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**Personalized Political Communication
in the era of Media Abundance: A
Comparative Study of Practices in the
United States, United Kingdom and
Nigeria**

Thomas Chukwuma Ijere

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of
the requirement for the award for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the
University of Northumbria at Newcastle

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Arts, Design and Social Sciences

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Abstract

This thesis is a multi-method qualitative comparative study of modern campaign practices in the United States, United Kingdom and Nigeria. Designed to contribute to the gap in knowledge on the technological dimension and features of modern electioneering, the thesis focuses on the 2008 and 2012 Obama campaigns as a technologically innovative exemplar to explore changes and emerging practices in campaigning across three democracies.

Findings indicate that in the two advanced democracies, campaigning has entered a historically new era where data driven practices and new technology now form the ingredients and infrastructure for voter identification, mobilization, persuasion and de-mobilization.

Three key contributions are notable in the thesis. First, the comparative methodological design of the study allowed for a typology that captures the technological state and dimension (s) of modern campaign practices to be developed. This way, the work builds comparative theory and rescues the field from comparative knowledge stagnation on the technological features of modern campaigns.

Second, using empirical evidence from the three case studies, the thesis contributes to theory by reducing and strengthening the explanatory scope of Swanson and Mancini's (1996) Americanization and modernization theses respectively.

Third, the thesis also adds contemporary understanding to the dynamics of contextual factors and conditions that shape innovation and the uptake of technologically innovative approach (es) to campaign in the United States, United Kingdom and Nigeria.

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List of Accompanying Material

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Authors Declaration

I declare that the work contained in this thesis has not been submitted for any other award and that it is all my own work. I also confirm that this work fully acknowledges opinions, ideas and contributions from the work of others.

Any ethical clearance for the research presented in this thesis has been approved. Approval has been sought and granted by the Faculty Ethics Committee/University Ethics Committee on 09/03/2017.

I declare that Word Count of this Thesis is 92, 871 words

Name: Thomas Chukwuma Ijere

Signature:

Date: 28.9.2020

List of Abbreviations

AD	Advertisement
ACSPN	Association of Communication Scholars and Professionals of Nigeria
ADS	Advertisements
AI	Artificial Intelligence
AIT	Africa Independent Television
AMA	Ask me Anything
APC	All Progressives Congress
API	Application Programming Interface
BP	British Petroleum
CA	Cambridge Analytica
CCHQ	Conservative Campaign Headquarters
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CFRUSS	Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COGR	Commonwealth Observer Group Report
CPR	Conservative Party Review
CPRR	Conservative Party Review Report
DCMS	Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport
DFID	Department for International Development
DNC	Democratic National Committee
DPA	Data Protection Act
EIPS	Experiment Informed Programs
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FIPPs	Fair Information Practice Principles

GDPR	General Data Protection Regulation
GMB	General Muhammadu Buhari
GOP	Grand Old Party
GOVT	Get out the Vote
GPS	Global Position System
ICO	Information Commissioner's Office
ICTs	Information Communication Technologies
IRA	Internet Research Agency
KGB	Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti
MYBO	Mybarackobama.com
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
OCEAN	Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Neuroticism
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIG	Office of the Inspector General
ONDI	Office of the Director of National Intelligence
OFA	Organizing for America
PACs	Political Action Committees
PDP	People's Democratic Party
PEBs	Party Election Broadcasts
PR	Public Relations
RDS	Relational Data Base Service
RNC	Republican National Committee
R/O	Research Objectives
SNS	Social Networking Sites

SCL	Strategic Communication Laboratories
SOA	Service Oriented Architecture
SQS	Simple Queue Service
S3	Single Storage Service
TAA	Target Audience Analysis
TAN	Transformation Ambassadors of Nigeria
TV	Television
UK	United Kingdom
UKIP	UK Independence Party
US	United States
VAN	Voter Activation Network

1: Introduction and Background to the Study

This dissertation seeks to investigate the impact of new technology on contemporary practices in political communication. The aim is to comparatively identify and define the technological dimensions of modern campaigns in order to inform an empirical typological mapping of contemporary techniques, registers and practices that complement missing ingredients in Swanson and Mancini's 1996 'modern model of campaigning'. Thus, the historical point of departure and take off point of analysis is Barack Obama's campaign of 2008 and 2012-which the bulk of recent empirical research reference as an exemplar in advancing and usage of data driven and technologically innovative campaign practices.

In the literature on political communication-defined as 'the role of communication in the political process' (Chaffe, 1975:15); the 'interactive process concerning the transmission of information among politicians, the news and the public' (Norris, 2004:1); and the 'forms of communication undertaken by politicians and other political actors for purpose of achieving specific objectives' (McNair, 2011:4) or 'the means and practices whereby the communication of politics takes place' (Negrine, 2008:1), a vast number of analysis suggest that technology is altering techniques in contemporary campaigns with technologically innovative practices found in other sectors now dominating elections in most advanced democracies like the United States (Ewen, 2001; Lees-Marshment, 2004, 2012; Davies, 2013; Newman, 2016).

Campaigns they argue now rely on 'state of the art' technology and recent time technological advancement in designing political marketing, voter identification and persuasion (Johnson, 2017, Newman, 2016) with an emerging new model that is data driven, technology intensive, digitally enabled and personalized (see Earl and Kimport, 2011; Nielsen, 2011; 2012; Issenberg, 2013; Balwin-Philippi, 2015; Kreiss, 2016). Entman and Usher (2018) are of the view that technology or what they call 'new digitally enabled pump-valve's (i.e. 'platforms, analytics, algorithms, ideological media, and rogue actors') now serve as flow channels for contemporary political communication, leading to the 'decline in the fortunes and authority of institutional journalism' (ibid).

Historically, approaches and conditions for political mobilization rested on region, group interest and other attributes like education, occupation, income, sex, age etc. that the voter possess (Campbell et al., 1964; Sigler and Getz, 1972). Thus, socio-economic and geodemographic factors constituted the basis for understanding voter behavior, segmentation and mobilization (Johnson, 2016). Today however, technologically enabled strategies now form part of the

growing tools that political parties, and candidates deploy for these functions (Howard, 2005; Kreiss, 2012; Nielsen, 2012). Abse (2013), Rogers (2013), and Johnson (2016) argue for example, that in today's age of media abundance, information for voter segmentation, mobilization and persuasion is now data driven, more behaviorally focus and powered by intelligence from high tech machine learning, predictive modelling, data mining and social network people profiling. Thus, in the contemporary electoral landscape of most advanced democracies, traditional structures, social variables and groupings that played central role in classical models of campaigning are no longer relied on for voter mobilization and persuasion (Holtz-Bacha and Kaid, 2006). As Nielsen (2009), Van Aelst et al. (2011) and Holtz-Bacha et al. (2014) argue, under the modern electoral environment, mediated campaign communication and political organizing or canvassing have all increasingly become personalized. Thus, both 'people' and 'media matter' for targeting as campaigns rely on technological infrastructure and 'data mining to pin-point individual voters for contact' (Nielsen, 2009). Although, studied mostly as a 'multidimensional phenomenon' (Holtz-Bacha et al., 2014), the concept of personalization describes 'a general process in which individual political actors become more prominent at the expense of parties and other political groups' (Pedersen, 2017).

That said, while these studies paint a picture of the technological state of contemporary political communication, a gap still exist in comparative literature on the cross-contextual patterns of manifestation of the technologically enhanced model of campaigning described above, and to date, studies mostly explore single-case, with no attempt at a cross-case comparative mapping of the features, characteristics and elements of the emerging campaign model described in this literature. For example, in the literature on presidential campaigns in the United States, while recent scholarship point to the uptake of innovative new practices in campaigning incentivized by new media and new technology in shaping contemporary campaign infrastructure and methods of electoral context and contest, there is no clear characteristic definition of what these practices and methods represent (see Kreiss, 2012; Nielsen, 2012; Issenberg, 2013; Nickerson and Rogers, 2014; Johnson, 2016; Kress, 2016; Johnson, 2017).

Similarly, in the United Kingdom, even though the longstanding 'native British history of campaigning' (Scammell, 1995:293), continues to surface in modern elections, scholars also suggest that new media technology, digitization and data driven insight is causing and inspiring shifts in political advertising, voter identification, targeting and mobilization (see Cowley and Kavanagh, 2015; Moore and Ramsay, 2015; Anstead 2017). However, like the American strand of literature, except for Anstead (2017) who offers a lens for understanding 'the data-based

campaign techniques being used by UK parties', there is also scanty characteristic definition of the manifestation and features of these emerging practices in British electoral context and contest. Furthermore, in Nigeria, while recent research also suggest that new media technology and digitization is changing and reshaping the structure, methods and face of contemporary electioneering, there is failure in detailing what such change represent in specific terms and characteristics (see Easton et al., 2014; Okeke et al., 2016; Dunu, 2018; Williams and Jideonwo, 2018). Taken together, this gap in comparative literature is what this thesis address and Nigeria is particularly important because of the paucity of research in Africa. Thus, from the standpoint of comparative theory building, the thesis comparative approach rescues the field from comparative knowledge stagnation on the cross-contextual dimensions of technological features of modern campaigns in ways that complement Swanson and Mancini's modern model framework. Bridging this gap across the three countries as the thesis sets out to do reinforces 'the unique contribution that comparative scholarship can make to political communication analysis' (Blumler, 2015:430). 'Second, all comparative enquiries so far have dealt with advanced Western democracies. While it is true that Hallin and Mancini (2012) have sought to project their typology 'beyond the Western world', however, even such an effort is open to a charge of cultural imperialism. In the end, calls to *de-Westernize* media studies can be answered only by *non-Westernizers*' (ibid).

1.1: Research Question

As earlier mentioned, the aim of this study is to shed light on the impact of new technology on political communication using the Obama campaign of 2008 and 2012 as a point of departure. Thus, the research is guided by one main question: i.e. **whether the Obama model is to date the most advance-i.e. in terms of its technological component?** In answering this question, the thesis explores the technological features and characteristics of the campaign and the extent to which those features and characteristics have been used, applied, or deployed in Nigeria and the United Kingdom by finding 'patterns of similarity or difference in the empirical materials collected (Babour, 2008:217). To do this, the study applies detailed qualitative comparative case study method to observe and explain patterns of manifestation of the Obama model in Nigeria and the United Kingdom, and patterns of data driven innovation in the 2016 Trump campaign and how such manifestation and innovation can be theoretically explained, using Swanson and Mancini's (1996) Americanization and modernization theses are guiding theoretical frameworks respectively. Thus, the three case studies provide empirical materials for a typological mapping of practices and for testing the Americanization and modernization

theories, with results used to make 'inferences on how best to modify' both theories regarding how to explain convergence and advancement in practices (George and Bennet, 2005:6). In methodological sense, the strength of this work lies in its comparative case study approach used usually to theorize typologies, test theories and reveal context (ibid).

That said, although, the Obama campaign may not take all credit for the uptake of technology in US election, since candidates like Bob Dole-President Bill Clinton's Republican challenger is known to have launched the first campaign website on October 6, 1996 during the presidential debate, with Governor Howard Dean then front runner for the Democratic Presidential nomination in 2003/2004 also using technology to support electoral practices in domains like fundraising, voter identification and mobilization (see Halperin and Harris, 2006).

Nevertheless, Kriess (2016) and Johnson (2016) argue that those initial first steps were popularized in the 2008/2012 Obama campaigns with more sophisticated data driven and technologically savvy campaigning. Thus, by focusing on the use, manifestation and deployment of the Obama model-(i.e. define in chapter two as a sixteen element campaign model comprising-(1) political and technology consultants, (2) big data and single database, (3) predictive modelling, (4) data mining and microtargeting, (5) web 2.0:digital and social media, (6) digital fundraising and small donors, (7) air war-political advertising, (8) ground game, (9) political opinion polling, (10) branding image and message, (11) negative campaigning, (12) campaign and feedback strategy, (13) campaign and interaction strategy, (14) speed and consistency of campaign communication, (15) campaign games, and (16) the permanent campaign) in Nigeria and Britain and incidence or evidence of data driven and technologically innovative practices in the 2016 Trump campaign that deviates from Obama's, it is hoped that space and time insight on the technological features, register (s) and practices of modern campaigns will be identified, explained and defined.

That said, even though the findings are case specific and based on materials collected on each case study, the thesis comparative methodological design provides both the imperative and empirical background for a cross-case operationalization of the Obama model and a typological mapping of the technological dimension (s) and features of modern campaigns from the four cases. Findings also provide material for a cross-case commentary on Americanization, commentary and expansion of the explanatory scope of modernization and an explanation of the prevailing contextual conditions that inspire innovation in the US and dissimilarity in the uptake of the Obama model in Nigeria and the United Kingdom.

1.2: Research Objectives

The focus of the analysis in this thesis is the 2008 and 2012 Barack Obama campaign. Specifically, the campaign dubbed hereafter as the Obama model is used as a comparative framework for exploring the gap in Swanson and Mancini 'modern model of campaigning' -i.e. regarding the technological dimension (s) of modern campaign. In the literature, America is often regarded as a major influence in cutting edge electioneering innovation (Semetko, et al. 1991; Esser and Pfetsch, 2004; Maarek, 2011), and a good amount of recent empirical work on technologically innovative campaign practices point to the Obama campaign as a stand-out exemplar in this regard (Harfoush, 2009; Hendrick and Denton, 2010; Issenberg, 2012b; Nielsen, 2012; Nickerson and Rogers, 2014; Axelrod, 2015; Kriess, 2016; Newman, 2016).

For instance, Alter (2013) refers to the Obama model as the 'first campaign of the digital age'. Scholars outline for example how the campaign used new technologies-big data, predictive modelling, microtargeting, experiment-informed programs, personalized campaigns messages delivered via smartphones, social media- free YouTube advertising, text messaging and emails, MySpace and Facebook to moved campaigning further away from traditional methods reliant on socio-economic and geo-demographic segmentation to more data driven, digitally enabled and personalized forms (see Hendricks, 2010; Nielsen, 2012; Bimber, 2014; Kreiss, 2015; Kriess, 2016; Mullen, forthcoming). Drawing from this literature, this thesis deploys the Obama model as an analytical framework and comparative explanatory starting point for producing an empirical register of technological practices that now inform political communication in selected democracies (i.e. United States, United Kingdom and Nigeria). Three research objectives were identified to guide the study:

- First, to test and establish the use, manifestation and deployment of the Obama model in Nigeria and the United Kingdom.
- Second, to explore the theoretical explanation for the manifestation and deployment of the Obama model in the case studies and the contextual conditions that shape its uptake or dissimilarity.
- Third, to investigate any use of innovative technological and data driven practices in the 2016 Trump campaign that may differ from the Obama model and the theoretical explanation for such innovation and country incentive for uptake.

Thus, this work focuses principally on the technological dimension or practices of modern campaigning, the theoretical explanation for the emergence of such practices in the US and

their manifestation in the United Kingdom and Nigeria and the contextual factors or conditions that shape their emergence in the US and uptake in Nigeria and the United Kingdom respectively. In the first objective, the Obama model is used as an exemplar to comparatively explore and reveal the sequence and form (s) of technologically innovative practices now appearing and manifesting in recent campaign in the United Kingdom and Nigeria. Both countries 2015 General Elections provide the empirical context for the analysis. This way, the study provides a cross-contextual picture of the technological state of modern election campaign that updates and complement Swanson and Mancini's modern model.

In the second objective-i.e. theoretical, considering that the Obama campaign is American, Americanization is questioned regarding whether it provides 'suitable theoretical description' for the emergence and convergence of the Obama model in Nigeria and the United Kingdom. At the second theoretical level, following investigations and debate across both sides of the Atlantic regarding the use of psychometrics/psychographics in the 2016 presidential election campaign of Donald Trump, the campaign is used to investigate and explain innovation or modernization in data driven and technologically innovative campaign practices in recent US political communication landscape. This way, the thesis contributes to the debate on the use of psychometrics/psychographics in the 2016 Trump campaign by uncovering further evidence of innovation and advances theoretical understanding of modernization as an explanation of such campaign innovation. At both theoretical levels, specific focus here is on testing the Americanization and modernization theses (Swanson and Mancini, 1996) purely in terms of their technological dimensions and not the broader processes identified by their framework. Thus, the objective here is to provide an expanded contemporary theoretical update to the explanatory scope of Americanization and modernization. Lastly, with a research design that is conscious of contextual differences, the work seeks to reveal and add to the understanding of contextual dynamics that shape convergence in campaign, particularly, convergence of the Obama model in Nigeria and the United Kingdom and US specific incentive (s) for innovation.

Now, regarding technology, recent discourse in the literature suggest that technology has grown and continue to grow as a social network, political forum, marketplace, entertainment source, and contemporary society molding tool (Brockman, 2011). Changes in social, political, and economic patterns of the world, global communication and information infrastructure, power configuration, as well as structure and composition of contemporary public sphere have equally been ascribed to technological change and advancement (see Bimber, 2003; Tuten, 2008; Harrington, 2009; Johnson and Wetmore, 2009; Papacharissi, 2009; Mullen, 2013; Howard,

2015). However, much of the literature on the impact of technology on democracy and society speculate about its advantage and disadvantage and is a subject of increasing scholarly debate.

The debate and the huge body of work that exist raises two strands of literature. On one hand, cyber-optimist scholars such as Baber (1998), Castells (2001), Kidd (2003), Benkler (2006), Bennett and Manheim (2006), Chadwick (2006), Bennett and Iyengar (2008), Dahlgren (2009) and Anduiza et al. (2012) perceive the global technological infrastructure change as transformative, networked and revolutionary in diffusing social ideas, opening new participatory spaces and democratizing communication. On the other hand, cyber-pessimist scholars like Steve et al. (1999), Nye (2007), Fenton (2010), Curran et al. (2012), McChesney (2013), Freedman (2014) and Fuchs (2014) argue that the new technological era is capitalist, monitoring, controlling and erodes individual and citizen's privacy.

On the role of technology as a tool for transforming society Taylor (2014:7) asserts that 'technology alone will not deliver the cultural transformation we have been waiting for', instead, we need to first 'understand and then address the underlying social and economic forces that shape it'. Although Taylor acknowledges that internet technology is driving some great inventions, a 'real cultural democracy' for her 'means more than everyone with an internet connection having the ability to edit entries on Wikipedia or leave indignant comments'. Taylor's view in terms of the democratic credentials and potentials of internet technology is that the idea of a level technological playing field is an illusion as they are only very few gate keepers that provide access to information. As she argues, to foster and propagate a democratic culture in the digital age requires that 'supporting creative work' is 'not because it is vital, but because it is important', serves needs as well as desires, and ensures 'marginalized people are given not just a chance to speak but to be heard'. As Benedikt and Osborne (2013) note, technological progress as good as it is for society is threatening the future of work by shifting the composition of employment as non-routine cognitive and manual task are now affected by advances in machine learning and other subfields of artificial intelligence. In everyday work place environment for example, Eadicicco (2015) and Dutton et al. (2017) are of the view that technologies like mobile phones even though they can increase efficiency, also undermine productivity through distraction and interruptions and can create pressure on personal lives and leisure because of their ability to erode the boundary between work and home.

Challenging the techno-solutionist idea, Morozov (2013) also agree with Taylor that technological advancement is not the one stop solution to all the challenges that contemporary society faces. However, Morozov does not reject technological effectiveness and the increasing

rise of network structures in organizations and society. Similarly, Greenfield (2015) argue that some technological tools often celebrated for their participatory potential like social networking sites could impact humans and 'worsen communication skills and reduce interpersonal empathy.' (p.256). Curran, Fenton, and Freedman (2012) while also tempering with the techno-optimistic and uncritical account of the impact of technology are of the view that even though new technologies have 'energized activism', it 'has not revitalized democracy' (p.17). Curran (2012) also express pessimism about technology's power to change society. In his view, the debate on the impact of technology on society is not what technology and technological advancement can do, but rather what economic power will permit regarding the use and application of technology. For Fenton (2010) the optimism and wide held view that internet technology has the capacity and will generate a public sphere that can function independently from existing political and economic power is contestable. As Bimber (2003:39) notes, while new technology can enhance the 'public sphere', it can also 'degrade' it and the 'state of citizens' civic engagement'. Thus, Papacharissi, (2009:14) argue that since online public spaces are not immune to commercialization, they usually transit from public to commercial spaces and in the process 'compromise their democratizing potential', such that they 'provide a public space' and do not 'inevitably enable a public sphere'. Broadly, de la Cruz and Lin (2016) describe these two theoretical camps on the relationship between technology and society as either technological determinism or social determinism (see de la Cruz and Lin, 2016).

These theoretical differences and conflicting debates notwithstanding, scholars like Howard (2010) Newman (2016) and Kreiss (2016) argue that technology and the falling cost of producing and distributing information in the digital age is driving changes in the political realm of contemporary society. Although, they are critical voices like Wilhelm (2000), Fuchs (2008), Chris and Olsen (2011), Islas (2015), Noble (2018) and Benjamin (2019) who argue that technology is a space for ideological reproduction and authoritarian engineering, maintenance of existing capitalist structure and society's political power status quo, reinforcement of racism and discrimination and fragmentation of the public.

That said, even though much of the literature above is critical of the democratic credentials and potentials of technology, scholars have equally developed a body of empirical work that shows how politics is increasingly embedded in emerging technology. For example, Latour (2005), Paul (1996), Earl and Schussman (2008), and Gracia-Castanon et al. (2012) argue that even though its agency is dissimulated, technology is politics by other means and a tool with agency that manufacture actions in structured ways, thus making it a new venue for the 'same old

human compunction' of 'politics'. For Chadwick (2012:39) internet technology is today 'the most significant enabler of political innovation since the emergence of mass democracy'. Scholars also point to digital applications and commercial platforms as forming part of the invisible technological context for the conduct of social and political life, civic engagement and political agency (see Castells, 2011; Curran, 2011; Bimber et al., 2012; Esser and Stromback, 2014; Howard, 2015; Kreiss, 2015).

On the dynamics of technology and change in Africa, even though gaps still exist when compared to the global north, Mavhunga (2017:2) is of the view that continental policy making bodies like the African Union see 'science, technology, and innovation as the centerpiece of modernity'. Mutsvairo and Karam (2018:6) also suggest that although history point to a complicated pattern for the continent owing to its 'colonial legacy, diverse religious and social cultures', technology is beginning to take the 'lead as focal point of political and economic development'. Taken together, while this literature speaks of changes that technology is inspiring, the debate offers compelling need for a continuous rigorous analysis of the impact of technology on society and democracy both from a communication and democratic participation perspectives as this work attempts to do.

Furthermore, communication scholarship has also witness progressive theorization following technological changes and developments in the media arena. Although, the importance of communication and rhetoric date back to its role in Ancient Greek Democracy with the Aristotelian, Socratic and Stoic traditions (see Solmsen, 1941; Triadafilos, 1999; Mehdi, 2015), Lasswell (1927) and the Chicago School of Sociology's 'direct, undifferentiated and powerful effect theoretical models' (Delia, 1987:21), and Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet challenge of the powerful effect model-i.e. in *The People's Choice* (1948) (see Benoit and Holbert, 2010) and the two theories or theoretical offspring of their study, (i.e.) *the limited-effect* model-the idea that the media had little impact on public opinion, and *the two-step flow theory* (which held that political information in the media is consumed largely by opinion leaders who act as mediators between the media and the public), dominated the field for several decades (ibid).

However, in ways that differ from Lazarsfeld and colleagues, the theoretical hegemony that these sets of theories exerted as explanatory lenses of the role of the press in elections was countered by other theories like (a) *agenda setting*-explained as a 'process of salience transfer where the frequency of discussion of a subject in the media and the public's perception of its importance is positively related' (McCombs and Shaw, 1972); (b) *priming*-a theory that explains 'preceding stimulus or event of how we react to some subsequent stimulus' (Roskos-Ewoldsen

et al., 2002:97); and (c) *framing* (i.e.) a theory that lay claim to 'schemata of interpretation' (Goffman, 1974:20) or 'a central idea that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events' (see Gamson and Modigliani, 1987:143). Gilardi et al. (2020) argue that technology and digital platforms seem to have reshaped these traditional theories by reducing 'the gatekeeping power of traditional media' and expanding 'the number, capacity and type' of agenda setting actors.

That said, scholars have also pointed to a host of other factors that can account for change in the political realm. They include factors like the decline of mass parties and the weakening of party loyalties (Johnson, 2016; Negrine, 2008); the fragmentation of identities and emphasis on identity and lifestyle politics (Layotard, 1979); modernization (Vaudagna, 1991; Xifra, 2011); and path dependence tendencies of technological diffusion (Page, 2006; Paul, 2007; Cortada, 2012; Epstein, 2013; Issenberg, 2013; Nikerson and Rogers, 2014; Kriess, 2016).

According to Bryant and Miron (2007), 21st century new electronic media environment is both the incentive for these practices and new theoretical problems and expansion that have accompanied several spheres in the field. As Nielsen (2013) argue, the range of 'analytic constructs' in the literature like Hallin and Mancini' (2004), Picard and Rossi (2012) media system/market; Adoni et al. (2006), Blumler and Gurevitch (1995), Pfetsch (2004), Pfetsch and Esser (2012) and Voltmer (2008, 2012a) political communication/systems/cultures and subcultures; Swanson and Mancini (1996) modern model; Kim (2012) communication culture as well as Benson (2005) and Hanitzsch (2007) journalistic culture and journalist field are all incentivized by the new and changing technological environment. However, as Nielsen (2013) observe, these analytic constructs while guiding research focused more on 'industry structures' across national boundaries rather than 'practices', 'values', 'content' and form'.

In another tradition in the literature, scholars have equally chosen a number of concepts like 'professionalization' (Holtz-Bacha, 2002; Negrine and Lilleker, 2002); 'specialization' (Maarek, 2016), 'personalization' (Rhat and Sheafer, 2007); 'entertainization' (Van Zoonen, 2005); 'transformation' (Negrine, 2008) and hybridity (Chadwick, 2013) to advance scholarly understanding of changing practices that have accompanied technological and societal change.

Similarly, research has also offered a historical reconnaissance of changes in political communication from the standpoint of periodization. Insight includes for example-Farell, Kolodny and Mevic's (2001) pre-modern, modern and post-modern model; Swanson and Mancini's (1996) modern model of campaigning and Seymour-Ure's (1996) age of media abundance. Others include: Blumler and Kavanagh's (1999) third age; Norris's (2002) modern

and post-modern form; Gibson and Rommele's (2001) modern or professional campaign; Wring (1996), Norris et al. (1999), and Norris (2000) pre-modern, modern and post-modern eras.

In the periodization, a pre-modern era dates back from the nineteenth century through to the Second World War (Lilleker and Jackson, 2011), and signifies an era where dominant practices includes a partisan press, reliance on local volunteers, face-to-face meetings and public events guided by geo-demographic consideration and practices (Norris et al. 1999). A modern era signified and dominated by television (Kavanagh, 1995); and a post-modern era ushered in by the 1990s and epitomized by the fragmentation of television (i.e. the expansion of terrestrial and satellite television stations), a less partisan national press aimed at maintaining market share and the introduction of ICTs that has enabled targeted communication (Norris et al., 1999; Lilleker and Jackson, 2011).

That said, while the bulk of these studies across the various subfields highlighted above point to continuous shifts in practices and the media and technological environment, studies in political communication tend to focus more on periodization or epochal changes, except for Swanson and Mancini's (1996) 'modern model of campaigning' that offers a more basic characteristic recognizance of modern campaigns comprising five broad features (i.e. personalization of politics, reliance on technical experts and professional advisers, detachment of political parties from citizens, development of autonomous structures of communication, and casting citizens in the role of spectators) (see p.14-17). However, as seminal as the 'modern model of campaigning' is, they failed to detail what it constitutes in terms of the key political communication technologies and techniques that were available and utilized in 1996. In sum, despite the large body of work that now describes changes in electioneering and the media and technological environment, the technological ingredients of modern campaigns are scarcely defined. Similarly, even though vast amount of research now exist that describes modern electioneering in the age of media abundance, answers remain limited from a comparative perspective on the technological components, dimension (s), features, practices and characteristics of such campaigns.

Thus, in contrast to this literature this study considers the technological dimension (s) and ingredients of modern campaign from a comparative standpoint. Specifically, the thesis argues that technology and technological change are driving changes in political communication in the US and elsewhere (i.e. Nigeria and United Kingdom). This perspective and argument are based on emerging literature on contemporary campaign practices. As earlier stated, the unanswered

questions that remain regarding the key political communication technologies, techniques and practices now in use across some democracies makes this work an important research agenda.

Thus, this work is a step in that direction. Indeed, by identifying technology as the growing ingredient in contemporary campaign and the missing component in Swanson and Mancini's modern model of campaigning, this thesis addresses the gap in the literature by going beyond their characteristic description of modern campaign to develop a comparative account of the technological dimension and features of contemporary electioneering using the Obama model as an analytical framework. This way, the thesis seeks to strengthen the key weakness of their modern model campaign framework and to contribute to the literature on comparative political communication by providing empirical data on Nigeria and the United Kingdom that helps define the technological features and state of modern electioneering. In this regard, Nigeria provides a unique perspective of an emerging democracy in the global south in ways that Africanizes the field. For example, in the context of contemporary changes in the information communication technology and media environment, and given the dearth of political communication research in the African continent, evidence that emerged in Nigeria captures the means and ways in which political parties and actors in Africa disseminate political messages in modern election campaign. Thus, the Nigerian case study provides empirical grounds for rethinking practices and theory-i.e. the register of the range of practices of contemporary political communication and Americanization as explanation for convergence of such practices in emerging democracies in the global south.

1.3: Organization of the Thesis

As an introductory synopsis, this first chapter has presented the research background, research objectives and research question. However, it is important to also highlight key focus of each chapter in the thesis for clarity in reading. Generally, the thesis is organized in eight chapters. In chapter two, the thesis sets out the comparative analytical framework for the study (i.e. the Obama model). Using the constant comparative method of reading the literature, the chapter sets the stage with a sixteen-element framework that exemplifies recent technological innovation in modern campaign as a building block for exploring the technological dimension of modern election campaign in Nigeria and the United Kingdom. The methodological intention of this chapter is that the possibility of finding similar practices in Nigeria and the United Kingdom will inform a cross-case typological mapping of the technological dimension and features of contemporary campaigning. Chapter three explores the theoretical approaches for understanding change in political communication. Specifically, the chapter focuses on

conceptual debate on Americanization and modernization (Swanson and Mancini, 1996) and unpacks the theoretical insight of both theses, and their role, relevance and value as guiding explanatory framework for the study. Although in this discussion, the chapter sketches brief explanations of concepts like modernism, modernity, postmodernism, globalization and glocalization as alternative theoretical perspectives and lenses for explaining change in social theory.

Chapter four outlines the methodology of the study. The chapter includes ontological and epistemological debate and research stance, an explanation of the comparative goal of the study, justification for case selection and the theoretical and methodological benefits of the design, methods of data collection and analysis and limitations of the study. Chapter five, six and seven are results of findings. In chapter five, evidence of the use, manifestation and deployment of the Obama model in the 2015 presidential election campaign in Nigeria is presented. Drawing from empirical evidence that emerged, the chapter also engages the theoretical and methodological approaches of the study for an explanation of convergence in the manifestation of the Obama model in Nigeria and unpack country specific factors that account for dissimilarity in practices. As such, the chapter contributes to the first two research objectives above. Chapter six repeats this process and follows the sequence in chapter five using evidence from the 2015 British election. In chapter seven, evidence and result of innovation or advancement in technologically enabled and data driven campaign practices in the 2016 Trump campaign is presented. This chapter basically address the third research objective by presenting evidence of innovative technological practices deployed in the 2016 Trump campaign, the theoretical explanation for such innovation and incentive for uptake. Although, there is no evidence of collusion between the Trump campaign and Russia, the chapter also highlight the role of the Kremlin and pattern of new 'active measures' in the 2016 US presidential election.

Chapter eight is a presentation of lessons from the three case studies. Specifically, the chapter distills and highlight the cross-case manifestation of the Obama model. This way, similarities and differences in the use, manifestation and deployment of the Obama model in Nigeria and the United Kingdom is presented alongside evidence of data driven technological innovation in the 2016 Trump campaign in ways that allow for a typology of the technological dimension and state of modern campaigning to be developed. In doing this, the chapter produces a cross-contextual evidence and picture of the technological dimension and features of modern campaign that complements Swanson and Mancini's (1996) modern model of campaigning. The

chapter also provide a cross-case commentary on Americanization and modernization theories and highlight contextual factors that limit and impede convergence of the Obama model in Nigeria and the United Kingdom as well as US specific contextual incentive (s) for the uptake and deployment of data driven and technologically innovative campaign practices in America. Lastly, the chapter concludes by highlighting the limits of the Obama model and areas of opportunity for further research.

That said, as an introduction, this chapter has provided a background and stated the purpose of the study as well as the structure of the thesis. The chapter that follows sets out details of the sixteen elements of the Obama model-i.e. the analytical comparative framework and starting point of the thesis cross-case comparative analysis.

2: Literature Review: The Obama Campaign of 2008 and 2012

2.1: Introduction

This chapter lays the foundation for the comparative approach of this study by setting out a sixteen-element framework of the Obama model as an analytical framework for the thesis. Drawn from empirical literature on the campaign, the sixteen-element framework exemplifies recent technologically innovative practices in campaigning and will serve as basic parameter for comparing and exploring the technological dimension of modern election campaign in the United States, United Kingdom and Nigeria. As a comparative study, the methodological intention is that evidence from Nigeria and the United Kingdom will provide empirical grounds for operationalizing the model and for mapping common patterns of technological practices in contemporary electioneering-a contribution that this thesis make.

2.2: Obama Model: Starting Point for a New Analytical-Comparative Framework

Studying change is inherently comparative and the first principle in any study of change should begin with selecting or identifying some relevant baseline from which comparison of either the state of affairs in one country vs another country or period can be examined (Chaffe and Chu, 1992; Rosengren et al., 1992). Thus, this work situates technological changes in the realm of political communication as exemplified in the 2008 and 2012 Obama campaign as baseline for exploring changing practices and dimensions of modern campaign.

As highlighted in the previous chapter, even though they are conflicting debates between cyber-optimist and pessimist scholars on the transformative power of technology, scholars suggest that in America, technology is reshaping US electoral landscape by altering longstanding traditional structures that played central role in classical models of voter understanding, mobilization, field canvassing and political advertising etc. (see Nielsen, 2012; Issenberg, 2013; Nickerson and Rogers, 2014; Kriess, 2016). Thus, guided by the constant comparative method, this section sets out the technological exemplars of these practices as deployed in the 2008/2012 Obama campaign as a baseline for comparing practices in the 2015 elections in Nigeria and the United Kingdom.

Although, Obama's election was indeed a product of many factors (see appendix I). However, through the constant comparative method, technological patterns and practices of the campaign are identified from the literature (see Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Dey, 2004; Barbour, 2008).

Whilst much of the literature relating to the constant comparative method assumes that codes are used, however, this is not necessarily the case. In deploying the method here, a thorough literature review that involved constantly comparing evidence from empirical and technical literature and insider accounts on the campaign was relied on to identify technologically innovative categories of the campaign.

That said, on the basis for signposting the Obama campaign as a historic technologically innovative exemplar, this review follows Epstein (2018:7) identification of four political communication orders in American politics-i.e. The *Elite Political Communication Order*-a phase dominated by print media (newspapers). The *Mass Political Communication Order*-driven by technological advancement in printing and changes in US postal system. The *Broadcast Political Communication Order*-led by the advent of radio and television and the *Information Political Communication Order*-inspired by internet and digital media. According to Davies et al. (2009) and Hamilton and Tolbert (2012:6) this fourth order of internet technology and related tools have dramatically altered the campaign for national political office in the United States 'as America has quickly become a nation of digital citizens residing in a digital public sphere'. Thus, as an election campaign that falls within the scope of the fourth order (i.e. the *Information Political Communication Order*) (Epstein, 2018) the focus here is on the strand of literature exemplified by the Obama campaign.

Thus, as a building block for exploring, understanding and defining the technological dimension and state of modern election campaign, the methodological expectation is that the possibility of finding similar patterns, practices and elements of the Obama model in Nigeria and the United Kingdom will inform a cross-case and cross-contextual operationalization and typological mapping of the technological characteristics of contemporary campaign-a missing feature and gap in contemporary comparative political communication literature. As a comparative study, a cross-case synthesis and pattern matching of evidence from the two case studies with the sixteen predicted elements below can conceptually offer empirical grounds for validating the Obama model in ways that builds comparative theory. This way, what is missing in contemporary comparative political communication literature to date-i.e. a tested comparative theory of practices of the Obama model in other democracies is provided.

2.2.1: Obama Model: Key Features and Elements

'While Hilary Clinton and John McCain set out to run the last campaign over again, Barack Obama forged ahead and ran the first campaign of the twenty-first century'.

Garrett M. Graff (2009)

The 'Analytics Department is looking for 'predictive modelling/data mining specialists to join the campaign's multi-disciplinary team of statisticians which will use predictive modelling to anticipate the behavior of the electorate. 'We will analyze millions of interactions a day, learning from terabytes of historical data, running thousands of experiments, to inform campaign strategy and critical decisions'' (quoted in Peggy, 2012).

The Obama campaign of 2008 and 2012 has attracted a huge amount of academic interest and the two quotes above suggest why. Among other things, the campaign is hailed as unique for its use of new technologies in creating 'unparalleled opportunities for interaction and information acquisition, helping to make 2008 a water shed year' (Panagopoulos, 2012, p.3). As McKenna and Han (2015) observe, Obama campaigns can be referred to as 'extreme case' or 'crucial case' in the history of contemporary campaign for its creativity and ability in 'blending new and old organizing tactics in a modern era'. According to Johnson (2017:14), in modern American history, the Obama campaign represent the 'smoothest, best-run, strategically savvy and ground-breaking in its use of technology and online communication'.

Although historically, the use of digital technology during campaign is traceable to the 1990s, when a culture of innovative campaigning began to rise in the US, even though limited internet penetration meant less attention was given to the evolving model (Bimber and Davies, 2003). By the 2000 and 2004 electoral cycles, the role of technology in US political communication increased, with growing intersection of old media, new media and campaigning (Halperin and Harris, 2006; Johnson, 2016). According to Johnson (2016:2) 'what was new and creative in 2000 was surpassed in 2004, what was exciting and unique in 2008 has been improved upon in 2016' as we witness the continuous influence of social media, data mining technologies and 'dark money' in campaigning (ibid).

The rise in political spending by non-profit organizations incentivized by the country's institutional and legal political finance landscape-i.e. Supreme Court's verdict in *Citizens United v. Federal Electoral Commission* have made huge 'dark money' investments possible (Kristy, 2012). As a concept, dark money is used to describe money that come from 'politically active non-profit organizations that can receive unlimited donations from corporations, individuals, and unions but are not required to disclose who the donors are' (Couch et al., 2016:6).

The possibility of such huge campaign finance mobilization means that candidates and parties can invest in tools and strategies for electoral success (Hunt, 2011; Hendricks and Schill, 2014;

Newman, 2016). According to Plouffe (2009:4) such investment in the Obama campaign made technology the 'core from day one and only grew in importance'. As Plouffe note, the campaign's 'unique mixture of idealism and pragmatism' focused on technology as a tool for recruiting what he calls 'new buyers', for social networking and for creating new online fundraising models (ibid). Balz and Johnson (2009) also reveal how Obama himself acknowledged the role of technology in his campaign when he was quoted as president-elect to have said 'the way that internet served our campaign in unprecedented ways' is one way he would tell the story of the 2008 election.

According to Hendricks and Denton (2010), through technology, 'the Obama campaign organized over one hundred and fifty thousand events, created more than thirty-five thousand groups, had over 1.5 million accounts, and raised over \$600 million from three million donors'. The campaign utilized YouTube for free ads with campaign materials watched on earned media totalling over 14.5 million hours-a cost of over \$47 million were that to be on broadcast television (ibid). As they argue, 'without question, Obama established a precedent of how future contenders for the White House must communicate with the electorate, especially a technologically savvy electorate' (p.14).

Empirical literature on the campaign also echo this narrative and point to the campaign as the most technologically savvy to date (see Nielsen, 2012; Issenberg, 2013; Bimber, 2014; Johnson, 2008, 2016; Kreiss, 2016; Newman, 2016). Issenberg (2013) for instance, affirms that the Obama campaign was a standard for its innovative use of social media and new technology. For Newman (2016), the campaign strategically stepped away from traditional socio-demographic categorization of voters by using data analytics to 'carefully define segments of voters' (p.3). Offering a structured reconnaissance of the campaign, Mullen (unpublished) outline fifteen key elements he argued can be associated with the Obama campaign model (see Table 2.1).

Table 2.1: *Elements of the Obama campaign*

Well-established techniques and technologies	Established but revised techniques and technologies	New techniques and technologies
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
<p>Use of political consultants – individuals and agencies</p>	<p>Opinion polling – use of new technologies (e.g. social media data mining)</p>	<p>Development of a centralized, integrated and dynamic database, plus a range of apps and tools, accessible in real-time via the internet and available to activists and volunteers as well as campaign staff</p>
<p>Use of the internet and social media (e.g. blogs, Facebook, Twitter, emails, texts, websites, etc.) to disseminate campaign messages and user-generated content, organize activists and volunteers, and raise funds</p>	<p>Air war – informed by big data mining, political modelling and micro-targeting (i.e. Optimizer tool)</p>	<p>Development of Facebook Are You In? app and Targeted Sharing tool, plus the exploitation of the Facebook EdgeRank algorithm to distribute campaign messages</p>
<p>Development of brand and narrative to inform campaign strategy</p>	<p>Ground war – use of army of volunteers who undertake tasks and have access to data that was previously reserved for campaign staff and activists</p>	<p>Big data mining, political modelling and micro-targeting – used for campaign message dissemination, canvassing, volunteering and voter mobilization</p>

Intense and fast-paced style of electioneering	Gamification – deployed in a more systematic way and on a larger scale than before	Development of a more dynamic and responsive style of electioneering via the use of Experiment-Informed Programs (i.e. randomized controlled experiments plus political modelling)
Digital fundraising and small donations		
Negative campaigning and the exploitation of wedge issues		
Permanent campaign		

Source: Mullen (unpublished)

For Mullen, the effective synthesis of what he calls 'the new techniques, the revised and the old' produced a campaign model that is pioneering (p.21). Similarly, Newman (2016:28) discusses the Obama campaign under what he calls the 'Strategic Triad' of Microtargeting, Big Data and Social Media and identifies seven sets of electioneering tactics associated with the campaign- (i.e. advertising, polling, marketing research, branding, positioning, data base technologies and crisis management) he argues represent the paradigm shift introduced by the Obama campaign in 2008 and 2012 (see figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1: A Strategic Triad: Shifts in the Obama campaign



Source: Newman (2016) *The Marketing Revolution in Politics: What Recent U.S Presidential Campaigns can Teach US About Effective Marketing*.

That said, although, Mullen and Newman’s method for setting out their characteristics of the Obama model is not clearly stated, below, I build on their work to distil sixteen elements associated with the campaign. As earlier stated, these elements will guide cross-case comparison of practices in the case studies.

1. Political and Technology Consultants

Historically, the first recorded form of campaign consulting and electioneering advice is traceable to the Roman empire when Quintus Tullius (102-43 BCE) wrote a campaign manual for the electoral benefit of his elder brother Marcus Tullius Cicero (Cicero and Freeman, 2012 cited in Johnson, 2017).

In the United States, the 1930s-i.e. Clem Whitaker and Leone Baxter family consulting firm in California was the first set of campaign advisers (Johnson, 2017). However, between the 1930 and 60s, the role of these ‘king makers’ ‘president makers’ and ‘spin doctors’ had increase- following the weakening of political parties and party loyalties, the increasing role of voter surveys during elections and the rise of new communication platforms etc. (Negrine, 2008; Johnson, 2017:47). Sabato (1981) also point to the growth of ‘image politics’ and new techniques for winning elections such as direct mails, political polling and spot advertising as factors that contributed to the rise of political consultants in the United States.

In modern elections, the business of political consultancy has evolved and transited into a highly skilled profession with actors assembled from many fields (Johnson, 2001). Adoption of new technologies have fueled the increase of new entrants of consultants into the political market

place-with website specialist, digital advertising strategist, big data and microtargeting technicians, online fundraising, polling, messaging and social media specialists now an integral part of campaign and political Party structure (Bohne et al. 2009; Johnson, 2000, 2015, 2017).

In America, recent presidential elections point to a rising role for political consultants. However, from Bill Clinton's James Carville, to President Bush's Karl Rove and President Reagan and George HW Bush Lee Atwater, no other presidential campaign has exemplified the importance of assembling a technically and professionally diverse team of political and technology consultants like Barack Obama (Paul, 2012). Apart from known traditional political consultants, team Obama inspired the entrance of many individuals with background in technology-data and computer science (Miller, 2014). According to Sifry (2011b) and Miller (2014) these new entrants were assembled by team Obama to do 'excellent voter science', in ways that have created a new consulting culture in political communication where investment in predictive modelers and data scientist is now key.

For instance, apart from Jim Messina, David Axelrod and David Plouffe-the well-known and established political consultants who were instrumental to Obama's campaign successes, the campaign equally assembled an extraordinary team of experts-120 engineers, programmers, mathematicians, statisticians and data mining specialist (Ahonen, 2012a; Axelrod, 2015; Plouffe, 2009). Furthermore, the campaign built a grass-roots neighborhood team, research team, media team and analytics team, comprising names like Harper Reed-chief technology officer; Joe Rospars-chief digital strategist; Teddy Goff-digital director; Julianna Smoot-fundraising; Larry Grisolano and Eric Smith-media and advertising, and Dan Wagner with his fifty person analytics staff (Johnson, 2017; Siegel, 2013). The campaign also established contact with high-power chief executives-Steve Jobs of Apple, Steven Spielberg of DreamWorks Marketing Studios, Anna Wintour of *Vogue* as well as Eric Schmidt of Google for ideas (ibid). The Obama campaign also embarked on a mobilization of academics in what Issenberg (2013) referred to as 'Fight Club' a group of '29 psychologist, economist and law professors dedicated to sending democrats to congress and electing a Democrat president'. The assemblage of these consultants seemed to have inspired the technological and data driven techniques for voter identification and mobilization deployed by the campaign (2012 Obama Campaign Legacy Report, 2013).

Historically, this seem to deviate from longstanding practice where consultants in most cases start off 'their carriers working on campaign staffs, for elected officials, or for a political party' (Johnson, 2017:2). Now, whether such patterns of diverse assemblage and recruitment of

political communication and technology consultants is happening in other democracies is what is missing in the wider literature and this thesis will attempt to address this gap with evidence from Nigeria and the United Kingdom.

2. *Big Data and the Single Database*

The potential of largescale data made possible by the increasing datafication of human life, identities, activities and relationships have been praised in many sectors (see Boyd and Crawford, 2012; Lane et al. 2014; Mayer-Schonbenger and Cukier, 2014). The bulk of the big data literature celebrate its potential- with big data optimist (Smolan and Erwitte, 2012; Pentland, 2014; Mayer-Schonbenger and Cukier, 2014) arguing that it has capacity to improve decision making, service delivery and innovation in many sectors. Critics on the other hand question its methodology, processing, monopolistic nature and the privacy and ethical challenges associated with its use (Crawford, 2014).

Nevertheless, the combination of statistical logic and big data and its potential in predicting what people do, want and will consume has increased its attractiveness to marketers, producers and politicians (Mayer-Schonbenger and Cukier, 2014; Harper, 2016). Advances in cloud computing and the development of data warehouses are some of the major enablers of these practices (Dutton et al., 2017). Similarly, space and distance compressing technologies-global positioning system (GPS), the personalization of mobile services, as well as context-aware and location-based services are also incentivizing these practices (ibid).

As a concept, Boyd and Crawford (2012) define big data as ‘a cultural, technological, and scholarly phenomenon that rests on the interplay of: (1) Technology: maximizing computational power and algorithmic accuracy to gather, analyze, link and compare large data sets. (2) Analysis: drawing on large data sets to identify patterns in order to make economic, social, technical, and legal claims. (3) Mythology: the widespread belief that large data sets offer a higher form of intelligence and knowledge that can generate insights that were previously impossible, with the aura of truth, objectivity, and accuracy’.

In recent times, however, a common view is that big data approaches are a product of the world’s current technological capacities and data produced in volumes, variety and velocity, driven by economic, political and cultural forces and deployed in vast array of sectors (Crawford et al., 2014; Wu et al., 2016). According to Wu et al, at the heart of big data is data mining or ‘machine learning’-an automated process of pattern recognition in data, with the objective of

seeking business intelligence that enables decision makers to make right decisions based on prediction.

Although, they are critical perspectives of the methodology like Eubanks (2014) and Faucher (2018:6) who perceive the rise of big data as 'informatics of domination' and a 'new spectacle of digital capitalism and a channel for accumulating online social capital'-i.e. 'resources derived through social relation/connections and acquired/mobilized by social actors'. Thus, ethical and privacy concerns that the methodology generate has continue to incentivize debate in the US and globally (Maytom, 2017; Stewart, 2017).

Nevertheless, from the point of view of campaigning, advances in big data technologies and techniques-data mining and analytics contributed to the insight team Obama relied on (Issenberg, 2013; Kriess, 2016). As Isenberg and Kreiss show, before now, managing and making sense of the vast amount of data gathered by political parties and candidates about voters have been a major challenge during campaigns.

However, in 2008, the campaign recorded success in this regard with their data bank weapon code-name *Project Houdini*-a get-out-the-vote system (Gallagher, 2012). With *Project Houdini* team Obama reached over 21.8 million voters; recorded contact made with voters-through mails sent, phone calls, traditional home mailings, social media and door-to-door visits (Ahonen, 2012a). Using the campaign's Voter Activation Network (VAN) and its VoteBuilder interface component, they kept an identifiable data bank of contact with every individual they had been in touch with during the campaign by assigning them a seven-digit code (Issenberg, 2012). VoteBuilder also powered an internet driven interface between campaign field staff and provided the campaign team with information that assisted canvassing, voter registration, fundraising and get-out-the-vote (GOTV) efforts (ibid).

Although they were challenges with managing the data collected, with the platform crashing on Election Day, due to the overwhelming data and traffic (Ahonen, 2012b; Gallagher, 2012). However, drawing from the experience of the mini failures of 2008, the campaign built *Project Narwhal*- in 2012, one of their most celebrated successes-a program that served as a single data bank, merging all the data (demographics, voting histories, census data, credit cards, magazine/ TV subscriptions and viewing etc.) from the various digital, field, off and online as well as financial sources once in separate repositories into one single database (Gallagher, 2012; Issenberg, 2012, 2013; Mullen, unpublished; Nickerson and Rogers, 2014; Kreiss, 2016).

Narwhal also had other components like DreamCatcher-used for targeting of messages; Dashboard-for field workers data input and download; the Call Tool-used for targeted calls; Vertica-the main data base; Ushahidi-election fraud related reporting platform; Optimizer-the TV ad targeting system, Taargus-the social media tool that includes a Facebook Blaster, a Twitter Blaster and QuickDonate-campaign sms fundraising and donation platform (Ahonen, 2012a) According to Ahonen, *Narwhal* is the biggest most powerful election-related voter database and vote support system ever made. With data covering over 175 million voters, it powered the campaign's simulation strategies and tested messages, learning from data about what would work best for the campaign (ibid).

According to Kreiss (2016:132) this technological and data infrastructure was developed as a product of the investment of the Democratic Party in the areas that define contemporary electioneering, with the innovation inspired by what Kriess call 'party network processes' that unfold over time and staffers who cross field from the technology and other industries into politics and organizations that emerge after campaigns (ibid).

For the campaign, *Narwhal* made it possible to integrate existing and incoming data into a single system-linking 'once completely separate repositories of information to create voter specific profiles' that 'fused the multiple identities of the engaged citizen-the online activist, the offline voter, the donor, the volunteer, etc.' (Issenberg, 2013). This creativity enabled the campaign to establish a single database with 'terabytes of information', 'integrating all aspects of fundraising, social networking, and activism from MyBarackObama.com-something never done before in presidential campaigns' (Johnson, 2016). With the data, the campaign developed what Hersh (2015:213) refers to as *The Perceived Voter Model*-a model where campaign formed predictions about how to 'interact with the electorate based on an understanding of the data that campaign used to perceive voters' characteristics'. For example, they predicted how likely a voter is to be a supporter, how likely he is to show up at the polls and how likely is he persuadable. In Hersh's account, such prediction enabled the campaign to 'determine the right message to use and the right voters to engage' (ibid).

According to Gallagher (2012) the central data platform included apps like *Dreamcatcher*-a tool developed to 'microtarget voters based on sentiments within text' and *Dashboard*-the 'virtual field office' app that helped volunteers in the field get information, communicate and collaborate. This tech infrastructure apart from feeding the campaign's web presence, fed the analytics department of the campaign. Using Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) principles, the campaign built an architecture that allowed for all their apps to connect together and share one

common data store' (ibid). According to Gallagher (2012) the campaign team 'relied on Amazon's MySQL-Relational Data Base Service (RDS)'; 'snapshot capability of RDS that allowed images of database to be dumped into Single Storage Service (S3) without having to run backups'.

As a data integration element of the campaign, *Narwhal's* development according to Gallagher was two phased-an API team that developed app interfaces required and the integration team in-charge of connecting the data streams from vendor applications-using programs that run off Amazon's Simple Queue Service (SQS) to pull all campaign related data-NPG VAN, Blue State Digital applications, polling data from data providers, emails data and many more, while processing them in real time. This plethora of data combination with data from voting histories, consumer database, shopping and television viewing history of the electorate, the Vertica database and the VAN database facilitated campaign analytics (Gallagher, 2012; Kriess, 2016).

In using this data platform, access was given to both campaign staff, activist and volunteers and the information gleaned from it made 'ground game' for the campaign more effective (Issenberg, 2013). Furthermore, artificial intelligence derived from the central database equally informed campaign advertising (Newman, 2016a). Taken together, a central big data repository and apps deployed for harnessing and processing campaign information knitted the Obama campaign together, making decision making during the campaign a function of measurable data (ibid). According to Sifry (2011a) through the campaign's use of data, the various departments of the campaign-the political, finance and field operations all talked to each other in real time with data 'flowing back and forth and informing the actions of each other'.

That said, while this new campaign infrastructure seem to differ from how US political parties managed data and understood voters in the past (Issenberg, 2013, Kreiss, 2016), there is no comparative commentary as to whether such data based and technologically driven campaign infrastructure is now in use or in its development stage in other democracies. This thesis attempts to address this gap.

3. Predictive Modelling

No other presidential campaign (besides Obama's) has relied so heavily on the science of analytics, using information to predict voting patterns. Election Day may have changed the game.

Parsons and Hennessey (2012)

According to Siegel (2013) the earliest effort at predicting behaviour dates back to World War II when Norbert Weiner tried to predict the behavior of German airplane pilots in 1940-with the goal of shooting them down. In recent times, the rise of big data is making predictive analytics an embedded part of contemporary society (ibid). As Balicki et al. (2015) notes, big data driven artificial intelligence and algorithms is increasingly making it possible to understand human behavior. The literature on social psychology and personality also indicate that 'big social data' (Lambiotte and Kosinski, 2014) and social media language (Park et al., 2014) offer 'unprecedented insights into population-wide patterns and detailed characteristics' of individuals political attitudes (Park et al., 2014), and personality (Adali and Golbeck, 2014).

Thus, enabled by developments in machine learning, it is now possible to accurately measure an individual's personality along the big-five factor model of personality (i.e. Openness, Conscientiousness, Extroversion, Agreeableness and Neuroticism) in ways that open opportunities for improved product and service delivery, targeted online marketing and people centered manipulation (Lambiotte and Kosinski, 2014; Youyou et al., 2015). However, questions are on the increase regarding the ethical and privacy implication of these approaches and the need to find a balance between the opportunities and dangers.

That said, the supply of these quantitative, algorithmic, predictive analytics is fast gaining foothold in sectors like banking, marketing and e-commerce etc. In politics, the Obama's campaign team incorporated this trend into campaigning (Nickerson and Rogers, 2014). For example, the consequence of the campaign data platform (i.e. Project *Narwhal*) enabled team Obama to produce artificial intelligence with clearer perception of voters that moved the campaign away from demographic targeting of past campaigns (Rogers, 2013; Hersh, 2015).

As Kreiss (2016) show, the individual voter's data on Project *Narwhal* made this approach possible by enhancing the construction of predictive models on individuals based on their likelihood to support, turn out to vote, and be persuaded. Led by Rayid Ghani chief data scientist of the 2012 presidential campaign and over 50 other analytics experts, this approach changed the process of voter identification-through its tech-driven-data crunching and mining approach, and broke new ground by applying predictive modelling to deliver action oriented insight and to 'drive millions of per-voter campaign decisions' (Siegel, 2013). Johnson (2016) suggest that such predictive behavioral clusters and segmentation of voters drove television and online ad, flyers, door knock- door-to-door canvassing and who to call.

According to Issenberg (2013), Nickerson and Rogers (2014), Rogers (2014) and Kriess (2016) the predictive analytics result were in three categories-behavior scores, support scores, and responsiveness scores. For behavior scores, data was used to calculate the probability that citizens will engage in particular forms of political activity including voting, donations, volunteering and rally attendance. Support scores predicted the political preference of citizens so that in the real world of budget constraints campaign only contact a subset of citizens (ibid). In the responsiveness scores, randomized field experiments were used to predict how citizens would respond to campaign outreach to ensure efficient, supporters prone targeted campaigning, while citizens predicted to be unresponsive can be avoided by the campaign.

In terms of campaigning, the worth of the predictive modelling is in the fact that they were used for door-to-door canvassing, phone calls, as well as television advertising, online ads and social media outreach (Issenberg, 2013; Kriess, 2016; Nielsen, 2012; Nickerson and Rogers, 2014). Siegel (2013) suggest that this calculated form of voter understanding guided the campaign's political marketing and advertising strategies, as well as field canvassing, taking volunteers to location and houses within highly dominated Republican neighborhoods, thereby, changing in a unique way the standard protocols of past elections.

Historically, this approach deviates from how political parties understood voters in the past, where socio-economic and geodemographic factors constituted the basis for voter understanding and mobilization (Johnson, 2016). Thus, in comparative sense, this thesis attempts to provide answers regarding whether there is an incorporation of this approach of predictive modelling in recent election campaign in Nigeria and the United Kingdom.

4. Data Mining and Microtargeting

As an approach, data mining involves the use of technological advances to gather information, identify relationships, patterns and characteristics about a set of individuals through machine learning, predictive modelling and analytics with the aim of personalization of messages or what is referred to as microtargeting (Becky, 2008; Newman, 2016b; Owen, 2013). Also called micro-niche, microtargeting is a technique that involves mining an individual's personal data and devising directed messages that appeal to that individual and communicating such message on their preferred channel (Owen, 2013; Rouse, 2013; Wyloge, 2012; Kruikeimer et al., 2016). Behavioral media researchers (Poiesz and Robben, 1996) agree that messages and adverts are more effective when placed before audience that are interested in them. Thus, the aim of

customer directed message-customization or microtargeting is to ensure that advertising becomes on the basis of preference (Newman, 2016a).

To produce the artificial intelligence needed for microtargeting, microtargeters harnesses multiple consumer data point variables ranging from kind of car, magazine subscription, shopping history, donation to charity, size and kind of house, ethnicity, income, family size, marital status, drivers licence etc. from 'data houses' and then crunch it for microtargeting purposes (Wyloge, 2012). A combination of these sets of data and more can provide useful insight about individual preferences and aid person centered decision making (ibid).

One of the techniques used to derive microtargeting intelligence is data mining (Murray and Scime, 2010). As an analysis technology, it uses specific algorithms to extract intelligence from large data sets (ibid). As a process, it involves both human and software resources and the inductive analysis of data to find previously unknown patterns of relationship in a data set (Hofmann and Tierney, 2003; Scime and Murray, 2007). By identifying relationships and enabling classification as well as association in data, data mining algorithms drive explanation and prediction and have a long history in marketing (Murray and Scime, 2010; Osie-Bryson, 2004).

In recent times, this technique has become part of political Parties tool for campaigning and is powering the personalization and individualization of campaign messages-television ads, volunteer or activist knock on the doors, messaging, emails, fundraising messages as well as online advertising (Abse, 2013; Issenberg, 2013; Kriess, 2016; Wyloge, 2012; Newman, 2016a).

According to Issenberg, 'microtargeting' is now the maxim of successful campaigns. First tried in 2004 by Republican strategist Karl Rove through the Voter Vault platform developed during George W. Bush presidential campaign, it was modified and used in 2008 by the Obama campaign team through the Voter Builder database and advanced in 2012 with Project *Narwhal* (Issenberg, 2013; Johnson, 2016; Wyloge, 2012). According to Sifry (2011a) microtargeting was one of the important developments introduced by the Obama campaign. Commentators on the 2012 elections like Abse (2013) are the view that data driven microtargeting helped Obama raised millions of dollars and millions of votes.

In deploying microtargeting, the campaign used its integrated big data app called 'optimizer' project that assign scores to voters who they had identified through artificial intelligence as sympathetic to the campaign. Armed with this information, the campaign used focused emails and text messages to reach particular group of voters and gained insight that informed

placement of campaign ads (Cruz, 2012; Owen, 2013; Newman, 2016a). This approach was also used to develop messages, attract and recruit volunteers and raise campaign finance as they match messages with a set of individuals on the basis of support for Obama and the likelihood to vote (Fouhy, 2012; Issenberg, 2013).

Relying on the voter behavior intelligence gathered from Project *Narwhal*, the campaign was able to strategically direct campaign staff, activist and volunteers to contact these individuals with voter tested messages, direct mails, TV/ online ads, door-to-door canvassing and by telephone, making targeted messages one of the successes of the Obama campaign (Issenberg, 2013, Lloyd, 2012; Newman, 2016b).

Incentivized by new technology, Obama campaign signal a significantly new and different approach compared to how political campaigns contacted voters in past US elections (Issenberg, 2013; Johnson, 2016; Wyloge, 2012). Thus, considering that there is little or nothing about this in contemporary comparative political communication literature, this thesis intends to shed more light regarding whether there is a combination of data mining and microtargeting techniques in recent election campaign in Nigeria and the United Kingdom.

5. Web 2.0: Digital and Social Media

According to Corbett and Edwards (2018) Web 2.0 'encompasses the various segments of social media such as blogs, social networking sites (SNSs) (e.g. Facebook), microblogging tools (e.g. Twitter), content communities (e.g. YouTube), team websites, forums and bulletin boards'. In Kaplan and Haenlein (2010) view, these new media technologies represent the fastest and rapidly expanding platforms for information sharing and propagation. As Jensen et al., (2012:5) observe, its expansion has increased the 'repertoire of modes and channels of political participation, communication and information' that facilitates the 'creation and diffusion of political messages as well as political recruitment'. For example, Facebook-user's life and messaging, Twitter's-short messages, Instagram-pictures and Pinterest etc. are now popular platforms for sharing and accessing news, understanding social behaviors and civic participation (Baranuik, 2016; Corbett and Edwards, 2018).

Ragnedda and Ruiu (2017) suggest that the attractiveness of these platforms to politicians is in their potential for 'enlarging social network' and 'increasing people visibility'. Kruikeimer et al. (2016) are of the view that for campaigns, these tools are incentivizing online advertising and targeting through user's demographic profiles that enable precision messaging and the activation of voters' persuasion knowledge. Chadwick (2012) and Lilleker et al. (2015) also

assert that with these social networking tools, political parties can build 'network environments' and new forms of community that opens the door of politics 'beyond formal party membership'.

For example, while radio and television took close to four decades to reach 50 million users, Facebook managed to reach one hundred million users in less than nine months and today boast of over one billion registered users with over 823 million daily visits (Ramalingan and Chinnaiyah, 2017). A good number of other social networking sites-Twitter, Google+, Myspace, Instagram, Tumblr, Foursquare, LinkedIn also harbor its own share of millions of accounts and profiles (see Leeson, 2016). Although, social media accounts have the possibility of being automated and fake, the rise of these digital media platforms is enveloping populations at very fast rates and redefining interaction and communication among large population, with impact in 'peoples social capital, civic and political participation behaviors (Baranuik, 2016; Humero et al. 2012; Laleh, 2010; Leeson, 2016). However, there is also debate as to whether these platforms are incentivizing or threatening political participation and discourse (Farrar-Myers and Vaughn, 2016).

Nevertheless, evidence from recent electioneering shows that political parties and campaigns have not been left out in adapting to the changing technology and communication environment (Bimber, 2014; Johnson, 2016). Barack Obama's campaign of 2008 and 2012 provides a good illustration of the use of digital media for political purpose (Germany, 2009; Stromer-Galley, 2014, Kriess, 2016). According to Issenberg (2013) the Obama campaign is particularly 'celebrated for its use of social media and smartphones in the political process'.

Johnson (2016) is of the view, that the campaign 'made history by integrating online technology and presidential campaigning as never before', spending over \$100 million on a plethora of networking tools-i.e. Mybarackobama.com, BarackTV, YouTube (with over 20 million watching the Obama Channel), Facebook (with over 2.3million friends in 2008 and 32.3 million in 2012), MySpace (800,000), Google+, Instagram, Pinterest, Tumblr, Twitter, blogs,'robo-calls' to reached supporters, mostly millennials, and to create an online community (Garrett, 2008; Talbot, 2008; Graff, 2009; Sifry, 2012; Kriess, 2016). The creativity of the campaign was more evident in the networking effect of these tools as those who signed up to MyBO could form their groups and communities, set fundraising plans, volunteer and host events. Thus, re-engineering the principle of the two-step flow (Lazarsfeld et al. 1948; Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955; Katz, 1957). By deploying the supporters multiplying power of social networking tools, Obama by Election Day knew over 7 million supporters, held online town hall meetings via Twitter ('The Ask Me Anything 'AMA online engagement through reddit.com, with such platforms and

meetings used to: (a) point voters to where to register and vote; (b) teach supporters how build a national grassroots infrastructure. Taken together, over 75, 000 of such offline campaign events were hosted, with 4,000 Unite for Change house parties held to persuade neighborhoods, Clinton supporters and undecided voters (Fineman, 2008; Stelter, 2008; Newman, 2016a).

Furthermore, through social media integration with a number of apps, the campaign inspired highly personalized forms of communication through email, online ads and text messages to targeted population (Gallagher, 2012; Issenberg, 2012, 2013; Sifry, 2012; Stromer-Galley, 2014). Now, considering the trans-national nature of social networking sites and the phenomenal changes they inspired as channels of communication and campaigning as exemplified by the Obama campaign, this thesis seek to address the gap in the literature regarding how these tools are serving political parties and campaigns in Nigeria and the United Kingdom. Here, Nigeria is particularly important because of the paucity of research.

6. *Digital Fundraising and Small Donors*

Money has continued to play an increasingly important role in elections as political parties, political action committees (PACs) and trade unions struggle to influence elections by contributing towards their preferred candidates (Corrado and Corbett, 2009; Johnson, 2016). In the US, efforts to raise more campaign funds have followed the rising cost of elections. For example, only \$426 million was contributed in 1996, \$800 million in 2004, \$1.8 billion in 2008 and \$2 billion in 2012 (Johnson, 2016). However, the landscape of political financing changed significantly in 2008 as the Obama campaign broke new grounds in fundraising by moving away from traditional fat cat contributors (ibid). The success story is attributed in part, to the way campaign team deployed internet tools first used by Howard Dean in 2004 for fundraising. Thus, the campaign was able to reshape the world of fundraising in the US while relying on data driven insight from *Project Narwhal* (Ahonen, 2012a).

According to Corrado and Corbett (2009), Obama's 2008 campaign signaled the demise of public funding as a major source of campaign money. With Obama opting out from the \$84 million election fund public grant, he went on to raise over \$400 million in primary campaign dollars alone-a sum greater than the total amount accrued by all ten Democratic contenders in 2004 and exceeded the money raised by Hillary Clinton by more than \$200 million (ibid). Furthermore, after receiving the general elections donation of mid-October, Obama had raked in over \$643 million-40 percent of the \$1.6 billion total funds raised by all major party contenders in

the 2008 primary and general election campaign, with the bulk of it coming from the campaign's online donors (Luo, 2007; Johnson, 2016). Although, the campaign showed strength in attracting large donors, the overriding story of campaign financing in 2008 was small donors who formed the majority of Obama's donor list. For example, in 2008, the Obama campaign raised over \$500 million digitally with over 53 percent of that coming from small donors who had donated less than \$200. In 2012 the campaign raised over \$690 million digitally, with over 29 percent coming from small donors who had donated \$200 or less (Corrado and Corbett, 2009; Corrado, 2014; Johnson, 2016).

According to Green (2008), Mosk (2008) and Corrado and Corbett (2009) the small donor online fundraising platform was designed around Obama's MyBarackObama.com campaign website, where the campaign took advantage of the potential the internet and social network tools offered to make giving to the campaign 'nothing short of an online phenomena'. With perfectly designed click and donate platform on the BarackObama.com website, users easily donated, and signed up for a subscription kind donation program that allowed them to regularly donate with credit cards on a monthly basis until they reach the contribution limit legally allowed. Website users were also able to establish their own fundraising page where they can encourage friends to contribute to the campaign while they watch their personal 'fundraising thermometers' online rise. In this unique and creative way, 'an online fundraising psychology' was created by the campaign that facilitated small group and individual networks who fundraise for the campaign (Corrado and Corbett, 2009).

That said, although Americans have always donated to campaigns, 'with the share of adult' Americans who 'donated directly to candidates doubling since 1992' (Hughes, 2017). However, it is the technological dimension of the political finance mobilization of the Obama campaign that differ from past patterns. Thus, this thesis intends to add to the literature, whether such small donors and mediated approach to campaign donation and campaign finance mobilization are also a feature of recent elections in Nigeria and the United Kingdom.

7. Air War: Political Advertising

Political advertising, 'polispot' (Diamond and Bates, 1992) or 'infomercials' (West 1993)-the presentation of candidates, political parties and issues to the electorate in the media have a place of great importance in American campaigns and electioneering (Holtz-Bacha and Kaid, 1995; Holtz-Bacha and Kaid, 2006; Berger, 2011). Air wars represent such politically motivated advertising on television that extend far beyond the debates between candidates during an

electoral cycle (Niall, 2012). Although, new technologies (digital media, computers, smart phones and tablets etc.) are changing the media and advertising landscape, traditional media advertising still offer spots for various forms of identification ads, argument ads, attack and negative ads as well as positive ads as political parties and candidates attempt to influence the electorate's 'mind industry' (Enzensberger, 1974; Kern, 1989; Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1995).

