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Reconceptualising faith-based diplomacy to expand the diplomat's toolkit

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**Reconceptualising Faith-based Diplomacy to Expand the
Diplomat's Toolkit**

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Submitted in total fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Faculty of Society and Design

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Assistant Professor Marie-Claire Patron

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Abstract

Faith and religion have long been recognised as a dynamic force in the international system. Within the scope of Diplomacy Studies, however, the positive integration of faith into the theory and practices of diplomacy is only a recent endeavour. Faith-based diplomacy, which emerged in the 1990s, is a framework for achieving this effective integration. This thesis evaluates the theoretical constructs of faith-based diplomacy to assess if these frameworks are appropriate when addressing the challenges of the 21st Century. Given the changing nature of conflict, the implications of globalisation, and the impacts of global terrorism and religious violence, this thesis finds that the current theoretical frames are insufficient. As such, this thesis aims to reconceptualise the framework of faith-based diplomacy considering the theoretical advancements in Diplomacy Studies, and the changes in the international system since the faith-based diplomacy's introduction into scholarship. A comprehensive review of the literature in Diplomacy Studies reveals that faith-based diplomacy can benefit from the expanded scopes of analysis, including areas such as public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy. This, along with the development of concepts such as reconciliation, mediation and the tracks of diplomacy all suggest that the theoretical framework of faith-based diplomacy can be improved. To expound on this improvement, this thesis evaluates the development of theory in Diplomacy Studies more broadly, recognising the presence of faith and religion in diplomatic theory through history. This thesis, however, will also assess the actors who engage with diplomacy, highlighting ways in which faith-based diplomacy can be utilised by both state and nonstate actors. In doing so, this thesis provides an evaluation of faith-based diplomacy in theory, and also in terms of how actors in the contemporary international landscape may be able to engage in practice. From this evaluation, this thesis concludes with key recommendations on how faith-based diplomacy's framework can be reconceptualised to integrate more effectively the assets of religion into the practice of diplomacy. This reconceptualisation contributes to the growing body of scholarship within Diplomacy Studies by providing a theory that better reflects the nature of diplomatic theory and practice in the current international system.

Key Words

Faith-based, diplomacy, religion, interfaith, Diplomacy Studies

Declaration

This thesis is submitted to Bond University in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

This thesis represents my own original work towards this research degree and contains no material that has previously been submitted for a degree or diploma at this University or any other institution, except where due acknowledgement is made.

Full name: Scott Blakemore

Signature:

Date: May 2019

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

The resurgence of religious feeling will continue to influence world events. [Policymakers] cannot afford to ignore this; on balance they should welcome it. Religion at its best can reinforce the core values necessary for people from different cultures to live in some degree of harmony; we should make the most of that possibility - Madelaine Albright.¹

In 2015 the Pew Research Center released a report titled *The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050*. The report revealed that the percentage of the world's population unaffiliated to any religion will decrease from 16% in 2010 to 13% in 2050.² This statistic indicates that the presence of religion is not declining, but rather will remain or grow as a force in society in the future. The report also indicates that the percentage of the population adhering to the Islamic faith will grow to 29.7% of the world's population in 2050, with Christianity remaining the world's largest religion at 31.4% of the population.³ Likewise, 'imported' religions such as Islam and Buddhism have an increased presence in Western societies, based on migration and changing demographics.⁴ Traditional conceptions of religion and its place in the community are being tested by the reality of an increasingly pluralistic and globalised world. Indeed, observers of international relations will have to contend with religion as a factor in decision making well into the century. Today, the importance of religion is not only indicated by its increased prevalence throughout the world, but also its centrality to much of the conflict that has unfolded within the prevailing international system.⁵

Religion's presence in conflict is not a new phenomenon, with past conflicts ravaging modern Europe across Islamic-Christian and Protestant-Catholic lines. Religious conflict

¹ Madelaine Albright, "Faith and Diplomacy," *Review of Faith & International Affairs* 4, no. 2 (2006). 9

² Pew Research Center, "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050," (2015).

³ Ibid.

⁴ For more see Peter L. Berger, "Religions and Globalisation," *European Judaism* 36, no. 1 (2003). For more from the Islamic perspective, see René Otayek, "Religion and Globalisation: Sub-Saharan Islam to Conquer New Territories," *South African Historical Journal* 61, no. 1 (2009).

⁵ Douglas M. Johnston, "Introduction: Real Politik Expanded," in *Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik*, ed. Douglas M. Johnston (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 4

began to increase again in global distribution from 1977.⁶ However, due to the deeper social and political roots that religion has within society, religious conflicts have been fought for longer periods than other types of conflict.⁷ Not only are religious conflicts often more entrenched and intractable, but studies suggest that they are fought more savagely.⁸ Fox notes that this has been evident by the wave of religious terror and militant movements, highlighting that this wave of religious conflict may outlast previous waves.⁹ The emergence of extremist religions, namely militant Islam through groups such as the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda, has dramatically reshaped the Middle East.¹⁰ The ideology underpinning the expansion of such groups is radical and dogmatic, and has informed the contemporary understanding of terrorism as a globalised movement. The strong religious narrative presented has proven difficult for policymakers to curb as recruitment, the spread of ideology, and the threat of attacks have posed an increasingly global challenge. Followers are bound by religious symbolism and collective identity which is difficult to respond to effectively.¹¹ The West in particular exhibits a longstanding inability to respond to the challenges of religion, and it is these challenges that will only intensify over time.¹² Not only is religion often present in violent extremism, but in much of today's identity and communal based conflict, religion plays a vital role.¹³ Therefore, there is a need for the development of frameworks to understand and implement the positive assets of religion, particularly in combatting violence and building peace. However, as Hehir notes, "there's no place where a sophisticated understanding of religion as a public force in the world is dealt with".¹⁴ As such, this thesis aims to construct a clear frame of analysis by which the place of faith, particularly in diplomacy, can be better understood.

Such an undertaking comes in the context of a renaissance in Diplomacy Studies – in the way that diplomatic theories are being explored, expanded and constructed¹⁵ – and one of these innovations has been faith-based diplomacy, first proposed as a scholarly perspective in

⁶ Jonathan Fox, "The Religious Wave: Religion and Domestic Conflict from 1960 to 2009," *Civil Wars* 14, no. 2 (2012). 155

⁷ Ibid. 155

⁸ Albright, "Faith and Diplomacy." 3

⁹ Fox, "The Religious Wave: Religion and Domestic Conflict from 1960 to 2009." 155

¹⁰ Nicos Panayiotides, "The Islamic State and the Redistribution of Power in the Middle East," *International Journal on World Peace* 32, no. 3 (2015). Islamic State is also known by other names, these being Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Daesh.

¹¹ Stephan Rosiny, "The Rise and Demise of the IS Caliphate," *Middle East Policy* 22, no. 2 (2015). 95

¹² Johnston, "Introduction: Real Politik Expanded." 5

¹³ Douglas Johnston, "Introduction: Beyond Power Politics," in *Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft*, ed. Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 3

¹⁴ Hehir as cited by, Albright, "Faith and Diplomacy." 3

¹⁵ Stuart Murray, "The Renaissance of Diplomatic Theory," *International Politics Quarterly/Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjiu* (2013).

1994. Douglas Johnston is recognised as a principle proponent of the theory of faith-based diplomacy, and notes that this form of diplomacy is typically conducted by nonstate actors who integrate the dynamics of religious faith in the processes of international peacemaking.¹⁶ As a conceptually new addition to the area of international relations more broadly, faith-based diplomacy can benefit from this renaissance in Diplomacy Studies, quite apart from being one of its strands. In further developing the theoretical understanding of faith-based diplomacy, it can be reconceptualised to address more effectively the religious challenges presented in the 21st Century.

Aims of the Thesis

The primary aim of this thesis is to contribute to the scholarship of Diplomacy Studies by reconceptualising the theoretical framework of faith-based diplomacy. To achieve this reconceptualised framework, this thesis has identified the research gaps by reviewing the pertinent literature. Fundamentally, religion needs to be better understood as a driver in the international system. Leonard highlights that religion has become a decisive trend in international politics and thus the operation of diplomacy needs to be rethought.¹⁷ Former United States (US) Secretary of State John Kerry called for foreign policy to construct a sophisticated approach to religion.¹⁸ When considering operationalisation, what is required is a form of diplomacy that seeks to understand the sources of conflict while actively also rebuilding relationships.¹⁹ Johnston has warned that government officials are often ill-equipped to engage in faith-based diplomacy, but there is potential for unofficial diplomatic agents to metaphorically pass the baton on to official government agents of diplomacy.²⁰ Understanding the different tracks of diplomacy and where faith-based diplomacy would be best positioned is a topic that scholars have started to address. However, this remains underdeveloped.²¹ These gaps suggest a need for a frame of analysis that recognises the role of religion as a driver in the

¹⁶ Douglas M. Johnston and Brian Cox, "Faith-Based Diplomacy and Preventive Engagement," in *Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik*, ed. Douglas M. Johnston (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 15

¹⁷ Mark Leonard, Andrew Small, and Martin Rose, "British Public Diplomacy in the 'Age of Schisms'," (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2005).

¹⁸ John Kerry, "Religion and Diplomacy. (Cover Story)," *America* 213, no. 6 (2015).

¹⁹ Johnston, "Introduction: Real Politik Expanded."

²⁰ Johnston, "Review of the Findings."

²¹ See Jodok Troy, "Faith-Based Diplomacy under Examination," *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 3, no. 3 (2008).

international system, that can better inform foreign policy, and that can place more effectively the different agents and actors of diplomacy.

When looking to diplomacy as a tool for conflict resolution, primarily in situations where faith-based diplomacy can be a positive force for mitigating religious violence, several gaps are present in the literature. Finding commonalities between different religious traditions and values as a platform for resolution needs attention.²² Research on the dissimilarities between religions is well known; however, the focused understanding of the assets shared between religions to achieve peace²³ is yet to be clearly articulated.²⁴ The literature and practical expertise in conflict resolution need to adapt to the changing nature of conflict, including the impact of religion, before strategies are employed to resolve conflict situations.²⁵ Thus, reconceptualising faith-based diplomacy to understand its position as a tool for conflict resolution can satisfy these gaps.

Burnett has called for the scholarly literature of International Relations to attend to the intellectual framework of faith-based diplomacy because a well-constructed theory can exert a positive influence on the effectiveness of practice.²⁶ More specifically, the field of Diplomacy Studies would benefit from a new, encompassing lens that analyses and engages the contemporary challenges of religious conflict and religious extremism.²⁷ In 1994, the theoretical considerations of faith-based diplomacy were first published following discourse from diplomatic and academic contributors. One principal contributor to the scholarly lens, Douglas Johnston noted that, “today’s model leans heavily on the recycling of old approaches and adapting them to fit new problems, problems which they are ill-designed to

²² R. Scott Appleby, "Retrieving the Missing Dimension of Statecraft: Religious Faith in the Service of Peacebuilding," in *Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik*, ed. Douglas M. Johnston (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). Catholic theologian Hans Küng's Declaration of a Global Ethic, presented at the 1993 Parliament of the World's Religions, was an effort to address this. So, too, in a broad fashion, were the United Nations Dialogue of Civilisations and later the Alliance of Civilisations that included dialogue among religions and sought conflict resolution. They were in contrast to Huntington's 'Clash of Civilisations' thesis of post-Cold War conflict.

²³ Early phases of exploration on this topic have taken place, namely Hans Küng, *A Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics* (Oxford University Press, 1997). Attempts to run interfaith initiatives have also been conducted but scholars note that the theoretical frameworks for application have not been fully developed.

²⁴ Pauletta Otis, "Religion and War in the Twenty-First Century," in *Religion and Security: The New Nexus in International Relations*, ed. Robert A. Seiple, and Hoover, Dennis R. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005).

²⁵ William Vendley and David Little, "Implications for Religious Communities: Buddhism, Islam, Hinduism, and Christianity," in *Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft*, ed. Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 313

²⁶ Stanton Burnett, "Implications for the Foreign Policy Community," *ibid.*

²⁷ Douglas M. Johnston, *Religion, Terror and Error: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual Engagement* (California, United States: Praeger, 2011).

accommodate”.²⁸ While there has been some movement to explore faith-based diplomacy’s application in conflict resolution, the theoretical, intellectual, and analytical framework for faith-based diplomacy still lacks cohesion.

Since faith-based diplomacy’s emergence as a scholarly construct in Diplomacy Studies in the 1990s, several scholars and practitioners have engaged with it to varying degrees. While some suggested that the theoretical framework for faith-based diplomacy already exists,²⁹ this thesis seeks to demonstrate that theoretical advancements in faith-based diplomacy are necessary to address the changing nature of conflict and diplomacy in the current international system. As such, this thesis aims to review the literature of faith-based diplomacy and consolidate the theory’s advancements. This will result in a redesigned definition for faith-based diplomacy, a revised construction of the theory’s central tenets, and a frame of understanding by which different actors can engage in faith-based diplomacy. By doing this, the absence of a sophisticated theoretical conceptualisation of faith-based diplomacy will be addressed in order to fill this gap in the literature.

Methodological Considerations

As one of the central aims of this thesis is to consolidate the different streams of research surrounding faith-based diplomacy, this thesis will begin with an extended literature review. This approach to research is required since a detailed theoretical framework for faith-based diplomacy does not exist, and both historical and methodological approaches need to be explored. Short case studies will be used as part of its analysis, with reference to examples throughout the thesis to demonstrate the practical application of the theories. Before providing a structure for the thesis, however, some comments will be made about the methodologies that have been employed previously on studies of faith-based diplomacy. The strengths and weaknesses of the existing analytical approaches will be highlighted to inform a systematic approach to new approaches to diplomacy presented in this thesis. These considerations will provide some insight into the scope of analysis applied to this study. Due to the nature of the field itself, data collection is limited regarding research on faith-based diplomacy. Most of the literature has utilised case studies and interviews as their primary methodology to gather data. Considering that the topic lends itself to qualitative research, this is to be anticipated. The

²⁸ Johnston, "Looking Ahead: Toward a New Paradigm." 333

²⁹ See Burnett, "Implications for the Foreign Policy Community." 296

author responsible for most of the research on faith-based diplomacy is Douglas Johnston, and his edited texts form the bedrock for this thesis.³⁰ A variety of scholars have contributed to these texts, and their larger bodies of work have also been considered in this thesis. However, their approach to studying faith-based diplomacy also relies heavily on the case analysis and interview approaches. Within the case studies, scholars rely on interviews and written documentation from primary sources such as media releases and government policies. Albright, who has also written from a diplomat's perspective on the topic of faith-based diplomacy, interviews diplomats and government officials as her source of data collection. While these sources of information are helpful in building a qualitative data set, they are not without their limitations.

Johnston offers his critique of this methodology.³¹ He states that when selecting case studies, the bulk of the literature focuses on Christian religious traditions, and religions beyond Christianity are relatively underexplored in scholarship. As a result of this, there are areas within this thesis where there may seem to be a Christian bias in the analysis presented. This is not the intention of the author. However, as this thesis is reviewing the available literature, it is inevitable that this is reflected through analysis. Yet, in light of this critique, the scope of religions studied in Johnston's second text, *Faith-based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik*, does make a concerted effort to address this. While studies on faith-based diplomacy from various perspectives have begun, those perspectives remain underdeveloped. Johnston also notes that analysis developed from case studies is inherently subjective. The opinions and personal beliefs of different groups will ultimately impact the analysis of faith-based diplomacy. This is a concession that analysts must be mindful of when examining cases on something as inherently personal and identity-based as faith. Furthermore, Johnston recognises that the application of faith-based diplomacy to conflict resolution can be troublesome when measuring effectiveness as each conflict is unique and therefore can promote dissimilar conclusions.³² To balance this concern, this thesis looks to the work of Babb who discusses the methodological value of equivalences.³³ When applying equivalences to literature, the researcher recognises that comparative cases will have areas of disagreement. While this is

³⁰ These texts include his seminal text, edited with Cynthia Sampson: Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, *Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Douglas Johnston, *Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); and, Johnston, *Religion, Terror and Error: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual Engagement*.

³¹ See Johnston, "Introduction: Beyond Power Politics."

³² See "Looking Ahead: Toward a New Paradigm."

³³ J. Babb, *A World History of Political Thought* (Edward Elgar, 2018).

certainly the case between different religions, different conflicts, and different diplomatic approaches, equivalences in a methodological approach suggest that these disagreements aside, research will highlight areas of similarity. These similarities are valid, even with the fundamental differences between cases found in the literature. As this thesis aims to consolidate research and provide an overarching theoretical framework for faith-based diplomacy, these equivalences will be presented through the thesis. Regarding data collection, the role of faith-based diplomats in peacemaking is limited in the analysis. Documentation on the topic is often fragmented, and coupled with the subjectivity of the interview process, data used to assert claims can be misguided. The result of this is that any conclusion drawn on in the issue of faith-based diplomacy, or even on the role of religion in conflict resolution, can be either oversimplified into general terms or overcomplicated by existing cross-cultural differences. These limitations have been taken into consideration when undertaking the review of literature in this thesis and drawing inferences from available data.

Scope and Structure of the Thesis

The central purpose of this thesis is to consolidate the research on faith-based diplomacy to provide a theoretical framework for future application and study. As such, this thesis is firmly scoped in Diplomacy Studies as a school of analysis within International Relations. The structure of this thesis has been designed to evaluate the literature of Diplomacy Studies to establish a firm foundation of scholarly analysis. This forms the theoretical background that grounds the analytical discussions of faith-based diplomacy for the rest of the thesis. Chapter 1 introduces the context for studying faith-based diplomacy, the aims of the research to fill the gaps in the literature, methodological considerations in studying faith-based diplomacy, and the structure for the thesis.

Chapter 2 begins the analysis of theory in Diplomacy Studies by discussing traditional diplomacy and the foundations of Diplomacy Studies. This focuses on what constituted diplomacy through history and how the traditional agent of diplomacy, the diplomat, engaged in diplomatic practice. The central functions of traditional diplomacy follow, with consideration as to where faith intersects with traditional diplomacy. The scholarship of diplomacy did evolve from this point, however, and Chapter 2 concludes by providing a contextual springboard for this theoretical transition.

Chapter 3 is designed to expand on the theoretical base for analysis in Diplomacy Studies by examining the evolution of diplomatic theory from traditional diplomacy. The chapter begins by discussing the broader expansions in International Relations theory, from a positivist to a post-positivist lens, and how this shift impacted the study of diplomacy. Scholars have labeled this significant shift in the theories of Diplomacy Studies as the ‘new school’ and the ‘innovative school’. The central tenets, characteristics, and implications to the study of diplomacy for both schools are discussed in this chapter.

Chapter 4 takes the theoretical considerations of Chapter 3 and applies them to the actors that practise diplomacy. Where Chapter 2 looks at how the state engages in diplomacy, Chapter 4 considers how nonstate actors are involved in diplomacy. Intergovernmental organisations, nongovernmental organisations, civil society organisations and individuals constitute the actors examined. This chapter seeks to demonstrate how the modes, channels and actors of diplomacy have expanded in line with the growth of theory in diplomacy studies. Thus, a comprehensive analysis of both diplomacy’s theory and practice is sought before assessing these constructs through the lens of faith-based diplomacy.

Chapter 5 establishes the context and framing of faith-based diplomacy. The importance of this chapter is to set the analytical parameters for the framework constructed in the latter stages of the thesis. To achieve this objective, the changing nature of conflict in the contemporary system is addressed, as is the changing character of conflict resolution. An important consideration in a thesis of this nature is defining the concepts of religion, spirituality and faith. The terms used in the thesis will be those that have been chosen by the authors referenced. Expanding on the definitions, Chapter 5 identifies the central characteristics of religion and faith. A necessary discussion in the foundation of a theory involving faith and international relations is that of secularisation. The separation of church and state, and the implications of that separation are also addressed in Chapter 5. The debate that many parts of the world are shifting into a post-secular society merits discussion in this chapter too. Also, the way that religion has re-emerged in the current international climate will be contended with to form the contextual requirements of the theory.

Chapter 6 turns to the theory of faith-based diplomacy. An overview of the term and its emergence in scholarship is conducted. Scholars have also provided several definitions for faith-based diplomacy. This chapter distils the similar elements of those definitions and, importantly, offers a revised definition for faith-based diplomacy. This chapter also identifies

the imperative characteristics of a faith-based diplomat, according to current theories. Finally, the chapter proposes the differences between faith-based diplomacy and another emergent theory for consideration in the field, that of interfaith diplomacy.

Chapter 7 presents the various scholarly perspectives that can support faith-based diplomacy as it has been defined in Chapter 6. The scholarship and theories of International Relations and Diplomacy Studies are interrogated to highlight areas of complementarity with faith-based diplomacy. In particular, this chapter looks at new areas of scholarship, soft power, cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy, to suggest a nexus for theoretical support. Chapter 7 also presents the frameworks of analysis that are already available in faith-based diplomacy. This chapter seeks to establish the essential requirements to address the gap in Diplomacy Studies and provide a more sophisticated analysis of faith-based diplomacy's theoretical underpinnings.

A consolidated conceptual lens of faith-based diplomacy is developed in Chapter 8. Here, the central tenets of faith-based diplomacy and how actors engage in it are discussed. The central tenets of faith-based diplomacy identified through this thesis are a values-based approach to diplomacy, the role of reconciliation, religious freedom, how faith-based diplomacy can inform foreign policy, the place of religious leaders in the diplomatic process, the capacity for faith-based diplomacy to engage as a third-party mediator, and the way in which faith-based diplomacy can be utilised in multiple tracks of diplomacy. Chapter 8 also offers frames by which various international actors can incorporate faith-based diplomacy. The actors highlighted in this chapter include the state and diplomats, and nonstate actors including nongovernmental organisations, civil society organisations, places of worship, and individuals. When considering individuals, this primarily focuses on the role of religious leaders. Thus, this chapter offers the field of Diplomacy Studies a comprehensive presentation of faith-based diplomacy's central tenets and the actors suited to engage in such diplomacy.

The final part of this thesis, Chapter 9, evaluates faith-based diplomacy in light of the framework provided. Here, the strengths of faith-based diplomacy are proposed, while recognising a number of limitations of faith-based approaches. Being aware of these limitations is integral to building more effective faith-based theories and strategies for the future. Finally, the chapter discusses the opportunities available for the future of faith-based diplomacy. This includes careful consideration of how this thesis can be of assistance in supporting future research in the field.

At the conclusion of this thesis, a comprehensive analysis of faith-based diplomacy would have been performed. Not only will the idea of employing a faith-based diplomacy be conceptualised, but the examinations conducted in the theories of Diplomacy Studies will allow for it to be reconceptualised to serve more effectively the contemporary international system. This reconceptualisation will be evident by the revised definition of faith-based diplomacy, the comprehensive theoretical analysis, the presentation of central tenets for faith-based diplomacy, and a framework by which different actors can engage in faith-based diplomacy. With this reconceptualisation, practitioners and theorists of diplomacy will have an accessible theoretical lens of faith-based diplomacy to apply to the international system, expanding the diplomat's toolkit.

CHAPTER TWO

Traditional Diplomacy

The purpose of this chapter is to establish the foundation of theory within Diplomacy Studies by examining traditional diplomacy. An understanding of the theory and practice of traditional diplomacy affords the basis for evaluating the evolution of Diplomacy Studies, ultimately resulting in an expanding scope featuring faith-based diplomacy. This chapter will outline the core definitions and theoretical tenets of traditional diplomacy, primarily through the scholarly contributions of practitioners historically. Hedley Bull's conception of the functions of diplomacy will form the basis of the investigation into the central operations of diplomacy. Following this, the chapter will highlight intersections between faith and diplomacy based on historical evidence. The chapter will conclude with a brief outline of the limitations of traditional diplomacy and how those limitations prompted an evolution in diplomacy's theory. As a result, this will provide the historical context for concepts discussed in this thesis.

The Foundations of Traditional Diplomacy: Definitions, Thinkers, and Theory

Diplomacy through History

Diplomacy, as it is presently understood, is the product of a long period of historical development. The practice of diplomacy is informed by a rich historical tradition that places the state at the centre of diplomatic affairs. Typically, the origins of diplomacy are associated with the system of states emerging from the Westphalian Treaty in 1648 – and yet evidence of diplomacy and its institutions are recognisable in earlier human societies.³⁴ Across the ancient world, from ancient Egypt, Mesopotamia, Rome and China, diplomatic institutions comprised a systematised process of communication, procedures and conventions to govern intergroup relations and to mediate between cultures.³⁵ With the evolution of traditional diplomacy progressing from Roman to European diplomacy,³⁶ notable features of Greek, Byzantine,

³⁴ Donna Lee and Brian Hocking, "Diplomacy," in *International Encyclopedie of Political Science*, ed. Bertrand; Schlosser Bardie, Dirk-Berg and Morlino, Leonardo (Sage, 2011).

³⁵ Ibid. See also Richard H. Wilkinson and Noreen Doyle, "Between Brothers: Diplomatic Interactions," in *Pharaoh's Land and Beyond: Ancient Egypt and Its Neighbors* ed. Pearce Paul Creasman and Richard H. Wilkinson (New York, United States: Oxford University Press, 2018).

³⁶ Raymond Cohen, "Reflections on the New Global Diplomacy: Statecraft 2500 BC to 2000 AD " in *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice* ed. Jan Melissen (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 1999).

Venetian and French expressions of diplomacy have endured.³⁷ This section will now outline some of the defining historical features of traditional diplomacy evident from these eras.

The early foundations of the practice of Western diplomacy stem from the Hellenistic period. During this time envoys, embassies, heralds and emissaries would carry messages and negotiate in response to conflict.³⁸ The Hellenistic era (323-31 BC) was renowned for its “ordered and predictable” diplomatic system, which was tested by the challenge of Roman conquest.³⁹ The extended Roman period (64-1453) of diplomacy then reinterpreted basic mechanisms of exchange including diplomatic procedure, rituals and vocabulary.⁴⁰ As the stability of Rome directly impacted its broader region, Roman allies, Greek states and extensions of the Roman Republic were all engaged in maintaining relations, of which the Roman state set the tone.⁴¹ This meant that once Rome came to dominate the Mediterranean, it had the controlling power of the diplomatic mechanisms. The Greek influence on the practices of diplomacy showed that the diplomatic institutions reflected the dynamic political life of Athens, where embassies and *proxenoi* (local citizens selected by foreign states to represent them)⁴² became an integral feature of political outlook and representation.⁴³ The Byzantine (330-1453) style of diplomacy reflected the need for foreign cultures to be understood, whereby “the practical development of patterns of protocol and diplomacy” allowed for the development of communication mechanisms between great empires.⁴⁴ Another key feature of Byzantine diplomacy was the control of information, secrecy and displays of military might.⁴⁵ Notably, religious elements were bound in the construction of Byzantine diplomacy, which enabled dialogue between the East and Europe as a way of managing great powers.⁴⁶ Characteristics of these different historical diplomatic traditions are evident in the

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ John D. Grainger, *Great Power Diplomacy in the Hellenistic World* (Florence: Taylor and Francis, 2016).

³⁹ Ibid. 278

⁴⁰ Claude Eilers, *Diplomats and Diplomacy in the Roman World* (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2008).

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² See Andre Gerolymatos, *Espionage and Treason: A Study of the Proxenia in Political and Military Intelligence Gathering in Classical Greece* (Brill, 1986).

⁴³ Derek J. Mosley, "The Size of Embassies in Ancient Greek Diplomacy," *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 96 (1965).

⁴⁴ R. James Ferguson, "Rome and Parthia: Power Politics and Diplomacy across Cultural Frontiers," *CEWCES Research Papers* (2005). 25

⁴⁵ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* Fourth Edition ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977). 164

⁴⁶ Telea Marius, "Mission and/or Conversion: Strategies of Byzantine Diplomacy," *International Journal of Orthodox Theology* 6, no. 3 (2015).

modern European context, highlighting the value of understanding the foundations of traditional diplomacy and its contribution to Diplomacy Studies.

The European style of diplomacy draws on this historical context. Several units of power governed the relations between groups in this time. The relations between kingdoms in the medieval era, the mobilisation of the Holy Roman Empire and the authority of the Catholic Church as political entities dominated different diplomatic channels.⁴⁷ Indeed, the Vatican developed an extensive corps of diplomats (*nuncios*), alongside the active collection of intelligence, designed to retain influence across Europe. The collapse of universal Christendom tested these systems. In response, a gradual increase of city-states, coupled with the acceptance of the idea of sovereignty, emerged on the international stage.⁴⁸ This was most apparent with the advent of the Italian city-states system, wherein actors would facilitate communication and other diplomatic functions to ensure a balance of power between the city-states.⁴⁹ This system was a precursor for the state system introduced by the Westphalian treaty. The shift to the city-state system was bolstered by the rise of resident ambassadors in Renaissance Italy which reinforced diplomatic culture.⁵⁰ It was in the late 15th Century that diplomatic theory began to appear as a scholarly consideration – albeit weak and stunted from growth.⁵¹ The 17th Century required a more practical diplomacy to manage the newly emerged state system.⁵² Later, the French style of diplomacy established a clear ordering to the diplomatic process, achieved through the intentional training of diplomats to create the French consular service – an institution which would promote trade and the French influence.⁵³ This need for practical diplomacy to govern state relations in the post-Westphalian system mirrored the theoretical formulations of diplomacy that remained at the forefront of affairs between states well into the 20th Century.⁵⁴ As evident through history, traditional diplomacy is predicated on the conduct of formal relations between states.⁵⁵ The mechanisms and features of formal relations between groups, city-states, and sovereign states, has been formed and reformed by the influence of

⁴⁷ Lee and Hocking, "Diplomacy."

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Tracey A. Sowerby and Jan Hennings, *Practices of Diplomacy in the Early Modern World C.1410-1800*, ed. Jan Hennings (Milton: Taylor and Francis, 2017).

⁵¹ G. R. Berridge, Maurice Keens-Soper, and T. G. Otte, *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger* (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).

⁵² Murray, "The Renaissance of Diplomatic Theory."

⁵³ Jan Melissen and Ana Mar Fernández, *Consular Affairs and Diplomacy*, ed. Ana Mar Fernández, *Diplomatic Studies* (Dordrecht: Brill, 2011).

⁵⁴ Murray, "The Renaissance of Diplomatic Theory."

⁵⁵ Daryl Copeland, "Transformational Public Diplomacy: Rethinking Advocacy for the Globalisation Age," *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* 5, no. 2 (2009).

great powers throughout history. Not only did the historical trends heavily influence the formation of traditional diplomacy, but the practitioners of diplomacy – the diplomats – played an integral role in the construction of diplomacy’s foundational theory.

Traditional Diplomacy through the Lens of the Practitioner

Observers conclude that the study of traditional diplomacy has been influenced more heavily by practitioners than academics.⁵⁶ Accordingly, this section will examine prominent practitioners of diplomacy to understand how they contributed to traditional diplomacy’s theorisation. Berridge highlights that up to the end of the 17th Century, diplomacy was thought to concern the perfectibility of the ambassador and “his complex legal standing at a foreign court”, supporting the notion that the functions of the diplomat formed the basis of diplomatic theory.⁵⁷ Sending, Pouliot and Neumann provide an overview of the diplomat’s role in constructing theory, stating that:

Key texts have been written by diplomats like Sir Ernest Satow and Harold Nicolson and by statesmen like Henry Kissinger. This helps explain why diplomacy has often been defined by its purpose and ideal functions, or by the particular skills that the diplomat should have, either to excel in the “art” of resolving negotiations peacefully or more generally to define the national interest beyond the constraints and lack of vision expressed by elected politicians, as in the example of Talleyrand’s tenure at Quai d’Orsay, or in Kissinger’s idea that diplomats should balance the dual goals of advancing the state’s interests and maintain the state system.⁵⁸

Berridge, Keens-Soper and Otte studied how ‘diplomatists’ (the old term for diplomat often used when referring to the traditional forms of diplomacy) informed theory in their text titled *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*. The following section will interrogate this text as the foundational source for examining the selected practitioners as the authors have consolidated the broader literature in this text. This will elucidate practitioners’ contributions to defining diplomacy while presenting traditional diplomacy’s central role. The key contributors featured in this section are Machiavelli, Richelieu, Callières, Satow, Nicolson and

⁵⁶ Ole Jacob Sending, Vincent Pouliot, and Iver B. Neumann, "The Future of Diplomacy: Changing Practices, Evolving Relationships," *International Journal* 66, no. 3 (2011). 530.

⁵⁷ Berridge, Keens-Soper, and Otte, *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*. 2.

⁵⁸ Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann, "The Future of Diplomacy: Changing Practices, Evolving Relationships." 530

Kissinger. These diplomats best represent diplomacy as a reflection of their respective international contexts. This section does not intend to give a comprehensive outline of the effectiveness of each of these diplomats, but rather it will highlight their respective contributions to traditional diplomacy. While it is recognised that there are a variety of theoretical perspectives that are evident in traditional diplomacy, the realist strands most prominently feature throughout this section as the central tenets of realist theory most closely align with the paradigm of traditional diplomacy.

Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) is widely recognised for his evaluation of power from a classical realist perspective formed through a career as a diplomat for the Republic of Florence.⁵⁹ In simple terms, he focused on the state, how to bring stability to the state, the relations between states, and what might impact those relations.⁶⁰ The essence of diplomacy for Machiavelli was that it was a key machinery of the state, particularly when gaining control of regimes.⁶¹ As Berridge notes, Machiavelli examined the genuine nature of *raison d'état* and wrote about themes which have implications for the methods and role of the ambassador.⁶² In evaluating the role of diplomacy, "Machiavelli's fundamental assumption was actually that skill in the art of war was more important to the state than anything, including skill in diplomacy, because of his belief that 'sound laws' follow 'sound arms'".⁶³ Even so, Machiavelli did acknowledge that diplomacy is important to great powers, even with significant military capacity, because prudent strategy values the avoidance of military overstretch.⁶⁴ Machiavelli's discussion of strategy, fear, deceit and human character all inform his conceptualisation of diplomacy's purpose and place in society, as revealed through his own writings.⁶⁵ Machiavelli assumed that good faith between states existed as fertile ground for negotiation.⁶⁶ Diplomacy functions in this sphere of good faith; however, when that good faith

⁵⁹ Maurizio Viroli, "Machiavelli's Realism," *Constellations* 14, no. 4 (2007). For more on Machiavelli's career as a diplomat see Niccolò Machiavelli, *History of Florence and of the Affairs of Italy: From the Earliest Times to the Death of Lorenzo the Magnificent Together with the Prince. And Various Historical Tracts*, The Prince (London: H. G. Bohn, 1854).

⁶⁰ G. R. Berridge, "Machiavelli," in *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger* ed. G. R. Berridge, Maurice Keens-Soper, and T. G. Otte (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).

⁶¹ Andrea Guidi, "The Florentine Archives in Transition: Government, Warfare and Communication (1289–1530 ca.)," *European History Quarterly* 46, no. 3 (2016); Robert Black, "Un Segretario Militante: Politica, Diplomazia E Armi Nel Cancelliere Machiavelli, by Andrea Guidi," *The English Historical Review* CXXVI, no. 519 (2011).

⁶² Berridge, "Machiavelli."

⁶³ *Ibid.* 11.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ See Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, 2nd ed. (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1998). Further excerpts from *The Prince* have been included below, quoted by Berridge when defining the role of the ambassador.

⁶⁶ Berridge, "Machiavelli."

is tested, diplomacy becomes even more crucial.⁶⁷ It is upon these assumptions that Machiavelli explored the roles and functions that diplomats had the responsibility to fulfil.

Machiavelli commonly explored the general rules of human conduct, particularly in his early diplomatic reports.⁶⁸ When considering the role of the ambassador, Machiavelli outlined the following tasks:

1. The ambassador must encourage the prince to whom he is accredited to pursue policies congenial to the interests of his own prince, and refuse to consider policies to them;
2. The diplomat must also submit advice on policy to his own prince, and at all costs defend his own prince's reputation;
3. He must, if instructed, engage in formal negotiations, and obtain information to report home; and,
4. If possible, the ambassador must be aware of potential future developments.⁶⁹

Diplomatic reporting is an integral element to the foundation of key texts in Diplomacy Studies. As reflected in Machiavelli's time, "the growing importance of diplomacy in Renaissance Italy as a whole also necessitated similar archival procedures and practices, especially for the preservation and [organisation] of diplomatic letters alongside the wider body of public records".⁷⁰ For Machiavelli, the diplomat had a civic duty to fulfil, and reporting advice, even if that advice may be deemed negative, fell within that duty.⁷¹ Machiavelli's career as a diplomat reveals central features of traditional diplomacy beyond the importance of reporting. The two most important features are outlined by Russell. "Firstly, his public service exemplifies how professional diplomacy, by the end of the [15th Century], became one of the branches of statesmanship" and, "secondly, while the diplomatic arts might serve as an auxiliary component of statesmanship broadly conceived, the diplomat had to observe certain rules of negotiation and communication in his capacity as a reliable liaison."⁷² In line with the developments in the international system made through the Italian Renaissance period, as a

⁶⁷ Ibid. For a series of negotiations and thoughts on discourse from Machiavelli, see N. Machiavelli, H.C. Mansfield, and N. Tarcov, *Discourses on Livy* (University of Chicago Press, 2009).

⁶⁸ Greg Russell, "Machiavelli's Science of Statecraft: The Diplomacy and Politics of Disorder," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 16, no. 2 (2005).

⁶⁹ Berridge, "Machiavelli."

⁷⁰ Guidi, "The Florentine Archives in Transition: Government, Warfare and Communication (1289–1530 ca.)." 465.

⁷¹ Russell, "Machiavelli's Science of Statecraft: The Diplomacy and Politics of Disorder."

⁷² Ibid. 246

practitioner of diplomacy, Machiavelli made significant contributions to the formation of theory in traditional diplomacy.

Along with Machiavelli, another practitioner who made contributions to the field was Cardinal Richelieu. Armand Jean du Plessis was a Cardinal and Duke of Richelieu in France. In this role, he developed considerable political and administrative skills which allowed him to engage with the growing understanding of diplomacy at the time.⁷³ Harold Nicolson wrote that the very origins of modern diplomacy could be traced to the impact of Cardinal Richelieu, as it was Richelieu who developed a new class of diplomatists who were active in promoting the state's interests through ceaseless negotiation.⁷⁴ His religious affiliation notwithstanding, Richelieu could express tolerance to people of different religious dispositions and would incline to reason over force.⁷⁵ Richelieu's political career spanned over many years with several significant posts, but the height of his career was being appointed as Chief Minister to King Louis XIII from 1624 till his death in 1642.⁷⁶ At a time of religiously fuelled conflict, notably during the Thirty Years War, Richelieu worked to achieve two chief objectives: 1) "to forge unity within France and increase the authority of the crown" and 2) "to create a peace of Christendom".⁷⁷ This peace Richelieu pursued was intended to promote coexistence and liberty within Christendom.⁷⁸ His methods to achieve this peace exemplify the hallmarks of traditional diplomacy in practice. He invested in the military and naval strength of France to extend the French national influence and worked to construct a balance of power within Christendom.⁷⁹ Even when declaring war on other states, Richelieu was known for seeking peaceful resolutions surreptitiously.⁸⁰

One principle that Richelieu famously contributed to Diplomacy Studies was that of continuous negotiation. This notion meant having diplomatic agents available anywhere there was a French interest, being active always.⁸¹ This network of agents would not only fulfil their

⁷³ G. R. Berridge, "Richelieu," in *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger* ed. G. R. Berridge, Maurice Keens-Soper, and T. G. Otte (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).

⁷⁴ James Nathan, "Force, Order, and Diplomacy in the Age of Louis XIV," (*Virginia Quarterly Review*, 1993). 633

⁷⁵ Berridge, "Richelieu."

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ *Ibid.* 72

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ For an example of how this has been translated into diplomatic mechanisms and used in the contemporary system, see Anthony F. Imbrogno, "The Founding of the European Council: Economic Reform and the Mechanism of Continuous Negotiation," *Journal of European Integration* 38, no. 6 (2016).

symbolic functions but also pursue negotiation and agreements where possible.⁸² This principle suggests that Richelieu's priority in diplomacy was negotiation. For Richelieu, negotiations are most effective when they are directed by a single mind, acknowledging that different circumstances in negotiations required different responses, where secrecy in negotiation is essential, and where negotiators are keenly trained.⁸³ Historians have examined the writings of Richelieu and have noted that Richelieu placed significant importance on clear and explicit diplomatic instruction.⁸⁴ As a result, his writings and processes heavily influenced the early modern European practice of diplomacy as demonstrated in Richelieu's publication *Lettres, instructions diplomatiques et papiers d'état*⁸⁵.⁸⁶ Richelieu is a significant figure to consider in the lens of this thesis. His writing and experience demonstrate an undeniable link between religious prominence and diplomatic activity. Most pertinent to this section, however, Richelieu markedly influenced the development of traditional diplomacy in theory and practice.

Another notable diplomat from within the French diplomatic system was Francois de Callières, an author and diplomatic envoy. He was vitally important in bringing about the "elaboration of a diplomatic system of states articulated and mediated by the activities of resident envoys".⁸⁷ Hedley Bull wrote with great esteem of Callières' work, calling it "the most important general analysis of diplomacy and its place in international society".⁸⁸ Scholars observe that Callières represented a uniquely French expression of diplomacy by reformulating the work of Richelieu. He also contributed to the body of literature in Diplomatic Studies through his key text *The Art of Diplomacy*.⁸⁹ This text promotes diplomacy as a moderating influence, where:

The pursuit of interests in relation to other states is taken to be compatible with [civilised] behaviour. Intelligence with respect to one's own interests and that of others must however inform the conduct of foreign policy. Without

⁸² Berridge, "Richelieu."

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Joseph Bergin, "Three Faces of Richelieu: A Historiographical Essay," *French History* 23, no. 4 (2009).

⁸⁵ Armand Jean Du Plessis Richelieu, *Lettres, Instructions Diplomatiques Et Papiers D'état Du Cardinal De Richelieu / Recueillis Et Publ. Par M. Avenel*, ed. Georges d Avenel, 8 vols., Collection De Documents Inédits Sur L'histoire De France (Paris: Impr. Nationale).

⁸⁶ Berridge, "Richelieu." and Bergin, "Three Faces of Richelieu: A Historiographical Essay."

⁸⁷ Maurice Keens-Soper, "Callières," in *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger* ed. G. R. Berridge, Maurice Keens-Soper, and T. G. Otte (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001). 106

⁸⁸ Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. 162

⁸⁹ Keens-Soper, "Callières."

intelligence prudence is impossible, and in the absence of prudence men habitually come to rely on force.⁹⁰

Callières' observations highlight the need for order, where power politics and civilised behaviour are complementary.⁹¹ His work espouses the transition from a temporary, ad hoc approach of representation, to a system of regular representation.⁹² He identified that diplomacy was most active when the balancing and counterbalancing of great powers was apparent in the region.⁹³ Keens-Soper quotes Callières as saying,

In order to know truly the usefulness of negotiations, we ought to consider that all the States of Europe have necessary ties and commerces one with another, which makes them to be looked upon as members of one and the same Commonwealth. And that there can hardly happen any considerable change in some of its members, but what is capable of disturbing the quiet of all the others.⁹⁴

This quote demonstrates Callières' appreciation of the balance of power approach to the international system. It also alludes to the role of negotiation that is not only continuous but also universal.⁹⁵ By way of definition, Callières states that "the task of the negotiator is, by means of reason and persuasion, to bring princes to act on a true appreciation of their interests, rather than a mistaken one, and to recognise common interests, where these exist."⁹⁶ As a result, effective diplomacy needs to come from its own independent profession, where the art of the negotiator is the primary concern.⁹⁷ By extension, Callières saw a role for the diplomat to engage in conflict resolution, actively negotiating in peace politics.⁹⁸ Callières wrote during a time between great conflicts, and his writing provides an understanding of diplomacy in this environment, focusing on political interest.⁹⁹ His approach consolidates the foundation of diplomatic theory set before the Thirty Year War, and provides form to diplomacy in the Westphalian state system, giving political direction to the discussion of diplomacy in a time of

⁹⁰ Ibid. 113

⁹¹ Maurice Keens-Soper, "Francois De Callieres and Diplomatic Theory," *The Historical Journal* 16, no. 3 (1973).

⁹² "Callières."

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid. 110

⁹⁵ Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*.

⁹⁶ Ibid. 163

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Alain Lempereur, "A Rhetorical Foundation of International Negotiations. Callières on Peace Politics," (ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School, 2003).

⁹⁹ Keens-Soper, "Callières."

transition.¹⁰⁰ With the establishment of the Westphalian state system, diplomacy's theory and practice became a more recognisably European institution.

Modern European diplomacy emerged from the era of distinct French influence. European diplomacy was also heavily influenced by British diplomats, where the diplomatic character was rich with literary tradition, making the British development of diplomacy pertinent to the discussion of diplomatic theory.¹⁰¹ As Otte states, "perhaps one of the most exceptional representatives of the literary tradition of British diplomacy was Sir Ernest Satow".¹⁰² His early career placed Satow as a valuable bridge between East and West as he became one of the best-informed diplomats in the East due to his diplomatic roles in Japan.¹⁰³ Satow's active career saw him engage with diplomatic questions arising from Western imperialism in the East, the Anglo-Japanese alliance and China's territorial unity; however, when his career ended, the policy direction on these issues changed.¹⁰⁴ He remained keenly interested in scholarship as evidenced by his most famous work, *The Guide to Diplomatic Practice*.¹⁰⁵ This text earned Satow the reputation as a leading authority on the practice and theory of diplomacy, and *The Guide to Diplomatic Practice* is still regarded today as a classic exposition of diplomacy.¹⁰⁶ His work outlines the practical application of diplomacy. The text intended to propose a form of diplomacy that might be a more effective tool for conduct in international relations, avoiding the need to resort to military violence.¹⁰⁷ To the student of diplomacy, Satow's text is seminal as it elaborates on three valuable insights, being the changes of the European diplomatic tradition, the international political environment of the time, and the position of diplomacy as an integral tool of statecraft.¹⁰⁸ As is common in traditional diplomacy, Satow identified precedents for diplomatic rules and processes from history and used history to highlight the problems of statecraft to best improve diplomatic practice.¹⁰⁹ By

¹⁰⁰ "Francois De Callieres and Diplomatic Theory."

¹⁰¹ T. G. Otte, "Satow," in *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger* ed. G. R. Berridge, Maurice Keens-Soper, and T. G. Otte (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).

¹⁰² Ibid. 125

¹⁰³ Ibid. Satow describes his time as a diplomat in Japan in his text, E.M. Satow, *A Diplomat in Japan* (SEELEY, SERVICE & CO LIMITED., 2013).

¹⁰⁴ Nigel Brailey, "Sir Ernest Satow, Japan and Asia: The Trials of a Diplomat in the Age of High Imperialism," *The Historical Journal* 35, no. 1 (1992).

¹⁰⁵ Otte, "Satow."

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ T. Otte, "'A Manual of Diplomacy': The Genesis of Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 13, no. 2 (2002).

¹⁰⁸ Otte, "Satow." 129

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. 131

examining history, Satow was able to prescribe the practice of diplomacy and inform diplomacy's theoretical base.

Diplomacy, in Satow's often quoted definition, "is the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states".¹¹⁰ Satow's definition highlights the context of the international system and how ingrained the institution of diplomacy had become in the Westphalian state system. This system is one where independent states work to maintain mutual relations to develop a "society of [civilised] nations" where diplomacy is the pursuit of state interest but also works as a moderating influence.¹¹¹ This process of moderating and maintaining relations was a dynamic and complex process for Satow, with the diplomatist being required to distinguish threats to a government's interests within changing circumstances.¹¹² Satow outlines specific tasks that are imbedded in the role of the diplomat. These include: to watch over the maintenance of good relations, to protect the interest of their government, to actively report to their government.¹¹³ Further, in a similar vein to Callières, the diplomatist is to watch over the execution of treaties, to make representations, minimise tension and manage disputes arising between the governments to which they are accredited and the government they represent.¹¹⁴ These characteristics are still repeated by scholars in the contemporary context, thus demonstrating the impressive contribution Satow has made in theorising the practice of diplomacy. Satow was able to anchor diplomacy in international affairs within the great power state system of the early 20th Century.¹¹⁵ When examining Satow's influence on the theory and practice of diplomacy, the observer should note that

Satow's work is a clear and precise exposition of the essence of diplomacy, and as such it has become by no means archaic. On a more practical level, the illustrations of diplomacy in action and the advice to practitioners offered by Satow deserve to be given due attention.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁰ E. Satow, *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice* (Cambridge University Press, 2011).

¹¹¹ Otte, "Satow." 129

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid. 133

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid. 144

His text remains a hallmark of scholarship in Diplomacy Studies, and his prescriptive writing informs the frameworks of diplomacy in the modern context. The form of diplomacy Satow represents typifies the character and practical nature of traditional diplomacy.

Like Satow, Harold Nicolson expanded the British literature on diplomacy and wrote widely on various aspects of diplomatic history, theory, and practice.¹¹⁷ In contrast to Satow, though, he wrote with more ease and fluency which changed the tone of his writing on diplomacy.¹¹⁸ Nicolson maintained the hallmark of traditional diplomacy in that he viewed the world ‘through the embassy window’, meaning his preference was for state-qua-state relations on the international stage.¹¹⁹ Hailing from a political pedigree, Nicolson turned easily to diplomacy for his career.¹²⁰ The key texts that influenced the theory and practice of diplomacy written by Nicolson included *Diplomacy* and *The Evolution of Diplomatic Method*. Both sought to explain “the transformation of diplomatic practice in the aftermath of and in response to the Great War”;¹²¹ and his writing showed what diplomacy is and what it is not.¹²² Nicolson’s texts also explore the changes to the international system from the inter-war period’s Wilsonian Idealism, to a post-war realist pragmatism.¹²³ This underpinning shift is supported by Nicolson’s preference of the balance of power as being the best method to preserve peace and security in the post-war era.¹²⁴ His approach to international politics embraced realist assumptions about the prevalence of power. However, he also acknowledged the moral dimensions of politics, drawn from the Graeco-Roman-Christian tradition which forms the foundation of modern Western civilisation.¹²⁵

When defining diplomacy, Nicolson would often quote Satow’s definition, approving of its central ideas. However, in his writing, he would expand on certain concepts. Some of these additions to Satow’s definition include: ‘Diplomacy essentially is the organised system of negotiation between sovereign states’; ‘...diplomacy is neither the invention [n]or the pastime of some particular political system, but is an essential element in any reasonable

¹¹⁷ As detailed through his series of lectures, see Harold Nicolson, *The Evolution of Diplomatic Method: Being the Chichele Lectures Delivered at the University of Oxford in November 1953* (London: Constable, 1954).

¹¹⁸ Otte, "Nicolson."

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid. 154 His position on the Great War was famously discussed in H. Nicolson, *Why Britain Is at War: With a New Introduction by Andrew Roberts* (Penguin Books Limited, 2010).

¹²² Costas M. Constantinou, "Diplomacy, Grotesque Realism, and Ottoman Historiography," *Postcolonial Studies* 3, no. 2 (2000).

¹²³ Otte, "Nicolson."

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

relation between man and man and between nation and nation’; ‘Diplomacy is... ordered conduct of relations between one group of human beings and another group alien to themselves’; ‘Diplomacy...designates... the art of negotiation’; and ‘the aim of sound diplomacy... is the maintenance of amicable relations between sovereign states. Once diplomacy is employed to provoke international animosity, it ceases to be diplomacy and becomes its opposite, namely war by another name’.¹²⁶ Otte asserts that the central thinking in Nicolson’s definitions is that there is a distinct element of alienation and separation between group identities, that diplomacy is an inevitable outcome of relations between groups and there should be some conduct and order to these relations, and finally that this system is essentially one of negotiation.¹²⁷ One key feature that Nicolson would purport is that students of diplomacy must avoid empirical generalisations, because in his view “diplomacy is the most protean” of human activities.¹²⁸ Protean diplomacy means that diplomats and their governments will need to adapt to political, military, and economic changes which would influence diplomatic initiatives.¹²⁹ Nicolson’s key texts and definitions of diplomacy cement the value of traditional diplomacy following World War 1.

When considering the evolution of diplomatic theory, Nicolson was a key theoretician at the time of the proclamation of ‘New Diplomacy’. The theory of new diplomacy is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. However, for the sake of understanding the context of Nicolson’s writing, some considerations must be made. Wilsonian ideals exemplified new diplomacy as “open covenants openly arrived at” as opposed to the traditional secrecy of old diplomacy.¹³⁰ Hedley Bull noted that Nicolson saw the push toward open covenants “as an advance upon the Old Diplomacy, in so far as it makes possible parliamentary control of foreign policy and provides a safeguard against secret treaties of the sort that were concluded before and during the First World War.”¹³¹ This concerned Nicolson as it challenged the diplomat’s role in international negotiations.¹³² Even in this climate of change, Nicolson saw the core element of diplomacy in the traditional way – essentially that negotiation was an ordered framework based on representation between sovereign states.¹³³ Thus, for Nicolson, ‘new diplomacy’ was merely

¹²⁶ Here Otte refers to a number of Nicolson’s primary texts, including *Diplomacy, Peacemaking 1919, The Foreign Service and Evolution of Diplomatic Method*. Ibid. 156

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Barry H. Steiner, "Diplomacy and International Theory," *Review of International Studies* 30, no. 4 (2004). 493

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Otte, "Nicolson." 157

¹³¹ Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. 169

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid.

a mirage. The changes which occurred reflected a shift in the centre of power, but not the essential principles of diplomacy.¹³⁴ Regarding the understanding of diplomacy in the modern environment, Nicolson stressed the impact of policy-making on diplomacy.¹³⁵ The construction of policy based on popular opinion in democratic channels could challenge the way diplomatists function, and their resultant effectiveness, an observation upon which Henry Kissinger would develop in his later works.¹³⁶ Nicolson, like other practitioners examined in this section, did proffer his formulation of ideal diplomacy. This diplomat must work within four principles. First, no government should give secret pledges or conclude secret treaties – diplomacy and foreign policy should not be confused.¹³⁷ The second principle is that governments should not make promises they cannot fulfil.¹³⁸ Third, the country's response has to be proportionate with its strength. Thus, the government needs to know its relative strength.¹³⁹ Fourth, self-preservation is the most permanent of human desires, and therefore the maintenance of national security is the most compelling ideal of foreign policy.¹⁴⁰ The diplomat should communicate these underpinning principles through what Nicolson characterised as the qualities that constituted the ideal diplomat: "truth, accuracy, calm, patience, good temper, modesty and loyalty."¹⁴¹ Many of these characteristics are displayed in his lectures, diplomatic writings and demonstrate Nicolson's commitment to clear diplomatic practice even in a changing environment.¹⁴² At the end of his career, Nicolson was credited with rendering an objective account of the nature of diplomacy and establishing its immutable, essential elements in a time of great international change.¹⁴³

The final key figure examined in this section of the thesis is Henry Kissinger. The international system of his time was remarkably different from that of the practitioners discussed previously. Kissinger represents an American expression of diplomacy in the Cold War era, where he brought a realist, practical sense of conduct to the American brand of

¹³⁴ Otte, "Nicolson."

¹³⁵ Nicolson's comments on the transition to a new diplomatic system are evident in chapter 4 of his text, Nicolson, *The Evolution of Diplomatic Method: Being the Chichele Lectures Delivered at the University of Oxford in November 1953*.

¹³⁶ Otte, "Nicolson."

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Ibid. 166

¹⁴² For a comprehensive account of Nicolson's primary works, see Derek Drinkwater, *Sir Harold Nicolson and International Relations: The Practitioner as Theorist* (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2005).

¹⁴³ Otte, "Nicolson."

diplomacy, while still representing the central characteristics of traditional diplomacy.¹⁴⁴ Kissinger is well regarded for his extensive list of writing achievements. Most notable for this study is his text *Diplomacy*, which outlines the history of post-Westphalian international politics to the end of the Cold War. Kissinger states in his text that “examining how statesmen have dealt with the problem of world order – what worked or failed and why – is not the end of understanding contemporary diplomacy, though it may be its beginning” which suggests that, like previous diplomatic scholars, Kissinger is interested in building upon the historical accounts of diplomacy to suggest ideal diplomatic behaviour in the international system.¹⁴⁵ *Diplomacy* demonstrated “a virtual transplant from the world of thought into the world of power... a unique experiment in the application of scholarship to statesmanship, of history to statecraft”.¹⁴⁶ His writing maintained the state-centric lens, with his approach to academic work being rooted in the classical tradition of historically saturated political theory, which is consistent with the core tenets of traditional diplomacy.

Otte discusses the two main assumptions of Kissinger’s writings. The first is that the present is historically grown, and second, there is a key role of philosophy.¹⁴⁷ Instead of using ‘diplomat’ as the term for a practitioner, Kissinger preferred the title of ‘statesman’, which reflected his classical leanings to the outworking of diplomacy as a form of statecraft.¹⁴⁸ When outlining his version of the ideal statesman (a term, one notes, is gendered in line with the understanding of traditional diplomacy as male-oriented), Kissinger supported the idea that the statesman must be prepared to grapple with the circumstances, to wrench politics from the tight fist of the past in order to reshape reality, being endowed with extraordinary gifts of charisma, perseverance, sober analysis, and the intuitive understanding of any given situation and the forces within.¹⁴⁹ To be fully effective, these must translate into a proper understanding of policy.¹⁵⁰ The statesman, according to Kissinger, would operate within a specific international environment which maintains the hallmarks of classical realist thought.¹⁵¹ In fact, Kissinger was known to speak “of realist theory to provide academic justifications for policies tailored

¹⁴⁴ "Kissinger," in *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger* ed. G. R. Berridge, Maurice Keens-Soper, and T. G. Otte (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).

¹⁴⁵ H. Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (Simon & Schuster, 1994). 28

¹⁴⁶ Otte, "Kissinger." 184

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ This is reflected in Kissinger’s analysis of historical diplomacy, see H. Kissinger, *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22* (Friedland Books, 2017).

to political needs".¹⁵² Kissinger approached international relations through geopolitical and strategic perspectives – a reflection of traditional European power politics.¹⁵³ In this approach, states are the primary actors, concerns for national security motivate their actions, and the international system requires order and stability.¹⁵⁴ This demonstrates how firmly Kissinger applied the realist perspective to the international system, and how principles of traditional diplomacy were embedded in his policy approach even in a relatively recent era.

For Kissinger, the diplomat must understand how to operate within the international system and be a contributing agent to global order. Through the time of his writing, the Cold War and the proliferation of nuclear weapons was a determining factor of instability. As a result of the significant weight nuclear weapons applied to international relations, diplomacy's ability to exert pressure, while still present, weakened.¹⁵⁵ Yet, diplomacy was still involved in the many international disputes around the globe during the Cold War.¹⁵⁶ In this context, "diplomacy, therefore had become the complement to war rather than remaining an alternative to it."¹⁵⁷ To highlight the value and influence of diplomacy, Kissinger understood the international system as a complex balance of powers and found that "it is within a functioning equilibrium that diplomacy operates at its best".¹⁵⁸

Diplomacy, like statecraft, requires a degree of intuition to reach its full potential, which is why Kissinger refers to it as an art.¹⁵⁹ Kissinger's definition of diplomacy is "the art of relating states to each other by agreement rather than by the exercise of force."¹⁶⁰ However, this does not mean that diplomacy is void of a role in military affairs. For Kissinger, negotiations are the main instrument of diplomacy. This was evident in his favouring of negotiations in his approach to politics in his role as the US Secretary of State. Some observers expressed concern at this involvement in the political office, which may tarnish a legitimate contribution to diplomatic theory. Otte offers a counter to this point, arguing that:

By highlighting the link between diplomacy and politics he very effectively circumscribed the potential of diplomacy as the main tool of international

¹⁵² Otte, "Kissinger." 190

¹⁵³ Ibid. 190; J.J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (Norton, 2002).

