# MULTIMOORA OPTIMIZATION USED TO DECIDE ON A BANK LOAN TO BUY PROPERTY 

Willem Karel M. Brauers ${ }^{1}$, Edmundas Kazimieras Zavadskas ${ }^{2}$<br>${ }^{1}$ Vilnius Gediminas Technical University, Saulėtekio al. 11, 10223 Vilnius, Lithuania<br>${ }^{2}$ Department of Construction Technology and Management, Vilnius Gediminas Technical University, Saulėtekio al. 11, 10223 Vilnius, Lithuania<br>E-mails: ${ }^{1}$ willem.brauers@ua.ac.be (corresponding author); ${ }^{2}$ edmundas.zavadskas@vgtu.lt

Received 8 September 2010; accepted 27 January 2011


#### Abstract

Different multiple objectives are expressed in different units, which makes optimization difficult. Therefore the internal mechanical solution of a Ratio System, producing dimensionless numbers, is preferred to Weights which are most of the time used to compare the different units. In addition, the ratio system creates the opportunity to use a second approach: a non-subjective Reference Point Theory. The two approaches form a control on each other. The choice of the objectives is even more non-subjective if the opinion of all stakeholders interested in the issue is involved by the use of the Ameliorated Nominal Group and Delphi Techniques. The overall theory is called MOORA (Multi-Objective Optimization by Ratio Analysis). The results are still more convincing if a Full Multiplicative Form is added to MOORA under the name of MULTIMOORA. At that moment the control by three different approaches forms a guaranty for a solution being as non-subjective as possible. MULTIMOORA is used to decide upon a bank loan to buy property.


Keywords: MOORA, MULTIMOORA, bank loans, weights, Ratio System, Reference Point Theory, Full Multiplicative Form, Ameliorated Nominal Group and Delphi Techniques.
Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Brauers, W. K. M.; Zavadskas, E. K. 2011. MULTIMOORA optimization used to decide on a bank loan to buy property, Technological and Economic Development of Economy 17(1): 174-188.
JEL Classification: C44, C61, D22, E17, G21, M21.

## The Problem

Just as an example: suppose a single person decides to buy a small apartment consisting of two rooms in, let us say, Lithuania. The cost price of the apartment is $30,025 €$. The person has sufficient income to pay the initial down payment including all kinds of fees and commissions and to guarantee the monthly loan payments, the payment of interests and of insurance.

The client is reluctant for the obligation to take a special life insurance. In addition he has to face the following obligations:

- The initial payment in $€$.
- Loan repayment and payment of interest in $€$ per month.
- Hypothecation bond registration fee in $€$.
- A one off loan administration fee in $€$,
- Life insurance in $€$ per year.
- Insurance of the apartment to be purchased in $€$ per year.
- Commission for currency exchange in $€$.
- Monopolization of all bank activities and the wage administration of the client in \% ( $0 \%, 50 \%$ or $100 \%)^{1}$.
Even if two obligations are expressed in $€$ the same $€$ is not necessary meant. For instance, a Euro of initial payment can not be substituted by a Euro for the payment of interest.

We limit us to a simulation exercise. Contrary to a lot of other definitions, simulation is defined here in a rather broad sense. Gordon, Enzer and Rochberg (1970) give the most complete description of simulation as mechanical, metaphorical, game or mathematical analogs. They conclude: "are used where experimentation with an actual system is too costly, is morally impossible, or involves the study of problems which are so complex that analytical solution appears impractical".

Three banks are assumed in the simulation exercise, one foreign and two domestic banks A and B as shown in the following Table 1.

Table 1. Conditions for a Bank Loan of $30,025 €$

|  | initial <br> payment | monthly <br> repayment | registration administration | life <br> insurance | insurance exchange | bank <br> deposits |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | MIN. | MIN. | MIN. | MIN. | MIN. | MIN. | MIN. | MIN. |
| Foreign <br> Bank | 5617.6 | 331.31 | 115.44 | 103.9 | 0 | 46.18 | 115.44 | 0 |
| A | 6926.41 | 317.46 | 129.87 | 115.44 | 69.26 | 57.72 | 0 | 0.5 |
| B | 6926.41 | 346.32 | 129.87 | 101.01 | 69.26 | 57.72 | 0 | 1 |

## Which Method of Multi-Optimization is to be used for this Banking Activity?

MULTIMOORA is a strong instrument for solving the banking problem.
Table 1 (a matrix) assembles raw data with vertically numerous indicators, criteria or objectives and horizontally fictive banks.

[^0]Two different methods under the name of MOORA, namely a Ratio System and a Reference Point Approach, will try to make optimal the content of the table. By adding the Full Multiplicative Form three methods will compose MULTIMOORA, whereas the three methods will control each other (for more information, see also: Brauers, Zavadskas 2010). The following diagram (Fig. I) clarifies the combination of the three different methods of MULTIMOORA (Balezentis et al. 2010).


Fig. 1. Diagram of MULTIMOORA

The figures between brackets refer to the basic equations involved as shown in the following pages.

