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The Effect of Religiosity on Public Perceptions about Punishment and Public Confidence in the Police and the Justice System: a Comparison between the U.S. and Turkey

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The effect of religiosity on public perceptions about punishment and public confidence in
the police and the justice system: A comparison between the U.S. and Turkey

By

Gunseli Ayca Yildirim

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of
Mississippi State University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Master of Science
in Sociology
in the Department of Sociology

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The effect of religiosity on public perceptions about punishment and public confidence in
the police and the justice system: A comparison between the U.S. and Turkey

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The purpose of this thesis is to examine how religiosity affects both public attitudes about the importance of severe punishments (as a characteristic of democracy) and public confidence in the police and the justice system. This study also examines the socio-demographic (e.g., age, gender, education) factors that influence public perceptions about punishment and confidence in criminal justice institutions. In doing so, this study compares two countries that are both religious and democratic: Turkey and the United States. The current study employs data from Wave 5 (2005-2008) of the World Values Survey (WVS). The U.S. data is based on a sample of 1,249 respondents who participated in face-to-face interviews in 2006. The Turkish data is based on a sample of 1,346 respondents who participated in face-to-face interviews in 2007. Analyses were conducted using the SPSS 21 software program.

DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this study to my dear family: my lovely husband Yalcin Yildirim, and my dear parents Ferhat Yildirim and Necla Yildirim who encouraged and stood behind me during this research period. In addition, I want to expand this dedication to my sister Neslihan Ozcicek and to my motivation source Ela Begum Ozcicek for their motivation.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The focus of this study is on developing a better understanding of the relationship between religiosity and public opinions about both punitiveness and confidence in the police and the justice system. This study will compare results from Turkey to those of the United States. The current study employs data from Wave 5 (2005-2008) of the World Values Survey (WVS).

Culture consists of many elements and creates a unique society. These elements are visible attributes of culture such as language, symbols, values, and social organizations (Minkov, 2013). Because religion is one of the basic elements of culture, it is a powerful social institution that influences individuals and societies. Religion affects social behaviors, dominant values, and ideologies (Minkov, 2013). According to the Pew Research Center (2012), worldwide, more than eight in ten people identify with a religious group. Religious beliefs, practices, and prejudices are important because they affect people's feelings and attitudes. These effects may be seen in a variety of ways; for instance, religion positively affects mental and physical health (Seybold and Hill, 2001), religiosity decreases crime rates (Hull, 2000), religiosity influences penal practices and shapes communities' punitive mentalities (Garland, 1990), religiosity influences opposition to abortion (Unnever et al., 2010; Woodnam and Davidson, 1992) and it affects whether or not people use drugs and have close friends who use drugs (Bahr et al.,

1998). It is reasonable to expect, then, that religiosity might also affect public perceptions about the importance of severe punishment (as a characteristic of democracy) and public confidence in the police and the justice system.

Even though beliefs about the purposes of punishment differ across cultures and over time, societies have always punished those who violate their rules. Several studies have examined the relationship between religiosity and punitiveness (Koster et al., 2009; Grasmick et al., 1993; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2004; Ulmer et al., 2008). These studies have shown that religious people are more likely to support harsh punishments like incarceration and the death penalty. In these studies, religious people are those who have conservative views and tend to believe that people have the power to choose between right and wrong. In other words, conservative people tend to believe that poverty, abuse, addiction, racism, and/or a lack of opportunity may not be reasons to commit a crime (Hardisty, 2004). Religious people think those who violate the law must pay the penalties and need self-discipline, punishment, isolation, and religious redemption to correct their behavior (Hardisty, 2004). Fundamentalist people who are not just religious conservatives, but also take stand and fight for it (Marsden, 1991) commonly hold retributive beliefs about punishment (Grasmick et al., 1993).

Religiosity also influences people's political opinions and naturally leads them to prefer conservative social outcomes and policies (Malka et al., 2012). It shapes how people see the world based on traditional religious beliefs and teaching; and strongly influences which party a person votes for (LaMothe, 2012). For instance, "love your neighbor" is a religious goal and it may translate into political activism such as fighting for the poor. Jacobs and Carmichael (2004) claim that political conservatism shapes the

frequency of sentences for severe punishments because political conservatism tends people to believe that the poor and deprived are not predestined to criminality by their situation; and that individuals have free will and freedom of choice regardless of their particular personal circumstances. Thus, for political conservatives, the individual is responsible for his or her criminal acts, and needs to punish.

Confidence in the government and in public institutions is important because it affects the institutions' efficacy (Alesina & Ferrara, 2002) Confidence in any institution shapes people's willingness to support the institution. Trusting an institution means having confidence that the institution is efficient, reliable, be able to achieve its duties, and fair (Devos et. al., 2002). The police and the courts are two key institutions that work cooperatively to enforce laws and regulations. Societies cannot survive without being able to impose their rules (Tyler and Huo, 2002). The success of the police and the courts depends on public confidence because when people trust these organizations, they are more likely to support and cooperate with them. Evidence suggests that religiosity is related to confidence in the police and the justice system (Guiso et al., 2003; Wisneski et al., 2009; Garza, Rossi, & Zaclicever, 2009; Cao, Stack, & Sun, 1998). Specifically, religious people trust legal authorities more so than do non-religious people (Guiso et al., 2003). Garza, Rossi, and Zaclicever (2009) emphasize that religiosity is positively related to trust in the police and in the judiciary. Also, Cao, Stack, and Sun (1998) found that regular church attendants had more trust in the police in the United States.

To examine the relationship between religiosity and both public perceptions about punishment and confidence in the police and the justice system, several main research questions will be used:

1. Are religious people more punitive than non-religious people in response to crime?
2. How do levels of punitiveness in the U.S. differ from those in Turkey?
3. How are religiosity and confidence in the police and the justice system related?
4. How do levels of confidence in the police and the justice system in the U.S. differ from those in Turkey?

The current study expects to find that people who are more religious are more punitive in their response to crime than are less religious people because religious people are more likely believe that criminal acts are the result of freely chosen and willful behavior, rather than external circumstances and constraints. Also, in Turkey, overall levels of punitiveness are likely to be higher than in the U.S. Because people are more likely to desire conformity, social order, discipline, they look to legal institutions to punish threats to collective security. Hard economic times, rapid social change, beliefs about the loss of respect and discipline in society, concerns about social cohesion and perceived social threat lead to a more punitive minded general public (Hardisty, 2004; Tyler and Boeckann, 1997; King and Maruna, 2009).

This study also predicts that people who are more religious have more confidence in the police and the justice system because religiosity reflects a generalized willingness to trust authority, regardless of whether the authority is secular or religious. Belief in God and a generally high level of trust in religion influence confidence in the authorities. Stronger religiosity would be associated with greater trust in authorities (Wisneski et al., 2009). Also, levels of confidence in these institutions are expected to be higher in Turkey than in the U.S. Even when the police and courts were criticized by the West for their violation of human rights, in Turkey they gained public support for their tough action

against minorities. This action was highly supported by the Turkish majority, most notably by political elites (Cao and Burton, 2006).

This study will also consider how age, gender, and education affect public perceptions about punishment and public confidence in the police and the justice system. The current study expects to find that older people, men, and less educated people are more punitive in their responses to crime. Older people, who are more vulnerable, may be more fearful and thus more punitive than younger people, who are less vulnerable people (Langworthy and Whitehead, 1986). Women are less punitive in their response to crime because of greater concern for the well-being of others (Applegate, Cullen, and Fisher, 2002). Also, men are less likely women to feel empathy toward criminals and leads them to prefer more severe punishments for criminal offenders (Unnever and Cullen, 2009). Additionally, more educated people are less punitive in their attitudes toward criminal punishment because education may help people to recognize the inequalities of the justice system and external circumstances and determine that solutions to the crime problem may be better served by policies of reintegration or rehabilitation (Applegate et al., 2000; Grasmick et al., 1993; Dowler, 2003). This study also predicts that older people, women, and less educated people have more confidence in the police and the justice system. Older citizens tend to have more confidence in criminal justice system because they more likely see the police as maintaining safety and order (Jesilow et al., 1995). Also, young people view the police as exercising a restrictive role on their freedoms and therefore may have negative views about the police (Reisig and Correia, 1997). Because men and more educated people are more critical about criminal justice system, they may have less confidence (Thompson and Lee, 2004).

Most studies examining the relationships among beliefs about punishment, levels of confidence in criminal justice institutions, and religiosity have been conducted in Europe and the United States. Furthermore, these studies generally have relied on data from largely Christian populations. Thus, scholars have not compared countries that have two different religious profiles. The current study fills this gap by using data from Turkey, which is predominantly Muslim, and the United States, which is predominantly Christian. In this respect, the U.S. and Turkey differ in regards to their religious homogeneity. While the U.S. population is separated into many different religions and religious affiliations, the Turkish population is more homogenous. This difference is important because it affects public attitudes and opinions about more punitive criminal sanctions and incarceration. Religious homogeneity influences formal and informal case processing and sentencing norms (Ulmer et al., 2008).

Turkey is the best case to compare with the United States because they are both very religious and democratic countries. In nondemocratic societies, examining public perceptions about punishment may be difficult since policies about punishment would not be affected by public perceptions. Policies may not be collective preferences of citizens because in nondemocratic regimes policies are made by a person and/or a small group of people, military, and one-party without whole public participation. Compared to the U.S. and Turkey, levels of religiosity in other democratic countries are much lower. When looking at other very religious countries especially Muslim countries, according to Francis Fukuyama and others, the Islamic world has the fewest democracies and Turkey is the Muslim world's original and still most assertively secular state while remaining devout members of Islamic faith (Fukuyama, 2001; Lewis, 1994; Costopoulos, 2005;

Terrill, 2013). In sum, comparing the U.S. and Turkey is beneficial because both are religious and democratic nations, but they also differ in terms of their religious homogeneity.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of the current study is to examine the effects of religiosity on both public attitudes about the importance of severe punishment (as a characteristic of democracy) and public confidence in the police and the justice system. The first part of the literature review begins by describing the importance of public opinion. Next, it presents a brief history of punishment and of the motives (i.e., purposes) of punishments. It then describes the effects of religiosity on beliefs about punishment. The second part of the literature review begins by describing the nature and importance of public confidence in the police and the justice system. Next, the literature review describes the effects of religiosity on confidence. The literature review concludes by discussing the role of religiosity, public perception about punishment, and confidence in the police and the justice system in both the United States and Turkey.

Why does public opinion matter?

At its most basic level, public opinion refers to citizens' collective preferences on politics and government actions (Bianco and Canon, 2011). These opinions are expressions of people's feelings about specific subjects. Public opinion is often made concrete through questions asked on polls. Politicians routinely cite public opinion polls to justify their support of or opposition to public policies (Paletz, Owen, and Cook, 2012).

Public opinion plays a number of important roles in a representative democracy. Leaders get their legitimacy from citizens and they take public opinion into account when making laws and formulating policy (Yavasgel, 1991). Opinion polls provide a mechanism for briefly presenting the public's views to government leaders who are making decisions that will affect society. Leaders often monitor the public pulse when making policy decisions, especially when they face an election campaign (Paletz, Owen, and Cook, 2012). In the United States, many governmental officials at both the national and local levels have to take public opinion into account when deciding how to act because voters elect them. These elected positions include sheriffs (except in New York), some judges, and prosecutors (Ellis, 2012). Compared to the U.S., Turkish people have less say in who runs their country at all levels because larger numbers of administrative positions are appointed by senior administrators such as the Prime Minister, the President, and the Ministry of Justice. These appointments include ambassadors, rectors of universities, judges, and prosecutors (Aksel, 2013). Regardless of whether they are elected or appointed, governmental officials must listen to public opinion if they wish to keep their jobs because dissatisfied constituents can vote out those who ignore their views or the regime could be in serious danger of revolution or collapse.

In particular, public opinions shape policies about punishments (Unnever & Cullen, 2010). Although some studies claim that sentencing and correctional policies should be determined by experts, others argue that public opinion must be considered in democratic societies (Cullen et al., 2000). If policy makers do not consider public opinion, a wide divergence may occur between the views of the public and the practices of the justice system. This disagreement may damage the perceived legitimacy of and

people's confidence in criminal justice institutions, thereby undermining the administration of justice.

People's beliefs in the legitimacy of police and the courts affect their tendency toward self-regulation, personal responsibility for following laws, acceptance of the decisions of legal authorities, and voluntary deference to individual police officers and judges (Tyler & Huo, 2002). Disenchanted or alienated members of the public are less likely to report crimes to the police and less willing to participate in the criminal justice process as witnesses or jurors (Roberts and Hough, 2005). Also, people who do not trust the criminal justice system may try to provide their own justice (Roberts & Hough, 2002), known as vigilante justice. Vigilante justice involves pursuing your own justice, without legal authority, because you think the legal agencies are inadequate (Oxford, 2015). In sum, then, public preferences play a crucial role in responses to crime.

Historical overview of beliefs about punishment

In general terms, punishment can be defined as a proper and reasonable response to violations of social norms (Carlsmith et al., 2002). According to Kale (1995), punishment is a sanction that persecutes people who defy a law or order. A basic aim of punishment is to make criminals suffer. This suffering may include incarceration, limitation of rights, pecuniary punishment, and/or execution.

