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EASTERN EUROPE IN THE STRATEGIC BALANCE

by

DR. JAMES A. KUHLMAN

How does one best begin to address the whole of Eastern Europe? Certainly it is difficult to portray the region as a homogeneous entity. Eastern Europe incorporates 27 linguistic groups, 25 ethnic communities, 11 political parties, and 10 economic systems; the region's history speaks of 15 former nation-states, 5 major periods of boundary change, and 3 former empires. To accurately assess the region, and, more importantly, Eastern Europe's role in the strategic balance, it may be useful to lay a foundation of three general assumptions upon which further discussion can be built.

The first of these assumptions is that physical closeness of states does not necessarily make for identity of interests. In this sense, regions exist only when there is a community of interests in addition to mere vicinity; therefore, functional interest accommodation is a better basis for conflict management than any concept of region. This means that we must not necessarily look at the Soviet East European subsystem as a geographical region alone. As a community of interests, it is in fact a geographical community, but inherent in that geographical community are quite divergent interests. Consequently, if we take a more exacting socioeconomic and politico-military look at those states, we are quite likely to come up with a fairly accurate assessment of what we may find in the future in terms of Eastern Europe and its implications for our approaches to that part of the world.

The second assumption is one of asymmetry, particularly between the United States and the Soviet Union. There is, in general, no consensus on which superpower is more super than the other, but it is clear that in the new conditions of international disorder and imperfect conflict control, the United States will be more influential, more resented, and more blamed, while the Soviet Union will be more peripheral to the handling and solution of a conflict in any region, yet more successful in exploiting it. The Soviet Union may become a more global power in a military sense, capable of intervening with forces, gunboats, Cubans, or what have you; however, at the same time, when military

force alone does not produce influence in a world spanned by a web of economic, social, and technological interdependencies, the Soviet Union may become less of a superpower. Only the United States possesses the panoply of power in the modern world—economic strength, technological dynamism, military power, and allies. This presents a range of incentive both for the United States to seek a shaping influence in the world and for others to cooperate with her.

The third assumption involves the implications of this asymmetry. Will it make the world a safer place, with rationality prevailing over frustration, dynamic stability over bloody conflict? I'm afraid it's quite likely to be the opposite.

A Soviet Union devoid of means of influence other than military power would be forced to demonstrate the utility of military force. A Soviet Union unable to adjust to the pressure of modernization for fear of endangering the legitimacy of her own regime internally would need an external enemy and success to deflect from her internal shortcomings. This "Fortress Russia," if you will, would be too powerful to be bypassed, yet too weak to contribute to a new international order. It is here that the so-called North-South and East-West conflicts meet; for this reason, the latter will continue to provide the matrix of rivalry, security, and insecurity in much of tomorrow's world.

Now then, where does Eastern Europe fit in an international system based upon these three assumptions? In a strict geopolitical sense, Eastern Europe weighs heavily on the Soviet side of the strategic balance scale. The region, comprising Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia, contributes to the Soviet European advantage both offensively as a forward front for the Warsaw Pact and defensively as a buffer zone against traditional Soviet antagonists and NATO. Soviet insistence since World War II on political, ideological, economic, and military hegemony in the region, periodically

demonstrated by outright intervention such as in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, irrespective of the resultant impact on world public opinion, indicates the degree to which the Soviet Union values the maintenance of a bloc structure for its strategic security in the international system.

Yet from perspectives other than the pure geopolitical aspects of East-West and European security, the various countries of Eastern Europe—herein to include the Soviet Union, or core, as well as Albania and Yugoslavia, or the periphery, of the regional system—present a much more problematical element in the strategic balance. Just as the character and capability in foreign policy of a single nation are defined in large measure by domestic developments, so the impact of a community of nations in the overall balance of power in the global arena is to a significant degree determined by the nature of relationships within that community. Historical, cultural, social, economic, organizational, and elite perspectives point to a number of within-nation and between-nation differences in Eastern Europe which seriously question standard assumptions about the position and meaning of the region in an assessment of the strategic balance.

