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Reply Brief for the Petitioner, Dunn v. Pierce, No. 90256 (Supreme Court of Illinois 2001)

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No. 90256

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

MAURICE DUNN,

PETITIONER,

-vs-

GUY PIERCE, Warden,
Pinckneyville Correctional Center,

RESPONDENT.

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER

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ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

FILED

MAR 27 2001

SUPREME COURT
CLERK

ARGUMENT

I.

THE EXTENDED SENTENCE PROVISION OF THE ILLINOIS SENTENCING LAW, 730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(a)(2) (1973) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE. ALTERNATIVELY, IT WAS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY APPLIED IN CONJUNCTION WITH 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(2) (1973) TO EXTEND MAURICE DUNN'S SENTENCE FOR THE CRIME OF RAPE BEYOND THE STATUTORY MAXIMUM OF THIRTY YEARS BY TEN YEARS.

Your Honors may take notice that the Illinois legislature has enacted Public Act 91-0953 in reaction to the *Apprendi* decision. The Governor of the State signed it into law on February 23, 2001. (See Appendix to the Reply Brief.) This is clear evidence of the prior law's unconstitutionality *Cf. People v. Ramsey*, 92 Ill.2d 154, 735 N.E.2d 533, 534-35 (2000).

Respondent's attempt to distinguish New Jersey's statute on the basis that the extended sentencing there is mandatory while Illinois' is discretionary is not persuasive. What matters in all the Illinois cases that challenge unconstitutional sentencing procedures under *Apprendi* is the reality that in each case a judge, and not a jury, made the predicate finding for an extended sentence and that finding was not supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

II.

THE EXTENDED TERM PROVISIONS UNDER WHICH THE PETITIONER WAS SENTENCED ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID *AB INITIO*.

Petitioner should be heard on his claim at this time. This Court has recently reaffirmed the proposition that "a challenge to the constitutionality of a

criminal statute may be raised at any time." *People v. Wright*, 194 Ill.2d 1, 740 N.E.2d 755, 766 (2000). The rationale for allowing this challenge is fundamental fairness. *People v. Wright*, 740 N.E.2d at 766.

The Respondent relies on *People v. Davis*, 156 Ill.2d 149, 619 N.E.2d 750 (1993), to argue alternatively that the judgment below is merely voidable and therefore Petitioner's claim is not justiciable in a collateral challenge. *Davis* does not support that conclusion. The question here is not whether the trial judge exercised his power to extend the sentence correctly or incorrectly. We are not challenging whether the trial judge had in fact made a mistake either on the facts or the law. What we do claim is that the trial judge had *exceeded* his power when he, and not a jury, determined the predicate for the imposition of an extended sentence and that he did so without the benefit of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Under the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Illinois he lacked that power. "Without such power the judgment or sentence is void." *People v. Davis*, 619 N.E.2d at 754. The power to impose a certain sentence is an element of jurisdiction, therefore *Davis* concluded, "a judgment or decree may be void where a court has exceeded its jurisdiction." *People v. Davis*, 619 N.E.2d at 754-55.

III.

ALTERNATIVELY, THIS COURT SHOULD APPLY *APPRENDI* RETROACTIVELY BECAUSE THE RATIONALE OF *APPRENDI* REQUIRES FULL AND COMPLETE RETROACTIVITY.

AND

IV.

ALTERNATIVELY, EVEN IF *APPRENDI* CREATED A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL RULE OF LAW THIS COURT SHOULD NEVERTHELESS APPLY IT RETORACTIVELY BECAUSE ITS SAFEGUARDS ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE FAIRNESS OF THE SENTENCING PROCESS AND THE ACCURACY OF THE SENTENCE.

The Respondent relies on *People v. Flowers*, 138 Ill.2d 218, 561 N.E.2d 674 (1990), and *People v. Kizer*, 318 Ill.App.3d 238, 741 N.E.2d 1103 (1st Dist. 2000), and urges this Court to apply the *Teague - Flowers* analysis to this case. Petitioner suggests to this Court that this State's long-standing void *ab initio* jurisprudence controls and that there is no reason for this Court to inject federal *habeas corpus* analysis to the resolution of this issue. Moreover, this Court's recent decision, *People v. Rissley*, ___ Ill.2d ___, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Docket No. 82536, filed March 15, 2001, at page 8), once again demonstrates that it is unwise for this Court to look to the United States Supreme Court for guidance as to how that court treats the claims of state prisoners in federal *habeas corpus* proceedings. Illinois courts, including this Court, must be reminded that they are not mandated to follow the views of the United States Supreme Court when they review constitutional claims under independent state procedures and remedies created for Illinois prisoners. The Respondent injects the specter of comity into

the wrong forum, but he can certainly argue that in federal courts. However, when our state constitution and our statutes provide for procedures and remedies, there should be no recourse to "standards foreign" to the review process of constitutional claims in the courts of this State. *People v. Rissley*, ___ Ill.2d ___, ___ N.E.2d ___ (C.J. Harrison, dissenting, at p. 17).