## Ratio System of MOORA

We go for a ratio system in which each response of an alternative on an objective is compared to a denominator, which is representative for all alternatives concerning that objective ${ }^{2}$ :

$$
\begin{equation*}
x_{i j}^{*}=\frac{x_{i j}}{\sqrt{\sum_{j=i}^{m} x_{i j}^{2}}} \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

with: $x_{i j}=$ response of alternative $j$ on objective $I ; j=1,2, \ldots, m ; m$ the number of alternatives; $i=1,2, \ldots n ; n$ the number of objectives; $x_{i j}^{*}=$ this time a dimensionless number representing the response of alternative $j$ on objective $i^{3}$.

[^1]For optimization, these responses are added in case of maximization and subtracted in case of minimization:

$$
\begin{equation*}
y_{j}^{*}=\sum_{i=1}^{i=g} x_{i j}^{*}-\sum_{i=g+1}^{i=n} x_{i j}^{*}, \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

with: $i=1,2, \ldots, \mathrm{~g}$ as the objectives to be maximized; $i=g+1, g+2, \ldots, n$ as the objectives to be minimized; $y_{j}^{*}=$ the total assessment of alternative $j$ with respect to all objectives; $y_{j}^{*}$ can be positive or negative depending of the totals of its maxima and minima.

An ordinal ranking of the $y_{j}^{*}$ shows the final preference. Indeed, cardinal scales can be compared in an ordinal ranking after Arrow (1974): "Obviously, a cardinal utility implies an ordinal preference but not vice versa".

## The Reference Point Approach as a part of MOORA

The Reference Point Approach will go out from the ratios found in formula (1), whereby a Maximal Objective Reference Point is also deduced. The Maximal Objective Reference Point approach is called realistic and non-subjective as the co-ordinates $\left(r_{i}\right)$, which are selected for the reference point, are realized in one of the candidate alternatives. In the example, A $(10 ; 100)$, B $(100 ; 20)$ and C $(50 ; 50)$, the maximal objective reference point $R_{m}$ results in: (100;100). The Maximal Objective Vector is self-evident, if the alternatives are well defined, as for projects in Project Analysis and Project Planning.

Given the dimensionless number representing the normalized response of alternative j on objective $i$, namely $x_{i j}^{*}$ of formula (1) and in this way arriving to:

$$
\left(r_{i}-x_{i j}^{*}\right)
$$

with: $i=1,2, \ldots, n$ as the attributes $; j=1,2, \ldots, m$ as the alternatives; $r_{i}=$ the $i^{\text {th }}$ co-ordinate of the reference point; $x_{i j}^{*}=$ the normalized attribute i of alternative $j$ then this matrix is subject to the Metric of Tchebycheff (Karlin and Studden 1966) ${ }^{4}$ :

$$
\begin{equation*}
\min _{(j)}\left\{\max _{(i)}\left|r_{i}-x_{i j}^{*}\right|\right\}, \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

$\left|r_{i}-x_{i j}^{*}\right|$ means the absolute value if $x_{i j}$ is larger than $r_{i}$ for instance by minimization.
Concerning the use of the maximal objective reference point approach as a part of MOORA some reserves can be made in connection with consumer sovereignty. Consumer sovereignty is measured with the community indifference locus map of the consumers (Brauers 2008: 92-94). Given its definition the maximal objective reference point can be pushed in the non-

[^2]allowed non-convex zone of the highest community indifference locus and will try to pull the highest ranked alternatives in the non-allowed non-convex zone too (Brauers, Zavadskas 2006: 460-461). Therefore an aspiration objective vector can be preferred, which moderates the aspirations by choosing smaller co-ordinates than in the maximal objective vector and consequently can be situated in the convex zone of the highest community indifference locus. Indeed stakeholders may be more moderate in their expectations. The co-ordinates $q_{i}$ of an aspiration objective vector are formed as:
$$
q_{i}<r_{i},
$$
$\left(r_{i}-q_{i}\right)$ being a subjective element we don't like to introduce subjectivity in that way again. Instead, a test shows that the min-max metric of Tchebycheff delivers points inside the convex zone of the highest community indifference locus (Brauers 2008: 98-103).

## The Full Multiplicative Form

The following $n$-power form for multi-objectives is called from now on a full-multiplicative form in order to distinguish it from the mixed forms:

$$
\begin{equation*}
U_{j}=\prod_{i=1}^{n} x_{i j} \tag{4}
\end{equation*}
$$

with: $j=1,2, \ldots, m$; $m$ the number of alternatives; $i=1,2, \ldots, n ; n$ being the number of objectives; $x_{i j}=$ response of alternative $j$ on objective $I ; U_{j}=$ overall utility of alternative $j$.

The overall utilities $\left(U_{j}\right)$, obtained by multiplication of different units of measurement, become dimensionless.