Nearly everyone believes that criminal offenders deserve to be punished (Unnever & Cullen, 2009). There are two common beliefs about why people should be punished (Carlsmith et al., 2002). First, people who break society's rules should be punished to achieve justice and to restore social balance. The second purpose of punishment is to reduce the risk of future crimes and to defend innocent people from being victimized.

Scholars have recognized five main purposes of punishment: (1) *retribution* - punishment is justified because it is deserved and it fits the amount of harm; (2) *deterrence* - threat of punishment discourages people from committing crime; (3) *incapacitation* - felons cannot commit crimes while imprisoned; (4) *rehabilitation* - the treatment and reform of offenders may include training, counseling, and drug treatment; and (5) *restorative justice* - offenders take full responsibility for their wrongdoing and initiate restitution to the victim, beginning the process of returning victims and the community to their previous conditions (Stohr et al., 2013).

Across different cultures and times, the motives for punishments have changed. Traditional societies were characterized by features such as lack of a written language, limited production functions, an agricultural based economy, relative isolation, small populations, relatively simple social institutions and technology, and a generally slow rate of socio-cultural mobility (Rostow, 1960). In these societies, victims and/or their families determined the form of punishment offenders received. Punishments were not proportionate to the harm done. Capital punishment was a common response to several of crimes including sexual assault. Generally, the purpose of these punishments was retribution and deterrence (Kale, 1995). Crime was mostly attributed to the influence of evil spirits. Punishments for treason, witchcraft, sacrilege, and incest or other sex offenses were severe in primitive societies. The whole group, sometimes including neighboring clans, turned out to punish the offenders (Barnes and Teeters, 1959; Stearns, 1936).

Similar features were continued in more developed ancient civilizations such as Hebrews, Egyptians, and Babylonians (Stearns, 1936). Ancient people believed that law

had been given to them by God. Therefore, in their view, if a person broke a law, he or she was also disobeying God and if a person disobeyed God, the whole city might get punished with a flood or storm. Punishing criminals was done to make sure God did not become offended or angry (Kale, 1995). In addition to execution, punishments included torture, whipping, branding, mutilation, drowning, suffocation, and banishment (Stohr et al., 2013). People attempted to equalize crime and punishment with the rule of “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth,” meaning that criminals were punished by having an equally painful thing done to them that they did to their victims (Stearns, 1936; Stohr et al., 2013).

During the Middle Ages, religious reasons for punishment increased (Stearns, 1936). This occurred because religion was the source of the law. An offense against society was also an offense against God. The criminal justice system was in many ways another arm of religious orthodoxy. Crimes were sins, and sinners were to be punished (Friedman, 1993). Punishment was often barbaric; whipping was an extremely common punishment especially for servants and slaves (Friedman, 1993; Stohr et al, 2013). Public execution and corporal punishment were common, and torture was part of most criminal investigations. Punishment was ceremonial and directed at the prisoner’s body. It was a ritual in which the audience was important (Foucault, 1977). The primary motive of punishment was deterrence. The sinner or offender was punished as an example so that others would not do likewise (Stearns, 1936).

There were significant changes at the end of the 18th century. In addition to economic, cultural, and social developments, beliefs about human rights and the growth of new philosophies arose. These new philosophies included classicism, or the penal law

movement which focused on legality, equality of all men, equal treatment under the law, and prohibition of cruel punishments (Canals, 1960) and humanism, which focused on a range of ideas such as human freedom, critical thinking, the autonomy of the human subject, the dignity of the person (Rusen and Laass, 2009). Philosophers such as Voltaire, Jean Jacques Rousseau, John Locke, and Cesare Beccaria fueled social change with their belief in human potential, free will, and the innate goodness of man. Their thoughts reformed European countries. Old punishment systems were deemed barbaric. The practice of cruel punishment and arbitrary legal codes began to wane. Reformers were not agreeing to any more whippings, torture, and the like. Also, prison sentences became standardized (Friedman, 1993; Lyons, 2003; Stohr et al, 2013; Foucault, 1977). Foucault (1977) explained the shifting from public execution to prison rules. The exhibition of prisoners and the public execution ended and publicity moved from the trial and the sentence. The end of the public idea of punishment was the change from body to soul because imprisoned people can be controlled by sciences directed at the soul, such as psychiatry. When a criminal was condemned to be executed, the judge alone passes the sentence. When he was sent to prison, he was also evaluated by doctors and psychiatrists. Therefore, offenses became objects of scientific knowledge. Psychiatrists now decide on a criminal's medico-legal treatment. The penalty now addressed the soul. Upon the idea of the "soul", concepts of the psyche, personality, and consciousness were created, as well as scientific techniques and claims. There were limits to how you can punish the body, as the execution at the beginning demonstrates, but the soul allows new possibilities; instead corporal punishment and/or killing criminals, punishment became possible to supervise and investigate them (Foucault, 1977).

In modern communities, the primary punishment motives began to change as rehabilitation and restorative justice rather than retribution, deterrence, or incapacitation. However, severe punishments are still supported and many countries have inhumane prisons, use the electric chair, and continue to use torture (Kale, 1995). People continue to believe that punishment is the most effective deterrent of crime (Carlsmith et al., 2002). They also believe that current punishments are too lenient and should be tougher (Roberts & Hough, 2002-2005).

Effects of religiosity on punishment

Religion is one of the most effective institutions at shaping opinions about punishment (Applegate et al., 2000; Murphy, 2003). All major world religions regulate lifestyles and have religious laws. Although all of them mention the importance of forgiveness, they also have sanctions for punishment (Moses, 2007).

Grasmick and McGill (1994) evaluated the relationship between religious convictions and public punitiveness in the United States. They found that Christian fundamentalism strongly predicted individual support for the use of corporal punishment and punitive criminal justice policies. The study concluded that people who are highly religious seem to hold people more accountable for their actions and therefore deserving of punishment. Conservative Christians believe that crime is a result of the offender's character, rather than unfortunate or unjust environmental influences (Grasmick & McGill, 1994).

Koster et al. (2009) investigated the relationship between religiosity and attitudes toward victimless crimes such as tax evasion and fare-dodging in the public transportation system. Law prohibits these types of crimes, but people may think they are

justifiable because social norms may differ from legal norms. According to their research, religious beliefs guide social norms and therefore people's behavior. Members of religious organizations have shared beliefs about which desired behavior is rewarded and which undesired behavior is punished. Koster et al. (2009) compared the effects of religion across 70 countries by using data from the World Values Survey (WVS). In this study, religious affiliations were examined in four categories: none, Christian, Islamic, and other. Results showed that people who have a religious affiliation judged victimless crimes to be less justifiable than people who do not belong to an organized religion. In addition, Koster et al. claimed that members of a religion group would condemn victimless crimes more strongly than those who do not have a religious affiliation. A religious affiliation and a higher level of religiosity both result in a stronger condemnation of victimless crimes such as tax evasion.

Grasmick et al. (1993) examined the link between support for the retributive justice and fundamentalist religious beliefs. According to their research, Fundamentalist Protestant churches are a powerful force in public policy debates, not only at the national level, but also at state and local levels. Fundamentalist Protestants are more punitive than liberal/moderate Protestants about criminal justice policies because fundamentalist religious people believe that crime results from characteristic of offenders rather than their situations (e.g., poverty). Jacobs and Carmichael (2004) also considered conservative churches' attitudes toward criminals. There are more death sentences in states that have large number of members in conservative churches. Jacobs and Carmichael claimed that areas with more fundamentalist conservatives may have increased public support for harsh punishments like the death penalty because strong

fundamentalist values may increase the probability that prosecutors ask for severe punishments and that judges and juries support these requests. According to Jacobs and Carmichael (2004), public religiosity shapes the frequency of using severe criminal sentences (Jacobs and Carmichael, 2004).

Ulmer et al. (2008) examined the relationship between religious context and sentencing severity in Pennsylvania county courts. When residents in an area share the same religion, the place is characterized by a religious homogeneity. Their research claimed that religious homogeneity influences formal and informal case processing and sentencing norms. Specifically, Christian homogeneity likely represents the shared cultural and political influence of local Christian communities on local justice. Homogeneous Christian communities favor more punitive criminal sanctions and incarceration. More homogeneously Christian counties are tougher on offenders overall and there may be less tolerance for repeat wrongdoing. Even though Ulmer et al., (2008) examined only Christian homogeneity, it relates to the current study. While the U.S. population is separated into more different religions and religious affiliations, the Turkish population is more homogenous. According to Pew Research Center, in 2007 78% of Americans were Christian (51.3% of those Americans were Protestant, 23.9% were Catholic, and 0.6% were Orthodox). As reported by the Central Intelligence Agency in 2005, 99% of Turkish people were Muslim (78% of those Muslims were Sunni and 21% were Shia). These figures illustrate how Turkey is religiously more homogenous than the U.S.

Religiosity influences people's political opinions and naturally leads them to prefer conservative social outcomes and policies (Malka et al., 2012). According to

Jacobs and Carmichael (2004), public conservatism shapes the frequency of severe sentences. Jacobs and Carmichael (2004) emphasized that in contrast to liberals, conservatives attributed crime not to environmental conditions, but to criminals freely choosing to commit it. While liberals encourage rehabilitation to reduce violent offending, conservatives support deterrence to reduce crime. Conservatives stand behind the assertion that a few executions will protect many innocent victims from brutal crimes. Moreover, people often want a simple and quick solution to the complex problem of crime (Roberts and Hough, 2005). They do not believe that rehabilitation may change an offender's criminal behaviors because these behaviors results from offenders' characteristics rather than from their limited opportunities such as lack of housing, low wages, and poor education (Roberts and Hough, 2005). Maruna and King (2009) support that those who believe criminal acts are the result of freely chosen and willful behavior are more likely to be punitive than those who feel crime is the result of external circumstances and constraints.

Other important studies have explored the relationship between religiosity and support for corporal punishment which involves spanking or a slap to shape children's inappropriate behavior. Several empirical studies have linked religious fundamentalism or conservatism with greater use of corporal punishment (Gith, 2014; Ellison et al. 1996; Ellison and Sherkat, 1993; Ellison and Bradshaw, 2008). These studies indicate that even though corporal punishments produce physical harm, conservative Christian and Muslim parents commonly use it. In general, evidence suggests that conservative parents use corporal punishment more often than parents who have less conservative beliefs. More specifically, according to Ellison and Sherkat (1993) conservative protestant parents

endorse punitive punishments because they use biblical principles as a guide for authority relations with children. Generally, they believe that all humans are born sinful, and corporal punishment is necessary for saving children from sins such as selfishness. Relatedly, Ellison and Bradshaw (2008) found that conservative religious beliefs and sociopolitical ideology are positively related to approval of corporal punishment among the U.S. public. Specifically, persons who identify themselves as politically conservative are more prone to support corporal punishment than are their more moderate and liberal counterparts. Additionally, Gith (2014) claimed that corporal punishment is permitted by Islamic law for children who do not fulfill their religious obligations or who show signs of unacceptable traits or behavior. Conservative Muslim parents commonly use corporal punishment and they think it is an effective disciplinary measure.

In contrast to previous studies, Unnever and Cullen (2009) claimed that religious beliefs may also increase people's empathy for criminals rather than their punitiveness. Empathy is associated with believing offenders are regretful and giving them a second chance. Consequently, religious beliefs may generate more support for rehabilitation as opposed to a punitive punishment. Unnever et al. (2005) also claimed that people who are more forgiving, more compassionate, and have a close personal relationship with a loving God are less likely to support punitive crime control policies. In a related study, Applegate et al. (2000) examined the effects of compassionate religious beliefs (i.e., forgiveness) on correctional attitudes. Their research supported that those respondents who were more forgiving were more supportive of offenders' treatment and were less punitive. Applegate et al. also asserted that belief in forgiveness as well as conservative religious beliefs may shape how Americans think about crime.

Apart from the effects of religion and politics on punishment, researchers have also examined factors such as age, education, and gender. For instance, Langworthy and Whitehead (1986) examined people's attitudes towards punishment according to their membership in particular socio-demographic categories. Their research pointed out that older people, who are more vulnerable, may be more fearful and thus more punitive than younger people, who are less vulnerable. War and Ellison (2000) found that because older people tend to have more empathy toward crime victims than toward offenders, they are more punitive than are younger people (Warr and Ellison, 2000). Older people are also more likely to have children; fear of criminal victimization for their children may make them less empathetic toward criminal offenders.

Langworthy and Whitehead (1986) also investigated the role of gender in attitudes towards punishment. They expected to find that women are more fearful and thus more punitive than men; however, their research found that men, not women, were more punitive. Applegate, Cullen, and Fisher (2002) explained that women are less punitive in their response to crime because of their greater concern for the well-being of others. Also, Unnever and Cullen (2009) suggested that the compassionate personality of women may make it easier to empathetically identify with criminals, leading them to prefer more lenient punishments for criminal offenders. Sanders and Hamilton (1987) found no gender differences in punishment norms, while Gault (1997) discovered that men were more likely than women to support punitive political policies.

Evidence suggests that education is the strongest predictor of punitiveness, with more highly educated people being less punitive (Gelb, 2011). According to Dowler (2003), one reason that people who have a college education are more likely to hold non-

punitive attitudes may be that education helps people recognize the inequalities of the justice system and determine that solutions to the "crime problem" may be better served by policies of reintegration or rehabilitation (Applegate et al., 2000; Grasmick et al., 1993; Dowler, 2003).

