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GREEK FOREIGN POLICY

IN THE 1980's:

DECADE FOR DECISION

by

MICHAEL M. BOLL

In the spring of 1980, Constantine Karamanlis resigned his position as foreign minister of Greece in preference for the title of President of the Republic. Undoubtedly, Karamanlis could look back in pride at the major innovations and policies attributable to the years he held control over the Greek cabinet. In the span of six years, Greece had restored democratic rule, achieved a careful balance between Karamanlis's ruling New Democracy Party and its main domestic critics, and set the stage for full integration into the European Economic Community.

In themselves, these achievements constitute a remarkable record, but they far from exhaust the problems in foreign policy still awaiting resolution. Still on the Greek agenda are the continuing dispute as to the future of Cyprus, an emotional issue which transcends the strategic interest of Athens in this island; unresolved conflicts with Turkey as to control over Aegean air and water spaces; the protracted quarrel over acceptable terms for Greece's reintegration into NATO's military organizations; and the recent freeze in intra-Balkan relations. Greek relations with Moscow, although distinctly improved thanks to the guiding hand of Karamanlis, remain unstable as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the recent demise of Yugoslav President Tito.

All these issues require final resolution if the diplomatic initiatives of the past decade

are to show to best advantage. The 1980's will unquestionably reveal a dynamic pace in Greek policy exceeding even that of the past decade, but with a major difference. Policy henceforth will be built upon the carefully nurtured economic and political structures established by Karamanlis and his dream of integrating Greece more fully in the major political decisions of both his region and continent.

MEMBERSHIP IN THE EEC

The anticipated integration of Greece into the European Economic Community in 1981 constitutes the outstanding diplomatic success of the Karamanlis government—an achievement which will have a profound influence on all aspects of Greek foreign policy in the current decade. It was an earlier Karamanlis cabinet in the late 1950's which first tendered application for membership, an application which bore fruit in the first EEC associate membership, granted in 1962. This agreement provided for the gradual establishment of a full customs union to be achieved over a 12-year period, with certain Greek products retaining protected status for an additional decade. The military coup in Athens in 1967, however, disrupted the gradual transition toward union, producing a seven-year hiatus in Greek-EEC relations. In June 1975, a year after the restoration of democracy, Premier Karamanlis renewed

formal application for EEC membership. But the following January, contrary to all expectations, the commission of the EEC resolved that immediate membership would prove economically harmful to both Greece and the Community alike.

In response, Karamanlis opened a direct lobbying effort with the nine individual governments, stressing the political gains for all parties realizable through Greek membership. In late 1978 his efforts were successful, with a Ministerial Conference of the EEC in Luxembourg drafting the outlines for full Greek membership commencing in early 1981. Certain areas of preferential treatment, especially in agricultural products, were accepted, with additional temporary restrictions being placed on Greek labor movements within the Community. The final accord was signed in Athens on 28 May 1979.

On the morrow of the Luxembourg draft, Karamanlis evaluated the gains anticipated from full membership. True to his past pronouncements, he eschewed the purely economic gains for the political. Speaking to his National Assembly, Karamanlis revealed that EEC membership was the key ingredient of his policy to insure Greece's future independent role within a democratic Europe. Entry into the EEC constituted the decisive turning point in modern Greek history, a turning point which once and for all would end Greece's historic dependence on outside powers for solutions to Greece's domestic and foreign difficulties.¹

CYPRUS, TURKEY, AND THE RETURN TO NATO

The masterful skill displayed by Karamanlis in restoring democracy while integrating Greece into the broader European Community has been less evident in dealings with more regionally oriented problems. The major policy decisions for Greece in this decade will involve her relationships with another NATO member, Turkey—specifically the questions of Cyprus and control of the Aegean air and water spaces. The eventual return of Greece to the NATO military structure depends on a successful resolution of these issues.

