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THE GLOBAL CITIZEN, GLOBAL TRUST, AND NATIONAL PRIVILEGE: A
STUDY OF INDIVIDUALIZED IDENTITY IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD

by

Hannah L. Pallotta

A Thesis

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ABSTRACT

This study examines how the ongoing globalization process has shaped people's citizenship identities and values toward the distribution of political and economic benefits at the national level. These research questions are asked: Are people actually becoming more globalized? Are they developing a sense of global trust toward one another? Moreover, how do these global outlooks vary across different groups of individuals based on some key demographic identifiers such as age, education level, and social class? Using wave 5 and wave 6 from the World Values Survey dataset, this study examines these research questions in the context of nine high-income countries. The findings from binary and ordinal logistic regressions and Chi-square analyses suggest that individual-level factors help produce variation in people's citizenship identities and global trust. In particular, it is found that an individual's social class and education level are statistically significant in predicting if individuals have more globalized views.

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INTRODUCTION

The idea of globalization has become so embedded in the world today that people rarely pause to think about what it is or how it has or has not shaped their views. Globalization is generally understood as “an increase in the volume of cross-border economic interactions and resource flows, producing a qualitative shift in the relations between national economies and between nation-states” (Kotz, 2002). Essentially, this means that with the newest wave of globalization—driven by neoliberalism and the digital revolution—the means of connection is easier now than possibly ever before in history; through the Internet, trade, and travel, people are able to explore other cultures, languages, foods, and more. With this interconnection, it seems, and globalization theories would also suggest that people are becoming more global, i.e., trusting others, viewing themselves in a globalized lens, etc. However, people seldom think to themselves, “Am I a globally minded person?” Yet, it seems to be a pertinent question, especially in a time that seems rife with nationalistic veering polities, climate uncertainties, and ever widening global inequality. These global scale crises should incline individuals to investigate their own views of the world and their views of others. But are there certain individualized factors that could bend people toward more globalized views?

This study looks at demographic identifiers to determine if individualized factors play a role in certain people being more globalized than others. Most theories of globalization look at the interrelationships between nation-states, international organizations and the business sector. They also look at the individual-level social changes but do so primarily from a political-economic perspective. Individual-level cultural values and how globalization interacts with them are understudied. These theories would predict that people across the board are more likely to have globalized views than before. But is this the case for all people? Does social class,

education level, or age help predict these behaviors and attitudes? Building on empirical analysis of global citizenship, global trust, and national privilege against demographic identifiers from data collected from the World Values Survey, this study suggests that there is variation in globalized views among different social classes, education levels and age groups. This study also suggests that globalization does not have a universal effect on all people as the world is flat theory or world society theory would suggest. Using two waves of data from years 2005 to 2009 and 2010 to 2014 show that, unlike what globalization theories seem to maintain, individuals are not necessarily holding more globalized views now than they previously were.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Globalization Theories: World Society Theory

John W. Meyer pioneered the theory of world society in the 1970s. World society theory explains, “that social action in modern societies is highly structured by institutionalized rules. These rules take the form of cultural theories, ideologies, and prescriptions about how society works or should work to attain collective purposes, especially the comprehensive and evolving goals of justice and progress” (Meyer, 2009). Meyer argues that the world, because of globalization, has become one large society. Rather than having multiple societies (i.e., multiple countries) that function on their own, the world now has one society that shares culture and structural rules. Intergovernmental organizations and international nongovernmental organizations are the main mechanisms in which the diffusion of culture takes place. It is possible for any country, organization, charity, advocacy group, etc. to be an agent of diffusion in the world society theory.

Pierotti uses Meyer in her work on global cultural diffusion explaining, “world society theory holds that the global arena is more than political and economic exchanges among

states... World society is a distinct social space constituted by interactions among transnational actors” (2013, 241). Pierotti shows in her work that intergovernmental organizations and advocacy groups are able to change the dialogue around intimate partner violence worldwide because of global cultural diffusion, which is founded in world society theory. These organizations and groups are able to diffuse their ideology based on the idea that the world is one society with a shared culture but with multiple sources of dispersion. Global trust, one of the dependent variables, stems from this theory. If it is true that the world has become one society with a shared culture, it could be assumed that people from all over the world would trust one another. It could also be assumed that over time this trust would grow. Similarly, the rejection of another dependent variable, national privilege, also comes from this theory. Immigrants should be welcomed into any country if this theory stands correct. While there are many countries, citizenship should mean very little in this view that the world is one society. National privilege should be something of the past in the world society theory.

Globalization Theories: World Systems Theory

Similar to the world society theory, the world system theory reviews the idea that the world has one society with a world culture. However, a key distinction between the two is that world system theory claims that there is a power struggle within this society. Immanuel Wallerstein developed this idea in the 1970s as well. Taking a conflict theory approach, the idea is that there are core countries, periphery countries, and even semi-periphery countries. In *The Capitalist World-Economy*, Wallerstein writes, “The core-periphery distinction, widely observed in recent writings, differentiates those zones in which are concentrated high-profit, high-technology, high-wage diversified production (the core countries) from those in which are concentrated low-profit, low technology, low-wage, less diversified production (the peripheral

countries)” (1979). Core countries are able to push their cultural values onto the periphery and semi-periphery countries. In this perspective, instead of each country being able to bring something to the table, like in the world society theory, the core countries tend to coerce the periphery and semi-periphery countries into producing what they desire. Just like in a capitalist society, there are winners and losers among countries. There are countries that are able to gain wealth and power through this system and “dominate cultural production” as Janssen, Kuiper, and Verboord found in their longitudinal study on arts and cultural coverage in world newspapers (2008). These countries influence the countries that are considered periphery. These countries are manipulated into producing what core countries need or want and participating in the world culture that the core countries have created.

Because of this theory, this study will be using only high-income, OECD countries, or as this theory would call them, core countries. The countries that have been chosen would be considered core countries in this theory because they are able to use their power and resources to coerce lower-income countries. These countries are the conventional ‘winners’ of globalization. Globalization has allowed them to gain capital and power, thus the individuals within these countries should be the most globalized individuals after feeling these affects of globalization in their own lives. It is possible in lower-income countries that individuals would not feel like global citizens or want to trust people from other countries because they feel used by other countries or they feel as though their way of life has changed.

Globalization Theories: The World is Flat Theory

In globalization literature, most researchers would agree that globalization refers to the rise of neoliberalism in the last half-century and the economic embeddedness of unlikely countries, which caused a spread of cultural and political ideologies. However, Thomas

Friedman argues that there are three distinct waves of globalization in his book, *The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century* (2005). Of the three waves of globalization, he points to the last being the most influential and the most wide-spread. With each wave, Friedman argues that the actor involved in the world's economic arena changes and that the world gets smaller. The first wave of globalization arrived when Columbus fumbled his way into the Americas in 1492. With the "discovery" of the New World, the world went from 'large' to 'medium.' Countries began to compete on a global scale for resources and land. In the second wave, marked by the Industrial Revolution, transportation and telecommunication costs fell, which caused companies like the Dutch and English joint-stock companies to become global powers and this shift put the emphasis on companies to contend on a global scale. The world again shrunk from 'medium' to 'small.' And finally, Friedman argues that in the early 2000s the third wave of globalization began with the rise of the Internet. Now in this new globalization wave, the world has become 'tiny' and individuals themselves are able to compete globally. He also suggests that it no longer matters which country you are from or what your background is; the world is flat denoting that there is now an even playing field.

Because it is flattening and shrinking the world, Globalization 3.0 is going to be more and more driven not only by individuals but also by a much more diverse—non-Western, non-white—group of individuals. Individuals from every corner of the flat world are being empowered. Globalization 3.0 makes it possible for so many more people to plug in and play, and you are going to see every color of the human rainbow take part (Friedman, 2005).

Friedman optimistically encourages individuals to be involved globally and to compete for resources. This theory brings about a sense of hope for the future, that each person will be able to

control their fate through their participation in the global arena.

Of the three globalization theories presented in this paper, the world is flat theory is the newest and the most individualized. The dependent variable global citizenship comes from this theory. If individuals understand the world through this theory, believing they are capable of competing with others from around the world, they may see themselves as global citizens rather than just a citizen of their own country. This theory may help individuals see themselves as global citizens or encourage them to go after lofty goals, but it does little to examine the overarching structures that cause inequality, which might make competing globally difficult or even impossible for some individuals.

Globalization Theories: Looking at the Individual

Looking at the individual in light of globalization is not a new concept. As shown in the world is flat theory, Friedman believes in the third wave of globalization, or globalization 3.0, that the individual is the focal actor; the individual is the one with the power to compete globally. However, Friedman stops at the individual as an ambiguous character, undefined, without features. In almost every piece of literature on globalization, individuals are not seen as what they are: individuals, with distinct characteristics—different social backgrounds, ethnicities, education levels, etc. William I. Robinson breaks this cycle in his work on global capitalism theory. He views world history through four epochs and he argues that globalization is the fourth (Robinson, 2004; 2012). He also argues that with this newest epoch that there is an emergence of a group of global elites, who work to create policies to benefit themselves. Robinson uses an individualized approach to look at globalization. In the same way, this study will take globalization in an individualized light. Robinson looks at individuals exclusively as economic actors, this study is unique in that the individualized factors that will be analyzed are cultural.

