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THINGS OLD, THINGS NEW: SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE 1980s

by

KEITH A. DUNN

Nostalgia for the bygone era when the United States was the unchallenged political, economic, and military leader of the world currently pervades much of US thinking. All too often there is a sense that most of America's current national security problems resulted from a lack of military commitment that began in the 1970s and was epitomized by the Carter Administration's regionalist solutions to world problems. If Washington had not retreated from its foreign obligations in the aftermath of the Vietnam debacle and had maintained strategic nuclear superiority, so the thinking goes, the Soviets would not have invaded Afghanistan. If somehow the United States could just build a larger military and man that force with better-trained personnel, it would solve its major national security problems. As President Reagan told last year's graduating class at West Point, the United States would not be facing the domestic and international problems that it does if the "government had not neglected one of its prime responsibilities, national security, as it engaged more and more in social experimentation."¹

There is no doubt that the first two years of the 1980s have been trying not only for the United States but also for the world at large. It is tempting to hope that as the decade progresses events will become more predictable, peaceful, and stable. If the recent past is a reliable index for the rest of the decade, however, the United States will face a strategic environment growing more diverse, more complex, and more fragmented.

Moreover, the United States will face significant new challenges to its ability to support and defend its most fundamental national interests.

As a result, nostalgia notwithstanding, during the 1980s we will be coping with an environment dramatically and irreversibly changed from the environment that shaped US strategic concepts in the years just after World War II. No longer is the United States the clearly preeminent strategic nuclear power. The 1980s will be an era of Soviet-American strategic nuclear equality in gross terms, but with asymmetries in particular means of delivery. In addition, the United States is no longer the world's unchallenged economic and political leader. The growing economic strength of Western Europe, Japan, and the oil-rich nations of the Persian Gulf region have caused those states not only to pursue more assertive independent economic policies but also to challenge the United States for international political influence. In the short term, the relative decline in US political and economic status is disconcerting. That it would occur, however, was inevitable. Particularly with regard to Western Europe and Japan, the United States supported, sponsored, and otherwise encouraged economic revitalization in the belief that economically prosperous nations would be more politically stable and would best serve US long-term interests.

The United States began the 1980s with its alliance relationships in more disarray than probably at any other time in the recent past. In part, this was a reflection of the

decline in US political and economic status and of the corresponding increase in the capabilities of the allies themselves. The episodic nature of the American political system, with its changes in political leadership often leading to major new directions in foreign policy, also has strained alliance relationships. For example, human rights was such an important issue to the Carter Administration that it was willing to embargo arms sales to nations because of their human rights records. Yet an election and a new administration has reduced, if not severed, the linkage between human rights and arms sales. These sorts of extreme shifts in policy make it difficult for some nations to determine exactly where they stand with the United States, causing some to believe that the United States is interested in them only during times of crisis. Finally, the original basis of many post-World War II US alliances was a fervent fear of monolithic communism. Given the factions and fissions that have developed in the communist world, containing the spread of monolithic communism no longer has the motivating force that it did in the 1950s and 1960s; therefore, some of the cement of those US alliances has weakened.

While the strategic environment has been changing, there have been no essential alterations in US national interests or objectives, nor probably should there have been. Changes in the strategic environment, however, will affect the ability of the United States to achieve its objectives in pursuing its national interests. Those changes therefore have obvious implications for US foreign and defense policymakers. This article will discuss some of the major trends in international relations that will confront policymakers through the remainder of the decade and then analyze the implications of those trends and their possible effects on US interests, objectives, and policies. The trends to be discussed are not an exhaustive listing of the potential problems facing the United States, nor are they approached in any particular order or priority. They are simply some of the more important trends—some, in the words of former Secretary of Defense Harold

Brown, "old and familiar; others, relatively new."²

Any effort to discuss future threats to US interests must grapple with the problem of how much attention is to be given to the Soviet challenge. Since the end of World War II, the Soviet Union has been the only nation generally considered a serious threat to the most salient US interests—those relating to survival, territorial integrity, and world order. Nearly every foreign-policy and defense decision over the last 35 years has been made with an eye on the USSR. The invasion of Afghanistan, concerns about improved Soviet power projection capabilities, and fear that the Soviet achievement of nuclear parity has made the Kremlin more bold and adventuresome insure that the Soviet Union will continue to be perceived as the most significant military threat to the achievement of US objectives throughout the 1980s.

The United States will face some significant challenges, however, that will be only marginally related to, or caused by, the USSR even though Moscow will, no doubt, attempt to exploit such opportunities when they arise. With improved military capabilities acquired as a result of extensive force modernization programs during the Brezhnev era, there is reason to believe that the Kremlin will continue to pressure, probe, and test the United States in attempts to expand Soviet influence. But every challenge to US interests should not be viewed solely through the lens

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of Soviet-American competition. To do so would limit American abilities to seek solutions to problems that invite Soviet exploitation but that have not necessarily been initiated by the Kremlin.

THE SOVIETS AND THE THIRD WORLD

The first major trend facing the United States in the 1980s that we might profitably examine is that of continued Soviet involvement in the Third World. That involvement will probably increase. Part of the difficulty we have today in understanding Soviet behavior and objectives with respect to the Third World stems from an overselling of detente in the early 1970s. The Kremlin never accepted the US idea that detente meant that the Soviet Union would cease its political, economic, and military support of Third World "national liberation" movements. Except during the Stalin period, the Kremlin has always perceived those states now collectively called the "Third World" to be natural allies in the struggle with the capitalist world.

