Headquarters of International Organizations as Portals of Globalization: The African Union Commission and its Peace and Security Policies

Ulf Engel

ABSTRACTS

With a view to analyze the changing spatialities of power and shifting sovereignties in current processes of globalization, this text investigates the headquarters of the African Union. It does so through the lens of portals of globalization and a focus on (1) new, dense practices emerging in response to experiences in the field of peace and security; (2) newly established social spaces of communication, and (3) forms of cultural learning, creativity, and innovation emanating from this condition. The case study on the African Union and its partnership with the United Nations demonstrates that such an approach could add value to the understanding of international organizations and their role at the centre of managing the reterritorialization of contemporary processes of globalization.

Dieser Artikel untersucht am Beispiel der Zentrale der Afrikanischen Union die Verräumlichung von Macht und Verlagerungen von Souveränität in aktuellen Globalisierungsprozessen. Aus Perspektive der „Portale der Globalisierung" legt er den Schwerpunkt auf 1. neue Praktiken, die in Reaktion auf Erfahrungen im Bereich Frieden und Sicherheit entwickelt wurden, 2. neu geschaffene soziale Räume der Kommunikation und 3. Formen kulturellen Lernens, von Kreativität und Innovation, die auf dieser Grundlage entstanden sind. Die Fallstudie zur Afrikanischen Union und ihrer Kooperation mit den Vereinten Nationen verdeutlicht, dass eine solche Perspektive zum besseren Verständnis von Internationalen Organisationen und deren zentraler Rolle in gegenwärtigen globalen Prozessen von Verräumlichung beitragen kann.

Comparativ | Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 27 (2017) Heft 3 / 4, S. 151–114.

1. Introduction

With the changing nature of globalization processes, the headquarters (HQ) of international organizations (IOs) have changed their character, too: over the last century or so, they have developed from being relatively small entities, which were often only loosely connected to the HQ of other IOs, to huge bureaucracies with a considerable degree of actorness and connectivity in international relations (IR). Today's HQ of IOs represent hotspots of contemporary processes of globalization: they are not only the sites where a particular knowledge about how to manage globalization processes is developed, but they also became privileged hubs for the exchange of related practices; that is, they themselves have become drivers of globalization processes.

The empirical case presented in this article is the African Union Commission (AUC) that is based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and its interaction with the United Nations (UN) HQ in New York. In 2001, the secretariat of the African Union (AU),[1] which is a supranational organization with 55 member states, replaced the small secretariat of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), established in May 1963. While the OAU had a few dozen staff members, the AUC today has some 1,400 employees (or "Africrats", as some refer to them).[2] I look specifically at the policy field construed under the generic term "peace and security," in order to make a more general argument about the role and function of HQ.

I employ the concept of "portals of globalization," as it emerged in global history, as an analytical category to explore this field. The HQ of IOs are considered to be entities through and around which certain forms of social and cultural capital are generated and transferred to deal with accelerated processes of globalization. Portals of globalization have been suggested as one of a number of useful analytical categories to further this interest empirically.[3] Looking through this particular lens allows for the analysis of the simultaneity of processes playing out at different spatial levels; invites us to investigate intra-, inter- and trans-locality, and other scales, and calls for an analysis of entangled spaces. According to my reading of the debate, the notion of portals of globalization introduces three concrete fields of observation for the study of globalization processes: (1) moments of densification of certain policy fields; (2) forms of transnational and transregional communication, and (3) cultural effects of global encounters (such as interculturality, processes of cultural learning, and the emergence of cultural capital). Claiming that portals of globalization in principle constitute a useful category for the analysis of contemporary processes of globalization, the HQ of IOs will be interrogated as a specific form of portals of globalization in this article. This means that the space-boundedness

1 Organization of African Unity, The Constitutive Act of the African Union, Lomé 2000, §20(1).

2 T.K. Tieku, The Evolution of the African Union Commission and Africrats: Drivers of African Regionalism, in T.M. Shaw, J.A. Grant, S. Cornelissen (eds.), The Ashgate Research Companion to Regionalisms, Farnham 2011, pp. 193–212.

3 M. Middell and K. Naumann, Global History and the Spatial Turn: From the Impact of Area Studies to the Study of Critical Junctures of Globalization, in: Journal of Global History (2010) 5, pp. 149–170.

of IOs will be taken as a point of departure for an analysis of (1) how their HQ actually become the sites of densification of policy processes – in this case, in the field of the AU's peace and security-related activities; (2) how they create entanglements with other HQ of IOs across space – in this case, the UN, and (3) how they become the incubator for a particular form of knowledge production and transfer, regarding the challenges posed by the changing nature of violent conflict in Africa and new spatialities of power.

2. State of the Art: IOs and Contemporary Processes of Globalization

In contrast to business studies and the role of HQ of transnational corporations, the HQ of IOs are surprisingly underexplored in the social sciences and humanities. In general, there is little contemporary research carried out on them, be it in public administration, IR, or international law.[4] Therefore, I offer a brief review of the state of the art, with the intention to identify some important gaps in the academic literature on HQ of IOs. For analytical purposes, six distinct debates on the challenges posed to IOs by contemporary processes of globalization can be separated.

First, starting in the mid 1990s, the notion of "global governance" quickly gained currency as a response to the emerging post-Cold War world order and a series of peace-support operations (PSOs) in Africa, Asia, and the Balkans, which were all led by the UN.[5] Building on an older school of thought on the relevance of transnationalism in IR,[6] the global-governance paradigm was rapidly established. With increasing empirical evidence for the emergence of global arenas as sites of negotiations by nation states, which are mediated by global governance regimes and in which IOs play a major role, the category successfully asserted a lasting dominance beyond the political-science subfield of IR. Twenty years down the line, it seems there was little need to revise the concept.[7]

Secondly, and as a supplement to the master narrative, the dark side of global governance and some failures or dysfunctionalities of IOs have been discussed, in particular with regard to the apparent failure of an imagined "international community" to prevent

4 See B. Reinalda (ed.), Routledge Handbook of International Organizations, London, New York 2013.

5 For the original concept, see L. Finkelstein, What is Global Governance? in: Global Governance, 1 (1995) 3, pp. 367–372; and P.F. Diehl (ed.), The Politics of Global Governance: International Organizations in an Interdependent World, Boulder, CO 1997.

6 See M. Wallace, J.D. Singer, Intergovernmental Organizations in the Global System, 1815–1964: A Quantitative Description, in: International Organization, 24 (1970) 2, pp. 239–287; and R.O. Keohane, J.S. Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations, in: World Politics, 27 (1974) 1, pp. 39–62.