In sum, numerous studies have shown that more religious people tend to support more severe punishments than less religious people in their response to crime (Ellison, 1991; Grasmick et al., 1993; Jacobs and Carmichael, 2004; Grasmick and McGill, 1994). Studies show that those who support fundamentalist or/and conservative attitudes commonly hold retributive beliefs about punishment. Also, to understand perceptions about punishment, age, gender, and education are commonly used as control variables. Most studies find that older people, men, and less educated people are more punitive in their responses to crime (Warr and Ellison, 2000; Applegate et al., 2000; Grasmick et al., 1993; Dowler, 2003; Ellison, 1991; Jacobs and Carmichael, 2004; Grasmick and McGill, 1994).

Confidence in the police and in the justice system

Confidence in an institution requires that people believe in and support the institution. Trusting an institution entails having confidence that the institution is efficient, reliable, able to achieve its duties, and fair (Devos et. al., 2002). All societies create organizations and authorities whose purpose is to maintain social order. Two key institutions, the police and the courts, work cooperatively to create and enforce laws and regulations that shape public conduct in socially desirable ways. Societies cannot survive without being able to enforce their rules (Tyler and Huo, 2002).

Confidence is a conviction that the justice system performs successfully and reasonably and that it represents the concerns and principles of the society. Fairness is essential for all confidence relations, including the public's relations with the police and the justice system. Fairness focuses on public ideas about whether services are distributed equally to all groups or whether the public is receiving what it deserves (Bradford et. al., 2008). Confidence not only affects an individual organization, but also influences society as a whole. According to Alesina and Ferrara (2002), when people trust organizations, they function better and governments are more efficient. Therefore, more trust brings more success in a country because it shapes people's responses to the law and the legitimacy of legal authorities (Tyler & Huo, 2002).

Trust shapes public willingness to obey legal authorities and this willingness is sign of the legitimacy of authorities (Tyler & Huo, 2002). Legitimacy is a belief that affects people's motivation to cooperate with, and defer to, legal authorities. Confidence and legitimacy are essential, especially with respect to the police and the justice system, because they promote support and cooperation (Hohl et al., 2010). When legitimacy is weakened, legal authorities, individuals, commodities, and societies are damaged (Jesilow et. al., 1995). People's beliefs in the legitimacy of police and the courts affect their tendency toward self-regulation, their personal responsibility for following laws, accepting the decisions of legal authorities, and their willingness to defer voluntarily to individual police officers and judges (Tyler & Huo, 2002).

The functions of the police and the justice systems shape the quality of life in a city or a country. If these systems work better, people live in serenity (Salvatore et. al., 2013). Police officers and court officials are the "face" of the criminal justice system.

However, public attitudes toward the criminal justice system have focused primarily on police officers because they are citizens' most frequent (and sometimes only) contact with the legal system. That is, they are the most visible representatives and they represent prototypical authorities (Bradford et. al., 2008; Jesilow et. al., 1995). Moreover, police are the system's primary agents to detect and solve crimes and to help people (Jesilow et. al., 1995).

Building trust for any organization is essential, but it is critical to the fight against crime. According to Tilly (1985), a government's legitimacy comes from its power and force. The government uses this power and force to achieve its responsibility for protecting citizens from threats. Tilly claimed that before the establishment of the modern state, the state's use of power was not legitimate. The state offered protection to its citizens like a mafia groups that created a threat themselves and then provide protection from that threat. Similarly, to monopolize the power, the states create a threat, but there is no enemy except the states. He gave the example of piracy and Robin Hood and analyzed how the modern state evolved in a way to possess permanent, professional military and police forces that could regulate the state's rules and monopolize power. He defined the sale of the protection by the state as the "forced sale of protection" and showed how citizens have no choice but to accept the state's authority.

Trust and confidence are at the heart of policing in the modern world. Members of the community need to trust their police officers and be confident that they will be respected and treated fairly. The other side of the concern is that the police need to gain the trust and confidence of all members of the community (Kabukcu, 2006). Confidence in the police system is an indicator of public satisfaction because the public is the

consumer of police services (Cao, Stack, & Sun, 1998). The more positive people's perceptions are about the legitimacy of the police, the more confidence they have in them. Increased confidence in the police also increases citizens' cooperation with the police and their willingness to obey the law (Kirmizidag, 2015). In contrast, decreased confidence in the police may result in a reluctance to report crimes. When public confidence in the police is low, citizens may not report crimes or call for services and assistance (Jang et. al., 2010). Without community support and information, the police cannot fulfill their obligations (Cao and Burton, 2006).

Individuals from different societies with various cultures, religions, and political backgrounds may develop different attitudes toward legal authorities (Jang, Joo, & Zhao, 2010). There are several studies that have examined the factors associated with confidence across different countries. Newton and Norris (1999) examined the relationship between social trust and institutional confidence. They used the World Value Survey to compare public support for some institutions, such as parliament, civil services, the legal system, the police, and the army, in 17 nations including Spain, France, Canada, the United States, and Denmark. Their research showed that confidence is not affected by social attitudes or behavior. Instead, the performance of governments and their political characteristics define citizens' confidence in the police and other institutions. In countries like Norway, Denmark, and Canada, high social trust is accompanied by considerable public confidence in the police. In contrast, countries like France, Belgium, and Italy display the opposite tendency, with suspicion of other citizens going hand-in-hand with minimal confidence in the police. Most countries, such as Japan, the Netherlands, and

Britain, are predictably scattered along the middle of the diagonal. Similar patterns are found for confidence in the legal system (Newton & Norris, 1999).

Kaariainen (2007) discussed public trust towards the police in European countries. The quality and structure of the system of government indeed affected the degree of citizens' trust in the police. In particular, the level of corruption in the government clearly decreased trust in the police and probably in other public service institutions as well.

Apart from the level of corruption and the performance of governments and their political characteristics, there are several studies suggesting that religiosity affects public confidence in the police and the justice system.

Effects of religiosity on confidence

Evidence suggests that religiosity affects both people's behavior and their beliefs about various social issues. Even though the effects of religiosity have been examined in many different fields, there are few theoretical explanations available about its effect on public confidence in legal authorities because religiosity is usually used as a control variable. According to Guiso and colleagues (2003), religious people trust others, the government, and the legal system more than do non-religious people. Moreover, they tend to be less willing to break the laws because religious people are more likely to follow rules mandated by authority and tend to be less critical toward authorities (Okumus, 2005).

Religious people may be more likely to cooperate with legal authorities by, for example, reporting a crime to the police (Becker & Dhingra, 2001). One reason for this may be because religious associations serve as an important platform for social

connection. Voluntary associations such as religious groups bring people together to work on local problems (producing social order) and guide people to cooperate with police and the courts (Newton & Norris, 1999). Wisneski et al. (2009) also confirm that religiosity reflects a generalized willingness to trust authority, regardless of whether the authority is secular or religious. Belief in God and a generally high level of trust in religion influence trust in the authorities. Stronger religiosity would be associated with greater trust in authorities. Their research also showed that people with higher religiosity are more likely to trust the justice system.

Garza, Rossi, and Zaclicever (2009) conducted another important study about the relationship between religiosity and confidence. Their study examined the link between subjects' religiosity and trust in five key institutions: the government, the police, the armed forces, the judiciary, and banks in Latin America. The study's result showed that individual religiosity is positively correlated with trust in institutions. There is a positive relationship between religious practice and trust in the government, the police, and the judiciary.

Several studies have examined the relationship between confidence in the police and religiosity. For example, Cao and Zhao (2005) compared levels of confidence in the police in nine Latin American nations to that of the United States. According to their study, confidence in the police was positively related to one's religiosity in Latin America, but a similar relationship was not found in the United States. Cao and Zhao attributed this difference to church attendance, which is higher in Latin America. Religious diversity in the U.S. may decrease church attendance.

The relationship between religiosity and confidence in criminal justice institutions also differs by age, gender, and level of education. The older people are, the higher their confidence in the police since they more likely see criminal justice institutions as maintaining safety and order (Cao, Stack, & Sun, 1998; Jang et al. 2010; Jesilow et al., 1995). The young may have less confidence in authorities because they think legal authorities and rules restrict their freedoms and therefore they are inclined to possess negative views (Reisig and Correia, 1997). In addition to young people, men and more educated people have less confidence because they are more critical of the criminal justice system (Thompson and Lee, 2004; Jang et al. 2010). Cao and Zhao (2005) claimed that education makes people value freedom more, thereby decreasing their confidence in the police because they represent the long arm of the government and because they represent the oppressive part of a democratic government.

The U.S. context

Religiosity and punitiveness in the U.S.

The United States is one of the best cases to analyze the effects of religiosity on public perception about punishment and confidence in criminal justice institutions because the U.S. differs from other developed democratic countries in its level of religiosity. Although there is significant religious diversity in the United States, more than 80 percent of Americans identify themselves as Christian (ARDA, 2014). Crabtree and Pelham (2009) examined levels of religiosity using Gallup Poll data from 143 countries and territories for the years 2006, 2007, and 2008. Across all populations, the median proportion of residents who said religion was important in their daily lives was 82%. Americans fell well below that midpoint, at 65%. A population's religiosity level is

strongly related to its average standard of living. Social scientists have stated that Americans' high level of religiosity is relative to other *rich-world* populations. Among 27 countries generally seen as part of the developed world, the median proportion of those who say religion is important in their lives is just 38%. From this point of view, the fact that two-thirds of Americans respond this way makes them look extremely devout (Crabtree & Pelham, 2009). The Pew Global Attitudes Project (2002) confirmed this finding that religion is more significant for Americans than for people in other prosperous countries. Almost sixty percent of Americans mention religion as being very important in their lives. This is approximately two times higher than in Canada (30%) and much higher than in Japan (12%), Italy (27%), Germany (21%), and France (11%). Levels of religiosity in the U.S. are closer to developing countries than to developed countries like Turkey (65%). This is an important difference to consider when examining the effects of religiosity on public perceptions about punishment and confidence in the police and the justice system in the U.S.

In the U.S., religion was also influential in the development of the criminal justice system. The first settlers to America brought with them the English system of common law. Many colonial crime codes were defined in biblical terms. Over the years, Americans have developed mechanisms that institute and enforce rules of society as well as assign responsibility and punish offenders (Hartzell, 2015).

Simon (2007) described the history of public perceptions about punishment in America. In the 1960s, people were more supportive of rehabilitating offenders because they attributed crime to social problems such as poverty and lack of education. However, they now think offenders do not deserve rehabilitation; instead, they think offenders

should be removed from the community by being imprisoned. Americans' punitiveness has grown dramatically since 1960. More and more people are excluded from community life through incarceration and other sanctions. A higher percentage of the population is involved in the criminal justice system in the United States than in any other developed country (Ghandoosh, 2014). The United States has the highest incarceration rate in the world (Nagin et al., 2009; Kugler et al., 2013), and this rate is five times higher than other countries (Tsai & Scommegna, 2012). Also, one out of every nine prisoners is serving a life sentence (Ghandoosh, 2014). Furthermore, the U.S. continues to use the death penalty even though almost all Western democracies have banned it (Kugler et al., 2013).

Kugler et al. (2013) investigated differences in punitive attitudes between Americans and Germans. They found that Americans adopt longer sentences, support retribution, and are less supportive of rehabilitation. For both minor and major crimes, Americans impose more severe sentences than Germans. For instance, Germans assigned a sentence of 30 years for murder, whereas Americans assigned life sentences. For armed robbery, Germans assigned a sentence of over 6 months and Americans assign a sentence of over one year (Kugler et al., 2013). Wilson and Petersilia (2010) also compared the crime and criminal justice policies of different nations. According to their research, the United States is more punitive than other industrialized countries. The United States has higher levels of serious violence than other developed nations, but similar levels of minor violence and property crime. Moreover, the U.S. is more punitive than other countries toward less severe offenses like property crimes and drug offenses.

Confidence in criminal justice institutions in the U.S.

Several studies have examined the public's satisfaction, trust, and confidence in legal authorities in the U.S. In general, they have found that when the authority is neutral and unbiased, respectful, and fair, there is a high level of public confidence, cooperation, and willingness to participate. Although Americans value freedom and individualism, and are deeply suspicious about state power, they have higher confidence in legal authorities than do other Western countries. Furthermore, although American police are often tainted by new scandals, empirical studies have shown that Americans generally hold positive attitudes toward legal authorities, especially the police (Cao, 2001).

According to the most recent Gallup poll (2015), more than half of Americans remain confident in the police. Even though levels of confidence in the police are lower compared to previous years, the police are still one of the institutions ranking highest in confidence. Overall, 25% of Americans say they have a great deal of confidence in the police, 27% report having quite a lot of confidence, 30% have some confidence, 16% have very little confidence, and only 2% have no confidence. Americans are also confident in newspapers (24%), the presidency (33%), the church or organized religion (42%), and the medical system (37%).