The Soviet ideological commitment to the Third World has undergone significant permutations, but Soviet interest in the area is strongly rooted in history. In *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1916), Lenin saw the preconditions for a global socialist revolution inexorably tied to the developing world. The imperialist powers' competition for colonies would inevitably lead to conflict and wars among the imperialists. This development would advance the progress of socialism by hastening the demise of capitalism. Khrushchev saw newly created independent, neutral states that did not want to join any military bloc as part of a worldwide "zone of peace," and he believed that it would be in the Soviet interest to support them. The fact that Nehru, Sukarno, Nasser, and Ben Bella were non-Marxists was of little importance to Khrushchev. They had undertaken to travel independent "non-capitalist roads of development," which to Khrushchev's way of thinking made them anti-imperialist and pro-Soviet. As

Khrushchev told the 22d Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1961, there existed a "harmony between the vital interests of the peoples of these states [the emerging national states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America] and the interests of the people of the socialist states."³

During the Brezhnev era, the Soviet approach toward the Third World has changed to a degree. Whereas Khrushchev's approach was "oversimplified, overoptimistic, and oversold," the Brezhnev regime has been "highly rationalist, realistic, pragmatic, and cautious."⁴ Nevertheless, the Soviet view of the Third World remains largely unchanged: it is still seen to have a conceptual importance and to possess the ideological underpinnings necessary to its role in the world revolutionary movement's struggle against imperialism. Peaceful coexistence and avoidance of nuclear war are still Soviet objectives, but they do not preclude the Soviet Union from providing ideological, social, political, economic, and military support to Third World movements in their struggle for national liberation. As Brezhnev said at the 26th Party Congress, the Soviet Union

will continue to pursue consistently the development of cooperation between the USSR and the liberated countries in an effort to consolidate the alliance between world socialism and the national-liberation movement.⁵

Soviet economic interest in the Third World is also increasing. Third World nations are important markets for Soviet goods, and they are a significant source of foodstuffs that cannot be grown in the USSR. More important, the Soviet Union may need to import from Third World areas increasing levels of critical raw materials, both for itself and for its East European allies.

The Soviet oil future and the possibility that Moscow may become a net importer of oil has sparked significant debate in recent years about Soviet resource dependency. The original CIA estimates on this issue remain controversial because they are based on

important assumptions about how many proven reserves exist, the Soviets' ability to discover new fields, and the technological capacity of the Soviets to exploit new fields when and if they are discovered. Nevertheless, current production trends tend to support the prediction that by the late 1980s or early 1990s Soviet oil production will level off.⁶ The Soviets' problem in this regard is not a simple lack of oil. Rather, it is the ability of the USSR to meet competing requirements as production slows: How is the Soviet Union to fulfill its own domestic needs and at the same time be a consistent supplier to Eastern Europe and to hard-currency buyers of Soviet energy? As Thane Gustafson has recently argued, Soviet energy concerns are "more than a crisis of production; issues of consumption, distribution, and substitution of fuels are key elements also."⁷

To some degree, the Soviets can cushion their oil problem by reducing exports to the West or not increasing the amount supplied to Eastern Europe, but there are risks involved with these approaches. Reducing exports to the West would lower the amount of hard currency the Kremlin could obtain and could create the perception among recipients of other Soviet energy supplies that the USSR is not a reliable supplier. Lowering supplies to Warsaw Pact allies would force those states to buy large quantities of oil on the open market, straining their already weak economies and increasing their foreign indebtedness. It is very likely that during the coming years some East European nations will have to backtrack on pledges made in the 1970s to improve domestic standards of living and provide more consumer goods. Events in Poland in 1970, 1975, and 1980-81 rather clearly demonstrate that failure to meet such pledges can spark political unrest and instability. If Soviet oil policies contribute to further economic declines throughout Eastern Europe, economic dissatisfaction could fuel political unrest in East European countries other than Poland.

There are also indications that the Soviets and their East European allies may be required to import nonfuel mineral resources at the same time that they are reducing ex-

ports of the same kinds of resources. In 1977, for example, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe imported 68 percent of their cobalt, 28 percent of their bauxite, 13 percent of their nickel, 10 percent of their silver, and 23 percent of their phosphate requirements.⁸ Eastern European states have also been importing 90 percent of their tin requirements. A large portion of Eastern Europe's requirements has come from the Soviet Union, but increasingly the East Europeans have been forced to turn to other suppliers, particularly Southeast Asian nations.⁹ Regarding the decline in exports, in 1979-80 Soviet exports of chrome and platinum group minerals were down 50 percent. Exports of gold declined approximately 40 percent. There was also a significant decline in manganese and lithium exports, and the Soviet Union ceased exporting tantalum and vanadium altogether.¹⁰

During the 1980s, the Soviet Union will not be as dependent on foreign sources of raw materials as the United States, Europe, or Japan. Nevertheless, despite Soviet desires for self-sufficiency and the Soviets' rich resource base, projections indicate that the Soviet Union—and particularly its East European allies—will need to import increasing quantities of raw materials. Since many of the required resources are to be found in Third World nations, the Kremlin's economic interest in the Third World should continue to increase.

The Soviet Union's desire to be treated as a great power will also continue to drive the USSR toward an active role in the Third World. The Soviets believe that stature as a global power confers on them the right to participate in decisions that shape events in other parts of the world. Historically, all world powers have played such a role in international politics, and since World War II the Soviets have emphasized that they see this as one of their legitimate rights.