Global Citizen

In *Global Visions Beyond the New World Order*, Brecher (1993) discusses four types of global citizen. The first is the global reformer - “an individual who intellectually perceives a better way of organizing the political life of the planet” (Brecher 1993). This person wants global change politically and feels it is their duty to help. The second is “a person of transnational affairs.” They see themselves as a global citizen because their ties to their country have been replaced with travel and the culture of the world. Being a citizen of their country holds little importance to them in the grand scheme of their travels of livelihood. The third considers themselves a global citizen because of their care of the environmental condition the world is in. They feel a responsibility to help find sustainable methods of living. And finally, the fourth global citizen refers to the idea of “regional political consciousness,” meaning countries that are close together that act more like states than countries. A prime example is the Europe Union; countries that allow ease of travel and business with lax travel laws and the use of the same monetary system. In the survey used for this analysis, individuals are only asked if they consider themselves to be global citizens, not how; although it is helpful to understand how individuals could view themselves as global citizens. Using Brecher’s interpretations of the global citizen helped produce the hypotheses involving global citizenship that were tested in this study.

Global Trust

Global trust, being a new concept, at least in a sociological context, is in need of being defined. Through the research done for this paper, global trust was only found in two articles referring to computer networking (Don, et al., 2004; Birrell, Lampson, Needham, & Schroeder, 1986). The Internet has drastically changed the way we communicate with individuals, specifically with those from other countries. For this reason, “global trust” is a necessary concept

in that field. However, from these articles' discussion, global trust does not seem promising. These articles' main discourse centers on security measures that can be put in place to eliminate the need for this kind of trust. For this study, global trust will not be defined in these same terms, but rather as an extension of social trust.

To define global trust, social trust must first be examined. There are many definitions for social trust, but Kwon, Heflin, and Ruef explain it as, "Social trust extends beyond the boundaries of face-to-face interaction...It is a standard estimate of the trustworthiness of the average person—someone who is not a friend, not even an acquaintance (Robinson & Jackson 2001)" (Kwon, Heflin, & Ruef, 2013, 982). In other words, social trust is the mutual faithfulness in the generalized other to do the right thing; this trust involves risk and potential doubt (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). Why is trust necessary to form a society? Cooperative communities are the end goal of social trust (Uslaner, E. 2018). "Trust is an objective social reality...for all levels of social interaction, whether deeply interpersonal or globally transnational in character" (Lewis & Weigert, 2012, 25). Social trust is necessary "for complex societies that involve countless daily interactions between unfamiliar people" (Delhey, Newton, Welzel, 2011, 787).

Trust among individuals within a society has been researched well, however, trust on a global scale among individuals has not. A cross-national study by Rothstein and Uslaner found that, "Countries that score highest on social trust also rank highest on economic equality... these countries have put a lot of effort in creating equality of opportunity" (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005, 47). Social trust is something that is built on equality; when people know others in their society are similar to them, they are able to trust more easily. Delhey and Newton also wrote that, "High trust countries are characterized by ethnic homogeneity, Protestant religious traditions, good government, wealth (gross domestic product per capita), and income equality" (Delhey &

Newton, 2005, 321), agreeing that similarities among peers seems to be a crucial aspect of trust. However, as the world becomes more globalized, people's circle of whom they must trust, or their radii of trust, (Delhey, Newton, & Welzel, 2011; Fukuyama, 2000) widens and similarities may be hard to come by. This is the challenge of global trust—a trust that extends beyond one's society, to all people on earth, understanding that humanity ties us all together and that everyone is involved in the global economy.

National Privilege

National privilege is the idea that native-born citizens of a country should have priority over immigrants in times of job scarcity. Essentially, it is more important for people to be native-born citizens to get jobs than it is for them to be qualified for them. A study published in 2007 about public opinion on immigrants in the years 1995 and 2003 found that the United States had one of the highest percentages of respondents believing immigrants were taking jobs away from native-born citizens (Simon & Sikich, 2007). This percentage decreased by 2003, however, Japan and Germany's percentage increased. These two countries also maintained a high percentage of respondents believing immigrants increase crime in both study years. During these eight years, respondents in the United States and Australia also increased their belief in immigrants being good for the economy, while this belief decreased in Germany and Japan. Similar to the current study, a study on Europeans' opinions on immigrants looks more at the individualistic level than at the national level. Sides and Citrin found that often times people misperceived the number of immigrants in their country and those that felt that their country was being singled out as the country to migrate to were associated with anti-immigrant feelings as well (2007). They also found that economic satisfaction and "higher levels of social trust and having immigrant friends tend to produce attitudes that are less anti-immigrant" (2007, 493). The

literature shows that while on a national level, a country can lean one way or another on immigration, views vary drastically between individuals based on economic and cultural factors.

What causes individuals to have hesitancy towards immigrants and agree with national privilege? While this is a hugely open question with multiple variables at play, Florian Bieber wrote an article about the perceived rise of nationalism in 2018 that may point to some of these variables. Nationalism is not a new concept; it has been seen all throughout history, from World War II, and even today. This is not to say that agreeing with national privilege is equivalent to nationalism. “Nationalism is best understood as a malleable and narrow ideology, which values membership in a nation greater than other groups (i.e. based on gender, parties, or socioeconomic group), seeks distinction from other nations, and strives to preserve the nation and give preference to political representation by the nation for the nation” (Bieber, 2018, 520). This definition of nationalism is extreme in comparison to national privilege, however, it seems fair to say that nationalism is a sliding scale and national privilege would be on the less aggressive side of that scale. Kunovich wrote that national identity is one goal of nationalism and that these identities are made through perceptions of shared attributes, such as “ancestry, language, territory, religion...” (2009, 574). He went on to say that, “nationalism and national identity must become real to people” to have any sort of political power. Those who encourage nationalism try to find a single commonality to united a group against others, i.e. whiteness, maleness, conservatism, etc. Certainly, it is possible to have pride in one’s country without wanting an authoritarian dictatorship that works only to continue one ethnic agenda. However, if the common discourse is that of nationalistic sway, it is possible that the conversation moves slightly closer to the more aggressive side of the scale, and national privilege becomes the norm.

Hypotheses

As shown in the literature, a society as a whole can have generally a high or low sense of social trust, however, individuals' social trust can also fluctuate based on their own lived experiences or demographic identifiers. This makes the current study unique and needed in the body of literature; as it looks at these individualized factors. Brandt, Wetherell, and Henry found that as individuals' income increased, so did their social trust (2014). This seems to indicate that those in a higher social class would have more social trust. People in lower social classes may also feel that they have to compete with immigrants for their jobs; if this is the case, they may be more likely to agree with national privilege than people in higher social classes. Brecher's second account of a global citizen, a person who has replace the importance of citizenship to one's country with a transnational outlook based on travel and exploration of other cultures, seems to align with people of the upper class. These individuals may have the disposable income to travel more frequently than individuals in a lower social class. This aligns with Robinson's work on global elites; Robinson argues that there is a group of individuals in a high social class that is making up a new group of global elites. These individuals most likely believe themselves to be global citizens and have globalized views. Using this information and the world systems theory, the first hypothesis centers on social class indicating how global a person's views are.

***Hypothesis 1:** Individuals in a higher social class will be more likely to consider themselves as global citizens, have more global trust, and desire less national privilege than individuals in a lower social class.*

Zanin found that higher education levels completed were linked with a higher level of social trust (Zanin, 2016, 926). He argues that, "education is important because the knowledge accumulated through schooling stimulates new ideas, enhances individual talents, and improves

job opportunities...” Bieber wrote that, “voters of nationalist parties in developed post-industrial societies—often from working classes—are less well educated” (2018, 530). Becher’s first view of the global citizen is of an individual who is concerned with human rights and policy. His third view of the global citizen is a person who wants environmental preservation. These two types of global citizenship would seem to be more evident in more highly educated individuals.

Individuals who accept neoliberal values would more than likely have more globalized views.

This leads to the second hypothesis, which focuses on more educated individuals and their global views.

Hypothesis #2: Individuals with a higher educational level will be more likely to consider themselves global citizens, have more global trust, and desire less national privilege than individuals with a lower educational level.

Robinson and Jackson found that “Americans begin adult life with low levels of trust, become more trusting as they grow into middle age, and then maintain this higher level of trust for their remaining years” (2001, 137). Another study found that social trust stabilized in individuals once they reached young adulthood (Abdelzadeh & Lundberg, 2016). Younger individuals have grown up using technology that has connected them to the globalized world, which in turn may make them identify more as a global citizen than someone who has not always had this technology or may have been/be apprehensive to use it. Also, because older individuals are less likely to be in the workforce, they may be less likely to agree with national privilege. They may not have to compete for job opportunities like younger respondents. Because many older individuals have had to adapt to the technological changes in recent years, they may feel a bit behind younger individuals in feeling like a global citizen. Younger generations may be more inclined to consider themselves global citizens because they have been connected to global

others their entire lives through the use of the Internet. The third hypothesis assumes older adults would have more life experience to be more trusting than younger individuals, however, younger individuals would be more likely to consider themselves global citizens because of their online presence.

