Introduction: National and Regional Belonging in Twentieth-Century East Asia

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RESÜMEE

Die Konzepte von Nation und *belonging* sind entscheidend, um die Geschichte Ostasiens im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert als Periode der Entstehung von Nationen und der Neuverhandlung von Zugehörigkeitsgefühlen zu verstehen. Diskursive Verbindungen zwischen beiden Konzepten können mindestens bis ins neunzehnte Jahrhundert zurückverfolgt werden. Begegnungen mit dem westlichen „Anderen" seit dieser Zeit hatten einen wichtigen Einfluss auf Vorstellungen und Formierungen von Nationalstaaten in Ostasien. Während der Aufstieg des Nationalismus eigentlich nationale Abgrenzung von Nachbarn suggeriert, vereinigten Anti-Kolonialismus und Anti-Imperialismus eine wachsende Zahl von Asiaten im Kampf für Gleichheit und Selbstbestimmung. Dieser Kampf beeinflusste nicht nur die Zwischenkriegszeit, sondern charakterisierte auch die Epoche der Dekolonisation nach 1945. Dementsprechend diente vielen asiatischen Akteuren nicht nur die Nation, sondern auch die supranationale Region als Referenzpunkt für die Ausbildung eines Zugehörigkeitsgefühls. Dieses basierte oft auf kulturellen Elementen wie Religion, Sprache, Werten und Abstammungsmythen. Zahlreiche räumliche Vorstellungen von Kommonalität trugen dementsprechend zur gleichzeitigen Ausbreitung von Nationalismus und Regionalismus bei. Dieser Artikel vermittelt einen Überblick über die Bedeutung der Konzepte von Nation und *belonging* für die Geschichte Ostasiens im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert und diskutiert theoretische Ansätze, die zum Verständnis des Zusammenhangs der Konzepte dienen. Abschließend stellt er die fünf Fallstudien dieser Ausgabe vor.

The emergence and dispersion of ideas of belonging[1] to a distinct ethnic or civic entity and the pursuit of their realization as nationalism in various parts of twentieth-century East Asia[2] is the result of a complex process of interacting phenomena. Anthony Reid in his work on the dissolution of the European colonial empires in Southeast Asia in the mid-twentieth century differentiates three types of East Asian nationalisms[3], which can be described as political assertions of belonging to a certain nation: *Ethnie nationalism*, which is based on myths of common descent; *state nationalism*, which relies on state-promoted education, ritual and media; and *anti-imperialist nationalism*, which he deems the most important type and which emerged as a result of the power asymmetry between colonizers and colonized (and after decolonization often turned into state nationalism).[4] This new reference of belonging, that of the nation, was fostered by the confrontation with the Western 'Other' in the wake of the rapid European and American territorial expansion in the nineteenth century, and triggered important debates about the conflicting or complementary nature of different forms of belonging.

East Asian reactions to these encounters with Western practices and discourses were manifold. Japan, for instance, following the 'Meiji Restoration' (1868) implemented rapid processes of 'modernization' and of national integration and standardization, ideologically centred on the Emperor as the spiritual head of the Japanese nation. Based on Japan's 'successful' escape from colonization and on its military victories, the nation state could be relatively easily propagated as the key reference point of belonging. In contrast, many East Asian countries descended to the status of colonies or semi-colonies and saw their nation-building efforts hampered by near-complete coordination under imperial structures (Korea, Taiwan, Southeast Asia) and by internal separatism (China, Eastern Siberia). As a result, processes of nation-building were interrupted or delayed and "the dream of [national] belonging"[5] became an important driving force of political discourse and activity. Other countries, such as the Philippines, experienced a change in terms of the colonial master and encountered increased pressure on territories that had previously remained relatively autonomous. As a consequence, the formation of anti-colonial and

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1   We have chosen to privilege the term 'belonging' over 'identity', although we acknowledge the partially interchangeable character of both terms. In this article we understand 'belonging' as connoting two characteristics: first, it refers to the sense of belonging to a certain group and less to the effects this may have on one's identity. We therefore suggest that there is a notable difference between belonging (to a group), in the sense of "this is where I belong" and identity. Second, we interpret 'belonging' as conveying a stronger sense of self-asserted (as opposed to assigned) features. For a critical discussion of the use and abuse of the concept 'identity' see Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), 59-90.

