

US Army War College  
**USAWC Press**

---

Monographs, Books, and Publications

---

4-1-1998

## **The Role of the Armed Forces in the Americas: Civil-Military Relations for the 21st Century**

Donald E. Schulz Dr.

Follow this and additional works at: <https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs>

---

### **Recommended Citation**

Schulz, Donald E. Dr., "The Role of the Armed Forces in the Americas: Civil-Military Relations for the 21st Century" (1998). *Monographs, Books, and Publications*. 861.  
<https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/861>

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in Monographs, Books, and Publications by an authorized administrator of USAWC Press.

**THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES  
IN THE AMERICAS:  
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS  
FOR THE 21st CENTURY**

**Conference Report  
Edited by  
Donald E. Schulz**

**April 1998**

\*\*\*\*\*

The editor wishes to thank Dr. Gabriel Marcella and General Fred Woerner (USA Ret.) for their many useful comments and suggestions on this manuscript. Also deeply appreciated were the efforts of Lieutenant Colonel Keith Stedman, who made a major contribution to the administration of the conference. Last but not least, special recognition must go to Colonel Michael Gonzáles, who had the original idea for the conference, and who devoted enormous amounts of time to its organization.

\*\*\*\*\*

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

\*\*\*\*\*

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5244. Comments may also be conveyed directly to the editor by calling commercial (717) 245-4123 or DSN 242-4123. Copies of this report may be obtained from the Publications and Production Office by calling commercial (717) 245-4133 or DSN 242-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at rummelr@carlisle-emh2.army.mil

\*\*\*\*\*

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs are loaded on the Strategic Studies Institute Homepage for electronic dissemination. SSI's Homepage address is: <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/>

# CONTENTS

## Foreword

*Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon*  
*Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College . . . . . v*

Recommendations . . . . . vii

Part One: Introduction . . . . . 1

1. The Americas: The Strategic Landscape  
*Colonel Michael R. Gonzáles,*  
*Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College . . . . . 3*

Part Two: The Role of the Military:  
Current Issues and Future Prospects. . . . . 11

2. Building New Security Relationships in the Americas:  
The Next Critical Steps  
*Dr. Richard Downes*  
*North-South Center, University of Miami . . . . . 13*

3. Brazilian National Defense Policy and Civil-Military  
Relations in the Government of President Fernando  
Henrique Cardoso  
*Dr. Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira*  
*Campinas State University, Brazil . . . . . 31*

4. Civil-Military Relations in Latin America:  
Pitfalls and Prospects  
*General Fred F. Woerner (USA Ret.)*  
*Boston University . . . . . 71*

5. Armed Forces Missions and the Strengthening of Democracy  
in the Americas  
*Licenciado Luis Tibiletti*  
*Ser 2000, Argentina . . . . . 77*

Part Three: National Security and Civil-Military Relations  
in the 21st Century: Three Views From Latin America . . . . . 83

6. Civil-Military Relations in the Americas for the 21st Century:  
A Latin American Perspective  
*Professor Luis Bitencourt Emilio*  
*Catholic University of Brasília . . . . . 85*

7. The Colombian Army in the 21st Century <i>Major General Manuel José Bonett Locarno</i> <i>Commanding General of the Armed Forces, Colombia . . . .</i>	101
8. The Peace Process in Guatemala <i>Brigadier General Víctor Manuel Ventura Arellano</i> <i>Vice-Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Guatemala . . . . .</i>	105
Part Four: Civil-Military Relations and U.S. Policy: A U.S. Military Perspective . . . . .	109
9. The U.S. National Guard and State to State Partnership: Implications for Latin America <i>Major General William J. Jefferds, Ed. D. (ARNGUS Ret.)</i> <i>Special Assistant to the Chief, National Guard Bureau</i> <i>Colonel Robert B. James</i> <i>Director of International Affairs, National Guard Bureau . .</i>	111
Part Five: The Workshop Reports . . . . .	117
10. The Inter-American Defense System <i>Dr. Thomas Bruneau</i> <i>U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. . . . .</i>	119
11. Inter-Institutional Relations in the National Policy Process <i>Dr. Judith Gentleman</i> <i>U.S. Air War College . . . . .</i>	123
12. Cooperative Security and Peacekeeping <i>Lieutenant Colonel Victor Tise</i> <i>U.S. Air Force Academy . . . . .</i>	133
13. Subregional Cooperation <i>Dr. William Stanley</i> <i>University of New Mexico . . . . .</i>	141
14. Emerging Roles and Missions <i>Dr. Andrés Serbin</i> <i>Venezuelan Institute of Social and Political Sciences</i> <i>and Central University of Venezuela . . . . .</i>	151
Part Six: Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . .	155
15. The Role of the Armed Forces in the Americas: Conclusions, Lessons, Recommendations and Unresolved Issues <i>Dr. Donald E. Schulz</i> <i>Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College . . . . .</i>	157
Recommended Reading . . . . .	185
About the Editor . . . . .	187

## FOREWORD

In November 1997, the United States Army War College joined with the U.S. Southern Command, the Inter-American Defense Board, the National Guard Bureau, and the Latin American Consortium of the University of New Mexico and New Mexico State University to cosponsor a conference entitled “The Role of the Armed Forces in the Americas: Civil-Military Relations for the 21st Century.” The meeting was held from 3 to 6 November in Santa Fé, New Mexico, and was hosted by the New Mexico National Guard.

The conference brought together over 150 prominent civilian governmental and military leaders and some of the most noted scholars from throughout the Americas. It was designed to support the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command’s objectives of strengthening democratic institutions, assisting nations in eliminating threats to their security, supporting economic and social progress, and enhancing military professionalism. In addition, the meeting sought to promote the Army Chief of Staff’s goals of conflict prevention through peacetime engagement, strategic outreach to organizations and institutions outside the Department of Defense, and the enhancement of Active and Reserve component integration.

Included in this publication are the papers and speeches delivered at the conference, rapporteurs’ synopses of the working group discussions and an analysis, with recommendations, of the implications for civil-military relations and U.S. policy. These presentations, the level and scope of participation, the candor of the dialogue, the outstanding support provided by our cosponsors, and the charming atmosphere of Santa Fé all contributed to making the meeting a success.

The U.S. Army War College extends sincere appreciation to General Charles E. Wilhelm, the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command, and to Major General John C. Thompson, Chairman of the Inter-American Defense Board, and their staffs for the leadership and financial support that made the conference possible. We also recognize Lieutenant General Edward D. Baca, Chief of the National Guard Bureau; Major General William A. Navas, Jr., Director of the Army National Guard; the Adjutants General of New Mexico and Utah, and their outstanding soldiers who provided the crucial escort, logistical and interpretation support.

The conference represented a joint military-civilian effort. The Governor of New Mexico, the Honorable Gary E. Johnson; his Chief of Staff, Mr. Lou Gallegos; the Santa Fé County Commission, and the City of Santa Fé permitted use of their facilities and ensured gracious hospitality during our stay in their beautiful state and city. Last, but not least, we would like to express our heartfelt gratitude to Dr. Gilbert Merckx, Mr. Theo Crevenna, Dr. José García and Ms. Vicki Madrid Nelson, from the University of New Mexico-New Mexico State University Latin American Studies Consortium for their assistance in organizing, coordinating and administering the conference. Without their help, this endeavor could not have been undertaken.

Our mutual goals as neighbors in this hemisphere are to promote democracy, preserve the peace, and provide for our nations' common security in the 21st century. We hope this conference will be but one step on the path toward those objectives.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON  
Colonel, U.S. Army  
Director, Strategic Studies Institute

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Based primarily on the Conclusions, Lessons and Recommendations that came out of the Santa Fé conference on “The Role of the Armed Forces in the Americas: Civil-Military Relations for the 21st Century,” the Strategic Studies Institute offers the following targeted recommendations to Latin American and U.S. leaders:

### **For Latin American Policymakers.**

- Military institutions should consider unprecedented levels of civil-military dialogue and regional cooperation.
- New arrangements for domestic and regional security cooperation should be informed by effective civilian control over the military and the adoption of a hemispheric approach as a supplement to nationalism.
- In general, democratically elected civilian leaders should move more aggressively to strengthen their control over the military.
- At the same time, those leaders must assume leadership in developing an effective defense policy. It is the responsibility of civilians, rather than the military, to decide when and how armed force is used. The latter, however, should play an important advisory role. This relationship is best achieved through a frank and constructive dialogue that recognizes the political responsibilities of civilian officials and the technical expertise of military professionals.



- A fundamental intermediate step is a national commitment to train and educate civilian professionals in strategic affairs and the leadership and management of defense institutions. This requires the creation of think tanks, the financing of research projects, and the organization of conferences and seminars that can bring together civilians and military officers in shared educational experiences where they can interact and learn from each other.
- The Latin American armed forces should open up their national defense and war colleges to senior governmental officials and other key political actors who would benefit from the educational programs offered at those institutions.
- The Latin American militaries should establish liaison offices with Congress.
- Since public perceptions of the military's role are of great importance to the development of functional inter-institutional relations, a civil-military dialogue should be fostered to help build public confidence.
- There must be a decision at the national level on the division of responsibilities between military, police, and other public safety institutions. Here national traditions, values, needs and capabilities should provide the guidelines. Again, civilian authorities must take the lead. One should expect considerable variation in policy from country to country.
  - The answer to extensive police corruption is police and judicial reform, rather than the militarization of law enforcement (which exposes the armed forces to corruption and diverts them from military training).

- There must be a similar decision at the national level with regard to the military's use in national development/civic action programs. Again, such decisions must be made on a country-by-country basis in accordance with the values, needs and capabilities of each country.
- Once policy is established, civilian and military leaders should work closely together to prepare and defend before Congress a budget that realistically meets the armed forces' needs. This would both help legitimize military spending and hold policymakers accountable.
- Since the reformulation of inter-institutional relations is at an early stage in much of the hemisphere, states looking for models to emulate should examine the processes in the most advanced countries, where the civil-military dialogue has already led to extensive cooperation. Continued regional exchanges of personnel are highly recommended.
- With regard to Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs), it is recommended that educational and training systems be created that would focus on military, governmental and nongovernmental activities involving PKOs. Such systems should include think tanks, like the U.S. Army's Peacekeeping Institute, where key issues and strategies could be identified, and specialized training centers, such as Uruguay's Center for Instruction for Peacekeeping Operations. The funding of peacekeeping conferences and roundtables can also be a great help in determining whether the region's armed forces have the capabilities to undertake specific operations.
- Along these same lines, it would be useful to have more general "cooperative education/training"

programs and institutes involving military and civilian participants with regard to a whole range of national security issues.

- Laws inhibiting subregional cooperation—for instance, those preventing the sharing of defense information—need to be reviewed and revised when deemed desirable.
- Human rights education should be incorporated into the military's training and instructional system at all levels.

### **For U.S. and Latin American Policymakers.**

- There is a need for a new multinational hemispheric security doctrine for security cooperation. This should complement, rather than replace, national objectives and establish agreement on the basic common denominators of hemispheric security cooperation.
  - This doctrine would be supplemented by greater levels of multilateral cooperation among police and judicial officials. This would occur through channels separate and distinct from those providing armed forces cooperation on security matters.
- The basic elements of this new hemispheric security might include commitments to:
  - improve cooperation with regard to information on the transit of vessels and aircraft to prevent the illegal use of national territory;
  - improve the exchange of climatological information from sources available to the military;

- enhance information exchange on insurgent groups operating near borders in order to prevent the establishment of sanctuaries;
  - exchange information on potential arms purchases to prevent misinterpretations of intentions;
  - debrief results of bilateral and multilateral military exercises so all countries in the region can benefit from investments in training;
  - define support functions that can be efficiently provided to those forces combatting drug trafficking in the region; and
  - eventually reach agreement on the specialization of functions by some armed forces, particularly those of smaller states. Here NATO can provide a model.
- For the new security doctrine to work, a multilateral defense architecture must be developed that cannot be dominated by any single country. This would be constructed under the authority and through the cooperation of national defense ministers, thus assuring its consistency with the principle of civilian control. This architecture would include:
    - the establishment of a defense secretariat devoted to meetings of the ministers of defense. This body would coordinate the meetings and provide periodic follow-up on resolutions adopted at those sessions;
    - coordination by that same secretariat of agendas for meetings of the Conference of American Armies and chiefs of the regional air forces and navies to focus on commitments arranged through the hemispheric security doctrine;

- creation of electronic communication systems to better link defense establishments for purposes of exchanging information related to the hemispheric security doctrine; and
  - periodic meetings of senior defense ministry officials below the rank of minister to review the mechanisms of security cooperation implemented by defense institutions.
- There should be more communication and cooperation among the components of the Inter-American Defense System, such as the Organization of American States (especially its Commission on Hemispheric Security) and the Inter-American Defense Board, and the various conferences and ministerials.
  - *The Inter-American Defense Board* should take the lead in developing a defense secretariat devoted to meetings of the ministers of defense, as proposed above. The secretariat would coordinate those meetings, as well as those of the Conference of American Armies and regional air forces and navies.
  - The *IADB* should also sponsor periodic meetings of senior defense ministry officials below the rank of minister to review the mechanisms of security cooperation.
  - *The U.S. Department of Defense and the Inter-American Defense Board* should provide funding and other support to think tanks, such as the recently established Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies in Washington, DC, devoted to the development of civilian competence in defense and security matters. Such institutes should not be limited to the United States, but should be established throughout Latin America. Some could be affiliated with national

defense or war colleges, as is already being done in some countries; others could be associated with civilian universities; and still others might be independent. They should share, however, a common purpose of national security education, and should be strictly nonpartisan and nonpolitical in nature.

- *The U.S. Department of Defense, the Inter-American Defense Board and associated institutions, such as SOUTHCOM, the U.S. Army War College and other military institutions, should increase their sponsorship of educational and training facilities devoted to Peacekeeping Operations. The continued sponsorship of conferences and roundtables on peacekeeping themes is also useful in identifying key issues and strategies, and assessing regional capabilities for undertaking certain kinds of operations. Consideration might even be given to the creation of a regional Peacekeeping Institute, modeled perhaps on the U.S. Army's PKI. This institution would be strictly educational, rather than operational, in nature.*
- *The U.S. Department of Defense, the Inter-American Defense Board and associated institutions, such as SOUTHCOM, the U.S. Army War College and other military institutions, should continue to sponsor conferences, workshops, seminars and other meetings designed to facilitate civilian-military interaction, both in the United States and the other countries in the hemisphere. This should be part of a broad program to educate both civilian and military cultures about each other, as well as about the challenges to national and international security in the 21st Century.*
- There should be increased educational efforts to better define and implement the goals of the Inter-American Defense System, including the

defense of democracy and human rights, the maintenance of security, and the containment of criminality.

- A greater effort should be made to promote civilian participation in the Inter-American Defense System. The region's militaries have generally agreed to redefine their roles in decision-making, but civilians are often poorly informed and uninterested. To assist them, the military should recognize them as the constituencies of the system, and help them become involved in all of its aspects.
- An effort should be made to develop a hemispheric counternarcotics policy. Among other things, the role of the Organization of American States should be strengthened by giving its Inter-American Commission Against Drug Abuse (CICAD) authority to evaluate the counternarcotics performance of OAS members.
- A more mature relationship between Latin America and the United States must be developed, abandoning the historic tendency of the latter to intervene in its neighbors' political affairs. There should be a reinforcement of contacts at the level of parliaments, political parties, and ministries of defense and foreign affairs in order to balance the influence of the U.S. Southern Command.
- There should be a substantial increase, monitored by the OAS, of cooperation among all areas of government at the national, subregional and hemispheric levels that have responsibility for addressing new threats.
- There should be a strengthening of all political and diplomatic organizations, including Non-Governmental Organizations, that have a role in conflict resolution, using their experiences in past

peacekeeping and mediation efforts to build a regional security structure that is not overly dependent on military instruments.

- There must be a resolution of the modernization versus arms race dilemma in order to permit all countries, in reasonable proportion to their legitimate defense needs under the concept of cooperative equilibrium, to count on their armed forces when the duly elected civilian leadership determines it is necessary.
- Several recommendations were made with regard to Peacekeeping Operations:
  - PKOs should be limited to countries outside the subregion concerned in order to alleviate fears and suspicions of intervention and partiality.
  - Most of the funding should come from either the United Nations or other international and regional sources. Too much funding from a single country creates dependency, and can easily distort the purposes of the operation or result in a loss of political resolve.
  - Authorization to use force must be clearly outlined. Force should be used only in extreme circumstances, including self-defense.
- More resources, including transfers from the wealthier countries to poorer countries, are needed to promote subregional cooperation, especially with regard to countering organized crime and narcotrafficking. As matters now stand, resource scarcity is a major obstacle to such cooperation. Effective information sharing and operational cooperation require compatible equipment, software, data formats, procedures and communications equipment, as well as transportation and personnel.



There are also significant asymmetries between states in terms of the capacities of their security institutions, differences which need to be addressed for cooperation to be effective.

- Follow-up conferences to the Santa Fé meeting are recommended in order to further develop and flesh out courses of action for U.S. and Latin American policymakers, both military and civilian.

### **For U.S. Policymakers.**

- The United States should act as a catalyst for multilateral cooperation.
- Greatly expanded police and judicial training assistance should be provided to Latin American countries to strengthen civilian institutions so that Latin Americans do not become dependent on the use of the military for law enforcement.
- U.S. military support for non-traditional roles and missions (e.g., counternarcotics, law enforcement, economic development) of the Latin American armed forces should be given only at the request of the duly elected civilian authority.
  - Support for the Latin American militaries' law enforcement missions should be given only under exceptional circumstances, when the rule of law has broken down and the police and other security institutions cannot cope with the threats posed by growing criminal activity. Such support should be conceived as temporary in nature, lasting only as long as it takes to develop competent and honest civilian institutions.
- U.S. military sales to Latin America, especially those involving advanced weapons systems, should be made

on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the legitimate security needs of the countries involved, and exercising care not to destabilize any regional or subregional balances of power. The initiation and authorization for such purchases must come from the democratically elected civilian authority, rather than the armed forces.

- *The U.S. Department of Defense* should increase resource transfers to Latin America to promote subregional cooperation. Compatible communications equipment, transportation, and training are especially needed.

**For the U.S. Military.**

- *The U.S. Southern Command* should take the lead in creating electronic communications systems to improve the sharing of security information between the hemisphere's defense establishments.
- *The U.S. National Guard's State to State Partnership Program* should be expanded to develop partnerships with more Latin American militaries in response to requests from the duly constituted civilian authorities in those countries.
- Human rights training for the Latin American armed forces should be continued and expanded at all levels.

**PART ONE**  
**INTRODUCTION**

# **Chapter One**

## **The Americas: The Strategic Landscape**

**Colonel Michael R. Gonzáles**  
**Strategic Studies Institute**  
**U.S. Army War College**

The end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new world order herald a period of relative peace and prosperity for the United States and its allies. The spread of democracy, coupled with the growth of free trade and rising expectations, have created both new opportunities and challenges, which promise to have a profound and lasting impact on a worldwide scale.

In fulfilling its role as a global leader, the United States has embraced a National Security Strategy based on the principle of “Engagement” and built on the three core objectives of:

- Enhancing its security with effective diplomacy and with military forces that are ready to fight and win.
- Bolstering America’s economic prosperity.
- Promoting democracy abroad.<sup>1</sup>

In doing this, the United States hopes to enhance its security and that of its allies, using an integrated approach that calls for shaping the international environment to prevent or deter threats, while maintaining the ability to respond across the full spectrum of potential crises and preparing today to meet the challenges of an uncertain future in the 21st Century.<sup>2</sup>

While this strategy is designed to optimize mutual opportunities on a global scale, perhaps nowhere is it more applicable than in dealing with the United States’ historical

allies and friends in the Western Hemisphere. With elected civilian governments in power in every country except Cuba, and with the enactment of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as a model of free market economics, the United States has the opportunity to assist in promoting democracy and fostering economic growth in the region. By employing elements of its political, economic, military and socio-cultural power, the U.S. can act as a catalyst in preserving peace, ensuring stability and enhancing the quality of life throughout the hemisphere.

With these opportunities also come new challenges. Transnational threats, including drug trafficking, terrorism, organized crime, human rights violations, ethnic unrest, corruption, environmental degradation, and a number of other social and political issues, are potential inhibitors to peace, prosperity and stability.<sup>3</sup> In a part of the world where military authoritarianism and oppression have long been engrained, a major challenge will be to bridge the gap between the military and civilian segments of society. With the goal of making the military a viable instrument of national policy, while subordinating it to civil authority under democratic rules, it will be necessary to mold the armed forces into an institution that supports the people and improves their quality of life.

The Americas are a geographically and culturally diverse region. They comprise an area stretching from the Arctic Circle in northern Canada to the tip of Cape Horn in South America, and from the Aleutians to the Caribbean Islands. The region consists of 35 sovereign nations, with a total population of over 800 million people, with perceptions and concerns as unique as their historical experiences.<sup>4</sup>

Once relegated to a secondary role in U.S. foreign policy priorities as Washington focused on the Cold War threat from the Soviet Union, the region now promises to move to the forefront in political and economic importance. In this regard, the goal of the United States is to embrace each country with the same spirit of individuality, cooperation

and mutual respect afforded to any other coequal partner in the community of democratic nations, and to assist each in the democratization process based on its individual desires and needs.

By helping shape the international environment, the United States can enhance global and regional security, while promoting democracy and reducing the wide range of threats that challenge its interests and those of its partners. These “shaping activities” can be undertaken through diplomacy, international assistance, arms control, nonproliferation initiatives and military activities.<sup>5</sup>

The Secretary of Defense, in a document entitled United States Security Strategy for the Americas, identified U.S. security objectives for the region:

- Support the commitment to democratic norms in the region, including civilian control in defense matters, constructive civil-military relations, and respect for human rights;
- Foster the peaceful resolution of disputes, transparency of military arms and expenditures, and development of confidence and security-building measures appropriate to the region;
- Carry out responsibilities under the Panama Canal Treaty and cooperate with the government of Panama in addressing issues linked to the companion Neutrality Treaty;
- Work with our friends in the region to confront drug trafficking, combat terrorism, and support sustainable development;
- Expand and deepen defense cooperation with other countries of the region in support of common objectives, encouraging them to improve capabilities for joint actions, including international peace-keeping;

- Prevent humanitarian crises from reaching catastrophic proportions; and
- Encourage efforts to prevent the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and associated delivery systems, as well as other arms control initiatives of common benefit. It is hoped that achieving these objectives will ensure the growth of democracy, peace and prosperity in the region. The United States is committed to using all of the political, economic and military assets at its disposal to help realize these goals.<sup>6</sup>

The Commander-in-Chief of the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) is charged with overseeing U.S. military activities in the region, with the exception of those in the United States, Canada and Mexico. In an effort to achieve the goals envisioned by the Secretary of Defense, SOUTHCOM supports U.S. national interests, working with our allies in the region, in four specific ways:

- Building regional cooperative security arrangements and confidence-building measures to reduce regional tensions;
- Developing military roles and missions by supporting the armed forces of our allies as they develop the appropriate force structures and doctrines and demonstrate a respect for human rights and civilian control over the military;
- Supporting the counterdrug efforts of U.S. lead agencies and committed allies;
- Restructuring SOUTHCOM to ensure continued support of U.S. national security interests in the Americas for the 21st Century.<sup>7</sup>

In an effort to help shape the strategic landscape, the Southern Command joined with the U.S. Army War College,

the Inter-American Defense Board and the National Guard Bureau in sponsoring a conference on civil-military relations, but also dealing with a number of other important and inter-related strategic issues. The participation of the Inter-American Defense Board, which provides military advice to the Organization of American States, was seen as critical to the forum in order to ensure a multinational voice in the proceedings. In addition, the gathering attracted national delegations, comprised of senior civilian governmental and military representatives and academics from almost every democratic nation in the region. Thus, some of the finest minds in the hemisphere contributed to the conference.

Since the National Security Strategy,<sup>8</sup> National Military Strategy,<sup>9</sup> Quadrennial Defense Review,<sup>10</sup> and National Defense Panel Report<sup>11</sup> all envision a greater role for the Reserve Components, and with its already active role in the region a key part of SOUTHCOM's peacetime engagement initiative, the participation of the National Guard was both timely and appropriate. Its organization, dual roles and missions, relationship to its civilian governmental leaders, and citizen-soldier heritage serve as a model for the role of the armed forces in a democratic society. Its dual function of providing for the common defense and protecting the lives, property and well-being of the citizenry, while adding value to America, suggest desirable roles for other military organizations to emulate.

Attempting to carry out the intent of the Army Chief of Staff's directive of strategic outreach to organizations and institutions outside the Department of Defense and to ensure a balanced representation in our discussions, the U.S. Army War College invited the Latin American Consortium of the University of New Mexico and New Mexico State University to cosponsor the event and to assist in identifying and inviting the finest academic experts in the region to participate. The scholars who answered the call added to the scope and breadth of the proceedings in a manner rarely experienced in conferences of this type.



Collectively, the sponsors agreed to call the conference “The Role of the Armed Forces in the Americas: Civil-Military Relations for the 21st Century.” The four-fold purpose of the gathering was to:

- Examine the dynamic between the military and civilian segments of society within the democratic nations of the Western Hemisphere;
- Analyze the emerging role for the armed forces, in support of civil authorities, as an instrument of national security policy;
- Highlight the viability of the National Guard State to State Partnership Program as a vehicle for increased international cooperation in the region; and
- Establish an ongoing working relationship between the various military and civilian academic institutions and governmental agencies in the region, relative to key strategic issues impacting the hemisphere as we approach the 21st Century.

The conference included a variety of plenary sessions and small group working discussions led by civilian and military leaders from throughout the Western Hemisphere, all experts in their field. Plenary sessions focused on “The Role of the Military: Current Issues and Future Prospects,” and the “National Guard State to State Partnership Program,” as well as presentations on “Civil-Military Relations in the 21st Century: A Latin American Perspective,” “The Peace Process in Guatemala,” and “The Colombian Army in the 21st Century.” Working groups deliberated a myriad of issues including: The Inter-American Defense System, Inter-Institutional Relations in the National Policy Process, Cooperative Security and Peacekeeping, Subregional Cooperation, and Emerging Roles and Missions.

The following chapters include the papers and speeches (the latter sometimes in summary form) delivered at the conference, rapporteurs' synopses of each of the working group discussions, and an analysis of the implications, with recommendations, for the conduct and enhancement of civil-military relations and U.S. policy. We hope that these efforts will contribute to an understanding of the complex issues involved in civil-military relations in a democratic society, and that they will help foster the evolution of regional armed forces that are committed to performing their roles and missions in an environment firmly based on democratic principles and subordinate to duly elected civilian leaders working in the interests of the nation and its citizens.

## **ENDNOTES - CHAPTER ONE**

1. President William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, Washington, DC: The White House, May 1997, p. i.

2. General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997, pp. 2-3.

3. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, pp. 10-11.

4. Otto Johnson, ed., *Information Please Almanac*, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997, pp. 143-297.

5. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, pp. 6-9.

6. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, *United States Security Strategy for the Americas*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1995, pp. 4-5.

7. General Wesley K. Clark, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Southern Command—Command Briefing, Quarry Heights, Panama, 1997.

8. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, p. 12.

9. Shalikashvili, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, pp. 22-24.

10. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1997, pp. 32-34.

11. Philip A. Odeen, Chairman of the National Defense Panel, *Transforming Defense: National Security for the 21st Century*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1997, pp. 52-55.

## **PART TWO**

### **THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY: CURRENT ISSUES AND FUTURE PROSPECTS**

**Chapter Two**  
**Building New Security Relationships**  
**in the Americas:**  
**The Critical Next Steps**

**Dr. Richard Downes**  
**North-South Center**  
**University of Miami**

**ABSTRACT**

***Thesis:***

Military institutions in Latin America should consider unprecedented levels of civil-military dialogue and regional cooperation to overcome the detrimental effects of the past. Implementation of effective civilian control over the military and adoption of continentalism as a supplement to nationalism should guide new arrangements for domestic and regional security cooperation. Such an approach could be more effective if the United States gave priority to serving as a catalyst for multilateral cooperation.

***Support:***

The onset of the neo-liberal state has reduced the size and influence of military institutions in the past ten years while non-traditional security threats have risen in strength and many historic conflicts remain unresolved. Democratic governments are increasing their control over military institutions. Greater subregional economic integration ties the fates of governments more closely together. While bilateral security cooperation has increased in some cases, the doctrine and architecture for security

cooperation lack a unifying theme and structure. Violent crime, insurgency, illegal arms trade, climatic anomalies, and drug trafficking are challenging many democratic governments. Because the revolution in military affairs requires major expenditures to modernize forces, few of the region's military establishments can afford the investment required. Historic suspicions about the role of the United States will continue to impede bilateral cooperation.

Two scenarios for the future are possible. The pessimistic one sees continued atrophy of some military institutions and further disruption of the state at the hands of transnational criminals allied with insurgencies with territorial aspirations, eventually leading to a return to authoritarian governments. Selective modernization may exacerbate historic tensions and cause further higher allocations for defense needs than would otherwise be necessary. A more optimistic scenario envisions more effective military institutions resulting from a greater civil-military dialogue at the domestic and international levels, better integration of defense and economic foreign policies, and higher levels of multilateral trust and cooperation. The United States can promote higher levels of regional security by sharing perspectives on civil-military relations and on multilateral cooperation gained from NATO and the Persian Gulf War, by promoting multilateral cooperation in civil infrastructure functions performed by Latin American militaries, and by emphasizing a multilateral approach to training, exercise, and intelligence.

## **Building New Security Relationships in the Americas: The Critical Next Steps**

### **Introduction.**

I am pleased and humbled to be here. This is a most impressive group whose credentials testify to your

commitment to furthering inter-American security. I especially thank Dr. Gil Merckx for inviting me to share personal observations about the topic assigned me, the current role and future prospects for the armed forces acting within the hemisphere, including that of the United States. I am speaking personally, without coordination, approval, or guidance from any U.S. government institution.

