

Klarstellung folgt eine Reihe von Studien über den Warenumschlag in die Levante. Ruthy Gertwagen entwirft ein gutes Bild von den wichtigsten Routen der abendländischen Seefahrt. Dabei stellt sie den Beschreibungen der mittelalterlichen Pilger die aktuellen Schifffahrtsabhandlungen gegenüber (S. 95-119). Ein Aufsatz von John Dotson versucht die Zunahme von Galeeren in den italienischen Kriegsflotten im 13. Jh. zu bewerten (S. 63-75). Segelschiffe scheinen die ersten Opfer dieser Entwicklung gewesen zu sein, trotz ihres weiteren Gebrauchs bei Kaperoperationen.

Es wäre illusorisch, diese Schlussfolgerungen auch auf die Flotten aus dem Nord- und Ostseeraum anzuwenden, die Richard Unger untersucht (S. 251-273). Der Autor unterstreicht die Bandbreite der von den nordischen Flotten genutzten Schiffstypen. Mit Drakkaren, Koggen, Segelschiffen und Snekkyas wollten sie sich im Mittelmeerhandel durchsetzen. Die Mietverträge für Schiffe der Zeit offenbaren eine ganze Reihe logistischer Probleme, deren Einfluss auf die Umlenkung des 4. Kreuzzuges Thomas Madden zu bestimmen sucht (S. 209-228). Seine Studie arbeitet den Willen des Papstes heraus, die Kontrolle über die Expedition im Jahr 1203 zurückzugewinnen, indem er kommerzielle Verhandlungen mit den byzantinischen Machthabern einleitete.

Das Verhalten der Kreuzfahrer kann aufgrund der vielfältigen Faktoren, die über den Ausgang einer Expedition entscheiden, nicht ausschließlich unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Verpflegung analysiert werden. Ein Aufsatz von John France erinnert an das Ausmaß der deutsch-französischen Rivalitäten, die für das Scheitern

des 2. Kreuzzuges im Jahr 1148 verantwortlich waren (S. 77-94). Eine soziale Dimension zeigt der Text von Yaacov Lev über die muselmanischen Fußkämpfer, die im Kampf gegen die Franken aktiv waren (S. 185-207). Der Autor führt die Niederlagen der Fatimiden auf die Nutzung einer unfreien Infanterie zurück, die nach und nach von türkischen und kurdischen Reitern ersetzt wurde. Sein Aufsatz rundet einen aufregenden Band über einen in der Historiographie der Kreuzzüge vernachlässigten Bereich ab.

Anmerkung:

- 1 J.M. Smith Jr., Ayn Jälüt. Mamlük success of Mongol Failure, in: *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, XLIV (1984), S. 307-345.

**Mark Caprio / Matsuda Koichirō**  
(Hrsg.): **Japan and the Pacific, 1540–1920. Threat and Opportunity**  
(= **The Pacific World. Land, People and History of the Pacific, 1500–1900, vol. 10**), Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company 2006, 422 S.

Rezensiert von  
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This volume is part of a larger historical series that aims to overcome traditional nation-state perspective and to highlight instead, as underlined in the preface by the General Editors Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, “large-scale geographic interconnections” inside the Pacific Ocean.

This series on the Pacific World is modelled after the other one (*An Expanding World; the European Impact on World History, 1450–1800* also published by Ashgate) but pushes the content into a later century. We could also look to this study as a chapter of a “thalassographie” whose best and successful example has been *The Méditerranée* by Fernand Braudel. Indeed as for the Mediterranean the issue is to describe and grasp the elements that eventually unified the Pacific Ocean, considering that “in mid-nineteenth century this Ocean had long ceased to be a barrier; rather it was a free way” (Flynn-Giráldez). Nevertheless, even if this conclusion is worth of attention, we should not underestimate the deep differences, the contrasts, and the larger articulation which clearly existed in the past and still exist in the present in a so broad area as the Pacific (the “Great Eastern Sea”). Correctly Tsunoyama Sakae (one of the eighteen contributors) points out that the eastern sea coastline “is buffered by smaller seas, from north to south, with the Sea of Okhotsk, the Sea of Japan, Bo Hai, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, the South China Sea, the Philippines Sea, the Java Sea, the Celebes Sea, the Sulu Sea, the Molucca Sea, and the Banda Sea”. Inside these small seas certainly economic activity and cultural exchange have been intense for centuries, but one can wonder to what extent they reached the American coast and invest the Pacific as a whole. In short, these collected papers try to give answers – especially to the many “Western” historians, who are used to tackle problems not surpassing the Mediterranean and Atlantic areas.

