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What Caused the Failure of the Egyptian Revolution?

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WHAT CAUSED THE FAILURE OF THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION?

by

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Abstract

Why did the Egyptian Revolution fail after President Hosni Mubarak was overthrown and after a new president, Mohammed Morsi, was democratically elected for the first time in Egypt? Egyptian revolutionaries were able to depose a dictator that ruled them for three decades, but were unable to achieve their goals in making any political, social or economic improvements in their country. The rule of President Morsi did not last for more than one year. He was subsequently ousted, and members from the previous Mubarak regime returned to power and resumed autocratic rule in the same manner as before. This thesis explains the complex factors that caused the failure of the Egyptian Revolution. It discusses the different parties involved in Egypt's transitional period and the shift in the balance of power that resulted in the domination of the military's authoritarian rule. I argue that all the multiple national, regional and international factors had significant importance in shaping the outcomes of the Revolution of such a pivotal country in the Middle East and the world.

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Introduction

The year 2011 was an important year for many countries in the world, especially for the Middle East. Many crucial changes occurred in that year on political, social and economic levels. The people of the Middle East dared to rise and stand in the face of long-term oppression. Some countries, such as Tunisia, were able to achieve some of their goals and make a change in their governing systems. Others, such as Egypt, were not able to change their brutal authoritarian government even though they protested and actively worked against it.

The failure of the Egyptian Revolution has revealed some unknown facts and hidden politics in the Middle East and the world. The Egyptian revolutionaries tried to change policies and laws that were in force for decades. Such change did not seem to be possible when taking into consideration all of the global, regional and local authorities and circumstances which were influencing the region at the time. Decisions regarding the politics and the economies of the countries of the Middle East did not seem to be in the control of their own people. Different actors and factors had interacted and interconnected to direct the events in Egypt according to their own interests and benefits.

Egypt has an important position in the Middle East and the whole world. It is the most populous country in the region and has a very strategic location (Aftandilian, 2013). It also has the largest army in the Arab world (Darwisheh, 2015). Thus, it plays a crucial role in determining and influencing the politics and the economies of many countries in the region. The Egyptian Revolution raised hopes and expectations for a new and better era in the Middle East. The dream to end an authoritarian regime that supported corruption and poverty for decades moved millions of people. Reasons for the mobilization of the people varied. Yet, it is apparent that no single reason served as the catalyst for the revolt. Nevertheless, Egyptians of all ages and socio-economic levels came together to protest. The main reasons for the revolt will be discussed

and explained in this thesis. The mobilizing forces for the revolution will be explored and analyzed as well. Different perspectives from scholars who directly witnessed or participated in the protest will be discussed and evaluated.

The transition period between the fall of the Mubarak regime in 2011 and Mohammed Morsi's presidency in 2012 is characterized by complexity and unprecedented instability. Many actors were involved, and all had tried to take control of the situation. Parliamentary elections resulted in the Muslim Brotherhood winning the majority of seats, which allowed them to gain the presidency. The rule of the Brotherhood did not last for more than a year. The power returned into the hands of some members of Mubarak's dictatorial regime following the failure of the Brotherhood rule. The people's hopes for a needed change diminished and vanished. Egypt has been ruled by extensions of the Mubarak regime ever since its first democratically elected president, Morsi, was ousted. After all the work and efforts to end years of oppression and abuse at different levels of government in Egypt, progress was hindered, change was restrained, plans were prevented, and the Egyptian Revolution was reversed.

Examining the revolution of Egypt, the reasons behind its failure, and its outcomes is highly important in understanding the politics of the Middle East and its effects on the United States foreign policy. Such a revolution put some unknown politics and strategies on display for the public. The concepts of security and sovereignty seem to be in contrast with the concepts of democracy and elective government. International forces are highly effective in determining the politics of Middle Eastern countries like Egypt. Frequent external involvements resulted in the emergence of local actors who had common interests and mutual benefits with foreign ones and, were ready to sell out their own country and people for the sake of their own interests. Therefore, the Egyptian Revolution was not just an unorganized uprising. It was a real attempt to get rid of a

long reign of dictatorial rule. A combination of reasons resulted in suppressing such an attempt and reversing it, thus, returning it back to its previous form of rule and governance: one that demonstrated incredible brutality upon the Egyptian citizens. My study will provide a comparison of the different perspectives and arguments regarding the causes and consequences of the uprisings in Egypt.

Understanding how the Muslim Brotherhood came to power, and why they were opposed and fought, and by whom, is important to investigate in order to understand the failure of the Egyptian Revolution. Different analyses and arguments have been provided regarding the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Their faults and inexperience are regarded by many scholars as the primary reason for the failure of the Egyptian Revolution. On the other hand, other analysts discuss several factors that mobilized people against them and analyze the short period the Brotherhood was in power. The analysts attribute the instability associated with the Brotherhood's rule to different reasons besides their inexperience in governing and even give the Brotherhood credit for their achievements. Thus, they blame the failure of the Revolution on other parties such as the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) for the increased instability and insecurity in Egypt. For example, Mubarak's supporters caused serious socio-economic and political instability and chaos in Egypt after the Brotherhood took over the presidency. Human rights violations committed by the SCAF and Mubarak's supporters created tension and corruption in the country and were a major factor for interrupting any efforts for democratic governance by the Brotherhood, thus limiting their power. Yet, that was not the only reason. Many complicated factors and interconnected parties were involved in the process of transferring the rule of Egypt to Al-Sisi's military regime and supporting his repressive government.

In addition to local factors, regional ones have contributed to bringing the Egyptian Revolution down. Due to the strategic importance of Egypt in the region, different Middle Eastern countries have interfered in shifting the events in Egypt and reversing the Revolution. After the Brotherhood came to power, a few major regional countries and the United States interfered to maintain their interests in Egypt. Changes in the politics of Egypt are crucial to the sovereignty of Middle Eastern countries like Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Iran and Israel. Each of these countries interfered by supporting either the Brotherhood or the military in order to affect the outcomes of the Revolution. The U.S. also had its own interests in the Middle East, such as its interests in and loyalty to Israel. It interfered and supported the military to topple the first democratically elected president in Egypt; Mohammed Morsi.

Overall, I argue that the ouster of President Morsi and the opposition to all efforts of change and progress of the Revolution, were done by multiple actors on different levels. In the following sections, I will offer a detailed discussion of what extent the international factors affected local ones, and question whether local factors would be sufficient without the support of regional or international parties to topple the rule of the Brotherhood and give governance back to various members from the previous Mubarak regime.

First, in order to identify the reasons for the failure of the Egyptian Revolution, it is important to understand the circumstances through which the Revolution started. Reasons that sparked the anger of the Egyptian people and mobilized them will be explained and discussed. Scholars and analysts differ in their attribution of certain factors as reasons for the revolt. Social and economic deterioration in Egypt will be discussed as an important cause of the protests. An analysis of the economic conditions that lead to the protests will be examined. Political repression is also referred to as a reason for the Revolution. A few studies, however, argue that it

is not only one of these two reasons that motivated people to protest; rather, it is the combination. Furthermore, it is argued that the police in Egypt, which committed widespread repression, fueled the anger of most Egyptian citizens and motivated them to demonstrate and start the revolution on Police Day, January 25, 2011. Such factors were deeply rooted reasons that simmered for decades in Egypt and were considered major causes for the revolt.

Other significant issues discussed in this thesis as factors contributing to the Revolution are the events in Tahrir Square, the role of social media, and the role of the military. These factors were intervening causes that worked as further motives for the continuity and persistence of the Revolution. The events in Tahrir Square are argued to have contributed to motivate people to protest due to their unprecedented display of political freedom and unity. The role of social media is argued to have facilitated the mobilization of the Egyptian nation. However, scholars offered different arguments regarding its importance. Apparently, social media was not a major cause for revolting, but a new way to make it more efficient.

The role of the military was crucial in changing the direction of the Revolution. The way the military opposed the protestors in the beginning, and then later supported them, will be explained and discussed within the framework of different studies and arguments. Yet the majority of the research indicates that the military's motives were to protect its own interests. As shown in Figure 1, the military never ceased to control Egypt since the fall of Mubarak. It gained more power throughout the transitional period and continued controlling the country after Morsi became president. Figure 1 illustrates the main key events from the beginning of the Revolution until Al-Sisi came to power.

Figure 1. Timeline for Key Events of the Egyptian Revolution

The armed forces maintained a high level of power and authority after the fall of Mubarak and even after the emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood. Thus, this thesis also assesses the relationship of the military with the different national and international factors and how it has gained such authority and control over Egypt. I will specifically discuss whether the Revolution could have succeeded had it not been for the intervention of regional and international forces. In the conclusion section, I note that Egypt was going through an unprecedented phase of political void and instability that allowed many parties to fight over political control and sovereignty. Local forces and their demand to end the rule of the Brotherhood cannot be ignored. But it also cannot be separated from the effect of regional and international forces that spent tremendous efforts to bring down the revolutionary forces and prevent the Brotherhood from achieving any improvements in the country.

The rest of the thesis will be organized into sections based on analytical topics. The next section of this thesis refers to the causes of the Egyptian Revolution and is followed by a section that analyzes the causes which lead to nationwide protests. These will be followed by a section which discusses the faults of the Brotherhood, the obstacles and challenges they faced, and their

mismanagement. A separate section discusses their achievements and explains some reasons for their miscalculations. Thereafter, a section is dedicated to the role of the military and the regional and international forces in reversing the outcomes of the Revolution. A following section discusses some lessons learned from the Revolution and the attempted transition to democratic governance. Scholarly reflections on the political impact on the populace and its future political implications are discussed and contrasted. In addition, recommendations on the global level for U.S foreign policy are provided. Finally, a concluding section summarizes the findings of this thesis.