CRISES OF INTERNAL AUTHORITY

A second trend confronting the United States is the increasing potential for conflicts and disorders that are, as the International

Institute for Strategic Studies puts it, "immune to military force, yet whose outcome could have significant strategic implications for the United States."¹¹ These are the domestic conflicts and crises of internal authority, particularly within nations of geostrategic importance to the United States. The Iranian revolution is the most significant recent example. While there are analysts who have argued that a show of US force in the fall of 1978 might have bolstered the Shah and prevented his fall from power, such a military action would not have solved the problems that caused the Iranian revolution. By 1978, the Shah was clearly not in touch with the society that he ruled. His attempts to force Iran to modernize clashed with traditional Islamic values. Perhaps of more importance, the growing middle class created by modernization was stifled. Within 20 years the Iranian middle class more than doubled, making up over 25 percent of Iran's population. The Shah made few attempts, however, to incorporate this group into the Iranian political process. Rather, as one expert on Iran has said, the Shah attempted "to encourage enormous economic change and some social change (primarily in land reform and improved literacy) in order to prevent any basic political change" in Iran.¹²

The exact mix of conditions that led to the fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty cannot be recreated in other areas of the world. Where else does there exist a powerful religious leader like Ayatollah Khomeini who can obtain almost unlimited access to international radio and television to fuel dissension and dissatisfaction in a homeland hundreds of miles from his temporary residence? This is not to suggest, however, that Iran be viewed as an isolated example. The conditions that galvanized the Iranian radical left, middle-class, extreme right, and fundamentalist clerics were internal problems of modernization: unfulfilled expectations, disparity of wealth, destruction of traditional values, corruption, restricted participation in the governing process in a monarchical and authoritarian society, and a politically fragile government.

These conditions, though perhaps not to the same degree or in the same combination,

exist today in other nations of strategic importance to the United States—Saudi Arabia, the Philippines, Pakistan, and Egypt, for example. Whether an Iranian-style revolution will occur in any of these countries in the 1980s is extremely problematic. It is important, however, to recognize that sources of internal conflict and instability exist that are indigenous and unrelated to Soviet-American or East-West competition. If the Soviets attempt to take advantage of such situations, the United States might employ military force in an attempt to deter them. If the Soviet Union does not become directly involved, however, as was the case in Iran, it is unlikely that the United States could successfully employ military force in many of these areas. Without a clear external threat, US domestic support for such operations would probably not exist.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE THIRD WORLD

The economic importance of the Third World to the United States, particularly the Persian Gulf, has been recognized for some time. In recent years the United States and other oil-consuming nations have made major strides toward cutting imports, diversifying imports, conserving oil, and using alternative energy forms. Nevertheless, the United States and its allies continue to depend on oil imports, especially from the Persian Gulf. Between 1979 and 1980 US oil imports decreased by 19 percent; the United States still bought 35-40 percent of its oil from foreign sources, however, and 25-30 percent of the oil imported came from the Persian Gulf region. Western Europe imports over 85 percent of its needs, of which more than 60 percent still comes from the Persian Gulf. In 1980, Japan imported 99 percent of its oil needs, with Persian Gulf countries providing 69 percent of those imports. Suffice it to say, as long as the United States continues to believe that its economic, political, and military security are directly related to the political and economic survival of democratic governments in Western Europe and Japan, Persian Gulf oil will play a major role in US security planning. The

linkage between the United States and its allies' economic security means that for the foreseeable future Washington will continue to be concerned with the Persian Gulf, even if the United States itself were miraculously to become energy independent.¹³

The United States also depends on Third World sources for many other critical raw materials, importing more than half its requirements of 20 strategically important nonfuel minerals. Even more important, the United States is completely dependent on a limited number of sources located primarily in politically unstable regions of the world. For example, the United States imports 100 percent of its columbium, sheet mica, and strontium. It imports over 90 percent of its chromium, cobalt, manganese, platinum, and bauxite; and it acquires these minerals from relatively few major suppliers: 80 percent of its ferrochrome, 42 percent of its platinum, and 30 percent of its ferromanganese from South Africa; over 60 percent of its cobalt from Zaire; over 60 percent of its manganese ore from Gabon and Brazil; and 64 percent of its bauxite from Jamaica and Surinam.¹⁴ Projections show that US dependence on these and other materials will remain high and in some cases will even increase between now and the year 2000.¹⁵

In addition to their economic importance, the geostrategic location of some Third World countries gives them added significance to the United States. Third World nations border on most of the world's naval choke points. They flank 23 of the 31 essential US trade routes. Moreover, because Third World nations are near potential world trouble spots, or in some instances *are* the trouble spots, access to military bases or facilities in such countries can improve US power projection capabilities. It is in the latter area that the importance of the Third World to the United States should significantly increase during the next decade.

Since the early 1970s, US worldwide military presence, to include the number of overseas US military bases, has declined significantly. At the same time, concern about Soviet power projection capabilities has grown within the defense community to

the point that Andrew Marshall, Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, has said that the question is no longer *whether* the USSR will use its military forces in areas that are noncontiguous to its homeland. Rather, "the big question" for the 1980s, as Marshall sees it, is "*in what circumstances* the Soviet Union will be willing to commit her forces in combat at a distance."¹⁶

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan intensified an already existing concern about Soviet power projection and limitations on US abilities to project its military power, particularly to the important Middle East region. As a result, the United States has taken a number of initiatives to improve American power projection capabilities in the region. US representatives have negotiated increased access to naval and air facilities in Somalia, Kenya, and Oman, and they have obtained approval to preposition limited amounts of fuel and equipment in those three countries. Seven prepositioned cargo ships loaded with supplies for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force have been stationed in the Indian Ocean. Elements of the RDJTF were deployed to Egypt to exercise and demonstrate US capabilities to carry out long-distance force projection missions. Finally, President Reagan and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger have even gone so far as to say that in the near future the United States may need to increase the size of not only US naval forces but also ground components in or near the Middle East.¹⁷ The objective of all these actions has been to reduce the amount of time that it would take to deploy forces to the region in the event of crisis. But, at the same time, they point out that to fulfill its global military objectives the United States is becoming increasingly dependent on Third World nations for basing, access, and overflight rights.

