

# Between East and West: The Cold War, Japan and the 1964 Tokyo Olympics

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## RESÜMEE

Die Olympischen Spiele 1964 in Tokio dienten als Spektakel und Medienereignis dazu, die Idee einer einzigartigen asiatischen Identität mit der einer komplett neuen, modernen, ökonomisch entwickelten und demokratischen Gesellschaft zu verbinden. Japan wurde als ein nachahmenswertes Beispiel für einen erfolgreichen Modernisierungsprozess beworben, in dessen Verlauf es seine asiatische Identität und kulturelle Einzigartigkeit nicht verloren habe. Der Artikel untersucht, wie vor dem Hintergrund der ideologischen Prioritäten des Kalten Krieges die Frage nach der japanischen nationalen Identität in Debatten über den ‚Westen‘ und über ‚Asien‘ diskutiert wurde. Japan versinnbildlichte 1964 eine ‚globale Moderne‘ nicht nur durch die Transformation seiner Infrastruktur. Nationale Identität wurde auch ein ‚Konsumartikel‘ und ein ‚Japan‘ entstand, das unabhängig von der symbolischen Politik der Olympischen Spiele existieren konnte und jungen Japanern in den Metropolen eine scheinbar unpolitische nationale Identität offerierte. Dieses Bild wurde sowohl dem internationalen wie auch dem nationalen Publikum vermittelt und kann im Rahmen seiner Beschreibung von ‚Japan‘, dem ‚Westen‘ und ‚Asien‘ als ein Produkt des Kalten Krieges betrachtet werden.

*Understood in its totality, the spectacle is both the outcome and the goal of the dominant mode of production... the spectacle epitomizes the prevailing model of social life.*

Guy Debord<sup>1</sup>

The Tokyo Olympics held in October 1964 were the first to be held in Asia. Indeed they were the first to be held in a non-white, non-western country. They were also the first

1 Guy Debord, *The Society of the Spectacle*, Zone Books, New York 1995, 13.

to be telecast internationally, live and in colour, the first to use computer technology to record the results of the sporting events, and the first time a fibre glass pole was used in the Pole Vault competition.<sup>2</sup> In as much as the Olympics have long been considered a 'Western' event, their hosting by 'non-western' cities has mostly been interpreted in terms of the attainment by the host of certain social and economic conditions, usually marking the Games as a 'rite of passage' for the host country in the eyes of the international audience and the domestic public. But the Games in Tokyo in 1964, no less than those in Beijing and Seoul more recently, tell as much about the changing international political environment as about the social and economic development of the host country.

In many ways, the overarching imperative to make the Tokyo Olympiad a success was driven by the desire to flaunt the fact that, in the words of the Japanese government's 1956 white paper, the 'postwar is over.'<sup>3</sup> When novelist and cultural critic Yasuoka Shōtarō (1920–2013) claimed that the Tokyo Games brought a certain amount of peace to the hearts of the Japanese people after the worries of the immediate post war, and critic Etō Jun (1932–1999) watched an opening ceremony that 'showed a Japan which could at last take its place in the world', the same could no doubt be said for South Korea in 1988 and China twenty years later.<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, the hosting of the Olympics in East Asia has not simply demonstrated a growing worldwide homogeneity. The Games have very often emphasised distinctive Asian histories, priorities and identities more than what William Tsutsui has called 'a unitary global modernity.'<sup>5</sup>

The 1964 Tokyo Olympics as a spectacle and media event sought to combine the idea of a unique Asian identity with a thoroughly modern, economically advanced democratic society. In doing so, it demonstrated how the recurring question of 'universality and cultural integrity'<sup>6</sup> confronted Japan within the context of Cold War rivalries and rapid economic growth. For the domestic audience, as well as for the 'advanced countries' the Games presented 'Japan' as more than ready to play its role in the global modernity of the 1960s. Peace loving and democratic, the Japan on display in 1964 had thoroughly abandoned the militaristic, feudal tendencies of the 1930s and 1940s and could now be completely reintegrated into international society.<sup>7</sup> Less than twenty years after the end of the war the Games also projected an image of a rebuilt, modern country, centred on

2 <http://www.olympic.org/tokyo-1964-summer-olympics> (Accessed on December 17, 2012).

3 Sekiguchi Eri, 'Tokyo Orinpiku to Nihon Banpaku Hakurankai' (The Tokyo Olympics and the 1970 World Fair), in Oikawa Yoshinobu Ed. *Tokyo Orinpikku no Shakai Keizaishi* (The Socio-economic History of the Tokyo Olympics), 2009, Nihon Keizai Hyōronsha, Tokyo, 1-38; Yoshikuni Igarashi, *Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese Culture, 1945-1970*, 2000, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 143-163; Christian Tagsold, 'Modernity, space and national representation at the Tokyo Olympics 1964', *Urban History*, Vol. 37, No. 2, August 2010.

4 Ueyama Kazuo, 'Tokyo Orinpikku to Shibuya, Toyko' (The Tokyo Olympics and Shibuya), in Oikawa Yoshinobu Ed. *Tokyo Orinpikku no Shakai Keizaishi* (The Socio-economic History of the Tokyo Olympics), 2009, 39-74; William Tsutsui 'Introduction', in William Tsutsui and Michael Baskett Eds. *The East Asian Olympiads*, 2011, Global Oriental, Leiden, 1-22.

5 William M. Tsutsui, 'Introduction', in William M. Tsutsui and Michael Baskett, Eds. *The East Asian Olympiads 1934-2008: Building Bodies and Nations in Japan, Korea, and China*, 2011, 15.

6 Stefan Tanaka, *Japan's Orient: Rendering Pasts into History*, 1993, University of California Press, Berkeley, 68.

7 Noriko Aso, 'Sumptuous Repast: The 1964 Tokyo Olympics Arts Festival', *Positions* 10:1, Spring 2002, 8.

its capital city Tokyo, which offered up an example of modernization to be emulated by other countries in Asia. Within the popular media this idea of a Japan that had successfully followed the path of modernisation laid down by the 'free world', and had apparently 'caught up with the West' was one, which nevertheless retained its Asian identity and retained its cultural uniqueness.