2   In this article and volume we define East Asia as consisting of Northeast Asia (roughly coinciding with the territory covered today by the two Koreas, Japan, Taiwan, the People's Republic of China, Mongolia and Eastern Siberia) and Southeast Asia (roughly covering the territory represented by the ASEAN nations today).

3   In fact, Anthony Reid adds a fourth type which he calls 'outrage at state humiliation'. This type, however, resembles anti-imperialist nationalism so closely that we propose not to discriminate between the two. See: Anthony Reid, Imperial Alchemy. Nationalism and Political Identity in Southeast Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 10-11.

4   Reid, Imperial Alchemy, 5-11.

5   Ibid., 5.

anti-imperialist movements heavily contributed to the emergence of nationalism as an (initially mostly urban-based) mass phenomenon.

The First World War and its aftermath are often considered a catalyst of these movements. During the 'Wilsonian Moment' between late autumn 1918 and spring 1919, many intellectuals from East Asia and other parts of the world expected an end to colonialism, in line with US President Woodrow Wilson's promotion of the right of self-determination. However, the Euro-centric and self-serving interpretation of self-determination at the Paris Peace Conference eventually disappointed Asian hopes. Large-scale anti-imperialist demonstrations like the May Fourth Movement in China or the March First Movement in Korea (both 1919) brought together people from various layers of society and of different religions and ethnicities, uniting them – as quasi-apostles of the nation – in protest.[6] In this way, the nation became the promise of a better and self-determined future where people would enjoy equal rights without legal discrimination. The transnational spread of the communist promise of anti-imperialism and the equality of all human beings, gaining in importance after the Bolshevik victory in the Russian Civil War (1917–1922), further contributed to deliberations on self-determination and national integration.[7] This promise was eventually realized through decolonization after the Second World War, although this process, too, against the background of the Cold War, led directly and indirectly to many new 'intra-national' conflicts, some of which have not been solved to this date (Taiwan-PR China, North Korea-South Korea, as well as separatist movements in the Philippines, the PR China, etc.). The relation between nation and belonging is therefore particularly instable in places where the colonial experience has left deep scars; that is, in most parts of East Asia.[8]

The historical connectedness of East Asian peoples under the influence of the Sinocentric tributary system, together with shared historical experiences of encounters with the West, also produced a different sense of belonging that complicates the role of the nation

6   See for example: Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment. Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anti-colonial Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Benedict R. Anderson, The Spectre of Comparisons. Nationalism, Southeast Asia, and the World (London: Verso, 1998); Cemil Aydin, The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), chapter 5-6. On anti-colonial nationalism in the Philippines aimed against Spanish rule, and its global connections, see: Benedict R. Anderson, Under three Flags. Anarchy and the Anti-Colonial Imagination (London: Verso, 1998).

7   See for example: Aydin, The Politics, chapter 6; John Riddell (ed.), To See the Dawn: Baku, 1920 – First Congress of the Peoples of the East (New York: Pathfinder, 1993). On China see for example: Elizabeth J. Perry, Patrolling the Revolution. Worker Militias, Citizenship, and the Modern Chinese State (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), especially chapters 1-3; Elizabeth J. Perry, Anyuan: Mining China's Revolutionary Tradition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), especially chapters 1-5.