7 See T.G. Weiss, L. Gordenker (eds.), NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance, Boulder, CO 1996; R. Väyrynen (ed.), Globalization and Global Governance, Lanham/Maryland 1999; and D. Held, A. McGrew (eds.), Governing Globalization. Power, Authority and Global Governance, Oxford 2002. Revisiting the paradigm see K. Dingwerth/P. Pattberg, Global Governance as a Perspective on World Politics, in: Global Governance, 12 (2006) 2, pp. 185–203; and T. Farer, T.D. Sisk, Enhancing International Cooperation: Between History and Necessity, in: Global Governance, 16 (2010) 1–2, pp. 1–12.

genocide and other grave crimes against humanity, like in the Balkans and Rwanda during the early and mid 1990s.[8]

Thirdly, the IR hype – as mirrored in journals such as Global Governance or International Organization (the latter, admittedly, already well-established by that time) – and the often implied "discourses of newness," caught the attention of historians who, also motivated by a general turn towards histories of transnational entanglements and encounters, developed an interest in the history of IOs.[9]

Fourthly, at the same time, new forms of global-governance interactions were conceived in terms of emerging "network" structures, with hubs and spokes often built around IOs.[10]

Fifthly, the debate about the place of IOs in contemporary processes of globalization is also framed in terms of "new regionalisms" approaches, which have emerged outside Europe after the end of the Cold War.[11] In this debate, the constructed nature of regions has been emphasized, although, quite often, it is not always taken to its logical end.[12] Today, nevertheless, "new regionalisms shed light on how IOs outside the Global North relate to processes of globalization.[13] In this context, the AU is often described as one of the epicentres of new regionalisms in Africa.[14]

8 In particular, see study 2 of A. Surkhe, H. Adelman (eds.), Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda 1996, http://www.oecd.org/countries/rwanda/50189764.pdf (accessed 24 October 2017). See also M. Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda, Ithaca, NY 2002; and M. Barnett and M. Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations, in: International Organization, 53 (1999) 4, pp. 699–732.

9 See, for instance, A. Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World, Los Angeles, Berkeley, CA 2002; B. Reinalda (ed.), Routledge History of International Organizations: From 1815 to the Present Day, New York 2009; M. Herren, Internationale Organisationen seit 1865. Eine Globalgeschichte der internationalen Ordnung, Darmstadt 2009; D. MacKenzie, A World Beyond Borders: An Introduction to the History of International Organizations, Toronto 2010; M.G. Schlechter, Historical Dictionary of International Organizations, Lanham, MD 2010. With an emphasis on the UN see M. Mazower, No Enchanted Palace. The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations, Princeton, NJ 2009; but also M. Barnett and M. Finnemore, Rules for the World: Organizations in Global Politics, Ithaca, NJ 2004. For variations within the historical narrative see K. Dykmann and K. Naumann (eds.), Change from the "Margins". Non-European Actors, Ideas and Strategies in International Organizations, in: Comparativ, 23 (2013) 4–5, pp. 9–21.

10 Based on M. Castells, The Rise of the Network Society: Economy, Society, and Culture, Malden/Massachusetts 1996. See A. Chandler Jr. and B. Mazlish (eds.), Leviathans: Multinational Corporations and the New Global History, Cambridge 2005; B. Unfried, J. Mitta, and M. van der Linden (eds.), Transnational Networks in the 20th Century. Ideas and Practices, Individuals and Organizations, Leipzig 2008.

11 For early conceptualizations, see B. Hettne, Globalisation and the New Regionalism. The Second Great Transformation, in: B. Hettne et al. (eds.), Globalism and the New Regionalism, Basingstoke, NY 1999, pp. 1–24; and A. Acharya, Regionalism and the Emerging World Orders: Sovereignty, Autonomy, Identity, in: S. Breslin et al. (eds.), New Regionalism in the Global Political Economy. Theories and Cases, London 2002, pp. 20–32.

12 See U. Engel et al. (eds.), The New Politics of Regionalism. Perspectives from Africa, Latin America and Asia-Pacific, London 2016.

13 See A. Hurrell, One World? Many Worlds? The Place of Regions in the Study of International Society, in: International Affairs, 83 (2007) 1, pp. 127–146; F. Söderbaum and T.M. Shaw (eds.), Theories of New Regionalism. A Palgrave Reader, London, New York 2003. See also A.J. Grant, T.M. Shaw, and S. Cornelissen (eds.), The Ashgate Companion to Regionalism, Farnham 2012; and F. Söderbaum, Rethinking Regionalism, London 2016.

14 Though it has been analysed mainly within the confines of a traditional political science perspective on the emergence of regional peace systems, or with reference to K.W. Deutsch (1968) as a security "community" in the making, or – recalling IR regime theory – as an emerging security "regime" that is based on an emerging

And, finally, linked to this question, there is a discussion on whether IOs exercise agency and sovereignty in their own right.[15] In addition, there is a debate relevant for the argument to be developed here – on how norms, policies, and practices travel internationally – that is framed by IR political scientists in terms of diffusion,[16] and by others in terms of cultural transfers.[17]

Obviously, the notion of sovereignty employed here calls for clarification. In the past, the term has been dominated by political-science thinking, and it was associated with an imagined "Westphalian system" of sovereign nation states, in which "sovereignty" governed the interaction between given, fixed-domestic, and foreign domains.[18] Contemporary processes of globalization, which according to some observers, especially in the 1990s, have challenged or even undermined the sovereignty of the nation state,[19] have been met by a reassessment of the extent to which state sovereignty is exercised in the international system.[20] In this debate, some authors emphasize the social con-

"epistemic community". For the security community perspective – based on E. Adler and M. Barnett (eds.), Security Communities, Cambridge 1998 – see D.J. Francis, Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems, Aldershot, Burlington, VT 2006. For the security regime perspective see U. Engel and J. Gomes Porto (eds.), Africa's New Peace and Security Architecture. Promoting Norms, Institutionalizing Solutions, Farnham, Burlington, VT 2010; and U. Engel and J. Gomes Porto (eds.), Towards an African Peace and Security Regime. Continental Embeddedness, Transnational Linkages, Strategic Relevance, Farnham, Burlington, VT 2013. On the rise of particular epistemic communities, see P.M. Haas, Epistemic Communities and the Dynamics of International Environment Cooperation, in: V. Rittberger et al. (eds.), Regime Theory and International Relations, Oxford 2002 [1993], pp. 168–201.

15 Traditional IR holds that IOs are only the sum of the interests of their member states. In contrast, opponents of this claim argue that IOs (and their HQ in particular) develop identity, interests, and agency of their own. The debate has mainly focused on the EU. On increasing African agency in IR in general, see, for instance, W. Brown, A Question of Agency: Africa in International Politics, in: Third World Quarterly, 10 (2012) 1, pp. 1889–1908; and S. Harman and W. Brown, In From the Margins? The Changing Place of Africa in International Relations, in: International Affairs, 89 (2013) 1, pp. 69–87. With specific reference to the AUC, see U. Engel, The Changing Role of the AU Commission in Inter-African Relations. The Case of APSA and AGA, in: J.W. Harbeson and D. Rothchild (eds.), Africa in World Politics. Engaging a Changing Global Order, 5th ed., Boulder/Colorado 2013, pp. 186–206; and H. Hardt, From States to Secretariats: Delegation in the African Union Peace and Security Council, in: African Security, 9 (2016) 3, pp. 161–187.

16 Out of many contradictory contributions to this debate, see A. Acharya, How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism, in: International Organization, 58 (2004) 2, pp. 239–275; R. De Nevers, Imposing International Norms: Great Powers and Norm Enforcement, in: International Studies Review, 9 (2007) 1, pp. 53–80; B. Greenhill, The Company You Keep: International Socialization and the Diffusion of Human Rights Norms, in International Studies Quarterly, 54 (2010) 1, pp. 127–145, and S. Zwingel, How Do Norms Travel? Theorizing International Women's Rights in Transnational Perspective, in: International Studies Quarterly, 56 (2012) 1, pp. 115–129.