The dilemma of Cyprus forms a key political and emotional issue for Greece. While the island is located but 40 miles from the Turkish coast, its predominantly Greek-speaking population is perceived as an extension of Greek civilization and culture now exposed to Turkish domination. The island of Cyprus has enjoyed independence from Britain only since 1960, with the years following scarred by constant bloody quarrels between the dominant Greek-speaking population (about 78 percent of the estimated 628,000 inhabitants, as of the 1970 census) and the Turkish-speaking minority. Several times in the 1960's, the island's domestic disputes spilled into the international arena. In 1964, President Johnson felt compelled to warn Ankara that the use of NATO equipment on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot minority might result in the abrogation of NATO's defense commitments to Turkey.

The current impasse on Cyprus, while deeply rooted in disputes endemic since independence, finds immediate cause in the Athens-backed uprising of 1974, and the resulting Turkish invasion of the island. At present, Cyprus is divided into Greek and Turkish sectors, with Ankara maintaining in its area about 25,000 troops. The Turkish sector, which was expanded through the use of Turkish forces to include nearly 40 percent of the island, functions in an autonomous fashion under the guidance of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.² In contrast, administrative control over the remainder of the island lies with the governmental institutions originated at independence, devoid, naturally, of Turkish Cypriot representation.

To date, efforts to resolve the deep-seated anxieties and hatreds of the native population have borne little fruit, not, certainly, for lack of effort. Various diplomatic attempts have been mounted by Athens, Britain, the United States, NATO, and others, with proposed solutions ranging from partitioning the island between Greece and Turkey to establishing a federated state with varying degrees of regional autonomy. Complementing these international efforts, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots have held

numerous intercommunal talks under the auspices of the UN Secretary General.³ The continuing deadlock arises, in part, from the Greek Cypriot wish to institute a strong central government for a future state and the Turkish Cypriot desire to protect their minority status through creation of a federated republic which would leave administrative powers in the hands of its Turkish and Greek components.

Resolution of this crisis would have a major effect on both NATO and America's efforts to maintain the fragile peace in the Middle East. Modification of the original Cypriot constitution would raise the problem of the present British air bases on the island, placing in question the surveillance missions now mounted from installations at Akrotiri/Episkopi in the southwestern part of Cyprus and from Dhekelia in the southeast. The importance of these bases has been increased both by the loss of Iranian facilities for monitoring Soviet missile tests, and by the fragile understanding between the US and the Greek Cypriot government allowing US planes based on the island to insure implementation of the Israeli-Egyptian Camp David agreement. Both Turkish and Greek Cypriot leaders are on record in support of eventual neutralization of Cyprus once resolution of domestic differences produces a workable constitutional accord.⁴ Thus solution of the Cyprus problem, while of major importance to Athens, undoubtedly will require an international forum in which the interests of various parties and states can be harmonized. As with other Aegean disputes, the Cyprus question lies beyond the ability of Greece to achieve a unilateral resolution.

The disruption of relations between Greece and Turkey owing to the protracted Cyprus crisis is compounded by the equally intractable problem of disputed air and sea spaces in the Aegean. The problem arose in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis, when Turkey granted exploration rights to the Turkish Petroleum Company which amounted, in effect, to a de facto delimitation of the continental shelf in the northwest Aegean.⁵ In the following year, sections of the

southwestern Aegean were likewise assigned. In both cases, the response from Athens was definite and negative. Greece continues to reject any encroachments upon the continental shelf associated with the numerous Greek islands scattered throughout the disputed area. The problem is directly traceable, of course, to the as yet unresolved question of international law as to the extent of continental shelf possessed by islands. Ankara has charged that the position and compactness of these Greek holdings deny Turkish access to territorial waters if the conventional definition of continental shelf is applied. Greece, in turn, has suggested submission of the dispute to arbitration under the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, a convention Turkey has declined to sign. The International Court has been reluctant to involve itself in this complex issue. The result is constant tension concerning the seabed exploratory rights of the two states, with Turkish research vessels being followed on several occasions by units of the Greek Navy.