ALLIANCE COHESION

The United States can no longer take for granted that alliance unity and consensus will underscore American foreign policy. As the world has become more multipolar and

America's primary allies in Europe and Asia have changed from nations rebuilding war-destroyed economies to nations with global economic and political objectives, their national interests have more frequently come in conflict with US interests. A classic case of such conflict has been the recent tension in US-European relations over the identification of an appropriate response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Polish crisis, and the amount of emphasis that should be given to cooperation rather than competition with the Soviet Union.

Generally, Europeans have preferred to follow a selective-linkage approach in their relations with the Soviets. Before December 1979, the Carter Administration tried to separate SALT II ratification from Soviet activity in the Third World and argued that strategic nuclear arms negotiations were too important to US interests to sacrifice because of Soviet meddlesome behavior there. Similarly, Europeans have attempted to insulate European detente not only from crises in the Third World but also from bilateral Soviet-American relations. The invasion of Afghanistan and then the Polish crisis, however, presented Europeans with a difficult situation, and their unwillingness to adopt a hard-line attitude toward the Soviets served to strain US-European relations.

Part of the problem is that Europeans—particularly West Germans—are not ready to sacrifice the benefits of detente. This is not to say that Europeans are less concerned than the United States about the Soviet threat. They have been willing to spend money on defense and to support America's tactical nuclear weapons modernization program (albeit reluctantly in the case of Belgium and the Netherlands). The point is that detente and more normal relations with the USSR have been beneficial to the Europeans. In the last seven years, West German exports to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have increased by 55 percent, and their imports by 39 percent. Detente has also resulted in practical political benefits for West Germany. From 1973 to 1979, more than 50,000 Germans were repatriated from East Germany. Travel between East and West Ger-

many is significantly easier than in the past. In 1978 alone, more than 8 million West Germans were able to travel to East Germany to visit friends and relatives. Since the beginning of detente in the early 1970s, political and military tensions in Europe have been lower than at any other time since World War II. For example, there have been no major incidents over Berlin, a perennial problem in the 1950s and 1960s. Small as these accomplishments might appear in the American perspective, they are significant achievements that no West German politician is willing to sacrifice.¹⁸

The problem facing the United States and its European allies in the 1980s is how to develop a common approach, particularly toward the Soviet Union, that accommodates the divergent national interests of the United States and the individual European states. This is not an uncommon problem of alliances, but it is compounded in this instance by differing perspectives in dealing with the Soviets. The US approach in the aftermath of Afghanistan has been to emphasize the competitive nature of the Soviet-American relationship. Trade, cultural, scientific, and official government contacts have been drastically curtailed. The SALT II treaty is dead, and the Reagan Administration does not seem in any hurry to move toward a new treaty, START notwithstanding. Europeans, on the other hand, have tended to support keeping the lines of communication open between East and West. As Helmut Schmidt has said, "Particularly in times of crisis, contact must not be lost."¹⁹ Europeans also have not lost faith in arms control. The most important difference between the United States and Western Europe, in sum, is the latter's continued emphasis on the cooperative aspects of the Soviet relationship. As Schmidt said in a recent article, "We must carefully see to it that longer term chances for cooperation are not spoiled by the necessary short-term confrontation or even tests of strength."²⁰

Similar problems exist in US-Japanese relations, but for different reasons. Japan has become quite sensitive to the Soviet threat in the Pacific region. Historically, Japanese

Defense White Papers never specifically discussed the foreign threat to Japanese interests. Rather, they vaguely referred to the "enemy." Now, however, Japanese perceptions are much clearer, and recent Japanese White Papers have spelled out the Soviet Union as Japan's main threat. Japanese defense analysts openly worry about the Soviet air, ground, and naval buildup in the Far East. In 1979, Japanese politicians and military personnel were particularly troubled by the discovery of at least a full Soviet division, with over 300 armored personnel carriers and several hundred medium tanks, on the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, and Shikotan in the Kuril chain. Moscow's total refusal to discuss the status of the Northern Islands and their reversion to Japan is also a major irritant in Soviet-Japanese relations and fuels a growing anti-Soviet sentiment in Japan.

At the same time, there is some concern within Japan that while the USSR is building its forces in the Far East, US capabilities are on the decline. The net effect of these two perceptions has created a small but growing interest within some Japanese defense circles that Japan must do more for itself in the area of national security, while at the same time maintaining the US-Japan security relationship and the US nuclear umbrella.²¹

Tokyo has also become increasingly aware of its economic vulnerability. A constant flow of Middle East oil is critical to the economy of Japan. As a result, basic Japanese economic interests in that region are much more vital than those of the United States. To the extent possible during the 1980s, Tokyo will continue its post-World War II policy of keeping economics and politics separate in its efforts to maintain maximum access to the world's raw material resources (particularly oil) and markets. Japan may welcome new American efforts to increase its military power but will probably not support a confrontationist strategy with the Soviets. Given Tokyo's military and economic vulnerabilities and a perception that major shifts in US policy are not uncommon, any efforts to encourage Japan to take a more active political and military role

in international relations and to accept greater responsibility for events in the Pacific region will meet with far less than immediate and total success. As Robert Scalapino has said,

The future of US-Japanese relations promises to be one of competition and cooperation. Despite its vital importance, our harmonious cooperation can no longer be taken for granted.²²