This is an exceptionally good time to take stock. Decennial evaluations are usually conducted at the end of a decade, but 1997 is providing us with a handy measuring tool for two reasons. We are at the end of ten years of significant reform, as recognized by the Inter-American Development Bank, and we are also completing ten years of unofficial but officially-sponsored dialogue on inter-American security issues among security experts in the hemisphere conducted through the auspices of American University, the Southern Command, and the National Defense University, with the increasing participation of many non-governmental organizations, including, if I may add, the North-South Center of the University of Miami.

The approach of the millennium may also provide us with a handy marker for evaluating future progress. After all, the millennium is bringing us challenging questions and predictions. Will the military's computer systems continue to normally operate, or will we all be set back chronologically 100 years, forcing all our war reserve inventory to be declared obsolete because it is 99 years old? Is there any truth in predictions of a 1994 news story that "a newly discovered comet is heading earth's way, and will probably miss, but a collision could possibly wipe out the entire human race"? Can we afford to discount the chance of "a very large and uneven accumulation of ice around the South Pole causing a sudden catastrophic re-arrangement of the earth's tectonic plates"? We need not be so apocalyptic.

Rather, these two reference points suggest that now is an excellent time for a frank review of where we have been and where we are going with respect to the role of the armed forces. Clearly, we are at the end of 10 years of fundamental change in military institutions in the Western Hemisphere. The current disparity between security needs and resources begs definition, innovation, leadership, and commitment. We can either move toward a conflictive and dysfunctional future that will betray the historic promise of the Americas, or we can create security policies and military institutions that will facilitate achievement of a prosperous community of democratic governments in the Americas. In my personal opinion, after years of meetings like this, and hundreds of analytical articles, books, speeches, and seminars, it is time to get beyond the hand-wringing, theoretical stage about the security environment in the Americas and develop a prescriptive, substantive approach to the issue.

### **Conflicting Forces Acting upon the Armed Forces.**

So, then, where are we? I would like to use the analogy of a football team, comparing the armed forces to a concept we can relate to throughout the Americas. In short, our teams have been cut by up to 50 percent. We have absentee coaches, managers, and owners, and we are not sure who we are playing, or who might be supporting us. It is no secret, especially to many in this room who are living the process, that the onset of the neo-liberal state has reduced the size and influence of military institutions.

The introduction to a recent report by the Inter-American Development Bank, "Latin America After a Decade of Reforms: 1997 Economic and Social Progress Report," notes that "Latin America has made its choice for democracy, macroeconomic stability, market-oriented growth, and decentralization.... Ten years into the process, Latin America is a very different place, and the results are starting to bear fruit."



What the report doesn't say is that Latin America's military institutions have been significantly reduced in the process. Taken on an aggregate basis, as a percentage of Gross National Product, Latin American military spending fell by nearly one-half between 1984 and 1994, from 2.1 to 1.2 percent. Between 1984 and 1994, Latin America's spending on the armed forces fell at an average annual rate of 3.3 percent. During the same period, the ratio of Latin America's armed forces to population decreased at an annual average rate of 5.1 percent. In almost every country, these numbers have decreased, Colombia being the exception for reasons we can surmise.

This transformation has been accompanied by a reduction of the military's influence in strategic economic sectors, such as mining, telecommunications, and energy, and many military or state-owned or subsidized industries have been sold to private capital, including international enterprise, or forced to focus on civilian consumer goods to sustain their existence. A few militaries have been shielded from this trend, however, by access to revenues from natural resources or special taxes. Ecuador's military benefits from 15 percent of the nation's oil revenues. Colombia raised a special war tax in 1996 resulting in \$500 million to support counternarcotics purchases, and the Chilean armed forces receives 10 percent of the gross revenue from copper sales.

The decline in military resources is reflected in the reduced operational rates of Latin American armed forces. According to a recent paper by Patrice Franko of Maine's Colby College, the Navy of one major South American nation had only two of its forty-nine vessels in optimal working condition and only 15 of its 49 aircraft were serviceable. Another major country with an extensive coastline has only 25 major naval vessels available. Major programs have been drastically reduced in funding, such as the Brazilian Navy's nuclear submarine program.<sup>1</sup>

Also excluded from the report is the change in life style and status imposed upon the Latin American armed forces as a result of the reforms of the last decade. Anecdotal evidence suggests that one country's Army captains have to work as taxi cab drivers to supplement a meager income. In another, elevator operators working in a federal ministry earned more than an Air Force aviator at the rank of colonel. And in a third, Air Force officers worked only half the day, devoting the remainder of their time to their private businesses that were the main source of their family's income.

Finally, the political burden of the excesses of the bureaucratic authoritarian governments of the 1960s and 1970s is being borne by today's armed forces. Many civilians elected to office in the 1990s had no experience with the military other than negative interaction as opponents of the authoritarian state. Moreover, chief executives are often too harassed by uncooperative legislatures and trying economic conditions to give serious attention to security issues. Complicating the image of the armed forces are actions by military factions to challenge democratic rule in various countries in the 1990s. The armed forces have been forced to undergo two transitions. The first occurred during the beginning of the democratization phase, when legal guarantees were negotiated for members accused of excesses during the authoritarian-bureaucratic period. The second is the current period, which Felipe Agüero calls the "transition within a transition."<sup>2</sup> This stage is witnessing the redefinition of the armed forces' societal and professional roles. Legislatures and executives are asserting their prerogatives on security matters by cutting budgets and forcing military institutions to consolidate and operate jointly to avoid becoming a "trunkless elephant."

Civilians are now quick to point out that the military has no monopoly on patriotism, and the military has often reacted negatively to civilian intrusion into military affairs, citing the lack of civilian expertise or civilian willingness to manipulate the military for partisan political purposes.

During a recent conference involving civilian and military officials from the hemisphere, civilian representatives often began discussion sessions by questioning the need to spend any money to sustain military forces during a period of reduced international tensions.

How is this game going to be played? The irony of this debate, and of the reductions in military expenditures, is that war and other forms of organized violence are far from obsolete. Traditional and non-traditional threats are creating serious challenges to the region's governments, including the United States.

The Ecuador-Peru conflict of 1995 reminds us that historic, smoldering border conflicts can ignite anew, with serious consequences. Moreover, the slow progress at finding a lasting solution, arms purchases related to the conflict, and a continuing sequence of minor incidents are not encouraging. The consequences of a next round of conflict, as pointed out by analysts from Peru and Ecuador attending the North-South Center's 1996 conference on the topic, would not be limited to isolated jungle areas, but would instead include major elements of each nation's infrastructure.

At the opening of the 1995 conference on security cooperation, OAS Secretary César Gaviria noted that there were some 31 such disputes throughout the hemisphere, and a recent paper by a Chilean defense analyst highlighted the ten most prominent.<sup>3</sup> Most of us know the location and parties to those conflicts and how difficult it is to reach lasting resolutions. These conflicts are in reality not "historic"; they are latent, ready to be actualized by domestic political pressures, demographic trends, natural resource discoveries, or the unauthorized actions of a local commander. They could be exacerbated if purchases of new weapons by neighboring countries, intended to modernize aging arsenals, are interpreted as efforts to establish a regional advantage.

Neither has the threat of insurgency entirely disappeared. Insurgents openly challenged Colombia's democratic process only two weeks ago by disrupting municipal elections. Even if these insurgents have no detectable political ideology, the same was the case with China's war lords at the end of the 19th century. The net result—usurpation of the central government's authority and power—is the same. Sendero Luminoso is still active in Peru, and the MRTA has been declared dead more than once, a troubling record in itself. In Mexico, the People's Revolutionary Army continues to inflict casualties on military and police units in Oaxaca, the Zapatistas have moved from the Chiapas jungles to the streets of Mexico City, and armed bands continue to disrupt daily life in Nicaragua. Nor should we overlook the negative synergism arising from armed bands operating on borders, whether it be in the Darién region of Panama, the Venezuelan-Colombian border, or possibly spilling over from the Andean nations into Brazil.

It is increasingly difficult to draw the line between insurgents and drug traffickers. The \$49-billion demand of addicts and occasional users in the United States, coupled with increasing domestic use within Latin American nations themselves, have given the drug lords the unprecedented power to subvert democratic institutions. London's prestigious International Institute for Strategic Studies credits drug trafficking with giving rise to major criminal organizations and an increase in terrorist and violent actions. In the opinion of the IISS, "Their main challenge to government authority is through the corrosive influence of corruption, perhaps the greatest obstacle to democratic consolidation in the region." Why is it so difficult to get a conviction on a narcotics-trafficking charge in Miami? How can the "lord of the skies" fly passenger-size aircraft filled with cocaine around the Americas? Who is buying up large cattle ranches in Western Venezuela and for what purposes? The erosion of our justice systems and the subversion of local and national government

institutions can best be compared with Sicily's experience with the Mafia, a process that eventually forced Sicilian authorities to launch a life-or-death struggle for control of society itself.

Neither can we discount the potential threat of terrorists. Peru, Colombia, and Mexico experienced terrorist attacks in 1996, and the bombings of the Israeli Embassy and a Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires and of a commuter airplane in Panama have yet to be resolved.

The onset of the neoliberal state has also been marked by drastic increases in violence and organized crime. Figures compiled by the Inter-American Development Bank paint a grim picture. Between 1980 and 1991, the average homicide rate, measured as deaths per 100,000 inhabitants, nearly doubled from 12.8 to 21.4. Some communities have taken the law into their own hands in the face of burglaries, rapes, kidnappings, and assaults. One estimate concludes that crime costs Colombia 15 percent of its Gross National Product, and the possibility of being punished is about 3 percent. Mexico's Army is increasingly assuming internal security roles, including performing law enforcement functions and having military officers serve in police organizations. Throughout the region, the armed forces are being asked to supplement local police forces.

Latin America and the Caribbean are perennially faced with natural disaster, and the advent of El Niño has created particularly serious challenges for nations with a Pacific Coast. Volcanoes and Hurricanes, such as Hurricane Andrew, have propelled the military into central roles as coordinators and providers of disaster relief.

To continue the football analogy, a third force—the push toward regional economic integration—has caused us to ask who is on our side and who might be supporting us?

The commitment at the Summit of the Americas to agree upon a Free Trade Area of the Americas by 2005 and the

increasing pace of subregional trade integration are raising fundamental questions about bilateral and multilateral relationships. No longer shielded behind a wall of national tariffs, national economies are looking for opportunities by forming customs unions that may lead to free trade on a larger scale. The growth of intra-regional trade has been phenomenal. Argentina's intra-regional exports increased from 29 percent of total exports in 1991 to over 45 percent in 1995. The percentage of Brazil's total trade going to other Mercosul countries rose by 80 percent between 1992 and 1996, when it reached \$7.3 billion.

The advantages of freer trade are pushing a veritable explosion of agreements, meetings, and milestones, accompanied by political and economic consultation and cooperation, such as that marked by the multi-billion dollar guarantee recently extended to Mexico by the United States. The explosion in subregional trade is being accompanied by a similar expansion of sub-regional investment and massive investment in shared infrastructure. Chile is the third largest investor in Argentina, and gas pipelines throughout southern South America are tying the region's economies more closely together than ever. Economic integration, however, conflicts directly with previous defense scenarios that envisioned neighboring countries as constituting the primary threat to each nation's security. Taken together, the phenomena of economic integration, lower budgets and deteriorated security conditions are pressuring the armed forces for change to an unprecedented degree. What is happening in response?

### **The Armed Forces' Response.**

The armed forces and civil society have made important progress during the past ten years. Domestically, we are witnessing the beginnings of a civil-military dialogue based upon the primacy of the democratic principle of civilian control of the military. The publication of several elements

of national defense policies are major steps toward reconstituting public support for the armed forces. Public declarations of the principles of Argentine defense policy, the writing of the Brazilian policy of national defense by a joint committee of military and civilian experts, published in November of last year, and the Chilean white paper on defense are fundamental to understanding and support for national objectives. Brazil's annual conference on strategic issues, soon to realize its fourth meeting, is another major step at integrating elements of civil society into the dialogue on security matters.

Associations of retired armed forces officers are undertaking lobbying campaigns designed to emphasize their concerns about the plight of the armed forces. Leaders of the Argentine Forum of the Retired Generals and of Brazil's Clube Militar have made specific appeals for increased attention to the needs of the military through democratic methods.

Individual officers have decided to enter the democratic system to gain support for their concerns about the destiny of their respective nations by being elected to office. They have sought election to Congress and even to the presidency, and in the case of Bolivia have been successful.

We are also witnessing the rise of the first cadre of civilian defense experts who are broadly trained in security issues, with doctorates in strategic studies from the best universities, cognizant of the military and political dynamics of defense policy.

Finally, the increasing unification of control over the armed forces by the establishment of effective ministries of defense will lead to more coherent defense policies. This will lead to a clearer rationale for maintaining an armed force, and the identification of possible ways to eliminate duplication of forces or to strengthen national capability where needed.

Internationally, there are signals that cooperation on security issues is increasing throughout the region. I discuss elsewhere<sup>4</sup> three emerging trends marking, in an ad hoc manner, new ways of security cooperation in the region based upon 1) sub-regional detente, 2) re-invention of institutions engaged in security in the region, including those of the United States, and 3) thematic redesign—an initiative stressing a new civil-military reality supported by the periodic meetings of the defense ministers of the Americas and the recent foundation of the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies by the United States. Since the publication of my report, there have been several indications that sub-regional detente has become the most prominent of these trends and is progressing toward subregional defense cooperation. Combined operations by Venezuela and Colombia on their border earlier this year and an announcement that Argentina and Brazil will establish a formal consultative mechanism on security, followed by news that Brazil and Chile will do the same, are indicators that bilateral cooperation is advancing.<sup>5</sup>

But are these measures enough? As important as these domestic and international developments might be for the future of the armed forces as institutions and for the degree of security the region will enjoy, the process has left several critical questions unresolved.

Domestically, these include:

1. How will civilian expertise on defense matters be generated?
2. To what extent should the armed forces become involved, or remained involved, in public security functions?
3. How will the armed forces receive the support necessary to maintain their institutional structures, as expressed through an adequate budget?

Internationally, these include:



1. How can the inherent difficulties of coordinating multiple bilateral relations be resolved, especially as economic integration becomes more multilateral in scope?

2. Can the region's armed forces reach mutually agreed upon definitions of the threats to which they should respond, given their unique capabilities for the controlled application of force?

3. How can the United States best make a positive contribution to a better security posture, given its occasional tendency toward unilateralism and historic suspicions about its role in the hemisphere and its hegemonic status?

4. Most importantly, how can a new security doctrine be achieved that will simultaneously treat the challenges of the new security environment within an environment of reduced defense resources?

### **Answers.**

I do not pretend to have all the answers. I am fully aware that many so-called experts actually believe that the definition of an expert is anyone who is 500 miles from home and who has transparencies to project. I can suggest, however, after over 30 years of dealing with one aspect or another of inter-American security issues, that there are two major courses of action that will lead to resolution of most of these problems.

Domestically, the democratically elected civilian leadership must assume the burden of developing an effective defense policy. Just as absentee ownership in sports or business is not effective, so also is the case in defense policy. Deciding when and how a nation is to use its armed forces in a democracy is a fundamental obligation of elected civilian officials, not of the leadership of the armed forces. Such a defense policy, in my opinion, is best developed through a frank and constructive national dialogue that recognizes the political responsibilities of the

civilian officials and the technical expertise of the military professional. A fundamental intermediate step is a national commitment to train and educate civilian professionals in strategic affairs and the leadership and management of defense institutions. No military commander should be put in the position of acting in a security situation without the guidance of the civilian national command authorities.

Critical to that policy is a decision, at the national level, on the division of responsibilities between military, police, and other public safety institutions for public order and other domestic functions. National tradition and values should be the guiding precepts. As different countries' traditions vary widely, the experience of one country may not be adaptable to the needs of another. The notion that the military should assume police functions because of a supposed incorruptibility has, alas, proven to be unfounded. The answer to extensive police corruption is thorough reform of the police and of the judicial system, not an insertion of the military into functions that place the nation's armed forces into direct confrontation with elements of the civilian populace, whom they have sworn to protect, and that distract it from training for traditional military functions.

Once the defense policy has been established, the civilian and military leadership of the armed forces should work closely to prepare and defend before the legislative branch a budget that realistically meets the armed forces' needs. Allocations of resources to the armed forces will then be considered the legitimate priorities of civil society, rather than the mysterious, whimsical, or even wasteful product of military decisions taken behind closed doors.

Internationally, we must recognize the need for a new hemispheric security doctrine for security cooperation that is multilateral in concept. Such a doctrine should complement, but not replace, national objectives and establish agreement on the basic common denominators of hemispheric security cooperation. It would be comple-

mented by higher levels of multilateral cooperation among police forces and justice officials, but these actions would take place through channels separate and distinct from those providing armed forces cooperation on security matters. The essential elements of a new hemispheric security doctrine might include commitments to:

1) enhanced cooperation on information related to the transit of vessels and aircraft to prevent illegal use of national territory;

2) the enhanced exchange of climatological information from sources available to the armed forces to better prepare for climatic anomalies, such as the effects of El Niño;

3) higher levels of exchange of information on insurgent groups operating near national borders to prevent use of sanctuary, a key to the destruction of insurgent groups;

4) commitments to exchange information on potential arms purchases to prevent misinterpretation of national intentions;

5) a commitment to debrief the results of bilateral and multilateral military exercises so that all countries may gain from the investment in training throughout the region

6) definition of support functions that can efficiently be provided to the forces acting against drug trafficking in the region; and

7) even an eventual agreement on specialization of functions by some armed forces, especially those of smaller states, as is the case with NATO forces.

Essential to making such a doctrine work is a complimentary architecture, multilateral in nature, that will not be subject to domination or manipulation by any one nation, or a combination of nations in the region. Such an architecture would be constructed under the authority and through the cooperation of national defense ministers, thus guaranteeing its consistency with the precepts of civilian control. This architecture would include:

1) the establishment of a secretariat dedicated to meetings of the ministers of defense. This secretariat would coordinate meetings of defense ministers and provide periodic follow-up of resolutions adopted at the respective meetings;

2) the coordination by that same secretariat of the topics for meetings of the Conference of American Armies and chiefs of the region's air forces and navies to focus on commitments arranged through the hemispheric security doctrine;

3) the establishment of electronic communications systems that will better link defense establishments for purposes of exchanging information related to the commitments assumed under the hemispheric security doctrine;

4) periodic meetings of senior defense ministry officials below the rank of minister to review the mechanics of security cooperation carried out by defense institutions.

This approach will not provide immediate answers, but it is far more consistent with modern needs than the current system that emphasizes individual nation's military capabilities and bilateral relationships, and provides only limited opportunities for multinational cooperation. Under civilian control, with budgets that meet national priorities, and a higher level of multinational cooperation, the region's armed forces can meet their security needs more efficiently and with a higher degree of support from the civilian population. At the same time, the United States can enhance the effectiveness of its interaction by sharing perspectives on civil-military relations and on multilateral cooperation gained from NATO and the Persian Gulf War, by promoting multilateral cooperation in civil infrastructure functions performed by Latin American militaries, and by adopting a multilateral approach to training, exercise, and intelligence that would complement the hemispheric security doctrine.

## **Conclusion.**

Can the team be prepared to meet the needs of the future—to win, satisfy its fans, and put bread on the table of the players? Two scenarios for the future are possible. Continuing the current course may lead to continued atrophy of some military institutions and further disruption of the state at the hands of transnational criminals allied with insurgencies with territorial aspirations, eventually creating pressures for a return to authoritarian governments and the end of the democratic spring that the region enjoys. Selective modernization may exacerbate historic tensions and cause higher allocations for defense needs than would otherwise be necessary, or even conflict that could derail economic integration and the benefits promised to the region as a whole.

A more optimistic scenario, one which I support, envisions more effective military institutions resulting from a greater civil-military dialogue at the domestic and international levels, better integration of defense and economic foreign policies, and higher levels of trust and activity in multilateral operations. The United States can perform a singularly positive role in this process, as has been described.

Unlike the Europeans who sought to forge peace in the 19th and 20th Centuries, we in the Americas cannot point to the destructiveness of past wars and appeal to the mandates of great conferences, such as the Congress of Vienna or Potsdam Conference, as the basis for overcoming the deficiencies of our security system. But we who live them know that revolutionary changes are necessary to sustain the level of prosperity and dignity embodied in the promise of America, as envisioned by the leaders of our countries' independence movements. Fundamental changes are necessary, and the old questions, "If not us, who, and if not now, when?" should guide our deliberations. Thank you for listening to these ideas, and I look forward to your comments.

## ENDNOTES - CHAPTER TWO

1. Patrice Franco, "Patterns of Military Procurement in Latin America: Implications for U.S. Regional Policy," in *Security Cooperation in the Americas*, Gabriel Marcella and Richard Downs, eds., Miami: North-South Center Press, p. 7.

2. Felipe Agüero, "Las Fuerzas Armadas en una Época de Transición: Perspectivas para el Afianzamiento de Democracia en América Latina," Conference paper, Ford Foundation Conference, Buenos Aires, Argentina, May 22, 1997.

3. Francisco Rojas Aravena, "América Latina: Alternativas y Mecanismos de Prevención en Situaciones Vinculados a la Soberanía Territorial," in *Paz y Seguridad en las Américas*, Santiago, Chile: FLACSO, p. 4.

4. "Emerging Patterns of Security Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere," *North-South Issues*, 5, 1 (1996).

5. Institute for European-Latin American Relations, "A New Strategic Debate in South America?" An IRELA Briefing, August 25, 1997, pp. 8-9.

# **Chapter Three**

## **Brazilian National Defense Policy and Civil-Military Relations in the Government of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso<sup>1</sup>**

**Dr. Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira  
Campinas State University, Brazil**

[The National Defense Policy] is not just a decision of the military body or the diplomatic corps, but of a diplomatic vision...that should be supported by a military structure capable of generating an efficient deterrent effect. . . . In the strategies stemming from these policies, there should be occasional support of the armed forces to the police agency in charge of the permanent fight against organized crime in the domains of logistics, communications and intelligence. In exceptional cases, the armed forces could enter into operations against well-defined targets that require the use of mass or the physical surrounding of terrain. This is where the armed forces might use their fighting power. Therefore, it is not a direct action by the armed forces.

President Fernando Henrique Cardoso<sup>2</sup>

The object of this essay is to understand Brazil's National Defense Policy from the perspective of civil-military relations under the government of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso. In this context, the President has been working on the solution to two issues fundamental to a full subordination of the military to civilian authority. First, there has been a growing capability and willingness on the part of the Executive to direct the armed forces. (In this respect, it must be noted, that branch differs from the Legislature, which has been apathetic on this subject.) Secondly, this has led to the resolution of the military identity crisis that took place within the framework of re-democratization and the end of the Cold War.

My central thesis is that President Cardoso is creating a new pattern in the relationship between the political authority and the armed forces. The path to this new situation is being opened by means of the President's political and intellectual leadership as well as by his legitimacy, which is anchored in his election, in his economic and political reorganization of the state, and in his international role as Chief of State. This new pattern of civil-military relations is also a result of the performance and institutional profile of the heads of the military ministries. Thus has been solved some of the most acute recent problems of the Brazilian military apparatus.

The most symbolic issue—because it is so loaded with human and political meaning—is related to those opposed to the military dictatorship, who were killed or are missing.<sup>3</sup> The Law on the Missing (and the Catholic Church, a foremost defender of Human Rights, kept itself surprisingly mute on this subject), adapted specifically by the state of Rio Grande do Sul,<sup>4</sup> both closes and expands the political amnesty established by decree by General João Figueiredo, the last President of the military regime. Given the scars of Brazil's recent past, President Cardoso, by positing the nation's reconciliation with itself, went beyond amnesty. This has made it possible to restructure political life. Under pressure from international public opinion and a widespread clamoring by Brazilian society, Cardoso has gotten Brazil and even the armed forces to recognize that the latter had disobeyed positive and natural laws by establishing a structure of terrorism and torture to fight terrorism and guerrillas. In more general terms, it was a state terrorism that fought all modalities of "subversion." However, by maintaining the limits of the amnesty, the legal and political equation applied to those who are dead and missing did not bring about a loss of credibility either for the military authority or for the legitimacy of the President vis-a-vis the armed forces. It also did not reduce the prestige of the military in the eyes of Brazilian society. On the political and ideological level, this reconciliation



process suggests what amounts to almost a historical discontinuity between the present armed forces and those that acted in a reproachable way in the past. Therefore, fears of a trauma in the barracks—that might lead to a political destabilization in an already unstable political situation because of reforms within the state—did not materialize.<sup>5</sup>

I had the opportunity to analyze the possibility of such political instability during the first year of President Cardoso's administration. At that time I said that:

Brazilian democracy is beginning an important test. The potential for destabilization. . . resides in the feeling of isolation, condemnation, or stigma that might affect the military institution. Notwithstanding its behavior, which is clearly favorable to democracy, it finds itself against the wall, facing the possibility of losing its institutional autonomy. Even at a low level of political power, the armed forces will make their dissatisfaction known. It is up to both sides that engaged in violence to apologize. A good number of those opposing the authoritarian regime believed in building a new social system that—we know—was supposed to be authoritarian. However, there were also killings directed against people who worked for the government and, in some cases, against comrades of the same revolutionary ideals. They were victims of the arms that the nation gave the armed forces that—outside and against the law—offended both humanity and military principles by putting into operation a structure of torment and extermination of political prisoners. Both sides cultivated militarism while being held captive of a belief in the transforming character of violence in that war which stemmed from the narrow horizons of the Cold War.<sup>6</sup>

The positive response of society and the political system to the President's initiative reinforced the leadership of the Navy, Army and Air Force ministers,<sup>7</sup> but mostly it strengthened his own authority in the military area. In the National Defense Policy (PDN), Cardoso has displayed the same self-confidence he did when addressing the problem of the dead and missing under the military regime. The PDN is the main innovation in the domain of civil-military

relations, which besides opening the way to the creation of a Ministry of Defense, serves as a guide for preparing the military in a manner that is attuned to the country's foreign policy. And both are geared to building a new prestige for Brazil in the international arena. Since both military and diplomatic spheres involve medium and long-term concepts and perceptions, Cardoso linked diplomats, military and other government employees within the recently created Chamber of Foreign Relations and National Defense over which he presides.<sup>8</sup>

The President announced the results of this work, stating that:

I am signing today the National Defense Policy proposed by the Chamber of Foreign Relations and National Defense. The ideas contained in it are the result of a full analysis of today's national and international situations as well as of medium-term scenarios. Therefore, a conclusion was reached that it should be anchored on a strategic posture that is of a deterring and defensive character, based on the following assumptions: borders and limits that are perfectly defined and internationally recognized; close relations with neighboring countries and with the international community; rejection of wars of conquest; the need to find peaceful solutions to controversies, using force only as a resort to self-defense.<sup>9</sup>

The clear orientation of the National Defense Policy is faithfulness to a "diplomatic and military heritage" on both conceptual and international/foreign policy levels, as well as to the defense of a democratic state and military diplomacy. However, the National Defense Policy requires a more adequate conceptual and political framework with regard to two factors that are part of civil-military relations. The first of these concerns action by the armed forces—in particular, the Army—in the area of public safety. Here we have legal problems that affect the balance of the federation—i.e., the relations between the union and the states. The absence of the legislative branch in decisions on federal intervention in state Military Police organizations is remarkable. [Translator's note: In Brazil, state police are

known as Military Police—"Polícia Militar."] Those participating in such decisions are the governors requiring it and the ministers of Justice and Army. Obviously, it is up to the President to make the final decision.

However, the most important problem is the equation of public safety and internal defense: Given the continuity of the concepts and the operational structures of the military, public safety crises stimulate the use of the armed forces in national life. Thus, the border between public safety, internal defense and defense of the institutions of the democratic state continues to be nebulous. This requires a Presidential or Congressional initiative to fully clarify it. The responsibilities of the two branches concerning the National Defense Policy are clearly different: The Executive formulates and implements it, while the Legislature barely evaluates and monitors it. But the consolidation of democracy could lead to an increase in legislative functions directing and sharing responsibilities for the PDN. In that case, the PDN would continue to be proposed by the President, but would be subject to approval by the National Congress.<sup>10</sup>

As mentioned above, the PDN is inscribed in Brazilian foreign policy. Defining a new strategic posture means building a more reliable and responsible profile on the international plane. This is the significance of Brazil's candidacy for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (formulated a few years ago by the Foreign Ministry) and of its recent signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. By bringing Brazil into the latter, President Cardoso's government admits that the acquisition of nuclear weapons is not in the national interest; nor is it in accordance with the country's scientific and military objectives. Furthermore, after signing the nuclear agreements with Argentina and opening Brazilian nuclear programs to international inspection, "we are providing another example of our commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation, and taking another step to strengthen

Brazil's credentials in contemporary international politics."<sup>11</sup>

### **Models of Civil-Military Relations in Brazil: 1945-1997.**

In the last seven years, the Brazilian political system has contributed more to the subordination of the military to civilian authority than in all of the more than 100 years of the Republic's history—a republic created mainly by an intense mobilization by the military in 1889. The first years of the new regime not only witnessed a short-lived radical and highly repressive military dictatorship, but also the ascension of the armed forces to the highest level of national politics.