For Athens, the issue of sea control in the Aegean is one of both regional security and enhanced control over dwindling domestic energy supplies. Greece, which imports nearly three-quarters of domestic oil needs, has expanded her own exploratory activities in the disputed regions, reporting in late 1979 a major strike in the northwest

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Aegean.⁶ In February 1980, Greek Foreign Minister Rallis affirmed Athens' right to retain the disputed continental shelves of the Aegean islands and to extend territorial rights to 12 miles if the need arose.⁷ Such an extension would effectively close the eastern Mediterranean to Turkish ship traffic. This newest threat is naturally being watched carefully in Ankara.⁸

The problem of air rights in the Aegean is also tightly bound up with the Cyprus crisis and the issue of the continental shelf. Before 1974, commercial use of airspace in the eastern Aegean was under the effective control of Athens, to whom this commercial flight information region had been assigned. In August of that year, following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, Turkey insisted that all planes flying eastward coordinate with Turkish air control. In response, Athens forbade commercial flights in the disputed region.

Transcending the mere issue of commercial flights, the quarrel over airspace has its greatest significance with regard to military sorties. Uncertain as to the possibilities of war with Turkey, Athens has been most cautious with respect to Turkish flights over her Aegean islands, all the more so since many of these have been militarized in violation of existing international agreements. Thus the issue of airspace depends upon resolution of the dispute as to the limits of the Aegean continental shelf.

In early 1980, a tentative resolution of the commercial use of airspace in the Aegean was reached. On 22 February, Turkey unilaterally withdrew her restrictions on Aegean eastern flights, prompting a reciprocal gesture by Athens and a lifting of restrictions imposed by the Greek Cypriot government. This first, cautious movement toward a solution was perceived in Athens as a Turkish response to increased American pressure,⁹ and any future comprehensive solution still remains unclear. Despite the real and symbolic significance of the return to full use of commercial airspace in the Aegean, the issue of military rights remains unresolved. Athens has warned NATO on numerous occasions that the security problems of the

Greek Aegean islands require a return of full Greek military control over eastern airspace if Athens is to rejoin the alliance.¹⁰ Yet, even resolution of this important issue would not insure the full reintegration of Greece into the NATO group.

Since the fall of 1974, Greece has refused to participate fully in the military councils of NATO, pending resolution of outstanding problems with Turkey. The NATO response has varied from plans proposing a return *before* settling control over the Aegean to complex divisions of Greek and Turkish responsibility for regional defense once a return is accomplished. To date, the most interesting proposals are those offered in early 1979 by General Alexander Haig, then NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, and the most recent plan, submitted by Haig's successor, General Bernard Rogers.

The Haig proposals, tendered in the spring of 1979, suggested a four-point resolution of current difficulties. Greek return to the alliance would be accompanied by the creation of a new allied headquarters at Larissa, which would have responsibility for air defense throughout the Aegean, including airspace over the Greek islands. The commander, however, would not be Greek. With regard to naval defense, the "task force" concept would be invoked, with the nationality of the commander to be decided by NATO. Operational control for the area would lie with the NATO headquarters in Naples, and there the decisions would be made as to when defense of Greek national territory would be assigned to Greek or Turkish forces. All prior agreements as to allocation of defensive responsibility in the Aegean would be acknowledged as "invalid."¹¹ In May 1979, Greek Foreign Minister Rallis rejected the proposal, claiming it abridged Greek interests in the Aegean.¹²

Another NATO proposal was offered by General Rogers in January of this year. Under its terms, Greece and Turkey would bear full responsibility for defense of immediate territorial waters and airspace, with a NATO force exercising control in the disputed areas, including airspace over the

Greek islands. NATO protection would embrace naval security for the islands of Lesbos, Khios, Samos, Ikaria, and possibly Rhodes, and a US protective force would deploy in this region. Air control would be exercised through augmented American forces based on Crete.¹³ This proposal has since been rejected by both Greece and Turkey as an infringement of their respective national sovereignties.

