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Fred C. Weyland

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AMERICA AND ITS ARMY: A BICENTENNIAL LOOK AT POSTURE AND GOALS

by

GENERAL FRED C. WEYAND, US ARMY

The following article is adapted from the Chief of Staff's address to the 22d Annual National Security Seminar at the US Army War College, 4 June 1976.

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It is a delight to come up here. A trip away from the Pentagon is always worth taking.

But there is another trip that is worth taking—a trip back to the beginnings of this Republic. Most of you, because this is our Bicentennial Year, have thought back on these 200 years of ours and have contemplated our history in its simplest form—where we have been, where we are, and where we hope to go. I believe that to look back over those 200 years and to see where we have been is a very healthy experience. This is particularly so because, in recent times, we have suffered a series of disconcerting jolts—jolts that have tended to undermine our confidence and our faith in ourselves and our abilities. The Watergate affair, the tragedy of Vietnam, the abuse of power by government agencies, the growing Soviet imperialism and all that it implies—all of these things have been new and disconcerting to us. They have brought an awareness that we can fail, that we are not invincible, that unless we are careful we can be defeated.

While all of this may be new and disconcerting to us, it was not new (although it may well have been disconcerting) to the officers and men of the Continental Army 200 years ago. Certainly their objectives were not clear; more than that, the outcome was

very far from certain. Like ours, their world was imperfect and very dangerous. Although it might appear simple as we look back on it, to our forefathers it was complex—as complex as our world is to us today.

On the second of June, Secretary Hoffmann made a very fine graduation speech up at the Academy, and there is one part of it that bears on what I am talking about. Secretary Hoffmann said: “. . . the role of the Army . . . [is] tied closely to national goals. The United States seeks peace, stability, freedom, and the rule of law in the world. But it does so under conditions that are at once dangerous and deceptively disarming in appearance.” And then he went on and cited some of these disarming contradictions. He said:

The Soviet Union holds alien values, imposes a repressive political system on its own and neighboring peoples. It exploits international disorder; it openly advocates a competitive relationship based on military strength; and its challenges burst out in strange and distant places. But we must strive to reach reasonable understandings with it in areas where we can agree.

We are repeatedly told that we have entered the nuclear age and cannot turn back from it. But we are locked in a nuclear stalemate, and traditional forces, conventional weapons, and political geography have assumed their former importance.

We marvel at the intercontinental reach

of our strategic forces. But most of our military objectives we must be prepared to reach on foot.

The nation is at peace; yet all the energies and resources of the Armed Forces must be focused on readiness for combat.

We are prone to think of this situation as unprecedented. But, to a degree, the sense of complexity, contradiction, and uncertainty comes from our reverence for our history, and—in this Bicentennial Year—a yearning for quick lessons from it.

We tend to reflect on our beginnings, and indeed much of our past, as simpler times when choices and objectives were clearer than in the present.

I want to emphasize that the idea that things were simpler and clearer in the past than they are today simply is not so.

When I think about our problems as compared with those problems of 200 years ago, I am inclined to think about General Washington, my earliest predecessor as Chief of Staff of the Army. I wonder what Washington would think if he were with me and I told him of the problems of this Army today . . . or if I told him of the economic problems of this country of ours. Or take Abraham Lincoln. If we could talk to him and express to him our deep concern over the divisiveness of the Vietnam conflict, I have to conclude that we would not get much sympathy or much more than perhaps a wry smile from those two gentlemen.

After I became Chief of Staff, I went back and read in some depth accounts of when General Marshall took over as Chief of Staff in 1939. I am sure that he would not be overwhelmed with the problems I sometimes think overwhelm me as Chief of Staff of the Army. Neither would MacArthur, faced with the bonus marchers in Washington in 1930, and the onerous mission of removing them from the government buildings that they occupied in our capital, and in a sense, running them out of town at the point of a bayonet. The point of all of that is that the

world did not become complex, imperfect, and dangerous just in the last few years. It has always been so.

Those forefathers of ours were indeed true revolutionaries, and the revolution they began 200 years ago is still going on. It was and is a difficult and dangerous proposition. When those men signed that Declaration of Independence, they knew that the odds against their survival were very high. Some of them joked about how they would die—how long it would take them to hang when their time came. They faced a very uncertain future. They realized that democracy and the freedoms and liberties that they propounded were very fragile. They had challenged the divine right of kings; they were surrounded by autocracies, just as today we seem to have totalitarianism pressing in on us and our interests. They were very much aware of the fragility of their undertaking, and if we stop and think about it, we should be aware of just how fragile, just how rare, democracy remains today.

The other day I read part of the monumental work of Will and Ariel Durant, the respected historians, who have studied history in such great depth and have outlined it so beautifully. At one point, they conclude that civilization, as they see it, is just one generation removed from barbarism. Then they go on to explain that historically it has been proven that civilization is a very thin veneer. It must be passed from generation to generation, otherwise it will disappear. And so here again, you see the reflection of the fragility of the values we cherish.

Americans are sensitive to that fragility. At the same time, they are also sensitive and concerned about the use of force and the seeming contradiction between force and these fragile democratic values.

But how *does* force fit into the defense or the promotion of those values? Here again, we find a comparison between today and 200 years ago. Just as we do, our forefathers asked, "Why an Army?—If an Army, how big should it be? What's the relevance of force to the problems that face us?" After having

signed the Declaration of Independence, and then going on and winning that war, they then turned to the task of drafting the Constitution for this country. Having won the war, they were very sensitive to the continuation of anything like a standing force, because they had fought to remove themselves from the threat of armed oppression. So they debated, "Why an Army?" They finally concluded that since there were hostile nations that had armed forces, and since they could not remove the threat of those armed forces by just declaring them illegal, or do away with them by just writing a provision into our Constitution, it would also be necessary for the United States to maintain an Army. Now, that is very simple logic to a very complex question, but that logic, I believe, is just as pertinent today as it was then.

Then they went on to debate, "Well, if we are going to have an Army, how large should it be?" A proposal was made during this discussion that maybe it would be well to limit the Army to two or three thousand officers and men. And the story goes that George Washington said: "Yes, that would be acceptable, if by this same provision in the Constitution we could make it illegal for any attacking force to exceed two or three thousand officers and men." Again, that very simple but persuasive logic applies just as it did then.

And then came the question of the relevance of force. Well, I am not going into that in any depth. You could write a book or certainly make a speech about that one point alone. I think today, just as then, force is relevant to those who would oppose us. In our case, just in recent times, we have seen that force was indeed relevant to Hanoi, was relevant to the Soviet Union, was relevant to Cuba. So we have to conclude that, in some very important ways, force—conventional military strength—is relevant to the situation that we face.

When you go back and review the relatively short period since the founding of the Republic—in historical terms, something less than a millisecond—you

find that there are certain characteristics that run through us as Americans. One characteristic that is common—one that I am probably more conscious and sensitive to than many of you—is antimilitarism. But that is nothing new to America. Not too long ago I was reading about Ulysses S. Grant. In 1843, he went back to Bethel, Ohio, his hometown, after graduation from West Point. He had his new uniform on, and he was very proud of it. But when he walked down the main street of this little town, he was laughed at and hooted and hollered at and shamed off the street.

And there is this trait of idealism—a very beautiful thing. It causes us to want to make the world in our own image so that everyone will enjoy the values and ideals that we hold so precious. But at the same time, idealism causes us to posture and preach to others. Not only that, but we have this odd conflict of the means to achieve idealistic goals being denied because of our antimilitarism.

And then you have isolationism. For 200 years, whenever we are faced with situations outside pressing on us, we have the almost automatic reaction of withdrawal. I think this is one of the reasons that Americans have been very slow to, you might say, rise to the

General Fred C. Weyand, Army Chief of Staff since October, 1974, is the second ROTC graduate to hold that post. Called to active duty in 1940, after attending the Command and General Staff School he went to the China-Burma-India Theater in 1944 where he was a staff officer. During the Korean War, he led a battalion of the 3d Infantry Division, and in 1960 commanded the 3d Battle Group, 6th Infantry, in Berlin. In 1961 he became Deputy Chief, then Chief, of Army Legislative Liaison; was Chief of Reserve Components, 1968-69; military advisor at the Paris peace talks, 1969-70; and was briefly Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development. He went to Vietnam in March, 1966, where he commanded the 25th Infantry Division, moved up to become Deputy Commander, then Commander of II Field Force, which defended Saigon during the 1968 Tet offensive. He twice served directly under the late Chief of Staff, General Creighton W. Abrams, first as Deputy Commander, USMACV, then as Army Vice Chief of Staff. General Weyand, as the last US commander in Vietnam, met the difficult challenge of withdrawing and protecting US forces after the cease-fire.



bait—have been very slow to react to growing military threats. Certainly that was true in World War I; it was true in World War II, and I suppose that we will see it again.

These traits that are part of us are on the one hand one of our great strengths and on the other hand one of our weaknesses. We are a very complex people in a very complex world.

In 1840, DeTocqueville said—in a passage probably too often quoted—that it is in the conduct of foreign affairs that democracies appear to be decidedly inferior to other governments. That was true then, and it is true today. I do not say that to decry democracy or to complain about it. I simply say that it is a fact of life that should be taken into account. It should be taken into account particularly now, because we have come full cycle, back to the days of George Washington when he had to explain and justify the requirements, the needs, of that Continental Army to the entire Congress and to the people.

Today we have seen the end of the so-called era of the “Imperial Presidency.” As a member of the corporate leadership of the Army, I have gone through a period when the Army, in a sense, simply had to explain its requirements and justify its needs to the Executive Branch, to the President, and then all of the wherewithal would be forthcoming.

Those days have come to an end. Now it is necessary that the needs of the Army be justified and explained to the entire Congress and to the people of this country. This is so because this Army is indeed a people’s Army. Think back on Alexander Hamilton—he was the one who explained about the checks and balances as they affected the armed forces. In the Constitution, they very carefully gave the right to raise and equip the Army to the Legislative Branch. At the same time, to insure that even the legislature did not get carried away, they said that appropriations for the Army could not extend beyond two years. So this is why today, as Chief of Staff, I must go back to the Congress each year to justify the requirements, explain the needs of the Army.

Now to do that—especially in the times ahead—it is going to be increasingly important that the Army justify its requirements in a way that is understandable to the American people. This is why in the last session of Congress, where I had the option, I pressed for open hearings as I presented my case for the Army. I did that because I had found that if I go into a classified or closed session to explain the Army’s need for a new tank to a group of Senators, the Senator who was convinced of the validity of the case cannot take it to the floor of the Senate, because I have given him material that I said is classified in the national interest. He cannot go back to his State—nor can a member of the House go back to his District—and explain the case to his constituents. Closed sessions just do not further the Army’s interests, and we should avoid them when we can.

We have to explain these things openly and simply, not in words of one syllable—because our people are more erudite than that—but in words and terms that they can understand. We have got to relate it to history, to portray it as it really is, to look reality in the face, and to evaluate it for what it is. Now, as I mentioned at the outset, we have been through Watergate, Vietnam, abuse of power by people in agencies that had the trust of the people, and from all of that, many of us have concluded that this is a fatal weakness, that we have now seen the beginning of the decline of our civilization. Well, I do not believe any of that, and that is why I talked about relating events to reality. I think the reality of the experience that we have been through is that it has demonstrated one of our great strengths. Certainly it is better that we understand the rottenness underneath the surface and see it for what it is, rather than move blissfully along thinking that everything is fine.

We do need to review history, see it as it is, and learn lessons from it. The other night I was reading through a little book by Liddell Hart in which he outlines the various lessons we should gain from history. I am not so presumptuous as to try to give you the lessons that we should learn from history, but certainly for myself as a soldier, one of

the most important lessons is the terrible price that we have paid for unpreparedness, and not just the price in material things, but far beyond that.

In my own case, all I have to do is look back upon my World War II experience. I was there in Burma working with General Stilwell when that little band of Americans and British finally wended their way out of Burma. General Stilwell did not try to soften the blow but said straight out: "We took a hell of a beating!"

And later on, I was deeply involved in the events in Burma. We fought all through it, short of resources, demanding of men the sort of sacrifices and paying the same sort of prices that were paid at Valley Forge. It is just unbelievable that a country of our strength would go through an experience like that in fairly recent times, yet blot the lessons out of our consciousness.

Then, I was in Korea in 1950. Again I was personally conscious—perhaps overly so—of our unpreparedness. But I doubt that there is a Member of Congress who recalls as vividly as I do what happened to my division, the 3d Infantry Division, which went into Korea in September of 1950. We had two-thirds of that division—all that we were able to gather together. In that two thirds, we had around 7,400 American soldiers and officers. Just before we went into Korea, we received some 8,900 Koreans who had been pulled off the streets of Pusan, given three or four weeks training, and then sent to Japan as individual replacements to round out our division. And that is what an American fighting unit went into combat with.

These men could not be used in any other capacity than in the frontline infantry. I was an infantryman, and each one of my squads had eight Koreans, none of whom could speak English, and two Americans. Now that is the sort of armed force that upheld and protected the ideals and the values of this great country of ours.

And then even in Vietnam, which was slow in developing—I took the 25th Infantry Division into Vietnam in 1965 and 1966, and we should have had plenty of time to become ready for that. What we had were well

trained, but again I took over only two-thirds of a division and formed the other third of that division partly in Hawaii, after the bulk of the division had gone, and partly in Vietnam.

So what I am saying—and I admit that maybe I am overly sensitive to it—is that I have seen enough of death and destruction and suffering from this unpreparedness to last me several lifetimes.

Another lesson I got from Liddell Hart's book the other night had to do with the nature of our interests and our understanding of what those interests are. They are not just material interests. In fact, I will wager today that we do not have a good understanding of what even our material interests are—those that we will fight to protect—much less an understanding of what our moral interests are. Moral interests are terribly important, because, as I look back over my experiences, it seems that the conflicts we have become involved in stem not so much from material interests as from moral interests: The World Wars, Korea, Vietnam. Certainly there was nothing in Vietnam of material value to the United States. We did not go there to defeat communism. I think we went there because of this very deep-seated feeling on the part of the American people of the need to protect the ideals, the freedoms, the liberties that were propounded some 200 years ago.

If you disagree with why we went into Vietnam, think about our present support for Israel. You will have to agree that in Israel today there is nothing that is of material value to us. We are deeply committed to that small nation largely because of moral interests. Again, let me emphasize that moral interests are terribly important. I think they need to be gotten out on the table and examined.

Drew Middleton, in *Retreat From Victory*, related a little vignette about Somerset Maugham not long before his death. Maugham was listening to a friend vehemently attack American foreign policy, and when he finished, so the story goes, Maugham raised his head and said, "Well, you know *someone* has to hold the passes." Then he went on to

explain, like Durant's conclusion, that throughout history, someone has had to hold the passes of the rule of law against the barbarians, and that in today's world there is no one to hold those passes other than the United States. I know as I stand here today that our moral interests are terribly important to this country and will be a factor in our future.

Another lesson, a lesson that I am reminded of almost daily, is the increased interdependence of nations. We saw that graphically when we saw those astronauts projecting back this picture of the world—a little orange-sized affair. We realized then what a small world this really is—how events on one side of the world have an immediate impact on the other side of the world. That oil embargo was like a cold shower to most of us, a reminder that we cannot go it alone, that we have to have friends in this world. This is a constant theme in Secretary Kissinger's speeches; he highlights the need for allies and friends in every one of them.

Another lesson that comes to mind is simply that of the need for strength. Strength is an essential element of statecraft. Throughout our history, our problems—the kinds that I am concerned about—have never stemmed from strength; they have always stemmed from weakness. I think Dean Rusk put it as succinctly as it can be when he said a few years ago, "Weakness is provocation." It has not been our strength that has been the cause of conflict. I went through the Vietnam experience listening to people say that if we withdrew from Laos, all that conflict would go away; or if we withdrew from Vietnam, conflict would end there. Indeed, it turned out to be so—but not in the way that was contemplated. We have to disabuse ourselves of the idea that it is the strength of the United States that is the bad element in this world situation.

I suppose I could go on and on with lessons learned, but certainly we have to conclude that we are faced with formidable challenges. We wonder, for example, was Malthus correct? Will this population growth continue to the point where we just outstrip

the resources of the world and then resort to inevitable wars of annihilation? What about the Club of Rome? Is it true that the world's resources are so finite and that our appetite for those resources is so unalterably voracious that we will literally eat ourselves to extinction? Well, I do not believe it. I do admit that they are very real, serious problems, but I believe that we will find the ways to accommodate them.

But admittedly, I have to make allowances for my experiences—I guess you would say my prejudices—as a soldier. I know how important trying to look ahead and make valid plans for the future is, and I have seen and heard, as I know you have, some remarkably inappropriate and ridiculous results that we can come up with as we go about this very difficult job of trying to see what lies ahead.

For example, just imagine what it would have been like in 1776 or in 1876 if we had had computers. In all likelihood, those computers would have predicted that by 1976 there would be so many horse-drawn vehicles in the world that things would come to a standstill, because it would be impossible to clear a path through all the manure.

I really do not want to lead you astray by facetious remarks, because I do know that these future issues are very serious. There are others, in the near term, that are even more serious. We have just begun to think through the resolution of these problems; we are sort of like Ned in the *First Reader*—we have just begun to learn our lessons.

Consider the business of the "have" and "have not" nations and the pressures that come from the immense gap between these two parts of the world. Consider that here in the United States our per capita income now must be approaching somewhere around \$6,000 to \$7,000 a year, while the other two-thirds of the world has a per capita income of less than \$500 a year. So, inevitably, there are going to be immense pressures created as a result of that economic disparity alone, not to mention the pressures created as those people strive to gain for themselves in a practical sense the freedoms and liberties and the kind of independence

that we ourselves fought for. We do not see these problems very clearly; at least, we do not see the solution to them and our role in their solution.

Then you have the near-term challenge of Soviet imperialism and expansion. This is a very disconcerting situation, yet there are many people who want to deny the depth and the breadth of that particular challenge. You read, "Pay no attention to all of these intelligence estimates where they compare the ruble to the dollar—there is no validity to that." Or people will argue, "There is no meaning in the fact that the Soviets have over 4,000,000 men in uniform and the United States only has 2,100,000 men in uniform, because many of the jobs that their people in uniform perform are done by civilians on our side." What I suggest to you is that you take those kinds of comments and accept them for the sake of argument—then just put them aside. Forget them. Then take a look at, say, the inventories of Soviet weaponry compared with ours; or look at the production rates of their armaments, of their weapons systems; or look at their arms shipments throughout the world, where you see these things popping up like little blips on a wide radar screen; or look at their shipbuilding program; or look at their extending strategic reach, that really hit us in 1973.

Or, on the moral side, let us just take the voice of Solzhenitsyn or some of the other Soviet dissenters. Listen to their voices, and then you realize that there is another whole problem, a problem difficult for us to deal with. It is an ideological problem. I do not necessarily refer to it as communism, but whatever it is, it is there, and it has to do with a barrier between ideologies that we have been unable to break down.

The other day I sat at a joint session of the Congress and listened to Juan Carlos, King of Spain, address that session. He reflected back over the Spanish involvement in our history and commented with great pride on that period when we broke down what he called "the barriers of nature"—the discovery of the New World. At that time I thought, "Yes, we have broken down the 'barriers of nature,' but

unfortunately we have not yet broken down the barriers of ideologies." I do not know why that is so. I suppose part of it is that the gap is so great—maybe the animus is so great—that we cannot identify with it; we cannot comprehend it.

Take a nation like the Soviet Union, in which the military is so elite, something that is completely foreign to us. When Ustinov was made the Minister of Defense, a lot was made of that: "They are putting a civilian in there!" His appointment was going to show that the Soviets are in some way modifying their posture and their reliance on military strength. Well, then a few days later you read that Brezhnev was made a Marshal, which is the equivalent of a five-star general or admiral in our country. Then I thought, "I wonder what the American people would think if we made President Ford a five-star general. Wouldn't they be excited about that?"

I have also been struck by the almost wide-eyed look of our Members of Congress and other civilians who have returned from Communist China as they describe the unbelievable regimentation in that country. They tell stories and they bring back pictures of children eight years old carrying rifles and being taught to hate the Soviet Union and hate socialist imperialism, and all of that! It is frightening, yet it has been there all the time; we just cannot comprehend it.

We have got problems—there is no doubt about that, and they are not going to go away. We cannot turn our backs on them. We wonder what to do, and I do not have any answer to that, except another lesson I have learned in my time: that is that there are no simple answers... yet we predictably will search for the "one shot," the dramatic, the simple strategic solution, just as we did with massive retaliation as a strategy. You know, today it really seems almost unbelievable that the United States was so naive as to think that we could protect our interests—protect ourselves from *destruction*, yes, but protect our *interests*—with a strategy like massive retaliation.

Now that we have found that the long-term effect of massive retaliation was to boost

Soviet production of nuclear weapons until they reached parity with us, you will find all sorts of theories and proposals being put forth on how to respond to this very complex challenge—maybe do it by seapower or airpower. (Unfortunately, there is not too much support for just groundpower.) Well, I have to tell you that the Joint Chiefs of Staff—Jim Holloway, Dave Jones, Fred Weyand—do not believe that. We know from our experience that our strength lies in working together. It goes even beyond that. Our only hope lies in working together, not only with our own services, but with the combined strength of our Allies. And so I urge you to examine very carefully those seductive ideas that there is some one element, some quick fix, that will solve all our problems. That is a lure we must avoid.

We do have a good foreign policy—nothing dramatic but simply a policy that seeks a world structure based upon equilibrium rather than confrontation. It is a policy that actively seeks to maintain a balance based on power that will preclude war. It is a policy that actively seeks friends and offers to assist those who share interests in common with us. It is a policy that seeks to negotiate with those who would oppose us. It is a policy that actively seeks to assist and support these emerging nations who have expressed the need and a desire for us to help them, yet at the same time, it seeks to keep major power involvement in their affairs at a minimum. Most important, it is a policy that seeks to preclude the holocaust of nuclear warfare.

I guess our problem is not so much with the policy, because those main elements of strength, and partnership, and negotiation have been consistent throughout our history. The problem is in the implementation of that policy. Going back to that remark I made earlier about the validity of planning, we have often heard it said that any fool can make a plan; the trouble is in the execution—we get confused in carrying it out. That is what our problem is with respect to our foreign policy.

I am not about to say just how we ought to implement it. You will not get any simple

solutions from me—not that I want to do away completely with simple solutions. At least they have the advantage of bringing into the arena of debate the question of commitment, the question of interest, the question of what will we do about the problems—in short, how do we implement this foreign policy to achieve the ends that we seek?

Now, I came here to talk about the Army, and so far I have given it short shrift. I do want to tell you that the Army is one element, but a very important element, in this strength that I say that is essential to this country of ours. It is a first-class Army. It is the smallest we have had in some 25 years. It receives the smallest share of the Federal budget in over 35 years. Yet it is a force that is highly professional, disciplined, and ready—in the sense that it is ready *now*. I must say I am very proud of it. It is built from the ground up. This is something I will not go into detail about, but it is one of the benefits of the volunteer concept. In a sense we have had to turn the Army upside down as a result of the volunteer concept, because we found that we just did not have this continuing flow of resources that the generals and colonels and the rest of us could mold and make of it what we wished.

This Army today is built on quality young men and women. We found the only way we could have an Army was to attract quality people into it, motivate them once we got them in so they would do their best, and inspire enough of them to stay on to make the Army a career. Who was it that could do all that? Well, it turned out it was not the generals, but it was instead the sergeants, lieutenants, and captains who are in a one-to-one situation down at the operating level. So in order to build the Army from the ground up, we have given a lot more authority and responsibility down there where it should have been all the time—where the problems are and where the people are.

The Army is a proponent and an element in the national strategy of a forward positioning. Our deployments in Western Europe and in Northeast Asia are in those two places

because those are the places where our greatest national interests focus. They are there as a reminder to both our Allies and to our enemies. This Army is very strongly oriented toward NATO. My requirement to fulfill the NATO plan is to have at least 13 divisions in NATO by D+30 days. This is why we took the 13-division Active Army that we had two years ago and began trying to figure out how, from within those resources—without asking for anything else from outside—we could structure 16 divisions. We need those 16 divisions so we could give 13 to NATO and still have one in Korea, one as a backup in Hawaii, and one for contingencies. Certainly that is modest enough.

As Chief of Staff, I had to be careful that I did not get the Army totally structured and committed to NATO. Having built NATO, and with all the strength there, I suspect that if we have a problem it may very well be somewhere else. So we have built into the Army a flexibility and a versatility that will permit packages of it to be used elsewhere—and those outfits are also ready to go.

Now, as the Chief of Staff, I make three assumptions as I go about my work. One of them is to expect the unexpected, and this has to do with this flexibility that I talked about.

Another one is that there is not going to be any time. We are not going to have six months or a year. When this Army is needed it is going to be needed now, and so it has got to be ready now.

And then the last assumption is that we are undoubtedly going to fight outnumbered. How do we cope with that final assumption? Well, we cope with it in a number of ways, such as improved tactics and improved training. We have made dramatic improvements in both these areas. We are going to exploit technology to the limit, particularly in missile technology, antiaircraft, and antitank missilery. Here again, this is a complex problem, and it has got to be dealt with in a variety of ways. I cannot just depend on technology. Some wag once said: "If technology won wars, we would all be

speaking German now," and there is a lot to that. So we cannot get hung up on just technology as an end in itself.

Then, most importantly, we are gearing this Army to fight, all-weather, day and night, so it can keep the pressure on the enemy 24 hours a day.

When I took over as Chief of Staff, then-Secretary of Defense Jim Schlesinger swore me in and used a Bible that he sent down to me afterward. There on the flyleaf he had written a message to me—a very warm message that I cherish. Included in it was a charge that I develop an articulative vision for the Army. I have never done that. I guess after 200 years, it seems kind of presumptuous for me to do that.

I did think about it a lot, and it was not long after that I had a visit from five cadets from the Academy at West Point. They came to present me with the *Howitzer*, their yearbook. After the picture-taking and all that, I sat them down and I said, "Well, now, fellows, what kind of an Army do you want to come into? What is your vision of the Army?" Do you know, it really interested and surprised me how quickly those five young men came to a consensus. They wanted to be in an Army that was professional. They wanted to be in one that was disciplined. They wanted to be in an Army that was capable and ready. They wanted to be in an Army that had integrity, that was honest. There was a lot of discussion about the last point. They meant that the Army be honest with itself, that it be honest with the country, and that it be made up of men who were honest and had trust in each other. Then they made a point that was most interesting to me. They said they wanted to be in an Army that had the support of the American people, an Army that merited that support. This goes back to that point I made earlier about the need for the American people to understand just what this Army is all about. I am pleased to tell you today that we are well on the way toward the realization of the vision those cadets had. The one shortfall is in getting the understanding and the support of the American people. That is just an area that we have to keep working on.

This has to do with a lot of things. In March I attended a joint session of the Congress, and I listened to Liam Cosgrave, the Prime Minister of Ireland. I was struck by the note that he took in expressing the pride of the Irish in the accomplishments in America over these 200 years, because the Irish played a large part in those accomplishments. He struck a note of dependence and trust that, during my visits to other countries of the free world, I have heard expressed in almost the same way. He talked about this period of self-questioning that America has been through, and he said, "I know that as we differ with you, it may seem that we set a double standard—that we expect more from Americans than we do from others," and he said, "The fact is that we do." He said, "You should remember that one of your greatest strengths is the idea that your

friends have of you," and then he concluded by saying that we should know, too, that there are others—and he implied millions and hundreds of millions outside of the United States—who still believe in everything that America stands for.

And I thought afterward, how paradoxical it is that possibly our friends have greater faith in us than we have in ourselves. If I had to pinpoint one problem that concerns me most about this country, it is not the Army, it is the element of faith and confidence we have in ourselves. I am positive that we do have the intellectual and the material and the moral strength to do whatever has to be done. We can indeed afford to do the right thing. As a matter of fact, as we embark on our third century as a free nation, we cannot afford *not* to afford it.