Hypothesis #3: Younger individuals will be more likely to consider themselves global citizens than older individuals. However, older individuals will be more likely to, have global trust and desire less national privilege than younger individuals.

METHODOLOGY

Dataset & Sample

In this study, data were collected from a secondary dataset, The World Values Survey (WVS). The WVS is “the largest non-commercial, cross-national, time series investigation of human beliefs and values ever executed” (WVS Database). The headquarters of the international team is located in Vienna, Austria. The survey has 6 waves, the first began in 1981 and the last published wave ended in 2014. The breadth of this survey is also found in the amount of countries that participate; the WVS boasts, “Nationally representative surveys [are] conducted in almost 100 countries... including interviews with almost 400,000 respondents.” Individuals are asked questions about their values on topics such as, politics, religion, migration, science and technology, corruption, and more. Access to this dataset was obtained through Dr. Junmin Wang, the chair over this thesis. The last two waves of the dataset, wave 5 from the years 2005 to 2009 and wave 6 from the years 2010 to 2014 were used in this analysis. Because not much time has passed between waves, it is not feasible for this study to be considered longitudinal, however, the data show how attitudes could change over a small amount of time.

Nine countries are included in the analysis. All nine countries are OECD and high-income countries. The world is flat theory suggests that all individuals are able to compete globally for resources; similarly, the world society theory states that all countries are able to influence world culture. However, the world systems theory indicates that high-income countries are core countries and that core countries are the ones with the true power to spark global change and reap the rewards of globalization. For this reason, only high-income countries or core countries, were used. These countries are the ones that benefit most from globalization. They are the “winners” in the system. By that logic, the individuals in these countries should have very globalized views. Put differently, these individuals should see themselves as global citizens, have global trust, and believe that national privilege is a thing of the past, more so than individuals from lower-income countries. Lower-income countries could view globalization as a negative change to their country. They could view others from different countries as a threat to their job security, income, or way of life. Of course this could be the case with individuals from high-income countries, but according to the world systems theory, it seems less likely.

The countries used in the study are Australia, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the United States. Each of these countries is listed in both wave 5 and wave 6. The study included all of the high-income countries that were in both wave 5 and wave 6. Some countries were included in one wave or the other but not both, and for that reason they were removed from the study. By reducing the study to only countries that are included in both waves, wave comparison was analyzed more accurately. While nine countries were used, the survey questions were asked to individuals, therefore, each case is each individual, rather than each country. Table 1 shows the countries and the distribution of respondents in each country and wave.

TABLE 1
HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES & NUMBER OF CASES IN EACH WAVE

| Country | Cases (n) | | Total |
|----------------------|--|--|---------------|
| | Wave 5 Data collected from the years 2005-2009 | Wave 6 Data collected from the years 2010-2014 | |
| Australia | 1,421 | 1,477 | 2,898 |
| Germany | 2,064 | 2,046 | 4,110 |
| Japan | 1,096 | 2,443 | 3,539 |
| South Korea | 1,200 | 1,200 | 2,400 |
| Netherlands | 1,050 | 1,902 | 2,952 |
| Poland | 1,000 | 966 | 1,966 |
| Spain | 1,200 | 1,189 | 2,389 |
| Sweden | 1,003 | 1,206 | 2,209 |
| United States | 1,249 | 2,232 | 3,481 |
| Total | 11,283 | 14,661 | 25,944 |

Analytic Strategy

The research goal for this study is to examine whether individualistic, demographic identifiers determine how globalized a person is. Does say, a person’s social class or education level have an impact on how trusting they are towards people of another nationality? Another research goal is to observe how attitudes have changed over time. While this is not a longitudinal study, two waves of the data have been included. These data will show if any changes occurred over this small amount of time. For this study, SPSS was used to analyze the data. Binary logistic regression, Chi-squares, and ordinal logistic regression were used for the analysis of the data. The global citizen and global trust variables were both dichotomous. National privilege remained as it was from the dataset as a question with three possible answer choices. The three response options appeared to be large sections of the responses and could not be reduced to two choices. Binary logistic regression was used to analyze both global citizen and global trust, while ordinal logistic regression was used to analyze national privilege. Chi Square models were used on all of the dependent variables. Further analysis was needed to observe some of the independent

variables' significance. Because of this, the variables social class, education, and age were turned into dummy variables. Chi Square, binary logistic regression, and ordinal logistic regression models were done on these dummy variables.

Variables

The dependent variables of this study are global citizen, global trust, and national privilege. Social class, highest educational level completed, and age are the independent/demographic variables. Immigrant status and sex were used as control variables. Immigrant status obviously seem very closely tied to these attitudes that were being tested, however, between waves there were inconsistent ways of measuring immigrant status. Similarly, sex and gender were confused as the same category in this survey; gender or how the respondent identified were not asked. In fact, sex was also not asked. The surveyor was to note the sex of the respondent without asking and with only two options: female or male. If gender had been asked or more options had been given, such as transgender man, transgender woman, gender fluid, etc., sex may have been an interesting factor to investigate. After a first run of analysis with both immigrant status and sex being considered independent variables, the data showed that these factors were not as important as originally thought. For this reason, along with the inconsistent measurement of immigrant status and lack of gender and sex inclusion, these two variables were used as controls in the final analysis. Table 2 shows how each of the dependent, independent, and control variables were operationalized from the data. Tables 3 and 4 then show the descriptive statistics for each of the dependent and independent variables of the study respectively.

TABLE 2
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES

| Category | Variable | Description |
|----------------------------|--------------------|--|
| Dependent Variables | Global Citizen | The variable global citizen comes from a question in the WVS that asks, “People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Using this card, would you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about how you see yourself? 1. I see myself as a world citizen.” After hearing the previously stated phrase respondents are asked to choose from ‘strongly agree,’ ‘agree,’ ‘disagree,’ and ‘strongly disagree.’ Strongly agree is coded as 1, agree coded as 2, disagree coded as 3, and strongly disagree coded as 4 (Variable G019) The variable categories were then combined to create ‘agree’ and ‘disagree.’ ‘Strongly agree’ was added to ‘agree’ and coded as 1 and ‘strongly disagree’ was added to ‘disagree’ and coded as 0. |
| | Global Trust | Global trust was taken from a question in the WVS that asks, “I’d like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much, or not at all? 6. People of another nationality.” Individuals then chose from the four trust levels; Trust completely was coded as 1, trust somewhat was coded as 2, do not trust very much as 3, and do not trust at all was 4 (Variable G007_36). For the sake of this study, these four categories were then condensed into two categories. Trust completely and trust somewhat were combined to create the ‘trust’ category which was coded as 1. Do not trust very much and do not trust at all were added together to create the category ‘do not trust’ which was coded as 0. |
| | National Privilege | National privilege was measured by responses to the statement, “When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to people of this country over immigrants.” Respondents were asked to decide if they ‘agree,’ ‘disagree,’ or ‘neither’ agree nor disagree with the statement. Agree was coded as 1, disagree as 2, and “neither” as 3 (Variable C002). For this variable, it seemed best to keep |

TABLE 2 DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES CONTINUED

| | | |
|--------------------------------------|------------------------------|--|
| Dependent Variables Continued | National Privilege Continued | the three options because “neither” obviously did not fit into either category and a considerable percentage of individuals chose this category. To run ordinal logistic regression on this variable, the responses were recoded as agree being 1, “neither” as 2, and disagree as 3. |
| Independent Variables | Social Class | The WVS asks respondents to choose which social class they believe they fall under out of the following 5 choices: Upper class, upper middle class, lower middle class, working class, and lower class. This was coded as upper class as 1, upper middle class as 2, lower middle class as 3, working class as 4, and lower class as 5. When the data analysis was done, class was shown to have a negative association with globalized views. This was because upper class was listed as 1 and lower class being the highest. Because of this confusing display, social class was then recoded as lower class being 1 and so on, ending with upper class being 5 (Variable X045). |
| | Social Class Dummy | Further analysis required social class to be broken down into two dummy variables. The first being upper class. Upper class was coded as 1 and all other classes being the reference group, were coded as 0. Secondly, middle class was made into a dummy variable as well. This dummy variable was created by coding both lower middle and upper middle classes as 1 to combine them as one middle class. The other classes were coded 0 to be the reference group. |
| | Education | The WVS classifies the respondents’ highest level of education obtained as one of the following: inadequately completed elementary education, completed elementary education, incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type, complete secondary school: technical/vocational type, incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type, complete secondary: university-preparatory type, some university without degree, university with degree (Variable X025). To |

