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Robert K. Griffith Jr

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CONSCRIPTION AND THE ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

by

ROBERT K. GRIFFITH JR.

Despite the fact that the President, the Secretaries of Defense and the several uniformed services, the Chiefs of Staff, and leaders of Congress have declared the all-volunteer force viable and are committed to making it work in peacetime, some Army officers continue to insist that the volunteer Army is not working. These officers argue that before the Army can ever begin to perform its assigned functions adequately the active and reserve components must be filled to authorized strength with quality soldiers and that the replacement system cannot be left to the whims of voluntary enlistments. The consensus of this group is that the experiment has not produced sufficient forces at an acceptable cost and should be scrapped.¹

The unwillingness of some officers to consider an alternative to conscription is unfortunate, for it places these military professionals in an adversary relationship with the government, the Army, and the society which they serve and to which they are subordinate. Furthermore, those within the military who yearn for a return to the draft or some form of universal service as a "quick fix" to current manpower problems overlook the fact that peacetime compulsory military service in any form is an aberration in the United States. An all-volunteer force is the norm in American history. Only during periods when there was a broad popular consensus of a "clear and present danger" to

society have the American people resorted to conscription.

POPULAR OPPOSITION TO CONSCRIPTION

Only as colonials of Great Britain did the American people ever come close to experiencing universal military service. Yet even in the 18th century, as the frontier moved west and men found profit more appealing than military service, the settled and secured regions along the Atlantic coast modified the universal service implied by the militia system. As the threat receded, active participation in the militia became voluntary and the units themselves became increasingly social in nature. During the Revolution volunteers made up the backbone of both the Continental Line and those units that served beyond their states' borders. By the 19th century, the volunteer system had triumphed, despite the fact that the Militia Act of 1792, which formed the basis of US military manpower policy for over 100 years, reiterated the principle of universal military obligation. Even during the Civil War, when both the Union and Confederacy resorted to rudimentary state-controlled forms of conscription, volunteers formed the bulk of the contending armies.²

World War I brought the first truly modern draft (modern in the sense that it permitted no hiring of substitutes and was

centralized at the federal level) in the American experience. The draft supplied two-thirds of the manpower needed for the war, but it was strictly a wartime measure. The Selective Service Act of 1917 explicitly stated that conscription would end with hostilities; no one was inducted after 11 November 1918.³

In the summer of 1940, Congress enacted the first peacetime draft in American history. Alarmed by the rapidity of the German sweep into the European low countries and France, an organization of eastern businessmen with international connections organized a well-financed lobby effort that capitalized on the uncertainty of the times to overcome deep-seated isolationist tendencies and pushed a selective service bill through Congress. Interestingly, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall, and the General Staff initially opposed the measure. Marshall preferred a more gradual and balanced buildup of the Army based on the volunteer principle. Only when the new Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, a prominent member of the organization favoring a draft, scuttled the Army's planned volunteer effort did Marshall throw his support behind peacetime conscription. A year later, in 1941, after the hysteria attending the fall of France died down and England still stood, the Army and the Roosevelt Administration experienced great difficulty in extending the draft in peacetime; the House approved the continuation of conscription by only one vote. The subsequent total involvement of the United States in World War II and the ultimate victory obscured the prewar hostility to peacetime selective service and justified the apparent wisdom of that extraordinary move.⁴

Following World War II the United States initially pursued its familiar postwar tendencies. The mass army was quickly dispersed. By mid-1947 the strength of the Army, which still included the Air Force, had dropped from 8,267,958 to 1,070,000. The Selective Service Act expired 31 March 1947.⁵

The developing Cold War brought a resumption of the draft in 1948. Despite widespread opposition to both selective

service and universal military training, the draft continued into the 1950's. After the Korean War, opposition to the draft diminished. Congress renewed the Selective Service Act with little debate every four years beginning in 1951—notably in off-election years. During the height of the Cold War military leaders enjoyed a far greater role in formulating defense policy than they had ever experienced before. The realities of facing up to fascism and communism had silenced most of the opponents of a large peacetime military establishment and the draft.

