Non-Aligned Movement Countries as Drivers of Change in International Organizations

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RESÜMEE

Die Länder der *Bewegung der Blockfreien Staaten* waren bedeutende Akteure im Wandel der zeitgenössischen internationalen Beziehungen. Indem sie den Vereinten Nationen beitraten, vergrößerten sie deren Legitimität wie auch die anderer internationaler Organisationen. Durch individuelle und kollektive Initiativen bewirkten sie eine Reorientierung der politischen Leitlinien der UNO, die den eigenen Hoffnungen und Interessen mehr Raum gaben. Ihr wachsendes Gewicht, allein durch die zunehmende zahlenmäßige Stärke, setzte die USA und ihre westeuropäischen Verbündeten unter massiven Druck. Die Etablierung von Mechanismen wie die *United Nations Conference on Trade and Development*, aber auch neue Agenden für die Generalversammlung der UNO und etliche ihrer Spezialorganisationen sowie einige Initiativen der Weltbank in den 1960er Jahren verdeutlichen den Einfluss der Bemühungen der Entwicklungsländer. Ihre maßgebliche Rolle kommt schließlich in der Begründung von Programmen zur wirtschaftlichen Stärkung von „Dritte Welt"-Ländern sowie in den UN-Friedensmissionen zum Ausdruck.

Change is inherent to any living organisms, and it is also natural to international organizations (IOs). While its occurrence can be anticipated, its direction, pace, scope, or source cannot be prejudged. Change manifests itself in "modifications to formal institutional structures or to informal practices and working methods". Change can occur in an abrupt or incremental fashion "from within the organization, from outside it, or from a mix of endogenous and exogenous sources".[1] Following this line, the article essays the efforts and achievements of the non-aligned countries, either individually or as

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1   L. R. Helfer, Understanding Change in International Organizations: Globalization and innovation in the ILO, in: Vanderbilt Law Review, 59 (2006) 3, pp. 649-726, here pp. 666-667.

a group, in transforming the United Nations (UN) and other major IOs in giving their concerns and priorities necessary space and influence. After all, their purposes differed considerably from the interests of West European countries and the United States (US), which had created and shaped most of the newly founded IOs in the mid-20th century. In the strong position of having won World War II the "Western" countries[2] organized the founding conferences, ensured that the constitutional framework of these institutions incorporated their values –among others peace, freedom, equality, and justice– and placed the secretariats in their own lands.[3] Until the entry of newly independent states in the 1960s, the US had an "assured majority" that allowed them to push their agendas and to block the moves of the Soviet Union and its allies.[4] In fact, several IOs had been (ab)used as instruments of American foreign policy, due partly to the dominance of the advanced Western countries in the higher echelons of the secretariats.[5] Remarkably, the non-aligned countries actively countered this dominance by entering and engaging with IOs instead of keeping themselves out. More so, the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) – comprising more than 100 countries from Asia, Africa, and Latin America – followed a vision that centred on the potential of existing institutions in finding just and amicable solutions to common problems.

2   I use the term "West" for the countries of Western Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, which benefited from colonizing foreign territories across the world and were engaged in an ideological and military competition with their communist rivals in Eastern Europe. Likewise, the phrase, "non-Western" countries is used here to refer to the newly independent and economically underdeveloped countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America, which collectively strove to end political, economic and cultural exploitation and inequities. Further I make no distinction between the terms the "non-aligned" and "Third World" countries. On the meanings and problems as well as on the continuing relevance of these terms see: D. J. Puchala, Some Non-Western Perspectives on International Relations, in: Journal of Peace Research, 34 (1997) 2, pp. 129-134; B. R. Tomlinson, What was the Third World?, in: Journal of Contemporary History 38 (2003) 2, pp. 307-21; M. T. Berger, After the Third World: History, Destiny and the Fate of the Third World, in: Third World Quarterly, 25 (2004) 1, pp. 9-39.

3   The United Nations (UN) and the Bretton Woods institutions are located in the United States, just as the United Kingdom, France and Canada host the headquarters respectively of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). According to information from the Yearbook of International Organizations, the following top ten hosts of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations are the United Kingdom, France, the United States, Switzerland, Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, Canada, Italy, and Austria. See also: W. J. Feld / R. S. Jordan, International Organizations: A Comparative Approach, Westport 1994, p. 18.

4   J. G. Stoessinger, The United Nations and the superpowers, New York 1965; J. W. Müller / K. P. Sauvant (eds.), The Third World without Superpowers: Chronology, Bibliography and Index for the Group of 77 and the Non-Aligned Movement, New York 1993; M. Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations, Princeton 2009; M. Sherwood, 'There is no new deal for the Blackman in San Francisco': African Attempts to Influence the Founding Conference of the United Nations, April-July, 1945, in: The International Journal of African Historical Studies 29 (1996) 1, pp. 71-94.

5   L. S. Finkelstein (ed.), The United States and International Organization: The Changing Setting, Cambridge 1969; on the longer involvement of the US in international politics see: I. Tyrrell, Reforming the World: The Creation of America's Moral Empire, Princeton 2010. Official statistics compiled in 2011 regarding occupation of higher level posts in the UN Secretariat reveal that 38 Western-developed countries held more (117) posts than those (80) held by 137 developing countries. See Table 24 on the Distribution of Staff on at the D-1 Level and above, in: UN Document A/66/347, 8 September 2011, p. 51.

Non-Alignment as Movement: Principles, Priorities and Phases

The roots of non-alignment as a concept go back to the colonial experiences of peoples in Asia and Africa and their desire to build enduring peace following the ravages of World War II. Furthermore, the impetus to the thought process was provided by the vitiation of the post-war international environment, characterized by the onset of the Cold War between the erstwhile wartime partners who divided Europe and threatened to take away the newly earned independence of former colonies in Asia and Africa by roping them in as military allies.

The earliest expressions of the idea of non-alignment may be traced to the speech of Jawaharlal Nehru in September 1946, made shortly after he assumed the leadership of the pre-independence interim government in India. Outlining the objectives of a free foreign policy for India, he stated: "We propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale. We believe that peace and freedom are indivisible and denial of freedom anywhere must endanger freedom elsewhere and lead to conflict and war." He also obviously stressed the emancipation from colonial rule and the recognition in theory and practice of equal opportunities for all peoples, while articulating the vision of "one world" in which there would be "free cooperation of free peoples, and no class or group exploits another".[6] While referring to the negative perceptions that non-alignment meant not taking positions on contentious issues, Nehru once highlighted its positive attributes. According to him, the term being "non-aligned" means "nations which object to lining up for war purposes, to military blocs, to military alliances and the like. We keep away from such an approach and want to throw our weight in favour of peace".[7] These thoughts were reinforced later by other leaders like Gamal Abdel Nasser (Egypt), Marshal Josip Broz Tito (Yugoslavia), and Sukarno (Indonesia) who, together with Nehru, steered the newly independent countries from Asia and Africa to formulate the key principles of non-alignment in the 1950s.[8]

The first milestone in the formation of NAM was the Bandung conference in April 1955 at which ten principles of peaceful coexistence and cooperation were endorsed, besides the pledge to support the UN Charter.[9] In 1961 some twenty countries met in Cairo– as

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6   Quoted from: R. Khan, Non-Alignment: Context, Dimensions, and Challenges, in: idem (ed.) Perspectives on Non-Alignment, New Delhi 1981, pp. 3-39, here pp. 10-11.