The Tokyo Olympics confirmed Japan's existence in the world, and confirmed for the Japanese people their identity within a world of nations. There were vast, widely celebrated transformations which aimed to turn Tokyo into a modern, cosmopolitan city. 97.25% of the budget for the Games was spent on urban expansion and infrastructure improvement.<sup>8</sup> As the popular photographic magazine *Asahi Graph* recalled a few weeks after the closing ceremony: "The children of Tokyo had (the fact of) their existence among the many countries of the world burned into their eyes, and the visitors experienced first-hand the heart and energy of the Japanese people (*Nihonjin*). It was a truly precious month."

Regarding the Tokyo Olympiad, Christian Tagsold has argued that, "symbolic politics and the burden of history called for image management not simply in order to enhance marketing opportunities but to reconstruct national identities."<sup>9</sup> Yet, this paper shows how the growth of a consumer society within the context of almost a decade of high-speed economic growth, firmly embedded the reconstruction of Japanese national identity within the marketing opportunities presented by a youth led vibrant consumer society. As an event, the Tokyo Olympics was about consumption, and when "Tokyo turned out to be the most cosmopolitan city in the world during the 15 day Olympic Games..." it was in those spaces of consumption that this became a reality. As the *Asahi Graph* continued: "Tokyoites saw men and women from all the continents in the world at shopping centres, entertainment places and parks."<sup>10</sup> The 1960's was a period when "high school students' and University students' new ways of living and feeling brought about a change in the scenery of the imagination,"<sup>11</sup> and, to the extent that this changing scenery was about consumption, it was literally made concrete by the alterations in the actual scenery of Japan itself as the Games approached.

This paper will argue that an analysis of the popular media in Japan in the lead up to the 1964 Olympics exposes the tension between the emphasis on a distinctive cultural identity and the 'global modernity' of the Cold War. In the context of the Olympics, the question of Japan's national identity emerged in the popular press as a debate over the nature and desirability of consumer society. These debates informed ideas of nation in Japan throughout the period of high speed economic growth and made clear Japan's place in the global order of so-called 'free world capitalism.' As Shunya Yoshimi has shown, by the early 1960s Japanese companies had begun to assert a certain amount of national

8 Tsutsui, 2011, 14.

9 Christian Tagsold, 'Modernity, space and national representation at the Tokyo Olympics 1964', *Urban History*, Vol. 37, No. 2, August 2010, 291.

10 'Afururu Kokusai Iro' (Overflowing with International Colour), *Asahi Graph*, November 6<sup>th</sup> 1964.

11 Nakamura Masanori, Sengoshi (Postwar History), 2008, Iwanami Shoten, 107.

pride in their advertising of new consumer goods.<sup>12</sup> From this perspective Japan was, by 1964, an example for other Asian countries to follow as it epitomised 'global modernity' not only through the transformation of its infrastructure. The very nature of national identity was transformed into an article of consumption, one which could be separated from the symbolic politics of the Games and allowed an apparently depoliticised idea of nation to emerge.<sup>13</sup> This shift affected the way both Asia and the West figured domestically in the formation of ideas of nation. Japan's re-emergence onto the world stage as a 'bridge between East and West' was not simply related to the numerous feats of civil engineering carried out to make the Games a reality, it was also about the presentation of a lifestyle firmly embedded, ideologically if not economically, in consumption. Yet, this 'Japan' was just as much a product of Cold War concerns as the democratic, peaceful, economically advanced 'Japan' of modernisation theory. The debates framed the Olympics as a national and international event, and tied the policies of high-speed economic growth pursued since the mid-1950s directly to the ideological concerns of the Cold War.

### Japan as a Role Model

During and after the Bandung Conference, many in Japan saw an opportunity for the country to position itself as 'neither Eastern nor Western' but having an original civilisation which fitted the country to be the ideal bridge between the Cold War powers.<sup>14</sup> In the late 1950s, Japan's increasing economic role in Southeast Asia provided the ideal means to fulfil this position. After the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952, the issue of war reparations to countries in Southeast Asia was combined with the Japanese government's desire for economic development in the region. Japanese leaders sought to promote economic cooperation and create markets for the rapidly growing Japanese economy. The region offered Japan the cheap raw materials and markets neces-

12 Shunya Yoshimi, 'Consuming America, Producing Japan', in Sheldon Garon and Patricia L. Maclachlan Eds. *The Ambivalent Consumer: Questioning Consumption in East Asia and the West*, 2006, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 79-82.

13 Kosaku Yoshino discusses the connection between nationalism and consumption in the popularity of *Nihon-jinron* (theories of Japaneseness). Whilst Yoshino focuses on the 1980s and the consumption of a particular kind of 'cultural nationalism', driven by elite discourse and apparently detached from the state, this article takes a broader view. Ideas of nation are grounded in everyday experience and the Tokyo Olympics provided the opportunity for the people to see and experience the emergence of the country as 'modern'. See Kosaku Yoshino Ed, *Consuming Ethnicity and Nationalism, Asian Experiences*, 1999, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu; for a discussion of national identity as grounded in everyday experience see Tim Edensor, *National Identity, Popular culture and Everyday Life*, Berg, Oxford, 2002.

14 Ikeda Sôgo, 'Sengo Nichibei Kankei ni Okeru Nihon Gaikô no Aidentiti' (Japan's Diplomatic Identity in the Context of Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations), in Hasegawa Yuichi Ed. *Nihon no Gaikô no Aidentiti* (Japan's Diplomatic Identity), 2002, Nansôsha, Tokyo, 195-198; Ronald P. Dore, 'Japan's Place in the World', *The World Today*, Vol. 22, No. 7, (Jul, 1966), 304-306; Kweku Ampiah, 'Japan at the Bandung Conference: An attempt to assert an independent foreign policy', in Iokibe Makoto, Caroline Rose, Tomaru Junko, John Weste Eds. *Japanese Diplomacy in the 1950s: From Isolation to Integration*, 2008, Routledge, New York, 79-97.

