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Benedict F. Fitzgerald

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A US STRATEGY FOR THE MIDDLE EAST

by

BENEDICT F. FITZGERALD

The Middle East is now the focus for a major portion of US strategic thinking. American concerns for assuring the continued flow of oil to the industrial West and Japan, resolving the Arab-Israeli problems, forestalling increased Soviet influence, preserving the national independence of area states, and maintaining regional stability indicate the importance and complexity of US involvement in the region. Events in the late 1970s altered the strategic environment drastically, causing the United States to make a searching reappraisal of its interests and objectives in the region. These events included the disintegration of the Central Treaty Organization, the oil price spiral, the declaration of a Marxist state in South Yemen, the overthrow of the Shah in Iran and the assumption of power by a militant Islamic Republic, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Singly each event might have proven manageable, but in concert they pointed clearly to the overall deterioration of the US position throughout the region. These developments set a disquieting tone for the strategic environment facing the United States in the Mideast in the 1980s.¹

TRADITIONAL INTERESTS

Despite the upheavals in the region since the end of World War II, US strategic interests in the Middle East have remained relatively constant.² Foremost among these interests has been the containment of Soviet influence. The Baghdad Pact Organization—

which evolved into the Central Treaty Organization—was one attempt to deny influence to the Soviets; the shuttles of Kissinger after the 1973 war and President Carter's Camp David actions were the latest of such moves.³

Closely aligned with the goal of containing USSR influence has been US interest in avoiding a direct confrontation with this nation. The Soviets hold avoidance of a face-to-face confrontation with the United States as one of their goals as well, but it took special effort during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars to avoid a direct conflict. Both powers took steps which could have led to war, but then exchanged sufficiently cooling messages to avoid such a disastrous eventuality.

A third major interest has been access to oil. For years the United States has held that oil must be available at reasonable prices and relatively free of restrictions, not just for the United States but for all nations. The oil embargo which followed the 1973 war and the price rises since then have emphasized the vulnerability of the West in this area of the world and the need to safeguard access to oil.⁴

Another interest of the United States has been the survival of the state of Israel. American commitment to that end has been a central theme of US policy since Israel's birth in 1948. In each of its wars Israel has received strong US support, and the strength of the US commitment has been reaffirmed by successive American presidents. There seems little doubt that the security and well-being of

Israel will continue to be primary objectives of US Middle East policy.

In conjunction with its support of Israel, the United States has long pursued a solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute. However, little progress was made until after the 1973 war.⁵ Achievements since then include the two interim disengagement agreements between Egypt and Israel, the interim disengagement agreement between Syria and Israel, and the Camp David accords culminating in the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty signed in March 1979. This treaty represents substantial progress, but it also leaves many issues unresolved.

Regional stability has been another consistent interest. To minimize Soviet influence, confine inter-Arab rivalries, and reduce the likelihood of another Arab-Israeli war, the United States has supported moderate change, peaceful solutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and moderate regimes.⁶

PRINCIPAL FACTORS

Numerous factors influence US interests, actions, and objectives in the Middle East. Key among these are Soviet challenges and activities; changes in Middle East perceptions of the United States; the effects of Camp David and other US moves related to the solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute; attempts to grapple with the Palestinian issue; inter-Arab rivalries; oil pricing; and, finally, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. None of these factors can be extricated cleanly from the rest; indeed, they are so closely tied that it is difficult to speak in definite terms about one without discussing the others.