17 M. Espagne, Comparison and Transfer: A Question of Method, in: M. Middell and L. Roura (eds.), Transnational Challenges to National History Writing, Basingstoke, NY 2013, pp. 36–53.

18 For a critical discussion, see J. Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty, Cambridge 1995; W.C. Opello and S.J. Rosow, The Nation-State and Global Order. A Historical Introduction to Contemporary Politics, 2nd ed., Boulder, CO, London 2004 [1999]; and S. Elden, Terror and Territory: The Spatial Extent of Sovereignty, Minneapolis/Minnesota 2009.

19 See, for instance, K. Ohmae, The End of the Nation State, London 1995.

20 Fairly traditional perspectives have been proffered by A. James, The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society, in: R. Jackson (ed.), Sovereignty at the Millennium. Special Issue of Political Studies, 47 (1999) 3, pp. 35–51; and A.-M. Slaughter, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, Cambridge 2005. More adept ones: E.N. Kurtulus, State Sovereignty – Concepts, Phenomenon and Ramifications,

structiveness of sovereignty, including the ever-present assumption of the centrality of the nation state.[21] While this debate mainly took place within the confines of political science, other disciplines developed a radically different point of view, in particular new political geography (or critical geography). Here, the "territorial trap" of political science, i.e. its unquestioned reliance on fixed spatial entities ("containers") and the ontological "fetishization" of space as states, has been heavily criticized.[22]

This critique of what is considered to be conventional wisdom in political science was triggered by a careful reading of the so-called spatial turn in the humanities and social sciences.[23] In a variety of newly emerging academic fields – global history, new political geography, but also in many "new" sociologies ranging from "urban" to "migration" to "transnational social spaces"[24] – this gave rise to a reconsideration of the spatialization of power and sovereignty, with an interest in how exactly new territorializations of power and sovereignty are negotiated and how specific "regimes of territorialization" come into being.[25] In this reading, "globalization" is, essentially, understood as the permanent dialectic of processes of deterritorialization on the one hand and reterritorialization on the other, or the interplay between "flows" and "controls."[26]

To summarize, there are at least three shortcomings of contemporary research in political science on IOs and their HQ. First, little work is done on the interactions among various HQ of IOs, as a particular form of interregionalism. Secondly, the dialectic of how spe-

New York 2005, and S. Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages, Princeton, NJ 2006.

21 See A. Hurrell, Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective, in: L. Fawcett and A. Hurrell (eds.), Regionalism in World Politics, Oxford 1995, pp. 37–73; T.J. Biersteker and C. Weber, The Social Construction of State Sovereignty, in: T.J. Biersteker and C. Weber (eds.), State Sovereignty as a Social Construct, Cambridge 1996, pp. 1–21; A. Osiander, Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth, in: International Organization, 55 (2001) 2, pp. 251–287, and D. Zaum, The Sovereignty Paradox. The Norms and Politics of International Statebuilding, Oxford 2007.

22 Important contributions have been made by, among others, J. Agnew, The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory, in: Review of International Political Economy, 1 (1994) 1, pp. 53–80; N. Brenner, Beyond State-Centrism? Space, Territoriality, and Geographical Scale in Globalization Studies, in: Theory and Society, 28 (1999) 1, pp. 39–78; A. Appadurai, Sovereignty without Territoriality: Notes for a Postnational Geography, in: S.M. Low and D. Lawrence-Zúniga (eds.), The Anthropology of Space and Place. Locating Culture, Oxford 2003, pp. 337–349; J. Agnew, Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics, in: Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 95 (2005) 2, pp. 437–461. With regards to Africa, see, for instance, A. Mbembe, At the Edge of the World: Boundaries, Territoriality, and Sovereignty in Africa, in: R. Beissinger and C. Young (eds.), Beyond State Crisis?, Washington D.C. 2002, pp. 53–80, as well as U. Engel and G.R. Olsen, Authority, Sovereignty and Africa's Changing Regimes of Territorialisation, in: S. Cornelissen, F. Cheru, and T.M. Shaw (eds.), Africa and International Relations in the 21st Century: Still Challenging Theory?, Farnham 2012, pp. 51–65.

23 H. Lefebvre, The Production of Space, London 1991 [1974], and E.W. Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space on Critical Social Theory, London 1989.

24 Some of the new sociologies stress the importance of transnational dynamics. See L. Pries (ed.), Rethinking Transnationalism. The Meso-link of Organisations, Abingdon, Oxford 2008.

25 See M. Middell and U. Engel, Bruchzonen der Globalisierung, globale Krisen und Territorialitätsregimes – Kategorien einer Globalgeschichtsschreibung, in: Comparativ, 15 (2005) 5/6, pp. 5–38, inter alia, developed out of reflections on C. Maier, Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era, in: American Historical Review, 105 (2000) 3, pp. 807–831.

26 See Brenner (fn. 22) and Appadurai (fn. 22).

cific spatialities of power and sovereignty shape the way IOs operate, and how symbolic and social space around their HQ is created and becomes a resource or constraint for their own operations, needs to be understood both empirically and conceptually. And, thirdly, there is a need to better integrate the research on the historicity of these processes: when and under what circumstances did HQ of IOs assume the new, claimed quality of becoming hubs of globalization processes? Thus, the role and functioning of HQ of IOs in contemporary processes of globalization calls for stronger empirical grounding and further conceptualization.

3. Case Study: The AUC's Peace and Security Policies

The AU was established on 26 May 2001, as successor to the OAU. At the centre of this transformation was an evaluation of past OAU policies on peace and security, and their obvious limits.[27] Growing out of this debate, new norms emerged and new institutions were established, as will be detailed below. Starting with the 1992 UN secretary general's Agenda for Peace,[28] with its emphasis on preventive diplomacy, a process of norm-making, norm-transfer, and norm-appropriation was set into motion, in which the two IOs – the UN and the OAU / AU – influenced each other. A year later, in 1993, the OAU secretary general issued a report, titled "Resolving Conflicts in Africa. Implementation Options."[29] The empirical cases for the origin of new norms were partly based in Africa – such as Rwanda, Sierra Leone, or Liberia – but even though the locus of the debate was African, there was also, to a certain extent, an intertwined process of external norm-making; most obviously, this was the case with the debate on "humanitarian interventions" and the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P).[30] With the transformation of the OAU into the AU, an African version of this debate gained momentum. R2P was conceptualized in terms of the principle of "non-indifference."[31] As a consequence, the Constitutive Act of

27 See K. van Walraven, Dreams of Power. The Role of the Organization of African Unity in the Politics of Africa 1963-1993, Aldershot 1999, and K.M. Khamis, Promoting the African Union, Washington, DC 2008.

28 UN Secretary-General (UNSG), An Agenda for Peace. Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping, UN doc. A/47/277 – S/24111, 31 January 1992.

29 OAU Secretary-General, Resolving Conflicts in Africa. Implementation Options, Addis Ababa 1993.

30 Cf. N. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, Oxford 2000. See also International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to Protect. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Ottawa 2001, and United Nations, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, New York 2004.

