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John R. Witherell

Andrew P. O'Meara Jr.

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THE ARMY AND THE 1980's

by

JOHN R. WITHERELL and ANDREW P. O'MEARA JR.

What will the 1980's require of the US Army? Increasingly, it is becoming apparent that certain fundamental changes are needed to enable the Army to cope with problems related both to the institution itself and to its resources. The former deal with the way we live and train, while the latter involve narrowing the gap between what is given for the Army to do and the means provided. The changes necessary will doubtless challenge many existing practices and assumptions. For example, we foresee increased importance for our non-NATO missions and a pressing need to strengthen the cohesiveness of military unit life. The scope of these challenges is such as to warrant the attention and commitment of all echelons.

Our discussion of Army mission requirements in the 1980's will be divided into four parts: I. Strategic Assessment; II. Total Army Assessment; III. Renewal of the Total Army; and IV. Required Actions.

PART I: STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

► *The Changing Strategic Postures.* The last decade has seen a major strategic shift in the policy initiatives of the United States, the USSR, and the People's Republic of China (PRC). The US enunciated the Nixon Doctrine; reduced military assistance to a number of friendly and nonaligned nations; reduced overseas forces; and refocused its military programs with added emphasis upon NATO. The Soviet strategic posture has also changed. During the period that saw the gradual decline in the forward deterrence posture of the US, the Soviets have built formidable strategic and conventional capabilities on the Eurasian landmass, while

creating a maritime warfighting force much more capable of projecting Soviet power beyond its contiguous seas.¹ The Soviets have achieved at least rough parity in strategic forces as well as in theater nuclear forces.² The emergence of both the Soviet maritime force projection potential and the development of an enhanced Soviet strategic lift capability has facilitated the introduction of Soviet and Soviet-sponsored forces into new areas of the globe.

At the same time these changes were underway, the PRC emerged from a decade of internal political instability and injected itself more vigorously into world affairs. The post-Mao policies of the PRC have demonstrated the Chinese resolve to continue to oppose the Soviet drive for hegemony in Asia and projection of influence into the Third World. Moreover, the PRC has encouraged the strengthening of NATO and the independence of Eastern European regimes and Soviet neighbors along the southern flank of the USSR.

These actions have occurred against a background of dynamic change in the Third World. The OPEC nations have emerged as a major economic force capable of dominating vital sectors of the world economic market and asserting powerful political influence.³ The Third World has felt the full impact of the increase in energy prices while attempting to achieve political stability and economic development. The result of these shifts in the strategic balance has been the emergence of new loci of power and the weakening of the US-dominated strategy of forward containment that had attempted to neutralize earlier Soviet initiatives for expansion into Africa and Asia.

► *The New Environment of Strategic*

Forces. The altered strategic environment is the product of a new balance of power in which the following trends are clearly discernible:

- The US commitment to NATO has been reaffirmed, but a retrenched America exerts a relatively diminished influence on the world scene.

- The Soviet warfighting capability on the Eurasian landmass and in the waters that provide egress from the USSR has grown to the point that the Soviet Union is not seriously threatened by conventional arms, and her initiatives for expansion have greater promise.

- The emergence of an active, outward-looking PRC on the world scene has created a major rival to Soviet power on the Eurasian landmass which, although still economically underdeveloped, is committed to challenge Soviet hegemony in order to secure the perceived national interests of the Chinese peoples.

- The nations of the Third World suffer from endemic instability as the goals of modernization have become significantly less attainable and as energy costs have raised the price of industrialization.

- Western Europe and Japan have emerged as expanded trading partners of the US, possessing major economic and political power.

- The OPEC nations have emerged as a disturbingly effective cartel dedicated to achieving independence and modernization for themselves.

► *Conflict and Tension Within the Global Environment.* The interaction of conflicting national interests on the world scene appears to have increased the potential for conflict outside Europe. The combination of increased Soviet warfighting capability and decreased US ability to contain Soviet expansionary efforts into areas ripe for exploitation has created a situation in which the US finds itself more vulnerable, increasingly threatened, and unable to apply traditional strategies (forward containment) to restrain Soviet expansion. Consequently, the US finds itself in a global environment more dangerous than that faced in the 50's

and 60's, one in which it is able to exert less leverage vis-à-vis the Soviets.