Today the Soviet challenge seems to weigh most heavily on US interests, and the United States is attempting to counter the threat posed by the Soviets in such places as Afghanistan, South Yemen, Libya, the Horn of Africa, the Indian Ocean, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. Secretary of State Haig's call for the formation of a "strategic consensus" to counter Soviet incursions and activities is a key feature of the Reagan Administration's regional actions.⁷ Competition for influence is intense. The Soviets are rapidly expanding

the range of their activities in the region. Despite setbacks in the Sudan, Egypt, and elsewhere, the Soviets are engaged in what some observers believe to be an encirclement of the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf.⁸ In Afghanistan the Soviet Union is trying to consolidate its hold on the population following a succession of pro-Soviet coups and its armed invasion in December 1979. A pro-Soviet communist movement has proclaimed South Yemen an Arab-Marxist state and has permitted an influx of Soviets, Cubans, and East Germans to exercise control over significant portions of the society. In addition, there are threats of rekindling the Dhofar rebellion in neighboring Oman and attempting to make trouble for North Yemen.⁹ The Soviets are selling large quantities of sophisticated military equipment to Libya far exceeding legitimate defense needs. Libya is acting as the leading exponent of radical terrorism not just regionally, but worldwide; has urged the use of armed force among the Moslem states in the Middle East and North Africa to overthrow moderate, pro-Western regimes; conducted extensive military operations in Chad in early 1981; and poses a threat to Egypt and the Sudan.¹⁰ Syria and Iraq have been long-term clients of the Soviets, obtaining substantial infusions of armaments. In early October 1980, Syria concluded a 20-year Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with the Soviet Union.¹¹ Although Iraq has been attempting to extricate itself from the tight Soviet embrace (an impulse abetted by the Soviet declaration of neutrality in the Iraqi-Iranian war), the

Lieutenant Colonel Benedict F. FitzGerald is a Middle East Foreign Area Officer and has been a Strategic Research Analyst with the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, since September 1979.

In 1978, he was the US Army Attaché in Beirut, Lebanon. He has also had overseas assignments in Iran, Vietnam, and Korea. Colonel FitzGerald is a graduate of Xavier College in Cincinnati, Ohio and holds a master's degree from George Washington University, where he is now a Ph.D. candidate.



Soviets retain considerable leverage.¹² The recent "merger" of Syria and Libya, reflecting the isolation both states feel, bears watching both for the possible disruptive effect such a union could have on regional stability and for the new opportunities posed for the Soviets.¹³ In Iran, the revolution is an opportunity for virulent anti-Americanism, which the Soviets hope may turn the situation in their favor.

A pattern that emerges—one which concerns and motivates US policymakers—is that the Soviets have stimulated radical action when chances of success seemed high, then backed the action with military equipment and manpower, if not occupation, to insure that success followed.

Two categories of Soviet action can be observed. First, as political realignments occur in various states, the Soviets are active in providing political and military support. Whether they are the instigators or the exploiters of unstable situations is moot. What is important is that they are able to capitalize on these events, and the consequent potential for trouble is considerable. Second, the Soviets have sought to establish a system of alliances and friendly states strongly tied to the USSR through civil and military assistance programs. It seems clear that the Soviets are looking for radical, activist elements in the region to support, paving the way for eventual Marxist takeover. Each time the Soviets succeed in installing such a regime, the United States finds its interests threatened increasingly.

US responses to the Soviet challenge in the Mideast have changed the perception of the United States held by regional states. US positions have been seen as vacillating and uncertain, as inconsistent and nonreceptive to local needs, as biased in behalf of Israel so that an evenhanded policy is impossible, and as reactive without a steady long-range direction. Many former American friends and allies in the region find the association to be a liability, and, although they will not draw closer to the Soviets, they will distance themselves from the United States. No longer is the United States considered a country capable of keeping its word. US resolve has

been seriously questioned and its leadership has been seen as so weak as to be unable to adequately address Middle East issues with the attention they deserve.¹⁴

Another major influence is the effect that the Camp David accords have had on Mideast politics. The United States expended enormous effort to bring about the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, but, because of the perception that major Arab-Israeli issues were not properly addressed, Egypt has become increasingly isolated in the Arab world. In addition, the United States has been adversely affected by its support of the treaty. Former staunch US supporters such as Saudi Arabia have not backed US positions to the extent they formerly did. (However, recent spillover threats from the Iraqi-Iranian war have tended to nudge Saudi Arabia back into the fold.)