7   R. Khan, Non-Alignment (6), p. 14.

8   K. Ampiah, The Political and Moral Imperatives of the Bandung Conference of 1955: The Reactions of the US, UK and Japan, Kent 2007; C. J. Lee (ed.), Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Moment and its political afterlives, Athens (OH) 2010; S. S. Tan / A. Acharya (eds.), Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African Conference for International Order, Singapore 2009; A. Ajala, The Organisation of African Unity and Non-Alignment, in: Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, 7 (1981) 1-2, pp. 103-117; P. P. Ramchandani, India-Africa: Economic and Technical Co-operation, 1947–1997. An assessment, in: Africa Quarterly, 37 (1997) 1-2, pp. 77-122; for the European background see: R. Kullaa, Non-Alignment and its origins in Cold War Europe: Yugoslavia, Finland and the Soviet Challenge, London 2011.

9   The principal source for these ten principles was the "Panchsheel" (five principles) incorporated in an agreement signed by China and India in 1954. Nehru explained the concept of Panchsheel after the Bandung conference:

a prelude to the first summit conference of the non-aligned countries in Belgrade – and agreed on the criteria of eligibility to become part of the group: a country should be in pursuit of an independent policy based on the coexistence of states with different political and social systems; should reliably support independence movements, should not be involved in bilateral or multilateral military alliances related to "Great Power" conflicts, and should not allow military bases for use in the Cold War rivalry.[10] In a sense, the criteria for NAM membership were couched in a liberal, inclusive manner: a country had to show a tendency towards an independent foreign policy, even if it momentarily tilted towards one of the power blocs, and it could have military relationships with the "Great Powers" but they should not be such that it could precipitate competition and conflict among those powers.[11]

Clearly the intention to turn non-alignment into a powerful political concept and policy depended on its popularization. In the span of 50 years since the founding of NAM in Belgrade, 16 summit meetings took place, while the membership increased from the original 25 to 120 at the most recent summit in Tehran in 2012, which shows that is has spread beyond Africa and Asia. From 1972 onwards a number of Latin American countries joined NAM, whereas prominent global and regional organizations such as the African Union, the (British) Commonwealth, and the United Nations have been associated with NAM as observers.

In the five decades of its existence, NAM has evolved in different directions and at varying paces. Johan Galtung identified two periods in the evolution of NAM. In the early phase, managing the Cold War rivalry and upkeep of world peace by emphasising the importance of dialogue, conciliation, and coexistence remained the central concern. In the next phase, during the 1970s when decolonization had made significant strides, economic issues became prominent with a focus on altering the existing unjust economic order.[12] This can be seen in issues dealt with and resolutions taken: While the summit

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"This idea of Panchsheel lays down the very important truth that each people must ultimately fend for itself. I am not thinking in terms of military fending, but in terms of striving intellectually, morally, spiritually, and in terms of opening out all our windows to ideas from others, and learning from the experience of others." Quoted from: Soedjatmoko, Non-alignment and Beyond, in: U. S. Bajpai (ed.), Non-Alignment: Perspectives and Prospects, New Delhi 1983, pp. 61-74, here p. 63.

10   O. Jankowitsch / K. P. Sauvant, The Third World without Superpowers: The Selected Documents of the Non-Aligned Countries, vol. 1, Dobbs Ferry 1978, pp. xxxi-xxxii.

11   E. Agaev / S. Krylov, Non-Aligned Movement: 116 Nations, in: International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations, 52 (2006) 3, pp. 46-63; A. Orlov, The Non-Aligned Movement: 40 Years After, in: International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations, 48 (2002) 1, pp. 49-56; K. Tassin, Lift Up Your Head My Brother: Nationalism and the Genesis of the Non-Aligned Movement, in: Journal of Third World Studies 23 (2006) 1, pp. 147-168.

12   J. Galtung, On the Relationship between Military and Economic Non-Alignment, in: The Nonaligned World, 1 (1983) 3, pp. 192-202. An equally important part of the agenda of NAM was the aim of ending all manifestations of colonialism and apartheid in South Africa, see: H. Strydom, The Context and Determinants of South Africa's new Role in the United Nations, in: Strategic Review for Southern Africa, 29 (2007) 1, pp. 1-37; A. Fourie, Non-Alignment as a Foreign Policy Orientation of the African National Congress, in: Politikon, 19 (1992) 2, pp. 81-98; on recent developments: S. Morphet, South Africa as Chair of the Non-Aligned, September 1998-February 2003, in: D. Lee / I. Taylor, P. D. Williams (eds.), The New Multilateralism in South African Diplomacy, Basingstoke 2006, pp. 78-99.

at Belgrade paid a good deal of attention to the danger of war between the two super-powers and the need to make all possible efforts avert such confrontation, the policy of non-alignment began to be spelled out in broader terms from the next summit in Cairo in 1964. Five priority areas for collective action were identified: (a) bringing an end to colonial rule wherever it existed, (b) fighting against racial discrimination, (c) general and complete disarming and settling of disputes without resorting to use of force and in accord with the UN Charter, (d) strengthening of the role of the UN and better implementation of UN resolutions; and (e) then promoting economic development and cooperation.

Still, the first two summits of the non-aligned countries were concerned almost exclusively with political matters. Of the 27 points of the declaration adopted at the 1961 Belgrade summit, only three or four points had a bearing on economic questions. Similarly, out of the 11 chapters of the "Programme" adopted by the 1964 Cairo summit, only one dealt with economic issues.[13] However, as the decolonization gained irreversible momentum by the end of 1960s (owing to the push given by the UN Declaration on Decolonization), the 1970 Lusaka summit brought a thorough reordering of priorities. The Lusaka Declaration on Non-Alignment and Economic Progress took note of the "rapidly widening gap between the economies of the rich and the poor nations" and characterized it as "a threat to the independence of developing countries and to international peace and security". The participating countries were called upon "to employ international machinery to bring about a rapid transformation of the world economic system particularly in the field of trade, finance and technology so that economic domination yields to economic cooperation and economic strength is used for the benefit of the world community."[14]

Another clear shift took place from politics to economics. For the first time two separate declarations were adopted – one on political and another on economic subjects–and this practice was continued at the meeting in Algiers in 1973 when the political and economic manifestations of imperialism were sharply attacked: "Imperialism is still the greatest stumbling block to the emancipation and advancement of developing countries, which are striving to attain a standard of living in accordance with the basic norms of welfare and human dignity. Imperialism is not only opposed to the economic and social progress of developing countries but has also adopted an aggressive attitude towards those who stand in the way of its designs and seeks to impose political, social and economic structures which facilitate foreign domination, dependence or neo-colonialism."[15]

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13   O. Jankowitsch / K. P. Sauvant, The Initiating Role of the Non-Aligned Countries, in: K. P. Sauvant (ed.), Changing Priorities on the International Agenda: The new International Economic Order, Oxford 1981, pp. 41-77, here p. 58.