The question of Greece's return to NATO lies uppermost on the Athenian agenda in the present decade. There is no doubt that Greece recognizes the importance of her past participation as the basis of the regional security maintained in the eastern Mediterranean since the early 1950's. Support for a strong NATO found clear expression in the statements of both Karamanlis and Foreign Minister Rallis on behalf of the continuing modernization program decided last winter in Brussels.¹⁴ Turkey, too, is on record as acknowledging benefits to be reclaimed once Greece returns to full partnership. It seems probable that ultimate resolution lies not in the endless presentation of creative but unilateral NATO proposals, but in identifying an appropriate forum in which both Greece and Turkey have confidence and can participate jointly in working toward a solution. If the matter is approached from this perspective, the time never has been so propitious as now for rapid reintegration of the Greek forces.

In March 1980, Constantine Menges, noting the desperate Turkish need for Western economic assistance and the sincerity of current Greek efforts to resolve the Aegean and Cyprus disputes, suggested binding arbitration to be exercised by America, West Germany, and other NATO members.¹⁵ Such a suggestion constructively acknowledges the interlinkage among existing problems, recognizing that a resolution of any single dispute is unlikely without solutions for the remaining difficulties. Some type of binding arbitration should indeed be proposed to Athens as well as Ankara, but the membership ought not be restricted to NATO, given the scope of the disagreements.

For arbitration to be accepted and effective, a larger community of values must come into play and potential penalties must be evident to both parties; NATO alone is too narrow in function to serve these broader roles. A much more logical forum would be the European Economic Community, which, as in the case of Greek entry into the EEC, has clearly demonstrated its concern for political stability in the eastern Mediterranean. The Karamanlis government is on record as believing that entry into the EEC is the most important decision touching Greece in the entire decade. The respect for and sharing of democratic values common to the EEC offer the best hope of conciliation within a European framework. Turkish acceptance of this forum can be expected, given her increasing dependence upon Western European economic assistance, as indicated by the May 1979 Paris agreement to advance major funding to Ankara,¹⁶ and by the recent announcement by Turkish Foreign Minister Hayrettin Erkmen that Ankara expects to apply for full EEC membership before the current year is out.¹⁷ A preferred vehicle for supervising binding arbitration might be the new, directly elected European Parliament, which already has given signs of accepting increased responsibility for further European political integration. An appropriate committee selected by the Parliament would merit the respect and attention of both Greece and Turkey.

It would be foolish for any observer to suggest the specific terms and proposals to be offered, since failures to date in conjunction with the plethora of solutions advanced reveal the futility of an issue-oriented approach. The EEC itself must examine existing suggestions, combining and excluding points in response to hard bargaining with Athens and Ankara. At present, EEC arbitration offers the best hope of resolution, a hope reinforced by the associate membership which Cyprus now holds within the Community. Resolution of disputes with Turkey will free Greek energies and attention for promoting regional stability with her other Balkan neighbors.

THE STALLED MOVEMENT FOR BALKAN COOPERATION

Events of the past two years have emphasized the fragility of current peaceful relations in the Balkans and put Athens on notice that further efforts aimed at regional stability are urgently in order. In early 1979, Karamanlis, taking note of increased Chinese attention towards the Balkans, warned that increased Balkan cooperation was the sole means of dampening an emerging Sino-Soviet rivalry in the peninsula.¹⁸ Fears of future instabilities have been magnified by prospects of a resurgent Soviet imperialism in the wake of the Afghanistan invasion, and by prospects of a disputed succession in post-Tito Yugoslavia. The Soviet invasion received widespread condemnation in Greece, from official sources, from Karamanlis's chief rival party, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement, and even from the Greek Communist Party. In January 1980, a government spokesman, after requesting Bulgaria to clarify rumors of Soviet troop concentrations along the Yugoslavian frontier, reiterated the opposition of Athens to any outside interference in the Balkans.¹⁹ These new uncertainties threaten to undermine the real progress achieved by the Karamanlis government in advancing regional cooperation, progress which characterized the last five years of the Seventies.

After the Helsinki Conference on European Cooperation in August 1975, Prime Minister Karamanlis took the initiative, dispatching a note to his fellow Balkan heads-of-state requesting a conference designed to promote Balkan cooperation. The most enthusiastic response came from Rumania, a communist state whose past efforts to reduce regional tensions were well known. Rumanian President Ceausescu's encouraging reply was published in full in the Rumanian party newspaper *Scinteia* on 3 October 1975.