Historically, the first television political advertising in the US is credited to Dwight D. Eisenhower presidential campaign in 1952 (West, 1993). In recent elections, television advertising has remained an influential channel for the purchase and dissemination of political information across the broad spectrum of US election campaign, with increasing spending that seem to double in every new election cycle (Holtz-Bacha and Kaid, 2006; Johnson, 2016; Kaid, 2006). In both elections for example, Obama campaign spent over \$293 million on television advertising in 2008 and \$404 million in 2012 (Fenn, 2009; Johnson, 2016). Arteton and Greener (2009) and Fenn (2009) suggest that Obama campaign advertised on selected television channels, outspending his main challenger. The campaign also deployed digital advertising, out-emailing, out-blogging, out-tweeting and out-YouTubing his challenger (Niall, 2012).

Furthermore, by the 2012 election cycle, data driven advances in voter understanding incentivized by Project *Narwhal* led to more narrowcasted advertising as the campaign targeted specific messages on specific platforms based on voters' characteristics (Germany, 2014). Insight and artificial intelligence from Project *Narwhal* were also used to inform television ad placement, calls, emails and text messages (Ahonen, 2012a). The campaign also deployed targeted ad buying using specific terms related to Obama, like 'Obama singing', 'Obama birthday' with expectation that those who searched for these terms online would make the adverts go viral (Newman, 2016a).

That said, while political advertising is not new in US elections, it is the data enabled pin-point style of advertising in the Obama campaign that makes it different from the past. Thus, in the context of comparative political communication literature, this thesis seeks to enhance understanding regarding whether such campaign advertising that deviates from longstanding traditional approaches is now in use for electioneering in Nigeria and the United Kingdom.

8. Ground Game

Our campaign was not hatched in the halls of Washington; it began in the backyards of Des Moines and the living rooms of Concord and the front porches of Charleston..... . It drew strength from the young people who rejected the myth of their generation's apathy, who left their

homes and their families for jobs that offered little pay and less sleep. It drew strength from the not-so-young people who braved the bitter cold and scorching heat to knock on the doors of perfect strangers, and from the millions of Americans who volunteered and organized, and proved that more than two centuries later, a government of the people, by the people, and for the people has not perished from the earth. This is your victory. Barack Obama, November 4, 2008, Grant Park, Chicago (quoted in McKenna and Han, 2015).

Ground game or ground wars involves people-centered, contact-based personalized political communication during campaigns (Nielsen, 2012). It reflects electioneering tactics deployed to return campaigns to what Jil Lawrence (Cited in Joe, 2004) refers to as the-person-to-person-approach. This approach to vote seeking is incentivized by suggestions that personal contact during campaigns, and door-to-door canvassing can get out votes (Green and Gerber, 2008). Although person-to-person approach to vote canvassing through campaign staff, volunteers, and activist have long been part of American campaigns. However, recent advances in data mining and predictive analytics have inspired the introduction of personalization and narrowcasting in ground game campaign efforts (Nielsen, 2012). Guided by voter based artificial intelligence extracted from Project *Narwhal* and other integrated apps (i.e. Vertica, Dreamcatcher, Facebook), the Obama campaign was able to make target based contact with voters-totalling over 126 million door-to-door visit in 2012 and telephone calls based on the individual's models constructed from data (Issenberg, 2013; Semiatin, 2016). Through a programme called Airwolf, the campaign also identified postal voters and kept contact with them via emails in a unique marriage of 'the online and offline world' (ibid).

In an era of weakening political loyalties and rising apolitical populations, the campaign also achieved something extraordinary with the assemblage of over 2.2 million activists and volunteers in 2012-with more than 30, 000 of those leading neighborhood teams that organized and mobilized communities (McKenna and Han, 2015). Through the campaign's Voter Activation Network (VAN), these army of volunteers had access to a list and printout of voters name, addresses, basic demographics and checklist as well as an app containing a checklist of specific data to gather from every door-knock which they fed back to the campaign (Nielsen, 2012). The country-wide organizational structure and grassroots army mostly concentrated in battleground states was powered by over 700 field offices nationally in 2008 compared to the Republicans 400 (Masket, 2009) and 649 to the Republican 261 in 2012 (Corrado, 2014). Ahohen (2012b) is of the view that the Obama's campaign ground game army succeeded in visiting over 7 million Narwhal targeted homes before Election Day.

Central to the recruitment of the millennials who volunteered for the campaign and facilitated the interactive success of the field canvassers and the *cave*-i.e. campaign headquarters was MyBarackObama.com website that drove constant exchange and update of information and data. The disciplined ground game tactics of identifying and mobilizing supporters, holding them in line, and turning them out on election day led to 92% of the vote Obama received in 2008 (Rove, 2012a). According to Mullen (forthcoming) 'for all the technological sophistication of the Obama Model' in 2008 and 2012, the ground war army is a demonstration that there was no substitute for actual people who organize campaigns, knock doors and make telephone calls'.

That said, while canvassing itself is not entirely new in US elections, the data driven human agents led-'door-to-door campaigning' and canvassing of the Obama campaign differ from the 1950s when targeted canvassing was 'on the basis of printed voter files' and 'precincts captains' knowledge 'about their turf' (Nielsen, 2009). Thus, from a comparative perspective, this thesis will address the gap in the literature regarding how and whether such patterns of data led canvassing are emerging in Nigeria and the UK.

9. Political Opinion Polling

Historically, agenda shaping political opinion assessment in the United States started in the 1930s (Herbst, 1993; Kavanagh, 1995). However, as a campaign tactic, its institutional development and deployment is traceable to Kennedy's presidential campaign of 1960 when changes in the political, journalistic and campaign research scenes as well as the rise of advertising agencies in political campaign became dominant (Kelly, 1960; Cantril, 1995). During the primary context to win the Democratic nomination in 1960 for example, 50 polls were conducted and another 27 during the general election campaign by the Kennedy's team (Jacobs and Shapiro, 1995).

Today, this campaign tactic has endured as most campaign now rely on opinion research via telephone surveys, online polling, and short automated telephone surveys to inform them about what the electorate think (Johnson, 2016). Their potency in understanding voters, forecasting electoral outcomes and the design of campaign strategy have increased their attractiveness (Braun, 2012). Hersh (2015) is of the view that perception of voters in recent elections is no longer a merely vague idea, but electronically detailed-with constituents within a jurisdiction properly profiled and described.

For the Obama campaign of 2008 and 2012, access to new technology and techniques-apps and social media, meant they had new tools that enabled more automated polling approaches-

robo-polls, quickie telephone surveys, online polling, and even do-it-yourself surveys, thus moving away from traditional polling methods (Johnson, 2016).

Now, considering that very little or nothing is known albeit comparatively, regarding whether such shifts from traditional political opinion polling to automation is taking place in other democracies, this thesis will rely on recent elections in Nigeria and the United Kingdom to provide evidence that will seek to address this gap.

10. Branding, Image and Message

The marketing and advertising literature acknowledge that branding, image and message have potential for impact (Lee-Marshment, 2009; Darrel and Vincent, 2011; Lilleker, 2015; Scammell, 2015). Similarly, the literature also suggest that image, message and brand management are also key in marketing as they combine to play an important and critical role in customer decision making and choices (see Newman, 2016a).

However, like brands, political office seekers now attempt to also make such brand-like connection through their personality, character, policy position (s) and message (s) in order to bond with the electorate (Temple, 2013). Experts agree that a candidate's political image-policy position, personality, character, and affiliation to voters and opinion leaders can all be shaped and developed. As Newman (2016a) argue, this understanding is incentivizing image management of politicians and their parties in contemporary campaign, following arguments that consumer-based marketing strategies can influence voter behavior.

In 2008 and 2012 the Obama campaign developed a unique brand and image using strategically coordinated slogans, logos and colours with clear message to create a unified campaign (Newman, 2016a). Again, taking advantage of social networking technologies, mobile applications, and non-traditional media, the campaign used interviews, focus groups, surveys, and experiment informed programs to understand both the most effective campaign message and medium of delivery (Issenberg, 2013; Newman, 2013). According to Hersh (2015:170), the 'differentiated messages with which the Obama campaign experimented had slight variations in language and subject lines, designed to gauge how to pique people's interest and inspire them to either open an e-mail or make donation.

In terms of image, Obama was presented as a unifier both in 2008 and 2012, while his campaign labelled John McCain as 'Mcsame' (Newman, 2016a). In other words, Obama campaign branded Senator McCain as a cloned president Bush who will continue the failed

policy path of the Republican Party (Kenski et al, 2010: 27). Although, the campaign struggled to find an appealing message in 2012 largely because of the various policy positions Obama had chosen during his first term. Nevertheless, the campaign slogan of 'Change We Can Believe In', 'Yes We Can' in 2008 and 'Leadership We Can Believe In', and 'Forward' in 2012 generated attachment and loyalty in similar ways as company marketing products (Newman, 2016a). According to Newman a 'strong brand, image, and strong message'-Hope and Change' provided very resonating rallying points for voters. Taken together, consistency in message, brand and image was reasonably effective for the Obama campaign and a contributory factor to the campaign's success (Ahonen, 2012b).

However, from the standpoint of comparative literature, whether such consistently coordinated branding, image and technologically enhanced message testing is featuring in election campaign in other countries remain largely unknown. Thus, this thesis attempts to address this gap using recent elections in Nigeria and the United Kingdom as case studies.

11. Negative Campaigning

The use of negative advertising and controversial issues is now commonplace in electioneering campaign (West, 2009; Geer, 2012; Nai and Walter, 2015). This trend stem from the believe that negative ads impact on the electorate emotions and overall electoral outcome (Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1995; West, 2009; Iyengar, 2011; Wadok, 2015). Since the 1964 Daisy ad aired by the Lyndon Johnson campaign for example, negative advertising has continued to be incentivized by the media because of the coverage they receive (Geer, 2012). Obama's campaign of 2008 and 2012 did not ignore this campaign tactic (Langley, and Holmes, 2008; Lee and Murray, 2012).

For example, the Wesleyan University Media Project that surveys presidential advertising in the US indicated that Obama ran more negative ads in September and November (Wesleyan Media Project, 2012). Kessler (2012) estimates that over 245,000 of such ads were aired between July and Election Day in 2012. Rove (2012b) suggest that in contrast to the positive message of hope and optimism that guided the campaign in 2008, Obama got 'down and dirty' with negative campaign that targeted Romney's character, wealth and business ethics. For example, Romney was attacked for 'shipping US jobs overseas', for 'false filing to the Securities and Exchange Commission', and for having a 'Swiss Bank account' as well as offshore investment funds (ibid). Obama's team TV ads also painted Romney as a 'corporate raider nasty guy you wouldn't trust

to run the economy' (Ahonen, 2012b). According to Rove (2012b) such negative attacks allowed President Obama to talk less about the bad state of the country's economy.

That said, although from the US perspective, negative campaigning is a longstanding campaign tactic (Geer, 2012). However, this thesis intends to offer a comparative view of the pattern (s) of deployment of this element in recent elections in Nigeria and the United Kingdom-a gap in recent literature.

12. Campaign and Feedback Strategy

Although the American voter have opportunity to elect their president every four years, low voter turnout means campaigns need to design interventions to get-out-the-vote (Green et al. 2003). Thus, under rising and increasing voter apathy, the need to devise mediated strategies to get voters out on Election Day have increasingly become important (Imai, 2005; Johnson, 2016).

However, drawing from the understanding that face-to-face canvassing and personal communication can be more effective in mobilizing voter turnout (Gerber and Green, 2000; Green and Gerber, 2008; Costa and Shang, 2015), the Obama campaign deployed experiment revolutions in partnership with the Analytics Institute to performed randomized trials and Experiment-Informed Programs (EIPs) that enabled them gauge the impact of campaign ads and messages in real time (Issenberg, 2012b). According Issenberg, this method 'combines recent exciting developments in electioneering': 'randomized' and 'controlled experiments able to isolate cause and effect in political activity and microtargeting statistical models' able to calculate 'the probability a voter will hold a particular view based on hundreds of variables'. As a campaign strategy and get-out-the-vote-technique, the approach gives the vote mobilization effort an empirical mindedness such that campaign ground troops can be more precise in making contacts and in producing mediated feedback to the campaign headquarters. As Nielsen (2009) suggest, this approach runs on data insight, generates data and move campaigning away from over-reliance on 'precincts captains'-i.e. individuals' knowledge'.

That said, using a comparative lens, this study intends to examine whether such data led mediated approach to field feedback in campaigning is also happening in Nigeria and the UK.

13. Campaign and Interaction Strategy

Historically, top-down campaign approaches tend to dominate electioneering strategies (Negrine, 2008; Johnson, 2017). However, the Obama campaign showed creativity in 2008 and 2012 by creating an expansive community-like interactive campaign-where affiliate

organizations, the Democratic Party, activist, volunteers and ground game troops interacted conveniently and consistently, sharing data and information effectively for voter mobilization, fundraising and get-out-the-vote efforts through the use of social networking sites and new technologies (Germany, 2009; Nielsen, 2012; McKenna and Han, 2015; Johnson, 2016). According to Johnson (2016: 28) 'with the enormous opportunities' created by 'online communication', 'a new' bottom-up model of campaigning that fosters and encourage 'citizen input' seem to be appearing.

For example, the Obama campaign social networking hub MyBarackObama.com facilitated the interactive approach-giving sympathizers and supporters, activist and volunteers the opportunity to organize meetings and neighborhood events, fund raise, invite friends into their network and expand the campaign network by giving volunteers access to campaign information, data base and training kits (Talbot, 2008; Graff, 2009). According to Scola (2012) and Kreiss (2016) 'approximately 20 million' of such meetings were held before the 2012 election, with technology and data driving more sophistication than the 2008 campaign. Scola (2012), Sifry (2012) and Ahonen (2012a) found that through applications like the Call Tool and Dashboard, field campaign team leaders had more control and access to data on the basis of their responsibility and were able to organize over 358,00 events and had direct dialogue with supporters totaling over 150 million by Election Day.

That said, considering the trans-national nature of digital communication technologies and the dearth of comparative commentary on patterns of campaign interaction in modern elections, this thesis will also address the gap in the literature regarding whether such bottom-up model and style of campaigning is also emerging in Nigeria and the United Kingdom.

14. Speed and Consistency of Campaign Communication

The impact of the age of media abundance (Seymour-Ure, 1996)-multiple communication channels powered by new technologies and round the clock media environment in the third age (Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999) runs through the activities of political parties in democratic contest (Bimber, 2003; Chadwick, 2006). Today, a good number of political actors have embraced these shifts in the mechanisms for the delivery of political messages (Dahlgren, 2009; Anduiza et al, 2012). According to Johnson (2016), under this new environment, new media has led to the speeding up of political campaign in the past two decades, as the 'fifteen-minute and thirty-minute television newscast' and 'morning, noon, 6:00 p.m and 11:00 p.m time slots' vanishes. Johnson is of the view that as the 'proliferation of 24/7 news cycle' continue to surge,

'politicking' during electioneering campaign have equally taken a 24/7 dimension. Thus, with the possibility of 24hrs negative attacks, campaigns have developed mechanisms for immediate response online, offline and on television. For example, in taking advantage of the multifaceted media environment, the Obama campaign hosted websites like 'Fight the Smears' which countered and corrected falsehood about Obama and 'asked viewers to report viral smear campaign and named names of those responsible' (ibid). This, way the campaign fought against smear and negative campaign instantly (Johnson, 2009).

That said, from a comparative perspective, this thesis intends to add to comparative literature regarding whether the changing media environment is also inspiring speed and consistency of campaign communication in Nigeria and the United Kingdom.

15. Campaign Games

There is a growing trend in the use of games to inspire behavior, learning and political engagement (McCormick, 2011; Foxman and Forelle, 2014). Referred to as gamification in the literature, it entails utilizing 'game rewards' as triggers to potentially influence and inspire behavior through task designed games (Basulto, 2011; McGonigal, 2011; Track, 2013). In 2008 and 2012, the Obama campaign deployed game related approaches to build an enticing relationship with the electorate (Newman, 2016). For example, for fundraising, the campaign designed a gamified fundraising psychology that used online 'fundraising thermometers' to measure and reward achievement (Corrado and Corbett, 2009). Similarly, gamified precincts and State-based competitions were also used for activist and volunteers to drive mobilization. For example, through campaign's app like Call Tool, Identity and Dashboard, volunteers and activist get-out-the-vote efforts were published on the 'leadersboard' in a way that gamified their effort and encouraged friendly competition (Gallagher, 2012). To get supporters out to the polling station, the campaign deployed a unique 'voter turnout gimmick', 'by sending out a 'voter report card' where each Obama-friendly registered voter's recent voting behavior was given a 'school grade' and compared to the neighborhood average'. This strategy showed how good a voter you have been compared to your neighbour, thus, 'in effect', gamifying 'the election turnout' (Ahonen, 2012).

That said, as a new campaign tactic, this thesis intends to show whether such gamified approach to campaigning is also emerging in elections in Nigeria and the United Kingdom as a way of addressing the gap in comparative literature.

16. The Permanent Campaign: Campaigning for Office and Campaigning in Office

According to Ornstein and Mann (2000), Elmer et al. (2012) and Doherty (2013b), the dividing line between campaigning and governing has grown increasingly blurred as electoral politics techniques move into the political cycle of governance. Referred to in the literature as the permanent campaign (Blumenthal, 1980), it is a 'hyper-partisan, insider-driven political game' that combines 'image making and strategic calculation that turns government into a perpetual campaign and strategic calculation that remakes government into an instrument designed to sustain an elected official's popularity' (Blumenthal, 1980; Elmer et al. 2012). In his work, Sidney Blumenthal described how United States politics has moved from periodic elections to the 'permanent campaign'. According to Hecl (2000) this change has turned elected officials from navigators-steering the ship of state to warriors-who seek to 'defeat and destroy their enemies' since their eye is always on the next election.

Henninger (2012) suggest that Obama's eight years was not just a presidency, but a 'political corporation providing political product' with a clear trademark of the 'permanent campaign' displayed first in the *Change.gov* transition website that sort the views of supporters and the disproportionate travel to key electoral states (Scherer, 2009; Doherty, 2013a). Doherty is of the view that in keeping the permanent campaign machine alive, battleground states become the disproportionate destination when a president travels from the White House. He cites Obama as an example, of the first commander in chief in the last 32 years to visit all of the presidential battleground states during his first year in office-a permanent campaign manifestation (ibid).

Furthermore, the transformation of the 'Obama for America' campaign platform to 'Organizing for America'-a 'political group that mobilize supporters and dismiss critics represent another display of the permanent campaign that aimed to build a 'governance organizing model' (Rove, 2009; Melber, 2010). According to Issenberg (2013) Organizing for America also became a platform for testing citizens' response to some of Obama's policies as team Obama kept their campaign permanent. In Trish (2009) view, Organizing for America (OFA) was a well-coordinated campaign institutionalization effort directed at 'altering the basic framework of Democratic Party organizational politics, including the fundamental relationship between the president, the party and campaign volunteers'. It was according to Trish a President's structure to sustain an electoral movement beyond an election season and an effort to enlist the campaign's 'ground war army' (Nielsen, 2012) 'in the business of governing' (ibid).

Built on the movement and momentum that made Obama's campaign a success and launched before Obama's inauguration, Organizing for America (OFA) relied on an email list and the BarackObama.com web address and staff in almost every state to drive the President's

governance agenda (Trish, 2009). Supervised by David Plouffe Obama's campaign manager and Mitch Stewart its director, OFA's first activity was a State-wide 'listening tour' to connect with campaign's ground war army as well as 'county party leaders' to solicit their views on the issues to prioritize (Ibid). According to Trish, OFA also made impact in the March 2009 budget debate by asking volunteers to contact 'members of congress directly in order to convey popular support for the president'. Furthermore, in a bid to influence decisions in Washington, OFA volunteers were asked to 'stand with Sotomayor', when justice Sonia Sotomayor was penciled for confirmation at the Supreme Court. Again, in asserting itself as a policy formulation pressure group, OFA campaign's effort were also visible during the health care reform debates as volunteers were asked to write letters to members of Congress and to collect and post 'health insurance horror stories' online (ibid). According to Trish, OFA was an elaborate attempt to import campaign structures 'as a tool for governing', to push a President's policy initiatives and the framing of public policy.

That said, from the standpoint of the comparative goals of this work, this thesis intends to examine whether patterns or incidence of the permanent campaign are also actively manifesting in recent Nigerian and British elections.

In conclusion, the sixteen elements of the Obama model discussed above captures a technological dimension and picture of campaigning that indicate a shift in how a modern campaign operated for voter mobilization under the new communication, media and technological environment. Nevertheless, as Johnson (2016:29) observe, these slick and fancy 'online tools' notwithstanding, candidate charisma, excitement and authenticity is still required in modern campaign. That said, as a research project, an exploration of whether the elements above represent and are now an attraction and standard of emulation for political parties in other democracies is an important step in operationalizing and mapping the technological dimension (s) and practices of modern campaign and campaigning. Furthermore, a cross-case and cross-contextual testing of the manifestation of the elements above is also important for advancing contemporary comparative political communication literature.

2.3: Conclusion

As the analytical take-off point for this thesis, this chapter has set out the key elements of the Obama model as a comparative framework that will guide analysis in the case studies. Agreed, the sixteen elements above may not be exhaustive, nevertheless, this characterization is an

evaluative specification of the kinds of technologically enhanced political communication practices that emerged out of the 2008 and 2012 Obama campaign as indicated in the literature.

Comparatively speaking, this is necessary, since, the principal research question of this study is to explore whether the Obama campaign is today the most advance-i.e. in terms of the technological component of the campaign, and whether the model have been exported to other democracies (i.e. Nigeria and the UK). Thus, to answer the question, it was necessary to first work out a clear characterization of what the campaign or model exactly consist of, in order to come up with a framework to answer the central research question.

Thus, in setting out the sixteen elements of the Obama model above, the chapter followed a constant comparative method of reading the literature to identify 'patterns of similarity or difference' (Barbour, 2008:217). The methodological and theoretical aim is that elements of the model will serve as a set of basis parameters for comparing recent electioneering practices in the two case studies (i.e. Nigeria and the United Kingdom) as well as the 2016 Trump campaign. Thus, these elements provide lines of comparison, or what Nimmo and Swanson (1990:34) and Gideon (1995) refers to as 'pattern variables' or 'empirical categories' 'closely associated with empirical reality' to enable both comparison and theory testing. This first step in the thesis is necessary for a cross-case discovery of the technological dimension (s) and state of modern campaign and a theoretical explanation of the emergence and convergence of these practices and elements in the United States, United Kingdom and Nigeria respectively.

To test theory, the thesis draws on Swanson and Mancini's Americanization theory to explore whether the border-crossing manifestation of the technological components of the elements above can be explained as Americanization (Swanson and Mancini, 1996). To explore change in the 2016 Trump campaign, the thesis also draws on their modernization theory as a guiding lens for discovering and explaining any technologically innovative data driven practice (s) in the 2016 Trump campaign that may differ from Obama's.

As theoretical frameworks, both theories will guide explanation of the emergence of innovation and convergence in modern campaign. Under an increasingly trans-nationalized media and technology environment, this theoretical exploration seeks to enhance understanding of how components of technologically innovative campaign practices emerge and converge and how to account for differences and similarities and the role of context. In the next chapter, the relevance and value of both theories as guiding explanatory framework for the study is explained.

3: Theoretical Framework

3.1: Introduction

This chapter unpacks the theoretical insight of Americanization and Modernization (Swanson and Mancini, 1996) and the role, relevance and value of both theories as guiding explanatory framework for this thesis. However, first, the chapter highlights the theoretical and conceptual debate on both theories.

3.2: Americanization: Conceptualization, Debate and Critique

According to Aronovici (1921) the first and earliest conception of 'Americanization is a post war creation, birthed out of the need for a new and stronger national consciousness' in the United States. As Aronovici notes, the real task for early Americanization or Americanizers implied the 'weaving of national and racial characters of the alien into the fabric of American civilization'. For historians like Kuisel (2000:511) the concept signifies the 'spread of consumerism and mass culture via America as part of a global interconnectedness'. In contemporary analogy, scholars like Ritzer (2006) perceive the term as cultural imperialism, even though Kuisel (2000) contend that we discard the cultural imperialist interpretation and look at the concept historically in terms of its merit in helping us understand the 'market, advertising and political leverage that America has enjoyed'.

For Fehrenbach and Poiger (2000), Americanization can be defined as the 'transfer of goods and symbols from the United States to other countries' and how 'societies abroad have taken up and, in the process transformed these influences' (p.xiv). However, Berghahn (2010:122) is of the view that in a 'multi-polar state' and a weakened America, it has become increasingly 'difficult to discern where the new developments in economic and technological innovations now instantly circulating the globe originate'. In international relations, multipolarity describes a world where more than two countries exert similar level of socio-cultural, economic and military influence on the world stage (Varisco, 2013). Thus, the 'one-way Atlantic lane' or absolute US hegemony that make claim of practices running from the West to East is now contestable because of mutuality in global cultural flows (ibid).

In Elteren (2006:351) view, Americanization is the 'real or purported influence of one or more forms of Americanism on some social entity, material object or cultural practice'. Although Elteren rejects a 'simple equation of Americanization' that fails to account for 'local reworking' of suppose recipients, he points to the concept as a 'process in which economic, technological, political, social, cultural and/or socio-psychological influences emanating from America or

Americans impinge on values, norms, belief systems, mentalities, habits, rules, technologies, practices, institutions and behaviors of non-Americans'. For Elteren, these influences are conveyed by the importation into foreign contexts 'products, models or exemplars, images, ideas, values, ideals, technologies, practices, and behaviours originating from, or at least closely associated with America or Americans'. This perspective is however questioned by Frenkel and Shenhav (2003) for its failure in identifying 'a cross-national spread' of innovation.

In furthering the debate towards a more acceptable perspective of Americanization that moves away from the cultural imperialist viewpoint, Elteren identifies four approaches. In the first, Americanization is seen as 'assimilation' or domestication in local setting of American innovation. Here, the cultural exchange that takes place is not of 'transmission or transformation' but a negotiated exchange 'among equals'-where non-Americans 'pick and choose what they want from America's innovation and convert those to something that fit their context. In the second perspective, a poststructuralist view is adopted that rejects Americanization as cultural dominance and the idea of a 'stable identity of any culture', instead emphasis is on the 'fluidity', bi-or multidirectional' nature of cultural products. In the third perspective, Elteren's view is that the spread of cultural products across varied contexts is not the exclusive preserve of America and her influence but a function of an increasingly globalizing world that incentivize the transnational flow of ideas even though America remains an actor. In the fourth perspective, Americanization is perceived in behavioral terms, where focus is on the extent to which American innovation has brought changes in behavior and identity in other context, in terms of what 'constitute success and a good life', even though empirical measurement of this kind of Americanization is problematic (ibid).

Nevertheless, in communication scholarship, a significant amount of literature point to American inspired models as inspiration for practices in other countries. In this regard, Swanson and Mancini (1996) have had a sustained theoretical contribution to how we can examine and explain changes in political communication. Their idea of 'Americanization', which hinges on the fact that it is practices first developed in the US that become benchmark for other liberal democracies through adoption has survived long debates. The central idea of the thesis is that change (s) in political communication is an outcome of the transfer of practices and influence from the US to other countries. Specifically, the thesis holds that 'campaigning in democracies around the world is becoming more and more Americanized as candidates, political parties and news media takes cues from their counterparts in the United States' (p.4).

However, in a strong critique of the thesis, Nielsen and Kuhn (2014:4) argue that 'American forms of political communication are not, have never been and probably will never be the global standard'. Thus, Plasser and Plasser (2002:250) prefers the concept of 'hybridization' (i.e. a shopping of practices that produce a hybrid model) as explanation for transformation in political communication. For Negrine, the problem with the idea of 'Americanization' is that context limits 'full Americanization'. As Negrine argue, 'professionalization' explores better the transformation of political communication, since it 'suggests that there are common pools of knowledge about political communication from which all participants can draw' (p.152). In Negrine's words, 'whilst Americanization as an idea is a pointer to practices that have been transferred across borders, something else (i.e. 'professionalization-an improvement of practices by political actors to suit modern period' points to the circumstances or conditions that make it possible for those practices to become established elsewhere' (p.153-156).

Expanding on the Americanization thesis, Hallin and Mancini (2004) are of the view that it explains the 'manifestation of the deepest trend of homogenization or a significant degree of convergence of world media towards forms that first evolved in the United States'. As Swanson and Mancini (1996:5-6) puts it, Americanization explains 'particular types and elements of election campaign and professional activities connected with those that were first developed in the United States'. Thus, growing similarity and convergence in electioneering practices is accounted for as a by-product of American innovation, where American style is seen as 'cutting edge' (see Esser and Pfetsch, 2004; Maarek, 2011; Semetko et al., 1991).

However, when we speak about Americanization of political communication, Plasser (2000) is of the view that we ask for example, if the concept can be define based only on the fact that external communication and marketing experts are enlisted from the US. In his view, deconstructing the concept identifies two competing perspectives. First, is what Plasser calls the '*diffusion*, directional one-way convergence' theoretical viewpoint, where key characteristics and features of political communication in other countries become similar with US evolved practices. In this sense, Americanization is the adoption of US inspired practices by political actors in other democracies.

Nevertheless, Plasser (2000) also show that consultants from other countries like Britain are equally having impact in the exchange of political communication practices that we can also speak for instance of 'West Europeanization'. Thus, scholars like Neilsen (2013) are doubtful if the concept is well suited to capture developments in existing media systems. As Lilleker et al. (2017) observe, it is rather the wave of modernization, evident also in information technology

and communication infrastructure that has been the incentive for the adoption of new forms of political communication.

Plasser as well as Negrine (2008) also identify another theoretical perspective-where change is seen as a consequence of continuous and ongoing changes in structural, political and media spheres of society. In this sense, change or convergence in campaign and electioneering practices is conceived as part of a modernization process driven in part by technological, socio-economic and political developments common in many societies. From this theoretical point of view, similarities in political communication practices is a consequence of increasing 'fragmentation of the public sphere' and internal change (s) in a country (Plasser, 2000).

Nevertheless, this is not contesting that the US have been at the heart of cutting-edge innovation in political communication practices. The point being made for example by Plasser (2000) is that the diffusion of US inspired practices 'is not a linear process resulting in uniform standardization' across media centred democracies. Plasser admonishes instead, that we speak about the 'shopping model' as description for the adoption of certain US inspired practices by other countries, who do so to fit peculiar national context.

In lending their voice to the debate, Norris (2004) argue that rather than explaining convergence in trends across countries as Americanization, it seems more appropriate to 'understand this process as an import-export shopping model with campaigners borrowing whatever techniques are believed to work.. Negrine and Pathanapossolous (1996) also argue that the 'transfer' of political communication practices takes place in 'a world that has become increasingly internationalised'. Thus, attention need not necessarily be on 'transfer of practices from one country to another', but on what they call 'broader patterns of practices being adopted from a variety of sources and common pool of resources to meet domestic needs'. As Cunliffe (1974) (cited in Negrine and Pathanapossolous, 1996) argue, evidence of 'a two-way traffic in fads, reforms, inventions and theories shared between the United States and Europe' exist that show the manner in which practices flow across the globe today. For example, there is evidence that the Clinton campaign of 1992 used campaign advisers from the Labour Party in the United Kingdom. In this sense, Negrine and Pathanapossolous are of the view that attributing the rise and use of campaign practices in other countries to a single source undermines the nature and 'complexity of the modern world' and its' interconnectedness (ibid).

That said, even though the Americanization thesis lays claim to a 'one-way flow' (Negrine and Pathanapossolous, 1996), with Negrine (2008) and other scholars questioning its

appropriateness, emerging innovation in contemporary American campaign embolden such narrative today. In this sense, the Obama model as set out in chapter two stand as an exemplar.

Thus, considering that the Obama model is an American construct, and all four political parties in our case studies had hired American political communication consultants in their 2015 campaigns, the Americanization thesis is deployed in this thesis as a guide for explaining whether the use and manifestation of the Obama model in Nigeria and the UK can be ascribed to such American influence. Here, the objective as highlighted in the introduction is on testing the Americanization thesis purely in terms of its technological dimension and questioning the thesis regarding whether it provides 'suitable theoretical description' for the emergence and convergence of the Obama model in the two case studies. This way, apart from operationalizing the Obama model with evidence from Nigeria and the UK, the study can provide contemporary theoretical update to the explanatory scope of Americanization.

However, in doing this, there is informed caution factored into the methodology, in order not to assume that the same incentives, consequences and intensity in practices apply in the case studies, since context differ. Thus, as an objective, the research design is such that it will enable the revelation of contextual conditions and dynamics that may shape dissimilarity or convergence of the Obama model in Nigeria and the United Kingdom. This way, the study can account for any contextual factor that may condition the application and manifestation of the Obama model in the case studies.

3.3: Modernization

The basic question of what modernization entails permeate many disciplines. Advocates and opponents of the term have all inspired debates that span decades. This section briefly highlights such conceptualization and debate. As a way of capturing the vast theorization of social change in the literature, the section also delves into the discourse around modernization, modernity and post-modernism, globalization and glocalization as further explanations for change in social theory. This way, the section unearths the concept's theoretical value in this study.

3.4: Modernization: Conceptualization, Debate and Critique

The intellectual roots of modernization date back to the 1950s when theorist and scholars attempted to map, prescribe and predict a development path for newly independent countries of the global South (Moore, 1979). Its classical conception for example, suggest a transformation

of these states from their supposedly 'traditional' forms into those that are 'characteristically prosperous, politically stable', in resemblance of Western countries (ibid). According to Deutsch (1961) cited in (Eisenstadt, 2010) classical modernization theory is an 'understanding of society' that represent a move away from 'older and closed institutional frameworks' to the development of 'new structural features and formations' that inspire growth and 'social mobilization'.

In economic sense, the term has been framed in the 'language and concepts of many discipline', but all carrying the same promise that: 'all nations however poor were able, with the implementation of correct politics to achieve a modern standard of living by following exactly the same path as that pioneered by western nations' (McKay, 2008:56). For example, scholars like Rostow (1960) proposed five stages to modernity: the traditional society; the pre-take-off-society; take-off; the road to maturity; and the mass consumption society. This trajectory for Rostow, can be a path that economies of the global south can follow to modernize.

Nevertheless, this view is contested by scholars like Evans (1995) who account for alternative path to development or modernization in East Asia citing 'embedded autonomy' of the state as the key to progress.

In the development debate, the modernization theory has also come under attack from other directions. The most prominent being the 'dependency school' who challenged the 'trickle down' modernization prescription for peripheral states. In what is sometimes referred to as very strong position, they argue that the wealth of the North is because of the poverty of the South. Put differently, the poverty of the South is what made the North rich. In their critique, dependency school scholars-Andre Gunder Frank (1969), Samir Amin (1974; 1976) and Walter Rodney (1972) attribute the underdevelopment of the global South to the historical evolution of highly unequal intentional capitalist system. For them, it is the intentional exploitation of the 'peripheral countries' by the 'centre nations' that renders attempts by the periphery to be self-reliant difficult.

3.5: Modernization as Explanation for Social Change

The debate about modernization encompasses many dimensions. At another level, it is also used as an explanatory concept for understanding change at various levels of society.

Conceptualized as a 'series of change' (Clar and Pinilla, 2011) the concept they argue can equally be explained as path dependence, where an 'idea', 'sector' or 'option' is conceived to have greater benefits that it in-turn inspire an improvement of such idea, 'sector' or 'option'(ibid). According to Pierson (2000), this perspective has been used to understand the 'sources of political stability, collective activity in politics and change in institutions'. Conceived as

increasing returns, Sewell (1996:262) (cited in Pierson, 2000) defines this process as the possibility that past occurrence will 'affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a latter point in time'. According to Pierson, innovation is 'self-reinforcing' and has 'positive feedback' and increasing returns from such innovation act usually as the source of path dependence. In Pierson's view, increasing returns or what he calls '*relative benefit*' of the current innovation or activity increases move towards 'that path'. Thus, path dependence arguments can be used to explain 'sources' and 'patterns' of social outcomes and change, since they produce what Collier and Collier (1991:31) (cited in Pierson, 2000) call 'mechanism of reproduction'.

Expanding this perspective, Arthur (1994) used examples in modern technology to explain how 'increasing returns' (a situation where increasing benefits accrue to a product or service as more people acquire it) and 'path dependence' (events in the early stages of a phenomenon's development) inspires their adoption and further development as more experience about them is gained. According to Pierson (2000) in politics or 'political life', four features will be evident in settings where increasing returns or path dependence processes are at work. First is what he calls *multiple equilibria*-a 'set of critical conditions conducive to increasing returns'. Second, is *contingency*-that is, 'relative small events, that occur at the right moment with large and enduring consequences'. Third is a 'critical role for timing and sequencing'-where the timing and sequence of the occurrence of the event matter. Fourth is what Pierson calls *inertia*-where 'positive feedback leads to a single equilibrium'. This setting according to Pierson reinforces the importance of 'historical causes' (Ikenberry, 1994) (cited in Pierson, 2000) and has 'fundamental theoretical' implication in political theorizing. Thus, for Pierson, 'increasing returns arguments' hold relevance in 'understanding politics as they are in other areas of social science'.

In more recent research, Kreiss (2016) adopts a historical approach and uses the Obama campaign as an example, as he cites path dependence as a framework for explaining change and innovation in contemporary campaigning. As Kreiss writes, 'circulation of staffers to other sites in party politics after elections and the founding of political consultancies and other organizations'...are 'mechanism through which the knowledge, practices, and technologies forged on campaigns diffuse to other sites and in turn give rise to future campaigns' (p.12). According to Kreiss, 'party networks and campaigns that are able to generate field crossing from technology and other industries into politics give rise to innovations' (ibid). Thus, in Kreiss's view, changes in 'campaigns are in large part the outcome of party network processes that

unfold over time, including the work of people and organizations that build infrastructure, staffers who cross fields and organizations that emerge after campaigns' (p.18).

As an explanation for social change, modernization has also remained useful in explaining changes in political communication. For example, Vaudagna (1991) and Xifra (2011) are of the view that the concept captures better, the general changes that lie at the root of new electioneering techniques. Their view is that the changes experienced in political communication techniques represent changes that affect society in general. Maarek (2016) also argue that 'modernization' and concepts like 'professionalization' and 'specialization' can also help in explaining the global evolution and convergence of political communication. Espien (2011) however prefers the concept of path dependence as explanation for political change since it explains how 'elements unite to disrupt the status quo and create transformational change' (p.6). According to Epstein, path dependence 'suggest that change occurs over time largely through incremental adjustment guided by the series of changes that have taken place stretching back through time' (p.5-6).

For Esser and Stromback (2012:314) modernization as explanation for change in political communication 'acknowledges' that 'over-time changes in practices are due to external influences', even though conditioned by the 'institutional and cultural environment' in which they occur. Negrine and Papathanassopoulos (1996) and Vliegenthart (2012) outline the consequences of modernization to include among other things-de-ideologicalization of traditional political parties, high voter apathy, decrease in party membership and the rise of catchall political parties. That said, even though there is vast amount of literature on the consequence of modernization on society, focus here is on political communication.

In political communication, other proponents like Swanson and Mancini (1996:6) conceive the term as a more 'general and fundamental process of change that... leads to the adoption' of new practices. They attribute innovation in electioneering to 'transformations in the social structure and form of democracy in countries where the innovation' takes place. These 'transformation' they argue are 'part of the modernization process', since the more advance or modernize a country is, 'the more likely we...find innovations in campaigning being adopted and adapted' (ibid).

However, in explaining such changes, Negrine (2008) suggest that it is important to consider the modernization of political parties themselves. In Negrine's view, transformation in electioneering practices can be interpreted as 'a consequence of the changing form of political parties

themselves'-a 'consequence of a changed socio-political environment' (p.68). As political parties transform from mass-membership to cartel parties (i.e. those whose politics and goals are 'more self-referential' and professional (Mair, 1988) and catch-all parties (i.e. those that target to catch 'the entire electorate' with resonating messages (Safran, 2009), they change in both structure and approach as they 'sought to represent the interest of many constituencies rather than a traditional base of support (Negrine, 2008:56). Thus, the knock-on effect of modernization is such that political parties are a part (Thompson, 1990), even though 'significant variations' may exist when we explore specific countries (Negrine, 2008). Understood from this sense, Negrine and Pathanapossopoulos (1996) argue that the changes we see in campaign practices may 'derive from the very nature of modernity, rather than some process linked to Americanization'.

That said, although, as the debate above indicate, the literature and discourse on modernization encompass many dimensions. However, as a lens for exploring change in campaign practices in recent US political communication landscape, the objective in this thesis is to deploy the concept as a guiding explanatory framework for investigating and explaining innovation in data driven practices in the 2016 Trump campaign. Although, the theory serves as a guiding explanatory framework, the methodological intention is to advance its explanatory scope with evidence from the Trump campaign.

The sections that follow turns to other concepts that also provide explanation for change in social theory. At various levels, concepts like modernism, modernity, postmodernism, globalization and glocalization have been used to explain societal change and proponents of these concepts relate them to certain explanation of change. Below, a brief explanation of these concepts is presently as alternative theoretical perspectives.

3.6: Modernism, Modernity and Postmodernism: The Contestation

According to Aronowitz (1989) modernism and modernity 'refer to similar but non-identical aspects of 20th century life'. While the former captures and explain change in 'representation' and 'narratives' that forms the 'core' of everyday life, the later explains the dominance of a 'pluralist political system'. Postmodernism on the other hand describes a shift in sensibilities and the deconstruction of grand narratives or what Aronowitz refers to as 'master discourses'.

Furthermore, in sketching out the postmodern turn, Bauman (1992) argues that changes in contemporary society and culture are new modes of thought, morality and politics that seek to respond to the new sociocultural and political conditions. For Bordoni (2016), modernity is unstable and provides a 'temporary period of interregnum before a new regime arises'. This

suggest that there is always a transition between cultural-economic and socio-political regimes overtime. In Eisenstadt (2010) view, the best way to understand today's world is for modernity to be conceived as a continuous process. Thus, instead of speaking of modernity, Eisenstadt speak about 'multiple modernity' since according to him, modernity does not have a natural end point. Eisenstadt view is that classical modernization, modernity and post-modernism can be said to have interwoven with 'contemporary globalization process'. As he argues, globalization and the wave of new institutional and ideological trends are challenging 'earlier modes of modernity. For Barzinji (2013), modernism is connected to modernization and modernity and its development is based on the two. As he writes, modernism is 'a response to the sharp shifts molded by modernization and modernity'.

3.7: Globalization and Glocalization: A further explanation for change

According to Chen and Ren (2016) the concept of globalization has gained more prominence in the literature and debate on contemporary social change far more than traditional perspective of modernization. For them, the words 'global' and 'globality' have been more often used to describe the changing cultural values in many societies than the words 'modern' or 'modernity'. Thus, they suggest a rethinking of our understanding of modernity based on current changes in the global age.

As Hoogvelt (1997) observe, the global age is one that implies a 'world incline consciousness' that differ from classical views of modernization that suggested as highlighted above, shift by non-Western societies from traditional cultures and structures to Western patterns. Chen and Ren (2016) opine that the global age is one where an interaction exist between the global and the local, implying that 'some traditional values may persist or evolve in a path-dependent manner'. In this sense, globalization is not just the expansion of global capitalism (Roudometof, 2016) and cultural imperialism or hegemony (Beck et al., 2003), but the 'particularization of universalism and the universalization of particularism' (Robertson, 1992). This theorization moves the definition of globalization away from mere expansion of economic activities, trade and investment across national boundaries or greater economic interdependence of world economies. Thus, globalization can equally be conceived as 'tendencies of convergence by all countries towards similar political systems, lifestyles and even taste of entertainment' (McKay, 2008:69).

Scholars that hold the view above, define globalization in terms of increase magnitude in global flows to a degree that bring almost all levels of human activity into an intertwine system (ibid).

Their view is that globalization represent a genuine social restructuring where human activity becomes operated in an 'interregional' and 'intercontinental' scale (Castells, 1996). In this globalized environment, proponents suggest that there is a diffusion of traditional powers of the nation-state and a shift of this power to international organizations and non-state actors (Swanson, 2004). Porter (2015) also suggest that another consequence of this globalized environment is the closure of territorial boundaries through digitally enabled deterritorialization that has enhanced creation of network cities, virtual societies and a global village. Nevertheless, scholars like Hirst (1997) are of the view that global changes celebrated today in the form of globalization do not differ from the economic interconnectedness of 1890-1914.

Furthermore, Robertson (1992; 1994), Ritzer (2006), Ritzer and Ritzer (2012), Roudometof (2016) and Chan and Lee (2017) speak also of 'glocalization' (i.e. the situation where the local becomes the global) (Ritzer and Ritzer, 2012). These scholars argue that in the global age, it is now almost impossible for anything to be purely local except there is a discontinuance of transnational and cross border interaction of global processes. As Roudometof (2016) argue, 'glocalization' fits more as a concept for theorizing social change, since innovation, ideas and practices can easily spread like waves across the globe. According to Roudometof, viewed this way, we can point to 'meso-temporal levels of change, without necessarily accepting the proposition of a total integration'.

That said, from the standpoint of social theory, the sections above though brief, provide an understanding of the different theoretical approaches and perspectives for explaining social change. Such theorization can equally be drawn to explore and explain change in political communication in the global context. Applied as interpretive lenses for understanding media, communication or political communication change, the various theoretical perspectives above can account for the transformation of the field as well as changes in practices from national to transnational phenomena (Livingstone, 2012). As Beck (2000), Krotz (2007) and Thompson (1995) (cited in Livingstone, 2012) argue, media and communication infrastructure is deeply implicated in the entire process of globalization and is constitutive of modernity and modernization. The next section presents an expanded explanation of Americanization and modernization (Swanson and Mancini, 1996) as theoretical framework for this thesis.

3.8: Americanization and Modernization: Working hypothesis for exploring contemporary Political Communication Convergence and Innovation

This section presents an elaborate clarification on the role and relevance of the Americanization and Modernization theses as theoretical frameworks for exploring convergence of the Obama model in Nigeria and the United Kingdom and the emergence of data driven innovation in the 2016 Trump campaign.

According to Canel and Voltmer (2014:8), globalization is driving 'transnational and transcultural developments' in national arenas, as new flows of communication intersect in new spaces, with the internet as a major driving force'. As Levy (1965) argue, 'the structure and patterns' of modernization or changes in society underpins or construct political development. Thus, as in the early 90s, when Swanson and Mancini (1996:2) argued that 'recent changes in election campaigning share common themes despite great differences' in context, commentary from contemporary electioneering seem to echo same narrative.

Negrine (2008), Kindra et al. (2013) and Wring et al. (2017:12) all argue that changes taking place permeate a number of sectors in the political life of 'long established democracies' in ways that have reduced the role of political parties 'as channels for political communication'. Negrine argue for example that the depreciating role of political parties as channels of communication follows 'the age of the internet' that has put internet technology at the 'centre stage in political communication'. That said, even though Negrine appreciates the change and continuing changes in the communication of politics, he is not convinced that there is an epochal distinction of what was and now is.

Nevertheless, scholars like Anstead and Chadwick (2009), Davies et al. (2009) and Hamilton and Tolber (2012) are of the view that technology and the changing digital communication environment is playing many great roles in the American campaign environment. Similarly, Bimber (2003; 2014), Jorba et al. (2012), Van Aelst et al. (2012), Van Santen and Van Zoonen (2012), Kruike-meier (2013), Johnson (2016) and Kriess (2016) also point to technological development and change as inspiration for new patterns of political engagement and campaign practices.

In advance democracies like the US, Nielsen (2012), Issenberg (2013), Kriess (2016) and Johnson (2016; 2017) argue that the changing technological environment is the incentive for emerging campaign practices that increasingly place less emphasis on socio-economic and geodemographic factors in campaign strategy. In emerging democracies of Africa, Mutsvairo and Karam (2018:17) and Ndlela (2020:13) also suggest that 'technological advancement has become the focal point for political development', with social networking sites and platforms

exerting 'tremendous influence in the creation, dissemination and consumption of political content'. Thus, technology seem to be a critical factor in the contemporary political environment of both advanced and developing democracies. As Kline and Pinch (1996), observe, the role of technological innovation as a factor of change in society is noticeable. Thus, this thesis seeks specifically to test the Americanization and modernization thesis purely in terms of their technological dimensions.

Against this background, this thesis is deploying the Americanization theory as a guiding theoretical lens for exploring and explaining the manifestation and deployment of the Obama model in Nigeria and the United Kingdom. As a way of interrogating the thesis theoretical suitability for describing the manifestation and convergence of the Obama model in both countries as well as examining the role of American political communication experts in both elections. This is necessitated by the hiring of American consultants by the four campaign in our case studies (see methodology). Although, this work is testing the Americanization theory purely from a technological point of view, the theoretical benefit is that this will enable the clarification, modification, or amplification of Americanization as a theory for explaining convergence of contemporary campaign practices.

On modernization, the focus is to deploy the theory as guide to investigating the emergence and use of innovative data driven practices in the 2016 Trump campaign. In testing the 'modernization' theory-i.e. what Swanson and Mancini (1996:8) define as 'steadily increasing social complexity' or 'the more general and fundamental process of change that...leads to adoption of these techniques in different national contexts', this work seek to enhance explanation of this thesis on the basis of evidence of innovation in the 2016 Trump campaign.

Furthermore, whilst their explanation of modernization as 'increasing functional differentiation within society' where 'growing numbers of subsystems develop that become more and more specialized to satisfy the increasing demands of particular sectors of society and groups of citizens' (Luhmann, 1975) (cited in Swanson and Mancini, 1996) speak broadly about change, it fails to account explicitly and clearly, what the modernizing source, origin, and inspiration of such change or changes are. Thus, the 2016 Trump campaign serves both as 'an instrument of discovery' (Molnar, 1967) and an empirical context for enhancing theoretical explanation. However, focus here is not necessarily on similarity or continuity between the Obama campaign and Trump's, but on data driven change (s) and the specific sectoral incentive, origin and inspiration of such change. Nevertheless, where evidence that support similarity or continuity

between the Obama and Trump campaign emerge, such evidence will be highlighted in the analysis.

That said, in terms of factors that make for divergence or dissimilarity, this thesis only discusses in line with the research design and methodological underpinning, the factors that emerge from empirical material collected. Thus, in this study, contextual factors that conditioned the adoption and manifestation of the Obama model in Nigeria and the United Kingdom are first empirically based. In this regard, the Nigerian case bring up unique factors like 'stomach infrastructure' as explanation for dissimilarity in ways that Africanizes the field of political communication and the sub-field of comparative political communication. Recall that in their work-*Politics, Media and Modern Democracy: An International Study of Innovation in Electoral Campaigning and their Consequences*, except for Argentina, Israel and Venezuela, the volume is purely Anglo-American and Eurocentric. However, Hallin and Mancini did try to remedy their neglect of the global south by publishing a subsequent book in 2012 on media systems beyond the western world. The Nigerian case study particularly advances this effort.

That said, in deploying the framework, the other processes discussed by Swanson and Mancini (e.g. features of their modern model-'personalization of politics, scientification of politics, detachment of parties from citizens, autonomous structures of communication') and factors that make for dissimilarity (i.e. 'election system, the structure of party competition, regulation of campaigning, national political culture, and national media system') (p.14-20) are beyond the scope and design of this thesis and not integral to the analysis.

Furthermore, from a theoretical standpoint, they are also other theoretical accounts used to explain change in political communication. Prominent typologies include insights like Farrell, Kolodny and Mevic's (2001) pre-modern, modern and post-modern model. Seymour-Ure's (1996) age of media abundance, Blumler and Kavanagh's (1999) third age, Norris's (2002) modern and post-modern form, Gibson and Rommele's (2001) modern or professional campaign, Negrine (2008) and Holtz-Bacha's (2002) professionalization classification etc.

In this study, Swanson and Mancini's Americanization and modernization theses suffices for two reasons. First, while the frameworks above tend to guide research on periodization, the focus of this study is on the technological dimension of contemporary political communication practices and how such practices emerge for example in the US and re-emerge in other context (i.e. Nigeria and the United Kingdom). Thus, Swanson and Mancini's framework offer both a theoretical take-off point for examining campaign innovation and for explaining convergence of

the Obama model in Nigeria and the United Kingdom. Therefore, even though their model failed to account for the key political communication technologies and techniques that were available and utilized in 1996 (i.e. the year they published their book), both theories (i.e. Americanization and Modernization) offer explanatory lenses for analyzing convergence and innovation in modern campaign.

Second, considering that this study takes a US election campaign (i.e. the Obama model) as a historical point of departure for understanding and explaining recent technological changes in political communication, Americanization suggest a relationship of the phenomena under study and theory (Hancke, 2009). As Bryman (1988) observe, qualitative research can follow theoretical logic, in terms of their generalizability of theoretical propositions, and can make a case the basis of theory. In this regard, such theoretical basis is not only because Obama model is American, but also because key staffers of the Obama campaign were hired by all four political parties in our case studies (see methodology).

That said, while the role and value of both theories in this thesis is to guide explanation of convergence and innovation in the technological dimension and state of modern campaign, the hope is that empirical material will provide evidence to test both theories in ways that either reduce or expand their explanatory scope. This way, this study can do three things-i.e. (1) operationalize the Obama model with evidence from our case studies whether it account as the most advance to date, i.e. on the basis of its manifestation and application in Nigeria and the United Kingdom by finding 'patterns of similarity or difference within the data' (Babour, 2008:217); (2) test theory i.e. (2a) Americanization, with evidence from Nigeria and the UK- regarding whether the theory is sufficient for explaining convergence of the Obama model, (2b) modernization-i.e. evidence of data driven innovation in the 2016 Trump campaign and how to explain the origin and source (s) of such innovation and (3) explain contextual incentive for the uptake of such innovation in the US and contextual condition (s) that account for dissimilarity or divergence in the manifestation of the Obama model in Nigeria and the United Kingdom.

Thus, the expectation is that from a comparative standpoint, this thesis will complement Swanson and Mancini's framework by addressing the gap in terms of what constitutes the technological dimensions and features of modern campaign. Theoretically, it is expected that work will also bring renewed insight on how to explain convergence and innovation in the technological dimension of modern campaign. Contextually, the '*implicit*' (Esser and Hanitzsch, 2012) or '*metatheoretical*' (Wirth and Kolb, 2004) design of the study (see methodology) will also enhance the revelation of country specific factors that will explain divergence.

3.9: Conclusion

This chapter has explained the role and value of Americanization and modernization theories as framework for guiding explanation of convergence and innovation in modern campaign. The chapter also highlighted the conceptual debate surrounding both theories as well as alternative concepts for explaining change in social theory. In deploying Swanson and Mancini's theses, the hope is that they will enable a contemporary theoretical generalization across time and space that provides new insight for understanding political communication convergence and innovation. Furthermore, the optimism is that the framework and *implicit* design adopted in the study will guide the distinction and understanding of country specific factors that condition dissimilarity, convergence and innovation. The next chapter will explain the methodological design of the study.

4: Research Methodology

4.1: Introduction

This chapter outlines the research design. As noted in chapter two, this thesis centres on the Obama model-i.e. whether it constitute to date the most advance form of political communication in the extent that it has been applied and appropriated in other democracies. Thus, this chapter sets out the ontological and epistemological consideration and the comparative goal of the thesis. The chapter also consist of justification for case selection and methods of data collection and analysis.

4.2: Ontological and Epistemological Consideration

This thesis aligns with critical realist orientation where social reality forms the basis for the construction of knowledge and the interpretive philosophical notion that sees the world as socially made (Byrne, 2009b; Harvey, 200; Wedeen, 2010; Schwandt and Gates, 2013). In taking this research stance, the study does so from the methodological and theoretical standpoint to elucidate beyond a 'specific instance' the features and characteristics of an empirical case (i.e. the Obama Model) using selected cases studies (see Byrne, 2009a:1; Harvey, 2009). Frazer and Lacey (1994) support ontological and epistemological flexibility. Thus, research can possess a critical realist lens at ontological level, yet interpretivist at epistemological level. (see expanded discussion on ontology and epistemology in appendix II). That said, considering the theoretical imperative of the study (Brennen, 2013; O'Mahoney and Vincent, 2014); the methodological tools for data collection (semi-structured interviews, audio records, documents and newspapers) (King et al., 1996) and the fact that the study is 'dealing with things that are both real and constructed' (Byrne and Callaghan, 2014:155), with no intention of measurement, but a 'thick' qualitative 'description' of the object of analysis (Gray, 2009:33), the research follows Crotty (1998) and Denzin and Ryan (2007) suggestion that a researcher's world view, theoretical import and methodology should define research process. The sections below will describe this process and design.

4.3: Features of the Study's Comparative Design

This section offers a detailed explanation of the key features of the study's comparative research design. First, it explains what the thesis is comparing and the principles that guided case selection. The section also highlights the theoretical and conceptual relevance of the method, as well as data sources and strategy for data analysis.

4.3.1: The Comparative Goals of the Study

In setting out the research strategy for this thesis, this section highlights why the comparative method is important for answering the research question. Thus, the remainder of this section defines the comparative goal of the study as a way of rationalizing why the comparative approach is preferred.

That said, change being a problem of comparison over time, is inherently comparative (Chaffee and Chu, 1992). As a field and subject of empirical inquiry, epochal or progressive changes in world 'media system, caused by changes in information technology and communication infrastructure and diffusion of news, belong to the driving force behind comparative research' Pfetsch and Esser (2004:5). Gurevitch and Blumler (2004:327) and Chan (2017:252) point to 'the increasing homogenization of political communication across previously more diverse societies, polities and cultures' and 'advancement in ICTs' as incentive for such scholarship.

Furthermore, Gurevitch and Blumler (1990), Norris (2009) and Mancini and Hallin (2012) suggest that 'globalization' and increased global 'circulation of cultural products' and the need to counteract 'naïve universalism' and secure grounds for generalizations have contributed in inspiring comparative research in the field. Thus, under rapidly changing conditions and increasing 'globalization of media markets' (Voltmer, 2012b), Semetko and Scammell (2012) and Fletcher and Young (2012) suggest the need to reassess research priorities and a rethink of 'theory and practice'. From the standpoint of theory and the need to define technological practices and registers of modern campaign, this research design is inspired by such thinking.

Thus, using the Obama model set out in chapter two, focus is to 'contextualize' or 'decontextualize' the model, by placing it outside of its original context in order to explain whether it is cross-contextually common or country distinctive (see Canel and Voltmer, 2014; Blumler, 2012; Mancini and Hallin, 2012). In doing this, the thesis seeks to examine whether elements of the model constitute the most advance to date in the extent that they manifest in Nigeria and the United Kingdom. Considering the gap that exist in comparative literature on the technological registers of modern campaign, answering the research question this way provides empirical material for a cross-contextual definition of practices and for updating Swanson and Mancini 'modern model of campaigning'. As some of the forebearers in the field have argued above, practices in the Obama model provide distinctive opportunity to test and update practices, theories and expand the boundaries of knowledge on the technological dimension and state of contemporary political communication. Thus, the sixteen elements are used to

comparatively interrogate and reveal the sequence of practices and innovation now appearing and manifesting in contemporary campaigns in Nigeria and the United Kingdom.

Following from the above, a theoretical explanation for the manifestation and diffusion of the sixteen elements is explored within the context of the case studies. This second level seek to explain how elements of the Obama model come to surface and converge in Nigeria and the United Kingdom using Americanization as explanatory lens. At the second theoretical level, the 2016 presidential election campaign of Donald Trump is also used to explore and explain innovation in data driven campaign practices in the US, as a way of advancing theoretical understanding of modernization. Here, focus is specifically on using empirical material to examine whether there is an advancement away from the data driven practices of the Obama model (see Blumler et al., 1992; Pfetsch and Esser, 2008). This way, Trump's campaign contributes both to theory advancement and the update of practices that emerge in Nigeria and the United Kingdom. Emphasis on Trump's campaign follows Rosengren et al., (1992) and Gerring (2007) who suggest that events (i.e. investigation on Cambridge Analytica and the Trump campaign across both sides of the Atlantic and the increasing conversation on the use of psychographics in the campaign) can serve as benchmark for comparison. In this sense, the Trump campaign instead of serving as a case for exploring continuity and change is used an instrument of discovery and theory advancement (see Molnar, 1967).

Lastly, with a research design that methodological looked beyond the contextual factors identified in Swanson and Mancini's framework, this thesis seeks to also explore contextual conditions that shaped the uptake and convergence of the Obama model in Nigeria and the United Kingdom. This way, as Gurevitch and Blumler, (2004) admonish, the study realizes the 'double value' design of a comparative study and deepens explanation. To achieve this however, the thesis adopts Esser and Hanitzsch (2012) '*implicit*' or Wirth and Kolb (2004) *metatheoretical* design, where no initial identification of contextual variables was done. Esser and Hanitzsch argue that the methodological value of this strategy is that it 'facilitates the optimal adaptation of research question to theoretical background', since an explanation of similarities and differences between cases can point to and enable the identification of contextual factors and conditions.

4.3.2: Justification for Case Selection

This section highlights guiding principles for selecting Nigeria's 2015 presidential election, the 2015 British General Election and the 2016 Trump's campaign as case studies (see Appendix 1

for expanded discussion on principles of the comparative method and principles of comparative case study design).

That said, case selection is usually the 'first step in comparative study design' (George and Bennette, 2005) and a 'crucial ingredient in comparison', since well-chosen cases allow for inferences to be made (Collier et al., 2004). However, historically, case selection has been the site of many longstanding critiques, and there is yet no methodological consensus regarding strategies for case selection-with the use of 'numerous strategies' (Colin, 2017), 'the different, but also the similar' (Wang and Huang, 2017:94) accepted in one study.

Drawing from the general principles of case study design highlighted in appendix 1, this thesis adopts some strategies in selecting Nigeria, the United Kingdom and Trump's campaign as case studies. First, case selection follows Przeworski and Tuene's principles-as the countries-US, Nigeria and United Kingdom are alike in the important respect that they are democracies, thus meeting the most similar system design. Conversely however, they also meet the most different system design since the US and the UK are industrialized democracies with high levels of economic development, internet diffusion and democratic consolidation (Jensen et al., 2012) and Nigeria an emerging and developing democracy with widespread digital divide. In the *civic culture* (1963) Almond and Verba used similar principle to guide case selection.

However, a point worthy of note is that in terms of democratic institutions and structure, Nigeria and the US are different from the UK. Whilst Nigeria and the US are decentralized, presidential democracies, the UK is a centralized parliamentary democracy. Thus, because of the countries institutional and developmental differences, their combination will be particularly useful in revealing how systemic differences shape political communication practices (Semetko et al., 1991). By comparing the three countries (different but also similar), each case was used in the last chapter to highlight reasons for similarity and differences within the context of the Obama model (Ferree et al., 2002).

Second, guided by research question and theory replication logic (Yin, 2014) and following Ellis (1973), Bryman (1988), Patton (1990), Rosengren et al. (1992), Conge (1996), Mason (1996) and Palys (2008), theoretically guided sampling logic for case selection was also deployed. Thus, cases selected exemplify a dimension of interest for the research in anticipation that they might enable theory testing. Here, the hiring of American political communication consultants-referred in the literature as agents of Americanization by the four political parties in Nigeria and the United Kingdom reinforced this sampling notion (Plasser and Plasser, 2002). For example,

both the Conservative and Labour Parties hired Jim Messina and David Axelrod respectively (see The New York Time, May 27, 2014). In Nigeria, the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) and All Progressive Congress (APC) also hired American consultants for their campaign (see Tukur, 2014). Thus, case selection accounts for traces of Americanization (see Marcus, 1995). This approach also conforms with the principle of pragmatic concerns advanced by Moghadam (1995), O'Kane (1995) and Gerring (2007). Thus, case studies were constructed in part on the basis of theory, with cases representative, critical, typical and closely related to research question, and representing instances in which something similar might have happen in a different context (Hancke, 2009; Esser and Hanitzsch, 2012).

Furthermore, Trump's campaign, was selected as a critical case for its potential in providing 'rival explanations' for theory-i.e. regarding how campaigns modernize or innovate in the US (Yin, 2014:129). This rational is grounded in the various investigations and inquiries regarding Cambridge Analytica's tactics and role in the campaign. Thus, with such incidences lacking in Hilary Clinton's campaign, the methodological reasoning is that an empirical analysis of Trump's campaign can produce descriptive information that will be revelatory and important for theory. Thus, rather than an examination of similarity and continuity, Trump's campaign is selected for its longitudinal potential in providing insight on change that can enable theory modification (Simons, 2009). Molnar (1967), Gerring (2007) and Seawright (2016) are respectively of the view that such 'influential case' or 'deviant case' selection can serve as 'an instrument of discovery' and a useful way of discovering new information. Thus, following Rosengren et al. (1992) recommendation and Gerring (2007) principle, events around Trump's campaign guided its selection as benchmark for comparison.

4.3.3: Theoretical and Methodological benefits of the Research Design

Generally, the conceptual and methodological advantage of comparative inquiry is that it expands research data base in ways that enable 'solid generalization', clarification, modification, and amplification of theories (Gurevitch and Blumler, 1990:6).

Furthermore, with much of the scholarship in the field still reflecting an Anglo-American bias (Stromback and Kaid, 2008), the comparative case study design will rescue us from speculations and presumption regarding whether the Obama model is applicable elsewhere.

Lastly, considering that the range of cases include Nigeria (an emerging democracy in the global south- with 46.1% internet penetration) (Internet Live Stats, 2016) and a region of the world missing in Swanson and Mancini's (1996) initial country sample, the design provides

opportunity to test the extent, validity and applicability of Western-base theories/practices of political communication in a non-Western society and context.

4.4: Data and Methods

This section presents data collected for the study. They include semi-structured interviews-to draw insight from key actors in the campaign; digitally harvested audio records of online interactions were members of the study's sample participated in discussion on the object of the study; documents-as a lens for understanding context and practices; and newspapers-as instrument for an enhanced interpretation of events relating to the 2016 Trump campaign. Data triangulation ensures reliability of observations and results.

4.4.1: Interviews

First, in conducting interviews, a purposive sample of key campaign actors in the three elections was drawn (see table 4.1-4.3). Journalist were included in the sample since without the cloak of party loyalty and party campaign secrets, they were more open about practices that had been deployed in the campaign.

4.4.2: Sampling Strategy

Sampling strategy was purposive, with respondents identified based on their roles as individuals with privilege access to information that will be enriching to the study (Moser and Kalton, 1983; Hakim, 2012). Thus, the role played by these individuals during the campaign informed their selection. As key actors at various levels of the campaign with a common dimension of involvement, the assumption was that they possessed perspectives and knowledge regarding the object of analysis. The journalists were included for their personal investigative and journalistic work and engagement with the object of analysis.

4.4.3: Sample Recruitment

As stated earlier, sampling for this study was purposive. In purposive sampling, the researcher chooses participants who fit the aims and objectives of the study and invite them either facially or digitally to participate (Eide, 2008; Harding, 2013). In recruiting participants for this study, social media particularly Twitter, LinkedIn and Facebook were initially used to send out messages to solicit access. Through these channels, some responded positively and accepted to be interviewed. However, when investigation into the activities of Facebook and Cambridge

Analytica started in America and Britain respectively, some respondents declined to continue, while some stopped responding to messages.

Furthermore, in Britain and the US, negotiating access was not without the challenges and constraints usually experienced by outsider observers. Cultural and racial positionality-i.e. researcher outsider status were disadvantageous for gaining access to the sample. This experience though disappointing, was not too strange. Johnson-Bailey (1999), Matthews and Ross (2014), and Boucher (2017) admonished that researchers consider racial, gender, class and cultural differences during their fieldwork. As Crean (2018) argue, such factors and the positionality of researchers influence both the research process and results their studies produce-with the dynamics of race, class, gender and culture affecting how a researcher penetrates the research or field site. Thus, from the reflection from field notes, cultural and racial barriers emerged as factors that had influenced access.

Nevertheless, as data collection progressed amidst concern of participant recruitment in Britain and the US and data saturation, sampling became more opportunistic (Patton, 2002). This implies that I started looking out for expert commentators on the object of analysis. Through this process, four additional respondents were identified, contacted and interviewed. In Nigeria however, such challenges were minimal as cultural affinity made snowballing possible. For example, one participant pointed the researcher to industry gatekeepers whose work dovetails into the object of analysis passing their mobile telephone numbers. Across the three case studies, the entire process enabled the recruitment and interviewing of nineteen participants in Nigeria, four in Britain and seven in the US. Altogether, one interview was conducted face-to-face in Nigeria, one in the US via Skype, another via Twitter, and the rest on telephone. Recourse to mediated interviews had been part of the pre-interview plan as a way of avoiding location and distance challenges (Novick, 2008; Mason and Inde, 2014; Oates, 2015; Merrison, 2016; Corbett and Edwards, 2018). Taken together, the empirical and theoretical insight produced from the materials collected in all three case studies are worthy for making interpretive claims.