¹⁵⁴ Otte, "Kissinger." For more on these classical concepts of realism, see Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*.

¹⁵⁵ Otte, "Kissinger."

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid. 191

¹⁵⁸ Ibid. 193

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Kissinger, *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22*. 326

politics as well as its limits. His conception of this tool is firmly rooted in traditional European diplomacy, as, for instance his emphasis on the need for reliability and honesty demonstrates. Similarly, however much he was in the political limelight, in practice he relied on the classic usages of secrecy and patience in negotiations. His insistence on the need for thorough preparation of conferences and summit meetings also harks back to the precepts of classical diplomatic writers.¹⁶¹

The evaluation of Kissinger highlights the relationship among foreign policy, politics, and diplomacy in the modern era. Furthermore, Kissinger's approach to international relations demonstrates the enduring features of the theory and practice of traditional diplomacy over time.

Traditional diplomacy is understood best through the eyes of a practitioner and sets the foundation of what constitutes diplomacy. Before evaluating the specific functions of traditional diplomacy, this chapter will now examine the core characteristics of traditional diplomacy as outlined by practitioners and scholars in the field of Diplomacy Studies. This will provide a summary of key ideas in the scope of traditional diplomacy before understanding how traditional diplomacy functions in the international system.

The Characteristics of Traditional Diplomacy

This section will briefly present the central tenets of traditional diplomacy drawn from the analysis of key thinkers and practitioners. Traditional diplomacy is predicated on the conduct of formal relations between states, reflecting the realist perspective of International Relations.¹⁶² This interaction occurs through foreign ministries or organisations that represent independent states. Within traditional diplomacy, the business of diplomacy is conducted only to achieve the state's interests in meeting foreign policy objectives.¹⁶³ In this context, diplomats work to achieve the aims of the state they represent, and until units other than the state can assume a state's power, this trend will remain.¹⁶⁴ The definitions of diplomacy put forward by

¹⁶¹ Otte, "Kissinger." 203

¹⁶² Copeland, "Transformational Public Diplomacy: Rethinking Advocacy for the Globalisation Age."

¹⁶³ Fen Osler Hampson, Chester A. Crocker, and Pamela Aall, "Negotiation," in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, ed. Andrew F. Cooper, Heine, Jorge and Thakur, Ramesh (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2013).

¹⁶⁴ Alan K. Henrikson, "Sovereignty, Diplomacy, and Democracy: The Changing Character of "International" Representation- from State to Self?," *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 37, no. 3 (2013).

scholars reflect these notions. Satow's definition of diplomacy, being "the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states", is still maintained by several scholars as the benchmark of traditional diplomacy.¹⁶⁵ Even in the modern context, Kissinger did not depart too far from this definition when he stated that diplomacy is "the art of relating states to each other by agreement rather than by the exercise of force."¹⁶⁶ Hedley Bull synthesises the different definitions of diplomacy to find that when defining diplomacy, three consistent features emerge. They are:

1. The conduct of relations between states and other entities with standing in world politics by official agents and by peaceful means.
2. Such conduct of relations by professional diplomatists.
3. Such conduct of relations between states that is carried out in a manner which is, in the everyday sense of the term, 'diplomatic'.¹⁶⁷

These are broad categorisations of the core features of diplomacy, and Bull concedes to the potential limitations of these definitions. However, they are helpful to understand traditional diplomacy. A simplified definition of diplomacy offered by Kerr and Wiseman is "the process and institutions by which a country represents itself and its interests to the rest of the world".¹⁶⁸ In this definition, diplomacy is a tool of statecraft utilised as an instrument of governing relations between states.¹⁶⁹ Scholars such as Berridge maintain that the chief purpose of diplomacy is for states to achieve their goals, meaning that states are the primary actor to engage in the diplomatic process.¹⁷⁰ After surveying the scholarship of diplomacy studies, Murray posits that there are five key features of traditional diplomacy, being:

1. Diplomacy is a state function;
2. Diplomacy is a study of sovereign states overcoming the anarchical nature of the state system;
3. Highlighting the importance of the high political agenda, typical in terms of security architecture;

¹⁶⁵ Otte, "Satow." 129, the definition here being drawn from Satow's *Guide to Diplomatic Practice*, see the edited text, I. Roberts, *Satow's Diplomatic Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). xxix, 3

¹⁶⁶ Otte, "Kissinger." 194

¹⁶⁷ Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* 156-157

¹⁶⁸ Pauline Kerr and Geoffrey Wiseman, *Diplomacy in a Globalizing World: Theories and Practices* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 338

¹⁶⁹ Juergen Kleiner, "The Inertia of Diplomacy," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 19, no. 2 (2008).

¹⁷⁰ Stuart Murray, "Consolidating the Gains Made in Diplomacy Studies: A Taxonomy," *International Studies Perspectives* 9, no. 1 (2008).

4. Diplomatic and political history is central to the school of thought, and
5. Theorists within the traditional school write prescriptive guides to the practice of diplomacy.¹⁷¹

These characteristics are consistent with the analysis of the historical trends of diplomacy.

The Functions of Traditional Diplomacy

Traditional diplomacy is best understood both in terms of its theoretical construction and how it operates in practice. That is why the theory of traditional diplomacy generally focuses on prescribed manuals of diplomatic behaviour. Hedley Bull is regarded as a prominent thinker in the study of diplomacy and has outlined specific functions of diplomacy as derived from theory and practice. This section will examine those five functions. Bull discusses the definition of diplomacy but does contend that the traditional conceptions of diplomacy required expansion in the contemporary international environment. He begins to extrapolate on the potential areas of concern with the traditional constructs of diplomacy, for example when he states, “we must apply the term diplomacy to the official relations not only of states but also of other political entities with standing in world politics.”¹⁷² However, Bull does note that the core elements of traditional diplomacy remain as the official relationships between sovereign states. This is reflected in the Vienna Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities which codified diplomatic practice. This Conference confined the diplomatic practice to the traditional scope of diplomacy.¹⁷³ When considering traditional diplomacy in a modern environment, Bull suggests observers bear in mind the following distinctions:

1. Diplomacy includes both the formulation of a state’s external policy and its execution.
2. Diplomatic relations are either bilateral or multilateral [relations].
3. Diplomacy may be either ad hoc or institutionalised.
4. Distinction should be made between the ‘diplomatic’ and the consular branches of the conduct of international relations.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷¹ "The Renaissance of Diplomatic Theory."

¹⁷² Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. 157-158

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid. 158-160

To understand the way that diplomacy interacts and informs international order, Bull outlines five functions of diplomacy. These are communication, negotiation, intelligence, the minimisation of friction and the symbolic function of diplomacy. Bull selected these functions as they are “the functions which diplomacy has fulfilled in relation to order within the modern states system.”¹⁷⁵ These five functions will be used to structure analysis within the remainder of this section.

The first function proposed by Bull is communication. Bull expresses the importance of communication within diplomacy by stating that “diplomacy facilitates communication between the political leaders of states and other entities in world politics. Without communication there could be no international society, nor any system at all. Thus, the most elementary function of diplomatists is to be messengers...”¹⁷⁶ Beyond simply exchanging messages, however, messages need to be understood and interpreted.¹⁷⁷ That is where the diplomat is crucial to successful communication. The way that the diplomatist interprets a message depends on several contextual elements. This includes the person who sent the message, the person who received it, the circumstances of the message being sent, the previous history of exchanges, the content of the message, and what may be omitted in the message.¹⁷⁸ Bull summarises the function of communication within diplomacy as follows:

Diplomatists are specialists in precise and accurate communication. They are more than mere couriers or heralds; they are experts in detecting and conveying nuances of international dialogue, and are equipped not merely to deliver a message but to judge the language in which it should be couched, the audience to whom and the occasion at which it should be presented.¹⁷⁹

Other scholars support the importance of communication within the theory of diplomacy. Jönsson and Hall illuminated the recurring feature of communication in diplomacy in their study titled *Communication: An Essential Aspect of Diplomacy*. They quote Tran who states that “whenever communication ceases, the body of international politics, the process of diplomacy, is dead...”¹⁸⁰ Stearns labels communication as the essence of diplomacy.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁵ Ibid. 163

¹⁷⁶ Ibid. 164

¹⁷⁷ Ibid. 172-173

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid. 172-173

¹⁸⁰ Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, "Communication: An Essential Aspect of Diplomacy," *International Studies Perspectives* 4, no. 2 (2003). 195-196

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

Constantinou and James even define diplomacy as a process of communication.¹⁸² These scholars explicitly present communication as being essential to the diplomatic process, establishing the importance of communication to the theorisation of diplomacy within the traditional school.

Jönsson and Hall outline that the basic aspects of diplomatic communication are the gathering and transmission of information.¹⁸³ This communication between diplomatists, the government they represent, and the government to which they are assigned, can be performed verbally, nonverbally, privately and publicly – amongst other categorisations.¹⁸⁴ The processes by which diplomats communicate have been ritualised within the institution of diplomacy, and although the institution of diplomacy has adapted and evolved, communication remains the essential aspect of the diplomatic process.¹⁸⁵ The following paragraph will examine changes to the methods and theory surrounding communication in diplomacy, but Jönsson and Hall caution against a preoccupation of the revolution in communication technology at the expense of understanding the enduring features of diplomatic communication.¹⁸⁶

A point of consideration in communication concerns the forms and channels in diplomats utilise to communicate in the current international system. Pamment examines the impact of ‘mediatization’ on diplomacy. This term refers to the ways that communication technologies are integrated into activities, even in the diplomatic context.¹⁸⁷ This means that diplomatic actors are communicating in new ways. However, the fundamental need for communication as a part of diplomacy remains. Pamment elaborates in his study on the connection between communication, diplomacy, and public diplomacy. What is important in this analysis is that, even in changing diplomatic contexts, the role of communication is still being considered, evaluated and re-evaluated as a central feature of diplomacy.¹⁸⁸ Beyond the technological impact on the methods of communication, the media more broadly is being utilised by states as an instrument of communication.¹⁸⁹ During the process of negotiations, the media constantly communicate messages that can assist or hinder the overall diplomatic

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid. 208

¹⁸⁷ James Pamment, "The Mediatization of Diplomacy," *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 9, no. 3 (2014).

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Eytan Gilboa, "Mass Communication and Diplomacy: A Theoretical Framework," *Communication Theory* 10, no. 3 (2000).

outcome, meaning that communication must be considered on several fronts.¹⁹⁰ The methods of communication in diplomacy have expanded, but communication remains a key consideration in the practice of diplomacy.

Not only has communication been examined through the lens of the practice of diplomacy, but also in the theorisation of diplomacy. This is evident in the expansion made to the field of public diplomacy. A prominent scholar in the field, Joseph S. Nye, suggests three dimensions of public diplomacy being “daily communication, explaining policy decisions; political campaigns built on a few strategic themes; and long-term relations with key individuals”.¹⁹¹ Each of these features relies on the application of communication at multiple levels. Even as it translates to the international policy level, multiple modes of communication can be integrated, such as the mass communication approach often taken by the United States.¹⁹² Strategic communication, a concept featured in the theorisation of public diplomacy, looks at the role of communication in policy construction. Paul quotes Bruce Gregory, stating, “we know that exponential growth in mobile phone, social media, and viral communication is changing diplomacy and armed conflict” and the institutions of diplomacy are still contending with how to manage these modes of communication best.¹⁹³ Communication is having a significant impact, not only in policy but in the construction of the message to communicate policy. Importantly, the function of communication in diplomacy remains as integral in the modern environment as it was when Bull assessed it during the Cold War period. When considering the success of public diplomacy strategies, the strategy must align with political and communication dynamics evident in that strategic landscape.¹⁹⁴ This strategic level of communication is evident in areas of connectivity, interactivity and cultural exchange.¹⁹⁵ Although these issues are still examined in their respective fields, the central role of communication is primary in the theory, practice and future of diplomacy. Communication is an essential feature of traditional diplomacy, but also to Diplomacy Studies more broadly.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Zaharna notes that Nye’s dimensions are drawn from the US Government’s Accountability Report published in July 2007 as cited in R.S. Zaharna, “The Soft Power Differential: Network Communication and Mass Communication in Public Diplomacy,” *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 2, no. 3 (2007). 214

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Christopher Paul, “Challenges Facing U.S. Government and Department of Defense Efforts in Strategic Communication,” *Public Relations Review* 38, no. 2 (2012). 190. See also Bruce Gregory, “Mapping Smart Power in Multi-Stakeholder Public Diplomacy/Strategic Communication ” in *New Approaches to U.S. Global Outreach Forum* (George Washington University: The Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication, 2009).

¹⁹⁴ Zaharna, “The Soft Power Differential: Network Communication and Mass Communication in Public Diplomacy.”

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

The second function of diplomacy highlighted by Bull is negotiation. Bull explains the importance of negotiation by stating that, “without the negotiation of agreements, international relations would be possible but they would consist only of fleeting, hostile encounters between one political community and another.”¹⁹⁶ Although interests between parties are different, the skilled diplomat can determine where interests overlap, knowing that this space is the fertile ground for productive negotiations.¹⁹⁷ An underpinning assumption of the international system is that states are rationally pursuing their self-interest. Within this process, state representatives can understand their interests, and other parties’ interests and negotiate within the rational decision-making process.¹⁹⁸ The significance of negotiation as a function of diplomacy is of particular importance to the practitioner. This was shown earlier in the chapter when assessing the contributions of Callierés, Satow, and Nicolson. Bull notes that within the traditional scope of diplomacy, professional diplomats are skilled at formulating and promoting proposals.¹⁹⁹ These proposals are then put forward in negotiations, generally conducted in private, with members of the negotiating profession who have built confidence and mutual respect with one another over time.²⁰⁰ The function of negotiation is an essential element to consider when outlining the theory and practice of traditional diplomacy.

Within diplomacy, negotiation is the fundamental means of reaching the potential settlement of conflicts and crises.²⁰¹ Some scholars see negotiation as the institutional framework for diplomacy between states. Therefore, diplomatic negotiation is evidence of a functioning state system.²⁰² This exemplifies how central negotiation is in understanding the theories of traditional diplomacy. The negotiator is a key channel to project and represent the state and the state’s interests. The diplomat must understand and relay varying styles, cultures, rules, traditions, and symbols – all becoming integrated in negotiations.²⁰³ This notion of representation is central to successful negotiations. An individual negotiator needs the support of the body they represent, which is why the networks between the diplomat and the state are well established.²⁰⁴ This is clear in both theory and practice. Historical accounts of negotiations between nations are documented through the Greek and Roman era, particularly when

¹⁹⁶ Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. 164

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Nada Simjanoska, "Diplomacy as a Skill of Negotiations," *Analele Universității Constantin Brâncuși din Târgu Jiu: Seria Economie* 1, no. 1 (2017).

²⁰² Alisher Faizullaev, "Diplomatic Interactions and Negotiations," *Negotiation Journal* 30, no. 3 (2014).

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

mitigating conflict between warring parties, such as with Attila in 425 AD.²⁰⁵ The conduct of negotiations between parties during the Middle Ages is also clear in classical texts, where dignitaries and members of religious organisations would represent and negotiate agreements with other groups.²⁰⁶ In the same way that diplomatic theory is developed by evaluating history, examining the methods of negotiation in conflicts through history has influenced the theories of negotiation.²⁰⁷ Negotiation, being an interactive and communicative process, shows the interlinked nature of the functions of diplomacy – successful negotiations requires effective communication.

Negotiation is an important facet of the diplomatic peace process. Scholars within the conflict resolution field have reinforced the importance of timing in negotiations. The diplomat needs to understand when to begin negotiations and the appropriateness of conducting negotiations with certain parties.²⁰⁸ Scholars such as Zartman suggest that diplomats look for a stage at which both parties see no advantage in continuing in conflict – that is, a stalemate – to determine the ripeness of negotiation.²⁰⁹ This demonstrates the importance of negotiation in diplomacy, but also the skill required for a diplomat to enter negotiations effectively. As the study of negotiation is expanding in the conflict resolution field, the versatility and importance of diplomacy across many disciplines are apparent. Beyond negotiating to resolve conflict, negotiation is also a method of rule-making in the international system, and is important in both treaty formation and multilateral diplomacy.²¹⁰ This makes effective negotiations essential as a force that can contribute to conflict prevention.

Due to the changing nature of conflicts in the 21st Century, some scholars are concerned with the diplomat's ability to negotiate within identity-based conflicts. Here, the diplomat needs to understand how to de-escalate tension while developing a problem-solving approach which can change the framework for future negotiations.²¹¹ Within the scope of traditional diplomacy, state-to-state negotiations are well understood. However, diplomats that represent states are confronted by the challenge of negotiation with religious and/or ethno-nationalist groups to reach peaceful settlements.²¹² This is evident in the proliferation of terrorist and

²⁰⁵ Simjanoska, "Diplomacy as a Skill of Negotiations."

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Robert L. Rothstein, "The Timing of Negotiations: Dueling Metaphors," *Civil Wars* 9, no. 3 (2007).

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Winfried Lang, "Negotiation as Diplomatic Rule-Making," *International Negotiation* 1, no. 1 (1996).

²¹¹ Daniel Druckman, "Negotiation and Identity: Implications for Negotiation Theory," *ibid.* 6, no. 2 (2001).

²¹² Lang, "Negotiation as Diplomatic Rule-Making."

insurgent groups in recent history. Thus, the need for the diplomat to engage in negotiations successfully is more complex but perhaps more vital.

The next function proposed by Bull is the function of information or intelligence gathering. This function of diplomacy refers to “the gathering of intelligence or information about foreign countries” as a state’s external policies need to be based on reliable intelligence concerning other states.²¹³ When considering it as a function for diplomats to perform, “the professional diplomatist is uniquely skilled in gathering a particular kind of information that is essential to the conduct of international relations”.²¹⁴ An interesting consideration about this function is that it is not just about finding information about another party. Rather, the diplomatic agent is also tasked with denying their counterparts sensitive information, while supplying information that is more favourable.²¹⁵ This is where the notion of secrecy in diplomacy is important to understand and is perhaps where the duplicitous reputation of the diplomatic institution has originated. Bull outlines the historical development of the function of information gathering in diplomacy. In the 17th and 18th centuries, as the balance of power was the key concern of international politics, diplomats would be gatekeepers of a constant flow of information that maintains a favourable balance.²¹⁶ In the 17th Century, the sultans of the Ottoman Empire established networks of diplomats - a rudimentary form of the diplomatic corps - as it was an indispensable source of intelligence.²¹⁷ In the early part of the 19th Century, the gathering of intelligence and the selective access of information from institutions became formalised, primarily through military attaches.²¹⁸ The diplomat needs to evaluate and understand how intelligence influences the government’s political leadership, how intelligence will influence policies over the long term, and how intelligence might influence the day-to-day business between parties.²¹⁹ Considering the complex nature of intelligence and the diplomat’s role in disseminating and interpreting intelligence, a nuanced understanding of this function is required.

²¹³ Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. 164-165

²¹⁴ Ibid. 164-165

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Brandon J. Kinne, "Dependent Diplomacy: Signaling, Strategy, and Prestige in the Diplomatic Network," *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 2 (2014).

²¹⁸ Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*.

²¹⁹ Ibid. For more on the role of military and defence personnel, such as attaches, engaging in diplomacy, see Patrick Blannin, *Defence Diplomacy in the Long War* (Leiden: Brill, 2017).

An important consideration of the function of information gathering is how the diplomat engages in intelligence systems. The channels of intelligence in the international community have been formalised through the 20th and 21st centuries. An example of this is the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Within this institution, diplomatic agents can engage in everyday diplomacies that govern the relationships between the member states of the institution.²²⁰ This has given a formal structure to the sharing of information. The contemporary preference to build networks of information gathering with prestigious, powerful partners is a mirror of the trends in traditional diplomatic practice.²²¹ States utilise the network of embassies to provide information about another state's economies, policies, and military movements.²²² From the network of embassies, the frequent diplomatic reporting aims to strengthen the reliability and credibility of intelligence.²²³ In this space, the diplomat's fundamental role is that of an information gatherer.²²⁴ In an international climate where multiple channels of communication exist, in particular through information communication technologies and social media, "diplomatic channels offer one of the more credible sources of strategic information."²²⁵ In the contemporary environment, the diplomat must be skilled at engaging in the established intelligence networks. At the same time, they must gather information while also disseminating intelligence that aligns with their state's interests. This function of diplomacy demonstrates the skills that are necessary for successful diplomatic relations. Although the methods of intelligence gathering have evolved, as with communication and negotiation, this function remains an integral skill in the diplomat's repertoire.

The next function refers to the minimisation of the effects of friction between actors on the international stage. Bull accepts that within the international system, tension is ever-present. This is due to the competing interests, prejudices, preoccupations and divergent histories among states.²²⁶ Bull maintains that even between close and amicable states, friction can still exist on points of interest; this a diplomat is tasked to minimise and manage.²²⁷ By influencing the policy of their own state, and by observing conventions governing relations between foreign

²²⁰ Jason Dittmer, "Everyday Diplomacy: UKUSA Intelligence Cooperation and Geopolitical Assemblages," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 105, no. 3 (2015).

²²¹ Kinne, "Dependent Diplomacy: Signaling, Strategy, and Prestige in the Diplomatic Network."

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Jérémie Cornut, "To Be a Diplomat Abroad: Diplomatic Practice at Embassies," *Cooperation and Conflict* 50, no. 3 (2015).

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Kinne, "Dependent Diplomacy: Signaling, Strategy, and Prestige in the Diplomatic Network." 248

²²⁶ Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*

²²⁷ Ibid.

officials, the diplomat can de-escalate potential tension.²²⁸ As noted earlier in this chapter, practitioners in contemplating the ideal ambassador have stressed that they must be skilled in minimising tension between parties. Remarkably, the characteristics promoted for an effective diplomat in minimising friction have changed very little.²²⁹

As with other functions of the diplomat, such as negotiation, this function of minimising friction has cross-sector relevance – namely conflict resolution. The diplomat in this instance seeks to minimise friction to reach an agreement supporting the diplomatic process.²³⁰ This process can take place within several different phases of the conflict resolution process. The underlying assumption from conflict resolution practitioners is that conflict is too costly. Thus the resolution of conflict peacefully is a priority.²³¹ The use of force is considered by many observers as an illegitimate tool of statecraft, even though it may seem necessary in the short term.²³² As conflict continues, this goal may be harder to achieve. For diplomats to minimise friction, it is imperative that the diplomat ‘gets the parties to the table’ to allow the effective minimisation of friction to take place.²³³ When the conflict resolution process has begun, the interests and conditions of the parties may change. The diplomat must be able to identify a shift in these priorities. At this time of the resolution process, there are significant consequences to abandoning the diplomatic process. These consequences include, “the loss of valuable intelligence, a diminished public diplomacy capability, and the potential [radicalisation] of moderates in target regimes”.²³⁴ These challenges are particularly evident with the presence of non-traditional security threats in the current system.²³⁵ Understanding that diplomatic agents are skilled at lessening tension between actors in the international system signifies the importance of this function in diplomacy.

The final function of diplomacy that Bull outlines is the symbolic element. This function has multiple levels of interpretation. Bull proposes that “diplomacy fulfils the function of symbolising the existence of the society of states.”²³⁶ Within multiple areas of the institution

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ J. Michael Greig and Paul F. Diehl, "Softening Up: Making Conflicts More Amenable to Diplomacy," *International Interactions* 32, no. 4 (2006).

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² John Hoffman, "Reconstructing Diplomacy," *British Journal of Politics & International Relations* 5, no. 4 (2003).

²³³ Greig and Diehl, "Softening Up: Making Conflicts More Amenable to Diplomacy." 359

²³⁴ Tara Maller, "The Dangers of Diplomatic Disengagement in Counterterrorism," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 32, no. 6 (2009). 512

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. 166

of diplomacy, diplomats are an expression of the rules and norms of state relations in action.²³⁷ Bull presents an example of the presence of a diplomatic corps in every capital city as evidence of the notion of an international society at work.²³⁸ Not only does the diplomat symbolically express the working of a society of states, but they also are tasked with preserving and strengthening that system of states.²³⁹ Bull critiques the modern international system, observing that “states are more numerous, more deeply divided and less unambiguously participants in a common culture”, but he recognises that in this environment, the symbolic role of the diplomatic institution is all the more important.²⁴⁰ Indeed, the willingness of states to still embrace diplomatic procedures demonstrates an acceptance of the idea of international society.²⁴¹ When Bull refers to the symbolic function of diplomacy, he refers to the underlining existence of the society of states which the diplomat tangibly reflects. Later in *The Anarchical Society*, Bull explores alternative paths of world order and the role of diplomatic culture. He recognises that the international system of the 18th and 19th centuries has changed dramatically. These centuries are important because the international system of the time strongly supported diplomatic culture. There is a risk, however, that with the current system’s marked difference, the diplomatic culture is not as well supported.²⁴² This does not undermine the importance of this diplomatic function, but it may mean that the diplomat represents a different type of international society. As Sharp aptly states, “diplomats will represent whatever is there and in need of representation.”²⁴³ Where Bull sees the diplomat to be symbolically representing the international society of states, some scholars would also posit that the diplomat is a symbol of other elements of the international system.

Here, scholars would consider the close link between diplomacy and representation. Scholars such as Der Derian and Sharp consider that “much of diplomacy is about representation, the production and reproduction of identities, and the context within which they conduct their relations.”²⁴⁴ While the composition of the symbolic function of the diplomat is made up of more nuanced features than just the representation of broader international society, these features feed into the notion of an international society of states, where “by diplomacy,

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ Ibid. 176-177

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Paul Sharp, "For Diplomacy: Representation and the Study of International Relations," *International Studies Review* 1, no. 1 (1999). 54

²⁴⁴ Ibid. 50

the actors and their relations are ‘constituted’.”²⁴⁵ So long as something requires representation, the diplomat will have a function to play.²⁴⁶ This is evident in the relations between states, and the role diplomats have in representing those relations. For example, when a state wishes to express its strength and to have its power recognised by other states, the embassy becomes a way of symbolising power – and the diplomat works to ensure the symbol of state power is represented.²⁴⁷

Diplomacy, as an institution, is recognised for making extensive use of symbols. Faizullaev, in studying the role of symbols within diplomacy, found numerous examples of how states and their intentions are objectified through symbols, symbolic actions, and interactions, and then how diplomatic agencies are symbolically representative of the state.²⁴⁸ These examples include a national flag, an anthem, a map, monuments, songs, food, and many others.²⁴⁹ Not only are diplomats themselves a symbol, but the diplomat must expertly translate symbols to provide their interpretation. For these reasons, the function of symbolism and representation in the diplomatic institution is not likely to decline in importance. Neumayer outlines several reasons for this, including that “the substance and symbolism of diplomatic missions is crucial in defending the precarious role of the state in an era of globalisation.”²⁵⁰ Foundationally, diplomatic representation maintains and reinforces the modern system of sovereign states.²⁵¹ Understanding the role that the diplomat plays in representing symbols, but also interpreting symbols, is necessary for appreciating the importance of diplomacy as an institution in the international system. More specifically to this thesis, the role of symbols in diplomacy is also an important facet to understand when evaluating and constructing diplomatic theory.

This section has used Bull’s chapter on diplomacy in *The Anarchical Society* to provide an outline of the predominant functions of diplomacy and to expand on the concept of traditional diplomacy. By examining the functions of communication, negotiation, intelligence gathering, the minimisation of friction, and the symbolic function of diplomacy, this section has explored the traditional theory that underpins Diplomacy Studies. Before analysing how

²⁴⁵ Ibid. 50

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ Eric Neumayer, "Distance, Power and Ideology: Diplomatic Representation in a World of Nation-States," *Area* 40, no. 2 (2008).

²⁴⁸ Alisher Faizullaev, "Diplomacy and Symbolism," *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 8, no. 2 (2013).

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Neumayer, "Distance, Power and Ideology: Diplomatic Representation in a World of Nation-States." 235

²⁵¹ Ibid.

theory has changed, the review of the literature through this chapter will reveal several intersections between faith and traditional diplomacy. By highlighting this, a historical platform of faith in diplomacy will be provided.

Traditional Diplomacy and Faith

This section will examine where faith and religious orientations emerged as important factors in the study of traditional diplomacy. By assessing key thinkers that utilised principles of faith in their theorising of diplomatic theory, namely Butterfield and Wight, a foundation of faith in traditional diplomacy will become evident. This section will be relatively short as the bulk of analysis on this notion of faith in diplomacy will be reviewed in later chapters. However, considerations concerning the historical development of diplomatic theory will be presented. The reason for doing this is to make the intersection between faith and traditional diplomacy apparent to construct a comprehensive framework of faith-based diplomacy later in this thesis.

When discussing the historical turning points in international relations, of particular significance was the establishment of the authority of the state system following the Westphalian Treaty of 1648. This was a defining moment in the secularisation of politics, marking the separation of church and state, even though it took time to pervade wider European practices. History reveals that there is an influence of faith on politics and diplomacy. When examining the European context, “the medieval era witnessed the growth of diplomatic processes as international relationships became more complex and dense.”²⁵² A pursuit of universalism underpinned the Christian philosophy of the Catholic Church, expressed through the dominance of the Holy Roman Empire.²⁵³ During this time, diplomacy was not firmly rooted as an activity conducted by states, but rather by emissaries and figures representing the Church or the Empire.²⁵⁴ The agents that would act as diplomats were typically papal envoys, representatives of rulers of the church, or representatives of rulers of kingdoms, fiefdoms, or powerful cities.²⁵⁵ Relations between these groups stemmed from the common ground of *respublica Christiana*, an ecclesiastical society of Christians, where inter-group relations were managed.²⁵⁶ Many historians note that the influence of this common grouping, underpinned by

²⁵² Lee and Hocking, "Diplomacy." 8

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Robert Jackson, "Martin Wight's Thought on Diplomacy," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 13, no. 4 (2002).

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

faith and universal Christendom, gave strength to empires and imperial enterprises.²⁵⁷ Thus, religion had a place in sustaining the traditional constructions of power. History also shows that as the universal concepts of Christendom began to break down, the emergence of sovereign statehood became realised in the international system.²⁵⁸

The influence of faith, particularly Christianity, is clear in the writings of some practitioners in history, informing the scholarship of traditional diplomacy. Drawing from practitioners examined earlier in this chapter, the influence of faith is apparent through the writings of Cardinal Richelieu. Not only did he rise to prominence due to his role in the church, but his understanding of international relations was guided by his personal faith. For example, the notion of collective security was supported by Richelieu because collective security maintained the universalist notion of Christendom – that if states adhere to Christendom, then they should engage in negotiations due to their common ground.²⁵⁹ Here the principles of faith were used as a lens to understand the international system. Furthermore, Christian ethics would often be used to rationalise political activity. Machiavelli was known for criticising the way some Christian ethics were used to justify activities which served only political gain.²⁶⁰ Even though he would criticise the potential misuse of Christian ethics, Machiavelli did not discredit the role or value that Christian ethics could have in the international system.

Practitioners and scholars of diplomacy in modern history are also known for using principles of faith to underpin their constructions of diplomatic theory. Two prominent figures who did this were Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight. Both Butterfield and Wight were influential in what is called the English School within International Relations. This school of thought comprised scholars, historians, philosophers, theologians, and diplomatic practitioners, who formed the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics created in 1959.²⁶¹ The goal of this committee was to investigate theory in International Politics and demonstrate the role of culture, sociology, and history on the state system.²⁶² The intersection with classic theory and faith often saw these scholars titled Christian Realists.²⁶³ As a result, these scholars

²⁵⁷ Robert Jackson, "From Colonialism to Theology: Encounters with Martin Wight's International Thought," *International Affairs* 84, no. 2 (2008).

²⁵⁸ Lee and Hocking, "Diplomacy."

²⁵⁹ Bergin, "Three Faces of Richelieu: A Historiographical Essay."

²⁶⁰ Russell, "Machiavelli's Science of Statecraft: The Diplomacy and Politics of Disorder."

²⁶¹ Scott M. Thomas, "Faith, History and Martin Wight: The Role of Religion in the Historical Sociology of the English School of International Relations," *International Affairs* 77, no. 4 (2001).

²⁶² *Ibid.*

²⁶³ Jeremy Black and Karl Schweizer, "The Value of Diplomatic History: A Case Study in the Historical Thought of Herbert Butterfield," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 17, no. 3 (2006). 628

would offer valuable insights into the intersections of diplomacy, faith, and international relations.

One prominent practitioner from the English School involved in the inclusion of faith in diplomacy is Herbert Butterfield. He was a Christian and “one for whom his faith informed what he had to say about international relations and diplomacy”.²⁶⁴ Butterfield was a historian whose writing would apply a Christian perspective to the discussion of important historical events.²⁶⁵ Perhaps most famously, Butterfield published *Christianity, Diplomacy and War*, which explored the classical ideas of the balance of power, preponderance of power, hegemony in the international system, and great power politics.²⁶⁶ Butterfield’s writing conclusively described, “judgement, fear, righteousness, tragedy, and other foundational elements of traditional Christian teaching – including providence – as it applies to diplomacy, war, and other recurrent features of international affairs”.²⁶⁷ Butterfield justified this approach in combining ethical and pragmatic ideals as they were evident in Western political traditions.²⁶⁸ The concepts that Butterfield focused on are the “timeless dilemmas of politics and power” which were presented as an innovation in scholarship due to Butterfield’s faith-based approach.²⁶⁹ Even when discussing classical realist concepts, Butterfield’s Christian lens is obvious. For example, when describing alliances between states, Butterfield contends that since humanity is made up of sinners, “statecraft and diplomacy ought to be conducted on the principle that today’s friends may be tomorrow’s enemies”.²⁷⁰ When examining the impact of virtues in international affairs, Butterfield seems to accept that there is a difference between what virtues are maintained internally within a state, and what virtues are evident in the state’s external conduct. However, his writing often blurs this separation. When considering the characteristics of an effective diplomat, Butterfield often presents the importance of virtue in effective diplomacy – such as the diplomat living a good life and avoiding temptation.²⁷¹

²⁶⁴ Paul Sharp, "Herbert Butterfield, the English School and the Civilizing Virtues of Diplomacy," *International Affairs* 79, no. 4 (2003). 866

²⁶⁵ "Virtue Unrestrained: Herbert Butterfield and the Problem of American Power," *International Studies Perspectives* 5, no. 3 (2004).

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

²⁶⁷ Jackson, "Martin Wight's Thought on Diplomacy." 23. Consistent with the traditionalist approach, Butterfield evaluates these concepts through a historical lens, see Herbert Butterfield and J. H. Adam Watson, *The Origins of History* (London: Taylor and Francis, 2016).

²⁶⁸ Black and Schweizer, "The Value of Diplomatic History: A Case Study in the Historical Thought of Herbert Butterfield."

²⁶⁹ Ibid. 628

²⁷⁰ Sharp, "Virtue Unrestrained: Herbert Butterfield and the Problem of American Power." 301. Many of Sharp’s conclusions are drawn from H. Butterfield, *Christianity, Diplomacy and War* (Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1953).

²⁷¹ Sharp, "Virtue Unrestrained: Herbert Butterfield and the Problem of American Power."

Consistent with the scholars of the traditional school of diplomacy, Butterfield writes on how diplomats should conduct themselves, and the prescribed behaviour comes from Christian ethics.²⁷² As a way of summary, Sharp consolidates Butterfield's writings and highlights that there are three central implications for the diplomat, and for the theory of diplomacy more broadly.

First, because the interests of those they represent are derived from understandings which are necessarily incomplete and partial, good diplomats will [realise], in a spirit of humility, that they ought to conduct themselves with restraint and urge a similar restraint upon those who send them. Second, because a full understanding of the imperatives which drive others is impossible, but a recognition of the equal moral worth of others, if not of their imperatives, is right, good diplomats will [realise], in a spirit of charity, that they ought to conduct themselves with generosity, and urge a similar generosity on the part of those who send them, in their judgements of the actions and arguments of those who receive them. Finally, [recognising] that a good system of diplomacy performs the role of civilizing international relations, in the sense of fostering the conditions within which human personalities are heightened and enriched, and that such a system has its own needs if it is to be maintained and function, its own 'raison de système', good diplomats will [realise] that they ought to represent these needs to both those who send and those who receive them.²⁷³

A challenge that Butterfield faced was that the faith-based approach he took to theorising was difficult for observers to accept if they did not share the same faith perspective as him.²⁷⁴ To counter this, Butterfield argued that not only did the faith-based perspective of international relations provide the foundations in one's faith, but it also reflected the person's general interpretation of life.²⁷⁵ Butterfield was intentional in ensuring that his theory had wide-ranging application. It was this approach that made his writing important to the school to which he belonged. Butterfield was able to present the traditional Christian perspectives with empirical knowledge from his background as a historian. This enabled his contributions to remain both credible and influential in scholarly fields.²⁷⁶

²⁷² "Herbert Butterfield, the English School and the Civilizing Virtues of Diplomacy."

²⁷³ *Ibid.* 866-867

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁶ Jackson, "Martin Wight's Thought on Diplomacy."

From the same school of thought as Butterfield, Martin Wight also wrote on the influence of Christian theology in international relations. They often wrote together, but there were areas of divergence in their thinking. When considering Wight's writing, "unless one gets hold of the religious dimension of Martin Wight's thought on diplomacy and international relations more generally one will not understand it".²⁷⁷ This demonstrates how Christian thought underpinned Wight's approach to assessing international relations.²⁷⁸ Hedley Bull highlights this when analysing Wight's work.²⁷⁹ Bull thought that two attitudes should be applied when considering the development of politics in history. First, one must reject secular optimism. That is the belief that humans are well-meaning and things will happen for the best.²⁸⁰ This does not, in Wight's view, represent the true human condition and thus does not accurately represent the pessimistic tendencies of state relations. The other attitude important for Wight is the idea of theological hope. This is a more transcendent notion than simply hoping for the best to happen, but rather this hope is an intentional casting "upon God's mercy" where humanity has the promise to be saved.²⁸¹ For Wight, this approach gives intentionality to the activities of humans, and by extension, states. Although he supports a Christian approach to relations between states, Wight condemns a politics of faith and upholds a sceptical approach to diplomacy.²⁸² The goal of diplomacy is mutual accommodation of independent states, and if the diplomat does not have some level of scepticism of the human condition, the goals of diplomacy will not eventuate.²⁸³ Reflected from the personal level to the international level, Wight believes that humanity should strive for the best, but that the root of humanity cannot be escaped.²⁸⁴ The response to this, from a Christian perspective, is that a Christian's attitude toward politics should reflect "pessimism about what might be achieved and gratitude for what is achieved but it is not one of hope or confidence that anything can be achieved if we only put our minds to it and keep an open heart".²⁸⁵ This pessimistic view of politics correlates with the

²⁷⁷ Ibid. 25

²⁷⁸ See Martin Wight, Hedley Bull, and Carsten Holbraad, *Power Politics* (Leicester University Press, 1995).

²⁷⁹ For Bull's perspective on Wight's work, see Hedley Bull, "Martin Wight and the Theory of International Relations: The Second Martin Wight Memorial Lecture," *British Journal of International Studies* 2, no. 2 (1976).

²⁸⁰ Jackson, "Martin Wight's Thought on Diplomacy."

²⁸¹ Ibid. 7

²⁸² Ibid.

²⁸³ Ibid.

²⁸⁴ Ibid. See Martin Wight, "The Disunity of Mankind," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 44, no. 1 (2015).

²⁸⁵ Jackson, "Martin Wight's Thought on Diplomacy." 8

realist paradigm of international relations and grounds this approach to politics within traditional diplomacy.²⁸⁶

Wight's work has specific implications for the development of diplomacy. Summarised below is his conception of traditional diplomacy as a set of fundamental moral principles:

- Honesty and truthfulness: do not tell lies or break promises, it does not pay and brings its own retribution; establish a reputation for straight dealing.
- Moderation and restraint: keeping a sense of proportion... requires the absence of assertiveness or national (and personal) egotism, and a readiness to make concessions, to give way on unessentials.
- Courtesy: seeking not diplomatic "victories", "triumphs" or "successes", all of which imply a defeated antagonist, but "agreements", which suggests common achievement; or perhaps seeking "victories" which come without being noticed. The art of diplomacy is to conceal the victory: "the best diplomacy is that which gets its own way, but leaves the other side reasonably satisfied".
- Respect for the other side: thinking the best of people... trying to share their point of view, understand their interests.²⁸⁷

This list follows the pattern of theorists in traditional diplomacy in that theory prescribes diplomatic behaviour. Wight took religious ideas seriously and believed that they could genuinely contribute to diplomacy and other institutions of international affairs. This includes religious doctrines and how they shaped a state's approach to war and peace, how religious doctrine impacted national churches and the resultant national consciousness, the influence of culture and religion on diplomatic practices and state systems across varying civilisations, and the role of common culture between states throughout history.²⁸⁸ However, in line with the pessimistic assumption of state relations, Wight recognises that any activity of statecraft, primarily diplomacy, is influenced by the moral quandary of the human condition.²⁸⁹ For Wight, patterns of culture influence international society and the society of states, and as there is no shared culture (compared to the universal Christendom of the past, for example), the base

²⁸⁶ For Wight's perspective on the theories of international relations, see Martin Wight, "Why Is There No International Theory?," *International Relations* 2, no. 1 (1960). Further, on political philosophy see "An Anatomy of International Thought," *Review of International Studies* 13, no. 3 (1987).

²⁸⁷ Jackson, "Martin Wight's Thought on Diplomacy." 10

²⁸⁸ Thomas, "Faith, History and Martin Wight: The Role of Religion in the Historical Sociology of the English School of International Relations."

²⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

of international relations is unstable.²⁹⁰ This means that culture derived from faith-based values must be properly understood so their incorporation into policy can play a role in stabilising the balance of power in international affairs. In Wight's opinion, the cultural and moral community that enables fruitful relations between parties was degraded by the development of the Western state-system.²⁹¹ With this critique in mind, diplomatic systems must find a way to operate in that state-based paradigm effectively.

Both Butterfield and Wight show the strong influence that Christian thought has had on the development of diplomatic theory. These ideas will be expanded upon later in this thesis when considering a framework for faith-based diplomacy. The important factor to recognise at this point is that there is evidence of the influence of faith and religious systems in traditional diplomacy, which gives a platform for theory construction.

Moving from Traditional Diplomacy

Traditional diplomacy is deeply rooted in historical tradition. As a result, it has been challenged by the changing nature of the international system in the modern period. Although there are some enduring features of traditional diplomacy, there are limitations to the traditional approach to diplomacy. In the traditional form of diplomacy, bilateral relations are the basis for diplomatic engagement.²⁹² With the onset of non-traditional security threats, the advent of new technologies, the growth of multilateral organizations, the impact of globalisation, and with the extended cast of actors on the international stage, diplomacy's scope has expanded.²⁹³ Indeed, eminent thinker Hans Morgenthau predicted that "consequently, traditional diplomacy, too, must give way to a new conception of diplomatic intercourse appropriate to the new relations established between nations".²⁹⁴ However, the intensity of the evolution of the international system brought about this change sooner than some scholars anticipated. These contemporary forces saw a decline in the traditional approach of professional diplomacy.²⁹⁵ Some argue that the functions of diplomacy, even those mentioned earlier in this chapter, can

²⁹⁰ Barry Buzan, "Culture and International Society," *ibid.* 86, no. 1 (2010).

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*

²⁹² Andres Rozental and Alicia Buenrostro, "Bilateral Diplomacy," in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, ed. Andrew F. Cooper, Heine, Jorge and Thakur, Ramesh (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2013).

²⁹³ Juergen Kleiner, *Diplomatic Practice: Between Tradition and Innovation* (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co., 2009).

²⁹⁴ Hans J. Morgenthau, "Diplomacy," *The Yale Law Journal* 55, no. 5 (1946). 1069

²⁹⁵ Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*.

be performed by other actors.²⁹⁶ Even though other actors may be able to communicate, engage in negotiations, or gather intelligence, the traditional mechanisms within the state are still well-adapted to fulfil the necessary functions of diplomacy.²⁹⁷ The actors may be expanding, but the state still has a degree of authority when it comes to diplomacy. This challenge to the primacy of the state and state-centric diplomacy has seen an expansion in the theory of diplomacy. What emerged in scholarship is the distinction between what some scholars call the old and new diplomacy. Old diplomacy began to decline in the World War I era, where other systems, such as the Washington system, began to emerge.²⁹⁸ The influence of the Foreign Office was impacted in the wake of World War I, which brought about the construction of other channels of diplomacy.²⁹⁹ The nuanced balancing of powers in Europe in the post-World War era saw the typical state of affairs change.³⁰⁰ The impacts of the diminishing power of the state in this period saw changes to the processes of international law. The Hague Conferences are evidence of a forum where the traditional goals and methods of diplomacy were challenged and modified in the early 20th Century.³⁰¹ In several ways the basic assumptions of traditional diplomacy were challenged, leading scholars, discussed in more detail in the next chapter, to believe that the old had to make way for the new.

The term new diplomacy encompasses the changing international order in response to the First World War. While these concepts will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter 3, here it is important to note that institutions of diplomacy were established to move away from bilateral deals to a multilateral approach, such as in the League of Nations, supported by advancements in diplomacy, conflict resolution and international law.³⁰² The notion of new diplomacy emerged out of the deficiencies of the old diplomacy. This was primarily the public desire for openness, lessening the control of the state, and the development of international

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

²⁹⁷ Ibid.

²⁹⁸ Asada explains the Washington system as the processes developed from the Washington Conference. He states, “the conference brought an across-the-board détente by redirecting naval confrontation to a new order of peaceful cooperation. Arguably, after Wilson had left the scene, some of his principles (arms reduction, peaceful settlement of international disputes, cooperation, etc.) were partly realized at the Washington Conference by the more pragmatic Harding administration. The conference succeeded in creating in East Asia a neo-Wilsonian order of cooperation under a liberal-capitalist system. The resulting international order, the Washington System, was to consist of naval limitation in the Pacific and a regime of political cooperation in East Asia” in Sadao Asada, "Between the Old Diplomacy and the New, 1918–1922: The Washington System and the Origins of Japanese-American Rapprochement," *Diplomatic History* 30, no. 2 (2006). 214

²⁹⁹ T. G. Otte, "Old Diplomacy: Reflections on the Foreign Office before 1914," *Contemporary British History* 18, no. 3 (2004).

³⁰⁰ Ibid. 31

³⁰¹ Daniel Hucker, "British Peace Activism and ‘New’ Diplomacy: Revisiting the 1899 Hague Peace Conference," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 26, no. 3 (2015).

³⁰² André Géraud, "Diplomacy, Old and New," *Foreign Affairs* 23, no. 2 (1945).

forums to facilitate peaceful resolutions of dispute.³⁰³ The state still does have a role to play in the 'new' international environment. The responsibility of scholars is to ensure that theory is present to facilitate understanding of these changes. This includes the role of the state, the role of new actors in the international system, the influence of faith and religion in international politics, and the advancements of Diplomacy Studies more generally. This chapter has outlined the theory of traditional diplomacy to present the foundation of Diplomacy Studies. The next chapter will examine how the theory of diplomacy expanded from traditional diplomacy to new diplomacy and then innovative diplomacy. Where traditional diplomacy gives a historical sketch of Diplomacy Studies, investigating new and innovative diplomacy in Chapter 3 will allow for an assessment of diplomacy in the current era.

³⁰³ Hucker, "British Peace Activism and 'New' Diplomacy: Revisiting the 1899 Hague Peace Conference."

CHAPTER THREE

Evolutions in Diplomacy Theory: From Traditional to New and Innovative Diplomacy

Having established the foundation of theory within Diplomacy Studies by examining traditional diplomacy, this chapter turns to the diplomatic schools of thought that proceeded from traditional diplomacy. First, the shift from positivism to post-positivism in International Relations will be considered. This is a crucial area of analysis as it marked an expansion in the processes of theoretical construction in International Relations more broadly, with significant implications to the area of Diplomacy Studies emerging as a result. Following the consideration of the post-positivist approach, this chapter will summarise what scholars have called ‘new diplomacy’, how it emerged from traditional diplomacy, and how it impacted diplomacy’s theoretical landscape. From this point, the innovative school of thought in Diplomacy Studies will be examined. Once the theoretical schools of thought have been discussed, this chapter will then apply that analysis to the actors in the international system that utilise these non-traditional approaches to diplomacy. Nonstate actors such as nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), civil society organisations (CSOs) and individuals, will be examined to understand how these actors operate within the changing diplomatic institution.

Expansions in International Relations Theory: From Positivism to Post-positivism

To fully understand the shift from traditional diplomacy to new and innovative diplomatic theory, it is important to consider a significant development that underpinned theory construction in International Relations scholarship. When analysing what is referred to as the debates of International Relations theory, three debates must be considered. In general terms, the first debate examined the distinction between idealism and realism and focused on theory in International Relations.³⁰⁴ The second debate explored methodology in International

³⁰⁴ Rakhahari Chatterji, "Developments in International Relations: Issues and Controversies," *Jadavpur Journal of International Relations* 17, no. 1 (2013). 28-29. On a brief overview of idealism and realism, see also Vitor Ramon Fernandes, "Idealism and Realism in International Relations: An Ontological Debate," *Janus.Net: e-Journal of International Relations* 7, no. 2 (2016). Noteworthy is Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Knopf, 1948). This was the primary realist work to shape the post-1945 IR field.

Relations from the perspectives of the traditionalists and behaviouralists.³⁰⁵ The third debate, and most important for consideration in this section, concerns “both ontology and epistemology of the discipline, that is, about the nature of knowledge sought in IR, and about how best to find it”.³⁰⁶ This third debate started toward the end of the Cold War and is now commonly known as the distinction between positivism and post-positivism. When considering social research, it was in the second half of the 20th Century that the field of International Relations began to adopt “standard social-scientific conceptions of ‘explanation’ and ‘prediction’”.³⁰⁷ This impacted the construction of theory. Scholars would look for causal regularities among events and coupled those regularities with mechanisms and principles to build theory.³⁰⁸ It was these considerations that challenged the traditional positivist perspective, opening the way for a post-positivist approach to the development of International Relations theory.

When critiquing positivism, post-positivist scholars “identified a connection between the pursuit of objective truth in theory and domination and violence in practice”.³⁰⁹ This created a general separation in thinking, with positivists presented as relying on ‘common-sense’ when considering truth, and post-positivists assuming the role of sceptics.³¹⁰ When this distinction between positivism and post-positivism is debated, it often takes “a highly politicised tone”.³¹¹ The traditional conception of positivism has been challenged. The main criticism of the positivist perspective is that “positivism is not only epistemologically and ontologically flawed; it is also co-responsible for many of the social ills and political catastrophes of the modern world”.³¹² In response to this, positivists argue that the “post-positivist assault amounts to advocating subjectivism, irresponsible relativism and lack of standards, which work against

³⁰⁵ Chatterji, "Developments in International Relations: Issues and Controversies." 28-29. For more on this debate, see Arend Lijphart, "The Structure of the Theoretical Revolution in International Relations," *International Studies Quarterly* 18, no. 1 (1974). To understand the contemporary legacy of this debate, see Simon Curtis and Marjo Koivisto, "Towards a Second 'Second Debate'? Rethinking the Relationship between Science and History in International Theory," *International Relations* 24, no. 4 (2010).

³⁰⁶ Chatterji, "Developments in International Relations: Issues and Controversies." 28-29

³⁰⁷ Fred Chernoff, *Power of International Theory*, New International Relations (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2012). 35. These concepts of explanation and prediction started to emerge as paradigms which impacted policy, discussed in Steve Smith, "Paradigm Dominance in International Relations: The Development of International Relations as a Social Science," in *The Study of International Relations: The State of the Art*, ed. Hugh C. Dyer and Leon Mangasarian (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989).

³⁰⁸ Chernoff, *Power of International Theory*. 35; A. Wendt, "On Constitution and Causation in International Relations," *Rev. Int. Stud.* 24 (1998).

³⁰⁹ Matthew Fluck, "Truth, Values and the Value of Truth in Critical International Relations Theory," *Millennium* 39, no. 2 (2010). 259-260

³¹⁰ Ibid. 259-260

³¹¹ Ibid. 259-260

³¹² Heikki Patomaki and Colin Wight, "After Postpositivism? The Promises of Critical Realism," *International Studies Quarterly* 44, no. 2 (2000). 213

conducting proper research and the effort to make the human condition better”.³¹³ At the time of serious debate on the issue of positivism in International Relations, observers recognised that the term post-positivism had an expansive scope which suggested the consideration of a broader array of activities.³¹⁴ Although this is beneficial, in that it expands the scholarship within International Relations, the broader array of activities did not necessarily translate into practice. A reason for this may be the technicality in defining the competing terms.

When defining the term positivism, Riley identifies three meanings: “it can be a commitment to social evolution”; “it can refer to an articulated philosophical tradition: logical positivism”, or, “it can refer to a set of scientific research practices: methodological positivism”.³¹⁵ A pursuit in the development of post-positivist theory in International Relations is the understanding of its epistemological foundations. Where positivists assumed that “truths could be identified, free from the interference of interests and values”, post-positivists argued that power and interests play a significant role in “constituting the objects of knowledge”.³¹⁶ This allowed the emergence of a plurality in critical approaches to the construction of International Relations theory.³¹⁷ Post-positivism suggests that “truth is still a practical and normative matter which might play a role in constituting international political realities”, and that the critics of post-positivism cannot “maintain the boundary between the nature of truth and political norms and practices”.³¹⁸ Consequently, when caught in the tension between these approaches, theory is in a tenuous position of either being too broad in evaluation, or too specific in application. Analysts applying a post-positivist lens typically are concerned with “a self-conscious reflection on the larger social and political context within which theoretical activity takes place”.³¹⁹ This includes the way that theory “both reflects and reproduces dominant power positions and interests”, while others prioritise the “social construction of theoretical tradition”.³²⁰ With these considerations in mind, the essential benefit of the post-

³¹³ Ibid.

³¹⁴ Thomas J. Biersteker, "Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations," *ibid.* 33, no. 3 (1989). 264

³¹⁵ Dylan Riley, "The Paradox of Positivism," *Social Science History* 31, no. 1 (2007).

³¹⁶ Fluck, "Truth, Values and the Value of Truth in Critical International Relations Theory." 261-262

³¹⁷ Ibid. 261-262. The role of plurality in IR research has been a central discussion for many scholars. See also Jacqueline de Matos-Ala, "Making the Invisible, Visible: Challenging the Knowledge Structures Inherent in International Relations Theory in Order to Create Knowledge Plural Curricula," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 60, no. 1 (2018); Gerard Ree, "Saving the Discipline: Plurality, Social Capital, and the Sociology of IR Theorizing," *International Political Sociology* 8, no. 2 (2014).

³¹⁸ 269-270

³¹⁹ Biersteker, "Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations." 264

³²⁰ Ibid. 264

positivist approach is seen to lie in its pluralism.³²¹ Critical theory, historical sociology, feminism, postmodernism, scientific critiques – all have been applied to the cases of International Relations to build a base for post-positivism.³²² As a result, it has been observed that IR theory “has become richer and wider thanks to the emergence and development of post-positivism”.³²³ To aid in this more substantive development of theory, post-positivist scholars use multiple methods and approaches to achieve their goals. For example, post-positivism does accept historical evidence and narratives as a basis for critical analysis.³²⁴ Another approach and primary contribution of post-positivism is the focus of reflexivity in International Relations theory. The core elements of reflexivity in scholarship include:

1. Self-awareness regarding underlying premises
2. The recognition of the inherently politico-normative dimension of paradigms and the normal science tradition they sustain
3. The affirmation that reasoned judgement about merits of contending paradigms is possible in the absence of neutral observation language.³²⁵

Chatterji summarises the value of reflexivity in that it “challenges the positivist idea that theory can be tested in terms of its correspondence to fact”.³²⁶ This assists in achieving another goal of post-positivism: to enhance the validity of predictiveness within social science theory.³²⁷ This is done by isolating and verifying key causal factors to identified outcomes.³²⁸ Although these achievements are advantageous for the advancement of International Relations theory, they are not without criticism.

While the central tenets of post-positivism have been identified, even the very definition of post-positivism is still debated. Ryan demonstrates this by arguing, “to respond that the term’s meaning is contested does not do justice to the challenge: the term is so protean that one

³²¹ Chernoff, *Power of International Theory*.39

³²² Ibid.39. See also Tim Dunne, Lene Hansen, and Colin Wight, "The End of International Relations Theory?," *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 3 (2013).

³²³ Yong-Soo Eun, "To What Extent Is Post-Positivism ‘Practised’ in International Relations? Evidence from China and the USA," *International Political Science Review* 38, no. 5 (2017). 593

³²⁴ Biersteker, "Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations." 264. To better understand how history has been incorporated into theory, see John M. Hobson and George Lawson, "What is History in International Relations?," *Millennium* 37, no. 2 (2008). However, the appropriate role of history in theory construction in IR is still contested as seen in Lorenzo Cello, "Taking History Seriously in IR: Towards a Historicist Approach," 44, no. 2 (2018). This does not, however, discount the philosophical complexities of the term historicism, such as those explored in K.R. Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism* (Routledge, 2002).

³²⁵ Chatterji, "Developments in International Relations: Issues and Controversies." 29

³²⁶ Ibid. 29

³²⁷ Chernoff, *Power of International Theory*. 127

³²⁸ Ibid. 128. This notion of predictiveness is tested in Wendt, "On Constitution and Causation in International Relations."

cannot even tease out a ‘family resemblance’ among uses”.³²⁹ Warranted, this is a significant challenge to the construction of theory. In its original formulation, post-positivism is thought to contain very little of substance for International Relations.³³⁰ However, some of the results from the influence of post-positivism include the awareness “of the need for humility in our theorising claims”, the adoption of “a critical attitude to our theoretical assumptions as well as to the character of evidence”, a greater sensitivity to the normative implications of findings, and generally moving International Relations scholarship “closer to the epistemological and ontological issues raised in some of the other human sciences”.³³¹ Even considering the advancements in critical approaches to theory, post-positivist research is not fully accepted or practised; indeed, concerns have been expressed that scholarship in the field will ultimately be marginalised.³³² To bridge this gap, some scholars look to the contribution of Alexander Wendt. He developed a theoretical lens through the advancements of post-positivism; this is referred to as constructivism. Wendt, when designing constructivism, applied a positivist approach to epistemology and a post-positivist understanding of ontology.³³³ Wendt also considered central tenets of science and social science into defining and understanding the aims of constructivism.³³⁴ To construct a valid theoretical approach, Wendt had to take into consideration the critiques of post-positivist thought.

The post-positivist approach does engender some reservations from scholars. Biersteker was concerned that, even though post-positivism may open methodological pluralism and relativism, the founding scholarship of post-positivism does not provide criteria by which to choose between competing explanations.³³⁵ For Biersteker, this is not an insoluble problem. The scholarship “could be evaluated according to explicit normative criteria, in full recognition of the intellectual interests being served”.³³⁶ Another form of evaluation could be by assessing the avenues of research, consensus building and pluralism in research.³³⁷ Some scholars

³²⁹ Phil Ryan, "Positivism: Paradigm or Culture?," *Policy Studies* 36, no. 4 (2015). 418

³³⁰ Chatterji, "Developments in International Relations: Issues and Controversies." 30-31

³³¹ Ibid. 30-31. Such reflections are echoed in Pratt’s study which explores ontology and epistemology in the understanding of pragmatism in IR. See S. F. Pratt, "Pragmatism as Ontology, Not (Just) Epistemology: Exploring the Full Horizon of Pragmatism as an Approach to IR Theory," *Int. Stud. Rev.* 18, no. 3 (2016).

