Dominion Contingents at Home other than the Territorial Force 30 April 1917 and 28 May 1917

<sup>91</sup> There were 85,673 men who served outside of Canada and were discharged as medically unfit. Available figures do not discriminate between those who were unfit because of wounds and those who had been unfit on enrolment. However, by using strength returns in WO 114, it is possible to arrive at an approximate estimate. Between August 1916 and May 1917, strength returns submitted to the War Office listed the total of all men with Category E including those on strength of the Canadian Casualty Assembly Unit (CCAC). The CCAC was a holding unit for all men in England who had been admitted to hospitals or convalescent centres. Virtually all of these men had been wounded in action. By subtracting the number of unfit men with the CCAC from the total number of unfit with the Canadian contingent it is possible to determine the number of men who were unfit for non-battle related reasons. The average proportion of those who were unfit because of wounds was 61.3%. This proportion was then applied to the total number who had served outside of Canada and were unfit, to produce a total of those repatriated because of wounds. The balance, presumably, was made up mostly of men who had been medically unfit on enrolment. I appreciate that the numbers produced are inexact. But, the numbers produced are a useful estimate and reflect the anecdotal evidence available.

<sup>92</sup> LAC MG 27 II D9 (Albert Edward Kemp Fonds) Vol 74 File 'Marlow Report 1917', Marlow, Colonel F.W. Report to the Honourable the Minister of Militia Upon the Medical Service of Canada Generally and in Respect to the CEF Particularly 20 October 1916 p.4; Canadian Medical Association Journal Vol VI, Number 12 (December 1916) p. 1108 noted that medical officers allowed themselves to be overruled by anxious commanding officers and claimed that civilian physicians were unduly careless.

<sup>93</sup> Grant, Lieutenant-Colonel J.A. 'The Medical Profession and the Militia' in The Canadian Medical Association Journal Vol IV Number 9 (September 1914) p.763. Grant read the paper to the Canadian Medical Association at Saint John, New Brunswick on 7 July 1914

<sup>94</sup> Militia Order Number 87 of 28 February 1916 authorized fifty cents for each recruit examined

<sup>95</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1144 File 54-21-51-9 Vol 1, GOC MD 5 to Militia HQ 9 January 1917

<sup>96</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4509 File 17-1-49, OIC Recruiting Bonaventure and Gaspé to OIC Recruiting MD 5 24 December 1916

<sup>97</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4380 File 34-7-91 Vol 1, OC 119<sup>th</sup> Battalion to AAG MD 2 3 May 1916

<sup>98</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1401 File 593-6-2 Vol 18, ADMS to GOC MD 3 21 August 1916

<sup>99</sup> RG 24 Vol 1144 File 54-21-51-9 Vol 2, OC MD 11 to Militia HQ 19 April 1917

<sup>100</sup> Morton. When Your Number's Up. p.60

<sup>101</sup> Cassel, Jay. The Secret Plague: Venereal Disease in Canada 1838-1939. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987) p.19. A short summary of detection of the gonococcus and the use of the Wasserman test can be found on pp.41-43.

<sup>102</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4642 File 99-4-55, OC 4<sup>th</sup> Company 4<sup>th</sup> Divisional Train to AAG MD 11 3 May 1916. The man concerned was released as unlikely to become an efficient soldier.

<sup>103</sup> LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 8677 personnel file 865774 George Sawyer. The quote is taken from 'Medical History of an Invalid' 6 February 1918. Sawyer enlisted in 1916, but it was not until 1918 that he was released into the care of his father at Gilbert Plains, Manitoba.

<sup>104</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1836 File GAQ 9-25, AG OMFC to Militia HQ 16 January 1917 with list of mentally ill or deficient soldiers; LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 552 File U-4-1, ADMS 3<sup>rd</sup> Canadian Division to DDMS Canadian Corps 24 June 1916 complaining of six newly-arrived reinforcements with 'senility'; LAC RG 9 III C1 Vol 3483 File 10-14-1 Vol 2, OIC Moore Barracks Hospital to ADMS HQ Canadians 8 January 1917

<sup>105</sup> DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 1 Folder 3, Statistics compiled by Brigadier J.A. Linton M.C. Op cit. The total given excludes shell-shock.

<sup>106</sup> Fifth Census of Canada: Vol II, Table XLVI p.640 shows 1,324,563 men between the ages of 20 and 39. The proportion of 'idiots' was 10,327 per thousand and the proportion of insane was 19,598 per thousand. In round numbers, 39,473 men or 3% had some form of mental disability.

<sup>107</sup> Love, Major Albert G. and Davenport, Major Charles B. Defects Found in Drafted Men: Statistical Information compiled from the Draft Records, Showing the Physical Condition of the Men Registered and Examined in Pursuance of the Requirements of the Selective Service Act. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920) p.124 gives a ratio of 15.08 per thousand for all cases of mental alienation, a term which included constitutional psychopathic states, mental deficiency (the largest category with 12.06 men per thousand), dementia praecox or schizophrenia (second leading category with 0.06 men per thousand), psychasthenia, psychoneurosis, psychosis, manic-depressive and 'general paralysis of the insane'.

<sup>108</sup> Yerkes, Robert M.(ed) National Academy of Sciences: Vol XV, Psychological Examining in the United States Army. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1921) p.9

<sup>109</sup> Physical Standards and Instructions for the Medical Examination of Recruits for the Canadian Expeditionary Force. p.3

<sup>110</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4615 File IG 206 Subfile 206-10, AG Circular Letter 6 March 1918

<sup>111</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4615 File IG 206 Subfile 206-10, AG Circular Letter 6 March 1918

<sup>112</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4343 File 34-3-105-1 Vol 1, DGMS Circular Letter 27 October 1917

<sup>113</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4547 File 79-1-1, Department of Justice Military Service Branch Circular Memorandum #2 24 June 1918.

<sup>114</sup> Archives of Ontario RG 8-5 Box 78 File 'Military Service Act', Superintendent Hamilton Hospital for the Insane to Provincial Secretary July 1918 reporting a list had been forwarded as requested, Provincial Secretary to Ontario Registrar MSA 11 July 1918 reporting that a list of all provincial institutions had been forwarded to HQ MD 2; Archives of Ontario RG 10 Reel Ms 640 #3 'Statistic Register Queen Street Mental Hospital Centre Toronto' and RG 10 Reel Ms640 #5 'Brockville Asylum Admission and Deportation Ledger 1911-1924' as well as RG 10-302 (Penetanguishene) Vol 1 'Probation 1905-1958', Vol 2 'Patient transfers to other asylums 1904-1947', Vol 4 'Discharges 1905-1963' and Vol 5 'Eloperments [escapes] 1905-1966' do not list any patients who were discharged to join the CEF. However, a number were discharged as cured and no doubt, some of these may have enlisted. I am grateful to the Archives of Ontario for negotiating a research agreement to allow me to gain access to these records which are restricted and to Ms Sarah Fontaine for her assistance.

<sup>115</sup> LAC MG 27 II D9 Albert Edward Kemp Finds, Vol 73 File 63, 'Report to the Honourable the Minister of Militia Upon the Medical Service of Canada Generally and Respect to the CEF Particularly by Colonel F.W. Marlow, CAMC, ADMS MD Number 2 acting as Principal Medical Inspector in Respect to the CEF, Canada' 20 October 1916; LAC RG 24 Vol 1144 File 54-21-51-9, AG Circular Letter 26 August 1916; LAC RG 24 Vol 4311 File 34-1-59 Vol 1, AG Circular Letter 12 September 1916; Bruce, Herbert A. Report on the Canadian Army Medical Service. (London: np, 1916) wrote extensively on the problem of unfit soldiers in England.

<sup>116</sup> Militia Order 372 of 17 August 1914 reproduced in Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-1919: Vol II Appendice, p.43; King's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Militia (1911) article 260

<sup>117</sup> General Order 1915 of 15 March 1915 reproduced in Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-1919: Vol I, Appendices p.347

<sup>118</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1311 File 593-3-7 Vol 3, General Orders 13 August 1915

<sup>119</sup> Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-1919: Vol I, Appendices p.58 Appendix 86 noted that 523 men from foreign countries other than the United States were attested in the First Contingent. The total is likely understated since 1,032 men did not give their place of birth. The statistics given in the Official History include officers, nursing sisters and other ranks.

<sup>120</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4336 File 34-3-24, CGS to GOC 2<sup>nd</sup> Division 8 December 1914 noting that thirty-eight men were repatriated from Glasgow on 17 November 1914. Thirty-two had been born in Germany, Austria-Hungary or Turkey. The remaining six (including four Americans) were thought to be German sympathizers.

<sup>121</sup> Section 95(1) of the Army Act, reproduced in Manual of Military Law, 1914 p.471

<sup>122</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4336 File 34-3-24, AG to OC 2<sup>nd</sup> Division 24 February 1915

<sup>123</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4593 File 20-10 Vol 10, AG to DOC MD 10 21 November 1914, DSA HQ MD 10 to 105<sup>th</sup> Regiment 16 February 1915



<sup>124</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4331 File 34-2-18, AAG 2<sup>nd</sup> Division to 38<sup>th</sup> Regiment 11 January 1915, AAG 2<sup>nd</sup> Division to 19<sup>th</sup> Regiment 14 January 1915; LAC RG 24 Vol 4336 File 34-3-24, AAG 2<sup>nd</sup> Division to 51<sup>st</sup> Soo Rifles 17 March 1915

<sup>125</sup> Canadian Expeditionary Force: 37<sup>th</sup> Battalion, also 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Reinforcing Drafts: Nominal Roll of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. (Issued with Militia Orders 1915), Private Stawigky, a Ukrainian from Kiev, sailed with the 2<sup>nd</sup> Reinforcing Draft on 17 August 1915 while Private Maki, a Finn, sailed with the main body on 27 November 1915

<sup>126</sup> Canadian Expeditionary Force: 59<sup>th</sup> Battalion and Reinforcing Drafts: Nominal Roll of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. (Issued with Militia Orders 1915). More than sixty Russians were enlisted. Reinforcing drafts sailed on 27 August 1915 and 13 November 1915 while the main body sailed on 1 April 1916. More than half of the Russians sailed with one of the two reinforcing drafts.

<sup>127</sup> Canadian Expeditionary Force: 57<sup>th</sup> Battalion and Reinforcing Draft: Nominal Roll of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. (Issued with Militia Orders 1915). Nineteen men sailed with the reinforcing draft on 21 July 1915 while another forty-five sailed with the main body on 2 June 1916. The proportion of those who sailed (60.4%) suggests that only naturalized men were retained.

<sup>128</sup> Morton, Desmond. 'The short, Unhappy Life of the 41<sup>st</sup> Battalion, CEF' in Queen's Quarterly Vol LXXXI, Spring 1974, Number 1. p.75

<sup>129</sup> Canadian Expeditionary Force: 41<sup>st</sup> Battalion and Reinforcing Draft: Nominal Roll of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. (Issued with Militia Orders 1917). The reinforcing draft sailed on 17 June 1915 while the main body sailed on 18 October 1915

<sup>130</sup> LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 496 personnel file 416690 Kostos Bastas

<sup>131</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4740 File 448-14-262 Vol 2, GOC MD 13 to Militia HQ 18 January 1917

<sup>132</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4336 File 34-3-24, AG to OC 2<sup>nd</sup> Division 6 November 1915; LAC RG-24 Vol 4375 File 34-7-61 Vol 1, AAG 2<sup>nd</sup> Division to OC 198<sup>th</sup> Battalion 2 March 1916 concerning citizenship requirements for the 213<sup>th</sup> (American Legion) Battalion

<sup>133</sup> LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 1188 File A-42-5 Vol 1, PC 1177 of 26 April 1917

<sup>134</sup> *An Act Respecting Military Service* [29 August 1917] article 2(1). There are numerous examples of non-British subjects being accepted in 1918 while draftees were discharged if they were aliens; LAC RG 24 Vol 6566 file 1064-30-34 Vol, PC 111 of 17 January 1918 which provided that immigrants who had not been naturalized could be drafted but only for non-combatant service.

<sup>135</sup> St Marys and District Museum Larsson Fonds, certificate of naturalization for Adolf Gottfrid Larsson, a Swede living on St Marys, Ontario, granted 18 October 1916

<sup>136</sup> *Wartime Elections Act* [20 September 1917] article 2(g) concerning those naturalized after 31 March 1902 and article 2(h) concerning those had joined the CEF or who had been turned away as unfit.

<sup>137</sup> DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 4 Folder 14 File 'Recruiting', AG circular letter 4 January 1916 concerning Italian citizens; LAC RG 24 Vol 4552 File 125-1-14, MD 6 Chief Recruiting Officer circular letter 2 February 1916 repeated the AG circular letter; LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 personnel file 829485 Frank Mark who was discharged from the 144<sup>th</sup> Battalion in Winnipeg as an Italian reservist on 29 May 1916; LAC RG 24 Vol 425 File 54-21-1-48 Vol 1, Colonial Secretary to Governor General 3 January 1916 concerning Montenegrins, Colonial Secretary to Governor General 24 January 1916 concerning Serbs. Curiously, the caveat concerning recall does not appear to have been passed on to districts. See AG to HQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Division 28 January 1916 concerning Serbs.

<sup>138</sup> LAC RG 9 III D3 Vol 4996 Reel T-10835, War Diary 5<sup>th</sup> Field Company, 14 January 1915

<sup>139</sup> LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 416 File E-6-1, OC A Company to OC 5<sup>th</sup> Battalion 1 December 1914 noting that French reservists with the CEF were subject to court-martial on arrival to France, British Ambassador to France to Foreign Office 13 January 1915 noting that the French government was satisfied if the men were serving with an allied contingent

<sup>140</sup> LAC MG 30 E406 (Likacheff-Ragosine-Mathers Collection) Vol 11 Reel 7601 File 339, Russian Embassy in Washington to Russian Consul in Montréal 17 October 1914; File 340, Russian Consul to External Affairs 25 October 1914 [old style?] and 10 November 1914, External Affairs to Russian Consul 24 November 1914; DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 4 Folder 14 File 'Recruiting', AG circular letter 21 November 1914; LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 416 File E-6-1, DMO War Office to GOC Canadian Division 11 December 1914 repeating a request from the Russian Attaché.

<sup>141</sup> LAC MG 30 E406 (Likacheff-Ragosine-Mathers Collection) Vol 11 Reel 7601 File 341, Maurice Dunsford, Humboldt Recruiting Officer to Russian Consul 1 March 1915, Consul to Dunsford 4 March 1915

<sup>142</sup> LAC MG 30 E406 (Likacheff-Ragosine-Mathers Collection) Vol 11 Reel 7601 File 400, Sergeant-Major Haynes of Roblin, Manitoba, to Russian Consul in Winnipeg 9 June 1915 and Consul to Haynes 16 June 1915

<sup>143</sup> LAC MG 30 E406 (Likacheff-Ragosine-Mathers Collection) Vol 11 Reel 7601 File 344, Consul to External Affairs 23 July 1915; LAC RG 24 Vol 4331 File 34-2-18, AG to OC 2<sup>nd</sup> Division 2 July 1915

<sup>144</sup> LAC MG 30 E406 (Likacheff-Ragosine-Mathers Collection) Vol 11 Reel 7601 File 344, Consul to CGS [1] November 1915

<sup>145</sup> LAC MG 30 E406 (Likacheff-Ragosine-Mathers Collection) Vol 11 Reel 7601 File 344, Russian Consul to CGS [1] November 1915 confirming the substance of a conference on 29 October 1915,

<sup>146</sup> LAC MG 30 E406 (Likacheff-Ragosine-Mathers Collection) Vol 11 Reel 7601 File 344, CGS to Russian Consul 5 March 1916 and Consul to CGS 17 March 1916

<sup>147</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4320 File 34-3-24, 213<sup>th</sup> Battalion to HQ MD 2 23 November 1916

<sup>148</sup> LAC MG 30 E406 (Likacheff-Ragosine-Mathers Collection) Vol 11 Reel 7601 File 344, CGS to Russian Consul 20 March 1916 saying in part, "...at Militia HQ we gratefully recognize the fact that your one object is to safeguard our interests by preventing the enlistment of alien enemies who may pass themselves off as Russian subjects."

<sup>149</sup> LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 6127 personnel file 2776923 George Morris Merkel, Box 328 personnel file Rudolph C. Bach; LAC RG 38 A-1-a Vol 5 reel T-2060 personnel file 7606 Rudolph C. Bach

<sup>150</sup> LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 5257 personnel file 722021 Reinhold Krinke, Box 6137 personnel file 808337 personnel file Adolf Messerschmidt, Box 1090 personnel file 12675 Andi William Brod

<sup>151</sup> CEF recruiting statistics for other ranks only taken from Nicholson The Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919 p.546; The sample was drawn from published embarkation rolls supplemented by a search of the Library and Archives Canada website Soldiers of the First World War (1914-1918) using surnames and first names supplemented by 'wild cards'. The samples are obviously not complete but probably represent the vast majority of men who were enlisted. Unless otherwise noted, all statistical information presented concerning immigrant soldiers is based on a sample of 18,694 men from seventeen countries. These samples vary in size from Albania (13 men) to Russia (6,485 men).

<sup>152</sup> LAC RG 4375 file 34-7-61 Vol 1, AAG MD 2 to K.A. Wee of Leonia, New Jersey 27 April 1917

<sup>153</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4547 file 79-1-1 Vol II, Military Service Branch Miscellaneous Circular No. 22 of 22 August 1918

<sup>154</sup> Wong, Marjorie. The Dragon and the Maple Leaf: Chinese-Canadians in World War II (Toronto: Pirie Publishing, 1994) pp. 3-7 contain a quick survey of World War I. Of the names mentioned, James Delbert Harold Chew was obviously Caucasian while Hanson Lee, Yee Chong Leong, Y.C. Lee and Wee Tan Louie cannot be traced. Wong also claims that the 52<sup>nd</sup> Battalion at Port Arthur, Ontario, enlisted more than sixty men. The claim is doubtful since the 1911 Census showed only 162 men in the Thunder Bay-Rainy River Districts who had been born in China; see also Canadian Expeditionary Force: 52<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, also 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Reinforcing Drafts: Nominal Roll of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. (Issued with Militia Orders 1917). About 1,500 other ranks are listed. None were born in China.

<sup>155</sup> LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 5522 personnel file 687931 Frederick Lee, Box 5750 personnel file 2323392 Wee Hong Louie, Box 5750 personnel file 3206975 William Thomas Louie, referred to by Marjorie Wong as Wee Tan Louie.

<sup>156</sup> LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 4475 personnel file 2250839 Tung On Hong and Box 3173 personnel file 1069777 Victor Fong

<sup>157</sup> Hugh Guthrie speaking to the House of Commons 29 April 1920 quoted in Walker, James W. St. G. 'Race and Recruitment in World War I: Enlistment of Visible Minorities in the Canadian Expeditionary Force' in Canadian Historical Review Vol LXX Number 1 (March 1989) p.4

<sup>158</sup> Japanese Contribution to Canada: A Summary of the Role Played by the Japanese in the Development of the Canadian Commonwealth. (Vancouver: Canadian Japanese Association, 1940) pp.27-28. A survey carried out in 19124-1926 by the Continental Daily News of Vancouver is cited as the source for the proportion of Japanese immigrants who could not read, write or understand English; LAC RG 24 Vol 1397

File 593-6-2 Vol 8, AG circular letter 9 September 1915 concerning language ability; LAC RG 24 Vol 4427 File 26-5-64-3 Vol 1, AG circular letter 14 September 1916 concerning language ability.