MILITARY ARMS AND THE THIRD WORLD

The final trend to be examined is the proliferation of military arms to Third World countries in the 1980s. Even though a major objective of the Carter Administration was to lower the volume of US arms sales, it is unlikely that the trade in weapons will decrease dramatically in the remainder of this decade. As long as there has been conflict and war, nations and individuals have been willing to sell, or provide in some other way, the weapons of war. In sub-Saharan Africa, many nations continue to obtain surplus, out-of-date, or technologically inferior weapons; nevertheless, the quantity of such weapons and their superiority over weapons previously held often represent a significant increase in combat capability. On the other hand, there is also a trend that points to an increased willingness of suppliers to provide first-line, high-technology weapons to the Third World. For example, the United States has sold Israel the F-15 and F-16; Egypt has decided to buy the F-16; and Saudi Arabia has purchased the F-15. The Reagan Administration has also agreed to sell Saudi Arabia advanced Sidewinder missiles, five Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft (AWACS), seven KC-135 refueling planes for the F-15 and AWACS, and external fuel tanks for the F-15. Additionally, France has sold or agreed to sell its latest model Mirage to Jordan and Morocco. The Soviet Union has also been willing to provide first-class equipment to its customers. Within recent years it has provided Ethiopia, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), and Cuba with

the modern MiG-23. In addition, Moscow has sold the Su-20 (an export version of the Su-24 fighter-bomber) to Algeria and the PDRY.²³

The number of arms suppliers is another major change in the arms-transfer arena. The United States and the Soviet Union are still the dominant suppliers, respectively supplying nearly 40 and 30 percent of the arms sold in the world. France, Britain, and the Federal Republic of Germany are also significant suppliers, however, collectively controlling more than 16 percent of the arms sales market. West Germany recently considered breaking with its past policy of prohibiting the sale of arms to "crisis zones" by mulling the possibility of selling Saudi Arabia Leopard II tanks, Marder and Gepard armored vehicles, and self-propelled artillery. For domestic political reasons Germany ultimately backed away from such an arms sale agreement, but it left open the option to raise the issue in the future.²⁴

It is also significant that countries such as Israel, Argentina, Brazil, Korea, Taiwan, and Yugoslavia are either now producing and selling, or will produce and sell later in this decade, sophisticated weapons to a number of international buyers. In addition, with an increasing number of nations signing coproduction and licensing agreements with the major arms suppliers, the probability grows that more nations will be able to supply weapons to others, as well as build their own military capabilities, further contributing to the spread of sophisticated weapons technology. While many of these coproduction and licensing agreements exist between the United States and its NATO allies, numerous other such agreements exist. For example, South Korea and Taiwan have signed agreements with the United States to coproduce the F-5. India has a licensing agreement with Great Britain to produce a medium battle tank. Brazil produces an armed jet trainer aircraft under a license from India. Pakistan produces antitank missiles under a license from France and Germany. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has indicated that "23 developing nations participate in the licensed production of

warships, 20 in military aircraft, 10 in missiles, and 7 in armored vehicles."²⁵

The proliferation of nuclear weapons is another concern. To date, at least six nations (Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, the United States, China, and India) have exploded nuclear weapons. It is generally assumed, however, that at least another dozen nations could produce nuclear weapons within a few years if they decided to do so. For countries like Israel, Taiwan, South Korea, South Africa, and Brazil, the technology for making nuclear weapons is only a small inhibition. The biggest obstacle they face is the difficulty in acquiring sufficient fissionable material to make nuclear weapons, and this problem should decrease as nuclear plants for peaceful purposes increase and nations begin to accumulate plutonium as spent fuel.

Whether the potential nuclear nations will decide to join the nuclear club in this decade is a moot question. The decision to go nuclear or to refrain from doing so will depend on domestic political pressures, regional threat assessments and other security concerns, desire for status, and, in the case of US allies, the question of US willingness and ability to fulfill its alliance commitments. As in the case of the proliferation of conventional weapon systems, the United States will be able to exert some influence on the decisions of the potential nuclear nations. It will not be able to dictate any of those decisions, however, because the information for building nuclear weapons is readily available and the United States, after all, is only one member of the present nuclear club.

IMPLICATIONS

The international trends confronting the United States indicate that the strategic environment through the remainder of the decade, again, will be more diverse, more complex, and more fragmented than in the past. At present, it is commonplace to hear critics argue that the major cause of current US problems is past inability to face up to the global Soviet threat, as it has been manifested in Angola, Ethiopia, Vietnam, and

Afghanistan. There is no doubt that the Carter Administration was vulnerable to such charges, and it is not clear whether that Administration could stick to a policy once it was enunciated. Nevertheless, too many of these criticisms seem to be based on a belief that military force is the best—maybe even the only—method for meeting the Soviet challenge in the Third World.

This type of thinking has significant implications for US foreign and defense policy, particularly if the projections of continued Soviet involvement in and US dependence on the Third World are accurate. Within US policymaking circles, there is a tendency to view an increase in Soviet presence in a given area, the willingness of a Third World nation to accept Soviet arms, or Soviet sponsorship of a proxy's efforts as the start of an irreversible dependency. Even though Soviet failures in the Third World are significant and numerous, US policymakers are often under a considerable amount of self-generated pressure to offset a supposed improvement in Soviet influence when Soviet presence increases in a given area of the Third World.²⁶ Such attempts to offset Soviet influence can create situations that allow the United States to be manipulated by Third World nations, and they may well involve short-term actions that may conflict with more general and longer-term US objectives.