The stakes here are high, but this case does not concern itself with matters of comity. The real interest here is one of justice and equity. Will Illinois courts recognize the vitality of the state constitutional right of a prisoner to petition a court for a *writ of habeas corpus*, *Illinois Constitution* (1970), Article I, Section 9, when this is the only effective remedy that is available to him or to similarly situated persons who are wrongfully confined pursuant to unconstitutional sentencing procedures? *People v. Beacham*, 317 Ill.App.3d 693, 740 N.E.2d 389, 397 (1st Dist. 2000), makes a good point. "Our constitutional history teaches us we best survive when we hew to the line drawn by the rule of law." *Kizer*, unfortunately, falls short in this regard.

V.

APPRENDI RELIEF MUST EXTEND TO AN INCARCERATED INDIVIDUAL WHOSE MANDATORY SUPERVISED RELEASE HAD BEEN REVOKED.

Illinois statutory law is very clear that a mandatory supervised release term is inseparable from the extended sentence. It is *included* in it. Therefore, Respondent's attempt to inject federal statutory arguments is without merit.

VI.

THE DOCTRINE OF *RES JUDICATA* IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE.

Respondent argues that Petitioner's claim is barred by *res judicata* principles. Respondent misunderstands the doctrine and fails to support his assertion with relevant legal authority. The doctrine of *res judicata* bars the relitigation *at the trial level* of a previously adjudicated claim. It does not bar the litigation of the same claim before this Honorable Court when this Court entertains the claim in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. Respondent offers no case that defeats Petitioner's claim before this Court. *DeLuna v. Treister*, 185 Ill.2d 565, 708 N.E.2d 340 (1999), did not address the original jurisdiction of this Court. Nor was it a *habeas corpus* action. Rather, it presented a question concerning the relitigation of a previously adjudicated medical malpractice claim in the Circuit Court. The same can be said of *People v. Progressive Land Developers*, 151 Ill.2d 285, 602 N.E.2d 820 (1992) (relitigation in the Circuit Court seeking to recover charitable assets). (Respondent refers to the Appellate Court opinion below. Petitioner cites this Court's later opinion.)

This Court should also reject Respondent's argument because it unfairly seeks to destroy the only remedy that the Petitioner and similarly situated Illinois prisoners have left after years of wrongful and unconstitutional incarceration. Respondent's argument also ignores the long history and tradition of the *writ of habeas corpus* that allow prisoners to seek judicial relief for their freedom from unlawful incarceration. Your Honors found that a natural father could utilize the

writ of habeas corpus to seek the release of his son from his adoptive parents, *inter alia*, because "the petitioner had no other legal avenue by which to seek custody of the child." *Petition of Kirchner*, 164 Ill.2d 468, 649 N.E.2d 324, 329 (1995). Is an Illinois prisoner who seeks his freedom entitled to less? The answer is clearly, no!

In essence, the Respondent's protestation is nothing less than a frontal challenge to this Court's expressed authority granted to this Court by the Illinois Constitution to issue a *writ of habeas corpus* in appropriate situations. Respondent further seeks to prevent this Court from exercising its inherent power of judicial review in a case where a fundamental question of liberty is involved. In a democratic society that is dedicated to the rule of law, the highest court in this state should have an opportunity to redress a constitutional wrong in the long tradition of judicial independence, especially when no effective remedy is otherwise available to the Petitioner or for similarly situated prisoners in Illinois.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner, Maurice Dunn, respectfully requests this Honorable Court to issue a writ of *habeas corpus* and order his immediate release from confinement.

Respectfully submitted,

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APPENDIX

State of Illinois
Public Acts
91st General Assembly

[\[Home \]](#) [\[ILCS \]](#) [\[Search \]](#) [\[Bottom \]](#)
[\[Other General Assemblies \]](#)

Public Act 91-0953

HB1511 Enrolled

LRB9104882RCdv

AN ACT in relation to criminal sentencing.

Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly:

Section 5. The Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 is amended by changing Section 111-3 as follows:

(725 ILCS 5/111-3) (from Ch. 38, par. 111-3)

Sec. 111-3. Form of charge. (a) A charge shall be in writing and allege the commission of an offense by:

- (1) Stating the name of the offense;
- (2) Citing the statutory provision alleged to have been violated;
- (3) Setting forth the nature and elements of the offense charged;
- (4) Stating the date and county of the offense as definitely as can be done; and
- (5) Stating the name of the accused, if known, and if not known, designate the accused by any name or description by which he can be identified with reasonable certainty.

(b) An indictment shall be signed by the foreman of the Grand Jury and an information shall be signed by the State's Attorney and sworn to by him or another. A complaint shall be sworn to and signed by the complainant; Provided, however, that when a citation is issued on a Uniform Traffic Ticket or Uniform Conservation Ticket (in a form prescribed by the Conference of Chief Circuit Judges and filed with the Supreme Court), the copy of such Uniform Ticket which is filed with the circuit court constitutes a complaint to which the defendant may plead, unless he specifically requests that a verified complaint be filed.