14   Quoted from Lusaka NAM Summit Final Document, pp. 81, 84, URL:http://cns.miis.edu/nam/documents/Official_Document/3rd_Summit_FD_Lusaka_Declaration_1970.pdf, access on 16.09.2013.

15   O. Jankowitsch / K. P. Sauvant, Third World without Superpowers, p. 215 (10); K. P. Sauvant, From Economic to Socio-Cultural Emancipation: The Historical Context of the New International Economic Order and the New International Socio-Cultural order, in: Third World Quarterly, 3 (1981) 1, pp. 48-61; A. K. Das Gupta, Non-Alignment and the International Economic Order, in: K. P. Misra (ed.), Non-Alignment Frontiers and Dynamics, New Delhi

Having set its eyes on a "new type of international economic relations", "new and more equitable international division of labour", and "new international monetary system", the Algiers declaration requested member governments to "use all possible means" to achieve the economic objectives of the non-aligned countries including "the establishment of a new international economic order".[16] The radical stance peaked and spread to political issues at the Havana summit in 1979 where the Soviet Union was described as a natural ally. Understandably, the members were distressed at the completely stalled "North-South"[17] dialogue over economic issues and the deterioration of economic and political climate by the end of 1970s. The effectiveness of the movement has decreased since 1980s, particularly after the Cold War came to an end.[18] As part of this process, fissures between more moderate and more radical positions broke open. India, Egypt, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Yugoslavia were generally seen as moderate in comparison to Cuba, Iraq, Libya, and Vietnam, which were considered as radicals.[19] Often NAM countries began to be identified either as pro-US or pro-Soviet in their foreign policy orientation. Added to this, there occurred armed conflicts between NAM countries during the 1980s, with the result the movement faced the hard task of projecting unity. For

1983, pp. 133-142; more broadly: R. Looney, New International Economic Order, in: R. J. B. Jones (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of International Political Economy, London 1999; M. Hudson, Global Fraction: The New International Economic Order, New York 2003.

16   O. Jankowitsch / K. P. Sauvant, Initiating Role of the Non-Aligned Countries, p. 59 (13).

17   Here the reference is to the economic polarization between the industrially advanced countries of Western Europe and North America on the one side and the economically less developed countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America on the other. On this see: C. N. Murphy, What the Third World wants: An interpretation of the Development and Meaning of the New International Economic Order, in: International Studies Quarterly, 27 (1983) 1, pp. 55-76; J. Bandyopadhyaya, North over South: A Non-Western Perspective on International Relations, New Delhi 1984.

18   Gradually NAM summits failed to attract substantial inputs from its members, notwithstanding that the declarations of the 1990s pleaded unequivocally to build a multipolar world order, to enhance multilateralism and democratization of the international financial architecture, and addressed the widening income gaps. On the post-Cold-War development of NAM see: G. N. Srivastava, The Non-Aligned Movement: A Methodology for the post-Cold War Era – a note for Discussion, in: Peace and Security, 30 (1998), pp. 14-20; S. Morphet, Multilateralism and the Non-Aligned Movement: What is the Global South Doing and where is it Going?, in: Global Governance, 10 (2004) 4, pp. 517-537.

19   The non-aligned group is known for its unity as much as for its issue-based divergence. For example, on the issue of anti-colonialism, India is considered to have taken a moderate stance while Ghana and Indonesia followed a more aggressive line. Likewise, at the 1976 Colombo summit Iraq, Cuba, North Korea, and Libya – heavily criticising the US– were pitted against India, Indonesia, Yugoslavia, and Sri Lanka who feared that an intemperate declaration could damage the own bargaining position, see for example: N. S. Sutresna, The Non-Aligned Movement: An Indonesian Perspective, in: The Indonesian Quarterly, 25 (1997) 2, pp. 128-141. Consistency of non-aligned voting at the UN and other decision-making forums varied depending on the issue. Votes on core questions of decolonization tended to be unanimous while on issues more peripheral to the non-aligned or where the context was clearly East-West rather than North-South differences came up. Cohesion was greater on geographical issues where its regional subgroup was unified. As a general rule, differences were greater on votes with a specific and limited focus, and less or non-existent on more generalized or global issues, see: P. Lyon, The Non-Alignment: Performance and Prospects, in: U. S. Bajpai (ed.), Non-Alignment, pp. 28-38, especially p. 30 (9); R. L. Jackson, The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers, New York 1983, pp. 29, 141-142. See also: S. Y. Kim / B. M. Russett, The new Politics of Voting Alignments in the United Nations General Assembly, in: International Organization, 54 (1996) 4, pp. 629-652; E. Voeten, Clashes in the Assembly, in: International Organization, 54 (2000) 2, pp. 185-215.

long, NAM scrupulously avoided taking up contentious issues between their members. For example Marshal Tito clearly stated at the Belgrade summit that disputes between the non-aligned countries were delicate "issues of secondary importance", and on "some of them it is not easy to reach agreement and they could, if insisted upon, impair the successes" of the movement. Protecting and projecting unity was necessary "at this moment of vital importance for all mankind".[20]

The policy of the 1960s could not be sustained in the 1980s as conflicts in Afghanistan, Angola, Kampuchea, Iran, Iraq, and Nicaragua tested the capabilities of NAM to paper over serious differences. Burma (now Myanmar), a founding member, even announced its withdrawal, while Egypt, another influential player, felt unwanted, at least until its widely noted participation in the 2012 Tehran summit. Furthermore, the developments in post-Tito Yugoslavia, a country to which NAM had always looked for leadership, proved to be demoralizing. While the ethnic conflict leading to the disintegration of post-Tito Yugoslavia in the beginning of 1990s had affected the morale of NAM countries, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union along with emergence of the United States as the only superpower shook the foundations of NAM, both as an idea and as a movement. Doubts about its usefulness were magnified.[21] Nonetheless, a few analysts continue to passionately hold that "the transition from a bipolar world does not render NAM anachronistic", rather they argue that both the non-alignment and "Third World" would "retain [their] usefulness so long as the world continues to be riven by serious economic and political disparities".[22]

Nevertheless, a few aspects of the incremental institutionalization of NAM are noteworthy. Until the end of the 1950s individual countries like Egypt, India, Indonesia, and Yugoslavia maintained a relatively independent foreign policy. Only sporadically did they take part in consultations in Bandung or Brioni. When the escalating arms race between the Cold War rivals severely threated world peace, they became more open to the need for collective action and institutionalization of non-alignment as a movement. In the formative phase during the 1960s, an ad hoc approach found favour in the Belgrade and the Cairo summits. Both were held at the personal initiative of the leaders of the host countries (that is to say, Tito and Nasser) and neither summit could envisage as to when the next one would take place.[23] The summits were held on an ad hoc basis at irregular intervals. The Lusaka summit in 1970 signified a clear attempt at institutionalization of NAM in two ways: It called for regular summits every three years and it established a bureau of foreign ministers who would meet at the time of the UN

20   L. Mates, The Movement is Facing Discord and Trial, in: U. S. Bajpai (ed.), Non-Alignment, pp. 51-60, here p. 52 (9).