This study is focused on Japan, seen in its complex rapports with, first, the other two

Eastern Asia giants, i.e. China and Korea, further with the other numerous Pacific cohabitants. It is the story of a relative small archipelago, proud of its cultural inheritance, gifted with extremely rich (certainly during the sixteenth and seventeenth c.) silver mines as famous as the well known Spanish-American mines. A country which believed to have also a civilizing mission towards a large area, where it inevitably came in contact with nations such as the United States, Russia, and in earlier times with the Christian Portugal (Fernando Mendes Pinto reached Japan in 1543) and Spain. Indeed, the latter intentioned in name of the Catholic Church to evangelize Japan, and provoked, or at least played an important role in the so called “sakoku” (“national seclusion”) of the archipelago, a concept that has a long historical tradition. This fundamentalism has been scrutinized over the last years and is now fully analyzed by Arano Yasunori. Also the other essays demonstrate how complex this seclusion was, for the Tokugawa authority opening the country to what was necessary (information, science, technique) in order to develop the economy and at the same time to strengthen their political power. Definitions as “maritime prohibition” and “civilized/barbarian order”, proposed by Arano Yasunori, seem to be more useful to describe the Japanese reality and this Asian path to the construction of a national state. From the other side the persecution of the Christians decided by the Tokugawa Bakufu, and the definitive expulsion of the Spanish and the Portuguese (1639), left important marks inside the Pacific space thanks to the diaspora of Japanese converted during the Seventeenth century, from Macao to Cambodia, from Siam to Bata-

via (Madalena Ribeiro). Michael Mathes has estimated the Japanese population of Manila at 15.000 in this period, forming a peculiar “mestizo culture” and an enduring “Asiatic heritage” inside this archipelago. On the contrary, later on, Spain would not become a part of the Western presence when Japan reopened its doors in the Nineteenth century. The opening to the West was a spontaneous movement of expansion and migration that could not fully impeded by the Tokugawa and was on the contrary favoured by the Meiji authorities.

Even though the diplomatic and cultural aspects are massive in this volume, economy and monetary issues are treated in a fruitful way by Tashiro Kazui and Nagazumi Yoko. Although relations to and competition with China, considering itself as the centre of the earth and the true “Middle Kingdom”, became the focus of the Tokugawa efforts (not less important was the building of a national economy, creating a kind of an oriental mercantilism), it was evident that the major preoccupation was for the 17th and 18th centuries to restrain the export of silver (in silver ingots as well silver coins) at the advantage of its major competitor, China. Korea played in this period the role of an intermediary economy between the two countries (a large amount of ginseng was exported by this peninsula) as Japan had interrupted diplomatic relations with China. (One can working with between a vertical alliance (Korea and China) and a horizontal one between Korea and Japan). In order to reduce the flow of silver abroad the Tokugawa did not hesitate to proceed to a monetary debasement, induced by the natural diminution of the mine resources. It is

certain that the crisis of the Ming dynasty offered a decisive input to Japan. So the country had the possibility to increase its production of porcelain, lacquer ware, paper, sugar, and especially of silk, becoming independent from the import of raw silk and being able to compete directly with China on the market of luxury goods.<sup>1</sup> In this sense the neighbouring countries, such as Siam, were worried to lose contact with an ascendant economy and were keen to admit a status of subservience and to renew alliances (Nagazumi Yoko).

The most numerous essays collected by Mark Caprio and Matsuda Koichirō, who wrote an enriching Introduction, adding more information to an already broad scope, focus on an expanding Japan, which during the Nineteenth century, after the Meiji restoration, invested with its “castaways” (sometimes introduced by simple fishermen, lost in the vast ocean, as pointed out by Stephen W. Kohl; sometimes by political planning and an assertive policy). Josefa M. Saniel puts in evidence how in the early Meiji period on one side the government adopted “a policy of restraint from territorial expansion” but on the other side “the Japanese nationalistic-activists rested their case on four arguments: that Japan had a surplus population for which outlets had to be found; that Japan needed raw materials and food; that Japan had a right to preventive self-defence; and that Japan had a mission of civilizing and/or aiding backward areas of the world especially their neighbours”. This pressure had been directed to Papua and New Guinea especially “from 1890 to 1914, because the settlement was most prosperous in this period” (Iwamoto Hiromitsu) as well as to Australia. It is true that the discovery of

the importance of Australia (the existence of a „Southland“) remained obscure to the Japanese concept of world geography, being this limited to Asia, “the depiction of India, China, and Japan adhering to a Buddhist-oriented three country view of the world” (Henri Frei).