Most of the negativism with regard to the Egyptian-Israeli treaty revolves around the Palestinian issue.¹⁵ The resolution of the Palestinian question continues to be the single most difficult issue in the Middle East. Autonomy for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is seen by some as the first step toward a solution. The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty calls for such autonomy, with an overall solution deferred into the indefinite future. According to former US Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders, "We have realistic hope of progress in resolving the Palestinian problem in all its aspects."¹⁶ However, 26 May 1980 was the date set for a framework to be arranged for autonomy, and the Egyptians and Israelis let that date pass with both parties issuing acrimonious statements. Into the summer of 1981, the parties remained apart and the problem seemed more intractable than before. Autonomy is only one of many complications. Equally difficult are such problems as the status of East Jerusalem, security arrangements on the West Bank, water rights along the Jordan River watershed, and Jewish settlements. When portrayed as a whole the Palestinian question does indeed seem unsolvable in the near future and is bound to lead to further conflict.

The role of the United States in bringing Egypt and Israel closer together has been crucial. Without the direct involvement of high-level policymakers, including the sustained efforts of former President Carter, the peace treaty would probably not have been concluded. US assistance has been constantly at the call of the participants, and the United States has been willing to break impasses when asked to do so. However, many Arab states see the United States as the protector of Israel and its interests, and thus indisposed to prod Israel sufficiently to move the talks forward. Indeed, the US commitments to Israel and the pressures of internal US politics make movement toward closer links with the Palestinians, especially the PLO, seem further away. Exacerbating the situation, the Palestinians have yet to renounce terrorism and the Israelis have yet to recognize any Palestinian claims as justified. Progress is thus exceedingly difficult. Whether the Reagan Administration will move with the same vigor as its predecessor remains to be seen. The Israelis have given the new Administration its most serious regional challenge with the airstrike against the Iraqi nuclear reactor near Baghdad. How this is met will set the tenor for much of US policy and action and will serve to either severely limit the US or widen US abilities to make further progress. US-Iraqi relations have seemed to thaw with the collaboration at the UN in drafting a resolution condemning the Israeli airstrike and in President Hussein's call for improved relations.¹⁷

Inter-Arab rivalries also affect US interests in the Middle East, because many are hinged to resources, big-power competition, the Arab-Israeli question, and ideological considerations. In addition, the relationship of the United States with any one of the rival states affects its ability to deal with other states in the region.

For example, the rivalry between North and South Yemen and the involvement of Saudi Arabia directly involve the United States and its interests. The rivalry has existed for many years, having its inception before either state took its present form. In addition,

Saudi Arabia and North Yemen have long been at odds over the Saudi Arabian province of Asir along the northern border of North Yemen. Saudi Arabia seized the area from Yemen during the consolidation campaigns of King Ibn Saud in the 1930s, and has suffered the enmity of the Yemenis ever since. In addition, during the North Yemeni civil war of the 1960s, Saudi Arabia and Egypt supported opposite sides, each gaining enemies.¹⁸ More recently, however, North Yemen and Saudi Arabia have been able to set aside their animosities, perceiving as a greater threat South Yemen's attempts to destabilize the region by supporting both the Dhofar rebellion in Oman and the overthrow of North Yemen's government. Saudi Arabia has also relied heavily on Yemeni laborers in order to carry out its modernization and development program. Presently about a million Yemenis are employed in Saudi Arabia. The Saudis have supported North Yemen in its battles with South Yemen and have provided a large financial package for North Yemen's economic and military needs.¹⁹

In late 1978, the leaders of both Yemens were assassinated, with both acts seemingly instigated from South Yemen. Saudi Arabia, fearful of a leftist coup or greater Soviet involvement in North Yemen, appealed to the United States to provide emergency military assistance to North Yemen. The United States responded with a \$400 million package. Although much of the materiel arrived in short order, some of it is still dribbling in. As a result, the United States has been seen as only partially responsive at best, reacting only when the situation reached the point where a significant strategic setback might have been suffered had aid not been forthcoming.