Nevertheless, after recovering political power from the Army, the oligarchies left the military in a subordinate role that led younger generations of uniformed men to rebellion and prevented the development of professional perspectives. The lieutenants' rebellions that shook the political system in the 1920s opened the path to the political-military revolution that ushered in a long period of conservative modernization of the state and economy, as was the case in other parts of the world under fascist or Soviet structures. Thus, Brazil, with the Revolution of 1930, lived under a civilian dictatorship with strong military support, with the exception of the brief period under the 1934 Constitution that was terminated by the coup through which President Getúlio Vargas established the New State ("Estado Novo") in November 1937. Though the dictator implemented important reforms in the armed forces, he kept the institution subordinated through a refined game of divide and conquer in order to assure his own supremacy. In the end, however, the military overthrew him when he attempted to re-democratize under his own control.

In Brazil, civil-military relations since the beginning of the Cold War can be analyzed according to four models. The

political regime based on the 1946 Constitution established a high degree of armed forces autonomy by subordinating them to the Chief of State. Alfred Stepan used the concept of a “moderating pattern” to analyze the relationship between the parties and politicians, on the one hand, and the armed forces, on the other.<sup>12</sup> The military commanders felt entitled by both the nation’s history and the way the military institution developed to intervene in the political arena to stimulate or veto ongoing processes. Political leaders accommodated themselves to these interventions, and frequently even encouraged them. Parodying General Goes Monteiro, one could say that the political system allowed the Army to have its own politics.<sup>13</sup>

Thus, to take only two examples, the liberal-conservative party União Democrática Nacional (UDN) had its military arm in the “Cruzada Democrática” movement, organized around the War College (Escola Superior de Guerra) and the Military Club (Clube Militar), against the populism of Getúlio Vargas’ constitutional government. [Translator’s note: Former dictator Vargas returned as a constitutionally elected President in 1950.] The Communist Party maintained an identical relationship with the nationalist left-wing military. But it was a two-way street where the liberal-conservative military and the left-wing nationalist military used, respectively, the UDN and the Communist Party as “party arms” of their military perspectives.

The second element of the moderating pattern—what I would rather call the “intervention function of the military”—features highly politicized military, unions and social movements. An important example of a social sector that is mobilized is the civilian bureaucracy, which was stimulated in the late 1930s and gained an even more important momentum with the creation of state-owned companies starting in the 1950s. Finally, the military apparatus is highly politicized and mobilized. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, stemming from a military initiative for a nationalist solution to the issue of oil exploration, a

significant movement developed among the middle class in favor of a state monopoly in the energy sector. The creation of Petrobras—a state-owned company holding the oil exploration monopoly—was a result of this initial politicization of the energy question in the military area. Another example is Brazil’s refusal to send troops to Korea. Getúlio Vargas’ government, which under pressure was leaning towards accommodating the United States, was led to review this position because of the nationalistic reaction of military officers linked to the Communist Party, who at that point were in charge of the highly politicized Clube Militar.

Different military sectors were also encouraged by civilians (especially the parties and the press) to act as umpires in civilian disputes, but without holding political power. Short-lived military coups were accepted by civilians as part of the political game so long as they were not aimed at replacing civilians at the helm of state. Unfortunately, they led to an increasing lack of military discipline, which in turn only accelerated political instability.

National Defense was defined by the National Security Council, which Vargas had created in the 1930s. Within the context of the Cold War and U.S. hegemony, Brazil acquired military materiel and was subjected to a solid and enduring doctrinal influence from the United States. The struggle against subversives, as defined by the Doctrine of National Security, became a priority in the armed forces’ mission. Military preparedness for external defense concerned a distant hypothesis of participating with the United States in a war against the Soviet Union, together with the “containment of the internal enemy.” In fact, however, Brazil’s immediate strategic dispute was with Argentina, as a result of the colonial inheritance of both countries.<sup>14</sup>

Two aspects of this model acquired a greater dimension during the post-1964 military dictatorship. On one hand, while the direct struggle against the opposition was a result

of the shutting down of the political regime, that conflict contributed to the further expansion of the political closing from 1968 onward. The use of the armed forces in repressive activities, particularly against paramilitary leftist groups, led to the organization of a military and police structure that operated outside the law but under the institutional direction of the military ministers. Extra-constitutional authoritarian legislation blocked the judicial study of punitive measures within and outside the armed forces. On the other hand, the National Security Council occupied that space in the military government, above the staffs and the military ministers, in planning and executing development projects for the Navy, Army and Air Force.

The military, which had mediated and repressed political conflicts during the constitutional regime, would in the dictatorial model replace and subordinate the civilians in directing the state, restricting the role of the political parties and consequently that of the Legislature. By occupying the most important positions in these governments, in civilian as well as military areas, the armed forces reinforced social control to a point that it became the “raison d’etre” of the Army. The dynamics of military anti-communism prevented the few timid efforts to reach a political opening from getting anywhere. The armed forces became a state within a state, such was the degree of political and institutional autonomy in parts of its repressive and intelligence sectors.

When political detente occurred, it was directed by Presidents Ernesto Geisel (1974-79) and João Figueiredo (1979-85), both Army generals, who exercised power on behalf of the armed forces. Both faced episodes of acute resistance by military sectors identified with the social and political control role of the armed forces, which those elements wanted to preserve as a requirement of an envisioned “world power project.” The defeat of this alternative was due, in part, to the military command capability of President Geisel, but also to the development of civil society, the revitalizing and challenging effects of the

amnesty, and the formation of new parties. Detente and amnesty widened the political arena, and democratization brought competition to elections for public office. With the end of the military dictatorship and the election of the first civilian president in 1985, the military apparatus was unable to regain its moderating power; nor were civilian authorities able to impose themselves on the armed forces. This ambivalence translated into military tutelage.

The tutelage of the Army Minister, General Leonidas Pires Gonçalves, over President José Sarney (1985-90) was based on democratization via transition (partial reforms under military control) and on the political circumstances of the New Republic. The death of President-elect Tancredo Neves created a political vacuum that was quickly filled through a decision by the future Minister of the Army, Congressman Ulysses Guimarães—the most prominent opposition politician (and Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies)—and the jurist and politician Afonso Arinos. This decision, based on a specific interpretation of the Constitution, resulted in the inauguration of Vice-President José Sarney. The Judiciary was not called upon to make a pronouncement, nor did it take the initiative to do so. Thus, having eliminated the possibility of a government temporarily headed by the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies (in accordance with the rules of temporary succession of the President), a new and a very early presidential election was avoided. Had elections been held at that time, they would have been by direct vote, and the mentors of the New Republic feared that Leonel Brizola (a “Getulista”) might be elected President. They considered Brizola a risk to the political transition in that his presidency might lead to the military’s return to power.

The authoritarian legislation was partially revoked by President Sarney as part of the measures preceding the meeting of the National Constitutional Assembly. During that meeting, the Minister of the Army tried to contain the union movement, impede the adoption of a parliamentary regime, block the creation of a Ministry of Defense, and



thwart a presidential mandate of less than five years. At the end of that administration, an Army intervention in the Companhia Siderurgica Nacional (National Steel Company) resulted in the deaths of three workers who had occupied the plant. Military tutelage was also applied in efforts to provide oversized powers to the Army and to create difficulties for agrarian reform. During the Sarney administration, the Minister of the Army acted as a condottieri of the transition, holding final responsibility for the continuity of re-democratization. At the same time, the National Congress, while preparing the new Constitution, was unable to free itself from the legal and political heritage of the military's interventionist function.

President Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-92) performed a restricted role concerning the armed forces, but should be credited with designating military ministers who would follow strictly legal procedures during the presidential impeachment crisis that ensued. There are indications that they refused to apply force to remove Collor when corruption in his administration brought about the suggestion of impeachment. Actually, they might have been encouraged to violate legal norms by politicians of strong democratic inclinations. Nevertheless, the innovative behavior of the military ministers did not imply a reformulation of strategic ideas by the armed forces. These conceptions were transferred in full to the administration of President Cardoso.

An innovative aspect was the elimination of the "Serviço Nacional de Informações" (National Intelligence Service) by President Collor. As a result of this, President Cardoso did not inherit a civilian intelligence service. But contrary to Sarney and Collor, Cardoso interacts with military thought and looks for alternatives at the level of military organization. At the moment, the House is studying an administration-introduced bill that would create the Brazilian Intelligence System and the Brazilian Intelligence Agency, which would be in charge of providing the government with "data of a strategic character on the

difficulties, potentials and impediments to the fulfillment of its high functions.” The system and agency would be monitored by a Special Commission of the National Congress, including three senators and three congressmen. Within the government, supervision of its activities and the fulfillment of the National Intelligence Policy would be given to the Chamber of Foreign Relations and National Defense, presided over by the President of the Republic.<sup>15</sup>

## **The National Defense Policy.**

### *The Diplomatic and Military Heritage.*

The National Defense Policy (PDN) is based on a diplomatic and military heritage. In other words, it contains concepts and describes practices that are current in the armed forces and in Itamaraty (the Ministry of Foreign Relations). On this aspect, the presidential document says that: “The transformations that have occurred internally as well as those that took place regionally and globally made it necessary and timely to issue an explicit [Translator’s note: used as a verb in the Portuguese original—*explicitar*] policy of national defense, stemming from the highest level of the state, that reflects the aspirations of society and acts as a reference point for the ensuing strategies.”<sup>16</sup> Thus, the PDN does not mean a profound innovation or a rupture with previous concepts. This is why some analysts wrongly assessed it as innocuous and unnecessary, while others understood that its carefully balanced tone was the result of difficult negotiations led by diplomats. However, the PDN in itself constitutes a significant innovation in the patterns of civil-military relations. In this sense, President Cardoso is issuing a signal to society, the armed forces and the political system indicating that military questions are no longer solely the domain of the armed forces. “In a democracy, the Defense Policy is not a military issue, it is a society issue, a government issue. Obviously, the military participates actively in it.”<sup>17</sup>

Historically, Brazil has had many difficulties defining its national interests. With the exception of the National Security Doctrine, which resulted from a military vision of the state, national and international policies generally reflected the 1967 Constitution. Before the PDN, everything happened as if the country did not have interests of a national character. But while taking over a certain “diplomatic and military heritage,” the working group that prepared the PDN resorted to three orientations with deep roots in the Brazilian state, besides the orientation provided by President Cardoso himself.

The first current of this heritage comes from the strategic issues area. Consider the testimony by Ambassador Ronaldo Sardenberg, Minister of the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs in the Cardoso administration, to the National Defense Commission of the Argentine Congress, where he defined Brazilian-Argentine relations as a “strategic partnership” and explained it in terms of the guiding concepts of Brazilian foreign policy: First, Brazil tries to preserve national and regional interests and does not perceive threats of world conflict. Second, the post-Cold War international framework is defined by a dissonance between the unipolar military power (the United States) and multipolar economic powers (particularly, Japan and Germany). Third, Brazil is trying to develop its condition as “global trader” in order to achieve the position of a global actor. Fourth, and most significant for the purposes of this essay, the Brazilian strategic agenda would include the following objectives later incorporated almost in their entirety into the National Defense Policy: territorial and national integrity; defense of the state under a democratic rule of law; development of a national scientific and technological capability; maintaining a regional and global strategic presence; strengthening of Mercosul, the Amazon Treaty, and the South Atlantic as a zone of peace and cooperation; strengthening the Brazilian peace policy; and the implementation of great strategic associations, beginning with Argentina.<sup>18</sup>

The analysis of the world scene comes from the diplomatic domain. As Foreign Minister Luiz Felipe Lampreia noted during a lecture at the “Escola Superior de Guerra”:

A democratic revolution swept the world, starting in Latin America, and nowadays the huge majority of people live under democratic regimes. . . .An economic revolution took place, based on the exhaustion of the more closed models that prevailed in the 50's through the 70's, and today the vast majority of people live in economic systems based on market freedom. . . . We also had a revolution in the behavior of states, with the growing universalization of the rules of political coexistence in areas such as non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and environmental protection. . . .It seems that the path to isolation, autarchy, to options outside the mainstream of international relations is definitely closed. . . . There is a clear and intolerable cost for marginality and xenophobic nationalism. . . . Democracy, economic freedom and participation in economic and commercial mechanisms and the universal systems that regulate relations between states became the standards.

On globalization, from which states cannot escape and which would not bring about on its own either equity or justice in international relations, Minister Lampreia said that Brazilian diplomacy “defends and projects overseas the national interests. . . . But it does not create interests, nor can it project that which does not exist. . . . And the diplomacy of a country like Brazil operates necessarily from a diplomatic heritage. It does not accept changes that are not well thought out or are sudden, nor short-term bargaining, posing or unrealistic quests for prestige.”

The concepts Minister Lampreia expressed about foreign policy have been incorporated into the heart of the Defense Policy. First, “our diplomacy is universalistic and non-exclusionary.” In other words, it does not limit itself to regional areas and interests, but whenever and wherever possible tries to strengthen partnerships based on common interests. Second, “there are no ideological elements

presiding over these partnerships.” Diplomatic action is geared to pragmatically expand trade and cooperation at the world level. Third, only Brazil’s available resources limit diplomatic action. Finally, Brazilian diplomacy sees itself as active and capable of initiatives: “We repudiate every false tutelage and every abstract attachment to principles that justify inaction and can be responsible for loss of space in the international scene and loss of time in necessary strategic movements. We are dedicated to consolidating and extending Mercosul, which is today a respected and sought out international partner and a kind of second dimension of our international projection, thanks to the economic and commercial—and therefore political—force that it adds to us.”<sup>19</sup>

The military reflection on the international situation, which is characterized by U.S. hegemony without historical parallel in the strategic arena, is part of the intellectual background of the PDN. The former Minister of the Navy and of the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs, Admiral Mário César Flores, says that

All this international evolution has been so far, still discreetly and imprecisely, built into the construction of what is called the new world order, to be controlled like a condominium by the oligarchy of the powerful under the leadership of a United States left free by the sunset of the Soviet empire, holding a military capability that is so far uncontained all over the world. . . . Once done with the Cold War that legitimized the division of the globe between two hegemonies, it is natural that the United States will now try to extend the order it considers desirable for the new era. . . . Its relative economic decline vis-a-vis Japan and Europe . . . puts the United States at risk of having its hegemony rest primarily on military power, turning it (perhaps together with Great Britain) into a militarized country at the service of the new order as, in a way, has already occurred in the Gulf War with its huge financial bill that depended on a strong contribution from Japan, Germany and Saudi Arabia.<sup>20</sup>

This concern is shared by Rear Admiral Luiz Sérgio Silveira Costa, an instructor at the Escola Superior de Guerra:

Before, we had a bipolar world in political and military terms, and frozen multilateral trade and nationalisms. What we see today is a unipolar world in military terms, a relatively more intense activity by international organizations, such as the UN, in political terms: a tendency towards economic regionalisms and, in psycho-social terms, an exacerbation of ethnic nationalisms and the prevalence of issues such as human rights, demographic growth, environmental pollution and unemployment. The United States managed to defeat communism, but this did not assure peace. . . . The balance of terror was replaced by the reign of insecurity. . . . In the new world order, the bipolar world was replaced by American hegemony. . . . By uniting and leading 28 countries under the UN aegis, the United States showed that it is the only country capable of dictating new world rules. . . . We now live under the Pax Americana, or—in a dissimulated way—the Pax UNana. [Finally,] the military issues lost preeminence to the economic ones. It seems that the world is marching towards a . . .softening in the political and military domains—which does not, however, mean a scenario of total peace.<sup>21</sup>

We focus now on the observations by General Gleuber Vieira, Chief of the Army Staff. As participants in the international scenario, states have different perceptions of the new international world order: “Some of these actors try to preserve and manipulate power. Others fight for a place in the sun. And there are those that only try to survive.”<sup>22</sup> Representative democracies replace authoritarian systems and planned economies give way to market economies, where the Minimal State and market forces reign. In the military domain, institutions tend to take the place of armed forces. Within this context, the United States exercises an uncontested military hegemony and a collegiate economic hegemony within the G-7 sphere. Given there are no solid and tested rules with regard to its permanence and range, the post-Cold War order corresponds to a “world mess” in which the United Nations

has not been able to manage international conflicts efficiently.

As for the American continent, General Vieira states that, because of the “power asymmetry” favoring the United States, Latin America became a “lower priority in geo-strategic concerns,” since U.S. interests are primarily “directed to their most important partners in the power game and to threats outside the continent.” At the continental-defense level, most American countries would have changed their position, traditionally founded on collective anti-communism, a “powerful anesthetic” during the Cold War era. But the United States and its neighbors perceive threats differently. To Washington, drugs seem to be a priority “chosen to replace communism as a new continental threat,” followed by concerns with the environment, the proliferation of arms of mass destruction, and illegal immigration.

Vieira also says that new democracies—where illegal “points of convergence of power” such as terrorism, organized crime, and drug trafficking seek shelter—look forward to a new relationship between the United States and Latin America. Therefore, Washington’s “attempts to make drug trafficking a priority and a central point for continental mobilization do not seem to be...a wise and politically satisfactory position.” On the other hand, to counter the U.S. position, an agenda based on a search for understanding and mutual confidence would be indispensable. In other words, there is a need to promote the establishment of “sub-regional associations” capable of preventing conflicts through mechanisms of consultation and mutual confidence. The idea is to avoid hegemonic interventions of continental or global character. As a rule, these initiatives should not confront, nor try to replace, the OAS or the United Nations.

Regarding these sub-regional associations, a Brazilian Army document<sup>23</sup> indicates that initiatives like these would be considered appropriate so long as all countries involved

establish mutual confidence measures as an alternative to a potential regional defense system. Depending on their success, political or economic sub-regional associations could “bring us closer and lead to integration in the military field, fostering reciprocal confidence.” Instead of creating a “small regional NATO,” the Brazilian Army prefers the development of follow-up mechanisms for conflict resolution and confidence-building, such as cooperation on intelligence, exchange of professionals in the respective training centers, accepting observers during military maneuvers, periodic consultations at staff level, meetings of military experts, joint maneuvers and exercises, professional internships for officers and NCOs, systematic bilateral meetings, visits, joint sports and social events, and joint service activities (navigation through international rivers, search and rescue, air mail, disaster assistance operations, flight protection, and so on). That is, instead of a regional defense association, a more fluid and informal structure of cooperation would allow “high-level mechanisms for periodic or emergency consultations, capable of opening personal confidence channels, and allowing consultations and clarification when two or more countries face common threats.” Therefore, as a result of the power asymmetry and imbalance in the Americas, “proposals for the establishment of Permanent Inter-American Peace Forces, controlled by the OAS, are considered inopportune” by the Brazilian Army.

On the other hand, the Minister of the Army, General Zenildo Lucena, has also presented his views on these matters.<sup>24</sup> The Army that the country needs, he says, must rise to its historic mission of “maintaining Brazil’s unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.” As a result, its lines of development should be, first of all, to keep its military units in adequate operational form along our national territory. Secondly, there needs to be established a Core Force, “an embryo of the Army of the future,” comprised of professional soldiers devoted to external defense, with “all the functions of an immediate deployment force and troops



ready for use in peacekeeping missions. Such a force would also serve as a laboratory for experimentation with new techniques and combat procedures, as well as a hands-on school for updating permanent personnel.” Thirdly, teaching and research systems must be improved for the training of the military’s human resources. Finally, the greatest possible number of troops must be deployed abroad as part of peace operations, so they can acquire professional training and the motivation for personal development.

In conclusion, I would ask the armed forces Staff to emphasize—without depleting military assets—the designation of military personnel to defend our national sovereignty, which is a component of Brazil’s “strategic dimension.” According to the EMFA [the Brazilian armed forces Staff], “our sovereignty will be preserved, especially in those aspects making that concept even more important: the ownership and jurisdiction over our territory, its indivisibility and our ability to sustain political actions aimed at preserving our vital interests.... Our conception also includes the notion that...society as a whole is also responsible for defending our sovereignty...and [that the latter] is not based solely on the military component....”<sup>25</sup>

*Brazil’s Strategic Dimension: Between Past and Future.*

When talking about the PDN (National Defense Policy), which includes national objectives, foreign and domestic policy, military readiness, and the international picture, President Cardoso tries to develop a dialogue with society—a dialogue that, in a way, has already begun. He says that “we need to reconcile defense needs with the availability of funds, with Congress approving budgets and, whenever possible, involving the country’s academic, scientific, technological, and industrial segments.”<sup>26</sup> In other words, even with responsibility for implementation of the National Defense Policy falling entirely on the shoulders of the Executive branch, this does not relieve the Legislature from participating in the conception of that

policy. If Congress has the role of discussing the resources that will make the PDN viable, its more effective participation will depend, among other things, on the adoption of a new standard of responsibilities, shared among the two branches.

We can say that the PDN has a generic content, but it also precisely defines structures and factors of power at the international level, as well as objectives, strategic orientation, and guidelines for military readiness. Considering this is the first step in an important attitudinal change toward the power of the state, broad generality does not represent a serious flaw, but rather a posture of caution. On the conceptual level, it is important to emphasize that the PDN will be dealing with “external threats,” advocating a military readiness that is congruent with the country’s “foreign attitude.” That is, the PDN is involved at the foreign relations level: “Dealing with external threats, the National Defense Policy aims at creating objectives for defending the nation, as well as orienting the readiness and employment of national capabilities at all levels and spheres of power, while also involving civil and military sectors. The PDN’s major premises are objectives and principles inserted in the Constitution. They are attuned with Brazil’s external posture, based on seeking a peaceful solution to controversies and strengthening international peace and security.”<sup>27</sup>

The PDN is shaped by notions such as “national objectives,” an “international order that is unstable and unpredictable,” and “Latin America [as] a region without large strategic tensions.” But there is something new related to the values rooted in the military: the priority given to external defense does not include the traditional and authoritarian concept of a “domestic enemy.” But, as we will see, this issue has not been resolved. Although Latin America is “the most demilitarized region on the planet,” and the world is reorganizing its power structures now that the “East-West confrontation” is over, the global picture has more uncertainties than proven, stable, and predictable

mechanisms. Therefore, Brazil has to strengthen its means of negotiation, which are capable of thwarting war, and at the same time, under the rule of law, improve its instruments for defending national interests. In this way, “military capability and diplomacy [will be] expressions of national sovereignty and dignity,”<sup>28</sup> since Brazil is not free from risks to its security, including regional ones.

Other National Defense objectives include: guaranteeing our territory’s sovereignty and integrity, preserving the rule of law, projecting Brazil into the international decision-making process, and contributing to the preservation of peace and security abroad. According to President Cardoso, “in this new world scenario in which Brazil needs—and will have—a more active voice on decisions worldwide, we...are reinforcing our peace policy in South America, keeping in mind that, for historic and geographical reasons, there is a more immediate need for Brazil to take action in relation to its neighbors—namely, the need for increased integration. This includes financial integration, an increased cultural integration, and a very positive military relationship.”<sup>29</sup>

In short, beginning with these objectives, which link diplomatic and military sectors, the PDN will be guided by the following central strategic concepts: (a) preserving national borders; (b) rejecting wars of conquest; (c) backing peaceful solutions for disputes and controversies among states. “At the regional level, we still have areas of instability that are opposed to Brazilian interests. The actions of international organized crime and of armed gangs from neighboring countries in the Brazilian Amazon are two points of great concern. Military capability and diplomacy are expressions of national sovereignty and dignity, and Brazil has shown . . . its determination to live in peace and harmony, according to the principles of international law. . . .”<sup>30</sup>

Thus, the PDN’s central orientation is preventive and defensive, though the country will adopt offensive

initiatives as part of this larger strategy. That is, Brazil's strategy of preventive defense

values both diplomacy as a vital tool for solving conflicts and . . . a credible military structure capable of generating an efficient deterrent effect. . . . Today's [national defense] policy centers on an active diplomacy dedicated to peace and a strategic and dissuading defensive posture based on the following major premises: borders and limits perfectly defined and internationally recognized; close relations with neighboring countries and the international community . . . based on mutual trust and respect; rejecting wars of conquest; search for peaceful solutions to controversies; and the use of force only as a means of self-defense."<sup>31</sup>

The guidelines of the policy point towards: (a) contributing to the construction of a law-based, equitable international order; (b) participating in the principal decision-making and peace-negotiation processes; (c) fostering disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons from battlefields; (d) participating in peace forces; (e) collaboration, integration and peacekeeping in Latin America; (f) military exchanges with friendly nations; (g) armed forces participation in national development programs; (h) military training and improvement in terms of structure, human resources, science and technology, education, financial resources, and so on; and (i) better territorial, air, and sea surveillance systems. The guidelines close with an interesting—and necessary—statement: “Keep public opinion informed in order to create and preserve a National Defense mentality, stimulating nationalism and dedication to country.”<sup>32</sup> This National Defense mentality suggests not only society's participation, but also better human resources for planning and executing national defense, which is very necessary now that President Cardoso has decided to create a Defense Ministry.

*Internal Defense, Public Security, and the Defense of the Democratic State.*

The National Defense Policy does not include the concept of a domestic enemy, a central theme during the military regime. But since internal defense will only be implemented as a result of a threat inside the country, a diffuse concept of internal enemy still conditions the military—even with the PDN in place. But something has to be emphasized: the Army's readiness still focuses more on internal than external defense. These were my conclusions in a document entitled "The Army's Strategic Concept,"<sup>33</sup> which was the center point of a timely debate among senior Army officers (the Navy, Air Force, and War College were also represented), as well as retired officers, civilian officials and academicians. The discussion took place at the Army Staff on August 12-13, 1997. In the notes prepared for that seminar, I emphasized the clarity of the defensive deterrence concept and external defense priorities. That is, strategies concerned with defending the Amazon and Guyana regions, the Mid-West and the Plata River basin are oriented, respectively, by Gamma and Delta Doctrines. The Gamma Doctrine is divided into offensive strategies (aimed at a quick victory in a conventional conflict against forces equal in strength with Brazilian national troops) and defensive strategies (facing forces clearly superior in a long-term war). The internal defense is oriented by the Alpha Doctrine.

Keeping in mind the distribution of Army units inside Brazilian territory—a result of their readiness for external and internal defenses—I presented the following thoughts to the seminar audience: "As for the priority between external and internal defense, the country of the Tordesilhas Treaty has an internal defense priority, with other priorities—for external defense—maintained beyond that historic landmark." This is also true with regard to doctrines for troop employment. Alpha Doctrine is the forces' number one priority, deserving a clear treatment when "facing the existence of multiple threats, some of them

potentially occurring in a short period of time.” Thus, whether as a result of realism or deep conviction, internal defense becomes the land forces’ priority, a situation not immune to the resurgence of autonomies posing serious risks to the rule of law, whose defense represents the heart of internal defense.