³³² Eun, "To What Extent Is Post-Positivism ‘Practised’ in International Relations? Evidence from China and the USA." 599

³³³ Chernoff, *Power of International Theory*. 61 See Wendt’s seminal text on social constructivism, Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

³³⁴ Chernoff, *Power of International Theory*. 61

³³⁵ Biersteker, "Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations." 265

³³⁶ Ibid. 265

³³⁷ Ibid. 265. For evidence on how this has been applied to research perspectives from the Global South, see Matos-Ala, "Making the Invisible, Visible: Challenging the Knowledge Structures Inherent in International Relations Theory in Order to Create Knowledge Plural Curricula."

remarked that post-positivism occupied the “intellectual high ground in the policy field” by the early 1990s.³³⁸ This declaration was short lived, however, as the translation of theoretical ideas into policy was not as substantial as first thought. When evaluating the debate between both schools of thought broadly, both positivists and post-positivists have applied problematic assumptions which limit the contribution of the opposing theory to International Relations scholarship.³³⁹ To contrast these perspectives, Fluck states,

Post-positivists’ emphasis on the normativity of truth is linked with the epistemic understanding of the concept and with an anthropocentrism which leads them to ignore the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity. Critical Realists, in contrast, recognise the importance of the subject–object relationship, but in doing so reject post-positivist insights into the normativity of truth.³⁴⁰

These critiques demonstrate that the shift to post-positivist constructions of theory are still being fully recognised. This must be considered when constructing theory in the future, or even considering theoretical shifts in fields such as Diplomacy Studies.

When looking to the future of theory construction in International Relations, benefits accrue in judiciously applying a post-positivist approach. Eun argues that a post-positivist perspective expands the scope of International Relations to allow for “truth claims” outside the purview of positivism.³⁴¹ A more pluralistic approach will require a greater degree of criticality and self-reflexivity in terms of the theories constructed. These considerations are important to recognise in theory construction, but they are also helpful in evaluating the theoretical shifts seen in the International Relations discipline. The same tensions that exist between the underlining theoretical shift between positivism and post-positivism are evident in the theoretical shift from traditional diplomacy to the new and innovative schools of thought in diplomatic theory. Indeed, the post-positivist approach has arguably been a significant contributor to many of the changes evident in new and innovative diplomacy.

³³⁸ Ryan, "Positivism: Paradigm or Culture?." 417. As evidence of this, Ryan quotes the work of Dryzek and Torgerson where this claim is explored. See John S. Dryzek and Douglas Torgerson, "Editorial: Democracy and the Policy Sciences: A Progress Report," *Policy Sciences* 26, no. 3 (1993).

³³⁹ Fluck, "Truth, Values and the Value of Truth in Critical International Relations Theory." 278

³⁴⁰ Ibid. 278

³⁴¹ Eun, "To What Extent Is Post-Positivism ‘Practised’ in International Relations? Evidence from China and the USA." 603

Expansions in Diplomacy Theory

The New Diplomacy

While the influence of the post-positivist approach had been expanding the theoretical frameworks of International Relations, so too did diplomacy undergo significant revisions. The general concern was that traditional diplomacy was proving inadequate in fulfilling its responsibilities, and therefore the theory and practice of diplomacy would require a new approach to meet the changing agenda of global politics.³⁴² This made significant inroads in theory construction because “just as feminism, post-colonial theory, and postmodernism have long challenged cultural historians to ‘deconstruct’ society, the same motivation is now leading diplomatic historians to deconstruct the state and rethink the relationships between peoples and societies.”³⁴³ This section will focus on the emergence of the new school of diplomacy from the traditional school, indicating how new diplomacy formed following the First World War, and how new diplomacy is congruent with a changed system including the expanding presence of nonstate actors. The school of diplomacy that challenges the traditional school of thought has been referred to by several titles including new diplomacy, the nascent school, and future diplomacy. New diplomacy, as explored by Brown, is intended to be a replacement for, and rejection of, traditional power politics that is state-centric; instead, there would be an ideal world government that would govern relations through international law and institutions above the state.³⁴⁴ This would entail elevating human rights, for example, above “narrow geopolitical interests” where “the measure of power in the new age will be morality, not military strength”.³⁴⁵ Hence ethical elements of foreign policy, or even the interests and nature of other states, became associated with the new diplomacy. Progress in the evolution of diplomacy “occurs when broad public recognition of the unacceptability of conditions creates pressure on governments to act”.³⁴⁶ As global priorities began to shift, and new diplomacy gained critical attention, diplomatic practice needed to respond to a reorganised international agenda.

Before outlining the key developments in new diplomacy, it is noteworthy that advances in theory are reflected in how new diplomacy is defined. Evidence of a shift from traditional to new diplomacy is clearly found in the definitions given to diplomacy in the

³⁴² Shaun Riordan, *The New Diplomacy* (United Kingdom: Polity Press, 2003). 135

³⁴³ Christopher W. Bishop, "New Age Diplomacy," *Foreign Policy*, no. 125 (2001). 96

³⁴⁴ Bernard E. Brown, "What Is the New Diplomacy?," *American Foreign Policy Interests* 23, no. 1 (2001).

³⁴⁵ "The "New Diplomacy" and American National Interests," *ibid.* 40

³⁴⁶ David D. Newsom, "The New Diplomatic Agenda: Are Governments Ready?," *International Affairs* 65, no. 1 (1988). 41

contemporary international system. Essentially the new definitions for diplomacy have been derived from a non-traditional environment where diplomacy works “more fully and consistently in a stateless context”.³⁴⁷ This has enabled the scope of diplomacy’s definition to expand. Paul Sharp offers a definition of diplomacy in this setting by stating that it is:

[T]he way in which relations between groups that regard themselves as separate ought to be conducted if the principle of living in groups is to be retained as good, and if unnecessary and unwanted conflict is to have a chance of being avoided.³⁴⁸

This definition is distinct from the definitions for diplomacy offered in the previous chapter. Notions of morality are considered to be important in diplomacy when diplomats must consider what is good. Furthermore, the primary diplomatic actor, traditionally the state, is not expressly mentioned. This definition proposes that diplomacy is an act between groups, suggesting that a myriad of nonstate actors could engage in the process. The central goal of avoiding conflict is still considered the key goal of new diplomacy, but what is significant is the consideration of new actors and new priorities on the diplomatic agenda. While the definition is distinctly different from the definitions put forward from the traditional school, the historical development from which this definition emerged is important to consider.

The shift to new diplomacy resulted from the impact of World War I and the influence of Wilsonian Idealism. In simple terms, Woodrow Wilson predominantly championed new diplomacy initially by emphasising “parliamentary participation and transparent practices” with consideration to what Butterfield described as social laws.³⁴⁹ Harold Nicholson noted that the ‘Old Diplomacy’ was being undermined by the events of the First World War, and exposed the classical realist approach to international relations to scrutiny.³⁵⁰ This is because the traditional form of diplomacy was unable to safeguard against the devastation caused by the First World War. The reputation of a successful form of diplomacy was ruined as “the entire diplomatic profession was blamed for being unable to halt the drift towards war and strong calls to action were heard for a fundamental revision of diplomatic practices and institutions”.³⁵¹ Bjola and Kornprobst argue that three factors, other than the inability to halt

³⁴⁷ Murray, "Consolidating the Gains Made in Diplomacy Studies: A Taxonomy." 24.

³⁴⁸ Ibid. 24

³⁴⁹ Iver B. Neumann, "The English School on Diplomacy: Scholarly Promise Unfulfilled," *International Relations* 17, no. 3 (2003). 344

³⁵⁰ Riordan, *The New Diplomacy*. 31; For Nicholson’s perspective on the changing nature of diplomacy, see Harold Nicholson, "Diplomacy Then and Now," *Foreign Affairs* 40, no. 1 (1961).

³⁵¹ Corneliu Bjola and Markus Kornprobst, "The New Diplomacy after World War I," in *Understanding International Diplomacy: Theory, Practice and Ethics* (New York: Routledge, 2013). 29

World War I, substantiated the transition from traditional diplomacy to new diplomacy. The first is that great powers desired widespread colonial expansion, however “the balance of power limited this desire” as there was a general recognition that expansion would be too damaging to relations between great powers.³⁵² Powerbalancing, which was so central to traditional diplomacy, was no longer working in favour of great powers. The second factor which brought about the shift to new diplomacy through the First World War was the advent of fast communication.³⁵³ This influenced the methods of interaction and the processes of negotiation. The development of telegraphic and telephone communication shifted the landscape of diplomatic interaction through the war. The third influential factor was the rising power of the United States in international relations. The rules of diplomatic conduct needed to be adjusted to consider the new prominence of the United States as American diplomats were “deeply distrustful of the European diplomatic methods”.³⁵⁴ The American influence on new diplomacy was characterised by self-determination, equality, democracy, legal formulations, conference diplomacy, and collective security.³⁵⁵ These principles were spearheaded by Woodrow Wilson. Tucker suggests that there are a number of changes to old diplomacy that Wilson established. These include:

The ostensible emphasis on moral principle rather than material interest, the distinction drawn between a people and its (illegitimate) rulers, the belief that public opinion might be effectively appealed to over the heads of recalcitrant governments, the propensity to find in almost every conflict of interest a conflict of principle that could not be readily compromised, the disposition to threaten force only to later back away from the threat – these distinguishing features of the new diplomacy had come to the fore.³⁵⁶

These changes were developed and realised throughout the 20th Century. However, the diplomatic agenda was tested again in the wake of the Second World War with other interests coming into play.³⁵⁷ The advent of the Second World War reminded the international community that “the existing nation-state diplomatic relationship will not suffice” and that “new patterns of global management will need to be developed”.³⁵⁸ World War I was a catalyst

³⁵² Ibid. 29

³⁵³ Ibid. 29

³⁵⁴ Ibid. 29

³⁵⁵ Ibid. 34-40. This is discussed by Kissinger in chapter 2 of Kissinger, *Diplomacy*.

³⁵⁶ Robert W. Tucker, "Woodrow Wilson's "New Diplomacy", " *World Policy Journal* 21, no. 2 (2004). 106

³⁵⁷ Newsom, "The New Diplomatic Agenda: Are Governments Ready?." 29

³⁵⁸ Ibid. 29

for change toward a new diplomacy, with World War II reaffirming that not enough had yet evolved from the traditional school of thought.³⁵⁹ Emerging from this time, a changing international agenda reinforced the need to further develop new diplomacy.

In essence, the traditional international diplomatic agenda focused on political and economic relations between states, but could not prevent the two World Wars or the rise of the Cold War, all of which in turn irrevocably changed the constitution of the international agenda, even into the 21st Century. In his text, *The New Diplomacy*, Riordan outlines several key issues that have taken precedence on the international agenda. These include organised crime, international terrorism, the environment, human rights, finance, trade, health, and migration.³⁶⁰ Traditional security concerns do still exist, but the international agenda must be shared with these non-traditional factors. Scholars of diplomacy's new school argue that traditional diplomacy is distanced from these global issues.³⁶¹ The current diplomatic structures must address the concerns of the new diplomatic agenda, and this agenda requires specialists who can apply the "rapidly changing nature of knowledge".³⁶² The inclusion of these specialists will significantly impact the traditional diplomatic mechanism, including the loss of "many of the honest and hardworking diplomats who have in the past staffed the consulates, commercial sections and geographical desks in foreign ministries" in favour of professionals who are not part of the traditional diplomatic service.³⁶³ To assist in addressing the new international agenda, other methods have been employed, including international law. New diplomacy and its processes are apparent through the implementation of the Ottawa and Rome treaties.³⁶⁴ The idea of professionals entering into the diplomatic service illustrates that those who traditionally engaged in diplomacy, state diplomats, may be required to share the stage with new actors within the scope of new diplomacy. More broadly, however, new diplomacy also considers the

³⁵⁹ Realist thought did, however, return back into consideration further reflecting the tension between these schools of thought. For example, see Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 6th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1985).

³⁶⁰ 51-58

³⁶¹ Murray, "Consolidating the Gains Made in Diplomacy Studies: A Taxonomy."

³⁶² Riordan, *The New Diplomacy*.118-119

³⁶³ Ibid.118-119

³⁶⁴ "The "New Diplomacy" and American National Interests." 40. These treaties are significant as they saw nonstate actors spearhead their construction. For more on the Ottawa Treaty, see Louis Maresca and Stuart Casey-Maslen, *The Banning of Anti-Personnel Landmines the Legal Contribution of the International Committee of the Red Cross*, ed. Louis Maresca and Stuart Casey-Maslen (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000). On the Coalition for the International Criminal Court see, H. N. Haddad, "After the Norm Cascade: NGO Mission Expansion and the Coalition for the International Criminal Court," *Global Governance* 19, no. 2 (2013).

expanding cast of diplomatic actors on the international stage, beyond the state. New diplomacy gives a place for the role of nonstate actors and legitimises their engagement in diplomacy.

The new global agenda has brought about a myriad of actors to address the expanding goals of the international community. New actors will frame the agenda and the diplomatic process will be modified as a result.³⁶⁵ The central skills of diplomats and diplomatic institutions, being negotiation, representation, communication, skills of information gathering and dissemination, reporting and symbolism, will henceforth also be adopted by nonstate groups in the new diplomatic environment.³⁶⁶ This new position of influence has come about because, as some observers such as Brown believe, “the era of sovereign states is dead”.³⁶⁷ States may have influence, but not dominance in globalised activities, including finance, markets, the movement of people or information. The unitary power of the state is “being displaced by forces from below (international civil society), from above (regional organisations such as the European Union and the United Nations), and at the side (multinational corporations)”.³⁶⁸ This is not to say that the state no longer exercises power. But rather, even the political structures of the state are complicated by an “odd combination of post-Westphalian (nation states), pre-medieval (city states) and medieval transnational entities (like the Holy Roman Empire)”.³⁶⁹ This brings a level of complexity to the order and position of actors on the global stage. The state must still contend with its place in new diplomacy, if indeed one can be found. Since the post-World War era, the ability for states to address global issues has been undermined by the misconception that internal and external affairs can be kept separate. In other words, the structures built by sovereign states are not capable of dominating international affairs when the domestic affairs of one state affect the other.

As the state attempts to fill the gaps of an adjusting diplomatic structure, other actors have emerged to engage in the diplomatic process. The way in which nonstate actors engage in diplomacy will be addressed in detail in Chapter 4. However, here it is important to appraise the changing role of actors. International civil society is increasing in its influence, particularly when considering its ability to organise and manage international conferences on global issues, with the most prominent case being that of the landmine treaty, but also in its engagement with

³⁶⁵ Kathryn Hochstetler, "Civil Society," in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, ed. Andrew F. Cooper, Heine, Jorge and Thakur, Ramesh (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2013).

³⁶⁶ Murray, "Consolidating the Gains Made in Diplomacy Studies: A Taxonomy."

³⁶⁷ Brown, "What Is the New Diplomacy?." 3

³⁶⁸ Ibid. 3

³⁶⁹ Riordan, *The New Diplomacy*. 94

women's rights, trade, finance, economic development, and the environment.³⁷⁰ The participation of nongovernmental organisations has garnered significant international attention and, together with civil society, wields influence in international processes that include diplomacy, dialogue and consultancy, surrounding global issues.³⁷¹ Their impact is enhanced by addressing the "democratic deficit" in global affairs, resulting in a form of governance that allows for multi-stakeholder dialogue.³⁷² The prominence of nongovernmental organisations continues to rise based on the increasing number of organisations in the world, and their integration into governance and decision making positions through institutions such as the United Nations. The role of the nongovernmental organisation has evolved since their emergence on the international stage, with observers realising that "both the extent of their contemporary existence and the scope of their participation exceeds by far any role that was originally envisioned for them".³⁷³ New diplomacy, as an approach to international diplomacy, seeks to replace the prominence of the state with nonstate actors to achieve the goals of the new global agenda.

Given its emphasis on nonstate actors, it is understandable that the foundations of the new diplomacy can be found in an environment of plurality, that is, one in which multiple actors are pursuing multiple goals. It is believed that within this notion of pluralism and theoretical equality put forward by the nascent school, diplomacy can flourish.³⁷⁴ The effectiveness of diplomacy in this school of thought is aided by the networked connection among a broader-based membership of multiple groups beyond the state, enhanced by technology and other communicative channels.³⁷⁵ Emerging within the new school of diplomacy is a separate track of diplomacy, commonly called 'track two' diplomacy, wherein communities, civil society and nongovernmental actors engage in the diplomatic process.³⁷⁶ As this track is strengthened, the power enjoyed by sovereign states is eroded. Five principle features emerge in the study of this new school of diplomatic thought. They are:

³⁷⁰ "The "New Diplomacy" and American National Interests." 40

³⁷¹ M. Sabatello, "The New Diplomacy," in *Human Rights and Disability Advocacy* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013). 255

³⁷² Ibid. 255. This concept is explored in detail in K.S. Rana and V. Katrandjiev, *Multistakeholder Diplomacy: Challenges and Opportunities* (DiploFoundation, 2006).

³⁷³ Sabatello, "The New Diplomacy." 254

³⁷⁴ Abba Eban, *Diplomacy for the Next Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

³⁷⁵ Gareth Evans, "Commission Diplomacy," in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, ed. Andrew F. Cooper, Heine, Jorge and Thakur, Ramesh (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2013).

³⁷⁶ Arzu Geybullayeva, "Nagorno Karabakh 2.0: How New Media and Track Two Diplomacy Initiatives Are Fostering Change," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 32, no. 2 (2012). For the theory underpinning the development of multitrack diplomacy see Louise Diamond and John W. McDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace*, 3rd ed. (West Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press, 1996).

1. The current state of diplomatic institutions is fragmenting;
2. Diplomacy is becoming more public in terms of a global public domain;
3. New diplomacy relies on grassroots mobilisation and therefore is agile in response to new policy and entrepreneurs;
4. Official diplomacy is superior in terms of accountability and legitimacy due to its proximity to policy makers, yet;
5. New diplomats compete with the government in this space, compensating for government inaction in new spaces.³⁷⁷

The support for the new diplomacy approach has been bolstered by theories within International Relations that concur with its central tenets. An example is the growing prominence of the notion of ‘soft power’. Soft power moves beyond the traditional measurements and ‘hard’ material resources of power, stating that if attraction or influence can be gained without military coercion, power can be achieved beyond the state.³⁷⁸ Other theoretical constructs will be examined later in the thesis, but the example of soft power illustrates that theory has been constructed to affirm the approach of new diplomacy.

Although the idea of new diplomacy has been successful in many areas, it is not without its critics. When considering the role of the state in the new diplomatic environment, states have consistently integrated new approaches into the classical diplomatic model without necessarily sacrificing state power.³⁷⁹ In turn, as Davenport recognises, ‘new’ does not necessarily mean improved.³⁸⁰ Even though conceptions of power have evolved over time, the way that diplomacy functioned did not necessarily match advancements in political thinking. Morgenthau noted the emergence of new diplomacy in the late 1940s (in a post-World War II environment), and revealed that “the old diplomacy has failed, it is true, but so has the new one” due to the lack of penetration in political problem solving.³⁸¹ This frustration between the traditional order and its outright replacement led scholars to explore possible alternatives for balancing out the tensions that had been created. This raises another central concern, that “there

³⁷⁷ John Robert Kelley, "The New Diplomacy: Evolution of a Revolution," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 21, no. 2 (2010).

³⁷⁸ Joseph S. Nye, "Hard, Soft, and Smart Power," in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, ed. Andrew F. Cooper, Heine, Jorge and Thakur, Ramesh (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2013). For the foundational text for this concept, see *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, 1st ed. (New York, N. Y.: Public Affairs, 2004).

³⁷⁹ Kelley, "The New Diplomacy: Evolution of a Revolution."

³⁸⁰ David Davenport, "The New Diplomacy," *Policy Review*, no. 116 (2003).

³⁸¹ Morgenthau, "Diplomacy."

is perhaps a new diplomacy, but not a new world order".³⁸² This suggests that the new diplomacy will possibly reach its limitations. Other observers state that the presence of new diplomacy is a desire to revert back to the 18th Century style of diplomacy, which Butterfield suggested would have been the most effective in the post-World War II period.³⁸³ As much as the methods of diplomacy evolve, it appears that a firm grounding in traditional diplomacy will persist as "new diplomacy has its origins in the old".³⁸⁴ Central characteristics of traditional diplomacy, such as good faith, discipline, and loyalty, will remain hallmarks of negotiation.³⁸⁵ When writing at the time of a great shift in diplomacy, Rossow indicated that "the qualities that [traditional diplomacy] embodied are as valid for the new diplomacy as for the old".³⁸⁶ The calls for transparency and openness will also come at a cost for nonstate actors. The diplomats of the postmodern world "must legitimate their policies and implementation".³⁸⁷ Most importantly, regardless of the pressure for change, all embassies maintain the same structure.³⁸⁸ Their key functions are the same, leaving some to consider that the new diplomacy has not penetrated deeply enough.³⁸⁹

When new diplomacy emerged, its supporters did indeed seek to replace traditional diplomacy. However, new diplomacy does still have central challenges that need to be addressed, despite the international agenda having changed, and an increase in the types of actors on the international stage. Riordan in examining the role of new diplomacy in the 21st Century found that "governmental diplomacy must deal with the non-state actors".³⁹⁰ This has not, however, meant that the role of the government in diplomacy has completely disappeared. Riordan continues by stating that "although the entry of these new players has ended the effective monopoly diplomats once enjoyed over international relations, governmental diplomacy continues to have an important role. It can ensure democratic accountability and legitimacy in the conduct of international affairs."³⁹¹ It may be contended that the theoretical distinction between traditional and new diplomacy is too polar. If one seeks to replace the other,

³⁸² Brown, "What Is the New Diplomacy?." 19

³⁸³ Neumann, "The English School on Diplomacy: Scholarly Promise Unfulfilled." 363

³⁸⁴ R. Rossow, "The Professionalization of the New Diplomacy," *World Politics* 14, no. 4 (1962). 563

³⁸⁵ *Ibid.* 563

³⁸⁶ *Ibid.* 563

³⁸⁷ Riordan, *The New Diplomacy*. 102

³⁸⁸ *Ibid.* 109. The role of the diplomat in the new environment may be expanded (seen for example through the lens of public diplomacy), but the traditional structure of diplomacy – the embassy – remains based on the same frameworks, such as the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.

³⁸⁹ *Ibid.* 109

³⁹⁰ *Ibid.* 130-131

³⁹¹ *Ibid.* 130-131

the success and effectiveness of diplomacy in the future may be hindered by this impasse between theoretical camps. It is as a result of these issues that another school of thought in diplomacy emerged. The innovative school of diplomacy came about as a way to seek an effective middle ground between opposing theoretical positions, as the next section shows.

Innovative Diplomacy

In the search for theory within Diplomacy Studies, it is important to recognise that diplomacy is a human institution that of necessity reflects the environment in which it finds itself.³⁹² Diplomatic innovation is no new phenomenon, but the complete transformation of the diplomatic institution is still in question.³⁹³ Appreciating a growth in multilateral diplomacy, the application of advanced technology, and the integration of poor and weak states into the diplomatic system through institutions, the international system is left with a diplomacy that is neither old nor new, but rather a blend of the two fortified by respected legal regimes and norms.³⁹⁴ The traditional tasks of diplomats, being reporting, communicating or negotiation over borders, are increasingly being performed by non-diplomats.³⁹⁵ This indicates that traditional diplomats must expand their usual tasks within diplomatic practice to remain as relevant and effective as possible. In the same way, non-traditional diplomats must also apply themselves to these traditional roles indicating a widening of diplomatic responsibility across a breadth of actors. Hocking argues that the challenging of state-centrism by emergent actors has created patterns of behaviour that “are generating symbiotic relationships between governmental and nongovernmental actors, reflecting an incapacity to achieve policy goals in an increasingly complex policy milieu”.³⁹⁶ Melissen suggests that the changing nature of the international system is increasingly in a state of tension with traditional modes of diplomatic action.³⁹⁷ Murray summarises four key assumptions of the innovative school of diplomacy:

1. Innovators share a criticism of the divisionary relationship between the traditional and nascent schools of diplomacy,

³⁹² Stuart Murray, "The Renaissance of Diplomatic Theory," *Stuart Murray* (2013).

³⁹³ G. R. Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

³⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁹⁵ Raymond Cohen, "Reflections on the New Global Diplomacy: Statecraft 2500 BC to 2000 AD," in *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*, ed. Jan Melissen (Basingstoke, Hampshire: MacMillan Press Limited, 1999).

³⁹⁶ Brian Hocking, "Catalytic Diplomacy: Beyond 'Newness' and 'Decline'," *ibid.* 21.

³⁹⁷ Jan Melissen, *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: MacMillan Press Limited, 1999).

2. Polarisation of diplomatic thought forces the observer of modern diplomacy into making binary either/or choices,
3. Banishing this binary appropriation is a common goal for innovators who seek to reappraise the state and non-state relationship, and
4. The balance of this relationship is key to these thinkers. In seeking to define diplomacy, innovators would aim to avoid familiar theoretical terrain.³⁹⁸

In the 21st Century, the study and practice of diplomacy are enjoying a renaissance,³⁹⁹ and this has contributed to what Zartman refers to as the widening scope of diplomacy.⁴⁰⁰ Some scholars have taken this widened scope to explore the relationship between diplomacy and other fields that would typically sit outside of diplomacy's constructs. The mass proliferation of hybrid terms such as "sports-diplomacy" has created a condition of "over-hyphenation", compounding the distillation of the essence and utility of modern diplomacy.⁴⁰¹ For scholars, the distinction of diplomacy as its own institution can be diluted, while for practitioners the complex needs of the increased number of stakeholders in diplomacy are not being adequately addressed when the term diplomacy is constantly hyphenated.⁴⁰² However, this type of cross fertilisation would broaden the canon giving the scholarship a theoretical identity that the subfield lacks.⁴⁰³ While training in the practice of diplomacy would still continue, education of diplomatic actors must now take a multidisciplinary approach.⁴⁰⁴ As Wiseman notes, scholars of diplomacy have embraced the notion that diplomacy is a process of continuity and of change.⁴⁰⁵ This capacity for change indicates that more inventive models of governance and diplomacy can realistically be achieved in order to address the complex agenda of the prevailing international system.⁴⁰⁶

Where traditional diplomacy sees diplomacy as being effective through the state, and new diplomacy views diplomacy as being effective away from the state, innovative diplomacy

³⁹⁸ Murray, "The Renaissance of Diplomatic Theory."

³⁹⁹ "Consolidating the Gains Made in Diplomacy Studies: A Taxonomy."

⁴⁰⁰ William Zartman, "Diplomacy as Negotiation and Mediation," in *Diplomacy in a Globalizing World: Theories and Practices* ed. Pauline Kerr and Geoffrey Wiseman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

⁴⁰¹ Stuart Murray et al., "The Present and Future of Diplomacy and Diplomatic Studies," *International Studies Review* 13, no. 4 (2011). This issue of potential over-hyphenation can also be applied to the new forms of public diplomacy being discussed. While theoretical advancements are positive, it is the distillation of the essence of diplomacy that Murray warns against.

⁴⁰² Craig Hayden, 23/02/2017, 2011, <https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/lessons-hyphenated-diplomacy>

⁴⁰³ Murray et al., "The Present and Future of Diplomacy and Diplomatic Studies."

⁴⁰⁴ Rozental and Buenrostro, "Bilateral Diplomacy."

⁴⁰⁵ Geoffrey Wiseman, "Diplomatic Practices at the United Nations," *Cooperation and Conflict* 50, no. 3 (2015).

⁴⁰⁶ Lee and Hocking, "Diplomacy."

finds an overlap between the two schools of thought. This provides fertile ground for the exploration and construction of contemporary diplomacy theory. Within Diplomacy Studies, the innovative approach allows scholars to contend with the entire cast of actors, through a multiplicity of approaches, while addressing a variety of global goals. The previous chapter set the foundation of theory in Diplomacy Studies by critically outlining traditional diplomacy. In this chapter, new diplomacy has been examined to demonstrate how diplomacy theory evolved from its traditional origins. The emergence of innovative diplomacy is a welcomed reminder that Diplomacy Studies represents a rich arena for the development of theory to address the complex issues of the 21st Century. In the next chapter the way that nonstate actors engage in diplomacy will be examined. Just as traditional diplomacy focused on the state, Chapter 4 will map out how nonstate actors engage in the diplomatic process.

CHAPTER FOUR

Nonstate Actors and Diplomacy

With post-positivism encouraging a plurality of approaches in International Relations research, the scope of theory within Diplomacy Studies expanded. Where traditional diplomacy maintained the state as the unitary diplomatic actor, new diplomacy presented nonstate actors as viable diplomats on the world stage. Innovative diplomacy expressed the need to consolidate both state and nonstate actors into an effective diplomatic process. Before examining how faith-based diplomacy may fit within the expanding scope of theories in Diplomacy Studies, it is important to examine the application of these fundamental changes. To do so, this chapter will explore how nonstate actors engage in diplomacy. This will include an analysis of intergovernmental organisations, nongovernmental organisations, civil society organisations, and the individual.

Intergovernmental Organisations

As the international system adapted to the changing international agenda, actors gained prominence in the diplomatic landscape. Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs) became prominent through the 19th and 20th centuries, as independent states began to seek cooperation through institutions.⁴⁰⁷ IGOs can at some levels be considered as nonstate actors, even though their membership comprises states, and sometimes have intergovernmental rather than supranational structures. The institution itself has the capacity to engage in the international sphere as an actor in its own right, engage in organizational learning, and develop its own identity and culture. As a result of deepening levels of globalisation, international institutions became empowered in place of traditional notions of national authority.⁴⁰⁸ In the contemporary

⁴⁰⁷ The emergence of international institutions came about in the 19th Century through the International Telegraph Union in 1865, the Universal Postal Union of 1874 and the International Labour Movement of 1864. The Concert of Europe, the Hague Conferences and the Pan-American Conferences also served to build multilateral structures that moved into the standing organisations recognised today. For more on the development of internationalism through history, see A. Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).

⁴⁰⁸ Satoshi Machida, "Globalization and the Legitimacy of Intergovernmental Organizations," *International Studies* 46, no. 4 (2009). 372. For a discussion on the relationship between sovereignty and international organisations, see also Dan Sarooshi, *International Organizations and Their Exercise of Sovereign Powers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). The issues surrounding this relationship are often evident in humanitarian situations, see Clea Kahn and Andrew Cunningham, "Introduction to the Issue of State Sovereignty and Humanitarian Action," *Disasters* 37 (2013).

environment, IGOs have become integral because “without them, modern governance would not be possible” as so much of the day-to-day business of diplomacy is now embedded in these institutions.⁴⁰⁹ The number of IGOs in the international system have grown, but beyond that they also exercise influence over the global rule-making process which impacts states, transnational actors, and even individual citizens.⁴¹⁰ As their importance and influence continues to grow, their engagement in the diplomatic sphere needs to be understood.

In defining IGOs, the founding principle is that “intergovernmental organisations are established and governed, directly or indirectly, by sovereign states”.⁴¹¹ That states still play a significant role in IGOs shows the importance attached by independent governments for IGOs to be functional and effective, and that they are perceived as legitimate rule-making institutions.⁴¹² IGOs have a bureaucratic structure and regularly engage in meetings to establish dialogue between members for information to be exchanged.⁴¹³ An IGO typically has a permanent secretariat, with staff “who embody not only the institutional, scientific, and technical knowledge but also distinctive cultures and norms”.⁴¹⁴ This general structure is relatively standard in formalised IGOs, but informal IGOs are emerging, such as the G-group⁴¹⁵, which maintain high-level interactions between states, but are not governed by bureaucracy and a permanent secretariat.⁴¹⁶ The central defining features of IGOs, including also institutions as proponents of norms and procedures, are cemented in the goals and aims pursued by IGOs.

When IGOs are constructed, they are guided by a mandate which embodies the aims of the institution. That mandate gives the IGO a level of authority in its activities but also

⁴⁰⁹ Tobias Weise, "Between Functionality and Legitimacy: German Diplomatic Talk About the Opening of Intergovernmental Organizations," *Global Governance* 21, no. 1 (2015). 101

⁴¹⁰ Ibid. 99

⁴¹¹ Piers Campbell and Judith Hushagen, "The Governance of Inter-Governmental Organisations," *Corporate Governance* 2, no. 1 (2002). 21. An interesting notion in this area is the fact that intergovernmental organisations are being constructed to include state and nonstate actors. This is the case in the Arctic Council and demonstrates developments in the area of regional cooperation. See D. Wehrmann, *Non-State Actors in Arctic Council Governance* (2016). And Page Wilson, "Society, Steward or Security Actor? Three Visions of the Arctic Council," *Cooperation and Conflict* 51, no. 1 (2016).

⁴¹² Weise, "Between Functionality and Legitimacy: German Diplomatic Talk About the Opening of Intergovernmental Organizations." 99

⁴¹³ Srividya Jandhyala and Anupama Phene, "The Role of Intergovernmental Organizations in Cross-Border Knowledge Transfer and Innovation," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 60, no. 4 (2015). 717

⁴¹⁴ Ibid.

⁴¹⁵ This refers to the economic institutions, the G7 and the G20.

⁴¹⁶ Felicity Vabulas and Duncan Snidal, "Organization without Delegation: Informal Intergovernmental Organizations (IIGOs) and the Spectrum of Intergovernmental Arrangements," *The Review of International Organizations* 8, no. 2 (2013). 194

establishes the scope of its influence.⁴¹⁷ As IGOs are constituted by states, these states can engage in the IGO to achieve several goals. Vabulas and Snidal suggest that both informal and formal IGOs will allow states to attain different outcomes. These outcomes are presented in the table below.

Table 1: State Goals in Informal and Formal IGOs⁴¹⁸

Outcome of informal IGO	Outcome of formal IGO
Maintain greater flexibility	Achieve a binding commitment
Maintain state autonomy	Strong collective oversight
Maintain closer control of information	Collective control of information
Lower short-term transaction costs and speeds	Lower long-term costs for implementation
Minimal bureaucracy and costs	Centralised bureaucratic capacity and stability
Managing high uncertainty (crisis)	Managing routine problems

When states choose to work through IGOs, they do so to achieve some of the goals mentioned above. There are several areas of benefit which make IGOs an attractive actor to engage with in the international system. Dorussen and Ward argue that the main benefit of IGOs in the international system is their ability to “link states in a network that allows for direct and indirect transmission of information about interests, intentions, and resolve”.⁴¹⁹ This is a machinery which favours diplomatic engagement. From a liberal and constructivist perspective, IGOs have the capacity to minimise friction in the international system as they are able:

. . . to coerce norm breakers, to mediate between conflicting parties, to reduce uncertainty by conveying information, to assist in problem solving through altering members’ perceptions and beliefs, to socialise members and shape norms, and to generate a sense of mutual identity.⁴²⁰

⁴¹⁷ Jandhyala and Phene, "The Role of Intergovernmental Organizations in Cross-Border Knowledge Transfer and Innovation." 717

⁴¹⁸ Vabulas and Snidal, "Organization without Delegation: Informal Intergovernmental Organizations (IIGOs) and the Spectrum of Intergovernmental Arrangements." 209-212

⁴¹⁹ Han Dorussen and Hugh Ward, "Intergovernmental Organizations and the Kantian Peace: A Network Perspective," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52, no. 2 (2008). 190

⁴²⁰ Ibid.

In terms of managing the behaviour of states in the international system, IGOs can pursue a variety of ways to support or enforce norms and rules. To coerce state behaviour, IGOs often apply sanctions as punitive measures for straying from the central purpose of these organisations.⁴²¹ More commonly, however, IGOs are using diplomatic pressure and mediation to maintain order.⁴²² From this analysis, a benefit of IGOs as an actor on the international stage is that they allow a platform for a rules-based order to be maintained. IGOs are also able to offer a coherent message to the global community. Rettig and Avraham study the way in which IGOs are able to engage with the media and notice that IGOs are able to utilise terminology and their reputation to frame the way in which issues are perceived.⁴²³ With a variety of significant benefits offered by engaging with IGOs, states are utilising the institution as a platform to engage in diplomacy. There are, however, critiques of IGOs which may impact their effectiveness.

The most pressing critique is that an IGO still comprises independent states. Independent states pursue independent interests, and this can often complicate the ability of the IGO to manage competing goals.⁴²⁴ With the state ultimately determining the success of the IGO, the increase of the IGO's influence is epiphenomenal when considering that great power competition has adapted to performing within the IGO arena.⁴²⁵ Fundamentally, "nations sometimes cooperate despite [International Organisations] and fail to cooperate even in the presence of them".⁴²⁶ A further criticism concerns the IGOs wielding power in the international system, and yet channels of accountability to mediate the relationship between the IGO, its members and then global citizens, are often lacking.⁴²⁷ Accountability provides legitimacy to institutions, but remains "at odds with the 'ethos of confidentiality' entrenched in the systems of diplomacy".⁴²⁸ These are discernible challenges that influence how effective IGOs are in international diplomacy.

⁴²¹ Daniela Donno, "Who Is Punished? Regional Intergovernmental Organizations and the Enforcement of Democratic Norms," *International Organization* 64, no. 4 (2010). 594-5

⁴²² Ibid. 604

⁴²³ Elai Rettig and Eli Avraham, "The Role of Intergovernmental Organizations in the "Battle over Framing"," *International Journal of Press/Politics* 21, no. 1 (2016). 112

⁴²⁴ Campbell and Hushagen, "The Governance of Inter-Governmental Organisations." 21

⁴²⁵ Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Jana von Stein, and Gartzke Erik, "International Organizations Count," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52, no. 2 (2008). 177

⁴²⁶ Ibid. 179

⁴²⁷ Machida, "Globalization and the Legitimacy of Intergovernmental Organizations." 375

⁴²⁸ Alasdair Roberts, "A Partial Revolution: The Diplomatic Ethos and Transparency in Intergovernmental Organizations," *Public Administration Review* 64, no. 4 (2004). 411

IGOs have had significant influence on the diplomatic process, and diplomacy more broadly. From a realist perspective, IGOs derive their influence from their more powerful members by providing a platform for state communication and decision making.⁴²⁹ Thus, integral to the success of global governance in IGOs, is the role of the diplomat who acts as gatekeeper of information, makes decisions on plenary or executive organs, enhances the IGO's functionality, and provides technical expertise to increase the legitimacy of the IGO.⁴³⁰ This shows that the diplomat as the state representative within an IGO manifests the traditional elements of diplomacy. These, therefore, must still be utilised in multilateral settings like IGOs. When considering the role of an IGO in diplomacy to mitigate conflict, Babbitt proposes some key points to enhance the effectiveness of IGOs. An IGO must be able to intervene in conflict where agreement must be sought, or the IGO must utilise its leverage to entice or coerce a conflicting party to an agreement.⁴³¹ To do so, the normative and shared values of the members of the IGO can be employed to leverage and attract conflicting parties to agreement.⁴³² The IGO must offer consistent mediation for both the short and long-term, where impartiality, inclusion, skilled operationalisation, multiple problem-solving approaches, and the incorporation of party interests are all done to the highest level to generate opportunities for resolution.⁴³³ Finally, Babbitt suggests that the most sustainable resolution of conflict can come from IGOs whose commitment to catalysing change in conflict zones, such as their domestic laws and institutions, can "help countries translate abstract values into realities" as the IGO is engaged over an extended period of time.⁴³⁴

Undeniably, the presence and influence of IGOs in the modern international system have changed the diplomatic landscape. Although the IGO may be considered a nonstate actor, it is still beholden to the interests of its member states. This means that traditional diplomacy continues to operate but has now extended to a multilateral platform emergent from new diplomacy. The secretariat and civil service who work for the IGOs, however, may be distinguished as a new brand of diplomat who do not necessarily serve the interests of a state, but rather the IGO that states construct. Regardless, the rise in prominence of IGOs is an

⁴²⁹ Dorussen and Ward, "Intergovernmental Organizations and the Kantian Peace: A Network Perspective." 189

⁴³⁰ Weise, "Between Functionality and Legitimacy: German Diplomatic Talk About the Opening of Intergovernmental Organizations." 100

⁴³¹ Eileen F. Babbitt, "Preventive Diplomacy by Intergovernmental Organizations: Learning from Practice," *International Negotiation* 17, no. 3 (2012). 351

⁴³² *Ibid.* 351

⁴³³ *Ibid.* 352

⁴³⁴ *Ibid.* 352

important event for diplomacy, for the the diplomat, and for effective diplomatic processes in the contemporary international system.

Nongovernmental Organisations

Along with IGOs, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and INGOs have become more significant in the international system as nonstate actors who engage in the diplomatic process. This is especially so after World War II when the world was in dire need of reform and NGOs found their place in the subsequent restructuring. As they became more involved in the field of conflict resolution, their presence in the institution of diplomacy increased.⁴³⁵ This section seeks to define NGOs, elaborate on how NGOs engage in diplomacy, and the implications for the study and practice of diplomacy.

Defining NGOs cements the role of the NGO as a nonstate actor. The term NGO was coined by the United Nations at its inception through its Charter, of which Article 71 states:

The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organisations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organisations and, where appropriate, with national [organisations] after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned.

Beyond consultative engagement, NGOs then attained rights to participate in diplomacy when recognised as legitimate actors by the United Nations Economic and Social Council.⁴³⁶ Farris puts forward two definitions of an NGO, one simply being a “legally constituted organisation which is operated by legal persons who act independently from the government”.⁴³⁷ Farris also cites Willett’s definition of an NGO, being, “an independent voluntary association of people acting together on a continuous basis for some common purpose other than achieving government office, making money, or illegal activities”.⁴³⁸ It is evident in these definitions that NGOs are distinct from state or government activities. Martens further refines the definition by

⁴³⁵ Carlos Branco, "Non-Governmental Organizations in the Mediation of Violent Intra-State Conflict: The Confrontation between Theory and Practice in the Mozambican Peace Process," *Janus.Net: e-Journal of International Relations* 2, no. 2 (2011). 78

⁴³⁶ Peter Willetts, "From "Consultative Arrangements" to "Partnership": The Changing Status of NGOs in Diplomacy at the UN," *Global Governance* 6, no. 2 (2000).

⁴³⁷ Virginia L. Farris, "Non-Governmental Organizations: Doing Their Share for International Religious Freedom," *Review of Faith & International Affairs* 11, no. 1 (2013). 56

⁴³⁸ *Ibid.* 56

saying that NGOs are “formal (professionalised) independent societal organisations whose primary aim is to promote common goals at the national or the international level”.⁴³⁹ This clear separation from the state that gave rise to the term ‘track two’ diplomacy, which is a channel of negotiation between unofficial agents, often shuttling among parties to present proposals and reach agreement.⁴⁴⁰ This has created a valuable space for NGOs and other nonstate actors to become influential in the diplomatic process.

An element of confusion surrounds the understanding of what can be classed as an NGO. When identifying different nonstate actors, some observers refer to NGOs as civil society organisations “to distinguish them from the other two major sectors of society – government and the for-profit private sectors”.⁴⁴¹ This is problematic as other scholars provide clear distinctions between NGOs and civil society organisations and consider them to be separate nonstate actors. However, it is clear that “NGOs like to see themselves as the representatives of civil society, acting as a necessary check and balance on the actions of governments and multinationals”, meaning that there is some overlap in the goals and processes of the two actors.⁴⁴² This will be discussed in more detail in the following section on civil society organisations, but essentially NGOs are a significant actor within a broader array of civil society organisations. Some distinct and central characteristics of NGOs become apparent when NGOs are observed engaging in international affairs. Ryfman highlights five notable characteristics concerning the role of NGOs. This study is specifically in the sphere of humanitarian aid. However, the characterisations listed below are relevant to NGOs and their involvement in conflict resolution and diplomacy:

1. The concept of volunteering for not-for-profit entity in terms of grouping together individuals who are free and considered to be vested with rights with a view to achieving a common purpose for the benefit of others and not for the members alone;
2. The special legal framework it [the NGO] symbolises, depending on national legislation;

⁴³⁹ Kerstin Martens, "Mission Impossible? Defining Nongovernmental Organizations," *Voluntas* 13, no. 3 (2002). 282

⁴⁴⁰ Janet Martinez and Lawrence Susskind, "Parallel Informal Negotiation: An Alternative to Second Track Diplomacy," *International Negotiation* 5, no. 3 (2000). 571

⁴⁴¹ Farris, "Non-Governmental Organizations: Doing Their Share for International Religious Freedom." 57

⁴⁴² Riordan, *The New Diplomacy*. 91

3. The relationship with public and private authorities both at the national level (with the state and its institutions, in particular) and at the international level;
4. The reference to values involving both the voluntary commitment and the declared will to ensure that the work of the volunteering group is consistent with a civic approach geared, to a varying extent, to the “civil societies” which NGOs form an essential part; and of
5. The transnational nature of the work carried out, irrespective of the conditions and procedures that govern it.⁴⁴³

This list demonstrates that NGOs can have a distinctive role in international relations and conflict resolution. As a result, the institution of diplomacy has been strongly impacted by the growing role of NGOs in international affairs.

The increased role of NGOs reduces the relevance of traditional diplomacy insofar as it only relates to the professional representatives of the state.⁴⁴⁴ This has consequently changed the structural dimensions of diplomacy.⁴⁴⁵ As previously mentioned, the emergence of a second track of diplomacy changed the channels by which effectual diplomacy could take place. Here, unofficial (nonstate) agents engage in diplomacy; however as the study of this area became more prominent, observers recognised the need for identifying a track one-and-a-half diplomacy (track 1.5 diplomacy) whereby nonstate actors work with official, government agents to mediate agreement.⁴⁴⁶ Tracks one and 1.5 diplomacy have provided marginalised groups with a forum and represent an “alternative form of diplomacy”.⁴⁴⁷ The diplomatic landscape has indeed evolved to suggest that the state is not the only actor capable of engaging in diplomacy.⁴⁴⁸

⁴⁴³ Philippe Ryfman, "Non-Governmental Organizations: An Indispensable Player of Humanitarian Aid," *International Review of the Red Cross* 89, no. 865 (2007). 27

⁴⁴⁴ Andrew F. Cooper and Brian Hocking, "Governments, Non-Governmental Organisations and the Re-Calibration of Diplomacy," *Global Society* 14, no. 3 (2000). 361

⁴⁴⁵ *Ibid.* 366

⁴⁴⁶ Branco, "Non-Governmental Organizations in the Mediation of Violent Intra-State Conflict: The Confrontation between Theory and Practice in the Mozambican Peace Process." 78

⁴⁴⁷ Herman Joseph S. Kraft, "Track Three Diplomacy and Human Rights in Southeast Asia: The Asia Pacific Coalition for East Timor," *Global Networks* 2, no. 1 (2002). 60

⁴⁴⁸ In the multitrack approach to diplomacy, some suggest that there are up to nine tracks of diplomacy, see Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, "What Is Multi-Track Diplomacy?," Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy <http://imtd.org/about/what-is-multi-track-diplomacy/>. This includes developing a form of people-to-people diplomacy which is important when considering the individual's role in diplomacy discussed later in this chapter.

Not only are the structural elements of the diplomatic institution impacted by NGOs, but so too are the operational dimensions of diplomacy.⁴⁴⁹ The large number of NGOs active in these channels has created a substantial transnational network of NGOs – with this network being a valuable asset to the success of NGOs and their diplomatic influence in the international arena.⁴⁵⁰ Tapping into that global network, NGOs are also important in more contemporary forms of diplomacy, including public diplomacy. NGOs are able to use their network to utilise channels of communication with numerous constituencies globally to influence the image of a state to a global public.⁴⁵¹ Success in this area can be attributed to the way that NGOs have been able to take advantage of new technologies, notably the internet and associated social media, in a much more effective way to communicate with governments and corporations.⁴⁵² While using these technologies and the networks provided by NGOs, the NGO has the capacity to fill the gap that is left by other states. Traditional, state-centric diplomacy has major limitations, and can often hamper success in conflict resolution and peaceful mediation. This leaves a need for NGOs to fill.

The role of NGOs in diplomacy has been criticised by some observers. For those who believe that the primacy of the state still dictates diplomacy, “the role of NGOs is likely to be, at best, of secondary importance to that of national governments”.⁴⁵³ Here, the NGO may engage in diplomatic activities, but the activities are always defined in terms of the professional diplomat being a governmental official.⁴⁵⁴ This suggests that the influence of the NGO will be circumscribed by that of the state. Other observers also suggest that “NGOs do not have the legitimacy of international organisations to mediate, and their behaviour in the mediation of violent conflicts is similar to that of other informal mediators”.⁴⁵⁵ Branco notes that NGOs are limited in their resources, they have very few strategies to mediate conflict, and the strategies to which they are limited (namely communication and facilitation), make constructing and maintaining an environment conducive to conflict management difficult.⁴⁵⁶ As a result of the

⁴⁴⁹ Cooper and Hocking, "Governments, Non-Governmental Organisations and the Re-Calibration of Diplomacy." 370

⁴⁵⁰ Kraft, "Track Three Diplomacy and Human Rights in Southeast Asia: The Asia Pacific Coalition for East Timor." 49

⁴⁵¹ Olga Zatepilina, "Non-State Ambassadors: NGOs' Contribution to America's Public Diplomacy," *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* 5, no. 2 (2009). 165-6

⁴⁵² Riordan, *The New Diplomacy*. 89

⁴⁵³ Cooper and Hocking, "Governments, Non-Governmental Organisations and the Re-Calibration of Diplomacy." 361

⁴⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵⁵ Branco, "Non-Governmental Organizations in the Mediation of Violent Intra-State Conflict: The Confrontation between Theory and Practice in the Mozambican Peace Process." 85

⁴⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

purpose of NGOs, they can often have separate and competing interests to states which can impact the way the NGO can function. These challenges notwithstanding, the position of NGOs has grown steadily.

As noted above, NGOs gained prominence in the international system when they became a key consultative player in the United Nations. Willetts, in writing about the status of NGOs and diplomacy through the United Nations, suggests that provisions of the NGO statute through the United Nations are so deeply embedded they could be regarded as part of customary international law.⁴⁵⁷ The strongest evidence of this status is “the way in which NGOs can often gain access to intergovernmental proceedings even when the political climate turns against them and there is significant opposition to their presence”.⁴⁵⁸ To this point, NGOs have the right to be participants in the policymaking bodies of the UN system, but they are not members of those bodies. This means that they do not possess the right to vote, but can still play a valuable role in the dialogue. From this platform, NGOs have grown in influence, working alongside governments, engaging in issues on the international agenda, and become more involved in contributing to global governance.⁴⁵⁹ Willett’s study into the United Nations and the role of NGOs highlights one significant shift in international relations, and that is that “the interstate system has been transformed since 1945, both politically [and] legally, into a multiactor system”.⁴⁶⁰

For the purposes of this thesis, it is important to note that NGOs have made a clear impact in the area of faith-based diplomacy. While this will be addressed in Chapter 8, it is worth noting here that NGOs have a rich history in religious advocacy.⁴⁶¹ Religious advocacy groups, a form of NGO, were studied in a Pew research report titled, *The Pew Forum on Religion in Public Life*, that found the majority of religious advocacy groups listed human

⁴⁵⁷ Willetts, "From "Consultative Arrangements" to "Partnership": The Changing Status of NGOs in Diplomacy at the UN."

⁴⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid. A prominent example of this is the way that NGOs have become integral actors in relation to the environment, sustainability and climate change. See Clair Gough and Simon Shackley, "The Respectable Politics of Climate Change: The Epistemic Communities and NGOs," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs)* 77, no. 2 (2001). Further on the example of climate change, NGOs are working in conjunction with IGOs, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to enhance multilateral cooperation and bring more actors in to deal with global concerns. See Miquel Muñoz Cabré, "Issue-Linkages to Climate Change Measured through NGO Participation in the UNFCCC," *Global Environmental Politics* 11, no. 3 (2011).

⁴⁶⁰ Willetts, "From "Consultative Arrangements" to "Partnership": The Changing Status of NGOs in Diplomacy at the UN."

⁴⁶¹ Farris, "Non-Governmental Organizations: Doing Their Share for International Religious Freedom." 56

rights as a top priority in their agenda.⁴⁶² This means NGOs can claim historical experience in addressing global issues and engaging effectively in dialogue. Indeed, Farris suggests that it is of crucial importance for governments “to recognise the vital role that NGOs can play and incorporate their ideas and experience so that together they can advance this critical human right, international religious freedom, which can contribute so much to long-term stability and security”.⁴⁶³ Farris writes on religious freedom as a central issue that NGOs have had the capacity to promote and protect, a factor that encourages the future potential of faith-based diplomacy, and the key role of NGOs in diplomacy.

The role of NGOs in the international arena is set to increase. Riordan attributes this to their “access to information that allows them to challenge on increasingly equal terms the assertions of governments and multinational corporations” with the added benefit of NGOs being “unfettered by the bureaucratic baggage of generations”, “more apt at networked organisation”, and, “quicker on their feet and more adaptable in a rapidly changing international environment”.⁴⁶⁴ Ignoring the role of NGOs in the future of international relations and of diplomacy would be of great detriment to the field. NGOs are better trained and equipped at responding to the needs of humanitarian crises and interventions leaving them to fill the voids in the international arena.⁴⁶⁵ While the value of engaging with NGOs in diplomacy is evident, the challenge of genuine cooperation between the state and NGOs remains. Cooper and Hocking argue that “defining appropriate relations between government and NGOs, identifying clearly the strengths of each, and helping NGOs do what they do best will be critical tasks for a New Diplomacy”.⁴⁶⁶ As the study and practice of diplomacy has expanded beyond the traditional, state-centric approach, New Diplomacy has presented an opportunity for a recent actor, the NGO, to engage and influence diplomacy.

Civil Society Organisations

The impact of new diplomacy in the study and practice of diplomacy has underscored the newfound role for civil society organisations (CSOs). In the area of human security in particular, CSOs continue to influence the global agenda, and like NGOs, “the exponential

⁴⁶² Ibid. 57

⁴⁶³ Ibid. 64

⁴⁶⁴ Riordan, *The New Diplomacy*. 91

⁴⁶⁵ Ryfman, "Non-Governmental Organizations: An Indispensable Player of Humanitarian Aid." 45

⁴⁶⁶ Cooper and Hocking, "Governments, Non-Governmental Organisations and the Re-Calibration of Diplomacy." 363

growth in the numbers, prominence, and sophistication of these organisations and the campaigns they orchestrated” substantially impacted the institutions of diplomacy.⁴⁶⁷ Moreover, the significance of globalism needs to be considered, where the national confines of societies, politics, and economies are superseded by a global civil society.⁴⁶⁸ Its rise from the end of the 20th into the present Century has been likened to the rise of the nation state in the 19th Century.⁴⁶⁹ Civil society is assigned a lesser role in international affairs than traditional political structures. However, the idea of civil society is evolving as a concept with expanding influence across many sectors, including the political, historic, cultural, social and economic.⁴⁷⁰ Importantly, the development of civil society has been linked to successful governance in democratic states.⁴⁷¹ Beyond looking at the NGO as a specific nonstate actor, the broader area of CSOs must also be considered to understand the impact they have had on diplomacy in the time of its manifestation as the so called new diplomacy.

Prior to a closer definition of a CSO, the notion of a civil society needs to be examined. Black highlights that civil society is an embodiment of several characteristics, including “the sphere of ideas, values, institutions, organisations, networks and individuals located between the family, the state, and the market” that can have an impact domestically, internationally and globally through transnational networks.⁴⁷² In an age of globalisation, the global civil society will also influence the way that organisations operate. The current global civil society, according to Kaldor, may be discerned in its activist, neoliberal and postmodern forms. These are elaborated as:

1. A social movement-based ‘activist version’ of global civil society;
2. A tamed or ‘neoliberal version’ of nongovernmental organisations that have become increasingly institutionalised and professionalised in the course of routine collaborations with governments and international organisations; and
3. A ‘postmodern version’ encompassing more ascriptively based forms of association, such as those associated with ethnic and religious identities.⁴⁷³

⁴⁶⁷ David R. Black, "Civil Society and the Promotion of Human Security: Achievements, Limits, and Prospects," *Asian Journal of Peacebuilding* 2, no. 2 (2014). 169

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid. 171

⁴⁶⁹ Amitai Etzioni, "The Capabilities and Limits of the Global Civil Society," *Millennium* 33, no. 2 (2004). 342

⁴⁷⁰ Alan Fowler and Kasturi Sen, "Embedding the War on Terror: State and Civil Society Relations," *Development & Change* 41, no. 1 (2010). 10

⁴⁷¹ Ibid.

⁴⁷² Black, "Civil Society and the Promotion of Human Security: Achievements, Limits, and Prospects." 170-1

⁴⁷³ Cited in Black, *ibid.*171

It is within this broader context of civil society that organisations can function to achieve their goals on the global agenda. Advocates for CSOs have highlighted that CSOs can provide “governance without government”, a statement that suggests that CSOs are able to satisfy some functions of the state more effectively, specifically at a societal level.⁴⁷⁴ Venturi identifies two helpful definitions for CSOs. The first, from the World Bank, sees CSOs as the “wide area of nongovernmental and not-for-profit organisations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations”.⁴⁷⁵ The second comes from the Civil Society Index, which defines civil society as “the arena, outside of the family, the state and the market where people associate to advance common interests” - indicating that any political or diplomatic engagement does sit in the second track of diplomacy as a clearly defined nonstate actor.⁴⁷⁶ When considering institutions that exist within civil society, the organisations “are distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated”.⁴⁷⁷ This is because the scope of CSOs is broad and complex, involving a multiplicity of actors to address common concerns. Although the organisations that operate within civil society cover a wide spectrum of issues and operations, when considering peaceful resolution and diplomacy there are some central purposes that CSOs must achieve. These include:

- Protection of the rights of civilians
- Promoting reconciliation
- Confidence building among the conflicting parties and groups
- Monitoring for accountability of reconciliation
- Advocacy and public communication for wider dissemination of peacebuilding
- Socialisation
- Practice of democratic attitudes among citizens
- Intermediation and facilitation between the citizens and the state.⁴⁷⁸

⁴⁷⁴ Etzioni, "The Capabilities and Limits of the Global Civil Society." 342

⁴⁷⁵ Bernardo Venturi, "Civil Society Organizations and Conflict Resolution: Moldova-Transnistria," *International Journal on World Peace* 28, no. 2 (2011). 16-7

⁴⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁷ Irina Ghaplanyan, "Empowering and Engaging Civil Society in Conflict Resolution: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh," *International Negotiation* 15, no. 1 (2010). 89

⁴⁷⁸ Mohammad Tarikul Islam, "Conflict Resolution and Civil Society: Experiences of Nepal in Post-Maoist Revolution," *Jadavpur Journal of International Relations* 21, no. 2 (2017). 89

These central goals are helpful in substantiating the definitions of CSOs previously provided as they present the pursuits and aims of the organisations in international affairs. It is apparent that CSOs have the potential to engage and impact the processes and institutions of diplomacy in an effective way. The emergence of CSOs into the diplomatic arena requires consideration in view of the impact of CSOs on the political and diplomatic structures of international relations.