sary to build up capital reserves and begin to bridge the ‘dollar gap’. Yet Japan’s position in the post-war world was closely tied up with decolonisation in Asia and the ideological power politics of the Cold War. It was closely linked to the transformation of order in the region.<sup>15</sup> Throughout the 1950s, Japan’s war reparations, paid in the form of services and capital goods, were explicitly designed to, and did, “facilitate integration with Southeast Asia” whilst easing the path for Japanese influence in the region.<sup>16</sup>

After 1945, as the Japanese Empire was disbanded and international power politics divided along ‘Free World’ versus ‘Communist Bloc’ lines, the strategic imperatives of the United States and its allies shifted. The immediate post-war emphasis of the Occupation authorities on stripping Japan of military and economic power and punishing the country’s wartime leaders ceded to the necessity of finding a way to bring the country back into the post-war world, in particular into Asia. Unaware of the strength of nationalist feeling in the colonies of Southeast Asia and lacking an overall post-war plan for the region, the European and American colonial powers feared that instability could provide fertile ground for pro-communist movements. The longer the transfer of sovereignty took, the weaker the anti-communist nationalists and the colonial powers. By 1949, U.S Policy Planning Staff Paper 51 emphasised the importance of Southeast Asia in the battle against communism in Asia and the importance of relations between Japan and Southeast Asia for the economic revival of both regions.<sup>17</sup> Japan’s advance into the region throughout the 1950s then, “proceeded with the tacit acceptance of the United States” which worried that the vacuum created by the retreat of the colonial powers would be filled by communist influence. “Japan’s return to Southeast Asia overlapped with decolonisation and the Cold War, and Japan’s return to Asia was thus closely linked to the transformation of the order in this region.”<sup>18</sup>

After the boom of the Korean War, reparation payments through the provision of services and products continued to fuel domestic production in Japan and provided ready-made export markets for Japanese firms. Trade with Asia increased more than 300% in the ten years between 1957 and 1967. But, aside from the purely economic benefits, the policy is also credited with sowing the seeds of a conscious independent identity in Japan’s international relations. This was further bolstered by the policies pursued by the Kishi government in the late 1950s.<sup>19</sup> During the same period, the Japanese domestic

15 Taizo Miyagi, ‘Post-War Japan and Asianism’, *Asia-Pacific Review*, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2006; John Weste, ‘Japan in British Regional Policy Towards southeast Asia, 1945–1960’, in Iokibe Makoto, Caroline Rose, Tomaru Junko, John Weste Eds. *Japanese Diplomacy in the 1950s: From Isolation to Integration*, 2008, 34–54.

16 William S. Borden, ‘Cooperation in Southeast Asia, 1950–1954’, in *The Pacific Alliance: United States Foreign Policy and Japanese Trade Recovery, 1947–1955*, 1984, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison; Akira Suehiro, ‘The Road to Economic Re-entry: Japan’s policy toward Southeast Asian Development in the 1950s and 1960s’, *Social Science Japan Journal*, Vol 2, No 1, 1999.

17 Kenichi Goto, *Tensions of Empire: Japan and Southeast Asia in the Colonial and Postcolonial World*, 2003, Ohio University Centre for International Studies, Athens. See Chapter 11.

18 Taizo Miyagi, ‘Post-War Japan and Asianism’, *Asia-Pacific Review*, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2006.

19 Ikeda, 2002. Sakamoto Kazuya, ‘Conditions of an Independent State: Japanese Diplomacy in the 1950s’, in Makoto Iokibe Ed. *The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan*, 2011, Routledge, London, 50–80.

economy grew at a rapid rate and by 1964 according to a government white paper the standard of living in Japan was equal to that of countries in Western Europe. The policies pursued at Bandung in 1955, and then through the Kishi administration, gradually put Japan in a position economically, to take over much of the burden of leading the development of the region from the United States.<sup>20</sup> By the early 1960s, this was as much political as economic.

From the mid-1950s, historian and diplomat Edwin Reischauer had pressed the need for the downplaying of the American model in advancing the cause for democracy in Asia because, “to the extent that we identify democracy exclusively with the United States, we are actually undermining our cause in Asia, for then we make democracy seem hopelessly unobtainable.”<sup>21</sup> Reischauer did not offer up Japan as a role model to take the place of the United States, but, by early 1960, the United States National Security Council had made clear its desire to “use Japan as an example to the less developed countries of the feasibility of achieving rapid economic progress within a framework of free institutions.”<sup>22</sup> Nevertheless, by 1964, as Ronald Dore pointed out, Japanese attempts to claim a place alongside the developed world whilst siding with the interests of its poorer Asian neighbours were becoming increasingly difficult.<sup>23</sup> How Japan was understood in the region became a pressing issue as its economic power increased. Not only that, but Japan was still not accepted as a part of the ‘developed world’ of the West.

In July 1964, three months before the start of the Tokyo Olympics housewives magazine *Fujin Kōron* carried an article based on a roundtable discussion, which focused on the way people in other Asian countries viewed Japan. The article was accompanied by a picture of Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato on a visit to Southeast Asia, and sought to examine the way ordinary people in Asia understood Japan’s diplomatic policies in the region and what that meant for their views on the country itself. After recent U.N. trade negotiations in Geneva one newspaper reported that within Asia Japan was seen as an ‘advanced country’, while from the viewpoint of ‘advanced countries’ Japan was Asian. This report gave the impression that both sides – Asia and the advanced countries – had marginalised Japan. The *Fujin Kōron* roundtable hoped to understand why despite the best efforts of Japan’s diplomats to present Japan as ‘one country in Asia,’ one of the ‘three principles’ of Japanese foreign policy announced by the Kishi cabinet, Japan was still not accepted by countries in Asia as ‘a member of Asia.’<sup>24</sup>

20 Suehiro, 1999; the result of the Vietnam War was to leave Japan in the position of the most powerful country in the region, Thomas Havens, *Fire Across the Sea: Japan and the Vietnam War*, 1987; although Tadokoro Masayuki argues that this did not become evident until the 1970s, Tadokoro Masayuki, ‘The Model of an Economic Power: Japanese Diplomacy in the 1960s’ in Makoto Iokibe Ed. 2011, 83-86.

21 Quoted in John Dower, ‘E. H. Norman and the Uses of History’, in *Origins of the Modern Japanese State: Selected Writings of E. H. Norman*, 1975, Pantheon Books, New York, 48.