4.4.4: Research Participants

Table 4.1: Case Study I: *NIGERIA*

S/N	Participant Name	Assigned Code	Role and Characteristic of Respondent	Insight
1.	PROF. TUNDE ADENRAN	G1	PDP Deputy Director General Head Office	Compliant with R/O

2.	REUBEN ABATI	G2	Media aide and presidential spokesperson of President Goodluck Jonathan	Compliant with R/O
3.	BOLAJI ABDULLAHI	B1	APC National Publicity Secretary	Compliant with R/O
4.	ADEBOLA WILLIAMS	B2	CEO Red Media and APC Media Consultant	Consistent with R/O
5.	AZIMAZI MOMOH JOHN	J1	Journalist-The Guardian Newspaper	Consistent with R/O
6.	CHRIS UWAJE	J2	Director General Delta State Innovation Hub	Consistent with R/O
7.	JOHN BOSCO AGBAKWURU	J3	Journalist-Vanguard Newspaper	Consistent with R/O
8.	EMMA UJAH	J4	Journalist-Vanguard Newspaper	Consistent with R/O
9.	EBISIKE EBUBE GEORGE	J5	Scientist, Researcher, Journalist-The Guardian Newspaper	Consistent with R/O
10.	DIRISU YAKUBU	J6	Journalist-Vanguard Newspaper	Consistent with R/O
11.	OLUSEGUN ADENIYI	J7	Journalist-This Day Newspaper, former presidential spokesman	Consistent with R/O
12.	SAMUEL OGUNDIPE	J8	Journalist-Premium Times	Consistent with R/O
13.	AYOOLUWA OYELERE	J9	Lawyer and Political Columnist	Consistent with R/O
14.	ANNA CUNNINGHAM	J10	BBC Staff, Freelance Multimedia Journalist-Lagos	Consistent with R/O
15.	OLUGBENGA ADANIKI	J11	Journalist the Nation Newspaper	Consistent with R/O
16.	BABAJIDE OGUNSOWO	J12	Channels Television Data Consultant	Consistent with R/O
17.	SEUN OKINBALOYE	J13	Channels Television Political Correspondent	Consistent with R/O
18.	MATTHEW T. PAGE	J14	Ex U.S State Department Official for Nigeria	Consistent with R/O
19.	GBENGA SESAN	J15	Executive Director Paradigm Initiative	Consistent with R/O

Sampling: purposive/snowballing

Table 4.2: Case Study II: **UNITED KINGDOM**

S/N	Participant Name	Assigned Codes	Role and Characteristic of Respondent	Insight
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1.	TOM BALDWIN	L1	Former Labour Adviser and Director of Communications	Compliant with R/O
2.	STEVE HOWELL	L2	Labour Party Strategist/Jeremy Corbyn Adviser and Author of Game Changer	Compliant with R/O
3.	GREG BEALES	L2	Labour Party Director of Strategy	Compliant with R/O
4.	TOM EDMONDS	C1	Conservative Party Creative Director/Digital Media Specialist	Compliant with R/O

Sampling: purposive

Table 4.3: Case Study III: AMERICA

S/N	Participant Name	Assigned Codes	Role and Characteristic of Respondent	Insight
1.	JASON JOHNSON	T1	Chief Strategist Ted Cruz for president	Consistent with R/O
2.	ALEX CONANT	T2	Former Communication Director Marco Rubio for president	compliant with R/O
3.	DAVID CARROLL	T3	Litigant with Cambridge Analytica	compliant with R/O
4.	SCOTTIE NELL HUGHES	T4	Journalist and CNN News Host	compliant with R/O
5.	CHRIS VICKERY	T5	Director of Cyber Risk Research at UpGuard	compliant with R/O
6.	GARRETT M. GRAFF	T6	Journalist and Cybersecurity Director at Aspen	compliant with R/O
7.	BRIAN EKDALE	T8	Associate professor of digital cultures and global media at University of Iowa School of Journalism and Mass Communication	compliant with R/O

Sampling: purposive/opportunistic

4.4.5: Interview Research Questions

The interview research questions below were drafted based on theoretical propositions i.e. the 'specific propositions to be investigated in the study' (Wengraf, 2001:55). According to Wengraf, 'theory questions govern the production of the interview-questions' (p.62). Thus, following Wengraf, interview research questions were based on the specific conception of knowledge that the study sort to present. Thus, in Nigeria and United Kingdom, interview research questions were designed to enabled the empirical identification of the application and manifestation of the Obama model, and to trace any semblance of Americanization as well as country specific factors that conditioned or influence the application of the Obama model.

In the Trump case, interview research questions were designed to guide the identification of any specific differences or uniqueness in data driven practice (s) deployed in order to provide empirical ingredients for showing advancement in practice, and the inspiration and origin of such innovative data driven campaign practice. This way, interview research questions for Trump’s campaign makes modernization the focus rather than a complete comparison with the Obama model (see table 4.4-4.6).

Table 4.4: Case Study I: NIGERIA

S/N	INTERVIEW RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1.	What do you think was particularly unique about your/the campaign of 2015?
2.	Was there any general hiring interest for the campaign? Like any specific skill that was specially courted? How many digital/tech-related staff did your campaign hire?
3.	Can you tell me more about the role you and your team played during the campaign and how much you may have spent on technology and digital advertising/what did you observe about the hired consultants and experts
4.	How did you use technology/ tell me about your role and the innovation you inspired)/how do you think they used technology
5.	Can you give me any examples that are worthy of note? Do you think/Did big data, predictive modelling and microtargeting play any part? (similar questions on the other elements)
6.	Do you think/Did the Obama campaign any way influenced what your team and political party did during your campaign?
7.	How did that happen and what was the level of influence?
8.	What did you do differently from the Obama campaign?
9.	How did you/did they use social media?
10.	Were they any legal/regulatory constraints in trying to follow the Obama approach?

Note: (1) To support empirical identification of the application of the Obama model in Nigeria (2) To trace any semblance of Americanization as well as (3) factors that may have influenced the application.

Table 4.5: Case Study II: UNITED KINGDOM

S/N	INTERVIEW RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1.	What do you think was particularly unique about your/the campaign of 2015?
2.	Was there any general hiring interest for the campaign? Like any specific skill that was specially courted? How many digital/tech-related staff did your campaign hire?
3.	Can you tell me more about the role you and your team played during the campaign and how much you may have spent on technology and digital advertising/what did you observe about the hired consultants and experts
4.	How did you use technology/tell me about your role and the innovation you inspired)/how do you think they used technology
5.	Can you give me any examples that are worthy of note? Do you think/Did big data, predictive modelling and microtargeting play any part? (similar questions on the other elements)
6.	Do you think/Did the Obama campaign any way influenced what your team and political party did during your campaign?
7.	How did that happen and what was the level of influence?

8.	What did you do differently from the Obama campaign?
9.	How did you/did they use social media?
10.	Were there any legal/regulatory constraints in trying to follow the Obama approach?

Note: (1) To support empirical identification of the application of the Obama model in Nigeria (2) To trace any semblance of Americanization as well as (3) factors that may have influenced the application.

Table 4.6: Case Study III: AMERICA

S/N	INTERVIEW RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1.	Can you tell me what was particularly unique about the 2016 election from the standpoint of President Trump's campaign?
2.	What would you say was the main innovation in the 2016 campaign and what would you attribute that to?
3.	Was there any role for big data and analytics during the campaign? How was this used and what do you think was the source of that innovation?
4.	What was the data driven component of the 2016 campaign you may have found innovative
5.	Do you think psychographic understanding of voters played any role?
6.	Is there anything that strikes you about the campaign that you want to share including documents please?

Note: To unearth any specific differences or uniqueness in the data driven techniques and their source.

In furtherance of the use of interviews as instruments for data collection, questions in tables 4.4-4.6 above served as method for generating research subject conversations with participants. The interpretation made from data generated from this sort of conversation (s) constitute the fundamentals of interview and interviewing (May,2001; Kvale,1996; Gadner,1954). Thus, interviews entail focused and purposeful conversation between two or more people, conducted face-to-face, online, over the phone or through mails to elicit people's views (Gray, 2009; Brennen, 2013). According to Kvale (1983:174), the main purpose is 'to gather descriptions of the life-world of the interviewee with respect to interpretation of the meaning of the described phenomena'.

The model employed in this thesis is semi-structured, even though Nunkoosing (2005) and Anyan (2013) are of the view that 'transactional power dynamics in qualitative research interviewing' makes 'descriptions such as structured and semi-structured unsuitable'. However, the model enabled a deep probe and engagement with respondents and enhanced the acquisition of a rich and deep understanding of the object of analysis (Lilleker, 2003).

To navigate the challenge of rapport that usually accompany elite interviews, I studied their basic aspects of life interest, activities, profession and organization to facilitate rapport (Fontana and Frey, 1994; Heyl, 2001; May, 2011). Thus, drawing from the background information gathered about respondents, interviews commenced with the 'icebreaker' questions as recommended by Liebling (1963) and Walters (1970). 'Icebreaker' questions help researchers

engage respondents about key aspects of their interest and profession to create an environment where questions are asked and answered non-judgementally (Brennen, 2013). This approach made it easy to set the tone for the conversations and extraction of respondent's commitment (see Arksey and Knight, 1999).

Furthermore, to ensure reliability and credibility of responses and check the possibility of exaggeration and excess public relations in comments provided by respondents, a careful triangulation of claims with data from audio materials, documents and newspapers was done to ensure credibility and trustworthiness. That said, considering that interview transcripts only 'represent raw descriptive data', a detailed framework for analysis is presented in sections 4.8, 4.8.1 and 4.8.2 (Sanna, 1999; Pope et al., 2000; Weston et al., 2001; Gibson and Brown, 2009; Turner, 2010). The next section is a discussion of audio materials as additional source of data for the study.

4.5: Digital Audio Records

- Interviews conducted on the object of analysis with a member of the study's sample
- Conference presentations on the object of analysis delivered by a member of the study's sample
- Radio talk on the object of analysis with a member of the study's sample

Table 4.7: Case Study I: *NIGERIA*

S/N	Participant Name	Assigned Codes	Role and Characteristic of Participant	Subject of Audio Record	Insight
1.	CHRISTOPHER WYLIE	ANG1	Former Research Director at Cambridge Analytica	UK DCMS Parliamentary Select Committee Testimony on Cambridge Analytica	Relevant
2.	BRIAN EKDALE	ANG2	Associate Professor, School of Journalism and Mass	African Elections as a Testing	Relevant

			Communication, University of Iowa	Ground: Cambridge Analytica in Nigeria and Kenya	
3.	BRITTANY KAISER	ANG3	Former Director of Business and Programme Development at Cambridge Analytica	UK DCMS Parliamentary Select Committee Testimony on Cambridge Analytica	Relevant

Sampling method: *opportunistic*

Table 4.8: Case Study II: **UNITED KINGDOM**

S/N	Participant Name	Assigned Codes	Role and Characteristic of Participant	Subject of Audio Record	Insight
1.	MICHAL KOSINSKI	AB1	Professor of computational psychology and designer of psychometric research tool	BBC World Service: The real story: Hacking the Vote	Relevant
2.	GREG BEALES	AB2	Labour Party Director of Strategy and Planning	BBC World Service: The real story: Hacking the Vote	Relevant

Sampling method: *Snowballing*

Table 4.9: Case Study III: **AMERICA**

S/N	Participant Name	Assigned Codes	Role and Characteristic of Participant	Subject of Audio Record	Insight
1.	BRAD PARSCALE	AM1	Data and Digital Director Donald Trump presidential campaign	Inside the Trump 2016 Advertising Campaign	Relevant
2.	MICHAL KOSINSKI	AM2	Psychology and Data	Big data, politics and	Relevant

			Scientist/developer of psychometrics	Trump's election	
3.	CHRISTOPHER WYLIE 1	AM3	Former Research Director at Cambridge Analytica	US Senate Committee Testimony on Cambridge Analytica	Relevant
4.	CHRISTOPHER WYLIE 2	AM4	Former Research Director at Cambridge Analytica	UK DCMS Select Committee Testimony	Relevant
5.	KELLYANNE CONWAY	AM5	Former campaign manager of Donald Trump	Institute of Politics Roundtable discussion on campaign for president 2016	Relevant
6.	BRITTANY KAISER	AM6	Former Director of Business and Programme Development at Cambridge Analytica	Parliamentary Select Committee Testimony on Cambridge Analytica	Relevant

Sampling method: *Opportunistic*

As table 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9 above indicate, the field-site for this study includes online public sphere, where 'digital' materials were collected (Hine, 2013). Archives of internet discussion offer a rich array of data for qualitative research (ibid). As Seale et al. (2010) argue, recorded or online discussion forum can give researchers access to the way people discuss an issue of interest. Thus, recorded audio discussion featuring a member or members of the study's sample where the focus of discussion was the object of analysis was harvested. As Baym (2000) notes, the internet is today serving research and researchers as a field-site where online interactions

can sufficiently serve for explaining social phenomena. In this regard, the internet offered a field-site where hard-to-reach members of the study's sample were accessed using conversations in forums where the subject of the study was the focus of discussion.

In harnessing this data, I listened and transcribed hours of interactions that happened in events and this yielded rich data. To fulfil ethical standards, discussants in the audio records who were among the study's sample were informed about using these materials. However, none of them acknowledged the messages except Greg Beales (i.e. Labour Party Director of Strategy and Planning), who had initially pointed the researcher to some of the materials. Nevertheless, since the sites where audio records were found was not subject to any formal terms and conditions, it was not compulsory for consent to be sort. That said, triangulation was used to validate audio content to ensure reliability. The next section discusses documents collected.

4.6: Documents

Table 4.10: Case Study I: [NIGERIA](#)

S/N	Origin/Source	Major Focus	Author	Insight
1.	Julian Malins Q.C Linda Hudson	Report on Cambridge Analytica LLC and SCL Elections Ltd in Nigeria	Julian Malins Q.C Linda Hudson	<i>Relevant</i>
2.	Association of Communication Scholars and Professionals of Nigeria (ACSPN)	Understanding Nigerian Media and Elections: Analysis of the 2015 presidential election campaign message	Association of Communication Scholars and Professionals of Nigeria (ACSPN)	<i>Relevant</i>
3.	Independent National Electoral Commission	2015 General Election Report	Electoral Commission	<i>Relevant</i>
4.	The Commonwealth	Commonwealth Observer Group Report on the 2015 General Elections	Bakili Muluzi-Chairperson	<i>Relevant</i>

5.	<i>African Union Commission</i>	African Union Election Observation Mission 2015 Election Report	African Union Commission	<i>Relevant</i>
6.	<i>European Union Election Observer Mission</i>	European Union Election Observation Mission: Final Report, Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2015	European Union Election Observer Mission	<i>Relevant</i>
7.	<i>Independent National Electoral Commission</i>	Electoral Commission Political Party Code of Conduct	Electoral Commission	<i>Relevant</i>
8.	<i>Independent National Electoral Commission</i>	Electoral Commission guidelines for political rallies and campaigns	Electoral Commission	<i>Relevant</i>
9.	<i>Independent National Electoral Commission</i>	Electoral Commission Political Party Finance Handbook	Electoral Commission	<i>Relevant</i>
10.	<i>Westminster Foundation for Democracy</i>	The cost of politics in Nigeria	Westminster Foundation for Democracy	<i>Relevant</i>
11.	<i>Yiaga Africa</i>	Youth participation in Nigeria's 2015 General Elections	Yiaga Africa	<i>Relevant</i>
12.	<i>Department of International Development</i>	Social Media for Election Communication and Monitoring in Nigeria	Department of International Development	<i>Relevant</i>
13.	<i>The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes</i>	2015 General Election Report	The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes	<i>Relevant</i>

14.	Idayat Hassan and Shamsudeen Yusuf	Report on Electoral Integrity in Nigeria	Idayat Hassan Shamsudeen Yusuf	<i>Relevant</i>
15.	Independent National Electoral Commission	Nigeria's 2010 Electoral Act as Amended	Electoral Commission	<i>Relevant</i>
16.	Association of Communication Scholars and Professionals of Nigeria (ACSPN)	Understanding Nigerian Media Elections through Research	Association of Communication Scholars and Professionals of Nigeria	<i>Relevant</i>
17.	University of Oxford	Computational Propaganda Research Project: Challenging Truth and Trust: A Global Inventory of Organized Social Media Manipulation	Samantha Bradshaw Philip N. Howard	<i>Relevant</i>
18.	UK House of Commons	Brittany Kaiser: Written Testimony to the Fake News Inquiry	UK House of Commons	<i>Relevant</i>
19.	UK House of Commons	Disinformation and Fake News: Interim report	UK House of Commons	<i>Relevant</i>

Sampling method: *Purposive*

Table 4.11: Case Study II: **UNITED KINGDOM**

S/N	Origin/Source	Major Focus	Author (s)	Insight
1.	Information Commissioner's Office	The use of data in modern UK campaigns	Information Commissioner's Office	<i>Relevant</i>
2.	Electoral Commission	permissible funders and sources of UK	Electoral Commission	<i>Relevant</i>

		campaign finance		
3.	Oxford University	Inventory of social media manipulation and disinformation during elections.	Samantha Bradshaw and Philip N. Howard	<i>Relevant</i>
4.	Information Commissioner's Office	Rules guiding the use of data in UK campaigns	Information Commissioner's Office	<i>Relevant</i>
5.	Electoral Commission	Political party spending and donations in the 2015 elections	Electoral Commission	<i>Relevant</i>
6.	Electoral Commission	Commission report of the 2015 elections	Electoral Commission	<i>Relevant</i>
7.	Labour Party	Post-election review	Dame Margaret Beckett	<i>Relevant</i>
8.	Electoral Commission	Returning officers briefing on the campaigns and elections	Electoral Commission	<i>Relevant</i>
9.	DEMOS for Information Commissioner's Office	Emerging trends on the use of data in UK campaigns	Jamie Bartlett Josh Smith Rose Acton	<i>Relevant</i>
10.	Information Commissioner's Office	Evidence of data trading with Labour Party	Information Commissioner's Office	<i>Relevant</i>

11.	Conservative Party	Review of 2015 campaign and election outcome	The Rt. Hon. the Lord Feldman of Elstree-Chairman	<i>Relevant</i>
12.	Martin Moore/Gordon Ramsay-King's College London	Media, press and political agenda setting in the 2015 elections	Martin Moore Gordon Ramsay	<i>Relevant</i>
13.	Reuters Institute for the study of Journalism	Social media and traditional media use in the 2015 elections	The Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism	<i>Relevant</i>
14.	Reuters Institute for the study of Journalism	Report on campaign practices in the 2010 elections	The Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism	<i>Relevant</i>

Sampling method: *Purposive*

Table 4.12: Case Study III: AMERICA

S/N	Origin/Source	Major Focus	Author (s)	Insight
1.	The Royal Court of Justice	<i>Litigation between John Green, Mark Newman and SCL Group Limited</i>	Royal Court of Justice	<i>Relevant</i>
2.	UK House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sports Committee	<i>Inquiry on digitization and disinformation in elections.</i>	House of Commons DCMS Committee	<i>Relevant</i>
3.	UK House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sports Committee	<i>Brittany Kaiser written testimony to the fake news inquiry</i>	Brittany Kaiser	<i>Relevant</i>
4.	UK House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sports Committee	<i>Disinformation and 'fake news': final report</i>	House of Commons DCMS Committee	<i>Relevant</i>

5.	US Senate Committee on Intelligence	<i>Dr. Emma L Briant written testimony to the Facebook inquiry</i>	Emma Briant	<i>Relevant</i>
6.	UK House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sports Committee	<i>SCL Elections Digital summary: Background papers submitted to the inquiry by Christopher Wylie</i>	Christopher Wylie	<i>Relevant</i>
7.	US Securities and Exchange Commission Case 3:19-cv-04241	<i>District Court Northern District of California litigation between Securities Exchange Commission vs Facebook Inc.</i>	US Securities and Exchange Commission	<i>Relevant</i>
8.	Information Commissioner's Office	<i>Data protection Act 1998-supervisory powers of the information commissioner monetary penalty notice to Facebook</i>	Information Commissioner Office	<i>Relevant</i>
11.	UK House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sports Committee	<i>Written evidence submitted by Aleksandr Kogan</i>	Aleksandr Kogan	<i>Relevant</i>
12.	UK House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sports Committee	<i>Christopher Wylie written response to misstatement in relation to Cambridge Analytica</i>	Christopher Wylie	<i>Relevant</i>

13.	UK House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sports Committee	<i>Written testimony submitted by Facebook</i>	Facebook	<i>Relevant</i>
14.	US Federal Trade Commission	<i>FTC's \$5 billion Facebook settlement: Record-breaking and history- making</i>	US Federal Trade Commission	<i>Relevant</i>
15.	U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission	<i>Facebook to Pay \$100 Million for Misleading Investors About the Risks It Faced from Misuse of User Data</i>	US Securities and Exchange Commission	<i>Relevant</i>
16.	Cambridge Analytica Website	<i>Company's methodology, expertise and list of clients</i>	Cambridge Analytica	<i>Relevant</i>
17.	Strategic Communication Laboratories (SCL Group) Website	<i>Company's methodology and expertise</i>	Strategic Communication Laboratories	<i>Relevant</i>
18.	US Department of Justice Washington	<i>Special Council Report on the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 Presidential Election</i>	US Department of Justice	<i>Relevant</i>
19.	Office of the Director of National Intelligence	<i>Report on the Assessment of Russian Activities and intentions in recent US Elections</i>	Office of the Director of National Intelligence	<i>Relevant</i>

20.	United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations	<i>Report on Putin's assault on democracy and the implication for US National Security</i>	United States Senate	<i>Relevant</i>
21.	United States District Court	<i>Expert report on litigation between the United States and Russian agents</i>	United States District Court	<i>Relevant</i>
22.	US Department of Justice	<i>Office of the Inspector General report on review of Fisa applications regarding Russian interference</i>	US Department of Justice	<i>Relevant</i>
23.	United States District Court for the District of Columbia	<i>Litigation documents between the US and Russian agents</i>	United States District Court	<i>Relevant</i>
24.	United States Senate	<i>Hearing report on Russian interference in the 2016 US election</i>	United States Senate	<i>Relevant</i>

Sampling method: *Purposive*

Tables 4.10-4.12 above consist of additional empirical materials for triangulation of results and findings. Generally, document 'comprise a range of research sources' and their analysis is one way of generating data for exploring a given phenomenon in qualitative research (Scott, 1990; Kvale and Brinkmann, 2008; Yin, 2014). According to McCulloch (2004) and Gibson and Brown (2009:65), they can serve as critical empirical data for the investigation of society and social life and can 'offer distinctive analytic possibilities of social worlds, lives and practices, particularly when combined with other data generation methods'. Hakim (2000), Webb et al. (2000) and Yin (2014) suggest that they can provide data for longitudinal studies, quasi-experimental designs and international comparisons such as this.

Thus, following Hakim (1983), Scott (1990) and Gibson and Brown (2009) an analytically filtered method was used to select documents according to their relevance to the research. The created categorization and schema above i.e. origin/source, major focus, authorship and the insight they produce guided how documents were accessed, classified and collected. This strategy also ensured a careful appraisal of their purpose, targeted audience, ownership, context, and content to avoid assuming the documents contained unmitigated truth (Yin, 2014). Scott (1990:27) refers to this approach to document sample construction ‘as one which is theoretically and empirically meaningful’.

Furthermore, to ensure quality of evidence produced, I drew from Scott (1990:6-8) four criteria of *authenticity*- i.e. testing the genuineness and unquestionable origin of evidence emanating from them; *Credibility*-questioning how free of error and distortion they are, *representativeness*-ensuring evidence from them is ‘typical of its kind’ and *meaning*-verifying the extent to which the evidence from the document is ‘clear and comprehensible’. The next section discusses newspapers as the final data collection method for this thesis.

4.7: Newspapers

Table 4.13: Case Study III: *AMERICA*

S/N	Origin/Source	Title	Author	Date	Major Focus	Insight
1.	Politico	<i>Cruz partners with donors psychographic firm</i>	<i>Kenneth Vogel</i>	<i>July 7, 2015</i>	<i>CA’s role in Ted Cruz’s campaign</i>	<i>Relevant</i>
2.	Bloomberg	<i>Cruz-connected Data Miner Aims to Get inside U.S Voters’ Head</i>	<i>Sasha Issenberg</i>	<i>November 12, 2015</i>	<i>CA’s role in Ted Cruz’s campaign</i>	<i>Relevant</i>
3.	The Guardian	<i>Ted Cruz using firm that harvested data on millions of</i>	<i>Harry Davies</i>	<i>Dec. 11, 2015</i>	<i>CA’s role in Ted Cruz’s campaign</i>	<i>Relevant</i>

		<i>unwitting Facebook users.</i>				
4.	The Guardian	<i>Google, Democracy and the truth about internet search</i>	<i>Carole Cadwalladr</i>	<i>December 4, 2016</i>	<i>The role of Google and platforms in the digital ecosystem</i>	<i>Relevant</i>
5.	The Guardian	<i>Robert Mercer: The Big Data Billionaire Waging War on Mainstream Media</i>	<i>Carole Cadwalladr</i>	<i>Feb. 26, 2017</i>	<i>Actors behind CA</i>	<i>Relevant</i>
6.	The Guardian	<i>Revealed 50 million Facebook profiles harvested for Cambridge Analytica in major data breach</i>	<i>Carole Cadwalladr and Emman Graham-Harrison</i>	<i>March 18, 2018</i>	<i>CA's role in the 2016 elections</i>	<i>Relevant</i>
7.	The Guardian	<i>Cambridge Analytica may be guilty of hype. But data mining poisons our politics</i>	<i>Gaby Hinsliff</i>	<i>March. 20, 2018</i>	<i>CA's role in the 2016 elections</i>	<i>Relevant</i>
8.	The Guardian	<i>The Cambridge Analytica saga is a scandal of</i>	<i>Harris John</i>	<i>March. 21, 2018</i>	<i>CA and Facebook's role in the 2016 elections</i>	<i>Relevant</i>

		<i>Facebook's own making</i>				
9.	The Guardian	<i>MoD granted 'List X' status to Cambridge Analytica parent company</i>	<i>Holly Watt</i>	<i>March. 21, 2018</i>	<i>SCL contact in the Defence Industry</i>	<i>Relevant</i>
10.	The Guardian	<i>Leaked: Cambridge Analytica's blueprint for Trump victory</i>	<i>Paul Lewis and Paul Hilder</i>	<i>March. 23, 2018</i>	<i>CA's role in the 2016 elections</i>	<i>Relevant</i>
11.	The Guardian	<i>Facebook's wee of shame: The Cambridge Analytica fallout</i>	<i>Tim Adams</i>	<i>March. 24, 2018</i>	<i>Facebook's role in the 2016 elections</i>	<i>Relevant</i>
12.	The Guardian	<i>Politicians can't control the digital giants with rules drawn up for the analogue era</i>	<i>Andrew Rawnsley</i>	<i>March. 25, 2018</i>	<i>Politicians and institutions in the big data era</i>	<i>Relevant</i>
13.	The Guardian	<i>Facebook told me it would act swiftly on data misuse-in 2015</i>	<i>Harry Davies</i>	<i>March. 26, 2018</i>	<i>Facebook's role in the 2016 elections</i>	<i>Relevant</i>
14.	The Guardian	<i>Facebook to contact 87 million users affected by data breach</i>	<i>Nadeem Badshah</i>	<i>April 18, 2018</i>	<i>Facebook's role in the 2016 elections</i>	<i>Relevant</i>

15.	The Guardian	<i>Exposing Cambridge Analytica: It's been exhausting, exhilarating, and slightly terrifying</i>	<i>Lee Glendinning</i>	<i>Sep. 29, 2018</i>	<i>CA's role in the 2016 elections</i>	<i>Relevant</i>
16.	The New York Times	<i>Delay, Deny and Deflect: How Facebook leaders fought through crisis</i>	<i>Sheera Frenkel, et al.</i>	<i>Nov. 14, 2018</i>	<i>Facebook's role in the 2016 elections</i>	<i>Relevant</i>
17.	The Guardian	<i>Our Cambridge Analytica scoop shocked the world. But the whole truth remains elusive.</i>	<i>Carole Cadwalladr</i>	<i>Dec. 23, 2018</i>	<i>CA's role in the 2016 elections</i>	<i>Relevant</i>
18.	The Guardian	<i>Facebook labelled 'digital gangsters' by report on fake news</i>	<i>David Pegg</i>	<i>Feb. 18, 2019</i>	<i>Facebook's role in the 2016 elections</i>	<i>Relevant</i>
19.	The Guardian	<i>Cambridge Analytica a year on: A lesson in institutional failure</i>	<i>Carole Cadwalladr</i>	<i>March 17, 2019</i>	<i>CA's role in the 2016 elections</i>	<i>Relevant</i>
20.	The Guardian	<i>Facebook faces fresh</i>	<i>Carole Cadwalladr</i>	<i>March 17, 2019</i>	<i>Facebook's role in the</i>	<i>Relevant</i>

		<i>questions over when it knew of data harvesting</i>			<i>2016 elections</i>	
21.	<i>The Guardian</i>	<i>Fresh Cambridge Analytica leak shows global manipulation is out of control</i>	<i>Carole Cadwalladr</i>	<i>Jan. 4, 2020</i>	<i>CA's role in the 2016 elections</i>	<i>Relevant</i>
22.	<i>The Guardian</i>	<i>I made Steve Banon's Psychological Warfare</i>	<i>Carole Cadwalladr</i>	<i>March 18, 2020</i>	<i>CA's role in the 2016 elections</i>	<i>Relevant</i>

Sampling method: Purposive/online snowballing.

As a way of strengthening evidence on the Trump case, UK based newspapers-i.e. The Guardian and its yearlong investigation on activities relating to the campaign-i.e. Cambridge Analytica and Facebook investigations codename-*Guardian Files* constituted another source of data. Following theoretical purposive sampling (Emmel, 2013), articles were selected for the depth of investigation on the object of analysis. Thus, sampling was made easy by the *Cambridge Analytica Files*-a compendium of investigative articles published by the Guardian capturing actors and practices in the 2016 Trump campaign and CA/Facebook's role.

A search period of June 2015 to March 2020 was used in order to cover the heightened coverage of the subject. The search and sampling string identified articles that contained Strategic Communications Laboratories/SCL Group, Cambridge Analytica, Psychometrics/Psychographics, Project Alamo, The RNC and Donald Trump's 2016 presidential campaign. Methodologically, this logic of sampling is shaped by the research objective and theoretical imperative of the case.

That said, Baur and Lahusen (2005), Silverman (2007), Baumgarten and Grauel (2018) and Davidson et al. (2019) suggest that as 'process-generated data' and 'actors in their own right in the arena for public discourse', newspapers can serve as data, since as naturally occurring, they report historical or emerging events and facts that may not be generated through interviews. Triangulated with the interviews, audio records and documents in what Davidson et

al. (2019) call ‘big qual’, the newspapers enhanced ‘thematic mapping’ and interpretation of evidence from the other data sources.

Although, as a source of data, newspapers are usually criticized for their tendency to reflect political bias and values (Kang and Park, 2018). However, as a way of addressing such bias, focus was more on British based newspapers, since contextual positionality insulated them from the partisan pressures of their US counterpart.

Taken together, the pool of data above enhanced the interpretive claims and generalization that emerge from the study. Such triangulation of data is to ensure that the various data sources validate, support and confirm each other. The next section discusses decisions that shaped data analysis and interpretation.

4.8: Reflection on Data Analysis

Empirical research is usually ripe with decisions made by researchers, and transparent documentation of such decisions is essential (Greckhamer et al., 2018). This section captures decisions made and analytic constructs that guided transcription and data analysis (see Bailey, 2008).

4.8.1: Transcription: Steps Taken

According to Lapadat and Lindsay (1999) and Poland (1995), transcription is theory laden- such that ‘choices that researchers make about transcription enact the theories they hold’. Mischler, (1991:261), Kvale (1996:166) Lapadat and Lindsay (1999:74) also suggest that transcription ‘begins with research purpose’ and reflect researcher’s ‘theoretical assumptions and rhetorical purposes’, which is all part of ‘a critical step in the social production of scientific knowledge’.

In transcribing interviews, transcription was guided by the methodological assumptions and theoretical underpinnings of the study (see Lapadat, 2000). Following Ochs (1979; 1999:44) transcription reflected ‘theoretical goals’ and methodological ambition of the thesis. Thus, a *denaturalised* approach that focused on parts relevant to research question was adopted (see Cameron, 2001; Meuser and Nagel (2009).

Table 4.14: *Illustrative structure for transcription of interviews*

1.	Name of Voice	Capturing initials of respondent
2.	Characteristic of respondent	Role and relevance to the study
3.	Interview question (s)	Questions asked

4.	Text	Transcribed text
5.	Review of text with interview notes	For trustworthiness
6.	Identification of text capturing elements of the model	Imposing operationalized model on the data
7.	Identification of text capturing elements theoretical interest	Finding evidence for theoretical arguments
8.	Cross-interview analysis	Finding patterns across all interviews

Source: own elaboration

4.8.2: Framework for Data Analysis: Methodological and Theoretical Underpinnings

Representation of the four data sources in this study is an interpretive process and this requires a framework for analyzing the data. Thus, theory, research objectives and methodological underpinnings formed the basis for which content of interview transcripts, audio records, documents and newspapers were utilized (see Bailey, 2008; Elizabeth et al. 2014). This way, data used from empirical materials significantly reflect underlying assumptions about what count as data that can address the research question (Kvale, 2011). Thus, an analytic structure was imposed on the data to develop ‘filters and ‘descriptive codes’ comprising methodological ambitions and theory (Saldana, 2009:7; Cooper, 2009:245) (see table 4.15 and 4.16).

Table 4.15: Illustrative structure for data analysis in case study I&II

Obama Model (1-16)	Step1: Testing for convergence and application of Obama model	Step2: Americanization: Tracing the source of convergence in case study I & II for theoretical explanation	Step3: The critical search for deviant elements unique to the case study	Step:4 Thematic mapping of contextual factors and conditions that influenced the application of Obama model
Political and Technology Consultants	<i>Analytical focus on empirical evidence in the primary and secondary data on the</i>	<i>Analytical focus on empirical evidence that explains how the model emerged</i>	<i>Analytical focus on empirical evidence of elements that differ/contradict</i>	<i>Analytical focus on empirical evidence that point to contextual factors that</i>

	<i>application of elements in case study I & II</i>	<i>and converge in case study I & II</i>	<i>the Obama model both as an exhaustive way of utilising all data collected and expanding the emerging typology from case study I & II</i>	<i>shape, influence or condition the application of Obama model in case study I & II</i>
Big data and single database	<i>As above</i>	<i>As above</i>	<i>As above</i>	<i>As above</i>
Predictive modelling				
Data Mining and Microtargeting				
Web 2.0 Digital and Social Media				
Digital Fundraising and small donors				
Air War: Political Advertising				
Ground Game				
Political Opinion Polling				
Branding Image and Message				
Negative Campaigning				

Campaign Feedback strategy				
Campaign and Interaction strategy				
Speed and consistency of campaign communication				
Campaign Games				
The permanent Campaign	<i>All As above</i>	<i>All As above</i>	<i>All As above</i>	<i>All As above</i>

Source: Own Elaboration-Structure integral to research objectives, theoretical assumptions and methodological underpinning.

Table 4.16: Illustrative structure for data analysis in case study III

Modernization: Looking beyond Obama Model data driven practices	<i>Step 1: Deviant case analysis and identification of advancement/innovation in data driven practices (i.e. modernization)</i>	<i>Step 2: Explanation of such advancement and innovation/innovative practice</i>	<i>Step 3: Analytical focus on empirical evidence that point to contextual incentive for innovation</i>
Modernization: Generating empirical evidence for theory expansion and elaboration	<i>Step1: Emphasis on tracing the origin and source of such innovation</i>	<i>Step 2: Explaining the implication of such origin and source for theory and theory advancement</i>	

Source: Own Elaboration-Structure integral to research objectives, theoretical assumption and methodological underpinning.

The structure and analytic framework in table 4.15 and 4.16 above, and a deep reflection on data created summative attribute of data collected (see Saldana, 2009). MacQueen et al. (2008), Namey at al. (2008:141) and Wick (2012) refers to this approach as *structural coding*-

i.e., where conceptual phrase (s) act as a label that enables analysis to ‘quickly access data likely to be relevant’ from the data set.

However, in analyzing data collected for the Trump campaign, emphasis was specifically on variations in data driven practices and the implication for theory. This way, analysis is not on similarities and differences between the Obama model and Trump’s, but to facilitate the identification of variations in data driven tactics and practices that can aid the development of a theoretical explanation (see Emigh 1997). Therefore, focus is on empirical evidence that support understanding of how the Trump campaign deviates from existing theoretical explanation of campaign innovation and modernization.

That said, as a way of tidying up empirical materials collected, deviant case analysis was also imposed on data so that evidence that run counter to the Obama model is ‘incorporated into the research findings’ (Wick, 2012). The use of WhatApps in the 2015 Nigerian presidential election campaign was identified this way.

Lastly, in analyzing newspapers, relational analysis (Lagerberg, 1975; Osgood, 1959)-i.e. identifying relevant statements about the object of analysis was used. This way, analysis connects the message in the newspapers with evidence from interviews, audio records and documents (Grbich, 2007). In this sense, analysis is used to divide text, so that only paragraphs or sentences that highlight events, activities and actors related to the object of analysis is evaluated (Osgood, 1959) (see table 4.17).

Table 4.17: Illustrative guide for analyzing newspapers

<p>Step 1</p>	<p><i>Guiding question/analytic intension: What are the key components of Trump’s campaign as reported in the newspapers?</i></p> <p><i>Focus: method, actors and data driven practices</i></p>
<p>Step 2</p>	<p><i>Identification of section of text that provide insight to step 1 above and the three areas of analytics focus (i.e. innovative data driven practices, origin/source of such innovation and contextual incentives</i></p>

Step 3	<i>Confirmation of text by cross-comparing with evidence from interview, audio records and documents.</i>
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Source: Own elaboration

Taken together, the framework and strategy above is embedded in the study's objectives and methodological and theoretical underpinning (Bohm, 2004). However, to ensure rigour, validity and reliability of analysis, triangulation-a constant comparison of interviews with audio records and documents as well as attention to deviant elements contrary to the Obama model established consistency in the analysis (Burnard et al., 2008; Lynn, 2014; Patton and Cocham, 2002). Such consistency follows Wolff (2004) who argue that it is methodologically reasonable for practices that guided interpretation of text to correspond with those used in the interpretation of verbal interactions. This way, a rigorous methodologically triangulated door opens for data-to-data explanation of the manifestation of the Obama model in the case studies.

That said, in identifying contextual factors and conditions that influenced the application and manifestation of the Obama model from the empirical material, an iterative thematic approach was deployed to draw out the most prominent themes through repeated reading of the structural coding section on context (Wengraf, 2001). The relevance of this approach for identifying contextual factors that influenced the application and manifestation of the Obama model hinge on the fact that it enabled areas of agreement over themes that represent a contextual condition to be easily noted (ibid). Nowell et al. (2017) argue that such thematic approach is important since it helps in both the identification and reporting of themes found in the data set. This way, the study fulfils its methodological underpinning by ensuring that contextual factors that influence the application of the Obama model emerged solely from empirical data (see Tobin and Begley, 2004; Braun and Clarke, 2006; Barbour, 2014).

In conclusion, data triangulation and a constant and consistent reflection on the study's theoretical and methodological considerations ensured depth of clarity in the transcription process, rigour in the analyses and data presentation. At ontological and epistemological level, this process conforms both to the critical realist and interpretivist lens (see appendix 1 for an expanded discussion on the value of triangulation and approach to methodological equivalence).

4.9: Limitations of the Study

Eide and Allen (2005) agree that conducting research across diverse cultures and context is a challenge for qualitative researchers. Boyd (2008) also observe that pursuing people online and between media is usually problematic for recruiting participants. Thus, the problem of online recruitment account as one of the challenges of this study.

Secondly, operating from three field sites-i.e. in Nigeria as an insider, and as an outsider in the United Kingdom and America, meant that the politics of location (Gilbert, 1994), and cultural barriers (Crean, 2018; Eide and Allen, 2005) led to divided focus that would have made one country more expansive.

Thirdly, considering that campaign case studies took place in 2015 and 2016 respectively, they may have been the tendency that the research lost the recentness component in data collection that would have enriched responses. In Nigeria for example, performance of the president who was a candidate in the election at the time may have had influence.

Nevertheless, these limitations did not diminish the validity of findings, since triangulation and a rigorous and systematic data analysis process was conducted.

4.10: Conclusion

This chapter sets out components of the study's research design by providing a rationale for the comparative approach of the thesis, justification for cases selected and steps for data analysis.

In summary, the design seeks to achieve three things-first, to test the manifestation of the Obama model in Nigeria and the United Kingdom as a way of operationalizing and illuminating the model. Second, to re-demonstrate theory-i.e. regarding how elements of the model come to emerge, manifest and converge in Nigeria and the UK as well as evidence of data driven innovation in the 2016 Trump campaign. Thirdly, to reveal albeit empirically, context specific factors that influenced or conditioned the manifestation and application of the Obama model in Nigeria and the UK as well as contextual incentive for innovation in US political communication landscape. In the preceding chapters, these three outputs encapsulate the value of this comparative work (see Collier, 1993; Stake, 1995). In the next chapter, data presentation and discussion of findings on the Nigerian case study is presented through interpretation and aggregation of evidence and instances from the literature.

5: Case Study I

5.1: Introduction

This chapter offers a description of the application of the Obama model in the 2015 presidential election in Nigeria. In doing this, the chapter sets in motion empirical resources for a cross-case typological mapping of the technological dimensions of modern campaign. Thus, firstly, the chapter describes manifestation and presence of elements of the Obama model as well as any dimension of variations among the instances of the elements. Secondly, guided by theoretical framework, i.e. Americanization, empirical material is used with a critical realist lens to refine theory by identifying alternative explanation for the emergence and convergence of the Obama model in Nigeria. Thirdly, in line with methodological underpinning, contextual factors that bear influence on the application of the Obama model are discussed in the last section. This section clarifies the empirical view on the application of elements of the model by empirically pointing to socio-political and institutional features and conditions in the country and how such factors influence and affect the application of innovative campaign practices like the Obama model.

5.2: Manifestation of the Obama Model

Nigeria's 2015 presidential election campaign was dominated by many issues (see Appendix III for the socio-political and economic context of the campaign). However, the focus here is on the application of the Obama model by the two major political parties-i.e. the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Progressive Congress (APC). As highlighted in the methodology, the two political parties serve a specific theoretical purpose and have been selected in part because they represent instances in which something similar might have happen.

Table 5.1: 2015 Presidential Election Result: Candidates and Political Parties

S/N	Candidate/Nominee	Running Mate	Political Party	Party Acronym	Votes Received
1.	Allagoa Chinedu	Arabamhen Mary	Peoples Party of Nigeria	PPN	24,475
2.	Ambrose Albert Owuru	Haruna Shaba	Hope Party	HOPE	7,435
3.	Adebayo Musa Ayeni	Anthony Ologbosere	African Peoples Alliance	APA	53,537
4.	Chekwas Okorie	Bello Umar	United Progressive Party	UPP	18,220
5.	Comfort Oluremi Sonaiya	Seidu Bobboi	KOWA Party	KOWA	13,076

6.	Ganiyu Galadima	Ojengbede Farida	Allied Congress Party of Nigeria	ACPN	40,311
7.	Godson Okoye	Haruna Adamu	United Democratic Party	UDP	9,208
8.	<u>Goodluck Jonathan</u>	<u>Namadi Sambo</u>	<u>People's Democratic Party</u>	✓ PD P	12,853,162
9.	Mani Ahmad	Obianuju Murphy-Uzohue	African Democratic Congress	ADC	29,666
10.	Martin Onovo	Ibrahim Mohammed	National Conscience Party	NCP	24,455
11.	<u>Muhammadu Buhari</u>	<u>Yemi Osinbajo</u>	<u>All Progressives Congress</u>	✓ APC	15,424,921
12.	Rufus Salawu	Akuchie Cliff	Alliance for Democracy	AD	30,673
13.	Sam Eke	Hassana Hassan	Citizens Popular Party	CPP	36,300
14.	Tunde Anifowose-Kelani	Ishaka Ofemile	Accord Alliance	AA	22,125
Invali lid/ bla nk vot es					844,519
Tot al					29,432,083
Reg iste red vot ers/ turn out					67,422,005 43.65%

Source: INEC 2015

As stated above, in presenting evidence of the manifestation of the Obama model in Nigeria, analytic focus is on how or not candidates-Goodluck Jonathan and Muhammadu Buhari and their respective political parties respectively engaged, applied or adopted elements of the Obama model in 2015.

That said, in comparison to other democratic regions of the world, Africa's emerging democracies like Nigeria lack a long history of competitive elections to draw from for a historically grounded within case analysis (see Bleck and van de Walle, 2019). Nevertheless, to ensure contextual richness, the analysis is embedded in the reading of Africa's-election related

existing literature on electoral competition and new media. Thus, even though the focus is exclusively on evidence, with analysis providing vivid description of the dynamics of the manifestation of the Obama model, it does so within the context of existing literature. Therefore, discussion of findings is presented below as an explanation of elements applied or adopted as well as any evidence of deviant elements that emerged from the empirical material collected. Such consideration of deviant elements in the analysis offers tools for both the exhaustive use of empirical material collected and an analytic lens for discovering elements or practices that differ from the Obama model and unique to the Nigerian context (Hanson, 2017; Wicks, 2012).

However, following Miles et al. (2014) and for purpose of enhanced clarity, a meta data of empirical material collected is presented in tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 as a way of contextualizing findings and validating interpretive claims. From the point of view of ethical standard and anonymity, labels are given to respondents and where quotes are used, G represents respondents from Goodluck Jonathan’s campaign, B-for Buhari’s campaign, J-for journalist and industry gatekeepers and ANG for audio records collected. Documents collected were only assigned serial numbers for ease identification.

Table 5.2: Interviews conducted

S/N	Participant/Codes	Insight
1. 2.	Goodluck Jonathan Campaign G1 G2	<i>Compliant with research objectives</i>
3. 4.	Muhammadu Buhari’s campaign B1 B2	<i>Compliant with research objectives</i>
5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.	J1 J2 J3 J4 J4 J6	<i>Compliant with research objectives</i>

11.	J7	
12.	J8	
13.	J9	
14.	J10	
15.	J11	
16.	J12	
17.	J13	
18.	J14	
19.	J15	

Refer to table 4.1 for participant incidentals.

Table 5.3: Audio records

S/N	Participant/Codes	Insight
1.	ANG1	Relevant
2.	ANG2	
3.	ANG3	

Refer to table 4.7 for participant incidentals.

Table 5.4: Documents

Total number of Documents Collected	Insight
1- 23 (see methodology)	Relevant

Refer to table 4.10 for title and source.

5.2.1: Summary of Findings and Deviant Element

As earlier highlighted, this chapter present dynamics of the manifestation of the Obama model in Nigeria. From a comparative perspective, the analysis provides empirical foundation for a typological mapping of the technological dimension (s) and state of modern campaigns. Thus, in what follows, discussion of findings is distilled from the meta data above. Table 5.5 is a summary of findings of the application of the Obama model by both political parties.

Table 5.5: The Obama model and summary of findings

	Comparative/explanatory Variables	Summary of Findings	Summary of Findings	Deviant Elements
S/N	<i>Obama Model Elements</i>	<i>Jonathan's Campaign</i>	<i>Buhari's Campaign</i>	
1.	Political and Technology Consultants	<i>Local and foreign consultants hired to brand the candidate, manage public perception and online persuasion.</i>	<i>Local and international consultants hired to offer technical support-lobby, media and publicity services.</i>	
2.	Big data and single database	<i>Unused element, party data infrastructure may still be in formative stage.</i>	<i>Unused element, party data infrastructure may still be in formative stage-voter identification/mobilisation enabled by focus groups, polls and interviews.</i>	
3.	Predictive Modelling	<i>Unused element</i>	<i>Unused element</i>	
4.	Data Mining and Microtargeting	<i>CA Facebook enabled data mining/targeting that involved-voter messaging/voter misinformation.</i>	<i>Facebook enabled audience profiling/research led micro/macro or individual and demographic messaging.</i>	
5.	Web 2.0 Digital and Social Media	<i>Digital and social media networks used for persuasion, voter mobilisation, targeted advertising and election monitoring</i>	<i>Digital and social media networks deployed for fundraising, voter mobilisation, targeted messaging, fact-checking, and election monitoring</i>	<i>The Use of WhatsApp and WhatsApp enable chats</i>
6.	Digital Fundraising and small donors	<i>Unused</i>	<i>Individual/digital fundraising from small donors-online, through bank deposits/text messages</i>	
7.	Air War: Political Advertising	<i>Television, social media, radio and newspaper-based advertising</i>	<i>Television, radio, newspaper and social media enabled audience profile advertising</i>	
8.	Ground Game	<i>Recruited youths who anchored without data/targeting the</i>	<i>Recruited youths who through social media had access to information for</i>	

		<i>part's neighbour-to-neighbour campaign</i>	<i>the party's street and neighbourhood campaigning</i>	
9.	Political Opinion Polling	<i>Traditional polling for voter insight/victory claims</i>	<i>Traditional polling, interviews, focus groups for voter insight/victory claims</i>	
10.	Branding Image and Message	<i>Inconsistent message, weak branding/image</i>	<i>Consistent message, clear branding/creative image presentation</i>	
11.	Negative Campaigning	<i>Negative campaigning/hate speeches framed along ethnic lines, and attack on Buhari's health/democratic credentials</i>	<i>Negative campaigning/hate speeches framed along ethnic lines and personality attacks</i>	
12.	Campaign Feedback Strategy	<i>Less experimental and more reliant on social media for response/interaction and engagement of voters</i>	<i>Less experimental but a bit empirical in its use of interviews, polls and focus groups in voter interaction and engagement</i>	
13.	Campaign and Interaction Strategy	<i>Social media for interaction-information sharing/election monitoring and reporting</i>	<i>Social media, virtual town halls/website created to share information, fact check and monitor elections</i>	
14.	Speed and consistency of campaign communication	<i>Social media affordances used for responding, countering/shouting down opposition</i>	<i>Social media, media centre used to put out statements/respond to opposition</i>	
15.	Campaign Games	<i>Unused</i>	<i>Unused</i>	
16.	The permanent Campaign	<i>Unused</i>	<i>Unused</i>	

Note: Analysis indicate twelve used and four unused elements

5.2.2: Comparative Explanation of Application of Model

As a way of expanding on the summary above, a descriptive comparative explanation of the application of the Obama model is presented below. However, as earlier mentioned, all direct quotes from respondents are anonymized. As a methodologically triangulated study, evidence is drawn from the mix empirical data collected and findings are discussed in block of types.

1. Political and Technology Consultants

The PDP and Goodluck Jonathan's Campaign

The history of Political Party formation in Nigeria 'dates back to the colonial era', with politics and campaigning gaining wide appeal in the 1950s following the intensification of nationalist movements and calls for independence (Danjibo and Ashindorbe, 2018). Although, pre and post-independence political parties and party competition differ, the nationalist spirit and foundation of pre-independence politics meant that political mobilization among other things, united the country against imperial Britain (Aghara, et al. 2015). However, changes in the political system-i.e. changes in the politics and party competition of independent Nigeria and the institutional structures of the country-i.e. from the Westminster parliamentary model in 1960 to the American presidential system meant that the nature of competition and incentive for electioneering changed (Olasupo, Oladeji and Ijeoma, 2015).

Among other things, Mbufor (2016) is of the view that such changes and the multi-party competition for political power inspired the entrance and rise of actors like 'political consultants, image makers and advertisers' in Nigerian elections. Across Africa for example, there is evidence that shows how democratization and media development inspired the recruitment and involvement of American and British political consultants since the 1990s (Simenti-Phiri et al., 2015). Ndlela and Mano (2020:9) suggest that in recent elections in the continent, 'political parties are spending huge sums hiring consultancy companies with expertise in digital campaigning and even manipulation of social media content'.

While the recruitment of political consultants seems to be a longstanding pattern, evidence also confirms that like the Obama model, the services of both local and foreign political and technology consultants was a general feature of the PDP and APC campaign in 2015. In the PDP campaign for example, G2 and J7 indicated respectively, that the international consultants that were hired were involved "at the level of developing the general principles and philosophy for the campaign" in ways that place them "in the decision making structure within Nigerian elections campaigns".

G1 also stated that "foreign influence has always been a part of Nigerian campaigns even though sometimes it is outside the party main campaign structure". According to Baines and Jones (2018), foreign influence in election-i.e. the use of overt and covert activities by one country to change the tide of elections in another is increasingly becoming prevalent. As a system that produces the decision-making organ of government, interested states can choose

to influence the outcome of an election in another state to ensure that leaders emerge who align with their interest. (ibid).

In terms of the necessity for such foreign influence in Nigeria, the UK House of Commons report suggest that Nigeria became strategic to the US when the country 'emerged as an oil power' in the 1970s (HC 363, 2018:24). Although, Wylie (2019:148) suggest that apart from America, Israelis, Russians, British and French' were also involved in what he called 'civic engagement projects'-and the 'unspoken belief shared by all' that 'foreign interference in elections does not matter if those elections are African'. However, in the global north, the recent case of alleged Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election suggest growing dynamics towards such interference (Howard et al., 2018).

That said, on America's involvement in Nigeria, the understanding is that America's interest in the 2015 elections may not be unconnected with US national energy security (Volman, 2003). Rising insecurity in the months leading up to the 2015 elections and the need to protect oil investments and interest by routing for the candidate of the All Progressive Congress-a retired General could account as one reason for US interest and influence in the elections. Historically, Uche (2008) has shown how oil interest and investment in Shell BP pitched the British and her allies on the side of one-Nigeria during the separatist and secessionist civil war of 1979.

Regarding the recruitment of political and technology consultants, G1 indicated that the PDP had her "own people who were ICT experts and social media practitioners". As he further stated, "some were hired, some worked because they are friends of the party and also friends of the members of the campaign committee". This view was also echoed by G2 who admitted that for the PDP campaign, it was "standard practice to hire political consultants, social media influencers, social media volunteers because social media was the major battleground". As G2 further stated, recruited consultants who worked for the PDP included "American consultants, UK based consultants, Israeli consultants, who provided technical support for the campaign and lobby groups who helped to manage the international end of the campaign". J11 who wrote extensively on the activities of Cambridge Analytica in Nigeria argue that one of the things he found about the consultancy firm Cambridge Analytica was that they were "actually sponsored or hired to play some role in changing or persuading people through the use of wrong social media posting in such a manner that offended some other parties at that time".

Furthermore, ANG2 also suggested that even though the firm was not directly hired by the campaign, CA's work involved hacking of "Buhari's data and advertising attack of Buhari". For

ANG1 a former employee of Cambridge Analytica, “an Israeli firm” worked on the Nigerian election and was “engaged to hack into Buhari’s medical records and credit dealings with videos created to intimidate voters and portray Muslims as violent”. Similarly, ANG3 also indicated that “Israeli” were contacted for some form of what she calls “opposition research” with evidence at her disposal showing that they had “some documents that the other candidate (i.e. Buhari) had visited hospitals”. Such information according to ANG3 informed “one or two articles that was put out by the local campaign team” in addition to “video that used violent images that was specifically used to initiate fear on the citizens”.

Documentary evidence also reveal that the PDP had engaged both foreign and local consultants. For example, the Association of Communication Scholars and Professionals of Nigeria report suggest that “the PDP hired Levick Strategic Communication-a UK/US based communication firm and engaged the services of a local consultant-Badejo Okusanya who was managing director of CMC Connect (a Public Relations firm) to handle the media, publicity and image management of the party and its presidential candidate” (p.6). A report on Cambridge Analytica and SCL Elections involvement in Nigeria confirms the hiring of “Mark Pursey of BTP Advisers-a UK based Public Relations and Communications company as well as Jeo Trippi and Bell Pottinger” who all advice and consulted for the PDP and Goodluck Jonathan (p.34). Furthermore, the UK House of Commons report also showed how the PDP recruited “internet warriors” whose job was to attack rivals online (p.44). The Computational Propaganda Research Project report revealed the hiring of an “Israeli intelligence firm-Black Cube-a select group of veterans from the Israeli elite intelligence units that specializes in tailored solutions to complex business, whose job was to hack into Buhari’s email and dig out dearth” (p.223). Similarly, in her written testimony to the UK Parliament select committee on Culture, Media and Sport, Brittany Kaiser a former staff of Cambridge Analytica indicated that she was involved in securing a “contract for the SCL Group” in the 2015 presidential election in Nigeria (p.7). This is particularly interesting, considering that SCL Group has its roots and expertise in Defense operations and contracts.

That said, what the evidence above suggest is that even though, scholars like Johnson (2016) speak of the increasing growth of ‘enterprising American campaign specialist’ in international political consulting, the plethora of consultants involved in the PDP campaign of 2015 and the diversity of services they offered to the party speak rather to increasing diversification and internationalization of contemporary political communication consulting with actors and players now emerging from many countries (see table 5.6).

The APC and Mohammadu Buhari's Campaign


Like PDP, the APC also hired local and foreign consultants. J1 indicated for example, that RED Media-a PR firm based in Lagos "brought a lot of creativity to the table for Buhari, in that quote and unquote, they rebranded Buhari himself". Echoing this view, B2, the CEO of Red Media and Statecraft suggested that the APC engaged services of "an international agency AKPD-David Axelrod" who worked alongside his agency. According to B2, RED Media's work for the APC "focus on the candidate, how to connect him with the electorate, because the candidate is the product, and everything revolves around the candidate". As he further stated, RED Media "were involved in every detail of the president's outing, that's why you saw that I was touring around the country with him, you know guiding him on things as regards his outlook that is branding and message communication". Mogaji (2013) suggest that the design of 'the corporate identity' of political parties in Nigeria have not been the job of party leaders who sit across tables and debate but that of marketing and consulting experts. In 2015, consultancies like RED Media and David Axelrod's AKPD showed again how external actors have increasingly taken the responsibility of how political parties and candidates are branded by skills set that dominate the marketing world.

Furthermore, in one instance, J10, thought that the APC had equally "appealed to social media influencers" who were not necessarily consultants but commanded great "social media influence". Agina and Ekwevugbe (2017) found for example, that campaign managers now have 'huge confidence in celebrity endorsement strategy' in ways that make it part of a campaign strategy and tactic to influence the electorate. As we will later see in the British case study, recourse to such celebrity endorsement have increasingly become part of the way politicians and celebrities' partner to mobilize voters.

That said, the hiring of consultants like David Axelrod who served as a key staffer in the Obama's campaign and administration resonates with Kazeem (2018) argument regarding international networking usually engaged by opposition political parties as they seek to collaborate with foreign countries and actors for the maintenance of 'political and security conditions free of intimidation and state interference' during elections in Nigeria.

However, apart from David Axelrod, J11, J12 and J14 respectively expressed views that suggest some form of direct US interference in the elections targeted at benefitting the candidate of the APC. In their account, they point to a meeting between former Secretary of State John Kerry with 19 governors of northern Nigeria as well as Obama's speech to Nigerians days before the elections as prove (see figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1: Photoshoot of President Obama's election address to Nigerians



Source: YouTube

Perhaps, the address to Nigerians by President Obama affirms G1's allusion when he said foreign influence have always been part of Nigeria's election. In his book *My Transition Hours* then President Goodluck Jonathan pointed to the two incidence above to show that the US clearly took 'sides in the country's election' in 2015 (Jonathan, 2018:67).

Furthermore, apart from the CEO of RED Media and David Axelrod-AKPD, documentary evidence from the Association of Communication Scholars and Professionals of Nigeria and the International Republican Institute (IRI) revealed that the party "hired Burson-Marsteller, a London based Public Relations and Public Affairs firm to handle the Party's public perception and reputation challenges" (p.13) as well as a team of "computer and smart IT guys" who "set up a special unit more like an information centre equipped with computers", that served as the party's opposition research hub, mopping up information and posting negative stories against the PDP online (p.5).

Similarly, the UK Department for International Development report suggested that Statecraft-a Nigerian marketing firm was "the company that was in charge of Buhari's social media and digital drive" (p.43). The House of Commons report also indicated that like the PDP, the APC had hired and recruited its own "internet warriors" to attack rivals. Interestingly, the report confirms the creation of "a James-Carville-Clinton campaign style war room in Lagos" from

where their very coordinated digital propaganda and online persuasion activities were carried out (p. 24-28).

That said, from a comparative standpoint, the assemblage of consultants in the 2015 presidential elections cutting across a number of skill set and countries that include America, Britain, Israel and Nigeria seem to signal a new era in political communication consulting that moves away from both country specific hegemony in knowhow, practices and tactics towards new patterns of digitized disinformation and voter de-mobilisation (Wylie 2019:149). As Kaiser (2019:74) argue for example, at the heart of the hacking effort to discredit the APC presidential candidate was 'Israeli operatives who successfully passed information to SCL for use'.

Although, SCL and Cambridge Analytica's work in Nigeria began in 2007 where they recorded success without scrutiny or scandal (Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison, 2018). In 2015 however, their tactics failed to re-elect or win Goodluck Jonathan a second term. However, as we will see in the 2016 US elections, Cambridge Analytica replicated the fear stoking, disinformation and voter de-mobilisation tactics, making it in recent times, the first political consultancy firm with disinformation and voter de-mobilisation as an ingrained campaign tactic across the elections it was involved in. ANG2 even suggest that as institutionally weak democracies and unregulated political environments "elections in Nigeria and Kenya were the testing ground" for such Cambridge Analytica's tactics.

Furthermore, as revealed by the British parliamentary report on the inquiry on fake news, the Israeli hacking firm was "Black Cube-a corporate intelligence organization of a select group of veterans from the Israeli elite intelligence units that specializes in tailored solutions to complex business and litigation challenges" (DCMSC report, p. 223-229). According to the report, Black Cube uses intelligence to provide "otherwise unobtainable information", and it is on the basis of such expertise that they were able to hack the now President of Nigeria to "get access to his medical records and private emails". The report also added that part of CA's strategy was to use videos including "people being dismembered, having their throats cut and bleeding to death" to portray Muslims as violent (ibid).

Wylie (2019:148) is of the view, that such CA's negative ads and scary videos 'were placed on mainstream networks, including Google, and targeted at 'areas of Nigeria where the population leaned pro-Buhari' exemplifying the same strategy used in the 2016 US presidential election. Cadwalladr (2018) also found similar evidence suggesting that Cambridge Analytica was hired to provide 'advertising and marketing services in support of the Goodluck Jonathan campaign',

with events that 'prefigure what happened' in the 2016 US presidential election, with 'many of the same characters and some of the same tactics'.

That said, CA's widespread involvement across many countries-America, Britain, Columbia, Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, South Africa and Trinidad and Tobago speak both to the increasing relevance, spread and use of the firm's personalized and microtargeted advertising tactics (see Ndlela, 2020). Nevertheless, what is more worrying is the firm's voter de-mobilisation operation as exemplified in Nigeria, and the weaponization of information against the opposition and increasing use of dark advertising and disinformation in times of high voter apathy (Cadwalladr, 2018; Kaiser, 2019). Called voter suppression by some American scholars like Daniels (2020), it is a situation where digitization and demographic shifts are combining to incentivize how political parties and campaigns are finding new ways to de-mobilize and hinder voters from voting in an election. Indeed, the Nigerian example reduces the gap in what we know about CA's work in the global south and offer a lens for comparing CA's methods in an emerging democracy like Nigeria and the tactics the firm deployed in the 2016 US election and 2016 British referendum.

Taken together, and from the standpoint of Americanization, what this evidence suggest is that there was a mix assemblage of consultancies with diversity of skills that served the purpose of helping both parties in their search for electoral success in 2015. Importantly, the recruitment of such consultancies cuts across many countries and suggest a reduction and complete reliance on US based experts and expertise in campaign innovation and consulting (see table 5.6).

Furthermore, in ways that show the increasing relevance of local, homegrown political communication consultancies, *RED Media* and *Statecraft*-companies that had consulted for the PDP in the 2011 presidential election campaign were the firms that offered consultancy services to the APC in 2015-a commercialized shift in clients within two election cycle. *RED Media* and *Statecraft* list President Macky Sall's political campaign in Senegal, and Nana Akufo-Addo's political campaign in Ghana in their list of clients (Williams and Jideonwo, 2018). As we will see later, the 2015 British election and 2016 US presidential election campaign indicate the increasing global diffusion and growth of contemporary political communication consulting that suggest a gradual move away from longstanding US hegemony and dominance.

Table 5.6: Consultants hired in the 2015 campaign

S/N	Consultants	Expertise/Role	Country/Nationality	Hiring Party
1.	AKPD	<i>Message and media/message</i>	UNITED STATES	APC
2.	BTP Advertisers	<i>Communication &campaign advisers/focus messages and ads</i>	UNITED KINGDOM	PDP
3.	Black Cube	<i>Intelligence/Kompromat and opp research</i>	ISRAEL	CA for the PDP
4.	Burson-Marsteller	<i>Public Affairs/public relations</i>	UNITED KINGDOM	APC
5.	Bell Pottinger	<i>Public relations and reputation management /public relations</i>	UNITED KINGDOM	PDP
6.	Cambridge Analytica	<i>Political consulting/dark advertising and voter suppression</i>	UNITED KINGDOM	Billionaire for the PDP
7.	CMC Connect	<i>Perception managers/public relations and advertising</i>	NIGERIA	PDP
8.	Joe Trippi	<i>Political strategist/message and messaging</i>	UNITED STATES	PDP

9.	Levick Strategic Communication	<i>Corporate communication and media/media relations and public affairs</i>	<i>UNITED KINGDOM/ UNITED STATES</i>	<i>PDP</i>
10.	RED Media	<i>Public relations and branding/public relations, image and branding</i>	<i>NIGERIA</i>	<i>APC</i>
11.	Statecraft	<i>Governance and election consulting/message social media communication</i>	<i>NIGERIA</i>	<i>APC</i>

Source: own elaboration

2. Big data and the single database


The PDP and Goodluck Jonathan’s Campaign

Although, the internet is increasingly making data for psychographic analysis accessible in Africa (Jideonwo and Williams, 2018), J5 suggested that “big data use did not play that much role” since “it is still in the formation stage” in Nigeria. As J15 correctly observed, big data “works with data collected over time and unfortunately we haven’t had a lot of data collected in Nigeria at the time so right now what we have is still not actually big data yet”. Thus, even though as stated by G1 and G2 respectively, that “some kind of analysis of data was involved in the realm of polling” during their campaign, evidence seem to suggest that big data and a single database was not used by the PDP.

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In contrast to the PDP, the APC seem to standout in its engagement with data inspired voter understanding techniques. That said, whilst there is no clear evidence of the use of a single database by the party, the campaign seemed to have deployed social media to scale up membership registration and citizens data collection (see figure 5.2).

Figure 5.2: APC social media registration drive/data gathering



Source: Facebook

Thus, comparatively speaking, Nigeria seem to differ from the US in terms of the conscious investment in the development of campaign database and digital infrastructure that political parties in America are now developing. Perhaps, the long-term impact of such social media registration drive in Nigeria could result in data driven sophisticated campaign tactics in the form of those used in the Obama model. Nevertheless, the emergence and growth of companies like Cambridge Analytica and other data analytics companies and evidence of what was achieved in a very short time in the Trump campaign, in terms of how the campaign sub-contracted and built its campaign database also indicate the path Nigerian political parties could follow in building party campaign data and digital infrastructure (Green and Issenberg, 2016).

That said, B2 also suggested that the APC campaign voter understanding in 2015 benefited from "research of RED Media and Statecraft". RED Media and StateCraft are Lagos based public relations and governance consultancies that 'drive agenda, build movements and turn audience into fans' (Kazeem, 2018). According to B2, the firm's methods revolves around research they "have done over time" and "updated regularly" that focused on "understanding the aspiration of youths particularly in the pioneering national projects they led that have inspired the way young people think in Nigeria, which include the Future Awards Africa which rebranded what it meant to be young and Nigerian, to be young talented hardworking driven high achiever".

B2 who doubles as CEO of RED Media and Statecraft was hired as brand manager and communication consultant for the APC presidential campaign. Again, even though big data and a single data base was an unused element, local and homegrown companies and consultants like RED Media and StateCraft and the expertise they bring to bear in contemporary African elections continue to show how globally diversifying the political consultancy market has become. Across Africa, Easton et al. (2014) suggest that the increasing growth in the use of homegrown and foreign political consultants 'has been largely related to democratization, development of the media and changes in social and economic factors'.

Furthermore, B2 also suggested that their work for the APC campaign drew from their longstanding work on political advocacy that focused on understanding "where the generation is going and that is a key science you can't find anywhere". Such insight according to him is what he calls "science of human knowledge-psychology of a human being, psychology of a demography" derived from their "understanding of the generation we have been alongside together for 13 years and understanding all of those people who revolve around that demography through consensual engagements that helps you understand mind sets". That said, the methodology described by B2 above even though suggestive of a methodical effort toward voter understanding is not indicative of the use of big data analytics or psychographic segmentation. What it seems to suggest is that, like the Obama model, managers of the APC campaign took cognizance of the need to understand the drivers of political behavior among Nigerians and attempted to understand those without the sophisticated use of big data, a single database and data-driven analytics.

Before proceeding to the next element, it necessary to note that a possible explanation for the level of application of big data and a single database by the PDP and APC may in part include the fact that political party infrastructure and political communication is only recently developing in Africa (Mutsvairo and Karam , 2018). However, commentary from recent elections in Senegal suggest that such data driven approaches to campaigning were applied in President Macky Sall's campaign (Allison, 2019).

From the Nigerian and African standpoint, an understanding of the electoral landscape requires more examination of the state of digitization. Indeed, with digital divide presumably less among young people (on social media for example, 47.81% are on Facebook; 27.13% on Twitter; 11.68% on Instagram; 11.18% on Pinterest and 1.76% on YouTube) (Statcounter, 2020), with 'social media applications like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, WhatsApp and blogs' now an integral part of Africa's communication landscape, political communication in Africa's emerging

democracies like Nigeria might be moving into a future that shifts away from longstanding socio-economic and ethno-religious demographic characterization of voters (Ndlela and Mano, 2020:3).

3. Predictive Modelling

The PDP and Goodluck Jonathan's Campaign

While data enhanced predictive modelling and analytics seem to be gaining ground in some sectors in Africa (Rohr et al. 2016; Taylor et al., 2018), evidence indicate that predictive modelling was unused in 2015. For the PDP, accounts regarding the use of any form of predictive modelling by G1 and G2 only echo that the campaign had people engaged in "some kind of data analysis and demographics" as well as "conducting polls". However, irrespective of the intensity of the campaign and the recruitment of local and foreign consultants, data driven predictive analytics to voter understanding in the manner deployed in the Obama model was not a feature of the PDP campaign.

The APC and Mohammadu Buhari's Campaign

In no very significant contrast to the PDP, only J16 stated that one thing he knew much about regarding the APC campaign was their "use of empirical statistics and deep-rooted research to determine voter interest and voter decision". While 'empirical statistics' sound complicated, such use as he further noted, "was not as empirical and data enabled as you will find in maybe 2019". What this seem to suggest, is that there was an attempt by the handlers of the APC campaign to move closer to finding ways of understanding the electorate through data driven research. As B2 argued for example, "understanding of the key target audience" was a key part of their campaign. However, the approach as he further alluded was not powered by "data harvesting like in the US".

Furthermore, J18 also thought that even though "analysis of data to understanding voters is key to a lot of permutations", such effort by the APC was in the realm of "demographic profiling". Thus, taken together, this result suggests that there was no use of predictive analytics by both parties. However, in the 2019 elections, DeepDive Intelligence-a Nigerian based manifesto and public policy rating company claimed to have developed a predictive analytic model to help political party strategist identify, understand and influence voter behavior. Whilst this is now the case for elections in America and Britain, Africa's emerging democracies like Nigeria may not have fully entered this stage of electioneering.