How is it possible to combine a minimization problem with the maximization of the other objectives? Therefore, the objectives to be minimized are denominators in the formula:

$$
\begin{gather*}
U_{j}^{\prime}=\frac{A_{j}}{B_{j}}, \\
\text { with: } A_{j}=\prod_{g=1}^{i} x_{g i}
\end{gather*}
$$

$j=1,2, \ldots, m ; m$ the number of alternatives; $i=$ the number of objectives to be maximized,

$$
\text { with: } B_{j}=\prod_{k=i+1}^{n} x_{k j},
$$

$n-i=$ the number of objectives to be minimized,
with: $U_{j}^{\prime}=$ the utility of alternative $j$ with objectives to be maximized and objectives to be minimized.

If one of the $x_{i j}=0$ it would mean that an objective is not present in an alternative. In that case a foregoing filtering stage can prescribe that an alternative with a missing objective to be an optimum is withdrawn from the beginning. Otherwise for the calculation of a maximum the zero factor is just left out.

A zero in a minimization problem is much more complicated. A real zero factor, like in the case of the absence of pollution, has to maintain its influence. Therefore the zero factor will receive an extremely low symbolic value like 0.01 . If the zero factor means missing information then the situation is different and will ask for a serious correction. A correction factor has to be introduced being a bit larger than all corresponding factors of the other alternatives, for instance next ten, next hundred etc. With factors 8 and 11 next ten will be 20. With factors 80 and 110 next hundred will be 200 etc.

## MULTIMOORA

MULTIMOORA is composed of MOORA and of the Full Multiplicative Form of Multiple Objectives and in this way up till now no other approach is known including three or more methods, in this way MULTIMOORA becomes the most robust system of multiple objectives optimization

## The Importance given to an Objective

The method of multiple objectives which uses non-subjective dimensionless measures without normalization like in MULTIMOORA is more robust than this one which uses for normalization subjective weights (weights were already introduced by Churchman et al. in 1954 and 1957) or subjective non-additive scores like in the traditional reference point theory (Brauers 2004: 158-159).

The Additive Weighting Procedure (MacCrimmon 1968: 29-33), which was called SAW, Simple Additive Weighting Method by Hwang and Yoon (1981:99) starts from the following formula:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\max . U_{j}=w_{1} x_{1 j}+w_{2} x_{2 j}+\ldots+w_{i} x_{i j}+\ldots+w_{n} x_{n j} \tag{5}
\end{equation*}
$$

$U_{j}=$ overall utility of alternative $j$ with $j=1,2, \ldots \ldots, \mathrm{~m}, \mathrm{~m}$ the number of alternatives; $w_{i}=$ weight of attribute i indicates as well as normalization as the level of importance of an objective

$$
\sum_{i=1}^{i=n} w_{i}=1
$$

$i=1,2, \ldots, \mathrm{n} ; \mathrm{n}$ the number of attributes and objective; $x_{i j}=$ response of alternative j on attribute $i$.

In addition, weights adding up to one create a new artificial super-objective, denying any form of multiple objectivity.

Reference Point Theory is non linear with, this time, non-additive scores replacing weights. The non-additive scores take care of normalization.

With weights and scores importance of objectives is mixed with normalization. Indeed weights and scores are mixtures of normalization of different units and of importance coefficients. On the contrary the dimensionless measures of MULTIMOORA do not need external normalization. However the problem of importance remains.

In the Ratio System to give more importance to an objective its response on an alternative under the form of a dimensionless number could be multiplied with a Significance Coefficient:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\ddot{y}_{j}^{*}=\sum_{i=1}^{i=g} s_{i} x_{i j}^{*}-\sum_{i=g+1}^{i=n} s_{i} x_{i j}^{*} \tag{6}
\end{equation*}
$$

with: $i=1,2, \ldots, \mathrm{~g}$ as the objectives to be maximized; $i=g+1, g+2, \ldots, \mathrm{n}$ as the objectives to be minimized; $s_{i}=$ the significance coefficient of objective $I ; \ddot{y}_{j}^{*}=$ the total assessment with significance coefficients of alternative $j$ with respect to all objectives.

For the Reference Point Approach the formula would be:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\left|s_{i} r_{i}-s_{i} x_{i j}^{*}\right| \tag{7}
\end{equation*}
$$

If the Full Multiplicative Form has to stress the importance of an objective a $\alpha$-term is added or an exponent is allocated on condition that it is done with unanimity or at least with a strong convergence in opinion of all stakeholders concerned.

As the stakeholders concern in the banking example only a group of candidate mortgagees a representative sample of them will be sufficient.

The attribution of sub-objectives represents another solution. Take the example of the purchase of fighter planes (Brauers 2002). For economics, the objectives concerning the fighter planes are threefold: price, employment and balance of payments, but there is also military effectiveness. In order to give more importance to military defense, effectiveness is broken down in, for instance, the maximum speed, the power of the engines and the maximum range of the plane. Anyway, the attribution method is more refined than that a significance coefficient method could be as the attribution method succeeds in characterizing an objective better. For instance, for employment two sub-objectives replace a significance coefficient of two and in this way characterize the direct and indirect side of employment. In the banking example for instance some criteria could be split for the older or for the younger generations.

