

“Ceremonial Pedagogy” in Revolutionary Societies: Public Staging and Aesthetic Mass Inculcation in Meiji Japan, the Early Soviet Union and Post-1910 Mexico

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RESÜMEE

Begriff und Sachverhalt „zeremonieller Pädagogik“ gehören nicht gerade zum Kernbestand historisch-sozialwissenschaftlicher Forschung. Der Artikel unternimmt zunächst eine Klärung des Konzepts im Verweis auf vormoderne Traditionen des Zeremonialwesens und deren radikale Uminterpretation in der Französischen Revolution. Die damit gegebenen Bestimmungsstücke machen deutlich, dass „zeremonielle Pädagogik“ weit über den Raum von Schule im engeren Sinne hinausgeht. Sie bezieht sich vielmehr auf (kontextabhängig durchaus variierende) Formen einer *ästhetisch-medial* – durch öffentliche Feste, Raumarchitektur, symbolische Inszenierungen oder kollektive Rituale – *vermittelten Repräsentation* von Programmen für die Neuordnung ganzer Staaten und Gesellschaften, wie sie typischerweise im Zusammenhang mit revolutionären Umbrüchen entworfen werden. Konstitutiv für das Konzept ist überdies eine mit „zeremonieller Pädagogik“ verbundene *instrumentelle Absicht*: Sie ist darauf angelegt, auf die breite Masse der jeweiligen Bevölkerung bewusstseinsformend einzuwirken und die revolutionären Neuordnungsprogramme sozialisatorisch zu verankern. Als fruchtbare Fälle für eine historisch-vergleichende Analyse „zeremonieller Pädagogik“ bieten sich an: Japan im Gefolge der Meiji-Revolution von 1868, die frühe Sowjetunion der 1920er und 1930er Jahre sowie Mexiko nach der Revolution von 1910. Diese Vergleichsfälle stehen im Zentrum eines Forschungsprojekts zum Thema, das als Teilprojekt des Sonderforschungsbereichs 640 an der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin durchgeführt wird und dem die Beiträge dieses Sonderheftes entstammen. Unter Stichworten wie „nationale Integration“, „kulturelle Homogenisierung“ und „Modernisierung“ werden schließlich die theoretischen Perspektiven entwickelt, die diese Forschungen konzeptionell anleiten.

1. From “Ceremonies” to “Ceremonial Pedagogy”

The concept and subject matter of “ceremonial pedagogy” are not necessarily a core topic of study in education or the social sciences. In fact they point to a research landscape which is still largely open. This remains true even despite a recent increase in the number of individual studies covering issues such as festival culture in the early Soviet Union or the consciousness-shaping messages of the Mexican *murales*.¹ Accordingly, it will be some time before entries for “ceremonial pedagogy” are found in encyclopaedias, handbooks or equivalent reference works either for political science and sociology or for education and educational history. The *Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland* [Historical Lexicon of Political and Social Language in Germany] has nothing to say on this subject, and nor does the *Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought*.² The *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* [Historical Dictionary of Philosophy] is of some assistance, however. The entry for “ceremony; ceremonial studies” begins with definitions which are of immediate relevance for our topic. It states that ceremonies consist of “sequences of human actions which symbolically represent an order (representation) and aestheticize this order for their audience”. The entry continues by stating that more complex political or religious systems of order in particular are scarcely conceivable without such self-presentation through a medium of “sensuous contemplation”. Above all, this is the case

*where (a) great significance is attached to formal social interaction in order to reflect certainty of expectation and exclude variation, (b) an address to the senses is deemed legitimate, (c) there is a high level of confidence regarding the truthfulness of the visible, (d) there is a trend towards hierarchizing concepts of order and (e) the procedural is assigned a symbolic value of its own.*³

While these explanations are still strongly focused on the pre-modern period, they already introduce key defining elements to what will subsequently manifest itself in specific historical contexts in practices of “ceremonial pedagogy”. These defining elements emphasize aspects such as the media-conveyed representation of patterns and concepts of socio-political order; the translation of such patterns and concepts of order into sensuously tangible and procedural forms of expression seeking to establish the social acceptance and consciousness-shaping internalization of the former; and thus an aestheticization and staging of socio-political forms of authority and meaning contexts which, at its core, is deemed to be instrumental, i.e. seeking social influence. Ceremonial practices

1 See, e.g., Malte Rolf, *Das sowjetische Massenfest*, Hamburg 2006, or Desmond Rochfort, *Mexican Muralists: Orozco-Rivera-Siqueiros*, London 1993.

2 Otto Brunner /Werner Conze /Reinhart Koselleck (eds), *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, 8 vols, Stuttgart 2004 (rev. edition); Alan Bullock/Stephen Trombley (eds), *The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought*, Hammersmith 2000.

3 Miloš Vec, “Zeremonie; Zeremonialwissenschaft”, in: Joachim Ritter et al. (eds), *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, vol. 12, Basel 2004, columns 1301-1305, quote in column 1301.

of this type are rooted in rituals which reach far back to antiquity and to ecclesiastical traditions. However, already in the early modern period, in congruency with the rise of the modern state, they become the subject matter of more differentiated elaboration and theoretical reflection.⁴ In his *Einleitung zur Ceremoniel-Wissenschaft* [Introduction to Ceremonial Studies] of 1733 Julius Bernhard von Rohr, for instance, underlines the instrumental status of ceremonies when he remarks that they “are to be considered means through which a sovereign achieves a certain ultimate aim by prompting subjects’ special respect and reverence towards their sovereign”. Rohr also emphasizes that in the pursuit of this “ultimate aim” it is the appeal to the senses which predominates. For “the common man who is merely dependent on his external senses [...] cannot on his own imagine the majesty of the king, but through the objects which catch his eye and move his other senses he receives a clear notion of the latter’s majesty, power and authority”.⁵ At the close of the eighteenth century, and particularly in the aftermath of the French Revolution, the patterns of order to which the ceremonially communicated messages refer changes though the intended effect remains the same. The aim is no longer to visualize monarchical authority guaranteed by tradition and to glorify this authority through impressions of “dignity and grandeur”, “higher significance” or “venerableness”, as the *Staats-Lexikon* [Encyclopaedia of the State] of the 1830s comments with retrospective detachment.⁶ What now prevails through extensive staging for the broad masses is the symbolization of a radically new socio-political order and of its underlying concepts of order founded on the principle of equality. In this sense, historical studies of the French Revolution – studies, incidentally, in which the concept of “ceremonial pedagogy” originates – have traced the pedagogical application of spatial arrangements and visual media for purposes of state-controlled mass inculcation and consciousness-shaping.⁷ They have forcefully presented the attempt made by the revolutionaries of 1789 to deliberately stage public festivals, spatial architecture and collective rituals and instrumentalize these for purposes of far-reaching ideological re-education.⁸ As is frequently the case, the goals

4 Cf. the detailed study, undertaken from the vantage point of legal history, by Miloš Vec, *Zeremonialwissenschaft im Fürstenstaat: Studien zur juristischen und politischen Theorie absolutistischer Herrschaftsrepräsentation*, Frankfurt am Main 1998.