Incidentally, today’s definitions of internal defense would have had harmful effects in the past, since “there is a fine line between defining a social movement as a particular regime’s adversary and defining it as a national enemy.” So, I asked: “Could the actions of an entire generation of military commanders identified with the rule of law (as it stands today) be sufficient guarantee of respect for the tenuous line between internal defense and public security operations? Or between both and the difficult task of maintaining the balance of the Federation?”<sup>34</sup>

This essay does not evaluate the Army’s performance in the recent public security crisis. Nevertheless, I will make some brief comments on three of these cases. During the military occupation of Rio de Janeiro’s hills and slums in late 1994 and early 1995, the Army was used by President Itamar Franco to restore the state’s authority, which at the time faced grave challenges from organized crime as well as the corruption and bankruptcy of Rio’s civilian and military police forces. The armed forces were deployed by the President on a mission justified by an extremely serious public security crisis. That did not mean that they were creating a situation aimed at preserving a political space or expanding their areas of influence. The military knew that it was not a police force, and it was not deployed under the cover of military autonomy. On the contrary, it reluctantly accepted the mission. It appreciated that there were high risks due to its lack of preparation and all the problems involved in the mission’s execution. Thus, it was not convenient to create a military model to replace the police forces in crisis. Governors were—and are—responsible for adopting the necessary public security policies in their states. Within this context, which did not even remotely

resemble a civil war, military participation was a legitimate tool of the rule of law. Moreover, it was the political authority that determined the military's withdrawal when the situation permitted it.<sup>35</sup>

Early in his administration, President Cardoso deployed Army troops to regain control of oil refineries occupied by striking employees, since the incident could have interrupted oil and gasoline distribution, creating problems for his economic reform policies. At the time, I noted that:

Military intervention also creates problems for democracy. President Henrique Cardoso worked according to law when he decided to use the military, although it still is not clear why he deployed the [state's] Military Police. He took that step without consulting Congress, something not compatible with the necessary balance among the three branches of government. His decision raised an important question for constitutional reform under the title Defense of the State and Democratic Institutions. It is indispensable that a congressional commission be given access to all facts involving the oil refineries. In addition, although the law does not demand it, Congress should have a say with regard to the mission the Army received from the President. Nothing indicates that political power has suffered military pressures, but employing military forces can cause discomfort, and not only in Brazil. Recently, the French government deployed troops to open roads occupied by striking truck drivers. On the other hand, after the tragedy in Oklahoma City, the American President intends to use U.S. forces to fight terrorism. We also need to take into consideration that the Army's deployment, because of an exhaustion of conflict resolution mechanisms, is one of a growing number of responses the federal government can make in the face of explosive social situations that challenge the state's authority and respect for the law.<sup>36</sup>

The third case, in mid-1997, had to do with the Army's intervention in some rebellious [state] Military Police units. In the absence of effective public security policies by governors, an institutional crisis involving disobedience and a lack of legitimacy of local commanders increased

discontent among soldiers and officers already upset with their low salaries. Here I observed that:

Another dimension of the crisis in [the state of] Minas Gerais is linked to the Army's participation in these events. In strictly operational terms, everything went fine. Soldiers secured the governor's palace and his official residence without any confrontation with the rebellious forces. But President Cardoso will have to explain all legal procedures leading to the Army's involvement. Since Cardoso was at the time visiting the UN, Vice-president Marco Maciel accepted the governor's request, but did not sign any authorization for the Army's operations in Minas Gerais. According to news reports, . . . Chief of Staff Clóvis Carvalho had signed the order. Was it the perfect decision—from a legal point of view—capable of generating sustainable consequences? Did Mr. Carvalho have the authority (even if delegated) to sign the order? From a political standpoint, the action is highly inconvenient and disputable, for the great risks involving a confrontation with the rebellious forces in Minas Gerais were well known. (What would have happened if the rebellious forces had gained control over the MP's Command? What if they had invaded the governor's palace? What would have been the cost—material, human and institutional—of expelling the rebels?) In discussing these risks, President Cardoso's Chief of Military Affairs, General Alberto Cardoso, says the tragic shot that killed Corporal Valério was a lucky strike that ended the police rebellion, avoiding larger problems.<sup>37</sup>

In all these cases, the fine line between internal defense, public security crises, and defense of the democratic state was not clearly drawn. Considering that “defense of a democratic state” is a much broader concept than the others—and more compatible with a democratic regime—I think this will have such a clear and efficient conceptual treatment that the Army will not risk becoming a “police's police,” in charge of controlling critical public security situations. President Cardoso recently sent a bill to Congress giving states more latitude in reorganizing their police units, especially with regard to demilitarization. Since early 1997, the administration has been studying the



creation of a National Guard, which would replace Army troops in missions involving internal order.<sup>38</sup>

Returning to my thoughts on the “Army’s Strategic Concept”—and to conclude my remarks on the National Defense Policy’s internal and national areas of interest—I would like to say that: “The democratic equation will be clearly defined when Congress has an active and responsible role (a) in defining the PDN, through President Cardoso’s initiative, and (b) when there is a debate (even if by referendum) on the armed forces’ deployment for internal and foreign defense.” There is, of course, a lack of conviction over this equation, which can be found neither in the constitution nor in the predominant mentality of Congress. So, one must ask: Which lessons has the Army Staff learned during the crisis involving Military Police units? Would the creation of a National Guard be an attempt to preclude the Army’s involvement in internal crises that could be resolved without using the state military apparatus? How will they solve the problem of a continued existence of military influence within Military Police units, something that the armed forces seemed to have overcome?<sup>39</sup>

In spite of the support several governors gave the President and his plan to reform the police force, Military Police units intend not only to preserve their functions and institutional format, but want a direct armed forces involvement in the fight against drug trafficking. Through their commanders—and with the support of Justice Minister Íris Resende—Military Police and Military Fire Department units “propose that Federal Police and the armed forces participate directly in combating drug trafficking and arms smuggling at the country’s borders.”<sup>40</sup> As we have seen, however, President Cardoso’s conception of public security leads in the opposite direction. He recently emphasized his position by declaring that the armed forces can only help police units by giving them “support and infrastructure, and sometimes providing intelligence.” The Army Minister confirms his government’s willingness to

help by giving logistical support. About the direct involvement endorsed by Minister Resende, General Zenildo Lucena states: "This may be his [Minister Resende's] view, but it is not the armed forces' position."<sup>41</sup>

## **Conclusions.**

This essay has not dealt with all of the questions involving Brazil's civil-military relations. I have not discussed legal definitions for the military's status as "state employees" that would give its members special treatment vis-a-vis public employees.<sup>42</sup> Neither have I talked about the establishment of a Defense Ministry, scientific and technological developments, the Amazon Air Vigilance System and other issues, though we should expect the Defense Ministry to be part of the ongoing changes in civil-military relations. Another topic not analyzed is the armed forces reequipment efforts promoted by the Cardoso administration, with foreign resources.<sup>43</sup>

Our analysis covered only President Cardoso's National Defense Policy, because it is a novel idea in Brazil's civil-military relations. We have also indicated that this tool reinforces the President's willingness to implement the Defense Ministry next year [1998], an agency that should have a civilian mentality in dealing with the PDN and should stimulate a higher degree of professionalism in military readiness. As for presidential statements (some excerpts are presented at the end of this essay), we find two simultaneous features: First, traditional concepts of military doctrine (including the new National Security Doctrine, with concepts like "expressions of national power") are being incorporated, step by step, into presidential statements, probably because of the participation by Mr. Cardoso's military advisors in preparing his speeches. A more appropriate hypothesis would be: President Cardoso "makes a speech from the military to the military," since it would be easier for the armed forces to understand this kind of discourse. Second, at the same time, he makes a political and diplomatic statement

to the country, although being very discreet when talking to the people on matters dealing with the military.

We should emphasize that the adoption of the National Security Policy will lead to important developments in civil-military relations during the coming decade, for Brazil intends to climb to a higher level in its international responsibilities. In other words, diplomats, the military and President Cardoso are leading the country to adopt a higher strategic dimension.

As always, Congress has not worked hard in this area.

**APPENDIX**  
**Excerpts of President Fernando Henrique  
Cardoso's Statements on the Armed Forces**

*Brazil and the World Order.*

“. . . Brazil's real dimension in the international arena has to be recognized because of its economic stabilization, its territorial area, the extension of its coast and air space, a 160-million-people market, and the consolidation of the country's democracy—all of which make clear our peaceful projection beyond Latin America and provide us with the credentials to be an active participant in the world's decision-making process. . . . The armed forces have a vital role in preserving our territorial integrity and supporting efforts to maintain public order, as well as in complementary missions, such as honoring Brazilian commitments to peacekeeping operations or—as observers in friendly countries—becoming vectors of my foreign policy.” (Ceremony honoring General Officers, Brasília, April 25, 1995)

*Armed Forces and Diplomacy.*

“The armed forces have broadened their functions, in accordance with today's opinion in Brazil. They have—far beyond attributions determined by the Constitution—played a civic and humanitarian role, not only within the country's territory, in remote border regions, but also abroad. Their increased participation in UN peace operations is one of the most important facets of their modern operations.” (Ceremony honoring Brazilian Officers, who were members of the UN Military Observers Corps in the former Yugoslavia. Brasília, July 6, 1995)

“I have mentioned four areas for the employment of the Brazilian military, where the armed forces must be able to

answer to the nation. They are: maintaining constitutional powers and our territorial integrity; participating in peace operations abroad, with troops or observers; participating in complementary actions according to government policies; and supporting activities on behalf of public security.” (Republic’s Assembly, Lisbon, July 10, 1995)

“These are some ideas that deserve special attention in your reflections and professional improvement. In a few words:— harmonization among military readiness, economic strengthening, and diplomatic action aimed at keeping the peace;— awareness of the power delegated by society, and the armed forces responsibility to that same society; — understanding the consequences of a constant evolution of the concept of national defense on the international arena;— a joint effort among services, as the best foundation for military professionalism. . . .” (Farewell to “Brazil” School Ship, Rio de Janeiro, May 3, 1996)

“The new international order is so complex that it would be difficult for a country, no matter how powerful, to transform itself into an exclusive ‘pole of power.’ What we see in this new order, which still shows signs of change and uncertainty as to its direction, is the control of and need for shared power. . . . We also see the emergence of decision-making groups, but with limited power, like the famous G-7, for example. But they cannot position themselves as a central committee for decisions at the international level because they lack a legitimate base. . . . In South America, we live in one of the most demilitarized regions of the world and with limited threats to peace. In spite of this, . . . we have to recognize that some problems . . . still exist . . . for example, armed groups in neighboring countries and the even more serious presence of organized crime. . . . Within this international picture, in which Brazil needs and will have an even more present voice on worldwide decisions, we, at the same time, are strengthening our peace policies in South America, keeping in mind that here we have—for historical and geographical reasons—a more immediate interaction with our neighbors, characterized by increased

integration. We are integrating economically and culturally, and with a very positive military relationship.” (Speech to students of the Navy War College’s superior courses (EGN), Air Force and Army Command and Staff Schools, and Superior War College (ESG), Rio de Janeiro, November 23, 1996)

*National Defense Policy: Armed Forces and Internal Order.*

“I want to emphasize the role played by the armed forces. And here I should not speak; I should listen, because you know better than I do. Today, I would like to say that, besides the armed forces’ constitutional responsibilities in facing threats against our sovereignty and social structure, we have the principle of authority that has to be considered by our forces. We have to give logistical and intelligence support to police units fighting drug-trafficking, arms smuggling, and organized crime that today are transnational and affect national sovereignty.” (Speech to Superior War College students. Planalto Palace, Brasília, June 17, 1996)

“I still want to say that the armed forces are responsible for an important part of Brazilian scientific production and that today’s civil-military dialogue is democratic. Therefore, our concerns should be about broadening creative abilities and increasingly integrating the military into the civilian research fields.” (Ceremony introducing new General Officers, Planalto Palace, Brasília, August 14, 1996)

“In a democracy, a Defense Policy is not a problem for the military alone, it is also a problem for society and government. It is obvious that the military is a very active part of that policy. But Military Policy and Defense Policy are two different things. The latter is subordinate to the country’s definitions of what it wants in the international arena. What are the security requirements that will enable Brazil to have an international presence within parameters

mandated by its Constitution?. . . . This is a peaceful country, but we must have a Defense Policy to assure this very peace. . . . We are going to make decisions in an organized spirit. Brazil has a Defense Policy, and this committee was established so we could have a strategic view of our objectives, and could attune our presence in the world knowing what our national interests are and how we are going to direct them.” (Closing speech on the 6th National Superior War College Alumni Convention, São Paulo, September 21, 1996)

### *Military Profession.*

“I have to say and recognize that our armed forces professionalism allowed that choice to be made through a selection process created by the military. The President only endorses a normal process of evaluation. This, in my opinion, is very important. . . . You are the result of an analysis made by your peers. Therefore, your promotion to the rank of General Officer is well deserved. You have been through a filter of professional qualification, which is the only one that really dignifies a person. As Chief of State and Commander of the armed forces, all I can do, at this point, is symbolically bestow [your new rank] upon you,...doing my part in this professional and democratic concept that guides our armed forces.” (Ceremony introducing new General Officers, December 19, 1996)

## **ENDNOTES - CHAPTER THREE**

1. We would like to acknowledge the support of Colonel Guillermo Giandoni, the Secretary of the Inter-American Defense Board, who was instrumental in obtaining the Portuguese-to-English translation of Dr. Rizzo de Oliveira’s chapter. The actual translation was done by Alvares Bittencourt and John Typrin.

2. Lecture to students at the Higher Studies Courses at the School of Naval Warfare (EGN), Army Staff and Command School (ECEME) and Air Force School (ESG).

3. Article 1 of Law No. 9,140 of December 4, 1995: "For all legal purposes, all those persons listed in Annex I of the present law are recognized as dead, due to having participated or having been accused of participating in political activities in the period from September 2, 1961, to August 15, 1979, and that were detained for that reason by government agents and that have been missing since then, without any news from them." This law establishes the payment of indemnification to family members of these victims in order to promote national reconciliation and pacification as stated in the Amnesty Law (August 1979). In September 1997, the Cardoso government paid indemnification to 43 other families besides those included in Law No. 9,140. The most intensely debated cases were those of the former Army Captain Carlos Lamarca and the guerrilla leader, Carlos Marighela.

4. Legislation approved by the Legislative Assembly of the state of Rio Grande do Sul, at the Executive's initiative, establishes indemnification for persons subjected to mistreatment by the police forces of that state during the same period covered by the Law of the Missing. Sandra Hahn, "RS Promises to Indemnify Those Who Were Tortured," *Folha de São Paulo*, October 24, 1997, pp. 1-8.

5. Former President José Sarney expressed this discontinuity in military behavior standards in the following way: "The truth is that our armed forces were victimized by a policy of resentments. They are permanent institutions and cannot be judged based on occasional temporary errors by persons." José Sarney, "What and Whose Defense?" *Ibid.*, April 25, 1997, p. 2.

6. Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira, "Os Desaparecidos e a Anistia," *Correio Popular*, August 1 and 11, 1995.

7. The Army, Navy and Air Force ministers kept under control the military's concern about the indemnification of the families of those who had died and disappeared. Colonel (ret.) Jarbas Passarinho, former head of the ministries of Education, Labor, Welfare and Justice, as well as an ex-Senator, criticized the government's solution to this problem in the following terms: "Defeated by the infamous military dictatorship, we are rehabilitating them. . . . Our good communists lost the armed struggle, but it is as if they had won because they gained official recognition." Jarbas Passarinho, "Porque Me Ufano," *O Estado de São Paulo*, September 9, 1997, A-2.

8. The Chamber of Foreign Relations and National Defense is in charge of "formulating policies, establishing directives, approving and monitoring programs to be established (concerning): 1. international cooperation in security and defense matters; 2. border integration; 3.



indigenous populations and human rights; 4. peacekeeping operations; 5. drug trafficking and other offenses with international ramifications; 6. immigration; and 7. intelligence activities.” Decree 1,895 of May 6, 1996.

9. Speech at a ceremony announcing the National Defense Policy, Planalto Palace, Brasília, November 7, 1996.

10. Federal Deputy José Genuíno, an active member of the National Defense Commission, is the author of a constitutional amendment expanding the Legislature’s functions with regard to the National Defense Policy, which deletes the military mission of preserving law and order. José Genuíno, “A Política de Defesa Nacional,” *O Estado de São Paulo*, June 26, 1997, p. 2.

11. Cardoso’s speech at the signing ceremony for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that was submitted to Congress, June 20, 1997.

12. Alfred Stepan, *Os Militares Na Política*, Rio de Janeiro: Artenova, 1975.

13. General Goes Monteiro, *A Revolução de 30 e a Finalidade Política do Exército*.

14. On the military’s preparedness for the hypothesis of war with Argentina, I refer to the testimony by Colonel (ret.) Geraldo Lesbat Cavagnari Filho, an Army Staff officer: “The military organization of national defense was not established to carry out a geopolitical project, nor to sustain an offensive policy. The military force was prepared for limited purposes, as an answer to immediate requirements in a specific situation dominated by the East-West conflict and communist subversion. Therefore, the hypothesis of war that was accepted expressed a defensive political attitude towards threats that were considered as real (revolutionary and conventional warfare in South America) or theoretical (a world war). However, at the level of military strategy, the offensive principle prevailed under the perspective of not allowing an internal limit-situation to occur. . . .” Admitting a medium-level intensity conflict in South America, the Delta Hypothesis “considered Argentina as the most dangerous potential enemy—and moreso if it had the potential to lead a coalition including Uruguay and Paraguay. In such a case, war would be considered a clash of hegemonic intention on the South American continent, particularly in the Southern Cone. . . . The war should be conducted offensively so that decisive results would be achieved in its initial phase to assure favorable conditions for later negotiations. Furthermore, military operations

should be kept out of national territory. Otherwise, a cease-fire would only be accepted after re-establishing territorial integrity.” Geraldo Lesbat Cavagnari Filho, “Estratégia e Defesa (1960-1990),” *Premises*, Notebook 7, August 1994, Strategic Studies Nucleus, State University of Campinas, p. 63.

15. According to Joint Explanatory Document (“Exposição de Motivos Conjunta”) No. 52-A, Office of the Military Staff of the Presidency of the Republic, Ministry of Administration and State Reform, Brasília, August 29, 1997.

16. Presidency of the Republic, “National Defense Policy,” Brasília, 1996, p. 3. Italics by the author. “Explicitar” means to make “clearly expressed, clear, developed, explained.” Aurélio Buarque de Holanda Ferreira, *Novo Dicionário Aurélio*, Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, n.d., p. 599.

17. President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, speech at the closing of the VI National Convention of Alumni of the Escola Superior de Guerra, São Paulo, September 21, 1996.

18. Minister Rolando Sardenberg, “Concepción Estratégica del Brasil,” public hearing on the re-structuring of the National Defense System, Buenos Aires, August 22, 1995. (Ser 2000 Data Bank)

19. Minister Luiz Felipe Lampreia, “A Execução da Política Externa Brasileira,” lecture by the Foreign Minister to the students of the Escola Superior de Guerra, Rio de Janeiro, July 3, 1996. ([www.mre.gov.br](http://www.mre.gov.br))

20. Admiral Mário César Flores, *Basis for a Military Policy*, Campinas: Editora da Unicamp, 1992, pp. 93-94. Note that this statement was made before the extended economic crisis in Japan became apparent and prior to the U.S. economic recovery under the Clinton administration.

21. Rear Admiral Luiz Sérgio Silveira Costa, “A Complexa Nova Ordem Mundial,” *Revista de ESG*, Vol. 10, No. 29, 1994, pp. 38-39, 46.

22. Division General Gleuber Vieira, “Perspectivas de um Futuro Sistema de Segurança Hemisférica,” *National Defense*, No. 765, July/September 1994, pp. 4-13.

23. “Posições e Propostas do Exército Brasileiro sobre: Segurança Hemisférica, Vinculação JID-OEA e Medidas para Fomento de Confiança e Mecanismos de Segurança no Hemisfério Americano,” document for use at a meeting of government experts on Confidence Building and Security Measures, held in Buenos Aires, March 14-18,

1994. Signed by Brigadier General Sylvio Lucas da Gama Imbuzeiro, the Brazilian Army representative.

24. “O Exército Brasileiro no Atualidade,” *National Defense*, No. 674, April/June 1994, pp. 7-13.

25. Presidência da República, Estado-Maior das Forças Armadas, “O Brasil e suas Forças Armadas,” Brasília, 1996, p. 19.

26. Presidency of the Republic, “National Defense Policy,” p. 4.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

29. Speech to the students and faculty at the Courses of High Studies of the Naval War College, the Army Command and General Staff College, the Air Force Command and General Staff College, and the Senior War College, Rio de Janeiro, November 23, 1996.

30. Presidency of the Republic, “National Defense Policy,” p. 6.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

33. Ministry of the Army, Army General Staff, “Concepção Estratégica do Exército (Siplex-4. Extrato),” Brasília, n.d., pp. 11-12.

34. Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira, “Concepção Estratégica do Exército,” p. 4.

35. Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira, “Inimigos da Democracia,” *O Estado de São Paulo*, December 24, 1994, p. A-2.

36. “A Intervenção Militar nas Refinarias,” *Correio Popular*, May 30, 1995, p. 2.

37. Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira, “Rebelião Armada em Minas,” *Ibid.*, July 2, 1997, p. 3.

38. *O Estado de São Paulo*, March 7, 1997, p. A-15.

39. Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira, “A Concepção Estratégica do Exército,” pp. 6-7.

40. *Manifesto do Conselho Nacional de Comandantes Gerais das Polícias Militares e Corpos de Bombeiros Militares. Carta de Foz do Iguaçu.* Agosto de 1997.

41. *O Estado de São Paulo*, October 24, 1997, p. A-5.

42. In January 1998, the National Congress adopted this definition through a change to the Constitution.

43. On the debates regarding the creation of this ministry, see: Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira, “Ministério da Defesa,” *Correio Popular*, September 2, 1997, p. 151. The journalist Antonio Carlos Pereira defends the exclusive nomination of civilians for this ministry. See his “Democracia e Defesa,” *O Estado de São Paulo*, September 2, 1997, p. A-4. On alternative institutional models of the Defense Ministry, see “Governo já Decidiu Implantar o Ministério da Defesa,” *Folha de São Paulo*, September 9, 1997.

## **Chapter Four**

### **Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: Pitfalls and Prospects**

**General Fred F. Woerner (USA Ret.)**  
**Professor, Department of International Relations**  
**Boston University**

I would like to thank the organizers for this opportunity to appear before this distinguished gathering. Just as a policeman out of uniform no longer issues tickets, so a retired general no longer commands audiences.

We are undertaking together an extremely important dialogue. The civil-military relationship constitutes one of the most important challenges for emergent democracies in Latin America because it signals the full integration of the military into democratic society. It further signals the mutual development by the civilian and military authorities of missions for the armed forces that address the role of the military in peace and war within a democratic context. And, perhaps most importantly, it signals a break with a historical tradition of military rule and its replacement by a relatively new pattern in which the armed forces are subordinated to democratically elected civilian control. As both Professors Downes and Rizzo de Oliveira have indicated, the process is well under way. Yet, we should not underestimate the difficulty of the challenge in modernizing the civil-military relationship within the context of the democratic principle. The task requires a cultural revolution in both civilian and military sectors in their knowledge of and respect for each other. The rewards of success and costs of failure are enormous. With success comes a harmonious civil-military relationship that will strengthen both institutions (the military and civilian governance) and will thus further the cause of democracy. However, failure—or attempts to marginalize the military

by an unenlightened civilian authority—will once again place democracy at risk.

We can draw many lessons. I would like to draw on one case—that of Venezuela in 1992—that I believe is especially appropriate, because at that time Venezuela had completed over three decades of democratic rule. And yet, in February and November, there were two attempted coups. The first lesson to be learned is that these coup attempts occurred. They occurred in a country with a long status of democratic rule. And what this taught us was that under conditions of political, economic and social stress, a military may step outside the democratic process in the interest of its definition of the greater good.

But there was a second lesson of equal importance, and that is that the coup failed. This instructs us that democracy is in ascendancy and, though still vulnerable, it now has the strength and the emergent institutionalization to withstand threats that in earlier times would have been fatal.

Yet, for me, the most important lesson is the third—namely, that the attempted coups were not overwhelmingly rejected by the populace. This signals to us the power, the pervasiveness, and the longevity of the authoritarian tradition.

I believe, however, and I am in agreement with the outline presented by Dr. Downes, that we are in an era of virtually unbelievable change—politically, economically and socially. We perhaps do not fully appreciate the enormity of this change because of our proximity to it. And it will await the judgment of our children and grandchildren, who will look on this time as one of the truly seminal eras in the revolution of governance over the affairs of mankind. The challenge is enormous, but it is not impossible. Change in the character of the civil-military relationship is possible, but it can only be achieved through the deliberate and conscientious efforts and good faith of both the civilian community and the military profession.

And it is precisely that conscientious effort and good faith that we are embarked upon in this conference.

We normally look at the challenge in terms of threats. We are schooled in that line of thinking in the military. And again, Dr. Downs has elaborated for us a series of threats that are residual in the Western Hemisphere. And Dr. Rizzo de Oliveira has brought that down to the specifics of Brazil, when he instructs us that the current Brazilian national security/defense policy is fundamentally directed against foreign threat. But I would like to place the threat to civil-military relations within a somewhat different context, and that is the context that faces democracies as they emerge and institutionalize. Because as I compare mature democracies vis-a-vis less mature democracies, I observe a fundamental difference: that mature democracies possess multiple, peaceful alternatives for problem resolution and deconfliction that are not within the arsenal of emergent democracies.

Thus, there is a difference in perception in the civilian communities towards the military. In a mature democratic environment, civilians look upon us in the military and wonder how to put us to better use in peacetime in solving socially relevant challenges. The debate is frequently one of cost-effective ways of addressing difficult national issues. In the vernacular, it may be an issue of “getting our money’s worth out of the military.” In contrast, in emerging democracies there is a different attitude on the part of the civilian community: it is one of limiting the military to protecting national sovereignty and, in particular, national frontiers and borders. And when not so involved, if they could have their way, they would confine the military to the barracks. And in extremis, there are some who would argue for the elimination of the military institution in the best interests of the nation.

And so this presents us with a fundamental dilemma as we consider the expansion of missions for militaries in emergent democracies during times of peace. What for a

mature democracy is a more relevant threat analysis and a refining of the role of the military may represent for emergent democracies a renewed justification for military involvement in politics and a threat of a return to militarism. Thus, mature democracies can use the military in this broader security environment without concern of challenge to democratic governance because of the strength of their political institutions and processes. This luxury may not be available in emergent democracies. We need look no further back in our history than to our experience with the “National Security Doctrine” to establish the validity of this thesis.

I join with the presenters in optimism with regard to the progress being made. We know well the numbers. In 1970, Latin America was characterized by military governments except in Mexico, Costa Rica, Venezuela and Colombia. Now democratic regimes rule everywhere except Cuba. We know that from 1930 to 1976 over 50 percent of the changes of government were by methods outside and in violation of national constitutions. But in comparison, since that date in 1976 (the Peruvian military assumption of power), there have been only three—if I count correctly—successful coups d’etat.

The hemisphere is now free to address the future in terms of its own interest, no longer encumbered by the external ideologically-based conflict of the Cold War. The diminished armed threat has reduced the rationale for military rule. Extremism of both the right and the left is progressively being marginalized. National elites are coming to recognize the cost of arbitrary coercion—that it outweighs the benefits to be realized—particularly as these elites increasingly view their prosperity and good fortune in terms of the international marketplace. The left has displayed a willingness to participate within the democratic system. In spite of the setback in Ecuador and Peru, we can make the general observation that Latin American countries are at peace with their neighbors. Seated governments are in place, elected by the people. Economies



are recovering, but still can ill afford capricious military budgets and spending. There is greater mass mobilization that has resulted in powerful demands for legitimate government and civilian rule. And the increased complexities of the political and economic agenda demand broadly based expertise that exceeds that which we possess in our mutual military institutions. Finally, the fact that the armed forces have played a supportive role in this movement toward democracy and the strengthening of the civil-military relationship is also extremely important.

Challenges, however, remain. These would include, but not necessarily be limited to:

- curtailing in selected countries the disproportionate political power of the military institution;
- instilling more broadly and profoundly a sense of public accountability and willingness to discipline from within the institution;
- providing for adequate and competent oversight by elected government officials on matters of national security;
- being alert to enlargements of the private economic activity of the armed forces that perhaps challenge the rightful place of the civilian sector;
- developing from its current state of infancy the joint definition (“joint” meaning civilian and military, working together) of roles and missions for our militaries in this new era of comparative peace;
- and, most importantly, continually enlarging the civil-military dialogue.

I believe that, although there has been remarkable progress, the civilian sector has in general acted timidly, and that there is ample opportunity for a strengthening of civil governance and the proper placement of military

institutions within civil society. There is an opportunity to further strengthen that process that is not yet being fully leveraged by the civilian sector. I think that we in the military would accept a greater dominance by the civilian sector than that which we would volunteer. The challenge, then, is to both of us: For the civilian sector, it is to act wisely and with competence in the furtherance of its rightful place as the dominant force in our nations; and for us in the military, it is to support them in the movement towards this objective, which will serve our national interest.

## **Chapter Five**

### **Armed Forces Missions and the Strengthening of Democracy in the Americas**

**Licenciado Luis Tibiletti**  
**President, Ser 2000, Argentina**

#### **SUMMARY**

The object of my presentation is to analyze which functions of the armed forces can contribute to improved civil-military relations as a way of strengthening the American democracies. To attain that goal, it is first necessary to stress that my methodology differs from that of Samuel Huntington, the author of several classic works on civil-military relations. Huntington's focus on military professionalism and the forms of civilian control is based on the assumption that there is a natural acceptance of the principle of military subordination to civilian authority by society as a whole. The problem is that this supposition is false for the civic culture that is predominant in Latin America. There the Hispanic origins of the culture and its institutional history have made civilian control of the military something that is neither normal nor natural.

Yet now, for the first time, with this latest wave of regional democratization, the assumption of civilian control has begun to permeate society's consciousness, auguring what could be the permanent stability of the democratic system.

Another interesting point—following the important work of Spanish Professor José Antonio Olmeda—is that the English expression “civil-military” should be translated into Spanish with the words *civil-militares* rather than *cívico-militares*, since the word *cívico* alludes to the

condition of citizens, and that means civilians as well as those in uniform.

Taking into account yet another linguistic consideration, we must be very careful about the use of the English word “support” when discussing the relationship of the armed forces to democracy. This is because the Spanish term *soporte* has two meanings, and neither applied to civil-military relations contributes to the strengthening of democracy: The first is that the armed forces endure and tolerate, but don’t integrate themselves into the democratic system. The second is that they are the foundation on which democracy is established. As Alfred Stepan has indicated, this is incompatible with democracy, which can only be based on the popular will and not on bayonets, as Napoleon suggested.

These clarifications being made, I want to talk about some trends relating to military functions and their implications for the consolidation of democracy. The recent huge international changes have confused military planners all over the world. The redefinition of functions, roles and missions has been turned into a desperate search to replace the enemy and permit a return to the intellectual and strategic placidity of the Cold War.<sup>1</sup>

There is a very real link between the ways of redefining functions and the strengthening of democracy. In the first place, because our Latin American political leaders have been raised in a patrimonial oligarchical way of conducting politics, they have systematically refused to exercise, much less train themselves for, the legitimate state monopoly of violence. Therefore, everything that had to do with military functions, including matters related to the police, was delegated totally to the military. In effect, this amounted to the renunciation of political leadership and political power.

This explains why intellectuals and politicians who want to consolidate democracy are unalterably opposed to any efforts on the part of the armed forces to reassume functions linked to the monopoly of state violence, such as the

struggles against narcotrafficking and terrorism. The only way to prevent a return to “armour-plated democracies” is by allowing—indeed, impelling—civil society to take that responsibility upon itself and, through a network of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), to demand that political leaders assume their responsibilities once and for all.<sup>2</sup>

The same may be said with regard to military functions linked to the internal development of the country. We do not deny that there are states whose weakness prevents them from integrating their entire national territory, and even attaining some of their social goals, which may be tempted to use the armed forces in a “civic action” capacity. Nevertheless, this is the very opposite of what needs to be done to strengthen civil society. Without a strong civil society, democracy is not possible. This may be the most important lesson for the 21st Century, and we should not forget it when thinking about the future.