31 See B. Kioko, The Right of Intervention Under the African Union's Constitutive Act: From Non-Interference to Non-Intervention, in: International Review of the Red Cross, 85 (2003) 852, pp. 807–824; T. Murithi, The Responsibility to Protect as Enshrined in Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, in: African Security Review, 16 (2007) 3, pp. 14–24, and P.D. Williams, From Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference: The Origins and Development of the African Union's Security Culture, in: African Affairs, 106 (2007) 423, pp. 253–280. On UN-AU relations, see R. Tavares, T. Felício, The Responsibility to Protect by African Organizations: A New Trend in the Cooperation Between the UN and Regional Organizations, in: Engel and Gomes Porto (eds.), Towards an African Peace and Security Regime (fn 14), pp. 53–70.

the African Union (2000) provides for the right of the union to intervene in the internal affairs of otherwise sovereign member states, in cases of gross human rights violations, genocide, and other crimes against humanity.[32]

On the basis of this shift in norms, which guided the transformation from OAU to the AU, an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) was designed. It is built on five institutional pillars: a Peace and Security Council (PSC); an African Standby Force (ASF); a Panel of the Wise; a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), and a Peace Fund.[33] This architecture is matched by an African Governance Architecture (AGA), which is based on the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (see below).[34] Linked to processes of institutionalization and professionalization, at least in relevant pockets of the continental body,[35] the AUC has increasingly become an actor in its own right. Together with a coalition of like-minded member states, it is the driver of the union's new peace and security agenda.[36] However, it has to be noted that, over time, member states follow different and changing interests; the new norms are permanently renegotiated, and that this happens in an environment of high financial dependency on international donors and little ownership of the new institutions and norms by member states.[37]

3.1 Densification

According to the AUC and the PSC, current processes of globalization in and around Africa have prompted specific dynamics in the field of peace and security. These dynamics are experienced as threats to "order and stability." For instance, in the biannual report on the state of peace and security on the continent presented to the AU Assembly, the PSC lists the following specific areas of concern in January 2016:[38]

32 Organization of African Unity, Constitutive Act … (fn. 1), §4(h).

33 Organization of African Unity, Constitutive Act … (fn. 1), and African Union, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Addis Ababa 2002. See also S.F. Makinda and F.W. Okumu, The African Union: Challenges of Globalization, Security, and Governance, Abingdon 2008; U. Engel and J. Gomes Porto, The Africa Union's New Peace and Security Architecture: Towards an Evolving Security Regime?, in: African Security, 2 (2009) 2/3, pp. 82–96; Engel and Gomes Porto (eds.), Africa's New Peace and Security Architecture (fn. 14); and U. Engel, The African Union's Peace and Security Architecture – From Aspiration to Operationalization, in: J. Harbeson and D. Rothchild (ed.) Africa in World Politics, 6th ed., Boulder, CO, pp. 262–282.

34 AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. Adopted at the 8th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Assembly/AU/Dec.147 (VIII), 30 January 2007.

35 See L.M. Fisher et al., Moving Africa Forward. African Peace And Security Architecture (APSA). 2010 Assessment, Addis Ababa 2010, and L. Nathan et al., African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). 2014 Assessment Study. Final Report, Addis Ababa 2015. With regard to the operationalization of the APSA, see also African Union, APSA Roadmap 2016-2010, Addis Ababa 2016.

36 Engel and Gomes Porto, The African Union's New Peace and Security Architecture (fn. 33).

37 Engel, The Changing Role (fn. 15); A. Witt, The African Union and Contested Political Order(s), in: Engel and Gomes Porto, Towards an African Peace and Security Regime (fn. 14), pp. 11–30, and U. Engel, The African Union finances – How Does it Work?, Leipzig 2015.

38 AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government 2016, Report of the Peace and Security Council on its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa [Assembly/AU/2 (XXVI)], Addis Ababa, 29 January 2016. This list, in fact, is more comprehensive than more recent ones. For an update, see AU Assembly of Heads of State and

– on-going conflicts: Abyei (Sudan), Libya, South Sudan, Western Sahara;
– PSOs: Central African Republic (CAR), Darfur (Sudan), Mali, Somalia;
– post-conflict situations: Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC, related to the M23), Eritrea/Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau;
– unconstitutional changes of government (UCG): Burundi, Burkina Faso, CAR, Madagascar, Mali;
– terrorism and violent extremism: al-Mourabitoun, al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, Ansar Dine, Ansar Bait al-Maqdis (Egypt), Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest, MUJAO), the so-called Islamic State Provinces (Sinai, Libya, and Tunisia), al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA);
– "non-traditional security topics": Ebola, El Niño, illicit financial flows.

These conflicts are a manifestation of changes in the nature of violent conflict in Africa since the end of the Cold War; the re-spacing of social relations in Africa, and the ongoing renegotiation of spatialities of power beyond the nation state.[39] In the 1990s literature, it is argued that contemporary conflicts do not typically have a precise beginning, since in the vast majority of cases there are no formal declarations of war that would indicate the initiation of hostilities; contemporary armed conflicts conspicuously lack definitive battles, decisive campaigns, and formal endings (they "typically last for decades"), and they are fought by loosely-knit groups of regulars, irregulars, cells, and frequently by locally-based warlords under little to no central authority. The London School of Economics (LSE) global-governance scholar Mary Kaldor has coined the term "new wars,"[40] for in these conflicts, organized violence targets civilians in a particular, instrumentalist way; conflict of ethnic identities has replaced ideological issues, and violent conflict often occurs within and not between states. Others observed that the distinction between war (understood as violence between states or organized political groups for political motives), organized crime, and large-scale violations of human rights is largely blurred, and that "new wars" are often related to specific political economies characterized by the plunder of natural resources (e.g. diamonds, oil, coltan); black markets for illegal trade in arms, drugs, or valuable commodities; external assistance by diaspora communities, and support from neighbouring governments.[41]

In the last two decades, research on violent conflict in Africa stresses the multiplicity of actor roles a single person can assume (e.g. illegal trader, "rebel," and/or transnational jihadist); the relevance of networks rather than clear-cut groups, including transnational

Government 2017, Report of the Peace and Security Council on its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa [Assembly/AU/Dec.629 (XXVIII)], Addis Ababa, 31 January 2017.

39 See U. Engel and P. Nugent (eds.), Respacing Africa, Leiden, Boston, MA 2009. See also Engel and Olsen (fn. 22).

40 M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, Cambridge 1999.

41 M. van Creveld, The Transformation of War, New York 1991, and K. Holsti, The State, War and the State of War, Stanford, CA 1996. For a critique of the "new wars" paradigm, see the late S. Ellis, The Old Roots of Africa's New Wars, in: Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, (2003) 2, pp. 29–43, and S. Kalyvas, "New" and "Old" Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?, in: World Politics, 51 (2001) 1, pp. 99–118.

interventions; the importance of conflicts at the margins of territories and in transnational theatres of operation (spaces in between, borderlands, etc.) rather than containerized (i.e. national or state-to-state) conflicts, and the increasing targeting of civilians, especially women and children, as well as the displacement of civilians.[42] Often overlooked forms of violent conflict include low-level, ad hoc violence (often performed by non-state armed groups); xenophobic violence; localized violence (e.g. conflicts around cattle rustling), and routinized violence (for instance, during legitimate strikes).[43] In order to recontextualize these violent conflicts in current processes of globalization, proper attention should also be given to the external dynamics impacting the African continent; among others, these include the United States's Global War on Terrorism (and its successors in disguise); Wahhabi proselytizing (with adverse effects on Sufi communities); the global jihadist movement (e.g. variations of al-Qaeda or al-Shabaab, including the arrival of Western fighters following a script seen in Bosnia, Kashmir, or Chechnya); transnational drug trafficking (especially from Latin America), and local food insecurity as a result of external actors' food production strategies in Africa (more prominently referred to as "land grabbing").