22 ‘U.S. Policy Toward Japan’, NSC 6008, May 20, 1960. (Accessed at <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/home.do> April 2, 2013).

23 Ronald P. Dore, ‘Japan’s Place in the World’, 1966.

24 Japanese Foreign Ministry, *Diplomatic Bluebook 1957* at [www.mofa.gov.jp](http://www.mofa.gov.jp) (accessed April 3, 2013); Sakamoto 2011, 66-69.

At a time when the United States was seeking Japan's support for operations in South Vietnam and talks between South Korea and Japan had been put on hold due to violent student protests against the resumption of bilateral relations, Tokyo University law professor Terasawa Hajime, a specialist in international law, urged the need to think about how Asian people saw Japan. The legacy of Japanese colonialism and the present Cold War between the free world and communism loomed large in the discussion. As the sub-title of the article put it 'twenty years after war how do Asian people caught up in the ideological battle between East and West see and think about a Japan which has recovered so surprisingly?' By understanding the views of ordinary Asian people it would be possible to understand the stance Japan should take in international relations. As the article saw it knowing how 'ordinary people' in other Asian countries saw the effects of Japan's diplomacy it would be possible to get to the core of how Japan should act in Asia.<sup>25</sup> The perception of a low opinion of Japan among many of the people in Asian countries was a worry for all the participants in the roundtable debate.

Maruyama Shizuo, an editorial writer for the *Asahi* daily newspaper who as a war correspondent had covered Japanese campaigns in Burma, discussed Indonesia, where during the wartime he had sensed a lot of hope and expectation among the people in regard to Japan.<sup>26</sup> Unfortunately, those hopes were dashed by the actions of the Japanese military in Southeast Asia. As Maruyama saw it, despite their initial goodwill, the Indonesian people were left understandably disappointed. With the end of the war and the dismantling of the Japanese Empire "whether in Singapore or Manila" the people's opposition to Japan in light of the actions of what he referred to as 'bad Japanese soldiers' grew stronger and anti-Japanese sentiment continued to rise. Nevertheless, the journalist was optimistic that over the next three or four years feelings would become much more favourable towards Japan. In analysing the way Japan was viewed in Asia, Maruyama sensed a feeling of affinity towards Japanese as fellow Asians. He put this shift in opinion down to the recent rapid development of the Japanese economy and a growing respect for the way Japan had overcome the total destruction of the war. In most countries of Asia, as Maruyama saw it, the feeling that there was something to learn from Japan's policies of high-speed growth was now very strong. Ômori Minoru, head of foreign news for the *Mainichi Shimbun* agreed that feeling towards Japan's present economy and the feelings in most countries during the war were completely different.<sup>27</sup> By the mid-1960s, for many Asian countries the Japanese experience offered a path to economic success and development which would allow those post-colonial countries to stand on their own two feet.

25 'Kongetsu no shoten: Ajia ni okeru tai Nichi kanjô'(Focus of the Month: Feeling Toward Japan in Asia), Fujin Kôron, No 577, July 1964.

26 See Maruyama Shizuo, 'A New Asian Approach to Asia', in Joyce C. Lebra Ed. *Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere in World War II: Selected Readings and Documents*, 1975, Oxford University Press, London, 171-175.

27 'Kongetsu no shoten: Ajia ni okeru tai Nichi kanjô'(Focus of the Month: Feeling Toward Japan in Asia) Fujin Kôron, No 577, July 1964.

Travelling around Asia, journalist Obokata Kôhei had been struck by the wealth of Japan. During the discussion he chose to emphasise the fact that Japan's position in the Cold War under the protection of the United States 'nuclear umbrella' was essential to this. In a section of the debate entitled 'Blissful Japan,' he explained how Japan's wealth had come about predominately because of the security of the country. When he met with political leaders in Taiwan, Laos, and Korea they had all told him that Japan was in a position to develop its economy safe from the fear of communism because Vietnam was the focus of the battle between the United States and the Soviet Union. Obokata claimed that at first he didn't pay much attention to these comments, but after thinking about it he had to admit that "having a military budget of 2 per cent of the people's earnings and the Anpo treaty" Japan had "absolutely no fear of communism."<sup>28</sup> Despite the fact that all over Asia the battle between left and right still raged, Japan was secure because of her "blessed geography."

As the participants in the roundtable debate pointed out, there was an emerging respect for Japan among many Asian countries, particularly with regard to the economic advances it had made. Japan was portrayed as a role model for many countries hoping to overcome their positions as pawns in an ideological battle between the free world and the communist bloc. The commentators all saw Japan itself as having moved beyond those ideological struggles, struggles which had been the hallmark of much of the debate over ideas of nation in Japan in the early and mid-1950s.<sup>29</sup> Yet, as Obokata hinted, the problem of Japan's seeming subordination to the United States could negatively influence feeling toward Japan in many Asian countries. While the *Fujin Kôron* debate presented Japan as a leader on the world stage and an example to other countries in Asia, the 'low key diplomacy' of the 1950s needed to appear further disengaged from U.S policy in the region if Japan was to be fully accepted as 'one country in Asia.' The problem of finding the right balance between Japan as 'West' and Japan as 'East' was firmly embedded in the concerns of the Cold War. In his commemoration speech to mark Japan's accession to the United Nations in December 1956, Japanese foreign minister Shigemitsu Mamoru had claimed that Japan could be 'regarded as a bridge between East and West'.<sup>30</sup> Throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s Japan's diplomacy was characterised by attempts to "unobtrusively position Japan as an international mediator" in Asia. The Tokyo Olympics provided the opportunity to embody that role.

28 'Kongetsu no shoten: Aija ni okeru tai Nichi kanjô'(Focus of the Month: Feeling Toward Japan in Asia), *Fujin Kôron*, No 577, July 1964. The ANPO treaty refers to the U.S-Japan Security Treaty which went into effect at the same time as the peace treaty. This is the shortened Japanese name for the treaty.

29 See Curtis Anderson Gayle, *Marxist History and Postwar Japanese Nationalism*, 2002, RoutledgeCurzon, London, for a discussion of the polarized debates on nationalism in the 1950s.