21   C. R. Mohan, Impossible Allies: Nuclear India, United States and Global Order, New Delhi 2006; T. G. Weiss / M. A. Kessler (eds.), Third World Security in the post-Cold War Era, Boulder (CO) 1991.

22   C. Grant, Equity in International Relations: A Third World Perspective, in: International Affairs, 71 (1995) 3, pp. 567-587, p. 569; E. T. Agaev / S. Krylov, The Non-Aligned Movement, in: International Affairs, 42 (1996) 2, pp. 90-96.

23   F. R. D. Bandarnaike, History of Non-Alignment as a Force for Peace and Stability in a Divided World, in: U. S. Bajpai (ed.), Non-Alignment, pp. 18-27 (9); P. Lyon, Non-Alignment: Performance and Prospects, in: U. S. Bajpai, Non-Alignment, pp. 28-38, here pp. 29-31 (9); R. L. Jackson, Non-Aligned, pp. 11-36 (19).

General Assembly annual sessions in New York City or elsewhere in the intersession period to coordinate the movement and do the groundwork before each summit. As a corollary, NAM received an observer status in the General Assembly. Three years later in Algiers it was decided that the country hosting the NAM summit would represent the non-aligned countries in all international gatherings till the next summit. Accordingly, delegates from host countries voiced collective views on behalf of NAM on issues ranging from disarmament to development, even when some individual non-aligned countries might have struck different notes.[24]

NAM Countries and Change in International Organizations

Non-aligned countries have taken extraordinary interest in strengthening IOs, despite the fact that these institutions were used by major powers for advancing their material power and interests. The non-aligned countries valued the "normative power" of IOs "to define, control, and transform the agenda of international politics and to legitimate another world view or vision as the dominant political paradigm",[25] and to establish rules of conduct as well as principles of accountability for all states. In sum, the non-aligned countries viewed IOs as useful devices to preserve freedom and peace as well as to promote progress and justice.

NAM has attached special importance to the strengthening of the worldwide role of the UN. At the Belgrade summit it was agreed to work for peaceful resolution of problems in line with the provisions of the UN Charter and to seek better implementation of UN resolutions, the need for which was regrettably ignored by the big powers. The Cairo summit (1964) recognised the "paramount importance" of the world organization and the need to enable it to carry out the task of promoting international cooperation.[26] And the final act of the Lusaka summit held in 1970 asserted that the UN had "a vital role to play in safeguarding the independence and sovereignty of the non-aligned nations"[27] while it was also viewed as the most suitable forum for cooperative action by the non-aligned countries and a key factor in democratizing international relations. In pursuit

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24   Discord within NAM equally had effects on its approach and performance. Illustrative are several instances in the 1970s. Cuba as the head of NAM after the Havana summit suggested in 1979 to keep Kampuchea's seat in the UN vacant in view of the competing claims by two rival factions that had emerged after the military intervention by Vietnam. At the meeting of the General Assembly, however, 35 non-aligned countries voted for the representation of the old regime (Democratic Kampuchea), whereas 25 supported the pro-Vietnamese People's Republic of Kampuchea, with 24 abstaining. Likewise, non-aligned countries did not heed the call of the Lusaka Summit Declaration in 1970 to follow the initiative for a UN declaration on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace until Ceylon in 1971 went alone with the proposal, see: K. P. Saksena, Non-Alignment and the United Nations, in: International Studies, 20 (1981) 1-2, pp. 81-102, here pp. 92-95.

25   S. S. Kim, The United Nations and the Development of International Law, in: M. S. Rajan / V. S. Mani / C. S. R. Murthy (eds.), The Nonaligned and the United Nations, New Delhi 1987, pp. 1-16, here p. 12.

26   Cairo Summit Programme for Peace and International Cooperation, in: O. Jankowitsch / K. P. Sauvant, The Third World without Superpowers (10), p. 56.

27   Lusaka Summit Statement on the United Nations, in: O. Jankowitsch / K. P. Sauvant, The Third World without Superpowers (19), p. 104.

of their political and economic agendas, NAM countries had a strong preference for the UN system over the Bretton Woods institutions, conceiving the former as the most appropriate forum to flag their problems because of the organization's comprehensive mandate and the "equality principle" that guided its decision-making. In other words, the weighted voting mechanism in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank was seen as an unwelcome antithesis to the one-country-one-vote principle embodied in the UN and other organizations.

This positive and supporting attitude towards the UN was reciprocated when the UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim during his tenure in the 1970s began to attend NAM summits as an acknowledgement of the growing importance of NAM in international affairs.[28] Despite serious pressure at times – most recently the US and Israel advised Ban Ki-moon to stay away from the summit in Iran – the tradition continues. Naturally, for the UN, an enduring engagement with the non-aligned countries turned out to be a source of dynamism, direction, and democratization aimed at strengthening its role.[29]

As noted already, the West European countries and the US not only invested time and money in establishing a range of IOs in the mid-1940s but also took advantage of their founding role by ensuring that they would serve their own political and ideological interests. That limited the space for NAM, at least in the beginning. The socialist bloc tried but hardly succeeded (in organs other than the Security Council) in its efforts to resist the Western stronghold due to limited voting power. Added to this, many Latin American countries supported the US on political questions in the UN General Assembly, at a time when only few Afro-Asian countries were represented. Surely, the steady increase in membership of the UN and other IOs brought tactically important voting power to the non-aligned countries and helped to counter the power wielded by the West.

NAM countries effectively sought to overcome limitations of their individual bargaining power by forging large voting coalitions to push the West to a minority position on political and economic questions. The non-aligned group in the UN General Assembly and elsewhere joined forces with the Third World grouping to put forward a common economic agenda. They extended these tactics to such other IOs as the International Labour Organization (ILO), United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the World Health Organization to denounce the policies of the Western countries with regards to colonialism, apartheid, economic development, Israeli policies in occupied Palestine, and so forth.[30] Analysts – mostly from the West – have mistakenly argued that, unlike in the case of the UN, influence of the non-aligned was

28 M. S. Rajan, The Role of the Nonaligned in the United Nations', in: M. S. Rajan / V. S. Mani / C. S. R. Murthy (eds.), The Nonaligned (24), pp. 294-348.

29 M. Komatina, Policy and Movement of Non-Alignment and the United Nations, in: Review of International Affairs 32 (1981) 756, 5 October, pp. 11-14.