In response to this multiplicity of factors shaping violent conflict on the continent, the AU has developed a set of specific practices. In this process, it has partnered with the UN (and the European Union [EU]). This strategy can be described as sovereignty boosting.[44] As Runa Reta argues, this cooperation developed against the backdrop of a reevaluation of UN activities on the continent, after a decade of failed UN missions in Africa, because the AU offered itself as a reliable regional ally that could rally the political will of member states.[45] According to the late veteran African diplomat Margaret Vogt, relations between the OAU and the UN were rather based on comparative advantages, as the former lacked "the institutional structure, managerial capacity and resources to manage a peacekeeping operation properly."[46] Or, as a joint AU-UN panel on modalities for support to the AU peacekeeping operations put it in 2008, the partnership should be

42 See W. Reno, Warfare in Independent Africa, New York 2011; P.D. Williams, War and Conflict in Africa, Cambridge 2011, and S. Straus, Making and Unmaking Nations. War, Leadership, and Genocide in Modern Africa, Ithaca NY 2015.

43 See S. Straus, Wars Do End! Changing Patterns of Political Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, in: African Affairs, 111 (2012) 444, pp. 179–201.

44 Following Agnew, Globalization and Sovereignty (fn. 22), and F. Söderbaum, Modes of Regional Governance in Africa: Neoliberalism, Sovereignty-boosting and Shadow Networks, Global Governance, 10 (2004) 4, pp. 419–436.

45 R. Reta, Joint African Union-United Nations Peacekeeping Efforts: A Dangerous Liaison?, in: Le Panoptique, 1 September 2007 http://www.ia-forum.org/Content/ViewInternalDocument.cfm?ContentID=6100 (accessed 21 November 2017).

46 M.A. Vogt, Co-operation Between the UN and the OAU in the Management of African Conflicts, in: M. Malan (ed.) Whither Peacekeeping in Africa?, Pretoria 1999, Pretoria, http://www.issafrica.org/publications/monographs/monograph-36-whither-peacekeeping-in-africa-edited-by-mark-malan (accessed 25 August 2013). For prior relations between the UN and the OAU/AU, see also M.A. Vogt, Conflict, Resolution and Peace-Keeping – The Organization of African Unity and the United Nations, in G.M. Sørbø and P. Vale (eds.), Out of Conflict. From War to Peace in Africa, Uppsala 1997, pp. 57–78, and M.A. Vogt, The UN and Africa's Regional Organisations, in A. Adebajo (ed.), From Global Apartheid to Global Village. Africa and the United Nations, Scottsville 2009, pp. 251–268.

based on the exercise of the two organizations' respective comparative advantages (and avoidance of "the perception that the United Nations is subcontracting peacekeeping to the African Union"),[47] i.e. the AU's ability to provide a rapid response in the regions concerned and the UN's capacity for sustained operation.

Faced with what were seen as serious peace and security challenges in Africa, the emerging partnership focused on practices around two issues: peacekeeping and mediation, which were supported by development assistance to the AU.[48] To foster this partnership, the respective HQ established special formats of interaction. However, a critique has been raised that the nature of this partnership is ad hoc and technical, rather than political and strategic.[49] In 2014, the UN and the AU established a Joint United Nations-African Union Framework for an Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, and they are now regularly signing "UN-AU Framework[s] for an Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security" to guide their bilateral relation.[50]

The most pronounced element of the AU-UN partnership evolved around peacekeeping in the ongoing conflict in Darfur, Sudan.[51] In December 2007, the AU Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) was transformed into the AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).[52] As the chairperson of the AUC recalls:

> *As part of the transition to UNAMID, the UN provided a light and a heavy support package to AMIS, funded through UN assessed contributions. In establishing UNAMID, the two institutions ventured into the practicalities of harnessing the advantages that the UN enjoys due to its universal character and those of the AU due to its regional character*

47 UN General Assembly (UNGA) and UN Security Council (UNSC), Report of the African Union-United Nations Panel on Modalities for Support to the African Union Peacekeeping Operations, A/63/666 and S/2008/813, 31 December 2008, p. 39.

48 See UNSC, Presidential Statement on the Relationship between the United Nations and Regional Organizations, in Particular the AU, in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, S/PRST/2007/7, 28 March 2007. See also D.Y. Wondemagegnehu, The African Union-United Nations Inter-Organizational Cooperation for Peace: Unraveling an Emerging Partnership, Leipzig 2017.

49 See AUC Chairperson, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Partnership between the African Union and the United Nations in Peace and Security: Towards Greater Strategic and Political Coherence, PSC/PR/2 (CCCVII), 9 January 2012.

50 See Joint United Nations-African Union Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security. New York, 19 April 2017 (mimeo). See also U. Engel, The African Union and the United Nations: Crafting international partnerships in the field of peace and security, in A. Adebajo (ed.), The African Union: Regional and Global Challenges, London, New York (forthcoming).

51 Cf. C.D. Coning, The Emerging UN/AU Peacekeeping Partnership, in: Conflict Trends, (2010) 1, pp. 3–10; Institute for Security Studies, Summary Report of Seminar on The AU Report on the AU and UN Partnership: Towards a Comprehensive Redefinition of the Interface between the Regional and the Global?, Pretoria 2012; P.D. Williams and A. Bourtellis, Partnership Peacekeeping: Challenges and Opportunities in the United Nations-African Union Relationship, in: African Affairs, 113 (2014) 451, pp. 254–278; A. Bourtellis and P. Williams, Peace Operations, the African Union, and the United Nations: Toward More Effective Partnerships in Peace Operations, New York 2013, and P.D. Williams and S.A. Dersso, Saving Strangers and Neighbors: Advancing UN-AU Cooperation on Peace Operations, New York, 2015.

52 See AU PSC, Report by the Chairperson of the Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the Hybrid Operation in Darfur, PSC 79th meeting, PSC/PR/2 (LXXIX), 22 June 2007; and UNSC, Resolution S/RES/1769, 31 July 2007.

and other relevant factors. UNAMID is essentially an interesting experiment of marrying universalism and regionalism.[53]

Yet, Darfur remained the only hybrid AU-UN mission. Though the UN supports, for instance, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which was authorized by the AU PSC on 19 January 2007,[54] it clearly favours an African lead in this second major peace support operation of the union, which should be based on a clear though somewhat limited mandate (which, for instance, does not include antipiracy activities), as can be deduced from the current debate on the future of AMISOM.[55] In two cases – the CAR and Mali – AU-led missions have been transformed into UN-led missions: in 2013 the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) transited to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation au Mali, MINUSMA), and in 2014 the International Support Mission in the CAR (Mission Internationale de Soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite Africaine, MISCA) changed to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR (Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en Centrafrique, MINUSCA). However, in Somalia, the initial vision of the AU of transitioning AMISOM to a UN peacekeeping operation has not yet taken place. Above all, the UN remained an important source of funding for AU PSOs – with an average cost of some $7 billion per year.[56]

The second area of the emerging AU-UN partnership revolves around mediation in ongoing conflicts, in particular in Darfur.[57] As the chairperson of the AUC recalls:

In May 2005, the then Chairperson of the AU Commission appointed Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, former OAU Secretary-General, as the AU Special Envoy for the Inter-Sudanese Political Talks on Darfur. While Dr. Salim worked closely with the UN Mediator, Mr.