30 See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/address5612.html> for a transcript of Shigemitsu's address. (Accessed January 10, 2013); Sakamoto, 2011, 66-67.



## The Virtue of Consumption

In the mid-1950s, Japanese politicians and economists sought ways of continuing economic growth after the Korean War boom. With less need for armaments and heavy industrial goods, new methods of production, along with ways and means of stimulating demand, were necessary. These were sought and developed under the guidance of the Japan Productivity Centre (JPC), established with American assistance in 1955. The first such group had been set up in Britain in 1948 with the assistance of Marshall Aid. The economic theory behind the JPC, closely linked to the emergence of the Mutual Security Agency, was an American ideology and, an important component of U.S Cold War policy.<sup>31</sup> The original aim was to increase industrial productivity, a goal that would bring about the expansion of markets, help to increase employment, and raise real wages and standards of living.<sup>32</sup> Promoting the belief that the golden egg of rapid growth in gross national product was tied to improvements in productivity, the United States had, by the time of the JPC's inauguration, already welcomed some 16,000 European managers, technicians and labour leaders paid for by the Foreign Operations Administration. U.S. aid had also financed a large series of reports on American productivity in Japan and Europe, and the efforts came to incorporate CIA personnel in the U.S. embassy in Tokyo as well as front organisations such as the Asia Foundation.<sup>33</sup>

Between 1956 and 1966, the JPC sent more than six hundred inspection groups to the United States in which more than six thousand people took part. The groups were made up of representatives of small business, academics, labour leaders, technical specialists and business leaders who studied various aspects of American manufacturing know how. As Simon Partner has shown, these groups studied and took back to Japan technical skills and knowhow, which helped to spur the development of the Japanese consumer electronics market. Yet in the late 1950s and early 1960s, by far the most important tool these tourists brought back were marketing techniques. Japanese managers came to see marketing as an essential technology “offering a solution to a problem that had plagued Japan throughout its modern history: how to find domestic outlets for the nation's growing industrial capacity.”<sup>34</sup> Throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, the power and wealth of the mass market came to be seen as best fuelled by the spending power of the middle classes.

This consumption would create a virtuous circle spurring production, which would in turn fuel people's desire to consume more. As the agro-economist Tobata Seiichi put it: “the masses are appearing on the economic stage, they are the agents of effective

31 Lonny E. Carlile, *Divisions of Labour: Globality, Ideology, and War in the Shaping of the Japanese Labour Movement*, 2005, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 218-221.

32 Andrew Gordon, *The Wages of Affluence, Labor and Management in Postwar Japan*, 1998, Harvard University Press, Cambridge M.A, 45-57.

33 Simon Partner, *Assembled in Japan: Electrical Goods and the Making of the Japanese Consumer*, 1999, University of California Press, Berkeley 124; Gordon, 1998, , 49.

34 Partner, 1999, 121-136.

demand.”<sup>35</sup> Yet these ideas and policies by their very nature were not confined to the discussions and debates of intellectuals, politicians or business leaders. The period saw the emergence of a “mass-consumption consciousness,”<sup>36</sup> and popular magazines showed their readers what they should be, what they should aspire to, and what they should and could consume.<sup>37</sup> In doing so, they deliberately constructed the 1964 Tokyo Olympics as a consumer event. As Eri Sekiguchi has argued, the Games became “a mechanism for the formation of consumer culture through a media which reflected the times, influencing society whilst changing people’s lifestyles and consciousness.”<sup>38</sup> In the popular media the transformation of the country for the Tokyo Olympiad was one aspect of this broader, Cold War influenced, shift in emphasis from a production oriented economics to a focus on the ‘consumer as king.’

The design and development of buildings central to the Games themselves, such as the stadia and the athlete’s village, were directly aimed at proving Japan’s modernity whilst reconciling its recent history. Kenzo Tange’s Yoyogi gymnasium with its ‘imagined line of sight’ towards the resting place of the Meiji Emperor, deliberately proposed a continuation between Meiji era modernisation and the postwar transformation of the country.<sup>39</sup> But wider transformations in infrastructure were also necessary in light of the hasty reconstruction of the Occupation period, which had been followed by the rapid population growth brought about by the industrialization of the 1950s. Japan, and particularly Tokyo, was dramatically rebuilt to prepare for the Games, with much of the budget for the Games being spent on urban expansion and infrastructure improvement.<sup>40</sup> Taking the previous Olympiad in Rome in 1960 as an example, the Tokyo Olympics became the trigger for large-scale urban improvement.<sup>41</sup>

According to the headline of an article in the young people’s magazine *Shūkan Heibon* in August 1964, massive building projects had, over the course of the early 1960’s, transformed Tokyo into a ‘dream modern city.’<sup>42</sup> This was an element of the vast cleanup operation beginning in the late 1950s, which took in infrastructure as well as public morality with the aim of ‘beautifying Japan’ for the foreign visitors.<sup>43</sup> To address the noxious smell emanating from the Sumida River new sewers were laid and the govern-

35 Tobata Seiichi quoted in Shinozaki Takao, ‘Shōhi wa Bitoku no Keizai Shisō’ (The Economic Thought of Consumption as a Virtue), in Oikawa Yoshinobu Ed. *Tokyo Orinpikku no Shakai Keizaishi*, (The Socio-economic History of the Tokyo Olympics), 2009, 75–98.

36 Charles Yuji Horioka, ‘Consuming and Saving’, in Andrew Gordon Ed. *Postwar Japan as History*, 1993, University of California Press, Berkeley, 279.

37 Marilyn Ivy, ‘Formations of Mass Culture’, in Gordon Ed. *Postwar Japan as History*, 1993, 247.

38 Sekiguchi Eri, ‘Tokyo Orinpikku to Nihon Banpaku Hakurankai.’ (The Tokyo Olympics and the 1970 World Fair), 2009.

39 Tagsold, 2010, 295.

40 More than \$12 billion of the total amount of \$13 billion spent on the Tokyo Olympics went into these areas. See above and Tsutsui, 2011, 14.

41 Tagsold 296; Igarashi, 2000, 143–163; Ueyama 2009.

42 ‘Yume no Kindai Toshi Tokyo shin chizu’ (The Dream Modern City: A New Map), *Shūkan Heibon*, August 27<sup>th</sup> 1964.