American involvement in Vietnam ended an era of bipartisan agreement on foreign and defense policy. As Americans began to question the assumptions behind their foreign policy, they also began to examine the instrumentalities by which those policies were sustained. In one sense the draft was a natural casualty of the longest, most unpopular war in American history. Inductions from 1954 to 1964 averaged 100,000 a year. As American involvement in Vietnam escalated, so too did conscription. (Voluntary enlistments also increased, but certainly many of these were draft-motivated.) In 1966, 400,000 were called. Casualties also increased, especially among draftees. Draftees, who constituted only 16 percent of the armed forces, but 88 percent of infantry soldiers in Vietnam, accounted for over 50 percent of combat deaths in 1969, a peak year for casualties.⁶ Little wonder that the draft became the focus of anti-Vietnam War activism.

But more than the war in Vietnam ended in the early 1970's. By officially embracing the policy of detente, normalizing relations with China, and enunciating the Nixon Doctrine, the United States (perhaps prematurely) effectively proclaimed the end of an even longer war—the Cold War. Thus, in a larger sense, the end of the draft simply represented a return to the status quo antebellum.

PAST EXPERIENCE WITH VOLUNTEERS

Unfortunately for the military services,

the draft had in their eyes come to represent the natural state of affairs. By 1973 only a few of the most senior officers still on active duty could remember having served in a truly all-volunteer force. The services had neither institutional memory nor experience related to recruiting or retaining peacetime volunteers in an environment free of conscription pressures. Thus it was natural that when the all-volunteer force of the 1970's failed to live up to expectations—when higher pay and better working and living conditions failed to attract either the required quantity or quality of recruits—critics would declare the experiment a failure and demand a return to the draft. In fact, the record of the contemporary peacetime volunteer Army is about the same as those of its predecessors. Volunteers have rarely been representative of the larger society; dependency on volunteers has often left the Army understrength; and officers have been less than satisfied with the quality of peacetime enlisted volunteers in the past.

Enlisted men in the 19th-century Regular Army came largely from the disadvantaged or disaffected elements of society. Some few were educated men, often professionals, who had fallen on hard times. In 1850, the *United Service Journal* reported that in one company of 55 men, “nine-tenths enlisted on account of female difficulty; 13 . . . had changed their names, and 43 were either drunk, or partially so, at the time of their enlistment.” By mid-century, immigrants constituted over half of the volunteer Army.⁷ In the 20th century the proportion of immigrants in the Army began to decline. Legislative restriction cut the flow of immigrants to a trickle in the 1920's, and Congress restricted enlistment to citizens or men who had declared their intent to become citizens. Most enlisted men in the Army of the 1920's and 1930's came from urban working class backgrounds. Except during the depths of the Great Depression, few possessed more than an eighth-grade education. These soldiers served the pre-World War II Army's needs well enough, and after 1931 “quality” recruits were not an issue. As late as 1940, high school graduates made up only half of the 17-year-olds in the country.⁸

Conditions of service in previous all-volunteer American armies were often harsh. Low pay, slow promotions, and arduous fatigue duty did little to attract men to enlist. Before the Civil War, privates received five or six dollars a month, compared to about \$30 a month earned by non-farm workers in 1860. They enlisted for five years and could not expect a promotion before their second or third enlistment. When they were not campaigning, soldiers on the frontier laid out and constructed roads, built their own forts and barracks, and grew and harvested most of their food and forage. One soldier complained in 1838, “I never was given to understand that such duties were customary in the Army, much less that I would be called on to perform them, or I never would have enlisted. I enlisted to avoid work, and here I am compelled to perform three or four times the amount of labor I did before my enlistment.”⁹