53 AUC Chairperson (fn. 49), §61. For more background on the field of peace support operations and the AU/UN partnership in this area see UN Secretary-General, A Regional-Global Security Partnership: Challenges and Opportunities. Report by the Secretary-General, A/61/204 – S/2006/590, 28 July 2006, and Report of the Secretary-General on the Relationship between the United Nations and Regional Organizations, in particular the African Union, in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, S/2008/186, 7 April 2008. See also UNSC, Presidential Statement, S/PRST/2010/21, 22 October 2010; and AU PSC, Report of the Chairperson … (fn. 50); and Note on the Report of the African Union-United Nations Panel on Modalities for Support to African Union Peacekeeping Operations, PSC 178th meeting, PSC/PR/2 (CLXXVIII), 13 September 2009.

54 AU PSC, Communiqué on AMISOM adopted at the 69th PSC meeting, PSC/PR/Comm. (LXIX), 19 January 2007, and UNSC, Report by the Chairperson of the [AU] Commission Pursuant to Paragraph 21 of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2036 (2012) on United Nations Support to the African Union Mission in Somalia, S/2012/176, 26 March 2012.

55 See AU PSC, Report of the African Union Commission on the Strategic Review of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), presented at the 356th PSC meeting, PSC/PR/2 (CCCLVI), 27 February 2013.

56 Engel, The AU Finances (fn. 37). See also UN Peacekeeping Fact Sheet http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml (accessed 24 October 2017).

57 However, this field of mediation is not closely related to other ongoing mediation efforts by the AU and the RECs in the case of unconstitutional changes of government or election-related violence. See U. Engel (ed.), New Mediation Practices in African Conflicts, Leipzig 2012. A process of reassessing lessons learned in African mediation is currently underway and coordinated by the secretariat of the AU Panel of the Wise.

> *Jan Eliasson, nonetheless it was difficult for them always to harmonize their positions. Thus the Mediators themselves argued for the need for the appointment of a single joint Mediator who would present a unified position to the parties. Thus, in June 2008, the Secretary-General of the UN and I appointed Mr. Djibril Yipènè Bassolé as the Joint AU-UN Chief Mediator for Darfur (JCM), to lead the efforts to reach a negotiated solution of the protracted conflict in Darfur.*[58]

Finally, this process led to the signing of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur on 14 July 2011. Another example of the emerging partnership in mediation was the 2007/2008 post-electoral conflict in Kenya, where Kofi Annan assumed a major role in a situation when the AU did not have a mediation unit:

> *The AU and UN have embarked on successful partnerships in mediation in other theatres, most notably in Kenya in 2008. The Panel of Eminent African Personalities, which was chaired by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, was established by the AU to mediate in the post-electoral conflict between the two main parties in Kenya, following the disputed elections of December 2007.*[59]

These two forms of cooperation between the AU and the UN were supported by UN-sponsored forms of "capacity-building": on 16 November 2006, in Addis Ababa, the chairperson of the AUC and the UN secretary general signed a Declaration on Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation: Framework for the Ten Year Capacity Building Programme for the AU,[60] which was drafted in response to the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document.

In combination, these various practices led to a densification of experiences and responses to contemporary globalization processes in the field of peace and security. Basically, through the HQ of the two IOs, joint understandings and policy responses were negotiated and facilitated, effectively leading to an advanced level of synchronization of problem perception and problem-solving strategies.

3.2 Social Space of Communication

Emerging practices in PSOs and mediation called for improved and more institutionalized channels of communication between the HQ of the AU and the UN. First and foremost, this pertained to the AU PSC and the UN Security Council (UNSC). On 14 December 2006, the union's PSC decided to establish a coordination and consultation mechanism between itself and the UNSC.[61] Two years later, a panel was established

58 AUC Chairperson (fn. 49), §72.

59 AUC Chairperson (fn. 49), §79. The AU Mediation Support Unit was finally established in 2016.

60 Ibid.

61 AU PSC, Decision on the Establishment of a Coordination and Consultation Mechanism between the African Union Peace and Security Council and the United Nations Security Council. Adopted at the 68th PSC meeting, PSC/PR/Comm. (LXVIII), 14 December 2006.

between the two.[62] On 1 July 2010, a UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) was opened, headed by a special representative of the UN secretary general. In the same year, on 25 September 2010, the UN secretary general and the chairperson of the AUC launched the AU-UN Joint Task Force (JTF) on Peace and Security to coordinate "immediate and long-term strategic issues of common interest between the two organizations."[63] Again the AUC's chairperson summarizes:

> *The PSC and the UNSC have established close links. Since 2007, the two organs have organized five consultative meetings, alternating between Addis Ababa … and New York … The partnership between the two Councils is based on the recognition that successful collective action relies on an effective cooperation between the two organs.*[64]

And furthermore:

> *Significantly, the annual consultations are not between the two Councils, but rather between the PSC and members of the UNSC. Moreover, the consultations have been limited due to time constraints.*[65]

In addition, at an operational level, assessments of joint missions increasingly play a role in establishing lessons learned and best practice, at times involving additional actors, such as the EU or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).[66] More generally, this partnership is supported by regular meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa at the UN in New York. To organize communication at these different policy levels, the AU had to establish, both at strategic policy and at desk officer levels, focal points, procedures, and routines that would enable it to systematically link its HQ to that of the UN; to translate AU decisions to the UN, and to learn to read the UN.[67] Thus, the increased entanglements on peace and security issues not only linked the HQ of the AU and the UN as sites of collaboration, but also created a social space between the two IOs.

3.3 Cultural Learning

This last section offers an analysis of knowledge transfer and production, evolving around peace and security in the social space of collaboration, that has emerged between the AU and the UN. How exactly is the union making use of the social and cultural capital acquired in interaction with other HQ of IOs? The specific forms of cultural learning

62 UNGA/UNSC (fn. 47), and UNSC, Presidential Statement, S/PRST/2009/3, 18 March 2009.

63 AUC Chairperson (fn. 49), §57.

64 Ibid., §42.

65 Ibid., §44.

66 On a joint assessment mission, one year after the UGC in Guinea-Bissau on 12 April 2012 by ECOWAS, the AU, the EU, the UN, and the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa, CPLP) see AU, Report of the Joint ECOWAS/AU/CPLP/EU/UN Assessment Mission to Guinea-Bissau [16-21 December 2012], Addis Ababa 2013 (mimeo).

67 See Engel, The African Union and the United Nations (fn. 50).

observed in this case study is looked at in two areas: conflict prevention, and the emergence of new intergovernmental norms and a related set of practices. At first glance, the common denominator in both cases is that the union is acting in a policy field, where the initial process of defining policy responses seems to rest with the UN (one could, of course, easily argue that some of the issues emerged in parallel and that there are always some African roots to a particular debate). In a second step, the AU then, through interaction with the HQ of several IOs (and not only the UN), adapts and develops concrete tailor-made solutions for its purposes. These are mainly at the level of principles and norms. In a third step, which could be described as creatively developing innovations, the AU is actually implementing certain policies of its own.