In addition the problem is raised of the subjective choice of objectives in general, or could we call it robustness of a choice? The Ameliorated Nominal Group Technique, as explained in Brauers (2004: 44-60), will gather a representative sample of all the candidate mortgagees to determine the objectives in a non-subjective and anonymous way. The original Nominal Group Technique of Van De Ven and Delbecq (1971) was less robust as the Ameliorated Version, as this one excludes subjective wishes of the group. Indeed in the Ameliorated Nominal Group Technique the group is questioned about the probability of occurrence of an event. In this way the experts become more critical even about their own ideas. The probability of the group is found as the median of the individual probabilities. Finally, the group rating $(\mathrm{R})$ is multiplied with the group probability $(\mathrm{P})$ in order to obtain the effectiveness rate of the event (E). The events are translated into objectives and selected in a robust way by the Ameliorated Nominal Group Technique (for an example, see Brauers. Lepkova (2003), also Brauers, Zavadskas (2010: 18-19).

Given the absence of a representative sample of all mortgagees in the banking simulation all criteria are considered to have the same importance.

## Be careful with Rank Correlation in MULTIMOORA

If we would use for MULTIMOORA the total of the ranks of the ratio system, the reference point and the multiplicative form at that moment we would work ordinal and arrive in the rank correlation method (Kendall 1948). The most robust multi-objective method has to satisfy the following condition: the method of multiple objectives based on cardinal numbers is more robust than this one based on ordinal numbers. "An ordinal number is one that indicates order or position in a series, like first, second, etc." (Kendall and Gibbons 1990: 1). Robustness of cardinal numbers is based first on the saying of Arrow (1974: 256): "Obviously, a cardinal utility implies an ordinal preference but not vice versa" and second on the fact that the four essential operations of arithmetic: adding, subtracting, multiplication and division are only reserved for cardinal numbers (see Brauers 2007 and also: Brauers and Ginevičius 2009: 137-138).

## Axioms on Ordinal and Cardinal Scales

1. A deduction of an Ordinal Scale, a ranking, from cardinal data is always possible (Arrow).
2. An Ordinal Scale can never produce a series of cardinal numbers (Arrow).
3. An Ordinal Scale of a certain kind, a ranking, can be translated in an ordinal scale of another kind.

In application of axiom 3 we shall translate the ordinal scale of the three methods of MULTIMOORA in another one based on Dominance, being Dominated, Transitivity and Equability.

## Dominance, being Dominated, Transitiveness and Equability

The three methods of MULTIMOORA are assumed to have the same importance. Stakeholders or their representatives like experts may have a different importance in ranking but this is not the case with the three methods of MULTIMOORA. These three methods represent all existing methods with dimensionless measures in multi-objective optimization and all the three have the same important significance.

## Dominance

Absolute Dominance means that an alternative, solution or project is dominating in ranking all other alternatives, solutions or projects which are all being dominated. This absolute dominance shows as rankings for MULTIMOORA: (1-1-1).
General Dominance in two of the three methods is of the form with $\mathrm{a}<\mathrm{b}<\mathrm{c}<\mathrm{d}$ :
(d-a-a) is generally dominating (c-b-b);
( $a-d-a$ ) is generally dominating ( $b-c-b$ );
( $a-a-d$ ) is generally dominating (b-b-c),
and further transitiveness plays fully.

## Transitiveness

If $a$ dominates $b$ and $b$ dominates $c$ than also $a$ will dominate $c$.

## Overall Dominance of one alternative on another

For instance ( $a-a-a$ ) is overall dominating ( $b-b-b$ ) which is overall being dominated.
Equability
Absolute Equability has for instance the form: (e-e-e) for 2 alternatives.
Partial Equability of 2 on 3 exists e. g. (5-e-7) and (6-e-3).

## Circular Reasoning

Despite all distinctions in classification some contradictions remain possible in a kind of Circular Reasoning.
We can cite the case of:
Object A (11-20-14) dominates generally object B. (14-16-15);
Object B. (14-16-15) dominates generally Object C (15-19-12);
but Object C (15-19-12) dominates generally Object A (11-20-14).
In such a case the same ranking is given to the three objects.

## Application on the Banking Example

The different criteria as shown in table 1 are grouped in the following way:

1) The Initial Payment:

- The initial payment;
- Hypothecation bond registration fee;
- A one off loan administration fee;
- Commission for currency exchange.

2) Regular Payments:

- Loan repayment and payment of interest;
- Insurance of the apartment to be purchased.

3) Life Insurance.
4) Monopolization of all bank activities and the wage administration for the client.

Following Table 2 shows the new grouping.
Annexes A and B gives the details of the MULTIMOORA calculations. Table 3 shows the results.

The Foreign Bank shows an ABSOLUTE DOMINANCE on the other banks.
Bank A shows a GENERAL DOMINANCE OF TWO ON THREE MULTIMOORA rankings against Bank $B$.

