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# What Makes a Terrorist? Muslims' and non-Muslims' Lay Perceptions of Risk Factors and Their Consequences for Counter-terrorism Policy Support

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## ABSTRACT

The question of why people become terrorists has preoccupied scholars and policy makers for decades. Yet, very little is known about how lay people perceive individuals at risk of becoming terrorists. In two studies conducted in the U.K., we aimed to fill this gap. Study 1 showed that Muslims and non-Muslims perceived a potential minority-group terrorist in terms of both structural (e.g., life-history, social) and individual risk factors (e.g., personality, psychopathology, ideology). In Study 2, Muslims and non-Muslims perceived a potential right-wing majority-group terrorist as having more individual predispositions to terrorism than a potential left-wing majority-group terrorist. Importantly, in both studies, individualist perceptions such as psychopathology were positively associated with support for stricter law enforcement, whereas structuralist perceptions such as adverse childhood experiences were positively associated with support for social interventions. Lay people seem to have multifactorial understandings of individuals at risk of becoming terrorists, which influence their counter-terrorism policy support.


## KEYWORDS

Law enforcement; psychopathology; policy support; social interventions; terrorism

Over the past ten years, terrorism has increased in threat to Western societies<sup>1</sup> due to its sharp upsurge in incidence and diversification (i.e., ideology, motivation, execution). Amongst Western countries, the U.K. recorded one of the largest growths in terrorist attacks in recent years.<sup>2</sup> Whereas the most dominant form of terrorism experienced within the U.K. remains Islamist terrorism, right-wing terrorism is on the rise<sup>3</sup> and also left-wing terrorism is predicted to become more prominent over time.<sup>4</sup>

In light of these developments, understanding the psychological factors that drive terrorists became a salient topic of research. Whereas research has tested lay peoples' perceptions of crime and delinquency,<sup>5</sup> and some work exists on the perceived motives of terrorists,<sup>6</sup> to the best of our knowledge, no study so far has investigated the lay perceptions that people have of individuals *at risk* of becoming home-grown terrorists. Importantly, empirical insights are missing on whether these perceptions depend on people's group membership (e.g., their religious group) and the type of terrorism in question (e.g., right-wing, left-wing or Islamist). Most critically, knowledge is missing on how such lay perceptions influence counter-terrorism policy support.

Against this background, in two studies, we investigated the lay perceptions that Muslims (mostly ethnic minority-group members) and non-Muslims (mostly White Europeans) in the U.K. have of minority and majority-group members at risk of becoming terrorists, and how these perceptions

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underpin their support for social policy interventions or stricter law enforcement. We decided to focus on the U.K. as it remains amongst the most severely affected by terrorism in Europe since 2002<sup>7</sup> and has a strong governmental focus on terrorism prevention.

### **Risk factors predicting terrorism**

A relatively large body of research has investigated the factors that drive terrorists and support for terrorism. These factors can broadly be categorized into individualist and structuralist types of explanations.

Individualist explanations include cognitive dispositions and ideological beliefs.<sup>8</sup> For instance, terrorism has been explained through an individual's religion and religiosity,<sup>9</sup> religious fundamentalism,<sup>10</sup> and moral commitments and communal values.<sup>11</sup> Further factors include an individual's social support,<sup>12</sup> need for belonging and social significance,<sup>13</sup> perceived efficacy and emotions,<sup>14</sup> and social identity.<sup>15</sup> Finally, terrorism is often attributed to individual psychopathologies<sup>16</sup> such as psychopathy,<sup>17</sup> and personality disorders.<sup>18</sup> Yet, although often intuitive, the importance of psychopathology has been questioned.<sup>19</sup>

Structuralist explanations for terrorism, on the other hand, often focus on economic, political, cultural, and group-related factors.<sup>20</sup> These factors include Western foreign policy,<sup>21</sup> political instability,<sup>22</sup> oppressive governments,<sup>23</sup> poor political and socioeconomic opportunities,<sup>24</sup> and resulting perceived injustices, group grievances,<sup>25</sup> and perceived civilization-related incompatibilities.<sup>26</sup> One could argue that culture comprises an interactive set of individual and contextual factors. Nevertheless, for simplicity, we categorized it as a contextual factor because we focused on a person's social membership in cultural groups.

### **Lay perceptions of the causes of terrorism**

Few studies have investigated people's *lay perceptions* of terrorism's causes. Qualitative accounts include<sup>27</sup> Jackson and Hall (2016) who showed that residents in Wales attributed terror to individual factors such as personal religious extremism as well as to structural factors such as social marginalization and inequality.<sup>28</sup> Focusing on the issue of British citizens joining ISIS as foreign fighters, da Silva and Crilley (2017) found religious extremism to be the most prominent perceived individual motive. By contrast, structuralist explanations that highlighted responses to British government policy were also relatively frequently mentioned. Importantly,<sup>30</sup> Hall (2013) demonstrated that people often simultaneously endorse structuralist (e.g., poverty) and individualist (e.g., psychopathology, brainwashing, religious fanaticism) explanations.<sup>29</sup>

A few quantitative studies have also focused on lay perceptions of terrorists and their motivations. For instance, two studies showed that prejudiced participants tend to attribute violent incidents to ideology/terrorism rather than mental illness when the perpetrator was a minority-group member;<sup>31</sup> also see.<sup>32</sup> Moreover, employing a network analysis,<sup>33</sup> Reser and Muncer (2004) showed that British participants perceived cultural and religious differences, Middle Eastern conflicts, inequality and prejudice as distant causes of the 9/11 attacks.

### **Group differences in explanations of social phenomena**

We could only identify one study that explicitly investigated whether lay perceptions of terror and terrorists differ as a function of people's group membership. Specifically,<sup>34</sup> Shaykhutdinov (2018) showed that (Tatar) Muslims in Russia endorsed both individualist and structuralist explanations. For instance, some attributed a terror incident to extreme forms of Islam and fanaticism, whereas others attributed it to inequality, harassment, ethnic persecution and to some extent even to conspiracy theories. Ethnic, non-Muslim Russians by contrast almost exclusively relied on individualist explanations. These group differences are in line with several studies showing that understandings of social

phenomena generally tend to differ between social groups. In general, Americans seem to favor individualist explanations for wealth but structuralist explanations for poverty. This tendency is less marked among low-status ethnic and racial groups however.<sup>35</sup> Thompson and Bobo (2011) showed that African Americans more likely attributed crime to structural causes than White Americans<sup>36</sup> (but see<sup>37</sup>). Hence, existing evidence suggests that those belonging to low-status groups in society may more likely hold structuralist explanations of social phenomena.

Based on these findings and the initial research by<sup>38</sup> Shaykhutdinov (2018), it is possible that social groups, as a function of their status in society, also differ in their perceptions of individuals at risk of becoming terrorists. In the U.K., Muslims belong to a stigmatized group whose members are stereotypically seen as believing in a religion that endorses violence and sometimes even are suspected of being terrorists themselves.<sup>39</sup> In reaction to public discourse commonly attributing terrorism to individual factors such as religious fanaticism and cultural orientation, Muslims, as compared to non-Muslims, may perceive potential terrorists more in terms of structural risk factors, such as the person's family background, life history and group-related experiences, than in terms of individual risk factors, such as religious fanaticism, ideology, personality, or psychopathology.

However, it is possible that this tendency may further depend on whether the target (i.e., the person at risk of becoming a terrorist) belongs to a minority or the majority group. From a social identity perspective,<sup>40</sup> people derive parts of their self-esteem from membership in positively valued groups. Hence, to protect the value of their group-based self-esteem, Muslims, who belong to a religious minority group in the U.K., may describe a target at risk in more structural and less individual terms than non-Muslims especially when the target also belongs to a minority group. However, alternatively one could argue that one way to protect the image of one's group may precisely be to describe an in-group target in individual terms such as mental illness.<sup>41</sup> As such, the target's action may be seen as driven by internal factors rather than being reflective of characteristics of the group.