8   See for example: Karl Hack, "Decolonization and Violence in Southeast Asia. Crisis in Identity and Authority," in: Els Bogaerts and Remco Raben (eds.), Beyond Empire and Nation. The Decolonization of African and Asian Societies, 1930s-1960s (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2012), 137-166; Martin Shipway, Decolonization and Its Impact. A Comparative Approach to the End of Colonial Empires (Malden: Blackwell, 2008), chapters 1-4; Clive J. Cristie, A Modern History of Southeast Asia. Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996); Gungwu Wang (ed.), Nation-Building. Five Southeast Asian Histories (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005); Reid, Imperial Alchemy; Anderson, The Spectre.

and of nationalism. Pan-Asianism or Asianism, which may be defined as "perceptions and processes that focus on similarities or common interests between Asian regions, draw on common historical roots and traditions or consider integration as a politico-cultural vision"[9], has mostly expressed itself as political or cultural anti-Westernism, as Cemil Aydin has shown.[10] However, as Asian actors often transcended national borders, forged friendships with other Asians, and engaged in transnational cultural, economic, and political activities, Asianism also displayed a positive and self-affirmative dimension whose main rationale was not always anti-Western. Instead, it could be directed at traditional structures within Asian societies that obstructed reform along the lines of democracy, liberty, and equality.[11] In this way, Asianism's 'Asia' could serve as a regionalist proxy for the nation whose realization had – for whatever reasons – to be delayed. This potential of 'Asia' to appeal to different aspects of commonality (cultural, ethnic, anti-Western etc.) was later exploited by the Japanese government and military in the course of their imperialist expansion and the proclamation of a 'Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere'.[12] The creation of *dependent* nation-states (or 'puppet states') such as Manchukuo, established by the Japanese army in 1932, can be seen as an adaption to the 'problem' of increasing resistance to traditional forms of imperialism and colonialism.[13] As Prasenjit Duara writes, such "national imperialisms" strove to develop regional bloc formations which "promoted economic autarky as a means for the imperial power to gain global supremacy or advantage".[14] Of course, these projects could not substitute the nation as a desired place of belonging, but rather infused the national idea with even more vigour. Eventually, "the national interests of the imperial power" caused the disintegration of the region; it became "an unsustainable region".[15] Only after the end of the Second World War could Asianist concepts of regional belonging find a different trajectory of power, resulting, for example, in the comparatively more egalitarian Afro-Asianism that characterized the 1955 'Asia-Africa Conference' in Bandung.[16]

9   Marc Frey and Nicola Spakowski, "Einleitung: Asianismen seit dem 19. Jahrhundert. 'Asien' als Gegenstand nationaler und transnationaler Diskurse und Praktiken," Comparativ 18, no. 6 (2008), 7-15, here: 8. For an overview of different Asianist conceptions see also: Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman (eds.), Pan-Asianism. A Documentary History, 2 Vols. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), especially "Introduction".

10   Aydin, The Politics, especially chapters 4, 5, 7.

11   See: Saaler and Szpilman, Pan-Asianism, Vol. 1, Part III.

12   See for example: Aydin, The Politics, chapter 7; Eri Hotta, Pan-Asianism and Japan's War 1931-1945 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). See also the relevant articles in: Saaler and Szpilman, Pan-Asianism.

13   See: Prasenjit Duara, The Global and Regional in China's Nation-Formation (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), especially chapter 2.

14   See: Prasenjit Duara, "Asia Redux: Conceptualizing a Region for Our Times," Journal of Asian Studies, 69, no. 4 (2010), 963-983, here: 966.

15   Duara, "Asia Redux", 968.

16   See for example: Christopher J. Lee (ed.), Making a World after Empire. The Bandung Moment and its Political Afterlives (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010); See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya (eds.), Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African Conference for International Order (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008); Sinderpal Singh, "From Delhi to Bandung: Nehru, 'Indian-ness' and 'Pan-Asian-ness'," South Asia 34, no. 1 (2011): 51-64. See also the relevant articles in Saaler and Szpilman, Pan-Asianism.