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Causes of the Revolution

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Egypt was governed by the same regime for almost 30 years. The Egyptian people had grievances and had experienced abuse for decades. An interesting fact of the Revolution was the mobilization of different segments of Egyptians regardless of their class, education, gender, age or occupation. This section discusses the factors that resulted in that mobilization of the Egyptian people and contributed to the fall of the Mubarak regime. It explains the factors that worked as the underlying causes for the Revolution versus the intervening factors that worked as contributing reasons and added functional aspects to it. It also explores the transition period after the fall of the regime and studies how the balance of power was shifted between different parties until it was given to the Muslim Brotherhood. Finally, it shows that while the Brotherhood was seen as a power holder on the surface, other parties worked hard from underneath and succeeded to undermine it.

Economic Grievances and Corruption in the Government. Egyptian people had been demanding major socio-economic and political changes for decades. They had suffered from harsh circumstances that continued worsening and diminishing any hope for change. As if to

exemplify this suffering, one of the nationwide slogans of the Revolution was "bread, freedom and social justice" (Ibrahim, 2011, p.1348). Some scholars like Jumet (2014) neglect the political demands of the Egyptian people by arguing that democracy was not the main factor for the uprising of the majority of the Egyptian citizens. Rather, he states that they mainly protested for economic and social issues. On the other hand, other scholars such as Aziz (2014), Mady (2013), Van de Sande (2013), Ibrahim (2011) and Cleveland and Bunton (2013) argue that deteriorated socio-economic conditions and poverty were not the sole reason for the revolt. They note that political repression was another major factor that contributed to the onset of the Revolution. Clearly, a combination of these factors created the escalating need for protest by different groups in the country.

Economic insecurity has major effects on nations and their ability to function as societies. Because a large portion of the Egyptian population lives in poverty, their daily focus is on fulfilling their basic survival needs. They therefore might be unable to devote enough attention to important political issues. The economy of Egypt had remarkable imbalances, which were associated with high corruption rates resulting in deteriorated economic conditions (Mady, 2013). Millions of Egyptians of different age, education level, and occupation, were "below the poverty line" (Korotayev & Zinkina, 2011, p.168). According to the report by UN World Food Programme (WFP) and the Egyptian Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), an estimated 13.7 million Egyptians or 17% of the population suffered from food insecurity in 2011, compared to 14% in 2009 ("Hunger and Poverty Rates in Egypt," 2013). A large segment of the population also faced denial by the Egyptian government on essential health issues (Ibrahim, 2011). High food prices and the inability to have jobs or affordable housing caused frustration for Egyptians for many generations. Their material

demands for decent incomes, good education and housing were among the major reasons for discontent in the country (Cleveland & Bunton, 2013; Van De Sande, 2013).

Widespread corruption in Mubarak's regime was also a major cause for anger and frustration for Egyptians. According to the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which ranks countries and territories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be, Egypt's received as score of 3.1 in 2010 on a scale of 0-10, "where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 10 means that a country is perceived as very clean" (CPI, 2010). Corruption was associated with privatization in Egypt where private sector companies are "sold for less than their true value," and where some of those responsible for the public sector "benefited from that through the authority they had and their ability to influence those in power" (Amin, 2013, p. 44).

After a series of market reforms decision-making power was more concentrated in fewer hands and security controls were more strengthened while the majority of people were further alienated (Cleveland & Bunton, 2013). Data from research by Hlasny and Verme (2013, p. 30) shows that during the ten years that preceded the Egyptian Revolution, GDP (Gross Domestic Product) growth did not result in higher wages or more benefits to households, rather it was mostly maintained by corporations. The inability of a large number of Egyptians to earn sufficient income despite the growing economy proves the inequality in the distribution of resources and employment opportunities in the country (Ibrahim, 2011).

Corruption in Egypt is obvious in different aspects of daily life. Most citizens were not able to get proper jobs and obtain other necessities without having contacts, which caused serious obstacles and deep frustration especially in younger generations (Cleveland & Bunton, 2013). Social stratification caused the feeling of alienation and bitterness, and created plenty of problems in the Egyptian society (Amin, 2013). Other factors that contributed to "segmented

citizenship and increased social exclusion" in Egypt are the increasing mistrust between the government and people and the growing tensions between different religious groups in the country, such as those between the Muslims and the minority Copts (Ibrahim, 2011, p. 1350).

Political Repression. Besides economic grievances, political demands contributed to the onset of the Revolution. The Egyptian people had been ruled by the Mubarak regime for almost three decades. Most of them lost hope of a democratic state or a change in governance after Hosni Mubarak's own son, Gamal, was widely considered to be the next to rule after Mubarak's demise (Amin, 2013). The plan to appoint Gamal to govern after his father reveals the fact that Egypt had become a dynastic political system and not a republic (Cleveland & Bunton, 2013).

Mubarak's regime was continually repressing Egyptian people and denying their basic freedoms such as "freedom of association and freedom of expression" (Ibrahim, 2011, p. 1362). While economic deterioration affected the poorer segments of the society, political repression affected mostly the educated and upper classes and caused further frustration. A study done by the Egyptian Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics at the end of 2010 indicated that "more than 43% of the Egyptian unemployed had university degrees" (Korotayev & Zinkina, 2011, p. 168). Not only poor Egyptian citizens suffered from the cruelty of the Mubarak regime, but so were the wealthy and more educated ones who were considered once among the regime's key supporters (Amin, 2013). The extensive use of torture practiced by security forces against whoever opposed the regime had been allowed by a state of emergency that existed in Egypt for decades (Korotayev & Zinkina, 2011). Thus, the situation in Egypt was dominated by problems on the economic, social and political levels, causing the Egyptian people to live in dire conditions; further fueled by oppression and discontent.

As discussed above, the mobilization of millions of Egyptians was a result of the

Mubarak regime's continued neglect of the people's demands for health and educational needs,

and political and economic oppression. Thus, popular discontent in Egypt was not a new and

sudden phenomenon that was just motivated by the Tunisian Revolution, which is considered the

first popular uprising that occurred during the Arab Spring. Rather, it had been brewing since

before the 1990s and intensified after recent acts of exploitation and abuse by the Mubarak

regime (Cleveland & Bunton, 2013). Many activists and organizations had worked for years

mobilizing opposition groups and networks against the Mubarak regime prior to the Revolution

in 2011 (Van de Sande, 2013). The most recent protest in Egypt before the Revolution had begun

in 2000 (Mady, 2013). Since 2000, informal groups of activists and politicians had formed to

oppose the Mubarak regime (Abdulrahman, 2013). Demonstrations and strikes continued to take

place in Egypt until 2010, especially after the rigged parliamentary elections sparked outrage

(Mady, 2013). However, taking over state power was not the objective of the protests. Rather, it

aimed at confronting the limitations of the dominant politics of the government and findings

ways to transfer more power to local communities (Abdulrahman, 2013).

Police and Rule of Law in Egypt. The police in Egypt were well known for their

human rights violations. They constantly humiliated Egyptian citizens and denied their rights of

self-dignity and respect (Ismail, 2012). Egyptians suffered from assaults, tortures, kidnappings

and murders by the police for years (Haque, 2013). Such major human rights abuses often went

with no prosecution or punishment. Haque (2013) even argues that political legitimacy in Egypt

was indeed weakened by criminal injustice and thus should be considered a strong reason

contributing to the Revolution. When people marched in peaceful demonstrations, the police

forced resorted to violent means to not let them reach Tahrir Square (Holmes, 2012).

Participation from citizens who directed their grievances and vengeance towards police stations and centers was essential in the mobilization for the Revolution (Ismail, 2012).

Youth groups called for the Revolution on January 25, 2011 (Police Day) demanding the fall of the Mubarak regime and the reformation of the socio-economic and political systems (Amin, 2013; Cleveland & Bunton, 2013; Mady, 2013). Protestors were shot and on the day of January 28 "hundreds of people were killed and thousands were injured" (Holmes, 2013, p. 399). After 18 days of protest, Mubarak was placed under house arrest and activist groups worked on coordinating with other various groups in Tahrir Square and tried later to negotiate with the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) on behalf of the protestors (Abdulrahman, 2013). The economic and political repression and the rule of law and the police in Egypt were main reasons and grievances that drove Egyptians to the uprising.

The Tahrir Square. The Tahrir (Liberation) Square provided an important opportunity for Egyptians to freely express their demands without the fear of political repression or abuse (Van de Sande, 2013). Participants commonly referred to the Square as "liberated ground" (Khalil, 2011, p. 248). Many attempts were undertaken in order to prevent people from participating at the Square such as closing and blocking streets and bridges, but protestors continued heading towards the Square challenging the regime's forces and violent actions (Holmes, 2012). Eventually, such strategies by the regime to oppress the Egyptian citizens were counterproductive that further motivated and mobilized the protestors.

Scholars have differed in their views on regarding the evolution of the Revolution, as well as the role that social media and the military played. Amin (2013), for example, argues that such movement was "new to Egypt's political life" (p. 104), while Van de Sande (2013) describes it as "far from unprecedented" (p. 233). Amin refers to the huge number of people who

participated in the protest, to the fact that demonstrations were taking place in different parts of the country at the same time, and to a large number of educated participants in the protests. On the other hand, Van de Sande argues that the revolutionary movement did not have "any tightly articulated programme" (233). However, the effect of Tahrir Square was evident in bringing the Revolution to public spaces and providing a trigger for people to take to the streets in other parts of the country (Abaza, 2014).

Social Media. Egyptian journalists were important providers of information in the Revolution where activism in social media was "unprecedented" (Elmasry, Basionly, & Elkamel, 2014). Even though the Egyptian government tried to restrict cell phone calls and the internet usage during the protests in an attempt to restrain the demonstration, protesters were able to communicate by other ways of networking, like TV channels such as Aljazeera, which helped motivate the Egyptian nation against the Mubarak regime (Mady, 2013).