5 Julius Bernhard von Rohr, *Einleitung zur Ceremoniel-Wissenschaft der großen Herren*, Berlin 1733. Reprint edition Leipzig 1990, p. 2.

6 Carl von Rotteck, “Ceremoniel; Etikette”, in: Carl von Rotteck/Carl Welcker (eds), *Staats-Lexikon oder Encyclopädie der Staatswissenschaften*, vol. 3, Altona 1836, pp. 392-398.

7 See the standard-setting study by Mona Ozouf, *La fête révolutionnaire 1789–1799*, Paris 1976. More specific aspects are highlighted by Hans-Christian Harten, *Elementarschule und Pädagogik in der Französischen Revolution*, Munich 1990, as well as *Transformation und Utopie des Raums in der Französischen Revolution. Von der Zerstörung der Königsstatuen zur republikanischen Idealstadt*, Brunswick 1994. Cf. also James A. Leith, *Space and Revolution: Projects for Monuments, Squares, and Public Buildings in France 1789–1799*, Montréal/London 1991.

8 In contrast to the frequently exclusive emphasis given to the French Revolution in this regard, Jürgen Heideking refers to the style-setting predecessor role played by the public constitutional ceremonies and “federal processions” in North American East Coast towns following the American Revolution, particularly in the period from 1787–1789. This is all the more applicable as they referred to the same Greco-Roman examples and were designed with the key involvement of well-known French architects and artists. These figures include, in particular,

of such practices find expression not in the grand manifestos of the greats – such as the impressive outline of a public education system put forward by the Marquis de Condorcet in April 1792 – but instead in lesser programmatic proclamations. One such example is the *Projet d'éducation nationale*, which the Protestant pastor Jean-Paul Rabaut Saint-Etienne presented in December 1792 to the French National Convention to enthusiastic applause. While he duly underlines the significance of methodical instruction for the progress of the Enlightenment and the role of the Enlightenment in the revolution's success, he does so not without the following qualification:

The results of all these projected teaching institutions, however, will make themselves felt only in posterity, whereas you – Citizens [Members of this Assembly] – desire institutions for our own generation. You wish to raise instantaneously our morals to the level of [political awareness and enlightened justice which has already been reached by] our laws, and to trigger a revolution in the hearts and minds of the people just as the political Revolution has changed our social condition and form of government. However, does any method exist which is infallibly suited to convey to all Frenchmen, without any delay or exception, those uniform and universally shared impressions and sensations whose effect would make them collectively worthy of the Revolution, freedom [...] and equality [...] ?⁹

Naturally, Rabaut Saint-Étienne has an answer at hand to his somewhat rhetorical question. This answer initially refers to the institutions of Greek antiquity as well as the visualizing representations, rituals, and ceremonies defined by the Church of Rome in the wake of the Counter-Reformation. Moreover, Rabaut underscores the practice, allegedly current in these contexts, of moulding “the citizens of all ages and in all places by imparting to them, on the same day and at the same moment, the same impressions – through the senses, through imagination, through memory, through reasoning, in fact through all the faculties of the human being”.¹⁰ In doing so, he clearly refers to anthropological ideas, widespread in the eighteenth century, which state that it is the senses, the passions, the psycho-physical emotivity of Man in general that, well beyond reason, are to be considered as points of departure for the process by which he is influenced and moulded. Finally, Rabaut makes plain his answer to his sham question by introducing a distinction that could hardly be more indicative of the French revolutionary context and of the radical restructuring of the country's social and political order which his contemporaries are

Pierre l'Enfant – who later developed the urban plan for the capital, Washington, and Jacques Louis David who, back in France, contributed to the glorification of the French Revolution through his monumental paintings. Cf. Jürgen Heideking, *Die Verfassungsfeiern von 1788. Das Ende der Amerikanischen Revolution und die Anfänge einer Nationalen Festkultur in den Vereinigten Staaten*, in: *Der Staat. Zeitschrift für Staatslehre, Öffentliches Recht und Verfassungsgeschichte* 34 (1995), 3, pp. 391-413; as well as Jürgen Heideking/Geneviève Fabre (eds), *Celebrating Ethnicity and Nation: American Festive Culture from the Revolution to the Early Twentieth Century*, New York/Oxford 2001.

9 Jean-Paul Rabaut Saint-Etienne, *Projet d'éducation nationale*, Paris 1792. Reprint in: Bronislaw Baczko (ed.), *Une Education pour la Démocratie. Textes et projets de l'époque révolutionnaire*, Paris 1982, pp. 295-301, quote p. 296.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 297.

striving for. This is the distinction between “public schooling” (*instruction publique*) and “national education” (*éducation nationale*):

The former is meant to spread enlightened knowledge, the latter is designed to instil virtues; the former is to provide a society's prestige, the latter to guarantee its strength and cohesion. Public instruction requires academies, colleges, schools, books, calculating machines, and teaching methods; it secludes itself behind walls. National education [by contrast] requires circus games, halls for physical training, weapons, public games, national celebrations, fraternal interaction between all age groups and both sexes, and the impressive and charming spectacle of assembled society. It requires large spaces, the spectacle of the open fields and of nature; national education is nurture indispensable to society at large; public instruction matters only to parts of it. The two are sisters, to be sure, but national education is the older. More than this, national education is the mother common to all citizens, she breast-feeds them, raises them, treats them as siblings, and, through the commonality of care dispensed to them, imprints on them a certain family resemblance that distinguishes a nation raised in this way from all other nations on earth. The whole doctrine of national education consists, then, in captivating man from his cradle onwards, and even prior to his birth; for even the unborn child belongs to his or her mother country. National education captivates man in his entirety without ever releasing its hold on him; it is consequently not just an institution for children, but for one's entire life.¹¹