TABLE 2 DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES CONTINUED

| | | |
|--|---------------------|--|
| Independent Variables Continued | Education Continued | simplify this variable, the categories were combined to only have 4 options: less than high school, high school, some college, and college or more. Anything that mentioned incomplete secondary or below was included in the new less than high school category. Completed secondary of any type was included in the high school category. Some college meant university without a degree. And lastly, university with degree was changed to college or more. |
| | Education Dummy | College or more was then used as a dummy variable to determine if having a college degree was significant. College or more was recoded as 1 and all other categories were coded as 0 to be the reference group. |
| | Age | For the age variable, the WVS simply asked respondents how old they are (Variable X003). After collecting the raw data, age was then recoded into age ranges, which was used for this study. There were 6 categories for the age variable: 15-24 years old (coded as 1), 25-34 years old (coded as 2), 35-44 years old (coded as 3), 45-54 years old (coded as 4), 55-64 years old (coded as 5), and 65 years old and older (coded 6). |
| | Age Dummy | To determine if a certain age was a significant factor, each of the age categories were made into dummy variables. Firstly, 15-24 years old was coded as 1 and the rest of the age groups were coded as 0 to create a youngest age group dummy variable. Each age group was then singled out to create a dummy variable for that age range. |
| Control Variables | Immigrant Status | Immigrant status had to be measured differently between wave 5 and wave 6. In wave 6, the respondent was asked, “Were you born in this country or are you an immigrant?” Respondents responded with either “I was born in this country” |

TABLE 2 DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES CONTINUED

| | | |
|------------------------------------|----------------------------|---|
| Control Variables Continued | Immigrant Status Continued | <p>(coded 1) or “I am an immigrant to this country” (coded 2) (Variable G027A). This was used for wave 6 analysis, however, wave 5 did not ask this question or any other question pertaining to the immigrant status, race, or country of origin of respondents. Because this variable seemed to be important and needed to be analyzed, another variable was found in wave 5 to take its place. Immigrant Parent was the variable created for wave 5 to take the place of immigrant status in wave 6. These data were taken from two questions, one being “Is your mother an immigrant?” with the responses being “yes” (coded 1) and “no” (coded 0) (Variable G026). The second question is “Is your father an immigrant” with the responses being “yes” (coded 1) and “no” (coded 0) (Variable G027). These two questions were combined to create a new variable: immigrant parent. This variable added together respondents’ answers from both the mother immigrant variable and the father immigrant variable. If the sum was 0, the respondent had no immigrant parents. If the sum of the two variable responses was 1, the respondent had one immigrant parent. If the sum of the responses was 2, both parents of the respondent were immigrants.</p> |
| | Sex | <p>The respondents were not asked their sex. The codebook for the WVS instructs the interviewer to code the respondent’s sex by simple observation as male or female. Male is coded as 1 and female is coded as 2 (Variable X001).</p> |

Wave Descriptive Statistics

A frequency distribution table, Table 3, shows the difference between responses in wave 5 and wave 6 in all of the dependent variable categories. 74.2% of respondents agreed that they

viewed themselves as global citizens in wave 5. There is an almost 3% increase in this agreement in wave 6. Global trust actually decreased by 1.4% from wave 5 to wave 6. Agreement to national privilege, meaning agreeing that employers should give priority to natural born citizens over immigrants in times of job scarcity, went down by 3.2% from wave 5 to wave 6. Strangely enough, disagreement went down by 1.8% in wave 6 from 28.9% in wave 5. This means that the “neither” category rose from 16.9% in wave 5 to 21.9% in wave 6. Throughout the results, waves 5 and 6 will be used side by side to show comparison. Overall, however, it seems that global citizenship has gone up and global trust has decreased over time. The “neither” category has risen in the national privilege variable in every model shown. Agreement and disagreement has had inconclusive results. This could mean that respondents were still unsure about how they felt regarding the issue or that they felt more comfortable choosing “neither” than stating their opinion one way or the other.

TABLE 3
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP,
GLOBAL TRUST, & NATIONAL PRIVILEGE FOR WAVE 5 & 6

| Variables | Wave 5 % | Wave 6 % |
|---------------------------|----------|----------|
| Global Citizen | | |
| Agree | 74.2 | 77.1 |
| Disagree | 25.8 | 22.9 |
| Global Trust | | |
| Trust | 55.4 | 54.0 |
| Do Not Trust | 44.6 | 46.0 |
| National Privilege | | |
| Agree | 54.2 | 51.0 |
| Disagree | 28.9 | 27.1 |
| Neither Agree or Disagree | 16.9 | 21.9 |

Countries Descriptive Statistics

Table 5 shows the frequency distribution of each country and the dependent variables. Germany, Poland, and Spain each gained around 10% in global citizenship agreement from wave

TABLE 4
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR WAVE 5 & 6

| Category of Variable | Variable | Category | Wave 5 % | Wave 6% |
|------------------------------|------------------|--------------------------------------|----------|---------|
| Independent Variables | Social Class | Lower Class | 6.2 | 5.8 |
| | | Working Class | 29.3 | 27.6 |
| | | Lower Middle Class | 42.7 | 41.1 |
| | | Upper Middle Class | 20.8 | 24.3 |
| | | Upper Class | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| | Education | Less than high school | 36.8 | 32.7 |
| | | High School Complete | 37.2 | 36.3 |
| | | Some College | 11.4 | 10.4 |
| | | College or More Complete | 14.6 | 20.6 |
| | Age | 15-24 Years Old | 10.9 | 10.0 |
| | | 25-34 Years Old | 16.7 | 15.6 |
| | | 35-44 Years Old | 20.0 | 18.0 |
| | | 45-54 Years Old | 18.7 | 17.9 |
| 55-64 Years Old | | 16.2 | 17.3 | |
| 65 Years Old or Older | | 17.5 | 21.2 | |
| Control Variables | Immigrant | No | 89.0 | 90.2 |
| | Parent/Immigrant | Yes- I am/My parent was an immigrant | 11.0 | 9.8 |
| | | Sex | Female | 52.2 |
| | | Male | 47.8 | 48.6 |

5 to wave 6. Germany went from 52.9% to 62.3%, Poland went from 73.8% to 81.3%, and Spain from 79.2% to 89.6%. Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States had the least amount of agreement in wave 6; 62.3%, 67.8%, and 69.1% respectively. Japan had the most consistent and highest levels of agreement between the two waves at 93.7% and 93.8%. Global trust was the highest in Sweden at 90.6% in wave 5 and 85.5% in wave 6. Korea had the lowest global trust with wave 5 having 27.1% and wave 6 having 31.7%. In Germany and Poland global trust increased dramatically, around 14% for each. Korea and Spain both has only very slight

increases in global trust. In every other country, global trust went down between waves. National privilege generally hovered around the same percentages for most countries, except for Australia and Germany. For Australia, agreement to national privilege rose by 9.4%, while disagreement declined by the same percentage. The “neither” category stayed around 22%. Germany’s agreement declined from 55.7% in wave 5 to 41.4% in wave 6; each of the other categories jumped up by around 7%. Korea had the most national privilege at 78.9% agreement in wave 5 and 71.0% in wave 6. Sweden had the least amount at 11.8% and 14.5% in waves 5 and 6 respectively. Australia, Japan, and Sweden had instances of national privilege agreement rising from wave 5 to wave 6. Similarly, their disagreement levels decreased, as well as Spain’s slightly and the Netherlands’ significantly. The Netherlands’ “neither” category jumped from 10.2% to 22.7%. Every other country had a decrease in agreement and an increase in disagreement of national privilege.

RESULTS

Table 6 and 7 show binary logistic regression models for the variable global citizen using all of the independent variables and the control variables. Social class and education level were both statistically significant at the .000 level in wave 5. Age was not statistically significant in wave 5, but became significant in wave 6. In wave 6, social class and education level were again statistically significant at the .000 level; education level went down to being statistically significant at the .01 level in Model 4. This means that the higher the social class and education level one had, the more likely they were to consider themselves global citizens. Age, however, had the opposite effect. As respondents got older, they were less likely to consider themselves to be global citizens. In other words, younger respondents were more likely to consider themselves global citizens than older individuals.