Desertions plagued the peacetime armies. Nearly half the men who enlisted in 1825 deserted before the end of the year. In 1891 the Adjutant General reported that one-third of the 255,712 men who had enlisted since 1867 had deserted. Not surprisingly, the army found that reenlistments tended to be lowest when desertions were high.¹⁰

Throughout the 19th century, the Army accepted high annual losses philosophically. The conventional wisdom of the era seemed to be that conditions inducing desertions and low reenlistments—low pay compared to prevailing civilian wages, for example—were

Major Robert K. Griffith Jr. is a teaching fellow with the Combat Studies Institute of the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. A 1967 graduate of West Point, he received his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in history from Brown University in 1974 and 1979. In previous assignments he has served in leadership and staff positions in armored and armored cavalry units in the United States, Vietnam, and Germany. From 1974 to 1979 he was Assistant Professor of History at West Point. His first book, *Men Wanted for the U.S. Army: The Volunteer Army and American Society, 1919-1940*, is forthcoming.



beyond the ability of the service to control. Furthermore, the recruiting service usually proved able to enlist enough men to keep the small Regular Army reasonably up to strength. After World War I, when for the first time the peacetime strength of the standing force exceeded 100,000, the War Department began a determined effort to reduce losses, improve the quality of inductees, and establish "scientific" recruiting practices.

REORGANIZATION OF THE RECRUITING SERVICE

Modernization of the recruiting system began in 1919. Faced with the task of replacing virtually the entire enlisted force after the World War I Army was demobilized, the Adjutant General conducted a review of the existing recruiting service and its practices. Major Irving J. Phillipson, who prepared the report, concluded that the established practices of getting recruits, which relied heavily on uniformed recruiters canvassing local districts throughout the country, supplemented by periodic recruiting drives, would not be adequate in the future. He proposed a flexible organization that could expand or contract to meet the Army's manpower needs. Phillipson also recognized the potential of advertising and urged the Adjutant General to exploit all aspects of the news media.¹¹ At about the same time, Colonel Charles Martin, the Chief of the General Recruiting Service, commissioned an undercover investigation of recruiters and their activities. Martin sent Lieutenant Harry G. Dowdell on an inspection tour in the guise of an unemployed drifter. Dowdell found that most recruiters concentrated their efforts on unemployment lines and railroad stations frequented by itinerants. He reported that throughout the country recruiters enthusiastically enlisted him despite his ostensible medical disabilities, criminal record, and illiteracy. Martin made energetic use of the information; he dismissed about one-third of the recruiting sergeants and officers.¹²

While the Adjutant General and Colonel

Martin busied themselves with building an effective recruiting system for obtaining the higher number of requisite volunteers for the postwar Army, others in the War Department considered what to do about enlisted losses. In 1920 Colonel Edward L. Munson, Chief of the Morale Branch of the General Staff, ordered a study of the desertion problem. Munson believed that desertions were but a symptom of a broader internal problem affecting Army manpower procurement and retention—in short, poor morale. Munson identified seven general causes of manpower loss: discharges without reenlistment, discharges by courts-martial, discharges by order, desertions, disability discharges, retirement, and death. The last three he considered legitimate; the first four could be affected by low morale. Only improve the morale of the service, Munson said, and reenlistments would go up while desertions, courts-martial, and directed discharges would go down.¹³

Major Edward N. Woodbury, an infantryman detailed to the Morale Branch, conducted the study on desertions ordered by Colonel Munson. The final report ranged well beyond the immediate issue, exploring the relationships among recruiting, reenlistments, and desertions. Reenlistments, Woodbury found, varied inversely with desertions, because "the causes which produce lack of contentment with the service undoubtedly increase desertion and prevent reenlistment." Woodbury also identified conditions in society which appeared to affect losses. The most significant outside influence was the economy. He discovered that desertions decreased sharply during every economic panic in American history. Conversely, he found that when employment was high desertions rose and reenlistments declined.

