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Climate and Security: Evolution in the United States Political Discourses

by

Luciano da Costa Pereira de Souza

Under the Direction of Willian Joseph Long, PhD

A Thesis submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

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ABSTRACT

Climate change emerged as a high-level global issue in the Rio Earth Summit (1992). In the United States, the Clinton Administration was the first to associate climate and security in official documents. Since then, there has been an overall tendency to consolidate climate security in political discourses in the United States. Based on the Copenhagen School criteria, analysis of speeches by Post-Cold War U.S. governments (Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden), and a review of each Administration's climate change policies demonstrate how climate securitization has evolved in the United States. Climate securitization has evolved as a nonlinear process characterized by periods of progress and reversals of narratives and securitizing measures with a strong influence of partisanship.

INDEX WORDS: International Politics, Climate change, Environment, Environmental security, The Copenhagen School

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my family for their love, support, and constant partnership for success in my life.

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1 INTRODUCTION

Article 1 of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) defines climate change as "a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods." For most of Earth's history, climate variability was caused by many factors but fundamentally natural causes. The anthropogenic factor originates from human activity responsible for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, especially since the Industrial Revolution, in the last two hundred years. The emissions primarily stem from the burning of fossil fuels and industrial, agricultural, or land-use activities, which release to the atmosphere carbon dioxide (CO₂), methane (CH₄), nitrous oxide (N₂O), and other gases. In 1945, "the level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere was just 310 PPM or 11% higher than its pre-industrial concentration around 280 PPM. By 2016, it had increased to 401 PPM or 43% higher than the pre-industrial level" (Dryzek & Pickering, 2019, p. 91). Secondly, human activities also produce aerosols, altering the Earth's energetic balance by reflecting or absorbing the received solar radiation.

The greenhouse gases reinforce the greenhouse effect - the greater retention of heat in the atmosphere. The consequence of the greenhouse effect is global warming, defined by the U.S. National Academy as "an average increase in the temperature of the Earth's surface and in the troposphere, which can contribute to changes in global climate patterns." The average temperature of the planet's surface has risen about 1.18 degrees Celsius since 1800.¹ Most of this temperature increase occurred in the last three decades. Climate change is a broader term that refers to higher

¹ NASA, 2020. Global Climate Change. Retrieved from <https://climate.nasa.gov>.

temperatures on the planet caused by human activities but encompasses other changes in climate patterns caused by global warming.²

Climate impacts are not manifested in new problems but in situations that will become more intense and more often worldwide and affect more people, such as extreme weather, sea-level rise, droughts, etc. Furthermore, climate change is a threat multiplier. Climate change can indirectly increase the risks of conflicts by amplifying their causes, especially poverty caused by failed crops and other economic shocks. Climate change may increase migrations, which may add pressure to borders, foster international disputes for natural resources, or deepen fault lines that already exist in societies.

Though causality between human activities and global warming was established by science at least since the 1950s and 1960s, the end of the Cold War in 1989 is correlated with worldwide attention to climate change, which was established as an international theme at the United Nations debates, first at the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), by the end of the 1980s. Moreover, the end of the Cold War challenged the classical security view based on state-centrism and military power and opened the possibility for broadening the security agenda, including environmental security (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). In the Post-Cold War context, in a pioneering effort, the Copenhagen School responded to the call to reconceptualize security. The Copenhagen School emerged at the Conflict and Peace Research Institute in Copenhagen and is represented by the writings of Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, Jaap de Wilde, and others.

The Copenhagen School is best known for its theory of securitization, which will be constitute the theoretical framework of this thesis. In the constructivist tradition, the Copenhagen School describes securitization as the discursive construction of a particular issue as a threat:

² Despite these differences, "climate change" and "global warming" are often used interchangeably. "Climate change" has become the predominant expression in speeches more recently.

"securitization can be defined as the positioning through speech acts (usually by a political leader) of a particular issue as a threat to survival, which in turn (with the consent of the relevant constituency) enables emergency measures and the suspension of "normal politics" in dealing with that issue" (McDonald, 2008, p. 567).

In the international context, climate change was consecrated as the first global environmental problem in the Rio Earth Summit (1992).³ In the United States, the Clinton Administration was the first to associate climate and security in official documents. Besides emphasizing environmental security in political speeches and official documents, President Bill Clinton created in the Department of Defense a new sector to deal specifically with environmental security (Broda-Bahm, 1999).

Since the Clinton Administration, there has been an overall tendency to consolidate environmental security, notably climate security, in political discourses in the United States. Nevertheless, this process has not been linear, notably due to different perspectives between Republicans and Democrats on the environment. Different views on security issues, depending on partisan views, have produced differences and discontinuity in discourses and policies, notably in climate. Conservatives and liberals tend to construct their speeches highlighting ontological threats and security priorities in distinct ways (Dunlap et al., 2016).

This situation has led to the research question that guides this thesis. "How has climate security evolved in high-level United States political speeches in the post-Cold War? To answer

³ The Rio Summit represented the apogee of environmental multilateralism praised by observers, the media worldwide, and NGOs to start a new international cooperation era. Two U.N. principles govern the Climate Convention: equality, which stipulates that each country has one vote, and the principle of "shared but differentiated responsibility," making a difference between developing and developed countries in terms of efforts. All States have the shared responsibility to protect the environment and promote sustainable development, but with distinct burdens due to their different contributions to environmental degradation and their diverse financial and technological capabilities. The Climate Convention also establishes the Conference of the Parties (COP), its supreme body bringing together all signatory parties and which, since 1995, has met annually (Bodansky, 2016).

the research question, the first part of this thesis will discuss why the security agenda has globally expanded in the post-Cold War and how the partisan factor influences the United States' policies on climate change. The empirical part of this thesis, the speech analysis, will be based on the criteria established by the Copenhagen School. These discourses will be contextualized through a review of climate change policies by the U.S. Administrations in the historical period concerned, which will add more factual elements besides the interpretative research. The results will be established by contrasting the outcomes of the speech analysis and the policy review.

The justification for choosing this thesis theme is twofold. First, climate change has become one of the most important issues in international politics, presenting the broadest and more severe threats to humankind. Climate change studies need a constant update since environmental issues are very politicized; significant shifts can happen. Second, the importance of following the development of climate security in the U.S. Administration stems from the country's relevance in building security at the global level. Since World War II, the United States has been the most significant world hegemon, controlling international institutions, having an unparalleled military might. The U.S. high-level discourses impact not only domestic policies but also international relations. The country is an essential actor in the security in the global system; it can influence the collective representation of threats and the choice of measures necessary to overcome them.

2 CLIMATE SECURITIZATION: GLOBAL TENDENCIES

Several factors have contributed to the politicization and progressive securitization of climate change. There has been a widespread trend towards politicizing ecological problems, notably since the 1960s. Moreover, the end of the Cold War binary logic subverted security views that almost exclusively emphasized state-centrism and military power and allowed the emergence

of "soft issues," such as the environment, on the political agenda (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). This trend is also inseparable from global crises, the expanding role of international organizations, and the progress of science, enabling societies to understand the threats imposed by climate change.

2.1 The End of the Cold War

An analysis of the international context at the end of the Cold War is relevant for two major reasons. Besides a correlation between the end of the Cold War and the beginning of global politicization of climate change and its treatment as a security issue, the end of the bipolar conflict broadened the security agenda in the academic domain. The Copenhagen School is tributary of the new currents of thought that searched to reconceptualize the notion of security in the post-Cold War.

At the end of the Cold War, critical international developments led to the consolidation of climate security in global speeches. In 1988, the growing awareness concerning climate threats lead to the organization by the World Meteorological Organization of the World Conference of the Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security in Toronto. The 1988 Toronto Statement establishes a clear association between climate change and security: "Far-reaching impacts will be caused by global warming and sea-level rise, which are becoming increasingly evident as a result of atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases" (Lanchbery & Victor, 1995, p. 32).

In the same year, 1988, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was created. The IPCC is a scientific intergovernmental body under the auspices of the United Nations. Scientists and other experts contribute voluntarily to the IPCC to write or review reports. IPCC reports contain a "Summary for Policymakers," which is subject to governmental review. The IPCC first report was published in 1990, and by this year, the climate change issue was established

in top-level political debates. The IPPC prepared the background information for the discussions at the 1992 Earth Summit.

One year before the official end of the Cold War, in the 1989 Malta Summit, and three years before the collapse of the Soviet Union, President Mikhail Gorbachev had already translated in a speech in the 1988 United Nations General Assembly new perspectives on security that emerged in the final years of the Cold War: "The relationship between man and the environment has become menacing. The threat from the sky is no longer missiles but global warming" (Trombetta, 2008, p. 591).

On December 26, 1991, the USSR was dissolved: The Cold War, the nearly 50-year pattern of U.S. - USSR competition, came to a sudden end. The end of the Cold War had a determinant impact on views on security, which was no longer seen only in terms of defense or military power but also in political, economic, social, and environmental aspects. For Baldwin (1995, p. 141), the post-Cold War U.S. policies would resemble again in some aspects security issues of the period 1945–1955, with a greater emphasis on nonmilitary aspects of security.

The traditional concept of national security is concerned with protecting the State's integrity against armed attack. This perspective on security is found in Realism, which sees threats essentially presented by other States. For Hobbes' classical Realism, "man is jeopardized primarily by man." Only the State's power can prevent the "Bellum omnium contra omnes" ("war of all against all"), which would result from the anarchy of the natural state. Realism has a negative view of the State's power, whose primary function would be to curb the violent human nature. In this perspective, security is guaranteed by the building of offensive and defensive military capacities). Hans Morgenthau's book *Politics among Nations* in 1948 had a remarkable influence on the movement in the post-war period.

Realism has been a major source of inspiration in international relations and Security studies, which have developed notably after the second world war, mainly from 1955 to 1965 (Walt, 1991). In post-World War II, threats represented by nuclear weapons gained central importance in international security concerns. National security was based on military might and access to technologies (Buzan & Hansen, 2009; Funke, 2011, p. 72). However, nuclear weapons led to assured mutual destruction, which meant that the United States and the Soviet Union could launch a devastating nuclear attack. Thus, a defense strategy would be impossible in the case of War (Powell, 2003, p. 88). The importance of armaments and military power continued to be debated, but new conceptual approaches or more advanced analytical tools were necessary (Walt, 1991, p. 216).

Moreover, the end of the Cold War was a theoretical challenge for realist thinking. Classic realists and neorealists could not predict or explain the sudden end of the bipolar conflict. According to Structural Realism, the Cold War would continue to an indefinite future as it was a stabilizing factor in the international system, which prevented major wars between superpowers due to the balance of power. As late as 1988, the structural realist Kenneth Waltz argued that the Cold War "was firmly rooted in the structure of post-war international politics and will as long as that structure endures" (Wohlforth, 1994, p. 101). The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 further puzzled realist analysts as it happened without an international conflict between the two hegemons and considering that Russia continued to be a military nuclear superpower.

If much of the security studies emphasized only strategic and military aspects during the Cold War and legitimized the bipolar logic, the end of the Cold War had a determinant impact on widening the security agenda (Baldwin, 1995). Buzan and Hansen (2009) highlight that three

major currents in security studies evolved in the post-Cold War: "traditionalists," "wideners," and the "deepeners":

a) The "traditionalists" continue to claim, in line with Realism, state-centrism, and military power as the central security elements. The State is the referent object of security, which means that sovereignty and territorial integrity must be preserved. The primary security concern is thus the threat of an external military attack.

b) The "wideners" seek the expansion of the security agenda. The traditionalist view did not seem sufficient to explain the new reality: insecurity threatens States and individuals who live under State power. New issues such as the peaceful end of the Cold War, the recrudescence of domestic conflicts, the concern with immigration in the developed world, environmental crisis, the Aids pandemic suggested that traditional analysis could not explain the post-Cold War scenario (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 7). The "wideners" argue that the State continues to be a referent object of security but believe new themes ("soft themes") should be included in the security agenda if they can impact the State. The expansion of the security agenda may involve military issues such as domestic conflicts or nonmilitary themes such as population displacement and climate change.

c) The "deepeners" argue that security should contribute to human emancipation and that state-centrism in security deviates the debate from the centrality of the human being. Individuals should be security's primary focus and referent object, not the State. Security should include social themes, such as unemployment, feminism, health, criminality, etc.

The Copenhagen School's theoretical perspective can be classified within the group of the "wideners." The School has a broad view of security: threats originate from the military sphere and the political, economic, environmental, and societal spheres. Concerning the notion of

security, the Copenhagen School does not deviate very far from a traditional view. The Copenhagen School broadens the notion of security but does not necessarily deepen it. Security for the Copenhagen School is still a matter of survival due to an existential threat. This expansion of the security agenda does not challenge the logic of national interest. However, the School suggests that there might be referent objects for security other than the State.

2.2 Global Crises

Besides the exhaustion of the Cold War, global environmental and economic crises fostered a worldwide politicization of environmental issues and widened the view of security to themes beyond militarized geopolitics. In the aftermath of the international oil crisis in the 1970s, an early view of environmental security tended to highlight the threats caused by shortages of natural resources.

In 1977, the environmental analyst Lester Brown, in the article "Redefining National Security," captured this new political moment highlighting that the depletion of resources could generate political and economic tensions: "Blocking external aggression, may be a relatively simple matter compared with arresting the deterioration of local ecological systems. The new threats to national security are extraordinary complex. Ecologists understand that the deteriorating relationship between four billion humans and, the Earth's biological systems cannot continue. But few political leaders have yet to grasp the social significance of this' unsustainable situation" (Brown, 1977, p. 37).

In the post-Cold War scenario, a series of factors and other global threats, such as the growth of peripheric conflicts, immigration, the HIV/AIDS epidemic, etc., demanded new views on security that transcended its military aspect (Buzan & Hansen, 2009; Trombetta, 2008). It should also be mentioned that, during the 1980s, major environmental disasters occurred: the gas

leak at the Union Carbide plant in 1984, the explosion of the nuclear reactor in Chernobyl in 1986, and spillage of 50 million liters of oil in the Prince William Canal, Alaska in 1989, which helped to bring international attention to cross-border threats provoked by human activities.

Among the global threats, the ozone layer crisis in the 1980s had the most direct implication to future discussions to tackle climate change. The threat of ozone layer depletion brought attention to the risks human activities can entail to all ecosystems on Earth, similar to climate change today. What is more important is that this crisis could be overcome by international diplomacy and cooperation. Thus, the solutions envisaged for the ozone crisis remain today an inspiration for climate negotiations.