Several studies state that confidence levels in the U.S. are higher than some other nations. For instance, Cao and Huo (2001) compared public confidence levels in the police in China and in the United States. The study maintained that the public in the U.S. has greater confidence in the police than do their Chinese counterparts. According to Cao and Huo, low levels of public confidence in the police in China may well be an extension of the low level of public confidence in the regime in general. In addition, Cao, Stack,

and Sun (1998) compared confidence levels in Japan and the U.S. The findings showed that the Japanese actually have less confidence in their police than do Americans. Americans generally have high levels of confidence in the police, but this confidence was not equally distributed among citizens and often varied across larger social aggregations. Specifically, the African Americans less likely have confidence in police (Jang, Joo, & Zhao, 2010).

The Turkish context

There are some important differences between the U.S. and Turkey, like their religious homogeneity. While the U.S. population is separated into many different religions and religious affiliations, the Turkish population is more homogenous. According to Pew Research Center, in 2007 78% of Americans were Christian; 51.3% of those were Protestant, 23.9% were Catholic, and 0.6% were Orthodox. As reported by the Central Intelligence Agency in 2005, 99% of Turkish people were Muslim; 78% of those were Sunni and 21% were Shia. These percentages illustrate how Turkey is religiously more homogenous than the U.S.

Turkey and the U.S. also differ in regard of their crime rates. European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, affiliated with the United Nations published international comparison of crime statistics. This comparisons were based on police recorded cases in 2006 and based on six of the most serious crimes: intentional homicide, rape, robbery, assault, causing serious bodily harm, burglary, and vehicle theft. According to results, intentional homicide 5.0 in the U.S. and 3.3 in Turkey; rape 28.6 in the U.S. and 1.5 in Turkey; robbery 133 in the U.S. and 11 in Turkey; assault 262 in the U.S. and 218 in Turkey; burglary 715 in the U.S. and 161 in Turkey; and vehicle theft

258 in the U.S. and 25 in Turkey for per 100,000 population (Cowen, 2010). Therefore, it may be said that police recorded crime rate is somewhat higher in the U.S. than in Turkey.

On the other hand, the two countries are similar in that they are both democratic and religious nations and therefore comparing the U.S. and Turkey would be beneficial. The Turkish context is unique because most studies in criminology have been conducted in Europe and the United States. Furthermore, most studies have relied on data from largely Christian populations and therefore analyzing a Muslim population helps address this limitation.

According to Fukuyama (2001) and others, the Islamic world has the fewest democracies and Turkey is the Muslim world's original and still most assertive secular state, although it has devout members of Islamic faith (Fukuyama, 2001; Lewis, 1994; Costopoulos, 2005; Terrill, 2013). Fukuyama claimed that a liberal democracy and free markets require certain values to work in societies and these values' origins may not be entirely rational. It is not an accident that modern liberal democracy emerged first in the Christian West, and then in regions such as East Asia, Latin America, Orthodox Europe, South Asia, and Africa. However, the fundamentalist versions of Islam that have dominated in recent years make Muslim societies particularly resistant to modernity. Of all contemporary cultural systems, the Islamic world has the fewest democracies and only Turkey alone qualifies (Fukuyama, 2001).

According to Lewis (1994), in Turkey democracy is limited and formal and may not contain completely democratic features such as respect for civic, human, and minority rights. However, it is the only Muslim democracy that can be measured and defined.

Also, it offers the best chance for securing and maintaining those other rights that are an essential part of a free society. Lewis (1994) listed three major reasons to explain the relative success of democracy in Turkey. First, Turkey was never colonized and was never subject to imperial rule or domination, as were almost all the Islamic lands of Asia and Africa. And democratic institutions were neither imposed by the victors, as happened in the defeated Axis countries, nor bequeathed by departing imperialists, as happened in the former British and French dependencies, but were introduced by the free choice of the Turks themselves. Second, Turkey, of all the Muslim countries, has had the longest and closest contact with the West, dating back almost to the beginnings of the Ottoman state, and made a deliberate choice for westernization and for a Westward political orientation. Third, Turkey is the only Muslim country that, has achieved significant economic growth and a substantial rise in the standard of living, and this by its own efforts, not by some fortunate accident, such as the presence of oil in the subsoil. Turkish economic growth was not due to resources discovered by others and used by others for purposes invented by others. It was due to the emergence of new attitudes to economic activity, of new policies for economic development, and of new social elements able to put these policies into effect.

The road to democracy has not been easy in Turkey. Secularism was the main aim of founders of the Republic of Turkey. They wanted to transform Turkey into a modern, secular, and Western-style state (Akbaba and Morrison, 2012). A series of radical, social, and political reforms were instituted such as the abolition of the caliphate (i.e., a form of Islamic government led by a leader of the entire Muslim community and believed to be the successor to the Prophet Mohammed), the banning of religious clothing, and the

obliteration of Sharia (i.e., Islamic legal system) courts. The goal was to eliminate religion from the public sphere and simply relegate it to the private sphere (Akbaba and Morrison, 2012). Religious discourse had been strictly controlled by multiple mechanisms. For instance the Ministry of Religious Affairs was established to regulate, control, and oversee all religious activity in the country. This entity was, and still is, responsible for the administration and organization of religious institutions, as well as for providing religious education in schools (Akbaba and Morrison, 2012). Also, the military was another powerful control mechanism over religion. In addition to protecting the territorial integrity of the country, the military was responsible for the preservation of the unitary and secular character of the country. Three military interventions happened in 1960, 1971, and 1980. Also, in 1995 an Islamic party won the election and then Islam became more visible in public life. After two years, the military forced the president of this political party to resign (Akbaba and Morrison, 2012). According to Akbaba and Morrison (2012), these military interventions interrupted democratic processes and led to polarization of the political system in Turkey.

Religiosity and punitiveness in Turkey

Even though Turkey has tried to create a strong tradition of secularism, it is still a religious nation. According to Pew Research Center (2002), 65% of people say religion is important in their lives. This figure is much higher than European countries such as Great Britain (33%), Germany (21%), Russia (14%), Bulgaria (13), and France (11%) some Asian countries such as Korea (25%), Japan (12%). Also, the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) conducted a study that compared religious attitudes. There are 45

members of ISSP and Turkey is one of them. The research found that 95% of people in Turkey believe in God (Carkoglu & Kalaycioglu, 2009).

Muslims make up more than 90 percent of the population in Turkey (PRC, 2013). Muslims' holy book is the Quran and the ethical principles set down in Islam's holy book are known as Sharia (PRC, 2013). Islamic Law (sharia) offers moral and legal guidance for nearly all aspects of Muslims' life, from marriage and divorce to inheritance and contracts and criminal punishments.

According to Islamic criminal procedure, to commit a crime is a sin and retaliation is mandatory because crimes affect God's rules that defend higher values and welfare. The Quran prescribes these rules and believers' lives should be based upon them (Halemm et al. 2003). According to followers of Islam, punishment is essential to correct a crime. It seeks to prevent crime before its occurrence and is a warning against its repetition. It therefore has both a preventive and a curative role. Sinful criminals damage the community as a whole and punishments benefit the whole of the community (Halemm et al. 2003).

The concerned authorities determine the type and degree of punishment needed to implement justice, so different punishments may be awarded for one crime, depending on the different circumstances surrounding the crime and the criminal (Halemm et al. 2003). For some crimes, however, punishments are prescribed in a specific manner. With crimes like burglary, for example, the punishment is not measured in proportion to the degree of harm sustained by the victim; this offence has been penalized by amputating a hand in order to reach the aims of giving a lesson and being a deterrent. These kinds of crimes are perceived by God as intolerable, and thus deserve no less than the full application of their

prescribed punishments. As such, commission of these crimes must be followed by application of the required penal sanctions (Halemm et al. 2003).

The specific punishments that deter the criminal in Islam and prevent crime are the following: imprisonment; banishment and exile from the place of the crime and the city in which it was perpetrated; death; reprimand and rebuke; threat; boycott; publicizing of the crime perpetrated; financial punishment by the seizing or destroying of wealth or assets; and flogging, which is often the subject of much controversy (Halemm et al. 2003).

Flogging is one of the corporal punishments prescribed in the Qur'an. According to Halemm et al. (2003), there is a physical effect of this punishment on the one who is flogged, which directly encourages offenders to desist from crime now and in the future. In addition they support that this punishment contains a psychological pain far greater than any physical pain, which again serves as a deterrent. For instance, flogging is mentioned in the Quran:

“The [unmarried] woman or [unmarried] man found guilty of sexual intercourse - lash each one of them with a hundred lashes, and do not be taken by pity for them in the religion of Allah, if you should believe in Allah and the Last Day. And let a group of the believers witness their punishment” (Q.24:2)

According to Halemm et al. (2003), another benefit of flogging is that it can be awarded in cases of all minor and major crimes, depending on the seriousness of the offence. Also, flogging punishes only the offender. In this way, it differs from punishments such as imprisonment, which also harm the prisoner's family and children, and also represents a waste of the community's resources (Halemm et al., 2003).

Moreover, according to Islamic law supporters, this punishment is at times sufficient to replace other punishments, such as imprisonment, which frequently brings criminals into

contact with one another and provides opportunities for them to learn each other's criminal ways (Halemm et al. 2003).

Murder is identified as the most terrible crime in the Qur'an. The Qur'an allows execution of murderers; however, it also recommends patience. It advises allowing time and opportunity for forgiveness, reconciliation, and reform (Halemm et al. 2003). For example, the Qur'an says, "And if you decide to punish, then punish with the like of that with which you were afflicted. But if you show patience, it is certainly best for those who remain patient" (Q.16:126).

Although the aforementioned punishments exist in Sharia, they have not been applied in Turkey since 1924 with the Law Regarding the Abolition of Islamic Law Courts and Amendments Regarding the Court Organization (Grigoriadis, 2013). The Republic of Turkey was established in 1923 and it became one of the successor states of the Ottoman Empire (Howard, 1958). Even though most of the population was Muslim, religion and the state were separated in Turkey. Traditional sharia courts were eliminated in the 1920s (PRC, 2013). Within the Ottoman, Turks generally identified themselves primarily as Muslims. During the transition from the Ottoman to the Turkish republic, Turkey followed Western models to become a nation-state (Shoen, 2013). Islam was separated from Turkish national identity (Howard, 1958). After a separation of national and religious identity, people of different religions were able to consider themselves as belonging to the same nation (Shoen, 2013). In 1926, the new Turkish Penal Code (inspired by the Italian Penal Code of 1889) came into operation. Although this new penal code has been modified several times to adapt to the conditions of the country, its essence has been preserved (Ansay & Wallace, 2011). It may be said that the Turkish

Penal Code did not entirely penetrate Islam. However, it is rational to expect that Islamic perceptions and levels of religiosity may affect culture, tradition, and, in turn public opinion in Turkey.

Although there have been many studies on punitiveness conducted in Europe and the United States, much less is known about Turkey. Ayten (2009) conducted one of the few studies on this topic. This study found that Islam encourages people to forgive each other. To illustrate the relationships among forgiveness, socio-demographics variables, and religiosity, Ayten examined a Muslim sample from Istanbul-Turkey. Ayten found no link between forgiveness and socio-economic variables, but religious people were more forgiving and had fewer revenge feelings. The study showed that women were more forgiving than were men and that older people tend to be more forgiving than younger people.

Confidence in criminal justice institutions in Turkey

Apart from religiosity and public opinion about punishment, there are some differences between the U.S. and Turkish criminal justice system. Police duties are generally similar in both countries; they include enforcing laws, maintaining order, protecting citizens, and preventing crimes (Nalla & Boke, 2011). However, Turkey has a centralized police organization and the U.S. has a decentralized system. The U.S police system is community-oriented in nature. Turkish police officers perceive that their first priority is to serve the government rather than the citizen, and thus police are always seen as government agents and not as public servants (Nalla & Boke, 2011). In addition, there are some differences between the U.S. and Turkish justice systems. In general, while Turkey has a centralized court system, the U.S. court system is divided into two

administratively separate systems; the federal and the state. Erhan (1968) claims that centralized system may accelerate to take a decision. Also, the Turkish court system does not recognize the concept of the jury. This absence brings some advantages, like not losing time to choosing a jury (Erhan, 1968).

Studies conducted in Turkey show that confidence levels in the police and the justice system are getting lower each year. For example, between 2011 and 2013, Kadir Has University conducted a study of adult respondents in 26 different cities (Aydin et al., 2014). The results showed that confidence in the justice system is decreasing year by year in Turkey. Approximately one out of four people trusted the justice system in 2013. Levels of public trust in the justice system were 38.8% in 2011, 32.7% in 2012, and 26.5% in 2013. Furthermore, the percentage of people who do not trust the justice system was almost 50.4% in 2013 (Aydin et al., 2014). Apart from confidence in the justice system, confidence in the president, military, politicians, media, and the police were also measured in the research. The most dramatic decreases were for confidence in the police system. While trust in the police was 52.7% in 2011, it declined to 35.3% in 2013 (Unal, 2014). According to Dag Medya (2014), this decrease is due in part to the Gezi Park Protests. In 2013, the Turkish government wanted to cut down trees and build a shopping center in the Gezi Park in Istanbul. People protested this construction and started a peaceful protest aimed at saving the trees in the Gezi Park (The Guardian, 2014). Police used unnecessary and abusive force, including tear gas, pepper spray, water cannons, beatings, rubber bullets, and live ammunition on protestors. The public was irritated because of the government's violent reaction and protests swept across Turkey. Almost one month later, eight people died, at least four as a result of police violence. About

8,000 people were injured, 104 sustained serious head injuries, and 11 people lost an eye, most as a result of plastic bullets fired by the police. People who had supported, reported on, or even tweeted the protests lost their jobs. Members of the public believe that police officers are responsible for abuses to justice (Amnesty International, 2013).