Woodbury recognized that the Army could not control the outside influences. He concentrated on the internal influences, such as pay, length of the enlistment period, increases or decreases in strength, and condition of service. Decreases in pay or increases in the length of the enlistment contract had a negative impact on morale,

while the opposite adjustments had a positive impact. Any sudden changes in strength created personnel turbulence and uncertainty, which also affected morale adversely. But conditions of Army life affected soldiers most. These conditions included state of barracks, quality of food, pass and furlough privileges, recreational facilities, and guard and fatigue duties. All of the conditions named, Woodbury said, fell under the control of the local commander. The commander who looked after his soldiers' health, welfare, and living and working conditions could appreciably hold down losses.¹⁴

Not everyone agreed with Woodbury's conclusions. His report received wide circulation in the Army and generated considerable comment. Few of the 156 responses to the study directly challenged Woodbury's contention that leadership was crucial to holding down losses, but fully half of the replies mentioned recruiting practices and the poor quality of recruits obtained during peacetime as central to the Army's manpower problem. Brigadier General Henry Jervey, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, complained that the problem resulted from unenlightened recruiting—taking men who were “mentally deficient or ignorant, irresponsible, young, unstable or easily influenced, addicted to drugs or excessive use of intoxicants, physically weak, ill or physically deficient, degenerate or of weak character, of known bad or criminal civil record, discontented or disgruntled, given to excessive association with or victims of immoral women.” Jervey recommended tightening recruiting requirements to weed out the undesirables even if it meant accepting fewer men. Above all, he wanted an end to recruiting drives which induced recruiters to accept the dregs in order to meet quotas. Major General Charles P. Summerall, Commander of the First Division, felt that “the fundamental cause of desertion is instability of character, a thing that is, I think, beyond the power of the military to remove.” Summerall, a future Chief of Staff, suggested an additional study of individual deserters to enable the Army to

identify potential deserters before they enlisted. Brigadier General Douglas MacArthur agreed with Summerall, whom he would succeed as Chief of Staff in 1930, but he also agreed with Woodbury that desertions were a function of dissatisfaction with the service. However, rather than eliminate sources of discontent, MacArthur urged that malcontents be discharged. “In all business enterprises, except that of the military or naval establishment,” MacArthur wrote, “men who do not fit the positions for which they are hired are discharged almost immediately.” MacArthur was only one of the most eloquent who thus blamed the recruit, the enlisted men, or the Recruiting Service for the Army's problems.¹⁵

Most of the officers who commented on Woodbury's study listed causes and conditions within the Army which affected losses. The question of outside factors received scant treatment. One officer, however, Major C. W. Harlow, Commander of the Tenth Field Artillery at Camp Pike, Arkansas, recognized the external economic factor and addressed it candidly. Harlow felt that the brunt of the blame for high losses fell on poor recruits. Although he did not hold the Army or the Recruiting Service blameless, he believed that all “causes simmer down to one. Protracted peace produces genuine economic prosperity which in turn, by increasing the pay of industrial workers, relatively reduced the pay of the soldier, whereupon the recruiting service, compelled to fill the Army, accepts men below a good standard. . . .” It is in periods of depression that the Army gets good men, Harlow said: “Industry's extremity thus becomes the Army's opportunity.” Harlow recommended that the Army cease recruiting drives in good times and concentrate on picking up good men in hard times.¹⁶

THE VOLUNTEER ARMY BETWEEN WORLD WARS

The ideas and recommendations embodied in Phillipson's and Woodbury's reports and the comments generated by Woodbury's report set the tone for the