(c) When the State seeks an enhanced sentence because of a prior conviction, the charge shall also state the intention to seek an enhanced sentence and shall state such prior conviction so as to give notice to the defendant. However, the fact of such prior conviction and the State's intention to seek an enhanced sentence are not elements of the offense and may not be disclosed to the jury during trial unless otherwise permitted by issues properly raised during such trial. For the purposes of this Section, "enhanced sentence" means a sentence which is increased by a prior conviction from one classification of offense to another higher level classification of offense set forth in Section 5-5-1 of the

"Unified Code of Corrections", approved July 26, 1972, as amended; it does not include an increase in the sentence applied within the same level of classification of offense.

(c-5) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in all cases in which the imposition of the death penalty is not a possibility, if an alleged fact (other than the fact of a prior conviction) is not an element of an offense but is sought to be used to increase the range of penalties for the offense beyond the statutory maximum that could otherwise be imposed for the offense, the alleged fact must be included in the charging instrument or otherwise provided to the defendant through a written notification before trial, submitted to a trier of fact as an aggravating factor, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Failure to prove the fact beyond a reasonable doubt is not a bar to a conviction for commission of the offense, but is a bar to increasing, based on that fact, the range of penalties for the offense beyond the statutory maximum that could otherwise be imposed for that offense. Nothing in this subsection (c-5) requires the imposition of a sentence that increases the range of penalties for the offense beyond the statutory maximum that could otherwise be imposed for the offense if the imposition of that sentence is not required by law.

(d) At any time prior to trial, the State on motion shall be permitted to amend the charge, whether brought by indictment, information or complaint, to make the charge comply with subsection (c) or (c-5) of this Section. Nothing in Section 103-5 of this Code precludes such an amendment or a written notification made in accordance with subsection (c-5) of this Section.

(e) The provisions of Article 33B of the Criminal Code of 1961, as amended, shall not be affected by this Section. (Source: P.A. 86-964.)

Section 10. The Unified Code of Corrections is amended by changing Sections 5-5-3, 5-5-4, 5-8-1, and 5-8-2 as follows:

(730 ILCS 5/5-5-3) (from Ch. 38, par. 1005-5-3)
Sec. 5-5-3. Disposition.

(a) Every person convicted of an offense shall be sentenced as provided in this Section.

(b) The following options shall be appropriate dispositions, alone or in combination, for all felonies and misdemeanors other than those identified in subsection (c) of this Section:

- (1) A period of probation.
- (2) A term of periodic imprisonment.
- (3) A term of conditional discharge.
- (4) A term of imprisonment.
- (5) An order directing the offender to clean up and repair the damage, if the offender was convicted under paragraph (h) of Section 21-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961.

- (6) A fine.

- (7) An order directing the offender to make restitution to the victim under Section 5-5-6 of this Code.

- (8) A sentence of participation in a county impact incarceration program under Section 5-8-1.2 of this Code. Whenever an individual is sentenced for an offense based

upon an arrest for a violation of Section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, or a similar provision of a local ordinance, and the professional evaluation recommends remedial or rehabilitative treatment or education, neither the treatment nor the education shall be the sole disposition and either or both may be imposed only in conjunction with another disposition. The court shall monitor compliance with any remedial education or treatment recommendations contained in the professional evaluation. Programs conducting alcohol or other drug evaluation or remedial education must be licensed by the Department of Human Services. However, if the individual is not a resident of Illinois, the court may accept an alcohol or other drug evaluation or remedial education program in the state of such individual's residence. Programs providing treatment must be licensed under existing applicable alcoholism and drug treatment licensure standards.

In addition to any other fine or penalty required by law, any individual convicted of a violation of Section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code or a similar provision of local ordinance, whose operation of a motor vehicle while in violation of Section 11-501 or such ordinance proximately caused an incident resulting in an appropriate emergency response, shall be required to make restitution to a public agency for the costs of that emergency response. Such restitution shall not exceed \$500 per public agency for each such emergency response. For the purpose of this paragraph, emergency response shall mean any incident requiring a response by: a police officer as defined under Section 1-162 of the Illinois Vehicle Code; a fireman carried on the rolls of a regularly constituted fire department; and an ambulance as defined under Section 4.05 of the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems Act.

Neither a fine nor restitution shall be the sole disposition for a felony and either or both may be imposed only in conjunction with another disposition.

(c) (1) When a defendant is found guilty of first degree murder the State may either seek a sentence of imprisonment under Section 5-8-1 of this Code, or where appropriate seek a sentence of death under Section 9-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961.

(2) A period of probation, a term of periodic imprisonment or conditional discharge shall not be imposed for the following offenses. The court shall sentence the offender to not less than the minimum term of imprisonment set forth in this Code for the following offenses, and may order a fine or restitution or both in conjunction with such term of imprisonment:

(A) First degree murder where the death penalty is not imposed.