I hail and warmly support your initiative with regard to organizing a meeting to be attended by the Deputy Ministers of

Economic Planning of the Balkan countries. . . . I should like to assure you that Rumania is determined to attend such a meeting at whatever time and place may be established . . . , and to make every effort to insure its successful development and success.

While acknowledging that improved relations might prove a slow and time-consuming process, Rumania suggested that future conferences might expand their agendas to include political topics.

For Yugoslavia, a leader of the nonaligned nations and acknowledged foe of existing military alliances, Karamanlis's invitation called forth an equally positive response. President Tito stated that he "accepted all points of the Karamanlis proposal."²⁰ As if to set the stage for improved cooperation, Yugoslavia and Greece shortly thereafter announced a "dramatic improvement" in relations along their common frontier.²¹

The Bulgarian response, as expected, was much more circumspect. Because this country was the most loyal Soviet ally in Eastern Europe, suggestions of a new Balkan conference were bound to evoke memories of past Balkan alliances, alliances which had been directed against the USSR. On 22 August 1975, the Bulgarian paper *Rabotnichesko delo* noted receipt of Karamanlis's invitation, but avoided comment as to Sofia's position. From that moment until the Bulgarian delegation actually arrived in Athens for the conference in January 1976, the Bulgarian press failed to discuss it.

Bulgaria's hesitancy was mirrored by Turkey, though for different reasons of course. The familiar sources of Greek-Turkish friction as well as the Greek goal of a "special relationship" within NATO precluded a warm response from Ankara. Like Bulgaria, Turkey accepted the invitation quietly, indicating that bilateral discussions were a preferred way to resolve existing problems.²² Only one Balkan state, Albania, rejected the invitation out of hand, owing to her conflicts with Bulgaria. Bulgaria, the

Albanian press noted, had become "an instrument in the hands of Soviet social imperialism."²³

The differing views of the foreign delegations did little to diminish the hopes of Karamanlis for eventual multinational understandings aimed at reducing Balkan tensions. In his opening speech to the assembled delegates, Karamanlis took pains to link his initiative to the broader multilateral agreements approved at Helsinki. This first Balkan conference, he stressed, was but the initial step toward broad Balkan cooperation.

You all know that the goals we have set are not so grandiose as to run the risk of being proven unwarranted. We must begin our *multilateral* cooperation with faith and enthusiasm, and also with a practical spirit to avoid disappointment. The development and the forms of this cooperation will depend on the atmosphere that the current conference will create. I believe that the convocation of this conference, despite the economic-technical character we have given it, fulfills a historic necessity.²⁴ [emphasis supplied]

But despite the expectations of Karamanlis, the bilateral preferences of Sofia and Ankara acted as effective brakes to any significant multinational agreement. The final communiqué noted that progress had been limited to drafting an extensive list of "ideas, suggestions, and proposals" which would be "presented by each delegation to its government for information and study."²⁵ The convening of a second Balkan conference was prominently suggested in the communiqué, and, as the Rumanian daily *Scinteia* subsequently noted, the Athens conference should be viewed "as a first stage in a comprehensive process aimed at broadening the scope of multilateral cooperation among Balkan countries."²⁶ This position coincided exactly with that of Karamanlis.

The inability of the combined Balkan delegations to reach significant multinational agreements in no way undercut the central

goal of Karamanlis's policy: the improvement of relations with his communist neighbors. In the period after 1976, Karamanlis continued these efforts, with the most notable successes being achieved with Rumania. The two states have exchanged several high-ranking military visits, and the value of trade between Athens and Bucharest has risen each year. Relations with Yugoslavia have also dramatically improved. Economic cooperation now includes joint projects along the Vardar River and plans to link Greece and Austria via a four-lane Yugoslavian highway.²⁷ Military delegations have also been exchanged between the two states.

The most important challenge to Karamanlis's efforts to improve relations with his communist neighbors has been Bulgaria. Yet, here too developments since 1976 have elevated Greek-Bulgarian ties to their highest level of the past few decades. Equally important, there are now signs that Bulgaria has relaxed her past objections to multilateral agreements among the Balkan states.

