

From Soviet Kin to Afro-Asian Leader: The People's Republic of China and International Sport in the early 1960s

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RESÜMEE

In den frühen 1960er Jahren nutzte die chinesische Führung den internationalen Sport für ihr außenpolitisches Ziel der Neupositionierung der Volksrepublik China auf globaler Ebene. Damit versuchte sie auch, die bisherige geopolitische Situation in Asien gemäß ihren Interessen zu revidieren. Der Kulminationspunkt dieser Anstrengungen waren die Ersten Spiele der Neuen Aufstrebenden Kräfte (GANEFO), die im November 1963 in Jakarta abgehalten wurden und als Sport-Großereignis in vielerlei Hinsicht den Olympischen Spielen ähnelten. Die Volksrepublik leistete einen fundamentalen Beitrag zur Entstehung der Spiele, sendete die größte Delegation und gewann die meisten Medaillen. Der Artikel untersucht das Interesse und die Beteiligung Chinas an den GANEFO im Rahmen der Stärkung der chinesisch-indonesischen Beziehungen und des Versuchs, China als sozialistische Führungsmacht der afrikanischen und asiatischen Länder zu stilisieren. Die GANEFO sollten dementsprechend dazu dienen, Ideale des Afro-Asiatismus im Sinne des revolutionären Sozialismus Chinas weltweit zu propagieren.

Introduction

We the Youth of the New Emerging Forces, do hereby solemnly pledge that we will take part in our Games, in the true Spirit of Fairness, of Sportsmanship [sic] and of Solidarity among New Emerging Forces, For the Honour of our Countries and for the Victory of our Common Ideas.” – Athlete Pledge recited at the first Games of the New Emerging Forces held November 1963¹

1 China's Sports, vol. 1, 1964, 21.

In the early 1960s Chinese leaders used international sport as part of a larger effort to re-position the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the world stage, a move that fundamentally challenged and shaped the geopolitics of Asia. In the early to mid-1950s, just after the establishment of the PRC, Chinese leaders had sought to emulate the Soviet Union, including in sport. They believed in Soviet ideological superiority and they wanted China to be part of the Soviet-led international socialist movement. Following the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations in the late 1950s, however, Chinese leaders began to focus their efforts on building their influence among non-aligned and newly decolonized nations. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Chinese leaders began to see these nations – most of which were in Asia and Africa – as potential allies in a Chinese-led worldwide socialist revolution. Sports exchanges propagandized China as the natural leader for worldwide socialist revolution that would arise primarily from underdeveloped and recently decolonized nations in Asia and Africa. They believed that China's brand of socialism would serve as the model for these nations to follow.

The culmination of these efforts came in 1963 with the first Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO), a major sports mega-event that took place in Jakarta, Indonesia in November 1963 and paralleled the Olympic games in many respects. PRC involvement was fundamental to engendering these Games, they sent the largest delegation of athletes, and they won by far the most medals.

In this essay I trace the PRC leadership's interest and involvement in the GANEFO, vis-à-vis larger geopolitical changes post-World War II that led to contestations in international sport over who represented Asia (as an entity), and in the wake of new geopolitical frameworks that had emerged by the early 1960s. The Games can be attributed to strong Sino-Indonesian relations at the time, but they also show how Chinese leaders, following the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, sought to increase their influence as socialist leader among African and Asian nations. I show how Chinese leaders manipulated the relationship with Indonesia for the purposes of their own agenda: GANEFO served to spread propaganda worldwide on the Afro-Asian ideals that conveniently resonated with the Chinese revolutionary model of socialism.

Sports mega-events provide excellent venues for spreading propaganda due to their scale and spectacle. Maurice Roche defines a sports "mega-event" as a large-scale cultural event, which has "a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international significance."² Sports mega-events also have political, cultural, and economic importance, and significant consequences for the host, such as infrastructure development and increased media surrounding the event. I would further add that political consequences and national image are always tied into the hosting of any international sports mega-event. In China, sport has always been associated with overcoming a narrative of national humiliation in which China suffered in the past from "victimization" by foreigners.³ Participation in

2 Maurice Roche, *Mega-Events and Modernity: Olympics and Expos in the Growth of Global Culture* (London: Routledge, 2000), 1.

3 Peter Gries, "Nationalism, Indignation, and China's Japan Policy," *SAIS Review* 25, no. 2 (2005): 109-110.

Olympic and Far Eastern Championship Games in the first half of the twentieth century helped Chinese leaders imagine China as part of Asia (as a geographical and political entity) and within a “world of respected modern nations.”⁴

By challenging the western dominance of international sport through producing their own large sports mega-event, the GANEFO, Chinese leaders stressed their solidarity and identification with other recently decolonized and third world nations involved in the burgeoning Afro-Asian movement. They sought to strengthen the national image of China as “victor” over foreign aggressors,⁵ and as leader of the international socialist movement. Chinese socialism, they believed, had produced a state superior to that in the Soviet Union, and the GANEFO could help bolster that image nationally, in Asia, and worldwide.

Learning from the Soviet Union and the “two Chinas” issue

In the first few years of the PRC, Chinese leaders had few resources and little desire to send athletes abroad. The more pressing issues were consolidating Communist rule, building a centralized government, and the Korean War (1950–1953). Furthermore, many top sports leaders had fled the mainland following the end of the Civil War,⁶ and Communist leaders tended to be more interested in – and familiar with – mass sport (e.g., calisthenics, paramilitary drills, ping pong and basketball), than the world of international sport.⁷

Chinese leaders promoted the emulation of Soviet models in the development of new sport and physical culture (*tǐyù*) programs as part of the official policy of “leaning to one side,” which remained strong until mid-1956 and positioned China as a member of the broader, Soviet-led socialist world. The PRC received Soviet economic and military assistance and welcomed Soviet technical advisers, specialists, and experts in a wide range of fields – including social and cultural.⁸ At the center of sports and physical culture was

4 Andrew Morris, *Marrow of the Nation: A History of Sport and Physical Culture in Republican China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 141.

5 Gries, “Nationalism”, 109.

6 For example, of the three Chinese Olympic committee members from the earlier Republican period, only one, Dong Shouyi, remained on the mainland following the establishment of the PRC. The other two, Wang Zhengting and Kong Xiangxi, were ardent Nationalist leaders who fled the country during the Civil War. Hao Gengsheng, another sports leader and Nationalist, fled to Taiwan where he subsequently became the main representative for the Republic of China (ROC) in international sports organizations. For more on this issue, see Xu Guoqi, *Olympic Dreams: China and Sports 1895–2008* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008), especially pages 80–82.

7 This was largely due to the communist ideological belief in, and the leaders’ practical experience with, mass sport in Soviet base areas in the 1930s and 1940s. Ping pong, for example, was a popular recreational sport played by future Premier Zhou Enlai, and basketball – which has a history in China dating back to the YMCA’s influence in the early twentieth century – was popular with future Vice Premier Marshall He Long, who was named head of the newly founded State Sports Commission in 1952.