Regular Army's approach to manpower procurement and retention problems for the next 20 years. In February 1921, Congress reduced the enlisted strength of the standing Army from 150,000 to 125,000. The War Department halted all recruiting and disbanded the Recruiting Service as an economy measure. When enlistments were allowed to resume in September, a reorganized Recruiting Service, designed according to Phillipson's proposal, took to the streets. The system remained under the supervision of the Adjutant General but was decentralized and extremely flexible. A General Recruiting Service officer, attached to the headquarters of each of the nine Army corps areas, monitored the strengths and losses of the units in his area. The number of men assigned to recruiting duty could be expanded or contracted to meet the Army's needs, while the General Recruiting Service could be supplemented by recruiting teams drawn from local units or posts. A Recruiting Publicity Bureau, located in New York City, was established to coordinate advertising, advise recruiters of the Army's monthly personnel needs, and keep members of the widely dispersed recruiting service informed. By the end of 1923, this reorganized procurement system was functioning smoothly and, except when Congress made sudden changes in the enlisted strength, enabled the Regular Army to maintain its authorized strength throughout the interwar period.¹⁷

Recruiters had to work hard to keep the ranks filled during the 1920's. Starting pay for an enlisted man was \$21 a month, an amount which, owing to the general prosperity of the decade, unskilled laborers frequently earned in a week. The Army understood the influence of pay on both attracting and retaining soldiers, and lobbied hard before Congress for a raise. The effort was to no avail, however, so that recruiters had to find other ways to appeal to potential recruits. A Recruiting Publicity Bureau handbook of the period stressed the theme "earn, learn, travel." Recruiters countered the disadvantage of low pay by pointing out that the Army offered job security and

excellent retirement benefits to enlisted men at a time when only a few skilled blue collar workers enjoyed similar advantages. The Army also appealed to that sense of adventure it was sure lurked in the hearts of all young men. Finally, the Army offered itself as a vocational school for those men seeking to develop marketable skills. An effective canvasser determined what his prospect was interested in and then sold the Army accordingly: if the civilian was out of work the recruiter offered a steady job; if he was filled with wanderlust, the recruiter talked of faraway places like Hawaii or Panama; if he seemed interested in bettering himself, the recruiter might suggest enlisting in the Signal Corps, which promised assignment to radio school. Little or no mention in printed literature was ever made of patriotism or preparing for war.¹⁸

Beginning in the mid-1920's, War Department efforts to improve the quality of recruits and cut down on enlisted losses made the recruiter's task more difficult. The Army initiated a program of fingerprinting all applicants for enlistment, checking these against discharge records and Justice Department files in an effort to prevent criminals and former soldiers discharged under less than honorable circumstances from enlisting or reenlisting. For the first time, youths were required to furnish authenticated proof of age. The Army also insisted that applicants under the age of 21 produce notarized consent papers from parents or guardians before they could sign up. But the major effort focused on preventing potential deserters from enlisting. Between 1924 and 1926, the Department of Psychiatry and Sociology of the United States Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, under the guidance of Brigadier General Edward Munson, developed a series of examinations designed to identify misfits and malcontents.¹⁹ When Charles P. Summerall became Chief of Staff in 1926, he ordered the tests administered to all applicants for initial enlistment. The Army also developed intelligence tests for applicants and established minimum standards of basic literacy for enlistment. At about the same

time, the General Recruiting Service adopted the slogan "quality not quantity."²⁰

The stock market crash of 1929 followed by the onset of the Great Depression changed the social and economic context in which the interwar all-volunteer Army operated. Whereas during the 1920's the Army struggled for every man it got, during the early 1930's recruiters enjoyed a seller's market. The Army lost no time in taking advantage of the situation. The official publication of the General Recruiting Service admonished canvassers:

Now is the time when every application for service with the colors must be scrutinized with unusual care. . . . The good man must be shown every consideration. . . . But the Army has no place for the individual who is merely seeking 'three squares and a flop.' The 'quality not quantity' idea must be kept always in mind.²¹