For example, former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance defined one US objective as the ability to promote "peace in troubled areas of the world," which "reduces potential threats of wider war and removes opportunities for our rivals to extend their influence."²⁷ A recognized and proven ability of the United States to project and sustain its forces in areas distant from its borders is one method of deterring the Soviet Union from taking advantage of crises in the Third World. As the recent crises in Iran and Afghanistan indicate, however, there are many areas in the world where US force projection capabilities are lacking and where the United States needs access to regional facilities to increase its capabilities. To the extent that improved access to support facilities in the Third World and the formulation of the Rapid

Deployment Joint Task Force increase US force projection and rapid response capabilities, these actions will be positive steps. There are, however, other less positive implications associated with these actions.

American access to support facilities in the Third World will not be provided free. The return, or quid pro quo, for improved access will depend on the particular nation and region of the world involved. In some cases, Washington may simply be able to buy the desired access. At the other extreme, a nation may ask for sophisticated weapons, with the intention of using those weapons against domestic opposition or to begin a conflict with a neighboring nation. It is therefore important to recognize that while US interests with a potential client may be coincident in one respect (e.g., to deter the USSR), they may not be compatible in many other respects (e.g., to promote peace in an unstable region). If the payment for increased US access builds a nation's military capabilities, the recipient might use those capabilities to pursue national interests in conflict with those of the United States. The Soviet-Somalia relationship from 1969 to 1977 is instructive and should be studied as the United States continues to develop its own relationship with Somalia.²⁸

It is important also to recognize that once the United States enters into an agreement for access to facilities, it loses some degree of leverage over the client. By the nature of the agreement, the client is providing the United States something that is important to US national interests. In addition, once access is obtained, a formal status-of-forces agreement signed, and some level of US presence established, it is not always a simple matter to withdraw from those commitments at a later date. US allies and potential adversaries may view such a withdrawal as part of an overall decline in US commitment or a diminution of political will, and such a perception could have an adverse effect on other US national interests.

As noted earlier, the competition and tensions that already exist between the United States and its alliance partners could adversely affect US foreign policy in the

remainder of the decade. The most significant implication of this trend may be a growing reluctance on the part of many Americans to support military expenditures for the defense of NATO and Japan. For a long time, some Americans have believed that the West Germans and Japanese have not taken enough responsibility for their own military defense and have been too willing to rely on American forces and the US strategic deterrent. In the early 1970s, this attitude manifested itself in the various Mansfield Amendments, which called for reductions in US forces in Europe and the assumption of more of the burden by Europeans of their own defense.

Current tensions within the alliance may foster the impression in the United States that America's allies are unwilling to defend their own vital interests, particularly with regard to access to oil and other raw materials. If such an impression does gain widespread currency, there could be a revival of the sentiments expressed in the Mansfield Amendments. Namely, if US allies are unwilling to shoulder the major part of the burden in the defense of their national interests, why should the United States bear the cost and the risk? There are some indications that such an attitude may be spreading.²⁹

Finally, the proliferation of weapons will have several effects on US interests. When conflicts between smaller nations do occur, they may be easier to go to war over and more destructive than in the past. As a result of coproduction and licensing agreements, major suppliers may have less control over clients because the clients can produce their own arms or obtain arms and repair parts from other nations. In the Soviet case, if arms shipments exceed a recipient's capabilities to absorb the new arms, Soviet opportunities to introduce proxy forces as advisers, support personnel, and combatants may, as a result, be increased. Finally, the proliferation of sophisticated weapons will increase the risk that either superpower will have to accept if it initiates military action in the Third World. Soviet and American military planners increasingly will have to be concerned not only with the other super-

power's possible reaction to such a military initiative, but also with the military capabilities that Third World nations or proxy forces have at their disposal.

IN LIEU OF CONCLUSIONS: AN OPTIMIST'S EPILOG

Lest we end this essay on too pessimistic a note, we should recognize that the Soviets will face similar and, in some cases, even more difficult problems. The Soviets' economic future is bleak. Disastrous harvests and industrial shortfalls in the last two years have resulted in the lowest Soviet economic growth since World War II. Assuming a stable domestic and international environment—admittedly an optimistic assumption—the Central Intelligence Agency has projected that Soviet economic growth will not be higher than 2.5 percent annually through 1985.³⁰ More pessimistic assessments suggest that Soviet economic growth will be as low as one or two percent annually by the mid-1980s.³¹ As raw materials and energy supplies in European Russia have been depleted, Moscow has increasingly turned to new resource fields in Siberia. The cost of recovering raw resources has thus increased significantly because of the resulting great distances from population and industrial centers and because of the problems of mining and drilling in permafrost. In addition, many oil and coal fields are not producing as much as expected, and some are being depleted more rapidly than planned. Natural gas is the only energy area in which the Soviets have exceeded production goals in recent years.

The Soviet Union has largely depended on its ability to increase its labor input in order to increase its economic output. Soviet population trends indicate, however, that reliance on an ever-growing labor force may no longer be feasible. The average annual growth rate of the Soviet population has been declining for the last 20 years. It is quite possible that by the mid-1980s there will be a shortage of able-bodied 18-year-old males to fill Soviet military and economic requirements.³²

A decline in the overall labor supply is only part of the Soviet problem, however. The pattern of Soviet population growth is extremely uneven across the nation's breadth. Over the next two decades, an increasing percentage of the total Soviet population growth will occur in the Central Asian Republics, where industry and natural resources are lacking. The Central Asian population growth will occur at the same time that the proportion of the Soviet population living in areas normally inhabited by Great Russians, Belorussians, and Ukrainians—and where the majority of Soviet industry is located—will be declining. The ethnic groups of Central Asia are a particularly immobile segment of the Soviet population. It will be increasingly difficult, therefore, for the Soviet leadership to match up its declining labor pool with its industry and resources.