It is apparent that social media was instrumental in facilitating the mobilization of the Egyptian Revolution. Media and technology provided activist groups with important information necessary to better mobilize people (Mady, 2013). Some scholars like Amin (2013) believe that media was not just a tool to report the events of the Revolution. Rather it was a means to support and contribute to it. Similarly, Choudhary, Hendrix, Lee, Palsetia, & Liao (2012) suggest that social media was a major historical force behind the events of the Revolution. Others like Van de Sande argue that such "network tools" are not causes for the "organizational structure" of the Revolution, but are only "symptoms" (2013, p. 235). Overall, it is true that social media provided the benefit of fast networking aimed at spreading the call to a huge number of participants at once, yet it was not the main reason the people were determined to protest (Mady, 2013). Rather,

it was a secondary factor that contributed to enhance the Revolution and provide a better organizational structure of it.

The Role of the Military. The army was not like the despised police in the country. It had some role in enforcing unity in Egypt (Cleveland & Bunton, 2013). The protestors demanded the military to stay by their sides. In turn, the military helped them overthrow Mubarak (Amin, 2013). The Egyptian army officers had a long-term relationship marked by loyalty and interest with the Mubarak regime (Martini & Taylor, 2011). Yet, the way the Revolution took place and the need to depose Mubarak gave the army strong reasons to side with the protestors in the beginning. They, in essence, had to pursue and protect their own interests (Cleveland & Bunton, 2013). After the people defeated the despised police, dominated public places, and created some forms of security among themselves, the military decided to be on their side declaring that it would refrain from using force against protestors (Holmes, 2012). While state security and the police were regarded by citizens as enemies, the people and the army were considered to be united like "one hand" against the regime (Haque, 2013, p. 234).

On February 8, 2011, over one million workers joined the uprising and went on massive labor strike throughout the country (Aziz, 2014). In his last speech, on February 10, 2011, Mubarak appointed his intelligence chief Omar Suleiman as his vice president and delegated power to him. Eventually, protests spread all over the country demanding Mubarak to step down immediately (El-Bendary, 2013). On February 11, Suleiman declared Mubarak's resignation and announced that the SCAF, whose highest officer Mohammed Hussein Tantawi –Mubarak's Minister of Defense– would be in charge of ruling the country (Gerbaudo, 2013). Mubarak was subsequently put "under house arrest in his vacation retreat at Sharm al-Shaykh" (Cleveland & Bunton, 2013, p. 528).

The army had to create a system that would ensure the continuity of its power after the fall of Mubarak. The SCAF was regarded as an extension of the old regime for not taking the agenda of transferring power to a civilian government seriously (Gerbaudo, 2013). The military first followed public demands by making banned political parties legal and even allowing new ones to form. That was due to the fact that having multiple parties would not allow only one single political party to be powerful enough to challenge the SCAF (Martini & Taylor, 2011). Eventually, the authorities who cooperated with the Revolution in the beginning were different from the new SCAF members who in turn showed reluctance in deposing the old regime and providing any development on the social level (Amin, 2013). Although at first the armed forces coordinated with the uprising, their abuse and crimes against citizens later on damaged their credibility and legitimacy as a governing body (Haque, 2013). Thus, later in February 2011, protesters started demanding the "end of the military government, the military trials of civilians that imprisoned over 12,000 people and the immediate transfer of power to a civilian authority" (Gerbaudo, 2013, p. 13). In conclusion, the military was not a factor that caused Egyptians to revolt. Its role emerged after the persistence and determinacy of people were apparent to last until change would be achieved in the rule of Egypt, only after that, the military played an important role in overthrowing Mubarak and directing the outcome of the Revolution according to its interests.

The Transition Process

The post-Mubarak period is characterized by many difficulties and challenges due to the power struggle between different parties: the SCAF, the Muslim Brotherhood and the revolutionaries. The SCAF took over formal executive power and promised a transition to democracy, but in fact power was not transferred to civilians: the military intended to protect its

own power and economic and political privileges (Cleveland & Bunton, 2013). The increasing repression and attempts to manipulate the law and the political process proved that the SCAF was in itself a real threat to democracy (Elgindy, 2012).

The Muslim Brotherhood emerged as another major power. It sided with the protestors and tried to achieve a compromise with the military forces in the beginning (Gerbaudo, 2013). Eventually, the Brotherhood won the majority of seats in the 2012 parliamentary elections and an electoral mandate "by which to challenge military rule" (Elgindy, 2012, p. 89). The Muslim Brotherhood declared its role to defend the uprising and regarded the SCAF as a group opposing the Revolution (Cleveland & Bunton, 2013). The role of the Muslim Brotherhood thus continued getting stronger, and they eventually won the presidency.

Revolutionary groups were thus faced with two opposing powers of the military and the Brotherhood. Furthermore, youth protest movements had also committed several mistakes and arguably pursued wrong strategies during the transition period (Mady, 2013). Mady argues that the activists had "not devoted their time and effort to building new political parties or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)" (2013, p. 334). Other scholars argue that activists focused mainly on political issues, such as transferring power to the civil government, and neglected the social needs of a majority of the people considered to be the mobilizing force in the Revolution (Gerbaudo, 2013; De Smet, 2014). However, the transition process was not going in the right direction because so many different parties were working for their own interests. The fall of Mubarak left a political gap that gave a chance to the military and the Brotherhood to attempt to seize power and control in the country. Instability, tension and complexity are the main characteristics that best describe the transition period; a new and unprecedented phase in Egypt's society and politics.

The next section explains why the Muslim Brotherhood did not succeed in governing Egypt after Mubarak and discusses its faults, as well as the obstacles and the challenges it faced on the local, regional and global levels. It provides a detailed discussion of both the achievements and the misguided strategies the Brotherhood attained, and explores the politics behind the fall of its regime in a very short period.

Why the Muslim Brotherhood Failed

In order to understand why the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood did not succeed, we need to first understand what the situation was in Egypt during the transition. As noted earlier, different parties were vying for control over Egypt to suit their own interests, including the military and various other political parties (Brown, 2013). Some factions who favored the status quo further complicated matters by trying to hinder any change or progress from within, as well as from outside of Egypt. These factions tried to instill fear in the people, warning that revolutions are not simple but difficult and risky (Atawna & Othman, 2015).

Serious challenges also came from members of the Mubarak regime. Toppling Mubarak and arresting some members in his regime did not end the rule of many influential people who continued to maintain some authority, allowing them to practice in the same manner as before the Revolution (Amin, 2013). Eighteen days of demonstrations and protests could not change such an authoritarian regime that had been in place for decades. Senior members of all key state institutions and agencies were not displaced. They remained in their positions with the same political mentality and loyalties (Atawna & Othman, 2015). Corrupt officials who were involved in the Mubarak regime retained their positions due to repeated delays in replacing them with new officials. At the same time, new officials would only be appointed if they were ones who did not believe in the Revolution and its objectives (Amin, 2013). Former officers remained forceful:

authorities carelessly ignored criminal charges against them (Brown, 2013). Thus, the lasting and pervasive effect of the authoritarian regime of Egypt could not be overcome. Any attempt at change within the regime was fought by many of its own institutions regardless of which political party it derived from: whether it was from the Muslim Brotherhood or others (Aziz, 2014).

The Mubarak regime had regarded political Islam as an enemy, and had directed the state media to portray the concept as an extremist threat in order to create domestic opposition to the Brotherhood, and to maintain relations with the West (Monier & Ranko, 2013). The Mubarak regime taught Egyptian citizens that the Muslim Brotherhood and its members were the reason for any instability in the country and regarded them as a threat to the state and its national security (Atawna & Othman, 2015). It framed the Muslim Brotherhood as a cause for undermining "national sovereignty and, by extension, the regional order" (Monier & Ranko, 2013, p. 113). The regime also practiced several forms of torture and oppression against the Brotherhood, including forced exile to other countries (Atawna & Othman, 2015). For example, when the Brotherhood attained the majority of seats in parliament in 2005 it was responded to by retaliation and suppression by the Mubarak regime (Wilmot, 2015). Such repression is believed by some scholars to have created a certain political mindset among members of the Brotherhood, which was an obstacle in their attempt to transition to democracy (Atawna & Othman, 2015).

The Muslim Brotherhood's Mohammad Morsi became the first democratically elected president in Egypt in 2012. By that time, disputes and confrontations between different political parties and actors were continuing, and these parties had totally different views on how the situation after Mubarak should proceed (Tabaar, 2013). The Brotherhood lacked sufficient political experience to hold complete control of the situation. Its members did not have an

opportunity under the Mubarak regime to participate in meaningful political activities, or form a stable political party (Atwana & Othman, 2013). They were not able to mature and develop appropriately as a political party due to their constant concern about avoiding any accusation of repression against them (Tadros, 2012). With these limitations their work became limited, and they primarily focused on controlling domestic political divisions and chaos and thus lacked the ability and attention to manage other important matters that would eventually lead to their fall.

      Faults and Miscalculations of the Muslim Brotherhood. Democratic rule has not been practiced in Egypt in decades. Under the Mubarak regime, opposition parties were not permitted to practice politics or undertake a role in the political life such as founding parties or talking freely to the media. Therefore, they were unable to acquire sufficient political skills (Atwana & Othman, 2013). Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood did not have sufficient experience with the concept of democratic governance (Brown, 2013). The reason for their apparent victory in the Revolution was believed to be their success in organization, not their political aptitude (McDonnell, 2013). The Brotherhood was accused of focusing more on consolidating its own power rather than seeking solutions for the deteriorating social, political and economic issues in the country (Carafano & Phillips, 2014). It was also accused of trying to monopolize the writing process of the Constitution to increase their control of the state apparatus. This undermined its image in the public eye (Aftandilian, 2013).

      Morsi made many promises that led to high expectations, yet his government did not fulfill many of them (Jumet, 2014). Domestic political transition consumed much of the Brotherhood's capacity to make any foreign policy advances, except for the Gaza truce agreement between Israel and the Palestinian government in 2012 (Monier & Ranko, 2013). For some, it is "undeniable" that the Brotherhood made many mistakes such as "reaching too quickly

for political power or failing to build coalitions with others that they had vowed they knew enough to avoid" as well as such miscalculations as not using the necessary tools to address the discontent of the people (Brown, 2013, p. 57). People inside and outside of Egypt expressed their fear of Islamist control of non-governmental institutions in the country such as the media, which could result in restrictions on freedom of speech (Tabaar, 2013). In one instance, the Muslim Brotherhood's political party, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), proposed a civil society law that would restrict civil society organizations and place them under the scrutiny of the "Coordinating Committee." This organization was authorized to control foreign funding for national organizations as well as overseeing foreign NGOs in the country (Selim, 2015, p. 193). Such strategies by the Brotherhood are believed to be principal reasons for its failure.