As a result of the international discussion to solve the issue, the 1989 Montreal Protocol was the first legally binding environmental treaty. The Protocol aimed at protecting the ozone layer by eliminating the production and consumption of substances that contributed to its depletion.⁴ The Montreal Protocol's multilateral relevance resides in allowing immediate action that preceded the complete scientific understanding of the matter. It was a step in developing the precautionary principle, which became the cornerstone of International Environmental Law (Benedick, 2021, p. 216). The Montreal Protocol is the only international treaty with universal ratification - the first in the United Nations history. The massive participation of 197 countries is an indication of global environmental awareness (Tänzler & Carius, 2012, p. 121). The goals for developed and developing countries are different, motivated by the principle of shared but differentiated responsibilities. The established legal regime was effective – the atmospheric concentrations of

⁴ The document established specific obligations to ensure the progressive reduction in the production and consumption of ozone depleting substances until complete elimination is achieved. It is structured around seven groups of halogenated hydrocarbons that contribute to ozone depletion. For each group of these substances, the Protocol provided a timetable, which establishes an initial "consumption freeze" and pre-defined dates for the cessation of production and eventual elimination of these substances.

the main substances that deplete the ozone layer have stabilized or reduced since the Protocol entered into force. For Benedick (2021, pp. 5-8), the success of the Montreal Protocol is a result of multiple causes: the role of scientific communities, the power of the public opinion, the influence of international organizations, national leadership (notably the example from the U.S. Government), the private sector's engagement, and the flexibility of the agreement design. It also should be mentioned that science and industry were able to develop market alternatives to ozone-depleting substances.

The Ozone crisis fostered a global realization that there are threats, such as an environmental crisis, that are not represented by other States. These threats can only be overcome by international cooperation. The ozone depletion threat produced one of the first global endeavors to securitize the environment. International negotiations, under the auspices of the United Nations and with strong support by the U.S. government, resulted in the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. Considering that the ozone layer is currently recovering, Dryzek and Pickering (2019, p. 26) evaluate that "the 1987 Montreal Protocol for protection of the ozone layer remains the only unambiguously successful collective response to a potentially catastrophic problem."

2.3 International Governmental Organizations

International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) or Intergovernmental Organizations are composed primarily of sovereign States, known as Member States. IGOs play an important role in preparing and executing programs for climate impact assessment, risk management, and adaptation. This influence of international organizations on the international debate on environment and climate change dates to the 1972 UN Stockholm Summit, which was the first

global conference organized to deal specifically with environmental themes, drawing attention to the impacts of economic development on the environment (Purvis et al., 2019).

The pioneering role of international organizations is also remarkable in the efforts of climate securitization. The 1989 U.N Brandt Report highlighted already that the degradation of the biosphere posed serious threats to humanity's survival (Trombetta, 2008, p. 591). In 1992, the Rio Earth Summit introduced climate change in international negotiations under the United Nations auspices. The UNFCCC (or "Climate Convention") was adopted in the Rio Summit, along with the Convention to Combat Desertification and the Convention on Biodiversity. The other two global legal instruments concerning climate change, the Kyoto Protocol (1997) and the Paris Agreement (2015) were also constructed within the United Nations context.

The views on the role of the IGOs on foreign affairs and security issues can vary according to the different currents in International Relations. For the currents of thought that sprung from Classical Realism, the State is the primary actor in international politics. Therefore, other international actors such as IGOs would have a secondary role. According to Realism, States are responsible for their survival and have a monopoly of violence, which leads to a situation known as the "security dilemma." The "security dilemma" is a vicious circle of mistrust: the efforts of one State to enhance its security will be perceived by other States as a threat. Therefore, Realism does not leave much room for cooperation in the foreign field; International Organizations are of little help in addressing the endless power struggle among States.

Unlike Classical Realism, the Institutionalist School currents argue that States try to address international and cross-border problems by creating IGOs. The States' interests are not necessarily antagonistic or harmonious; cooperation through IGOs can subdue the power struggle. States may have a common interest in obtaining joint gains from collaboration while individual

States also have incentives to avoid cooperation. Considering the issues caused by interdependence and mutual vulnerabilities, even the most powerful States must rely on cooperation, renouncing self-help strategies (Keohane & Nye Jr, 1973).

The Constructivist Schools differ from Realism and Institutionalism currents. One major difference is that for Constructivism, the international system anarchy is not inherent to the structure but socially constructed, and therefore the international system can evolve. The concept of global governance has emerged from constructivist current, mainly in opposition to international relations' state-centered theories (Barnett & Duvall, 2004, pp. 1-32). In the context of accelerated globalization, theories of power and the rational choice seemed insufficient to analyze international relations' complexity; globalization implies a demand for cooperation. Constructivism emphasizes that actors do not only act rationally based on their self-interest (interest orientation) but also on what is expected of them according to ideals, values and norms in their communities ("norm orientation").

Finnemore and Sikkink (2001, p. 401) contend that international organizations may have a role "in disseminating new international norms and models of political organization." According to Barnett and Finnemore (1999), international organizations can influence international relations by establishing meanings in the social world and articulating and disseminating new principles and norms. Thus, IGOs would have a dual role: IGOs reflect the values and norms of their foundation but also influence the development of values and norms and structure the international system.

For Barnett and Finnemore (1999), the influence of international organizations is not confined to the functions established at their foundation; IGOs develop distinct attributes based on their expertise or moral authority. For these authors, this authority would be based on a) the legitimacy of the rational-legal authority, legal procedures, impersonal and rational norms, and b)

the control over technical knowledge. Considering the technical knowledge within the organization, IGOs also can offer an organizational platform for epistemic communities. From this position, these "norm entrepreneurs" can persuade States to adhere to global norms. Furthermore, IGOs offer possibilities of discourse and persuasion with negotiations among States, fostering shifts in the actor's interests. For Barnett and Finnemore (1999), International Organizations are modern bureaucracies; attributes, also present in other organizations' bureaucracies, can be found in them. Nevertheless, these authors deny an idealistic view of the effectiveness of IGOs and point to bureaucracy dysfunctions and resistance to change.

2.4 Scientific Communities

The debate on climate change has been inextricably linked to the development of science. As early as 1896, the Swedish scientist, Svante Arrhenius, hypothesized that an increase in the atmospheric concentration of CO₂ could lead to global warming. In 1938, a British amateur climatologist, Guy Stewart Callendar, argued before the Royal Meteorological Society that global warming caused by human activity was underway through greenhouse gas emissions. However, the idea that an increase in the concentration of CO₂ would lead to global warming was not accepted by the scientific establishment at that time (Fleming, 1998).

The first scientific findings concerning climate change date back to the 19th century, but the ability to study if humankind influenced the Earth's climate only came about in the second half of the 20th century. Some scientific developments were necessary to discover anthropogenic global warming, which was only possible after WWII: an understanding of radiative physics, the ability to detect trace gases in the atmosphere, the ability to measure climate variables, and computing power to process climate information.

In the post WWII, the development of aviation demanded the expansion of the knowledge about the oceans and the skies. Furthermore, nuclear weapons became more complex and required more sophisticated computing power to simulate the effects of different weapon designs. The development of nuclear weapons also fostered new technologies to detect trace gasses in the atmosphere; identifying radioactive material from atomic fallout became essential to detect nuclear tests. New technologies originally developed for defense purposes could be used to track carbon emissions, indicating, for the first time, the presence in the atmosphere of carbon dioxide originated from the burning of fossil fuels. Furthermore, improved computer systems allowed scientists to analyze all the new climate data and conclude that human carbon emissions had warmed the planet (Weart, 2008).

In this context, the 1957 article published by the University of California researchers Roger Revelle and Hans Suess is often regarded as the starting point for the academic debate about climate change due to anthropogenic factors. The two authors estimated that the ocean would be less capable of absorbing the CO₂ emitted into the atmosphere than thought until then and highlighted the risks of climate change due to emissions. Later, Charles Keeling set up a CO₂ measurement laboratory on the slopes of Mauna Loa and, in 1961, could confirm that an increase in atmospheric CO₂ was happening (Fleming, 1998, p. 3).

As a result of these developments, since the 1960s, a circle of scientists could affirm that an increase of CO₂ in the atmosphere was taking place. Still, there were not enough data to evaluate the risks represented by the higher concentrations of greenhouse gases. More developed climate models were soon available and made possible a better evaluation. In 1979, a report to the American Academy of Sciences, coordinated by Professor Jules Charney, indicated a possibility of a temperature increase of 1.5 to 4.5 ° C if the amount of CO₂ doubles in the atmosphere. When

the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) conveyed in 1979 the First World Climate Conference, there was enough evidence on climate change that justified the proposal for the establishment of the World Climate Program. This international research program was eventually created in 1980 within the WMO and, with the involvement of other organizations, provided the foundations for the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on climate change (IPCC), created in 1988 (Zillman, 2009, p. 145).

Despite the evolution of scientific knowledge regarding climate change, the influence of this knowledge on political discourses and decision-making is not automatic. Scientists grouped in various networks and associations have played a fundamental role in structuring international environmental governance since the 1970s by their influence on the political agendas (Meyer et al., 1997). Haas (1992, p. 3) introduced the notion of "epistemic communities": "a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within a domain or issue area." Epistemic communities are often organized in transnational networks of like-minded actors supporting an idea or policy which do not necessarily reflect States' interests. The members of an epistemic community should share causal beliefs, normative principles, and a political project; they not only create but justify knowledge. They may hold different functions, be within various organizations, be located in several countries, and jointly exert influence over several governments.

For Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, epistemic communities function as "norm entrepreneurs," seeking to persuade States to agree and to adhere to specific norms. The epistemic communities can influence political decisions by highlighting a particular issue and drawing State leaders' attention to a specific theme. Scientists and experts are recognized as privileged holders of knowledge, which gives them an intellectual authority to promote their ideas to political leaders.

This position allows them to feed governments with information and construct the framework through which the information is interpreted.

Epistemic communities sometimes exert a strong influence on international negotiations. For Haas, the global networking of scientists in the environment started by convincing the Reagan Administration to implement strict regulations on CFC emissions. Haas envisages the ozone negotiations, which led to the 1987 Montreal Protocol, as evidence that some international environmental regimes are initiated thanks to the contribution of scientific knowledge by epistemic communities. Today, the IPCC is considered the most influential epistemic community on climate change.

The influence of the epistemic communities depends on the ideological predisposition of public decision-makers to accept the ideas (Haas, 1992). Furthermore, other factors can amplify the capacity of an epistemic community to present an issue to the political agenda, such as the alliance with a coalition of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), a high degree of uncertainty, a context of crisis, and low political opposition (Gough & Shackley, 2001).

3 UNITED STATES: SPECIFIC TRENDS IN THE CLIMATE DEBATE

The politicization of the environment in the United States has its origin in the 1960s wave of social contestation, which also fueled other movements in the country, such as the Civil Rights movement (Howison, 2018). Environmentalism had become a major concern for the U.S. civil society in the 1960s; air pollution, oil spills, and other signs of environmental degradation were visible for most citizens. On April 22, 1970, Earth Day mobilized millions of Americans, which is usually considered the beginning of environmentalism as a social and political movement in the United States. In the 1970s, despite politicization, there was relative consensus between Democrats and Republicans concerning environmental politics. This bipartisan support fostered significant progress in the environmental legislation during the Nixon Administration, 1969-1974 (Dunlap & Mertig, 2014).

Much of the framework for environmental and conservationist policies that are still relevant in the United States today was designed by the Republican party with a bipartisan support. In the context of the Vietnam war, the environment was seen as a unifying issue. Republicans took the lead as Nixon pulled out environmentalism from the counterculture spirit (Dryzek & Pickering, 2019). During Nixon Presidency, environmental regulation was moved up to the federal level as a sign of priority. The laws were passed on a bipartisan basis with the overwhelming support of both parties.

In 1968, President Nixon created the Task Force on Environment. The initiative of the Republican Administration led to the congressional approval of one of the first laws that established a national framework for environmental protection, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. The purpose of the Act was, and is to this day, to certify that the government conducts assessments before it begins federal projects that may affect the environment. The Nixon

Administration, with the help of a Democratic Congress, passed many environmental initiatives, from institutional reforms to pollution control. On January 1, 1970, President Nixon signed the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), creating the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), a body of special environmental advisers to the President and initiated an organizational restructuring which gave origin to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The institutionalization of environmentalism was complemented by important legislation: the 1970 Clean Air Act, in order to tackle air pollution and set standards for what type of pollutants can be released. In 1972, President Nixon signed the Clean Water Act to regulate water quality. The Act also made it illegal to discharge pollutants into navigable waters. In 1973, the Nixon government approved The Endangered Species Act, which granted government powers to protect species at risk of extinction (Dunlap et al., 2001).

After an initial period of relative consensus between Democrats and Republicans in the early 1970s, the ideological divide between conservatives and liberals concerning environmental politics deepened. This ideological and partisan divide became a particular feature of the political debate in the country that should not be ignored when U.S. political speeches and policies on the environment, and particularly climate change, are analyzed. Authors highlight that party polarization is not limited to themes related to the environment but much broader, affecting many different areas, such as immigration, health, and reproductive rights. The ideological divide is more easily perceived in climate change than in other themes in the environmental area (Sinclair, 2006).

Multiple studies have shown a strong correlation between political affiliation and individual views on climate change. Dunlap et al. (2016) analyzed the disparity of views between Democrats and Republicans regarding climate change. Republicans' disbelief about global warming was evident, especially during the economic crisis: in 2010, 71% of Democrats and 29%

of the Republicans believed in climate change. In 2016, these numbers were 75% for Democrats and 41% for Republicans. Moreover, the study points out that, in 2016, 84% of Democrats and 43% of Republicans believed in the influence of man in climate change. The authors contend that this divide stems from the conservative aversion to government regulatory measures, combined with substantial campaign donations from the fossil fuel lobby to conservative politicians. The tendency to selectively reject information that confronts beliefs and identities would be an important reason why scientific data does not modify opinions on climate change. The research conducted indicated that partisan differences are stronger with higher education among individuals who believe they understand climate change reasonably well than among those who believe they understand poorly.

On the other hand, concerning liberals, authors have lighted a deeper ecological concern than conservatives and that the deeper criticism against environmentalism tends to come from conservatives. Liberals tend to be more concerned about the environment, recognizing the anthropogenic origin of climate change and its risks for humanity. For Currie and Choma (2018), the green behavior for many liberals often assumes characteristics of a moral imperative.

Horwitz (2013) can trace this partisan divide back to the 1980s, when the Reagan Administration influenced conservative opinions on many themes, including the environment. The conservative view on environmentalism became more defined. The Reagan Administration, guided by a free-market ideology, was hostile to government regulation and, by extension, opponent to environmental protection through regulation. Republican party leaders began championing a deregulatory mindset; according to free-market conservatives, environmental regulation was placing unnecessary burdens on business. Instead of reforming the environmental

regulation approved in the 1970s, the Reagan Administration tried to reverse it but without success (Dunlap et al., 2001; Hochschild, 2018).