### ***Political effects of lay beliefs***

Importantly, how people perceive individuals at risk of becoming terrorists likely influences how they believe terrorism should be politically addressed. Generally, the greater people perceive a certain risk including that of terrorism, the more they support pro-active policies aimed at containing it.<sup>42</sup> Crucially, previous research focusing on attributions of crime has shown that people who endorse individualist rather than structuralist attributions are more supportive of law enforcement as compared to social policy.<sup>43</sup> Thus, one may argue that people who perceive individuals at risk of becoming terrorists in more structural terms will differ in their policy support from those who perceive them in individual terms. Generally, as structural risk factors may be perceived as more malleable, one could expect perceptions of them to be especially predictive of support for social counter-terrorism policies (e.g., better social services in poorer neighborhoods, improving educational opportunities). By contrast, individual risk factors that attribute terrorism to relatively stable and internal traits (e.g., personality, psychopathology) may primarily predict stricter law enforcement policies as a means to prevent terrorism. This follows the logic that an individualist perspective attributes terrorism risk to a set of relatively "fixed" traits that cannot be changed through social interventions, and hence urges the need to contain this risk through law enforcement.

### ***The present research***

To the best of our knowledge, the question of how lay people perceive individuals at risk of becoming terrorists has not been addressed. Moreover, how these perceptions drive different types of counter-terrorism policy support remains unexplored. To fill these gaps, the present research investigated people's lay perceptions of individuals at risk of becoming terrorists in the U.K. It did so in two separate studies that were conducted at different time points, and that are reported consecutively here. To get nuanced insights, we explored the role that people's own group membership (Muslim vs. non-Muslim)

has on how they perceive a target individual at risk, as well as the extent to which the target's characteristics (minority vs. majority-group member, political ideology) matters. In addition, we tested the prediction that (a) individualist perceptions of the targets would negatively predict social policy support and positively predict support for stricter law enforcement, whereas (b) structuralist perceptions would have the opposite effects. While we focus on a test of these effects across the participant groups, we present detailed moderation tests of whether the perceptions have different effects on policy support among Muslims and non-Muslims (Studies 1 and 2) and depending on the ideology of the target person at risk (i.e., far-right vs. far-left orientation; Study 2) in the online appendix.

## Study 1

In this first study, we investigated how ethnic majority non-Muslims (henceforth called non-Muslims) and ethnic minority Muslim (henceforth called Muslims) in the U.K. perceive a minority-group member at risk of becoming a terrorist and tested how these perceptions influence their policy support. Specifically, we first asked participants to imagine a minority-group member at risk. To prevent demand characteristics or to bias responses toward religious factors, we did not describe the religion or religiosity of the target but left this open to the imagination of the participants. Next, participants were asked to rate this individual on various individual and structural dimensions selected based on the research on extremism reviewed above. Finally, we assessed participants' support for two types of counter-terrorism policies, namely social interventions and stricter law enforcement. We tested the prediction that holding individualist perceptions would be related to less social policy support and more support for stricter law enforcement. Structuralist perceptions were expected to have the opposite effect, predicting more social policy support and less support for strict law enforcement.

## Method

### Participants

A power analysis indicated that 86 participants in each group (total  $N = 172$ ) would provide a 90 percent chance to observe moderate group differences ( $d = .5$ ) at a .05 significance criterion. Hence, data was collected from 107 non-Muslims and 93 Muslims living in the U.K. using the Prolific survey platform in February 2019. Participants were paid equivalent to a rate of £7/hour. Detailed information about the samples are provided in [Table 1](#). The non-Muslim sample had a varied religious orientation, with 24.8 percent being Christian, 67.0 percent being atheist, 1.8 percent Buddhists and 5.5 percent indicating "other" (missing percentages represent non-responses).

### Procedure

This research was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the primary affiliation of the first author (Nr. 4230334). Participants were asked to read a text (please see online appendix for exact wording) and imagine a typical person with a minority background that they thought was at risk to commit terrorism. Having read this text, they rated the imagined target on various instruments described in [Table 2](#). Whereas each one example item per construct is presented in this table, all items and materials are available in the online appendix. Please note that in this and the second study, the policy items were introduced with the question, "To what extent do you support the following measures to prevent terrorism in society?" We also measured perceived demographic variables for which results also are presented in the online appendix.

### Analyses

Before creating scales, in this and the second study, items were factor analyzed. We first tested for group differences between non-Muslims and Muslims on the main variables using  $t$ -tests. Next, to test whether perceptions of the minority-group member would predict policy support, we estimated two regression models. For all tests,  $p$ -values (for statistical significance), 95 percent confidence intervals

**Table 1.** Descriptive information of the samples in Study 1.

	Non-Muslim <i>N</i> = 109	Muslim <i>N</i> = 93
Age, <i>M</i> ( <i>SD</i> )	34.66 (12.19)	28.52 (8.19)
Gender, Female in %	70.6	62.4
Born in the U.K. in %	74.3	71.0
Education in %		
Elementary school	0.9	0.0
High school	19.3	23.7
College University	79.8	73.1
Other	0.0	3.2
Occupation in %		
Working	68.8	49.5
Unemployed	9.2	20.4
Student	14.7	22.6
Other	7.3	7.5
Income in £		
<10,000	9.2	6.5
10,000–39,999	48.6	60.2
40,000–69,999	32.1	23.7
> 70,000	10.1	9.7
Ethnicity indicated in % <sup>a</sup>		
British	78.9	24.7
African	0.0	6.5
Asian	0.9	23.9
Arab /Middle Eastern	4.5	54.7
European	28.0	8.8
North America/Australia	2.7	0.0

<sup>a</sup>Detailed information is available on request. Participants could choose multiple ethnicities.

and effect sizes are reported in addition to standard statistical estimates (e.g., *t* values). To guide the reader, findings with *p*-values above .05 are boldened in the respective tables. Zero-order correlations between the main study variables are presented in the online appendix.

## Results

### Group differences

As displayed in Table 3, differences between non-Muslims and Muslims were observed on some dimensions. In terms of individualist perceptions, non-Muslims perceived the minority-group member at risk to be more religious and to show more heritage culture maintenance. In terms of structuralist perceptions, non-Muslims perceived the minority-group member at risk to more likely belong to a culture that predisposes him or her to commit terrorism and to show more group grievances. All significant differences reported were also significant in follow-up analyses controlling for participants' age, gender, education, occupation, income and place of birth. Next, we plotted a radar chart (see Figure 1) as in<sup>48</sup> Krueger and Laitin (2008) to visualize the profiles that both non-Muslims and Muslims had of the minority-group member at risk. To facilitate visual interpretation, we transformed the discrimination and acculturation measures into 7-point scales.

### Relation of perceived characteristics with policy support

Only structuralist perceptions were significantly associated with the extent to which participants endorsed social interventions to prevent terrorism (see Table 4). Here, perceived adverse childhood experiences, discrimination experiences and group grievances predicted more of this support. In terms of support for stricter law enforcement, both factors conceptualized to be of an individual or structural nature showed significant associations. Regarding individual factors, perceived psychopathology predicted more support for stricter law enforcement. Regarding structural factors, perceived cultural risk predicted more, and perceived discrimination experiences predicted less support of such policies.

**Table 2.** Overview of the study variables in Study 1.


Variable	No. items	Example item	Response format	$\alpha$
<b>Individualist Perceptions</b>				
Religious fundamentalism <sup>44</sup>	4	The person thinks that his or her religion is the only acceptable religion.	1 (strongly disagree)—7 (strongly agree)	.69
Religiosity	1	How religious do you think the person is?	1 (not at all)—7 (very much)	-
Personality risk factors	3	The person has a personality that predisposes him or her to commit terrorism.	1 (strongly disagree)—7 (strongly agree)	.77
Psychopathology	4 <sup>a</sup>	The person has a psychological disorder.	1 (strongly disagree)—7 (strongly agree)	.79
Host culture adoption <sup>45</sup>	6	To which degree do you think the person has adopted the culture of the Western society he or she lives in each of the domains specified? (see online appendix for domains)	1 (not at all)—5 (very much)	.85
Heritage culture maintenance <sup>46</sup>	6	To which degree do you think the person has maintained the culture of his ethnic minority group in each of the domains specified? (see online appendix for domains)	1 (not at all)—5 (very much)	.87
<b>Structuralist Perceptions</b>				
Cultural risk factors	3	There is likely something in the person's culture that fosters terrorism.	1 (strongly disagree)—7 (strongly agree)	.93
Person's SES <sup>b</sup>	3	The person has higher education.	1 (strongly disagree)—7 (strongly agree)	.80
Parents' SES	3	The person grew up with parents who lacked education.	1 (strongly disagree)—7 (strongly agree)	.88
Adverse childhood Discrimination <sup>47</sup>	6	How often do you think the person was discriminated against because of his or her ethnic minority-group background?	1 (strongly disagree)—7 (strongly agree)	.92
War experiences	4	The person has lost family members or friends due to war.	1 (never)—4 (very often)	.89
Criminal Past	1	The person has a criminal past.	1 (strongly disagree)—7 (strongly agree)	-
Fluent English	1	The person speaks fluent English.	1 (strongly disagree)—7 (strongly agree)	-
Group Grievances	5	The person feels the following emotions thinking about the status of his/her group in the West: angry, furious, ...	1 (not at all)—7 (extremely)	.92
<b>Policy Support</b>				
Social interventions	6	better social services in poorer neighborhoods	1 (not at all)—7 (very much)	.90
Stricter law enforcement	6	stricter laws	1 (not at all)—7 (very much)	.86