As applications for enlistment began to increase dramatically in 1930, desertions predictably fell and reenlistments rose. The Army responded by tightening reenlistment standards. Beginning in 1931, the Adjutant General directed that "no man discharged from his first enlistment with character less than 'very good' will be reenlisted." The Adjutant General also raised the minimum acceptable score on the intelligence test for original enlistment from 34 to 44 (a score "which corresponds to the completion of the eighth grade in school"), and required applicants for enlistment to furnish letters from citizens of known reputation attesting to the good character of the applicant.²²

From 1930 to 1933, canvassers did not have to look far to find recruits. Lower annual losses meant that the Army needed fewer recruits at a time when more men sought to enlist. By the end of 1930, most recruiting districts had waiting lists. In 1932 the Adjutant General reported that "Employment conditions throughout the country were such that recruiting resolved itself into a matter of selection." In 1933, however, the situation changed. The inauguration of work relief programs by the

New Deal, such as the Civilian Conservation Corps, offered unemployed youths an alternative to military service. By 1934 the waiting lists were gone and canvassers returned to the streets on a full-time basis.²³

Douglas MacArthur, who became Chief of Staff in 1930, took an active interest in the program to upgrade the enlisted ranks. A year after the highest enlistment and reenlistment standards went into effect, he asked all major commanders to comment on the results of the program. The replies were gratifying. Unit commanders throughout the Army declared that "a much higher type of recruit is being obtained at present, both physically and mentally." MacArthur insisted that the higher standards remain in effect even after the Depression eased and recruiting again became more difficult.²⁴

MacArthur also gave his personal attention to attempts to purge the ranks of inefficient soldiers. The principle effort focused on married enlisted men. The Army prohibited soldiers below the top three enlisted grades from marrying, on the premise that the pay for the lower ranks was insufficient to support families. The families of these men thus constituted a "burden on the service" and the men were deemed inefficient. In 1931 MacArthur ordered men who married without permission or who could not support their families on Army pay barred from reenlistment.²⁵

When Congress began to increase the strength of the volunteer Army in response to the deterioration of peace in Europe, the programs established for enlisted procurement functioned adequately at first. In 1936 Congress increased strength from 118,750 to 147,000 and the next year to 165,000. The War Department responded by increasing the size and budget of the Recruiting Service, so that the new enlistments were obtained with relative ease. But in 1939 and 1940, Congress raised strength so rapidly that the system could not keep pace with the demand. For example, in September 1939 Congress approved an enlisted strength of 227,000. The Army responded by doubling the size and budget of the Recruiting Service. The new strength was

attained in July 1940, but by that time Congress had enacted an additional increase to 370,000 men. The Army again prepared to double both the budget and strength of the General Recruiting Service, but by the summer of 1940 events overtook the peacetime volunteer Army, and it was scrapped in favor of a draft.²⁶

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE PAST

The experience of the volunteer Army between the World Wars suggests several lessons for the contemporary force. The individuals charged with both obtaining and keeping volunteers went to great lengths to understand the problems they faced. The different Army agencies involved with personnel procurement studied virtually every shred of available data on voluntary enlistments, desertions, and reenlistments. They did not confine their inquiries to recent experience, but carried their investigations as far into the past as reliable records permitted. Recruiters clearly understood that more than pay brought men to the service. The volunteer Army of the 1920's, albeit smaller, obtained the men it needed without the benefit of competitive pay or enlistment bonuses. It did so in an atmosphere of congressional and societal indifference to the size of the Army, and, except during the worst years of the Depression, during an era when few men showed interest in military service except as a last resort. In the early 1930's, the Depression enhanced volunteer Army recruiting beyond the wildest expectations of recruiters of the day, but by the late 1930's recruiting had become a full-time job again. To overcome these significant obstacles the War Department involved all levels of the Army in the programs to understand and solve manpower problems. The General Staff frequently circulated proposals to unit commanders for comment. Officers were encouraged to express their opinions on all matters directly to the Chief of Staff or appropriate General Staff directorate. By doing so, the War Department tacitly condoned loyal dissent and encouraged full