Relatively late did Japan and Russia discover each other. The area of friction and direct confrontation became the Kuril Islands (the Japanese were also present in Kamchatka at the end of the Seventeenth century). The expansion of Russia in compliance with Peter the Great’s policy in direction of Siberia, the exploration of the Danish Vitus Bering seeking for a passage to the American continent, and the advantages that the possession of the Kuril islands would entail, all these facts led to an open hostility between Russia and Japan (Georg Alexander Lensen). The only encounter, basically peaceful, of fishermen, hunters and merchants (“birds of passage”) of the two countries in Kamchatka, Sakhalin, Vladivostok, on the Kuril Islands and Hokkaido was replaced by direct confrontation during the Russia-Japan war, 1904–1905. Past of the remarkable process of a Japanese diaspora is the migration to Russia, which ranks seventh in terms of the total number of Japanese residents abroad, “following Hawaii, the continental United States, Brazil, Canada, Peru, and the Philippines” (Igor R. Saveliev).

A movement of people with many facets, which included on the one side the sad phenomenon of women trade towards the American coast, controlled by the Japanese themselves (Ichioka Yuji), on the other side an advanced program of women emancipation. This was the case of Tsuda Ume, “pioneer educator of women”, sent to United

States with four other young girls in order to learn what was necessary for the country if it wanted to catch up with the West. Tsuda Ume greatly accomplished her task and founded in 1900 a still existing and celebrated college for women. Just like the “Yankeefied Japanese”, she was a testimony of the deep sense of duty and work so typical for Japanese mentality. Many scholars recognize a Max Weber effect also in this country. Indeed, she insisted to her students that “life without work is useless” (Christine Chapman).

It is without doubt that the ambition of the new Japanese elite, after the Meiji restoration, aimed to exercise a sort of economic and political domination on its Asian neighbours, Korea in the first place, after having neutralized the Chinese influence. Even though the process of industrialization (i.e. the formation of large concerns with a high number of workers per unity of production<sup>2</sup>) developed rather slowly, the progress of the Japanese economy was undoubtedly strong, as well as the government’s will to implement a policy of armament. First of all, it was necessary to tackle Western superiority revising the unequal treaties imposed on Japan at the arrival of the Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry in 1853. The mission organized by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Iwakura Tomomi in 1871 (it was composed by four vice-ambassadors, the minister of finance, the vice-minister of industry and numerous officials and commissioners with their own assistants, by a total of nearly hundred Japanese) has to be interpreted on this light. Officially the mission was charged “to study Western institutions and culture”. The mission visited for two years (1871–1873) the United States and Eu-

rope and has been, by the conclusion of Eugene Soviak, “one significant factor in the development of modern Japan”.

Following the example of Western colonialism and abandoning the traditional Asian diplomacy, the “new Japan” directly and dramatically confronted China. Sending to this country in the same period an analogous mission as that of Iwakura, the Mission of Soejima Taneomi, “made an appeal for greater cooperation between China and Japan”. The diplomat reminded “the penetration of the foreign powers in Asia – the French in Annam, the British in the canton area, the Russians to the north of the Amur and in Karafuto”. It was necessary to address the “barbarians” with their own guns and on their own field. As Wayne C. McWilliams quotes, behind the diplomacy there was already the conviction by the Japanese to have a civilizing mission to accomplish, for “even barbarians are people; if you treat them as barbarians they will be just that, but if you treat them as true gentlemen they will indeed become true gentlemen”. The result of this attitude led to the military victory during the Sino-Japanese war in 1895, the real start of an imperial history of Japan and a subtle policy with Korea. The Kanghwa Treaty signed by the Japanese in 1876 formally provided to Korea a statute of independence and equality, but the ultimate aim, as correctly demonstrates Brahm Swaroop Agrawal. The conclusion here is that “Japan herself violated the provisions of equality and independence of both nations, established her protectorate over Korea in 1905 and annexed her completely in 1910”.

We know what happened in the following decades with the new international order implemented by Japan, but also “that even

at the peak of imperial rule, the Pacific was never Japan’s ocean” (in 1942 nevertheless the country controlled an area “thirteen times of its home islands” as Marcia Yonemoto points out). Now, the Empire of Sun, having been in the last decades the second world economy, has to compete again with the ancient rival China, but this, as the editors Caprio and Koichirō convincingly conclude, “may eventually encourage Japan to exploit further opportunities among its traditional deep-rooted Small Eastern Sea ties”. Meanwhile the new economic order will provoke new challenges to some partnerships in the “Great Eastern Sea”.

#### Notes:

- 1 S. Ciriaco, Scambi commerciali e produzione di beni di lusso nel Giappone del periodo Edo. Una lettura storiografica, in: *Quaderni Storici*, 125 (2007) 2, pp. 591-621.
- 2 M. Tanimoto (Hrsg.), *The Role of Tradition in Japan’s Industrialization. Another Path to Industrialization* (Japanese Studies in Economic and Social History, vol. 2), Oxford 2006.