<sup>a</sup>A fifth item was deleted due to low factor loadings and inter-item correlations. <sup>b</sup>These items were reverse-scored so that higher values reflect a lower socio-economic background.

**Table 3.** Mean perceptual differences between non-Muslims and Muslims on main variables in Study 1.

Variable	Non-Muslims		Muslims		<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>d</i>
	<i>M</i>	95 percent CI	<i>M</i>	95 percent CI			
<b>Individualist Perceptions</b>							
Religious fundamentalism	4.33	[4.20, 4.45]	4.33	[4.14, 4.52]	-.04	.966	.01
<b>Religiosity</b>	<b>5.49</b>	<b>[5.21, 5.76]</b>	<b>3.66</b>	<b>[3.27, 4.05]</b>	<b>7.59</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>	<b>1.08</b>
Personality risk factors	4.09	[3.85, 4.32]	3.97	[3.67, 4.27]	.60	.549	.09
Psychopathology	4.56	[4.32, 4.80]	4.62	[4.34, 4.89]	-.29	.770	.04
Host culture adoption	2.47	[2.31, 2.62]	2.50	[2.32, 2.67]	-.24	.808	.03
<b>Heritage culture maintenance</b>	<b>3.60</b>	<b>[3.45, 3.75]</b>	<b>3.16</b>	<b>[2.97, 3.35]</b>	<b>3.64</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>	<b>.51</b>
<b>Structuralist Perceptions</b>							
<b>Cultural risk factors</b>	<b>3.75</b>	<b>[3.42, 4.08]</b>	<b>2.78</b>	<b>[2.47, 3.09]</b>	<b>4.21</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>	<b>.60</b>
Person's SES	3.38	[3.18, 3.58]	3.22	[2.99, 3.44]	1.09	.278	.15
Parents' SES	4.07	[3.85, 4.29]	3.82	[3.52, 4.13]	1.29	.199	.18
Adverse childhood	4.33	[4.09, 4.57]	4.58	[4.31, 4.85]	-1.39	.165	.20
Discrimination	2.64	[2.51, 2.76]	2.69	[2.55, 2.83]	-.54	.589	.07
War experiences	3.98	[3.74, 4.22]	3.90	[3.60, 4.20]	.41	.679	.06
Criminal Past	4.47	[4.22, 4.72]	4.47	[4.21, 4.74]	-.03	.978	.00
Fluent English	4.12	[3.89, 4.34]	4.33	[4.07, 4.59]	-1.24	.216	.17
<b>Group Grievances</b>	<b>5.54</b>	<b>[5.34, 5.74]</b>	<b>4.98</b>	<b>[4.68, 5.28]</b>	<b>3.11</b>	<b>.002</b>	<b>.44</b>
<b>Policy Support</b>							
Social interventions	5.67	[5.43, 5.91]	5.75	[5.51, 5.99]	-.47	.636	.07
Stricter law enforcement	5.00	[4.73, 5.27]	5.17	[4.92, 5.42]	-.88	.379	.12

Significant differences are presented in bold.



**Figure 1.** The profiles that non-Muslims and Muslims had of a minority-group member at risk to become a terrorist in Study 1. The discrimination measure was transformed from a 1–4 to a 1–7 Likert format to yield visual comparability. \* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \*\*\* $p < .001$ .



**Table 4.** Effects of perceived characteristics on policy support in Study 1.

Variable	Social Interventions					Stricter Law Enforcement				
	B	SE	95 percent CI		Sig.	B	SE	95 percent CI		Sig.
			Lower	Upper				Lower	Upper	
Intercept	<b>2.66</b>	<b>1.17</b>	<b>.35</b>	<b>4.97</b>	<b>.024</b>	<b>3.73</b>	<b>1.33</b>	<b>1.11</b>	<b>6.36</b>	<b>.006</b>
Participants' Religion <sup>a</sup>	.07	.19	-.30	.45	.708	<b>.47</b>	<b>.22</b>	<b>.04</b>	<b>.90</b>	<b>.033</b>
Perceived Demographics										
Age	.00	.02	-.03	.04	.805	.02	.02	-.02	.06	.291
Gender	.11	.32	-.51	.73	.731	-.16	.36	-.88	.55	.650
Born in U.K. <sup>b</sup>	.30	.18	-.06	.66	.098	-.02	.21	-.43	.39	.921
Civil status <sup>c</sup>	.20	.20	-.20	.59	.330	.05	.23	-.40	.51	.813
Individualist perceptions										
Religious fundamentalism	-.14	.11	-.35	.08	.208	.06	.12	-.19	.30	.656
Religiosity	.00	.05	-.11	.10	.935	-.01	.06	-.13	.10	.808
Personality risk factors	.00	.07	-.14	.15	.960	-.07	.08	-.23	.10	.415
Psychopathology	-.08	.08	-.24	.08	.312	<b>.30</b>	<b>.09</b>	<b>.12</b>	<b>.48</b>	<b>.001</b>
Host culture adoption	-.05	.10	-.24	.14	.608	.03	.11	-.19	.25	.760
Heritage culture maintenance	.08	.10	-.12	.28	.429	.02	.11	-.20	.25	.849
Structuralist perceptions										
Cultural risk factors	-.07	.06	-.19	.05	.233	<b>.18</b>	<b>.07</b>	<b>.04</b>	<b>.31</b>	<b>.009</b>
Person's SES	-.15	.08	-.31	.01	.060	.03	.09	-.15	.21	.758
Parents' SES	.06	.07	-.07	.19	.388	.02	.08	-.13	.18	.760
Adverse childhood	<b>.28</b>	<b>.07</b>	<b>.14</b>	<b>.42</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>	-.09	.08	-.25	.08	.298
Discrimination experiences	<b>.28</b>	<b>.14</b>	<b>.00</b>	<b>.55</b>	<b>.047</b>	<b>-.34</b>	<b>.16</b>	<b>-.65</b>	<b>-.03</b>	<b>.033</b>
War experiences	.01	.07	-.13	.15	.922	-.11	.08	-.27	.05	.192
Criminal past	.08	.07	-.05	.22	.211	.06	.08	-.09	.21	.440
Fluent English	.04	.07	-.09	.18	.521	-.10	.08	-.26	.05	.182
Group grievances	<b>.19</b>	<b>.07</b>	<b>.05</b>	<b>.33</b>	<b>.008</b>	.14	.08	-.03	.30	.097

<sup>a</sup>-.5 = Non-Muslim, .5 = Muslim. <sup>b</sup>-.5 = No, .5 = Yes. <sup>c</sup>-.5 = No, .5 = Yes.