43 Sheldon Garon, *Moulding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life*, 1997, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 170.

ment attempted as best it could to conceal the persistence of prewar hygiene conditions and various unsightly aspects of the city. The human side of the cleanup campaign saw the metropolitan police removing “malicious violators who would damage the capital’s appearance,” targeting wounded veterans begging on the streets outside major train stations and anyone caught ‘urinating in the street.’<sup>44</sup> A policy which would not only affect the homeless as ‘*Punch-kun*’ of the young men’s magazine *Heibon Punch* pointed out: with only thirteen weeks left before the Olympic Games there was a distinct lack of public toilets. In Tokyo there were four hundred public toilets but, according to ‘*Punch-kun*,’ this was only a tenth of the number in London. Clearly, with the new law against urinating in public, for the foreign visitors flocking to Japan, going out of the hotel during the Olympics to enjoy the bars and restaurants could pose a problem.<sup>45</sup>

It had its critics, but the idea of Tokyo as a ‘dream modern city’ helped fuel the discourse over Japan’s rebirth less than twenty years after the destruction of 1945. These debates revolved around the idea of consumption and the consumer society. In the popular media, it was the promise of a modern consumer lifestyle that was being touted as the true symbol of modernity. Even the efforts of the police to eradicate crime sought to present Tokyo as “a bright space where nothing could hide in its interstices.”<sup>46</sup> The ‘*hanzai no nai akarui machi*’ (crime free, bright town) touted by the metropolitan police used ‘bright’ (*akarui*) in exactly the same way as the advertising gurus and corporate salesmen of the high-speed growth period in their promotion of a consumer driven economy. The ‘bright life’ had emerged in the 1950s as an ideological symbol, which sought to imply “the housewife-centred family and the dominance of the middle class.”<sup>47</sup> Companies such as Matsushita promoted their electronic appliances as the ‘housewives partner’ and linked the arrival of these goods in the home to democratisation, even going so far as to link the promotion of these goods to article 25 of the Japanese constitution: ‘The people of Japan have the right to enjoy a healthy and cultural life.’<sup>48</sup> This clearly reflected the deliberate shift in the wider economic discourse from a production led economy to the promotion of consumption as the ultimate driving force of economic growth. The expansion of the mass media throughout the 1950s played a central role in pushing these ideas onto Japanese social attitudes.<sup>49</sup> They strongly influenced debate and discussion over the nature of Japanese national identity as the Olympics approached.

44 Igarashi, 2000, 146-153.

45 ‘Punch-kun no Yoron Chōsa’ (Punch’s Public Opinion Survey), *Heibon Punch*, July 20<sup>th</sup> 1964, 15.

46 Igarashi, 2000, 153.

47 Partner, 1999, 145.

48 Yoshimi, 2006, 79.

49 Partner, 1999; Helen Macnaughtan, ‘Building up Steam as Consumers: Women, Rice Cookers, and the Consumption of Everyday Household Goods in Japan’, in Penelope Francks and Janet Hunter, Eds. *The Historical Consumer, Consumption and Everyday Life in Japan, 1850–2000*, 2012, Palgrave MacMillan, London, 79-104; Marilyn Ivy, ‘Formations of Mass Culture’, 1994, 239-259; Yoshimi, 2006, 75-79.

## Consuming the City, Consuming the World

In January 1964, nearly ten months before the start of the event, the *Asahi Graph* published images and commentary on the building work being carried out in Tokyo in preparation for the opening ceremony in October. The journal boasted that the Tokyo Olympiad would be: “the first celebration of beauty and power in the East, adorned with the unique ideas of Japan and supported by world class civil engineering.”<sup>50</sup> In terms of engineering, the rebuilding of Tokyo was a spectacular demonstration that Japan had achieved the standards of the economically advanced countries and the *Asahi* focused on those buildings that would host Olympic events. Meanwhile, *Shūkan Heibon* and *Heibon Punch* excited their readers with the rapid growth of opportunities for a life of leisure. A high-speed monorail to link the city centre with the country’s busiest airport, Haneda, had been constructed, new roads and highways, new subway lines, not to mention the stadiums and facilities which would be used to host the Games were impressive examples of the ‘dream modern city’ and brought vast changes to the experience of the city. “While breathing in the sea air of Tokyo Bay,” Haneda international airport was now only thirty minutes away thanks to a fantastic new highway. The nature of these changes and their basis in consumer culture was underlined by the fact that while around 50,000 people per day visited the airport itself, 20,000 of them were there purely to see the airport. For these ‘tourists’ there was a ‘flight simulator’, which gave the experience of ‘really flying in an aeroplane.’ At four to five degrees cooler than the city the airport was a great place to take in the view and the ‘leisure mood’ was epitomised by a rooftop beer garden where the beer drunk in the evening while gazing at the amazing illuminations of the airport “tasted completely different,” according to Mr Nakazawa of the airport building management company. With the opening in September of the high-speed monorail it would be possible to travel from Haneda airport to the city of Hamamatsu non-stop in just fifteen minutes. At Hamamatsu a heliport was planned next to the monorail station, a bus terminal would be built, and eventually the monorail would be extended to Shimbashi in central Tokyo.<sup>51</sup>

These above ground changes were impressive, but of greater interest to the magazines younger readers was the fact that Ginza would see a great new underground ‘date spot’ once the underground lines and the marble shopping arcades were finished. Amorous young couples would be able to “see a film in Hibiya and then enjoy shopping in Ginza.” The article also pointed out that for those who wanted to soak up just ‘a smidgen’ of the ‘gorgeous atmosphere’ at the airport there was a hotel on the third floor of the international departures lounge which could be reached (rooms for two costing 2,800 yen for three hours!) via the escalator in the lounge.<sup>52</sup> Tokyo was Japan’s capital city but other areas

50 ‘Kansei Isogu Hare Butai’ (Hurrying to Complete the Big Stage), *Asahi Graph*, January 24<sup>th</sup> 1964.

51 ‘Yume no Kindai Toshi Tokyo shin chizu’ (The Dream Modern City: New Map), *Shūkan Heibon*, August 27<sup>th</sup> 1964.