Due in large part to the post-World War II ability of the two superpowers to shape the international system into Eastern and Western alignments—with mirror-image reflections appearing in critical theaters such as Europe in the form of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)—Eastern Europe has become consigned to the Soviet sphere of influence. Whether by tacit acquiescence (the notion, incorrectly attributed but with inherent logic, of a "Sonnenfeldt Doctrine") or realpolitik pragmatism (the so-called "Brezhnev Doctrine," a parallel concept similarly disavowed by the Soviets), Eastern Europe has achieved the status of a foregone conclusion in United States foreign policy formulation.¹ Despite an acute awareness of flexibility and fragmentation within their own Atlantic alliance, the Western powers

have taken for granted an ideological, political, and even socioeconomic uniformity and solidarity in the East of Europe.

The issue at hand is the recognition of differences other than those of an East-West dichotomy which pertain to the nature of within-nation, within-region, and interregional relationships, particularly as these differences impact on American foreign policy and the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. A simple shift of emphasis from East-West to North-South differentiation provides the vehicle for reexamination of Eastern Europe as it relates to US foreign policy and Soviet-American strategic postures. Of special importance will be the identification of issues made salient by the cross-cutting of North-South and East-West dimensions in the East European region.²

Differentiation within Eastern Europe is not and should not be necessarily correlated at all times and in every place with a foreign policy of differentiation on the part of the United States. However, the argumentation in this essay will lead to a conclusion calling for a clearer understanding of the complexities involved in East European international relations and when and where they may accrue to the advantage of the United States in strategic competition and confrontation with the Soviet Union.

EASTERN EUROPE IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

Despite a considerable range in rates and levels of development within the East European region, it is important to recognize that the European Community Party-states represent a late-developing cluster of nations whose economic motivations have a good deal more in common with the Third and Fourth Worlds than with the advanced, industrial systems of the Western World.³ Eastern European shares of global population, production, and consumption point to an unenviable position, particularly in relation to other European actors.

Regional shares of global population and production are telling. The United States, for

example, with only 5.4 percent of global population, accounts for 25.8 percent of global product. This contrasts with the Soviet Union's shares: 6.3 and 12.5 percent, respectively. Similarly, other developed non-Communist states account for 12.4 percent of population and 38.5 percent of production, while other developed Communist states account for respective shares of 2.7 and 4.6 percent. To complete the picture, India and other less-developed non-Communist countries comprise 48.6 percent of world population and produce 14.2 percent of world product; the shares of China and other less-developed Communist countries are 24.6 and 4.4 percent, respectively.⁴

A more meaningful contrast may be provided by per capita income figures. In terms of 1973 dollars, according to the World Bank, the per capita incomes of Denmark, France, West Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom are at least \$2500. On the other hand, Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania are among the nations with as little as \$740

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per capita income. These are very startling, meaningful figures when one considers that they reflect the standard of living, the quality of life.

At the global and European-wide levels of analysis, one might expect that the same processes occurring throughout the international system with respect to social and political change in response to economic, ecological, and environmental stress will take place inevitably within Eastern Europe irrespective of the traditional structure of power. As the superpowers themselves have simultaneously experienced increased economic and military advantage over middle and small powers on the one hand, and inability to exercise those capabilities in influence over developing nations on the other hand, a paradox of power exists for each superpower within traditional areas of influence.

Critical energy and economic problems in the United States have produced a changing balance of political power in Atlantic relationships. Economic development and political independence among West European allies have progressed to the point at which post-War political parallels of two superpower-dominated blocs no longer hold essential meaning, at least for the West. Western Europe contains disparate types of socioeconomic systems, yet a marked commonality persists among Atlantic partners. Similarly, in the East there exists a commonality in the form of planned, command-oriented economies, but significant variations on the socialist model appear.

As East European systems attempt to redress the development imbalance vis-à-vis Western Europe, two simultaneous processes could occur: first, increased interaction and interdependence between Eastern and Western European countries; and second, accentuated differentiation and independence within the socialist community. The Soviet-sponsored political and military reinforcement of orthodox socialist administration within each country could

well become susceptible to the same political impact of economic development found in global relationships.

To be sure, the East European systems, in relation to the Soviet Union, are caught in the same sort of development paradox persisting among socialist and nonsocialist Third World countries alike; namely, in economic interaction between advanced industrial systems and late-developing nations, the advantage for the former is quantitatively and qualitatively increased.⁵ International economic relations within any context that includes vast development differentials give ever-greater political and economic strength to the more developed partner in the interaction, especially in those instances in which the differentials may be attributable to the historical timing of development.