## Discussion

Generally, only few differences were observed in the ratings between both groups, but some findings suggested that, compared to Muslims, non-Muslims were more likely to rate the target higher on both individual and structural dimensions. For instance, non-Muslim participants rated the target as substantially more religious and as being more oriented toward their heritage culture. At the same time, non-Muslim participants also rated the target higher on structural dimensions, seeing the target as more likely to belong to a culture that predisposed people to terrorism and to be more likely to show group grievances. As such, on first sight, our results seem inconsistent with previous research showing that minority groups are less likely to use individualist and more likely to use structuralist explanations for phenomena such as poverty, inequality or crime.<sup>49</sup> However, one could argue that group grievances, conceptualized as negative emotions shown toward the West due to the (mal)treatment of one's group, as well as belonging to a culture that predisposes one to terrorism reflect a mix of individualist and structuralist perceptions. While group grievances are attributed to the context (i.e., how one's group is treated within it), the resulting negative emotions are expressed by the individual. If one, thus, considers these factors to involve individual aspects, the results may be more reconcilable with previous work. Yet, it is also important to mention that in particular the attribution of terrorism to culture and religion is a common theme of the mainstream public discourse in many Western countries including the U.K.<sup>50</sup> Hence, some of the differences observed in the present research may be due to non-Muslims' views being more in line with this public discourse, which may be rejected by Muslims who may view it as unjustified or unfair.<sup>51</sup>

Thus, both groups seemed to have a multifactorial perception of a person at risk of becoming a terrorist, but how were these perceptions related to policy support? As we had expected, structural perceptions were predictive of support for social interventions to counter terrorism, whereas

individual factors played less of a role. Specifically, the more participants perceived the target to have had adverse childhood experiences, discrimination experiences, or to hold group grievances, the more they showed social policy support that essentially aims to improve disadvantaged individuals' position in society. Both individualist and structuralist perceptions predicted more support for stricter law enforcement. As expected, the more participants perceived the target to suffer from psychopathology, the more they supported stricter law enforcement to counter terrorism. This finding is consistent with previous research showing that perceiving a perpetrator in terms of having mental or personality disorders such as psychopathy leads to harsher punishment, including the death penalty.<sup>52</sup> The present findings extend this research by demonstrating similar associations in the case of terrorism and by showing that ratings of a potential future terrorist predict general policy preferences.

Furthermore, perceiving the target's culture as a risk factor was related to more support for stricter law enforcement, suggesting that the culture factor may have been perceived partly in individual, and possibly even essentialist terms. For instance, one could speculate that participants believed that culture is a fixed, inherent part of the target, which irreversibly will continue to drive him or her into becoming a terrorist. Thus, they may have perceived strict law enforcement as the only way to mitigate such a risk factor. By contrast, perceptions that the target had experienced discrimination were related to less support for stricter law enforcement. Research with Muslim minority-group members has shown that experiencing relative deprivation indeed can increase extremist inclinations.<sup>53</sup> To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study showing that believing that a minority-group target at risk experienced discrimination is related to less support for stricter law enforcement. One possible pathway underlying this effect may be an increase in empathy. Indeed, empathy predicted decreased support for capital punishment in previous research.<sup>54</sup> Also in the context of terrorism, showing empathy toward minority groups and their experiences may be related to less support for punitive counter-terrorism policies.<sup>55</sup>

Although this study provided first insights into people's perceptions of individuals at risk of becoming terrorists, it focused only on a minority-group target, which leaves the question of how people perceive *majority-group* members at risk unanswered. Another interesting question is whether the ways in which a target person at risk is perceived depends on the target's political ideology. The next study aimed to address both questions.

## Study 2

In this second study, we asked Muslim and non-Muslim participants to imagine a majority-group target at risk of becoming a terrorist and asked them to rate the target on various dimensions. Importantly, we asked participants to separately rate two targets: one who was at risk of becoming a right-wing terrorist and another who was at risk of becoming a left-wing terrorist. In terms of rating dimensions, we again differentiated between individual and structural factors selected based on previous research reviewed in the introduction and research seen as particularly relevant to right- and left-wing extremism.<sup>56</sup> Finally, as in Study 1, we assessed participants support for social and law enforcement policies to counter terrorism.

The study had several predictions and exploratory goals. First, as in Study 1, we tested the prediction that individualist perceptions of the targets would predict less social policy support and more support for stricter law enforcement, whereas structural perceptions were expected to have the opposite effects. Second, we were interested in how perceptions of potential terrorists differed as a function of their political group membership. That is, we were interested in whether right-wing and left-wing targets were perceived differently in terms of individual factors such as personality, psychopathology and ideology, and structural factors such as social group aspects, and developmental and life histories. Third, given that the targets this time were described as majority-group members, we were interested in whether perceptions would differ depending on whether participants were Muslim or non-Muslim.

## Method

### Participants

We followed the same power analysis as in Study 1, collecting data from 102 non-Muslims and 90 Muslims living in the U.K. using the Prolific survey platform at the end of May 2019. Participants were paid equivalent to a rate of £7/hour. Participants from Study 1 were prevented from participation in this study, ensuring unique samples. Detailed information about the participants are provided in Table 5. In terms of the religious orientation of the non-Muslim sample, 29.5 percent were Christian, 64.7 percent atheist, 1 percent Hinduist and 4.0 percent indicated “other” (missing percentages represent non-responses).

### Procedure

Participants read the same introduction as in Study 1, with the difference that the study focused on perceptions of “White British individuals who are at risk to commit right-wing or left-wing terrorism.” They were then told that they would be asked questions separately in terms of individuals at risk of becoming right-wing and left-wing terrorists (see online appendix for exact wording).

Having read this text, participants completed the various instruments that are described in Table 6. Importantly, in randomized order, they either completed these questions first for right-wing and then for left-wing terrorists or vice versa. Cronbach’s alphas are presented separately for the measures framed toward the right-wing (RW) and left-wing (LW) targets in Table 6. All but the cognitive ability scale showed acceptable to good reliability. Perceived demographic characteristics of the targets were assessed and analyzed in the online appendix.

**Table 5.** Descriptive information of the samples in Study 2.

	Non-Muslim N = 102	Muslim N = 90
Age, <i>M</i> ( <i>SD</i> )	36.70 (11.95)	29.28 (8.92)
Gender, Female in %	66.7	64.4
Born in the U.K. in %	82.4	73.3
Education in %		
Elementary school	1.0	0.0
High school	18.6	14.4
College University	78.4	85.6
Other	1.0	0.0
Occupation in %		
Working	65.7	54.4
Unemployed	12.7	12.2
Student	16.7	26.7
Other	4.9	6.7
Income in £		
<10,000	10.8	7.8
10,000–39,999	41.2	57.8
40,000–69,999	33.3	22.2
> 70,000	14.7	12.2
Ethnicity indicated in % <sup>a</sup>		
British	85.3	24.4
African	2.0	8.9
Asian	2.0	19.9
Arab /Middle Eastern	3.0	58.5
Caribbean	0.0	1.1
European	15.8	6.6
South America	1.0	0.0

<sup>a</sup>Detailed information is available on request. Participants could choose multiple ethnicities.

Table 6. Overview of the study variables in Study 2.

Variable	No. items	Example item	Response format	$\alpha$ (RW <sup>c</sup> )	$\alpha$ (LW <sup>d</sup> )
<b>Individualist Perceptions</b>					
Religiosity	1	How religious do you think the person is?	1 (not at all)—7 (very much)	-	-
Nationalism <sup>57</sup>	3	The person thinks that it is the foremost duty of each young Briton to honor the national history and its heritage.	1 (strongly disagree)—7 (strongly agree)	.83	.85
Intolerance <sup>58</sup>	3	The person thinks that if there are too many foreigners in the country, one might as well let them feel that they are not welcome.	1 (strongly disagree)—7 (strongly agree)	.89	.94
Normative political activism	2	The person has tried to achieve political change through non-violent means in the past	1 (strongly disagree)—7 (strongly agree)	$r = .80$	$r = .84$
Social dominance orientation <sup>59</sup>	6	The person thinks that an ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom.	1 (strongly disagree)—7 (strongly agree)	.90	.93
Racial identification <sup>60</sup>	3	For the person, being part of the White ethnic group is an important reflection of who he or she is	1 (strongly disagree)—7 (strongly agree)	.88	.88
Personality risk factors	3	The person has a personality that predisposes him or her to commit terrorism.	1 (strongly disagree)—7 (strongly agree)	.78	.76
Psycho pathology	4 <sup>a</sup>	The person has a psychological disorder.	1 (strongly disagree)—7 (strongly agree)	.77	.85
Machoism <sup>61</sup>	3	The person believes it is necessary to fight when challenged.	1 (strongly disagree)—7 (strongly agree)	.92	.88
Cognitive ability/ Intelligence	3	The person is highly intelligent.	1 (strongly disagree)—7 (strongly agree)	.56	.54
<b>Structuralist Perceptions</b>					
Cultural risk factors	3	There is likely something in the person's culture that fosters terrorism.	1 (strongly disagree)—7 (strongly agree)	.94	.92
Person's SES <sup>b</sup>	3	The person has higher education.	1 (strongly disagree)—7 (strongly agree)	.84	.82
Parents' SES	3	The person grew up with parents who lacked education.	1 (strongly disagree)—7 (strongly agree)	.93	.87
Substance abuse	3	The person likely has a history of using drugs	1 (strongly disagree)—7 (strongly agree)	.94	.90
Adverse childhood	6	The person was neglected as a child.	1 (strongly disagree)—7 (strongly agree)	.94	.94
Discrimination <sup>62</sup>	6	How often do you think the person felt treated rudely or unfairly because of his or her White ethnic background?	1 (never)—4 (very often)	.94	.94
Military experiences	3	The person likely has a military background.	1 (strongly disagree)—7 (strongly agree)	.93	.95
Online radicalization	2	The person likely radicalized online	1 (strongly disagree)—7 (strongly agree)	$r = .67$	$r = .75$
Criminal Past	1	The person has a criminal past.	1 (strongly disagree)—7 (strongly agree)		