Table 2. Criteria for Loan Payment

|  | $\mathbf{1 + 3 + 4 + 7}$ | $\mathbf{2 + 6 / 1 2}$ | $\mathbf{5}$ | $\mathbf{8}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | MIN. | MIN. | MIN. |  |
| FB | 5952.38 | 335.5 | 0 | 0 |
| A | 7171.72 | 322.27 | 69.26 | 0.5 |
| B | 7157.29 | 351.13 | 69.26 | 1 |

Table 3. MULTIMOORA results for the Banking Example

|  |  | RS | RP | MF |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | MULTIMOORA

## Conclusion

MOORA and MULTIMOORA present strong instruments to measure an optimum in economic calculus. MOORA is composed of a Ratio System, producing dimensionless numbers. In addition, the ratio system creates the opportunity to use its ratios as a starting point for a second approach: a non-subjective Reference Point Theory. The two approaches form a control on each other. The choice of the objectives is even more non-subjective if the opinion of all stakeholders interested in the issue are involved by the use of the Ameliorated Nominal Group and Delphi Techniques. The overall theory is called MOORA (Multi-Objective Optimization by Ratio Analysis). The results are still even more convincing when a Full Multiplicative Form is added to MOORA under the name of MULTIMOORA.

However at that moment we are in the ordinal sphere, the combination of three rankings. Which is the next step as summation is not allowed? Indeed addition belongs to the cardinal and not to the ordinal sphere. The following axioms are rather to be respected:

1. A deduction of an Ordinal Scale, a ranking, from cardinal data is always possible.
2. An Ordinal Scale can never produce a series of cardinal numbers.
3. An Ordinal Scale of a certain kind, a ranking, can be translated in an ordinal scale of another kind.
On the one side we have three separate rankings belonging to the ordinal sphere and on the other side we will replace them by another ranking decided by a theory around dominance.

Absolute Dominance means that an alternative, solution or project is dominating in ranking all other alternatives, solutions or projects which are all being dominated. This absolute dominance shows as rankings for MULTIMOORA: (1-1-1).
General Dominance in two of the three methods is of the form:
$(d-a-a)$ is generally dominating $(c-b-b)$;
$(a-d-a)$ is generally dominating $(b-c-b)$;
$(a-a-d)$ is generally dominating $(b-b-c)$.

Whereas Transitiveness means that if $a$ dominates $b$ and $b$ dominates $c$ then also $a$ will dominate $c$.

Applied on the loan demand for an apartment from a bank in a simulation exercise a Foreign Bank shows an ABSOLUTE DOMINANCE on the other banks. A second Bank shows a GENERAL DOMINANCE OF TWO ON THREE MULTIMOORA rankings against a third Bank.

## References

Arrow, K. J. 1974. General Economic Equilibrium: Purpose, Analytic Techniques, Collective Choice, American Economic Review, June: 256.
Balezentis, A.; Balezentis, T.; Valkauskas, R. 2010. Evaluating Situation of Lithuania in the European Union: Structural Indicators and MULTIMOORA Method, Technological and Economic Development of Economy 16(4): 578-602. doi:10.3846/tede.2010.36
Brauers, W. K. M.; Zavadskas, E. K. 2010. Project Management by MULTIMOORA as an Instrument for Transition Economies, Technological and Economic Development of Economy 16(1): 5-24. doi:10.3846/tede.2010.01
Brauers, W. K. M.; Ginevicius, R. 2009. Robustness in Regional Development Studies, the Case of Lithuania, Journal of Business Economics and Management 10(2): 121-140. doi:10.3846/1611-1699.2009.10.121-140
Brauers, W. K. M. 2008. Multi-Objective Decision Making by Reference Point Theory for a Wellbeing Economy, Operations Research International Journal 8: 89-104.
Brauers, W. K. M. 2007.What is meant by normalization in decision making? International Journal of Management and Decision Making 8(5/6): 445-460. doi:10.1504/IJMDM.2007.013411
Brauers, W. K. M.; Zavadskas, E. K. 2006. The MOORA Method and its Application to Privatization in a Transition Economy, Control and Cybernetics 35(2): 445-469.
Brauers, W. K. M. 2004. Optimization Methods for a Stakeholder Society. A Revolution in Economic Thinking by Multiobjective Optimization. Kluwer Academic Publishers and Springer, Boston.
Brauers, W. K. M.; Lepkova, N. 2003. The application of the nominal group technique to the business outlook of the facilities sector of Lithuania over the period 2003-2012, International Journal of Strategic Property Management 7(1): 1-9.
Brauers, W. K. M. 2002. The Multiplicative Representation for Multiple Objectives Optimization with an Application for Arms Procurement, Naval Research Logistics (49): 327-340. Wiley Periodicals. doi:10.1002/nav. 10014
Churchman, C. W.; Ackoff, R. L.; Arnoff, E. L. 1957. Introduction to Operations Research. New York, US, Wiley.
Churchman, C. W.; Ackoff, R. L. 1954. An Approximate Measure of Value, Operations Research (2): 172-180. doi:10.1287/opre.2.2.172
Gordon, T. J.; Enzer, S.; Rochberg, R. 1970. An Experiment in Simulation Gaming for Social Policy Studies, Technological Forecasting (1): 241. doi:10.1016/0099-3964(70)90027-X
Hwang, C.-L.; Yoon, K. 1981. Multiple Attribute Decision Making, Methods and Applications, Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, 186. Berlin, Springer.
Karlin, S.; Studden, W. J. 1966. Tchebycheff Systems: with Applications in Analysis and Statistics. Interscience Publishers, New York.
Kendall, M. G.; Gibbons, J. D. 1990. Rank Correlation Methods. Edward Arnold, London.
Kendall, M. G. 1948. Rank Correlation Methods. Griffin London.
MacCrimmon, K. R. 1968. Decisionmaking Among Multiple Attribute Alternatives. A Survey and Consolidated Approach, RM-4823- ARPA, the Rand Corporation, Santa Monica (CAL).
Van De Ven, A. H.; Delbecq, A. L. 1971. Nominal Versus Interacting Group Processes for Committee Decision Making Effectiveness, Academy of Management Journal 14(2): 203 and fol.
Zavadskas, E. K.; Kaklauskas, A.; Banaitis, A.; Kvederyte, N. 2004. Housing credit access model: the case for Lithuania, European Journal of Operational Research (155): 335-352. doi:10.1016/S0377-2217(03)00091-2
Annex A
Table 4. MOORA applied on 3 banks Lt with 8 conditions
$\underline{4 \mathrm{a} \text { - Matrix of Responses of Alternatives on Objectives: }\left(x_{i j}\right)}$