Methods and Theories

For a couple of years now, international history and more recent methodological approaches like transnational and global history have strongly influenced research on the nation, including its limits and its relation to supranational entities such as, for example, the region and the global.[17] The spatial turn in the humanities further contributed to this development, focusing attention on entanglements and demarcations, and putting maps and other means of representing or constructing spaces at the centre of analysis.[18] At the same time, historical research has been shaped and guided by several other cultural turns, such as the performative turn, which draws attention to the staging, for example, of the nation. This staging includes symbols, architecture, and many other components serving to (non-verbally) communicate certain messages to the public and to create or support certain sentiments of belonging. Thereby, a certain past can be referenced or a vision of the future shown.[19]

In the remainder of this article we will discuss and connect some of the different approaches that appear particularly useful for studying the relation between nation and belonging in modern East Asia. This overview will provide the theoretical and methodological framework for the five case studies in this special issue, which we will introduce at the end of this article.

Having already briefly reviewed the impact of colonialism on the nation and on belonging in modern East Asia, it is only logical to follow Anthony Reid's claim that anti-imperialist nationalism can be considered the most important form of nationalism in East Asia. Nevertheless, we believe that ethnie nationalism and state nationalism, to use Anthony Reid's concepts, were also important, since these forms provided many of the ethnic and cultural elements that could be – and were in fact – used to create both national and supranational (East Asian) sentiments of belonging. Ethno-symbolism, an approach to studying the nation proposed by Anthony D. Smith that has strongly influenced Anthony Reid's typology of nationalism, is very useful for explaining nationalism based on the state, the monarchy and on myths, and acknowledges the significance of

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17   For new approaches to international history see: Patrick Finney (ed.), Palgrave Advances in International History (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher (eds.), Culture and International History (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003). On transnational and global history see for example: Akira Iriye, Global and Transnational History. The Past, Present, and Future (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Dominic Sachsenmaier, "Global History, Version 1,0," Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte, 14 August 2012, http://docupedia.de/docupedia/images/6/66/Global_History.pdf (accessed: 17 August 2012); Sebastian Conrad and Andreas Eckert, "Globalgeschichte, Globalisierung, multiple Modernen: Zur Geschichtsschreibung der modernen Welt," in: Sebastian Conrad, Andreas Eckert and Ulrike Freitag (eds.), Globalgeschichte. Theorien, Ansätze, Themen (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2007), 7-49.

18   See for example: Matthias Middell and Katja Naumann, "Global History and the Spatial Turn: From the Impact of Area Studies to the Study of Critical Junctures of Globalization," Journal of Global History 5, no. 1 (2010): 149-170; Barney Warf and Santa Arias (eds.), The Spatial Turn. Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Routledge: London, 2009); Doris Bachmann-Medick, Cultural Turns. Neuorientierungen in den Kulturwissenschaften. Fourth Edition (Reinbek: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 2010), chapter 6.

19   On the new turns see: Bachmann-Medick, Cultural Turns, especially chapter 2 (on the performative turn).

the performative turn for nationalism studies. Regarding the practical usage of official or semi-official nationalisms Anthony Smith stated: "There is no greater effect on the collectivity of members than that created by moving ceremonies, reiterated rituals, striking political symbols and the music and imagery of choreographed mass gatherings, especially when these are linked to the ideology of the nation; nor is there any more powerful means of binding the members of the community, and separating them from outsiders."[20] Sporting events, public trials, or any form of mass communication, insofar as they emphasize messages of collective belonging and group ideology, may be examples of such nationalism (including subnational regionalist micro-nationalism and supranational regionalist macro-nationalism[21]) in practice.