Rabaut Saint-Etienne's distinctions and explanations are significant in several respects. First of all, he clearly spells out the intentions associated with “ceremonial pedagogy” – for it is nothing other than “ceremonial pedagogy” he has in mind in expounding his ideas for “national education”. These intentions are directed not so much towards intellectual understanding but rather towards influencing the masses and thus reshaping their consciousness. Rabaut's “national education” is conceived, in other words, as a particular means of non-scholastic mass inculcation aimed at shaping the beliefs and behaviour patterns of man and, ultimately, the very core of human personality. With no less emphasis – and in terms unmistakably reminiscent of the theoretical programmes published by France's so-called “revolutionary” architects at this time¹² – Rabaut Saint-Etienne also focuses on the means of realizing such intentions. Through moulding the “hearts” and “minds”, the “impressions” and “sensations” as well as the “senses” and “imagination” of man, his “national education” seeks to visually impress, to emotionally overwhelm and thus to holistically affect the consciousness of the newborn “citizens”. Above all it is the great “spectacles” – of nature as well as public gatherings, national celebrations, open arenas and amicable competition – that are seen as the most suitable means of deeply

11 Ibid., p. 297-298; cf. also Ozouf, *La fête révolutionnaire* (footnote 7).

12 Cf. in particular Étienne-Louis Boullée, *Architecture, essai sur l'art* (1796–1797). Published from the original manuscript as Helen Rosenau (ed.), *Boullée's Treatise on architecture: a complete presentation of the "Architecture, essai sur l'art"*, which forms part of the Boullée papers in the Bibliothèque nationale, Paris/London 1953.

embedding in the popular consciousness the ideas of a novel political order and the principles of republican morality. Moreover, Rabaut Saint-Etienne emphatically refers to the exceptional situation that was created by the Revolution – and to which his *Plan for a National Education* owes its emergence – viz the radical changes in the societal and political order brought about from 1789 onwards and the attendant necessity of resocializing the masses in accordance with ideas directly opposed to France’s feudal and monarchical past and the theological legitimization of that past. Finally, it is characteristic of the rather ambiguous modernity of Rabaut’s *Plan for a National Education* that he not only takes up traditional ceremonial practices and transmutes them into secularized contemporary forms, he also tries to make these forms all-inclusive, demographically as well as biographically. In fact, the “national education” he advocates is meant both to seize hold – *s’emparer* as his French term reads – of *all* citizens and to keep hold of them *for their entire life-time*. Not least by thus extending “ceremonial pedagogy” to France’s *population as a whole* and every Frenchman’s *entire life-cycle*, Rabaut Saint-Etienne in a sense anticipates the totalitarian aspects associated with conceptions of ceremonial re-education or counter-education. He anticipates, in other words, the totalitarian aspects not only of the French Revolution – especially during the “Reign of Terror” years from 1793 to 1794 – but also of subsequent scenarios of revolutionary upheaval and “ceremonial pedagogy”, leading to systems of government which have sometimes been characterized as “inculcating states”.¹³

2. The “Revolutionary” Character of “Revolutionary Societies”

Japan in the wake of the Meiji Revolution of 1868, the Soviet Union following its inception as well as revolutionary Mexico churned up by successive upheavals and rival factions from 1910 onwards represent such scenarios. They therefore serve as fruitful cases for broader comparative studies which – located at the intersection of political history, history of education and media history – seek to describe particular manifestations of “ceremonial pedagogy” in various socio-political contexts.¹⁴ These studies are aimed, moreover, at analyzing the functions fulfilled by such media-based – and, in this sense, aesthetic – forms of representing novel conceptions of social order and patterns of social meaning. They therefore focus primarily on the instrumental status of “ceremonial pedagogy”, analyzing its workings with respect to the dissemination of the programmes of revolutionary restructuring and of the underlying legitimating myths and ideologies, and the establishment of these programmes, myths and ideologies by way of a virtual

13 Cf. the comparative case-studies collected in Dietrich Benner / Jürgen Schriewer / Heinz-Elmar Tenorth (eds), *Erziehungsstaaten. Historisch-vergleichende Analysen ihrer Denktraditionen und nationaler Gestalten*, Weinheim 1998.

14 Reference is made here to the research project on “Ceremonial Pedagogy in Post-Revolutionary Societies” coordinated by Jörg Baberowski and Jürgen Schriewer. This research is a component project of the Collaborative Research Centre on Representations of Changing Patterns of Social Order – Cross-temporal and cross-cultural studies which was established at Humboldt University, Berlin, on the basis of substantial research funds granted by the German Research Agency. For more information, cf. <http://www.sfb-repraesentationen.de>.

resocialization of the people. “Ceremonial pedagogy” is thus analyzed as a practice which is as much cultural (making use of a broad array of symbolic structures, visual representations, public stagings and spatial arrangements) as it is social (performed by individual and collective actors committed, for their part, to varying – and sometimes even antagonistic – values, world-views, beliefs or ideologies).

A closer look at these studies’ units of comparison reveals that historical research into the *Russian Revolution* of October 1917 widely concurs in regarding it as the paradigm of modern social revolutionary movements, comparable only to the French Revolution of 1789.¹⁵ Criteria justifying such a categorization include the spatio-temporal connections between the revolutionary coup d’état, subsequent civil wars, and the attempts to radically restructure state and society in circumstances of totalitarian violence.¹⁶ The revolutionary character is underscored, moreover, by well-grounded structural characteristics. Historical-*cum*-comparative research has identified such characteristics with reference to a twofold coincidence, viz “the coincidence of societal structural change with class upheaval; and the coincidence of political with social transformation”.¹⁷ Last but not least, the Russian Revolution was a prime example of a deliberate use of “ceremonial pedagogy” to reshape popular consciousness. This pedagogy’s manifestations characteristically included mass parades, public celebrations, monumental architecture as well as the use of a language of symbols which was intended to have a broad impact on the populace and was put into practice in a broad range of objects of art and everyday devices.¹⁸ For just as the universalist claim of the American Revolution had inspired the revolutionaries of 1789,¹⁹ the radical concepts of new order and the enforcement strategies of the French Jacobins were likewise reflected in the ideas of the early leaders of the Russian Revolution.²⁰

What is less clear, in contrast, is the revolutionary character of the radical changes and thorough-going modernization which *Japan* underwent in the years after 1868. For a long time, following the self-stylizations of the protagonist elites, this reshaping process was referred to as the “Meiji Restoration”. For these elites had sought to avoid the term “revolution” which bore negative connotations in the Confucian imagination. Their aim was instead already to symbolically underline the continuity of political authority through use of the term “Meiji Restoration”. In contrast, recent scholarship has tended to use the term “Meiji Revolution” to describe the entire process of Japanese modernization from the late Edo period (1854–1867) through the coup of 1867–1868 and up to

15 Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions. A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China*, Cambridge etc. 1979, pp. 206 ff.