and open discussion of Army policy. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the pre-World War II Army "succeeded" because there was no alternative. When the recruiters failed to maintain strength or when losses became embarrassingly high, there were no "good old days of the peacetime draft" to look back on. Officers before World War II possessed a better appreciation of the subordination of the Army to society. They knew that in peacetime social, economic, and political priorities took precedence over purely military considerations. General Summerall clearly recognized the principle of military subordination to society when he asked President Hoover for an increase in both the Army's strength and budget in 1929 (Hoover had asked Summerall to propose areas for a budget cut). "It is recognized," Summerall wrote, "that the establishment of military policy is not a function of the Army."²⁷

The error of those who seek a return to the peacetime draft is that they define the problem in purely military terms. They want society to conform to the military and cannot understand or have little patience with the notion that the military is and appropriately must remain subordinate to society. In my opinion, it is unlikely that in the absence of "a clear and present danger" society will tolerate a return to the draft. Indeed, even stand-by registration for a draft has caused the kind, though not the measure, of divisive debate occasioned by the draft itself. Critics of the shortcomings of the contemporary volunteer Army should redirect their attention from seeking alternatives to making the system work. A number of sociologists and political scientists have proposed schemes to enhance the attractiveness of military service to volunteers without prohibitive expense.²⁸ History does not offer solutions. But it does offer a past rich with experience in maintaining an all-volunteer force under a wide variety of conditions. Especially in the area of manpower procurement and retention, policymakers can ill assume that present problems are unique and that there are no useful ideas to be gained from past successes or failures.

NOTES

1. This is the author's subjective conclusion based on impressions gained in discussions with students at the US Army Command and General Staff College and based on CGSC student responses to statements concerning the validity of the volunteer-force concept. Further evidence of continuing dissatisfaction with the all-volunteer force can be found almost weekly in the letters to the editor of such unofficial publications as the *Army Times*.
2. For a discussion of the Colonial Militia see Douglas Leach, *Arms for Empire: A Military History of the British Colonies in North America, 1607-1763* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 8-40. A good treatment of the decline of the militia is found in Richard H. Kohn, *Eagle and Sword: The Beginning of the Military Establishment in America* (New York: The Free Press, 1973). The figures on draftees during the Civil War are taken from *The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971), chap. 13.
3. For a brief overview of the World War I draft, see Russell Weigley, *History of the United States Army* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 356-58.
4. The organization referred to is the National Emergency Committee of the Military Training Corps Association. A comprehensive study of the World War II Selective Service System that includes an analysis of its origins is found in the Selective Service System's Special Monograph No. 2 series, *The Selective Service Act, Its Legislative History, Amendments, Appropriations, Cognates, and Prior Instruments of Security* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1954). The Army's plans, including Marshall's views, are summarized in Mark S. Watson, *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 184-89.
5. Weigley, pp. 486, 529.
6. John W. Chambers, *Draftees or Volunteers: A Documentary History of the Debate Over Military Conscription in the United States, 1783-1973* (New York: Garland, 1975), pp. 359-71, 428-31. Chambers provides excellent introductions to each period covered in his documentary history.
7. This coverage of the composition of the 19th-century Army is drawn from Marcus Cunliffe, *Soldiers and Civilians, The Martial Spirit in America, 1775-1865* (New York: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 111-20. See also Francis Paul Prucha, *The Sword of the Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier, 1783-1846* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1977), especially pp. 319-30, and Robert M. Utley, *Frontier Regulars, The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1890* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 22-28.
8. The decline in the number of foreign-born enlisted men can be traced in the *Annual Report of the Secretary of War*. Information on educational levels is sketchy. See for example *U.S. Army Recruiting News*, 5 (January and March 1923). Comparative educational levels are found in *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 379.
9. Prucha, p. 170; *Historical Statistics*, p. 165.
10. Prucha, p. 324; Utley, p. 23.
11. Phillipson's study "Report on Recruiting" is in the National Archives, Washington, D.C. See file 341.1, Central Files of the Adjutant General's Office, Record Group 407.
12. "Excerpts of the Report of LT Harry G. Dowdell," AGO 341.1 (Confidential), RG 407, National Archives.
13. Edward L. Munson, *The Management of Men* (New York: Henry Holt, 1921), pp. 564-65.
14. E. N. Woodbury, "A Study of Desertions in the Army," Mimeograph, Morale Branch General Staff, Washington, D.C., 1920. A copy of Woodbury's report may be found in the Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.
15. Woodbury reviewed and compiled the replies and wrote a cover letter for them. They are in AGO 251.1 (10-12-20) Bulkey, RG 407, National Archives.
16. *Ibid.*
17. "Proposed Plan for Resumption of Active Recruiting," Memo, Adjutant General to Chief of Staff, 18 July 1921, AGO 341.1, RG 407; "Recruiting Situation," Memo, Adjutant General to Chief of Staff, AGO 341.1, RG 94, National Archives.
18. Based on an analysis of articles on recruiting published between 1923 and 1930 in *U.S. Army Recruiting News*, the monthly publication of the Recruiting Publicity Bureau. A fairly complete collection of *Recruiting News* is located at the Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.
19. For a good summary of recruiting restrictions during this period see Captain Reyburn Engles, "Recruiting Problems and Possibilities," *Quartermaster Review*, 6 (January-February 1927), 29-31. The development and institution of mental and intelligence tests for recruits is documented in the files of the Adjutant General's Office. See AGO 220.8 and 319.12, RG 407, National Archives.
20. The development and implementation of literacy and suitability tests for recruits is documented in records at the Adjutant General's Office for the period. See file numbers 220.8, 319.12, and 702; Record Groups 407 and 94, National Archives.
21. "Parting the Sheep from the Goats," *U.S. Army Recruiting News*, 12 (April 1930), 2.
22. *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1931* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1931), pp. 213-15; Memo, Assistant Chief of Staff, Personnel Division to Chief of Staff, "Improvement in Calibre of Recruits," 23 October 1931, AGO 341, RG 94, National Archives.
23. *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1932*, pp. 237-39. For a more detailed discussion of this subject see Robert K. Griffith Jr., "Quality Not Quantity: The Volunteer Army During the Depression," *Military Affairs*, 43 (December 1979), 171-77.
24. The replies were addressed to the Adjutant General. See for example the replies of the Commanding Generals of the Second and Fourth Corps Areas, 21 and 10 February 1933, respectively, AGO 341, RG 94, National Archives.
25. The issue of married enlisted men cropped up periodically during the 1930's. In this instance see "Marriage of Enlisted Men," a lengthy staff study with supporting documents filed under AGO 220.81, RG 94, National Archives.
26. These statistics are derived from a number of sources, principally *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1939*, p. 64; *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1940*, p. 40; Special Report, Statistics Branch, General Staff, 1939, 1940, File 198-A, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.; *The New York Times*, 17 February 1940, p. 6; and Letter, Adjutant General to Commanding General, First Corps Area, 6 February 1940, AGO 341, RG 94, National Archives.
27. Report of the Survey of the Military Establishment by the War Department General Staff, Washington, D.C., 1 November 1928, AGO 333 E.P., RG 407, p. 124.
28. See for example Jerald G. Bachman, John D. Blair, and David R. Segal, *The All-Volunteer Force: A Study of Ideology in the Military* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1977), especially chap. 7; Morris Janowitz and Charles C. Moskos Jr., "Five Years of the All-Volunteer Force: 1973-1978," *Armed Forces and Society*, 5 (February 1979), 171-218; and William L. Hauser, "A Smaller Army? Adapting to the All-Volunteer Situation," *Parameters*, 9 (September 1979), 2-7.