30 B. Reinalda, Routledge History of International Organizations: From 1815 to the present Day, London 2009, pp. 545-547; R. Coate, The Changing Pattern of Conflict: The United States and UNESCO, in: M. P. Karns / K. P. Mingst (eds.), The United States and Multilateral Institutions: Patterns of Change, London 1990, pp. 231-260 here pp. 250-251.

limited in the UN specialized agencies owing to "the technical nature of these bodies".[31] The fact, however, was quite opposite. The non-aligned and the developing countries had an impact on the functioning of many of these agencies. UNESCO is a clear example where the non-aligned and the Third World countries linked up with the socialist group to press for their demands. They instituted a press pool of their own in 1976 to counter what was dubbed "media imperialism" and joined the socialist bloc to call for a New World Information and Communication Order.[32] Similarly, during the 1970s the International Labour Organization – on their insistence – denounced the oppressive policies of Israel in Palestinian territories.[33] As a result both these organizations incurred the wrath of the US and West European countries who alleged that they had come under the influence of the radical Third World.

Universality of Membership

NAM also had considerable contribution to enhancing representative character of the UN. In a generation's time, UN membership increased manifold due to the entry of newly independent non-aligned countries from Africa and Asia (see table 1). This is by far an important change since the UN when created was not intended to be a universal or unaligned institution. The criteria for membership, laid down in Articles 3 and 4 of the Charter, were unambiguous, that is to say, only those who declared war against the Axis powers (Germany, Japan, and Italy) during World War II would be eligible. At the founding conference in San Francisco it was still debated whether universal membership – advocated by Brazil and some others – should be the aim. The position taken in the end was that universality was not advisable at that point in time.[34] Nevertheless, the situation eased with the recognition that UN should not be "a club of like-minded states" and room had to be made for "states with widely differing ideologies and different economic and political systems".[35] This captured the core conviction of the non-aligned countries who from the beginning consistently pressed for universal membership – whether it was China's representation or admission of former enemy countries.[36] This position was stat-

31   R. L. Jackson, Non-Aligned (19), p. 173. The impact of actors from the non-European world more broadly is shown among others by: S. Amrith, Decolonizing International Health: India and Southeast Asia, 1930-65, Basingstoke 2006.

32   C. Roach, The Movement for a new World Information and Communication Order: A second Wave?, in: Media, Culture & Society, 12 (1990) 3, pp. 283-307, here pp. 292-293.

33   D. Williams, The Specialized Agencies and the United Nations: The System in Crisis, London 1987, pp. 65-66; K. A. Mingst, The United States and the World Health Organization, in: M. P. Karns / K. A. Mingst (eds.), The United States and Multilateral Institutions (29), pp. 205-230, here p. 223.

34   R. B. Russell, A history of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States, Washington 1958, pp. 843-848; R. C. Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for post-War Security, Chapel Hill 2001.

35   L. M. Goodrich E. Hambro A. P. Simons, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents, New York 1969, pp. 76-77.

36   The NAM support to seating of Communist China in the UN bodies was articulated right from the Belgrade Summit.

ed in the final declaration of the Cairo summit (1964): "In order to be an effective instrument, the United Nations Organization should be open to all the States of the world. It is particularly necessary that countries still under colonial domination should attain independence without delay and take their rightful place in the community of nations."[37] The push to universalize the UN has inspired other IOs like the International Labour Organization, UNESCO, and the World Bank to widen their membership too.[38]

Growth of UN Membership of the United Nations[39]

Years	New Admissions	Total Membership
1946–54	9	60
1955–60[1]	39	99
1961–70[2]	28	127
1971–90	32	159
1991–2011[3]	34	193

1   In this period, two of the enemy countries – Italy and Japan – were admitted in 1955 and 1957 respectively, while the two Germanys had to wait till 1973. Otherwise, 30 of the newly admitted hailed from Africa and Asia.
2   Since the adoption of the Declaration on Decolonization in 1960, 54 former colonies became independent and joined the UN. China occupied its seat in the UN in 1971. For China's views on NAM, see: G. Chaudhuri, China and nonalignment, New Delhi 1986.
3   These consisted predominantly of the new states that emerged as a result of disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

With the steady entry of members from Africa and the Pacific region, the profile and politics of the UN changed; the new members united to undercut the manoeuvring capacity of the Western countries and exploit their own voting strength to full effect.[40] For instance, NAM countries successfully manoeuvred in the negotiations leading to the adoption of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1966 and acceptance of the right to self-determination, which preceded all other rights! The caucusing group of NAM countries was launched in the 1970s to enhance their bargaining position in the General Assembly where it worked as a pressure group on disarmament and other issues. To cite an example, the group successfully lobbied for convening special session of the General Assembly on disarmament in 1978.[41] There Mexico, Yugoslavia, and others

37   O. Jankowitsch / K. P. Sauvant, Third World without Superpowers (10), p. 56,
38   At the time of writing this article, the membership of the ILO, UNESCO and the World Bank stood at 183, 195, and 185 respectively – not very different from that of the UN.
39   Prepared by the author based on the information available on the UN official website, URL: www.un.org.
40   See: C. S. R. Murthy, US and the Third World at the UN: An ambivalent Relationship, in: International Studies, 40 (2003) 1, pp. 1-21.
41   M. J. Peterson, The UN General Assembly, New York 2006, pp. 122-137; D. Bourantonis, Democratization, Decentralization, and Disarmament at the United Nations, 1962–1978, in: International History Review, 15 (1993) 4, pp. 688-713.

harmonized initial divergence of positions on replacement of the Disarmament Committee – considered to be working in the shadow of the two superpowers – with a more democratic body: the Conference on Disarmament.

Focus on Key Structures

Deeply convinced of the indispensability of the UN, the non-aligned worked for changes in the composition and functions of key structures. The notable initiatives in this regard related to the addition of four non-permanent seats to the Security Council in the mid-1960s and the three-fold increase in membership of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).Each case had different consequences: For the latter (enlarged twice in the mid-1960s and early 1970s) they were rather negative since that organ was caught between the Western countries, which distanced themselves, and the Third World, which in reaction turned to the General Assembly to take up their concerns.[42] The transformed Security Council, on the other hand, strengthened the position of smaller and non-aligned countries. Often seven among ten non-permanent members belonged to the non-aligned group.[43] With that the Western permanent members lost their dominance in decision making and were left with two options in dealing with the new development, either to block adoption of resolutions by veto or to compromise. Particularly uncomforting was the situation for the US. From the time of its first veto in 1972 up to the end of the Cold War in 1990, it made use of it veto power 37 times, far more than any other permanent member.[44] At times the US and its allies went along with the proposals of the non-aligned non-permanent members; illustrative is the adoption of a resolution for imposition of a mandatory arms embargo against the apartheid regime of South Africa in 1977.[45]

In a bid to take the success further, NAM debated in the 1980s to propose a second expansion of the non-permanent membership, revising it with the end of the Cold War to also claim the permanent seats. Holding the view that the process of Security Coun-

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42 T. G. Weiss, ECOSOC is dead, long live ECOSOC (= Dialogue on globalization, edited by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung), Berlin 2010.