In a study on the achievements, limits, and prospects of civil society in human security, David Black outlines common factors which may be attributed to the success of CSOs and their emergence as an actor in the international system. He suggests that the global environment in the aftermath of the Cold War encouraged transnational civil society to engage in the diplomatic and political process.⁴⁷⁹ During this time, the scholarly literature started to show an interest in civil society when examining anti-statist perspectives to theory (being neoliberal and post-structural).⁴⁸⁰ Along with this, the advent of new information and communication technology enabled a greater reach and a more effective mobilisation of civil society.⁴⁸¹ The leadership of civil society organisations also gained a level of influence in policymaking as they could inspire capable strategies above the regular bureaucracy of the state.⁴⁸² The final factor which Black suggests contributed to the successful emergence of CSOs was that their novel approach to diplomacy brought about a rise in media and popular interest, which reframed the global agenda and enhanced access to the political and diplomatic domain.⁴⁸³ These factors may account for the reasons CSOs gained power in the political landscape, but at the same time several critiques emerged about the role of CSOs in diplomacy.

CSOs have encountered several limitations to their effectiveness in engaging in diplomacy. Fundamentally, civil society is not given as much weight in the decision-making process. Essentially, while the political elite exists in the Westphalian system of nation states, civil society will be assigned a lesser role due to the structures of power and international relations embedded in the system.⁴⁸⁴ CSOs exist to represent civil society, and are often then susceptible to civic influences, but the citizens are not empowered to control the political

⁴⁷⁹ Black, "Civil Society and the Promotion of Human Security: Achievements, Limits, and Prospects." 175

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁸¹ Ibid.

⁴⁸² Ibid.

⁴⁸³ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁴ Ghaplanyan, "Empowering and Engaging Civil Society in Conflict Resolution: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh." 89

systems that are accountable to the polity.⁴⁸⁵ This means that the structures for influence are not yet sufficiently effective to create a channel between civil society and high-level decision-making. By virtue of the role and constituency of CSOs, there is the potential that CSOs could undermine areas of human security, such as those that forestall the negotiation and signing of a global Arms Trade Treaty as a result of different CSOs protesting some points while others may be struggling implementing the programs advocated for.⁴⁸⁶ This could bring about divisions between CSOs and ultimately lead to a level of cynicism toward their involvement at a high level. Another pressing concern is that as CSOs continue to seek collaboration with governments, a level of institutionalisation and professionalisation can gradually diminish the CSO's critical independence from the state.⁴⁸⁷ Indeed, this may progress and see some CSOs formed to reflect state interests or even advocate for regime change. Although new diplomacy has allowed for a more participatory form of diplomacy, the engagement of CSOs with the machinery of the state has often impaired the legitimacy and effectiveness of CSOs in the diplomatic process.⁴⁸⁸ These challenges have impacted the way that CSOs have engaged in diplomacy, and the potential successes that the nonstate actor can achieve. However, it is undeniable that the rise of CSOs has challenged the traditional constructs of diplomacy.

The engagement of CSOs in diplomacy and global governance has indeed influenced the study and practice of diplomacy. For one, CSOs have gained access to the negotiating table, directly or indirectly. CSOs are able to affect or even change policies designed by states, challenge the diplomatic agenda, and become key contributors to informal, or backdoor, diplomacy.⁴⁸⁹ This has become apparent with the high-level engagement of CSOs in issues of climate change. This is where civil society positions itself as an arbiter of the interests of society, essentially holding the state to account for lack of transparency and accountability.⁴⁹⁰ This increased access has brought about a deepened level of participation in the political process – whether it be in supporting policies, opposing proposals, or applying pressure as an advocate for civil society.⁴⁹¹ Through multilateral institutions like the United Nations, CSOs have a space to facilitate communication, to engage with the global agenda, and to improve

⁴⁸⁵ Fowler and Sen, "Embedding the War on Terror: State and Civil Society Relations." 8

⁴⁸⁶ Black, "Civil Society and the Promotion of Human Security: Achievements, Limits, and Prospects." 173

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid. 177

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid. 178

⁴⁸⁹ Tobias Böhmelt, "Civil Society Lobbying and Countries' Climate Change Policies: A Matching Approach," *Climate Policy* 13, no. 6 (2013). 699

⁴⁹⁰ Islam, "Conflict Resolution and Civil Society: Experiences of Nepal in Post-Maoist Revolution." 86

⁴⁹¹ Kléber Ghimire, "The United Nations World Summits and Civil Society Activism: Grasping the Centrality of National Dynamics," *European Journal of International Relations* 17, no. 1 (2011). 75

linkages and networks, both among other CSOs and with regional or international social movements and campaigns.⁴⁹² This cements the role of the CSO as a consultative agent in many areas of international affairs, including security and humanitarian concerns.⁴⁹³

This is where CSOs can have a distinct role in conflict resolution and diplomacy. When examining CSOs in conflict resolution, there are two approaches to peacebuilding in which CSOs can play a pivotal role. Firstly, reconstructive peacebuilding seeks a breadth of aims, as suggested by the United Nations. These include “monitoring a truce, disarming, and [demobilising the] army; providing humanitarian assistance; strengthening participatory governance; protecting human rights and rehabilitation; reconstruction; and reconciliation building”.⁴⁹⁴ Each of these areas provides scope for CSOs to be involved. Also, within a reconstructive peacebuilding approach, root causes of conflict such as insecurity, identity issues, and development, can all be strengthened through CSOs.⁴⁹⁵ The transformative approach to peacebuilding can be enhanced by CSOs. This approach looks to leadership in conflict resolution, managing root causes of conflict formation and structural violence; this in turn lends itself to the construction of mechanisms for addressing a crisis, creating political reconciliation, and developing a sustained system of peace.⁴⁹⁶ Again, CSOs can play a vital role in development. To succeed in this area, “the commitment and motivation of the parties concerned, mechanisms to resolve differences, and institutional transformation” is necessary from all actors involved.⁴⁹⁷ Looking to a more conceptual level, the development of institutionalised norms and practices are often strengthened by CSOs.⁴⁹⁸ The CSO could be used as a conduit for translating policies and decisions at an institutional level to the constituent level. The multiple channels of potential engagement demonstrate the way in which diplomacy has adjusted to enable CSOs to be considered as a legitimate actor, to varying degrees of success.⁴⁹⁹

⁴⁹² Ibid. 81

⁴⁹³ Jude Howell and Jeremy Lind, "Securing the World and Challenging Civil Society: Before and after the 'War on Terror'," *Development & Change* 41, no. 2 (2010). 281

⁴⁹⁴ Islam, "Conflict Resolution and Civil Society: Experiences of Nepal in Post-Maoist Revolution." 87

⁴⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid. 88

⁴⁹⁸ Tan See Seng, "Non-Official Diplomacy in Southeast Asia: "Civil Society" or "Civil Service"?", *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International & Strategic Affairs* 27, no. 3 (2005). 371

⁴⁹⁹ An example of this is the involvement of CSOs in the Kimberley Process to control the flow of conflict diamonds. See Virginia Haufler, "The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: An Innovation in Global Governance and Conflict Prevention," *Journal of Business Ethics* 89 (2009). CSOs have actively shaped this process, but have also left the process too, such as *Global Witness* to exercise their position as a legitimate actor and influence the global regime.

There are many ways to improve the effectiveness and role of CSOs in diplomacy. The first is that CSOs have the capacity to adapt and learn from their growing engagement, whereby they have enough distance from other actors to maintain their own distinctive role.⁵⁰⁰ With the substantial network of CSOs that has been established, momentum can be gained through cooperation between various CSOs that pursue similar goals.⁵⁰¹ This can strengthen the scope and influence of the CSOs in addressing their priorities on the global agenda. It is important for CSOs to remain innovative as they have the space within the new diplomatic landscape to challenge the control of the state, while not “implicitly subscribing to the restrictive and ‘safe’ conventions of diplomatic orthodoxy”.⁵⁰² This is a concern for the involvement of CSOs on different levels of structural and operational engagement. For example, after examining the engagement of civil society in conflict resolution, Ghaplanyan proposes eight recommendations to improve the effectiveness of CSOs in future conflict resolutions. They are:

1. Civil society should seek better and more efficient ways to link their conflict transformation initiatives to the official conflict negotiation process. This could be done, for example, through third party mediators.
2. Civil society and particularly NGOs and other civic initiatives that undertake peacebuilding projects and activities must strive towards joining forces, coordinating activities, mobilising more NGOs to join them and exerting pressure on governments.
3. Civil society must continue raising awareness among the wider population about the complexity of the conflict and the eventual necessity of compromise, despite the governments’ failure to do so.
4. Changing the nature of media would require more attention from international donors and, more importantly, political will from national governments. Civil society, too, can play a significant role in mobilising its efforts and creating alternative media sources, internet and print, which would provide opportunities for interactive discussion of issues usually not tackled by the official, government-controlled media.
5. Civil society should continue engaging youth in peacebuilding activities and attempt to organise not simply ad hoc meetings, but longer term projects where the same groups meet regularly throughout the year and discuss and brainstorm the contending issues. This will provide the opportunity for youth to connect with each other and slowly

⁵⁰⁰ Black, "Civil Society and the Promotion of Human Security: Achievements, Limits, and Prospects." 180

⁵⁰¹ Ibid.

⁵⁰² See Seng, "Non-Official Diplomacy in Southeast Asia: "Civil Society" or "Civil Service"?" 379

overcome the preconceived notion of seeing the other as the enemy. Conducting similar activities with other age or sex groups, or among journalists, civil activists or scholars, should be aimed at diffusing the 'enemy' image and helping the conflicting societies look for constructive solutions.

6. Respected think tanks and research institutes in [zones of conflict such as] Armenia and Azerbaijan should seek opportunities to launch joint research initiatives, involving scholars from both countries and producing policy or white papers intended for their respective governments.
7. Grassroots organisations and relevant NGOs should aim at building capacity to support and/or implement educational programs for youth on peacebuilding and conflict prevention and resolution.
8. Civil society should aim to establish closer contacts with the media or invest time, effort and finances in creating independent media sources to ensure regular and informed coverage of issues and the work of civil society in the context of national reconstruction and rehabilitation.⁵⁰³

These recommendations are only some that could be suggested to promote improvement in the way that CSOs engage in diplomacy. This is significant because it does demonstrate that CSOs can have a more robust role in the field in the future. As political institutions continue to develop the mechanisms and structures to allow for productive engagement from CSOs, the potential benefits from CSO involvement in diplomacy will continue to grow. In conjunction with IGOs and NGOs, CSOs are an increasingly important actor to consider in the future of diplomacy, and the state needs to continue to learn how to engage with them effectively. Importantly for this thesis, these recommendations provide areas for future engagement in the area of faith-based diplomacy if indeed these CSOs are either faith-based or operate on an interfaith basis.

Individuals

To this point in the chapter, the role of nonstate organisations has been examined to evaluate how they have influenced the study and practice of diplomacy. At a more foundational level, observers are beginning to study the impact that the individual can have on diplomacy. In the

⁵⁰³ Ghaplanyan, "Empowering and Engaging Civil Society in Conflict Resolution: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh." 101-102

current international environment, “the individual citizen – the private person – also is in a position to challenge state control” with high profile cases such as Edward Snowden demonstrating that platforms exist for the individual to engage in traditionally state affairs.⁵⁰⁴ There are several ideas that suggest why the individual has emerged as a significant player in diplomacy. In 1949 James Marshall observed that foreign affairs were democratising, a phenomenon which has increasingly seen the role of the individual strengthen.⁵⁰⁵ He proposed that if people, rather than the state, formed the foundation of goodwill, then people should become active participants in the expression of international goodwill.⁵⁰⁶ When it comes to diplomacy and maintaining peace, states “must now speak the minds of citizen diplomats, of great masses of people, rather than of dynasties, political parties, or ruling groups”.⁵⁰⁷ This attitude emerged following the Second World War, and has gained support in different areas since. An example of a more recent push to see the role of the individual enhanced was the anti-globalisation movements at the turn of the Century. These movements “highlight the critical importance of citizens’ perspectives of global politics” which seek to transform existing conditions of the global system.⁵⁰⁸ One implication of this movement is that citizens would express their trust or mistrust of other states, which ultimately affected the preferences of foreign policy objectives as a result.⁵⁰⁹ The individual, therefore, merits study as a potential actor on the international stage.

There is a simple argument to be made about the role of the individual in diplomacy. Irrespective of whether the state is the primary diplomatic actor, the actual operation and function of diplomacy is carried out by an individual – the diplomat.⁵¹⁰ In examining this concept, Faizullaev argues that the state cannot be reduced to structural units and functions, but “on an individual level, people experience the state as a living being and personalised phenomenon, as a unitary and purposeful actor with distinctive selfhood”.⁵¹¹ This entity then

⁵⁰⁴ Henrikson, "Sovereignty, Diplomacy, and Democracy: The Changing Character of "International" Representation- from State to Self?." 132-3

⁵⁰⁵ James Marshall, "International Affairs: Citizen Diplomacy," *The American Political Science Review* 43, no. 1 (1949). 86

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid. 90

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid. 90

⁵⁰⁸ Machida, "Globalization and the Legitimacy of Intergovernmental Organizations." 372

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁵¹⁰ An interesting debate within this area is the role of heads of state and their capacity to act as diplomats. Indeed, leaders often shape their foreign policies and represent those interests globally, usually through Summits. This notion of ‘summitry diplomacy’ does, however, demonstrate that the individual can have significant influence on the diplomatic process. See David H. Dunn, *Diplomacy at the Highest Level: The Evolution of International Summitry* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996).

⁵¹¹ Alisher Faizullaev, "Diplomacy and Self," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 17, no. 3 (2006). 517

translates to the diplomats who represent that state, essentially individualising that experience. This enhances the role of the individual when considering state-centric diplomacy. However, “diplomacy is not just an operational tool of foreign policy, but a personal art too”.⁵¹² The diplomat’s individual personality intersects with their diplomatic performance. The more complex point that Faizullaev makes is that “the diplomatic self, on the one hand, is part of the personhood of a diplomat, but on the other hand, it is also part of the state personhood”.⁵¹³ This is the outcome of the personal self-merging with the identity assumed by representing the state,⁵¹⁴ thereby concluding that the state and the individual identity are compatible. This validates the deepened understanding of the role of the individual in international relations. The functions of the diplomat, however, are seen as operating on the individual level. For example, from Henrikson’s perspective, the individual has some control over how they are represented, and also the platforms on which to engage for global representation.⁵¹⁵ If the individual can fulfil the diplomatic functions outside the locus of the state, then their potential role in diplomacy should be taken more seriously. To demonstrate how the individual has engaged in the theory and practice of diplomacy, two areas of individual diplomacy – that of citizen diplomacy and celebrity diplomacy – will now be examined.

The concept of citizen diplomacy has changed the participation and form of diplomacy. Paul Sharp suggests four broad types of citizen diplomats. The first is the conventional understanding of the citizen diplomat, where the citizen is “a go-between, representing to one another countries that find direct and open communication difficult”.⁵¹⁶ Private citizens may be used in this sense to preserve secrecy, avoid official status, and avoid embarrassment, or as a way to utilise the citizen’s expertise on an issue, or as a result of personal relationships with political leaders.⁵¹⁷ Each of these potential outcomes places the individual in an important position when engaging in diplomacy. The second type of citizen diplomat that Sharp defines is the idea of citizen diplomacy “as a representative for a sectoral, regional, or local economic interest”.⁵¹⁸ Individuals act as consultants to represent the interests and needs of the local community they represent. The third conception of citizen diplomats entails their ability to

⁵¹² Ibid. 517

⁵¹³ Ibid. 501

⁵¹⁴ Ibid. 501

⁵¹⁵ Henrikson, "Sovereignty, Diplomacy, and Democracy: The Changing Character of "International" Representation- from State to Self?." 133

⁵¹⁶ Paul Sharp, "Making Sense of Citizen Diplomats: The People of Duluth, Minnesota, as International Actors," *International Studies Perspectives* 2, no. 2 (2001). 137

⁵¹⁷ Ibid.

⁵¹⁸ Ibid. 138

engage as lobbyists or advocates for a particular cause. Typically, citizens will lobby and campaign at a domestic level, lobbying their own government. However, “it is reasonable to suppose that the internationalisation of this sort of lobbying will increase as a result of the developments in communications and information technologies”, meaning that the citizen will have a more global scope.⁵¹⁹ This final type of citizen diplomat put forward by Sharp is “the citizen diplomat as a subverter or transformer of existing policies and/or political arrangements, domestic and/or international”.⁵²⁰ This is a high level of political engagement which does place the individual at the centre of diplomatic agreement. For example, Bishop writes in the way that individuals are able to peruse and show support for United Nations Treaties using the internet.⁵²¹ Ramseur examines the role that citizens played during Cold War tensions to address issues of nuclear testing and environmental related impacts.⁵²² Furthermore, while the International Campaign to Ban Landmines is hailed as a successful case of nongovernmental organisations impacting the international system, there is a strong presence of citizen diplomacy at work to achieve the results recognised by the institution today.⁵²³

When applying these ideas to conflict resolution, citizen diplomacy provides both sides of a conflict with the opportunity to interact with one another, potentially leading to peace. The aim is that “gradual shifts in attitudes among a critical mass of people can yield major changes in the course of conflicts”, noting importantly that “this change must come from all aspects of society – decision makers, civil society and civilians”.⁵²⁴ The transformative element of conflict resolution requires the involvement of civilians, thus presenting another opportunity for the citizen diplomat to play a noteworthy role in diplomacy. The “dominancy of themes of change and transformation in any contemporary discussion of diplomacy” has presented the opportunity for citizen diplomats to be considered more seriously in the literature of diplomacy.⁵²⁵ However, a critique is that although citizen diplomats are growing in number, they may not be sufficiently representative if they are so eclectic. This may lessen the legitimacy and influence the individual can have on the diplomatic process. Ultimately, “a

⁵¹⁹ Ibid. 139

⁵²⁰ Ibid. 140

⁵²¹ Christopher W. Bishop, "Citizen Diplomacy," *Foreign Policy*, no. 135 (2003).

⁵²² David Ramseur, *Melting the Ice Curtain: The Extraordinary Story of Citizen Diplomacy on the Russia-Alaska Frontier* (Farmington Hills: University of Alaska Press, 2017).

⁵²³ See Jody Williams et al., *Banning Landmines: Disarmament, Citizen Diplomacy, and Human Security* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008).

⁵²⁴ Aviva Shemesh, "Citizen Diplomacy - Creating a Culture of Peace: The Israeli-Palestinian Case," *Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics & Culture* 18, no. 2/3 (2012). 59

⁵²⁵ Sharp, "Making Sense of Citizen Diplomats: The People of Duluth, Minnesota, as International Actors." 144-5

diplomat with no one to represent is a diplomat who does not need to be recognised".⁵²⁶ The presence of citizen diplomats in international relations is increasing, but there are still areas of limitation that require improvement for citizen diplomats to be as effective as possible in their diplomatic endeavours.

Along with citizen diplomacy, which looks at a broader range of participants, celebrity diplomacy is a concept that is gaining more influence in the contemporary diplomatic landscape. The rise in prominence of track two forms of diplomacy has presented the opportunity for celebrities to play a role.⁵²⁷ Kissinger observed that the "revolution in global telecommunications had created a new hybrid world where politics and pop culture mixed" and so institutions would employ strategies where celebrities would become representatives and advocates for certain global issues.⁵²⁸ This approach to diplomacy has gained favour in the United Nations, forming out of Kofi Annan's conferences in 2000 and 2002, the second being titled "celebrity Advocacy for the New Millennium".⁵²⁹ The goal at this point was for celebrities to be used as a way to influence "reluctant governments to take seriously the rhetorical pledges they make during every General Assembly".⁵³⁰ This strategy has expanded within the institution with the role of Goodwill Ambassadors cementing the presence of celebrity diplomacy in the United Nations. A celebrity will demonstrate their "commitments to humanitarian causes and international issues of inequality, and other celebrities follow their lead".⁵³¹ A benefit of this approach is that it bridges the gap between generations, where celebrities can appeal to a youth audience on international, political and humanitarian issues.⁵³² Although the concept of celebrity diplomacy does garner several criticisms, when a celebrity takes an active role in advocating for particular policies in relation to global issues, the public is willing to listen to celebrities speak.⁵³³ Not only are celebrities attractive to the public, with the ability to speak eloquently and passionately, but the celebrity also "represents a collective

⁵²⁶ Ibid. 149

⁵²⁷ Mark D. Alleyne, "The United Nations' Celebrity Diplomacy," *The SAIS Review of International Affairs* 25, no. 1 (2005). 175

⁵²⁸ Ibid. 176. In the contemporary environment, this often manifests itself in the area of advocacy for international development issues, see Dan Brockington, *Celebrity Advocacy and International Development* (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2014).

⁵²⁹ Alleyne, "The United Nations' Celebrity Diplomacy." 179

⁵³⁰ Ibid. 179

⁵³¹ Emma Dwight, "Celebrity Humanitarianism Bridging the Gap," *Harvard International Review* 37, no. 3 (2016). 18

⁵³² Ibid. 18

⁵³³ Lauren Kogen, "For the Public Good or Just Good Publicity? Celebrity Diplomacy and the Ethics of Representation," *Mass Communication & Society* 18, no. 1 (2015). 38

identity of the public in which an articulation of culture is embodied”.⁵³⁴ This may give celebrities a position to engage in global issues through diplomacy, but there are several limitations that must be taken into consideration when deciding on the effectiveness of this as a diplomatic strategy.

While UN programs that utilise celebrities to avoid upsetting member states can be helpful to communicate a message, such a strategy can be criticised as an instrument of propaganda.⁵³⁵ Actors such as Liam Neeson, performers such as Katy Perry and athletes like Serena Williams have all been named Ambassadors by UNICEF⁵³⁶ due to their talents and achievements, but mostly due to their “commitment to improving the lives of children worldwide”.⁵³⁷ The strategy may be convenient “but this maxim should be subjected to careful interrogation” to ensure that it is genuine in its pursuits and outcomes.⁵³⁸ The public should not uncritically accept the celebrity-conveyed message, but see celebrities “as legitimate, educated, and aware individuals, not just superficial entertainers”.⁵³⁹ This is a significant limitation to the perceptions of celebrities in this position. The legitimacy of celebrities who speak with authority on development and other international issues must be questioned. One reason for this is because “celebrities lack a mandate to become active in global politics”.⁵⁴⁰ Another reason is that celebrities are often self-appointed to these positions, where their own personal credibility is the source of their legitimacy.⁵⁴¹ The message presented by the celebrity must also result in substantive change in the issues to which they are responding. If the improvement of governance and development is a goal, the constant proliferation of celebrity diplomats could bring about a trivialisation of development challenges, and the consequences of this are detrimental to achieving the desired change.⁵⁴² Some studies suggest that the overall impact of celebrity diplomats can be quite negative. When celebrity diplomats speak on behalf of victims, Kogen suggests that they do a disservice to the victims they represent by “entrenching historical narratives of the other as a child, a victim, and politically underdeveloped, and the United States as saviour and hero; and narrowly defining for viewers how they can engage politically with

⁵³⁴ Ibid. 39

⁵³⁵ Alleyne, "The United Nations' Celebrity Diplomacy." 175-6

⁵³⁶ The United Nations Children's Emergency Fund

⁵³⁷ UNICEF, "Goodwill Ambassadors & Advocates," https://www.unicef.org/people/people_ambassadors.html

⁵³⁸ Alleyne, "The United Nations' Celebrity Diplomacy."

⁵³⁹ Dwight, "Celebrity Humanitarianism Bridging the Gap." 18-19

⁵⁴⁰ Heribert Dieter and Rajiv Kumar, "The Downside of Celebrity Diplomacy: The Neglected Complexity of Development," *Global Governance* 14, no. 3 (2008). 262

⁵⁴¹ Ibid.

⁵⁴² Ibid. 263

the global other".⁵⁴³ These limitations have severe consequences and thus must be considered when celebrity diplomats are being employed to achieve foreign policy goals.

The potential drawbacks of celebrity diplomacy must be emphasized when celebrities are used to engage in high-level political decision making. Regardless of the limitations, the presence of celebrity and citizen diplomats does recognise that in this globalised international system, the individual does have the platform and potential to engage diplomatically. Perhaps most poignantly, individuals are able to make complex global issues accessible. An individual speaking on development concerns in their community, for example, localises and personalizes a typically complex debate, which can foster global support and enhance shared understanding on issues. Mechanisms and structures are already in place, such as at the United Nations and its various agencies, which allow individuals to become a part of the diplomatic process. This is a reflection of the changing nature of the diplomatic system, where individuals and other nonstate actors are challenging the unitary strength of the state.

Conclusion

Chapters 3 and 4 have focused on the shift in the study and practice of diplomacy since its traditional foundation. The scholarship on diplomacy has transitioned from a positivist to a post-positivist approach, enabling scholars to consider the role of nonstate actors in international relations. Thus, the emergence of theory in new and innovative diplomacy garnered support in Diplomacy Studies. The theory established several different goals for diplomacy, but importantly created scope for other actors to engage in the diplomatic process. This chapter then introduced notable nonstate actors that have entered the diplomatic landscape, namely IGOs, NGOs, CSOs and individuals. The purpose of considering these actors is to understand what they are and how they engage in diplomacy. Later in this thesis, each of these actors will be assessed in terms of the way they engage in faith-based diplomacy – however, it is important to have established how these actors impact diplomacy as a whole. In doing so, this chapter has prepared the ground for examining how nonstate actors in new and innovative diplomacy can deal with the challenges presented by religion in the contemporary international system.

⁵⁴³ Kogen, "For the Public Good or Just Good Publicity? Celebrity Diplomacy and the Ethics of Representation." 54

CHAPTER FIVE

The Context and Framing of Faith-based Diplomacy

Having examined the traditional, new, and innovative schools of diplomacy, the following chapters will explore the concept of faith-based diplomacy to understand its place as a theory within the context of Diplomacy Studies. This is performed in five stages. The first (the current chapter) will explore the wider context of faith-based diplomacy. The second (Chapter 6) will undertake an overview of faith-based diplomacy as it exists to date. The third (Chapter 7) will examine the impact of faith-based diplomacy in scholarship and theory. The fourth (Chapter 8) will apply faith-based diplomacy to other frames of analysis. The final and ninth chapter of the examination of faith-based diplomacy provides a summary of key findings and a proposal of the central tenets of faith-based diplomacy as a theory.

Introduction

The study of faith-based diplomacy is complex and multifaceted. Understanding the intersection between significant areas of study such as politics, diplomacy, the state, religion, and faith, represents a task with which scholars have been re-engaging in recent times. Complexity is no reason for this field of study to be neglected. Studies have highlighted that intervention in future conflicts will be based more on moral and ethical justifications, and yet the opportunity for religion to be seen as a force for positive engagement is strikingly absent in the literature.⁵⁴⁴ Following the dramatic events of September 11, 2001, religious tension has contributed to violence in the United States, Western Europe and the Middle East, indicating the challenges posed by religious conflict are global in scope.⁵⁴⁵ Usually, if academic attention is given to the study of religion in diplomacy, it looks at “extremist beliefs and actions of a

⁵⁴⁴ Burnett, "Implications for the Foreign Policy Community," 292. This absence is also evident in D. M. Johnston, "Religion and Conflict-Resolution," *Notre Dame Law Rev.* 67, no. 5 (1992); and Richard Friedli, "Religious Dimensions in Conflict Transformation: A Tentative Approach toward a Reconciliation Methodology" in *Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution* ed. Martin Leiner and Christine Schliesser (United States: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). See specifically chapter 2, 'Blind Spots and Blowback: Why Culture and Religion were Marginalized in International Relations Theory' in Scott M. Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations the Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century*, Culture and Religion in International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). Also, with reference to the potential for negotiated agreements when conflict parties are religious, see Isak Svensson, "Fighting with Faith," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51, no. 6 (2007).

⁵⁴⁵ See, for example, Paul Sharp, "Crazy Religion Diplomacy," in *Diplomatic Theory of International Relations* (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 243

minority, rather than the ways it guides and inspires the majority and can be harnessed for good”.⁵⁴⁶ This thesis aims to contribute to the latter. As Madelaine Albright states, “religion is a powerful force” that is indeed “a subject worth studying”.⁵⁴⁷ The scholarly investigation of faith in diplomacy has accelerated in part due to change in the very nature of conflict itself. The change has become noticeable as conflict is derived from communal identity which is informed by religion.⁵⁴⁸ As a result, religion takes a central role in much of contemporary conflict.⁵⁴⁹ Yet, “policymakers, diplomats, journalists, and scholars... are still in the habit of disregarding the role of religion, religious institutions, and religious motivations in explaining politics and conflict”.⁵⁵⁰ If, however, as Huston Smith asserts, “the surest way to the heart of a people is through their faith”, then the field is ripe for understanding how faith can positively engage with diplomacy.⁵⁵¹ The question arises, why has religion as a positive force in this field been ignored? Luttwak explains that,

One is therefore confronted with a learned repugnance to contend intellectually with all that is religion or belongs to it – a complex inhibition compounded out of the peculiar embarrassment that many feel when faced by explicit manifestations of seriously religious sentiment; out of the mistaken Enlightenment predication that the progress of knowledge and the influence of religion were mutually exclusive, making the latter a waning force; and sometimes out of a wilful cynicism that illegitimately claims the virtue of realism.⁵⁵²

If ignorance of religion has been learned and reinforced, then it is possible that the addition of religion into scholarship can also be learned and reinforced. However, this shift - to engage in critical scholarship and integrate faith into the practice of diplomacy - is, as Seib notes, both simple and profound. He states that it is “simple in its common sense and profound in its implicit challenge to the commitment to secularism that pervades the diplomacy of the United States and many other states”.⁵⁵³ With the knowledge that the world is increasingly shaped by

⁵⁴⁶ Sheherazade Jafari, "Local Religious Peacemakers: An Untapped Resource in U.S. Foreign Policy," *Journal of International Affairs* 61, no. 1 (2007). 111

⁵⁴⁷ Albright, "Faith and Diplomacy." 3

⁵⁴⁸ Johnston, "Introduction: Beyond Power Politics." 3

⁵⁴⁹ Johnston, "Introduction: Real Politik Expanded." 5

⁵⁵⁰ Edward Luttwak, "The Missing Dimension," in *Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft*, ed. Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 9

⁵⁵¹ Johnston, "Introduction: Real Politik Expanded." 4

⁵⁵² Luttwak, "The Missing Dimension." 9

⁵⁵³ Philip Seib, "Introduction," in *Religion and Public Diplomacy*, ed. Philip Seib (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

religion, observers have noted that the success of diplomacy is going to be found in the ability of diplomatic institutions to understand and connect with people whose identity is defined by religion.⁵⁵⁴ As the international system has experienced the mass-movement of people around the world as a product of globalisation, people are crossing borders with their own religious traditions and values.⁵⁵⁵ This has highlighted the need for scholars to pay closer attention to the field as the religious dimension of how people live cannot be marginalised.⁵⁵⁶

In the literature, there has emerged across numerous disciplines a recognition of the need to bypass conventional ideas about “modernity and secularity”, as “the intertwined relationship between religion and politics poses new puzzles”.⁵⁵⁷ While recognition of the neglect of religion in the International Relations literature is to be applauded, the danger still exists that “religion is topically recognised” and “is still often substantively misrecognised”.⁵⁵⁸ In the contemporary field of Diplomacy Studies, scholars echo the words of Victor Hugo, stating that faith-based diplomacy is “an idea whose time has come”.⁵⁵⁹ Before engaging with the concept of faith-based diplomacy itself, this chapter will endeavour to settle some fundamental contextual concerns. The first section will evaluate the changing nature of conflict and conflict resolution in light of the contemporary international system and the role that religion has within it. The following section will outline the complexities of religion by contending with the definition of religion and faith while also extrapolating on some of religion’s central characteristics. Before fully exploring faith-based diplomacy, attention is drawn to the notion of secularisation and its impact on the international system and the field of Diplomacy Studies. The final section of this chapter will examine the rise or re-emergence of religion in the 21st Century, thus establishing the foundation for analysis in faith-based diplomacy.

The Changing Nature of Conflict

The changing nature of conflict in the post-Cold War international system is an integral element of the construction of faith-based diplomacy. It is widely recognised by observers that

⁵⁵⁴ Liora Danan, "Shaping the Narrative of Religious Freedom," *ibid.* 181

⁵⁵⁵ Kerry, "Religion and Diplomacy. (Cover Story)." 14

⁵⁵⁶ Seib, "Introduction." 1

⁵⁵⁷ Jonathan C. Agensky, "Recognizing Religion: Politics, History, and the “Long 19th Century”," *European Journal of International Relations* 23, no. 4 (2017). 730

⁵⁵⁸ *Ibid.* 730

⁵⁵⁹ Brian Cox and Daniel Philpott, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: An Ancient Idea Newly Emergent," *Brandywine Review of Faith & International Affairs* 1, no. 2 (2003). 39

religion and religious affiliation does have a divisive character that can fuel conflict, even at the social level.⁵⁶⁰ Resultantly, religion has become a central feature to many of the conflicts around the globe.⁵⁶¹ These conflicts are “intractable, identity-based conflicts that exceed the grasp of traditional diplomacy”, and manifest as ethnic, tribal, or religious conflicts.⁵⁶² This form of conflict reveals the insufficiencies of traditional diplomacy in what Sharp describes as “the nightmare of the Westphalian story of religion and diplomacy”.⁵⁶³ The ‘nightmare’ occurs when “at least one party makes non-negotiable, faith-based claims upon others, enjoys considerable capacity to affect them, and acts in a way which appears to bear no relation to the moral precepts of its own faith”.⁵⁶⁴ This has far-reaching implications as the younger generation will be drawn to view that religion through the frame of conflict, not by its spiritual enrichment.⁵⁶⁵ It is within these spiritual depths that the individual is able to find the positive elements of faith that counter violent conflict. If this trend continues, a cycle of religiously motivated violence can become protracted in societies. These resurgent cultural identities entrench divisions and exacerbate ethnic conflicts.⁵⁶⁶

This is not only limited to the societal level. Koesel suggests that religious majorities and minorities, as well as religious actors have cooperated throughout history with authoritarian state officials, meaning that the impact of religion and conflict can affect multiple structures in the international system.⁵⁶⁷ Not all religions, however, are the same in this respect. As a result, the way that religion may have changed the nature of conflict is different depending on the religion in question. For example, inclusivist religions are “less likely to prompt the type of large-scale violence that has come to be associated with religious war”.⁵⁶⁸ Furthermore, different regions of the world have experienced different patterns of religious war.⁵⁶⁹ Kang defines religious war as “a war in which religious belief or practice or the use of religious ideas

⁵⁶⁰ Johnston, "Introduction: Beyond Power Politics." Johnston, "Introduction: Beyond Power Politics." 4; Sharp, "Crazy Religion Diplomacy." 249

⁵⁶¹ Johnston, "Introduction: Real Politik Expanded." 4

⁵⁶² "An Asymmetric Counter to the Asymmetric Threat," *American Foreign Policy Interests* 35, no. 1 (2013). 10

⁵⁶³ Sharp, "Crazy Religion Diplomacy." 250

⁵⁶⁴ Ibid. 250

⁵⁶⁵ Appleby, "Retrieving the Missing Dimension of Statecraft: Religious Faith in the Service of Peacebuilding." 237

⁵⁶⁶ James H. Billington, "Religion and Russia's Future," *Review of Faith & International Affairs* 7, no. 2 (2009). 9

⁵⁶⁷ Karrie J. Koesel, "Religion and the Regime: Cooperation and Conflict in Contemporary Russia and China," *World Politics* 69, no. 4 (2017). 701-2

⁵⁶⁸ David C. Kang, "Why Was There No Religious War in Premodern East Asia?," *European Journal of International Relations* 20, no. 4 (2014). 967

⁵⁶⁹ Ibid. 981

or symbols are either a central or peripheral issue in the conflict".⁵⁷⁰ In a post-September 11 society, where terrorism is a key antagonist to global security, conflict with religion as a factor has continued to fester in these conditions.⁵⁷¹ Johnston posits four reasons for religious conflict's intensification:

1. Economic globalisation produces profound confrontations with traditional values, often embedded in religion;
2. An increasing fraction of the world's population is left behind by rapid technological change;
3. The economic gap continues to widen between the "haves and have nots", and;
4. Secular governments in hard-pressed areas fail to meet the legitimate expectations of their populations.⁵⁷²

Fundamentally the nature of conflict has changed and therefore by extension conflict resolution methodologies have also evolved.

The Changing Nature of Conflict Resolution

A key feature of successful conflict resolution is the active role of effective diplomacy. However, the changing nature of conflict has impacted the broader field of conflict resolution. As conflicts have become increasingly more identity-based, the resolution process for this type of conflict is "not well understood by practical-minded diplomats accustomed to operating in the old East-West context of nation-state politics".⁵⁷³ The seriousness of the West's inability to manage religious differences in conflict resolution will only continue to intensify. In the scope of traditional diplomacy, the rational-actor framework is being stretched to consider elements of reconciliation, unofficial channels of diplomacy and societal reconciliation.⁵⁷⁴ This sees conflicts exceed the grasp of traditional diplomacy. The frameworks of conflict resolution are indeed being tested.

⁵⁷⁰ Ibid. 968

⁵⁷¹ Loram Gerstbauer, "Faith in Religion's Reconciling Power," *Brandywine Review of Faith & International Affairs* 2, no. 2 (2004). 50

⁵⁷² Douglas M. Johnston, "Religion and Foreign Policy," in *Forgiveness and Reconciliation: Religion, Public Policy and Conflict Transformation*, ed. Raymond G. Helmick and Rodney L. Peterson (Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation Press, 2002).

⁵⁷³ Johnston, "Introduction: Beyond Power Politics." 3

⁵⁷⁴ Johnston, "Introduction: Real Politik Expanded." 7

In this study, the scope of conflict resolution is applied to conflicts where violence contains religious elements, or the conflict resolution features some form of religious involvement. This is most apparent in conflicts where religion is a determining factor of the violence, yet increasingly there is a role for religious actors as mediators of conflict resolution even if religion was not principally involved in the conflict.⁵⁷⁵ Historically, the emotional or spiritual element of an individual or community is merely tolerated in conflict resolution. However, the recognition of the spiritual needs of the parties involved can enhance the effectiveness of the resolution process.⁵⁷⁶ The new mechanisms of conflict resolution extend beyond the state-centric approach or the involvement of a religious individual, but now also consider the role of institutions, non-state actors and other constructs in international relations that have a space for faith-based engagement.⁵⁷⁷ These emotional and spiritual stakes of the parties involved in conflict resolution are “deeply rooted in history, and their respective interpretations of first principles such as self-determination, justice and freedom”.⁵⁷⁸ Thus, at a micro level of conflict resolution, religion must become a part of the solution of intractable conflicts.⁵⁷⁹ The ability to see virtues and ethics in religious tradition has the capacity to foster conflict transformation.⁵⁸⁰

Scholarship accepts that religion and religious beliefs can contribute to conflict; however, the literature is now exploring the notion that religious principles might be used to ease conflict as well.⁵⁸¹ A challenge to resolving conflicts of a religious nature is entrenched in what scholars have called ‘theological overattribution’, that is, “the tendency to attribute all hostility to the theology of an unfamiliar religion”.⁵⁸² This continues to highlight the relatively unknown nature of religion in conflict, which limits the effectiveness of conflict resolution. To move to a “just and peaceful settlement” in resolving a conflict, it is necessary to “address a conflict’s religious aspects” to provide a resolution that is “consistent with each side’s religious

⁵⁷⁵ Appleby, "Retrieving the Missing Dimension of Statecraft: Religious Faith in the Service of Peacebuilding." 239

⁵⁷⁶ Marc Gopin, "When the Fighting Stops: Healing Hearts with Spiritual Peacemaking," in *Religion and Security: The New Nexus in International Relations*, ed. Robert A. Seiple, and Hoover, Dennis R. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005). 134

⁵⁷⁷ Johnston, "Religion and Foreign Policy."

⁵⁷⁸ Johnston, "Introduction: Beyond Power Politics." 3

⁵⁷⁹ Johnston, "An Asymmetric Counter to the Asymmetric Threat." 10

⁵⁸⁰ Troy, "Faith-Based Diplomacy under Examination." 217

⁵⁸¹ Albright, "Faith and Diplomacy." 4. See also O. Ramsbotham, H. Miall, and T. Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* (Wiley, 2011). 332-346; Marc Gopin, "Religion, Violence, and Conflict Resolution," *Peace & Change* 22, no. 1 (1997); and, for a practical approach, see for example Mohammed Abu-Nimer, "Conflict Resolution, Culture, and Religion: Toward a Training Model of Interreligious Peacebuilding," *Journal of Peace Research* 38, no. 6 (2001).

⁵⁸² Otis, "Religion and War in the Twenty-First Century." 15

imperatives".⁵⁸³ This trend is supported by research that suggests the significant influence religious freedom has on the achievement of transitional justice.⁵⁸⁴ Concepts such as religious freedom are becoming increasingly important in the analysis of conflict resolution for its ability to assist in conflict prevention, mitigation and support national stability.⁵⁸⁵ This is an example of one of the many ways that there has been a transformation in the conflict resolution approach.

In a standard form of conflict resolution, conflicting parties would engage in a bilateral process of communication and negotiation in the pursuit of peace and justice. When a party of a religious disposition then engages in this bilateral process as a mediator, they assume the role of a peacemaker – a bridge between two communities – that does not victimise the ‘other’, but rather senses a common humanity or origin under God.⁵⁸⁶ However, just being religious does not immediately mean successful peacemaking as “not every leader claiming to work for peace successfully reaches opposing parties and resolves conflicts”.⁵⁸⁷ This then remains a critical task of foreign service officers, so that they learn how to identify effective religious peacemakers from the community to engage in the resolution process.⁵⁸⁸ The religious peacemaker must be able to dissect the meaning of religious symbols, rituals, traditions and meanings, and how these elements pervade through a community.⁵⁸⁹ Whether this be in the form of official mediation, or nonofficial diplomacy, third-party interveners have often changed the configuration of negotiations.⁵⁹⁰

This has been a challenge to the field of conflict resolution. In the traditional sense, states and even international organisations were the central and primary feature of the conflict resolution process. However, an “observable expansion of the role played by citizens outside of government – religious figures and spiritually motivated laypersons among them – in the conduct of various forms of mediation and conflict resolution” has occurred.⁵⁹¹ This is where the use of multiple tracks of diplomacy for the purposes of conflict resolution has come into

⁵⁸³ Johnston and Cox, "Faith-Based Diplomacy and Preventive Engagement." 12

⁵⁸⁴ Daniel Philpott, "Religious Freedom and Peacebuilding: May I Introduce You Two?," *Review of Faith & International Affairs* 11, no. 1 (2013). 396

⁵⁸⁵ Danan, "Shaping the Narrative of Religious Freedom." 185

⁵⁸⁶ Marc Gopin, "Judaism and Peacebuilding in the Context of Middle Eastern Conflict," in *Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik*, ed. Douglas M. Johnston (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 112

⁵⁸⁷ Jafari, "Local Religious Peacemakers: An Untapped Resource in U.S. Foreign Policy." 122

⁵⁸⁸ *Ibid.* 125

⁵⁸⁹ Najeeba Sayeed-Miller, "Public Diplomacy and Transnational Cases of Blasphemy," in *Religion and Public Diplomacy*, ed. Philip Seib (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 100

⁵⁹⁰ Johnston, "Introduction: Beyond Power Politics." 4

⁵⁹¹ *Ibid.* 3-4

evaluation within faith-based diplomacy.⁵⁹² A mediator adopting a faith-based approach has the ability to “draw from unique social-psychological emotions and perceptions” to understand religious convictions and behaviours “for the purposes of peacebuilding” which address the deep-rooted elements of conflict.⁵⁹³ Religious actors are especially valued for their possible contribution to the conflict resolution process when it reaches the impasse stage, typically once the high political agenda points – politics, economics and security – have been resolved.⁵⁹⁴ This role can expand beyond being just a negotiating mechanism, and move toward the introduction of “the authority of religion” which means that parties are not conceding to antagonists, but rather to that religious authority.⁵⁹⁵ As religious leaders are often perceived as acting in good faith, they are often viewed as representatives of communities, thus strengthening their potential authority. This has led some scholars to critique how faith-based diplomacy utilises religious authority because it may be seen as a challenge to political authority, especially if it is motivated by a political will.

As a theoretical approach in the conflict resolution field, peacebuilding has been gaining influence. Peacebuilding is considered as the “holistic efforts to build sustainable, positive peace in a society or relationship between societies” – which has yet to fully appreciate the role that religion can play in aspiring toward holism.⁵⁹⁶ At the core, however, theorists of faith-based diplomacy see that there is “common ground in different religions’ approaches to peace, respect, opposition to killing, and the capacity to reach out to those of other faiths to resolve conflict”, and these ideas form a strong basis upon which to develop.⁵⁹⁷

Beyond the mechanisms for resolution and the role of actors within that process, religions themselves represent a rich source of advice in building peace and resolving conflict. The field of conflict resolution still focuses on religion in relation to conflict, though it is promising to observe that scholars are beginning to pay attention to “religion as a site of reconciliation”.⁵⁹⁸ The notion of reconciliation, both in terms of when conflict threatens or after

⁵⁹² Johnston, "Looking Ahead: Toward a New Paradigm." 329

⁵⁹³ Naomi Johnstone and Isak Svensson, "Belligerents and Believers: Exploring Faith-Based Mediation in Internal Armed Conflicts," *Politics, Religion & Ideology* 14, no. 4 (2013). 561-2

⁵⁹⁴ Johnston, "Review of the Findings." 265

⁵⁹⁵ Luttwak, "The Missing Dimension." 17

⁵⁹⁶ Philpott, "Religious Freedom and Peacebuilding: May I Introduce You Two?." 31

⁵⁹⁷ Lee Marsden, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: Conservative Evangelicals and the United States Military," *Politics and Religion* 7, no. 3 (2014). 494. The basis of commonalities across major religions is evident in Küng, *A Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics*.

⁵⁹⁸ John D. Brewer, Gareth I. Higgins, and Francis Teeney, "Religion and Peacemaking: A Conceptualization," *Sociology* 44, no. 6 (2010). 1020

it occurs, is a principle fostered in many religious traditions.⁵⁹⁹ This, in theory, follows the constructivist approach to resolving conflict by utilising reconciliation as a tool to achieve progress.⁶⁰⁰ The role of conflict reconciliation is now being recognised as an effective counter to religious fanaticism.⁶⁰¹ A difficulty in resolving extremist conflict is effectively countering “the ideas behind the guns” where hard power has only exacerbated the cycle of revenge that has mobilised those engaged in politically motivated violence and expanded their base of support.⁶⁰² Reconciliation in conflict resolution is a restorative process that impacts every level of society, particularly the grassroots, and requires “a broader array of roles than those normally associated with traditional diplomacy”.⁶⁰³ This shift sees the diplomat acting in roles including an “impartial observer to message carrier to advocate to activist” which are all strengthened by a sense of moral authority.⁶⁰⁴

Reconciliation is not the only value that is leveraged in conflict resolution. There is a depth of hope and positive aspiration that religious peacemakers can provide, breaking through the intractable nature of conflict.⁶⁰⁵ Incorporating reconciliation, hope, compassion and forgiveness into conflict resolution has assisted in the development of diplomatic techniques to aid in the peaceful settlements of conflict.⁶⁰⁶ Although this is beneficial to the faith-based diplomacy approach, researchers are developing the tool more as a way to achieve reconciliation in and of itself, which can move beyond the scope of conflict resolution.⁶⁰⁷ This difficulty does demonstrate the complexity of effective conflict resolution mechanisms and also highlights the need for a comprehensive strategy when employing a faith-based approach. It is undeniable that, as a result of the changes in the nature of conflict, conflict resolution theory and practice has had to adapt with mechanisms and theories that can effectively integrate the constructive engagement of religion. This is where faith-based diplomacy has found favour.

⁵⁹⁹ R. Scott Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000). 8

⁶⁰⁰ Gopin, "Judaism and Peacebuilding in the Context of Middle Eastern Conflict." 97

⁶⁰¹ Johnston, "Introduction: Real Politik Expanded." 6

⁶⁰² "An Asymmetric Counter to the Asymmetric Threat." 13-14

⁶⁰³ *Religion, Terror and Error: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual Engagement*. 56

⁶⁰⁴ Johnston and Cox, "Faith-Based Diplomacy and Preventive Engagement." 16

⁶⁰⁵ David A. Steele, "Christianity in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo: From Ethnic Captive to Reconciling Agent," *ibid.* 165

⁶⁰⁶ Troy, "Faith-Based Diplomacy under Examination." 209

⁶⁰⁷ *Ibid.* 228

Defining Religion, Spirituality and Faith

The concept of religion has not hitherto been defined or evaluated within this thesis. This section will endeavour to perform the complex task of operationally defining religion, and other related terms such as spirituality and faith. International Relations tends to use the terms religion and faith interchangeably, which reflects the usage of the term found in the mainstream literature. Scholars, however, have discussed the nuances of these terms and the related issues in defining what they mean. This is supported by the work of Zinnbauer et al. who highlight that the conceptualisation and usage of faith, spirituality and religion is not consistently applied in current research.⁶⁰⁸ They describe the result of this confusion as ‘fuzziness’ which may prove disadvantageous for legitimate social science research.⁶⁰⁹ This section will explore the definitions provided by scholars to explain the implications of these definitions in theory and practice.

Religion has been an evident phenomenon in human history for millennia. *Religio*, in a general sense, to Ancient Rome meant “fear of the preternatural”. It emphasised maintaining relationships of peace between the Roman gods and the human world, particularly in times of crisis or victory.⁶¹⁰ In the Middle Ages it referred to “the consecrated life of nuns, monks and friars”, and then after the Reformation, religion began to take a form as it is known today.⁶¹¹ The scholarship on religion and international politics aligns with the early modernity of the international system from the late 15th to early 18th centuries.⁶¹² During this time there was a decline in, and a withdrawal of, religious power from the public to the private sphere, even though this was at first fiercely contested and largely due to the resultant ferocity of the wars of religion that had embroiled much of Europe.⁶¹³ While the notion of secularisation will be elaborated below, it is noteworthy that this is where the scholarship surrounding the current understanding of religion began to emerge. The study of religion itself has been defined as “a scholarly enterprise without an identity, one that lacks any widely shared understanding of its central topic, or of the methods appropriate to the study of this topic”.⁶¹⁴ This explains why the

⁶⁰⁸ Brian J. Zinnbauer et al., "Religion and Spirituality: Unfuzzifying the Fuzzy," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 36, no. 4 (1997). 549-564

⁶⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁶¹⁰ See E.M. Orlin, *Temples, Religion, and Politics in the Roman Republic* (Brill Academic, 2002). And P. Brown, *Authority and the Sacred: Aspects of the Christianisation of the Roman World* (Cambridge University Press, 1997).

⁶¹¹ William Charlton, "Religion, Society and Secular Values," *Philosophy* 91, no. 3 (2016). 321-2

⁶¹² Agensky, "Recognizing Religion: Politics, History, and the “Long 19th Century”." 738

⁶¹³ Ibid. 738

⁶¹⁴ Nukhet A. Sandal and Patrick James, "Religion and International Relations Theory: Towards a Mutual Understanding," *ibid.* 17, no. 1 (2011). 6

definition of religion is contested by scholars and by separate fields of inquiry and has evolved since frameworks began being tested in the 17th Century.⁶¹⁵

In simple terms, “religion is meant to imply an institutional framework within which specific theological doctrines and practices are advocated and pursued, usually among a community of like-minded believers”.⁶¹⁶ Religion “fills a central social function in most societies in the world” where places of worship, congregations, and communities “constitute a substantial part of the civil society”.⁶¹⁷ Appleby expands on this concept, noting that “religions inhabit a unique social location, display a powerful and pervasive institutional presence, and exercise significant cultural power”.⁶¹⁸ The way that religious leaders engage in this process has ultimately afforded them “an unparalleled legitimacy”.⁶¹⁹ Pauletta Otis considers these elements and writes an extensive definition of religion in the context of the 21st Century. This definition captures the many facets of religion, while giving explanation to its organisational manifestations. The definition also firmly sits within the scope of International Relations, making it beneficial for the elucidation of this thesis. She states:

Religion is an integrated, systematized set of beliefs, behaviours, values, institutions, modes of communication, and leadership. It institutionalizes transcendence and provides preferred patterns of behaviour for human beings in relationship both to a supernatural power and to fellow humans. It is an ideology and a set of normative behaviours reflective of that ideology. Moreover it derives from an external framework, linking individuals to the greater whole and providing formal institutions that help to define and organise that whole. It provides a meaningful worldview as well as the rules and standards of behaviour that connect individual actions and goals to the worldview. It has the ability to legitimize actions and institutions.⁶²⁰

This definition, however, can change depending on the perspective of the field to which it is applied. In a legal sense, religion has been defined by the United Kingdom Supreme Court as:

⁶¹⁵ See Peter Harrison, "Narratives of Secularization," *Intellectual History Review* 27, no. 1 (2017).

⁶¹⁶ Johnston, "Introduction: Beyond Power Politics." 4

⁶¹⁷ Appleby as cited by Johnstone and Svensson, "Belligerents and Believers: Exploring Faith-Based Mediation in Internal Armed Conflicts." 557

⁶¹⁸ Ibid. 557

⁶¹⁹ Ibid. 557

⁶²⁰ Otis, "Religion and War in the Twenty-First Century." 17

A spiritual or non-secular belief system, held by a group of adherents, which claims to explain mankind's place in the universe and relationship with the infinite and to teach its adherents how they are to live their lives in conformity with the spiritual understanding associated with that belief system.⁶²¹

From a sociological perspective, "religion is understood as a set of beliefs, symbols and practices oriented towards and demarcating the 'sacred'".⁶²² By allowing the world religions to define what they mean by the term sacred, analysis can be conducted across world religions which can bypass differences in beliefs and practices.⁶²³ This also helps to delineate the secular from the sacred.⁶²⁴ The institutional and behavioural character of religion, being religious practice, mainly derives from the scriptures or sacred texts.⁶²⁵ These beliefs and practices vary from religion to religion as "each religion is constituted by a set of stories that make up its central identity" which are then "transmitted and developed across time".⁶²⁶ This then means that religion also encompasses "a system of ideas that purport to offer a true understanding of the world and our place within it", suggesting an element of the divine first and foremost, a spiritual essence to life, and a moral code governing the lives of believers providing support for degrees of social cohesion.⁶²⁷ This is why the term religion has been coupled with terms such as movements, organisations and institutions.⁶²⁸ The variety of different perspectives do, however, share common ground across the definitions of religion, and these are the central features of religion which are important for this study.

Within contemporary scholarship, religion certainly remains a contested term. Some suggest that a better way to think about religion is that it is an adaptive phenomenon, be it at the personal level or on the larger scale of organisation and institution, "to new social, economic, political, and cultural contexts and demands".⁶²⁹ In this sense, religion goes beyond beliefs and encompasses the full spectrum of ritual, community and the patterns of people's

⁶²¹ Baroness Hale of Richmond, "Freedom of Religion and Freedom from Religion," *Ecclesiastical Law Journal* 19, no. 1 (2017). 4

⁶²² Brewer, Higgins, and Teeney, "Religion and Peacemaking: A Conceptualization." 1022

⁶²³ Ibid. 1022

⁶²⁴ Marion Maddox, "Finding God in Global Politics," *International Political Science Review* 36, no. 2 (2015). 188

⁶²⁵ Ganesh Prasad Pokhariyal, "The Influence of Religion, Technology, and Economy on Culture, Diplomacy, and Peace," *International Journal on World Peace* 32, no. 2 (2015). 44

⁶²⁶ Vendley and Little, "Implications for Religious Communities: Buddhism, Islam, Hinduism, and Christianity." 307

⁶²⁷ Sharp, "Crazy Religion Diplomacy." 248

⁶²⁸ Ibid. 248

⁶²⁹ Brie Loskota and Richard Flory, "Why Religion Still Matters in the World," in *Religion and Public Diplomacy*, ed. Philip Seib (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 18

lives.⁶³⁰ This demonstrates the broadening scope of religion in its potential application. However, when categorised in scholarship, the tendency is for categorisation of religion into (a) its features and (b) its functions.⁶³¹ Thompson sees this as problematic. He applies the concept to diplomacy and finds that “the demarcation between what a religion is and what a religion does may be unrealistic or at least unnecessary” because perceptions of the religion vary according to denomination, region, and other factors.⁶³² The rigidity of this categorisation does not allow the appropriate depth of the concept to be realised. This is perhaps why researchers have come to separate the notions of spirituality and religion, where religion remains closely associated with “a set of beliefs and practices associated with a religious tradition” and spirituality focuses on “making meaning”.⁶³³ Within this separation, there is still room for variation that appreciates the complexity of these ideas and their contribution to theory-building with religious or spiritual elements.

How the term religion is used in the construction of policy carries significant implications. Through history, some states construct policies to promote and establish an official religion or recognise a set of religions.⁶³⁴ However, identifying the importance of religion in foreign policy, for example, engages in the broadest sense of the term – looking to representations of faith and values in relation to the state.⁶³⁵ But, as Loskota and Flory highlight, it is difficult to have a “homogenised” version of religion in a “pluralistic world” and this hinders the way that religion can be included in technical theorisation and policy construction.⁶³⁶ Nonetheless, Phillips notes that religion, by virtue of its structures and normative values historically underlines the international system and constitutes international order.⁶³⁷ Yet, when applied within the theory of International Relations, religion is considered as inherently individual, institutional and irrational.⁶³⁸ Scholars like Wilson go further and posit that religion “is both individual and communal, both institutional and ideational, both irrational

⁶³⁰ Ibid. 19

⁶³¹ Livingstone Thompson, "Religion and Diplomacy," *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 10, no. 2 (2015). 197-8

⁶³² Ibid. 420

⁶³³ J. Mark Lazenby, "On “Spirituality,” “Religion,” and “Religions”: A Concept Analysis," *Palliative and Supportive Care* 8, no. 4 (2010). 469-70

⁶³⁴ For example, Indonesia’s policy of Pancasila recognises six religions. On how interfaith diplomacy in Indonesia has been achieved through the Pancasila policy, see Adrianus Sunarko Ofm, "Interfaith Dialogue and Cooperation across Faiths: The Experience of Indonesia," *Theology Today* 73, no. 1 (2016).

⁶³⁵ Philip Seib, "Religious Freedom and US Public Diplomacy," *Review of Faith & International Affairs* 11, no. 1 (2013). 251

⁶³⁶ Loskota and Flory, "Why Religion Still Matters in the World." 23

⁶³⁷ Andrew Phillips, *War, Religion and Empire: The Transformation of International Orders* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 145

⁶³⁸ Maddox, "Finding God in Global Politics." 188

and rational.”⁶³⁹ This understanding suggests that an effective engagement with religion in diplomacy can have far-reaching benefits. Gutkowski’s definition recognises religion as multifaceted and “as a form of command and/or intellectual identity, as a series of practices or rituals, as an informal or formal set of doctrines, as an articulated discourse or set of symbols, and as a worldview and/or ethical and political system”.⁶⁴⁰ This follows the argument of scholars in International Relations who warn that the thinking of religion “should shift from mutually exclusive interpretations to an interlinked set of perspectives that complement each other”.⁶⁴¹ In an attempt to achieve this complementarity, the notions of spirituality and faith will now be explored.