52 *Ibid.*

would not be left out of the transformation. In July 1964, the world's fastest rail network was unveiled. Capable of carrying people from Tokyo to Osaka in just three hours, it would begin passenger services right before the beginning of the Games in October. As a sign of the rapid development of the country, this was a feat of engineering which would allow the intrepid Japanese office lady to skip work for the day, visit her boyfriend in Kyoto for lunch, after that visit some temples, and easily return home by 8.30pm, then "with a look of innocence, give the excuse of overtime work" before joining in her sister's birthday party."<sup>53</sup> The country was undergoing huge changes, but for the young and predominantly single female readership of *Shūkan Heibon*, it was the promise of a lifestyle of consumption and leisure, which framed those changes.

The narrowing of the country through the development of world leading Japanese technology made travelling around the country much easier. At the same time, the lifting of restrictions on foreign travel brought the world closer through the popular media. Up to the mid-1960s it was unusual for Japanese to travel abroad. Passports were valid for only one trip, there was a \$500 limit on the amount of money that could be taken out of the country, and the Ministry of Finance had to approve the trip. Tourism was not usually considered a valid reason. In any case the cost of travel was prohibitively expensive for most Japanese so that even when restrictions were lifted in 1964 only 15.1% of overseas Japanese travellers were classed as tourists.<sup>54</sup> Nevertheless, by the year of the Tokyo Olympics, magazines such as *Fujin Kōron*, *Shūkan Heibon*, and *Heibon Punch* were promoting not only tourism, but living and working abroad.

In September 1964, *Fujin Kōron* published an article on Japanese women working abroad. According to the magazine, it was a reality that the "number of women saying 'whatever city, whatever job I want to try working abroad'" was increasing. The article explained which countries were the best for Japanese women seeking work (Argentina and Brazil if they learnt the language) and which would be difficult (Soviet Bloc countries of course).<sup>55</sup> *Shūkan Heibon* celebrated the luxury of life in Sydney where "at the age of twenty there were typists who earn 80,000 Yen per month." Not only that, the population was 1/5 of that of Tokyo and "even at the young age of twenty, around the average age to marry, it is normal for a standard middle-class household to own their own house and car."<sup>56</sup> In January 1964, the magazine published a 'travel essay' by Kanetaka Kaoru a TV presenter of Tokyo Broadcasting Services (TBS) 'Kanetaka Kaoru's World Travels,' which predicted that 1964 would be a boom year for travelling abroad.<sup>57</sup> Then in May 1964, the magazine published a travel guide for those readers who were "fed up

53 'Yume no Chōtokkyū wa Itsu Hashiru!?' (When Will the Super-Express Begin Running?) *Shūkan Heibon*, January 23<sup>rd</sup> 1964.

54 Lonny E. Carlile, 'Economic Development and the Evolution of Overseas Tourism, 1964–1994', *Tourism Recreation Research*, Vol. 2(1), 1996, 11–18.

55 'Sekai wa Nihon Josei o motomete iru,' (The World is Seeking Japanese Women) *Fujin Kōron*, September 1964.

56 'Kaigai Rupo: Hatachi de Gesshū Hachi-man Yen no Taipisuto mo iru' (Report from Abroad: There are Even Twenty Year Old Typists Earning 80,000 Yen per Month), *Shūkan Heibon*, June 18<sup>th</sup> 1964.

57 'Kanetaka Kaoru no Sekai no Tabi,' (Kanetaka Kaoru's World Travels) *Shūkan Heibon*, January 9<sup>th</sup> 1964.

of living in small Japan.”<sup>58</sup> The world was getting closer and easier to navigate. At the same time, readers of *Fujin Kōron* were urged not to look for cultural differences but to “see the world as one place, like going from Kyūshū to Tokyo.” Air travel had transformed the globe in the same way as the Shinkansen had transformed Japan. “From Tokyo to Kyūshū takes 20 hours, on a jet you can be in America in the same time. And Europe too.”<sup>59</sup> The world was getting smaller, and Japan’s young people were urged to look at the world outside Japan.

In an article in *Fujin Kōron* in February 1964, Tokyo University Professor and management guru Hayashi Shūji hoped to encourage Japanese women to travel more. Through the article Hayashi also wanted to address the questions ‘What is Western Europe?’ ‘What kind of thinking governs the daily life of the people of ‘Western Europe?’” But also to work out what ‘Western Europe’ really meant, at a time when the Japanese government claimed that their country was on a par with ‘Western Europe’ at least economically. Travel to Europe was becoming cheaper for Japanese tourists, and Hayashi recounted meeting a Japanese woman in Heidelberg who was travelling around on only three dollars a day. The woman did not speak German so in Hayashi’s opinion the trip must have been difficult, nevertheless, more freedom to travel would mean more people being able to gain this kind of experience. “Touching deeply embedded Christian culture and monuments, seeing the remains of the development of civic culture” this was all needed “to make Japanese people into world people.”<sup>60</sup> Despite what the Japanese government said about Japan reaching the levels of Western Europe, Hayashi saw Europe as a cheap place to live, work, and travel. In contrast the cost of living and travelling in Japan was very expensive. The reason for this difference in living costs was cultural according to Hayashi, and it was very evident in the large differences in the modes and means of consumption between Europe, and the U.S. and Japan.

Life was ‘cheaper’ in Europe because people placed more value on what they owned, the problem in Japan was the adoption of an American attitude to everyday consumer society. For Japanese people to live at the same level as the people in Western Europe, to ‘have central heating, eat luxurious high calorie food, wear Italian shoes, and English clothes,” they “would probably need four or five times the lifestyle costs of today.”<sup>61</sup> Housing costs were more expensive in Japan, but watches, clothes, stationery, leather goods, jewellery and other goods were also more expensive in Japan. In a consumer society this meant that Western Europe was a much cheaper place to live than Japan. For Hayashi, things became more expensive if other people did them for you, and this was a fundamental part of the culture of consumption in Japan. Hayashi’s advice to Japanese people travelling in Europe was simple, “drive the car yourself, stay in a pension, wash your own clothes, eat in self-service restaurants.” Japanese people thought Europe was expensive

58 ‘Kaigai Ryokō no Pin kara Kiri Made,’ (The Top to Bottom of Travelling Abroad), *Shūkan Heibon*, May 14<sup>th</sup> 1964.