8 Zhihua Shen and Danhui Li, *After Leaning to One Side: China and Its Allies in the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2011), 121.

the Soviet-inspired “Ready for Labor and Defense” system, which focused on strengthening the health and fitness of ordinary citizens and building an athletic foundation. Soviet sports books and articles were translated, and Soviet experts and athletes sent to China. These “friendly” learning experiences, as they were often called in Chinese, emphasized the unilateral nature of the Sino-Soviet relationship. Chinese sports leaders claimed that working with their Soviet comrades on matters in international sport helped create friendly relations between the two countries.

When PRC leaders received an invitation in February 1951 sent by the Helsinki organizing committee for the upcoming 1952 Olympics, they decided that the decision hinged on whether or not the Soviet Union would also participate.⁹ But PRC leaders also needed Soviet support in their own Olympic battle. IOC rules technically stated that each nation could have only one National Olympic Committee (NOC), but the PRC and the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan each claimed to be the only “China.”¹⁰ Just a few days before the opening ceremonies at Helsinki, the IOC decided to allow both to attend as “China.”¹¹ The ROC withdrew in protest, while the PRC delegation arrived six days after the start of the Games and only one swimmer was able to officially compete. Despite this, PRC leaders claimed that attending the Games had been very successful in raising the international status of the PRC in light of the ROC’s non-participation.¹² Soviet athletic successes at the Olympics also impressed PRC leaders. Rong Gaotang, leader of the Chinese delegation and vice chair of the All-China Sports Federation, cited five things that the PRC needed to do: strengthen national sports leadership (and mimic Soviet sports organizational structure); centrally train outstanding athletes and create a program for future prospective athletes; hire five Soviet sports experts to come work in China; hold national games each year in every Olympic discipline; and build sports stadiums and facilities around the country.¹³

PRC leadership meanwhile instructed their Olympic delegates to rely on Soviet comrades in the IOC for advice on all matters. The Soviets gladly took on this role as part of an agenda to build their own position and influence in the IOC, promote the Soviet Union as leader in sports development, and make the IOC more inclusive (especially of African and Asian nations) – all part of their effort to “democratize” sport.¹⁴

9 Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives (CFMA) 113-00097-01: Guanyu woguo shifou canjia shiwujie aolinpike yundonghui (zai fenlan) de youguan wenjian [Related documents concerning whether or not our nation participates in the 15th Olympic games (in Finland)].

10 Christopher Hill, *Olympic Politics* (New York: Manchester University Press, 1996), 44–45.

11 Morris, *Marrow of the Nation*, 238–39.

12 CFMA 113-00158-02: Wo canjia aowehui de jue ding ji huihou baogao [Post-Games report on our decision to participate in the Olympic games], message sent from Rong Gaotang to Liu Shaoqi and the Central bureau, August 21, 1952.

13 Ibid.

14 Jenifer Parks, “Red sport, red tape the Olympic games, the Soviet sports bureaucracy, and the Cold War, 1952–1980,” Unpublished dissertation, University of North Carolina, 2009, 105–107.

In 1954 the IOC changed its rules so that territories under the control of an NOC could receive the same recognition as nations, thus recognizing both the ROC and PRC.¹⁵ Official PRC policy in this period, however, dictated that the PRC would refuse to participate in any event that also recognized the ROC as China.¹⁶ When the IOC invited both to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics, the ROC rejected, and then accepted, the invitation. The PRC delegation, in an attempt to discourage ROC participation, apparently planned to arrive at the Olympic village ahead of time – they were shocked upon their arrival to see that the ROC flag had already been hoisted. They formally voiced their discontent to the IOC and organizing committee to no avail and subsequently withdrew from the Games.¹⁷ Sino-Soviet solidarity at IOC meetings also broke down as PRC representatives felt increasingly belittled and their interests ignored. The Soviets had silenced them at a 1955 IOC meeting for having brought up the “two Chinas” issue, claiming that socialist unity was more important.¹⁸

But ideological differences with the Soviet Union following Joseph Stalin’s death in 1953 had already created a rift between the two nations, and the years 1956–1957 saw a general disintegration of this supposed socialist unity.¹⁹ The earlier emphasis on “learning from the Soviet Union” declined as Chinese leaders began to show a more active interest in pushing their own agenda. This continued into 1958, when China kicked off the Great Leap Forward, a massive political, economic, and social movement marked by an intensive propagation of Maoist ideology that stressed revolutionary action and practice. In August, as the Politburo approved the nationwide establishment of communes that accelerated collectivization and marked the beginning of the most extreme phase of the movement, the PRC withdrew from the IOC and several other international sports associations. In a letter to the IOC, Dong Shouyi, IOC member for China, accused IOC President Avery Brundage of serving the American imperialists and their “two Chinas” plot.²⁰

Nevertheless, the PRC continued to build elite sport programs and promote international sports exchanges. During the Great Leap Forward a campaign to boost the number of elite athletes over a ten-year period began,²¹ and although international sports federations affiliated with the IOC technically had rules prohibiting competitions between member and non-member nations, many countries still sent athletes to compete with

15 Hill, *Olympic Politics*, 45.

16 Liang Lijuan, He Zhenliang and *China’s Olympic Dream* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2007), 46–47.

17 Xu, *Olympic Dreams*, 85.

18 Susan Brownell, “Sports and politics don’t mix’: China’s relationship with the IOC during the Cold War,” in *East Plays West: Sport and the Cold War*, eds. Stephen Wagg and David Andrews (London; New York: Routledge 2007), 259–260.

19 Lorenz Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 46–47.

20 Dong Shouyi to IOC, 19 August 1958, International Olympic Committee (IOC) Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland.

21 Fan Hong, “China,” in *Comparative Elite Sport Development: systems, structures and public policy*, ed. by Barrie Houlihan and Mick Green (Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2007), 28.

the PRC in “friendly” (unofficial) competitions.²² In fact, these types of sport exchanges increased in the following years.²³ For the next half-decade, as exchanges with socialist bloc countries continued much as they had before, PRC leaders also forged their own path by fostering new sports relations with third world nations.