Even though confidence levels seem low in Turkey, comparison to some nations shows that confidence in the police is actually higher than some other countries. For example, Cao and Burton (2006) analyzed data from the European and World Values Surveys to demonstrate cross-national public opinions toward the police. They examined levels of public confidence in the police in Turkey and compared their findings to 24 members of the EU (e.g., France, Germany, Greece, and Poland), to Turkey's neighboring countries (e.g., Iran, Bulgaria, Romania, and Azerbaijan), and to other Muslim nations (e.g., Morocco, Iran, Pakistan, and Egypt). Their data analysis revealed that more than two-thirds (71%) of Turkish respondents said that they had either a great deal of confidence or quite a lot of confidence in their police. The results suggest that support for the Turkish police ranks highly compared to 24 nations within the EU. Turkey's percentage is among the top 33 percent of all nations in the EU. Countries that have higher levels of confidence than Turkey include Denmark (91%), Finland (90%), Ireland (86%), Austria (75%), Sweden (75%), and Germany (71%). Nations with lower levels of confidence include Great Britain (68.8%), Italy (67.3%), The Netherlands (64%), Spain (59%), and Belgium (55%). Moreover, this study showed that public confidence in the police is higher for Turkey (70.7%) than for its neighboring countries, including Iran (61%), Bulgaria (47%), Russia (29%), and Greece (28%). Also, regarding their level of confidence in the police, Turkey is third among 12 Muslim nations. Even

though Jordan (91%) and Egypt (87%) state higher public rankings than Turkey (70.7%), several Muslim countries such as Albania (65%), Iran (61%), Azerbaijan (41%), and Pakistan (29%) fall behind Turkey.

Confidence in the legal authorities is high in Turkey because even when the police were criticized by the West for their violation of human rights, they gained public support for their tough action against minorities. This police action was highly supported by the Turkish majority, most notably by political elites (Cao and Burton, 2006). Relatedly, according to Kirmizag (2015), minorities (e.g., Shia, Kurdish people) have less confidence than others in Turkey.

In sum, religious beliefs affect people's attitudes and opinions, including their perceptions about punishment and their confidence in legal authorities. Religious people are more likely to support harsh punishments like incarceration and the death penalty than are non-religious people. These levels of punitiveness in Turkey are likely than those in the U.S. Previous studies have also shown that more religious people tend to have more confidence in the police and the justice system. The success of the police and the courts depends on public confidence, because when people trust these organizations, they are more likely to support and cooperate with them. Levels of confidence in the police and in the justice system are likely higher in Turkey than in the U.S.

CHAPTER III

DATA AND METHODS

This research uses data from the United States and Turkey to examine how religiosity affects public attitudes about punitiveness and confidence in criminal justice institutions. Specifically, this study will start by analyzing how respondents' religious attitudes and behaviors affect their beliefs about the importance of severe punishment as a characteristic of democracy. Next, it will examine how religiosity affects respondents' confidence in the police and the justice system. Finally, it will compare the results from the United States to those of Turkey. Based on prior research, several hypotheses can be generated that will be tested in this project.

Research hypotheses

Hypothesis 1

People who are more religious are more punitive. For the purpose of the current study, punitiveness refers to people's beliefs about the importance of severe punishment as a characteristic of democracy. Numerous studies have shown that more religious people tend to be more punitive than less religious people in their response to crime. They are more likely support harsh punishments like incarceration and the death penalty (Ellison, 1991; Grasmick et al., 1993; Jacobs and Carmichael, 2004; Grasmick and McGill, 1994; Gelb, 2011). Level of religiosity is important because it shapes the frequency of using severe criminal sentences (Jacobs and Carmichael, 2004).

Because the WVS asks about severe punishment as a characteristic of democracy, it is also important to consider how religion relates to feelings about democracy. Belonging to religious organizations, being politically active, and discussing politics with others positively influences people's attitudes about democracy. People who are members of a religious organization or are religiously dedicated, engaged in political and social networks, and hold higher social status, view democracy very positively (Meyer, Tope, and Price, 2008). According to previous studies, higher levels of religiosity increase beliefs about the importance of democracy among both Christians and Muslims (Grundel and Maliepaard, 2012; Meyer et al., 2008; Bratton, 2003; Patterson, 2004).

Hypothesis 2

Levels of punitiveness (i.e., beliefs about severe punishment as a characteristic of democracy) are higher in Turkey than in the U.S. While the U.S. is more diverse in its religious makeup, Turkey is more homogenous. Religious homogeneity likely represents the shared cultural and political influence of policies and it affects formal and informal case processing and sentencing norms. Homogeneous religious communities favor more punitive criminal sanctions and incarceration (Ulmer et al., 2008). Therefore, Turkish communities may favor more punitive criminal sanctions than the U.S.

If people feel vulnerable and insecure, rationally or not, they often look for someone, something, or some group to blame. Hard economic times, rapid social change, beliefs about the loss of respect and discipline in society, and concerns about social cohesion and perceived social threat lead people to feel more vulnerable and insecure. These feelings may, in turn, lead to a more punitive-minded general public (Hardisty, 2004; Tyler and Boeckann, 1997; King and Maruna, 2009). Compared to the U.S.,

Turkish people are more likely to feel vulnerable and insecure because Turkey has an unstable economy (Boratav et al., 1996), is politically unstable (e.g., three military interventions that is military force into the current governance; Akbaba and Morrison, 2012), and is more likely to be under terrorist attacks (Global Terrorism Index, 2014). Because people are more likely to desire conformity, social order, and discipline, they look to legal institutions to punish threats to collective security. Concerns about social cohesion and feeling of insecurity may lead Turkish people to support more severe punishments.

Hypothesis 3

People who are more religious tend to have more confidence in the police and in the justice system. Religiosity reflects a generalized willingness to trust authority, regardless of whether the authority is secular or religious. Belief in God and a generally high level of trust in religion influences confidence in the authorities. Stronger religiosity would be associated with greater trust in authorities (Wisneski et al., 2009). If this is true, I would expect to find that people who are religious have more confidence in the police and in the justice system.

Hypothesis 4

Levels of confidence in the police and in the justice system are higher in Turkey than in the U.S. Individuals from different societies (with their differing cultures and religions) may develop different attitudes toward the police and the justice system (Cao and Huo, 2001). Public confidence in the legal authorities tends to increase when society becomes more democratic (Cao and Zhao, 2005). Confidence in the legal authorities is

high in Turkey because Turkey has become more democratic over the years and the Turkish criminal justice system increasingly behave in a more popular way to appeal to the mainstream of the Turkish public. Even when the West criticized Turkish police for their violations of human rights, they gained public support for their tough actions against minorities. This police action was highly supported by the Turkish majority, most notably by political elites (Cao and Burton, 2006). I would expect that confidence in the police and the justice system are higher in Turkey than in the U.S.

Data

To test these hypotheses, I use data from the World Value Survey (WVS). WVS is a non-profit organization that includes a global network of social scientists investigating values and their effects on social and political life. The WVS has completed six waves of surveys from 1981 to 2012. They have used a standardized questionnaire to analyze more deeply the causes and consequences of change in the beliefs and values concerning religion, democracy, political participation, economic developments, environmental protection, gender roles, subjective well-being, social capital, and good governance. Research has been conducted in almost 100 countries and each country conducts its own national survey (WVS, 2015).

I will use Wave 5 (2005-2008) of the WVS for the current study. Although Wave 6 is now available, it will not be used because there are no questions about punitiveness. Wave 5 was conducted in over 40 countries. Of these 40 countries, only the United States and Turkey will be used.

The U.S data were collected in 2006. In general, a simple random sample was used from active panel members who were 18 years of age and older. When participants

were selected, they received a letter about the questionnaire by email. Then, once the survey was available, they received a second email that included the survey. If respondents did not contribute, they received a reminder email. (WebTV appliances (i.e., a web camera designed to facilitate interviewing) were used for face-to-face interviews.) Of the 1,710 people who were selected from the panel to participate in the survey, 1,249 responded. The response rate is 73.04%.

Turkish data were collected in 2007 using personal face-to-face interviews. Of the 1,815 adults who were randomly selected, 1,346 completed the survey. The response rate is 74.15%. The survey sampling consisted of three steps. First, blocks of 150 households each were randomly selected. Second, addresses inside the blocks were randomly selected. Third, a randomly selected individual was interviewed within the household. Another random selection of households, using NUTS-1¹, was made within the same statistical block in cases of invalid addresses and hard refusals.

Dependent variables

In prior research, public perceptions about punishment have been measured in several ways, including support for the death penalty, for life sentences, and/or for harsher local courts (Unnever et al. 2005). In the current study, one question will be used to measure *public attitudes toward punishment*: “How essential do you think ‘criminals are severely punished’ is as a characteristic of democracy?” This measure is coded on a

¹ There are 12 Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) in Turkey. This system subdivides of countries for statistical purposes.

Likert scale ranging from 1 = “not an essential characteristic of democracy” to 10 = “an essential characteristic of democracy.”

Two items will be used to measure confidence in the criminal justice system: confidence in the police and confidence in the justice system. *Confidence in the police* (“Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the police?”) is coded as 1 = “none at all,” 2 = “not very much,” 3 = “a great deal,” and 4 = “quite a lot.” These categories were collapsed to create a dichotomous variable coded 0 for “none at all or not very much” and 1 for “a great deal or quite a lot.” *Confidence in the justice system* (“Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the justice system?”) is coded as 1 = “none at all,” 2 = “not very much,” 3 = “a great deal,” and 4 = “quite a lot.” Again, these categories were collapsed to create a dichotomous variable coded 0 for “none at all or not very much” and 1 for “a great deal or quite a lot.”

Independent variables

Five separate measures will be used to measure religiosity, the primary independent variable:

1. *Religious importance*: “How important religion is in your life?” (coded 1 = “not at all important,” 2 = “not very important,” 3 = “rather important,” and 4 = “very important”)
2. *Membership in a religious organization*: “Could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of church or religious organization?” (coded 0 = “not a member” and 1 = “inactive member or active member”)
3. *Attendance at religious services*: “Apart from weddings, funeral and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?” (coded 1 = “never,” 2 = “less often,” 3 = “once a year,” 4 = “only holy days,” 5 = “once a month,” 6 = “once a week,” and 7 = “more than once a week”)

4. *Religious person*: “Independently of whether you attend religious services or not, would you say you are...?” (coded as 1 = "A religious person," 2 = "Not a religious person," 3 = "A convinced atheist," and 4 = "Other answer." However, to make a dummy variable recoded as 0 = “not a religious person or a convinced atheist and other answer” and 1 = “a religious person.”)
5. *Importance of God*: “How important is God in your life?” (coded on a scale ranging from 1 = “not at all” to 10 = “very”)

When analyzing the U.S. data, this study will also examine the effects of religious affiliation using the question “Do you belong to a religious denomination? If yes, which one?” This variable was originally coded as 9 different denominations (i.e., none, Buddhist, Hindu, Jew, Muslim, Orthodox, Protestant, Roman Catholic, and other) in the U.S. data. (Except none, Orthodox, Protestant, and Roman Catholic, rest of denominations recoded as "other"). However, I recoded and created five dummy variables (1) 1 = "None" and 0 = "Else," (2) 1 = "Orthodox" and 0 = "Else," (3) 1 = "Protestant" and 0 = "Else," (4) 1 = "Roman Catholic" and 0 = "Else," and (5) 1 = "Other" and 0 = "Else."

Three demographic variables will be included in the analyses. These are *gender* (0 = “female,” 1 = “male”), *age* (in years), and *education* (nine categories ranging from 1 = “no formal education” to 9 = “university-level education, with degree”).

Control variables

This study uses as control variables two items measuring public opinion about democracy: “How democratically is this country being governed today?” (coded on a Likert scale ranging from 1 = “not at all democratic” to 10 = “completely democratic”) and “How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically?”

(coded on a Likert scale ranging from 1 = “not at all important” to 10 = “absolutely important”).

Cases listed as “missing; not asked by interviewer, not asked,” “not applicable,” “no answer,” or “don’t know” were coded as missing for all variables.

Analysis Plan

The purpose of this study is to examine how religiosity affects public perceptions about punishment and public confidence in the police and the justice system. It further examines the effects of demographic variables such as age, gender, and education on these outcomes.

The analyses will proceed in three stages. First, I will conduct descriptive analyses of the two samples: the U.S. and Turkey. Second, I will present a correlation matrix showing the bivariate relationships among the independent and dependent variables. Third, I will use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to examine the effects of religiosity on public perceptions about punishment and binary logistic regression to examine its effects on confidence in the police and the courts. Finally, I will use a t-test and chi-square to determine whether any significant differences exist between the U.S. and Turkey in terms of their levels of public perceptions about punishment and chi-square will be used to determine confidence in the police and the justice system.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

This chapter begins by describing the results of the U.S. analyses. This includes a description of the sample, bivariate correlations among the independent and dependent variables, and the results of the regression analyses. Next, it describes the results of the Turkish analyses. This also includes a description of the sample, bivariate correlations among the independent and dependent variables, and the results of the regression analyses. Then, it compares results of the U.S. and those of Turkey.