4. Data Mining and Microtargeting

The PDP and Goodluck Jonathan's Campaign

Although, no interviewee reported the use of data mining in the 2015 campaign. Ndlela (2020:31) is of the view that 'contemporary political campaigns in Africa are enmeshed in data-rich environments, where data mining firms, PR and other consultancy firms are making inroads'. While no evidence of data mining emerged, both political parties had deployed online personalized message targeting. For the PDP, G1 stated for example, that "online targeting was involved" in their campaign as they battled the online space during the election. J5 also indicated that a lot of people attested to have gotten "information through Facebook targeted marketing". According to J15, even though "data may be limited in Nigeria", "Facebook offered a ready targeting opportunity" for the PDP campaign. As Ndlela show, Facebook advertising tools 'have made micro targeting easier, allowing campaigns to target more precisely with geographical data and algorithmically created lifestyle profiles' (ibid). Thus, in the move to reach their target audience across Nigeria's six geo-political zones, microtargeting was deployed by the PDP. As J19's comment below illustrate, Facebook was used "to target people with information online, to push out information, play it up, dig up facts and play them up just to get the attention of the voters". J15 even suggested that microtargeting was the specific area that "Cambridge Analytica was very good at and they used it to spread videos about Tinubu"-i.e. the national leader of the APC.

In documentary evidence, the Computational Propaganda research project report suggest that "16 million Nigerian Facebook users" data had been mined by SCL Elections and used to spread fear and misinformation. While there is no evidence anywhere to corroborate this, the report indicated that SCL Elections "were paid U.S.D 2.8 million to orchestrate a ferocious campaign" against the APC (p42). Maeve and Khalili (2018) found evidence of intimidating videos used by Cambridge Analytica to orchestrate voter de-mobilisation tactics online. That said, while the documentary evidence seems to contradict evidence from interviews, social media no doubt had afforded the campaign tools for microtargeting and a platform for the spread of disinformation.

The APC and Mohammadu Buhari's Campaign

Microtargeting was equally a key feature of the APC's campaign. As indicated by J15, Facebook also offered the party and campaign team opportunity for "audience profiling" that enabled

messages to be targeted at individuals and groups. Explaining their work for the APC for example, B2 suggested that “targeted messaging and microtargeting” for the APC campaign can be classified as “micro and macro”, and entailed “using trend to ensure that your information is in the space, some targeting individuals and some targeting demographic blocks”. Gish (2017) suggest that in marketing, micro targeting is the strategy used for targeting small section of individuals, while macro approaches are used target larger population.

Thus, as B2 indicated, for individual targeting, they crafted messages and asked party members “to share these messages and ensure that people tag their messages to make them viral”. Similarly, since it was important for them to understand how the people will respond, they “tested the messages before putting them out on air or online and ensured that the videos they did are shareable”. To target demographic blocks, they put out messages and videos that will “provoke an emotion that will lead to an action which is to share for more people to see”. In this sense, APC’s microtargeting can be said to be unique for its message testing.

Furthermore, evidence from documentary analysis also reveal that the “APC’s targeted messages had significant emotional and psychological appeal in most of their adverts” (ACSPN, p.5). That said, it is important to note however, that the APC’s micro and macro or individual and demographic targeting was not a product of data mining. Thus, in contrast to Obama model, even though microtargeting was deployed, no evidence of data mining was attributed to the campaign.

That said, it is also important to highlight the nature and dimension of microtargeted disinformation deployed by Cambridge Analytica. As Kasier (2019:270) show, their work for the PDP campaign in 2015 also include ‘putting information out through rumors on social media’. According to Wylie (2019;149), videos were designed to demonize Muslims, with such content and ads targeted at pro-Buhari populations ‘placed on mainstream networks, including Google’- such that ‘a Nigerian surfing the news would encounter an ordinary-looking clickbait’ that redirects them ‘to a black screen with a video box in the middle’.

Although since independence, Nigeria’s politics has struggled with ‘agenda-setting news and hate comments’ (Pate and Ibrahim, 2019). However, such Cambridge Analytica’s hateful microtargeting weaved around religion-i.e.one of Nigeria’s major fault line was a potent ingredient for electoral violence. As I argued elsewhere, one of the main triggers of violence in Nigeria is the ‘politicization and mobilization of identities by political parties and actors in the struggle’ for state power (Ijere, 2015a).

That said, it is also important to add, that from the standpoint of the three elements above (i.e. big data/single database, predictive modelling, and data mining) evidence suggest as we will see later that digital divide-i.e. disparities in penetration and access to digital affordances at individual, group, and regional levels account as contextual factor that influenced dissimilarity and the appropriation and application of these practices in Nigeria. While the three elements combine have contributed in moving political communication away from longstanding socio-economic and geo-demographic factors in developed democracies like America and Britain, ethnic, religious and primordial sentiments continue to influence campaigning in Nigeria.

5. Web 2.0: Digital and Social Media

The PDP and Goodluck Jonathan's Campaign

Although, gaps still exist regarding the impact of digital media on democratic development in Africa, the attractiveness of social media networks to politicians as tools for enlarging party and candidate visibility, as well as voter reach and mobilization has increased in recent elections (Mutsvairo and Karam, 2018). According to Ndlela and Mano (2020:3), across Africa for example, social media is 'disrupting well established forms of elite control over the media and creating new methods of election campaigning and how citizens interact with political messages'. In Nigeria, Dunu (2018) is of the view that social media is reshaping 'the structures and methods of contemporary political communication and engagement', with the abundant media the world now enjoys-i.e. platforms 'Facebook, Blackberry Messenger, WhatsApp, Twitter, Blog, Myspace, YouTube and Instagram' all moving from the realm of the social into 'powerful tools for political communication and useful means of policing election results' (ibid). Table 5.7 shows progressive changes in social media stats in Nigeria between 2011 and 2015.

Table 5.7: *Four-year changes in social media stats*

<i>Internet/platform</i>	<i>Year 2011</i>	<i>Year 2015</i>
<i>Internet Users</i>	<i>28% of population</i>	<i>45.1% of population</i>
<i>Facebook</i>	<i>76.75%</i>	<i>89.95%</i>
<i>Twitter</i>	<i>1.99%</i>	<i>6.69%</i>
<i>Pinterest</i>	<i>Not in use</i>	<i>1.51%</i>

<i>Tumblr</i>	<i>Not in use</i>	<i>0.61%</i>
<i>Google</i>	<i>0.05%</i>	<i>0.49%</i>
<i>YouTube</i>	<i>0.52%</i>	<i>0.13%</i>
<i>LinkedIn</i>	<i>0.09%</i>	<i>0.15</i>
<i>Largest user group</i>	<i>Age 25-34</i>	<i>Age 18-35</i>

Source: *statcounter.com*

According to Bartlett et al. (2015), the 2011 presidential election was the first-time social media was deployed for campaign in Nigeria. Scholars like Agbata (2015) and Nwaubani (2015) suggest that apart from democratizing the electioneering and communication environment, such introduction of social media-a ‘reflection of global trends’ inspired a more transparent election process in the country. That said, whilst it can be argued that the 2011 elections signaled the beginning of digital politics in Nigeria, the expansion of digital as indicated in table 5.7 above suggest that the 2015 presidential election seem to have further advance such practices. In 2015 for example, among other things, social media served as channel for political news, attack, deliberations and debate among party members and as a platform for campaign and campaigning (Okeke et al., 2016).

In the evidence from interviews, J4 suggested for example that for both the PDP and APC, social media networks “gave a lot of impetus to their 2015 campaign”. However, G1 also indicated that even though the PDP campaign relied on social media to “influence what Nigerians read or saw”, traditional legacy media particularly “radio and television played a major role in some parts of the country particularly in the north”.

Nevertheless, as G2 and some respondents suggested, digital media technology became a major issue in Nigeria in 2011. According to G2, former President Goodluck Jonathan is the “first social media-Facebook president that Nigeria would have because in 2011 he conducted his campaign majorly on social media and he was able to capture the imagination of a lot of young people through Facebook and Blackberry messenger”. In terms of the different ways that social media became significant, respondents agree that social media networks served the PDP as a channel for mobilizing and improving citizens awareness and participation in politics. The party as G2 puts it “had a very strong social media team” mainly because “social media was a

major battleground” and was basically used as J5 stated for “targeted messaging, advertising, location specific advertising, and to share information”.

Furthermore, J9 also suggested that social media also “gave credibility to the election” by enabling party members to “monitor results, the behavior of security men and thugs at the polling unit”. According to Omilusi (2015) ‘political thugs’ youths recruited and armed by politicians is one way that desperate political actors prepare for elections in Nigeria. However, J7 was also of the opinion that the use of social media in 2015 explains how political mobilization was carried out and “gives an insight into the prevailing narrative among the political parties” and “how they attack each other, as well as the echo chamber that they operate from”. Thus, as significant as social media was for voter enlightenment and mobilization, it was equally a medium for attacks and negative campaigning.

In the audio materials collected, ANG3 even though she seem to question the ethics of Cambridge Analytica’s tactics and her partners in Nigeria suggested that violent content and digital ads designed to suppress voters in the opposition candidate stronghold was “put out on local radio, Facebook and Twitter”. Thus, reinforcing the view that apart from serving the campaign as an instrument for getting out the vote, social media also served as a channel for disinformation.

Similarly, documentary evidence seems to echo the same narrative. For example, in the report of the Commonwealth Observer Group, it was revealed that social media had both positive and negative impact and served as a source of “instantaneous communication”, “voter education” and “misinformation” (p.25). The UK House of Commons report on fake news also revealed that social media was also used as a platform for attack on political rivals orchestrated by “internet warriors” (p.43).

Furthermore, the DFID report revealed that the PDP created “Google Hangouts”—a virtual community platform where candidates answered questions. According to the report, other use of social media networks includes, “to detect and characterize unexpected events quickly as they occur, observe elections and transmit collected results” (p.44).

That said, whilst the evidence above give credence to the use of social media networks, interestingly however, “WhatsApp”—a free messaging platform service, and a feature absent in the 2008 Obama model social media element was used for sharing short videos. Perhaps, this is because WhatsApp didn’t exist in 2008, but played a remote role in the 2012 campaign cycle

(Howard, 2018). Elsewhere, recent reports on the 2019 Indian election identifies WhatsApp as an emerging political campaign tool (Harris, 2019). Khan (2019) is of the view that the popularity of WhatsApp in the global south is because of the group conversation it enables, and the increasing number of mobile phone owners in rural areas where digital connectivity is only through smart phones.

The APC and Mohamradu Buhari's Campaign

Evidence on the APC campaign suggest that the party was ahead of the PDP in the use of social media. As the opposition party at the time, the party's main strength as respondents alluded was in information dissemination on social media. Relying on strong media presence, J10 thought for example that they held "unto certain regions.....and had the northern part of the country virtually under the control of their propaganda machinery" and in the southern part of the country, successfully divided it with the PDP-particularly in the "south-west where you have a preponderance of print and electronic media and educated people who used a lot of social media". According to J12, the party "poured posting, several quotas of postings, jingles, lot of carvings, a lot of things in the social media against a particular candidate".

Furthermore, a few things were equally unique about APC's use of social media platforms. As J16 and J14 respectively stated, they used it for "soliciting for financial support online" and for "massive mobilization". In J15's view, a volunteer consultant for the Buhari's campaign, social media enabled people to report "from across the nation and do fact checking". As he further stated, he created a website called "Factcheckng" and "led a personal fact checking project" where they picked and confirmed things that they "consider lies and injurious to Buhari's campaign and then did some research and some fact finding and then share that information on the website".

According to J19, the APC also had "virtual town halls" where people connected real time, chatting and broadcasting party events and sending feedback on happenings across the country. J19 also thought that the APC had "a special unit more like an information centre equipped with computers and smart IT guys", that served as the party's opposition research hub. In his comments, B1 also affirmed that a lot happened in the social media space for their campaign-with the creation of "unbelievably creative content imaginative content on various social media platform, producing music videos and posting them using Facebook". Such videos as B2 suggested were shared between party faithful's and targeted at "individual and demographics blocks".

Documentary evidence equally demonstrate that the APC was more creative and visible on social media. For example, the Association of Communication Scholars and Professionals of Nigeria report indicated that the APC “posted more hate messages than the PDP” online and the party’s vice presidential nominee Yemi Osibanjo “even created a website for the campaign <https://www.profyemiosinbajo.com>” (p.11&13). Furthermore, the African Union Election Observer Mission report also revealed that apart from serving “as a platform for intense debates on electoral and governance issues”, the party created “*Revoda*”, a mobile application which enabled a parallel vote count and staged “Google Hangouts” where the party’s candidate answered questions (p.28). Overall, like the Obama model, this result indicates that, irrespective of the debate on digital divide in the global south, digital and social media platforms are also increasingly becoming a major tool for campaign, voter mobilization and persuasion in Africa’s emerging democracies like Nigeria.

However, taken together, whilst there continue to be debate and a lack of consensus on the role of social media as a tool for deepening democratization in Nigeria (Ugba and Saka, 2019), the positive is that social media seemed to have incentivized deliberation and mobilization in the 2015 election. The negative however is that social media also served as a platform for the spread of hate, misinformation and fake news (Dunu, 2018). Thus, like the 2016 US presidential election, were the now defunct consultancy firm Cambridge Analytica converted social media platforms to channels for spreading ‘political falsehood both about candidates and about important campaign issues’, platforms are increasingly becoming drivers of political misinformation and voter de-mobilisation (Garrett, 2019).

6. Digital Fundraising and small donors

The PDP and Goodluck Jonathan’s Campaign

Political finance is variously identified as the incentive for political corruption in many African democracies (Eme and Anyadike, 2014). While money usually confers unmerited political advantage to political parties and candidates, in Nigeria, the bulk of such campaign fund is usually a product of ‘large corporate, single donor funding and private saving’ (ibid). Although, money continues to be crucial for electioneering with increasing awareness of the problems associated with campaign financing, solutions that both democratizes, regulate practices and instill sanctions are only still emerging in Africa (Bryan and Baer, 2005).

In Nigeria for example, even though the 2015 campaign was significantly the most expensive election in Nigeria’s democratic history, political parties relied mostly on ‘membership dues’, the

'investment of political entrepreneurs', 'big men and godfather's', and some form of government support (Bryan and Baer, 2005; Eme and Anyadike, 2014; Olorunmola, 2017). As part of her yearlong investigation for example, Cadwalladr (2018) even found that funding of CA and the PDP in 2015 was through 'a rich Nigerian who supported the incumbent President Jonathan'.

That said, even though the PDP campaign outraised and outspent the APC in the elections in what Ukase (2016) refers to as 'suspicious' mobilization of campaign funds, no evidence indicated that the campaign and its managers had relied on small donors for fundraising. As the party in government at the time, perhaps the 22 billion naira raised at President Goodluck Jonathan fundraising dinner by friends and business moguls was enough war chest for the campaign (ibid). As Ukase argue, even though such fundraising and donations 'breached the maximum limits prescribed by the 2010 Electoral Act', supervisory institutions like the Independent National Electoral Commission repeatedly failed to impose sanctions. In the discussion on context in the last section, money emerged as a factor that condition the application of innovative campaign practices in Nigeria.

The APC and Mohammadu Buhari's Campaign

According to Ukase (2016), the APC also 'breached the maximum limits encapsulated' in the Electoral Act. However, unlike the PDP, the APC though with minimal success had involved Nigerians digitally in raising funds for the campaign. B1 indicated for example, that they had "citizens who contributed to the campaign that were not party members". Citizens who out of admiration for the party's presidential nominee were "contributing their own money, raising money online and spending their own money".

It is important to note however, as J15 suggested, that what the APC generated from small donors "online was so little that it wouldn't make any meaning" for prosecuting the massively expensive 2015 election. Nevertheless, irrespective of amount generated, B1 argue that raising money from ordinary Nigerians was unique for the campaign, since it was inspired by "people who felt and believe that anything but Jonathan in 2015". Thus, making it the first time an election campaign in Nigeria will target and mobilize campaign funding from ordinary Nigerians.

Documentary evidence like the DFID report seem to corroborate that the APC crowdfunded for the 2015 elections by "using a mobile platform designed to tap into the social media networks of its supporters" (p.22). The Westminster cost of politics report specifically identified five platforms that the APC deployed: "an electronic donation platform; dedicated bank accounts; donation of a maximum of N100 per time by means of text messages to dedicated numbers; purchase of

the party ringtone for which N100 was deducted per time; and the use of scratch cards through which supporters could donate between N100 and N1, 500 each” (pp.11-12).

That said, considering that this was the first time in the history of campaign financing that a political party will digitally crowdfund, the 2015 campaign witnessed a new dimension and method in the mobilization of campaign finance in Nigeria. However, as a country with a history of unregulated party and campaign finance practices often hijacked by ‘big men and godfathers’ (Bryan and Baer, 2005), who conceive campaign funding as ‘business investment’ and disrupt governance to their favor rather than constituents (Eme and Anyadike, 2014), small donors can serve as alternative channel that democratize and modernize campaign finance mobilization in ways that can both inspire political participation among Nigerians and remedy reliance on donors who target government contracts and incentivize political corruption.

7. Air War: Political Advertising

The PDP and Goodluck Jonathan’s Campaign

According to Opeibi (2006), ‘political advertising’ gained popularity in Nigeria in the 1990s. Historically however, ‘ownership of mass media’ had ‘determine how they are used for political communication’ (Olayiwola, 1991). Nevertheless, Africa’s media liberalization of the 90s, the third wave of democratization and ‘diffusion of democratic norms and ideas in hitherto authoritarian states’ and the advent of new media opened up new frontiers for political advertising (Salawu, 2013; Ijere, 2015; Suntai and Targema, 2017).

In 2015, although deceptive, negative, less issue base, and framed sometimes with music, legacy media advertising was integral to the 2015 campaigns (Aririguzoh, 2019; Obot and Batta, 2012). Ibelema (2008) suggest that the historical relationship between traditional legacy media and politics in Nigeria ‘demonstrates the potential as well as the liability of the African press as an instrument of democracy’. In 2015 for example, legacy media advertising patterns include personality and issue-based advertising, fear/scaremongering ads, as well as attack and negative advertising with social media serving as new channels of dissemination (Aririguzoh, 2015).

Evidence also suggest that the PDP as the party in government had a good part of its air war and campaign advertising in traditional legacy media. What the data did not reveal however, is evidence of Obama style voter specific and location targeted advertising.

Nevertheless, Aririguzoh (2015) found evidence on both sides of the 2015 political divide of what she calls 'deceptive advertising' with 'misinformation, lies, and misrepresentation'. As J12 and J11 respectively indicated about the PDP's approach, there was "massive spending on adverts in the media both print and electronic" including "scary advertorials that portrayed Buhari as somebody who will decapitate Nigeria" (see example in the link attached (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KOpKkgXNb50>)). According to Esuh and Umanah (2019), billing on advertising in the 2015 campaign was the highest in Nigeria's political history with a combine spend of N 7,457,732,849.77 billion or \$374,760,44.5 million with the PDP as highest spender.

Furthermore, G1 seem to also affirm that in the PDP campaign, "the mainstream media, the traditional media got more into it". As J7 suggested, focus was on "media spending like buying adverts-TV, digital and online". J7 also indicated, as Esuh and Umanah argued above, that the PDP as well as the APC "spent over 9 times the limit set by law" on advertising.

For ANG3, the bulk of the scaremongering content and videos designed un-behalf of the PDP formed most part of its advertising content. Evidence also point to the negative ads and attacks on the national leader of the APC and the party's presidential nominee on national television as examples of the messiness and media bias in the 2015 campaign (see links attached-lion of Bourdillon <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iJAf1Z6AgbE> and the real Buhari https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ZafoHEQMoe). These videos, though below the standard required by Nigeria's advertising regulatory agency i.e. the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) aired on some national television channels. Thus, despite its regulatory responsibility, the agency it may seem was entangled in the politics of 2015 and had favored the ruling party at the time.

Furthermore, documentary evidence like the Association of Communication Scholars and Professionals of Nigeria report revealed that political advertising in 2015 was on platforms like "television, social media, radio, newspapers and magazines, billboards and flyers". However, the report also suggest that the PDP sponsored more personality-based ads than the APC (p.1). Similarly, the Commonwealth Observer Group report pointed to "gross abuse of political advertising rules" on State owned National Television Authority (NTA) with significant coverage of campaign activities dedicated only to the PDP (p.24). Indeed, such favoritism of the ruling party raises criticism and questions about the nature and extent of agency and institutional independence in Nigeria.

The APC and Mohammadu Buhari's Campaign

Evidence on the use of air war and political advertising by the APC suggest that the party was a bit more sophisticated in terms of its use of location specific advertising. As J19 and J5's comments below respectively illustrate for example, the APC "marshalled their political messages both on air and online and leveraged on the social media" ... "for advertising, location specific advertising through adverts, on social media". In another comment, J19 thought that the party "did it very intelligently and they went down to the whole nooks and cranny using adverts on radio, TV and social media to dig out a lot of stories, negative stories and figures about the PDP". J8 also seem to suggest that the campaign environment was virtually under the control of the APC propaganda machinery and the party was "everywhere, social media, TV, radio and newspapers". Furthermore, B2 also indicated that the APC's advertising content was both individual and demographically targeted, with platforms like Facebook offering more opportunities. According to Elliott (2018) '*Facebook Location Targeting options*' offer advertisers 'powerful methods' for reaching specific users in certain areas.

That said, in its analysis of political advertising in 2015, the Association of Communication Scholars and Professionals of Nigeria report indicated that the PDP had more "attack advertisement", while the APC "had over two-thirds of all the commercials and jingles with over 67.2% of the ads rated as personality-based and 32.8% as issues-based" (p.51).

Comparatively, the report equally indicate that the APC advertorials were more issue based than PDP's. Nevertheless, the report recognizes television as the more dominant channel of political advertising in 2015 and rates the APC as more visible on social media than the PDP.

The Commonwealth Observer Group report also reveal that political advertising "appeared in the style of music videos and wittily drawn cartoon characters" that seem to attack other candidates (p.19).

In summary, what this analysis confirm is that air war and political advertising was engaged by the two political parties. However, the evidence failed to demonstrate the application of the data guided approach of the Obama model. Interestingly, in a political climate where government institutions tend to sing the tune of the party in government, it was surprising to find that the Independent National Electoral Commission post-election report was bold in its submission that the political advertising landscape of 2015 favored the incumbent, since government controlled media houses "failed to comply with legal requirements on equitable coverage" (p.36). Perhaps, the bold conclusion of the electoral commission may in part be because the government in power lost the election and the report was published after the handover date of 29th May 2015.

8. Ground Game

The PDP and Goodluck Jonathan's Campaign

In most of Africa's plural societies, it is 'ethnic group membership', though with low impact on 'party preferences' that usually determine 'party attachment' (Norris and Mattes, 2013). Thus, identity as the last section of this chapter will further highlight matter to voters, voting and voting pattern (ibid). As Fawole (2005) argues on Nigeria, under such political climate and atmosphere, the general conception and approach to politics and voter mobilization include the use of ethnic rhetoric, 'intimidation, blackmail, bribery, and occasional use of state terror' in ways that often jettison civil processes of getting-out-the-vote (Ake, 1993).

Nevertheless, the changing nature of political parties from the ethno-regional parties of pre-and early post-independent Nigeria to more nationalistic parties have since inspired changes in party institutionalization and campaign strategies (IDEA, 2000). As Paget (2019) and Bob-Milliar (2014) suggest, as political parties institutionalize across Africa, 'rally intensive campaigning' full of high entertainment that cut across national, local, state, regional and ethnic boundaries are dwarfing canvassing 'as a form of campaign contact' even though political parties have continued to recruit local actors for ground game campaigning.

That said, in 2015, ground canvassers and organizers featured in both Parties strategy. However, such ground game canvassing was not the labor-intensive, top-down, bottom-up, tech enabled information flowing and data sharing style of the Obama model. Nevertheless, J4 suggested that one unique feature generated by the enthusiasm of the 2015 campaign was "the recruitment of the youths and the younger ones". J5 also indicated that the enthusiasm brought by the youths to both campaigns was not only visible on social media and online discussions, but also in their neighborhood effort at "campaigning for their preferred candidates". That said, the difference here is that the incentive for such youth participation and engagement in Nigeria is usually tied to 'political opportunities-jobs and contracts as personal rewards for their contributions' during the election (Eneji and Ikeorji, 2018).

Furthermore, G2 also confirmed that the PDP had recruited youths that anchored the party's "neighbour to neighbour campaign". Documentary evidence also corroborated this by suggesting that the party's ground troops also served as "agents and were present at polling stations across the country" (COGR:28). Similarly, the Association of Communication Scholars and Professionals of Nigeria report also revealed that the most prominent mobilization arm of the PDP's campaign was the Transformation Ambassadors of Nigeria (TAN) and Goodluck

Support Group who “carried a lot of youths along who went round campaigning in their neighbourhoods” (p.121). According to the report, TAN conducted regional rallies in the country’s six geo-political zones and “laboured vigorously to rally Nigerians” (ibid).

The APC and Mohamradu Buhari’s Campaign

Like the PDP, APC’s ground game effort revolved around youth mobilization. As B1’s comment below illustrate, youth participation in the campaign moved from a group of “people who were not just content to be voters even though they were not party members but to volunteers who drove the campaign”. According to B2, commitment to the party’s change message was the inspiration for youth volunteers. As B2 indicated, the youths “were ready, armed with our messages online in the streets and neighborhoods because they were committed to the change message”. Similarly, J19 and J18 also suggested respectively, that “the APC if I may say was smart in engaging the youths in their streets campaigning” and in how they “push out information to those who were on the streets and neighborhood”. This finding, though different from the Obama model approach, suggest that the APC campaign had some interaction with ground troops in their voter mobilization effort in a manner relatively different and more sophisticated than the PDP.

Furthermore, apart from the party’s use of ground troops, the Association of Communication Scholars and Professionals of Nigeria report also indicate that the party partnered with the Independent National Electoral Commission “in voter education initiatives” (p.6). Interestingly however, the Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group indicated that vulnerable youths were equally recruited and used “as political pawns in carrying out election-related violence” (p.28). Among other things, a possible explanation for this may include, youth unemployment and weak democratic values and norms within the political class who usually assign violent roles to youths during elections (Oluwaseun, 2013). That said, with decreasing voter turnout in successive Nigerian elections, institutionalizing ground game in party campaign tactics in future elections can help inspire and increase voter turnout.

9. Political Opinion Polling

The PDP and Goodluck Jonathan’s Campaign

With ‘multi-party politics’ now becoming the norm in Africa, Africa’s political domain is increasingly experiencing the embedding of public opinion (Mattes, 2012; van de Walle, 2013). However, as Wolf, (2009) and Lindberg (2013) argue, the politics remain ‘different’ with such

polls used mostly to 'measure the true distance from the eventual polling day reality', since most elections deviate from 'free and fair practices'.

That notwithstanding, evidence suggest that political opinion polling was a cross party strategy in 2015. As J16 indicated, part of the responsibility of the consultants hired by both political parties was, "to poll for them, and to do expert analysis about their chances". However, it is important to highlight, that the polling done by both political parties could be classified as traditional, considering the absence of any evidence of technology enhanced polling in the nature of the Obama model.

Thus, in the PDP campaign for example, even though G2 expressed doubt about the scientific accuracy of polling as a tool for capturing the preferences of Nigerians, he did attest that polls were a common feature in the election and part of the people they hired during the campaign were "conducting polls" for them. Nevertheless, as J4 and J5's comments below respectively illustrate, doubts about accuracy of the polling hinge on the fact that both the PDP and APC were conducting the polls to lay "claims about their prospective victory" and "to reassure themselves". Thus, reinforcing Wolf (2009) argument above on the peculiar use of polling in African elections.

The APC and Mohammadu Buhari's Campaign

According to J7, those recruited as consultants by the APC were paid among other things "for work like public opinion polling". Similarly, J18 suggest that the party's message consistency was down to their effort at "conducting polls and analysis". However, rather than the technology enhanced approach of the Obama model, the APC as B2 said relied on "research, from polls, from interviews, and focus groups". In his account, these tools informed the campaign about the psychology of the voter as well as the psychology of the demography the campaign targeted.

Documentary evidence like the DFID report also indicated that social media offered the campaign an equally "valuable supplementary source of insight and information" (p.38). Overall, result from this element suggest that polling has endured as a campaign tactic for voter understanding and forecast of electoral outcome. However, while the polling remains mostly traditional, the indication is that it was concern over party and candidate's acceptability and electoral chances that formed the basis of the parties polling.

10. Branding Image and Message

The PDP and Goodluck Jonathan's Campaign

Across many countries in Africa, political parties as well as governments and their agents are increasingly using branding, 'brand messages and images as a strategy in many spheres' (Youde, 2009; Hinson and Tweneboah-Kaduah, 2010; Pier, 2015). Electorally however, even though the benefit remains vaguely measured, Downer (2016) argues that a 'brand-oriented party model is now emerging in many democracies. Across Africa, Hinson and Tweneboah-Kaduah (2010) are of the view that such party branding strategies are 'evidenced by the mushrooming of new international and local advertising agencies' that now offer consultancy services to political parties.

In 2015, the hiring of international consultancies like US based AKPD, British based BTP Advertisers and Cambridge Analytica as well local-homegrown companies like Statecraft and RED Media reinforce Hinson and Tweneboah-Kaduah point above.

That said, Aduradola and Ojukwu, (2015) and Amifor (2015) argue that party display of the importance of message in electioneering campaign have been displayed in previous Nigerian elections. They point for example, to Nigeria's Third Republic Social Democratic Party (SDP) 1993 presidential election campaign that had "Hope 93" and "Farewell to poverty" and Goodluck Jonathan's 2011 campaign that had "A breath of Fresh Air" as key campaign messages respectively.

In 2015, evidence suggest that there was an understanding among the two political parties on the importance of branding, image and messaging. In both campaigns, online and traditional media attempts including billboards were used to position and market their candidate as well as de-market the opposition.

However, as the party in government, the PDP was the recipient of blame and had struggled to craft and communicate a clear, coherent and consistent message. For example, not only did they have multiple slogans and messages that include: Re-elect Goodluck Ebele Jonathan; One Good Term Deserves Another; Continue Moving Forward; Vote Continuity; and Forward Nigeria, which portrayed a disjointed lack of direction in the choice of party's campaign message. Despite these multiple slogans, the party also failed to make these messages resonating and struggled in its branding effort with candidate Goodluck Jonathan whose image was tarred with the brush of corruption, weakness and incompetence.

As G2's comment below illustrate, "there seem to have been some kind of consensus, general consensus that Nigerians were tired of the PDP-the ruling party and that they want change which was the core message and main slogan at that time for the opposition APC". G2's comment above, seem to explain why the PDP struggled with branding, image and message because the acceptability and marketability of Goodluck Jonathan was at the lowest level of recession going into the 2015 election.

In the documentary evidence, the Association of Communication Scholars and Professionals of Nigeria report indicated that the American political consultant Joe Trippi had collaborated with the Goodluck Jonathan's campaign on the party's "Forward Nigeria" message (p. 5-6). The report suggest that the focus of the PDP's image, branding and messaging effort was in presenting "Nigeria's development as work-in-progress", and Goodluck Jonathan as a "master builder". However, the report further noted that "the image of Muhammadu Buhari received a higher level of boosting than that of Goodluck Jonathan" irrespective of PDP's effort at attacking Buhari's personality and credibility (ibid). In the Commonwealth Observer Group report, the use of "songs" in praise of President Jonathan as well as what they refer to as "wraps advertising" to tarnish the image of the opposition candidate was another approach adopted for branding, messaging and image making (p.20).

The APC and Mohammadu Buhari's Campaign

Evidence suggest that the APC was more creative in the way the party crafted and marshalled political message and branded their candidate. The campaign's branding, image and messaging may have been incentivized by the perceived failure of the party in government and the supposed strength of character of the candidate the party fielded. Although, less than a year after the expiration of Buhari's first term and 11 months after taking oath of office for his second, Kukah (2020) argue that such character strength and integrity that was presented to Nigerians in 2015 was a 'fabricated integrity and empty morality'.

That said, in branding, J12 indicated that the campaign carefully presented Buhari as "a near perfect man who as Governor of the north-eastern state, chairman of the Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) and Minister for Petroleum resources didn't steal money". Given the search for leaders with integrity in Nigeria, such narrative may have resonated with many voters.

Furthermore, as a former military dictator accused of highhandedness and disregard for the law as head of state from 31 December 1983 to 27 August 1985, J14 gives credit to the campaign for their creativity in presenting him as "a man more likely to be better based on the messages

his party was putting out about him even with all they said he did then”. In a similar comment, J4 thought that the campaign successfully “rebranded Buhari himself with their messages; pictorial, graphical, video and audio materials to boost his candidature”.

B1 also indicated that in presenting Buhari’s image, the campaign “sold the story of a no-nonsense candidate, a general who was jailing politicians for 150yrs and was enforcing discipline and that skewed their minds”. B2 thought that Muhammadu Buhari was “a subject matter that required a particular kind of presentation and branding based on its essence and based on its target audience”. Thus, as B2 added, the campaign’s approach was carefully crafted in order “to threat the subject as a product”.

In messaging, the party’s campaign message centred on *change*. J10 thought for example, that the APC may have drawn inspiration from the “performance of the then government to say since this government has not performed give us a chance this is what we are going to do and many people believed”. Perceived government failure and the candidate’s branding as honest, with a no-nonsense personality and disposition may have endeared the promise of change to many Nigerians. Given the hatred for corruption, clarity and consistency of message and promise of change may have resonated. That said, B2 also indicated that in crafting messages, the campaign was able “to identify what the audience want, what to offer, and then find the bridge to communicate in a language that connects”.

In the documentary evidence, the Association of Communication Scholars and Professionals of Nigeria report suggest that in branding and image “Buhari was presented as a man of character”, who is “disciplined and detest corruption” (p.399). Taken together, this result suggests that like the Obama model, a carefully branded candidate, a resonating slogan or campaign message and a creatively marketed image can make a lot of difference in shaping a candidate’s fortune during an election.

11. Negative Campaigning

The PDP and Goodluck Jonathan’s Campaign

Although, questions remain regarding how to measure negativity in an election campaign. Nevertheless, this has increasingly become a campaign strategy (Haselmayer, 2019). In Nigeria for example, Nwofe (2016) found the 2015 campaign ‘overtly negative’ and ‘conflict driven’ with press partisanship incentivizing the negativity.

Evidence also suggest that one of the downsides of the 2015 campaign which may have been enabled in part, by the ethnic coloration of the contest was the level of degeneration in negative campaigning. Strategies deployed by both parties ranged from negative ads and negative imaging of the opposition. As J4 puts it for example, his concern about the campaign was that “there was a lot of abuse and attacks on both side”.

That said, for the PDP, negative campaign had many dimensions. First, was the use of misinformation and attack on Buhari’s health. As J1 indicated, the campaign repeatedly emphasized “about Buhari being sick and unfit to stand”. Second, was the ethnic stamp on Buhari. As J11 stated, the PDP portrayed Buhari “as somebody who will decapitate Nigeria” if elected. The negativity and pettiness were also seen in documentaries aired about Buhari (see link attached) (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ZafoHEQMoe) and Bola Ahmed Tinubu (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iJAf1Z6AgbE>) the national leader of the APC.

However, as J10 comment below illustrate, the intensity of such negativity and the marketing of an opposition candidate’s “negative tendencies and character assassination as a route to get to power” is nothing unusual. As a party, part of what the PDP had to confront as G2 suggested was the “blackmail, to damage the image of the sitting government, attacks, verbal abuse, personality attacks, and hate speech campaign on social media”.

Corroborating this evidence, ANG1 revealed that part of the negative campaign of the PDP were videos made “to intimidate voters by portraying Muslim as violent”. In the documentary evidence, the Commonwealth Observer Group report suggest that they was high level use of “inflammatory language and hate speech featuring throughout the campaign period”, with media houses airing “virulent personal attacks on leading opposition candidates” (p.24). As the report further indicate, the most provoking being “documentaries broadcast by the television station AIT-The real Buhari’, and ‘The Lion of Bourdillon’ (about the former Lagos Governor, Bola Tinubu)” (ibid).

The Association of Communication Scholars and Professionals of Nigeria report also revealed that the PDP “disseminated more hate messages and attack advertisements through television and radio spots” and had branded Buhari as a violent ethnic apologist who “view national issues with parochial lenses, even Boko Haram” (p.339). The UK’s House of Commons report also identified another feature of the negative campaign engaged by the PDP as “attack on Buhari’s democratic credentials” (p.47).

The APC and Mohammadu Buhari's Campaign

The use of negative campaigning also featured in the APC. For example, J8 indicated that “the incumbent president at that time (i.e. Goodluck Jonathan) was called all sorts of names on the social media and nobody really could stop that”. B1 also thought that the rhetoric of APC’s propaganda and negative campaigning was “powered by ethnicity and religion more than any other thing”. Furthermore, J12 suggested that another dimension of the party’s negative tactic was effort targeted at “trying to demonize the then ruling party”.

In documentary evidence, reports also suggest that the APC equally utilized negative campaigning. For example, in an apparent reference to the insecurity and unemployment in the country, the Association of Communication Scholars and Professionals of Nigeria report revealed that the APC released an ad that read “Nigerians need jobs, not death” as attack on the PDP’s performance on national security (p.4). In an ethnic coloration and apparent effort to induce antagonism among the Yorubas who constitute one of the major ethnic groups in Nigeria, the International Republican Institute report revealed how the APC portrayed Goodluck Jonathan as an ethnic bigot who “hates the Yorubas” (p.5). The European Union Election Observer Mission report also indicated how “negative tactics, inflammatory language, hate speech and religious, ethnic and sectional sentiments and appeal” shrouded the 2015 election campaign (p.20).

Taken together, this result suggest that the prevailing echo chamber operated by both political parties was dominated by negative campaign and hate speeches, irrespective that language perceived as “likely to injure religious, ethnic, tribal or sectional feelings” is constitutionally barred in the 2010 Electoral Act (2010 Electoral Act:14). That said, it is both worrying and disturbing to highlight however, that actors in the Nigerian political firmament seem to play consciously and aggressively outside the rules of the game and the heightened and unethical deployment of negative campaigning in 2015 reinforces this fact.

12. Campaign Feedback Strategy

The PDP and Goodluck Jonathan's Campaign

In some of the most recent elections in Africa, opposition parties in Botswana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Nigeria, The Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia, have turned to the ‘courts’ after losing elections (Baulch and Resnick, 2020). Whilst this might imply increasing confidence in the judiciary and reliance on the rule of law for settling political disputes, these

litigations also suggest that the bulk of these elections are plagued with irregularities that may contribute in undermining political parties preparedness to play by constitutional rules of the game. Thus, the level of political party interest in the construction of party infrastructure for campaign feedback and monitoring strategies is rather shaped by games within the rules. Such contextual variation may have influenced the application of this element in the 2015 campaign.

That said, while the evidence that emerged seem to suggest that both parties have attempted to deploy this strategy using social media albeit scantily, both parties had a less institutionalized approach to this element in their campaign. As earlier analysis on the big data and single database show, this can be explained in part by the paucity of data and absence of intense scientific approach to getting out the vote in emerging democracies like Nigeria.

Thus, in the PDP campaign for example, apart from the Transformation Ambassadors of Nigeria (TAN) and the Goodluck Support Group who as earlier stated anchored the party's ground game effort albeit without evidence of the Obama model empirical mindedness, J9 thought that social media enhanced "reporting, the collection of results, online posting of results, and reporting the behavior of security men, thugs at the polling unit". Although, J9's comment above, might explain why for the first time in Nigeria's democratic history, the presidential candidate of the PDP didn't have to wait for the usual ritual of final announcement of result by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) before conceding defeat. Nevertheless, this is not an indication that the campaign had an app-based, digitally enabled feedback strategy with campaign ground troops.

Similarly, even though documentary evidence like the DFID report suggest that in designing how the party understood and responded to the electorate, social media interaction-"Twitter images/photos or real-time activity on the ground" gave the party useful insight in "determining what is taking place" (p.22). This evidence only suggests a weak application or embedding of this element in the party's 2015 campaign compared to how it was utilized in the Obama model.

The APC and Mohammadu Buhari's Campaign

In terms of intention rather than technique, the APC's get-out-the-vote effort in 2015 can be rated highly. According to B2, what the campaign cared about was "ensuring that you put out things that will provoke an emotion that will lead to an action among more people". However, this statement even though indicative of the campaign's understanding of the need to connect with and get people involved, no evidence emerged to suggest that this was designed to

function on a platform that provided feedback from those the campaign connected with i.e. supporters, ground troops and party agents across the country.

Furthermore, even though evidence from the DFID report suggest that social media equally influenced the APC's voter engagement, interaction, reaction and response to issues during the campaign, such social media driven engagement with supporters seem to be the only channel for any bottom-up feedback strategy. Thus, making it different from the Obama model app enabled ground troops vs campaign feedback/information flow.

13. Campaign and Interaction Strategy

The PDP and Goodluck Jonathan's Campaign

With less 'institutional constraints' to navigate, politicians in developing democracies usually draw from a large list of unconventional 'campaign strategies' during elections more than their counterparts in developed democracies (Borzyskowski and Kuhn, 2020). For example, to 'overcome information' problems during election campaign in many African countries, Stokes (2011) and Stokes et al., (2013) suggest that politicians and political parties usually 'hire local agents' to help with their interaction with voters, with such campaign networks serving as 'local intermediaries' in providing campaigns with information (Koter, 2013). However, in addition to these approaches, digitization seems to be incentivizing mediated approaches to addressing such campaign voter information flow and campaign voter interaction.

Although, unlike the Obama model campaign interaction strategy where data infrastructure, and the campaign's social networking hub-i.e. MyBarackObama.com and technologically sophisticated apps facilitated interaction between campaign and ground troops, social media tools facilitated such campaign interaction in Nigeria (Table 5.8 shows progressive growth of the social media following of both candidates in 2011 and 2015). Campaign interaction in the form of sharing information and fact checking, responding to propaganda, citizens monitoring and reporting from polling units, retweeting of trending hashtags and elections observation represent how both political parties interacted with the electorate through social media.

Table 5.8: *Social media followers of the candidates*

<i>Candidate</i>	<i>Year 2011</i>	<i>Year 2015</i>	<i>Likes</i>	<i>Twitter</i>
<i>Goodluck Jonathan</i>	<i>Facebook Followers</i> 246,000	<i>Facebook Followers</i> 2,259, 810	1, 864,143	<i>Joined Nov</i> 2015

				959.6 k followers
Muhammadu Buhari	Facebook Followers 630, 108	Facebook Followers 892,403	868, 000	Joined Dec 2014 3.1m followers

Source: statcounter.com

Example of campaign and interaction strategy reflect in J18’s comment below when he alluded that “social media had its impact, at least for the first time we were able to monitor elections and report to campaign, share information online between campaigners and push out information to those who were on the streets and neighbourhood”. In the PDP, G2 confirmed that the intensity of the campaign and the fact that “social media was a major battle ground” meant that every known and available campaign methodology was used to reach voters.

In documentary evidence, the DFID report revealed that Facebook offered the PDP her most potent platform for the party’s campaign and interaction strategy. As noted in the report, Goodluck Jonathan’s Facebook fan page account “was by some distance the most active page and had the most interacted with content” (p.46).

The APC and Mohammadu Buhari’s Campaign

The creative use of social media by the APC manifested in the party’s campaign and interaction strategy. As earlier mentioned for example, B2 stated that social media provided the campaign with a platform to share messages with members. J9 also suggested that the party had equally used social media to “respond” and spread “propaganda”. In J15’s view, what worked for the APC in 2015 was the “use of social media to share information and do fact checking”. As he further mentioned, the campaign had a fact checking project that enabled the party to respond and tackle things considered “injurious to the campaign”. In another response, J15 thought that the APC “had virtual town halls where people connected, chatted, and broadcast events”.

Similarly, the DFID report also revealed that the APC had also used social media to “track and respond quickly to rumours or misinformation, detect and characterise unexpected events quickly as they occur” (p.46).

In summary, this result suggest that both the PDP and APC had some inclination of the value of campaign interaction and had attempted to craft a strategy that relied on social media. However,

as the evidence show, both parties fell short in the area of intensive data exchange, information sharing and bottom-up interaction with sympathizers, supporters and volunteers as evident in the Obama model.

14. Speed and consistency of campaign communication

The PDP and Goodluck Jonathan's Campaign

According to Bleck and van de Walle (2019), trends are emerging-i.e. 'increasing urbanisation, innovation in the use of information technology, and a surging number of youth voters' that are altering the pace of contemporary African elections. Thus, like the Obama model, media abundance-multiple channels of communication powered by digital technologies incentivized both the PDP and APC's campaign embedding of speed and consistency of campaign communication. Apart from targeting, sharing information, online fundraising, attacking each other with negative stories and monitoring elections, J16 thought that social media also provided both campaigns platforms for "countering each other at the same time". Whilst such campaign antagonism among opposition parties may not be new in the legacy media, social media seem to have enhance the speed with which parties and their supporters engage in such media war.

In the PDP for example, G2 indicated that because "social media was a major battle ground, it became standard practice to hire social media influencers, to hire social media volunteers" that engaged in what he called "social media shouting match among the various gladiators".

Similar evidence also emerged from the House of Commons report suggesting that online trolls "young internet warriors" were used to respond, attack rivals, peddle disinformation and provocative language (p.57). DFID report also revealed that social media provided the tools to "track and respond quickly to rumours or misinformation" (p.44).

The APC and Muhammadu Buhari's Campaign

In the APC campaign, speed and consistency of campaign communication was also enabled by social media. For example, B2 stated that social media had enabled "party members to report issues in the localities pre and post-election". In another instance, J19 thought that social media had enabled "party faithful's to send feedback across polling centres".

The campaign's creativity in quick response and consistent communication was also reflected in the website they created. As mentioned earlier, J15's indication of a factchecking website created for the campaign standouts out as the campaign's most creative signature project. As

he further indicated, the campaign equally had what he called “the media centre-basically a troll farm that gets information out and also look for information to tackle and respond to”. According to him, the approach was such “that campaign spokesperson didn’t have to constantly put out press statements because some people were responding appropriately online”.

Corroborating this finding, the Commonwealth Observer Group report also revealed that social media “has been a source of instantaneous communication” for the APC (p.25). The Association of Communication Scholars and Professionals of Nigeria report also showed how “Adebola Williams, Chief Executive Officer of Statecraft and Red Media, and Social Media Consultant to GMB, was tweeting in real time on the political campaign train of GMB” (p.148). In one example, the report noted that on 21 March 2015 through his Tweeter handle @DebolaLagos he tweeted “#CampaignTrail the streets litter with love as @ThisIsBuhari #HajiaSaratu proceeds to the rally grounds #Lafia4GMB”. Similarly, on 23 March 2015 with the same handle “@DebolaLagos”, he tweeted “#CampaignTrail @ThisIsBuhari set to go #Owerri4GMB”. Again on 24 Mar 2015 he tweeted “#CampaignTrail the supporters in their trademark light up as they see @ThisIsBuhari, screaming #change” (ibid).

In summary, what this evidence suggest is that the impact of media abundance seem to equally run through the activities of political parties in developing democracies like Nigeria as they try to engage and interact with the electorate. However, even though both parties had deployed this element, the APC seems to have showed more sophistication in its campaign consistency and speed of communication.

15. Campaign Games

The PDP and Goodluck Jonathan’s Campaign

Across most parts of Africa, gamification is increasingly being used to inspire youth participation in certain programmes (Adukaite and Cantoni, 2016). In Nigeria for example, such game designed approaches are also already in use in driving sales performance (Yusuff et al., 2019). However, in the 2015 election, no evidence on the use of gamification was found.

The APC and Mohamradu Buhari’s Campaign

Like the PDP, no evidence was found on the use of gamification by the APC. However, from the context of electioneering, and from the standpoint of political participation, considering that Nigeria recorded only 43.65% turnout-i.e. 29 million of the 67 million registered voters in the 2015, gamification can serve as an incentive for remedying the increasing voter apathy

particularly among millennials and digital natives who represent the largest group of digitally enabled and active mobile telephone users in Nigeria.

16. The permanent Campaign

The PDP and Goodluck Jonathan's Campaign

With the liberalize media now increasingly forming partnership with political actors for campaign (Windeck, 2010), Cheeseman (2018) suggest that most of 'everyday politics in Africa is not about solving current problems, but on winning future elections'. Whilst there is no evidence of the use of this element by both political parties, Windeck and Cheeseman's thoughts above suggest that political actors concern with elections can involve unconscious embedding of ingredients of the permanent campaign in day-to-day governance.

That said however, in an apparent comparison of the application of this element, J14 thought that "in the US, Obama, Bush, Clinton and Trump are all presidents known to engage the people severally and not only when the campaign is coming". In contrast however, the Nigerian polity as his comment below illustrate is such that "it is only when election is coming up that you see politicians going out and when they choose to go out, you see them at big events, they just go there, speak they don't take questions or somebody delivers speeches on their behalf". Thus, apart from highlighting the fact that the permanent campaign was unused, the absence of government vs people engagement described by J14 above may have also contributed to PDP's undoing and eventual loss in 2105. Whilst the absence of such state-citizen interaction may have implication for democratic consolidation, it also speaks to the absence of relations that can deepen democracy, improve governance and accountability.

The APC and Mohammodu Buhari's Campaign

The APC's creative use of social media since taking over government in 2015 may be incentivizing the deployment of what Cook (2002) calls 'permanence of the permanent campaign'. This is because after winning the elections, the party has continued to engage with Nigerians on social media platforms. As Olukotun (2017) show, evidence emerged suggesting that prior to the 2019 elections, the APC had started campaigning for President Buhari's second term in 2017-i.e., two years before the date of the election, thus invoking the possibility of the permanent campaign. From the point of view of governance and state-citizens relations, perhaps, the permanent campaign can open opportunities for election off-season interaction between the government and the governed.

Taken together, it is important to note in summary, that the significance of this section hinge on the fact that even though a good amount of empirical literature exist with narratives of significant changes in campaigning since Obama, no recent work exist that attempts a comparison and cross-contextual definition of emerging campaign practices in a developed and developing democracy. Thus, what this chapter does, in ways that advances comparative literature is testing the Obama model in another context to show empirically and cross-contextually the technological dimension and state of contemporary campaign. The possibility of showing the manifestation of the Obama model in another context is indeed one of the important contributions in this work.

That said, the key difference to note is that while the Obama model revolves around big data infrastructure and analytics, social networking hub and sophisticated apps as an anchor for moving campaigning away from traditional and socio-demographic categorization and segmentation of voters that characterized previous campaigning to more personalized form, social media formed the basic tool, instrument and infrastructure deployed by the PDP and APC for campaign, voter engagement and mobilization. Significantly, in getting out the vote, ethnic, religious and demographic considerations still matter in Nigeria.

5.3: Trajectory of the Manifested 12 Elements

As the analysis above show, 12 of the 16 elements of the Obama model were deployed in the 2015 Nigerian presidential election albeit in varying ways when compared with the Obama model. For example, while political and technology consultants were recruited by both political parties, social media and campaign speed and communication was not used in the same degree in Nigeria.

Furthermore, while digital fundraising and small donors sat at the core of Obama's campaign finance mobilisation, only the APC had deployed this element with minimal success.

In the same vein, while the Obama model air war and political advertising was data driven and location specific, such patterns did not emerge in Nigeria. However, media abundance has also inspired huge modification in the channels where such air war now take place.

Similarly, while apps and technologically sophisticated infrastructure drove the Obama model use of campaign feedback strategy and campaign interaction strategy, such efforts were only minimally enhanced by social media in Nigeria.

Evidence also suggest that both parties fell short in the use of campaign games, the permanent campaign, big data and single data base and predictive analytics. What this means is that while data powered voter understanding and personalization was at the centre of the Obama model, social, demographic, ethnic and religious factors still matter in Nigeria.

Furthermore, across both campaigns and context, speed and consistency of campaigning was enhanced by social media with political party supporters, recruited social media handlers and paid consultants playing roles similar with those of recruited party spokesmen in the digital public sphere. That said, dissimilarity or differences in the use and deployment of the Obama model and a more elaborate cross-case discussion of the trajectory of manifestation of the model is presented in the last chapter.

However, taken together, considering that very scanty systematic study on campaign practices exist in Africa, this case study advances understanding of evolving campaign tactics in the global south. Thus, giving expression of differences between campaign innovation in advanced Western democracies and contemporary Africa. In considering how to characterize and classify campaign innovation in sub-Saharan Africa, this case study not only de-Westernizes existing literature, but it also advances the existing typology and the subfield of comparative political communication. In the next section, empirical material is used to examine whether Americanization suffices as theoretical lens for explaining convergence of the 12 elements.

5.4: Americanization: Theoretical Implication of the manifested 12 Elements

As internet and information communication technology continue to advance, empirical narratives seem to echo the fact that common practices in electioneering are still emerging across countries despite contextual differences. Drawing from the 12 converged elements above, this section seeks to explore theoretical explanation for such similar occurrence in dissimilar context. The focus therefore is theory elaboration. Specifically, it involves the process of refining the Americanization theory with empirical material in order to specify more carefully whether it does offer in contemporary times, a lens or potential for explaining convergence of the 12 elements exemplified in Nigeria.

That said, it is important to highlight again, that the Nigerian and British case studies were selected in this work for certain theoretical invocation and suspected similarities that account for traces of Americanization. Thus, the guiding theoretical notion of Americanization is assessed in

the light of empirical findings. Indeed, this process is important for understanding whether convergence in practices in a developing democracy like Nigeria could be attributed to the process of Americanization. Thus, through empirical material and a critical realist lens, the thesis is subjected to an examination both as a way of testing theory and expanding theoretical insight for the explanation of convergence and change in contemporary campaign.

5.4.1: Evidence and Theory Elaboration

As the analysis above show, 12 elements were identified as similar features of campaigning in Nigeria and the US. This section will explore this seeming convergence from a theoretical perspective regarding how to refer to similar practices in different national context. However, before moving to theory elaboration, it is necessary to highlight again, that a deviant element- i.e., the use of WhatsApp was identified in Nigeria. This is worth mentioning because it goes back to the idea of whether American influence i.e. Americanization suffices as a theoretical explanation for campaign practices that emerged in another context.

That said, whilst this effort at theoretical update may be questioned as unnecessary or narrow, the comparative take-off point of this study- i.e. the Obama model makes the approach ideal for revising Swanson and Mancini's Americanization thesis. As their thesis argue, among the drivers of transnational diffusion of American practices are agents of Americanization- political consultants, professional organizations, market driven campaigns, democracy assistance program as well as academic and professional programs (Swanson and Mancini, 1996:4-5). In the discussion below, evidence is used to explore the depth and impact of these forces in the 2015 elections as justification for revalidating the Americanization theory.

The PDP and Goodluck Jonathan's Campaign

When talking about how American experts may have influenced what the party did in 2015, G1 suggested that "foreign influence has always been a part of Nigerian campaigns" and "to some extent, they wanted to integrate some of what transpired in the Obama style". Although the PDP campaign as he further noted had their "own people who were ICT experts and social media practitioners", some "were hired, some worked because they are friends of the party and also friends of the members of the campaign committee". This standard practice of recruiting consultants meant that the party looked beyond US consultants to include "UK based consultants, Israeli consultants, who provided technical support for the campaign and lobby groups who helped to manage the international end of the campaign". Similarly, ANG3 a former

employee of Cambridge Analytica also alluded to the involvement of “an Israeli firm” that worked on the Nigerian elections, while majority of those who responded confirmed that Cambridge Analytica a UK based consultancy firm was equally involved in the PDP’s campaign.

In the documentary evidence, it was also revealed that the PDP had engaged the services of a local Nigerian-consultant-Badejo Okusanya of *CMC Connect* who handled the campaign’s media, publicity and image management, as well as Mark Pursey of BTP Advisers-a UK based Public Relations and Communications Company and Joe Trippi-a US based political communication consultant. The implication of this is that the party’s campaign consultant architecture in 2015 was drawn from many countries including Nigeria.

The APC and Mohammadu Buhari’s Campaign

Like the PDP, the APC had also recruited consultants nationally and internationally, i.e. in Nigeria, the US and the UK. Commenting on the impact of the foreign consultants on the APC campaign, B1 suggested for example, that their job was “setting the principles for the campaign rather than the hands-on implementation of the campaign itself”. Foreign experts he said were involved, but “Nigerian actors take the first stage the moment the initial grand plans are drawn” and “the driving of it, the populating of it, developing the content for it was done by Nigerians”.

Furthermore, apart from the recruited international consultants, B1 also indicated that the campaign had “many young people who were driving things at various level”. Pointing to the importance of contextual knowledge in an election campaign, B2 argued that campaigning is about the environment and many of the foreign experts “don’t understand the people, don’t understand the pulse of the masses”, they bring what he calls “helicopter plans that’s why some politicians now hire us”. When probed further whether Obama’s campaign use of social media may have influenced the work of his company, B2 responded by saying “social media is the tool we have been using since 2005 actively for marketing even before it became the thing in Nigeria”. That said, while his comment seems to sound like a marketing hype, the fact that B2 had a central role in the APC campaign makes his comments considerable and reasonable.

Thus, as seen above, irrespective of the engagement of US political consultants, both campaigns had not relied on US experts alone for the expertise, skills, know-how and practices deployed in 2015. As J18 observe, there “was actually home-grown skill, the knowledge to use social media” that was deployed in the campaign. J10 and J14 comments below also respectively indicate that in terms of the role of foreign consultants, their impact “was minimal” and the “influence of

American consultants was limited". J7 even thought that the main limitation of the foreign experts was developing a "strategy that fit into the Nigerian context".

Now, considering that Swanson and Mancini's Americanization thesis argue that experts-i.e., political consultants, professional organizations, market driven campaigns and democracy assistance programs etc. are the major drivers of the spread of American inspired campaign practices, the evidence above seem to suggest that what transpired in Nigeria cannot be completely attributed to the theory's identified forces. J11 and 15, as well as ANG3 even refer to Nigeria and Kenya as "an experiment" and 'test ground' for Cambridge Analytica's work in the 2016 US elections. Comments that suggest the inspiration and flow of campaign insight and tactics from the global south. Furthermore, the mixture of recruited consultants assembled by both political parties in the 2015 presidential election campaign also suggest less reliance on American experts and expertise.

Thus, even though the 12 converged elements are similar or closely associated with the Obama model and manifest forms and patterns of those deployed in the US election, the evidence seem to suggest that we may not speak of Americanization as the theoretical incentive and driver of convergence.

Furthermore, the evidence does not also suggest that the manifestation of the 12 elements is a function of diffusion, adoption or shopping (Plasser, 2000; Plasser and Plasser, 2002). What it suggests is that convergence of the 12 elements may be a product of the assemblage of the many consultants and experts across different national context and within the Nigerian political communication and advertising market. Although, it could be argued that these actors may have tapped knowhow from the US. However, the fact that some practices used in the 2015 presidential election campaign in Nigeria-i.e. Israelis and Cambridge Analytica's hacking, dark advertising and voter de-mobilisation tactics were not used in the Obama model also point to how campaign practices now emerge.

Indeed, evidence also seem to suggest that convergence may not be an import/export influence in practices (Norris, 2004). This is because, there was no evidence of a cross-fertilization of ideas between the Nigerian consultants and their American counterparts except for the practices tested by Cambridge Analytica in Kenya and Nigeria (Cadwalladr, 2018; Kaiser, 2019; Wylie, 2019).

That said, the diverse set of foreign nationals i.e. Americans, Britons, Israelis and Nigerians and changes in social structures/media technology seem to sit as the inspiration of the practices deployed in the 2015 presidential election campaign in Nigeria. Thus, as the debate in the theory chapter indicated, it is 'the structure and patterns' of changes in a society that seem to underpin the construction of political developments (Levy, 1965). As Negrine (2008) argue, evidence seem to also suggest that it is changes in the nature of technologies of communication that explain better the changes in practices adopted and deployed in the 2015 election. Thus, like in America, technological change seems to have played an important role in shaping the campaign environment in Nigeria.

Mutsvairo and Karam (2018:17) agree that 'technological advancement has become the focal point for political and economic development' in Africa. Although this case may be insufficient for theoretical generalization. That notwithstanding, the evidence suggest that Americanization or outright American influence now seem too simplistic as a theoretical lens for describing global campaign convergence in contemporary electioneering. As Frenkel and Shenhav (2003) and Berghahn (2010) argue, in an era of cross-national spread of innovation and multi-polarity, it has become increasingly 'difficult to discern where new developments in economic and technological innovations now instantly circulating the globe originate'.

As earlier highlighted for example, Cambridge Analytica seem to have tested its dark advertising and voter de-mobilisation/disinformation tactics in Kenya and Nigeria (Cadwalladr, 2018, Kaiser, 2019; Wylie, 2019). Thus, as Negrine and Pathanapossolous (1996) argue practices now seem to be taking place in 'world that has become increasingly internationalised ...with a variety of sources and common pool resources' appearing in different context. In the next chapter, the 2015 British Election will also provide empirical basis for this theory revalidation and elaboration process.

Nevertheless, this section has contributed to the discussion on how campaign practices converge in specific national context. Significantly, considering the paucity of research in Africa, this section offers some important contribution to scholarly understanding of campaign convergence. Importantly, the evidence shows that external influences in contemporary campaigning are real and subsist. However, these influences are now trans-national, with recruitment of campaign consultants and experts now taking place across many countries (see table 5.6 above).

Furthermore, even in developing democracies like Nigeria, internal expertise in campaigning and campaign consultancy seem to be growing in a path dependent way, such that reliance on US evolved practices and experts have continued to wane. That said, this evidence from Nigeria does not describe the entire world of political communication.

However, as Flyvbjerg (2006) observe, a case study research can make specific theoretical observation based on evidence the researcher encounters in the case. Thus, the best description theoretically perhaps, is that converged elements in Nigeria are rather hybrid (Chadwick, 2013), path dependent and a product of the development of internal national expertise and trans-national assembling of skills and knowhow. A conclusion that seem to support Negrine (2008) 'professionalization thesis-of improvement of practices derived from circumstances or conditions that make it possible for those practices to become established' (p.153). Interestingly for example, *RED Media* and *Statecraft*-i.e. indigenous Nigerian companies based in Lagos consulted for Goodluck Jonathan's campaign in 2011 and for Muhammadu Buhari's campaign in 2015.

That said, recall that in the initial section of this analysis, it was highlighted that SCL Group the parent company of CA had secured the 2015 Nigerian election contract. Similarly, analysis also showed that Black Cube-i.e. an Israeli company comprising of veterans from Israel's elite intelligence units with specialty that includes 'cutting-edge analytical skills; harvesting in the cyber world and a unique experience of accessing and analyzing information on various platforms' were also involved in the PDP's campaign (see Black Cube's website attached- <https://www.blackcube.com/>).

Now, considering that both SCL Group, Cambridge Analytica and Black Cube are British and Israeli companies respectively, with roots in defense operation contracts and intelligence, they seem to be a new pattern that has emerged in recent electioneering that suggest a relationship between defense intelligence tactics and political campaign. Indeed, the 2016 Trump campaign in chapter seven provides a better context for understanding such new and emerging pattern. That said, the theoretical implication of such defense-intelligence tactics and campaign relationship to the theoretical critique of Americanization is that it is a possibility that such Cambridge Analytica dark tricks and voter de-mobilisation tactics were out of the playbook of defense derived intelligence where Cambridge Analytica's parent company SCL Group boast expertise (see Tatham, 2015). Thus, we could infer that convergence of practices in dissimilar context notwithstanding, American forms of political communication might not necessarily be the progenitor of practices in other democracies.

Thus, there is a sense, from the mixture of competing firms gathered in the 2015 elections-foreign consultants and consultancies-Israelis; US based AKPD; UK based Cambridge Analytica and BTP Advertisers; CMC Connect, RED Media and Statecraft-Nigerian players in the industry that suggest increasing internationalization of political communication consulting and transition from complete Americanization. Like in Nigeria, evidence of consultancies and consultants engaged in the 2015 British Election and the 2016 Donald Trump campaign reinforces the global growth, transnational flow, diversification and tactical differences in contemporary political communication consultancy.

Indeed, haven identified Swanson and Mancini's Americanization thesis 'black swan' (Popper, 1959)-i.e. a clash in empirical observation (Lakatos, 1969), if we invoke Popper's 'falsification' reflexivity, in the context that evidence that emerge as it relates to theory does not fit the theoretical proposition of Americanization, the case for theory refutation can be made (ibid), such that we can also conclude that the thesis is weak or invalid for explaining contemporary campaign convergence. This finding I have to say altered my own view and preconceived assumptions on the impact of American experts on campaign practices in Nigeria. In the next section, contextual factors that emerged from empirical material with influence on the application of the Obama model are discussed.

5.5: Context and Implication for Model Application in Nigeria

As indicated in the methodology, this thesis had intended to explore the application of the Obama model beyond one national boundary without overlooking national and case specific contextual differences and conditions. Thus, the research design had sought to empirically identify country specific factors that may shape the application of the sixteen elements in the case studies. Although, analysis began with examination of the application of elements and the theoretical explanation for convergence, the context within which this happens matter. Political environments have formal and informal rules and structures, and therefore, elements of the Obama model might manifest differently because of those.

That said, to achieve the above methodological objective, the *implicit* (Esser and Hanitzsch, 2012) and *metatheoretical* (Wirth and Kolb, 2004) research strategy was adopted i.e., a design without contextual variables at the onset. In specific terms, the approach adopted is a design that factored the need to empirically identify and explain contextual conditions, variables or differences that may condition the application of the Obama model. In doing this, the thesis seek to reveal structural or systemic features that can contribute to explaining dissimilarity and the application of the model in the case studies.

As Swanson and Mancini (1996:248) argue, 'forms and influence of campaign innovations are shaped by local contextual factors'. Negrine (2008:42) also assert that the problem with the idea of 'Americanization' for example, is that context limits 'full Americanization'. Thus, such methodological framing informs this section. As Franzese (2007) observe, in modern comparative work, the central tenet in this kind of study is that '*context*-structural, cultural, institutional, strategic, social, economic, and political matter'. Therefore, this section delivers on the methodological promise by discussing contextual factors that shaped the application of the Obama model in Nigeria. In doing this, the study realizes the double value design of a comparative research and deepens explanation rather than mere description. Five broad themes emerged from the analysis as follows:

5.5.1: Digital Divide

Nigeria provides evidence of the consequence of digital divide on electioneering. Like many countries around the world, digital transformation seems to have revolutionized the information and communication ecosystem in Nigeria. However, with 46.1% internet penetration (Internet Live Stats, 2016), the country is further known for disparities in access to digital affordances at individual, group, and regional levels. For example, majority of respondents cited internet penetration as a barrier to the application of some elements of the Obama model. Thus, even though social media contributed in driving practices, tactics and trends, digital inequality-lack of access by a significant number of Nigerians influenced the level of application of elements of the model.

In their accounts on internet penetration for example, J5, G2, J1, G1 and J8 comments below respectively illustrate that of the country's over 180 million population, they is a "a high population of illiterates"; "those who do not have access to phones in the rural areas"; "are not even connected"; or "familiar with the use of social media" and "don't have income to buy data too". In one instance, J15 argued that "big data works with data collected over time and unfortunately we haven't had a lot collected in Nigeria". In the literature, Ragnedda and Glenn (2014) suggest that digital divide i.e. unequal access to internet communication technologies and resources condition its use in sub-Saharan Africa.

In the documentary evidence, DFID report found that the northern part of the country for example "has less internet availability than the south" suggesting an inherent propensity in social media towards the south (p.34). Similarly, the Computational Propaganda Research Project report equally reveal that in a state like Lagos, "women were less likely to have internet

access than men” (p.46). Thus, differences in the application of the Obama model seem to be in the degree to which internet penetrated and afforded Nigerians access to digital tools.

Furthermore, the evidence above seems to also suggest multiple levels of digital divide-i.e., access, represented in regional disparity in penetration between the northern and southern parts of the country, and skill, use/socio-cultural and gender factors. In the literature, digital divide is equally considered as multifaceted and multidimensional (Vartanova and Gladkova, 2019). For example, Compaine (2001:15); Colombo et al. (2015) and Ragnedda and Muschert (2013) respectively establish that ‘there is more than one digital divide’ with different aspects and dimensions, including gaps between men and women. Indeed, this evidence reinforces Ragnedda (2017) and Ragnedda and Ruiu (2017) view of an interrelation between social capital-i.e., ‘individual resource’ (Coleman, 1990) and the three levels of digital divide. Mutsvairo and Ragnedda (2017) have also found for example, that digital divide ‘reflects on one’s race, gender, socio-economic status or geographical location’. Thus, as Jensen et al. (2012) have noted, one of the many influences that contributes in conditioning digital politics in Africa and by inference the adoption of the Obama model in Nigeria is digital divide.

5.5.2: The North-South Divide

Another dominant theme in the analysis of contextual factors that condition electioneering in Nigeria and the application of innovative campaign practices is primordial sentiments and loyalties. A system of political competition dominated by politicians and political parties that encourage political mobilization on grounds of regional affiliation as well as religious and ethnic identity is problematic. Historically, the multi-ethnic configuration of Nigeria and the Muslim north vs Christian south divide has been at the heart of some of Nigeria’s worst political challenges and violent crises (Ijere, 2015).

In most multiparty democracies around the world, political parties are usually differentiated by ideological and programmatic grounds. However, this is not the case in Nigeria. As Geertz (1963) note, in many new states like Nigeria, primordial ties tend ‘to become politicized’, with political life framed along the lines of ‘regionalisation of nationalism’ (Coleman, 1960:56) and citizens preferably bonding on ‘assumed blood ties, race, language, region, religion and custom’ (Geertz, 1963).

That said, the 2015 election was conducted at the back of 16 years monopoly of the PDP who lost the presidential election to the opposition APC. Significantly, this will be the first time in the history of Nigeria’s democratic experiment that an incumbent president will lose a presidential

election. Analysts had long held the view that it was virtually impossible to defeat an incumbent Nigerian president with all the resources at his disposal (Abdullahi, 2017; Adeniyi, 2017). However, political dynamics in the 2015 elections proved otherwise. According to Adeniyi (2017:3) the logic of rotational presidency which basically centres on 'geo-politics' was critical in determining voting pattern and outcome. Prior to the campaign, the presidential aspiration of Presidential Goodluck Jonathan, an ethnic Ijaw from the minority south-south who became president after the demise of President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua a Muslim northerner was contentious. Thus, geo-ethnic and regional sentiments became crucial in the build up to the 2015 election (Abdullahi, 2017). As Adeniyi argue, north vs south power sharing agreement has its roots in the formative stage of the fourth republic in 1998 and was part of the policy in the PDP for ensuring political equity and geo-ethnic balancing. Thus, since 1999 an informal power sharing arrangement has applied within the PDP, where presidential power rotates between the north and south in what is popularly called *zoning system* (Auge, 2015). In the literature, scholars like Lindemann (2008) and Laws (2012) point to such inclusionary elite bargains as a factor that account for political stability in Africa's post-colonial states.