<sup>159</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1256 File 593-1-94, CGS to AG 29 March 1917 in commenting on the enlistment of Japanese in the 191<sup>st</sup> Battalion in Alberta; Adachi, Ken. The Enemy That Never Was: A History of the Japanese Canadians. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1976) p.102

<sup>160</sup> Toronto Star 14 March 1916 p.2. See also Toronto World 15 March 1916 p.4

<sup>161</sup> LAC RG 9 II A2 Vol 33 'Minutes of the Militia Council 1916', p.60 19 April 1916

<sup>162</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4642 File 99-4-57, CGS to OC MD 11 22 April 1916 in connection with the Japanese battalion noting that "...the services of a smaller unit, a company for example, could not be conveniently utilized."; Adachi The Enemy that Never Was p.102

<sup>163</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1256 File 593-1-94, DAAG Militia HQ to GOC HQ BCRM 4 April 1918; 2007157 Frank Kasino, 2768007 Samey Nagano, 3236549 Masahito Nishioka, 2007981 Hatustaro Okita, 2501096 Suny Tanaka and 2768270 Takeji Tsuge were all Japanese-born while 3032176 Lee Young Chung had been born in Korea, then a Japanese possession. Two were Nisei: 2507423 Thomas Nash and 3032811 John Sasaki.

<sup>164</sup> Based on a sample of 226 Japanese or Nisei men.

<sup>165</sup> Fifth Census of Canada: Vol II Table XII 'Origins of the People' pp.368-369 notes that 2,315 Hindu men lived in Canada with British Columbia accounting for 2,289 or 98.9%; For a succinct summary of British Columbia's treatment of East Indians, see Manak, Sonia 'The Sikh Immigrant Experience' in B.C. Historical News Vol 31 Issue 4 (Fall 1998); LAC MG 26 II 1(c) (Sir Robert Borden Fonds) Vol 196 p.109546, Major (retired) R.O. Montgomery to Sir Richard McBride 10 February 1915 noting that a number of British Columbia Sikhs had returned to India in order to enlist

<sup>166</sup> LAC RG 73 C1 Vol 49 file 1-1-65 Part 1, W.P. Archibald to Minister of Justice 11 September 1914

<sup>167</sup> LAC MG 26 II 1(c) (Sir Robert Borden Fonds) Vol 196 p.109532, Sir Richard McBride to Prime Minister Borden 21 December 1914

<sup>168</sup> LAC MG 26 II 1(c) (Sir Robert Borden Fonds) Vol 196 p.109533, Prime Minister Borden to Sir Richard McBride 23 December 1914, p.109545 Borden to McBride 3 February 1915 noting that the CGS had objected because of the problem finding reinforcements

<sup>169</sup> LAC MG 26 II 1(c) (Sir Robert Borden Fonds) Vol 196 p.109544 McBride to Borden 2 February 1915, p.109558, Borden to Governor General 22 February 1915

<sup>170</sup> Walker, James W. St. G. 'Race and Recruitment in World War I: Enlistment of Visible Minorities in the Canadian Expeditionary Force' in Canadian Historical Review Vol LXX Number 1 (March 1989) p.4

<sup>171</sup> The number identified includes one man who enlisted twice claiming to have been born first in Singapore and then in India.

<sup>172</sup> LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 3971 personnel file 3328986 Abdul Hamed, Box 3671 personnel file 65400 Sunta Gougarsing

<sup>173</sup> LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 2969 personnel file 2137823 Silas Ezra, enlisted by the BCRM, Box 8947 personnel file 2074282 Sewa Singh, Box 8947 personnel file 4080094 Ram Singh

<sup>174</sup> LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 8405 personnel file 827025 Harry Robson whose real name was Harnon Singh. Robson enlisted at Vancouver in October 1916. He claimed to have been born in Mexico and that his next of kin lived in Singapore, India. His complexion was described as 'Malay'.

<sup>175</sup> TNA CO 42/1007, PC 1459 of 12 June 1918 noted that ACI 1771 of 12 September 1916 exempted East Indians in Britain from conscription and directed that natives of India would not be called up.

<sup>176</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1206 file 297-1-21, AG to T.J. Stewart of Hamilton 16 October 1915

<sup>177</sup> Walker, James W. St. G. 'Race and Recruitment in World War I: Enlistment of Visible Minorities in the Canadian Expeditionary Force' in Canadian Historical Review; Ruck, Calvin. Canada's Black Battalion: No. 2 Construction Battalion 1916-1920. (Halifax, Society for the Protection and Preservation of Black Culture in Nova Scotia, 1986); Foyne. Underside of Glory: African-Canadian Enlistment in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1917.

<sup>178</sup> LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 1992 personnel file 721010 Curley Christian, Box 2793 personnel file 5085 Miles Smith Dymond, Box 7919 personnel file 144214 James A. Post, Box 3721 personnel file 442664 John Granito

<sup>179</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4375 file 34-7-61 Vol 1, Minister of Militia and Defence to OC 2<sup>nd</sup> Division 18 November 1915 and District Commander to Minister 18 November 1915

<sup>180</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4375 file 34-7-61 Vol 1, AAG 2<sup>nd</sup> Division to Toronto Recruiting Depot 19 November 1915, OC Recruiting Depot to GOC 2<sup>nd</sup> Division 22 November 1915

<sup>181</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1400 file 593-6-2 Vol 16, AG to OC No. 1 Construction Battalion 10 July 1916. The original complaint is not on file.

<sup>182</sup> DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 8 file 74/672-II-36 'Enlistment of Colored Men in the CEF', J.R.B. Whitney to Minister of Militia and Defence 24 November 1915, Minister to Whitney 3 December 1915; LAC RG 24 Vol 1206 file 297-1-21, J.R.B. Whitney of Toronto to Minister of Militia and Defence 19 January 1916, AG to OC 2<sup>nd</sup> Division 3 February 1916

<sup>183</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4387 file 34-7-141 Vol 1, AAG MD 2 circular letter 3 April 1916. Forty-five battalions were queried but only thirty-seven replies are on file

<sup>184</sup> Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Canadian Expeditionary Force Units: Instructions Governing Organization and Administration. (Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1916) P.4

<sup>185</sup> See Canadian Observer Vol 3 Number 5 (8 January 1916) p.4 concerning the benefits of a formed platoon to the black community.

<sup>186</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1206 file 297-1-21, Military Secretary to John T. Richards of Saint John 11 October 1915 noting that Richards' suggestion that blacks could not enlist was incorrect.

<sup>187</sup> Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Canadian Expeditionary Force: No 2 Construction Battalion: Nominal Roll of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. (Issued with Militia Orders, 1917) shows a total of 605 other ranks. A composite nominal roll has been compiled of 440 men born in the Caribbean or Central America who were probably black based on the description of complexion, eyes and hair on the reverse side of the attestation form. Those who joined No. 2 Construction Battalion have been excluded from this roll. There are also 45 men who joined units other than No. 2 Construction Battalion and were probably black. In all, there are 1,090 blacks in these nominal rolls. The estimate given is probably understated.

<sup>188</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1833 File GAQ 9-34A 'Labour Units', AG to GOC MD 1 30 April 1918 discussing a proposal from MD 1 to recruit American blacks through the BCRM.

<sup>189</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1221 file 593-1-7 part 1, OC 1<sup>st</sup> Divisional Area to Militia HQ 8 August 1914, AG to OC 1<sup>st</sup> Division 8 August 1914. The draft reply is on file and bears a note 'OK' followed by Hughes' initials; Archives of Ontario, Alexander Emerson Belcher Fonds, F18 Reel MS 93, MU 5813-5814, Military Secretary to Lieutenant-Colonel A.E. Belcher, Parliament Buildings, Toronto 8 August 1914 advising that "any of our good friends of the Chippewas" who wished to enlist in the First Contingent should apply to the 32<sup>nd</sup> Huron Regiment; The telegram was first published in Wilson. Ontario and the First World War 1914-1918. p. cx. Wilson cited the document as 'Adjutant General to Colonel L.W. Shannon'. This was clearly an error the telegram was addressed to 'OC 1<sup>st</sup> Division' and not to a specific individual. Shannon was the AAG as a major at the time and did not become the district commander as a colonel until January 1915 when Brigadier-General W.E. Hodgins was posted to Ottawa as the AG. Gaffen used the same citation as Wilson which suggests he did not consult the originals.

<sup>190</sup> Data taken from Fifth Census of Canada: Vol II Table VII 'Origins of the People by sub-districts'

<sup>191</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1221 file 593-1-7 Vol 1, OC 2<sup>nd</sup> Division to Militia HQ 23 November 1915 requesting permission to enlist Indians in the 114<sup>th</sup> Battalion and alluding to a previous request which was turned down by Militia HQ 1 February 1915. This letter has not been found.

<sup>192</sup> LAC RG 10 Vol 6767 file 452-13, Deputy Minister Militia and Defence to Indian Affairs 22 October 1915

<sup>193</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1221 file 593-1-7 Vol 1, OC 2<sup>nd</sup> Division to Militia HQ 23 November, 27 November and 3 December 1915, OA 1<sup>st</sup> Division to Militia HQ 2 December 1915 noting that Hughes had already granted verbal authority for the 135<sup>th</sup> Battalion to recruit natives; AG circular letter 10 December 1915 advising that Indians could be enlisted provided they were medically fit.

<sup>194</sup> LAC RG 9 II B5 Vol 5 file 'CEF: 18<sup>th</sup>, 19<sup>th</sup>-22<sup>nd</sup>, 24<sup>th</sup>-27<sup>th</sup> Battalions', Examination - Board of Officers. Canadian Expeditionary Forces. Report on 20<sup>th</sup> Batt. 29 January 1915 commenting that the Indian company from the 37<sup>th</sup> Regiment had been a failure. The two officers concerned were Lieutenant A.G.E. Smith of 13 Platoon and Lieutenant C.D. Smith of 14 Platoon; Toronto World 14 November 1914 p.2 noted that the contingent from the 37<sup>th</sup> Regiment that joined the 20<sup>th</sup> Battalion included 'Indian braves'.

<sup>195</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1221 file 593-1-7 Vol 1, OC 2<sup>nd</sup> Division to Militia HQ 23 November 1915 requesting permission to enlist Indians in the 114<sup>th</sup> Battalion and alluding to a previous request to enlist Indians which was turned down by Militia HQ 1 February 1915. This letter has not been found; LAC RG 24 Vol 4380 file

34-7-89 Vol 1, OC 114<sup>th</sup> Battalion to AAG 2<sup>nd</sup> Division 6 December 1915 noting that there were a number of natives serving with the CMR Depot who should be transferred to the 114<sup>th</sup>. Two of these men have been identified: 225517 George Frederick Anderson (enlisted 22 October 1915) and 225608 Abraham Maracle (enlisted 27 October 1915). Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Canadian Expeditionary Force: Nominal Roll 114<sup>th</sup> Battalion: Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. (Issued with Militia Orders 1917) includes five natives who enlisted in MD 2 in August, September and October 1915 and were transferred to the 114<sup>th</sup>: 142257 John Barefoot, 158525 Leonard W. Martin, 453787 Harold Dean Powless, 163226 Newton Yellow and 142337 Thomas York.

<sup>196</sup> Gaffen, Fred. Forgotten Soldiers. (Penticton: Theytus Books Ltd., 1985), pp.93-108

<sup>197</sup> Dempsey, L. James. Warriors of the King: Prairie Indians in World War I. (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre, 1999) p.viii suggests 3,500 native enlistments; Summerby, Janice. Native Soldiers, Foreign Battlefields. (Ottawa: Veterans Affairs Canada, 1993) p.5; Gaffen, Forgotten Soldiers. p.20 claimed that about 3,500 natives enlisted plus others who were living off the reserve. He did not disclose the basis for his estimate; Scott, Duncan Campbell. 'The Canadian Indians and the Great World War' in Canada in the Great World War: Vol III. (Toronto: United Publishers of Canada Limited, 1919) p.288. Scott noted that more than 3,500 Indians enlisted according to records of the Department of Indian Affairs while there were many more of whom the Department was unaware. At the time he wrote the article, Scott was the Deputy Superintendent General of the Department of Indian Affairs.

<sup>198</sup> LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 7506 personnel file 715070 August Otoon. Born in Alaska. Attestation paper is franked 'Eskimo'. Otoon's physical description supports the designation; LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 3185 personnel file 1007034 John Ames Ford and 1007035 Abram Ford. Both men (apparently unrelated) were Moravians from remote settlements in northern Labrador. Their physical description suggests they may have had Inuit ancestry. I have been unable to confirm their ethnicity.

<sup>199</sup> Gaffen. Forgotten Soldiers. pp.93-108

<sup>200</sup> Gaffen's roll includes two militiamen, one man from the Newfoundland Regiment, three Englishman and twenty-seven who died after demobilization, mainly from 'phthisis' or tuberculosis.

<sup>201</sup> Fifth Census of Canada: Vol II. Table XII pp.368-369. The Yukon Territory has been included in the overall total of native males because Boyle's Machine Gun Battery and the Yukon Infantry Company within the Territory. The British Columbia Regiment also accepted draftees from the Yukon in 1918.

<sup>202</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 6566 file 1064-30-34 Vol, PC 111 of 17 January 1918 authorized Indian agents to make application on behalf of their bands for exemption from combatant military service; Despite the wording of PC 111, there was a belief Indians were exempt from compulsory service. See LAC RG 10 Vol 6767 file 452-15 Part 1, Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs to Militia HQ 20 February 1918 noting PC 111 and requesting that all Indians drafted should be discharged; LAC MG26H (Sir Robert Borden Fonds) Reel C-4331 Item 53796 noting that PC 111 had been amended and Indians were exempt from the MSA since they did not have the franchise. I am grateful to Professor Brock Millman of the University of Western Ontario for his notes from the Borden Fonds.

<sup>203</sup> Holt, Richard. Cenotaphs of South-Western Ontario. (unpublished mss, 1996). The data was collected as part of a project to identify all cenotaphs and war memorials in the vicinity of St Marys, Ontario. At the time, the author was a member of the St Marys Museum Board.

<sup>204</sup> LAC RG 10 Vol 6766 File 452-13. Kwawkewlth Agent to Indian Affairs 7 January 1916

<sup>205</sup> LAC RG 10 Vol 6767 file 451-16 part 1, Indian Affairs to Militia HQ 29 May 1917

<sup>206</sup> RG 10 Vol 6766 File 452-13. BC Inspector of Indian Agencies to Indian Affairs 8 January 1917

<sup>207</sup> LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 personnel file 2184374 John James Simple [Semple]

<sup>208</sup> LAC RG 10 Vol 6766 file 452-13, C.M. McCarthy to Reverend R.J. Renison 14 April 1917 with details concerning McCarthy's proposed recruiting expedition. The attestation papers of those who joined were signed by McCarthy.

<sup>209</sup> Fifth Census of Canada: Vol II. Table XII (Origins of the People) pp.368-369. I have chosen to use Table XII rather than Table XVII (Birthplace) because many of those who were born in India and joined the CEF, for example, were the sons of British expatriates.

<sup>210</sup> DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 1 Folder 3 'Disposition on Discharge'

<sup>211</sup> DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 1 Folder 3 'Diseases'

<sup>212</sup> King's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Militia (1910) paragraph 322. See also the 1917 edition, paragraph 393.

<sup>213</sup> Bryce, P.H. Conservation of Manpower in Canada: A National Need. (Ottawa: np, 1918) p.13 Table 14a



## Chapter 5 The Manpower Pool

During the First World War, 598,020 other ranks joined the CEF, a tremendous achievement for a small nation of only 3,859,183 men.<sup>1</sup> But not all of these men could reasonably be expected to join the CEF: some were too old or too young, others were needed for essential industries and some were medically unfit. In all, an estimated 820,637 men were available for military service with only 652,820 fit for overseas service. The manpower pool therefore was severely limited and was able to sustain the CEF only with difficulty. Not surprisingly both official and unofficial efforts were made to modify enlistment criteria and tap alternative sources. Some of these efforts were successful while others were not. But, in the process, long-standing prejudices were challenged, peacetime shibboleths discarded and the employment of manpower rationalized with the result that by 1918 many thousands of men were eligible for military service who would have been turned away at the beginning of the war.

There was no fixed order of battle for the CEF throughout the war, although by 1917, there was a general understanding that Canada would maintain four divisions and a cavalry brigade in France together with ancillary troops and the 5<sup>th</sup> Division in England. In terms of an establishment, Sir Robert Borden announced in his New Year's message on 1 January 1916 that the strength of the CEF would be maintained at 500,000 men. The order of battle (i.e. number of divisions or units) was not specified and there is no evidence that Borden considered the number of men required to maintain this establishment before he made his announcement.

Prime Minister Borden may not have considered the limitations of the national manpower pool, but others had grave concerns. In June 1915, when only two divisions were contemplated, Sir George Perley, the Canadian High Commissioner in London, suggested to Borden that additional divisions should be raised only if the requisite number of soldiers, together with reinforcements, were available. The CGS, Gwatkin, also had doubts and in the fall of 1915, predicted the CEF would have difficulties maintaining more than three divisions in the field.<sup>2</sup> Implicit in both comments was the notion that the CEF should be tailored to the available manpower pool. Others shared their concerns. In Montréal, Lord Shaughnessy, President of the Canadian Pacific Railway, spoke to the Board of Trade in March 1916, saying that "the raising of 500,000 men seemed an almost unbearable burden for the country when it was taken into consideration that more than 300,000 were already engaged in war industries."<sup>3</sup> In Parliament, Senator James Mason addressed his colleagues in April 1916, and warned them that the nation could not sustain a force of 500,000 men.<sup>4</sup>

All of these concerns revolved around the size of the national manpower pool. In round numbers, about 15.5% or 598,020 of the 3,821,995 males reported in the 1911 census served in the CEF.<sup>5</sup> The proportion is understated, however, since enlistment was open (officially) only to British subjects between the ages of eighteen and forty-five. If only these men are considered, then 39.1% of the potential manpower pool joined the CEF.



Table 27  
Canadian Manpower  
Age 18-45<sup>6</sup>

Province (1)	Canadian Born (2)	British Born (3)	Foreign Born (4)	Total Males (5)	Foreign Naturalized (6)	Total Eligible (7)
PEI	16,592	157	119	16,868	43	16,792
Nova Scotia	85,909	8,437	4,147	98,493	1,504	95,850
New Brunswick	64,188	2,371	2,151	68,710	780	67,339
Québec	341,783	23,066	26,048	390,897	9,448	374,297
Ontario	410,896	106,997	64,353	582,246	23,341	541,234
Manitoba	49,868	39,806	33,088	122,762	12,001	101,675
Saskatchewan	61,193	38,871	58,843	158,907	21,342	121,406
Alberta	37,446	31,954	53,515	122,915	19,410	88,810
British Columbia	41,508	54,718	62,046	158,272	22,504	118,730
Totals	1,109,383	306,377	304,310	1,720,070	110,373	1,526,133

Notes: (1) Data excludes the Yukon and Northwest Territories.

(2) Germans, Austro-Hungarians and those born in the Ottoman Empire have been deducted from the totals shown in Column 4 to produce a revised total of 188,672 of whom an estimated 110,373 (column 6) had been naturalized and were therefore eligible to join the CEF.

(3) The total number of eligible males in column 7 is the sum of columns 2, 3 and 6.

Not all of the eligible men shown in Table 27 were available to the CEF: essential services and industries, especially munitions plants, needed labour despite the need for recruits. However, the Canadian government did not designate essential industries and the number of essential workers is therefore unknown. How many were there?

A postwar compilation of Empire recruiting statistics by the War Office noted that it was difficult to compare British and dominion recruiting rates because of staple industries in the dominions that "did not lend themselves readily to the substitution of female labour."<sup>7</sup> The comment is apt. Loggers, foundry workers and miners not only

needed specific skills, but also brute strength. Industries that employed relatively few women therefore can serve as a useful proxy for essential occupations.