(B) Attempted first degree murder.

(C) A Class X felony.

(D) A violation of Section 401.1 or 407 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, or a violation of subdivision (c)(2) of Section 401 of that Act which relates to more than 5 grams of a substance containing cocaine or an analog thereof.

(E) A violation of Section 5.1 or 9 of the Cannabis Control Act.

(F) A Class 2 or greater felony if the offender had been convicted of a Class 2 or greater

felony within 10 years of the date on which the offender committed the offense for which he or she is being sentenced, except as otherwise provided in Section 40-10 of the Alcoholism and Other Drug Abuse and Dependency Act.

(G) Residential burglary, except as otherwise provided in Section 40-10 of the Alcoholism and Other Drug Abuse and Dependency Act.

(H) Criminal sexual assault, except as otherwise provided in subsection (e) of this Section.

(I) Aggravated battery of a senior citizen.

(J) A forcible felony if the offense was related to the activities of an organized gang.

Before July 1, 1994, for the purposes of this paragraph, "organized gang" means an association of 5 or more persons, with an established hierarchy, that encourages members of the association to perpetrate crimes or provides support to the members of the association who do commit crimes.

Beginning July 1, 1994, for the purposes of this paragraph, "organized gang" has the meaning ascribed to it in Section 10 of the Illinois Streetgang Terrorism Omnibus Prevention Act.

(K) Vehicular hijacking.

(L) A second or subsequent conviction for the offense of hate crime when the underlying offense upon which the hate crime is based is felony aggravated assault or felony mob action.

(M) A second or subsequent conviction for the offense of institutional vandalism if the damage to the property exceeds \$300.

(N) A Class 3 felony violation of paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of Section 2 of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act.

(O) A violation of Section 12-6.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961.

(P) A violation of paragraph (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), or (7) of subsection (a) of Section 11-20.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961.

(Q) A violation of Section 20-1.2 of the Criminal Code of 1961.

(R) A violation of Section 24-3A of the Criminal Code of 1961.

(3) A minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 48 consecutive hours or 100 hours of community service as may be determined by the court shall be imposed for a second or subsequent violation committed within 5 years of a previous violation of Section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code or a similar provision of a local ordinance.

(4) A minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 7 consecutive days or 30 days of community service shall be imposed for a violation of paragraph (c) of Section 6-303 of the Illinois Vehicle Code.

(4.1) A minimum term of 30 consecutive days of imprisonment, 40 days of 24 hour periodic imprisonment or 720 hours of community service, as may be determined by the court, shall be imposed for a violation of Section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code during a period in which the defendant's driving privileges are revoked or suspended, where the revocation or suspension was for a

violation of Section 11-501 or Section 11-501.1 of that Code.

(5) The court may sentence an offender convicted of a business offense or a petty offense or a corporation or unincorporated association convicted of any offense to:

(A) a period of conditional discharge;

(B) a fine;

(C) make restitution to the victim under Section 5-5-6 of this Code.

(6) In no case shall an offender be eligible for a disposition of probation or conditional discharge for a Class 1 felony committed while he was serving a term of probation or conditional discharge for a felony.

(7) When a defendant is adjudged a habitual criminal under Article 33B of the Criminal Code of 1961, the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of natural life imprisonment.

(8) When a defendant, over the age of 21 years, is convicted of a Class 1 or Class 2 felony, after having twice been convicted of any Class 2 or greater Class felonies in Illinois, and such charges are separately brought and tried and arise out of different series of acts, such defendant shall be sentenced as a Class X offender. This paragraph shall not apply unless (1) the first felony was committed after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1977; and (2) the second felony was committed after conviction on the first; and (3) the third felony was committed after conviction on the second.

(9) A defendant convicted of a second or subsequent offense of ritualized abuse of a child may be sentenced to a term of natural life imprisonment.

(d) In any case in which a sentence originally imposed is vacated, the case shall be remanded to the trial court. The trial court shall hold a hearing under Section 5-4-1 of the Unified Code of Corrections which may include evidence of the defendant's life, moral character and occupation during the time since the original sentence was passed. The trial court shall then impose sentence upon the defendant. The trial court may impose any sentence which could have been imposed at the original trial subject to Section 5-5-4 of the Unified Code of Corrections. If a sentence is vacated on appeal or on collateral attack due to the failure of the trier of fact at trial to determine beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of a fact (other than a prior conviction) necessary to increase the punishment for the offense beyond the statutory maximum otherwise applicable, either the defendant may be re-sentenced to a term within the range otherwise provided or, if the State files notice of its intention to again seek the extended sentence, the defendant shall be afforded a new trial.