In 1976, following the Balkan conference, Bulgarian President and Party Chief Todor Zhivkov paid a three-day friendship visit to Athens, where he noted that "the differences in socio-political systems are not and cannot be an obstacle to the building up of relations of friendship and good neighborliness."²⁸ In July 1978, Karamanlis returned Zhivkov's visit, affirming that "during the past three years, our relations have been marked by spectacular development."²⁹ The final communiqué confirmed Bulgaria's new interest in future multinational Balkan cooperation.³⁰

In the spring of 1979, Zhivkov returned once more to Greece. On the eve of his visit, he informed his National Assembly that Bulgaria and Greece "note a lack of anything whatsoever which would bring disorder or open problems in our relations."³¹ One day prior, *Rabotnichesko delo* ran a lengthy article praising recent joint Greek-Bulgarian economic undertakings and suggesting that more dramatic projects were in the offing.

Trade between the two states, it was stated, had risen by more than 300 percent in the past few years, and tourism had greatly expanded.³² During Zhivkov's visit, several long-term economic agreements were signed, promising an expanded trade turnover within "the coming years" of more than 200 percent. Karamanlis shrewdly used the resulting joint communiqué to announce that Greece would issue an invitation for another Balkan conference within the next year.³³

The second Balkan conference opened in Ankara in late November 1979. Despite high hopes voiced in both Athens and Bucharest, the meeting produced few tangible results. Discussion was confined to narrow economic interests and agreement restricted to enhanced cooperation on behalf of more efficient postal services. Future negotiations aimed at a possible lowering of Balkan tariffs were referred to a committee of experts, with no specific date set for reconvening. All in all, the conference was viewed with disappointment in most Balkan capitals, signaling a hiatus in Karamanlis's drive for multilateral cooperation.³⁴

Despite this disappointment, bilateral ties between Athens and her communist neighbors to the north remain at their strongest since the communists came to power in Sofia, Bucharest, and Belgrade. Militarily, Karamanlis has extracted a verbal nonaggression pledge from Bulgaria,³⁵ and tensions along the extensive Yugoslavian frontier are at an all-time low. In late November 1978, Rumanian President Ceausescu confirmed the greatly enhanced prospects for regional peace in a major speech to his National Assembly. Explaining his recent refusal to approve a Soviet-sponsored call for increased Warsaw Pact military spending, Ceausescu stated:

Political relations and the general atmosphere in this part of Europe do not at the present provide any cause for worry. I must say openly that with many of these [NATO] countries, we have traditionally friendly relations which have always helped us in our struggle against foreign domination.³⁶

Even relations with Albania are on the upgrade, with the Athenian journal *Akropolis* on 25 March 1978 taking note of recent friendly overtures from Tirana and expressing hope that "Hoxha's friendly intentions toward our country will find expression in other initiatives for Greek-Albanian rapprochement and cooperation." Greek-Albanian trade exchanges for 1978 increased by over 30 percent.³⁷ It is thus this legacy of bilateral economic and political connections upon which Athens must pin her hopes and policy for improved Balkan relations in the current decade.

GREECE AND THE SOVIET UNION

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the prospect of Soviet interference in post-Tito Yugoslavia have produced a searching reappraisal in Athens of recent efforts to improve economic and political relations. Before December 1979, Karamanlis could take pride in steps taken to diminish tensions with Moscow and in creation of a framework for proper interstate relations, the first since the Second World War. The most tangible improvement in Greek-Soviet relations during the 1970's occurred in the areas of trade and economic cooperation. On 21 February 1978, a Memorandum on Cooperation was signed that significantly increased the existing trade turnover. As a result, the Soviet Union today ranks as Greece's seventh largest partner, with current discussions expected to augment trade further. The independent Athenian daily *Elevtherotipia* announced in February 1979 that current proposals foresee a 20-year understanding to supply Greece with Soviet natural gas via a pipeline through Bulgaria, and several other agreements of shorter duration to facilitate the importation of Soviet crude oil. A long-term agreement linking Greece with the Soviet-East European electrical network is now under discussion, as is joint construction of a Greek-based aluminum plant projected to sell its output to the Eastern bloc. In late 1978, a Soviet delegation announced agreement for joint