While the definition of religion has been well-documented in scholarship, the definition of faith and spirituality is, at least in the context of International Relations, much harder to come by. Faith or spirituality “transcends the normal parameters of organised religion, suggesting a less bounded and, at times, more far-reaching scope of human involvement”.⁶⁴² This approach looks beyond the institutional nature of religion. It considers the “foundational character of the beliefs they embody and may make manifest”, which becomes central to the way that a person, or peoples, see the world and their place within it.⁶⁴³ An example of a definition of spirituality is cited by Lazenby who states that it is “the aspect of humanity that refers to the way individuals seek and express meaning and purpose and the way they experience their connectedness to the moment, to self, to others, to nature, and to the significant or sacred”.⁶⁴⁴ One challenge encountered when defining spirituality is that “a variety of concepts, ranging from faith and meaning to religious beliefs and well-being, are reflected in measures of spirituality”.⁶⁴⁵ Therefore, understanding these terms is integral to analysing and constructing theory. Thus, spirituality and faith may be said to be central to identity, whereas religion has been linked more to the structure and institutions constructed around faith, spirituality and belief. That is why, in the study of faith-based diplomacy, the term faith is used. It suggests a precursor to the organised expression of religion in the value and belief system inherent in the individual. For the purposes of developing theory, this is most helpful as it enables flexibility in theory’s construction.

⁶³⁹ Ibid. 188

⁶⁴⁰ Marsden, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: Conservative Evangelicals and the United States Military." 476

⁶⁴¹ Sandal and James, "Religion and International Relations Theory: Towards a Mutual Understanding." 6

⁶⁴² Johnston, "Introduction: Beyond Power Politics." 4

⁶⁴³ Sharp, "Crazy Religion Diplomacy." 248

⁶⁴⁴ Lazenby, "On “Spirituality,” “Religion,” and “Religions”: A Concept Analysis." 469-70

⁶⁴⁵ Ibid. 471

Central Characteristics of Religion

With the terms religion, faith and spiritually now discussed, the definitions will be further expounded to consider the characteristics and features of religion pertinent to the study of faith and diplomacy. An important consideration to make is the linkage of religion to the construction of culture and its underpinning dynamics.⁶⁴⁶ The influence of religion in the international system is multilayered, whether it be in terms of religion itself, how religion inspires motivation, or religious institutions.⁶⁴⁷ Religion also has the ability to define the characteristics that construct a social community.⁶⁴⁸ This community is supported and enhanced in every sphere of society through ecumenical and denominational bodies at the international, national, ad hoc, and individual level.⁶⁴⁹ The capability, credibility and constituencies of these religious groups then impact a variety of major issues of concern on the international agenda, even from the perspective of the state.⁶⁵⁰ As religious identity is constructed socially, so too are the structures which inform global institutional norms, normative practices, interconnectedness, and the dynamics of socio-political interaction from those religious groups.⁶⁵¹ This then sees religion recognised as “an intractable force that can be quite unresponsive to all the normal instrumentalities of state power, let alone the instrumentalities of foreign policy”.⁶⁵² Religion, by nature of its construction, can be seen as divisive and yet embedded are religious influences that can contribute positively to areas such as peacemaking.⁶⁵³ This is due to religion and religious institutions having “control of resources, interpersonal relationships, communications and expertise” that are all advantageous in the international area.⁶⁵⁴ Faith can be a strong force for socio-political involvement, and this can translate onto the international stage both positively and negatively.

Historical experience suggests that not only can religion be divisive, but it can also become fanatical with extremist forms of politicised religion threatening security.⁶⁵⁵ In recent

⁶⁴⁶ Johnston, "Introduction: Real Politik Expanded." 7

⁶⁴⁷ Luttwak, "The Missing Dimension." 9

⁶⁴⁸ Barry Rubin, "Religion and International Affairs," *ibid.* 21; Danan, "Shaping the Narrative of Religious Freedom." 181

⁶⁴⁹ Vendley and Little, "Implications for Religious Communities: Buddhism, Islam, Hinduism, and Christianity." 312

⁶⁵⁰ Judd Birdsall, "Keep the Faith: How American Diplomacy Got Religion, and How to Keep It," (Routledge, 2016). 112

⁶⁵¹ Agensky, "Recognizing Religion: Politics, History, and the “Long 19th Century”." 734-5

⁶⁵² Luttwak, "The Missing Dimension." 13

⁶⁵³ Johnston, "Introduction: Beyond Power Politics." 4

⁶⁵⁴ Otis, "Religion and War in the Twenty-First Century." 20

⁶⁵⁵ Examples in history include the Religious Crusade to separatist groups to terrorist organisations in the current day. For a brief sketch, see Phillip Jenkins, "A Long View of History and Religious Extremism," Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, <https://institute.global/insight/co-existence/long-view-history-and-religious->

years this has manifested as the fear of militant groups such as Daesh, Al Qaeda or Boko Haram engaging in campaigns of de-stabilisation and eroding state structures with such instability enhanced by demagogues who manipulate religion for their own power.⁶⁵⁶ These extreme positions, however, are outliers in the wide spectrum of religious beliefs and interactions. The stark division between religions can be lessened when it is recognised that the philosophies propounded in religion follow identical patterns, including “preaching peace, love, and truthfulness” even though there are differences in ritual and culture.⁶⁵⁷ The similarity of these religious roots represents an opportunity worthy of consideration when linked to diplomacy.

A comparison of historical political constructs and the contemporary international system reveals that “religious ideas, practices, framings, and identities” were influential in articulating the basis of European empires, as well as having a normative impact in the opposite direction after the Second World War, including the UN Charter and the movement towards decolonisation.⁶⁵⁸ The consideration of religion in the current era of global engagement impacts a variety of concerns, including “conflict mitigation, post-conflict stabilisation operations, immigration and integration, women’s rights, and engagement of multilateral institutions and international law”.⁶⁵⁹ Such concerns depend on faith being more than a subjective experience of one’s spirituality; it also needs to be “demonstrated through social justice and action”.⁶⁶⁰ The contemporary nexus of politics and religion contends with how religion develops and also what its normative implications are on a global scale. Observers also note that political structures are more than ever “institutionally attentive” to the role of religion,⁶⁶¹ a trend also reflected in religion becoming more prominent in the scope of scholarly enquiry. The scholarship surrounding religion in the post-Cold War era reflects the complexity and diversity of the subject. Some difficulties in the scholarship still surround the question of “whether

extremism. Research is often done on a regional basis to explore cases of extremism too, for example see D. Suba Chandran and P. R. Chari, *Armed Conflicts in South Asia 2010: Growing Left-Wing Extremism and Religious Violence* (New Delhi: Routledge, 2011).

⁶⁵⁶ Johnston, "Introduction: Real Politik Expanded." 5. Examples of such demagogues in Johnston’s context include leaders of violent religious groups such as Osama Bin Laden of Al Qaeda or Joseph Kony of the Lord’s Resistance Army. Trends of populism in the 21st century might also result in demagoguery in other manifestations.

⁶⁵⁷ Pokhariyal, "The Influence of Religion, Technology, and Economy on Culture, Diplomacy, and Peace." 49

⁶⁵⁸ Agensky, "Recognizing Religion: Politics, History, and the “Long 19th Century”." 739. On the history and impact of empires in global history, see John Darwin, *After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire since 1405* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2007).

⁶⁵⁹ Liora Danan, "A Public Diplomacy Approach to International Religious Freedom," *Review of Faith & International Affairs* 10, no. 3 (2012). 59

⁶⁶⁰ Henry Wooster, "Faith at the Ramparts: The Philippine Catholic Church and the 1986 Revolution," in *Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft*, ed. Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 158

⁶⁶¹ Birdsall, "Keep the Faith: How American Diplomacy Got Religion, and How to Keep It." 112

religion should be treated instrumentally; whether its substantial dimensions are adequately addressed; whether it is sui generis; and whether extant frameworks are up to the task".⁶⁶² New theories, however, are emerging that provide alternate perspectives about religion in politics.⁶⁶³ This momentum has given space for faith-based diplomacy to be seriously considered in theory.

Secularisation and the Separation of Church and State

Through the examination of literature on faith-based diplomacy, a re-emerging theme is the role of the relationship between church and state – namely, the idea of separation or secularisation. Before the theory of faith-based diplomacy can be examined in full, consideration needs to be given to secularisation and what impact it has had on faith and diplomacy. This section will not be analysing the Thirty Year War and the religious conflict as a case, but rather it will examine the implications of this violence leading to secularisation. The most significant problem posed by religion in international relations was the breaking apart of the civilisational unity of Western Europe, leading to intensified conflict. Paul Sharp notes that “Christendom’s ability to stand and act as a single political unit, whether under pope or emperor, had been in long decline” and this resulted in disunity, an inability to restrain ambition or moderate conduct, and a weakened moral frame that increased the levels of alienation between groups.⁶⁶⁴ This heightened the challenge of maintaining peace between religious and political authority.⁶⁶⁵ At this time of the beginnings of a plural religious environment, neither the Catholic Church nor the various Protestant sects “had lost the solidarist assumptions and universalist habits of thought of the order they had replaced”.⁶⁶⁶ It was a situation which saw these sects become linked secular power centres. To counter this concern, European states from the 17th Century sought to diminish the power of religion by circumscribing its influence so that faith became restricted to the interior life.⁶⁶⁷ Scholars named this phenomenon secularisation, which can be summarised as follows:

⁶⁶² Agensky, "Recognizing Religion: Politics, History, and the "Long 19th Century"." 731

⁶⁶³ Kang, "Why Was There No Religious War in Premodern East Asia?." 967

⁶⁶⁴ Sharp, "Crazy Religion Diplomacy." 245

⁶⁶⁵ Challenges to political and religious authority had occurred through Europe, namely the investiture conflict (see, Gerd Tellenbach and Ralph Francis Bennett, *Church, State and Christian Society at the Time of the Investiture Contest* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1948).) At this time, however, the challenges to political and religious authority had become more difficult to manage.

⁶⁶⁶ Sharp, "Crazy Religion Diplomacy."245

⁶⁶⁷ Ibid. 258

As societies modernised economically and politically, and as science became ever more important and dominant in how reality is understood, religion would naturally lose ground and be a relic of past superstitious ages. In this, if religion were to survive at all, it would only be in the private sphere as an aid for individuals who might need this type of psychic support.⁶⁶⁸

This separation is entrenched in the international system as secularisation, linked to the Treaty of Westphalia and thus the formation of the modern state system, the implications of which are still being contended with today.⁶⁶⁹ Although Church institutions sought to retain some areas of privilege, for example, via roles in education and shaping moral and legal codes, their influence was further reduced by revolutionary movements and freedom of religion. This is most evident in France and the evolution towards *laïcité*, or secularity, which saw strained relations between political and religious institutions.⁶⁷⁰

Secularisation informed the belief that, from the time of Enlightenment, progress and knowledge would make the influence of religion a waning force in the international system.⁶⁷¹ This post-Enlightenment prejudice toward religion has lasted for centuries. Virtually no significance was placed on “religion as a factor in the policymaker’s calculus”, except in a few specific cases.⁶⁷² The modernisation of the developing world was also considered to be a driving force in the decline of religion’s influence; however, this has not been the case.⁶⁷³ Modernity and secularism are not necessarily coterminous. Western expectations that economic development would diminish the power of religion over a nation’s affairs failed to account for how deeply in society religion penetrates.⁶⁷⁴ The challenge is what Luttwak refers to as “secularizing reductivism”, which is an intentional ignorance of the role of religion in foreign affairs and policy construction.⁶⁷⁵ This was a common approach to international politics for much of the 20th Century. Nonetheless, religious actors retained a role in diplomatic practice.⁶⁷⁶ The complexity of the nature of secularisation is apparent and prone to confusion.

⁶⁶⁸ Loskota and Flory, "Why Religion Still Matters in the World." 10

⁶⁶⁹ Sandal and James, "Religion and International Relations Theory: Towards a Mutual Understanding." 3

⁶⁷⁰ See Ann Margaret Doyle, "Catholic Church and State Relations in French Education in the Nineteenth Century: The Struggle between "Laïcité" and Religion," *International Studies in Catholic Education* 9, no. 1 (2017).

⁶⁷¹ Luttwak, "The Missing Dimension." 9

⁶⁷² Johnston, "Religion and Foreign Policy."

⁶⁷³ Rubin, "Religion and International Affairs." 21

⁶⁷⁴ Sharp, "Crazy Religion Diplomacy." 243-4

⁶⁷⁵ Luttwak, "The Missing Dimension." 10

⁶⁷⁶ Cecelia Lynch, "Christian Ethics, Actors, and Diplomacy: Mediating Universalist Pretensions," *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 66, no. 3 (2011). 613

As Miles indicates, being secular does not mean being anti-religion, and yet it does not necessarily mean being supportive of religion either.⁶⁷⁷ This does not, however, suggest that the separation of church and state should be viewed in a negative light. Indeed, “when religion gets political power, with no separation of religion and state, and officially tries to replace culture and diplomacy, violence usually follows.”⁶⁷⁸ This has created an environment where the “fundamental constitutional principle of separation of church and state” is misunderstood, resulting in a reticence to see religion as a relevant factor in policy construction.⁶⁷⁹ A consequence of this misunderstanding is that it can manifest in some believing that secularism is a denial or indifference to religion which has resulted in secularism carrying negative connotations in many regions of the world.⁶⁸⁰

This reflects the historical and social construction of modern secularism that goes back to the time of Westphalia. With respect to policy construction, Western separation of church and state has obscured non-Western understandings of the role of religion in political and societal affairs. In the West, for a government to apply religion to their political agenda, it is necessary to overcome the limitations posed by separation of church and state. This may compromise the necessary balanced neutrality of religious representatives on political issues.⁶⁸¹ Within the context of the United States, for example, incorporating religion into the problem-solving approach is difficult. This is because “the first amendment establishing the separation of church and state has been a site of contestation domestically as religious and secular actors have argued over the permeability of the wall of separation”.⁶⁸² Policies designed to divide church and state are now seen as counterproductive to diplomacy and diplomats as these secular projects can direct people toward intolerance, even in powerful political positions.⁶⁸³ Confusion surrounding the place of religion in the modern international system is the result, as well as the rise of extremist actors in conflict. This being said, the current world order has changed considerably from 17th Century Europe and solutions may be found.⁶⁸⁴ The idea of a “desecularisation” of some diplomatic methodologies can be viewed as a promising prospect

⁶⁷⁷ Jack Miles, "Religious Freedom and Foreign Policy," *NPQ: New Perspectives Quarterly* 20, no. 4 (2003). 31-2

⁶⁷⁸ Pokhariyal, "The Influence of Religion, Technology, and Economy on Culture, Diplomacy, and Peace." 49 Examples of consolidating religion and power are evident through history, as discussed in James W. Laine, *Meta-Religion: Religion and Power in World History* (Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2014).

⁶⁷⁹ Seib, "Religious Freedom and US Public Diplomacy." 15

⁶⁸⁰ Danan, "Shaping the Narrative of Religious Freedom." 190

⁶⁸¹ Johnston, "An Asymmetric Counter to the Asymmetric Threat." 14

⁶⁸² Marsden, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: Conservative Evangelicals and the United States Military." 479

⁶⁸³ Sharp, "Crazy Religion Diplomacy." 264

⁶⁸⁴ Ibid. 258

in that the role of religion, be it through its doctrines or actors, can serve the cause of liberty, as opposed to advancing against freedom as some secularists might assume.⁶⁸⁵ Instead, it has been found “the religious lurking in the secular, doing away with overwrought secularisation and modernisation theses and establishing a powerful new research agenda”⁶⁸⁶ As such, theories associated with faith-based diplomacy are increasingly more pertinent to the study of International Relations.

The Re-emergence of Religion

The final point of consideration in the context and framing of faith-based diplomacy is the apparent re-emergence of religion in the 21st Century’s international agenda. This section will suggest reasons as to why religion has increased in importance in Diplomacy Studies, and what this means for theory construction. Essentially, the expectation of religion’s decline was mistaken.⁶⁸⁷ Secularisation theory was exercised for most of the 19th Century, but in the last two decades of the 20th Century that theory came into question with the rise of religion as a politically potent force.⁶⁸⁸ When scholars consider the idea of religion resurging, careful observation reveals that “religion, as beliefs, associations, and a motivator for public action, has never gone away” and currently religion remains a force and influence for people and their everyday lives.⁶⁸⁹ This is why some scholars refer to religion’s role in the current international system as a ‘rediscovery’.⁶⁹⁰

In response to the question of why religion has emerged as a critical factor of conflict in the 21st Century, Otis offers three potential reasons:

1. The seeming failure of other ideologies and institutions;
2. The power of religion in providing ideological resources supporting social justice; and

⁶⁸⁵ Mohammed el-Nawawy, "Muslims' Online Faith Diplomacy," in *Religion and Public Diplomacy*, ed. Philip Seib (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 115

⁶⁸⁶ Agensky, "Recognizing Religion: Politics, History, and the “Long 19th Century”." 748

⁶⁸⁷ Rubin, "Religion and International Affairs." 21

⁶⁸⁸ See Maddox, "Finding God in Global Politics." 186

⁶⁸⁹ Loskota and Flory, "Why Religion Still Matters in the World." 9. In fact, not only has religion not ‘gone away’, but in some parts of the world it has indeed grown as a share of the population. Notably in the Middle East and Africa, populations of adherents to religions are rising. While those unaffiliated to religion are increasing in the West, they are shrinking as a share of the global population and will continue to do so, based on demographic trends. See Pew Research Center, "The Global Religious Landscape " <http://www.pewforum.org/2012/12/18/global-religious-landscape-exec/>. And Pew Research Center, "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050."

⁶⁹⁰ Agensky, "Recognizing Religion: Politics, History, and the “Long 19th Century”." 730

3. The power of religion in providing an ideological basis for social coherence and comprehensiveness.⁶⁹¹

Through the lens of conflict in particular, the rise of religion has been accelerated since the attacks on September 11 and the surge of transnational terrorism.⁶⁹² Generally, religion is seen as a source of conflict, violence, terrorism and as a limitation to individual liberties, and yet religious actors are gaining positive attention by some observers suggesting a post-secular age where religion is reinvigorated.⁶⁹³ With the rise of religiously-fuelled conflict, particularly in the Middle East, the relationship between faith and diplomacy has been strengthened in various diplomatic and political contexts.⁶⁹⁴ When considering how this impacts policy construction, particularly in the context of the foreign policy of the United States, Patterson has highlighted five trends contributing to the resurgence of religion globally. They are:

1. Individual religiosity is rising the world over;
2. Public expression of religion by individuals and groups worldwide matters more in political discourse;
3. States are no longer the sole legitimate centres of authority and authenticity, nor are they always the most reliable providers of initial services;
4. Religious actors, identities, and ideas are vigorously transnational; and
5. Whether at the individual or collective level, religious impulses can transcend what scholars typically define as “rational” or material interests.⁶⁹⁵

Whether considering religion as increasingly central to conflict and conflict resolution, or even seeing religion as an opportunity for diplomatic engagement in the construction of foreign policy, the presence and influence of religion in the 21st Century is increasing.

Religion’s importance can only grow, according to Johnston, in light of community fears that long-held values are being compromised by “economic globalisation and the uncertainties stemming from rapid technological change”.⁶⁹⁶ This notion of religion’s influence has been shared elsewhere in International Relations scholarship. Famously, Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis suggested that religions, which influence culture and civilisation,

⁶⁹¹ Otis, "Religion and War in the Twenty-First Century." 16

⁶⁹² Sharp, "Crazy Religion Diplomacy." 243

⁶⁹³ Thomas Diez, "Diplomacy, Papacy, and the Transformation of International Society," *The Review of Faith & International Affairs* 15, no. 4 (2017). 31

⁶⁹⁴ el-Nawawy, "Muslims' Online Faith Diplomacy." 114

⁶⁹⁵ Marsden, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: Conservative Evangelicals and the United States Military." 477

⁶⁹⁶ Johnston, "Introduction: Real Politik Expanded." 4

would be an increasing motivator in the international system, potentially even leading to violent conflict.⁶⁹⁷ The rise of religion is regarded as a critical issue on the international agenda insofar as it impacts global security. However, the problems posed by religion for inter-faith peace and also for tolerance between believers and non-believers are open to resolution.⁶⁹⁸ These issues are being addressed through diplomatic channels as the emergence of the role of religion in international affairs has coincided with the phenomenon of people themselves having the power to behave as diplomatic actors, empowered by social media and the growing use of multitrack diplomacy.⁶⁹⁹ The scope of this rise is global, as major religions are becoming more influential across new regions of the world. This has been supported by empirical studies which find that the number of people adhering to religion is increasing demographically in developing countries and the spread and rise of major religions is also growing, along with religiously related concerns such as challenges to religious freedom (see below).⁷⁰⁰ This study recognises these trends as an opportunity for the expansion of theory in Diplomacy Studies, namely in the area of faith-based diplomacy.

Table 2: Size and Projected Growth of Major Religious Groups⁷⁰¹

	2010 POPULATION	% OF WORLD POPULATION IN 2010	PROJECTED 2050 POPULATION	% OF WORLD POPULATION IN 2050	POPULATION GROWTH 2010-2050
Christians	2,168,330,000	31.4%	2,918,070,000	31.4%	749,740,000
Muslims	1,599,700,000	23.2	2,761,480,000	29.7	1,161,780,000
Unaffiliated	1,131,150,000	16.4	1,230,340,000	13.2	99,190,000
Hindus	1,032,210,000	15.0	1,384,360,000	14.9	352,140,000
Buddhists	487,760,000	7.1	486,270,000	5.2	-1,490,000
Folk Religions	404,690,000	5.9	449,140,000	4.8	44,450,000
Other Religions	58,150,000	0.8	61,450,000	0.7	3,300,000
Jews	13,860,000	0.2	16,090,000	0.2	2,230,000
World total	6,895,850,000	100.0	9,307,190,000	100.0	2,411,340,000

⁶⁹⁷ See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (London: Free Pr., 2002).


⁶⁹⁸ Sharp, "Crazy Religion Diplomacy."244

⁶⁹⁹ Ibid. 265

⁷⁰⁰ Loskota and Flory, "Why Religion Still Matters in the World." 11; Pew Research Center, "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050."; and, Pew Research Center, "Restrictions on Religion among the 25 Most Populous Countries, 2007-2015," (2015).

⁷⁰¹ Pew Research Center, "The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050."

Figure 1: Projected Annual Growth Rate of Country Populations, 2010 - 2050⁷⁰²



⁷⁰² Ibid.

CHAPTER SIX

Faith-based Diplomacy

In this chapter the theory of faith-based diplomacy is examined, beginning with the scholarly literature introduced in 1994. While there was discourse pertaining to the nature and structures of incorporating faith into diplomacy before this time, it was the published texts in 1994 that gave the substantial theoretical frames of reference to the notion of faith-based diplomacy. Available definitions of faith-based diplomacy are then compared and contrasted, leading to a proposal of the most appropriate definition of the theory. The chapter proceeds to discuss the role, function, and suggested characteristics of a faith-based diplomat. Finally, a contrast between faith-based diplomacy and interfaith diplomacy is conducted to firmly scope the theory of faith-based diplomacy. In doing so, this chapter endeavours to provide an analytical overview of the theory.

An Overview of Faith-based Diplomacy

The exploration into faith-based diplomacy is based on some simple premises. After serving as the Secretary of State for the United States, and then as US Ambassador to the United Nations, Madelaine Albright began to recognise the benefits of faith-based diplomacy as an approach to conflict resolution. She suggests that “if diplomacy is the art of persuading others to act as we would wish, effective foreign policy requires that we comprehend why others act as they do”.⁷⁰³ If this is the case, she continues, “No American ambassador should be assigned to a country where religious feelings are strong unless he or she has a deep understanding of the faiths commonly practiced there.”⁷⁰⁴ This premise identifies a simple link in the central goal of diplomacy and the presence of faith. Thompson affirms this position by positing that:

If diplomacy is about the strategies used to manage the negotiation and exchange of what happens between individuals, groups and states, it should not be surprising to see that a religious view of the world and reckoning with religious worldviews can be part of diplomatic strategies. In fact, the surprise

⁷⁰³ Albright, "Faith and Diplomacy." 8

⁷⁰⁴ Ibid. 8

should rather be that the awareness and appreciation of the role of religion in diplomacy has only recently come to be formalized.⁷⁰⁵

Such a premise has motivated the emerging space for faith-based diplomacy. Douglas Johnston, founder of the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy, has been recognised as a leader in this area of study for being the first to consolidate theoretical underpinnings related to faith-based diplomacy in the discipline of International Relations.⁷⁰⁶ For this reason, his writings feature heavily in this thesis. His pursuits in faith-based diplomacy are also distinguished by the way in which he conceived of religious faith in relation to peacemaking rather than the instigator of conflict.⁷⁰⁷ In this perspective, faith is reassessed as a locus for positive diplomatic engagement, as “religion, with its unmatched authority among many communities in every region of the world, carries within it a diverse set of traditions and methodologies that promote peace”.⁷⁰⁸ However, before being recognised as faith-based diplomacy, senior officials of the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy debated as to whether the concept would be considered as faith-based diplomacy, or as a model of religious peacebuilding that incorporated faith-based initiatives.⁷⁰⁹ Through this initial dialogue, and the foundational publications presented by Johnston, it was decided that integrating faith and politics into the resolution of intractable identity-based conflicts was evidence of an emerging paradigm. From this basis it was found that faith-based diplomacy, then, could potentially be an effective and far-reaching tool in diplomacy if developed and applied appropriately.

The development of a framework for faith-based diplomacy from a scholarly perspective has been continuing since 1994. The need came from the inadequacy of existing diplomatic approaches used in religious conflict. Thus, as a conceptual tool, faith-based diplomacy is still relatively new to the discipline of International Relations. The conditions in which faith-based and religious actors are more effective in conflict resolution have not yet been fully explored in scholarship.⁷¹⁰ Even though faith-based diplomacy is conceptually new, diplomatic interactions between Christian and Islamic groups, along with the spread of evangelists across diverse cultures, can be a source of insights. They demonstrate that

⁷⁰⁵ Thompson, "Religion and Diplomacy." 202

⁷⁰⁶ Rob Moll, "The Father of Faith-Based Diplomacy," *Christianity Today* 52, no. 9 (2008). 181

⁷⁰⁷ Ibid. 181

⁷⁰⁸ Jafari, "Local Religious Peacemakers: An Untapped Resource in U.S. Foreign Policy."; *ibid.* 111

⁷⁰⁹ Brian Cox, *Faith-Based Diplomacy: The Work of The Prophets* (United States: Xlibris, 2015).

⁷¹⁰ Johnstone and Svensson, "Belligerents and Believers: Exploring Faith-Based Mediation in Internal Armed Conflicts." 577

diplomacy between and within faith groups is possible, but not easy.⁷¹¹ Powerful states have also been recorded interacting with faith groups. China, for example, has a rich history of engagement with religious diplomacy when Buddhism was first introduced over 2000 years ago.⁷¹² Through those centuries, China actively engaged in foreign relations with a variety of other faith groups.⁷¹³ Internally it also managed relations among its three major spiritual traditions of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism. In recent times, the increasing role of religion in political contexts, particularly in the Middle East, has revealed the extent of the faith-diplomacy nexus.⁷¹⁴ This has been recognised on the international agenda, and observers are now tasked with addressing religious influences in conflict. As the then Secretary of State for the United States, John Kerry, implored:

So I say to my fellow State Department employees, all of them, wherever you are, I want to reinforce a simple message: I want you to go out and engage religious leaders and faith-based communities in our day-to-day work. Build strong relationships with them and listen to their insights and understand the important contributions that they can make individually and that we can make together.⁷¹⁵

The above historical and contemporary instances indicate that faith-based diplomacy may be a viable approach in the current international system.

The central, distinctive principle of faith-based diplomacy is that it is oriented towards the divine. This may be understood as a personal revelation of God, or as a source of meaning, identity, existence and belonging. However, this notion of 'the divine' motivates a particular vision of politics, suggests assumptions about human nature and political order, and generates norms that govern conduct and behaviour.⁷¹⁶ With this assumption comes the role of divine agency in human affairs, where a diplomatic actor performs the role of an intermediary between

⁷¹¹ Sharp, "Crazy Religion Diplomacy." 255

⁷¹² Juyan Zhang, "China's Faith Diplomacy," in *Religion and Public Diplomacy*, ed. Philip Seib (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 75

⁷¹³ Ibid. 75. See also R. James Ferguson and Rosita Dellios, *The Politics and Philosophy of Chinese Power: The Timeless and the Timely* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2016). 95-124

⁷¹⁴ el-Nawawy, "Muslims' Online Faith Diplomacy." 114. This is not only evident in conflicts, such as the factional divisions between Sunni and Shia for example, (see Nathan Gonzalez, *The Sunni-Shia Conflict Understanding Sectarian Violence in the Middle East* (New York: Nortia Press, 2012).) but also in relation to other political goals. This includes human rights, gendered issues, democracy and foreign policy – see Bernard Lewis, *Faith and Power Religion and Politics in the Middle East* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

⁷¹⁵ Kerry as cited by Birdsall, "Keep the Faith: How American Diplomacy Got Religion, and How to Keep It."

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⁷¹⁶ Cox and Philpott, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: An Ancient Idea Newly Emergent." 32

divinity and humanity to represent human concerns.⁷¹⁷ In this context religion is understood to be at the heart of identity, whether that be individual identity or a communal identity, and if that identity is not properly understood, effective resolution cannot be achieved.⁷¹⁸ Thus, the priority of diplomacy becomes personhood as opposed to efficiency and convenience.⁷¹⁹ This distinguishes faith-based diplomacy from other diplomatic approaches because faith-based diplomacy moves beyond the absence of conflict – being negative peace – and engages in the reconciliation of respectful relations between parties.⁷²⁰ The dynamics of religious faith are introduced into peacemaking to support the pursuit of a positive peace.⁷²¹

Where diplomatic processes stagnate, faith-based initiatives can revive them by incorporating elements of reconciliation and forgiveness into conflict resolution. Due to faith-based diplomacy seeking reconciliation as a priority beyond conflict resolution, it “is not a classical peacemaking tool, and certainly not a classical tool of diplomacy either”.⁷²² What is clear, however, is that the main impacts of this approach are felt on the individual and societal level, as faith-based communities, such as churches and congregations, define the main contours of civil society, predominantly in developing countries.⁷²³ As an example, churches have a unique ability to promote solutions to conflict issues where problems that seem insolvable can be thawed through the support of the church and the influence of the broader sense of common universality inspired by the church, as has been seen in parts of Africa and Southeast Asia.⁷²⁴

A primary goal of diplomacy is to mediate estrangement, and faith-based diplomacy sees this as a key task.⁷²⁵ An instance of this process in history was the expansive spread of

⁷¹⁷ Ibid. 33

⁷¹⁸ Moll, "The Father of Faith-Based Diplomacy." 57

⁷¹⁹ Bernard J. O'Connor, "A Diplomacy of Candor: Pope Benedict XVI on the Global Stage," *Review of Faith & International Affairs* 4, no. 2 (2006). 43

⁷²⁰ Johnston, *Religion, Terror and Error: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual Engagement*. 56

⁷²¹ Johnston and Cox, "Faith-Based Diplomacy and Preventive Engagement." 15

⁷²² Troy, "Faith-Based Diplomacy under Examination." 228

⁷²³ Johnstone and Svensson, "Belligerents and Believers: Exploring Faith-Based Mediation in Internal Armed Conflicts." 557

⁷²⁴ Lynch, "Christian Ethics, Actors, and Diplomacy: Mediating Universalist Pretentions." 620. Instances of churches promoting solutions to conflicts include the Catholic church in Mozambique, (see L. B. Serapião, "The Catholic Church and Conflict Resolution in Mozambique's Post-Colonial Conflict, 1977-1992," *Journal of Church and State* 46, no. 2 (2004).) the church's role in resolution to conflict in Rwanda, (see S. Cyuma, *Picking up the Pieces: The Church and Conflict Resolution in South Africa and Rwanda* (Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2012).) during Apartheid South Africa, (see D. Johnston, "The Churches and Apartheid in South Africa" in *Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft* ed. D. Johnston and Cynthia Sampson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).) or activity of the church in the Philippines revolution (see Wooster, "Faith at the Ramparts: The Philippine Catholic Church and the 1986 Revolution.").

⁷²⁵ Lynch, "Christian Ethics, Actors, and Diplomacy: Mediating Universalist Pretentions." 615

Christian missionaries, but contemporary humanitarian groups “function in a context of contradictory diplomatic norms regarding proselytism and religious freedom”.⁷²⁶ The values used in the approach to diplomacy could be called ‘virtue ethics’⁷²⁷ and it is an approach being tested in other frameworks, such as restorative narrative-building which sees diplomats reframe their methods of dialogue to enhance reconciliation.⁷²⁸ Within this frame the common ground that may be held by multiple faiths is revealed and then incorporated into contexts relevant to the various faiths with the aim of building engagement and ultimately resolving conflict between previously estranged groups.⁷²⁹

The potential viability of faith-based diplomacy is best nurtured “in the spaces where the actual practice of the religious tradition in all its multivalence still remains possible”.⁷³⁰ In these societies, the traditions of religion are vast and spiritually enriching where valid alternatives to the violence of religious, ethnic and ethnoreligious wars can be found.⁷³¹ One author suggests that the foundational position of a spiritual view of diplomacy is that one must recognise the omnipotence and omnipresence of God because from this starting point peace and reconciliation are more viable than through the conventional wisdom of diplomacy.⁷³² From this perspective, religious authorities can dissuade conflict-prone behaviours by suggesting that “such activity will provoke divine disapprobation”.⁷³³ In this sense, religious authority is a valuable preventative tool. However, the context in which the faith-based approach is used must be carefully considered and need not always depend on application within religious spaces. “The impulse to engage ... on issues of religion need not stem simply from progressive liberal values”, or as a more sinister form of proselytization from different sects, or even a progress of building a ‘national faith’.⁷³⁴ Faith-based diplomacy, therefore, must be applied strategically. Troy has outlined four areas of implementation for faith-based diplomacy that have been deemed as most appropriate. These are:

⁷²⁶ Ibid. 615

⁷²⁷ Troy, "Faith-Based Diplomacy under Examination." 217

⁷²⁸ Sayeed-Miller, "Public Diplomacy and Transnational Cases of Blasphemy." 108

⁷²⁹ Marsden, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: Conservative Evangelicals and the United States Military." 494

⁷³⁰ Appleby, "Retrieving the Missing Dimension of Statecraft: Religious Faith in the Service of Peacebuilding." 237

⁷³¹ Ibid. 237

⁷³² Jeremy Carper, "Diplomacy, Wikileaks, and a Spiritual View," *Christian Science Monitor* (2010).

⁷³³ Johnston and Cox, "Faith-Based Diplomacy and Preventive Engagement."

⁷³⁴ Chris Seiple and Joshua White, "Uzbekistan and the Central Asian Crucible of Religion and Security," in *Religion and Security: The New Nexus in International Relations*, ed. Robert A. Seiple, and Hoover, Dennis R. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005). 47

1. In conflicts ‘in which religion is a significant factor in the identity of one or both communities’;
2. In conflict situations ‘in which religious leaders can be mobilized to facilitate peace’;
3. In situations in which ‘two major religious traditions [are] in a conflict that transcends national borders’; and
4. In ‘third-party mediation in conflicts where there is no particular religious dimension present’.⁷³⁵ (See below for applications to secular societies.)

This is a strong framework for application of the faith-based approach. But upon further development this could still expand in terms of scope and efficacy in the future. The application of faith-based approaches to diplomacy should not aim to establish an official religion, as may have been the case through history, but rather it should recognise and incorporate the role of religion and religious freedom as a diplomatic asset.⁷³⁶ If this is maintained as a central feature, it should assuage the fears that faith in diplomacy will dismantle a healthy separation between church and state and lead to evangelisation. Importantly, pluralistic approaches to conflict resolution initiatives that involve a faith-based element are continuing to expand, even in secular countries.⁷³⁷ An example of how this is paralleled constitutionally is the Indonesian political philosophy of Pancasila.⁷³⁸

This raises the question of the role of the state in faith-based approaches to diplomacy. With modern states categorising religion as an internal affair in the personal sphere, institutions and international organisations have not intervened in conflicts of a religious nature, resulting in citizens and actors outside of government engaging in the mediation process.⁷³⁹ Foreign policy structures have not yet achieved the capacity for spiritual engagement in their diplomatic outreach.⁷⁴⁰ Consequently, faith-based diplomacy has been deemed ill-suited for representatives of the state where in many cases “religion will be an unstable partner for statecraft”.⁷⁴¹ This is why analysis in faith-based diplomacy has hitherto focused on the perspective of non-state actors. This does not mean, however, that the state is unable to engage in this process. One area of complementary engagement from official and non-official agents

⁷³⁵ Troy, "Faith-Based Diplomacy under Examination." 218

⁷³⁶ Seib, "Religious Freedom and US Public Diplomacy." 17

⁷³⁷ Marsden, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: Conservative Evangelicals and the United States Military." 485

⁷³⁸ See Sunarko Ofm, "Interfaith Dialogue and Cooperation across Faiths: The Experience of Indonesia." 53; and Robert W. Hefner, "Christians, Conflict, and Citizenship in Muslim-Majority Indonesia," *Review of Faith & International Affairs* 15, no. 1 (2017). 91

⁷³⁹ Johnston, "Introduction: Beyond Power Politics." 3-4

⁷⁴⁰ Johnston, *Religion, Terror and Error: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual Engagement*. 5

⁷⁴¹ *Ibid.* 57; Johnston, "An Asymmetric Counter to the Asymmetric Threat." 14

lies in the use of religious and cultural resources for peace. Indigenous cultural practices, in particular, can provide an avenue for engagement that bridges the gap between religion, culture and politics.⁷⁴² This is why US military chaplains have made concerted efforts to formally include indigenous religious groups and leaders into stability operations post-conflict, such as in the case of Iraq.⁷⁴³ Some are calling for the need to treat religion and religious freedom “not just as ‘soft’ culture but ‘hard’ geopolitics”, where the conceptual basis of faith-based diplomacy can translate to effective policy.⁷⁴⁴

Still, it is primarily non-state actors, namely faith-based organisations, which are able to engage both locally and transnationally – in such areas as emergency relief, education and health services – to achieve the aims of faith-based diplomacy. Religious leaders and organisations are able to offer humanitarian assistance and community reconstruction efforts effectively as they already have the infrastructure to deliver services locally.⁷⁴⁵ Religious delegations in people-to-people diplomatic settings are increasingly more familiar, but the “asymmetrical, state-to-society diplomacy with religious reform as its target is virtually without precedent in the modern West”.⁷⁴⁶ Scholars are still debating on the future of faith-based diplomacy as an approach in official channels. By viewing faith-based diplomacy as a tool to integrate into frameworks and diplomatic institutions to inform social relations and social meanings, a faith-based approach may still be useful for the state.⁷⁴⁷ The central point on the state’s engagement in faith-based diplomacy is that “the possibility that religious beliefs can contribute either negatively or positively to nations’ foreign policies depends on how those beliefs are being interpreted and implemented by the people who adopt and practice them”.⁷⁴⁸ The examination offered in this thesis seeks to provide a framework which allows for positive engagement even for the state.

As an approach within the diplomatic process, faith-based diplomacy must be equipped to address conflict. An assumption within faith-based diplomacy is the recognition that the human soul harbours the potential for evil which can translate to violent conflict.⁷⁴⁹ Translated

⁷⁴² *Religion, Terror and Error: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual Engagement*. 64

⁷⁴³ William S. Lee, Christopher J. Burke, and Zonna M. Crayne, "Military Chaplains as Peace Builders Embracing Indigenous Religions in Stability Operations," (2005). 2

⁷⁴⁴ Harold H. Saunders, "Relational Realism: Toward a New Political Paradigm for Security," in *Religion and Security: The New Nexus in International Relations*, ed. Robert A. Seiple, and Hoover, Dennis R. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005). 165

⁷⁴⁵ Marsden, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: Conservative Evangelicals and the United States Military." 494

⁷⁴⁶ Seiple and White, "Uzbekistan and the Central Asian Crucible of Religion and Security." 47

⁷⁴⁷ Troy, "Faith-Based Diplomacy under Examination." 229

⁷⁴⁸ el-Nawawy, "Muslims' Online Faith Diplomacy." 113

⁷⁴⁹ Cox and Philpott, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: An Ancient Idea Newly Emergent." 34

to non-Abrahamic traditions such as the Indic spiritual tradition of Buddhism, one may speak of a karmic cycle of ignorance and aggression. However, “fulfilled through the divine”, or in the case of Buddhism through compassion and the quest for ‘enlightenment’ (or *bodhi*, spiritual awakening), “the person is the site of potential spiritual transformation” – which is where faith-based diplomacy can be conducted to see conflict resolved.⁷⁵⁰ This contrasts with common perceptions in international relations that associate religion with the extremist behaviours of minority religious groups. Faith-based diplomacy aims to find the common ground in religion which “guides and inspires the majority and can be harnessed for good”.⁷⁵¹

A concern here is that each case of conflict is unique, and when constructing a theoretical framework this creates problems when comparing experiences which are not the same. This is especially when not every case is about the same aspect of conflict.⁷⁵² Arguments based on incommensurability, however, pertain more to methodological issues (discussed in the introduction) than a denial of the potential for faith-based diplomacy. Babb recommends that comparative analysis is at its strongest when identifying commonalities is the primary goal of inquiry, as opposed to simply highlighting disparate opinions.⁷⁵³ In the case of understanding different religions, this notion of ‘equivalences’ is methodologically useful,⁷⁵⁴ as illustrated in the above example that positions the importance of the ‘divine’ in one religion with that of ‘enlightenment’ in another. In essence, scholars will recognise that in spite of there being differences between cases, there are commonalities which are cause for study. The strength of seeking commonalities is that it presents the space for religious actors to be successful mediators who can work through debilitating impasses;⁷⁵⁵ while at the global level it permits the religious dimension to play a role in the conduct of international relations.

More challenging, however, is the consideration of faith-based diplomacy at the operational level, which finds ways to involve religion as a part of the solution to intractable, identity-based conflicts.⁷⁵⁶ This area of mediation can see faith-based actors leverage religious convictions, qualities and behaviours which impact the deep-rooted sentiments and structures

⁷⁵⁰ Ibid. 34

⁷⁵¹ Jafari, "Local Religious Peacemakers: An Untapped Resource in U.S. Foreign Policy." 111

⁷⁵² Johnston, "Review of the Findings." 258

⁷⁵³ Babb, *A World History of Political Thought*. IX-XI

⁷⁵⁴ Ibid. See also Eric Voegelin, "Equivalences of Experience and Symbolization in History," *Philosophical Studies* 28 (1981).

⁷⁵⁵ Johnston, "Review of the Findings." 265

⁷⁵⁶ Johnston, *Religion, Terror and Error: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual Engagement*. 56

in religious conflict.⁷⁵⁷ This strength is highlighted by Assefa, who states that “religious peacebuilders are much more likely to lead conflict parties to reconciliation and international transformation ... because they have the language, the concepts, and the legitimacy to talk about [the root causes of conflicts]”, where typically secular actors do not.⁷⁵⁸ This sentiment is echoed by scholars who state that “the argument that religious actors are best equipped to deal with problems with a religious dimension, even (or especially) where this involves those of a different religious persuasion advanced by the faith-based diplomacy school are in the ascendancy”.⁷⁵⁹ As this continues to rise, diplomatic approaches must be adapted to see the cooperative involvement of a myriad of actors in the diplomatic process. Ultimately, a new framework for analysis is required to face the challenges posed by religious extremism that enhances the capacity for spiritual engagement on various levels of the diplomatic process.⁷⁶⁰

The methodology that has been employed to construct faith-based theory must also be understood to demonstrate how theory has been formed. When the theory began to emerge in 1994, Johnston noted the research methodologies employed to introduce faith-based diplomacy and recognised some of their faults. Each study in the area of faith-based diplomacy featured a series of case studies which would estimate how influential the factors of faith-based diplomacy would be in conflict resolution.⁷⁶¹ At this time, the scholarship had only really engaged with the Christian religious tradition, while other religious traditions were difficult to find in research.⁷⁶² This is no longer the case as scholars from a variety of regions have put forward diverse perspectives on the topic. Indeed, Johnston intentionally integrated multiple religious perspectives in his 2003 edited text, *Faith-based Diplomacy: Trumping Real Politik*, where Buddhism, Judaism, Islam, and Christianity all featured in analysis. As the scholarship has considered this a more viable field of analysis, this area of inquiry has continued to expand. Inherent in the case research approach has been an emphasis on personal interviews as the main method of data collection, and this presents the danger of subjectivity, especially when considering religion.⁷⁶³ Furthermore, when investigating the intersection between religion and politics, the treatment of the data carries the danger of being oversimplified or overcomplicated, meaning that conclusions made from the data are often understood by either extreme,

⁷⁵⁷ Johnstone and Svensson, "Belligerents and Believers: Exploring Faith-Based Mediation in Internal Armed Conflicts." 561-2

⁷⁵⁸ Assefa as cited by *ibid.* 561-2

⁷⁵⁹ Marsden, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: Conservative Evangelicals and the United States Military." 479

⁷⁶⁰ Johnston, *Religion, Terror and Error: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual Engagement.* 5

⁷⁶¹ Johnston, "Introduction: Beyond Power Politics." 5

⁷⁶² *Ibid.* 5

⁷⁶³ Johnston, "Review of the Findings." 100

potentially skewing the outcomes of the study.⁷⁶⁴ When presenting faith-based diplomacy as a theory in 1994, Johnston was forthright in indicating these methodological weaknesses. The body of research has, however, gained momentum and scholarship is reflecting advancements in these areas. As this thesis serves to assess the literature and theory of faith-based diplomacy, these methodological challenges will be taken into account when evaluating faith-based diplomacy and ultimately reconceptualising the theory within a diplomatic framework.

Defining Faith-based Diplomacy

The foregoing definitions for faith-based diplomacy provide an insight into the theory's central aims, features, and mechanisms.⁷⁶⁵ Therefore, it is vital to examine the definitions articulated by scholars to gain a better understanding as to how the theory has been constructed. Although scholars have generally been congruent in their definitions, there are some areas of dissimilarity that potentially shift the scope and core focus of faith-based diplomacy. These will be discussed to elucidate how and why the definition has changed as the field has continued to expand. Before doing so, it is important to recognise that definitions are framed from the perspective and experience of the author. For a topic such as faith-based diplomacy, this means that definitions may have different forms based on a differing religious predisposition. The scholar who provides a definition may also frame that definition based on their academic perspective. Taking these considerations into account, and after having compared and contrasted the definitions, the most appropriate definition for this thesis will be proposed.

The first two terms to be defined are religious diplomacy and religious peacemaking. Both of these terms highlight certain elements that are consistent in the definitions offered by faith-based diplomacy. However, they are relatively simple and serve as a general foundation for the definitions to follow. Hall defines religious diplomacy as “a diplomacy in which advocates of religious traditions speak their understating of religious truth in such a fashion that adherents of other religious traditions are enabled to hear, investigate and safely accept or reject the religious claims offered”.⁷⁶⁶ This definition suggests that the purpose of religious

⁷⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁵ While these have been discussed in this chapter, and are elaborated elsewhere in the thesis, for a succinct overview of the principles of faith-based diplomacy, the methods for faith-based intermediaries, and the levels of application on the field, see Cox, “Faith-Based Diplomacy: The Work of the Prophets.”

⁷⁶⁶ Christopher A Hall, “Truth, Pluralism, and Religious Diplomacy: A Christian Dialogical Perspective,” in *Religion and Security: The New Nexus in International Relations*, ed. Robert A. Seiple, and Hoover, Dennis R. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005). 84

diplomacy is to open dialogue between two parties of different religious perspectives, thus more in the scope of interfaith diplomacy rather than faith-based diplomacy. This is an important consideration to make because this definition limits the actors able to engage in the dialogue process, but it also narrows the scope of the functions and practical application of this form of diplomacy. When religious principles are applied more directly to peacemaking, where peacemaking “encompasses the multitude of efforts required to resolve and transform the intractable, identity-based conflicts prevalent today”, an expanded form of religious peacemaking would be defined simply as “a variety of actions guided by religion toward the specific end result of peace”.⁷⁶⁷ This definition starts to apply the concept of religion to conflict, more specifically to identity-based, intractable conflicts. The aim provided here is that the actions of these processes will pursue peace. This definition does provide a good aim, objective, and a clear application to conflict, but it does not recognise the methods and approaches applicable to this form of peacemaking.

Looking more directly at faith-based diplomacy, Appleby poses some of its defining features. Centrally, “faith-based diplomacy makes sense where religion is seen to be a genuine and in some cases a decisive factor in the conflict, rather than a dispensable sidebar, artefact, or instrument of propaganda”.⁷⁶⁸ This sees faith-based diplomacy become a more integral feature in the consideration of policymakers when constructing a diplomatic approach to conflict. Hall notes that when religion is a driving force in conflict, whether in a determining capacity or as a supporting factor, “faith-based diplomacy can make a difference in that religion is simultaneously a way of life, an intellectual heritage, and a social tradition, all of which are constantly being contested and reinterpreted”.⁷⁶⁹ This element of the definition sees the depth and complexity of faith realised, but also the influential force that it is to multiple areas of identity. Additionally, it recognises different sources of religious influence, from which the meaning of faith is derived. Finally, Hall broadens the scope of possible engagement for faith-based diplomacy when he states that “faith-based diplomacy can also play an important role in certain conflicts, where there is no religious involvement, normally in a third-party mediating capacity”.⁷⁷⁰ The acceptance of faith-based diplomacy in a mediating role sees the concept being broadened in scope and application.

⁷⁶⁷ Jafari, "Local Religious Peacemakers: An Untapped Resource in U.S. Foreign Policy." 113

⁷⁶⁸ Appleby, "Retrieving the Missing Dimension of Statecraft: Religious Faith in the Service of Peacebuilding." 238

⁷⁶⁹ Ibid. 239

⁷⁷⁰ Ibid. 239

The expansion of faith-based diplomacy's application has come with its consideration through different theoretical lenses within Diplomacy Studies. From the perspective of public diplomacy, "faith diplomacy can be defined as 'the use of religion to communicate with global publics.' It incorporates 'religious insights and influence with traditional diplomatic practices (realpolitik) for the purposes of peacemaking'".⁷⁷¹ The notion of communicating with global publics is a central tenet of public diplomacy, but this sees religion as a method of achieving that engagement. The second part of the definition suggests that the traditional diplomatic process is engaged in order to achieve sustainable peace. This, fundamentally, is supported by other scholars – in that the traditional processes of diplomacy are used – however, there is some contestation surrounding whether traditional diplomacy, as governed by the state, is the best actor to instigate faith-based diplomacy.

From the perspective of Diplomacy Studies more broadly, Cox and Philpott put forward an extensive, descriptive definition of faith-based diplomacy. Their definition is as follows:

In the parlance of diplomats, faith-based diplomacy is 'track two,' that is, diplomacy practiced by non-state actors, officials of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), religious leaders and private citizens. Most distinctively, it is rooted in religions – their texts, their practices, their traditions, and the two-vectored spiritual orientation around which all of them revolve: first, the proper orientation of politics to the transcendent, and second, the active role of the divine in human affairs. Practitioners of faith-based diplomacy will, to be sure, draw upon secular expertise in conflict resolution and analysis, political science and philosophy, experience in national security, diplomacy, community development, and the like. But their central, orienting compass is their faith.⁷⁷²

There are several features to this definition that can be highlighted as pivotal to the composition of faith-based diplomacy. The first point is that Cox and Philpott label faith-based diplomacy as a Track Two form of diplomacy. The use of this track of diplomacy is supported by Johnston, whose definition will be discussed shortly. It is important to note, however, that even though the use of non-state actors is encouraged in faith-based diplomacy, the type of Track Two diplomacy pursued in faith-based diplomacy is unique to other Track Two approaches. Troy,

⁷⁷¹ el-Nawawy, "Muslims' Online Faith Diplomacy." 113

⁷⁷² Cox and Philpott, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: An Ancient Idea Newly Emergent." 31-2

after examining the constructs of faith-based diplomacy, elaborates on the use of Track Two diplomacy in light of faith-based diplomacy's pursuit of reconciliation. He writes,

Faith-based diplomacy seeks to transform the individual's life so that the individual can in turn transform the life of the community. That very approach forms the bases of the fundamental differences between faith-based diplomacy and other styles of track-two diplomacies: faith-based diplomacy seeks to transform conflict situation through faith and personal beliefs, which is different from those of other track-two diplomacies dealing with religious issues.⁷⁷³

These considerations set faith-based diplomacy apart as a unique approach to conflict resolution, even when considered solely within the realms of Track Two diplomacy. Returning to Cox and Philpott's definition, the next significant feature is that the methodology of faith-based diplomacy is informed by religion. Texts and practices are both included, but then scholars begin to highlight a spiritual orientation to faith-based diplomacy. A reordering of priorities and principles in the diplomatic process would see the divine (or equivalent principle in other religions) placed as the pinnacle. Here, the relationship between world politics and the divine would come back into alignment from the perspective of that religious position, and the acknowledgement would be made that the divine has a part to play in human affairs – including conflict. The final point made by Cox and Philpott relates to the role of the diplomat in faith-based diplomacy. This definition encourages the faith-based diplomat to use their skills from a variety of areas, but faith will always be their guiding principle. This definition is extensive and recognises the essential elements required when defining faith-based diplomacy.

The final definitions of faith-based diplomacy that will be examined in this thesis are the definitions that are proposed by Douglas Johnston. Johnston offers some simple definitions of faith-based diplomacy in his 2011 text. His overview of the theory states that:

At the macro level, faith-based diplomacy simply means incorporating religious considerations into the practice of international politics. At the operational level, it involves making religion part of the solution to intractable, identity-based conflicts that escape the reach of traditional diplomacy. Typically these conflicts include an ethnic, tribal, or religious dimension.⁷⁷⁴

⁷⁷³ Troy, "Faith-Based Diplomacy under Examination." 217-8

⁷⁷⁴ Johnston, *Religion, Terror and Error: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual Engagement*. 56

These two understandings of faith-based diplomacy identify the level at which they are applied. When considering the type of resolution that faith-based diplomacy seeks to achieve, Johnston remarks that, “a distinguishing characteristic of faith-based diplomacy is the fact that it is more about reconciliation than the absence of conflict. It is about restoring respectful relationships between the parties” which are achieved “through a broader array of roles than those normally associated with traditional diplomacy – from impartial observer to message carrier, empathetic advocate, or activist”.⁷⁷⁵ These are the foundations upon which the primary definition of faith-based diplomacy is built.

Johnston and Cox have provided the most succinct and encompassing definition of faith-based diplomacy. It is one that has been used in multiple articles and is often regarded as authoritative in terms of theory:

Faith-based diplomacy, while conceptually new to the field of international relations, is a form of Track II (unofficial) diplomacy that integrates the dynamics of religious faith with the conduct of international peacemaking. As such, it is more about reconciliation than it is conflict resolution. The peace that it pursues is not the mere absence of conflict but rather a restoration of healthy and respectful relationships between the parties.⁷⁷⁶

This definition has four central elements that form the bedrock of faith-based diplomacy as a theory. First, the definition frames faith-based diplomacy as a Track Two form of diplomacy. Second, religious faith is incorporated into the processes of peacemaking. Third, the focus is on reconciliation, not just conflict resolution.⁷⁷⁷ Finally, the process aims to achieve restoration of relationships. As seen throughout this section, there is generally corroboration between authors about these key features, which is why this definition is maintained as the primary definition for the theory. As stated above by Johnston and Cox, faith-based diplomacy is conceptually new to the discipline of International Relations, and thus there must be scope in this definition to appreciate how it may change over time.

⁷⁷⁵ Ibid.56

⁷⁷⁶ Johnston and Cox, "Faith-Based Diplomacy and Preventive Engagement." 15

⁷⁷⁷ Generally, reconciliation seeks to move beyond the resolution of conflict to restore healthy relationships between parties, often regarded as a deeper process in the post-conflict society. For definitions and examples see David J. Whittaker, *Conflict and Reconciliation in the Contemporary World* (London: Routledge, 1999). With particular reference to religion and reconciliation, see Amy Benson Brown and Karen Poremski, *Roads to Reconciliation Conflict and Dialogue in the Twenty-First Century* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2005).17-88

As such, there are two major limitations to this definition which can be identified upon review of the current literature. The first is that the definition states faith-based diplomacy is only a Track Two form of diplomacy. By saying this, traditional tracks of diplomacy are isolated. Track Two is most preferred and most effective when considering faith-based diplomacy, but disengaging official diplomatic agents from applying faith-based approaches to the diplomatic process may be disadvantageous for developing the field in the future. Furthermore, the latter part of the definition places reconciliation as the primary target above conflict resolution. Again, this may be a limiting factor. Faith-based diplomacy may have a role in a mediating capacity in conflict resolution, and its primary goal can still be reconciliation, but the involvement of faith-based diplomacy for the long-term can see this approach to diplomacy cemented as a method to achieving a more encompassing positive peace. Essentially, these two limitations have been identified because as the body of literature has expanded, so too has the role of faith-based diplomacy – and this should be reflected in any evolving definition. Borrowing Johnston and Cox’s definition as a framework, a definition that accounts for these points may be proposed as follows: *Faith-based diplomacy is a form of diplomacy usually conducted by, but not limited to, Track Two agents. Faith-based diplomacy integrates the dynamics of religious faith with the conduct and processes of international peacemaking. As such, reconciliation is the primary goal of faith-based diplomacy in conflict resolution as faith-based diplomacy seeks not only the absence of conflict, but the restoration of relationships between parties to establish positive peace.* This definition provides the capacity and flexibility to see faith-based diplomacy applied to a broader context, accounting for its growing viability as a diplomatic approach in the 21st Century.

Faith-based Diplomat

Along with defining the term faith-based diplomacy, scholars have also identified some central characteristics of a diplomat who engages in faith-based diplomacy. These characteristics will help expand the definition of faith-based diplomacy and suggest how the principles of faith-based diplomacy are manifested through practice. Appleby presents some elements of the role and skills of an effective faith-based diplomat. He writes:

Can the faith-based diplomat be seen, therefore, as a technical consultant, a member of a new class of religious experts, one who could serve, for example, as a cultural attaché assigned to an embassy or a ministry of foreign affairs? Yes

– but that is not enough. . . . The faith-based diplomat . . . should be a person of faith, one who understands the psychodynamics of religion and spirituality because he or she has experienced them personally and has mediated or reflected on them and on their relevance to conflict transformation. . . .the faith-based diplomat must find and widen the narrow path between religious extremism and religious commitment that exists within a threatened religious community.⁷⁷⁸

This would create what Appleby describes as a “new breed of diplomat” that can enable elements of a community to accept reconciliation and enhance the peacemaking capabilities within a community.⁷⁷⁹ In this approach, the diplomat’s “central, orienting compass is their faith”, but they will draw upon the skills of secular diplomacy to augment this approach.⁷⁸⁰ This is reinforced by the understanding that “political order is shaped by a divinely grounded vision” (or other equivalences) where the relationships with society – the horizontal plane – is informed by the relationship with the divine (or sacred) – the vertical plane.⁷⁸¹ The work that a faith-based diplomat does for the peace process will be based on how they understand the divine plan for humanity⁷⁸² – or, to use a non-Abrahamic religious concept, the *dharma* (teaching) in Indic thought.