Ethno-symbolism strongly focuses on the *mythomoteurs* (cultural elements) of certain *ethnies* (ethnic communities), who constitute a nation. Among such cultural elements are languages, religions, values, laws, myths of ancestry or election, memories of 'Golden Ages', heroes and saints, architecture, dances, music and dress. Cultural elements are deemed particularly important because they play a vital role in shaping social structures and cultures. Distinctive symbolic repertoires serve, for example, to differentiate a specific community from other analogous communities. Cultural elements also help to ensure a sense of continuity with past generations of the community. As a result, the cultural elements of the dominant ethnic community in a population often seem to have been selected by elites in their nation-building efforts. A shift in power relations, therefore, can be – and often is – accompanied by a reselection of cultural elements. Hence, the working definition which Anthony Smith provides for 'nation' is: "a named and self-defining human community whose members cultivate shared memories, symbols, myths, traditions and values, inhabit and are attached to historic territories or 'homelands', create and disseminate a distinctive public culture, and observe shared customs and standardised laws".[22] It is obvious that in many parts of East Asia where peoples did not have the power to organize self-defined communities for a long time and where territories were subjected to massive changes of population and borders the above-outlined processes of nation formation were extremely complicated.

The impact of the change in power relations within a nation is particularly interesting. Colonialism and decolonization can both be considered to have had a strong impact on the choice of cultural elements that served to constitute the nation. Arguably, ethno-symbolism can also be used to explain the creation of macro-national feelings of belonging, especially when regionalist activities reach the level of organized and insti-

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20 Anthony D. Smith, Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach (London: Routledge, 2009), 51-52. Further literature on ethno-symbolism can be found there.

21 For the definition of regionalisms as micro- and macro-nationalisms, including the argument that the dynamics of nationalism resemble those of regionalisms, see: Louis L. Snyder, Macro-Nationalisms. A History of the Pan-Movements (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984), 3-5. Louis Snyder uses the term mini-nationalism for micro-nationalism.

22 Smith, Ethno-Symbolism, 29.

tutionalized cooperation.[23] A region can be constituted in a similar way by using those cultural elements that are common to several nations, or by modifying and 'reinventing' the cultural elements of a nation in such a way as to facilitate a connection with the cultural elements of other nations, thus increasing the potential for regional integration. Cultural unity, historical interconnectedness, racial kinship, values and spirituality, and a common destiny were among the cultural elements pan-Asianists advocated to construct Asia as a supranational, regional entity.[24] Ethno-symbolism is therefore useful not only as an approach to studying mechanisms of nationalism in Asia, but also for examining certain types of pan-movements before, during, and after the Second World War.

Imagining space is another important factor in constituting nations as well as in national and supranational notions of belonging. There are certainly strong connections between the spatial and performative approaches to studying the nation if one focuses on content, since cultural elements are identified with a certain geographical entity or 'homeland' (and, possibly, a diaspora). Research on the imagination of space nevertheless also serves to explain how ideas of belonging emerged and spread in the first place. Benedict Anderson in his seminal study on 'imagined communities', as well as in some of his later works, described the spread of nationalism in Europe not primarily as the outcome of deliberate inventions of commonality, but as the result of the anonymous forces of 'print-capitalism'. The increase in mass media, such as vernacular language newspapers that covered a certain area, increased consumption of news and contributed to the readers' imagining of themselves as members of a certain community, even though they never had met (and would never be able to meet) every member of this community.[25] The point here is not to debate whether the spread of nationalism in East Asia was the outcome of 'print-capitalism' or of deliberate attempts by elites, since these also needed to use mass media, including newspapers, maps and textbooks, to reach the people. Nor are we concerned about the question of which cultural elements (languages or symbols, for instance) have had a greater impact. The important point is the change in spatial thinking created by the

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23 When explaining different regionalisms in Asia, Amitav Acharya describes regions not only as material constructs, but also as ideational ones, which are not given or fixed, but are socially constructed and can rise and decline just like nations. Regionalism thus describes the deliberate forging of a common regional identity. See: Amitav Acharya, "Asia Is Not One," Journal of Asian Studies 69, no. 4 (2010): 1001-1013, here: 1001-1002. To describe the degree of regional integration, Marc Frey provides a typology that at the first level only sees an identifiable geographical form. On a second level, multiple relations between individuals and communities are added, while on a third level organized and institutionalized co-operation in fields like culture, economy, politics or strategy exist. Finally, a fourth level is characterized by the emergence of a civil society and the establishment of institutions with independent actor capabilities. See: Marc Frey, "Concepts of Region in International History," in: Marc Frey, Lothar Hönnighausen, John Peacock and Niklaus Steiner (eds.), Regionalism in the Age of Globalism. Vol. 1: Concepts of Regionalism (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005), 15-26, here: 24-25.