Bandung and International Sport: A Shared Struggle

These changes in sports relations came alongside Chinese efforts to get more involved in the burgeoning Afro-Asian, Third World-led movements. In April 1955, PRC Premier Zhou Enlai had delivered a memorable speech at the Bandung Conference held in Indonesia. Over two-dozen national leaders convened at Bandung to discuss future economic and cultural cooperation, united on the basis of a common opposition to colonialism and imperialism.²⁴ Those who called for the Bandung Conference, including Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Indonesian President Sukarno, were interested in looking for ways in which they could unify and represent the interests of decolonized nations in an increasingly polarized political situation. Conference participants unified around general themes expressed through a common repertoire of terms, such as “peaceful co-existence,” Afro-Asian solidarity, and the shared struggles against colonialism and imperialism. Zhou praised the goals of the conference and called for Asians and Africans to “rise against colonialism” and unite for “peace and independence.”²⁵

The Bandung Conference is often considered the beginning of the Afro-Asian and non-aligned movements, or the third world project,²⁶ as it took place in the context of massive decolonization and the rise of anti-colonial nationalist movements. Positioned between the end of European imperialism and the height of the Cold War, the Bandung meeting became an important turning point between colonial and post-colonial periods.²⁷

Despite political differences among some participants, Bandung resulted in a kind of political and moral solidarity²⁸ that Christopher Lee has recently called a “community of feeling.”²⁹ Sentimental rather than geopolitical in nature, this community united on “a shared experience of western imperialism,” with the goal to produce “a distinct, even

22 Liang, He Zhenliang, 51.

23 See: Dashiji [Record of big events] for the years 1958-1961 in *Zhongguo tiyu nianjian 1949-1991* [China Sports Yearbook 1949-1991] (Beijing: Renmin tiyu chubanshe, 1993).

24 For more on Bandung, see Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations* (New York: New Press, 2007), Chapter 2, and McDougall and Finnane, eds., *Bandung: Little Histories* (Victoria: Monash University Press, 2010).

25 Chou En-lai, “Main Speech by Premier Chou En-lai, Head of the Delegation of the People's Republic of China, Distributed at the Plenary Session of the Asian-African Conference,” in *China and the Asian-African Conference* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1955), 10, 19.

26 Prashad, *The Darker Nations*, 1.

27 Christopher J. Lee, “Introduction: Between a Moment and an Era: The Origins and Afterlives of Bandung,” in *Making a World After Empire: the Bandung Moment and Its Political Afterlives*, ed. Christopher J. Lee et al. (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010), 9-10.

28 Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*, New Ed (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 106.

29 Lee, “Introduction,” 25.

utopian alternative to the preceding era through a discourse of Afro-Asian solidarity.”³⁰ The conference offered leaders a venue to discuss colonial pasts and possible postcolonial futures. Sukarno acknowledged this purpose at the opening session:

*Our nations and countries are colonies no more. Now we are free, sovereign, and independent. We are again masters in our own house. We do not need to go to other continents to confer.*³¹

Bandung thus set the framework for the rise of a community of leaders from decolonized nations, armed with hopeful optimism for the future even as they continued to deal with decolonization's discontents at home.

In 1956, following on the heels of Bandung, Nehru called for a policy of “nonalignment” – in other words, for countries and peoples who did not wish to align themselves with either the U.S. or the Soviet Union to promote instead “nonaggression and non-interference” between countries.³² PRC leaders, not willing to completely sever relations with the Soviet Union, remained hesitant on nonalignment, but they attended the first Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity conference held in Cairo in late 1957 and subsequently joined the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) established in 1960. The AAPSO upheld many of the principles of Bandung and coincided with major changes in PRC foreign policy. The Sino-Soviet split in 1960 led to increasing isolation from Soviet “brother” countries (*xiongdi guojia*) and PRC leaders simultaneously began to compete with the Soviet Union for socialist influence in Africa and Asia. Zhou Enlai, as well other high-level PRC leaders, worked hard towards cultivating Afro-Asian relations.³³

The Non-Aligned Movement and the AAPSO both claimed that nation-states could choose independent ideological paths, but goals such as uniting oppressed peoples in anti-colonial struggles conveniently blended with the goals of international socialism as interpreted by the Chinese Communist Party. The Soviet Union, in the Chinese Communist Party’s analysis, had abandoned the international socialist movement and forgotten about oppressed peoples around the world; the PRC should instead set the example for others to follow. Socialist China, according to the PRC leadership, would lead the rest of the world in the development of peaceful co-existence and economic cooperation.³⁴

Between 1961 and 1965, the influence of Chinese leaders vis-à-vis Soviet and Indian leaders in the AAPSO reached its height.³⁵ PRC leaders participated in numerous state-

30 Ibid, 26.

31 Cited in Prashad, *The Darker Nations*, 30.

32 Jawaharlal Nehru, “Economic Development and Nonalignment” from a speech in Washington, D.C., December 18, 1956, printed in the U.S. Department of State Bulletin, January 14, 1957, 4950.

33 R. MacFarquhar, *Origins of the Cultural Revolution* Volume 3, 298, 310-312. Sino-Indian relations meanwhile deteriorated following unresolved border conflicts in 1962, and the PRC never joined the Indian-backed non-aligned movement established in 1961.

34 Mao Zedong, “Speech At The Tenth Plenum Of The Eighth Central Committee, 24,” in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung* (India: Kranti Publications, no date), http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-8/mswv8_63.htm [accessed 24 February 2012].

35 Omar Ali Amer, “China and the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization,” PhD Thesis, Université de Genève, 1972, 10.

to-state visits, but at a time when prominent international organizations like the United Nations did not recognize the PRC, sport visits and cultural exchanges with AAPSO nations often helped foster diplomatic relations. Indeed, the PRC's active establishment of sports relations with decolonized nations grew alongside these Afro-Asian and non-aligned movements. Already by 1960, as PRC and Soviet leaders competed for socialist influence in Africa and Asia, international sports exchanges had become sites for PRC leaders to promote Chinese socialism – in the name of Afro-Asian solidarity and friendship. Official sports delegation visits with African and Asian nations grew during subsequent years and included exchanges with Indonesia, Japan, North Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Mali, Guinea, Ghana, and Sudan among others.³⁶

These visits occurred in the aftermath of the disastrous economic effects following the end of the Great Leap Forward that led to a re-evaluation of sports programs in the PRC. Chinese leaders decided to use scarce financial resources exclusively for elite athletic development and specialized training programs. The International Table Tennis Federation (ITTF), one of the few international sports organizations that consistently recognized the PRC, gave the nation its first opportunity to host a major event, and in April 1961 Beijing held the ping-pong world championships. Athletes from over thirty nations showed up to watch the Chinese sweep the competition; a year later the government sent top ping-pong athletes to Africa where, in two months, they visited Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Sudan. Delegation leader Huang Zhong enthusiastically reported that the Chinese athletes had expressed “Chinese and African people's deep camaraderie” through, for example, playing exhibition matches covered by the local presses as well as visits to historic and cultural sites to learn about the “heroic struggle” of African people against imperialism and colonialism.³⁷ Huang argued that the visit also showed African people “our nation's vigorous development” and noted that efforts had been made to help Guinea, Mali, and Sudan develop their sports programs. Couched in terms of Afro-Asian solidarity, sports exchanges such as this one thus served as platforms for promoting Chinese socialism at home and abroad.

These PRC efforts to use sport as a means to expand its own influence among AAPSO nations reached an apex with the 1963 Games of the New Emerging Forces, which will be discussed in more detail below, an international sports mega-event co-orchestrated with Indonesian leaders following the Fourth Asian Games held in Jakarta in 1962. By then PRC leadership had developed a particularly close political relationship with Indonesian president Sukarno; there was no formal alliance between the two nations, but Chinese leaders and leftist Indonesian leaders shared common communist goals.³⁸ The Fourth Asian Games demonstrated the influence of PRC leaders in this relationship

36 See: Dashiji in *Zhongguo tiyu nianjian 1949-1991* for the years 1961-1965. Although sports exchanges with the Soviet bloc (i.e., the Soviet Union, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, etc.) declined, and could sometimes grow tense, they did continue in this period.