construction of a large spinning mill in Thessaloniki.³⁸

Karamanlis, in the company of other high officials, visited Moscow on a state visit in October 1979. A 12-point joint declaration of "Friendship and Good Neighborliness" was issued, pledging the two states to a renunciation of force in interstate relations and promising increased political and economic ties. Despite the agreement, Karamanlis took pains during his speech at a Kremlin dinner to note the existence of political topics still in dispute: "True, we have different social and economic systems, and we belong to different alliances. It is also true that we do not always assess identically the development of certain events in international life."³⁹

Disturbing to Greece's NATO allies, however, was the arrival on 6 October 1979 of the first Soviet ship at the newly reserved repair facilities on the Cyclades island of Siros—a 7000-ton tanker, *Koida*, assigned to the Soviet Mediterranean fleet.⁴⁰ Under an agreement signed prior to Karamanlis's Moscow visit, Soviet ships will be allowed repair if they belong to the "auxiliary fleet," and are not armed. Housing facilities will be provided for crews while in port, and transit rights through Greek waters granted.⁴¹ As Greek observers were quick to note, this is the first time in 140 years that Russia has had a ship facility in Greece.

As Greece enters the new decade, the tenuous improvement in relations with Moscow will increasingly become hostage to other, more international problems of Greek and European development. Resolution of the Cyprus, Turkish, and NATO problems, uppermost on the current Greek agenda, will likely result in diminished interest in the newly found Russian connection. While ties with Moscow will undoubtedly remain at an improved level in comparison with the days of the Greek Junta, there appears little chance of a further realignment of Greek policy toward Moscow. The return to a Cold War atmosphere in the wake of the Afghan invasion and the uncertainty as to the future of Yugoslavia have produced a new caution in Athens which will characterize the next

years of this decade. Greek support for a modernized NATO and strident denunciations of the occupation of Kabul offer clear evidence of a more circumspect policy.

CONCLUSION

Greece enters the decade of the 1980's with a much more balanced set of regional and international relations than might have been thought possible a scant decade ago. Her entry into the EEC is expected to produce major domestic changes, further altering the components of foreign policy input and decision regarding increased integration with the West. On a bilateral basis, ties with her Balkan neighbors, excepting Turkey, and with the Soviet Union show clear improvements, although the impact of pending concerns over Yugoslavia and Afghanistan are yet to be fully realized. Problems with Turkey still remain a top priority in Athens, with no sure resolution now in sight.

The most intractable issues of regional security no longer admit of solution within a bilateral setting, depending instead on a more general resolution within a broader European or NATO context. Even progress in Balkan cooperation depends now more on the general European political climate than it does on new policy initiatives from Athens or Bucharest. With talks in progress between the EEC and the East European Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, future Balkan cooperation is likely to become part and parcel of more general East-West relations.

During his almost seven years as Prime Minister, Constantine Karamanlis has laid the basis for new efforts within the expanded multilateral avenues now open to Athens. While many uncertainties remain, one can expect that Greek foreign policy in the 1980's will be as dynamic as in the recent past.⁴²

NOTES

1. Constantine Karamanlis, address to the Greek Chamber of Deputies, Athens Domestic Television in Greek, 16 January 1978.

2. For a discussion of the Cyprus problem, see Halil I. Salih, *Cyprus: The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on a State* (University, Ala.: Univ. of Alabama Press, 1978); Eugene K.

Keefe et al., *Area Handbook for Cyprus* (Washington: GPO, 1971); and Nancy Crawshaw, "Zypern in der Sackgasse," *Europa Archiv*, 3 (1979), 83-92.

3. For a detailed recounting of these numerous talks, see Public Information Office, *Cyprus Intercommunal Talks following the Turkish Invasion of July-August, 1974*, Nicosia, October 1979.