TABLE 5
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP, GLOBAL TRUST,
& NATIONAL PRIVILEGE FOR EACH COUNTRY

| Country | Global Citizen | | | | Global Trust | | | | National Privilege | | | | | |
|----------------------|----------------|---------------|------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------|--------------|------------|---------------|--------------|
| | Wave 5 | | Wave 6 | | Wave 5 | | Wave 6 | | Wave 5 | | Wave 6 | | | |
| | Agree % | Disagree % | Agree % | Disagree % | Agree % | Disagree % | Agree % | Disagree % | Agree % | Disagree % | Neither % | Agree % | Disagree % | Neither % |
| Australia | 79.9 | 20.1 | 79.4 | 20.6 | 75.0 | 25.0 | 70.3 | 29.7 | 41.6 | 36.4 | 21.9 | 51.0 | 26.9 | 22.1 |
| Germany | 52.9 | 47.1 | 62.3 | 37.7 | 41.9 | 58.1 | 55.7 | 44.3 | 55.7 | 27.9 | 16.4 | 41.4 | 34.9 | 23.9 |
| Japan | 93.7 | 6.3 | 93.8 | 6.2 | N/A | N/A | 22.7 | 77.3 | 62.7 | 6.1 | 31.2 | 67.2 | 4.2 | 28.6 |
| Korea | 80.2 | 19.8 | 82.9 | 17.1 | 27.1 | 72.9 | 31.7 | 68.3 | 78.9 | 2.4 | 18.7 | 71.0 | 6.0 | 23.0 |
| Netherlands | N/A | N/A | 67.8 | 32.2 | 57.6 | 42.4 | 57.8 | 42.2 | 40.1 | 49.8 | 10.2 | 38.4 | 38.9 | 22.7 |
| Poland | 73.8 | 26.2 | 81.3 | 18.7 | 45.7 | 54.3 | 60.3 | 39.7 | 81.6 | 8.4 | 10.0 | 73.1 | 13.3 | 13.6 |
| Spain | 79.2 | 20.8 | 89.6 | 10.4 | 49.4 | 50.6 | 50.1 | 49.9 | 57.7 | 34.2 | 8.1 | 55.0 | 32.2 | 12.8 |
| Sweden | 84.3 | 15.7 | 82.0 | 18.0 | 90.6 | 9.4 | 85.5 | 14.5 | 11.8 | 79.9 | 8.3 | 14.5 | 73.9 | 11.6 |
| United States | 68.6 | 31.4 | 69.1 | 30.9 | 75.3 | 24.7 | 67.0 | 33.0 | 55.4 | 20.0 | 24.6 | 50.5 | 23.6 | 25.9 |

TABLE 6
LOGISTICS REGRESSION MODELS FOR GLOBAL CITIZEN
WITH ALL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES WAVE 5

| Variables | Coefficients | | | |
|--------------------------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
| Sex | .06 (.05) | .06 (.05) | .08 (.05) | .08 (.05) |
| Parent Immigrant Status | .23** (.08) | .23** (.08) | .19* (.08) | .19* (.08) |
| Social Class | | .25*** (.03) | .16*** (.03) | .16*** (.03) |
| Education | | | .25*** (.03) | .23*** (.03) |
| Age | | | | -.07 (.02) |

†p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; *** p<.001

TABLE 7
LOGISTICS REGRESSION MODELS FOR GLOBAL CITIZEN
WITH ALL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES WAVE 6

| Variables | Coefficients | | | |
|-------------------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|
| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
| Sex | .14** (.05) | .15** (.05) | .16** (.05) | .16** (.05) |
| Immigrant Status | .23** (.08) | .26** (.09) | .26** (.09) | .25** (.09) |
| Social Class | | .20*** (.03) | .16*** (.03) | .17*** (.03) |
| Education | | | .09*** (.02) | .07** (.02) |
| Age | | | | -.06*** (.02) |

†p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; *** p<.001

Table 8 and 9 show the binary logistic regression models for global trust with all of the independent variables and control variables. In both waves, every independent variable was significant at the .000 level. Respondents in a higher social class, education level, and age group were more likely to have global trust than those in lower brackets. These two tables are good

examples of why the different measurements of immigrant status created confusing results and why ultimately immigrant status was better off as a control variable. In wave 5, parent immigrant status was highly significant, however, in wave 6, respondent immigrant status was not significant at all. Using these two for the same variable was necessary because of what was given from the dataset, but because these two measurements yielded such wildly different results, it was impossible to keep them as a regular independent variable. Regardless, immigrant status was not a significant factor in wave 6. Similarly, sex produced inconsistently insignificant results, and thus seemed to be a better fit as a control variable.

TABLE 8
LOGISTICS REGRESSION MODELS FOR GLOBAL TRUST
WITH ALL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES WAVE 5

| Variables | Coefficients | | | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
| Sex | .00 (.05) | .00 (.05) | .20 (.05) | .02 (.05) |
| Parents' Immigrant Status | .69*** (.08) | .69*** (.08) | .65*** (.08) | .64*** (.08) |
| Social Class | | .29*** (.03) | .20*** (.03) | .20*** (.03) |
| Education | | | .24*** (.02) | .26*** (.03) |
| Age | | | | .06*** (.02) |

†p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; *** p<.001

Table 10 and Table 11 show the cross-tabulation analysis for national privilege and social class for wave 5 and wave 6, respectively. It is shown in the analysis that in both waves social class had a statistically significant relationship with national privilege. Individuals who have a higher social class are more likely to disagree with national privilege. Lower class individuals are the most likely to agree with national privilege at 64.3% in wave 5 and then slightly less in wave 6 at 63.3%. Across all social classes individuals agreed less in wave 6 than in wave 5. And

disagreement went up in all social classes except in the lower class category. The “neither” category increased in all categories between wave 5 and wave 6.

TABLE 9
LOGISTICS REGRESSION MODELS FOR GLOBAL TRUST
WITH ALL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES WAVE 6

| Variables | Coefficients | | | |
|-------------------------|--------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
| Sex | .07 (.04) | .09 (.04) | .09* (.05) | .08 (.05) |
| Immigrant Status | .05 (.08) | .08 (.08) | .11 (.08) | .13 (.08) |
| Social Class | | .28*** (.03) | .19*** (.03) | .17*** (.03) |
| Education | | | .25*** (.02) | .30*** (.02) |
| Age | | | | .17*** (.01) |

†p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; *** p<.001

Cross-tabulation analyses of both national privilege and education level and national privilege and age are shown in Tables 21-24 in the appendix. The cross tabulation analyses of education level shows that individuals with a college degree or more were the most likely to disagree with national privilege. Conversely, individuals whose highest educational attainment was less than high school were the most likely to agree with national privilege. Put differently, the more education a person has, the more likely they are to disagree with national privilege. Between wave 5 and 6, however, respondents chose “neither” more often in wave 6 than in wave 5. Surprisingly, those in the college degree or more bracket increased their agreement by 6% and their “neither agree nor disagree” by 3%. This means that disagreement declined in respondents with college degrees by 9%. The “neither agree nor disagree” choice grew by at least 4% in each category and increased in the less than high school category by 6.6%. Tables 10 and 11 show the cross-tabulation analysis of national privilege and age from wave 5 and wave 6. National

privilege agreement was most likely among older individuals; essentially, agreement increased over age. This means that older individuals felt that in times of job scarcity employers should give priority to native-born individuals over immigrants. Disagreement in this sentiment was more associated with younger respondents. This was true in both waves. By wave 6, both agreement and disagreement had gone down, and in all categories “neither” had gone up.

TABLE 10
CROSS-TABULATION ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL PRIVILEGE
AND SOCIAL CLASS WAVE 5

| National Privilege | Lower Class | Working Class | Lower Middle Class | Upper Middle Class | Upper Class | Total |
|------------------------------|-------------|---------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------|-------|
| Agree % | 64.3 | 61.7 | 55.7 | 47.0 | 50.5 | 56 |
| Disagree % | 17.2 | 22.4 | 26.6 | 33.8 | 28.6 | 26.3 |
| Neither Agree nor Disagree % | 18.6 | 15.9 | 17.6 | 19.2 | 20.9 | 17.5 |
| | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

$\chi^2(8) = 136.42, p = 0.000$

TABLE 11
CROSS-TABULATION ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL PRIVILEGE
AND SOCIAL CLASS WAVE 6

| National Privilege | Lower Class | Working Class | Lower Middle Class | Upper Middle Class | Upper Class | Total |
|------------------------------|-------------|---------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------|-------|
| Agree % | 63.3 | 55.0 | 52.1 | 42.7 | 42.5 | 51.1 |
| Disagree % | 15.4 | 23.3 | 26.4 | 35.7 | 32.9 | 27.2 |
| Neither Agree nor Disagree % | 21.3 | 21.8 | 21.6 | 21.6 | 24.7 | 21.6 |
| | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

$\chi^2(8) = 237.56, p = 0.000$

Next, ordinal logistic regressions were run on the national privilege variable. Tables 12 and 13 show these results. Ordinal logistic regression was used because the national privilege variable had three response choices, “agree,” “disagree,” and “neither.” For this regression to be done, the national privilege response choices were recoded so that “neither” (2) was between

“agree” (1) and “disagree” (3). Two regression models were run: national privilege in wave 5 with all of the independent variables and control variables, and the same with wave 6. In the wave 5 analyses, social class and education were both statistically significant at the .000 level. With one unit change of class, there is an expected increase of .146 in the log odds of being in high level of disagreement with national privilege. Similarly, with one unit change of education, there is an expected increase of .322 in the log odds of being in disagreement with national privilege. This means that as respondents get a in a higher social class or higher level of education, they are more likely to disagree with national privilege. In other words, the more education or social class a person has, the less likely they are to believe native born citizens should have priority over immigrants in times of job scarcity. This was also true of wave 6. Education’s log odds went down to .075, while social class’s log odds went up to .255.

