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TERRORISM AND *RESSENTIMENT*: USING NIETZSCHE TO THINK ABOUT
INEQUALITY

by

Christy L. Lewis

A Thesis

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

Major: Sociology

The University of Memphis

August 2011

Abstract

Lewis, Christy Lynn. M.A. The University of Memphis. August/2011. "Terrorism and *Ressentiment*: Using Nietzsche to Think About Inequality." Major Professor: Larry R. Petersen.

This paper attempts to contribute to the sociological literature on terrorism by testing Friedrich Nietzsche's (1967) ideas about the relationship between inequality and terrorism. Nietzsche's work predicts that political and economic inequality are positively related to *ressentiment*, a hatred of the elites in society. *Ressentiment*, in turn, is positively related to political violence, one form of which is terrorism. Working from Nietzsche's writing and a body of literature that examines the connection between terrorism and regime type, it is also predicted that these relationships will be stronger in liberal democracies than any other regime type. Using country-level data, the findings reveal that none of the predicted relationships hold true for other regime types. However, liberal democracies do exhibit the expected positive relationship between economic inequality and *ressentiment*. Implications the findings have for Nietzsche's theory and possible explanations for unexpected findings are discussed.

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Introduction

This paper draws on Friedrich Nietzsche's ideas on the consequences of inequality and *ressentiment* to develop and test a theory of sources of terrorism. According to Nietzsche, inequality in social status and material resources leads to feelings of *ressentiment* among those who are disadvantaged by the status quo. *Ressentiment* is a hatred of and desire to punish the elite, which, if gone unchecked, can spark political violence. The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, it opens the door to empirically testing the validity of Nietzsche's work and approaching it from a sociological point of view. His writings have been largely ignored by the discipline. Some sociologists argue that Nietzsche is a potentially important social theorist that can and should be brought more prominently into the field (see Antonio 1995 for a discussion of sociologists who have argued that Nietzsche has something important to contribute to sociology as well as the ways he has influenced the discipline indirectly). Second, by examining a specific kind of political violence, terrorism, this paper seeks to add to the literature concerning the link, or lack there of, between different dimensions of inequality and terrorism.

Theory

In *The Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche (1967) outlines the process by which the structure of a society gives rise to *ressentiment*. He conceptualizes human nature as being innately power-seeking, and he calls this fundamental drive the will to power, the force behind all human action. J.P. Stern (1979) identifies the will to power as “a self or ‘a

center of power' that expands beyond its own boundaries, asserts itself over another and strives to appropriate it" (118).

Many European philosophers believed that the time before human beings created societies represented chaos and brutality, as all people were at the mercy of whoever was stronger than they were. The invention of society represented an escape from this state of barbarism. Thomas Hobbes (1651), for example, characterized pre-social humans as being chaotic, violent, and condemned to short and fearful lives due to an absence of any greater force that might keep the strong from fighting amongst themselves and preying on the weak. The only way to escape this state of permanent infighting was to build a society that was guided by the absolute authority of a single sovereign. Without such a sovereign, society would inevitably break down and the population would be thrust back into that pre-social state of turmoil. Since society was preferable to a lack of society, Hobbes decried any attempt to overthrow or any action that might undercut the authority of the sovereign ruler. John Stuart Mill (1806) held an evolutionary view of human social arrangements. Based on how complex a society was, it could be categorized as being higher or lower on a scale of human progress, and a society's placement on this scale was indicative of its overall moral state. European societies represented the current pinnacle of human progress. As such, they represented the highest state of rationality and morality. The people living in less advanced societies were closer to nature and less civilized. European observers believed that people from primitive societies possessed less intelligence and were less rational and moral. Their social customs were barbaric as a result of not having these traits.

In contrast, Nietzsche (1967) held that society was not an escape from domination by the strongest, but the product of domination and the inevitable outcome of a power-seeking human nature. Pre-social humans became social humans with the emergence of some people who exemplified the will to power. They had both the desire and ability to dominate others and could force them to bend to their will.

These founders of society, identified as the elites or aristocrats, sought to preserve their advantage by building a system that was most beneficial for themselves. They achieved this through both physical and ideological domination. These two aspects of dominance are deeply intertwined, as the ability to inflict violence on others buffered the claim to superior social status and high social position legitimized the use of force. For Nietzsche, society put constraints on people that ran contrary to their primal nature, and the only way human beings could be compatible with a social order, particularly that of the modern nation-state, was for their behavior to be remolded through continuous acts of violence from the elite. The elites gained power, wealth, and a claim to greater social status. Ironically, however, by building a society they imposed constraints upon themselves, although to a lesser degree than the commoners faced. Commoners were constrained by the legal, political, and economic systems that benefited elites, whereas the elites were constrained by the contact with other people who embodied the free exercise of the will to power. This created a balance of power among the elites of a society, where the desire to gain more power was present but thwarted by the presence of others with similar desires.

After imposing physical domination, the elites established ideological dominance. Nietzsche believed that the moral systems that upheld social order were not objective

entities but products of class position. In his conceptualization of society, there are only two classes: a relatively small and culturally distinct class that dominates other members of society while it holds the lion's share of power and resources and an oppressed class that constitutes the majority. The elites were in a position to determine what was good or bad, and they decided to cast their class as innately good. They labeled the traits that they believed they embodied and gave them the right to rule as virtues. In contrast, since commoners lacked these fundamental traits, the elite held them in contempt. Their power allowed them to impose their moral system on the whole of society.

Thus, cementing inequality in terms of power, resources, and social status accompanies the creation of society. However, the subjugated did not like being at the mercy of elite violence and relegated to a subordinate social rank. In response to the abuses of their oppressors, the commoners developed *ressentiment*, or a hatred, toward the elite.¹ According to Nietzsche, it was only after humans created a civilization that *ressentiment* could arise.

Once subjugated people bring it into being, *ressentiment* enables them to challenge the morality of the elites, and, by extension, the inequalities of society by creating an alternative system of moral evaluation. However, rather than representing a complete break with the prevailing morality, the new moral system is an inversion of the

¹ There are some noticeable similarities between Nietzsche's writings about the development of *ressentiment* and Karl Marx's theory of class conflict. Both philosophers theorize that political violence against the elite was a possible outcome when subordinated social groups begin to think that the dominant group is acting unjustly against them. For Marx (2008), class and class structure is an economic designation. Which class each person falls into and which class is dominant is based on what productive resources they control. Political and social power stem from economic power, and elites use power to further their control over society's economic resources. However, Nietzsche's conception of class is based around Max Weber's (2008) definition of power, which is "the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action" (114). The defining hallmark of the elite class was a skill for commanding power, and their political, social, and economic advantages ultimately stemmed from their knack for exercising it.

old. It redefines the virtues of elite morality as vices and the vices of the commoners as virtues. Nietzsche calls this the slave revolt of morality, as it arms the oppressed with ideological weapons that they can use against the elites. By labeling their oppressors as evil, the masses have tools to contest the elites' right to power and special privileges. Should the moral system of the lower classes overpower that of the elites and become dominant, it justifies the suppression and punishment of the elite.

Nietzsche is rather ambiguous about what form of punishment the lower classes seek to inflict on the elite. At one point, he says that *ressentiment* represents an “imaginary revenge,” as it allows those that lack power to strike back at their oppressors without taking real action (Nietzsche 1967: 36). He holds up the Christian idea of damnation as an example of this phenomenon, as it can allow people who have been mistreated to imagine that God will punish their tormentor for them. He also uses the rise in social prominence of Christianity during the end of the Roman Empire and the subsequent decline of the pagan moral philosophy of the Greeks and Romans as a major cultural force as an example of a successful slave revolt in morality. Since *ressentiment* is characterized in this instance as being passive, eschewing power on surface level, the punishment of the elite is relegated to the ideological realm². By vilifying the elite and their power seeking ways, the worst that people motivated by *ressentiment* could do to powerful individuals is shame them into complying with the morality of the lower

² Karl Marx had a similar view of religion and may have influenced Nietzsche's views. For Marx, human beings created religion in order to cope with the suffering they experienced. He believed that religion would cease to exist once suffering was relieved. However, religion could only offer solace rather than a solution to suffering as it also promoted the idea that people should accept the status quo rather than try to change it (Marx 2002). This implies that Marx felt that passivity stemmed from a sincere belief that the world was as it was because of some greater entity. Nietzsche, however, felt that in the modern world few people held a sincere belief in the god of Christianity (Antonio 1995). It is possible that *ressentiment* becomes an active force after this point, as people try to stand in for God since they can longer be certain that there is an entity that will mete out divine punishment.

classes. Elite advantage falls, not because of violent overthrow, but because it becomes incompatible with the dominant view of what constitutes a just society.

If one is to accept the Christianization of Rome as an example of successful social revolution spurred on by *ressentiment*, the facts of this historical event contradict the idea that early Christians were content to leave revenge to God. To consolidate power, early Church leaders used violence against rivals to political power both from outside and inside the Christian community. Rather than being passive, the early Christian Church was aggressive in establishing political and cultural dominance (Collins 1974; MacMullen 1997).