37 CFMA 108-00816-01: *Zhongguo pingpangqiu dui fangwen feizhou baogao* [Report on the Chinese ping pong team's visit to Africa], August 1, 1962.

38 MacFarquhar, *Origins*, 121, 134, 339.

as they successfully pressured Indonesian leaders to prevent ROC athletes from participation.

“Ever Onward”:³⁹ The 1962 Asian Games

The founding members of the Asian Games Federation (AGF), established in 1949, had all come from their countries’ Olympic committees – but given the political circumstances at the time, the AGF did not initially include any Chinese members. The Games, to be held every four years, were designed as regional qualifiers for the Olympics. At the first Games, held in New Delhi in 1951, the best the PRC could do was send a handful of observers; the ROC could not even manage that. When both PRC and ROC representatives attended an AGF meeting held during the 1952 Olympics, Rong Gaotang (PRC) claimed that the AGF remained separate from the Olympics, relying instead on the “cooperation of all Asian countries.”⁴⁰ But the AGF mostly followed IOC policy, and ROC athletes participated in the 1954 Manila Games.

Jakarta won the bid to host the 1962 Games in 1958, and Sukarno wanted to use the event to promote national image.⁴¹ Some members of the AGF (Japan, India and the Philippines) expressed concern, however, over how Sino-Indonesian relations might affect the Games – would the planning committee send invitations to the PRC and not the ROC (Taiwan)?⁴² Indeed, leading up to the event, Chinese embassy officials in Jakarta discussed how to exert pressure on the Indonesian Foreign Ministry and national sports leaders to prevent ROC participation.⁴³ PRC leaders, as part of a larger anti-American campaign, and in the face of a growing Sino-Soviet split, saw an opportunity to use the Games to further their own agenda.

When Hao Gengsheng, the AGF member from ROC (Taiwan), visited Indonesia in the spring – despite Indonesian promises to the Chinese that he would not – top Chinese leaders decided to take action. Vice Premier Chen Yi warned the Indonesian ambassador to China that allowing Taiwan to participate would be detrimental because it would make the outside world think that Indonesia’s policy toward China had changed. He also argued that people would suspect that Indonesia was “not determined to recover

39 The official motto of the Asian Games Federation.

40 CFMA 113-00158-02: message sent from Rong Gaotang to Liu Shaoqi and the Central bureau, August 21, 1952.

41 Stefan Hübner, “The Fourth Asian Games (Jakarta 1962) in a Transnational Perspective: Japanese and Indian Reactions to Indonesia’s Political Instrumentalisation of the Games,” *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 29, no. 9 (2012): 1298.

42 See collected news briefs from January 18, 1962 in CFMA 105-01086-03: Youguan guojia zai guoji tiyu huodong zhong dui Taiwan dangju de taidu [The attitudes of some nations towards Taiwan in international sports activities]. Also, in 1959 the IOC ruled that the ROC Olympic committee, since it did not represent the majority of the Chinese people, could not use “China” in its name. Throughout the 1960s ROC leaders protested this decision and the IOC continued to remain divided over an appropriate name. Xu, *Olympic Dreams*, 90-94.

43 See CFMA 105-01492-01: Guanyu yinni ni yaoqing Taiwan dangju canjia di si jie yayunhui wenti [Concerning the issue of Indonesia inviting Taiwan to participate in the 4th Asian Games], telegram December 2, 1961.

the [Dutch colonial territory] West Irian [West Papua].”⁴⁴ China, he noted, supported Indonesia’s counter-insurgency in West Irian,⁴⁵ while Taiwan did not. Thus it was “difficult to understand” why Indonesia wanted Taiwan in the Asian Games. A month later, during discussions on the upcoming Afro-Asian conference preparatory meeting to be held in Indonesia, the ambassador claimed that if Taiwan was banned then some nations might boycott the Games (namely Thailand, Philippines, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Japan) and that would “affect the prestige of Indonesia and Sukarno.”⁴⁶ Chen retorted that Sukarno’s prestige rested on his “anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, and peaceful founding of the country” and he compared Taiwan to West Irian, asking, “if we invited a representative group from West Irian to participate in an activity in China how would Indonesia feel?” PRC leaders simply would not do that, he claimed, because that would be “engaging together in colonialism.”⁴⁷

By late July, the Chinese embassy in Jakarta had sent numerous telegrams to Chinese leaders outlining the preparations being made for the arrival of the Taiwanese. Distressed PRC leaders called for more pressure on Sukarno, and stepped up propaganda on the “American conspiracy.”⁴⁸ An article in the popular magazine *New Sport* [*Xin tiyu*] linked the situation at the Asian Games to the IOC and its American president Avery Brundage. Outlining the entire history of the “two Chinas” issue in the IOC, it claimed that international sports organizations hypocritically stated, “sports and politics don’t mix” while carrying out their own political plot under the influence of American imperialism.⁴⁹

In August the Indonesian organizing committee made its move: the Taiwan delegation received blank slips of paper instead of entry cards for its athletes.⁵⁰ Some AGF leaders tried desperately to reverse the situation at the last minute, but behind the scenes PRC leadership pressured Indonesian leaders through their embassy in Jakarta and intelligence agents.⁵¹ Officially, Sukarno waited until the opening ceremonies to publicly ban Taiwan. Emergency AGF meetings were held and G. D. Sondhi, Indian delegation lea-

44 CFMA 105-01085-03: summary of talks between Vice Premier Chen Yi and Ambassador Sukani, May 29, 1962.

45 The West Irian was a part of the Dutch East Indies. Although Indonesia had laid claim to all former Dutch colonies following independence in 1949, the West Irian remained an area of dispute. Charles A Coppel, *Indonesian Chinese in Crisis* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1983), 24, 34. At the time of these talks, Sukarno was in the midst of military operations to take over the territory, which was still technically under the control of the Dutch. In fall 1962 the territory became part of Indonesia. R B Cribb and Colin Brown, *Modern Indonesia: A History Since 1945* (London, New York: Longman, 1995), 85-86.

46 CFMA 105-01085-03: summary of talks between Vice Premier Chen Yi and Ambassador Sukani, June 22, 1962.

47 Ibid.

48 CFMA 105-01083-01: telegram from Foreign Ministry to Chinese embassy in Jakarta, July 24, 1962.

49 “Mei diguozhuyi yi gui zai guoji tiyu huodong zhong wannong ‘liangge zhongguo’ de yinmou [America imperialism has always played the “two Chinas” plot in international sports activities],” *New Sport* [*Xin tiyu*], August 6, 1962, 2-3.