24 Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman, "Introduction. The Emergence of Pan-Asianism as an Ideal of Asian Identity and Solidarity, 1850-2008," in: Saaler and Szpilman (eds.), Pan-Asianism, Vol. 1, 1-41, here: 2, 34-35.

25 Benedict R. Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Revised Edition (London: Verso, 2006). In addition to newspapers, Benedict Anderson also named other media such as maps and museums, which are based on print-capitalism, as the reason for imagining communities. For some comparisons between events in the West and in Southeast Asia see also: Anderson, The Spectre; Anderson, Under three Flags.

maps and other geographical displays used and reproduced in an increasing number of copies of newspapers and school textbooks. These maps and other geographical displays very often shifted their focus from showing a mythological or cosmic order based on a religious worldview to national and other (secular) forms of borders. Producing maps that only provided national borders thereby especially contributed to the imagining of a national community linked to a certain territory.[26] It should be obvious that the production of different maps, which focused on confession, ethnicity, 'mere' geography and other categories, could serve to create different feelings of community independent from and possibly surpassing the nation.

In conclusion, the public performance of cultural elements such as symbols, values, religion, language, and law had an important impact on constituting feelings of belonging to a nation or to a supranational entity. Many of these elements were already available and practiced in East Asia, such as dynastic mythology, collective names, or myths of descent.[27] However, direct encounters with a hegemonic West necessitated new considerations of political, cultural, and ethnic organization and affiliation that would to a large extent draw on ethno-symbolism as defined by Anthony Smith. While acknowledging the importance of material preconditions, we propose – following him – that studying the "constituent symbolic resources" of communities and their diverging representations facilitates entry into "the 'inner world' of the participants and understand[ing of] their perceptions and visions"[28] regarding the nation, sentiments of belonging, and their intertwined character in twentieth century East Asia.

The Case Studies

The following articles reflect the above outlined theoretical considerations of conflicting ideas of nation and belonging in different case studies. They cover the entire modern (and post-modern) era from the mid-nineteenth century to the early twenty-first century, with temporal foci on the First World War and the Russian Civil War (Sablin), the Second World War (Weber) and its immediate aftermath (Lawson), the early 1960s (Shuman) and 1964 (Smith). Their spatial radius is equally wide in order to include transnational linkages that span much of the globe, focussing on the Russian-Mongolian Baikal region (Sablin), China (Shuman, Weber), Japan (Smith, Weber), and the Philippines (Lawson).

Using the concept of "relational space" with a focus on Eastern Siberia, Ivan Sablin discusses different ways of how feelings of common territorial belonging came into existence in this area. They were based on various geographical, ethnic, social and religious categories which were produced and reinforced through communication that

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26   Anderson, Imagined Communities, chapter 10.
27   See Reid, Imperial Alchemy, 6-7.
28   Smith, Ethno-Symbolism, 15-16.