Despite the apparent decline in US influence, the internal tensions of rival power centers (i.e. between group solidarity and individual national interests) hold considerable promise for the preservation of US interests. The emergence of Western European and Japanese economic power serves to strengthen the community of democratic nations whose interests are fundamentally allied with those of the US. The emergence of the OPEC cartel has resulted in a primarily Middle Eastern power bloc opposed to Soviet expansion in the area. Third World interests in self-determination are fundamentally in conflict with Soviet efforts to create hegemony over an expanded sphere of influence, though the expedient flirtations of some Third World countries with the Soviet colossus are complicating factors. The increased interest of the world community in human rights reflects the fundamental contradiction between the Soviet authoritarian model of economic and political development and the nearly universal recognition and sympathy for the protection of individual human rights as expressed in the Helsinki Accords. Thus, we find the following basic tensions in the world economic and political scene:

- East-West conflict: Western-style democracy vs. Soviet communism.

- Third World national interests vs. Soviet hegemony.

- Human rights vs. authoritarian exercise of political power.

- OPEC control of energy vs. Third World economic development.

- North-South conflict: industrialized nations vs. Third World nations.

The East-West conflict is of course of long standing. The West's NATO plays a fundamental role in averting armed conflict and resisting Soviet expansionism. Third World national interests and the human rights movement create antagonistic responses to further Soviet expansionism and provide opportunities for US support to nations resisting Soviet expansion in the Third World. OPEC's drive for higher oil

prices serves to heighten tensions between the cartel and the Third World; this drive may trigger conflicts between Soviet-sponsored forces in the area and OPEC powers. Any destabilizing developments in the nations of OPEC are obviously dangerous since the economies of the major industrialized nations are dependent upon the OPEC nations for petroleum.⁴ Denial of petroleum, for any reason, could lead to the rapid economic decline of the West. This aspect of the global environment promises to be a major area of contention during the remainder of the century. The North-South conflict is an expression of the longstanding demand by developing nations for a greater share of the economic returns previously enjoyed by industrialized nations. This tension challenges both the US and the USSR; however, it impinges more heavily upon the West, since the Soviet Union is less dependent upon the Third World for resources.

► *The Character of the Evolving US Strategy.* A fundamental motive force in US strategy in the period following World War II has been the acquisition of allies to resist communist expansion. This force has led the US into alliances with autocratic regimes of the right while rejecting authoritarian regimes of leftist persuasion. The new strategy, however, with its emphasis on human rights *per se*, reaches back to the roots of the American democratic philosophy, adopts a stand committed to human dignity, allows diplomatic latitude to isolate Soviet expansionism, and makes possible a

legitimate role for states opposed to Soviet hegemony in contributing to US strategic interests. Thus, the strategy encourages communist states opposed to Soviet imperialism to contribute to US-sponsored efforts toward that end. The US posture encourages resistance to Soviet hegemony and relies upon the human rights issue to attack the philosophical basis of Soviet power legitimacy. It is a strategy that unites the efforts of the democratic states with *de facto* alliances among communist states in opposition to the Soviet Union, and with developing nations prepared to resist Soviet domination.

On this watershed issue, the US occupies the high ground. It is a good battlefield on which to fight. The authors see in progress a fundamental shift in world opinion on this matter; time is now on our side. This is not to say that the struggle will be less costly or less intense; it is rather to say that with continued resolution, understanding, and commitment, the struggle can further US interests and fundamental national security objectives. Despite apparent setbacks for the US in Iran and Nicaragua, which have called into question the soundness of US human rights initiatives, the outcome of current rights policies will be measured in future decades. The adoption of rights initiatives should eventually work to the long-term benefit of our system of government and foster changes in the international environment that will ultimately discredit the Soviet model of political development.

Lieutenant Colonel (P) Andrew P. O'Meara Jr. has served tours in Germany and Vietnam and is now assigned to the Office of the Chief of Staff, Department of the Army. He is a graduate of the US Military Academy, Class of 1959, and the Army War College, and holds master's degrees from the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and the Army Command and General Staff College. He is the author of *Infrastructure and the Marxist Power Seizure: An Analysis of the Communist Models of Revolution* (1973) and articles in *Army*, *Armor*, and *Parameters*.