Skocpol and Hertel-Fernandez (2016) can trace the beginning of the ideological divide to the aftermath of the civil rights movement, which led to a concentration of more conservative views in the Republican and liberal ideas in the Democratic Party. However, this initial divide cannot explain the more recent polarization. The authors indicate that since the 1960s, there has been an "asymmetric polarization" - the Republican Party continued to move further to the right than the Democratic Party. This movement contradicts the "median voter theorem" as the Republican Party did not move back to the middle of public opinion. The authors suggest an "organizational approach" to explain the partisan divide: the move to the right in the Republican party cannot be defined only by the position of the electoral base. There is a correlation between certain Republican representatives' positions and the action of donor groups, advocacy groups, think tanks, and constituency organizations. This correlation would explain a gap between the position of Republican officeholders and the average Republican voter in themes such as social benefits, social security, public spending, and climate change. Concerning climate politics, for instance, the authors found the correlation between the action of the anti-climate tax group "Americans for Prosperity" and the position of Republican representatives increasingly against climate tax in the period 2009-2014 (p. 693). This tendency was contrary to most constituencies of the Republican party, which were increasingly favorable to measures to control GHG emission in the same period.

Likewise, Hoffman (2012) contends that the partisan divide on climate change has been promoted by sectorial interests: "following in the wake of the 1997 Kyoto Treaty that threatened the material interests of powerful economic and political interests, particularly members of the

fossil-fuel industry." The Kyoto Protocol meant that an issue that was debated primarily in scientific circles became relevant to the point of impacting powerful economic interests.

Dunlap and Jacques (2013) contend that polarization increased as conservative thinktanks and corporations started to become more involved in the organization of climate denial: "manufacturing uncertainties." For these authors, in the 1990s, in part as a reaction to the growing globalization of the environmental regulations stimulated by the 1992 Rio Summit, conservative thinktanks launched an anti-environmental movement. The tactic was doubting climate science to delegitimize the claims of environmental policymakers, especially through the media.

Hoffman (2012) accepts the influence of economic interests on climate change policies but argues that this influence is consolidated by cultural and identity aspects: "climate change has become enmeshed in the so-called culture wars." For this author, climate denialism is not a matter of access to scientific knowledge but an expression of political identity that leads to the disregard of scientific data, as in other social issues such as gun ownership, same-sex marriage, etc. The difference of views between Democrats or Republicans concerning climate change is a cultural issue; opinions regarding climate change are based on ideological preferences, personal experiences, and values, influenced by reference groups. The author also suggests that the culture war on climate change is part of a broader cultural/religious/political conflicts that generate debates between conservatives and liberals on abortion, weapons, health system, evolution, etc. These groups see climate change through different "cognitive filters" and interpret and validate the information from the scientific community by their own pre-existing beliefs. The "cognitive filters" show cultural identification with the group - cultural identity can overpower scientific reasoning.

Other authors contend that some conservatives tend to react against environmentalism because they associate the movement with socialism or with anti-establishment positions (Howison, 2018; Pilbeam, 2003). Furthermore, conservatism in the United States is often associated with the nationalistic sentiment, critical of international organizations and international commitments in general, including in the environment (Pilbeam, 2003). As discussed, environmental organizations have a paramount role in the environmental securitization moves at a global level.

In the post-Cold War era, partisan polarization and divergence of views on environmental security have substantially impacted the United States' environmental agendas. At the domestic level, polarization is intense in Congress, where a Republican majority produces severe obstacles to legislate for environmental protection (Dunlap et al., 2016). In foreign policy, the divergence of views on environmental security has resulted in the discontinuity of U.S. speeches and international positions: the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol⁵ under the Clinton Administration (1997), abandoned by the Bush Administration (2001); President Obama's pledges in Copenhagen (2009), rejected the following year by the conservative majority Congress; the signature of the

⁵ The Kyoto Protocol was not ratified due to the Republican opposition of the United States Congress (Bodansky, 2016). In 1997, Republican Senators issued the Byrd-Hagel resolution blocking the Kyoto Protocol ratification. The resolution was contrary to any agreement differentiating between commitments for the United States and other countries. For the Republican opposition, the commitment to carbon reductions would affect American competitiveness with emerging economies. To add to the difficulty, several Senators brought sovereigntist arguments (Milkoreit, 2019, p. 1024). The negotiations for implementing the Kyoto Protocol took seven years (1998-2005). The Parties extended the Protocol's deadline from 2012 to 2020 and started negotiations for the next period of commitments. During the new round of negotiations, developed countries tried to convince emerging economies to make specific commitments to mitigate climate change.

Paris Agreement in 2016⁶, denounced by Donald Trump; the return to the Paris Agreement by Joe Biden (2021). ⁷

⁶ On December 12, 2015, the Paris Agreement was approved by 195 states. The Paris Agreement complements the International Climate Change Regime's three-dimensional structure, composed of the Climate Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement. The Agreement was the first that established a universal target to limit global warming but based on voluntary commitments (pledge and review system), without the institutional framework to guarantee its implementation, (Dryzek & Pickering, 2019). The Paris Agreement seeks an intermediary solution that is neither too demanding, and therefore unacceptable for most governments, nor too weak, and consequently ineffective. The nationally determined contributions (bottom-up approach) complement international standards to encourage States to increase their efforts progressively (Bodansky, 2016).

⁷ Robert Putnam's (1988) two-level game theory is useful to describe the dynamics of climate negotiations. Putnam's theory highlight that States engage in negotiations at the international level and at the domestic level, sometimes simultaneously. A country's position at the foreign level is the result of domestic political competition between various actors that attempt to shape a foreign policy favorable to their interests. Domestic actors may also have a role in approving an agreement reached at the international level in the phases of ratification or implementation. The two-level game theory may help understand why the U.S. has signed the Kyoto Protocol or the Paris agreement but has failed to ratify them. These agreements could be successfully negotiated internationally but did not overlap domestic demands and thus could not be approved by the U.S. Senate as a result. International negotiations fail when outcomes preferred by domestic constituencies cannot be attainable in foreign negotiations, or outcomes preferred by other countries may not be acceptable to domestic constituencies. The challenge of finding results that satisfy both international partners and domestic interests can be a barrier to successfully concluding an international agreement. In the case of the United States, the challenge to conciliate the domestic and foreign levels is increased due to intense politization and different views, sometimes opposing views, of the two major political parties concerning environmental security, notably climate change.

4 THE CONSTRUCTIVIST VIEW ON ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY

Constructivism has drawn on philosophers like Emmanuel Kant or sociologists like Emile Durkheim. Durkheim inspired Constructivism on several levels; he developed a concept of social facts, highlighting the importance of shared beliefs and feelings (the "collective consciousness"). Constructivism is a priori antiessentialist: States' behavior and their identities and interests change because they are determined by beliefs and representations, which can change through social interactions.

If Realism argues the structural anarchy of the international system makes power essential in international relations, Constructivism claims that ideas are the primary driver of international politics. For Wendt (1992, p. 395): "anarchy is what States make of it." Thus, for Constructivism, anarchy is constructed; it depends on the States' behaviors. The States' behaviors are based on their culture, their national identity, and how their societies are shaped. According to Finnemore and Sikkink (2001, p. 393), contrary to Neorealist and Neoliberal approaches, which focus on the results of the actors' behavior, Constructivism contends that the actors' (countries, societies, individuals) conscience develops together with the structures they create. For Constructivism, human interaction is primarily determined by ideational factors, not material ones, which build identities and interests. Constructivism acknowledges that material factors matter, but they are interwoven and interdependent of ideational factors. Beliefs play a fundamental role in building reality; an environmental threat is a physical reality, but at the same time, a social construction.

The primary forum for the constructivist views on environmental security is the Copenhagen School. Few authors outside School use constructivist analytical tools to analyze environmental security. In Denmark, the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) was

organized in 1985. The Institute was formed by two chief researchers, Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, and later Jaap Wilde and Lane Hansen. From the beginning, COPRI was critical of the Realist Theory, denying that the State and its military issues were the only focus of security issues (Buzan & Hansen, 2009).

The School's foundational work, "Security: A new framework for analysis," was published in 1998 by Buzan, Weaver, and Wilde. The authors did not intend a break from traditional security studies but broadened the field of study beyond the military sector. For the Copenhagen School, securitization involves constructing ontological threats in the discourse following what Barry Buzan calls a "grammar of security." For the School, discourses contribute to creating new practices and rules. The construction of threats occurs, fundamentally, through speeches by the actors interested in establishing security agendas, raising an issue to the level of threat to national or international security. Political authority can define an ontological threat with enough salience to have substantial political effects. An issue becomes a security concern when it is articulated as such and, as society starts to approach an issue through the prism of security, its behavior changes. In international relations, securitization causes a change in the nations' behavior concerning the securitized issue.

The securitization framework involves a spectrum. On the one hand, nonpoliticized issues are not considered political matters; they are not included in the public debate but belong to the private domain. There are those politicized issues, which are a matter of public policy and are part of the standard political system, but they are not presented as existential threat. At the other end of the spectrum, securitized issues are not just considered a matter of public policy but are given special priority status.

Securitization happens when an issue is presented to an audience as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the procedures of normal politics. Thus, securitizing an issue result in the radicalization of the range of possible policies that the securitizing actor can enact in the name of this political problem. As soon as a theme becomes a security concern, the choice of possible measures becomes larger. Since the security discourse carries a sense of urgency, priority, alarm, and crisis, actors can take extraordinary means in its name. According to Buzan et al. (1998, pp. 23-24), securitization is an extreme version of politicization. Desecuritization means that the issue returns to the politicization stage.

For Buzan et al. (1998), the discourse is the beginning of the process of securitization. Security is seen as an essentially intersubjective process, not an objective state of affairs, but a discursive construction of a specific issue. Thus, the most appropriate way to study securitization would be "to study discourses and political constellations" (p. 25). Security equals, therefore, enclosing the address in a logic of "threat/defense" requiring increased intervention. Securitization only occurs when there is acceptance of this speech and a recognition of an ontological threat by the audience. An audience must agree collectively on the threat's nature and support extraordinary measures for securitization.

Buzan et al. (1998, p. 25) state that: "the existential threat has to be argued and just gain enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures or other steps that would not have been possible had the discourse not taken the form of existential threats, point of no return, and necessity." Thus, the evolution of the theme from one stage to another (nonpoliticization, politicization, or securitization) will depend on the capacity of the securitizing agent to convince a specific audience.

Though the success of securitization involves the combination of intrinsic characteristics of the discourse, the social conditions capable of favoring the acceptance by the audience of the existential threat should not be disregarded. Thus, in the case of climate securitization, the expansion of the scientific information on the problem has helped to give visibility to it and contributed to its politicization and securitization.

For Buzan et al. (1998, pp. 36-40), security involves three types of units: a) The referent objects, which are threatened and need to be protected. The range of possible referent objects in the environmental sector is wide: biodiversity, threatened species, habitats, water resources, or large-scale themes such as climate or ozone. b) The securitizing actors declare the threats, having the institutional power to politicize and move the issue. Securitizing actors are, for example, international organizations, governments, politicians. c) Functional actors significantly influence the security field but are not securitizing actors, for example, the media, academia, NGOs, and think tanks (Buzan et al., 1998).

A securitizing actor presents a securitizing speech act by declaring a reference object under an existential threat, defining the political agenda of security, which is fundamentally governmental and intergovernmental. The securitizing actors determine the public policies that indicate how the environmental threat will be treated (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 72). The scientific agenda is constructed by "functional actors" and addresses scientific and nongovernmental activities involving scientists and research institutions responsible for listing the most diverse environmental problems as referent objects. Indeed, epistemic communities have a significant influence on the process of climate securitization. Science is the ultimate refuge of political legitimacy, notably in complex environmental issues such as the climate (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 77).

Concerning the notion of security, the Copenhagen School does not deviate very far from a traditional understanding. However, the School suggests that there might be referent objects for security other than the State. Buzan et al. (1998) presented a multisectoral approach to security in five sectors: (1) the military sector is associated with the use of force and coercion by military agents. The military sector is the realm of traditional security studies; (2) the political sector involves the threats to the organizational stability of the State, organizations, regime types, ideologies; (3) the societal sector is related to collective identities in society – the survival of a language, culture, identity, values, "way of life"; (4) the economic sector involves threats related to in the economic order, resource and fiscal stability, threat of poverty and starvation; (5) the environmental, concerning the relationships between human activities and the biosphere, ecological balance and preventable natural and health disasters. These sectors have specific referent objects conducive to securitization.

Societal security concerns the stability of interactions between individuals and social groups. While security means a defense of its sovereignty for the State, it means the defense of its identity for society. In society, individuals can feel threatened, for instance, by economic crises, immigration, some form of foreign cultural influence, etc., which do not necessarily impact the State's sovereignty (McSweeney, 1996). In societal security, the Copenhagen School provides a distinction between the State and the population. The concept also highlights that the coherence of a society can be threatened by threats other than violence and coercion.

The Copenhagen School distinguishes environmental threats into three groups: a) natural factors not related to human activities (such as natural catastrophes); b) human actions that affect natural systems to the level of posing an ontological threat to humanity - the most evident example is emissions of gases such as the GHGs or the CFCs; c) human actions in the natural systems that

do not seem to pose an ontological threat to civilization. Only the threats illustrated in the second point (b) are considered within the range of environmental security.

The Copenhagen School raised the possibility that systemic issues could unite human communities before a common threat (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 11-15). These authors recognize an opportunity to transcend the antagonism linked to securitizations when actors join to counter a common threat that goes beyond them. In these conditions, antagonisms and rivalries would give way to cooperation (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 199). The School, however, downplayed the likelihood that a threat perceived as global would receive enough attention to generate a feeling of universal vulnerability (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 82-83).

Buzan and Waever (2009) more recently returned to this discussion by specifying the conditions relating to these systemic securitizations (which they call macrosecuritization). Macrosecritizations would still be rare but not entirely impossible when motivated by universal claims such as ideology, religion, or the environment (Buzan & Waever, 2009, pp. 257-261). According to Buzan and Waever, only environmental issues have the potential to reach a universal level of securitization. The possibility of the climate threat for macrosecuritization derives from its nature, as presented by the scientific consensus. The environmental threat is not represented by other States, nations, cultures, religions, etc. The danger is a priori external to human relations and social life. Thus, as the climate change threat is global and diffuse, its characteristics are conducive to systemic and universal securitizations.

5 METHODOLOGY: SPEECH ANALYSIS

The research question that motivated this project was formulated as follows: "How climate security has evolved in high-level United States political speeches?" I hypothesize that climate change securitization has progressed in U.S. high-level security speeches in the post-Cold War period. Verifying this hypothesis involves: a) identifying climate securitization in top-level U.S. speeches in the post-Cold War, according to the criteria established by the Copenhagen School, b) contextualizing the discourses with a review of climate change policies by the U.S. Administrations in the historical period concerned; c) comparing the results of the speech analysis and the review of policies.

Speech analysis will be based on the National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (NSS), and other documents when necessary, such as State of the Union addresses, by Post-Cold War U.S. governments, namely Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden. The primary audience of the National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement is the U.S Congress, the same as in the case of State of the Union Addresses. The speeches were chosen as they represent national security concerns and future policy proposals with a targeted audience, reflecting each Administration's beliefs and values in the historical moment they were elaborated.