encouraged people to relate to each other. But many of these relations had to be imagined in order to make claims about the formation of collectivities plausible. This became especially important when the Russian February and October Revolutions, the Civil War and the 'Wilsonian Moment' led various actors in Eastern Siberia to engage in projects of separatism or autonomy. As his three rival cases of integration show, the "key question for most actors was which group would best legitimize delineation and should therefore form the basis for a future autonomous or independent nation". Because the former territorial boundaries were of only secondary importance, particular ethnic (initially Buryat, later, on a supra-ethnic level, pan-Mongolian) and religious (Buddhist) categories were prominently mobilized, albeit with limited success as the emphasis placed on them also served as a reminder of the actual ethno-cultural heterogeneity of the population. These unsuccessful examples of nation-building attempts suggest that the variety of often conflicting feelings of belonging (as to an ethnicity and a social group), the imperial resistance against separation, and the choice of 'impractical' cultural elements such as pacifist Buddhism may, at least partly, be blamed for their failures. Later, both the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic used the lessons learnt from these short-lived projects as they – often violently – enforced grander narratives of belonging based solely on ethnicity.

Torsten Weber studies how maps and cartoons as political mass media aimed at conveying messages of national and regional belonging. He particularly focuses on the gaps between the supranational claims of these visual portrayals and their implicit (and sometimes rather explicit) nationalist contents. Weber argues that the "rhetoric of images" […] has played a key role in the way people have been persuaded to define themselves territorially, to fight for territorial revisions, or to accept given territorializations" since images visualize otherwise abstract dimensions of written political discourse. Even more so than maps, political cartoons "through their simplistic exaggerations and satirical portrayals" function as powerful tools of political communication that often define collectivities according to explicitly noticeable traits, such as race or cultural symbols. Importantly, such portrayals seem to require an outer point of reference or comparison (territory beyond the border on maps, xeno-stereotypical portrayals in cartoons) in order to fully enfold their impact. As the case studies of visual visions of a united Asia during the first half of the twentieth century make clear, however, Asianist messages were often dominated by nationalist agendas. In the discursive battle that accompanied the numerous conflicts and wars between China and Japan from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries this meant that Japano-centric visions of 'One Asia' competed with Sinocentric visions. 'Asia', more often than not, served only as the territorial screen on which imperial ambitions and self-proclaimed national greatness could be projected.

Konrad Lawson's case study of the war crimes trials of Filipinos who had collaborated with the Japanese occupation forces during the 1940s points at the particular complexity of the relationship between of conceptions of the nation and belonging, on the one hand, and shifting power relations on the other. In a rapidly changing political context of Philippine semi-autonomy, war, Japanese occupation, formal independence, reconquest

by the United States, and (renewed) formal independence (all within less than one deca-
de), sentiments of collective belonging beyond the local level were frequently challenged.
Large parts of the Filipino elite had committed treason against the (pre-war) nation by
politically or economically collaborating with the Japanese occupation forces, but the
"vast majority of accused Filipino traitors were dismissed for lack of evidence and other
technicalities" or amnestied by President Manuel Roxas, a member of the Filipino elite,
following the post-war achievement of independence. His very broad amnesty, however,
excluded Filipinos who had been members of several pro-Japanese organizations and
who had engaged in certain criminal activities, mostly extremely violent ones. It is ne-
vertheless almost ironic that the trials for atrocities committed by Filipino collaborators
judged their crimes to be treason, that is, betrayal of the (pre-war) nation, instead of war
crimes. The Philippine Supreme Court thereby de facto (and most likely willingly) red-
uced the severity of the punishment, by declaring acts such as murder to be expressions
of treason. Had, for example, charges of both treason and murder been pursued, the
act would have been a 'complex crime' and the maximum penalty for the greater crime
(treason – therefore a death sentence) imposed. These legal judgments – one could call
them tricks – illustrate how cultural elements, in this case law and its interpretation, that
constituted and defined the Filipino nation, reflected the change in power relations due
to post-war independence. The new interpretation of the law showed a willingness to
ignore most crimes of treason committed against the pre-war nation that had been an
American colony, if a relatively autonomous one, thereby indirectly delegitimizing it or
at least begging the question of whether the Japanese-sponsored Filipino nation during
the war had not been more relevant and present than the American one.