U.S. Data

Descriptive analyses

The U.S. sample includes 1,249 respondents. As shown in Table 1, the sample includes equal proportions of males (50.0%) and females (50.0%). The average age of the sample is about 48. The most common highest educational level is technical/vocational type secondary school (33.3%), followed by university preparatory type secondary school (21.8%). All respondents completed at least primary school and 2.0% received university level education with degree. In terms of their religious affiliation, Protestants (33.6%) are the largest group, followed by no religious affiliation (26.2%), Roman Catholics (21.5%), others (18.4%), and Orthodox (0.3%). In addition, Table 1 shows that more than half (54.4%) of the participants mention that living in a country that is governed democratically is absolutely important. Only 7.8% of Americans state that the U.S. is

completely democratic today (i.e., a 10 on a 10-point scale); the median response is 7.0 ($M = 6.4$).

Table 1 indicates that 19.5% of participants believe severe punishment of criminals is an essential characteristic of democracy (i.e., a 10 on a 10-point scale). The median response is 7.0 ($M = 6.8$), which is above the scale midpoint of 5.0. At the opposite end of the spectrum, 5.5% of people think severe punishment of criminals is not an essential characteristic of democracy (i.e., a 1 on a 10-point scale). Table 1 also shows that while 73.3% of respondents have quite a lot or a great deal confidence in the police, only 58.2% of them have quite a lot or a great deal confidence in the justice system.

In terms of religiosity, Table 1 shows that almost half (46.8%) of respondents say that religion is very important in their life and only 8.2% of people say religion is not at all important. In addition, 65.8% of people report being a member (either an inactive member or an active member) of a church or religious organizations. Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, the percentage of people attending religious services is as follows: 12.3% attending more than once a week, 24.5% attending once a week, 10.8% of people attending once a month, 9.1% of people attending only on holy days, 4.3% attending once a year, 12.4% attending less often, and 26.6% attending never. Regardless of whether they attended religious services or not, 74.5% of Americans consider themselves a religious person. Over half (57%) of participants mention that God is very important in their life.

Table 4.1 Description of the U.S. Respondents in Wave 5 (2005-2008) of the World Value Survey

	Percent	Mean	Median	SD
Gender			1.0	0.5
Male	50.0			
Female	50.0			
Age (in years)		48.0	48.0	17.0
Education		5.8	6.0	1.3
No formal education	0.0			
Incomplete primary school	0.0			
Complete primary school	3.8			
Incomplete secondary school: tech./voc. type	11.4			
Complete secondary school: tech./voc. type	33.3			
Incomplete secondary school: univ.-prep. type	19.5			
Complete secondary school: univ.-prep. type	21.8			
Some university-level edu., without degree	8.2			
University-level education, with degree	2.0			
Religious Denomination			2.0	1.4
None	26.2			
Orthodox	0.3			
Protestant	33.6			
Roman Catholic	21.5			
Other	18.4			
Importance of democracy		8.7	10	1.9
Not at all important	1.1			
2	0.3			
3	0.7			
4	0.5			
5	8.0			
6	5.7			
7	5.1			
8	9.5			
9	14.8			
Absolutely important	54.4			
Democraticness in own country		6.4	7.0	2.3
Not at all democratic	4.2			
2	2.5			
3	4.8			
4	6.4			

Table 4.1 (continued)

5	16.8			
6	12.1			
7	17.8			
8	17.8			
9	9.9			
Completely democratic	7.8			
Importance of Severe Punishment		6.8	7.0	2.6
Not an essential characteristic of democracy	5.5			
2	2.9			
3	5.1			
4	4.3			
5	15.5			
6	9.2			
7	12.2			
8	12.9			
9	12.9			
An essential characteristic of democracy	19.5			
Confidence in the police		2.8	3.0	0.7
None at all	3.4			
Not very much	23.3			
Quite a lot	56.1			
A great deal	17.2			
Confidence in the Justice		2.6	3.0	0.7
None at all	5.5			
Not very much	36.4			
Quite a lot	49.0			
A great deal	9.2			
Importance of religion		3.1	3.0	1.0
Not at all important	8.2			
Not very important	19.2			
Rather important	25.8			
Very important	46.8			
Membership of religious organization		0.7	1.0	0.5
Not a member	34.2			
Inactive or active member	65.8			
Attending religious services		3.9	4.0	2.3
Never	26.6			
Less often	12.4			
Once a year	4.3			

Table 4.1 (continued)

Only holy days	9.1			
Once a month	10.8			
Once a week	24.5			
More than once a week	12.3			
Religious person		0.8	1.0	0.4
Not a religious person or a convinced atheist and other	25.5			
A religious person	74.5			
Importance of God		8.3	10.0	2.7
Not at all	5.3			
2	1.7			
3	2.3			
4	2.1			
5	5.2			
6	5.2			
7	5.3			
8	7.6			
9	8.5			
Very	57.0			

(N=1249)

Bivariate correlations

I calculated correlations among the dependent and independent variables. These results, which are presented in Table 2, indicate that Americans' beliefs about punishment (i.e., about the importance of severe punishment as a characteristic of democracy) are positively associated with religiosity. Specifically, people who believe religion and God are important are more likely to believe that severe punishment is an essential characteristic of democracy. There is also a positive correlation between beliefs about punishment and people who are members of a religious organization and who consider themselves religious. Overall, the correlations between beliefs about punishment and religiosity are weak. In addition to religiosity, Table 2 shows that there is significant negative correlation between education and public opinions about punishment. Although

the relationship between gender and beliefs about punishment is not significant, age has a weak positive association with punitiveness.

In addition, opinions about democracy have a weak positive association with opinions about punishment. People who believe living in a democratic country is important tend to also believe that severe punishment is an essential characteristic of democracy. Opinions about democracy and religiosity are also positively related. Specifically, there is a weak positive correlation between believing that living in a democratic country is important and believing that God is important.

Confidence in the police and the justice system are both positively related to religiosity. There is a positive relationship between being a member of a religious organization and confidence in the police and the justice system. Also, attending religious services is positively associated with confidence in the police and the justice system. Regarding demographic characteristics, age is positively associated with confidence in the police and education is positively associated with confidence in the justice system.

Table 4.2 Bivariate Correlations Between Dependent and Independent Variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Importance of Severe Punishment	1.000						
2. Confidence in the Police	0.149**	1.000					
3. Confidence in the Justice	0.032	0.635**	1.000				
4. Importance of Religion	0.080**	0.098**	0.086**	1.000			
5. Membership of Religious Org.	0.073*	0.140**	0.120**	0.560**	1.000		
6. Attending Religious Services	0.048	0.131**	0.100**	0.604**	0.631**	1.000	
7. Religious Person	0.097**	0.087**	0.068*	0.590**	0.412**	0.410**	1.000
8. Importance of God	0.138**	0.089**	0.055	0.682**	0.423**	0.440**	0.644**
9. Importance of Democracy	0.233**	0.140**	0.081**	-0.014	0.062*	0.058*	0.066*
10. Democraticness in Own Country	0.155**	0.242**	0.239**	0.112**	0.164**	0.116**	0.121**
11. Gender	0.015	-0.047	-0.006	-0.144**	-0.063*	-0.086**	-0.124**
12. Age (in years)	0.129**	0.133**	0.056	0.130**	0.079**	0.074*	0.144**
13. Education	-0.069*	0.032	0.070*	-0.074**	0.088**	0.080**	-0.002

Note. *p<0.05. **p<0.01

Table 4.2 (continued)

	8	9	10	11	12	13
1. Importance of Severe Punishment						
2. Confidence in the Police						
3. Confidence in the Justice						
4. Importance of Religion						
5. Membership of Religious Org.						
6. Attending Religious Services						
7. Religious Person						
8. Importance of God	1.000					
9. Importance of Democracy	0.089**	1.000				
10. Democraticness in Own Country	0.118**	0.353**	1.000			
11. Gender	-0.140**	0.015	0.047	1.000		
12. Age (in years)	0.142**	0.270**	0.073*	0.057*	1.000	
13. Education	-0.061*	0.191**	0.088**	0.036	-0.079*	1.000

Note. *p<0.05. **p<0.01

Regression analyses

The results presented in Table 3 describe four regression models predicting respondents' opinions about punishment in the United States. I started by examining the effects of religious affiliation on public opinions about punishment (i.e., beliefs about the importance of severe punishment as a characteristic of democracy; Model 1). Next, I added the demographic variables (Model 2), measures religiosity (Model 3), and public opinions about democracy (Model 4).

In order to examine the effects of religious affiliation on public opinions about the importance of severe punishment, I created five dummy variables (1) 1 = "None" and 0 = "Else," (2) 1 = "Orthodox" and 0 = "Else," (3) 1 = "Protestant" and 0 = "Else," (4) 1 = "Roman Catholic" and 0 = "Else," and (5) 1 = "Other" and 0 = "Else." Table 3 shows that, in Model 1, Protestant is the reference variable. People who have no religious affiliation were on average 0.78 points less likely than Protestants to think severe punishment is an essential characteristic of democracy.

Table 3 shows that, in Model 2, age ($b=0.02, p<.01$) and education level ($b=0.17, p<.01$) related significantly to beliefs about punishment. Specifically, older respondents are more likely to believe that severe punishment is an essential characteristic of democracy; a one year increase in age corresponded with a .02 unit increase in beliefs about punishment. More educated respondents are less likely to believe that severe punishment is an essential characteristic of democracy, such that a one unit increase in education corresponded with a .17 unit decrease in beliefs about punishment. The effect of gender on beliefs about punishment is not significant.

Model 3 shows that beliefs about the importance of God ($b=0.13, p<.01$) significantly affected beliefs about punishment; a one-unit increase in beliefs about the importance of God corresponded to a 0.13 unit increase in beliefs about severe punishment as an essential characteristic of democracy. In the final model (Model 4), both importance of democracy and democraticness in one's own country are statistically significant. For each one-unit increase in beliefs about these variables, opinions about severe punishment as an essential characteristic of democracy increase by 0.28 and 0.09 units, respectively.

Table 4.3 OLS Regression Models Predicting Importance of Severe Punishment

	Importance of Severe Punishment											
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
No Affiliation	-0.78	0.20	**	-0.72	0.21	**	-0.56	0.24	*	-0.37	0.24	
Orthodox	-0.30	1.33		0.10	1.32		0.00	1.31		-0.16	1.28	
Catholic	-0.04	0.21		0.00	0.21		0.01	0.21		0.08	0.21	
Other	-0.42	0.22		-0.29	0.23		-0.24	0.23		-0.05	0.23	
Gender	--	--		0.11	0.15		0.14	0.16		0.13	0.15	
Age (in years)	--	--		0.02	0.01	**	0.01	0.01	**	0.01	0.01	
Education Level	--	--		-0.17	0.06	**	-0.15	0.06	*	-0.24	0.06	**
Importance of Religion	--	--		--	--		-0.17	0.13		-0.07	0.13	
Membership of Relig. Org.	--	--		--	--		0.11	0.23		0.04	0.22	
Attending Religious Services	--	--		--	--		-0.03	0.05		-0.03	0.05	
Religious Person	--	--		--	--		0.12	0.24		0.07	0.24	
Importance of God	--	--		--	--		0.13	0.04	**	0.10	0.04	*
Importance of Democracy	--	--		--	--		--	--		0.28	0.05	**
Democ. in Own Country	--	--		--	--		--	--		0.09	0.04	*
Constant	7.05	0.13	**	7.20	0.47	**	6.51	0.60	**	4.29	0.65	**
N	1178			1178			1162			1144		
R square	0.012			0.027			0.033			0.083		

*p<0.05. **p<0.01.

Table 4 shows the results of the binary logistic regression models predicting respondents' confidence in both the police and the justice system in the United States. The dependent variables are coded "0" for respondents who reported "none at all" or "not very much" confidence and "1" for respondents who reported having "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence. Thus, these analyses compare people who have a lot of confidence to those who do not. I started by examining the effects of the demographic variables on confidence (Model 1), and then added the religiosity measures (Model 2).

Across both sets of models, for both confidence in the police and confidence in the justice system, only demographic variables are significant. Specifically, age is positively related to having a lot of confidence; a one-unit change in age increased the odds of having a lot of confidence in police by a factor of 1.014. Older people are 1.014 times more likely to have confidence in the police. Also, the relationship between education and confidence is positive; more educated people are 1.126 times more likely to have confidence in the police and 1.137 times more likely to have confidence in the justice system.²

² The odds ratio computed by raising e to the power of the logistic coefficient.

Table 4.4 Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting Confidence in the Police and the Justice System

	Confidence in the Police				Confidence in the Justice			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 1		Model 2	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Gender	-0.14	0.13	-0.09	0.14	-0.02	0.12	0.02	0.12
Age (in years)	0.01	0.00	**	0.00	**	0.00	0.00	0.00
Education Level	0.12	0.05	*	0.05	*	0.04	**	0.05
Importance of Religion	--	--	-0.14	0.11	--	--	-0.03	0.10
Membership of Religious Org.	--	--	0.30	0.19	--	--	0.23	0.17
Attending Religious Services	--	--	0.08	0.04	--	--	0.05	0.04
Religious Person	--	--	-0.08	0.21	--	--	0.02	0.19
Importance of God	--	--	0.04	0.04	--	--	0.02	0.03
Constant	-0.26	0.36	-0.49	0.45	-0.64	0.33	* -0.96	0.41
N	1212		1176		1207		1171	
R square	0.021		0.041		0.011		0.027	

*p<0.05. **p<0.01.