16 Jörg Baberowski, *Der rote Terror. Die Geschichte des Stalinismus*, Munich 2003.

17 Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (footnote 15), p. 4.

18 See, inter alia, Rolf, *Das sowjetische Massenfest* (footnote 1), as well as Klaus Klemp/Karl Weber (eds), *Die Tafel der Zaren und das Porzellan der Revolutionäre. Porzellan als Kunst und Instrument in Diplomatie, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Frankfurt am Main 2008.

19 Cf. footnote 8 above.

20 This holds true particularly for Lenin himself, cf. among others Robert Service, *Lenin – A Political Life*, vol. 1-3, Basingstoke etc. 1985–1995.

the proclamation of the Meiji constitution and the supplementary “Imperial Rescript on Education” in the years 1889 and 1890, and thus to emphasize the radicalness of the change in the political, economic and social system:²¹ The shogunate was replaced with a bureaucracy-based central government; the traditional feudal economy gave way to a western-style capitalist economic system; and social structures granting the nobility, samurai and other citizens equality, at least by law, were superimposed on the feudal estates system. Unlike in France and Russia, however, in the case of Japan, notwithstanding isolated revolts, there was no national peasants’ uprising which had actually contributed to the “Meiji Revolution”. Accordingly, this “revolution” does not easily fit with Skocpol’s key criteria for “real”, i.e. socio-revolutionary upheaval. The transformations of the Meiji era should instead be seen as “a centralizing and nationalizing political revolution without landed upper-class obstruction and without class-based revolts from below”, in other words a “revolution from above”.²² The national-*cum*-political character of the revolutionary reshaping of the country from 1868 on is made particularly clear through the virtual *volte-face* in the Japanese population’s collective identity. While before 1868 the popular masses largely identified with the given local and regional framework, with either the village environment or the feudal fiefdom (*daimyat*), after 1868 the oligarchies willing to modernize deliberately pursued the transformation of “peasants into Japanese” – to adapt Eugen Weber’s pithy title²³ – and thus the creation of the modern nation. The figure of the Japanese emperor, the tennō, played a key role in this process. He functioned equally as a symbol of national unity and as the highest religious figure in Shintō. In accordance with this dual function, his appearance fluctuated between mass public staging (as the supreme military commander and the holder of ultimate political sovereignty) and a concealing sacralization (through phases of invisibility behind the palace walls and the ceremonial veneration of his portrait in schools and public buildings). The development of this tennō cult required the increasing homogenization and centralization of the previously extremely heterogeneous Shintō religion.²⁴ At the same time, the religious concepts embodied in it were instrumentalized for nationalistic political purposes and associated with state representational functions. If the idea of “Japan” as a homogenous nation had only vague contours at the beginning of the Meiji period, in the space of a few decades up to the death of the Meiji tennō in 1912 it had become firmly entrenched in the popular consciousness. This project of establishing a nation conscious of its unity – which, in connection with the establishment of State Shintō, has been

21 Sven Saaler, Die Bedeutung der Epochenmarke 1868 in der Japanischen Geschichte: Restauration, Revolution, Reform [“The Significance of 1868 as a Caesura in Japanese History: Restoration, Revolution, Reform”], in: Saeculum. Jahrbuch für Universalgeschichte 56 (2005), pp. 69-104. Cf. also the discussion of recent scholarship on the “Meiji-Ishin” by Daniel Hedinger at the beginning of his article in this volume, pp. 78 ff.

22 Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (footnote 15), p. 102 f.

23 Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1870–1914, London 1977.

24 Cf. among others Klaus Antoni, Shintō und die Konzeption des japanischen Nationalwesens (Kokutai). Der religiöse Traditionalismus in Neuzeit und Moderne Japans (= Handbuch der Orientalistik, Bd. 8), Leiden etc. 1998; Ernest Satow/Karl Florenz, Ancient Japanese Rituals and the Revival of Pure Shintō, London etc. 2002.

characterized as “most daring social engineering”²⁵ – could only succeed in such a short period of time through the use and establishment in public space of manifold forms of “ceremonial pedagogy” for purposes of social integration. These integration rituals with mass appeal included national holidays, a national flag and anthem, national heroes (on bank notes or stamps), monuments and statues as well as national rites and ceremonies closely interwoven with Shintō religious practices.²⁶ Central to these efforts was the attempt to enforce personified representations of the nation in public space which enabled the establishment in the general consciousness of the abstract idea of the Japanese nation while largely levelling previously existing regional and social ties.

The trajectory and significance of the revolutionary movement which shook *Mexico* from 1910 onwards are different once again. To a very considerable degree, this movement was split into heterogeneous currents. Historiography therefore tends to characterize it as a scenario of multiple – regionally, politically, socially or culturally determined – sub-revolutions featuring rapidly changing fronts and varying coalitions. The liberal groupings around Francisco Madero, for instance, and the industrial middle classes of northern Mexico associated with these groupings primarily sought a widening of the opportunities for political participation and a basic reorganization of a political system which had hardened into dictatorship under the long-lived presidency of Porfirio Díaz (1876–1880 and 1884–1911). In contrast to such constitutional objectives, the peasant agrarian revolutionaries around Emiliano Zapata – the “revolution of the south” – were primarily concerned with a social reform programme comprising the restitution of their hereditary land (which had undergone widespread expropriation under Díaz). Finally, a conglomerate of small peasants, agrarian workers and a homeless lumpenproletariat led by Pancho Villa – which revolted against the concentration of land in major estates and against large American land-holdings in particular – formed temporary allies of the Zapatistas. However, all these groups were in themselves too heterogeneous to formulate a binding political and ideological programme, let alone jointly pursue one. In fact, for the origins and changing trajectory of the revolution a variety of ethnic, legal, religious and cultural factors were just as important as entirely personal ambitions, affinities or aversions. Thus in overall terms the Mexican revolution can be interpreted as an extremely violence-ridden redistribution of positions of power at every level – at that of the Federation as well as that of individual states, municipalities, cultural institutions and social groups. Yet the revolutionary process simultaneously revealed acute crises of integration, in at least two different senses. On the one hand, the disputes between the revolutionary factions themselves took an exceedingly conflict-laden course and even intensified into internal civil wars, military rebellions and popular uprisings. It was only towards the end of the 1920s that these factions were brought together in a united revolutionary party under the leadership of the ultimately victorious “Jacobin” faction of the Constitutionalists. Henceforth factional struggles were fought within the new party