3.3.1 Conflict Prevention

The international debate on conflict prevention emerged in the mid 1990s at different places and in parallel, mainly in response to developments in the Balkans and in Rwanda. Apart from the European dialogue between the EU Commission and various advocacy international NGOs, the UN system was the most important site to frame this debate.[68] In 1998, the UN secretary general established a crucial distinction between operational conflict prevention on the one hand – involving early warning, preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment, and early humanitarian action – and structural prevention on the other, involving preventive disarmament, development, and peace building.[69]

When the OAU was transformed into the AU during the years 1999–2002, the main mandate of this new institution was the prevention, management, and resolution of violent conflict; hence the core objective of the continental body is the promotion of peace, security, and stability in Africa.[70] Among others, the AU is based on the principles of peaceful resolution of conflicts among member states of the union "through such appropriate means as may be decided upon by the Assembly," as well as "respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance."[71] To further these objectives and support its principles, the union's policies of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention involve key actors and institutions, first and foremost but not exclusively the PSC, the AUC chairperson, the Panel of the Wise, and the CEWS.

Once member states had adopted conflict prevention as their policy (it already featured strongly in the 1993 OAU Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, but now really took centre stage), the AUC was tasked to develop detailed implementation roadmaps towards the operationalization of these policies. Here, a number of truly innovative decisions were taken, also in comparison to other IOs. This holds true,

68 See U. Engel, Conflict Prevention and Early Warning, in M. Middell (ed.), Routledge Handbook on Transregional Studies, London (forthcoming).

69 UNGA/UNSC, The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa. Report of the Secretary-General, A/52/871 – S/1998/318, 13 April 1998.

70 Organization of African Unity, Constitutive Act … (fn. 1), §3 (f).

71 Ibid., §§4 (e), (m).

for instance, for CEWS, which started to partly adopt UN templates for conflict analysis, but then changed them according to its own needs and embedded them in a far broader set of analytical and IT-driven tools.[72] In the end, the AUC came up with a sophisticated early-warning system that is currently being coordinated and harmonized with related mechanisms of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and within the AUC.[73] Likewise, the union struggles with the concept of structural conflict prevention, especially because it is usually preoccupied in fire-fighting mode with ongoing conflicts. In fact, the PSC has drawn attention to a number of serious institutional challenges, which include

> *… the lack of effective preventive structures in many African countries, inconsistency in the implementation of some of the continental policy instruments, lack of capacity and resources that could allow the AU to intervene timely in some crisis situations before they escalate, and lack of the necessary clout to dissuade actors from engaging in activities that could lead to conflict.*[74]

Self-critically, the PSC posits that the Union's

> *… lack of capacity constitutes a challenge for conflict prevention in that the continental body often has to rely on external support to enable it to implement many of its own policy recommendations, a situation that has at least two major consequences. One is that it is beholden to the decisions of external actors and their appreciation of the pertinence and urgency of its pronouncement. This means that many opportunities may be lost for timely action for preventive purposes. A second consequence is the message this situation sends to actors targeted by preventive action, as these actors often perceive AU's injunctions as toothless, and are therefore not deterred.*[75]

Inspired by the ECOWAS, the AUC therefore has developed a Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework (which was endorsed by the RECs in June 2013 and the PSC in April 2014):[76]

> *Structural prevention is composed of measures to address structural/root causes of violent conflict. … Structural prevention activities should support inter alia the balancing of political, economic, social and cultural opportunities among all segments of society, contributing to the strengthening of democratic legitimacy, effectiveness of governance, peaceful conciliation of group interests, bridging of dividing lines among different seg-*

72 Cf. E.-G. Wane et al., The Continental Early Warning System: Methodology and Approach, in: Engel and Gomes Porto, Africa's New Peace and Security Architecture (fn 14), pp. 91–111.

73 See African Union Commission, Meeting the Challenges of Conflict Prevention in Africa. Towards the Operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System, Leipzig.

74 PSC, Report of the Peace and Security Council on its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa, Assembly/AU/5 (XXI), 26 May 2013, Addis Ababa, §164.

75 Ibid., §165.

76 ECOWAS, The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (Regulation SC/REG.1/01/ 08), mimeo. See AU PSC, Communiqué issued after the 502nd PSC meeting held in Addis Ababa on 29 April 2015 [PSC/PR/COMM.2(DII)].

> *ments of society. It includes longer term measures designed to address the structural causes of conflict at a very early stage through: [preventive peace-building, preventive disarmament, and preventive development].*[77]

The main purpose behind this process is to take the policy coordination and harmonization role described in the 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union[78] seriously and to overcome the above-mentioned deficits in operationalizing the APSA. In 2012/2013, fresh momentum was given to this debate by the political crisis in Mali, where France intervened in January 2013 to prevent a takeover of the country by armed jihadist movements.[79]

3.3.2 New Intergovernmental Norms

The AU is based on a commitment to democratic values, good governance, and respect for human rights, as well as adherence to universal principles as enshrined in the 1945 UN Charter and the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights.[80] Commitment of member states to these core values varies considerably; most norms are contested and constantly renegotiated. Therefore, it is of particular relevance that the AUC, in coalition with a number of like-minded member states, managed to frame an African discourse on "shared values."[81] Closely linked to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981), the union picked up a debate on UCGs, which the OAU had already started in the mid 1990s.[82] In response to cases of electoral violence, debates on extra-constitutional presidential third terms, which often turn violent, and a resurgence of coups d'état, the union came up with a firm position on how to address UCGs. It developed a policy script that increasingly has been enacted since 2008.[83]

UCGs were defined as (1) a military coup d'état against a democratically elected government; (2) an intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically-elected govern-

77 African Union, Draft Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework, Addis Ababa 2013 (mimeo), §28.

78 African Union, PSC Protocol … (fn. 33).

79 As for the recent AU debate on preventive diplomacy, see AU PSC, Communiqué issued after the 360th PSC meeting, PSC/PR./COMM (CCCLX), 22 March 2013.

80 Organization of African Unity, Constitutive Act … (fn. 1); United Nations, Charter of the United Nations. San Francisco, 26 June 1945, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/, and United Nations, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1948, http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr (accessed 24 October 2017).

81 AU Assembly, Declaration on the Theme of the Summit: "Towards Greater Unity and Integration through Shared Values." Adopted at the 16th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Assembly/AU/Decl.1 (XVI), 30–31 January 2011.

82 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 1981. Adopted at the 17th Ordinary Assembly of OAU Heads of States and Government held in Nairobi, Kenya, on 24–27 June 1981, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev.5, http://www.hrcr.org/docs/Banjul/afrhr.html (accessed 24 October 2017). See I. Souaré, The AU and the Challenge of Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa, Pretoria 2009, and K. Sturman, Unconstitutional Changes of Government: The Democrat's Dilemma in Africa, Johannesburg 2011.