|  | initial <br> payment | monthly <br> repayment | registration | Admini- <br> stration | life <br> insurance | insurance | exchange | bank <br> deposits |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | MIN. | MIN. | MIN. | MIN. | MIN. | MIN. | MIN. | MIN. |
| FB | 5617.6 | 331.31 | 115.44 | 103.9 | 0 | 46.18 | 115.44 | 0 |
| A | 6926.41 | 317.46 | 129.87 | 115.44 | 69.26 | 57.72 | 0 | 0.5 |
| B | 6926.41 | 346.32 | 129.87 | 101.01 | 69.26 | 57.72 | 0 | 1 |
| 4b - Sum of squares and their square roots |  |  |  |  | 0 |  |  |  |
| FB | 31557429.76 | 109766.3161 | 13326.3936 | 10795.21 | 0 | 2132.5924 | 13326.3936 | 0 |
| A | 47975155.49 | 100780.8516 | 16866.2169 | 13326.394 | 4796.9476 | 3331.5984 | 0 | 0.25 |
| B | 47975155.49 | 119937.5424 | 16866.2169 | 10203.020 | 4796.9476 | 3331.5984 | 0 | 1 |
| $\Sigma$ | 127507740.7 | 330484.7101 | 47058.82740 | 34324.624 | 9594 | 8795.789 | 13326.394 | 1.2500 |
| root | 11291.93255 | 574.8779958 | 216.9304667 | 185.26906 | 97.948431 | 93.785869 | 115.44 | 1.118034 |


|  |  |  | roots and | RA |  |  |  |  | sum |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| FB | 0.497487917 | 0.576313587 | 0.532152084 | 0.5608060 | 0 | 0.4923983 | 1 | 0.000 | -2.6591579 | $a_{1}$ | 1 |
| A | 0.61339456 | 0.552221519 | 0.598671095 | 0.6230938 | 0.7071068 | 0.6154445 | 0 | 0.4472136 | -1.8485051 | $a_{2}$ | 2 |
| B | 0.61339456 | 0.602423475 | 0.598671095 | 0.5452071 | 0.7071068 | 0.6154445 | 0 | 0.8944272 | -1.3736068 | $a_{3}$ | 3 |

4 d - Reference Point Theory with Ratios: co-ordinates of the reference point equal to the maximal objective values
0.5322

| 4e - Reference Point Theory: Deviations from the reference point |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| FB | 0.0000 | 0.0241 | 0.0000 | 0.0156 |
| A | 0.1159 | 0.0000 | 0.0665 | 0.0779 |
| B | 0.1159 | 0.0502 | 0.0665 | 0.0000 |

## Table 4bis

| 4a - Matrix of Responses of Alternatives on Objectives: $\left(x_{i j}\right)$ |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $\mathbf{1 + 3 + 4 + 7}$ | $\mathbf{2 + 6 / 1 2}$ | 5 | 8 |
|  | MIN | MIN. | MIN. |  |
| FB | 5952.38 | 335.158333 | 0 | 0 |
| A | 7171.72 | 322.27 | 69.26 | 0.5 |
| B | 7157.29 | 351.13 | 69.26 | 1 |

$4 b^{\prime}$ - Sum of squares and their square roots

| FB | 35430827.66 | 112331.1084 | 0 | 0 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| A | 51433567.76 | 103857.9529 | 4796.9476 | 0.25 |
| B | 51226800.14 | 123292.2769 | 4796.9476 | 1 |
| $\Sigma$ | 138091195.6 | 339481.3382 | 9593.89520 | 1.2500 |
| root | 11751.22102 | 582.6502709 | 97.94843133 | 1.118034 |