When the elements of faith that are conducive to peacemaking have been identified, this will translate into revised policies. This idea looks to “particular ambassadorial virtues and character traits that mark the religious diplomat. . . .”⁷⁸³ Hall studies how these traits are evident in the Abrahamic religious traditions and suggests that they are conducive to interfaith diplomacy. Identifying how a diplomat is situated within a particular religious tradition is important to understanding their viewpoint and how this will inform their diplomatic engagement.⁷⁸⁴ Johnston and Cox identify five characteristics that inform the actions of a faith-based diplomat. These are:

1. There is a conscious dependency on spiritual principles and resources in the conduct of peacemaking;

⁷⁷⁸ Appleby, "Retrieving the Missing Dimension of Statecraft: Religious Faith in the Service of Peacebuilding." 242

⁷⁷⁹ Ibid. 243

⁷⁸⁰ Cox and Philpott, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: An Ancient Idea Newly Emergent." 31-2

⁷⁸¹ Ibid. 32-3

⁷⁸² Ibid. 33

⁷⁸³ Hall, "Truth, Pluralism, and Religious Diplomacy: A Christian Dialogical Perspective." 85

⁷⁸⁴ Thompson, "Religion and Diplomacy." 205

2. They operate with a certain spiritual authority;
3. A pluralistic heart;
4. A transcendent approach to conflict resolution; and
5. Their ability to persevere against overwhelming odds.⁷⁸⁵

In this approach, the fundamental principle of an effective faith-based diplomat is a deep understanding of qualities that constitute the religious and the way they see the world.

There are several skills that should be employed for effective faith-based diplomacy. One such skill is that faith-based diplomats bring “a distinct ability to address the complex role of religion” to clarify the conflict puzzle.⁷⁸⁶ Another is “a practical on-the-ground understanding of the nature of conflict among the people” which enables “the knowledge and authority to take action and move communities toward peace”.⁷⁸⁷ These skills are revealed in the way that faith-based diplomats engage in the mediation process. Through ‘corridor diplomacy’, looking at behind-the-scenes, nonofficial tracks of diplomacy, faith-based diplomats can intervene as a third-party to change the form of negotiations.⁷⁸⁸ Brewer, Higgins and Teeney examine the role of religious peacemakers, and support Little’s claims who found that the religious diplomat can make a noticeable difference in peacemaking for three reasons. First, it supplies a theology or hermeneutics of peace; second, it gives religious peacemakers detachment and trustworthiness; and third, it serves as a corrective to the focus on the specifically religious dimensions of violence.⁷⁸⁹ While this helps establish peacemaking in cases where religion is the fundamental cause of violence, religious peacemakers can at times exacerbate tensions and lose their perceived neutrality.⁷⁹⁰ This may occur if the religious leader is too one-sided, attempts to consolidate their power, or indeed adds to the violence. Being aware of the potential negative impact is important when employing a faith-based diplomat, which is why observers have worked to observe integral qualities of the religious agent to ensure that neutrality is protected, and conflict does not intensify. Thompson has identified four central qualities which should be visible in faith-based diplomats to assist in achieving success. First is what can be called divine/transcendent dependence.⁷⁹¹ Second, the faith-based diplomat would treat perseverance and patience as imperatives into which they must grow in

⁷⁸⁵ Johnston and Cox, "Faith-Based Diplomacy and Preventive Engagement." 16-17

⁷⁸⁶ Jafari, "Local Religious Peacemakers: An Untapped Resource in U.S. Foreign Policy." 124-5

⁷⁸⁷ *Ibid.* 124-5

⁷⁸⁸ Johnston, "Introduction: Beyond Power Politics." 4

⁷⁸⁹ Brewer, Higgins, and Teeney, "Religion and Peacemaking: A Conceptualization." 1032-3

⁷⁹⁰ *Ibid.* 1032-3

⁷⁹¹ Thompson, "Religion and Diplomacy." 205-7

the diplomatic process and not as potential options.⁷⁹² Third, the faith-based diplomat is aware of and weighs spiritual authority appropriately.⁷⁹³ This spiritual authority is derived from the individual or institution that the diplomat represents.⁷⁹⁴ The fourth quality entails the faith-based diplomat having an awareness and knowledge of religious pluralism.⁷⁹⁵ Thompson suggests that “the formidability of the inclusion of religion, let alone plurality of religions, is to be admitted” as religion represents a “structural component of the social order” and is therefore difficult to remove from the process without complications.⁷⁹⁶ These central characteristics help inform how a faith-based diplomat can operate in the diplomatic process.

Looking at how the faith-based diplomat can be employed in the diplomatic landscape is an area that has yet to be fully realised in scholarship. Research does indicate the constructive role faith-based diplomacy can play as a third-party mediator, but the training of diplomats should also be reviewed to assess the viability of introducing faith-based diplomacy at a more influential level. For example, when negotiating with disputants that apply a faith perspective, a diplomat who has been trained in religion has the credibility to engage with that party and, in a sense, ‘call their bluff’.⁷⁹⁷ The counter to this, however, is that religious peacemakers will be able to identify the religious actors in the community who may be able to assist in the peacemaking process.⁷⁹⁸ Thus, diplomats must be skilled at evaluating the dynamics of a religion’s actors at the negotiating table and also in the processes of community reconstruction. With respect to the formal training of diplomatic staff, ambassadors and diplomats should have a deep understanding of the faiths practised in the country to which they have been assigned and also in conflict areas where they may be negotiating, for example as special envoys in shuttle diplomacy.⁷⁹⁹ This changes the required training of diplomats and recognises the central role religion plays in individual and communal identities. As a result, the home nation should train core specialists in religion to then assign them as experts to key strategic embassies.⁸⁰⁰ This urge for more explicit training was offered by Albright, who identified this as a major weakness in the US State Department. To appropriately train diplomats, particularly diplomats who operate in the conventional state-centric diplomatic environment, a more rigorous

⁷⁹² Ibid. 205-7

⁷⁹³ Ibid. 205-7

⁷⁹⁴ Ibid. 207

⁷⁹⁵ Ibid. 205-207

⁷⁹⁶ Ibid. 209

⁷⁹⁷ Albright, "Faith and Diplomacy." 7

⁷⁹⁸ Jafari, "Local Religious Peacemakers: An Untapped Resource in U.S. Foreign Policy." 125

⁷⁹⁹ Albright, "Faith and Diplomacy." 8

⁸⁰⁰ Ibid. 8

framework of faith-based diplomacy must be created. The goal of this thesis is to provide the parameters of such a framework so that diplomats may be armed with the rubrics of application of faith-based diplomacy, allowing it to become a viable arm of national strategy.

Interfaith Diplomacy

The final section of this chapter explores the concept of interfaith diplomacy. This is important as many elements of interfaith diplomacy are predicated on the principles espoused in faith-based diplomacy. In interfaith diplomacy, however, the primary function is to practise diplomacy between faith groups. Some elements of interfaith diplomacy may be important in informing a framework for faith-based diplomacy. Fundamentally, “moral warrants for peacemaking exist in the theologies of all major world religions”, however, “their development and articulation have been inadequate, despite the increasing need to apply religious principles and instruments to the practical work of conflict prevention and resolution”.⁸⁰¹ This area is, therefore, still developing and being tested. Yet, the raw materials are available to see this method improved. Essentially, many view “interfaith dialogue as the religious bodies’ equivalent of the United Nations”, where dialogue between different perspectives is maintained as the highest priority.⁸⁰² In a simple form, Sookhdeo sees that interfaith dialogue, “advocates a value-free approach to other faiths and cultures that accepts them all as valid spiritualities and ways to God”.⁸⁰³ This is a starting point in the area of interfaith dialogue, but the methodologies employed to achieve this are being severely tested in the 21st Century. Notably, the frameworks of interfaith dialogue have been drastically impacted in the post-September 11 era, and the ‘interrogation’ of interfaith diplomacy began in earnest.⁸⁰⁴

Studies have been conducted to look at the potential of interfaith diplomacy in enhancing dialogue between faiths. Azumah examines the relationship between Christianity and Islam after September 11, 2001, drawing out key features that promote success in interfaith diplomacy. In an aim to define interfaith dialogue, Sookhdeo identifies driving motivations. They include:

⁸⁰¹ Johnston and Cox, "Faith-Based Diplomacy and Preventive Engagement." 15

⁸⁰² Sookhdeo as cited by John Azumah, "Evangelical Christian Views and Attitudes Towards Christian–Muslim Dialogue," *Transformation* 29, no. 2 (2012). 128

⁸⁰³ Ibid. 129

⁸⁰⁴ Ibid. 128

1. A perception that Christians have treated Muslims badly in the past (as in the Crusades and the colonial period) and even in the present (as in contemporary neo-colonialism), and a belief that Christians should acknowledge these mistakes and repent. Often the behaviour of Christians is identified with that of Western governments.
2. A conviction that the contemporary policies of Western governments, particularly since 1979 (from the creation of the Taliban to the current war in Afghanistan), are responsible for the recent Muslim violence toward the West, and a call to the West now to redefine its relationships with the Muslim world.
3. A sense that Christian mission activities in the Muslim world, and indeed among Muslims in the West, embody Western hostility towards Islam. This position is now being argued not just by Muslim countries and organisations but also by Western governments and even some Western Christian denominations. The freedom to propagate one's faith, enshrined in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, is quietly overlooked in this context.
4. The embracing by many participants of a relativism and postmodernism that affirms everything and denies nothing. This includes not only an affirmation of Islam's legitimacy, but also the belief that Islam should be protected legally, both internationally and nationally; as a result it tends to privilege Islam and downgrade Christianity.
5. A widespread belief among Muslim participants that Christianity [is] a religion of violence, inextricably linked with a corrupt West.⁸⁰⁵

These five motivations are argued to have resulted from the events of September 11 and demonstrate the deep-rooted tension that exists between the two religious perspectives. If this is the perspective of Muslim participants in interfaith dialogue, the Christian counterparts have noted their limitations to interfaith dialogue, including: the denial of truth claims and the uniqueness of Christ; suspicion and concerns about compromise and syncretism; questions about dialogue, evangelism and mission; and the lack of 'a level playing field'.⁸⁰⁶ This is only one perspective of these interactions post-2001, and while other findings may suggest other perspectives on the issue, this example does illuminate the underpinning tensions that must be recognised, if not resolved, before entering into formal diplomacy between faiths.⁸⁰⁷

⁸⁰⁵ Ibid. 129-30

⁸⁰⁶ Ibid. 130

⁸⁰⁷ For more on the Islamic and Christian interactions in the post-2001 era, see Jane Smith, "Muslim-Christian Relations: Historical and Contemporary Realities," (Oxford University Press, 2015).

There are some problems evident in the contemporary international system that must be identified when considering interfaith diplomacy. One key area of concern in interfaith diplomacy is the use of language. Other religious traditions contest many elements of a given religion. This means the language used in dialogue is imperative. As Sayeed-Miller notes: “Not only are intercultural, interethnic, and interfaith sources of conflict and epistemic commitments being contested, so too are languages of terms”.⁸⁰⁸ Disagreement exists, even within the same religious tradition, about how to approach a different faith to engage in dialogue. An example identified by Azumah is that of American Christian “conservatives” denouncing their “progressive” counterparts for their more liberal stance on Islam.⁸⁰⁹ Before entering into negotiations to represent one religious tradition, the internal positions of that faith must first be settled. A trend that has emerged in the international arena in the 21st Century is that of Islamophobia. The rise of the fear of Islam has many contributing factors, from the persecution of Christians in Muslim countries, the harsh methods of militant groups, and the impact of provocative pronouncements by social conservatives.⁸¹⁰ Interfaith diplomacy may be an effective strategy to combat the rising trend of Islamophobia and its divisive influence on society. One way to achieve this is to encourage dialogue between religious leaders of different faiths, then urge social and communal engagement between congregations.⁸¹¹ These ideas are formative but do demonstrate that there is a pressing need for positive interfaith relations. An example of where this is taking place is in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, an institution which supports dialogue among religions as a way to reduce Islamophobia around the world.⁸¹² So central is this aim that it has been enshrined in the institution’s charter, stating that the Organization of Islamic Cooperation determined to “to contribute to international peace and security, understanding and dialogue among civilizations, cultures and religions and promote and encourage friendly relations and good neighbourliness, mutual respect and cooperation”.⁸¹³

While such a pursuit is desirable, there is a gap in the diplomatic literature regarding the similarities between religious traditions that could form the basis of positive interfaith

⁸⁰⁸ Sayeed-Miller, "Public Diplomacy and Transnational Cases of Blasphemy." 102

⁸⁰⁹ Azumah, "Evangelical Christian Views and Attitudes Towards Christian–Muslim Dialogue." 136

⁸¹⁰ Douglas M. Johnston, "Combating Islamophobia," *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* 51, no. 2 (2016). 171-2

⁸¹¹ *Ibid.* 172-3

⁸¹² For more on civilisational dialogue programs from the Islamic perspective, see T. Kayaoglu, "Constructing the Dialogue of Civilizations in World Politics: A Case of Global Islamic Activism," *Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations* 23, no. 2 (2012).

⁸¹³ Organization of Islamic Cooperation, "Charter of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation " <http://ww1.oic-oci.org/english/charter/OIC%20Charter-new-en.pdf>. 2

dialogue. Despite the work done in addressing this lacuna, such as Küng's formula for a global ethic which noted that there would be no peace among religions without dialogue,⁸¹⁴ September 11 and resultant global events have reinforced this gap in literature. Appleby notes that, "indeed, the cultural capaciousness of Islam and Christianity is a woefully underdeveloped resource in conflict resolution in general".⁸¹⁵ The history of religions and their tradition demonstrates that there are spaces of similarity, such as the connection between Jesus and Abraham, the continuity between the Abrahamic community and the new covenant, Christian community, and recognition of major Jewish and Christian figures as prophets within Islamic viewpoints.⁸¹⁶ The connections between the Abrahamic faith traditions are reinforced in scripture, which affirms that Christian identity and Judaism are shaped from common foundations.⁸¹⁷ Indeed, "as the Abrahamic faiths understand it, God reveals his vision for how his people are to live together through scriptural texts".⁸¹⁸ Some literature also suggests that traditionally Western concepts, such as democracy, are potentially compatible with Islam.⁸¹⁹ The effective models to facilitate this wider dialogue have not as yet been developed.

In application, interfaith diplomacy was a central feature to the negotiations between US President Jimmy Carter, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli President Menachem Begin. Carter entered the negotiations with the hope that "religion would ultimately contribute to finding a resolution of the differences in the Middle East".⁸²⁰ To best prepare for the negotiations, Carter realised his need to understand the position of his interlocutors and intentionally equipped himself with knowledge of the Islamic faith.⁸²¹ When preparing for interfaith dialogue, Carter noted that he would reinforce the role religion would play in the talks and encouraged the three parties to discuss their individual beliefs informally to build

⁸¹⁴ See Küng, *A Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics*.

⁸¹⁵ Appleby, "Retrieving the Missing Dimension of Statecraft: Religious Faith in the Service of Peacebuilding." 236

⁸¹⁶ Manfred T. Brauch, "Choosing Exclusion or Embrace: An Abrahamic Theological Perspective," in *Religion and Security: The New Nexus in International Relations*, ed. Robert A. Seiple, and Hoover, Dennis R. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005). 64

⁸¹⁷ Ibid. 65

⁸¹⁸ Cox and Philpott, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: An Ancient Idea Newly Emergent." 32

⁸¹⁹ The idea of consolidating Western democratic ideals into Islamic thinking is a significant debate that has garnered a large amount of scholarly attention. For some considerations on this debate, see John M. Owen IV, "What History Says About the Prospects for Islamic Democracy" *The Washington Post* 2015; James B. Hoesterey, "Is Indonesia a Model for the Arab Spring? Islam, Democracy, and Diplomacy," *Review of Middle East Studies* 47, no. 1 (2013). 58; and, Jocelyne Cesari, "Why ISIS Is Not All of Political Islam and What It Means for Democracy" *Projects on Middle East Political Science* <https://pomeps.org/2015/06/22/why-isis-is-not-all-of-political-islam-and-what-it-means-for-democracy/>.

⁸²⁰ D. Jason Berggren, "Carter, Sadat, and Begin: Using Evangelical-Style Presidential Diplomacy in the Middle East," (Oxford University Press, 2014). 747

⁸²¹ Ibid. 747

confidence in their relationships.⁸²² Positively, Egyptian president Sadat famously spoke in Israel about pursuing peace on this mutual basis and later received the Nobel Peace Prize.⁸²³ This example demonstrates that there are fruitful elements of interfaith diplomacy that can translate into the diplomatic process, but these remain underdeveloped.

This section on interfaith diplomacy has indicated a need to understand it better, and to construct frameworks for interfaith engagement to resolve the complex issues within its remit. The significant consideration to be made here is that interfaith diplomacy suggests improved dialogue and diplomacy between two different religious perspectives. This differentiates interfaith diplomacy from faith-based diplomacy. Faith-based diplomacy looks more toward the inherent values of religion that inform a diplomat and the diplomatic process. As a result, faith-based diplomacy could theoretically be conducted between parties of the same religious tradition, of different religious traditions, or even in processes where the faith-based diplomat plays a mediating capacity. Essentially, faith-based diplomacy considers the precursors that inform diplomacy, whereas interfaith diplomacy is concerned with the practical application of diplomacy between faith groups. An effective framework of faith-based diplomacy could eventually enhance the application of interfaith dialogue, which is why it is being examined in this thesis.

⁸²² Ibid. 748

⁸²³ For more on this address, see "40 Years since Egyptian President Sadat's Historic Speech at the Knesset ", Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs <https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Pages/40-years-since-Saadat%27s-historic-speech-at-the-Knesset-.aspx>.

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Scholarship of Faith-based Diplomacy

The focus of this chapter is to examine the linkages between faith-based diplomacy and the scholarship of International Relations and Diplomacy Studies. The first section will highlight the scholarly considerations that form the basis of faith-based diplomacy. How this connects with International Relations scholarship will then be discussed. Faith-based diplomacy's scope within the scholarship of Diplomacy Studies is the third section, followed by an examination of sub-disciplines within Diplomacy Studies that demonstrate a level of compatibility with faith-based diplomacy. Finally, available frameworks for understanding faith-based diplomacy in the wider scholarship will be identified to present the theoretical and intellectual foundations of faith-based diplomacy.

Scholarship of Faith-based Diplomacy

In 1994 Burnett examined the impact of faith-based diplomacy on the foreign policy community, concluding that “there will be no attempt here to construct a fresh theoretical framework because a satisfactory framework already exists”.⁸²⁴ This may have been the case in the 1990s, but since then much has changed in the international system and the theoretical bases of faith-based diplomacy need to be reconsidered. As Johnston recognised, the models used to integrate faith into diplomacy simply took old frameworks and adapted them to new problems even if they were not designed to accommodate those changes.⁸²⁵ Academics and practitioners alike have called for the role of religion in diplomacy to be more critically examined, with Albright urging that spiritual matters be considered as an integral part of diplomatic study in the future.⁸²⁶ Hehir argues that “if you look at standard textbooks of international relations or the way we organize our foreign ministry, there's no place where a sophisticated understanding of religion as a public force in the world is dealt with”.⁸²⁷ This gap is evident in that a systematic assessment of the engagement of faith-based and religious actors in conflict resolution does not exist. In view of this, it is not surprising that policy decisions

⁸²⁴ Burnett, "Implications for the Foreign Policy Community." 296

⁸²⁵ Johnston, "Looking Ahead: Toward a New Paradigm." 333

⁸²⁶ Albright, "Faith and Diplomacy." 4

⁸²⁷ Hehir as cited by *ibid.* 4

based on misguided understandings of the diverse religious landscape have become too common.⁸²⁸ Although the scholarship in the conflict resolution field is growing,⁸²⁹ it has yet to recognise the importance of adapting and applying conflict resolution strategies to religious communities at their various levels.⁸³⁰

There are several reasons for the apparent neglect of religion in scholarship, particularly in regard to international political scholarship. Agensky suggests that the underlining reasons “were issues of disciplinary identity, positivist American political science, and received wisdom about religion’s epiphenomenal nature or irrelevance with respect to collective political action, state international, and system effects under anarchical conditions”.⁸³¹ The trend for scholars to abstain from theoretical and systematic study of the role of religion in politics also occurred as a result of the general acceptance that wars which were caused by religion were primarily an event of history.⁸³² If wars fought in the name of religion were a thing of the past, scholarly attention could be better spent elsewhere. However, the neglect of religion in scholarship became apparent through the post-Cold War era of international relations, and these gaps required urgent addressing following the Global War on Terror.⁸³³ Even scholarship generated in this climate runs the risk of not addressing religion effectively.⁸³⁴ Various schools of thought have encouraged the creation of new scholarly disciplines focusing on cross-cultural analysis, all being reinforced by improved research methodologies.⁸³⁵ This trend in theoretical expansions has been bolstered by the decline in support for the secularisation theory. Maddox, in evaluating the progress of scholarship regarding secularisation, has noted that the ‘secularisation thesis’ of 19th Century sociology “predicted that, with modernisation, religion would fade, to be replaced by enlightenment rationality, science, scientific socialism, or some blend”, but that the end of the 20th Century proved otherwise: “Only parts of Europe followed the script. Resurgences of religion elsewhere – and

⁸²⁸ Jafari, "Local Religious Peacemakers: An Untapped Resource in U.S. Foreign Policy." 115

⁸²⁹ For more on the expansions of conflict resolution studies, see Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*, Fourth ed. (Cambridge Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2016). This text thoroughly documents advancements that have been made to consider the role of gender, culture, religion, local forms of justice, and other topics in traditional frames of analysis in the area of conflict resolution.

⁸³⁰ Vendley and Little, "Implications for Religious Communities: Buddhism, Islam, Hinduism, and Christianity." 313

⁸³¹ Agensky, "Recognizing Religion: Politics, History, and the “Long 19th Century”." 731

⁸³² Sandal and James, "Religion and International Relations Theory: Towards a Mutual Understanding." 5

⁸³³ Agensky, "Recognizing Religion: Politics, History, and the “Long 19th Century”." 731

⁸³⁴ *Ibid.* 731

⁸³⁵ *Ibid.* 743. For example, see Glen Fisher, *International Negotiation: A Cross-Cultural Perspective* (Chicago: Intercultural Press, 1980).

politically-assertive religion, at that – forced the secularisation thesis’s surviving proponents to reconsider their theory.”⁸³⁶ With the central claims of the secularisation thesis having been challenged, a space opened for faith-based theories to be investigated.

When the initial constructs of theory for faith-based diplomacy were created, academics noted the need to go beyond the traditional focus on the state, within the theoretic perspective of political realism, and consider nongovernmental actors operating at sub-national levels.⁸³⁷ Political realism is underpinned by the rational actor model of decision making, which argues that the state will pursue its own self-interest and maximise power when deciding on policy.⁸³⁸ However, the rational actor model fails to take into account the impact of supposed ‘irrational’ factors, including the role of religion, when deciding on that policy.⁸³⁹ These approaches will be discussed in greater depth in the ‘Available Frameworks of Analysis for Faith-based Diplomacy’ section below. By looking beyond this traditionalist approach to foreign policy construction, policymakers can more accurately appreciate the complex contemporary environment, reorient their thinking toward religion and, ultimately, reshape their strategy as a result of this new information.⁸⁴⁰ Observers have noted that the time is ripe for “unconventional approaches”, where traditional methodologies of diplomacy can be coupled with religious peacemaking to address communal conflict.⁸⁴¹ Already, the impacts of religion on “security, rights, aid, foreign policy, track-two diplomacy, and democratization, as well as their metatheoretical implications” have been discussed by scholars.⁸⁴² These advancements in theory, like the challenge to the secularisation thesis, suggest that there is room for theoretical complementarity.

When considering faith in the construction of theory, Farr recommends that analysts identify that “religion is normative, not epiphenomenal, in human affairs”.⁸⁴³ If religion was epiphenomenal, it would be the result of another driving factor. However, if religion is treated as a normative force, theoreticians can recognise its ability to influence and drive behaviour. The ability of policymakers to meet the challenges of the 21st Century will in large part be

⁸³⁶ Maddox, "Finding God in Global Politics." 186

⁸³⁷ Johnston, "Looking Ahead: Toward a New Paradigm." 333

⁸³⁸ Johnston, "Introduction: Real Politik Expanded." 5. See also John J. Mearsheimer, "Reckless States and Realism," *International Relations* 23, no. 2 (2009). And Konstantinos Kostagiannis, *Realist Thought and the Nation-State: Power Politics in the Age of Nationalism* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).

⁸³⁹ Johnston, "Introduction: Real Politik Expanded." 5

⁸⁴⁰ *Religion, Terror and Error: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual Engagement*. 10

⁸⁴¹ "Religion and Foreign Policy."

⁸⁴² Agensky, "Recognizing Religion: Politics, History, and the “Long 19th Century”." 732

⁸⁴³ Thomas F. Farr, "Diplomacy in an Age of Faith," *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 2 (2008).

influenced by the basic assumptions of the international system which have been informed by the conceptual lenses used to examine global affairs.⁸⁴⁴ When this conceptual lens is applied to faith, clear and unique linkages between diplomacy, culture, and religion can be identified to form the basis of theory.⁸⁴⁵ These conceptual and normative frames have enabled faith-based diplomacy to advance theoretically in the area of conflict reconciliation impacting the personal and societal levels.⁸⁴⁶ Theorists of faith-based diplomacy are recognising the common ground regarding how different religions approach peace, the capacity for interfaith cooperation on conflict resolution, and how religious leaders can be more effective in delivering humanitarian assistance and assisting in community reconstruction efforts.⁸⁴⁷ Much can still be done in the study across disciplines, such as the examination of peacebuilding and religious freedom.⁸⁴⁸ Advancements in this scholarship will strengthen progress made in the broader field of faith-based diplomacy. The emerging contemporary scholarship “has successfully dismantled problematic assumptions about religion and international politics” which has ultimately established “a powerful new research agenda”,⁸⁴⁹ upon which this thesis builds.

Some challenges and limitations are still apparent in the scholarship. There is evidence to suggest that religious actors can play a positive role as an intermediary peacemaker. Yet the scholarship on this issue is still finding support partially due to the fact that legitimate documentation and available research is often fragmentary.⁸⁵⁰ While there exists a strong literature on religious politics, the same cannot be said of more refined scopes of analysis, for example, religion-related public diplomacy.⁸⁵¹ In this case, Seib sees the potential of religion-related public diplomacy strategies as an effective counterweight to the violent and extremist form of religious politics, but the faith-based diplomatic strategy needs more credence to stand alone in the conduct of international relations.⁸⁵² A further challenge to overcome is what Agensky calls a Eurocentric philosophy of religion. Here religion is “contemplative, private, and prone to devastating consequences when made public” which “has long maintained a foundational, authoritative, and constitutive force within international political scholarship, casting religion as exceptional to main-stream politics and religiously identified actors as

⁸⁴⁴ Saunders, "Relational Realism: Toward a New Political Paradigm for Security." 165

⁸⁴⁵ Pokhariyal, "The Influence of Religion, Technology, and Economy on Culture, Diplomacy, and Peace." 44

⁸⁴⁶ Troy, "Faith-Based Diplomacy under Examination." 228

⁸⁴⁷ Marsden, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: Conservative Evangelicals and the United States Military." 494

⁸⁴⁸ Philpott, "Religious Freedom and Peacebuilding: May I Introduce You Two?." 31

⁸⁴⁹ Agensky, "Recognizing Religion: Politics, History, and the “Long 19th Century”." 748

⁸⁵⁰ Johnston, "Review of the Findings." 258

⁸⁵¹ Seib, "Conclusion: The Future of Religion and Public Diplomacy." 219

⁸⁵² *Ibid.* 219

inherently suspect”.⁸⁵³ This Western-centric scholarship presents “the incomplete nature of secularism in the West itself”, and a “misrecognition of religion” resulting in its neglect as a potential part of diplomacy.⁸⁵⁴ The appropriate measures to address these limitations are found in developing scholarship that broadens the scope of critical analysis.

Faith-based Diplomacy in the Scope of International Relations and Diplomacy Theory

International Relations Scholarship

Faith-based diplomacy relates to a number of theories of International Relations showing clear compatibility and explanatory value. This section will explore the way in which the metatheories⁸⁵⁵ in the field of International Relations link to faith-based diplomacy, before refining the scope of analysis to Diplomacy Studies. In terms of the research methodology employed to study religion in International Relations, Maddox reviewed texts which draw “lightly from the existing corpus of religious studies, whose theoretical insights could deepen the discussion” of religion in International Relations scholarship.⁸⁵⁶ What Maddox finds is that both approaches to studying religion in International Relations, being either a presentation of large empirical data sets on religion, or small empirical studies lending to a qualitative approach, could be improved by one another, suggesting that the methodologies themselves must be strengthened. Sandal and James note that the marginalisation of religion in International Relations scholarship is primarily a result of International Relations theoreticians being reluctant to engage with religion, rather than International Relations scholarship itself being incompatible with religion.⁸⁵⁷ They argue that “religion can indeed be employed as a variable in explanatory [International Relations] theory as a part of ostensibly objective accounts of what is going on ‘out there’”.⁸⁵⁸ By using this approach, scholars have noted that even the challenging forms of International Relations theory can accommodate religion in some sense, which is necessary if domestic politics, international politics and foreign policy decisions are to be better understood.⁸⁵⁹

⁸⁵³ Agensky, "Recognizing Religion: Politics, History, and the "Long 19th Century"." 730

⁸⁵⁴ Ibid. 737

⁸⁵⁵ Metatheories is a term used to describe the foundational theories of International Relations (being realism, liberalism, and more recently constructivism).

⁸⁵⁶ Maddox, "Finding God in Global Politics." 194

⁸⁵⁷ Sandal and James, "Religion and International Relations Theory: Towards a Mutual Understanding." 4

⁸⁵⁸ Ibid.4

⁸⁵⁹ Ibid. 4

The foundational feature of International Relations scholarship is the metatheories that have been developed over time. The study conducted by Sandal and James on the link between religion and International Relations theory will be used as the basis for discussing realism, liberalism and their contemporary forms of neorealism and neoliberalism, and how these metatheories intersect with religion. Within classical realism, realists typically demonstrate an aversion to the use of ideology or religion, particularly by elites.⁸⁶⁰ However, ideology is valid in the realist lens if the ideology is utilised as a tool of legitimacy, if the state itself is based on that ideology, and also if the decisionmakers of that state are affected by a dimension of that ideology.⁸⁶¹ The place of religion in classical realism is substantiated by the scholars of the English School who evaluated the role of Christianity in the roots of international relations.⁸⁶² Classical realism does, moreover, provide a suitable lens for sub-state accounts of religion that “focus on human nature, the flexible definition of rationality, interest and power as well as the widely used terminology of emotions and cognition” which “allow for integration of studies of belief systems and worldviews, over which religion has significant influence”.⁸⁶³ Still, even within this traditional frame, Patterson sees that the national security community can be strengthened by bringing more comparative politics, and religious and cultural studies into the approaches to education of traditional International Relations concepts such as security.⁸⁶⁴ In enhancing the theories available, the education and training process will be improved, hopefully leading to more successful practical outcomes. When looking at the contemporary form of this theory, neorealism does not easily accommodate religion, apart from potentially allowing the incorporation of moral considerations only as they apply to the actors within the international sphere.⁸⁶⁵ In fact, Sandal and James found that structural realism is the most challenging framework within which religion can play a role. They note that “there is always the possibility of coming up with a ‘complementary’ model of foreign policy that includes religion as a variable” but the challenge to this is that “such a model would still have to accept its conceptual subordination to the system-level theory”.⁸⁶⁶

The liberal theoretical perspective, however, is more accepting of the role of religion in international politics. Neoliberalism, in particular, maintains the assumption that transnational

⁸⁶⁰ Ibid. 12

⁸⁶¹ Ibid. 12

⁸⁶² Lynch, "Christian Ethics, Actors, and Diplomacy: Mediating Universalist Pretensions." 616

⁸⁶³ Sandal and James, "Religion and International Relations Theory: Towards a Mutual Understanding." 18

⁸⁶⁴ Eric Patterson, "What They Say and Do: Religious Freedom as a National Security Lens," *Review of Faith & International Affairs* 11, no. 1 (2013). 28

⁸⁶⁵ Sandal and James, "Religion and International Relations Theory: Towards a Mutual Understanding." 12-4

⁸⁶⁶ Ibid. 18

actors pursue their own goals and thus “makes space for religious organisations and groups that would seem to exceed any strand of realism”.⁸⁶⁷ Cultural and normative explanations of religion in politics can be understood by using the constructivist-oriented tools founded in liberal scholarship.⁸⁶⁸ The tools of the neoliberal school of thought are able to measure the influence of religion in both domestic and transnational politics.⁸⁶⁹ One area where this is most obvious is that neoliberalism is able to account for the rise of religious institutions and their related transnational phenomena, making this the most suitable framework for understanding religion within mainstream International Relations theory.⁸⁷⁰ Sandal and James’ study concludes that “religion, a relatively new variable in the study of international relations, not only can be integrated into [International Relations] theory, but can even benefit from the insights of established traditions when there is a need to explain complex interactions”.⁸⁷¹

Although there are areas of compatibility, limitations are apparent when applying religion to International Relations scholarship. According to Agensky, there are two major barriers when incorporating faith-based approaches into International Relations scholarship. The first is that such scholarship is informed by a secularist outlook that treats religion as a homogenous entity temporally and spatially. This limits the analysis of “religiously identified actors whose shifting identities, preferences, and modes of collective action often overwhelm the frameworks used to understand them”.⁸⁷² As a result of this limitation, scholars neglect the significance of liberal modernity and religion being able to constitute a single field of analysis which can incorporate political scholarship.⁸⁷³ The second significant limitation is that:

scholars continue to identify enduring sets of Eurocentric assumptions in: the dichotomization of the religious and the political; the ‘othering’ of religious actors within the political mainstream; the selection of largely Southern-based, violent religious politics; and the treatment of politically salient religious activities as exceptional to politics.⁸⁷⁴

As a consequence of these categorisations, religion may be more prominent in academics’ scope of analysis, but it may also be misrecognised as a result of the Eurocentric intellectual

⁸⁶⁷ Ibid. 15

⁸⁶⁸ Ibid. 17

⁸⁶⁹ Ibid. 17

⁸⁷⁰ Ibid. 19

⁸⁷¹ Ibid.

⁸⁷² Agensky, "Recognizing Religion: Politics, History, and the “Long 19th Century”." 732

⁸⁷³ Ibid. 748

⁸⁷⁴ Ibid. 732

legacies that have endured over time.⁸⁷⁵ These limitations, however, are not insurmountable. As the complementarities between religion and International Relations theory are found in scholarship, these limitations can actively be reduced.

Diplomacy Studies Scholarship

As an instrument of diplomacy, faith-based diplomacy must fit firmly within the scope of Diplomacy Studies. To consider religion in diplomacy, Pokhariyal suggests that “diplomacy is represented by a pseudodynamical variable, which in most cases is considered as biased and is controlled as well as manipulated by the decisionmaker” and if this is the case, “since religion has significant influence on human behaviour and actions, it is treated as a moderating variable in the model”.⁸⁷⁶ Observers note that within the development of diplomatic theory, both idealist and realist tendencies prevail, allowing for further advancements with different perspectives.⁸⁷⁷ Troy suggests that faith-based diplomacy can work with both of these tendencies: “idealism because it claims to be, as a track-two diplomacy, an altered set of hypotheses about international affairs and human behaviour and is therefore progressive”, and also on the side of realism as “it claims to be aware of and recognises the evil in the human soul (*animus dominandi*)”.⁸⁷⁸ Knowing that there are platforms to work from in constructing theory, Sharp posits, “all religious thought offers an opening in principle at least, to diplomacy”.⁸⁷⁹

There is a debate among scholars as to whether faith-based diplomacy can be compatible with traditional diplomacy. The traditional approach to religion was to “box and tame” religion.⁸⁸⁰ Religion was withdrawn from the public sphere as political structures became increasingly secular.⁸⁸¹ This approach was sufficient within that system of diplomacy where religious faith was excluded to a set of functions dictated from agreements of international elites who proposed that religion would remain this way in the future.⁸⁸² As a result of this line of thinking, traditional diplomacy neglected religious factors and placed religion at the behest of demagogues who manipulated religion for self-interested purposes.⁸⁸³

⁸⁷⁵ Ibid. 748

⁸⁷⁶ Pokhariyal, "The Influence of Religion, Technology, and Economy on Culture, Diplomacy, and Peace." 42

⁸⁷⁷ Troy, "Faith-Based Diplomacy under Examination." 227

⁸⁷⁸ Ibid. 227

⁸⁷⁹ Sharp, "Crazy Religion Diplomacy." 244

⁸⁸⁰ Ibid. 258

⁸⁸¹ Agensky, "Recognizing Religion: Politics, History, and the “Long 19th Century”." 738

⁸⁸² Sharp, "Crazy Religion Diplomacy." 259

⁸⁸³ Johnston, "Religion and Foreign Policy." Examples of this include Putin’s use of Orthodoxy in his civilizational claims for Russia, see John Anderson, "Religion, State and ‘Sovereign Democracy’ in Putin’s

The West is still ineffective in dealing with these issues as a result of this tendency.⁸⁸⁴ Longstanding theoretical constructs in International Relations, such as Morgenthau's nation-state model, do not consider religion as a significant factor in the policymaker's calculus.⁸⁸⁵ Albright cautions that, although faith-based diplomacy can be a useful tool, it cannot replace traditional diplomacy altogether.⁸⁸⁶ Rather, she highlights the trend of a religious resurgence influencing world events and, as a result, policymakers should balance this influence within their traditional decision making approach.⁸⁸⁷ Johnston agrees, stating that religion in the construct of diplomacy is not intended to be a revolution of traditional diplomacy, but rather "the addition of a resource and mode of analysis to the peacemaker's tool belt".⁸⁸⁸ In this way, the approach to conflict resolution implicit in faith-based diplomacy explores a wider variety of tasks than those typically related with traditional diplomacy.⁸⁸⁹ The contemporary nature of conflict has exceeded the capacities of traditional diplomacy, and in this respect it is notable that faith-based diplomacy seeks reconciliation as a priority. This has been overlooked by the secularist assumptions of global affairs which, when re-examined as Lynch has done, show that religious actors who were ignored through the 20th Century have always been active as a part of diplomatic practice.⁸⁹⁰ That is why some scholars suggest that the best way to understand faith-based diplomacy is to "apply moral insights and religious concepts towards the development of peaceful settlements of conflicts through diplomatic techniques" and faith-based initiatives into conflict resolution.⁸⁹¹

Beyond traditional diplomacy, faith-based diplomacy does interact with the new school of diplomacy too. One area of dramatic change in Diplomacy Studies is the expansion of actors on the world stage. Indeed, this challenge to diplomacy has seen the consideration of international organisations, religious figures, and even religious individuals into the diplomatic process – a development that the theory of diplomacy is still integrating.⁸⁹² The rise of the phenomenon that some observers call paradiplomacy is gaining greater acceptance in

Russia," *Journal of Religious and Political Practice* 2, no. 2 (2016), or the notion of the 'caliphate' being mobilised and contested by diverse Islamist groups around the world, see H.M. Sahid, "Contesting Caliphate: Opposition of Indonesian Fundamentalist Groups to ISIS Caliphate," 2014 8, no. 2 (2014).

⁸⁸⁴ Johnston, "Religion and Foreign Policy."

⁸⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁸⁶ Albright, "Faith and Diplomacy." 9

⁸⁸⁷ Ibid. 9

⁸⁸⁸ Gerstbauer, "Faith in Religion's Reconciling Power." 50

⁸⁸⁹ Johnston and Cox, "Faith-Based Diplomacy and Preventive Engagement." 16

⁸⁹⁰ Lynch, "Christian Ethics, Actors, and Diplomacy: Mediating Universalist Pretentions." 613

⁸⁹¹ Troy, "Faith-Based Diplomacy under Examination." 209

⁸⁹² Johnston, "Introduction: Beyond Power Politics." 3-4

diplomatic scholarship.⁸⁹³ Nonstate actors, subnational units, nongovernmental organisations, and individuals, for example, are linking the institution of diplomacy with international society, and using this forum as a way to integrate religion more favourably.⁸⁹⁴ This is most evident in the asymmetrical, state-to-society paradigm, which sees the active involvement of faith-based actors.⁸⁹⁵ This also suggests that the scholarship surrounding Track One and Track Two diplomacy needs to be considered when seeking the most effective implementation of faith-based approaches to diplomacy.⁸⁹⁶ The proper track of diplomacy remains an area of contention among scholars in the field, but there is debate that is fruitful for generating scholarship. New diplomacy represents a conducive space for the inclusion of faith-based approaches to diplomacy, particularly in the contemporary landscape of diplomacy.⁸⁹⁷ The modern structures of the international system, being the post-World War era, the United Nations system, the processes of decolonisation, and the multipolarity of the 21st Century, are all influenced by the institutional bases which were informed by religious framings.⁸⁹⁸ The parallels here suggest that faith-based diplomacy does have a foundation to work with in the modern international architecture.

From the perspective of the innovative school of diplomatic theory, faith-based diplomacy raises the possibility of “official diplomacy coupled with religious peacemaking as offering a greater potential for dealing with today’s problems of communal conflict, particularly those involving ethnic and religious dimensions”.⁸⁹⁹ This fits within the theoretical frameworks of innovative diplomacy which seeks to find cooperation between traditional and new approaches. These non-traditional approaches to diplomacy can incorporate actors beyond the state with contemporary mechanisms of conflict resolution to best integrate faith-based approaches to diplomacy. The constructs to support these approaches, however, are still being revised; but, importantly, the scholarly foundation exists for further work to be carried out.

⁸⁹³ Diez, "Diplomacy, Papacy, and the Transformation of International Society." 13

⁸⁹⁴ Ibid. 34

⁸⁹⁵ Seiple and White, "Uzbekistan and the Central Asian Crucible of Religion and Security." 47

⁸⁹⁶ Troy, "Faith-Based Diplomacy under Examination." 227-8

⁸⁹⁷ Cox and Philpott, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: An Ancient Idea Newly Emergent." 39

⁸⁹⁸ Agensky, "Recognizing Religion: Politics, History, and the “Long 19th Century”." 739

⁸⁹⁹ Johnston, "Religion and Foreign Policy."

Soft Power, Cultural Diplomacy and Public Diplomacy

Advancements in scholarship have resulted in fields of study where faith-based diplomacy may be an appropriate strategy to incorporate. This section will examine the theory of soft power and two subfields of diplomacy, those of cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy. The analysis provided in this section will highlight that existing theoretical constructs do have the capacity to engage faith-based diplomacy and suggest that the theorising of faith-based diplomacy can use these other frameworks for support.

Soft power is a theory which seeks to reconceptualise how power is viewed in the international system.⁹⁰⁰ Through this frame “exchanges of ideas, information, value systems, traditions, beliefs and other aspects of culture – such as art, sports, science, literature, and music” are utilised with the “intention of fostering mutual understanding”.⁹⁰¹ This process of attracting understanding between groups promotes people-to-people diplomacy by leveraging soft power assets.⁹⁰² Ideas, information, values, traditions, beliefs and cultures have all been influenced by religion and faith and thus soft power can be a viable theoretical lens to understand the potential impact of faith-based diplomacy.

By extension, using soft power in conjunction with other diplomatic approaches provides a viable way to manage the growing role of faith in international affairs. As Seib notes:

Ignoring the role of faith in an increasingly religious world makes no sense. The use of soft power can be successful only if elements of culture such as religion are integral to the planning and implementation of public diplomacy. This is not the easiest of partnerships to establish, but it is essential.⁹⁰³

Here Seib recognises the potential complementarity between soft power, faith-based diplomacy, and public diplomacy. Another way in which soft power strategies are increasingly effective may be found in the promotion of religious freedom.⁹⁰⁴ When articulating values, advocating for policies, or influencing global publics, religious freedom and soft power can work together to inform successful diplomatic strategy.⁹⁰⁵ As soft power strategies are tested

⁹⁰⁰ For a full examination of soft power see Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*; and, *The Future of Power and Use in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011).

⁹⁰¹ Johnston, *Religion, Terror and Error: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual Engagement*. 61

⁹⁰² *Ibid.* 61

⁹⁰³ Seib, "Introduction." 7

⁹⁰⁴ Danan, "Shaping the Narrative of Religious Freedom." 182

⁹⁰⁵ *Ibid.* 182

and expanded in the literature, the scholarly lens for incorporation of faith-based diplomacy is also widened.

Some theoretical frameworks within Diplomacy Studies also provide a promising platform for integrating faith-based approaches to diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy allows for more options with which to engage by leveraging culture to bring about understanding between groups. The use of the arts and culture for political purposes is well-established through history, and yet the theoretical constructs of cultural diplomacy have only been emerging since the 1990s.⁹⁰⁶ When examining how the concept has developed over time, “the meanings and understandings of cultural diplomacy have been shaped by the evolution of the practices it describes, as well as by national traditions and contexts”.⁹⁰⁷ Since the mid-20th Century, International Relations scholars started integrating culture into their examinations of international affairs, moving beyond the high political components of economics, military and political issues.⁹⁰⁸ Culture and religion can be seen as independent variables in the model of diplomatic decision-making, where the two play significant roles in determining diplomatic outcomes.⁹⁰⁹ As religion is an influential element of culture, they must both be considered in the planning and implementation of diplomatic strategy.⁹¹⁰

A challenge to the diplomatic community is the recognition that culture, if integrated carelessly, may be a destructive force.⁹¹¹ Resurgent cultural identities can lead to more divisions and disputes, so that “deeper cultural understanding” is needed to help prevent cultural hostilities from becoming a global phenomenon.⁹¹² Successful cultural diplomacy strategies provide a context for alleviating these concerns. As the traditional focus of culture promoted through states and institutions remains strong,⁹¹³ cultural diplomacy scholars need to broaden their source material and approaches. By examining oral history within case studies, for instance, they would be better positioned to understand how people perceive cultural policies and how policies impact on communities.⁹¹⁴ Within this setting, religions can be seen as a vehicle through which the rich tradition of oral and written history can be used to

⁹⁰⁶ Charlotte Faucher, "Cultural Diplomacy and International Cultural Relations in Twentieth-Century Europe," *Contemporary European History* 25, no. 2 (2016). 374

⁹⁰⁷ Ibid. 374

⁹⁰⁸ Ibid. 374

⁹⁰⁹ Pokhariyal, "The Influence of Religion, Technology, and Economy on Culture, Diplomacy, and Peace." 42

⁹¹⁰ Seib, "Introduction." 7

⁹¹¹ Billington, "Religion and Russia's Future." 9

⁹¹² See *ibid.* 9

⁹¹³ Faucher, "Cultural Diplomacy and International Cultural Relations in Twentieth-Century Europe." 383

⁹¹⁴ *Ibid.* 383

strengthen cultural understanding. Thus, future advancements in cultural diplomacy could benefit from a cooperative engagement with faith-based diplomacy.

Arguably the field of scholarship exhibiting the most complementarity with faith-based diplomacy is that of public diplomacy. The literature of public diplomacy has engaged with the role of religion in building effective diplomatic strategy, as is evident in *Religion and Public Diplomacy*, a 2013 work edited by Philip Seib. The relationship between the two concepts has been recognised by scholars. Burnett has observed that “public diplomacy has the charge to penetrate the culture of the host country beyond the political and governmental institutions” which results in “a greater focus on people rather than on institutions”.⁹¹⁵ At its simplest form, if public diplomacy is a strategy that seeks to attract and influence foreign publics, then the most direct way to influence people, especially in more conservative societies, is through their faith.⁹¹⁶ A simple definition of public diplomacy is that “while traditional diplomacy is state to state, public diplomacy is state to people” where “discourse is the essence of public diplomacy”.⁹¹⁷ This definition becomes more complex when the role of nonstate actors is integrated and where, “in the new social media era, publics... not only are able to receive messages from foreign governments, but they also have come to expect such communication”.⁹¹⁸

Beliefs, norms, and identities (all informed by religion) assist in making truth claims which enhance the credibility and legitimacy of the discourse being conducted within the scope of public diplomacy.⁹¹⁹ Public diplomacy has, in the past, recognised the importance of religion, but has not always successfully integrated religious factors in its strategy.⁹²⁰ And yet, “if public diplomacy can be defined in part as involving the gentle wielding of influence to advance national interests, then the role of religion in people’s lives must not be overlooked”.⁹²¹ To construct an effective public diplomacy strategy, Marshall and Farr note that a priority task is recognising religion as a driver of culture.⁹²² This includes political culture as religion informs the worldview of many, at both the individual and community level.⁹²³ Seib agrees that

⁹¹⁵ Burnett, "Implications for the Foreign Policy Community." 296

⁹¹⁶ Huston Smith, *The Illustrated World's Religions: A Guide to Our Wisdom Traditions* (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1994). 3

⁹¹⁷ Seib, "Religious Freedom and US Public Diplomacy." 15

⁹¹⁸ *Ibid.* 15

⁹¹⁹ Ben D. Mor, "Credibility Talk in Public Diplomacy," *Review of International Studies* 38, no. 2 (2012). 418

⁹²⁰ Danan, "A Public Diplomacy Approach to International Religious Freedom." 59

⁹²¹ Seib, "Introduction." 1

⁹²² As cited by *ibid.* 2

⁹²³ As cited by *ibid.* 2

religion still fails to be integrated fully into the elements of public diplomacy.⁹²⁴ Although there have been some beneficial advancements in the field of public diplomacy, practitioners of “multitrack diplomacy have still not realised the potential of employing religion as an enhancement of public diplomacy.⁹²⁵ In future, as the scholarship continues to grow, faith-based diplomacy can be applied productively in this field.

A concerted effort has been made to understand the use of public diplomacy to support international religious freedom. At its core, “promoting religious freedom furthers three of the strategic objectives of public diplomacy: shaping the narrative, expanding and strengthening people-to-people trust, and combatting violent extremism”.⁹²⁶ The tools of public diplomacy accord with the soft power strategy of promoting religious freedoms.⁹²⁷ Soft power and religious freedom are compatible as public diplomacy “both raises awareness about government restrictions and encourages the social conditions necessary for religious freedom”.⁹²⁸ This approach is considered integral to the success of public diplomacy, which in itself cannot be separated from the issues of religious freedom, particularly in democracies.⁹²⁹ This is because “public diplomacy programs are able to account for a variety of theologies and worldviews, and they have the ability to promote positive religious freedom developments when bilateral efforts are not viable”.⁹³⁰ By exploring questions of religious freedom through the medium of public diplomacy, a space for faith-based diplomacy can be fostered. Ultimately, when designing public diplomacy strategies in the contemporary international system, the expansion of religious beliefs in many parts of the world needs to be recognised, especially for future planning.⁹³¹ When looking to the scholarly constructs of faith-based diplomacy, it is therefore instructive that both public and faith-based diplomacy show a compatibility which can be more intentionally leveraged in the future of Diplomacy Studies.

Available Frameworks of Analysis for Faith-based Diplomacy

This section will examine the literature’s analytical approaches that may not necessarily accord with previous thinking, but which would recommend themselves to constructing faith-

⁹²⁴ Ibid. 2

⁹²⁵ Sayeed-Miller, "Public Diplomacy and Transnational Cases of Blasphemy." 99

⁹²⁶ Danan, "A Public Diplomacy Approach to International Religious Freedom." 60

⁹²⁷ Ibid. 59

⁹²⁸ Ibid. 59

⁹²⁹ Danan, "Shaping the Narrative of Religious Freedom." 182

⁹³⁰ "A Public Diplomacy Approach to International Religious Freedom." 59

⁹³¹ Seib, "Conclusion: The Future of Religion and Public Diplomacy." 216

based diplomacy strategies. Some are relatively simple in that they call for a reappraisal of how religion is viewed. Farr, for example, suggests that “policy makers should approach religion much as they do economics and politics – that is, as something that drives the behaviour of people and governments in important ways”.⁹³² Farr suggests this because, like economic and political motives, “religious motives can act as a multiplier of both destructive and constructive behaviours, often with more intense results”.⁹³³ A simple adjustment of perspective by policymakers can make a dramatic difference to how the religion is dealt with in international affairs. Other academics have analysed diplomacy by constructing a model where religion can be treated as a moderating variable considering its influence on human behaviour.⁹³⁴ Classifications between religions, such as Kang’s identification of those that are inclusivist and exclusivist and their contributions to religious war, are also ways in which frames of analysis are expanding to develop the scholarship which, in turn, assists the construction of faith-based diplomacy theory.⁹³⁵

When examining the study of religion through history, Agensky proposes the “entangled history” approach to analysis. This focuses on transformative interconnections that exist among social groups that have been dispersed,⁹³⁶ highlighting the importance of critical dialogism. While evident in other theoretical appraisals, the distinguishing feature in this approach is its focus on International Relations,⁹³⁷ wherein the global religious-political field is observed as an interconnected whole. Thus religious agency can be examined in light of the heterogeneities, contestations and politics of those connections.⁹³⁸ By adopting this approach to historical analysis, religious practice is repositioned to examine social encounters through history, showing religious agency as a subject for tension when connected to political developments.⁹³⁹ Not only is this achieved when analysing religious practice, but it is possible to apply Agensky’s approach to the concept of religion itself; and, more specifically, in the way that it interacts with analytical, normative and political tensions.⁹⁴⁰ This method allows religion to be understood through the lens of International Relations when critically analysing the history of political developments.

⁹³² Farr, "Diplomacy in an Age of Faith."

⁹³³ Ibid.

⁹³⁴ Pokhariyal, "The Influence of Religion, Technology, and Economy on Culture, Diplomacy, and Peace." 42

⁹³⁵ Kang, "Why Was There No Religious War in Premodern East Asia?." 968

⁹³⁶ Agensky, "Recognizing Religion: Politics, History, and the “Long 19th Century”."

⁹³⁷ Ibid. 737

⁹³⁸ Ibid. 737

⁹³⁹ Ibid. 736

⁹⁴⁰ Ibid. 736

An approach that has been traditionally applied to understanding the international system, and the issues within that system, is the use of the rational actor model. As noted above, the rational actor model posits that state behaviour is governed by “the rational pursuit of their national self-interests, foremost among which is maximizing power”.⁹⁴¹ Traditional diplomacy has long been tied to the assumptions of the rational actor model, and thus the religious and cultural dynamics of contemporary conflicts are testing the model.⁹⁴² This model, as it stands, does not appreciate the impact of religion, but rather classifies religion as an irrational factor in decision making.⁹⁴³ Yet, simply viewing religion as irrational does not allowed the issues of religion to be dealt with effectively. Instead, Johnston proposes that rather than categorising religion as irrational, it is considered asymmetrical. If this is applied, then policymakers can focus on the motivating role of religion behind conflict and appreciate the religious nature of those conflicting behaviours.⁹⁴⁴ By viewing religion as an asymmetrical threat, new frameworks of analysis can be provided which give greater credence to the impact of religion in the international system.

One notable approach to integrating religion in conflict management is the OODA Loop, or Boyd Cycle.⁹⁴⁵ The cycle is a continuous process that moves through stages of observation, orientation, decision, and action, where feedback is incorporated to adjust to the conflict situation on the ground.⁹⁴⁶ In light of the rational actor model of decision making, Johnston suggests that the OODA Loop may be a more viable approach as it highlights the complexities of contemporary conflict which exceed the limits of the rational actor approach.⁹⁴⁷ The goal of the OODA Loop is to broaden the scope of decisionmakers, providing them with the perspective to integrate religion as a factor. The ‘looped’ nature of this process accommodates changes within the dynamics of a conflict which suits its contemporary nature as they are intra-state and more identity/communal based. Johnston supports this approach to decision making as it provides a more nuanced understanding of contemporary circumstances, which can reorient the thinking of decision makers to reshape diplomatic strategies.⁹⁴⁸ This

⁹⁴¹ Johnston, *Religion, Terror and Error: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual Engagement*. 5

⁹⁴² "Introduction: Real Politik Expanded." 7

⁹⁴³ *Religion, Terror and Error: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual Engagement*. 5

⁹⁴⁴ "An Asymmetric Counter to the Asymmetric Threat." 9

⁹⁴⁵ For a brief summary of the OODA Loop, and its linkage to culture, see: A. Maccuish Donald, "Orientation: Key to the OODA Loop – the Culture Factor," *Journal of Defense Resources Management* 3, no. 2 (2012).

⁹⁴⁶ Johnston, *Religion, Terror and Error: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual Engagement*. 7

⁹⁴⁷ *Ibid.* 7

⁹⁴⁸ *Ibid.* 10

framework is an example of how the literature and scholarship has been reconsidered to account for religious factors.

The role of religion within authoritarian regimes has also been studied, and a framework of analysis has been provided which helps understand religion within the scope of the state. In Koesel's study, three frameworks are put forward.⁹⁴⁹ First, "religion-regime relations are assumed to be complementary, where both sides stand to gain even if they do not necessarily gain equally".⁹⁵⁰ In this positive view of the relationship, religion is valued in that it can provide political legitimacy for the state's ruling elite.⁹⁵¹ In response to the legitimacy offered, political elites may designate an official religion where financial support and freedoms may be offered to that religion over other institutions.⁹⁵² An example would be Putin's use of Orthodoxy as part of the traditional and conservative image of Russia which he promotes and celebrates in policy.⁹⁵³ Contrary to this, the second frame of analysis proposed by Koesel is one where "authoritarian leaders interact with religious groups as they might with political rivals – that is, they employ strategies of 'encapsulation' to neutralise potential threats" which sees the relationship between religion and regimes as more competitive.⁹⁵⁴ Koesel notes that the Orthodox Church during the Soviet Union and Buddhist groups in Thailand's military regime exemplify this second frame.⁹⁵⁵ The third frame of analysis is adversarial where "the relationship is generally assumed to be one of domination and resistance. The authoritarian regime attempts to coerce religion and religious actors, who in turn seek to challenge the right and capacity of autocrats to rule".⁹⁵⁶ Illustrative of this is China's policies against religion during the Cultural Revolution,⁹⁵⁷ or the control of Islam at political levels in Central Asia.⁹⁵⁸

The theoretical framework of analysis proposed by Koesel considers religion at the subnational level to examine the way that the relationship between political elites and religious

⁹⁴⁹ For explicit examples of these frames, see Koesel's study that looks at the three frameworks through the cases of Russia and China, but also draws on some historical analysis in the cases of the Catholic church in Spain and Portugal and also Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia.

⁹⁵⁰ Koesel, "Religion and the Regime: Cooperation and Conflict in Contemporary Russia and China." 677

⁹⁵¹ Ibid. 677

⁹⁵² Ibid. 677

⁹⁵³ See Anderson, "Religion, State and 'Sovereign Democracy' in Putin's Russia."

⁹⁵⁴ Koesel, "Religion and the Regime: Cooperation and Conflict in Contemporary Russia and China." 677

⁹⁵⁵ See also E.E. Roslof, *Red Priests: Renovationism, Russian Orthodoxy, and Revolution, 1905-1946* (Indiana University Press, 2002).

⁹⁵⁶ Koesel, "Religion and the Regime: Cooperation and Conflict in Contemporary Russia and China." 678

⁹⁵⁷ See C. P. Fitzgerald, "Religion and China's Cultural Revolution," *Pacific Affairs* 40, no. 1/2 (1967). And Jiping Zuo, "Political Religion: The Case of the Cultural Revolution in China," *Sociological Analysis* 52, no. 1 (1991).