The Copenhagen School establishes a body of criteria for identifying securitizations in speeches, a methodology inseparable from its theoretical thinking. Securitization is identified with the presence of a particular narrative structure where four fundamental elements are associated: (a) a securitizing actor that informs a (b) relevant audience about a threat to (c) a referent object and that (d) extraordinary measures should be taken to overcome this threat (Buzan et al., 1998,

pp. 23-25). In this discourse, the word "security" does not need to be evoked, but its resonance must be at least implicit (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 176).

Besides the speech structure, an effective securitization demands a relevant securitizing agent and the acceptance by the audience of exceptional measures. An effective securitization should convince a relevant audience of the imminence of an ontological threat; the dynamics of urgency must be accepted (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 23-25). When a securitizing attempt does not fully meet these conditions, there is a "securitizing move" (in the words of the Copenhagen School).

Buzan et al. (1998, p. 74) highlight that securitizing attempts in the environmental sector often fail: "The environmental sector displays more clearly than any other the propensity for dramatic securitizing moves but with comparatively little successful securitization effects (i.e., those that lead to extraordinary measures)." Securitizing moves are not necessarily insignificant because they bring attention and solutions for specific issues in the political agenda and can pave the way for future securitization (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 57).

Researchers have studied the different security representations of environmental degradation and climate change through the speeches of political actors. Barnett (2003) highlighted a duality in the security representation of environmental issues by actors: some discourses focus on the risks of conflicts arising from ecological problems; others on the dangers these problems pose to the development and survival of humankind. Barnett criticizes a tendency to the militarized representation of the climate threat in speeches; thinking about this type of problem through traditional security schemes would be unproductive: "understanding climate change as a security issue risk making it a military rather than a foreign policy problem, and a sovereignty rather than a global common problem. This may help justify further securing of the

unsustainable livelihoods of the North in the way of George Bush Snr at the United Nations Conference on Development in 1992, and George W Bush over the Kyoto Protocol" (Barnett, 2003, p. 10).

Detraz and Betsill (2009) analyzed speeches and official reports presenting climate change as a threat to national, regional, or international security. These authors highlight that the threat representation varies according to the speaker, somewhat reflecting the broad interpretive power of actors in this regard. However, if the authors evoke examples where climate change is associated with a risk of conflicts, this would not be the dominant view. In most speeches, the threat would concentrate on the overall impact on human communities' well-being.

Some elements of the speech distinguish climate securitization from traditional securitization and indicate normative innovation compared to traditional security speeches. In the case of climate change, the exceptional measures do not target any specific enemy. For Buzan and Waeber (2009), climate securitization is conducive to macrosecuritization, and thus, is often associated with normative innovations in speeches. In macrosecuritization, the referent object would have a universal character (the planet, the humanity). Rather than being defined as a precise enemy, the designated threat would be presented as diffuse, intangible, or seen as a collective responsibility. The exceptional measures imply a departure from "politics as usual"; however, deployed in a context of global security not targeting any specific enemy. Macrosecritizations foster international cooperation and the erosion of particularism.

On the other hand, the traditional security is state-centric: the referent object is specific (usually, a State, group of States). A particular object makes systemic and universal securitizations improbable. Moreover, the nature of the designated threat is intrinsic to human relations, caused by a specific enemy ("alien other"), usually a State or a group of States considered responsible for

the insecurity that weighs on the referent object. The exceptional measures tend to resort to the conventional security apparatus and involve coercion. Classical securitization involves urgency, antagonism, identity tension, and a zero-sum game in terms of dynamics (Buzan et al., 1998).

The criteria discussed above help with a preliminary identification of climate security elements in a text. Nevertheless, ambiguities can remain in speech analysis. It is often unfeasible to quantify the significance of speeches, their acceptance, and their specific contribution to moving the security agenda. Likewise, exceptional measures are not precisely defined by the School's framework and depend mainly on the context. Thus, the effort to contextualize the speeches by a review of each Administration's policies had the objective of better assessing the speeches' significance and scope.

Concerning the notion of exceptional measure, a priori, Buzan et al. (1998, p. 24) refer to a break with the legal framework or the pattern of resource allocation for a specific action. In speeches, it remains challenging to distinguish between measures that fall into the category of "politics as usual" from those considered "exceptional." Overall, in the case of climate change, exceptional (or extraordinary) measures fall into two categories: mitigation and adaptation. Mitigation measures aim to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases. Adaptation measures aim to decrease the vulnerability of natural and human systems against the effects (present and expected) of climate change.

In this thesis analysis, plans, at the domestic level, to promote and allocate resources to efficient transportation systems, alternative energy sources, clean energy transformation, suspension of actions that could lead to increased emissions, such as the construction of pipelines or drilling, the establishment of stricter emissions regulations, etc. will be considered examples of mitigation actions. Investments to build or renew infrastructure more resilient to climate change

would fall into the adaptation category. At the international level, participation in global efforts, such as international agreements that restrict national emissions, will be considered extraordinary measures in mitigation. Furthermore, global cooperation initiatives for mitigation or adaptation, such as funding climate change actions in developing countries, are exceptional measures that also indicate a break with antagonisms that characterize traditional security views.

This thesis epistemological approach remains more interpretative than positivist. The socially constructed and intersubjective aspect of security is highlighted by choosing the Copenhagen School framework to analyze the relationship between climate and security. Environmental threats (notably climate change) are tangible but are often projections based on scientific research. Therefore, the constructivist framework is interesting since the climate threats that motivate securitization are designated threats based on scientific information. Climate threats have not reached their full potential; nonetheless, they encourage exceptional security measures at present.

Ultimately, this project does not aim at establishing a matrix of the evolution of climate securitization in terms of percentage of change or continuity or in terms of acceptance. The objective is humbler and essentially theoretical: to demonstrate that climate change contributes to a conceptual renewal in the U.S. security discourses and policies, security is understood here as mental representation and a political process. A literature review can give relevant elements about the overall acceptance or rejection of the securitizing moves proposed by the U.S Administrations that will be analyzed.

6 ANALYSING UNITED STATES' DISCOURSES

The elaboration of the most important official document that states U.S. foreign and security, the National Security Strategy (NSS), is based on the U.S. system's constitutional division of power, originating from the efforts of multiple institutions. The NSS is far from a politically neutral document (Snider & Nagl, 1995). The NSS elaboration leads to an interactive and interinstitutional process requiring high-level meetings that help conciliate government views and help create internal consensus on policies, allowing the Administration to speak with unity. The NSS aims at informing the President's positions to Congress, legitimizing its demands for resources; thus, its primary audience is the U.S. Congress. Nevertheless, it is impossible to assess its ultimate audience, scope, and impact as the NSS is a public document available online. The NSS also communicates with individual citizens, academics, the media, multiple groups, and the electorate seeking presidential recognition of their demands, and these groups, in the end, can influence the congressmen's views on the issue.

6.1 The Bill Clinton Administration (1993 – 2001)

In the post-Cold War, international relations developments helped broaden the international security agenda to cover other themes such as the environment. A new world order emerged. The inexistence of major military threats to the U.S allowed the emergence of "soft power" issues. Moreover, these new issues could receive resources that originated from reducing the country's budget for military defense.

The first Administration after the Cold War, the election of Democratic President Bill Clinton and his environmentally friendly Vice-president Albert "Al" Gore, represented an expansion of environmental security compared with previous Administrations. The end of the Cold

War implied that the country did not fear any significant military threat. Greater attention started to be given to the environmental and other soft power agendas, followed by reducing the country's defense budget.

During his two mandates, the Clinton Administration issued seven National Security Strategy Reports in 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000. In the National Security Strategy Reports, the term "environment" (in the sense of ecology) was mentioned 47 times in 1994, 54 in 1995, 59 in 1996, 57 in 1997, 80 in 1998, 63 in 1999, 64 in 2000. Climate Change was mentioned twice in 1994, twice in 1995, four times in 1996, four times in 1997 NSS, six times in 1998 NSS, once in 1999 NSS, once in 2000 NSS. The term "environmental security" was mentioned in all National Security Reports but in 1997.

In the NSSs released in both Clinton Administrations, climate change was treated as a security issue when it was mentioned according to the criteria established by the Copenhagen School. For instance, the 1994 NSS highlights that the United States and ultimately humanity as the referent objects threatened by climate change. Climate change is included on a list of environmental threats: "Chernobyl or the East African drought, and to largescale ecosystem damage caused by industrial pollution, deforestation, loss of biodiversity, ozone depletion, and ultimately climate change" (Clinton, 1994a, p. 15). In Bill Clinton's speeches, climate change is often treated in a list of other environmental security issues as the climate change had still not reached the preeminence in political discourses that it has today.

The exceptional measure to confront climate change as an existential threat is established, the reduction of GHG emissions: "We have committed the United States to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000, and we have developed a National Climate Plan to achieve that goal" (Clinton, 1994a, p. 3). The universal character of climate change as the

designated threat, the referent objects (ultimately the whole planet) justify the call for international cooperation and solidarity, breaking with oppositions that usually characterizes traditional securitization: "Strategies dealing with environmental issues of this magnitude will require partnerships between governments and nongovernmental organizations, cooperation between nations and regions, and a commitment to a strategically focused, long-term policy for emerging environmental risks" (Clinton, 1994a, p. 15).⁸

The same narrative structure can be identified in the 1999 National Security Strategy. The Report designates climate change as a threat in a list of other environmental threats: "Environmental threats such as climate change, stratospheric ozone depletion, introduction of nuisance plant and animal species, overharvesting of fish, forests and other living natural resources, and the transnational movement of hazardous chemicals and waste directly threaten the health and economic well-being of U.S. citizens" (Clinton, 1999a, p. 13). Like other environmental threats listed, climate change is presented as a potential to harm the referent objects: the United States and the well-being of its citizens. The exceptional measure to counter climate threat is emissions reduction based on the Kyoto Protocol commitments. Furthermore, the discourse highlights the importance of diplomacy and cooperation to react to climate threats and alludes to common but differentiated responsibilities, indicating that key emerging economies should participate in the efforts: "We will not submit the Kyoto agreement for ratification until key

⁸ In the National Security Strategies, the Bill Clinton Administration often mentions international cooperation through the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) in climate change or the environment in general. The Global Environment Facility (GEF) is an organization created in 1991, before the 1992 Earth Summit, which operates a fund intended to carry out actions to preserve the environment. It is an independent financial organization that grants subsidies to projects related to biodiversity, the fight against the effects of global warming, water pollution, soil regression and degradation, reduction of the ozone layer and pollutants, etc. The GEF works in partnership with international institutions, non-governmental organizations, and private sector partners, addressing environmental issues on a global scale. Today, the GEF is the world's largest fund for environmental projects.

developing nations have agreed to participate meaningfully in efforts to address global warming" (Clinton, 1999a, p. 13).

Other documents of the Clinton Administration inform the climate securitization narratives following the Copenhagen School criteria. During the Clinton Administration, "environment" or "climate change" were mentioned in all State of the Union Addresses, except for the 1995 State of the Union Address. The speaker adjusts his rhetoric to the audience. The political reason why the words "environment" or "climate" is not mentioned in the 9,190 words of the 1995 State of the Union address can be explained by the fact that since 1954 this was the first discourse to a Republican majority Congress and the first time with a Republican Speaker. This State of the Union Address was particularly conservative to seek support from the Republican majority; mentioning environmental issues was certainly not one of the themes in this strategy to gather support from conservatives.⁹

In 1998, for the first time during the Clinton Administration, a State of the Union Address brought climate change as an issue: "Our overriding environmental challenge tonight is the worldwide problem of climate change, global warming, the gathering crisis that requires worldwide action. The vast majority of scientists have concluded unequivocally that if we don't reduce the emission of greenhouse gases, at some point in the next century, we'll disrupt our climate and put our children and grandchildren at risk. This past December, America led the world to reach a historic agreement committing our Nation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions through market forces, new technologies, energy efficiency. We have it in our power to act right here, right

⁹ Devroy, A (1995). Clinton Calls for a Centrist' Social Compact. Washington Post. January 25, 1995.

now. I propose \$6 billion in tax cuts and research and development to encourage innovation, renewable energy, fuel-efficient cars, energy-efficient homes" (Clinton, 1998a).

The narrative structure in the 1998 State of the Union Address indicates a securitization move. First, the discourse establishes the centrality of the designated threat, climate change. The disruption of the climate is an overwhelming problem that justifies securitization. Climate change is defined as the country's primary environmental challenge but also as a universal problem. The designation of climate change as an existential threat to the referent object "the future our children and grandchildren" reinforces the gravity and the urgent character of the matter. Furthermore, the exceptional measures (to reduce GHG emissions) are associated with a specific resource allocation.

In the 1999 State of the Union Address, in the securitization move, the association of future generations with climate change is reiterated, like in other Bill Clinton speeches. This association is not trivial: the allusion to intergenerationally would run against short-term political rationality, a rhetorical strategy to push for a break with "politics as usual": "But our most fateful new challenge is the threat of global warming; 1998 was the warmest year ever recorded. Last year's heat waves, floods, and storms are but a hint of what future generations may endure if we do not act now."

Actions by the Clinton Administration also corroborate the idea of progress in environmental and climate security. From the beginning of his mandate, President Clinton sought to implement climate policies to reduce GHG emissions. The "Climate Change Action Plan" was presented in April 1993 to stabilize emissions for the year 2000. However, the 52 voluntary initiatives encompassed by the "Climate Change Action Plan" found objection in Congress,

particularly the tax on fuel. Changes in the plan in Congress made the tax too low to have a significant impact on fuel consumption (Hahn et al., 2002).

The Clinton Administration created the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Environmental Security (ODUSD-ES) and defined "environmental security." For the first time, the term "environmental security" became part of the official name of an administrative branch, though most of the programs run by the ODUSD-ES were not new. Sherri Wasserman Goodman was designated as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Environmental Security, remaining in this position during the Clinton Administration (Floyd, 2010, pp. 87-90).

During the Clinton Administration, as a convergence of traditional national security and environmental protection, "environmental security" was defined by the DOD as follows: "Environmental security threats are conditions affecting human health, safety, or environment that impair DOD's ability to prepare for or carry out the National Security Strategy or create instabilities that can threaten U.S. National Security" (Floyd, 2010, p. 89).

Despite facing congressional opposition, notably after the approval of the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, which prevented the United States from ratifying any agreement that did not set binding targets for all the nations involved, the Clinton Administration actively participated in the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol established limits to greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions for the most industrialized countries and economies in transition; 38 countries committed to emission reductions. For the first time, an international agreement set mandatory limits for GHG emissions.