Other events and philosophies that Nietzsche identifies as examples of *ressentiment* also clearly conflict with the idea that the social change spurred by *ressentiment* is the result of bloodless revolution. He holds up the French revolution, the Protestant Reformation, socialism, anarchism, and anti-Semitism as modern manifestations of *ressentiment*. There was an anti-elite ideological component to these political movements, as each one represents a backlash against the dominance of some group, although in the case of anti-Semitism this is an imagined dominance. However, these movements were not merely ideological rebellions. Rather, the French Revolution and the Protestant Reformation were accompanied by political violence, as alternative ideas that stood in opposition to the status quo were used to justify physical rebellion against reigning elites. Public executions of the aristocracy during the French Revolution provides a well known example *ressentiment* leading to the violent overthrow of an elite group that had been perceived as the cause of suffering among the lower classes. It is more difficult to paint entire ideological movements as inherently violent since different

adherents may have vastly different ideas about what tactics of resistance are morally permissible, but the political philosophies that Nietzsche describes as rooted in *ressentiment* have been used in the past to justify episodes of violence.

Sheila Fitzpatrick (2001), in her work on the Russian Revolution, concurs with the idea that violence is an outcome of *ressentiment*, as it must always precede revolutions. In discussing *ressentiment* as a social phenomenon, she states that during a revolution, the perception of who is an elite may shift over time, as when revolutionary leaders fill the social void left over from the defeat of the previous elite. Also, the elite may not be one group that dominates the whole of society. Rather the elite may consist of several distinct groups whose power only extends over a limited sphere of social life. Therefore, once a grievance has been avenged against one elite group, attention may shift to a different elite and the perceived injustice that they are responsible for.

However, revolutions are fairly uncommon in human history, indicating that, while *ressentiment* may be a pre-condition for anti-elite violence, it may not immediately express itself as overt rebellion. James Scott (1985) suggests that violent rebellion may be a last ditch attempt to fend off exploitation when all other subtle methods have failed. Subordinate groups, rather than being passive in the face of exploitation, often express resistance to the elite in covert ways that do not directly challenge the social system. For example, carrying out elite dictates sloppily can be a invisible form of resistance as the saboteur has plausible deniability in that he or she can be thought of as incompetent rather than acting out of malice. Refusal to give elites proper respect, often expressed as social snubs that can be attributed to lower class crudeness and stories about elite immorality traded between members of the subordinate group, constitutes another form

of resistance. This type of resistance is particularly interesting to Scott because stories about evil elites, especially if multiple people speak disparagingly about their treatment at the hands of the same elite, can transform individual grievances into collective grievances, as members of the oppressed class begin to realize a common source of troubles. Stories about particularly infamous oppressors achieve a myth-like status and are retold across several generations, transforming the subject of the tale into a symbol that represents the community's grievances against their oppressive conditions.

Creating a special conceptual category for terrorism as a specific kind of political violence implies that it differs from revolutions and other kinds of rebellion in some way. The line between terrorism and revolt can be quite thin at times as terrorism can also be used as one tactic of many during revolts against those in power. However, since terrorism can exist independent of a larger rebellion, there is a possibility that terrorism springs from different sources and is committed with different motivations than other types of political violence. In the following section, I argue that terrorism is no different from other kinds of political violence as it exhibits the characteristics of *ressentiment*.

The Link Between *Ressentiment* and Terrorism

It would seem that all political violence directed at the powerful of society by the weak would be animated by *ressentiment* from Nietzsche's point of view. An inherent difficulty in singling out terrorism as a distinct form of political violence is creating an objective definition of the concept, a task which has proved elusive. Typically, definitions emphasize the use of violence to either force or hinder some kind of political change through fear and intimidation. However, Audrey Kurth Cronin (2003) points out that "terrorism is intended to be a matter of perception and is thus seen differently by

different observers” (32). Whether or not one is classed as a terrorist or a righteous freedom fighter is often subjective. It is a matter of where one stands in the social system or the success of the terrorist, as those that act on behalf of a political movement that gains state power can have history re-written to cast them in a positive light.

As many definitions give terrorism a non-state character, meaning it is carried out by actors that are not officially connected to a legitimately recognized state, it could be argued that terrorism is naturally the tool of the weak or disadvantaged. The most powerful in society have access to the power of the state and could use that coercive power to force their will. The targets of a terrorist attack tend to be secondary to conveying the terrorist’s disapproval towards state policy. As states are ultimately the arbitrator of all policy decisions, terrorism is therefore a tactic that people from a less powerful position in society use against the political elite.

Cronin (2003) also claims that “terrorism is about justice, or at least someone’s perception of it, whether man-made or divine” (33). This suggests that terrorists perceive themselves as the morally righteous party acting against an immoral party. They may think they are ultimately innocent of wrong-doing or that the “collateral” damage from their actions is justified in the name of a higher purpose, be it religious or secular. If they don’t perceive themselves as the victim of wrong-doing, they may believe that they are acting on behalf of a third-party that is being victimized and cannot fight back.

Thus *ressentiment* is a potential source of terrorism. It provides society’s weak with the motivation and justification to lash out violently at the elite. It also stands firmly in opposition to some aspect, ranging from a single policy to the very structure of society itself, of the status quo and seeks to ultimately subvert the dominant view of society,

recasting actions and policies held to be legitimate under the status quo as illegitimate. Finally, people motivated by *ressentiment* gain a basis for moral authority from the belief that the powerful have injured them. These characteristics, opposition to dominant power, hatred of the elite, assertion of righteousness against an evil oppressor, and belief in one's status as a victim, are all aspects of *ressentiment* as Nietzsche described.

Nietzsche's argument is relevant for explaining domestic and transnational terrorism, where at least one participant in planning or carrying out the act is not a member of the targeted society. Domestic terrorism is spurred on by *ressentiment* directed against the perceived injustices carried out by local and national elites. However, the world is increasingly interconnected and interdependent through economic and political ties between nations. International organizations are attempting to lay the foundation for institutions that provide global governance. As such, the interests and influence of the political and economic elite are not confined to one country and may even be global in reach.

Thus the elite that terrorists rebel against may not be their local or national leaders, as is the case with domestic terrorists, but a foreign elite that has influence over the political and economic situation in their country. Transnational terrorists may be motivated by inequality in two ways. First, people may connect the political and economic inequality that exists in their society as serving the interests of foreign elites who collude with or control their national elite. Second, people may be radicalized if they believe that their home country is being subordinated politically or economically because of the manipulations of a foreign power, meaning their country's status is unequal relative to others. Once they have designated a foreign elite as the source of their grievances, they

can develop *ressentiment* towards this group. It is possible that they can feel stronger *ressentiment* toward the foreign elite rather than their national elite if they believe that outside forces are more morally culpable for their current situation than domestic elites.

Nietzsche's Views on Egalitarianism

Although Nietzsche deconstructs the notion of civilization and culture to reveal their brutal underpinnings, as he argues that complex social organizations and social customs are used as tools of oppression, he is not a radical egalitarian. Rather he decried such attempts to erase inequalities between groups of people as signs of cultural stagnation, as they would impose widespread conformity that suppresses individuality and ultimately destroys the differences necessary for creativity and cultural progression (Antonio 1995). However, he primarily associates creativity with the elites of society. They are the ones who are better able to exercise their will to power, as they built a system that is most favorable to realizing their desires.

Nietzsche associates exercise of the will to power with vitality and health, the characteristics of pre-social humans that he finds most praise-worthy. People who can realize their will to power and societies that allow such people to flourish are the healthiest. In contrast, *ressentiment*, and the oppression that births it, has a corrosive effect on the human spirit. Society functions as a prison for some people, preventing them from following their impulses and desires, and Nietzsche associates being unable to exercise the will to power with ill health.

As such, Nietzsche believed that *ressentiment* rendered whole segments of society as irredeemably corrupt. Their feelings would leave them desiring revenge against elites and he wrote that such people would always “crave to be hangmen,” a description that

supports the idea that violence is an outgrowth of *ressentiment* (Nietzsche 1967: 123). By rejecting the moral system of the elites, based on self-glorification, those afflicted with *ressentiment* would eventually adopt a moral code based on asceticism and self-abnegation, the inverse of elite morality. Nietzsche feared that eventually this new moral code would create intense self-loathing and nihilism.

Taking steps to alleviate *ressentiment* were useless as inequality and domination were inescapable facts of life. In Nietzsche's inegalitarian view, it was basic human nature that the strongest would eventually separate themselves from and conquer those weaker than themselves. If *ressentiment* was an inevitability, the best solution was to attempt to manage it so that it was kept harmless and contained. To achieve these ends, Nietzsche identified the law and ascetic religion as being instrumental to stifling the expression of *ressentiment* and directing it away from the elite. Brutal domination created the problem of *ressentiment*, but, paradoxically, in Nietzsche's view, it is also the remedy that keeps *ressentiment* from destroying the social order.

Literature Review and Hypotheses

Within the last decade, along with rising governmental and public concerns about terrorism, empirical studies also have increased. Studies focused on possible sources of terrorism have implications for foreign policy and domestic security. Most focus on the effects of regime type, absolute poverty, relative economic inequality, and economic globalization. The following section provides an overview of the existing research on these topical areas.