Other inter-Arab and regional rivalries which affect US interests include the Lebanese Civil War, the Libyan-Egyptian border dispute, the Iraqi-Iranian war, the Syrian-Iraqi ideological split, and the Moroccan-Algerian border dispute and Polisario rebellion. Each has implications for American security.

The Lebanese situation gravely intensi-

fied in May 1981 following the Israeli downing of two Syrian helicopters in the central Bekaa Valley and the subsequent Syrian introduction of SA-2 and SA-6 missiles into Lebanon. Special presidential envoy Philip Habib engaged in "shuttle" diplomacy among Syria, Israel, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia in an attempt to defuse the situation. The Lebanese missile crisis shows the fragility of regional stability, the sectarian divisions in Lebanon, the opportunities for superpower involvement, and the tinderbox quality of the status quo.²⁰

The recent oil price spiral is another factor with broad and disturbing effects on US and Western interests. Since the 1973 war the "oil weapon" has been in the Arab arsenal for use against the United States, driving home US dependence on Middle East oil. OPEC price rises increasingly strained the economies of the United States and its allies, as well as those of Third World states. Some of the Arab oil producers tied the price rises to progress on the Middle East peace issues. Others felt the mere threat of doing so was sufficient to induce the United States to put pressure on the Israelis. Many observers saw the United States drawing away from its support of Israel because of the need to maintain access to Mideast oil. Regardless of which perspective is taken, the oil price spiral and the series of events surrounding it directly affect US interests, thus affecting how the United States deals with Middle Eastern states. Before the 1973 war the United States was able to take for granted a readily accessible and sufficient supply of oil. Now that supply is in serious jeopardy, and hard bargaining is required. For any assessment of US interests in the Mideast to be valid, it must take into account the accessibility and price of the region's oil.²¹

Another major implication related to oil is the almost total dependency of such US allies as the Western European nations and Japan on Middle East oil supplies. The United States can probably survive a cutoff of Middle East oil by shifting to other sources; however, Western European nations and Japan cannot. Japan presently receives nearly 75 percent of its oil from the Middle

East, and most Western European nations receive more than half their oil from that region. Disruption of oil supplies for Japan and Western Europe could seriously jeopardize the entire Western security and alliance system.

The last of the major factors influencing US Middle East interests is the rise of Islamic fundamentalism since the overthrow of the Shah of Iran and the coming to power of an Iranian Islamic Republic with its fundamentalist ideology.²² No assessment of the Middle East is complete that fails to take account of this newly awakened concept. Traditionally, the two branches of the Islamic religion have produced a sharp intra-faith cleavage. The Shia branch has tended to exercise a militancy generally lacking in the Sunni sect.²³ The rise to power of Ayatollah Khomeini is the rise of a fundamentalist, puritanical Shia; he has called for the strictest interpretation of the Koran and the rejection of virtually all Western influence. Further, once the Islamic fundamentalists were in power in Iran, they announced as one of their tenets the export of revolution to the entire Islamic world.²⁴ This was especially unsettling to Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the states of the Arabian Peninsula along the Persian Gulf. Here the potential exists for instability and unrest owing to the large numbers of Shias present in the populations. Concurrently with the rise to power in Iran of an Islamic fundamentalist state, President Zia in Pakistan was establishing stricter enforcement of Islamic laws.²⁵ In addition, Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi instituted a strict Islamic government and has waged a vehement campaign against every Arab state that does not adhere to Islamic precepts.

THE DECADE OF THE EIGHTIES

Basic US interests and objectives have not been altered by the events described above, but changes in direction and emphasis are appropriate. Former relationships must be restructured, adjustments must be made to compensate for changing realities, and the role of economic power must be realized.

Paramount among American objectives

will be the continued denial of Soviet influence and the avoidance of big-power confrontations. Now that the Soviets have aggressively sought new inroads in the region, demonstrated a power projection capability in Afghanistan, and exhibited a global reach, the pursuit of these interests will become even more difficult.