43 Jackson, tracing in 1978 the development of the non-aligned group in the Security Council, notes a compatible group of non-aligned members and observers comprising Bolivia, Gabon, India, Kuwait, Mauritius, Nigeria, and Venezuela emerged. In 1979, Bangladesh, Jamaica, and Zambia replaced India, Venezuela, and Mauritius as non-permanent members. The group of seven non-aligned non-permanent members held regular consultations and acted in concert on issues targeting South Africa and Israel, see: R. L. Jackson, Non-Aligned, pp. 116-119 (19). D. Bourantonis, Reform of the UN Security Council and the Non-Aligned States, in: International Peacekeeping 5 (1998) 1, pp. 89-109.

44 See Negative Votes by Permanent Members at public meetings of the Security Council, Annex III in Supplement 47 (Doc.A/58/47), 58th session of General Assembly, 2004. See also: R. L. Jackson, Non-aligned, p. 116 (19); E. C. Luck, UN Security Council: Practice and Promise, London 2006; V. Lowe / A. Roberts / J. Welsh (eds.), The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945, Oxford 2010.

45 R. Jaipal, Consensus Making in the Security Council, in: Indian and Foreign Review, 15 (1978) 1, pp. 21-23; J. Prantl, Informal Groups of States and the UN Security Council, in: International Organization, 59 (2005) 4, pp. 559-592, especially pp. 577-578; also R. L. Jackson, Non-Aligned (19), pp. 116-119.

cil reforms need to be "comprehensive, transparent, inclusive and balanced",[46] NAM countries demanded enlargement in both permanent and non-permanent categories to strengthen the representative character of the organ and enhance its legitimacy and ef-fectiveness. However, NAM could not endorse the candidature of any particular country from within its ranks for permanent seat due to irreconcilable differences.[47] Naturally, the General Assembly is ceaselessly seized of the matter without any sign of a break-through in the foreseeable future. However, one interesting consequence is discernible. Disappointed with lack of progress and being suspicious of an unreformed Security Council, the non-aligned worked through the General Assembly to limit the influence of the Security Council by pressing for a shared responsibility, or power sharing, between the two main organs, as it happened when the Peace Building Commission was set up in 2005.More strikingly, the Human Rights Council, established in 2006 in place of the Commission on Human Rights, was mandated to report only to the General Assembly, thus denying any overseeing role to the Security Council.[48]

Impact in Key Policy Areas: Economic Development

Two key policy areas may be discussed briefly to demonstrate the role of the non-aligned in affecting change in the agendas of major IOs. Foremost is the concern of NAM coun-tries about problems of economic development, which they made into an overriding priority of numerous IOs. The second area relates to the control of armed conflicts by hugely supporting the UN in conducting peacekeeping activities on a large scale. Both need to be seen as complementary, and not as conflicting or competitive.

First, the promotion of a "development agenda": The priority given to economic devel-opment set from the very beginning the less-developed countries apart from the indus-trialized world, although their achievements in shaping the institutional design were at best marginal. Still, the assertion mattered and can be illustrated with the developments at the San Francisco and the Bretton Woods conferences.

At the Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods – which gave final shape to the setting up of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) – the non-European developing countries had little to influence. Although they had a numerical advantage (they were 27 out of 44 participating countries), their combined voting weightage stood at 13.21 % against the weight of 73.69 % held by the North American and European countries. Little wonder they could hardly impact the negotiations and the final outcome.[49] However, even with

46   H. Strydom, The Non-Aligned Movement and the Reform of International Relations, in: A. v. Bogdandy / R. Wolfrum (eds.), Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 11 (2007), pp. 1-46, here p. 15.

47   C. S. R. Murthy, US and the Third World (43).

48   C. S. R. Murthy, New Phase in UN Reforms: Establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Human Rights Council, in: International Studies, 44 (2007) 1, pp. 39-56.

49   Even in 1971 when the "developing countries" supplied three-fourths of the members of the World Bank, they

a more balanced voting power the result would not have been very different since the core lines of the agreement had already been laid in the bilateral exchanges between the United States and the United Kingdom prior to the conference.[50] Not surprisingly, the request by the Latin American countries to allocate half of the funds of the IBRD for development purpose was not considered. As a matter of consolation, however, they could get "development" included in the name of the World Bank.[51]

At the San Francisco Conference, held in April 1945, the situation was different. The African, Arab, and Asian states[52] joined forces with other small states and secured a significant concession from the sponsoring powers, namely to elevate the ECOSOC from originally a subsidiary to a principal organ of the UN – notwithstanding the downside that it was provided with limited power, i.e., it could only initiate studies and make recommendations.[53]

Nevertheless, during the early years the developing countries made themselves heard in the ECOSOC, mainly through Latin American representatives, with India chipping in regularly. After ensuring establishment of the first regional economic commission in 1946, they called for the setting up of the UN Economic Development Administration in 1949.[54] That had far-reaching effects: Firstly, it prompted the UN to design modest technical assistance facilities, later in 1966 consolidated into the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the largest multilateral technical aid body funded voluntarily by the Western advanced donor countries. Initially intended as a modest provider of advisory services of a pre-investment nature besides finances for training and exchange programmes, over time the UNDP assumed a greater role as key tasks were entrusted by other IOs, including the IMF. Secondly in the 1960s the UN began playing the role of catalyst in promoting public policies for economic growth in the Third World.[55] The first in the series of "development decades" was launched in 1961 by the General Assembly, as a positive follow-up to the proposal mooted by US President John F. Kennedy, with the aim to boost economic growth by setting targets for different sectors of developing countries' economies.

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possessed only one-third of the voting weight: E. S. Mason / R. E. Asher, The World Bank since Bretton Woods, Washington 1973, p. 65.

50   T. Ferguson, The Third World and Decision Making in the International Monetary Fund: The Quest for full and effective Participation, London 1988, p. 26.

51   Ibid., p. 22.

52   They included Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Syria.

53   R. B. Russell, History of the United Nations Charter (33), p. 777.

54   India as chairman of the UN Sub-commission on Economic Development proposed a new international organization called the UN Economic Development Administration (UNEDA) to be financed by member countries in their own currencies, with the purpose to provide "loans and not grants, though terms of repayment will be liberal and the interest charged may be only nominal", see: E. S. Mason / R. E. Asher, World Bank (51), p. 382. This idea took later shape in the International Development Association.

55   K. Dadzie, United Nations and the Problem of Economic Development, in: A. Roberts / B. Kingsbury (eds.), United Nations, Divided World: United Nations' Roles in International Relations, Oxford 1993, pp. 139-57.