TABLE 12
ORDINAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION
FOR NATIONAL PRIVILEGE WAVE 5

| | Variable | Parameter Estimate | Standard Error | Wald Chi-Square | Significance p > Chi Square |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Threshold: | National Privilege Agree | 1.484 | .114 | 169.706 | .000 |
| Threshold: | National Privilege Neither | 2.218 | .115 | 369.178 | .000 |
| Location: | Sex | .065 | .043 | 2.212 | .137 |
| National Privilege Disagree | Parents’ Immigrant Status | .470 | .041 | 134.065 | .000 |
| | Social Class | .146 | .027 | 29.955 | .000 |
| | Educational Level | .322 | .022 | 213.591 | .000 |
| | Age | .004 | .011 | .131 | .718 |

TABLE 13
ORDINAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION
FOR NATIONAL PRIVILEGE WAVE 6

| | Variable | Parameter Estimate | Standard Error | Wald Chi-Square | Significance p > Chi Square |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Threshold: | National Privilege Agree | 2.195 | .137 | 257.155 | .000 |
| Threshold: | National Privilege Neither | 3.123 | .139 | 505.120 | .000 |
| Location: | Sex | .074 | .040 | 3.346 | .067 |
| National Privilege Disagree | Immigrant Status | 1.235 | .071 | 301.121 | .000 |
| | Social Class | .255 | .024 | 114.416 | .000 |
| | Educational Level | .075 | .019 | 14.968 | .000 |
| | Age | -.015 | .013 | 1.426 | .232 |

After this round of first analysis was finished, it became apparent that dummy variables were needed to investigate further about the demographic variables. Table 14 shows all of the cross-tabulation analyses for the dummy variables used. It was not obvious which social class, which education level, and which age group were the most significant in the initial analysis. For this reason, dummy variables were created out of these variables to pinpoint the significance. College was the first dummy variable created. The table shows that college was significant in every model. Respondents with a college degree or more were more likely to have a sense of global citizenship, global trust, and desire less national privilege. The next dummy variable was upper class. Upper class was not a significant statistic at any level, however, the next dummy variable, middle class, was. In every model, middle class was significant. Middle class individuals were more likely to see themselves as global citizens, have global trust, and desire less national privilege. Twenty-five to 34 year olds were more likely in both waves to view

TABLE 14 CROSS-TABULATION ANALYSIS OF DUMMY VARIABLES IN WAVE 5 AND WAVE 6

| Variables | Global Citizen | | | | Global Trust | | | | National Privilege | | | | | |
|----------------------------|----------------|----------|--------|----------|--------------|--------------|--------|--------------|--------------------|----------|---------|-------|----------|---------|
| | Wave 5 | | Wave 6 | | Wave 5 | | Wave 6 | | Wave 5 | | Wave 6 | | | |
| | Agree | Disagree | Agree | Disagree | Trust | Do Not Trust | Trust | Do Not Trust | Agree | Disagree | Neither | Agree | Disagree | Neither |
| College | 83.9 | 16.1 | 81.9 | 18.1 | 68.8 | 31.2 | 67.0 | 33.0 | 38.1 | 42.1 | 19.8% | 44.1 | 32.8 | 23.0 |
| Non-College | 72.6 | 27.4 | 76.0 | 24.0 | 53.3 | 46.7 | 50.1 | 49.9 | 56.9 | 26.7 | 42.1% | 52.5 | 25.8 | 21.7 |
| Significance | *** | | *** | | *** | | *** | | *** | | *** | | | |
| Upper Class | 81.3 | 18.7 | 80.4 | 19.6 | 51.9 | 48.1 | 62.8 | 37.4 | 50.5 | 28.6 | 20.9 | 42.5 | 32.9 | 24.7 |
| Non-Upper Class | 74.3 | 25.7 | 76.9 | 23.1 | 56.5 | 43.5 | 53.8 | 46.2 | 56.2 | 26.3 | 17.5 | 51.2 | 27.2 | 21.6 |
| Significance | | | | | | | | | * | | | | | |
| Middle Class | 76.6 | 23.4 | 78.6 | 21.4 | 60.0 | 40.0 | 57.1 | 42.9 | 52.8 | 29.0 | 18.2 | 48.6 | 29.8 | 21.6 |
| Non-Middle Class | 70.2 | 29.8 | 73.7 | 26.3 | 50.4 | 49.6 | 47.7 | 52.3 | 61.8 | 21.7 | 16.5 | 56.0 | 22.3 | 21.8 |
| Significance | *** | | *** | | *** | | *** | | *** | | *** | | | |
| 15-24 Years Old | 79.6 | 20.4 | 77.2 | 22.8 | 53.4 | 46.6 | 53.4 | 46.6 | 50.5 | 31.4 | 18.1 | 47.5 | 29.7 | 22.9 |
| Non 15-24 Years Old | 73.5 | 26.5 | 77.1 | 22.9 | 55.6 | 44.4 | 54.0 | 46.0 | 54.6 | 28.6 | 16.8 | 51.3 | 26.9 | 21.8 |
| Significance | *** | | | | | | | | | | * | | * | |
| 25-34 Years Old | 77.6 | 22.4 | 80.3 | 19.7 | 53.9 | 46.1 | 52.7 | 47.3 | 52.2 | 31.4 | 16.4 | 47.7 | 29.9 | 22.4 |
| Non 25-34 Years Old | 73.4 | 26.6 | 76.5 | 23.5 | 55.6 | 44.4 | 54.2 | 45.8 | 54.6 | 28.4 | 17.0 | 51.6 | 26.6 | 21.8 |
| Significance | *** | | *** | | | | | | | | * | | ** | |
| 35-44 Years Old | 73.9 | 26.1 | 77.7 | 22.3 | 52.1 | 47.9 | 51.0 | 46.0 | 53.6 | 29.4 | 17.0 | 49.0 | 29.2 | 21.9 |

TABLE 14 CROSS-TABULATION ANALYSIS OF DUMMY VARIABLES IN WAVE 5 AND WAVE 6 CONTINUED

| Variables | Global Citizen | | | | Global Trust | | | | National Privilege | | | | | |
|----------------------------|----------------|----------|--------|----------|--------------|--------------|--------|--------------|--------------------|----------|---------|-------|----------|---------|
| | Wave 5 | | Wave 6 | | Wave 5 | | Wave 6 | | Wave 5 | | | Wave6 | | |
| | Agree | Disagree | Agree | Disagree | Trust | Do Not Trust | Trust | Do Not Trust | Agree | Disagree | Neither | Agree | Disagree | Neither |
| Non 35-44 Years Old | 74.2 | 25.8 | 76.9 | 23.1 | 56.2 | 43.8 | 54.6 | 45.4 | 54.3 | 28.7 | 16.9 | 51.4 | 26.7 | 21.9 |
| Significance | | | | | ** | | ** | | | | | | * | |
| 45-54 Years Old | 74.1 | 25.9 | 76.1 | 23.9 | 54.7 | 45.3 | 55.4 | 44.6 | 53.0 | 28.0 | 16.9 | 51.0 | 27.7 | 21.3 |
| Non 45-54 Years Old | 74.2 | 25.8 | 77.3 | 22.7 | 55.5 | 44.5 | 53.7 | 46.3 | 54.5 | 29.1 | 16.4 | 50.9 | 27.0 | 22.0 |
| Significance | | | | | | | | | | * | | | | |
| 55-64 Years Old | 73.3 | 26.7 | 78.3 | 21.7 | 60.4 | 39.5 | 55.7 | 44.3 | 56.6 | 28.6 | 14.8 | 52.5 | 25.8 | 21.7 |
| Non 55-64 Years Old | 74.3 | 25.7 | 76.8 | 23.2 | 54.4 | 45.6 | 53.6 | 46.4 | 53.7 | 28.9 | 17.3 | 50.6 | 27.4 | 21.9 |
| Significance | | | | | *** | | | | | * | | | | |
| 65+ Years Old | 68.5 | 31.5 | 74.0 | 26.0 | 57.7 | 42.3 | 55.1 | 44.9 | 58.3% | 25.4 | 16.3 | 55.4 | 22.9 | 21.8 |
| Non 65+ Years Old | 75.3 | 24.7 | 77.9 | 22.1 | 54.8 | 45.2 | 53.7 | 46.3 | 53.4% | 29.6 | 17.0 | 49.8 | 28.3 | 21.9 |
| Significance | *** | | *** | | * | | | | | *** | | | *** | |

themselves as global citizen, as well as 15-24 year olds in wave 5 only. The 65 and older age group was the least likely to consider themselves global citizens and was the most likely to agree with national privilege. Fifty-five to 64 year olds were the most likely to have global trust among the age ranges. Global citizenship was highest in 25-34 year olds. After this age, global citizenship had an inverse relationship with age—meaning citizenship decreased with age. Global trust was highest in 55-64 year olds in wave 5 at 60%. Sixty-five and older respondents had the highest agreement in national privilege. Fifteen to 24 and 25-34 year olds were the most likely to disagree with national privilege.