In closing, I would like to outline those military functions that can help consolidate our democracies. These are based on a correct interpretation of professionalism, in Huntington’s sense, and generally coincide with the same functions performed in the developed states of the First World. Here we refer to the function of providing the state with a military instrument in line with the economic possibilities of the country, and modern in terms of doctrine and equipment, that can fulfill the traditional mission of armed vigilance, without excluding the new needs of cooperative equilibrium with neighbors and shared responsibility for maintaining world peace.<sup>3</sup>

Linking this conception of military functions with the debate on governability and security, I wish to conclude by indicating some conditions for a possible path towards higher levels of security, the resetting of the armed forces in a more expectable position, and the strengthening of democracy:

- Assumption on the part of the Latin American political sectors of the entire responsibility for the formulation of international security, national defense and public security policies, abandoning the comfortable position that “I know nothing about it; this is a subject for experts.” To renounce the political core of security is to renounce power.
- Consensual definition on the part of the majority political sectors of each country of that nation’s security agenda, and subsequently the negotiation of security agreements starting on subregional levels and eventually on the hemispheric level.
- Subsequent joint identification of interests, threats and opportunities at the subregional level, thus removing the geopolitical obstacles to the processes of integration.
- The establishment of mature relations with the United States, closing the search for leaderships chosen by the North American power. At the same time, reinforcement of contacts and political relations at the level of ministries of defense and foreign affairs, parliaments and political parties in order to neutralize the influence of the parallel military diplomacy of the U.S. Southern Command, which allows it to carry out its missions without understanding democracy.
- Substantial increase, under the supervision of the Organization of American States, of cooperation among all areas of government at the national, subregional and hemispheric levels that have responsibility for addressing new threats. These would include the armed forces, but only in support of the state’s needs, not allowing them to change the essence of conflicts.

- Resolution of the “modernization versus arms race” dilemma in order to allow all countries to count, in reasonable proportion, on armed forces that are able to interoperate—based on the idea of a cooperative balance—when political systems of security demand it.
- Strengthening all organizations of a political and diplomatic nature, including NGOs, for conflict resolution, using their experiences with Contadora, MOMEPA (in the Peru-Ecuador dispute) and Europe (such as the OSCE or the OSCEM). It will thus be possible to build security with tools suitable for the nature of regional threats, and not always using military instruments.

## **ENDNOTES - CHAPTER FIVE**

1. In this sense, we can refer to the “ordering effort” that Huntington attempted in his famous “clash of civilizations.”

2. As an example, one may cite the important restructuring process in which the Buenos Aires provincial police force, which is the largest in the country, is involved. This occurred after the force had reached a point of collapse as a result of inefficiency and corruption, conditions which it shared with certain local judicial and political leaders. The project was devised by politicians and lawyers, and implemented by the political authorities.

3. Thus, for example, in July 1996 the Argentine Senate unanimously approved a declaration where this responsibility is assumed.

## **PART THREE**

# **NATIONAL SECURITY AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE 21<sup>st</sup> CENTURY: THREE VIEWS FROM LATIN AMERICA**



**Chapter Six**  
**Civil-Military Relations in the Americas**  
**for the 21st Century:**  
**A Latin American Perspective**

**Professor Luis Bitencourt Emilio**  
**Universidade Católica de Brasília**

I have been asked to address the topic of this conference—"Civil-Military Relations in the Americas for the 21st Century"—from a Latin American perspective. Although it troubles me that I must attempt to summarize the complexity of Latin American views on this issue—which is perhaps an impossible task—at the same time I feel honored and privileged to have been invited to talk to you. The invitation was accompanied by the request that I cover the subject in the shortest time possible.

Besides the natural difficulty of interpreting and summarizing a Latin American perspective, the topic involves three additional challenges. The first is the enigmatic, symbolic and useless (since it only makes sense as an artificial time marker) expression "21st Century." In Latin America, the expression is even more symbolic: we love to write centuries in roman numerals, either Siglo XXI or Século XXI. Anyway, the phrase "21st Century" gives the topic the obscure and mystic quality of the uncertain. And it gives us, the participants in this conference, the feeling that we are alchemists or apprentice wizards: we must speculate on the future and chase away the shadows of the past. Without the right to consult the oracles, we are invited to look into the 21st Century.

The second challenge is the delicate issue of civil-military relations in Latin America. This topic has provoked mild debate among Latin American political scientists. However, when the subject is addressed in the

North, it seems to go beyond the political sciences and into the terrain of thermo-dynamics: if the issue is discussed in the North, it provokes heated reactions in the South.

Finally, the subject involves the notion of the “Americas,” observed from the standpoint of those interested in ensuring external security and democratic stability. Moreover, it involves—or implies—the idea that the military may be a threat to democracy. Regional security initiatives fuel different perceptions and stimulate different levels of sensitivity in the Americas. The combination of an extraordinary power asymmetry with the lack of serious threats to the region does not inspire Latin America to reach common security arrangements. Besides, when the suggestion for such arrangements originates in the United States it usually arouses reservations in Latin America. In sum, the mere fact that the United States is the one proposing the creation of a regional security system ignites traditional suspicions in Latin American countries.

I will briefly deal with the first two challenges in order to define a referential framework for these ideas, and will concentrate more heavily on the last: the Americas within the context of both the initiative of this meeting and the U.S. strategy for the region. The first two topics have been intensively debated in the panels. The third, however, which is related both to the initiative for this meeting and to the U.S. strategy for the region (under the broad topic “cooperative security”), involves the philosophy of hemispheric relations at a time that is extraordinarily important for all of us. It is a more palatable issue, and therefore more adequate for dessert speeches such as this.

Anticipating the agenda for the 21st Century requires some reflection on the meaning of this temporal mark: 21st Century. Some, like Stephen Jay Gould, try to identify the exact starting point of the century—whether it will be in the year 2000 or 2001—and they are seriously concerned about this issue. Others, such as Peter Drucker or Alvin Toffler, whose concerns about the future have assured that they do

not have to concern themselves about *their* future—at least financially—understand that the 21st Century has already started. For them, recent global changes (such as the end of the Cold War, the technological revolution, and the globalization of the economy) have been so profound that the temporal mark 21st Century has been anticipated by events. Both, of course, have a planetary vision that is quite selective in terms of where to apply their conclusions. I can only imagine how true those conclusions would be for some of the planet's inhabitants—the majority, in fact (and specifically in Latin America)—whose only temporal references are the scars from their daily struggles to survive.

What can we expect of the future? Santayana taught us to respect history. Pessimists look upon the past and talk about the inevitability of conflict and war. Their argument is the frequency of wars. In contrast, optimists look upon the past and anticipate the inevitability of cooperation and peace. Their argument is the horror provoked by wars. Researcher's caution suggests moderation, and advises us to respect the logic of the pessimists' argument while at the same time recognizing the need —albeit idealistic—for peace and cooperation. But it also suggests that we not seek—whether as realists or idealists, pessimists or optimists—in an uncertain and malleable future, an escape from the present. In my native town of Ponta Grossa, in southern Brazil, we thought we had solved this problem. We had a motto we proudly displayed in all public buildings: “Ponta Grossa: Here the Future is Today!” This was an inspirational phrase for a while, until someone destroyed the illusion by writing underneath: “If here the future is today, then this is a city without a future.”

Scholars—both realists and idealists—failed to predict the end of the Cold War in spite of the sophistication of their academic analyses. They are now recovering from their intellectual hangover. And as they avoid this uncomfortable near past, they draft theses looking towards the future. In the prolific U.S. academic environment—where ideas may

be totally wrong but have the power of resonating the world over—there are now emerging the first intellectual spasms pushed by a need to create a new defense strategy. The first of these arose from idealistic defense circles, still intoxicated with the celebration of victory in the Cold War. It is the end of history, Francis Fukuyama assured us as he predicted a peaceful future, guaranteed by democracies which do not go to war against each other. But this idealist/pacifist argument, immediately echoed by the supporters of the democratic peace, was threatening to those interested in maintaining high defense budgets and to arms industry CEOs—all clever psychologists of fear. McDonald's and Coca Cola stockholders—convinced that where liberal democracy has installed their enterprises there can be no war—could celebrate (probably by engorging fast food). But Boeing or Raytheon stockholders could not do the same. The argument of a peaceful future has inspired the mathematicians of the defense budget, who are now interested not in squaring the circle but in triangulating the Pentagon.

For some Latin American militaries, concerned with reinforcing or at least preserving their shrinking military budgets, Fukuyama became an “F— word.” For some who read his article “The End of History,” made famous in *National Interest*, Fukuyama's ideas were perfectly in agreement with themes previously suggested by Lyndon La Rouche. The latter, who had never reached any political or literary standing in the United States, found a certain echo—fortunately short-lived—among some sectors in Latin America. These elements were concerned about the possibility of a U.S. conspiracy to transform the armed forces in the region into law enforcement agencies. For these sectors, Fukuyama's words about the reduction of tension and the reasons for conflict fit like a glove the alleged U.S. strategy to dismantle and demoralize Latin American armed forces.

Soon, however, it was discovered that the glove, as in the O. J. Simpson trial, did not fit the hand. Consequently, La

Rouche's conspiracy theory was forgotten. In reality, its acceptance was based on a hypothesis of causal, sequential stupidity that was extremely difficult to verify: First, Latin Americans had to be incredibly stupid to accept such an idea; and, second, Americans had to be utterly stupid to articulate it. On the one hand, the scheme—if it existed—revealed an absolute ignorance of Latin American realities, including those relating to the region's armed forces. On the other hand, to be successful, it was totally dependent upon a premise of Latin American stupidity. Third, Americans and Latin Americans had to be simultaneously stupid; the former for believing in the stupidity of the latter, and the latter for believing in the stupidity of the former. At this point, I think we have had enough stupidity.

Casper Weinberger injected new blood into the realist side by dramatically invoking the phantom of the Third World War: a war that will have no veterans, as Walter Mondale reminded us. Also, Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski appeared on the scene to torment both critics of geopolitics and newspaper editors; the critics because they believed that geopolitics was out of fashion, the editors because they had to cope with misspellings of his name. Brzezinski called attention to the permanent importance of European geo-strategy (since that region is still the axis of the world) in the future blueprint of international relations. The influential and alluring Samuel Huntington, for his part, tried to drive U.S. policymakers' attention to the rapid identification of a super enemy, as a way of avoiding the erosion of U.S. national influence. Soon, he found this catalytic enemy in a clash, not among nations but rather civilizations: an argument magnificently written—as usual—but with arguable logic—also as usual.

In Latin America, we have been watching this debate from the sidelines; we have more pressing domestic economic and political problems. Paradoxically, our literary heroes are not found in the realm of political science but rather in fiction. We lean more towards the sinfully

romantic, and we find more delight, even in the hard terrain of politics, in nostalgic prose and poetry than in academic writings. Authors such as Octavio Paz, Pedro Nava or Jorge Luis Borges had a greater political impact than any purely political writer in the region. Names such as Kissinger—a Cold War strategist with a heavy mixture of realist intellectualism and cynical geo-political surrealism—do not fill our bookshelves. We celebrate the end of the Cold War more as distant spectators than as participants.

For us in Latin America, the main impact of the Cold War, with its profound implications for civil-military relations, was the generation of internal conflicts fueled by subversion. Many of our countries were unwillingly transformed into theaters of operation for the larger conflict. Consequently, the first step towards understanding civil-military relations in the Latin America of the 21st Century is to detail the distortions provoked by the Cold War in our internal politics. Failing to take into account those distortions, as well as the fluid nature of the political transitions still underway, is a recipe for analytical disaster.

Therefore, within Latin America the Cold War is more remarkable for its indirect than its direct effects; more remarkable for the sequels than for the disease. It basically created a propitious environment for the installation and support of authoritarian regimes. Not that the military had not taken power—and even shown some appetite for political power—before in Latin America, but in this case communist subversion allied itself with its visceral enemy, the “Americanist” counter-subversion, to arrive at an unprecedented institutionalization of military regimes. Hence, we can easily understand where the concern with civil-military relations comes from, which is the second challenge this conference poses.

To begin with, we must recognize that the expression “civil-military relations” is no more than a convenient euphemism to hide our true concern. The critical point is not

in the understanding of civil-military relations in the region, but rather in the evaluation of the prospects for the subordination of the armed forces to the political authority. Thus, our first step is to understand how the militaries conform to—accept and support—the decisions made in the political spheres in their own countries.

In fact, this effort to coin a palatable euphemism, “civil-military relations,” has created indigestion in military stomachs through the promotion of the civil-military dichotomy. Such a dichotomy is both militarily undesirable and methodologically ineffective. The militaries in the region do not feel detached from their societies, or from the civilians. Rather, they feel they belong to society (some militaries believe they even belong more than civilians), and they are “uniformed civilians,” as some like to say. Even the Argentine armed forces, which were considered elitists until a few years ago, are not considered such any longer.

By the same token, from the methodological point of view the division between civilian and military is ineffective because the problem does not lie in the posited division, but in the degree of subordination of the military to the political authority. In surveys conducted in the region, the militaries are often among those groups enjoying the highest ratings from public opinion. Therefore, “civil-military relations” are not problematic; the problem lies in the relations of the state’s political sphere, which involve policy-making, whereas the role of the armed forces is instrumental—that is, to carry out those decisions.

As I said before, this is the central issue of the conference, and I will not stop to analyze it. This would mean repeating much of what we have been discussing in the panels. So far, I have tried to position and clarify my argument. Now, I would like to return to the motive underlying the interest in understanding civil-military relations. First, we must recognize that the basic motive for such an interest is idealistic: to create a universe of peaceful nations capable of negotiating their differences in an

orderly fashion and doing business. This is an attractive image, and democracy has been identified as the cornerstone for the creation of this peaceful universe.

One of the obstacles to making this idyllic image concrete lies in the apparently endless desire of the military to participate in the political banquet. Theoretically, the military should be an instrument of the state, thus of the political authority, the latter being the only valid interpreter of the society's will. Only the political power, under a clear perception of necessity, can decide on the activation of the military.

On the topic of the role of the armed forces vis-a-vis society, I am opposed to an idea commonly espoused by military schools: namely, that the armed forces are basic societal institutions. The Ecuadoran General Paco Moncayo, for example, wrote an excellent and informative book, *Armed Forces and Society* (which I strongly recommend to all those who desire to understand how the militaries in the region see themselves and their respective societies), where he describes generically and historically the role of the armed forces and analyzes their importance in Latin America. In this book, he offers a number of arguments to characterize the role and relevance of the armed forces. I just disagree with his first line. Mirroring ideas common to many militaries in the region, he states that the "armed forces are a basic institution of the state, no matter their organization, level of development, form of government or historical or cultural tradition."

I do not believe the armed forces are a *basic* institution of the state. If that were the case, General Moncayo would not have needed to write an entire book to justify the need for and relevance of the armed forces. However, I do believe that this is a common perception among the military in Latin America. I prefer, though, to consider that the armed forces are an *important* institution of the state. In some cases, they even preceded the creation of the state—as Moncayo demonstrates—in historical circumstances.



However, the state is not defined—as would be the case if the armed forces were basic institutions—by the existence of its armed forces. There are states that have no armed forces, and are no less important or less respected. I would accept further that in Latin America the role of the armed forces goes well beyond the classical concept of protecting sovereignty. The Latin American armed forces wield a unifying power in the state. They have had a role in the construction of the nationality of Latin American countries. They are at once social and socializing tools, given the characteristics of Latin American societies. These important features, however, do not turn them into “basic” institutions of the state.

The objective of my counterargument is to show that societies have responsibility in the definition of the missions, roles and limits of their armed forces. Also, societies must continually pressure their armed forces to reflect on their roles at the service of their societies. Both armed forces and societies have responsibility in defining, reviewing, and updating these roles. Societies concerned with armed forces and defense mean societies informed on armed forces and defense. And informed societies demand the existence of think tanks, independent research institutions, and defense research projects promoted and sponsored by the armed forces themselves. Mainly, societies educated on national security matters have a greater awareness of the roles of their armed forces, and of the potential deviations that may transform them into oppressors rather than defenders of society.

Specifically, in the case of the military, I believe that Clemenceau was not being ironic in his oft-repeated phrase: “War is too serious a matter to be left to the military.” Indeed, the decision to submerge the nation in armed conflict must involve the society as a whole. The military is only a part of society; it receives from the society an instrumental mission to defend society. It is an instrument of the institutionalized coercion of the state—as Weber would say—but merely an instrument—as I dare to say.

Furthermore, and for that reason, the nature of military decisions does not mix well with the negotiation and compromise that are the essence of political decisions, at least in the purposely diffuse and unclear sphere of democratic decisions. The art of politics lies in the arena of the possible and negotiable. Military art lies in discipline and obedience. Political action involves consultation and interpretation. Military action involves readiness and response to command. The political gesture represents the will of the society. The military gesture represents the sovereign decision of the state, as interpreted by its political authority.

That is the theory. In practice, in our region military intervention in the political sphere—on behalf of the most diverse motives—has been more the rule than the exception. This is why we must make exceptional efforts to try to understand that dynamic. This is especially important for those who—because they believe in the peaceful vocation of democracies—are concerned about securing peace in the Americas. Also, this is why we are concerned about the preservation of this exceptional moment in the history of the Americas. This is a remarkable moment, be it because of the existence of thirty-three democracies or the relatively peaceful nature of the strategic environment. Therefore, it is understandable that this is the basic motivation for the U.S. strategy in the region.

Nevertheless, two problems endure. First, not all Latin American militaries necessarily share these idealistic visions—in fact many believe that the military has and should have an effective moderating and controlling power over political misdeeds. We cannot deny—and this has been made clear not only in this conference but in others on the same topic—that there are many differences between the North American vision and the different Latin American visions on the role of the military inside their own states. There are differences related to the position of the armed forces within their respective states. There are differences

in the understanding of the specific functions of the armed forces. There are differences in the political and institutional contexts of the various countries. Particularly, there are gigantic differences in the missions within the purely operational contexts of the armed forces.

Second, Latin Americans usually view North American security initiatives with considerable mistrust. Some see them as merely self-seeking, episodic and intrusive in the interests and autonomy of the countries in the region. Others see them as simplistic and incapable of distinguishing and understanding regional peculiarities. César Sereseres, for instance, in a biting comment in a symposium promoted by SOUTHCOM in 1994, characterized U.S. strategic interest in the region as merely marginal. He suggested that a Latin America free of conflicts is important for the United States only to the extent that it allows the U.S. to focus on more important interests in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Similarly, the Brazilian general, Gleuber Vieira, also at that symposium, noted that:

the interests of the U.S. are basically oriented towards their more important partners and extra-continental threats, not towards Latin America. . . . Latin Americans cannot reasonably expect that somebody in Washington will be more sensitive to the problems in the region than to their interests in the Middle East, Russia, the Balkans, the Far East or North Korea. Nobody should be surprised at the difficulty the U.S. finds in identifying and assessing the wide spectrum of multidimensional domestic challenges faced by Latin America.

I will now deal with the third and last point, which is also the largest challenge. Is it possible, in the area of international security, to create an identity for the Americas based on a democratic ideal when the initiative for this combined effort comes from the United States? Is it possible to break the mistrust of accidental allies (accidental because they happen to share the same hemisphere) regarding the sponsor of the initiative? An initiative that, on the one hand, obviously meets the

strategic interests of the United States, but that, on the other, seems to meet Latin American interests as well.

For understandable reasons, many countries have preferred to define their policies contrary to those of the United States. From the point of view of intellectual structures that inspire strategic defense initiatives in the North and South of the hemisphere, it seems that either the United States and Latin America have been working in opposite directions or are suffering from an acute timing problem. By using the same idealistic and realistic paradigms mentioned above, it is possible to see a curious inversion in the political defense definitions in the Americas. In the past, the realism of U.S. policies taught Latin Americans—culturally, sociologically, and emotionally deeply idealistic peoples—to be mistrustful . . . and realistic vis-a-vis U.S. initiatives. Presently, the new U.S. security initiatives towards the region (like those that led to the Defense Ministerials in Williamsburg and Bariloche)—intensely impregnated with idealistic values—face a wary Latin America . . . as a consequence of the realism that we were made to learn.

The result of these Latin American positions, constructed against the flow of U.S. initiatives, is the definition of reactive and essentially negative agendas. “Negative agendas” help protect smaller powers’ interests in their relationships with hegemonic powers. This is only true, however, when the strategic environment is static or stable, as it was during the Cold War. Everything changes when the characteristics of the strategic environment change, as they changed after the end of the Cold War. The difficulty with negative agendas is that they may cause us to miss opportunities for cooperation in areas where interests may eventually converge or be negotiable. In a situation of change in the global strategic environment, this negative position taken a priori may lead to isolation and loss of autonomy, also a priori. And the ones that lose the most are the weaker actors, not the stronger.

Within our hemisphere, there are three other factors complicating the construction of this strategic paradise. First, the changes in the international system are not yet consolidated. Many inertial forces from the old strategic system are still alive. These forces affect U.S. policies as well as multilateral organizations, most of them created to ensure the stability of the old system. In short, the bipolar system was dissolved, but we are still in the process of transition to a system whose features and time of arrival nobody can predict. Second, the United States, the remaining power from the bipolar system, is in our hemisphere; the U.S. is our neighbor. As a global actor, the United States feels it must articulate its leadership on a global scale. As the sponsor for a new security agenda, based on regional cooperation, the U.S. has the respect of the countries in the region, who are after all its allies in regional multilateralism. At the same time, though, the United States also causes distrust among those same partners. Third, in the domestic environment of several Latin American countries, where the memories of a very recent authoritarian past are still fresh, effects of the previous regimes still persist. Notwithstanding the democratizing wave in the hemisphere, in many countries the democratic model is still not broadly consolidated. At the same time, urgent internal demands, particularly those of a social nature, do not allow these countries to focus on issues of international security.

Thus, the regional situation, including the North American initiative proposing a new regional security agenda and the corresponding caution of Latin Americans, can be comically depicted as a condominium of apartments. The apartments are different, and the families that live there have different problems. On the penthouse live two very rich families, one particularly powerful, with interests and investments in many other neighborhoods. The other dwellers, however, are facing serious difficulties, especially financial. Overall, the relationship among the dwellers is friendly, but there have been arguments here and there,

apart from some domestic conflicts that ended up spilling over into other apartments. The poorer residents have mixed feelings toward their rich neighbor. On the one hand, they admire his success, his apartment, his televisions and cars. On the other hand, they hold old grievances. They complain of his arrogance and past insistence on imposing his points of view on the condominium. They also complain of his persistent mania for interfering in domestic disputes within some apartments: as we all know, it is best not to interfere in family arguments.

For a long time, our rich and powerful penthouse neighbor was engaged in a heated dispute with a resident on the other side of the street. This resident, who was also a powerful and tough guy, had a curious fixation on the color red. He had a strange compulsion for painting everything red. Besides, he never missed opportunities to show his aversion towards our neighbor, and built a huge wall around his property. The two sides were always threatening and arguing with each other. At a given time, the conflict rose to such levels that it echoed over the entire building. Then, prodded by the rich penthouse neighbor, most of the apartments became entirely dominated by the husbands, who established authoritarian rule within their respective families. Husbands, it was assumed, would be more capable of resisting the other neighbor's attempts to have our apartments painted red. Finally, after a long time, the tensions subsided, and the dictatorial rule of the husbands was replaced by a more participatory decision-making process. More recently, the resident across the street went bankrupt and gave up the fight with our penthouse neighbor. Even his huge wall fell, dismantled.

The problems in our condominium did not end, however. Imagine that there is a heated discussion in one of these apartments. There is not enough money to pay for the children's school. A big hospital bill is on the table. The wife complains about the husband because he is not making enough money. The husband complains about the wife because she is not helping. The dinner has been burned.

The baby is crying. Just then, somebody knocks on the door: it is the rich neighbor. He has come to invite the couple to a meeting in two hours to discuss a new security system for the building.

It is easy to imagine how difficult it is for the couple to feel any sympathy for the rich neighbor's initiative. In the back of their minds, the owners of that chaotic apartment believe that a new security system may be useful, even necessary, for the future . . . . But right now?

This is not the most opportune time for Latin Americans to define a regional defense agenda. In particular, it is not the best time to define concerns about civil-military relations, especially at the encouragement of the United States. However, if politics is the art of the possible, strategic politics should be the art of the impossible. There is a growing sense in the region that, despite difficulties and suspicions, the opportunity we now have to define a productive defense agenda may not be repeated. As for the U.S. initiative, the central point is that, independently of the reasons that led the United States to present the proposal in this shape, this is the first time we have been presented with an open agenda, and the proposal includes our participation in the definition of the agenda itself. On the one hand, this means that the U.S. recognizes that solutions for regional problems cannot be imposed; the design and implementation of possible solutions depend on the participation of the Latin American countries. On the other, it implies responsibilities for Latin American countries. For us, this is a precious moment, with profound implications for our aspirations for the next century. To define what we Latin Americans want of this moment is fundamental and urgent.

To summarize, as I reflected on "Civil-Military Relations in the Americas for the 21st Century" I posed three fundamental themes: 1. The future is unpredictable, but the present suggests the need for new conceptual defense structures both domestically and for the hemisphere. 2. The

real concern with the military in Latin America does not lie in civil-military relations, but in the subordination of the military to the political authority as a way of preserving the fledgling democracies in the region. In that sense, more important than ensuring the obedience of the military is ensuring the participation of society in the political definition of the role of the armed forces. 3. With respect to the recent U.S. initiatives for cooperative security arrangements, including concerns about the preservation of democracies, I accepted the vast difficulties that lie in the enormous asymmetry of power in the region. In particular, I underscored what I see as the Latin American countries' responsibilities, which are implicit in their participation in the design of the new security agenda. And I gave two reasons for this: 1. in spite of the fact that the new security agenda is being pushed by the United States, the agenda is open; and 2. the global strategic moment is characterized by a rearrangement of forces and, as such, it has opened some windows for productive cooperation. It is therefore essential that Latin Americans participate in the process. To paraphrase a well-known saying, this is a U.S. initiative, and the U.S. is a friend of Latin America . . . whether we like it or not.



## **Chapter Seven**

### **The Colombian Army in the 21st Century**

**Major General Manuel José Bonett Locarno**  
**Commanding General, Colombian Armed Forces**

#### **SUMMARY**

Major General Bonett presented his vision of what the Colombian Army should be in the 21st Century. He began by admitting that his country has a lot of problems. However, he said that it also had a lot of natural resources and potential, and that by the year 2020 most of those problems would be solved and the country would be living in peace. In the years ahead, the Army would focus on a number of distinct roles:

1. *The defense of democracy.* A prerequisite for this role is the defense of national security, broadly defined. The protection of democracy, he said, is attained through the protection of the population and civil society. This includes the defense of national sovereignty and culture, national borders, frontiers, natural resources, and the survival of ethnic groups. Civilian authorities must be properly elected. In the 21st Century, he argued, it was almost unthinkable that there would be undemocratic countries in the hemisphere. Any country that reverted to dictatorial rule would find itself isolated.

2. *Respect for human rights and the opinion of the international community.* Bonett said that there could not be democracy and peace without human rights. Moreover, he argued that Colombia's internal conflicts (wars) could not be won without the support of the population, and that was dependent on respecting human rights. Therefore, the military forces of the 21st Century had to be both

academically educated and practically trained to respect human rights.

3. *Combatting the trafficking in illegal drugs.* Bonett said that he did not know which was worst, the social penetration and corruption that comes from narcotrafficking or the violence and subversion of democratic institutions. But he also noted that, beyond these problems, narcotrafficking can lead to confrontation between allied nations. He said that Colombia had paid a heavy price for its involvement with drugs, not only with regard to the above domestic ills, but in terms of its relations with other countries. Colombia had become a suspect nation, the target of all blame. Yet, he argued that without the demand/consumption from the developed countries the problem would not exist. This is not to deny Colombian responsibility in these matters, but it is important to emphasize that we are all responsible for fighting this scourge. He said that the military could help by destroying illegal crops, educating the populace against drug use, and avoiding repression in its counterdrug operations. He concluded that drug trafficking was a national security threat that weakened military as well as civilian institutions.

4. *Respect for the environment and conservation.* Bonett pointed out that economic development, though entailing obvious benefits, also has created environmental hazards such as air pollution, the destruction of vegetation and water resources, and the changing of climate patterns. He said that the military could help solve these problems by planting trees, creating natural parks, recuperating water resources, and assisting in other civic works. He speculated that in the next century the armed forces might become more deeply involved in such activities. If there were fewer military conflicts, there would presumably be more opportunities and resources available to engage in such missions. Nature conservation, he opined, could become one of the military's biggest challenges.

5. *Multinational cooperation.* Major General Bonett said that multinational military cooperation could help defuse tensions and improve security in various regions. In the 21st Century, he noted, poor countries could ill afford to spend precious monies and resources to fight their neighbors. Multinational forces must be organized to help resolve conflicts without violating national borders or sovereignty. Such forces, he noted, would not be acting out of selfish national interests, but would be reacting in compliance with a mission agreed upon in the United Nations or other international fora.

6. *Improving the quality of life.* Bonett averred that poverty is perhaps the greatest threat to Colombia today. It is largely responsible for narcotrafficking and organized crime. The military must use its resources to support socioeconomic and cultural development through the construction of roads, schools, hospitals, sports areas, parks and other installations, and by serving as role models for Colombian youth. The key for the next century, he said, will be education and the quality of life. Of critical importance will be the re-enforcement of the nuclear family.

7. *Scientific improvement.* The 21st Century, he declared, will be a century of high technology. Those who do not have access to this will not be able to compete. Therefore, the military must use its resources and organization to support the government in developing national education and research programs.

In conclusion, Bonett said that the soldier of the future will be a soldier-citizen who will have problem-solving skills in a broad range of activities. He/she must be able to implement policies in a nonviolent manner if at all possible, respecting human rights and promoting democracy, social justice, and national sovereignty and well-being.

## **Chapter Eight**

### **The Peace Process in Guatemala<sup>1</sup>**

**Brigadier General Víctor Manuel Ventura Arellano**  
**Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,**  
**Guatemala**

#### **SUMMARY**

Brigadier General Ventura Arellano began by noting that the end of the Cold War had provided an impetus for defusing internal conflicts in countries that had long been immersed in the East-West struggle. With the lowering of international tensions and the discrediting of armed struggle as a strategy for taking power, it had been possible for Guatemala to put an end to 36 years of violent conflict. He traced the process of negotiations from the initial contacts with the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) to the signing of the final agreements on the implementation and verification of the peace accords in December 1996.