(e) In cases where prosecution for criminal sexual assault or aggravated criminal sexual abuse under Section 12-13 or 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 results in conviction of a defendant who was a family member of the victim at the time of the commission of the offense, the court shall consider the safety and welfare of the victim and may impose a sentence of probation only where:

(1) the court finds (A) or (B) or both are appropriate:

(A) the defendant is willing to undergo a

court approved counseling program for a minimum duration of 2 years; or

(B) the defendant is willing to participate in a court approved plan including but not limited to the defendant's:

- (i) removal from the household;
- (ii) restricted contact with the victim;
- (iii) continued financial support of the family;
- (iv) restitution for harm done to the victim; and
- (v) compliance with any other measures that the court may deem appropriate; and

(2) the court orders the defendant to pay for the victim's counseling services, to the extent that the court finds, after considering the defendant's income and assets, that the defendant is financially capable of paying for such services, if the victim was under 18 years of age at the time the offense was committed and requires counseling as a result of the offense.

Probation may be revoked or modified pursuant to Section 5-6-4; except where the court determines at the hearing that the defendant violated a condition of his or her probation restricting contact with the victim or other family members or commits another offense with the victim or other family members, the court shall revoke the defendant's probation and impose a term of imprisonment.

For the purposes of this Section, "family member" and "victim" shall have the meanings ascribed to them in Section 12-12 of the Criminal Code of 1961.

(f) This Article shall not deprive a court in other proceedings to order a forfeiture of property, to suspend or cancel a license, to remove a person from office, or to impose any other civil penalty.

(g) Whenever a defendant is convicted of an offense under Sections 11-14, 11-15, 11-15.1, 11-16, 11-17, 11-18, 11-18.1, 11-19, 11-19.1, 11-19.2, 12-13, 12-14, 12-14.1, 12-15 or 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961, the defendant shall undergo medical testing to determine whether the defendant has any sexually transmissible disease, including a test for infection with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) or any other identified causative agent of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). Any such medical test shall be performed only by appropriately licensed medical practitioners and may include an analysis of any bodily fluids as well as an examination of the defendant's person. Except as otherwise provided by law, the results of such test shall be kept strictly confidential by all medical personnel involved in the testing and must be personally delivered in a sealed envelope to the judge of the court in which the conviction was entered for the judge's inspection in camera. Acting in accordance with the best interests of the victim and the public, the judge shall have the discretion to determine to whom, if anyone, the results of the testing may be revealed. The court shall notify the defendant of the test results. The court shall also notify the victim if requested by the victim, and if the victim is under the age of 15 and if requested by the victim's parents or legal guardian, the court shall notify the victim's parents or legal guardian of the test results. The court shall provide information on the availability of HIV testing and counseling at Department of

Public Health facilities to all parties to whom the results of the testing are revealed and shall direct the State's Attorney to provide the information to the victim when possible. A State's Attorney may petition the court to obtain the results of any HIV test administered under this Section, and the court shall grant the disclosure if the State's Attorney shows it is relevant in order to prosecute a charge of criminal transmission of HIV under Section 12-16.2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 against the defendant. The court shall order that the cost of any such test shall be paid by the county and may be taxed as costs against the convicted defendant.

(g-5) When an inmate is tested for an airborne communicable disease, as determined by the Illinois Department of Public Health including but not limited to tuberculosis, the results of the test shall be personally delivered by the warden or his or her designee in a sealed envelope to the judge of the court in which the inmate must appear for the judge's inspection in camera if requested by the judge. Acting in accordance with the best interests of those in the courtroom, the judge shall have the discretion to determine what if any precautions need to be taken to prevent transmission of the disease in the courtroom.

(h) Whenever a defendant is convicted of an offense under Section 1 or 2 of the Hypodermic Syringes and Needles Act, the defendant shall undergo medical testing to determine whether the defendant has been exposed to human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) or any other identified causative agent of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). Except as otherwise provided by law, the results of such test shall be kept strictly confidential by all medical personnel involved in the testing and must be personally delivered in a sealed envelope to the judge of the court in which the conviction was entered for the judge's inspection in camera. Acting in accordance with the best interests of the public, the judge shall have the discretion to determine to whom, if anyone, the results of the testing may be revealed. The court shall notify the defendant of a positive test showing an infection with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). The court shall provide information on the availability of HIV testing and counseling at Department of Public Health facilities to all parties to whom the results of the testing are revealed and shall direct the State's Attorney to provide the information to the victim when possible. A State's Attorney may petition the court to obtain the results of any HIV test administered under this Section, and the court shall grant the disclosure if the State's Attorney shows it is relevant in order to prosecute a charge of criminal transmission of HIV under Section 12-16.2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 against the defendant. The court shall order that the cost of any such test shall be paid by the county and may be taxed as costs against the convicted defendant.

(i) All fines and penalties imposed under this Section for any violation of Chapters 3, 4, 6, and 11 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, or a similar provision of a local ordinance, and any violation of the Child Passenger Protection Act, or a similar provision of a local ordinance, shall be collected and disbursed by the circuit clerk as provided under Section 27.5 of the Clerks of Courts Act.