4. For a report on the use of Akrotiri for monitoring the Camp David Accord see *Ta Nea* (Nicosia), 14 December 1979. See also *Tercuman* (Istanbul), 20 May 1979, and Nicosia Domestic Service in Greek, 21 November 1979, for Greek and Turkish Cypriot statements supporting eventual demilitarization of Cyprus.

5. Christo L. Rozakis, *The Greek-Turkish Dispute over the Aegean Continental Shelf*, Occasional Paper 27, The Univ. of Rhode Island, December 1975.

6. Athens Domestic Service in Greek, 10 October 1979.

7. Athens Domestic Service in Greek, 29 February 1980.

8. See the categorical Turkish response to the 1978 hints of a Greek 12-mile limit in *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul), 4 March 1978.

9. *The Economist*, 1-7 March 1980, p. 45.

10. *Elevtherotipia* (Athens), 4 January 1979.

11. *To Vima* (Athens), 20 May 1979; and *The Economist*, 2-8 February 1980.

12. *I Vradhini* (Athens), 21 May 1979.

13. For details of the "Rogers Plan," see *To Vima* (Athens), 20 January 1980; *Rizopastis* (Athens), 30 January 1980; and *The Economist*, 2-8 February 1980, pp. 56-57.

14. Athens Domestic Service in Greek, 12 December 1979.

15. Constantine Menges, "The Turkish Opening," *The New Republic*, 22 March 1980, p. 15.

16. Michael M. Boll, "Turkey between East and West: The Regional Alternative," *The World Today*, 35 (September 1979), 360-69; and Michael M. Boll, "Turkey's New National Security Concept: What it Means for NATO," *Orbis*, 23 (Fall 1979), 609-31.

17. Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish, 6 February 1980.

18. Athens Domestic Service in Greek, 10 March 1979.

19. *To Vima* (Athens), 20 January 1980.

20. Quoted in *I Kathimerini* (Athens), 23 September 1979.

21. *Athens News*, 13 January 1976.

22. For the Turkish position, see the statements by the Turkish delegate to the First Balkan Conference (Oguz Gokman), in *Elevtherotipia* (Athens), 31 January 1976.

23. Quoted in L. Zanga, "Albania's Unique Foreign Policy," *Radio Free Europe Background Report* 234, 15 November 1976.

24. Athens Domestic Service in Greek, 26 January 1976.

25. Press release by the Athens Press and Information Secretariat, Athens, 5 February 1976.

26. *Scinteia* (Bucharest), 8 February 1976.

27. *Vesnik* (Zagreb), 27 March 1977.

28. Quoted in *Radio Free Europe Bulgarian Situation Report* 12, 14 April 1976.

29. Athens Domestic Television in Greek, 7 July 1978.

30. Athens Domestic Service in Greek, 7 July 1978.

31. *Rabotnichesko delo* (Sofia), 28 April 1979.

32. *Ibid.*, 27 April 1979.

33. *Ibid.*, 1 May 1979.

34. Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish, 29 November 1979.

35. See *Radio Free Europe Bulgarian Situation Report* 12, 14 April 1976.

36. Radio Bucharest in Rumanian, 1 December 1978.

37. Athens Domestic Service in Greek, 3 April 1978.

38. *I Vradhini* (Athens), 15 September 1978.

39. *TASS* in English, 1 October 1979.

40. *Athens News*, 7 October 1979.

41. See the statement by Greek Coordination Minister Mitsotakis, Athens Domestic Service in Greek, 7 September 1979.

42. As this article goes to press, prospects are brightening for solutions to the problems of Greece's re-entry to the military wing of NATO and the sharing of operational rights in and over the Aegean between Greece and Turkey. Largely on the basis of initiatives by General Bernard Rogers, Turkey has accepted a formula for Greece's return to NATO, with the matter of operational rights to be negotiated later. See "Athens Agrees to Proposals for Rejoining NATO," *The New York Times*, 19 October 1980, p. 5; and "Turks Said to Favor Greek Role," *The New York Times*, 20 October 1980, p. A3.