Ventura Arellano then went on to discuss the actual implementation of the agreements. He said there were 3 stages in the process: 1. 15 January through 14 April 1997; 2. 15 April through 31 December 1997; and 3. 1998 to the year 2000. During the first months of 1997, the government began implementing those programs dealing with displaced populations, including the return of refugees from Mexico and local development projects designed to integrate the returnees in their communities. The demobilization and disarming of the URNG was begun in early March, with the deployment of the U.N. Mission's military cease-fire verification team. Almost 3,000 ex-combatants were registered in 8 camps, where they went through orientation and job training programs. On 3 May, the U.N. team delivered to the Guatemalan government its report on the

number of arms turned in, and the cease-fire was finalized. In spite of this, some 400 ex-combatants remained in temporary shelters, while employment opportunities were created for them. It was expected that they would be relocated by the end of the year. He also said that consultations had been held with organizations in civil society in an effort to identify and aid human rights victims. Included in these efforts were provisions for socioeconomic and psychological assistance.

In addition, Ventura reported that by the end of 1997 the Guatemalan military would be reduced by a third. (This included the mobile military police, which had already been demobilized.) By that time, also, legal initiatives would be presented which would provide the basis for redefining the state's intelligence mechanisms. Other measures designed to strengthen civilian authority and the functioning of the military in a democratic society included: the disbanding of the *Comités Voluntarios de Defensa Civil* (deemed necessary to lower tensions and build the trust necessary to facilitate the peace process); training programs to help reinsert demobilized military personnel into civilian life; the transfer of the Department of Arms and Munitions Control (which is responsible for regulating the possession and bearing of arms) to the Ministry of Interior, and the strict limitation of the military's role in this area to giving advice on matters endangering national security; armed forces modernization, including downsizing and educational and doctrinal reforms, to enable the institution to adjust to changing national and international circumstances; reforms in the military justice system to allow ordinary courts to try cases involving armed forces personnel who commit common crimes; pending reforms in the terms of military service; changes in intelligence operations (also pending), which would limit the role of military intelligence to military functions, establish a Department of Civil Intelligence and Information Analysis in the Ministry of Interior, and create legislative oversight mechanisms; and efforts to provide greater opportunities

for women in the military at all levels, including their admission to the Politechnical School, the alma mater of the armed forces.

Ventura Arellano went on to talk about the impact of the peace accords. He said that one of the areas in which they had greatest impact was in the significant improvement in the human rights situation. He also noted that they had a noticeable effect in strengthening civilian institutions, which would permit the consolidation of the democratic process. At the same time, he claimed, the military had not been weakened. Rather, freed from the responsibility of conducting counterinsurgency operations, it would have more resources at its disposal to support the police, if necessary, in maintaining public order, as well as to participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations. Finally, he said that the restoration of peace had led to the discovery of other serious national problems that had been ignored during the civil war. Guatemala was now trying to overcome those problems with the support of the international community.

In conclusion, Brigadier General Ventura made three points: First, strengthening the security of the citizenry is a fundamental prerequisite for obtaining the stability that the peace process requires. This can be accomplished through the professionalization of the Civilian National Police, the strengthening of human rights, the creation of a culture of respect for law and democracy, and, above all, the acceleration of the modernization and strengthening of the justice sector. In order to avoid a vacuum of authority, the armed forces will support the Civilian National Police, in fulfillment of a governmental decision, until the police have the capacity to maintain order themselves.

Second, stability and governability are preconditions for productive investment and social development. The government will continue making investments in rural areas in order to generate the conditions needed to attract private investment, both national and foreign, which is the

generator of productive employment. It will also continue making the efforts necessary to assure the quantity and quality of government social expenditures established by the accords. The military, he said, would faithfully carry out its mission emanating from expected constitutional reforms, thus contributing to the country's governability and stability.

Finally, the military is waiting for those constitutional reforms, such as the constitutive law of the Army and other legal modifications derived from the peace accords, so that it can properly implement them, thereby publicly demonstrating its complete desire to support the strengthening of the civilian authority in a culture of peaceful coexistence.

## **ENDNOTE - CHAPTER EIGHT**

1. This chapter is based on BG Ventura Arellano's paper, "The Peace Process in Guatemala," rather than on his speech, which was a considerably abbreviated version of the former.

**PART FOUR**

**CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS  
AND U.S. POLICY:  
A U.S. MILITARY PERSPECTIVE**



**Chapter Nine**  
**The U.S. National Guard and State to State**  
**Partnership:**  
**Implications for Latin America**

**Major General William J. Jefferds, Ed.D.,**  
**(ARNGUS Ret.)**  
**Special Assistant to the Chief,**  
**U.S. National Guard Bureau**  
**and**  
**Colonel Robert B. James**  
**Director of International Affairs**  
**U.S. National Guard Bureau**

**SUMMARY**

**Introduction.**

Major General Jefferds began the presentation by briefly discussing the roles and missions of the National Guard. He noted that there are over 500,000 Army and Air National Guardsmen and women located in more than 3,000 communities in the 50 states and other U.S. territories. Guard personnel have been in every military engagement the United States has been involved in since its inception. The Guard even preceded this country as an institution.

Jefferds explained that, although the Guard is an integral part of the Army and Air Force, its units stay under the command of the governor of each territory until they are federalized by the President of the United States to perform federal missions. The Guard, he said, has three missions: First, it has a federal mission where it is an integral part of the Army and Air Force, and its units serve on active duty. As an example, he cited the Guard presence not only in Bosnia, but in 68 countries around the world. Second, it has a state mission in which it is responsible to the governor.

Here, he mentioned disaster relief. He said that in the state of California, where he used to command the Army National Guard, there were four seasons—fires, floods, earthquakes and riots—and the Guard had been actively dealing with all these problems for many years. Third, there is its local mission. Guard personnel serve in civilian roles—as teachers, lawyers, doctors, truck drivers and salespeople—in the communities where they live. In this sense, they represent mainstream America.

Jefferds said that the National Guard was very proud of its many programs. One of the most unique and newest of these was started under former Secretary of Defense William Perry, as part of an operation called “Preventive Defense,” and then passed on to the current Secretary of Defense, William Cohen. “Preventive Defense” covers many areas, but one of the most important involves the development of partnerships between individual U.S. states and various foreign countries. At that point, Jefferds yielded the floor to Colonel James, who went on to discuss the Guard’s State Partnership Program in detail.

### **The State to State Partnership Program.**

Colonel James said that the origins of the program, which began in 1992, came from a request by Lithuania to the Department of Defense to help in the creation of a military based on the principle of civilian control. DOD turned to the National Guard Bureau for help, and the result was what you see today.

James explained that the National Guard, in its international programs, seeks to capitalize on the unique role of its citizen-soldiers. It does this through an aggressive program of engagement, both in the United States and abroad. Through its State to State Partnership Program, the Guard links U.S. states with foreign nations in an attempt to establish broad ties of cooperation between the two sides. In the process, personal and institutional relationships are developed at all levels of society. He said

that they had found that the interpersonal relationships that they have developed are as important as the institutional ones. He also said that the Guard, in its relations with other countries, tries to build on those things that it does in its federal and state missions. He used the example of disaster relief. The idea of using the Guard's missions to help its foreign partners was an important part of the State to State Partnership Program.

Colonel James explained that the purpose of the program was to promote the National Security Strategy of the United States. In doing so, the Guard worked with the U.S. Ambassador in support of his Country Plan in those countries participating in the program. It also worked with the theater Commander-in-Chief (CINC) in an effort to support the National Military Strategy of the United States. The objectives were to:

- foster democratic institutions and free-market economies;
- project American values of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; and
- promote interoperability between military and civilian communities.

The program had begun as a Eurocentric operation designed to bring nations—many of which did not understand the concept of military and civilians working together—out of the Cold War and into a new reality. At the same time, it attempted to replace prejudice with an informed opinion. The idea was to establish genuine partnerships, long-term functional relationships that go well beyond the military. In the process, the National Guard would provide a role model for military subordination to civil authority, and also demonstrate that it was a cost-effective and credible defense force.

The speaker then proceeded to walk the audience through the process of establishing such a program. He

emphasized that the Guard would not go into a country on its own. Rather, a host nation must request a National Guard presence. Once that request has been made to the U.S. Ambassador—and this is usually done by the Minister of Defense, or in some cases the President or Foreign Minister—the Ambassador would review it, and either accept or reject it. Assuming the former, he would then include it in his Country Plan. He would then forward it to the theater CINC, who would also review it, and if it were accepted, he would include it in his Country Plan. The CINC would then send it on to the Department of Defense, which would forward it to the National Guard Bureau for implementation.

Once the National Guard Bureau receives a request, Colonel James' office—the Office of International Affairs—attempts to match the requesting country with an appropriate state. In doing this, a number of considerations are taken into account. They look at similarities in ethnic background, geography and economy. Once his staff makes a recommendation, he forwards it to a General Officers Steering Committee (GOSC). The GOSC is composed of 7 Adjutants General, 2 Deputy Adjutants General, and a retired division commander, who review the proposal and make a recommendation. This is then sent to the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, Lieutenant General Edward Baca, who will approve or reject it. (Col. James noted that at this stage proposals are rarely rejected.) Once the recommendation has been accepted, it is then forwarded back to the theater CINC and the U.S. Embassy, so that the host nation can be properly notified and the relationship can begin.

James returned to the theme of the National Guard's unique qualifications for this program. He said that Guard personnel were a unique blend of citizen-soldiers, who were totally involved in the communities they lived in. They were part of mainstream America. Not only were they a cost-effective defense force, but the fact that many Guardsmen were community leaders made them a model of

democratic civil-military relations. They supplied military support to civil authority, including crisis action, emergency response, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance. He said that the Guard was a valuable way of involving communities themselves in such efforts.

Since the State to State Partnership Program's birth in 1992, it has rapidly picked up speed. Today, the Guard is in 68 countries. In Europe, 21 countries are matched with 23 U.S. states. While many of these matches are made on the basis of ethnic backgrounds, this is not always the case. Colonel James mentioned Romania and Bulgaria, two countries which share common borders and rivers and have nuclear plants, but which did not talk to each other during the Cold War. So the Guard matched them with Alabama and Tennessee, which also share borders and rivers and have nuclear facilities, to show that neighbors could live together in a harmonious fashion. He noted that Gen. Jefferds had just returned from an exercise in Romania, involving the Romanian civil defense force in a scenario in which an airplane loaded with hazardous materials crashed close to the international border. Thus, three countries worked together to rehearse a response that served each nation's interests. The United States was involved in a support capacity, but it was Romania and Bulgaria that actually conducted the exercise. Similarly, the Guard has partnerships with some of the countries in the former Soviet Union, like Ukraine and Georgia. In this regard, the program serves as an integral part of the Partners for Peace effort.

Two years ago, the U.S. Southern Command asked the Guard to put together some partnerships for Central America, with a view to eventually expanding such programs into other Latin American countries. As a result, there are now a number of partnerships in progress or being planned: Louisiana and New Hampshire are both involved in Belize. Other current partnerships include Missouri and Panama, Kentucky and Ecuador, and West Virginia and Peru. Still awaiting final approval are proposed

partnerships between Puerto Rico and Honduras, Florida and Venezuela, and Connecticut and Uruguay.

Colonel James said that the Program can do many things with its foreign partners, and he mentioned a few: medical and engineering activities, non-commissioned officer development, environmental protection, disaster relief, and emergency response. He recalled that the Guard had helped one Eastern European nation establish a chaplain's corps, and another create a code of military justice. He again emphasized that all these programs originate with requests from the host country. The Guard does not solicit requests.

In conclusion, he noted that the State to State Partnership Program had come a long way. It was now a global operation. He said he had on his desk proposals for Africa and the Pacific. He ended with a quote from Goethe: "I find that the greatest thing in life is not so much where we are, but rather in what direction we are moving."

**PART FIVE**  
**THE WORKSHOP REPORTS**

## **Chapter Ten**

### **The Inter-American Defense System**

**Dr. Thomas Bruneau**  
**U.S. Naval Postgraduate School**

This panel, which included approximately twenty military and civilian officials from North America, South America, Central America and the Caribbean, decided to divide its discussion of this topic into four main questions that were dealt with sequentially. These were as follows: What is the system? Does a system really exist? How does it work? And how should it work?

The Inter-American Defense System consists of a collection of countries, instruments, organizations, and norms that are often poorly integrated due to political and military considerations from its founding until the present. This short definition, which sounds better in Spanish than English, captures the panel's sense of the system. It first of all consists of the independent republics of the Western Hemisphere stretching from the Arctic to Antarctica and including the Caribbean. The instruments and norms include all the corpus of treaties and documents from the Rio Treaty of 1947 and the creation of the Organization of American States in 1948 until the present day. The organizations include the Organization of American States (OAS), Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), Inter-American Defense College, annual conferences of the American armies, navies, and air forces, the December 1994 Summit of the Americas, and the two defense ministerials. The system is, then, very broad and general. Since it is so broad and general, it raises the question as to whether it really exists. The panel thus decided to look further into the existence and nature of a system.



The panel's further discussion and debate resulted in a consensus that a system really does exist. It exists to the extent that a concept such as "system" is necessarily abstract and allows us to define something concrete out of a collection of diverse elements. The issue is particularly relevant in that the system was initiated in 1947 with the Rio Treaty, and while it has adjusted to changing circumstances, the current world and security environment are so dramatically different that there is a real question whether it can at all resemble the original system. There was agreement that there are elements or components that often work well together. In the last analysis, while it may not be very coherent, it is in fact the system we want. If the political leaders wanted it to be more of an integrated and coherent system, it would be. When there are special circumstances and sufficient political will is achieved, the system takes on a greater degree of integration than when the will is lacking. The system is a system of cooperation, including communication, on issues that are perceived as at least challenges and maybe even threats. Currently, there is a high degree of cooperation in promoting confidence-building measures and de-mining. Finally, there is agreement that a system does exist as long as we understand that a "system" is an analytical construct.

To evaluate how well the system works presupposes an explicit set of criteria for evaluation. In this system, as in most other international systems, there are no such specified criteria. The panel agreed, however, that there are several elements which are positive and provide evidence of the operation of a system. The first is the availability of fora, such as the OAS, IADB, defense ministerials and other mechanisms, which allow for debate and understanding of issues of mutual concern, such as democratic consolidation, human rights, threats arising from drugs, and the like. The second is the fact that by existing at all the system allows other countries in the hemisphere to leaven the asymmetrical power of the United States. Indeed, this factor is one of the main reasons motivating these countries

to participate. Third is the counterfactual matter of the dog that didn't bark. Overall, relations among the countries in the region are good, including in the area of defense. Since there is a relatively high level of interaction, there is much evidence of a system. And the results are positive. It is clearly not negative in its impact, since there is in fact very little inter-state conflict in the hemisphere. Further, all countries in the region but Cuba are now under popularly elected governments, and in some cases it can be shown that the demonstration or contagion effect was significant in the expansion of democracy. The prospects are for a continued low level of conflict since democracies tend not to go to war with other democracies. This last point is indicative of how the priorities and functions of the system have changed with the times. The system now seeks to promote democratic consolidation, and so far it has been successful.

The discussion and suggestions on how the system should work are extensive. The fact that the participants could conceive of the system doing more in the changed world context suggests that they indeed view it as a system. The suggestions for elaboration or improvement are also three in number. The first concerned the operation of the organizational elements of the system. Here the participants wanted to see more cooperation and communication among such components as the OAS and the IADB, and particularly the former's Commission on Hemispheric Security, and the various conferences and ministerials. The intent of this was to increase the efficiency of the elements in the system by improving definitions and communications. The second concerned the definition and implementation of goals, including defending democracy and human rights, ensuring security, and defeating criminality. It was suggested that through education these goals could be better defined and implemented. And third, it was stressed that civilians, particularly those in government and the media, would have to be more involved in the system. Traditionally, in most of the region (excluding Canada, the Commonwealth Caribbean, and the United

States), issues of security and defense were left to the military. Civilians had little or no role, and virtually no interest. Today, in the context of democratic consolidation, the civilians have no option but to become involved. The militaries generally agree to a (re)definition of roles in decision-making. The civilians have the responsibilities to be aware and to act, but often are poorly informed and not interested in being involved. To assist them, the military should recognize them as the constituencies of the Inter-American Defense System and help them become involved in all of its aspects.

In sum, the participants in the panel agreed that there is indeed an Inter-American Defense System, that it is probably about what those in power want it to be, that it does have some important functions, and that civilians have to assume more responsibility.

## **Chapter Eleven**

### **Inter-Institutional Relations in the National Policy Process**

**Dr. Judith Gentleman**  
**U.S. Air War College**

The working group focused its discussion on institutional relations in the defense and security policy arena, with particular emphasis on emerging patterns of civil-military relations. The group's deliberations were shaped by the varying experiences of the countries represented, together with the fact that different countries were experiencing different historical moments in the evolution of their political and defense policy processes. Although these processes might be similar as nations in the region have largely come to accept a set of commonly held norms concerning democracy and the primacy of civilian political authority, Latin American nations are still at different junctures in their own evolving democratic consolidation. In some cases, states may be attempting to create new laws and build new institutions. In others, leaders may be attempting to bring about compliance with existing regulatory and decision-making procedures; in still others, actors may be stalled in a defense policy process in which either the military or civilian leadership may be avoiding policy-making responsibilities. In some, problems of policy implementation remain to be solved. Finally, in some states, support from civil society for the recomposition of the military and the redefinition of its role in society may be weak owing to the residues from the transition from authoritarianism.

## **The Roles and Missions Debate.**

The discussion highlighted the divergent notions of appropriate roles and missions, as seen from the perspectives of national leaders, civil society and the military itself. The development of effective inter-institutional relations is predicated upon a clear understanding of the military's role in defense and—as was repeatedly stressed by several participants—in assuring the nation's security. Indeed, the question of the proper use of the term “defense” versus “security” engaged many in the group. One panel member argued that a correct analysis of the components of national power requires that the political factor include the military and that both be integrated into a more mature concept of “security.” In an integral concept of security, for instance, which would encompass such issues as food, law enforcement, democracy, the environment, and the survival of the state, it would be appropriate to address military efforts in agriculture, including the training of conscripts for farming. In this way, the military would not only help insure the nation's security, but also instill workers with the discipline and technical knowledge necessary for agriculture. There was considerable divergence of views as to the appropriate roles for military establishments. Participants discussed options ranging from armed forces that were conceived as “development armies” to those that would be largely confined to the barracks while they continued to search for an appropriate role. (The latter reflecting civil society's reluctance to permit them wider roles following years of military governance.) In some instances, militaries are being urged to become extensively involved in the internal development challenges faced by their societies. In these cases, their roles might include economic development, border control, customs collection, management of civil aviation and airport maintenance, environmental protection, natural resources management, support for the educational system, natural disaster relief, health care, and finally, law enforcement.

On the other hand, some militaries are being increasingly confined to an external defense role. In some cases, this is due to the rejection of the corporatist model that underlay many traditional military organizations and led to military interventions in the political arena, as well as to the sea change that has swept the region economically with the opening of the market, and has much improved inter-state relations. With diminished inter-state tensions and public sector revenues, and with rising levels of regional economic cooperation, some felt that defense had been “devalued” as a public policy goal or public good. As such, in some nations the military had lost its preeminent role within the state. Dramatic declines in defense spending have effectively limited the military’s role above and beyond the issue of the appropriate civil-military infrastructure.

A further complication arises from uncertainty as to the appropriateness of the institution’s role in the socialization of youth versus its responsibility for offering recruits professional military training in support of its traditional mission. Should the military conceive of itself as primarily playing a peacetime role as the likelihood of war and regional conflict wane? Alternatively, should it regard itself as chiefly being responsible for war preparation for internal or external defense? In short, regional militaries and civilian leaders alike are uncertain as to whether to embrace a more or less expansive concept of security as opposed to a more limited notion of defense. While this is by no means a new dilemma, it is one that currently confronts many states in the region.

New threats are arising that require a coordinated response from security forces, among them migration, narcotrafficking and organized crime. In some cases, the state has responded primarily through the gendarmerie and the coast guard, with little if any employment of the traditional defense side of the house. Indeed, scarce resources are being allocated to the “security” or law enforcement community. Inevitably, with doctrinal issues concerning force employment as well as matters of

institutional responsibility unresolved, competition over scarce resources breeds discontent and rivalries. In some instances, despite uncertainty over formal responsibilities, an “inversion” of roles may be occurring, with a de facto “militarization” of the police and a “policization” of the military. This outcome stems mainly from the state’s failure to define responsibilities for internal security requirements or the maintenance of public order, a situation that was a source of concern for the working group.

### **The New Civil-Military Dialogue.**

The above difficulties notwithstanding, remarkable efforts have been undertaken to address the need for elected democratic civilian leaders to harmonize institutional relations with the armed forces and begin shouldering responsibility for defense and security planning. Emerging profiles of civil-military relations have been shaped by the process of economic liberalization that has driven declining defense budgets and substantial privatizations, some of which have affected the military sector. In many countries, military issues have become a low priority, with the armed forces suffering a loss of prestige and influence. In others, the military has gained growing respect, and ranks among the top national institutions in terms of public opinion. In some cases, this rebound in popularity has grown in recognition of the fact that the military appears to be abiding by the new rules of the game despite internal pressures and even the prosecution of military personnel for past transgressions. The working group noted the great importance that attaches to public perceptions of the military’s role as the foundation for developing functional inter-institutional relations.

For those building new institutional relations between civilian authorities and the military, the choices have sometimes included a decision to separate the armed forces from the political sphere—in particular from political parties—in an effort to depoliticize the military. Officers

have been encouraged to avoid taking public positions in political debates. The services are to be delinked from any identification with political parties' positions or platforms, and active duty officers have been asked to suspend their party affiliations. Overall, the goal has been to achieve what Samuel Huntington has called "objective" civilian control of the military. In this arrangement, the military manages its own professional responsibilities and remains free of the subjective interventions of political actors. It remains outside the political fray in exchange for the right to exercise full authority within the sphere of its own professional competence.

Importantly, civil-military dialogue achieved through both public and non-public seminars and work groups is helping build mutual confidence between civilian and military sectors. In one country, seminars on the international security environment, military roles and missions, the legal structure for military organizations, poverty and security, and the public perception of the armed forces, together with a simultaneous prolonged national social debate, have facilitated the development of new military laws that are consonant with democracy.

In the past, civilian politicians in many countries often avoided broaching issues that would be disturbing to the military. Although there were constitutional mandates and laws governing military affairs, unwritten rules, informal relations and taboos frequently shaped national policy in this arena. Change, however, has brought about a new openness that has pushed to the fore many issues for discussion that were previously off limits. Indeed, in some cases debate has even surfaced concerning secrecy and the classification of documents as they relate to civilian access to critical information.

In this new climate of openness, it is anticipated that legislative debates will be permitted to go beyond formalities to address issues such as the military budget, military education, and threats and other global factors that



may signify a different military formation in the future. To accomplish this, some armed forces have established liaisons with national legislatures. Developing congressional expertise has helped support the February 1998 meeting of parliamentary defense committees of the Americas.

In some countries, a civilian-led Ministry of Defense now exercises full authority over the armed forces. Sometimes, it runs the budget and decides promotions. It no longer plays only a “decorative” role, but rather enforces the “Defense Law” of the country that places strict limits on the proper role of the military in society. The group discussed the issue of whether it is necessary to have a civilian Minister of Defense, and some suggested that the question was not so much that of the identity of the minister as his subordination to elected civilian authority within the democratic framework.

As one member of the group put it, the military must be subject to political control rather than autonomous. Elected civilian authority must exercise political control and must do so to wall off the military from day-to-day partisan political intrusions. In some cases, however, the civilian sector has provided neither stability nor direction for institutional development, and it has been left to the military to establish order for itself. For some members of the group, however, the notion of civilian leadership in defense ministries was preferable because a civilian (in theory at least) would be better able to interpret the aspirations of civil society.

### **Dimensions of Inter-Institutional Relations.**

The work group considered several inter-institutional relationships whose proper management was deemed critical to the successful institutionalization of civil-military relations in a democracy:

- Relations between the President and the Executive, including the bureaucracy, the armed forces, and even maneuver units close to the Presidency.
- Inter-service relations. Staffs may require reorganization and improved coordination.
- Congressional-armed forces relations. The Williamsburg Defense Ministerial meeting of 1995 touched upon some of the issues important to this relationship.
- Political party-armed forces relations.
- Armed forces-police relations.
- Civil society and the armed forces. Intellectuals, professionals and organized religion play important roles.
- Relations internal to the military services.

In all these domains, the challenge is to build dialogue and cooperation.

The group considered the U.S. interagency model that coordinates inter-institutional relations and shapes policy in the national security arena, together with other coordination models now in place in several countries. Along with procedural routines, personal relations constitute an important element in the successful harmonization of the executive, civil, legislative and military perspectives.

### **The Legislative-Military Relationship.**

The discussion repeatedly returned to the pivotal subject of the legislature's role in defense and security policy. The sentiment was that there was still a tremendous amount of work to do in forging new productive relationships. In some cases, although laws have been passed (such as Argentina's

National Security Act) that govern defense policy, there is often a failure to institutionalize them effectively or to develop regulations that facilitate the implementation of new laws. Civilian authority inadequately shoulders its implementation responsibilities. To remedy this problem, communications need to be improved and dialogues established and maintained on a regular basis. Such developments must move beyond the informal realm and achieve institutionalization in all countries. Leadership on defense issues can only come through improved communication and dialogue, and forums must be established and promoted to foster this activity. Although legislatures typically have few staff resources at their disposal, lawmakers must overcome old habits of deference to traditionally powerful executives, and that includes habits of deference to military authorities.

In some instances, the relationship between the military and congressional representatives has been confined to informal contacts with little formal institutionalization. Elsewhere, the military itself has had to learn how to become a more effective player within a formal process of governance by developing lobbying skills in the congressional sphere. In some countries, the legislature has developed the capacity to act and has been effective in dealing with what is for many a new policy arena and a new set of responsibilities.

### **Education for Defense Policy-Making.**

The group highlighted the importance of educating the general public, and civilian policymakers in particular, in defense and security matters. In some countries, professional military education has been made available to senior government officials and some key political actors through National Defense or War Colleges. In one instance, civil-military familiarization has been brought about by including the military under the umbrella of the civilian civil service. Ultimately, much more must be done to

develop civilian political competence in defense and security analysis in order to build military confidence in civilian management. This may come in part from enhanced contact between civilian leaders and the military, but it may also require the funding of institutes and think tanks dedicated to this effort. The military itself should designate funds to support workshops, seminars and meetings to facilitate interaction between the civilian sector and the armed forces. Military liaison offices could be established in congress, as has been done in some countries. Without an educated civilian constituency with skills appropriate for defense policy management, formal inter-institutional relations, even if well elaborated, will be undermined by the absence of interpersonal confidence and trust.

Thus, a step-by-step process must be developed in the region that formally stipulates the role to be played by civilians in defense policy, and then charts a course to prepare both military and civilian elements to meet their shared responsibilities for defense policy formulation and implementation. The recently established Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies in Washington, DC should provide an additional forum for educating civilians about defense policy and military organizations. In the end, however, building military confidence in their civilian counterparts is an age-old problem in Latin America, and overcoming the legacy of the past and the realities of current and future problems will be difficult. No doubt this is in part due to the low esteem in which political parties and “politicians” are still generally held by Latin American militaries. The problem is further exacerbated by the weakness of civil society in many countries. Conversely, civilian distrust and suspicion towards their military counterparts must also somehow be overcome.

## **Conclusions.**

The work group reached agreement in several areas, including a recognition that the roles and missions issue

must be sorted out for the military by the political leadership prior to any effective elaboration of inter-institutional relations. Second, the development of confidence between civilian and military actors in the defense arena is critical to facilitate the further strengthening of the inter-institutional environment. Also essential to these efforts are communication and dialogue. Creative approaches to each must be forthcoming from both civilian and military sectors, as both share responsibility for defense policy formulation and implementation. The reformulation of inter-institutional relations is at an early stage throughout much of the region. It will be to the advantage of states looking for solutions to examine the process of development now underway in those countries where the dialogue has already led to cooperation. Continued regional exchanges are thus vital to this process.

## **Chapter Twelve**

### **Cooperative Security and Peacekeeping**

**Lieutenant Colonel Victor Tise**  
**U.S. Air Force Academy**

This panel examined past and recent experiences in Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) and cooperative security missions of the countries represented at the conference. Presenters briefed from various points of view, including government, academic and, in some instances, representatives of the armed forces. During the discussions, the panelists spoke on an individual or academic basis, with the disclaimer that the views expressed did not represent those of their respective governments. Few concrete conclusions were reached because of the varied backgrounds and diverse opinions of the various presenters. Due to this inability to reach conclusions and the complexity of the subject matter, the group chose to pose questions for consideration, rather than offer conclusions or policy recommendations for future missions. This report will attempt to synthesize the workshop's main points of agreement and disagreement.

Many countries in the inter-American community have extensive and broad-ranging experience in Peacekeeping Operations. These efforts have occurred on a multinational basis in both global and regional venues. Latin American countries have participated in cooperative security operations for over 50 years. Examples include UN military observer missions in the Balkans and Middle East, and unit deployments to such countries as Cyprus, India, Pakistan, Angola and, more recently, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, and Mozambique. Regional efforts include UN observer missions to El Salvador, Guatemala, the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), and the recent Military Observer Mission in Ecuador and Peru (MOMEPE). On the other hand, many

countries have had little or no PKO experience. Federal statutes, constitutional restrictions and, in some cases, lack of political resolve limit the participation of many governments.

The group focused on three general areas:

1. PKOs as cooperative security or collective security on both global and regional bases.

2. Organizing and preparing for PKOs—training, financing, rules of engagement (ROE), and the political will of participating nations, including those being supported by the operations.