Political Inequality, Regime Type, and Terrorism

Traditionally the social sciences have viewed economic inequality as a potential trigger of political violence. For Nietzsche, not only a lack of material resources, but also inequality in access and control of the political process can create *ressentiment*. By monopolizing political power, elites create systems that allow them to monopolize economic and social benefits. There are on-going academic discussions about the relationship between terrorism and regime-type. Although the researchers may not conceptualize it in terms of inequality, these studies are about political inequality because they hypothesize that democracies should experience less terrorism than authoritarian systems. Theoretically, democracy has the most political equality and should have less terrorism because all citizens have the right to participate in policy-making. In contrast, in authoritarian systems, decision-making power rests in the hands of a privileged few, and members of the elite circle have free reign to maintain an exclusive hold on power. Angered by ill-treatment and the vast power differential between the elites and everyone else, oppressed people may adopt terrorism to express grievances against the state because the closed political system leaves them no legitimate avenue to effect change in a peaceful manner.

However, several empirical studies suggest that democracy does not deter terrorism. Eubank and Weinberg (1994) found that terrorist groups were almost four times more likely to emerge in democratic countries than non-democratic countries. Democracies most at risk for the formation of terrorist groups were those who protected civil and political rights, contained large numbers of political parties, indicated high rates of both economic discrimination and economic growth, and demonstrated high numbers

of residents obtaining higher education. Several years later, the authors conducted a follow-up study using terrorist attacks instead of terrorist groups to test the relationship between terrorism and democracy (Eubank and Weinberg 1998). The new data reconfirmed the findings of the first study. Stable democracies experienced more terrorist attacks than any other type of government. Stated differently, the countries that scored highest on protecting civil and political rights reported the highest level of terrorist attacks, and absolutist governments, which scored the lowest on protecting political and civil rights, reported the fewest attacks. Paradoxically, these findings are almost the reverse of the relationship between regime type and civil war. Liberal democracies and repressive authoritarian states tend to be the most stable. States falling between those two extremes are most at risk for civil war (Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch 2001).

Quan Li (2005) built on this work by attempting to discern what aspects of democracy encourage and discourage terrorism. He found a negative effect for voter turnout. Higher rates of voter-turn out led to fewer attacks. Moreover, institutional constraints had a positive effect on terrorist attacks. Higher constraints against civil rights curtailment were associated with an increase in terrorist attacks. Having a higher GDP per capita also had a negative effect on terrorism, while having a history of terrorist activities had a positive effect on terrorism, as terrorist groups, once established, continued operating within their home countries.

What explains this link between democracy and terrorism? There are several explanations for these findings. Quan Li (2005) relates the higher number of terrorist attacks on democratic nations to freedom of the press. When governments cannot easily suppress information, news organizations are able to call attention to terrorist incidents.

Therefore, democracies become targets of terrorism because the press can disseminate the terrorists' message to a large audience. This may also have the secondary effect of skewing the data to make it look like democracies experience more terrorism when non-democratic systems may merely be better at suppressing information about attacks within their borders. Eubank and Weinberg (1994) suggest that democratic freedoms make it easier for terrorists to operate within and attack democratic countries since the restraints that prevent the government from curtailing civil liberties also make it more difficult to detect terrorist activity. These explanations stress that the institutional features of democratic systems provide the motivation for terrorists to attack them rather than suggesting that there is something radicalizing about democratic politics.

However, the relationship between political systems and terrorism could be parsed out more finely. These studies neglect the role that political inequality within democracies might play a role in encouraging terrorism. Nietzsche (1967) implied that *ressentiment* was inherent to a democratic political system when he called democracy "the modern *misarchism*," or hatred of being governed (78). He also felt that liberal democratic ideals could never be satisfactorily realized in practice. The disparity between democracy's promise and its reality could be intolerable for some. They would reject living under an imperfect system and try to destroy it to remake society so it could be compatible with their ideals (Diken 2009). People in democracies reject the very idea that there should be a group endowed with greater privileges and seeks to guard against anyone who would attempt to exert their will to power and claim greater status. Political theorist Judith Shklar (1989) argues that the basis of liberalism, the political philosophy intimately tied with modern democracy, is fear of having pain, suffering, and cruelty

inflicted on one's person by a more powerful entity. For this reason, the ability of the state as well as powerful social and economic actors, must be checked in order for people to live free from terror and abuse. Nietzsche sees a ruling class, differentiated from the rest of the population by special status, as integral to a social system. In theory, democratic states are not supposed to make distinction between citizens. No citizen has more or fewer rights than any other citizen. However, state policies and the general public in democracies often do differentiate between citizens and non-citizens, as non-citizens are not seen as being entitled to the same rights as citizens of a country.

The full set of political rights is typically reserved for citizens of a country. Not everyone who lives inside a country is a citizen, and all democracies do not have the same naturalization systems. Some have higher barriers to gaining citizenship, and therefore to obtaining full political rights, than others. Not being of a particular ethnic group can disqualify a person from citizenship in some countries. For example, Germany only granted citizenship to ethnic Germans for many years. High barriers to citizenship create permanent immigrant communities barred from becoming full members of the national political community. The political inequality between citizens and non-citizens puts non-citizens at the margins of the political system, unable to air grievances through legitimate political channels. They may feel particularly vulnerable if their presence is defined as a problem by citizens of the country. Non-citizens are at the mercy of others who may petition their government to enact policies harmful to them, which can turn political exclusion into economic and social exclusion. Under hostile circumstances and with no other avenues open to them, this political inequality within democracies may cause the marginalized to turn to terrorism. Exposure to democratic ideals can prove

radicalizing as it creates a philosophical and moral justification for terrorism against the state when the government fails to be inclusive.

In the last several decades in liberal democratic countries, the prevailing view on the political rights of citizens has come to include the notion that rights should not be abridged based on immutable characteristics such as race, ethnicity, or gender. The belief that citizens that do not belong to culturally privileged groups should be given fewer political rights than those that do has largely gone out of style in mature democracies. However, many democracies curtail political rights for criminals, effectively conferring an abridged form of citizenship. Many people think that breaking the laws of society is both voluntary and the need for punishment justifies revoking certain rights. Depending on the nature and seriousness of the crime, voting rights may be forfeited. The length of time that political rights are abridged varies, from the amount of time required to serve out a prison sentence to life.

People in democracies have adopted an ideology that repudiates the idea of a ruling class residing over a ruled class. Components of that ideology, such as the universality of political and civil rights, may be perceived by those excluded from the political system as giving them a legitimate claim to political participation and supporting their inclusion into political life. Marginalized people in democratic states may be more vulnerable to the radicalizing effects of political inequality than their counter-parts in non-democracies because the messages that the marginalized receive in authoritarian states reinforce unequal political privileges. This may be done through active measures, via propaganda or state repression, that encourage people to keep to their place by not asking for greater political rights or it may be done more subtly by making the political

process invisible from the public. If the process is completely cut off from public scrutiny, it may not even occur to people that they could have a voice in politics or even imagine how their lives could be different if those privileges were not monopolized by an elite few.

More simply stated the democratic ideology portrays exclusion from national political life as an injustice. It is from this injury that *ressentiment* develops, pushing frustrated people to adopt militant ideologies that promise the political liberation that the democratic state has failed to give them. However, at the same time, they can also use the civil liberties that democracies grant them to tap into or create national and international networks that support terrorist activities (Wiest 2007). In authoritarian states, exclusion is a fact of life for most people. However, this is not to imply that no person chafes under the restricted political rights of authoritarian regimes, but the empirical literature seems to support the idea that authoritarianism is better at keeping a lid on *ressentiment* through repression.

Depending on the laws of the nation, some countries will have higher degrees of political inequality than others. This will be true even among democratic countries. Therefore, it is not enough to talk about political inequality in terms of regime type, as such broad categorizations can only reveal that inequality exists between different types of systems. A better way to study political inequality would be to have a standardized measure that can quantify how much inequality exists for each country, regardless of regime type. Based on Nietzsche's theoretical ideas and on the empirical research discussed above one would expect political inequality to have a stronger effect on

ressentiment in liberal democracies than in other regime types. Formally stated, the first two hypotheses are:

Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between political inequality and *ressentiment*.

Hypothesis 2: The positive relationship between political inequality and *ressentiment* is stronger in liberal democracies than in other regime types.

As will be discussed in greater detail in the methods section, I operationalize political inequality as the percentage of the population excluded from voting, and I operationalize *ressentiment* as the degree that people in a society perceived the elites as corrupt. Therefore, the percentage of the national population denied voting rights is positively related to perceptions of elite corruption.

Terrorism and Absolute Poverty

On the economic side of the terrorism debate, one line of reasoning in the literature argues that terrorism is caused by the extreme inequality related to widespread poverty. Poverty creates fertile ground for terrorist groups to spring from through desperation. The poor are more willing to take drastic measures against those in power because they feel like they have nothing left to lose. Essentially, the benefits that they could receive if they successfully forced governments to shift their policies would be greater than the loss they may incur for participating in terrorist actions. It is also assumed that poverty and its consequences, such as diminished chances for education and marginalization in political life, leave the poor especially vulnerable to the influence of radical ideologies.

Empirical tests, however, cast doubt on the link between absolute poverty and terrorism. Alberto Abadie (2006), using country specific terrorism risk ratings, found that poor countries, measured by GDP per capita and scores on the Human Development and Gini indices, do not experience significantly higher risk levels than rich countries. Economic measures had no statistically significant effect on the risk for terrorist incidents. However, lack of political rights did exert a positive effect on terrorism risk ratings, but the effect was more pronounced among states that were fairly repressive rather than states that received the lowest possible score for protection of political rights. This suggests that states in the process of political liberalization or transitioning to democracy are at the greatest risk of terrorist attacks. People lack of enough rights to provoke them into rebellion against the state, but they have enough legal protection to make the state less effective at repressing terrorism.