50 Hübner, “The Fourth Asian Games,” 1299.

51 See numerous telegrams sent from the Foreign Ministry to the Chinese embassy in Jakarta during August 1962 in CFMA 105-01086-01: Zhu yinni shiguan guanyu zuzhi Taiwan dangju canjia yayunhui douzheng xingshi de baogao ji yinni gejie dui Taiwan canjia yayunhui de fanying [The Embassy in Indonesia’s report concerning the forms of struggle to prevent Taiwan participation in the Asian Games and the general Indonesian reaction towards Taiwan participation in the Asian Games].

der and (IOC-friendly) AGF member, convinced the IOC executive board to withdraw support of the Games. As riots against him broke out in Jakarta, Sondhi fled, but he continued to work the IOC for suspension of Indonesian membership.⁵²

Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi meanwhile sent personal messages of thanks to Indonesian leaders for having blocked the Taiwanese delegation from participation.⁵³ Sukarno thanked the PRC for its support and replied that the event “further strengthened the friendship between Indonesia and China.”⁵⁴ Shortly thereafter, Indonesian leaders requested Chinese support for organizing an Afro-Asian sports structure. International sports organizations, they believed, needed to have a “revolution.”⁵⁵

Chinese leaders supported the idea. In an official summary of “achievements and weakness” for 1962, the State Sports Commission stated that the year’s most important accomplishments in international activities had been increasing “understanding and friendship” particularly between Asians and Africans – as well as “coordinating foreign struggles and expanding political influence.”⁵⁶ Furthermore, in light of the fact that the Olympics had become a stage for showcasing American and Soviet athletes, and Chinese ping-pong athletes had brought international glory through their wins, the leadership in the PRC knew that one way to display their power would be through the talent of Chinese athletes in a large-scale, international, multi-sport competition. Except for ping-pong, many Chinese athletes had yet to participate in any large-scale sports competition outside the socialist world. The creation of an alternative organization thus appealed not only to top leaders, but also to Chinese sports leaders and athletes.

In early February 1963, the IOC passed a resolution that would suspend the Indonesian Olympic Committee, who then voluntarily withdrew from the IOC.⁵⁷ Sukarno subsequently announced the creation of a new international sports organization, the Games of the New Emerging Forces. Politically inspired by the Bandung conference, the GANEFO would have specific and explicit political aims in line with Sukarno’s larger political project. He believed that the world was made up of “New Emerging Forces” and “Old Established Forces.” The “New Emerging Forces” constituted “all countries opposing imperialism and colonialism and struggling for justice and prosperity,”⁵⁸ whereas the old forces were essentially those of colonialism. Apart from these political aims, the Games themselves would resemble the Olympics in nearly every aspect.

52 Hübner, “The Fourth Asian Games,” 1295, 1304-1305.

53 CFMA 105-01085-05: Zhou Enlai zongli, Chen Yi fuzongli dui Yinni zuzhi Taiwan dangju canjia yayunhui biaoshi ganxie [Premier Zhou Enlai and Vice Premier Chen Yi express their thanks for Indonesia blocking the participation of Taiwan in the Asian Games], September 3, 1962.

54 CFMA 105-01085-06: Youguan Yinni zongtong Sukanuo zhixin Zhou Enlai zongli, Chen Yi fuzongli shi [Letter from Indonesian President Sukarno to Premier Zhou Enlai and Vice Premier Chen Yi], October 4, 1962.

55 CFMA 105-01789-05: Yinni zhushiguan dashi Sukani tan yayunhui he dierci yafeihuiyi wenti [Indonesian ambassador Sukani discusses the Asian Games and the 2nd Afro-Asian conference issue], October 12, 1962.

56 “1962 nian quanguo tiyu gongzuo huiyi jiyao (zhailu) [Summary of the 1962 nationwide sports conference (extract)] in *Tiyu yundong wenjian xuanbian 1949–1981* [Selected documents on sports] (Beijing: Renmin tiyu chunbanshe, 1982), 85.

57 Ewa Pauker, “Ganefo I: Sports and Politics in Djakarta” (*Asian Survey* 5, no. 4 (1965), 173.

58 “Imperialist Intrigues in Olympic Games,” *Peking Review*, February 22, 1963, 8-9.

From the start, PRC leaders played a central role in seeing the GANEFO come to fruition. A week after the announcement Zhou Enlai wrote Sukarno in praise of the decision to uphold “the national dignity of Indonesia as well as that of the Asian-African countries and peoples.” “The Chinese government and people,” he stated, would “strive jointly with the Government and people of Indonesia to bring about the realization of this proposal.”⁵⁹

But the Chinese interest in GANEFO also extended beyond the Sino-Indonesian alliance, with the intent to use the event to re-position China on the world stage as the Afro-Asian leader. Chinese leaders privately concluded that even though Sukarno’s definition of “new emerging forces” was “vague”, China should “strive for the GANEFO to become a gradual realization of African-Asian-Latin American strength and a world competition opposite to the IOC.”⁶⁰ Even though participation in this first GANEFO would probably be limited, the potential long-term importance was enough to conclude that “no matter how many athletes, what the budget” they should “make [this first one] happen.” So confident were Chinese leaders of their own influence among African and Asian nations that the only concern they had was possible Soviet-led sabotage.

“Onward! No Retreat!”: the GANEFO as Idea

The first GANEFO preparatory conference, held in April 1963, sheds light on the overlapping (and sometimes disparate) political goals of both the PRC and Indonesian leadership. Sukarno’s opening speech emphasized that the main purpose of the Games was to unite nations in the struggle against imperialism. Starting with a quote from Bertrand Russell that the world is divided into two communities, that of the “Declaration of Independence” and that of the “Communist Manifesto,” Sukarno stated that some people said there was now a “third community” among the peoples and countries of Asia and Africa. But, he stated, mankind was still divided into two communities, “the community of the Old Established Forces, and the community of the New Emerging Forces!”⁶¹

According to Sukarno, the problem was not the Olympics per se, but rather current IOC leadership. He reiterated support for the original Olympic principles to “build an international structure of sports that encourages the flowering of international respect, friendship, and peace” and tied it to the Indonesian revolution’s aim to build a “new world order of friendly brotherhood” which also included sports. Turning to China, he

59 CFMA 105-01833-01: Zhou Enlai zongli zhihan yinni zongli Sujianuo zhichi yinni tuichu guoji aolinpike weiyuanhui [Premier Zhou Enlai’s letter to Indonesian President Sukarno supporting Indonesia leaving the IOC], February 20, 1963.

60 CFMA 105-01169-01: Guanyu wo zhichi zhaokai xinxing lilian yundonghui de fangzhen [Policies concerning our support of holding the GANEFO], March 23, 1963.