(Continued)

**Table 6.** (Continued).

Variable	No. items	Example item	Response format	$\alpha$ (RW <sup>c</sup> )	$\alpha$ (LW <sup>d</sup> )
Group Grievances	5	<i>The person feels the following emotions thinking about the status of his/her group in the West: angry, furious. . .</i>	1 (not at all)—7 (extremely)	.96	.96
<b>Policy Support</b>					
Social interventions	6	<i>better social services in poorer neighborhoods</i>	1 (not at all)—7 (very much)	.90	.89
Stricter law enforcement	6	<i>stricter laws</i>	1 (not at all)—7 (very much)	.91	.93

<sup>a</sup>A fifth item was deleted due to low factor loadings and inter-item correlations.

<sup>b</sup>These items were reverse-scored so that higher values reflect a lower socio-economic background.

<sup>c</sup>Reliability for right-wing target.

<sup>d</sup>Reliability for left-wing target.

## Analyses

The analyses comprised two parts. First, to test for group differences on the main variables, we ran mixed models with target group (within-subjects) and participants' religious group (between-subjects) and the interaction between both as predictors. Intercepts were allowed to vary for participants. Next, we ran multi-level models to test for the associations of perceived characteristics with support for social interventions and stricter law enforcement policy. In these models, the ratings of the two targets were nested within participants, and intercepts were allowed to vary for each participant. In addition to testing for main effects reported here, we also tested whether these effects would depend on the type of target (i.e., right- vs. left-wing), or participants' religious group (i.e., Muslim vs. non-Muslim). As for Study 1, these additional results as well as zero-order correlations between the main study variables are reported in the online appendix due to space limitations.

## Results

### Effects on main variables

Results from the mixed models for each of the dependent variables are presented in Table 7. Means and 95 percent confidence intervals for the main effects are presented in Table 8. To ease visualization, the different profiles are further illustrated in Figure 2.

**Main effects of the target's political group.** In terms of individualist perceptions, the right-wing target was perceived to be more religious,  $d_r = .33$ , nationalist,  $d_r = 1.20$ , intolerant,  $d_r = 1.36$ , be higher in social dominance orientation,  $d_r = 1.41$ , show more racial identification with being White,  $d_r = 1.08$ , possess more personality risk factors,  $d_r = .45$ , psychopathology,  $d_r = .73$ , and to score higher on machoism,  $d_r = .86$ , than the left-wing target. By contrast, the left-wing target was seen as having more of a history of normative political action,  $d_r = .63$ , and to have a higher cognitive ability/intelligence than the right-wing target,  $d_r = .71$ .


**Table 7.** Model test results for main variables in Study 2.

Variable name	Target's Political Group				Participants' Religious Group				Interaction			
	Df1	Df2	F	p	Df1	Df2	F	p	Df1	Df2	F	p
<b>Individualist Perceptions</b>												
Religiosity	<b>1</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>10.51</b>	<b>.001</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>8.09</b>	<b>.005</b>	1	190	1.59	.209
Nationalism	<b>1</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>145.64</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>	1	190	.65	.423	<b>1</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>18.29</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>
Intolerance	<b>1</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>184.21</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>	1	190	1.79	.183	<b>1</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>10.17</b>	<b>.002</b>
Normative political action	<b>1</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>38.09</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>	1	190	.23	.630	<b>1</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>5.97</b>	<b>.015</b>
Social dominance orientation	<b>1</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>195.58</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>	1	190	.61	.435	<b>1</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>7.31</b>	<b>.008</b>
Racial identification	<b>1</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>110.97</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>	1	190	.95	.331	<b>1</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>7.17</b>	<b>.008</b>
Personality risk factors	<b>1</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>19.68</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>	1	190	.36	.550	1	190	.16	.689
Psychopathology	<b>1</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>50.34</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>	1	190	.66	.418	1	190	.00	.968
Machoism	<b>1</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>70.23</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>	1	190	.01	.932	1	190	1.13	.290
Cognitive Ability/Intelligence	<b>1</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>47.66</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>	1	190	.50	.479	1	190	.59	.444
<b>Structuralist Perceptions</b>												
Cultural risk factors	<b>1</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>26.00</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>	1	190	2.60	.108	1	190	.01	.920
Person's SES	<b>1</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>11.32</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>	1	190	.91	.342	1	190	.00	.962
Parents' SES	<b>1</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>9.56</b>	<b>.002</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>6.85</b>	<b>.010</b>	1	190	.24	.626
Adverse childhood	<b>1</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>17.41</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>4.38</b>	<b>.038</b>	1	190	1.13	.289
Criminal past	<b>1</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>13.17</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>	1	190	2.40	.123	1	190	2.39	.123
Substance abuse	<b>1</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>6.01</b>	<b>.015</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>21.81</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>	1	190	.00	.996
Discrimination	<b>1</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>30.08</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>5.75</b>	<b>.017</b>	1	190	1.87	.173
Military experiences	<b>1</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>47.98</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>9.85</b>	<b>.002</b>	1	190	.41	.524
Online radicalization	<b>1</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>7.87</b>	<b>.006</b>	1	190	.56	.453	1	190	.27	.604
Group Grievances	<b>1</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>43.32</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>	1	190	1.91	.169	<b>1</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>7.62</b>	<b>.006</b>
<b>Policy Support</b>												
Social intervention	1	190	3.32	.070	1	190	.48	.490	1	190	.26	.614
Stricter laws enforcement	<b>1</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>37.31</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>	1	190	.40	.530	1	190	.02	.900

Significant effects are presented in bold.