In 2015 however, Jonathan's second term presidential ambition was conceived by northern political leaders as a threat to stability. The leaders felt that it was only fair for political power to return to the north (Okonta, 2015). Although, Terwase et al. (2016) are of the view that north to south power rotation and sharing agreement was truncated in 2011 when President Goodluck defied it to contest after the demise of President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua. The decision of President Goodluck Jonathan to contest again in 2015 infuriated the north who termed it 'an invitation to lawlessness and anarchy' and pitched campaign and campaign rhetoric along ethno-regional and religious lines (Adedniyi, 2017:21). Nigeria's complex nature of identity politics meant that the north went into the election insisting that the presidency was their turn. As president Jonathan himself asserted in his book *My Transition Hours*, 'my leadership was besieged with contending primordial forces with the ever-present threat of violence and formidable modern-day players who were bent on not allowing the sentiments to die a natural death' (p.55).

Commenting on this theme for example, B1, G1, G2, and J15's, comments below respectively illustrate how people invoked "ethnic, real raw ethnicity for campaign purpose", and some politicians had to "resort to ethnic and religious sentiments", "religion, ethnicity and then regional politics", in framing the 2015 election as "Fulani men vs Niger Delta men", since candidates of the two major political parties were from the north and south respectively.

In the documentary evidence, the House of Commons report suggest that the campaign was characterized “more by low politics than by high minded pledges on policy” (p.36). The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Dispute report also indicate that the two major political parties held onto “ethno-regional and religious identities in the campaign process” and were discussing “trivial issues” (pp.12-18). Similarly, the European Union Election Observation Mission and African Union Election Observer Mission reports respectively showed how the use of “religious, ethnic and sectional sentiments and appeal in the campaign” (p.19) mixed with “religion and geo-political zone influenced the choice of candidate voted for” (p.23).

Indeed, as the election results show, voting was clearly along ethno-religious and regional lines. Jonathan secured more than 50 percent of his votes from the south and lost all the north-east and north-west states (Adeniyi, 2017). According to Jonathan, ‘since independence in 1960 there has always been tension between the north and south over who controls political power’ (p.55). Some commentators also argue that the north vs south power struggle is an inheritance of the British administrative and structural creation of the colonial era (Thurston, 2015). That said, the significance of this factor to the 2015 election is that voter mobilization was essentially around ethnicity, religion and region, with northerners basically voting for their northern candidate likewise the south-south and south-east, with the south-west vs north alliance electing the president (Mbah et al., 2019).

Although, scholars like Nnoli, (1978:12) argue that the potential of primordial loyalties like ethnicity as a ‘force for changing the realities of African life is very minimal’, Ezeibe and Ikeanyibe (2017) are however of the view that recent time politics in Nigeria shows that ‘political elites manipulate and mobilize ties like ethnicity, geopolitical region, and religion to seek and retain political power’. Thus, the degree to which candidates and political parties worry about the application of innovative campaign practices vary, since emphasis is usually placed on securing support from ethnic, regional and religious blocks. Moreover, such primordial affiliations and loyalties seems to transform political competition and voting into an expression of solidarity with a candidate of one’s religious, regional or ethnic constituency. Indeed, Hamalai et al. (2017:2) agree that the 2015 elections elevated to unprecedented heights ‘ethno-regional and religious polarizations in the country’. Thus, it seems prudent to conclude, that, under such political climate, dependence on innovative campaign techniques, tactics and practices is de-emphasized and can account for dissimilarity in the level of application of the Obama model.

5.5.3: Violation of Campaign Finance Regulations

Violation of campaign finance regulation and gross institutional weakness in the monitoring and enforcement of campaign finance laws emerged as another contextual condition that influence

electioneering in Nigeria. Although, constitutional and legal requirements exist that place limit on campaign spending, evidence indicate that such constitutional and institutional regulations are not adhered to by candidates and political parties. For example, sections 88-93 of the 2010 Electoral Act sets limits on contribution, funding and candidate/party expenditure (Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN), 2010). However, despite these provisions, politicians and parties still flout these laws with impunity (Chikodiri and Olihe, 2016).

Commenting on this theme, a common view among respondents was that both political parties had spent far beyond the threshold approved by the Electoral Commission. As J7's comment below illustrate for example, "the PDP spent over 9 times the limit and the APC spent about 5 billion naira, everybody is breaking the campaign finance law and there is no consequence and this is not part of the narrative when we talk about election integrity and election credibility".

Similarly, G1 and B1 respectively indicated that one concern in the 2015 election was that "politicians and political parties far outspend the approved limit" leading to the "weaponization of campaign funding". J5 also thought that this phenomenon of excessive and unregulated funding is "because of the way Nigeria's electoral process is". As he further indicated, "logistics, transport, recharge cards for party representatives at polling unit on election day could cost a presidential candidate over 1.2 billion naira". Ojo and Onuoha (2018) are of the view that such money influence in most instances have turned Nigeria's election into a contest that is usually determine by the 'highest bidder'.

In the documentary evidence, the Westminster Cost of Politics report suggest that "the PDP and APC expended on the media alone eight times and three times respectively the amount legally allowed for running the entire presidential campaign" (p.11-13). As the report further indicate, one consequence of the huge amount of money spent by both parties was "the emergence of rented crowds for parties' activities". The report suggest that "N3, 000 to N8, 000 per head" was budgeted for such rented crowd because for the political parties and candidates, "the larger the crowds at their rallies, the more the public is impressed and the more seriously their candidature is perceived" (ibid).

Thus, violation of campaign finance regulation seems to influence the extent to which political parties and candidates manipulate election and the electoral system. Adhering to limits on campaign spending seem not to have been effective and weak institutions and institutional monitoring and enforcement exacerbate this challenge. As Oluwadare (2019) explain, money plays 'illegal role in Nigerian politics' and political competition is usually commodified. As we will

see in the next factor below, violation of campaign regulations afford politicians and political parties the financial luxury for manipulating the campaign and electoral process in such a way that it can lower the quality of engagement with the electorate and jettison the incorporation and application of innovative campaign practices like the Obama model. Overall, the point made is that there is evidence suggesting that unregulated campaign finance affects electioneering and excessive spending may intensify fraudulent tactics that reduces emphasis on the use of innovative campaign practices.

5.5.4: Money, Vote Buying and Stomach Infrastructure

Another theme that emerged in the analysis as a factor that affects application of innovative campaign practices like the Obama model is the exchange between politicians and the electorate. Although, this may not be termed political culture since it might imply a generalized conclusion on the national political terrain. However, the focus here is on the pattern of political behavior that shaped how the two dominant political parties campaigned.

In the analysis, respondents speak for example of vote buying or what some specifically call “stomach infrastructure” as a strategy deployed by both political parties in their engagement with the electorate. By stomach infrastructure, respondents meant the use of and preference for inducement, ‘pork barrel’-spending largesse to cronies and hand-outs to the electorate for political support (Ojo, 2014).

In his seminal work on post-independent African politics, Bayart (1993) in *The State in Africa: The politics of the Belly*, Bayart argues that African politics extends the metaphor of eating and the belly into a framework of clientelistic relationship between the rulers and the ruled in the expenditure of state resources. Similarly, Omilusi (2018) observed that the 2015 election was a socio-political paradox, where the electorate seem to have preferred and politicians offered ‘stomach infrastructure’ over sustainable development policy promises on the campaign trail.

As evidence suggest, both the PDP and APC applied this strategy in 2015. Their approach includes-sharing of money, foodstuff, gratification, and gifts to the electorate ahead of the elections. G1 suggested for example, that such practices include “financial mobilization of voters from states and local governments across the country for rallies”. In another example, G2 indicated that during campaigns “people who come to visit will expect to be fed, expect to be given gifts, expect to be given transport fair” as a standard practice. Furthermore, J8 also suggested that during rallies and political campaigns, “you share money to buy their loyalty on voting day”. This practice as J5 indicated “is what is call stomach infrastructure which is vote

buying". Thus, money as J5 further stated "plays a big role not just to the candidate but to the voters and it is the economy that provides an incentive to collect the money".

Documentary evidence like the Commonwealth Observer Group report also revealed "an increasing resort to inducement" in the 2015 elections (p.35). The International Republican Institute report on the election also revealed how observers noticed "vote buying, including one polling unit where it seemed someone was watching how voters voted" (p.13). The Westminster Cost of Politics report also indicated that there was a "shift of emphasis from the provision of public goods to a new concept of stomach infrastructure" in the 2105 elections (p.11).

Thus, the implication and prudent conclusion from such financially induced political climate is that the use of innovative campaign practice (s) like the Obama model might be unpopular to politicians with the financial war chest to offer stomach infrastructure, thus jettisoning and affecting the extent to which the model may have been applied.

5.5.5: Media Environment

The nature of Nigeria's media environment i.e. degree of media independence and autonomy is the fifth theme that appeared in the analysis as a factor with influence on innovative campaign practices. Media influence refers to a system where media organizations tend because of political manipulation and pressure to favor personalities in government, with such media coverage favor in many instance undermining regulations and standards. As Capitant (2011) show, across Africa, a new group of media players now exist with roles in 'democratization' and the 'electoral process' that politicians cannot ignore. Indeed, such media influence and the impact it had on journalistic ethics and autonomy in the 2015 elections reflected on the nature of coverage and amount of airtime given to opposition candidates.

For example, J10 thought that as the party in government, the "PDP were dominant in the mainstream media at that time". Nevertheless, this dominance in the traditional legacy media arena was not without institutional compromise. As J12 and B1 respectively suggested, "there were also pockets of compromise on the part of the agencies" in such a way that "they probably got entangled in politics". B1 cites the case of a subsisting law under a government agency known as Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) where all campaign ads are expected to get clearance before going on air. As B1 argued, by AMCON's standard of advertising practice in Nigeria, "you cannot get certain videos on mainstream media without passing through AMCON". However, as he further stated, "because of politics, those system that supposed to monitor went to sleep or looked the other way" and videos like the lion of

bourdillon and the real Buhari got aired on mainstream television even with AMCON existence” see link to videos attached (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8cNZn-WeTuY> & <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZafoHEQMoe>). These videos targeted the national leader of the opposition APC and APC’s presidential standard bearer.

That said, while media liberalization in Africa seem to have unbundled the continent’s post-independent state monopolized Soviet media model (Mutsvairo and Karam, 2018), state and state actors seem to still exert enormous influence on media outlets and social media (Gumede, 2016) in semblance of what Oates (2007) refers to as ‘neo-Soviet model of mass media’ or Herman and Chomsky (1988) ‘propaganda model’-where ‘money and power allow the government and dominant private interest to get their messages across to the public’.

Documentary evidence equally highlight features of political influence on traditional legacy media. For example, the Commonwealth Observer report revealed that “on the state-owned National Television Authority (NTA) Campaign advertising carried during news programmes was one-sided”, favoring incumbent President Jonathan (p.22). Similarly, the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes report also showed that on National Television, i.e. the National Television Authority (NTA) “political advertising rules were grossly abused, with almost all the coverage devoted to PDP campaigns, to the detriment of other parties” (p.21). In their report, the African Union Election Observer Mission revealed that national television stations “continued to publish sponsored political messages of both the APC and the PDP even after the 24-hour deadline” (pp.22-30). The Independent National Electoral Commission post-election report also highlighted that the political advertising climate of the 2015 elections favored the incumbent as government-controlled media houses “failed to comply with legal requirements on equitable coverage” (p.47).

Thus, traditional legacy media seem to have been equally central in 2015. However, as the evidence indicate, political influence and favored media coverage given to the PDP, as well as the biased, one-sided, and partial coverage given to the opposition may have conferred the PDP unusual airtime and confidence that reduced the party’s interest and commitment to innovative practices. As the analysis in the first section showed, the APC as the opposition party at the time seem to have been more methodical in the application of the social media component of the Obama model.

That said, while the literature on political influence on the media in Africa indicate that liberalization, commercialization and diversification of the media industry have contributed to accountability in state affairs (Tettey, 2001), Mutsviario and Karam (2018:11) argue that ‘colonial

legacy has been critical to media development' and 'state intervention leaves the government as the lone supplier of bulletins', with a narrative that usually support incumbents. As they argue, in most post-colonial African countries, 'media politics' (Zaller, 1999) (cited in Mutsvairo and Karam, 2018) 'a system of politics where individual politicians seek to gain office, and to conduct politics while in office, through communication that reaches citizens through the mass media' 'has always been guarded, with members of the press corps working to actively promote the ruling party' in what Siebert (1956) calls the Soviet media model.

That said, in the context of contemporary changes in the media and information communication technology environment, and the fact that the sample in Swanson and Mancini's (1996) work stop short of including an emerging or developing democracy in sub-Saharan Africa, practices and contextual variables that have emerged above apart from updating their modern model of campaigning captures the means and ways in which political parties and actors disseminate political messages in contemporary Africa.

Similarly, while recent scholarship emerging from Africa agree on the changing nature of campaigning in the continent, these studies fail in itemizing the characteristics and features of contemporary campaign in the continent (see Mutsvairo and Karam, 2018; Ndlela and Mano, 2020). Thus, as the field continue to transition, this chapter and work expands the register of the range of practices that now count as elements of political communication. As Fletcher and Young (2012) and Semetko and Scammell (2012) argue, reassessing and 'rethinking theory and practice' are important contemporary research priorities.

Thus, in this sense, apart from Africanizing the field, this chapter sets the groundwork and foundation for updating Swanson and Mancini's modern model from a cross contextual standpoint as well as prevailing contextual conditions that shape practices. While this may be an ideal type and not reflective of every practice in contemporary Africa's electioneering, it makes contribution for revealing the technological dimension (s) and state of modern campaign practices in Africa and the contextual factors that shape them. Thus, following Hadland (2011), the missing contextual variables in Swanson and Mancini's modern model that have emerged above and practices that have also emerge-i.e. microtargeting, web 2.0-digital and social media, digital fundraising and small donors, air war-political advertising, ground game, branding, image and message etc. expands both the discourse on contextual conditions and practices of contemporary political communication.

Therefore, what this case study show is that in an increasingly trans-national and globalized media world, practices and features of the model of political communication exemplified in the US-Obama model also extend to non-Western emerging democracies. As a unit of analysis for this comparative work, the manifestation of some of the elements of the Obama model in Nigeria foregrounds the expansion of Swanson and Mancini's modern model of campaigning.

That said, even though practices are hybrid Chadwick (2013). i.e. reflective of old and new media practices, CA's testing of dark advertising and voter de-mobilisation tactics in Kenya and Nigeria theoretically suggest elements of Africanization and transition from an era of complete Americanization (Ekdale and Tully, 2019).

In summary, this section concludes by emphasizing that convergence of the 12 elements i.e., political and technology consultants; microtargeting; web 2.0-digital and social media; digital fundraising and small donors; air war-political advertising; ground game; political opinion polling; branding, image and message; negative campaign; campaign feedback strategy; campaign and interaction strategy and speed and consistency of campaign notwithstanding, application of these elements is shaped by context. In the same vein, dissimilarity in other elements like big data, single data base, predictive modelling and the permanent campaign can equally be explained as a function of contextual condition.

5.6: Conclusion

This chapter has done three things. First, the chapter has established that twelve elements of the Obama model were deployed in Nigeria though in varying degrees. Thus, indicating a direction regarding a typology of practices in contemporary campaign across different context.

Second, theoretically and from the standpoint of the study's theoretical framework, the chapter has established that Americanization comes short and is inadequate for explaining convergence in practices. Convergence was rather path dependent and a product of the development of internal national expertise and trans-national assemblage of skills and knowhow. Although, as a comparative study, this case is insufficient for a theoretical generalization. The British General Election of 2015 will serve as another empirical context for the continuation of a cross-contextual expansion of this effort.

Third, the chapter identified five broad empirical themes that emerged as contextual factors with influence on dissimilarity in the application of the Obama model. The next chapter will attempt to do the same from the standpoint of the 2015 British General election, by examining the

application of the Obama model, as well as validity of Americanization as a theoretical lens for explaining convergence in practices and the contextual factors that influenced convergence or dissimilarity. As a comparative study, the main value of this thesis is the cross-case operationalization and typological mapping of practices, the cross-case theoretical commentary and generalization on Americanization and modernization theories and exposition of contextual conditions in the three countries.

6: Case Study II

6.1: Introduction

Like the previous, the focus of this chapter is three-fold. First, empirical material is used to describe manifestation of the Obama model in the 2015 British election. Second, following theoretical framework, empirical material is used to further examine Americanization as a theoretical lens for explaining convergence. Third, in line with methodological underpinning, a unique British contextual factor that influenced application of the model is discussed to highlight dissimilarity. Taken together, the chapter advances effort towards a cross-case typological mapping of the technological dimensions of modern campaign and an understanding of Americanization theory in contemporary British context.

6.2: Manifestation of the Obama Model in the 2015 UK Election

Held on the 7th of May 2015 to elect 650 members of parliament after a five-year fixed term parliament, 3, 971 candidates stood for the elections. Amidst speculation of another hung parliament and minority or coalition government (see appendix IV for the socio-economic a political context of the campaign), the election ushered in an unpredicted majority for the Conservative Party 'with 331 seats, 232 for Labour, 56 for the SNP, and the Liberal Democrats winning 8 seats and losing 49' (Electoral Commission, 2015; Rose and Shephard, 2016; Hawkins et al., 2015). Table 6.1 is a summary of result and vote share.

Table 6.1: 2015 Election Result

S/N	Party	Votes	Percentage	Seats won	Gains	Losses
1.	Conservative	11, 291, 248	27.7%	331	35	10
2.	Labour	9, 347, 326	31.3%	232	22	48
3.	Lib Dems	2, 415, 888	8.1%	8	0	48
4.	UKIP	3, 862, 805	12.%	1	1	0
5.	<u>Green</u>	1 150, 791	3.8%	1	0	0
6.	Plaid Cymru	181, 694	0.6%	3	0	0
7.	SNP	1, 454, 436	4.9%	56	50	0
8.	<u>Others</u>	<u>275, 919</u>	<u>0.9%</u>	18	0	0

Curled from: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/elections2015/results>

As table 6.1 show, multiparty politics is the norm in Britain. However, governance have traditionally been associated with the two major political parties with fluctuating electoral fortunes for the Liberal Democrats (Denver and Hands, 2001; Forman and Balwin, 2007). This

analysis follows the two-party line (see methodology). Nevertheless, considering that British electioneering campaign takes place at two level-i.e. 'local constituency campaign and national campaign-directed by party headquarters', the analysis below though the subject of the latter, will where necessary, draw on the former (Denver and Hands, 2001:71). Put differently, where necessary, examples will be drawn from national campaign constituency strategy and mobilisation approach for emphasis. This is necessary because in Britain, there is usually an integration of constituency campaign in the overall campaign strategy designed by party headquarters (ibid).

That said, to provide clarity on the relevance of empirical material, a meta data is presented below as a way of contextualizing data presentation (see Miles et al., 2014). This way, a lens is formulated for accessing the appropriateness of empirical material generated for making empirical claims and theoretical commentary.

Table 6.2: *Interviews conducted*

S/N	Participant/Codes	Insight
1.	Conservative Party C1	<i>Compliant with R/O</i>
2.	Labour Party L1	<i>Compliant with R/O</i>
3.	L2	
4.	L3	

Refer to table 4.2 for participant incidentals.

Table 6.3: *Audio records*

S/N	Participant/Codes	Insight
1.	AB1 Michal Kosinski	<i>Relevant</i>

Refer to table 4.8 for participant incidentals.

Table 6.4: *Documents*

Total number of Documents Collected	Insight
1- 14 (see methodology)	<i>Relevant</i>

Refer to table 4.11 for title and source.

Drawing from the meta data above, this section present findings of the manifestation of the Obama model. Where necessary, quotes will be used to provide illustrative insight of the point or points being made-with **C**-representing Conservative *Party* respondent and **L** Labour Party (see table 6.2).

6.2.1: Explanation of Application of Model

This research was designed to examine the extent to which the Obama model was embedded in the 2015 campaign. In discussing the application of the model in the election, focus is on how the Conservative and Labour Party applied or adopted the elements. Table 6.5 is a summary of findings.

Table 6.5: Obama model and summary of findings

	Comparative/explanatory Variables	Summary of Findings	Summary of Findings	Deviant Elements
S/N	Obama Campaign Elements	Conservative Party	Labour Party	C/L
1.	Political and Technology Consultants (refer to chapter 2)	<i>Local and foreign political consultants hired as well as CCHQ campaign bureaucracy engaged to drive both digital and constituency targeting efforts</i>	<i>Local and foreign consultants recruited power campaign with a new dimension of celebrity engagement.</i>	<i>Labour's celebrity politics</i>
2.	Big data and single database	<i>VoteSource-a central database for voter identification and creation of voters models</i>	<i>Contact Creator and Nation Builder-central database for voter identification</i>	
3.	Predictive Modelling	<i>Data enabled voter clusters and predictive models on voters likely voting position</i>	<i>Data enabled voter segments and clusters</i>	
4.	Data Mining and Microtargeting	<i>Data enabled insight and precise personalised messaging</i>	<i>Core voter profiling and messaging</i>	
5.	Web 2.0 Digital and Social Media	<i>Deployment of digital for top down v down top campaign interaction, advertising and targeting</i>	<i>Organic use of digital for posting, core voter messaging and advertising</i>	
6.	Digital Fundraising and small donors	<i>Less reliance on digital fundraising and small donors</i>	<i>Successful use and reliance on digital fundraising and small donors</i>	

7.	Air War: Political Advertising	<i>Old method theme-based advertising on new unrestricted platforms</i>	<i>Old method theme-based advertising on new unrestricted platforms</i>	
8.	Ground Game	<i>Team2015 and RoadTrip2015 data retuning canvassing</i>	<i>Ambitious five million doorstep conversation with less data insight</i>	
9.	Political Opinion Polling	<i>Polling, market research, telephone canvassing/survey data used for election management</i>	<i>Private opinion polling, telephone/doorstep canvassing for campaign messaging</i>	
10.	Branding Image and Message	<i>Careful branding, stage managed image and a clear message</i>	<i>No clear branding, difficulty in image presentation and insistence message</i>	
11.	Negative Campaigning	<i>Digital/national press enabled negative attacks on Labour</i>	<i>Digitally enabled personality/policy based attacks on the Tories</i>	
12.	Campaign Feedback Strategy	<i>Digitally enhanced two-way flow communication between campaign and canvassers</i>	<i>Uncoordinated campaign feedback strategy</i>	
13.	Campaign and Interaction Strategy	<i>Digitally enabled action oriented interactive tool for voter mobilisation</i>	<i>No evidence of use</i>	
14.	Speed and consistency of campaign communication	<i>Gamified/digitally enhance response and rebuttals</i>	<i>No evidence of use</i>	
15.	Campaign Games	<i>Points gaining and reward driven online activities for voter engagement/ mobilisation</i>	<i>No evidence of use</i>	
16.	The permanent Campaign	<i>Fixed term parliament/incumbency advantage and party leader inspired permanent campaign</i>	<i>No evidence of use</i>	

Elaboration: All 16 elements applied

1. Political and Technology Consultants

Conservative Party Campaign

There is a longstanding recognition in Britain's political stage of the growing role of 'political consultancy, public relations, lobbying and political PR (Cliff, 1989). Changes in political party development have been accompanied by abandonment of internal party bureaucracy advise in favour of 'spin-doctors and moderators of information flows' whose media politics understanding and agenda setting skill is of benefit to parties and party leaders (Yukhanov, 2011). Thus, in an out of British election campaign seasons, they are now paid and unpaid political consultants who among other things monitor media and political developments, make technical recommendations, as well as advice government and Whitehall (Cliff, 1989). In campaigning however, the 1945 election stands out as the first, where 'outside experts' were used to help both the Conservative and Labour party campaign (Bartle and Griffiths, 2001:5).

For example, the Conservatives had maintained their relationship with S.H. Benson firm started in the 1930s, while Herbert Morrison kept close 'sympathisers from journalism and advertisers' (ibid). Since then and across the two parties, a good number of 'gentlemen players of the electoral game' have multiplied (Harrop, 2001:62). Home grown political consultants like Geoffrey Tucker-Conservative Party, Mark Abrams-Labour, Peter Madelson, Tim Bell, Robert Worcester and Alistair Campbell, and their foreign counterparts like Saatchi & Saatchi and American recruits have been credited with innovative campaign thinking in Britain (Harrop, 2001; Hollingsworth, 1997). Evidence exist however, of 'a two-way' flow of practices between Europe and the United States (Cunliffe, 1974) (cited in Negrine and Pathanapossolous, 1996).

In recent elections, this tendency of recruiting advisers has been maintained (see Bale, 2012). In 2015, evidence from both sides suggest a continuation of this tradition. For example, the Conservative Party recruited Lyton Crsoby an Australian and Jim Messina-from the United States. Also, in the Tories team were home recruits-Craig Elder and Tom Edmonds, both Directors of the Conservative digital campaign. It is important to mention however, that Craig and Tom had been part of the Tories campaign in 2010. The responsibility of this team centred on finding key voters through interviews, polling, questionnaires and data analytics and targeting voters with carefully crafted messages. Apart from these consultants, C1 illustrated how the campaign "built an in house team effectively of around 8 to 10 people which included digital experts, people from Twitter and Facebook targeting using data, a creative team as well as designers, video makers, copywriters, people who can produce all the content needed in house

and then used our digital experts to kind of power these into the right people”. C1 also stated that Jim Messina had given the campaign technical assistance particularly “in terms of data profiling”.

Writing about their role in the Tories campaign, Elder and Edmonds (2015) reiterated how their work in the campaign was focused on ‘using digital to speak to the people’. Byrne (2015:13) also found that the Conservative Party drew insight from Facebook’s Head of Public Policy Rishi Saha-‘an ex-Conservative Party digital strategist who worked on the party’s 2010 election campaign’. Similarly, Bale and Webb (2015), Cowley and Kavanagh (2015), Mullen (2015) and Scammell (2015) point to the services of Jim Messina, and longstanding Australian strategist Lyton Crosby-40/40 seat targeting strategy of defending 40 seats and targeting 40, as evidence of the continuous impact of political consultants in British politics.

Furthermore, apart from the experts recruited, the 2015 Conservative Party post-election review report pointed to the role of CCHQ (Conservative Campaign Headquarters) professional structure of campaigning which include Area Campaign Directors (ACDs), Regional Campaign Directors, Field Directors, Voluntary Party Managers and Field Campaigners as central to the party’s mobilisation effort in 2015 (see Conservative Party Review, p.32). In the Electoral Commission’s report on campaign spending in 2015, the commission indicates that ‘consultancies, intermediary agencies and staff costs’ rank among the highest spend area for the party (Electoral Commission campaign spending report p. 28 & 32). This trend apart from reinforcing the use of political consultants also highlight the changing nature, diversity and intersection of skill now deployed in modern election campaign.

Labour Party Campaign

The electoral misfortune of 1983 imparted on Labour the need to fully professionalise. Thus, subsequent campaign saw ‘the extensive use and reliance on communication professionals’ (Shaw, 1999: 222). More recently however, the party’s interaction with, and engagement of political consultants both local and foreign can be traceable to the months leading into the 2010 General elections. According to Hines (2012) prior to the 2010 general elections campaign, Matthew McGregor and David Axelrod had established campaign strategy cooperation with Iain McNicol-former General Secretary of the Labour Party and David Muir-former director of political strategy under Prime Minister Gordon Brown.

Commenting on the role of political consultants in Labour’s campaign, L1 indicated that the party had recruited David Axelrod and Matthew McGregor to help. As his comments below

suggest, “Axelrod was involved with the party’s message making”. Similarly, L3 argued that Axelrod role was mostly spent “preparing for the debates”. In recent elections, the leaders’ debate is among some of the new innovation in Britain. That said, according to Beckett (2016), the role of the consultants revolved around digital communication, voter mobilisation and fundraising. Nevertheless, L1 suggested that Labour’s effort in recruiting political consultants and digital experts was limited by money and emphasis was rather on the four thousand doorstep conversation.

Another interesting component of consulting in Labour’s 2015 campaign is what Wheeler (2015) calls ‘celebrity politics’. Wheeler cites Russel Brand-Hollywood actor published interview with Ed Miliband days into the election as an example. According to Byrne (2015:37), both on ‘YouTube- 1.4 million views and over 500, 000 on Facebook within days’, the video was the most watched campaign clip (see figure 6.1).

Figure 6.1: Russel Brand interviewing Ed Miliband



Curled from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RDZm9_uKtyo&t=15s.

Although, considering Labour’s performance in the election, we can question the impact of celebrity engagement in the overall success of the campaign. However, taken together, what this evidence suggest is that, from the post-war era one-man squad-wife and single journalist campaign of Clement Attlee, British election campaign now include a diverse set of consultants, with a new appeal that includes celebrities and technologically oriented staffers.

2. Big data and the single database

Conservative Party Campaign

Although, less is still known about the role of big data in British national electoral context, political parties in Britain have always engaged with data like canvassing returns during campaign. However, increased changes in technology and telephone penetration seem to have inspired the accumulation of more digital, centrally stored and organized political data (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2015). Denver and Hands (2001) point to these changes and the possibility of accessing electronic versions of the electoral register, returns on canvassing and knocking-up campaign as one of the drivers of improvement in the traditional model of campaigning.

Since the 1992 and 1997 elections for example, databases have been path of both the Conservative and Labour party's campaign architecture (Bartle and Griffiths, 2001). Advances in data enabled segmentation has equally inspired shifts from traditional geographic and demographic methods of voter identification and classification towards attitudinally based segments (Smith and Hirst, 2001). As Denver and Hands notes, these electronic and computer powered databases have facilitated new approaches to campaigning like 'direct targeted mail, leaflet and customized letters targeting to specific individuals' (p.78).

In 2015, big data and a single database were a feature of the Tories campaign. Access to data like the 2011 census data, data from Mosaic, party canvassing returns from the party's *Team2015* ground game canvassing, party polling data, over 1.5 million digitally harvested emails, and the electoral register data enabled CCHQ to harmonise a centrally held data software called *Merlin* that they latter codename *VoteSource*. According to Anstead (2017) the freely available census data that sub-divides British population into '181,408 output area's and Mosaic data-a post code-based database that divides the UK populace into '67 categories was available to both the Tories and Labour.

As C1 noted, the central database enhanced the campaign's "data mining and analysis". Although, C1 also stated that adhering to UK data protection regulation (i.e. DPA), constrained the campaign's use of unethical approaches of data driven campaigning. Nevertheless, the central database as well as the insight it provided enabled the Tories targeted campaign in 2015. Respondents from both sides, L1, L2 and C1 all noted that the Tories campaign had been effective and efficient on the basis of data analytics. Cowley and Kavanagh (2015) argue that the party's database insight was valuable in ensuring that campaign spending was effectively tailored. Furthermore, the Conservative Party post-election report also indicated that without

VoteSource, ‘the highly sophisticated targeting of the 40/40 seats would not have been possible’ (see CPR, p. 40).

Labour Party Campaign

Evidence of Labour’s investment in a database had emerged in the 1997 election with the highly celebrated *Excalibur* (Bartle and Griffiths, 2001; Harriman, 2001). However, in 2015, even though the party seem to have been deficient in the use of big data driven approaches, it had a central database called *Contact Creator* and *Nation Builder* software (Anstead, 2017). L3 was of the view that financial constraints as well campaign emphasis on ground game partly informed the party’s failing in maximizing the centralized database. As L3 stated, “the Conservative party did much more with data mining and analysis and those sort of things because they had much more money to play with”. Similarly, in what seem like apparent regret over Labour’ tactics, L1 was of the view that “in terms of investment in the tactics, the Conservative Party had a very good set of data and they knew exactly which message to send to which voter”. Cowley and Kavanagh (2015) found for example that Labour had opted for segmented data, with emphasis ‘on groups like students’ (p.267).

In the Information Commissioner’s report on the election, the perspective is that centrally held database like the ones used by both parties in 2015 makes them ‘data controllers’, since it ‘provides a function that enables political parties to match contact information with data on social media platforms (see Information Commissioner Democracy Disruption Report, p.28). Overall, what this evidence suggest is that from the class base, demographic and geodemographic voter categorization and segmentation of previous elections, British political parties seem to be moving towards data driven forms of voter identification, interaction and mobilization.

3. Predictive Modelling

Conservative Party Campaign

Historically, socio-political and geodemographic factors (i.e. class, age, sex, education, etc.) have been the pillars of voter identification in British elections (Butler and Stokes, 1974; Leonard and Mortimore, 2001, Pulzer, 1967). According to Denver and Garnett (2014) this model was dominant in the era of stable political parties, party support and membership. In the 1964 election for example, Denver and Garnett showed how turnout and levels of party support were correlated with a variety of social factors.

Leonard and Mortimore (2001:188-189) suggest that fluctuations and changes in voter allegiance and greater voter volatility explained in part, by disaffection from mainstream parties (Denver and Garnett, 2014), and the arrival of a new generation of voters-‘post-materialist voters-floating voters, liberals, abstainers, lukewarm supporters and genuine floaters’ have led to new patterns of voter identification and targeting. Similarly, Smith and Hirst (2001) argue that developments in segmentation have also inspired movement away from longstanding traditional geographic and demographic approaches towards more ‘psychological and attitudinal’ approaches. According to Bartle (2001) these new patterns of voter identification occasioned by a changing electorate have inspired political parties use of short-term issues in political communication, with a range of new characteristics now forming the knowledge political parties rely on to target voters. Farrell (1997), and Ward and Gibson (1998) are of the view that this new insight have led political communication into an era of campaign innovation like targeting.

In recent elections, (Bartle, 2001) point to decline in party attachment and alignment, the rise of the Liberals, UKIP, the Greens and national parties (i.e. Scottish and Welsh), as the motivation for turning attention away from longstanding aligned voter models of campaigning to issue-voter model. According to Smith and Hirst (2001) the Tories attempted psychological and attitudinal voter segmentation in 1992 for the purpose of political marketing. Indeed, evidence from the 2015 election suggest that this is now the case. Like Farrell (1997) argue, they seem to be a move towards data driven insight political marketing in British elections. For example, the Tories prided themselves in predictive insight for reaching out to voters during the elections. As C1 stated for example, the campaign’s work in “data profiling that has been successful for Obama” and the ability to know “exactly what message to send to who at what time was important”.

Cowley and Kavanagh (2015) suggest that the party’s investment in voter insight enabled them to identify a group of what they call ‘steady Tories (11% of the electorate); disaffected Tories (14% of the electorate); anxious aspirational (18% of the electorate); and in-play centre (11% of the electorate) (p.59). Furthermore, Cowley and Kavanagh also illustrated how canvassing returns yielded data that placed voters ‘on a scale of 1-10 depending on the likelihood of him or her voting Conservative (p.261). With such data, the party created groups and segments of voters that include-‘former Conservatives’ who have become UKIP leaning, ‘Labour voters who preferred David Cameron as leader and/or prefer the Conservatives on the economy’, Conservatives who were least likely to vote and most Liberal Democrats’. According to Cowley and Kavanagh, for each of these voter models, the party created ‘distinctive messages’ that were delivered to them on the phone, social media, direct mail and their doorstep (ibid). Moore

and Ramsay (2015:36) point to the Tories data predictive power as reason for the campaign's highly targeted 'multiple voter contact operations'.

Labour Party Campaign:

Attempt at Labour party's use of psychographic segmentation is traceable to the early 1970s with their so call 'Jack (New Labour), 'Old Fred' (old style Labour) 'floating left' voter segmentation models (Rosenbaum, 1997 cited in Smith and Hirst, 2001). However, there is no evidence suggesting that the party's voter identification in 2015 was guided by data driven prediction. For example, L2 was of the view that party's effort at voter identification and segmentation was "not attitude, the modelling that was done was traditional". My understanding of traditional here would mean that Labour stock with issue, demographic and geographic segmentation. As stated earlier, Cowley and Kavanagh (2015) found for example that Labour had used more segmented voter models with emphasis more 'on groups like students' (p.267).

Although, like the Tories, Labour had access to data through the party's *Contact Creator* and *Nation Builder* software. Nonetheless, what the evidence suggest at best is that the party was more focus on targeting a number of segmented groups. In interviews with respondents for example, none reported that Labour's five million doorstep conversation was built on predictive models. That said, even though much of the post-election commentary suggest that Labour had won the ground war, there is no evidence that such ground game was guided by psychologically predicted or attitudinally based models.

4. Data Mining and Microtargeting

Conservative Party Campaign

Targeting and marginal seat campaigning is nothing new in British elections (Kavanagh, 1997). Historically, such targeting has been defined by demography and geography. Although, this model remains dominant in British campaign, the introduction of market research, segmentation and changing voter characteristics have inspired a move away from such approaches (Bartle and Griffiths, 2001). According to (Kavanagh, 1995:20), the electoral value of targeting arises from the notion that 'crucial voters and those who are weakly attached or not attached to a party' are important for shifting election results. Thus, as voters change, identifying these influenceable characteristics and targeting them has become an important task for political parties. Interestingly, what has changed in the context of the 2015 election is that with increased availability of data and high computing power, such targeting is becoming more personalized. Thus, personalized voter insight enabled by political parties database and data mining now

means campaigns can now specifically target individuals through channels like telephone, targeted direct mails, and tailored digital advertising.

In 2015 for example, the Tories approach to targeting was two-fold. First, the party targeted specific constituencies in Crosby's 40/40 strategy (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2015). Second, specific set of voters were targeted through data powered insight that enabled more precise and personalized messaging. For example, C1 stated that "data modelling, data mining and microtargeting, as well as the usual party polling" enabled the campaign's "paid digital advertising to target small groups of swing voters in the seats that were going to decide the elections". According to him, "that was a better and more targeted way to talk to voters and that's why the analysis was important".

Moore and Ramsay (2015:35) and Garland and Terry (2015:18) suggest that the Tories high microtargeting on platforms like 'Facebook' partly explains the reason for gaining '3 seat seats in Wales and a 1% increase in their vote share'. In an apparent illustration of the campaign's data mining and microtargeting capabilities, Elder and Edmond (2015) writes, 'we knew when to reach a 40-year-old mum of two in Derby North' by knowing when 'likely to reach her on Facebook, in the evening, when the kids have gone to bed'. Although, C1 made reference to the Data Protection Act as a constraint to what the campaign was able to do with data, nevertheless, all respondents were in praise of the Tories creativity in data mining and microtargeting.

Labour Party Campaign

According to Fielding (2015:56) Labour's approach to microtargeting in 2015 reflect in the party's preference of a 'core vote strategy' i.e. focusing on 'issues of concern to the poorest voters and failing to indicate it understood middle-class aspiration and ambition'. Although, L3 acknowledged Labour understanding that "political communication is shifting towards personality profiling as a particular approach". However, he argues that no such intensive method was deployed. L1 for example was rather full of praise for the Tories use of "Facebook ads in particular to reach sections of the electorate with messages which were framed and tailored according to those individuals' preferences and demographics". Similarly, Labour's post-election review also conceded that the Tories data-enabled targeting was a lesson to learn from (Beckett, 2016).

Although, Mullen (2015) observes that Labour also targeted marginal seats with an extensively organized ground game troops, using it centralized database i.e. *Contact Creator* and *Nation*

Builder. Nevertheless, the party seem to have come short in its use of the emerging data-driven approach to targeting. Evidence exist however, including a fine of £140, 000 from the ICO for unethical data use in the party's development of *Promote*-i.e. its database in the 2017 snap election that suggest that the party had used this approach (Williams, 2018). Perhaps, the party has learned and is catching up albeit unethically.

That said, it is important to emphasize again, that even though the Tories and Labour differ in their use of data mining and microtargeting, targeting has been a longstanding strategy in Britain. What can be said about modern British elections is that a combination of increased data availability and technological advancement is contributing to dwarf longstanding targeting approaches that were principally based on socio-economic and geodemographic consideration. As Scammell (1995:270-271) notes, Britain seem to have entered era of 'rational electioneering' distinguished by political marketing that is reliant on 'increasingly acute and precise commercial techniques to discover voters motivation and desires coupled with a more specialized and discipline approach to communication'. The Electoral Commission echo this perspective, and point to advertising that was user specific, i.e. 'based on information about people's interest and voting intensions' as a feature of the 2015 elections (see Electoral Commission report on the Administration of 2015 GE p.66). Thus, it is fair to conclude therefore, that digitization and the emergence of new voter clusters and digitally enabled personality traits identification tools have only amplified the use of targeting in Britain.

5. Web 2.0: Digital and Social Media

Conservative Party Campaign

Although, they are endless debates on the impact of digital tools on political mobilization and election outcome (Margetts, 2006; Howard, 2005; Wring and Horrocks, 2006). Modern western politics is experiencing transformation thanks to the 'framing qualities of new media' (Axford, 2006:1). Apart from reawakening the two-step flow, (Lazarsfeld et al., 1948) and personalizing candidate voter relationship (Scher, 2016), such transformation include the emergence of a 'citizens initiated campaigns' (CIC) model of campaigning that is altering longstanding professionally supervised models through increasing devolution of campaign task to the grassroots (Rachel, 2015).

As the fastest rapidly expanding platform for information sharing and propagation (Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010), digital and social media seem to be increasing the 'repertoire of modes and channels of political participation, communication, information creation, diffusion of political

messages and political recruitment’ (Jensen et al., 2012:5). Although less is still known regarding the likely contribution of digital in delivering electoral payoffs, these tools have increasingly become attractive (Baranuik, 2016; Corbett and Edwards, 2016). Lilleker et al. (2015) and Chadwick and Stanyer (2011) point to digital and social media influence as part of the driver of new communities and design in British politics.

In Britain for example, internet penetration and membership of platforms like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and LinkedIn as at May 2015 runs into of millions (see table 6.6).

Table 6.6: 2015 Internet penetration and social media stats

Population	%	Internet Penetration	YouTube Users	Facebook Users	Twitter Users	Instagram Users	LinkedIn Users
44.7 Million	86%	<i>Fix Broadband- 100%</i> <i>Superfast Broadband- 83%</i> <i>Mobile data use 83.7%</i> <i>Public wi-fi- 44,804</i>	60%	63%	23%	16%	14%

Curled: <https://www.ons.gov.uk>

The Office of National Statistics also report that about 78% (39.3million) adults had either used the internet daily or almost daily. These figures and statistics are excellent example of the range of British public’s engagement in the digital public sphere.

Regarding electioneering campaign, claims about digital power began in 2010 but date back to 1997 with increased emphasis on the possibilities of digital for communicating and organizing (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010; Newman, 2010). Since then, they seem to have been competitive and progressive rise in the use of digital by all political parties and party leaders (Rothwell, 2015).

For the Tories, the election of David Cameron as leader in December 2005 signalled a new approach to communication with the launch of *WebCameron* website that opened-up ‘informal conversation and online conservative activism’ (Chadwick and Stanyer, 2011:229). By 2015,

digital had become an integral part of the party's campaign communication, advertising and voter mobilization channel. However, the uniqueness of its usage was in the party's ability to identify and engage voters digitally (Ross, 2015). As Ross notes, this process of online targeting, made it easy to 'send Tory ads to voters in the 100 key marginal seats' (p.117).

Furthermore, with 'over 1.3 million' people following David Cameron's on Twitter and 'nearly a million likes on Facebook' as well as the party's '200,000 followers on Twitter and half a million likes on Facebook', the party had a large community of people to engage and mobilize digitally (CPRR, 2016:12&34). According to Ross (2015), the Tories cyber war started around October 2013 with 'tried advertisement on Facebook, Twitter, Google as well as videos on YouTube and display advertising on newspaper websites' (p.110). As C1 stated, "one of the most important thing we did was we recognized very early the need to try the best we can to awaken the attitude of the people through social media".

As a marketing expert who worked on the Tories campaign in 2010 as deputy head of branding, it is not surprising how creative the Tories digital was in 2015. For example, C1 indicated that the campaign created a website call "*ShareTheFact*"s-an interactive platform accessible to supporters, where activists were armed with CCHQ approved messages, and could share content and canvassing activities as well as move content to Facebook, Twitter and other platforms. Similarly, *VoteSource* i.e. the party's central database, even though it crashed on polling day provided insight for the party's ground game troops, i.e. *Team2015* and *RoadTrip2015*. According to Wallace (2015), the insight *VoteSource* offered made it the driver of both the Tories air war, ground game and microtargeting. Since then, *ShareTheFacts* has remain in use and is now a prominent part of the Tories website design.

Furthermore, social media was equally instrumental to the party's well-coordinated digital advertising and microtargeting. Praising the party's digital for example, L1 stated that "the Conservative Party used Facebook ads in particular-targeted Facebook ads to reach sections of the electorate with messages which were framed and tailored according to those individuals' preferences and demographics". Evidence of the party's use of digital also cuts across a number of campaign activities. As figures 6.2-6.7 show, the party's use of digital include for: updating followers and documenting David Cameron's campaign, fundraising, conveying campaign promises and policy decisions and for attacking the opposition with negative online spin, Tweets and digital ads.

Figure 6.2: Campaign Information



Curled from: *Twitter*

Figure 6.3: Campaigning



Curled from: *Twitter*

Figure 6.4: Conveying policy



Curled from: *Twitter*

Figure 6.5: Attack on Labour




Curled from: *Twitter*

Figure 6.6: Scaremongering/attack on Ed/Labour v SNP Coalition



Curled from: <https://t.co/q8qzEPM4OF>


Figure 6.7: Attack on Alex Salmond



Curled from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6JeYIBRvUe>

In terms of voter contact and reach, the campaign claimed to have reached over 17 million in a week through digital (Elder and Edmonds, 2015; Cowley and Kavanagh, 2015). Although these figures can be debated, figure 6.8 from *integrity search* UK provides a breakdown of the party's digital engagement during the campaign.

Figure 6.8: Digital engagement summary



Curled from: integritysearch.co.uk

Although, critics of the use of digital in the election suggest a ‘familiar and unimaginative’ use of available channels that fail to match notions of a ‘conversational democracy’ (Wring and Ward, 2015). Nonetheless, evidence suggest that the Tories were at the forefront of making 2015 an internet election.

Labour Party Campaign

Although Labour’s digital fundraising in 2015 attracted commendation from commentators (Cookson, 2015). Nevertheless, the party’s digital campaign has been said to be organic (Coley and Kavanagh, 2015). Wring and Ward (2015:234) suggest for example, that the party’s digital strategy ‘tended towards a more grassroots, core audience approach’ and this may be partly explained by the lack of investment in analytics and digital (BBC News Online, 2015).

The evidence here seems to echo the same narrative. For example, L1 pointed to financial constraints and Brewer’s Green lack of appreciation of the significance of digital as the reason for the nature of investment. As his comments below explained, “the Conservative had money than anyone else, the Conservative Party is traditionally better funded than the Labour Party and in 2015 we were particularly short of money from big individual donors”. As he further stated, “our digital people were telling us we were left behind on Facebook and needed to do more. I think that the campaign leadership decided at the time that wasn’t the best use of money and I think the party leadership was wrong and the Conservative Party was right”.

In another comment that seem to suggest a less intense and thinly coordinated digital strategy, L3 stated that even though digital was an integrated part of the party’s campaign, “it was organic, we had a very modest strategy on social and it involved supporters sharing content and we set an objective of 5 million conversation”. Fletcher (2015) found evidence of Labour’s digital campaigning in conveying ‘imagery of the campaign’, fundraising as well as promoting negative attacks on the Tories (see figure 6.10-6.12). Similarly, Bell (2015) also found that social media enhanced the party’s advertising and use of ‘negative tweets, viral YouTube clips and memes’. That said, it is surprising that with David Axelrod in the team, Labour failed in designing an integrated digital strategy. One will imagine that as a key staffer in Obama’s campaign, Axelrod would have inspired similar practices in Labour’s campaign.

Figure 6.10: Labour's subtle combination of attack and fundraising




Curled from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mm6Y5FAPx9w&feature=youtu.be>

Figure 6.11: Attack on David Cameron and the Conservative party



Curled from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mm6Y5FAPx9w&feature=youtu.be>

Figure 6.12: Attack on the Tories regarding the NHS



Curled from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mm6Y5FAPx9w&feature=youtu.be>

That said, as earlier highlighted, Labour equally benefitted from celebrity advertising on Russel Brand's YouTube page following his interview with Ed Miliband (see figure 6.1). The party also benefitted from individually inspired online support like #Milifandom (figure 6.13) that procured Ed Miliband some much needed positive depiction considering the intense negative coverage he had to stand up to in the media.

Figure 6.13: Milifandom online support



Curled from: bbc.co.uk

This diverse mix of digital notwithstanding, it is also surprising that even though the party had a central database and had hired David Axelrod, Labour's entire digital still fell short of depth and intensity in precision microtargeting, thus calling into question the Americanization thesis. For instance, the party's post-election autopsy provided a less commendable assessment of its'

digital capacity in 2015. In the report, even though Beckett (2016: 29-31) agree that the party 'have new capabilities in digital', she recommended the party 'develop and promote the possibilities of social media for communicating with the public at large'. This recommendation suggest that her committee may have been unimpressed with Labour's digital in 2015.

Nevertheless, with a significant investment of over £ 1.2 million on digital in the 2017 snap elections, the party may be catching up (Waterson, 2017).

That said, taking together, what this evidence suggest is that digital provided a diverse set of channels for political party and candidate vs voter interaction and engagement far beyond what traditional UK news media had offered in the past. Furthermore, the Electoral Commission's report of over £ 1.3 million total spending on digital advertising in 2015 also point to changing patterns in British campaign communication and shifts in campaign reliance on party election broadcast time.


6. Digital Fundraising and small donors

Conservative Party Campaign

One of the consequences associated with the decline of party membership and party loyalty in Britain is decline of political finance (Pattie and Johnston, 2016). Thus, as a response to the changing fortune, 'cross-class appeals to wider groups of the electorate' have become popular (ibid). Although, such appeal falls under the Electoral Commission's 'permissible sources' that include individuals in the electoral register, UK registered companies, and trade unions, as well as direct payments and subsidies, etc., (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1981; 2008), more recently, political parties are also taking advantage of technological affordances to improve campaign finance through crowdfunding from small donors (Mason, 2015).

Nonetheless, as the 'business and tax cut friendly' party with 'firm beliefs in property', the bulk of the Tories campaign finance contribution in 2015 came from sources like the 'leaders club'; and big individual donors-'leaders group', 'cash donations in excess of £7,500, making the party to maintain its 'wealthy party status' (Fisher, 2015:144; Mason, 2015; Lindsay and Harrington, 1979, Ross, 2015). However, the party equally made reasonable effort to fundraise online (Mason, 2015). As C1 stated, the digital campaign team had "learnt ways of how to do fundraising online through emails, ads and the party's website" (figure 6.14). That said, the deployment of digital fundraising and small donors notwithstanding, this source of campaign finance did not give the Tories their wealthy party status and financial war chest for the 2015 elections. Wealthy individual donors continue to be important in the party's fundraising.

Figure 6.14: Conservative Party online donation platform



Curled from: <https://www.conservative.com>

Labour Party Campaign:

On the other hand, even though Labour continues to rely on donations from unions for most part of its campaign finance mobilisation, the party was more successful in digital fundraising and receipt of small donations in 2015. According to Mason (2015) and Mullen (2015) through specific digital approaches that allowed people to donate £5, £10 or £20, the party raised over £3million from thousands of small donors in what they both refer to as a semblance of the Obama model. As L1 stated for example, "social media played a significant part in terms of using it to raise money from supporters". L2 even suggested that the campaign had "digital operations in like separate sections of the office and the primary function was to raise money". Perhaps as a political party that doesn't in recent times enjoy the sort of financial support the

Tories gets, except for the Tony Blair years (Grant, 2005), Labour's financial position going into the 2015 election may have inspired the party's focus on digital fundraising from small donors.

In its report to the Electoral Commission on donations in election, the party cited 'online supporters', as permissible sources (BBC Online News, 2015). Moore and Ramsay (2015:35-36), and Jackson (2015) suggest that such donations apart from thousands of those that were small and made online came through response to 'letters and phone calls' and were basically driven by digital advertising. Jackson for instance attest to haven received such online pitching to donate to Labour (see figure 6.15).

Figure 6.15: Labour's subtle combination of attack and fundraising



Curled from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mm6Y5FAPx9w&feature=youtu.be>

In validating the use of such fundraising technique, the Electoral Commission stated that it issued a *factsheet* to political parties on how to apply PPERA (Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000) and RPA (Representation of the People Act 1983) rules on such donations (Electoral Commission report on campaign spending 2015:67). Although, the Commission did express concern over how to check permissibility on donations collected by political parties through 'crowdfunding websites' (p.67), what technology seem to have done to campaign finance mobilization in Britain is to expand the means through which such donations are made or collected. Perhaps, as Pinto Duschinsky (2016) observe, a more rigorous inclusion of such small donor led digital fundraising will not only democratize party financing in Britain, but

also reawaken the spirit and passion of the mass party model (Katz and Mair, 1995) by mobilizing broad segments of the excluded electorate to save both parties the criticism that has trailed the current system as well as allegations over peerage sale.

7. Air War: Political Advertising

Conservative Party Campaign:

Longstanding ban on political advertising in Britain means that British air wars- i.e. 'the battle for media supremacy, or battle to persuade voters through the national press' differ considerably from the US because they are waged in the context of Party Election Broadcast (PEBs) that constrain political parties to buy US style TV political advertising spots (Ross, 2015:54). For example, 2015 elections arrangement for such broadcasts (including production guidelines, content, and frequency were set by the Office of Communications (Ofcom) and the BBC (White and Gay, 2015).

Nevertheless, political ads are part of British campaign even though they are criticisms that such election season media led wars 'at best trivialises political debate' (Scammell, 1995:20). That said, what is unique and important to mention is that apart from evidence of such deployment in 2015, digitization seem to be diversifying the channels and means through which British parties now wage such wars. For example, Riley-smith (2016) found evidence of such digital advertising on YouTube, with attacks on Labour's record on the economy, Ed Milibands credentials, the danger of Labour SNP coalition, as well as the danger the Tories pose to the NHS.

That notwithstanding however, traditional media has remained influential-with instances described by Cowley and Kavanagh (2015) as a 'hostile print media coverage of Labour (see figure 6.16 and 6.17) and complains that the BBC served as a 'right wing echo chamber' (Ross, 2015:85) during the campaign. Tunney (2007) is of the view that such press versus Labour antagonism has been perennial in British politics, except in the relatively friendlier-living with the enemy years of Tony Blair's era.

Figure 6.16: Stoking coalition fears



Curled from: The Guardian

Figure 6.17: The Sun save our bacon



Curled from: The Sun


However, apart from the print media led attacks on Miliband and the SNP, evidence also suggest that the Tories air war was framed along many themes and disseminated across many channels. Emphasis for example, were on narratives like past Labour government's economic mismanagement and the threat of Labour SNP coalition, as well attacks on Ed Miliband's credentials as potential Prime Minister (see figure 6.18 and 6.19).

Figure 6.18: Conservative YouTube ad attack on Ed Miliband



Curled from: <https://youtu.be/2okIYp-ac04>

Figure 6.19: Ad Attack on Ed Miliband




One of the Ed Miliband attack adverts created by the Conservatives Photo: Conservatives/YouTube

Curled from: <https://youtu.be/2okIYp-ac04>

On digital platforms like YouTube, Facebook and Twitter, there was also creativity in making air war content even though the themes remain the same. For example, the Tories produced a YouTube ad with a bell jar clock that a sledgehammer descended to shatter to discredit Labour's record on handling the economy (figure 6.20).

Figure 6.20: *Depicting Labour's return as dangerous for the economy*



Curled from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xrqG6CbmZjw&feature=youtu.be>

Such content, and the possibility of sharing them online on platforms like Facebook and YouTube where the Tories had over 37 thousand followers would have particularly reached a significant number of the electorate in ways that can compete with traditional media. Roper (2016) found evidence of similar patterns of advertising on Google, with such advertising either 'matched, saturated or peer-to-peer' targeted.


According to C1, 2015 "was the first time in UK politics that a party has spent considerable part of its budget on digital advertising", "the most prominent being the use of paid digital advertising to target small groups of swing voters in the seats that were going to decide the elections". In what may seem like a confirmation of C1's comments above, the Electoral Commission reported that political parties and campaigners in the 2015 election had 'advertised on social media such as Facebook and YouTube, or placed adverts in relation to the election on websites' (p.66). In comparison to Labour, perhaps, the creativity of the 'pod'-i.e. the Tories

campaign war room in digital advertising may have been enabled by the Party's large campaign war chest.

Labour Party Campaign:

Although Labour struggled to counter the Tories air war on issues like the party's role in the deficit and Ed Miliband's leadership credential as future Prime Minister, the party equally utilised political advertising with themes revolving around the NHS and inequality as well as attempt to defend Ed Miliband's personality as future Prime Minister in a documentary called *A Portrait*.

Figure 6.21: Attack on the Tories handling of NHS




Curled from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mm6Y5FAPx9w&feature=youtu.be>

Figure 6.22: Labour's YouTube Ads



Curled from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ac_pbq-zHc

Figure 6.23: Documentary on Ed Miliband



Curled from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ac_pbq-zHc

According to Ross (2015), in the party's 'bashing-the-rich policy of abolishing non-domicile tax status',-'a policy that allows wealthy people to claim non-domiciled status to reduce their tax liability' (Roper 2016), Labour highlighted its stance on inequality and attempted to shift the debate. Nevertheless, Ross, Roper and Cowley and Kavanagh (2015) criticised the party for lack of discipline and consistency in the framing and dissemination of such air war content. Perhaps, Labour's campaign budget constrain may have been a limitation. Similarly, Moore and Ramsey, (2015:39) also highlighted that Labour equally 'struggle for coverage of its economic proposals in the press throughout the campaign'.

That said, all respondents were celebratory of the opportunity that digital political advertising provided. As L3's comment below illustrate, "I think the ability to buy digital adverts has really changed the rules" "The truth was that prior to 2015 advertising was only largely limited to direct mail and to out of phone poster campaigns and the increasing use of phone calls in order for you, you know to generate media interesting stories". "In 2015 that definitely changed with online advertising self-advertising". As he further stated, the two were "definitely the distinct thing about the election campaign". Similarly, L2 stated that "we advertise on YouTube, Google adverts and digital advertising was central to our campaigning and a lot of money was spent on paid digital advertising as well as using social media organically".

Walsh (2015), and Arthurs and Little (2015) also found evidence of Labour's political advertising on social media and YouTube. However, Ross (2015) is of the view that Labour's campaign war room 'top desk' messiness at Brewer's Green, including the lack of a well-structured campaign leadership and consistency on campaign programmes and inconsistency in air war content-that include the much touted *EdStone* meant that the party failed to make sustained impact despite the opportunities that digital tools provided.

Interestingly however, the 2015 Electoral Commission's campaign spending report highlighted that 'spending on campaign broadcasts fell from £1.5m or by 4.8% in 2010 to £806,000 in 2015', in what seem like an indication 'of a move away from traditional campaigning techniques' to more targeted online approaches (Campaign Spending Report p.27-28). Less reliance and shift away from PEBs seem to be one significant change in recent British political advertising. Cowley and Kavanagh (2015) assert that by offering opportunities that differ from previous campaign posters and party broadcast, the rise of digitally enabled advertising are themselves, good examples of the changing nature of British air wars.

8. Ground Game

Conservative Party Campaign

Although emphasis is not on the impact of ground game or canvassing on the electoral outcome of 2015, Karp, Banducci, and Bowler, (2008) assert that ‘party mobilization efforts can increase the willingness of voters to turn out and vote’. Between 1989 and 1992, Whitely and Seyd (1998) identified decline in ground game-‘fight for voters on the door step’ in Britain (Ross, 2015:89). However, this pattern of grass-root mobilization, ‘developed in the mid-Victorian era of small electorate’ was a feature of the 2015 election (Norris, 1997).

For the Tories, C1 affirmed that “ground game-people knocking on doors in constituencies and making canvass returns” was integral to the party’s 2015 campaign. However, Ross (2015) and Cowley and Kavanagh (2015) are of the view that co-chairman Grant Shapps was central in recruiting *Team2015*-a group of canvassers and ground game troops that invaded the party’s 100 target seats. Ranging over a 100,000, these ground troops ‘were sent around the country in buses to key seats (Mullen, 2015; Ross, 2015a).

Wallace (2015) also point to *Team2015* and *RoadTrip2015*-a group of ground game ‘activist who campaigned in target seats’ as central to the Tories data driven campaign. According to Wallace, a very critical role played by these ground game troops was the survey that returned canvassing data to CCQH. Such survey data that ranked an elector on the basis of their likelihood to support the Tories on a scale of 1-10 provided insight to the kind of ‘targeted communication’ that CCQH put out. In the party’s post-election review report for example, the Tories had hailed the work done by *Team2015* and *RoadTrip2015* (CPR, 2016:33). Perhaps, the data driven insight and microtargeted campaign may have been successful because of the quality of data supplied by ground game army.

Labour Party Campaign

According to Bale (2015) Labour’s approach to the 2015 campaign was their imaginative strategy that ‘its boot on the ground would trump the Conservatives’ cash in the bank’. That said, in terms of voters contacted through the party’s ground game, Fielding (2015) argue that it could be rated more successful than the Tory’s. Bale also found significant difference between the Tories and Labour’s ground game, with Labour more desirous on knocking on doors.

For example, L3 stated that “we set an objective of 5 million conversation and campaign interaction and that was still affected in part by social activity and if you then look at it, I think actually it was quite successful”. Perhaps, L3’s perspective of a successful ground game might

not be the view of party leaders at Brewer's Green, if we consider the outcome of the election. With such expansive and extraordinary reach of 'five million conversation', success one would imagine should have been measured by the number of seats won. For example, Ross (2015) criticism of Labour's ground game is that even though the party's canvassers had a script to return data, such script was too general to produce any reasonable insight. In that regard, L2's comment of canvassing being a "conventional campaign methodology" may in part explain Ross's criticism and the approach party leaders had adopted with ground game. As Mullen (2015) notes, 'with a target of 106 marginal seats, and an army of 300 paid activist', as well as those supplied 'by the unions' (Ross, 2015), one would think that Labour's ground game would have displayed the creativity of Obama's campaign ground army since David Axelrod was supervising.

That notwithstanding however, if Whitely and Seyd (1998) found a 'de-energization'-decline in election activism three decades ago, Labour's five thousand doorstep conversation is a positive re-energization of ground game activism in British politics. Furthermore, with the Electoral Commission report indicating spending on transportation and accommodation for canvassers (Electoral Commission report on the administration of the 2015 GE, p.68; and Campaign spending report p.27), modern British elections seem to have continued to be marketed at the door steps of the electorate with data returns by canvassers now influencing the nature of interaction, communication and targeting that campaigns design, in a description that fits Issenberg, (2013:44) explanation of modern campaigning as 'a 'tying together' of the 'online and offline world'.

9. Political Opinion Polling

Conservative Party Campaign

The need for 'accurate information about the views' of the electorate for an effective campaign and election strategy is the incentive for political opinion polling in Britain (Kavanagh, 1995:110). Kavanagh suggest however, that the first prove of polling expertise in Britain was 'Gallup's prediction of West Fulham by-election' in 1938 and its subsequent prediction of Labour's victory in the 1945 election. Subsequently, the use of political opinion polling has indicated political parties consciousness of the need for an informed management of the electorate.

Three types of such polling have been identified to have been commissioned by both the Tories and Labour. Panel of voters' survey/polling-that help them 'collect data to formulate long term strategy'; short term surveys-that provide understanding to reaction to 'issues, themes,

personalities and broadcast'; and medium term surveys that 'deal with reaction to slogans, policies and party's political communication' (ibid). The last two according to Kavanagh help campaigns to monitor their operations, while the first is 'used to help formulate electoral strategy'. Such drive by the Tories in Kavanagh view, was the inspiration for the commissioning of the British Market Research Bureau (BMRB) between 1964-65, with the work serving as the foundation for David Butler and Donald Stokes seminal work on political change in Britain.

Since then, the party seem to have remain consistent in its use of private polling. In 2015 for example, Ross (2015a) found that Lyton Crosby's political polling and focus groups were 'essential to honing the national messages which would deliver the party victory'. Cowley and Kavanagh (2015) also suggest that the party's message of 'Conservative competence versus Labour's chaos was a product of market research and polling, with such polling conducted in over '80 marginal seats with samples of up to 1,000 voters each' (p.63).

Apart from helping the party to craft messaging, C1 stated that "the usual party polling was essential to the issues" they chose to emphasize like voters' preference of who should be Prime Minister. Cowley and Kavanagh (2015), Ross (2015b) and Wallace (2015) all point to such internal Tory polls, focus groups, telephone conversation and canvass return data as the bedrock of the Tories 2015 targeted campaign.

Labour Party Campaign:

Historically, Labour was the first to commission polling with the employment of Mark Abrams in 1956 and the subsequent engagement of MORI in the 1974 and 1986 elections (Kavanagh, 1995). The tradition seems to have endured. In 2015 for example, L2 suggested that "private opinion polling that we did midway through the campaign", was important in providing "all of that information that was used for messaging"

However, Ross (2015b) argue that even though the party's polling showed at some point that Ed Miliband was ahead of Prime Minister David Cameron 'when it came to being trusted to help families with the cost of their everyday lives', Labour did not take advantage of such insight to maintain consistency in messaging. Similarly, Cowley and Kavanagh (2015) are of the view that even though the party's polling had showed Labour was ahead 'on the side of the ordinary people', the party's greatest curse was being behind on the 'right approach on the economy' (p.76). L3 however suggested that "the electoral polling didn't tell us things similar" to the polls we did on the phone and through our door canvassing". Perhaps, Labour was a victim of the shy Tory problem in 2015 or was too confident of the two-horse race narrative. For example, the

party's post-election report criticized the approach of restricting marginal polling to 'target seats', and for depriving the campaign of 'additional information about Scotland or the Liberal Democrats' (Beckett, 2015:17).

That said, although polls have repeatedly failed to correctly predict election outcome, campaign spending in Britain continue to cover subheads like 'market research including the use of phone banks' (Campaign spending report 2015:27). Thus, as Butler and King (1965:71) asserted, what this suggest is that the use of political opinion polling and market surveys have 'remain a permanent feature' of British political life.

10. Branding, Image and Message

Conservative Party Campaign

There is a long history of 'soundbites and spin doctors' in British politics (Jones, 1996:219). However, in an era of profound changes in class-political relations, branding, image and a resonating message have increasingly become important for political parties and campaign (Ross, 2015b). As Butler and Stokes (1974) observe, party image in Britain change with the 'cycle of power, and such changes are an important feature of the popular attitudes on which alteration of governments rest' (p.350).

For the Conservatives, since the days of Margaret Thatcher, campaign communication has been 'framed consciously as a branding exercise with focus since then, on 'economic management and commitment to improving public services' (Scammell, 1995: 240). The success of such effort has been a debate though, considering that 2015 was only the first time since 1992 that the Tories would win a majority in a general election.

Nevertheless, in 2015, the Tories maintained their 'life's better with the Conservatives-don't let Labour ruin it' narrative, with branding specifically around competent leadership (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2015). C1 was of the view for example, that how the electorate saw both the "Prime Minister's image and the party's image was important". Similarly, image toning-including photographs, speeches and appearance in the debate was equally carefully crafted (Bale and Webb, 2015; Moore and Ramsay, 2015). Wahl-Jorgensen (2015) argue that the Prime Minister's kitchen interview before the election represent a perfect example of such carefully planned branding.

In message, the campaign emphasized themes like the economy-and the party's long-term plan, Conservative competence versus Labour's chaos, SNP v Labour coalition threat as well as

portraying Ed Miliband as a potentially weak Prime Minister (Bale and Webb, 2015). Such messages as C1 stated were “definitely tested before there were release”. However, it is important to note that such message testing strategy is nothing new to the Tories. Woodward (1995) argue that the Conservative Party poster message of ‘*You Can’t Trust Labour*’ in the 1992 election campaign was also tested among supporters and focus groups.

Cowley and Kavanagh (2015), Mullen (2015), and Ross (2015) all point to party’s canvass returns, polling and focus groups as the ingredients for both the test and design of such messages. Cowley and Kavanagh also observed for example, that 60% of the Tories ‘press releases’ during the campaign had focus on the SNP and Nicola Sturgeon (p.172). Such consistency in message content as well as party and candidate adoption of the messages was praised by Wring and Ward (2015) for focusing on promoting the issues the Tories wanted.

Labour Party Campaign

As a party that has struggled in the past to rebrand from the ‘extremist, divided, lack of economic credibility image’ (Scammell, 1995:243), 2015 was a difficult election for the Ed Miliband brand. From reference to a ‘Marxist upbringing’, to brother stabber, and save our bacon (figure 6.17) as well as the weak leader picture painted by both the Tories and their press friends (Bale and Webb, 2015; Ross, 2015a), Fielding (2015:67) argues that the Ed Miliband brand failed in convincing voters of possessing ‘the skills necessary to be Prime Minister’ and for managing ‘the economy’. Such struggle with branding may have inspired the making of the documentary captioned-*A Portrait* (see link https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ac_pbq-zHc&feature=youtu.be) as well as Ed’s appearance in the celebrity interview with Russel Brand (see link https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RDZm9_uKtyo&t=15s and figure 6.1).

In image and message, even though as L1 and L3’s comment below suggest, “message making was important for us” with “David Axelrod offering the making of the many versus few type argument”, Labour’s inconsistency in message and reluctance to ‘confront, concede or convince’ account for its main criticism from commentators (see Cowley and Kavanagh, 2015:74). Nevertheless, Labour emphasis on the NHS, inequality-i.e. the non-dom tax may have also resonated with some voters (Fielding, 2015:66).

Furthermore, the party’s post-election report also indicted the campaign for failing in ‘creating a cohesive, consistent narrative and communicating this clearly and simply as well as for failing to have a consistent vision and political narrative, combined with a consistent and persistent approach to repetition and rebuttal’ (see Learning the Lessons Report p.9-11, 26). Similarly,

Moor and Ramsay (2015:57) and Scammel (2015) respectively criticize Labour for not being as single-minded as the Tories and for lacking ‘emotional connection with voters and clear political branding’.

That said, in an era of design and staged managed politics, where message and popular images of party leaders have been an ‘important source of transcendent conversions’ (Butler and Stokes, 1975) as well as inspirational factor in vote choice (Bittner 2011), perhaps, David Cameron may have had more electoral value than Ed Miliband and Labour’s failure in branding, image and message was the Tories gain.

11. Negative Campaigning

Conservative Party Campaign

The hallmark of successful campaigns has been their ‘ability to expose the weakness of the opposition’ (Woodward, 1995:23). From Macmillan’s *‘Don’t let Labour Ruin it* in 1959 to Margaret Thatcher’s *Labour isn’t working* in 1979, negative campaigning or ‘knocking copy’ is an ‘old tactic of adversary politics’ in Britain (Kavanagh, 1995:158). Although, press partisanship in driving such negative campaign tactics have been longstanding. What seems different in 2015, is ‘media obesity’-i.e. ‘limitless digital sources of news where this tactic was deployed (Moore and Ramsey, 2015:6).