Krueger and Maleckova (2003) also shed doubt on the idea that the poor are more likely to become terrorists than people economically better off. Their study consists of two separate parts. In the first, they try to gauge among what groups in society is support for terrorism the strongest and weakest. Using public opinion data from the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, they found a positive relationship between education and support for armed attacks against Israel and the a negative relationship between education and support for dialogue with Israel. When the data were broken down along occupation types, support for attacks against Israel was strongest among students, and weakest among the unemployed, a group that is in an economically precarious position. Supporting terrorism is quite different from participating in it, but the researchers seem to suggest that sympathizers constitute a potential pool of recruits. In

the second part of the study, they try to determine the socio-economic background of people who take part in terrorist activities. Available autobiographical data about deceased Lebanese Hezbollah fighters and Palestinian suicide bombers indicated that terrorists backgrounds typically included a high level of education and socio-economic status. Consequently, the poor are underrepresented in terrorist organizations. From these findings, they argue that economic development as an anti-terrorist strategy is of limited utility as terrorists are not overwhelmingly recruited from a society's poorest members. However, by the authors' own admission, it is possible that the data are not reflective of a terrorist organization's entire membership, and, if it is representative, these results may not be generalizable to terrorist groups motivated by different ideologies or located in countries outside the Middle East.

Several scholars have offered explanations for why terrorist recruits do not come from the very poor. Bueno de Mesquita (2005) claims that this tendency is explained by supply and demand. He theorizes that the supply for potential terrorists outstrips terrorist organizations' demand for recruits. A more highly educated terrorist sympathizer, with all the advantages that a higher class background provides, has more utility to a terrorist group than a poorly educated sympathizer from an impoverished background. Thus the organization is more likely to accept the one who is judged more beneficial. In other words, terrorist organizations put a higher premium on the quality of recruits than the quantity of recruits, so the poor are more likely to be weeded out in favor of people from more privileged backgrounds. Michael Mousseau (2003) claims that the social elites have greater motivation for turning to terrorism. He believes that terrorism is ultimately rooted in the pressures that modernization exerts on traditional society. The modernization

process seeks to displace clientalist networks with a market based economic system. Since those with higher social position tended to have the terms of exchange tilted in their favor in clientalist networks, they have more to lose than the poor when outside forces threaten to break those networks down. For this reason, the wealthier people in society are more likely to turn to terrorism since it is in their rational interest to attempt to halt the modernization process.

Some scholars would agree with Krueger and Maleckova's recommendation that economic development should not be used as an anti-terrorism strategy, but would disagree with the reasoning behind the conclusion. Rather, they would say that development serves as a catalyst rather than an antidote for violence and unrest. Jacqueline Best (2007) theorizes that the development model currently promoted by the Bretton Woods financial institutions stress a specific economic and political model that countries must adopt to receive development aid. The model is amenable to the needs of global capital and seeks to instill norms in government to favor free capital flows and economic rationalization. Failure to conform to these norms means that countries will be denied development assistance both from the Bretton Woods institutions themselves and private investors that rely on the Bretton Woods institutions' judgments about the economic and political soundness of a country. In doing so, the Bretton Woods institutions are "effectively deciding whose lives are worth living," as they have the power to decide who will be condemned to continued poverty and who will be lifted out of it (Best 2007: 102). Under conditions where the gatekeepers of development are perceived as self-interested and partial, development may prove radicalizing to excluded populations.

Relative Economic Inequality, Globalization, and Terrorism

Many other studies have tried to determine if relative economic inequality rather than poverty provokes terrorism. Edward N. Muller (1985) found a positive relationship between income inequality and the number of deaths resulting from political violence between 1958 to 1977. Perhaps due to the fact that it can be difficult to separate terrorism from other forms of violent rebellion, Muller lumps all forms of political violence together making it impossible to assess if income inequality effects distinct types of political violence differently. Terrorism can be used as a tactic that accompanies violent rebellion, but unless researchers can satisfactorily study terrorism in isolation from other kinds of political violence, they can not account for terrorist incidents that are not tied to civil wars.

Some studies explore the effects of globalization on terrorism, assuming that the economic and cultural changes globalization brings are potential sources for increased terrorist activity. These studies tend to conceptualize globalization as a possible source of inequality, eroding the standard of living of some members of a society while making others quite well off. Globalization is also a force that can make people aware of how better or worse their conditions are compared with the rest of the world. Omar Lizardo (2006) found mixed results for the hypothesis that globalization, since it can increase inequality, is linked to increased transnational terrorism. He found that increased integration into global trade networks had a negative effect on terrorism. However, there was a positive relationship between terrorism and foreign direct investment, a measure of financial globalization. Lizardo also found a positive relationship between terrorism and cultural globalization. Cultural globalization allows non-governmental organizations to

spread a model of political action that emphasizes the idea that individuals can work together using rational plans of action to produce meaningful social changes in society. This led him to conclude that cultural globalization may empower people who are angry with the inequality caused by certain types of economic globalization to take action against those that they believe have wronged them. In contrast, Li and Schaub (2004) found that economic globalization in the forms of trade, direct foreign investment, and portfolio investment did not directly increase the incidents of terrorism within countries. They suggest that globalization may have an indirect negative effect on terrorism, as economic interconnectedness can promote economic growth and reduce poverty.

These studies measure economic globalization as trade and investment. As such, they do not satisfactorily test the link between terrorism and inequality because the authors assume globalization causes increased economic inequality. It seems that a study that directly tests the relationship between terrorism and economic inequality is badly needed.

Theoretically, relative economic inequality would be more in line with the creation of *ressentiment* than absolute poverty. Theories that associate terrorism with absolute poverty assume that only the very poor will rebel. However, the dynamics of *ressentiment* are such one need not occupy the lowest level of society to chafe under it. Rather, the idea that someone else has a higher position than one's self and is somehow responsible for one's subordinate position is the trigger that provokes hatred of them. Therefore, it remains possible for anyone who is not among the elite to engage in terrorism.

The idea that the effects of wealth inequality are more keenly felt in democratic systems and more likely to spark political violence has ancient roots. In Greek democracy, citizens were supposed to have an equal share of political power. Aristotle (2000) theorized that in democracies people may start to believe that political equality entitles them to equality in other areas. While democracies were more internally stable than other kinds of political systems, they were the most vulnerable to the effects of economic inequality. An increase in the number of very rich people may cause the non-wealthy to revolt against them, fearing that wealth inequality would start to erode political equality. For Aristotle, this fear was not completely groundless as he thought that wealthy families might revolt against the democratic state and set up an oligarchy, or rule by a group of elites, if they began to think that their greater share of wealth entitled them to a greater share of political power. In contrast, under non-democratic systems, there is no expectation of equality between societal members in any aspect of life.

In ancient Greece, citizenship was a rather restricted category, as it did not extend to women, foreigners, and current or former slaves, when compared to modern ideas about citizenship found in liberal democracies. However, expectations of political equality and equality before the law may cause liberal democracies to be vulnerable to *ressentiment* in the face of economic inequality. People may start to believe that institutions are biased in favor of people with more money, eroding their faith that the political system is impartial. They may believe that it serves the interests of the wealthiest citizens at the expense of the common good, essentially increasing the elites' share of wealth by diminishing everyone else's. Under these conditions, *ressentiment* grows when

people start to believe that the system favors the wealthy elites at their expense and the trappings of democracy are merely a sham to hide how the system really works.

In contrast, in other non-liberal regimes, the lack of notions of equality in the political sphere should make it more difficult to make a resonant philosophical argument for economic equality. However, this does not preclude that ideologies that link social and political advantages to economic advantages will not develop, causing *ressentiment* to rise against economic elites. These ideas suggest the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between economic inequality and *ressentiment*.

Hypothesis 4: The positive relationship between economic inequality and *ressentiment* is stronger in liberal democracies than in other regime types.

I operationalize economic inequality as income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient. Therefore, as the Gini coefficient increases, denoting rising economic inequality, perceptions of elite corruption will also increase.

In previous sections, I have discussed the link between *ressentiment*, political violence more broadly, and terrorism more specifically. The basic idea, as laid out by Nietzsche, is that political violence requires an ideological basis and moral justification before people will act against an oppressor. People must have a hatred of the elite stemming from injustices suffered at the hands of the powerful, and Nietzsche calls this state of mind *ressentiment*. It is assumed that the ideology of democratic states spreads expectations for equality. When these expectations are not met, people are more likely to perceive their unequal status as an injustice. This yields the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 5: The relationship between *ressentiment* and terrorism is positive.

Hypothesis 6: The positive relationship between *ressentiment* and terrorism is stronger in liberal democracies than in other regime types.

I operationalize terrorism as the number of terrorist incidents that take place within a nation's borders. Therefore, as the degree that elites are believed to be corrupt increases, terrorist incidents also will increase within the country.

Taken collectively, the hypotheses suggest that *ressentiment* is an intervening variable that mediates some portion of the influence of political and economic inequality on terrorism. As Nietzsche theorized, both types of inequality have a positive effect on *ressentiment*, which in turn has a positive effect on terrorism. Figure 1 shows the causal model implied by the hypotheses. The hypotheses also suggest that all of the effects shown in the figure are stronger in liberal democracies than in other regime types.