Table 28  
Major Industries  
Workers Eligible for Military Service<sup>8</sup>

<b>Occupational Group</b> <b>(1)</b>	<b>Male Workers</b> <b>(2)</b>	<b>Female Workers</b> <b>(3)</b>	<b>Total Workers</b> <b>(4)</b>	<b>Female Proportion</b> <b>(5)</b>
Building trades	245,990	211	246,201	0.1%
Fishing and hunting	34,547	265	34,812	0.8%
Forestry	42,901	13	42,914	>0.1%
Mining	62,706	61	62,767	0.1%
Iron and steel manufacture	58,976	426	59,402	0.7%
Vehicle manufacture	21,312	63	21,375	0.3%
Shipbuilding	3,225	7	3,232	0.2%
Wood working	35,829	1,593	37,422	4.3%
Steam railways	86,116	190	86,306	0.2%
Water transport	24,367	78	24,445	0.3%
	615,969	2,907	618,876	0.5%
Workers of military age <sup>9</sup>	443,498			

Notes: (1) The 917,848 agricultural workers have not been included because many of these jobs could have been done by women, teenagers, old men and those who were unfit for military service.

(2) Wood workers included basket makers, many of whom were probably women.

If anything, the total of essential male workers shown in Table 28 is probably understated because the number of wage earners in the manufacturing sector almost doubled during the war, from 395,681 workers in 1915 to 693,116 in 1918. In part, the increase was due to women joining the work force but most were employed in the clothing and textile industries and were therefore not essential workers.<sup>10</sup> Heavy industry and the production of staples remained the purview of men. Assuming that the total of industrial workers in Table 28 represents the minimum number of men who could not be

spared for military service, the national manpower pool shown in Table 30 should be reduced to about 1,082,635 potential recruits.<sup>11</sup>

How many of these 1,028,635 potential recruits were medically fit? There are no comprehensive statistics available of the proportion of Canadian men who were fit for military service, although there is some evidence that a significant proportion did not meet the minimum medical standard. In 1917, a CAMC doctor in Windsor examined more than eight hundred recruits and found that 47.9% were fit for general service, 19.8% were fit for limited duties either in Canada or overseas and 32.3% were unfit for military service of any description.<sup>12</sup> In May 1917, the GOC MD 3 reported that from 1914 onward, 31.3% of all applicants in Eastern Ontario had been rejected, mainly because they were medically unfit. In the same district, between 1 January and 1 April 1917, 3,197 men volunteered for the CEF and 1,266 or 39.6% were found to be unfit for military service.<sup>13</sup> However, these results were specific to MD 3 only and may not have been typical for the country as a whole.

In the fall of 1917, medical boards under the direction of the Military Service Branch of the Department of Justice examined all single males between the ages of twenty and thirty-five who were eligible for conscription. The results were not entirely consistent. Saskatchewan boards, for example, found almost 60% of all men fit for combat duty overseas whereas Québec boards found only 36% fit for combat duty. Barring any evidence that Québec men were not as healthy as the rest of the country, the results provide a good snapshot of the general fitness of Canadian males in 1917.<sup>14</sup>

Table 29  
MSA Medical Board Results 1917  
Men Aged 20-35<sup>15</sup>

Medical Category	Number Examined	Percentage
Fit for combat duty overseas	128,974	46.8%
Fit for limited duty overseas	37,192	13.5%
Sub-total: fit for overseas duties	166,166	60.3%
Fit for limited duty in Canada only	42,581	15.5%
Unfit for any military service	66,733	24.2%
Total Examined	275,480	

How accurate were the results of the MSA medical boards? In Britain, National Service medical boards examined 2,425,184 Britons in 1917 and 1918 and found that of every nine men, three were fit for general service, and two were fit for non-combatant service. Of the remaining four, three were 'physical wrecks' capable of little exertion and the last was "a chronic invalid with a precarious hold upon life."<sup>16</sup> In summary, only 55.5% of all men examined in 1917-1918 were fit for some form of military service, a figure roughly comparable to the results of the Canadian boards.

Assuming that the level of fitness was uniform across the country, the revised manpower pool by province has been calculated as shown in Table 30.

Table 30  
Revised Manpower Pool  
Canadian Males 18-45

Province (1)	Eligible Males (2)	Fit for Overseas (3)	Fit for Canada Only (4)	Fit for Military Service (5)	Unfit for Military Service (6)
PEI	16,792	7,859	2,267	10,126	6,666
Nova Scotia	95,850	44,858	12,940	57,798	38,052
New Brunswick	67,339	31,515	9,091	40,605	26,734
Québec	374,297	175,171	50,530	225,701	148,596
Ontario	541,234	253,298	73,067	326,364	214,870
Manitoba	101,675	47,584	13,726	61,310	40,365
Saskatchewan	121,406	56,818	16,390	73,208	48,198
Alberta	88,810	41,563	11,989	53,552	35,258
British Columbia	118,730	55,566	16,029	71,594	47,136
Sub-total	1,526,133				
Less essential workers	443,498				
Total	1,082,635	652,829	167,808	820,637	261,998

Notes: (1) The sub-total of eligible males in column 1 is taken from column 7 of Table 29.

(2) MSA medical board rates have been used to calculate the number of men shown in columns 3, 4 and 6.

(3) Column 5 is the sum of columns 3 and 4.

(4) Of those fit for service overseas, 506,673 were fit for service at the front while 146,156 were fit for non-combatant duties only.

Whether or not district and unit commanders were aware of the intricacies of the manpower pool seems doubtful. On the other hand, manpower in general was a matter of concern at all levels, particularly after 1 January 1916 when Borden announced an establishment of 500,000 men for the CEF. The upshot was that consistent efforts were made both nationally and locally to modify, augment or, on occasion, ignore recruiting standards in order to expand the pool of potential recruits.

The manpower pool was also expanded by recruiting outside of Canada. Strictly speaking, this was not illegal. Enlistment in the CEF was restricted to British subjects but

Canadian residency was not a requirement and about 10% of all those who joined the CEF were residents of the United States, Bermuda, England, Greece, France and Belgium.

The PF and CEF garrisoned Bermuda for two years, from September 1914 to September 1916. During this time, at least forty-six islanders were enrolled, thirteen by the 38<sup>th</sup> Battalion and thirty-three by the 163<sup>rd</sup> Battalion.<sup>17</sup> There was no real need to enlist these men; Bermuda was not a theatre of operations, both battalions were near full strength and reinforcements were readily available from Canada.<sup>18</sup> Furthermore, by recruiting Bermudians, the CEF was directly competing with efforts in the colony to raise two small company-size contingents, one of which was attached to the 38<sup>th</sup> for training.<sup>19</sup> Remarkably, there were no objections by Bermuda's House of Assembly or the public at large.<sup>20</sup>

All thirteen Bermudians who enlisted in the 38<sup>th</sup> Battalion were expatriates and it is possible that these men, with no ties to Bermuda, preferred to take their chances with a formed unit rather than an independent Bermudian company, or perhaps they preferred CEF pay scales.<sup>21</sup> The 163<sup>rd</sup> Battalion also enlisted a few expatriates but most of their recruits were blacks from Bermuda or the British West Indies who were enrolled as officers' mess waiters to free Canadians for training with their parent companies.<sup>22</sup> However, the idea of local blacks serving in a white battalion upset local sensitivities and the governor registered a stiff protest with Militia HQ in Ottawa.<sup>23</sup> The 163<sup>rd</sup> therefore stopped enlisting islanders and in September 1916, left Bermuda without, apparently, discharging the offending mess waiters.<sup>24</sup>

The CEF also enrolled recruits in operational theatres such as Salonika, where, in 1917, the 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian General Hospital enlisted a twenty-four-year-old blacksmith who claimed to be from Montréal.<sup>25</sup> There were also at least thirty men enlisted in France or Belgium. The majority were British subjects by birth, fourteen Canadians and thirteen Britons, one of whom claimed to be a Canadian resident. Of the remaining three, one was a Belgian with former service in a militia unit, the 65<sup>th</sup> Carabiniers, and gave his next of kin as his wife who was living in Montréal.<sup>26</sup> In contrast, neither of the two Frenchmen who were enlisted had any discernable connection with Canada when they joined the 8<sup>th</sup> Canadian General Hospital.<sup>27</sup> Most of these men were probably enrolled with permission from HQ, although only one example is known when Canadian HQ in London authorized the 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Stationary Hospital at Saint-Cloud near Paris in January 1916 to enlist a Parisian with Canadian parents.<sup>28</sup>

Enrolling recruits in France and Belgium may have been unusual, but was not unheard of. Certainly the Canadian Section, GHQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Echelon was willing to accept recruits and in some cases, to frank the attestation papers of those who were enlisted in France.<sup>29</sup> HQ OMFC was also aware that men were enlisted on the continent and in June 1918 readily agreed to a proposal that Canadians serving with the Royal Engineers in France be allowed to join the CEF, provided, of course, the British Expeditionary Force [BEF] had no objections.<sup>30</sup>

The CEF also recruited in England and in 1919 HQ OMFC reported that 1,733 men had been enlisted in the United Kingdom.<sup>31</sup> None of these recruits, of course, were part of the Canadian manpower pool.

Recruiting in the United Kingdom started in October 1914 when the RCD were given permission by Divisional HQ to recruit twenty-three men to bring the regiment up to strength.<sup>32</sup> A month later in November 1914, the 17<sup>th</sup> Battalion and the Divisional Cyclist Company, both of which were under-strength, placed ads in British newspapers without the approval of Divisional HQ.<sup>33</sup> Neither recruiting campaign was overly successful (the Cyclists enlisted three men and the 17<sup>th</sup> eighty-seven), but the ads drew the attention of the War Office which ruled on 19 November 1914 that the CEF was permitted to recruit only in Canada.<sup>34</sup>

The War Office ruling was understandable given the need to build up the BEF, but could not be sustained in practice. Admittedly the CEF in England was over-strength by 4,500 men, but the haphazard mobilization at Valcartier meant there was a shortage of artificers, farriers, shoeing-smiths and saddlers, skilled tradesmen who were not available from Canada because there was no coherent reinforcement system.<sup>35</sup> The War Office position was also illogical since the BEF tapped the 1<sup>st</sup> Division for more than a hundred men and commissioned them in the British army.<sup>36</sup> Faced with the illogic of the original policy and the pressing need to find skilled specialists, especially for the 1<sup>st</sup> Divisional artillery, the War Office reluctantly gave permission on 19 January 1915, for the CEF to recruit thirty skilled tradesmen in England.<sup>37</sup>

More than 250 Britons joined the CEF in England before the 1<sup>st</sup> Division sailed to France in February 1915. About a hundred of these men were enlisted after the War Office gave permission to recruit thirty specialists.<sup>38</sup> Thirty-five joined the artillery, ten of whom were skilled tradesmen.<sup>39</sup> Forty-two cavalymen enlisted, but only nine had civilian experience that was relevant.<sup>40</sup> The CAVC took in twenty-seven recruits, but



only two had previous experience working with animals.<sup>41</sup> At least twenty-five men also joined HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Division including six grooms, two cooks and two footmen. These men may have been specialists, but were hardly the skilled tradesmen envisaged by the War Office.

In February 1915, the 1<sup>st</sup> Division sailed to France and recruiting in Britain virtually stopped, leaving expatriate Canadians with no alternative but to join the BEF. However, in June 1915, the minister's representative, Major-General J.W. Carson, obtained permission from the War Office to enlist bona fide Canadians living in the United Kingdom.<sup>42</sup> The question of what constituted a bona fide Canadian was a thorny one, and after some deliberation, Canadian HQ decided that a genuine Canadian was a British subject who had been previously domiciled in Canada for an unspecified period of time.<sup>43</sup>

This definition was apparently too elastic, however, and in May 1916, Canadian HQ ruled that potential recruits had to provide documentary evidence of three years' residence in Canada.<sup>44</sup> The following year, in April 1917, the rules were relaxed when the United States entered the war and 'friendly or neutral' aliens became eligible to join the CEF. But this policy was short-lived and from September 1917 onwards, recruits had to be bona-fide Canadians temporarily domiciled in Britain (i.e. visitors).<sup>45</sup> The definition of 'Canadian' was also tightened up and in June 1918, OMFC directed that prospective recruits in Britain or France had to produce a certificate of Canadian citizenship issued by the High Commissioner in London.<sup>46</sup>

Recruiting in England was tolerated but not encouraged and prospective recruits were expected to make their own way to a CEF unit willing to accept them.<sup>47</sup> Despite

this, there was a steady flow of recruits. Pay must have motivated some of the applicants; a private in the BEF received the princely salary of a shilling a day (about 25¢) while his CEF counterpart received four times as much. But there were other factors as well. Members of the Canadian Munition Workers Unit who were employed at Dalton-in-Furness in England, for example, were anxious to join the CEF when their contracts expired, but preferred to enlist in England to avoid the return trip to Canada.<sup>48</sup>

There were also Canadians with the BEF who wished to transfer to the CEF. In May 1915, thirty-one Canadians with the 2/6<sup>th</sup> (Cyclist) Battalion, Royal Sussex Regiment requested a transfer to the Canadian Reserve Cyclist Company at Hounslow. The request was approved by the War Office and the men transferred, together with fourteen unruly Rhodesians, men that the 2/6<sup>th</sup> Royal Sussex were glad to be rid of.<sup>49</sup> But this was an exception and the general policy was that "Transfers from the Imperial to the Canadian Forces are not permissible."<sup>50</sup> But as always, the rules were modified and in June 1918, HQ OMFC notified the Canadian Section GHQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Echelon that applications to join the CEF would be accepted from those serving with the BEF, "but only where the men are Canadians enlisted in North America in technical units [mainly men with the Inland Water Transport] and are now being transferred compulsorily by the Imperial Authorities to the Infantry."<sup>51</sup> It seems unlikely that many were transferred to the CEF. In April 1918, eighteen men serving with the Royal Engineer Inland Water Transport were drafted to the BEF's Durham Light Infantry and asked HQ OMFC to intervene. Their petition was unsuccessful despite a moving appeal: "We therefore ask you to claim us as Canadians. We only ask to be with our own countrymen."<sup>52</sup>

Table 31  
Sample – Enlistments In Britain

Quarter	Year	Enlistments	Proportion	Remarks
October-December	1914	207	13.7%	Recruiting forbidden
January-March	1915	104	6.9%	War Office allowed 30 skilled tradesmen to be enlisted
April-June	1915	13	0.9%	
July-September	1915	45	3.0%	Recruiting allowed for bona fide Canadians.
October-December	1915	137	9.1%	
January-March	1916	341	22.6%	
April-June	1916	219	14.5%	Documentary evidence of three years of Canadian residency required
July-September	1916	113	7.5%	
October-December	1916	42	2.8%	
January-March	1917	46	3.0%	
April-June	1917	62	4.1%	
July-September	1917	37	2.4%	Bona fide Canadians temporarily domiciled in UK
October-December	1917	20	1.3%	
January-March	1918	25	1.7%	
April-June	1918	64	4.2%	Citizenship certificate required
July-September	1918	23	1.5%	
October-December	1918	13	0.9%	
Total		1,511		

Notes: (1) The period January to March 1916 was the peak recruiting period for the CEF as a whole and the CEF in England.

(2) The mean enlistment date for the CEF in England was the beginning of April 1916, about two weeks later than the CEF as a whole.

In terms of numbers, the men enlisted in England, France and Belgium were not a significant extension to the manpower pool although the men who joined the 1<sup>st</sup> Division in 1914-1915 must have been a welcome addition. Only one in five was a native Canadian although all were required to have some connection with Canada. Whether this connection was genuine or imagined is immaterial. The care taken to enlist only

Canadians (however the term was defined) meant that those who wished to serve with other Canadians were given the opportunity to do so.

In contrast to Bermuda and Europe, the United States made a very significant contribution to the manpower pool. The number is uncertain but it is estimated that more than 57,000 Americans served in the CEF from start to finish. These recruits were American residents, although most had been born elsewhere.<sup>53</sup> They enlisted in two distinct groups: those who crossed the border on their own initiative to join up in Canada; and those who were recruited by the British Canadian Recruiting Mission (BCRM) in the United States.

Recruiting Americans was fraught with legal difficulties. American citizens who joined the CEF were deemed to have expatriated themselves or, in other words, forfeited their citizenship.<sup>54</sup> Foreign armies, including the CEF, were also forbidden by the *US Penal Code* to recruit within the United States or to enter the United States with the intention of enticing men to leave in order to enlist elsewhere.<sup>55</sup> Both provisions were reinforced in August 1914 by President Wilson's proclamation emphasizing American neutrality.<sup>56</sup> In Canada, CEF regulations and the *Militia Act* specified that recruits had to be British subjects, thereby excluding American citizens.

Despite these obstacles, there was a steady trickle of enthusiasts from 1914 onward who travelled to Canada to enlist in the CEF. At Beebe Junction in the Eastern Townships of Québec, 123 men crossed the border in September 1914, all bound for Valcartier.<sup>57</sup> At Windsor, Ontario, four men entered Canada on 21 September 1914 declaring their intention to enlist. Included in this group was James Groesbeck, who claimed to be a native Californian planning to enlist in Montréal. Presumably this was the

same man who enlisted in the 23<sup>rd</sup> Battalion at Québec City in November 1914, claiming to have been born in Winnipeg.<sup>58</sup> This was only the beginning and by the end of December 1914, forty-four men had entered Canada through the Windsor border point after declaring their intention to join the CEF.<sup>59</sup> Results were similar elsewhere and up to May 1916, 248 men entered Canada at Niagara Falls with the stated purpose of joining the CEF.<sup>60</sup> The majority of these men had been born outside of the United States.

The steady trickle of men travelling north to join the CEF was of interest to recruiters who sought likely prospects at major border stations. In 1915-1916 the 99<sup>th</sup> Battalion based in Windsor, Ontario, concentrated its efforts on the border crossings and was able to recruit a substantial number of American residents, a resource to which inland battalions did not have access.<sup>61</sup> Another Windsor-based battalion, the 241<sup>st</sup>, recruited 821 men in 1916-1917, of whom 517 or 63% were American residents.<sup>62</sup> Similarly, more than a quarter of those who joined the 176<sup>th</sup> Battalion at Niagara Falls in 1916-1917 were American residents. In London, the 63<sup>rd</sup> Depot Battery maintained a recruiting office in Windsor with the result that almost a third of those who joined in 1916-1918 were American residents.<sup>63</sup>

Recruiting offices near the border gave units a distinct advantage and there was considerable jostling at major border crossings. Windsor, Ontario, was particularly popular and at one point in October 1916, there were fifteen unit detachments vying for recruits from Detroit.<sup>64</sup> Surprisingly, there were no complaints from the American government. The 213<sup>th</sup> Battalion, however, went too far when it opened a battalion recruiting stand in Niagara Falls with British and American flags at the Canadian end of

the international bridge. In this case, the State Department lodged a formal complaint with the British Embassy in Washington.<sup>65</sup>

Some units advertised for recruits in American newspapers. In March 1916, the 99<sup>th</sup> Battalion committed a spectacular gaffe by placing ads in papers owned by Josephus Daniels, the U.S. Secretary of the Navy. In this case, Militia HQ had no choice but to act and in March 1916, banned all advertising in American papers.<sup>66</sup> But some units chose to ignore the unequivocal ban imposed by Militia HQ. In April 1916, the Grand Rapids News of Michigan noted CEF advertisements and reported that "Information has been received from American consuls that the Canadian Government is conducting a campaign to lure prospective recruits across the border on promises of work."<sup>67</sup> There were other complaints as well, and in November 1916, Militia HQ repeated the prohibition on advertising in the United States and added that district commanders would be "held personally responsible for observance of these instructions and any officer disregarding same will be subject to immediate dismissal."<sup>68</sup>

There were a few cases where units actively recruited on American soil. In February 1916, three men from Rochester, New York, claimed that an NCO in plain clothes from the 139<sup>th</sup> Battalion enticed them to Cobourg, Ontario, where they were delivered to the battalion recruiting office instead of being provided with the lucrative jobs promised. A few months later, in June 1916, Lieutenant Austin of the 211<sup>th</sup> Battalion, accused of recruiting in Seattle under an assumed name, was incarcerated in a local prison. In October 1916, three NCOs from the 141<sup>st</sup> Battalion were arrested in Duluth after interviewing prospective musicians for the battalion band.<sup>69</sup> It is important to

note, however, that these units were in a distinct minority and most units were careful to pay lip service to American neutrality.