While the regional import of the development process within Eastern Europe may point to stable and ongoing power relations, clearly to the Soviet advantage, there may be global and pan-European possibilities for Western influence and amelioration of Soviet hegemony. The Eastern European regional configuration finds itself in a disadvantageous position in competition and interaction on key economic indicators such as productivity, trade, and a variety of commercial relationships.

Global economic and, in particular, developmental indices offer an advantage and potential influence of the West over the East. The point is underscored by CMEA economic and trade indicators. The Soviet Union, with a gross national product (GNP) of \$787 billion at 1974 world market prices, is indebted to the West to the tune of \$15 billion at 1974 exchange rates. Comparable figures show the other CMEA countries of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia with a combined GNP of \$240 billion and an indebtedness to the West of \$22 billion.⁶

At the very least, such levels of indebtedness to the West and similar trade deficits among East European socialist systems demystify the popular Marxist tenets

concerning the contemporary decay of capitalist economic structures. It may be contested that continued granting of credits from the West to the East could prompt an abrogation of responsibilities on the part of socialist systems, but experience points more logically to increased levels of interdependence and long-term cooperation and flexibility in the solving of critical economic deficiencies which cannot be coped with in isolation from international economic realities.⁷

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) culminating in the Final Act signed in Helsinki, which provided for a reconvening of the CSCE institutional framework in Belgrade during late 1977, provides a potential for linking such global processes to regional politics with special impact upon Eastern Europe. The territorial status quo granted the Soviet Union in the basket one provisions seemingly works toward the notion of a *de jure* as well as a *de facto* recognition on the part of the Western countries of Soviet hegemony in the East. Yet Helsinki itself rests upon a foundation of pan-European concepts in which national borders and entities become stabilized internally but at the same time become more flexible as actors externally. The basket two provisions of economic interactions reinforce nonbloc processes in European international relations.⁸

Even those areas in which the Soviet Union holds a long-term advantage in global development indicators, such as in key minerals and energy supplies, technological inferiority dictates dependence upon and openness to Western expertise. The crucial questions concern the US and European strategies for the exploitation of points of weakness in these areas in the East. Global development indicators, describing ongoing economic and political advantages for the West over the East, especially in the context of Europe, offer an excellent example of a point at which North-South and East-West lines intersect and identify significant issues relating to the strategic balance. The concrete context in which these issues may be used to the advantage of the West must be explained

in terms of Eastern Europe as a region. Before examining the socialist systems from a regional perspective, however, some preliminary hypotheses may be formulated on the basis of the global level of analysis:

- Development differentials are correlated positively with political, economic, and military advantages, perhaps to the point of causal connection (i.e., greater differentials produce increased advantages over time).

- International economic processes at the global level may be replicated at lower levels of the international system, such as the European-wide region.

- Given West European developmental success to a degree greater than that found in the East of Europe, economic interaction offers potential for extension of influence and advantage on a variety of dimensions from West to East.

- The combination of global economic necessities and pan-European political processes under the framework of CSCE provides a mechanism by which such influence and advantage can be concretely realized.

EASTERN EUROPE IN REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE

The degree to which the medium and small countries of Eastern Europe represent an asset to the Soviet Union in the strategic balance with the United States depends upon the level of cohesion and degree of integration existing in the socialist community. Cohesion denotes the complementarity and similarity among systems on a variety of factors or attributes exhibited by the relevant social, economic, and political entities. Integration denotes an even more policy-relevant condition existing within a community of nations, a condition in which the whole becomes greater than the sum of its parts.⁹ In other words, integration denotes political unification, the transference of loyalties and authority of each part to a higher-level political system.

The qualitative difference between cohesion and integration demands not only analysis of the number of ways in which each system complements every other system in the Soviet-East European subsystem but also analysis of the degree to which such complementarity determines a patterning of public policies at the community level. Further, the plotting of public policy variations in the region must be accomplished for both domestic and foreign policy issue areas. Finally, in order to ascertain openings for the intrusion of actions and processes external to the region, some attempt must be made to delineate the linkage between domestic and foreign policy patterning.¹⁰

For the cross-national (cohesiveness on a number of dimensions) and for the international (integration on a given dimension, predominantly economic in West European experience and political in East European experience) analyses of the East European regional setting, the major obstacle to understanding is the sheer complexity of the nine systems under consideration. A myriad of historical and cultural, social and economic, organizational and institutional, and leadership and elite factors characterize each country, despite the obvious pressure for public policy patterning emanating from the core system of the USSR. A close examination of past and current behavior of the East European systems, from core to periphery alike, does point to the salience of certain factors in most situations. These critical factors include ethnic, linguistic, and nationalistic diversity; the ratio of private to state-owned forces of production; the degree of pluralism versus Communist Party control internally; and the continuity of the elite-leadership structure.