As C1’s comment below suggest, “negative campaigning yes, I mean you do a poster to attack the opposition quite a bit of the time”. As the evidence suggest, such attack focused on Labour’s credibility in handling the economy and drive towards more taxation and borrowing. As stated earlier, there were also personal attacks on Ed Miliband that was both press-enabled and digitally propagated. Trevisan and Reilly (2015) suggest that such negative campaigning and attack on Ed Miliband and Labour is similar to ‘US style attack ads’. However, in a critical indictment and direct implication of the press, Barnett (2015) and Greenslade (2015) point particularly to national newspapers negative coverage, ‘propaganda’ and attacks on Ed Miliband and the Labour Party as the reason for the 2015 defeat (table 6.7 shows press share endorsement in selected national newspapers).

Table 6.7: Press share endorsements

National Daily	Daily circulation Figure	% share of circulation	Party support
<i>Sun</i>	<i>1, 809, 240</i>	<i>26. 6 %</i>	<i>Conservative</i>

Daily Mail	1, 657, 867	24. 4 %	<i>Conservative</i>
Mirror	868, 992	12. 8 %	<i>Labour</i>
Daily Telegraph	486, 262	7.2 %	<i>Conservative</i>
Express	432, 076	6. 4 %	<i>UKIP</i>
Daily Star	417, 538	6. 1 %	<i>No preference</i>
The Times	397, 171	5. 8 %	<i>Conservative</i>
i	280, 074	4. 1 %	<i>Liberal Democrat</i>
Financial Times	210, 481	3. 1 %	<i>Conservative</i>
Guardian	178, 758	2. 6 %	<i>Labour</i>
Independent	60, 438	0. 9 %	<i>Liberal Democrat</i>

Curled from: <https://whorunsbritain.blogs.lincoln.ac.uk/2015/11/19/press-affiliation-and-the-2015-general-election/>

As table 6.7 show, national press seems to have been more favorable to the Conservatives and could have been culpable in the negative campaigning unleashed on Ed Miliband and Labour. As Deacon and Wring (2015:307) observe, the ‘Conservatives were able to harness and use the bulk of the print media for their own campaigning purpose’ and for demolishing the credibility of the opposition.

Labour Party Campaign

Although Labour equally deployed negative campaigning, evidence suggest that the party struggled to match the Tories organized and coordinated attacks. Perhaps, the party’s baggage of past record in government had in more stronger ways supplied the Tories the ammunition for a more sustained negative campaign. On Labour’s part however, the campaign focused on David Cameron as ‘elitist and more concerned about his rich friends than the poor’, and emphasis on equality as well as the future of the NHS under a Tory government (Moore and Ramsay, 2015:49). L2 suggested that “attacking specific policies of the Conservatives and showing what was wrong with them” was a strategy adopted by the campaign. Similarly, L3 stated that part of the party’s negative campaign “was a focus on the Lib Dems on trying to prevent voters who were disillusioned with the Lib Dems returning to the Lib Dems” (see figure 6.24).

Figure 6.24: Labour's negative attack on the Lib Dems



Curled from: @UKLabour

Digitally, Tweets like #sameoldTories appeared on Labour's Tweeter handle as well as videos on YouTube (see link https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ac_pbq-zHc) that attacked the Tories history 'as the party of unrepentant Thatcherites'. Hills (2015) suggest that online support for Ed Miliband like the popular *Milibandom* was one way of 'challenging the extremely negative Miliband representations produced in Murdoch-owned newspapers'.

Although, press bias and newspaper partisanship have a long history in British politics (Seymore-Ure, 2001). However, some analysts compared the attack on Ed Miliband to the 1992 election campaign attack on Neil Kinnock (Beckett 2015; Freedman, 2015). According to Seymore-Ure, dimensions of press partisanship in British politics reflect differently as political party versus press relationship and alignment, or government versus press antagonism and tension (ibid). Although digitization and the web has contributed in altering the British media architecture and landscape with growing online readers, national print media continues to exhibit wide influence (Gavin, 2007; Wring and Deacon, 2010). In the 1992 general elections for example, sentiments on the role of print media in British politics rose significantly during and after the campaign with the then famous *Sun* headline 'It's The Sun Wot Won It' (Curtrice and Semetko, 1994). As an essential link that provides and allow for political parties and voter interaction, analysts suggest that recent shifts toward Tory leaning press partisanship impacted the 2015 elections (Beckett, 2015; Norris, 1997; 2001). Thus, like 1992, 2015 reinforced the view that British press contributes in shaping electoral outcome (Defty, 2015; Freedman, 2015; Gaber, 2015; Mance, 2015).

12. Campaign Feedback Strategy

Conservative Party Campaign

They were disproportionate use of campaign feedback strategy in the 2015 elections. However, what is important to mention is that digitization now offers contemporary campaign a more mediated 'two-way communication channel between political parties and canvassers (Ward and Gibson, 1998). For the Tories, "*ShareTheFacts*"s-an interactive platform accessible to supporters and *VoteSource*-the party's central database provided such feedback strategy by promoting information gathering for CCHQ, information dissemination from CCHQ to ground game troops as well as feedback in the form of data supply to CCHQ by canvassers. As C1' comment below suggest, "we had a feedback strategy, feedback from anyone on the field and our digital platform made this possible". Apart from serving the campaign for instant rebuttals, *ShareTheFacts* offered *Team2015* and *RoadTrip2015* who formed the bulk of the Tories ground game army a platform for returning data to CCHQ. As stated earlier, the two-way flow of information is one unique feature of the Tories campaign in 2015 that may have accorded them some advantage.

Labour Party Campaign

Although Labour had a central database i.e. *Nation Builder/Contact Creator*, with L1 suggesting that the party was equally conscious about "trying to make a grass root activist base campaign". However, no evidence of a digital campaign strategy for enhancing campaign feedback was found. Again, even though the party's canvassing and ground game troops have been celebrated as successful, L 3 suggest that they were "very mixed report" on the update that was returned. What this suggest is that they seem to have been little coordination at Brewer's Green in the use of digital for the party's feedback strategy. Again, one would expect that having David Axelrod in the team would have afforded the campaign the knowhow of maximizing the open field competitive digital public sphere to create a well-coordinated campaign feedback strategy. This lack of coordination is probably more evident in the party's post-election report where Beckett (2016) recommended among other things that the party 'should try to ensure we maintain a two-way channel of communication and feedback of what campaigners are hearing on the doorstep as a major part of political intelligence' (The labour party learning the lessons report p.31). From the evidence above, it seems that the opportunities offered by digital for campaign feedback was largely ignored by Labour.

13. Campaign and Interaction Strategy

Conservative Party Campaign

The use of digital in creating a platform for campaign interaction reinforces the Tories creativity in 2015. Again, at the centre of this strategy was *SharetheFacts*. As C1's comment below suggest, "we came up with a platform which is called sharethefacts- a campaigning platform for galvanizing of supporters and giving them actions to take in the campaign and other interactive platforms and interactive tools". Furthermore, the party's post-election review report seem to also suggest that they were also webinars that were conducted regularly to keep canvassers not only aware of decisions at the *Pod*, but to also train volunteers and canvassers on how to use *VoteSource* (CPR, 2016:34). Jackson (2015) praised the Tories for using digital to inspire a new gamified interaction between the party and supporters. Similarly, Elder and Edmonds (2015) also point to the campaign's *interactive tax calculator*—a digital platform where the electorate entered their salary to calculate their tax and see how much they 'were saving' as one way the campaign interacted with people 'beyond core supporters' and had conversation on the issues they were most interested in.

Labour Party Campaign

For the Labour Party, even though there were digital platforms like *Nation Builder* and *Contact Creator* and as L1 stated effort "to reach out to supporters and activist to get them to do more campaigning", there is no evidence of a party designed campaign interaction strategy. As L2 stated, what "was important for the campaign was "understanding what issues would move voters and where we were getting our best response and I think it was that that was more important than any anecdotal feedback from the doors steps". The Electoral Commission also reported spending on *hustings*-meeting where election candidates answer questions from audience as well as local non-party campaign events like press conferences, media events and rallies that suggest alternative platforms for campaign interaction. That notwithstanding, it is empirically weak to conclude that Labour had relied on such events for the party's campaign interaction strategy (see Electoral commission report on the administration of the 2015 GE p.70; Campaign spending report p.36).

14. Speed and consistency of campaign communication

Conservative Party Campaign

The culture of news spinning and instant rebuttals in British elections is not new (Moran, 2001). However, technology seem to now facilitate the speed of such campaign tactic. For example,

Cowley and Kavanagh (2015) and Ross (2015a) found that Twitter enabled the Tories to rebut 'negative media stories, circulate statements to the press and stir up trouble for the opposition' during the campaign. As C1 statement here shows, the Tory campaign had thought of "ways to sort of inspire our support group to take part, respond to issues on time with counters facts and so we came up with a platform which is called sharethefacts". As we will see below, the Tories carefully used technology to gamify this tactic, with volunteers and supporters receiving rewards for task completed to enhance the campaign's digital operations.

Labour Party Campaign

There is no evidence of campaign speed and consistency in the Labour party. As stated earlier, a very clear sign that this was missing in the party's campaign architecture was Beckett (2016) report recommendation that the party should ensure maintenance of a 'two-way channel of communication and feedback of what campaigners are hearing on the doorstep as a major part of political intelligence' (The labour party learning the lessons report p.31). Scammell (2015) criticizes the party for its' failing in 'modern campaign wisdom of news management and instant rebuttals'. Perhaps Labour's pre-election weaknesses had forced it to put up with Neil Kinnock's 1992 general election order of ordeal. Again, this is surprising considering that the party had David Axelrod in its campaign ranks. That said, even though legacy media was Tory dominated, the absence of a centrally coordinated counter-attack platform can count as another weak point in Labour's 2015 campaign.

15. Campaign Games

Conservative Party Campaign

Evidence suggest that only the Tories had used gamification in 2015. As C1's comment below shows, "we came up with a platform which is called sharethefacts so is a campaigning platform as an app on your phone we set up for our supporters and every time you share they share any piece of content on that platform or something got retweeted online then they got points then they had a lead table and the more points you got the more you move up the lead table so we sort of using gamification to help people share the content they wanted to share" .

Moore and Ramsay (2015:26) also found similar evidence (see UK 2015 Elections: Setting the Agenda report p.26), with Jackson (2015) suggesting that the strategy of gamifying participation was 'designed to encourage interaction with their campaign'. Elder and Edmonds (2015) also asserted that they made online canvassers genuine and vital part of their team by creating 'a leaderboard and prizes-posters signed by George Osborne and books signed by Boris etc.' That

said, in an era of decreasing political participation and engagement with a highly technologically savvy millennial generation, perhaps, gamification has the potential to inspire a new era of mass participation in elections.

Labour Party Campaign

Apart from attempts like stopping disillusioned Lib Dems members from returning to the party as highlighted in figure 6.24, there is no evidence of the use of gamification by Labour.

16. The permanent Campaign

Conservative Party Campaign

According to Scammell (1995), the launch of the *Blue Book* or *War Book* by CCO in the days of Margaret Thatcher far ahead of the 1987 election represent the earliest sign of the permanent campaign in Britain. More recently like in 1987, such long term plan like 'opinion polling that took place in target seats prior to 2015' and the leader's tour in target seats that generated media coverage for the Prime Minister in regional media seem to account for ingredients of the permanent campaign (Fisher, 2015:148). Furthermore, apart from incumbency that seem to have procured the Tories opportunity for the permanent campaign, C1's comment below equally suggests that the plan to win the 2015 election started early. As he stated, "so one of the most important thing we did was we recognized very early the need to try the best we can to awaken the social media attitude of the people". Ross (2015:109) also found that it was in 'October 2013, around the time of the Conservative Party conference in Manchester that Elder launched a test campaign to gather the empirical data that Crosby required in order to know how big a role digital campaigning would play'.

Furthermore, Beckett's report seem to also suggest that the 'fixed-term parliament' and certainty of election timetable gave the Tories the momentum for campaigning that started '3 years before election day, with direct mail such as personal letters from David Cameron to carefully selected individual voters whose details and interests were held on a central data base' (Labour party learning the lessons report p.6). Among other things, Garland and Terry (2015:5) argue that part of the electoral benefit of the fixed-term parliament was making "the Prime Minister's visit to the Palace purely for show'. Cambell and Lee (2015) are of the view that 'the reality of the permanent campaign was more visible online with online posters appearing nearly daily, even outside of election periods and with a distinct increase before the General Election'.

Labour Party Campaign

For Labour, even though the fixed term parliament conferred similar opportunity to the party, there is no evidence of the permanent campaign in the party's approach. As Roberts (2015) argue, Ed Miliband and his team 'left a vacuum at the heart of the official parliamentary opposition and ceded the narrative to the Conservative from 2010 to May 2015.

In conclusion, this section has tested the application of the Obama model in the 2015 elections- with evidence showing convergence in all 16 elements and different level of application between the Conservatives and Labour. For example, while the Conservative party had deployed all sixteen elements, Labour fell short in using campaign and interaction strategy, speed and consistency of campaign communication, gamification and the permanent campaign. That said, the key difference is that while the Obama model was applied in an unregulated data environment, British political parties are compelled to comply with data protection regulations in their design of data-driven campaign practices. Nevertheless, like the United States, campaigning in Britain seem to be moving away from longstanding traditional, socio-economic and geodemographic categorization and segmentation of voters that characterized previous elections to more data driven, personalized and microtargeted forms- with media abundance and new opportunities for digital advertising trumping Political Party Broadcasts (PPBs) and Party Election Broadcasts (PEBs).

6.3: Theory and Convergence: The two-way flow, path dependence and constrains of Americanization in the 2015 British Election

First, it is important to emphasize that the methodological impetus for this case study hinged on the fact that agents of Americanization (i.e. campaign consultants) were hired by both the Conservative and Labour Party in 2015. Thus, representing an instance in which something similar may have happened. That said, whilst it is true that British political campaigns have historically been inspired by events and interaction across the Atlantic, evidence point to alternative theoretical explanation- i.e. the two-way flow and path dependence as explanation for convergence- even though practices deployed in 2015 bear semblance with the Obama model. Interestingly however, this is surprising, considering the role of agents of Americanization in the elections. That notwithstanding, Collier (1993) is of the view that the goal of comparative work is in part to find and demonstrate evidence of parallel manifestation of theory. In this sense, this account as one of the main contributions of this study.

That said, British legal context i.e. the Data Protection Act (1998) had limited complete Americanization in 2015. As Kavanagh (1992:71) has argued, such institutional constraints ‘limit the opportunity for innovation’,-in this case US type innovation of data driven campaigning. Nevertheless, it is important to mention that methodologies for measuring influence and ‘knowledge uptake’ across varied context differ and include-i.e. evaluation reports, theory based methods, contribution analysis, process tracing, social network analysis, participatory methods and case studies (Tsui and Lucas, 2013). The judgement made here is the subject of empirical material derived from the case study approach. The judgement though descriptive, is guided by the study’s critical realist stance and the weaving of the analysis with the rich history of British electioneering (see Bhaskar, 1988; George and Bennett, 2005; von Mises, 2005).

That said, the empirical evidence that emerged on the two-way flow seem to echo some theoretical position highlighted earlier in the theory chapter. Previous research has established for example that instances of the two-way flow in British political communication are longstanding. As Cunliffe (1974) (cited in Negrine and Pathanapossolous, 1996) argue, evidence of ‘a two-way traffic in fads, reforms, inventions and theories shared between the United States and Europe’ exist that shows the manner in which practices flow across the globe today. The Clinton campaign of 1992 is one of such examples of the two-way flow. In that campaign, Philp Gould-a British political consultant and former advertising executive was hired by the Democratic Party as a consultant (Bartle and Griffiths, 2001).

Evidence here seem to support such arguments. For example, Barack Obama’s campaign of 2012 had the imprint of Matthew McGregor-a British political consultant from East Anglia who was responsible and credited for the success of Obama’s digital rapid response (Hines, 2012; Wright, 2013). Speaking about Matthew’s role, both Teddy Goff-digital director of Obama campaign and David Axelrod respectfully said ‘he was one of the unsung heroes of the campaign whose finger prints were on every video, every e-mail and everything we did on Twitter’-‘Matthew has got that edge to him’. The introduction of Britain’s RomneyShambles-one of Barack Obama’s convention speech standing ovation moment into the American mainstream and digital media is credited to Matthew (see link <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9yTq2E1bTHg>).

Indeed, this view was similarly echoed by L1. As his stated, “we had David Axelrod from the Obama campaign who was Obama chief strategist. He came over-he wasn’t in the sort of data metrics heavily-he was more about message making-the big message and we also had Matthew McGregor who worked on the digital side of things for the Obama campaign”. That said, what this

comment suggest is that the Obama model was not without the contribution, skill and knowhow from Britain. In this sense, attributing convergence in 2015 as a complete product of American inspiration and influence undermines the contribution made from this side of the Atlantic as well as the interconnectedness of home-grown skills and knowhow in contemporary British campaign. Furthermore, Matthew McGregor's role in the Obama campaign also point to his contribution in the evolution of the Obama model and reinforces Plasser (2000) argument about the role of consultants from other countries like Britain in the global exchange of political communication practices.

Regarding path dependence, evidence seem to support Kreiss (2016) argument that 'campaigns are in large part the outcome of party network processes that unfold over time, including the work of people and organizations that build infrastructure, staffers who cross fields and organizations that emerge after campaigns' (p.18). For example, the campaign team of both the Conservative Party-Craig Elder-former advertising and communication director at McDonalds, Coca-Cola, BBC etc.; Tom Edmonds-former sales director head of IT/media; Lynton Crosby-the Wizard of OZ, and Labour-Greg Beales-former special adviser to Prime Ministers Tony Blair and Gordon Brown; Tom Baldwin-former *Times* Journalist; and Matthew McGregor-Barack Obama's campaign respectively point to individuals who come with a sustained background in other sectors. Such background and knowledge one would naturally think can inspire both creativity in design and use of tactics that align with the Obama model. For example, Craig and Tom who both seem to have had reputable careers in the IT, marketing and communication industry were part of the Tories campaign in 2010.

Similarly, Lynton Crosby had work for the Tories since 2005. Thus, it is likely that the drive towards improvement from previous campaigns came from within as a response to changing electioneering tactics and improved understanding of emerging tools. As C1 stated about the Tories, "we built an in house team effectively of around 8 to 10 people which included digital experts, so people from Twitter and Facebook targeting using data, we built a creative team as well as designers, video makers, copywriters, people who can produce all the content we needed in house and then used our digital experts to kind of power these into apps to the right people".

In the Labour party, L3 also stated that "the Labour party has built up a digital capability really between 2010 and 2015 and which it had really invested in". In his words, "I think there is sense that when you are building election campaign you are typically working off the model of the last election and so I mean most of the things that were significant about the planning that went into

2015 are things that sort of lessons that were learnt from 2010 not like we copied literally from them". L2 also thought that "the Obama campaign probably the 2008 campaign sets a kind of new standard for campaigning and a new standard for the use of online campaigning, fundraising online, gathering data online and people signing up to support and being communicated with by email and all that sort of thing and this was done by an in-house Labour team".

The comments of L3 and L2 above seem to support Arthur (1994) argument that it is 'increasing returns' (a situation where increasing benefits accrue to a product) and 'path dependence' (events in the early stages of a phenomenon's development) that inspires their adoption and further development as more experience about them is gained. As C1 stated, "I think the most important thing about the Obama campaign was it made British politicians realize what you could achieve with the internet. So in the 2015 elections we and our business partner Craig Elder had worked in the 2010 election campaign for the Conservatives and I think politicians paid lip service really to digital they sort of thought it was important but they didn't really believe it in their hearts so I think what the Obama campaign did was sort of show everyone the potential of digital and so that meant that when we sort of go to the people in the party to pitch about the importance of it, finally they believed it and they could see it with their own eyes and that meant that it was easier for me to recruit a team and it was also easier for me to get a budget it was easier for them to put their faith in digital as a campaigning tool because they have seen it done previously and I think that's the importance".

That said, following Collier and Collier (1991) and Pierson (2000), the argument the evidence above invoke is that 'mechanisms of reproduction', 'positive feedback', 'relative benefit' and increasing returns for innovating seem to have acted as the source of inspiration towards the Obama model. Thus, making path dependence argument more appropriate for explaining the source and pattern of change in practices produced and deployed in the 2015 elections.

However, although it could be argued that the two Americans-i.e. Jim Messina and David Axelrod would have made contributions to both the Tories and Labour Party's campaign respectively, their contributions and Labour's digital campaign weakness in particular raises questions on attempts to attribute convergence in practices to complete Americanization. Similarly, discussing their role as critical to both parties campaign without recourse to the contribution of Lynton Crosby and home grown recruited digital technologists and advertising consultants on both sides of the campaign will mean empirical blindness that shouldn't be made only for the purpose of arguing in favour of Americanization. Thus, it will be both empirically and theoretically weak to conclude that

since Jim Messina and David Axelrod had contributed to data profiling and message making respectively, then the emergence and use of elements of the Obama model in the 2015 elections suggest Americanization. Again, such conclusion can only be made if we ignore the rich and long history of British electioneering campaign that has been highlighted in the analysis above and the mixture of national and international talents assembled for the 2015 campaign by both political parties. As C1 stated, “we did work with Jim Messina who worked on the Obama campaign and so they were brought in and another agency to help out and so they sort of helped us with some of sort of techniques particularly in terms of the data profiling that has been so successful for Obama”. Similarly, L3’s comment below seem to suggest that David Axelrod contribution was only in the area of message making. As he stated “I mean David Axelrod came over and worked on the Labour campaign and I think probably there was also a sort of subtle influence I think Obama won in 2008 and 2012 but in 2012 Obama had won on a many versus few type argument which was our message and I think that was the basis of the Labour campaign in 2015”.

Indeed, Cowley and Kavanagh (2015:89) found that ‘within the core Labour team, there was doubts about Axelrod’s utility and the value-for-money that his appointment represented’. According to Cowley and Kavanagh, insiders in the campaign had described him as ‘comfort blanket for Douglas Alexander and a very expensive process story’, with one senior member of the Labour campaign team claiming they had ‘no idea what he did’,-with his role surrounding issues like ‘draft of speeches and debate preparations’-and his main celebrated contribution being in ‘forcing Labour to compose a narrative or overall story of Britain only succeed when working families succeed’.

Such contribution as well as Jim Messina’s to the Conservative Party in the area of data profiling is not enough to conclude that both Parties strategy was a function of transfer of practices or Americanization. Furthermore, differences in the use of digital advertising, gamification and data driven targeting between the Conservative and Labour Party equally suggest that the two ‘agents of Americanization’ operated at different levels of the insight even though both were an integral part of Obama’s campaign.

That said, although this is not a claim that the Americanization thesis has exhausted its explanatory capacities and theoretical relevance. Nevertheless, it is fair however to conclude that practices in the 2015 election rather than Americanization had many causal paths and was more a function of path-dependence and internal party awakening in traditional British electioneering. As Scammell (1995:293) argue, ‘there is a native British history of campaigning’ and the contextual background highlighted in each of the elements discussed above suggest that such native British campaign history was brought to bear in 2015 with nothing significantly new, except

for digital advertising, gamification and data driven insight of voter identification, targeting and mobilization.

Lastly, even though we choose to argue that the introduction of digital advertising, gamification and data driven voter mobilization is a consequence of Americanization, Britain's data regulatory framework i.e. The Data Protection Act (DPA) of 1998 represent an institutional contextual constraint that inhibits the complete adoption of US style data driven practices in the United Kingdom. As will be highlighted below, data protection regulation account for one of the main contextual difference and challenge identified by all respondents as a constraint in the application of the data driven component of the Obama model. As L1's comment suggest for example, "you can't do exactly the same thing because data protection laws are different, issues about data protection in particular means you can't mine data in the same way that the Obama campaign did-that is limiting". Thus, as Norris (1997:211) argue, differences in context seem to continue the restriction of 'wholesale importation of American campaigning' into Britain.

6.4: Context and Model Application

As highlighted in the methodology, this study had intended to explore the application of the Obama model in the two case studies without overlooking specific national conditions that may shape the model's application. Thus, the research design had sort to empirically identify such country specific factors that may limit or influence the application of the elements in both case studies. Methodologically, the advantage of such approach is that it allows empirical material to point researcher to factors and conditions that may have influenced, inhibited or limited application of the model in both countries.

That said, as stated above, evidence point to data protection regulation as a factor that conditioned deployment of the data driven component of the Obama model. Nevertheless, it is important to mention however, that in line with the Representation of People Regulation Act 2001, all British political parties are usually entitled to the electoral register (i.e. name and address), and 'marked register' (i.e. list of voters in previous elections) and these data sources as well as canvassing returns (i.e. doorstep, email, and telephone/surveys) constitute the bulk of data available for use during campaign in British elections (see Information Commissioner Democracy Disruption Report p, 12-14).

However, whilst the political parties have access and can use these data during campaign, the Data Protection Regulation expect them as *data controllers* to use such data with consent as well as within the legitimate interest of the data controller (see 1998 Data Protection Principles schedule 2&3). In this sense, every British political party is a data controller with responsibilities.

However, such responsibilities I should mention are not enshrined anywhere in the US-thus the difference. As a legislation, DPA mandates data controllers (i.e. person who determines the purpose and manner of processing of personal data) like a political party to register with the Information Commissioner Office. Again, this is not the case in America. According to Robert (2013), by the standard of the legislation, such data processing must be fair and lawful and used for the specified lawful purpose with failure to do so regarded as a criminal offence.

Interestingly, this transparency and responsibility question is absent in the US campaign context, and this suggest an obvious limitation in the use of data driven campaigning in Britain. As L3's comment below suggest, "they definitely were legal constraints although GDPR was not in force, the 1998 Data Protection Act was and many of the things which are codified into GDPR are anyway already prohibited under the 1998 Act and I don't think though I can't speak for other parties but from the perspective of the Labour Party I don't think our system was as sufficiently sophisticated nor are we doing very much paid targeting of people that we will run against the limit of what we were allowed to do and what the regulation says. So I think we were well within in terms of what we were doing, we were well within the bounds of what was legally acceptable". Similarly, C1 suggested that even though "the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) recently came up in the UK, "we had our eyes on the laws for example on the 1998 Data Protection Act".

Furthermore, in the Tories post-election review report for example, there is evidence that CCHQ had a 'Compliance Department' that communicated regulations and ensured that 'Associations keep to the law'. There is also for example, an instance in the report where staffers thought that compliance with the 'Data Protection Act is being used as an excuse to prevent the legitimate use of data by others' as well as instances where 'branch officers are not allowed the details of their members' (CPRR p.36). Such administrative and legal constraint suggest limitation that may have influenced dissimilarity in how the data driven component of the Obama model was deployed.

Similarly, to ensure 'integrity of the regulatory controls' and data protection compliance, compliance with Political Parties Election and Referendum Act 2000 (PPERA), and Representation of People Act 1983 (RPA), the Electoral Commission produced and issued a 'factsheet' to explain how campaigners should apply the rules in the use of data (see Electoral Commission Report on the Administration of the 2015 GE p.67). Thus, as this evidence suggest, such clear regulation and guideline and the implication of non-compliance by political parties is not only an institutional example of differences in British and US data legislation, but

also a contextual factor that limits the application of US type unregulated data driven model of campaigning in Britain.

6.5: Context and innovative Data-driven Campaign in British Politics: Secondary Literature and Reflection on the limitation of Data Set

As indicated in chapter four, the methodological approach for exploring the British context and its effect on innovative data-driven campaign practices was designed in a way that such contextual factors and conditions emerged solely from the empirical material collected in this study. That said, while it is understandable that such design and approach may run into problems of under-reporting mostly when sample size and time frame for data collection is limited, methodological approaches like participant observation and a much more 'larger sample and longitudinal' approach could have generated more data, interpretation and 'richer understanding of the social' and institutional context of the country (see Kawulich, 2005; Jackson, 2018). Thus, given this limitation and the fact that the analytic theme discussed above as a contextual factor fall short of capturing broader discussion in the literature, this section reflect on the limitation of the data set utilized by matching the evidence discussed in section 6.4 above with broader discussion from secondary literature on the contextual dynamics of digital politics in the United Kingdom. This way, the study addresses the methodological limitation and expand discussion on factors that influence dissimilarity.

Analysis and Limitation of the Data set

By the nature of the study's design, interpretation and discussion of contextual factors and conditions that shape the uptake and deployment of innovative data-driven campaign practices in the UK emerged solely from the empirical materials collected and was fully represented in the data set (see Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Thus, analysis relied solely on data collected to develop the category of theme discussed in section 6.4. However, while the contextual factor discussed is fully represented in the data collected, the discussion does not wholly and explicitly capture the huge body of work on British electoral context and its impact on innovative data driven campaign practices. Recall that as indicated in section 4.4:3, cultural and racial barriers to penetrating the American and British field-site limited access to interview wish list. Nevertheless, since data collected was sufficient to illustrate theory, this have not diminished the relevance of the findings and empirical claims (see Starks and Trinidad 2007; Saunders et al. 2018). However, as a way of addressing the limitation of the data set utilized in this chapter, this section draws on secondary literature to add to the discussion on the British context and its

impact on digital politics. Three contextual factors are further discussed below as a way of enhancing the analysis.

Resources Constraints

As indicated earlier, the contextual factor discussed as influential in the application of the Obama model in the United Kingdom emerged solely from empirical evidence. However, the body of work that exist on the penetration of digital politics and adoption of US-style data-driven innovation in British campaign suggest that other contextual factors are also at play. As Anstead and Chadwick (2009) show, the 'broader resources available to political actors heavily condition their ability to make effective use of the internet for campaigning'. As they argue, a good data-driven campaign in Britain does not 'offset other communication, institutional and strategic weakness'. For example, Anstead (2017) indicate that the infrastructure for incentivizing data-driven campaign like the 'UK electoral register is a relatively imprecise document with little standardization'. Similarly, Anstead also found that the role of polls in gathering data for innovative data-driven campaigning is a complex and expensive process. Thus, disparity in data availability bears consequence on what both big and small political parties in Britain can do in terms of microtargeting.

Furthermore, Anstead and Chadwick (2009) also argue that 'campaign finance is another area where pre-existing institutions have an impact on internet-based campaign strategies' in the UK. According to them, 'the centralize nature of British parties offers far fewer opportunities for individuals to donate'. Anstead (2017) also argue that 'the level of resources expended in UK electoral politics' is different from the 'largesse of the US system'. For example, Pattie and Johnston (2016) suggest that while some local parties in Britain are resource rich, many are not, since a 'vast majority of political donations in Britain are given to the national headquarters of a party'. In their work, Pattie and Johnson show for example, how 'only half of all Conservative and fewer than one in six Labour and Liberal Democrat constituency parties had an annual turnover in 2010 exceeding £25,000. Such limited resources and level of campaign finance mobilisation as well as spending caps imposed by the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act 1883 and the Political Parties Elections and Referendum Act 2000 (PPERA) impinge on technologically innovative and expansive methods and design in British election campaign that can be similar or equated to the US model.

Thus, as Fisher and Denver (2009) argue, human and financial resources affect how effectively British campaigns are conducted. Since technologically innovative and digitally driven campaign

practices evolve as technology changes, political parties in Britain only adopt according to the level of resources available to them (ibid). Johnston and Pattie (2014) also suggest that issues regarding the recruitment of 'local party workers and raising substantial funds to spend on campaigning have been central to party strategies' in British elections. Gibson et al. (2003) found evidence for example, that political parties with the 'greatest amount of resources' tend to develop and deploy more creative and innovative data-driven campaign practices. According to Jackson and Lilleker (2009), the 'fairly narrow' coverage of digital tools in British politics reflect what they call 'resource based-issues'. Thus, it could be said as Murdock (2018:359) argued, that 'raw materials and resources' and chains of labour' are contributory contextual factors that shape the uptake and flow of political communication in modern British elections.

Data-driven voter identification Infrastructure

As stated earlier, trends in how British political parties-i.e. Labour and the Conservative Party use and deploy innovative data-driven campaign tools mirror patterns from across the Atlantic (Jackson, 2007). However, such approach to campaigning seem to be limited by the ingredients and infrastructure that drive and power the design of such innovative campaign practices. Whilst these ingredients and infrastructure for voter understanding and mobilisation have increasingly become part of the architecture of British political parties, the scale seem to focus more on party members only (ibid). According to Anstead (2017), one of such barriers is the 'lack of an electoral register that identifies voters by partisan preference'. Anstead also suggest that 'the lack of a national register of email addresses and mobile phone numbers means that campaigns are rarely, if ever, reaching an undecided voter through the web'. For example, Jackson (2007) found that 'members-only email lists' is what Labour and the Conservative party 'relied on to direct volunteer help'. Similarly, Anstead and Chadwick (2009) also indicate that in the UK, 'volunteer activists are hardly in abundant supply like in the US'. And in situations where they are available, 'age range of most of the activists include 80year olds' who can be classified as digital immigrants-thus, limiting the use of mediated tools for data gathering and digital campaign innovation. In this regard, the ecosystem that facilitate the design of data-driven campaign approaches are far less sophisticated than in the US (Ward and Vedel, 2006).

As Ward and Vedel (2006) argue, because of this ecosystem, 'many parties in the UK only host elaborate ICT campaign infrastructure at their headquarters'-with 'branch level access and use of new ICTs' only patchy'. In other words, 'political and social realities frame the use of technologies' in British elections in ways different to the US (ibid). Nevertheless, this is not to say that similar data-driven developments and pattern are not emerging in the British campaign

landscape. Jackson (2007) is of the view that enhancing the deployment of digitally driven campaign practices in the UK would require political parties to 'possess the will to overcome the problems of creating an open architecture of participation'. As Anstead and Chadwick (2009) argue, the point to note is that even though they have been attempt to maximize digital potential in the UK, 'television and old-style direct-marketing, and its benefits for targeting undecided voters in key marginals' continue to shape 'the adoption of internet campaigning'.

Institutions, Party and Political Organisation

According to Anstead and Chadwick (2009) 'existing institutions can act as catalysts or anti-catalysts' of digital politics. Gallagher (2015) suggest for example that institutional context like the British first-past-the-post electoral system inspires a different methodology of voter mobilization and targeting during elections. Karp et al. (2008) also suggest that parties in the United Kingdom seem 'to adopt a mobilization strategy by focusing their efforts on the most committed voter'. As Petts (2015) argue, where people live in Britain make them more important voters-such that political parties usually seem to concentrate in targeting voters in those areas to ensure electoral success. Similarly, Anstead (2017) is of the view that larger political parties in the UK usually make decisions about 'seats to target and then which voters to target within those seats'. In other words, 'system-level characteristics' contribute in shaping the uptake of digital tools for canvassing and voter mobilization (see Karp et al., 2008).

Furthermore, Anstead (2017) also suggest that the British electoral system is a prominent factor that 'forces UK parties to focus their energies on certain would-be voters in a narrow number of seats'. Thus, because 'British political parties are comparatively integrated and hierarchical, national headquarters exert close control over the whole party'-such that the lines of campaign communication during elections 'are more vertically oriented, more firmly drawn and based in long-established formal structures with accompanying bureaucracies (see Anstead and Chadwick, 2009). As Anstead and Chadwick (2009) argue, 'the internet's technological affordances for creating loose horizontal networks have fewer affinities with this set of arrangements'. Thus, because of what they term 'routinized institutional traits' of British political parties-that usually involve less 'pressure to continually rebuild from scratch', innovative data driven campaigning in the UK follow a unique and different pattern to the American-Obama model.

That said, while these patterns of systemic, institutional and organizational features differ from America's-with scholars like Gibson et al. (2016) suggesting that the US is 'significantly more

advanced', they do not completely restrict the adoption of American-style data-driven innovation in British campaign. Nevertheless, what this section further highlight is that differences in political system, institutions and organisation bears consequence to how data-driven campaign practices are applied and adopted by political parties and campaigns in the UK. Thus, whilst it can also be said that technology is reshaping campaigning in the UK, contextual factors seem to be mediating input and outcome and de-incentivizing wholesome adoption of US-style innovation.

Therefore, in thinking about digital politics in the UK, it is important to take into account those elements of the institutional and organizational environment that influence the utility of new technology and emerging campaign tactics. Thus, while the contextual factors highlighted above seem to provide additional explanation for national differences and dissimilarity between the UK and US, they also provide further hypothesis that can be further tested against the index of factors that de-incentivize or inhibit the complete adoption of US-style data-driven innovation in British election campaign.

6.6: Conclusion

In summary, this chapter has discussed application of the Obama model in 2015, showing historical background and how Labour and the Tories applied elements of the model. The chapter also discussed alternative theoretical explanation for convergence as well as a context specific factor that limited the application of the model in the UK. Drawing from empirical literature and as a way of addressing the limitation on the data set utilized for the analysis, the chapter also added to the discussion on the British context and its impact on digital politics. Taken together, what the evidence suggest is that to understand how campaign practices are deployed, used and integrated in British elections, a historical trajectory and a modern context are especially important for explaining the diffusion of evolving transnational features and characteristics of contemporary political communication. The next chapter will explore the 2016 Trump campaign-a search for deviant elements as a way of explaining any advancement away from the data driven component of the Obama model. This is important considering the conversation around Facebook and Cambridge Analytica as well as investigation of the Trump's campaign. Thus, President Trump's campaign is critical for understanding the modernization of political communication as a process and modernization as a theory.

7: Case Study III

7.1: Introduction

From the context of the 2016 Trump campaign, this chapter seek to further advance the typology of data driven practices that emerged in case study I & II as well as the explanatory scope of Swanson and Mancini's modernization thesis. Focus therefore is on three things. First, evidence is used to describe innovative advancement in data driven campaign practice (s). Second, evidence that expands the explanatory scope of modernization thesis is provided. Third, US unique contextual feature that drive innovation in US political communication landscape is highlighted as well as the role of the Kremlin in the 2016 campaign. This way, the chapter adds both to the typological theorizing and theory testing in the previous case studies.

7.2: Modernization and Innovative Advancement in Data-driven Practice (s): From Political Characteristics to Emotional Characterization

On the 8 of November 2016, the United States of America voted to elect Donald Trump the 45th President-with an Electoral College majority of 306 to defeat Hilary Clinton with 232 irrespective of the 3 million more majority vote for Clinton (see table 7.1).

Table 7.1: *Popular vote share*

Presidential Candidate	Political Party	Vote Share	Percentage	Electoral College
Trump	Republican	61,201,031 votes	47.0%	306
Clinton	Democratic	62,523,126 votes	48.0%	232
Others		6,464,094 votes	5.0%	

Source: AP-After 99.7% of voting districts

Arising from the unexpected and surprise election, commentators and scholars across diverse background have produced multiple and divergent set of explanation on the outcome (see appendix V for the commentary).

Now, before discussion evidence of modernization or advancement in data-driven practice (s) and the implication of such advancement for theory, it is necessary to mention however, that the main focus here is on how the Trump campaign sit in the context of the Obama model's data

driven practices. Thus, the discussion below focused primarily on changes in data driven practices in the 2016 Trump campaign. As stated in the methodology, emphasis on President Trump’s campaign hinge on the increasing conversation on the campaign’s use of psychographics and the revelatory potential of the use of such practice for theory expansion. Thus, rather than an analysis of similarity and continuity in practices, the campaign serves as a longitudinal lens for providing insight into data driven innovative changes that emerged in the 2016 election cycle. Nevertheless, where evidence that support similarity, continuity or differences emerge, such evidence will be highlighted in the analysis both as a way of signposting broader changes in the socio-political and technological context and analytic exhaustion of empirical material collected.

Table 7.2: Changes in internet and technology trends in the US

<p>Growth of Internet 2012</p> <p>Cellphone-80%</p> <p>Internet Penetration-75%</p> <p>Smartphone-74%</p> <p>Desktop/Laptop/Computer-60%</p> <p>Tablet-40%</p>	<p>Growth of Internet 2016</p> <p>Cellphone-95%</p> <p>Internet-88%</p> <p>Smartphone-78%</p> <p>Desktop/Laptop/Computer-74%</p> <p>Tablet-51%</p>
<p>Social Media Use 2012</p> <p>Facebook-55%</p> <p>Instagram-25%</p> <p>Pinterest-10%</p> <p>Snapchat-Not available</p> <p>LinkedIn-18%</p> <p>Twitter-11%</p> <p>WhatsApp-Not available</p>	<p>Social Media Use 2016</p> <p>Facebook-68%</p> <p>Instagram-35%</p> <p>Pinterest-29%</p> <p>Snapchat-27%</p> <p>LinkedIn-25%</p> <p>Twitter-24%</p> <p>WhatsApp-22%</p>
<p>2012 Technological Changes</p> <p>Big data</p> <p>Predictive modelling/analytics</p> <p>Experiment informed programs (EIPs) that enabled microtargeting on social media, mybarackobama.com app and targeted TV ad buying</p>	<p>2016 and Recent Technological Changes</p> <p>Big data</p> <p>Psychometrics/psychographics</p> <p>Microtargeting:</p> <p>(i) The Facebook Pixel</p> <p>(a) Measure cross-device conversion and understand how cross-device ads help influence conversion</p>

	<p>(b) <i>Optimised delivery that ensures that ads are shown to the people most likely to take action</i></p> <p>(c) <i>Dynamic advertising that help automatically show website visitors ads on other websites</i></p> <p>(ii) <i>Facebook Offline Conversion for measuring how much your Facebook ads lead to real-world outcomes</i></p> <p>(iii) <i>Facebook for Business- Automatic targeting of ads to people who are most likely to find the ads relevant with further target audience like Core Audience, Custom Audience, and Lookalike Audiences.</i></p>
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Source: Own elaboration of data from Pew Research Center

As table 7.2 show, the broader technological context within which the 2016 campaign occurred indicate growth in internet and technological tools. Thus, in presenting evidence of how these changes impacted on data driven practices, the discussion draws on the meta in table 7.3-7.6 for interpretive claims and generalization. Where quotes are used, respondents are depicted as T, while participants in audio records are coded as AM.

Table 7.3: Interviews conducted

S/N	Participant/Codes	Insight
1.	T1	<i>Consistent with R/O</i>
2.	T2	
3.	T3	
4.	T4	
5.	T5	
6.	T6	
7.	T7	

Refer to table 4.3 for participant incidentals.

Table 7.4: Audio records

S/N	Participant/Codes	Insight
1.	AM1	<i>Relevant</i>
2.	AM2	
3.	AM3	
4.	AM4	
5.	AM5	
6.	AM6	

Refer to table 4.9 for participant incidentals.

Table 7.5: Documents

Total number of Documents Collected	Insight
1- 22 <i>(see methodology)</i>	<i>Relevant</i>

Refer to table 4.12 for title and source.

Table 7.6: Newspapers

Newspaper Articles Collected	Insight
1- 22 <i>(see methodology)</i>	<i>Relevant</i>

Refer to table 4.13 for title and authors.

Drawing from the meta data above, the analysis below will focus on innovative data driven techniques in the 2016 Trump campaign and the reputability of Swanson and Mancini’s modernization thesis as an explanatory theoretical lens for such innovation.

Analytically, this approach is guided by ‘deviant case analysis’ (Wicks, 2012)-where critical observation is imposed on data as a way of identifying innovative data-driven practice (s) that differ significantly from Obama’s. In signposting such innovation, the analysis draws from Fang (1997), Li and Bernoff (2011) and William and Delli-Carpini (2011) framework for evaluating politically relevant media and technology. Methodologically, such approach towards identifying deviant elements is conducive for generating new elements, variables, hypothesis or typology (George and Bennett, 2005). Thus, what Trump’s campaign offer is a context for identifying

innovative data-driven campaign practices that differ in significance from Obama's voter predictive modelling and the theoretical implication of such innovation. That said, this specific focus meets both the methodological and theoretical underpinning of the research design and the difference in analytical approach between cases hinge on the fact that Trump's campaign is used mainly to test modernization.

That said, the main difference as the evidence suggest is that unlike the Obama model, Trump's campaign access to *unsolicited Facebook data that has been the subject of investigations and a fine*, and the *five factor personality model and behavioural dynamics* voter profiling methodology of Cambridge Analytica and Strategic Communications Laboratories (SCL Group) produced psychographic, psychological and personality insight that moved data-driven predictive voter modelling away from the identification of political characteristics of voters in the Obama model to identification of the psychographic, psychological and emotional characteristics of voters.

Although in the early 90s scholars like Kleinman (1987), Worcester (1991) and Wring (1997) suggest that there was a move towards 'psychographic forms' of voter segmentation 'designed to explore voters' more deep-seated values and attitudes' in the United Kingdom and America. What is not clear is whether political parties in both countries continued the exploration and deployment of psychographic and psychometric approaches to voter understanding and targeting.

According to Wells (1975), psychographic insight on a population comprise of different approaches, depending on the 'investigator's objective' and can 'embrace a wide range of content including activities, interests, opinions, needs, values, attitudes and personality traits', with possible variables taken from either 'objective questionnaires', 'standardized attitude scales or personality inventories' to enhance 'good description of consumers'. Thus, at the centre of psychographics is data. Shoshana (2015) is of the view that such data powered psychographic methodology and architecture is producing 'new markets of behavioural prediction and modification' that is already embedded in society.

Furthermore, scholars like Akoka et al. (2017) argue that big data driven methodology is already at its 'maturity level' as a technological application that 'help organisations to gain richer insight on consumer behaviour'. Defined by 'volume, variety, velocity and veracity', the methodology has continued to generate ethical concerns, questions and arguments (Herschel and Miori, 2017). Nevertheless, the International Data Corporation predicted that between 2014 and 2019, a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 23.1% with total global annual spending on the

methodology was expected to reach \$48.6 billion (IDC, 2019). Cambridge Analytica’s work in the 2016 Trump campaign gives an insight into this methodology (see table 7.7).

Table 7.7: Cambridge Analytica’s Data-driven blue-print for Trump’s Campaign

Big Data Patterns	Media Platforms Microtargeting
(i) <i>Behavioural Data: Turning data to personality and emotional voter profiles</i>	(i) <i>Google-persuasion search advertising</i>
(ii) <i>Intensive Survey research</i>	(ii) <i>Snapchat advertising</i>
(iii) <i>Performance-optimising algorithms</i>	(iii) <i>Twitter-conversational ads</i>
(iv) <i>Right-wing web algorithmic profiling</i>	(iv) <i>Facebook-audience profiling advertising</i>
	(v) <i>YouTube-mastheads or digital billboard</i>

Source: Own elaboration

7.2.1: Cambridge Analytica: Blue-Print for Trump’s Campaign

As table 7.7 indicate, at the core of Cambridge Analytica’s role in the 2016 Trump campaign is data-driven emotionalization of voter profiling and the use of advances in the broader technological context for microtargeting. The now defunct company and affiliate of Strategic Communications Laboratories (SCL Group)-a defense contractor with expertise in behavioural dynamics and Target Audience Analysis (TAA) prides itself in the use of a methodology that builds ‘consent amongst organic populations’ aimed at ‘reinforcing or changing attitudes and behavior’ in conflict situations (Tatham, 2008; 2016) (see also appendix V).

Information on the company’s website had suggested that it specializes in the provision of data analytics and behavioral communications for political campaigns, issue groups and commercial enterprises, using cutting-edge technology and pioneering data science. As ‘spaces’ and ‘artefacts’ for claims and ‘expression of social processes and interest by social actors, the website offered a lens into the role of CA as an actor and provider of a methodology for campaigning (Pauwels, 2005; Singh and Point, 2006).

Regarding the methodology, AM2 suggest that “modern algorithm with a great capacity to infer our intimate traits, target underlying motivations, emotions and manipulate people and the way in which they behave” exit. According to him, the first stage in the use of such methodology in

politics is to “understand the psychology of political profile of a given voter”. T7 thought that “the idea with Cambridge Analytica is that apart from demographics they knew, they had some kind of detail portraits of who voters are”. In the literature, scholars point to increasing efficacy in big data as a source for inferring psychological traits and behaviour (Konsiski et al., 2013; Kosinski, 2014; Matz et al., 2017), as well as the growth and use of these practices for behavioural advertising and targeting (Aguirre, 2014; Edith, 2014; Chang-Dae, 2017; Steven, 2018).

As evidence suggest, CA’s methodology of psychological voter profiling revolves around the OCEAN (i.e. Openness; Conscientiousness; Extraversion; Agreeableness; Neuroticism) *five factor personality model*. In using the methodology, the firm ranks people on their probability of falling into any of the five personality categories. Just to mention however, before the shutdown of CA’s website, I had taken the five-factor standard personality test and was surprise at the near accuracy of the profile of my self-concept they created. Scholars like Funda et al. (2008) assert that the O.C.E.A.N personality model is a veritable approach for creating specific crowd models-where personality traits can be associated with certain behaviour. Laroslav (2017) argue for example, that through simple digital footprints and advanced deep machine learning methods, it is possible to create psycho-demographic profiles of individuals based on the five factor OCEAN personality model.

That said, on the potency of CA’s methodology, AM2 also thought that “digital footprint can predict future behaviour or psychological traits with very accurate models”. He points to Trump’s campaign ability to bring “people into politics that traditionally were not interested and disengaged with politics” as the advantage. AM6 also indicated that “SCL Group use data driven strategies to understand people’s psyche”.

On the entrance and deployment of such personality profiling methodology in the campaign, Kaiser (2019:148) and Pybus (2019) point to the link between the illegally-obtained Facebook data used by CA through Facebook’s ‘*Friends Application Programming Interface API*’ that allowed ‘companies such as SCL Group and Global Science Research to install apps that harvested Facebook data.

According to T6, a combination of the Facebook’s data, data from data brokers and OCEAN personality modelling gave Trump’s campaign “the sophistication of the targeting and the volume of the messaging both in terms of messages sent out and also in terms of the overall scale of the effort”. AM1 also suggested that “data drove content production” in a way that enabled the campaign “to be able to find people and give them content that matters”.

Grassegger and Krogerus (2017) argue that through the OCEAN personality model and CA's illegally obtained Facebook data, CA was able to co-opt voter models in developing specific targeted ads. Davies (2018) also found that through such 'psychological profiles' of voters, team Trump was able to match individuals 'traits with existing voter data-sets'.

Similarly, through signed legal contract papers deposited by Christopher Wylie with the UK House of Commons DCMS inquiry committee, Cadwalladr (2018) found that CA's success at personality profiling is traceable to the Global Science Research (GSR) OCEAN personality model designed by Cambridge University scholars Aleksandr Kogan and Michal Kosinski whose ground-breaking work: *Computer-based personality judgements are more accurate than those made by humans* was instrumental to the development of psychometrics (Youyou et al., 2015). Kaiser (2019) and Wylie (2019) argue that such OCEAN personality profiling enabled CA's 'five-step approach' of audience segmentation; algorithm design; algorithmic online tracking; message testing-through 'persuasion 'measurement/brand lift studies'; and microtargeting-that involved the use of tested ads and 'more-well-received speeches in online ad's (p.223 & 229).

In the UK Parliament's inquiry report on fake news for example, it was found that within the framework of President Trump's campaign, 'Project Alamo staff and Facebook staff' all worked together with Cambridge Analytica datasets' to target specific states and specific voters' (p.40). That said, three things are important to highlight. Firstly, there is an existing methodology for psychological and personality profiling made possible by (i) the quiz app-*thisisyourdigitallife* owned by Global Science Research (GSR)' that sold data to Cambridge Analytica (fake news report, p.39; Kaiser, 2019:149); (ii) Steve Bannon's desire for a 'cultural war' and Robert Mercer's money (Wylie 2019:67); (iii) GSR Cambridge University researchers-Aleksandr Kogan and Michal Kosinski 'personality test' and the over '87 million Facebook users' harvested data (Badshah, 2018; Glendinning, 2018); as well as (iv) CA's initial message testing in Virginia prior to the presidential elections where they tested tailored 'message to match psychometric tests' and its *Ripon* platform used to segment voters based on 'psychometric and behavioural factors' and (v) data bought from 'data brokers such as Experian, Acxiom, evangelical churches and media companies' in the unregulated US data market (Wylie 2019:71/166).

Secondly, Strategic Communication Laboratories (SCL Group), Robert Mercer, Cambridge Analytica and Facebook were all involved in both how CA's psychological profiling method was developed and how it gained entrance into the 2016 campaign. Frenkel et al. (2018) even suggest that it was Facebook's failure to stop or cry-out after spotting unusual Kremlin style activity of over '3,000 ads' that reached 'close to 126 million people' on its platform that

facilitated Russia's disinformation and disruption campaign. Discussion of Russia's role in the election is presented after the next section.

Thirdly, according to Cadwalladr (2017), with over '5,000 separate pieces of data on 220 million American voters', such data was used 'to understand people's deepest emotions' and to create profiles used to target them 'with political messages without their consent' (Cadwalladr, 2019), in what Kaiser (2019:149) calls 'psychological microtargeting'. In creating such ads, Cadwalladr (2016) suggest that the Trump campaign team was 'using 40-50,000 different variants of ads every day that were continuously measuring responses, adapting and evolving based on that response'. Comparatively, the fact that Trump's campaign was able to experiment with so many variations of adverts on Facebook qualitatively differ from the Obama model 'experiment informed programs' (EIPs).

Cadwalladr (2016) and Glending (2018) also found that CA was also able to track profiled voters online, and through their Facebook likes and web-based algorithmic tracking directed them to 'fake news sites'-i.e. through 'persuasion search advertising' (Lewis and Hider, 2018) designed to misinform and de-mobilise voters. According to T6, this methodology formed part of "CA's playbook kind of negative campaigning not only about the candidate but in what they did to decrease the turnout for their opponent". As T6 further stated, the "detrimental effect on democracy as a whole is that trying to figure out how do you convince people not to vote is a really worrying tactics". Adams (2018), Davies (2018) as well as Lewis and Hider (2018) found that such online propaganda material and content was 'viewed billions of times', with its version of paid advertising and targeting popping up on 'Facebook and Instagram', 'Google, Snapchat, Twitter and YouTube' and along 'congressional district' lines, 'interest', 'demographics or any combination of those'.

In Cadwalladr's (2017) opinion, CA's methodology is the 'latest understanding in science about how people work, enabled by technological platforms like Twitter, Google and Facebook built to bring us together' now powering 'the manipulation of information at a very individual level'. Hinsliff (2018), Moore (2018) and Rawnsley (2018) argue that the methodology of data-enhanced people understanding, and its application now span across many sectors in contemporary public life.

That said, it does appear that without SCL Group, GSR OCEAN Personality modelling research and the harvesting of Facebook data by GSR, the psychometric profiling and behavioural microtargeting deployed in the campaign may not have been possible (Harris, 2018). As Pybus

(2019) argue, the development of the psychological profiling approach advanced by CA made it possible to microtarget 'American voters by personality type'. In the opinion of UK parliamentarians, blame for GSR/Cambridge Analytica data breach goes to Facebook because of its 'policies' and preference for choosing profit over data security' (p.26 and 40).

However, in the United Kingdom, commendation have been given to the authorities specifically the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) for the response to the data breach. For example, the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) on 25th October 2018 imposed a £500,000 fine on Facebook-under the UK Data Protection Act 1998 'for lack of transparency and security issues relating to the harvesting of data' and its usage in a political campaign (DCMS fake new report, p. 21). Similarly, SCL Elections Ltd was fined £15,000 for failing to comply with an enforcement notice issued by the ICO in May 2018 relating to one American (i.e. David Carroll-interviewee in this study) *Subject Access Request* on CA's use of his data in the 2016 elections. According to the ICO, the fine was for breach of 'section 47 (1) of the Data Protection Act 1998'. The significance of the fine and the standard set by the ICO is that people wherever they live can sue if their data is unfairly 'processed by a UK company' (DCMS fake new report, p.22).

Furthermore, insider account by AM4 on the psychological profiling method suggest that CA was able to "develop a psychometric inventory" of voters for the campaign. As AM3 stated for example, the methodology hinge on identifying the "mental vulnerabilities in voters and working to exploit them by targeting information designed to activate some of the worst characteristics in people such as neuroticism, paranoia and racism biases". AM1 suggested that such behavioural understanding was the gamechanger for the Trump campaign. A he puts it, with data, they understood and identified "people in America that were hurting, people in America that felt left behind, people that felt that their infrastructure was crumbling, people that wanted change, people that were sick of the status-quo". This way, rather than the Obama model approach of political profiling or understanding of peoples' political affiliation, leaning and voting history, Trump's campaign identified people based on emotional and personality traits and had messages "that resonate with them". As AM1 further stated, such messages were done "for raising money, for getting people to show up to vote", meaning that "messages are shown to people as it relates to them and make them feel emotional".

For T4, Trump's "campaign was about maximizing the frustration of the voter" and "any candidate who came in and was able to whether it was true or not about who they were to see that and maximise it were the one who was going to be able to win in the end and Trump's campaign did so". As T4 argued, such maximization of the psychology of disaffection in

attacking the establishment informed campaign messages like “drain the swamp and MAGA” in Trump’s political marketing.

AM6 also suggested that the psychological profiling of voters was used to “target those whose mind we thought we could change”. According to AM6, the models developed revealed that the “persuadables were everywhere-Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania and Florida”. Thus, through the methodology, they identified “persuadables to target in the right precinct” in such a way that “those states would turn red instead of blue”. In her book, Kaiser (2019:92) refers to persuadable as those who were identified by psychographic and algorithms as ‘people and individuals that could be convinced not to vote’, and those considered ‘swing voters’. As she claims, such psychographic and algorithmic profiling informed ‘the types of disinformation that they sent those people in order to change their minds’, suggesting that even the campaign’s voter de-mobilisation tactics was equally guided by psychological profiling. That said, such Trump campaign style voter de-mobilisation operations were not a feature of the Obama model. As Smith (2018) argue, ‘Trump’s political viability is predicated upon animating the voters he needs and exhausting those he does not’. Smith (2016) argue that such campaign coordinated de-mobilisation of voters-‘white liberals, millennial women and black American’ deviates from popular campaign practice of persuasion and conversion aimed at getting-out the vote. Another clear difference between the Obama model.

Furthermore, AM5 suggested that “Donald Trump turned over 20 counties that went for President Obama in 2012 to Donald Trump in the 2016 election because of the messages that connected with people in those areas”. On this claim, T2 tend to hold the same view when he said “analytics obviously had a huge impact on how people received information, considering how focused their messages were”. As AM5 stated, “we thought in our modelling that the 2016 electorate had the tendency of resembling the loosely 2014 electorate in some of the key states”. Such modelling in her view, enabled “Donald Trump tap into the anger of the job loser and manage the expectation on empathy and connectedness” by identifying what she calls “the Trump undercover voter”-“like the union household who voted Democrats for years”. McCormack (2016) and Tett (2016) suggest that such voter profiling method and psychographic microtargeting may have been critical to Trump winning the Electoral College and ultimately the presidency since it enabled the campaign to identify and target voters who ‘flipped’.

Similarly, Silberberg (2019) argues that such personality type insight and modelling enabled ‘the Trump campaign designed 6.1 million specifically targeted Facebook ads, using the information Cambridge Analytica scraped from Facebook-ads targeted at people, families, groups and

subgroups in rural communities'. Wylie (2019:119) also suggest that the 'neural network algorithm that would help them make predictions' in the campaign was built through the search for patterns and a 'qualitative observation' that 'unpack the perception of given population' with both advertising guided by these models and algorithms prioritising 'topics for personalisation' on the basis of an individual's online engagement (see figure 7.1).


Figure 7.1: Photoshoot of CA personality model ads

PERSONALITY-TARGETED MESSAGING EXAMPLES: SECOND AMENDMENT THEM

High Neuroticism Type >



High Conscientiousness Type >



High Agreeableness Type >



Source: Emma Briant-Senior Researcher 'The Great Hack'

Luntz (2016) found that in most battleground states, such personality profiling and algorithmic prioritization of messaging and advertising informed team Trump campaign activities. Dalton (2016) also suggest that the entrance of such personality level insight in modern elections represent a 'gold standard' for understanding political behaviour. According to T5, "the malicious election manipulation and exploitation cabal certainly used Google and Facebook

various services”. However, he was also of the view that he didn’t think that “those two companies specifically are necessary for it to have happened”, because as he argued, “any other behemoths of advertising which could have hypothetically come into existence without Google or Facebook in alternative reality could have been utilised the same way”.

That said, what this evidence suggest is that CA’s psychological and personality profiling method seem to have moved the ingredients of microtargeting away from political characteristics to emotional characterization. Such shift from *political characteristics* to *personality* and *emotional/psychological features* of a voter represent advancement in practice away from the Obama model predictive modelling microtargeting.

Thus, it could be said that first, in view of SCL Group’s expertise, the *unsolicited Facebook* data and the OCEAN model, evidence is not short regarding innovative advancement in data driven practices in the 2016 Trump campaign. Second, even though focus is not on analysis of evidence of the effectiveness of CA’s methodology, it could also be argued that the psychological models and insight produced by CA made its messaging strategy more effective. For example, US professor of Media Design at Parsons School of Design in New York who featured prominently in the British Academy of Film and Television Arts (BAFTA) nominated documentary-*The Great Hack*-designated T1 here was of the view that his data profile accessed from the UK Information Commissioner’s Office as a result of his litigation with CA was a “surprise” to him, in a way that confirmed both CA’s involvement and success. The Great Hack documentary available on Netflix provides the most publicly available indication of the use of psychological profiling in the 2016 campaign.

Documents released by Brittany Kaiser-ex Cambridge Analytica employee as captured by Cadwalladr (2020) and commentary from Kaye (2016) and Albright (2016) also suggest that apart from President Trump’s campaign, CA was equally involved in the primary campaign of Ted Cruz and Ben Carson as well as John Bolton’s Super PAC. AM6 affirmed that CA “was paid to undertake work” for these three. Such work as she argued involved “psychographic messaging meant to resonate with your psyche and engage you depending on whether you are open, conscientious, extroverted, agreeable or neurotic”. Such widespread involvement of CA lends further credence to the prominence of its methodology. As Cadwalladr (2020) argue, ‘Facebook and CA data scandal was only part of a much bigger global operation of a firm that worked with governments, intelligence agencies, commercial companies and political campaigns to manipulate and influence people’. That said, given that CA’s work began outside

the US, this opens the possibility of electioneering experience (s) flowing from elsewhere to the US, in ways that interrogates the continuing relevance and validity of the Americanization thesis.

7.2.2: Money and Plutocrats: Robert Mercer's Model

According to Detrow (2018), at the heart of CA's data driven innovation was Robert Mercer's 'goal of giving conservatives big data tools to compete with the Democrats'. For example, Ted Cruz's victory in the Iowa caucuses was credited to CA's psychological profiling (ibid). However, with Cruz crashing out after the Indiana primary, Trump became CA's client courtesy of Robert Mercer-a 'Cruz-aligned super PACs major donor' (Detrow, 2016). According to Moore (2018), activities like those of Robert Mercer or what he calls 'new election hackers-individual plutocrats' is 'what is coming next' in the world of politics (p.4).

T5 suggest that Trump's campaign data driven infrastructure was a product of "obfuscation, corruption and enough money". As he further stated, "if tons of laundered dirty money from all over the planet is allowed to fund an endless stream of lies, it's going to be pervasive to a percentage of the population for many varying reasons and if no one stop it or is blackmailed into inaction, it keeps going". Vogel and Parti (2015) found that Robert Mercer's huge investment in CA in support of conservative candidates follows model like those of billionaires 'liberal hedge funders Tom Steyer' and conservative industrialists Charles and David Koch who throw money where their interest lie. As Vogel and Parti show, 'Federal Election Commission filings' indicated that 'nearly 93 percent of the \$ 2.6 million' Cambridge Analytica 'received in traceable federal payments came from committees to which Robert Mercer donated generously- i.e. Cruz's leadership PAC; Ending Spending Action Fund; John Bolton's super PAC; pop-up super PAC created to boost 2014 Republican senate candidates-GOP Sens. Tom Colton of Arkansas and Thom Tillis of North Carolina etc., with the Mercers combined donation to these groups totalling over \$3.3 million'.

According to Cadwalladr (2017) and Wylie (2019), such Mercer's led investment also flowed into Global Science Research (GSR) and CA with money in the region of '\$ 20 million' from Robert Mercer who was President Trump's 'single highest donor with \$13.5 million' inspiring CA's consolidation of data-driven campaign architecture. In his book *Mindf*ck: Cambridge Analytica and the plot to break America*, Wylie (2019) even though he repeatedly does not cite or produce any evidence, point to 'Mercer's investment' as key to funding SCL and CA (p.85). Although elsewhere, Wylie seem to suggest that 'what Cambridge Analytica eventually became depended in large part on the academic research published at the University' of Cambridge

(p.95). Such conflicting account of his role and the origin and use of psychometrics in the campaign as well as his failure to provide links to any documents makes his account appear more like a personal marketing story.

Nevertheless, Vogel (2015) suggest that Robert Mercer and daughter Rebekah Mercer have lately 'emerged among the leading financiers of conservative causes and candidates' in America. The family's investment in CA and their well-known interest and donations to the campaign of conservative Republican politicians make them in his view central figures both in the rise and expansion of CA and the election of President Trump. As Kaiser (2019:2&102) show, CA's 'Republican' only 'client base and outreach' and the 'marriage between' Robert Mercer's 'love for data science and his political motivations' foregrounds such conclusion.

Cadwalladr (2018) and Wylie (2019) point to Steve Bannon-friend and benefactor of the Mercer's who was 'installed' in CA's board and later as Trump's campaign manager and Chief Strategist as pointer to the relationship between Robert Mercer, CA and President Trump. Vogel (2015) argue that such Mercer-kind 'unlimited political' investment across candidates, campaigns and firms like CA is the incentive of US Supreme Court 2010 *Citizens United* judgement that allowed for near unlimited campaign financing by individual actors. For Cadwalladr, (2017) Mercer's 'personal beliefs' and billions sat at the heart of what she calls 'propaganda network' that gave birth to Cambridge Analytica. Here, Wylie (2019:92) seem to agree with Cadwalladr when he suggested that even though CA was created as a business, 'the firm's sole purpose was to cannibalise the Republican Party and remould American culture'. Thus-making Robert Mercer 'the power-house that made everything at Cambridge-and, eventually Trumpworld happen' (Kaiser, 2019:189).

Issenberg (2015) also suggest that Mercer's political project and financial investment in CA makes it 'a Republican Company' and 'an ingenious cog in the GOP party machinery'. As a foreign consultancy firm, Issenberg equally point to the company's 'psychographic profiles' of US voters-a new ingredient for campaign microtargeting as CA's exported product in modern electioneering. For Moore (2018) Mercer's patronage network or what he calls the 'Mercer's model-pop-up party machinery' (p.60) made possible by investment in 'digital media' (i.e. Breitbart news and its shaping of the 'digital media ecosystem' (p.50)) led by 'Steve Bannon' (Wylie 2019:59) as well as investment in professional data-driven campaigning (i.e. Cambridge Analytica) (p.41) sit both at the heart of his anti-establishment libertarian political agenda and distortion of 'the public sphere' and 'democratic accountability' (p.60).

For example, Benkler et al. (2018) found a 'right wing web, 'right wing media network' and what they call 'mammon's algorithm-marketing of manipulation'- that distort truth as one defining characteristic of the 2016 election (p.4;11&13). As they argue, such contemporary eco-system- i.e. 'technological process, social media, algorithmic news curation, bots, artificial intelligence and big data is creating echo chambers that reinforced our biases'. Comparatively speaking, there is no evidence that such centrist or leftist web and media network was available to Obama. Thus, another difference between both campaigns. That said, 'the critical change' for Benkler and colleagues is that 'in 2016 the party of Ronald Reagan and the two presidents Bush was defeated by the party of Donald Trump, Breitbart and billionaire Robert Mercer' (p.7).

7.2.3: Evidence and the Literature

Although they are still questions about the efficacy of psychographics, what the evidence suggest however, is that data driven innovation embedded in personality profiling, emotionalization and psychographic microtargeting that differ from practices of the Obama model emerged in 2016 (see Allen and Abbruzzese, 2018; Armstrong, 2018, Benkler et al., 2018). As T7 suggest, what makes the Trump campaign different is that "they play our negative emotions, they try to figure out what makes you afraid, how do I campaign to you so that you are voting out of fear or you are voting out of anger".

Similarly, even though AM1 agree that data driven psychographics or "secret targeting online is not enough and cannot in itself win the presidency", he indicated that "translating data to context, taking data to understand who is on the other end listening and be able to break that down and translate it into consumable content that millions of people can absorb" was critical to the success of the campaign. As director of digital, perhaps, this is only but a subtle way of owning up to the use of psychographic microtargeting. This is because, in the same presentation, AM1 had indicated that "emotion and feeling, audience understanding, humanizing the audience by pointing them into the right direction through content" was integral to the campaign. Such emotionalization or what he calls "audience understanding" and humanization of the audience as well as the over "150,000 data enabled created content" differs qualitatively from the Obama model voter characterization microtargeting.

That said, what this implies for the research objective on the 2016 Trump campaign is support for innovation and advancement in data-driven practice. However, the key difference as highlighted earlier is that data-enabled behavioural and psychological profiling, personality type and algorithms of personalization formed an inherent part of political mobilization, persuasion

and manipulation in 2016-in ways that differ from the Obama model data led predictive modelling, voter scoring and microtargeting. Beckett (2016) is of the view that moving microtargeting to the realm of 'particular personality types' represent the most significant brilliance of the Trump's campaign in its use of data mining and analytics.

Thus, such practices provide a reasonable benchmark for making the case for advancement in data driven innovation. Trump's campaign therefore have moved data-driven campaign practices from *what people are* (i.e. political characteristics-party leaning, affiliation, positioning and support for a candidate) to *what people feel* (psychology, emotions-anxious, angry, fearful, disillusioned and frustrated) (see Sides, Tesler and Vavreck, 2019).

Put differently, while the Obama's campaign data driven approach had relied on big data to identify the *political characteristics of voters*, Trump's campaign seem to have made *psychological, emotional and personality type* the basis of such identification. According to Russon (2017) Trump's campaign represent a significant success in the politics of data driven behavioural understanding. Albright (2016), Ahmar (2016) and Dalton (2016) suggest that whilst the Obama campaign had set up the precedent as a 'coming out party for big data' analytics, Trump's campaign is a bigger signal that we have entered an entirely different season of data-driven election campaign that makes Obama model strategies 'look old school' (ibid). Thus, as Kreiss (2016) argue, the uptake of emotionally centred methodology gave 'broader exposure to the particular mix of racial resentment, conservative identity, populist rhetoric and economic anxiousness that marked the 2016 campaign'.