In sum, the bivariate correlations show that religiosity is positively associated with Americans' beliefs about punishment (i.e., about the importance of severe punishment as a characteristic of democracy). Regarding the demographic variables, age and education level positively relate to belief that severe punishment is an essential characteristic of democracy. The effect on gender on beliefs about punishment is not significant. In addition, the bivariate analyses show that both beliefs about punishment and religiosity have a weak positive association with opinions about democracy.

Although the bivariate correlations analyses show that confidence in the police and the justice system are both positively related to religiosity, logistic regression show that the association is not significant. Regarding demographic characteristics, older and more educated people have more confidence in the police and the justice system.

In addition, regression analyses show that Protestants are more likely than those with no religious affiliation to think severe punishment is an essential characteristic of democracy. Regression analyses also confirm the finding from the bivariate analyses that people who believe God are important are more likely to believe that severe punishment is an essential characteristic of democracy. Older people are more likely support beliefs about severe punishment is an essential characteristic of democracy and more educated people are less likely to believe that severe punishment is an essential characteristic of democracy, but the effect of gender on beliefs about punishment is not significant.

Turkish Data

Descriptive analyses

The Turkish sample includes 1,346 respondents. As shown in Table 5, the sample includes almost equal proportions of males (50.2%) and females (49.8%). The average

age of the sample is about 36. The most common highest educational level is primary school (36.0%), followed by university preparatory type secondary school (26.8%) and university level education (11.1%). In addition, Table 6 shows that more than half (56.2%) of the participants mention that living in a country that is governed democratically is absolutely important (i.e., a 10 on a 10-point scale). Only 8.5% of Turkish respondents state that Turkey is completely democratic today (i.e., a 10 on a 10-point scale); the median response is 6.0 ($M = 5.9$).

Table 5 indicates that 39.7% of participants believe severe punishment of criminals is an essential characteristic of democracy (i.e., a 10 on a 10-point scale). The median response is 8.0 ($M = 7.8$), which is above the scale midpoint of 5.0. At the opposite end of the spectrum, only 3.2% of people think severe punishment of criminals is not an essential characteristic of democracy (i.e., a 1 on a 10-point scale). Table 1 also shows that 71.6% of respondents have quite a lot or a great deal confidence in the police and 75.0% of them have quite a lot or a great deal confidence in the justice system.

In terms of religiosity, Table 5 shows that the majority of participants (75.0%) say that religion is very important in their life; only 2.8% of people say religion is not at all important. In addition, almost all respondents (97.3%) report not being a member of religious organizations. This finding may be because people are more likely to practice their religion in private in Turkey. Also, the complex relationship between politics and religion may mean that religious organization that are legal today may be illegal tomorrow. Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, the percentage of people attending religious services is as follows: 13.9% attending more than once a week, 20.4% attending once a week, 2.0% attending once a month, 23.6% attending only holy days,

3.6% attending once a year, 3.9% attending less often, and 32.6% attending never.

Regardless of whether they attended religious services or not, 82.1% of participants consider themselves a religious person. The majority of participants (76.2%) mention that God is very important in their life.

Table 4.5 Description of Turkish Respondents in Wave 5 (2005-2008) of the World Value Survey

	Percent	Mean	Median	SD
Gender			1.0	0.5
Male	50.2			
Female	49.8			
Age (in years)		36.4	33.0	13.9
Education		4.9	4.0	2.5
No formal education	8.1			
Incomplete primary school	3.8			
Complete primary school	36.0			
Incomplete secondary school: tech./voc. type	2.6			
Complete secondary school: tech./voc. type	7.2			
Incomplete sec. school: univ.-prep. type	3.3			
Complete secondary school: univ.-prep. type	26.8			
Some university-level edu., without degree	1.0			
University-level education, with degree	11.1			
Importance of democracy		9.1	10.0	1.5
Not at all important	0.5			
2	0.7			
3	0.1			
4	0.2			
5	1.4			
6	3.3			
7	5.1			
8	13.2			
9	19.4			
Absolutely important	56.2			
Democraticness in own country		5.9	6.0	2.5
Not at all democratic	7.7			
2	4.5			
3	7.3			
4	8.3			

Table 4.5 (continued)

5	10.8			
6	16.5			
7	15.8			
8	13.5			
9	7.0			
Completely democratic	8.5			
Importance of Severe Punishment		7.8	8.0	2.5
Not an essential characteristic of democracy	3.2			
2	2.1			
3	2.4			
4	2.7			
5	7.9			
6	7.2			
7	10.4			
8	15.7			
9	8.8			
An essential characteristic of democracy	39.7			
Confidence in the police		3.0	3.0	1.0
None at all	11.0			
Not very much	17.4			
Quite a lot	35.4			
A great deal	36.2			
Confidence in the Justice		3.0	3.0	0.9
None at all	8.6			
Not very much	16.4			
Quite a lot	38.7			
A great deal	36.3			
Importance of religion		3.6	4.0	0.7
Not at all important	2.8			
Not very important	5.8			
Rather important	16.4			
Very important	75.0			
Membership of religious organization		0.0	0.0	0.2
Not a member	97.3			
Inactive or active member	2.7			
Attending religious services		3.8	4.0	2.3
Never	32.6			
Less often	3.9			
Once a year	3.6			

Table 4.5 (continued)

Only holy days	23.6			
Once a month	2.0			
Once a week	20.4			
More than once a week	13.9			
Religious person		0.8	1.0	0.4
Not a religious person or a convinced atheist and other	17.9			
A religious person	82.1			
Importance of God		9.4	10.0	1.5
Not at all	0.9			
2	0.5			
3	0.4			
4	0.7			
5	1.1			
6	2.2			
7	3.7			
8	5.7			
9	8.7			
Very	76.2			

(N=1346)

Bivariate correlations

I calculated correlations among the dependent and independent variables. These results, which are presented in Table 6, indicate that Turks' beliefs about punishment (i.e., about the importance of severe punishment as a characteristic of democracy) are positively associated with religiosity. Specifically, people who attend religious services and believe God is important are more likely to believe that severe punishment is an essential characteristic of democracy. Overall, the correlations between beliefs about punishment and religiosity are weak. In addition to religiosity, Table 6 shows that gender has a weak positive association with opinions about severe punishment, while age and education are not significant.

Additionally, opinions about democracy have a weak positive association with opinions about punishment. People who believe living in a democratic country is important tend to also believe that severe punishment is an essential characteristic of democracy. Opinions about democracy and religiosity are also positively related. Specifically, people who think religion is important and consider one's self a religious person are more likely believe Turkey is a democratic country today.

Confidence in the police and the justice system are both positively related to religiosity. There was a positive relationship between attending religious services and confidence in the police and the justice system. Also, considering one's self a religious person is positively associated with confidence in the police and the justice system. Regarding demographic characteristics, gender and education are negatively associated with confidence in the police and the justice system and age is positively associated with confidence in the police and the justice system.

Table 4.6 Bivariate Correlations between Dependent and Independent Variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Imp. of Severe Punishment	1.000						
2. Confidence in the Police	0.134**	1.000					
3. Confidence in the Justice	0.093**	0.588**	1.000				
4. Importance of Religion	0.047	0.295**	0.214**	1.000			
5. Membership of Religious Org.	0.020	-0.032	-0.030	0.013	1.000		
6. Attending Religious Services	0.138**	0.147**	0.106**	0.273**	0.094**	1.000	
7. Religious Person	0.018	0.262**	0.186**	0.418**	0.003	0.230**	1.000
8. Importance of God	0.087**	0.258**	0.199**	0.469**	0.010	0.220**	0.406**
9. Importance of Democracy	0.075**	0.019	0.071*	-0.025	0.001	0.025	-0.042
10. Democ. in Own Country	0.111**	0.323**	0.283**	0.0173**	-0.026	0.151**	0.160**
11. Gender	0.091**	-0.094**	-0.096**	-0.073**	0.082**	0.527**	-0.077**
12. Age (in years)	0.048	0.081**	0.086**	0.0131**	0.069*	0.184**	0.116**
13. Education	-0.043	-0.235**	-0.202**	-0.311**	0.019	-0.036	-0.270**

Note. *p<0.05. **p<0.01

Table 4.6 (continued)

	8	9	10	11	12	13
1. Importance of Severe Punishment						
2. Confidence in the Police						
3. Confidence in the Justice						
4. Importance of Religion						
5. Membership of Religious Org.						
6. Attending Religious Services						
7. Religious Person						
8. Importance of God	1.000					
9. Importance of Democracy	0.065*	1.000				
10. Democraticness in Own Country	0.199**	0.080**	1.000			
11. Gender	-0.095**	0.044	-0.003	1.000		
12. Age (in years)	0.087**	0.026	0.052	0.047	1.000	
13. Education	-0.220**	0.018	-0.099**	0.171**	-0.379**	1.000

Note. *p<0.05. **p<0.01

Regression analyses

The results presented Table 7 describe three regression models predicting respondents' opinions about punishment in Turkey. I started by examining the effects of the demographic variables on public opinions about punishment (i.e., beliefs about the importance of severe punishment as a characteristic of democracy; Model 1), then added variables measuring religiosity (Model 2) and public opinions about democracy (Model 3).

Table 7 shows that, in Model 1, gender ($b=0.48$, $p<.01$) relates significantly to beliefs about punishment; men are, on average, .48 points more likely to think severe punishment is an essential characteristic of democracy. Age and education level are not significant.

Model 2 shows that beliefs about the importance of God ($b=0.13$, $p<.05$) and attendance at religious services ($b=0.13$, $p<.01$) significantly affect beliefs about punishment; a one unit increase in these variables corresponds to a 0.13 unit increase in beliefs about severe punishment as an essential characteristic of democracy. In the final model (Model 3), both importance of democracy ($b=0.11$, $p<.05$) and democraticness in one's own country ($b=0.08$, $p<.01$) are positively associate with the belief that punishment is an essential characteristic of demo

Table 4.7 OLS Regression Models Predicting Importance of Severe Punishment

	Opinion About Punishment					
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Gender	0.48	0.14**	0.18	0.17	0.18	0.18
Age (in years)	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
Education Level	-0.05	0.03	-0.04	0.03	-0.05	0.03
Importance of Religion	--	--	-0.03	0.12	-0.04	0.12
Membership of Religious Org.	--	--	0.05	0.43	0.09	0.43
Attending Religious Services	--	--	0.13	0.04**	0.11	0.04**
Religious Person	--	--	-0.29	0.21	-0.25	0.21
Importance of God	--	--	0.13	0.06*	0.11	0.06
Importance of Democracy	--	--	--	--	0.11	0.05*
Democraticness in Own Country	--	--	--	--	0.08	0.03**
Constant	7.65	0.29**	6.47	0.64**	5.36	0.77**
N	1296		1254		1211	
R square	0.010		0.021		0.030	

*p<0.05. **p<0.01

Table 8 shows the results of the binary logistic regression models predicting respondents' confidence in both the police and the justice system in the Turkey. The dependent variables are coded "0" for respondents who reported "none at all" or "not very much" confidence and "1" for respondents who reported having "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence. Thus, these analyses compare people who have a lot of confidence to those who do not. I started by examining the effects of the demographic variables on confidence (Model 1), and then added the religiosity measures (Model 2).

For both confidence in the police and confidence in the justice system, Model 1 shows that gender and education level are negatively related to having a lot of confidence in the police. Men are less likely to have a lot of confidence in the police (odds ratio=0.70)³ and the justice system (odds ratio=0.74)³. Also, more educated people are 0.84 times less likely to have a lot of confidence in the police and 0.89 times less likely to have a lot of confidence in the justice system.³

For both confidence in the police and the justice system, Model 2 shows that beliefs about importance of religion and attending religious services are positively related to confidence in the police and the justice system. In addition, considering themselves religious is positively related to confidence in the police.

³ The odds ratio computed by raising e to the power of the logistic coefficient.

Table 4.8 Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting Confidence in the Police and the Justice System

	Confidence in the Police				Confidence in the Justice							
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 1		Model 2					
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE				
Gender	-0.36	0.13	**	-0.78	0.17	**	-0.30	0.13	*	-0.58	0.17	**
Age (in years)	0.00	0.01		0.00	0.01		0.01	0.01		0.01	0.01	
Education Level	-0.17	0.03	**	-0.10	0.03	**	-0.12	0.03	**	-0.07	0.03	*
Importance of Religion	--	--		0.42	0.11	**	--	--		0.25	0.11	*
Membership of Rel. Org.	--	--		-0.39	0.39		--	--		-0.27	0.40	
Attending Religious Services	--	--		0.19	0.04	**	--	--		0.14	0.04	**
Religious Person	--	--		0.41	0.18	*	--	--		0.25	0.19	
Importance of God	--	--		0.08	0.05		--	--		0.07	0.05	
Constant	1.85	0.27	**	-1.44	0.59	*	1.52	0.28	**	-0.67	0.58	
N	1323			1280			1315			1273		
R square	0.068			0.173			0.041			0.098		

*p<0.05. **p<0.01.