In the past, the Soviet Union has been able to expand its influence in the Third World through the use of military arms, equipment, advisers, and proxies, and the use or threatened use of military force. Since there is little reason to assume that any major domestic economic breakthroughs will occur to make the Soviet Union an economic superpower, Moscow will have to rely on its traditional military means to spread Soviet influence (and to undermine American and Chinese influence) in the Third World. Clearly, as the examples of Ethiopia, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Vietnam, and Afghanistan indicate, the Soviets have had significant successes with military "diplomacy." Equally, however, they have had some monumental failures. Moscow's inability to maintain its dominant position in Mali, Somalia, Sudan, Egypt, and Ghana; China's total break with the Soviet Union and its growing relationship with the United States; and the continued strong economic contacts of Angola and Mozambique with the West suggest that the commitment in many parts of the world to the Soviet brand of scientific socialism is not necessarily deep-rooted, nor is there a particular affection for the Soviet Union.³³ The unusually strong condemnation by most Third World nations of the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan suggests a new and more realistic assessment of the Soviet threat to their interests. As William LeoGrand has stated, the trends that point toward a more active Soviet involvement in the Third World may have long-range negative consequences:

The Soviets will run the risk (as the example of Afghanistan dramatically demonstrates) of producing among the nonaligned a new set of grievances which are anti-Soviet rather than anti-Western in character.³⁴

The problems confronting the Soviet Union at home and in the Third World may be exacerbated by economic and political problems in Eastern Europe. The remainder of the decade should be a period of economic difficulty and retrenchment in Eastern Europe as economic growth rates continue the pattern of decline established in the 1970s. Moreover, political stability in Eastern Europe will be jeopardized not only by succession in the Soviet Union, but also by the possibility of wholesale political succession in the Warsaw Pact nations.³⁵ Traditionally, Moscow has been able to deal with its allies' domestic problems through a combination of political and economic incentives or coercion when other instruments fail. As F. Stephen Larrabee has recently suggested, however:

It is increasingly questionable whether these methods will suffice in the future. In the 1980s, the Soviet leadership will face growing pressures both at home and abroad that will have already begun to manifest themselves and make the task of management and control more difficult.³⁶

If Poland were an isolated example, Moscow might have little to be concerned about. But the events that gave rise to Solidarity and threaten Polish political stability—inflation, declining economic growth, large foreign debts, rising prices, etc.—also exist in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and to some degree in Romania. This can hardly make the people in the Kremlin feel comfortable, given their concerns for

stability within their historical *cordon sanitaire* and the myriad of other problems that they face.

The remaining years of the 1980s will be a challenging period for both superpowers. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union controls events as before. How successful Washington and Moscow will be in achieving their interests and objectives will largely depend on their abilities to deal with a changing strategic environment. Pundits need to recognize, however, that the problems are *not* all one-sided, adversely affecting only the United States.