Soon foreign aid as a tool for development was viewed with suspicion because it tended to increase dependency of the recipient countries, thus the focus shifted to demand positive change in the terms of trade. NAM took its cue from the lead given by the Latin American voices. For example the Argentinean economist, Raul Prébisch, then Director-General of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America, took part in the special meeting called by NAM on problems of economic development in Cairo in 1962. Two years later the Cairo summit asserted that "a new international division of labour is needed to hasten the industrialisation of developing countries and the modernisation of their agriculture, so as to enable them to strengthen their domestic economies and diversity their export trade".[56]

The "free" trade regime perpetuated terms favourable to the Western advanced countries and unfair to the less developed countries pushing the latter continually to the periphery of the world economy. The Geneva-based General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) founded on the non-discrimination principle to promote free trade was perceived as advantaging industrialized countries, especially since it was not part of the UN framework.[57] Protection on the international markets via fair and stable prices for exports or new shipping and insurance regulations seemed necessary. Consequently, NAM and other developing countries urged the need for the UN to work for creating conditions in world trade in their favour. As a result, the UN convened the conference on trade and development in 1964, which paved the way for two important developments, both with long-lasting impacts. Firstly, developing countries formed a pressure group, known as Group of 77 (G-77) to formulate common positions and to undertake collective bargaining in multilateral economic negotiations. Secondly, the conference was converted into a standing body of the UN, named United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) with Prébisch as its first head. The UNCTAD was meant to draw a global version of the work of the UN's Economic Commission for Latin America which became noted for its "diagnosis of structural inequality and global transformation". The UNCTAD piloted the principle of "special and differentiated responsibilities" with the hope to galvanize GATT to accord preferential treatment for developing countries.[58] In a similar manner, a few years after the NAM summit in Cairo,

56   N. Desai, Non-Alignment and the New International Economic Order, in: U. S. Bajpai (ed.), Non-Alignment (9), pp. 174-196, here p. 190.

57   According to Janez Stanovnik, a former Slovenian negotiator at the formative stages of UNCTAD, trade was a forbidden zone for the UN in the 1950s and early 1960s: "Whenever you touched trade in the UN, there was always somebody who said, 'This is not the place to discuss trade. Trade we discuss in GATT. Here we discuss general economics. Finance we discuss in the World Bank. But here we will not discuss trade.' I think that one of the great breakthroughs for the G-77 was that they imposed the trade discussion in the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. And willynilly, the West had to yield under the pressure of arguments based on a number of trade studies prepared within the secretariat." See: Final Transcript of interview, in: UN Voices. UN Complete Oral History Project, New York, 2007, 7-8 January 2001, p. 50.

58   V. Prashad, The Story of Raul Prebisch: Impeccable foe for the First World Power', in ZNet, A Community of People for Change, 7 November 2009, URL: http://www.zcommunications.org/the-story-of-raul-prebisch-implacable-foe-for-first-world-power-by-vijay-prashad.html, access on 16.09.2013. Its secretariat, in particular, worked hard for the case of the G-77. Gamani Corea, once chairman of the G-77 and Secretary-General of UNCTAD during

the UN established in 1967 the Industrial Development Organization, which became in 1975 a specialized agency of the UN.[59]

These developments had an effect also on the World Bank, working at the behest of the Western countries as major shareholders. In the early 1960s, even before Robert Mc-Namara assumed leadership, development was included into the mandate of the World Bank, which meant a substantial increase in the loans allocated to infrastructure projects in developing countries. During that decade the amount lent by the World Bank almost tripled from $ 390 million to $1.05 billion; in the next decade the amount quintupled to$ 5.36 billion.[60]

In another important initiative the Bank agreed in 1960 to set up a soft-loan window – the International Development Association (IDA) – to provide long-term loans to those who could not afford loans on commercial terms. In the fifty years of the IDA's operations, 65 countries received credits worth $ 233 billion – half of which went to 39 African countries, while eight countries from South Asia also largely benefited. However, encouraging these developments may be, they did not resolve the basic contradictions between the UN and the Bretton Woods systems, it even escalated to a fierce turf war between the two in the 1970s.[61]

In 1973 a new twist to the role of non-aligned countries in the UN occurred on economic development issues. The Arab-Israel War and the consequent quadrupling of crude prices drove NAM to seize the moment of crisis and draft proposals for radical changes in the international economic architecture. At the Algiers summit in September that year, the need for thorough democratization of international monetary and financial institutions was flagged as the urgent necessity, for which NAM would strive in the UN more aggressively than before. Algeria's Houari Boumediene, then leader of the movement, requested a special session of the General Assembly on raw materials and development, a move meant to pre-empt the Western countries' plans to focus only on the oil price rise. In a well-conceived tactical masterstroke, NAM placed the problem of energy

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1974–84 recalled years later very clearly: "much of the so-called agenda of the G-77 was articulated by the UN secretariats rather than the G-77 itself. I remember the time I was in UNCTAD, whatever we put down as the course of action on any issue, whether on commodities, the Common Fund, the transfer of technology, shipping – you name it, that was taken by the G-77 and made into their own platform. They negotiated down from that position." Final transcript of interview conducted by Thomas Weiss, 1 February 2000, in: UN Voices (59), p. 32.

59   E. Luard, International agencies: The Emerging Framework of Interdependence, London 1977.

60   D. Kapur / J. P. Lewis / R. Webb, The World Bank: Its first half Century, vol. 1, Washington 1997, p. 6.

61   In the context of the "comparative advantage" argument, which disfavoured the UN in economic management matters and favoured the Bretton Woods agenda, the UN bureaucracy banked upon the political support of the non-aligned countries in critiquing the policies of the Bretton Woods institutions and favouring the coordinating role of the UN over the economic and financial institutions including the World Trade Organization (WTO), see: J. E. Stiglitz, Reforming the International Monetary and Financial Systems in the Wake of the Global Crisis (Report of the UN Commission of Financial Experts), New York 2010. In the process of the wider recognition of development as the foremost agenda, the UN and other IOs have come together to formulate the Millennium Development Goals, stressing among other things the need to meet the commitments on development finance, poverty reduction, etc. For a critique from Third World perspective, see A. Ziai, The Millennium Development Goals: Back to the Future?, in: Third World Quarterly 32 (2011) 1, pp. 27-43.

in the broader context relating to raw materials. Remarkably, the intellectual foundations of both the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and the Programme of Action, adopted by the General Assembly special session in 1974, were laid in the final document of the Algiers summit, which clearly complemented the positions already taken by the G-77, UNCTAD and the UN General Assembly.[62] However, the General Assembly's declaration and programme of action resorted to a more assertive approach by calling for the establishment of the NIEO as based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest, and cooperation, with due regard to the existence of different economic and social systems around the world. Without the contribution of NAM, surely, the outcome at the General Assembly would have been unthinkable. NAM saw itself and acted as initiator of new ideas that were later taken up by the G-77 and the UN for elaboration and endorsement.[63]

No doubt, the NIEO call did not bring anticipated changes in the real world, but this does not diminish the importance of a related development: within the UN system basically every problem area was seen through the lenses of development, not least because NAM countries had argued that the reversal of economic deprivation and poverty were critical for the mitigation of global problems in general. This clearly comes out of the programmes adopted at the series of UN-sponsored conferences in the 1970sdrawing attention to environment (Stockholm 1972), population (Bucharest 1974), food (Rome 1974), and women (Mexico City 1975), further to human settlement in 1976, water in 1977, desertification in 1977, anti-racism in 1978.[64] And the second series of global conferences – which started with the Earth Summit in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro –followed that path and perspective, linking explicitly each of the focal area to development. Even the issue of human rights had been "developmentalized"; the "right to development" became a core part of the human rights discourse at the UN.[65]

