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BUILDING REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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With Preface by General James T. Hill,
Commander, U.S. Southern Command

October 2003

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FOREWORD

Often, when a conference is over—it is over. More often than not, attendees and presenters return to their normal duties thinking good or ambivalent thoughts about what they heard and learned. At the same time, there might be a fleeting moment—or two or three—when one wonders how a particular set of ideas expressed at that conference might be implemented. But, again, "the fat lady has sung her song," and everyone has resumed normal routines.

In the case of the conference co-sponsored by the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Southern Command, and University of Miami North-South Center held last March, entitled "Building Regional Security in the Western Hemisphere," we have generated a substantive set of issues and recommendations. Dr. Max Manwaring and his team of conference rapporteurs have reviewed hours of tapes and reams of notes to clarify the issues and develop actionable recommendations. Interestingly, those issues and recommendations correspond closely with Department of Defense concerns expressed 2 years ago to help build mutual confidence on hemispheric security issues. In these terms, the conference rapporteurs have provided a viable means by which to begin the implementation of serious hemispheric security cooperation. Additionally, we have included U.S. Southern Command Commander General Hill's conference luncheon remarks as the Preface to our Issues and Recommendations report. The intent is to provide more context for readers who might not have attended the conference. We have also asked Ambassador Ambler Moss, the Director of the North-South Center, to expand that context with a short Afterword.

This report comes at a critical juncture—a time of promise for greater economic integration between the United States and Latin America, but also a time of profound concern about the deteriorating security situation in a number of countries in the region. The Strategic Studies Institute and the North-South Center are pleased to offer these issues and recommendations as part of our continuing effort to inform the debate and support the best interests of the governments and peoples of our hemisphere.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute

PREFACE

Today's Western Hemisphere strategic environment is unique. In stark contrast to many other parts of the world, countries in the Western Hemisphere are not threatened militarily by their neighbors. Twenty-five years ago, the vast majority of the governments in Latin America and the Caribbean were under either communist or autocratic rule. Today, every country in the hemisphere except one is a democracy. Democracy is the goal and the accepted model for government in the Western Hemisphere. This is significant because democracies tend to look out for the welfare of their people, seek positive relations with their neighbors, and, most importantly, do not make war against each other.

When flare-ups have occurred in the Americas in the past decade, they have been resolved by diplomacy and regional cooperation rather than by force of arms. Contrary to popular myth, Latin America is the least militarized region of the world, accounting for only 4 percent of the world's defense spending. The peace between our nations should have translated into greater prosperity and more security for the people of the Americas, but for some it has not. We know that our hemisphere, like the entire world, has become a more volatile and unpredictable place, and we've got a long way to go to make it safe.

Today the threat to the countries of the region is not the military force of the adjacent neighbor or some invading foreign power. Today's foe is the terrorist, the narcotrafficker, the arms trafficker, the document forger, the international crime boss, and the money launderer. This threat is a weed that is planted, grown, and nurtured in the fertile ground of ungoverned spaces such as coastlines, rivers, and unpopulated border areas. This threat is watered and fertilized with money from drugs, illegal arms sales, and human trafficking. This threat respects neither geographical nor moral boundaries.

Nowhere is the threat more graphically and brutally active than in Colombia, where Latin America's oldest democracy is under attack by three narcoterrorist groups. These terrorists should not be referred to as guerrillas, insurgents, or rebels because such "romantic" labels imply some sort of legitimacy. There is nothing

romantic or legitimate about these narcoterrorists who wreak havoc on Colombia and its people. On February 7, 2003, in Bogotá, a 200 kg car bomb planted by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) exploded in a parking garage under the 11-story El Nogal social club, killing 35 people, including six children, and injuring 173 more at a piñata party. These are the same narcoterrorists who employ homemade propane tank mortars with a range of 400 yards and notorious inaccuracy. They do what they are meant to do: kill indiscriminately. These are the narcoterrorists who kidnap and then force unwitting victims to drive cars loaded with explosives, which are then remotely detonated. These narcoterrorists conduct incessant violent attacks to undermine the security and stability of Colombia. They are incredibly well-financed by their involvement in every aspect of drug cultivation and production, kidnapping, and extortion. They have long since lost any ideological motivation they once may have had. Today, they are motivated by money and power, protecting and sustaining themselves through drug trafficking and terror. They offer nothing of value to the state or people, no better form of government, no liberation from an oppressive dictatorship. They offer death and lawlessness.

Last year over 28,000 Colombians were murdered—13 times the rate of the United States. More than 2,900 were kidnapped—including many children. More than 450 Colombians lost their lives last year to landmines, the vast majority due to mines laid by the narcoterrorists, not the military. Some 1.5 million Colombians have been driven from their homes, displaced by the war. There were more terrorist attacks in Colombia alone last year than in all other nations of the world combined. Colombia's narcoterrorists supply most of the cocaine and heroin consumed in the United States. Drugs kill more than 19,000 Americans annually and are indirectly responsible for another 55,000 deaths, according to the Office of National Drug Control Policy. By statistical definition, these drugs are weapons of mass destruction.

The facts: narcoterrorists and other armed illicit groups operate in and out of southern Panama, northern Ecuador, northern Peru, Bolivia, portions of Venezuela, and the tri-border area. They are involved in kidnappings in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Paraguay. They smuggle weapons and drugs in Brazil, Suriname, Guyana,

Mexico, and Peru. They use the same routes and infrastructure for drugs, arms, illegal aliens, and other illicit activities. There is a huge and growing market for forced and illegal immigration documents. Narcoterrorists and radical Islamic groups are feeding this market. As traffickers exchange drugs for arms and services in the transit countries, transit nations become drug consumers as well. Narcoterrorism fuels radical Islamic groups associated with Hamas, Hizbollah, Al Gamaat, and others. These groups, operating out of the tri-border area and other locales, generate millions of dollars through drug and arms trafficking and other illicit activities. Simply put, direct drug sales and money laundering fund worldwide terrorist operations. The reality is that narcoterrorism is a pervasive force of destruction that not only affects our region, but each and every one of our countries—big or small, rich or poor, weak or powerful. This is a battle that must be fought together. If the focus is exclusively on Colombia, we risk pushing the problem into neighboring countries that are struggling to govern and provide services in their own territory.

Narcoterrorists and drug trafficking organizations have shown considerable flexibility in adjusting their operations, tactics, and locations in reaction to our combined efforts. If we are not as flexible, if we are not as agile or as quick to anticipate and counter these adjustments, we will find ourselves always one step behind, with old or inaccurate intelligence, lunging at shadows, and we will come away with incomplete results. That is why I believe we need to reevaluate our armed forces, security forces, and collective agreements in order to bring about increased coordination and cooperation. I would never say that the day of traditional military capability has passed, but it surely must evolve to remain relevant and defeat the threats of the 21st century. We must have the courage and confidence to honestly evaluate how our armed forces are configured, trained, equipped, and, more importantly, how well they communicate with and mutually support their sister services, other security forces, and neighboring countries.