**Table 8.** Marginal means and 95 percent confidence intervals for main effects in Study 2.

	Target's Political Group				Participants' Religious Group			
	Right Wing		Left Wing		Non-Muslim		Muslim	
	M	95 percent CI	M	95 percent CI	M	95 percent CI	M	95 percent CI
<b>Individualist Perceptions</b>								
Religiosity	3.15	[2.90, 3.39]	2.68	[2.43, 2.92]	3.20	[2.93, 3.48]	2.62	[2.33, 2.91]
Nationalism	5.29	[5.11, 5.48]	3.72	[3.54, 3.91]	4.46	[4.28, 4.64]	4.56	[4.37, 4.75]
Intolerance	5.71	[5.50, 5.92]	3.67	[3.46, 3.88]	4.59	[4.38, 4.79]	4.79	[4.57, 5.01]
Normative political action	3.79	[3.58, 4.00]	4.68	[4.48, 4.89]	4.20	[3.99, 4.41]	4.28	[4.05, 4.50]
Social dominance orientation	5.49	[5.29, 5.68]	3.56	[3.36, 3.75]	4.47	[4.28, 4.66]	4.58	[4.38, 4.78]
Racial identification	5.57	[5.39, 5.76]	4.25	[4.07, 4.44]	4.84	[4.66, 5.03]	4.98	[4.78, 5.18]
Personality risk factors	4.21	[4.03, 4.39]	3.83	[3.65, 4.01]	4.07	[3.85, 4.28]	3.97	[3.74, 4.20]
Psychopathology	4.75	[4.58, 4.92]	4.12	[3.95, 4.29]	4.37	[4.17, 4.57]	4.49	[4.28, 4.71]
Machoism	5.71	[5.53, 5.89]	4.76	[4.58, 4.94]	5.23	[5.04, 5.42]	5.24	[5.04, 5.45]
Cognitive ability/Intelligence	3.50	[3.34, 3.66]	4.25	[4.09, 4.41]	3.83	[3.68, 3.99]	3.92	[3.75, 4.09]
<b>Structuralist Perceptions</b>								
Cultural risk factors	4.12	[3.90, 4.34]	3.51	[3.29, 3.73]	3.97	[3.71, 4.23]	3.66	[3.38, 3.94]
Person's SES	3.57	[3.40, 3.74]	3.93	[3.76, 4.09]	3.81	[3.63, 3.99]	3.69	[3.50, 3.87]
Parents' SES	3.71	[3.53, 3.90]	4.08	[3.89, 4.26]	4.09	[3.89, 4.29]	3.70	[3.49, 3.91]
Adverse childhood	4.49	[4.31, 4.67]	4.11	[3.93, 4.28]	4.14	[3.93, 4.34]	4.46	[4.24, 4.68]
Criminal past	4.33	[4.15, 4.52]	3.91	[3.73, 4.09]	4.01	[3.81, 4.20]	4.23	[4.03, 4.44]
Substance abuse	3.90	[3.72, 4.07]	3.65	[3.48, 3.83]	3.44	[3.24, 3.63]	4.11	[3.91, 4.32]
Discrimination	2.01	[1.90, 2.13]	1.67	[1.55, 1.78]	1.96	[1.83, 2.09]	1.73	[1.59, 1.86]
Military experiences	3.95	[3.76, 4.13]	3.17	[2.99, 3.36]	3.32	[3.12, 3.53]	3.80	[3.58, 4.01]
Online radicalization	5.11	[4.92, 5.30]	4.79	[4.60, 4.98]	4.89	[4.69, 5.10]	5.01	[4.79, 5.23]
Group grievances	5.02	[4.77, 5.27]	4.13	[3.88, 4.39]	4.73	[4.43, 5.02]	4.43	[4.11, 4.74]
<b>Policy Support</b>								
Social intervention support	5.95	[5.79, 6.11]	5.83	[5.68, 5.99]	5.84	[5.64, 6.04]	5.94	[5.73, 6.16]
Stricter laws support	5.19	[4.96, 5.41]	4.75	[4.53, 4.97]	4.90	[4.61, 5.19]	5.04	[4.73, 5.34]



**Figure 2.** Profiles of right-wing and left-wing targets at risk of becoming terrorists are presented for Study 2. \* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

In terms of structuralist perceptions, the right-wing target was perceived as having more cultural risk,  $d_r = .52$ , a criminal past,  $d_r = .37$ , more adverse childhood experiences,  $d_r = .42$ , a history of substance abuse,  $d_r = .25$ , and to perceive more discrimination against White people,  $d_r = .56$ , than the left-wing target (see Tables 7 and Tables 8). The right-wing target was also seen as more likely to have military experiences,  $d_r = .71$ , been radicalized online,  $d_r = .29$ , and to show group grievances,  $d_r = .67$ . By contrast, left-wing targets were seen as having a higher socioeconomic status (both personally,  $d_r = .34$ , and in terms of their parents,  $d_r = .32$ ). Finally, in terms of social policy support, participants showed more support for stricter law enforcement when the target was right-wing than when the target was left-wing,  $d_r = .62$ . No differences were observed in terms of social policy support.

**Main effects of participants' religious group.** In terms of individualist perceptions, Muslim participants perceived the targets as less religious than non-Muslim participants did,  $d_r = .41$ . In terms of structural factors, compared to non-Muslim participants, Muslim participants perceived the targets as more likely to have experienced adverse childhood experiences,  $d_r = .36$ , and as more likely to have military experience,  $d_r = .43$  (see Tables 7 and Tables 8). At the same time, Muslim participants perceived the targets to have parents with a lower socioeconomic background,  $d_r = .33$ , and to perceive less discrimination,  $d_r = .37$ .

**Interaction between both factors.** Significant interactions were observed for five individual dimensions and one structural dimension (see Table 7). In terms of individualist dimensions, while non-Muslim participants perceived the right-wing target as more nationalist,  $M = 5.53$ , 95 percent CI [5.27, 5.78], than Muslim participants did,  $M = 5.06$ , 95 percent CI [4.79, 5.33],  $t(190) = 2.46$ ,  $p = .015$ ,  $d_r = .35$ , this pattern was reversed for the left-wing target, with Muslim participants perceiving the left-wing target as more nationalist,  $M = 4.06$ , 95 percent CI [3.79, 4.33], than non-Muslim participants did,  $M = 3.39$ , 95 percent CI [3.13, 3.64],  $t(190) = -3.59$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d_r = .52$ , see Figure 2. In terms of intolerance, no significant differences were observed for ratings of the right-wing target by non-Muslim,  $M = 5.85$ , 95 percent CI [5.56, 6.14], and Muslim participants,  $M = 5.57$ , 95 percent CI [5.56, 6.14],  $t(190) = 1.31$ ,  $p = .192$ ,  $d_r = .19$ . Yet, Muslim participants rated the left-wing target as significantly more intolerant,  $M = 4.01$ , 95 percent CI [3.70, 4.33], than non-Muslim participants did,  $M = 3.32$ , 95 percent CI [3.03, 3.62],  $t(190) = -3.20$ ,  $p = .002$ ,  $d_r = .46$ . Next, Muslim participants rated the right-wing target as more likely to have engaged in past normative political action,  $M = 4.01$ , 95 percent CI [3.70, 4.31], than non-Muslim participants did,  $M = 3.58$ , 95 percent CI [3.29, 3.86],  $t(190) = -2.03$ ,  $p = .044$ ,  $d_r = .30$ . No significant difference was observed in terms of ratings of the left-wing target's past normative political action by non-Muslim,  $M = 4.82$ , 95 percent CI [4.54, 5.11], and Muslim participants,  $M = 4.54$ , 95 percent CI [4.24, 4.85],  $t(190) = -1.32$ ,  $p = .186$ ,  $d_r = .20$ .

A significant interaction was also observed for social dominance orientation. No difference was observed between ratings of the right-wing target's social dominance orientation by non-Muslim,  $M = 5.62$ , 95 percent CI [5.36, 5.89], and Muslim participants,  $M = 5.35$ , 95 percent CI [5.07, 5.64],  $t(190) = 1.36$ ,  $p = .176$ ,  $d_r = .20$ . However, Muslim participants rated the left-wing target to have a higher social dominance orientation,  $M = 3.80$ , 95 percent CI [3.52, 4.09], than non-Muslim participants did,  $M = 3.31$ , 95 percent CI [3.05, 3.58],  $t(190) = -2.47$ ,  $p = .015$ ,  $d_r = .36$ . A significant interaction was also observed for racial identification. No significant difference was observed between ratings of the right-wing target's racial identification by non-Muslim,  $M = 5.67$ , 95 percent CI [5.42, 5.93], and Muslim participants,  $M = 5.47$ , 95 percent CI [5.20, 5.74],  $t(190) = 1.06$ ,  $p = .291$ ,  $d_r = .16$ . However, Muslim participants rated the left-wing target as more identified with being White,  $M = 4.49$ , 95 percent CI [4.22, 4.76], than non-Muslim participants did,  $M = 4.02$ , 95 percent CI [3.76, 4.27],  $t(190) = -2.51$ ,  $p = .012$ ,  $d_r = .39$ .

In terms of structural factors, a significant interaction was observed for group grievances. Non-Muslim participants perceived the right-wing target to have more group grievances,  $M = 5.36$ , 95 percent CI [5.01, 5.71], than Muslim participants did,  $M = 4.68$ , 95 percent CI [4.31, 5.05],  $t$



(190) = 2.64,  $p = .009$ ,  $d_r = .51$ . No such difference was observed for the left-wing target as rated by non-Muslim,  $M = 4.10$ , 95 percent CI [3.75, 4.44], and Muslim participants,  $M = 4.17$ , 95 percent CI [3.80, 4.54],  $t(190) = -.29$ ,  $p = .771$ ,  $d_r = .06$ .