Therefore, whilst it can be argued that data driven personalization was piloted and implemented in the Obama model, a combination of military grade insight and Robert Mercer's conservative alt-right libertarian financing or what Kaiser (2019:190) calls the 'mercerization of the Trump effort', combined with privately harvested Facebook data ushered in personality, emotional and psychological profiling of voters and individual identity based microtargeting popularly called psychographics, psyops or psychometrics. As both volunteer in Obama's campaign and an ex SCL staff, Kaiser (2019:24) argue that while Obama 'segmented its audience, separating them according to the issues they cared about, the states which they lived, and whether they were male or female', CA led Trump campaign as she puts it 'went far beyond traditional demographics'. Indeed, with a methodology that involves understanding 'people's complex personalities' and devising 'ways to trigger their behaviour' with 'messages that had been carefully crafted for them' (p.25), Issenberg (2015), argue that CA's segmentation of the

American voter 'by individual psychological characteristics amounts to the most audacious new analytical innovation' in recent American politics.

Across the Atlantic, fines imposed on Facebook by the US Federal Trade Commission and the US Securities and Exchange Commission for the *unsolicited* sharing of data belonging to 87 million Facebook users with Cambridge Analytica and its deceptive misrepresentation of the EU-US Privacy Shield Framework provide validation to the evidence above (see Fair, 2019; Bose and Heavey, 2019). The EU-US privacy Shield Framework was designed to ensure compliance with data protection/transfer requirement between both sides (Official Journal of the European Union, 2016). In the \$5 billion and \$100 million fine respectively imposed on Facebook by US Federal Trade Commission and the US Securities and Exchange Commission for example, Facebook is accused of misuse of user data with Cambridge Analytica bothering on violation of sections of the US Securities Act of 1933 and Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (US Securities and Exchange Commission 2019-140).

Similarly, because the processing of such Facebook data took place in the United Kingdom, the Office of the Information Commissioner in the UK suggested that had SCL Group still existed in its original form, the company would have been issued 'with a substantial fine for very serious breaches of principle one (i.e. fair, lawful, collection and use) of the Data Protection Act 1998 for unfairly processing peoples personal data for political purposes' in the 2016 campaign (ICO, 2018:35).

Taken together, this evidence reinforces the continuous historical, progressive transition and modernization of US election since the Electoral College election years of 1800 (Williams, 1992). That said, although Facebook was fined for breaching data consent rules which benefited Trump, it is worth pointing out that Obama used similar methods for gathering campaign data in 2012. At the time however, harvesting Facebook data via third party apps may not have been illegal and all such data harvesting was done on US soil.

7.2.4: The RNC, Project Alamo and the Trump Campaign

Another interesting component of the 2016 Trump campaign is the collaboration of Trump's independent campaign infrastructure-i.e. Project Alamo with the Republican National Committee (RNC) campaign infrastructure in cultivating what Pierce (2016) calls the 'universe of millions of fervent Trump supporters'. Following the Republican Party's post-election review Growth and Opportunity project commissioned in 2012, weakness in the party's 'voter contact' infrastructure was identified as a shortcoming. Thus, authors of the report recommended among other things,

an improve 'culture of data learning across all campaign and party functions' as a way of catching up with the DNC technology and analytics model of 2012 (Barbour et al., 2012).

Lambrecht (2017) suggest that inspired by such recommendation, the RNC 'invested heavily in data and digital technology' and 'provided the Trump campaign with massive database that included details on millions of voters' attitudes, buying habits and personal information available from public sources, combined with information the party had gleaned from contacts over the years'. According to Allison et al. (2016) and Green and Issenberg (2016), a combination of such party campaign infrastructure and candidate Trump investment enabled the campaign to excel in building an audience through the collaboration of Jared Kushner and Brad Parscale led *Project Alamo-and its battleground optimizer path to victory* model (that focused on online voter de-mobilisation of 'idealistic white liberals, young women, and African Americans' and targeted mobilization of white rural American vote'.

As a Republican Party outsider, such candidate and party v campaign data-sharing partnership, given the initial bluff by the RNC on President Trump's campaign seem to be the first of its kind in recent US campaign history. Whereas, the Obama model was embedded in the DNC campaign set-up and infrastructure, Trump's campaign differs in this regard. Chotiner (2016) suggest that historically, all Republican Party nominees since McCain in 2008 have had their loyalist planted in the RNC. However, in 2016, Trump never did this and showed no desire to direct the affairs of the RNC for electoral advantage. In this sense, team Trump approach at building data-driven campaign infrastructure and innovation can account as something new in modern US election campaign.

Furthermore, Lapowski (2016) and Sumner (2018) also suggest that another reason why President Trump's campaign look different from Obama's is that it started out with an outsider arm anchored by family confidant Brad Parscale and son in-law Jared Kushner whose initial focus was on creating *Project Alamo* with over '4,000 to 5,000 data points' that drove the campaign's Facebook adverting, digital fundraising and voter de-mobilisation (Green and Issenberg, 2016). As Kaiser (2019) argue, advancement in the 'accuracy of Facebook advertising tools'; 'Twitter-conventional ads' tool; 'Snapchat-Webview ads/direct response' tool meant that team Trump 'took advantage of even newer innovations' in 2016 (p.157&194).

According to Lapowski (2016), Winston (2016) and Kaiser (2019) through the personality profiles and new tools like Facebook's 'custom audience list'-that enable list matching with data collected; 'audience targeting option'-which allow targeted ads on active Facebook users;

'lookalike audiences'-that enhance the identification of 'common qualities' among a target population, and 'brand lift'-that enables measuring ad effectiveness, *Project Alamo* was able to power the individualized microtargeting of nearly 200 million voters-with a total spend on Facebook ads in the region of \$85 million (Glaser, 2017). Bradshaw (2016), Smith (2016), Martinez (2018) and Sumner (2018) also indicated that such platform tools enabled the campaign's digital ads voter de-mobilisation operations coordinated by both *Project Alamo* and Cambridge Analytica through a grand plan that involved 'spreading fear' and depressing 'Clinton's vote total' by keeping 'marginal voters trembling at home'.

That said, the concern for American democracy in the context of practices described above is that data driven methods and technology now seem to be incentivizing voter de-mobilisation and the spread of disinformation and social division in ways that invoke the fears expressed by James Maddison in Federalist No.10. For example, Maddison had written about his fear of the power of 'faction-a number of citizens, whether amounting to a minority or majority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community' (Cooke, 1961). According to Haidt and Rose-Stockwell (2019), caution against such Maddisonian fear reflect in the constitutional design of checks and balances that encourage deliberation on national issues. As Cooke (1961) show, Maddison was also encouraged that apart from constitutional instruments, US landmass could serve as deterrent to widespread factional partisanship, since he thought it would be difficult to spread the incentive of factional rhetoric across the vast US landmass.

However as recent events suggest, technological advancement seem to have trumped landmass by making the speed and spread of disinformation and extreme online ideological bubble content geometric. In this sense, US democracy seem to be in the Maddison nightmare era, where rising polarization and factions fixated in ideological echo chambers are algorithmically created and maintained. While as T7 argue for example, "voter suppression has a long-term effect on democratic institutions by making people cynical about the process so that they stay home", only time will unveil where this trend and era leads democracy. Thus, with increasing ethical debate regarding best practices for conducting digital campaign (see Baldwin-Philippi et al., 2019), it is difficult to say whether CA and SCL Group psychological profiling and voter de-mobilisation tactics is a blowback for democracy and a backsliding for democratic deliberation in the digital public sphere.

A democratic blowback or backsliding could include the ‘undermining of institutions’, the ‘disabling’ of ‘opposition’ through digitally enabled disinformation and ‘collapse of the basic tenets of deliberation’ and the replacement of the democratic norm of self-determined democratic decision making of the voter during elections with algorithmic and algorithmically sorted motivation (Vaidhyanathan, 2018). Under the current political communication environment, Luo and Prezworski (2019) suggest that all of the above seem to be happening without legally amounting to ‘unconstitutional or undemocratic steps’. Miller and Vaccari (2020) even suggest that the current digital ecosystem is hurting democracy.

That said, the danger in the Madisonian sense is that AI enabled tools can give advantage to handlers to impose their ‘interest on others, even in opposition to the good of the state as a whole’ through digitally propagated ‘untruths and distortion aimed at inflating the positives of one party and undermining the credibility of the other’ (Grayling, 2018:85). The agency of algorithms and these new forms of electioneering seem to put pressure on the reliability and credibility of the democratic process.

Although the broader impact and consequence are still unclear, emerging evidence suggest that these practices undermine democratic participation through voter de-mobilisation (Tenove et al., 2017). Thus, like Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) and Moore (2018) argue, rather than with guns like in Chile in 1973 and Argentina, Brazil, Ghana and Nigeria during the cold war, the undemocratic behaviour of platforms, the intensification of digitally driven partisan polarization, and the algorithmization of politics and voter manipulation seem to constitute new ways for breaking democracies.

7.3: Modernization: Advancement in Practice and Implication for Theory

From the evidence in the previous sections, there seems to be no doubt that Cambridge Analytica’s involvement in Trump’s campaign goes beyond Facebook data and the research by Aleksandr Kogan, Michal Kosinski and David Stillwell at Cambridge University. Evidence suggest that military-grade psychological profiling insight crafted by Strategic Communication Laboratories (SCL Group) for creating ‘psychological effects’ that hinge on making impression on ‘mindset, thoughts, processes, attitudes and behaviours’ were part of the methodology (Mazeikis, 2016:3). Drawing from this evidence, this section revisits and expands the explanatory scope of modernization theory by showing the source and inspiration of Trump’s campaign data driven innovative practice (s) or modernization.

Theoretically, they are wide consensus among theories and theorist of change (s) in political communication that modernization theoretically explain better the origin and evolution of change in modern campaign practices. However, even though evidence from Trump's campaign reinforces that thesis, what it further reveals, and significantly so is that the origin and evolution of such change differ from the existing theoretical models/explanation. Thus, providing empirical ground for expanding the explanatory scope of the modernization thesis.

That said, apart from the explanatory weakness of Swanson and Mancini's modernization thesis regarding how 'steadily increasing social complexity' explain change (s) in recent political communication practices, they seem to be a general shortage of empirical analysis on innovation in contemporary election campaign. Nevertheless, Kreiss (2016) and Padgett and Powell (2012) point to the source and process through which innovation arise as a product of *network folding or recombination*-i.e. the transportation of 'social relations from one domain into another' through biographies that cross domains or through strategically place people who reconfigure networks across domains' to inspire and incentivize innovation. As Kreiss show for example, such migration of technologists from Howard Dean and Wesley Clark campaign in 2004 who founded companies and diffused those across the Democratic Party network contributed in forging the innovation in the Obama model. Kreiss also suggest that 'field crossing' or 'inter-field knowledge' from the technology industry and previous campaign path dependent roadmaps provide the theoretical explanation for recent change (s) or innovation in US election campaign.

Now, regarding the evidence of where Trump's campaign sits in the theoretical explanation of how the campaign innovated, this section begins by providing some insight into the corporate, organizational and personnel structure and specialization of Strategic Communication Laboratories (SCL Group)-i.e. the parent company of Cambridge Analytica. This is important not only as background information, but as a foundation to the theory expansion and elaboration argument this section make.


Established in 1993, Strategic Communication Laboratories (SCL Group) have been in the business of defence, political communication and humanitarian projects worldwide-with the company's core area of operation and competence situated in 'military contracts and psychological warfare' (Kaiser, 2019; Wylie, 2019). As Kaiser (2019:97) suggest, the company's methodology was inspired by work from the 'Behavioral Dynamics Institute' that looked 'at the ways in which human behavior could be understood and then influenced through

communication'. Such insight according to Kaiser is the foundation of the firm's consultancy 'in the defense industry' (p.97).

Similarly, Wylie (2019) also suggest that the global rise in online radicalization was the incentive for SCL Group methodology which it designed to 'identify and combat extremism online', thus, making the company 'an essential partner with governments' in the fight against terror (Kaiser 2019:98). According to Wylie and Kaiser, the methodology 'supplied 'the UK Ministry of Defense and NATO armies with expertise in information operations' or psyops. AM6 even suggest that there is evidence at her disposal of "contracts that the company had with NATO to identify young people in the UK who were vulnerable to being recruited into ISIS and to run counter-propaganda communications to keep them at home safe with their families instead of sneaking themselves into Syria".

T5 argued that "SCL and Cambridge Analytica used military psyops warfare on innocent civilians" and "committed acts of war which their own people have admitted were gleaned from Nazi propaganda tactics against Western democracies-the United States, the United Kingdom and many others". In her written testimony to the US Senate Committee on Intelligence, Emma Briant also suggested that such SCL Group methodology listed by Tatham (2008; 2015) to include *AB-Target Audience Analysis, AB-MOE Measurement Analysis, Social and Cultural Intelligence, Key Leader Engagement, Quick Looks and Standard Polling* deployed in various operations for governments and military clients have been used for US Defense Agencies, British Defense Agencies and NATO. For example, General Andrew Mackay who led the 2007/2008 British Army 52 Brigade operations in Helmand Province Afghanistan sit in the advisory panel of SCL Group (Tatham, 2008) (see also figure 7.2 for an illustrative structural and organisational chart of SCL Group).

Figure 7.2: Illustrative chart of SCL Group Corporate Structure



Source: Own elaboration

As the organogram above suggest, court documents and judgement delivered at the Royal Courts of Justice London-Case Numbers-CR-2018-006683; CR-2018-006687; CR-2018-006713; CR-2018-006709; CR-2018-006701; and CR-2018-006696 also reveal that all the other companies i.e. SCL Defence, SCL Elections and Cambridge Analytica were trading subsidiaries of Strategic Communication Laboratories (see The Royal Court of Justice (2019) Neutral Citation Case Number: (2019)EWHC 954 (Ch) p.2).

Although they may have been some technical legal differences between Strategic Communication Laboratories and Cambridge Analytica for administrative and electoral compliance purpose in order to meet, fulfil or get around foreign agents restrictions in the US, since CA was only created for political business (House of Common Disinformation and Fake

News Report 2019; Wylie, 2019). However, under the signed *exclusive service provision agreement*, all Cambridge Analytica's businesses were handled by Strategic Communication Laboratories-with SCL's 'personnel' servicing 'the actual delivery and work on behalf of Cambridge Analytica' (Wylie, 2019: 93). Wylie also suggest that because of Mercer's '90 percent ownership of Cambridge Analytica' and SCL '10 per cent' stake, CA 'was bestowed the IP rights to SCL's work-creating a bizarre situation where the subsidiary actually owned the core assets of its parent'. However, on the 3rd of May 2018, following an order of the High Court, Vincent John Green and Mark Newman-insolvency practitioners at Crowe Clark Whitehill LLP were appointed independent Joint Administrators of the Companies under an order of the High Court.

That said, regarding the utilization of the methodology within the defense community, Rowland and Tatham (2008) and Tatham (2008) argue that strategic communication as a 'means of changing behavior' and the centrality of 'influence as a tool for achieving military objectives' was at the heart of the success recorded in Helmand Province in Afghanistan. Tatham (2008) also suggest that the methodology formed the basis of training delivered by SCL Group to NATO officials in their bid to 'promote and sustain particular types of behavior' through behavioral dynamics and target audience analysis (TAA) in peace keeping operations.

In the UK Parliament Disinformation and Fake News Interim Report for example, evidence emerged suggesting that SCL Group had specifically provided psychological operations training for UK Ministry of Defense staff as well as carrying out psychological operation in Helmand Afghanistan. Thus, pointing very clearly to SCL Group as a 'company that operates in the government and defense space' (Disinformation and Fake News Report p. 226-296).

On using the methodology in the military, Tunnicliffe and Tatham (2017) found that 'interaction media' have the 'potential for exerting influence when accompanied by robust target audience analysis (TAA) for information operations'. According to Tatham (2015) the lesson in Afghanistan 'is that understanding the audience is not a nice thing to have but an imperative prerequisite for success'. In one of their major study Mackay and Tatham (2011) had called for a rethinking of military strategies by the West arguing that 'understanding people and their behavior will be decisive in future conflicts' and the 'ability to change behavior will be a defining factor in resolving armed dispute'. Richards (2015) also suggest that SCL Group style methodology or what he calls *information operations* or *psyops* 'offers the greatest potency for military information operations at this very point in history'.

In his comments on what was different about the Trump's campaign for example, T1 stated that it was the "internationalization and militarization of the voter mobilization industry" that came to him as a surprise. Perhaps, what T1 is alluding to here as Pybus (2019) show is the importation of military refine tactics and defense intelligence-i.e. 'psyops' into modern politics. According to Cadwalladr (2018), in US military doctrine and warfare, 'information operations' or psyops rank 'alongside land, sea, air and space as the five-dimensional battle space'.

Furthermore, Watt (2018) also found evidence that in the UK for example, SCL Group was granted UK Ministry of Defense 'List X' status, thus giving the firm 'access to secret documents' in a collaborative project with the Ministry of Defense codenamed '*Project Duco*-that analyzed how people would interact with certain government messages' and 'how target audience analysis could be used by the British Government' (ibid). Wylie (2019:5) also suggest that apart from working for the UK Ministry of Defense, SCL Group had also supplied 'NATO armies with expertise in information operations' as a way of tackling 'radicalization online' through data, algorithms and 'targeted narratives online'.

That said, however, they are skeptics and skepticism among commentators and political scientists regarding the effectiveness of data-driven militarized psychological profiling methods. Nevertheless, a huge body of empirical work also exist that point to the efficacy of these approaches as instruments for psychological understanding and mass persuasion (see Kosinski et al., 2016; Lambiotte and Kosinski, 2014; Mondak et al., 2010, Youyou, Kosinski and Stillwell, 2015). Similarly, defense and military scholarship also suggest that these approaches have been deployed in the fight against terror in some of the world's trouble spots (Tatham, 2008; Tunnicliffe and Tatham, 2017; Richards, 2015). Thus, as Shoshana (2015) argue, SCL Group style methodology seems enmeshed in contemporary society through data 'extraction, personalization, customization, behavioral prediction and modification' (ibid).

In conclusion, what this evidence suggest is that the entrance of a military grade contractor/consultant in the 2016 Trump campaign had inspired innovation and modernization. As Wylie (2019:39) show, SCL Group 'worked primarily for militaries, conducting psychological and influence operations around the world, such as jihadist recruitment mitigation in Pakistan, combatant disarmament and demobilization in South Sudan, and counter-narcotics and counter-human trafficking operations in Latin America'. Indeed, the entrance of 'psyops' (Issenberg, 2015) from the 'military service' (Vogel, 2015) into Trump's campaign is unique in the existing operational mechanics and theoretical construct of modern campaign innovation and sit clearly outside known models.

From the standpoint of theory, what this suggest is that as a theoretical lens for explaining changes or innovation in data driven practices in the 2016 Trump campaign, modernization as a theory continue to suffice. However, what this case study adds to the thesis is that the 2016 Trump campaign is a theoretical outlier that sit outside the existing theoretical norm of how campaigns innovate. First, for relying less on party provided campaign infrastructure. Second, for importing into modern electioneering campaign military-grade people profiling and psychological insight. This finding no doubt carries theoretical implication, since it reveals how SCL Group designed military style behavioural and psychological profiling methods were taken out and deployed in an election campaign. In this sense, the data driven innovation in the 2016 Trump's campaign sit outside the explanation of Swanson and Mancini's modernization thesis as well as outside existing theoretical explanations.

Thus, from the standpoint of the modernization theory, considering that Swanson and Mancini's thesis conveys little explanatory potency in explaining the data driven innovation in Trump's campaign, the evidence above advances the explanatory scope of the theory. Thus, the introduction of military designed psychological profiling and information operation technique and their adaption and adoption for political persuasion expands understanding of current innovation channel (s) or modernization in recent US election campaign. As T1 stated, such "internationalization" and "militarization" i.e. mixture of SCL Group led defence military contracting with the political communication industry is both empirically and theoretically new.

Indeed, with a 'span of twenty-five years' worth of experience, 'defence/political projects'/contracts worldwide and election consultancy deals 'in countries across the globe'-i.e. in both developed and emerging democracies, including clients like the 'U.S. Department of Homeland Security, NATO, CIA, FBI and the State Department', SCL model seem both international and militaristic (Kaiser, 2019:7;10;26). The company's 'methodology and how it applies it makes it a different political consultancy firm in the world' (p.48). Indeed, Issenberg (2015) considers SCL Group and CA led 'psychological profiles' on Americans as their most important exported ingredient and product of contemporary election campaign. Again, the involvement of CA and SCL Group both British companies in the 2016 Trump campaign reduces the scope of the Americanization thesis and reinforces consistency of the two-way flow. Indeed, CA and SCL Group involvement in the Trump campaign shows how UK based political communication and consultancy firm and campaign insight and practices continue to emerge and flow from the United Kingdom to the United States.

7.4: Contemporary Active Measures: Russia and the 2016 Election

Apart from modernization in data-driven campaign practices, discussion of the 2016 Trump campaign would be incomplete without highlighting the role of the Kremlin.

For example, T5, T6 and AM1 had all identified Russia as a relevant actor in the 2016 US presidential election. While T5 suggest that it is the first time in recent US electioneering history that they would be an “overlap” of a presidential campaign in the US with a foreign government that were doing “similar things to get a candidate elected”, T6 thought that “it was the first time that you had a foreign power playing in a big way in the US election system”-i.e. “the Russia Internet Research Agency” with “their hack and dump strategy”.

On the other hand, AM1 comment on Russia sounded more like a defence for Trump’s campaign. As he argued, “America’s meltdown on the campaigns use of data and their believe that foreign actors and the stuff were involve is crazy”. Such commentary in my view may not be unconnected with AM1’s role as data and digital director of the 2016 Trump campaign.

That said, documentary evidence points to practices that bear semblance to longstanding Kremlin style ‘active measures’. For example, in reports across a broad spectrum of US National Security Agencies, they are wide consensus regarding the role Russia played in the election of President Trump-in what can be called *new active measures* (i.e. ‘operations conducted by Russian security services to influence international affairs’ (Muller, 2019; ODNI, 2017).

Historically, *active measures* are Soviet-era tactics of engagement with the West (Abram, 2016). Today however, Russian *active measures* come in the form of Kremlin crafted information warfare design to upset the existing balance of power (Muller, 2019). According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (2019), contemporary Russian global engagement is not only an effort toward destabilizing ‘the global order by undermining Western institutions’, but a way of restoring ‘its place on the world stage’ in a bid to ‘overcoming perceived humiliation after the collapse of the Soviet Union’.

In the past, examples of *active measures* include Russian framed stories of FBI and CIA’s involvement in the 1963 assassination of President John F. Kennedy; crediting the 1979 attack on Mecca to the United States and Israel as well as lies regarding the creation of the aids virus as a biological weapon. As the evidence in this work suggest, modern day efforts seem to bear semblance with those and follow past patterns under the control and supervision of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) (ODNI, 2017).

In their background assessment of Russian interference in the elections for example, reports coordinated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),

and the National Security Agency (NSA) all seem to agree that 'Russian efforts to influence the 2016 US presidential election represent the most recent expression of Moscow's longstanding desire to undermine the US-led liberal democratic order-with a significant escalation in directness' targeted at (a) 'undermining public faith in US democratic process'; (b) 'denigrating Secretary Clinton to harm her electability and potential presidency' and (c) 'covert digital effort that shows preference/help for the election of President Trump' (ONDI, 2017a:17).

According to the Robert Muller's report, Russian influence in the election seem to have emanated from the Russian based Internet Research Agency (IRA) and was designed to sow 'discord in the US political system' (p.14). As both the Muller and US Senate Committee report on Foreign Relations show, the IRA's strategy comprised of many tactics. First, through 'politology'-IRA coordinated classes that teach IRA staff 'Russian position on latest news' and a 'foreign desk' dedicated to US election, they coordinated the spread of disinformation as a way of meddling in the election. Second, through the use of IRA staff and bots, they converted their understanding in the 'nuances of American social polemics on tax issues, LGBT rights, the gun debate to incite America, by setting American citizens against the government to provoke unrest and discontent' (see CFRUSS, 2018:45).

Furthermore, the report also points to evidence of IRA coordinated 'buying of political advertisement on social media in the names of US persons and entities as well as contact with individuals associated with the Trump's campaign' (p.14). On social media for example, DiResta et al. (2018: 34) found IRA related content on Facebook-reaching over 126 million and 1.4 million Americans on Twitter respectively, as well as over 3,519 IRA posted ads (videos and images) on Facebook and Instagram and 73 different IRA-affiliated pages'.

The report also suggest that '*doxing*' and cyber espionage-'the infiltration, stealing and leaking of secret or incriminating information for public consumption' was carried out on the Democratic National Committee (DNC) emails by groups like *COZY BEAR*-also known as APT29 (i.e. a Russian hacker group believed to be associated with Russian intelligence) and *FANCY BEAR* (APT28) (i.e. a cyber-espionage group classified as advanced persistent threat) released by *Wikileaks* (Farrante, 2018).

In another report from the Office of US Inspector General, a number of President Trump's associates (i.e. George Papadopoulos, Carter Page, Paul Manafort and Michael Flynn) (see figure 7.3) who have all pleaded or found guilty were said to have had some contact with Russia. This is not to say however, that there is established evidence of collusion between Russia and the Trump's campaign as findings have remain shrouded in high partisanship.

Figure 7.3: Convicted Trump Associates



Source: Fox News

However, as the report show, George Papadopoulos-Trump's campaign foreign policy adviser for example, 'suggested the Trump team had received some kind of suggestion from Russia that it could assist the election process with the anonymous release of information during the campaign that would be damaging to Mrs Clinton and President Obama', with such Trump vs Russian collaboration predicated on deals that included commitment to making Ukraine a non-campaign issue (see Office of the Inspector General Review of Fisa Applications, 2019: ii, 80, 94, 95). On his part, President Trump has repeatedly criticized these investigations, calling them 'witch hunt' motivated by Christopher Steel's DNC paid opposition research (Glasser, 2019).

d'Acona (2017) is of the view that such presidential narrative reinforces the fact that we are in a post-truth era where political actors evoke feelings rather than facts. That said, President Trump's claim notwithstanding, the Inspector General's report seem to be very clear about the 'serious threat to US national security' that Russian involvement in the 2016 election pose (see Office of the Inspector General Review of Fisa Application 2019: viii). The report concludes that 'political bias' or 'improper motivation' had not influenced decision to open investigation into the Trump's campaign as a 'sensitive investigation matter' even though there was a 'desperate and passionate' effort by Christopher Steele for Donald Trump not to be elected (OIG, 2019:102).

Furthermore, as the investigations across many agencies and institutions of US government have shown, a number of the members of Russian intelligence community-Viktor Borisovich Netyksho; Boris Alekseyevich Antonov; Dmitriy Sergeyevech Badin; Ivan Sergeyevech Yermakov and 8 others were tried and found guilty by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in case number: 1:18-cr-00215-ABJ, for conspiring 'to hack into the computer of US persons and entities responsible for the administration of the 2016 elections and to defraud the

United States and advance narratives that further erode social cohesion' (18 U.S.C: 25; 46; ODNI, 2017). The US Senate report also concluded that on the 2016 election, 'a hostile foreign power reached down to the states and local level to touch voter data, by employing sophisticated cyber tools and capabilities and helped Mosco to potentially build detailed knowledge' of how US election work (US Senate Hearing on Russian Interference, 2017: 1).

In the literature, Moore (2018:87) suggest that as a product of the KGB (i.e. Russia's secret service) 'conspirational perspective on international relations' would have been engrained in President Putin's thinking and approach to Russia vs Western engagement. Thus, like the 'cold war' era, strategies of propaganda, disinformation, demoralization and enemy weakening seem to constitute the new ways of fighting the West today. As Moore show, the digital era war tactics begins by 'identifying and exploiting vulnerabilities, opening and widening existing political wounds and social fissures, highlighting hypocrisies, and accentuating partisanship'(p.80), with digital tools and platforms-Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube providing both the incentive and enabling environment as 'virtual battlegrounds' for such cold war era active measures. Wylie (2019) even suggested that a link existed between CA and the Kremlin. He points for example to insider CA documents that show consultancy deals between CA and Russian based Lukoil that focused on 'developing new hacking capacity in concert with former Russian intelligence officers' that was used to spread 'online disinformation targeting social media networks' in the United States (p.152).

Although they are still questions regarding the extent of Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential elections, the long term implication of such hybrid 'active measures' is that apart from delegitimizing democracy and the democratic process, it could be used to create puppets of the Kremlin in many democracies (Chertoff, 2018; Silberberg, 2019; Wigell, 2019). In this sense, digitally robust and national anti-propaganda strategies, 'active defence' and 'hacking back' measure-(i.e. chasing down and destroying stolen information) (Chertoff, 2018:188-190) are now critically needed in much of the advanced democratic world to secure both elections and democracy.

In conclusion, it could be said therefore, that apart from modernization or innovation in data driven campaign practices-enabled by CA and SCL Group's psychological profiling of American voters, the 2016 election of President Trump can also be perceived as a digitally influenced, manipulated propaganda product of Russia's contemporary *active measures*.

7.5: Contextual Incentive for Innovation in US Political Communication

Although from what we now know, much of Cambridge Analytica's data mining took place in the UK rather than in the US where there is no legal restriction on the gathering, processing and use of individuals' data. As T6 suggested for example, the "US have a very different overall structure and expectation of personal privacy". T1 also thought that "the US is an unprotected data environment with only California as an exception where legislation is now under consideration". According to T1, one difference between the Obama and Trump campaign data collection is that apart from data purchase from brokers, much of the data collected and used by the Obama campaign "was all collected in the US and all in the context of consent, that is consenting to data sharing for political purpose, for political campaigning". Mortazavi and Salah (2015) suggest that the economic and policing incentive that the near unregulated US data environment incentivize allows for increasing data analytics both at private and public institutions.

Thus, as T6 and T1 argue above, the legal framework for managing data privacy in the US differ significantly from what is obtainable in Europe. According to Strandburg (2014), modern US foundation of privacy law was laid in 1973 with the five *Fair Information Practice Principles*. However, Benjamin (2002) argues that the birth of a privacy framework takes its roots from Brandeis and Warren's *Right to Privacy* classic written in 1890. Built on that foundation, Strandburg is of the view that modern US privacy tort were concerned with individualized harms of emotional distress, embarrassment, and humiliation arising out of 'intrusion upon seclusion' or 'public disclosure of private facts'.

However, the development of computers and the volume of data now generated, stored and used raised fears of misuse, unfairness and lack of transparency distinct from the concerns of emotional distress and reputation that were at the heart of initial US privacy torts (ibid). As a result, *Fair Information Practice Principles* (FIPPs) which is the mainstay of US data privacy law were developed. Subsequent legislations like the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) of 1970, the Privacy Act of 1974 that regulates data use by government agencies and laws like the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 1986, Video Privacy Protection Act and Children's Online Privacy Protection Act were all based on the FIPPs (ibid). According to Strandburg, these legislations were an attempt to cope with the scale of data collection by substituting transparency and consent for the individualized fact-specific approach of privacy torts.

That notwithstanding, T1 is of the view that “the US has no data protection laws or regulations or an effective regulator and can be characterised as a wild-feast lawless data market”. T1’s argument is that “in contrast to the trans-Atlantic market-the United Kingdom and EU”, request for access to data by a data subject in the US “is entirely at the discretion of the company”. Perhaps, T1 is not far from the truth, since the *Fair Information Practice Principles* (FIPPS) only consider it more appropriate to deter organizations and institutions from inappropriate practices, rather than being forced by regulations to adopt specific practices (see HEW Publication No. OS 7374). For example, according to the National Institute of Standards and Technology in the US Department of Commerce, ‘because of the broad collection and range of uses of big data, consent for collection is much less likely to be sufficient and should be augmented with technical and legal controls to provide auditability and accountability for use’(NIST, P.7). In this sense, T5 argues that essentially, these “are privacy regulations that could apply”, so that the “data environment is enough to instil some sanity and privacy and ethical consideration in data processing”.

Comparatively however, in Europe, the *General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679* (GDPR) and the 1980 OECD principles addresses issues that include: ‘collection limitation’-for ‘limits to the collection of personal data’; ‘data quality principle’ that seem to address the concern that data collected should be ‘relevant to the purpose for which they are to be used’, and a ‘purpose specification principle’ that suggest that purpose should be specified in advance and ‘subsequent use limited to the fulfilment of those purposes’ (see European Data Protection Supervisor Opinion 4/2015 Report Hardesty 2015; OECD, 1980).

Although they are existing institutional and legal frameworks like the EU-US Privacy Shield Framework and the US Securities Act 1933 and US Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 that was violated by Facebook in the processing and use of peoples’ data for political purposes in the 2016 Trump campaign. Nevertheless, such framework is still considered weak in terms of how it protects data subject privacy, data acquisition and data processing, thus creating incentive for the data analytics market in the United States. Basically, it is such free and nearly unregulated data analytics market that incentivize innovation in data-driven marketing strategies, psychometrics and microtargeting.

That said, as questions and debate regarding the ethics of digital campaigning continue, the US might need to achieve parity with the European Union Area in data protection standards if it seek to address concern over data driven microtargeting campaign tactics. Such regulative parity might begin with a debate as to whether notice and consent and the logic of harmless use of data suffices as potent legal instruments for privacy and personal information protection.

7.6: Conclusion

In line with the methodological objective and theoretical underpinning, this chapter has shown evidence of innovative data-driven practice (s) in the 2016 Trump campaign and the implication of such innovation for theory. The chapter also identified a contextual factor that seem to inspire innovation in data-driven campaign practices in the US. That said, what the 2016 Trump campaign significantly reveal is that emotionally laden, politically motivated personality/psychological profiling is possible and such methodology and tactic was in use in 2016 in ways that seem to have advanced the methodology of personalization and microtargeting crafted and first deployed in the Obama model. A move away from the predictive characterization of voters in the Obama model to emotional, personality and psychological profiling of voters in the Trump's campaign is a significant shift in longstanding practices of segmentation and personalization of political communication.

In the next chapter, a cross-contextual mapping of converged practices that define the emerging technological typology of campaigning and a theoretical commentary on the implication of findings on the Americanization and Modernization theses will be provided. The next chapter will also highlight contextual factors that shaped the adoption and application of the Obama model in case study I & II. Taken together, these three outputs in chapter eight sit as the three main contributions of this study.

8: Concluding Discussion: Learning from the Cases and the Three Level Update

8:1: Introduction

This thesis was designed to achieve three things. First, to operationalize the Obama model-i.e. the extent to which features of the model as set out in chapter two were deployed in Nigeria and the United Kingdom. Second, to test theory-i.e. Americanization and modernization, and third, to reveal context-i.e. how country specific factors shape the manifestation of the Obama model. As the main contribution of this thesis, this chapter follows the goals of the study by highlighting the cross-case manifestation of the Obama model and empirical evidence that reduces and expand the scope of the Americanization and modernization theories respectively. The chapter also highlight contextual factors that impeded convergence of the Obama model in Nigeria and the United Kingdom as well as US specific incentive for innovation in data driven campaign practices. The chapter concludes by highlighting limits of the Obama model and areas of further research.

8:2: First Level: The Obama Model

This section provides a cross-case commentary on similarity and differences in the manifestation of the Obama model in the case studies. As indicated in the introduction, this work began with the Obama model as an analytical framework for exploring the emergence of technologically innovative campaign practices. Thus, the Obama model is used as an exemplar for providing detail on emerging technologically innovative campaign practices by finding patterns of similarity in empirical materials from the case studies. This way, ‘a logical structure of possibilities was created before studying cases’ (George and Bennett, 2005:235), with each case study serving as a building block for operationalizing the Obama model and the mapping of the technological dimension (s) and state of modern election campaign. Thus, what is highlighted below is a form generalization on the manifestation of the Obama model in the case studies and identification of what George and Bennett call ‘empty cells’ (p.233)-i.e. elements of the model that have not occurred in the case studies (see also Maxwell and Chmiel, 2014).

Table 8.1: *The Obama Model: Operationalization and Trump Campaign*

<i>Obama Model</i>	<i>Nigeria J</i>	<i>Nigeria B</i>	<i>UK C</i>	<i>UK L</i>	<i>Trump's Campaign</i>
<i>Political and Technology Consultants</i>	<i>Active use</i>	<i>Active use</i>	<i>Active use</i>	<i>Active use</i>	

Big Data and single database	<i>Unused</i>	<i>Unused</i>	<i>Active use</i>	<i>Active use</i>	
Predictive Modelling	<i>Unused</i>	<i>Unused</i>	<i>Active use</i>	<i>Active use</i>	
Data Mining and microtargeting	<i>Unused/microtargeting enabled by social media</i>	<i>Unused/microtargeting enabled by social media</i>	<i>Active use</i>	<i>Active use</i>	
Web 2.0: Digital and social media	<i>Active use</i>	<i>Active use</i>	<i>Active use</i>	<i>Active use</i>	
Digital fundraising and small donors	<i>Unused</i>	<i>Used with minimal impact</i>	<i>Used</i>	<i>Used</i>	
Air war-political advertising	<i>Active use</i>	<i>Active use</i>	<i>Active use</i>	<i>Active use</i>	
Ground Game	<i>Used</i>	<i>Used</i>	<i>Active use</i>	<i>used</i>	
Political opinion polling	<i>Used</i>	<i>Used</i>	<i>Active use</i>	<i>Active use</i>	
Branding image and message	<i>Used</i>	<i>Active use</i>	<i>Active use</i>	<i>Active use</i>	
Negative campaigning	<i>Active use</i>	<i>Active use</i>	<i>Active use</i>	<i>Active use</i>	
Campaign and feedback strategy	<i>Used</i>	<i>Used</i>	<i>Active use</i>	<i>Active use</i>	
Campaign and interaction strategy	<i>Used</i>	<i>Used</i>	<i>Active use</i>	<i>Active use</i>	
Speed and consistency of campaign communication	<i>Used</i>	<i>Used</i>	<i>Active use</i>	<i>Used</i>	
Campaign Games	<i>Unused</i>	<i>Unused</i>	<i>Used</i>	<i>Unused</i>	
The permanent campaign	<i>Unused</i>	<i>Unused</i>	<i>Used</i>	<i>Unused</i>	
Deviant Element	<i>WhatsApp</i>				<i>Psychographics</i>

Source: Own elaboration-Nigeria J-Nigeria Jonathan's campaign; Nigeria B-Nigeria Buhari's campaign; UK C-United Kingdom Conservative Party campaign; UK L- Labour Party campaign; Trump's campaign.

1. Political and Technology Consultants

Since Larry Sabato's (1981) publishing of the 'rise of political consultants', evidence from this work also indicate that they has been tremendous increase in both the hiring of consultants and the diversification and growth of skills now offered to political parties and candidates during elections. However, what is unique and important to point out about this era is that American political consultants no longer monopolize or dominate the political communication consultancy market and field. As evidence from the 2015 Nigerian presidential election campaign, British 2015 general election and the 2016 Trump campaign show, the field has become more internationalized and diverse, with knowhow and skills designed and developed for other sectors including for military operations now imported into electioneering-symptomatic of Bernays (1947) engineering of consent. As Lees-Marshment (2009) argue, they are now an increased development of a new generation of home-grown political consultants in many countries who now compete with American consultants. Although as recent events in the 2015 elections in Nigeria and the 2016 US presidential election show, Cambridge Analytica's voter de-mobilisation tactics indicate some level of unethical and questionable roles of contemporary political consultants and consultancies.

Nevertheless, across the three countries-i.e. the US, UK and Nigeria, evidence point to the continuous reliance and use of what Blumler (2019) call as 'consultancy-led model' of political communication. As Issenberg (2015) argue for example, CA's involvement in Nigeria, the UK and US suggest a border crossing political consultancy that is transnational in approach and cross-sectoral in business with almost the same methodology and practices applied everywhere it goes and everywhere it was hired. That said, while the hiring of consultants has continued as a longstanding component of modern campaign, it is the entrance of new skill sets-technologists and data scientists, the internationalization of the trade and diminishing US dominance in the global political communication consultancy market that is remarkable.

2. Big data and the single database

Historically, political parties and campaigns have always used data and information to make judgement about strategy. However, in this era of big data and growing technological advancement, more and more organizations now have and are developing the capacity to accumulate, store and convert data into insight that guide decision making. In political communication, what evidence from this work indicate is that political parties in America and Britain are far ahead of those in developing democracies like Nigeria in the development of this new kind of campaign infrastructure that is embedded in databases and big data analysis of voters identity and personality traits. However, Ndlela (2020) is of the view that there is

possibility that modern African elections are equally now enmeshed in data driven microtargeting campaign tactics. That said, as political parties increasingly leverage on these data enabled insight, it is important to think about a global or transnational regulation and ethical framework. For example, recent evidence from Cadwalladr (2020) suggest that over 68 countries have been under the manipulative influence of Cambridge Analytica's voter manipulation tactics. Such regulation or ethical framework can save democracy from the rising disinformation and voter manipulation. Taken together, this finding brings to light the advantage of the most similar and different sampling of cases for this study.

3. Predictive Modelling

From the standpoint of voter understanding and mobilization, evidence from the two advanced democracies (i.e. America and the United Kingdom) suggest that predictive modelling is inspiring a significant shift in how campaigns identify and mobilise voters and likely supporters. Similarly, data inspired predictive modelling seem to be equally reshaping the entire landscape of American and British political marketing and advertising. While this is incentivizing less emphasis on demographic segmentation and mobilization in both countries, a large part of political mobilization in Nigeria is still shaped by regional, ethno-religious and socio-demographic factors and historical sentiments and differences in the country.

4. Data Mining and Microtargeting

In America and the UK, data mining now constitute one of the instruments used by contemporary campaigns for unmasking citizens deep-seated political sentiments, online activism and platform visibility. While it may have perpetually shifted and altered how campaigns make judgement on voters and how to contact and persuade such voters, there is no evidence that such data mining approaches are now in use in Nigeria. At best, what political parties in democracies like Nigeria leverage on are digital tools like Facebook audience profiling the have incentivized the use of location microtargeting.

However, in Britain and America, data mining and microtargeting have change the way campaigns identify, contact and persuade voters. As evidence from both countries indicate, campaigns now have the capacity to know which individual or group of voters are likely to support them and the kinds of message (s) they will receive that will resonate with their views and interest. Thus, with such insight, campaigns can now effectively target the right voters with the right or resonating message both to persuade them to vote and to discourage them from voting. Thus, questions remain whether the strategy is incentivizing democratic and electoral participation.

Nevertheless, taken together and from the standpoint of contemporary practices in the personalization of political communication, three elements (i.e. big data and a single data base, predictive modelling and data mining/microtargeting and psychographics (i.e. the innovative practice deployed in President Trump's 2016 campaign data driven approach to voter understanding and mobilization) have contributed in moving modern political communication away from longstanding socio-economic and geo-demographic segmentation that guided previous approaches to voter mobilization to more personalized, emotional, psychological and personality based forms of voter identification, mobilization, persuasion, de-mobilisation and even manipulation.

That said, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide commentary on whether less emphasis on demographics in the politics of some western countries and the new approach of audience identification and mobilization is an incentive for democracy and democratic participation. Nevertheless, as Hersh (2015:22) argue, despite the potential of shift in helping politicians and political parties to expand the pool of electorate to include more people with diverse interest and a clearer perception of voters 'persuadability' that these tools provide, reliance on these strategies can (a) distort the perception of politicians by reducing the 'portion of the electorate that a politician needs to care about' (p.207) and (b) 'distort voters behavior, alter the experience of voters, by limiting their exposure to alternative political viewpoints (p.208) in ways that may affect voters temperament for objective political debate (Sunstein, 2007). Thus, what can be said however is that in an era of rising political apathy, perhaps, a more positive form of microtargeting should rather be encouraged-i.e. responsible microtargeting or personalization of political communication that can inspire political and electoral participation.

5. *Web 2.0: Digital and Social Media*

Across all three countries, social media has increased the diversity and abundance of media now available to political actors and politicians. That said, these digital tools and platforms may have also altered the dynamics and balance of power between traditional legacy mainstream media in the arena of political communication. In Nigeria like the rest of Africa for example, politics have been penetrated by social media-a deliverance from the once state owned/government controlled Soviet-style media model (Ndlela and Mano, 2020). Although digital divide challenges exist, the media abundance and ubiquity incentivize by mobile telephony or what Nyamnjoh and de Bruijn (2009) call 'new talking drum of Africa' seem to have reshaped, democratize and change the media and political communication landscape.

In America and the UK, 'just like TV, social media is becoming a primary medium of communication' (Vaidhyanathan, 2018:2). The negative however, is that apart from incentivizing politics, social media platforms have equally become avenues for the fragmentation of the public, channels of voter de-mobilisation, the spread of ethno-nationalism and an incentive for the rise of authoritarianism (ibid). Whether or not we can continue to point to social media undermining of authoritarianism in the Arab Spring as its 'unequivocal democratic merit' (Habermas, 2005) is now a question for debate.

However, taken together, what the evidence suggest is that social media has inspired a shift across all three countries in the nature of campaign messaging away from traditional gatekeepers and the two-step flow to more mediated, direct and personal/personalized forms of political communication in ways that can inspire the participation of millennials in modern day politics and revive old patterns of mass parties. Nevertheless, scholars like Miller and Vaccari (2020) are of the view that practices that now dominate the digital public sphere i.e. surveillance capitalism, data-driven analytics, personalization, disinformation, online hate, intimidation and algorithmic manipulation are hurting democracy in ways that were not imagined by some of the early visionary theorists of digital politics. Thus, in their view, digitization and social media also bear significant consequences for the health of liberal democracy as we know it (ibid).

6. *Digital Fundraising and small donors*

Whilst digital fundraising and small donors seem to be democratizing campaign finance mobilization in the US and Britain, there is still minimal impact in Nigeria. Evidence seem to suggest that across all three context, big donors and wealthy individuals or what Johnson (2017) calls 'dark money' continue to flood elections in ways that raises questions on the integrity of modern-day elections in advanced and developing democracies. What is also important to highlight is that although digitally sourced donations from small donors have contributed in reshaping campaign finance mobilization, in America and the UK for example, it is the amount of money that campaigns are able to assemble for electioneering that tend to shape investment in and deployment of innovative data-driven campaign practices. That said, in Nigeria where political finance mobilization seem to account for much of the political corruption, perhaps, political parties institutionalization of this approach to campaign fundraising and financing can offer short term solutions to political corruption.

7. *Air War: Political Advertising*

Apart from traditional media spaces, digitization is diversifying the terrain for disseminating political ads through platforms, search engines and even celebrities. While evidence from the

three countries suggest that digital political advertising may have reduced the cost of producing and disseminating political information, an ethical framework for such digital campaigning might be necessary, given the rising challenge of disinformation and the need to find a balance between online mobilization and polarization. In the UK for example, even though they are regulations on political advertising in traditional legacy media, they are less or no such broad-based regulation that currently exists to police and checkmate digital political advertising and dark practices.

That notwithstanding, across all cases, digitization seems to have completely altered the political advertising landscape. In Nigeria for example, while they are no evidence of a big data guided approach to dissemination of political ads, digital platforms like Facebook location specific advertising seem to be inspiring sophistication in Nigeria's political advertising. In the United Kingdom, while traditional media remained influential, digitization has also diversified channels of such air wars in ways that have significantly reduced reliance on party election broadcast (PEBs).

8. *Ground Game*

According to Blumler (2019), patterns of contemporary ground game campaign like those deployed in the Obama model and the Tories in 2015 can be referred to as 'a movement-led model' of campaigning. However, from the point of view of comparison, while technology and a huge recruitment of ground troops were at the heart of the ground game tactics in America and Britain, investment in such technologically enabled apps and mass recruitment/masses guided coordinated approach to getting out the vote is only at the elementary stage in Nigeria. What we find in Nigeria is a less institutionalized, less labour-intensive, less information sharing ground game tactics, with political parties only drawing from the enthusiasm of youths who most times are motivated by monetary gains, jobs or promise of political appointments. In the United Kingdom however, Labour's five thousand doorstep conversation point to a remarkable re-energization of ground game activism that suggest that modern British elections have continued to be marketed at the doorsteps of the electorate with data returns by canvassers increasingly influencing the nature of messaging and targeting.

9. *Political Opinion Polling*

Political opinion polling has remained a regular tool for campaigns even in a developing democracy like Nigeria. However, what is different in Nigeria is that such political opinion polling remain mostly traditional and are conducted by political parties mainly to lay claim of electoral victory rather than for design of election or get-out-the-vote strategies. Conversely, in America

and Britain, technological and digital approaches to such political opinion polling seem to have overtaken traditional polling methods, with such polling increasingly becoming essential for design of national messages for campaign success and electoral victory.

10. Branding, Image and Message

Although it is beyond the scope of this work to comment on the political implication and electoral impact of branding, image and message. However, reliance on branding, candidate brand management and image are now a key component of contemporary campaigns. Similarly, campaign messages have also risen high in the list of priority of things campaigns consider key and want to get right through message testing as they plan for electoral victory. Across the three case studies for example, evidence indicates that the dissemination of political messaging has increasingly gone online, with technology and social networking sites acting as incentivizing vehicles for message testing and avenues for dissemination. Although questions about message precision remain, nevertheless, consumer-based marketing approaches are now part of modern campaign strategy. In both Nigeria and the United Kingdom for example, the range of responsibility that political consultants have include the design of such messages, with clarity and consistency in message and messaging increasingly becoming important sources of voter inspiration and mobilization.

11. Negative Campaigning

This element of campaigning-also social media driven featured in all two case studies. However, in Britain and Nigeria more than in America, they were more profound use of what Blumler (2019) calls 'journalistic interventionism'-tabloid aligned attack on politicians in ways that reinforced the partisan nature of British tabloid newspapers. In Nigeria for example, such negative campaign tactics come mostly with intense ethnic coloration and personality attacks with media houses as accomplices. Furthermore, a new dimension that also emerged was Cambridge Analytica-Israeli experts Blackcube led hacking of Buhari's medical records and the scaremongering videos that portrayed Buhari as a Muslim who will decapitate Nigeria. Indeed, such negativity strikes deeply into the heart of Nigeria's major fault line and could be a recipe for violence. Historically, ethno-religious and regional rivalry has contributed to most of Nigeria's pre- and post-election violence. In the United Kingdom, such negative campaigning is mainly designed to demolish the credibility of the opposition. However, even though digitization has contributed in altering the architecture for the dissemination of negativity during campaigns, the party that controls a bigger share of traditional press support tend to enjoy a better and more favorable and friendlier coverage.

12. Campaign Feedback Strategy

Again, across all case studies, social media seem to have inspired the use of this element as a campaign tactic. However, in Nigeria where party electoral strategy focused less on formal rules of victory, they are lesser institutionalization of this strategy in the overall campaign approach of the PDP and APC. Conversely, in America and the UK, campaigning is increasingly becoming a two-way mediated process incentivized by digitization such that canvassers and campaign headquarters constantly share information to enhance targeting and voter mobilization.

13. Campaign and Interaction Strategy

While they were more levels of technological sophistication involved in the deployment of this element in America and Britain, the growth of social media is the incentive for such campaign information flows in Nigeria. That said, even though this strategy was deployed in the United Kingdom and Nigeria, the evidence that emerged in Nigeria does not indicate a bottom-up campaign strategy like the pattern incentivized by ground-war troops, apps and new technology in the Obama model. Increasingly however, campaigns in both advanced democracies are consciously designing and creating interaction platforms that seek to gather information and attract people beyond traditional supporters.

14. Speed and consistency of campaign communication

In ways that seem to be competing or replacing longstanding strategy of campaigns reliance on spoke-persons, digitization, volunteers and ground game army are contributing to reshaping and changing the speed at which political parties and candidates attack, counter each other and respond to issues during election campaigns. In all three cases, the new media arena and environment seem to have made campaigning in modern elections a round-the-clock affair, with attacks and rebuttals from all parties spreading in the digital public sphere.

15. Campaign Games

On this element, only America and the UK produced evidence of the deployment of gamification as campaign strategy. However, while the Obama campaign had deployed this strategy for fundraising, voter mobilization and election turnout, the Tories only used gamification to design and encourage participation in sharing campaign content and materials. That said, from the standpoint of political participation, this element hold potential to inspire millennials to get active in politics. Creatively gamified campaign platforms can be an incentive and inspiration for tech loving millennials who connect with a candidate and their policies to campaign from their homes. In an era of rising voter apathy, gamification has the potential to drive mass participation.

16. The permanent Campaign

Although patterns vary between Britain and the US, political campaigns have increasingly become continuous and permanent for incumbents. Conversely, for opposition parties for example, both the Labour Party and APC respectively didn't engage in any form of permanent campaign. However, even though features of the permanent campaign are emerging under the current APC led government in Nigeria, there are no clear signs or evidence that the PDP (i.e. the party in government) had engaged similar patterns in the 2015 election campaign. In the UK, evidence of online posters appearing nearly daily even outside of election periods and the fix term parliament privileges that the governing party had enjoyed are suggestive of the permanent campaign. That said, in table 8.2 below, a cross-contextual trajectory of change is highlighted as a way of signposting the old, revised and new technologically innovative aspects and dimensions of modern election campaign.

Table 8.2: Trajectory of Change in Practices

Old Practices	Revised Practices (by technology)	New Practices	The New-new (Trump Campaign)
<i>Political and Technology Consultants</i>	<i>Political Opinion Polling</i>	<i>Big data and the single database</i>	<i>Psychographics- Emotional, psychological and personality voter profiling</i>
<i>Negative Campaigning</i>	<i>Air War: Political Advertising</i>	<i>Predictive Modelling</i>	
<i>The permanent Campaign</i>	<i>Ground Game</i>	<i>Data Mining and Microtargeting</i>	
	<i>Branding, Image and Message</i>	<i>Web 2.0: Digital and Social Media</i>	
	<i>Digital Fundraising and small donors</i>	<i>Campaign Feedback Strategy</i>	

		<i>Campaign and Interaction Strategy</i>	
		<i>Speed and consistency of campaign communication</i>	
		<i>Campaign Games</i>	

Source: Own elaboration

Now as earlier indicated, given that from the point of view of Swanson and Mancini’s ‘modern model of campaigning’, they failed to specify in detail what the modern model of campaigning’ constitutes both from a technological perspective and in terms of key and specific political communication technologies, techniques and practices that were available and utilized in 1996, table 8.2 above provides an update. As table 8.1 indicates, a cross-case synthesis and pattern-matching of empirical evidence from the two case studies with the predicted elements (i.e. 16 elements of the Obama model) establishes both the underlying uniformity in practices and differences (see Glasser and Strauss, 1967; Yin, 2003; Emmel, 2013). In this sense, the Obama model provides details on the technological dimension and state of modern election campaign.

That said, some of what has emerged in table 8.1 above also reflect in much of the wider discussion in the literature on contemporary campaign practices (see for example, Newman, 2016; Davies, 2019; Mullen, forthcoming). However, where differences in the application and manifestation of the Obama model emerged, such differences are conditioned by context and country specific factors. For example, while campaigns in America and Britain have entered a ‘radically transformed historical moment’ (Pybus, 2019) and an era where technology-data driven approaches built on big data, machine learning, algorithms, predictive behaviour and psychographics now ‘form the new instrument of persuasion’ (ibid), such practices remain in their formative stages in Nigeria.

Nevertheless, taken together, the analytically equivalent elements even though ‘hybrid’ (Chadwick, 2013) and with different levels of manifestation across the three countries, they conceptually offer empirically grounded validity to the Obama model. That said, whilst it is

agreeable that continuous expansion of this model is imperative as the technological environment continues to change, from the standpoint of Swanson and Mancini modern model of campaigning, comparative theory building, progress or contribution to knowledge, the Obama model rescues the field from comparative knowledge stagnation on the technological dimensions and state of modern campaign. The Obama model also offer a typological lens that can guide comparative work in other countries in ways that can further expand and explain the state of the field (see Feller and Stern, 2007). Thus, as a way of complementing Swanson and Mancini's 'modern model of campaigning' and its failure to adequately detail the technological dimension of changes in campaigning in 1996, the Obama model reveals and provide details of the sequence of technologically driven forms of innovation now appearing and manifesting in contemporary campaigns.

8:3: Second Level: Theory

This section offers an enhanced commentary on the Americanization and Modernization theories based on evidence from the case studies.

Americanization

On the basis of the evidence from the two case studies, the central claim that this work makes on Americanization is that the theory is inappropriate, insufficient and not well-suited as a theoretical lens for capturing, labelling and explaining the manifestation and convergence of the Obama model in the two case studies. As we saw in Nigeria and the United Kingdom, what the evidence suggest is an increasing internationalization of political communication consulting that show how globally diversifying contemporary political communication consultancy, consultants and innovation have become.

In the 2015 election in Nigeria for example, a conglomeration of political consultants and consultancies from America, Britain, Israel and emerging local actors and homegrown talents all assembled, competed and contributed in shaping the practices deployed in the campaigns. Furthermore, contextual factors-digital divide, ethno-religious and regional sentiments, and the penchant for political actors to compromise the electoral system undermined the emergence of common patterns on all elements of the Obama model. Similarly, Cambridge Analytica's testing of dark advertising and voter suppression tactics in Kenya and Nigeria also theoretically suggest elements of Africanization and transition from an era of complete Americanization. Thus, in an increasingly globalized and trans-national media world, practices of the model of political

communication exemplified in the US-Obama model are not extending to non-Western democracies like Nigeria completely on the wheels of Americanization.

In the UK, while there is a longstanding history of American influence in British elections, such influence has increasingly become mutual and reciprocal in recent times. For example, both in 2012 and in 2016, British consultants and consultancy company (i.e. Cambridge Analytica) were actively involved in American elections (see Hines, 2012). Thus, as the evidence from the 2015 British General elections show, even though they were American political consultants who were hired and had worked for both Labour and the Conservative Parties respectively, the Australian-Lynton Crosby and homegrown actors and professionals in the political consultancy market were part of the network process of the innovative practices deployed in the campaign. Thus, in both case studies, rather than complete reliance on American consultants, 'positive feedback' on technology (Pierson, 2000) and 'field crossing' (Kreiss, 2016:12) contributed to inspire the reproduction of the Obama model. In this sense, the longstanding US dominance and hegemony in the trade and export of skill/knowhow is diminishing and convergence in the manifestation of the Obama model couldn't be solely explained as a function of Americanization. As Berghahn (2010) argue, new developments in economic and technological innovation that now 'instantly circulate the globe' cannot be completely ascribed to America and American agents. For example, the involvement of SCL Group and Cambridge Analytica both British companies in the 2016 Trump campaign reduces the scope of the Americanization thesis and reinforces consistency of the to-way flow (Cunliffe, 1974) (cited in Negrine and Pathanapossolous, 1996).

Contextually, the British legal context-i.e. the 1998 Data Protection Act also constrained the full deployment of US kind data driven campaign practices in 2015. For example, UK data protection regulation and the Electoral Commission's guidelines for fair and lawful use of individuals' data by data controllers like political parties exemplifies contextual differences that limits complete Americanization. As Norris (1997:211) argue, differences in context seem to continue the restriction of 'wholesale importation of American campaigning' into Britain. Elteren (2006) also argue that such contextual limitation means that the cultural exchange that takes place is not of 'transmission' but a negotiated exchange where innovation is picked, chosen and converted to fit local context. Thus, as Negrine and Pathanapossolous (1996) argue, rather than theoretically paying attention only to how practices have been transferred from the US to other countries, emphasis should be on 'broader patterns of practices being adopted from a variety of sources and common pool of resources to meet domestic needs'.

Modernization

Regarding modernization, whilst technology and technological changes continue to sit at the heart of modern campaign innovation, evidence from the 2016 Trump campaign indicate that the market place of contemporary campaign innovation is expanding and changing from the existing theoretical norm, with new actors-rich oligarchs, sponsored research and military grade hearts and minds winning tactics now contributing to inspire innovative practices. Thus, whilst this work support the wide consensus among theories and theorist of change (s) in political communication that modernization can suffice as a general explanation for changes, new patterns and source of such innovation exemplified in the 2016 Trump campaign differ significantly from previous models of campaign changes and innovation. The dynamics of innovation exemplified in the 2016 Trump campaign challenges existing theoretical explanation on patterns of innovation in US political communication.

For example, evidence suggest that military-grade psychological profiling insight crafted by Strategic Communication Laboratories (SCL Group) for creating 'psychological effects' that hinge on making impression on 'mindset, thoughts, processes, attitudes and behaviours' were part of Cambridge Analytica's methodology (Mazeikis, 2016:3). Indeed, the introduction of such military designed psychological and personality profiling and information operation techniques and their adoption for political persuasion and mobilization expand understanding of innovation and modernization channels in contemporary US election campaign. SCL Group and Cambridge Analytica's methodology of psychological, emotional and personality profiling and how it is applied both for voter mobilization and de-mobilisation is an entirely new world in the political communication landscape. Similarly, shifts from political characterization of voters in the Obama model to personality, emotional and psychological characterization of voters in the 2016 Trump is a significant advancement in personalization of political communication.

That said, although, the theoretical generalization made here does not necessarily mean that we discard the modernization theory as an explanatory lens for explaining changes in contemporary campaigns. Rather, what this thesis does, drawing from Kriess (2016) and Padgett and Powell (2012) network folding or recombination explanation of innovation is a theoretical expansion of the explanatory scope and lens of the theory. Thus, what this work adds from the point of view of contribution to knowledge is that it provides a theoretical update to the explanatory scope of both theories, by subjecting the theories to a test and revision and empirically challenging the knowledge they previously provide, thus, adding both understanding and a new and revised thinking on Americanization and Modernization regarding how

technology now drive innovation and convergence in the modern political communication landscape (see Whetten, 1989; Bendassolli, 2013). George and Bennett (2005:109) are of the view that contribution can be made to theories by strengthening or reducing 'support for a theory', narrowing or extending 'the scope conditions of a theory', or determining 'which or two more theories best explains a case, type or general phenomenon'.

8:4: Third Level: Context and Barriers to Convergence

According to Swanson and Mancini, factors that militated against the convergence process of their modern model of campaigning in the countries studied include: 'the electoral system; the structure of party competition; the regulation of campaigning; national political culture; and the nature of the media system' (see Swanson and Mancini, 1996:249).

Whilst these five factors clearly remain relevant and important to any explanation of change, the focus in this thesis is a discussion of the technological dimension of factors that sustain difference and divergence in the uptake and application of the Obama model. Thus, the methodological design ensured that such country specific factors that emerged are empirically identified to add understanding to the contemporary contextual conditions that shape and influence the uptake and manifestation of innovative campaign practices exemplified by the Obama model.

As Gurevitch and Blumler (1990) argue, it is context that either 'differently promote or constrain' political communication practices within countries. Thus, in Nigeria for example, digital divide, religion, ethnicity, disregard for campaign finance regulations and stomach infrastructure emerged as constraints to the application of the Obama model. Given the Eurocentric nature of the field, the Nigerian case study provides a unique perspective that helps to Africanize the field.

Similarly, in the United Kingdom, data protection regulation (i.e. the 1998 Data Protection Act) and the transparency responsibility it imposed on political parties as data controllers limit and conditioned the uptake and application of the technologically innovative campaign practices exemplified in the Obama model. Furthermore, with the 2018 European wide General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) now in force, the use of such innovative data driven political communication practices may have also become more constrained. Thus, as Elteren (2006) argue, discussion of the influence of American consultants on British elections that fails to account for 'local reworking' of practices can be rejected. Furthermore, Cambridge Analytica's (a British consultancy) involvement in the 2016 Trump campaign also speak of continuous mutuality in spread of data driven campaign innovation.

Conversely, in the United States, evidence suggest that US data regulation framework and legal environment for managing citizens data privacy is one incentive for the uptake of data driven and technologically innovative campaign practices. While such difference between the American and British data market is unique in its sense, it is such contextual differences that inhibit uniform adoption of US type practices in the UK.

That said, taken together and from the point of view of contribution to knowledge, even though variations in contextual conditions may have created variations in the manifestation of the Obama model, the revelation of such contextual variations-a product of empirical discovery adds a socio-cultural, institutional and technological dimension to the discuss on context as a factor that condition political communication and more importantly, the application of the technologically driven political communication practices exemplified in the Obama model.

8:5: Context, Obama Model and Further Research

The contextual landscape of the three case studies in this work opens doors to deeper reflection and further research. First, as a continuous way of uncovering the technological state of the field in both established and developing democracies, researchers are invited to test the Obama model and the Trump's campaign data driven practice (i.e. old, revised, new and new-new see table 8.1 & 8.2) in future elections. Second, in the US where automated bots and deepfakes now seem to account for emerging tactics that seems to dwarf or highlight the limitation of the Obama model, research is needed to explore whether new practices are emerging that can also serve as update to the Obama model (see Choudhury, 2019). Both ways, research can continue to drive 'conceptual, theoretical and characteristic understanding' as well as discovery of practices and new 'trends' in the field (see Ijere, 2020).

Furthermore, considering that the consequences of digital campaign for electoral outcome remain largely unknown in all three countries, the impact of data driven quantification of political support on contemporary political behavior is also worth researching. Such research can produce diverse set of explanation in the context of behavioral microtargeting and digital echo chambers and give us tools for mapping ethical frameworks for digital political advertising.

Furthermore, in Nigeria, questions of direct US involvement in the country's election and what impact this have or may have had on electoral outcome can form an important aspect of future research. Further comparative work is also necessary to explore the use of big data/single data base, data mining and predictive modelling, gamification and the permanent campaign in

Nigeria's future elections. On the use of WhatsApp in Nigeria, research is also needed to explore how the app's end-to-end encrypted messaging could be serving as a platform for fake news and disinformation. Research is also needed to examine the electoral advantage unregulated campaign financing accord Nigerian political parties and how such campaign financing undermines the electoral system and process.

In the United Kingdom, research is needed to explore the impact of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) on data driven campaign practices and digital fundraising practices of UK charities in order to explain what changes the institutional context of GDPR have inspired on data driven campaigning and fundraising. In the wake of current global events, research can also examine UK citizens perspective, the privacy implication and overall consequence (s) of COVID 19 contact tracing apps and how the information and data collected is used. Success in the use of such apps can be balanced with individual privacy.

In the United Kingdom and United States where evidence is increasingly emerging on attempted Russian interference in the democratic space, electoral system and national security architecture, comparative work is necessary and critical for understanding new forms of 'active measures' in order to form a collaborative response in defense of liberal democracy. With increasing growth in technology and artificial intelligence that will continue to transform lives and society, research that examines the democratic and national security implications of artificial intelligence in a globe that includes actors like Russia is both important and critical. Given America's involvement in the 2015 presidential elections in Nigeria, such research can also compare patterns of electoral interference in advanced and developing democracies.

Lastly, in the United States, considering that this work focused mainly on differences between the Obama and Trump's data driven campaign approaches, further comparative work that places both campaign side-by-side for full exploration of continuity, similarity and change is still necessary. Such research can shine more light on the impact of rising ideological and identity politics-i.e. right-wing and left-wing rhetoric on US political parties, US media organisations, democratic institutions and political communication. The missing cells in Trump's campaign (see table 8.1 above) offer very important imperative for such comparison. Indeed, such research can also compare and analyse the way the media (i.e. traditional and digital) reflected and communicated dynamics of racial and ethnic identity in the 2016 US presidential election campaign and how those may have shaped political communication in the two electoral cycles.

8.6: Conclusion

To produce an empirical picture of the register and state of contemporary political communication practices, this thesis has used the Obama campaign of 2008 and 2012 as a historical case of importance and point of departure to set out an advanced schema for understanding old, revised and new technological changes and dimension of the 'modern model of campaigning' (see table 8.1 & 8.2). From the point of view of trajectories of change, and as table 8.2 indicate, the technologically innovative practices that emerged in the Obama campaign place it as the most advanced to date. Thus, this thesis has added clarification to Swanson and Mancini's 'modern model' of campaigning, regarding the technological state, dimensions and innovative data driven patterns, trends and practices that now inform contemporary election campaign. Taken together, the thesis has operationalized the Obama model and has also provided a theoretical update to the explanatory scope of Americanization and Modernization as well as additional understanding to contemporary contextual technological dynamics that shape the uptake and convergence of data driven and technologically innovative campaign practices in the case studies.

Thus, as evidence from the two established democracies indicate, innovative campaign practices that are data-driven, predictive, personality based, emotionally engaging, psychologically focused and technologically intense are now the norm. However, the uptake of such innovative practices is context dependent. Significantly however, while such practices remain in their formative stage in Nigeria, in the United States and United Kingdom, these data-driven and technologically innovative campaign practices are intensively and speedily moving political communication further away from longstanding socio-economic and geo-demographic segmentation and targeting that characterized past campaign practices to more personality-based, emotional and psychological forms of voter persuasion, mobilization and de-mobilisation. Furthermore, the thesis has also shown that theoretically, Americanization is inadequate for explaining the convergence of such practices across our case studies as network actors that now inspire such innovation and practices continue to spring up in other countries. Similarly, additional explanation to the theoretical path of innovation or modernization in recent US political communication landscape was provided. Here, evidence suggests that actors that inspired creativity and innovation in the 2016 Trump campaign differ significantly from existing known models.

Nevertheless, because comparison of the Obama and Trump campaign centered only on data-driven campaign practices and its theoretical implication, the use of psychographics in Trump's

campaign (see table 8.1 & 8. 2 above) is not enough to claim that Trump's campaign has now dwarfed Obama's. A more comprehensive comparison of both campaigns is needed to establish that. Lastly, contextual conditions that impeded the use of Obama model or the development of common pattern in practices in the case studies and a contextual incentive for such innovation in the US have been highlighted.

In doing these three things, this thesis goes beyond Swanson and Mancini's modern model of campaigning, by offering a comparative insight on old, revised and new technological registers, techniques and practices of contemporary campaign and political communication, a theoretical explanation for the emergence and convergence of such techniques and practices, and factors that shape and condition their use and uptake in Nigeria and the United Kingdom as well as their emergence in the United States of America.

APPENDIX I

The Socio-Political and Economic Setting of the 2008 and 2012 Elections

In defining political communication Swanson (2004) admonish that it is important not to underestimate the importance of the socio-economic and political context where political messages are framed. Moser and Scheiner (2012) also emphasize the need to understand context, since electoral system and practices alone do not shape outcome. Thus, this section briefly highlights the socio-political and economic setting/context that pervaded the 2008 and 2012 presidential election campaign. This is necessary for understanding factors that may have shaped campaign rhetoric and dynamics.

According to economic sociologists, economic situations and social-political action are linked (Ballarino and Regini, 2008). As Eichenberg et al. (2006) and Esser and Stromback (2012) note, a country's socio-political and economic situation or context during an election can serve as 'situational triggers' that drive election dynamics, debate, blame game and campaign strategies which is of fundamental importance in determining candidates and political party electoral fortunes.