Colonel John R. Witherell is Deputy Director of the Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS), Department of the Army. A 1952 graduate of the US Military Academy, he has commanded units in Korea, Germany, and Vietnam. His



extensive experience in combat developments and force development includes assignments as Director of Force Concepts and Design at the Concepts Analysis Agency and most recently as Chief of the War Plans Division, ODCSOPS.

► *The Objectives of Military Strategy.* The military strategy of the US must be characterized by the following:

- Both conventional and nuclear deterrent forces to protect the US, NATO, Japan, and Korea.

- Strategic conventional forces, appropriately mobile, to secure US vital interests in energy-rich areas such as the Persian Gulf.

- Military sales and assistance to both communist and noncommunist nations resisting Soviet hegemony.

- Military assistance to Third World nations to bolster defensive capabilities and encourage the development of mutually beneficial ties.

Strategic nuclear forces provide a deterrent umbrella under which the US and its allies must be prepared to wage a credible conventional defense of their national interests. Strategic nuclear forces alone provide little security from conventional Soviet attack, leaving NATO vulnerable to a nonnuclear attack by the Warsaw Pact—more so in view of the approaching parity in theater nuclear forces. Consequently, nuclear forces, while fundamental to preventing nuclear coercion, have decreasing practical use in deterring or resisting conventional aggression. Conventional forces thus take on added importance in the existing world order. Strong and modern conventional forces are required to prevent aggression against NATO and to respond to conventional aggression in the Persian Gulf, Korea, or elsewhere in the Third World.

► *The Impact of the Military Strategy Upon Army Planning.* The foregoing appraisal leads to the following policy planning guidelines:

- In view of the decreasing utility of nuclear warfare as a practical tool to influence Soviet power projection below the threshold of a strategic nuclear exchange, greater responsibility for achieving deterrence in Western Europe now rests upon ground combat units.

- Since the US commitment to NATO is permanent, the US must seek further logistical economies by creating additional European-based support.

- While previous emphasis on winning the first battle has been necessary to restore confidence in the US commitment to NATO, it is time to give more attention to winning the follow-on battles as well as to winning the last battle of a next war and having enough military strength remaining to assure termination of the conflict on terms favorable to the US.

- Forward global containment as practiced during most of the post-World War II period has evolved into a policy of containment only in NATO and Korea, as buttressed by support of US allies in the Third World. The US should increasingly look outward to provide assistance to Third World nations seeking to resist Soviet influence and domination (e.g. in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America).

- The PRC, a former rival of the US in Asia, now seeks US assistance to resist Soviet hegemony. Such support is needed to help counter the growing Soviet warfighting capability. The US is now prepared to provide such assistance and should continue to do so.

- The US commitment to resist conventional Soviet or Soviet-sponsored aggression in the energy-rich Persian Gulf has become an essential mission of the US general purpose forces.

- The US commitment to human rights can serve as a fundamental counterpoise to communism and should become a durable, useful cornerstone of US foreign policy initiatives.

Reflection on these guidelines indicates that the organizational and logistical features of today's Army are inadequately tailored to the emerging strategic imperatives. Outmoded equipment and depleted stocks are largely the cumulative product of 25 years of hot and cold war. Current shortages in war reserve stocks as well as the delay in procurement of more modern weapon systems encourage clinging to an outmoded strategy. The existing posture of US Reserve components is partially a result of strategic tailoring to meet an earlier need, as well as the contemporary failure of Reserve component recruitment programs to meet manpower goals. Despite these temporary

handicaps, the Army's accomplishments and sacrifices in the past will stand the test of time; but new policies and approaches are needed and must be initiated soon. Before we examine such approaches, however, it is first necessary to appreciate in greater detail the state of the contemporary Army.