In sum, the bivariate correlations show that religiosity is positively associated with Turkish people's beliefs about punishment (i.e., about the importance of severe punishment as a characteristic of democracy). Regarding the demographic variables, while age and education are not significant, gender has a weak positive association with the belief that about severe punishment is an essential characteristic of democracy. In addition, both religiosity and beliefs about severe punishment relate positively to opinions about democracy.

In addition, both the bivariate correlations and the regression analyses show that religiosity is positively related to confidence in the police and the justice system. Regarding the demographic variables, men and more educated people are less likely have confidence in police and the courts. While the bivariate correlations show that age is positively correlated with confidence, this relationship was not significant in the regression analyses.

Regression analyses show that people who believe God is important and attend religious services are more likely to think severe punishment is an essential characteristic of democracy. Also, men are more likely to believe severe punishment is an essential characteristic of democracy.

Table 4.9 Summary of the Findings from the U.S. and Turkey

Hypothesis 1: religious people are more punitive	Supported both in the U.S. and Turkey (specifically, importance of God)
Hypothesis 2: levels of punitiveness are higher in Turkey than in the U.S.	Supported
Hypothesis 3: religious people tend to have more confidence in criminal justice institutions	Partially supported in the U.S. (only correlation analyses supported) Supported in Turkey
Hypothesis 4: level of confidence in criminal justice institutions are higher in Turkey than in the U.S.	Partially supported (only confidence in the justice system)

Comparison between the U.S and Turkey

Table 10 compares beliefs about importance of severe punishment and confidence in the police and the justice system in the U.S. and Turkey. It also compares levels of religiosity between the two countries. The results show that Turkish ($M = 7.8$ on a 10-point scale) people are more likely to believe that severe punishment is an essential characteristic of democracy than are Americans ($M = 6.8$ on a 10-point scale). The t-test statistic ($t = 10.323$) for the difference between two means is statistically significant at the .01 level. There is a significant difference between the U.S. and Turkey in average beliefs about severe punishment as an essential characteristic of democracy. Table 10 also shows that Turks' ($M = 0.7$) and Americans' ($M = 0.7$) show similar levels of confidence in the police. The Chi-Square test ($\chi^2 = 0.823$) shows there is not a significant difference between the U.S. and Turkey in average confidence in the police. However, Turks ($M = 0.8$) are more likely have confidence in the justice system than are Americans ($M = 0.6$). There is a significant differences between the U.S. and Turkey in average confidence in the justice system ($\chi^2 = 80.446$).

Regarding the importance of living in a country that is governed democratically, the average response is higher for Turks ($M = 9.1$ on a 10-point scale) than for Americans ($M = 8.7$ on a 10-point scale). However, Americans ($M = 6.4$ on a 10-point scale) are more likely than Turks ($M = 5.9$ on a 10-point scale) to say their country is being governed democratically.

Regarding religiosity, Turks are somewhat more likely to think religion and God are important in their lives. Membership in religious organizations and attendance at religious services are higher in the U.S. than in Turkey.

Table 4.10 Comparison Between the U.S. and Turkey

	U.S. Sample (N=1,249)	Turkish Sample (N=1,346)		
	Mean	Mean		
Importance of Severe Punishment	6.8	7.8	$t = 10.323$	**
Confidence in the Police	0.7	0.7	$\chi^2 = 0.823$	
Confidence in the Justice	0.6	0.8	$\chi^2 = 80.446$	**
Importance of Democracy	8.7	9.1		
Democraticness in Own Country	6.4	5.9		
Importance of Religion	3.1	3.6		
Membership of Religious Org.	0.7	0.0		
Attending Religious Services	3.9	3.8		
Religious Person	0.8	0.8		
Importance of God	8.3	9.4		

* $p < 0.05$. ** $p < 0.01$.

Table 4.11 Crosstabulation of Confidence in the Police

	Confidence in the Police		x2
	None at all or not very much	Quite a lot or a great deal	
Turkey	375	948	0.823
U.S.	324	888	

*p<0.05. **p<0.01.

Table 4.12 Crosstabulation of Confidence in the Justice

	Confidence in the Justice		x2	
	None at all or not very much	Quite a lot or a great deal		
Turkey	329	986	80.446	**
U.S.	505	702		

*p<0.05. **p<0.01.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

In this chapter, I provide a brief summary of the findings. Next, I will identify some of the strengths and limitations of the present study, and make some recommendations for future research on these issues.

I expected to find that people who are more religious are more punitive in their responses to crime than are non-religious people. For the purpose of this study, punitiveness referred to people's beliefs about the importance of severe punishment as a characteristic of democracy. Previous studies have shown that more religious people tend to be more punitive than less religious people in their response to crime. They are more likely to support harsh punishments like incarceration and the death penalty (Ellison, 1991; Grasmick et al., 1993; Jacobs and Carmichael, 2004; Grasmick and McGill, 1994; Gelb, 2011). As expected, the current findings support previous studies from both the U.S. and Turkey. The results showed that religiosity is positively associated with beliefs about punishment (i.e., about the importance of severe punishment as a characteristic of democracy). In particular, beliefs about the importance of God increase beliefs about severe punishment as an essential characteristic of democracy in both the U.S. and Turkey. Hardisty (2004) explains that because religious people tend to believe people have the control to choose between right and wrong, they are responsible for their choices. Therefore, poverty, abuse, addiction, and lack of opportunity do not excuse

committing a crime. In addition, religious people think those who violate the law must pay the penalties and need self-discipline, punishment, isolation, and religious redemption to correct their behavior (Hardisty, 2004).

I hypothesized that Turkish people are more likely to believe that severe punishment is an essential characteristic of democracy than are Americans. The current study's finding supports this expectation. This finding may be explained by two ideas. First, while the U.S. is more diverse in its religious makeup, Turkey is more homogenous. Religious homogeneity likely represents the shared cultural and political influence of policies and it affects formal and informal case processing and sentencing norms. Homogeneous religious communities favor more punitive criminal sanctions and incarceration (Ulmer et al., 2008). Therefore, Turkish communities may favor more punitive criminal sanctions than the U.S. Second, if people feel vulnerable and insecure, rationally or not, they often look for someone or something to blame. Hard economic times, rapid social change, beliefs about the loss of respect and discipline in society, concerns about social cohesion, and fear about the social threat lead people to feel more vulnerable and insecure. These feelings may, in turn, lead to a more punitive-minded general public (Hardisty, 2004; Tyler and Boeckann, 1997; King and Maruna, 2009). Compared to the U.S., Turkish people are more likely to feel vulnerable and insecure because Turkey has an unstable economy (Boratav et al., 1996), politically unstable (e.g., three military interventions happened that is military force into the current governance; Akbaba and Morrison, 2012), and is more likely to be under terrorist attacks (Global Terrorism Index, 2014). Because people are more likely to desire conformity, social order, and discipline, they look to legal institutions to punish threats to collective

security. Concerns about social cohesion and feeling of insecurity may lead Turkish people to support more severe punishments.

In addition, previous studies claim that fundamentalist and/or conservative Protestants are more likely support severe punishment than liberal/moderate protestants (Grasmick et al., 1993; Ellison and Sherkat, 1993). Although the current data do not separate people as conservative and not conservative, or fundamentalist and not fundamentalist, it was examined whether there were any differences among religious affiliation in regard of beliefs about severe punishment as a characteristic of democracy in the U.S. These analyses included Orthodox, Protestant, Roman Catholic, no religious affiliation, and other. The findings showed that Protestants are more likely to think that severe punishment is an essential characteristic of democracy than are people who have no religious affiliation.

Regarding demographic characteristics in the U.S., similar to expectations older and less educated people are more likely to believe that severe punishment is an essential characteristic of democracy. Reason for these findings may be that older people who are more vulnerable, may be more fearful and thus more punitive than younger people, who are less vulnerable people (Langworthy and Whitehead, 1986). Also, more educated people may have more tolerant to offenders and they are more likely to believe in giving a second chance to wrongdoers (Applegate et al., 2000; Grasmick et al., 1993; Dowler, 2003). In contrast, age and education level did not significantly affect beliefs about punishment in Turkey. However, as expected, Turkish men are significantly more likely than women to believe severe punishment is an essential characteristic of democracy. Langwothy and Whitehead (1986) claim that women who are more vulnerable, may be

more fearful and thus more punitive than men, who are less vulnerable people (Langworthy and Whitehead, 1986). Also, another reason for this finding may be that men are less likely women to feel empathy toward criminals (Unnever and Cullen, 2009).

This study also considered how religion relates to feelings about democracy because the WVS asks about severe punishment as a characteristic of democracy. Previous studies claim that belonging to religious organizations, being politically active, and discussing politics with others positively influences people's attitudes about democracy. People who are members of a religious organization or are religiously dedicated, engaged in political and social networks, and hold higher social status, view democracy very positively (Meyer, Tope, and Price, 2008). Higher levels of religiosity increase beliefs about the importance of democracy among both Christians and Muslims (Grundel and Maliepaard, 2012; Meyer et al., 2008; Bratton, 2003; Patterson, 2004). The current study also supports these claims. It found that opinions about democracy and religiosity are positively related in both the U.S. and Turkey.

This study also predicted that people who are more religious have more confidence in the police and the justice system. Wisneski et al. (2009) claimed that religiosity reflects a generalized willingness to trust authority, regardless of whether the authority is secular or religious. Belief in God and a generally high level of trust in religion influence trust in the authorities. Stronger religiosity would be associated with greater trust in authorities. Previous studies found that level of confidence in legal authorities is positively related to one's religiosity (Cao, Stack, and Sun, 1998; Garza, Rossi, and Zaclicever, 2009; Guiso et al., 2003). The current study was found that confidence in the police and the justice system are positively related to beliefs about

importance of religion and attending religious services in Turkey, but a similar relationship was not found in the United States.

In addition, it was expected to find that level of confidence in criminal justice institutions are higher in Turkey than in the U.S. Results confirmed this expectation that Turks are more likely have confidence in the justice system than are Americans. This difference may be because in Turkey less people involved in the criminal justice system as a victim or an offender than are Americans (Ghandoosh, 2014), therefore Turkish people may less likely to experience efficacy of the courts. However, confidence in the police is not found significantly different.

The effects of demographic characteristics on confidence in the police and the justice system differ between the U.S. and Turkey. In the U.S., older people have more confidence in the police and more educated people have more confidence in the police and the justice system, perhaps because they are more likely to see criminal justice institutions as maintaining safety and order (Jesilow et al., 1995). Also, women and less educated people have more confidence in the police and the justice system in Turkey. Because men and more educated people are more critical of the criminal justice system, they may have less confidence (Thompson and Lee, 2004). This finding support Cao and Zhao (2005)'s claim about education makes people value freedom more, and thus, decreases one's confidence in the police because the police is one of the government's long arms and represents the oppressive part of a democratic government.

Limitations of the study

Many studies examining the relationships among beliefs about punishment, levels of confidence in criminal justice institutions, and religiosity have been conducted in

Europe and the United States. To examine these relationships in Turkey and to compare them to the U.S. is unique. Previous studies compared to the U.S. and other industrialized countries and they found that the U.S. is more punitive (Kugler et al., 2013; Wilson and Petersilia, 2010). The current study contribute to the literature that Turks are more likely believe the importance of severe punishment even though Turkey has less crime rate than the U.S. Moreover, Turkey should not be ignored in the criminological literature because it is a bridge nation culturally, economically, geographically, and politically. There are, however, several limitations to this study. I used Wave 5 (2005-2008) of the World Values Survey (WVS) for the current study. Although Wave 6 is now available, it was not used because there were no questions about public perception about punishment. A second limitation is that this study only used one question to measure public beliefs about punishment.

Another potential limitation is the age of data because after seven years public opinion may show different results because after 2008 (the year of Wave 5) several important issues happened that may affect public perception about punishment and confidence in legal authorities. As I mentioned before Gezi Park Protests, suicide bomb attacks (Amnesty International, 2013) may decrease confidence in legal authorities and may be seen as a social threat and increase public belief about importance of severe punishment.

Because the Turkish data was collected in an urban in the west of Turkey (Istanbul), results may differ across cities and regions of the country. The location where the sample was taken is not in a conservative city. This may change level of religiosity and public beliefs about punishment and confidence in the police and the justice system.

Directions for future research

I believe the measurement of religiosity was effective in the current study, because it measured several reliable questions, but the effect of being a fundamentalist or not should be included in future studies. It may help to completely understand whether fundamentalism affects correctional practices and attitudes. Future studies should also examine the effects of Islamic fundamentalism.

Additionally, there are not enough studies that examine the relationship between political affiliation and both public perception about punishment and confidence in legal authorities. Several studies link religiosity and voting for conservative political parties (LaMothe, 2012). Therefore, future studies should also examine the effects of being politically conservative on punitiveness and confidence in legal institutions.

As a conclusion, religiosity affects public attitudes about the importance of severe punishments (as a characteristic of democracy) and Turkish people are more likely to think punishment is an essential characteristic of democracy than Americans. Although the relationship between religiosity and confidence in the police and the justice system was found in Turkey, it was not found in the U.S. In addition, it was found that confidence in the justice system is higher in Turkey than in the U.S.

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