⁹⁵⁸ See A. Kramer, "Islam in Central Asia - Blossoming, Suppression, Instrumentalisation," *Osteuropa* 57, no. 8-9 (2007).

figures is developed and negotiated.⁹⁵⁹ By doing so, this analysis can present the ways in which the interests of religious and political actors are defined, how the needs of the parties are presented, and whether a strategy of cooperation or conflict is most suitable to achieving their goals.⁹⁶⁰ A theory of this nature, according to Koesel, is advantageous for three reasons:

First, it explores the dynamics between multiple religious and regime actors, which exposes subnational variation in how local government officials manage diverse and different religious groups. Second, it views religion-regime relations as an ongoing and dynamic process in which each side weighs costs and benefits to adapt to a changing environment. Third, it unpacks the underlying incentives for religion-regime interaction, but remains parsimonious enough to be applicable across the authoritarian world.⁹⁶¹

Within the scope of this thesis, this framework is important as it provides a form of analysis that studies religion within the state. This area of investigation is typically contentious due to secularisation; but advancements in theory assist in considering how faith-based diplomacy may effectively be employed by the state.

More specifically from the lens of diplomacy, scholars look to different ways in which faith-based diplomacy can be integrated as a tool. Some use an issue like religious freedom as a “comprehensive framework through which to name and analyse the ideational impulses and resulting policies of leaders and regimes”.⁹⁶² When looking at other approaches that address specific issues in international affairs, Sayeed-Miller proposes a paradigm called ‘restorative narrative-building’. In this, religious actors consider the role of language and mediation, particularly in response to cases of blasphemy and religious offence.⁹⁶³ The restorative narrative-building approach could be as follows:

1. The immediate response is an articulation of understanding of the harm that may have been suffered.
2. The official language used does not just condemn the offenders, it also seeks to open doors of reconciliation between the parties.

⁹⁵⁹ Koesel, "Religion and the Regime: Cooperation and Conflict in Contemporary Russia and China." 379

⁹⁶⁰ Ibid. 679

⁹⁶¹ Ibid. 679-80

⁹⁶² Patterson, "What They Say and Do: Religious Freedom as a National Security Lens." 22

⁹⁶³ Sayeed-Miller, "Public Diplomacy and Transnational Cases of Blasphemy." 108

3. Public, symbolic, affinity-making opportunities are sought that show leaders of all the parties in each other's sacred spaces, breaking bread and modelling conciliatory actions. This is important because the public presentation is not just a public relations opportunity, it is a true process of joint responsibility for making right what may be perceived as having been wronged. It also counters any narrative that reconciliation is impossible between the communities that might be at odds with one another.
4. Immediate engagement of religious leaders from all the parties to explain and explore the juristic issues present in the actual case.⁹⁶⁴

While this framework is a specific approach to dealing with the issue of blasphemy, it does demonstrate that scholarship is finding methods of countering religious conflict.⁹⁶⁵

When considering how these frameworks influence the analysis of faith-based diplomacy, Thomas argues that faith-based diplomacy:

...focuses on integrating faith into the existing frameworks of diplomatic or political institutions, social relations, and social meaning, and does not, as in critical theory or the Revolutionist tradition, challenge the existing framework of social order in international relations, nor does it consider how it may be fundamentally transformed.⁹⁶⁶

As such, faith-based diplomacy must be considered as a viable strategy to be utilised within the paradigms of frameworks, such as those discussed within this chapter. In so doing, faith-based diplomacy can be integrated into the systems and processes of conflict resolution, and modern diplomacy. These frameworks do provide a platform for analysis and demonstrate that advancements in scholarship since faith-based diplomacy's introduction to scholarship in 1994 have enhanced the scope of faith-based diplomacy, allowing it to play a more critical role in the decision-making process.

⁹⁶⁴ Ibid. 108

⁹⁶⁵ An example of another specific area where this issue has developed is in the protection of cultural property, such as churches, icons, libraries and writings, during conflict. See Bing Bing Jia, "Protected Property and Its Protection in International Humanitarian Law," *Leiden Journal of International Law* 15, no. 1 (2002). The attacking of cultural heritage during war has had detrimental impact, such as in the cases of the former Yugoslavia, Iraq and Syria – hence the development of international humanitarian law to counter this threat. See Helga Turku, *The Destruction of Cultural Property as a Weapon of War ISIS in Syria and Iraq* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018); and, S. Brammertz et al., "Attacks against Cultural Heritage as a Weapon of War Prosecutions at the ICTY," *J. Int. Crim. Justice* 14, no. 5 (2016).

⁹⁶⁶ Thomas as cited by Troy, "Faith-Based Diplomacy under Examination." 229

CHAPTER EIGHT

The Concepts and Actors of Faith-based Diplomacy

With faith-based diplomacy now evaluated through the lens of theory and scholarship, this chapter will investigate the central characteristics and concepts of faith-based diplomacy. Characteristics include the role of values in faith and their influences on the diplomatic processes, and the space of reconciliation in faith-based diplomacy and conflict resolution. Further, public diplomacy scholars have identified the role of religious freedom as a significant feature of faith-based diplomacy. Another critical development is the impact of faith-based diplomacy in the construction of foreign policy and the role of religious leaders in the diplomatic process. The concept of mediation, particularly third-party mediation, will be applied to faith-based diplomacy. Finally, the tracks of diplomacy will be analysed to find the most appropriate method of application for faith-based diplomacy in practice. These concepts will provide an overview of some of the key features of faith-based diplomacy that have been revealed in scholarship thus far.

This chapter will then focus on the central actors in the international system and suggest how each actor may engage with faith-based diplomacy. The actors under analysis are the state, the diplomat, intergovernmental organisations, nongovernmental organisations, civil society organisations, the church, and individuals. This review of actors will serve to illuminate the potential space for faith-based diplomacy in practice. As a result, this chapter will effectively highlight the central characteristics and key actors of faith-based diplomacy, providing a comprehensive theoretical framework.

The Concepts of Faith-based Diplomacy

Values and Faith-based Diplomacy

This section considers how the values found in faith can be of benefit to the practitioners of faith-based diplomacy. Inherent within faith traditions are values which could be leveraged to support the diplomatic process. Religious beliefs and values are vitally important as they motivate behaviour but are not always integrated cohesively within society, a situation which

could fuel conflict.⁹⁶⁷ Regarding practical frameworks, this may fit into the ‘virtue ethics’ approach to diplomacy, as discussed by Troy, where the main values of a religious tradition are present in the construction and processes of diplomatic dialogue.⁹⁶⁸ Former US president Jimmy Carter reflected on his role in the Israel-Egypt peace talks and noted that the pursuit of peace in all the religions that were represented girded the negotiations; and that his attempt to learn as much of the Islamic faith as possible enabled him to identify compatible values pertinent to cooperation.⁹⁶⁹ Carter understood that through the Abrahamic faiths (Judaism, Christianity and Islam), the way in which people are to live together was, in his perspective, authored by God within scriptural texts.⁹⁷⁰ Utilising the scriptures and sacred texts of religions can enable observers to appreciate the values that underpin negotiations. An evident use of religious scripture is when it is selectively retrieved and then applied to situations as a legitimising tool for acts of violence and extremism.⁹⁷¹ However, when used appropriately within the lens of faith-based diplomacy, scripture can reveal the values that can assist in achieving a successful resolution.⁹⁷² Scholarship, policy and self-identification recognise that categorisations of religions integrate normative values into behaviour, and thus these values require deeper understanding from diplomatic observers.⁹⁷³

When considering how this values-based approach may impact diplomacy, “each tradition’s collection of stories, narratives, religious customs, and artistic expressions can be usefully understood as that religion’s primary language”.⁹⁷⁴ Properly understanding and applying this language is crucial in constructing an effective diplomatic strategy. The foremost value to recognise in faith-based diplomacy is that people matter.⁹⁷⁵ For a faith-based diplomat, Cox and Philpott suggest that arguably the most important virtue is that of faith as “the belief that one’s actions will, through divine assistance, bear munificent fruit”.⁹⁷⁶ It is this same faith that can constitute a social group that answers most of the profound questions of human identity.⁹⁷⁷ Another practical value for diplomats to pursue is that of trust. Johnston remarks

⁹⁶⁷ Luttwak, "The Missing Dimension." 17

⁹⁶⁸ Troy, "Faith-Based Diplomacy under Examination."

⁹⁶⁹ Berggren, "Carter, Sadat, and Begin: Using Evangelical-Style Presidential Diplomacy in the Middle East." 747

⁹⁷⁰ Cox and Philpott, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: An Ancient Idea Newly Emergent." 32

⁹⁷¹ Johnston, *Religion, Terror and Error: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual Engagement*. 38

⁹⁷² *Ibid.* 38

⁹⁷³ Agensky, "Recognizing Religion: Politics, History, and the “Long 19th Century”." 737

⁹⁷⁴ Vendley and Little, "Implications for Religious Communities: Buddhism, Islam, Hinduism, and Christianity." 307

⁹⁷⁵ Cox and Philpott, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: An Ancient Idea Newly Emergent." 33

⁹⁷⁶ *Ibid.* 39

⁹⁷⁷ Sharp, "Crazy Religion Diplomacy." 249

that when practitioners engage in faith-based diplomacy, they first set out to establish relationships of trust to encourage interlocutors to take steps toward peace which may not be available if trust is not present.⁹⁷⁸

Recognising another value held in many religious traditions, that being expressions of hospitality, can also aid in building relationships and trust between parties. Hospitality is a value that is recognisable in the Abrahamic tradition, with religious scripture teaching the importance of being hospitable, even to enemy groups.⁹⁷⁹ Knowing the beliefs, norms, identities and values that constitute social structures will allow actors to appeal to, and influence, parties to enhance the diplomatic process.⁹⁸⁰ When dealing with a driver as deeply entrenched as religion, historical grievances can influence the potential effectiveness of diplomacy. Therefore, seeking forgiveness between parties is crucial in the faith-based approach. Forgiveness, “which could be translated as repentance, returning, transformation, or restoration” has “the capacity to transform oneself or a community”.⁹⁸¹ Forgiveness seeks to bridge the gap between the ‘other’, thus repairing that relationship which can encourage conflict resolution.⁹⁸² To achieve forgiveness effectively, peacemakers must develop humility in their interactions that recognise the profundity of this value in faith and history.⁹⁸³ Applying the frame of analysis provided by public diplomacy, as discussed in the previous chapter, is an effective way to see the role of values in diplomatic practice. However, a more substantial recognition of the importance and influence of values is fundamental for scholars and practitioners of faith-based diplomacy if they are to be efficacious .

Reconciliation in Faith-based Diplomacy

A concept that warrants critical attention is reconciliation, whether that be reconciliation as a value within a particular religion, a goal of faith-based diplomacy’s approach, or indeed as a reconciliation process within conflict resolution. Reconciliation is an area where faith-based diplomacy has made notable progress, so much so in fact that it has become a familiar term in public discourse for its ability to engage with the deep constructs of

⁹⁷⁸ Moll, "The Father of Faith-Based Diplomacy." 57

⁹⁷⁹ Steele, "Christianity in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo: From Ethnic Captive to Reconciling Agent." 158

⁹⁸⁰ Mor, "Credibility Talk in Public Diplomacy." 418

⁹⁸¹ Gopin, "Judaism and Peacebuilding in the Context of Middle Eastern Conflict." 110

⁹⁸² Ibid. 112

⁹⁸³ Ibid. 110

identity.⁹⁸⁴ Appleby suggests that religion is critically positioned to engage with reconciliation as its “unique social location, institutional configuration, cultural power, and remarkable persistence ... commend that cultivation of elements within them that foster harmonious and just relations among peoples” which in turn support reconciliation in conflict prevention or even in the post-conflict rebuilding context.⁹⁸⁵ By way of definition, Cox and Philpott examine the Greek and Hebrew derivations of the term reconciliation as these are more accurate depictions of reconciliation’s meaning in religious texts. The Hebrew word for reconciliation means “to heal, to repair, to transform”.⁹⁸⁶ In the Greek, reconciliation has a variety of meanings, including “to bring forces together that would naturally repel each other”, “to break down walls or barriers” and, “to heal or change the nature of a relationship”.⁹⁸⁷ These varying definitions promote several linkages with goals within the conflict resolution process. Reconciliation, as a term, is important because it finds its roots in several religious concepts. Reconciliation is linked closely to justice and peace in the Old Testament tradition of *shalom* with its literal meaning of “wholeness, fulfilment, completion, unity and wellbeing” in a just and reconciled community.⁹⁸⁸ These definitions are compelling when considering the goals of diplomacy and conflict resolution. As such, reconciliation has a central place within faith-based diplomacy, even to the point where Troy notes that “academic research and practice show that faith-based diplomacy is more about reconciliation than conflict resolution”.⁹⁸⁹

The purpose of reconciliation in faith-based diplomacy is to establish it is a broad principle “to point to distinctive ideas that religious traditions have to offer about statecraft in the hope that in their application, new political possibilities will emerge”.⁹⁹⁰ Reconciliation in a faith-based approach requires broad application because there are complex differences between religions, and even within the pluralistic religions, but these challenges do not devalue reconciliation as a driver in faith-based diplomacy.⁹⁹¹ The historical pain and provocation surrounding religious tension have been identified as a constructive approach in conflict reconciliation to further the reconciliation process.⁹⁹² As a result, reconciliation is a potential

⁹⁸⁴ Cox and Philpott, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: An Ancient Idea Newly Emergent." 34

⁹⁸⁵ Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation*. 8

⁹⁸⁶ Cox and Philpott, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: An Ancient Idea Newly Emergent." 34

⁹⁸⁷ *Ibid.* 34

⁹⁸⁸ Steele, "Christianity in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo: From Ethnic Captive to Reconciling Agent." 158

⁹⁸⁹ Troy, "Faith-Based Diplomacy under Examination." 228

⁹⁹⁰ Cox and Philpott, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: An Ancient Idea Newly Emergent." 36

⁹⁹¹ *Ibid.* 36

⁹⁹² Gopin, "Judaism and Peacebuilding in the Context of Middle Eastern Conflict." 97

counter to religious fanaticism.⁹⁹³ Johnston and Cox highlight five forms of reconciliation that faith-based diplomats seek. They are:

1. Unity in diversity through active acceptance of the pluralistic nature of life itself regarding race, gender, ethnicity, and culture;
2. The inclusion of all parties in any final solution, including one's enemies wherever possible;
3. The peaceful resolution of the conflict between individuals and groups;
4. Forgiveness as a prerequisite for restoring healthy relationships; and,
5. Social justice as the appropriate basis for a right ordering of relationships.⁹⁹⁴

In light of these forms of reconciliation, if the negotiator is a proxy or representative of an offending party, the skills of restorative justice described within mediation can potentially curb escalation and generate a deep reconciliation between parties.⁹⁹⁵ Reconciliation remains the distinctive notion that guides actors in shaping transitional justice.⁹⁹⁶ However, reconciliation in transitional justice can be improved when religious freedom becomes a component of political consideration by diplomatic actors.⁹⁹⁷ Reconciliation is a central feature in the construction of faith-based diplomacy, and if the strategies employed in the faith-based approach incorporate reconciliation effectively, there may be more success in diplomatic resolutions achieved.

Religious Freedom and Faith-based Diplomacy

Religious freedom is an undervalued concept, particularly in public diplomacy. It may provide an avenue for faith-based diplomacy to play a more active role in the international system. As a concept, religious freedom is evident in international law, meaning “the right of every person and religious organisation to seek out, embrace, practice, express and assemble

⁹⁹³ Johnston, "Introduction: Real Politik Expanded." 6

⁹⁹⁴ Johnston and Cox, "Faith-Based Diplomacy and Preventive Engagement." 16

⁹⁹⁵ Sayeed-Miller, "Public Diplomacy and Transnational Cases of Blasphemy." 107

⁹⁹⁶ Philpott, "Religious Freedom and Peacebuilding: May I Introduce You Two?." 34. For analysis on transitional justice, see A. Mihr, *An Introduction to Transitional Justice* (2016). who defines transitional justice as “a process that encompasses a number of different legal, political and cultural instruments and mechanisms that can strengthen, weaken, enhance or accelerate processes of regime change and consolidation. Transitional justice measures can foster or hamper successful transition or reconciliation processes, and there is not automatic guarantee for a certain outcome. Transitional justice measures can be politically instrumentalised, used or abused, and the process outcome depends on a variety of different actors involved. The process, as such, is inter-generational, and the measures are multiple.”

⁹⁹⁷ Philpott, "Religious Freedom and Peacebuilding: May I Introduce You Two?." 34

on behalf of a religious faith”.⁹⁹⁸ Other scholars see religious freedom as a more personal, identity-based concept. Seiple defines religious freedom as “soul freedom”, or “liberty of thought, conscience, and belief”.⁹⁹⁹ What Seiple suggests by this is that for faith to be authentic, the individual must freely embrace it. These definitions demonstrate that religious freedom influences the institutional, structural, and also the personal, identity-based level. In building a theory of religious freedom, Chris Seiple notes that several areas of analysis must be carefully understood to define religious freedom accurately. These include:

The context of global trends, the geo-politics of the region, the national narrative, ethnic majority-minority relations, economic and educational development policies (especially for ethno- and/or religious minorities), and how the culture and majority religion historically and currently understands the “other”.¹⁰⁰⁰

Scholars have examined religious freedom and found that it is “a critical release valve for public expression, public assembly, free speech, and property rights” and that societies which value religious freedom tend to be “more peaceful and to score higher on numerous indicators of social well-being”.¹⁰⁰¹ Religious freedom has obvious implications in a moral and altruistic sense. Danan goes further by asserting that religious freedom can tangibly impact society by contributing to conflict mitigation and prevention while critically supporting both national stability and international security.¹⁰⁰²

Within the security context, Patterson, in examining the national security of the United States, suggests that religious freedom “can be newly envisioned as a comprehensive framework through which to name and analyse the ideational impulses and resulting policies of leaders and regimes that pose risks to [United States’] national security”.¹⁰⁰³ Specifically, religious freedom can be a lens that can achieve a more critical evaluation when assessing “(a) a country’s political pronouncements, (b) how it treats its own people, (c) how it acts in its neighbourhood, and (d) how it acts on the international stage regarding religious liberty”.¹⁰⁰⁴

⁹⁹⁸ Ibid. 32

⁹⁹⁹ Robert A. Seiple, "Conclusion: A Lively Experiment, a Most Flourishing Civil State," in *Religion and Security: The New Nexus in International Relations*, ed. Robert A. Seiple, and Hoover, Dennis R. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005). 176

¹⁰⁰⁰ Chris Seiple, "Building Religious Freedom: A Theory of Change," *Review of Faith & International Affairs* 10, no. 3 (2012). 97

¹⁰⁰¹ Patterson, "What They Say and Do: Religious Freedom as a National Security Lens." 26

¹⁰⁰² Danan, "Shaping the Narrative of Religious Freedom." 185

¹⁰⁰³ Patterson, "What They Say and Do: Religious Freedom as a National Security Lens." 22

¹⁰⁰⁴ Ibid. 22

Following this analysis, security analysts can identify more accurately what might be a simple miscommunication or political rhetoric derived from an explicit religiopolitical ideology.¹⁰⁰⁵ This method of analysis can be an effective diplomatic tool when constructing a strategy to mitigate conflict. Religious freedom also inherently promotes peace due to its presence in the teachings and behaviours of actors that contribute to either peace or violence.¹⁰⁰⁶ Philpott aptly recognises the importance of religious freedom in that “the more strongly that religious and political leaders or organisations hold a political theology of religious freedom, the more they are likely to further peace”.¹⁰⁰⁷ In this way, when religious freedom intersects with traditional national security analysis, the most significant parties can be more accurately identified, thereby increasing the chances of constructive responses.¹⁰⁰⁸

Not only is religious freedom valuable regarding security analysis, but it is compatible with peacebuilding. While scholarship is generally lacking in this area, some scholars and practitioners have found a connection between religious freedom and peacebuilding.¹⁰⁰⁹ Peacebuilding activities instigated by nongovernmental organisations have the capacity to integrate religious freedom into their methods.¹⁰¹⁰ The Office of International Religious Freedom within the US State Department, for example, can see religious freedom become a part of the policymaking process.¹⁰¹¹ The institutional integration of religious freedom highlights its potential value in translating to multiple areas within diplomacy, which holds implications for the promotion of religious freedoms abroad. In the context of the United States, for example, promoting religious freedom is a process of multi-stakeholder collaboration, where civil society engages in assistance and development initiatives, nongovernmental organisations provide a network for activities, and governments, nonstate actors and the individual society enter into dialogue.¹⁰¹²

Typically, strategies and policies that protect and promote religious freedom take two forms. The first is advocacy programs that promote religious freedom which manifests through a public process that highlights situations where religious freedom is limited in some way.¹⁰¹³

¹⁰⁰⁵ Ibid. 25

¹⁰⁰⁶ Philpott, "Religious Freedom and Peacebuilding: May I Introduce You Two?." 33

¹⁰⁰⁷ Ibid. 33

¹⁰⁰⁸ Patterson, "What They Say and Do: Religious Freedom as a National Security Lens." 29

¹⁰⁰⁹ Philpott, "Religious Freedom and Peacebuilding: May I Introduce You Two?." 31

¹⁰¹⁰ Ibid. 31

¹⁰¹¹ Ibid. 31

¹⁰¹² Eugene K. B. Tan, "Faith, Freedom, and US Foreign Policy: Avoiding the Proverbial Clash of Civilizations in East and Southeast Asia," *ibid.* 76-77

¹⁰¹³ Seiple, "Building Religious Freedom: A Theory of Change." 98-99

This advocacy approach is used to generate awareness of violations, but can also “name, blame, and shame” governments, which may hinder the relationship between parties.¹⁰¹⁴ The second type of strategy is one that integrates religious freedom in a private process, engaging government officials and leaders in a country to address specific concerns.¹⁰¹⁵ This operational strategy can transform the political environment that is constricting religious freedoms, enhancing the value of faith traditions within the country. However, this strategy runs the risk of promoting harmful propaganda if the state chooses to only value one religion over another or marginalise a group.¹⁰¹⁶ While religious freedom may not be a key feature of transitional justice, it is not to be underestimated.¹⁰¹⁷ Religious freedom can play a crucial role in diplomacy beyond the traditional understanding of the state. For the United States, this ideally translates to religious freedom reinforcing “the virtues and values of diversity, pluralism, respect, and tolerance, even on foreign soil”.¹⁰¹⁸ If this was to be achieved in reality, the United States would reap the benefits in global image to maintain and influence relationships with other states.¹⁰¹⁹ This type of influence can become a key feature of policy construction in the future and position faith-based diplomacy to play a significant role.

Foreign Policy

Contemporary scholars are contending with the complex process of incorporating faith and faith-based diplomacy into foreign policy. This section will explore the limitations, opportunities, and methods available for integrating faith and faith-based diplomacy into the construction of foreign policy. The structures of foreign ministries suggest that there is no substantial understanding of religion and its role in policy.¹⁰²⁰ Even though the United States supports giving religious considerations a higher priority in the construction of foreign policy, Johnston finds that the State Department’s organisational structure does not reflect that priority in any substantive way.¹⁰²¹ Addressing these structures must be a priority as faith-based

¹⁰¹⁴ Ibid. 98-99

¹⁰¹⁵ Ibid. 98-99

¹⁰¹⁶ Ibid. 98-99

¹⁰¹⁷ Philpott, "Religious Freedom and Peacebuilding: May I Introduce You Two?." 34

¹⁰¹⁸ Tan, "Faith, Freedom, and US Foreign Policy: Avoiding the Proverbial Clash of Civilizations in East and Southeast Asia." 78

¹⁰¹⁹ Ibid. 78

¹⁰²⁰ Albright, "Faith and Diplomacy." 4

¹⁰²¹ Johnston, *Religion, Terror and Error: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual Engagement*. 84

diplomacy can be a useful tool of foreign policy.¹⁰²² Developing a deeper capacity for religious engagement on various levels of foreign policy will assist in achieving this goal.¹⁰²³

Policymakers would benefit from the realisation that they could “harness the unifying potential of faith, while containing its capacity to divide”.¹⁰²⁴ In essence, foreign policy institutions must reorient to account for how religion influences societal behaviour.¹⁰²⁵ There are evident overlaps between religion’s role in society and other international goals. When constructing foreign policy, policymakers will need to evaluate their decision to intervene in foreign conflict with a deeper consideration of the moral and ethical implications of that intervention; religion should be considered more closely as it can form the basis promoting ethical standards or as a source of positive conflict intervention.¹⁰²⁶ Contemporary conflicts are often identity-based, and the clear delineation created by traditional borders is not sufficient in clarifying policy decisions that must contend with the nature of violence.¹⁰²⁷ Essentially, religion cannot just be seen as a peripheral issue, especially when foreign policy is focusing on the negative force of religion, for example as a motivator for extremism.¹⁰²⁸

Religious peacemakers are important in contemporary foreign policy because they provide “a distinct ability to address the complex role of religion and a practical on-the-ground understanding of the nature of conflict among the people”.¹⁰²⁹ The bottom-up approach is an opportunity that policymakers can utilise as a valuable resource to peacemaking. Within the American experience, Patterson argues that in order to take advantage of religious resurgence, the United States should entrust its domestic religious actors to deliver foreign policy objectives.¹⁰³⁰ Marsden proposes that an example of effective American foreign policy about religion is the role of military chaplains (elaborated below in ‘The individual and Faith-based Diplomacy’) as an actor within the faith-based diplomacy paradigm.¹⁰³¹ Patterson notes that during the Cold War, US foreign policy sought to integrate multiple actors to assist in countering the idea of communism. In the same way, foreign policy can be targeted to academics to inform the policymakers about the nexus of security, religion and human rights;

¹⁰²² Albright, "Faith and Diplomacy." 9

¹⁰²³ Johnston, *Religion, Terror and Error: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual Engagement*. 5

¹⁰²⁴ Albright, "Faith and Diplomacy." 3

¹⁰²⁵ *Ibid.* 4

¹⁰²⁶ Burnett, "Implications for the Foreign Policy Community." 292

¹⁰²⁷ Jafari, "Local Religious Peacemakers: An Untapped Resource in U.S. Foreign Policy." 116

¹⁰²⁸ *Ibid.* 116

¹⁰²⁹ *Ibid.* 124-5

¹⁰³⁰ Patterson cited by Marsden, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: Conservative Evangelicals and the United States Military." 477

¹⁰³¹ *Ibid.* 485

to corporate leaders to discourage their financial support of violators of religious freedom; to enhance international coalitions and advocacy networks, and to inform the American national security policies.¹⁰³²

The primary limitation of incorporating religion into public policy, as noted in Chapter 7, is the belief that religion is inherently irrational, fueled by emotion, and thus incompatible with modernity. As a result, scholarly work has given insufficient attention to the links between religious freedom and societal well-being, as religion remains largely unrecognised as an integral policy matter.¹⁰³³ A challenge for incorporating faith-based diplomacy into foreign policy is that it is not sufficient in and of itself to replace traditional diplomacy.¹⁰³⁴ Often the policies for approaching religion are narrow, typically seeing religions as a problematic force which overemphasises terrorism-centric assessments of Islam and ultimately marginalises religion when it comes to cultural or humanitarian analysis.¹⁰³⁵ Recognising that religion is an intractable force, observers have found that the normal instrumentalities of statecraft and foreign policy are unresponsive to the challenges posed by religion.¹⁰³⁶ A critical goal of foreign policy experts is to be able to engage with religious actors within a community, to identify religious peacemakers, and to create a strategy that recognises the place of these actors.¹⁰³⁷

Within the scope of public diplomacy, the soft power strategy to promote religious freedom is a valuable tool as policymakers can draw attention to restrictions to freedom and also encourage social conditions which are conducive to those freedoms.¹⁰³⁸ The linkage between religious freedom and public diplomacy reflects on a wider implication: foreign policies that incorporate religious freedom into public diplomacy strategies are potentially a successful method of faith-based diplomacy. Understanding religious freedom in the American constructs of foreign policy can increase the chances of their foreign policy responses as contextually constructive rather than harmful or counterproductive.¹⁰³⁹ Tan asserts that the United States in the 21st Century is well positioned to conduct a faith-informed foreign policy in that:

¹⁰³² Patterson, "What They Say and Do: Religious Freedom as a National Security Lens." 28

¹⁰³³ Farr, "Diplomacy in an Age of Faith."

¹⁰³⁴ Albright, "Faith and Diplomacy." 9

¹⁰³⁵ Farr, "Diplomacy in an Age of Faith."

¹⁰³⁶ Luttwak, "The Missing Dimension." 13

¹⁰³⁷ Jafari, "Local Religious Peacemakers: An Untapped Resource in U.S. Foreign Policy." 125

¹⁰³⁸ Danan, "Shaping the Narrative of Religious Freedom." 182

¹⁰³⁹ Patterson, "What They Say and Do: Religious Freedom as a National Security Lens." 29

promoting religious freedom and eradicating religious persecution are crucial to the larger effort of promoting a broader suite of fundamental liberties in emerging democracies and sustaining those liberties in established democracies.¹⁰⁴⁰

In advancing and protecting these values as a part of foreign policy, the United States can remain in a position of influence in the international system.¹⁰⁴¹ The US must be cautious, however, not to use this influence as a way of interfering in domestic affairs as this can be viewed as antagonism, particularly by China or states in the Global South. This analysis of the linkage between religious freedom, public diplomacy and foreign policy demonstrates the potential benefits in this space for faith-based diplomacy and highlights that there is a need for the thoughtful construction of strategy in the future.

Religious Leaders

The role of religious leaders as part of the diplomatic process is expanding in theory and diplomatic practice. This role does require further examination; however, at the very least, there is increased involvement of religious figures in the process of peacemaking.¹⁰⁴² Religious leaders are beneficial to the diplomatic process for two primary reasons. The first is that “religious leaders can help to validate a peace process before, during, and after negotiations” by using dialogue and public statements to achieve and sustain peace.¹⁰⁴³ In fact, “respected religious figures provide a level of reassurance that official diplomats are often hard-pressed to equal”.¹⁰⁴⁴ The second primary reason is that religious leaders can persuade people of different religious perspectives to work together cooperatively which requires informed separation of what is debatable in scripture, and what is not.¹⁰⁴⁵ Religious leaders can address the role of religion in the local environment and understand the nature of conflict within a given community, especially if they are from the community in question.¹⁰⁴⁶

¹⁰⁴⁰ Tan, "Faith, Freedom, and US Foreign Policy: Avoiding the Proverbial Clash of Civilizations in East and Southeast Asia." 76

¹⁰⁴¹ *Ibid.* 78

¹⁰⁴² Johnston, "Review of the Findings." 259

¹⁰⁴³ Albright, "Faith and Diplomacy." 9

¹⁰⁴⁴ Johnston, "Looking Ahead: Toward a New Paradigm." 329

¹⁰⁴⁵ Albright, "Faith and Diplomacy." 9

¹⁰⁴⁶ Jafari, "Local Religious Peacemakers: An Untapped Resource in U.S. Foreign Policy." 124-5

When incorporating religious leaders into negotiations, they can provide a mechanism for engagement, a method of communication, procedural assistance, and also they can act as an intermediary where opposing parties concede assets and make claims to the religious authority as opposed to their antagonists at the negotiating table.¹⁰⁴⁷ Religious leaders can open a window “to a transcendent dimension at both the personal level (prayer, forgiveness, and reconciliation) and in political terms (peace, and political and social accords)”.¹⁰⁴⁸ As a result of this perspective, it can be easier for “individuals on both sides of the negotiation to speak with each other, and to see beyond their individual preoccupations to goals shared by the other”.¹⁰⁴⁹ Religious leaders can also provide a level of expertise that has a genuine appreciation for the power of faith to move people to certain behaviours.¹⁰⁵⁰ Johnston and Cox summarise the common attributes of religious leaders that can exert considerable influence on the peace process as:

1. A well-established and pervasive influence in the community
2. A reputation as an apolitical force for change based on a respected set of values
3. Unique social leverage for reconciling conflicting parties, including an ability to rehumanize relationships
4. The capability to mobilise community, national, and international support for a peace process.¹⁰⁵¹

These characteristics are compelling and support Marsden’s claims that “the argument that religious actors are best equipped to deal with problems with a religious dimension, even (or especially) where this involves those of a different religious persuasion advanced by the faith-based diplomacy school are in the ascendancy”.¹⁰⁵² As the understanding of the role of religious actors continues to rise, the policies and practices put in place to incorporate religious actors into the peace process are gaining acceptance. While some religious leaders will be discussed later in this chapter as individual actors, an example of a religious leader who has impacted the diplomatic process is Desmond Tutu. His commitment to overthrowing the apartheid regime was motivated by his theological background as an Archbishop, including his commitment to

¹⁰⁴⁷ Luttwak, "The Missing Dimension." 17

¹⁰⁴⁸ Bruce Nichols, "Religious Conciliation between the Sandinistas and the East Coast Indians of Nicaragua," *ibid.* 72

¹⁰⁴⁹ *Ibid.* 72

¹⁰⁵⁰ Johnston, *Religion, Terror and Error: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual Engagement.* 148

¹⁰⁵¹ Johnston and Cox, "Faith-Based Diplomacy and Preventive Engagement." 14

¹⁰⁵² Marsden, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: Conservative Evangelicals and the United States Military." 479

the principles of loving your enemy, truth and reconciliation.¹⁰⁵³ Religious leaders are a valuable asset that faith-based diplomacy can incorporate to increase its effectiveness.

Faith-based Diplomacy's Third-party Mediation Capacity

Research suggests that there is an increasingly important role for faith-based diplomats as a third-party mediator in negotiations. Johnston found that, whether in an official capacity or a more nonofficial Track Two approach, third-party mediators are making their mark in the area of negotiation, conflict intervention, and conflict resolution.¹⁰⁵⁴ They achieve success because faith-based mediators provide a negotiating mechanism, a method of communication and also procedural assistance.¹⁰⁵⁵ However, the religious element of these mediators also creates a level of authority which can bridge the divide created by an antagonist-protagonist dichotomy.¹⁰⁵⁶ In the traditional conception of a third-party mediator, the mediator is an “outsider-neutral” third party, which is the standard practice in diplomatic negotiations. However, when a faith-based individual or organisation is acting as a third-party, they are an “insider-partial” actor, which is valuable to the diplomatic process as they are influential “not in distance from the conflict... but rather in connectedness and trusted relationships with conflict parties”.¹⁰⁵⁷ This trust is the consequence of a result of longstanding relationships which traverse traditional political boundaries and can assist diplomatic progress.¹⁰⁵⁸ Through the lens of faith-based diplomacy, all humanity has a divine connection and that bond forms relationships between parties.¹⁰⁵⁹ As an example, the church as a representative body can play a role in peacemaking as it has: accumulated historical involvement in peacemaking within the community; demonstrated unusual persistence in the face of adversity; and, shown a special ability to influence the attitudes and actions of political leaders.¹⁰⁶⁰ If integrated correctly, the church, or its representatives, is capable of playing an influential role in the resolution process. Religious agents are available at every level of peacemaking, be it international, domestic,

¹⁰⁵³ Peter Lodberg, "Desmond Tutu: Church Resistance to Apartheid and Injustice in Africa," in *Christianity and Resistance in the 20th Century: From Kaj Munk and Dietrich Bonhoeffer to Desmond Tutu* ed. Soren Dosenrode and Sören Zibrandt von Dosenrode-Lynge (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill 2009).

¹⁰⁵⁴ Johnston, "Introduction: Beyond Power Politics." 4

¹⁰⁵⁵ Luttwak, "The Missing Dimension." 17

¹⁰⁵⁶ *Ibid.* 17

¹⁰⁵⁷ Nichols, "Religious Conciliation between the Sandinistas and the East Coast Indians of Nicaragua." 72

¹⁰⁵⁸ *Ibid.* 82

¹⁰⁵⁹ Cynthia Sampson, "'To Make Real the Bond between Us All': Quaker Conciliation During the Nigerian Civil War," *ibid.* 95

¹⁰⁶⁰ Johnston, "Review of the Findings." 263

regional, ad hoc, or even individually.¹⁰⁶¹ The concept of third-party mediation firmly sits within the field of conflict resolution and negotiation, but the space for accommodating religious actors to play a more engaging role is developing. Within the constructs of faith-based diplomacy, the third-party mediating capacity is an advantageous opportunity.

Faith-based Diplomacy and the Tracks of Diplomacy

The different tracks of diplomacy distinguish the methods and actors engaged in a diplomatic process.¹⁰⁶² The concept was developed by Joseph Montville, who made the distinction between Track One (being official, governmental action) and Track Two (being unofficial, nongovernmental action) as an approach to conflict resolution.¹⁰⁶³ In Track One diplomacy “communication goes from one official party directly to the decisionmaking apparatus of another”.¹⁰⁶⁴ Track Two looks toward an “unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversarial groups or nations with the goals of developing strategies, influencing public opinions and organizing resources in ways that might help resolve the conflict”.¹⁰⁶⁵ As the concept took hold in scholarship, other academics began to expand the two tracks. McDonald, for instance, identified nine tracks of diplomacy and named this concept multi-track diplomacy.¹⁰⁶⁶ This area of study has generated a framework which presents a “structure of mediator characteristics, resources and strategies”.¹⁰⁶⁷ The quantitative literature on international mediation is comparatively extensive. When analysing the tracks of diplomacy, by comparison, very few generalised insights have been developed.¹⁰⁶⁸ A task for the scholars of faith-based diplomacy is to identify which track is the most appropriate for faith-based strategies. As stated above, in the definitions of faith-based diplomacy, Track Two as the unofficial approach recommends itself.¹⁰⁶⁹

Johnston believes this is the case because Track Two agents can engage and intervene in situations where official government agents cannot.¹⁰⁷⁰ Track Two approaches rely on a

¹⁰⁶¹ Vendley and Little, "Implications for Religious Communities: Buddhism, Islam, Hinduism, and Christianity." 312

¹⁰⁶² For a visual representation of the different approaches, see: Thompson, "Religion and Diplomacy." 212-3

¹⁰⁶³ Troy, "Faith-Based Diplomacy under Examination." 212

¹⁰⁶⁴ Tobias Böhmelt, "The Effectiveness of Tracks of Diplomacy Strategies in Third-Party Interventions," *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 2 (2010). 168

¹⁰⁶⁵ *Ibid.* 168

¹⁰⁶⁶ Troy, "Faith-Based Diplomacy under Examination." 212

¹⁰⁶⁷ Böhmelt, "The Effectiveness of Tracks of Diplomacy Strategies in Third-Party Interventions." 168

¹⁰⁶⁸ *Ibid.* 167

¹⁰⁶⁹ Johnston and Cox, "Faith-Based Diplomacy and Preventive Engagement." 15

¹⁰⁷⁰ As cited by Moll, "The Father of Faith-Based Diplomacy." 57

progressive approach to diplomacy based on altered perspectives about international affairs and human behaviour.¹⁰⁷¹ Faith-based diplomacy is not typically well-suited for government practitioners as state institutions abide by the church-state divide.¹⁰⁷² As value-based conflicts about identity, survival and fears continue to intensify around the world, Track Two diplomacy is argued as the only effective approach because it “seeks to change the underlying relationships so as to promote a mutual understanding” between the parties involved.¹⁰⁷³ In view of faith-based diplomacy pursuing reconciliation which impacts the personal level, then society, it does not fit naturally within the Track One approach.¹⁰⁷⁴ The task of religious engagement in the diplomatic process then falls on individuals, nongovernmental organisations or civil society, but once that has taken place, governments can reinforce the processes or build upon them.¹⁰⁷⁵

A danger does lie, however, in suggesting that faith-based diplomacy only be applied to Track Two approaches, even if Track Two diplomacy deals specifically with religious issues.¹⁰⁷⁶ Instead, faith-based diplomacy must integrate faith into the frameworks of diplomatic and political institutions. Thus, a broader approach is needed.¹⁰⁷⁷ When writing on the theory of faith-based diplomacy, Johnston recognised that it fits well within the Track Two lens, but noted that there was the potential in the future for Track Two mediators to work constructively with Track One representatives.¹⁰⁷⁸ He argues that the use of Track Two in seriatim with Track One diplomacy is the most effective in resolving conflict.¹⁰⁷⁹ This is because the faith-based diplomat can provide a level of reassurance that official diplomats often cannot, helping to build relationships in the early stages of negotiations. But “by the same token, the parties to a settlement will inevitably look to the economic and military capabilities of the international community to provide the necessary political and security guarantees”.¹⁰⁸⁰

In the study of the tracks of diplomacy, the concept of Track One and a Half (or Track 1.5) diplomacy supports this trend. It is “public or private interaction between official representatives of disputants that is mediated by a third party not representing a political

¹⁰⁷¹ Troy, "Faith-Based Diplomacy under Examination." 227

¹⁰⁷² Johnston, *Religion, Terror and Error: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual Engagement*. 57

¹⁰⁷³ Böhmelt, "The Effectiveness of Tracks of Diplomacy Strategies in Third-Party Interventions." 169

¹⁰⁷⁴ Troy, "Faith-Based Diplomacy under Examination." 228

¹⁰⁷⁵ Johnston, *Religion, Terror and Error: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual Engagement*. 57

¹⁰⁷⁶ Troy, "Faith-Based Diplomacy under Examination." 229

¹⁰⁷⁷ *Ibid.* 229

¹⁰⁷⁸ Johnston, "Looking Ahead: Toward a New Paradigm." 329

¹⁰⁷⁹ *Ibid.* 329

¹⁰⁸⁰ *Ibid.* 329

institution”.¹⁰⁸¹ This approach is advantageous because, unlike Track Two diplomacy, it can involve parties from every level of official and unofficial diplomacy.¹⁰⁸² In a simple form, this track of diplomacy attempts to combine the strengths of Track One and Two approaches. When considering the role of faith-based diplomacy, decision makers must carefully consider which approach is most appropriate. Faith-based diplomacy fits most naturally in the Track Two style of diplomacy, but as Johnston suggests, it may benefit from being reinforced by Track One agents. With the emergence of Track One and a Half frameworks, faith-based diplomacy may be able to integrate styles and methods from both tracks, but this requires testing. Track One “as the more powerful and enforcing mediator, is more likely to come to stable and effective outcomes”.¹⁰⁸³ Importantly, however, “if this track is facilitated by unofficial mediators its effectiveness is even higher, owing to pooled resources, decreased uncertainty and the ensured support at the grassroots level”.¹⁰⁸⁴ This type of approach may be beneficial to faith-based diplomacy and should be considered by scholars and practitioners alike for future faith-based strategies.

The Actors of Faith-based Diplomacy

Throughout this thesis, consideration has been given not only to the theory of diplomacy but also to the actors that perform the diplomatic functions. This section will assess the way that different diplomatic actors can engage in faith-based diplomacy, beginning with the state and traditional diplomats, and subsequently continuing to nonstate actors. The section will then discuss intergovernmental organisations, nongovernmental organisations, faith-based civil society organisations, namely the church, and also the role of the individual. In doing so, not only will the theory and characteristics of faith-based diplomacy have been presented in this chapter, but potential practitioners and actors as well.

The State and Diplomats

As discussed previously in this thesis, the traditional constructs of diplomacy generally fall within the locus of the state. With the definition of states coming from Westphalian peace, religion has remained subordinate to the state and hence, Philpott suggests, observers have

¹⁰⁸¹ Böhmelt, "The Effectiveness of Tracks of Diplomacy Strategies in Third-Party Interventions." 169

¹⁰⁸² Ibid. 169

¹⁰⁸³ Ibid. 176

¹⁰⁸⁴ Ibid. 176

“assumed the absence of religion among the factors that influence states”.¹⁰⁸⁵ This absence was a result of the state restricting religion to the interior life of the individual within the state, where education and modernity were used to pacify the potential for religion to lead to conflict and control.¹⁰⁸⁶ The process of confining religion in the domestic sphere was an incremental process post-Westphalia and varied depending on how each state took form.¹⁰⁸⁷ The principle of *cujus regio, ejus religio*, or ‘whose region, his religion’ eventuated, meaning that variations in religious order became apparent between states.¹⁰⁸⁸ The legal perspective accepts that the role of the state is a “neutral and impartial organiser of the exercise of various religions, faiths and beliefs”.¹⁰⁸⁹ Here, the state’s “duty of neutrality and impartiality is incompatible with any power on the State’s part to assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs or the way those beliefs are expressed”.¹⁰⁹⁰

Frameworks that the state applies to concepts of religion are generally narrow in that they focus on the problematic element of religion, over-emphasise its extremist potentialities, and marginalise religion as a cultural issue.¹⁰⁹¹ While the value of culture in scholarship is increasing, the traditional focus on the state and institutions continues to limit culture’s penetration in policy.¹⁰⁹² Government departments have organised political structures in such a way as to diminish any priority given to religious considerations.¹⁰⁹³ In the United States, for example, “the rigorous constitutional separation of church and state so relegates religion to the realm of the personal that most Americans are uncomfortable discussing their religious convictions in any sort of professional context”.¹⁰⁹⁴ The nation-state model has entrenched this position and made religion of virtually no significance to government policymakers.¹⁰⁹⁵ In contrast, Birdsall suggests that the US Department of State “as a whole is more institutionally attentive to religion than at any time in living memory” because actors within the Department and academics writing on the issue have brought religion firmly into the scope of analysis.¹⁰⁹⁶ Increasingly within the state, the construct of the nation and national identity is defined by

¹⁰⁸⁵ As cited by: Farr, "Diplomacy in an Age of Faith."

¹⁰⁸⁶ Sharp, "Crazy Religion Diplomacy." 258

¹⁰⁸⁷ Sandal and James, "Religion and International Relations Theory: Towards a Mutual Understanding." 5

¹⁰⁸⁸ *Ibid.* 5

¹⁰⁸⁹ Richmond, "Freedom of Religion and Freedom from Religion." 4

¹⁰⁹⁰ *Ibid.* 4

¹⁰⁹¹ Farr, "Diplomacy in an Age of Faith."

¹⁰⁹² Faucher, "Cultural Diplomacy and International Cultural Relations in Twentieth-Century Europe." 383s

¹⁰⁹³ Johnston, *Religion, Terror and Error: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual Engagement.* 84

¹⁰⁹⁴ "Religion and Foreign Policy."

¹⁰⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹⁶ Birdsall, "Keep the Faith: How American Diplomacy Got Religion, and How to Keep It." 112

religion and ethnos.¹⁰⁹⁷ The state-centric focus on power-politics has made it difficult to accommodate religion as a feature of decision-making.¹⁰⁹⁸ Government practitioners, however, are constrained in their ability to conduct faith-based diplomacy.¹⁰⁹⁹ Johnston cautions that “it is important not to overstate religion’s utility to government” as “in some situations, religion will be an unstable partner for statecraft as church and state go their separate ways over issues relating to justice or injustice”.¹¹⁰⁰

These concerns do not mean, however, that faith-based diplomacy has never interacted with the state. Lambert’s study found that Thomas Jefferson modelled his diplomatic approach on morality and religious freedom, which reflected in the peace treaties he proposed.¹¹⁰¹ China, too, has had a long history of incorporating faith into their diplomatic engagement since the introduction of Buddhism into the country over 2000 years ago.¹¹⁰² This includes sending religious envoys, such as Monk Zuanzang to India and Monk Jianzhen to Japan during the Tang dynasty.¹¹⁰³ In the contemporary international system, China has identified that various faiths play an important part in boosting its soft power initiatives for diplomatic purposes.¹¹⁰⁴ The Chinese government has promoted certain goals in China’s faith diplomacy which include: “promoting international understanding and acceptance of China’s religious policy, advocating China’s actions regarding religions” and improving China’s image abroad.¹¹⁰⁵ These goals supported China’s “harmonious world” and “harmonious society” slogans, which underpinned China’s policy decisions under the Hu Jintao era, but the subsequent presidency of Xi Jinping has further emphasised loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) above all else, including religion. This has been especially evident in the restive regions of Tibet and Xinjiang where religious practices are circumscribed and those who refuse to be assimilated (or “harmonised”) are subjected to state security measures. These include detention in political “re-education camps” in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region where an estimated one million Muslims are

¹⁰⁹⁷ Burnett, "Implications for the Foreign Policy Community." 298

¹⁰⁹⁸ Johnston, "Looking Ahead: Toward a New Paradigm." 333

¹⁰⁹⁹ Johnston, *Religion, Terror and Error: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual Engagement*. 57

¹¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.* 57

¹¹⁰¹ Frank Lambert, "Thomas Jefferson's Moral Diplomacy," *Review of Faith & International Affairs* 9, no. 4 (2011).

¹¹⁰² Zhang, "China's Faith Diplomacy." 75

¹¹⁰³ Yihua Xu, "Religion and China's Public Diplomacy in the Era of Globalization," *Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia)* 9, no. 4 (2015).

¹¹⁰⁴ Zhang, "China's Faith Diplomacy." 75

¹¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.* 83. See the China’s special reference to religion in the 2018 White Paper, "Progress in Human Rights over the 40 Years of Reform and Opening up in China", The State Council of the People's Republic of China http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/12/13/content_281476431737638.htm. 19

interned.¹¹⁰⁶ Even prior to Xi Jinping's tighter policies, the Chinese Communist Party forbade divided loyalties by enforcing state power over religious leaders. This meant that the CCP had greater authority than the Dalai Lama for Tibetans and the Pope for Catholics. While the Dalai Lama is still deemed problematic for China, the same is no longer true for Catholics. In 2018, the Vatican recognised the CCP's authority to appoint bishops. This compromise from the Vatican would count as a reassuring outcome for China as the heightened importance of faith in China's domestic considerations finds that "religious adherents in China currently outnumber communist party members by more than four to one".¹¹⁰⁷ However, the exact number of religious adherents cannot be known. There is no conversion ritual to become a Buddhist, for instance. In the case of Christianity: "Pew Research estimated that by 2030, China's Christian population of 70 million would grow to between 250 million and 300 million. If the forecasts prove accurate, China will soon overtake the US as the most populous Christian country."¹¹⁰⁸ This would mean that China would be in a strong position to engage in faith diplomacy, be it as a Buddhist, Christian or Muslim representative country – despite "re-education" and "stabilisation" campaigns at home.

Another example of contemporary faith-based diplomacy through the state is the activities of Indonesia following the Arab Spring. The Indonesian Institute for Peace and Democracy worked with academics, civil society leaders and government officials to look at the state's structures vis-à-vis religion to revise their effectiveness in incorporating religion constructively into policy.¹¹⁰⁹ These examples do demonstrate that there are some attempts at addressing religion through state mechanisms, but more needs to be done. In Russia, for example, religion has returned to the everyday lives of people after the fall of Soviet Communism and its official atheism. As reported in 2017, Russia has the highest rate of belief among Europeans with more than 80 per cent of the Russian population identifying as religious.¹¹¹⁰ Although there are definitive limitations to what states can do to engage with religion in diplomacy, attention to where faith-based diplomacy is possible constitutes a valid pursuit.

¹¹⁰⁶ Zenz, Adrian, 'New Evidence for China's Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang', *China Brief*, Vol. 18, No.10, 15 May 2018. Available at <https://jamestown.org/program/evidence-for-chinas-political-re-education-campaign-in-xinjiang/>

¹¹⁰⁷ Koesel, "Religion and the Regime: Cooperation and Conflict in Contemporary Russia and China." 676

¹¹⁰⁸ Jennifer Oriel, "Pope Francis caves in to the Catholic Church's old enemies," *The Australian*, February 23, 2018, <https://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/columnists/jennifer-oriel/pope-francis-caves-in-to-the-catholic-churchs-old-enemies/news-story/1be7303dec3cca80ee7c80315f07708e>.

¹¹⁰⁹ Hoesterey, "Is Indonesia a Model for the Arab Spring? Islam, Democracy, and Diplomacy." 58

¹¹¹⁰ Koesel, "Religion and the Regime: Cooperation and Conflict in Contemporary Russia and China." 676

The primary diplomatic agent of the state is the diplomat. The diplomat has faced unique challenges in engaging with religion as a part of their functions, as discussed in Chapter 2. Albright notes that practitioners of foreign policy “have sought to separate religion from world politics, to liberate logic from beliefs that transcend logic”; however, “religious motivations do not disappear simply because they are not mentioned” – indeed, they may burst forth in time of trouble after lying dormant.¹¹¹¹ Throughout history, states have initiated policies that entrenched secularisation, and now it is becoming apparent that diplomats should separate themselves from those policies as these strategies have often been counterproductive and have driven people to intolerance and conflict.¹¹¹² Diplomats are under pressure to reconceptualise their understanding of how religion operates in the world, and then apply the necessary skills, competency and framing to see how they can best engage with such a world.¹¹¹³ As diplomats come to understand religion’s relevance, attempts are being made to adjust state structures. John Kerry noted in 2013 that “religious engagement would be a signature priority of his time as Secretary of State”.¹¹¹⁴ Kerry’s pronouncement was promising, but the changing international agenda, state leadership, and diplomatic priority have seen these advancements slowed. Regardless, while it may be difficult to integrate faith-based strategies at the state level effectively, there is still scope for it to occur.

Nonstate Actors

The research on faith-based diplomacy has suggested that nonstate actors are the most effective for successful diplomatic engagement with religion. Nonstate interactions at the subnational and individual levels are a challenge that faith-based diplomats are seeking to address.¹¹¹⁵ New mechanisms of engagement are required to move beyond the traditional state-centric focus on power to identify the positive contributions nonstate actors can make.¹¹¹⁶ The nation-state has long ignored the role that nonstate actors can play in conducting diplomacy.¹¹¹⁷ Nonstate actors, particularly terrorist organisations, can be responsible for inflicting violence through networks of radical ideology, but research suggests that popular support for this

¹¹¹¹ Albright, "Faith and Diplomacy." 7

¹¹¹² Sharp, "Crazy Religion Diplomacy." 264

¹¹¹³ Loskota and Flory, "Why Religion Still Matters in the World." 10

¹¹¹⁴ Birdsall, "Keep the Faith: How American Diplomacy Got Religion, and How to Keep It." 112

¹¹¹⁵ Johnston, "Looking Ahead: Toward a New Paradigm." 333

¹¹¹⁶ Johnston, "Religion and Foreign Policy."

¹¹¹⁷ Fredy Munthe, "Religious Movements in Humanitarian Issue: The Emergence of Faith-Based Organizations (FBO) in Diplomacy Sphere," *Jurnal Hubungan Internasional* 5, no. 2 (2016). 172

approach is waning.¹¹¹⁸ Munthe notes that nongovernmental organisations, multinational corporations, churches, religious movements, transnational terrorists, revolutionaries, and private individuals are all actors that can play a part in delivering diplomatic services.¹¹¹⁹ This section will focus, however, on the nonstate actors that can influence the diplomatic process positively. While intergovernmental organisations are impacting the diplomatic landscape, their capacity to engage in religious matters is beholden to the structures of the institution and the priorities of the member states. Research on their potential role is limited, but there is evidence of religion playing a role in the notion of pluralism and normative values.¹¹²⁰ Thus, the focus of analysis in this section will be on nongovernmental organisations, civil society organisations and the individual.

States are increasingly outsourcing their responsibility to engage in religious issues to religious organisations that have demonstrated the ability of delivering required services.¹¹²¹ Religious organisations can more effectively achieve humanitarian assistance and community reconstruction as they have relationships with the community that allow them to do so.¹¹²² Religious channels of dialogue between communities and government representatives require dependable interlocutors who come from the cast of nonstate actors.¹¹²³ This development has promoted the idea of a multi-stakeholder collaboration taking place where several actors engage in the diplomatic process.¹¹²⁴ The composition of the actors involved is of vital importance to scholars and practitioners of faith-based diplomacy.

Nongovernmental Organisations and Faith-based Diplomacy

Scholars note that nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) are a complementary avenue for the practice of faith-based diplomacy. As the state is not often best suited to deal with religious issues, the NGO has emerged to fill the gaps left by the state.¹¹²⁵ It is necessary to consider, however, if the NGO itself is equipped to take on the task left behind by the

¹¹¹⁸ Sayeed-Miller, "Public Diplomacy and Transnational Cases of Blasphemy." 100-1

¹¹¹⁹ Munthe, "Religious Movements in Humanitarian Issue: The Emergence of Faith-Based Organizations (FBO) in Diplomacy Sphere." 176

¹¹²⁰ Mario Mauro, "Religious Aspects of Politics," *European View* 11, no. 2 (2012). 158-161

¹¹²¹ Maddox, "Finding God in Global Politics." 191

¹¹²² Marsden, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: Conservative Evangelicals and the United States Military." 494

¹¹²³ *Ibid.* 494

¹¹²⁴ Tan, "Faith, Freedom, and US Foreign Policy: Avoiding the Proverbial Clash of Civilizations in East and Southeast Asia." 76-7

¹¹²⁵ Johnston, *Religion, Terror and Error: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual Engagement.* 57

state.¹¹²⁶ The central benefit for using NGOs is that unlike government officials they are not bound by political constraints, and therefore may be more effective when engaging in conflict resolution efforts.¹¹²⁷ With the space in the international system for NGOs to engage with global issues, faith-based NGOs can best address religious concerns in the international sphere.

When observing the role of faith-based nongovernmental organisations several distinctive benefits become apparent. Johnston states that “to the extent that faith-based NGOs constructively exploit their religious identities, relationships of trust, and far-reaching networks, they offer a vital (and too-often-overlooked) tool for conflict avoidance and mitigation”.¹¹²⁸ In the face of intolerance and limitations to religious freedoms, sustained, substantive training and education initiated by diplomatic programs in collaboration with NGOs, can ensure long-term impact.¹¹²⁹ As nongovernmental organisations integrate religious freedoms into their practices and methodologies, they can become a powerful advocate and contribute to the broader goals of peacebuilding.¹¹³⁰ Lynch examined the role of Christian NGOs and found that they have been increasing in influence transnationally and locally in the way that they engage in governance.¹¹³¹ She found that these Christian organisations exist as a network within a vast constellation of faith-based organisations that provide emergency relief and also support longer-term aid in education, health and other issues.¹¹³² Faith-based NGOs can contribute in communal conflict resolution by going beyond the customary methods of diplomacy to “deal with the deeper sources of conflict, rebuild relationships, and make the necessary concessionary adjustments wherever possible”.¹¹³³ As nongovernmental organisations work closely with the grassroots level of society, these goals are more attainable by organisations that can penetrate the government structures and impact society and its identity.

Although nongovernmental organisations have been effective in achieving their goals concerning faith-based diplomacy, faith-based diplomacy is limited if religious NGOs are the only actors recognised.¹¹³⁴ When NGOs work in conjunction with other actors’ strategies, such as public diplomacy strategies of enhancing discourse, the outcomes can be more

¹¹²⁶ "An Asymmetric Counter to the Asymmetric Threat." 14

¹¹²⁷ Seib, "Religious Freedom and US Public Diplomacy." 19

¹¹²⁸ Johnston, *Religion, Terror and Error: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual Engagement*. 148

¹¹²⁹ Danan, "A Public Diplomacy Approach to International Religious Freedom." 63

¹¹³⁰ Philpott, "Religious Freedom and Peacebuilding: May I Introduce You Two?." 31

¹¹³¹ Lynch, "Christian Ethics, Actors, and Diplomacy: Mediating Universalist Pretensions." 622-3

¹¹³² *Ibid.* 622-3

¹¹³³ Johnston, "Religion and Foreign Policy."

¹¹³⁴ Troy, "Faith-Based Diplomacy under Examination." 229

promising.¹¹³⁵ State and secular NGOs can work alongside faith-based organisations to engage in humanitarian diplomacy, for example.¹¹³⁶ This can be seen in the case of faith-based organisations and their support of internally displaced persons. In both Kenya and Nigeria, cases have emerged of faith-based organisations providing assistance to various communities fleeing from conflict, demonstrating their viability as an actor in the diplomatic process.¹¹³⁷ Thus, while NGOs can address certain religious issues in the international system, they may be more effective in impacting more substantial issues of conflict and diplomacy when working in conjunction with other international actors.