Figure 1
Theoretically Predicted Relationships

Methods

Sampling

The nation-state is the unit of analysis for this study, as the theory assumes that state policies generate inequality, creating *ressentiment*, and in turn triggering terrorism. There are only a limited number of states currently in existence, with the United States government acknowledging a total of 195 independent nations in the world (U.S. Department of State 2009). When dealing with cross-national data, missing data are often a problem. The sample consists of the nations which had available data for all five variables included in the study. Eighty-two countries are not included in the sample because of missing data for one or more variable.

Additionally, the data had two outliers in India and Pakistan. These countries had 520 and 552 terrorist attacks respectively, twice as many as the country with the third highest number of terrorist incidents. Compared to data from 2007, India's number of attacks more than tripled and Pakistan's number doubled in 2008. India and Pakistan share a tumultuous history, as they have been locked into territorial conflict for several decades. After fighting several wars over the disputed territory, without either side annexing it, both countries maintain an armed presence in the territory. Sometimes small skirmishes between military units break out along the border of the land that each side controls. Pakistan nurtured terrorist groups for the specific purpose of attacking Indian targets to whittle away at their opponent's will to keep the territory without a direct military conflict (Jones 2002). Before beginning the analysis, I decided to delete these countries from the sample, as these extreme values could be explained by conflict related

factors, variables that this model cannot account explain. Had the outliers not been attached to a conflict dyad, they would have been included in the final sample. The final sample consists of 111 countries, fifty-six are liberal democracies and fifty-five are some other regime type.

Measurement

The dependent variable, terrorism, is measured by the number of terrorist incidents that occur within a country's border during the year 2008. The data for the analysis come from the Global Terrorism Database or GTD, a dataset that collects extensive information about terrorist incidents from publicly available sources and encompasses the years between 1970 and 2008. Since defining terrorism is a highly contested debate, I use the GTD's definition of terrorism. For an incident to be included in the dataset, it must be an intentional act performed by a non-state actor that uses or threatens to use violence against property or human targets. It must also meet two of three criteria. The first criterion is that the act must be motivated by political, economic, religious, or social goals. The second is that it is intended to convey a message to an audience beyond the immediate victims of the attack. The third is that the action falls outside of what is defined as legitimate wartime conduct by international law (Global Terrorism Database 2009). The GDT includes both threats and attacks that were actually carried out. Threats of terrorism can be effective in terms of inspiring fear, disrupting the normal flow of daily life, and undermining confidence in the nation's leaders. Therefore, I will include both threats and successfully completed attacks as terrorist incidents.

This study identifies three independent variables. The first, regime type, refers to a state's system of government. For the purposes of this study, I sort the liberal

democracies into one category and all other government types, be they partial democracies or authoritarian, into another. Liberal democracies are those systems of government where selection for people to fill key government positions are decided through elections and the legal system codifies in law and enforces the protection of social, political, and economic freedoms from undue government interference. I determine if a country is a liberal democracy through data provided by Freedom House from 2009, which evaluates the previous year of 2008. To be classified as a liberal democracy, the country must have been acknowledged as an electoral democracy, the data for which runs from 1989 to 2009. However, according to Freedom House's definition of an electoral democracy, not all countries that qualify as electoral democracies are liberal democracies. Electoral democracies must have a multiparty system, periodic elections free from corruption and fraud, voting rights for all adult citizens, with the exception of criminals, and parties must be allowed to express their political platforms openly and without censorship. While electoral democracies enjoy political freedoms, they can lag behind liberal democracies in terms of having expansive civil liberties (Freedom House 2009).

Therefore, to distinguish liberal democracies from electoral democracies, Freedom House must also have given the country the designation of “free” in their annual country reports. The results of these reports are available for the years 1972 to 2009. In the annual reports, Freedom House evaluates the country’s performance on two aspects: political rights and civil liberties. In each category, the country receives a score that ranges from one to seven, with one being most free and seven being least free. The political rights and civil liberties scores for the year are then averaged. Using Freedom

House's (2009) designations, countries with scores that range between one and two and a half are “free,” those with scores between three and five are “partly free,” and those with scores between five and a half and seven are “not free.” Those countries designated both electoral democracies and free are considered to be liberal democracies and are coded one. All others are coded zero.

The second independent variable, economic inequality, refers to the degree to which economic resources are unevenly distributed within a country. The Gini Index, which measures such income inequality by showing how evenly incomes are distributed across a population, is used to measure income inequality. Gini coefficients can range from zero to one or from zero to one hundred. The data for this project come from the CIA World Factbook, which uses the zero to one hundred scale. Zero represents perfect equality, with income evenly spread across all societal members, and one hundred represents perfect inequality, with all income in the possession of one person (Central Intelligence Agency). Gini coefficients are not calculated on a regular basis, and therefore, different countries have Gini coefficients based on data from different years. A total of 135 countries have Gini coefficients. Therefore, I have only included those Gini coefficients that have been calculated between the years 2000 and 2008, working under the assumption that most countries will not experience significant changes in wealth distribution within the span of a few years. On occasions when a country had two Gini coefficients calculated during this period, I included the most recent one.

The third independent variable is political inequality. Political inequality is the degree to which people are excluded from the political decision making process. To make a standardized measure that can be used to make comparisons between all countries,

regardless of regime type, I operationalize political inequality as the percentage of a nation's population that is not extended voting rights. This measure, the Exclusion Index, is a crude indicator of political inequality because it cannot account for, through lack of data, people who are barred from the political process through social pressure, intimidation, or tactics on behalf of those in power to make it difficult or impossible for undesirable groups to participate in elections even though they are legally guaranteed franchise. The Exclusion Index uses a scale that goes from zero to one hundred, with one hundred representing all people excluded from the political process and zero representing the inclusion of all people.

For authoritarian systems, the country automatically receives a score of 99.9, as it is assumed that only a small portion of the population has effective political decision-making power. To qualify as an authoritarian state, based on the data from Freedom House, the country must not be classified as an electoral democracy and have an overall status of "not free" in the year 2008. For mature democracies and democratizing countries, a country's score depends on the size of two groups: the immigrant population and the prison population. The immigrant population is included in the measure because it represents people who are living inside a country who may not be considered citizens and therefore cannot vote. The other group included in the measure is the prison population. Under Freedom House's definition of electoral democracy, the only adult citizens that the state can deny voting rights to are criminals. When a member of a society breaks the laws of society, as part of their punishment some benefits of societal membership may be revoked. Human rights evaluations usually report about the treatment of prisoners while they are incarcerated, but they rarely focus on the state of ex-

prisoners' political and civil rights after they have been released. This indicates that there is consensus among many human rights advocates that it is permissible for the state to exclude convicted criminals from the voting population and that the issue of former prisoners' political rights are not considered serious injustices in need of remedy.

Data concerning these populations come from two sources. The percent of the total population comprised of immigrants comes from *World Population Policies 2007*. This publication contains demographic information for each country, including what percentage of the population was made up by immigrants in the year 2005, the most recent year with available data (United Nations). Data on the prison population come from the eighth edition of the *World Prison Population List* (Walmsley 2009). This report gathers the number of people held in prisons in countries and territories around the world for the year 2008 or the next most recent year that the information is available. Population data are presented as total number of prisoners rather than as percentage of the population. Therefore, I have divided the prison population by the total country population, also given in the report, to come up with what percent of the population is currently incarcerated. To determine the countries final score on the Exclusion Index, the two percentages are added together.

The final variable is *ressentiment*, the intervening variable. *Ressentiment* is a hatred of the elite by the less powerful that stems from the perceived evil or unethical actions that powerful and prominent people have committed against them. Inequality triggers *ressentiment* because people may perceive elite advantages as being dependent on someone else's disadvantage. I operationalize *ressentiment* as the degree to which the government of a country is considered corrupt. Corruption within the public sector carries

with it the connotation that the elite are unethical, as they are using their position for personal gain at public expense, and therefore are untrustworthy. The sense that the political elite harm others for their own ill-gotten gain and that they act immorally in doing so are elements of *ressentiment*. To measure perceived corruption, I use the 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). Based on a scoring system that runs from zero to ten, with numbers closer to ten being the least corrupt and numbers closer to zero being the most corrupt, the CPI assigns 180 countries a yearly score based on data collected and then standardized from thirteen surveys that query experts about corruption among governments. The CPI and all the surveys that it uses in its evaluations share the same definition of corruption in that it is "misuse of public power for private benefits" (Lambsdorff 2008: 4). Seven of the surveys rely on the perceptions of knowledgeable outsiders, typically Westerners that are not residents of the countries that they evaluate. The other six surveys query citizens of the country under evaluation, typically prominent businesspeople. The CPI uses both the perspective of cultural insiders and outsiders because only using one group could be problematic. Together both kinds of surveys can make up for the short-comings of each type by itself. Residents of a particular country may be tempted to rate the government by local cultural standards rather than by the surveyors' definition of corruption. Non-citizens lack the intimate understanding of and familiarity with a society that living in it for many years provides. The CPI claims that the evaluations of each survey type have a high correlation with each other, meaning that outsider observers and citizens typically agree about corruption levels (Lambsdorff 2008).