25 Helen Hardacre, *Shintō and the State, 1868–1988*, Princeton etc. 1989.

26 See the chapters authored by Sven Saaler and by Shin’ichi Suzuki and Kazuhiko Yamaki in this volume.

formation but thus became controllable. The organization of this party – which was founded in 1929 as the *Partido Nacional Revolucionario* and via several interim stages evolved into today’s *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* – was without doubt one of the most far-reaching measures in a subsequently extraordinarily effective strategy of mass mobilization. Bound by a corporatist model of state and society, this united party saw itself as a hegemonic force which was to reconcile the interests of state and society as well as those of business and administration. At the same time, it represented the myth of the revolution, which was subsequently to be called upon as an ever renewable source of legitimation for various political programmes and personalities.²⁷ On the other hand, manifest integration problems existed in view of the permanent threat of US interference in Mexico’s revolutionary turmoil. Short-term interventions such as the occupation of Veracruz harbour in 1914 or General Pershing’s “punitive expedition” to northern Mexico in the winter of 1916–1917 had dramatically illustrated this danger. In this context, the “Jacobin” revolutionary generals around Álvaro Obregón who had ultimately prevailed in the recurrent sub-revolutions and internal Mexican disputes rapidly realized that they could only be sure of consolidating their victory through sufficiently broad-based social support, preferably in the form of nationalistically-tinted mass mobilization. Accordingly, the programme of offensively linking modernization with internal nation-building primarily developed in response to the perceived national threat from the north. While a project of this sort had enjoyed hardly any significance in the early years of the revolution, it now became the victorious faction’s explicit programme. Nonetheless, its enactment was not possible without conflicts. First of all, the integration of the indios in a national space which was to be homogenized proved highly problematic, as the strategies drafted by Mexican intellectuals for the indios’ cultural and political inclusion clashed with the extraordinary social, ethnic and linguistic complexity of the highly heterogeneous indio populations between the north of the country and the federal states of the south east, as for instance between the Yuki and the Maya. The new nation-building policy also clashed with the traditional influence of the Catholic Church and the still lively popular religion, however; in other words, with deeply-rooted cultural factors which had often enough been employed for reactionary aims and the reinforcement of traditional loyalties. Accordingly, the effects of the secularization policy promoted under the constitution of 1917 triggered off the Catholic peasants’ uprisings in the north west, the so-called Cristeros wars of the 1920s and 1930s, which strongly signalled the level of opposition to the revolutionaries’ modernization and nationalization policies.²⁸ In view of such external and internal challenges the task was increasingly to realize social mobilization and national integration through new means and persuasive forms of expression such as the occupation of public space and the reinterpretation of identity-forming ritu-

27 Under the well-known abbreviation “PRI”, this party was to dominate political life in Mexico largely unchallenged right up to the 1990s.

28 Peter L. Reich, *Mexico’s Hidden Revolution: The Catholic Church in Law and Politics since 1929*, Notre Dame/London 1995.

als. This task was assigned to the education ministry which had been newly established in 1921, the *Secretaría de Educación Pública*. This ministry – which, under the dynamic leadership of the writer and philosopher José Vasconcelos Calderón, was for a time one of the country’s most influential governmental authorities, both in terms of shaping the dominant ideologies and translating them into actual policies – took on not only the reorganization of the public school system and eradication of the illiteracy still widespread among the rural population but also the public and cultural representation of the victorious Constitutionalists’ visions for the new political and social order.²⁹ Notwithstanding considerable material limitations, over a period of decades the executives in this ministry attempted to implement a policy of continuous modernization with the goals of cultural consciousness-shaping (through the development and maintenance of visually memorable national myths of origin and visions of the future), social mobilization and imposition of discipline (through hygiene, labour and social education) and national integration (through linguistic homogenization, civic instruction and the comprehensive integration of women). It is here that the large-scale frescos (*murales*) on many government buildings and town halls – which immortalized a stylization and mythicization of Mexican history spanning the historical ruptures and political fragmentations – as well as the public *fiestas* and the *misiones culturales* had their place.

3. Integration, Homogenization, Modernization: Problem Configurations in Revolutionary Contexts and the Role of “Ceremonial Pedagogy”

To be sure, the range of units of analysis of possible relevance for the comparative studies in question is not limited to Meiji Japan, the young Soviet Union and post-revolutionary Mexico. Quite apart from historical precedents such as the French Revolution, the radical transformation of the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire into a highly centralized and culturally and linguistically homogenized nation-state – first by the Young Turks (1908) and conclusively by Kemal Atatürk (1923) – might well represent another case worthy of detailed examination from the vantage point of “ceremonial pedagogy”.³⁰ Accordingly, whatever the number of potentially fruitful cases it is also crucial to identify the points of reference which are indispensable for meaningful comparisons. The common features of the revolutionary contexts outlined above – which facilitate their comparison – are typical problems or problem configurations that may hypothetically be described as follows:

29 Engracia Loyo Bravo, *Gobiernos Revolucionarios y Educación Popular en México, 1911–1928*, México, D.F. 1999.

30 Cf. among other works, Rezan Benatar, *Producing and Reproducing the Nation: Kemalist Turkey as an Education State*, in: Benner/Schriewer/Tenorth (eds), *Erziehungsstaaten* (footnote 13), pp. 287–304.

(i) *Resocializing the masses in exceptional circumstances*

Processes of "ceremonial pedagogy", pursued with a view to affecting and reshaping mass consciousness, are implemented only in exceptional circumstances in the context of the social life of modern states and societies. Conceived as a kind of "comprehensive scheme for popular instruction intended to promote the masses' graphical and profound understanding of the nature of the Revolution" – as a book published to mark the tenth anniversary of the Russian Revolution significantly states³¹ – they are not to be equated with the generally accepted forms of institutionalized schooling, nor can such forms of socialization be maintained over time without losing their socializing power. They are therefore typically linked with the exceptional political and societal scenarios arising in contexts of revolutionary transformation and not in the normal course of historical events.