### Relation of perceived characteristics with policy support

In terms of social interventions to prevent terrorism, only two structuralist perceptions reached significance. Specifically, perceiving the target as having had adverse childhood experiences was related to more support for social interventions whereas perceiving the targets as having military experience was related to less support (see Table 9). In terms of support for stricter law enforcement as an intervention to prevent terrorism, various main effects were observed (see Table 9). Regarding individual factors, perceived intolerance, previous collective action, personality risk and perceived psychopathology were all related to more support for stricter law enforcement. Interestingly, in terms of structural factors, perceived military experience was related to less, and perceived adverse childhood experiences to more support for stricter law enforcement. Judging by the zero-order correlations (see online appendix), the association of perceived military experience likely reflected a suppressor effect and should be interpreted with caution. However, the positive association of adverse childhood experiences on support for stricter law enforcement interventions was consistent with the bivariate correlations.

**Table 9.** Effect of perceived characteristics on policy support in Study 2.

	Social Interventions					Stricter Law Enforcement				
	B	SE	95 percent CI <sup>e</sup>		Sig.	B	SE	95 percent CI <sup>e</sup>		Sig.
			Lower	Upper				Lower	Upper	
Intercept	<b>5.98</b>	<b>.11</b>	<b>5.76</b>	<b>6.18</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>	<b>5.04</b>	<b>.13</b>	<b>4.80</b>	<b>5.29</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>
Participant Group <sup>a</sup>	.07	.15	-.22	.36	.657	.16	.19	-.23	.54	.426
Target Group <sup>b</sup>	.00	.04	-.08	.08	.995	-.01	.04	-.10	.07	.779
Perceived Target Demographics										
Age	-.01	.01	-.02	.01	.349	-.01	.01	-.02	.01	.497
Gender <sup>c</sup>	.06	.08	-.11	.23	.481	.08	.09	-.09	.26	.369
Civil status <sup>d</sup>	-.07	.05	-.17	.04	.220	-.02	.06	-.13	.10	.783
Individualist Perceptions										
Religiosity	.01	.03	-.05	.06	.786	-.03	.03	-.09	.03	.315
Nationalism	-.03	.05	-.13	.07	.611	-.05	.06	-.16	.06	.382
Intolerance	.00	.06	-.12	.11	.997	<b>.16</b>	<b>.06</b>	<b>.03</b>	<b>.29</b>	<b>.015</b>
Normative political action	.04	.04	-.03	.12	.240	<b>.08</b>	<b>.04</b>	<b>.00</b>	<b>.17</b>	<b>.040</b>
Perceived SDO	.06	.06	-.05	.16	.324	.06	.06	-.06	.18	.340
Racial identification	.04	.04	-.05	.13	.349	-.07	.05	-.16	.03	.172
Personality risk factors	.03	.05	-.07	.13	.584	<b>.12</b>	<b>.06</b>	<b>.01</b>	<b>.23</b>	<b>.032</b>
Psychopathology	.00	.06	-.12	.11	.940	<b>.23</b>	<b>.07</b>	<b>.10</b>	<b>.36</b>	<b>&lt;.001</b>
Machoism	.06	.05	-.04	.15	.220	.05	.05	-.06	.15	.381
Cogn. ability/Intelligence	.04	.05	-.06	.14	.431	.05	.05	-.06	.16	.346
Structuralist Perceptions										
Cultural risk factors	.01	.04	-.06	.08	.828	.04	.04	-.04	.13	.332
Person's SES	-.03	.05	-.13	.07	.582	-.03	.06	-.14	.07	.538
Parents' SES	-.01	.05	-.10	.08	.821	.06	.05	-.04	.16	.223
Adverse childhood	<b>.16</b>	<b>.05</b>	<b>.06</b>	<b>.27</b>	<b>.001</b>	<b>.13</b>	<b>.06</b>	<b>.02</b>	<b>.25</b>	<b>.019</b>
Criminal past	.01	.04	-.08	.09	.866	.01	.05	-.08	.10	.762
Substance abuse	-.01	.05	-.10	.08	.781	-.05	.05	-.15	.05	.311
Discrimination	.01	.07	-.13	.15	.853	.08	.08	-.08	.23	.333
Military experiences	<b>-.08</b>	<b>.04</b>	<b>-.17</b>	<b>.00</b>	<b>.039</b>	<b>-.11</b>	<b>.04</b>	<b>-.20</b>	<b>-.02</b>	<b>.015</b>
Online radicalization	-.02	.04	-.10	.05	.544	.04	.04	-.04	.13	.310
Group grievances	.02	.03	-.04	.08	.594	.04	.04	-.03	.11	.317

<sup>a</sup>-.5 = Non-Muslim, .5 = Muslim <sup>b</sup>-.5 = Right-wing target, .5 = Left-wing target. <sup>c</sup>-.5 = male, .5 = female. <sup>d</sup>-.5 = single, .5 = with partner.

<sup>e</sup>calculated using bootstrapping with 5,000 random re-samples.

## Discussion

The results showed that participants generated quite different profiles of potential left and right-wing terrorists. Unsurprisingly, the right-wing target was perceived as more nationalist, more intolerant, higher in social dominance orientation and racial identification, to perceive more discrimination against his or her group, and even to be somewhat more religious. However, interestingly, the right-wing target was also perceived as suffering more from psychopathology, to show more of a personality that predisposes him or her to terrorism, and to show more machoism than the left-wing target. Hence, at least in terms of these dimensions, it seems as if lay people believe that internal predispositions are more prevalent for right-wing than for left-wing individuals at risk of becoming terrorists. Some of these findings may reflect actual differences between left- and right-wing extremists. For instance, a study conducted by Chermak and Gruenewald (2015)<sup>63</sup> found that right-wing extremists showed more signs of mental illness than left-wing extremists.

It is important to note that the right-wing target was also seen as substantially less likely to have engaged in past normative collective action and to be somewhat more likely to have radicalized online. The latter again converges with actual comparisons of online radicalization.<sup>64</sup> The right-wing target was also perceived to have experienced more hardship from a developmental and life history perspective. Thus, lay people seem not to exclusively perceive right-wing targets more in individual terms, but also to acknowledge possible structural trajectories that may put them at risk.

The participants' group membership had main effects on one individualist and five structuralist perceptions. Specifically, in terms of individualist perceptions, non-Muslim participants were more likely than Muslim participants to see the target as religious. This finding is in line with the results from Study 1, and again suggests that Muslims see religion less as a factor putting people at risk for terrorism. In terms of structuralist perceptions, non-Muslim participants perceived the targets as less likely to have experienced an adverse childhood, to have abused substances and to have parents with a low socioeconomic status. Hence, non-Muslims seemed to have less of an emphasis on such background variables when describing a majority-group member at risk of becoming a terrorist. These findings contrast with Study 1, in which no such group differences were observed. One possible explanation may be that non-Muslim participants are less inclined to see an in-group member at risk as a product of challenging structural circumstances, and arguably more as a deviant in-group member who is driven by internal factors.<sup>65</sup> Yet, it has to be noted that majority-group members also saw the targets as more likely to perceive discrimination against their group. Nevertheless, here it is important to note that this measure did not assess experienced discrimination (as in Study 1), but perceived discrimination, and hence may represent more of an ideological variable (i.e., self-victimization<sup>66</sup>). Finally, Muslims were more likely to believe that the targets had military experience.

Generally, tests of two-way interactions suggested that the perceptions of left- and right-wing targets differed only slightly between Muslim and non-Muslim participants. However, some interesting findings emerged. Non-Muslims scored the right-wing target somewhat higher on the individual dimensions of nationalism and religiosity and the structural dimensions of perceived discrimination and group grievances. By contrast, compared to non-Muslim participants, Muslims scored the left-wing target as higher in social dominance, intolerance, and nationalism and as showing more racial identification. In other words, it seems as if Muslims perceive right-wing and left-wing targets as being more similar in terms of structural factors, whereas non-Muslims perceive right-wing and left-wing targets as being more similar in terms of individual factors.