Gomez and Wilson (2008) also argue that the 'politics of blame' even though 'acrimonious, messy, and fraught with uncertainty' is essential for a functioning democracy. If the electorate is to act as 'rational god of vengeance and reward' (Key, 1963) (cited in Gomez and Wilson, 2008), 'blame attribution for social, political and economic outcomes are necessary for political choice'. How this happens according to Costa (2012) stem from the fact that political campaigns 'function as a filter to mediate the impact of events'. Thus, by echoing the impact of relevant events (social, political and economic) campaigns help 'voters to form or update' candidate or political party preference (ibid). Thus, events matter, and how they are communicated during campaigns can reinforce their effects. Although, there is relatively low evidence on the impact of socio-political and economic events as factors that drive shifts in electoral preferences during campaigns, Cambell (2000), Stimson (2004) and Graff (2011) are of the view that pre-election events matter and can explain voter preference.

In the 2008 US presidential elections campaign, pre-election events contributed in shaping the political climate of the campaigns. For instance, after the 29th of August 2005 'Hurricane Katrina' storm that left the States of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama with widespread devastation, the door of political and institutional blame games was opened over the poor response given to the places and people affected by the natural disaster (Gomez and Wilson, 2008). Racial

interpretations were even given to the poor management of 'Hurricane Katrina' disaster, even though, disaster management is a responsibility constitutionally shared by the three tiers of government (Schneider, 1995; Tesler and Sears, 2010). According to Gomez and Wilson, the declining low rating of President Bush Republican Party caused by the poor handling of Hurricane Katrina contributed in shaping the 2006 November Midterm elections and the defeat the party suffered in 2008.

The war in Iraq equally contributed in shaping the 2008 election campaign discourse. According to Howard (2007) the Democrats ran their campaign emphasizing they were against the war, while Republican candidate, Senator John McCain tried to show how he favored the war strategy under President Bush. The arguments for and against, and the national disaffection against the war, ran into the presidential elections campaigns and perhaps was an advantage to the Democrats. Paul (2008) and Eichenberg et al. (2006) also suggest that the electoral fortunes of the GOP in the November 2006 Midterm elections can also be related to the war in Iraq and the voter discontent it generated.

The economy was also a major issue in 2008. According to Michael (2009) the economy was the most important single issue the Democrats may have benefited from during campaign, since it fitted 'nicely with the change message'. The economic crisis-the government's seizure of Fannie and Freddie Mac, the collapse of Wall Street, Wall Street giant Lehman Brothers, and the Dow Jones all brought into the campaign a conversation around economic depression (Costa, 2012). The fast decline of the automobile and manufacturing industry, the general slow-down of the economy-banking and corporate failures (Michael, 2008) meant that both Barack Obama and John McCain struggled with policy position regarding developments in Wall Street and Washington (Timiraos, 2008).

Kenski et al. (2010) argue that the 2008 financial crisis were framed as an indictment of the Bush presidency that incentivized the argument for a new leadership. In 2012 however, a frail economy, deficit and debt as well as concerns over Obamacare and the GOP reclaim of majority in Congress, made scaring voters about Romney a main campaign strategy (Edmonds, 2013; Johnson, 2017; Paul, 2012).

Furthermore, Race, religion and gender issues equally contributed in shaping the campaigns. Obama's nomination and presidential campaign fascinated many in America on the prospect of a first African American President. Given Obama's racial background and questions regarding his birth and citizenship, the rhetoric was whether his life exemplified the fulfilment of the

American dream or whether his political ambition was an impossible one because of race (Cunnigen and Bruce, 2010).

In America, attitude and debate about race, have featured prominently in the country's politics for decades, and not even the civil right movements and legislations that followed had erase the long history (Telser and Sears, 2010; Bafumi and Herron, 2012; Wingfield and Feagin, 2013). From Shirley Chisholm, the first African American to bid for nomination in America's modern-day political party, to Jesse Jackson, observers feared of a 'Bradley effect' in the 2008 presidential vote because of the history of racial division (Cunnigen and Bruce, 2010; Morrison, 2008). As a concept, 'Bradley effect' originated from the black mayor of Los Angeles-Tom Bradley electoral loss of 1982 after polls put him ahead for the California Governorship election up to voting day (Morrison, 2008). Conceptually, it is the idea that American voters lie to pollsters about black candidates and don't vote for them when in the voting booth (ibid).

However, these racial questions notwithstanding, Obama himself thought that America should be in a new era where race mattered less. His racial-neutrality stand echoed at the 2004 widely celebrated DNC convention address tried to push and put race behind (Morrison, 2008). In the speech, Obama is quoted to have said that '*there is not a black America and white America and Latino America and Asian America; there's the United States of America*' (excerpts from Obama 2004 Democratic Convention Speech). This post racial America rhetoric was also emphasized in his memoir *The Audacity of Hope: Thought on Reclaiming the American Dream* (Tesler and Sears, 2010). Although, the politically correct race-neutral position adopted by Obama and his subsequent election had led commentators to suggest a post-racial era for the country (Verney, 2011), recent rise in racial polarization suggest that such commentary may have been an error of judgment (see Steven, 2011; Klein, 2020).

As Klein (2006) argue, it was Obama's 'transcendence of racial stereotypes' that 'captured the American's public's imagination and his consensus building nature' that 'positioned him for the presidency'. As such, 2008 and 2012 was nothing but post-racial as they were division between 'racial conservatives and 'racial liberals' making vote choice 'radicalized' (Wingfield and Feagin, 2013). According to Newman (2016) the campaign was just a unique, strong 'movement of popular support' with a momentum that 'swept voters off their feet with an emotional high'. Thus, even though they was a 'persistence of racially unequal discourse' during the campaign, Obama's 'uncanny ability to make America feel non-racist, non-threatened, yet appropriately multicultural and progressive as well as the campaign's grassroots foundation' centered on new media made him the first United States President of African parentage (Kim, 2010).

Furthermore, religion and gender also played a role. However, as noted by Kim (2010), in dealing with the religion question, Obama was apt in distancing himself from inflammatory religious comments of his long-time pastor Jeremiah Wright and was able to manage their relationship during the campaigns. Gender issues were visible, not just because Obama primaries for the DNC nomination was against Hilary Clinton. Hilary Clinton failed bid and the nomination of Sarah Palin as vice presidential candidate contributed in shaping the electoral context and contest (Barnes and Shear, 2008; Tesler and Sears, 2010; Brox and Cassels, 2012). Kenski et al. (2010) are of the view that Sarah Palin's nomination energized the conservative base of the Republican Party and boosted Senator John McCain's poll rating after the convention.

Another factor that tend to shape US electoral landscape is what Anstead and Chadwick (2009) refer to as 'institutional political environment'. That is, the pluralistic nature of US politics that necessitates the building of campaign networks and 'lines of communication across all levels of the party; weak political party membership that makes them 'heavily campaign focus' with candidates seeking office always needing to develop campaign structure; the uncertainty and risk of the primary election and the rising cost of politics which generally inspires innovation for quick money; and the rising role of political consultants and the strategies they develop. As the next section below will show, some of these factors are embedded in the Obama model sixteen-elements.

That said, taken together, it can be said that Barack Obama's election was indeed a product of many factors. Thus, apart from the campaign's creative use of new technologies and grass root mobilizing, the socio-political and economic context (i.e. an unpopular Republican president, an unpopular war, and a slumping economy) 2008 and 2012 probably may have been just politically good years for the Democratic Party (Cambell, 2010; Newman, 2016).

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APPENDIX II

Ontology and Epistemology: Trends and Debate in the Field

Generally, ontological and epistemological stance-positivism, interpretivist and critical approaches are the subject of debate in many fields (Keat and Urry, 1982; Lee, 1991; Giddens, 1995; Walsham, 2006). In comparative political communication, there is also the debate, as to whether there is real correspondence between ontology-‘the science and theory of being’ and epistemology-‘the theory of knowledge’ and research methodology (Marsh and Furlong, 2002). Heckscher (1957) (cited in Westerstahl, 1968) argue that this is important, since ‘comparison is not a self-sustained separate subject, but part of the general method of political science’.

However, scholars like Burnham, Gilland, Grant and Layton-Henry (2004) (Cited in Hantrais, 2014) argue that finding a balance between ontology, epistemology and method is rarely achieved. As Hantrais (2014) observe, reaching consensus over ontological and epistemological position in comparative research is difficult, partly because of increasing ‘epistemological and methodological pluralism’ (Bryant and Pribanic-Smith, 2010). As Hall (2000) argue, scholars even suggest that the best way to define the field is by ‘reference to its use of a particular comparative method’. Thus, ontological and epistemological positions are by preference unstated but reflect in the methodological approach (es) of empirical work in the field. Among comparative researchers, the argument is that more attention has been given to methodological than ontological issues, with a substantial gap opened between ontology and methodology (ibid). In Henneberg (2008) view, the ontological and epistemological ‘knowledge stagnation’ is also evident in political marketing research.

That said, historically, the political communication research community seem to have adopted different positions regarding ontology and epistemology because of the interdisciplinary nature, competing theories, approaches, agenda and conceptions in the field (Nimmo and Swanson, 1990; Hall, 2000). In ontology, the debate is ‘whether the objects of any analysis is a socially determined existence’ (Anderson and Baym, 2004). Here, foundationalist think that the real world constitutes of ‘material objects that display discernible boundaries and exist within relatively stable and observable patterns of relationships’. While anti-foundationalist argue that ‘objects of inquiry make their appearance within localized patterns of human practice, language and discourse’ (ibid).

Epistemologically, the debate on the one hand is between foundationalist who conceive 'knowledge as the correspondence between mental impression and the true shape of the independently existent actual' (Anderson and Byam, 2004) and anti-foundationalist who perceive 'knowledge as simultaneously enabled and constrained within social achievement' (ibid). These dominant philosophical views as much as shaping researcher's world view and stance, are also contributory factors to the methodological tools researchers chose to use in advancing scholarship in the field.

According to Ryfe (2001) Bryant and Pribanic-Smith (2010) and Karpf et al. (2015), early philosophical climate of research in the field of communication was influenced by positivism and functionalism, with quantitative traditions-measurement, experimentation, and survey defining research, with only a few qualitatively designed studies. This philosophical and methodological orientation is traceable to the training of early scholars in the field who following behaviourism drew from social psychology-where 'attitudes, opinions, experiment and survey methods dominated'; political science-with emphasis on 'politics as process' and 'quantification', and mass communication-where research and methodological emphasis was on media 'effects' and 'influence' (Ryfe, 2001). In Ryfe's view, it was this 'theoretical and methodological commitments of early research' tradition that shaped scholarship in the field.

However, rapid changes in the technological, information communication and media environment (Bryant and Miron, 2007; Karpf et al., 2015) and the fact that scientific studies now cover 'aspects of life not previously considered topics of scientific investigation' is incentivising 'epistemological and methodological pluralism' (Bryant and Pribanic-Smith, 2010) with scholars borrowing freely from other scientific fields and traditions (Bryant and Miron, 2007), thus making way for 'qualitative-critical and cultural' methodological innovative approaches (Bryant and Pribanic-Smith, 2010; Karpf et al., 2015). As Bennett and Iyengar (2008) argue, the methodological innovation has followed the evolution of the field, leading to the incorporation of a 'critical tradition' or the development of a 'critical wing of political communication and media studies' and a 'British critical cultural studies tradition' (ibid). Fuchs and Linchuan (2018) are of the view that the domination of US and Eurocentric scholarship as well as 'theory development slow down' calls for a new epistemological turn and the return of critical communication scholarship and a postcolonial perspective (Shome, 2016).

Thus, as the changes endure and the field evolve, Bryant and Miron (2007) Bennett and Iyengar (2008) Jones (2013) and Karpf et al. (2015) emphasise the need for a new research approach, not necessarily because they reject traditional positivist quantitative approaches. For them, even

though positivist quantitative approaches have helped advance the field, theories as they argue have generally not kept pace with socio-political and technological advances, thus affecting the ability of political communication researchers to 'understand our objects of analysis' in today's rapidly changing political, social, and technological world (Karpf et al., 2015). This study is in part inspired by such thinking.

Indeed, Karpf, Kreiss, Nielsen and Powers's view is that to develop new theoretical understanding under this rapidly changing environment, qualitative tools are necessary, first because qualitative research in the field 'would contribute much to scholarly understanding of contemporary processes of political communication' and give rise to new theories in an era of rapid political communication changes. As Bennett and Iyengar (2008) argue, if the 'grand theoretical foundations in the field arose' at the time where 'shared social structures and mass communication technologies were glimmer in the eyes of visionary theorists', then today's 'third age' (Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999) require new theoretical perspectives to guide research. Similarly, Rogers (2013:154) is also of the view that thinking of 'new methods in the study of social networks' is important in a post-demographic era. Thus, Ryfe (2001) admonishes that political communication continue to expand its vision by enlarging 'the range of data that counts as registers of political communication' as the field continues its 'transition following exogenous shock' (Chadwick, 2012:43).

Although, there is still debate in the field as to whether old positivist traditions are still relevant in advancing scholarship in the 'third age' (see Jones, 2013). Anderson and Baym (2004) argue that even though there is still a desire to 'reaffirm foundational roots in the literature', the need to rethink the media (Hardy, 2012), the increasing hybridization of information communication and technological domains is opening up new avenues of how we speak of the world-thus creating an ontological and epistemological fragmentation that is serving to legitimize critical approaches (Swanson and Nimmo, 1992).

As Jones (2013) argue, there is now a shift in ontological and epistemological positioning, with critical approaches opening up new lens for studying citizenship and practices in an increasingly proliferated 'politically relevant media'. For Jones, the problematics of quantitative positivist 'normal science' in the field is that it tends to 'ignore broad swaths of human experience that are central to meaning making'. Hall (2000) and Savigny (2007) suggest that such shift in ontological and epistemological positioning implies that the bulk of scholarship in the field now sit within the inductive, interpretivist and critical realist stance-the view that 'the social world is reproduced and transformed in daily life (Bhaskar, 1989: 4 cited in Bryman 2001:430).

Critical realist ontology and epistemology is rooted in the presumption that reality exists independently of the knowledge that can be gained (Bhaskar, 1989; Gray, 2009; Yin, 2014) and the world is merely socially constructed, subjectively interpreted or determined by the concepts people hold about it (Ackroyd and Fleetwood, 2000; Hartwig, 2007; Edwards et al., 2014). This study aligns with such critical realist orientation where social reality forms the basis for construction of knowledge and the interpretive philosophical notion that sees the world as socially made (Byrne, 2009b; Harvey, 2009; Wedeen, 2010; Schwandt and Gates, 2013). In taking this research stance, the study does so from the comparative case study methodology and theoretical standpoint to elucidate beyond a 'specific instance' the features and characteristics of an empirical case (i.e. the Obama Model) using specific cases selected for the study (see Byrne, 2009a:1; Harvey, 2009). Frazer and Lacey (1994) support ontological and epistemological flexibility. In their view research stance can possess a critical realist lens at the ontological level yet interpretivist at the epistemological level. Furthermore, considering theoretical imperative (see Brennan, 2013; O'Mahoney and Vincent, 2014); methodological tools for data collection (semi-structured interviews, audio records, documents and newspapers) (see King et al., 1996) and the fact that, first, the study is 'dealing with things that are both real and constructed' (Byrne and Callaghan, 2014:155), and secondly, the fact that the intention is not measurement, but to present through qualitative data, a 'thick description' of the object of analysis (Gray, 2009:33), the study's ontological and epistemological stance follows Crotty (1998) and Denzin and Ryan (2007) suggestion that a researcher's world view, theoretical stance and methodology should define the research process. The sections that follow below describes this process and research design.

The Goals Comparative Research in the Field

In setting out the research strategy for this work, this study begins first, by explaining why the comparative perspective is essential for answering the central research question. In the remainder of this section, it defines the comparative goal of the study, highlighting first, what the study is comparing as a way of informing and rationalising why the comparative approach is the preferred method.

That said, change, being a problem of comparison over time, is inherently comparative (Chaffee and Chu, 1992). However, as a subject of empirical inquiry, it is changes in the global communication landscape, as well as developments in information technology that has progressively driven political communication into the 'third age'-i.e. from the era of 'relatively

strong and stable political institutions and beliefs; 'professionalized' parties and a 'mobile electorate'; and 'media abundance' (Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999) and probably now, into the 'fourth age' of increasing 'digitization' (Stromback, 2008). Scholars have equally pointed to advancement in the field from its 'infancy' (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1975; Nimmo and Sanders, 1981) into 'late adolescence' (Gurevitch and Blumler, 1990) and 'maturity' (Gurevitch and Blumler, 2004).

Thus, as Pfetsch and Esser (2004:5) argue, epochal or progressive changes in world 'media system, caused by the changes in information technology and communication infrastructure and diffusion of news, belong to the driving force behind comparative research'. For Gurevitch and Blumler (2004:327), 'the increasing homogenization of political communication across previously more diverse societies, polities and cultures' have increased interest in the field. Chan (2017:252) point to 'advancement in ICTs, the convergence of research culture, internationalization of education and research, and the formation of comparative scholarly networks' as incentive for such comparative scholarship.

For Mancini and Hallin (2012) 'globalization' and 'research questions linked to the increasingly globalized circulation of cultural products' and the 'internationalization of scholarly community' has played a role in expanding comparative research by pushing its frontiers, with comparisons sometimes focusing on 'contrasting spatial units, usually comparing nation-states---, local communities, media markets, or global regions' (Norris, 2009) in an effort to counteract 'naïve universalism' and to provide secure grounds for generalizations (Gurevitch and Blumler, 1990). Under this rapidly changing conditions and the increasing 'globalization of media markets' (Voltmer, 2012b), Semetko and Scammell (2012) and Fletcher and Young (2012) are of the view that there is need for a reassessment of contemporary research priorities, 'rethinking of theory and practice' and a new inspiration for scholarship. Again, from the standpoint of theory, this study is inspired by such thinking.

Thus, in the new and current changing context, the incentive for this study follow these theoretical pathways, and changes as well as the 'border-transgressing' nature of contemporary information, communication, technology and media arena (see Negrine and Papathanassopoulos, 1996; Hallin and Mancini, 2004; Negrine, 2008; Issenberg, 2012; Nielsen, 2012; Canel and Voltmer, 2014; Kriess, 2016; Maarek, 2016); the marketing revolution in politics and emergence of a new model of political communication (i.e. the 'Obama Model' as set out in chapter two) (see Issenberg, 2012; Mullen, forthcoming; Nickerson and Rogers, 2014; Kreiss, 2016; Newman, 2016); changes and common pattern in practices taking place in

different countries (see Elebash, 1984; Semetko et al., 1991; Swanson and Mancini, 1996; Plasser and Plasser, 2002; Esser and Pfetsch, 2004; Negrine, 2008; De Bruijn et al., 2009; Louw, 2011; Obijiofor, 2011; Akinfemisoye, 2013; Maarek, 2016); and the need to 'contextualize' or 'decontextualize' i.e. to identify and place changes outside of their original context or milieu of origin in order to explain whether they are cross-contextually common, global or country distinctive (Canel and Voltmer, 2014; Blumler, 2012; Mancini and Hallin, 2012). As the forebearers in the field above have argued, these developments provide distinctive opportunities to test and update practices, test theories and expand the boundaries of knowledge on contemporary contextual conditions and contemporary political communication- which is the focus of this work.

Thus, inspired by the factors above, and following changes and trends as exemplified in the political communication practices deployed in the Obama Model defined in chapter two, the study first, examines whether or not elements of the model as defined constitute to date the most advance form of political communication in the extent that they have been applied elsewhere. Considering the knowledge gap that exist on contemporary features and practices of political communication, answering this question provides the empirical foundation and material that sets in motion an update process for Swanson and Mancini (1996) modern model of political communication through a cross-case comparison of converging practices.

That said, whilst the conceptual explanation of what constitutes Swanson and Mancini's modern model of campaigning (i.e. 'the personalization of politics; expanding reliance on technical experts and professional advisors; growing detachment of political parties from citizens, development of autonomous structures of communication; and casting citizens in the role of spectator' (p.249) remains relevant for understanding contemporary political communication, the pattern of practices and techniques, particularly on new and emerging forms of personalized campaigning, the dominant domain of technical experts and professionals, how political parties continue to navigate the growing detachment of citizens and harness new structures of communications to mobilize spectator citizens are changing, innovating and diffusing. Thus, at the first level of update, the Obama model is used as an innovative exemplar to comparatively test, validate and update such changes and innovation in traditional forms of political communication and emerging news practices that are both data driven and seem to bypass traditional gatekeepers and how they diffuse globally. This way, their modern model is expanded by using the Obama model to comparatively interrogate and reveal the sequence of

sophisticated forms of innovation now appearing and manifesting in contemporary campaigns in Nigeria and the United Kingdom.

Secondly, following from the above, a theoretical understanding of such global diffusion is explored within the context of our case studies-i.e. Nigeria and the United Kingdom. This is necessary, as such global diffusion if any, invites us to interrogate how such innovative and emerging new practices exemplified by the Obama model come to surface and converge in other countries. Thus, at the first level of theory, Americanization is questioned regarding whether it provides 'suitable theoretical description' for the emergence and convergence of the Obama model in our case studies. This way, a contemporary theoretical update of the explanatory scope of the theory is provided. At the second theoretical level-i.e. modernization, while Swanson and Mancini 'hypothesize that increasing functional differentiation within society leads to growing numbers of subsystem of all kinds that develop to satisfy the specialized demands of particular groups and sectors' (p.253), such explanation does not adequately capture and describe contemporary dynamics in how these modernized 'subsystem' now develop in recent elections as well as their origin and incentive (s). Thus, the 2016 presidential election campaign of Donald Trump is used to explore and explain recent political communication innovation or modernization in the US, as a way of advancing theoretical understanding of modernization. This way, the work provides contemporary theoretical update to the explanatory scope of both theories.

Thirdly, with a research design that methodological looks beyond the contextual factors (i.e. 'nature of the electoral system; structure of party competition; regulation of campaign activities; national political culture; and national media system') (p.249), identified in their modern model as impediment to convergence and the development of a common model, the work updates and add to the understanding of contemporary context and how such context shape and influence the uptake and convergence of the emerging innovation exemplified by the Obama model in Nigeria and the United Kingdom. This way, the research design provides an empirically window for the work to reveal and add to contemporary contextual dynamics that shape convergence in global campaign, particularly, convergence of the Obama model, with the Nigerian case study providing a unique perspective of an emerging democracy in the global south.

Furthermore, considering that the central research question formulated above would be answered particularly or perhaps uniquely by comparison, the study relies on the principle and method of comparison, first across space, to examine (using elements of the Obama model) whether those have been applied or exported to the two case studies selected-i.e. the 2015

Nigerian presidential election and the 2015 British General Elections respectively. This way, the study seeks to advance understanding of global trends, converging practices and explain similarities as well as contextual differences (see rationale for country sampling below). Theoretically, since the set of basic parameters for comparison or comparative variables are constructed from an American campaign, the Americanization thesis (Swanson and Mancini, 1996) is tested against empirical material as a way of exploring the drivers and incentive of such contemporary convergence in practices.

Secondly, from the standpoint of comparison across time, the study uses empirical material to examine whether there is an advancement away from the data driven practices of the 'Obama Model' within the context of Donald Trump's 2016 presidential election campaign (see Blumler et al., 1992; Pfetsch and Esser, 2008). In doing so, the study draws on time as the dimension by means of which differences in data driven practices of political communication in the 2008/2012 and 2016 election cycle are highlighted, first to explore, in the context of Cambridge Analytica's involvement whether data-driven practices deployed in the Trump's campaign differ in any significance from Obama's and can contribute to an update of the practices and model that emerge in the Obama's campaign, Nigeria and the United Kingdom. Secondly, and from the standpoint of Swanson and Mancini's modernization thesis, how we may theorize such innovation if any. Thus, Trump's campaign serves as a case that can produce explanation with theoretical implication.

That said, emphasis on Trump's campaign follows Rosengren et al., (1992) and Gerring (2007) who suggest that events (i.e. like the investigation on Cambridge and the Trump campaign across both sides of the Atlantic and the increasing conversation on the use of psychographics in the 2016 Trump campaign) can serve as benchmark for comparison. In this sense, the Trump campaign rather than serve as a case for exploring continuity and change is used an instrument of discovery that can advance the emerging model and Swanson and Mancini's modernization thesis (see Molnar, 1967).

Following from the two goals above, the study hopes to empirically identify country specific factors that shape or condition the application of the innovative elements and practices of the Obama campaign in the two countries. In the end, the goal is to empirically define the contemporary model of political communication across varied context, as a way of discovering transnational trends and similarities and explaining changes that can serve as an update of Swanson and Mancini's modern model while highlighting contextual differences that shape convergence (Pfetsch and Esser, 2004; Mancini and Hallin, 2012). This way, as Gurevitch and

Blumler, (2004) admonish, the study realizes the 'double value' design of a comparative study and deepens explanation rather than mere description.

Theoretically, scholars have theorised a number of valuable frameworks to guide comparative inquiry. Examples include; Blumler and Gurevitch's (1995) Pfetsch and Esser's, (2012) 'political communication systems'; Adoni et al. (2006) Pfetsch (2004) and Voltmer's (2008, 2012a) 'political communication culture' 'cultures' and subcultures'; Hallin and Mancini's (2004) 'media system'; Picard and Rossi's (2012) 'media markets'; Kim's (2012) 'communication culture'; Hanitzsch's (2007) 'journalism culture' and Benson's (2005) 'journalistic fields' etc.

In this study however, Swanson and Mancini's (1996) Americanization and modernization framework suffice. Although, criticised for its claim on American domination and hegemony, with scholars like Maarek (2016) preferring concepts like 'professionalization' and 'specialization' as an explanation for the global evolution and convergence of political communication. The thesis however, serves in this study, as a working framework for exploring an explanation of the possible adaption of American inspired campaign strategies in other democracies as well as the theoretical path to the entrance of innovative campaign practices in recent US elections.

Thus, despite its conceptual flaws, the framework serves here as a theoretical lens for exploring and explaining recent changes in political communication practices. Again, this is because the United States has long been perceived as the pacesetter for innovation in campaign practices and the Obama campaign is a product of the US political environment (see Negrine and Papathananassopoulos, 1996; Swanson and Mancicni, 1996; Plasser and Plasser, 2002 and Hallin and Mancini, 2004). Thus, the relevance of the framework in this study, is the theoretical wheels it provides for driving explanation.

As earlier highlighted however, in applying the framework, the study seeks to update their model, by using its basic ideas, thereby expanding the definition of the contemporary typology of political communication. To do this, the study moves away from their 'major elements associated with modernized or Americanized campaigning' (see pp.14, 15, 16, 17) and 'contextual influences' (see also pp. 17-20) and following Rosengren et al. (1992) sets out a framework based on elements of the Obama campaign for the study's comparative analysis. This way, the sixteen elements of the 'Obama Model' defined in chapter two, serve as the set of basic parameters, 'pattern variables' (Nimmo and Swanson, 1990:34) or 'empirical categories' (Gideon, 1955) for comparison. Although, context-political, media, journalistic norms/values, style and character of the political campaign/election news coverage etc. matter (Stromback and

Kaid, 2008), the strategy adopted for exploring and unearthing any such contextual conditions and factors in the case studies is Esser and Hanitzsch, '*implicit*' (2012) or Wirth and Kolb (2004) *metatheoretical* design, where the study takes off without any initial identification of contextual variables. As Esser and Hanitzsch argue, the methodological value of such strategy is that it will 'facilitates the optimal adaptation of research question to theoretical background', since an explanation of similarities and differences between cases can then point to and enable the identification of contextual factors and conditions.

The approach though a comparison of processes within structures (Rosengren et al., 1992), follows the argument that rather than for example, compare the status quo (say, for example, Swanson and Mancini's (1996) 'modern model' and their contextual factors), it is important to rather consider the rapid changes in the conditions of contemporary political communication and factor a design that can enable explanation of contemporary practices and contextual conditions in ways that provide a unique understanding of this era of increasing 'glocalization and transnationality', 'proliferation of global mobile communication', and the 'emergence of big fluidic data across borders' (Chan and Lee, 2017:9; Esser and Pfetsch, 2004).

The Comparative Method: General Principles

This section briefly explains the general principles, theories and methodologies of comparative research.

The comparative method is variously praised as a prominent approach in the quest for knowledge. In Beniger (1992) view for example, all social science research is comparative and so too is all analysis. As Peters (1998) (cited in Esser and Hanitzsch, 2012) note, since the real world cannot be subjected to experimentation, comparison can act as a substitute for scientific experiment.

However, what constitute the term comparative is still considerably debatable. As a definition, Edelstein (1982:14) (cited in Esser and Hanitzsch, 2012) refers to it as 'a study that compares two or more nations with respect to some activity'. For Blumler, McLeod and Rosengren (1992:7) research is comparative 'when the comparisons are made across two or more geographically or historically (spatially or temporally) defined systems, the phenomena of scholarly interest which are embedded in a set of interrelations that are relatively coherent, patterned, comprehensive, distinct, and bounded'.

In the field of communication and media studies, Esser and Hanitzsch (2012:5), are of the view that comparative studies are understood as research 'contrasting different macro-level units (like world regions, countries, sub-national regions, social milieus, language areas, cultural thickenings) at one point or more points in time'. Such comparison as they argue would involve 'a minimum of two macro-level units', and 'at least one subject of investigation relevant to communication research' (ibid). Thus, this study by their estimation, meets the standard of a comparative work.

Methodologically, as an approach, it follows the principle that 'every observation is without significance if it is not compared with other observation' (Esser and Pfetsch 2004:7). Thus, it affords research the lens for observing patterns for theory building, helps research to overcome 'space and time bound limitations on the generalizability of theories, assumptions and propositions' and enable the exploration and revelation of the consequences of contextual differences (Blumler et al., 1992). In practical sense, its goal entails-describing differences and similarities; identifying functional equivalents; establishing typologies; explaining differences and similarities; and making predictions (Esser and Hanitzsch, 2012). Esser and Hanitzsch also point to six areas where comparative research can prove its superiority: (1) its relevance for 'establishing the generality of findings and the validity of interpretations' (2) its prevention of over generalization (3) its calibration of scope of conclusion (4) its contextualization of understanding (5) its ability to foster global scholarship and networks, where the world is treated as a 'global research laboratory' and (6) its ability to offer a wealth of practical knowledge and experience. In this regard, this work in using the comparative method intend to establish a typology from the three countries while contextualising understanding and making theoretical generalizations.

In the literature however, principles of comparative analysis vary. To compare, Blumler et al. (1992) propose four principles, where- (1) nations serve as objects of analysis (2) nations are treated as context-where context serve both as conditions for replicating findings and are the focus of comparison (3) nation is treated as unit of analysis and point of interest to the researcher (4) national communication system and practices examined as subsystem of an emergent global one. For Rosengren et al. (1992) the first principle in a comparative inquiry is to identify a set of basic parameters for comparison, before assessing relationships in order to compare similarities and differences either over space or time. The first task being theoretical, the second empirical and the third representing the essence of comparison (ibid). For them, comparative studies may be based over time or space, or both. This study follows their first

principle and is based on both space and time, in order to arrive at a 'deeper understanding of results' (ibid).

Furthermore, according to Ragin and David (1983) and Ragin (1989) comparison can be variable-base and quantitatively oriented (i.e. identifying 'relevant variables and their relationship before choosing a 'sample of observational units') or case-base with qualitative strategies (i.e. 'starting with an interest in specific historical processes and structures')-where quantitative tools are deployed with many cases and few variables to study relationships among variables or qualitative tools are used with many variables and few cases to study commonalities. For them, the 'theoretical goals and practical strengths' of case study design or what they termed '*qualitative historical method*' differ fundamentally from those of quantitative statistical strategies of comparison even though a combination of both is possible. The former they argue produce 'broad generalization about systemic relations' and the latter 'historically contextualized knowledge and consequences of historical diversity'. This study follows the latter approach.

That said, in political communication scholarship, these principles usually take the form of comparison of a minimum of two political systems, nation states, regional entities, political subsystems, or parts of subsystems-local areas of communication, elite or media cultures, national political systems and practice with at least one object of investigation relevant to the field. According to Chan and Lee (2017:1) its epistemological and methodological advantages lies in the fact that it delimits the 'generality and specificity of communication theories' and enable research to 'identify the influence of socio-political and cultural context in shaping media and communication phenomena'.

Comparative Case Study Design: General Principles

The aim of this section is to describe the general principles and approaches that guide case study design.

According to Ragin (2007) the goals of comparative analysis are assumed to be the same as those of variable oriented analysis: (i.e. assessing the relative merit of theory). However, one of the common debates of comparative research is the selection of countries to be studied. In most international comparisons, comparativists select cases for a variety of reasons-usually relying on questions of convenience (data accessibility etc.) rather than theoretical ideas (Wirth and Kolb, 2004).

As a guiding principle, Przeworski and Tuene (1970) suggest two logics (the most similar systems and the most different system designs). For Collier and Mahoney (1996) defining selection of cases can depend on research question. Patton (1990) and Palys (2008) also suggest a typical and critical case sampling logic. That is, selecting a case because it exemplifies a dimension of interest for the research in anticipation that it might allow theory to be tested. Ellis (1973) and Conge (1996) also make a similar point. For them, country selection can be because a case is 'crucial', is 'prototype' or 'exemplar'-where case selection represent the direction of the research, since obscure case selection will not be helpful in answering research question.

In the same vein, Rosengren et al. (1992) are of the view that case selection can be guided by key conceptual considerations, dimensions and levels vital to the theoretical problem in question. For Ragin (1989), cases can also be selected on the bases of a combination of variables as in the quantitative approach and as a configuration of set membership or combination of aspects and conditions. Berg-Schlosser (1997) also suggest and show how a most similar system and most different system can be chosen and analysed complementarily to improve research result.

Scholars are also of the view that case study design can be guided by pragmatic concerns (for example if they are understudied; are of novelty; have easily available data to support the research and are of particular interest to a researcher, and account for recent events that require empirical analysis or are of historical importance (see Eckstein, 1985; Hodgkin, 1976; Liu, 1988). Pragmatic reasons like the definitional and conceptual fitness of a case (Moghadam, 1995) case independence (Kautsky, 1975) the need for theoretical or empirical replication and extension (O'Kane, 1995, Yin, 2014) can equally inform case selection-where cases are constructed to provide 'test of prevailing explanations and ideas' (Hakim, 1994:62). Selection strategy could also be based on the attribute of a case (Gerring, 2007) where an event in the particular case is the criterion that guides its selection-with the intention that such a case is potentially likely to reveal the 'reputability of a theory' (ibid). Thus, contextual condition of the object of research can shape design and country selection (Ragin, 1989). In Hancke (2009:68) view, case (s) can be critically selected, where-case and theory have a relationship, with theory providing the 'relevant universe of cases' for selection as an 'illustrative portraits of social entities or patterns' (Hakim, 1994:61).

According to Bryman (1988) since qualitative research follows a theoretical, rather than statistical logic, qualitative comparative cases should be formulated in terms of their

generalizability to theoretical propositions rather than population or universe (i.e. rather than on the basis of a worldwide sample). As Mason (1996) observe, theoretically guided sampling is 'constructing a sample which is meaningful theoretically because it builds in certain characteristics or criteria which help to develop and test theory and explanation' (p.93). In this sense, cases are selected on the basis of their relevance to research question and the study's theoretical position and the explanatory account the study intends to develop.

The Value of Methodological Triangulation

In the literature, the process of triangulation is characterized by the combination of two or more theories, data sources or methods in the study of a single concept (Thurmond, 2001). The aim usually, is to provide confirmation and completeness of data by overcoming biases inherent in a single method (Foster, 1997). In most fields, the need to use multiple sources of information in any study is highly rated. Prominent in its advantage is the development of what Yin (2014) calls *converging line of inquiry*. As a method, it aims to enhance validity and confidence in findings (Coyle and Williams, 2000), whilst drawing from the principle that the intersection of different points can be used to calculate the precise location of an object (Yardley, 2009 cited in Yin (2014). In making a case for triangulation, Berger (2000) Newcomb (1999) and Hancke (2009) for example suggest that interview as research data source (s) should be verified and corroborated with other research resources in other to strengthen research findings through the use of different sources of evidence.

According to Denzin (1970) triangulation can either involve data, investigator, theory or methodological triangulation. Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) refers to data triangulation as the collection of data over different times or from different sources. For Mckernan (1991:188) triangulation can be 'conceptual/theoretical', of 'information and data collected' or 'researcher or investigator triangulation' or 'methodological triangulation'. In Denzin's view, since research methods serve as an instrument for revealing a phenomena's uniqueness, multiple methods, 'ought to be the norm in order to exhume this richness' (p.26). The logic here is that the more rigorous the evaluation, through the use of either 'multiple investigators, data, methods or theories, the more the observation and results can be made reliable (Mckernan, 1991). As Cohen and Manion (1994) and Briggs and Coleman (2007) argue, comparing two or more sources of evidence helps to strengthen accuracy of information regarding a phenomenon and affords richness in explanation, since inference is drawn from more than one standpoint.

That said, in this study, the use of triangulation is data centred (Cowman, 1993), and the aim was to subject research question to different ways of answering it, by corroborating the interviews with audio records, documents and newspapers, in such a way that the 'subjective understanding' (Hancke, 2009) made from them are validated, reliable and replicable (Oakley, 1999). The guiding principle here being a careful attempt at corroborating the interview data with alternative public data sources-audio record, documentary evidence and newspapers in order to measure the same object of analysis from multiple data sources. Indeed, this provided richness and diverse information on the object of the research, robust findings and multiple empirical lens for cross checking findings.

Methodologically, the virtue and value of such triangulation in this work is that the weakness in one data source (s) was compensated by another in ways that enhanced more comprehensive understanding of the object of study (see Hanitzsch and Esser, 2012). Furthermore, the value is also in the fact that it increased the rigour of the study's analysis and enhanced the development of in-depth understanding of the object of analysis (Brennen, 2013). Ontologically and epistemologically, this approach at triangulation is also in conformity with the study's research stance of a subjective and socially constructed nature of the world (Willig, 2001). The advantage for a comparative research as this, is that the use of the four methods offered additional source of information for interpreting findings and validating data (see Warwick and Osherson, 1973).

Lenses for Methodological Equivalence

One of the challenges of a comparative study is the problem of equivalence. According to Smelser (1976) Ragin (1989) Landman (2000) and Chan (2017), the validity of the comparative method hinges on whether comparability or equivalence is maintained across socio-cultural systems and context. This section highlights briefly, the contextual, socio-cultural and systemic meeting point that serve as guide and validate equivalence within the context of three case studies.

In this study, equivalence is contextualised, with measurement indicators and the comparability of the three contexts taken into consideration. First, is the contextually shared assumption concerning the object of the study (i.e., the Obama Model). This assumption, which follow context-specific knowledge, is that the operationalised framework (i.e., elements of the study's operationalised model) resonates in recent political communication practices in the Nigeria, Britain and America. Thus, as earlier highlighted in the case selection justification section

above, case studies had aimed at obtaining a representative, typical and systematic country sample. This method of ensuring functional equivalence is guided by the assumption that the object of analysis relates to political circumstance in the three case studies (see Rossler, 2012; Wirth and Kolb, 2012), with the 'glocalization (i.e. the local diffusion of a global phenomenon) and transnationalization' of new technologies (Chan and Lee, 2017:9) serving as the 'cultural meeting point' (Wang and Huang, 2017). This framework for establishing equivalence point to existence of similar experience but does not at the same time rule out differences (ibid). As Middleton (2014) (cited in Dutton et al., 2017) note, there is a growing centrality of 'mobile' in the day-to-day life of residents of both developed and developing nations. Thus, judgement on equivalence is therefore based on this albeit, fairly assume knowledge of the three contexts.

Second, since data collection source (s) for the study includes interviews, audio records, documents and newspapers with the elements of the operationalised model guiding measurement in Nigeria and Britain, and the factoring of the operationalized model into the interview research questions (see figures 4 and 5 above) as well as the structural coding deployed in the analysis of empirical materials collected (see figures 14-16 above), this approach ensured that data gathering and analytic technique across the two case studies were consistent. In the Trump's campaign, even though the analytic technique differed, data collection tools were also consistent with those used in Nigeria and Britain save for the newspapers used to strengthen interpretation. However, because the documentary sources were selected based on their relevance to the case study, there was the challenge of variation in terms of achieving numerical equivalence across cases (i.e. in terms of number of documents collected and used in each of the three case studies).

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APPENDIX III

Socio-political and Economic Context of the 2015 General Elections: Defining Issues

As highlighted in chapter three, a link exists between economic situation of a country and social-political action (see Ballarino and Regini, 2008). Scholars argue that a country's socio-political and economic situation during an election can drive election dynamics, shape debates and blame game which is of fundamental importance in determining candidates and political party electoral fortunes (Eichenberg et al., 2006). Key events according to Esser and Stromback (2012a) can serve as 'situational triggers for the strategic priming and framing' of campaign messages. Political campaigns therefore 'function as a filter to mediate the impact of events' and echo those during campaigns to help voters form opinion (Costa 2012). Following Swanson (2004), Moser and Scheiner (2012) admonition of the need to consider socio-economic and political context where campaign and political messages are framed since they contribute in shaping both practices and outcome, this section highlights briefly, the socio-political and economic setting prevalent in Nigeria in 2015, as a way of identifying factors that may have shaped the politics, campaign rhetoric, messages and dynamics.

The Emergence of an Opposition Coalition

Opposition groups have always existed in Africa even under single party and military regimes that dominated post-independent African politics (Olukoshi, 1998). However, the emergence of the All Progressive Congress (APC) in February 2013 from a merger of four political parties altered the 2015 contest by weakening the 16 years hegemony of the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP). In a country where ethnic, religious, and regional cleavages tend to militate against the creation of formidable opposition, the quest for power by a set of political elites and the prevailing socio-political situation in the country at the time, may have occasioned the formation and consolidation of the APC (Oyugi, 2006). Although, with very blurred lines of ideological differences in comparison with the PDP, the formation of the APC influenced to a large extent the context and contest of the 2015 elections through the emergence of a cross-regional alignment of a set of politicians and elites who were united against incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan (Abdullahi, 2018).

In the literature on ethno-politics, scholars like Dominika (2013) point to the relevance of shared ethnic identity between political actors and the electorate as a mechanism for electoral

mobilisation. According to Owen and Usman (2015) the elite alignment, defection of five PDP Governors, 37 House of Representative members to the APC, including the Speaker of the House of Representative and 11 Senators and the eventual victory of the APC in the 2015 presidential elections demonstrates the electoral value of a national coalition. As Abdullahi (2018:287) argue, the 'decampees' from the PDP 'supplied the blood that gave life' to the newly formed APC turning it into a formidable opposition and national party. For Jideonwo and Williams (2018:113), Muhammadu Buhari 'needed the APC to have been created for him to win', having unsuccessfully attempted to be president on three occasions on the platform of a relatively unknown regional political party the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC).

Insecurity

Insecurity-Boko Haram insurgency in the north east, and communal clashes between farmers and herders in north central Nigeria was a dominant pre-election issue. The influence of the security crisis was so strong that it provided reasons for the federal government to postpone the elections for six weeks (Orji, 2014). Significantly, the insecurity and the BringBackOurGirls campaign whose hashtag trended globally as a result of the kidnap of 270 schoolgirls in Chibok, Borno State had damaging effect on the government's reputation (Hamalai et al., 2017). The inability to solve the Boko Haram problem became a sentiment that resonated with many Nigerians and exploited by the opposition who sold Jonathan to the public as 'unfit, uncaring and inept' (Adeniyi, 2017:111). For Jonathan and his party the PDP, convincing Nigerians during the campaign that he was the man to be trusted with the nation's security became a herculean task (Abdullahi, 2018). As analysts like Adeniyi (2017) and Ewi (2015) argue, Buhari's victory was handed him by Jonathan's unpopularity occasioned by the nation's insecurity challenges and the way Jonathan's administration responded to it.

Furthermore, according to Ayanda and Udunayo (2015) the national security situation affected voter turnout with less than 30 million of the registered 67 million voters electing the president. Ibrahim et al. (2015) argue that the reduction in the number of voters was due to fear and insecurity. As the figures show, turnout in the elections was the lowest since the presidential election of 1979. For example, 67,422,005 Nigerians registered to vote, and only 29,432,083 voted (ibid). Africa's electoral outcomes it is argued are in part, affected by 'fear of violence and voter intimidation' that usually diminish voter turnout (Mac-Ikemenjima, 2017).

The candidates, scandals and the economy

As important as the factors highlighted above were, candidates mattered in the 2015 elections (Jideonwo and Williams, 2017). For the APC and its coalition of regional elites, Muhammadu

Buhari represented a better symbol of change, irrespective of his previous leadership record as a military head of state from 1983-1985. He represented the candidate of the moment and was presented as an incorruptible retired general who will guarantee security and prosperity (ibid). Arguments on economic growth and development statistics were also a factor in the election debate. For the ruling PDP, the economy was at its best and was the largest in Africa having grown consistently between 6-7% from 2008 to 2014 (Owen and Usman, 2015). According to the PDP, claims that the economy was struggling was a direct distortion of facts targeted at hitting a political goal (Omokri, 2017). Nevertheless, despite the impressive economic growth statistics, poverty, inequality and youth unemployment remained a key feature of the 2015 socio-economic landscape and these indicators were at the back of high oil revenue and the APC kept pointing at these (Owen and Usman, 2015).

On corruption claims, the opposition had pointed to President Jonathan's mismanagement of fuel subsidy funds, the revelation of a former Central Bank Governor that USD 48.9 billion of oil receipts could not be accounted for, as well as a presidential pardon granted a former governor who jumped bail in the United Kingdom having been held for money laundering as proves that the president condones corruption.

In his response, the president's claim was that 'corruption was as old as independent Nigeria' and every successive government has fought corruption including his (Jonathan, 2018:7). According to Adeniyi (2017) the president's response and disposition on these issues gave room for an unfavourable interpretation of his stand on corruption and contributed to his unpopularity. As Brian et al. (2014) notes, voters usually make electoral choices based on a retrospective assessment of incumbents and perceive malfeasance by incumbents usually provoke voters to punish tainted incumbents electorally. Owen and Usman (2015) argue that this was the case with President Jonathan in 2015, as scandals and governance failure provided the opposition with 'sufficient ammunition' and 'turned the tide of public opinion against' his government.

As Swanson and Mancini (1996:3-4) argue, election campaigns 'are complicated subjects to study and what happens within them usually reflect the coming together of opportunity, circumstance, tradition, personality, political culture' and several other factors. Thus, Like the 2015 presidential election in Nigeria, every election has its own complexity and the section above reinforces this argument by pointing to the fact that socio-political and economic context or what Esser and Stromback (2012a) calls 'situational triggers' continue to matter. Thus, as historic as the defeat of the PDP and the victory of opposition APC was, a combination of factors may account for the outcome. That said, this study is not concerned with the impact of

campaign practices on electoral outcome. It seeks however, to specifically identify campaign practice (s) prevalent in the 2015 presidential elections in Nigeria, within the context of the study's operationalized model (i.e. Obama Campaign elements 1-16) and how we may theorize such similarity and convergence.

In this regard, focus is on two major political parties, even though fourteen political parties and presidential candidates contested the 2015 elections. (see figure 1 below). Thus, the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Progressive Congress (APC) and their presidential candidates (i.e. Dr Goodluck Ebele Jonathan and Muhammadu Buhari respectively, are the focus of this case study. As highlighted in the methodology, these campaigns serve a specific theoretical purpose and have been selected in part on the basis of theory and represent instances in which something similar might have happen in a different context.

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APPENDIX IV

Political Communication in Britain and the 2015 Socio-Economic and Political Context

Developments in British political communication have followed the trajectory chronicled by Jay Blumler and Denis Kavanagh (1999) in their three ages of political communication-where in the first age, political communication 'was subordinate to relatively strong and stable political institutions and beliefs; a second, of shifting party loyalties-where television was the dominant medium of political communication, and the third age of media abundance-where a proliferation of channels of communication now dominate-with intensified professionalizing, increase competitive pressures and anti-elitist populist practices'. In the literature however, a number of scholars trace this stages and historical chronology in Britain from 1945 to 1997, where elements like spin and spin doctors, political consultancy, the permanent campaign, canvassing, targeting, branding, opinion polling, advertising, negative attacks and trends towards 'presidentialization' etc. became popular (see Bartle and Griffiths, 2001; Denver and Garnett, 2014; Jones, 1996; Mughan, 2000; Norris, 1997; 2001).

Although, since then, sustained changes have taken place in the national context-constituency campaigning, election administration and voting (Norris, 1997). Until recently, however, they have equally been continuity in the 'evolutionary adaptability of British institutions, history, parliamentary sovereignty, nature of the state, as well as the underlying cohesion of the society and degree of political agreement on fundamental issues' (Kavanagh and Morris, 1994; Forman and Baldwin, 2007; Denver and Garnett, 2014). Nevertheless, Norris and Inglehart (2019) argue that the consequences of the election-Brexit referendum and the cultural backlash that has followed has signalled a new era in British politics. That said, the empirical account intended in this chapter is not a detailed historical analysis of epochal changes and events in British electioneering, but rather, focus is on campaign practices deployed by the two main political parties (i.e. Conservative and Labour) and how we may theorize convergence in practices in the 2015 General Elections. Although, where necessary, through within-case analysis, reference was made to past elections and historical trajectory of campaign practices, as a way of weaving into the analysis the rich historical background of British campaigns (see George and Bennett, 2005). Such historical background as George and Bennet (2005) and von Mises (2005:198) argue provides additional 'standards of value' that both support and enhance interpretation and judgement made in the analysis. The contextual background and the insight this generates, enable both a historical and in-depth understanding of the manifestation of the model in the case study (see Mills et al., 2010). This way, the case tells both how the Obama model is

deployed in the 2015 British context as well as the historical pathway of how the model emerged.

That said, the 2015 General Election came at the back of the 2010 election that ended New Labour's 16-year prominence in British politics (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2015). Fought on a number of issues-the economy, the NHS, immigration, foreign policy, education, party leaders, defence, and permutations on Labour v SNP coalition (Jackson and Thorsen, 2015; Moore, 2015; Scammell, 2015), recent post-election events, particularly-the in/out referendum on Britain's European Union membership and the controversy that has trailed the result suggest that it remains one of Britain's defining elections (Rose and Shephard, 2016). The number of issues that dominated notwithstanding, the economy, taxation and Labour's role in the deficit and the 2008 economic crisis were topical (Deacon et al., 2015; Roberts, 2015; Salter, 2015). Butler and Stoke (1974) suggest that the state of the economy as the responsibility of any governing party in Britain has been the basis of dialogue between British political parties and the electorate, with the 'decline and 'recovery' of both Labour and the Conservative Party in the 50s, 60s, and 70s traceable to their responsibility to the state of the economy (p.369).

Furthermore, commentators point to press partisanship and negative attacks-similar to those lunched on Neil Kinnock in the 1992 general election (Mullen 2015), money-the Tories war chest-an overwhelming 41% share of the entire amount spent by all political parties as factors that may have influenced the outcome. (Beckett, 2016; Electoral Commission campaign spending report, 2016). Although, British campaign rules (i.e. the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act 1883; Representation of the People Act 1983 (RPA), and the Political Parties Election and Referendum Act 2000 (PPERA)) constrain excessive campaign spending (Castle, 2015; Law Library of Congress, 2019). Norris (1997) found a 'relationship between level of campaign spending in a constituency and a party's local vote' share (p.203). In the Labour Party's post-election autopsy report for example, Margaret Beckett and her team conceded that the party's financial position, as well as the 'two against one' dynamic; fixed term parliament; cultural and economic backlash and the rise of challenger parties like UKIP; and failure to frame a clear political message and narrative was a challenge in competing with the Tories central operation and digital campaign (see Beckett, 2016).

Further commentary on the election also suggest that decreasing youth participation and increase in turnout of 65+ (78% v 43%) who predominantly voted Conservative, partly contributed to the outcome (Hawkins et al., 2015; Sloam, 2015). Historically, Butler and Stokes (1974) argue that the 'generational effect' (p.204), growing affluence, weakening of class alignment, and decline of politics as a zero-sum game represent some of Britain's most

remarkable electoral changes. Sloam (2015) has shown that among all the 15 member states of the European Union, United Kingdom's youth elections turnout has been 'lowest in 2001, 2005 and 2010'. According to Norris and Inglehart (2019:56), such generational election 'turnout gap has grown over time' in many Western democracies.

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APPENDIX V

The Socio-political and Economic Context of Trump's America

Commentators and scholars across diverse background have produced multiple and divergent set of explanations on the 2016 US presidential election (see Edge, 2017; Fuchs, 2018, Lilleker et al., 2016; Norris and Inglehart, 2019; Oliver and Rahn, 2016 etc.). Fuchs (2018:6, 44) for example point to President Trump's emphasis on 'racial proletarianism' as his pathway to electoral victory-where a well-crafted distraction of attention from 'complex societal and political-economic causes of crises is employed by constructing scapegoats and preaching nationalism and law-and-order politics'.

That said, there is need to highlight however, that in modern politics of some Western democracies, Trump's America is not alone in pushing the narrative highlighted by Fuchs. In Europe for example Viktor Orban's-Hungary; Heinz Christia Strache-Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ); Marine Le Pen-France National Front; Geert Wilders-Netherlands Party for Freedom and Nigel Farage's UK Independent Party (UKIP) all provide examples that explain the rise of right-wing authoritarian politics- where politicians take advantage of 'insecurities and resulting fears to subvert class struggles and antagonism by advancing nationalist struggles' (ibid). This nationalist political framing apart from helping to elect Trump has produced and increase electoral fortunes in France-Jean-Marine Le Pen-National Front; Netherlands-Lijst Pim Fortuyn; Heinz-Christian Strache Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ); Hungarian Viktor Orban Fidesz Party and Italy Matteo Salvini Northern League fortunes progressively since 2000-2017, where among other things,-integration of ethnic minorities, immigration, border control, Islamic related terrorism etc. have dominated as the 'most heated political issues' (Norris and Inglehart, 2019:50). Thus, like in the countries mentioned above, Fuchs argument on Trump's campaign approach is that the 'mythology of unity and identity' is the political instrument deployed to present 'a common instinctual fate between the bourgeois and the proletarianised groups' (p.25).

Nevertheless, it is my view however, that such nationalist and populist framing alone cannot be blamed for incentivising the anti-establishment rhetoric that helped get Donald Trump elected. As Springer (2016) argue, the global political economy-'structural adjustment, fiscal austerity and free trade, augmented by direct military force, a marriage of the 'invisible hand' or the free market with the 'visible fist' of US military and its allies have served in feeding the current US political climate. Thus, as Springer notes, in discussing factors that contributed to Donald

Trump's election, they should be an appreciation of the capacity of neoliberalism to 'promote inequality, exacerbate poverty, license authoritarianism and advance a litany of social 'ills that reinforces anti-establishment' rhetoric like those framed by Donald Trump. Timcke (2017) for example argue that because of the central place of the US and its allies in the international political economy', they cannot be exculpated from the consequences of the crisis. For Fuchs (2018), it is the economic crisis of capitalism that has turned into a highly dangerous political crises in Europe and the world system, where nationalism and the friend/enemy logic are rapidly spreading and expanding' in modern political discourse (p.63). Nevertheless, the populist wind as Norris (2016) argue have equally been seen in 'post-industrial knowledge societies' like Sweden and Denmark where the negative consequence of globalization is less.

Perhaps, it might be fair to add, that the market as the arguments above suggest may not be working for everyone, even though they have been 'spectacular economic growth in most part of the capitalist core' (Basu, 2018:10). As Basu show, global electoral upset like the election of Donald Trump is an indication of how 'economic crisis has morphed into a political crisis, with authoritarian populist figures marshalling people's anger and fear into nationalist projects' (p.1). Nevertheless, such critique of market base neoliberal economics does not suggest that the left has a functional and all-fit solution. At best, the debate by leftist have remained 'confined to questions of inequality and redistribution', without concrete proposals of how to create or reconstruct 'socialist productive economies' (see Desai, 2019). However, Basu's concern is that the media rather than present the economic crisis narrative, have been caught up in an 'acute amnesia' preferring to stick with its root in the dynamics of free market capitalism and 'devotion to a narrative of swollen public sector and immigration'.

Furthermore, scholars have also suggested and pointed to some long-term structural transformations in the US political system that benefited Trump and disadvantaged Hilary Clinton. For example, Frank (2016) suggest that elitist changes in the form of support of the professional class instead of the working class in the Democratic Party is one of such socio-political transformation. On the Republican side, Kabaservice (2016) argues that the decline of moderates in the GOP have also embolden voices like Trump's, even though they are governance challenges that have accompanied the party's presidential election victory.

For Norris (2016) and Norris and Ingelhart (2019) growing economic and social exclusion sit at the heart of the recent rise in populism, with 'losers from globalisation', the 'forgotten American'-providing the 'strongest support for authoritarian and populist values' that have incentivise voices like President Trump's (p.132). Perhaps, as Andrew Carnegie (1889) wrote, 'the problem

of our age is that of proper administration of wealth'. Thus, as Nye (2019) suggest, 'policy elites who support globalization and an open economy may have to pay more attention to issues of economic inequality as well as to adjusted assistance for those disrupted by economic change'.

That said, whilst populist political narrative continues to grow, institutions of liberal democracy seem to have mitigated and limited manifestations of authoritarian tendencies in many of the countries highlighted above. Thus, the critical views on populism notwithstanding, Stavrakakis (2018) admonish that we consider in our reading of populism that 'its inclusionary form can be a corrective' for democracies that are losing their egalitarian and participatory component.

Furthermore, Trump's victory according to Norris and Inglehart (2019) is also rooted in cultural changes that is metamorphosing into 'cultural grievances' and the exploitation of 'cultural wedge issues-race, gender, religion and nation' in ways that resonated strongly with the electorate because of the generational contrast in cultural attitude (p.332 & 349). In their view, President Trump's election 'can best be explained as cultural backlash'. Norris (2016) even suggest that 'by giving voice to, and amplifying fears of cultural change', Trump and the Republicans opened the way for populism in the US. As Fuchs note, recourse to such rhetoric apart from the electoral advantage it conferred the GOP, amount to a classic distraction from the class conflict that continue to shape modern capitalism. For Zizek (2017:3), such rhetoric as events in large parts of Western politics suggest is a surprise shift to humanitarian issues and refugees-a literal repression, and replacement of class struggles with 'liberal-cultural topics of intolerance and solidarity'. Perhaps, 'the fundamental source' of modern 'conflict' as predicted by Huntington (1993) is now along 'cultural' lines.

On culture, Oliver and Rahn (2016) point to 'ideological shifts, party polarization and rightist evolution in the Republican Party that began with President Richard Nixon's appeal to southern conservatives' as the electoral ingredient that came to favour Trump. Historically, Neumann (1957) has shown for example, how anxiety in groups who feel disenfranchised and economically threatened tend to more likely support authoritarian and right-wing perspectives. Thus, Trump as Mutz (2018) and Klein (2020) suggest, may have capitalised on the rise of identity politics and the politics of 'marginalised groups' as well as the decline in social status of white America to advance the politics of resentment, alienation and distributional challenges during the campaign. Fuchs (2018) argue for example that Breitbart-news, articles and Stephen Bannon all served as suppliers of such 'coherent, incoherent and intolerant world view' to the Trump campaign to help get him elected. As Fuchs pointed out, readership of Breitbart for example increased from 7.4 million to 15.8 million between 2014 and September 2016.

Boczkowski and Papacharissi (2018), Block and Negrine (2018), Norris and Inglehart (2019), Oliver and Rahn (2016) all point to such rising polarization and partisanship in the media, social media troll farms and bots, the impact of disinformation, Trump's news making ability-i.e. 'populist spectacles that sell as news and attract audiences' and the rise in conspiracy theories as factors that may have influenced the election.

Furthermore, in what may sound like a racial interpretation of the election of President Trump, Norris (2016) also suggest that Trump's victory can also be interpreted as a backlash reaction to the election and re-election of the first African American president to the White House and public anger against the deep state-with such rhetoric resonating with 'older and non-college educated white men who felt threatened by 'liberal cultural currents'.

In other commentaries, the death of 'old politics'-'radicalization of anti-intellectualism' (Kayam, 2018); crisis of confidence and legitimacy in US government or what Short (2016) calls 'politics of de-legitimacy'; candidate and party issue position-i.e. the political power of identity, identity partisan alignment, race, immigration and religion (Sides et al., 2019); money, press coverage, rating boosting screen dominance in both less partisan and right-wing media, and political communication practice/strategy-the use of 'anti-intellectual rhetoric' (Beckett, 2016; Kayam, 2018; Norris and Inglehart, 2019); 'Trump's personal brilliant use of social media to control the news agenda' (Nye, 2019); his celebrity appeal, the fan feeling he created, the mood of the electorate and his reflection of the American voter 'ideological narcissism' (Negra, 2016; Richards, 2016; Wahl-Jorgensen, 2019); Hillary Clinton's emails controversy, Wikileaks and James Comey's unprecedented and controversial statement in the final days of the campaign (Edge, 2017); institutional rules-i.e. the Electoral College; 'deindustrialization' and declining wages as well as the Democratic Party's campaign failure to invest sufficiently in 'Blue Wall of Rust Belt states' (Short, 2016; Norris and Inglehart (2019: 21), where according to Norris and Inglehart, a mere 77,744 switch in votes in the States of Wisconsin, Michigan and Pennsylvania would have made Hillary Clinton president are other factors that may have contributed to the election of Donald J. Trump.

That said, as stated in the methodology, emphasis on President Trump's data driven campaign practices hinge on the increasing conversation on the campaign's use of psychographics and its revelatory potential for theory expansion. Thus, rather than an analysis of similarity and continuity in practices, the campaign serves as a longitudinal lens for providing insight into data driven campaign changes that emerged in the 2016 election cycle. That said, as a way of

highlighting Cambridge Analytica's role highlighted in chapter seven, figures AV1-AV12 below offers a picture into Cambridge Analytica's methodology and activities.


Photoshoots from Cambridge Analytica's Website

Figure AV.1: Cambridge Analytica 2016 Website page



Source: Cambridge Analytica's website

Figure AV.2: Website details about Cambridge Analytica



The CA advantage | About us

CA Political will equip you with the data and insights necessary to drive your voters to the polls and win your campaign. We offer a proven combination of predictive analytics, behavioral sciences, and data-driven ad tech.

With up to 5,000 data points on over 230 million American voters, we build your custom target audience, then use this crucial information to engage, persuade, and motivate them to act.

Our team of PhD data scientists, expert researchers, and seasoned political operatives have produced decisive results for campaigns and initiatives throughout the world. In the US, CA Political has successfully worked on projects for all three branches of government and at local, state, and national levels.

Experience an end-to-end campaign service

POLLING

With one of the best track records of accuracy in the industry, we will provide you with in-depth polling to advise informed decision making.

PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS

The global leader in predictive analytics, CA Political provides precise insights that will allow you to forecast voter behavior.

TV AND DIGITAL AD PLACEMENT

Through our detailed models, predictive analytics, and sophisticated ad-tech, you can find the most effective locations for ad placement and meaningfully impact your voters.

LIST BUILDING

Accumulate email addresses and an organic following in order to fundraise more efficiently and distribute campaign material.

EVENT PROMOTION, VOLUNTEER RECRUITMENT, APP PROMOTION

Rally supporters, promote your campaign events, and increase attendance through our creative and precisely targeted messaging.

REAL-TIME REPORTING

With our up-to-date reports, you will stay informed on the progress of your campaign and assess your voters' reactions to the campaign in real-time.

PERSUASION

More effectively engage and persuade voters using specially tailored language and visual ad combinations crafted with insights gleaned from behavioral understandings of your electorate.

GET OUT THE VOTE (GOTV)

Drive organized and methodical ballot initiatives, targeting the voters who could swing the

Source: Cambridge Analytica's website

Figure AV.3: Cambridge Analytica services

Data-driven services

CA Political's industry-leading data services help you to find, understand, and engage with voters more effectively. Our services can be purchased individually and tailored to your needs, but combined they offer a fully end-to-end campaign package. CA Political provides clients with a truly quantifiable approach to campaigning.

Research

What it is

The process of collecting valuable information on voters, opposition, and trends. This provides the fullest possible picture of voter behavior.

what we do for you

We review your existing voter information and carry out custom research projects for your specific needs. Using qualitative, quantitative, or combined research methods, we help you better understand who your voters are.

what you get

Data integration

What it is

Data sources are combined to provide a rich, holistic view of voter behavior. Correct data is the starting point for finding, understanding, and persuading people to vote a certain way.

what we do for you

We source data from a trusted list of major data providers and combine it with your own to produce deeper and richer insights. Then we centralize your data assets and match your data to ours, to help you to find and persuade voters quickly and efficiently.

what you get

Audience segmentation

What it is

We segment your electorate into distinct audiences using predictive analytics, a form of artificial intelligence that takes into account the behavioral conditioning of each individual to create informed forecasts of future behavior.

what we do for you

We show you members of the electorate most likely to respond to your messages and how they might behave in future. This lets you deliver highly targeted experiences to prospects and supporters.

Source: Cambridge Analytica's website

Figure AV.4: Cambridge Analytica services

what you get

Targeted advertising

What it is

We leverage many platforms to deliver messaging across desktop, mobile, tablet and connected TV devices. The channels we use include display, video, Facebook, Twitter, native, audio, interactive and search. We use full cross device placement to reach your customers wherever they are. We also match our target audiences to TV set-top box data to optimize linear broadcast media buys.

what we do for you

As a full-service digital agency, we will ably place digital and TV ads to bring your candidates closer to their electorate. The visuals and language in each piece are crafted to engage voters emotionally and impactfully.

what you get

Evaluation

What it is

Improvements in candidate performance are measured and analyzed during and post-campaign. Performance data is fed back to your data bank to make future campaigns more compelling.

what we do for you

CA Political's reporting and campaign management tools give you a clear view of conversion rates across target audiences and A/B testing groups - in real-time and retrospectively. This means you can identify and action the most important insights quickly and easily.

what you get

Divisions


Cambridge Analytica | CA Commercial | CA Political

CA Political

- Home
- CA advantage
- Services
- Products
- Case studies

Source: Cambridge Analytica's website

Figure AV.5: Cambridge Analytica services



Source: Cambridge Analytica's website

Figure AV.6: Cambridge Analytica's methodology




Source: Cambridge Analytica's website

Figure AV.7: The OCEAN Personality trait methods



Source: Cambridge Analytica's website

Figure AV.8: Cambridge Analytica's tools



Source: Cambridge Analytica's website

Figure AV.9: Cambridge Analytica's Trump campaign

Donald J. Trump for President

A Full-Scale Data-Driven Digital Campaign

Cambridge Analytica provided the Donald J. Trump for President campaign with the expertise and insights that helped win the White House.

Analyzing millions of data points, we consistently identified the most persuadable voters and the issues they cared about. We then sent targeted messages to them at key times in order to move them to action. All of this was achieved in a fraction of the time and at a much lower cost than was spent by our rivals.

With our help, your campaign can use these same intelligent targeting and sophisticated messaging techniques. Cambridge Analytica deployed three integrated teams to support the campaign: research, data science, and digital marketing.

These teams included PhD-caliber data scientists, seasoned strategists with experience of presidential primary, congressional, gubernatorial, and international election campaigns, expert researchers, digital marketing strategists, and content creators.

They worked together to identify audience segments and implement a marketing strategy for fundraising, persuasion and GOTV (Get Out the Vote) programs. Targeted adverts based on our data insights were heavily tested, then deployed to the most persuadable voters in key battleground states.

CAMPAIGN COMPONENTS

Research

We polled voters in 17 states every day, monitoring the campaign's progress in real time.

Cambridge Analytica delivered daily reports throughout the final months of the campaign, using fresh data to track the shifting perceptions of voters. We polled 1,500 people per week in each state, gaining valuable insights that informed marketing strategy. The research enabled us to assess state-by-state reactions to any political event and to understand any unexpected shifts in voting intention. In total we polled c180,000 individuals across 17 battleground states, online and by telephone. This information allowed us to speak to voters in a way they would understand and respond strongly to.

Data Science

Leveraging data science and predictive analytics expertise, we built 20 custom data models that could be used to forecast voter behavior.

Every time we polled an individual, we matched their information with existing data in our database. Analyzing everything from their voting history to the car they drive, we identified behaviors that were correlated with voting decisions. These models allowed us to predict the way individuals would vote - even if we didn't know about their political beliefs.

Using these insights, we could place voters into different categories and determine the best way to influence them through marketing. Crucially, we could also identify which voters were likely to support Donald Trump.

Source: Cambridge Analytica's website

Figure AV.10: Cambridge Analytica's Cruz campaign

Ted Cruz for President

A Sustained Voter Engagement Program

By the time of the Iowa caucus, Texas Senator Ted Cruz had gone from rank outsider to level with establishment favorite Marco Rubio and populist phenomenon Donald Trump. A sustained voter engagement program driven by CA modeling, analysis, and communication support helped Cruz to victory in Iowa and he emerged as the leading challenger to eventual nominee, Donald Trump.

A game-changing caucus book of key targets

The 'Ted Cruz for President' campaign engaged CA early on, making full use of our suite of products. We orchestrated a large-scale program of research and married the results with our nationwide database of demographic, consumer, lifestyle, and psychographic data of every adult in the United States.

Our data scientists then built models upon these data to predict the political affiliation, turnout propensity, candidate preference, Republican ideology, and importance of key social and political issues for every voter and prospective voter.

On the basis of these models, we segmented the population into groups of people for targeting with personalized messages. For high influence and key targets we created detailed information packs: 30,000 pages with one unique voter per page containing hard information, modeled scores, voter preference, and top issues.

CA publicly predicted the outcome of the Iowa caucus more accurately than every pollster in the United States, and provided a comparable level of accuracy via the campaign's internal polls for every primary election.

Source: Cambridge Analytica's website

Figure AV.11: Cambridge Analytica's Ben Carson's campaign

Ben Carson for President


A Data-Driven Digital Fundraising Campaign

The 2016 presidential campaign of Ben Carson, American pediatric neurosurgeon and bestselling author, was announced in May 2015.

CA were contracted to improve the number of daily signups to the campaign webpage. CA's TV audience optimizer boosted daily signups to the Ben Carson for President 2016 page by a factor of 16% over a period of five weeks. The campaign raised \$20.2 million in the third quarter of 2015, bringing the campaign's grand total to \$31 million.

Source: Cambridge Analytica's website

Figure AV.12: Cambridge Analytica's work for John Bolton's super-pac



Source: Cambridge Analytica's website

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