Other considerable challenges faced by the Brotherhood included the deteriorating economic and security conditions in Egypt. The country suffered from political tension combined with social and economic problems, unemployment, increasing crime rates, and sectarian tension (Carafano & Phillips, 2014, p. 3). It also suffered from years of corrupt policies and ill management that had destroyed the common good and weakened the country (Fadel, 2014). There was a need for significant reforms in the economy, education, health care and housing in order to promote social justice (Amin, 2013). The 100 Day Plan that Morsi launched to improve the infrastructure and the security in the country simply did not provide an appropriate length of time to accomplish such a goal (Wilmot, 2015). The Brotherhood was not capable of defending the country against the flawed institutions that remained largely unchanged from the Mubarak regime and continued to exert their control over the state apparatus (Wickham, 2013). Evidence shows that some political institutions of the old regime were deeply

rooted after the downfall of Mubarak and notably out of the control of the Brotherhood rule (Gassama, 2014).

Besides the inefficient governance over social and economic issues by the Brotherhood, it was also not able to manage the interests of the well-established elite class who represented the political power in the country, thus further limiting its capacity to govern (Housden, 2013). It was not able to contend with those who have interests against the interests of the poor, whether in urban areas or in the countryside. It also was unable to replace corrupt provincial governors with righteous ones (Amin, 2013). Finally, the Brotherhood rule failed to protect the state from the intervention of the powerful military and police forces that continued to function independently. This further prevented any significant change from occurring. During his one year in office, Morsi could not have full control over the military and police forces, nor could he rely on them as they mostly refused to work with the Freedom and Justice Party (Fadel, 2014; Brown, 2013).

Achievements of the Brotherhood

While opponents of the Brotherhood believed that it was responsible for any and all failures of the state, there were also strong supporters who praised its actions and achievements during the short period of its leadership. Some argue that the Muslim Brotherhood represented a moderate democratic movement that was able to survive even under the repressive political system of the Mubarak era (Wickham, 2002). In spite of all the repressive measures the Brotherhood faced under the Mubarak regime, it never responded with violence (Wilmot, 2015). It was able to succeed where several other parties failed, even though it had limited political experience. They provided many social services for Egyptians for decades, while building social support and organizational power (Tabaar, 2013). During the 2011 uprising, for instance,

members of the Brotherhood supported the protesters by providing security and medical services

and distributing water and food. They were credited for giving a voice to the Revolution by

providing microphones in Tahrir Square (Wickham, 2013). They showed the protestors they had

no plan to dominate the demonstrations or use them to advance their own interests. Rather, the

Brotherhood understood the importance of unity and thus even chose to "officially back"

secularist leaders like Mohammad ElBaradei who emerged as "the spokesman of the protestors'

demands" (Wilmot, 2015, p. 385). An organization called the National Association for Change

formed, with ElBaradei in charge, to strategize other movements including the Brotherhood and

put pressure on Mubarak and the military to achieve democracy (Coker & Said, 2011).

After facing years of repression under the Mubarak regime, the efforts of the Brotherhood

finally paid off and it succeeded to some extent at both legislative and executive levels

(McDonnell, 2016). The Brotherhood won the majority of seats in the parliamentary elections as

well as the presidency, and subsequently undertook the process of rewriting the Constitution

(Brown, 2013). The fact that Islamists won the majority in the parliamentary elections was a

cause for concern among liberal parties and secular groups in the country. To address this issue

the Brotherhood showed willingness to work with different political, social and religious groups

on both national and international levels (Elgindy, 2012).

On the national level, President Morsi "reinstated the dissolved legislative parliament"

after only one week in power (Wilmot, 2015, p. 391). Contrary to Morsi's opponents, supporters

argue that the new Constitution of 2012 limited the power of the President and granted more

power to the prime minister and the parliament. This document also increased the number of

formal political rights to enhance the political system in the country, such as forming political

parties, publishing in print "without the prospect of government censorship", and boosting the

capacity of the political branches "by leaving open the content of many rights" (Fadel, 2014, p.14). In less than one year, members of the Brotherhood party opened offices in every city, managed democratically elected institutions throughout Egypt, gained more popular support for the political party, and developed both short and long term plans to rebuild and modernize Egypt (Atwana & Othman, 2013).

The Muslim Brotherhood was the "largest movement to try such an approach", and its political activities from 2011 to 2013 demonstrated quick and effective results (Brown, 2013, p. 57). Morsi intended to prevent the Supreme Constitutional Court from dissolving the Constituent Assembly because a case demanding dissolution was pending, but the constitutional drafting process had to be competed in accordance with "the transitional road map, which had been approved by the March 2011 referendum" (Fadel, 2014, p. 12). However, when people protested because of Morsi's presidential declaration to control the judicial branch and other powers, he showed concern and declared that he would undertake an immediate correction of this plan (Maru, 2013).

Moreover, Morsi moved against an authoritarian military system that had imprisoned thousands of Egyptians since 2011. He moved against the armed forces when border control officers were attacked near Rafah after one month of his confrontation with the Supreme Constitutional Court, and later replaced several senior military members, including Minister of Defense Mohammed Hussein Tantawi, with younger officers (Wilmot, 2015). By doing so he showed some control over the military and won support from some liberal Egyptians (Aftandilian, 2013). The fact that Morsi was governing even though there were several different elements freely opposing him (including some in the military, judiciary, civil society and internal

security forces) actually provides evidence that his democratic government was functioning to some extent during his era (Gassama, 2014).

Due to its preoccupation with domestic politics, and the brief period of its rule, the effect of the Brotherhood at the regional level was limited. In this context, however, Morsi's governance was still able to play the role of a peace broker in the Gaza conflict between Israelis and Palestinians in the fall of 2012 and provided political support to Hamas (Aftandilian, 2013). Morsi played the role of the guarantor of the agreement between Hamas and Israel to end their conflict and was a significant mediator of the truce to end Israel's "Pillar of Defense" operation (Meringolo, 2015). Morsi also gained regional and domestic support for developing a majority Islamic government that functioned within a democratic framework. Iran and Qatar were major supporters for the Brotherhood (Monier & Ranko, 2013). They provided it with both political and financial support (Szalai, 2014).

The short period of governance did not give the Brotherhood more opportunity to further prove itself. Egypt stilled faced many problems which lingered from the Mubarak regime. The situation was not easy to handle. Forces from the Mubarak regime, primarily the military, fought the rule of the Brotherhood and hindered it from achieving further significant accomplishments (Al-Saif, 2015).

The Rule of the SCAF

The role of the SCAF in obstructing the progress of change in the politics of Egypt became clear after the fall of the Mubarak regime. The Brotherhood took power over a country that had essentially been controlled by the military which granted itself massive authority and was the country's most powerful institution at the time. Evidence suggests that throughout the

transitional phase, the SCAF did not appear to be willing to support democratic efforts (Selim, 2015).

While Egyptian citizens were engaging in political debates and experiencing free elections for the first time in their lives, the military was seeking control over the politics of the country by firmly establishing itself "as the political overseer with veto power" (Aziz, 2014, p. 25). By August 2011, most of the governors who possessed high positions in the Mubarak regime were still part of the SCAF (Said, 2012). After the resignation of Mubarak, the military insisted on holding parliamentary elections in less than a year, so that the generals could return to their previous positions and to prevent the formation of new political parties and organizations (Martini & Taylor, 2011). Before the presidential elections, the SCAF took over executive powers, and the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) of Egypt dissolved the first democratically elected house of parliament in which the Brotherhood had won the majority of seats (McDonnell, 2016). This was followed by other similar regulations by the SCC such as "the rejection of successive draft election laws proposed by Morsi, and of a decree issued on November 22, 2012 that would have given the president extensive executive powers" (Housden, 2013 p. 73). The role of the judiciary in disrupting the democratic process in Egypt, even before the new presidential elections, is said to have been openly discussed by Judge Tahani el-Gebali, the Deputy President of the Supreme Constitutional Court (Gassama, 2014).

In the beginning of the transitional period an alliance was established between the Brotherhood and the military. In order to protect its interests, the SCAF first aligned with the Brotherhood during the process of "constitutional amendments and the attendant referendum" (Selim, 2015, p. 184). However, this era was a period of uncertainty for the military. It is argued that even while Egyptian ruling generals promised to transfer power to elected leaders, they were

planning to hinder the rise and spread of Islamism, and to retain their own political authority (Gassama, 2014). The military promoted security measures by finding allies among the media to raise doubt in the public mind regarding the ability of civilian leaders to impose laws and handle the instability in the country (Martini & Taylor, 2011). The military also employed contradictory strategies during that period, which could be attributed to the division among the members of the SCAF regarding the way to handle the situation, and the fear of any potential criminal charges that could be levied against them later (Said, 2012).

When protests against the military council increased, the SCAF responded with more repression towards any who opposed its authority (Elgindy, 2012). Prompted by former regime members, the military police committed massacres against some youth movements, such as the Maspero and the Cabinet Office (Selim, 2015). By October 2011, "two-fifths of Egyptians" believed the SCAF was disrupting the progress of the Revolution (Aziz, 2014, p. 25). After acts of violence and human rights violations increased by the army, many became more skeptical of the role of the military during the transitional period (Said, 2012).