Even though this measure is based on expert opinion, there are reasons to believe that the CPI is still a viable proxy for the perceptions of the general public. When researchers compared data from the 2008 CPI against the 2009 Global Corruption Barometer (GCB), an international survey that asks members of the general population about their perceptions of and experiences with corruption, they found a negative correlation between expert and public opinion. They also found that the CPI scores were negatively correlated with the number of people in each country that self-reported paying a bribe (Transparency International 2009). Given that high CPI scores indicate low levels of corruption, this means that when expert perception of corruption was high, public perception of corruption also tended to be high. Although the GCB is a much more direct measure of corruption perceptions, it draws respondents from a limited number of countries. Therefore, using the 2007 GCB, as the survey was not conducted in 2008, in place of the CPI would shrink the sample by more than half.

I subtract each country's 2008 CPI score from ten to reverse the scoring system so that an increase in the score represents an increase in perceived corruption. Under the reversed coding system, numbers closer to zero indicate a lack of corruption and numbers closer to ten represent high levels of corruption. I did this to harmonize the CPI with the others measures in this study.

Statistical Procedures

The first step in the analysis will be to run the descriptive statistics to determine the mean and standard deviation for each variable. These statistics along with the correlation matrices will be presented for the total sample, for liberal democracies, and for other regime types.

I will test the hypotheses using path analysis, a regression-based procedure used to determine the extent that the effects of independent variables on a dependent variable are direct as opposed to being mediated through one or more intervening variables (Munro 1997). Path analysis is appropriate because my hypotheses assume that the independent variables "cause" terrorism by working through an intervening variable, *ressentiment*.

As shown earlier in Figure 1, economic inequality and political inequality are predicted to have a direct positive effect on *ressentiment*. *Ressentiment*, in turn, is predicted to have a direct positive effect on terrorism. Therefore, economic inequality and political inequality are expected to have positive indirect effects on terrorism that are transmitted through *ressentiment*. It is possible, however, that any effect economic inequality and/or political inequality have on terrorism is direct (not transmitted through *ressentiment*) rather than indirect. Therefore, I will estimate the parameters of a "fully recursive" model that includes all possible paths, both direct and indirect, from the inequality variables to terrorism. The fully recursive model is shown in Figure 2.

The parameters of this model, as measured by the standardized regression (path) coefficients and unstandardized regression coefficients, will be estimated twice: once for liberal democracies and once for other regime types. If hypotheses 1, 3, and 5 are correct, the path coefficients for liberal democracies and other regime types will be positive and statistically significant at the .05 level. If hypotheses 2, 4, and 6 are correct, the path coefficients (as measured by unstandardized coefficients) should be more strongly positive for liberal democracies than for other regime types. Tests for interaction using

the entire sample will be conducted to determine if effects are significantly stronger in liberal democracies than in other regime types.




Figure 2
A Fully Recursive Model of Sources of Terrorism

Findings

Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations

Table 1 displays the means and standard deviations of each variable used in the analysis. Since the hypotheses predict that the findings for liberal democracies differ from those for other regime types, the table is divided to present descriptive statistics for the total sample, liberal democracies only, and other regime types only. For each variable, the means are larger among the other regime types than the liberal democracies, indicating that on average other regime types have higher levels of political and economic inequality, *ressentiment*, and terrorism. Mean differences in political inequality

are especially large (36.011 for other regime types and 8.323 for the liberal democracies) as are the mean differences in *ressentiment* (7.091 versus 4.200). However, since liberal democracies by definition must trend towards political equality, these results are not unexpected.

Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations for all Variables (Total Sample=111, Liberal Democracies=56, and Other Regime Types=55)

Sample	Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Maximum	Minimum
Total Sample	Political Inequality	21.996	35.372	99.9	.2
	Economic Inequality	39.477	9.741	70.7	23.0
	Regime Type	.500	.502	1.0	0.0
	<i>Ressentiment</i>	5.632	2.212	8.6	.7
	Terrorism	14.380	40.279	249.0	0.0
Liberal Democracies	Political Inequality	8.232	8.465	39.9	.2
	Economic Inequality	36.663	10.561	70.7	23.0
	<i>Ressentiment</i>	4.200	2.041	7.5	.7
	Terrorism	7.200	20.264	131.0	0.0
	Other Regime Types	Political Inequality	36.011	45.599	99.9
Economic Inequality		42.344	7.943	59.2	26.7
<i>Ressentiment</i>		7.091	1.196	8.6	.8
Terrorism		21.690	52.713	249.0	0.0

As a first step in the analyses, correlation matrices were run for the total sample, liberal democracies, and other regime types. These correlations do not take statistical controls or the role the intervening variable, *ressentiment*, plays in mediating the effects of the exogenous variables on terrorism into account. Thus the correlation coefficients are

of limited value in testing the hypotheses and are mainly presented for descriptive interest. It is worth noting that in the table that displays the matrix for the total sample (Table 2) the relationship between political inequality and *ressentiment* is positive as is the relationship between economic inequality and *ressentiment*. Both relationships are moderately strong, significant at the .001 and .01 levels respectively. This is consistent with hypotheses 1 and 3. However, the correlations do not support hypothesis 5 which states that the relationship between *ressentiment* and terrorism is positive. While the relationship is in the predicted direction, it is not statistically significant. The strongest correlation in the table is between regime type and *ressentiment*. The relationship is quite strong and negative (-.656), indicating that liberal democracies have much lower levels of *ressentiment* than do other regime types. Referring back to Table 1, the mean level of *ressentiment* is 4.200 in liberal democracies and 7.091 in other regimes. This is a difference of almost three scale points on a measure that ranges from zero to ten.

Table 2
Pearson Correlation Coefficients for all Variables (Total Sample, N=111)

	Economic Inequality	Political Inequality	Regime Type	<i>Ressentiment</i>
Political Inequality	-.068			
Regime Type	-.293**	-.394***		
<i>Ressentiment</i>	.382***	.271**	-.656***	
Terrorism	.153	-.035	-.181†	.108

† $p \leq 0.10$, * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

The correlations between the variables change substantially when the sample is divided by regime type. Table 3 displays the correlation matrices for liberal democracies

below the diagonal and other regime types above the diagonal. Consistent with hypothesis 3, among liberal democracies there is a positive and highly significant relationship between economic inequality and *ressentiment*. However, the correlation between political inequality and *ressentiment* is highly significant, moderately strong, and, contrary to hypothesis 1, negative. Moreover, the relationship between *ressentiment* and terrorism fails to reach significance at the .05 level. Among other regimes, the correlations fail to support hypotheses 1, 3, and 5. Neither political inequality nor economic inequality has a significant positive relationship with *ressentiment* (hypotheses 1 and 3) nor does *ressentiment* have a significant positive relationship with terrorism (hypothesis 5). Although unpredicted by the hypotheses, in liberal democracies there is a positive and highly significant correlation between political inequality and terrorism.

Table 3
Pearson Correlation Coefficients for all Variables (Liberal Democracies, N=56, and Other Regime Types, N=55) (Liberal Democracies are Below the Diagonal)

	Economic Inequality	Political Inequality	<i>Ressentiment</i>	Terrorism
Economic Inequality				
Political Inequality	-.295*			
<i>Ressentiment</i>	.447***	-.474***		
Terrorism	.012	.490***	-.061	

† $p \leq 0.10$, * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

Path Analysis Results

As noted above, the bivariate correlations are of limited use in determining if the hypotheses are supported. They do not control for other variables included in the models nor do they assess the role *ressentiment* plays in mediating the effects of the exogenous variables on terrorism¹. The path analyses accomplish both of these goals. Hypotheses 1, 3, and 5 predict that the effects of political and economic inequality on *ressentiment* are positive and that the effect of *ressentiment* on terrorism is positive.

To test these hypotheses, the parameters of the path model shown in Figure 1 are estimated separately for liberal democracies and other regime types. The results for liberal democracies are displayed in Table 4 where the total effects are decomposed into their direct and indirect effects. In instances where no variable intervenes between an independent and dependent variables, a total effect equals a direct effect.²

Table 4 shows the decomposition of effects for liberal democracies. Political inequality exerts a rather strong *negative* effect on *ressentiment*, which directly contradicts hypothesis 1. However, the relationship between economic inequality and *ressentiment* is positive, as predicted by hypothesis 3. Both of these relationships are significant at the .01 level and collectively explain 32.8 percent of the variation in *ressentiment*. The relationship between *ressentiment* and terrorism is positive, as predicted by hypothesis 5, but it is not significant even at the .10 level. Therefore,

¹ During this stage of the analysis, a multicollinearity diagnostic was performed. All variables were well within the normal limits, indicating that multicollinearity was not a problem for the data.

² For interested readers, the results of the path analysis conducted for the total sample are presented in Appendix A. Those results are not particularly informative because results are expected to differ based on regime type. Furthermore, in the total sample model, the lack of statistical significance for certain variables in one of the models tends to conceal significant relationships found in the other.

Table 4
Decomposition of Standardized Regression Effects in a Model of Terrorism (Liberal Democracies, N=56)

Predetermined Variable	Independent Variable	Total Effects	Indirect Effects	Direct Effects
<i>Ressentiment</i>	Political Inequality	-.375**		-.375**
	Economic Inequality	.336**		.336**
	R ²			.328
	Terrorism			
	Political Inequality	.540***	-.067	.607***
	Economic Inequality	.171	.060	.111
	<i>Ressentiment</i>	.177		.177
	R ²			.288

† $p \leq 0.10$, * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

ressentiment plays a very limited role in mediating the effects of exogenous variables on terrorism. Both political inequality and economic inequality have much smaller indirect than direct effects.