Faith-based Civil Society Organisations, the Church and Faith-based Diplomacy

This section will assess the role of civil society organisations in engaging in faith-based diplomacy. The role of faith-based organisations will be considered, along with the distinctive position the place of worship – be it a Christian church, mosque, temple, synagogue or gathering place of religious believers – has in addressing religious concerns. Civil society is a “vital source of democratic participation, and a limit to the power of the state” as leaders of NGOs, academics, religious bodies and various other professions engage in political processes.¹¹³⁸ The principle of subsidiarity underpins the historical engagement of the state and civil society which “recognises the rights and responsibilities of civil society in relationship to the state”.¹¹³⁹ This relationship has been entrenched through history as organisations and the religious establishment have worked with the state to strengthen civil society.¹¹⁴⁰ As a result, civil society has worked closely with religious bodies to achieve nonviolent political change throughout history.¹¹⁴¹ Complex issues like the compatibility of Islam and democracy in the state are only achievable in a civil state. Thus civil society has taken a more influential role in dialogue to achieve this aim.¹¹⁴²

¹¹³⁵ Seib, "Religious Freedom and US Public Diplomacy." 15

¹¹³⁶ Munthe, "Religious Movements in Humanitarian Issue: The Emergence of Faith-Based Organizations (FBO) in Diplomacy Sphere." 173

¹¹³⁷ Elena Fiddian-Qasbiyeh, "Introduction: Faith-Based Humanitarianism in Contexts of Forced Displacement," (2011).

¹¹³⁸ Cox and Philpott, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: An Ancient Idea Newly Emergent." 36-7

¹¹³⁹ Lan T. Chu, "Vatican Diplomacy in China and Vietnam," in *Religion and Public Diplomacy*, ed. Philip Seib (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 59

¹¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.* 59

¹¹⁴¹ Cox and Philpott, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: An Ancient Idea Newly Emergent." 36-7

¹¹⁴² An example of this relationship can be seen in the case of Indonesia. See, Hoesterey, "Is Indonesia a Model for the Arab Spring? Islam, Democracy, and Diplomacy." 58-61

The concept of civil society is popular among scholars, and some suggest that “global civil society is an antidote to war” and that “civil society groups help in the introduction of deliberative democracy as a way to deal with violent politics”.¹¹⁴³ In a study conducted on the involvement of civil society organisations in the peace process, Bell and O’Rourke found that out of 389 peace agreements between 1990 and 2007, 139 referenced the involvement of civil society including allocating resources and humanitarian aid, monitoring parties’ obligations under peace accords, providing participative forums, and building constitutions.¹¹⁴⁴ Brewer, Higgins and Teeney suggest four key strategic social spaces where civil society can engage in advocating for positive peace. These are:

1. Intellectual spaces, in which alternative ideas are envisaged, and peace envisioned, and in which the private troubles of people are reflected upon intellectually as emerging policy questions that are relevant to them as civil society groups.
2. Institutional spaces, in which these alternatives are enacted and practised by civil society groups themselves, on local and global stages, making the groups role models and drivers of the process of transformation.
3. Market spaces, in which cultural, social and material resources are devoted by the civil society groups, drawn from local and global civic networks, to mobilise and articulate these alternatives, rendering them as policy issues in the public sphere, nationally or internationally.
4. Political spaces, in which civil society groups engage with the political process as back channels of communication and assisting in the negotiation of the peace settlement, either directly by taking a seat at the negotiation table or indirectly by articulating the policy dilemmas that the peace negotiators have to try to settle or balance.¹¹⁴⁵

Within this context, religious institutions are civil society groups that offer the opportunity for engagement globally and locally.¹¹⁴⁶

Faith-based organisations that represent every major religion are in operation around the globe.¹¹⁴⁷ As such, “civil society is a strategic site for faith-based diplomacy”.¹¹⁴⁸ Faith-based organisations cover a breadth of issues, and as Albright suggests, have the compatibility

¹¹⁴³ Brewer, Higgins, and Teeney, "Religion and Peacemaking: A Conceptualization." 1023

¹¹⁴⁴ Ibid. 1023

¹¹⁴⁵ Ibid. 1024-5

¹¹⁴⁶ Ibid. 1023

¹¹⁴⁷ Albright, "Faith and Diplomacy." 8

¹¹⁴⁸ Cox and Philpott, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: An Ancient Idea Newly Emergent." 36-7

to work cooperatively with other agents to pool resources and specialise in delivering services and goods.¹¹⁴⁹ She continues:

Some are most skilled at mediation others are best at helping former combatants readjust to civilian life. Still others emphasize prevention, addressing a problem before it can explode into violence. Many are experts in economic development or building democracy, both insurance policies against war. Together, these activists have more resources, more skilled personnel, a longer attention span, more experience, more dedication, and more success in fostering reconciliation than any government.¹¹⁵⁰

In support for Albright's claims, Brewer, Higgins and Teeney note that religious groups in civil society can work differently from each other, sometimes even in opposition. As such, the integration of different arms of civil society into a diplomatic approach requires strategic consideration.¹¹⁵¹ The composition of civil society organisations demonstrates their potential versatility when engaging in conflict resolution, but they are also capable of not just influencing the grassroots of society, but also influencing and urging leaders above to pursue reconciliation and other goals of faith-based diplomacy.¹¹⁵² A way to conceptualise the role of religion in the peace process is to identify its arena of influence within civil society "as special locations for religious peacemaking".¹¹⁵³ This approach is beneficial as it can give religion a weight in civil society that extends beyond a religion's number of adherents and highlights the mechanisms by which positive peace and communal transformation can take place.¹¹⁵⁴ When harnessed appropriately, civil society, propelled by faith, can be a powerful tool in the sphere of faith-based diplomacy.

An example of this is the role of faith-based organisations in humanitarian diplomacy, in delivering assistance in impoverished regions, where faith-based organisations have had greater prominence than secular development groups, which Munthe examined and found that the state had been ignoring.¹¹⁵⁵ Motivated by religious values, faith-based civil society groups seek to aid the needy and vulnerable, so the existing humanitarian values embedded in religion,

¹¹⁴⁹ Albright, "Faith and Diplomacy." 8

¹¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.* 8

¹¹⁵¹ Brewer, Higgins, and Teeney, "Religion and Peacemaking: A Conceptualization." 1024

¹¹⁵² Cox and Philpott, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: An Ancient Idea Newly Emergent." 36-7

¹¹⁵³ Brewer, Higgins, and Teeney, "Religion and Peacemaking: A Conceptualization." 1024

¹¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.* 1024

¹¹⁵⁵ Munthe, "Religious Movements in Humanitarian Issue: The Emergence of Faith-Based Organizations (FBO) in Diplomacy Sphere." 172

and specific religious language, help to garner the support of sponsors and stakeholders to assist in humanitarian diplomacy.¹¹⁵⁶ Indeed, a notable strength of faith-based organisations is their capacity to translate “the religious value into humanitarian action” in the field.¹¹⁵⁷

With the changes to the theory and practice of diplomacy in the international sphere, individuals in civil society who are well-versed in the religious complexities of conflict, namely grassroots religious leaders, can become key Track Two actors and partners in diplomacy.¹¹⁵⁸ As part of this process, religious values that are central to the identity of a community can be supported by civil society to influence key political figures.¹¹⁵⁹ The influence of faith-based civil society organisations is felt deeply in developing countries where they constitute a substantial part of civil society.¹¹⁶⁰ One challenge faced by religious civil society organisations is the fact that effectiveness can be dependent on garnering trust, legitimacy and relationships – sometimes in a secular environment.¹¹⁶¹ However, this does not mean that religious groups need to deny their faith to be effective, but rather “they enter strategic social spaces in civil society as faith communities in partnership with secular groups, giving a specifically religious dimension to peacemaking but as a part of a general coalition of peacemakers”.¹¹⁶² Indeed, the most effective engagement may be the multi-stakeholder collaboration that sees civil society engage with advocacy, overseas assistance and development initiatives to enhance the network of nongovernmental organisations and buttress the work of governmental agencies on the ground.¹¹⁶³ This network is achievable as civil society organisations, even faith-based organisations more specifically, are capable of developing relations and garnering support from diverse parties, be they governmental or nongovernmental.¹¹⁶⁴ These benefits are accessible when mobilising actors to engage in faith-based diplomacy.

Arguably the most valuable actor in civil society for the advancement of faith-based diplomacy is the community of faith. There are examples of churches influencing the conflict situation within a state, such as the Catholic Church’s involvement in the 1986 revolution in

¹¹⁵⁶ Ibid. 176

¹¹⁵⁷ Ibid. 177

¹¹⁵⁸ Jafari, "Local Religious Peacemakers: An Untapped Resource in U.S. Foreign Policy." 116

¹¹⁵⁹ Johnston, "Review of the Findings." 260-1

¹¹⁶⁰ Johnstone and Svensson, "Belligerents and Believers: Exploring Faith-Based Mediation in Internal Armed Conflicts." 557

¹¹⁶¹ Brewer, Higgins, and Teeney, "Religion and Peacemaking: A Conceptualization." 1033

¹¹⁶² Ibid. 1033

¹¹⁶³ Tan, "Faith, Freedom, and US Foreign Policy: Avoiding the Proverbial Clash of Civilizations in East and Southeast Asia." 76-77

¹¹⁶⁴ Munthe, "Religious Movements in Humanitarian Issue: The Emergence of Faith-Based Organizations (FBO) in Diplomacy Sphere." 172

the Philippines.¹¹⁶⁵ As Johnston found, “sometimes this opportunity relates to the temporal power of the church within the community. Sometimes it is simply that the church is the only institution having moral legitimate in the eyes of the populace. At times, it is both”.¹¹⁶⁶ The church is most effective as an advocate for social change when it utilises: institutional stability and moral authority; a capability for empowering individuals to act, and; a commitment to nonviolence.¹¹⁶⁷ In a study on the church’s ability to promote peace, Johnston identified five qualitative assets that the church could contribute. They are:

1. An established record for humanitarian care and concern
2. A respected set of values, including a reputation for trustworthiness
3. Unique leverage for promoting reconciliation between conflicting parties
4. A capability for mobilising community, national, and international support for a peace process
5. An ability to follow through locally in the wake of a settlement.¹¹⁶⁸

More conceptually from a Christian viewpoint, Lynch highlights that the church can promote universalism, truth and equality based on the fact that within the church there is a sense of common humanity where all people are equal in the eyes of God.¹¹⁶⁹ For peacemaking, this is a useful tool as “problems which otherwise seem unsolvable become susceptible of the solution if approached from the standpoint of the universal brotherhood of [humanity]”.¹¹⁷⁰ The leaders within the church, clergy and laity, are capable of helping re-establish communities after conflict, and the church itself “can play a vital role in the creation of democratic social structures, being vigilant in defence of social justice, and ready to challenge political and military leaders where necessary”.¹¹⁷¹

Historical cases demonstrate that the church can play an effective role in conflict resolution. In the case of the church's role in resolving conflict in the Philippines during the 1986 revolution, Wooster found that the church was a social and political force, and knew how to operate as one successfully.¹¹⁷² He noted that the strength of the church’s actions came from

¹¹⁶⁵ See Wooster, "Faith at the Ramparts: The Philippine Catholic Church and the 1986 Revolution."

¹¹⁶⁶ Johnston, "Review of the Findings." 260-1

¹¹⁶⁷ Ibid. 261

¹¹⁶⁸ Ibid. 262

¹¹⁶⁹ Lynch, "Christian Ethics, Actors, and Diplomacy: Mediating Universalist Pretensions." 620

¹¹⁷⁰ Ibid. 620

¹¹⁷¹ Steele, "Christianity in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo: From Ethnic Captive to Reconciling Agent." 145

¹¹⁷² Wooster, "Faith at the Ramparts: The Philippine Catholic Church and the 1986 Revolution." 168

the principles of the church as a Christian witness and a truth-teller.¹¹⁷³ In this “the church acted as the nation’s moral conscience: speaking out against the regime, denouncing repression, defending human rights, and pushing for transition to democracy.”¹¹⁷⁴ Throughout history, the Catholic church and the Papacy have held various degrees of political influence. The relationship can sometimes be complex, as a reflection of the history of conflict. However, there is a responsibility on the church to work with the state to develop civil society.¹¹⁷⁵

The place of religion in social conflict is, as Johnston stated, “a double-edged sword” in that “it can cause conflict, or it can abate it”.¹¹⁷⁶ For the church, it often reflects the society within which it operates and, consequently, “if a church moves too strongly against forces for social change, it faces the possibility of losing some of its followers”, but at the same time it is expected to be an advocate for peace.¹¹⁷⁷ As a result, the church is often in a tenuous position of balancing these contradictory tendencies. The history of the church in many societies around the world can be difficult to navigate. However, the church does have a particular place within civil society to influence change in diplomacy and conflict resolution. The church, and civil society more broadly, should be seen as a positive asset in faith-based diplomacy’s toolkit.

The Individual and Faith-based Diplomacy

The final actor that requires discussion in respect to engaging in faith-based diplomacy is the individual. Earlier in this chapter, the potential scope for religious leaders was examined. This section will build on that idea to demonstrate that the individual can contribute positively to faith-based diplomacy. As the nature of conflict has changed, the involvement of religious figures in peacemaking has increased.¹¹⁷⁸ By highlighting the identity-based dimension of conflict, religious figures can encourage “individuals on both sides of the negotiation to speak with each other, and to see beyond their individual preoccupations to goals shared by the other”.¹¹⁷⁹ In some cases, the individual can demonstrate the spiritual conviction that leads to reconciliation and can inspire parties to break the cycle of revenge and conflict.¹¹⁸⁰ It is important to contextualise how a community defines individual piety, so the peacemaker must

¹¹⁷³ Ibid. 168

¹¹⁷⁴ Ibid. 168

¹¹⁷⁵ Chu, "Vatican Diplomacy in China and Vietnam." 59

¹¹⁷⁶ Johnston, "Review of the Findings." 260

¹¹⁷⁷ Ibid. 261

¹¹⁷⁸ Ibid. 259

¹¹⁷⁹ Nichols, "Religious Conciliation between the Sandinistas and the East Coast Indians of Nicaragua." 84

¹¹⁸⁰ Johnston, "Religion and Foreign Policy."

be able to recognise how rituals and symbols are used for a community to demonstrate their religious commitment.¹¹⁸¹ If an individual is representing a party from a specific religious background, the diplomat should not disproportionately represent their religious perspective, or represent another religion negatively as a result.¹¹⁸² When assessing at the role of an individual in political leadership that engages with religion, several scholars look to the negotiations between US President Carter, Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli President Begin in 1978 to resolve Arab-Israeli tensions as an effective demonstration of faith-based diplomacy. Berggren's analysis of Carter's role in this negotiation points to several areas where Carter was able to utilise faith to enhance his diplomatic effectiveness. Carter was able to understand the religious value of each party, to leverage the power of faith as a bond between leaders, to highlight the commonality between each leader under God, to use scripture and values to see potentialities of peace, and to see the cooperation that was possible between each party as they saw God's purposes under the Abrahamic root of their traditions.¹¹⁸³ Beyond heads of state engaging in conflict resolution while being motivated by religious predispositions, there are other sites in which individuals have played a valuable role in supporting the aims of diplomacy.

An example of a religious individual being a significant part in peacebuilding is the role of chaplains.¹¹⁸⁴ Johnston and Cox state that chaplains, particularly military chaplains, can be a positive force for peacemaking and conflict prevention,

through their personal interactions with local religious communities and selected [nongovernmental organisations] with which they come in contact, they would be able to develop a grass-roots understanding of the religious and cultural nuances at play in any given setting and, at times, possibly provide a reconciling influence in addressing misunderstandings or differences with these communities. Perhaps more importantly, they could advise their commanders on the religious and cultural implications of command decisions that are either being taken or that should be taken.¹¹⁸⁵

¹¹⁸¹ Sayeed-Miller, "Public Diplomacy and Transnational Cases of Blasphemy." 100

¹¹⁸² Ibid. 106

¹¹⁸³ Berggren, "Carter, Sadat, and Begin: Using Evangelical-Style Presidential Diplomacy in the Middle East." 733-47

¹¹⁸⁴ Sayeed-Miller, "Public Diplomacy and Transnational Cases of Blasphemy." 106

¹¹⁸⁵ Johnston and Cox, "Faith-Based Diplomacy and Preventive Engagement." 25-6

Here the individual military chaplain plays a critical role in several areas of conflict resolution and can be a useful tool in the broader strategy of faith-based diplomacy. Even in secular countries, military chaplains are an integral part of conflict resolution strategies that encourage a pluralistic approach.¹¹⁸⁶ A challenge to incorporating military chaplains, however, is that there can be a competing agenda between the chaplains where intolerance is a part of their religious worldview.¹¹⁸⁷ Evangelical chaplains, for example, need to provide pastoral needs to service personnel and their families, maintaining the fundamental principle of freedom of religion, without evangelising and converting people of other religious traditions to their perspective.¹¹⁸⁸ More effort is required to construct military and constitutional boundaries which still allow chaplains to assist in conflict resolution to mitigate this issue.¹¹⁸⁹ However, the principle remains that the military chaplain is an example of faith-based diplomacy perspectives in action, where an individual actor effectively addresses foreign policy objectives about religion.¹¹⁹⁰

The final area of analysis regarding the individual is the role of the Pope in conflict resolution. The Pope's role is an area of study that has garnered much attention in scholarship and referred to by some as 'Papal diplomacy'. Historical cases of Papal diplomacy are available in the literature, and thus this section will only highlight the contributions of recent Popes in engaging in diplomacy. This case does demonstrate, however, that there is a valuable place for individuals in this position to represent religious values, and also engage in the process of faith-based diplomacy. As an individual religious actor, the Pope has received positive media attention, as "the Head of the Catholic Church seems to have returned as a player to be reckoned with in international politics".¹¹⁹¹ Two key factors have solidified the Pope's position as a vital nonstate actor. The first is "a structural change in the rise of the inclusion of non-state actors as well as practices of paradiplomacy" and second, "a normative change in the overlap of the values of a solidarist international society and the core beliefs of the Catholic Church".¹¹⁹²

¹¹⁸⁶ Marsden, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: Conservative Evangelicals and the United States Military." 485 For more on the development of military chaplains in the US, see Anne C. Loveland, *Change and Conflict in the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps since 1945*, First ed. (Knoxville, Tennessee: The University of Tennessee Press, 2014).

¹¹⁸⁷ Marsden, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: Conservative Evangelicals and the United States Military." 485

¹¹⁸⁸ Ibid. 486

¹¹⁸⁹ Ibid. 494 The practice of integrating military chaplains in conflict zones has yielded several opportunities for future development, as discussed in Eric Patterson, Douglas Carver, and Jon Cutler, *Military Chaplains in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond: Advisement and Leader Engagement in Highly Religious Environments* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014).

¹¹⁹⁰ Marsden, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: Conservative Evangelicals and the United States Military." 485

¹¹⁹¹ Diez, "Diplomacy, Papacy, and the Transformation of International Society." 31

¹¹⁹² Ibid. 37

There are several examples of the individual Popes engaging in diplomacy. Pope Leo XIII, in 1891, and Pope Pius XI both made concerted efforts to build a relationship between civil society, the state and the Catholic Church.¹¹⁹³ John Paul II assisted in limiting the advances of the Soviet empire and consequently helped in alleviating Cold War tensions.¹¹⁹⁴ In the case of Pope Benedict XVI, he pushed for the international community to address concerns of human dignity and of solidarity to safeguard the common interests of humanity.¹¹⁹⁵ He used diplomacy to advocate for and incorporate interfaith dialogue into global affairs, particularly in the case of Iraq.¹¹⁹⁶ Pope Francis, who began his papacy in 2013, has garnered popular support and a wave of enthusiasm for his contributions to issues on the international agenda, such as climate change.¹¹⁹⁷ While these examples have only examined the recent heads of the Catholic Church, they do demonstrate that the Pope has found a position of political influence that has allowed him to become an influential player in faith-based diplomacy. These diplomatic efforts are effective because the Pope can play a role in establishing a society of states “through diplomatic missions and the engagement in the United Nations and other international organizations, while at the same time addressing world society through means of public diplomacy and soft power”.¹¹⁹⁸

There is some complexity, however, with the Pope as a diplomatic actor. The main issue is that the Vatican is a sovereign state with a position in the United Nations.¹¹⁹⁹ This may blur the lines between the Pope as a state actor. However, a simple delineation is that the Pope represents the Catholic Church, whereas the Vatican is represented by a separate Head of State. Furthermore, The Holy See establishes its diplomatic integration through discourse channels, non-governmental organisations, through observer positions in United Nations bodies, and through individual activities led by the Pope.¹²⁰⁰ This deepening diplomatic engagement has entrenched the Pope as a valuable nonstate actor who suggests that individuals can be a key player in faith-based diplomacy efforts in the future.

¹¹⁹³ Chu, "Vatican Diplomacy in China and Vietnam." 59

¹¹⁹⁴ Diez, "Diplomacy, Papacy, and the Transformation of International Society." 31

¹¹⁹⁵ O'Connor, "A Diplomacy of Candor: Pope Benedict XVI on the Global Stage." 189

¹¹⁹⁶ Ibid. 42

¹¹⁹⁷ Diez, "Diplomacy, Papacy, and the Transformation of International Society." 31

¹¹⁹⁸ Ibid. 37

¹¹⁹⁹ For more on the role of the Pope within the United Nations see Robert John Araujo and John A. Lucal, *Papal Diplomacy and the Quest for Peace. The United Nations from Pius XII to Paul VI*, Papal Diplomacy and the Quest for Peace (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Saint Joseph's University Press, 2010).

¹²⁰⁰ Kristiono Michael Joseph, "Understanding the Body of Christ: A Literature Review on Roman Catholic Church in International Relations," *Global: Jurnal Politik Internasional* 19, no. 1 (2017).

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter is to suggest that, outside of the theoretical constructions within Diplomacy Studies, several central characteristics could apply to the understanding of faith-based diplomacy. These have included concepts such as values, reconciliation, religious freedom, foreign policy approaches, the role of religious leaders, the space for third-party mediation, and the access to multiple tracks of diplomacy. The variety of actors on the international stage has also been considered to optimise future strategies of faith-based diplomacy. The research suggests that a multitrack, multi-stakeholder approach to faith-based diplomacy has much to recommend it in addressing the challenges of the 21st Century. A promising finding of this chapter is that theorists and practitioners of faith-based diplomacy have a myriad of opportunities available to them for the construction of faith-based diplomacy in the future.

CHAPTER NINE

Evaluating Faith-based Diplomacy: Strengths, Limitations, and Opportunities

The purpose of this thesis has been to examine faith-based diplomacy as a theory within Diplomacy Studies and present a theoretical framework for faith-based diplomacy's application. Traditional diplomacy and traditional diplomatic actors were discussed to demonstrate the foundation of diplomatic theory in Chapter 2. Then in Chapters 3 and 4, an assessment of the schools of new and innovative diplomacy was conducted to see how nonstate actors engage in diplomacy. These chapters formed the foundation of this analysis scoped firmly in Diplomacy Studies. Expanding on the theoretical concepts forming the basis of Diplomacy Studies provided the contextual considerations that frame faith-based diplomacy in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 introduced the definitions and parameters of the theory of faith-based diplomacy. The literature that underpins faith-based diplomacy was critically evaluated to understand the prevailing scholarly frameworks and even those that could be effective for future application to faith-based diplomacy in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 highlighted the core concepts and characteristics that have emerged from the evaluation of faith-based diplomacy, and then provided a brief analysis of the actors in the international system, and how they may engage in faith-based diplomacy. To comprehensively examine faith-based diplomacy, this chapter must consider the strengths and limitations of faith-based diplomacy in light of the examination in previous chapters. After this analysis, opportunities and recommendations for the future study and application of faith-based diplomacy will come to light. These considerations have consolidated the development of faith-based diplomacy since its original introduction into scholarship in 1994 and, as such, the reconceptualization of faith-based diplomacy in the contemporary international system can be presented. To do this, a tenth chapter will be offered to discuss the scholarly contribution within Diplomacy Studies made throughout this thesis.

Strengths for Faith-based Diplomacy

Several strengths are evident in faith-based diplomacy, as presented throughout the thesis. By utilising faith-based diplomacy, diplomats will be able to place religion into the

centre of the analysis, which will ultimately assist in addressing the religious and identity-based motivators of violence present in many cases of 21st Century conflict, such as identity conflicts in developing states and continuing concerns regarding extremism in the Middle East. As Appleby notes, if religion is a determining or supporting factor in conflict, faith-based diplomacy can evaluate the contested and reinterpreted nature of religion as a way of life, as a form of intellectual heritage, and as a central social tradition.¹²⁰¹ Even in conflicts without a religious dimension, religious actors can still contribute through a mediating role; while on a larger societal scale the whole apparatus of a religious institution can be utilised to develop support for peacebuilding initiatives and negotiations.¹²⁰² This is one of the reasons that religion should not only be analysed to identify any negative effects it may have, but also in search of its inherent assets; indeed, religion possesses “power in relation to war and security as a direct result of its control of resources, interpersonal relationships, communications and expertise”.¹²⁰³ Cox and Philpott note four situations where faith-based diplomacy will be most favourable. They are:

1. “Conflicts whose parties define themselves by their religion and perhaps even fight over religion.” Examples of this may be found in Sudan, Israel-Palestine and the former Yugoslavia.
2. “Where, regardless of the identities of the parties, certain religious leaders enjoy a charisma that they may exercise for settlement and reconciliation.” Cox and Philpott provide the example of Gandhi who exercised his own spiritual force to build reconciliation.
3. “Civilizational dialogue. Here conflict, at least of the broad ideological sort, occurs even among the broadest religious collectivities – Islamic and Western civilisations, for example.” This notion of interaction between civilisations reflects perhaps an extension of Huntington’s thesis, however, research has engaged with the notion of civilisations to see how cooperation may be fostered between these groupings.¹²⁰⁴ While care needs to be taken in using the civilisational label, civilisational dialogue has a positive history, including the United Nations Year of Dialogue Among Civilisations in 2001, or the Dialogue of Civilisations research institute founded in 2016. The main problems with

¹²⁰¹ Appleby, "Retrieving the Missing Dimension of Statecraft: Religious Faith in the Service of Peacebuilding." 243

¹²⁰² Ibid. 246

¹²⁰³ Otis, "Religion and War in the Twenty-First Century." 20

¹²⁰⁴ See David Muskhelishvili and D. Musxelišvili, *Dialogue of Civilizations* (Hauppauge, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers, 2010).

thinking in terms of ‘civilisations’ is that it could create, ‘imagined communities’ of enemies (to borrow from Benedict Anderson¹²⁰⁵) on an unprecedented scale.

4. “Faith-based diplomats are well positioned to become trusted envoys”. Here Cox and Philpott refer to examples from Mozambique, the former Yugoslavia and Lebanon.¹²⁰⁶

The strengths of faith-based diplomacy listed in this section reflect on those that have been explicated throughout the thesis. What is apparent, however, is that faith-based diplomacy can be a tool for practitioners to consider in their diplomatic strategies. This is the contribution of this thesis: that faith-based diplomacy presents itself as a worthy theoretical perspective to employ in the diplomat’s toolkit within Diplomacy Studies.

Limitations of Faith-based Diplomacy

Having affirmed the benefits of faith-based diplomacy, it is important to note that faith-based diplomacy is not a panacea for all religious conflict and resultant implications. As such, careful attention needs to be given to the potential limitations that exist in the theory of faith-based diplomacy, and indeed what the consequences could be in practice. When considering the advancement of the study of faith-based diplomacy, the most significant limitation is that, since the Westphalian subordination of religion to the internal affairs of the state, analysts have essentially assumed that religion is absent among the factors that influence state behaviour.¹²⁰⁷ These assumptions have resulted in a “dangerous gap in knowledge about religion’s complex contemporary role”.¹²⁰⁸ While some observers are recognising the value of studying religion, the secularisation of church and state will provide a level of limitation to those within international relations who want to contend intellectually with religion and its role in political affairs and diplomacy.¹²⁰⁹ Maintaining the balance of this relationship between separateness and stability, where material power and secular mechanisms are in the service of a religious movement, is one that continues to challenge diplomats.¹²¹⁰ The core issues raised by religious violence is a challenge to the methods and structures of diplomacy, but this requires addressing

¹²⁰⁵ See B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (Verso, 2006).

¹²⁰⁶ Cox and Philpott, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: An Ancient Idea Newly Emergent." 39

¹²⁰⁷ Farr, "Diplomacy in an Age of Faith."

¹²⁰⁸ Jafari, "Local Religious Peacemakers: An Untapped Resource in U.S. Foreign Policy." 115

¹²⁰⁹ Luttwak, "The Missing Dimension." 9

¹²¹⁰ Sharp, "Crazy Religion Diplomacy." 258

religious differences, and not superficially.¹²¹¹ Data that is available on the intermediary peacemaking role, whether as a part of an institution or as a religious actor, is limited and the documentation that does exist to gather data is often fragmentary.¹²¹² When considering that all major religions in the world present some element of peacemaking, “their development and articulation have been inadequate”, even though observers are noting the need to use this as an instrument of conflict prevention and resolution.¹²¹³ Whether studying religion, theology or faith-based diplomacy, the principles of peacemaking in religious beliefs have not been easily accessible for diplomats. Fundamentally, “faith-based diplomacy should know its own limitations in conflict situations as well as being aware of the need to address the basic needs of conflicting parties in the first instance and not in the balance of power”.¹²¹⁴

The available frameworks to approach religion are too narrow in current Western government processes, which generally only understand religion as a negative force.¹²¹⁵ As such, the role of religion in public policy is confused. Assumptions about religion’s irrationality mean that its relationship to democracy and modern society is underappreciated, let alone its relevance to addressing the issues in the contemporary international system. From the perspective of public diplomacy in the United States using the assets provided by religion, two limitations are apparent when noting how slow these advancements have been. The two are: “trepidation about any government linkage to religion, and the absence of any governmental public diplomacy mechanism that would foster effective use of the asset”.¹²¹⁶ Still, within the public diplomacy perspective, religion-related public diplomacy strategies are often limited by the need to vigilantly critique the religious sensitivities of the target audiences of public diplomacy programs.¹²¹⁷ As religion is an inherently identity-based issue, these sensitivities can quickly escalate which may lead to counterproductive results, or even motivating violent conflict.¹²¹⁸ This, for example, may happen if engagement with religion is superficial or tokenistic, such as Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s visit to India in early 2018.¹²¹⁹

¹²¹¹ Dennis R. Hoover, "Introduction: Religion Gets Real," in *Religion & Security: The New Nexus in International Relations*, ed. Robert A. Seiple, and Hoover, Dennis R. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005). 3

¹²¹² Johnston, "Introduction: Beyond Power Politics." 258

¹²¹³ Johnston and Cox, "Faith-Based Diplomacy and Preventive Engagement." 15

¹²¹⁴ Troy, "Faith-Based Diplomacy under Examination." 227

¹²¹⁵ Farr, "Diplomacy in an Age of Faith."

¹²¹⁶ Seib, "Religious Freedom and US Public Diplomacy." 19

¹²¹⁷ "Conclusion: The Future of Religion and Public Diplomacy." 218

¹²¹⁸ *Ibid.* 218

¹²¹⁹ This was due to the way Trudeau engaged with Sikh culture and traditions through his trip, see Barkha Dutt, "Trudeau's India Trip Is a Total Disaster - and He Has Only Himself to Blame " *The Washington Post* 22/2/2018 2018.

When frameworks are applied, it is important to consider each conflict case as unique, as not every case highlights the same aspect of the conflict in question.¹²²⁰ This is important to consider when a decisionmaker is analysing patterns across conflict, or for academics who are attempting to construct frameworks based on previous patterns in religious violence. While the international system is changing to allow the role of nonstate actors, even individuals, to play a part in diplomacy, the methods and mechanisms utilised by these new actors – their diplomatic ‘toolkit’ – needs to be revised to match contemporary needs.

The rapid expansion of terrorist activity in the post-9/11 world has demanded a response from the international community. The rise of fundamentalism is a difficult issue to which to reply, and while faith-based diplomacy may be able to assist in some elements of the resolution of this distinctive conflict phenomenon, it remains an arduous task. From the perspective of the United States and its foreign policy which – in view of being the target of 9/11 and the chief protagonist in long ‘war on terror’ – provides a ready example, there are reasons for the urgency of addressing the issues of politically motivated violence. As Johnson has argued, the spectre of religious extremism and related threats requires a quick response.¹²²¹ Further, in light of the expenses of the American interventions in the post-Cold War era, and subsequently post-9/11 (notable Afghanistan and Iraq), interventions that seek to halt violent conflict which can impact American national interest have proven to be cost-prohibitive. They are also less politically palatable, as the Trump administration has shown. Also, terrorist organisations opposed to the foreign policies of the United States are finding environments which meet their needs for training, equipping and mobilising – as was evident with the rise of ISIS. The magnitude of the issues faced would suggest that they require a substantial response. It is a condition that requires methods perhaps more tested than faith-based diplomacy.

Another limitation to the use of faith-based diplomacy to address these typically high agenda areas of international affairs is that religion is viewed as a soft, cultural notion, as opposed to the traditionally hard power conceptions of geopolitics. Interestingly, the issues of religious violence and the implications of this type of conflict are increasingly found to impact developing countries. As Pokhariyal notes, the mechanisms and tools of diplomacy are predominantly used by rich, powerful, and industrialised nations as those diplomatic mechanisms have been professionally developed.¹²²² This divide between developing and

¹²²⁰ Johnston, "Introduction: Beyond Power Politics." 258

¹²²¹ Johnston, *Religion, Terror and Error: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual Engagement*. 104

¹²²² Pokhariyal, "The Influence of Religion, Technology, and Economy on Culture, Diplomacy, and Peace." 49

developed states in the institution and mechanisms of diplomacy will limit the potential application of faith-based diplomacy in the environments where it is most needed. Alternatively, developing nations with strong religious and cultural traditions and which are already using their religious culture diplomatically (as identified in this thesis, Chapter 8), may have tools of their own to contribute to the Western diplomat's toolkit. This may be viewed as an opportunity for further development (discussed below).

Returning to the risks of applying a poorly constructed faith-based approach to diplomacy, unless this problem is recognised it may even exacerbate conflict conditions. These limitations, however, are not a reason to ignore the study of faith-based diplomacy. As this thesis has suggested, there are significant opportunities in both the theory and practice of diplomacy for faith-based diplomacy to be considered as a viable tool for the diplomat, strategist and academic to use. Academics and practitioners have suggested areas of future improvement that should be considered to assist in enhancing faith-based diplomacy's effectiveness as a theory and as a diplomatic strategy. These opportunities will, hopefully, address some of the limitations discussed in this section and see faith-based diplomacy strengthened as a result.

Opportunities for the Future of Faith-based Diplomacy

Throughout the literature on faith-based diplomacy, scholars and practitioners have offered suggestions as to improving faith-based diplomacy in the future. This section will draw together these recommendations to present the opportunities for enhancing faith-based diplomacy in its theoretical construction and its practical application. These recommendations will provide the framework for reconceptualising faith-based diplomacy as it is understood and practised in the 21st Century. Fundamentally, the knowledge that there are tools for peacemaking in all major religions needs to be developed and articulated; these represent vital instruments for conflict prevention and resolution. The aim of the founding thinkers on faith-based diplomacy comes back to the core of finding ways to use religion as a positive force for peace within diplomacy. This was borne out of the findings in the early scholarly investigations of faith-based diplomacy which concluded that: "religious contributions to peacemaking have been under-appreciated, if not totally ignored, by foreign policy practitioners", and "there are substantial under-utilized assets within religious communities which, with proper training,

could be applied to peacemaking”.¹²²³ While progress is evident in this area, there is still much work to be done, whether that be in the exploration of more religious traditions, or the construction of diplomatic instruments which harness these religious norms for peacemaking. Cox and Philpott offer four recommendations for those who may see a future in faith-based diplomacy. They are:

1. For policymakers and diplomats: build relationships with faith leaders
2. For young activists in faith-based diplomacy: work with an experienced practitioner as a mentor
3. Explore programs in peace studies that have a strong religious component
4. Become committed to specific international conflict situations – long-term involvement, relationship-building, trust, and on-site knowledge are the keys to making a difference.¹²²⁴

These recommendations suggest the importance of improving the academic nature of faith-based diplomacy, and also the way in which faith-based diplomats engage in the diplomatic mechanism. A way to enhance the theory and practice of faith-based diplomacy may be to fill the gap in research where a “systematic and comprehensive assessment of the conditions under which faith-based and religious actors are more effective in resolving conflicts has not yet been undertaken”.¹²²⁵ Appleby also suggests that trained religious actors who are available to local communities impacted by conflict are accessible to engage in peacemaking efforts.¹²²⁶ Thus, this space of engaging with religious actors is one that warrants critical attention. Sharp notes that this is an attainable opportunity as “the rise of the idea [of] religion in international affairs has occurred hand-in-hand with the rise of the idea of people being international actors in their own right”.¹²²⁷ The construction of platforms which effectively integrate individuals into the diplomatic process should be considered by scholars in Diplomacy Studies to reap further results from this area. The growing variety of actors in the international system can be of benefit to faith-based approaches to diplomacy; official channels of diplomacy when partnered with peacemaking from a religious perspective can contribute to improved outcomes in overcoming communal conflict.

¹²²³ Johnston, "Religion and Foreign Policy."

¹²²⁴ Cox and Philpott, "Faith-Based Diplomacy: An Ancient Idea Newly Emergent." 40

¹²²⁵ Johnstone and Svensson, "Belligerents and Believers: Exploring Faith-Based Mediation in Internal Armed Conflicts." 577

¹²²⁶ Appleby, "Retrieving the Missing Dimension of Statecraft: Religious Faith in the Service of Peacebuilding." 253

¹²²⁷ Sharp, "Crazy Religion Diplomacy." 265

To enhance the application of faith-based diplomacy, Albright reflected on her own experiences within the State Department. She found that:

In the future, no American ambassador should be assigned to a country where religious feelings are strong unless he or she has a deep understanding of the faiths commonly practiced there. Ambassadors and their representatives, wherever they are assigned, should establish relationships with local religious leaders. The State Department should hire or train a core of specialists in religion to be deployed both in Washington and in key embassies overseas.¹²²⁸

These recommendations are not beyond the scope of possibility. What they require is a reordering of priorities within government departments that see the importance of religion as part of their policymaking. This is why Farr suggests that policymakers should see religion as a normative motivator of human and government behaviour, that can be a multiplier of either destructive or constructive outcomes.¹²²⁹ Luttwak echoes this point and notes that policymakers, diplomats, journalists and scholars can all recognise the role of religious institutions and religious motivations in the way that they explain politics and conflict.¹²³⁰ This does not mean, however, that faith-based diplomats isolate themselves from the broader diplomacy community. Indeed, “faith-based diplomats, in turn, have much to learn from the secular ‘veterans’ of conflict management”.¹²³¹ The opportunity for understanding religion as a contributor to soft power and also traditional hard power needs recognition, as the conceptual lens applied to the analysis of religion will determine how people act, and also how governments respond. Through history, governments have made a concerted effort to secularise society. In this current climate, Sharp notes that diplomats should try to remain separate from secular projects “designed to counter faith, ignorance and tradition, with reason, science and market democracies” because, as hindsight now shows, these projects have been counterproductive, often entrenching intolerance and misunderstanding.¹²³²

In the contemporary international system, the issues presented by religion need to be addressed by constructive responses, especially in the American context where the ‘war on terror’ became emblematic of the era. Johnson’s recommendations begin with the idea of

¹²²⁸ Albright, "Faith and Diplomacy." 8

¹²²⁹ Farr, "Diplomacy in an Age of Faith."

¹²³⁰ Luttwak, "The Missing Dimension."

¹²³¹ Appleby, "Retrieving the Missing Dimension of Statecraft: Religious Faith in the Service of Peacebuilding." 255

¹²³² Sharp, "Crazy Religion Diplomacy." 264

integrating religious attachés into the diplomatic corps.¹²³³ They fit within a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding, where they can plan programs appropriate to their budgets, and operate as experts with specialised training in dealing with the complexities of religious issues. Moreover, they understand religious motives, the language of local religious expression, and also how faith inspires action.¹²³⁴ Johnston also calls for adjusting the structures of government departments to allow for spiritual engagement.¹²³⁵ This structural change would be supported by what he calls “the congressional dimension”, which sees foreign policy and leadership involved in the processes of resolving religious issues.¹²³⁶ Finally, Johnston also calls for educational reform.¹²³⁷ In support of educational reform, Patterson states that the US “national security community needs to bring more comparative politics, religious studies, and cultural studies into traditional ‘international relations theory’ approaches to security education”.¹²³⁸ This is just one of the ways that education can be enhanced to increase the effectiveness of government institutions in addressing religious challenges. These are broad recommendations which fit within the context of the United States but do offer a target for reform.

Still, within the American context, Birdsall recommends several steps for how the United States can enhance religious freedom and religious engagement. In response to 9/11, the Bush administration in its difficulties conceptualising a coherent approach to Muslim outreach was unable to foster a positive religious engagement.¹²³⁹ The Obama administration, however, pledged to restore the American relationship with the Muslim world, but even then, religious freedom received little attention, and the International Religious Freedom Office within the State Department battled observer scepticism.¹²⁴⁰ President Trump’s ability to enhance religious engagement is, at the time of writing, not yet known. However the signals of the so-called “Muslim Ban” were not promising.¹²⁴¹ For an administration to effectively integrate religious engagement, they must first appoint an International Religious Freedom ambassador as a priority.¹²⁴² Furthermore, the bureaucratic apparatus surrounding religion and

¹²³³ Johnston, *Religion, Terror and Error: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Spiritual Engagement*. 84-88

¹²³⁴ *Ibid.* 85

¹²³⁵ *Ibid.* 89-92

¹²³⁶ *Ibid.* 94-5

¹²³⁷ *Ibid.* 92-4

¹²³⁸ Patterson, "What They Say and Do: Religious Freedom as a National Security Lens." 28

¹²³⁹ Birdsall, "Keep the Faith: How American Diplomacy Got Religion, and How to Keep It." 113

¹²⁴⁰ *Ibid.* 113

¹²⁴¹ See Justin Glyn, "Obama Built the Foundations for Trump's Muslim Ban," *Eureka Street* 27, no. 2 (2017); Kerry Smith, "United States: Trump's New Muslim Ban Faces Push Back," *Green Left Weekly*, no. 1129 (2017).

¹²⁴² Birdsall, "Keep the Faith: How American Diplomacy Got Religion, and How to Keep It." 114

foreign policy needs to be reviewed to ensure that government institutions are addressing effectively the religious challenges that states are facing.

Seib has suggested that within the context of the United States, religious values and religious freedom are assets that can enhance America's public diplomacy strategies.¹²⁴³ The national interests of the United States can advance if public diplomacy strategies can provide venues for defining the role of religious freedom in society, where diplomats are trained to engage with the dynamics of religious freedom critically, and where religious freedom becomes an integral part of American civil society.¹²⁴⁴ This is an example of how one intersection between religion and politics, in this case religious freedom, can be effectively managed by diplomatic strategies when constructed properly. Loskota and Flory note that American public diplomats' interest in religion has been growing, however, the "necessary skills, competency, or even framing to understand better the variety of religious forms and the ways they shape the world" are underdeveloped.¹²⁴⁵ They call for a reconceptualisation of diplomat's notions of how religion operates, how it influences social and political action, and how the religion impacts the personal and communal levels of society.¹²⁴⁶ Once this fundamental shift occurs, the potential for achieving public diplomacy goals will enhance. Faith groups can be partners, or at least consultants, in public diplomacy strategies.¹²⁴⁷ Spurred by globalisation, however, the need for a pluralistic understanding of religious differences is vital, and thus public actors and faith groups must articulate their understanding of how the world works and seek mutual roles for each group to play.¹²⁴⁸ Scholars recognise that religion-related public diplomacy can be a valuable counterweight to religious politics, but the way in which it is an effective counterweight, and also as an independent influence on the conduct of international relations, much work remains to be done.¹²⁴⁹

Whether in the scholarship of faith-based diplomacy or its application by diplomats in the field, these recommendations show that many opportunities can be taken to see faith-based diplomacy improve in the future. An issue present in these recommendations is that they are heavily US-centric, but this in itself can be viewed as an opportunity for future study. Other world religions in other regions within different state perspectives can be the focus of future

¹²⁴³ Seib, "Religious Freedom and US Public Diplomacy." 19

¹²⁴⁴ *Ibid.* 20

¹²⁴⁵ Loskota and Flory, "Why Religion Still Matters in the World." 10

¹²⁴⁶ *Ibid.* 10

¹²⁴⁷ *Ibid.* 23

¹²⁴⁸ *Ibid.* 23

¹²⁴⁹ Seib, "Conclusion: The Future of Religion and Public Diplomacy." 219

analysis, thus expanding the resources available for those engaged in the field of faith-based diplomacy. Some movement is evident in this area, but as the field begins to grow, the consideration of other religious perspectives and cultural positions will only help to strengthen the body of work. The review of literature conducted throughout this thesis has noted several recommendations that require attention. However, the intention of this thesis is not to merely advocate for the potential of faith-based diplomacy, but rather present a comprehensive and consolidated frame for academics and practitioners to utilise when devising future research or diplomatic strategy. This thesis has noted several distinct gaps in the literature, but to this point in the scholarship those gaps, and potential resolutions, have not been elucidated.

CHAPTER TEN

Conclusion: Reconceptualising the Theoretical Framework of Faith-based Diplomacy

This thesis has examined faith-based diplomacy in an endeavour to identify and explicate the tools available for diplomats in addressing the challenges of the 21st Century. Clarifying the constructs of faith-based diplomacy in theory and consolidating the various perspectives applied to the theory since its introduction into scholarship in the 1990s has been a priority of this study. This has been undertaken so that theory can inform practice; more precisely, so that the critically examined theories of faith-based diplomacy can inform the diplomatic strategies of the future. As a result, the understanding of faith-based diplomacy will have been reconceptualised in light of the gains made in the area. Each chapter of this thesis has been written to analyse and extend the scholarship of Diplomacy Studies by presenting advancements when considering the integration of faith and religion into diplomacy. In Chapter 2 the school of traditional diplomacy was examined to determine what the foundational theories of Diplomacy Studies are. The primary actors of traditional diplomacy, the state and state diplomats, were discussed. So too was the role of religion in diplomacy as evident in this traditional conception of the theory. This set the foundation for a literature analysis in Diplomacy Studies, but also suggests that there has been a strong interlinkage between religion, politics and diplomatic mechanisms throughout history. Chapter 3 highlighted the evolution of theory in Diplomacy Studies and noted the challenge to the traditional school of diplomacy by the new and innovative understandings of diplomacy theory. The movement away from the traditional school of thought in diplomacy recognised actors beyond the state and opened up the possibilities for different actors to fulfil the functions of diplomacy customarily conducted by the state. The new actors of diplomacy, nonstate actors who gained prominence through the new and innovative schools of thought, were then examined in Chapter 4. Like the examples given in the analysis of traditional diplomacy, new and innovative diplomacy also reveals the engagement of religious actors at various levels. The methods for integrating religious considerations into diplomacy have expanded with the advancements in Diplomacy Studies, a development to which this thesis has made a contribution. These early chapters formed the basis of analysis within the scope of Diplomacy Studies and suggested the areas of change in the theories that have made way for faith-based diplomacy to emerge. Chapter 5 looked to

resolve the contextual and framing issues of faith-based diplomacy, including its interaction with conflict, conflict resolution, secularisation, the definitions of religion and faith, and also how religion has re-emerged as an important factor of analysis in the 21st Century. Chapter 6 then examined specifically faith-based diplomacy as it has been discussed in theory thus far. This chapter highlighted some of the central definitions of faith-based diplomacy, with a revised definition (under ‘Defining Faith-based Diplomacy’ in Chapter 6) also offered by this thesis. This was undertaken to emphasise the expanding space of faith-based diplomacy in light of the prevailing trends impacting Diplomacy Studies.

This definition proposed by this thesis, and which supports the reconceptualization of the theoretical framework of faith-based diplomacy, is worth repeating in this concluding chapter:

Faith-based diplomacy is a form of diplomacy usually conducted by, but not limited to, Track Two agents. Faith-based diplomacy integrates the dynamics of religious faith with the conduct and processes of international peacemaking. As such, reconciliation is the primary goal of faith-based diplomacy in conflict resolution as faith-based diplomacy seeks not only the absence of conflict, but the restoration of relationships between parties to establish positive peace.

This definition is taken from Johnston and Cox’s definition, but key features of the definition have been adjusted to account for the changes in the international system since the definition was first produced. Those changes are worth justifying here to highlight how faith-based diplomacy has been reconceptualised. The first essential point is that faith-based diplomacy was originally labelled as functioning only in the second track of diplomacy. While this is arguably the most effective and convenient place for faith-based diplomacy to operate, it can be a limitation. As scholars have suggested, faith-based diplomacy can work well in tandem with official agents. Further, faith-based diplomacy does not seek to overthrow traditional mechanisms of diplomacy, but rather be integrated into practice as a viable option in diplomatic strategy. The strength of faith-based diplomacy as a Track Two practice is not being ignored; however, opening faith-based diplomacy to a broader cast of actors allows for the growth in the innovative school of diplomacy and Track 1.5 diplomacy. The second sentence of the definition remains the same as Johnston and Cox’s as the central aim of faith-based diplomacy remains the same. In the original definition, reconciliation was highlighted as the goal of faith-based diplomacy, and this definition affirms reconciliation as the primary pursuit. The value of

reconciliation in faith-based diplomacy and as a part of conflict resolution is an important association that will be elaborated on further below. However, the final part of this revised definition importantly places weight on the attainment of positive peace. Reconciliation and positive peace are inherently linked but positive peace as a theory provides more scope for the potential impact of faith-based diplomacy. Positive peace is an important addition to this revised definition because, even though it includes reconciliation, there are other activities within positive peace that faith-based diplomacy can benefit. Positive peace seeks to alleviate structural causes for conflict. This may include laws against religious freedom, or access for religious groups to participate in democratic institutions. Sources of cultural violence are also a focus of positive peace with issues stemming from the basis of ethnology or identity resolved in this process. Incorporating faith-based diplomacy into the broader spectrum of positive peace activities enables the theory to become a more readily available tool to diplomats and policymakers.

This thesis has also linked the scholarship of Diplomacy Studies to the concept of faith-based diplomacy to understand better how faith-based diplomacy fits as a theory within the scope of Diplomacy Studies. This was performed within Chapter 7, which noted theories of complementarity and provided new lenses of analysis to understand faith-based diplomacy from a variety of perspectives within International Relations. In Chapter 8, the core concepts of faith-based diplomacy, as suggested through the literature, were presented to strengthen the constructs and defining features of the theory. Through this section, the thesis gave special attention to the different actors in the international system and how they can potentially engage in faith-based diplomacy. In so doing, practitioners of diplomacy will have a clearer picture of what is available within the theory of faith-based diplomacy, and who best to engage with when employing faith-based diplomacy in practice. As the aim of this thesis is to reconceptualise faith-based diplomacy to best fit the current international system, Chapter 8 is essential in providing the key frameworks, targets, actors and concepts which form the basis of this reconceptualisation. In Chapter 9, recommendations for advancements in the study of faith-based diplomacy, predominantly in the American context, were identified, and this was in accordance with a central aim of this thesis: to identify the recommendations that scholars and practitioners have called for, in an attempt to present areas of future improvement. The discussions of the strengths, limitations and recommendations for faith-based diplomacy were given in Chapter 9 and presented to form a reconceptualised framework. In this current

concluding chapter, recommendations will be offered to assert how this deeper understanding of faith-based diplomacy can be applied to diplomatic theory, practice and to future research.

This framework, supported through the analysis of this thesis, comprises the following recommendations:

- To continue the investigation of religion to identify the assets for peace inherent in religions. As societies around the world are seeing a rise of religious populations, and scholarly attention continues to draw religious issues into light, this recommendation suggests that observers optimise the opportunities of this trend. This will require scholars to examine religious traditions, values, and key texts to identify potential contributions of these religions to peacemaking. Importantly, academics must clearly articulate what these assets are so that they can feature in diplomatic strategy. For future study in this area specifically, academics should direct attention not only to Western religious traditions such as Christianity, but the growing body of literature into other world religions.
- The recommendation of drawing from a variety of religious traditions leads to the second recommendation of expanding the basis of faith-based diplomacy from a multiplicity of perspectives through a strengthened knowledge base and understanding. Since 9/11, the body of literature focusing on the Islamic faith tradition has grown dramatically. Buddhist and Confucian traditions from Asia are also gaining more attention. In addition, indigenous religious traditions around the world will be valuable to investigate. The more research that is conducted to develop accurate understanding in this area, the greater the opportunities for those working within faith-based diplomacy.
- The interdisciplinary nature of religion is another way that perspectives and understandings of faith-based diplomacy can be expanded. As religion forms such a central part of many societies around the world, multiple scholarly fields are interested in its impact. Work in comparative theology and biblical studies, for example, has developed practical frameworks for conducting interfaith dialogue. Those in faith-based diplomacy can observe the advancements made through these approaches and find appropriate ways to translate those findings into diplomacy. Research in areas such as education, psychology, sociology, anthropology, theology, conflict resolution, peace studies, and security studies hold considerable potential in contributing to the development of strategies within the diplomat's toolkit.

- Religion needs to be afforded greater analytical relevance within the field of peace studies. In this, education would benefit from reform to highlight the importance of religion as a variable in the study of behaviour in society. Within this scope, religion would be a more important factor in multiple channels of conflict resolution and peace studies, including reconciliation, post-conflict rebuilding, confidence-building measures, mediation, and aid delivery. This re-evaluating of education within peace studies can be beneficial to multiple areas, including in general academic studies, in the education and training of diplomatic practitioners, and at the grassroots of society so that people better understand religion and its role in their community. Importantly, this requires a fundamental shift of perspective, where religion can be appreciated as a source of peace, not only as a driver of conflict.
- Religion should be considered as a critical part of the policymaker's calculus. This requires that decisionmakers see how religion influences behaviour, and where religion supports processes toward peace. Once religion has been given a higher priority on the agendas of policymakers, it will reflect in practice. This does not imply the dissolution of the separation of church and state, but it does mean that those involved in policymaking should give religious considerations the appropriate weight when constructing policy.
- The place of new actors in the diplomatic process is one that requires significant scholarly attention. The effectiveness of religious actors in conflict resolution needs to be studied, and upon realising their potential benefits, then religious actors can be integrated more effectively. Importantly, individuals within the community are a diplomatic asset, and training should be conducted to raise religious peacemakers from the grassroots. Throughout this thesis a myriad of actors has been hypothesised, including religious leaders, places of worship, faith-based civil society organisations and broader religious communities. As research continues to understand the different platforms from which actors can participate in diplomacy, scholars should consider the viability of faith-based actors in these processes.
- With respect to diplomatic theory, the area of public diplomacy seems the most effective for collaboration with faith-based approaches. Here, public diplomacy practitioners and academics should continue their investigations into how religion and religious values can enhance their diplomatic strategy. Not only that, but public diplomacy has enabled issues such as religious freedom to be seriously considered by

the state. This scholarly work is a fertile ground to expand faith-based diplomacy in the future.

- The final recommendation within the reconceptualised framework pertains to the state and the diplomat. Essentially, government structures need to be adjusted to ensure that there is a place for religion to be investigated, understood, and appropriately applied in policy. This should see religion given a more serious position in the formulation of diplomatic strategies. Diplomats should be trained on religious issues, especially when considering the location of their deployment. Furthermore, diplomats should be trained to engage with religious leaders and build relationships with the religious community when seeking to engage in conflict resolution. These goals are achievable by incorporating religious attachés, or technical experts in the area of religion, into diplomatic missions. Again, this does not suggest that the state remove the separation of church and state powers, but rather recognises that the diplomatic corps must be better equipped at dealing with religious issues. This thesis has proposed a reconceptualised understanding of faith-based diplomacy for the purposes of expanding the diplomat's toolkit. This recognises that faith-based strategies for diplomacy are tools that are available to state diplomats in the conduct of their profession.

The above recommendations are not only an extension on the areas of concern identified in the literature, but taken together form a higher order concept in which faith-based diplomacy gains coherence and recognition as a diplomatic tool. Moreover, in view of prior scholarship having been undertaken within a predominantly American context, this thesis – in examining the theoretical substance of faith-based diplomacy – recommends a globalised toolkit. Here the term ‘globalised’ is used in both senses of generalised and internationalised. An Australian, a European or a Chinese diplomat, for example, would benefit from utilising the unique space for public diplomacy and faith-based diplomacy to cooperate. Furthermore, with this thesis providing a comprehensive and consolidated framework of faith-based diplomacy, the central tenets of faith-based diplomacy and its application through various actors can be readily accessed by scholars and practitioners to incorporate into diplomatic processes to address global issues.

When examining the way that religion has impacted security studies, it is well to remember that behaviour is often determined by perception and its associated mental models. As Saunders aptly expressed it, how we act largely depends on “the conceptual lenses we use

to bring into focus the world around us and to give meaning to events".¹²⁵⁰ This is the goal of faith-based diplomacy as a theory, to enhance understanding of (a) the role and impact of religion and how religion has influenced conflict, as well as (b) how religion may be used as a positive asset to influence diplomacy and conflict resolution. Such a goal has been the central purpose of this thesis. In reconceptualising the frame of faith-based diplomacy in light of the changing international system and advancements to diplomacy scholarship, this reconfigured consideration of faith-based diplomacy can bring into focus the challenges facing the international community in the contemporary era.

The impact of new challenges to diplomacy globally has heightened the need for more sophisticated approaches to these issues. Faith-based diplomacy is one such conceptual lens that, if applied correctly, could offer greater analytical insights and assistance in resolving the conflict issues that have come to the attention of international observers. A number of these areas of concern have been identified throughout this thesis, and the inherent benefit of incorporating faith-based approaches to diplomatic practice has been made. As noted in this thesis, practitioners have recognised the efficacy of faith-based diplomacy as a tool of foreign policy. In line with the findings throughout this thesis (Chapter 8), faith-based diplomacy needs to be viewed not as a replacement of traditional diplomacy, but as a strategy that can work with the traditional mechanisms of diplomacy while also engaging with the new, contemporary diplomatic landscape. Acquiring a deeper appreciation of religion's influence in society and having frameworks for enhanced engagement with religion in diplomacy, represents a potent tool for the state, diplomats, nonstate actors, nongovernmental organisations, civil society organisations, religious communities, religious leaders and individuals who seek to participate in diplomatic institutions. In this way, it is envisaged that a reconceptualised theory will assist in informing practice.

Since faith-based diplomacy's emergence as a scholarly construct in Diplomacy Studies in the 1990s, several academics and practitioners have engaged with it to varying degrees. While some considered that further theoretical development was not necessary, this thesis has argued to the contrary: theoretical advancements in faith-based diplomacy are necessary to address the changing nature of conflict and diplomacy in the prevailing international system. As such, this thesis has reinvigorated the definition of faith-based diplomacy, presented faith-based diplomacy's revised central tenets, and constructed frames by which different global

¹²⁵⁰ Saunders, "Relational Realism: Toward a New Political Paradigm for Security." 165

actors can engage in the area of faith-based diplomacy. This has addressed the gap that existed in the literature, that being a lack of a sophisticated theoretical conceptualisation of faith-based diplomacy. With this now provided, scholars and practitioners have a frame which they can utilise to expand the diplomat's toolkit by better incorporating faith into the thinking and practices of diplomacy.

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