In June 2012, a constitutional declaration was issued by the SCAF to grant themselves extended powers, including legislative ones, and to strictly limit the power of the new president so that he would not have any control over the military and its budget, and would not declare war without its approval (Aftandilian, 2013). The SCAF tried to implement these changes in the few hours before the final results of the presidential elections when it looked like Morsi would win. At that time, it was announced that the parliament would be dissolved and that the SCAF would "assume the legislative power of the dissolved parliament as well as the right to object to any article in the constitution yet to be written. A new decree was also suddenly issued to replace the

abolished emergency law, giving the military police wider authority than that previously vested in the Ministry of the Interior" (Amin, 2013, p.277).

In addition to dissolving the elected house of parliament, the SCAF was accused of committing various human rights violations against civilians, such as arresting them and ill-treating or even torturing them (McDonnell, 2015). The day after Mohammed Morsi won the elections, before he could choose his cabinet, it was announced that a seat in the new cabinet would be for the chairman of SCAF titled "the Minister of Defense" (Amin, 2013, p.277). Even during this period, human rights violations were being committed by the security forces during several violent clashes that resulted in forty dead protesters (McDonnell, 2015). After the military imposed its own conditions in order to protect its own authority and economic interests, it allowed the transition to proceed (Said, 2012).

The SCAF had the strength to resist any efforts for change on the political and economic levels (Tabaar, 2013). The military had control over a massive network of "economic assets in all sectors." Its economy is estimated at one third of the economy of Egypt (Elgindy, 2012, p. 94). After facing criticism by a few opposition groups for its control over the state economy, the military tended to keep its activities hidden from the public. Because they hid their activities, the Brotherhood underestimated the real capability of the military, leading them to assume that civil-military problems could be solved over time (Yildirim, 2013).

The Brotherhood had planned an eight billion dollar development project for the area of the Suez Canal and did not allow any participation from the military. This action is believed to have been the impetus for the military's decision to depose the democratically elected government (McDonnell, 2015). Repeated attempts to privatize the assets of the country and attempts to invest in all sectors of the economy, including national defense, cars and electronics,

were blocked by the military (Housden, 2013). The Brotherhood was not able to improve the dire

economic conditions, nor could it compromise with its opponents, which eventually made them

unpopular (McDonnell, 2015). Even though Morsi imposed some control over civilian politics,

the military preserved its economic stronghold and established civilian rule on the Judiciary and

ministry systems through the December 2012 Constitution. This Constitution maintained the

military's broad economic interests, enabled the prosecution of civilians in military courts, and

ensured that future defense ministers "would be appointed from within the officer corps"

(Wenig, 2014). The constitution also placed the military judiciary system "under the section

dealing with the military, as opposed to the general judiciary section" (Selim, 2015, p. 192). The

military also maintained administrative control of Suez Canal cities even though President Morsi

declared a state of emergency due to the rise in protests in the area (Wenig, 2014).

Although the Brotherhood achieved some successes, it failed to confront the strong

military or to meet all the expectations and requirements of a new government in Egypt. By

April 2013, a movement called Tamarrud (Rebel) was mobilized against Morsi's government

(Jumet, 2014). These protesters held huge demonstrations against Morsi and the Brotherhood and

claimed to gather millions of signatures on a petition to demand that Morsi resign (McDonnell,

2015). This large number of signatures was suspected to be fraudulent because people could sign

the petition many times without the need to produce a national identification card (Jumet, 2014).

In June 2013, the Tamarrud campaign was able to bring massive numbers of people to

protest in the streets, which gave the army an opportunity to drive the President and the

Brotherhood from power (Monier & Ranko, 2013). There is strong evidence that before the

overthrow of the government, the military supported the protestors against Morsi financially and

with "other resources" and thus played a crucial role in the anti-Morsi demonstrations

(McDonnell, 2015, p. 364). The military gave the President 48 hours to respond to the demands of the protestors, and when Morsi refused, defense minister Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi revealed a plan to suspend the Constitution, oust President Morsi and appoint Chief Justice Adly Mansour as a temporary president (Selim, 2015). On July 3, the military responded to the protestors' demands by launching a series of actions against the Brotherhood leadership, closing Islamic networks and arresting Morsi and the top members of his government (Brown, 2013a).

Pro-Morsi demonstrators took to the streets and blamed Tamarrud for being counter-revolutionary by surrendering the country to the rule of the military and undermining the democratic process (De Smet, 2014). The military gave itself absolute control and authority. It restricted pro-Morsi demonstrations, and used excessive force by opening fire on peaceful unarmed civilians and sit-in protestors (Vassefi, 2013). The military charged Morsi with a "capital offense for allegedly inciting violence and sentenced him to twenty years in a maximum security prison." It also sentenced the Brotherhood's highest spiritual leader Muhammad Badie to death, and sentenced 682 people, mostly members of the Brotherhood, to death for killing a single police officer during a riot in the previous summer (McDonnell, 2015, p. 368).

Anti-Morsi protestors allowed the military to gain dominance in the Egyptian government, steal the democratically elected leadership from the Brotherhood, and practice unconditional authoritarian strategies against the Brotherhood and its supporters. The military accused Islamists of defining democracy as only elections and therefore being anti-democratic and "mindlessly majoritarian." Meanwhile, the fact that the military mobilized the opposition in the streets shows that it was more majoritarian than the Muslim Brotherhood, especially by ruling with authoritarian measures and denying the demands of the different groups in the country (Brown, 2013a, p. 58).

Thus, authoritarianism was not overcome by the ouster of Morsi. On the contrary, it was reestablished firmly. This system maintained power during the fall of Mubarak, throughout the Brotherhood rule, and continued after general Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi became President in June 2014 (Aziz, 2014). The Sisi regime outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood, assumed control over its political institutions, clinics and schools, and accused it of being a terrorist group (Darwisheh, 2015). The military under Al-Sisi's rule continued suppressing people by restricting their freedom, arresting, imprisoning and killing them (McDonell, 2015).

To summarize, the rule of the Brotherhood failed to effectively govern Egypt and failed to confront the different opposing factors because it lacked the time and full capacity needed to restore order and promote stability. Therefore, some scholars note that one year was not enough to judge the Brotherhood and assume its eventual failure (Al-Saif, 2015). Despite the progressive moves achieved by Morsi's government, a large number of Egyptian people were mobilized against it by the military, which had a major role in subverting the January 25 Egyptian Revolution.

The Role of the Regional Countries

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. The military needed support from regional and international countries to maintain its authority. Egypt has a central position in the Middle East, and any change in its politics and economy naturally affects the countries around it. The Egyptian Revolution posed a threat to the rule of other regimes in the region. The actions of other regional countries during the Revolution is believed to have contributed to, and shaped the outcome of, the Revolution. Some Gulf states were opposed to the Revolution and supported those who wanted to maintain the status quo. There were also competing interests in the region between 2011 and 2013. For example, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates

(UAE) supported the military while Qatar solely supported the Muslim Brotherhood (Szalai, 2014).

Generally, Saudi Arabia is an authoritarian country ruled by a monarchical regime. The ruling family of Saudi Arabia regarded the Arab Spring as a cause for disorder in the region. They were concerned that the Revolution might strengthen the Muslim Brotherhood, increase support for the expansion of Iranian influence, lead to sectarian conflict and promote jihadism (Wehrey, 2015). Egypt's relations with the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia were established long before Mubarak's fall and continued afterwards despite the tension and turmoil in Egypt (Farouk, 2014). When the Egyptian people protested against Mubarak, Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah condemned the protestors and described them as agents working to disturb Egypt's security and stability (Darwisheh, 2015).

Egypt was dependent on Saudi Arabia for financial support, which was crucial for the survival and continuation of Mubarak's autocratic rule (Meringolo, 2015). Between 2011 and 2014, Saudi Arabia gave Egypt almost $10.9 billion to aid the military in preventing the rise of the Brotherhood (Wehrey, 2015). In addition to monetary support, Egypt had strategic relations with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states based on "area-specific military cooperation and exercises rather than on a formal alliance" (Farouk, 2014, p.2).

The political opposition in Egypt criticized this dependent relationship with Saudi Arabia, which also had ideological influence in the Egyptian society (Farouk, 2014). Not only did Saudi Arabia support the Mubarak regime, but other gulf countries like the UAE also expressed confidence and hope in the SCAF to contain the uprising and secure the country (Szalai, 2014). The Brotherhood was perceived as a threat because of its potential to inspire further uprisings in the area and change the regional order (Monier & Ranko, 2013). After Morsi became President,

however, he sought not to change Egypt's foreign policy. He tried to assure the Gulf states and Saudi rulers that Egypt was in crucial need of their continued financial aid and that he would pursue a moderate Islamic governance with no plan to extend the Revolution elsewhere (Darwisheh, 2015).

Among the Gulf states, the country that supported Morsi's government the most was Qatar. It transferred about $8 billion to Egypt as financial aid during the year of Morsi's rule (Szalai, 2014). This was in contrast to Saudi Arabia which cut off its aid to Egypt after Morsi became President (Wehrey, 2015). Conversely, after the ouster of Morsi in 2013, the Gulf countries, except Qatar, enhanced the economy of Egypt, and saved it from breaking down by pledging $12 million to the military (Meringolo, 2015). Saudi Arabia alone has been accused of giving Al-Sisi $1 billion for the sole purpose of ending the rule of the Brotherhood (Szalai, 2014).

In conclusion, the role of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states was significant due to their support of anti-revolutionary forces and the Egyptian military, and toppling the rule of the Brotherhood. With the exception of Qatar, these countries strongly opposed the rule of the Brotherhood were concerned with their own national interests and the future of their authoritarian regimes, and most importantly due to Morsi's close relations with Iran (Szalai, 2014).

Iran. Iranian expansion has been a concern for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states for decades. After the fall of the Mubarak regime, the dynamics of the Gulf states shifted because of an increase in Iranian presence in Lebanon, Syria and Yemen (Farouk, 2014). The member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) declared in April 2011 that their national security would be threatened by any reconciliation between Egypt and Iran (Monier & Ranko, 2013).