(j) In cases when prosecution for any violation of Section 11-6, 11-8, 11-9, 11-11, 11-14, 11-15, 11-15.1,

11-16, 11-17, 11-17.1, 11-18, 11-18.1, 11-19, 11-19.1, 11-19.2, 11-20.1, 11-21, 12-13, 12-14, 12-14.1, 12-15, or 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961, any violation of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, or any violation of the Cannabis Control Act results in conviction, a disposition of court supervision, or an order of probation granted under Section 10 of the Cannabis Control Act or Section 410 of the Illinois Controlled Substance Act of a defendant, the court shall determine whether the defendant is employed by a facility or center as defined under the Child Care Act of 1969, a public or private elementary or secondary school, or otherwise works with children under 18 years of age on a daily basis. When a defendant is so employed, the court shall order the Clerk of the Court to send a copy of the judgment of conviction or order of supervision or probation to the defendant's employer by certified mail. If the employer of the defendant is a school, the Clerk of the Court shall direct the mailing of a copy of the judgment of conviction or order of supervision or probation to the appropriate regional superintendent of schools. The regional superintendent of schools shall notify the State Board of Education of any notification under this subsection.

(j-5) A defendant at least 17 years of age who is convicted of a felony and who has not been previously convicted of a misdemeanor or felony and who is sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the Illinois Department of Corrections shall as a condition of his or her sentence be required by the court to attend educational courses designed to prepare the defendant for a high school diploma and to work toward a high school diploma or to work toward passing the high school level Test of General Educational Development (GED) or to work toward completing a vocational training program offered by the Department of Corrections. If a defendant fails to complete the educational training required by his or her sentence during the term of incarceration, the Prisoner Review Board shall, as a condition of mandatory supervised release, require the defendant, at his or her own expense, to pursue a course of study toward a high school diploma or passage of the GED test. The Prisoner Review Board shall revoke the mandatory supervised release of a defendant who wilfully fails to comply with this subsection (j-5) upon his or her release from confinement in a penal institution while serving a mandatory supervised release term; however, the inability of the defendant after making a good faith effort to obtain financial aid or pay for the educational training shall not be deemed a wilful failure to comply. The Prisoner Review Board shall recommit the defendant whose mandatory supervised release term has been revoked under this subsection (j-5) as provided in Section 3-3-9. This subsection (j-5) does not apply to a defendant who has a high school diploma or has successfully passed the GED test. This subsection (j-5) does not apply to a defendant who is determined by the court to be developmentally disabled or otherwise mentally incapable of completing the educational or vocational program.

(k) A court may not impose a sentence or disposition for a felony or misdemeanor that requires the defendant to be implanted or injected with or to use any form of birth control.

(l) (A) Except as provided in paragraph (C) of subsection (l), whenever a defendant, who is an alien as

defined by the Immigration and Nationality Act, is convicted of any felony or misdemeanor offense, the court after sentencing the defendant may, upon motion of the State's Attorney, hold sentence in abeyance and remand the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General of the United States or his or her designated agent to be deported when:

(1) a final order of deportation has been issued against the defendant pursuant to proceedings under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and

(2) the deportation of the defendant would not deprecate the seriousness of the defendant's conduct and would not be inconsistent with the ends of justice.

Otherwise, the defendant shall be sentenced as provided in this Chapter V.

(B) If the defendant has already been sentenced for a felony or misdemeanor offense, or has been placed on probation under Section 10 of the Cannabis Control Act or Section 410 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, the court may, upon motion of the State's Attorney to suspend the sentence imposed, commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General of the United States or his or her designated agent when:

(1) a final order of deportation has been issued against the defendant pursuant to proceedings under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and

(2) the deportation of the defendant would not deprecate the seriousness of the defendant's conduct and would not be inconsistent with the ends of justice.

(C) This subsection (1) does not apply to offenders who are subject to the provisions of paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of Section 3-6-3.

(D) Upon motion of the State's Attorney, if a defendant sentenced under this Section returns to the jurisdiction of the United States, the defendant shall be recommitted to the custody of the county from which he or she was sentenced. Thereafter, the defendant shall be brought before the sentencing court, which may impose any sentence that was available under Section 5-5-3 at the time of initial sentencing. In addition, the defendant shall not be eligible for additional good conduct credit for meritorious service as provided under Section 3-6-6.

(m) A person convicted of criminal defacement of property under Section 21-1.3 of the Criminal Code of 1961, in which the property damage exceeds \$300 and the property damaged is a school building, shall be ordered to perform community service that may include cleanup, removal, or painting over the defacement.

(Source: P.A. 90-14, eff. 7-1-97; 90-68, eff. 7-8-97; 90-680, eff. 1-1-99; 90-685, eff. 1-1-99; 90-787, eff. 8-14-98; 91-357, eff. 7-29-99; 91-404, eff. 1-1-00; 91-663, eff. 12-22-99; 91-695, eff. 4-13-00.)

(730 ILCS 5/5-5-4) (from Ch. 38, par. 1005-5-4)

Sec. 5-5-4. Resentences.

Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review or on collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new sentence for the same offense or for a different offense based on the same conduct which is more severe than

the prior sentence less the portion of the prior sentence previously satisfied unless the more severe sentence is based upon conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the original sentencing. If a sentence is vacated on appeal or on collateral attack due to the failure of the trier of fact at trial to determine beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of a fact (other than a prior conviction) necessary to increase the punishment for the offense beyond the statutory maximum otherwise applicable, either the defendant may be re-sentenced to a term within the range otherwise provided or, if the State files notice of its intention to again seek the extended sentence, the defendant shall be afforded a new trial.

(Source: P.A. 77-2097.)

(730 ILCS 5/5-8-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 1005-8-1)

Sec. 5-8-1. Sentence of Imprisonment for Felony.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in the statute defining the offense, a sentence of imprisonment for a felony shall be a determinate sentence set by the court under this Section, according to the following limitations:

(1) for first degree murder,

(a) a term shall be not less than 20 years and not more than 60 years, or

(b) if a trier of fact ~~the court~~ finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty or, except as set forth in subsection (a)(1)(c) of this Section, that any of the aggravating factors listed in subsection (b) of Section 9-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 are present, the court may sentence the defendant to a term of natural life imprisonment, or

(c) the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of natural life imprisonment when the death penalty is not imposed if the defendant,

(i) has previously been convicted of first degree murder under any state or federal law, or

(ii) is a person who, at the time of the commission of the murder, had attained the age of 17 or more and is found guilty of murdering an individual under 12 years of age; or, irrespective of the defendant's age at the time of the commission of the offense, is found guilty of murdering more than one victim, or

(iii) is found guilty of murdering a peace officer or fireman when the peace officer or fireman was killed in the course of performing his official duties, or to prevent the peace officer or fireman from performing his official duties, or in retaliation for the peace officer or fireman performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was a peace officer or fireman, or

(iv) is found guilty of murdering an employee of an institution or facility of the Department of Corrections, or any similar local correctional agency, when the employee was killed in the course of performing his official

duties, or to prevent the employee from performing his official duties, or in retaliation for the employee performing his official duties, or

(v) is found guilty of murdering an emergency medical technician - ambulance, emergency medical technician - intermediate, emergency medical technician - paramedic, ambulance driver or other medical assistance or first aid person while employed by a municipality or other governmental unit when the person was killed in the course of performing official duties or to prevent the person from performing official duties or in retaliation for performing official duties and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was an emergency medical technician - ambulance, emergency medical technician - intermediate, emergency medical technician - paramedic, ambulance driver, or other medical assistant or first aid personnel, or

(vi) is a person who, at the time of the commission of the murder, had not attained the age of 17, and is found guilty of murdering a person under 12 years of age and the murder is committed during the course of aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, or aggravated kidnaping, or

(vii) is found guilty of first degree murder and the murder was committed by reason of any person's activity as a community policing volunteer or to prevent any person from engaging in activity as a community policing volunteer. For the purpose of this Section, "community policing volunteer" has the meaning ascribed to it in Section 2-3.5 of the Criminal Code of 1961.

For purposes of clause (v), "emergency medical technician - ambulance", "emergency medical technician - intermediate", "emergency medical technician - paramedic", have the meanings ascribed to them in the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems Act.

(d) (i) if the person committed the offense while armed with a firearm, 15 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court;

(ii) if, during the commission of the offense, the person personally discharged a firearm, 20 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court;

(iii) if, during the commission of the offense, the person personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another person, 25 years or up to a term of natural life shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court.

(1.5) for second degree murder, a term shall be not

less than 4 years and not more than 20 years;

(2) for a person adjudged a habitual criminal under Article 33B of the Criminal Code of 1961, as amended, the sentence shall be a term of natural life imprisonment;

(2.5) for a person convicted under the circumstances described in paragraph (3) of subsection (b) of Section 12-13, paragraph (2) of subsection (d) of Section 12-14, paragraph (1.2) of subsection (b) of Section 12-14.1, or paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of Section 12-14.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961, the sentence shall be a term of natural life imprisonment;

(3) except as otherwise provided in the statute defining the offense, for a Class X felony, the sentence shall be not less than 6 years and not more than 30 years;

(4) for a Class 1 felony, other than second degree murder, the sentence shall be not less than 4 years and not more than 15 years;

(5) for a Class 2 felony, the sentence shall be not less than 3 years and not more than 7 years;

(6) for a Class 3 felony, the sentence shall be not less than 2 years and not more than 5 years;

(7) for a Class 4 felony, the sentence shall be not less than 1 year and not more than 3 years.

(b) The sentencing judge in each felony conviction shall set forth his reasons for imposing the particular sentence he enters in the case, as provided in Section 5-4-1 of this Code. Those reasons may include any mitigating or aggravating factors specified in this Code, or the lack of any such circumstances, as well as any other such factors as the judge shall set forth on the record that are consistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing set out in this Code.