61 GANEFO Preparatory Committee, Documents on Preparations of the First GANEFO, and Conference of the Preparatory Committee in Djakarta, November 1963 ([N.p.] Secretariat of the GANEFO Preparatory Committee, 1964), 3.

asked, “Were you not excluded from these International Games [i.e., the Asian Games], because you are said to be communist?”⁶²

PRC representative Huang Zhong gave by far the most supportive speech in favor of the GANEFO, with anti-Americanism (and anti-ROC policies) high on his agenda. Both Indonesia and the PRC had suffered from “discrimination, restriction and interference” by the IOC “under the manipulation of the American imperialist elements” – the GANEFO would unite countries in the “common struggle against imperialism.”⁶³ A clause was also added to the GANEFO charter, stating that only one sports delegation from each country could participate; in other words, excluding the ROC from eligibility.⁶⁴ Practically speaking, the GANEFO were to be nearly identical to the Olympics in format, structure, inspiration, and overall goals. The only difference was in the overtly political message it wanted to project; technically, the Olympic committee claimed it was apolitical, while the GANEFO argued that sports were absolutely political.⁶⁵ The committee adopted general Olympic ideals, such as sportsmanship, international friendship, and peace. The development of independent youth sports movements in all countries was encouraged. Friendly, equal, amateur competitions would be held every four years in a country from the “New Emerging Forces.”⁶⁶

The committee for the GANEFO, consisting of four vice-presidents from Asia, Africa, Latin American, and Europe, would send invitations to nations, but other nations (or “forces” who were not yet nations) could also apply to participate.⁶⁷ Indonesia was chosen to host the first GANEFO mostly because it already had the infrastructure and facilities built for the Fourth Asian Games – originally built with funding from the United States and the Soviet Union.⁶⁸ An International Village for athletes, complete with a press house, transportation facilities, and a guesthouse, would be offered free of charge (paid for by the Indonesian government) to participating athletes. Twenty Olympic sports would be played over a period of 12 days and an arts festival would accompany the event.⁶⁹

A flag, song, logo, and other symbols and emblems were designed uniquely for the GANEFO. The logo used on all official event publications was a revolving globe with a sea of flags and the words “Onward! No Retreat!” – a specific reference to the “Ever Onward” motto of the Asian Games. It accompanied official publications, including committee

62 See Sukarno’s speech at the GANEFO preparatory conference in CFMA 105-01833-02: Yinni yaoqing wo canjia xinxinglilang yundonghui choubai huiyi he xinxinglilang yundonghui ji wo fang fuzhao [Indonesia invites us to participate in the GANEFO preparatory conference and we reply], 32-36.

63 Ibid., 23.

64 GANEFO Federation, Charter of the Games of the New Emerging Forces, the GANEFO (n.p., 1963), 19.

65 IOC President Brundage had been claiming for years “sports and politics don’t mix” without realizing that this was in itself taking a political stance. For more on this issue, see Allen Guttman, *The Games Must Go On: Avery Brundage and the Olympic Movement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), especially Chapter 9.

66 GANEFO Preparatory Committee, Documents, 5.

67 Ibid., 11.

68 Pauker, “Ganefo I”, 171.

69 GANEFO Preparatory Committee, Documents, 22-23.

documents, press releases, and reports from the games. The globe represented "Onward!" in the motto and symbolized a march "toward a new world...eternally new" based on "the right conviction and ideals." The flags represented "No Retreat!" and symbolized nations "fighting for truth and justice" by participating in "an international unity to build together a new world, to eliminate imperialism and colonialism in all their manifestations."⁷⁰



Official logo of the Games of the New Emerging Forces⁷¹

Beneath all this talk of unity, preparations for the first GANEFO also brought to light the Sino-Soviet competition for influence in Asia and Africa. The Soviets interpreted Chinese leadership in the GANEFO as an attempt to divide the world of international sport, in which they had invested so much time and effort.⁷² At the preparatory meeting the Soviet representative asked that the Games "not be bound with any limitations concerning future participation of national sports organizations in the world sports movement, official championships of the world... and Olympic Games."⁷³ The Soviets felt they had to participate in the GANEFO for the purposes of maintaining relations with Afro-Asian and socialist countries. At the same time, they had already made significant headway with and bolstered their own position in the IOC, and one of their goals was to hold the Olympics in Moscow. Hence they did their best to negotiate the use of Olympic language in GANEFO documents, while also trying to convince the IOC that the GA-

⁷⁰ GANEFO Federation, Charter, 13.

⁷¹ Logo taken from GANEFO Opens New Era in World Sports; Chinese Sports Delegation in Djakarta (Beijing: Renmin tiyu chubanshe, 1964).

⁷² Parks, "Red sport," 184-186.

⁷³ GANEFO Preparatory Committee, Documents, 23.

NEFO would be significant in African and Asian countries as meetings of youth, rather than sports competitions – and thus in no way competing with the Olympics.⁷⁴

PRC leaders meanwhile remained determined to show the rest of the world that the PRC was the socialist and Afro-Asian leader. In May, the *Peking Review*, the English-language mouthpiece of the CCP, stated that GANEFO was the first time the “anti-imperialist peoples” had “their own” international sports organization like the Olympics. But, unlike the (presumably imperialist-run) Olympics, GANEFO remained faithful to promoting “friendship and understanding and serving the interests of world peace.”⁷⁵ A government media directive in July stated that GANEFO served to break the “monopoly and control” of imperialists in international sports organizations and would help nations develop independently, while strengthening mutual exchange and friendship among Asian, African, and Latin American countries. The GANEFO would be an important aspect of the “international political struggle...an anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle in the international sports world.”⁷⁶

Media was asked to promote the Games as much as possible, including reporting abroad on Chinese sports activities and at home on Indonesian preparations and activities, as well as on sports in other participating nations. Particular emphasis was to be placed on the “struggles” in the international sports world, especially those taking place in IOC meetings.⁷⁷

The State Sports Commission prepared by choosing the very best Chinese athletes to send to the GANEFO, and provided ample funding for their delegation and to the Indonesian government for the event. In some cases they even offered to fund several delegations from other countries.⁷⁸ Indonesian leaders also prepared by promoting the event, organizing an art exhibition, constructing a new hotel, and training “a hundred translators.”⁷⁹

In October the number of GANEFO attendees remained unclear even as Chinese leaders geared up to also send acrobatic troops, sports movies, and Shanghai singing troupes to Indonesia.⁸⁰ Chinese leaders privately estimated that, in the best-case scenario, more than thirty countries would participate, competitions would be organized well and results would be good, leading to a permanent structure. In the worst-case scenario, there

74 Parks, “Red sport,” 180-187, 197.

75 “GANEFO: Sports and Anti-Imperialism,” *Peking Review*, May 3, 1963, 19.

76 Shanghai Municipal Archives (SMA) B126-1-688: Guanyu xinxing liliang yundonghui de xuanchuan yaodian [Propaganda points concerning the GANEFO], July 13, 1963.

77 SMA B126-1-688: Guanyu xinxing liliang yundonghui de xuanchuan baodao jihua [Media coverage plan concerning the GANEFO], August 28, 1963.