Finally, as in Study 1, we tested whether individualist and structuralist perceptions of the targets at risk would explain variation in support for social interventions as well as stricter law enforcement policies. Regarding social interventions, only few predictors reached significance. Perceiving the target as having had adverse childhood experiences was related to more social policy support, whereas perceiving the target to have military experiences was related to less support. The adverse childhood association was in line with our predictions, whereas the military finding was not. People may possibly have regarded military experiences among majority-group targets not specifically as part of their life

history but more as representing a violent mindset (i.e., an individual factor) that cannot easily be altered through social interventions (but see the discussion of the suppressor effect on stricter law enforcement policy below).

In terms of individual factors, perceiving the target as suffering from psychopathology and as having a personality predisposing him or her to terrorism were linked to support for stricter law enforcement. As in Study 1, these findings extend previous work,<sup>67</sup> showing that attributions to internal traits also can lead to support for stricter law enforcement when it comes to counter-terrorism measures. Moreover, perceiving the target as being intolerant was linked to more support for stricter law enforcement. People tend to support punishment proportionally to the moral wrong they perceive has been committed,<sup>68</sup> and perceiving a potential terrorists as being intolerant may increase the means seen justifiable to stop them. Interestingly, having been involved in normative political action was also linked to more support for stricter law enforcement, possibly because it signaled to participants that the targets for longer time had been pursuing an unacceptable political path and therefore be less likely to change it.

Some unexpected findings also emerged. Perceiving the target as having had adverse childhood experiences was related to *more* support for stricter law enforcement but also to more support for social interventions. Participants hence may have seen a combination of social prevention and strict law enforcement as best remedy to stop possible transgressions. Indeed,<sup>69</sup> Napoli (2019) has argued that, under certain circumstances, people might judge adverse childhood experiences as positive (e.g., resilience) as well as negative (i.e., a risk factor). Similar processes may have explained the findings in the present research.

Finally, having had military experiences was related to less support for stricter law enforcement, but an inspection of the zero-order correlations (that were non-significant and close to 0) suggested that this represented a suppressor effect that should be interpreted with caution. Follow-up analyses showed that the suppressor effect emerged in particular when variables such as nationalism and intolerance were controlled for. Hence, one explanation may be that, controlling for these variables, participants may have perceived being an ex-military as something positive (e.g., perceiving the target as having served the country), which may have attenuated their support for strict punishment.<sup>70</sup>

## General discussion

To the best of our knowledge, the present study for the first time quantitatively investigated how individuals *at risk* of becoming terrorists are perceived by lay people, and how these perceptions influence support for different types of counter-terrorism policies. At a broader level, we believe that our results can be summarized in three themes. Firstly, lay people seem to have a multifactorial view of individuals at risk of becoming terrorists that includes structuralist as well as individualist perspectives. This finding is consistent with previous qualitative research suggesting that people often have structuralist and individualist explanations for terrorism at the same time.<sup>71</sup> Yet, in terms of the accuracy of these perceptions, participants seemed to overestimate the role of psychopathology which was rated relatively high, especially for the majority-group targets in Study 2.<sup>72</sup>

Secondly, we observed a high overlap between how Muslim and non-Muslim participants perceived the targets. Yet, some more or less consistent differences emerged. For instance, Muslims tended to view the targets as less religious than majority-group members did. Importantly, this was the case regardless of whether the target was a minority or majority-group member, suggesting that their tendency did not simply reflect in-group bias but a genuine belief that religion is less relevant for understanding terrorism.

Thirdly, as we had predicted, how individuals at risk of becoming terrorists were perceived mattered for which types of counter-terrorism policies they supported. Although some exceptions were observed, individualist perceptions such as that the target suffered from psychopathology were generally related to more support for stricter law enforcement, whereas structuralist perceptions (e.g., that the target had an adverse childhood) were related to more social policy support.

The present work contributes to the growing literature on the impacts of public perception on support for counter-terrorism policy in several ways. Previous studies have shown that majority-group members, who perceive Muslims as a threat, as being religious and as supporting or being associated with terrorism, are more supportive of institutional discrimination, anti-immigration policies or extraordinary detention practices among others.<sup>73</sup> Our research extends this work by comparatively testing the influence on both punitive and social policy support. Such a focus is important as it captures and explains more of the diversity of people's perspectives on how terrorism should be addressed. Moreover, our work contributes to the state of the art by focusing on perceptions by majority-group members as well as minority-group members, the latter being an understudied group in this field, and by focusing on three different target groups (minority-group individual, majority-group left-wing and right-wing individuals). Expanding on our findings, future studies may further test the moderating role of people's own socio-political orientations and perceived status in society for the effects we observed.

Next, rather than focusing on a few dimensions of person perception, we included a range of both individual and structural dimensions, providing nuanced insights into the different variables underlying support for counter-terrorism policy. While we focused on perceptions of the target, future research may profitably address how these perceptions interact with individual cognitive differences, such as people's attributional style. For instance, one may expect that individuals, who have a tendency to generally attribute other's behavior to external factors, perceive potential terrorists primarily in light of structural rather than individualist factors. Finally, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first research focusing on how people perceive at-risk individuals (rather than terrorists *per se*). Since most prevention measures focus on at-risk individuals rather than terrorists, and some of these measures have led to increased stigmatization of Muslim communities in the U.K.,<sup>74</sup> further understanding of underlying lay perceptions is crucial to understanding the respective dynamics of policy support.

Before concluding, it is important to note some limitations of the present research. First, although a strength of this study is that it was comparative and comprised diverse samples of participants, these samples were recruited through online panels and were not representative of their populations. Moreover, the samples were ethnically heterogeneous, such that some group differences may be attributed to ethnic differences rather than religion. That is, the vast majority of participants in the non-Muslim samples were White Europeans, whereas the Muslim samples consisted primarily of participants from ethnic minority groups. Nevertheless, we decided to differentiate between Muslim and non-Muslims for the participant groups since the terrorist debate in the U.K. largely focuses on Islam following 9/11 and the 7/7 bombings.<sup>75</sup> Yet, we cannot exclude the possibility that some (White) Muslim participants might have seen the White majority terrorist as an ethnic in-group member. Similarly, we did not assess the perceived religious affiliation of the imagined minority/majority member. Future studies should assess which religious affiliation the participants attribute to the imagined terrorist to control for whether they perceive the terrorist to be part of their religious in-group.

It should also be noted that the present research was based on correlational data. Future studies are needed to test the causal impact of the factors identified in the present research using experimental designs (e.g., by using vignette experiments). We would also like to note some potential limitations regarding the measurement in both studies. Based on previous research and expert evaluations, we selected rating dimensions that were seen as most relevant for the specific type of targets in the studies. However, one could have argued that some dimensions may have been equally important for all targets (e.g., whether they radicalized online). Also, not all rating dimensions may have been equally relevant for the two policy support dimensions. Indeed, more dimensions were significantly related to support for stricter law enforcement than support for social interventions. On the one hand, various rating dimensions dealt with structural perceptions (e.g., of the individual's socio-economic background, experiences with discrimination, group grievances) that can in theory be addressed by social interventions. Even some individual characteristics (e.g., fundamentalism) may be addressed by some of the social intervention items (e.g., de-radicalization programs) that all loaded on the same factor. Hence, there was a logical connection between several of the rating dimensions and social intervention

support. On the other hand, while being preventive, many of the social intervention items may be seen as less effective in readily dealing with at-risk individuals. In other words, people may believe that law enforcement interventions may be more effective in addressing an at-risk person driven by individual factors than social interventions may be in addressing an at-risk person driven by structural factors. This may have explained why more predictors significantly explained the stricter law enforcement policy dimension.

Moreover, being unifactorial, our perceived psychopathology measure did not distinguish between different types of disorders, which can influence how targets are evaluated and judged.<sup>76</sup> Finally, the present study focused on how lay people perceive what could be labeled as “home grown” terrorists. Future studies may profitably compare perceptions of the risk factors of terrorists in the West to terrorists in other geographical regions.

To conclude, the present research demonstrated that lay people have multifactorial understandings of what puts individuals at risk of becoming terrorists. Evidence from both studies suggested that how we perceive potential terrorists has consequences for the ways we believe society should intervene.

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## Notes

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