59 ‘Sekai wa Nihon Josei o motomete iru,’ (The World is Seeking Japanese Women), *Fujin Kōron*, September 1964.

60 Hayashi Shūji, ‘Josei Seiyō no Michi’ (Women’s Path to the West), *Fujin Kōron*, February 1964.

61 *Ibid.*, 115.

because they tried to travel like they did in Japan. Japanese consumer society had developed on the basis of cheap labour and that had brought about a culture of 'service' where everyday tasks were paid for.<sup>62</sup> The implication was that Japan through its somewhat different culture of consumption was not yet among the ranks of the 'developed countries' (*senshin koku*). At the same time the country needed to distance itself from the consumer culture of the United States.

Another difference between Japan and Europe was the existence in the latter of an independent spirit. Hayashi claimed that while people in Europe would deal with problems among themselves, in Japan it was always necessary to rely on officials. To solve problems Japan always created more bureaucrats and this cost the people in tax. In Western Europe these problems were always sorted out independently. In Japan, because Japanese people were "always meddling in others affairs" people didn't care about causing other people trouble and so didn't try to solve it themselves. This led to a situation where the Japanese government treated the people like children, while in Western Europe they were treated like adults. Everyone was free to decide the best way to live but, Hayashi insisted, "if you don't treat people like adults there will be no independence. In Europe the independence which is at the base of democracy runs deep."<sup>63</sup> Japan lacked an independent people who took their civic responsibilities seriously, and the high cost of living stemmed, not only from the government's economic policies but also from a backward culture of waste. Hayashi neatly tied the economic insecurity and inequalities brought about through the policy of high-speed growth in Japan to cultural modes of consumption identified with the United States. His cultural explanation went beyond the economic though, pointing to broader problems of democratic accountability and individual independence.

In another article published in *Fujin Kōron* in August 1964, Furugaki Tetsurō described the coming Games as a national ordeal, which Japan, and particularly Japanese women would have to pass successfully. In France, the U.S, and Europe newspapers, radio, and television programmes were full of special editions about Tokyo, and Japanese cuisine, dance cabaret and restaurants had become fashionable around the world.<sup>64</sup> According to Furugaki, Tokyo would need to prepare to welcome tourists on honeymoon, celebrating silver wedding anniversaries, people celebrating retirement by 'diving into Japan', and the Japanese people wanted to give them something to remember as a once in a lifetime experience. But the overarching worry was about the reputation of Japan, 'its position in the world.'

This was not simply a problem of changing the landscape of Tokyo and cleaning up the morals of the people in the same way as the public spaces. From the point of view of the Japanese people the Games themselves were, in the author's opinion, like a school

62 Ibid. See Partner, 1999, for a discussion of the prevalence of cheap labour and its effect on the nature of the consumer culture that emerged in the early 1960s.

63 Ibid.

64 Furugaki Tetsurō, 'Orinpikku to Nihon Josei' (The Olympics and Japanese Women), *Fujin Kōron*, August 1964. Furugaki had been an ambassador to France between 1956 and 1961 although he was not a career diplomat. He also served as the head of Japan's national television station NHK.



entrance test. Furugaki saw the Games as a chance for Japan to join the ranks of the advanced countries. The modernisation this entailed, however, was, for him, something the country may later regret. Furugaki reminded readers of the eve of “the opening of the country” one hundred years earlier, in the Meiji era. In every area of society, politics, economics, manufacturing policies, “enlightenment and the catchphrase of freedom were put into practice.” At the beginning of the Meiji period, all over Japan, but particularly in Tokyo, hotels, bars and restaurants catering for high-class foreign tourists changed the nature of the country’s economy. The fear was that the transformation of the country in 1964 would, as in the Meiji period, entail the loss of something essential to Japan. Of course, Furugaki acknowledged, without things produced at home the foreign customers would have problems in the hotel lobbies, but at some point during their stay they would want to eat tasty Japanese food that was close at hand. Nevertheless, “without a Japanese person to tell them the best place to go they will be at a loss.”<sup>65</sup>

As Furugaki saw it, Tokyo had been ‘painted with the brush of the Olympics’, a mistake Paris and London before had avoided. The traditional Japanese culture, which would interest the huge numbers of tourists arriving in Japan, had gone as the city was rebuilt for the Games. People had not only visited London and Paris to experience the sport, they had also taken in the culture and history of the respective cities. There appeared to be no cultural life in Tokyo, as far as Furugaki was concerned, sport and fashion had completely taken over. The uniqueness of old Japan, or even of modern Japanese culture and tradition had gone. Tokyo had completely given itself over to the Olympics, yet “the foreign visitors, coming from one hundred and ten countries have different languages, customs, laws, history, and traditions we can’t have all of them. But *they* will all want to know about our country.”<sup>66</sup>

## Conclusion

Furugaki’s fear of the loss of a unique culture, as much as Hayashi’s questioning of Japanese consumer culture, emerge from a changing model of social life based on the supremacy of the consumer in economic discourse. As the country prepared to host the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, the question of national identity emerged in discussions of the ‘West’ and ‘Asia’, framed within the changing ideological priorities of the Cold War. If Japan was, by 1964, an example for other Asian countries to follow, it epitomised ‘global modernity’ not only through the transformation of its infrastructure. In becoming an article of consumption, the very nature of national identity was being transformed. Throughout the early 1960s, a ‘Japan’ emerged which could be separated from the symbolic politics of the Games to offer an apparently non-political sense of national identity. This ‘Japan’ was just as much a product of Cold War concerns as the democratic,

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid., 63.



peaceful, economically advanced 'Japan' of modernisation theory. Nevertheless, young Japanese could now create a Japanese national identity as they consumed the world on their travels and sampled the 'leisure mood' of their newly rebuilt capital city. And, if the reality of everyday life may still have made it difficult for most young people to experience the world first hand, the Games brought the world to Japan. In 1964, the shopping centres, entertainment places and parks thronged with young people from all the continents of the world in the 'most cosmopolitan city in the world'.