NOTES

1. "Transcript of the President's Commencement Address at U.S. Military Academy," *The New York Times*, 28 May 1981, p. D20.
2. *Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the Congress on the FY 1982 Budget, FY 1983 Authorization Request and FY 1982-1986 Defense Programs* (Washington: GPO, 1981), p. 14.
3. "The 22nd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party Proceedings and Related Materials," *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report* (USSR and Eastern Europe), Supplement, 20 October 1961, p. 85.
4. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, *The Soviet Union and the Third World: A Watershed in Great Power Policy?*, Report to the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, by the Senior Specialists Division (Washington: GPO, 1977), p. 2.
5. "Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th CPSU Congress and the Immediate Tasks of the CPSU in the Field of Domestic and Foreign Policy," Moscow Domestic Service, 23 February 1981, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service—Soviet Union*, Supplement, 24 February 1981, p. 12.
6. In 1977, the CIA predicted that the Soviets would need to import between 3.5 and 4.5 million barrels a day by the mid-1980s. Subsequent reports reduced the predictions to 2.7 million barrels. Later estimates called for imports of 1 million barrels, and the most recent predictions suggest that the Soviet Union will not have to import any oil by 1985. See Central Intelligence Agency, *Prospects for Soviet Oil Production* (Washington: CIA, April 1977); Central Intelligence Agency, *Soviet Economic Problems and Prospects* (Washington: CIA, July 1977); Bernard Gwertzman, "C.I.A. Revises Estimate, Sees Soviet as Oil-Independent Through 80's," *The New York Times*, 19 May 1981, pp. A1, D11.
7. Thane Gustafson, "Energy and the Soviet Bloc," *International Security*, 6 (Winter 1981-82), 65.
8. Daniel I. Fine, "Mineral Resource Dependency Crisis: Soviet Union and United States," in *The Resource War in 3-D—Dependency, Diplomacy, Defense* (Pittsburgh: World Affairs Council, 1980), p. 58.
9. Arthur D. Little, Inc., *Dependence of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe on Essential Imported Materials Year 2000*, a study for the US Navy Project 2000 (Cambridge, Mass.: Arthur D. Little, Inc., 1977), p. 1-7.
10. Fine, p. 47.
11. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey, 1978* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979), p. 1.
12. James Bill, "Iran and the Crises of '78," *Foreign Affairs*, 57 (Winter 1978-79), 237.
13. American Petroleum Institute, *Energy in America: Progress and Potential* (Washington: American Petroleum Institute, 1981), pp. 3, 28, and 33.
14. Warren P. Baker, "Next: A Resource War?" *Seapower*, 23 (October 1980), 56; David J. Fine, "Fresh Fears that the Soviets Will Cut Off Critical Minerals," *Business Week*, 28 January 1980, p. 64; Julius L. Katz, "International Commodity Policy," *Department of State Bulletin*, 78 (March 1978), 1-6; and "A U.S. Minerals Study With Few Answers," *Business Week*, 8 October 1979, p. 59.
15. Amos A. Jordan and Robert A. Kilmarn, *Strategic Material Dependence: The Stockpile Dilemma* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1979), p. 18.
16. Andrew Marshall, "Sources of Soviet Power: The Military Potential in the 1980's," in "Prospects of Soviet Power in the 1980's," Part II, Adelphi Paper, No. 152 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer 1979), p. 16. Emphasis added. For an opposing view on Soviet power projection capabilities, one that emphasizes the limitations on the Soviet Union, see my "Power Projection on Influence: Soviet Capabilities for the 1980's," *Naval War College Review*, 32 (September-October 1980), 31-47.
17. See "Excerpts From Interview With President Reagan Conducted by Five Reporters," *The New York Times*, 3 February 1981, p. A14, for President Reagan's comment. Secretary of Defense Weinberger referred to the need to increase force presence in the Middle East region on "Face the Nation," CBS Television, 8 March 1981.
18. For three good commentaries on the benefits of European detente from West German perspectives, see Marion Donhoff, "Bonn and Washington: The Strained Relationship," *Foreign Affairs*, 57 (Summer 1979), 1052-64; Theo Summer, "Europe and the American Connection," *Foreign Affairs*, 58 (America and the World 1979 edition, 1980), 622-36; and Joseph Joffe, "European-American Relations: The Enduring Crisis," *Foreign Affairs*, 59 (Spring 1981), 835-51.
19. Helmut Schmidt, "A Policy of Reliable Partnership," *Foreign Affairs*, 59 (Spring 1981), 753.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 755.
21. See Gerald L. Custer, "Japanese Security Policies and the United States," *Foreign Affairs*, 59 (Spring 1981), 852-74, for a more detailed discussion of Japanese attitudes and perceptions.
22. Robert A. Scalapino, "Asia at the End of the 1970's," *Foreign Affairs*, 58 (America and the World 1979 edition, 1980), 706.
23. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1979-1980* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979), pp. 103-07.
24. John Vinocur, "Schmidt Gives Saudis a Gentle 'No' on Arms," *The New York Times*, 29 April 1981, p. A13.
25. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1968-1977* (Washington: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1979), p. 18.
26. Two recent works, one by Alvin Z. Rubinstein and the other by Robert H. Donaldson, quite clearly illustrate that an extensive presence is no assurance of Soviet influence. Rubinstein has concluded that between 1967 and 1972 Moscow adjusted more than did Cairo to the demands of their relationship, that the Soviets had limited influence on any important Egyptian foreign or domestic decisions, and that Moscow was unable "to mobilize or strengthen the position of Egyptian officials or interest groups disposed to accommodate

to Soviet desires." Likewise, Donaldson has concluded that since 1967 there have been only two very minor instances when the Soviet Union caused India to take actions that it otherwise would not have taken. See Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Red Star on the Nile: The Soviet-Egyptian Influence Relationship Since the June War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1977); and Robert H. Donaldson, the *Soviet-Indian Alignment: Quest for Influence*, Monograph Series in World Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 3-4 (Denver: Univ. of Denver, 1979).

27. "Statement by the Honorable Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State, Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee," Department of State press release, No. 68, Washington, 27 March 1980, p. 6.

28. See Steven David, "Realignment in the Horn: The Soviet Advantage," *International Security*, 4 (Fall 1979), 69-90, for an excellent analysis of not only the Soviet-Somalia relationship but also the US-Ethiopia relationship and how the patterns of commitment between the superpowers and their clients shifted during the 1960s and 1970s.

29. See Jack Anderson, "Report Urges U.S. Pullout from Europe," *The Washington Post*, 28 April 1980, p. B13; and William Safire, "Doing It Ourselves," *The New York Times*, 22 May 1980, p. A35.

30. Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, *Simulations of Soviet Growth Options to 1985*, ER 79-10131 (Washington: CIA, March 1979), p. 3.

31. John P. Hardt, "Soviet Economic Options in the '80's," *Defense and Foreign Affairs*, 8 (No. 4, 1980), 40-42.

32. Murray Feshbach and Stephen Rapawry, "Soviet Population and Manpower Trends and Policies," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in a New Perspective*, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 1976, pp. 144-54; and Murray Feshbach, "The Soviet Future: A Different Crisis," *The Wilson Quarterly*, 5 (Winter 1981), 117-25.

33. See Robert H. Donaldson, ed., *The Soviet Union in The Third World: Successes and Failures* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981); and US Congress, House, Congressional Research Service Report Prepared for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Soviet Policy and United States Response in the Third World*, 97th Cong, 1st Sess., 1981, for two good analyses of Soviet successes and failures in the Third World.

34. William M. LeoGrande, "Evolution of the Nonaligned Movement," *Problems of Communism*, 29 (January-February 1980), 52.

35. Leaving aside Poland, because its political future is still so much in flux, it is quite possible that no current communist leader in Eastern Europe will be in power at the end of the decade. Nicolai Ceausescu of Romania is the youngest of the East European leaders; in 1990, he would be 72. The other figures will then be in their late seventies if they survive the decade.

36. F. Stephen Larrabee, "Instability and Change in Eastern Europe," *International Security*, 6 (Winter 1981-82), 64.