Amanda Shuman's article focuses on sports events as stages of national re-definition and
of the re-interpretation of international belonging. Shuman studies how leaders of the
young People's Republic of China tried to use international sports exchanges and events
from the late 1950s to establish and position their country internationally. Shuman`s
study of the first Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO), held in Jakarta in
1963, demonstrates how sports events served the shifting needs of political agendas.
While early PRC leaders had been keen on placing their country alongside the Soviet
Union, the eventual deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations required a new narrative of
international belonging. As the potential leader of a bloc of non-aligned and newly de-
colonized nations mostly from Asia and Africa, Chinese politicians made every effort
to establish a new geopolitical order and to use the Games as its first stage. As Shuman
shows, "GANEFO served to spread propaganda worldwide on the Afro-Asian ideals that
conveniently resonated with the Chinese revolutionary model of socialism". The hosting
of the event, which focused heavily on the 'Bandung spirit' of Asian-African solidarity
(though it was eventually also opened to other 'progressive' countries) and – obviously
– excluded the Republic of China (Taiwan), sent powerful messages to the international
community, but also to the domestic audience: "By challenging the western dominance
of international sport through producing their own large sports mega-event, the GA-
NEFO, Chinese leaders stressed their solidarity and identification with other recently

decolonized and third world nations involved in the burgeoning Afro-Asian movement." New symbols, constituting the idea of belonging to the supranational group of the 'Newly Emerging Forces', were created and were supported by further images of international solidarity against 'American imperialism'. In addition, China could be seen as modern without being Western and as Socialist without being a satellite of the Soviet Union. The Games therefore contributed to a re-definition of the national status and international belonging of China roughly one decade prior to the PRC's replacement of Taiwan as the sole representative of China in international diplomacy. Although the GANEFO movement quickly disintegrated, it offered a new arena of geopolitical affiliation whose rhetoric has survived to the present day.

Turning to Japan and the first Olympic Games hosted in Asia, Martyn Smith analyzes popular mass media (weekly or monthly women's journals) to understand how the Tokyo Games of 1964 served as an occasion for the re-negotiation of Japaneseness and Japan's place in the region and the world. Against the background of the rapid economic growth Japan had experienced from the late 1950s onwards and which would catapult it to the top ranks of the global economy, the Olympics triggered a debate about the potential loss of Japanese cultural uniqueness if it became part of a "global modernity" characterized by a focus on 'mere' economic progress and consumption. Smith explains that this debate was far from homogeneous. With a view to the international community, Japan's capital city was advertised as the "most cosmopolitan city in the world". Within Japan, the many new symbols of economic progress such as the high-speed monorail linking Tokyo and Haneda Airport and the bullet train running between Osaka and Tokyo affected the idea of the Japanese nation, and distinguished it, for example, from its less industrialized Asian neighbours. However, the years leading up to the Games also produced different critiques of Japanese patterns of cultural, social, and economic behaviour. In particular, the impact the event would have on Japanese mentality (modern vs. traditional), the Japanese sense of belonging (West vs. East vs. Japan), and the outward orientation of the Japanese nation as such (open vs. closed) came under debate. Were the Japanese really ready to face "the foreign visitors, coming from one hundred and ten countries [who] have different languages, customs, laws, history, and traditions", one observer critically asked as late as a few weeks before the opening ceremony (Furugaki, August 1964). While Smith's study underlines the importance of looking beyond the official staging of mega events to understand the diverse range of contexts it produces, it also demonstrates how encounters with the foreign shape processes of renegotiation of the national collectivity. On the national level, the actual impact of these encounters which centred on only one host city (Tokyo) may have been marginal. In fact, most Japanese did not meet a single visitor to the Tokyo Games personally. However, the mental and symbolic processes mega events such as the Olympic Games produce through nation-wide media, education, and consumption may influence the sense of belonging to a not inconsiderable degree. As this case of the most homogenous and stable society studied here reminds us, the constant imagining of the nation seems to be an essential part of belonging to it even long after the nation state has been established.