Access to oil will also remain a primary US objective in the 1980s, and dependency on oil will be a major factor influencing US actions in the Mideast. As can be seen from the actions of such oil-producing states as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Libya, movement on the Palestinian issue will be required to insure future Western access to oil.²⁶ Even though states outside the Middle East, such as Nigeria and Mexico, are now providing the United States with more petroleum products than in the past, the major source of US imports remains the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia. Thus, friendly American relations with the nations of the Arabian Peninsula remain vital. Recent reports reveal that the Soviet Union will continue to be a net exporter of oil through the 1980s. These estimates contrast sharply with earlier reports that the Soviets would be net importers by the mid-1980s and that Middle East oil fields would provide the most likely source for their imports.²⁷

American support and security assistance for the State of Israel will doubtless continue to affect US relations in the Middle East. Questions that must be addressed include: How much support is enough? What pressures, if any, should the United States exert to help resolve the Arab-Israeli problems? And should the United States support Israel without consideration for the effects of that support on other US interests in the Middle East? The United States must seek to moderate what has seemed to the Arabs and others as blind, unreasoned support of Israel to the exclusion of rights for the Palestinians; failing that, the United States must at least promote movement forward to some just solution for both sides. Israeli intransigence, shown by the recent Begin government statements and by Israeli actions in Lebanon and against the Iraqi nuclear facility, do not augur well for peace.²⁸

As a result of the Israeli position, other US interests suffer and it becomes much more difficult for the United States to take effective action or seem credible to the Arabs. The United States should continue to support legitimate Israeli needs, but Israel must make concessions toward solving the Palestinian issue. Guarantees are needed for each side, not just for the Israelis, but for the Syrians, the Jordanians, and the Palestinians as well. The United States must show that it is serious in seeking to solve the issues. This means that discussions must start with responsible Palestinians both within and outside the Palestine Liberation Organization. Moderation must be fostered. Both Israelis and Palestinians must renounce their mutually damaging statements regarding force and the use of terrorist tactics. Recognition of mutual rights must be forthcoming, and extreme positions should be avoided. Until the United States is able to begin meaningful discussions with the Palestinians, little of substance will occur. In such a situation, of course, the problem will continue to fester, and chances for a renewed outbreak of hostilities will grow.²⁹

RECOMMENDED US ACTIONS

To meet the difficulties described above, several American initiatives are urgently required. Specifically, the United States should—

- Make every effort to better its relations with moderate pro-Western regimes such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, Israel, and Egypt. It should identify those states in the area that are its friends, clarify mutual interests, and undertake appropriate guarantees and cooperative action. It should emphasize the paramount role of Saudi Arabia in all regional affairs, and insure that Saudi counsel is sought on the range of issues affecting the area.

- Begin a dialogue with the Palestinians. Many US concerns rest on the premise of a settlement of the Arab-Israeli problem. And without the direct involvement of the Palestinians, there can be no solution to the Palestinian question or to such other

issues as regional stability, Soviet influence, and the security of Israel. Although many difficulties still exist, the Palestinian leadership has in the last year or so appeared more realistic in its demands at a time when the Israeli government has seemed to become less realistic, if not totally opposed to any form of workable agreement. But Palestinian moderation and restraint cannot be expected to last indefinitely. Further signs of progress on their legitimate demands must be forthcoming.³⁰

- Improve its military credibility in the region to include use of facilities, overflight rights, port visits, military assistance, joint exercises, and training. Such steps as the creation of an independent Indian Ocean Command; the negotiation of agreements with regional states such as Oman, Somalia, Kenya, and Egypt for basing, training, and staging facilities; and the provision of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force with a capability that is real and perceived as credible by regional states will renew the US posture in the region.³¹