(ii) *Social mobilization and cultural homogenization*

As the French Revolution had conspicuously demonstrated, transformations of this kind were typically associated with a self-defined imperative for the modernization – and even the more or less wholesale rebuilding – of state and society. This imperative involved, first of all, the mobilization of large segments of the population in the societies in question. It also entailed the goals – differently weighted in each particular context – of political integration, and homogenization along the lines of a single national culture, of societies that still were strongly tradition-bound and highly segmented, whether through estates and regional divisions or through ethnic affiliations or religio-cultural orientations.³² These were societies, in other words, such as the semi-feudal and territorially and communicatively fragmented Japan under the Tokugawa shogunate, the socially, ethnically and culturally segmented Mexico of the late nineteenth century and multi-ethnic tsarist Russia. In this context, therefore, cultural homogenization meant, in the Japanese case, the realization of a nation-state steeped in nationalism (represented by the tennō and the State Shintō religion centred on the tennō); in the Mexican case, the fusing of ethnically and socially extremely heterogeneous population groups into an overarching "cosmic race" (represented by historical myths and, in a certain sense, a permanently "institutionalized revolution");³³ and, in the case of the Soviet Union, finally, the construction of a classless society (represented by the Communist Party and its ideology). As this last example makes clear, however, homogenization did not simply imply fully realized inclusion; instead, all three cases entailed varying degrees of inclusion and exclusion. Thus in the Japanese case ethnic groups such as the Ainu, who did not share the com-

31 Orest V. Tsekhnovitser, *Demonstratsia i karnaval: K desiatoi godovshchine Oktriabr'skoi revoliutsii* [Demonstration and Carnival: On the Tenth Anniversary of the October Revolution]. Leningrad 1927, p. 7. I am grateful to Malte Rolf who drew my attention to this phrase.

32 See the succinct discussion by Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford 1983, of the connections between nation-building and cultural homogenization.

33 Cf. the utopian programme drafted by José Vasconcelos, *La raza cósmica: misión de la raza iberoamericana*, París/Madrid etc. 1925.

mon ancestry of the Japanese nation derived from the mythic sun goddess Amaterasu, remained excluded. Similarly, in Mexico foreign – especially North American – entrepreneurs and large landowners as well as natives who clung to autochthonous lifestyles and cultural patterns and, later on, all those who opposed the “institutionalized revolution”, including the Catholic Church, were deemed incapable of integration. The relationship between inclusion and exclusion assumed particularly drastic forms in post-revolutionary Russia. Massive homogenizing pressure imposed on the majority of the population went hand in hand with the mass elimination of all groups even merely imaginarily identified as “bourgeois” or incriminated as “former”: landowners and kulaks, nobles and tsarist officers, civil servants and salaried employees, teachers and professors, priests and tribal leaders, and even the erstwhile “national communists” and Cossacks. To put it in paradoxical terms: “The more definite the systems of order the Bolsheviks dreamed of, the greater the number of those forced to remain excluded from them.”³⁴ Moreover, in all three cases here under discussion the general goals of modernization and homogenization were concretized in a cluster of complementary policies whose enactment was attempted – once again, with varying priorities in individual cases – within a highly compressed period of time. This included an infrastructure policy designed to achieve the rational reorganization of national territory and the development of a national transport system. This also laid the foundations for an economic and industrialization policy pursued with voluntaristic resoluteness. In parallel, an ideological and commemorative policy pursued with the utmost commitment aimed to realize society-wide acceptance of myths of origins, grand narratives and binding visions of history and the future.³⁵ Finally, cultural homogenization focused directly on language policy (in view of the binding enforcement of a standard national language) and general education policy (in view of the inclusive reorganization and modernization of institutionalized schooling).

(iii) Imperatives of modernizing under “compressed” time horizons

The drama of the revolutionary reorganization policies went hand in hand with a particular relationship to time. Not only did the self-imposed programme of modernization – as in the case of Meiji Revolution Japan – extend to the homogenization of time through calendar reform and reorganization of the entire nation’s time system.³⁶ In many cases the key protagonists acted under the impression of a shortening of the available time horizon, which was clearly perceived as such. This perception was determined in equal measure by external dispositions in the international state system and by self-imposed

34 Jörg Baberowski / Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, *Ordnung durch Terror*, Bonn 2006, p. 55. Cf. also Baberowski, *Der rote Terror* (footnote 16), pp. 36 ff, where the inhuman dictum of Grigorii Zinov’ev – a member of the Bolsheviks’ innermost leadership circle – of September 1918 is quoted: “Of the one hundred million-strong population of Soviet Russia we must get 90 million on our side. As for the rest, we have nothing to say to them. They must be destroyed”.

35 Cf. for general information Helmut König, *Politik und Gedächtnis*, Weilerswist 2008.

36 Cf. Reinhard Zöllner, *Zeit und die Konstruktion der Moderne im Japan des 19. Jahrhunderts*, in: *Historische Anthropologie. Kultur – Gesellschaft – Alltag* 11 (2003), 1, pp. 47-71.

– and partially utopian – visions of the future. In all three compared contexts, what predominated was an awareness of a relative lateness in the process of modernization and industrialization and a concomitant backwardness in relation to more advanced powers or rivals with superior military technology in the international state system.³⁷ This awareness grew into the realization of an acute threat from the imperialist powers of the West, a threat which it was thought could only be countered through energetic action and the broadest possible mobilization. This had been the situation in Japan since the forced opening-up of the country and the "unequal treaties" concluded with the western powers. But the same situation also applied in the Soviet Union during the eventful Civil War years and in view of the interventions of the Entente powers who had landed in the Far North, in the Black Sea ports of the south and in the Far East. And the situation in Mexico was largely analogous, as a consequence of humiliating defeats at the hands of the north American invaders and economic dependency on foreign (mainly US) large-scale companies and investors. Finally, the insistence on the rapid realization of utopian visions of society – where notions of lateness and threats were not insignificant – was a further factor in the compression of the political timeframe. Such forms of political anticipation of the future were particularly true of the Soviet Union, but to a lesser extent they also characterized certain elements of the Mexican revolutionary movement. In all these cases, then, it was the awareness of time deemed to be, in a sense, accelerated or "compressed" that spurred on voluntaristic activities utilizing extraordinary means, in a variety of different political fields.