While political inequality suppresses *ressentiment*, it also exerts a strong positive direct effect on terrorism (path coefficient = .607: $p < .001$), which was not predicted by the theory. The model explains 28.8 percent of the variation in terrorism which is largely attributable to the direct effect of political inequality. The direct effect of economic inequality on terrorism fails to reach significance. Figure 3 presents the path model with all the standardized direct effect coefficients shown.

The model for the other regime types (Table 5) fails to support hypotheses 1, 3, and 5. Neither political inequality nor economic inequality has a significant positive effect on *ressentiment* which, in turn, does not have a significant positive effect on terrorism. Therefore, political and economic inequality have indirect effects on terrorism




Figure 3
Path Coefficients for Liberal Democracies (Unstandardized Coefficients are in Parentheses)

that are essentially zero. The model only explains 4.7 percent of the variance in *ressentiment* and only 5.1 percent of the variance in terrorism. Even though none of the variables has significant effects, Figure 4 displays the path coefficients for each direct effect.


Table 5
Decomposition of Standardized Regression Effects in a Model of Terrorism (Other Regime Types, N=55)

Predetermined Variable	Independent Variable	Total Effects	Indirect Effects	Direct Effects
<i>Ressentiment</i>	Political Inequality	.157		.157
	Economic Inequality	-.113		-.113
	R ²			.047
Terrorism	Political Inequality	-.122	.010	-.132
	Economic Inequality	.150	-.007	.157
	<i>Ressentiment</i>	.060		.060
	R ²			.051

† $p \leq 0.10$, * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

So far the focus has been on testing hypotheses 1, 3, and 5, which are concerned with whether or not the direct effects of the exogenous variables on *ressentiment* are positive and with whether or not the direct effect of *ressentiment* on terrorism is positive. Only hypothesis 3 (economic inequality has a positive effect on *ressentiment*) received support and that support was limited to liberal democracies.

Hypotheses 2, 4, and 6 predict that the expected positive effects are stronger among liberal democracies than among other regime types. Even though only one



† $p \leq 0.10$, * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

Figure 4
Path Coefficients for Other Regime Types (Unstandardized Coefficients are in Parentheses)

predicted positive effect received support, the path model for liberal democracies proved to be a much better predictor of *ressentiment* and terrorism (as evidenced by the explained variance) than did the model for the other regime types. This suggests that effects are generally stronger in liberal democracies.

Therefore, it was decided to test for across-model (liberal democracies versus other regime types) interaction effects for all variables included in the analyses by re-running the regression for the total sample and including the appropriate interaction terms. These analyses make it possible to calculate unstandardized slopes for liberal democracies and other regime types and to determine if the differences in these slopes are statistically significant. The results of the regression runs necessary to calculate these slopes are presented in Tables 6 and 7. In Table 6 *ressentiment* is regressed on the

Table 6
Regression Results for *Ressentiment* that Include Interaction Terms in Model 2
(Total Sample, N=111)

Independent Variable	Model 1	Model 2
Regime Type	-2.500***	-5.102***
Political Inequality	.004**	.004
Economic Inequality	.050	-.017
Political Inequality x Regime Type		-.095***
Economic Inequality x Regime Type		.082*
Constant	4.838	7.663
R²	.473	.577

† $p \leq 0.10$, * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

independent variables in model 1 and on the independent variables plus two interaction terms (one for political-inequality-x-regime-type interaction and one for income-inequality-x-regime-type interaction) in model 2.

Model 1 explains 47.3 percent of the variance in *ressentiment*, with regime type and economic inequality having significant effects. However, when the interaction terms are added (model 2), explained variance increases to 57.7 percent, meaning that taking the interaction effects into account explains an additional 10.4 percent of the variation in *ressentiment*. The political-inequality-x-regime-type interaction is significant at the .001 level and the economic-inequality-x-regime-type interaction is significant at almost the .01 level ($p=.014$).

In other regime types, the unstandardized slope for the relationship between political inequality and *ressentiment* is essentially zero (.004), and the corresponding slope for liberal democracies is negative and strong (-.091)³. The difference in these slopes (-.095) is substantial, but the direction of the interaction effect (negative) is the opposite of what is implied by hypothesis 2. Political inequality was predicted to have a significantly stronger positive, not negative, effect on *ressentiment*. Hypothesis 4, which states that the relationship between economic inequality and *ressentiment* is stronger in liberal democracies than in other regime types, receives some support. In other regime types, the unstandardized slope for the relationship between economic inequality and *ressentiment* is -.017 and the corresponding slope for liberal democracies is .065.

³ Since "other regime types" is coded zero, the effect of .004 for political inequality in model 2 is the unstandardized coefficient estimating the effect of political inequality on *ressentiment* in other regime types. To obtain unstandardized coefficients estimating the effects of political inequality on *ressentiment* in liberal democracies one simply adds the regime-type-x-political-inequality coefficient (-.095) to the political inequality coefficient [$.004 + (-.095) = -.091$].

Although economic inequality does not have the hypothesized positive effect among other regime types, it has a weak negative effect that, as noted earlier, is not statistically significant. In contrast, the corresponding slope for liberal democracies is positive and moderately strong.

In Table 7 terrorism is the dependent variable. Model 1 includes all the independent variables and *ressentiment*. Model 2 includes all of the variables in the first model and adds interaction terms to assess political-, economic-, and *ressentiment*-by-regime-type interaction. Adding the interaction terms increases the explained variance ($R^2 = .054$ in model 1 and $.112$ in model 2). However, the findings do not support hypothesis 6, which predicts that the relationship between *ressentiment* and terrorism is more strongly positive among liberal democracies than other regime types. The *ressentiment*-by-regime-type interaction term is not significant, indicating that the relationships do not differ significantly from each other.

Only one of the three interaction terms is significant: regime type interacts with political inequality to influence terrorism. Among liberal democracies, the slope is 1.453 and, among other regime types the slope is $-.152$.

Table 7
Regression Results for Terrorism that Include Interaction Terms in Model 2 (Total Sample, N=111)

Independent Variable	Model 1	Model 2
Regime Type	-18.044	15.855
Political Inequality	-.119	-.152
Economic Inequality	.406	1.041
<i>Ressentiment</i>	-.885	2.667
Political Inequality x Regime Type		1.605*
Economic Inequality x Regime Type		-.828
<i>Ressentiment x Regime Type</i>		-.910
Constant	15.036	-35.825
R²	.054	.112

† $p \leq 0.10$, * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

Summary and Discussion

This paper brought evidence to bear on whether or not Nietzsche's ideas about *ressentiment* are helpful in understanding the relationship between inequality and terrorism. According to Nietzsche, inequality "causes" *ressentiment*, a hatred of the elite stemming from perceived wrong-doing, which, in turn, provides moral justification for violent action against the elite in the form of terrorism.

Hypotheses were tested which predict that political and economic inequality have positive effects on *ressentiment* and that *ressentiment* has a positive effect on terrorism. In addition, several hypotheses were tested which predict that these effects are stronger in liberal democracies than in other regime types. The stronger effects in liberal

democracies were expected because the ideology that supports liberal democracies creates expectations of equality and rejects the notion that some people are more deserving of power and privileges than others. As other regime types do not foster this idea and may in fact embrace inequality as an integral part of the social fabric, there is less of a basis for seeing inequality as a wrong-doing on behalf of the powerful. This does not mean *ressentiment* does not exist in other regime types, but rather that it will be less intense in those regimes.

Among other regime types, the inequality variables and *ressentiment* failed to have the hypothesized positive effects. As will be discussed in greater detail below, these findings may indicate that inequality is such an integral part of the social fabric in these regimes that it assumes a taken-for-granted reality that suppresses *ressentiment* to the point of being inconsequential. Nietzsche, who believed that the will to power was innate and not easily tamed by social norms, may have underestimated the degree to which being born into an established society and socialized to accept its customs and mores results in the politically and economically less fortunate accepting a subordinate position. Among liberal democracies, economic inequality had the hypothesized positive effect on *ressentiment*, and this effect, as hypothesized, was significantly stronger than the economic inequality effect for other regime types. This lends some credence to the idea that people who live in liberal democracies are more sensitized to issues of inequality than people who live under other regime types. However, none of the other hypotheses about liberal democracies were supported.

As only two of the six hypotheses were supported, the predictive utility of Nietzsche's theory is questionable. The positive relationship between economic inequality

and *ressentiment* in liberal democracies and the presence of a statistically significant interaction effect between economic inequality and regime type lend some credence to Nietzsche's proposed connection between liberal democracy and *ressentiment*. However, the fact that there was no relationship between *ressentiment* and terrorism in either model challenges the idea that *ressentiment* leads to anti-elite political violence. As the theorized relationship was not found, it is unclear and perhaps even unlikely that *ressentiment* poses a danger to the social order.

In addition to failing to support the hypotheses, the analyses yielded several other unexpected findings. First, in the liberal democracies, political inequality had a rather strong negative effect on *ressentiment* rather than the hypothesized positive effect. Moreover, this effect was significantly stronger in liberal democracies than in other regime types. Second, political inequality had a direct positive effect on terrorism that was substantial and unpredicted by the theory. While, in liberal democracies, political inequality had a negative relationship with *ressentiment*, economic inequality had the predicted positive relationship with *ressentiment*. These findings seem contradictory and warrant explanation.