I see the imperative for coordination and cooperation on three levels: joint cooperation between the branches of the armed forces within each country; inter-institutional, between the armed forces and the security forces; and international, between sovereign

nations. The most basic level of cooperation and coordination must be between the branches of the armed services themselves. Joint capability entails information-sharing, planning, and training between the Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard. When we train, plan, and operate together, we learn each other's terminology, doctrine, limitations, and capabilities, and we forge a strong, seamless, combined arms force. I believe we slowly are getting better in this area.

The next level must be between the military and the other security forces such as the police and customs. In this area we have a long way to go. Armed forces must, within their constitutional and legal constraints, support and cooperate with law enforcement agencies in combating drugs and other transitional threats. Where the legal boundaries do not make sense, given the current threat, they should engage in an honest dialogue with their democratically elected leaders to determine if laws and restrictions need revision. That is an essential discussion that takes place in a democracy, a proper role for a military in support of a democracy.

The final level is between countries, and I believe that this cooperation already is starting to take hold in the Western Hemisphere. The 5th Defense Ministerial Conference of the Americas held in Santiago in November 2002 emphasized the "desire to strengthen the inter-institutional and intergovernmental coordination . . . which permits the . . . preservation and stability of peace." Cooperation and coordination between nations are much more complex than just communicating with each other. They must be built on a foundation of mutual respect and trust, and they must be mutually beneficial. Without these precepts, there is no cooperation.

Working together in multilateral exercises and forming trust through transparency are just a few of the confidence- and security-building measures that have formed a structure for multilateral security cooperation in the Americas. We must continue to build upon this edifice with even more synthronization of effort. The U.S. Government and U.S. Southern Command are currently working on initiatives to do just that—not only to exercise together, but also to operate together in order to shut down transnational threats.

I routinely visit military and civilian leaders throughout Latin

America and the Caribbean. I talk with them about readdressing the roles and missions of their armed forces to ensure they focus on relevant 21st century threats, not those of the past. Our ideas must look ahead in anticipation of what can be. We must transform ourselves to meet these new threats, and we must develop new ideas that will ensure multinational cooperation and coordination to fight common enemies. We must act together to prevent the continuing and increasingly corrosive spread of narcoterrorism and its connections to international and transnational terrorists, arms, drugs, and other insidious threats throughout the hemisphere. It is no mean or simple task.

General James T. Hill
Commander
U.S. Southern Command

BUILDING REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

KEY POINTS:

- Generally, the conference dialogue stressed that building regional security cooperation in the Western Hemisphere is not a strictly short-term unilateral or bilateral defense effort. Regional security will result only from a long-term, cooperative, multilateral civil-military effort. A viable framework for success evolved from the conference presentations and related discussions that clarifies diverse issues, focuses the regional security debate, and generates a number of potential action items. The results emphasize four highly related needs and associated recommendations:

  o The need to advance hemispheric understanding of the security concerns of each country, and those that the region as a whole faces (e.g., the internal and external threat(s) to security).
  o The need to develop multilateral, civil-military structures and processes to identify and address threats in the contemporary security environment.
  o The need to foster expanded dialogue, consultations, and cooperation for building consensus principles and concepts for regional security cooperation.
  o The need to adapt U.S. military efficacy to the contemporary threat environment in the hemisphere at the strategic level.

- Finally, these issues and associated recommendations demand a carefully staffed and phased regional security plan of action, with measurable short- and long-term objectives to validate its planning and implementation. The basic directions for a regional security plan, as identified at the Miami conference, are as follows.

INTRODUCTION

Stability and security in the Western Hemisphere are pivotal for global security and prosperity. Yet, efforts to attain these objectives through the old paradigm of United States political domination, imposition of economic will, and the threat of military intervention have produced little but unproductive insecurity, mistrust, noncooperation, and instability. All the countries of the hemisphere have vested national security interests in helping to reverse these trends, and replace them with positive security, moderation, cooperation, stability, and prosperity. Nevertheless, there is no agreement on the threat, and no agreement on an ends-means-ways strategy to achieve the common security-stability interests.

The devastating effects of the Colombian crisis, and its spillover into the entire hemisphere, which produce terrorism, drug trafficking, vigilantism, and refugee flows, have given rise to three areas of consensus. First, there is a consensus that confrontation, regardless of outcome, brings nothing but death, destruction, waste of valuable human and material resources, and the possible renewal of militarism. Thus, according to this argument, multilateral cooperation, coordination, and trust-building are irrelevant. Second, there is the perception that nonstate actors and other unconventional destabilizers can be dealt with only by attacking the root causes of instability—poverty, disease, overpopulation, and injustice. This is an internal problem, moreover, that requires no cooperation or coordination with other countries. Third, there is a growing consensus that security and stability can be achieved only as a result of a combination of political-economic, socio-psychological, and military-police efforts aimed at both the root causes and the man-made causes of instability. Because of the porousness of international borders and the vastness of internal "lawless areas" that are unmercifully exploited by human destabilizers (e.g., transnational narco-terrorists) throughout the hemisphere, there is a growing realization that viable security, stability, and prosperity must begin with a process of building strong cooperative relationships with neighbors.

Thus, at present, the countries of the Western Hemisphere continue to work toward regional interests—separately. A beginning

point from which to achieve viable security and stability is an examination of the issues and recommendations that were derived from the Conference on "Building Regional Security Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere." Interestingly and importantly, these issues and recommendations correspond closely with the ideas the Department of Defense (DoD) first outlined nearly 2 years ago to help build mutual confidence on security issues and develop long-term bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the hemisphere. These ideas seek to:

> advance the region's understanding of the security concerns facing it, develop mechanisms for addressing these concerns, and obtain consensus on common principles and concepts of security to address emerging threats. The Department of Defense wants to foster expanded dialogue and cooperation in an atmosphere of mutual respect for sovereignty and understanding of diverse points of view.[1]

ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Issue A: The Need to Advance Regional Understanding of the Security Concerns Facing Each Country Individually and the Western Hemisphere as a Whole.

There was agreement on a strategic vision of peace, stability, security, prosperity, and civil society for the entire Western Hemisphere. At that point, however, consensus began to break down. There was no agreement on the threat. As a consequence, there could be no agreement on a unified ends-ways-means strategy that could contribute directly to the achievement of the strategic vision. The impasse regarding the threat resulted from differences in levels of analysis. The traditional level of analysis defines national security in narrowly military terms, generally involving the protection of national sovereignty against external military aggression. The more contemporary concept of security threat, espoused by the majority of conference participants, goes beyond conventional external aggression to encompass internal political, economic, and social matters. This view emphasizes the protection of national sovereignty against internal instability, with varying

degrees of concern regarding conventional external aggression.

Discussion. The impasse was further complicated by a general reluctance to take the broadened definition of national security to its logical conclusion, that is, to correspondingly broaden and integrate roles of security forces (i.e., military and police forces) to address internal sovereignty protection missions. In that connection, Clausewitz reminds us that "the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking."[2] ISSUE A, then, must be broken into two closely related sub-issues: (1) security threats, and (2) the political complexity and ambiguity of contemporary conflict.

Sub-Issue A(1): Security Threats. Contemporary terrorism and intrastate conflict are lineal descendants of the type of low-intensity conflict seen in the Third World over the past 50 years. They are prevalent and popular, in part, because rural and urban insurgencies had some success in contributing to fundamental political change during the Cold War. Further, as the means of causing shocking mass destruction become less expensive and more available, dissidents rely on these more asymmetric forms of violence to disrupt order and impose their own self-seeking values on peoples, countries, and the global community. However, it appears that narco-traffickers do not have a political agenda in that same sense. They are interested in ensuring the *inability* of governments to interfere with their freedom of action. Realistically, that is also an imposition of values applied with hostile intent. In either case, we are talking about war against the state.

Discussion. Those who argue that instability and conflict—and the employment of terrorism as a tactic or strategy in conflict—are the result of poverty, injustice, corruption, overpopulation, and misery may well be right. However, it is naïve to think that poverty crashed a jet airliner into the World Trade Center. Evidence demonstrates that it is individual men and women who commit terrorist acts when a government or other symbol of power is perceived to be unable or unwilling to deal with a perceived injustice. Thus, people are as much causes of terrorism as any other type of destabilizer. In this context, it is helpful to **(a) understand the differences between "threat" and "enemy."** After that, the next step in the process of understanding

associated security concerns is to **(b) outline a strategic security initiative that leads to stability and full sovereignty.** These are conceptual and educational requirements.

Example. The consequences of the 1985 Colombian terrorist attack on the national Supreme Court and the "assassination" of 11 of its justices provide a good example of the importance of defining "threat" and "enemy." That terrorist action generated much debate in government and security offices, but little action. Lack of action was the result of the inability to come to terms with the questions of (1) whether or not this blatant act was a simple law-enforcement problem or a serious national security issue, and (2) "What was the threat?" There was no agreement because the threat was not understood.

On the face of the problem, there was only the murder of 11 people. The perceived motive for the terrorist attack on the Supreme Court was simply the "punishment of corrupt and indolent justices." Thus, from the outset, there was a legal question regarding whether the enemy was vengeful terrorists or incompetent judges. The fact that the murder of 11 Supreme Court justices caused a key national institution to function even more slowly and less effectively than usual was not considered relevant. Yet, the exacerbation of the court's inefficiency led to a further discrediting of the Colombian judicial system. That led to the system's inability to guarantee civil rights, human rights, and personal liberties—and to a consequent weakening of the state. In turn, the ripple-effect of the associated internal violence began to spread beyond Colombia's porous borders into all five of the country's neighbors.

The resultant internal and regional instability constituted a closely related triple threat to the sovereignty of the state. First, that terrorist act indirectly and directly exercised a pernicious effect on Colombian democracy. Second, that attack eroded the ability of the Colombian government to carry out its legitimizing functions. Third, the spillover into Colombia's neighbors provides proof to ordinary people and to the global community that the government cannot control its national territory. Thus, the terrorist punishment of 11 justices contributed to a partial collapse of the Colombian state and the compromise of its sovereignty—a serious national security

issue.[3]

(a) Recommendations for Differentiating between "Threat" and "Enemy":

- It is helpful to think of the consequences (i.e., some level of violence) of instability as third-level threats to national and international security.

- Root causes (i.e., causes such as poverty, corruption, etc.) of instability must be recognized as second-level threats.

- The inability or unwillingness of governments to develop long-term, holistic, and morally acceptable means to maintain internal stability and development must be understood as the first-level (i.e., most fundamental) threat.

- Another threat emerges at a fourth level that is both a cause and a consequence of instability and violence. That is, once a violent internal adversary becomes well-established, first-level reform and development efforts aimed at second-level root causes would be important but not sufficient to control or neutralize a third-level (e.g., terrorist) threat. That violent human foe can be finally defeated only by carefully applied force.

- The sum of the parts of an effective response equals:
  - Recognition at the highest levels of a destabilizing problem;
  - A sure capability to coordinate political, economic, social, and security objectives against root causes (i.e., threats) and human causes (i.e., enemies) of illegal violence; but also,
  - Application of appropriate and effective "hard" and "soft" power against the self-appointed "terrorist" exploiters of human misery—regardless of label.

An Example of "What is to be Done." Contemporary nontraditional war is not a kind of appendage—a lesser or limited thing—to the comforting vision of conflict and "law enforcement."

It is a great deal more. As long as opposition exists that is willing to risk all to violently take down a government and establish its own—or simply to control that government—there is war. This is a zero-sum game in which there is only one winner. It is, thus, total.

In the novel, *The Centurions*, Jean Larteguy vividly captures the difference between traditional warfare designed to achieve limited political, economic, or territorial concessions and the totality of the type of conflict we confront today. Larteguy also describes "What is to be Done." In doing so, he contrasts the French (i.e., traditional) and the Viet Minh (i.e., total) methods of conflict:

> It is difficult to explain exactly, but it is rather like [the card game] bridge as compared to belote. When we [the French] make war, we play belote with 32 cards in the pack. But the Viet Minh's game is bridge and they have 52 cards: 20 more than we do. Those 20 cards short will always prevent us from getting the better of them. They've got nothing to do with traditional [military] warfare, they're marked with the sign of politics, propaganda, faith, agrarian reform. . . . What's biting [the French officer]? I think he is beginning to realize that we've got to play with 52 cards and he doesn't like it at all. . . . Those 20 extra cards aren't at all to his liking.[4]

(b) Recommendations for the Fulfillment of a Strategic Security Initiative That Leads to Stability and Full Sovereignty. The fulfillment of a strategic, holistic, and legitimate sovereign stability imperative consists of (**1**) **A military and intelligence capability to provide an acceptable level of internal and external security; (2) The ability to generate long-term social and economic capability-building; and, (3) The political competence to develop legitimate governance.**

1. *Military and Intelligence Recommendations for the Establishment and Maintenance of Security and Sovereignty at the Strategic Level:*

- Establish viable standards of order and the rule of law—and freedom from intimidation and violence—throughout the entire national territory (i.e., air-space, urban and rural "lawless areas," and maritime space).

- Isolate terrorists, insurgents, and criminal organizations from all sources of internal and external support.

- Establish programs to sustain life, relieve suffering, and help regenerate the economy.

- Establish unified national intelligence capabilities (with effective links to legitimate international organizations) that include the collection, fusion, and analysis of all sources of information.

- Make intelligence operations a dominant element of strategy, operations, and tactics.

- Develop a morally acceptable interrogation capability at the operational and tactical levels, as well as the strategic level, to take full advantage of human sources.

2. *Socio-Economic Development Recommendations*. In the past, the world generally emphasized socio-economic development under the assumption that security and political development would follow. That has not happened. Coherent long-term, multi-level, and multilateral security and political measures must:

- Be instituted to create and strengthen human (social) and physical (economic) infrastructure; and,

- Generate a technical, professional, and ethical climate to maximize the ability of those competent and legitimate structures to effectively provide individual and collective well-being.

3. *Recommendations Regarding The Development of Legitimate Governance.* An outside power or coalition of powers is limited in what it can do to facilitate the establishment of a level of security that will allow the development of optimal, long-term, infrastructural underpinnings necessary for achieving and maintaining a civil society and a sustainable peace. Ultimately, governments must reform and strengthen themselves. Nevertheless, effective help may be provided—not by a proverbial "Santa Claus," "Social Worker," or "neo-

Colonial state"—but by a sincerely interested "Facilitator" country. Multiple prescriptive points for a Facilitator to consider would include:

- The promulgation of internal legislation and programs that:
  - Resist violent solutions to internal destabilization problems.
  - Develop competent professional leaders.
  - Fight corruption.
- The development of national, regional, and international strategies to ensure global investment in multilateralism.
- The generation of a set of related and enforceable, rational, prioritized, and synchronized milestones (i.e., end-state planning) that will preclude piecemealing and "adhocery."
- Helping to institutionalize those identified processes for sustainable human and physical infrastructure capability development.
- The provision of periodic internal and external evaluation.
- Finally, the Facilitator must ensure that:
  - All programs directly support the mutually-agreed prescriptive vision of legitimate governance and civil society; and
  - Programs consistent with the end-state vision are applied at all levels.

Conclusion: Whatever the causes, instability within a nation-state leads to a crisis of governance and a downward spiral into violence, loss of de jure and de facto sovereignty, and failing and failed state status. In the novel, *The Constant Gardner*, author John LeCarré vividly and succinctly captures that linkage. He answers the question of "When is a state not a state?" from the point of view of a

commonsense practitioner:

> I would suggest to you that, these days, very roughly, the qualifications for being a civilized state amount to—electoral suffrage, ah—protection of life and property—um, justice, health and education for all, at least to a certain level—then the maintenance of a sound administrative infrastructure—and roads, transport, drains, et cetera—and—what else is there?—ah yes, the equitable collection of taxes. If a state fails to deliver on at least a quorum of the above—then one has to say the contract between the state and citizen begins to look pretty shaky—and if it fails on all of the above, then it's a failed state, as we say these days.[5]

Sub-Issue A(2): Political Complexity and Ambiguity of Contemporary Conflict. The political complexity and ambiguity of contemporary stability and counterterrorist operations stems from competing dynamics. Internal conflicts, such as those in Afghanistan, Colombia, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe, and elsewhere in the world today, are the result of strong political motivation and extreme supportive actions on the part of "rogues" and/or nonstate actors. Concurrently, an array of national and international governmental, military, and private organizations are engaged in a broad political, economic, informational, and military/police effort to bring viable governments, peace, and stability to those peoples. Understanding and working effectively in this complex environment depends on mind-set adjustments that will allow leaders at all levels to be comfortable with the political ambiguity of competing interests and diverse, legitimate policymakers in a long-term synergistic multi-agency and multinational process.

Discussion. The challenge, then, is to come to terms with the fact that achieving contemporary security/stability—at whatever level—is at its base a holistic political-diplomatic, socio-economic, psychological-moral, and military-police effort. The corollary is to change from a singular military approach to a multidimensional, multiorganizational, multicultural, and multinational paradigm. Thus, the political complexity and ambiguity issue dominates contemporary responses to man-made disasters at least at two related levels: **(a) leader development**, and **(b) development of a total unity of effort.**

Example of the Need for Civilian and Military Leaders Who Can Deal with the Political Complexity of Contemporary Conflict. During the height of the terrorist assault on the Italian state in the late 1970s and early 1980s, civil and military leaders understood that the strength of a terrorist program is nourished by the alienation of the governed from the government. Great care was taken to ensure that leaders at all levels were sensitive and accommodating to the general population while in the process of finding and dealing with the terrorists. Thus, the planning and implementation of the response to terrorism would have to be a completely coordinated and unified effort, and it absolutely could not be a "dirty war." Together, these unifying and legitimizing efforts would reestablish the kind of stability that was derived from popular perceptions that the authority of the state was genuine and effective, and that it used morally correct means for reasonable and fair purposes.

In these terms, the "enemy" would have to be very carefully discerned and politically isolated from the rest of the Italian population. This would require exceptionally prudent use of power. The blunt force of regular military formations supported by tanks and aircraft would be counterproductive. The more subtle use of "soft" power, supported by information warfare, careful intelligence work, and surgical precision in removing specific individual terrorists from the general populace would be imperative. Moreover, it would require an almost unheard of governmental unity of effort to coordinate the multidimensional paradigm necessary for success against the Italian terrorists.

The paramilitary carabinieri understand how to plan and coordinate prudent surgical actions, and have the full police power throughout the Italian national territory. As an emergency national security measure, the government created a temporary counterterrorism task force composed of state police, bank and currency security, and carabinieri personnel—supported unobtrusively by the regular Italian armed forces. This organization was headed by the late carabinieri general, Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa. He took the responsibility for unifying all intelligence collection and counterterrorist operations. Once this decision was implemented, long-term and short-term mutually supportive objectives were determined and pursued, and terrorism was brought

under control within 2 years.[6]

(a) Recommendations for Leader Development. Political complexity and ambiguity can be seen in several ways. The ambiguous multidimensional political-economic-psychological-moral nature of contemporary conflict situations forces the redefinition of long-used terms. In this connection, civilian and military leader development at all levels must lead to an understanding that:

- The enemy is not necessarily a recognizable military entity or an industrial capability to make traditional war. The enemy is also the individual political actor that plans and implements illegal violence, and exploits the causes of violence for his own nefarious purposes. Additionally, the enemy is now also recognized as poverty, disease, and other destabilizers that must be dealt with early and holistically.

- Power is no longer confined to combat firepower directed at a uniformed enemy military formation or industrial complex. Power is multilevel, consisting of coordinated political, psychological, moral, informational, economic, social, military, and police activity that can be brought to bear appropriately on the causes as well as the perpetrators of illegal violence.

- Victory or success is not an unconditional surrender marked by a formally signed document terminating a conflict. In the absence of an easily identifiable human foe to attack and destroy, there is no specific territory to take and hold, no single credible government or political actor with which to deal, no guarantee that any agreement between or among contending authorities will be honored, and no specific rules to guide leadership in a given "engagement" process. Victory, perhaps with an international impetus, is now more and more defined as the achievement of a sustainable peace. Those who would declare victory and go home before achieving a sustainable peace must be prepared to return and deal with the problem again—and again.

- Conflict is no longer a military-to-military war of attrition. Conflict now involves entire populations. It now involves a large number of national civilian and military agencies, external national civilian organizations, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and subnational indigenous actors, all dealing one way or another with a myriad of threats to security, peace, and well-being. Thus, conflict is not only multidimensional, but also multiorganizational.

- Finally, contemporary conflict situations, whether they be social or political, are not limited; they are total. Conflict is not a kind of appendage—a lesser or limited thing—to the development or disruption of well-being. As long as destabilizers (e.g., poverty, disease, etc.) exist that can lead to the destruction of a people, a society, and/or government—there is conflict. These destabilizers are as detrimental as human opposition willing to risk everything to take down violently a government, destroy a society, or cause great harm to a society.

An Example of an Integrated Force That Can Achieve Political and Psychological As Well As Military Objectives. An example of a military organization capable of rapid and decisive actions designed to achieve political, psychological, and military objectives is found in the Philippines during the period 1946-54. The first phase of the Philippine government effort against the Huk insurgents, 1946-50, was marked by a reliance on military force and state terror conducted by the generally corrupt Philippine Constabulary. That effort had come to an unsuccessful impasse by late 1950.

The turning point in the counterinsurgency came with the appointment of Ramon Magsaysay as Secretary of National Defense. About the same time, President Harry S Truman asked Air Force Major General Edward Lansdale to act as Magsaysay's U.S. advisor. Magsaysay and Lansdale understood the futility of state terrorism and corruption. They also understood that killing x-number of insurgents, militarily taking x-number of specific pieces of territory, or destroying x-number of enemy installations was irrelevant. Magsaysay did not engage in a simple war of attrition

in the classical sense of destroying the enemy force. Magsaysay's offensive was against the political and psychological underpinnings of the insurgents. He attacked the argument that the Philippine government was totally corrupt and could and would not respond to ordinary people's needs.

Given a free hand to deal with the rebels as he saw fit, Magsaysay drastically reduced the size of the Constabulary, began cleaning up all the armed forces, gave the counterinsurgency mission to the Army, and started schools to train officers in intelligence, psychological operations, and civil affairs work. He then assigned civil affairs officers to units to help solve peasants' problems. He demanded that all civilians, including suspected Huks, be treated as well as possible and took disciplinary action against officers and men who unnecessarily manhandled anyone. Information from local people, informant nets, interrogations, and patrols increased measurably. Exploitation operations to include psychological operations and civic action based on intelligence gathered at the operational and tactical levels during civic action operations brought the Huk insurgency to the "banditry" level by 1954. It took over 30 years and a morally bankrupt regime headed by Ferdinand Marcos to return the political-moral-psychological legitimacy rationale to the "revolutionaries."[7]

(b) Recommendations for the Educational Solutions to Unity of Effort. At a minimum, there are six educational and cultural imperatives to modify traditional war and ethno-centric mind-sets, and to develop the leader judgment needed to deal effectively with complex, politically dominated, multidimensional, multi-organizational, multinational, and multicultural contingencies:

- Attune civil-military leaders to cope with the many ways that political and psychological considerations affect the use and nonuse of force.

- Attune leaders to understand that the number of battlefield victories or the number of enemies arrested or killed has meaning only to the extent that such actions contribute directly to the legitimate strengthening of the state.

- Teach leaders how to communicate with a diversity of national and external civil-military cultures.

- Teach leaders how to cooperatively and collegially plan and implement an operation employing a full complex of diverse organizations—internal agencies, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and coalition/partnership civil-military organizations.

- Teach leaders a thinking process and an understanding of grand strategy that will allow them to be clear on what the situation is and what it is not.

- Because nonstate actors in a conflict situation are likely to have at their disposal an awesome array of conventional and unconventional weaponry, teach/train leaders, soldiers, and police involved in peace-enforcement and stability operations to be effective warfighters.

Conclusion. Meeting the extraordinary challenges explicit and implicit in the recommendations outlined above will not be easy. It will, however, be far less demanding and costly in political, military, and monetary terms than continuing a singular crisis management and essentially military approach to regional security that is inherently a strategic socio-political problem. Clausewitz's translator, Michael Howard, reminds us that "if [the socio-political struggle] is not conducted with skill and based on a realistic analysis . . . no amount of operational expertise, logistical back-up, or technical know-how could possibly help."[8]

Issue B: The Need to Develop Mechanisms to Address Threats in the Contemporary Security Environment.

Conference participants perceived that the United States is prepared to go its own way in the War on Terrorism (WOT), and deal militarily with selected terrorist groups and rogue states. It was also perceived that the United States has been oblivious to the more elusive nonmilitary problems that spawn illegal drug trafficking, terrorism, and myriad other destabilizing actions that lead to more violence, crime, corruption, and conflict. The articulation of this perception reawakened the long-standing Latin American juridical-political bias that tends to reject U.S. domination—and solutions—

anywhere. Thus, there were two sticking points in the discussions regarding what the United States and the region can do cooperatively to deal with the WOT. They are the questions of who decides who is a terrorist; and who decides how to deal with that terrorist. Consensus was that, at present, the answers to these questions are determined ad hoc and unilaterally by the United States—and that is unacceptable. Thus, the countries of the hemisphere continue to address common problems separately.

Participants agreed, however, that because success against the terrorist and related threats requires close unilateral and multilateral civil-military coordination for an effective unity of effort, the only viable approach to hemispheric stability and security is to devolve the responsibility to the Organization of American States (OAS).

Discussion. Devolving that responsibility to the OAS, nevertheless, does not absolve each sovereign nation of its inherent responsibility and obligation to provide for its own security. The OAS can provide only a moral position and structural framework from which members states can operate together when necessary and separately when desired. This takes us back to the problem of "unity of effort." The educational component of unity of effort has already been noted. As a result, recommendations will focus on: (a) conceptual requirements; (b) a conceptual and organizational requirement; and (c) organizational requirements.

Unity of Effort and Strategic Clarity: An Example. In the past, small-scale peace and stability operations tended to be unrealistically viewed as providing military solutions to military problems. Presently, the complex realities of these kinds of missions must be understood as a holistic process that relies on various civilian and military agencies and contingents working together in an integrated fashion. The intent is to achieve a common political end.

In the reality of the Balkan experiences, early U.S. military coordination during the assessment and plan development phases did not take place with key U.S. civilian organizations, international organizations, coalition partners, or nongovernmental organizations. Later, planning and implementing procedures broke down in the face of competing national interests and institutional agendas, and segregated planning and implementing processes. Moreover, ad

hoc reaction to changing conditions and "mission creep" became the norm in the absence of a single overarching political-military campaign plan. As a result, there was no strategic clarity, little if any unity of effort, and very limited effectiveness.

A former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General John R. Galvin, USA (Ret.), argues that continuous and cooperative planning among and between national and international civilian and military organizations, beginning with a strategic assessment of a given situation, can establish a mechanism for developing a common vision for ultimate political success (i.e., strategic clarity). Then, shared goals and objectives, a broad understanding of what must be done or not done or changed, and a common understanding of possibilities and constraints will generate an overarching campaign plan that becomes the basis for developing subordinate plans making direct contributions to the achievement of the desired end-state. Thus, the roles and missions of the various national and international civilian and military elements evolve deliberately—rather than as an ad hoc response to the crisis of the moment. Importantly, all these integrative efforts ultimately ensure the conditions that will allow a host nation or a guiding institution to develop or renew its political solvency and legitimacy—and that a given mandate for peace and stability will, in fact, be achieved.[9]

(a) Conceptual Requirements. It must be remembered that:

- The United States is not the only political actor in the global or hemispheric security arena, and it is not the only player. Sometimes it is not a player at all (e.g., in more specific smaller-scale contingency or stability operations).

- There is a bewildering array of U.S. civilian and military agencies, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations, as well as "coalition" and host country government civilian and military organizations, responding to complex emergencies, such as that in Colombia.

- For any degree of success toward providing the foundations of a sustainable peace, involvement must be understood as a holistic process that relies on various civilian and military agencies and institutions working together in a synergistic

manner (i.e., U.S., host country, international organizations, etc.).

(b) A Conceptual/Organizational Requirement. Before rushing to create the architecture to deal with the security and stability threats that have meaning for us all,

- At the highest level, the primary parties must be in general agreement with regard to the threats, end-state, and associated set of operations to achieve the political vision. And, although such an agreement regarding a strategic or operational end-state is a necessary condition for effective partnership, it is not sufficient. The agreement must be supported by an organizational structure that can identify, plan, and implement a plan of action. The structure has several organizational requirements, as follows:

(c) Organizational Requirements.

- An executive-level management structure which can and will ensure continuous cooperative planning and execution of policy among and between the primary internal players is required. The OAS can provide such a structure. That structure must also be capable of continuous cooperative planning and execution of policy among and between primary external actors (i.e., primary external ally, other coalition partners, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations).

- That same structure must also ensure that all political-economic-military action at the operational and tactical levels directly contributes to the achievement of the mutually agreed strategic political end-state. This requirement reflects a need to develop an effective end-state planning mechanism within the executive-level management structure.

- End-state planning is an ends, ways, and means methodology implied by Clausewitz's admonition to become involved in a conflict situation only when one is clear about what one intends to achieve. The approach allows the organizational leadership to:

- o Think logically, in synchronized small phases, about the conditions one seeks to create;

- o Synchronize the utilization of appropriate national and international hard and soft civil-military tools of power for each phase of the effort; and,

- o Ensure that every civil-military effort contributes directly to the achievement of the ultimate political objective (i.e., end-state).

- Even though the United States will not be the only player in achieving hemispheric security, it is the most powerful and influential actor. Thus, steps must be taken to ensure clarity, unity, and effectiveness by integrating U.S. political-military planning and implementing processes with hemispheric coalition government and nongovernmental agencies and international organizations (i.e., through the OAS).

Conclusions: The common denominator of the security dialogue in the Western Hemisphere is the underlying issue of national, regional, and international instability. Solutions to instability caused by violent nonstate and transnational actors must consider the transnational effects of these destabilizing activities, and the concurrent requirement for comprehensive, transnational structures involving the armed forces, police, and civilian instruments of national power of the affected societies. The individual countries of the region as well as the OAS face a challenge to change perspectives from working together, separately to working together, collectively.

Issue C: The Need to Foster Expanded Dialogue, Consultations, and Cooperation for Building Consensus Principles and Concepts for Regional Security Cooperation.

Conference participants agreed that a beginning point from which to achieve security cooperation in the Western Hemisphere is for the United States to become more of a partner and less of the proverbial "Colossus of the North."

Discussion. In that connection, it was argued that if the United

States wants to enhance the hemispheric trade that exceeds that of Europe and Japan and develop serious cooperation with three of the largest economies in the world (i.e., Canada, Brazil, and Mexico); if the United States wants sustainable economic development and prosperity in the region and a viable Free Trade Areas of the Americas (FTAA); and if the United States wants democracy and human rights as a basis for the peace and civil societies in the Americas—then the United States must become collegially involved in a strategy for stability in the region. That, in turn, requires an investment in multilateralism.

Examples. Ambassador Robert Komer has pointed out that lack of unity of effort was a major deficiency in the Vietnam War.[10] This was also the case at the Bay of Pigs (Cuba) in 1961; Aden, 1968; the Spanish experience in the Western Sahara, 1975-76; and subsequent actions in the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq.[11]

On the positive side of the unity of effort dimension—with the exception of the 1968 fiasco in Aden—British experiences seem to dominate as good examples. Normally, an overall coordinator for all military and civil activities is appointed by the prime minister. A committee of the cabinet provides periodic direction, support, and oversight for this individual. The coordinator may hold other appointments, and has been known to the flag officer commanding the armed forces involved in a given conflict—as was the case in the Falklands War in 1982. He may even be the appointed head of government—as was the case when General Templer in Malaysia and Field Marshal Lord Harding in Cyprus performed the "coordinator" tasks.

But regardless of other positions, the purpose of the "director of operations" or "coordinator" is to act as the executive officer of the supreme national body (i.e., Parliament). In this context, it is assumed that he or she has the authority to deal with relevant officials in the British government and with responsible individuals in the supported (i.e., host) country. Together, long- and short-term mutually supportive objectives—and ways and means—are determined and pursued.[12]

Recommendations. A low-cost but high yield investment in the Western Hemisphere for the United States would include the

following core elements:

- Continued and enhanced multilateral dialogues (i.e., conferences, roundtables, and workshops) that will build upon mutually rewarding relationships and contribute to the strategic thought undergirding U.S. and regional security policy and strategy. Collaboration like this, with a healthy exchange of ideas, is an excellent example of the strength and potential of sovereign and regional civil-military relations.

- Development of a guiding conceptual blueprint (i.e., strategic paradigm) for hemispheric stability and security that will put the "levels of analysis" debate to rest. That is, establish the complex linkages clearly demonstrating that without legitimized stability there can be no effective rule of law, judicial system, and human rights; no sustained economic development and prosperity; no effective democratic processes; and no durable peace.

- Development of relevant doctrine for providing standardized civil-military direction and guidance for multilateral (i.e., coalitional) counterterrorist and stability efforts.

- Generate understanding at the highest levels that addressing conflict situations solely through military training, military equipment, and associated funding has been proven ineffective in that it does not address the basic causes of conflict, and thus becomes reactionary instead of proactive. To accomplish the central strategic task of regaining control of lawless territories and enforcing the rule of law in a civil society, two fundamental efforts must be undertaken:

    o First, security organizations and their leaders must be professionalized and upgraded to the point where they can continually, effectively, and fairly enforce the law on land, in the maritime areas, and in the national air space; and,

o Second, security organizations (i.e., police and military) must be professionalized and upgraded to the point where they can neutralize or control the perpetrators of violence—regardless of label.

Conclusion: The United States shares with its hemispheric neighbors an increasingly and vitally important financial, commercial, and security/stability stake in the political and economic growth of the region. Any kind of political-economic-social-security deterioration in the area will profoundly degrade the health of the U.S. economy—and therefore, the concomitant power to act in the global security arena. The continuing U.S. responsibility to the region goes beyond the narrow purview of unilateral military training and equipping to broader multilateral strategy and leader development.

Issue D: The Need to Adapt U.S. Military Efficacy to the Strategic Threat Environment in the Hemisphere.

This fourth issue and associated recommendations concern the strategic application of U.S. military power in the Western Hemisphere. In that context, another major theme of the conference is that the central strategic task of regaining control of lawless territories and enforcing the rule of law in a civil society goes beyond the narrow purview of training and equipping units. It extends to broader multilateral civil-military education and leader development.

Discussion. At the outset, it should be noted that the ultimate responsibility for stability and security cooperation in the hemisphere lies with the democratic governments of the region. Yet, conference participants agreed that the United States, as the crucial interested outside actor, has indispensable experience, resources, and political influence. In teacher, mentor, and role model terms, U.S.military forces can act as a major positive influence for enhancing and strengthening hemispheric security at the strategic level. For greater clarity, these recommendations are divided into: (a) Primary Recommendations; (b) Intermediate Recommendations; and (c) Advanced Recommendations.

Example. Solutions to the problem of military efficacy take the United States beyond unilateral training and equipping units for conducting aggressive operations against a terrorist-insurgent "enemy" to multilateral approaches to broader professional military education and leader development. The accomplishment of the central strategic task of regaining control of lawless territories and enforcing the rule of law in a civil society requires that two fundamental efforts be undertaken. First, security organizations (i.e., the military and the police) and their leaders must be professionalized and upgraded to the point where they can enforce the law effectively and fairly. Second, security organizations must be professionalized and upgraded to the point where they can neutralize or control the perpetrators of violence—regardless of label.

Primary principles derived from previous experience are, first, that military force should not be applied ad hoc in response to either political or military failure, or in an attempt to do "something that might work." If a foreign military force must be inserted into a nationalistic milieu, it should be done overwhelmingly at the outset. Examples would include the successful U.S. interventions in Lebanon in 1958, Grenada in 1983, and Panama in 1989. Nevertheless, the data indicate that the best possible use of foreign military personnel in a contemporary small-scale contingency is probably one variation or another on the "train the trainer" role. Successful examples of this type of effort would include U.S. Military Training Teams (MTTs) training the first Cazador (hunter) units of the Venezuelan Army to be first-rate organizations during the period 1961-64; and the Bolivian Ranger units that destroyed Che Guevara's organization in Bolivia in 1968. This does not take many troops, they are in relatively little physical danger, and they can keep a low political profile. Large numbers of outsiders in a nationalistic environment for any length of time have tended to be counterproductive in terms of undermining the perceived "independence" of the host country, implicit host acquiescence to "foreign interests," and consequent weakening of the "legitimacy" of the regime.

Second, accordingly, the "outside" forces that might be brought into most contemporary situations do not necessarily need the skills required for success against Industrial Age armies on the north German plain or similar military formations operating in the open

desert. What they do need is a high degree of professionalism, the ability to insert themselves unobtrusively into a nationalistic environment, and the ability to help build and equip an indigenous military force capable of finding and defeating an elusive and dedicated enemy. This requirement takes us back to where we began—back to the need to professionalize, modernize, and upgrade indigenous leaders at all levels. Experience clearly demonstrates that simply training and equipping troops have proven to be ineffective reactions to the types of problems under discussion.[13]

(a) What the U.S. Military Can Do: The Primary Recommendations. The United States has had a great deal of experience and success in training military forces to take the offensive against enemies on the battlefield and in teaching armed forces how to fight according to the humane considerations required under the "just war" concept. The United States should continue to help train and educate Colombian and other forces in these fundamentals. Nevertheless, it was agreed that additional training and education are also necessary. At the least, a carefully designed and relatively modest assistance program could vastly increase the speed at which military and police forces professionalize and modernize themselves. A short list of the most important deficiencies and areas for improvement in regional security forces would include:

- Development of strategy.
- Development of end-state planning capabilities.
- Training and doctrine for joint and combined operations.
- Improvement in the collection, fusion, evaluation, and dissemination of usable and timely intelligence.
- Development of quick-reaction capabilities.
- Improvement in transport capability and lift.

(b) What the U.S. Military Can Do: Some Intermediate Recommendations for U.S.-Monitored Professional Military Education and Leader Development. Within this context, the study of the fundamental nature of conflict has always been the philosophical cornerstone for comprehending the essence of traditional war. It is no less relevant to nontraditional conflict. As examples:

- Nontraditional national interests centering on "well-being" must be carefully defined and implemented.

- The application of all the instruments of national and international power—including the full integration of legitimate civilian partners—as a part of a synergistic security/stability process must be rethought and refined.

- Information and intelligence must be understood as force multipliers, and commanders at all levels must take the responsibility for collecting and managing relevant information for their own use.

- The power of the interagency process, when used correctly, and the impotence of unilateral actions must be understood.

- The notion of indirect engagement versus direct involvement must be taught and applied.

- Regional, hemispheric, and global implications of tactical and operational actions must be understood and appreciated.

- The concept of multiple centers of gravity, to include public opinion and leadership, must be taught and applied.

- The importance of learning how to defend one's own centers of gravity as well as attacking those of an opponent—and the ultimate penalty for not doing so—must be understood and applied.

- The power of information and public diplomacy and the penalties that are paid when these instruments of power are not used, channeled, or harnessed must be rethought and refined.

- The fact that inaction can be as much of a threat to stability and security as any other "destabilizer" must be understood and internalized.

(c) What the U.S. Military Can Do: Some Advanced Recommendations. There are at least seven additional tasks

that could be initiated at any time that do not depend on the accomplishment of the primary and intermediate requirements listed above. They are:

- Help hemispheric governments to identify and correct key strategic political, economic, and social shortcomings.

- Recommend the modernization of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 in accordance with the realities of contemporary conflict.

- Recommend repeal of the legal prohibition against U.S. aid to foreign police.

- Replace U.S. operationally oriented officers with Foreign Area Officer (FAO) diagnosticians in designing and managing indirect and direct security assistance programs.

- Help hemispheric governments understand that unless a regime can exert legitimate control and governance throughout its entire national territory, there can be no effective judicial system, rule of law, and human rights; there can be no effective economic development programs; and there can be no effective democratic processes.

- Help hemispheric governments to identify and implement appropriate military-police-civil actions that will lead to reestablishing central government control of the "lawless" areas of a given country.

- Ensure that direct and indirect military aid to a given government makes a specific contribution to its strategic objectives of promoting democracy, human rights, economic development, social justice, personal and collective security, and a sustainable peace for the country and the region.

Conclusions: These recommendations for adapting U.S. military efforts to the problem of building regional stability and security cooperation take us beyond doing "something" for something's sake. They take us beyond developing budgets, force structure, and equipment packages for a given crisis situation. They take us beyond

asking, "What are we going to do?" "Who is going to command and control the effort?" "How is it to be done?" These imperatives take us to the development of a mutually agreed-upon strategic vision (i.e., the political end-game). In turn, these imperatives take us to the cooperative, holistic, and long-term planning and accomplishment of the objectives (i.e., strategic ends), ways (i.e., strategic courses of action), and means (i.e., strategic monetary, personnel, and equipment resources) that directly support the achievement of the end-game.

Governments not responsive to the importance of these concepts find themselves in a "crisis of governance." They face increasing social violence, criminal anarchy, and eventual overthrow. Solutions to these problems take us back to where we began. We return to Clausewitz's first dictum: "understand the nature of the conflict on which you are embarking." Importantly, solutions to these problems take us beyond conflict per se. They take us to the wisdom of Sun Tzu: "Do not advance relying on sheer military power";[14] and "Those who excel in war first cultivate their own humanity and justice and maintain their laws and institutions. By these means, they make their governments invincible."[15]

Final Issue: The Need to Continue the Momentum from the Conference and to Build on the Range of Issues Outlined in this Monograph.

The special status of the United States allows it the opportunity to facilitate positive change. By accepting this challenge, the United States can help to replace conflict with cooperation and harvest the hope and fulfill the promise that regional security cooperation offers.

Discussion. Within the global security structure, the United States remains the world's only superpower. No other nation-state currently possesses the attributes needed for effective international and regional leverage—political clout, economic impact, cultural appeal, and military reach. Still, the United States cannot do everything alone. There are those allies and friends who can and will assist the United States in creating a more peaceful and stable regional and international security environment, given cooperative

and collegial partnership—and careful end-state planning.[16]

Example. Should the United States not take these admonitions seriously, it will find itself in the position of Alice as revealed in her conversation with the Cheshire Cat:

> "Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to walk from here?" "That depends a good deal on where you want to get to," said the Cat. "I don't much care where," said Alice. "Then it doesn't matter which way you walk," said the Cat. "—so long as I get somewhere," Alice added as an explanation. "Oh, you're sure to do that," said the Cat, "if you only walk long enough!"[17]

Recommendation to Promulgate a Deliberate Process to Facilitate the Building of Regional Security Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere: Establish a multiorganizational (e.g., SOUTHCOM, Joint Staff, Army Staff, and War Colleges) "Tiger Team" to evaluate the recommendations made in this paper—and elsewhere—and develop a regional security plan of action to expedite implementation.

Final Note. The sense of urgency and importance of this and the other recommendations noted in this monograph permeated the conference discussions of the Colombian crisis as did acknowledgement of the need for better security cooperation in the hemisphere. Participants at the Miami conference generally agreed that Colombia is a paradigm of the failing state having enormous implications for the prosperity, stability, democracy, and peace of the entire Western Hemisphere. The illegal drug trafficking and paramilitary and insurgent organizations (i.e., narco-terrorists) in that country are perpetrating a level of corruption, criminality, human horror, and internal instability that—if left unchecked at the strategic level—can ultimately threaten the collapse of the Colombian state and undermine the political sovereignty of its neighbors. At the same time, the instability threat constitutes a serious challenge to U.S. national security, and to the U.S. position in the global community.

AFTERWORD

Congratulations to those who prepared this report. It was not easy to reflect in manageable fashion the consensus views of some 300 civilians and military officers from all around the Western Hemisphere, including such diverse provenances as academia, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations, as well as defense establishments. Nevertheless, this conference was built on the experiences of five previous major conferences by the same organizers on Western Hemisphere security issues. It therefore represents a considerable evolution of thinking on a broad scale. We should not be concerned that this document may raise more issues and questions than it answers. That fact demonstrates progress in gaining an understanding of the very meaning of security in the present-day context.

In an earlier age, and not so long ago, neither the U.S. participants nor the others from around our Hemisphere would have defined the issues in all of the manners represented in this report. The traditional "threats" were external enemies, boundary disputes between states, and militarism. As this report points out, the "lineal descendents" of such threats are global terrorists and especially the narcoterrorists who wreak such havoc and threaten the very existence of even major states such as Colombia. Yet the fragility of stability and security, as Dr. Max Manwaring and others have stressed, is now well understood in the Department of Defense as going well beyond the existence of enemies. It also emanates from problems of economic, social, and political development, poverty and disease, the legitimacy of governance, and environmental degradation, among others.

The good news is that our Hemisphere has come a long way in approaching these issues in the search for a common vision. The consensus that the report reflects tracks the views of retired Army General John R. Galvin when he says that there must be "continuous and cooperative planning among and between national and international civilian and military organizations." That process is not easy to achieve, but the conference offered hope that this has a better chance than ever before.

Laying one issue right on the line that came through strongly, however, was that the continuous and reliable presence of the United States is essential to the process as the most influential actor. But it can only be successful if it becomes "more of a partner and less of the proverbial 'Colossus of the North,'" as the report argues. Historically,

there was a time when that happened, as the Franklin Roosevelt administration in the 1930s announced its Good Neighbor Policy and formally signed on to the cherished Latin American nonintervention doctrine. That may explain the overwhelming and immediate support of most of Latin America for the Allies as World War II began. Of course, as we know, Roosevelt's policy was succeeded in Cold War years by the "paradigm of U.S. political domination, imposition of economic will, and the threat of military intervention," which, this conference report argues, has been unproductive and often unsuccessful.

We get the sense, from this report's delineation of the issues, that a combination of U.S. military efficacy and a long-term, broad, and continuous security dialogue will integrate the Hemisphere into a genuine common vision, not simply a forced one. The recent successes of the Uribe administration in Colombia, thanks in large part to the partnership of the United States, is evidence that progress is possible even under the most dire conditions. Kidnappings and homicides have been greatly reduced since last year, nacroterrorists are increasingly on the run, and President Álvaro Uribe's popularity rating is at 70 percent. A commitment over time by the U.S. Government now seems more likely, as the results have become demonstrable. It is never easy to keep Washington's attention focused on pressing issues in our own Hemisphere, however. That will require constant effort.

By the same token, more work is needed to produce successful cooperative efforts among Western Hemisphere nations to build genuine regional security cooperation beyond their separate national interests. The dialogue must be continued. For that reason, the three organizers of the conference—the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, the United States Southern Command, and the Dante B. Fascell North-South Center of the University of Miami will hold their next conference in early 2004. We hope it will move the agenda forward and continue to raise consciousness among civil and military leaders of the issues and recommendations outlined in this report.

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ENDNOTES

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3. Studies that make this point are Angel Rabassa and Peter Chalk, *Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001; and Eduardo Pizarro, "Revolutionary Guerrilla Groups in Colombia," in Charles Berquist, Ricardo Penaranda, and Gonzalo Sanchez, eds., *Violence In Colombia: The Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective*, Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 1992. Additionally, see David C. Jordan, *Drug Politics: Dirty Money and Democracies*, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999.

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