Ethnic Composition

On the historical and cultural dimension, those factors which indicate at once the greatest variation across nations in the area as well as exert the greatest impact upon public policies in the region relate to ethnic, linguistic, and nationalistic diversity.¹¹ In particular, it is important to recognize not

only the numbers of ethnic groups, especially those with recent or long-standing national independence, such as the Soviet Union itself, but also the degree of ethnic rivalry among a few but clearly divided groups, such as in the case of Czechs and Slovaks. Of considerable impact upon policy variations are those ethnic situations which are reinforced on other historical and cultural indices, such as periods of democratic experience as in the case of Czechoslovakia in the interim war period or in the case of former national independence for several groups now included in the Yugoslav system.

The historical fact that at various periods of time three foreign cultural dynasties have controlled major portions of Eastern Europe is reinforced by the idea that the East European region in general is a very heterogeneous ethnic community. On a continuum, we would find the unlikely political bed partners of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia at one end, representing the states most concerned about foreign domination and most beset by internal ethnic conflicts. On the other end we would find states like East Germany, Albania, and Bulgaria, relatively ethnically homogeneous and relatively secure in terms of their present positions.

Socioeconomic Structure

On the social and economic dimensions, perhaps the most critical factor indicating a lack of cohesion, and stress at the regional level due to enforced external economic uniformity by the Soviets, is the variation along an economic continuum from industrial to pastoral base.¹² This factor has, however, been modified to considerable extent by the fact that the East European systems, with the possible exception of Albania, have all undergone an essential shift from agricultural to industrial emphasis in recent years. East Germany and Czechoslovakia, of course, had traditionally occupied advanced industrial status but also underwent modernization processes under Soviet control in post-War years similar to those experienced by the other systems.

For the most part, the industrialization and urbanization process in East Europe has been massive, rapid, and of course at quite a late stage in terms of the industrial revolution. Consequently all of the East European countries find themselves in a late-developing category and experiencing the social disorientation that accompanies the rapid migration of populations from rural to urban settings in a brief historical period.

The factor, however, which currently affects domestic policy variation at least centers on the ratio in both industrial and agricultural sectors of private to state-owned forces of production.¹³ A surprising degree of variance on this factor exists among even the most orthodox domestic systems, such as the case of Polish agricultural holdings in contrast to those in Czechoslovakia. Less specific but equally important influences on policy variation can be seen in the varying rates as well as levels of development overall in the region.

A socioeconomic continuum would reveal the most explosive countries, in a socialist sense, at one end—those allowing the greatest amount of privatization in both agriculture and industry—and those that are still experiencing the rural to urban migration at the other end. Among the former we would find Yugoslavia and Poland; Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, and Albania would exemplify the latter.

Pluralism vs. Monolithism

On the organizational and institutional dimensions of cohesion and integration in the East European region, it is traditionally assumed that the commonality of Communist Party control internally in each nation and the integrating force of the WTO and CMEA across the region serve as the means by which the Soviet core achieves the ends of political and ideological uniformity. A more microscopic examination of the organizations within and across the East European systems, however, pinpoints a number of variations from the organizational norm.

The party in each system inevitably reflects the internal historical, cultural, social, and

economic factors operating in that system.¹⁴ Similarly, the influence of institutions outside the formal political system in each society varies from country to country. In some cases the Communist Party has attempted to incorporate all institutional facets of society into a controlled and hierarchical setting, such as in East Germany, while in other cases there are significant organizational loci outside the formal Party structure, such as in Poland with the highly visible Catholic Church and in Yugoslavia with a variety of economic institutions. Czechoslovakia signifies an especially important feature of many East European organizational frameworks for society in the cross-cutting of ethnic or administrative units and organizational loyalties with Czechs and Slovaks adhering to respective governmental and political organizational units.

Leadership Continuity

The political elite and leaders in other sectors of society are necessarily treated as the most significant determinants of policy variation in systems which are characterized by authoritarian political structures.¹⁵ Where the most interesting variations on these two dimensions appear is in the horizontal linkage between the two segments of policy-relevant opinionmakers. The traditional method by which the Communist Party has introduced new elites into the political system is through recruitment at the bottom of the political ladder and selective elevation of the most ideologically motivated to the top positions. Increasingly, however, East European systems have turned to a process of cooptation: the introduction of economic, administrative, and other technical experts at various levels of the political system in response to the requirements of modernization and resultant complexity and diversity.

Still, traditional indicators among authoritarian elite structures in Eastern Europe maintain the greatest impact upon policy variation. Age in particular, in cases as disparate as the Soviet Union at the core and Yugoslavia at the periphery, looms as the

single most critical elite factor in contemporary Eastern Europe.

Since it is virtually impossible to predict change in policy upon the basis of personality shifts as yet unknown, some indication of direction of change in the East European systems may be derived from an examination of the factions among elites of the various Communist parties and in particular the basis upon which such factions, or more properly coalitions, are formed. In several cases, most noticeably the Soviet Union itself, elite factions seem built around patron-client relations, the Secretary-General depending for the most part on a number of personally-sponsored members of the Politburo and Central Committee Secretariat for resolution of issues in his favor. On the other hand, there are cases, most extreme in Yugoslavia but increasingly apparent elsewhere in East Europe, where factions are built around issues as opposed to identities.

The simple identification of four major sets of factors salient for the shaping of domestic and foreign policies in Eastern Europe only begins the process of regional analysis. More relevant is the interconnection among and ranking of factors in terms of policy relevance with respect to given issues under consideration by the political system. At the regional level, the single most policy-relevant issue before East European elites is integration and the mix of political and economic options available in each national system.¹⁶

The above discussion notes the variation on several of the most significant factors determining policy differences in the region. What becomes apparent is the linkage existing, the pattern developing, among the various factors as they interact in the formulation of policy. For example, the ethnic heterogeneity in Yugoslavia, reinforced by historical experience of national independence in several cases, reinforces in turn the significance of development levels and types from one ethnically homogeneous republic to another within the Yugoslav system, which in turn has

had tremendous impact on the Communist Party and nonparty organizational aspects of the society. Elite diversity, signified by a variety of issue-oriented factions within a party nevertheless dominated by a single personality, is the result.

The regional significance of the interaction of key indicators of policy variation rests in the degree to which such variations operate to create political distance between the several medium and small states in the region and the core system of the USSR. The foreign policy issue area serves to illustrate the impact that an underlying lack of cohesion, as outlined above, has had upon Soviet goals of economic, political, and ideological integration. Four broad dimensions of foreign policy behavior can be identified, each with critical factors for the determination of differentiation within the region: participation in regional organizations; intra-bloc and extra-bloc interactions; orthodox or unorthodox ideological orientation; and roles in the international system at large.

Regional Organizations

The organizational focus to the regional goals of the Soviet Union on politico-military and socioeconomic dimensions are the WTO and CMEA, respectively.¹⁷ The dual roles of the Warsaw Pact, external defense vis-à-vis the NATO alliance and internal policing within the bloc, are highlighted in the various postures of the East European systems with respect to the military grouping. Albania and Yugoslavia eschew Pact activities altogether, while Romania limits its relationship to observer status. Of some significance to the prediction of foreign policy behavior within the bloc is the actual use of Warsaw Pact intervention in internal affairs of its members, as in the case with Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Similarly, the economic mechanism by which the Soviet Union exerts integrative influence in the region is CMEA, an organizational network of bilateral economic associations among members which has demonstrated only minor successes at multilateral association.

It is important to remember that Soviet resources and relative size place it in a position vis-à-vis any other East European system in such an advantageous manner as to be analogous to the global-level relationship existing between advanced industrial systems and the Third and Fourth Worlds.¹⁸ Again, the degree to which several of the East European systems have pursued alternative international economic paths to the Soviet-dominated mechanism of CMEA only serves to accentuate the lack of integration on the critical economic dimension. Paradoxically, East European systems seem to demonstrate the least integrative behavior on that very dimension on which cohesiveness is most pronounced, namely economics. Conversely, the political and cultural diversity and lack of cohesiveness has been artificially sublimated by Soviet military might in the form of the WTO.

Bloc Institutionalization

The entire range of economic, commercial, informational, and technological interactions undertaken by East European countries can offer evidence as to the distance of an individual system within the region from the core power. In two particular aspects, the ratio of bilateral to multilateral association with the Soviet system by a less-developed East European partner and the overall ratio of intra-bloc to extra-bloc interactions, the identification of integrative-disintegrative trends within the region may be facilitated. On a continuum, the Soviet Union and Bulgaria would be most integrative, most supportive of intra-bloc relations; Albania, Yugoslavia, and Romania, again, would lie at the other end of the continuum. Of special importance in the future may be subregional groupings of East European countries outside the Soviet dominated organizations.¹⁹

Ideological Movement

Ideological orientation in foreign policy behavior offers another critical dimension on which significant variations exist between the Moscow model and national orientations

elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The most obvious divergence occurred in the case of Albanian support for the Chinese side in the international Communist split, but it is equally significant that the Yugoslav national variation in the direction of a distinctly different means of administration of society and the economy has achieved the status of yet a third model for the construction of socialism. The socialist-humanist movement in several East European countries, originating in Hungary and Poland among small intellectual circles and continuing in Yugoslav philosophy and sociology in general, has been reinforced internationally by some elements among West European socialism and Communism.²⁰ Eurocommunism becomes most important in the East European context in that it gives, once again, an alternative locus with which the East Europeans may associate themselves, an alternative to the Soviet monolith.

International Relations

Orientation outside the region and roles played in the international system at large also point to foreign policy variation considerably at odds with Soviet aspirations for the region. Yugoslav involvement with the nonaligned nations of Africa and Asia, to some extent pursued by Romania as well in recent years, and the dual channels for non-Soviet association in the international system provided in the Helsinki meeting of all European states and the Berlin meeting of all European Communist parties evidence a regional flexibility previously impossible and potentially exploitable by East European systems seeking a greater independence vis-à-vis Moscow and West European systems seeking possibilities for a more flexible structure for post-War Europe.

The regional perspective is crucial to the determination of significant variations between public policy patterns existing in the Soviet Union on the one hand and among the other systems in the region on the

other hand, as well as to the identification of potential areas of impact which the Western systems may have upon the Eastern region. Without question, it would be misleading to suggest that political and military realities in Eastern Europe mitigate Soviet power in relation to the other members of the region, but equally misleading is the conclusion that the West cannot in some degree influence the type of social and economic evolution in the East European systems. Military and economic indices indicate the simultaneous political equations operating in Eastern Europe: political power for the Soviet Union based upon military and economic preponderance, with socioeconomic variability across the rest of Eastern Europe (a factor not unimportant within the Soviet system itself) signaling areas susceptible to influence from outside the region.²¹

It is obvious from the preceding discussion that a policy of differentiation is necessary with respect to the Eastern European region, especially in the context of the strategic balance in which political and socioeconomic distance between the Soviet Union and other systems in the region offers advantages to the West.²² Preliminary hypotheses based on a regional level of analysis can be formulated as follows:

- Direct political and military influence in Eastern Europe on the part of Western powers will only act counter to objectives of independence and flexibility in East European-Soviet relations.

- At the same time, socioeconomic differentials between the Soviet core and the remaining systems in Eastern Europe indicate not only the indigenous development of models based on national variations but also points of stress and susceptibility to Western influence in the area.

- In particular, the West European countries may be the most economically appropriate and politically acceptable agents of intrusive influence into Eastern Europe.

- The United States can most effectively

exert influence in the area by a policy of differentiation which recognizes the Soviet and East European necessities of economic and technological interaction with the West, a recognition that includes awareness of Soviet deficiencies and demands as well as those in less-developed systems within the region.

EASTERN EUROPE IN NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Proceeding from the macro to the micro level of analysis of Eastern Europe, this essay has attempted to outline a logical relationship and analogy between political and economic realities operating in global and regional configurations. Both globally and regionally, the traditional East-West differentiation of the post-War era has given way to the policy-relevance of North-South differentiation. Increasingly, economic status has accounted for political strategy. Even in a region characterized by traditional indices of power, such as in post-War Eastern Europe, various political models have arisen to achieve economic goals.

It is appropriate that American foreign policy goals, especially in the crucial context of the strategic East-West balance, be attuned to the national political strategies of Eastern European countries. Specifically concerning the strategic balance between the Soviet Union and the United States, Eastern Europe may represent a test case for the ability of the United States and the Western World to take advantage of economic and technological superiority. Particular national strategies for economic development and political independence vis-à-vis Moscow are keys for the unlocking of doors previously closed to Western influence.

Figure 1 illustrates a simplistic matrix of political choices and system models available to Eastern European countries in their quest for flexibility in regional context and for support from the West in the international system at large. Here the crucial interconnection occurs between political and economic realities on the one hand and internal and external dimensions of policy on the other hand.




FIGURE 1. PUBLIC POLICY OPTIONS IN THE SOVIET-EAST EUROPEAN REGION.

Two extreme cases, polar opposites in global, regional, and national contexts, are represented by Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, each system legitimately—and successfully—opting for contrasting models, the internally orthodox and externally inflexible for Bulgaria on the one hand and the internally unorthodox and externally flexible for Yugoslavia on the other hand. More interesting in contrast, and more instructive in the long run for Western systems attempting to exert influence, are the Hungarian and Romanian models. The former system has exhibited an experimental attitude with respect to the market mechanism within socialism domestically (the NEM or New Economic Mechanism), but at the same time has adhered to the Moscow line in foreign policy without significant variation on a single issue. The latter system is recognized as one of the most orthodox

internal systems in the bloc, yet at the same time Romania has openly disputed Moscow on significant issues of foreign relations, especially in instances which would benefit Romanian development irrespective of CMEA directives for regional division of labor.

Just as the logic of global socioeconomic differentials argues for realignment of traditional political communities of nations, so do national aspirations for industrialization and sociocultural modernization argue for political models and choices in opposition to regional political and military powers. Hypotheses derived from the national perspective in Eastern Europe may be tentatively formulated as follows:

- Even in cases of extreme variation from

the Moscow core of the region, such as in Albania, wherein the deviation does not in any sense indicate a degree of cohesion with the West, such cases are important evidence in the assessment of the East-West and, in particular, the Soviet-American strategic balance.

- Where variations reflect a conscious choice of balance between internal and external flexibility, the greatest opportunities for Western influence exist with respect to the system possessing external independence of action, since the Soviet pattern of behavior and reaction to such flexibility is less extreme.

- Where variations reflect a conscious choice of balance between political and economic flexibility, the greatest opportunities for Western influence exist with respect to the system possessing economic independence of action, since the mainstay of Soviet internal control is the authority of the Communist Party.

- In those cases where internal and external flexibility have been accomplished simultaneously on economic and political dimensions in relation to the socialist model exported by Moscow, the Western powers possess opportunities for the extension of influence into the periphery of the Eastern European region, a process which could potentially shift the strategic balance in favor of the Western World in general and the United States in particular.

CONCLUSION

Proceeding from the top downward and the bottom upward in the international system, socioeconomic change and its inevitable political impact indicate realignment at the global, regional, and national levels. In each instance such realignment will accrue to the advantage of the system which is capable and willing to use social, economic, and technological strength, even in lieu of such traditional indices of power as military might, if available. The overall strategic balance between East and

West can be best assessed in the total perspective of global, regional, and national levels.

The specific Soviet-American strategic balance, and the integral role played by Eastern Europe in that weighing of advantage in the international system, indicates not only an inherent economic and technological advantage for the Western superpower, but also beckons an initiative on the part of the United States for accentuation of those trends within the socialist community which tend toward development and stability in contradistinction to artificially imposed political uniformity and military solidarity.

NOTES

1. Charles Gati, "The Forgotten Region," *Foreign Policy*, 19 (Summer 1975), 135-45. On page 144, he states: "In our persistent, if not desperate, search for detente, we have rightly abandoned our provocative 'forward strategy' toward Eastern Europe, but have wrongly adopted a policy of deliberate indifference."

2. Evidence of East European intellectual and political awareness of the North-South impact upon the region may be seen in Bela Kadar, "Recent Trends in the Industrialization of the Developing Countries and the Global Strategy of the Leading Capitalist Countries," *Trends in World Economy*, Vol. 14 (Budapest: Hungarian Scientific Council for World Economy, 1974).

3. Elaboration of this point may be found in James A. Kuhlman, "Socialist Construction and the Steady State," in *Society's Future: The Boundaries of Growth*, ed. Dennis C. Pirages (New York: Praeger, 1977).

4. Based on Department of State statistics, with 1973 population totaling 3933 million and 1973 GNP totaling \$4988 billion.

5. This is a point developed at length with obvious implications for Soviet-East European economic interaction by Ferenc Kozma, "Some Theoretical Problems Regarding Socialist Integration and the Levelling of Economic Development," *Trends in World Economy*, Vol. 6 (Budapest: Hungarian Scientific Council for World Economy, 1971).