During his presidency, Morsi made a visit to Iran in August 2012 on the occasion of "the summit of the non-aligned countries" (Meringolo, 2015, p. 3). No Egyptian president had made such a visit since 1979 (Esfandiary, 2012). In February 2013, the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Cairo to show his support for Egypt and the new government. These actions were perceived by the Gulf states as a sign of an alliance between Egypt and Iran that needed to be stopped (Szalai, 2014). Morsi's administration took several additional moves to renew Egypt's relationship with Iran to enhance economic ties and improve political relations (Farouk, 2014). Such relations between Egypt and Iran even alarmed the United States and affected its policies in Egypt (Selim, 2015).

After Morsi was overthrown, Egypt's relations with Iran returned to the same state it was in before the Revolution, especially after the Sisi regime restored Egypt's ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE (Darwisheh, 2015). Relations with Qatar, on the other hand, deteriorated. After deposing Morsi, Qatar distanced itself from the position of the other Gulf states and withdrew 2 billion of the 3 billion dollars which it had deposited with the Bank of Egypt in 2011 (Meringolo, 2015). The Qatari ambassador had also left Egypt and the Egyptian ambassador returned to Cairo by January 2014 (Farouk, 2014).

Israel. Egypt is the southern neighbor of Israel. This close proximity is very critical for Israel's security. Egypt also borders the Gaza Strip, which makes it an important player in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict on both the political and strategic levels (Aftandilian, 2013). Egypt is one of only two countries in the Middle East that has signed a peace treaty with Israel on March 26, 1979 (McDonnell, 2015). Under Mubarak's rule, Egypt supported Israel against Arab forces. It backed Israel in its wars against Hezbollah in Lebanon and against Hamas in Gaza (Darwisheh, 2015). An agreement was also signed between both countries regarding the sale of

natural gas from Egypt to Israel and the establishment of qualified industrial zones with Israel and the United States (Yadav, 2007).

The survival of the Mubarak regime was seen as essential for Israel's security in the region. The Egyptian-Israeli relations were growing stronger especially with the emergence of Mubarak's son, Gamal, as the ideal option to maintain peace between the two countries (Darwisheh, 2015). Mubarak's fall was therefore concerning to Israel, especially when followed by what they perceived as an Islamist uprising. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu viewed the Arab uprisings as an "Islamic, anti-Western, anti-liberal, anti-Israeli, undemocratic wave" (Jones & Milton-Edwards, 2013, p. 400).

With the ouster of Mubarak, Islamists suggested the idea of revising the peace treaty with Israel. The military, on the other hand, expressed its full support for the treaty, and rejected any discussion of change. This negatively affected the US reaction to the Revolution due to concerns for the security of Israel (Yildirim, 2013). After Mubarak was overthrown, several Israelis were killed in an attack from the Sinai region. Weapons smuggling into Gaza increased, and the gas pipeline from Egypt to Israel was exposed to some damage (Jones & Milton-Edwards, 2013). This may have been due to the fact that during the early 2011 uprising, Egyptian prisoners were released from prison who, along with other extremists, executed a strike against Israel in an operation that resulted in the killing of 16 Egyptian soldiers and the destruction of many tunnels along the border between Egypt and Israel (Aftandilian, 2013). In August 2011, Israeli officials accused Egypt of violating the peace treaty when it deployed tanks on their border, and demanded that Egypt continue to abide by its terms (Aftandilian, 2013).

Egyptian-Israeli relations were clearly solidified under Mubarak's governance, but that was not the case under the Brotherhood rule, even though the terms of the treaty were still in

effect. (Brown, 2013b). Israel feared that the close political relationship between the Brotherhood in Egypt and the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip would turn attitudes against Israel and radicalize rather than moderate them in the Middle East (Jones & Milton-Edwards, 2013). Near the time of the presidential elections in 2012, a delegation of the Freedom and Justice Party visited Washington and tried to discuss the plans of the Brotherhood, in the event they came to power in Egypt. These plans included "the observance of the peace treaty with Israel, including no interruption of economic cooperation between Egyptian businessmen and their Israeli counterparts, no escalation in Egyptian support to Hamas in Gaza" (Selim, 2015, p. 188). Although historically the Brotherhood did not recognize the state of Israel, nor did it support the peace treaty, Morsi pledged to respect all of the international treaties of Egypt, including the peace treaty with Israel (Aftandilian, 2013).

When Morsi came to power, he initially did not alter the country's relationship with Israel, but rather he left its management to the military (Rabinovich, 2014). The Brotherhood acknowledged the importance of maintaining Egypt's international obligations and keeping the peace treaty with Israel (Brown, 2013b). Morsi's government preserved the critical relationships with Israel and the U.S. (McDonnell, 2015). The new Egyptian government maintained the economic ties that Mubarak had with Israel and the U.S. and moved to improved cooperation on the security level with Israel (Selim, 2015). The U.S.-Israel trade agreement allows for Egyptian exports to the U.S. to enter markets duty free as long as 10.5 percent of the exports are Israeli. The Morsi government maintained the agreement, yet it requested that the percentage of Israeli components be reduced to 8 percent (El-Menshawy, 2013).

When violence occurred in the Fall of 2012 between Israelis and Palestinians, Morsi politically supported Hamas but did not provide military support (Aftandilian, 2013). He played

the role of the guarantor of the agreement between Hamas and Israel to end their conflict and was a mediator of the truce to end Israel's "Pillar of Defense" operation. This action highlighted Morsi's negotiating position in such a crucial case within the Middle East (Meringolo, 2015). It is argued that Morsi supported Hamas during the Israeli operation by keeping the Rafah border open between Egypt and Gaza and sending his prime minister to Gaza (Jones & Milton-Edwards, 2013, p. 404). Brokering the ceasefire between the two sides was praised by the Israeli Deputy Prime Minister for creating "a new bond between Israel and Egypt's new government" (Darwisheh, 2015, p. 55).

Regardless of the success of Morsi as a peace broker, Israel never welcomed the Islamic rule in Egypt. It continued to oppose the expanding power of political Islam, fearing that this ideology might exclude all other political parties and actors (Jones & Milton-Edwards, 2013). Israel was not content with the rule of Morsi and the Brotherhood, and favored the rule of the military to preserve its interests and security in the region (Rabinovich, 2014). Israel had fears regarding the security of the Sinai region, and questioned Morsi's ability to protect it (Jones & Milton-Edwards, 2013). The ouster of Morsi was welcomed by Israel, which sided with Al-Sisi's military as a close and strong proponent on its borders (Marshall, 2013). Al-Sisi subsequently launched a campaign against the Brotherhood, showed disdain for the government of Hamas in Gaza, and attempted to prevent the smuggling of supplies to Palestinians through the Sinai region into Gaza (Rabinovich, 2014).

The Role of the United States

Egypt has been a strategic ally with the U.S. for about three decades (Aftandilian, 2013). Under Mubarak's rule, Egypt's political position was generally in favor of Israel and the United States often to the detriment of Arab interests. According to one source, Egypt's government has

long supported the American administrations against Middle Eastern countries such as the Gulf States, Iraq and Iran (Amin, 2013). It provided U.S. military aircraft with over-flight rights and facilitated the passage of U.S. naval ships through the Suez Canal to the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea (Aftandilian, 2013). In 2004 Egypt signed an agreement with Israel and the U.S. to create a Qualifying Industrial Zone (QIZ) in Egypt, which opened its doors to foreign private investment and privatization (Amin, 2013). Around the same time, Mubarak's government excluded the Muslim Brotherhood from political participation in Egypt and kept them under restriction, which satisfied the wishes of the U.S. because of their discomfort with Islamist movements (Perra, 2016).

The support of the U.S. was important for the political stability of the Mubarak regime (Mady, 2013). The United States gave Egypt more than $62 billion in civilian and military aid during the years of Mubarak's presidency (McDonnell, 2015). Egypt's role in mediating between Arab countries and Israel, which was dominated by the interests of the U.S., also affected domestic politics within the country (Mady, 2013). Preserving Gamal Mubarak as the inheritor of his father's rule was viewed as a priority by the U.S. in order to maintain the good relations between U.S. and Egypt (Ibrahim, 2013). The Arab uprisings alarmed the United States and threatened to disturb its strategic ties with Egypt along with its regional interests. As a result, with the help of the supporters of the Mubarak regime, the U.S. proceeded with a series of interventions aimed at shaping the outcome of the Revolution and controlling its repercussions in the region (Selim, 2015).

The U.S. initially attempted to support Mubarak "openly" and secure his regime against the uprising "until the last minute" (Selim, 2015, p. 178). The Obama administration was first hesitant in supporting the overthrow of Mubarak until it was inevitable after all the pressure and

insistence of the uprising (Yildirm, 2013). The U.S. realized that Mubarak was not able to conciliate his people, so the plan was altered to inform the military that it was time for Mubarak to resign (Indyk et al., 2013). The U.S. then relied on the military to stabilize the country and maintain U.S.-Egyptian relations (Aftandilian, 2013). The military complied with American demands in order to keep the $1.3 billion in aid that it received annually from the U.S. (Nepstad, 2013). Additionally, it had to preserve its military ties with the U.S., which had "provided the Egyptian armed forces with some of the most sophisticated weaponry in the world" (Hashim, 2011, p. 118). The U.S. did not encourage the deposition of Mubarak, it only advocated an "orderly transition" under the control of Mubarak's intelligence chief Omar Suleiman (Darwisheh, 2015, p. 51). Eventually, the downfall of Mubarak did not end the alliance between Egypt and the U.S., which was maintained by the SCAF that ruled Egypt in its transitional phase from 2011 to 2012 (Katz, 2014).