Binary logistic regressions were run on the variables global citizen and global trust with the dummy variables, and ordinal logistic regressions were run on the variable national privilege with the dummy variables. After the cross-tabulation analyses were done, the most statistically significant independent dummy variables were used for these regression models. The middle class, college or more, 25-34, and 65 and older dummy variables all showed to be the most important dummy variables, and for this reason, they were the only variables used in the binary logistic regression models shown below in Tables 15-18. The tables for global citizenship (15 and 16) show that being middle class and having a college degree with statistically significant at the .000 level. This indicates that these individuals are more likely to identify themselves as global citizens. Conversely, the 65 plus age group was shown to be statistically significant for not identifying themselves as global citizens. Twenty-five to 34 year old individuals were statistically significant at the .01 level to identify themselves as global citizens. This was true of both waves, however, the significance of the 25-34 year old group went down to the .05 level. Tables 17 and 18 showed the dummy variable binary logistic regression for global trust. In wave 5, middle class and college or more had a statistically significant relationship with global trust, at

the .000 level. This was also true in wave 6, however, the 65 plus age group also became significant at the .000 level. The 25-34 year old group became significant at the .01 level but this group had a negative relationship, meaning that this group was associated with distrusting people of other nationalities, while the older individuals were, the more globally trusting they were. In the ordinal logistic regressions done on national privilege with the dummy variables, shown in tables 19 and 20, middle class and college were shown to be statistically significant. In wave 5, with one unit change from another class to middle class, there is an expected increase of .291 in the log odds of being in high level of disagreement with national privilege. With one unit change from education level to college degree, there is an expected increase of .848 in the log odds of being in disagreement with national privilege. This shows that as respondents who are middle

TABLE 15
LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS FOR GLOBAL CITIZEN
IN WAVE 5 WITH DUMMY VARIABLES

| Variables | Coefficients | | | |
|----------------------------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|
| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
| Sex | .06 (.05) | .05 (.05) | .07 (.05) | .07 (.05) |
| Parents' Immigrant Status | .23** (.08) | .25** (.08) | .24** (.08) | .25** (.08) |
| Middle Class Dummy | | .35*** (.05) | .27*** (.05) | .26*** (.05) |
| College Dummy | | | .58*** (.08) | .56*** (.08) |
| 25-34 Year Old Dummy | | | | .22** (.07) |
| 65+ Year Old Dummy | | | | -.26*** (.07) |

†p<.10; *p<.05;**p<.01;***p<.001

class and who have a college degree or more are more likely to disagree with national privilege. In wave 6, the middle class log odds increased to .375, and the college degree or more log odds decreased to .240.

TABLE 16
LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS FOR GLOBAL CITIZEN
IN WAVE 6 WITH DUMMY VARIABLES

| Variables | Coefficients | | | |
|-----------------------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|
| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
| Sex | .14** (.05) | .14** (.05) | .15** (.05) | .15** (.05) |
| Immigrant Status | .23** (.08) | .25** (.09) | .25** (.09) | .24** (.09) |
| Middle Class Dummy | | .29*** (.05) | .25*** (.05) | .26*** (.06) |
| College Dummy | | | .31*** (.06) | .27*** (.06) |
| 25-34 Year Old Dummy | | | | .15* (.07) |
| 65+ Year Old Dummy | | | | -.21*** (.06) |

†p<.10; *p<.05;**p<.01;***p<.001

TABLE 17
LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS FOR GLOBAL TRUST
IN WAVE 5 WITH DUMMY VARIABLES

| Variables | Coefficients | | | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
| Sex | .001 (.05) | -.01 (.05) | .01 (.05) | .01 (.05) |
| Parents' Immigrant Status | .69*** (.08) | .71*** (.08) | .71*** (.08) | .71*** (.08) |
| Middle Class Dummy | | .42*** (.05) | .34*** (.05) | .35*** (.05) |
| College Dummy | | | .52*** (.07) | .53*** (.07) |
| 25-34 Year Old Dummy | | | | -.08 (.06) |
| 65+ Year Old Dummy | | | | .12 (.06) |

†p<.10; *p<.05;**p<.01;***p<.001

TABLE 18
LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS FOR GLOBAL TRUST
IN WAVE 6 WITH DUMMY VARIABLES

| Variables | Coefficients | | | |
|-----------------------------|--------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
| Sex | .07 (.04) | .07 (.04) | .08 (.04) | .08 (.05) |
| Immigrant Status | .05 (.08) | .08 (.08) | .08 (.08) | .10 (.08) |
| Middle Class Dummy | | .37*** (.05) | .27*** (.05) | .25*** (.05) |
| College Dummy | | | .71*** (.06) | .77*** (.06) |
| 25-34 Year Old Dummy | | | | -.17** (.06) |
| 65+ Year Old Dummy | | | | .34*** (.06) |

†p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

TABLE 19
ORDINAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION FOR NATIONAL PRIVILEGE
IN WAVE 5 WITH DUMMY VARIABLES

| | Variable | Parameter Estimate | Standard Error | Wald Chi-Square | Significance p > Chi Square |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------------------|
| Threshold: | National Privilege Agree | .699 | .078 | 81.097 | .000 |
| Threshold: | National Privilege Neither | 1.431 | .079 | 329.053 | .000 |
| Location: | Sex | .054 | .043 | 1.521 | .218 |
| National Privilege Disagree | Parents' Immigrant Status | .907 | .068 | 178.650 | .000 |
| | Middle Class Dummy | .291 | .047 | 38.441 | .000 |
| | College Dummy | .848 | .061 | 191.456 | .000 |
| | 25-34 Year Olds Dummy | .041 | .059 | .499 | .480 |
| | 65 + Years Old Dummy | -.079 | .060 | 1.742 | .187 |

TABLE 20
ORDINAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION FOR NATIONAL PRIVILEGE
IN WAVE 6 WITH DUMMY VARIABLES

| | Variable | Parameter Estimate | Standard Error | Wald Chi-Square | Significance p > Chi Square |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Threshold: | National Privilege Agree | 1.579 | .107 | 219.051 | .000 |
| Threshold: | National Privilege Neither | 2.502 | .109 | 529.255 | .000 |
| Location: | Sex | .061 | .040 | 2.288 | .130 |
| National Privilege Disagree | Immigrant Status | 1.219 | .071 | 294.912 | .000 |
| | Middle Class Dummy | .375 | .044 | 72.454 | .000 |
| | College Dummy | .240 | .050 | 22.885 | .000 |
| | 25-34 Years Old Dummy | -.034 | .057 | .348 | .555 |
| | 65 + Years Old Dummy | -.080 | .051 | 2.465 | .116 |

DISCUSSION

As the data show, over the short amount of time between wave 5 and wave 6, global citizenship had only slightly increased. From wave 5 to wave 6 global citizenship increased by 3%. Global trust had hovered around the same amount, however dropping marginally by 1.4%. These very small changes were likely due to the short amount of time in between each wave. It is possible that the future wave to be published in 2020 could hold some drastic changes to reflect the shift toward “nationalist politics in some countries” as Bieber mentioned (2018, 537). Both agreement and disagreement with national privilege had gone down between wave 5 and wave 6. Individuals may have felt like they were in a tough situation. They may not have wanted immigrants to have the same opportunities as native-born citizens, but they also may have also realized it is not “politically correct” for them to admit this. Similarly, they did not feel

comfortable fully denying that they wanted some kind of priority over immigrants. They instead may have felt it was easier to say, “neither.” Immigrants themselves or people with immigrant parents may have chosen “neither” to show solidarity with or an appreciation for the country in which they now reside. Alternatively, it could have simply been an issue or topic respondents had never thought of before and decided “neither” was the most appropriate response.

Hypothesis 1 was supported by the data. Individuals in a higher social class are more likely to have higher levels of seeing themselves as global citizens, having more global trust, and wanting less national privilege. However, the higher social class only went so far. The most statistically significant social class was the middle class. The middle class was significant in every category: high global citizenship, high global trust, and high disagreement with national privilege. The upper class was more likely than the lower or working class to have more globalized views, but middle class was the most significant. These data challenge Robinson’s theory that the global elites are the individuals who are the most globalized. These data indicate that there is a more significant jump from working class to middle class than there is from middle class to upper class. This could mean that this rise in globalized views between social classes is not necessarily economically based, like Robinson believes, but culturally based. Essentially, the values found in middle class culture, such as, neoliberalism, college education, human rights, equality, environmental preservation, etc. push this social class toward globalized views. The upper class shares these values, but lower classes tend not to, and it may be for these reasons that middle class was a more significant predictor than upper class.