(iv) Multiple motivations for the use of "ceremonial pedagogy"

The exceptional situation of revolutionary rearrangements outlined so far, the range of self-imposed modernization and homogenization imperatives and, not least, the awareness of an external threat and accelerated time horizons also determined the motivations of the revolutionary regimes for relying on extraordinary techniques for the extensive representation and communication of their programmes. This was particularly so in that, in all three countries under consideration, the occupation of public space which had for a time been fiercely contested and the displacement of competing systems of references and symbols – such as those of the church and the monarchy, the feudal daimyo or the bourgeois republic – played a key role. The use precisely of visual media and procedural forms of representation (public ceremonies, mass parades and rituals as well as an "architecture parlante", myth-narrating murals and symbol-saturated monuments) had a twofold motivation. On the one hand, in the Soviet Union and Mexico in particular – though less so in Japan – in the context of high levels of illiteracy there was a quite pragmatic need for increased use of highly expressive, non-written media for purposes

37 This was, incidentally, a realistic assessment according to Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*, Cambridge, Mass. 1962; cf. also Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (footnote 15), pp. 19 ff., 47 et passim.

of social mobilization and persuasion in relation to the mass adult population. On the other hand, the goal was the visual and auditory monopolization of public space and its penetration with a canon of core symbols which were suitable in order to superimpose, reinterpret or replace the representations of the *ancien régime* and its systems of order.³⁸ However, the aim was more than just to replace the old systems of order and their symbols – as clearly expressed for all to see, for instance, in the campaigns to remove women’s veils in the Muslim Soviet republics, the secularization of ecclesiastical symbols in Mexico or the conversion of Buddhist temples into exhibition halls or schools in Meiji Japan. Many cases also involved a transfer of sacrality. In other words, the shattering of the established systems of order – whether ecclesiastical or political in nature – was associated with the virtually sacral glory of new kinds of civil religions, identity-forming ruler figures or charismatic leaders.³⁹ It was precisely here that the staging and influencing techniques of “ceremonial pedagogy” had their place. They represented a key instrument in the enterprise of communicating the visions of a radical transformation and reorganization of state and society through forms of emotionally overwhelming aestheticization and staging and of embedding these visions in hearts and minds. While the protagonists of the French Revolution had already been aware of such potential forms of influence, the same was also true in principle for the new political elites in the post-revolutionary societies examined here. In Japan, for instance, the director of the newly established Imperial Museum defended the significance of erecting in public space bronze statues depicting heroes both of ancient times and of the Meiji Revolution as an important means of “public education”.⁴⁰ As already noted, the political intellectuals of the early Soviet Union likewise deliberately employed non-scholastic forms of mass education and inculcation – such as mass processions, open-air theatre, public festivals and decorative presentations of urban space – which were suitable “to promote the masses’ graphical and profound understanding of the nature of the Revolution”.⁴¹ In the same spirit, as early as 1918 the People’s Commissariat for Enlightenment organized a competition with the goal of identifying and selecting from among the works of well-known writers and revolutionary intellectuals “brief, expressive and profound quotations inspiring reflection, stimulating positive thought and unleashing strong revolutionary feelings in the soul”.⁴² And the programme which the Mexican *Secretaría de Educación Pública* – which was at

38 Examples of this are the complementary movements of destruction and redesign in architecture and urban planning – frequently enlarged into oversize ideal cities – both in the French Revolution and in early Soviet Moscow; cf. Harten, Transformation und Utopie des Raums in der Französischen Revolution (footnote 7); Janina Urussowa, Das neue Moskau: Die Stadt der Sowjets im Film 1917–1941, Cologne etc. 2004.

39 For the American and French Revolutions, cf. Heideking, Die Verfassungsfeiern von 1788 (footnote 8), p. 405, and Ozouf, La fête révolutionnaire (footnote 7), pp. 441 ff. On the sacralization of the charismatic ruler as the epitome of the revolutionary new order in Japan and Mexico cf. the articles by Shin’ichi Suzuki and Kazuhiko Yamaki and by Eugenia Roldán Vera and Carlos Martínez Valle in this volume.

40 Cf. the article by Sven Saaler in this volume, p. 34, footnote 29.

41 Tsekhnovitser, Demonstratsia i karnaval (footnote 31), p. 7.

42 Quoted in Klemp/Weber (eds), Die Tafel der Zaren und das Porzellan der Revolutionäre (footnote 18), p. 262.

the forefront on all issues of intellectual and cultural policy – announced in 1934 looks like a late reply to Rabaut Saint-Etienne:

Two kinds of educational influence have an impact on peoples and individuals: first, the influence of the school and, second, an influence which is more extensive, longer-lasting, and perhaps more direct, viz the influence of the social environment. [...] The influence of the school is subject to multiple contingencies and vanishes as soon as it ceases to be exercised directly. By contrast, the complex fabric of social life – comprising customs, common usages, daily examples of action and reaction, general means of discussing the exciting present as well as prejudices, conversations and many other aspects – continuously influences children, adults and old people just as it affects both the educated and the uneducated. It pervades all social classes and determines the collective character of the population. Social life at large, then, is the school without walls which relies on indirect and yet effective means. Accordingly, the state, heavily committed to educating the people, must – and indeed does – take care to have an impact, without neglecting the fundamental role of schooling proper, on the educational forces of the social environment so as to move beyond prejudice or ideology all those potentially seductive institutions – such as taken-for-granted habit, spectacle or fashion – that impinge on the spirit of a nation [...] In this sense, the Mexican State pays great heed to its duties as an educator.⁴³

(v) *Actors, levels of actors and “clash of representations”*

However, the far-reaching expectations and intentions outlined so far only describe *one* aspect of the use of “ceremonial pedagogy” in situations of historical and social upheaval. This does not yet cover the implementation of such intentions in practised forms of media-based resocialization or even the actual effects which they realized (or failed to realize). Yet it would not be wrong to assume that the representations of the generally urban political elites, on the one hand, and, on the other, the ideas founded on tradition, religion and habit of a largely peasant, if not mostly illiterate, population collided in a manner revealing all possible forms of mutual misunderstanding, stubborn rejection and open conflict. Just as the political elites had only learned to perceive their own societies as “traditional” through their confrontation with the “West”, the imperialist powers or “enlightened” Europe, the encroachment of secular visions of society, abstract legal norms, thoroughly rationalized systems of knowledge and western technology into the lifeworlds of agrarian populations were generally experienced by these populations as a rupture and conflict which they responded to with persistent resistance. In other words – to adapt another much cited book title⁴⁴ – the situation of upheaval at the level of macro-structural policies and transformations corresponded to a “clash of representations”