$4 \mathrm{c}^{\prime}$ - Objectives divided by their square roots and MOORA

|  |  |  |  | sum | min. |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| FB | 0.506532895 | 0.575230717 | 0 | 0 | 1.0817636 | $\mathbf{1}$ |
| A | 0.610295729 | 0.55311053 | 0.707106781 | 0.4472136 | 2.3177266 | $\mathbf{2}$ |
| B | 0.609067771 | 0.602642816 | 0.707106781 | 0.8944272 | 2.8132446 | 3 |

$4 \mathrm{~d}^{\prime}$ - Reference Point Theory with Ratios: co-ordinates of the reference point equal to the maximal objective values

| $\mathrm{r}_{\mathrm{i}}$ | 0.5065 | 0.5531 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

$4 e^{\prime}$ - Reference Point Theory: Deviations from the reference point

|  |  |  |  |  | $\max$ | $\min$. |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| FB | 0.0000 | 0.0221 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0221202 | $\mathbf{1}$ |
| A | 0.1038 | 0.0000 | 0.7071 | 0.4472 | 0.7071068 | $\mathbf{2}$ |
| B | 0.1025 | 0.0495 | 0.7071 | 0.8944 | 0.8944272 | $\mathbf{3}$ |

## Annex B

Table 5. Full multplicative method applied on 3 banks Lt with 8 conditions

|  | 1 |  |  | 3 |  | 4 | 5 |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | MIN. | MIN. |  | MIN. |  | MIN. |  | MIN. |
| $\boldsymbol{F B}$ | 5617.6 | 331.31 | 16.955721 | 115.44 | 0.146879 | 103.9 | 0.0014137 | 100.0 |
| $\boldsymbol{A}$ | 6926.41 | 317.46 | 21.818213 | 129.87 | 0.168000 | 115.44 | 0.0014553 | 69.26 |
| $\boldsymbol{B}$ | 6926.41 | 346.32 | 20.000029 | 129.87 | 0.154000 | 101.01 | 0.0015246 | 69.26 |


|  | $\mathbf{6}$ |  | 7 | $\mathbf{8}$ |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | MIN. |  | MIN. | MIN. |  |  |  |
| $1.41366 \mathrm{E}-05$ | 46.18 | $3.06119 \mathrm{E}-07$ | 115.44 | $2.65176 \mathrm{E}-09$ | 2 | $1.3259 \mathrm{E}-09$ | 1 |
| $2.10122 \mathrm{E}-05$ | 57.72 | $3.64037 \mathrm{E}-07$ | 200 | $1.82018 \mathrm{E}-09$ | 0.5 | $3.6404 \mathrm{E}-09$ | 3 |
| $2.20128 \mathrm{E}-05$ | 57.72 | $3.81372 \mathrm{E}-07$ | 200 | $1.90686 \mathrm{E}-09$ | 1 | $1.9069 \mathrm{E}-09$ | 2 |

4 a - Matrix of Responses of Alternatives on Objectives: $\left(\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{ij}}\right)$

|  | $\mathbf{1}$ | $\mathbf{2}$ | $\mathbf{3}$ | $\mathbf{4}$ | $\mathbf{5}$ | $\mathbf{6}$ | $\mathbf{7}$ | $\mathbf{8}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | initial <br> payment | monthly <br> repay | registration | admini- <br> stration | life insu- <br> rance | insurance | exchange | deposit |
| $\boldsymbol{\text { MIN. }}$ | MIN. | MIN. | MIN. | MIN. | MIN. | MIN. | MIN. |  |
| $\boldsymbol{F B}$ | 5617.6 | 331.31 | 115.44 | 103.9 | 0 | 46.18 | 115.44 | 2 |
| $\boldsymbol{A}$ | 6926.41 | 317.46 | 129.87 | 115.44 | 69.26 | 57.72 | 0 | 0.5 |
| $\boldsymbol{B}$ | 6926.41 | 346.32 | 129.87 | 101.01 | 69.26 | 57.72 | 0 | 1 |

Table 5bis. Full multplicative method applied on 3 banks Lt with 4 conditions

|  | $\mathbf{3 + 4 + 7 + 1}$ | $\mathbf{2 + 6 / 1 2}$ |  | $\mathbf{5}$ |  | $\mathbf{8}$ and <br> results |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | MIN. | MIN. |  | MIN. |  | MIN. |  |  |
| FB | 4952.38 | 335.1583333 | 14.77624009 | 100 | 0.1477624 | 2 | 0.0738812 | 1 |
| A | 7171.72 | 322.27 | 22.25376237 | 69.26 | 0.3213076 | 0.5 | 0.64261514 | 3 |
| B | 7096.68 | 351.13 | 20.21097599 | 69.26 | 0.2918131 | 1 | 0.29181311 | 2 |