There were also cases where measures were taken to assist potential recruits to cross the border. The 7<sup>th</sup> Field Company in London maintained a recruiting office in Windsor, Ontario, but also hired a Detroit crimp to find likely recruits in pool halls and taverns and then escort them to Canada past immigration agents who obligingly looked the other way.<sup>70</sup> The cooperation extended by these agents at Windsor was not an isolated example. In November 1915, the Department of the Interior instructed immigration officials at Niagara Falls and St John's, Québec, to admit potential recruits and escort them to the nearest recruiting office.<sup>71</sup> Similar instructions were also given to immigration officers in Victoria, Vancouver and Sarnia.<sup>72</sup> There were unofficial arrangements as well. In Winnipeg, the secretary of the Bohemian National Alliance of America (Canadian Branch) advised the Russian Consul in Montréal in 1916 that "The arrangements we [Bohemians] have made with the Emigration authorities are very satisfactory, and so far we have had no trouble getting [Bohemian] men across the border."<sup>73</sup> The arrangements made by the secretary of the Canadian Branch, Sergeant August Fibiger of the 223<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, could not have been a secret and were probably done with the tacit approval of the CO.

American neutrality ceased to be a problem on 6 April 1917 when the United States declared war on the German Empire. The mood of the country was distinctly pro-Allied and after the Ambassador in Washington cleared the way, Brigadier-General W.A. White, an officer with the British Mission to the United States, lost no time in soliciting congressmen for permission to enlist recruits from the 700,000 British subjects in

America who were neither citizens nor declarants.<sup>74</sup> The results were almost immediate and on 7 May 1917, Congress amended the *U.S. Penal Code* to allow Allied nations to enlist residents who were not American citizens or declarants and had been born in the Allied nation concerned.<sup>75</sup> The amendment, which allowed foreign armies to enter the United States and actively seek recruits, was a remarkable act of generosity and cooperation even though the potential recruits were not eligible to serve in the American Expeditionary Force (AEF).<sup>76</sup>

By 6 June 1917, the British Recruiting Mission, later renamed British Canadian Recruiting Mission (BCRM), had started operations in New York.<sup>77</sup> Developing the infrastructure and importing staff took some time, however, and in the interim, US Army recruiting offices assisted the BCRM by receiving applicants, conducting medical exams, providing subsistence and forwarding men to the nearest CEF depot in Canada or, in the case of Britons, Jews and Australians, to the Imperial Recruit Depot at Windsor, Nova Scotia.<sup>78</sup>

From a modest start in New York City, the BCRM expanded steadily. The headquarters was located in New York City and for organizational purposes the country was divided vertically into three divisions: the Eastern Division based in New York City, the Western Division in Chicago and the Pacific Division in San Francisco. By November 1917, twenty-seven recruiting depots had been established as well as mobile detachments that visited urban centres in the Western and Pacific Division. Canadians were part of every division, but the Western Division was staffed entirely by Canadians with a militia officer, Lieutenant-Colonel J.S. Dennis, in command.<sup>79</sup>



The BCRM also received civilian assistance. British consuls were instructed to assist the mission and seventy-two recruiting committees were formed by prominent Britons and Canadians living in the United States.<sup>80</sup> Border crossing problems were non-existent. In June 1917, the Superintendent of Immigration noted that "for months past our inspectors have, all along the Boundary, admitted such men as applied for entry to enlist and were believed to be suitable."<sup>81</sup>

Special efforts were made to recruit French Canadians and in June 1917, Major J.J.O.L. Daly-Gingras of the 258<sup>th</sup> Battalion was posted to the BCRM in the hopes of enlisting a sizable number of French-Canadian immigrants in the New England states. The results were disappointing and in August 1917, a Catholic priest, Captain F.C.D. Doyon, reported that many had already joined the AEF as translators and the remainder anticipated being drafted in the near future. In summary, said Father Doyon, a concerted effort to recruit these men would be a waste of time.<sup>82</sup>

BCRM recruiting in the United States encountered some obstacles. Most U.S. Army recruiting stations cooperated with the BCRM, but a few were reluctant to provide assistance or tried to entice BCRM recruits into the American Army.<sup>83</sup> Local draft boards were also loath to lose potential recruits for the AEF and in Boston, an Irish declarant who tried to join the CEF was instructed to remain in the United States or be charged with desertion from the AEF.<sup>84</sup> In Buffalo, a BCRM recruit from the Engineer Depot at Brockville was jailed for draft evasion when he returned home on leave in uniform.<sup>85</sup> But others were more cooperative and in Chicago, Judge Stelk ordered non-U.S. citizens held in the Cook County Jail to be taken to the BCRM recruiting office for attestation and transport to Canada.<sup>86</sup>

BCRM recruits were documented and examined in the United States and then forwarded to a Canadian depot for attestation. But the men were not subject to military law until they were attested and there were no legal means of preventing them from deserting. In March 1918, about 5% of all BCRM recruits vanished before they arrived at a depot in Canada while in August 1918 HQ MD 2 reported that more than 9% had disappeared while in transit.<sup>87</sup> To stop this, Militia HQ directed in April 1918 that men would be attested by BCRM recruiting detachments.<sup>88</sup> But since only one of the three BCRM divisions was controlled by Canadians, it is unlikely that the revised procedure had much effect.

Judging by attestation papers, BCRM medical examinations were carried out by CAMC or RAMC medical officers or, on occasion, by civilian physicians. The number of applicants who were medically unfit is unknown although returns from New York City for July 1917 show that 32.8% were rejected<sup>89</sup>. Those who had been passed as fit were reassessed by medical boards on arrival in Canada. Results probably varied by district, but in MD 2, for example, 4% of all arrivals were turned down by medical boards.<sup>90</sup> In all, it is estimated that about 63% of all BCRM applicants were fit for some form of military service, a rate comparable to the MSA medical boards.

Not all districts benefited equally from the BCRM. MD 2 received the lion's share with 12,390 recruits by 7 September 1918, more than a third of all those recruited by the BCRM.<sup>91</sup> The reasons seem fairly obvious. The Western Division HQ was located in Chicago which had direct rail connections to Toronto and the division covered a huge area, from Pennsylvania to the Rocky Mountains. A detailed breakdown of the allocation to each district has not been found, but partial returns illustrate the disparity.

Table 32  
BCRM Recruits  
Allocation by District 21 July 1917 - 4 August 1917<sup>92</sup>

District	Recruits	Proportion
MD 1	35	3.9%
MD 2	464	52.3%
MD 3	5	0.6%
MD 4	69	7.8%
MD 5	0	N/A
MD 6	46	5.2%
MD 10	120	13.5%
MD 11	108	12.2%
MD 13	0	N/A
New Brunswick	41	4.6%
Total	830	

Note: New Brunswick was later redesignated MD 7.

The issue of which corps the recruits were assigned to caused some difficulties. Initially, BCRM recruiters promised applicants they could choose any branch of the CEF they wished and, not surprisingly, most opted to avoid the infantry. It must have come as a shock, therefore, that on arrival in Canada, most were assigned to the infantry. Not all accepted their assignment and in MD 2 about 2% of all BCRM recruits refused to be attested and were returned to the United States.<sup>93</sup>

Only 63.4% of all BCRM recruits who arrived in Toronto up to 18 August 1918 were fit for combatant service.<sup>94</sup> The rest were assigned to duties commensurate with their medical category.<sup>95</sup>

Table 33  
Corps Allocation MD 2 as of 18 August 1918<sup>96</sup>

Corps	Total	Proportion
Infantry	5,306	42.1%
Artillery	332	2.6%
Cavalry	290	2.3%
Engineers	2,071	16.4%
Service Corps	215	1.7%
Medical Corps	233	1.8%
Railway Troops	2,616	20.7%
Dental Corps	6	
Officer Training	26	0.2%
Garrison duty in Canada	1,475	11.7%
Base Hospital	48	
Total	12,618	

By October 1918, the BCRM had provided more than 33,000 men for the CEF, a very substantial contribution to the national manpower pool. But how many actually served in France, especially with the infantry where the need for reinforcements was the greatest? Almost half of all BCRM recruits were enlisted after March 1918.<sup>97</sup> Judging by those who served in the 20<sup>th</sup> Battalion, it took twenty-eight weeks, or seven months, for the average BCRM recruit to reach the front lines after being attested in Toronto.<sup>98</sup> Assuming that all BCRM recruits took seven months to reach France, it is probable that about 17,000 men were taken on strength before the Armistice of whom about 42.1% or 7,100 were infantrymen, a total that would be consistent with Table 33. But, had the war continued into 1919, there is no doubt that the BCRM contingent would have made a much more substantial contribution.

Table 34  
BCRM Reinforcements – Select Battalions<sup>99</sup>

Unit	March-May 1918	June- August 1918	September- November 1918	Total	Depot
2 <sup>nd</sup> CMR	21	28	99	148	MD 2
4 <sup>th</sup> CMR	1	18	75	94	MD 2
4 <sup>th</sup> Battalion	14	24	118	156	MD 2
16 <sup>th</sup> Battalion	1 (Note 1)	5	26	32	MD 10, 11, 12
18 <sup>th</sup> Battalion	9	30	8	47	MD 1
20 <sup>th</sup> Battalion	89	50	121	260	MD 2
72 <sup>nd</sup> Battalion	26	51	79	156	MD 11
85 <sup>th</sup> Battalion	0	4	3	7	MD 6
PPCLI	28	10	0	38	MD 3
Totals	189	220	529	938	

Note: Other than Private Fraser who was posted to the 16<sup>th</sup> Battalion on 16 February 1918, all BCRM reinforcements arrived between March and November 1918.

The BCRM was useful but relied on voluntarism and was therefore limited since non-declarant British subjects living in the United States who refused to volunteer for the CEF, AEF or BEF could not be compelled to serve. Conversely, American citizens living in Britain or Canada could not be drafted by the BEF or CEF. To resolve this problem, Britain and the United States concluded a reciprocal convention that gave men a choice between returning home where they could be conscripted or remaining in their country of residence subject to local draft laws. The preliminary agreement was signed on 19 February 1918, but the American Senate insisted on amendments and it was not until 30 July 1918 that the reciprocal convention came into effect.<sup>100</sup> With the introduction of conscription for those living abroad, there was no need to recruit volunteers in the United States and on 12 October 1918, the BCRM closed its doors.<sup>101</sup>

The terms of the convention concerning Canada were simple and straightforward. All American citizens domiciled in Canada and all Canadians living in the United States between the ages of twenty and forty-four were liable to be conscripted in their country of residence unless they returned home.<sup>102</sup> Both Americans and Canadians had a sixty-day grace period in which to make a decision. For those who wished to return home, both the Canadian and American Governments agreed to facilitate repatriation but the men were required to pay their own way.

Whether or not the reciprocal convention had any effect on the manpower pool is impossible to determine although it appears that the CEF had the short end of the stick. In the United States, the Provost Marshal General estimated that about 20,000 potential CEF recruits living in the United States chose to serve with the AEF rather than return home. In Canada, 18,372 Americans registered with consular officials after 30 July 1918 and were thus exempted from the MSA. No record appears to exist of the number of Americans in Canada who were drafted into the CEF nor is there any record of the number of Canadians who trekked north under the terms of the convention.<sup>103</sup>

The CEF also accepted convicts, although initially the reason was patriotism and not the need to fill the ranks. The first were eight prisoners at St Vincent de Paul Penitentiary who volunteered for the CEF on 14 August 1914. Their applications were reviewed by the Minister of Justice, but only one prisoner was released; in the event, he failed to enlist and was returned to prison. Others soon followed and by December 1914, sixty-five felons had been released from penitentiaries and jails in order to join the CEF. Some were given unconditional pardons, but most were released on a 'Ticket of Leave',

the precursor to the modern parole. About half of these ex-lags failed to enlist. Twenty-five simply vanished, one was deported, two were convicted of burglary after their release and were returned to St Vincent de Paul, three were arrested for failing to enlist while the last, George Juen, from Kingston Penitentiary, enlisted but refused to go overseas and was returned to prison.<sup>104</sup>

For the first two years of the war, prisoners were released on the initiative of the Justice Department and not the CEF. The Justice Department motives were moral: in 1915, for example, the Inspector of Penitentiaries recommended that Frank Jones, a Kingston prisoner, be enlisted because "military discipline is exactly what he requires to make a man of him."<sup>105</sup> The Dominion Parole Officer also had faith in the uplifting nature of military service and in September 1915 recommended the release of a chronic alcoholic from Dorchester Penitentiary: "I think if he were given a chance to go the Front he would make an excellent soldier and would redeem himself by good conduct."<sup>106</sup>

The CEF was not concerned with morality but manpower, and in 1916 started to take an interest in retrieving men who had been incarcerated for desertion, of which there were a substantial number. A single raid by military police on St Thomas, Ontario, in November 1915 netted thirty absentees. The 176<sup>th</sup> Battalion on the Niagara Peninsula had 257 deserters in less than a year and in August 1916 there were 1,500 absentees from Camp Borden, Ontario, alone.<sup>107</sup> Initially deserters were tried by court martial, a procedure that required testimony by witnesses. However, in many cases, deserters were not apprehended before their unit, together with witnesses, had sailed to England. To solve the problem, an Order-in-Council was issued in January 1916 declaring that deserters would be tried under the *Criminal Code*, documentary evidence could be

substituted for sworn testimony and on summary conviction men could be imprisoned for up to two years, with or without hard labour.<sup>108</sup>

Not every deserter was caught, but there were enough to swell the prison population. Under ordinary circumstances these men would not have been welcomed back, but recruiting dropped off sharply in the latter half of 1916. An Order-in-Council was therefore issued in November 1916 to allow magistrates to suspend convictions at the request of the military providing the offenders agreed not to desert in the future. This did nothing for those already incarcerated, however, and the Order-in-Council was followed almost immediately by an amnesty allowing convicted deserters to be released into the custody of the military.<sup>109</sup>

In 1917, the CEF took an active interest in prisoners other than deserters and began to recruit within the prisons. At Kingston, for example, the MD 3 Recruiting Officer arrived at the penitentiary on the morning of Friday, 26 May 1917 with a small team to process recruits. By noon, nine men, selected by the warden beforehand, had been interviewed, medically examined, attested and issued with uniforms. At 1:40 p.m. that afternoon, the draft, accompanied by an escort, left for Halifax and early Monday morning, was delivered to a troopship, less than seventy-two hours after leaving prison.<sup>110</sup>

The passage of the *Military Service Act* in 1917 brought further changes. Nothing in the Act prevented convicts from being conscripted, although men disqualified under the Dominion Elections Act, a category that included prisoners, were exempt from combatant service.<sup>111</sup> There is no evidence that this legal nicety was followed, however, and virtually all of the convicts who are known to have been drafted served in the



infantry. Despite the MSA, however, prisoners could only be released with a pardon or ticket of leave granted by the Justice Department.<sup>112</sup> Convict conscription was therefore selective and only those deemed suitable by the Justice Department were called up.

The actual process of drafting convicts was carefully controlled. Traveling medical boards visited penitentiaries and examined those considered suitable by prison staff. In Kingston, Warden Creighton went so far as to measure potential recruits, so that uniforms could be issued before the men left prison.<sup>113</sup> Convicts who were drafted were not given their freedom, but simply acquired khaki-clad turnkeys. In December 1917, prison staff from St Vincent de Paul escorted draftees from the prison directly to Peel Street Barracks in Montréal.<sup>114</sup> In Halifax, a recently drafted prisoner was taken under guard in May 1918 from the County Jail to the Nova Scotia Regiment Depot, where "He will be kept under close confinement and placed on board transport as such, with orders to the OC Troops to release him after the transport sails."<sup>115</sup> The methodology may have varied, depending on local circumstances, but invariably, convicts were kept under close scrutiny until they were safely aboard the troopship.

There was some concern that hardened criminals might be enlisted in the CEF and in May 1917, Militia HQ notified districts that "men who are found guilty of serious crimes are not on any account to be accepted as recruits."<sup>116</sup> The Department of Justice also had concerns and in October 1917 issued instructions to exclude "serious cases in which on account of the nature of the crime committed or for repetition of offences it appears impossible in the public interest to exercise any clemency."<sup>117</sup> Despite these concerns, the majority of prisoners who enlisted seem to have been good soldiers despite their civilian crimes. In New Brunswick, a convict from Dorchester Penitentiary who had

been convicted of statutory rape was drafted under the MSA and served satisfactorily with the 18<sup>th</sup> Battalion in France until he was demobilized in 1919.<sup>118</sup>

However, there were a small number of unsavory recruits such as the twenty-three convicts from Kingston Penitentiary who were serving with the 6<sup>th</sup> Reserve Battalion in England in July 1918. The group included one man serving a life term, two imprisoned for 'white slavery', another convicted of manslaughter, one rapist and a bank robber convicted of two counts of armed robbery and shooting with intent to wound. Two of the men confessed that they were drug addicts and Sir Edward Kemp, the minister responsible for the OMFC, thought that the sudden increase of robberies and assaults in the vicinity of the 6<sup>th</sup> Reserve Battalion could be traced directly to these ex-prisoners.<sup>119</sup>

The number of men released to join CEF is uncertain since most of the relevant Justice Department files remain closed. Warden Creighton of Kingston Penitentiary wrote in October 1918, that he had released more than eighty prisoners for military service including thirty-one men drafted under the Military Service Act over a three-day period in March 1918.<sup>120</sup> Since Kingston held about a quarter of all federal convicts, this suggests that more than three hundred men were released from federal prisons alone. On the other hand, annual reports submitted to Parliament show that from 1914 to 1918, 523 prisoners were given a conditional release in order to join the CEF.<sup>121</sup> These were conditional releases, however, and if non-conditional releases (pardons) and MSA draftees are considered, then it is probable that more than 700 felons served in the CEF, a substantial number given that there were only 4,438 men in all penal institutions at the end of 1916.<sup>122</sup> The estimate is not unreasonable and is comparable to convict enlistments

in the Second World War when 598 convicts were transferred from prison to the armed forces between September 1939 and February 1943.<sup>123</sup>

Although Militia HQ was able to enlarge the manpower pool by tinkering with entry requirements and making more efficient use of manpower, the reluctance of the CEF to enlist non-English speaking immigrants was a significant loss of potential recruits. Numbers in Table 35 are soft, but if immigrants had joined at the same rate as Canadians born outside of Québec, the CEF would have gained an additional 26,900 men, or more, considering that many immigrants were males of military age. The loss of potential recruits may be overstated since 14.6% of a sample of 16,319 immigrants lived in the United States and were not part of the national manpower pool. Still, the potential loss was probably more than two months' wastage for the CEF in France and Flanders.<sup>124</sup>

Table 35  
Place of Birth  
Male Population 1911<sup>125</sup>

Place of Birth (1)	Males – All Ages (2)	British Subjects (3)	CEF Recruits (4)	Proportion (5)
Canada	2,849,442	2,849,442	318,728	11.2%
British Isles	470,061	470,061	228,170	48.5%
British possessions	16,967	16,967	9,416	55.5%
United States	168,728	98,706	35,599	21.1%
Foreign born – Allied and neutral	303,137	177,335		
Foreign born – enemy	104,488	61,125		
Foreign born – other	407,625	238,460	27,723	6.8%
Totals	3,912,823	3,626,621	619,636	15.8%
Canadian born excluding Québec		1,872,039	250,836	13.4%

- Notes: (1) There appears to be a mathematical error in the 1911 Census and the number shown in column 2 exceeds the published summary by 445 men.  
 (2) Column 5 reflects the proportion of Column 2 that enlisted.  
 (3) Column 3 is based on the 1916 census of the Prairie Provinces which showed that 58.5% of all immigrants had been naturalized.  
 (3) Column 4 includes American residents.  
 (4) The total number of enlistments includes officers, nursing sisters and other ranks who joined between 1914 and 1920.

Not surprisingly, the enlistment rate for immigrants from non-English speaking countries differed considerably. In general, the mean enlistment date for non-English speaking immigrants was later than the CEF norm of March 1916, a difference that can be attributed, in part, to the initial difficulties these men had in enlisting. Whether or not the recruit's parent country was engaged in the war also played a part; those from Italy, Romania, Norway and Sweden (both neutral) were slow to join. On the other hand, the enlistment date for those from Holland (also neutral) was not too far off the CEF mean.

Enlistment, however, not only depended on the willingness of the CEF to accept the foreign-born recruit but also on the individual's desire to serve. There were groups who were reluctant to join, for whatever reason, and therefore had to be conscripted, provided, of course, they were British subjects.

Table 36  
Sample  
Foreign Born Enlistments

Birth-place	Sample Size	Mean Enlistment	MSA Proportion	Naturalized Proportion <sup>126</sup>
Bulgaria	33	July 1915	21%	4.3%
Belgium	982	April 1916	12.7%	40.9%
Iceland	385	April 1916	34%	82.5%
Holland	364	May 1916	14.8%	29.6%
Montenegro	107	May 1916	3.7%	(Note 2)
France	970	June 1916	16.8%	50.6%
Serbia	250	June 1916	6.8%	(Note 2)
Switzerland	229	June 1916	10.5%	(Note 2)
Russia	6,696	July 1916	15.8%	45.5%
Denmark	968	August 1916	9%	44.5% (Note 4)
Japan	226	September 1916	10.2%	22.5%
Greece	334	October 1916	15.9%	18%
Sweden	1,679	November 1916	26.6%	44.5% (Note 4)
Italy	1,531	December 1916	25.7%	19.9%
Norway	1,481	December 1916	28.9%	44.5% (Note 4)
Romania	350	March 1917	32.3%	46.1%
Ottoman Empire	290	April 1917	17.2%	39.6%
Albania	13	September 1917	30.8%	(Note 2)
Germany	203	April 1918	62%	58.8%
Austria-Hungary	1,612	June 1918	74.1%	50.2%
Total – All	18,703	August 1916	24%	
Total – Allied	11,497	June 1916	17.6%	
Total – Neutral	5,068	September 1916	21.6%	
Total – Enemy	2,138	April 1918	64.3%	
CEF total		March 1916	21%	

- Notes: (1) The mean enlistment date is the month by which half of all men in the sample had enlisted.
- (2) Data on immigrants from these countries is not available.
- (3) More than 27,700 men born in non-English speaking enlisted. The sample at Table 35 is not complete but probably represents the majority of recruits from each country listed.
- (4) Available data groups Scandinavian immigrants together.

Attitudes to non-English speaking immigrants were mixed. Clifford Sifton, Minister of the Interior from 1896 to 1905, thought that the Ukrainian immigrant, "a stalwart peasant in a sheep-skin coat,"<sup>127</sup> was a decided asset to the nation, but others were not as sure. J.S. Woodsworth, who was generally sympathetic to immigrants and their problems, preferred a homogeneous people who were "in accord with our democratic institutions and conducive to the general welfare."<sup>128</sup> Similarly, Agnes Laut, a popular Canadian author who was not opposed to immigration per se, wrote, "These poverty-stricken Jews and Polacks and Galicians will be the wealth and power of Canada tomorrow" but added "will Canada remain Canada when these new races come up to power?"<sup>129</sup> There were also concerns that non-English-speaking immigrants were a potential threat to peace and good order. In April 1914, for example, Major Vernon Eaton of MD 13 wrote of "a large number of emigrants(sic) coming into the West who have to be taught to respect, and to obey the laws of Canada".<sup>130</sup> Immigrants, especially those whose native language was not English or French, were viewed with suspicion and were not regarded as true Canadians, regardless of their status as British subjects. In short, they were not 'one of us.'

The same attitudes prevailed in the CEF. In reply to a request from HQ MD 2 to enlist naturalized Bulgarians, the AG wrote in October 1915 that "blood being thicker than water, you should take no chances."<sup>131</sup> A few months later in March 1916, a request

from HQ MD 10 to enlist Persians, who were bitter about Turkish persecution, was turned down because Persians “would not mix well with Anglo-Saxons.”<sup>132</sup> Greeks could be enlisted but, the AG wrote in November 1917, “No special effort, however, should be made to recruit them.”<sup>133</sup> However, Canadians were ambivalent. In November 1914, the mayor of Fort William, Ontario, thought that “little encouragement is offered to the foreigners [to enlist], but if they could be persuaded to take up arms, there would be a profound effect on the future generation.”<sup>134</sup> All of this must have been discouraging to the immigrants themselves, many of whom “desire to be regarded as Canadians and to be permitted as such to discharge their duty to their adopted country in this war.”<sup>135</sup>

There were also concerns that men from enemy states concealed their origins when they enlisted and represented a security threat. Some of the Ukrainians from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, who claimed to be Russians, were suspected of maintaining ties with the old country, while others were “reported to be sending money from Canada to the United States to be forwarded from there to Austria.”<sup>136</sup> Other groups were suspect as well. Germans were said to be passing themselves off as Scandinavians while Austrians were suspected of claiming Serbian or Romanian citizenship.<sup>137</sup>

Security concerns with recruits born in enemy countries or of enemy parentage may have been exaggerated, but the concerns had some basis in reality. In England, Private Ziegler of the 14<sup>th</sup> Reserve Battalion, who may have been from Germany, advised his Polish-born comrades in 1917 to claim they had been born in Germany rather than Russia to avoid being posted to an infantry battalion in France.<sup>138</sup> In 1916, the CGS pointed to the case of Private Minot of German ancestry who was serving with the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in France. Minot apparently deserted to the Germans and

shortly afterwards, positions previously unknown to the enemy were heavily shelled.<sup>139</sup> In February 1917, Private George McDonald of the RCR deserted and warned the 6<sup>th</sup> (German) Reserve Corps that the Canadian Corps was making preparations for an attack at Vimy Ridge. McDonald, whose true name was Otto Ludwig Doerr, had been born in Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany, although when he enlisted with the 212<sup>th</sup> Battalion at Saskatoon in 1916, he claimed to have been born in Kentucky. McDonald/Doerr evidently had an accent but was able to account for this by claiming that he had been raised in Mexico and lived in Texas.<sup>140</sup>

Language presented a problem for immigrant recruits, many of whom spoke little or no English or French. The number of these men who managed to join is unknown although there were enough that Militia HQ found it necessary to issue repeated instructions that "no men should be enlisted who have not a satisfactory knowledge of either the French or English languages."<sup>141</sup> The instructions were not xenophobic and there were some very good reasons why non-English speaking men could not be accepted. In 1916 Russian-born soldiers with the 39<sup>th</sup> Reserve Battalion in England made little progress in training because they could not understand the English-speaking instructors. The problem was serious and the OC 12<sup>th</sup> Reserve Brigade warned that these men would only be partially trained on completion of the standard recruit course and would be of limited value to battalions in France who would "be unable to handle them owing to their want of English."<sup>142</sup> In April 1916, the 11<sup>th</sup> Reserve Battalion reported receiving a draft of forty-five Russians, only six of whom could speak or understand English. "These men would be unable to report their observations if they were sent out on patrol [in France]," reported their company commander, and would "also [be] absolutely



unable to transmit a verbal message.”<sup>143</sup> A year later in August 1917, the 5<sup>th</sup> Reserve Battalion commented on a draft of men who could not speak English and warned that “none of them would be of the slightest use for front line work.”<sup>144</sup>

Sporadic efforts were made by reserve units in England to accommodate men who had difficulties with French or English. In April 1916, the OC 12<sup>th</sup> Canadian Reserve Brigade recommended that all Russians be grouped for training under NCOs who were fluent in both Russian and English.<sup>145</sup> In November 1916, the 9<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Reserve Brigade noted that bilingual instructors were required for Russian-speaking reinforcements while in June 1917 the 5<sup>th</sup> Reserve Battalion recommended that instructors who spoke Greek should be used to train newly-arrived unilingual Greeks with the 241<sup>st</sup> Battalion. A different approach was taken by the Canadian Pioneer Training Depot and in 1916 a number of Russians were promoted to lance-corporal and used to instruct non-English speaking Russians. The experiment was not a success, however, because the instructors were no further advanced than their students.<sup>146</sup>

The use of bilingual instructors was not a satisfactory solution. Admittedly the immigrant soldiers would complete their training, but there was still the knotty problem of speaking English or French sufficiently well to function with units in France. The obvious solution was to conduct second-language classes. The 37<sup>th</sup> Battalion Base Company in MD 2 suggested in 1915 that non-English speaking soldiers (mainly Russians) be grouped together and given an opportunity to attend language classes, but nothing came of this recommendation.<sup>147</sup>

The American Expeditionary Force (AEF) had the same problem but on a much larger scale. Almost 20% of the AEF were foreign-born and many spoke English poorly

or not all. At Camp Gordon, Georgia, a major training base for infantry reinforcements, for example, about 75% of all draftees in 1918 could not speak English.<sup>148</sup> The US War Office was slow to recognize the problem, but in January 1918 the Intelligence Department in Washington was enlarged with the addition of the Foreign-speaking Soldier Subsection (FSS), intended to facilitate the training and integration of immigrant soldiers. Under the direction of the FSS, non-English-speaking soldiers were grouped into 'development battalions' with English-language training and military training under instructors who spoke their language.<sup>149</sup>

The AEF was able to do this, but only because it was highly centralized and took in a large number of men in a relatively short period. In contrast, the CEF was decentralized and recruited fewer men over a much longer period of time. As well, the Canadian Forces were administered by a headquarters staff that was miniscule in comparison to the AEF and barely able to keep up with routine administration, let alone launch creative innovations. In short, a Canadian equivalent to the FSS was simply not possible.

The failure to tap the pool of non-English speaking immigrants probably cost the CEF about two months' wastage for units in France and Flanders. Citizenship requirements, the ability of foreign states to control immigrants on Canadian soil, a general mistrust of immigrants and security concerns all played a part. Language was also an issue, not necessarily because men were turned away but because reserve units in England, which were set up to train homogeneous blocks of reinforcements, could not train the immigrant soldiers efficiently.

There was also considerable inefficiency because there was no uniform description of a soldier's fitness, which meant the pool of serving men could not be managed efficiently. For the first two years of the war, a soldier's fitness depended on his corps and there was no way of determining if a healthy CASC driver was fit for the infantry without a medical examination. Nor was there any way to determine if an infantryman marked as 'unfit' by his battalion should be transferred to the CASC or repatriated to Canada. However, with the introduction of medical categories, men could be employed in jobs consistent with their physical abilities. Category A men, for example, could be transferred to the infantry and replaced by Category B infantrymen. The effect was to reduce the strain on the manpower pool by making more men available for service in the trenches.

The War Office made several efforts to institute medical categories in 1915, but these applied only to conscripts and men reported unfit by their units.<sup>150</sup> In general, unfit soldiers, regardless of corps, were described as 'PB' (permanent base) or 'TB' (temporary base) if the individual was expected to improve. In May 1916, more than 12,000 soldiers were examined by CEF medical boards in England and 20.46% were judged to be 'PB'.<sup>151</sup> But the results were unsatisfactory since there was no indication of the limitations on employment.

The system was finally rationalized in May 1916 when the War Office promulgated Army Council Instruction (ACI) 1023 which set out a universal system of medical categories that reflected individual fitness and training regardless of corps.<sup>152</sup> The CEF was slow to follow suit, however, probably because Canadian HQ in London under Major-General Carson was not particularly efficient and did not recognize either

the problem or the remedy. In November 1916, Colonel A.D. McRae of Canadian HQ visited units in France and, together with Lieutenant-General Byng, the Canadian Corps commander, discussed the results of the visit with the DCIGS at the War Office. In a nutshell, the two recommended the use of common standards in both France and England and urged that the same standards be adopted in Canada.<sup>153</sup> The creation of HQ OMFC facilitated matters and by the end of November 1916, ACI 1023 was brought into effect for the CEF in England and France.<sup>154</sup> The system was then adopted in Canada in May 1917, when Militia HQ issued Militia Order 50 to identify unfit men who might otherwise be posted to England and “to utilize available material [manpower] to the best purpose.”<sup>155</sup>

The category system established by ACI 1023 with minor modifications authorized in Militia Order 50 is summarized in Table 37.

Table 37  
Medical Categories

Category	General Description	Remarks
A	Fit for active service	Ai – fully trained Aii – recruits Aiii – fully trained but required hardening Aiv – minors
B	Free from serious organic defects and fit for active service on the lines of communication	Bi – able to march five miles Bii – able to walk at least five miles to and from work Biii – sedentary duties only
C	Fit for service in Canada only	
D	Temporarily unfit	
E	Unfit for categories A, B and C	Not expected to become fit within six months

Note: Not all subcategories are listed in Table 37.

Once men had been categorized, the benefits of the system became obvious. In January 1917, for example, HQ OMFC directed units in England to transfer all men with

Category B or C to the Canadian Railway Troops Depot at Purfleet or to the Canadian Forestry Corps, something that would not have been possible six months earlier without mass medical boards.<sup>156</sup>

Standard medical categories allowed fit men in non-combatant corps to be weeded out and diverted to the infantry. As early as January 1917, a draft of 399 CASC reinforcements from Canada, "of splendid physique, being above the average of Infantry Battalions now arriving,"<sup>157</sup> lost a hundred men to the infantry on arrival in England. Further transfers of Category A soldiers to the infantry followed: by 9 May 1917, a total of 525 men had been transferred from the CASC Training Depot to reserve infantry battalions. Others followed; 436 CASC men were transferred to the infantry in August 1917 and a further 313 in September 1917.<sup>158</sup> Another 227 followed in October-November 1917.<sup>159</sup> The results were dramatic. In January 1917, CASC personnel in England were virtually all Category A but by July 1918, they were virtually all Category B.<sup>160</sup> Other corps were expected to yield Category A men as well and in the first six months of 1917, for example, 469 pay clerks at HQ OMFC were drafted to the infantry and replaced by Category B and C men.<sup>161</sup>

The system was not perfect. CAMC personnel in the forward areas in France were required to be medically fit and in May 1917, the ADMS at HQ OMFC noted that the CAMC Training Depot could not afford to surrender any more Category A men.<sup>162</sup> Similarly, the QMG reported in November 1917 that the CASC Training Depot had to retain a pool of Category A horse transport drivers as reinforcements for divisional trains in France, because "it is feared that under the trying winter conditions, the demand for reinforcements will be exceptionally heavy if men of low category are employed."<sup>163</sup>

Even the reserve battalions were affected. In January 1918, HQ OMFC urged that Category A NCOs should be posted to France although it was difficult to find competent instructors with low categories. Still, OMFC added, the effort should be made.<sup>164</sup>

The process of combing out non-combatants who were fit for the front was not a reaction to periodic shortages of infantry reinforcements for France, but an ongoing effort to make efficient use of available manpower. The general policy was set in May 1917, when HQ OMFC directed that "all men of Category 'A' of Units and Corps other than infantry, who are surplus to the estimated requirements of reinforcements for the next 8 months, should be transferred to Infantry Reserve Battalions."<sup>165</sup> In May 1918, the process was further refined when a Board of Officers was established by HQ OMFC to visit every unit in England and allocate men according to their medical fitness. The Board's work was difficult and time-consuming, but its efforts "resulted in effecting a saving of the greatest possible amount of Man-Power in the Overseas Military Forces of Canada."<sup>166</sup>

Despite the apparent benefits of the combing out process, the effect appears to have been negligible judging by the number of CASC men posted to infantry battalions in France.

Table 38  
Select Infantry Battalions  
Non-Infantry Reinforcements<sup>167</sup>

Corps	1917	1918	Total
CADC	1	2	3
CAMC	9	91	100
CASC	98	150	248
CAVC	6	5	11
CFC	2	128	130
CRT	2	24	26
Remount Depot	5	6	11
Signal Corps		93	93
Totals	123	499	622

Note: Table 38 lists non-infantry reinforcements posted to the 2<sup>nd</sup> CMR, 4<sup>th</sup> CMR, 4<sup>th</sup> Battalion, 16<sup>th</sup> Battalion, 18<sup>th</sup> Battalion, 20<sup>th</sup> Battalion, 72<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 85<sup>th</sup> Battalion and PPCLI. The table does not include men of the Canadian Labour Corps who arrived as reinforcements after their medical category was upgraded.

On average, each battalion listed in Table 38 received about 69 non-infantry reinforcements which suggests that about 3,317 were posted to the forty-eight battalions in the Canadian Corps. But the total number of transfers to combatant corps must have been somewhat more if postings to the artillery, machine gun corps and the cavalry brigade are also considered. The true significance of the use of medical categories lies in the realization that the manpower pool not only had to be tapped, but had to be efficiently managed.

Women could also have been used to replace men who were physically fit for active service, a measure that would have helped to alleviate the shortage of manpower in 1917-1918. In England, HQ OMFC was more than willing to make use of British women from Queen Mary's Army Auxiliary Corps (QMAAC) as cooks, drivers and mess waitresses, but there was no equivalent in Canada although more than 5,000 women were hired as civil servants and worked as clerks and typists.<sup>168</sup>

It was not as though women had not served with the CEF since the beginning. A total of 2,854 nurses were commissioned in the CAMC as well as ten other women in a variety of units including the Canadian Field Comforts Commission and the CAMC.<sup>169</sup> There were also 342 Canadian women who served overseas with Voluntary Aid Detachments.<sup>170</sup> But there were no female soldiers with the exception of Maud Blake, a Kingston dental mechanic who enlisted as a private in 1915 and was demobilized as a sergeant in January 1919.<sup>171</sup> Blake, it must be pointed out, joined as a woman and made no effort to conceal her gender.

Women were not unwelcome in the CEF. After all, QMAAC women served with CEF units in England with no apparent problems. The subject was not seriously discussed at Militia HQ, however, until December 1917 when a letter signed by an anonymous 'Anxious and 'Willin'-to-go' Stenographer' in Toronto suggested that the CEF form a Canadian version of QMAAC. The letter was passed to the CGS who took the suggestion seriously and directed the AG to broach the issue with the Minister's military secretary. HQ OMFC was then consulted on the proposal to form a Canadian equivalent to the QMAAC, but reported in March 1918 that the War Office had rejected the idea because there were enough British women to fill the demand and there was a shortage of shipping to bring the women to England.<sup>172</sup>

The matter did not end there. In May 1918, Colonel MacInnes at Militia HQ noted that the Royal Air Force was recruiting women to serve with RAF units in Canada and observed "Will this not, however, expose the Department to criticism, if something of the same kind is not done in connection with the Canadian Forces?"<sup>173</sup> MacInnes's suggestion evidently struck a chord. The Militia Council considered the issue on 30 May



1918 and formed a sub-committee headed by the QMG to study the matter. The sub-committee worked slowly, however, and it was not until 18 September 1918 that Militia Council reviewed the final report and approved the formation of the 'Canadian Women's Army Auxiliary Corps' (CWAAC). However, Major-General Mewburn, the Minister of Militia and Defence, deferred any action until the Prime Minister and Civil Service Commission had been consulted. Nothing concrete emerged from these consultations (if in fact, they ever took place) and the signing of the Armistice on 11 November 1918 rendered the proposal moot.<sup>174</sup>

Would a significant number of men have been made available for overseas duty with the creation of the CWAAC? In May 1918, there were approximately 90,600 soldiers serving in Canada.<sup>175</sup> Many were MSA men waiting to go overseas, however, while others were being cared for by the Military Hospitals Commission. In all likelihood there were only a few thousand fit men employed in administrative positions who could have been replaced by members of the CWAAC. As well, since the CWAAC had been authorized in September 1918, only two months before the armistice, there would have been little or no benefit to the CEF. Had the war continued into 1919, however, the CWAAC would probably have made a significant contribution by adding several thousand men to the reinforcement stream.

From start to finish, the CEF recruited about 616,636 officers and men. But many of these men did not meet age and fitness requirements or were recruited outside of Canada and thus were not part of the national manpower pool. All of this begs the question of how efficiently the pool was actually utilized.

Table 39  
Manpower Pool – Final Balance Sheet

Item	Debit	Credit
Medically unfit	81,449	
Overage	9,198	
Underage	24,369	
Sub-total – debits	116,016	
Recruits – convicts		700
Recruits – Bermuda		46
Recruits – Greece, France and Belgium		31
Recruits – England		1,733
Recruits – US residents		22,338
Recruits – BCRM		33,335
Sub-total – credits		58,183
All recruits not part of the manpower pool		173,198
All recruits from manpower pool		443,438

In summary, about 54% of all men in Canada who were eligible for military service enlisted in the CEF. However, the rate would have been somewhat higher if the CEF had welcomed non-English speaking immigrants, natives and visible minorities and encouraged them to enlist. On the other hand, modifications to recruiting criteria discussed in Chapter 4 probably added several hundred thousand recruits to the CEF, men who needed eyeglasses, dental care or dentures. The introduction of uniform medical categories also affected manpower. The system did not enlarge the reservoir, but made management of the pool more efficient and allowed men to be retained who might otherwise have been released. All in all, there may have been some shortcomings, but in the end, Militia HQ was able to make good use of the available manpower.

Numbers alone do not suffice to win battles and success depended on well-trained reinforcements arriving at their units in a timely fashion. Training, then, was vital and this forms the central theme in Chapter 6.

<sup>1</sup> Fifth Census of Canada 1911: Vol II p.440 Table XVII 'Birthplace of the people by provinces'

<sup>2</sup> Morton. When Your Number's Up p.53

<sup>3</sup> Armstrong, Elizabeth H. The Crisis of Québec, 1914-1918. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974) p.122; Québec Chronicle 10 March 1916 p.3; Haycock Sam Hughes: the Public Career of a Controversial Canadian p.204; LAC MG 30 E51 (Willoughby Garnons Gwatkin Fonds) File L-W 1913-1916, CGS to Colonel James Mason 3 July 1915

<sup>4</sup> Haycock Sam Hughes: the Public Career of a Controversial Canadian p.209; Hopkins, J. Castell. The Canadian Annual Review War Years: 1916 (Toronto: The Canadian Annual Review Limited, 1918) p.312; Toronto Globe 15 April 1916 p.5 reported remarks by Senator Mason similar to his earlier comments in March.

<sup>5</sup> Canada Yearbook 1918 p.96 quoting the results of the 1911 census.

<sup>6</sup> Canada Year Book 1918 p.99 with a table showing males aged 18-45 by province, p.111 showing naturalizations in the prairie provinces in 1916; Canada Year Book 1914 pp.63-65 quoted the 1911 census which showed that 121,430 people had been born in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 39,577 in the German Empire and 4,768 in the Ottoman Empire (2,907 in Syria and 1,861 in Turkey). A total of 9,657 people had been born in Bulgaria and Romania and it has been assumed that half (4,828) had been born in Bulgaria. The combined total of 170,603 people represents 38% of the 445,857 aliens living in Canada in 1911. The number of alien males of military age (304,310) has therefore been reduced by 38% to 188,672. Assuming that 58.5% had been naturalized, 110,373 were eligible to serve in the CEF. Combined with 1,109,383 Canadian born and 306,377 British born, a total of 1,526,133 males aged 18-45 were eligible to serve in the CEF.

<sup>7</sup> Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War. p.379

<sup>8</sup> Canada, Department of Trade and Commerce. Fifth Census of Canada, 1911: Vol VI, Occupations of the People. (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1915) pp.2-7 Table I

<sup>9</sup> Statistics Canada. Historical Statistics of Canada (1983) Table A1 at

<http://www.statcan.gc.ca.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca:2048/pub/11-516-x/section/A1-eng.csv>. It is assumed that few men would have been employed in heavy industry beyond age 60. Ages are given in five year cohorts with 2,355,000 men between the ages of fifteen and sixty. Of those aged fifteen to nineteen, it is assumed that 40% or 142,000 were eighteen or nineteen. A total of 1,694,000 or 72% of all men were aged eighteen to forty-four and of military age. It has therefore been assumed that 443,498 of the 615,969 essential workers were suitable for the CEF by reason of age.

<sup>10</sup> Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics. Canada Year Book 1922-23. (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1924) p.433 noted that the work force increased from 395,681 men and women in 1915 to 603,116 in 1918 with women mainly employed in the clothing and textile industries.

<sup>11</sup> The revised figure for the manpower pool is the total shown in Table 1 minus the number of workers available for enlistment in Table 2.

<sup>12</sup> Bryce. Conservation of Manpower in Canada: A National Need. p.12 citing the results of more than eight hundred examinations carried out by Captain C.J. Withrow, probably in late 1917. The figures include those placed in Category 'D' (temporarily unfit).

<sup>13</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4428 File 26-5-64-3 Vol 2, GOC MD 3 to Militia HQ 7 May 1917, the figures given were approximate only since in the early months, more attention was paid to organization than statistics; Chief Recruiting Officer MD 3 to GOC MD 3 25 April 1917 with the results of the survey and adding that eight recruiting offices felt medical standards should be reduced.

<sup>14</sup> An Act respecting Military Service 29 August 1917, section 3(1) defined Class I as "Those who have attained the age of twenty years and were born not earlier than the year 1883 and are unmarried or are widowers but have no child." PC 919 of 20 April 1918 extended the Act to single men aged nineteen; Morton When Your Number's Up pp.66-67 comments on differing standards of local tribunals. No doubt the same applied to medical boards.

<sup>15</sup> Machin. Report of the Director of the Military Service Branch. p.78. The numbers quoted exclude those who were granted an exemption from military service prior to being medically examined. The figures should be taken as a guide only since there were distinct regional differences, probably reflecting local attitudes towards conscription. Only 35.9% of all Québec draftees, for example, were fit for general service overseas while 59.7% of those examined in Saskatchewan were fit for general service.

<sup>16</sup> Great Britain, Ministry of National Service Report: Vol I: Upon the physical examination of men of military age by National Service medical boards from November 1<sup>st</sup>, 1917 – October 31<sup>st</sup>, 1918 pp.3-4;

Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War, 1914-1920, p.379 provided lower figures for men aged 18 to 41: 25% were fit for general service and 15% were fit for non-combatant overseas service. The source of the data was not given; Winter, J.M. 'Military Fitness and Civilian Health in Britain during the First World War' in Journal of Contemporary History Vol 15 (1980) pp.214-215 has critiqued the Ministry of National Service figures by pointing to imprecise definitions, hurried examinations and institutional biases on the part of local boards. The same remarks may apply to Canadian boards, but their methodology has not been studied by historians.

<sup>17</sup> The RCR, a PF battalion, was stationed in Bermuda in 1914-1915. They may have enlisted a few, but the PF attestation papers are not available or readily searchable at the RCR Museum. Recruits in the other two battalions were found by searching 38<sup>th</sup> Battalion attestation papers with service numbers from 410001 to 412000 and 163<sup>rd</sup> Battalion attestation papers with service numbers from 660001 to 663000 at <http://www.collectionscanada.ca/archivianet/cef/index-e.html>

<sup>18</sup> Gagnon, Jean-Pierre. 'Canadian Soldiers in Bermuda During World War One' in Histoire Sociale-Social History Vol XXIII Number 45 (May 1990) pp.17-18 noted that reinforcements were sent from Canada as required; An Historical Sketch of the Seventy-Seventh Battalion Canadian Expeditionary Force. (Ottawa: War Publications Limited, 1926) p.18 notes that a draft of 100 men was sent to the 38<sup>th</sup> Battalion in Bermuda on 3 December 1915.

<sup>19</sup> Ingham, Jennifer. Defence Not Defiance. (Bermuda: privately published, nd) p.50, The Second Bermuda Contingent was attached to the 38<sup>th</sup> for training.

<sup>20</sup> The Bermuda Royal Gazette was searched from September 1914 to September 1916 and no comment was found concerning recruiting by Canadian battalions; Bermuda Archives, House of Assembly Debates 1914-1915, House of Assembly Debates 1915-1916, CS 6/1/28 'Governor's Despatches 1913-1916 and CS 6/1/28 'Governor's Despatches 1913-1916 were searched as well with no results.

<sup>21</sup> Bermudians who enlisted in the 38<sup>th</sup> were born in Britain (six), Canada (four), Jamaica (two) and the United States (one). The Bermuda contingents were paid one shilling (twenty-five cents) per diem while the CEF received \$1.10.

<sup>22</sup> DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 8 File 74/672-II-36, Governor of Bermuda to Militia HQ 18 August 1916 complaining that blacks had been enlisted as officers' mess waiters and adding that the matter should not become public knowledge; Bermudians who enlisted in the 163<sup>rd</sup> were born in Bermuda (eighteen), Britain (nine), British West Indies (four), Australia (one) and the United States (one).

<sup>23</sup> DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 8 File 74/672-II-36, Governor of Bermuda to Militia HQ 18 August 1916; Ingham. Defence Not Defiance p.9 notes that Bermuda forces were segregated with whites serving in the Bermuda Volunteer Rifle Corps and blacks in the Bermuda Militia Artillery; Hallett, Clara and Harris, Edward 'Those who served: Bermuda Contingents overseas in the Great War, 1914-1918' in Maritimes: The Magazine of the Bermuda Maritime Museum Vol 19 Number 3 (2006), p.3

<sup>24</sup> One of the men enrolled by the 163<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, 661146 E.G. Steele, was killed in action on 7 July 1917 while serving with the 14<sup>th</sup> Battalion.

<sup>25</sup> LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 3674, 229463 George W. Goukler.

<sup>26</sup> LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 6449 62300 Joseph Guillaume Octave Mouton. According to his attestation paper, Mouton had served with the Belgian Army from December 1914 to 28 August 1916. He was attested by Major A.E. Dubuc of the 22<sup>nd</sup> Battalion 'in the field' on 22 October 1916.

<sup>27</sup> LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Boxes 2454 (229469 F. Derancougne) and 9503 (229457 H. Tardivon).

<sup>28</sup> LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 439 File E-479-1 Vol 1, OC 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Stationary Hospital to AAG & QMG Rouen 4 December 1915, AAQ & QMG to Canadian Records London 20 December 1915 and reply from Director of Recruiting and Organization 5 January 1916

<sup>29</sup> LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Boxes 10322 (1263461 James Whittingham) and 2870 (1263476 Harvey H Elliott). Elliott, a native Canadian, had formerly served with the British ASC.

<sup>30</sup> LAC RG 9 III D3 Vol 5047 File 911 Reel T-10938, War Diary Canadian Section GHQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Echelon, June 1918 appendix 6 with a copy of a letter from OMFC to the section dated 10 June 1918.

<sup>31</sup> Report of the Ministry: Overseas Military Forces of Canada, p.44 noted that 1,733 men had been enlisted; Duguid Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-1919: Vol I p.51 claims that 3,079 had been enlisted. The discrepancy may be due to Duguid counting those who were re-attested while OMFC did not. The OMFC figure is consistent with LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 28 File 8-1-11, Officer i/c Enlistments to Director of Recruiting and Organization 20 April 1916 with preliminary figures and a further letter dated 26 June 1916 with corrected figures for 1916 showing that 960 men had been enlisted

up to June 1916. A survey of on-line attestation forms on the Library and Archives of Canada web site has produced 1,516 British recruits, 1,064 of whom had joined by 30 June 1916.

<sup>32</sup> Duguid. Official History: Chronology, Appendices and Maps. p.140 notes the RCD were given permission on 20 October 1914 to recruit twenty-three men; Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Canadian Expeditionary Force: Royal Canadian Dragoons: Nominal Roll of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. Issued with Militia Orders 1915 notes that the RCD sailed to England with 557 men; Love, David W. A Call to Arms: The Organization and Administration of Canada's Military in World War One. (Winnipeg: Bunker to Bunker Books, 1999). p.25 notes that British War Establishments, presumably adopted by the RCD on arrival in England, called for 524 men. It is unlikely that the RCD lost fifty-six men on their arrival in England and the extra men may have been required to form a depot squadron to provide reinforcements.

<sup>33</sup> LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 419 File E-90-1, Chief Paymaster CEF to HQ Canadian Contingent ca15 November 1914 concerning the Cyclists and 17<sup>th</sup> Battalion. The same letter can be found in DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 8 File 74/672-II-39; Duguid. Official History: Chronology, Appendices and Maps. p.116 notes that the 17<sup>th</sup> Battalion sailed with 624 men – 355 under establishment and p.158 notes that the divisional cyclist establishment was 8 officers and 195 other ranks; Canada, Department of Militia and Defence. Canadian Expeditionary Force: Divisional Cyclist Company: Nominal Roll of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. Issued with Militia Orders 1915, notes that the company sailed with eighty-eight men; The company needed almost 110 recruits to reach the war establishment; Ellis, W.D. (ed). Saga of the Cyclists in the Great War 1914-1918. (Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion Association, 1965) pp.4-5 notes that the cyclist company was brought up to strength with men from the 8<sup>th</sup>, 9<sup>th</sup>, 10<sup>th</sup>, 11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Battalions as well as about twelve South African recruits.

<sup>34</sup> DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 8 File 74/672-II-39, War Office to OC 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Contingent 19 November 1914; Numbers enlisted have been taken from LAC RG 150 File '17<sup>th</sup> Reserve Battalion', Daily Orders 5 November 1914 to 20 January 1915; LAC RG 9 III D3 Vol 4956 Reel T-10773, War Diary 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Divisional Cyclist Company for November and December 1914.

<sup>35</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1811 File GAQ 3-9, 'Memorandum on the Canadian Expeditionary Force as at Present Reconstituted' by Colonel W.G. Gwatkin, CGS, 3 October 1914. Gwatkin also noted that reinforcements had not been raised, but would be required in May or June 1915 assuming the 1<sup>st</sup> Division was sent to France in January 1915.

<sup>36</sup> LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 419 File E-90-1, GOC Canadian Contingent to Southern Command 8 December 1914 commenting on the losses

<sup>37</sup> DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 8 File 74/672-II-39, GOC Canadians to War Office 12 January 1915, 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Division to War Office 19 January 1915 and reply 19 January 1915 giving authority to recruit specialists in Britain; Duguid. Official History: Chronology, Appendices and Maps. p.141 noting that thirty specialists for the Divisional Artillery were enlisted in January 1915

<sup>38</sup> . Taken from a nominal roll of 1,516 men enlisted in the United Kingdom based on attestation papers on-line at <http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/archivianet/index-e.html> Unless otherwise noted, all discussion concerning numbers enlisted are based on this sample.

<sup>39</sup> Tradesmen enlisted in the artillery included shoeing smiths (7), blacksmiths (2), wheelwright (1) and saddler (1).

<sup>40</sup> Tradesmen enlisted in the cavalry included grooms (3), ranchers (5) and Royal Northwest Mounted Police (1).

<sup>41</sup> Recruits included a rider and a groom.

<sup>42</sup> LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 28 File 8-1-11, Major-General Carson to War Office 25 May 1915 asking for permission to enlist Canadians resident in the British Isles, Major-General Carson to GOC Canadian Training Division Shorncliffe 14 June 1915 noting that bona fide Canadians could be enlisted in the CEF

<sup>43</sup> LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 439 File E-479-1 Vol 1, A/DAAG HQ Canadians [Shorncliffe] to all units 30 June 1915.

<sup>44</sup> LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 28 File 8-1-11, DAAG to HQ Canadians London 9 May 1916.

<sup>45</sup> LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 92 File 10-12-31, AG OMFC to Deputy Minister OMFC 30 April 1917; LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 92 File 10-12-33, High Commissioner to HQ OMFC 12 September 1917.

<sup>46</sup> LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 1260 File E-55-5, Canadian Section GHQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Echelon to AAG(C) GHQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Echelon 4 June 1918 with information concerning the decision by OMFC. Canadian citizenship per se did not come into existence until 1 January 1947. Presumably the High Commissioner certified that the man in

question was a British subject ordinarily resident in Canada; See also Report of the Ministry: Overseas Military Forces of Canada, 1918, p.44

<sup>47</sup> LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 28 File 8-1-11, Officer i/c Enlistments to Director of Recruiting and Organization 8 January 1916

<sup>48</sup> LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 28 File 8-1-11, W.G. Hunter, British Army Recruiting Officer to Major-General Carson 4 October 1915, Carson to Hunter 7 October 1915.

<sup>49</sup> LAC RG 9 A1 Vol 28 File 8-1-12, War Office to HQ CTD 11 May 1915 offering the men; File 8-1-11, War Office to Eastern Command 22 May 1915 directing the men be transferred, CTD to 2/6<sup>th</sup> (Cyclist) Battalion Royal Sussex Regiment 22 May 1915; LAC RG 9 III D3 Vol 4957 File 502 Reel T-10773, War Diary Canadian Reserve Cyclist Company, July 1915, Appendix B.

<sup>50</sup> LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 1260 File E-55-5, Canadian Section GHQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Echelon to AAG (C) GHQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Echelon 4 June 1918

<sup>51</sup> LAC RG 9 III D1 Vol 5047 File 911 Reel T-10938, War Diary Canadian Section GHQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Echelon, June 1918 Appendix 6, HQ OMFC to Canadian Section GHQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Echelon 10 June 1918. However, the release of these men from the BEF required British approval and it does not appear that this was given.

<sup>52</sup> RG 9 III B1 Vol 1260 File E-55-5, undated petition probably submitted to OC Canadian General Base Depot at Etaples in April 1918. The petition was forwarded by the OC Canadian General Base Depot to HQ Reinforcements 23 April 1918. HQ OMFC to Canadian Section GHQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Echelon 10 June 1918 noted that "...it seems desirable that they [petitioners] should be enlisted in the Canadian Infantry." Canadian Section GHQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Echelon to AAG(C) GHQ 3<sup>rd</sup> Echelon 4 June 1918 enclosing a partial list of Canadians with the Inland Water Transport.

<sup>53</sup> In an effort to determine the proportion of American residents who enlisted in the CEF, attestation papers were examined for all recruits who joined one of six major depots from 1915 to 31 May 1917. A total of 9,161 attestation papers included the recruit's address. The British Canadian Recruiting Mission started operations in June 1917 and the attestation papers of men who joined after May 1917 have not been included. Depots chosen for this sample accepted recruits from a broad area and operated for at least eighteen months thus eliminating local recruiting trends. The depots concerned were the CAMC depots in MD 10 (Manitoba, Saskatchewan and North-West Ontario), MD 11 (British Columbia and the Yukon Territories), the CASC Depot in MD 2 (Ontario and Québec), C Battery RCHA (Ontario and Québec), the CE depot at St John's, Québec (Ontario, Québec and the Maritimes) and the CMR Depot in Hamilton (Ontario and western Québec). A total of 502 men or 5.5% were American residents. With 406,147 recruits signing up by 31 May 1917, it is estimated at least 22,338 were American residents. A total of 663 men or 7.2% were American born of whom 426 or 64.3% were Canadian residents; Lyddon, Colonel W.G. British War Missions to the United States 1914-1918. (London: Oxford University Press, 1938) p.203 noted that the BCRM enlisted 47,188 men, 33,335 of whom joined the CEF. This total included 6,643 Jews, colored men and other nationalities, some of whom may have been American citizens; His figures were echoed by the British Ambassador to Washington in a statement on 18 November 1918 (DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 1 Folder 2. There were 22,473 Canadian residents who volunteered for the CEF between 1 June 1917 and 30 November 1918. Some of these men were, no doubt, American residents. It is also likely that some of the 6,643 Jews and colored men enlisted by the BCRM joined the CEF. At least four hundred blacks from the British West Indies joined the CEF. No fewer than seventy-five had been recruited by the BCRM. The grand total of American residents who enlisted was probably in excess of 57,000.

<sup>54</sup> United States, Government of. Statutes at Large of the United States of America: Vol XXXIV, Part 1. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1909) p.1228 *An Act In reference to the expatriation of citizens and their protection abroad* approved 2 March 1907. Section 2 provided that "Any American citizen shall be deemed to have to have expatriated himself...when he has taken an oath of allegiance to any foreign state."

<sup>55</sup> United States, Government of. Statutes at Large of the United States of America: Vol XXXV, Part 1 p.1088 *An Act to codify, revise and amend the penal laws of the United States* approved 4 March 1909, Section 10. Most historians such as Eric Smylie in Americans Who Would Not Wait: The American Legion of the Canadian Expeditionary Force. (University of North Texas; PhD Thesis, 2002) p.51 claim that the *Foreign Enlistment Act (1818)* prevented foreign countries from recruiting in the U.S. However, this act seems to have lapsed at some point in the nineteenth century.

<sup>56</sup> Richardson, James D.(ed). Compilation of Messages and Papers of the Presidents: Vol 18. (Washington: Bureau of National Literature, nd) pp.7969-7973, 'Neutrality Proclamations by the President of the United States

<sup>57</sup> LAC RG 76 Reel T-5462 'Beebe Junction Border Entries April 1914-December 1918', crossing 14-18 September 1914.

<sup>58</sup> LAC RG 75 Reel T-5506 'Windsor Border Entries October 1913-June 1917', return for 21 September 1914.

<sup>59</sup> LAC RG 75 Reel T-5506 'Windsor Border Entries October 1913-June 1917', returns for September, October, November and December 1914.

<sup>60</sup> LAC RG 76 Reel T-5488 'Border Entries Niagara Falls August 1914 to September 1915' and Reel T-5489 'Border Entries Niagara Falls October 1915 to May 1916'

<sup>61</sup> LAC RG 9 III D1 Vol 4699 Folder 68 File 1, 99<sup>th</sup> Battalion historical report produced March 1918

<sup>62</sup> Based on an analysis of attestation papers at <http://www.collectionscanada.ca/archivianet/cef/index-e.html> with service numbers in the block 1045001-1046000. Attestation papers for 823 recruits are available. A total of 517 (63%) of the men claimed to be American residents although only 226 (27%) were born in the United States.

<sup>63</sup> A search of attestation papers in the block 850001-851124 allocated to the 176<sup>th</sup> Battalion at <http://www.collectionscanada.ca/archivianet/cef/001042-100.01-e>. showed 1,032 enlistments, 268 or 26% of whom were US residents; A search of attestation papers in the block 333801-334800 allocated to the 63<sup>rd</sup> Depot Battery at <http://www.collectionscanada.ca/archivianet/cef/001042-100.01-e>. showed 960 enlistments, 288 or 30% of whom were US residents

<sup>64</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1402 File 593-6-2 Vol 21, OC 213<sup>th</sup> Battalion to AAG MD 2 14 October 1916 complaining about other units competing for American recruits.

<sup>65</sup> Smylie. Americans Who Would Not wait. pp.190-206 discusses the diplomatic problems at some length.

<sup>66</sup> Charlotte Daily Observer 26 February 1916, p.1 commented at length on the ad placed in a rival newspaper and quoted the Washington Times. The ad apparently invited applicants to obtain further information from William Gregory of the Leamington Recruiting Committee; LAC RG 24 Vol 4427 File 26-6-64-3 Vol 1, AG circular letter 17 March 1916

<sup>67</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 782 File 1982-1-56, the file contains a clipping from the Grand Rapids News dated 20 April 1916.

<sup>68</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 782 File 1982-1-56, AG circular telegram 16 November 1916. The telegram also stressed that no inducements were to be offered to citizens of the United States.

<sup>69</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4427 File 26-5-64-3 Vol 1, AG to OC MD 3 16 March 1916 with a copy of an affidavit from the three men dated 1 March 1916; OC 139<sup>th</sup> Battalion to AAG MD 3 23 March 1916 explained that the soldier in question was not dressed in uniform and did not have permission to visit the United States. The soldier was identified only as 'Wilson'. The three unhappy men from Rochester were imprisoned after refusing to enlist and were later deported; LAC RG 24 Vol 4670 File 99-4-7 Vol 3, GOC MD 11 to Militia HQ 6 July 1916 summarizing the case and adding that Austin was released for lack of evidence, Lieutenant Sanborn of the 211<sup>th</sup> Battalion to Judge Advocate General for the State of Washington 24 June 1916 explaining that Austin was on leave, had no authority to recruit in Washington and adding that the CO of the 211<sup>th</sup> Battalion would be grateful if arrangements could be made to release Austin from jail; Fort William Daily Times-Herald 16 October 1916 p.1, 17 October 1916 p.1 and 25 October 1916 p.1. One man was released on bail and fled to Canada leaving the bondsman to forfeit \$1000. The remaining two were evidently released without providing bail.

<sup>70</sup> McLellan, Roy A. Day to Day Experiences During World War I and World War II. (privately printed c1958) p.19. I am grateful to the Reference Room of the Saskatoon Public Library for providing a partial photocopy of their copy of McLellan's memories – the only known copy in Canada.

<sup>71</sup> DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 5 Folder 18 File 'United States Citizens –Enlistment of in Canadian Forces', Private Secretary Department of the Interior to Minister of Militia and Defence 3 November 1915.

<sup>72</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 289 File 13-123-5, Superintendent of Immigration to Militia HQ 14 June 1917 explaining that "...for months past our inspectors have, all along the Boundary, admitted such men as applied for entry to enlist and were believed to be suitable."

<sup>73</sup> LAC MG 30 E406 (Likacheff-Ragosine-Mathers Collection) Vol 11, Reel 7603 File 400, August Fibiger to Russian Consul 3 May 1916 and 11 November 1916. The Bohemian Alliance of America (Canadian

Branch) must have been small beer since the same address was given for the Alliance office and the secretary's home.

<sup>74</sup> Lyddon. British War Missions to the United States. pp.197-198. Lyddon claimed that White and seven other officers had been sent to Canada in February 1917 to prepare for the possibility of recruiting in the United States should the opportunity arise; United States, Bureau of the Census. Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970: Part I. (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1975) p.116 Series C 181-194 shows a total of 6,780,214 foreign born males of whom 3,038,303 or 44.8% were naturalized, 571,521 or 8.4% were declarants, 2,390,426 or 35.3% who were landed immigrants only and 779,964 or 11.5% who were of unknown citizenship; p.118 Series C 228-295 shows the place of birth of all immigrants of both genders. A total of 1,402,927 were British subjects by birth. Assuming that half were male and using Series C 181-194 as a guide, it is estimated that 701,464 men of all ages were neither US citizens nor declarants. The figure is slightly understated since Series C 228-295 did not list persons born in New Zealand, British African possessions, British Arabia, Straits Settlement (Malaya), Hong Kong of British possessions elsewhere.

<sup>75</sup> United States, Congress. U.S. Congressional Serial Set Number 7252 Vol 1, House Report Number 14 by the Committee on the Judiciary (Bill H.R. 2893) 16 April 1917, Senate Report Number 21 by the Committee on the Judiciary (Bill S. 1802) 18 April 1917; Statutes at Large of the United States of America: Vol XL. pp.39-40, *An Act to amend section ten of chapter two of the Criminal Code* approved 7 May 1917. The Act exempted the Allies from earlier legislation forbidding recruiting in the United States. The amendments were approved by the House of Representatives on 16 April and by the Senate on 18 April

<sup>76</sup> Statutes at Large of the United States of America Vol XL. pp.76-83 *An Act to authorize the President to increase temporarily the Military Establishment of the United States*. The act was approved by the President on 18 May 1917. Section 2 provided that "Such draft as herein provided shall be based upon liability to military service of all male citizens, or male persons not alien enemies who have declared their intention to become citizens, between the ages of twenty-one and thirty years."

<sup>77</sup> Lyddon. British War Missions to the United States. p.198 noted that White arrived in New York at the end of May 1917; New York Times 4 June 1917 p.6 reported that the Mission would begin recruiting on Wednesday, 6 June 1917; LAC RG 24 Vol 4510 File 17-1-49, AG circular letter 10 September 1917 announcing the change in nomenclature

<sup>78</sup> LAC MG 27 II D9 (Albert Edwin Kemp Fonds) Vol 76 File 127, A/AG to Minister of Militia and Defence 7 September 1917 suggested the mission be renamed; LAC RG 24 Vol 4510 File 17-1-49, AG Circular Letter 10 September 1917 notifying all districts of the change; LAC RG 24 Vol 289 File 13-123-5, U.S. Army General Recruiting Service Circular Letters 1917 Number 69 of 31 May 1917 advised all recruiting stations of the procedures for handling BCRM recruits; Lyddon. British War Missions to the United States p.198; New York Times 31 May 1917 p.5 with a brief outline; Boston Daily Globe 4 June 1917 p.1 quoting Brigadier-General White and adding that BEF recruits would be forwarded to New York while CEF recruits would be sent to Canada; LAC RG 24 Vol 23187 File 'Imperial Depot Windsor Nova Scotia MD 6', Part II Orders from 2 February 1918 to 25 April 1918 record recruits for the BEF, Jewish Legion (part of the BEF) and the Australian Imperial Force.

<sup>79</sup> LAC MG 27 II D9 (Albert Edwin Kemp Fonds) Vol 76 File 127, Undated memorandum ca September 1917 Appendix 1; LAC RG 24 Vol 4615 File IG 1 Vol 3, European War: Memorandum No. 4 respecting Work of the Department of Militia and Defence from January 1, 1917 to December 31, 1917 dated 6 February 1918

<sup>80</sup> RG 24 Vol 289 File 13-123-5, HQ British Recruiting Mission to Militia HQ 29 June 1917, Memorandum to Minister 20 June 1917; LAC MG 27 II D9 (Edward Albert Kemp Fonds) Vol 76 File 127, undated summary of BCRM ca September 1917

<sup>81</sup> G 24 Vol 289 File 13-123-5, Superintendent of Immigration to Major-General Mewburn 14 June 1917

<sup>82</sup> New York Times 19 June 1917 p.2 reported the arrival of Major Daly-Gingras and the purpose of his attachment to HQ BCRM; LAC MG 27 II D9 (Albert Edward Kemp Fonds) Vol 76 File 127, OC Boston Depot to GOC BCRM 29 August 1917 with details of Father Doyon's efforts in the New England states to recruit French-Canadians.

<sup>83</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 289 File 13-123-5, A/AG to Minister of Militia and Defence 23 July 1917.

<sup>84</sup> TNA FO 115/2440, HQ BCRM to British Ambassador Washington 31 May 1918, Local Draft Board for Division 12 (Boston) to BCRM Boston 20 May 1918 claimed that the man in question had been drunk



when he enlisted, Eastern Division BCRM to HQ BCRM 28 May 1918 noted that the recruit had been advised by the draft board to desert the CEF and his wife had brought in his uniform.

<sup>85</sup> TNA FO 115/2440, BCRM Buffalo to Eastern Division BCRM 29 May 1918.

<sup>86</sup> Willrich, Michael. City of Courts: Socializing Justice in Progressive Era Chicago. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) p.165

<sup>87</sup> DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 1 Folder 2 File British-Canadian Recruiting Mission, 'Synopsis of Recruits from the British-Canadian Recruiting Mission in the United States forwarded to Canada for the Canadian Expeditionary Force' dated 12 March 1918. HQ BCRM in New York reported that 16,959 recruits had been forwarded by 2 March 1918 but districts reported that only 16,043 men had actually arrived; LAC RG 24 Vol 4313 File 341-59-R Vol 4, OC Toronto Mobilization Centre to District Record Officer 5 September 1918 noted that 13,627 BCRM recruits had been forwarded between 16 June 1917 and 10 August 1918, but only 12,510 had arrived in Toronto.

<sup>88</sup> LAC RG 9 II B3 Vol 77, CEF Routine Order Number 475 of 23 April 1918. The change meant that those who failed to report in Canada were deserters and could be prosecuted. Judging by the desertion rate of men sent to MD 2 commented on above, it seems the order had little effect.

<sup>89</sup> LAC MG 27 II D9 (Albert Edward Kemp Fonds) Vol 76 File 127, Statements of Recruits in New York City for week ending 14 July 1917, 21 July 1917 and 28 July 1917. In all, 963 men were examined of whom 316 or 32.8% were rejected.

<sup>90</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4313 File 341-1-59R Vols 1 and 2, weekly statements of BCRM recruits in MD 2 1 July 1917 to 7 September 1918. In all, medical boards reassessed 11,636 recruits and found 498 or 4% unfit for military service.

<sup>91</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4313 File 341-1-59R Vols 1 and 2, weekly statements of BCRM recruits in MD 2 1 July 1917 to 7 September 1918; Lyddon British War Missions to the United States 1914-1918 p.203 notes that 33,335 men were recruited for the CEF

<sup>92</sup> LAC MG 27 II D9 (Albert Edward Kemp Fonds) Vol 76 File 127; BCRM returns for the weeks ending 28 July 1917 and 4 August 1917

<sup>93</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4312 File 34-1-59R Vol 1, OC Toronto Mobilization Centre to AAG & QMG MD 2 27 August 1917; LAC RG 24 Vol 4313 File 341-1-59R Vols 1 and 2, weekly statements of BCRM recruits in MD 2 1 July 1917 to 7 September 1918. A total of 256 men or 2.1% of all BCRM recruits refused to be attested

<sup>94</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4313 File 34-1-59R Vol 2, summary of BCRM recruits 18 August 1918

<sup>95</sup> LAC RG 9 II B3 Vol 77, CEF Routine Orders, Number 189 of 11 February 1918

<sup>96</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4313 File 34-1-59R Vol 2, summary of BCRM recruits 18 August 1918

<sup>97</sup> DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 1 Folder 2 File British-Canadian Recruiting Mission, 'Synopsis of Recruits from the British-Canadian Recruiting Mission in the United States forwarded to Canada for the Canadian Expeditionary Force' dated 12 March 1918.

<sup>98</sup> Taken from the nominal roll in Corrigan, Major D.J. The History of the Twentieth Canadian Battalion (Central Ontario Regiment), Canadian Expeditionary Force, in the Great War 1914-1918. (Toronto: Stone & Cox Limited, 1935)

<sup>99</sup> Taken from nominal rolls in Johnston, Lieutenant-Colonel G. Chalmers. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Mounted Rifles (British Columbia Horse) in France and Flanders. (Vernon: Vernon News Printing & Publishing Company, c1931), Bennett. The 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Mounted Rifles 1914-1919, Gibson, Captain W.L. Records of the Fourth Canadian Infantry Battalion in the Great War 1914-1918. (Toronto: The MacLean Publishing Company Limited, 1924), Urquhart, Lieutenant-Colonel H.M. The History of the 16<sup>th</sup> Battalion (The Canadian Scottish) in the Great War 1914-1919. (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1932), Corrigan. The History of the Twentieth Canadian Battalion (Central Ontario Regiment), Canadian Expeditionary Force, in the Great War 1914-1918.; McEvoy. History of the 72<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders of Canada.; Hayes The Eighty-fifth in France and Flanders., Hodder-Williams, Ralph. Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry 1914-1919: Vol II (London: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd., 1923), Holt, Richard. Fighting 18<sup>th</sup>: Vol II. (University of Western Ontario, undergraduate thesis, 2001). Names in the nominal rolls were matched with on-line attestation forms at [www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/archivianet/index-e.html](http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/archivianet/index-e.html) to identify BCRM reinforcements. Men were accepted as BCRM reinforcements if the attestation form was franked 'BM', 'RM' or 'BCRM' or the individual was medically examined in the United States.

<sup>100</sup> Wiktor, Christian L. (ed) Unperfected Treaties of the United States of America: 1776-1976: Vol 4. (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications Inc., 1979) pp.379 and 383 note that the initial conventions concerning the United States, Canada and Great Britain were signed 19 February 1918 and p.383; Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements between the United States and Other Powers, 1910-1923: Vol III. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1923) pp.2650-2654 contains the text of the reciprocal convention between the United States and Great Britain while pp.2654-2657 contains the text of the reciprocal convention between the United States and Great Britain on behalf of Canada.

<sup>101</sup> New York Times 20 September 1918 p.12 quoting an announcement by Brigadier-General White

<sup>102</sup> The term 'Canadian' was defined as one who had been born or naturalized in Canada or who had been resident in Canada prior to emigrating to the United States. Canadians living in Britain and Britons living in Canada were already liable to conscription in the country of residence.

<sup>103</sup> Crowder, Major-General E.H. Second Report of the Provost Marshal General to the Secretary of War on the Operations of the Selective Service System to December 20, 1918. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919) pp.36-37. Based on registration cards forwarded to Washington by local draft boards, the Provost Marshal General estimated that about 20,000 men eligible for the CEF joined the AEF; Report on the Operation of the Military Service Act 1917. p.6

<sup>104</sup> LAC RG 73 C1 Vol 49 File I-1-65 Part I, Warden St Vincent de Paul Penitentiary to Inspector of Penitentiaries 14 August 1914 and reply 17 August 1914; LAC RG 73 Vol 196 File 'Ticket of Leave 1912-14', Inspector D. Hogan to Chief of Remissions Branch 25 October 1915; LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 4989 personnel file 225244 George Adam Juen. Trooper Juen later re-enlisted in the CMR Depot on 12 July 1917

<sup>105</sup> LAC RG 73 C1 Vol 49 File I-1-65 Part I, Inspector Stewart to Minister of Justice 27 May 1915

<sup>106</sup> LAC RG 73 C1 Vol 49 File I-1-65 W.P. Archibald to P.M. Cote, Remissions Branch 10 September 1915

<sup>107</sup> London Advertiser 5 November 1915 p.2; LAC RG 9 II B5 Vol 6 'Abridged Report Upon 176<sup>th</sup> Overseas Battalion' 29 March 1917; Toronto Globe 10 August 1916 p.5

<sup>108</sup> LAC RG 73 Vol 196 File 'Ticket of Leave 1912-14' contains a copy of PC 3057 of 6 January 1916

<sup>109</sup> LAC RG 73 Vol 196 File 'Ticket of Leave 1915-1916' contains a copy of PC 2741 of 4 November 1916, Department of Justice to Provincial Attorneys-General 29 November 1916

<sup>110</sup> LAC RG 73 Vol 186 File 'Remission Branch: Tickets of Leave: Correspondence 1916-1924', MD 3 Recruiting Officer to Minister of Justice 31 May 1917

<sup>111</sup> Military Service Act Manual: For the Information and Guidance of Tribunals. (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1918) contains a reprint of the Act including Section 12. Prisoners were disqualified from voting by Section 67 of the Dominion Elections Act. Revised Statutes of Canada 1906: Vol I p.73; RG 24 Vol 4547 File 79-1-1, Department of Justice Military Service Branch 'Circular Memorandum #2' 24 June 1918 called on registrars to enumerate eligible men in asylums, poor-houses, reformatories and industrial farms as well as prisons and gaols.

<sup>112</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4615 File 206-8, 'Circular Memorandum to Wardens of Penitentiaries and Gaols re Military Service Act 1917' 19 November 1917

<sup>113</sup> LAC Microfilm reel T-2001 (Kingston Warden's Letter Book 11 January 1918-16 October 1918) Warden Creighton to Major A.T. Kidd of HQ MD 3 4 July 1918

<sup>114</sup> LAC RG 73 C1 Vol 49 File I-1-65, Warden G.S. Malepart to Dominion Parole Officer 20 December 1917

<sup>115</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4552 File 125-1-79, DAA & QMG MD 6 to OC 1<sup>st</sup> Depot Battalion Nova Scotia Regiment 10 May 1918

<sup>116</sup> DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 1 File 3, AG circular letter 10 May 1917

<sup>117</sup> LAC RG 73 C1 Vol 49 File I-1-65, Deputy Minister Department of Justice to Inspector of Penitentiaries 16 October 1917

<sup>118</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4552 File 125-1-79, Warden AB Pipes, Dorchester to AAG MD 6 10 Sep 1917; LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 2891; the man was not court-martialed or summarily tried during his service with the 18<sup>th</sup> Battalion. See Holt, Richard The Fighting 18<sup>th</sup>: A Canadian Battalion at War. (University of Western Ontario, unpublished mss, 2001)

<sup>119</sup> LAC MG 27 II D9 (Albert Edward Kemp Fonds) Vol 135 File 'Convicts 1918', Sir Edward Kemp to Major-General S.C. Mewburn 27 July 1918

<sup>120</sup> LAC Reel T-2001 (Kingston Warden's Letter Book 11 January 1918-16 October 1918) Creighton to Inspector WS Hughes 19 October 1918. A review of service numbers in the block 3057540-3057585 turned up 31 men who were drafted in Kingston 26-29 March 1918 but who claimed to live elsewhere. One man gave his home address as 'Kingston Pen'. A similar review of service numbers 3256912-3256915 turned up sixteen men from Dorchester Penitentiary.