- Expand its relations with such radical regimes as Iraq and Algeria. Both of these states have shown a willingness to distance themselves from the Soviet Union, and both desire to play a more respectable role in regional affairs. Both states have been hardliners regarding the United States and have chosen to encourage a level of instability in the region that goes beyond the bounds of normal patterns of change. Recently, they have indicated a willingness to alter their hardline positions. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the internal turmoil in Iran have given Iraq food for thought; this state is now actively seeking a rapprochement with the Persian Gulf states other than Iran and has begun to turn westward in search of economic realization.³² The United States has an opportunity to emphasize mutuality of interests with Iraq on a range of issues. If agreement could be reached with regard to the Palestinians and renewal of an American military presence, then US gains are possible. How well the US can assuage Iraqi sensibilities injured by the Israeli airstrike will be another important factor.

- Continue to pursue a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement. The whole range of issues involved must be addressed, including border questions with Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon; water rights covering the Jordan River watershed; Jerusalem; the Palestinians; and the security of Israel. The United States must show that it can deal with the issues objectively, resisting unseemly pressures from the American Jewish community and other special interest groups, and that it can deal with the issues in terms of US national interests.

- Encourage its Western European allies and Japan to take a more substantive role in the defense and stability of the Middle East. These countries have vital interests at stake in the region, in many instances greater than those of the United States, and they should be involved in the whole spectrum of Western military, economic, and political measures in the area.

- Clarify its interests in the area, clearly articulate them, and show the resolve and ability to support them. This will call for firmness in dealing with regional actors, in letting the Soviets understand our position, and in educating our own population on the realities of the region.

To pursue its own interests in the Middle East effectively, the United States must show that it has the ability and inclination to assist moderate elements and to provide diplomatic means to resolve conflicts. Further, the United States must meld its diplomacy with power if it is to gain a credible posture. For despite the formidable challenges of the Middle East, solutions are available if the United States can demonstrate the wisdom of its policy and then make believable its will and means to bring that policy into effect.

NOTES

1. James R. Schiesinger, "American Power and the Survival of the West," *Parameters*, 10 (June 1980), 19-25.

2. This point can be seen by reviewing statements by key US policymakers for the past 15 years. See, for example, "Charting the Future Course of US Foreign Aid in the Near East and South Asia," *Department of State Bulletin*, 54 (25 April 1966), 668-71.

3. The Soviet danger in the Middle East and the need for a strong US counter were well pointed out by John S. Badeau in "The Middle East: Conflict in Priorities," *Foreign Affairs*, 36 (January 1958), 233-40.

4. In his State of the Union Message on 23 January 1980, President Carter expressed America's stake in the Middle East oil region in the strongest possible terms: "Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America." For the complete text see *The New York Times*, 24 January 1980, p. A12.

5. Perhaps the most cogent discussions of US activities can be found in Edward R. F. Sheehan, *The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger* (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1976) and William B. Quandt, *Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1977).

6. Ample evidence for this position exists. The most recent public statement can be found in David D. Newsom, "US Policy Toward the Persian Gulf," *Current Policy*, 11 April 1980.

7. See the interview with Secretary of Defense Brown in "Cost to Protect Mideast Oil: \$5 Billion a Year," *US News and World Report*, 4 August 1980, pp. 26-28; Richard Burt, "Middle East Regional Security," *Current Policy*, 23 March 1981; and Alexander Haig, "A New Direction in US Foreign Policy," *Current Policy*, 24 April 1981.

8. A recent short appraisal of Soviet activity can be found in Steven J. Rosen, *Soviet Strengths and Vulnerabilities in the Middle East*, RAND P-6446 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, February 1980).

9. Several recent accounts point to the Soviet and Soviet proxy activity in South Yemen. See, for example, Drew Middleton, "Soviets Said to Build Arms Caches in Libya, Syria, Persian Gulf Area," *The New York Times*, 14 March 1980, p. A11; and Charles T. Powers, "Aden: A Stop on the Moscow Shuttle," *The Washington Post*, 17 September 1980, p. A29.