Hypothesis 2 was overwhelmingly supported. The more education a respondent had, the more likely they were to have globalized views, meaning agreement with global citizenship, having global trust, and disagreement with national privilege. Having a college degree or more

was statistically significant in each of these categories. And lastly hypothesis 3 was partially supported. Older individuals were statistically significantly associated with low global citizenship. This means that older individuals were the least likely to believe they were global citizens. Younger individuals, specifically the 15-24 and 25-34 year old groups, were statistically significantly associated with high global citizenship rates. This could be because these age groups have grown up in a world that has “always” been globalized, unlike older generations who have had to deal with world changes. Fifteen to 34 year olds have had the Internet almost all (if not all) their lives and may feel more connected to the rest of the world than older individuals who may still be catching up. Older individuals were, however, more likely to have global trust than younger individuals. No age group was shown to be statistically significant in terms of disagreement with national privilege. Younger age groups tended to disagree at a higher level but this was not statistically significant. The 65 and older age group was statistically significantly associated with agreement to national privilege. This means that this age group was more likely to agree that native-born citizens should receive priority over immigrants in times of job scarcity.

These data show that there has been a cultural change in globalized views, but people have not changed views in an economic or political sense. Individuals over these two waves identify more as global citizens. This shows that people are aware of the world around them. People do not necessarily have to travel to feel more globalized; they are able to connect with others through video games, social media networks, news outlets and more. Someone may feel like a global citizen even though they have never left their country. This is a cultural change in people’s view of themselves. However, while people may be able to see themselves globally, it seems they are only able to view people of other nationalities at a distance. Global trust decreased overall between wave 5 and wave 6, and national privilege agreement and

disagreement also decreased; only the category of ‘neither’ increased over the waves. This indicates that when thinking of the global other, it is still difficult for people to view them as if they were in the same culture. These data tend to agree with the world is flat theory. People still see others as economic competition; therefore, it is difficult for them to disagree with national privilege. They are unable to separate their own, or their country’s, economic success from their feelings towards immigrants. If immigrants are coming into their country they may still feel threatened by employment competition. These data also tend to agree with world systems theory over world society theory. The world may be becoming one society, but it seems people may be begrudgingly entering it.

This culturally global, but economically and politically nationalist sentiment can be seen in the United States today. The United States boasts of being a land of opportunity. “A mighty woman with a torch, whose flame / Is the imprisoned lightning, and her name / MOTHER OF EXILES...Give me your tired, your poor, / Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free” (Lazarus, 1883). With this poem on a national emblem, symbolizing freedom and hope, it is easy to assume the United States is a place for all to prosper. However, in recent years these feelings have shifted. The United States wants to have trade relations with many countries, but on their terms. This was one of Trump’s major presidential campaign talking points and has continued to be a focus of his presidency. He wants to ensure that the U.S. is being taken care of first and foremost, promising more jobs in the states and encouraging sales of American products by highly taxing imported goods. Another change has been the rise in hostility towards immigrants and refugees. Trump gained supporters by campaigning for border security and refugee bans. While in office, Trump has continued these ideas with pushes of legislation for building a wall along the border of Mexico and the United States and a ban on refugees from certain countries

coming into the country. While most of the country may not agree with Trump, the fact that he is in office fighting for legislation that is moving the country closer to nationalism than globalized policies ensures that the conversation shifts. Rather than the conversation being somewhere in the center of conservatism and liberalism, instead it moves slightly to the right, perhaps without people noticing. This shift may not seem like a big deal, but it could be part of the reason these data tell a story of global trust decreasing over such a short time span. Time will tell if this continues as this study's data end in 2016, the year Trump was elected president.

LIMITATIONS

One outstanding limitation with this study is the variation in the variable immigrant status. In wave 6, immigrant status was operationalized whether the respondents themselves were immigrant or native-born citizens. In wave 5, this question was not asked in the survey. There was not a question available to use that involved the information of the respondent being an immigrant or not. The questions that were used for wave 5 asked if the respondent's mother and/or father were immigrants. This does not answer the same question and was clearly a limitation in the data. There could have been a clearer comparison had the questions been the same and this control variable could have been an independent variable instead. Another limitation in the data was the countries that could be used. As stated in the methods section, some countries were only listed for one wave or the other, and because of this, those countries had to be eliminated from the study. Had more countries been in both waves, the study would have had a more global outlook on these variables. The variable of national privilege is operationalized with a somewhat weak variable. If the question being asked is about nationalism and not simply national privilege, a more clearly defined and pointed variable would need to be used. Similarly, this study does not go far enough to determine if people are becoming more

global. A more longitudinal study could possibly answers these research questions a bit better. Future research could look at in what ways people view themselves as global citizens. Another research venture could look at national factors by looking at immigrant policies, trade policies, globalization index, etc. to determine which countries actually practice these globalized views.

CONCLUSION

This research study analyzed two waves of the World Values Survey, wave 5—years 2005 to 2009—and wave 6—years 2010 to 2014, to see if there is variation of globalized views between different demographic groups of individuals. The dependent variables that were in this study were global citizenship, global trust, and national privilege. The independent variables were social class, education level, and age. Over the two waves, global citizenship levels and global trust levels have remained about the same, citizenship going up only by 3% and trust decreasing by 1.4%. Both agreement and disagreement in national privilege have gone down, while the “neither” category has increased significantly. The middle class and having a college degree are positively associated with global citizenship, global trust, and disagreement with national privilege. Younger individuals were more likely to consider themselves global citizens, but were less likely to have global trust in comparison to older individuals.

What is the importance of this research? First, this research is important to the literature because it looked at globalization through an individualized lens. Often this kind of research looks at institutions or nation-states as the unit of analysis, but individuals were chosen for this study to add another layer of the story to the discussion. Using a cultural view rather than an economic further distances this work from others like it. However, both cultural and economic results were found. The data challenge Robinson’s theory of the global elite. While it is the global upper class that may be more traveled, it appears it is the middle class that has the more

defined globalized views. The analysis also shows that while individuals are more likely to view themselves globally, they are still hesitant to treat foreigners as neighbors. This shows that culturally, individuals welcome globalized thoughts, but economically and politically, they are not ready to take the leap of faith. From the analysis, there appear to be factors that people may not be able to control that may predict variation in views, but having this knowledge can be a starting point for dialogue or a change in opinion. Policy changes at a city, state, or national level could increase globalized views based on these data. Rotter encourages, “We cannot control the forces at work in society by ourselves, but within our own smaller circles of influence, we can model and encourage a little more trust. The consequences can be beneficial, the risks do not seem to be too great, and a younger generation may be a little more ready for a better world—just in case there is one coming” (Rotter, 1980, 6). A guaranteed minimum income or free university could level the playing field, creating a larger, more educated middle class and perhaps further spreading globalized views, ensuring a flatter world, even flatter than Friedman originally planned. With the future of the earth being uncertain, as climate control is anything but in control, it is more important than ever that all humans work together, and having globalized views is just the beginning of that work.

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APPENDIX

**TABLE 21
CROSS-TABULATION ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL PRIVILEGE
AND EDUCATION LEVEL WAVE 5**

| National Privilege | Less than High School | High School | Some College | College or more | Total |
|------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------|--------------|-----------------|-------|
| Agree % | 61.0 | 57.3 | 42.3 | 38.1 | 54.1 |
| Disagree % | 24.9 | 24.3 | 40.2 | 42.1 | 29.0 |
| Neither Agree nor Disagree % | 14.1 | 18.3 | 17.5 | 19.8 | 16.9 |
| | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

**TABLE 22
CROSS-TABULATION ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL PRIVILEGE
AND EDUCATION LEVEL WAVE 6**

| National Privilege | Less than High School | High School | Some College | College or more | Total |
|------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------|--------------|-----------------|-------|
| Agree % | 53.6 | 54.4 | 42.4 | 44.1 | 50.8 |
| Disagree % | 25.6 | 23.0 | 35.9 | 32.8 | 27.3 |
| Neither Agree nor Disagree % | 20.7 | 22.6 | 21.7 | 23.0 | 22.0 |
| | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

**TABLE 23
CROSS-TABULATION ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL PRIVILEGE
AND AGE WAVE 5**

| National Privilege | 15-24 | 25-34 | 35-44 | 45-54 | 55-64 | 65 + | Total |
|------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|-------|
| Agree % | 50.5 | 52.2 | 53.6 | 53.0 | 56.6 | 58.3 | 54.2 |
| Disagree % | 31.4 | 31.4 | 29.4 | 28.0 | 28.6 | 25.4 | 28.9 |
| Neither Agree nor Disagree % | 18.1 | 16.4 | 17.0 | 19.0 | 14.8 | 16.3 | 16.9 |
| | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | | 100.0 |

TABLE 24
CROSS-TABULATION ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL PRIVILEGE
AND AGE WAVE 6

| National Privilege | 15-24 | 25-34 | 35-44 | 45-54 | 55-64 | 65 + | Total |
|------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Agree % | 47.5 | 47.7 | 49.0 | 51.0 | 52.5 | 55.4 | 50.9 |
| Disagree % | 29.7 | 29.9 | 29.2 | 27.7 | 25.8 | 22.9 | 27.1 |
| Neither Agree nor Disagree % | 22.9 | 22.4 | 21.9 | 21.3 | 21.7 | 21.8 | 21.9 |
| | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |