

The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters

Volume 2
Number 1 *Parameters* 1972

Article 6

7-4-1972

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John E. Coon

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Recommended Citation

John E. Coon, "NATIONAL GOALS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA," *Parameters* 2, no. 1 (1972), doi:10.55540/0031-1723.1038.

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NATIONAL GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

by

COLONEL JOHN E. COON, USA

(What domestic and foreign goals are likely to influence policy formation in Peking during the foreseeable future? What constraints are operative on the achievement of such goals? What are the more specific objectives likely to be selected by the People's Republic of China for the coming decade?)

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Mutual understanding is one of the prerequisites for intelligent interaction between nations. In the case of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States, doors to such understanding are inching open on both sides. Hopefully each new opening will shed fresh light on matters of mutual agreement or disagreement. Certain fundamental perspectives, however, will remain true unless clear evidence of substantial change appears.

In the absence of such evidence, the following summary of general goals and more specific objectives will be valid for any assessment of policies likely to be adopted by Peking in the foreseeable future. It is based on a continuity in theory and practice which suggests the national priorities set by the Maoist leadership since 1949. Even in the

event of unprecedented tactical maneuvers by the PRC, it is submitted that the weight of doctrinal authority and national interest precludes extreme or permanent deviation from the general line.

National goals have been outlined, from time to time, in general and doctrinaire statements from Peking. Two of the more recent formulations date from 1969. The first, from Lin Piao's report to the Ninth Party Congress, emphasizes preservation of the regime and strengthening the economy as fundamental domestic goals.

Our aim is to smash revisionism, seize back that portion of power usurped by the bourgeoisie, exercise all-round dictatorship of the proletariat in the superstructure, including all spheres of culture, and strengthen and consolidate the economic base of socialism so as to insure that our country continues to advance in giant strides along the road of socialism.

The second, from the new Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party, addresses external goals.

The Communist Party of China firmly upholds proletarian internationalism, resolutely unites with all true Marxist-Leninist political parties and organizations in the whole world, with all oppressed peoples and nations of the whole world, supporting one another and learning from one another, and fights to overthrow imperialism headed by the United States, modern revisionism headed by the Soviet revisionist renegade clique, and reactionaries of all countries, in order to build a new world free from imperialism, capitalism, and systems of exploitation.

Colonel John E. Coon, Military Intelligence, Director of Chinese and Asian Communist Studies at the Army War College, earned a Master of Arts degree at Stanford University as part of the Foreign Area Specialist Program in Chinese studies. Since 1954 all his assignments, with the exception of one year at the Army Command and General Staff College, have dealt with the Far East. He has served in Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong, as well as traveling extensively throughout Asia. He joined the Army War College faculty in 1970.





Mao Tse-Tung and Chou En-Lai greet students in Peking.

Constraints on the achievement of such goals are serious for the PRC. Mao would like to consider China's huge population as an asset, a vast reservoir of selfless dedication, inexhaustible ingenuity, and unlimited productivity. But the population is a problem in more ways than one. To the basic question of how to feed so many mouths is added the overwhelming task of governing 800 million people—a task unprecedented in world history. Thus Peking faces bureaucratic complexity, regional self-interest, and mass human inertia as factors intervening between the formulation of a directive at Party Central and its modified implementation at the grassroots in the provinces. Such constraints operate in different ways and to varying degrees on internal and external policy.

Associated with that complex of problems is another—the impending transition from first-generation leadership, with doubts about the ideological vigor and reliability of the coming generation of "revolutionary

successors." It was this question which furnished one of the prime motives of Mao's Cultural Revolution and which has been only partially resolved.

Finally, perhaps the harshest reality which the Peking leadership must face is the continuing inadequacy of the economy to support their aspirations to great power status. Coupled with the deficiencies of the domestic economy on both the agricultural and industrial sides, is the lack of sound trade and technological relations with the more advanced nations which might contribute substantially to China's desired leap into modern economic power status. Recent developments such as the new trade agreements with the USSR and the partial opening of doors to the United States suggest that, in the long term, some alleviation of the difficulties may be possible.

National Objectives for the PRC, since they are more specific, are more difficult to express with authority. Attempting to

determine individual objectives of PRC domestic and foreign policy involves second guessing the Peking leadership. This is particularly true since current objectives may change with tactical shifts which are often unpredictable—e.g. "Ping-Pong Diplomacy." Those listed below, however, are apt to be enduring, though emphasis may vary from time to time.

a. *Domestic.* This list is not necessarily in order of priority; many objectives overlap or are interdependent.

(1) To maintain the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in control of the country and the people, with the prospect of an orderly transition of power to "revolutionary successors."

(2) To sustain the revolutionary vigor and ideological purity of the CCP in a revitalized Party organization dedicated to perpetuating the thought of Mao Tse-tung and its future effectiveness.

(3) To mobilize the spirit of the Chinese people under Party guidance, with Mao either actually or symbolically, as "the Great Helmsman."

(4) To improve governmental organization at all levels, eliminating excessive bureaucratic aspects and promoting economy and efficiency.

(5) To build socialism in China, walking on the "two legs" of industry and agriculture toward a modern great power economy.

(6) To industrialize the nation rapidly with a simultaneous emphasis on heavy industry and numerous, dispersed small plants.

(7) To improve the agricultural sector of the economy through collectivization and modernization in the rural communes.

(8) To expand and modernize the national transportation system, with primary emphasis on the rail lines.

(9) To push a vigorous research and development program adapted to Chinese circumstances and needs, with particular reliance on the innovative genius of the masses.

(10) To maintain large, modern, regular armed forces as a "pillar of proletarian

dictatorship," with the triple mission of defense, production, and political work.

(11) To develop a significant advanced weapons capability including intercontinental ballistic missiles with thermonuclear warheads.

(12) To organize, train, and indoctrinate the nation-wide People's Militia as a force for economic mobilization and national defense.

(13) To maintain social order and stability throughout China under centralized control, including integration of the national minorities.

b. *Foreign.* These objectives, too, are not necessarily listed in order of priority and are often interrelated.

(1) To discourage foreign incursions of any type, while settling the "liberation of Taiwan" as an internal Chinese matter.

(2) To reduce non-Asian influence in the Far East to the minimum practical, with particular attention to incursions by the US and the USSR.

(3) To present a realistic challenge, politically and economically, to Japanese influence in Asia.

(4) To encourage deference and dependence in all other Asian governments as the correct attitude toward the Government of the PRC.


(5) To establish the CCP as the model for national Communist parties throughout Asia.

(6) To provide stimulus to wars of national liberation, particularly in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, whenever they may work toward the long-range goal of "encircling the cities of the world."

(7) To establish government-to-government ties with any developing nation where Chinese prestige might be increased at the expense of the US and the USSR.

(8) To assist Communist or potentially Communist subversive movements throughout the world when Chinese prestige or the Chinese economy will not suffer seriously from such assistance.

(9) To advance the Maoist version of Communism as the legitimate successor to Marxism-Leninism for the world, in contradistinction to "Soviet revisionism."



(10) To maintain such state-to-state relationships with the Soviet Union as will promote Chinese national interests while not compromising the ideological position of the PRC.

(11) To accelerate the inevitable decay of the "capitalist-imperialist" powers.

(12) To win great power status and dominance of the world Communist movement by diplomatic, psychological, economic, and military pressures applied in state-to-state relations or within international

organizations such as the UN.

Obviously, so summary a treatment of such an undefinable subject is no more than an outline offered for expansion by others as interest or need may indicate. It does, however, have the advantage of presenting an overall view of the forest without risking confusion by the trees. And this perspective, as maintained earlier, will remain true in the absence of clear evidence of any fundamental change in the Chinese Communist ideology we call Maoism.