10. Probably the finest expose of Libyan foreign adventures, perfidy, and terrorist activity can be found in G. Henry M. Schuler, "Beyond Billy: The Importance of Investigating Libya's Treacheries," *The Washington Post*, 27 July 1980, pp. D1, D4, and D5; John K. Cooley, "The Libyan Menace," *Foreign Policy*, 42 (Spring 1981), 74-93; and Nathan Alexander, "The Foreign Policy of Libya: Inflexibility Amid Change," *Orbis*, 24 (Winter 1981), 819-46.

11. See Middleton, p. A11; and William Branigin, "Isolated Syrians Tighten Soviet Ties," *The Washington Post*, 22 February 1980, pp. A17-18. For information about the Syrian-Soviet treaty, see Kevin Klose, "Moscow, Damascus Conclude Military, Economic Accord," *The Washington Post*, 9 October 1980, pp. A1, A44.

12. Iraq seems in the throes of a real dilemma. On one hand it wants to be the leader of the Pan-Arab movement and wants to be seen as the protector of Arab interests against what it sees as encroachment by both the West (epitomized by the United States, France, and Great Britain) and the Soviets. At the same time it feels impelled to retain its arms relationship with the Soviets because it has become dependent in that sphere. Yet, recent overtures to Italy, West Germany, France, and Britain to obtain equipment previously supplied exclusively by the Soviets indicate that the Iraqis intend to broaden their horizons and lessen their dependence. John K. Cooley, in "Conflict Within the Iraqi Left," *Problems of Communism*, 29 (January-February 1980), 87-93, discusses the internal strains in Iraq which provide the background for current actions. The Israeli airstrike against the Iraqi nuclear facility on 7 June 1981 has severely complicated Iraq's options

and has demonstrated anew Israel's military dominance of the region.

13. John Kifner, "Libya and Syria Sign Merger Agreement," *The New York Times*, 11 September 1980, p. A7.

14. Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Saudis Are Trying to Maintain a Safe Distance from the United States," *The New York Times*, 9 March 1980, p. E3. Recent Soviet discussions with moderate leaders from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, and Morocco provide additional evidence of the distancing syndrome.

15. Matti Peled, "Palestine Key to Mideast Security—An Israeli View," *Christian Science Monitor*, 1 April 1980, p. 23. Arab positions are clear: movement must be made on settling the Palestinian issue or there can be no movement on other issues. Saudi Crown Prince Fahd, in an interview on 24 May 1980, stressed the centrality of the Palestinian question; others, including the leaders of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Libya, have often reiterated that position. For Prince Fahd's comments, see Jim Hoagland, "Saudis Vow Aid on Accord If Israel Pledges Pullback," *The Washington Post*, 25 May 1980, pp. A1, A22.

16. Harold H. Saunders, "Defining US Interests in the Middle East," *New Outlook*, 23 (January-February 1980), 32.

17. See especially: James R. Schlesinger, "The US Will Now Be Forced To Choose," *The Washington Post*, 12 June 1981, p. A17; "Political Fallout from Israel Strike on Baghdad Reactor Spreads Around Globe," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 10 June 1981, pp. 12-13; and Donald Sutherland, "Another Casualty: Reagan Mideast Plan?," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 10 June 1981, p. 12. For a text of the UN resolution and discussion of the US-Iraqi efforts see "Text of Draft Resolution at U.N. On Israeli's Raid on Iraqi Reactor," *The New York Times*, 19 June 1981, p. A10; and Bernard D. Nossiter, "U.S. and Iraq Agree on U.N. Resolution to 'Condemn' Raid," *The New York Times*, 19 June 1981, pp. A1 and A6. Edward Cody, in "Iraqi Leader Endorses Better Ties With U.S.," *The Washington Post*, 29 June 1981, p. A16, discusses Iraq's movement toward the US.

18. One of the best studies in English of North Yemen is Manfred W. Wenner, *Modern Yemen: 1918-1966* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1967). An excellent survey of Saudi Arabia and its security concerns can be found in Adee Dawisha, *Saudi Arabia's Search for Security*, Adelphi Papers, No. 158 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979).