78 Xu, *Olympic Dreams*, 53.

79 CFMA 105-01169-02: Zhu Yinni shiguan dui “xinxing liliang yundonghui” qingkuang de fenxi baogao ji xiezhu jinxing gexiang zhunbei gongzuo qingkuang [Embassy in Indonesia report on the analysis of the GANEFO situation and status on assistance in preparatory work], October 8-9, 1963.

80 The Foreign Ministry sent out numerous telegrams to cultural bureaus in October 1963. See CFMA 105-01548-03: Guanyu canjia xinxing liliang yundonghui yanchu de wo yishituan, canzhantuan, shying deng wenti [Issues concerning our performing arts troops, exhibition troops, photography, etc.]

would be fewer than ten countries, results would be dismal, and the GANEFO would be “destroyed by imperialism and old revisionist elements.”⁸¹

Meanwhile, IOC leaders seemed unconvinced of the Soviet claim that this was just a youth festival and they persuaded international sports federations to institute a 12-month ban on Olympic participation for any GANEFO athlete.⁸² Brundage privately wrote that the GANEFO had become “unquestionably the first move in a campaign to take over international sport in one way or another.”⁸³

The first GANEFO: “a revolution in athletics”

The first GANEFO opened on November 10 to great fanfare. At the opening ceremonies in Jakarta's Bung Karno stadium, a 100,000-person crowd greeted athletes from forty-eight nations. President Sukarno officially opened the games and recognized the PRC delegation, followed by recitation of the athletes' pledge, a torch lighting, and a flag procession. The Indonesian Minister of Sports then declared the GANEFO the beginning of “a revolution in athletics.”⁸⁴

The Games lasted twelve days and attracted media worldwide. By the early 1960s, the Olympic Games had already long been a media spectacle, but few others sporting events could boast the same amount of exposure. *The Japan Times* stated conservatively that GANEFO's “victory” was simply that it had occurred.⁸⁵ France's *L'Équipe* meanwhile ran day-by-day detailed accounts on every aspect of the GANEFO, including extended commentaries on the ceremonies, competitions, speeches, the International Village, and the lives of athletes.⁸⁶ *The New York Times* covered the (mostly Chinese) athletic achievements of the Games. After just four days, the Chinese team had already won seventy-six medals,⁸⁷ and on November 18, the article “China Dominates Jakarta Games” listed the names of Chinese athletes and events in which they had picked up additional gold medals.⁸⁸ When athletes broke world records, they reported that, too.⁸⁹ In the end Chinese athletes won sixty-five gold medals; in second place was the Soviet Union with twenty-seven.⁹⁰

81 CFMA 105-01548-03.

82 Susan Brownell, “Globalization is not a Dinner Party: He Zhenliang and China's 30-Year Struggle for Recognition by the International Olympic Committee” (paper presented at the Conference on Globalization and Sport in Historical Context, University of California, San Diego, March 2005), 19.

83 Personal correspondence from Avery Brundage to Otto Mayer, 9 November 1963, IOC Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland.

84 “Hail the First Games of the New Emerging Forces,” *Peking Review*, November 15, 1963, 21.

85 “Sukarno's GANEFO Is An 'Emerging Sport; How to Qualify? Bite Hand That Feeds You,” *The Japan Times*, November 11, 1963.

86 See *L'Équipe*, November 11-23, 1963.


87 “Chinese Capture 7 First Places,” *New York Times*, November 15, 1963, 54.

88 “China Dominates Jakarta Games,” *New York Times*, November 19, 1963, 69.

89 “Chinese Weight-Lifter Sets World Record in Jakarta,” *New York Times*, November 12, 1963, 71.

90 “First GANEFO Comes Through with Flying Colors,” *Peking Review*, November 29, 1963, 18.

In China, *New Sport* devoted its entire November issue (and a substantial portion of its December issue) to the GANEFO. *People's Daily* published numerous articles and photographs on its front page. Articulated in the language of the Afro-Asian movement, these publications reiterated GANEFO's political goals of unity in the struggle against colonialism and American imperialism. For example, a cartoon published in *New Sport* shows a character resembling JFK, who dons a shirt with the characters "imperialism" and carries a caricature of a colonialist on his shoulders, as evidenced by the word "colonialism" on his hat. A sports ball inscribed with the words "Games of the New Emerging Forces" slams into the face of the colonialist, knocking him back. Song lyrics accompanied this cartoon, reminding readers that the "New Emerging Forces link up and surge forward" in order to "oppose imperialism and colonialism!"



Political cartoon in *New Sport*, November 1963

Media in the PRC also emphasized the success of the GANEFO alongside critiques of the IOC and American imperialism. A *People's Daily* cartoon printed less than three days into the Games depicts a diverse parade of athletes, happily and gallantly marching ahead led by a Chinese male athlete who carries a flag that says "Games of the New Emerging Forces." The athletes seem in complete ignorance of the three men holding sports equipment in the bottom right corner, one of whom wears a shirt with Olympic rings and the letters "US" on it, one man who wears boxing gloves, and one who holds a baseball bat.



“The Games of the New Emerging Forces”⁹¹

Another cartoon, printed a week into the Games, was even more brutal. Depicting three men in business suits, each with his head buried in a mound of sand, the banner above declares this the “International Olympic Committee Ostrich Competition.” From left to right, the mounds read: “non-recognition of GANEFO”, “non-recognition of new world records”, and “we don’t know anything about the Games of the New Emerging Forces.” The caption asks: “Who can keep their head buried the longest?”



“The International Olympic Committee Ostrich Competition”⁹²

91 People's Daily, November 13, 1963.

92 People's Daily, November 17, 1963.

Photographs of the GANEFO circulated by the PRC were also positive and stressed that the GANEFO offered athletes of all nations the opportunity for cultural sharing, friendship, cooperation, and mutual aid. Whether in the form of newspaper articles, magazines, images, athlete interviews, or post-event books and publications – the reader was constantly reminded that friendship and sharing was far more important than competition between athletes and countries.⁹³ The International Village was depicted as a place where athletes from various countries shared cultural experiences, while an art exhibition displayed works from different countries, and cultural performances from seven countries accompanied events.⁹⁴ The *Peking Review* stated that all athletes “learned from each other so that they all raised their athletic level together,”⁹⁵ while the *People’s Daily* declared that every nation’s athletes had throughout, whether during practice and competition, “helped each other, cared for each other, exchanged experience, open-mindedly learned from each other, [and] the playing field brimmed with a spirit of solidarity [and] friendship.”⁹⁶ Similar statements accompany pictures from the Games and show athletes smiling, laughing, and helping one another during and outside of competition. The GANEFO was “a reality of tremendous power and potentials” stated *China’s Sports*. “Athletes from various countries will meet again in the future. The torch of GANEFO will burn brightly forever.”⁹⁷

PRC leadership also reiterated support of this new tradition in sports. Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai sent a message to Sukarno declaring that the GANEFO marked a “victory gained by the people of the new emerging countries in their struggle against the... monopoly of international sports by imperialism.”⁹⁸ No matter what actually occurred in competition, they believed that the GANEFO would “become a household name.”