3. Cooperative security and its application to peacekeeping in the Western Hemisphere.

### **Peacekeeping as Cooperative or Collective Security: Applications in the Americas.**

What constitutes peacekeeping? What are cooperative and collective security? Defining peacekeeping was not nearly as problematic for the panelists as defining the latter terms. As one speaker put it: “Definitions are not as important as the context in which security arrangements are mandated. Security is ultimately in the eye of the beholder.”

Certainly, peacekeeping has changed drastically since the end of the Cold War. The accelerated transformation of the international scene during the past 7 years has made it necessary to reformulate security systems at the global level, as well as at the regional and national levels. PKOs will continue to be more complex and complicated than those of earlier years. The expectations of the international community (including the inter-American community) are now quite different from what they were in the days of Lester Pearson and Dag Hammarskjöld. New players will become involved, and peacekeeping initiatives may no longer be the automatic purview of the United Nations.

Still, the UN is currently the only international organization with the chartered authority to promote international peace and stability. (As one panelist observed: “If the UN did not exist, it would be necessary to invent it.”) It must have the support of the international community to exercise that authority effectively in the context of growing demands for stability. Beyond this, however, the workshop, when considering peacekeeping in this hemisphere, discussed the possibility that the Organization of American States might take on some of the roles currently performed by the UN.

Rather than viewing peacekeeping and cooperative security as two distinct activities, most participants initially agreed that the former was a tool of the UN cooperative security framework. Nevertheless, one speaker strongly argued that UN-sponsored peacekeeping could never be considered cooperative security because of the veto power of the 5 permanent members of the Security Council. Forceful arguments were then presented in favor of identifying regional and subregional peacekeeping with collective security rather than cooperative security. Support for this proposition, especially with regard to the inter-American community, focused on shared values, such as democracy and economic well-being.

### **Are PKOs More Feasible in a Global or Regional Context?**

In terms of cooperative security, all nations in the inter-American community have long-standing commitments to maintaining international peace and stability around the world. But when it comes to such efforts in the Western Hemisphere, the work group had mixed emotions. For one country to be involved in the affairs of its neighbors could lead to perceptions of partiality, when what is needed in such operations is strict impartiality (and the perception thereof). To avoid this, it might be desirable to limit PKO involvement to countries outside the subregion



concerned. An example might be Southern Cone countries taking part in stability operations in Central America.

Recent operations have been far more diverse than traditional peacekeeping and observer missions. PKOs now encompass a wide range of multinational combined military and civilian activities. The entire gamut of cooperative security is covered, from peacekeeping to peace enforcement and peacebuilding to stability operations. Who would have foreseen, as recently as a decade ago, that an international contingent composed of military forces from the United States, Canada, Argentina, Honduras, Guatemala, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, the Netherlands, and the Caribbean community, would become involved in the stability operations of the UN Mission in Haiti? Working under the mandate of UN Security Council Resolution 940, UNMIH forces not only assisted the fragile, but legitimate government of Haiti in maintaining a secure and stable environment by training a 5,200-man police force, they also assisted in the conduct of free and fair elections. For the first time in the country's history, Haitians witnessed a peaceful transition of power from one popularly elected president to another. To take another recent example, Latin American military forces have participated in UN operations to separate warring factions involved in ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, enabling both borders and governance to be reestablished. One could also cite many other instances in which Latin American militaries have taken part in global and regional cooperative security efforts.

### **If the Inter-American System Is Capable of Incorporating Peacekeeping, Then What Are the Mechanisms for Framing Cooperative Security?**

When considering security today, one can no longer think in terms of territorial security alone. In an interconnected modern world, security involves the integrity of the community of nations as a whole. One participant noted that there are security issues that

transcend any country's internal capabilities and that require multinational cooperation. Further, competition in the global market has meant that the state of a country's economy is often a priority focus of foreign and national security policy. As a point of departure, it was agreed that peacekeeping in its traditional sense, whether global, regional or subregional, requires the consent of the parties in conflict.

### **Organizing and Preparing for PKOs.**

How do the American nations prepare and organize for future PKOs? It was agreed that gatherings such as this conference were a step in the right direction. Opportunities for dialogue where experiences can be shared are an enormous help in determining whether the region's armed forces have the capabilities to undertake certain PKOs. The participants learned, for instance, that Uruguay has extensive experience in such operations, ranking as the tenth largest participant in international PKOs. Uruguayan forces have participated in PKOs since 1935, and now have a Training Center for Peacekeeping Operations. Similarly, the U.S. Army's Peacekeeping Institute (PKI) has been established to analyze peacekeeping missions in the post-Cold War era. The PKI has played an important role in identifying key issues, such as combined assessment and planning, unity of effort, military subordination to political and diplomatic structures, creation of sustainable security (rule of law), proper military support to civil operations, training for peace operations, and the enhancement of public support (consent) for such operations. The exchange of ideas and concepts at these various academic and operational fora is invaluable. Experience is the best teacher, and we should take advantage of each other's wisdom to hone not only war-fighting capabilities, but also an understanding of how to conduct peacekeeping.

Additionally, the workshop spoke extensively about the creation of an educational and training system that includes military, governmental and nongovernmental activities involving PKOs. There was a strong consensus that civilian decisionmakers must recognize the military's peacekeeping as well as war-fighting capabilities. Dialogue between the Executive, Congress and senior military leaders is essential. All of the military participants from countries which had recently engaged in PKOs in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia pointed out that their forces could not have done the job alone. Involvement of national and international civilian agencies is vital to the success of virtually any PKO.

Participation in UN and other multinational endeavors will continue to be carefully assessed on a case-to-case basis by civilian leaders in conjunction with the military. In addition to evaluating the capability of the force, the availability of funding and the political will of the populace will have to be considered. Having funds available is an absolute key to success. Without money, a UN peacekeeping force cannot perform its mission. The group agreed that most financing should come from either the United Nations or other international and regional sources. Too much funding from individual nations can easily result in a loss of political resolve to conduct certain collective security efforts. The bottom line is that a nation's participation will be heavily influenced by its leaders' balancing of ends, ways, and means in light of their perception of national interests.

One of the primary keys to the success of the UN Mission in Haiti was the Rules of Engagement (ROE) set forth for all participating nations. This was a ROE that had been crafted at the same time and by the same players who had drawn up UN Resolution 940, which served as the mandate for the UNMIH. The workshop participants agreed that authorization to use force must be clearly outlined. Force should only be used in extreme circumstances, including of course self-defense. Learning the ROE becomes an important training endeavor for all soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines taking part in a PKO.

The social, economic and political situation of a nation that is to receive peacekeeping assistance will be the focus of the UN Security Council or other regional organizations during the formulation of appropriate mandates or accords. A UN mandate is the basis of a commander's Mission Statement and Commander's Intent. Given a mandate, commanders can then plan, write and transmit their Concept of Operations, Operations Orders and Fragmentary Orders to subordinate units from the participating international contingents. The development of the mandates must be an exhaustive process, taking into account the needs of the relevant nations, the consent of the affected parties, and the capabilities of the PKO forces. Ultimately, the mandate will spell out an end state or definition of success, which will allow participants to formulate their exit criteria.

Finally, the group posed its last question concerning regional cooperative security: Should mechanisms be developed so that the OAS can be given chartered authority, like the UN, to promote peace and stability in the Americas? The implication here was that the OAS would formulate, coordinate, and be responsible for overseeing the implementation of mandates. This was one question on which no closure could be reached.

## **Conclusion.**

The dynamics of the workshop demonstrated the ability of the inter-American community to come together through its military members, academics and politicians to discuss complex issues such as international peacekeeping and cooperative security. They also underlined the inability to reach consensus and offer policy recommendations. As one panelist put it, "cooperative security and collective security need a seminar in themselves." This is especially true when considering peacekeeping in the Americas. Even though the workshop did not feel compelled to present conclusions, this rapporteur did find three areas of consensus:

1. Countries of the Americas have had, and continue to have, a genuine commitment to participation in maintaining world peace and stability.

2. Peacekeeping must be under the auspices of the United Nations or some other international organization that has recognized chartered authority to formulate and implement viable mandates.

3. Determining successful criteria for peacekeeping missions, whether global or regional, is extremely complex.

## **Chapter Thirteen**

### **Subregional Cooperation**

**Dr. William Stanley**  
**University of New Mexico**

This panel addressed the current status and future prospects of subregional security cooperation in the Americas, examining different patterns of cooperation in different parts of the hemisphere, as well as emerging trends and challenges. Participants represented countries of such diverse size, economies, social and political structures, and national security concerns, that their perspectives were necessarily wide-ranging and not easily summarized. Comments did not always respond directly to previous interventions and did not consistently produce an obvious accumulation of points of agreement. As one panelist remarked late in the second session, “I’m concerned about the broad range of themes brought up by the presenters. We need to clarify some conceptual issues about what we mean by cooperation and security. That isn’t to say we should oversimplify; cooperation is multidimensional, and it doesn’t have to involve homogeneity. Heterogeneity provides the richness of diversity that makes cooperation fruitful . . . . But I wouldn’t want to be the rapporteur . . . .”

Despite the diversity of topics and views, a number of themes did indeed come out of the discussions, and a clear consensus emerged on a few points: 1. subregional cooperation is both more possible and more necessary than ever; 2. very important progress has already been made in cooperation, confidence building, and the near-elimination of risk of interstate conflict in some regions; and 3. significant challenges remain, even in areas where cooperation is most advanced.

This report will examine additional points of convergence and divergence on the following issues: 1. the effect of democratization on the trajectory, importance, and form of subregional security cooperation; 2. the interaction of economic integration and security cooperation; 3. differences across subregions; 4. resource questions; and, 5. the role of the United States.

### **Democratization and Subregional Cooperation.**

The hemisphere-wide transition from military authoritarian regimes to elected civilian governance has brought greater confidence and predictability to the politics of neighboring countries, markedly reducing the likelihood of interstate conflict and increasing the willingness and ability of national defense institutions to cooperate across borders. Democratization has, in countries such as Brazil, been accompanied by new defense and national security doctrines emphasizing a broader notion of sustained and sustainable security incorporating protection and enhancement of individual rights and liberties, preservation and deepening of democracy, social and economic development, and regional development. Under such doctrines, the purpose of subregional cooperation is, first and foremost, the defense of democracy and human rights within the region, since all states have a shared interest in preserving and expanding these achievements. This was, in fact, one of the points of greatest consensus among participants on the panel: *Defense of democracy is the central security goal, and in turn a necessary condition for the continued survival of subregional cooperation.* As one participant put it, “democracy is the *sine qua non* of cooperation: a democratic state is much less likely to have the confidence to cooperate with an authoritarian neighbor.” Another stressed that the defense of human rights should be a central goal of subregional cooperation.

## **Economic Integration.**

Panelists agreed that growing economic integration had created conditions propitious for subregional security cooperation—indeed, most participants argued that economic integration made such cooperation essential. As economies are linked more closely with one another, increased interdependency, common interests, and social contacts have lowered security officials' estimations of the likelihood of interstate conflict, even between states with histories of armed conflict. Market integration can only proceed in a climate of stability and predictability. Thus, economic integration has reinforced social and political demand for effective security cooperation. With economic integration has come growing attention to common interests on such issues as environmental protection, greater willingness to view the environment as a security issue, and some progress toward cooperation on such issues.

That said, several participants noted that security cooperation does not flow automatically from economic integration: it must be deliberately constructed through the efforts of all states involved. Economic integration brings with it a series of complexities and potential threats to national and public security that necessitate more active efforts at coordination. Greater movement of goods, people, money, and information inevitably facilitate transnational criminal activities such as arms and drug trade that can threaten public safety and, in the view of some participants, undermine state sovereignty. Several panelists voiced concerns that during high-level regional political meetings, security concerns have too often been subordinated to economic questions considered more urgent and politically salient by civilian leaders. In the view of some, economic and political integration have often outstripped the development of "socio-professional" contacts between militaries.

Moreover, several participants remarked that the transnational nature of the security problems emerging



from economic integration presents difficult challenges for security cooperation. As one panelist put it, “No state can act unilaterally in this area: only cooperation (that respects sovereignty) is capable of dealing with these problems.” Yet, this same individual argued that fully effective cooperation is only possible if democratic governments remain in power. From this perspective, corruption, crime, and messianic leaders are counterposed to human rights, democracy, and the orderly functioning of markets under a liberal legal framework. The demands that regional economic integration generate for stability and security cooperation can only be fulfilled through preservation of democratic governance throughout a given region.

Another participant noted that regions seeking to develop a cooperative defense and security regime need a formula to address social, economic, military, legal, and technological differences between states. Yet, this is a tall order. The legal issues alone are daunting: states in Latin America have diverse laws and constitutional provisions with respect to the proper jurisdictions of police and military institutions. In some countries, the military is involved in law enforcement and has primary responsibility for dealing with illegal traffic in drugs, weapons, undocumented migrants, money laundering, and such environmental crimes as timber and wildlife poaching. In other states, the police have exclusive responsibility for domestic law enforcement, even on those issues that involve international criminal networks. In view of these differences, military-to-military cooperation is often insufficient, and even legally inappropriate, to deal with gray area threats that include a significant law enforcement component.

Furthermore, in some countries the jurisdictional boundaries between police and military are rapidly changing as a result of public security reforms and restructuring. In Panama, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Haiti, civilian police forces have taken on, or are moving toward, primary responsibility for domestic

public security. In Mexico, change is in the opposite direction, with the military moving increasingly into law enforcement roles. Several participants argued that in view of the significant differences across states, and rapid changes within states regarding institutional responsibility for dealing with transnational criminal threats, high-level civilian leadership is needed to provide overall policy guidance and to assist in making appropriate coordination linkages across military, police and judicial institutions. One speaker remarked that too often decisionmakers have perceived a “false dilemma between military and political solutions to problems. Instead, we need to find wise ways to combine these two elements to deal with the problems we face.” To accomplish this will require extensive cooperation not only between states, but between civilian and military leaders within and between states. Several panelists complained that civilian elected officials have not consistently provided the degree of leadership needed, in part because of a tendency to see security issues as secondary to economic and political concerns.

### **Differences across Subregions.**

The incentives for subregional cooperation, and the goals of states in attempting such cooperation, differ significantly across subregions. The different nature of concerns expressed by panelists from different parts of the hemisphere highlighted the probability that subregional cooperation will be more fruitful than cooperation across dissimilar areas, because attempts at cooperation within subregions can develop naturally from shared interests and similar capabilities. There are marked differences between subregions in terms of technical capacity, resources, and size of militaries. Such differences are not an insurmountable obstacle to cooperation between different subregions—as evidenced by the participation of South American militaries in de-mining operations in Central America, for example—but they are significant enough that

sub-regional cooperation is likely to outpace broader hemispheric cooperation for some time to come.

Remarks from participants representing Mercosur and Southern Cone states indicated a primary focus on avoiding interstate conflict. Cooperation in this region has focused on confidence-building measures, high-level meetings among senior military officials, technical cooperation, intelligence sharing, resolution of cartographic and boundary issues, professional exchanges, and movement toward combined maneuvers. Participants expressed considerable satisfaction with the important achievements already made in these areas. Countries with histories of bitter conflict have made significant strides toward mutual confidence.

In contrast, cooperation in the Andean region has produced less reduction in tensions, despite considerable investment of effort and resources. This region faces both continued interstate tensions, as well as extensive transnational criminal operations with complex financial, logistical, operational and political links to insurgencies. This combination of challenges has proven difficult to surmount, in part, according to one panelist from the region, because of a tendency not to deal adequately with the political component of insurgencies, focusing instead on their criminal, narco-terrorist dimension.

In Central America, the main concerns are with transnational criminal phenomena, including illegal traffic in arms, drugs, and people; money laundering; sophisticated car theft and re-export rings; and widespread kidnapping that often involves cross-border networks. Several speakers lamented that criminal networks have made much faster progress in developing the ability to move information and operate in a transnational setting than have states in the region. One officer noted that national institutions are inherently handicapped by the fact that they are constitutionally and institutionally bound to a given state, while criminal networks can move fluidly

throughout the region. The only solution to this is extensive sharing of information and joint action. The Central American Framework Treaty for Democratic Security provides the broad outlines of mechanisms for needed cooperation, but has been very difficult to implement due to a lack of resources.

Remarks by a panelist from a Caribbean country reflected the very different concerns of small states, particularly those heavily dependent on tourism. He cited the difficulty of dealing with drug trafficking in a country with numerous beaches that are easily accessible by road, and large numbers of tourist boats coming and going. Stronger enforcement efforts could undercut tourism, damaging the broader interests of the nation. Such domestic constraints limit the ability of such states to actively pursue cooperative anti-crime measures.

### **Resources and Other Constraints.**

Resources are a significant obstacle to sub-regional cooperation. Effective information sharing and operational cooperation require the purchase, development, or adaptation of compatible equipment, software, data formats, procedures, and communications equipment, as well as substantial transportation and personnel costs. All of these involve extensive expenditures that have not been feasible, especially in the present context of stagnant or declining government budgets. Moreover, one of the most difficult obstacles to cooperation has been significant asymmetries between states in the capacities of their security institutions, asymmetries that need to be addressed for cooperation to be effective. Surmounting these gaps would require resource transfers that are difficult if not impossible for the more technically advanced countries to provide due to fiscal constraints. Panelists had few solutions to offer for this problem: many mentioned the possibility that the United States could play a constructive role by providing resources, but this was consistently

combined with concerns that U.S. assistance might not reflect the needs of recipient states, but rather the distinct priorities of the United States.

Other constraints mentioned were institutional—both at the domestic and international levels. In some countries, existing legislation prevents the sharing of defense information, as is required for active cooperation. Until laws are changed, some states will be inhibited from cooperating as fully and effectively as they could. One Central American panelist also argued that the inter-American system needed to develop a stronger and more credible capacity for conflict resolution and mediation. He noted that military leaders in Guatemala and El Salvador regretted that the Organization of American States (OAS) had not been able to play a more prominent and effective role in peace processes. Although the United Nations had made valuable contributions toward resolving civil wars in the region, many military officers would have been more comfortable had mediation and verification functions been carried out by an inter-American institution such as the OAS.

### **The United States' Role.**

As already indicated, the majority of participants acknowledged that national resources were scarce and that greater U.S. assistance to subregional cooperative efforts would be welcome and highly valuable. The desire for U.S. aid was matched, however, by concern that in the past such assistance has tended to reflect U.S. priorities, not national or subregional ones. A number of speakers cited the “distorting effect” of U.S. Cold War priorities, and, more recently, Washington’s rather single-minded focus on drug trafficking to the virtual exclusion of broader public safety and regional security concerns of Latin American states. Several participants mentioned that, from their point of view, drug trafficking, even large-scale operations, was only part of an overall pattern of crime and social instability with

multiple dimensions. The drug problem, often the overwhelming priority of the United States, is not necessarily the priority concern of states receiving U.S. assistance. Several panelists expressed what can only be characterized as resentment at U.S. insensitivity to local priorities and concerns, and questioned whether receiving U.S. aid would be a net gain.

In this context, some participants urged that Washington reformulate its security assistance programs in such a way as to promote a broader, shared set of goals involving democratic stability and the economic integration that such stability makes possible. This might require the United States to subordinate or postpone its specific concerns about drug trafficking while helping countries enhance their ability to cooperate on an integrated set of concerns of which drug trafficking would be only one part. In the process of providing assistance programs, several panelists stressed that the United States should be careful not to contribute to divisions between Latin American states, but rather should provide consistent, balanced aid focusing on support for cooperation.

There was little consensus about what institutional mechanisms would be most propitious for such assistance. Possibilities mentioned included the Department of Defense, the Agency for International Development, and multilateral lending agencies. This remained an open question.

## **Conclusions.**

The panel's main point of consensus was that there is a powerful synergy between democratization and regional economic liberalization that makes regional security cooperation more necessary, more desired by political and economic leaders, and more feasible. Expansion of liberal economic activity requires a degree of stability that can only be achieved through cooperation, and cooperation is only possible through continued democracy, because of the

greater confidence that democratic regimes can have in one another's intentions and stability. As one panelist put it, a key to sustained cooperation is transparency. Significant obstacles remain, however, despite the generally propitious context and the important steps already taken. Among these are shortages of financial and technical resources, legal and institutional differences that are difficult to bridge, and in some contexts a lack of overall political guidance needed to coordinate the activities of diverse institutions operating in different legal frameworks.

## **Chapter Fourteen**

### **Emerging Roles and Missions**

**Dr. Andrés Serbin**  
**Venezuelan Institute of Social and Political Studies**  
**and**  
**Central University of Venezuela**

**Methodology of Work:** After a first round of presentations and commentaries by the group's participants, a rough draft was produced by the rapporteur. This draft was then discussed by the group and a second version produced that was again subjected to commentaries and revision. The following summary has been approved by the participants as a whole and contains their main points of agreement and disagreement.

The discussion identified a common ground for all cases analyzed: Faced with the new changes that are confronting the armed forces of these diverse countries—changes that are extremely complex and rapid—the fundamental challenge is adaptation. From this perspective, there have been developed various forms of identifying and prioritizing new and old threats and, consequently, different ways of defining emerging roles and missions as a function of special national, subregional and regional circumstances.

Nevertheless, within the group there was a consensus that, notwithstanding these changes, the traditional mission of the armed forces to defend the vital interests of the nation persists—in particular, the defense of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national values and institutions (especially democratic institutions).

Notwithstanding this traditional mission, the situations of change mentioned above pose new threats and challenges. These include: a. threats/challenges within our borders; b. threats/challenges outside our borders; and c.



threats/challenges on the international level that we have the obligation of meeting as “good international citizens.” By the same token, along with past and present threats and challenges, it is necessary to foresee the threats and challenges of the future.

The identification and prioritization of threats and challenges and the consequent identification of emerging roles and missions basically respond in each case to three variables—external and internal environments and available resources—both individually and in combination. In some cases, threats linked to the external environment are prioritized within the post-Cold War framework associated with the new international order, financial globalization, trade liberalization, and the technological revolution, which may in turn impact the domestic environment, particularly in the socioeconomic sphere. In other cases, the emphasis is placed on regional integration, which imposes strategic alliances, cooperation among partners and defense of common interests as a function of extraregional threats, with their consequent domestic impacts. Finally, in other cases and as a function of the limited availability of human and financial resources, the emphasis is put on the adaptation to new domestic situations linked to the need to promote development, consolidate democracy and combat poverty and exclusion, in which the armed forces can be involved in civic action programs, either as leading actor or in supporting and complementing the work of the government and/or private sector.

On the other hand, the definition of emerging roles and missions for the armed forces also responds to three fundamental relational nuclei among various domestic sectors: a. the relations between the government and armed forces, conditioned by the characteristics of the respective political systems and political cultures (strong presidentialism, the role of legislative power, the roles of governors and municipal authorities); b. the relations between the police and the armed forces (in a broad

spectrum that ranges from a model of total compartmentalization of the two forces to the militarization of the police or the adoption of police functions by the armed forces), and c. the relations of civil society and the armed forces (similarly with a broad spectrum of experiences from the involvement of both sectors in civic action programs to the nonexistence of common programs and the consequent isolation of the two sectors).

Within this framework, there was identified a present tendency in these three predominant relational forms to promote open and transparent processes in the definition of emerging roles and missions, starting with the sharing of information in an open and accountable manner.

From this ensemble of conditioning factors, there was identified, along with the continuing traditional mission, a set of subsidiary missions and an ensemble of accessory missions for the armed forces in the hemisphere. Without establishing hierarchies, the discussion group included the following among the subsidiary missions: a. support for economic and social development; b. defense of national identity; c. providing a national capacity to engage in international peacekeeping missions; d. maintenance of internal public order as a function of two conditions: when the police find themselves overwhelmed, and when there exists an express order of the Executive; e. protection of the environment; f. assistance in cases of national or regional disaster; g. the struggle against crime (here, however, there was no clear consensus, except for a desire that the mission be in support of rather than a substitute for the police; otherwise, approaches would have to be strongly conditioned by the internal structures of the security forces of each country and by the resources available); and h. the defense of regional institutionality (similarly, in a broad spectrum of positions as a function of the diverse progress of subregional integration schema). Finally, among the accessory missions were identified: a. the contribution to scientific and technological research when resources exist for such purposes; b. the administration and preservation of

national parks (though in some cases this mission is assigned to specific forces); and c. the control of explosives and armaments.

In conclusion, the work group agreed that the identification of emerging roles and missions must be made jointly by civilians and militaries, in accordance with the particular circumstances of each country, which led some participants to the conclusion that there was a need for growing involvement of civilians in national security and defense subjects through adequate programs of education and training.

**PART SIX**  
**CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

**Chapter Fifteen**  
**The Role of the Armed Forces in the Americas:  
Conclusions, Lessons, Recommendations and  
Unresolved Issues**

**Donald E. Schulz**  
**Strategic Studies Institute**  
**U.S. Army War College**

**Introduction.**

The end of the Cold War has brought a sea change in civil-military relations and the role of the armed forces in Latin America. The neoliberal revolution has strengthened the hand of democratically elected civilian leaders and eroded the influence of the armed forces, bringing marked declines in military spending and manpower. At the same time, new threats to national security have arisen, even as some old ones have persisted. While the danger from the Soviet Union and Cuba no longer exists, it has been replaced by the bogeymen of narcotrafficking and organized crime. In turn, this has led to a greater involvement of the armed forces in the public security arena. Meanwhile, insurgencies drag on in Colombia, Mexico and Peru. (Colombia, indeed, is so torn by the violence of guerrillas, narcotraffickers, paramilitary groups and the armed forces that many observers have begun to use terms like “balkanization” and “ungovernability” to describe its condition.) Border disputes—most notably between Ecuador and Peru—persist. Notwithstanding these continuing problems, the region’s militaries, anxious to prevent a further erosion of their budgets and influence, have sought to find new roles and missions beyond law enforcement that might serve to bolster their *raison d’être*.

Where is all this leading? While it is clear that Latin America is in the midst of a great period of transition, it is

not at all obvious what it is transitioning to. Moreover, change can be a frightening thing. The speakers at the Santa Fé conference identified two very different alternative scenarios for the future. The first of these, which might be termed the “Decay Model,” described a region torn by violence and institutional disintegration. In this scenario, socioeconomic and political conflicts grow beyond the capacity of national institutions to contain them; society is increasingly disrupted by organized crime, insurgencies and economic crisis; military modernization sparks regional arms races, resurrecting the spectre of external threats; and democratic institutions and civil-military relationships atrophy. The end-state is a return to authoritarian government, either through direct military rule or, perhaps more likely, a civilian strongman backed by the armed forces.

In contrast, the second scenario, or “Development Model,” posits societies that are in the process of solving their socioeconomic problems, while broadening and deepening democratization. In this vision, organized crime has been contained, insurgencies eliminated, and economic growth is raising living standards and leading to more equitable societies. Regional peace prevails, as economic integration binds countries ever more tightly together in a web of shared interests. Meanwhile, civilian control over the armed forces becomes engrained in the political culture. Military institutions are more professional and efficient, and there is a healthy civil-military dialogue on both the domestic and international levels. In turn, increased international trust leads to more multilateral military cooperation in terms of training, exercises, intelligence sharing, joint operations, and other activities.

These scenarios are, of course, polar alternatives. The real world of the 21st Century will almost certainly be somewhere in between. Latin America itself is not a monolithic entity. Within the region, there will continue to be major differences between countries in terms of the quality of democracy, degree of civilian control over the

military, and ability to generate sustained and equitable socioeconomic development while maintaining internal security and the rule of law. Some countries will probably do quite well, while others will flounder.

In short, one should not underestimate the challenges ahead. What is being attempted will require enormous efforts in several different realms—political, military, economic and social—simultaneously. Politically, this will involve the transformation of deeply engrained attitudes of authoritarianism and submission. These changes must occur in civilians as well as the military. As one speaker noted, the Latin American political leadership is largely the product of a “patrimonial oligarchic tradition” that has not prepared it to exercise democratic control over the armed forces. The traditional way that civilians have dealt with national security issues has been to renounce their responsibilities and abdicate leadership. But in doing that, they have also all too often abdicated power. Clearly, that must change, and there is considerable evidence that it is.

At the same time, however, there is a danger that—because of past experiences with the military—civilian leaders will attempt to marginalize (or in extreme cases even destroy) the armed forces. This could once again place democracy at risk. Not all Latin American militaries are committed to democracy. Some officers still believe, especially when their personal and institutional interests are at stake, that they should intervene when necessary in order to defend the Fatherland from irresponsible politicians. Perceived threats from the civilian sector could easily trigger a violent backlash.

As for U.S.-Latin American relations, there were notable differences between U.S. and Latin American participants. The latter still view the United States with considerable suspicion, the product of a long history of North American intervention in the region. As one speaker noted, the Cold War created a propitious environment for installing and supporting dictatorships, and Latin Americans are unlikely

to forget this. They have no illusions about any natural or automatic identity of interests between their countries and the “Colossus of the North.” Even when U.S. and Latin American interests are the same, the two sides are likely to have different priorities. Inevitably, this means that there will continue to be friction in the relationship.

This being said, the end of the Cold War has left Latin Americans free to address the future in terms of their own interests, and many of them have identified those interests as requiring a closer socioeconomic relationship with the United States. Since socioeconomic relations also have political and military implications, there has inevitably been spillover into the security arena. The following subsections discuss the conclusions reached in the conference’s workshops on security issues.

### *The Inter-American Defense System.*

In general, the work group gave the Inter-American Defense System high marks. While the “system” (which consists of a collection of countries, instruments, organizations, and norms) is often poorly integrated, it is the system the hemisphere’s leaders want. If they wanted it to be more integrated and coherent, they would change it. The system is flexible enough to take on greater coherence and integration when circumstances require it, and the will exists. At the same time, it seems to work fairly well. It provides a forum for debate and exchange of information, and to a certain extent allows the Latin American countries to counterbalance the power of the United States. It has also made some modest contributions to regional peace and the promotion of democracy, and it appears to be gaining momentum in this respect.