(c) A motion to reduce a sentence may be made, or the court may reduce a sentence without motion, within 30 days after the sentence is imposed. A defendant's challenge to the correctness of a sentence or to any aspect of the sentencing hearing shall be made by a written motion filed within 30 days following the imposition of sentence. However, the court may not increase a sentence once it is imposed.

If a motion filed pursuant to this subsection is timely filed within 30 days after the sentence is imposed, the proponent of the motion shall exercise due diligence in seeking a determination on the motion and the court shall thereafter decide such motion within a reasonable time.

If a motion filed pursuant to this subsection is timely filed within 30 days after the sentence is imposed, then for purposes of perfecting an appeal, a final judgment shall not be considered to have been entered until the motion to reduce a sentence has been decided by order entered by the trial court.

A motion filed pursuant to this subsection shall not be considered to have been timely filed unless it is filed with the circuit court clerk within 30 days after the sentence is imposed together with a notice of motion, which notice of motion shall set the motion on the court's calendar on a date certain within a reasonable time after the date of filing.

(d) Except where a term of natural life is imposed, every sentence shall include as though written therein a term in addition to the term of imprisonment. For those sentenced

under the law in effect prior to February 1, 1978, such term shall be identified as a parole term. For those sentenced on or after February 1, 1978, such term shall be identified as a mandatory supervised release term. Subject to earlier termination under Section 3-3-8, the parole or mandatory supervised release term shall be as follows:

(1) for first degree murder or a Class X felony, 3 years;

(2) for a Class 1 felony or a Class 2 felony, 2 years;

(3) for a Class 3 felony or a Class 4 felony, 1 year;

(4) if the victim is under 18 years of age, for a second or subsequent offense of criminal sexual assault or aggravated criminal sexual assault, 5 years, at least the first 2 years of which the defendant shall serve in an electronic home detention program under Article 8A of Chapter V of this Code;

(5) if the victim is under 18 years of age, for a second or subsequent offense of aggravated criminal sexual abuse or felony criminal sexual abuse, 4 years, at least the first 2 years of which the defendant shall serve in an electronic home detention program under Article 8A of Chapter V of this Code.

(e) A defendant who has a previous and unexpired sentence of imprisonment imposed by another state or by any district court of the United States and who, after sentence for a crime in Illinois, must return to serve the unexpired prior sentence may have his sentence by the Illinois court ordered to be concurrent with the prior sentence in the other state. The court may order that any time served on the unexpired portion of the sentence in the other state, prior to his return to Illinois, shall be credited on his Illinois sentence. The other state shall be furnished with a copy of the order imposing sentence which shall provide that, when the offender is released from confinement of the other state, whether by parole or by termination of sentence, the offender shall be transferred by the Sheriff of the committing county to the Illinois Department of Corrections. The court shall cause the Department of Corrections to be notified of such sentence at the time of commitment and to be provided with copies of all records regarding the sentence.

(f) A defendant who has a previous and unexpired sentence of imprisonment imposed by an Illinois circuit court for a crime in this State and who is subsequently sentenced to a term of imprisonment by another state or by any district court of the United States and who has served a term of imprisonment imposed by the other state or district court of the United States, and must return to serve the unexpired prior sentence imposed by the Illinois Circuit Court may apply to the court which imposed sentence to have his sentence reduced.

The circuit court may order that any time served on the sentence imposed by the other state or district court of the United States be credited on his Illinois sentence. Such application for reduction of a sentence under this subsection (f) shall be made within 30 days after the defendant has completed the sentence imposed by the other state or district court of the United States.

(Source: P.A. 90-396, eff. 1-1-98; 90-651, eff. 1-1-99; 91-279, eff. 1-1-00; 91-404, eff. 1-1-00; revised 10-14-99.)

(730 ILCS 5/5-8-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 1005-8-2)

Sec. 5-8-2. Extended Term. (a) A judge shall not sentence an offender to a term of imprisonment in excess of the maximum sentence authorized by Section 5-8-1 for the class of the most serious offense of which the offender was convicted unless the factors in aggravation set forth in paragraph (b) of Section 5-5-3.2 were found to be present. ~~Where a trier of fact the judge finds beyond a reasonable doubt that such factors were present, the judge he~~ may sentence an offender to the following:

(1) for first degree murder, a term shall be not less than 60 years and not more than 100 years;

(2) for a Class X felony, a term shall be not less than 30 years and not more than 60 years;

(3) for a Class 1 felony, a term shall be not less than 15 years and not more than 30 years;

(4) for a Class 2 felony, a term shall be not less than 7 years and not more than 14 years;

(5) for a Class 3 felony, a term shall not be less than 5 years and not more than 10 years;

(6) for a Class 4 felony, a term shall be not less than 3 years and not more than 6 years.

(b) If the conviction was by plea, it shall appear on the record that the plea was entered with the defendant's knowledge that a sentence under this Section was a possibility. If it does not so appear on the record, the defendant shall not be subject to such a sentence unless he is first given an opportunity to withdraw his plea without prejudice.

(Source: P.A. 85-902.)

Section 99. Effective date. This Act takes effect upon becoming law.

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