83 AUC Chairperson, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission to the PSC on the Prevention of Unconstitutional Changes of Government and Strengthening the Capacities of the African Union to Manage Such Situations, Assembly/AU/4 (XIV), Addis Ababa 2010. See also U. Engel, The African Union and Nediation in Cases of Unconstitutional Changes of Government, 2008–2011, in: Engel, New Mediation Practices … (fn. 57), pp. 55–82.

ment; (3) the replacement of democratically-elected governments by armed dissident groups and rebel movements, or (4) the refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party after free, fair, and regular elections.[84] Through the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, which was adopted in January 2007 but only entered into force in February 2012, this definition was broadened to also include (5) "any amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instruments which is an infringement on the principles of democratic change of government."[85]

The policy script the union is applying quite rigorously in most cases now starts with a condemnation of the perpetrators of UCGs by the AUC chairperson, a meeting of the PSC, and the suspension of the perpetrators of the UCG for a six-month period from the activities of the union until constitutional order is restored. In the meantime, the chairperson makes use of fact-finding missions, seeks the contribution of African leaders and personalities, and enlists the collaboration of relevant RECs (and other IOs). If necessary, the AU Assembly, and essentially the PSC, imposes targeted sanctions to press for a restoration of constitutional order.[86]

Again, the AUC buys into an international norm discourse (on democracy, elections, and governance) and develops innovative policy scripts that are increasingly applied in practice. Although this policy is openly rejected by roughly a third of member states, who (at the time of ratification) have refused to sign the African Charter,[87] it is a good example of the way in which the interaction between HQ of IOs is creating cultural capital that is creatively utilized by the AU.[88] The innovation, firstly, is in the development of norms to govern interstate relations on the continent. In this case, established practices of sovereignty and non-interference in the affairs of member states are slowly eroded and replaced by rule-based commitment to the restoration of constitutional order (whatever this order may be, though). Secondly, an innovation can also be seen in the coordination of policy responses by the union, member states, and RECs – often in close collaboration with international partners such as the UN or the EU through International Contact Groups (ICGs). This originality extends to the details of organizing new workflows and creating feedback loops between the union and its partners at very practical levels, involving different departments of the AUC but also the respective desk officers at the HQ of various IOs.[89]

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84 OAU, Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government, AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI), Addis Ababa 2000, p. 3.

85 AU Assembly 2007, African Charter … (fn. 34), §23(5).

86 Ibid.

87 African Union, List of countries which have signed, ratified/acceded to the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, Addis Ababa, 17 January 2012, http://www.achpr.org/instruments/charter-democracy/ratification/ (accessed 21 November 2017).

88 Cf. M. Finnemore, International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy, in: International Organization, 47 (1993) 4, pp. 565–597.

89 For details see Engel, New Mediation Practices … (fn. 57), and A. Witt, Order by Default. The Politics and Power of Post-Coup Interventions in Africa, PhD. Thesis, University of Leipzig 2015.

Despite the examples of an emerging AU-UN partnership given above, fundamental differences sometimes remain with regard to policy and style, as demonstrated in the case of the jihadist insurgency in Mali. When the UN Security Council decided on 25 April 2013 to establish MINUSMA; requested "the Secretary-General to subsume the United Nations Office in Mali (UNOM) into MINUSMA, with MINUSMA assuming responsibility for the discharge of UNOM's mandated tasks, as of the date of adoption of this resolution," and further decided "that the authority be transferred from AFISMA to MINUSMA on 1 July 2013,"[90] the AU PSC noted on the very same day "*with concern* that Africa was not appropriately consulted in the drafting and consultation process" [emphasis UE], which led to the adoption of this resolution.[91] The PSC stressed that "this situation is not in consonance with the spirit of partnership that the AU and the United Nations have been striving to promote for many years" and noted "that the [UN] resolution does not adequately take into account the foundation laid by the African stakeholders," i.e. "the launching of the process towards the return to constitutional order, the initiation of the ECOWAS-led mediation, the adoption of the transitional roadmap and the mobilization of the support of the international community through the Support and Follow-up Group on the situation in Mali."[92] The PSC also pointed out that the resolution ignored "the concerns formally expressed by the AU and ECOWAS and the proposals they constructively made to facilitate a coordinated international support for the ongoing efforts by the Malian stakeholders."[93]
In its report on the state of peace and security in Africa to the Golden Jubilee Summit, held in May 2013 in Addis Ababa, the PSC reiterated this point. Beyond the specific case of Mali, the PSC reasoned, "the ambition of Africa to own peace efforts on the continent and to exercise leadership … is challenged by at least two factors." First, by insufficient funding by the continent of the initiatives of the AU and the RECs, and, secondly, by

> *… the shortcomings of the partnership with the United Nations, in particular with regard to consultation with the AU before decisions on issues of fundamental importance to Africa are made by the Security Council. There are many examples, in recent years, which illustrate this regrettable situation, sometimes reducing the continent to being a mere spectator in the shaping of its own destiny, whose outlines, if not actual details, are determined elsewhere with agendas that are not always in harmony with Africa's concerns.*[94]

So what went wrong? The unusually strong statements by the AU PSC can only be understood in light of the union's experience with the crisis in Libya in 2011, when it was deliberately sidelined by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its allies, and essentially blocked to try "African solutions for African problems."[95] Against

90 UNSC, Resolution S/RES/2100, 25 April 2013, §7.
91 AU PSC, Communiqué on Mali adopted at the 371st PSC meeting, PSC/PR/COM. (CCCLXXI), 25 April 2013, §10.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 AU PSC, Report of the PSC (fn. 74), §10 (see also §132).
95 Cf. AUC Chairperson, Report by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on Current Challenges to Peace

this background, the AUC chairperson, in a report to a PSC meeting held at the level of heads of state and government on 23 September 2013, on the fringes of the UN general assembly in New York, re-emphasized that the AU-UN partnership should be based on the following principles: (1) respect for African ownership and priority setting; (2) flexible and innovative application of the principle of subsidiarity, and (3) mutual respect and adherence to the principle of comparative advantage.[96]

4. Conclusion

With a view to analyse the changing spatialities of power and shifting sovereignties in current processes of globalization, this text investigated the HQ of the AU. It did so through the lens of portals of globalization and a focus on (1) new, dense practices emerging in response to experiences in the field of peace and security; (2) newly established social spaces of communication, and (3) forms of cultural learning, creativity, and innovation emanating from this condition. The case study on the AU and its partnership with the UN demonstrates that such an approach could add value to the understanding of IOs and their role at the centre of managing the reterritorialization of contemporary processes of globalization.
But, obviously, this statement calls for some qualifications: HQ of IOs are real social entities as much as they are also symbols for the “global governance” arenas in which the conditions of global entanglements are negotiated. In practice, the actual negotiations are carried out along webs, hubs, and spokes. However, the assertion of sovereignty in current processes of globalization by the AU and the dialectic of deterritorialization and reterritorialization in the field of peace and security, call for more detailed analysis than could be provided in this text. Suffice to say that as much as the union tries, and partly also manages, to gain sovereignty over transnational and privatized forms of organized violence, at the same time member states are de facto ceding sovereignty to the union in the area of peace and security. Through its collaboration with the UN, the AUC is trying to boost its own sovereignty, in particular since 2007. The HQ of the two IOs are in fact at the heart of these processes, demonstrating a vivid portal agency in IR.

and Security on the Continent and the AU’s efforts “Enhancing Africa’s Leadership, Promoting African Solutions” to the Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government, Addis Ababa 25/26 May 2011. EXT/ASSEMBLY/AU/2.

96 AUC Chairperson, Report on the African Union – United Nations Partnership: The Need for Greater Coherence, PSC/AHG/3 (CCCXCVII), 23 September 2013, §4. See also AU PSC, Communiqué on the AU/UN Partnership adopted at the 397th PSC meeting held at the level of Heads of State and Government in New York, PSC/AHG/COMM/1 (CCCXCVII), 23 September 2013. See also the Joint United Nations – African Union Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, New York, 19 April 2017.