At one point, the political rise of the Brotherhood in Egypt alarmed the U.S. sufficiently enough that it started to work on establishing relations with the Brotherhood to preserve its interests (Selim, 2015). The U.S. had to learn to work with a political entity with which it had major philosophical and political disagreements for decades (Elgindy, 2012). The U.S. started sending high-ranking officials to visit both the Brotherhood and the SCAF (Aftandilian, 2013). The Obama administration described Morsi's election as a "truly historic set of achievements", and members of his administration made several visits to Morsi promising to help Egypt "deal with its financial challenges, including meeting immediate financial concerns, providing debt relief, and encouraging U.S. investment and tourism" (Perra, 2016, p. 39). Morsi's government needed the financial support of the U.S. because of the deteriorating economic conditions that were present in Egypt when he came to power (Darwisheh, 2015). For example, Morsi attempted

to keep close relations with the U.S. by continuing to observe the Camp David treaty (Katz, 2014). One significant indication of positive U.S.-Brotherhood relations was the Brotherhood's decision to lift the travel ban on foreign NGO workers who had been arrested for receiving foreign funds within Egypt without the permission of the government (Selim, 2015).

Regardless of Morsi's pledge to cooperate with the U.S. and Israel and to protect their interests, the U.S. remained concerned about Morsi's domestic policies and expanded power. Morsi's government imposed restrictions on NGOs and freedoms of speech and of the press (Carafano & Phillips, 2014). His administration was also accused of prioritizing the interests of the Brotherhood over the national, political and social demands by holding the majority of the seats in the Shura Council (the upper house of the Parliament), and controlling the process of writing the new Constitution (Selim, 2015). The Obama administration became cautious about the Brotherhood's stance when they started considering Camp David Accord "open to changes", when the security in the Sinai region on the Egyptian-Israeli border deteriorated, and when Morsi limited the options for the U.S. in the Arab-Israeli negotiations after he supported Hamas openly (Perra, 2016, p. 39). Another concern was the renewed Egyptian-Iranian relations being pursued by the Brotherhood at a time when tension between Iran and the U.S. was at its peak (Darwisheh, 2015). Although the United States did not condemn Morsi's government publicly, it was keenly interested in preventing the emergence of an Islamic conservative rule (Carafano & Phillips, 2014). As a result, U.S. officials maintained their reliance on the Egyptian military, even during Morsi's rule, as a strong force to protect their interests (Aftandilian, 2013).

The U.S. remained silent when the Egyptian military committed several human rights violations against pro-Morsi protestors. It supported Mubarak who suppressed political opposition in the form of the Brotherhood for thirty years, yet opposed Morsi's democratically

elected government (McDonnell, 2015). It is even argued that the Obama administration worked

to oust Morsi from the presidency by financing anti-Morsi opposition groups. Government

documents show that the U.S. approach included support for "an exiled Egyptian police officer

who plotted the violent overthrow of the Morsi government, an anti-Islamist politician who

advocated closing mosques and dragging preachers out by force, as well as a cadre of opposition

politicians who pushed for the ouster of the country's first democratically elected leader"

(Yildirim, 2013, p. 66). This strategy included economic and military support to the Egyptian

military. Obama intended not to call the ouster of Morsi by the military a "coup" per se because

he would have been forced to stop the aid of $1.5 billion "as federal law would otherwise have

required" (McDonnell, 2015, p. 349).

In summary, throughout the Egyptian Revolution the United States never ceased to be

vigilant over its own interests in the country. Initially the U.S. supported Mubarak. The U.S. then

also supported Mubarak's deposition, the rule of the Brotherhood, and later, Morsi's ouster.

Finally, the U.S. approved the SCAF's Al-Sisi when he finally came to power (Helfont, 2015).

The U.S. essentially prioritized its own interests in all the phases of transition that Egypt went

through. Egypt's foreign policy underwent a noticeable degree of change in its relations with

Mubarak, the SCAF, Morsi and back to the military, yet "continuity" characterized Egypt's

foreign relations "rather than change" (Katz, 2014, p. 80).

It was a dynamic set of complex factors that all contributed to the downfall of the

Egyptian Revolution. Combining all the national, regional and international factors discussed

above provides a more accurate and complete picture of the failure of the democratic government

under President Morsi and the emergence of another military dictatorship under Al-Sisi's

leadership in Egypt. None of the factors can be minimized or separated from the other factors.

They are all interconnected and have equal significance. The chaos and turmoil in Egypt after the overthrow of Mubarak was not easily controlled by the Brotherhood, which caused local discontent. On the other hand, the authority enjoyed by the Brotherhood limited the power and control of the military which only wanted to protect its own interests. On the regional level, the Arab neighboring countries were concerned about their own national interests and stability, and did not want the success of the Brotherhood to inspire uprisings in their countries and threaten their own authority and leadership. Israel was concerned for its security and pursued protection for its national interests. The United States prioritized the interests and security of Israel and backed the SCAF in deposing Morsi. Ultimately, it would appear that U.S. foreign policy towards the Brotherhood rule contradicted its own principles of democracy and freedom in order to protect its interests in the region.

Lessons Learned and Recommendations for the Future

Egypt's transition suffered from divisions caused by various protest groups and political parties seeking to protect their own interests, and this became an obstacle in achieving their goal of ending the authoritarian rule (Mady, 2013). The process of transitioning to democracy was thus undermined by these divided political groups who essentially worked as a counter-revolutionary force and ultimately paved the way for the military to take control and impose hegemony (De Smet, 2014). Groups such as liberals and secularists needed to recognize the problems in their campaigns and the way they aligned themselves with the military in order to overthrow Egypt's first democratically elected president (Housden, 2013). The different political parties should have abandoned their ideological disputes in order to reach the mutual goal of democratic rule (Mady, 2013).

Decisions were made by inexperienced parties who had limited power, limited ability and shortsighted plans (Brown, 2013a). Egyptian activists needed more developed plans and better organizational skills in order to confront the rule of both the military and the Brotherhood (Abdelrahman, 2013). A different organizational and institutional structure of the Revolution could have created a stronger foundation to face the influence of repressive forces and replace them with democracy and social justice (Gerbaudo, 2013). In the future, revolutionary forces in Egypt and elsewhere should develop new and independent opposition parties, trade unions and committees in order to overcome the imbalances of the needed reforms (De Smet, 2014).

The Brotherhood had to satisfy multiple political groups. It had to work within a deeply divided society and avoid marginalizing any of its sectors (Wickham, 2013). Special attention should have been directed to protect minorities and establish social justice (Mady, 2013). Combining the concept of democracy with religious rules resulted in undesired outcomes and led to further divisions among the many existing parties. The restrictions placed on some of the freedoms of Egyptians turned people against the Brotherhood and decreased its popularity. It needed to modify its ideology and direct its focus on national and domestic issues rather than religious issues (Monier & Ranko, 2013). The Brotherhood needed to create long-term economic plans and had to face the remnants of the old regime institutions who were opposed to those changes because of the effects it would have on their own interests. It was apparent that the same social, economic and political problems that had mobilized Egyptians to revolt, were still largely unresolved after the fall of Mubarak and eventually lead to further opposition (Aziz, 2014).

Most importantly, the Brotherhood should have recognized the strength of its opponent; the military. Ironically, Morsi was the one who chose Al-Sisi to replace his military adversary, Tantawi (Wilmot, 2015). The Brotherhood should have been aware that the military was strongly

entrenched in governing and controlling the Egyptian society. The role of the military in suppressing the Revolution is one of the main reasons for toppling Morsi. Without the influential involvement of the SCAF in the coup, the political pressure created by the oppositional protests would not have been enough to overthrow Morsi (Maru, 2013).

Egypt witnessed several human rights violations by the military during the Revolution. Going forward into the future, establishing fair laws needs to be an essential component in building national security and stability in the country (Housden, 2013). If Egypt had signed the Second Optional Protocol after it ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1982, it would have confirmed its commitment to democratic principles and human rights and it would have benefited Egypt during the short-term transition phase. Furthermore, it would have served as a core aspect of a long-term program of judicial change toward equitable and fair treatment of all its citizens (Vassefi, 2013, p. 1123). Nondemocratic practices can be eliminated through the rule of law and a "complete revision of documents, agendas, and reform projects" (Mady, 2013, p.337). Democratic leadership can better secure Egypt's interests and ensure a stronger role for itself on national and international levels.

On the regional level, the role of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states is argued to have cast a dominant and inseparable shadow of influence on the politics of the Middle East, and specifically on the relationship between Iran and Egypt (Szalai, 2014). Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states clearly opposed the Brotherhood and backed the military in Egypt. These countries are likely to continue supporting the military regime in the future. The mutual relations and the interconnected elements of security, social, political and economic structures between Egypt and these countries suggest that Egypt will have to maintain its relationship with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, at least through an "informal alliance" (Farouk, 2014, p. 20). As a result, Qatar's

political position does not suggest there will be any strong support for the Brotherhood in the future (Szalai, 2014). The Saudi-Egypt alliance puts pressure on and threatens Qatar, and even Hamas, which is considered to be a political ally and an associate of the Brotherhood (Darwisheh, 2015).

On the international level, Israel's concerns for its own security and interests became a major influence on the events of the Revolution and allowed Egypt to again be controlled by the military. This concern also moved the United States to protect the mutual interests of Israel and the U.S., as well as act to protect its own interests and advantages in the region (McDonnell, 2015; Jones & Milton-Edwards, 2013). The U.S. provided strong support for the authoritarian rule and dictatorship in Egypt, as had the other Arab regimes. The U.S. did not urge the military to give authority to a civilian rule, nor to respect basic human rights of the Egyptian citizens. The financial aid that was offered by the U.S. annually has continued to be directed to the military; not to address the economic insecurity of the people, nor to fighting terrorism in the region (Carafano & Phillips, 2014). In the future, it will be necessary for the U.S. foreign policy and foreign aid to place more emphasis on economic development programs and on establishing reforms to make laws more equitable and just (Elgindy, 2012). The continuous support by the U.S. for the military, while ignoring its repetitive human rights violations, opposes all attempts to create completely democratic institutions, and eventually provokes the growth of terrorist ideologies in the region. This can only be countered by stopping the double standards of the U.S. toward the people of Egypt specifically, and the Middle East collectively (McDonell, 2015).

Conclusion

On January 25, 2011, the Egyptian people broke the wall of fear and challenged a tyrannical leader after three decades of oppression. People from all aspects of Egyptian society

came together and demanded the end of Hosni Mubarak's dictatorial rule. Their unity emphasized the importance of political freedom as well as economic security. A special aspect of the Revolution was that the revolutionaries were not only people from the lower-income class; they were also young and very highly educated (Korotayev & Zinkina, 2011).