SUMMARY OF THE 3 METHODS OF MULTIMOORA

|  | RS | RP | MF | MULTIMOORA |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :--- |
| $\boldsymbol{F B}$ | $\mathbf{1}$ | $\mathbf{1}$ | $\mathbf{1}$ | $\mathbf{1}$ | ABSOLUTE DOMINANCE |
| $\boldsymbol{A}$ | $\mathbf{2}$ | $\mathbf{2}$ | $\mathbf{3}$ | $\mathbf{2}$ | GENERALDOMINANCE OF TWO <br> ON THREE RANKINGS |
| $\boldsymbol{B}$ | $\mathbf{3}$ | $\mathbf{3}$ | $\mathbf{2}$ | $\mathbf{3}$ |  |

# OPTIMIZAVIMAS MULTIMOORA METODU IMANT BANKO PASKOLĄ NEKILNOJAMAM TURTUI PIRKTI 

W. K. M. Brauers, E. K. Zavadskas

Santrauka. J̦vairūs suinteresuotų asmenų tikslai išreiškiami ̨̣vairiais vienetais, o tai optimizavimą daro sudètingą. Todèl skirtingiems vienetams palyginti reikalinga speciali ̨̣vertinimo sistema, kuri dydžius paverčia bedimensiais. Straipsnyje atliekamas optimizavimas pagal MULTIMOORA metodą imant banko paskolą nekilnojamajam turtui įsigyti.

Reikšminiai žodžiai: reikšmingumai, îvertinimo sistema, atskaitos taško teorija, MOORA, MULTIMOORA, Delphi metodai.

Willem Karel M. BRAUERS was graduated as: Ph.D. in economics (Un. of Leuven), Master of Arts (in economics) of Columbia Un. (New York), Master in Management and Financial Sciences, in Political and Diplomatic Sciences and Bachelor in Philosophy (Un. of Leuven). He is professor at the Faculty of Applied Economics and at the Institute for Development Policy and Management of the University of Antwerp. Previously, he was professor at the University of Leuven, the Military Staff College, the School of Military Administrators, and the Antwerp Business School. He was a research fellow in several American institutions like Rand Corporation, the Pentagon, the Institute for the Future, the Futures Group and extraordinary advisor to the Center for Economic Studies of the University of Leuven. He was consultant in the public sector, such as the Belgian Department of National Defense, the Department of Industry in Thailand, the project for the construction of a new port in Algeria (the port of Arzew) and in the private sector such as the international seaport of Antwerp and in electrical works. He was Chairman of the Board of Directors of SORCA Ltd. Brussels, Management Consultants for Developing Countries, linked to the world-wide group of ARCADIS and Chairman of the Board of Directors of MARESCO Ltd. Antwerp, Marketing Consultants. At the moment he is General Manager of CONSULTING, Systems Engineering Consultants. Brauers is member of many international scientific organizations. His specialization covers: Optimizing Techniques with Several Objectives, Forecasting Techniques and Public Sector Economics such as for National Defense and for Regional Sub-optimization and Input-Output Techniques. His scientific publications consist of seventeen books and hundreds of articles and reports.

Edmundas Kazimieras ZAVADSKAS is Principal Vice-Rector of Vilnius Gediminas Technical University, and Head of the Dept of Construction Technology and Management at Vilnius Gediminas Technical University, Vilnius, Lithuania. He has a PhD in Building Structures (1973) and Dr Sc. (1987) in Building Technology and Management. He is a member of the Lithuanian and several foreign Academies of Sciences. He is Doctore Honoris Causa at Poznan, Saint-Petersburg, and Kiev. He is a member of international organisations and has been a member of steering and programme committees at many international conferences. E. K. Zavadskas is a member of editorial boards of several research journals. He is author and co-author of more than 400 papers and a number of monographs in Lithuanian, English, German and Russian. Research interests are: building technology and management, decision making theory, automation in design and decision-support systems.


[^0]:    $\overline{{ }^{1} \text { For these items Zavadskas et al. } 2004 \text { inspired this article. In addition we are grateful for a discussion with Prof. Banaitis, }}$ one of the other authors.

[^1]:    ${ }^{2}$ Brauers and Zavadskas (2006) prove that the most robust choice for this denominator is the square root of the sum of squares of each alternative per objective.
    ${ }^{3}$ Dimensionless Numbers, having no specific unit of measurement, are obtained for instance by multiplication or division. The normalized responses of the alternatives on the objectives belong to the interval $[0 ; 1]$. However, sometimes the interval could be $[-1 ; 1]$. Indeed, for instance in the case of productivity growth some sectors, regions or countries may show a decrease instead of an increase in productivity i.e. a negative dimensionless number. Instead of a normal increase in productivity growth a decrease remains possible. At that moment the interval becomes $[-1,1]$. Take the example of productivity, which has to increase (positive). Consequently, we look for a maximization of productivity

[^2]:    e.g. in European and American countries. What if the opposite does occur? For instance, take the original transition from the USSR to Russia. Contrary to the other European countries productivity decreased. It means that in formula (1) the numerator for Russia was negative with the whole ratio becoming negative. Consequently, the interval changes to: $[-1,+1]$ instead of $[0,1]$.
    ${ }^{4}$ Brauers (2008) proves that the Min-Max metric is the most robust choice between all the possible metrics of reference point theory.