6. Compiled from US Department of Commerce, Bureau of East-West Trade, Office of East-West Policy and Planning, *US Trade Status with Socialist Countries*, monthly reports, 1974-76. A figure included for Yugoslavia represents total external debt, public and private, as of 1976, according to a Morgan Guaranty Trust/*New York Times* estimate carried in Leonard Silk, "The Problem of Enormous Buildup of International Debt," *The New York Times*, 11 November 1976, p. 60. The same estimates put the total CMEA external debt at \$40 billion.

7. See Michael Kaser, "Soviet Trade Turns to Europe," *Foreign Policy*, 19 (Summer 1975), 123-34; and Marshall I. Goldman, "The Soviet Economy Is Not Immune," *Foreign Policy*, 21 (Winter 1975-76), 76-87. The Western academic community only recently has begun to devote attention to the impact of such interaction.

8. This political impact is stressed continually by the Romanians in particular. See Aurel Ghibutiu, "Pan-European

Economic Cooperation—The Essential Component of the European Security," *Perspektiven und Probleme wirtschaftlicher Zusammenarbeit zwischen Ost- und Westeuropa* (Berlin: Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, 1976), Sonderheft 114.

9. Ernst Haas, *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 16.

10. A preliminary framework and approach for this task has been developed in James A. Kuhlman, "A Framework for Viewing Domestic and Foreign Policy Patterns," in *The International Politics of Eastern Europe*, ed. Charles Gati (New York: Praeger, 1976), pp. 275-91.

11. *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, ed. Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969). The impact of ethnicity upon relations between states in Eastern Europe is discussed in Robert R. King, *Minorities Under Communism: Nationalities as a Source of Tension Among Balkan Communist States* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973).

12. US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy, "East European Economic Development: Two Decades of Interrelationships and Interactions with the Soviet Union," by John P. Hardt, in *Economic Developments in Countries of Eastern Europe*, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 1970, pp. 5-40.

13. US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy, "Magnitude and Distribution of the Labor Force in Eastern Europe," by Andrew Elias, in *Economic Developments in Countries of Eastern Europe*, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 1970, pp. 149-239.

14. *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics*, ed. H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971); and, in particular, H. Gordon Skilling, "Group Conflict and Political Change," in *Change in Communist Systems*, ed. Chalmers Johnson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), pp. 215-34.

15. Variability within and between national Communist elites is examined in *Political Leadership in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union*, ed. R. Barry Farrell (Chicago: Adline Publishing Company, 1970). Also Carl Beck, et al., *Comparative Communist Political Leadership* (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1973).

16. See the section on "Policy and Planning" in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Reorientation and Commercial Relations of the Economics of Eastern Europe*, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 1974, pp. 17-250.

17. The standard works on the two regional organizations are Robin Alison Remington, *The Warsaw Pact: Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1971); and Michael Kaser, *COMECON: Integration Problems of the Planned Economies* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).

18. Dennis C. Pirages, "Global Resources and the Future of Europe," in *The Future of Inter-Bloc Relations in Europe*, ed. Louis J. Mensonides and James A. Kuhlman (New York: Praeger, 1974), pp. 121-44.

19. For instance, see George W. Hoffman, *Regional Development Strategy in Southeast Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia* (New York: Praeger, 1972).

20. This is one of the major reasons for the ambivalence toward Eurocommunism evidenced to date on the part of the Soviet leaders. Such channels of communication, even if only philosophical in nature, are perceived as political intrusions by the Soviets. Yet such nonbloc interactions in the ideological sphere are especially difficult to contain or curtail given that the agents of such change fall within socialist and Communist parameters.

21. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1965-1974 and 1966-1975* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1976).

22. The point here is that the United States cannot and should not expect that lack of cohesion on the part of some systems in Eastern Europe necessarily will mean a realignment of those systems with the Western World. Despite the suggestions raised recently by Laurence Silberman, essentially putting forth the notion that basic change in a Communist society should be that *a priori* condition for enhancement of economic, technological, and political interactions with the West, traditional American strength must be used in an ongoing and subtle attempt to reinforce processes of innovation. See Laurence Silberman, "Yugoslavia's 'Old' Communism," *Foreign Policy*, 26 (Spring 1977), pp. 3-27.