PART II: TOTAL ARMY ASSESSMENT

► *The Price of Change.* The Army lives in a crisis-driven environment. It has had to fight wars in Korea and Vietnam while maintaining readiness to fight a NATO war. Throughout this period, the Army has confronted the constant challenge of inadequate resources to meet assigned missions. It has seen multiple strategies, new doctrines and systems, new organizations and tactics, and new approaches to personnel and training management. Throughout this period of flux, the single constant has been the need to master the new techniques while maintaining a high state of unit readiness. Change and readiness have been the themes that have driven our units and ultimately determined their character. A German officer observing training in the Federal Republic of Germany was recently asked to comment on the difference between the US Army and the *Bundeswehr*. He replied, "Your army is a hectic army, ours is not." The criticism by the German observer has merit and deserves attention. Some armies produce weathered old soldiers, with pride and affection for their units. More often than not, the US Army burns out its soldiers. Affection does not take root in turbulent units.

► *The Character of the Army.* The US Army has the heritage of the classic models of modern armies: the regular or professional army, on one hand, and the mobilization army, on the other. During the long periods of the Indian frontier wars, during the Philippine Insurrection, and during the interludes of peace that have separated American wars, the Army has traditionally assumed the role of a professional army. During major wars, the nation has used its professional army structure as the nucleus of massive citizens' armies that were largely

built on a cadre of professional soldiers. Whereas the professional armies have tended to be highly disciplined forces composed of volunteers willing to accept sustained duty on remote battlefields, the mobilization armies have been composed primarily of citizen-soldiers responding to a temporary national emergency.

A serious disadvantage of the mobilization army is that it is unsuited to respond to those crises falling short of fundamental threats to national survival. The farms, businesses, and industries of the nation will not long permit great numbers of citizen-soldiers to guard foreign soil once the crisis has passed. This trait of citizens' armies is not unique to American history: it is common to Greek, Roman, German, French, and English history. The lessons of this history are imbedded in the force structures of major armies.

► *The Structure of the Army.* Traditionally, major national armies have been divided into small active components and large reserve components, the latter suitable for mobilization in time of national emergency. The protracted crises of the last two wars and the continuing NATO defense commitment, however, have driven the Army into a structural reversal, that is, the evolution of a large Active component and relatively small Reserve components. Moreover, the distinctive citizens' army flavor of the Korean and Vietnam War eras, a product of reliance on Selective Service, thus stands in contrast with the professional flavor required of today's All-Volunteer force.

► *Personnel and Accession Policies for Today's Force.* The pressure to man a large peacetime army performing garrison and frontier security duty has led to recruiting techniques and management approaches that, while solving one set of problems, have introduced a new set. The management techniques and simultaneous degradation of the quality of service life of the Army have produced a military organization with a distinctly industrial cast.⁵ The industrial trends are resulting in an eight-to-five, five-day-week army, dependent upon centralized,

industrial, managerial techniques to field combat-ready and combat-willing professionals. This semi-industrial army is manned by personnel who are recruited on the basis of appeals ("Let the Army Join You," "Join the People Who've Joined the Army") that assume the individual can "do his own thing" while on active duty. The industrial, centralized, managerial approach has created an Army of units in which the unit commander has reduced authority to promote or demote, reward or punish, his personnel. The large and highly turbulent active structure sits atop Reserve components that are dangerously undermanned as a result of inability to recruit in an environment of inadequate incentives.⁶

► *The Image of the All-Volunteer Army.* The Modern Volunteer Army and the All-Volunteer Force have been themes employed to attract men in periods of great need. They served the nation well in difficult times. Combat readiness has been demanded in an environment of severe resource constraint. Repair parts have not been funded sufficiently to support the fleet of equipment on hand; post personnel support functions have not been adequately manned, requiring combat units to divert organic combat personnel; personnel turbulence and MOS shortages have increased the unit workload and cut efficiency; and college and high school studies programs have become erratic, often involving unfulfilled promises. Weakened command authority at the unit level and the gap between resources and demands for readiness have been compounded by the cynicism that inevitably results when "Volunteer Force" recruitment themes, promising unfettered individual expression and wide education vistas, generate unredeemable expectations. As a result, the "Modern Volunteer Army" and the "All-Volunteer Force" are tarnished names in the eyes of overcommitted and unfulfilled soldiers.