43 Memoria de la Secretaría de Educación Pública 1934, vol. II, México, DF 1934, pp. 539 f.

44 I am referring to Samuel P. Huntington's book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York 1996.

at the level of the actors concerned. These actors should be pictured at a wide variety of different levels, with varying statuses, fields of action and intellectual horizons. The key protagonists first of all consisted of the chief ideologues and guiding intellectuals with political responsibility in ministries and propaganda institutions. At the level below this executive stratum were technical specialists who conceived the changing programmes and organizational forms of “ceremonial pedagogy”. Hardly less important were the local organisers charged with interpreting the directives of the central government authorities and guiding intellectuals, refracting these in line with the horizon of their own particular – and highly individual – experience and ideas and enforcing them in the regional and local organizational committees and bodies. Last of all there were the recipients, in other words the broad “public” which formed the object of the re-educational intentions – couched in terms of aesthetics, appeal or agitation, depending on the initial situation. Yet the political initiators found in and through their interactions with the nearly unforeseeable variety of this public’s currents, groups, loyalty ties and educational and life experience – if not before – that the opportunities for enforcing their intentions became uncontrollable. Likewise, it is hard for present-day scholarship as well to control – both in methodological terms and with regard to the sources – the establishment of both collective and individual identities in such processes of interaction.

4. Different Contexts and Varying Manifestations of “Ceremonial Pedagogy”

Under these circumstances, comparative studies examining forms of “ceremonial pedagogy” in connection with the exceptional conditions and problem scenarios of post-revolutionary societies will not be able to limit themselves to consistently identifying identical phenomena. Founded in historical sociology, they have “no fear of comparisons or context”;⁴⁵ on the contrary, they emphasize politico-cultural contexts and context-determined deviations. They are therefore not focused on invariant causal relationships but instead assume the functional equivalence of different manifestations of “ceremonial pedagogy” in relation to structurally similar reference problems of far-reaching mobilization and consciousness-shaping.⁴⁶ The task of such comparative historical analyses is then to indicate a differentiated spectrum of various forms of “ceremonial pedagogy” whose selection and effectiveness are equally attributable to problem perceptions which vary according to context, to tradition-determined – and in this sense, path-dependent – social meanings, and to different collective and individual historical actors. By way of an initial summary, the forms of “ceremonial pedagogy” whose application in the context

45 Lars Mjøset, No fear of comparisons or context: on the foundations of historical sociology, in: Jürgen Schriewer (ed.), *Comparative Methodologies in the Social Sciences – Cross-Disciplinary Inspirations* (= *Comparative Education*, special issue no. 32, August 2006), pp. 337-362.

46 Cf. Jürgen Schriewer, *Comparative Education Methodology in Transition: Towards a Science of Complexity*, in: Jürgen Schriewer (ed.), *Discourse Formation in Comparative Education*, 3rd revised edition, Frankfurt am Main etc. 2009, pp. 3-52.

of post-revolutionary societies is analysed in detail in the following case studies may be arranged in three different groups:

Nationwide tours by the *key representatives* of the new revolutionary system of government and society played a key role in all the above-mentioned units of analysis. Just as the Meiji emperor travelled across unified Japan, president Lázaro Cárdenas travelled through post-revolutionary Mexico (and – it should be added for the sake of completeness – the Azerbaijani revolutionary leader Nariman Narimanov travelled through his new zone of influence). Each of these journeys was intended to provide a clear contribution to spreading the message of the enacted revolution or reorganization of the state and nation from the respective capitals – Tokyo, St. Petersburg/Moscow or Mexico City – throughout the country, including its peripheral parts. But as well as demonstrating power and symbolizing unity, these journeys were also intended to enhance the legitimacy of the new rulers by staging their physical presence. Prompted on the one hand by concrete occasions such as military parades, openings of parliament or the dedication of monuments or schools, on the other hand these journeys also represented an attempt to consolidate the new order which had been brought about by revolutionary means. The article by Shin’ichi Suzuki and Kazuhiko Yamaki on Japan articulates the tours made by the Meiji tennō with deeply symbolic intention just as the article by Eugenia Roldán Vera and Carlos Martínez Valle analyzes the reiterated travels of the Mexican president Lázaro Cárdenas across the country.

A second, highly characteristic group of forms of “ceremonial pedagogy” – the *construction of monuments* and the *cultivation of rituals* – was tied to traditions which can be traced back to distant historical origins. Both these forms are linked, on the one hand, with the intentions associated with deliberate commemorative policy and, on the other, with the attempted transfer of sacral dignity and legitimacy. The first of these aspects is at the heart of Sven Saaler’s article on the mythical and the contemporary founding figures of Japan who were immortalized by the oligarchies of the Meiji period at highly symbolic locations as “men in metal”. On the other hand, in their extensive essay Shin’ichi Suzuki and Kazuhiko Yamaki not only consider the transfer of the sacral aura, dignity and morally binding nature of the Buddhist temple to the western-inspired modern school building; they also analyze the ritual of honouring the emperor’s portrait which was regularly practised until 1945 in Japanese elementary schools and of reciting, in an elevated tone of voice, the deeply Confucian “Imperial Rescript on Education”.

Finally, a third form of “ceremonial pedagogy” – a form which was given special weight in all three comparative scenarios – was the practice of *campaigns* and *exhibitions* which were specially linked with the symbolization of modernity and progress. This is true of the national exhibitions in Japan which were initially tentatively improvised in what had previously been temples but increasingly followed Western patterns, and which thus expressed in visible form – and hence as an “aesthetic” staging – new types of knowledge systems as well as the political resolution to fuel industrial progress. Far more strongly than in imperial Japan, the Soviet campaigns expressed the opposition between peasant tradition and Soviet modernity, between “disease” and “hygiene”, and thus also between

supposed dilapidation and health (including in intellectual terms). This is illustrated on the one hand by Matthias Braun's article on hygiene campaigns in Soviet Russia. On the other hand, with his analysis of unveiling campaigns in the Muslim Soviet republics, Jörg Baberowski establishes the extreme degree of conflict which was associated with the collision of different – yet equally exclusive – religio-cultural and ideological world-views. He also provides emphatic proof – if such proof were necessary – that the use of “ceremonial pedagogy” in the exceptional conditions of revolutionary upheavals and in connection with the voluntaristic modernization policies of post-revolutionary regimes always entailed a serious “clash of representations”.