Impact in Key Policy Areas: Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is the second policy area in which NAM countries took an invaluable part. Conceived to suppress acts or threats of aggression by collective use of military force with the permanent members in the forefront, the UN was handicapped from the very beginning by the Cold War politics of polarization. This opened up new opportunities to the UN that turned to the non-aligned and European neutral countries for help to intervene in such a manner that would keep armed conflicts in check. The resultant UN activity

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62   O. Jankowitsch / K. P. Sauvant, Initiating Role of the Non-Aligned Countries (13), p. 68.
63   N. Desai, Non-Slignment and the new International Economic Order (56), p. 193.
64   See M. G. Schechter, United Nations Global Conferences, London et al. 2005.
65   See R. Normand / S. Zaidi, Human Rights at the UN: The Political History of Universal Justice, Bloomington 2008, pp. 289-315; S. L. Hoffmann, Human Rights in the 20th century, Cambridge 2011. The New Delhi non-aligned summit conference in 1983 dubbed development as a "right" of nations as of individuals comprising them. The 1979 Senegalese initiative culminated in 1982 resolution of the General Assembly sponsored by Cuba and India. Later in 1986, the General Assembly adopted a declaration on the subject, see: R. L. Jackson, Non-Aligned (19), p. 179.

came to be known as "peacekeeping" since the 1956 when the UN and non-aligned countries worked together to peacefully bring an end to Arab-Israel War and secure the withdrawing of troops.

The UN peacekeepers are understood for long as impartial troops, contributed by countries other than the permanent members of the Security Council, deployed with the consent of the countries concerned to stop an armed conflict without using military force save in self-defence. The UN peacekeepers traditionally aimed at the following objectives: first the warring sides were to be separated and then they should be helped to return to positions they had hold before the fight, all this without losing face. The UN peacekeeping missions sent to Egypt and Israel, Lebanon, and the Congo during the late 1950s and early 1960s exemplified this approach. The underlying political goal was to prevent local conflicts from being engulfed by the "East-West" Cold War rivalry, and it seemed that the UN had drawn lesson from the Korean War (1950–51) where the threat of direct military involvement of the superpowers complicated the situation.[66] The new UN approach obviously fit well with the approach of the non-aligned countries, which sought to counter the negative effects of the bipolar world order. NAM and the UN shared interest in preserving peace and controlling violent conflicts led to an immensely fruitful cooperation in the conduct of generations of peacekeeping operations for over five decades.

Until today the UN has launched 67 peacekeeping missions in Africa, Asia, South and Central America, as well as in Europe, involving more than two million soldiers and military leaders.[67] Whether during the Cold War or afterwards, no UN peacekeeping operation could be planned or executed without the support and participation of the non-aligned in the form of supplying troops, observers, civilian police, and administrators. Until August 2012 they furnished 82% of troops, coming from 60 non-aligned countries, and the fact remains that the 10 largest contributors are NAM countries.[68] Half of the UN Emergency Force in 1956 to supervise troop withdrawal from the Suez Canal came from non-aligned countries, two-thirds of the countries contributing troops to the operation in Congo in the early 1960s belonged to NAM.[69] All in all, 29 non-aligned countries (excluding former Yugoslavia) have hosted 54 of the total 67 operations. True, the recipients or beneficiaries of an overwhelming number of UN peacekeeping missions

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66 Notably India and a few other countries advocated that the UN would do well to avoid use of coercive means to enforce peace. India abstained (along with Argentina) in the vote of the UN General Assembly on the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution (3 March 1950), by contending that "it is not the time for stressing the military aspects of the United Nations. We feel that at present we should rather concentrate on improving the machinery in the United Nations for the tasks of peace", see: R. N. Berkes / M. S. Bedi, The Diplomacy of India: Indian Foreign Policy in the United Nations, Stanford 1958, p. 7.

67 The operation varied immensely in terms of size and mandate, the largest operations being the ones in former Yugoslavia (UN Protection Force), the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), and Cambodia (UNTAC).

68 Compiled from the statistics at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2012/august12_1.pfd; access on 16.09.2013. The top ten countries are: Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Egypt, Nepal, Jordan, and Ghana.

69 A. James, The United Nations: Peace-keeping, and Nonalignment, in: M. S. Rajan / V. S. Mani / C. S. R. Murthy (eds.), The Nonaligned (24), pp. 93-109.

have also been member countries of NAM – whether it is Egypt, Haiti, Lebanon, Somalia, Syria, or India and Pakistan. All the past operations except for the one in Kosovo and all of the14 current ones are on duty in the territories of non-aligned UN members. In short, UN peacekeeping has long established itself as – to adapt the words Abraham Lincoln used for characterizing democratic form of government – an activity *of* the non-aligned, *by* the non-aligned, and *for* the non-aligned. At the same time, peacekeeping activities have helped UN overcome the bottlenecks in implementing the Charter provisions on collective security and prove its usefulness in arresting existential threats to (and safeguard the security interests of) the bulk of the non-aligned member countries.[70]

A lot has changed in the UN practices of UN peacekeeping since the beginning of the 1990s, with a thrust towards multidimensional peacekeeping that has often involved the use of force and generation of ambitious mandates under the enforcement provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter. NAM countries have expressed unease at this trend as this tended to dilute the traditional principles of consent of the host state, non-use of force and non-interference in internal affairs. On its part, NAM has stressed the need for the UN to continue to adhere to the principles of non-interference in internal affairs and avoidance as long as possible of using force.[71]

Conclusion

The article demonstrates the varied aspects of influence of NAM countries in major IOs, especially the United Nations. Admittedly, NAM was never a monolithic group. Yet certain core convictions bound its member countries together, viz., anti-colonialism, anti-racism, peace with economic justice, and a multipolar world managed through democratized international institutions. Remarkably the non-aligned countries did not rise against the existing array of international organizations, which were established primarily to serve the interests of the Western countries. Instead, they joined those organizations and worked actively to bring about changes in policy agendas, to enlarge membership and thus to strengthen legitimacy of UN and other IOs for effective pursuit of given functions.

The decline in the solidarity among NAM countries resulting in less effective participation in the deliberations on global issues in the recent couple of decades, therefore, may not augur well for the future of international organizations, whose role in the increasingly complex task of global governance, encompassing such vital issue areas as human security and climate change, might remain at best incomplete, if not less legitimate.

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70   A. J. Bellamy / P. D. Williams / S. Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping, Cambridge 2010; W. J. Durch, The Evolution of UN peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis, New York 1993.
71   Final Declaration of the XVI NAM Summit, August 2012, paragraph 143.2. Also see: A. J. Bellamy / P. D. Williams (eds.), Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges and Future of United Nations Operations, Oxford 2013; A. Cottey, Beyond Humanitarian Intervention: The new Politics of Peacekeeping and Intervention, in: Contemporary Politics, 14 (2008) 4, pp. 429-446; E. Aksu, The United Nations, Intra-state Peacekeeping and Normative Change, Manchester 2003; A. Bullion, India and UN Peacekeeping Operations, in: International Peacekeeping 4 (1997) 1, pp. 98-114.