Mainly due to the U.S. influence, the Protocol created financial mechanisms, which allowed, for example, the possibility of exchanging emission limits between nations and the creation and trade of carbon credits (Hahn et al., 2002). Despite its involvement in the

negotiations, the Clinton Administration did not submit the Protocol to Congress since it realized the meager chances to be approved. As a result, the Clinton Administration could not restore the country's leadership in environmental issues, whereas European countries started to occupy a vanguard position (Milkoreit, 2019). As Dunlap et al. (2016) indicate, since 1994, when Republicans gained control of Congress, the Clinton Administration realized that the window of opportunity to deal with climate change had closed.

According to Floyd (2010, p. 90), Bill Clinton's environmental security defense strategy had positive results, such as creating a stable annual budget of U\$S 5 billion. The author notes that the advancements in the environmental area were largely the result of the enforcement of already existing state, federal, and international environmental legislation, which can be explained by the opposition to create new laws. The Clinton Administration faced in Congress to pass new environmental laws. The Clinton Administration brought the environmental security agenda to an unprecedented level of priority. The environmental agenda listed climate change among other environmental threats during the Clinton Administration, such as biodiversity loss, ozone layer depletion, air pollution, etc. Climate change, still often referred to as "global warming," had still not assumed the same relevance that the theme has today. Daynes and Sussman (2010, p. 89) highlight this aspect of President Clinton's speech: "similar to most people during the 1990s, he used the terms - climate change and global warming interchangeably throughout his presidency. He referred to global warming 240 times from 1993 until the end of his second term in 2001. During the same period, he referred to climate change 284 times."

The complexity of climate disruption brought by the increase of the Earth's temperature was still not as palpable as today. Relatively few specific measures to deal with climate change were implemented during the Clinton period, comparing to more recent Democratic

Administrations. The primary domestic policy to deal with this issue was the 1993 "Climate Change Action Plan," without tangible results. In foreign policy, the most significant contribution of the Clinton Administration to climate security was its participation in the negotiations that led to the Kyoto Protocol and in those that followed its signature. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, since 1994, when Republicans gained control of Congress, the Clinton Administration's window of opportunity to deal with environmental issues, and especially the climate change, closed (Dunlap & McCright, 2010).

Thus, progress became more visible in international negotiations when congressional approval was not necessary. In the international negotiations, the Clinton Administration favored climate change-supported cost-effective strategies, including market-based instruments, particularly cap-and-trade mechanisms. For Hahn et al. (2002, p. 31), the Clinton Administration was largely responsible for the inclusion in the Kyoto Protocol of "significant provisions for international emissions trading and joint implementation projects among the industrialized nations, as well as what came to be known as the Clean Development Mechanism for offsets in developing countries."

Despite the failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, Bill Clinton remained clear concerning the climate threats until the end of his mandate. He mentioned climate change in every State of the Union Address from 1998 to 2000. In 2000, his last State of the Union Address followed the same pattern: "The greatest environmental challenge of the new century is global warming. The scientists tell us the 1990's were the hottest decade of the entire millennium. If we fail to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases, deadly heat waves and droughts will become more frequent, coastal areas will flood, and economies will be disrupted. That is going to happen unless we act" (Clinton, 2000a).

The speech analysis of Clinton's discourses reveals the emphasis given to environmental (and climate change) securitization during his Administration. The narrative structure specific to securitization is respected in several opportunities: the designation of climate change as an existential threat to a referent object (humanity), requiring exceptional measures. A sense of urgency also characterizes the discourse through the speaker's attempts to accentuate the seriousness of the threat. Nevertheless, the Copenhagen Schools' criteria demand that the audience accept the exceptional measures proposed. Thus, one can question the effectiveness of the rhetoric in this regard, considering the level of opposition the Clinton Administration faced in the U.S. Congress, as shown by the literature review.

6.2 The George W. Bush Administration (2001-2009)

The two George W. Bush Administrations released two National Security Strategies (2002 and 2006). In the NSSs, "environment" was mentioned: four times in 2002, and three times in 2006. Climate change was mentioned twice in the 2002 NSS and not mentioned in the 2006 NSS. These documents' rare references to climate change or other environmental problems suggest a de-emphasis on environmental security.

The 2002 NSS reacts to the September 11 attacks and is dominated by the global war on terrorism and codifies "the Bush Doctrine". The Bush Doctrine advocates maintaining the United States military supremacy in the world, if necessary, through preventive war against the dissemination of weapons of mass destruction. The doctrine supported the global promotion of human rights and freedoms through military means, if necessary. These goals justified an attempt to rebuild the Arab world into the "Greater Middle East." The Bush doctrine softened during the second presidential term.

The 2002 National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement defines its main objectives: a) to defend peace, to fight "terrorists and tyrants"; b) preserve peace, "build good relations between the great powers," and c) extend peace, "encourage free and open societies on all continents" (Bush, 2002a, p. 1). Environmental issues are mentioned, not as threats, and listed together with worker protection: "The United States must foster economic growth in ways that will provide a better life along with widening prosperity. We will incorporate labor and environmental concerns into U.S. trade negotiations, creating a healthy "network" between multilateral environmental agreements with the WTO, and use the International Labor Organization, trade preference programs, and trade talks to improve working conditions in conjunction with freer trade" (Bush, 2002a, p. 19).

In the 2002 NSS, a distant association between climate and security could hardly be qualified as securitization. It further illustrates the lukewarmness concerning the recognition of the climate threat. The discourse denies contradiction between economic growth and climate change under a win-win paradigm: growth is not the antithesis of climate protection but one of its conditions. Along with environmental issues, energy security is listed: "We will also continue to work with our partners to develop cleaner and more energy-efficient technologies. (...) Economic growth should be accompanied by global efforts to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations associated with this growth, containing them at a level that prevents dangerous human interference with the global climate" (Bush, 2002a, p. 19) . Distant from a logic of cooperation, the document portrays developing countries, naming China and India (p. 20) as the major emitters, and does not propose an exceptional measure to securitize the climate at the international level.

The 2006 National Security Strategy Report follows the same line as the previous one, stressing the U.S. economy and the threat of terrorism. The NSS brings attention to floods,

hurricanes, earthquakes, and tsunamis as non-traditional national security themes that may become threats to national security: "environmental destruction, whether caused by human behavior or cataclysmic mega disasters such as flood, hurricanes, earthquakes or tsunamis" (Bush, 2006, p. 47). Nevertheless, neither the catastrophes caused "by human behavior" nor the behavior that leads to the catastrophes are defined. The document highlights the responses to hurricanes Katrina and Rita, which required a comprehensive strategy of communication and coordination with the federal government. Environmental concerns in the 2006 NSS were not described as environmental security but rather as general emergencies and were not associated with anthropogenic factors.

In the 2006 NSS, the lines between traditional and environmental security remain blurred. The military was seen as capable of providing logistical support in natural disasters: "Environmental destruction, whether caused by human behavior or cataclysmic mega-disasters such as floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, or tsunamis. Problems of this scope may overwhelm the capacity of local authorities to respond, and may even overtax national militaries, requiring a larger international response".

Furthermore, the 2006 NSS also addresses energy security and independence, focusing on searching for clean and sustainable energy sources. The War in Iraq had raised awareness about dependence on oil imports and the regimes that the U.S. was financing with its imports. This concern with energy dependency had resulted in the 2005 Energy Policy Act, which approved tax cuts as incentives for individuals and companies to consume energy-efficient equipment. The 2006 State of the Union address also presented this concern: "Keeping America competitive requires affordable energy. And here we have a serious problem: America is addicted to oil, which is often imported from unstable parts of the world. The best way to break this addiction is through technology" (Bush, 2006).

Other Bush Administration speeches also illustrate the dissociation between climate change and security. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in August 2005, President Bush linked the destruction in New Orleans with the narrative of the war on terror or weapons of mass destruction, not climate change, confirming that environmental disasters were not cast in the climate security narrative: "We must have plans to evacuate large numbers of people in an emergency and to provide food, water, and security as needed. In a time of terror threats and weapons of mass destruction, the danger is greater than a fault line or flood plain. Emergency planning is a national security priority" (Bush, 2005). Since the catastrophic event was not described as a hypothetical consequence of climate change, no association with any anthropogenic factor is established. For the Copenhagen School, only human actions that affect natural systems are considered within the range of environmental security.

Furthermore, President Bush, in a speech "President Bush Discusses Global Climate Change," released on June 11, 2001, minimizes the impacts of climate change to justify withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol: "We do not know how fast change will occur, or even how some of our actions could impact it. And, finally, no one can say with any certainty what constitutes a dangerous level of warming, and therefore what level must be avoided" (Bush, 2001). This rhetoric is the opposite of a sense of urgency that should characterize a securitization move, according to Buzan et al. (1998, pp. 23-25).

If speeches often do not mention climate change, political actions demonstrate more concrete steps to desecuritize the issue. From the beginning, there was a departure from the previous Administration's climate policies, which included eliminating the office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Environmental Security (Funke, 2011, p. 74). Once in office, President Bush began to publicly criticize the Kyoto Protocol, as he had already done during the

election campaign, questioning the exclusion of developing economies such as India and China and the impact of international competition for the United States. Even in the face of repeated criticism from countries that had already adhered to the climate agreement, President Bush kept this position against climate change policies.

In March 2001, the Bush Administration declared that it would not implement the Kyoto Protocol. President Bush stated in a letter to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig, and Roberts dated March 6, 2001: "As you know I oppose the Kyoto Protocol because it exempts 80 percent of the world, including major population centers such as China and India, from compliance, and would cause serious harm to the U.S. economy. The Kyoto Protocol is an unfair and ineffective means of addressing global climate change concerns" (Bush, 2001a). The refusal to accept climate change as a serious threat to the entire planet is not conducive to macrosecuritization attempts. Consequently, the Bush discourse on climate change does not break with the antagonism and the zero-sum game associated with traditional security. The rhetoric of cooperation with emerging economies, such as China and India, does not develop in the speech.¹⁰

In the last year of his second mandate, in a speech on June 18, 2008, at the Rose Garden, "Remarks on America's Energy Predicament," President Bush announced the expansion of the U.S. shale, oil and gas production, and new areas for exploration and exploitation that included environmentally protected areas of the territory. All these policies contribute to GHG emissions and could have multiple environmental impacts. Finally, as part of the so-called "midnight regulations," a series of deregulatory measures with severe environmental impacts were passed (Floyd, 2010, p. 166).

The Bush Administration adopted some measures favorable to reducing carbon emissions. For example, in 2005, the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) was announced at an ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) summit. This initiative of the Bush Administration was joined by Australia, South Korea, the People's Republic of China, Japan, and India, and, in 2007, Canada. The Partnership called on governments and the private sector of member countries to accelerate the use of clean energy technologies and to review their goals for energy, clean development and change climate (Floyd, 2010, p. 160). Moreover, the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) in 2007 included incentives for biofuels, the implementation of more efficient energy use and efficiency standards for light motor vehicles (Floyd, 2010, p. 159). However, these initiatives have been criticized for not establishing goals for GHG emissions reduction.

The deficit of attention to environmental security or other soft issues at the beginning of the Bush Administration can be to a certain degree explained by the September 11 events, followed by the fight against terrorism and the Second Gulf War. In a situation of military confrontation, all attention, efforts, and funding tend to concentrate on the conventional security apparatus. Furthermore, the main arguments for expanding the U.S. energy autonomy were related to September 11. For Floyd (2010, p. 127), Bush's foreign policy was indistinct from the fight against terrorism, and environmental security was seen as opposed to the national defense or economy. Thus, in parallel with actions against climate regulation, the Bush Administration boosted energy policy to explore and consume fossil fuels. The Bush Administration submitted to Congress an energy plan, which provided incentives for fossil fuels and nuclear energy. However, opposition from the Democrats and various environmental organizations to the projects, which included

authorization for oil drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge led to significant changes in the final text.

During the Bush Administration, as a result of the congressional deadlock concerning climate change, several U.S. states started playing a leading role in environmental and climate policies. For example, in 2002, California passed a climate legislation, demanding from the automobile industry the production of more efficient vehicles with lower emissions. Another example is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, an effort initiated by the Northeast States in 2008. The initiative aims at creating a carbon emissions market and a fund to finance mitigation programs (Rabe, 2009).

The Bush Administration also reflected a tendency in the Republican party to highlight military or economic security to the detriment of environmental security, often viewing an antagonism between the two. According to Funke (2011), "with the Administration of George W Bush, the concept of environmental security seemed to disappear from view. The Administration's ideology, and events during Bush's first term, diverted attention back toward military might and generally ignored environmental considerations compared to immediate military advantage" (Funke, 2011, p. 74). The construction of the Bush Administration discourse highlighting economic security over environmental security is recurrent and reveals that the speech targets conservative audiences. This speech is a general trend among conservatives, often very pro-business, seeing environmentalism as a potential threat by stimulating barriers for investments and trade (Dunlap et al., 2001; Hochschild, 2018).

According to the Copenhagen School, a "desecuritizing move" implies that an actor disassociates a referent object from an existential threat. Unlike the securitizing move, a desecuritizing move can be silent and lead to the end of security practice (Floyd, 2008, p. 9). There

was a tendency to deemphasize and depoliticize the climate as a security issue during both Bush Administrations. Though the Bush Administration accepted the anthropogenic influence on climate change¹¹, a broad security complex, such as the proposed Kyoto Protocol, was considered unnecessary and burdensome for the U.S. economy. Instead, the Administration often argued that the issue could be dealt with more limited measures, such as environmentally friendly technologies and renewable energy, without clear emission reduction goals. These measures, however, could not be seen as "exceptional measures" in climate security since they related to programs that primarily target energy independence and security, with eventual beneficial results in terms of emission reduction.

6.3 The Barack Obama Administration (2009-2017)

Despite the consequences of the 2008 international economic crisis and domestic opposition, progress in environmental and climate security can be noticed in top-level planning documents during the Obama Administration. President Obama Administration published two NSSs (2010 and 2015). The 2010 NSS mentions "environment" 23 times and climate change also 23 times. The 2015 NSS mentions the environment nine times and climate change fourteen times. The speeches confirm the tendency of the environmental security agenda becoming assimilated by the climate agenda; other potential candidates for environmental securitization, such as biodiversity, forests, water, etc., almost faded away from speeches. Unlike the National Security Strategies published during the Clinton Administration, the term "environmental security" is no

¹¹ According to Floyd (2010, p. 156), President Bush formally acknowledged the human contribution to global warming by 2007. This author contends that climate change had become more widely accepted by the U.S. electorate and could not be ignored considering the elections in the next year. However, Bush's opinion shift on climate change did not imply substantial policy changes. Many initiatives in the name of climate change had little to do with curbing GHG emissions (p. 160).

longer present in the two Obama Administration NSSs, though "moves" to securitize the environment, notably the climate, are structured in the discourses.

In both National Security Strategies, several clues inform the securitizing character of the discourse on the criteria set by the Copenhagen School. The narrative structure often points to a specific securitization: the designation of an existential threat to a referent object requiring exceptional measures. For instance, the 2010 NSS designates climate change as a serious threat: "The danger from climate change is real, urgent, and severe. The change wrought by a warming planet will lead to new conflicts over refugees and resources; new suffering from drought and famine; catastrophic natural disasters; and the degradation of land across the globe" (Obama, 2010a, p. 47). Climate change ultimately threatens the whole globe as the referent object.

In the 2010 NSS, the proposed exceptional measures include investments in renewable energies and clean technologies, optimizing energy efficiency, assistance for developing countries for adaptation, and technology transfer. President Obama's speech breaks with the main elements of continuity regarding security concerning more traditional military threats. The geographical amplitude and the long-term consequences of climate threat eschew antagonisms and rivalries and favor cooperation and collective responsibility: "Our goal is an effective, international effort in which all major economies commit to ambitious national action to reduce their emissions, nations meet their commitments in a transparent manner, and the necessary financing is mobilized so that developing countries can adapt to climate change, mitigate its impacts, conserve forests, and invest in clean energy technologies. We will pursue this global cooperation through multiple avenues, with a focus on advancing cooperation that works" (Obama, 2010a, p. 47).

Furthermore, the Obama Administration perceives climate change as a pressing global threat that demands the establishment of a broad security complex because its views on the issue

reflect the dominant position of scientific epistemic communities: "The United States will therefore confront climate change based upon clear guidance from the science, and in cooperation with all nations—for there is no effective solution to climate change that does not depend upon all nations taking responsibility for their own actions and for the planet we will leave behind" (Obama, 2010a, p. 47).

In the 2015 NSS, the word "climate" or "climate change" is mentioned nineteen times. Climate change is designated as a major threat to the referent objects (the United States, the global economy): "Climate change is an urgent and growing threat to our national security, contributing to increased natural disasters, refugee flows, and conflicts over basic resources like food and water. The present-day effects of climate change are being felt from the Arctic to the Midwest. Increased sea levels and storm surges threaten coastal regions, infrastructure, and property. In turn, the global economy suffers, compounding the growing costs of preparing and restoring infrastructure" (Obama, 2015a).

The 2015 NSS also highlights the exceptional measures that the Obama Administration proposed to address the issue of climate change. For instance, the "Climate Action Plan" envisages reducing emissions between 26-28% by 2025 compared to 2005 levels (Obama, 2015a, p. 12). Internationally, the document announces that the United States and China had reached an agreement to reduce their emissions and pledge to contribute to the "Climate Fund" (Obama, 2015a, p. 12). The idea that a global threat demands worldwide cooperation is implicit in the speech.

On various occasions, President Barack Obama also associates "climate security" with energy security and the dependence of the United States on foreign oil. President Obama's first State of the Union Address in 2010 addressed energy consumption and efficiency. Nevertheless,

differently from his predecessor, President Obama links oil and gas consumption directly to climate change (instead of denying the association): "to create more of these clean energy jobs, we need more production, more efficiency, more incentives. And that means building a new generation of safe, clean nuclear power plants in this country. It means making tough decisions about opening new offshore areas for oil and gas development. It means continued investment in advanced biofuels and clean coal technologies. And, yes, it means passing a comprehensive energy and climate bill with incentives that will finally make clean energy the profitable kind of energy in America" (Obama, 2010).

Like Bill Clinton's discourse, the association of future generations with climate change, which President Obama often makes in his speeches, is not trivial and can be perceived as a rhetorical strategy to stress the need for exceptional measures: "And no challenge—no challenge—poses a greater threat to future generations than climate change" (Obama, 2015a). The allusion of future generations was also present in the 2013 State of the Union Address: "But if Congress won't act soon to protect future generations, I will. I will direct my Cabinet to come up with executive actions we can take, now and in the future, to reduce pollution, prepare our communities for the consequences of climate change, and speed the transition to more sustainable sources of energy" (Obama, 2013).

The Obama Administration's attempts to securitize the climate are also evident in policy efforts. President Obama's choices for his staff on energy and climate issues were a break from the former Administration and were praised by experts and environmentalists. For instance, John Holdren, Professor of Environmental Sciences at Harvard, was appointed as Director of President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology. Stephen Chu, Noble Prize winner, and Physicist at Berkeley was chosen as Energy Secretary. Todd Stern was chosen as the climate negotiator.

Lisa Jackson, former head of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, was appointed to the EPA. President Obama created at the White House the Office of Energy and Climate Change Policy, headed by Carol Browner, former administrator of the EPA during the Clinton presidency. The new decision-making configuration became much more favorable to environmental associations and the non-governmental world as a whole (Bomberg & Super, 2009, p. 427).

Berg (2017) classifies the Obama Administration policies in the environmental area as “stealth environmentalism”. The author suggests that the Obama Administration did not move away from its climate agenda but, notably in the first term, avoided direct conflicts with the Congress. Due to the gridlock in Congress, President Obama developed alternative strategies to foster climate change initiatives, which did not require congressional approval, for example, through aid packages launched in response to the 2008 crisis. The budget expansion for climate programs is another example of the Obama Administration's priority to climate change. In 2010, this increase corresponded to more than three times the value of the first year of the Obama government (Kincaid & Roberts, 2013).

In 2009, in the first year of his government, President Barack Obama signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. This law of Keynesian inspiration envisaged significant domestic investments in infrastructure, seeking to recreate the job market losses due to the economic crisis while responding to climate and energy challenges. Moreover, President Obama supported the American Clean Energy and Security Act (Waxman-Markey Bill), which aimed to establish a carbon cap-and-trade market system similar to the European system, support the development of renewable energies and demonstrate the United States' commitment to the fight against climate change. The US House of Representatives approved the bill, appearing to usher in a new era in US

climate policy. This legislation set, for the first time, concrete greenhouse gas emission targets for the United States and signaled Washington's return to climate talks. The American Clean Energy and Security Act passed the House of Representatives in 2009 but was never voted in the Senate (Bodansky, 2016).

In 2013, the Obama Administration presented the Presidential Climate Action Plan, which had three main axes. The first axis aimed to reduce carbon pollution through federal regulations based on the Clean Air Act of 1970, eliminating the most polluting sources, such as the oldest thermal power stations and modernizing power generation. The 2015 EPA's Clean Power Plan intended to implement this part of the Presidents' Climate Action Plan. Furthermore, the Plan favored renewable energy, the electrification of vehicles, and increasing energy efficiency at homes. In the second axis, the Obama Administration committed to helping the states to strengthen infrastructure as part of adaptation measures to climate change. Moreover, federal agencies were encouraged to invest in infrastructure resilient to climate change. The third axis was to establish international leadership in negotiations, sending a signal of the Administration's engagement on the international political scene.¹²

In February 2015, President Obama vetoed the bill to construct the Keystone Pipeline XL (KXL) between Alberta, Canada, and Nebraska in the United States, which President George W. Bush had previously approved. Likewise, at the end of the last year of his government, President Obama vetoed the Dakota Access Pipeline, a pipeline linking North Dakota and Illinois.

Considering the difficulty to approve climate legislation in Congress, in addition to direct presidential action, as in the case of pipelines, the creation of procedures and quality standards by

¹² White House (2013). Fact Sheet: President Obama's Climate Action Plan. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/25/fact-sheet-president-obama-s-climate-action-plan>

federal agencies also proved to be a viable alternative. In 2015, the Obama Administration developed the Clean Power Plan, which established norms regulating carbon dioxide emission standards. EPA enacted these norms; therefore, congressional approval was not necessary. The White House used a juridical precedent of a court case to classify carbon dioxide as a pollutant and regulate it based on the Clean Air Act. However, the Clean Power Plan was suspended after lawsuits questioning its legality.

Moreover, the Obama Administration promoted the adaptation of the U.S. federal government to climate change. A series of Executive Orders (E.O.s) required several agencies to acknowledge climate change in their actions and policies, leading them to integrate climate change into their mission objectives. E.O.s do not require congressional approval and could spotlight key concepts around climate change. They called upon a reflection by the Federal Agencies on their actions to mitigate impacts on the environment and foster measures for the adaptation to climate change.

In 2009, President Obama signed Executive Order 13514: "Federal leadership in environmental, energy and economic performance." This E.O. specifies that the federal government must set an example in terms of environmental protection, energetic efficiency, reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, construction of sustainable buildings. Each year, the agencies were required to publish a Sustainability Performance Plan. This plan specifies the targeted goals, the actions implemented to achieve them, and the results achieved during the year. The E.O. 13514 was expanded in 2015 by the E.O. 13693, "Planning for federal sustainability in the next decade."

Following Executive Order 13514, President Obama signed a new Executive Order 13653 in 2013, "Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change," which aimed to prepare

the country for future impacts caused by climate change and implement adapted risk management strategies. This Executive Order created an Interagency Climate Change Adaptation Task Force, responsible for developing guidelines for climate adaptation and the "climate data" initiative, aiming to collect and make climate data available to a broad public.

In the international domain, the renewed United States leadership positively affected the negotiations. The Copenhagen and the Cancun agreements are a direct result of the involvement of the U.S. Administration (Bodansky, 2016). Despite the prior refusal of the United States Senate to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the Obama Administration was active in international discussions to reach a new agreement. The United States' participation in negotiations was essential for developing a compromise in the Copenhagen Summit in 2009. In Copenhagen, President Obama had a closed-door meeting with representatives from emerging economies, South Africa, Brazil, China, and India. This meeting, parallel to COP-15, resulted in a framework of the Copenhagen Accord.

The Copenhagen Agreement requires that the increase of global temperature stay below 2°C. However, the document did not establish binding strategies, mechanisms, targets, or deadlines for its execution. The Obama Administration proposed emission reduction goals (17% below 2005 levels by 2020, 42% by 2030, and 83% by 2050) less ambitious than those the Kyoto initially proposed for the United States. The reduction goals established in Copenhagen were not adopted in the Senate for lack of a majority.

COP-17, in Durban, 2011, created an ad hoc working group, which started negotiations that led to the Paris Agreement. Emerging and developing countries agreed to negotiate a new instrument that would impose obligations on all, fulfilling a requirement by the U.S. Senate for U.S. participation in the negotiations. Considering the lack of approval of the Copenhagen

Agreement, President Obama became more aware of the weight of the opposition in the Senate for ratification of any international climate agreement. This reality led to innovation in the Paris Agreement on Climate Change negotiations, agreed in 2015 at COP-21.

The Paris Agreement was the first international agreement that established a universal target to limit global warming but on voluntary basis. The Agreement determines that the global temperature increase should not exceed 2°C, but the signatory countries will endeavor that such a variation does not exceed 1.5°C. The main argument for the nonbinding characteristic of the Paris Agreement was presented by the United States delegation, considering the unlikelihood of approving binding instruments in the U.S. Congress. Unlike the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement was a political agreement, which adopted a non-prescriptive "bottom-up" approach, with less differentiated national commitments. This innovation in treaty architecture was essential for the Paris Agreement's success (Dryzek & Pickering, 2019, p. 2019).

The analysis of the documents available reveals the centrality of climate change in the Obama Administration's discursive construction and policies, despite the unfavorable domestic and international scenarios. In the speeches, the character of the designated threat, the referent objects targeted, and the nature of the proposed exceptional measures lead to believe that the Obama Administration represented a rhetorical shift in climate securitization. A call for cooperation and solidarity tends to confirm that President Obama's speech breaks with the main elements of continuity in terms of traditional security.

Nevertheless, the effectiveness of President Obama's speech to securitize the climate was limited by domestic partisanship and the global crisis. The most evident success of the Obama Administration in the securitization of climate, the Paris Agreement, was possible because it circumvented opposition in the Senate. This fact indicates a significant division in domestic

audiences concerning extraordinary measures to deal with the issue, which later led to President Trump's denunciation of the Agreement.

President Obama's discourse and climate policies can be considered essential steps in climate securitization and may have coincided with a window of opportunity, which did not remain open. The President's attempt was not convincing enough (for the audience in the U.S. Congress) and can be seen as a securitizing move. Normative changes in security are not trivial and demand time. As discussed later, President Joe Biden will reestablish many aspects of President Obama's discourse and policies on climate security.

6.4 The Donald Trump Administration (2016 – 2020)

During the Trump Administration, the depoliticization of climate security contrasts with the securitizing emphasis given by the previous Obama Administration and the progress of securitization efforts globally. The Trump Administration published one National Security Strategy in 2017. In the 2017 National Security Strategy Report, "climate change" is not mentioned. Climate policies are tied to energy policies: "Climate policies will continue to shape the global energy system" (Trump, 2017a, p. 22). On the other hand, "immigration" is a new issue compared with former Administrations and appears fourteen times and "immigrants" three times.

Instead of highlighting environmental security, the 2017 NSS establishes an antagonism between economy and environmental politics: "Excessive environmental and infrastructure regulations impeded American energy trade and the development of new infrastructure projects" (Trump, 2017a, p. 18). The idea of excessive regulation due to environmental concerns is recurrent: "The United States will promote clean and safe development of our energy resources, while limiting regulatory burdens that encumber energy production and constrain economic growth" (Trump, p. 19).

The recurrent message in the 2017 NSS is "a strong America." The document highlights the need to protect the country, foster its economic prosperity and global influence, and preserve peace. The document, in the Preamble, summarizes the threats to the United States, as seen by the Trump Administration, which includes biothreats, weapons of mass destruction, pandemics, terrorism, and military and geostrategic threats represented by some countries such as Iran and North Korea (Trump, 2017a, pp. 1-2). In the Introduction, besides the threats specified in the Preamble, China and Russia are defined as primary rivals to the county.

The NSS does not associate "natural disasters" with climate change. Moreover, often in the text, there is an association between natural disasters and terrorist attacks: "... in the event of natural disaster or attack on our homeland" (Trump, 2017a, p. 7). As in documents elaborated by the George W. Bush Administration, the lines between traditional and environmental security remain blurred. In the chapter "Protect the American People, the Homeland, and the American Way of Life," there is no mention of eventual adaptation or mitigation policies in case of more recurrent natural disasters due to climate change.

Unlike preceding NSS reports, including those elaborated by Republican Administrations, the 2017 NSS emphasizes economic threats represented by the immigrants. The document stresses that immigration and lack of border control as possible threats: "strengthening control over our borders and the immigration system is central to national security" (Trump, 2017a, p. 8). The 2017 NSS stresses immigration as a threat to referent objects in the social and economic sectors (American jobs and way of life): "Illegal immigration, however, burdens the economy, hurts American workers, presents public safety risks, and enriches smugglers and other criminals" (Trump, 2017a, p. 9).¹³

¹³ This securitization move against immigration innovates the rhetoric, as it evades the state-centrism that characterizes the traditional security but preserves its dynamics in terms of antagonism against the 'alien other'.

The Trump Administration produced three State of the Union Addresses in 2018, 2019, 2020. The word "environment" only appears in one paragraph in the 2020 State of the Union Address: "To protect the environment, days ago I announced that the United States will join the One Trillion Trees Initiative, an ambitious effort to bring together government and private sector to plant new trees in America and all around the world." There is no mention of "climate" or "climate change." As in the 2017 National Security Strategy, other themes, such as uncontrolled immigration, were seen as more urgent and menacing than environmental issues. In these speeches, among the exceptional measures to counter the immigration threat, President Trump often tried to convince the U.S. Congress about the importance of constructing the wall on the Southern Border, as in the 2019 State of the Union Address: "walls save lives."

President Trump, in his four-paragraph statement on Earth Day, April 2017, reinforces his commitment to the preservation of the United States' natural resources, not mentioning climate change: "My Administration is committed to keeping our air and water clean, to preserving our forests, lakes, and open spaces, and to protecting endangered species" (Trump, 2017b). He highlights that "economic growth enhances environmental protection" (Trump, 2017b), and, in so doing, suggests that environmental issues could be regulated by the economic system. The discourse that economic growth would lead to environmental protection suggests that regulation in this sector would unnecessarily burden U.S. workers and companies. Contrary to this view, any regulation, including the environmental or climate ones, usually indicates market externalities; the

Thus, the extraordinary measures proposed, as in conventional security, involve coercion in the case, border militarization. The word "immigrant" is mentioned three times in the text in laudatory or neutral terms, "the contributions immigrants have made to our Nation throughout its history" (Trump, 2017a, p. 9). On the other hand, mentioned fourteen times in the document, "immigration" is depicted as a negative phenomenon.

problems will not be solved in that sector by the "market's invisible hand" without governmental intervention.

Mentions to climate change appear significantly less frequently in the Trump discourses than in the previous Administrations. President Trump more often revealed his positions concerning climate change to the press or published them in his social media. On June 1, 2017, on "Remarks Announcing United States Withdrawal from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Paris Agreement," President Trump justifies the withdrawal from the Agreement based on the negative impacts on the U.S. economy: "As President, I can put no other consideration before the well-being of American citizens. The Paris climate accord is simply the latest example of Washington entering into an agreement that disadvantages the United States to the exclusive benefit of other countries, leaving American workers—who I love—and taxpayers to absorb the cost in terms of lost jobs, lower wages, shuttered factories, and vastly diminished economic production". Once again, an antagonism between climate security and the economy is established. Though not formally denying the consequences of the climate threat, the speech suggests that the Paris Agreement represents a more severe threat to the United States and its economy than the climate change itself.

In his social media, President Trump went even further in his attempts to deny the climate threat by affirming, for instance, that "global warming was created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive." He has also criticized the "perennial prophets of doom and their prediction of the apocalypse" and "global warming hoaxsters." The scientific data is essential to developing environmental policies and establishing climate change as a threat; therefore, doubting scientific data on the issue equals to desecuritizing move. Though informal and often not always harmonious with previous messages on the same issue, his social media

content had the power to influence public opinion and revealed climate desecuritization, which more formal sources do not reveal.¹⁴

In terms of implemented policies, the Trump Administration agenda represented a shift from Barack Obama's environmental actions, notably in carbon reduction. In the first month of his Government, President Trump issued Executive Orders to speed up authorization for high-priority projects. The Trump Administration asked TransCanada to request again authorization to build the KXL pipeline and reinitiated the Dakota Access Pipeline's project. Trump promoted increased fossil fuel use and rolled back Obama Administration regulations, such as the Clean Power Plan, which aimed to strengthen consumption standards for motor vehicles (Selby, 2019).

Trump implemented the "America First Energy Plan," aiming at increasing employment in the non-renewable energy industries, mainly coal (Hermwille & Sanderink, 2019). Trump's choices for his staff show close ties with business. The management of environmental agencies, notably the EPA, was handed over to pro-carbon actors such as Scott Pruitt (and later Andrew Wheeler). Through EPA, the Administration suspended regulation on methane emissions (another GHG), approved more flexible air quality standards for motor vehicles and end climate adaptation programs. The Republican Administration was criticized for undermining the institutions' regulatory capacity (Antadze, 2019).

Concerning the withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the Trump Administration had a similar position to George W. Bush's definitive rejection of the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, but both national and international contexts were different. Deese (2017) highlights that in 2015 investments in clean energy accounted for twice the resources invested globally in fossil fuels that

¹⁴ Cheung, H. (2020). What does Trump actually believe on climate change? BBC News, 23; Wong, E. (2016). Trump has called climate change a Chinese hoax. Beijing says it is anything but. New York Times, 11(18), 2016.

year. Several nations adopted alternative sources of energy much faster than predicted. The author also points out that only in the United States, between 2008 and 2016, carbon emissions resulting from power generation fell 11%, while economic growth continued to rise.

The Trump Administration's environmental discourses analysis reveals attempts to desecuritize climate change, favoring other ontological threats such as immigration in speech (Hermwille & Sanderink, 2019; Selby, 2019). The Trump Administration mentions climate change much less frequently than its predecessors in official documents. Consequently, it does not propose "exceptional measures" to the problem. The desecuritization in climate change was more often associated with not mentioning the issue in speeches or not presenting it as an urgent matter. Compared to previous Administrations, discourses on climate change were more clearly adjusted to a specific domestic audience. While the 2017 National Security Strategy did not mention climate change, the issue could be more present and submitted to a negative politicization in statements and interviews to the press. This negative politicization was more perceptible in his social media.

6.5 The Joe Biden Administration (2021 - present)

In March 2021, the Biden Administration published the "Interim National Security Strategic Guidance.". The word "environment" (with an ecological meaning) is mentioned one time, and "environmental security" also one time. Climate change is mentioned fourteen times in the document. According to the Copenhagen School framework, some elements present in Interim National Security Strategic Guidance indicate its securitizing character. First, the seriousness of climate change as a threat to the referent objects (the United States and the world): "The climate crisis has been centuries in the making, and even with aggressive action, the United States and the world will experience increasing weather extremes and environmental stress in the years ahead." (Biden, 2021a, p. 11)

The call to action and an easily identifiable dynamics of urgency are also perceptible: "But, if we fail to act now, we will miss our last opportunity to avert the most dire consequences of climate change for the health of our people, our economy, our security, and our planet" (Biden, 2021a, p. 12). The nature of the exceptional measures mentioned by President Biden to confront the climate threat reflects the referent object in the discourse (ultimately the planet). Their implementation requires innovation ("clean energy transformation") and international cooperation: "in the coming months, we will convene the world's major economies and seek to raise the ambition of all nations, including our own, to rapidly lower global carbon emission." (p. 12).

Governments are thus called upon to work together to overcome the climate threat. These proposed measures in climate securitization deviate considerably from the traditional securitization standards. The military aspects remain non-existent in the discourse on climate securitization. Furthermore, President Biden argues that this global effort implies assisting more vulnerable countries: "enhancing resilience to climate change at home and in vulnerable countries" (Biden, 2021, p. 12). As described by the securitizing actor, the consequences of climate change are vast in terms of geographic range and with a long-term effect; thus, the securitizing efforts should transcend national rivalries and call upon cooperation and collective responsibility.

In climate change, the document transcends the rivalry with China and proposes active U.S. engagement with that country to meet this challenge. This perspective harmonizes with the Copenhagen School view that global ontological threats such as climate change can foster a sense of shared identity and, in so doing, a chance for a broad security complex, which should be rooted in international cooperation rather than rivalries. This perspective would transcend the antagonistic logic associated with traditional security in foreign affairs (Trombetta, 2008). Unlike climate change, when it comes to other threats, the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance

establishes a security narrative in harmony with a more conventional view of security, indicating that China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are testing U.S. strength in various ways.

President Biden links "climate" with "security" in other discourses. For instance, on January 27, 2021, in his remarks before signing executive actions on tackling climate, President Biden stated, "I'm signing today also makes it official that climate change will be at the center of our national security and foreign policy" (Biden, 2021b). In a speech on January 27, 2001, President Biden described climate change as an "existential threat." The designated referent object "the planet" shows universalism. Other more particular referent objects were mentioned, such as military installations.

President Biden proposes a series of exceptional measures for mitigation and adaptation beyond designating the climate threat. In terms of mitigation, he offers using the federal government's purchasing power to buy clean, invest in clean energy sources and stop federal subsidies to fossil fuel projects. He also suggests adaptation initiatives to climate change, such as modernizing water systems, construction, transportation, and energy infrastructure to endure the consequences of extreme climate. He describes a win-win relation between climate securitization, the economy, jobs, and technological development: "dealing with this existential threat to the planet and increasing our economic growth and prosperity are one in the same" (Biden, 2021b).

President Biden has been evident in his policies to securitize climate change, manifesting the United States' objective to become the world leader in climate securitization. In the Biden Administration, climate transition is integrated transversally into all economic decisions. The Biden Administration created the Office of Domestic Climate Policy that former EPA Director Gina McCarthy lead as the National Climate Advisor and the chair of the National Climate Task

Force. The National Climate Task Force aims to mobilize all agencies at the Federal level to include so that they may include measures against climate change in their plans.

Biden's first actions on the climate have been to revoke a good number of Trump's Executive Orders, including re-entry into the Paris Agreement, as well as the blocking of the construction of the Keystone XL pipeline, the prohibition of drilling in the National Wildlife Refuge in the Arctic; likewise, federal agencies were ordered to purchase only pollution-free electricity and zero-emission vehicles, and the leasing of public lands for offshore oil and gas exploitation was halted.

The Administration presented in 2021 Build Back Better (BBB) budget plan, subdivided into American Rescue Plan, the American Jobs Plan and American Families plan. The American Jobs plan was largely incorporated in the "Infrastructure Bill" (Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act) was signed into law on November 15th 2021. The 1,2 trillion-dollar bipartisan bill intends to stimulate job creation, modernize roads and bridges and other infrastructure, adapt them to climate change, expand broadband, and give an advantage to the country in world economic competition.

Concerning climate change, the Build Back Better includes mitigation efforts such as investments in clean energies, strengthening electric mobility, modernization of buildings, and improvement of the electricity network and infrastructure to reduce emissions and the impact on the climate. Nevertheless, the suppression of the Clean Electricity Performance Program (CEPP) in the plan has reduced its ambition. Still, it keeps a significant budget dedicated to the fight against climate change (US\$ 555 billion) that, if approved, will be the most ambitious "green" investment project ever adopted by the United States.¹⁵

¹⁵ - Wingrove & Wasson (2021). Biden Goes All-In to End Deadlock With \$1.75 Trillion Blueprint. Bloomberg.Com, N.PAG.

- Goodkind (2021). What's in—and what's out—of Biden's new \$1.75 trillion Build Back Better reconciliation plan. Fortune.Com, N.PAG.

While climate change is a high priority in President Joe Biden's Administration, the small Democratic majority in Congress may limit climate ambitions. Thus, as in previous Democratic Administrations, regulatory action may have an essential role in climate action. Michael Regan, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), has declared his intention to formulate an aggressive plan regardless of the outcomes in Congress. In particular, the measures should target methane emissions from oil and gas operations. However, this regulatory path remains fragile since an Executive Order can easily be overturned by the next Administration, which has happened before.

The Administration has also been very active in the climate securitization efforts in foreign policy. In April 2021, President Joe Biden, in his speech at The Summit of Leaders on Climate, highlighted the U.S. return to the fight against climate change. Joe Biden has pledged to decrease greenhouse gas emissions by the United States from 50% to 52% by 2030 compared to 2005, as a part of the country's Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), a higher commitment than President Obama's (Lepesant, 2021). Furthermore, the country intends to reach carbon neutrality by 2050. He urged the rest of the world to follow America's lead on behalf of a "moral and economic imperative," explaining that the world must "take action" (Biden, 2021c).

In the 2021 Glasgow Climate Change Conference, COP-26, President Biden sought to highlight the United States' leadership in the international climate negotiations. In his national opening speech on November 1, President Biden indicated that COP26 should launch a "decade of action" for climate change, mentioning an "economic" and "moral" imperative. The United States is not only "back to the table" but wants to lead this endeavor (Biden, 2021c). President Biden reiterated his commitment to halve the United States' greenhouse gas emissions by 2030

- Cook (2021). Biden's Trying to Sell His Economic Plan. Americans Don't Know What's in It. Bloomberg.Com,

compared to 2005 levels. He announced that the United States will contribute for the first time to the U.N. Adaptation Fund. At COP-26, the United States took part in important actions, notably in two global alliances, to end deforestation by 2030 and reduce global methane emissions by 30 % between 2020 and 2030. Moreover, the United States and China announced a joint declaration pledging to work on mitigation, adaptation, and to give financial support to developing countries.

The Biden Administration follows a similar path as its Democratic predecessors, promoting climate change into the security domain, conveying a message of urgency and proposing exceptional measures. Nevertheless, this emphasis on climate securitization seems much more robust in President Biden's speech and initiatives than in former Administrations. Climate change in the Biden Administration is present in a variety of policy sectors, from social policies to economic development. The Biden's Administration intention to assume a leadership position in the international climate talks can be perceived in initiatives like the Leaders' Summit, outside the calendar of negotiations established by the United Nations.

The speech analysis demonstrated that, on several occasions, President Biden's discourses presented all the elements in the narrative structure conducive to climate securitization according to the criteria set by the Copenhagen School. Compared with the former Democratic Administration, there was a clear evolution in climate discourses. Climate change is given much more prominence in discourses as the major environmental threat, if not the only one. The referent objects in climate securitization tend to be universal, and climate change is seen not only as a threat multiplier but a threat in itself. The amplitude of climate threats leads to a very developed speech on global cooperation breaking with the antagonistic logic usually associated with traditional security, calling for international cooperation, including economic and geopolitical rivals such as China. Some of the exceptional measures proposed by the Biden Administration are in the early

stages, and many are under examination in the U.S. Congress. Some initiatives, such as the infrastructure bill, were able to receive bipartisan support, but, at this time, it is too early to know the level of acceptance that the securitizing discourse on climate change will meet in Congress.

7 CONCLUSION

The research question that motivated this project was formulated as follows: "How has climate security evolved in high-level United States political speeches in the post-Cold War?" Discourses of post-Cold War U.S. Administrations were analyzed through the Copenhagen School's securitization framework. Additionally, a review of each Administration's policies added more factual elements besides the interpretive research, highlighting the speeches' social, political, and economic contexts.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the choice of the post-Cold War period for the analysis was justified by the growing importance of climate change first as a political and later as a security issue in this period. The evolution of climate security in the United States occurs in a historical and international context that favored the politicization of environmental issues and the expansion of the security agenda. The end of the Cold War fostered a perspective on security not exclusively focused on state-centrism and military power and, in so doing, allowed the emergence of "soft issues" in the security field.