The reason there is a negative relationship between political inequality and *ressentiment* in liberal democracies and no relationship between these two variables in other regime types may be due to socialization into a system's political norms. In authoritarian and democratizing countries, people may have no expectations of political representation in the government because they were not brought up in an environment that values those rights. Therefore, since it is taken for granted that the workings of the

government are removed from their lives, they do not feel aggrieved by not being able to participate in it.

By the same token, liberal democracies also socialize people to accept their political values. Since policies, in theory, ultimately are controlled by the will of the people, the public in liberal democracies may be much more willing to trust politicians and political elites than people in other regime types would. Mechanisms of exclusion may carry legitimacy in liberal democracies because of this public trust. If laws that exclude are to be accepted, they must carry some rationale that it is in the best interest of the state and the people as a whole. Some research into public opinion concludes that in liberal democracies, elite opinion has more effect on the beliefs of the general public than the public does on the positions of the elites (Zaller 1992; Jacobs and Shapiro 2000). Thus, the public may be more willing to accept that laws that favor exclusion as necessary if politicians argue that they are for the public good. People will believe these policy rationalizations because they generally trust the political elite to do the right thing for the nation.

If the norms in liberal democracies justify political inequality, that is not the case for economic inequality. Economic inequality may be positively related to *ressentiment* because, while people may be able to comfortably live without political equality, it is harder to accept bad economic outcomes, as this directly affects most people's quality of life. Since the political system promotes the idea that public policy should reflect the will of the people as a core value, people may feel aggrieved by growing economic inequality as the policies that uphold the economic system are not working in their favor. In essence, expectations of social and political equality may bleed over into the economic

sphere, giving citizens the sense that they should enjoy some decent standard of living if not total economic equality. Other regime types lack a political or social basis for equality, so the people that live in them may not feel that they deserve economic equality either.

According to Lipset (1981), even in democratic systems, people low in the status and economic hierarchy tend to exhibit greater anti-democratic and authoritarian tendencies than those who are from a higher class. Thus in times of economic precariousness and growing economic inequality, when the ranks of the lower classes start to swell, people may still retain faith in the system if some political faction tries to exclude others, who they brand as dangerous elements, from the political process. If politicians pick targets for exclusion that have pre-existing social prejudice directed against them, this may suppress *ressentiment*. The public may perceive appeals for exclusion as evidence of democratic responsiveness and the government looking out for their interests rather than as a threat to their collective freedom.

The direct positive effect of political inequality on terrorism in the liberal democracies also seems to contradict its negative effect on *ressentiment*. This study assumes that the terrorism that springs from *ressentiment* will be directed towards the nation that created it rather than that *ressentiment* will provoke violence against convenient targets. This means that it can only account for domestic terrorism. Although most terrorist attacks are likely home grown, the data did not allow for distinctions between domestic and transnational terrorism, as there is no master list of transnational terrorist organizations and many incidents in the GTD were carried out by unknown perpetrators. Therefore, this finding may reflect that liberal democracies with relatively

high levels of political inequality are the preferred targets of transnational terrorists. While excluded groups in liberal democracies accept their status, outsiders that are motivated by a cause may not. Therefore, transnational terrorists may integrate the plight of the excluded groups as part of their own grievances.

There may be other factors related to regime type that have a greater effect on terrorism than economic and political inequality. Ongoing civil conflict between ethnic and religious groups may cause an increase in terrorist activity. If governments cannot stop the fighting, more people may enter the conflict because of the perceived need for self-defense rather than whatever issues originally sparked the conflict. Groups may use terrorism as a tactic against their enemies. The research relating to civil conflict indicates that this more likely to affect democratizing countries than liberal democracies or authoritarian states (Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch 2001).

In most societies, prejudice exists that favors certain kinds of social traits such as race, gender, and religion. Over time these sentiments can relax, and the groups that benefited from possessing favored traits may no longer feel like they are getting the same benefits, be they tangible or intangible rewards. People with the favored traits may not receive any material benefits from having them, but may feel a disappearing sense of pride when the idea that they are the right kind of person is no longer as strongly reinforced. Declining social status may spur members of a formerly dominant group to engage in acts of terrorism. This is more likely to cause terrorism in liberal democracies than other regimes, because in other regime types the dominant group would have an easier time using the power of the state to uphold and officially sanction their dominant status. Thus, when people in liberal democracies do not feel like they are being paid the

appropriate social honor, they can engage in terrorism in an attempt to force the state to comply with their demands. Terrorism has the secondary effect of intimidating people so that they change their behavior in the ways that comply with the terrorists' goals. For example, fear of reprisal might compel people to maintain informal social exclusion of some groups, such as cutting off their access to well paying jobs, when they would otherwise have no interest in doing so.

The study has some important limitations. It is based on data from 2008, only a single year of terrorist activity. Before, drawing firm conclusions about the usefulness, or lack thereof, of Nietzsche's ideas, the analyses should be repeated using data from several years. It is also limited by its sample size. Using the nation-state as the unit of analysis and the difficulty of finding cross-national data for all countries in the world restricted the sample size. In the current study, two of the categories of regime type, partial democracies and authoritarian regimes, had to be collapsed to create a single category that was large enough to allow for data analyses. Clumping these two types of countries together may conceal important differences between them.

The Corruption Perceptions Index is a less than ideal measure of *ressentiment*. It relies on the opinions of outside observers and the business elite of each country to gauge the general consensus on how corrupt the government is. It does correlate well with other surveys that do measure public opinion, indicating that there is a fair amount of agreement between groups concerning a country's level of corruption. Nevertheless, a survey that polled the general population of the country would be a better measure, especially if it included questions that tried to discover if perceived corruption is associated with strong feelings of hostility towards the government. Perceptions of

corruption may not automatically translate into intense anti-elite sentiments as it may be possible for people to begrudgingly accept elite misdeeds as the way things are.

Despite these limitations, this study has added to the empirical literature concerning the ties between inequality, regime type, and terrorism. It is also novel in that it used a theorist, Nietzsche, that has been largely overlooked by sociologists as a theoretical guide and derived testable hypotheses from his writings. Future research should continue to explore the relationship between political inequality and terrorism in liberal democracies. In addition to trying to overcome the short-comings of this study, further refinement of the Exclusion Index may be necessary, so that it includes the people who are enfranchised by law but disenfranchised by practice. It would be ideal for future research to find some way to filter out or control for types of terrorism that the current model cannot easily account for, such as transnational and state-sponsored terrorism.

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Appendix A: Path Analysis Model of Total Sample

The table below shows the decomposition of effects for a model that uses the total sample. The effects of political inequality and economic inequality on *ressentiment* are positive, but only the effect of economic inequality is statistically significant. The direct effect of regime type on *ressentiment* is negative and significant at the .001 level. *Ressentiment* is much lower in liberal democracies. None of the variables has a statistically significant total or direct effect on terrorism.

Table 8
Decomposition of Standardized Regression Effects in a Model of Terrorism (Total Sample, N=111)

Predetermined Variable	Independent Variable	Total Effects	Indirect Effects	Direct Effects
<i>Ressentiment</i>	Political Inequality	.062		.062
	Economic Inequality	.220**		.220**
	Regime Type	-.568***		-.568***
	R ²			.473
Terrorism	Political Inequality	-.107	-.003	-.104
	Economic Inequality	.880	-.010	.098
	Regime Type	-.197†	.028	-.225†
	<i>Ressentiment</i>	-.049		-.049
	R ²			.054

† $p \leq 0.10$, * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

Figure 5 presents the standardized and unstandardized path coefficients for the total sample. It shows that there is a moderately strong (.220) positive relationship




Figure 5
Path Coefficients for Total Sample (Unstandardized Coefficients are in Parentheses)

between economic inequality and *ressentiment*, and a very strong (-.568) negative relationship between regime type and *ressentiment*. No other relationship between variables are statistically significant.

Appendix B: List of Countries Included in the Analysis

Albania	Costa Rica	Honduras
Armenia	Cote d'Ivoire	Hungary
Australia	Croatia	Iceland
Austria	Cyprus	Indonesia
Azerbaijan	Czech Republic	Iran
Bangladesh	Denmark	Ireland
Belarus	Dominican Republic	Israel
Belgium	Ecuador	Italy
Benin	Egypt	Jamaica
Bolivia	El Salvador	Japan
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Estonia	Jordan
Brazil	Ethiopia	Kazakhstan
Bulgaria	Finland	Kenya
Burkina Faso	France	Kyrgyzstan
Cambodia	Germany	Laos
Cameroon	Ghana	Latvia
Canada	Greece	Lithuania
Chile	Guatemala	Luxembourg
China	Guinea	Macedonia
Colombia	Haiti	Madagascar

Malawi	Russia	Uzbekistan
Malaysia	Rwanda	Vietnam
Mali	Senegal	Yemen
Malta	Singapore	Zambia
Mauritania	Slovakia	Zimbabwe
Mauritius	Slovenia	
Mexico	South Africa	
Moldova	South Korea	
Mongolia	Spain	
Morocco	Sri Lanka	
Mozambique	Swaziland	
Namibia	Sweden	
Nepal	Switzerland	
Netherlands	Tajikistan	
Nicaragua	Tanzania	
Nigeria	Thailand	
Norway	Tunisia	
Panama	Turkey	
Peru	Uganda	
Philippines	Ukraine	
Poland	United Kingdom	
Portugal	United States	
Romania	Uruguay	