<sup>121</sup> Canada, Parliament, House of Commons. Sessional Papers: Number 17: Criminal Statistics for the Year Ended September 30, 1914 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1915) p.xxvi; Canada, Parliament. Sessional Papers: Number 17: Criminal Statistics for the Year Ended September 30, 1915 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1917) pp.xxiii-xxiv; Canada, Parliament. Sessional Papers: Number 17: Criminal Statistics for the Year Ended September 30, 1916 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1917) pp.xxv-xxvi; Canada, Parliament. Sessional Papers: Number 10c: Criminal Statistics for the Year Ended September 30, 1917 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1918) pp.xxvi-xxvii; Canada, Parliament. Sessional Papers: Number 10d: Criminal Statistics for the Year Ended September 30, 1918 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1919) pp.xxii-xxiii

<sup>122</sup> Urquhart, M.C. (ed) and Buckley, K.A.H. (assistant ed). Historical Statistics of Canada. (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd., 1965) p.42 Series Y 170-177 shows 1,474 persons in reformatories and training schools of whom 1,198 or 81.3% were males. There were a total of 5,459 persons in all penal institutions and it is assumed that 81.3% or 4,438 were male.

<sup>123</sup> LAC RG 73 Vol 186 File 'Ticket of Leave, Vol 8, January 1934-1944'

<sup>124</sup> LAC RG 9 III B3 Vols 3764 and 3765, Strength returns for the period September 1916 to November 1918 show an average monthly wastage of 10,942 officers and men or 8.3% of the CEF in France and Belgium. The number of additional recruits that could have been found were based on the difference between the proportion of Canadian-born that enlisted and the number of immigrants that enlisted.

<sup>125</sup> DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 5 Folder 20 File 'Statistics', AG to CGS with statistics on nativity and adding "The above figures are official"; Fifth Census of Canada 1911: Vol II. (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1913), p.440 Table XVII

<sup>126</sup> Canada, Department of Trade and Commerce. Special Report on the Foreign-Born Population: Abstracted from the Records of the Fifth Census of Canada. (Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1915) Table 5 p.10 and Table 9 p.17

<sup>127</sup> Quoted in Neatby, H. Blair, 'The New Century' in Careless, J.M.S. and Brown, R. Craig (ed) The New Canadians 1867-1967. (Toronto; Macmillan of Canada, 1968) p.143

<sup>128</sup> Woodworth, J.S. Strangers Within Our Gates or Coming Canadians. (Toronto: Missionary Society of the Methodist Church, 1909) p.277

<sup>129</sup> Laut, Agnes. The Canadian Commonwealth. (Chautauqua, New York: Chautauqua Press, 1915) p.119

<sup>130</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4718 File 448-14-158 Vol 2, Major Vernon Eaton to DOC MD 13 14 April 1914

<sup>131</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4320 file 34-1-90, AG to OC 2<sup>nd</sup> Division 19 October 1915. Those already enlisted were discharged. See AAG 2<sup>nd</sup> Division circular letter 5 November 1915

<sup>132</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 858 file 54-21-12-30, MD 10 to Militia HQ 16 March 1916 with minute by CGS regarding the inability of Persians mixing with Anglo-Saxons, AG to HQ MD 10 23 March 1916 advising that Persians could not be enlisted.

<sup>133</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 436 file 54-21-1-91, AG to GOC MD 6 3 November 1917

<sup>134</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4593 file 20-10 Vol 10, Mayor of Fort William to Minister of Militia and Defence 27 November 1914

<sup>135</sup> LAC MG 27 II D9 (Albert Edward Kemp Fonds) Vol 71 file 31, Prime Minister Borden to A.E. Kemp 14 December 1916 regarding a request from a delegation of Ruthenians [Ukrainians] to enlist as such rather than describing themselves as Russians or Poles. The delegation felt that service in the CEF would make Canadian-Ukrainians 'better citizens and stronger Canadians.'

<sup>136</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4509 file 17-1-49 Vol VIII, AG circular letter 7 November 1916

<sup>137</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1402 file 593-6-2 Vol 21, AG to DOC MD 12 22 November 1916 regarding Scandinavians; LAC RG 24 Vol 1206 file 297-1-29, AG circular letter 12 July 1916 regarding Serbs and Romanians

<sup>138</sup> LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 560 file A-84-2 Vol 2, AG OMFC to HQ Canadians Shorncliffe 29 June 1917. The AG directed that Ziegler be transferred to the CFC Depot at Sunningdale although in the event this was delayed owing to the man's need for treatment for venereal disease.

<sup>139</sup> LAC MG 30 E51 (Willoughby Garnons Gwatkin Fonds) file 'Correspondence A-K, 1914-1916', CGS to Loring Christie 21 July 1916

<sup>140</sup> RG 150 acc 1992-93 acc 166 Box 6720 personnel file 261286 George McDonald, 'Proceedings of a Court of Enquiry...enquiring into and reporting upon the circumstances regarding 261286 Pte McDonald G, Royal Canadian Regiment, reported missing 12-2-17' 16 June 1917'. Curiously, a man named Otto L. Doerr, a life member of the Royal Canadian Legion who claimed former service with the Canadian Army and Royal Flying Corps died in British Columbia in 1996 at the age of 98.

<sup>141</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1397 file 593-6-2 Vol 8, AG circular letter 9 September 1915, RG 24 Vol 4427 file 26-5-64-3 Vol 1, AG circular letter 14 January 1916

<sup>142</sup> LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 488 file R-34-1, OC 39<sup>th</sup> Reserve Battalion to HQ 12<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Reserve Brigade 25 February 1916 and OC 12<sup>th</sup> Reserve Brigade to HQ Canadian Training Division 26 February 1916.

<sup>143</sup> LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 773 file R-9-2, OC 1 Company to OC 11<sup>th</sup> Reserve Battalion 12 April 1916 and OC 11<sup>th</sup> Reserve Battalion to HQ 12<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Reserve Brigade 12 April 1916

<sup>144</sup> LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 560 file A-84-2 volume 2, OC 5<sup>th</sup> Reserve Battalion to HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Reserve Brigade 11 August 1917

<sup>145</sup> LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 30 file 8-1-65, OC 12<sup>th</sup> Canadian Reserve Brigade to HQ Canadian Training Division 8 April 1916 with the results of an investigation by Russian-born Lieutenant Francesco Gidony into disturbances in the 39<sup>th</sup> Reserve Battalion involving Russian soldiers.

<sup>146</sup> LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 52 file 8-7-3, OC 9<sup>th</sup> Canadian Infantry Reserve Brigade to HQ Canadian Training Division 26 November 1916; RG 9 III B1 Vol 560 file A-84-2 Vol 1, OC 5<sup>th</sup> Reserve Battalion to HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Reserve Brigade 21 June 1917; RG 9 III B1 Vol 790 file R-46-2 Vol 4, OC D Company to OC Canadian Pioneer Training Depot 15 June 1916 and OC Canadian Pioneer Training Depot to OC 5<sup>th</sup> Canadian Training Brigade 16 June 1916

<sup>147</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4331 file 34-2-18, OC Base Company 37<sup>th</sup> Battalion to HQ MD 2 1 September 1915

<sup>148</sup> Ford. Americans All! Foreign-born Soldiers in World War I. pp.66 and 68

<sup>149</sup> Ford. Americans All. pp.68 and 76-77

<sup>150</sup> Macpherson. History of the Great War: Medical Services General History, Vol I. p.120 describes the grading system for those unfit for service abroad, p.122 describes the grading system for men called up under the *Military Service Act*. There is no evidence that either system was used by the CEF in Canada or overseas,

<sup>151</sup> LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 439 File E-105-1, Medical Board Department to Director of Recruiting and Organization at Canadian HQ 20 May 1916

<sup>152</sup> TNA WO 293/4, ACI 1023 of 19 May 1916. The new system took effect 1 June 1916.

<sup>153</sup> LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 74 File 10-8-22 Vol 1, Deputy Minister [A.D. McRae] to Chairman Sub-Militia Council in England 2 November. McRae had visited Canadian units in France 28 October-1 November 1916. He and Byng visited the DCIGS [Major-General R.D. Whigham] on 2 November 1916.

<sup>154</sup> LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 789 File R-42-2 Vol 3, AA&QMG CTD Shorncliffe to all units 26 November 1916

<sup>155</sup> Militia Order 50 of 6 August 1917. The order cited a circular letter of 3 May 1917 as the authority.

<sup>156</sup> LAC RG 9 III C7 Vol 4470 Folder 7 File 6, Director of Organization to all commands 24 January 1917

<sup>157</sup> LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 774 File R-9-2 Vol 6, CTD Shorncliffe to HQ OMFC 4 January 1917

<sup>158</sup> LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 789 File R-43-2 Vol 4, CASC Training Depot to HQ Canadian Troops Shorncliffe 9 May 1917; LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 53 File 'Monthly Reports August 1917', QMG Monthly Report for August 1917, QMG Monthly Report for of September 1917

<sup>159</sup> LAC RG 150 Vol 237, Canadian Army Service Corps Base Depot Daily Orders Part II for 9 October, 20 October and 16 November 1917. The men were posted to virtually every reserve battalion in England.

<sup>160</sup> LAC MG 30 E46 (Richard Ernest William Turner Fonds) Vol 10 File 63, QMG to AG HQ OMFC nd ca July 1918

<sup>161</sup> LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 85, File 10-12-1, Chief Paymaster to Deputy Minister OMFC 10 July 1917

<sup>162</sup> LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 789 File R-43-2 Vol 4, ADMS HQ OMFC to HQ Canadian Training Division 8 May 1917

<sup>163</sup> LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 53 File 'Monthly Reports November 1917', QMG Monthly Report for November 1917

<sup>164</sup> LAC RG 9 III C13 Vol 4605 Folder 22, HQ OMFC to HQ Canadians Bramshott 11 January 1918

<sup>165</sup> LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 789 File R-32-2 Vol 4, HQ OMFC to HQ Canadian Troops Shorncliffe 4 May 1917

<sup>166</sup> Report of the Ministry: Overseas Military Forces of Canada, 1918 p.49

<sup>167</sup> Taken from nominal rolls in Johnston The 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Mounted Rifles (British Columbia Horse) in France and Flanders, Bennett The 4<sup>th</sup> Canadian Mounted Rifles 1914-1919, Gibson Records of the Fourth Canadian Infantry Battalion in the Great War 1914-1918, Urquhart The History of the 16<sup>th</sup> Battalion (The Canadian Scottish) in the Great War 1914-1919, Corrigal The History of the Twentieth Canadian Battalion (Central Ontario Regiment), Canadian Expeditionary Force, in the Great War 1914-1918., McEvoy History of the 72<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Infantry Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders of Canada., Hodder-Williams Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry 1914-1919: Vol II

<sup>168</sup> See, for example, LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 98 file 10-4-18, DD of S&T to OMFC QMG 24 May 1917 concerning female drivers at HQ OMFC. Six were Canadian, seven British and one American, OMFC Council 6 August 1918 approving the use of female drivers with the CASC; LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 96 file 10-13-9, Accountant-General to Deputy minister OMFC 18 October 1918 concerning twenty-two women from QMAAC who were employed in the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Tank Battalion Officers' Mess, AG to GOC OMFC 5 April 1918 concerning twenty-eight women from QMAAC who were employed at the Officers' Casualty Company Mess; A number of typed attestation forms have been found with a woman, presumably the typist, signing as a witness. See also the saga of Miss B. Thoburn of the Ottawa Base Recruiting Office, a stenographer who demanded the same pay as a sergeant on the grounds that she was doing a sergeant's job in LAC RG 24 Vol 4425 file 26-5-64-2 Vol 1; Archives of Ontario F92 (George Halsey Perley Fonds) file 'Speeches, addresses, reports', undated speech to Dudley and District Chamber of Commerce c1918 claiming that between five and six thousand women were taken into the Canadian Civil Service to replace men who had enlisted.

<sup>169</sup> The Canadian Field Comforts Commission consisted of Captain Mary Plummer and six lieutenants; Joan Arnoldi, Mary Critchley, Mabel Finn, Mary Gordon, Dorothy McMeans and Sara Spencer. Lieutenant Amy Galt Cassels, a self taught radiologist served with the Duchess of Connaught's Red Cross Hospital at Taplow in England until she was sacked by Sir George Perley. Major Francis Evelyn Windsor served in England as a CAMC doctor. Lastly, Julia Henshaw was commissioned as a militia captain by Sam Hughes in 1915 with a vague mandate to assist recruiting. Her services were terminated by the Militia Council in 1917. Henshaw's husband was a civil servant who commanded the Central Recruiting Depot in Vancouver.

<sup>170</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 1744 file DHS 4-64, Charles J. Copp of St. John's Ambulance Brigade to Superintendent of Immigration 13 May 1919.

<sup>171</sup> LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 99 file 10-19-14X Part 2; RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 personnel file 95 Maud Blake including 'Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry assembled at the Armouries, Kingston, Ontario on the 20<sup>th</sup> Day of February 1919'

<sup>172</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 493 file 54-21-4-147, 'An Anxious and Willin'-to-go Stenographer' to the Department of Militia and Defence 28 December 1917, AG to Military Secretary 31 December 1917 Militia HQ to OMFC 17 March 1918, War Office to HQ OMFC 22 March 1918

<sup>173</sup> LAC RG 9 III B2 Vol 3745 file 'Adami Papers (1) Miscellaneous', DAG Organization to AG Militia HQ 10 May 1918

<sup>174</sup> DHH KE6848 A329 C309 Minutes of the Militia Council 1918 Vol II, 30 May 1918 pp.453-454; DHH KE6848 A329 C309 Minutes of the Militia Council 1918 Vol III, 18 September 1918 p.872; LAC RG 24 Vol 1744 file DHS 4-62 'Canadian Women's Army Auxiliary Corps, Deputy Minister to War Committee 11 Oct 1918 noted that no action had been taken.

<sup>175</sup> The number has been calculated using three sets of figures. LAC RG 9 III B3 Vol 3765 which shows that 153,061 men were serving with the CEF in France or Flanders at the end of May 1918; TNA WO 114/35 Weekly Returns of the British Army and Dominion Contingents at Home other than the Territorial Force 27 May 1918 shows that 101,087 men were serving in Britain on that date; Nicholson The Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919 p.547 which shows that the CEF as a whole had 344,757 men on strength at the end of May 1918.

Annex A  
Chapter 5

General Health  
Canadian-born and Immigrant Recruits

As discussed previously, British National Service medical boards examined 2,425,184 men in 1917-1918 and found that only 55.6% were fit for overseas employment in one capacity or another. In contrast Canadian MSA boards examined 275,480 men in 1917 and found that 60.3% were fit for overseas duty.<sup>1</sup> On the surface therefore, Canadian males were somewhat healthier than their British counterparts. However, this is contradicted by the fact that, in general, immigrants, with the exception of those from non-English speaking countries, enlisted at a much higher rate than the Canadian-born.

Table 40  
Enlistments by Place of Birth<sup>2</sup>

Place of Birth	Male Population	Recruits	Proportion of Males
Canada	2,819,442	318,728	11.3%
British Isles	470,061	228,170	48.5%
British possessions	31,077	9,416	30.3%
United States	168,728	35,599	21.1%
Other foreign born	305,029	27,723	9.1%
Totals	3,794,337	619,636	16.3%

Notes: (1) Table 40 deals in relative proportions. No attempt has been made, therefore, to reduce the number of recruits by the estimated number of American residents. Nor has the number of those from enemy countries been deducted from the total of foreign born.

(2) Officers, nursing sisters and other ranks are included.

About 80% of the CEF were volunteers, and enlistment depended to a large degree on motivation. Patriotism, love of adventure, boredom and unemployment all played a part. In the case of the British-born some may have been homesick or disenchanted with life in Canada and were seeking free passage home. But these

explanations are not entirely satisfactory given the difference in medical fitness between Britons and Canadians. A postwar study by the War Office claimed that "A very considerable proportion of the population in the Dominions is composed of emigrants from Great Britain who are for the most part of very good physical fitness."<sup>3</sup> Did medical fitness play a role in recruiting?

Table 41  
Recruits Processed in Toronto  
Week Ending 10 February 1917<sup>4</sup>

Place of Birth	Fit	Unfit	Total	Proportion Fit
Canada	103	69	172	59.9%
British Isles	56	28	84	66.7%
Other	22	6	28	78.6%
All Immigrants	78	34	112	69.6%
Totals	181	103	284	63.7%

The sample in Table 41 is too small and specific in terms of time and location to provide proof of the relative fitness of native-born Canadians and immigrants. However, the results are reinforced by statistics from the 1911 Census showing place of birth of males of all ages who were blind, deaf and dumb, insane or idiotic. Admittedly the conditions listed are limited, but the data may serve as a proxy for public health in general.

Table 42  
Males of All Ages  
Infirmities 1911<sup>5</sup>

Condition	Canada	British Isles	Other	All Immigrants
Blind	1,455	269	126	395
Deaf and Dumb	2,115	184	192	376
Insane	5,489	823	1,338	2,161
Idiotic	3,213	149	139	288
Total Afflicted	12,272	1,425	1,795	3,220
Male Population	2,849,442	470,061	508,603	978,664
Proportion Afflicted	0.43%	0.30%	0.35%	0.33%

Not all who wished to immigrate to Canada did so. Arguably those who were sick, infirm or otherwise incapacitated would have had little energy with which to raise funds and arrange for passage to Canada. There were also rudimentary checks by immigration doctors. From April 1903 to March 1914 a total of 4,529 men and women were refused entry because they medically unfit. A further 2,334 were deported in the same time frame, also for medical reasons. Causes were varied: insanity, mental deficiency, tuberculosis, hernia, trachoma, poor eyesight, epilepsy, poor physique, general debility and general infirmity. The fact that the lead cause for rejection was trachoma (infectious eye disease) suggests that the inspections were, at best, hasty and superficial.<sup>6</sup> But, the combination of physical ability and means to organize ocean passage to Canada together with medical checks at the port of entry probably combined to produce immigrants who were somewhat healthier than Canadian-born.



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<sup>1</sup> Great Britain, Ministry of National Service. Report: Vol I: Upon the physical examination of men of military age by National Service medical boards from November 1<sup>st</sup>, 1917 – October 31<sup>st</sup>, 1918 (London: HMSO, 1920) pp.3-4; Machin. Report of the Director of the Military Service Branch. p.78.

<sup>2</sup> DHH 74/672 (Edwin Pye Fonds) Box 5 folder 20 'Statistics', AG to CGS 9 December 1927 saying "The above figures are official."; Fifth Census of Canada Vol II p.440 Table XVII 'Birthplace of the people by provinces'

<sup>3</sup> Great Britain, War Office. Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War 1914-1920. (London: HMSO, 1922) p.380

<sup>4</sup> LAC RG 24 Vol 4310 file 341-59J Vol 1 'Recruits Processed in Toronto for Week Ending 10 February 1917'

<sup>5</sup> Fifth Census of Canada 1911 Vol II p.626 Table XLIII 'Infirmities – Summary for Canada'

<sup>6</sup> Canada Year Book 1914. p. 87 Table 33