Furthermore, scientific data was essential to bring awareness concerning the risks of climate change. The Second World War and the Cold War fostered the development of technological innovation and the study of the physical environment, which have contributed to the development of climatology. Most of the technology necessary to prove climate change, satellites, radioactive tracing, digital computers, were developed and directly funded by the military sectors in the Cold War context. As the climate threats became more palpable, the politicization around climate change reached a new level as a security issue.

In the post-Cold War, foreign affairs and global crises have influenced the evolution of U.S. political speeches and policies. During the George W. Bush Administration, the 9/11 attacks,

the Second Gulf War, and the War on Terror favored a more traditional view of security to the detriment of the incorporation of environmental security and other “soft issues” in the security agenda at least in the first term. The 2008 economic crisis, during the Obama Presidency, was not, in principle, a factor that favored climate securitization, as financial crises usually do not. The allocation of resources for environmental securitization often becomes more complex during crises, when economic policies need to stimulate recovery. Nevertheless, despite this unfavorable global scenario and domestic opposition, the Obama Administration advanced climate themes, particularly the Clean Power Plan, the Paris Agreement signature, and a series of Executive Orders.

Global factors can explain the development of climate security in U.S. political speeches and policies in the post-Cold War. However, these factors cannot explain the almost pendular variation in policies and speeches concerning climate regulation. As discussed in Chapter 3, ideological and partisan divide in the United States became a particular feature of the political debate concerning environmental issues, notably climate change, which should not be ignored when policies and speeches are analyzed. The review of climate change policies by the U.S. Administrations in the historical period shows that the political alternation between Democrats and Republicans as a relevant factor explaining changes in discourses concerning climate security.

As illustrated by Table I, which summarizes the main actions on climate change during the period covered by this research, policy decisions concerning climate change have been characterized by changes of courses and reversals. The Bush Administration revoked President Clinton's Climate Change Action Plan and did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol. President Trump followed the same trend: he reversed President Obama's Clean Power Plan in the first month in office and later determined the United States' withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. In turn, the

Biden Administration revoked many of President Trump's Executive Orders in the environmental area and reentered the Paris Agreement on the first day in office.

These parallel situations should not be interpreted as mere repetitions; each Administration developed specific strategies in distinct historical moments. The comparison between Democratic and Republican Administrations reveals more significant differences in speech and policies concerning climate change. Nevertheless, evolutions in discourses and policies are also noticeable within each political camp.

TABLE I – CLIMATE INITIATIVES SUMMARY

President	Major climate change initiatives
Bill Clinton	Annual budget for environmental security Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Environmental Security Climate Change Action Plan Kyoto Protocol
George W. Bush	Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) Asia–Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP)
Barack Obama	White House Office of Energy and Climate Change Policy American Clean Energy and Security Act Clean Power Plan E.O. 13514: "Federal leadership in environmental, energy and economic performance." E. O. 13653: "Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change," E.O. 13693: "Planning for federal sustainability in the next decade". The Copenhagen Agreement The Paris Agreement
Donald Trump	Specific initiatives were not identified
Joe Biden	Suspension of Keystone XL pipeline permit and reversal of Trump climate policies. Suspension of drilling in Public Lands Suspension of drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge Office of Domestic Climate Policy National Climate Task Force Build Back Better plan Infrastructure bill Organization of the Leaders Climate Summit Return to the Paris Agreement

Within the Democratic camp, the Clinton Administration had a central role in giving legitimacy to environmental security. Climate change still had not reached the same prominence as today and was dealt together with other environmental issues. A broader view of environmental security is reflected by the creation of the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Environmental Security. In terms of domestic policies, the most specific action concerning climate change was the "Climate Change Action Plan," which had no tangible results concerning the stabilization of emissions.

Compared to the Clinton Presidency, during the Obama Presidency, climate change impacts were much more evident. Climate change became the only environmental threat presented as an existential threat to humankind and ubiquitous in national or international security speeches. The specific attention given to the issue is demonstrated at the institutional level by the creation of an office in the White House (Office of Energy and Climate Change Policy). President Obama, like President Clinton, framed climate change initiatives with a positive economic view. President Obama proposed specific measures to combat climate change, the American Clean Energy and Security Act, which aimed to create a cap-and-trade system to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Considering the difficulty of approving climate legislation in Congress, the Obama Administration built alternative strategies to these policies, especially through Executive Orders or EPA's regulatory measures.

Compared to Clinton and Obama Administrations, mitigation and adaptation measures are presented in much more detail and more ambitious goals by the Biden Administration. President Joe Biden has been clear concerning the centrality of climate change, maybe the most central issue for his Administration. Differently from previous Administrations, climate transition is integrated transversally into virtually all social and economic decisions in President Biden's government. On

his first day in office, President Biden recommitted the United States to the Paris Agreement with bolder goals than former commitments, and he frames these climate goals to boost the economy through job creation.

Within the Republican field, comparing the Trump Administration with the predecessor Republican Administration, George H. Bush, it is possible to draw parallels in anti-climate initiatives, such as the decisions to denounce the Paris Agreement and the refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Nevertheless, it is necessary to highlight different contexts and historical realities. President Trump expanded his energy policy to explore and consume fossil fuels in line with previous Republican Administrations policies. However, in the Bush Administration, the driving arguments for expanding U.S. energy reserves and autonomy were related to the September 11 attacks, which demanded a greater energy autonomy. Moreover, during the Bush Administration, in the early 2000s, doubts still remained about the technical and financial feasibility of energy alternatives for fossil fuels.

During the Trump Administration, there were already significant investments in clean energy in the United States and other countries. The decisions to replace fossil fuels with alternative energy sources could have a market sense and renewable energy market developed far beyond initial forecasts. These technological and economic developments that offered alternatives to the fossil fuel industry were not particularly visible during the George W. Bush Administration but were more consolidated during the Trump Administration. President Trump's position differed from the importance given to renewable energy by counterparts in Europe or countries like China, which invests heavily in the sector. Today, positions that disregard energy transition may also overlook market opportunities that economic sectors in the United States already see (Klass, 2021).

Furthermore, public opinion in the United States had already evolved concerning climate change during the Trump Administration. In 2016, Gallup noticed that 64% of Americans were concerned about global warming: among them, 59% thought global warming was already taking place, and 65% believed that human activities caused global warming. Moreover, among U.S. adults, 41% indicated they believe climate change represents a severe threat to their lifestyle, compared to 37% in 2015. According to the survey, these figures show that "Americans are taking global warming more seriously than at any time in the past eight years" (Saad & Jones, 2016). The Yale Climate Change Communication Program observes that in 2019 69% of Americans believed in climate change (Ballew et al., 2019).

Thus, more extraordinary than President Bush's positions, considering his historical context, President Trump's policies concerning climate change seem to have evolved in a different direction that could have been expected. These contradictions reinforce the argument of the influence of partisanship on speeches and policy decision-making concerning climate change. Moreover, the Trump Administration's decision to withdraw from the Paris agreement in 2019, and the speeches associated with this decision, can also be analyzed through the influence of the partisan factor, mainly because the agreement is not legally binding. From the 195 signatories, the United States was the only one that decided to withdraw, reinforcing the idea of exceptionalism in the climate debate in the country.

Despite policies discontinuities and the difficulties in approving legislation at the Federal level, the literature on evolving climate policy at subnational levels indicates progress starting in the George W. Bush years. An evolution in the fight against climate change has been possible in the United States, particularly by going beyond the federal decision-making framework (Selin & VanDeveer, 2011).

Compared with a review of policy initiatives, the speech analysis demonstrates harmony between speeches and actions concerning climate securitization. As illustrated by Table II, the discourses produced by Democratic Administrations (Bill Clinton, Barack Obama, Joe Biden) overall presented climate change as a security issue, in light of the parameters adopted. On the other hand, the Republican speeches (George Bush and Donald Trump) did not have all the narrative elements that define climate securitization according to the Copenhagen School's criteria. These speeches could often be interpreted as climate desecuritization attempts, according to these same criteria.

TABLE II - CLIMATE SECURITIZATION: NARRATIVE ELEMENTS

President	NSS	Referent Object	Exceptional Measures	Cooperation proposals
Clinton	1994	International stability	Climate Change Action Plan The United States to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000.	Partnership between governments and NGOs. Cooperation between nations and regions.
Clinton	1995	International stability	The United States to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000.	Global Environmental Facility Partnerships between governments and NGOs Cooperation between nations and regions
Clinton	1996	International stability	Climate Change Action Plan	Global Environmental Facility. Joint Implementation to help reduce emissions abroad (part of Climate Change Action Plan)
Clinton	1997	Health of U.S. citizens The United States The World	Reducing the GHG emissions.	The Global Environmental Facility
Clinton	1998	Not identified	The Kyoto Protocol Efficient transportation systems Alternative fuels	The Global Environmental Facility U.S. Initiative on Joint Implementation.
Clinton	1999	U.S. Security and well being	Kyoto Protocol Limit greenhouse gases	Kyoto Protocol

		Health and economic well-being of U.S. citizens		
Clinton	2000	The economy Future generations The U.S. security and well-being	Curb global warming through the Kyoto Protocol Emissions reduction	Through the Kyoto Protocol Global Environmental Facility Bilateral programs for clean energy and forest preservation. Assistance programs
Bush	2002	Not identified	Promote energy efficient technologies	Not identified
Bush	2006	Not identified	Promote nuclear energy and clean coal.	Not identified
Obama	2010	The globe, the planet Global stability	Promote renewable energy New energy sources Clean technologies National actions to reduce emissions and their impact.	International cooperation Assistance to developing countries. Cooperation with China in climate change. Support the resilience of the poorest nations to the effects of climate change.
Obama	2015	The United States The global economy	Climate Action Plan	Climate fund International cooperation Cooperation with China in climate change.
Trump	2017	Not identified	Not identified	Not identified
Biden	2021*	The global economy Global security The Planet	Clean energy transformation	International cooperation The Leaders' Summit Assistance to developing countries Cooperation with China in climate change.

*Interim National Security Strategy Guidance

In discourses, Democratic Administrations overall presented the climate threat in similar terms, associating climate change due to human activity. The referent objects show a substantial degree of universalism; there is often a call for the planet or humanity's survival. The exceptional measures proposed are consistent with the magnitude of a global threat, indicating that a specific allocation of financial and technological resources is essential. The speeches do not establish an antagonism between climate securitization and the economy. Indeed, they highlight the importance



of protecting the economy from the effects of climate change as a secondary referent object and suggest that it is possible to reduce emissions without undermining growth and jobs.


The exceptional measures proposed in Democratic discourses fall into two categories: mitigation and adaptation measures. The mitigation initiatives are reducing GHG emissions, investments in renewable energies, and the development of new technologies. The discourses indicate that these measures should be harmonious with a global and diplomatic strategy under the United Nations umbrella and the principle of shared but differentiated responsibility. Often, the discourses contend that international cooperation is essential for climate securitization, transcending the antagonistic logic associated with traditional security in foreign affairs. Even countries described as U.S. rivals in other sectors, such as China, are often introduced in speeches on climate change as potential partners in the securitizing efforts.

Within the Democratic field, an evolution in a speech concerning climate change can be identified in the period. In Bill Clinton's speeches, it is possible to discern the frequent use of "global warming," a term that tends to be replaced by "climate change" in communications more recently. The replacement of "global warming" by "climate change" happens as scientists and epistemic communities show that the effects of greenhouse gases are broader and more complex than the increase of the Earth's temperatures.

Moreover, environmental security progressively became almost synonymous with climate security in discourses. In President Clinton's discourses, a broader concept of environmental security was still perceptible compared to later Administrations. Climate change was often included on a list of other environmental threats such as industrial pollution, deforestation, loss of biodiversity, ozone depletion (Chart I). In the following Democratic Administrations, climate change became virtually the only environmental issue presented as an existential threat to

humankind (Chart II). Thus, the term "environmental security," which was recurrent in speeches during the Clinton Administration, disappeared in discourses in the following Administrations (Chart III).





For a full securitization, the Copenhagen School does not require that extraordinary measures be adopted but requires that the audience be convinced of their necessity. The gridlocks that remained in the legislature throughout the analyzed period indicate that securitization moves did not convince political opposition in the United States Congress. Considering the U.S Congress as the targeted audience, the review of each Administration's policies does not corroborate the idea that the specific speeches of the three Democratic Administrations represented full securitization.

Thus, the speeches supporting climate securitization were interpreted as "securitizing moves" and not full securitization. This result echoes the analysis of the Copenhagen School, according to which environmental securitization attempts often fail to gather the necessary level of support for their full realization (Buzan et al., 1998: p. 74). The process of securitizing the

climate is a recent phenomenon, most often characterized by securitizing moves and not full securitizations.

In contrast, the speech analysis demonstrated the Republican Administrations' discourses show a tendency to desecuritize climate change. As illustrated in Table II, according to the Copenhagen School criteria, the narrative elements that indicate securitization were not present in Republican speeches when climate change was mentioned. As showed by the review of each Administration's policies, the attempts do desecuritize climate change did not remain rhetorical but affected policy decisions and had concrete impacts. The depoliticization and the deemphasis strategy often mean not mentioning the issue, not associating the phenomenon with anthropogenic causes, or sometimes blurring the lines between traditional and environmental security. Republican discourses tend to manifest a more "pro-business" character and are suspicious of regulations and State intervention. The tendency to desecuritize or deemphasize climate change is more evident in President Trump's speeches compared to President Bush's.

The review of climate policies demonstrates that the desecuritizing moves did not prevail. Climate change gradually becomes a mainstream political issue on both sides of the political spectrum. For the first time, Republicans sent a delegation to COP-26 in November 2021.¹⁶ The politicians' interest in climate change demonstrates that citizens, more and more concerned with the issue, keep their influence on the U.S. political system. A Pew Research Center poll in 2020 found that 65% of Americans believed government action on climate change was too weak (Tyson & Kennedy, 2020).

¹⁶ Joselow (2021). Meet the Republicans going to COP26. The Washington Post.

Furthermore, in the global context, the efforts on climate securitization continued to be a central issue. The exceptional response to President Joe Biden's invitation to The Summit of Leaders on Climate, on April 22 this year, as preparation for COP-26 in Scotland, indicates that climate security has not lost its momentum, quite the contrary. In the Summit, world leaders, among the main responsible for gas emissions besides the United States, such as China and the European Union, and those who have a crucial role in the fight against climate change, such as India, Russia, Brazil, Canada, Australia, presented substantial pledges to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

Thus, it is possible to affirm that climate securitization has evolved in the United States discourses and policies during the post-Cold War period. There is a gradual progression characterized by periods of expansion and regression, mainly due to political and ideological factors. The climate issue has not lost its importance and impetus over time, neither domestically nor internationally. Furthermore, the climate threat has fostered a conceptual renewal of security discourses in the United States regarding securitization. In speeches where it was possible to identify climate securitization structure, the threat is not materialized as a specific enemy. The referent object has a universal character, military solutions are not proposed. The speeches on climate securitization often suggest many alternatives for international cooperation and break with the continuity when compared to traditional military threats.

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