Aftermath

Following the successful first GANEFO, delegates from thirty-six nations met immediately in Jakarta to establish a permanent GANEFO organization.⁹⁹ After just two hundred days of preparation, the number of participants had proved to them that despite “fighting and struggling” many nations had awoken “in the spirit of confidence

93 See, for example, GANEFO-related articles in: *China’s Sports*, Vol 1, 1964 and *People’s Daily*, November 16, 1963.

94 “GANEFO: New Wave in Sports And Friendship,” *Peking Review*, November 22, 1963, 17-18.

95 “First GANEFO Comes Through with Flying Colors,” 19.

96 “Tianjing changshang chengji youyi shuang fengshou [A double bountiful harvest of track and field achievements, friendship],” *People’s Daily*, November 16, 1963.

97 *China’s Sports*, Vol 1 1964, 10.

98 “Hail the First Games of the New Emerging Forces,” 22.

99 For more on the establishment of a permanent GANEFO organization, see Chris Connolly, “The Politics of the Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO),” *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, 29:9 (2012), 1315-1320.

in [their] own power.” A second GANEFO was planned for Cairo in 1967 and the PRC chosen as a backup site in case of unspecified “difficulties.”¹⁰⁰

In fact, press reports varied over participation counts and countries, making it difficult for the IOC to determine who faced possible Olympic disqualification. A circular was sent out to NOCs to determine who had participated in the GANEFO. Responses indicated that, although not many NOCs had sent athletes to the GANEFO, the governments of these nations had sent groups of workers, students, youth, and other non-Olympic athletes.¹⁰¹ Nevertheless, IOC leaders upheld the ban on GANEFO athletes and neither North Korean nor Indonesian athletes participated in the 1964 Tokyo Olympics.¹⁰²

In PRC media the political message was clear: the Games helped cultivate friendships between athletes and nations, especially those from Africa and Asia, all of whom were united against an IOC dominated specifically by the U.S. and its allies. Post-event publications, however, focused more broadly on “friendly competition,” cultural sharing, and solidarity among peoples of the world, who were united in a struggle against imperialism and colonialism. *GANEFO Opens New Era in World Sports* (1964) opens with a statement from Rong Gaotang, stating that the GANEFO “clearly demonstrates that countries and peoples free from imperialist and colonialist control are fully able to organize and develop their own independent sports activities” and they could also “contribute much to the development of world sports.”¹⁰³ The importance of GANEFO, above all, was in strengthening solidarity “among the peoples of Asia, Africa, Latin America and the rest of the world.” World sport no longer included only those countries in the Olympics; the GANEFO torch would “shine forever” for all nations engaged in the anti-imperialist, anti-colonial struggle. But, as a sports mega-event, the GANEFO had primarily served to boost the international political position of China and its athletes.

Moreover, publications depicted Chinese athletes as initiating friendships and leading efforts to share culture, knowledge, and experience with athletes from other nations. Images in the above-mentioned publication show content athletes, from various countries, engaged in friendly, non-competitive, non-sports activities. Underlying these images, of course, was the reality of Chinese athletic superiority, demonstrated in the results of competition. What they also show is that Chinese athletes were more than simply athletes—they were representatives and leaders for their nation, above and beyond their athletic duties. Indeed, taken out of context, none of these images evidences the importance of sports competition, or any sign of sports at all.

100 Documents of the First GANEFO Congress, Djakarta, 24th-25th November 1963 (Djakarta, 1964), 11, 19.

101 List of Responses to Circular Letter no. 252, 12/15/63, Avery Brundage collection, box 201, reel 116, IOC Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland.

102 “Brundage Condemns Political Interference in Sport,” *New York Times*, October 8, 1964, 56. Because other nations had not sent their Olympic athletes to the GANEFO, these Olympic athletes could participate in Tokyo.

103 *GANEFO Opens New Era in World Sports*; Chinese Sports Delegation in Djakarta, introduction.

Conclusion

Although the first GANEFO were successful, a second large-scale GANEFO never occurred. An Asian-only GANEFO, held in Cambodia in 1966, was not nearly as popular in the media as its predecessor. Afro-Asian solidarities became strained following PRC opposition to the 1963 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.¹⁰⁴ Relations with Indonesia and the PRC quickly disintegrated following the 1965 military coup that overturned Sukarno's authority and brought his successor to power on anti-Communist, anti-China platform.¹⁰⁵ Political tensions among GANEFO leaders, which mostly revolved around the organization's strong anti-IOC position, likely resulted in Egypt's unwillingness to host the second Games.¹⁰⁶ In China, the changing political tides in Chinese high politics, including the fall of Liu Shaoqi and the start of the Cultural Revolution, had a significant impact on foreign relations and the role of elite athletes in society. The state turned inwards, embroiled with internal ideological battles, to purge "bourgeois" elements from its ranks and begin another mass movement. Publications like *New Sport* no longer showed athletes breaking records or competing in friendly competitions, but instead portrayed them holding portraits of Mao and reading from the Little Red Book. By late 1966, the GANEFO had all but disappeared from the record. In the early years of the Cultural Revolution, sports newspapers and magazines ceased publication and few international sports competitions were held.

In summary, international sport played a defining role in Chinese diplomacy and Chinese leaders' attempts to project itself as an Afro-Asian leader during the years of 1961-1965. The GANEFO expressed China's unbroken commitment to using elite competitive sports for nation building, but the Games also served as an important piece of a larger political project: expanding political influence in the Afro-Asian movement, itself an expression and a vision of a new ordering of the world. The GANEFO shows how international sport offered Chinese socialism a way to represent itself to its own people, while also challenging Western-dominated sports organizations and negotiating a new position for China on the world stage.

The GANEFO also complicates traditional Cold War narratives that tend to align nations with either the Soviets or Americans. Furthermore, the ideals of nonalignment and Afro-Asianism sometimes overlapped, but they cannot be easily grouped into a single, third alternative. Nonalignment, for example, called for total disarmament and a ban on nuclear weapons, while Afro-Asianism stressed the need for revolutionary struggle against colonialism and imperialism. The Bandung-inspired GANEFO served as a site for performing the ideals of post-Bandung organizations such as the AAPSO, but these ideals were neither exclusively geographic nor Asian. The GANEFO was instead based

104 B. E. Shinde, "China and Afro-Asian Solidarity 1955-65: A Study of China's Policy and Diplomacy," *China Report* 1978 14(2), 48-71.

105 Coppel, *Indonesian Chinese in Crisis*, 52.

106 Connolly, "The Politics," 1311.

on the idea of unity found in common sentiment, and the belief that a revolutionary struggle in international sport was necessary. Built on the foundations of a strong Sino-Indonesian relationship and China's influence in the AAPSO, Chinese leaders had high hopes that the success of these Games would help show the rest of the world that the Chinese revolutionary model of socialism was the superior path to follow.