► *The Contemporary Recruiting Dilemma.* The recruiting effort to support the All-Volunteer Force has played a valuable role in meeting the service's needs. The effort has been supported by highly qualified

recruiters and a superb management effort. Regrettably, shortfalls in manpower and in quality accessions have occurred. As a result of these shortfalls, the Army is not receiving sufficient quality personnel to operate modern weapons systems programed for force modernization.⁷ More serious is the massive shortfall in the strength of the Reserve components, which strikes at the heart of mobilization capability. These shortfalls cannot be accepted in the face of the strategic realities of the 1980's. Revitalization of the Selective Service System will be needed to correct these problems and simultaneously provide the mechanism required for immediate essential personnel accessions in the event of mobilization.

► *The Social Environment.* Since World War II, the Army has made significant internal social progress. It has accepted equal opportunity and matured in the process. This evolution has been essential, bringing the modern Army into harmony with the philosophy of human rights in American society. Despite this needed change, the split personality of the force (having both professional and mobilization army characteristics) reflects the dilemma created by contradictory initiatives to improve the force. The centralized industrial techniques are more appropriate for a mobilized citizens' army. Unfortunately the missions of the Active Army are those of a professional army.

► *Military Socialization and the Accession Process.* Military socialization—i.e. the inculcation of requisite ideals, values, and attitudes—is accomplished through two fundamental processes. Socialization of the professional army is accomplished through intensive training, close and protracted unit ties, effective leadership, institutional benefits and rewards, and sound discipline. Such a process presumes unit stability, sufficient institutional support to allow the unit to achieve a strong sense of identity and confidence in its capability, and provision for the needs of the individual. Socialization of the mobilized citizens' army, on the other hand, depends upon society to imbue the necessary values. The strong sense of

community interest fostered in the home, church, school, and family provides the cement to bind together citizen soldiers when the community is seriously threatened. Citizens' armies traditionally do not march well on parade, but they accept sacrifice and serve the nation with varied skills and talents until the crisis has passed.

The army of Frederick the Great relied predominantly upon military (professional army) socialization. The army of Napoleon, in contrast, relied more upon societal socialization. Among modern armies, the Soviet Army depends heavily upon military socialization, whereas the US Army relies to a greater degree upon a mix of the two processes. Regardless of which socializing process is relied upon, a substantial commitment to the army must be achieved. The dilemma confronting the US Army today is that it has been divorced from the strengths of both socializing systems. Turbulence within units, Madison Avenue recruiting themes, reduced authority at the unit level, and the impoverished training environment degrade the socialization process.⁸ Simultaneously, our recruiting has provided a soldiery which, by virtue of marked ethnic and socioeconomic imbalances, is not representative of society.⁹ The spiritual supports needed to sustain the citizens' army are lacking in peacetime, and the wealth of talent normally associated with the citizens' army is denied the active force. Thus, we find ourselves in a position in which neither socialization process functions effectively. The result is that unrepresentative citizen soldiers, denied the strong spiritual support ordinarily provided the mobilization army, are trained in units possessing inadequate military socialization means.

► *Current Status—Summing Up.* Analysis of existing force capabilities reveals that US capability to meet its commitments to NATO and defend its interests elsewhere is questionable at best. Certainly, the US ability to sustain itself in a NATO conventional war in addition to a non-NATO contingency is doubtful. Reserves of stocks and the reinforcing structure are too small, while mobilization capability is too slow. In short,

the US needs a new approach. It clearly does not have properly proportioned capabilities.¹⁰

PART III: RENEWAL OF THE TOTAL ARMY

► *Essential Missions.* Any regeneration and rebalancing of Army capabilities must ensure accomplishment of the following tasks, in the order of priority listed:

1. Contribute to an adequate nuclear deterrent.
2. Contribute to an effective NATO deterrent.
3. Contribute to a non-NATO contingency force independent of NATO obligations.
4. Modify the base in the US to achieve greater unit cohesion.
5. Plan and structure a total mobilization potential.
6. Achieve integrated, mutually supporting components of the Total Army.
7. Support an expanding security assistance program.

► *Strengthening the Total Army.* The challenge confronting the Army is to bring into harmony all elements of the force structure—its management, recruiting, missions, and character. The frontier security mission must be performed by a professional army. The reserve mobilization base must remain a citizens' army, but it must be expanded and modified to fit the strategy. Selective Service is needed to fill the ranks of the Reserve components, as is the case in all other modern armies of the major world powers, and the sustaining base in the United States must adjust its operations to meet the early mobilization needs of both components.

► *Focus on Units.* Planning must address the essential character of both the active (professional) force and the reserve (mobilization) force. The mobilization army, once called up, enjoys the spiritual support of a united citizenry responding to a major national crisis. It accepts sacrifice because the nation demands sacrifice to protect its interests and answer immediate needs. The professional army marches to the beat of a different drummer; it requires a continuing

military socialization process to fill the void created through the absence of the more impassioned spiritual support of the nation that would be forthcoming in wartime. The current corporative flavor in the active force must give way to more professional attitudes and administration. Its units must live together, eat together, work together, train together, and fight together. Its NCOs are its backbone. Its commanders must be seasoned and allowed greater authority to support their NCOs and train their units. Turbulence must be substantially eliminated. The hopscotch rotation of men through the industrial training environment must be reduced so as to permit a greater role for unit training. The Army must foster and husband the strong tie between the trainer and his men. Unit traditions and symbols must be strengthened. Tactical units must be substantially exempted from post and garrison support missions in order to train and ensure combat readiness.

► *Service to the Nation.* One of the traditional sources of strength of the Army has been the concept of service to the nation. This concept applies to the Total Army, both Active and Reserve. During recent years, the emphasis on higher pay and individual "self-expression" within the military have eroded the concept of service. It may be that the concept of service is linked with personal sacrifice, and may not be entirely compatible with competitive pay scales and reliance upon the salary approach to compensation. The idealistic tone of the new strategy lends itself to the concept of service. Service to a nation

dedicated to the worldwide advancement of human freedom and dignity should provide an instinctive appeal to all. A return to the Selective Service System and the simultaneous appeal to the concept of service should provide a highly pragmatic stimulus to the Army as well as reinforce the sense of calling within the profession. The current emphasis upon dollars in return for active duty appeals to basic needs, but leaves a void that becomes serious during rigorous duty and more especially during combat. Self-serving dollar motives are insufficient to provide an adequate sense of duty when the time comes to shed blood. Consequently, there is strong logic behind emphasizing service to nation and providing increased fringe benefits to strengthen the appeal and solidarity of service life, even at the expense of maintaining the competitive salary approach.

► *Structuring the Army for Its Missions.* The formula required to restore a proper force balance is straightforward. The Active component will continue to meet the country's forward or overseas defense commitments. The Active component would be reinforced by the Reserve components in time of emergency. The Active component and Reserve components together fight and secure vital national interests until the force produced by total mobilization can be fielded. The key to developing this capability is a continuously expanding force which can be equipped, trained, deployed, and sustained so as to overcome the initial force disadvantage.

ARMY OF THE 1980's: STRUCTURE AND MISSION

	NON-MOBILIZATION	PARTIAL/FULL MOBILIZATION		TOTAL MOBILIZATION
STRUCTURE	Active Army (Forward Deployed Forces plus Rapid Deployment Forces)	Active Army (US-Based)	Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and Cadre (consisting of both Active and Reserve components)	National Army
MISSION	Expeditionary	Surge	Reinforcing	Sustaining

► *The Active Component.* The Active component must consist of expeditionary forces and surge forces. The expeditionary force—recruited, trained, and prepared for extended foreign service—is divided between an overseas component and a US-based component, the latter serving as the Army's contribution to a US Rapid Deployment Force prepared to deploy on short notice to meet non-NATO contingencies. Such non-NATO contingencies might require forces ranging in size from a ranger battalion to several divisions. The remaining units of the Active component are prepared to deploy as surge forces to augment the expeditionary forces until Reserve component units can be mobilized and deployed to reinforce the Active component overseas.

The expeditionary forces and the surge forces must be equipped, manned, and funded at levels appropriate to their missions. This need implies additional investment in personnel, training, repair parts, and base operations.

Cadre brigades and divisions are required to be added to the active structure to create a rapid response mobilization capability of several additional divisions. The cadre units would be composed primarily of Active Army leadership down to company level, as augmented by specialists from the Army Reserve and fleshed out by Individual Ready Reserve fillers with recent military training in the Active Army. Such units would be primarily light units able to deploy in about two weeks. This concept rests upon a revitalization of the Selective Service System for manning the Reserve components, i.e. a Reserve draft. The designated Individual Ready Reserve fillers would receive a year's active duty training in an Active component unit.

► *The Reserve Components.* The Army Reserve must be reorganized and expanded in order to provide maneuver divisions and augment active duty cadre units capable of rapid mobilization and deployment. The additional divisions would provide a more suitable mobilization base for the expansion of the Army once total mobilization was declared. The Army National Guard

structure would remain essentially unchanged. However, appropriate steps would have to be taken to increase readiness through a return to a peacetime Selective Service System for both Reserve components.

The restructuring of the Army Reserve plays a critical role in fitting the force structure to the simultaneous strategic missions of supporting both NATO and non-NATO contingencies. Furthermore, the creation of a total mobilization capability requires additional forces capable of significant growth early in the mobilization period to provide both an effective sustaining base for training and progressive expansion of the total force following the overseas deployment of units identified in existing war plans. Specific reorganization concepts include the augmentation of Active component cadre divisions and brigades; expansion of the Army Reserve structure so as to provide for additional formations; and realignment of the Army Reserve peacetime chain of command.

► *The National Army.* The National Army, defined as the Army force structure produced through total mobilization, would be raised through a combination of individual and unit training. Once total mobilization is declared, a combination of schools and training centers would be employed to prepare the individuals and units to undertake wartime missions. The focus of this activity will be to expand the force beyond that programmed for partial/full mobilization. Critical questions facing planners for the National Army are the types of units to be created and their deployment schedules. Planning and programing to field a National Army must be flexible, owing to the inherent uncertainty of guidelines promulgated in advance of hostilities. The considerations ultimately driving the total mobilization process will include the progress achieved in modernization, the status of reserve stocks, the degree of prior industrial base preparedness, and the extent of readiness of the manpower base.

► *Training Environment.* A tactical unit that trains its personnel, that reaches a Level-One proficiency according to the Army

Training and Evaluation Program, that is properly administered, and that maintains its equipment has fully accomplished its readiness mission. Readiness to operate modern weapon systems efficiently—and to win the first battle—is incompatible with simultaneous base operation responsibilities and chronic personnel turbulence. The force structure must therefore include tailored base operation units manned and designated specifically for that purpose. Operation of post facilities is beyond the scope of the tactical unit commander's responsibilities. Combat units, in particular, must be manned at levels that minimize the effects of turbulence; they must be provided with required levels of combat support and combat service support.

► *Base Operations.* An active base operation capability is needed in the United States in order to allow posts, camps, and stations to function and receive Reserve component units following the deployment of Active component units to fight a NATO war. Moreover, the base operation concept, long in use by the Air Force, allows the tenant unit to concentrate its efforts upon readiness. For this reason a permanent base operation capability composed of personnel not drawn from our tactical units is required both in the US and overseas.

► *Regional Distribution of Units.* Army efforts to achieve maximum efficiency and economy in the maintenance of the US-based force structure have resulted in the gradual concentration of units into a shrinking number of locations. The resulting concentration has tended to remove Army units from highly populated regions, especially from the northeast and from the northern sector of the midwest. From the standpoint of unit recruiting, this trend has serious drawbacks. Moreover, Army efforts to create grass-roots ties between units and regional sectors of society are eroded through the continuing concentration of units. Regional ties have played a major role in the strengthening of support for the Army in the past and are a continuing source of strength for Army Reserve and National Guard units. The significant political support for

stationing Army units in the northeast further indicates that a reversal of the trend toward concentration is in order. Such a reversal has potential for expanding unit-of-choice options, expanding unit recruiting opportunities, and increasing support and understanding of the Army by the American public. As the Army implements changes in the stationing of the US-based force structure in consonance with the strategy of the 1980's, priority should be given to the achievement of wider geographical distribution.

PART IV: REQUIRED ACTIONS

► Staff planning should be initiated as soon as possible to revitalize the Selective Service System to man the Reserve components. Until such time as Selective Service is revitalized, staff planning should commence on a program of graduated enlistments and terms of obligated service.

► The Active Army should be manned at full wartime-authorized manning levels, and turbulence reduced by limiting personnel moves so as to assure no more than one unit turnover during a two-year period. The Active Army must be sustained by the existing officer and enlisted personnel management systems with the exception that unit training of recruits for combat and combat support specialties must be the rule. The individual replacement system will continue to provide required fillers to replace unprogrammed losses in the Active Army and training replacements to meet the needs of the Reserve components and the US sustaining base.

► The force structure of the Total Army must be modified to achieve a responsive and complementary balance among the Active Army, cadre units, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve.

► Congress should pass appropriate legislation to permit the full manning of the Reserve components by reliance on the Selective Service System.

► Department of the Army should undertake a policy of increased in-theater support arrangements for US Army Europe which would purposely make it more reliant

on the NATO infrastructure and less dependent on the US base.

► Department of the Army should revamp administrative and training policies to support the changes envisioned in the foregoing three sections.

► Department of Defense should initiate planning and investment to assure that a sustaining capability is developed to support military initiatives ranging from the commitment of a minor contingency force to the fielding of a National Army.

We view these long-term goals as the minimum essential to ensure the optimum contribution to successful national defense by ground combat forces. Security of the nation's vital interests in the long term cannot be bought for less. Only the implementation of comprehensive plans and the development of a professional Active component and a balanced Total Army will enable the nation to resist coercion effectively and thwart future attacks upon its vital interests.

The force structure of the Army must contribute to the attainment of the objectives of a military strategy that serves in turn the national strategy. The national strategy must be designed so as to create a stable world order that secures vital national interests. The linkage between national strategy and the world order is neither passive nor reactive. It is creative.

The conflicts and tension in evidence on the world scene have produced an international environment favoring a creative national strategy. National policy must orchestrate the application of national resources so as to strengthen those world trends that further the interests of the US and its allies, while mitigating those that are detrimental.

The Army plays a significant role in this process, ensuring that enemy coercion and violence are not employed to structure the world order of the 21st century. The currents of world opinion have shifted in directions

that complement democratic processes. They reject political systems that ignore human rights, that exploit human resources for the acquisition of economic and political power by oligarchic elites answerable neither to national or international opinion. The prudent employment of military force, or the credible threat of such force, appears to be the single feasible alternative to widespread coercion, fear, and human exploitation on the world scene. Only the soldiers of the democratic states can ultimately veto blatant disregard of world opinion and thereby shield vulnerable populations from political power that comes from the threat of aggressive force.

Time is on the side of the Western democracies, but only if the West's humanitarian goals and aspirations are accompanied by faith in tomorrow and determination not to yield to violence.

NOTES

1. Harold Brown, *Department of Defense Annual Report Fiscal Year 1979* (Washington: DOD, 1978), p. 35.
2. George F. Will, "How to Think About SALT," *Newsweek*, 28 May 1979, p. 104.
3. Robert R. Ulin, "US National Security and Middle Eastern Oil," *Military Review*, 59 (May 1979), 39-40.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
5. In a study addressing the contemporary military socialization process, Dr. Charles C. Moskos Jr. argues that the military is tending toward a civilian occupation model of socialization that erodes the military institution and the concept of service. See "The All-Volunteer Military: Calling, Profession, or Occupation?" *Parameters*, 7 (No. 1, 1977), 2-9.
6. See James R. Compton, "Retention in the Reserves: The Motivation Factor," *Parameters*, 9 (March 1979), 30-45; and Daniel Gans, "Retention for Reserve Survival," *Military Review*, 58 (September 1978), 25-33.
7. Morris Janowitz and Charles C. Moskos Jr., "Five Years of the All-Volunteer Force: 1973-1978," *Armed Forces and Society*, 5 (1979), 171-218.
8. Moskos, "The All-Volunteer Military: Calling, Profession, or Occupation?" pp. 2-9.
9. Janowitz and Moskos, pp. 196-98.
10. For a discussion of the current NATO defense strategy, see Stephen L. Canby, "NATO Strategy: Political-Military Problems of Divergent Interests and Operational Concepts," *Military Review*, 59 (April 1979), 50-58.