19. The vagaries of peninsular politics and the role that the US-Soviet rivalry plays can be seen in the whole question of arms sales to North Yemen. See Edward Cody, "Yemeni Hostilities Heating Up Again," *The Washington Post*, 7 June 1980, pp. A13, A19.

20. A superb discussion of Lebanon's internal and external difficulties is in Walid Khalidi, *Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1979).

21. President Carter had noted the importance of Persian Gulf oil before his 1980 State of the Union Message; on 16 March 1978, in an address at Wake Forest University, he said that "the economic health and well-being of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan depend upon continued access to the oil from the Persian Gulf." The economic effect of the oil pricing has wide-ranging ramifications, not just for the United States and the West, but for the producing states and the Third World states that have limited resources and find oil becoming increasingly dear.

22. Numerous excellent articles and books are available to provide an appreciation for the Islamic revival and the impetus given this revival by the Iranian revolution. Among the best is G. H. Jensen, *Militant Islam* (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), especially pp. 121-204.

23. Charles H. Whittier, *Islam in Iran: The Shi'ite Faith, Its History and Teaching* (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 11 September 1979).

24. Raymond N. Habiby and Fariborz Ghavidel, "Khumayni's Islamic Republic," *Middle East Review*, 11 (Summer 1979), 12-20.

25. Evidence of Zia's effort can be seen in Carol Honsa, "Pakistani President Hopes to Sculpt 'Model Islamic State,'" *Christian Science Monitor*, 2 September 1980, p. 3.

26. Statements by senior Saudi officials are indicative of this attitude. See, for example, Pranay B. Gupte, "Saudi Oil Revenues Seem to Outstrip Nation's Capacity to Put Them to Use," *The New York Times*, 24 March 1981, p. A12.

27. US Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, *The World Oil Market in the Years Ahead*, August 1979, (especially Appendix C, pp. 37-42) had indicated that the Soviets would no longer be net exporters of oil by the mid-1980s. However, new reports revise the earlier estimates and suggest that the Soviets will not become net importers at least until the early 1990s if at all. These can be found in Bernard Gwertzman, "C.I.A. Revises Estimate, Sees Soviet As Oil-Independent Through 80's," *The New York Times*, 19 May 1981, pp. A1, and D11; and US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Energy in Soviet Policy* (Washington: GPO, 11 June 1981).

28. The Begin attitude is described in Jason Morris, "Begin Pursues His Hard Line, Defies Friends and Allies,"

Christian Science Monitor, 15 July 1980, p. 3.

29. Two recent proposals regarding Jerusalem ought to be useful in any discussion: Lord Caradon, *The Future of Jerusalem: A Review of Proposals for the Future of the City*. National Security Affairs Monograph Series 80-1 (Washington: National Defense University, February 1980); and John A. Berry, "The Jerusalem Question: Cutting the Gordian Knot," *Parameters*, 10 (June 1980), 33-43.

30. The ebb and flow of sentiment in the Palestinian camp indicate considerable internal strife and dialogue. See Jonathan C. Randal, "PLO's Armed-Struggle Rhetoric Muted by Pragmatic Politicking," *The Washington Post*, 22 March 1980, pp. A1, A28.

31. In the spring and summer of 1980, the United States concluded agreements with Oman, Kenya, and Somalia, and has shown movement in expanding its military posture in the region. For many area states, however, the question of US credibility and resolve remains in doubt.

32. Edward Cody, "Iraq Leader Seeks Greater Globe Role," *The Washington Post*, 2 October 1979, p. A7. Despite Iraq's many signals of change and its seeming desire to play a more moderate role in regional and global affairs, its relations with the United States remain in disarray, in large part because of conflicting actions by the United States. US problems are discussed in Jonathan C. Randal, "Iraq Rebuffs US Overtures on Full Diplomatic Ties," *The Washington Post*, 12 May 1980, p. A12.