### *Inter-Institutional Relations in the National Policy Process.*

Different countries are at different stages in the evolution of their political and defense processes. Though



almost all Latin American states are democratic, there is considerable variation in the quality and degree of consolidation of democracy. The development of inter-institutional relations is predicated on a clear understanding of the military's role in assuring the nation's defense and security. There was much debate in the workshop over the "defense" versus "security" issue. Clearly, the two are not the same. The latter encompasses a much broader range of issues. New threats (e.g., narcotrafficking, migration, and common crime) have led to different responses in different countries. Some states rely on the police and coast guard. In others, there is an inversion of roles, with the "militarization of the police" and a "policization of the military." This tendency stems largely from the state's failure to define responsibility for internal security requirements and the maintenance of public order, a source of much concern within the group.

In some countries, a civilian Minister of Defense now exercises full control over the armed forces. There was no agreement as to whether this was always necessary. Some participants suggested that the institutional identity of the minister was less important than his subordination to democratically elected civilian authority. Others felt that civilian defense ministers were preferable. The bottom line, however, was that elected civilians must shield the military from day-to-day partisan political intrusions. There was general agreement that there is still a tremendous amount of work to do in terms of forging productive legislative-military relations.

### *Cooperative Security and Peacekeeping.*

The transformation of the international scene has made it necessary to reformulate security systems at the global level, as well as regional and national levels. Recent operations have been far more diverse than earlier missions, and have covered the entire gamut of cooperative security from peacekeeping to peace enforcement,

peacebuilding and stability operations. Such activities will continue to be more complex and complicated than in the past. The expectations of the international community are very different from what they were under Dag Hammarskjöld. New players will become involved, and initiatives may no longer be the automatic purview of the United Nations. Still, the UN is currently the only international organization with chartered authority to promote international peace and stability.

### *Subregional Cooperation.*

Subregional cooperation is more possible and necessary than ever. Important progress has been made in confidence-building and other forms of collaboration, and in some regions the risk of inter-state conflict has nearly been eliminated. Nevertheless, significant challenges remain, even in areas where cooperation is most advanced.

The transition to democracy has markedly reduced the likelihood of inter-state conflict and increased the willingness and ability of national defense institutions to cooperate across borders. In some countries, democracy has been accompanied by new defense and national security doctrines stressing a broader notion of security, incorporating protection of individual rights, the preservation of democracy, and the fostering of socioeconomic and regional development. Under such doctrines, the purpose of subregional cooperation is, first of all, the defense of democracy and human rights. There was broad consensus on this point: *Defense of democracy is the central security goal, and a necessary condition for continued subregional cooperation.* A democratic state is much less likely to cooperate with an authoritarian neighbor than with a democratic neighbor.

Growing economic integration has created conditions favorable for subregional security cooperation—indeed, such cooperation is essential. Market integration requires a climate of stability and predictability. Common interests

and social contacts have lowered the likelihood of inter-state conflict. At the same time, regional economic integration brings with it new problems and threats (e.g., migration, organized crime, narcotrafficking and arms smuggling) requiring greater regional cooperation. Thus has integration reinforced the social and political demand for effective security cooperation.

Some regions have been more successful than others. The Southern Cone countries have primarily focused on avoiding interstate conflict, and have made considerable progress. This is much less the case, however, in the Andean region, which is faced with a much more complex combination of problems. In Central America, in turn, the main concern is with transnational criminal activities, such as narcotrafficking, arms smuggling, car theft and re-export rings. The panelists noted that criminal organizations had made more progress in terms of their ability to operate in a transnational setting than governments had, because national institutions are handicapped by the fact that they are constitutionally and institutionally bound to a single state whereas criminal networks can move fluidly throughout the region.

### *Roles and Missions.*

Faced with new changes that are confronting the armed forces of these diverse countries—changes that are extremely rapid and complex—the fundamental challenge is adaptation. Thus, various forms of identifying and prioritizing new and old threats and different ways of defining roles and missions have been developed, depending on national, regional and subregional circumstances.

The identification and prioritization of threats and challenges and the identification of roles and missions generally reflect three variables: internal environment, external environment, and available resources. In some cases, threats linked to the external environment are prioritized according to the needs of the new international

order, including financial globalization, trade liberalization and the technological revolution, which may impact the domestic environment, especially in the socioeconomic realm. In other instances, the emphasis is on regional integration, which requires strategic alliances, partnerships and a definition of common interests in response to extra-regional threats and their domestic impacts. In still other cases, as a function of limited human and material resources, the emphasis is on adaptation to new domestic situations linked to the need to promote economic development, consolidate democracy, and combat poverty and inequality. Here, the armed forces may be involved in civic action programs, either in a lead role or in support of the government and/or private sector.

The definition of emerging roles and missions is also a response to: 1. relations between the government and the armed forces, which are conditioned by the respective political systems and political cultures; 2. relations between the police and armed forces, which can range from total separation to the militarization of the police and the adoption of police functions by the military; and 3. relations between civil society and the armed forces, which run the gamut from isolation to the involvement of both sectors in common programs. There is a present tendency in such relationships to promote transparency in the definition of emerging roles and missions, starting with the sharing of information in an open and accountable manner.

There was a consensus that the traditional mission of the armed forces—the defense of sovereignty and territorial integrity—is still of vital importance. In addition, however, a number of secondary missions were identified, including: support for economic and social development; defense of national identity; international peacekeeping; maintenance of internal public order when the police require support and the Executive expressly orders it; environmental protection; national and regional disaster relief; defense of regional institutionality; scientific and technological research; administration and preservation of national parks; control

of armaments and explosives; and crime control. On the last, there was no clear consensus, except for the desire that the mission be in support of rather than a substitute for the police.

## **Lessons.**

A number of general lessons came out of the presentations and discussions. General Woerner, for instance, commenting on the significance of the Venezuelan coup attempts of 1992, suggested that one lesson had to do with the fact that these attempts had occurred in a country with over three decades of democratic rule. This demonstrated, first of all, that: *Under conditions of political, economic and social stress, a military may step outside the democratic process and attempt to overthrow the government, even in a country with a substantial tradition of democracy.* Secondly, however, was the fact that the coups failed. From this he concluded that: *Democracy is in the ascendancy and, though still vulnerable, it now has the strength and institutionalization to survive threats that would have been fatal in earlier times.* But the most important lesson, he argued, was the third, namely that: *The attempted coups were not overwhelmingly rejected by the populace. This shows the continuing power, pervasiveness and durability of the authoritarian tradition.*

In turn, this suggests that while a change in the character of the civil-military relationship is possible, it can only be achieved through the conscientious efforts and good faith of both civilian and military communities.

Woerner also observed that *there is a fundamental difference between mature democracies and less mature democracies in that the former possess multiple, peaceful alternatives for conflict resolution that the latter do not have. Because they are more secure, civilians in a mature democracy will be more willing to accept the military as a legitimate national actor and more open to allowing it to perform non-traditional roles and missions. In contrast, in*

*emerging democracies, civilians are likely to be more suspicious and fearful, and thus may try to limit the armed forces to protecting national sovereignty.* And when the latter are not involved in such activities, civilians might be tempted to confine them to their barracks, or perhaps even try to eliminate the institution altogether. In short, mature democracies can use the military in a broader way without as much concern for challenges to democratic governance. Emerging democracies may not feel they have this option.

How aggressive should civilian leaders be in their efforts to extend their control over the military? Woerner suggested that, notwithstanding the remarkable progress that had been made, *civilians had, in general, acted too timidly.* He argued that *there were opportunities to further strengthen democracy—including civilian control—that had not been fully explored.* He felt that the armed forces would accept a greater degree of civilian dominance than it would volunteer.

Luis Tibiletti, though more pessimistic than Woerner about both military and civilian leaders, came to a somewhat similar conclusion. Given the historical tendency of civilians to renounce political power, he suggested that the only way to prevent a return to military domination was for civil society, including Non-Governmental Organizations, to demand that political leaders assume their responsibilities. He said that civilians must reassume functions such as counternarcotics, counterterrorism and economic development that had been turned over to the armed forces. Going a step further than Woerner, he argued that the use of the military in civic action operations would weaken civil society. And without strong civil societies, viable democracies were impossible.

Different people drew different lessons. Most of the participants at the Santa Fé conference would probably not have gone as far as Tibiletti. Indeed, a number of speakers placed the issue of new roles and missions in a considerably more favorable light. In his keynote address, Major General

Manuel Bonett Locarno, Commander of the Colombian armed forces, made the case for shifting the focus of the army of the future (specifically, in Colombia) to a wide range of nontraditional missions, including the defense of democracy and human rights, counternarcotics, multinational peacekeeping and conflict resolution, environmental protection, socioeconomic development, and support for science and education. U.S. National Guard representatives made an implicit case for their institution as a role model for Latin American militaries, and several of the workshops focused heavily on new roles and missions from differing perspectives. The following subsections summarize the lessons learned from those sessions.

### *Inter-Institutional Relations in the National Policy Process.*

There was considerable debate over the appropriate roles for the armed forces. The discussion focused on a wide range of activities, including border control, customs collection, management of civil aviation and airport maintenance, economic development, environmental protection, disaster relief, health care, law enforcement, and support for education. But there was also sentiment for confining the military to a traditional defense role. The group felt that the political leadership must sort out the roles and missions issue for the military before effective inter-institutional relations can occur.

The panelists also concluded that *the development of confidence between civilian and military actors is critical to the strengthening of the inter-institutional environment. Essential to this process are communication and dialogue.* This is true whether one is talking about relations between the President and other elements of the Executive branch (including the armed forces), congressional-military relations, or relations between the armed forces and the police, political parties and civil society. *Such communication should be institutionalized so it can be maintained on a regular basis.*

Another lesson is that *without an educated civilian constituency, skilled in defense policy management, formal inter-institutional relations will be undermined by a lack of interpersonal confidence and trust.* The group emphasized the importance of educating the general public, and especially civilian policymakers, in defense and security matters. Much more needs to be done to build civilian political competence in defense matters in order to build military confidence in civilian management.

### *Cooperative Security and Peacekeeping.*

Peacekeeping operations must be under the auspices of the United Nations or some other international organization that has recognized chartered authority. In the traditional sense of the term, they require the consent of the parties in conflict. *Decisions to undertake PKOs must be made on a case-by-case basis, through an exhaustive development of mandates which take into account the needs of the recipient countries, the capability of the force, the availability of funding, and the political will (consent) of the populace involved. Ultimately, the mandate must also spell out the desired end-state or definition of success, which will allow participants to formulate their exit criteria / strategy. The bottom line, however, is funding: Without it, the operation cannot be successful.*

Dialogue between executive, congressional and senior military leaders is essential. The military cannot get the job done by itself. Civilian support is necessary. Thus, *the involvement of national and international civilian agencies is vital to the success of the operation.*

### *Subregional Cooperation.*

There is a powerful synergy between democratization and regional economic liberalization that makes regional security cooperation more necessary, more desired by political and economic leaders, and more feasible than ever before. The expansion of liberal economic activity requires a



degree of stability that can only be achieved through cooperation, and that cooperation is only possible through continued democratization because of the confidence that democratic governments can have in each other's intentions. In short, *the demand that economic integration generates for security cooperation can only be fulfilled through the preservation of democratic governance throughout a given region.*

This being said, security cooperation does not automatically flow from economic integration. It must be deliberately constructed. There was some concern within the workshop that security had been subordinated to economic issues considered more important. At the same time, there is a tendency to view military solutions as being separate from political ones, when the real task is to combine them to deal with the problems faced. In view of the rapid changes that are occurring, *there is a need for high-level civilian leadership to provide overall policy guidance and assist coordination across military, police and judicial arenas. In addition, there is a need for extensive cooperation between civilian and military leaders between states as well as within states.* Some of the participants complained, however, that the civilians had not provided the degree of leadership needed.

The incentives for subregional cooperation and the goals of the states attempting such cooperation differ significantly. Still, subregional cooperation is likely to be more fruitful than cooperation across dissimilar areas because of the shared problems, interests and capabilities of the states involved. Therefore, *subregional cooperation is likely to progress more rapidly than broader hemispheric cooperation.*

Lack of resources is a significant obstacle to subregional cooperation. Effective information sharing and operational cooperation require compatible equipment, software, data formats, procedures, and communications equipment, as well as transportation and personnel. Another major

obstacle is that there are significant asymmetries between states in terms of the capacities of their security institutions, differences which need to be addressed for cooperation to be effective. Overcoming these problems would entail considerable expenses in a time of tight or declining government budgets. Resource transfers from wealthier, more technically advanced countries would be difficult for the same reason. There are also legal constraints. Many countries, for instance, have laws preventing the sharing of defense information.

### *Roles and Missions.*

The working group agreed that the identification of emerging roles and missions must be made jointly by civilians and militaries, in accordance with the particular circumstances of each country. This led some participants to conclude that there was a need for growing civilian involvement in national security and defense subjects through education and training programs.

### **Recommendations.**

In any large and diverse gathering of academics and practitioners such as the Santa Fé conference, there will be many different points of view expressed. Rather than picking and choosing, or attempting to come to some kind of artificial consensus, I will lay out a broad menu of policy prescriptions, and let the reader decide which are most pertinent. Some papers and groups focused more on recommendations than others. Perhaps the most fruitful was the opening presentation by Richard Downes.

Professor Downes offered an impressive list of both general and specific proposals, including the following:

- Military institutions should consider unprecedented levels of civil-military dialogue and regional cooperation.

- New arrangements for domestic and regional security cooperation should be informed by effective civilian control over the military and the adoption of a hemispheric approach as a supplement to nationalism.
- The United States should act as a catalyst for multilateral cooperation.
- Domestically, democratically elected civilian leaders must assume leadership in developing an effective defense policy. It is the responsibility of civilians rather than the military to decide when and how armed force is used. This is best achieved through a frank and constructive dialogue that recognizes the political responsibilities of civilian officials and the technical expertise of military professionals.
  - A fundamental intermediate step is a national commitment to train and educate civilian professionals in strategic affairs and the leadership and management of defense institutions.
- There must be a decision at the national level on the division of responsibilities between military, police, and other public safety institutions. Here national traditions and values should provide the guidelines. One should expect considerable variation from country to country.
  - The answer to extensive police corruption is police and judicial reform, rather than the militarization of law enforcement (which exposes the armed forces to corruption and diverts them from military training).
- Once policy is established, civilian and military leaders should work closely together to prepare and defend before their legislature a budget that

realistically meets the armed forces' needs. This would both help legitimize military spending and hold policymakers accountable.

- On the international level, there is a need for a new multilateral hemispheric security doctrine for security cooperation. This should complement, rather than replace national objectives, and establish agreement on the basic common denominators of hemispheric security cooperation.
- The above doctrine would be supplemented by greater levels of multilateral cooperation among police and judicial officials. However, this would occur through channels separate and distinct from those providing armed forces cooperation on security matters.
- The basic elements of this new hemispheric security doctrine might include commitments to:
  - improve cooperation with regard to information on the transit of vessels and aircraft to prevent the illegal use of national territory;
  - improve the exchange of climatological information from sources available to the military;
  - enhance information exchange on insurgent groups operating near borders in order to prevent the establishment of sanctuaries;
  - exchange information on potential arms purchases to prevent misinterpretations of intentions;
  - debrief results of bilateral and multilateral military exercises so all countries in the region can benefit from investments in training;

- define support functions that can be efficiently provided to those forces combatting drug trafficking in the region; and
  - eventually reach agreement on the specialization of functions by some armed forces, particularly those of smaller states. Here NATO provides a model.
- For the new security doctrine to work, a multilateral defense architecture must be developed that cannot be dominated by any single country. This would be constructed under the authority and through the cooperation of national defense ministers, thus assuring its consistency with the principle of civilian control. This architecture would include:
    - the establishment of a defense secretariat devoted to meetings of the ministers of defense. This body would coordinate the meetings and provide periodic follow-up on resolutions adopted at those sessions;
    - coordination by that same secretariat of agendas for meetings of the Conference of American Armies and chiefs of the regional air forces and navies to focus on commitments arranged through the hemispheric security doctrine;
    - creation of electronic communication systems to better link defense establishments for purposes of exchanging information related to the hemispheric security doctrine; and
    - periodic meetings of senior defense ministry officials below the rank of minister to review the mechanisms of security cooperation implemented by defense institutions.

Downes argued that the above approach, while not providing immediate answers, would be more relevant to modern defense needs than the current system, which emphasizes individual national military capabilities and bilateral relationships, and which offers only limited opportunities for multinational cooperation. Under civilian control, with budgets that meet national priorities and increased levels of multinational cooperation, the region's armed forces would be able to meet their security needs more efficiently and with greater support from the civilian populace. At the same time, the United States would be able to enhance the effectiveness of its relations with Latin American governments, and especially with Latin American militaries.

Another, somewhat different list of recommendations was provided by the Argentine defense analyst Luis Tibiletti, who argued that:

- The Latin American political sectors must assume all responsibility for the formulation of international security, national defense and public security policies. To renounce their responsibilities in these matters is to renounce power.
- Closely related to the above recommendation, political leaders must maintain responsibility for functions like counternarcotics, counterterrorism and economic development, rather than surrender them to the military. Using the military as a tool of civic action will only weaken civil society, and without a strong civil society there can be no democracy.
- The majority political sectors in each country must reach a consensus about that nation's security agenda. Subsequently, regional and eventually hemispheric security agendas should be similarly negotiated. There needs to be a joint identification of interests, threats and opportunities at subregional

levels, so that geopolitical barriers to integration can be removed.

- Mature relations with the United States have to be established, eliminating the tendency of the “Colossus of the North” to try to choose Latin American leaders. There should also be a re-enforcement of contacts at the level of parliaments, political parties, and ministries of defense and foreign affairs that can counteract the excessive influence of the U.S. Southern Command, which in the past has often been exercised without much consideration of democracy.
- There should be a substantial increase, monitored by the OAS, of cooperation among all areas of government at the national, subregional and hemispheric levels that have responsibility for addressing new threats.
- There must be a resolution of the “modernization versus arms race” dilemma in order to permit all countries to count, in reasonable proportion, on armed forces that are able to interoperate, based on the idea of cooperative balance, when the duly constituted political authorities determine that national security requires it.
- There should be a strengthening of all political and diplomatic organizations, including NGOs, that have a role in conflict resolution, using their experiences in past peacekeeping and mediation efforts to build a regional security structure that is not overly dependent on military instruments.

Most of the Latin American civilian participants would probably have agreed with Tibiletti and Woerner, who argued that, in general, civilians should move more aggressively to strengthen their control over the military. Most of the participants—military as well as civilian—would probably have agreed with Luis Bitencourt

Emilio, who emphasized that both the armed forces and civil society have a responsibility for determining the military's roles and missions. For this to occur, *civilians have to be educated on national security issues. An informed society requires the creation of think tanks, the financing of research projects, and the organization of seminars and conferences that can bring together civilians and military officers in shared educational experiences where they can interact and learn from each other.* This was a theme that was also widely embraced in the workshops. A summary of the recommendations that came out of those meetings follows.

*The Inter-American Defense System.*

- The participants felt that there needed to be more communication and cooperation among the components of the system, such as the OAS and the Inter-American Defense Board (especially the former's Commission on Hemispheric Security) and the various conferences and ministerials.
- They recommended more education to better define and implement the goals of the system, including the defense of democracy and human rights, the maintenance of security, and the containment of criminality.
- They said that civilians, especially those in the government and media, have to become more involved in the system. The region's militaries have generally agreed to redefine their roles in decisionmaking, but civilians are often poorly informed and uninterested. To assist them, the military should recognize them as the constituencies of the Inter-American Defense System, and help them become involved in all of its aspects.



*Inter-Institutional Relations in the National Policy Process.*

- The participants noted the importance of public perceptions of the military's role as a foundation for developing functional inter-institutional relations. They recommended that a civil-military dialogue be fostered to help build public confidence.
- Along with the above, a step-by-step process should be developed that formally stipulates the role to be played by civilians in defense policy, and then charts a course to prepare both military and civilian elements to meet their shared responsibilities for defense policy formulation and implementation. Specifically, the participants called for:
  - the funding of institutes and think tanks, such as the recently established Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies in Washington, DC, devoted to the development of civilian competence in defense and security matters;
  - the designation of funds by the military to support conferences, workshops, seminars and other meetings designed to facilitate civilian-military interaction;
  - the opening of national defense and war colleges to senior government officials and other key political actors who would benefit from the educational programs offered at those institutions; and
  - the establishment of military liaison offices with Congress.
- The participants recommended that, since the reformulation of inter-institutional relations is at an early stage in much of the region, states looking for solutions should examine the process now underway

in those countries where the dialogue has already led to cooperation. Continued regional exchanges are thus vital to this process.

*Cooperative Security and Peacekeeping.*

In addressing the question “How do the American nations prepare and organize for future PKOs?” the panelists reached the same general conclusions about the value of education and shared experiences as the previous panel. Gatherings such as the present conference were commended as an enormous help in determining whether the region’s armed forces have the capabilities to undertake specific operations. Specialized training institutes, such as Uruguay’s Center for Instruction for Peacekeeping Operations, and think tanks, like the U.S. Army’s Peacekeeping Institute, help identify key issues and strategies. In general, the participants endorsed the creation of an educational and training system that would focus on military, governmental and nongovernmental activities involving PKOs. Such a system would involve both the military and civilians, and would help educate the latter as to the armed forces’ peacekeeping and warfighting capabilities. Beyond this, the panel also suggested that:

- Peacekeeping operations ought to be limited to countries outside the subregion concerned in order to alleviate fears and suspicions of intervention and partiality.
- Most of the funding for PKOs should come from either the United Nations or other international and regional sources. Too much funding from a single country creates dependency, and can easily distort the purposes of the operation or result in a loss of political resolve.

- Authorization to use force must be clearly outlined. Force should be used only in extreme circumstances, including self-defense.

### *Subregional Cooperation.*

- The panelists suggested that more resources be made available, including resource transfers from the wealthier countries, especially the United States. They also recommended that laws inhibiting subregional cooperation—e.g., those banning the sharing of defense information—be revised accordingly.
- Some participants, concerned that U.S. Cold War priorities (and, more recently, narcotrafficking) had distorted Latin American development, urged that the United States reformulate its security assistance programs in such a way as to promote a broader, shared set of goals involving democratic stability and economic integration. It was suggested that this might require Washington to subordinate or postpone some of its specific concerns about drug trafficking in order to enhance the ability of Latin American countries to cooperate on an integrated set of issues of which narcotics would be only one part.

### *Roles and Missions.*

Like many other conference participants, some panelists recommended that more educational and training programs be created to foster informed civilian involvement in national security and defense processes.

### **Unresolved Issues.**

As might be expected in a conference of this size and diversity, many issues were left unresolved. There were serious disagreements on roles and missions. Many

participants advocated that the Latin American militaries undertake a variety of new activities, according to the needs and values of their particular societies. Others—especially Latin American civilians—were uncomfortable with this idea, fearing that civic action, counternarcotics, policing, and other missions might undermine civilian authority and weaken the process of democratization. There was an extended discussion in the Roles and Missions workshop of the U.S. National Guard and its relationship to the regular U.S. armed forces. Clearly, there was a great deal of curiosity about the institution. But there was also some skepticism, and whether (or to what degree) Latin Americans were willing to accept it as a role model for their own militaries—as some Guard representatives hoped—was not at all clear.

There was also a good deal of pessimism over the availability of resources with which the armed forces might maintain its institutional structure, engage in subregional cooperation, and embark on various new missions. Money is tight everywhere. Moreover, even if the United States were willing to transfer more resources, such aid often comes with strings attached. The Latin American participants were very aware that U.S. priorities were often different from their own. Some expressed resentment about North American insensitivity to local concerns.

Along these same lines, some participants felt there was a need to re-evaluate the entire concept of national security and the strategies that are appropriate for addressing it. There is a point at which the function of the institution becomes the institution: Self-preservation and growth are the ultimate interests of bureaucratic organizations, and the military is no exception. To one extent or another, this is reflected in the search for new roles and missions. That, in turn, raises the question of whether more attention ought to be paid to non-military national security issues like poverty, unemployment and landlessness, since a failure to alleviate those problems can be profoundly destabilizing. The question is one of priorities. Would not scarce resources be

better spent on non-military solutions to non-military dangers? What is the right balance?

In addition, the workshop on Cooperative Security and Peacekeeping raised—but did not answer—the question of whether and how the inter-American system could incorporate peacekeeping: Should the OAS, like the United Nations, be given chartered authority to promote peace and stability in the Americas? No closure could be reached on this issue.

General Woerner listed a number of other unresolved problems, including the need to:

- curtail in some countries the disproportionate political power of the military;
- instill more broadly and deeply a sense of public accountability and willingness to discipline from within the military institution; and
- be alert to enlargements of the private economic activity of the armed forces that might challenge the rightful place of the civilian sector.

This raised still another issue that was in the back of many people's minds, namely: How deep was the military's commitment to democracy and human rights? The presentations by Generals Bonett Locarno and Ventura Arellano were extraordinary for their expressed commitments to these goals. It is significant that Latin American militaries are publicly pledging themselves to such values. In particular, it is important that these commitments are being made in countries like Guatemala and Colombia, where there are histories of massive human rights violations and/or dictatorship. But even when such statements are made in all sincerity, one cannot forget the past. Nor should one underestimate the problems in protecting human rights under circumstances of national disintegration and violence, such as are currently ravishing Colombia.

Clearly, the development of democratic civil-military relations is a long-term effort. In the United States, the Founding Fathers divided power between different branches of government and subordinated the military to civilian authority. Subsequently, these arrangements were tested by over two centuries of real-world experience that involved considerable evolution in both law and practice. Along the way, civilian authority and responsibility for national security policy have been strengthened.

The Latin American experience has been very different. Military authoritarianism and civilian submission are deeply engrained in the political culture. Accordingly, the proposals set forth in these pages represent only the initial steps in a lengthy process of learning, value transformation and confidence building. Conferences and seminars may help, but much more is needed. For civilians, experience and the assumption of substantive responsibilities are essential. As for the military, one of the dangers in the short-to-medium run is that it may simply undergo a kind of institutional hypothermia<sup>1</sup> or “cocooning,” temporarily retrenching and adopting a low profile to protect its corporate interests while awaiting a more favorable future climate in which to reassert itself.

Finally, we should not fall prey to the easy assumption that civilians will always be more democratic or less militaristic than the military. *Caudillismo* runs deep in the political culture of the region. Historically, more than a few civilian leaders have displayed dictatorial tendencies. Witness, most recently, Fujimori in Peru and Serrano in Guatemala.

Notwithstanding all the unresolved problems and doubts about the future, the overall tone of the conference was friendly and constructive. Luis Bitencourt Emilio no doubt spoke for most of the Latin Americans present when he said that while this is not the most opportune time for Latin Americans to define a regional defense agenda, especially at the encouragement of the United States, it is

important for them to participate. For the first time, Latin Americans are being presented with an open agenda which they can help shape. If they do not grasp the opportunity, it may not come again. In short, some windows for productive cooperation have been opened. The United States recognizes that it can no longer impose solutions, and that the design and implementation of hemispheric defense/security depend on Latin American participation. And that, he said, implies that Latin Americans have a responsibility to take part. It is essential that they participate.

## **ENDNOTE - CHAPTER FIFTEEN**

1. The term is Richard Millett's. Cited in Juan Rial, "Civil-Military Relations in the Transition to and the Consolidation of Democracy in Latin America," in *Warriors in Peacetime: The Military and Democracy in Latin America, New Directions for U.S. Policy*, Gabriel Marcella, ed., Essex, England: Frank Cass, 1994, p. 44.

## RECOMMENDED READING

- Rosendo Fraga, *Ejército: Del Escarnio al Poder*, Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1988.
- Louis W. Goodman and Johanna S.R. Mendelson, eds., *The Military and Democracy: The Future of Civil-Military Relations in Latin America*, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990.
- Abraham F. Lowenthal and J. Samuel Fitch, eds., *Armies and Politics in Latin America*, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1986.
- Gabriel Marcella, ed., *Warriors in Peacetime: The Military and Democracy in Latin America, New Directions for U.S. Policy*, London: Frank Cass, 1994.
- Richard L. Millett and Michael Gold-Biss, eds., *Beyond Praetorianism: The Latin American Military in Transition*, Miami: North-South Center Press, 1996.
- Francisco Rojas Aravena, ed., *Balance Estratégico y Medidas de Confianza Mutua*, Santiago, Chile: FLACSO, 1996.
- , ed., *Medidas de Confianza Mutua: Verificación*, Santiago, Chile: FLASCO, 1996.
- Alain Rouquié, *The Military and the State in Latin America*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.
- Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.



## ABOUT THE EDITOR

DONALD E. SCHULZ is a Research Professor of National Security Policy at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. He is coauthor of *Reconciling the Irreconcilable: The Troubled Outlook for U.S. Policy Toward Haiti* and *The United States, Honduras and the Crisis in Central America*, and coeditor of *Mexico Faces the 21st Century, Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean, Cuba and the Future and Political Participation in Communist Systems*. His articles have appeared in *Foreign Policy*, *Orbis*, the *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, *Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos*, and *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, as well as such media outlets as *Newsweek*, *The Washington Post*, the *Miami Herald*, the *Los Angeles Times*, and the *Christian Science Monitor*.

**U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE**

**Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.  
Commandant**

\*\*\*\*\*

**STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE**

**Director  
Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon**

**Director of Research  
Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.**

**Editor  
Dr. Donald E. Schulz**

**Director of Publications and Production  
Ms. Marianne P. Cowling**

**Publications Assistant  
Ms. Rita A. Rummel**

\*\*\*\*\*

**Composition  
Mrs. Mary Jane Semple**

**Cover Artist  
Mr. James E. Kistler**