The protestors wanted to overthrow the Mubarak regime because it had lost its legitimacy as well as the capacity to enforce the law and provide justice (Haque, 2013). Causes for the Revolution simmered for three decades under the suffering and abuse of the Egyptian people by the Mubarak regime at all socio-economic and political levels. Such causes are major factors that lead people to protest. At the same time, there were several specific reasons which sparked the onset of the Egyptian Revolution and mobilized people to streets. The repetitive attempts to suppress the protesters at the Tahrir Square proved the ineffectiveness of Mubarak's brutal enforcement policies in restraining the uprising. The use of new technologies and social media played a powerful role in driving some events of the Revolution, but they were not the main reasons for change. They were contributing factors that added further mechanisms to the Revolution.

After only 18 days of protests, the Revolution's first goal, to overthrow Mubarak, was achieved. However, members of the old regime were still deeply involved and strongly rooted in controlling the country. The transitional period between Mubarak and Morsi was characterized by an unprecedented period of instability, chaos, and a shift in the balance of power; all of which the military was heavily involved. Several key actors and parties struggled over governing Egypt after the fall of Mubarak, including the military headed by the SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as the leftist and secularist groups whose presence was not sufficient enough to form any real competitive political power.

The Muslim Brotherhood emerged as a new political power with an organized agenda. It achieved high levels of success in areas where other anti-Mubarak movements failed. They won the majority of the seats in Parliament, and eventually won the presidency. In June 2012 the first democratically elected President Mohammed Morsi came to power. Morsi's government pursued several socio-economic and political policies to improve economic and political conditions in Egypt over time (Atwana & Othman, 2013). However, the Brotherhood's lack of experience in governance due to decades of suppression by the Mubarak regime, as well as the continued instability and disorder during the transition period after the downfall of Mubarak, made it difficult to rule the country.

After one year in power, President Morsi was deposed, the government of the Brotherhood was toppled, and the military resumed control over the country, just as it had done during the transition period prior to the elections. Large numbers of Egyptian citizens protested against Morsi's rule and demanded his deposition. Yet most of them were pushed into this protest by other forces, like the military, which fought the Brotherhood in direct and indirect ways. While a large number of Egyptians desired a transition to democracy, some others did not. It was apparent that the Brotherhood had suffered from some miscalculations and errors in management. They also lacked sufficient experience in leading a politically divided country. Yet, as discussed in detail above, one year was an insufficient time frame to judge the effectiveness of their rule and policies. It is evident that, whether they had sufficient time or not, they were simply not strong enough to confront and prevail over the other parties and forces that were unsatisfied with their rule.

The ongoing instability allowed the military to claim to be a force for restoring stability and order in Egypt (Gerbaudo, 2013). Those who supported the military rule allowed the country

to be controlled by an authoritarian regime once again and denied the Brotherhood to rule even when they get democratically elected (Brown, 2013a). While some suggest that Egyptians did not realize how the Revolution was stolen from them by the military rule (Aziz, 2014), I argue that some segments of the Egyptian people did not prioritize the goals of the Revolution as much as they cared for and valued their own interests. That is, they placed their own interests over the interests of the country as a whole. It is argued that most Egyptians' understanding of democracy was limited to "freedom of opinion" (Jumet, 2014, p.1). However, it is more likely that the highly educated protestors who had a great impact during the Revolution (Korotayev & Zinkina, 2011) understood the concept of democracy, but simply were unable to cope with it or establish it in such an unstable and chaotic period.

The SCAF appointed itself as the powerholder of Egypt against the will of the people. It became apparent that the military never ceased to control Egypt since the fall of Mubarak, especially during the transitional period, as well as following the brief rule of the Brotherhood (Aziz, 2014). After overthrowing Mubarak, the military imposed several conditions to protect its authority and economic interests against the transition of power to a civilian rule (Said, 2012). After Morsi came to power and started replacing the officers, the military became disturbed and started opposing him. It blocked many changes by Morsi's government, especially on the economic level (Housden, 2013). It encouraged demonstrations against Morsi's rule and supported those protestors financially (McDonnell, 2015). The military eventually arrested Morsi and the top members of his government (Brown, 2013a). The military restricted pro-Morsi demonstrations and opened fire on peaceful unarmed protestors (Vassefi, 2013). Nothing stopped the military from suppressing the protestors by use of force. The military's human rights violations did not move the opinion of the international community regarding the illegitimacy of

its rule in the country. On the contrary, the military regime under the leadership of Al-Sisi was supported by many regional and international countries.

Due to Egypt's important and strategic position in the Middle East, any change in its politics disturbs the other countries in the region. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, such as the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, were threatened by the downfall of the Mubarak regime. They were distressed by the rule of the Brotherhood and feared its expansion to their region. Morsi's close relationship with Iran alarmed the Gulf states which in turn were determined to oppose the relationship, and instead supported the anti-revolutionary forces and the military. Qatar was an exception among the Gulf states. It supported the rule of the Brotherhood and provided financial aid during its leadership. This was in contrast to Saudi Arabia which cut off its aid to Egypt after Morsi became President (Wehrey, 2015). Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has been accused of giving Al-Sisi $1 billion to end the rule of the Brotherhood (Szalai, 2014). After overthrowing Morsi, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states pledged millions of dollars to the military to enhance Egypt's economy and save it from breaking down (Meringolo, 2015a). Therefore, it is clear that Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states played a key role in shaping the outcomes of the Egyptian Revolution.

The increased presence of Iran in the Arab world after the fall of Mubarak caused a shift in the dynamics of the Gulf states (Farouk, 2014). The reconciliation between Egypt and Iran threatened the Gulf states' national security. No Egyptian president prior to Morsi had made such close ties with Iran (Esfandiary, 2012). Such moves worried both the regional governments and the United States, all of whom were determined to stop such a relationship. After the overthrow of Morsi, the relations between Iran and Egypt returned to the same state as they had been under

the Mubarak regime, especially after Al-Sisi restored ties with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states (Darwisheh, 2015).

Egypt's critical location next to Israel and the Gaza Strip, and the fact that it shares borders with both, explains why it plays an important role in Israel's security. The downfall of Mubarak was very concerning to Israel, especially when followed by the rule of the Brotherhood. The turmoil and instability in Egypt during its transition negatively affected the national security of Israel, especially after several attacks and incidents on its borders. Morsi respected Egypt's relations with Israel and did not alter the existing peace treaty between them (Selim, 2015). He also played the role of the peace broker when a conflict occurred between Israel and Hamas (Meringolo, 2015). Such actions should have been praised by Israel, but Israel never welcomed Morsi's rule. It regarded the close political relationship between the Brotherhood and the Hamas government in Gaza as a threat to its interests (Jones & Milton-Edwards, 2013). Israel welcomed the ouster of Morsi and sided with Al-Sisi, who in turn launched a campaign against the Brotherhood, showed disdain for the government of Hamas in Gaza, and attempted to prevent the smuggling of supplies to the Palestinians through the Sinai region into Gaza (Rabinovich, 2014).

The United States also played a crucial role in shaping the outcomes of the Egyptian Revolution. Mubarak's government had a long history of close ties with the U.S. The political rise of the Brotherhood concerned the U.S., who had major political and philosophical disagreements with the Brotherhood for decades (Elgindy, 2012). Morsi attempted to keep close relations with the U.S. because he needed the financial support of the U.S. However, the U.S. was alarmed by the emergence of an Islamic conservative rule (Carafano & Phillips, 2014). It remained concerned about the Brotherhood's expanded power, as well as the economic and political changes taking place at the national, regional and international levels. U.S. officials

maintained their reliance on the Egyptian military during Morsi's rule to protect their interests (Aftandilian, 2013). The U.S. therefore did not oppose the Egyptian military when it committed several human rights violations against pro-Morsi protestors. The U.S. approved Al-Sisi when he came to power and continued its financial aid and support for the military (Helfont, 2015)

"It's hard to start a revolution. Even harder to continue it. And hardest of all to win it. But, it's only afterward, when we have won, that the true difficulties begin" (The Battle of Algiers, 1966). The Egyptian people were able to start their Revolution and depose their dictator President, Mubarak, in 2011, but they were unable to continue it or stand in the face of all the interconnected challenges. Overthrowing the first democratically elected president in Egypt, Mohammed Morsi, and replacing him with a member of the Mubarak regime proved the failure of the Egyptian Revolution and any attempt toward democratic rule. The Revolution did not bring about any major political or economic reforms or freedoms. Corruption levels did not improve after the Revolution: the contrary is actually true. Human rights continued to be violated. The Egyptian people were further suppressed and abused.

This thesis suggests that it was a complex set of factors contribute to the failure of the Revolution. Various political relationships, groups, and countries vied for power, economic interests, political stability, for foreign government gain and national security. With change came a period of chaos, instability, loss of power, and the rise of new parties whose power either weakened or posed a security threat to other powerful countries in the Middle East and the world. Egyptian Revolutionaries tried the taste of freedom and hoped for a democratic system, but their dreams were destroyed by another authoritarian era that currently has an unseen end.

The Egyptian Revolution taught us that the will of the people does not always prevail and that foreign aid often directly impacts opposing groups, enabling them to redirect the political

system away from the will of the people, giving them the power to control the people. The Egyptian Revolution was initially a motivating example for uprisings in other Arab countries, but its outcomes resulted in doubt, fear and frustration instead. It highlighted how powerful parties are willing to do anything to stay in charge.

Even if the Arab uprisings did not result in desired political or economic shifts, it revealed several facts about the true political situation in the region, and the principles of many anti-democratic regimes in the Middle East and the world. Toppling the heads of the Mubarak regime did not result in changing its rule due to the powerful forces supporting it on the national and international levels. The chance of change in the rule of Egypt and, indeed, many other Middle Eastern countries seems unlikely without the national, regional and international will and support.

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